Ninety Not Out : The Nationals, 1920–2010 9781742231679, 9781742231662

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ninety not out

Paul Davey has an intimate knowledge of The Nationals. A former journalist, he was the party’s federal director in Canberra for nearly ten years and the New South Wales party’s general secretary for more than three. He also worked as a senior staffer to party ministers in Canberra and Sydney. He is the author of The Nationals: The Progressive, Country and National Party in New South Wales 1919–2006 and Politics in the Blood: The Anthonys of Richmond.



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paul davey

ninety not out the nationals 1920–2010

unsw press

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A UNSW Press book Published by University of New South Wales Press Ltd University of New South Wales Sydney NSW 2052 AUSTRALIA www.unswpress.com.au © Paul Davey 2010 First published 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publisher. National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Author: Davey, Paul. Title: Ninety not out: the Nationals, 1920–2010/Paul Davey. Edition: 1st ed. ISBN: 978 174223 166 2 (hbk.) Notes: Includes index. Bibliography. Subjects: National Party of Australia. Australia – Politics and government – 20th century. Australia – Politics and government – 2001– Dewey Number: 324.29404 Cover design Jo Pajor-Markus Printer Everbest This book is printed on paper using fibre manufactured from plantation or sustainably managed forests.

Published with the support of

The Page Research Centre Ltd John McEwen House Pty Ltd

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Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

Preface

ix

1 The beginning

1

2 Flexing muscles

15

3 Runs on the board

31

4 Depression and Opposition

43

5 Tragedy, triumph and downfall

53

6 Fadden takes the reins

69

7 Rocky years

85

8 Fadden to McEwen

102

9 The veto

121

10 New era, new name

135

11 The night of the long prawns

149

12 The dismissal

163

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13 Return to government

170

14 Innovation in difficult times

187

15 Back to Opposition

200

16 Joh for Canberra

214

17 Tentatively back to Coalition

240

18 The Nixon Report

248

19 An era ends dramatically

257

20 The brief reign of Charles Blunt

275

21 Moulding party and Coalition interests

287

22 Is this the joy of government?

298

23 Delivering for the bush

316

24 Internal issues and international disaster

330

25 Timing for change

346

26 Rebelling or reverting to type?

363

27 Infiltrators and dissidents

370

28 Amalgamators

379

29 90 not out

391

Appendices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Formation and Name Changes Electoral Performance, House of Representatives Parliamentary and Organisational Leaders Party Senators and Members Party Ministers in the Commonwealth Parliament Landmark Achievements in Government April 1987 Coalition Agreement

402 403 404 408 416 422 425

Notes

427

Select bibliography and further reading

459

Index

462

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Acknowledgments

I gratefully acknowledge the contributions made towards researching and writing this book from the following people, in alphabetical order: John Anderson, Doug Anthony, Larry Anthony, Bill Baxter, Ron Boswell, Ray Braithwaite, David Brownhill, Ian Cameron, Ian Causley, Stan Collard, Tim Fischer, Peter Fisher, John Forrest, Noel Hicks, Kay Hull, Ralph Hunt, Bern Kilgariff, Bruce Lloyd, Sandy MacKenzie, Bruce McIver (on behalf of the Queensland Nationals), Shirley McKerrow, Tom McVeigh, Ron Maunsell, Clarrie Millar, Peter Nixon, Grant Tambling, David Thomson, Warren Truss, Jim Webster. The following people graciously allowed themselves to be interviewed and consulted, or assisted in other ways: Jacky Abbott, John Anderson, Doug Anthony, Larry Anthony, Jenny Bailey, Liam Bathgate, Bill Baxter, Rina Benedictos, Florence Bjelke-Petersen, Charles Blunt, Don Boadle, Ron Boswell, Ray Braithwaite, David Brownhill, Tim Bruxner, Ian Cameron, Mary Carroll, Paul Chamberlain, Stan Collard, Bruce Cowan, Terry Ann Cranwell, Ken Crooke, Julie Dale, Greg Dezman, Helen Dickie, Wendy Duncan, Michael Evans, Cecile Ferguson, Christine Ferguson, Tim Fischer, Peter Fisher, Ben Franklin, John

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Fuller, Andrew Hall, Brad Henderson, Noel Hicks, Kay Hull, Ralph Hunt, Barnaby Joyce, Bob Katter (jnr), Bern Kilgariff, Bruce Lloyd, Sandy MacKenzie, Don McDonald, Stuart McDonald, Julian McGauran, Peter McGauran, Bruce McIver, Graham McKellar, Shirley McKerrow, Tom McVeigh, Ron Maunsell, Joan Maunsell, Sue Mitchell, Fiona Nash, Garry Nehl, Paul Neville, Peter Nixon, Rob Oakeshott, Michael O’Dwyer, Phil Orphin, Bryce Osmond, Luke O’Sullivan, Don Page, Michael Priebe, Ian Robinson, David Russell, Bruce Scott, Rick Setter, John Sharp, Elizabeth Sheil, Ian Sinclair, Peter Slipper, Jen Southwell, John Stone, Helen Snyders, Grant Tambling, John Tanner, David Thomson, Helen Tiller, Warren Truss, Gerrie van Dam, Mark Vaile, Felicity Walker, Jim Webster, Troy Whitford, Lorraine Young. I also thank the team at UNSW Press for their help in bringing this project to publication. In particular, I thank my editor, Neil Thomson, for his fine sub-editing and critical eye for detail.

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Preface

Doug Anthony suggested in April 2007 that the history of the federal National Party – The Nationals as the party is now known – should be brought up to date. The most comprehensive record was that by Ulrich Ellis, A History of the Australian Country Party, published in 1963. Ellis had previously written about the party in New South Wales in 1958, and BD Graham documented The Formation of the Australian Country Parties in 1966. Professor Don Aitkin studied the party extensively and published The Country Party in New South Wales – A study of Organisation and Survival in 1972. Fellow academics Brian Costar and Denis Woodward edited Country to National – Australian rural politics and beyond in 1985, which, as the title suggests, focused on the transition from National Country Party to National Party of Australia and examined the prospects for the state and federal parties at that time. A further collection of academic assessments, The National Party: Prospects for the great survivors, edited by Linda Botterill and Geoffrey Cockfield and addressing future options, was published in 2009. Anthony wanted a volume on the political fortunes of the party and

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its personalities from the time of its formation in 1920 to the present day, thereby marking its 90th anniversary in 2010. Acknowledging that the work would have to be objective and accurately researched and sourced, he nonetheless wanted the result to be ‘a good yarn’. ‘We’ve got a colourful history,’ he said, ‘and that’s what should come through.’ After more discussion, I said I would undertake the project if he managed it, which he agreed to do; having suggested it in the first place, he had little option! He wrote to a host of people seeking their co-operation and support and was both tenacious and successful in the task, for which I thank him sincerely. Details of contributors and those who participated in interviews and consultations are contained, with appreciation, in the in the preceding acknowledgments. The support of John McEwen House Pty Ltd and The Page Research Centre Ltd in bringing the manuscript to publication is also gratefully acknowledged. Almost from the day of its formation as the Australian Country Party, announced to the House of Representatives on 22 January 1920, the party’s detractors have been predicting its downfall. Despite reduced representation at the present time, it has never been unrepresented in the Commonwealth parliament and, at 90 not out, is the second-oldest political organisation in the country. Its story is colourful and eventful. More importantly, its contribution to and influence on the shaping of modern Australia runs deep. The party’s very existence has forced all other parties to pay greater attention to the needs of regional Australia than would otherwise have been the case. That is testament alone to its success and relevance.

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The beginning

1: The beginning

The veteran federal parliamentarian Earle Page never knew his 42-year hold on the New South Wales electorate of Cowper was finally broken by the Labor Party at the election on 9 December 1961. Page, the member since December 1919, a founder of the Australian Country Party in January 1920, and to this day the party’s longest serving leader, knew from the outset of the campaign that he had a serious political fight on his hands. What he did not know was that another battle loomed on his horizon, one that he could never win. The Coalition government had ruled uninterrupted under the prime ministership of Robert Menzies since December 1949. Its popularity now was not as solid as it had been at the election in 1958, even though communism and communist influences in the Labor Party still provided fertile political clout in the electorate. Treasurer Harold Holt’s stringent economic announcements a year earlier to curb inflation had produced a credit squeeze and seriously aggravated unemployment, especially in the eastern states and in the automobile industry. There would be electoral casualties in the Coalition’s ranks.1

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In Cowper, Page’s main opponent, Labor’s Frank McGuren, a factory inspector and former Grafton City Council alderman, had a significant advantage: he was a relatively young 52, while Page was 81. There was some consternation, even resentment, within the local Country Party that Page had not retired at the end of the last parliament, but politics was something he simply could not give up and the party felt it could hardly withdraw its endorsement of its most famous representative and long-standing inaugural president of its federal organisation. Moreover, up until shortly before the close of nominations on 14 November it looked as though Page would be unopposed. Ultimately, apart from McGuren, a third candidate, publican Neville Weiley, entered the field as an Independent.2 Page seemed fit enough when the last session of the twenty-third parliament closed on 27 October, signalling the start of the campaign, although many who knew him privately commented that he looked tired, old and worn-out. He toured the electorate, speaking at various functions and public meetings. Then his health failed dramatically. He often used to drop in to the home of Ian Robinson and his mother, Jean, at Bungawalbyn, near Coraki. Robinson had been the Country Party Member for Casino in the New South Wales parliament since 1953. Two weeks before the election, Page and his wife visited the Robinson home after a function in Casino. Page complained of stomach pains and rested for an hour or so before continuing to another commitment. Worried about their friend’s health, Mrs Robinson rang her son, who was in Sydney attending state parliament, and voiced her concern. When Page returned to his Grafton home that evening, his son, Iven, a surgeon, examined him and suspected cancer. Page was flown to Sydney on 26 November and admitted to the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital. A party spokesman in Grafton said there was ‘absolutely no suggestion’ that Page would withdraw his candidacy for Cowper. He underwent surgery for ‘an acute bowel condition’ the following day. While a hospital spokesman said the operation was successful and Page’s condition good,

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rumour spread around Cowper that he was, in fact, grievously ill.3 The Cowper result had still not been finalised when Page died in hospital on 20 December. Just before the poll declaration in Grafton later that day, McGuren called for two minutes’ silence. After the declaration, which gave McGuren victory by 1345 votes following the distribution of preferences, the winner noted that Page had died ‘in harness and, in fact, was still the representative of Cowper in Federal Parliament’, adding: ‘Learning of Sir Earle’s death today was the worst ordeal of this election campaign. Never before in the history of Australian politics has a candidate had to accept election to Parliament in these tragic circumstances.’ 4 Page was given a state funeral at St Andrew’s Cathedral in Sydney on 22 December. Notably absent was Prime Minister Menzies. He was represented in that capacity by the Deputy Prime Minister and Country Party leader, John McEwen, and, as leader of the Liberal Party, by the Minister for National Development, Senator William Spooner (New South Wales).5 The relationship between Menzies and Page had been cold ever since Page launched an extraordinary personal attack on Menzies in parliament in April 1939.6

k Earle Christmas Grafton Page, the second-longest-serving member of the House of Representatives behind William ‘Billy’ Hughes, was born at Grafton on 8 August 1880.7 By 1901 he had completed a medical degree and embarked on a career as a doctor and surgeon, beginning at the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, coincidentally, the same institution in which he died. His family took a keen interest in politics. His father, Charles, had been a mayor of Grafton and counted among his friends John See, the New South Wales premier from 1901 to 1904. It was natural for Earle Page to become involved in politics. He was an avid supporter of the growing campaign to establish a new state in northern New South Wales.8

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After World War I, during which he served in 1916 and 1917 as a captain in the Australian Army Medical Corps in Egypt and France – an experience that had a major bearing on his future determination to develop a national health scheme – he decided to seek election to the federal parliament. He planned to run as an Independent in the 1919 election against the sitting Nationalist Member for Cowper, John Thomson, who had held the seat since 1906.9 Page’s support for the Northern New State Movement, for decentralisation, and for the management of water resources on a national, rather than state, basis, prompted the Farmers and Settlers’ Association of New South Wales (FSA) to offer its endorsement, which he accepted.10 State farming bodies had been endorsing candidates for state parliaments for several years, to get greater political attention for the interests of primary producers. They had even sponsored the formation of country parties, which had returned their first members to the parliaments of Western Australia in 1914, Queensland in 1915, Victoria in 1917, and South Australian in 1918.11 On 30 September 1916, the Victorian Farmers’ Union (VFU) and the Farmers and Settlers’ associations of New South Wales, Western Australia and South Australia met in Melbourne and formed the Australian Farmers’ Federal Organisation (AFFO), on the basis that the time had come when ‘a Federal constitution and political platform for primary producers throughout Australia should be inaugurated’. The meeting adopted a platform which advocated arranging the functions of the federal and state governments ‘to prevent duplication of taxation and the overlapping of administration; to obviate conflict between Commonwealth and state industrial laws and awards; and to encourage scientific agricultural education and co-operative trading in the interests of primary producers’. The president of the New South Wales FSA, Arthur Trethowan, was appointed chairman and TI Campbell, secretary of the New South Wales association, federal secretary. A less prominent, but no less important issue from an electoral perspective, was preferential voting for the House of Representatives, to replace the existing first-past-the-post system, and proportional

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representation for the Senate. Compulsory or optional preferential voting was already in place for Queensland, Western Australian and Victorian elections. The campaign for preferential voting took on significant proportions during 1918 and its introduction before the December 1919 federal election became a key to attracting farm organisation candidates. Prime Minister Joseph Cook had promised to introduce preferential voting in his policy speech for the 1914 election, but his Liberal government was defeated by Labor’s Andrew Fisher and the priorities of World War I took the matter largely off the agenda for the next four years.12 Following its annual conference in March 1918, the AFFO formally asked Prime Minister Hughes, then heading a Nationalist government, ‘to bring about an alteration in the method of election by the introduction of preferential voting’. Hughes left on a visit to England without replying, which proved to be a bad and unnecessary mistake, stirring the ire of the farm organisations.13 The farm bodies were not particularly enamoured with Hughes or those Nationalists who had previously been members of the Labor Party. As Prime Minister from October 1915, Hughes had put the question of military conscription to a national vote on 28 October 1916. The plebiscite was lost and Hughes expelled from a deeply divided Labor Party. In November he forged an interim National Labor administration with his Labor supporters and the Liberals. They formally developed into the Nationalist government in February 1917.14 The farmers were suspicious that these former Labor men and some of the Liberals, notably those representing city electorates, were not adequately supportive of the reforms for which they were fighting. To apply the necessary pressure, they needed their own men in parliament and the new voting system offered the best opportunity of achieving that goal, by enabling candidates to exchange preferences with like-minded contestants and so increase their chances of election. While the farmers saw themselves as more of a centre group, rather than supporting or opposing either of the major parties, they were undoubtedly more anti-Labor.

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When the Member for Flinders in Victoria, William Irvine (Nationalist), resigned in April 1918 to become his state’s chief justice, the VFU saw an opportunity to respond directly to Hughes’s snub by endorsing its general secretary, JJ Hall, to contest the seat against the Nationalists’ Stanley Bruce and Labor’s GJ Holmes. The acting Prime Minister, William Watt, tried to persuade Hall to withdraw from the contest by making a personal offer to introduce a preferential voting bill in the next session of parliament. The VFU held its ground, refusing to withdraw Hall until two days before the by-election, when it received a guarantee from the Nationalists as a whole that Watt’s undertaking would be honoured. Ballot papers were already printed with Hall’s name included, so the VFU successfully urged voters to support Bruce instead of Hall. Bruce was elected with 14 445 votes to Holmes’s 7740. Hall received 382 votes.15 The Member for Swan in Western Australia, John Forrest (Nationalist), renowned explorer and the state’s first premier from 1890 to 1901, died at the beginning of September 1918, leading to a by-election that would be held on 26 October.16 Belatedly, the government was delivering on the undertaking by Watts and introduced legislation into parliament on 3 October providing for preferential voting. This would not affect the voting system for the Swan by-election; first-pastthe-post would prevail. The Western Australian FSA decided to contest the seat against the Nationalists, Labor and an Independent. Labor’s Edwin Corboy won with only 34.36 per cent of the vote. The FSA candidate polled 31.39 per cent, the Nationalist 29.61 and the Independent 4.64 per cent.17 Clearly, had preferential voting been in place and a tight exchange of preferences agreed, the FSA candidate would have won comfortably on Nationalist preferences. Three days before the Swan poll, the Nationalist Member for Corangamite in Victoria, James Manifold, died.18 When the Swan results were known, the full import of Manifold’s death and the potential result of a first-past-the-post by-election to replace him became starkly clear. Even though the government retained a comfortable majority in the parliament, losses to Labor caused by splitting the non-Labor

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vote were unnecessary and unacceptable.19 The government was spurred into action, specially proclaiming those sections of its electoral bill dealing with preferential and postal voting before the proclamation of the whole act to ensure preferential voting would apply to the 14 December 1918 Corangamite by-election.20 It was a threecornered contest between the Nationalists, Labor and the VFU. Labor’s James Scullin – a future prime minister – won the highest number of primary votes. However, the VFU’s William ‘Billy’ Gibson, coming second on primaries, attracted most Nationalist preferences and took the seat with 14 096 votes on the final count to Scullin’s 10 944.21 Preferential voting had opened new opportunities by maximising rather than splitting the non-Labor vote. The VFU would see similar success nine months later when its president, William Hill, won a by-election for the seat of Echuca – also brought on by the death of the sitting member.22 The by-election experiences of 1918 and the introduction of preferential voting prompted the farm organisations to focus more directly on standing candidates at the next federal election. The AFFO expanded its platform in August 1919 so it contained 15 planks, or policy objectives, with the state bodies developing their own manifestos based on the federal organisation’s document. Among the priorities were tariff reform, free trade between the states, no restrictions or embargoes on exports, and direct representation of producers on all boards and commissions dealing with their interests.23 Candidates for the 13 December 1919 election – the first conducted with preferential voting – who supported the AFFO platform and objectives, or state derivations of them, would receive endorsement in a fairly loose arrangement whereby they could run as candidates for their state farm organisation, or, with joint endorsement, as Nationalist and Farmers candidates, or as Nationalists supporting the AFFO. A total of 27 such candidates were nominated, of whom 15 were elected to the House of Representatives, including Earle Page, who won Cowper with a convincing majority – 11 372 first preference votes to the Labor candidate, Ross Pryor’s 5712, and the incumbent Thomson’s disappointing 4624.24

The beginning

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k The first question for this group of 15 was how could they best work in the parliament to further the causes upon which they had won election? This was pressing as they could come close to holding the balance of power. On the basis of candidate endorsements, the Nationalist government held 38 seats in the House of Representatives, including one Independent Nationalist, to the Labor Party’s 26.25 Party endorsements at this time did not necessarily translate into how members saw themselves voting in the parliament. The Nationalists were a conglomerate of former Labor and Liberal members and some of those endorsed as Nationalist and Farmers may also be unpredictable. On the other hand, if all or most of the 15 ‘farmer’ members formed a united cross-bench block they could make or break the government if they sided with Labor on a crucial issue, such as the budget or a motion of no confidence.26 One of them, Edmund Jowett, who had entered parliament as a Nationalist for the Victorian electorate of Grampians at a by-election in October 1917, wrote to several others on 31 December 1919 asking them to jointly sign a letter inviting the country members to meet. The letter was sent on 5 January 1920 under the signatures of Gibson, Henry Gregory (Dampier, Western Australia), Hill, Jowett, and William McWilliams (Franklin, Tasmania): In view of the early opening of the federal parliament it is obviously desirable that those members whose candidatures were endorsed by organisations of the Country Party [state farm bodies] should meet together as soon as possible. As it seems necessary that someone should move in the matter a few of us who could be got together have taken the liberty of writing to you. We should be very much obliged if you would kindly let one of us know as early as possible how soon it would be convenient for you to attend a meeting of the party at the federal parliament house, Melbourne.27

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The letter resulted in a meeting less than three weeks later, on 22 January. It was attended by the five signatories as well as Robert Cook (Indi, Victoria), Alexander Hay (New England, New South Wales), Page, and Percy Stewart (Wimmera, Victoria), and was chaired by Gibson. John Chanter, who had first won the seat of Riverina in New South Wales as a Protectionist in 1901 and had since been a Labor member, a Nationalist and now a dually endorsed Nationalist and Farmers member, briefly attended to say he owed allegiance to Hughes and would stay with the Nationalists. The nine remaining members unanimously carried a resolution establishing themselves as a parliamentary party: ‘That the party shall be known as the Australian Country Party and shall act independently of all other political organizations’.28 The AFFO met in Melbourne on 4 February and ‘approved of the Federal Parliamentary Party styling themselves as the Australian Country Party’.29 The party met again on 24 February, two days ahead of the first session of the new parliament. This meeting was attended by two other members, John Prowse (Swan, Western Australia) and Arnold Wienholt (Moreton, Queensland), both of whom had been unable to attend the January meeting. The parliamentary Country Party was made up of 11 members from assorted backgrounds. Cook had helped in the cooperative organisation of the Victorian dairy industry. Gibson was a country storekeeper, farmer and grazier. Gregory, an expert on tariffs, had been a minister for mines and railways in Western Australia and a storekeeper on the Kalgoorlie goldfields. Hay had a distinguished war service record, was well versed in financial affairs, and had an extensive knowledge of coastal dairying and the pastoral industry. Hill was a wheat farmer who had been chairman of the Australian Wheat Pool during the war, managing the disposal of the entire Australian crop. Jowett was one of Australia’s pre-eminent sheep and wool producers, with a passion to increase wool processing in Australia. McWilliams was a journalist and newspaper proprietor before beginning his long service as a politician in the Tasmanian and Commonwealth parliaments. Page was a surgeon, newspaper proprietor and supporter

The beginning

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of the movement for new states, a national water conservation program, and decentralisation. Prowse, a former lord mayor of Perth, was an accountant and wheat farmer. Stewart had sailed the world on tall ships as a youth, been a member of the Victorian parliament, and played a leading role in bringing co-operative marketing to the wheat industry. And Wienholt was a businessman with a particular interest in farming industries, an impressive war record and known in Africa as a big game hunter.30 These were pragmatic and determined men, well known and involved in their local communities and able to bring an extensive To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

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knowledge of the issues and concerns of their electorates to the parliament. At their 24 February meeting they agreed to defer the question of leadership until the next day. Jowett reported that he, Gregory and McWilliams had asked the Speaker to provide the party with a separate party room. The meeting then agreed to send a deputation to the government to seek improvements in country telephone and postal services and to work for the removal of ‘costly duplication in the assessment and collection of land and income taxes by both Federal and State Governments’. 31 The meeting on 25 February agreed that as a new party the members should give themselves time to assess each other’s strengths and skills before electing a permanent leadership team. In the meantime, they would elect temporary leaders who would hold their positions for about a year. McWilliams was chosen leader because of his parliamentary experience. The 60 year old, who sported a flourishing handlebar moustache, had held the seat of Franklin since 1903. Before that he had been the Member for Ringarooma in the Tasmanian parliament from 1893. Jowett was elected the interim deputy and Page appointed party secretary and whip. Jowett made the following statement after the meeting: At this afternoon’s meeting of the Australian Country Party the whole of the eleven members were present. Mr W. G. Gibson was in the chair. Mr. W. J. McWilliams was elected leader of the party, and I was elected deputy leader, both elections being unanimous. Dr. Earle Page was elected secretary and party whip.32

When the parliament met the following day, Prime Minister Hughes was relieved to see the Country Party support his Nationalists in the first division to re-elect Elliot Johnson (Lang, New South Wales) as Speaker. McWilliams made his first parliamentary comments ‘on behalf of the Country Party’ to congratulate the Speaker,33 but it was not until 10 March, while speaking on the Supply Bill (No. 4) 1919– 20, that he outlined its objectives:

The beginning

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I think it is desirable that I should take this early opportunity – the first real opportunity that I have had – to inform the Government, their supporters, and the members of the Opposition of the exact position of members occupying the cross benches, and who constitute the Australian Country Party, which has done me the great honour of electing me as its leader. I may say at the outset that the Country party is an independent body quite separate from the Nationalists or the Labour party. I think it my duty to let honourable members of this House and the country generally know exactly the position in which we stand. We occupy our own party rooms, we have appointed our own Leader and other officers. We take no part in the deliberations of Ministerialists or of the Opposition. We intend to support measures of which we approve, and hold ourselves absolutely free to criticize or reject any proposals with which we do not agree. Having put our hands to the wheel, we set the course of our voyage. There has been no collusion, we crave no alliance, we spurn no support; we have no desire to harass the Government, nor do we wish to humiliate the Opposition. We have not entered upon this course without the most grave consideration. … We have recognized – as have other honourable members and a considerable number of electors – that drastic action was necessary to secure closer attention to the requirements of the primary producers of Australia than they have hitherto received. The primary producer is determined that he shall now take his proper place. We have no quarrel with the consumers in the cities. We regard them, in part, as our best customers.

McWilliams said the Country Party would fight the ‘cursed system of centralization, under which hundreds of thousands of pounds are squandered in our city Departments, whilst necessary adjuncts to civilization, in the way of telephonic communication and mail services are denied to the residents of our back-blocks’. He concluded that, on these principles, the party ‘will stand or fall’. 34

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The Australian Country Party (ACP) had formally arrived in the federal parliament and the state farming organisations and the AFFO could feel satisfied they had successfully sponsored an impressive and decisive electoral breakthrough that would have a major impact on the course of Australian politics for decades to come. The party’s numbers would soon increase by one when Reginald Wilson, elected as a South Australian Farmers and Settlers’ Association candidate on an agreed Senate ticket with the Nationalists at the 1919 election, took up his seat from 1 July 1920 and soon thereafter joined the Country Party. Apart from being the party’s first senator, Wilson was for several years regarded as the only ‘farmer’ representative in the Senate.35 Within a year the ACP attracted another member

To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

When it came to which of the two major parties had precedence, the new Country Party, headed by ‘policeman’ William McWilliams, would decide (Bulletin, 4 March 1920)

The beginning

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to its ranks, William Fleming, who had held the New South Wales seat of Robertson since 1913 and had been a Nationalist and Farmers candidate at the 1919 election. He left the Nationalists and joined the Country Party in March 1921, giving it a block of 12 members and one senator.36

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Flexing muscles

2: Flexing muscles

The Country Party wasted no time making its presence felt in parliament. In his maiden speech on 4 March, Page criticised the government for its late presentation of the budget estimates. On 10 March, McWilliams moved for a cut in outlays to ‘limit the term of Supply to six weeks’.1 The government took the motion as one of no confidence and narrowly survived by 34 votes to 30. It was a close enough shave for Hughes to realise he must treat the Country Party with some care and he immediately assured the House of Representatives that ‘after 30 June next we shall give members an early opportunity of discussing the following year’s Estimates’, giving the Country Party its first parliamentary victory.2 Page set the tone of more ACP priorities on 17 March, canvassing a range of topics: the need for federal control of industrial affairs, a single tax collecting agency, a common electoral roll for federal and state elections, the effective management of national debt, uniform railway gauges, national action on water conservation, co-operation between the states on power generation, and an elected convention to revise the constitution, including the creation of new states.

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The Labor Opposition tried to goad the Country Party into supporting it by moving censure motions on issues designed to appeal to ACP members. They generally rejected the bait, although on one embarrassing occasion, McWilliams was sitting with Labor members when a division was called. The rest of the ACP sided with the government and the censure, condemning its failure in areas including securing an adequate return for wool and other primary exports, was easily defeated.3 While not backward in criticising the government, the party was crucial to the success of much of its legislation. It supported the Oil Agreement Bill 1920, setting up the Commonwealth Oil Refineries Limited and establishing a refining industry in Australia – a move bitterly opposed by Labor. Also, in spite of Labor opposition, it endorsed the Science and Industry Bill 1920, which established an Institute of Science and Industry. It supported legislation establishing Amalgamated Wireless Limited, which would be an integral part of the development of sound broadcasting; a civil aviation subsidy to extend air services to remote areas; an amendment to land tax legislation; and amendments to income tax assessment, which partially met the AFFO’s long-standing policy to allow farmers to average their income over an extended period for taxation purposes. A seemingly intractable difference between the Country Party and the Nationalists and Labor was over tariffs. The Minister for Trade and Customs since January 1919, Walter Massy-Greene (Richmond, New South Wales), tabled comprehensive new tariff schedules in parliament on 24 March 1920. They proposed the most protective of any tariffs placed before parliament since federation. While not totally anti-tariff, the Country Party regarded these schedules as too high and over coming months argued they would increase production costs of both primary and secondary goods, making them less competitive on the domestic and export markets. Gregory was a vehement critic, to the point of being a virtual free trader. Maintenance of high tariffs was one issue over which there was no argument between Hughes and his former Labor colleagues. While the Country Party gained support

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from some country Nationalists for its calls to reduce tariffs on imports such as fencing wire, agricultural sprays and machinery, it had little impact on the outcome of votes in the House of Representatives.4

k A conference of delegates to the AFFO and parliamentary members of the ACP, held in Sydney in March 1921, adopted the first formal federal political platform of the Country Party. Under the slogan Production and a Fair Deal, it promoted: reform to eliminate overlapping between federal and state jurisdictions; a federal convention to remodel the constitution and facilitate the subdivision of existing states; encouragement of industries essential to national development; the full encouragement of private enterprise in production and all forms of co-operative enterprise; extension of the Commonwealth Shipping Line; a vigorous immigration policy; extension and cheapening of postal and telephonic communication in country areas; a ‘resolute’ policy to develop the north of Australia; establishment of a representative tribunal to fairly regulate co-operative control of the sugar industry; and a comprehensive system of water conservation and power production.5 The following month, the parliamentary party decided it was appropriate to review its leadership positions. All 12 House of Representatives members attended the party meeting on the afternoon of 5 April – Fleming had left the Nationalists and joined the ACP in March. According to Page, Stewart suggested there should be no nominations for the leadership, meaning all 12 members could be regarded as candidates. McWilliams probably gauged that his time was up. Page noted that McWilliams ‘had shown an increasing tendency to vote against the majority’, while Graham said he ‘had failed to win the confidence of his colleagues’.6 He clearly did not seek to continue as leader, because, on the nomination of Prowse, seconded by Wienholt, Page won the job with 11 votes, the only one missing being his own – ‘I hadn’t voted for myself’.7 Jowett did not re-contest the deputy leadership and Henry Gregory was chosen to replace him.

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Gibson was appointed party secretary, or whip. McWilliams congratulated Page and assured him ‘of his assistance in the performance of his duties’.8 Through turbulent and controversial times, Page’s leadership would span 18 years, five months and eight days – an unsurpassed record in the party’s history – and would place him as the doyen of the Australian Country Party.9 To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

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Page was no orator; he spoke in a torrent of high-pitched words, frequently punctuated with an emphatic ‘You see! You see!’ as well as an occasional chortling laugh. Affectionately known as ‘Doc’, he was politically tough, tenacious, determined and impatient, and often did several tasks at once – drafting a speech, dictating letters, making telephone calls. He sometimes mixed metaphors spectacularly, for instance: ‘The Government has discovered a skeleton in the cupboard and they are now trying to kill it with one stroke of the pen.’10 He irritated Hughes, whom he never fully trusted because of his previous Labor credentials. A former New South Wales party chairman and federal president, Ralph Hunt, who held the northern New South Wales seat of Gwydir for almost 20 years from 1969, remembered Page well: ‘My father joined the [New South Wales] Country Party, becoming one of its founding members, because of Page. They knew each other really well. I got to know him more when I was chairman of the Gwydir electorate council from 1953. He had a good personality and a good way of communicating with people, whether young or old.’ 11 A former federal leader, Doug Anthony, recalled Page convening a meeting of the four Country Party candidates – of whom he was one – who contested the September 1957 by-election for Richmond, following the death of Anthony’s father: ‘I wasn’t very impressed with him, although he and my father had been good mates. He told us, “you’ve got to get out there and make speeches, you see, you see; get up on street corners and don’t be backward, you see, you see”. It was good advice.’ 12 Ian Robinson remembered ‘Doc’ as ‘an incredible man, a fast reader with an incredible capacity to cut through red tape and the public service line to get things done’.13 Two days after Page was elected leader, Hughes announced that he would visit London in June for an imperial conference on foreign policy, naval defences and renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Over recent years, Hughes had been making a greater impression walking the stage of international politics than at home. He met privately with Page, seeking a guarantee that the Country Party would

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not threaten the government on the floor of the lower house in his absence. Page used the request to try and win assurances from Hughes on the position Australia would adopt at the conference. In return, he said, his party would not take ‘undue advantage’ of the Prime Minister’s absence, but would also not give any carte blanche undertaking. Less than a week later, on 14 April, Jowett moved the adjournment of the House of Representatives to debate the impact of ‘excessive and crushing’ shipping freight rates on Australian exports. Jowett later said his motion was not intended as one of censure, but rather to highlight the damage shipping costs were having on export competitiveness. The government, however, treated it with derision. Treasurer Joseph Cook quipped that if the Country Party did not call for a division, the government would.14 When the vote was taken, Hughes was absent from

Pragmatic and determined men: probably the first photograph of the federal parliamentary Country Party – taken between April and July 1921. Left to right (back row) Alexander Hay, Robert Cook, Arnold Wienholt, Percy Stewart, William Hill, John Prowse, William Fleming, Edmund Jowett, William McWilliams; (front row) Henry Gregory, deputy leader, Earle Page, leader, William Gibson, whip. South Australian Senator Reginald Wilson, who stood aloof from the party room, is not present (the Page family)

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the chamber and one Nationalist, James Fowler (Perth) inadvertently voted with the ‘Ayes’. The government was defeated by 32 votes to 30. A compromise was reached and Hughes remained in office, but the incident was another demonstration of the Country Party’s potential authority in the parliament. This was further illustrated when Hughes sought to extend his overseas trip to attend a disarmament conference in Washington in November, without returning home for the budget session. The Country Party said its conditional guarantee was for the duration of the imperial conference only. Hughes pulled out of the Washington meetings and returned home, sending his defence minister, Senator George Pearce (Western Australia) in his place.15 Adding to Hughes’s woes – and perhaps also prompting his return – the Country Party won the Queensland seat of Maranoa at a byelection on 30 July 1921, following the death of the sitting Labor member, James Page. James Hunter took the ACP’s representation in the House of Representatives to 13.16 The budget, introduced on 19 October 1921, provided for a deficit of nearly £3 million. The Country Party moved for a reduction. All the Country Party members voted with Labor, except Wienholt, who maintained faith with the party by being paired, meaning he could not vote, and Hay, who voted with the Nationalists. Hay’s action resulted in the government avoiding defeat by a single vote – 33 to 32 – and saw him excluded from the Country Party room and sitting as an Independent until losing New England to another Country Party candidate, Victor Thompson, at the 1922 election.17 Hughes did not need more shocks from the Country Party. When Cook resigned on 11 November 1921 to become Australia’s High Commissioner in London, he used the need for a reshuffle to test the ACP’s interest in becoming part of a composite government, offering two portfolios. Page demanded more: three portfolios, including Treasury and Repatriation; preservation of his party’s separate entity and its right to contest any seats it chose at the next election; any statements on coalition to be jointly approved; the speedy consideration of the muchdelayed bill to set up a convention to review the constitution; and a

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reduction in the budget deficit. It was more than Hughes could accept, although he did reduce the budget deficit by £500 000, doubtless as a placatory measure to try and keep the Country Party more on-side than off. Hughes’s obfuscation and delay over reviewing the constitution was the straw that broke the camel’s back so far as Page’s relations with him were concerned. Page was a constitutional reform enthusiast, and not just because he favoured the creation of new states. He believed that – nearly 20 years after federation – it was appropriate to review the constitution, particularly its impact on federal-state relations. Reform was also part of the party’s platform, as it was that of the AFFO. Hughes had promised that if two referendum questions to amend the constitution, put to the people at the same time as the 1919 election, were lost, which they were, he would call a constitutional convention in 1920.18 He did not do so and it was not until after his return from the imperial conference in the latter part of 1921 that he finally introduced legislation for a convention that Page and just about everyone else knew would be totally unworkable. Page believed the bill was deliberately designed to fail and he determined he would no longer try to work with Hughes. The Country Party met on 24 November and endorsed his refusal to join a composite administration. The one exception was Gregory, who resigned as deputy leader on 2 December, giving an assurance that his action in no way affected his loyalty to the party or his desire for its interests and advancement.19 Fleming replaced him.20 The Country Party’s actions throughout the eighth parliament identified it clearly as occupying the centre ground, one that would fearlessly take on the government, or support it, as circumstance demanded. It established its credentials as a group that fought tenaciously for its constituency and could put a strong case to the people in the campaign for the 16 December 1922 election. Delivering his policy at Grafton on 8 October under the slogan Hughes Must Go, Page called for a national debt sinking fund and said the states should assume responsibility for tax collection to eliminate

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duplication. He outlined plans to remodel the Commonwealth Bank as a central bank and suggested the establishment of a system of rural credits through a land bank. Other proposals included a national insurance scheme for sickness, unemployment, poverty and age; cooperative marketing arrangements for primary industries; a national scheme of water conservation and irrigation; a national roads program; an adequate level of immigration; and a constitutional convention. Throughout the campaign, he accused Hughes of wanting the extermination of the Country Party because it had sought just conditions for country people, worked to check government extravagance, and demanded the budget be introduced before and not after the money was spent.21 The Country Party went into the campaign technically holding 13 seats, given Wienholt’s defection from the Nationalists and the addition of Maranoa at a mid-term by-election. But Wienholt retired at the election and New England was effectively no longer a Country Party seat following Hay’s exclusion from the party room after his support of Hughes’s budget. It therefore entered the election with 11 incumbent members. Wienholt’s seat went to the Nationalists. Jowett’s Victorian seat of Grampians was abolished by a redistribution and his bid for Bendigo saw him defeated by the Nationalists. Fleming, in Robertson (New South Wales), and McWilliams, in Tasmania, were also defeated – the latter, ironically, in the same year the Tasmanian Farmers, Stockowners and Orchardists’ Association formed a country party and won five seats in the state parliament. Hay was successfully replaced with a ‘dinkum’ Country Party man, Victor Thompson, who was honorary secretary of the Northern New State Movement. The party had the satisfaction of taking a ministerial scalp by toppling the high tariff Massy-Greene in Richmond with a one-legged war veteran, Roland Green. Green, a grazier who lost his leg at Ypres, campaigned on the slogan Vote for the Green without an E.22 Other successes were: Riverina (New South Wales), where John Chanter, who, as a Nationalist and Farmers candidate since 1919 had stayed with the Nationalists in parliament, lost to William Killen;

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Gippsland (Victoria), where the vice-president of the VFU, Thomas Paterson, overhauled the Nationalist, George Wise, a former postmaster-general; and Darwin (Tasmania), where Joshua Whitsitt defeated George Bell. Another Tasmanian, Llewellyn Atkinson, who sat as a Nationalist in the previous parliament, retained his seat of Wilmot as a Country Party candidate. The Country Party was returned with 14 members, while Reginald Wilson continued as a Country Party senator. The election was a disaster for the Nationalists, with five ministers losing their seats and their representation falling from 38 after the 1919 poll to 26. Labor was returned with 29 members and there were five Liberals and one Independent.23 The Country Party held the indisputable balance of power. For the Nationalists to stay in government, striking a deal with the Country Party was now imperative.

k John Latham, a king’s counsel and expert in constitutional law, who had just been elected as a non-aligned Liberal to the Victorian seat of Kooyong, and regarded by Page as sympathetic to the Country Party, attended the Country Party meeting in Melbourne on the afternoon of 16 January 1923, at which leadership positions were declared vacant. All 14 party members were present, while Senator Wilson maintained his position of non-attendance. Page said he received the party’s approval for Latham to be present, although the latter took no part in the party’s leadership elections: He was more than an honoured guest for over a year, giving us the benefit of his practical wisdom and his sage legal advice. As he had been elected on the slogan ‘Hughes Must Go’ and his own views on the Prime Minister’s actions were more virulent than our own, he found the atmosphere to his liking in the Country Party room.24

The party re-elected Page as leader and appointed Gibson as deputy and Stewart as secretary and whip. All appointments were unanimous.

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The meeting continued late into the night and a statement was issued before its conclusion, saying ‘the view of all those present was that the result of the election was a distinct vote of censure by the people upon the present Administration’. It was unanimously agreed that ‘pending developments in other directions’ – meaning the leadership of the Nationalists – ‘it was impossible at present to define the future attitude of the [Country] party’.25 The Nationalists met on the same day and sent a message to the Country Party suggesting a conference of respective party managers on 22 January, to develop future working arrangements. Page replied saying the meeting should be convened the following afternoon. The Sydney Morning Herald speculated that it was ‘regarded as certain that they [the Country Party] will refuse to accept Mr. Hughes as leader’.26 The die was cast for the failure of the conference on the morning of 17 January, when the Country Party reconvened and adopted a motion, moved by Latham, ‘that the party would not support or cooperate with any Ministry of which the present Prime Minister is a member’. Only Gregory dissented.27 Latham was much more than an interested observer at Country Party meetings. At this particular time, he was a crucial participant. Not only was he directly involved, drafting and moving motions, he was also central to developing the strategy and negotiating points the party would put to the conference, and he insisted the detail and progress of the negotiations be documented. The conference continued for a week and no final resolution was achieved until 2 February. As proposal and counter-proposal was put forward, Hughes became convinced Page was trying to engineer a situation whereby he could become Prime Minister. He refused to stand aside, but said if an arrangement could be arrived at that ensured stable government he ‘would not stand in the way’. This was not good enough for Page. He wanted a complete capitulation from Hughes. He was not necessarily looking for portfolios in a composite administration; rather he and the Country Party would support a Nationalist government, providing Hughes was not in the ministry. As the deadlock continued its weary course, and after the Nationalists had offered the

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Country Party five portfolios in a ministry of 12, and suggested a joint meeting of both parties to elect a leader, Page summarised his Party’s position in a memorandum – probably drafted by Latham – to Hughes on 24 January: 1. The Country Party will not support or co-operate with any ministry containing the present Prime Minister. 2. Your memoranda would convey the impression that what the Country Party has been seeking is the Prime Ministership for Dr. Earle Page and portfolios for its own members. This, as you are aware, is not the case. The Country Party repeats that it does not demand portfolios or the leadership of the Ministry. 3. The Country Party will support a Nationalist Ministry of whose programme it approves. When a programme is placed before the Country Party on behalf of the Nationalist Party, it will determine the extent to which support can be given. 4. Alternatively, the Country Party is prepared to consider the formation of a Composite Ministry, provided that provision is made for the retention of separate entity of the parties, and that there is such a proportion and distribution of portfolios as will give the Country Party power as great as its responsibility. The practical way of bringing this result about is for the present Prime Minister to resign and for some other member to be entrusted with the formation of a Government. The Country Party would not consider, in any circumstances, a joint meeting for the selection of a common leader. 5. As a further alternative, if necessary, Dr. Page is prepared to accept the responsibility of endeavouring to form a Ministry from the non-Labor side of the House.28 Ultimately, Hughes did the right thing. He had little alternative. If he did not resign the chances were Labor would assume the Treasury benches because the intransigent Country Party would not support a Nationalist administration with him at the helm. It would also hardly be supportive of much of Labor’s program, meaning stable govern-

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ment would be impossible. Perhaps Hughes was more of a pragmatist and less of a Labor ‘comrade’ than Page appreciated. He was also shrewd. He did not just resign and leave it to the Nationalist party room to elect a new leader. He tendered his resignation to the Governor-General, Lord Forster, on the morning of 2 February 1923 and recommended that Stanley Bruce be called to form a government. Hughes had recognised Bruce’s potential and leadership qualities. Even though he had barely been in parliament for three years, Hughes had promoted Bruce to Treasurer over other aspirants. Now he was recommending him for the top job, side-stepping even his deputy and the Attorney-General, Littleton Groom, the Member for Darling Downs in Queensland. If Page was surprised that Bruce was given the nod by the outgoing Hughes, he would also have been delighted. He liked Bruce and knew he could work with him. He met Bruce in Melbourne on 6 and 7 February and the two struck an agreement that was published in the press on 9 February: The following has been arrived at: 1. The identity of the Nationalist and Country Parties to be respectively maintained. 2. A composite Ministry to be formed, the Cabinet to consist of eleven members. The following positions to be held by the Country Party: Treasurer; Works and Railways; PostmasterGeneral; Vice-President of the Executive Council; Honorary Minister. The following positions in the Ministry to be held by the National Party [Nationalists]: External Affairs; Customs; Attorney-General; Defence; Home and Territories; Honorary Minister. 3. Dr. Earle Page to take precedence in the Ministry after the Prime Minister and to speak on behalf of the Ministry where necessary in the absence of the Prime Minister. In the event of the necessity for the appointment of an Acting Prime Minister, Dr. Earle Page to occupy such position.

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4. The Ministry to be the Bruce-Page Ministry.29 Largely thanks to Latham’s insistence on recording the details of the failed conference with the Nationalists, and the fact that the party room had given Page the authority to negotiate with Bruce, the Country Party leader was reasonably confident that his colleagues would not object to the arrangements.30 While it was difficult to quickly communicate with all members because they were back in their electorates, he did have his deputy, Gibson, and whip, Stewart, on hand. Neither were particularly enamoured with the idea of coalition, but they both confirmed Page’s belief that the arrangement should be accepted. This is an interesting point. Here was history in the making. Never before had these two political groups entered into such an arrangement in the federal parliament, yet it was achieved without the direct approval of the parliamentary Country Party or, apparently, the parliamentary Nationalists. Moreover, the Country Party’s position was substantially masterminded, through the communiqués and memoranda produced for the negotiations with Hughes, by a non-party member in John Latham. Latham joined the Nationalists from November 1925, becoming Opposition leader from 1929 to 1931, and later heading the United Australia Party (UAP), forerunner of today’s Liberal Party, before retiring from parliament in August 1934 to become Chief Justice of the High Court.31 There was considerable apprehension among some state Country parties over the wisdom of coalition. In New South Wales only 14 months earlier, a group of Progressive parliamentarians under the leadership of Mick Bruxner had split from their colleagues specifically to stay out of a coalition government with George Fuller’s Nationalists.32 Divisions in the Victorian Country Party over coalition had persisted for several years. The genesis of what later became known as ‘the pledge’ dated back to a decision of the VFU annual conference in September 1919, ruling that the Country Party should not enter any composite ministry unless it held a majority of the positions.33 The resolution applied to Victorian, not federal governments, but many VFU members believed it should apply to both. In Western Australia,

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where the Country Party had been involved in coalition governments since 1917, there was now growing doubt that they benefited the party’s interests. There were doubters in the federal Country Party room. Killen told parliament he had been opposed to a composite government ‘because I did not think it was the right thing to do’. Having been established, however, he would ‘do what lies within my power to make it a success, providing that the Country party does not lose its separate entity’. Thompson said he had been ‘very disappointed’ about the joint government ‘because I had given my constituents the assurance that I would, at all times, stand firmly on the issue of a straight-out separate Country party both in Parliament and out of it’. 34 The core concern of those opposed to joint arrangements – in the parliaments and the organisations – was that the party’s independence would be suffocated and ultimately it would be swallowed by the Nationalists. Their view was that the Country Party should be unequivocally independent, neither anti-Labor nor anti-Nationalist, and prepared to support whichever of those parties endorsed its policies, whether it was in government or opposition. The pro-coalitionists said that only by being a part of government could the party argue its policies through the ministry and on to the statute books.35 This was the central theme that Page and his pro-coalition colleagues put to the state party organisations. Thomas Paterson, who was elected president of the VFU in March 1922, managed to persuade the union’s central council to adopt a resolution that the Bruce-Page ministry should be given ‘a fair chance to make good’.36 Despite differing opinions, the agreement survived and became the foundation for all future coalition arrangements between nonLabor parties. In the joint ministry, Page was Treasurer and nominally Deputy Prime Minister, although the latter role was not formally documented in parliamentary records at the time. The Victorians, Gibson and Stewart, were respectively made Postmaster-General and Minister for Works and Railways, thereby placating some of the anti-coalition mood in the VFU. Senator Wilson was appointed an honorary

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minister, while Atkinson became vice-president of the executive council. While the formal position of Deputy Prime Minister was not introduced until the first Gorton-McEwen government in January 1968, and has been maintained by governments of all persuasions since, all coalition administrations up to that time recognised the Country Party leader as the Deputy Prime Minister, who would automatically act in the top job during absences of the Prime Minister, sometimes for lengthy periods. The same arrangement has continued in all contemporary coalition governments. For this story, the Country Party leader’s position as Deputy Prime Minister prior to January 1968 is recognised as a formal role. 37

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Runs on the board

3: Runs on the board

The only way Page could settle coalition doubters was to prove their fears were unfounded. He had to run up some clear Country Party achievements in the new government and at the same time maintain the party’s independent identity. He was perhaps fortunate that post-war politics required substantial reform, rebuilding and new directions, giving him the opportunities he needed. The government quickly embarked on a program of startling reforms, many of which Page had promoted in his 1922 election policy and which now, as Treasurer, he could highlight as Country Party initiatives. The premiers’ conference in June 1923 was an historic event, laying the foundations for many of the government’s legislative programs through to 1928. A voluntary Loan Council, to co-ordinate federal and state borrowings and set interest rates on government loans, and a National Debt Sinking Fund were established.1 Uniform bankruptcy laws and measures to reduce duplication in federal and state tax collection followed. The subsequent States Grants Act 1927 heralded a completely new system of financial arrangements between the Commonwealth and the states. The Commonwealth Bank, which

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had been established in 1912, was transformed into a central bank in 1924, and the following year a Rural Credits Department was established within the bank to provide low interest loans to primary producers. The Commonwealth Savings Bank came into being in 1927. The government pioneered wireless broadcasting in Australia, largely to the credit of Postmaster-General Gibson, who also introduced a rural automatic telephone exchange system which he regarded as ‘my baby’.2 The nation’s first radio station, 2SB in Sydney, which later became 2BL, made its first transmission on 23 November 1923. The New South Wales Labor Party recognised the value of this medium, acquiring Sydney Radio 2KY in 1925 and becoming the first Labor Party in the world to own and operate its own radio service.3 Unlike many of his contemporaries, who viewed the new medium with suspicion, Page would have embraced it with enthusiasm. He was keenly aware of the value of the press in political campaigning and could see the wireless as a natural extension. His uncles, Thomas and Robert Page, were press men, having founded the Grafton Argus newspaper in 1894. Together with a group of local businessmen, Page floated a company in 1915 and bought the Clarence and Richmond River Examiner. Within a year the weekly publication was turned into a daily and renamed The Daily Examiner. Page used it to further his campaigns for a northern new state, unifying the rail link between northern New South Wales and southern Queensland, damming the Clarence River, and establishing the Nymboida hydro-electric scheme to provide power to Grafton.4 As one of the first people in Australia to own a motor car, Page was particularly interested in improving roads, especially in country areas.5 The Main Roads Development Act 1923 provided up to £500 000 to the states on a pound-for-pound basis and was the forerunner to the Federal Aid Roads Act 1926, which instigated a 10-year program under which Commonwealth money was provided to the states on a one pound Commonwealth to 15 shillings state ratio. The

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To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

Dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s: Earle Page (centre) puts the finishing touches to his 1924 budget, flanked by Secretary to the Treasury, ASR Collins, (left) and another adviser, J Marshall (the Page family)

federal money was raised by increasing petrol tax, which had been collected since 1902, to two pence a gallon. The tax law was amended in 1924 to allow businesses which suffered a loss in one year to carry it forward as a deduction from assessable income in succeeding years over a five-year period. Of particular help to primary producers, this was the equivalent of the modern system of tax averaging. Page also introduced depreciation allowances for on-farm fences, dams and essential plant and machinery. Page abolished the crown leasehold tax, an offshoot of the 1910 federal land tax; sold unnecessary or unprofitable enterprises like the Commonwealth Harness Factory, Williamstown Dockyards and the Commonwealth Woollen Mills; developed a new sugar agreement

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with the Queensland government, the Colonial Sugar Refining Company and sugar producers; disposed of a two-year stockpile of canned fruit by cutting the price of a can from one shilling and three pence to ten pence halfpenny; subsidised rural exports, charging domestic consumers more and using the revenue to lower Australian commodity prices on world markets; and oversaw the introduction of voluntary pools for the wheat industry and the establishment of export control boards for many others. One scheme, developed by Paterson when he became Minister for Markets and Migration in June 1926 and known as the Paterson Butter Plan, was a voluntary equalisation scheme which pioneered later statutory arrangements and implemented the Country Party’s principle of the home consumption price.6 The Department of Markets and Migration was established in January 1925, initially under the control of Wilson, with a key role to better promote Australia’s primary products domestically and overseas. In later years, it progressively became the Department of Markets, of Commerce, of Commerce and Agriculture, of Primary Industry, of Primary Industries and Energy, and of the contemporary Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. It paved the way for the establishment by Page in 1934 of the Australian Trade Commissioner Service, now known as Austrade, and, a year later, of the Australian Agricultural Council, made up of federal and state ministers. To accomplish his commitment to see science more directly applied to industry, in June 1926 Page substantially expanded the Institute of Science and Industry, which had been set up in 1920, into the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, the forerunner of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). As a medical man, Page had a deep commitment to health issues. In his medical practice he used to note having treated patients who could not afford the fee with ‘FLG’, meaning ‘for the love of God’.7 He facilitated the establishment of the Federal Health Council in 1926 and developed it into the National Health and Medical Research Council 10 years later. He planned a national health system with subsidised medical services for all, free essential drugs and medical services for

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low-income earners, and a voluntary hospital and medical benefits insurance scheme. This would not be fully developed until his term as Minister for Health in the 1950s, when he also introduced the free milk scheme for school children under 13 and inaugurated free medical treatment for pensioners These were big achievements for a small and relatively new party. Such was the concern of the Labor Party that, on the insistence of caucus, its 1924 federal conference adopted a new 15-plank country policy to be included in the platform.8 Labor saw the Country Party as a serious threat to its rural seats. Of particular satisfaction to Page was being able to chair the first cabinet meeting convened on federal territory. The Commonwealth had acquired 900 square miles of land from New South Wales in 1908, thereby establishing the Australian Capital Territory. Part of the acquisition included the station homestead of Yarralumla, now the residence of the Governor-General. The first federal cabinet meeting in the ACT was convened at Yarralumla on 30 January 1924 and, with Bruce overseas, the acting Prime Minister, Page, chaired the event. Among its decisions were: to hold a national competition for the design of the Australian War Memorial; establishment of a Federal Capital Commission to oversee the construction of Canberra and its services; allotment of 300 acres for the development of the Australian National University: arrangement of the first auction of 500 housingblock leases; and reaching agreement with the religious denominations on where their main churches would be sited.9

k While the Country Party’s early influence did not go unnoticed by the state Country parties, it was overshadowed by a pre-election pact agreed between Bruce and Page as they began planning how to campaign at the next election. Bruce first canvassed the idea of a pact in a speech in Adelaide on 20 May 1924, 18 months before the election of 14 November 1925. Details were placed before the parlia-

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mentary parties on 29 May. In essence, neither party would oppose sitting members – a so-called ‘immunity clause’: in Labor-held seats the parties should try to select the strongest of either the Nationalist or Country Party candidate, with both parties supporting that candidate; in seats where such agreement could not be reached and three-cornered contests ensued, each party would exchange preferences; and, where they could be arranged, joint Senate teams would be established comprising two Nationalists and one Country Party candidate.10 Bruce and Page knew that agreement to the pact by the parliamentary parties would mean little if it was not supported by their respective organisations. For Page, this meant seeking the approval of the AFFO, as the effective federal organisation, as well as the individual state bodies. There was strong opposition in Country Party circles to the concept of restricting where the party could or could not stand candidates. The state parties generally believed they should be free to contest any electorate they wished. The AFFO met in Melbourne on 16 June and after an eight-hour session agreed to convene a special conference on 18 July. The Nationalist organisation, the National Federation, would meet in Melbourne on 21 July and a joint meeting of delegates from both organisations would be held on 23 July. In the meantime, Bruce and Page let it be known that if the pact was rejected they would resign their cabinet and leadership positions. Compromise was ultimately reached. The ‘immunity clause’ was eased so that prospectively the Country Party could contest the Nationalist seats of Bendigo and Corio in Victoria and the Nationalists could stand in the Country Party seats of Gippsland, Victoria, and Richmond and Riverina in New South Wales. The right of the Country Party to contest any country seats held by Labor was recognised and the proposal regarding joint Senate teams was upheld. Bruce announced his acceptance of these modifications after a cabinet meeting on 5 August 1924, at which Stewart, who had taken an increasingly anti-pact line during the AFFO conferences, resigned as

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Minister for Works and Railways. The Western Australian Member for Forrest, John Prowse, then resigned as Country Party whip.11 Stewart was replaced in the ministry by William Hill (Echuca, Victoria), while James Hunter was elected whip. The level of co-operation in the campaign was extensive. Joint Senate teams were nominated in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia and joint election committees established in Western Australia and Queensland to endorse candidates and manage the campaigns.12 The only contest between sitting government members was in Richmond, where the Country Party’s Roland Green held off a Nationalist challenge. In Victoria, an Independent Nationalist unsuccessfully took on Paterson in Gippsland. In Laborheld seats, three-cornered contests saw the Country Party take Gwydir from Labor; Labor retain Hume in New South Wales; and the Nationalists win Wannon, Victoria, from Labor. The electoral pact substantially reduced three-cornered contests – there were 18 in the eastern states, excluding Tasmania, in 1922, compared to only five in 1925 – and contributed to the government’s handsomely increased majority. The Nationalists were returned with 37 seats, their representation boosted by the fact that five former Liberals – two in Victoria, one of whom was John Latham, and three in South Australia – had joined their ranks and all retained their seats. There was an Independent in Fremantle, Western Australia, who was generally supportive of the Nationalists. Labor had 23 seats, while the Country Party, which contested 18 seats compared to 32 in 1922, retained its strength at 14, offsetting the loss of Darwin in Tasmania by gaining Gwydir. This was negated not long after the election because the Country Party in Tasmania ceased to exist in 1925 and merged with the Nationalists. Its one returned member, Atkinson, in Wilmot, chose to sit with that party.13 Moreover, Stewart left the parliamentary Country Party in July 1926 after being instrumental in forming a breakaway anti-coalition Country Progressive Party in Victoria, thereby reducing the parliamentary Country Party to 12 in the House of Representatives.14 The joint Senate arrangements proved successful,

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with the Country Party increasing its representation from one to four – a senator in each of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia.15 To several state party organisations, however, the overall outcome did not justify the pact. Virtual status quo representation in the House of Representatives was no compensation for having agreed not to contest potentially winnable seats. The anti-pact view was that the Country Party had acknowledged its future role would always be that of a junior party. Although no state party condemned or campaigned against the pact and the resultant continuation of the Bruce-Page Coalition government, divisions in the Victorian, South Australian and Western Australian parties deepened. Country Party ministers were included in state governments in Victoria and Western Australia, to the increasing ire of those who despised joint arrangements. Apart from the breakaway Country Progressive Party in Victoria, divisions in South Australia over a ‘closer union’ with that state’s Liberals (Nationalists) raged for two years, culminating in four pro-amalgamation Country Party members of the House of Assembly resigning from the party in January 1928, leaving it with only one sitting member, Archie Cameron, in Wooroora.16 By June 1932, the Country Party and Liberal Federation agreed to merge into the South Australian Liberal and Country League (LCL). The Country Party’s participation in this merger was prompted by its success in demanding a redistribution that provided over-representation for rural areas by a ratio of two country seats to one metropolitan – the so-called ‘Playmander’, after the premier, Thomas Playford. Cameron played a central role in the negotiations.17 There was no controversy in Queensland, where the Country Party and the Nationalists, who were re-badged as the United Party, had joined to form the Country Progressive Party in May 1925 and then became the Country and Progressive National Party (CPNP) from December that year. The CPNP survived for 12 years and held government in Queensland from 1929 to 1932.18 A future federal party leader, Arthur Fadden, was a CPNP member of the Queensland parliament

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from 1932–35, during which time he became shadow treasury spokesman.19 An independent Country Party re-emerged in 1936, largely because ‘there was never any enthusiasm for the Country and Progressive National Party beyond the City’ and because control of the party ‘was mainly by city representatives’.20 An important positive reaction came from New South Wales, where the Progressive Party, renamed The Country Party of New South Wales in August 1925, was sufficiently impressed with the continuing achievements of Page and his team to form a coalition with the Nationalists under Thomas Bavin, a former Progressive member, after the state election in October 1927.21

k Page realised he needed a more cohesive and influential federal party organisation that could weld the state parties more closely together at the federal level, irrespective of the way they chose to operate within their own jurisdictions. The AFFO brought the all-important farm groups together, but Page needed a party organisation, not a farm representative organisation, especially if the Country Party was to appeal to a wider section of the community than farmers and graziers. The AFFO convened a conference of Country Party delegates in Melbourne on 23 and 24 March 1926. Chaired by the AFFO president, Alfred Hunt, who was the immediate past-chairman of The Country Party of New South Wales, it was attended by 60 delegates from Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia, as well as six women representatives. Page told the conference the time had come to ‘carefully define the real aim and mission of the Country political movement’. After a day’s debate, the conference appointed a committee of 12 to draft a constitution. The following morning, it unanimously carried a motion recommending ‘the formation of an Australian Country Party Association’. The draft constitution, with minor amendments, was adopted. It established a

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central council of 23, made up of the federal leader and two other representatives elected by the federal parliamentary Country Party; three delegates each from the Country Party organisations of New South Wales and Victoria; two delegates each from the organisations in Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania; and one woman representative appointed by the affiliated women’s organisations in each state. The affiliation fees payable by the state bodies for the first year were set at £50 each for New South Wales and Victoria and £25 each for the other states.22 While the constitution forbade the central council from forming an alliance with any other political organisation ‘which does not preserve intact the entity of the Australian Country Party Association’, it was silent on whether or not the parliamentary party could do so, probably because the Bruce-Page Coalition was already a fact of life.23 The first meeting of the central council was held in Sydney on 30 September 1926, at which Page was elected chairman – a position he held until his death in 1961.24 The association’s first conference, in Sydney from 1 to 3 June 1927, streamlined the constitution by renaming the central council the federal council, to avoid confusion with the state central councils; making the parliamentary leader from each affiliated state a delegate to the council; defining rules and procedures governing the affiliation of organisations in states where no Country Party existed; and introducing a new section on federal policy, which provided that policy should be determined from time to time by a joint meeting of the federal council with the federal parliamentary party. Such a joint meeting was required at least every three years – once in the life of a parliament – and, while everyone attending could take part in debate, only federal councillors could vote.25 The conference also revised the party platform, advocating adequate defence for national security; preference for returned sailors and soldiers and the fulfillment of all promises made to them and their dependants; measures to increase production of primary industries, improve methods of distribution, and reduce production costs;

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uniform methods of tax assessment, company and insurance laws, and divorce laws; one authority for the assessment and collection of federal and state land and income taxes; one authority to administer federal and state electoral laws; and federal and state co-ordination in the provision of health services, notably the establishment of obstetric nursing and bush nursing centres in country districts. A new section was included to promote the development of country towns and secondary industries. 26 A conference in Melbourne in July 1937 amended the constitution to provide for the establishment of an executive – known today as the federal management committee – to manage the affairs of the party between meetings of the federal council.27 In December 1943, it was agreed to drop the word ‘Association’ from the organisation’s name, making it simply The Australian Country Party, and to recommend state organisations adopt the same name with the addition of their state. Two new provisions were inserted governing candidates and composite ministries – all candidates ‘must contest elections on Country Party policy only’ and ‘acceptance of portfolios in any other than a purely Country Party Government must be with the approval of a majority of members of the Federal Council’. A marginally less qualified right for the parliamentary party to enter into coalition arrangements was provided in the 1952 constitution, which stated that ‘unless the Federal Council has decided to the contrary, portfolios in a Composite Government may be accepted by the Australian Country Party’.28 This position remained virtually unchanged until 1988, when a wholesale revision of the constitution was implemented (see chapter 18). For Page in 1926–27, an important milestone had been achieved. The ACP had a formal federal organisation. While its members were predominantly representatives of the state Country parties, they could gather as delegates to the federal council and specifically consider federal party matters and Commonwealth issues. State party prejudices on such matters as coalition could in theory be divorced from the considerations of the federal council.

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Administrative and secretarial work associated with the new federal council became the responsibility of the general secretary of the New South Wales Country Party, EJ Munro, who was appointed honorary general secretary of the council.29 When journalist Ulrich Ellis became Page’s political secretary early in 1928 he began writing publicity for distribution to the press and the state Country parties. Ellis was a prodigious writer and researcher. He took over producing the Country Party Weekly Bulletin, which contained comments on current political issues and was sent to most newspapers. In 1932 he formed the grandly titled Federal Country Party Bureau of Publicity, Research and Information. Working from Page’s office in Parliament House, Canberra, with two typewriters, a Roneo machine given to him by the NSW Graziers’ Association, and a small rubber stamp bearing the bureau’s name, Ellis produced the Weekly Bulletin, pamphlets and speakers’ notes for use by parliamentarians and candidates. In 1936 he turned the Weekly Bulletin into a more substantial Country Party Bulletin, circulated to 750 newspapers throughout Australia, which Prime Minister Joe Lyons at one stage described as ‘notorious’. He opened an independent Office of Rural Research, located in the Canberra suburb of Manuka, in July 1948 and continued producing briefing notes and political material from there, under the auspices of a federal secretariat, until closing it when he resigned from Page’s staff early in 1960. 30

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Depression and Opposition

4: Depression and Opposition

A problem of coalition for Page was tariffs. The state and federal Country parties had championed low tariffs and protection in their early years, and still did so. The Nationalists were immovable in their support for tariffs and import duties to support manufacturing industries. Page knew he would never be able to realise the Country Party’s tariff objectives, especially as a partner in a Coalition government, which bound him and his fellow party ministers to cabinet decisions. He switched the emphasis of the parliamentary party’s policy from low protection to providing all-round protection – assistance for primary as well as secondary industries. For agriculture this basically meant tariffs on imports of food grown in abundance in Australia, such as maize, hops and sugar; subsidies on high production cost exports like dried fruits; and a fair return for wheat exports, rather than prices on a par with those prevailing overseas. Nonetheless, significant tariff hikes implemented by the government in 1926 and 1928 increased the pressure on Page from the state Country parties and farm organisations to return to the cross benches and renew an independent, unequivocal fight for lower tariffs.1 Largely

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because of the strong relationship between Bruce and Page, the Coalition was never seriously threatened by the tariff differences, even though there was dissent in the Country Party from the Western Australian members, Gregory and Prowse. One satisfying win was the establishment of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, under the chairmanship of Sydney University professor John Peden, to investigate the potential for constitutional reform and the creation of new states. The commission held its first meeting in Canberra on 19 September 1927 and was still under way when the elections were held on 17 November 1928.2 The government was returned, with a reduced but seemingly comfortable majority of 13 seats. The Nationalists lost six to Labor, being returned with 29. The Country Party, going into the election with 12 seats, lost Indi in Victoria when the sitting member, Cook, failed to lodge his nomination on time, giving Labor’s Paul Jones the election unopposed. The loss was offset by the party winning Wakefield in South Australia and Wide Bay in Queensland, returning it with 13 members. McWilliams, who had lost his seat of Franklin in 1922, won it back as an Independent, and the renegade Victorian Country Progressive, Stewart, held his seat of Wimmera. Labor’s representation increased to 31 and included among its new members two future prime ministers, John Curtin and Ben Chifley.3 In the Senate, the Country Party’s representation remained at four. Two departing New South Wales senators were replaced by Edward Johnston in Western Australia and Robert Charles Dunlop Elliott, known as ‘RD’ and a close friend of Page, in Victoria. Elliott was an astute businessman and newspaper proprietor who at one point wryly observed that ‘prosperity is created by producers and traders so that politicians can take the credit’.4 The government’s difficulties intensified as the world slid towards depression in 1929. Hughes, now the Member for North Sydney and on a personal mission of revenge against the two men who forced him from the Nationalist leadership in 1923, regularly voted against the government and garnered support from disaffected Nationalists

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as well as McWilliams and Stewart. Page’s August 1929 budget, which increased income tax and customs duties to offset sharply reduced export revenue caused by falling world commodity prices, was widely unpopular. There were problems with industrial relations. The government had sought but failed to increase the Commonwealth’s industrial powers at a referendum in 1926. By 1929, the worsening economic and employment conditions led to strikes in the timber, coal and maritime industries. In May, the Commonwealth unsuccessfully tried to reach agreement with the states on industrial powers at a special premiers’ conference, resulting in the government in early September introducing the Maritime Industries Bill into parliament. This measure, foreshadowed at the premiers’ conference, aimed to transfer most arbitration powers to the states and leave only the maritime industries under federal control. The bill was carried on 7 September by four votes, with Stewart, Hughes and two other Nationalists voting with Labor. A further motion to declare the bill urgent was also carried by four votes, with McWilliams this time replacing one of the Nationalists in voting with Labor. Three days later, with the House in committee, Hughes moved that the measure not be enacted until it had been referred to the people at a referendum or an election. Under standing orders, the chairman of committees, James Bayley (Nationalist, Oxley, Queensland) had no casting vote and the Speaker, Littleton Groom, was renowned for studiously upholding the view that under British tradition the Speaker did not involve himself in divisions. Bruce accepted the motion as one of no confidence and declared that if it was carried, he would seek an immediate election. The resultant vote saw the government go down by one vote, 35 to 34, with Bayley unable to vote, Groom refraining from voting, and Hughes, McWilliams, Stewart and three other Nationalists giving Labor the majority.5 Bruce sought an election for the House of Representatives and the date was set for 12 October 1929, with the Bruce-Page electoral pact of the previous two elections brought into play for a third time.

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The result was not good for the Nationalists. Bruce became the first sitting prime minister to lose his seat and was among 11 Nationalist casualties, leaving the party with only 14 seats. This was just four more than the Country Party, which fell to 10 with the loss of its deputy leader, Gibson, in Corangamite, and Gwydir to Labor, and Wakefield to the Nationalists. Five dissident Nationalists – Groom, Hughes, Edward Mann (Perth, Western Australia), Walter Marks (Wentworth, New South Wales), and George Maxwell (Fawkner, Victoria) – stood as Independent Nationalists, with Hughes, Marks and Maxwell being returned. Groom, who was refused Nationalist re-endorsement after his failure to save the government in the crucial division vote, was replaced by another Nationalist, Arthur Morgan. The Victorian Country Progressive, Stewart, comfortably held his seat. Labor increased its representation impressively to 46 and would in two months take this to 47: the Independent, McWilliams, the first federal leader of the Country Party who had increasingly swung his support behind Labor and was tacitly supported by Labor in the 1928 and 1929 elections, died suddenly within hours of the declaration of the poll in his Tasmanian seat of Franklin, on 22 October 1929. He had been suffering from angina. The Labor Party won the subsequent by-election on 14 December 1929.6

k Just after polling day the New York stock exchange collapsed, sparking the Great Depression. Nonetheless, a jubilant Labor Party took to the Treasury benches for the opening of parliament on 20 November 1929, under the leadership of Jim Scullin, who had been Opposition leader since March 1928 and who became Australia’s first Roman Catholic prime minister. With the loss of Bruce, the decimated Nationalists elected Page’s long-time friend and one-time strategic adviser, John Latham, as leader. Page remained Country Party leader and Tom Paterson was elected deputy to replace the defeated Gibson. The two parties, while working independently, co-operated in Opposition.

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Much to the pleasure of the farm bodies and state Country parties, being out of formal Coalition enabled the federal party to stridently attack the high tariff regime. While its demands for tariff cuts generally went well beyond what the Nationalists could contemplate, there was broad agreement between the two that reform was essential to reducing the impact of the depression. Before the election, Bruce and Page had been planning some tariff cuts. Scullin, on the other hand, with the support of the large manufacturing industries, which abhorred the Country Party’s policy, saw the depression as an opportunity to increase tariffs. He enacted ‘a tariff of unprecedented severity’ that made the Bruce-Page schedules look like ‘models of moderation’.7 Scullin’s philosophy, to use a tariff regime that cut the flow of imports and so increase employment in domestic secondary industries, was doomed to failure because of what it ignored, namely that with a disastrous fall in exports of primary products, farmers were unable to buy the high priced machinery and equipment produced by protected secondary industries.8 Local manufacturers began losing markets and could no longer sustain their employment levels. The queues of jobless men mounted relentlessly. Before the Wall Street crash, unemployment in Australia was already a high 10 per cent. It doubled to 21 per cent in 1930 and to more than 30 per cent by mid-1932.9 The Country Party stepped up its anti-tariff rhetoric. Many members and supporters would say it returned to form. Page raised tariffs as the key point for discussion at the triennial meeting of the Australian Country Party Association in 1930. At the same time, in September 1930, the Victorian Country Party and the breakaway Country Progressives re-united, enabling Stewart to rejoin the federal parliamentary party and increase its lower house numbers to 11.10

k The depression had many political impacts. Incumbent governments were generally doomed to electoral oblivion as they scrambled to find answers to overcome a compounding financial crisis and mass

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unemployment and the mounting social problems associated with them. Political organisations divided and split. The only mainstream political group not to be racked with division and disunity was the Country Party. Hughes and his Independent Nationalists, together with another disgruntled Nationalist, New South Wales Senator Walter Duncan, briefly formed The Australian Party. Other political and quasi-political groups emerged in 1930 and 1931, such as the Young Patriots’ Association, the Australian Citizens’ League and the United Australia Movement. The latter two joined forces to become the All for Australia League and within three months boasted a membership exceeding 140 000.11 More radical groups like the Communist Party on the left and the New Guard on the right also enjoyed increased membership. The push for new states, particularly in New South Wales, gained new momentum, especially after the Labor government under Premier JT (Jack) Lang defaulted on interest payments in London and New York to the tune of £854 628 in March 1931.12 Four new state movements in New South Wales joined to form the United Country Movement and the Country Party in New South Wales changed its name to the United Country Party (UCP) to help it become the political voice of the movement.13 The Labor Party was ripping itself apart on two fronts. The Treasurer, Edward Theodore, a former Queensland premier, was forced to resign his portfolio at the end of 1930, pending legal developments over a Queensland royal commission report which questioned his role in some mining transactions when he was premier. Scullin, on the verge of leaving for an imperial conference in London, appointed his trade and customs minister, James Fenton, the acting PM and made Postmaster-General Joe Lyons, acting Treasurer. On his return in January 1931, Scullin re-appointed Theodore as Treasurer, even though the legal proceedings over the royal commission report were not resolved. Fenton and Lyons regarded this as a lack of confidence in them by Scullin and resigned from the ministry on 4 February. The two, together with three other government members, sealed their fate so far as the Labor Party was concerned when they supported a Nationalist motion

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of no confidence in the government in March. All five resigned from the Labor Party and a sixth joined them a few days later.14 There were those who supported Lang’s policy for dealing with the depression, the Lang Plan, which called for the suspension of interest payments to British bond holders, the compulsory reduction of interest on all Australian borrowings, the abandonment of the gold standard, and the adoption of a new currency. The plan was rejected by the Loan Council on 9 February 1931.15 One plan supporter was the Labor candidate for a by-election in East Sydney on 7 March 1931, Eddie Ward. Ward was successfully elected, but had pledged support for the state Labor Party’s platform during the campaign, and therefore for the Lang Plan, rather than that of the federal party. Caucus refused to admit him, resulting in four New South Wales members and two senators joining Ward as renegade Labor men. The ALP federal conference expelled the New South Wales branch of the party and unwittingly gave birth to what became known as Lang Labor.16 With so much division, it was only a matter of time before the Scullin government would fall. The non-Labor groups began thinking about a new, united organisation. On 9 April 1931, the National Federation met in Melbourne to discuss possibilities. After Lyons and his five dissenting Labor colleagues voted with the Nationalists and Country Party on a motion to adjourn the House on 14 April, Latham wrote to Lyons and Page enclosing a copy of proposals ‘approving in principle unity of action between parties and groups having similar objectives’.17 While history shows the Country Party held true to its independent entity, the overtures led to the formation of the United Australia Party (UAP), made up of the Nationalists, the Lyons group and the Hughes group. Latham was happy to stand down from the Opposition leadership, paving the way for Lyons to be elected the first leader of the UAP at a meeting on 7 May. Latham was elected deputy leader. An irony was that Hughes, whose Nationalist leadership in 1923 was to a large extent scuttled by Latham’s work with Page and the Country Party, joined the UAP and served under Latham’s deputy leadership.

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Like the Bruce-Page government just over two years earlier, the Scullin government was brought down by rebels in its ranks. One of the Lang Labor members, John Beasley (West Sydney, New South Wales), moved for the adjournment of the House on 25 November 1931 so it could discuss the allocation of funds for unemployment relief programs, claiming an undue proportion had been allocated to Theodore’s electorate. The UAP and Country Party voted with the Lang Labor members to defeat the government, by 37 votes to 32, forcing Scullin to call an election for 19 December.18 There was no electoral pact for the campaign, as there had been for the previous three polls, but there was a strong spirit of co-operation between the new UAP and the Country Party. Page and Lyons had agreed a month before Scullin was defeated in the House of Representatives that they would fight the election on a joint program as ‘a symbol of common objective’. They even issued a joint policy for the campaign, which was not surprising, as Page had told Latham on 6 May that he wanted to continue ‘friendly relations’ and would ‘wholeheartedly assist in every endeavour to secure an appeal to the country at the earliest possible moment and to formulate and support a positive policy that will bring about the restoration of confidence and the speedy rehabilitation of the affairs of the Commonwealth’.19 The joint policy contained a commitment to hold a series of referendums in New South Wales on new states, thereby adopting the majority report of the Peden royal commission, which proposed a constitutional amendment to pave the way for the establishment of new states ‘having a territory not less than the territory of the State of Tasmania’.20 More significantly, the policy contained a commitment for a scientific review of tariffs with a view to encouraging and protecting efficient primary and secondary industries; expanding primary and secondary exports; encouraging British Empire trade; and negotiating reciprocal trade treaties with other nations.21 Page fully expected the UAP and Country Party to form a coalition after the election. There was no doubt that Labor would lose; the only question was to what extent. Herein lay a problem for the

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Country Party. While it impressively increased its numbers to 16, which included the return of former deputy leader, Gibson, in Corangamite, the UAP was returned with 40 seats – among them Flinders, regained by Stanley Bruce – and could also count on the support of Littleton Groom, who won Darling Downs back as an Independent. The Labor Party was still in disarray, with the federal party winning only 14 seats and Lang Labor four.22 Lyons had a majority in his own right. He did not need the Country Party and the UAP party room was unwilling to sanction a composite government. Despite this, Lyons offered up to three portfolios to Country Party representatives, but insisted that he, not the Country Party leader, would decide who those ministers would be. The Country Party feared this would effectively make its representatives UAP, not Country Party ministers. The leaders agreed to disagree, issuing a joint statement which concluded that the Country Party ‘would be glad to co-operate as far as possible with the new Government in a friendly spirit in carrying out the policy on which the election was fought’.23 As events turned out, Page would have been pleased the Country Party was not involved in this government because tariffs quickly became an issue on which it got bogged down for most of its term. Many previous Nationalist and Labor members of the UAP were high protectionists and Lyons was unable to meet the commitment of the pre-election joint policy. The Country Party constantly called for tariff reductions, revisions or references to the Tariff Board, and was frequently supported in divisions by some of the UAP members representing country seats, of which there were 16. But the government was never in jeopardy as its more cautious approach was generally supported by the Labor members. The Ottawa Agreement, signed in August 1932, should have paved the way for more rapid tariff reform. The agreement set out basic principles of trade between Australia and Great Britain. In return for guaranteed preferential access for a substantial range of Australian goods in British markets, Australia would observe a basic set of tariff principles: it would protect only those industries which were reasonably assured

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of success; levels of protection should not deny efficient British producers the opportunity of reasonable competition; as soon as practicable, existing protective duties should be reviewed by the Tariff Board, and where necessary, parliamentary action would follow such review. The Ottawa Agreement was not ratified by the federal parliament until 29 November. In the meantime, on 13 October, the government introduced a new consolidated tariff schedule, which reduced a handful of tariffs on British goods while leaving most at their high levels, and increased rates for other foreign goods. The high tariff regime of the Scullin government fundamentally remained in force. Fluctuations in exchange rates, coupled with high tariffs, often led to protection levels in excess of 100 per cent, providing protection to inefficient industries and creating a strong incentive for the local manufacture of goods for which there was little demand. Page suggested one way of fixing the problem was to place the exchange rate permanently in the hands of the Commonwealth Bank and provide, through amendment to the Customs Act, that whenever exchange rates changed, tariffs would be adjusted accordingly. Although the government did not take up his suggestion, Lyons agreed to refer the matter to the Tariff Board. The board produced a comprehensive formula for reform, which led to the government early in 1933 cutting tariffs on about 300 items by between five and 12.5 per cent and on a further 400 items by even more – a significant victory for the Country Party. 24

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Tragedy, triumph and downfall

5: Tragedy, triumph and downfall

Earle Page and his wife, Ethel, suffered a tragedy in January 1933 when their eldest son, also Earle, died. Together with his brother, Iven, the young Earle had been moving a mob of cattle to the family’s Heifer Station property, near Grafton. A sudden, violent thunderstorm struck when the two were six miles short of the property. They took shelter in a culvert until the worst appeared to be over, and had remounted and begun regrouping the cattle when Earle and his horse were struck by lightning and killed.1 Page implored his secretary, adviser, confidant and friend, Ellis, to travel from Canberra as quickly as possible. Ellis found ‘a stricken family’, adding that ‘after this blow, Doctor and Mrs Page were never quite as they were’.2 Page’s instinct was to resign as party leader and even from parliament, but the party room urged him not to. It appointed deputy leader Paterson as acting leader. Page was granted leave from parliament and did not return until October.3 It is interesting to consider the tolerance and understanding of the party room to Page’s predicament. Political parties are naturally made up of ambitious people not known for their patience. At no time was there any suggestion within the Country

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Party that Page should be replaced, just as, many years later, the parliamentary party would stand by Doug Anthony as its leader when he was stricken with hepatitis for much of 1976 and absent from the leadership for four months to February 1977. Under Paterson’s acting leadership, the party continued to pester the government over tariffs and for programs to restore the competitiveness of primary industries on world markets. Page later made an interesting observation about this period of non-coalition, saying it ‘sharpened our wits and enabled us to prepare public opinion for the policies we hoped to implement when the next opportunity came’. He noted that ‘the rank and file of a party which closely supports a government for too long faces the danger of succumbing to apathy’.4 As the 1934 elections approached, Page and Lyons again tested the scope for an electoral arrangement. With the impact of the depression still being felt, especially across the export-producing primary industries, a comprehensive program of rural relief was a priority for the Country Party. The agreement of Lyons to this made some joint arrangements possible. There would be some joint Senate tickets, but no vetoing of three-cornered contests, although, where these did occur, the parties would work to ensure a close exchange of preferences. There was no pre-election agreement on working in coalition after the election. Page and Lyons launched their separate campaigns for the 15 September 1934 election on the same day, 14 August. Among Page’s priorities were the establishment of an Australian Agricultural Council and re-establishment of the Australian Transport Council, each made up of respective federal and state ministers; a national insurance scheme; a Commonwealth/state rural adjustment scheme; and constitutional reform to facilitate the creation of new states.5 Lyons’s policy was complementary in all major respects, except tariffs. The Country Party wanted a thorough inquiry, with a view to further cutting tariffs, whereas the UAP would maintain its existing policy.6 The UAP’s numbers fell from the 40 held after the 1931 election to

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33, and included four South Australians who were members of that state’s Liberal and Country League (LCL), formed in June 1932. One notable newcomer was Robert Menzies in Kooyong, replacing Latham. The Labor Party remained divided, with the federal party winning 18 seats and Lang Labor taking its New South Wales representation to nine. The Country Party result was complicated by events in Victoria. In August, the state’s central council decided that all candidates, state or federal, should sign a pledge, which, among other conditions, required them to ‘refuse to support a composite government without the approval of the Victorian organisation’.7 The sitting Victorian federal members, Gibson, Hill, McClelland, Paterson and Senator Elliott, refused to sign. Hill went so far as to resign from his seat of Echuca on 7 August, while Gibson took advantage of a UAP invitation to join a so-called joint Senate team, resigning from his seat of Corangamite, even though Elliott was running as a Country Party Senate candidate, unendorsed by the Victorian organisation, but supported by the federal party. The Victorian organisation endorsed candidates who supported its pledge in several seats, including those held by McClelland and Paterson. One was John McEwen in Echuca, who faced off against a Labor candidate and two Independent Country Party men who were also backed by the federal party.8 Page entered the Echuca campaign, supporting the two Independents, much to the chagrin of McEwen, who carried the day on Labor preferences. McClelland and Paterson retained their seats, but Corangamite was lost to the UAP and Elliott was defeated by Gibson, who was excluded from the party room for his treachery, prompting him to retort that ‘four hundred thousand people put me into the Senate, and a dozen people exclude me from the Party’.9 The LCL allowed its federal parliamentarians to choose which non-Labor party to sit with in Canberra and one of the five elected, the former leader of the South Australian Country Party and newly elected Member for Barker, Archie Cameron, sat with the Country

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Party. Despite his supposed support for the Victorian organisation, McEwen aligned himself with the federal party, so its overall parliamentary numbers only slipped by one, from 16 to 15 members.10 Lyons had two options: pursue the highly risky course of forming a minority government, or guarantee a solid majority and stability by forming a coalition with the Country Party. He chose the latter, but was unable to conclude an agreement because of the Country Party’s insistence that a key plank of policy must be a Tariff Board inquiry into unprofitable protected industries. A minority government was formed, but just how tenuous it was became clear on the first day of the new parliamentary sitting on 23 October. When the Prime Minister moved for a special adjournment of the House of Representatives to enable members to attend the Melbourne Cup on the first Tuesday of November, Page cheekily advised that his party was opposed to the recess and all Labor members indicated they would support him.11 Lyons withdrew the motion and hurried negotiations were re-opened, resulting in a new Coalition ministry being announced on 1 November and sworn in on 9 November. The joint Lyons-Page statement said ‘a satisfactory understanding has been come to regarding general policy’ and added that the Prime Minister had assured Page that on tariffs ‘the decisions made … were of such a character as would be generally acceptable to the Country Party’.12 Page was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Commerce; Paterson, Minister for the Interior; James Hunter, Minister without portfolio representing the Postmaster-General in the House of Representatives; and the Member for Calare in New South Wales, Harold Thorby, Minister without portfolio in charge of War Service Homes and assisting the Minister for Repatriation.13 As a result of subsequent tariff policy, 465 items of machinery not made in Australia, but necessary for Australian industries and subject to high duties, were placed on the free list.14

k

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Controversy flared in October 1935 over the issue of a Senate leader of the Country Party. At the time, there were six party senators – Macartney Abbott and Charles Hardy (New South Wales), Oliver Badman (South Australia), William Carroll and Edward Johnston (Western Australia), and Walter Cooper (Queensland). Up to now, the party had not elected a Senate leader, but had instead, for about ten years, appointed one of its number to act as the representative of the party in regard to formal matters affecting procedure – a sort of liaison officer. The position had been occupied for most of the time by Carroll, who in October 1935 was absent through illness. The rationale for having no formal leader was that the senators were first and foremost representatives of their states, able to enjoy complete freedom of action and speech in the Senate and not beholden to the dictates of the party, or of a party Senate leader. Hardy announced to the Senate on 3 October that a meeting of Country Party senators earlier in the day – there were five present, given Carroll’s absence – ‘acting at the request of the United Parliamentary Country party, have appointed me as Leader of that party in the Senate’.15 Johnston and Carroll strongly disputed this, saying Hardy’s appointment had been to act as the party’s representative, as per the previous arrangement. Johnston said Hardy’s announcement was ‘at complete variance’ with that which the meeting had authorised him to make and declared: ‘There is no Leader of the Country Party in the Senate.’ Hardy refuted Johnston’s assertions and suggested the latter was airing his grievances because he ‘was the only senator besides myself nominated for the position of leader.’ 16 The issue was settled on 10 October when a meeting of the entire party room approved the appointment of a party leader in the Senate. Johnston had been sent a special invitation by Page to attend, but declined, saying his views had been clearly expressed and he had nothing to add: ‘I have no real differences with the Country party except on this major question of the alteration of the status of Country party senators, by the new appointment of a Country party leader in this chamber.’17

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Johnston, who had been a senator since July 1929, said the 3 October 1935 meeting was ‘the first separate meeting of the Country party senators which had been held since I have been a member of this chamber’. He declared the meeting had been a ‘complete failure’ and doubted that the ‘experiment’ would be repeated.18 It was a messy start to the concept of the senators electing their own leader. Hardy, regarded by many as a fascist, had headed the Riverina and United Country movements in New South Wales in the early 1930s and was described by Johnston as the ‘Cromwell of the Riverina’. He held the party’s Senate leadership until retiring from parliament in June 1938. Thereafter, no leader appears to have been elected until 1949, no doubt mainly because the party’s Senate numbers over the decade were gradually reduced to one before returning to four in 1949 and increasing to five from February 1950. Cooper was elected the party’s Senate leader from 1949 and the position has been maintained ever since.19

k Page’s Australian Agricultural Council was established in 1935 and, as Minister for Commerce, he travelled to the United Kingdom in 1936 and 1938 to successfully press for improved access for Australian produce under the Ottawa Agreement. On the first mission he had to do battle with the British over a trade agreement they had signed in 1933 with Argentina, which resulted in a cutback in imports of Australian meat into the United Kingdom. While this appeared to contravene the preferential treatment Australia should have enjoyed under the Ottawa Agreement, what riled the government more was that it had been signed without any reference to or consultation with Australia.20 The issue was resolved by Page’s delegation, but the incident gave an indication of how cavalier the British could be with their Commonwealth partners, as would prove to be the case when Britain joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in January 1973.

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To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

Promoting Australian produce: Earle Page, left, attends a trade exhibition at Australia House, London, 30 April 1936. His companion inspecting an apple is the Secretary of the Department of Commerce, FJ Murphy (the Page family)

The government was returned at the elections on 23 October 1937. The most interesting aspect from the Country Party point of view was that the ongoing split in the Victorian party saw the sitting pro-federal Country Party Member for Wimmera, Hugh McClelland, beaten by an anti-coalition Victorian organisation candidate, Alexander Wilson, who sat in the parliament as an Independent, calling himself an Independent Country Party member. At the time this had little impact, as the government boasted 29 UAP, including one Independent UAP, and 15 Country Party members to Labor’s 29.21 Wilson, however, would become central to the downfall of the government led by the Country Party’s Arthur Fadden in 1941. The three other Victorian members, McEwen, now the Member for Indi, following a redistribution,

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Paterson in Gippsland, and the newly elected George Rankin in Bendigo, all supported the parliamentary ACP. A further ramification of the Victorian split came when McEwen, who was proving to be a solid parliamentary ACP performer, was appointed Minister for the Interior. The Victorian organisation, already miffed that he had snubbed it after the 1934 election and supported the composite government, ordered him not to accept the appointment. McEwen ignored the edict, arguing the pledge only applied to state and not federal parliamentarians. The party responded by expelling him. A new breakaway group, the Liberal-Country Party, supporting the parliamentary ACP, was formed early in 1938, which McEwen joined, as did Paterson. Rankin finally bowed to the pressure of the Victorian organisation and withdrew from the federal parliamentary party in May 1939, but he continued to support both it and the Coalition. The Country Party’s 15 members met on 30 November 1937 for their post-election appointment of leaders. Page was re-elected unopposed. There were two nominations for deputy – McEwen and Thorby. Paterson, who had been deputy for eight years, wanted to retire from the job and from the ministry. The ballot became interesting when the newly elected Member for Richmond, Hubert Lawrence Anthony, said he did not think it would be right for him to participate in the vote as he did not know either contestant.22 His abstention resulted in the ballot being tied, with seven votes cast for each candidate. Page favoured Thorby as his deputy. While he recognised McEwen’s political skills – he had recommended him for the ministry – he didn’t want him as his deputy. The two simply did not like each other. McEwen hadn’t forgotten how Page campaigned against him in Echuca in 1934. Page spoke to the scrutineers who in turn persuaded Anthony to break the deadlock. In the second ballot, Thorby was elected by one vote. 23 There is no evidence of Page having pressured Anthony to vote for Thorby. It is more likely that Anthony, not knowing either candidate, decided to support the one from his own state. On the other hand, Page and Anthony held neighbouring electorates and it is equally

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possible that Anthony was aware of the antipathy between McEwen and Page. Ian Robinson said the dislike ran deep: ‘There couldn’t have been a greater animosity and deeper resentment between two people than there was between McEwen and Page. It was so great that I don’t think it could ever be properly or fully described. Yet it was never allowed to affect the party’s structure, effectiveness and success’.24 McEwen would have to wait a further six years before being elected deputy leader in September 1943 and then another 15 years before becoming leader in March 1958. The re-negotiated Coalition saw Page take on Health as well as retain Commerce. Thorby became Minister for Defence; McEwen, Minster for the Interior; Thompson, Minister assisting the Treasurer; and Cameron, Minister assisting the Minister for Commerce.25 Cameron was an interesting character with a tempestuous nature. Born of strict Presbyterian parents, he left the Nairne Public School in South Australia at the age of 12, cleared scrub on his father’s farm near Loxton, and served on the Western Front in World War I. Neither a drinker nor a smoker, he was received into the Roman Catholic Church and raised eyebrows when he accepted his commission as a government minister by making an affirmation instead of swearing the oath of allegiance. He became the first minister to be suspended from the federal parliament when he called the Victorian Independent Country Party man, Wilson, a ‘clean-skin’ – meaning unbranded, and so of doubtful quality – and refused to withdraw the comment. In November 1938, he was promoted to PostmasterGeneral, in which post he demonstrated his heavy-handed approach to portfolio administration. Within a month he temporarily revoked Sydney Radio 2KY’s licence because he objected to the views expressed by one of its commentators. He is also said to have told the chairman of the Australian Broadcasting Commission, WJ Cleary, to forget his charter, saying ‘I don’t believe in boards or commissions – I believe in ministerial control’.26

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As 1938 progressed it became clear Europe was again heading dangerously close to war and much of the Australian government’s focus was concentrated on building the nation’s defence capability in expectation of once more being called upon to help defend the Empire. On the domestic front, the government suffered heavy internal conflict over its National Health and Pensions Insurance Bill, a piece of legislation that had been on and off the political agenda in one form or another since first being introduced by Page as Treasurer in 1928. The complex bill aimed to consolidate a range of federal and state social services, including old age, widows’, orphans’ and invalid pensions, maternity benefits, workers’ compensation, sick pay and family medical benefits, under a single national insurance scheme. There was division within both the UAP and Country Party over elements of the bill. Anthony, for instance, wanted small farmers to be exempt from some provisions that would add to their costs, while Badman, now the Member for Grey, South Australia, having switched from the Senate, and fellow Country Party member, Bernard Corser (Wide Bay, Queensland), voted against the entire package.27 In the end, it passed and received royal assent, but its scheduled enactment from 1 January 1939 never eventuated; the cabinet decided defence spending had to take priority – which in turn produced a new crisis.28 On 14 March 1939, as Germany began its invasion of Czechoslovakia, Menzies resigned as Attorney-General, Minister for Industry and deputy leader of the UAP. He felt compelled to do so because he had given an undertaking to his electorate that the national insurance scheme would be implemented and he could not accept the cabinet’s deferral. The crisis deepened three weeks later when Prime Minister Lyons died suddenly on 7 April. There had been no intervening meeting of the UAP to replace Menzies as deputy, so the UAP was leaderless. The Governor-General, Lord Gowrie, called on the acting PM, Page, to form a government with full authority. This was done the same day Lyons died, with Page making no changes to the ministry and saying

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he would retain the prime ministership only until the UAP elected a new leader. He warned, however, that if Menzies became leader, he would not serve in his cabinet. Page thought Menzies had been self-indulgent in walking out of the cabinet and destabilising the government with the world on the brink of war: ‘I urged that it was unthinkable for the third-ranking man in the Ministry to resign at such a time. But I could not shake him. Next morning the story of Hitler’s coup [Germany’s invasion of Czechoslovakia] was published by the Melbourne Argus on the whole of one page and the resignation of Menzies dominated another’.29 Page’s concern about Menzies went deeper than his action over national insurance. He doubted the ability of Menzies to lead the country at such a critical time and believed Australia needed an all-party national government under a leader acceptable to the UAP, ACP and Labor. To this end, he approached his friend and former parliamentary colleague, Stanley Bruce, now Australia’s High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, to return home and head up such a government, even offering to vacate his seat of Cowper to facilitate Bruce’s return to parliament. The parliamentary Country Party, on 18 April, supported the idea of bringing Bruce back, although whether Page told the party room of his preparedness to leave parliament is not clear: ‘ … the Country Party unanimously approve of the suggestion for Mr Bruce to return to Australia to form a Government with a Cabinet drawn from all parties or members who are willing to co-operate to that end.’ The party room carried a further motion, endorsing Page’s refusal to work with Menzies: In spite of past harmonious co-operation in government with the United Australia Party and a willingness to continue similar cooperation to maintain stable government, the Party is definitely unable to co-operate in a Government with the Hon. R. G. Menzies, K. C., as its Prime Minister; nor is it willing to give any undertaking to support such a government if it be formed.30

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This was heavy brinkmanship. Page had accused Menzies of destabilising the government at a critical time and yet here he was, together with his parliamentary party, threatening precisely the same. Such was his concern about Menzies and his belief in the need for a national government that he was able to carry the argument in the party room. In the meantime, the UAP went ahead with its leadership ballot, with Menzies emerging the victor. Menzies met with Page on the evening of 18 April and told him he was not enthusiastic about a national government. Page told Menzies the Country Party would not work with him.31 Two days later, at 11.13 in the morning, Page told the House of Representatives he would tender the resignation of his administration to the Governor-General in the afternoon and moved a special adjournment of parliament for two weeks to enable the formation of a new government. There the parliament could have risen. But Page launched into an astonishing attack on Menzies, a central part of which questioned the latter’s decision not to serve in World War I: ‘Some 24 years ago the right honourable member for Kooyong was a member of the Australian Military Forces and held the King’s Commission. In 1915, after having been in the military forces for some years, he resigned his commission and did not go overseas’.32 As the House of Representatives descended into uproar, with government members from both parties looking decidedly uncomfortable, Page said he was not calling into question Menzies’ reasons for not serving, but argued Menzies had not explained ‘to the satisfaction of the very great body of people who did participate in the war, his reasons’, adding that because of this he feared Menzies would not be able to ‘get the maximum effort from the people of Australia … ’. A seething Menzies replied that he concluded the door to any negotiation on co-operation between the UAP and Country parties was now ‘closed, bolted and barred’. He regarded his resignation from the ministry and deputy leadership as ‘one of the more respectable actions of my public life’ and said the issue of not having served in the war represented a ‘stream of mud through which I have waded at every

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election campaign in which I have participated’. He had not resigned his commission, but had completed his period of service under the then existing system of compulsory military training and decided that, as two brothers were serving in the Australian Imperial Force, his duty was to remain at home. After the debate, four Country Party men, Arthur Fadden (Darling Downs, Queensland), Bernard Corser, Thomas Collins, and Oliver Badman, dissociated themselves from Page’s attack and sat as Independent Country Party members – although not aligned with the Victorian Wilson. Page had split his party, raising speculation he would be dumped as leader. The next day’s The Sydney Morning Herald, describing his speech as ‘one of the most extraordinary’ in Commonwealth parliamentary history, said Page had told his colleagues very little about what he intended to say in the parliament.33 However, Fadden in his memoirs indicated the party room had, in fact, been given a reasonably comprehensive briefing: When Menzies was elected Leader of the United Australia Party, Page gave a meeting of Country Party members an outline of the speech he proposed to make in Parliament, explaining why he refused to serve under him. In this he attacked Menzies in forthright and strongly personal terms. As a comparatively new backbencher I told Page that his remarks would be grossly unfair to Menzies. I said I did not believe that such an attack was justified and that I would not be a party to it. In this attitude I was supported by two colleagues – Bernie Corser from Queensland and Tom Collins from New South Wales. Subsequently, Oliver Badman of South Australia joined us in our stand. In the face of our criticism Page reluctantly consented to modify his statement, at least in regard to what we considered the more objectionable features … The House met in an atmosphere of tension and Page … proceeded to express his feelings towards Menzies along the lines to which my three colleagues and I had so strenuously objected. This was a big disappointment to me.34

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Other members also found the issue embarrassing. Anthony in Richmond had to tread the fine line between supporting and admonishing his neighbouring electorate colleague and leader. On 26 April, the day the Menzies UAP government was sworn in, Anthony returned to his electorate and issued a press release to his local newspaper: ‘In common with other Country Party members, I regret that what was otherwise a strong case for the Country Party attitude towards Mr Menzies should have been overshadowed by the unfortunate war reference, which, it must be admitted, was a lapse of judgement’. Seeking to excuse, or at least mitigate, Page’s mistake, Anthony said he had seen first-hand the ‘great emotional strain’ under which Page had been since the death of Lyons. Sounding a warning about the potential direction of the Menzies government, he said the priority in such a time of national emergency was to ensure the interests of primary producers were not ‘side-tracked by the new Government, practically the whole of whose members are drawn from city constituencies and the leader of which [Menzies] has shown no great political sympathy in the past with the Country Party in its fight for country interests’.35 Page appeared unmoved by the crisis he had created. He continued to snipe at Menzies in the coming weeks, notably over the Prime Minister’s reversal of Lyons-Page government initiatives regarding defence.36 Such was the concern of the New South Wales party’s central council that on 19 July 1939, it unanimously carried a resolution calling on Page to stop criticising Menzies. The resolution was not written into the minutes, but conveyed to Page in a private and confidential letter signed by the New South Wales party chairman, Joseph Abbott: My dear Sir Earle: At a meeting of the Central Council of the United Country Party of N.S.W., which was held today … the following resolution was unanimously carried: “That the Central Council of the United Country Party deplores the continual personal attacks by Sir Earle Page on the Prime

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Minister … and asks that Sir Earle be requested to desist from such statements, particularly as they are seriously damaging the Country Party in the minds of the electors.” With regard to this motion, the Council asked that I write to you personally to say; firstly, that the Council has no intention of publishing the motion; secondly, that the motion will not be put even in the Minutes of the Council, but that the Council is in deadly earnest in what they say, and is very worried indeed at the repercussions which are taking place in the country districts amongst the electors, owing to the continual personal attacks which you are making on the Prime Minister.

The letter warned that unless Page’s criticisms ceased, ‘the most dire results would accrue to the Party’ and would eventually ‘cause their destruction in the electorate’.37

k Parliament adjourned for the winter recess on 16 June. Britain declared war against Germany on 3 September and when parliament met again on 6 September, Australia was also at war. Page wrote to Menzies offering the support of the Country Party and his willingness to join a composite government with the UAP and, if possible, the Labor Party, thus forming a national government. The Opposition leader, John Curtin, pledged Labor’s support for the war effort, but declined to become part of an all-party administration. Not surprisingly, Menzies spurned Page’s olive branch, insisting that if the Country Party was to return to government, he, not that party’s leader, would choose who the ACP ministers would be. Acknowledging the imperative of co-operative government, Page resigned his leadership on 13 September to pave the way for the re-establishment of the Coalition. Before voting on a new leader, the party room had to decide whether to admit the four members, Fadden, Corser, Collins and Bad-

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man. Deputy leader Thorby moved that they not be allowed in and the motion was narrowly carried. McEwen and Cameron contested the leadership, with Cameron winning by seven votes to five. The Sydney Morning Herald reported the four would have supported McEwen and ‘if present at the meeting, they would have ensured his election’.38 Once again, McEwen’s leadership ambitions were side-lined. With Page no longer leader, the four rejoined the party room from 14 November on the understanding that the party would generally support the government and personal criticism would cease.39

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Fadden takes the reins

6: Fadden takes the reins

The Coalition was not immediately re-formed. Menzies calculated that the Country Party, holding the balance of power, would not threaten his minority administration, particularly as Australia was now at war. A shocking by-election result early in the year caused him to re-think this strategy. In January 1940, Menzies appointed his Treasurer, Richard Casey, as Australia’s first Minister to the United States, the equivalent of ambassador. The by-election for Casey’s Victorian seat of Corio was held on 2 March, and was comprehensively won by the Labor Party.1 On 13 March Menzies offered the Country Party five portfolios, with their ministers to be selected by the mutual agreement of both leaders. The new Coalition was sworn in the next day, with Cameron becoming Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Navy and for Commerce; Thorby, Postmaster-General and Minister for Health; McEwen, Minister for External Affairs; Fadden, Minister without portfolio assisting the Minister for Supply and Development and assisting the Treasurer; and the Member for Riverina, Horace Nock, Minister without portfolio in charge of External Territories and assisting the Prime

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Minister and Minister for the Interior.2 Page remained on the back bench. Early in August 1940, after the government and opposition had failed to agree on new proposals for joint administration – by way of an all-party national war council or a revisited national government concept – Menzies announced a general election for 14 September. The campaign had barely begun when the government was rocked with the loss of three senior ministers and two high-ranking army officers among 10 killed when a RAAF Lockheed Hudson aircraft crashed on approach to Canberra aerodrome on 13 August after a flight from Melbourne. The dead included the ministers for the army and for air and civil aviation, Geoffrey Street and James Fairbairn, and the vice-president of the executive council, Henry Gullett – all UAP Victorian members of the House of Representatives. From the military, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Sir Brudenell White, and the officer attached to the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel F Thornthwaite, died. Also killed were the crew of four and Fairbairn’s private secretary, Richard Elford. Fadden, who was at the Melbourne meeting, was offered and accepted a seat on the aircraft, but then gave it up so that Elford could stay in Melbourne overnight to celebrate his first wedding anniversary. As a result of the crash, the election was postponed for a week, to 21 September. In hasty ministerial adjustments, Fadden took over Fairbairn’s portfolios. He said Menzies was ‘temporarily shattered’ by the disaster, but ‘even in the face of such tragedy the government of a country must go on’. 3 The election result was not a happy one for the government or the Country Party. Labor, with the support of Lang’s members from New South Wales, won 36 seats. The Coalition also had 36 – UAP 23 and Country Party 13. The Country Party lost two sitting ministers, Thorby, who was also deputy leader, and Nock.4 Wilson, the Victorian Country Party member sitting as an Independent in Wimmera was joined by another, non-aligned Independent, Arthur Coles, in the seat of Henty. Wilson and Coles held the balance of power.

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To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

At the post-election party meeting on 16 October, which also included the party’s senators, Cameron faced the embarrassment of receiving no immediate nomination for re-election as leader. He had recently given a speech in Gippsland that angered many in the party because they believed it did not reflect policy, especially on wheat stabilisation. Several in the party room wanted a change in leadership and the numbers were looking strong for McEwen. Page, a friend of Cameron, was persuaded to again contest the top job, primarily so that his

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preferences might favour Cameron. The plan fell apart when Cameron, after allowing a long and sometimes critical debate of his statements on wheat stabilisation, in somewhat typical fashion lost his temper. Gregory eventually nominated Cameron, explaining that while his action did not necessarily indicate support, it would be wrong for him not to be in the ballot. Cameron further harangued the meeting before hurling his boots at the wall and declaring that he would leave the Country Party and sit with the UAP, which he was entitled to do as a member of the Liberal and Country League, and which he subsequently did.5 Page persuaded him to stay and chair the meeting, but Cameron refused to take part in the vote. The ballot resulted in a tie of eight votes each for McEwen and Page. Two further ballots brought the same result. Still Cameron refused to vote to break the deadlock. The new Member for New England, Joseph Abbott, who had beaten his Country Party predecessor, Victor Thompson, in a multiple endorsement contest, suggested the party room resolve the impasse by electing Fadden as deputy leader – a position for which he had overwhelming support – and then appoint him as acting leader for a few months before holding another ballot. Everyone agreed and no further ballot was taken to appoint another deputy. The Menzies-Fadden ministry was sworn in on 28 October, with the Country Party representatives being: Fadden, as Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer; McEwen, Minister for Air and for Civil Aviation; Page, Minister for Commerce; Anthony, assisting the Treasurer and the Minister for Commerce; and Collins, Minister assisting the Prime Minister dealing with External Territories and assisting the Minister for the Interior.6 Menzies left on a four-month visit to London and the British War Cabinet in early 1941, leaving the acting Country Party leader as the acting PM. McEwen, putting aside his differences with Page, recalled: I went to Page and said that it was incredible that, in the depths of a desperate war, our Acting Prime Minister should be no more than a stopgap leader of his own party. I suggested that we should

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have a quick formal meeting and elect Fadden to the leadership. Page agreed and this was done.7

Originally from Ingham, Fadden was an accountant with a ‘hail fellow, well met’ character, who enjoyed a drink and had an endless store of jokes and stories which he told with great enthusiasm wherever he went. He was confirmed leader on 12 March 1941. Still no deputy was elected, The Sydney Morning Herald recording the meeting agreed that, with the party reuniting and in light of international events, there was no need for an appointment to be made.8 The position stayed vacant until 22 September 1943, when McEwen’s leadership ambitions finally bore fruit.

k Fadden caused a flurry of outrage within the Country Party in April and May 1941 when he began promoting amalgamation of the nonLabor parties. On 27 April he convened a meeting in Brisbane of Queensland federal and state Country Party and UAP parliamentarians, which resulted in the formation of the Country National Organisation (CNO). It was a fairly informal and short-lived unity of the Queensland parliamentary representatives, with the parliamentarians remaining true to their own organisations, but co-operating for electoral contests, as would be the case in the August 1943 federal poll. The unity of the parliamentary groups was not all that surprising; there had been, off and on, unity or close co-operation in Queensland for many years. Two weeks after Fadden cobbled together the CNO, he announced in Wagga Wagga, New South Wales, that he would welcome an amalgamation with the UAP, at least for the duration of the war. This was a tender subject for the United Country Party in New South Wales, which, with regular monotony since its inception, came under pressure from the Nationalists and then the UAP to amalgamate. Fadden’s comments undermined its case against a merger. They also brought

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Fadden and Anthony, close friends, into open disagreement. Anthony said any amalgamation would ‘destroy the Country Party overnight’, adding the unity in the war effort between the two parties made amalgamation unnecessary: ‘I believe that rural industries face unprecedented difficulties and that it is vitally necessary that they should keep their organization alive and alert as a separate entity’.9 Fadden was probably trying to restore greater stability and direction to the Coalition, which was being undermined by dissatisfaction within the UAP at Menzies’ leadership.10 But he stirred a hornets’ nest and was quickly forced to retreat. Within 48 hours the Sydney Daily Telegraph reported his plea for unity, while favoured by the UAP, had been so coldly received by Country Party members that it had been dropped.11 Nonetheless, the memory of such a suggestion, coming from the party’s leader, would give succour to the pro-amalgamationists in the UAP and subsequent Liberal Party later in the 1940s. Menzies, back from London, tried to solve his problems with a reshuffle on 26 June 1941. Two New South Wales Country Party members were significant winners – Abbott becoming Minister for Home Security as well as Minister assisting the Minister for Defence Coordination and for the Army, and Anthony becoming the Minister for Transport – on top of being the Minister assisting the Treasurer and Minister assisting the Minister for Commerce. Collins moved from assisting the Prime Minister on External Territories to assisting the Minister for Supply and Development. Among Anthony’s tasks was trying to devise a more equitable system of fuel rationing for farmers, and encouraging motorists generally to accept that rationing was ‘necessary in the national interest and is inescapable’.12 The reshuffle failed to quell Menzies’ critics and proposals he put forward regarding Australia’s representation on the British War Cabinet, in London, became his undoing. By the time he returned from London in May 1941, Menzies had become convinced that the Dominion countries should have permanent representation on an expanded imperial war cabinet, at prime ministerial level. He proposed this to his Commonwealth counterparts.

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Prime ministers Jan Smuts of South Africa and Mackenzie King of Canada believed they should remain in their respective countries and New Zealand’s Peter Fraser indicated he was satisfied with existing arrangements. On 21 August, the federal parliamentary Labor Party voted in favour of Australia being represented on the British War Cabinet, but not by the Prime Minister – ‘it is essential for Australia to have its Prime Minister here to direct the administration and organization of a total war effort … ’ On 28 August, Menzies’ own cabinet agreed that a minister other than the Prime Minister should be Australia’s representative in London. No one supported his idea. Menzies resigned the following day and the joint UAP/Country parties unanimously elected Fadden to replace him.13 The new Prime Minister made only minor adjustments to the ministry. The cabinet unanimously agreed to appoint Page as Australia’s envoy to the British War Cabinet, with Fadden announcing it to parliament on 7 September 1941. Page said it was ‘well understood’ the government was a ‘stopgap’ and it was only a matter of time before Curtin took over. He later recalled: ‘… I called immediately to see Curtin on my appointment. I told him that I realized that I would go to London as a representative of the whole Parliament and not of the Government only. I asked him where he stood. Curtin replied that he would have complete confidence in my judgement.’ Page left Australia on 22 September 1941 and did not return until 15 August 1942, during which time the remorseless Japanese advance across southeast Asia made his mission increasingly important. He was Australia’s advocate on the Pacific War Council as well as the war cabinet, negotiating on crucial issues, including the deployment of Australian troops, equipment and supply, and the war in the Pacific after Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor and simultaneous invasion of Malaya on 6 December 1941. The fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942 and the first Japanese bombing of Darwin four days later underlined the case for returning Australian troops from the Middle East and strengthening defences in Ceylon to better protect sea lanes in the Indian Ocean.14

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Page’s view on the longevity of the Fadden government was prophetic. The Victorian Independent, Coles, and the Independent Country Party member, Wilson, refused to support the budget in October 1941. Curtin moved a censure and Fadden was defeated on the floor of the lower house by 36 votes to 33 on 3 October. He tendered his resignation to the Governor-General, advising him to call on Curtin to form a government. Page, in Singapore at the time, received a telegram from the new Prime Minister, advising ‘Will be glad if you will continue journey … ’15 On 8 October a joint meeting of the UAP and Country parties elected Fadden unopposed as leader of the Opposition, thereby creating the first formal Coalition Opposition between the two non-Labor parties. Menzies declined to nominate as leader of the UAP and the position went to Billy Hughes, then in his late seventies.16 While there was no challenge to his leadership over the ensuing 17 months, Hughes did not enjoy much support within the UAP. After a failed bid to declare party leadership positions vacant in March 1943, Menzies and 16 colleagues formed themselves into a ‘party within the party’ to try and forge new policy directions for the UAP. There was little evidence of unity in the Opposition, as was demonstrated during the campaign for the 21 August 1943 election. There were two key policy objectives in Fadden’s joint Opposition campaign launch – the formation of a national government and introduction of a system of pay-as-you-earn taxation. Hughes supported both policies, but Menzies attacked them. Fadden, who had walked away from Page’s attack on Menzies four years earlier, now better understood what had motivated his former leader. He dryly observed: ‘The stab in the back at this juncture makes another betrayal in the series for which Mr Menzies has become notorious.’17 In addition to the formal Opposition policy, Fadden launched a separate rural policy at Toowoomba, giving him the opportunity to highlight the Country Party’s specialist interests. He promised a tribunal to investigate rural production costs and determine prices. He said wool, wheat, butter and meat prices would be improved and

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stabilised, and announced an investigation into the manpower position of rural industries to ensure adequate labour was available for the production of food and raw materials. He declared the Curtin government had ‘failed completely’ to appreciate the value of rural industries in a balanced war effort.18 The policy was praised by The Courier-Mail in Brisbane, which said Fadden ‘dealt with many matters which had only cursory attention from Mr. Curtin’.19 The election hastened the fragmentation of the UAP, especially in New South Wales, where a breakaway group calling itself the Liberal Democrats contested nine seats, although failing to win any. Labor was returned with 49 seats – a comfortable majority; the UAP had 13, including Cameron in South Australia, and the Country Party an unimpressive nine, including the Country-Nationals in Queensland.20 Wilson and the Independent, Coles, were re-elected in their Victorian seats. In a period of just six years, the Country Party’s numbers in the House of Representatives had fallen from 15 to nine. There was despondency in the party’s ranks, particularly in New South Wales, where it was reduced to three members with the loss of Hume to Labor – half the number of seats it held in 1937 and well below its level of eight in 1931. Looking for scapegoats, some blamed the lingering impact of Page’s attack on Menzies. More than a few talked of the impending end of the party and lamented that amalgamation was the only course left open. In reality, the bad performance was more reflective of disunity within the UAP than anything else. Fadden was re-elected unopposed as leader. The party room decided it was time to fill the vacant deputy leader’s position and on this occasion McEwen was successful. With the support of the state parties, including New South Wales, the party room also agreed that while co-operating with the UAP, now again under the leadership of Menzies, it should not reform a Coalition Opposition to the re-elected Curtin government. 21 The Country Party’s numbers would increase to ten later in the year, after reunification of the Victorian party enabled Wilson to come

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into the parliamentary party. While numbers are everything in politics, it is hard to imagine he would have been a welcome member, given his previous actions against both the party and the Fadden government. Nonetheless, he remained until resigning from parliament on 31 December 1945.22 The party harassed the government, focusing on issues including food production and the inadequate strength of the rural workforce. Fadden demanded the establishment of a supreme food authority and To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

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warned that without an increase in the number of farm workers, Australia would let down Great Britain by not supplying enough produce. The party criticised the inadequate supplies and equipment being provided to Australian troops, particularly in New Guinea, and accused the government of going soft on communism, especially when the New South Wales Labor Party – which was split from the party at federal level – welcomed proposals by the Communist Party to establish a united working class front with both Labor parties ‘to achieve a greater war effort and ensure the continuance of the Curtin Government in office’.23 Curtin died on 5 July 1945, to be briefly succeeded by his deputy, Francis Forde, before being replaced by Ben Chifley, an affable but avid socialist, eight days later. The crumbling UAP was eventually transformed into the Liberal Party of Australia, following a conference in Canberra on 16 October 1944, with Menzies elected as its leader.24 Many Liberals still believed the best way forward was to mould the non-Labor forces into a single party. At a meeting in Sydney on 13 December 1945 attended by Menzies and Fadden and officials of both parties, the Liberal federal president, T Malcolm Ritchie, said his objective was ‘the complete amalgamation of both parties’. If the Liberals were hoping there was some remnant wind in the amalgamation kite flown by Fadden in 1941, they were disappointed; he lent no support to their overtures. The Country Party said it would agree to collaboration, but not amalgamation.25 Fadden hardened his position in a keynote address to the annual meeting of party’s federal council in Sydney in early 1946, in which he spelled out his priorities for post-war reconstruction and economic development. They were based on an unequivocal commitment to primary industries as the basic enterprises that would underpin the growth of a manufacturing and service sector. He said Australia must decide whether to concentrate on expanding its primary industry production and exports, or ‘attempt to become a highly industrialised nation, in open competition with countries which had a start of

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centuries upon us’. He doubted the economy could afford the protection necessary to build a successful secondary industry sector: ‘On the other hand, a more assured future, both in employment and as a basis for export trade, can be foreseen in the primary industries, if they are not starved and debilitated by short-sighted Government policy.’ This, he said, was the reason why the Country Party must maintain its separate entity: We maintain that the rural producer and every country dweller are entitled to fair prices, proper living conditions, adequate wages, and general improvement in amenities of country life. Other political parties, which draw their main political support either from the employer or the employee in secondary industry can be regarded as representing a section of the community, which, for a long time past, has participated unduly in the national income at the expense of the rural producer. … What I have said indicates the line of cleavage between Australian political parties, and supplies the reason why the Australian Country Party will never be absorbed into other groups.26

Fadden was true to his word on rural industry and development commitments in his policy for the 28 September 1946 election. Delivering what he termed the Country Party’s Prospectus for Prosperity on 3 September, he pledged £100 million over ten years for rural development, to be co-ordinated by reconstituting the war-time National Works Council as a National Council of Development and Defence. Wool, wheat and butter producers would be reimbursed ‘the huge sums’ of which the Chifley government had deprived them ‘as a deliberate act of policy’. Guaranteed minimum prices for a period of not less than ten years would be implemented for primary industries generally, and stabilisation funds made available for those export industries that desired them. Home consumption prices would be applied to all primary products, the marketing structure of primary products reviewed to preserve the principle of producer representation, and administra-

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tive delays eliminated in the handling of applications for land by exservicemen. Additionally, there would be tax cuts worth £35 million a year, with tax on incomes of up to £800 slashed by at least 33 per cent. The Country Party would take firm action to deal with illegal strikes, declare the Communist Party an illegal organisation (becoming the first party in Australia to make such a commitment), support a comprehensive policy of social security, extend child endowment from second and subsequent children to cover the first one, and provide a ‘phone for every farm’ by reinstating pre-war programs for rural telephone and postal facilities.27 Fadden made little reference to the new Liberal Party. In contrast, Menzies, who had delivered a separate Liberal policy two weeks earlier, praised Fadden’s ‘acknowledged authority’ on financial matters, adding that he had conferred with the Country Party leader on the financial measures he would be announcing. Menzies went further: Upon the principle that it is good strategy to divide and conquer, our opponents are always seeking for some division or conflict between the Liberal and Country Parties. I am therefore glad to be able to tell you that the Liberal Party and the Country Party are working in close co-operation. If there are any differences between their policies, they are matters of detail only and will present no real difficulties in the new parliament.28

The electorate was not swayed. To Menzies’ bitter disappointment – he even considered quitting politics – Chifley was comfortably returned. Labor slipped from 49 seats to 43, and there was one Lang Labor member, while the non-Labor total increased from 24 to only 29. The Liberal Party won 17 seats, including two by the Liberal and Country League in South Australia. The Country Party, going into the election with ten seats now that Wimmera was back in the fold, increased its representation to 12, regaining Swan in Western Australia from Labor and taking Capricornia in Queensland from the Deputy Prime Minister, Frank Forde, who had held the seat since 1922.29 While no gains

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were made in New South Wales – the three sitting members held their seats – Labor margins in Gwydir and Riverina were substantially eroded. Labor’s Joseph Langtry held Riverina by 542 votes, while William Scully, the Minister for Commerce and Agriculture, hung on by just 90 votes after the distribution of preferences in Gwydir.30 Menzies would have been convinced the result would have been better with a single non-Labor party in the field. But the Country Party was satisfied. With no reference at all to the Liberal Party, Fadden declared the results indicated ‘a definite turning of the tide in favour of the Country Party’ and were a recognition by the people of the ‘valuable services rendered by the Party in its many and varied spheres of activity’.31 Fadden and Menzies were re-elected to their respective leadership positions and agreed to continue their previous informal co-operative arrangements. The growing threat of communism and Chifley’s decision in 1947 to nationalise the private banks – both opposed by the Liberal and Country parties – necessitated a re-think on relations.32 It also became imperative for the parties to reach a formal working agreement before the next election, when the size of the parliament would be enormously increased – from 75 to 123 members and 36 to 60 senators.33 Electoral boundaries across the country were being redrawn and without some agreement there could be open slather on three-cornered contests. The Country Party’s federal organisation met in January 1949 and agreed that, while clearly maintaining its separate entity, the party should confer with the Liberals on key areas of policy, participate in a joint committee to minimise division and conflict, minimise threecornered contests and, where these did occur, agree to exchange preferences, and participate in joint Senate ticket arrangements. The proposals were endorsed by Menzies and substantially put in place across the nation, so that well before the election there was clear unity between the Opposition parties.34 Fadden and Menzies agreed on key joint policy points, several of them reflecting Fadden’s commitments in the 1946 election. The Bank Nationalisation Act would be repealed and a referendum held on

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amending the constitution to ensure future nationalisations required approval in referendums. The Communist Party would be outlawed and communists blocked from holding government jobs. Secret ballots would be made compulsory for trade union elections and proposed strikes. Coal production and the building up of coal reserves would be a priority. On the primary industry front, if approved by growers and producers, long-term stabilisation programs based on guaranteed minimum prices would be put in place; marketing boards would have majority producer representation; and home consumption prices would be periodically reviewed. Still with its eye on the rural sector, the Opposition promised to use petrol tax to support a £250-million rural development loan, administered through a national works council, to improve country roads, housing, sewerage, water and power supplies. Menzies delivered the policy on behalf of both parties at the RSL Memorial Hall in Melbourne on 10 November 1949, with Fadden also on the platform. ‘It is a joint policy,’ Menzies announced. ‘Just as we have acted jointly in Opposition, so we now tell you that we shall set up a combined Government if you elect us.’35 There was only one significant policy area of potential disagreement between Fadden and Menzies – petrol rationing. Fadden wanted to end it almost immediately, but Menzies doubted it could be done so quickly. In the joint policy speech he only committed to increasing Australia’s fuel reserves: ‘We believe that petrol should have been got. We shall make it our business to get in adequate quantities. If it costs more, we shall either subsidise purchases outside the usual sources of supply or adjust the present rates of tax.’36 Fadden forced the issue. He met with executives of the Australian oil company, Ampol, and was convinced by them that an almost immediate end to rationing could be achieved. He persuaded Menzies to this view, so that in his campaign launch at Boonah, Queensland, seven days after the Menzies speech and with Menzies in attendance, Fadden was able to declare: ‘We pledge ourselves to free Australia from petrol restrictions as early as possible in the New Year. Petrol is indispensable to the Australian

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community. We must get it. We can and we will. This is the policy of the Country and the Liberal Parties. Our slogan brings hope to a browbeaten people – Empty out the Chifley Socialists and fill the bowsers.’ 37 The policy was hugely popular in the electorate. The election, on 10 December 1949, was a triumph for the nonLabor parties – the Liberals won 55 seats, Labor 47, and the Country Party 19, including eight of the 11 seats contested in New South Wales.38 The ALP, however, controlled the Senate. Menzies and Fadden formed the first of a series of Coalition governments, which would remain unbeaten until the election of Gough Whitlam in December 1972, and which sidelined the issue of amalgamation for more than 30 years. Fadden became Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer; McEwen, Minister for Commerce and Agriculture; Page, Minister for Health; Anthony, Postmaster-General; and Queensland Senator Walter Cooper, Minister for Repatriation.39 The announcement to end petrol rationing was made on 8 February 1950 – a milestone victory for Fadden and the Country Party.40

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Rocky years

7: Rocky years

The first years of the Menzies-Fadden government were highlighted by people trotting to the polls with regular monotony – a double dissolution election on 28 April 1951, a referendum on communism on 22 September 1951, a half Senate election on 9 May 1953, one for the House of Representatives on 29 May 1954, and an election for the lower house and half the Senate on 10 December 1955.1 Cold War fears and the threat of communism, exacerbated by the start of the Korean conflict in June 1950, combined with rising inflation to command most of the new government’s attention. Even though he had effectively divided the Labor Party with the Communist Party Dissolution Bill, introduced into parliament on 27 April 1950, Menzies was initially loath to get Australia involved in Korea.2 He was overseas on a trip to the United States and Britain when the acting Prime Minister, Fadden, without first consulting Menzies or the cabinet, responded to an urgent plea for more forces from the United Nations by announcing on 26 July that Australia would commit volunteer ground troops to the conflict. The announcement came a few hours before the British made a similar commitment.3

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Menzies’ displeasure at Fadden’s action dissipated when he arrived in New York to find that Americans regarded the Australian commitment as a clear sign of its willingness to support the USA. On 27 June, two days after the North Korean People’s Army invaded South Korea, and after Pyongyang had failed to act on a UN Security Council resolution that it withdraw north of the 38th parallel, American President Harry Truman ordered US forces to support the south. Now, just four weeks later, the Australians were joining them. Menzies was lauded in Washington. He was invited to lunch at the White House and addressed the National Press Club as well as both houses of Congress. Never before had an Australian prime minister received such treatment. Menzies was happy to let the Americans believe the decision to deploy Australian troops had been at his instigation.4 The cabinet became increasingly concerned that the war on the Korean peninsula was the prelude to a third world war and that Australia had only three years in which to prepare for such an eventuality. The government announced a three-year defence program on 2 March 1951. McEwen observed that Australia could not prepare for war in three years on a 40-hour week, but the potential union backlash against increasing it to 44 hours was deemed politically too dangerous and was not pursued.5 America was keen to sign a peace treaty with Japan, thereby keeping the country a western ally in the face of expanding communism across Asia. Some in the cabinet were not keen on the idea, although McEwen said there could be no balance of power in Asia without a strong Japan. The cabinet eventually agreed to support the Americans provided that they agreed to come to Australia’s aid if it was attacked. The resulting Japanese Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS) were signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951. Article III of the ANZUS treaty provided that ‘the Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the

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Pacific’.6 Building on this, McEwen would sign the historic AustraliaJapan Agreement on Commerce, better known as the Australia-Japan trade treaty, on 6 July 1957. Domestically, the Korean war fuelled already rising inflation, as did record wool prices. Menzies and most Liberals argued for a revaluation of the Australian pound to bring it to parity with sterling; the exchange rate of £125 Australian to £100 sterling had been pegged since 1931. Fadden and the Country Party were opposed to parity because of the adverse impact it would have on the value of exports. The value of wool and sheepskin exports, forecast at £280 million for 1949–50, was estimated to crash by £56 million under revaluation. Fadden was certain the reduced cost of imports resulting from a revaluation would be nowhere near sufficient to counteract the rise in the cost of living.7 He said the cabinet was so divided on the issue that ‘the survival of the composite government was seriously threatened’: Cabinet discussed it on at least seven occasions and failure to resolve the issue so dominated our thoughts that two of my colleagues, Earle Page and Larry [Hubert] Anthony, carried signed letters of resignation in their pockets. The Country Party was adamantly opposed to appreciation and three Liberal members (notably from Queensland and South Australia) let it be known that they shared our view. Had there been strict unanimity within the Liberal Party in favour of appreciation, there is little doubt that in light of the Country Party attitude, there would have been no alternative to the dissolution of the coalition, with disastrous effects on the economy and on stable government.8

Fadden came up with a solution, lying in his hotel room in the dead of night: ‘When I wanted to put it on paper I found paper to be in short supply. Every hotel lavatory, however, is equipped with an essential supply and this, despite its fragile nature, served my purpose.’ He developed a wool sales deduction scheme, under which 20 per cent of the value of wool sold or exported would be paid to the treasury and

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held as a credit against the woolgrowers’ income tax – effectively a pre-payment of tax on the high incomes of woolgrowers. Once it had served its purpose and wool prices stabilised, the scheme would be repealed and growers credited for the advance payments. The government accepted the proposal, but woolgrowers and Country Party members were less enthusiastic. The New South Wales party general secretary, John Dredge, told Fadden his central executive was alarmed at the level of criticism ‘rolling in like a tidal wave’ and urged Fadden to ‘get out and defend your scheme as fast as you can, or there won’t be a woolgrower left in the organization’. Fadden agreed to travel the country and explain the scheme – not defend it, but sell it as something of benefit to growers and the nation. He and other Country Party ministers were heckled, booed and jeered at meetings across wool-growing regions, but Fadden said when the scheme was abolished the following year, with the price of wool falling, growers finally appreciated the advantages they reaped.9 Running parallel with this, Fadden was trying to reform banking legislation. The government’s intention was to repeal Labor’s Bank Nationalisation Act and replace it with a Commonwealth Bank Bill, which would restore the bank’s board of directors. The Labor-controlled Senate passed the legislation in June 1950, but with deletion of the provision for a board. This was unacceptable to the government. The lower house again passed the original bill and sent it back to the Senate in October, where it languished until being referred to a select committee in March 1951. The government regarded this as a second rejection and claimed it had the trigger for a double dissolution of parliament, a simultaneous election for the House of Representatives and the whole Senate – even though the last (and first) time one had been granted was in 1914. Menzies’ approach to the Governor-General, William McKell, a former Labor premier of New South Wales, was successful and a double dissolution election was called for 28 April 1951. The government majority dropped by five seats, from 74 in 1949 to 69. The Liberals lost three seats, returning with 52, and the Country

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Party two, Hume in New South Wales and Leichardt in Queensland – both to Labor – to take its lower house numbers to 17. Labor’s representation increased from 47 to 52, but, crucially, it lost control of the Senate, where the Coalition held 32 seats to Labor’s 28.10 While the returned government began planning its case for a referendum to outlaw communism, Fadden focused on the worsening economy and the fix it needed from the budget later in the year. Consumer prices had increased by 8.4 per cent in 1949–50, by 13 per cent the following year and by more than 22 per cent in 1951–52.11 The referendum, held on 22 September 1951, was narrowly lost, with the states splitting three-three and the ‘no’ case obtaining a majority of just 58 000 votes out of the 4.75 million cast.12 Four days later, Fadden brought down what became known as his ‘horror’ budget. To restrict spending power wherever possible and build an inflation-busting surplus, income taxes went up by 10 per cent, company and sales taxes were substantially increased, as were customs and excise duties on tobacco, beer and spirits, and the fee for radio receiver licences doubled to £2, although second and subsequent receivers were allowed to be tax free. Loan funds to the states were restricted, resulting in the slowing down or abandonment of public works. The director of the Chamber of Manufactures in New South Wales, CR Hill, commented that if the government was bent on political suicide, it could not have chosen a better method of ending its life. An unrepentant Fadden made no apology for the tough measures, declaring that while they were ‘clearly not pleasant they are clearly necessary, and in the end they will prove far less hurtful than the results of unchecked inflation’.13 The rural sector was also angry. While the wool sales deduction scheme was repealed, the budget changed the long-standing tax averaging arrangements, first introduced by Page in 1924, by excluding all annual income above £4000. The Sydney Morning Herald urged government MPs not to be content to toe the party line, saying ‘Parliament’s duty in debating the budget is not merely to contest this or that point, but to challenge the entire concept on which it is based’.14 Such was

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the condemnation that Fadden quipped he could have had a meeting ‘of all my friends and supporters in a one-man telephone booth’.15 The anti-inflationary measures were so fierce that the following year’s budget required some easing of the purse strings, including increased depreciation rates and the abolition of Commonwealth land tax. Inflation during 1952–53 remained stubbornly above 20 per cent, earning the government the ire of the electorate, but the combined impact of the two budgets gradually took effect and paved the way for the ‘golden age’ from the mid-1950s to the end of the 1960s, when Australia enjoyed almost full employment and inflation was around three per cent a year. In between the two budgets, Fadden went on his first overseas trip in 20 years as a member of parliament, when, in January 1952, he visited London, principally to attend a meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers. On the morning after his arrival he received an invitation to lunch from the King’s brother, the Duke of Gloucester, whom he had met when the duke was Governor-General of Australia.16 Fadden had received a knighthood in the June 1951 King’s Birthday honours, but had not yet been invested with it. Neither had he been sworn in as a member of the Privy Council, an honour sponsored by Curtin in 1942, so the duke said he would make arrangements for his brother to ‘do the honours’ while Fadden was in town. Fadden observed that his majesty was not a well man – ‘The King’s eyes were sunken and his handshake, though firm as a rock, was cold’.17 George VI died on 6 February 1952, while Fadden was returning to London from Switzerland, where he had floated Australia’s first Swiss loan. He made the dash to London and was the last privy councillor to sign the Declaration of Accession of the princess Elizabeth. He represented Australia the following day at her accession ceremony and also at George VI’s funeral, on 15 February, at St George’s Chapel, Windsor. The day before the funeral, he was called to Buckingham Palace, where the young queen asked him to convey to the Australian people her and the Duke of Edinburgh’s regret at having to postpone their trip to Australia.18 Fadden later noted: ‘In these sorrowful circumstances I found

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that I had been the last subject to have a private audience with the late King and the last to be invested by him; and that I was also the first to have an audience with the Queen.’19

k Ominous signs for the Coalition were reflected in a number of elections. The Liberals lost the Victorian seat of Flinders to Labor at a byelection in October 1952 and two months later the Victorian Country Party government was defeated by Labor. The early months of 1953 saw the Liberal-Country Party government in Western Australia fall to Labor, the Cahill Labor government in New South Wales increase its majority from 11 to 25 seats, and the Liberal and Country League government in South Australia hang on by the skin of its teeth, with its majority cut from seven to one.20 When the Country Party Member for Gwydir in northwest New South Wales, Thomas Treloar, died on 15 November 1953, the scene was set for a by-election that was widely seen as a curtain-raiser for the House of Representatives elections expected before the end of June the following year. A federation electorate, Gwydir, which at this time took in towns including Walgett in the far west, Moree, Narrabri, Wee Waa, Inverell, Gunnedah and Quirindi, had see-sawed between Labor and the Country Party. Before Treloar won the seat in 1949, it had been held for Labor by William Scully since 1937.21 A predominantly sheep, cattle and wheat growing region, the traditional conservative voting force was offset by considerable trade union numbers in farm and railway workers and, to a lesser degree, sawmill employees. The New South Wales Liberal Party, which since its inception had been trying to force the state Country Party into amalgamation – as had its predecessor the UAP – believed country townspeople would support it, given the opportunity. Having failed to sway the Country Party away from its determination to remain a separate entity, many Liberals believed the answer was to wipe it out seat by seat. The Liberal state executive decided to contest Gwydir and endorsed Arthur Howard. The Country

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Party endorsed two candidates, Ian Allan and Thelma Kirkby, while Les Quinn was endorsed by Labor. Country Party outrage at the Liberal action came from all directions. State parliamentary leader Mick Bruxner declared that Gwydir must be held ‘against all comers’. Page, still federal president and also a cabinet minister, told his party’s federal council in Canberra: Despite its proud record, attempts are being made to destroy the Country Party, regardless of their effect on a satisfactory political situation now existing in the Federal sphere and regardless of the role the Country Party is destined to play in the ultimate progress of Australia. … Consequently we must accept as a national duty the obligation to fight to the last ditch for representation in the Parliaments of Australia.22

A more pithy condemnation of the Liberals came from the Country Party’s acting deputy leader, Hubert Anthony: ‘Until the people we represent tell us we are not wanted, no one else is going to tell us.’23 Fadden shared these views, but was cautious not to voice them publicly and so create a split between himself and the Prime Minister, who, no matter what he personally thought about his New South Wales executive, felt obliged to support its right to endorse candidates, particularly as the executive’s annual report, urging ‘quiet, steady expansion into country districts’, was adopted by the Liberal Party state council on 30 November.24 Fadden and Menzies would both take part in the campaign, but not together. Menzies justified their separate paths to a press conference in Canberra on 1 December: ‘If he as the Leader of the Country Party and I as the Leader of the Government Party, cover six major meetings, instead of three, I suppose that is good business in a by-election.’25 Gwydir was swamped with politicians over the three weeks leading up to the by-election on 19 December 1953 – state and federal leaders, ministers and numerous back benchers from all three parties. Labor leader Doc Evatt, accompanied by his deputy Arthur Calwell,

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two senators and the whip, Fred Daly, spent 16 days blitzing the electorate, covering 2700 miles and giving more than 100 speeches and radio broadcasts. Menzies was there for three days, 7 to 9 December, principally visiting Inverell, Moree, Narrabri and Gunnedah, and giving six speeches a day. Significantly, he avoided voicing support for the Liberal candidate, saying instead that whichever of the Liberal or Country Party candidates won would be a victory for the government.26 Hardline country expansionists in the New South Wales Liberal Party would have been disappointed, but an underlying objective of Menzies’ tour – it was not often prime ministers went to such farflung regions – was to boost his and the government’s waning popularity ahead of the general election. He was able to emphasise his country origins, having been born in the Victorian Wimmera: ‘I was brought up on the sound of a harvester … It gives me a great feeling to be able to smell that wheat as you drive past. It is a mistake to think that this “city slicker” was always one. Many of us have respectable origins.’27 From Menzies’ point of view, the game that mattered was the general election and, providing the government held Gwydir at the by-election, it did not matter who won. Fadden visited Gunnedah, Boggabri, Narrabri, Bingara, Warialda and Gunnedah over four days from 8 to 11 December. He and Menzies met briefly at Boggabri. Unlike Menzies, Fadden exhorted electors to give their primary vote to Allan or Kirkby and their preference to Howard.28 Mick Bruxner’s son, Tim, who would succeed his father in his state seat of Tenterfield in a little over eight years, remembered driving Fadden to one of his meetings: ‘It was in the evening and Artie had had a few beers. As we went into the hall, he stopped and swore because he’d left his speech notes in the car. I said we could go back and get them, but he said he’d do without. He gave the best speech I’ve ever heard!’29 The non-Labor campaign was helped by the Cahill state Labor government, which, following its re-election with a substantially increased majority in February, announced its intention to introduce

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compulsory unionism, or absolute preference in employment for trade union members. This opened the way to hammer Labor’s socialist programs and, with Australian troops fighting in both Korea and Malaya, fan the communist flame. Allan warned that under Cahill’s Compulsory Unionism Bill ‘communist-led and controlled unions in this State can force their way into your shop, store, office or property without any search warrant’. Immediately it became law ‘an army of trade union organizers’ would ‘swarm through country towns, farms and properties’. He even suggested that in some country towns there would be ‘open warfare’.30 The result was interesting. Quinn headed the primary count with 45.30 per cent of the vote, followed by Allan (28.19 per cent), Kirkby (16.21 per cent) and Howard (10.29 per cent). After the first distribution of preferences, eliminating Howard, Quinn still led, but was then overhauled when Kirkby’s preferences flowed to Allan. The final count was Allan 18 409 votes to Quinn’s 16 431. Allan’s two-party preferred vote slipped only 0.32 per cent below that gained by Treloar at the 1951 election.31 If the Gwydir barometer was accurate, the government had weathered the storm of high inflation and unemployment. The forthcoming general election, only a few months earlier widely regarded as an almost certain win for Labor, took on a new perspective. For the Country Party, the result reinforced its view that the Liberals should stay out of country regions.

k An added bonus for the government’s electoral stocks was renewed focus on the communist threat brought about by the defection in April 1954 of two Russians, Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, from the Soviet embassy in Canberra. Menzies told a shocked parliament on 13 April that Petrov, who had been third secretary at the Soviet embassy since 1951, had sought and been granted political asylum. He announced the establishment of a royal commission into Soviet espionage in Australia, which took evidence from 119 witnesses and received more

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than 500 exhibits. Its final report, tabled in parliament on 14 September 1955, found: the Petrovs were truthful witnesses; from its establishment in 1943 until its temporary closure in April 1954, the Soviet embassy had been used for espionage in Australia; and the only Australians who knowingly assisted Soviet espionage were communists. The commissioners recommended that no prosecutions be launched.32 The royal commission had been sitting a short time only before election day, 29 May 1954. But the Petrov affair (perhaps mingled with the memory of the hugely successful royal tour by Queen Elizabeth and Prince Phillip in February – the first to Australia by a reigning monarch) was fresh in the minds of voters and quite probably saved the government from defeat. The Coalition was returned with 64 seats – 47 Liberal and 17 Country Party – to Labor’s 57.33 Fadden was unaware of the result. In fact, he had not even voted. In the last week of the campaign he had travelled 6000 miles by land and air from north Queensland to Western Australia and back, with a final meeting at Dalby, 120 miles west of Brisbane, on election eve. While driving to Brisbane after the meeting, his car skidded on a bridge approach and rolled: A wooden rail penetrated the door of the car beside me, passed through my suit and neatly threaded itself between my shirt and my backbone, giving me a vicious jab in the process. A displacement of a mere fraction of an inch would have spelt the end of my political career – and me. … Bandaged and unconscious as the votes were being cast, I could not even vote for myself. I learned of the results two days after everybody else and some weeks later I received a “Please explain” from the Electoral Office with the threat of a two quid fine for not voting.34

The Country Party line-up in the ministry remained basically the same as it had been since the Coalition came to office in 1949 – Fadden, Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer; McEwen, Minister for Commerce and Agriculture; Page, Minister for Health; Anthony, Post-

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master-General and Minister for Civil Aviation; and Cooper, Minister for Repatriation. Anthony, who was appointed to the Civil Aviation portfolio in May 1951 and was largely responsible for instigating the domestic two-airline policy and overseeing the re-equipment of the Qantas international fleet with the American Lockheed Constellation airliner instead of the ill-fated British Comet, relinquished the post on 9 July 1954 to concentrate on improving and expanding post and telephone services, particularly in the regions, and on bringing television to Australia.35 Progress on introducing television had been slow. The Chifley government had committed itself in June 1949 to introducing it as soon as possible and talked of having programs on air by the end of 1951. Menzies was well aware that television was a new medium that could not be denied to the Australian people. But he was in no hurry to introduce it, telling a visiting official from the BBC in 1952 that he hoped ‘this thing will not come to Australia within my term of office’.36 As the new Postmaster-General, Anthony announced on 29 June 1950 that the nation’s first television service would go to air in Sydney in about two years’ time. It did not happen. Instead, the whole issue was hived off to a royal commission in February 1953, delaying Anthony’s announcement of the granting of commercial broadcasting licences until April 1955, and the actual start of television in Sydney and Melbourne by Frank Packer’s Channel 9 and the ABC until late 1956, just in time for the Melbourne Olympic Games. Anthony was not the minister at the time. Menzies dropped him from the ministry after the election on 10 December 1955 because of ailing health. Anthony took the decision hard, but his son, Doug, said it was right: ‘At that stage, he simply was not well enough for those responsibilities. There is absolutely no doubt about that.’ 37

k Menzies advised the Governor-General to grant an early dissolution of the parliament barely 18 months after the 1954 election to bring lower

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house and Senate elections back to the same day. They had been put ‘out of kilter’ by a half Senate election in May 1953.38 This was a convenient technicality. In reality, Menzies wanted to capitalise on a new and deep division in the ALP. In October 1954, Evatt had attacked the anti-communist Industrial Groups in trade unions as being anti-ALP. Many in the party saw this as opening the way for the Communist Party to gain control of the union movement and even the ALP itself. The split was mainly centred in Victoria, where intervention by the federal executive eventually led to the dismissal of the Victorian state executive in December 1954. Many members refused to switch allegiance to the new executive, with the result that, on 7 April 1955, it expelled 104 members from the party, including 18 Victorian state parliamentarians, 23 endorsed candidates for the forthcoming Victorian election, and seven federal parliamentarians. A vote of no confidence in the Victorian Labor government on 19 April was carried by 34 votes to 23, with the help of expelled Labor members, paving the way for Henry Bolte’s Liberals to begin an uninterrupted 27 years on the Treasury benches at the resulting state election on 28 May.39 Menzies needed to take advantage of this chaos in Labor’s ranks, hence his determination to force an early election, held on 10 December 1955. It was a stunning success, with the Liberals returned with 57 seats, the Country Party winning all of the 18 seats it contested, and Labor 47. The Coalition was back to its 1949 strength.40 A particular highlight for the Country Party was the election of its first woman parliamentarian, Agnes ‘Aggie’ Robertson, a committed Presbyterian of Scottish parentage, who was born at Adelaide in 1882, but had lived in Western Australia since about 1895. A school teacher with strong political interests, Robertson supported Menzies and was an office-bearer in the women’s council of the then Liberal and Country League (LCL) of Western Australia. Staunchly anti-communist, she was elected to the Senate in December 1949 – the fifth woman to enter the federal parliament – and sat with the Liberal Party.41 In the lead-up to the 1955 election, she was

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dropped from the LCL’s ticket on the grounds that, at 73, she was too old. In September, she switched her allegiance to the Western Australian Country Party, which gave her first place on its Senate ballot paper. Following a vigorous 40-day campaign, in which she averaged three speeches a day, she was elected ahead of the LCL candidate with the help of Labor preferences. A tall, imposing woman who wore pearls, pastel-coloured ensembles and practical laced shoes, she constantly

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reminded the Senate that ‘the Word of the Old Book is still true: Righteousness exalteth a nation’.42 Doug Anthony remembered her as ‘happily attending our party meetings and accepting party policy’.43 Her acceptance of the Country Party had a direct influence on her family. Her daughter, Jessie, a teacher, radio broadcaster and community leader, became a founding member of the Western Australian Country Party’s women’s auxiliary and, as such, a delegate to the inaugural federal conference of Country Party women representatives, largely initiated by McEwen and held at the Hotel Canberra on 24 November 1960. The conference, attended by Aggie Robertson as an observer, elected Phyllis Innes, of Queensland, its first president, Jessie Robertson, vice-president, and Margaret Lawrie, also from Queensland, secretary. Aggie Robertson expressed her pleasure at ‘the big step forward’ which had been taken to enable women from the affiliated state parties to become an integral part of the federal council. The next meeting of the women’s conference, on 7 December 1962, agreed that it should be known as the Women’s Federal Council, a body which continues to this day.44 Aggie Robertson remained a member of the federal parliamentary party until her retirement at the age of 80 on 30 June 1962.45 There would be no other woman member of the parliamentary Country or National Party in Canberra until the election of Florence BjelkePetersen as a senator for Queensland 19 years later, in 1981.46 However, the party was not backward in promoting women to leading positions. In June 1973, Doug Anthony appointed Stella Swinney, a foundation member of and former major in the Australian Women’s Army Services and recently retired principal of Duval College at the University of New England, as a special adviser on women’s issues, attached to the federal secretariat. It was the first such appointment by a political organisation. Shirley McKerrow was the first woman to head a state political organisation, as president of the Victorian National Party from 1976 to 1980. She then became the first woman to be federal president of a political party, holding the National Party’s presidency from 1981 to

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1987. Helen Tiller was appointed the first woman director of a state political organisation when she ran the South Australian National Country Party for five years from 1978. Jenny Gardiner, in New South Wales, was general secretary of the state National Party from 1984 to 1991, before entering the New South Wales Legislative Council. Cecile Ferguson became the first woman political federal director in Australia when she took over the National Party’s Canberra secretariat in February 1992; she remained in the post until 1997. Another female federal director was Gaye White in 2000. While not appointed as federal director, Jenny Bailey, who had worked for Ian Sinclair, ran the secretariat from 1977 to 1979. As well as Aggie Robertson and Flo Bjelke-Petersen, National Party women in the federal parliament have been De-Anne Kelly (Dawson, Queensland), Kay Hull (Riverina, New South Wales) and Fiona Nash (Senate, New South Wales).47 There have

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been many more women who successfully won party preselection – and not just as tokens in unwinnable seats – and still more who have represented the party in state parliaments. Coincidentally, but unrelated, the party formalised the involvement of young party members in its federal council structure. From the early 1970s, the federal constitution provided for ‘one representative of the Young National Country Party appointed or elected by the Young National Country Party organisation in each affiliated state or by such method as the State Central Council shall direct …’ to be delegates to federal council.48 The Young Nationals remain an integral part of today’s federal council.

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Fadden to McEwen

8: Fadden to McEwen

Fadden’s concentration in the latter half of the 1950s was on further reform of the banking system. In October 1957, he put forward complex legislation that would establish the Reserve Bank of Australia to carry out central banking functions, control the note issue, and administer the Rural Credits Department, which had been put in place by Page as part of the Commonwealth Bank. Fadden’s proposals provided for the other functions of the Commonwealth Bank – the trading bank and the savings bank – to be administered by a Commonwealth Banking Corporation, together with a new Commonwealth Development Bank, the objective of which was to overcome the lack of adequate long-term finance for farm development and small industries. He was proud of the development bank concept, which he said was a ‘completely new venture’ and ‘my own brainchild’.1 The legislation passed the House of Representatives, but was held up by a hostile Senate and did not progress until after the government regained a Senate majority at the elections in November 1958, at which Fadden retired from parliament. His successor as Treasurer, Harold Holt (Liberal, Higgins, Victoria), finally steered

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the reforms through parliament in February 1959, sending a telegram to Fadden that he was ‘proud to be presenting banking Bill tonight in substantially identical terms with your own pioneering work’.2 Fadden began planning his retirement well in advance, making his intentions known in March 1958. He would relinquish the Country Party’s leadership and deputy prime ministership, but remain as Treasurer, delivering his eleventh budget in August, until the elections expected later in the year. The Country Party chose McEwen unopposed as its new leader on 26 March, with the Queensland Member for Dawson, Charles Davidson (he transferred from Capricornia at the 1949 election), becoming deputy. The Menzies-Fadden administration seamlessly gave way to the Menzies-McEwen government. There is some speculation as to whether Menzies offered McEwen the job of Treasurer, thereby following the trend set by Fadden, but McEwen, who had been Minister for Trade since January 1956, and who had been central to many trade negotiations as Minister for Commerce and Agriculture since December 1949, said he was happy to stay with Trade ‘because this post was the one most central to Country Party interests’.3 McEwen had sealed many useful bilateral and multilateral agreements for Australia. One was a 15-year agreement on meat with Britain in 1951 that increased exports and led to the development of ‘beef roads’ across the vast inland areas of Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia for the transport of cattle to rail heads. These roads were extended and took in the far north of South Australia during the 1960s, by which time their value was pivotal to the minerals industry. The Commonwealth provided more than £42 million in grants or interest-free loans for beef roads between 1949 and 1974 and, while not directly his area of responsibility, McEwen’s name became synonymous with them. 4 He concluded a deal with Britain in 1956, further reforming the Ottawa Agreement and enabling Australia to relax tariff barriers against Japanese goods. This in turn led to one of his best remembered achievements, negotiating the agreement

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on commerce between Australia and Japan in July 1957. He had been prepared to let the success or failure of this potentially controversial initiative rest on his own shoulders, so minimising any electoral backlash on the government as a whole: When I set out to convince the government and the Australian public that the Japanese could be trusted, I thought I was taking my political life in my hands. The whole country was still very aware of the bad treatment of Australian prisoners and of the threat that Japan had posed to Australia during the war. So I expected there to be great opposition to the idea.

To his surprise, he found no substantial opposition from the Returned Sailors’ Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Imperial League, or the public generally – only from the parliamentary Labor Party. He conceded that ‘public opinion is not always correctly judged’.5

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McEwen brought a different style of leadership to the party. With a jutting jaw and seemingly constant scowl, he was a dour, serious personality compared to Fadden. Six feet tall and ramrod-like in bearing, he added to his ‘grim’ image by usually wearing sombre dark suits and ties – all of which contributed to his nickname, Black Jack. For all this, he commanded enormous respect among his party colleagues. He was a mentor to the young parliamentarians, especially Doug Anthony, Peter Nixon (Gippsland), Ian Sinclair (New England) and Ralph Hunt (Gwydir), coaching them in the art of political hardball. He was perceptive, recognising, for instance, in the early 1960s that if he did not do something to better harness the interests of the promising young back bencher Anthony he would be lost to politics. McEwen’s solution was to make him Minister for the Interior. Anthony would later say that from the time he succeeded to his father’s seat of Richmond in the by-election of September 1957 until his ministerial appointment in 1964, he found parliament ‘extremely boring’ – to the point where he was looking for opportunities beyond politics. Once appointed to the ministry, however, ‘everything came back into balance and from that point on I loved my political life’.6 Anthony was only 27 when he entered parliament and most of the other members of the parliamentary Country Party were old enough to be his father. A blond-haired farmer, he was seen by many in the press gallery, including Rob Chalmers, who first went there in 1951 and was still an active member in 2009, as a ‘terrible hick’, exemplifying a ‘slow-talking country kid, not sophisticated at all’.7 By the early 1960s Anthony had struck up friendships with other party newcomers – Ceb Barnes (McPherson, Queensland), John England (Calare) and Victorians Bob King (Wimmera), Mac Holten (Indi) and Peter Nixon. He revealed a certain larrikinism: during one late-night session of parliament, Anthony, Nixon, England and Holten were kicking a football to one another in King’s Hall in Old Parliament House, when it hit a painting, shattering the glass: ‘There was a huge noise, it echoed all through King’s Hall. We swept up the broken glass and picked all the bits out of the frame and straightened the painting. It stayed

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like that for years before anyone noticed there was no glass in the frame!’8 McEwen was also not without a sense of humour. Hunt described it as ‘whimsical’ adding ‘but you wouldn’t want to under-estimate him!’ 9 Nixon said McEwen was a wonderful teacher: He told me from the day I arrived in Canberra to get into debates everywhere, because once you’re a minister you’ve got to feel comfortable on the floor of the House. He also said ‘if you ever mislead the House and find out about it, fix it’. I remember when I was Minister for the Interior, Gordon Bryant [ALP, Wills, Victoria] asked me a question about housing in the Northern Territory. In my answer I gave a wrong figure. I worried about it a bit, but thought no one would notice. Then I remembered McEwen’s advice, so I went into the House and gave a personal explanation, correcting the mistake. Bryant came up to me afterwards and said ‘you’ve buggered my day tomorrow – I was going to move a motion of no confidence in you’. McEwen was always on the alert, watchful of his team.10

Someone else who knew the Country Party leader well and appreciated the sense of humour behind the dour exterior was future Victorian Country Party MP and federal party president Stuart McDonald, whose family farmed the property adjoining the McEwen farm, Chilgala, at Stanhope: I knew him since I was about ten. I remember the days when the [Victorian Country] party was fighting like cats and dogs over Coalition and joint government. A lot of us in the local organisation did a lot of work for McEwen. It was the natural thing to do because of the respect you had for him. And the feeling’s still there. In Stanhope, they had a bust of him unveiled in 2007. He’s still remembered very fondly around the local traps. He suffered badly from dermatitis which often left him with

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his feet and hands painful and bleeding. He carried medication for it, but had to go to Rushworth hospital on one occasion for injections. He was in his farm clothes. The nurse didn’t know him and when filling in his personal details asked if he was a pensioner. He said ‘I’m the Deputy Prime Minister’, to which she replied ‘and I’m the Queen of England!’ There are countless stories about Black Jack. He used to pour the most fearsome whiskeys you’ve ever seen!11

McEwen paid close attention to relations with the state Country Party organisations and parliamentary parties. John Fuller, who was New

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South Wales party chairman from 1959–64 and Minister for Decentralisation and Development in the Askin-Cutler government, said the federal leader was ‘always very supportive’ in attending state party annual conferences and ‘when I was a state minister taking trade missions overseas, he took a personal interest in what we were doing and what support we needed’.12 McEwen enjoyed a good relationship with Menzies, with the two having only one dispute of significance – in December 1962, when McEwen refused to accept an electoral redistribution that would have abolished the Country Party seats of Dawson and Gwydir and given Labor almost certain victory over the party in Moore (Western Australia). McEwen threatened to take the Country Party out of government if Menzies persisted with the proposals. The Prime Minister backed down.13 Menzies recognised McEwen’s potential to lead the country. As Sinclair observed, ‘McEwen was the managing director of Australia while Menzies was the chairman’.14 Sinclair knew McEwen well; he was his assisting minister in Trade and Industry from 1966 to 1971. McEwen himself recalled that as early as the 1950s Menzies tried to encourage him to consider becoming his successor: In the first half of the 1950s, I know that Menzies would have liked me to follow him as Prime Minister. He urged me to get into line behind him. Menzies was never more explicit than this – ‘Get into line’ he said – but I took him to mean that I should join the Liberal Party. Of course, I would never agree to this. Menzies came back to this point again and again over a period of about five years, but I could not contemplate leaving the Country Party for my own preferment. I never encouraged Menzies in his line of thinking and, eventually, he came to know my mind on the matter well enough.15

McEwen’s relationship with another Liberal minister, William McMahon (Lowe, New South Wales), was far less amicable. Over the

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decade between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s it deteriorated to the point of becoming poisonous. Menzies developed McEwen’s portfolio of Commerce and Agriculture into new departments of Trade and of Primary Industry from January 1956, with McEwen taking Trade and McMahon becoming the first Minister for Primary Industry.16 Previously a junior portfolio of Trade and Customs, McEwen turned Trade into a highly powerful department, taking over such responsibilities as import licensing and tariffs, overseas shipping, rural and mineral export policy and, later, manufacturing policy, which would be administered through an office of secondary industry. The one stumbling block was Primary Industry, supposedly subservient to Trade but not seen that way by McMahon, who irritated McEwen by often disagreeing with him in cabinet meetings and bringing proposals to them that McEwen did not know about. McEwen’s distrust of McMahon was sealed by an incident in 1956 when the latter was representing him while he was in London renegotiating the Ottawa Agreement. The outcome of the talks was to be jointly announced in Canberra and London. The agreed text of the statement, clearly embargoed, was transmitted to Canberra, where, to McEwen’s embarrassment and fury, it was released early – in McMahon’s name. McMahon himself blamed the Department of Trade. When he got home, McEwen ordered an investigation, which found no evidence that the department had sighted the statement before its release.17 McEwen was no doubt insistent after the November 1958 election on having the Primary Industry portfolio brought more directly under his own wing, with the appointment of the Country Party’s Charles Adermann as the new minister. McMahon was promoted to Minister for Labour and National Service.18 Yet the differences between McEwen and McMahon were just beginning.

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In a speech to the South Australian Chamber of Manufactures at the General Motors Woodville plant on 5 November 1955, McEwen aligned himself with developing secondary industry by challenging Australia’s manufacturers to improve their export performance. He said industry and the government should sit down to discuss what support was needed ‘to get a better contribution than 8 per cent of our export income out of our factory production’.19 Over the next decade, he championed a policy that became known as ‘McEwenism’, and increasingly attracted the ire of the farm organisations, the Treasury and the media. His rationale was that Australia, a huge but underpopulated nation, had to grow. Migrants were needed from Britain and western Europe, but they would not be attracted to the other end of the world unless there were jobs and the opportunity to establish a new, prosperous life. Such jobs were not available in the farm sector, which was becoming increasingly mechanised. They had to be generated by expanding the nation’s manufacturing capacity. McEwenism used tariffs to protect local manufacturers from being wiped out by foreign imports, while at the same time compensating primary industries for the increased costs such protection would impose on them, because of more expensive imported machinery and other goods. Primary industries would be assisted with guaranteed domestic markets, bounties, subsidies, and enhanced stabilisation and marketing schemes. Not dissimilar to Page’s policy in the late 1920s, it was a form of double protection. McEwen’s philosophy was simple: It was my belief then – and still is now – that the whole of the Australian economy is protected in one way or another. It has to be once some protection has been given to certain sections of industry. You cannot logically protect one section and not protect other sections, given basically similar circumstances.20

The escalation in the use of tariffs was prompted by the government’s decision in February 1960 to end import restrictions, which McEwen had opposed, and Treasurer Holt’s mini-budget in November that

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year. The latter increased sales taxes and interest rates and reduced tax deductions for industry, resulting in a serious credit squeeze, sending a number of companies to the wall, and increasing unemployment. With the government’s popularity diving and an election due in about a year, McEwen was in no doubt its survival was almost solely dependent on its ability to create jobs – fast. This meant bolstering the manufacturing sector, which in turn required higher protection. It was against this critical economic background that the Menzies government squeaked back into office at the election on 9 December 1961 with a majority of one seat, arguably Moreton, in Queensland, clinched for the Liberals by Jim Killen, who was elected with a two-party preferred majority of just 110 votes. Standing on the government’s record, Menzies delivered a joint policy speech at the Kew City Town Hall, Melbourne, on 15 November and McEwen followed with the second part of the joint policy at the Star Theatre in Shepparton five days later.21 McEwen said the government would ensure Australian manufacturing had adequate tariff protection to grow strong and expand. He said there was evidence that protection was working – there were 41 per cent more factories in Australia than existed when the government came to power in 1949 and the value of factory production was three and a half times higher. Another concern was Britain’s announcement in July 1961 that it would seek membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), or Common Market. In October, McEwen had told a business conference in Brisbane that, while not opposing Britain’s prospective entry – he saw that as none of Australia’s business – he was determined to protect the preferential trade arrangements enjoyed between the two nations. 22 Now he pledged that a returned Coalition government would stand by any Australian industries harmed by Britain’s proposed entry. He saw the Common Market as both ‘fraught with danger to Australian stability’, and ‘providing one of the great opportunities of history if the needs of all free people are to be taken into account’. Australia, he said, would put its case forthrightly to Britain’s

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negotiatiors: ‘We will certainly argue that if Britain is to buy food at higher prices from the Continent we will not expect, when selling our food, to receive depressed, unprofitable prices.’23 The Liberals were reduced from 58 seats at the 1958 election to 45, the Country Party went from 19 to 17, losing Cowper and Hume, but gaining Calare, in New South Wales, and losing Wide Bay in Queensland, and the Labor Party soared from 45 to 60.24 A special meeting of the Country Party federal executive on 8 January 1962, after ‘standing in silence in memory and tribute to the late Sir Earle Page’, who had died on 20 December 1961, considered the result and noted that the ‘lack of a separate Country Party Policy … had been detrimental’, and going to the country ‘on past record’ had been a serious mistake. The government platform should have contained ‘something specific in the future’.25 Nonetheless, a win was a win.

k The wisdom of using tariffs was increasingly questioned by Alf Rattigan, appointed by McEwen to succeed Leslie Melville as chairman of the Tariff Board in 1963: ‘Gradually, Rattigan shifted from being basically uncommitted on the question of general tariff levels to a position in which he strongly favoured lower tariffs … and after my retirement in 1971 and the change of government in 1972 he got much of his way.’ 26 The state Country parties and farm organisations were also becoming anxious, with party annual conference agendas regularly containing motions for a comprehensive review of tariffs and a reduction of tariffs to the lowest levels possible. McEwen blamed the farm bodies for fanning such sentiments, accusing some of them of supporting anti-tariff groups such as the Basic Industries Group (BIG).27 Jack Doohan, who was president of the Graziers’ Association of New South Wales from 1973–76 and a Country Party member of the state’s Legislative Council from 1978–91, said McEwen’s policies caused many in the association to question its continued financial support for the New South Wales Country Party: ‘I’m sure he [McEwen]

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Fertile news copy: the lead story in the first issue of The Australian, on 15 July 1964, highlighted Coalition tensions, reporting that McEwen’s sense of urgency about Australia’s economic development had ‘contrasted with Liberal policies, such as … a general vagueness on the Common Market issue’ (© Newspix/The Australian)

didn’t mean manufacturing industries should be protected for ever; they should be looked after like a poddy calf. But I don’t think many farm leaders ever forgave him.’28 Leaks from the cabinet, generally unfavourable to McEwen, his tariff policy, and the Country Party, grew in frequency in the media in the mid-1960s. McEwen believed McMahon, who was widely suspected of leaking cabinet information, was the source.29 He was convinced McMahon was associated with BIG and was using a freelance Canberra journalist and economics commentator, Maxwell Newton, to undermine him. McMahon denied connections to BIG or Newton. At one stage BIG implied that Country Party deputy leader Doug Anthony supported its campaign, placing him at odds with McEwen. Anthony

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said the implication was ‘sinister’ and that BIG had ‘tried to malign me. They have tried to make me a bunny’.30 The party’s federal president, Bill Moss, from Victoria, told a federal executive meeting that ‘B.I.G.’s one objective is the destruction of the Country Party’.31

k Menzies’ retirement from the prime ministership and parliament at the beginning of 1966 saw the country’s top political job go to Harold Holt. McEwen was not troubled by this and the Coalition continued with little disruption. Of more concern to the Country Party leader was McMahon’s election as deputy leader of the Liberal Party and his elevation to Treasurer. It was not long before the two were at loggerheads again – this time over the value of the Australian currency, which was decimalised in February 1966. On 18 November 1967 Britain announced a 14.3 per cent devaluation of sterling. Australia’s Department of Trade wanted the Australian dollar to follow suit to maintain the competitiveness of exports, particularly as many international contracts were negotiated in sterling. Treasury and McMahon argued for no devaluation. McEwen, attending General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations in Geneva at the time, and keeping in touch with developments in the cabinet by telephone with Anthony and Sinclair, insisted that if Australia did not devalue, export industries would have to be compensated. The cabinet supported the Treasury, although Holt announced the government would investigate the impact of Britain’s devaluation on Australian exports. This was not concrete enough for McEwen, who, after his return to Australia, issued a statement on 11 December that came close to outright disagreement with the cabinet decision. He called for the establishment of an advisory authority on export compensation to make sure there was no substantial damage to export industries, and said that by not devaluing Australia had in effect revalued its currency. Holt demanded to know why McEwen had not discussed the

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statement with him before releasing it. At a meeting on 12 December, McEwen candidly told the Prime Minister that had he done so, he would not have been able to issue the statement and ‘my views and the views of the Country Party would not have been known to the rural industries’. There were rumblings about whether McEwen should resign from the ministry and speculation that the Coalition was on the verge of collapse. But the two worked through their differences amicably: ‘He [Holt] agreed with the integrity of my action, though he disagreed with the substance of my statement. I am glad to say there was not the slightest tension or atmosphere of tension arising from our meeting. We understood each other perfectly’. The media gave Holt credit for having hauled McEwen into line. McEwen, however, had wrung from Holt an agreement that there would be what he called ‘devaluation compensation’, a program that went on for several years and which McEwen regarded as one of his most significant wins for Australia’s rural industries.32 The next and most critical phase in the McEwen-McMahon relationship would reach its climax just before Christmas 1967 – and this time, for McEwen, there would be no room for compromise.

k Always with an eye to opportunities, McEwen saw a chance for the Country Party to win the seat of Northern Territory, held by Labor since 1949, when, early in 1966, the sitting member, Jock Nelson, announced he would retire at the next election. McEwen not only understood Territory politics from his days as Minister for the Interior, but was also committed to seeing it develop. He had many contacts and friends there, one of whom was Eddie Connellan, whose business, Conellan Airways, based at Alice Springs, McEwen had supported with government subsidies as a means of developing the outback. He suggested to Connellan that he should contest the seat, but the businessman declined, saying it would be inappropriate because of the support his airline was receiving from the Commonwealth. Instead,

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Connellan suggested his former chief pilot and World War II RAF ace Sam Calder, holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross. McEwen dispatched Anthony to the Alice to sound out Calder and see how the party might support a federal campaign across the Northern Territory. The Country Party at this time did not exist there and had not previously contested the seat. Most non-Labor members of the Legislative Council in Darwin stood as Independents, although by the mid1960s there was a new conservative group, the Northern Australia Party (NAP), most influential around Alice Springs, and a fledgling Liberal Party in Darwin.33 After some persuasion, Anthony was able to report that Calder, now a cattleman and closely involved with the NAP, would be willing to stand for the Country Party. A party branch was launched in Darwin on 20 July 1966 and another in Alice Springs nine days later to help support Calder’s campaign, and the New South Wales Country Party agreed to help fund the formal establishment of the Australian Country Party – Northern Territory. The Liberals decided not to contest the election, lending their support instead to Calder, who won by a narrow 51.7 per cent of the two-party preferred vote and went on to hold the seat for six consecutive elections, until his retirement in September 1980.34 Also during the 1960s, McEwen was concerned that, with the retirement of Ulrich Ellis from close involvement with the federal party, the ACP was becoming increasingly reliant on the resources of the Liberal Party for strategic and campaign support. Over the years, Ellis had produced an enormous amount of material to help Country Party parliamentarians, candidates and campaigns and, through his independent Office of Rural Research, effectively ran an unofficial Country Party secretariat.35 McEwen knew that the need for strong and professional organisational support would be more critical in Opposition, when the parties would not have the luxury of unrestricted advice from the public service. He wanted the Country Party to have its own support capability in the shape of a national secretariat, and won support for the concept from the party’s federal executive in June 1965.36

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Organisational independence: John Gorton (left) and John McEwen at the opening by Gorton of John McEwen House, Canberra, 4 November 1968 (The Nationals federal secretariat)

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The original John McEwen House (The Nationals federal secretariat)

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Mac Holten was to raise funds for the project, which involved the purchase of the lease on a block of land on National Circuit, Barton, and the development of a new building. Holten took to his task with gusto, garnering donations from corporate supporters and initiating a membership fundraising effort, whereby party members in the states could ‘buy a brick’ towards the project. The fundraising activities caused concern in state Country Party organisations that the ‘feds’ were muscling in on their territory. Up to this point, the New South Wales party had provided most of the logistical support for the federal council and saw little need for the arrangements to change. John Fuller was openly sceptical about the project: The idea was good, but the fund raising aspects of it were my concern. McEwen was a very good friend of mine and he understood my feelings. Bob Rowland Smith, who was chairman of the Wool Buyers Association at the time, used to get donations for us [New South Wales Country Party] from the farm traders and elsewhere. Then he began to discover when he approached them that they had already been approached by the feds, without any reference to the state organisation. It started a split in the camp. That was the basis of my unhappiness about a national secretariat’.37

McEwen reassured the state parties that fundraising for the secretariat, apart from the ‘buy a brick’ drive, would not impinge on their sources of money. The project was finally completed and officially opened by Prime Minister John Gorton on 4 November 1968. Named John McEwen House, it was single-storey and cost $280 000 to build. With the federal secretariat occupying only 30 per cent of the floorspace, the rest was available for commercial leasing, so presenting the prospect of a self-funding enterpise.38 The first director was Peter Warwick. Originally from England, he had served in the Royal Navy in World War II before moving to Australia and settling on a sheep and cattle property near Armidale, New South Wales, where he became

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Facing the hecklers: the Minister for Primary Industry and Country Party deputy leader, Doug Anthony (left), at the time the acting party leader, faced a rowdy public meeting in Perth during the campaign for the 25 November 1967 half-Senate election. The New South Wales Countryman recorded that Anthony had to contend with a continuous barrage of interjections, and police twice removed one man – once after he had tried to climb up on the truck from which the minister was speaking. Anthony said afterwards: ‘It was a true political meeting. I loved it all.’ (The New South Wales Countryman, December 1967, The Nationals – NSW)

active in the Country Party, serving for a time as chairman of its Armidale electorate council.39 McEwen’s other concern was succession. He was critical of Menzies for not grooming any future leadership for the Liberals beyond his immediate successor, Holt.40 After the 1966 election, McEwen forced the retirement of his deputy, Charles Adermann, who was nearly four years older than him, in favour of a younger man. With Adermann’s agreement not to re-contest the deputy leadership at the post-election

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party meeting on 9 December, the re-elected McEwen bluntly told his colleagues: The situation is that I am the Country Party. This is bloody well not safe and has got to be ended. … With all respect to Charlie Adermann, he is several years older than I am and I do not think he should be the heir apparent when I am of an age where I might get a coronary or whatever and be gone tomorrow. I think you ought to elect a younger man as deputy leader and then build up a senior rank of younger members behind him.41

The party room elected Anthony the new deputy leader in a ballot with Sinclair. A disappointed Adermann held on to his Primary Industry portfolio for almost a year before retiring to the back bench on 16 October 1967, again at McEwen’s urging, so enabling Anthony to take over his portfolio and Nixon to replace him as Minister for the Interior.42 Three of the party’s rising stars, Anthony, Sinclair, and Nixon, were now in the ministry, forming a solid foundation upon which the long-term leadership could be based. McEwen noted that Ralph Hunt ‘later came to the fore’, and reflected: ‘If these four people had been available at one point in time, I would not like to have had to judge between them. I regard the four of them as being pretty much on a level.’ 43

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The veto

9: The veto

Harold Holt disappeared in the surf off Cheviot Beach, near Portsea, Victoria, shortly before midday on Sunday 17 December 1967. McEwen, who was at his farm, received the news by telephone and immediately flew to Canberra, where he had a meeting with the Governor-General, Lord Casey, and made arrangements for Anthony to also return to Canberra from his home in Murwillumbah, on the New South Wales far north coast. It was after 8.30pm when Anthony arrived at Canberra’s Kurrajong Hotel, where McEwen stayed when in the national capital. McEwen had advised the Governor-General of his willingness to accept a commission as Prime Minister if Holt was not found, which was becoming more likely with every passing hour. He had also told Casey that, while he would only hold the commission until the Liberal Party elected a new leader and therefore Prime Minister, he would not accept that as a formal condition of his appointment. He intended to maintain the ministry in its existing form and act in a caretaker capacity, but wanted full authority. He had a further condition: the Country Party would not continue to serve in the Coalition if the Liberal Party elected McMahon as its leader – which it might well do as he was

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the current deputy leader and Treasurer. McEwen briefed Anthony on these developments and the two discussed possible options. Anthony said the conversation concentrated not on how to prevent McMahon from becoming the Prime Minister, but on who could or should fill the office: The other obvious contender was Paul Hasluck [Curtin, Western Australia], who was Minister for External Affairs … McEwen liked Hasluck but thought he was too temperamental and dogmatic at times to make a good Prime Minister. We agreed John Gorton [Senate, Victoria] was the best bet. John was very popular, particularly among his Senate colleagues, and he was competent. The problem was he was in the Senate and to be Prime Minister we had to get him into the House of Representatives. We believed that could be done quite quickly through the by-election to fill Holt’s Victorian seat of Higgins. McEwen gave me the job of persuading Gorton that he should be the next Prime Minister. So I went to see Gorton at his home in [the Canberra suburb of] Narrabundah. This would have been about 10 o’clock or a bit after. I had to wake him up. We sat and talked for some time and I explained to him that if he became Prime Minister McEwen and the Country Party would support him. I went through the byelection scenario and all that. I don’t think Gorton had given any consideration to such an idea at all. I mean, this was the same day that Holt disappeared; there was still perhaps a vague hope that he would be found; it was a pretty chaotic time. Anyway, he didn’t say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the proposition. He wanted to think it through carefully.1

The following morning, McEwen met with party colleagues who had arrived in Canberra, and spoke by telephone to others. Mindful of the split in the party following Page’s attack on Menzies in 1939, McEwen wanted to make sure the majority of his colleagues clearly understood and supported the position he was taking. The convening of a formal

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parliamentary party meeting in Canberra was out of the question – decisions had to be made that day. All those he contacted agreed with his stand. Around midday he asked McMahon to come to his Parliament House office, where he told him he would not work with him as the Prime Minister: The words I had used to McMahon were very simple and direct. ‘Bill,’ I had said, ‘I will not serve under you because I don’t trust you.’ I did not add a syllable to that. McMahon did not answer at all. He just sat looking at me and then left the room. He was quite at liberty to say in public what I had told him, but never did so.2

With Holt now missing for some 30 hours and any realistic hope of finding him alive all but gone, Casey announced at 10pm that he would swear in McEwen as Prime Minister the following afternoon. Referring to the situation and the uncertainty it caused, the GovernorGeneral said: In these circumstances I have consulted my ministers. Their advice is that it is necessary to determine his [Holt’s] commission as prime minister so that a successor can be appointed … I have therefore asked Mr McEwen to accept my commission as prime minister … He has told me that he would intend to retain the office of prime minister until the government parties assemble to consider their position and to decide by proper processes to appoint a new leader.3

The term ‘until the government parties assemble … to decide … to appoint a new leader’ prompted speculation that McEwen wanted to keep the top job for himself. He did not, and the ‘government parties’ did not decide the matter; it was done by the parliamentary Liberals. Nonetheless, McEwen believed it was his responsibility to advise the Liberal Party in advance that his party would not serve under McMahon: ‘As a coalition partner, the Country Party has a right

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to declare whether or not it will serve under a particular leader of the majority party in the coalition.’ 4 McEwen maintained the Holt ministry. Anthony was one of the last ministers to see Holt alive. He had an informal meeting with him in his prime ministerial office in Parliament House at lunch time on the Friday before he disappeared: It was a beaut Canberra day. Harold looked out of his office window and up towards Anzac Parade and I said ‘What a beaut day!’ and he turned to me and said ‘What’s good about it?’ I had never seen him like that. I was really taken aback. He was usually petty resilient and didn’t let things get him down. He certainly had a lot of things on his plate. One was trouble he was having with his shoulder. He kept it quiet but it troubled him.5 Politically, the Senate was giving him hell. We’d just had a Senate election and the result wasn’t good for us, partly because of our growing involvement in Vietnam.6 And there was controversy over the use of VIP aircraft. These sorts of things were on. But still, his comment was totally out of character and when I heard he was lost my reaction was that he probably knew he was doing something silly, but couldn’t care less. I don’t believe at all that he committed suicide. He was down in the dumps, but there’s no way he deliberately killed himself.7

Holt was under pressure by the end of 1967. Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam war, a controversial issue in the 1966 election, had turned into an electoral nightmare. Two actions by Menzies were returning to haunt the government – the 1963 decision to buy the F-111 strike aircraft for the Royal Australian Air Force and the setting up of the royal commission into the HMAS Voyager disaster of February 1964.8 The F-111 contract was being questioned because of escalating costs and technical problems. The Voyager commission under Mr Justice Spicer was inconclusive, forcing Holt to agree to a second inquiry. The government had lost two by-elections in 1967 and fared badly in a half

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Senate election. McEwen and McMahon were at each other’s throats. The Coalition had been stretched over the value of the dollar. And the government was facing a scandal over who was entitled to use the RAAF’s VIP fleet and whether it had misled parliament in claiming that records of passengers on such flights were either not retained for long or did not exist at all.9 The Minister for Repatriation, Senator Colin McKellar (Country Party, New South Wales), came under sustained Opposition pressure over the VIP affair. As the Minister representing the Minister for Air, Peter Howson (Liberal, Fawkner, Victoria) in the Senate, he was at the centre of the controversy, though never accused of any personal dishonesty in the matter. McKellar was also the target of the RSL, having to defend the government’s decision to reduce pension entitlements to ex-servicemen. As a veteran of World War II, he found it hurtful to be the subject of a vote of no confidence carried by the RSL’s 1968 Victorian annual conference – particularly as he put considerable effort into visiting repatriation hospitals and discussing veterans’ needs. With mounting opposition to the Vietnam war, he insisted on spending Christmas with Australian troops in South Vietnam in 1966 and again in 1967.10 McEwen said achieving the highest office in the land gave him ‘no sense whatever of personal gratification’: I was neither warmed nor elated by the circumstances which unexpectedly precipitated me into this position. Nevertheless, it was gratifying to me, as leader of a great national party, that once again a person in my position [Country Party leader] was called upon to accept the position of head of the Australian Government.11

The parliamentary Liberal Party elected Gorton as its new leader on 9 January 1968. McMahon did not contest the ballot and Gorton comfortably beat the other contenders, Hasluck, Billy Snedden (Bruce, Victoria) and Les Bury (Wentworth, New South Wales). No other

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John McEwen vetoes any hope Bill McMahon has of succeeding Harold Holt as Prime Minister (, used with permission)

positions were declared vacant, leaving McMahon to continue as the deputy leader. McEwen was concerned at the precedent set by Gorton’s appointment – for a period, while he transferred from the Senate to the House of Representatives, the new Prime Minister would not be a member of parliament. The Country Party leader suggested that he should retain the prime ministership until Gorton completed the transfer. Gorton would not countenance this, so one of McEwen’s last acts as Prime Minister was to convene a cabinet meeting, explain the situation, and get its endorsement: After pointing out that Gorton would be Prime Minister whilst not being a member of either House of Parliament, I said, ‘I do not approve of this but I do not propose to oppose it at all. Can I take it that this situation has Cabinet approval?’ No one uttered a sound, so I said ‘Thank you, you all agree! It is now a Cabinet decision.’12

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Eleven days later, on 20 January, McEwen told his federal council he believed that he and his colleagues would be able to work ‘harmoniously, successfully and constructively’ with Gorton: ‘When I tell you that my understanding with Senator Gorton is exactly the same as the one I had with Mr. Holt, you will understand that the coalition will be able to work smoothly and successfully.’13 Gorton, however, proved to be something of a cavalier Prime Minister. He frequently made decisions without reference to the relevant minister, let alone the cabinet. He became accident-prone, largely because of his dislike of bureaucratic briefings and taking departmental officials on overseas visits. Ultimately, it was defence policy that caused McEwen his greatest difficulty with Gorton. The defence minister, Allen Fairhall, made a statement on 7 July 1969 warning about the expansion of Soviet military and naval power in the Indian Ocean. Barely five weeks later, on 14 August, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gordon Freeth, discounted the significance of the Soviet naval presence and said there had been discussions between Canberra and Moscow on collective security in the Asia-Pacific region. This was the first McEwen or Fairhall knew of such talks. McEwen was furious: it was a politically stupid statement to make before an imminent election; it had not been discussed with him, the cabinet, or any other minister; and it could undermine the Country Party’s relations with the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), in which McEwen had invested considerable effort to secure second preferences. Under pressure from his own party as well as from McEwen, Gorton toned down the apparent pro-Soviet stance in a speech to a Liberal Party rally in South Australia on 12 September: ‘We feel that any military alliance between Russia and a country in our region would pose a threat to ourselves.’14 Unimpressed, Fairhall resigned from parliament, leaving Gorton to lead a far from united Coalition into an election for the House of Representatives on 25 October. McEwen’s relations with the DLP maintained their preferences and helped the Country Party retain all but one of the 21 seats it held before the election. The result for the Liberals was less impressive – a

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loss of 15 seats on its 1966 result. The government’s majority was whittled from 41 to seven seats.15 The Country Party reconfirmed McEwen and Anthony as leader and deputy respectively. McEwen also indicated he might retire from the leadership and ministry in the near future, giving rise to speculation about who would succeed him, Anthony or Sinclair. The press opined that McEwen, while remaining publicly neutral, favoured Sinclair. This was logical, as Sinclair had been McEwen’s assisting minister in trade and industry since December 1966, in addition to holding the portfolios of Social Services (February 1965 to February 1968) and Shipping and Transport (February 1968 to February 1971). He had impressed McEwen and others with his ministerial management of the construction of the Ord River Irrigation Scheme in Western Australia, the conversion to standard gauge of the east-west railway, creating the Indian Pacific, and the survey work to re-route The Ghan railway from Tarcoola to Alice Springs by standard gauge.16 The speculation all but ended when, during a visit to Perth, McEwen replied to the succession question more directly: ‘This will be decided by members of the party themselves, and I am not trying to influence them. But I would think it would be a reasonable judgment that my deputy leader, Mr. Anthony, who has demonstrated his competence in the whole field, will succeed me.’17 In the Liberal Party, Gorton’s national development minister, David Fairbairn, announced he would challenge for the leadership at the post-election party meeting on 7 November. McEwen decided it was time to lift his veto on serving under McMahon, assuring him that if he contested and won, the Country Party ‘would not refuse to join him in a Coalition, subject to having a satisfactory understanding with him on a variety of matters’.18 Not that McEwen’s relationship with McMahon had improved. He had been at loggerheads with the Treasurer for more than a year over his plans to establish an authority to provide funding for industry development. Gorton narrowly survived the ballot, beating Fairbairn first and then McMahon, who was reelected deputy leader. McEwen retired from parliament on 1 February 1971, having been

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deputy Country Party leader from 1943 to 1958 and leader since then. He was the third-longest-serving member of the House of Representatives – 36 years and five months – behind Billy Hughes (51 years and seven months) and Earle Page (42 years). He also achieved his final victory over McMahon and Treasury, successfully establishing the Australian Industry Development Corporation (AIDC), which began operations in 1971 and was often referred to as the McEwen Bank.19 The parliamentary Country Party met the following day to elect a new leader. Anthony won the contest from Sinclair, who was elected his deputy in a ballot with Nixon.20 A new era was beginning. Anthony told his first news conference as leader there should be more emphasis placed on the fact that the Country Party represented To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

Start of a new era: Doug Anthony was elected leader of the Country Party when the long-serving John McEwen stepped down on 1 February 1971 (Australian Information Service/Auspic)

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people in regional cities and towns, and not just farmers: ‘I know of no other Party that can look after their interests better than the Country Party. I think it’s unfortunate there are some of these people who don’t recognise the work of the Country Party. A little more promotion has to be done in these areas, and probably a little more emphasis put on the country towns and cities.’ He said the party’s special role was to look after people outside the capital cities, ‘and I think we service that responsibility well’.21 After finalising ongoing Coalition arrangements with Gorton, the new Country Party ministerial line-up took office from 5 February: Anthony, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry; Sinclair, Minister for Primary Industry; Nixon, Minister for Shipping and Transport; Hunt, Minister for the Interior; Ceb Barnes, Minister for External Territories; Tom Drake-Brockman (Senate, Western Australia), Minister for Air; and Mac Holten, Minister for Repatriation.22 For his part, McEwen nominated as one of his most important achievements isolating New Caledonia from potentially being used as a Japanese base if Japan entered World War II. He told The Sydney Morning Herald that he had ‘contrived’ through Menzies and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to ensure that New Caledonia, just 800 miles from Brisbane and administered by the Nazi-supporting Vichy French, could be secured for the Allies: ‘We established an Australian flying boat base there. And when Japan did come into the war the Americans were able to occupy New Caledonia and establish it peacefully as a great American base’. He acknowledged his other great ‘victory’ was the establishment of the Australia-Japan trade treaty.23 The former Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, who entered the House of Representatives in 1955, regarded McEwen as ‘the most under-rated political figure’ in Australia: He had a sense of the future. During the Japanese trade treaty discussions McEwen got authority from Cabinet to negotiate. At the end of the Cabinet discussions he was told ‘you’ve got

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authority to negotiate, but in your name, on your account’. Jack obviously knew it was between him and the muck hole if it went wrong. In spite of that he had the courage to do it and the capacity to recognise that Australia was desperately going to need markets as Britain went into the Common Market. In the [joint] party room on one occasion when he was bringing in the trade treaty, two or three people got up in a row and said ‘we don’t need this trade treaty, we’ve got our great and powerful friends’ and so on. McEwen jumped to his feet, banged the table, and said ‘and that’s just the bloody trouble. Our great and powerful friends do not allow us to sell this or this and this. And if we don’t proceed with this treaty I’m perfectly happy to go into the honorable gentleman’s electorate and tell his constituents that he has taken a position which prevents me finding markets for your produce’.24

k In his memoirs recorded for the National Library in 1974, McEwen said he would have preferred Hasluck as Prime Minister and did not think he ever thought Gorton would make a good PM: ‘Gorton could not bear to think that his ideas on anything might be wrong. He was too insistent upon his own supremacy and quite unconscious of the need to operate as a member of a team’.25 Anthony doubted these views: ‘No. McEwen always preferred Gorton to Hasluck, no doubt about that. He never wanted Hasluck over Gorton. I think his National Library recollections might have been tainted with hindsight or retrospect’.26 Gorton also understood the Country Party. An orchardist near Kerang, Victoria, he had been a member of the Victorian Country Party before joining an ill-fated, amalgamated Liberal and Country Party of Victoria in 1946 and then the Liberal Party from 1949.27

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Anthony’s first opportunity to put his stamp on the party’s future direction came when he launched the by-election campaign for McEwen’s replacement in his Victorian seat of Murray, Bruce Lloyd, a month after becoming leader. McEwen had favoured his neighbour and family friend, Stuart McDonald, as his successor over the younger Lloyd, who was the immediate past president of the Victorian party. Lloyd said although he knew he ‘was not McEwen’s choice’, the former leader helped in his campaign. It was an important by-election, seen by many as a test for potential tariff reform. There were four candidates – Labor, Liberal, Country Party and Democratic Labor Party – with all party leaders entering the fray at one point or another. All candidates supported a 25 per cent tariff cut, which Lloyd said ‘probably hurt McEwen personally’.28 No doubt to avoid embarrassing his former leader at the campaign launch – McEwen was there – Anthony said little about tariffs, instead using his speech to highlight some of the party’s achievements and to identify decentralisation as an area for greater attention in the future: The biggest factor in the way of decentralisation is the lack of recognition by the people in the cities of the need for decentralisation. This is the same problem I’ve mentioned before – the unfavourable climate of public opinion. But I believe the climate of public opinion on the question of the overcrowding of our cities is beginning to change. The problem of the country areas is the problem of the cities – people drifting from the country is a problem; the overcrowding of the cities is a problem. We must take full advantage of the change in thinking that is taking place. … The Country Party must seize this opportunity to press for a new approach to decentralisation.29

The Liberal campaign was spectacularly derailed by continuing unrest over Gorton’s leadership, which led to a spill in the Liberal Party room precipitated by the resignation on 8 March of the new Minister for Defence, Malcolm Fraser. The leadership contest two days later

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resulted in a tied vote. As chairman of the meeting, Gorton could have used his casting vote to re-elect himself, but realised the hopelessness of his position. He withdrew from the contest, enabling McMahon to take over as party leader and Prime Minister, with Bury elected as deputy. The Murray by-election, on 20 March saw Lloyd elected. Gorton stayed briefly as defence minister until 13 August, when he resigned from the ministry, an unhappy and bitter man.30 With the by-election out of the way, Anthony felt free to develop a clear distinction between himself and McEwen on tariffs and to haul the party away from the protectionist image of McEwenism. He defined his philosophy in a speech to the Victorian section of the Australian Institute of Management five days after the by-election: Australia cannot afford any featherbedding of its industries. Nor can we afford the luxury of giving protection, as of right, to any firm which wants it. Protection brings costs as well as advantages to the nation, so we must avoid excessive protection. We must be discriminating. We are not in the situation of needing industry at any price. Wrong decisions in the granting of protection impose unnecessary burdens on other industries and the community as a whole. Industries which have been encouraged to develop by deliberate decision of Government cannot be faced with extinction overnight by Government edict. The Government has the right to continuously re-assess whether its policies are up to date and still meet the current needs of the country. But if new or additional rules are to be introduced, then this must be done slowly and with care.31

He announced the new policy, and an additional appointment to the Tariff Board, on 28 April, winning editorial support from The Sydney Morning Herald: ‘Yesterday’s tariff policy speech by the Minister for Trade was a refreshing change from the political obliquity, intrigue and pushing of narrow sectional interests that characterised his predecessor’s attitude to tariffs.’ 32

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What ensued was a comprehensive industry-by-industry review of tariffs, beginning with the most heavily protected sectors, which Anthony said ‘broke the protection link that McEwen carried so heavily and that I wanted to move on from’. It was an ongoing review over several years and it eased tariffs in many areas. Anthony conceded that farm organisations were not necessarily ‘adequately placated by it, but they were pleased it was happening’.

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New era, new name

10: New era, new name

There was no difference in policy between McEwen and Anthony over Britain’s impending entry to the Common Market, scheduled for 1 January 1973. Britain would have a five-year transitional period in which to adjust its trade and other policies to conform to EEC requirements and Australia believed a similar timeframe should be applied to phasing out the preferential arrangements in British-Australian trade, thereby giving affected Australian industries time to adjust and find new markets. In 12 months of negotiations between Britain and the Common Market countries, British officials repeatedly assured Australia they would look after its trade interests. As the negotiations were reaching their climax in Luxemburg in June 1971, Anthony was shocked to discover this was not the case: I have been dismayed to learn that in the May [1971] negotiations the British delegation accepted an arrangement which, while affording a transition for British agriculture and for raising food prices in Britain, places Australia with the prospect of possible

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immediate exclusion from this market for some of our traditional exports and harsh consequences for many others.1

He believed the British, and in particular their chief Common Market negotiator, Geoffrey Rippon, had welshed on undertakings given to Australia. Between the signing of Britain’s entry to the Common Market on 24 June 1971 and her membership from 1 January 1973, Anthony doggedly continued his fight: They weren’t going to budge a bloody inch. I laid into the Brits – I said ‘we’ve been your best ally through two world wars and what do you do – throw us out of your markets’. I said ‘if that’s the best you can do, we’ll look after ourselves.’ … I never forgave the British. I also never forgave Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy and the way it prostituted trade with production and export subsidies. The EEC had no qualms about the policy and its impact on world trade – and still doesn’t. … We came in for criticism for not winning more concessions from the EEC, but if anyone thinks we were too mild or timid, that certainly was not the case.2

In the late 1960s, the UK imported nearly 80 per cent of all Australian butter exports. These collapsed from 79 000 tonnes in 1973 to 7000 tonnes by 1981. Dairy herd numbers dropped from 4 million to 2.4 million by 1988, requiring extensive domestic reconstruction programs. Annual apple exports fell from 86 000 tonnes to 27 000 tonnes between 1975 and 1990, requiring widespread tree pull programs to cut production.3 The Country Party under Earle Page had established the Australian Trade Commissioner Service in 1934, mainly to promote trade between Australia, Britain and other Empire countries. McEwen expanded it to more than 20 countries during his term as trade minister as he forged new markets, notably Japan, and began moving Australia away from its dependence on Britain. In 1972, Anthony announced one of the most significant expansions of the service. New posts would be

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opened in the 1972–73 financial year in Seoul, Belgrade and Berne, and in the following year in countries in South America and Eastern Europe. Existing posts in Europe – at Brussels, Paris, Bonn, The Hague and Rome – would be expanded to lift Australia’s negotiating capacity with Europe, and posts in Moscow, Suva, Chicago, Singapore, Mexico City and Tokyo would also have their profiles raised. The initiatives would take Australian trade commissioner representation to 53 posts in 40 countries.4 If Australia was to crack substantial new markets for its primary products, it had to guarantee a ‘clean and green’ status. This was not difficult in most respects. There was no foot and mouth disease in livestock, or fire blight in apples. But there were problems with beef, in the form of the diseases brucellosis and tuberculosis. Hence the development in 1970 of a nationally co-ordinated government and industry funded Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Campaign (BTEC).5

k Another clash over the value of the Australian dollar at the end of 1971 again plunged the Coalition into crisis.6 Following a devaluation of the American dollar, McMahon and Treasury argued for a revaluation of the Australian dollar by 8.57 per cent to keep in it line with sterling. In a series of dramatic cabinet meetings spanning three days and running a total of 23 hours, the Country Party ministers – Anthony, Sinclair and Nixon – walked out on three separate occasions. They demanded a revaluation of no greater than 5.2 per cent. A compromise was eventually struck, with the decision to align the Australian dollar with the US dollar rather than sterling. This meant a revaluation of 6.3 per cent, sweetened for the Country Party by a commitment to consider compensation for rural industries that were adversely affected. Announcing the decision, McMahon said it meant ‘an overall depreciation in relation to the parities of our trading partners as a whole of approximately 1.75 per cent’. It was a victory for the Country Party, but not

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one welcomed by The Sydney Morning Herald, which said ‘The Country Party is again demonstrating what a negative and destructive political force it is. Once more it has thrown itself behind the selfish demands of narrow sectional interests with a complete disregard for the best interests of the nation as a whole’. Its economics writer, Alan Wood, said ‘The Australian economy has run second to the Country Party’.7 The Anthony-McMahon relationship was always going to be strained; some of McEwen’s antipathy towards McMahon had rubbed off. In addition, Gough Whitlam, who succeeded Arthur Calwell as Labor leader in February 1967, was more flamboyant than McMahon and superior to him in parliamentary debate. With media coverage of election campaigns, particularly on television, focusing increasingly on the party leaders, a McMahon-Whitlam contest would be a virtual foregone conclusion. Anthony began searching for an issue that might dominate a campaign and deflect attention away from the leaders. He thought he found it in the August 1972 budget, which set the economic scene for the next election, forecasting continuing low inflation and near full employment. When Whitlam in his reply called on the government to go to the people if it thought its budget was so good, Anthony and the Treasurer, Billy Snedden, went to McMahon and suggested he should take up the challenge: ‘Bill took great umbrage – he nearly threw us out of his office – and our relations became very cool after that. I still believe if we had gone to the people on the budget we could have won.’ 8 Relations got so low that Anthony was not consulted by McMahon on the timing of the1972 election: I remember going to see Bill and saying ‘It would be nice to know when the election is going to be’, to which he replied ‘I’m not going to tell you; I’ve made up my mind and there are only three people who need to know and you’re not one of them’. I went back to my office and thought about it. I guessed one of the three would be his wife, Sonia, one would be his senior staffer, and one would be Jack Marshall, the New Zealand Prime Minister, because

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a pattern had been established that Australia and New Zealand held their elections on the same day. So I rang Marshall – I knew him pretty well – and casually asked if he had decided on an election date yet, to which he said ‘Yes, haven’t you heard?’ and told me the date. I never let on to McMahon, but I got the Country Party’s campaign geared for the same date – and I was right!

The election was to be held on 2 December 1972.

k Anthony launched the Country Party’s campaign, under the slogan A strong Country Party keeps the balance, on 20 November at the Lismore City Hall in his electorate. The media accompanying his campaign now began dubbing it the Wombat Trail, because of the way it crisscrossed regional Australia in the comfortable, yet somewhat ponderous Hawker Siddeley HS748 aircraft of the RAAF’s VIP fleet. The plane was particularly suited to the Country Party campaign because it could land on short country airstrips.9 In his speech, Anthony reflected on the government’s positive budget and the nation’s economic strength. He promised continuing Country Party opposition to currency changes that might adversely affect export industries, to any reduction in working hours, and support for administrative changes that would be the first step towards statehood for the Northern Territory. In a new pitch to broaden the party’s electoral appeal he turned to more social issues: The Country Party believes that there must be a fundamental reappraisal of the role of women in our society. This will mean looking harder at the opportunities provided for women to become more closely involved in the commercial, industrial, social and political life of the community. There must be a new approach to specific matters such as working conditions, the care of children, removal of inequalities of opportunity, and special

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training to equip women for an extended role in the community. In short, there must be a complete reshaping of some of our old thinking so that the women of our society have the chance to be what they should be – total women, totally involved.10

He concluded with a set of words about the role of the party that became a standing definition in state and federal organisations for years to come: A strong Country Party does keep the balance – the balance of stable, dependable government; the balance of development between city and country; the balance of economic activity; a balance between the rural industries and the other sectors of the community. We want to see a balance of opportunity for education and employment; a balance of social justice between different sections of the community; a proper balance between the powers and responsibilities of the State governments and the Commonwealth Government, with neither becoming overdominant, but working in partnership. We keep a balance between the extremes of political thought.

Throughout the speech there were references to the Country Party’s and the government’s achievements and forward commitments, but not one mention of McMahon. Anthony was intent on quarantining his party from potential electoral negatives of association with the Prime Minister. The Country Party was returned at the election with 20 seats in the House of Representatives, the same number it held following the polls in 1969. It was a vindication of the controversial and initially unpopular programs the party had pursued in the interests of many farm industries: the partial lifting of the ban on merino ram exports in March 1969; introduction of wheat delivery quotas in 1969–70 to reduce plantings in the face of a slump in world prices coinciding with Australia’s record crop the previous year; and the marginal dairy farms

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To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

On the Wombat Trail: Doug and Margot Anthony board a RAAF HS748 at the start of the 1972 election campaign (the Anthony family)

reconstruction scheme in July 1970, which Labor said meant farmers had to ‘get big or get out’. More popular had been the establishment of the Australian Wool Commission in October 1970, with powers to operate a flexible reserve price scheme for auction sales and to improve marketing of the product.11

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The Liberals were less fortunate, with the result that 23 years of Coalition governments came to an end. Gough Whitlam’s Labor Party, campaigning under the simple but effective slogan, It’s Time, won a majority of nine seats in the House of Representatives.12 It had been so long since a change of government that protocols on the transfer of power had been virtually forgotten. Whitlam wanted minimum delay. He and his deputy, Lance Barnard, were commissioned to form an interim ministry on the Tuesday afternoon following the election. Former ministers barely had time to clear their desks, let alone their filing cabinets. A full caucus meeting to confirm Labor’s ministerial line-up was not held until 19 December and in the meantime Whitlam and Barnard split all portfolio responsibilities between each other and got to work, immediately ending national service for Vietnam, which had been introduced in 1964, and announcing the winding up of Australia’s involvement in the conflict, which had been substantially achieved during 1971. Whitlam was going to make Australia more internationally independent. He would replace imperial honours with an Australian system and used Australia Day 1973 to announce that his government would sponsor a nationwide competition for a new national anthem to replace God Save the Queen. He removed the word ‘Commonwealth’ from official government documents and buildings, replacing it with ‘Australian’. He intended his government to have a greater role in areas including health, education, urban and regional development, social justice, housing, transport, Aboriginal affairs, and the environment – all of which had been substantially the responsibility of the states. With Whitlam moving rapidly, the defeated Coalition was not only trying to come to terms with Opposition, but also with whether or not the two parties should continue to be in a coalition.

k While the Liberals were preoccupied with the leadership ballot that would take place at their party meeting on 20 December, Anthony –

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confident of his leadership tenure of the Country Party, even though it would not be formalised until the party room met on 13 December – moved quietly into the parliamentary office that for the past 23 years had been occupied by the deputy leader of the Opposition. He made himself comfortable – and permanent. After the Country Party reconfirmed all parliamentary party positions at its meeting, Anthony held a press conference and said he envisaged close co-operation with the Liberals, adding: ‘I would think that I would hold the second-most important position in Opposition as leader of a political party. Now, whatever you call that position, it’ll be a matter for negotiations or discussions with the Liberal Party. But I think I have a right to claim that position.’13 The Liberal Party elected Snedden as leader and Phil Lynch, the Member for Flinders in Victoria and Minister for Labour and National Service under McMahon, deputy leader. Lynch was piqued to find Anthony squatting in what he regarded as his domain. He wanted the office, but Anthony had assumed squatter’s rights and, as he’d said, presumed to be the second most senior person in the Opposition, whether there was a coalition or not. The episode might seem trivial, but it was part of the jockeying between the parties for staff allocations, office accommodation, allowances and entitlements as they grappled with the transfer to Opposition. Anthony said he was justified in occupying the room because it used to be Arthur Fadden’s office – ‘that was my story anyway and I wasn’t moving’.14 Anthony and Snedden agreed before leaving Canberra for the 1972 Christmas break to work co-operatively in Opposition, but not in a formal coalition. Anthony devised a system of five committees to monitor government legislation, with the committee chairmen to be the party’s spokesmen in their respective areas. The committees and chairmen were: Economy and Industry, Anthony; Foreign Affairs and Security, Sinclair; Communications and Labour, Nixon; Humanities, Holten; and Government Services and Administration, Hunt. Anthony was angry when, on 8 January 1973, Snedden released

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a list of 16 Liberal Party spokesmen – effectively a shadow ministry – covering all portfolios and including Malcolm Fraser as primary industry spokesman. He said Snedden’s announcement was ‘quite disturbing’ and ‘To believe that the Country Party would accept that the Liberal Party would be official spokesman in the Opposition for the whole range of Government business is not being realistic.’15 Better synchronisation began with a joint Snedden-Anthony announcement on 6 February that Opposition speakers in parliament would be called in the sequence of two Liberals and one Country Party. When Snedden and Anthony wanted to speak on the same issue, Anthony would immediately follow Snedden so the views of both parties could be identified at the start of a debate. A co-ordination committee was established, which met weekly when parliament was in session, but there were no joint party or policy committee meetings during the first session of the new parliament. A meeting between Anthony and Snedden in August 1973 led to the reinstatement of joint meetings and committees.16 The parties settled into a more affable relationship.

k Soon after the election, Anthony began analysing the results across a range of regional seats, studying demographic, social and economic details. He decided to test the views of the grassroots membership on various issues and pioneered sending questionnaires to party branches across Australia, inviting their input into a comprehensive revision and broadening of the party’s national policy document. Through this, he became convinced the Country Party had to change, including renaming itself, if it was to underpin its future. He determined to use the period in Opposition to bring this about. McEwen had partly recognised the challenges facing the party by initiating closer relations with the DLP to secure its second preferences, instigating the women’s federal council and establishing the federal secretariat in Canberra.

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Anthony knew the ideas he was forming would be acceptable to the party in Queensland, which was coincidentally assessing how to broaden its own electoral appeal, but controversial elsewhere, especially his own state of New South Wales. He could not simply start imposing changes on the state parties, which were autonomous organisations with their own constitutions. The momentum had to be seen to be driven by the states. The agenda for the New South Wales party’s annual general conference at Ballina in June 1973 contained a motion from the Merriwa branch that ‘this Conference favour the retention of the name Australian Country Party and affirm as one of the Party Objects to encourage the establishment of the Australian Country Party throughout the Australian continent as an independent political entity’. After some behind-the-scenes negotiations, the motion was significantly amended, and carried, to read: That Conference affirms its support for the name and objectives of the Australian Country Party but recommends that an Australiawide professional survey be conducted into ways and means of broadening the image of the Party including the consideration of a change of name and that the results be co-ordinated by the National Secretariat.17

Through the federal secretariat, Anthony commissioned Sydney business consultants WD Scott and Company to research the party’s options. Its key findings were that the party should broaden its policy base and change its name from one appearing to have a sectional farmer-grazier image, especially in provincial towns and cities. The Queensland Country Party, at a special conference in Brisbane on 27 and 28 October 1973, voted by 420 to 22 to change its name to National Party of Australia – Queensland. The new name was launched on 6 April 1974. Now Anthony had to convince the party nationally that the name Country Party would no longer translate into the votes it needed to grow and extend its electoral appeal.

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At a meeting of the federal council in Canberra at the end of November, he suggested the federal party name be changed from Australian Country Party to National Country Party of Australia. He said his proposal would accommodate the names of the National and Country parties and ‘help further to identify us for what we already are – a truly national party concerned with the wellbeing of the whole of the Australian nation’.18 He suggested the federal council consider convening a national convention, with a delegate from every one of the party’s 1200 branches invited to attend. The council unanimously accepted a notice of motion, to go to a further meeting on 9 March 1974, that the federal party adopt the name National Country Party of Australia, and agreed in principle to hold a national convention during the year. The subsequent federal council agreed by 18 votes to six to recommend the name change. Partly because of the May 1974 double dissolution election, the convention was postponed to May 1975, when the change to National Country Party of Australia (NCP), by then a fait accompli, was formalised. The Western Australian party became the National Country Party from 28 July 1974, Victoria followed the Queensland model, becoming the National Party from April 1975, and South Australia changed to National Country Party from 9 September 1975. The New South Wales party held out for a further two years before changing to National Country Party on 26 June 1977.19 The federal convention, held in Canberra from 2 to 5 May 1975, attracted more than 1000 delegates from around Australia.20 It discussed a range of topics, including the involvement of Aborigines in politics, the changing role of women in society, federalism, and the party’s relationship with the Liberal Party. The new Opposition leader, Malcolm Fraser, who had toppled Snedden a few weeks earlier, on 21 March, gave a keynote address, declaring the new-look NCP ‘can only encourage greater co-operation and cohesion between the parties’.21 The convention also adopted a revised and expanded federal platform, the previous one having remained largely unaltered for the past nine years. The platform unveiled a new party logo, which had been designed

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A new name for new times: Doug and Margot Anthony and John McEwen at the party’s first federal convention, Canberra, May 1975, which formally changed the name from Australian Country Party to National Country Party of Australia (The New South Wales Countryman, The Nationals – NSW)

by Sydney media manager and friend of Anthony’s, Harry M Miller. It was a green roundel encircling a stylised map of Australia. Under the logo the platform proclaimed Honour to God, Loyalty to the Crown, Justice for all. The convention was the culmination of more than three years’ work and took the party into a new era, positioning it to attract wider electoral support from regional towns and cities. Strategically, it was a good time to put a spotlight on the party. The Whitlam agenda required major increases in public spending and coincided with oil price hikes in 1973 and 1974 by the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Resultant price rises saw an increase in strikes as unions pushed for higher wages. Unemployment rose dramatically, as did inflation. By the September quarter 1974, inflation was at a record 16.4 per cent, nearly four times greater than when Labor came to power two years earlier. In July, Treasurer

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Frank Crean had warned that unless decisive action was taken, it could hit 20 per cent.22 Male average weekly earnings rose from $93.00 in 1971–72 to $148.20 in 1974–75. Industrial disputes saw the number of working days lost rise from just over 2 million in 1972 to nearly 6.3 million in 1974, the number of people registered for unemployment went from just under 99 000 in 1972 to nearly 246 000 in 1975 and the Commonwealth budget deficit soared from $709 million in 1972– 73 to $2567 million in 1974–75.23 Labor’s poor record and the added focus on the NCP because of the federal name change and national convention proved a boon to the party. In New South Wales, for instance, its membership had grown from 13 500 to just under 20 000 between 1948 and 1972. But in the following three years the state party’s membership grew steeply to more than 25 000 members. Membership revenue went from $102 382 at the end of March 1973 to $142 077 by the end of March 1975 – with no increase in the subscription. Corporate donations also increased handsomely.24 Similar trends were evident in other state parties.

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The night of the long prawns

11: The night of the long prawns

By 1974, Whitlam was totally frustrated by the way the OppositionDLP-controlled Senate kept knocking back his legislation and disrupting what he saw as the mandate for reform that he had been given by the Australian people barely 12 months earlier. He wanted to neuter the Opposition parties in the Senate. But how? A half Senate election was due before the end of June, but it was extremely unlikely that this would tip the numbers the government’s way. The upper house comprised 60 senators – 10 from each state. Representation for the Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory did not come about until the 1975 elections, when each gained two senators.1 The government had 26 senators in 1974, five short of an absolute majority of 31 and four short of the 30 needed to block Opposition initiatives. Twelve government senators would complete their terms on 30 June 1974. If it was to obtain an absolute majority at a half Senate election, the government had to win three of the five Senate positions in each of the six states, giving it 32 senators. To do this it had to secure 50 per cent of the vote, including preferences – an almost impossible target.2

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Anthony was also frustrated, but for different reasons. He and his colleagues were angered and astounded by the government’s disregard for the rural sector and its mismanagement of the economy. Moreover, Whitlam was intent on a raft of electoral reforms, including changing the formula by which the size of electorates was established, that would be extremely damaging to smaller parties. The Country Party MPs agreed to do whatever they could to force an early election. Their frustration was compounded by a seeming unwillingness on the part of some Liberals to push the government to the wire. There had been some loose talk about forcing an early election by blocking Supply bills in the Senate. But this had come to nothing because several Liberals, notably senators, were opposed to it. The Senate had never knocked back an elected government’s Supply bills, the legislation facilitating public service funding and payments to the states. Setting such a precedent, said Liberal opponents of the idea, was too abhorrent to contemplate. Whitlam and the Attorney-General, Senator Lionel Murphy (New South Wales), were less reticent about playing political hardball. Whitlam was ready to consider almost anything to thwart the hostile Senate. With several bills already twice rejected by the upper house, he had grounds to call on the Governor-General, former Liberal minister Paul Hasluck, and seek a double dissolution. But Labor strategists calculated the government needed a few more months to improve its electoral stocks before such action could be seriously considered. Perhaps there was another possibility. Could the government improve its Senate strength by offering judicial or ambassadorial appointments to a couple of long-term senators and thereby create casual vacancies before the next Senate election? At this time, a replacement appointed to fill a casual Senate vacancy had to stand for election at the first state-wide federal election following appointment. From 1977, the constitution was changed so that the appointee to a casual vacancy served the balance of the term of the senator he or she replaced before facing re-election. 3 In 1974, therefore, the attraction to the government of creating casual vacancies was that they would

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improve Labor’s prospects of increasing its numbers at the impending half Senate election because six and not five senators would be elected from the state or states concerned, thereby reducing the quota required to win three Senate positions from 50 per cent to just under 43 per cent.4 It was a tantalising prospect and one Murphy had been quietly exploring for the past few months. In later years it was suggested the Liberal senator from Western Australia, former lawyer Peter Durack, was earmarked for an offer of appointment to the High Court, though he was never approached. DLP leader at the time, Senator Frank McManus (Victoria), claimed he had been approached with the offer of appointment as Australian Ambassador to the Vatican, but had refused on the grounds that Whitlam was ‘peddling’ jobs to ‘get positions in the Senate’.5 The break Whitlam needed came in the unlikely form of Sen-ator Vince Gair (Queensland), who had reluctantly resigned from the DLP’s leadership in October 1973 and had been disgruntled ever since. A former Queensland treasurer and Labor premier, he had been thrown out of the ALP in 1957 for failing to implement a resolution of the previous year’s state conference to legislate for three weeks’ annual leave for workers employed under state awards. In retaliation, Gair and his supporters formed the Queensland Labor Party (QLP), which subsequently merged with the DLP in 1962. He was elected to the Senate from 1 July 1965 and revelled in the scorn poured on him by the ALP.6 Gair, whose father was Scottish and mother Irish, was a colourful character. He was a rotund five feet six inches, feisty, amiable, enjoyed a drink, and was quick to use thoroughly undiplomatic language. The Attorney-General followed up suggestions in early 1974 that the 73-year-old Gair might be ripe for an overseas appointment. Given his strong Irish background, and the fact that his wife was also from Irish stock, the bait was Ambassador to Dublin – and Gair took it hook, line and sinker. The challenge now was to keep the arrangement secret until Gair could submit his resignation to the president of the Senate, Magnus Cormack (Liberal, Victoria). Gair accepted the appointment

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on 13 March. The Governor-General approved it the following day, and it was agreed to by the Irish government on 20 March. The day after, Whitlam announced that a half Senate election would be held on 18 May. The issue of the writs was expected on 18 April. The first opportunity for Gair to submit his resignation would be when the parliament returned on 2 April. All went well until the Melbourne Sun newspaper ran a leak about the appointment on the morning of 2 April, prompting Snedden to demand an explanation from the Prime Minister as soon as the lower house met at 11am. A triumphant Whitlam announced: ‘I am happy to inform honourable members that the Irish Government has given its agreement for the appointment of Senator Gair as Australia’s Ambassador. I hope that Mr and Mrs Gair will be able to welcome me to Dublin next July.’ The House of Representatives descended into uproar, with Anthony declaring: ‘We are highly concerned that a government will get into such an act of corruption as to try to buy off some Senator so that it has a better chance in a Senate campaign.’7 Amidst Opposition outrage and Government euphoria, Anthony returned to his office and thought back to his time as Minister for the Interior, when he had charge of Commonwealth electoral laws. It occurred to him there might be a way of beating the government – on the technicality of the timing of Gair’s resignation. To Anthony’s recollection, the creation of a casual Senate vacancy was dependant on the senator concerned resigning before the issue of the writs by his or her state for a Senate election. If the resignation was submitted after the issue of the writs, the vacancy could not be filled at the election, but would have to be filled by a vote of the relevant state parliament. In other words, the election in Queensland would be for five, not six, senators, and the Gair replacement – almost certain to be an anti-Labor DLP representative because by convention replacements came from the same party as the departing senator – would hold the seat until the following election. Anthony tested his theory on his deputy, Sinclair, who was a barrister, an authority on parliamentary procedure, and manager of Opposition business in the House of Representatives, and

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two colleagues who had also been interior ministers, Nixon and Hunt. The three agreed it might have legs. Anthony went to see the Opposition’s leader in the Senate, Reg Withers: Reg looked at the Electoral Act and agreed that if the writs could be issued immediately – before Vince had time to give his resignation to the President of the Senate – we could trump the government. Wheels had been put in motion for the writs to be issued in Queensland by about 18 April and of course there was no way we could prevent Vince from lodging his resignation for that long. It literally had to be done as soon as possible. I thought that it was just a wish that this might happen. We needed a miracle. I went back to my office and rang [Queensland Premier] Joh [Bjelke-Petersen], thinking it would be impossible for him to understand. Joh listened as I talked him through the complexity and urgency of it all. He didn’t say much and I thought ‘well, that’s that’. I didn’t expect to hear back from him. But evidently he got straight on to his Solicitor-General. He rang me back about an hour later saying he had taken the necessary action and writs for the election of five senators would be issued that night. I was amazed; thrilled and amazed, because the issuing of writs is quite a complex business.8

During the few intervening but crucial hours, Gair had to be prevented from handing a letter of resignation to the Senate president. The government was aware of the need for the resignation to be lodged before the issue of the writs, but was not too concerned about a day or two, believing there was plenty of time before their anticipated issue on 18 April. Anthony’s plot depended on secrecy, something that would be difficult to ensure given the number of people involved, especially in Queensland, in the rush to issue the writs. Gair had been occupied for most of the afternoon giving media interviews on his appointment and declaring that he had ‘sold out to no one’.9 By now it was early

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evening and Anthony decided the safest course was to try to keep the senator hidden for the rest of the night. Coincidentally, Senator Ron Maunsell (Queensland), the Country Party’s Senate whip and a good friend of Gair’s, visited Anthony’s office The party leader’s conversation with him turned immediately to Gair: ‘Doug mentioned what Vince was intending to do and said if we could stop him resigning it would be a big help. I said “I’ll fix him!”.’10 As Maunsell was returning to his office around 6pm he ran into Gair in the corridor. The latter was flustered. He’d had a hectic afternoon with the media and been pilloried by his parliamentary DLP To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

Host of the night of the long prawns: Ron Maunsell, whose congenial hospitality was crucial to delaying Vince Gair’s resignation from the Senate (Australian Information Service/Auspic)

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colleagues for accepting the ALP’s patronage. Not that he was concerned about that, telling them: ‘I’ve carried you bastards for years and now you can go to buggery!’11 Gair told Maunsell he had been trying to find Cormack to give him his resignation. According to Maunsell, Cormack had known what was going on and ‘kept disappearing on to the verandah all the time’. Noting Gair’s agitated state, Maunsell asked if he would like a beer, to which Gair said he would love one – ‘typical Vince!’. The two adjourned to Maunsell’s office, where Gair was happy to sit with a mate enjoying beer and scotch – and a helping of the fresh prawns, for which Maunsell was renowned for bringing to Canberra from Townsville, where his office was: ‘I’m pretty sure he twigged to what was going on, but he didn’t want to move. The scotch bottle interested him more than anything else!’ Maunsell’s hospitality was perhaps harder to resist because the parliamentary catering staff had gone on strike that morning, so there were no refreshments for the dinner break.12 Maunsell said it was not long before just about everybody knew where Gair was: Whitlam twigged and sent one of his senators round to see me, to get me to take Gair into the Senate, but Vince didn’t want to go, so I sent him off. I brought Doug Anthony round at one stage because I thought Vince might be getting restless, but he wasn’t. He was quite happy. Journos kept coming round, but Vince and I choofed them off. Wallace Brown, who worked for the Courier-Mail and was a good mate of mine, was in the office with us, but he didn’t know what was going on at all. Another good mate was Bob Baudino, on The Australian. He wasn’t with us all the time – kept coming and going – but I gave him the story and he ran it on the front page the next morning under the heading ‘The night of the long prawns’. It was a beauty!13

Tactics changed as the evening wore on. It was learned the government would likely argue that Gair’s resignation was effective from the

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day the Governor-General approved his appointment, 14 March. If Gair could now take his seat in the chamber and vote, it would be well nigh impossible for the government to argue he had already resigned. Maunsell steered Gair to the chamber, where, just before 10pm, he voted with Opposition and DLP senators against the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Bill.14 Maunsell stuck to Gair like glue, leaving no opportunity for Murphy or any other Labor senator to get close enough to haul him before Cormack. Then he spirited him back to his office: ‘Everybody was trying to get at him, but he wasn’t going to have any of it. He made his vote and was happy to get back to the scotch.’ The two remained ensconced until well after the Senate adjourned a little before 12.30am and parliamentary offices and corridors became empty. Maunsell thought it was around three in the morning before Gair finally left. An hour or so earlier, at 1.40am, and true to his assurance to Anthony, Bjelke-Petersen announced to the Queensland parliament a special gazette containing the writs for the election of five senators in Queensland for the 18 May half Senate election.15 It would not be until the afternoon of the same day, 3 April, that Gair finally submitted his resignation. The Queensland DLP state council met in Brisbane that evening and agreed to recommend its senior vice-president, 49-yearold public accountant, TG Maule, to the Queensland parliament as its nominee to fill Gair’s vacancy.16 The terminology in Gair’s resignation letter gave the impression that the government had a hand in its drafting. Gair later confirmed he had ‘edited’ it.17 The wording tried to imply his resignation was effective from the date of the Governor-General’s approval of the ambassadorial appointment: My appointment was approved by the Governor-General on 14 March 1974, with my knowledge and consent. I was informed on 20 March that the Government of Ireland had communicated its agreement to my appointment. As you are aware, the position of Ambassador is an office of profit under the Crown and also carries

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with it fees for services rendered to the Commonwealth, within the meaning of Section 45 of the Constitution, which I had agreed to take. The effect of my appointment as Ambassador was to vacate my place as Senator by virtue of the Constitution.18

In the lower house, Whitlam stated somewhat limply: ‘I was under no impression that his [Gair’s] resignation from the Senate was required. I was under the impression that under the Constitution his seat had been vacated.’ Two days earlier, Whitlam had said he understood Gair had not resigned.19 In the Senate, Murphy produced an opinion from the SolicitorGeneral, Maurice Beyers, supporting the government’s claim and unsuccessfully tried to have the matter referred to the High Court. But Gair’s Senate vote on the night of 2 April made his case look farcical. Instead, an Opposition amendment resolving that Gair had not resigned before 3 April was carried by 30 votes to 26.20 The government had lost, and, most galling for Whitlam, he had been outsmarted by Anthony – someone, he said, whose statements meant little as he had ‘the least general education of the political leaders’.21 The Senate turned some attention to the night of the long prawns story. Labor Senator George Georges (Queensland) asked Murphy if he would investigate to see if a deliberate attempt had been made to prevent Gair from informing the president that he had vacated his seat, and if Gair had been entertained ‘to the point of confusion’ so that he took part in the petroleum bill vote ‘without realising exactly what he was doing’. Murphy replied that what had occurred was ‘certainly an unedifying story, or rather a disgraceful episode’ and suggested Maunsell should inform the chamber whether it was true.22 Maunsell replied that he frequently invited people, including some from the ALP, to his office, adding: On this occasion I happened to ask Senator Gair whether he would like a drink and he accepted. He had not eaten a meal all day and so he had a meal there. Various people came into the room at

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different times and went out. This is what usually happens. … I left my office with Senator Gair when a division was called. I was not hijacking him as Government senators would have us believe. It must be the greatest joke of all time to think that anyone could tie down Senator Gair. … I object to the fact that Senator Murphy did not consult with me as to whether this newspaper article that he referred to was true before he attacked me in the Senate.23

Maunsell said that some months later he and Murphy were reflecting on the night of the long prawns and events in the Senate, particularly on 3 April: ‘Murphy quipped that it had been a funny day and I said, “yes it certainly was”.’ While the Gair affair had its humorous side, it was a turning point in the fortunes of the Whitlam government that would ultimately lead to its dismissal in November 1975. By showing its preparedness to manipulate Senate numbers for its own political advantage, Labor hardened the determination of the Opposition to force it to an election for the House of Representatives along with the half Senate on 18 May. Most in the Liberal Party were now more prepared to consider blocking Supply bills. The Gair affair was a crucial turning point.

k The day after Gair’s resignation, Snedden and Anthony announced that the Opposition parties would reject two appropriation bills providing more than $170 million for wages and administrative expenses in the public service and finances for capital works in the states.24 Snedden said the bills, then before the lower house, would be rejected by the Opposition and he ‘expected’ that this would also happen in the Senate, adding ‘if the bills fail to pass it will mean the Government must go to an election’. Anthony said the Australian people were ‘sick and tired’ of the policies and attitudes of the government: ‘We have seen the Government involved in a complete breakdown in principle and morality when it bought over Senator Gair as Ambassador to Ireland.’

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McManus later said the DLP senators ‘believe it is proper to take the Government to the people’25 Whitlam said he would dissolve both houses if the Opposition blocked a Supply bill: ‘Let there be no equivocation,’ he said. ‘If the Senate rejects any money bill – the first time that the Senate would have rejected a money bill in the history of our nation – I shall certainly wait upon the Governor-General and I shall advise the Governor-General not merely to dissolve the House of Representatives but to dissolve the Senate as well.’ 26 The first of three appropriation bills before the Senate came to a vote six days later, on the afternoon of Wednesday, 10 April. To a government motion that the debate be resumed at a later hour, the Opposition moved an amendment, adding the rider ‘but not before the Government agrees to submit itself to the judgement of the people at the same time as the forthcoming Senate election’.27 This was a carefully crafted form of words, because technically the Opposition was not blocking Supply, merely making its passage conditional. It was deliberately worded to appease those Liberals who harboured concerns about directly blocking the legislation. The government countered by moving that the motion be put, with Murphy saying that if it was lost and the amendment carried, the government would regard the action ‘as a denial of Supply’. The government lost by 31 votes to 26. Whitlam went to Government House during the parliamentary dinner adjournment. At 8pm the two Supply bills were forced through the House of Representatives and sent to the Senate. At 8.30pm the Prime Minister returned to announce that Hasluck had accepted his advice ‘and granted an immediate simultaneous dissolution’ of the entire parliament, on the grounds that six bills had either been twice rejected by or had failed to pass the Senate, including legislation to set up Medibank.28 It would be only the third double dissolution election since federation, the two previous ones being in 1914 and 1951. All the machinations and calculations of the Gair appointment instantly became irrelevant, as every Senate seat would now be determined

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1974 election: Doug Anthony campaign poster (left) and Country Party how-to-vote card for the coinciding referendum (The Nationals – NSW)

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at the election. The House rose almost immediately after Whitlam’s statement, while the Senate sat long enough to pass the appropriation and Supply bills, virtually without debate, before also rising.29 There was little sympathy for Whitlam’s predicament in the major newspapers. The Sydney Morning Herald said the government had been ‘convicted of a particularly sordid piece of political chicanery’ and the Opposition ‘is entitled to argue that the Government has behaved disgracefully.’30 The government was returned with a majority of five seats in the House of Representatives, down from nine in the previous parliament. The Country Party’s numbers increased to 21 and the Liberal Party’s to 40. The government again failed to win the majority it needed in the Senate, increasing its numbers from 26 to 29, two short of a working majority. The Liberal and Country parties between them also held 29 seats. The DLP was wiped out, with all five of its previous Senate positions obliterated. There were two other senators, Steele Hall from South Australia and Michael Townley from Tasmania.31 Hall, a former South Australian premier and leader of the breakaway Liberal Movement in the state, might prove unpredictable in his support for the Opposition. Townley, while Independent, was more pro-Liberal (and became a Liberal in early 1975). The numbers were essentially deadlocked. Particularly gratifying for the Country Party was the comprehensive rejection of four referendum questions put by the government at the same time as the election. 32 The one that principally concerned the party proposed making the size of the population rather than elector numbers the basis for determining the size of electorates. In his election policy speech at Lismore on 2 May, Anthony warned of the consequences if the proposal was carried: ‘The strategy is to decimate rural political representation. Six million children, non-citizens and overseas visitors will be counted in setting the boundaries of electorates. There’ll be many more city electorates and many fewer country electorates’.33 One of the first initiatives of the new Opposition was to reform

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the Coalition. During the election campaign, Whitlam had been able to exploit policy differences between the Liberal and Country parties, and renewing joint arrangements was seen as the best way to avoid this in the future. The Coalition was announced on 14 June 1974, with a shadow ministry of 27, eight of whom were from the Country Party, including Anthony, who became spokesman on trade, resources and decentralised development; Sinclair, agriculture and leader of Opposition business in the House; Nixon, transport; and Hunt, environment and conservation, and assisting the leader of the Opposition.34

k Vince Gair took up his ambassadorial post from early May 1974, but was recalled by the Fraser-Anthony government in January 1976 for persistently commenting on domestic politics, criticising Australian ministers and, on one occasion, referring to the British ambassador as ‘You old bugger’.35 He died in South Brisbane on 11 November 1980 and, as a former Queensland premier, was accorded a state funeral. His death closely followed the 18 October 1980 federal election, at which Maunsell had been dropped from first to third position on the Senate ticket by the Queensland National Party. Maunsell had fallen out of favour with Bjelke-Petersen for refusing to conform to the Queensland premier’s edicts on how he should vote in the Senate. As a result, he was defeated at the election and vacated the Senate from 30 June 1981.36 Attending Gair’s funeral, Maunsell went to pay his respects to the former senator and ambassador’s widow, Nell: ‘She said she was pleased to see me because Vince had been so outraged by what had happened to me on the Senate ticket that for the first time in his life he had voted Tory – he gave me his number one vote!’

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The dismissal

12: The dismissal

Two events in the Senate – the resignation of the Attorney-General, Lionel Murphy, on 9 February 1975 to take up an appointment to the High Court, and the death of the Queensland Labor Senator Bertie Milliner, on 30 June 1975 – led to a dramatic change of fortune in national politics. In the former case, the New South Wales Liberal premier, Tom Lewis, chose to ignore the long-standing convention that a casual Senate vacancy be filled by a person nominated by the political party from which the departing or deceased senator came. Instead of accepting the state Labor Party’s nomination, Lewis, who had the numbers in a joint sitting of the state parliament, rammed through the appointment of the 72-year-old mayor of Albury, Cleaver Bunton, as an Independent senator.1 In the case of the vacancy created by Milliner’s death, Queensland premier Bjelke-Petersen rejected that state’s Labor nominee, Mal Colston, and forced the appointment of a disillusioned Labor man, Albert Field. Both appointments created outrage locally and in Canberra. Effectively, Labor’s Senate numbers were reduced by two to 27. In between the two events, the federal parliamentary Liberal Party deposed Snedden as leader in favour of the more tenacious Malcolm Fraser.

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The Queensland Labor Party expelled Field, so he arrived in Canberra as an Independent – a lonely and lost soul whom Maunsell ‘took over as a friend’.2 Labor challenged his appointment in the High Court, forcing him to take leave of absence until the outcome. Even with Field’s absence, Labor was denied one vital vote. If it could not influence the direction of at least three votes, either by gaining the support of the Independents, or a mix of Independent support and Liberal abstentions, it could not win a Senate division if the Opposition again moved to block Supply. To Fraser and Anthony, the need to force Whitlam to the polls gathered urgency as details of the Khemlani loans affair unfolded. Tirath Khemlani, a self-claimed international financier, boasted that he could raise billions in Middle East petrodollars to finance the development of Australia’s resource industry infrastructure. On 14 December 1974 the executive council authorised the minerals and energy minister, Rex Connor, to raise $4 billion ‘for temporary purposes’, with the intention of bypassing the Loan Council and the Treasury.3 By July 1975 details of the loans affair were stunning the nation, thanks largely to Treasury leaking information to the Opposition. The first time rejection of the Budget was seriously considered was at a shadow cabinet meeting on 25 September 1975. It was then canvassed at all shadow cabinet and shadow ministry meetings – sometimes two or three meetings a week – over the next six weeks.4 In shades of the previous year, continuing nervousness among some Liberals at the prospect of rejecting Supply in the Senate led to the Opposition parties agreeing their tactic should be to defer it until Whitlam agreed to an election. On 16 October the Senate, by a majority of one, passed a resolution blocking the first of the Supply bills – ‘this bill not be proceeded with until the Government agrees to submit itself to the judgement of the people’. Bunton and Hall voted with the government.5 Whitlam dug in as the Governor-General, John Kerr, tried to broker a compromise. On 3 November, Fraser offered Whitlam passage of the Supply bills if the Prime Minister called an election for the House of Representatives with the half Senate election due by 30

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June 1976. Whitlam refused. Shortly before 1pm on 6 November, with Bunton and Hall maintaining their same voting lines the Senate determined by a majority of one that the remaining appropriation bills ‘be not further proceeded with’. 6 Anthony travelled to Melbourne for a meeting with the ageing Robert Menzies, whom he admired greatly: We had quite a long chat. Menzies was totally up with what was happening and he didn’t like it at all. He was against our tactics and thought we were going to get done over. I said to him ‘what do you expect us to do as an Opposition – just sit back and let this man wreck the country?’ I explained our position, the rationale for it, and said ‘we’ll win’. As I was leaving he said ‘Douglas, thank you for coming, you’ve given me great heart’.7

Anthony joined Fraser and Lynch at a meeting with Whitlam, the Treasurer, Frank Crean, and administrative services minister Fred Daly at 9am on 11 November. Daly said it lasted about 45 minutes, began with a cup of coffee and was conducted in a calm atmosphere, although it was ‘quite apparent that there was no possibility of agreement’.8 Anthony agreed, albeit from a different perspective: Whitlam was utterly intransigent. He refused everything. I think he thought we or the Senate would capitulate, but the GovernorGeneral could not rely on that, particularly as Supply was running out and this was the last day the Electoral Commission could organise a pre-Christmas election. The Governor-General’s hand was forced by Whitlam’s attitude. There were some nervous nellies among the Liberals, but we, to a man, were solidly behind what the Opposition was doing. We gave a lot of strength to Malcolm Fraser. I was fairly aggro. I’d had enough of the Whitlam government. There was nothing I regarded as even remotely redeeming about the Whitlam government.9

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Moment of destiny: the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr (centre), commissioned Malcolm Fraser (left) to form a caretaker administration with his Coalition partner Doug Anthony (right) after the dismissal of the Whitlam government on 11 November 1975. Anthony’s deputy, Ian Sinclair, is behind his party leader and partly obscured (The Nationals – NSW)

Fraser said the support of the National Country Party (NCP) – the name had changed from Australian Country Party six months earlier – was ‘critically important during the Supply crisis’.10 The Governor-General sacked the government at 1pm on 11 November, Remembrance Day, and commissioned Fraser to form a caretaker administration until a general election could be held. Anthony learned of the dramatic events when he received a telephone call from Fraser saying he had been appointed caretaker Prime Minister: ‘I was just staggered. It was a scenario, an option, that was possible, but never one that I really devoted much attention to. I just

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couldn’t see it happening. My expectation was always that Whitlam would call an election as he had done the previous year.’11 The caretaker Coalition had a ministry of 15, with, from the NCP, Anthony as Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Overseas Trade and Minister for Minerals and Energy; Sinclair, Minister for Agriculture and for Northern Australia; Nixon, Postmaster-General and Minister for Transport; and Drake-Brockman, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and for Administrative Services.12 Amid uproar and confusion, the Supply bills were passed by the Senate and an election set for 13 December. There was little doubt the Coalition would win and in the bush the anti-Whitlam mood was palpable. Anthony launched the NCP campaign at Brisbane’s Festival Hall – the first by the party in a state capital – on 26 November, before an enthusiastic crowd: Mr Whitlam weeps crocodile tears for democracy, while he stands knee-deep in the wreckage of his policies. The real lawlessness to be feared in Australia today is lawlessness in government. … While Mr Whitlam laments his self-imposed fate, we head for 400 000 unemployed. We’re on the way to 20 per cent inflation and worse. We are running up a national debt of $6000 million under Labor.

The goal of the election, Anthony said, was to restore good management, repair a damaged nation, put men and women back to work, fight inflation, rebuild confidence, revive national growth and restore integrity. In conclusion he borrowed from Labor’s 1972 election slogan and from Whitlam’s own words: ‘Men and women of Australia: It’s time to stand up and be counted. It’s time to stem the socialist tide. It’s time to return to integrity. It’s time to sweep out the Whitlam wreckage. It’s time to put Australia back on its feet.’13 Labor was crushed. The Coalition was returned with 91 seats in the House of Representatives to Labor’s 36 and it won control of the Senate, with 27 Liberals and eight NCP, including the Northern

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The largest parliamentary membership in the party’s history: twenty-three members and eight senators, making a total of 31, achieved at the December 1975 election. Left to right (back row): Tom McVeigh, John Sullivan, Sandy MacKenzie, Peter Fisher, Bob King, Col Carige, Stephen Lusher, Ray Braithwaite, Glen Sheil, Stan Collard, Frank O’Keefe, Tom Tehan, Doug Scott, Bruce Lloyd, Sam Calder; (middle row): Ron Maunsell, Ian Robinson, Clarrie Millar, David Thomson, Tom Drake-Brockman, Mac Holten, Bern Kilgariff, Bob Katter (snr), Jim Corbett; (seated): Phil Lucock, Jim Webster, Ian Sinclair, Doug Anthony, Peter Nixon, Ralph Hunt, Evan Adermann (Australian Information Service/Auspic)

Territory CLP senator, Bern Kilgariff, making 35 Coalition senators to Labor’s 27. Steele Hall continued representing the Liberal Movement in South Australia and there was one Independent, Brian Harradine, from Tasmania.14 Anthony said ‘if ever there was an overwhelming endorsement of John Kerr’s sacking of the Whitlam Government that was it’.15

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The NCP increased its lower house numbers by two, to 23, the highest in its history and a level unlikely to be attained again, given the population shift from the country to cities and coastal regions and the consequent decline in the number of rural electorates. Including its eight senators, the party room swelled to 31. In the post-election reshuffle, Anthony was Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for National Resources and Minister for Overseas Trade; Sinclair, Minister for Primary Industry; Nixon, Minister for Transport; Hunt, Minister for Health; Evan Adermann (Fisher, Queensland), Minister for the Northern Territory and assisting the Minister for National Resources; and Victorian Senator Jim Webster, Minister for Science.16 Anthony never had second thoughts about the correctness of blocking Supply. He believed Whitlam’s contempt for parliament and its procedures verged on dictatorship. He thought if Whitlam had accepted the challenge and gone to the people, history could have been different: I’m sure we would have won, but we would only have won by a modest majority and I think Whitlam’s standing in the community would have been such that he was in a position to be returned as Prime Minister at a later date. But his defiance of the system and the fact that he ultimately had to be dismissed by the Governor-General to find a solution made it the bigger issue of the elections.17

Anthony organised a dinner at Old Parliament House on 10 November 1995 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the dismissal. Guests included Fraser and former Coalition ministers of the time and their wives. The guest of honour was the retired chief justice, Harry Gibbs, who said the Whitlam government’s political fate was sealed by the electors and not the Governor-General: ‘It is important to emphasise this at the very outset because even now critics assert that what Sir John Kerr did was undemocratic. Of all the criticisms of Sir John Kerr’s actions, none is more absurd than that’.18

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Return to government

13: Return to government

The Fraser-Anthony government was never going to have cordial relations with the Canberra press gallery, particularly as, when in Opposition, some of its members had strongly criticised alleged media bias. The media enjoyed the Whitlam years because they brought a new air of excitement to politics, providing good copy for journalists. Despite his often aloof manner, Whitlam used the media – especially television – to a much greater extent than any of his predecessors. While Holt took a couple of journalists on some of his overseas visits, Whitlam filled his aircraft with them. Nixon, gaining quite a reputation for being something of a political head-kicker, had for some years been running a campaign against left-wing bias in the media. He started doing it as a back bencher but developed a considerable head of steam during the Whitlam years. His main target was the ABC: It reached a point where I was getting inside information – and from highly respected people, who I trusted implicitly – on what was happening with internal ABC funding allocations. It was

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terrible. It was plain to see that any programs that didn’t have a left-wing bias were being starved of funds and people working on them having their travel budgets cut. Rural programs had their allocations cut to pieces. I had access to information I could only get by people on the inside talking to me and it got the ABC pretty worried. I used to bet whenever I went to some remote area that there would be an ABC crew there to meet me, and, sure enough, it always happened. I think they thought they’d better give me coverage no matter where I was just to try and keep me happy! The media generally, but particularly the ABC, hated my guts. I was seen as one of the inner players in the dismissal. I was totally disliked. But I had a lot of fun with it.1

In the caretaker government period, as Postmaster-General, Nixon unsuccessfully called for the appointment of a Supreme Court judge to act as moderator of ABC news broadcasts during the election campaign, claiming the organisation was biased towards socialism and the Labor Party.2 Early into the Fraser-Anthony government, he acquired a set of thick volumes on the history of broadcasting in Britain. He augmented these with several annual reports of the ABC, giving a width of almost three feet of publications on broadcasting on a bookshelf that was strategically positioned at shoulder height behind his Parliament House office desk – just in line of shot for TV cameras. He would lean forward on his desk, fix his ice blue eyes on the hapless reporter, punch his finger towards the camera lens, and rail against left-wing bias with apparent national and international knowledge. He later confided that he never once opened any of the books or reports. Nixon said Anthony and Fraser were aware of what he was doing and seemed happy to let him have his head, ‘but there was never any Cabinet consideration of it, or any plot by the government to attack the ABC. It was seen as my baby and I was going on with it’. Anthony supported Nixon’s campaign: ‘If nothing else, Peter’s work was a reminder to the ABC that they were supposed to act and report in an unbiased manner.’ Anthony reflected on the media’s relationship

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with the Fraser government in a speech in November 2005: ‘We were never given enough credit for the work we did. But you have got to realise that the media hated us, particularly the press gallery, for disposing of Gough. I mean, they loved Gough. There was nothing kind being said about us during that period.’ 3

k The government’s priority was the economy. Inflation was still in double figures and unemployment in December 1975 stood at 220 000 and rising. In January 1976, the 1975–76 budget deficit was projected to be $4525 million, but finally came in at $3583 million. The estimated deficit of $5000 million for 1976–77, given to the cabinet on 15 March 1976, caused ministers consternation. Such a figure was ‘not a credible prospect in terms of economic policy or the philosophy of the LNCP [Liberal/National Country Party] government’. Spending cuts and restrictions across nearly all departments would have to be implemented. Commonwealth public service numbers were cut by 2.8 per cent in 1975–76 and a further 3.7 per cent the following year.4 Compounding the problems was worsening drought over much of the southern half of the country, requiring substantial funding for fodder subsidies and livestock disposal. The Victorian dairy and fruit industries were in dire straits, needing price support and adjustment assistance to encourage marginal farmers out of the industries. Forty thousand cattle were shot in Victoria because of drought and low butterfat prices. Championing the need to help family farms, Sinclair more often than not found himself at odds with Treasury, which urged greater emphasis on market realities and structural change. Sinclair ensured the election promise to reintroduce the superphosphate bounty, abolished by Whitlam in 1974, was met, and won two increases in the floor price for wool. He also insisted that the promise of a rural industry bank to provide low interest loans to primary producers be met. In another clash with Sinclair and the NCP, Fraser insisted that

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the Whitlam government’s commitment to ban cigarette and tobacco advertising on radio and television from the beginning of September be upheld. Tobacco growing was important to the Atherton Tablelands in far north Queensland and around Myrtleford in Victoria. To help offset the adverse impact of an advertising ban, the government agreed to increase the minimum local leaf content in domestic tobacco products from 50 per cent to 57 per cent in 1977.5 The government was on a collision course with the Arbitration Commission over wages. In the wake of the December 1975 quarter consumer price index (CPI) rise of 5.6 per cent, it pressed the commission to peg wages to a maximum of half that amount. The commission, fearing strikes, granted an increase of 6.4 per cent. It granted full indexation for those on average weekly earnings for the 1976 March quarter and 60 per cent of the CPI rise for the June quarter, when the government had argued for an increase of only 30 per cent. The Whitlam government’s controversial Medibank health scheme, finally introduced from July 1975 after having been three times rejected by the Senate before being passed by a joint sitting of both houses on 7 August 1974, was another headache. The responsibility for implementing the scheme fell to Hunt, the NCP’s first health minister since Earle Page in the 1950s. The original Whitlam bill proposed that Medibank be funded by a 1.35 per cent levy on taxable income, with exceptions for low-income earners, but this was rejected by the Senate, so it was entirely funded from general revenue. The scheme was expected to cost $1.8 billion in 1976–77. Struggling to find ways of reducing the cost, Hunt was faced with the prospect that if the government tried to shift more costs on to users, while preserving the principles of universal coverage and free care for low-income earners and the disadvantaged, it could be met with an electoral backlash, higher wage claims and more industrial unrest. But there was little option. On 27 May, in a ministerial statement to parliament, Hunt announced Medibank Mark II, to begin from 1 October and to include a 2.5 per cent health insurance levy, with the option of taking out

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private health insurance instead of paying the levy. The ACTU, having argued unsuccessfully for a levy of 1.6 per cent, organised a 24-hour strike for 12 July, spearheaded by its president, Bob Hawke. Hawke claimed it was Australia’s first truly national strike. The government wrote it off as a fizzer. Other changes saw the Health Insurance Commission being allowed to enter the private health insurance business, leading to the establishment of Medibank Private from 1 October.6 At its launch, Fraser was presented with a membership number ending in 1F – ‘F’ standing for Fraser – while Hunt was given one ending in 1H and Hawke got 2H. Hunt said the Medibank Private idea was Fraser’s: ‘He rang me at about two o’clock in the morning saying we needed Medibank Private so we could prove Medibank was alive and well.’ Hunt was no fan of Medibank or of Medibank Private: ‘I told Malcolm – and I argued in Cabinet – that we had enough private health funds in the country and we didn’t need any more. I fought against Medibank Private and we got it!’7 Elsewhere, the government was implementing recommendations of the July 1974 report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Land Rights, paving the way for the Northern Territory to become selfgoverning from July 1978, awaiting the final report of the Fox Ranger Uranium Inquiry before finalising its policy on uranium mining and export, and incurring the wrath of Queensland’s Bjelke-Petersen for intervening in his decision to allow bauxite mining at the Aurukun Aboriginal reserve on Cape York and banning sand mining on Fraser Island. The new government’s readiness to involve itself in areas regarded the domain of the states was causing alarm to the likes of Bjelke-Petersen and his Western Australian counterpart, Charles Court. The Coalition was not turning out as they had thought or hoped. They saw Canberra’s proposed mineral export pricing controls – designed to maintain fair prices at a time of high stockpiles and depressed demand, especially for coal – as further evidence of meddling in their affairs. The Commonwealth’s foreign investment policy, ensuring Australian control over mineral and energy developments, went further than the election policy and flew against Anthony’s oft-stated declaration that

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in government he would ‘get things moving’ in the minerals’ area.8 The following year, 1977, saw inflation, wages, unemployment and industrial unrest continue to rise.9 There were strikes and work bans involving air traffic controllers, postal workers, Victorian power workers, in the coal, oil, building and iron ore industries, and the export of uranium, merino rams, and live sheep and cattle. The government brought down legislation enabling Commonwealth public servants to be stood down, outlawing secondary boycotts in industrial disputes, establishing a general right of conscientious objection to compulsory union membership, and establishing the Industrial Relations Bureau to investigate unfair labour practices and irregularities in union membership. A proposed three-month wages and prices pause was scuttled by the ACTU, which would not support it unless taxes were also cut. A referendum in May resulted in: approval for constitutional amendments to ensure, as far as possible, that a casual Senate vacancy be filled by someone from the same political party as the departing senator – thereby protecting against future Bunton or Field appointments; electors in the territories being allowed to vote in referenda; and 70 being set as the compulsory retiring age for federal court judges. A fourth proposal, to introduce simultaneous elections for both houses of parliament, was rejected.10 The NCP had not previously held the Science portfolio. Now it was in the hands of Webster, who took to the job with enthusiasm. His bid in June 1977 for funding to replace the buildings at Australia’s Antarctic bases at Mawson, Casey, Davis and on Macquarie Island was shelved in light of the economic conditions. He did, however, win approval for a new Antarctic expedition ship to replace the ageing icebreakers that had been used for the past 20 years, and for Australia to extend its Antarctic research effort to offshore areas. Webster argued these measures were necessary if Australia was to maintain a credible presence in Antarctica, particularly at a time when the identification of the continent’s land and offshore mineral resources was on nations’ agendas.11 He negotiated the original plans to establish the $25-million National Marine Science Research Centre in Hobart and transfer the

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CSIRO Division of Oceanography and Fisheries Research from Cronulla, in Sydney, to Hobart. Webster made two visits to the South Pole, increased flights to and within Antarctica, and expanded the Department of Science into that of Science and Environment from December 1978.12 His successor, the NCP’s David Thomson (Leichhardt, Queensland) continued the thrust of Webster’s work, opening the first meeting of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources in Hobart on 10 September 1981.13 Being seen to be actively involved in the care and use of Antarctica for peaceful and scientific purposes became crucially important for Australia after the Antarctic Treaty came into force in 1961. Australia claimed sovereignty over some 42 per cent of the frozen continent, though there were 11 other signatories to the treaty, including South Africa, Argentina, New Zealand, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. While the treaty stipulated that nothing in it ‘shall be interpreted as a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty’, and while no new claims or enlargement of existing claims could be made, the treaty required all signatories to cooperate and exchange information on scientific research. It was, therefore, very much in Australia’s interests to ensure that its scientific activities were not only maintained, but also expanded to match its claimed sovereignty.14 Webster began the development in 1978 of the CSIRO’s Australian National Animal Health Laboratory at Geelong, Victoria, providing a world-class facility for the safe handling of exotic animal diseases, and oversaw the final stages of Australia’s conversion to the metric system of weights and measures, notably with regard to packaged goods, petrol pumps, and the air transport industry. The conversion to metrication was completed under Thomson.15 Webster fell victim to the progressive Liberals who controlled the Victorian party’s state executive after 1972. Known by their opponents as trendies, the progressives believed the Liberals should aim to govern in their own right in Canberra. They forced an end to a joint

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Senate arrangement that had lasted for many years and ensured the Country Party/NCP continuous Senate representation by guaranteeing it the winnable number two position on the ticket at alternate half Senate elections. For the expected half Senate election in 1974, however, the Liberals insisted on dropping the Country Party, specifically Webster, to the virtually unwinnable number three spot. He survived because the election, in May, was a double dissolution. He was not so lucky when he was due for re-election in 1980, by which time relations between the Victorian Liberals and NCP at organisational level were far from cordial. Nixon said the state NCP threatened to run against the Liberal employment and industrial relations minister, Tony Street, in Corangamite: ‘I flew to Melbourne to meet with our Victorian officials and headed it off, on the grounds that they couldn’t stand against a senior Cabinet minister. It was an entirely separate issue from the Webster situation.’16 Nonetheless, the progressive Liberals forced Webster down the ticket and also intended to run against Nixon in Gippsland. Fraser managed to quell the threat to Nixon on the same grounds used to divert the threat to Street, namely that the Liberals could not contest a cabinet minister, but he was unable to prevent the rearrangement of the joint Senate ticket. To avoid the embarrassment of Webster being defeated by the Liberal Party, Nixon and Fraser agreed he should be appointed High Commissioner to New Zealand. Webster resigned from the Senate in January 1980 to take up the post. His casual vacancy was filled by the NCP’s Laurie Neal, who was defeated at the October 1980 election and left the Senate at the end of June 1981.17

k Anthony’s priority was to restore and expand international trade relations, which he said had been ‘shot to pieces’, particularly in Japan, China and the Middle East, because Labor ministers had acted inappropriately, failing to recognise local protocols and traditions.18 He planned a hectic round of visits for 1976, starting with Japan in

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February, then a meeting of the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development in Kenya in May, the Soviet Union and Romania in July, and Iran and Europe in August. During the Russian trip Anthony became ill with an apparent intestinal infection. He stuck doggedly to his main engagements in between spending a few days in bed in Moscow before breaking the homebound flight in Tokyo. He arrived in Australia on 22 July, little better. There was no opportunity to properly convalesce. He was due to leave in 14 days for Iran, Britain and Europe, and meanwhile he was the acting Prime Minister while Fraser made a 10-day trip to the United States and Canada, starting on 24 July.19 As news of Anthony’s illness began to circulate, there was a flurry of media speculation that he was the victim of deliberate food poisoning by the Soviets. He doubted this, but could find no obvious explanation for his ailment, which seemed to have developed following a banquet luncheon in Tbilisi, Georgia: ‘No one else got sick and I was a pretty hardy traveller, not prone to those sorts of problems.’ After the Iran and Europe trip, Anthony underwent a series of medical tests, which still proved inconclusive. He tried to keep up with his ministerial and party duties, but found himself lacking in energy and concentration. In early October, his Canberra doctor diagnosed hepatitis and ordered him to bed for a week. Fraser flew out of Canberra on 7 October for a five-day visit to Indonesia, leaving Anthony to run the country from the sickbed of his Canberra home.20 By now the media was beginning to speculate about Anthony’s leadership, with the Sydney Daily Mirror running a story on 6 October saying ‘there have been strong rumours that his party leadership is under challenge’. This prompted the annual meeting of the party’s federal council, on 16 and 17 October, attended and addressed by Anthony, to pledge support for him. The federal president, Adrian Solomons, from New South Wales, acknowledging a ‘malicious and sometimes inspired campaign’, declared: ‘I want to scotch this unequivocally now.’ With no improvement in his condition, Anthony finally accepted that he needed a long spell of rest and recuperation.

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He was granted leave from parliament from 20 October and spent three days in Canberra’s Woden Valley Hospital before going home. Sinclair became the party’s acting leader and Nixon the acting deputy. The leadership speculation gained in intensity when in mid-December it was announced that the Treasurer and deputy Liberal leader, Phil Lynch, would act as prime minister when Fraser took two weeks holiday over Christmas-New Year.21 When The Sydney Morning Herald reported on 31 December, Anthony’s 47th birthday, that he would not lead the Australian delegation to the fourth round of Australia-Japan ministerial talks in Tokyo on 17 January 1977, the Sydney afternoon Sun newspaper bannered across its front page ‘Nixon may become Deputy PM’. Nixon issued a statement saying the Sun story was ‘garbage’ and the party was completely behind its leader: ‘Mr Anthony has the support of his colleagues – that is unquestionable. We all know what hepatitis does to a person and anyone with any commonsense knows the illness is not cured overnight.’22 Nixon was still indignant about the speculation many years later: ‘It came as a surprise that I was being touted as the leader. I was a loyalist. I never had any ambition to turf Anthony out. In all my career, I never sat around to become leader. It annoyed me to see it being suggested that I was.’23 There was no challenge to Anthony’s leadership. He went back to work full-time on 1 February 1977. His first objective was to get a submission through the cabinet that day on oil import parity pricing, to increase exploration for oil in Australia. He failed. His submission called for domestic crude prices to be increased in four stages to 50 per cent of world parity by 1980. Australian crude prices at the time were only 21 per cent of world prices and the impact of the submission would be to increase retail petrol prices by up to six cents a gallon within six months. The cabinet would not risk the electoral backlash. Announcing a deferral, Fraser nonetheless acknowledged the rationale: ‘Over 400 million barrels of [Australian] oil could be recovered under import parity pricing that could not be recovered at existing

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prices, representing an addition of about 20 per cent to known recoverable reserves.’24 Another issue was uranium. Anthony believed Australia had an international responsibility to contribute to the peaceful use of nuclear energy because of its vast reserves of the ore. The second report of the Fox Ranger Uranium Inquiry, released on 17 May 1977, gave conditional support to mining and export, including from the Ranger deposits in Kakadu in the Northern Territory, under strict safeguards and environmental controls, and providing no sales were made to any country that had not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Commonwealth announced the go-ahead for the Ranger project the same day the second Fox report was released and followed up a week later with a statement on its nuclear safeguards’ policy. Uranium mining at Ranger, Nabarlek, Mary Kathleen and later Olympic Dam-Roxby Downs in South Australia proceeded on the basis of the two Fox reports.25 Shortly before the March 1983 federal election, the government gave approval for the development of the Jabiluka mine, but this was stalled with the arrival in office of the Hawke Labor government.26 Nonetheless, there was no shortage of agreements on nuclear transfers and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the FraserAnthony years, such agreements were signed with Finland, Sweden, the Philippines, South Korea, the United States and United Kingdom, France, Canada, the European Atomic Energy Community, and Japan. There was even an agreement drafted with Iran in 1982, but it was never ratified.27

k The government had not been without ministerial casualties. From Liberal Party ranks, Vic Garland (Curtin, Western Australia) had resigned from the ministry and been later reinstated; Gorton, disillusioned, was gone; Bob Ellicott (Wentworth, New South Wales) had resigned from the ministry on a matter of principle, but later returned; Don Chipp (Higgins, Victoria), also disillusioned, had quit

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the Liberals to form the Australian Democrats ‘to keep the bastards honest’, and Ivor Greenwood (Senate, Victoria) was dead from a heart attack and stroke. A half Senate election was due by May 1978, leaving Fraser with the choice of holding an early election for both houses or holding separate elections during 1978 for the House of Representatives and half the Senate. Neither option looked attractive against the background of the government’s internal problems, especially as opinion polls frequently placed the Coalition behind Labor. In June 1977 the tables began to turn. There was a growing mood in the Labor caucus that the party needed to break its link with the Whitlam years. However, Whitlam and his deputy, Tom Uren (Reid, New South Wales), narrowly beat off challenges by Bill Hayden (Oxley, Queensland) and Paul Keating (Blaxland, New South Wales). The ALP national conference a month later, followed by the ACTU congress in September, revealed serious policy divisions on uranium, both within the trade union movement and between the unions and the parliamentary party. On 27 October, Fraser announced that an election for the House of Representatives and half the Senate would be held on 10 December. Then the Treasurer and deputy Liberal leader, Phil Lynch, got snared by the involvement of a family trust in land acquisitions in Victoria. Lynch, hospitalised with kidney problems on 7 November, reluctantly resigned from the cabinet on 18 November so the issue would no longer provide a focal point for the Opposition’s campaign. John Howard replaced him as Treasurer. 28 Gauging that the electorate would be frightened at the prospect of a return to Whitlam, the government campaign leant heavily on the tight economic management of the past two years. Anthony’s freetime election telecast on the ABC featured him pointing to a series of graphs to illustrate the story on inflation, unemployment and interest rates – one of the first to make use of graphics. In his policy speech he attacked the Whitlam program bluntly: ‘Mr Whitlam says he will fix unemployment by spending a lot of money to create jobs. But that’s

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how he caused unemployment in the first place – by spending too much money. Surely we don’t want to go through all that again?’ A key commitment was to abolish Commonwealth death and gift duties, effective from 1 July 1979. Bjelke-Petersen had led the way by abolishing death and gift duties in Queensland from January 1977. Anthony had been insistent that the Commonwealth must follow suit.29 Other commitments included: a five-year, $200 million national water resources program; a fuel price equalisation scheme to ensure motorists in rural Australia paid no more than four cents a gallon, or one cent a litre, above normal city petrol prices; the previously promised primary industry bank to be in operation in the first half of 1978; extra assistance for parents of children in isolated areas; and the reinstatement of a 20 per cent tolerance in electoral quotas for rural electorates, which had been reduced to 10 per cent by Whitlam.30 The Coalition was emphatically returned, with Labor only increasing its numbers by two to 38 and the government still enjoying a majority in the Senate, despite the election of two Australian Democrats, Don Chipp and Colin Mason (New South Wales). The NCP was reduced from 23 in 1975 to 19, partly due to a redistribution which reduced the size of the lower house from 127 to 124. Wimmera, which had been held by the NCP, was abolished and the party lost Indi to the Liberals and Riverina and Capricornia to Labor.31 Whitlam did not re-contest the leadership at the Labor caucus meeting on 22 December, and was replaced by Hayden, with Lionel Bowen (Kingsford-Smith, New South Wales) becoming his deputy.

k After receiving written details from Lynch on 16 December about his business and financial affairs, Fraser decided he was eligible to be reelected deputy leader and reinstated to the cabinet. While not returned to the Treasury, Fraser gave Lynch the powerful, expanded portfolio of Industry and Commerce, which included policy control over the departments of Productivity and Business and Community Affairs. But

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with questions still hanging over his affairs, the Opposition pledged to pursue the matter and the media accused Fraser of political cynicism and double standards.32 The NCP, despite its smaller representation, won an additional ministry – Queensland Senator Glen Sheil, in Veterans’ Affairs. Anthony’s responsibilities of National Resources and Overseas Trade were combined into Trade and Resources, and Adermann, while keeping the Northern Territory portfolio, moved from assisting in National Resources to assisting the Minister for Primary Industry. Other ministers kept their same portfolios. The new ministry was criticised because of its expansion to 28 members, two more than in the previous government and one of the largest up to that time. Existing legislation limiting the size of the ministry to 27 would have to be amended, meaning the most junior minister, the 28th, could only be sworn in as a member of the executive council and would have to await the legislative changes before being sworn in as a minister. The man in question was Sheil, a tall and solid former Queensland rugby five-eighth with a jovial disposition, and a doctor by profession. He also held firm views, well known to anyone who cared to listen, that were sympathetic to the white minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and against imposing sporting and economic sanctions on those countries. Shortly after the new ministry was announced on 19 December, Sheil was tracked down by reporters and was happy to tell them it was his view that Australia could learn a lot from South Africa and Rhodesia, and apartheid could be introduced in Australia if Aborigines wanted it. Apartheid, he said, was the only policy which guaranteed self-government to all people. As soon as he learned what had happened, Anthony contacted Sheil to dissuade him from making further such comments, which were clearly contrary to government policy. Instead, Sheil repeated his views to newsmen on the lawns of Government House the following day after the ministry and executive council had been sworn in and were gathering for photographs. Seeing what was happening, Anthony called his hapless colleague away, saying,

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somewhat irritably, ‘there are photos to be taken, there is plenty of time for that later’. Time irrevocably ran out for Sheil when he told Brisbane radio that evening that his views were his own and he would ‘put them whenever I can’.33 The next day, Fraser and Anthony agreed in a morning telephone conversation that Sheil had to go. He had embarrassed Fraser, who only six months earlier had played a leading role in negotiating the Gleneagles agreement, banning sporting contacts with South Africa, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) meeting. He had embarrassed his party leader, who had recommended him for promotion: ‘I was so shattered by Glen. I couldn’t believe how stupid he was. I got on well with him and he was very good to me when I was sick. But I had no option but to agree with Malcolm.’ 34 The best Anthony could do was to have Sheil replaced with another NCP representative, although this did not happen immediately.35 The Liberal, Garland, who was special trade representations minister, took on responsibility for Veterans’ Affairs until 4 July 1978, when it came back to the NCP under the control of Adermann, after the legislative amendments allowing for a 28-man ministry had been processed.36 It was not an auspicious start to the government’s second term.

k In 1978, too, the relationship of the Northern Territory Country Liberal Party and its federal parliamentarians with the Liberal and National Country parties in Canberra, became strained. The CLP was formed in July 1974, combining the Australian Country Party – Northern Territory with Liberal interests. The original ACP-NT had been affiliated with the federal Country Party on 19 April 1971.37 No change to this status was made after the formation of the CLP. Former Liberals began pressing for a more equal relationship with both the Coalition parties in Canberra. Suggestions by the CLP that it also affiliate with the Liberal Party were rejected by the Liberals,

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who would not accept an organisation affiliated with another political body. In November, the central council of the CLP, meeting at Nhulunbuy in the Northern Territory, authorised its chairman to confer with the NCP and the Liberal Party with a view to reaching agreement on a proposal for association without affiliation with both parties. This would mean a less formal attachment, and would limit CLP delegates attending federal organisational bodies to being able to vote on issues affecting the Northern Territory only. In the meantime, the CLP maintained its affiliation with the NCP. Agreement on association was finally reached early in 1979, with a special conference of the CLP in Darwin agreeing that its federal parliamentarians ‘be permitted to sit in the Party Rooms of their choice in Canberra’.38 While this gave CLP parliamentarians the right to choose whether to sit as Liberals or NCP members in Canberra, the CLP’s intention was that its MPs should divide themselves evenly between the two parties.39 At the time, the Member for the Northern Territory, Sam Calder, and the CLP senator, Bern Kilgariff, both sat in parliament as members of the NCP. Calder, who had originally been elected under the Country Party banner in 1966, refused to shift allegiance, but Kilgariff saw merit in the CLP being even-handed in its relationships in Canberra. He decided, from 8 March 1979, to sit as a parliamentary Liberal senator. It was an uncomfortable time for Kilgariff, with some NCP members trying to persuade him to reverse his decision and others accusing him of ratting on the party: I said ‘I can understand what you’re saying, but I’ve got to’. This was misrepresented to quite a degree, and up in the Territory too of course a lot of the old Country Party were put out. But really what I was doing was to indicate to all that the CLP meant what it said – Country Liberal Party. I suppose it doesn’t sound much now, but I guess it was the hardest decision I have ever made, because I lost so many friends in the thing and this went right through my political life.40

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Kilgariff, who went on to become the Coalition’s Senate whip from March 1981 until his retirement from parliament in July 1987, was always amused that he held elected office in the Coalition without ever being a member of either the Liberal or National Country parties, or the latter’s successor, the National Party.41

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Innovation in difficult times

14: Innovation in difficult times

Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which provided production and export subsidies to the EEC’s farmers and protected them with import quotas, seriously distorted world agricultural markets and was a continuing thorn in the side of Australia’s international trading efforts. Anthony regarded the policy as immoral, especially as subsidised European produce was undercutting Australia in the markets it was developing to offset the loss of the British one after the country’s entry to the Common Market. Together with Sinclair and Nixon, Anthony took up the issue time and again in negotiations with British and EEC ministers, in rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and in bilateral talks with the USA.1 No matter how firmly Australia put its case for reform of the CAP, however, it fell on deaf ears. The Americans, who supported Australia’s position in theory, were not prepared to do much in practice, as they too provided substantial support to their politically powerful farm sector. Anthony began focusing more on agreements with groups of countries or direct bilateral arrangements, strengthening

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existing ties and opening new links, notably in the Middle East, where he expanded the wheat and live sheep trades. Another development, Australia’s Closer Economic Relations (CER) with New Zealand, had its genesis when Anthony and his departmental head, Jim Scully, were flying to New Zealand in April 1979 for the annual ministerial review of the New Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement, which had been in place since 1966.2 After reading his briefing papers, Anthony complained that if there was nothing else on the agenda, why was he going at all? During a dinner hosted by the New Zealand Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, he floated the idea, with no authority from the Australian cabinet, that the two countries should look at a closer economic association to strengthen their ability to deal with the rest of the world. The New Zealanders were impressed; development of CER was under way. It was not until the end of 1982, more than three years later, that the negotiations were finally concluded. Anthony and Muldoon signed a Heads of Agreement, providing for CER to take effect from 1 January 1983. However, the 5 March 1983 Australian elections delayed the formal signing until 28 March, and with a change of government in Australia, it became one of the first trade treaties signed by the new Minister for Trade, the Labor’s Party’s Lionel Bowen.3 The World Trade Organisation said CER was ‘recognised as the world’s most comprehensive, effective and multilaterally compatible free-trade agreement’. It achieved its specific objective of removing all tariffs and quotas from trans-Tasman goods trade by 1990, five years ahead of schedule. Between 1983 and 1999, the total value of goods traded between the two countries doubled in real terms to $11.3 billion and investment between the two countries increased in value from $1.5 billion to $25 billion.4 Anthony would have liked to take the relationship further, to political union and a common currency. 5

k The idea of exposing Australia to world oil prices under import parity

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pricing was revisited in 1978, and this time Anthony was successful. It was unpopular because the immediate impact would be to increase the price of petrol and other oil-based fuels, including heating oil. Recognising the challenge of convincing the electorate, Anthony summoned his ministers and senior back benchers and told them to get into the rural communities and explain why the policy was not only necessary, but essential. There were rowdy meetings across Australia, with the greatest criticism of the NCP coming from its own supporters. Nixon was harangued at a meeting at Goondiwindi, Queensland, by a former state Young Country Party president, Ian Cameron, who would be elected the MP for Maranoa in the 1980 federal election. Cameron saw no need for parity pricing: I’ve always argued that once we became self-sufficient in oil, which we did, there was no reason for us to be part of the OPEC oil cartel. I know that there’s this argument that you’ve got to have a world price, but we don’t have a world price for wheat. We do a lot of economically stupid things, and that’s one of them – and I still think it’s stupid. Big oil would have got to Anthony and said if you don’t come along with us, we won’t search. But we’re an island with a secure and stable government. We’re a stable country for oil companies to search and develop in.6

Anthony refused to retreat, certain the policy was the only way to encourage exploration for oil in Australia and so increase the nation’s fuel security. Under the slogan Keeping Australia Strong, he made a spirited defence of the policy in his campaign speech for the 18 October 1980 election: One of the areas in which we must be strong is in security of fuel supplies. You’ll hear a lot about fuel prices in the weeks to come. ... But the real issue isn’t price – it’s supply. … The plain fact is, if we don’t pay a realistic price now, we just won’t have enough fuel.

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That would make Australia a beggar for fuel – scrambling for oil and paying through the neck for it. Realistic prices are saving fuel … So don’t be fooled by Labor’s propaganda. There’s no cheap fuel … And I for one don’t want you coming to me in five years’ time saying ‘Why didn’t you do something to safeguard our fuel supplies?’7

The sting of higher petrol prices was eased to some extent by Anthony’s election announcement that the government would make the cost of buying and installing fuel storage facilities fully tax deductible for businesses. Opinion polls put the Opposition increasingly close to the Coalition as the campaign unfolded. Seventeen days out from the poll, Nixon took part in a live television debate with his shadow, Western Australian Senator Peter Walsh, on the ABC’s Countrywide program. Nixon was less than enthusiastic about it as he drove to the studio in Canberra and his initial contributions in the broadcast lacked spirit and conviction. Then the interviewer asked Walsh if a re-elected Labor government would introduce a capital gains tax. Walsh, a long time proponent of wealth taxes, said Labor would hold an inquiry into the distribution of wealth and added that ‘the Labor Party believes that there ought to be some form of capital taxation’. He was then asked about speculation that Labor might reintroduce death duties and a tax on gifts, to which he replied: ‘The Labor Party believes that Australia ought to have some form of capital taxation, as every other country to which we compare ourselves has.’ Nixon interjected, accusing him of ‘wiggling too much’, to which Walsh snapped: ‘I’m not wiggling. Whether it will be a capital gains tax, a wealth tax or a reintroduction of inheritance taxes, which they have in the United Kingdom and the United States, is something which is yet to be determined.’8 He had virtually confirmed that Labor would introduce some form of wealth tax or reintroduce death duties. Nixon issued a release to the Canberra press gallery after the debate and was dismayed the following day to discover that it had not been

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run anywhere. Campaigning in Cairns he instructed that it be rewritten and re-issued. Again, there was no bite from the press. Convinced that Walsh’s comments had the potential to derail Labor’s campaign, he contacted the Liberal Party’s federal director, Tony Eggleton. If the media would not run the story, the Liberals had to expose it through television advertising. A commercial finally went to air towards the end of the penultimate week of the campaign. It featured aerial footage of suburban roofs and a grim voice-over warning about Labor’s taxing intentions. It was widely credited with turning the tables against Labor and giving the Coalition a comfortable return – despite a warning in the results for the Liberal Party, which lost 13 seats in the lower house, declining to 54. In contrast, a resilient NCP gained a seat, up from 19 to 20. Labor improved to 51 seats. The half Senate election meant the government would lose its majority from July 1981, with 31 Coalition senators to 27 Labor, five Australian Democrats and one Independent.9 Sheil resigned from the Senate in early February 1981 to unsuccessfully contest a by-election for the lower house seat of McPherson, centred on the Gold Coast. His casual vacancy was filled by the Queensland premier’s wife, Flo Bjelke-Petersen, making her the first woman to join the federal party’s ranks since the retirement of Aggie Robertson in 1962.10

k By the early 1980s Australia was facing the worst world economic recession since the Great Depression, a new world oil price shock, and a long-running and worsening drought. Inroads made by the government since 1976 to bring down inflation and stimulate growth and investment were being eroded. Inflation hit 10 per cent in mid-1980 and rose to 11.5 per cent by 1982. Unemployment rose from 6 per cent to 10 per cent. As the cost of living increased, the trade unions pushed for pay rises. By 1982 wages were increasing at the rate of 14 per cent and industrial disputes in support of wage rises saw more than 6.25

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million working days lost in the two years 1981 and 1982. Desperate to contain this blowout, Canberra and the states agreed to a 12-month salaries and wages pause, which was implemented from December 1982 despite fierce opposition from the unions.11 The drought, which began to bite in 1976–77, was acknowledged in 1982 as the worst in the nation’s modern history.12 Nixon introduced fodder and interest rate subsidies over and above existing joint federal-state drought relief programs to help farmers stay on their properties and maintain breeding herds and flocks. By 1982–83, $356 million had been appropriated for these subsidies.13 The drought also focused more attention on the government’s water resources program. A centrepiece of the NCP’s 1977 election policy had been a new National Water Resources Program worth $200 million over five years. In his policy speech for the 1980 election, Anthony said $76 million had been committed and added that, despite the priority having to be the control of inflation and spending, he was ‘disappointed that we haven’t been able to go a lot further in the first three years of this fiveyear programme’.14 Soon after the election, he complained to Fraser, saying expenditure on the program would have to increase and warning that ‘I would find it very difficult explaining the Commonwealth’s and my Party’s position if we do not honour our commitment. It is a matter of national importance and one to which I attach a high priority’.15 As a result, the Prime Minister announced in January 1983 a fouryear extension to the program and a special five-year supplementary program, jointly worth $640 million and packaged as a new Bicentennial Water Resources Program. Further, the Commonwealth would undertake feasibility studies into turning north Queensland rivers and the Clarence River in New South Wales inland. 16 Anthony said that under the program ‘a long-awaited aspiration of my party will come closer. We’ll be looking very seriously at the possibility of turning the surplus waters of some of our coastal rivers inland – something that could open up exciting prospects for large areas of Australia’.17

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The idea has since become contentious, with most Nationals MPs representing coastal seats strongly opposed. Another initiative for the 1988 bicentenary was the development by transport minister Hunt in 1982 of the Australian Bicentennial Road Development Program. Designed to upgrade the road network, particularly national highways, over the six years to the bicentenary, the program was funded by an excise surcharge on petrol and diesel of, initially, one cent a litre, and later two cents a litre. Hunt regarded the program as one of his most notable accomplishments.18 Despite the persistent economic difficulties and continuing drought, the Fraser-Anthony government pursued some innovative policies. As Minister for Transport in the late 1970s, Nixon developed bilateral airline agreements with several countries, starting with Britain and quickly followed by Germany, The Netherlands and Yugoslavia and then with countries including the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Italy, Greece and nations in southeast Asia. The agreements introduced a system of low-priced advance purchase (apex) airfares for non-stopover flights, which became known as ‘Nicko’s Cheapos’. The lowest priced return flight to London was brought down to $568 by the beginning of 1979.19 The coinciding oil price hikes took the gloss off the low fares, prompting Labor to ridicule Nixon every time price rises were announced. The minister doggedly defended his airfare regime, arguing that if the pre-apex price levels were still in place, the impact of oil price rises would have increased the cost of tickets even more. He and his successor in the Transport portfolio, Hunt, further enhanced the Australian Design Rules (ADRs), which set national standards for motor vehicle safety, and anti-theft and emissions’ controls. The Australian Transport Advisory Council agreed to develop a revised and updated set of ADRs at its meeting in February 1983. The rules had been introduced by Sinclair in January 1969 when he was shipping and transport minister. Over the years they had reached the point where they virtually set the world standard for motor vehicle design. The early standards made the fitting of seatbelts compulsory in

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passenger vehicles, required the removal of sharp edges from bodywork, and ruled that metal dashboards were unsafe.20 Another milestone was the extension of the Ghan railway, planned to run from Tarcoola, in South Australia, to Alice Springs, across the Northern Territory border. 21 Sinclair established the 200-mile Australian Fishing Zone in 1979. The previous year he had banned commercial whaling in Australia, closing down the last whaling station, near Albany in Western Australia. In 1980, Australia banned all whaling activity in its 200-mile zone and the following year prohibited the importation of whale products.22 Against the background of a growing exodus of people from South Vietnam after its fall in April 1975, the government substantially changed the emphasis of Australia’s immigration and refugee policies. From 1976 to 1982, around 200 000 immigrants arrived in Australia from Asian countries, including nearly 56 000 Vietnamese who applied as refugees. Additionally, 2029 Vietnamese arrived on Australia’s northern shores in dilapidated vessels and were granted permission to stay. 23 In later years, the arrival by boat of illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers, and government policy towards them would be a politically divisive issue. Despite a fairly widely held view that the NCP was only interested in farmers, it was active in many areas affecting society and public morality. In 1977, the government restructured the Office for Women’s Affairs, established by the Whitlam administration in 1974 within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, into the Office of the Status of Women, controversially placing it under the more junior Minister for Home Affairs. When Tom McVeigh (NCP, Darling Downs, Queensland) took over as Minister for Home Affairs and Environment in May 1982, he appointed Quentin Bryce as convenor of the National Women’s Advisory Council, an advisory body to the Office of the Status of Women. Bryce went on to become Governor of Queensland and, from 2008, Governor-General of Australia.24 In August 1978, the Member for Hume in New South Wales,

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Stephen Lusher, gave notice of a private member’s bill to ban the payment of medical benefits for abortion except where the mother’s life was in danger. Items covering abortion were added to the medical benefits schedule of Medibank in April 1974, without prior parliamentary debate or vote. The Lusher bill caused some consternation among government members, which partly explains why it was not brought on for debate until March 1979, by which time government members had been granted a conscience vote on the matter. Lusher’s bill failed. Instead, an amendment moved by Barry Simon (Liberal, McMillan, Victoria) restricting the payment of benefits to cases where the abortion was carried out strictly in accordance with state or territory law was carried by 62 votes to 52.25 Lusher, a Roman Catholic, said he was ‘never particularly for or against abortion’, but felt strongly about ‘the taxpayer picking up the bill for an optional procedure which, in most cases, was not a health issue in the conventional sense’.26 On another occasion, in 1984, Lusher said that dole bludgers were ‘living it up’, which not only caused heated community debate, but also prompted the Channel 9 current affairs program 60 Minutes to challenge him to put his theory to the test for a week by living on the dole, which he did. He found he was able to live on unemployment benefits providing he made sacrifices, such as riding a bicycle instead of using public transport, and economising on groceries. It was an interesting experience for someone whose shadow responsibility was roads, and nothing to do with unemployment or welfare: We met and spoke with several groups from deliberate bludgers to genuine homeless and the just dead unlucky. For me, the outcome was that it was very hard to generalise – there were many different types of unemployed. In the end I apologised for generalising and criticised myself for being insensitive to others less fortunate than myself. I took it in spades from the bleeding hearts and probably from the hardliners who didn’t agree with my softening attitudes. I still reckon I shouldn’t have done it, even if so much of what we wanted changed did come to pass.

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Lusher lost his seat at the 1984 election, not so much because of this incident but more because of a major redistribution of boundaries, leading to a three-cornered contest in Hume that was won by the Liberal Party’s Wal Fife.27

k To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

The office: acting Prime Minister Doug Anthony running the country from his caravan at New Brighton, January 1982 (the Anthony family)

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Since 1970, Doug Anthony had owned a beach-side block of land at New Brighton, near Brunswick Heads on the New South Wales far north coast, where the family gathered for the Christmas-New Year holidays. During the Fraser years he earned a reputation for running the country as the acting Prime Minister from a caravan on the block. Initially, there was no telephone in the caravan, so the acting Prime Minister kept in contact with the Canberra bureaucracy by using a public one outside the local general store. The only Christmas-New Year period during the Fraser-Anthony government when the country was not run from the New Brighton caravan was 1976–77, when Anthony was sick with hepatitis and Lynch took over as acting PM. Anthony’s caretaker prime ministership over the holidays became iconic: We handled some big issues from the caravan. … After a number of years working as acting Prime Minister from there, I got the confidence of more ministers and departmental heads. They came to realise that this was the way things were working over the holidays. They accepted it. I’ll probably be remembered for the caravan more than anything else in my political career. When the nation heard I was running the show from my caravan it sent a message that it was Christmas, time to relax, everything was on hold, but also everything was being looked after.28

k On the afternoon of 26 September 1979, the New South Wales Attorney-General, Frank Walker, tabled a report in state parliament that rocked the Commonwealth government and the National Country Party. It was the long-awaited Finnane report into a group of family companies that the Minister for Primary Industry, Ian Sinclair, had inherited on the death of his father. Sinclair himself had reported anomalies in some company returns to the New South Wales

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Corporate Affairs Commission some years earlier. The state Labor government of Neville Wran nonetheless decided to establish a separate inquiry, headed by Sydney barrister Michael Finnane. A key allegation of his report was that Sinclair had forged his father’s signature on company returns. Anthony defended his deputy on the ABC Nationwide television program that evening: It was Mr Sinclair who reported the matter to the Taxation Commissioner, himself feeling uncomfortable about the circumstances of the companies that he was involved with, and as a result of his own initiative this whole matter has been brought out into the public arena and he himself has been placed in a most unfortunate position. … He has inherited a situation from his father, as being chief executive of a number of companies of which there obviously were some irregularities, and now he is being asked to resign from his position, an important position in Government, because of these allegations that are being made, allegations now because of a quasi judicial inquiry.29

Sinclair protested his innocence, but was left with no option but to stand down from the ministry in the early hours of 27 September. He also stood aside as party deputy leader, with Nixon taking over as acting deputy and as Minister for Primary Industry. For Labor it was sweet revenge: as manager of the Opposition’s parliamentary tactics in 1974 and 1975, Sinclair had been a key architect of the Whitlam government’s dismissal. He was subsequently cleared on charges resulting from the Finnane report, resumed the deputy leadership and returned to the cabinet from 19 August 1980 as Minister for Special Trade Representations, before moving to Communications, where he was instrumental in consolidating the fledgling SBS television service and developing the government-owned AUSSAT satellite communications system. Later still he took over the Defence portfolio.30 Sinclair had no doubt the Finnane episode had been politically motivated by Wran and Walker:

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They saw it as a way by which they could get at me, who they believed had been fairly instrumental in Gough’s [Whitlam] downfall. That was what it was all about. But you know what you’ve done and you know what you haven’t done. If somebody charges me with something I haven’t done, I’ll have no hesitation in standing up and fighting, which I did. I didn’t have any real worry because I knew none of the charges had substance – which helps!31

Anthony was at a function at Canberra’s Lakeside Hotel when the decision on Sinclair’s case was handed down: ‘It was quite a big function and there were lots of press there. One of them said “Ian Sinclair’s been cleared” and I said in a loud voice “whacko!” And they picked it up and played it all next day – whacko!’32

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15: Back to Opposition

Primary Industry was a complex and frequently controversial portfolio. Up to this time, policies were generally framed to match what a particular industry wanted, sometimes with little regard for the broader national economic interest. McEwen made the point in 1965 that ‘it is the function of my party to see that the will of those who produce and own the product is carried into legislative and administrative effect’.1 At times, programs developed with the backing of industry bodies were not supported by grassroots growers or producers. The minister of the day had to negotiate carefully in his efforts to bring all sides together. To meet changing circumstances, Sinclair introduced the Rural Reconstruction Scheme in 1971 and modified it into the Rural Adjustment Scheme in 1976. In the meantime, the Whitlam government replaced the Tariff Board in 1974 with the Industries Assistance Commission, a move strongly opposed by the Country Party, prompting Anthony to say it should be named the ‘Industries Withdrawal Commission’ because it would lead to reduced support for agriculture.2 The Whitlam government also developed a green paper on agricultural

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policy in 1974. In a further attempt to bring more consistency and long-term predictability to rural policy settings, Nixon commissioned a working group, chaired by a Melbourne businessman with wide agricultural knowledge, James Balderstone, to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the issues and options for agriculture into the 1980s. Among Balderstone’s findings were that policy should be responsive to national and international economic developments, create conditions under which the agricultural sector could handle change, encourage the efficient use and conservation of resources, and promote the adoption of new technology and increased productivity in the farm sector.3 Nixon also had to handle some controversial issues when he became Minister for Primary Industry. A subsidiary of the Australian Dairy Corporation (ADC), established by Labor in 1975, became embroiled in scandal over a protracted period. Asia Dairy Industries (ADI), based in Hong Kong to market Australian product, notably milk power, throughout southeast Asia, was found to have been evading withholding tax due to the Thai government and engaging in practices that had breached Australia’s obligations under the GATT. Under-the-table concessions had been made in contracts, some executives had received overpayments and misused credit card and travel entitlements, and receipts were either lost or non-existent. A report by the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government Operations, tabled in the Senate on 17 September 1981, was critical of the lack of ministerial and departmental control, including the power of direction, over the statutory body and its subsidiaries. The events had occurred before Nixon took over the Primary Industry portfolio. He now responded by implementing new guidelines and reporting procedures and reimbursing the Thai government more than $215 000 in unpaid tax.4 The unfolding affair reinforced Nixon’s view that the department needed to be made more professional. He brought in a new departmental head, Lindsay Duthie, previously deputy secretary at the Department of Trade and Resources. On 11 August 1981, with ADI a front-line political issue, Nixon received advice from the United States that made his heart miss a

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beat: the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) had discovered what it suspected was horsemeat in a consignment of Australian boneless beef in San Diego, California. The political implications for Nixon and the government were enormous. All exports from the company at the centre of the allegation, Profreeze, of Richmond in Victoria, were immediately suspended. Two days later the USDA said tests had proved positive for horsemeat. The Australian Federal Police was asked to investigate and Profreeze was deregistered. By 21 August, further tests found there was also kangaroo meat in the shipment. Nixon was embroiled in what became known as the meat scandal, with Australia’s $1.3 billion-a-year beef export trade – $600 million of it to the USA – in jeopardy. Meat inspection procedures were urgently tightened, including spot checks on export works, the sealing of cartons and trucks enhanced, inspection stamps redesigned and penalties for substitution increased from what Nixon acknowledged was a ‘ridiculous’ $1000 to $100 000. The federal police provided an interim report on 4 September that prompted Nixon to recommend the establishment of a royal commission. He announced the decision to parliament on 8 September and the following day Anthony, as acting Prime Minister, detailed wide terms of reference for an inquiry under Justice AE Woodward. Nixon was then dispatched to the USA, Britain, Europe, Japan and South Korea to detail the actions taken and reassure those markets the problem would not occur again.5 Nixon appeared before the royal commission on 12 July 1982, providing it with a 20-page written submission supported by seven attachments. The commission’s report was handed to the government on Friday, 17 September. Nixon flew home to Orbost in Gippsland, armed with a copy to read over the weekend. By that evening he believed he would have to resign from the ministry. He rang Fraser and told him as much. Woodward had found that a two-year inquiry into meat inspection services, established by the government in 1978 and chaired by a former South Australian Liberal MP, Bert Kelly, had ‘received insufficient attention from the Minister, the Hon. P. J. Nixon’.

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The commission chairman, found that Nixon, having heard from Kelly that there had been cases of bribery and abuse of power among Commonwealth meat inspectors, ‘should have taken positive steps to investigate the matter. In my view he did not deal with this allegation in a manner that was adequate and effective’.6 Nixon had received the meat inspection report at a meeting with Kelly in Melbourne on 11 February 1980. He referred it to the director of the Bureau of Animal Health, Bill Gee, for assessment and advice, and tabled it in parliament on 27 February. When he gave Nixon his report, Kelly told him it was a ‘pretty shonky’ industry, but provided no details or specifics for definitive investigation. Gee, in a brief to Nixon, observed: ‘Like so many allegations on the meat industry, those in the Kelly report were not specific enough to be referred to the Commonwealth Police. With the establishment of the Royal Commission, I very much hope that Mr Kelly will now put his information forward for detailed study.’7 Even though Kelly acknowledged to the royal commission that he either did not or could not remember providing Nixon with the names of particular places where malpractices were said to have happened, Woodward made his finding on Nixon, who in turn believed this required his resignation. He was not entirely surprised at the direction of Woodward’s report: ‘I was at the commission hearing when Kelly was giving evidence. He cracked some joke and Woodward laughed and I thought “what a strange thing for any judge to do”.’ 8 Fraser, who was at his Nareen property in western Victoria, wanted to read the report before considering Nixon’s future. Anthony and Nixon met in Nixon’s Parliament House office on the Sunday afternoon. After several hours’ discussion Nixon signed a letter to the Prime Minister, which concluded with the words: ‘For my part I believe my record is sound and I am of the view that the facts do not warrant my resignation. I am, however, conscious that this will be a contentious political issue and I am aware that attempts will be made to damage the Government over this issue. Accordingly, I confirm my telephone call to you on Friday evening, 17 September, and leave myself in your

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hands.’ 9 This gave Anthony the necessary breathing space to work on Fraser if need be. He was determined Nixon must stay: ‘It was a horrible time. Malcolm knew I was drawing a line in the sand. I wasn’t going to lose Peter and Malcolm never quibbled.’10 Indeed, he did not. After receiving briefings and advice from his own department, the Department of Primary Industry, and senior ministerial staff, Fraser concluded Nixon’s position was defensible: ‘To this day I would not vary one iota from what I said in the Parliament.’11 Fraser tabled the royal commission report on 21 September and in a lengthy statement effectively said the royal commissioner had tried to read too much into what Kelly had told Nixon at their meeting on 11 February 1980 and what Nixon should have done about it, given it was all hearsay and not evidence. He pointed out that the objective of the Kelly inquiry was to devise a single, uniform system of meat inspection and so streamline the existing dual state and Commonwealth systems; Kelly was not investigating corruption. Fraser criticised Woodward for selectively quoting from the Kelly report and thereby casting Nixon in a negative light: If all the omitted words had been included, they would have altered the balance of the evidence substantially in the Minister’s favour. The fact that they were not included is a sad and unhappy omission, with a most unfortunate consequence. Mr Speaker, there can be no doubting that the Royal Commissioner acted in good faith in drawing the conclusion that he did. But on the basis of the evidence that I have outlined, I cannot accept that the one adverse finding against the Minister has been substantiated. I unequivocally reject it.12

Nixon retained his portfolio. More than a few in the parliamentary Liberal Party believed Fraser was giving preferential treatment to NCP ministers over Liberals who fell from grace. They recalled the 1978 McGregor royal commission report on an electoral redistribution in Queensland, which found the then administrative services minister,

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Senator Reg Withers, guilty of an impropriety. Fraser sacked Withers, saying he had no choice but to accept the commission’s finding. Given the Prime Minister’s attitude to the Woodward report, several Liberal back benchers, including senators David McGibbon from Queensland and Steele Hall from South Australia, who had joined the Liberal Party from June 1976, called for the reinstatement of Withers.13 It did not happen. Fraser insisted he gave no preferential treatment to anyone; the actions taken in each case were based on the facts of the individual issue.14 In the meantime, the NCP organisation had been planning for another name change. On 16 October 1982 a federal conference in Canberra agreed to drop the word ‘Country’ from its title. The National Country Party of Australia became the National Party of Australia. But journalists and cartoonists were loath to let go of the cocky image. On 3 February 1983 Fraser called a double dissolution election for 5 March, several pieces of legislation, notably sales tax amendments, having been blocked by the Senate. The same day Bill Hayden announced to a Labor caucus meeting in Brisbane that he would resign as Opposition leader, paving the way for the former head of the ACTU and Member for Wills (Victoria) since October 1980, Bob Hawke, to take over. Labor under Hayden had made little impact on the government, despite its crises and the nation’s economic difficulties. Hawke offered charisma, a wages accord with the trade unions, and a new era of consensus and reconciliation. Change was in the air. There was little the government could offer beyond a continuing crackdown on inflation, spending and interest rates. Perhaps because it had – against Treasury advice – brought down an expansionary budget for 1982–83 that included tax cuts, more spending on roads, an increase in family allowances, tax rebates for home interest mortgage payments over 10 per cent, and further spending for drought relief and unemployment programs, there was little left with which to entice the electorate. Anthony’s policy speech implored voters not to experiment with ‘an L-plate government’ but look to the longer term:

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New name, but old image: the party’s name changed from National Country Party to National Party of Australia on 16 October 1982, but cartoonist Geoff Pryor was not going to let the cocky image die, The Canberra Times (Geoff Pryor)

It’s only five years till our Bicentenary. There’ll be major improvements to Australia’s roads before we celebrate in 1988. We’ll have the Alice Springs to Darwin railway built by then. We’ll be building standard-gauge rail links to several ports. The Bicentennial Water Resources Program is another exciting step forward.

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He attacked Hawke and the trade unions for their determination to ‘smash the wage pause, even with strikes’ and blamed them for diminishing Australia’s international reputation. Fraser’s campaign took on an air of desperation when he warned that if Labor won office people would be better off putting their money under the bed. A jubilant Hawke retorted: ‘You can’t put it under the bed because that’s where the Commies are!’ Labor under Hawke was on a roll. Despite last-minute rallies in capital cities addressed by the likes of Fraser, Anthony, Sinclair and Nixon, Hawke’s Labor machine powered into office. It won 75 House of Representatives seats, up from 51 in 1980. The Liberals fell from 54 to 33, while the renamed National Party of Australia dropped three, from 20 to 17 – a combined Opposition strength of 50 to Labor’s 75. Fraser announced his resignation as leader of the Liberal Party and resigned from parliament on 31 March. Anthony soon realised his enthusiasm for politics was on the wane. He had gone from Government to Opposition once and did not relish the prospect of staying around to do it again. Fraser was gone, as was his friend and colleague Nixon, who retired at the election, and several others. There were suggestions Nixon retired because he had been injured by the meat scandal. He denied this, saying he had wanted to ‘pull the pin’ much earlier. He had hinted to Anthony as long ago as the 1977 election that it would be his last: he would turn 50 in March 1978 and would retire at the following election: I wanted to do different things. At the 1980 election I tried to pull the pin, but Doug and Malcolm spent about three weeks persuading me not to. By 1983, I was determined. As soon as it was obvious that Malcolm was going to call the election, I said I was going. Again, Doug – he was in the Philippines at the time – and Malcolm pleaded with me to stay; but not this time. I was getting too old to go back to the farm and pull thistles. Doug got a shock when I left because he thought I’d stay and take over the [National Party] leadership.’

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A bright spot in a disappointing election: 14 March 1983 and the National Party room welcomes the return of Noel Hicks after a bruising campaign in Riverina, in which he polled 50.43 per cent of the vote after distribution of preferences. Left to right (back row): Bruce Lloyd, Ray Braithwaite, Bruce Cowan, Tom McVeigh, Doug Scott, Ian Robinson, Ian Cameron, Flo Bjelke-Petersen, Ralph Hunt, Ian Sinclair, Stan Collard, Peter Fisher; (front row): Bob Katter (snr), Stephen Lusher, Doug Anthony, Noel Hicks, Peter McGauran, Ron Boswell (The Nationals federal secretariat)

Unbeknown to anyone, Sinclair had also been contemplating retirement at the election, but Nixon’s announcement trumped him: ‘If Peter had stayed in 1983, I would have gone. But I enjoyed politics, and when he made his intentions known, I was happy to stay.’ As 1983 wore on, ideas of retirement began to firm in Anthony’s mind. The party leadership succession was obvious: Sinclair – ‘Sinkers’ to his friends – the deputy leader for the past 17 years, a barrister and grazier, smart dresser, urbane and charming, was the clear replacement. Succession in Richmond was another matter. Anthony thought about the New South Wales party’s general secretary since 1980, Charles Blunt, whose development of election campaigns and organisational management had impressed him. Blunt had brought

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the New South Wales party into the computer age and helped to revitalise the federal secretariat in the period immediately after the 1983 election defeat, turning it into a more effective research and support facility for National Party Opposition MPs. Anthony kept his thoughts to himself, mainly because there was one more task he wanted to supervise as leader. In preparation for the parliament’s move to the new and more spacious Parliament House, scheduled to coincide with the bicentenary in 1988, the Hawke government was proposing a substantial increase in the size of the parliament, from 125 to 148 members and 64 to 76 senators. The Coalition shadow executive produced a discussion paper arguing against the increase. Anthony was not convinced and asked the New South Wales head office to make its own assessment. The work revealed that there had not been a significant increase in the number of members or senators since 1949, yet in the 34 years since then the number of people eligible to vote had nearly doubled. The number of New South Wales MPs in the lower house had actually fallen from 47 to 43 since 1949 because of boundary changes, although there had been an increase of 70 per cent in the number of voters in the state. It was calculated that the National Party could expect to hold 21 House of Representatives seats in an enlarged parliament, compared to its present 17, and increase its Senate representation by one. The downside from the Senate point of view was that the quota required to elect a senator to the enlarged Senate would reduce, making it easier for minor parties and Independents to win seats. Nonetheless, Anthony was convinced. To the fury of the new Opposition leader, Andrew Peacock (Kooyong), and the Liberals, the National Party senators crossed the floor to vote with the government, ensuring the Representation Act 1983 was passed on 8 December. True to calculations, at the federal election on 1 December 1984, the National Party won 21 House of Representatives seats and increased its senators from four to five. While Labor was comfortably returned, the Sinclair-Peacock campaign reduced its majority in the lower house from 25 in 1983 to 16 and its share of the

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primary vote from 49.5 per cent to 47.5 per cent. The election also saw the introduction of a system of public funding and disclosure for federal elections. Under the new rules, political parties received public funding on a per vote basis for candidates who polled four per cent or more of the primary vote, and had to disclose the source of their funds for election campaign costs, such as advertising.

k Anthony told few people beyond his immediate family of his retirement plans. He intended to make an announcement in Canberra on 3 January 1984, but brought this forward to 30 December 1983 when he learned that day’s Sydney afternoon newspaper the Sun was about to splash the story across its front page. Commenting that Anthony was entitled to feel ‘contented’ about his period as leader, next day’s The Sydney Morning Herald said he had extracted a high price from the Liberal Party for his party’s electoral support. It noted that the expected successor, Sinclair, who had proved himself to be an intelligent, tough and resilient politician, would not have ‘the assistance of Mr Anthony or Mr Nixon – the other members of a trio which many regarded as one of the shrewdest political alliances Australia has seen’. With his intentions public, Anthony encouraged Blunt to seek preselection for Richmond, which he successfully did. The New South Wales party chairman, David Brownhill, was not happy about losing his general secretary: ‘It left us in a bind. I would have thought Doug would have rung and canvassed it beforehand, but we didn’t discuss it at all. But it was a long time ago and I wouldn’t like to fall out with a good friend now.’ Anthony’s resignation as leader took effect on 17 January 1984, when the parliamentary party elected Sinclair to replace him, with Hunt the new deputy. His resignation from parliament formally took place the following day. Blunt won the Richmond by-election on 18 February. At only 54, but after 26 years and four months in parliament,

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‘The Mulga Mafia’: emphasising the influence in the cabinet of (left to right) Peter Nixon, Ian Sinclair and Doug Anthony, The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 September 1981 (Chris Henning)

16 of them as a minister and nearly 13 as party leader – a few weeks longer than McEwen – Anthony could turn his mind to other pursuits. He had served in six administrations and, as leader, joined in Coalition with five different Liberal leaders. Frequent changes of leadership in the Liberal Party made him quip that every time he wanted to dance with his Liberal partner there was a new one. The troika of Anthony, Sinclair and Nixon was often seen as having an undue influence on the cabinet and government decisions. The fact that Fraser was himself a farmer undoubtedly helped the National Party’s cause, particularly on issues affecting primary industry and trade. Nixon said Fraser ‘understood us’ – unlike others in the ministry:

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New leaders: Ian Sinclair (left) and Ralph Hunt (The Nationals federal secretariat)

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John Carrick [Senate, New South Wales] hated us and opposed everything we put up. He used to say ‘Malcolm you can’t agree, the Nats will be getting a victory’. Doug and Ian and I, and also Ralph Hunt, were totally solid in Cabinet. We never caucused before a meeting on any issue, as we all had the same view. Lynch was constantly rolled. I used to often tell him ‘Phil don’t oppose us, you’ll get done over’ and he invariably did!

Contemporary critics of the Fraser-Anthony government say it failed to implement important promises, notably on industrial relations, even though it had majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate for its first two terms. Anthony said what people did not understand was that there were up to seven Liberal senators who would not accept some cabinet decisions: ‘The government’s opposition came from within its own ranks. We had to face this. It would have made us look silly to keep putting up legislation that wasn’t going to get through the Senate because of the government’s own people.’ Fraser acknowledged that some senators frustrated the government’s program, but said ‘we did most of what we said we were going to do’. An early initiative of Sinclair’s was to modify the stylised Australia roundel logo – being used in slightly differing formats by the state parties in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia – into a federal party logo by including the Australian national flag within the map of Australia. It was particularly appropriate at this time, given there was considerable debate, substantially generated by the new government, about the appropriateness of maintaining the Union flag in the Australian flag. The National Party was a staunch defender of the existing flag.

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Joh for Canberra

16: Joh for Canberra

Joh Bjelke-Petersen reached the pinnacle of his success when, contrary to opinion polls, he led the Nationals to a stunning victory at the Queensland election on 1 November 1986, winning 49 of the state parliament’s 89 seats.1 This trumped his previous result, in October 1983, when the Nationals were able to form a government after two Liberals, Don Lane and Brian Austin, defected to their ranks. Bjelke-Petersen became the superstar of non-Labor politics in Australia, lauded by right wing conservatives and courted by a small but apparently influential group of business people, including the socalled ‘white shoe brigade’ of Brisbane and the Gold Coast, who said he should be the prime minister and who promised financial backing for a campaign in that direction. Moreover, Bjelke-Petersen was armed with the results of nationwide research, involving a sample of 2000 people in every state, which showed that if he spearheaded a federal campaign the National Party’s vote would increase by four per cent nationally.2 Bjelke-Petersen had long believed the conservatives in Canberra needed a shake-up. He had worked to help rid the nation of the

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Conservative superstar: Queensland Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen addresses the New South Wales party’s central executive, Sydney, July 1983. The party’s state chairman, David Brownhill, listens attentively (The Nationals – NSW)

Whitlam socialists, only to find the Fraser-Anthony government, as he saw it, failing to crack down on unions, meddling unnecessarily in state affairs, and supporting such trendy ideas as human rights and equal opportunities, industrial democracy, multiculturalism and freedom of information. Now, inspired by the encouragement flooding into his office, he believed he could lead a campaign to oust the Hawke government and replace it with an administration that did what he

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wanted. Immediately after the 1986 election win, he made his ambitions clear: I definitely intend to have a big input in relation to [federal] policies, because I’ve had the bitter experience of giving years of work for the two federal [Coalition] parties and received nothing for it other than bitterness and disappointment with Fraser and John Howard and his retrospective tax, land rights, a stack of things Whitlam left. I had many arguments and talks trying to change their direction, but this time I won’t be working through them. They’ll work with the policies I set or I will work against them, and I’ve told them that.3

It was the opening shot in what became known as the Joh for Canberra campaign, which culminated in the early 1987 federal election, rocked the National Party around Australia to its foundations, directly challenged Sinclair’s leadership of the federal party and denied the possibility of Howard and Sinclair winning government. The central part of Bjelke-Petersen’s campaign was a new economic direction for Australia, the core of which would be a single, flat rate of income tax. The idea was not new. In 1977, Anthony had floated the concept. The New South Wales party’s annual general conference in Sydney in June 1985 called for ‘the progressive introduction of a flat rate of tax’. And Bjelke-Petersen had previously presented the idea at a national tax summit in Canberra in July 1985.4 Most economists derided it, but many taxpayers and voters liked it. Bjelke-Petersen could attract substantial nationwide support for such a policy and it could also drive a wedge into the federal Opposition, as the Liberals believed any move towards a single rate of tax would have to be accompanied by wider indirect taxes. It might even break the Coalition, enabling the formation of new arrangements, or even a new conservative party, based on those Nationals and other likeminded supporters of the Queensland premier. Bjelke-Petersen outlined his tax plan to a rally at Wagga Wagga, in

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the New South Wales Riverina, in January 1987. He would provide a maximum 25 cents-in-the-dollar single rate of income tax, with no off-setting broad-based indirect or consumption taxes. People paying less than 25 cents in the dollar would continue paying the same amount; those paying more would come down to the 25 cents level. There was no explanation of how the system would work, but BjelkePetersen was not worried about that. He told the rally that unless sitting federal National and Liberal MPs adopted his policy one of his own candidates would stand against them. Sinclair suggested that if Bjelke-Petersen was genuine in wanting to come to Canberra, he should run against the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bill Hayden, in his outer Brisbane seat of Oxley. Bjelke-Petersen retorted by predicting that the first federal National Party meeting of the year, to be held on 16 February, would ‘see a challenge to Mr Sinclair’s leadership and possibly an end to the Coalition’.5 Sinclair tried but failed to get a clear vote of confidence in his leadership from the party meeting. Instead he got a resolution that read: This Party, recognising the crisis in the Australian economy and the need to defeat the Hawke Labor Government, states its accord with the thrust of that which the Premier of Queensland seeks to achieve and supports his general philosophy. This Party proposes that the benefits which the Premier would bring to such a united effort be harnessed by requesting the Premier to become fully involved with the Federal National Party in the campaign to remove the Hawke Government from office and thereby gain the maximum benefit of the electoral support the Premier of Queensland has within Australia.6

The 12 Queensland senators and members of the 26-member party room, as well as some from other states, were not going to dump Bjelke-Petersen. The New South Wales Member for Lyne, Bruce Cowan, who was identified in the media as a Bjelke-Petersen supporter, said that while he never outwardly supported the Joh campaign, ‘I admired

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him for the great things he achieved for Queensland. I was sympathetic to Joh as a great politician. And there were tensions at the time within the [federal] Coalition, so there was some sympathy for what Joh was trying to do.’7 Cowan’s friend and colleague, Ian Robinson, in the neighbouring seat of Page, found the Joh campaign placed him in a difficult position. Local branch members virtually demanded that he support Bjelke-Petersen. Despite explaining that ‘it was not as simple as that’, his failure to oppose the campaign led to accusations from some in the federal parliamentary party that he was a traitor: They did not want to listen to the fact that I had to at least recognise what members of the party in my own electorate were saying. There was initially a substantial groundswell of support in northern New South Wales for the Joh campaign. It became a very nasty situation. It was alleged that I was directly involved in supporting the Joh for Canberra campaign. At the local branch level I was being accused of not supporting him. That was the dilemma. It was a case of taking every precaution to ensure that the parliamentary party was not split in two, with the Queensland members going one way and the remainder the other.8

Robinson had bitter exchanges with some of his colleagues, including Sinclair, but said he never directly supported the Joh campaign: ‘My view was that we had to do all we could to accommodate the groundswell that had been created, to find ways of utilising it to our advantage. That is very different from saying that I was totally in support of the proposition that Joh could go to Canberra and become leader of the party, or of the Coalition for that matter.’ An added complication was that Bjelke-Petersen had thrown his weight behind a breakaway conservative organisation that had emerged in the Northern Territory in December 1986, the NT Nationals. The new party would contest the March 1987 Northern Territory election, standing candidates against the ruling CLP. The NT Nationals applied for affiliation with the National Party of Australia on 5 February 1987.

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The CLP, associated with the Liberal and National parties in Canberra, had endorsed Grant Tambling as its leading Senate candidate for the next federal election. Tambling had sat with the National Party as the Member for Northern Territory from 1980 until his defeat in 1983. He could be expected to do so again if elected to the Senate, but this would not be the case if the federal party accepted the affiliation of the renegade NT Nationals; he would sit with the Liberals. Ultimately, the affiliation application was rejected.9 The federal parliamentary party reconvened on 17 February and gave Sinclair majority support to continue the Coalition – a decision that was relayed to the ensuing joint party meeting. A press statement was issued with Howard: At today’s Joint Party Meeting Mr Sinclair informed the meeting of the desire of the National Party to continue the existing Coalition with the Liberal Party. The Joint Party Meeting reaffirmed the desire of both Parties to maintain that Coalition and its belief that the maintenance of that Coalition is the most effective instrument to destroy the Hawke Government.10

k The president of the Queensland National Party, Bob Sparkes, ruled his domain with an iron fist. While he had had many arguments with Bjelke-Petersen over the years, the two generally got along well. Now Sparkes, who had been Queensland party president since 1970, was in a dilemma.11 While basically sympathetic to Bjelke-Petersen’s ambitions, he feared his campaign would fly off the rails if it was not harnessed and professionally managed. At present it consisted simply of Bjelke-Petersen shooting from the hip. Sparkes had to find a way of giving the campaign direction without antagonising the premier. Sparkes was fortunate in commanding considerable respect among rank and file Queensland party members; most were prepared to

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accept his recommendations virtually without question. Together with Queensland management committee member and barrister David Russell, he masterminded a complex set of motions to place before the party’s powerful central council, which was to meet at Hervey Bay on 27 February. The motions were read to the 250 delegates. No written copies were circulated. The delegates then voted overwhelmingly in support of what they had just heard. The resolutions began by fully supporting ‘the move by Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen to attain the Prime Ministership’ and committing ‘all members of the National Party in Queensland, Parliamentary and organisation, to this cause which can be appropriately styled Joh for PM for Australia’s sake.’ They authorised the formation of a Joh for PM Committee, with Bjelke-Petersen as chairman and Sparkes his deputy; the appointment of a national coordinator and sub-committees; and use of the existing National Party headquarters and resources in Brisbane. There were three demands regarding the federal Coalition: 1. We request that the National Party Federal Parliamentary Leader, Mr. Sinclair, to immediately withdraw the National Party from the Federal Opposition Coalition because of basic differences in taxation and other philosophies and policies; 2. Failing that we request the Queensland delegation to the next National Party Federal Council meeting to put forward a motion to the effect that the Federal Opposition Coalition be terminated immediately; 3. and failing that, we request that our Queensland National Party Federal Shadow Ministers to immediately withdraw from the Federal Shadow Ministry and all Queensland National Party Federal Parliamentarians who are members of joint policy committees to withdraw from those committees.12 Not everyone supported the resolutions. Ray Braithwaite (Dawson) told the meeting they were ‘a load of crap’– to which he was warned that acceptance of them was a condition of his continued endorsement. Despite this, he and the Dawson delegates voted against the res-

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olutions – just about the only ones to do so. Ultimately, Braithwaite fell into line, realising that he ‘would never have held Dawson as an Independent candidate’.13 Senator Ron Boswell made an impassioned plea not to force a break in the Coalition. The party’s Senate leader, Stan Collard, was deeply concerned, but withheld his views for the time being. Sinclair ignored the Hervey Bay demand to withdraw from the Coalition. His party room had affirmed its support for continuing the arrangement only ten days earlier. However, the Queensland Member for Groom and former Fraser minister, Tom McVeigh, unilaterally withdrew from the Coalition at a party meeting on 17 March, telling Sinclair that while there was no challenge to him, he should resign. The remaining Queenslanders chose to stay in the Coalition pending the outcome of a federal council meeting in Canberra on 27 to 29 March. The federal council would become a central battleground. If Queensland had its motion demanding an end to the Coalition carried, it would effectively control the council and could be expected to move rapidly to make all council decisions constitutionally binding on the federal parliamentary party. Sparkes had argued for several years that this should be the case. If he got his way, the first directive would be one ordering the entire federal parliamentary party out of the Coalition. Even today the federal council is not a large body. In March 1987, there were 42 delegates made up of executive office bearers, state and federal parliamentary representatives and delegates from the affiliated states, Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. There were also five delegates from the associated NT-CLP, but they could not vote on National Party issues.14 Acting on legal advice on voting entitlements, the federal president, Shirley McKerrow, ruled that, as chairman of the meeting, she had a casting vote only, that the treasurer and secretary were not entitled to vote on any issue, and that one Western Australian delegate was ineligible to vote for technical reasons. This meant the number of delegates with a deliberative vote was 38. The numbers fell precariously

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close – Queensland could count on the support of Western Australia, probably more than half of South Australia’s delegates and some from Victoria. It would get no support from New South Wales, a pro-coalition state. There was intense lobbying in the lead-up to the meeting and even, at one point, a suggestion – subsequently dropped – to revamp the defunct Tasmanian party to bring in six more voting delegates. When the council gathered at Canberra’s Lakeside Hotel at 2pm on 27 March, the atmosphere was electric. Bjelke-Petersen arrived just before the opening session. Sparkes told him the federal management committee, which had met in the morning, had determined that he should address the forum at the start of the following day. Bjelke-Petersen went to his suite, where he stayed. Sinclair opened the council with a strong plea for continuing the Coalition: Its benefits, for those we represent, and for Australia, are such that it should only be broken when there is a fundamental difference between the two Parties. In the current political hothouse, with an election inevitable and a double dissolution imminent, changes in our effective working relationship without valid reason will only weaken public support for the National Party and help the Hawke socialists.15

One of Queensland’s arguments against maintaining the Coalition when in Opposition was that it prevented the National Party from releasing its own policies. Sinclair countered this by releasing with his speech a lengthy discussion paper, Federal National Party Policy Objectives, which he said highlighted the party’s ability to put forward its own priorities while remaining in the Coalition.16 While Sinclair was speaking, Bjelke-Petersen’s press secretary, Ken Crooke, began briefing journalists in the hotel foyer. He said Queensland would support the thrust of a South Australian motion which endorsed the principle of not being in Coalition in Opposition, but which left the decision on whether or when to break it in the hands

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of the federal parliamentary party. He defended the position on the grounds that, with the possibility of a federal election being called as early as 9 May – sparked by the government having withdrawn its bill of rights legislation at the end of 1986 because of Senate opposition, and by the imminent second rejection by the Senate of its Australia Card national identity system – there was sense in not implementing the Hervey Bay resolutions immediately.17 The Australia Card Bill would go to the vote again in the Senate on 2 April and it was obvious the Coalition would successfully block it for a second time, with Australian Democrats’ support. The media was speculating that this would lead Hawke to seek an early double dissolution election. In the meantime, in a last-ditch attempt to reach a compromise, former minister and party heavyweight Peter Nixon had been secretly brought to Canberra by McKerrow to negotiate between Sinclair and Bjelke-Petersen. Nixon, who had a reasonable relationship with the Queensland premier, arrived at the Lakeside on Friday afternoon and went to see him: ‘I was the only one he’d talk to. I tried to reason with him, explain to him that he could never become Prime Minister unless he was a Liberal, and that there was no guarantee that he would even become leader of the National Party.’18 Sinclair, Sparkes, Nixon and McKerrow met late into Friday night in McKerrow’s hotel suite. They developed a set of objectives aimed at achieving the defeat of the Hawke government, the maintenance of a united National Party, the use of the Joh factor in the campaign, and the acceptance or recognition of each state organisation’s rights and powers. Early next morning, Nixon gave Sinclair and Sparkes a typed copy for their consideration and, if acceptable, signature. Both signed and Nixon, also with a signed copy, quietly returned to Melbourne on a breakfast flight, believing he had ‘got within an ace’ of reaching peace with Bjelke-Petersen. But Bjelke-Petersen did not buckle. He appeared at the council’s morning session and, with arms outstretched, declared: ‘I have some very good news for you today – the Coalition is finished. I told you that quite a long time ago and I remind you of it again today. And

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anyone who thinks otherwise, of course, has got his head in the sand.’ He said the decisions the federal council made were ones that it had a right to make: ‘Whatever, you make them and that’s your responsibility and so on. But I tell you it won’t make one iota of difference, as I’ve said in the media so often, to what I do in the interests of Australia.’19 He then left and flew back to Brisbane. A Queensland urgency motion, welcoming the fact that the state premier would promote sound policies to achieve national recovery and seek a federal seat at the forthcoming election, was amended by New South Wales to also require that any Bjelke-Petersen campaign be based on National Party policies and fall within the state and federal constitutions of the party. The objective was to contain Bjelke-Petersen’s future actions and prevent him from standing ‘Joh’ candidates against endorsed party candidates, particularly beyond Queensland. The amended motion was carried. The South Australian motion on the Coalition was slightly modified, so the resolution read: That this Council supports the principle of the National Party being a separate identity whilst in Opposition but recognises that there are problems in an election year. Therefore the final decision and timing as to whether and when the National Party withdraws from the Coalition shall be left to the Federal Parliamentary National Party.

A Western Australian motion, ‘that the National Party does not enter into an agreement of Coalition in Opposition’, was carried after its mover, the state parliamentary leader, Hendy Cowan, explained that it was not aimed at existing arrangements, but was intended as a principle for the future. 20 These outcomes amounted to a significant retreat by Queensland from the Hervey Bay requirement that its delegation put a motion to the federal council ‘that the Federal Coalition be terminated immediately’. The Queenslanders put forward a motion, which was carried,

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‘requesting the Parliamentary wing to present its policies as National Party policies only’. Two other significant policy motions, endorsing a commitment to a single 25-cents-in-the-dollar flat tax with no other broad-based consumer tax, and calling for a toughening of Australia’s industrial laws – both sponsored by Queensland – were also carried. The Bjelke-Petersen campaign, now less ambitiously called ‘Joh for Canberra’, rather than ‘Joh for PM’, would subsequently use these resolutions to criticise Sinclair for not upholding the wishes of the party. Another critical issue was the election of the federal president. McKerrow, who had been re-elected every year since taking up the position in 1981, had decided not to seek another term. There were two nominees – the senior federal vice-president and Queensland vice-president, Charles Holm, a supporter of Joh and Sparkes, and the immediate past-president of the Victorian party, Stuart McDonald. The election of a Queenslander to the top position in the federal organisation would be a powerful boost to the Joh campaign. Early in the New Year, before relations turned nasty, Sinclair had been happy to support Holm, thinking it was logical for the man who had been the senior federal vice-president for several years to progress to the presidency. That was not the case now. Sinclair was delighted when McDonald won the ballot with 27 votes to Holm’s 17.

k Hawke appeared to scotch speculation of an early election in a statement on 1 April saying he had decided ‘that the election will be held towards the end of this year, or early next year’.21 The irony of the statement being released on April Fools’ Day might have been lost on Sparkes, who replied that as there was not likely to be an early election the Queensland management committee, due to meet in Brisbane on 10 April, would probably endorse the withdrawal of all Queensland federal politicians from the Coalition.22 This is what happened, despite the federal council’s resolution to leave the matter in the hands of the federal parliamentary party. Sinclair’s reaction was bitter. He told jour-

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nalists in Wangaratta, where he was attending the Victorian party’s annual conference: ‘It’s a very sad day for democracy when Federal Senators and Members find themselves in a position where they have no choice but to accept the dictates of their organisation.’ 23 Braithwaite and Collard reluctantly acceded to the instruction and resigned their shadow portfolios. Other Queensland members and senators withdrew from Coalition policy committees and all agreed not to attend any Coalition or joint party meetings. The Queensland organisation did little to nurture their enthusiasm. Ian Cameron, the forthright and outspoken member for the vast southwest seat of Maranoa since 1980, a farmer and grazier and, up to now, supporter of the Joh campaign, was threatened with disendorsement or even expulsion from the party for leaking the substance of the Hervey Bay resolutions to the media. The resolutions had been discussed at the state’s management committee the day before they went to central council. Cameron had been at the meeting. Sparkes insisted that nobody should brief the media on the discussions. Cameron did, telling newsmen the committee had passed a motion which effectively called on the federal party to split from the Coalition and which he expected would be ratified by central council the following day.24 As a result, the Queensland party sent him a letter headed ‘RE: YOUR BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY’, advising that the management committee would consider the matter on 10 April.25 Cameron was furious at the implied predetermination of his guilt. The media suggested he was to become the sacrificial lamb that would take Bjelke-Petersen into federal parliament.26 Cameron broke from the ranks, saying he might defy his organisation and return to the Coalition, adding that ‘if he [Bjelke-Petersen] is desperate to go to Canberra, he should take on the ALP’.27 The Maranoa MP was eventually let off with a warning. His ultimate judgment on the Joh campaign was that it had been ‘idiotic’.28 Howard and Sinclair spent four days developing a new agreement to take into account the divisions in the Coalition. They outlined the arrangements to a meeting of the shadow ministry at Lilydale, near

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Melbourne, on 14 April and received endorsement for them. Released at a joint news conference in Sydney the following day, the agreement remains a unique document in the context of Coalition arrangements.29 Howard worked on a reshuffled front bench over the Easter weekend, making several changes and replacing Braithwaite and Collard with Liberals, and took the gamble of announcing it on 21 April – a week before the agreement was to be considered by a full meeting of the parliamentary National Party. He believed that to delay the announcement until after the party meeting would imply admission of his own lack of confidence in the future of the arrangements. In the new shadow ministry, Sinclair, previously the Opposition’s defence spokesman, took over trade from Braithwaite, while the other National Party shadows kept their previous responsibilities: Hunt, primary industry; Lloyd, transport and aviation; Blunt, social security; and Tim Fischer (Farrer, New South Wales) veterans’ affairs. Sinclair was not comfortable with the agreement. He warned Howard that he expected opposition from the National Party to two clauses stipulating that regular meetings of the Coalition Nationals would ‘replace normal meetings of the full Parliamentary National Party’, and that full meetings of the parliamentary party would ‘only be held in special cases, e.g.: internal Party ballots.’ He told Howard the clauses were directed at National Party affairs and were not relevant to the Coalition agreement. Under intense pressure from a growing number of Liberals to simply walk away from the rabble of the National Party, Howard refused any further compromise. Sinclair tried to shore up the numbers in the party room. If he could hold the New South Wales and Victorian parliamentarians, the agreement would scrape through. If he lost just one of those votes, the party room would be deadlocked. He decided to call the southern politicians together on 27 April, to explain that the party could live with the conditions as their wording was sufficiently broad to allow flexibility. He could not muster the necessary support. Cowan, Robinson and Peter Fisher (Mallee, Victoria), among others, were concerned that the conditions threatened the autonomy of the party.

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Predictably, therefore, the party meeting on 28 April rejected the deal. A clear majority of members saw its restrictions as the Liberal Party trying to muzzle the Nationals and dictate what they could and could not do. Despite explaining the difficulties he had faced in his negotiations with Howard, many members remained surprised that Sinclair had even countenanced the arrangement, believing he had put preservation of the Coalition ahead of the interests of the party. It seemed he was prepared to be too accommodating to the dictates of the Liberals. It was the catalyst that ultimately led to his downfall as leader two years later. Sinclair reported the National Party position to Howard just before 2pm. The two agreed to meet after Question Time to see if any compromise could be reached, even though they both knew the chances were now extremely slim. They met on and off throughout the afternoon. A scheduled dinner meeting of the leaders’ group at the Commonwealth Club was cancelled.30 Sinclair called the party room together to advise of the impasse. Significantly, he also received party room endorsement as leader. At 8.30pm, Howard announced the end of the Coalition. Sinclair said its collapse was a matter for ‘deep regret’: ‘I believe the points I took to John Howard tonight were right for both Parties to be able to operate as individual identities. The National Party will work to see the end of the Hawke Government. We have no greater goal than that.’ 31 The Coalition agreement had lasted just 13 days and the reshuffled shadow ministry one week. Moreover, the agreement was never consummated as the National Party room never accepted it. Coalition between the Liberal and Country/National parties had endured since 1949, with the single interruption, agreed between then leaders Anthony and Snedden, of 17 months between December 1972 and May 1974, when the parties were in Opposition to the Whitlam government. This latest agreement, which had taken hours to develop, was finally killed almost in the blink of an eye. Sharp was in Sinclair’s office when Howard came in and said the Coalition had to break: ‘The conversation took less than two minutes.’ 32

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These were torrid times within the parliamentary National Party. Even though MPs got on with the job of representing their electorates, attending local functions and bringing representations to Canberra, the party room was divided and leaking like a sieve. Noel Hicks said his role as chief whip became ‘almost impossible’ as leaks ‘were reported almost verbatim in the next day’s newspapers’. They undermined confidence and trust. The party had always been respected by the press gallery and envied by both the Liberal and Labor parties for its ability to maintain confidentiality of its affairs, beyond those matters that were agreed should be made public, usually by the leader. Not any more. Hicks became so concerned that he suggested to Sinclair the party room should be swept for listening devices: Ian, very reluctantly, agreed and suggested I speak quietly to the relevant authorities within the parliament to have the search carried out. He added that if the information leaked that we were doing this, as a party we could be somewhat embarrassed. I was unaware that, for the job to be done, more than a few people within the parliament had to be consulted. Not surprisingly, next morning in the press was a headline along the lines ‘National Party Room searched for listening devices’! 33

Flo Bjelke-Petersen was in a difficult position. She backed her husband, although she was not convinced he should switch to federal politics: ‘I always believed he should have stayed in Queensland where he’d won the state election so well, but he was being pushed all the time.’ Nonetheless, she supported the thrust of what he was trying to achieve and found her parliamentary colleagues generally understanding: ‘I worked my way through it alright. Ian Sinclair treated me alright, although he and John Howard didn’t like it at all.’ 34

k Sinclair had to reshape his team so that it could credibly monitor the

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activities of both the formal Liberal Opposition as well as the government. He spent a sleepless night, scribbling on bits of paper, drafting and redrafting a complex arrangement of portfolio committees, drawing on his experience of the non-coalition Snedden-Anthony arrangements. At 8.30 on the morning of 29 April he called the National Party executive to his office: former shadow ministers Hunt, Blunt, Fischer, Braithwaite, Collard and Lloyd; the chief whip, Hicks; and Cameron, whom he had appointed as his parliamentary secretary. He told them he would maintain the executive with the addition of two others, Peter McGauran (Gippsland, Victoria) and Bob Katter senior (Kennedy, Queensland), making a total of 11, including himself.35 Each of the previous shadow ministers would be the chairman of a committee of senators and members responsible for a group of portfolio areas. The committees would have to scrutinise government legislation and develop National Party responses to it; monitor government and Liberal Party statements in its area of responsibility; plan counter statements and questions for parliament; and develop National Party policy. The senators would also have to monitor the activities of both sides in the Senate and keep their lower house colleagues up to date on all developments. It was going to be an almost impossible task. Each of the party’s 26 members and senators would have several jobs. Sinclair argued that this was the only way the party could hope to cover the activities of 29 government ministries and be seen as a viable third force in the parliament. With the endorsement of his executive, the party room accepted the arrangements and Sinclair announced them on 30 April. He was keen to have them in the public domain ahead of Howard’s announcement of an all Liberal shadow front bench, and so give the appearance of a party that knew its way forward despite the difficulties. He trumped Howard by a day. The Liberal Opposition was announced on 1 May.36 Bjelke-Petersen reacted by telling The Sydney Morning Herald ‘we’ve changed the direction of the National Party. I will be putting forward the policies and those are the ones which will be on the front

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pages across the whole nation’. In The Age he said he would deliver the National Party election policy: ‘I will deliver that policy speech. I will draft it.’ Sinclair replied that ‘the only person who will deliver the policy speech for the next election will be the Federal Parliamentary Leader’.37

k Hawke hosted a premiers’ conference in Canberra on 25 May, at the end of which he warmly wished Bjelke-Petersen a successful trip to the United States to promote World Expo, to be held in Brisbane in 1988. The Queensland premier flew out that evening. Two days later, with Bjelke-Petersen barely on the ground in Los Angeles, Hawke announced a double dissolution election for 11 July – giving plenty of time for the Nationals to further implode. Bjelke-Petersen was caught off-guard. He abandoned his trip to rush back to Brisbane as his campaigners scrambled to find ‘Joh’ candidates. Several high-profile prospects were mentioned in the media: yacht designer Ben Lexcen; Mudginberri abattoir owner Jay Pendarvis; businessmen John Leard and Charles Copeman; political commentator Katharine West; Budget Rent-a-Car boss Bob Ansett; electronics whiz Dick Smith; and National Farmers’ Federation president Ian McLachlan. If any were approached – McLachlan certainly was – they all declined. The Joh campaign all but collapsed, together with any lingering prospect he had of making the switch from state to federal politics.38 McVeigh’s safe seat of Groom had been tagged as another possibility for Bjelke-Petersen: ‘If Ian McLachlan had come on side, Joh would have taken my seat. But when McLachlan said “no go”, it all fell apart.’ The popular theory was that McVeigh would vacate his seat and be appointed Queensland’s agent-general in London. He did resign, in February 1988, and he was given the London post, but he said it was not related to the Joh for Canberra campaign: ‘Joh had plagued me for 12 months before that to resign and become Agent-General.’39 On 3 June, at the suggestion of Sparkes, Howard flew to Brisbane

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for a meeting with Bjelke-Petersen, after which two press releases were issued – a joint statement announcing that the two would work together to defeat Hawke and another from Bjelke-Petersen saying he would not seek a federal seat. Sinclair was not involved at all, highlighting the depth of the bitterness between him and the Queenslanders. Crooke said Howard was ‘ecstatic’ at the development and ‘wouldn’t leave the office until he knew the [Bjelke-Petersen] press release had been issued – he wanted to be convinced it had really happened’.40 Bjelke-Petersen said he would continue to campaign in support of his flat tax policy and have Joh candidates running in House of Representatives and Senate seats around Australia. He was unrepentant about his campaign: ‘I have made them [Howard and Sinclair] sit up, I have made them move faster than a bee in a bottle and they have gone all over the place and they have changed their direction, they have changed their policies.’ 41 Flo Bjelke-Petersen was pleased her husband had decided not to run for Canberra. She indicated one reason he changed his mind was because much of the promised financial backing was not forthcoming – ‘the money dried up’.42 The Queenslanders had earlier engaged the former head of the Commonwealth Treasury, John Stone, to develop their flat tax policy.

Divided campaign: Joh’s Nationals bumper stickers were circulated to Joh-supporting Independent candidates around Australia (The Nationals federal secretary)

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Released on 13 June, it was an attractive package, certainly one which Sinclair could not reject out of hand. Its key proposals were for a 25 per cent single rate of tax, to be phased in over a period of 19 months; a reduction in the company tax rate from 49 to 25 per cent by July 1990; a special ‘bonus for working’ tax rate of 23 per cent for any increases in taxable income from one year to the next; and a balanced budget by 1989–90. Overall, it would cost $4.64 billion in the current tax year of 1987–88, $6.78 billion the following year and $6.70 billion by 1989–90. The cost would be met by cutting government spending and returning responsibility for a whole range of functions to the states, including health, education, Aboriginal affairs, housing, industry and technology, tourism, sport and recreation, arts, heritage and environment, local government, welfare, community services, and transport. Many grassroots National Party members had long believed such a policy should be championed by the party. Sinclair had to tread a fine line in his election policy speech, delivered during the New South Wales party’s annual general conference on 21 June in the Hunter Valley town of Cessnock. He picked up much of the Stone policy, while also supporting Howard’s economic and tax policies. He got around the apparent contradiction by promising the Stone initiatives would be National Party objectives for ongoing reform: As a first step to major tax reform and in light of the consideration given to National Party concerns in the tax policy of the Leader of the Liberal Party, Mr John Howard, the National Party will support his programme, both for expenditure savings and immediate tax reform. … However, the Party does not see this as the end of tax reform, nor of expenditure cuts. We will seek further changes in due course. The corporate [tax] rate must be reduced to the maximum personal rate. Further personal and corporate tax reductions should then be pursued so that the maximum rate of tax would be no more than 25 cents in the dollar.

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Sinclair concluded by commenting on internal party divisions: Over the last few months, divisions among those who share our beliefs in the urgent need for a new national direction for Australia have gained a lot of media attention. That these differences have been public rather than private does not affect the essential strength of the National Party around Australia. The Party has always been a loose federation of strong State organisations. However, the majority of those Senators and Members elected on July 11 alone will determine our Parliamentary attitude in government. To do otherwise opens the path to corruption, abuse and ultimately, tyranny.43

The question now was how would the Queenslanders react? Sparkes made some comments to The Australian, published in the newspaper the following day, in which he forecast Sinclair’s ‘two bob each way’ policy would be thrown out by a majority vote of the parliamentary party immediately after the election. He accused Sinclair of maintaining deep divisions by embracing the Liberals’ tax policy in defiance of the party’s federal council and ‘all States except New South Wales’. The story wasn’t widely taken up by the rest of the media, largely because Sparkes put out a written statement later that day. This was more conciliatory: The National Party in Queensland says today’s Sinclair tax statement clears the way for clear-cut choice for voters on July 11 – between more ALP deficit budgeting or a tax relief-driven national recovery under the Coalition. Nationals around Australia will be spurred on by Mr Sinclair’s statement, just as all Australians are being excited by the economic recovery programme spelt out in the 25 cents in the dollar National Party tax policy.44

Even Bjelke-Petersen gave some credit: ‘I am pleased Mr Sinclair has picked up the threads of our 25 per cent tax policy and our industrial

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To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

Taxing times for the party leader: Ian Sinclair leaves the Cessnock Town Hall after delivering his election policy speech, 21 June 1987 (The Nationals – NSW)

relations policy. He seems to be picking up our threads a bit and, at last, starting to follow our lead. I guess you could say he’s finally seen the light to some degree.’ 45 Problems persisted. Sinclair’s speech, which was released with an accompanying 36-page policy summary booklet under the slogan For Australia, had embraced the Liberals’ commitment to abolish Labor’s assets test, which was not a part of the Stone tax policy. The BjelkePetersen campaign tried to block any reference to this promise being circulated to candidates in Queensland. Sinclair ordered pamphlets supporting the policy to be sent to all Queensland candidates and recorded radio commercials that were booked on Queensland regional stations by the federal secretariat.

k Sparkes told the federal management committee on 27 March 1987 there was ‘no intention on our [Queensland National Party] part to

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run candidates against sitting National Party members anywhere – it’s unfortunate Joh’s been saying otherwise’. He gave a further assurance to federal management on 15 April: ‘We won’t be running against them [sitting National MPs].’ Yet, in New South Wales, Joh Independent candidates stood against Sinclair, deputy leader Hunt, the Member for Parkes, Michael Cobb, and the Liberal Member for Hume, Wal Fife. They opposed Lloyd and Fisher in Victoria and the endorsed National Party candidate for Indi.46 Bjelke-Petersen wanted to run a separate Joh Nationals Senate ticket in New South Wales, but it did not eventuate because no candidates lodged nominations by the deadline of 18 June. Joh Senate teams did run in Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia, while in the Northern Territory, the NT Nationals, strongly backed by Bjelke-Petersen, undermined the campaign by the CLP. Before the Joh campaign, the Hawke government was losing popularity, especially in country Australia, for its deregulatory and openmarket policies, and initiatives such as the Australia Card. There were real prospects the Nationals could hold all existing seats and win Leichhardt, Herbert and Rankin in Queensland, Hunter and Calare in New South Wales, and Bendigo in Victoria. It was not beyond the realm of possibility they could win Capricornia in Queensland, EdenMonaro in New South Wales and McMillan in Victoria. The Joh campaign confused the electorate and fragmented the non-Labor vote. Even in Queensland many supporters did not know where their National Party candidate stood – for Joh, or for Sinclair? For the Joh tax policy or some other policy? For the Coalition or against it? There were several so-called ‘National Party’ campaigns running at once – the Joh campaign, Sinclair campaign, Independent Joh campaigns – all using different logos and slogans. It was amazing the party did not suffer more than it did. Labor was returned with 86 seats to the Coalition’s 62, giving it a majority of 24, only one less than in 1983.47 Hawke became the first Labor prime minister to achieve a third term and would be Prime Minister during the 1988 bicentenary celebrations, which would include the official opening by the Queen of the

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new Parliament House in Canberra in May – a milestone in Australian political history. The National Party lost its two most marginal seats, Hinkler and Fisher, both in Queensland, to Labor, but offset this by winning a Senate seat in Victoria, with Julian McGauran, and having the Northern Territory’s newly elected CLP senator, Grant Tambling, sitting in Canberra as a National. Its overall numbers remained unchanged at 26 – 19 in the House of Representatives and seven in the Senate. Joh Independents won no seats in either house and Bjelke-Petersensupporting National Party candidates running in all lower house seats in Western Australia and South Australia were annihilated. Joh Independents in New England and Gwydir won 6.64 per cent and 5.88 per cent of the primary vote respectively, but both Sinclair and Hunt were re-elected without being taken to preferences.48 The CLP lost its lower house seat to the ALP, mainly because a large proportion of NT Nationals preferences went to Labor. Also new to the Senate was John Stone, who had been preselected to the number two position on the Queensland Nationals’ Senate ticket after the sitting senator and party Senate leader, Stan Collard, was dumped for making pro-Coalition statements. Collard, a train driver before entering the Senate in 1975, was the party’s whip and deputy leader in the upper house from 1981–85, before being elected its leader. In anticipation of a half Senate election, he had been re-endorsed at the Queensland central council meeting at Hervey Bay, but relegated from the top position to second on the ticket to make way for Flo Bjelke-Petersen. It was still a comfortably winnable position. While initially keeping his concerns to himself about the same central council’s decision to endorse the Joh campaign, he soon aired his doubts, saying he did not think the campaign was ‘going anywhere’.49 While he heeded the 10 April instruction to quit the shadow ministry, he bemoaned the subsequent collapse of the Coalition as a ‘tragedy’, adding ‘I think the public always exacts retribution from divided parties’.50 Collard had denounced Hervey Bay, for which he had to be punished.

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The opportunity came when Hawke announced a double dissolution election. The Queensland organisation decided to re-open all nominations for an enlarged Senate ticket. Collard, one of 14 candidates who nominated for eight positions, half expected to be dropped another notch down the ticket, but was shattered when the central council, meeting in Brisbane on 13 June, threw him off the ticket entirely: ‘The only emotion I am allowing myself is disappointment’.51 Stone won the number two spot and subsequent election to parliament.

k Sparkes was asked by the Channel 9 current affairs program, Willesee, on 16 March 1987 what he would say if the price of internal fighting meant further success for the Labor Party, to which he replied: ‘If the price is further success for Labor, then we’ve made a very serious mistake. We’ve gambled and the gamble has not come off.’ There was no admission of mistakes now, even though two National Party seats had been lost in his state. Instead, he said he would ask John Stone to consider contesting the parliamentary leadership because he was probably the most talented member of the parliamentary party and because Sinclair was ‘tarnished’.52 The only blame Joh would apportion to himself was that he ‘didn’t continue to go [to Canberra] myself’.53 Sinclair had no doubt where the blame lay, saying Bjelke-Petersen was the cause of the early election and ‘he and nobody else has to accept responsibility for that defeat’.54 McVeigh saw positives in the Joh campaign, pointing to the fact that at the first post-election party meeting, Sinclair had invited two prospective Joh Independent senators, one each from South and Western Australia, to attend: ‘They attended because it was likely that they were going to be elected senators. In the final analysis, they weren’t. But they attended the party meeting. Sinclair, quite rightly, and agreed by us, didn’t allow them to vote. But we thought they were going to get elected – hadn’t happened for years [in those states]. So it wasn’t all negative.’55

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On a lighter note, Sinclair in 1984 had ‘embedded’ the Wombat Trail by having a special tie designed for presentation to the reporters and news crews who accompanied his campaign. On a plain coloured background, the tie featured a large gold wombat, lying on its back clutching a can of beer. It was kitsch in the extreme, but the presentations of the second issue in 1987 (on a different coloured background) with a few drinks were an enjoyable distraction from the hurly-burly of this particular campaign.

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Tentatively back to Coalition

17: Tentatively back to Coalition

Within days of the election, Sparkes received lengthy letters from Queensland MPs Katter and Braithwaite criticising the Joh campaign. While both had gone along with the edicts of the state central council, Sparkes could now see that they did so with grave reservations. Braithwaite had spoken out against the campaign at the original Hervey Bay meeting, and privately to Sparkes on later occasions. Now he said it was his duty ‘to express to you my concern, or perhaps, disgust, at what has happened within the Party, particularly over the last six months’. He said he would no longer receive instruction from the Queensland executive, management or central council if he believed it to be ‘in conflict with, or not in the best interests of, National Party members or my constituents in Dawson, or the State or Federal organisations’.1 The Katter letter was similar. He had adhered to Hervey Bay ‘because I had no option’, and described the decision to break the Coalition as ‘ill-advised’. His strongest condemnation was reserved for the dumping of Collard: ‘We are all aware of the organised move against him at Hervey Bay, and fortunately commonsense prevailed there, but

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To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

Victim of schism: Senator Stan Collard was dumped from the Queensland National Party’s ticket for supporting the Coalition (Australian Information Service/Auspic)

the relentless determination to throw him on the scrap heap persisted, and an act of supreme political misjudgement was perpetrated’.2 Sparkes had told the ABC on 17 June that Collard was dumped because the central council ‘took the view that on the basis of the usual criteria of commitment to party solidarity, ability to contribute in the Parliament, Stan didn’t measure up as well as those that were put on the ticket ahead of him’.3 The accusation hurt Collard. He asked the parliamentary library to compile details of attendances, votes in divisions, speeches made and questions asked by National Party senators in the life of the 34th parliament. It showed he had been present

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on more days, attended more divisions, asked more questions without notice and made more speeches than any of his colleagues. This was not altogether surprising, as he was the party leader in the Senate. But the statistics disproved the claim of his ‘not measuring up’.4 After the election, he put his side of the story in a final newsletter to party branches across Queensland: The reasons for my dumping have been officially and unofficially put down to lack of effort, treachery and failure to honour undertakings given at Hervey Bay. No one who has known me over my twelve years of Parliamentary service could say I did not put in the required effort – and more! The charge that I failed to honour agreements at Hervey Bay is false. I undertook to resign my Shadow Ministry and not to attend joint party meetings with the Liberals if the Party required I should do so. … The charge of treachery is equally untrue. … Anyone who cares to think about it will soon realise that what I did could not have been in self interest. In fact, the opposite is true.5

k Ralph Hunt announced on 20 July that he would not re-contest the deputy leadership, arguing that it was ‘not only timely but wise to make way for younger members to be given experience in positions of responsibility’.6 Sinclair tried to dissuade him, to no avail. The two had been colleagues in the cabinet and friends, and shared extensive parliamentary experience. As deputy, Hunt was a steadying influence on the party room. Sinclair called the party meeting for 23 July, having deferred it because of uncertainty over the outcome of the Senate election. He was re-elected leader, but not before Braithwaite challenged him. Braithwaite believed it was important for the party room to have a choice. He also felt Sinclair had not given an adequate indication of

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the directions he intended to take the party in the wake of the Joh experience. He had no illusion of beating Sinclair, but wanted to impress upon him the party room’s general desire for new ideas and greater cohesion. Braithwaite won six of the party room’s 26 votes – not threatening, but still a warning to Sinclair of an undercurrent of dissatisfaction that he needed to address.7 The contest for the deputy leadership provided a Melbourne Cup field of candidates – Bruce Lloyd, John Stone, Charles Blunt, Tim Fischer, Noel Hicks, Ian Robinson, and Peter McGauran. Contrary to speculation, John Sharp, identified by the media as a likely winner, did not run. In the exhaustive ballot, Lloyd won the position. The surprise runner-up was the newly elected Stone. Sinclair and Hunt wanted a deputy who was a proven coalitionist. Lloyd had such qualities. He had experience, both in the parliamentary party, where he had been a member since 1971, and in the Victorian organisation, where he had served as a state president. Sinclair suggested the method of electing the party’s Senate positions of leader, deputy and whip be by a ballot of the entire party room. Up to now the senators alone elected their office bearers. Sinclair wanted the change because as long as Queensland held the majority representation in the party’s Senate team it could almost certainly ensure outcomes it wanted, particularly if the Queensland senators accepted direction from their state organisation. Sinclair’s bid failed to win party room endorsement. The senators deferred their elections until all Senate results were declared. By contrast, the leader did win the unanimous support of his party room to begin discussions with Howard on reforming the Coalition. He was, however, told not to reach any decisions before reporting back. In view of the resolution of the federal council that the party ‘does not enter into an agreement of [future] Coalition in Opposition’, Sinclair was also asked to consult the party organisation. His position was strengthened the following morning when Cameron told the ABC that the election results had ‘proved to us conclusively that it’s wise for us to work together in Coalition’.8

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Sinclair had an initial meeting with Howard in Sydney that day, following which he asked the federal president, McDonald, to convene a meeting of the federal management committee. This was held in Sydney on 28 July. Queensland was unrepresented, saying its delegates would be unable to attend a federal meeting until after the Queensland management committee had met in three days’ time and also arguing, with some justification, that it was inappropriate for federal management to be discussing the election result when the Senate result in Queensland was still unknown. There were apologies from four other delegates and, as the party room had deferred the election of a Senate leader there was no such person to invite. Seven of the committee’s normal strength of 14 – one more than required for a quorum – assembled in Sydney.9 Sinclair briefed the meeting on the party room’s resolution on Coalition and his initial talks with Howard. He said he was not seeking management’s endorsement of a return to Coalition, but rather its agreement to the continued autonomy of the parliamentary party. Unbeknown to delegates, he had brought Nixon back into the act for private negotiations with Sparkes. Nixon’s brief was to find out what Sparkes would do if a majority of the party room voted to return to Coalition. Nixon was able to give to Sinclair word for word the assurances Sparkes had given him. Sinclair used them to the letter in forming two of four motions that he put to the management committee: 1. That Federal Management confirms the traditional autonomy of the Federal Parliamentary Party. 2. That should the majority of the Parliamentary Party opt to go back into Coalition with the Liberal Party, so be it. 3. That Federal Management has no reason to believe that State Management of any affiliated branch of the National Party will cause Senators or Members any problems if the Parliamentarians decide to go back into Coalition. 4. That Federal Management recommend to Federal Council [due to

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meet from 15–18 October] that it endorses the above resolutions as the view of the Federal Council. The wording of the second and third motions had come from Sparkes, via his conversation with Nixon. The first, third and fourth motions were carried unanimously, while the second was carried with one opponent, John Paterson, of Western Australia.10 It was a significant outcome for Sinclair. He could report to Howard and his party room that the way was substantially clear, from an organisational point of view, to reform the Coalition. If Sparkes or the Queenslanders tried to argue differently, they could be embarrassed by the revelation that the wording of two of the key management resolutions was precisely that which Sparkes had given. Sinclair had further talks with Howard the following day and called another party meeting in Sydney the day after that, 30 July. Twenty-four of the party’s 26 senators and members attended. Katter had electorate commitments and Cowan was overseas. Sinclair put forward seven motions detailing how the party might work in Coalition and reaffirming the parliamentary party’s autonomy and right to make decisions, despite the views of state organisations. While the voting numbers changed on some of the motions, with opponents being Queensland members and/or senators, all were carried with commanding majorities. The two key motions on Coalition were: 1. That the Parliamentary National Party believes the most effective way to defeat the Labor Government is to work co-operatively with the Liberal Party in Coalition [carried by 20 votes to 4]; and 2. That the Parliamentary National Party enter into a Coalition in Opposition in the Federal Parliament with the Parliamentary Liberal Party, with a view to forming a Coalition Government after the next federal election [carried by 19 votes to 5]. Despite this, it was not going to be easy to convince the Liberals that a lasting Coalition could be guaranteed, even though Sparkes confirmed after a 10-hour meeting of the Queensland management committee on 31 July that his organisation would not be directing its parlia-

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mentary members: ‘In the final analysis, we’re prepared to allow our parliamentary members to make the decision [on Coalition].’11 Armed with this and the resolutions from the parliamentary National Party, Howard was able to persuade his party room that an ‘honourable’ Coalition could be resumed. In a letter to Sinclair, he detailed five conditions for the resumption of joint arrangements, the second of which prompted a renewed howl of opposition from several areas of the National Party: There will be joint Coalition policies both in relation to Government legislation and issues generally. It will be the obligation of each member of our Parties to support and advocate Coalition policy both inside the Parliament and elsewhere. No member of either Party shall advocate in the name of his or her Party policies in any area which differ in substance from Coalition policy.12

Sinclair believed this was acceptable because another clause enabled each party to preserve its ‘independent identity, meeting procedures, platforms, and organisational policy process’. He and Howard completed their shadow ministerial arrangements, with Howard announcing the new Opposition front bench on 14 August, made up of 30 members, eight of whom were from the National Party – Sinclair became spokesman on trade and resources; Lloyd, primary industry; Stone, finance; Blunt, family and community services and assisting the leader of the National Party; Braithwaite, territories; Sharp, tourism and sport and recreation; Cameron, local government; and Fischer, veterans’ affairs.13 The inclusion of three Queenslanders was questioned by some who wondered why the state party was being rewarded after the chaos and pain it had caused. Sinclair’s point of view was that he was trying to heal the rifts caused by the Joh campaign, reunite his parliamentary team, and respond to the Braithwaite leadership challenge. Stone’s rapid rise did not end with his appointment to the shadow

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ministry. The National Party senators finally met to elect their leaders in Sydney on 21 August. Ron Boswell was tipped as the likely winner, but ultimately did not contest the position – apparently at the suggestion of Sparkes. This cleared the way for Stone. Flo Bjelke-Petersen was elected deputy and, significantly, the CLP’s Grant Tambling, whip. Sheil had been the whip in the previous parliament. By electing Tambling, the senators, especially the four from Queensland, acknowledged the association of the CLP with the federal party, making it all the more difficult for anyone to continue to argue for the affiliation of the NT Nationals with the federal organisation. Stone’s star rose higher a month later when, with the assistance of a retired public servant, Ewart Smith, he uncovered a fatal flaw in Labor’s Australia Card legislation, resulting in the government announcing on 28 September that it would not proceed with the proposal.

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The Nixon Report

18: The Nixon Report

The federal council of the National Party, usually an annual affair, met twice in 1987. The first meeting, in March, had been the previous year’s gathering, which had been postponed because of the Queensland election. It had endorsed the principle of not being in coalition in Opposition, yet the alliance with the Liberal Party had been reformed, albeit with the sanction of the federal management committee. It was a situation with the potential to make the second council meeting, in October, an explosive affair. Seven motions on the agenda had the potential to be divisive if they went forward for debate. They covered coalition, the autonomy of the parliamentary party, policy formulation, separation of the roles of the parliamentary and organisational leaders, and reviewing the party’s federal constitution. A possible way of avoiding open disagreement would be for the council to establish a special committee to assess and report on the party’s future. The motions could then be referred to such a committee and become part of its terms of reference, thereby taking them off the council’s agenda. The party had never conducted such a comprehensive review before and this could

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provide the basis for a positive new era. The council’s agreement to the idea would depend on the committee’s membership. It had to be acceptable to all states, otherwise it would be doomed. McDonald got Sinclair’s agreement to the concept and was then successful in asking Nixon to chair the committee. He judged there would be no opposition to Nixon, as he had an intimate understanding of the party at all levels and was respected by the party nationally. The federal parliamentary party would have to be represented. McDonald saw Hunt as the best choice. Just retired as deputy leader, he was a former cabinet minister and a former federal president. Being from New South Wales, where he had been the party’s chairman from 1964–69, Hunt would be acceptable to that state and able to reflect its views. He would also be representative of the interests of the parliamentary party.1 Queensland would clearly have to be represented. Sparkes favoured Charles Holm. McDonald preferred David Russell, who was a QC, which could prove useful for constitutional considerations. The interests of the smaller states, South Australia and Western Australia, had to be taken into account. McDonald suggested the president of the Western Australian party, John Paterson. Paterson would also be acceptable to Queensland, as he had been an enthusiastic proponent of breaking the Coalition and had welcomed Joh candidates running in Western Australia in the election. The proposed review committee structure and draft terms of reference were put before the federal management committee on the morning of 16 October. The committee agreed, with compromise being reached to recommend to the federal council that Holm and McDonald be appointed ex-officio members. The proposal was circulated to the federal council that afternoon, with debate scheduled for the next morning to give delegates time to consider it. The council accepted the proposal, although it did not support the appointment of ex-officio members. The committee’s report, to be completed by 31 March 1988, would be circulated to the states for consideration ahead of a special federal council meeting in June, which would

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make the ultimate decisions on the findings and recommendations. The committee was given wide terms of reference to review the party’s federal constitution, relationships between state and federal parties at parliamentary and organisational levels, the role and responsibility of the federal secretariat, the liaison and division of responsibilities between the state and federal parties in all matters relating to federal elections, the role of the women’s federal council and the Young National Party, and to examine ‘any other matters that the Committee considers relevant’. It would be an interesting exercise. Philosophically, Nixon and Hunt were coalitionists, while Russell and Paterson did not believe in coalition in Opposition. With research and other support provided by the federal secretariat, Nixon convened the committee’s inaugural meeting in Melbourne on 17 December. It discussed what background research was required and developed an itinerary of hearings to be held in the major capitals, the first scheduled for Melbourne on 27 January 1988. Meanwhile, Labor’s fortunes were taking a turn for the worse. It lost the normally safe seat of Adelaide to the Liberals at a by-election on 6 February, and just retained Port Adelaide at a further by-election on 26 March, suffering a two-party preferred swing of nearly 11 per cent. In the meantime, the New South Wales Labor government of Barry Unsworth was defeated by the Coalition of Nick Greiner and Wal Murray on 19 March, and there were substantial swings against Labor in state by-elections in Victoria and Western Australia, and in the Brisbane City Council election the Liberal lord mayor, Sallyanne Atkinson, successfully won a second term in office. There were two catastrophic by-election results for the National Party, both in Queensland. Two weeks before resigning as premier and from parliament on 1 December 1987, Bjelke-Petersen appointed McVeigh as the state’s agent-general to London, so precipitating byelections for his own Barambah constituency and McVeigh’s seat of Groom. The Groom poll, which took place first, saw a swing of 20 per cent against the National Party candidate – Nixon committee member David Russell – with the seat going to the Liberal Party. One week later,

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on 16 April, Barambah, held by Bjelke-Petersen for almost 37 years, fell to a new political entity, the Citizens’ Electoral Council (CEC) with an almost unheard of swing of 35 per cent against the National Party. The former premier, who had said in his resignation speech that the National Party was no longer the one he’d taken to the election the year before, endorsed the CEC candidate in Barambah and the Liberal one in Groom over his own party’s candidates. Russell’s campaign in Groom, together with the New South Wales election, forced Nixon to seek a short extension of his deadline. He was given until mid-May, with the special federal council rescheduled to 28 to 31 July. The Nixon committee held formal hearings in Brisbane, Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth, received formal and informal information, verbal and written, from many other areas, and studied political party constitutions, organisational structures and reviews from the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Once the submissions had been studied, the committee agreed that Nixon should work on an initial draft report. He outlined what his approach would be to a meeting on 22 March. After much interchange of draft chapters between committee members, involving many hours of telephone discussions and some – although surprisingly little – compromise, a final draft was ready for consideration at a meeting in Melbourne on 14 April. Further minor amendments saw all committee members agree with the contents. Divergent views had come together. If the rest of the party could do likewise, there was hope that a new era of unity could be achieved at all levels across the country. A substantial print run of the 86-page report was ordered, with presentation to the federal management committee set for 6 May in Sydney. From the outset, Nixon had emphasised as a condition of his heading the review that its report would have to be a professional and objective document. The study, titled The Future – A Report by The Committee of Review into the Future Direction of the National Party of Australia, became known as the Nixon Report and is still referred to as that. Nixon canvassed the idea of a new, single conservative party, but

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Peter Nixon: his 1988 report on the future of the National Party still resonates more than 20 years after publication (Australian Information Service/Auspic)

found if one was formed it would be ‘most unlikely to bring about the demise of either the existing National or Liberal Parties.’ Noting that this had been an objective of the Joh campaign, he commented that ‘history has shown that it failed dismally.’ He broached amalgamation, saying there was ‘an undeniable truth’ that maintaining two separate non-Labor parties was bad economics, involving ‘a waste of money and valuable human resources’ and requiring ‘enormous duplication of effort’. He suggested that any change in the voting system for federal elections, such as the introduction of optional preferential voting, ‘could force a decision on the question’. Overall, however, the committee believed the issue ‘requires far greater and deeper consideration by all the State Parties before proper conclusions can be drawn’,

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adding that it would be ‘improper’ for the committee to ‘try to impose conclusions’ on the states.2 The report contained 68 findings and recommendations and a totally revised federal party constitution. Key conclusions reflected issues arising from the Joh campaign, and included: • It is the exclusive right of the Federal Parliamentary Party to elect its Leader. • The Federal Parliamentary Leader must have the freedom to implement and promote the Federal Party and its policies in any way he and his Parliamentary colleagues judge to be the best under the political circumstances of the day. At the same time, there must be proper coordination and liaison between the Federal Leader and the Organisation. • There is no electoral statistic in existence today to support an argument that the National Party would be better able to win power in Federal Parliament by standing outside Coalition. • If the argument of National Party Parliamentarians is good enough, there is no reason why their policy attitudes should not dominate Coalition policies. • The Federal Parliamentary Party must be able to take a different stance on [party] policy, but must explain why to the Organisation. • The Federal Parliamentary Party must fully take into account the views of the Federal Management Committee before determining its position on Coalition, either in Government or Opposition. • Whatever decision is ultimately adopted by the Federal Parliamentary Party on Coalition, it must be accepted by the Parties right around Australia. • No Affiliated Party may seek to endorse candidates for Federal elections or Federal by-elections outside its own State or Territory.

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• If the Federal Organisation wants to stand a National Party candidate in a State or Territory where there is no Affiliated Party, then the Federal Management Committee should have the power to call for nominations, select and endorse candidates. • In areas where there are Affiliated Parties, no other State should seek to intervene in that Affiliated Party’s affairs in any way whatsoever, unless specifically asked or invited to do so by a vote of the Central Council of that State. • Any member of an Affiliated Party who stands against a candidate endorsed by an Affiliated Party for a Federal election or a Federal by-election should be automatically expelled from his or her Affiliated Party.3 A total rewrite of the party’s federal constitution was included to incorporate Nixon’s findings, transforming it from a five-page document of 44 clauses, little changed since it was adopted in 1926, to one of 16 pages, 83 clauses and many more sub-clauses.4 The federal management committee agreed the report should be released to the media and circulated widely throughout the state parties, so maximum time could be given to considering its recommendations before the special federal council meeting at the end of July. The federal council was quick to scupper the amalgamation question, resolving that, against a background of recent anti-amalgamation statements by the leaders of all affiliated parties, and by the federal leader, ‘this Council agrees that amalgamation or merger is not an option for the National Party of Australia in the foreseeable future’.5 It adopted the draft constitution, with minor amendments, and referred other recommendations to the state parties for co-ordinated action. Specifically, these covered strengthening preselection processes and improving co-operative arrangements, communications and building the party’s profile. Nixon secured a new federal constitution that clarified the parliamentary party’s autonomy, responsibility and relationship with the federal council. It streamlined organisational structures, the relationship between state and federal organisations,

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including financial arrangements, increased the size of the federal council and provided for a federal conference to be held once in the life of every federal parliament, or once every three years. It required the parliamentary party to consider the policy decisions of the federal conference and the federal council in determining its policies. Where the parliamentary party intended taking a position inconsistent with the policy of the organisation, the federal leader was required to advise the federal management committee of the reasons for so doing. It empowered the parliamentary party to ‘enter into, alter the terms of, or terminate, either in Government or Opposition, a coalition or alliance with another Parliamentary political party.’ Before doing so, however, the federal leader was required to consult with the management committee and refer its views to the parliamentary party when considering its decision. There was a new section on candidates for election, which specified that ‘no Affiliated Party shall endorse candidates for election to the Australian Parliament in Federal electoral divisions other than those within its State or Territory.’ 6 The right of the federal parliamentary party to make its own decisions, albeit with some consultation with the organisation, was, for the first time, constitutionally defined; a Joh-type campaign could not happen again. The role and responsibilities of the federal secretariat were also defined, as were the conditions of affiliation and association. Necessary consequential amendments to state party constitutions were progressively adopted, giving the party across Australia a greater degree of constitutional uniformity than was previously the case. For that alone, the Nixon Report was a landmark. All state parties adopted the report, leading to improved levels of co-operation, information exchange and strategic planning. Standing federal campaign and finance committees, each representative of state and federal party interests, were established.7 But some of the broader findings – effectively, warnings for the future – were largely overlooked. A follow-up review commissioned by the federal management committee in 1996 nominated a number of Nixon observations to which ‘the Party has failed to pay adequate attention.’ These included

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the threat to the party by the ability of the Liberals to win rural and provincial electorates, the need to better market and promote the party’s independence, and for state parties to improve their preselection processes.8 A 1999 review into the party in New South Wales, under the chairmanship of a former state leader and deputy premier, Wal Murray, identified improvements that the state party could make to raise its profile and improve communications and voter appeal.9 There was a distinctly familiar ring about them; many echoed the Nixon Report. Another federal review by former federal leader John Anderson and former New South Wales state director Michael Priebe after the November 2007 defeat of the Howard-Vaile Coalition again made it clear that much of what Nixon had recommended had been inadequately acted upon (see chapter 28).10

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19: An era ends dramatically

The 1980s brought a different generation into the parliamentary party’s ranks – Ian Cameron, Noel Hicks, Bruce Cowan, and Grant Tambling (CLP), all elected in 1980; Flo Bjelke-Petersen in 1981; Peter McGauran and Ron Boswell in 1983; and David Brownhill, Charles Blunt, Tim Fischer, John Sharp, Michael Cobb, and Garry Nehl, all from New South Wales and all elected in 1984. Arriving in 1987 were John Stone, Peter McGauran’s younger brother, Julian, and Grant Tambling, who had lost his lower house seat in 1983 and now returned to the Senate. The 1987 party room, comprising 19 members and seven senators, was markedly different in its nature to that of a decade earlier. There were fewer farmers. The party room now included a former small businessman, vet, draftsman, barrister and solicitor, family company director, publisher and public relations consultant, newsagent and business consultant, and a former secretary to the Commonwealth Treasury. The most significant change was in Ian Sinclair’s home state of New South Wales, brought about by the entry of six new faces in 1984. This would become significant to his future. The

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more traditional, ‘old guard’ members included Sinclair himself and Ian Robinson, both first elected in 1963; Bob Katter (snr), 1966; Ralph Hunt, 1969; Bruce Lloyd, 1971; Peter Fisher, Evan Adermann, and Tom McVeigh, 1972; Clarrie Millar, 1974; Ray Braithwaite, 1975; and Glen Sheil, first elected in 1974, resigned in 1981 and re-elected in 1984. Some of the newer members wanted to forge a broader and moreprogressive direction for the party. Lusher’s intervention in welfare policy in 1984 was part of this: ‘I was more interested in my part in changing the agenda. Along with Charles Blunt and others, we started the momentum away from agrarian socialism.’ There was also a view among some that Anthony had not followed the McEwen example and promoted younger members into the ministry during the seven years of the Fraser-Anthony government. People like Sandy MacKenzie (Calare, 1975 to 1983), Peter Fisher, Lusher, Braithwaite and Lloyd had been overlooked. Robinson, who was Assistant Minister assisting the Postmaster-General from August 1971 until the McMahon-Anthony government’s defeat in December 1972, did not return to the ministry in the Fraser-Anthony years. The party had six ministers for nearly all of the time in each of the Fraser-Anthony governments, and with Anthony, Sinclair, Nixon and Hunt holding key positions, and the party’s Senate leader also traditionally in the ministry, there was little opportunity for others. But some believed what opportunity did exist was wasted. Frustration increased because the Coalition seemed unable to land meaningful hits on the Hawke government. Liberal infighting saw Peacock replaced as leader by Howard in May 1985. Then the Joh for Canberra campaign derailed any semblance of non-Labor unity from the beginning of 1987, culminating in the early election. While Sinclair fought off the Joh campaign, its ramifications continued into 1988 and beyond, with the Queensland organisation, notably Sparkes, still intent on having him replaced as party leader. There was a growing sense of impatience for change in the parliamentary party. Sinclair was scarred from the 1979 Finnane report and bruised from the Joh campaign. More than a few members saw him as part of a

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bygone era. In the 1984 election, he controversially claimed that Labor’s erosion of family values was responsible for the introduction of AIDS into Australia. In 1987 he blamed Labor’s soft approach to law and order for the horrendous murder the previous year of Sydney nursing sister Anita Cobby. This was old fashioned Country Party politics, good for keeping the right-wing conservative vote on-side, especially in the bush, but hardly the enlightened politics of a modern party. A front-page story in Sydney’s Sunday Telegraph in April 1988, headlined ‘Sinclair signs $40 000 perks for staff!’ – pointing to a double-page inside spread – did nothing to help him. Using documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the story asked why Sinclair had changed the home base of two of his staff from Canberra to Sydney between February 1985 and August 1986, implying that this had enabled them to improperly claim $40 000 in tax-free travel allowances.1 No finding of wrongdoing or subsequent action to recover moneys was instigated by the Department of the Special Minister of State. The Sunday Telegraph asserted that the incident, coming on top of the disastrous by-election for Groom on 9 April, had raised party room discontent with Sinclair’s leadership to ‘new levels’. Sinclair said the report was ‘unbalanced and vindictive’, did not reflect well on the writer, Fia Cumming, and had been based on information in addition to that obtained under freedom of information, which could only have come from the Labor Party.2 Following a further article in the same newspaper in July, Sinclair told the party room he was happy for the issue to be examined internally.3 Robinson undertook the task, closely studying documents and conducting interviews: ‘I talked to all the people concerned, individually, and came up with an all clear on the matter. It was a trumped up performance by the newspaper.’4 He detailed to the party room many discrepancies in the allegations, and concluded that the articles were ‘highly politically motivated’ and ‘designed to damage the National Party and discredit the Leader’.5 Sinclair caused another stir when he made some controversial

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remarks about the wife of former Labor leader Bill Hayden after Hawke confirmed at the end of June 1988 that he had sounded out Hayden on the possibility of his succeeding Ninian Stephen as GovernorGeneral. Stephen was due to retire the following February. Hayden was a renowned anti-monarchist and the Opposition attacked the prospective appointment. Sinclair went a step further, saying ‘I’m not here to damn or otherwise individuals on things that have happened in the past. … It’s a position for a man and wife capable of pulling Australia together, and there is doubt that Bill Hayden and his wife would be capable of doing this’.6 The interpretation was that Sinclair was obliquely referring to an incident early in 1987, when Mrs Hayden had allegedly stolen $100 worth of cosmetics from a Sydney department store. No charges were preferred after medical evidence showed she had been suffering from disorientation and memory loss. Apart from being criticised by Howard and the former prime minister, Malcolm Fraser, Sinclair was undermined by his own side, notably Blunt, who said: ‘I think we are appointing a Governor-General. A person’s family and private life have a right to be just that – private.’ 7 Blunt said the Hayden and travel allowance issues were ‘serious’ and needed addressing by Sinclair: ‘It’s significant for both him personally and the National Party.’8 Clarrie Millar said the situation ‘should be addressed on the basis that on receiving all the evidence, in inverted commas, the party [room] should be in a position to unequivocally declare its support for Mr Sinclair in the present situation, or alternatively take such steps as might be necessary to secure the reputation and the integrity of the party in the public perception’.9 Sinclair said he was ‘disturbed at the level of public comment about matters which properly should be dealt with in the privacy of the Federal Parliamentary National Party Room’. He would be happy to discuss any issues when the party room next convened prior to the budget session of parliament in August.10 Tensions continued to fester. Sinclair believed the trust he had placed in several younger members, by having them appointed to the shadow ministry, or giving them opportunities and more responsi-

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bilities within the party, were not being reciprocated. Several parliamentarians became critical of Sinclair’s senior personal staff, believing they blocked their access to the leader. The atmosphere of discontent was known beyond the party room; Nixon rang Blunt on one occasion, warning that it would be ‘foolhardy’ to ‘rock the boat’ on the leadership.11 On top of this, there was a sense that Sinclair was too accommodating towards the Liberal Party. The sentiment was aggravated when Howard sacked Stone as shadow finance minister on 13 September 1988 for repeating a personal view, first made ten months earlier, that Asian immigration should be slowed down and that a qualification for migration should be an ability to speak English.12 The issue created an undercurrent question: had Sinclair done all that he could or should to support his Senate leader against the Howard demand that he go from the front bench? In the early months of 1989 Sinclair supported negotiations between the Victorian Liberal and National parties for a joint Senate ticket in the state for the next federal election. The arrangement, agreed to in principle by the Victorian National Party annual conference at the end of April, required Julian McGauran to be placed in the non-winnable fourth position. While the agreement would guarantee him a winnable spot for the following election, and thereby secure the party’s and McGauran’s longer term Victorian Senate representation, many thought he had been given a raw deal and questioned why Sinclair had tolerated an arrangement that was contrary to the party’s immediate electoral interests. On the other hand, Sinclair scored a significant win for the National Party and its campaign against the Hawke government’s September 1988 referendum. This sought approval for: extending the term of the House of Representatives to four years and reducing the terms of senators from eight to six years; providing for ‘fair and democratic elections throughout Australia’ – an initiative that would almost certainly abolish compulsory preferential voting; recognition of local government in the constitution; and the extension and guaranteeing

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of various civil rights in relation to jury trials, freedom of religion, and compulsory acquisition of property. Philosophically, the National Party supported constitutional recognition of local government, but Sinclair well knew that to try to split the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes tended to confuse voters. The National Party would campaign for a ‘no’ vote to all four questions.13 Many in the Liberal Party wanted to campaign on a ‘yes’, ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘no’ ticket, and this was the recommendation of the shadow ministry. In the joint party room, however, it was rejected in favour of Sinclair’s preference. The government was defeated on all four questions.14 Then came the government’s proposal to deregulate the wheat market. This was Holy Grail stuff for the National Party; it was historically opposed to any deregulation of the wheat market, while a growing number of Liberals were free marketeers. There were suggestions Labor was deliberately using deregulation to further divide what was still a fragile Coalition. There were also sections of the industry that supported deregulation, notably in Western Australia, prompting Brownhill, in a background paper to Liberal and National parliamentarians, to say he was ‘seriously concerned that certain vested interests are anxious to encourage a split within the two parties over this issue’.15 Sinclair’s deputy and shadow primary industry minister, Lloyd, obtained a written agreement from Howard to six conditions that had to be met before the Coalition would support the legislation. The key ones were that there be no deregulation of the export market at all, and no deregulation of the domestic market until reforms or efficiency gains had been made in areas affecting growers’ costs, such as transport, handling, storage and waterfront reform, and in the membership of the Australian Wheat Board (AWB), then still a government body. Lloyd said the Liberals ‘welshed’ on the conditions on domestic deregulation after the government offered some concessions: ‘The Liberals said that’s fine, let’s go with it. And, of course, you had in the Liberal Party some strong deregulationists for wheat.’16 The Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, John Kerin,

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introduced the Wheat Marketing Bill 1989 and supporting legislation into the House of Representatives shortly before 5pm on Thursday, 13 April 1989, saying the package contained provisions ‘to retain the AWB’s export monopoly, but to open up more choice for growers by deregulating the domestic wheat market’.17 Lloyd said the bill was so badly drafted that the government itself had to put forward 45 amendments, while the Opposition pressed a further 40, some of which were accepted.18 Later that evening a National Party meeting was convened, with several members absent because they had left the building when the lower house adjourned. Sinclair said the party should accept the bill, as it had won four notable concessions from the government [and the Liberal Party], namely preservation of the AWB’s sole export marketing powers, maintenance of the AWB as a strong domestic trader, legislation to deregulate transport, handling, storage, shipping and other practices inhibiting wheat marketing, and retention of an ability to amend the legislation after consultation with the Grains Council of Australia. He noted that the Grains Council had endorsed the Coalition’s position on 4 April.19 A majority in the party meeting agreed, although Lloyd objected, saying he felt he should resign ‘because what had been agreed to [with Howard] had been dishonoured’. He ultimately did not do so, at the urging of the Grains Council: ‘I withdrew [my resignation], which I have regretted ever since. I should have stuck hard … to make the National Party wake up and become a little more assertive in our dealings in the Coalition.’ While Lloyd disagreed with Sinclair over the wheat bill, he was not anti-Sinclair. He believed the party leader’s ability to drive hard bargains with Howard had been weakened by the upheavals of the Joh campaign, the pre-election collapse of the Coalition, the election loss, and the disastrous Groom by-election. But his threatened resignation might unwittingly have fuelled the fire for those who were now convinced Sinclair had to go. Blunt and Braithwaite had been looking for an appropriate opportunity to challenge him for several weeks. Earlier in the year, Brownhill had met with a group of colleagues in his Canberra home unit, which he shared with Sharp: ‘I remember that

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meeting. I talked them out of having a spill, saying I’d go and work it out with Sinclair; tell him he had to be more forthright with the Liberals. It [becoming more forthright] didn’t happen’.20 Sinclair’s preparedness to compromise on the wheat legislation, contrary to Lloyd’s view, offered a trigger, although Lloyd said the excuse was not justified because several of the people who used wheat as part of the argument to challenge Sinclair ‘didn’t bother to go to the [13 April] party meeting, showed no great interest in the issue, did not talk to me about it or offer any advice, and did not try to revisit wheat policy after the change of leadership’.21 Also fanning the flames of discontent was division in the Liberal Party over Howard’s leadership. There was a growing view that he should be dumped in favour of a return to Peacock. Blunt, flying into Canberra on the evening of Sunday 7 May for the start of the parliamentary week, ran into John Moore (Liberal, Ryan, Queensland) at the airport. Moore told him that a challenge against Howard ‘was on’, adding ‘so if you want to challenge Sinclair, this is the week to do it’. Blunt contacted National Party colleagues and concluded the numbers were there for a successful challenge: ‘Ian had burnt so much good will and people were just wearing thin. The concern about his leadership had reached the point of abject despair.’ 22 Blunt knew the key to the success or failure of a challenge lay in the hands of the New South Wales members – 11 in total, including Senator Brownhill. At least half of them were prepared to go for the jugular, something that would have considerable impact on the rest of the party room. The double leadership coup took final shape the following day, 8 May. Sharp was handed a note from Blunt during a meeting that morning: ‘He asked me to come and see him on a personal matter in his office that evening. I wondered what on earth I could do to help him on a personal matter!’23 Others were also contacted. A regular dinner meeting of the leaders’ group was gathering in Howard’s private dining room in the Opposition leader’s office suite in the new Parliament House at 6pm. The dinners were a monthly

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event when parliament was sitting, involving the two party leaders, Howard and Sinclair, the deputies, Peacock and Lloyd, the Liberal Senate leader, Fred Chaney (Western Australia), his deputy, Austin Lewis (Victoria), and the two party federal directors, Tony Eggleton and Paul Davey. Howard, Eggleton, Sinclair, Lloyd and Davey were ready to start the meeting. Howard apologised for Peacock, explaining that he was taking his fellow Victorian colleague, Ian McPhee, out for a private dinner to console him over having just lost preselection for his seat of Goldstein. Chaney and Lewis were also missing. Howard, fidgety, asked his personal assistant, Barbara Williams, to chase them up. She returned saying both were out of the building at private functions. Eggleton looked seriously worried. Howard was annoyed that neither had sent apologies. The dinner got under way, with Lloyd quipping ‘we’ve [the Nationals] got the numbers here to make a few decisions’. Howard gave an unamused, nervous chuckle. Lloyd left not long after to attend a function for the retiring president of the Cattle Council of Australia, Wally Peart. The dinner ended before 8pm. Soon afterwards Peacock and Chaney went to see Howard and told him there would be a move against him at the Liberal Party meeting the following morning.24 Sinclair telephoned Lloyd to tell him Howard was facing a challenge. Lloyd said he would return to Parliament House as soon as he could. Sinclair then went to see his chief whip, Hicks: He came into my office and said ‘the Libs are going to get rid of Howard’ and asked if I’d heard anything about our blokes. I said ‘no’, which was true, to which Ian said ‘okay’ and left. Then I got a phone call from Charles Blunt asking me to go to his office. Just as I was leaving [my office], Michael Cobb [Parkes, New South Wales] came in. He’d also been called to Charles’s office. When we got there, we found half the party there!25

Sharp found the same:

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The meeting was dominated by Blunt and Fischer. Blunt was saying Sinclair wasn’t cutting it. Fischer said the Libs would drop Howard in the morning. The view was that Peacock would give a fresh image for the Libs and that Blunt could do the same for the Nats. There was general agreement that this was the way to go; that we’d knock off Ian at our party meeting in the morning.

Hicks was uncomfortable with the way events were developing. As chief whip, a key responsibility was to keep the leader informed of what his troops were thinking and doing: ‘We were all a bit disgruntled with Ian. When they started talking about a spill I thought there was no point in trying to stop it because it was obvious it was going to happen anyway.’ Surprisingly, beyond agreeing to move against Sinclair, there was no real plan. No serious consideration had been given as to who would replace him. That evolved during the meeting. Blunt, with his contacts with the Peacock power players and having instigated canvassing the challenge, seemed the natural option. Other potential contenders, Sharp and Fischer, were not interested. There was some discussion on whether the spill should extend to the deputy leader, but it was agreed Lloyd would not be challenged. Once the course was set, it was decided that those at the meeting should go to Sinclair’s office and tell him what would occur the following morning. Sharp said the ‘group of brave hearts dwindled’ as some looked at their watches and ‘found something urgent they had to do’. The deputy whip, Garry Nehl, was sent off to round them up.26 Stone knew nothing of what was happening until he received a telephone call – he thought from either Fischer or Hicks – asking him to go to Blunt’s office: When I got there someone was saying Howard would go tomorrow and therefore it would be appropriate to make a clean sweep and get rid of Sinclair as well. What struck me immediately was that Sinclair was not there, which I didn’t like. I had a high

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disregard for Sinclair, but that didn’t seem right to me. What absolutely appalled me was that both the whips were there. I thought ‘God almighty, even the whips are part of this conspiracy’. I liked Noel Hicks, but I was appalled and shocked to see him there. We were told Blunt was going to be the nominee [for the leadership] and I went home and thought about it.27

One person who was completely unaware of the plotting was the new Member for Gwydir, John Anderson. He had only been sworn in on 2 May, having won the April by-election to replace Hunt, who had resigned on 24 February. Anderson was sitting in his office, wondering where his new-found career would take him when a party staffer dropped in and suggested he go to the leader’s office for a drink: So in I go and there are Sinkers, Bruce Cowan and Ian Robinson, having a Scotch. Sinkers in his affable way said ‘have a seat, have a drink’ and went on to say he had just been telling Cowan and Robinson that it looked very much as though Howard was gone tomorrow, but that our boys seemed quite settled.28

Robinson said he and Cowan had gone to Sinclair’s office because they had ‘heard some murmurings about the leadership’ involving Braithwaite, which they wanted to raise with him: ‘Ian said he didn’t believe there was any concern with Braithwaite, because he had just spoken to him on some electorate matter and he [Braithwaite] had given no indication of any move against him.’ 29 They left Sinclair’s office shortly after Anderson arrived. Neither was party to the meeting in Blunt’s office. The same applied to the McGauran brothers. Peter McGauran said he and Julian first heard rumours at about 6pm, but were not involved in the Blunt meeting. On the day, Peter McGauran did not support Sinclair, while, perhaps surprisingly in light of the Victorian joint Senate ticket negotiations, Julian McGauran did.30 Anderson and Sinclair got little further with their conversation before there was a knock on the door – it was 10.45pm – and in

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came a group of members led by Sharp, Blunt, Braithwaite, Fischer and Hicks. Within moments, Anderson was left dumbfounded: ‘Come in boys,’ said Sinkers, and they all sat around and Ray Braithwaite said ‘I’m here to tell you there’ll be a challenge to your leadership tomorrow morning and you don’t have the numbers’. I just thought ‘wow, what a hornets’ nest this is!’ and I said ‘I’ve only just arrived on the scene and obviously it’s not going to make any difference what I do, so I think I’ll just depart’.

Sinclair expressed his disappointment to his colleagues, but conceded the members were entitled to call a spill. Noting there was no precedent for such an event, he briefly outlined the procedures he would follow at the party meeting. He was particularly disturbed to see Hicks as one of the group, mistakenly believing that he had been involved in the plot and had therefore lied to him earlier in the evening when he said he was not aware of any move against him. The matter was subsequently cleared up and Sinclair accepted an assurance from Hicks that he had known nothing before entering Blunt’s office. Hicks said he understood why at the time Sinclair ‘must have thought that I was a bastard’. Despite being on friendly terms with Blunt, Hicks voted for Sinclair. Just as the meeting was ending, Lloyd, back from the Cattle Council function, walked into Sinclair’s office: ‘Ian calmly said to me “I am being challenged too”.’ Lloyd said he would do a check on the numbers: ‘I rang Ian back and told him they were not good’. Sharp went to see Lloyd to tell him there would be no move to replace him as deputy. He also telephoned Anderson – the two had been at The King’s School, Parramatta, together – to tell him the party understood the situation was difficult for a newcomer and that Anderson should feel free to vote whichever way he wished. It was predictable that Anderson, whose father had a high regard for Sinclair and Hunt, would support Sinclair.31 Sharp wanted to reassure him there would be no hard feelings if he did so.

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Tuesday, 9 May 1989 saw an historic and simultaneous change of leadership in both non-Labor parties – Peacock taking over from Howard and Blunt from Sinclair. The irony with regard to Sinclair was that the Labor Party had been after his scalp for years and now here it was, delivered by his own party. The National Party meeting lasted about two hours. Not everyone was aware of the impending spill as they gathered in the party room at 9am. Peter Fisher, who had previously talked with Blunt about dissatisfaction over the leadership, knew nothing about it: ‘I think I was regarded as a status quo bloke, so it’s not surprising they didn’t contact me. Either that, or they already knew my vote wouldn’t matter anyway’.32 Ian Cameron only found out just before the meeting: ‘I got up and told them they were a pack of bastards – this was not the way we worked.’ 33 Braithwaite moved the spill to declare the leadership vacant, seconded by Fischer, who at the same time resigned from the shadow ministry. Stone voted against the spill motion: But it was a done deal. I said it wasn’t right, that it was very bad for this to be happening. Blunt was nominated for the position – I was not a great admirer of him – and I thought that he should not be elected unopposed by anyone other than Sinclair, so I put myself forward as well. I had had no contact with Bob Sparkes or anyone in the Queensland party organisation, none whatsoever. Some of them may have had the idea in their minds of my taking over [as leader] at some time in the future, but so far as I’m concerned that was fantasy.

The ballot was between Sinclair, Stone and Blunt. Anderson said Sinclair ‘looked quite tired’. Brownhill believed the situation might have been salvageable for Sinclair if he had handled the meeting differently: ‘Ian allowed everyone to have their say, so you effectively had an open vote before the vote was taken. If he’d insisted on proceeding straight to the ballot, the result might have been different.’ 34 There is no accurate record of the vote. Party room ballots are

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traditionally destroyed immediately after the count and memories, many years later, have faded on such detail. Most believed Blunt had a comfortable win. Sinclair thought the margin was closer, which, as he was to observe, mattered little: ‘I’ve always believed that democracy is 50 per cent plus one.’ 35 A point that stuck in Braithwaite’s mind was that, despite the number of people who knew the night before what would happen the following morning, nothing leaked to the media: ‘We were able to go home that night and come back to parliament the following morning without being hounded in any way by the press gallery. They were all on to what was happening with the Libs, but knew nothing about what we were planning.’ 36 There was little sense of elation when it was over. One member said it was ‘like dropping a beast’. Another said it was sad to see ‘the old bull’ move to a side seat in the party room with his place in the leader’s chair taken by ‘this young steer’. Everyone was acutely aware of the history they had just made. Sinclair was the first federal leader in almost 70 years of the party’s existence to be dumped by the party room. Arguably, the first leader, William McWilliams, would have been dumped in April 1921, but did not recontest the position against Earle Page. Page may have been rolled after his attack on Menzies in April 1939 split the party room, but resigned first. Archie Cameron would not have been re-elected after the September 1940 elections, but avoided the prospect by walking out on the party and joining the United Australia Party. Now the party room had not only tossed its leader but had also removed the man who had been deputy leader for 13 years before succeeding Anthony in 1984, had extensive ministerial experience, had survived numerous political crises, and commanded more political expertise than almost anyone in the parliament, let alone the party. Sinclair went back to his office and told his staff: ‘I’m sorry folks, but I didn’t have the numbers.’ He told a news conference he would stay as the Member for New England. Asked what went wrong, he replied it was an interesting question: ‘I would have been really very interested if somebody [at the party meeting] this morning had told

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A challenge fraught with danger: Braithwaite queries with Blunt whether the spill against Sinclair has been successful. Cartoonist Geoff Pryor’s depiction of the episode, The Canberra Times, 11 May 1989 (Geoff Pryor)

me what went wrong but they still refrain to do so’. He was adamant that wheat was not the issue. He congratulated Blunt on his win, but stopped short of pledging his support: ‘I pledge my support for the National Party. The National Party has my one hundred per cent endorsement’.37 He was not openly disruptive to Blunt, but enjoyed being a bit difficult. He took more than two weeks to swap offices with Blunt. While there was little difference between the two, Sinclair’s office had more staff accommodation and was closer to the lower house chamber and the party room. Sinclair said his leadership demise had been born out of a belief in the need for generational change, fuelled by the frustration of Opposition:

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My concern was that – perhaps I should have gone – but when and how and at minimal cost and disruption to the party, that was the issue. The sensible thing would have been to get the election over and try to get into government. The trouble was, because we weren’t stable, it did a lot more damage to us. It was not seen as anything that was particularly identified with us. It was more because the Liberal Party did it, we had to do it without looking [at the consequences] beyond.38

He disputed that he had not nurtured the newer members, pointing out that he had secured shadow portfolios or promotions for the likes of Blunt, Braithwaite, Cameron, Peter McGauran, Boswell, Sharp, Stone and Fischer. Robinson said he and Cowan had talked about Sinclair’s decision to ‘give the young turks jobs’ and had prophetically concluded that ‘they’d run over the top of him’. Robinson was ‘appalled’ at the challenge, which he believed was based on the ambition of younger members more than anything else: ‘They just decided that if it was good enough for the Liberals to have a palace revolution, they were going to have one too.’39 Sinclair stayed in parliament, even after open-heart surgery in September 1991, and became quite the statesman. He served on several committees and was recalled to the Opposition front bench as shadow special minister of state in January 1994. It was a short revival – he returned to the back bench four months later after Alexander Downer toppled John Hewson for a brief spell as Liberal leader.40 Sinclair was chairman of the Constitutional Convention in Canberra from 2 to 13 February 1998 – the forum that led to the unsuccessful republic referendum in November 1999 – and Speaker of the House of Representatives from March to August 1998, a short period, but one during which he brought to the new parliament some of the traditions of the old one – four Australian flags in the chamber and seating for invited guests of members on the floor of the chamber, behind the members’ benches. He improved the acoustics and set in train the consolidation of procedures to enhance the role of members over that of the

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executive. He was satisfied that he had achieved ‘one hell of a lot’ in the period after he lost the leadership. As Father of the House (the longest current sitting member), he retired from parliament on 31 August 1998 after 34 years and nine months as the Member for New England, the eighth-longest-serving member of the House of Representatives.41 Not bad for someone who never thought of going into politics in the first place: ‘I had no such intention at all. The first I knew was when Bill Chaffey [Country Party Member for Tamworth in the New South Wales parliament] told me he had nominated me for the [New South Wales] Legislative Council in 1961!’42 For Anderson, a back bencher, the ‘only upside’ in the ousting of Sinclair was that he had him as a personal mentor, because Sinclair was ‘incredibly generous with his time’: ‘He taught me how to make speeches, saying he wasn’t going to rest until I could do them without notes. While Ian was known as a politically tough man, he had a very big heart and was genuinely interested in people, and often on a non-partisan basis.’ 43

k The wheat marketing legislation passed the House of Representatives in the early hours of 5 May 1989. Only four members voted against it, all Nationals – Evan Adermann, Ian Cameron, Peter Fisher and Clarrie Millar.44 Fisher remembered making speeches against the legislation, and moving several unsuccessful amendments on 3, 4 and 5 May: ‘During this time, John Howard came to my office in a vain attempt to reverse my actions. He told me I was a rural socialist, to which I fully agreed!’ 45 The bills came before the Senate on 9 May, the day after the coups against Sinclair and Howard. The following day, Stone gave notice of an amendment which, in part, condemned the government for its ‘betrayal of the wheat farmers of Australia’.46 The amendment failed. The legislation passed the Senate on 1 June 1989, with Stone and his

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National Party colleagues voting against it. The last word in the debate went to Julian McGauran, who claimed passage of the legislation would amount to the ‘dismantling and destruction’ of the Australian Wheat Board, adding ‘I am sure that the ghost of Black Jack McEwen will haunt this chamber this evening’.47 An interesting point was that Stone personally favoured the Liberal position. He was a deregulator at heart. He also believed a deal was a deal: ‘The Liberal Party’s welshing on the original agreement between Howard and Lloyd could simply not be allowed to go uncontested. Whatever my personal views, I felt I had a duty, as National Party [Senate] leader to uphold the party’s – and especially the Queensland party’s – position on the matter.’ 48

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The brief reign of Charles Blunt

20: The brief reign of Charles Blunt

Blunt’s first opportunity to identify his priorities for the party came four days after his election, in a speech to a National Party seminar at Longreach, Queensland. He said the emphasis would be on ‘representing people and industries outside the metropolitan capitals of Sydney and Melbourne’. He reaffirmed the party’s philosophy and principles, saying its role as the ‘stable foundation of long term Coalition Government’ must again be its number one objective: ‘We must follow our very clear direction and emphasis so that the National Party is guaranteed continued viability, strength, growth, electoral appeal, political influence, and – most importantly – independence for the future’.1 The Queensland party organisation welcomed him, with Sparkes advising the federal management committee that Queensland would review a decision taken when Sinclair was leader not to contribute funds to the leader’s campaign for next federal election.2 Blunt renegotiated the Coalition agreement with Peacock to ensure that the National Party’s representation in ministerial or shadow ministerial arrangements after the next election would not be reduced because of the loss of Julian McGauran from the Senate due to the

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Victorian joint-ticket arrangements: ‘That is, notwithstanding that the National Party will not have a Victorian Senator in the next Parliament our total Parliamentary numbers will have that position added to the actual position.’ 3 The agreement was signed on 1 June 1989. This positive start was achieved more by good luck than good management. Blunt conceded that the Nationals were ‘totally unprepared, unlike the Libs, who had been planning their move against Howard, had it orchestrated and everything’. He found himself leader with ‘no preparation, no staff, no game plan, nothing’. Then came the launch of the Black Book, a 54-page publication detailing Labor’s perceived failures and broken promises since its election in 1983. In the making by the federal secretariat since March, the Black Book had been planned for release at a federal conference in Canberra from 30 June to 2 July 1989. Blunt decided to launch it at a press conference the day before. The move backfired. With insufficient time to get across the detail of the document, he fumbled answers for nearly an hour before finally conceding that perhaps some of the statistics had been presented ‘selectively’.4 From that point on, he was targeted by the press gallery: I monumentally stuffed up the launch of the Black Book. All that set me up from a media point of view. Tim [Fischer] ran into the same problems when he took over the leadership, but he had time to ride out the storm and rebuild. My problem was that I went straight into the damned election.5

The party’s conference adopted a 51-page set of revised policies, covering all areas of Commonwealth administration and including policies on the greenhouse effect and the ozone layer. These called for the establishment of a Co-ordinating Committee of Longterm Climatic Change in Australia, to bring together climate-related research, greater development of alternative sources of power, and, in cooperation with the states, implementation of a progressive ban on the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in pressure packs.6 The policies

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were influenced by a discussion paper prepared 18 months earlier by David Brownhill, Green Politics: History and Political Implications, in which he urged the party to be alert to the growing political power of green politics and capitalise on the trend ‘before any further leakages from our traditional electoral base take place’.7 Blunt wanted to have the party’s election strategies and campaign structure in place well in advance of the election, which could be held before the end of the year, but most likely early in 1990. He knew what he wanted – a high-profile leader’s television advertising campaign, supported by intensive direct mailing in target seats, notably Leichhardt, Kennedy and Herbert in Queensland. To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

Charles Blunt: his ascendancy to the top of the National Party in May 1989 was short-lived; he unexpectedly lost his seat at the election barely 11 months later (The Nationals federal secretariat)

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Blunt was friendly with Greg Daniel, chairman of the Sydneybased advertising company, Clemenger. He wanted Daniel to develop his television campaign and invited him to present a concept to a campaign committee meeting in Canberra on 28 June 1989. The federal management committee met the following day and agreed in principle to the Daniel concept, but wanted other agencies to be given the opportunity to put forward their ideas. Ultimately, Blunt’s wishes won through. The management committee was keen to support the new leader, even to the point of totally funding the production costs of his television advertising, usually supplemented with state contributions. By November 1989, Blunt had completed the first draft of a 35-day election program, plotting the electorates and towns he would visit, and developed a detailed direct mail blitz of target electorates. By the end of the year, the party was better prepared for an election than it had been for a long time. But there were ominous signs pointing to how difficult the election would be, especially for the National Party. The Greiner-Murray Coalition government in New South Wales was facing mounting criticism over its policies to cut back rural services, including police, health, education and rail. Most of the blame was levelled at Murray and the state National Party. Murray and three other National Party state parliamentarians, as well as the party’s general secretary, became directly or indirectly snared in an investigation by the state’s new Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) into possible corrupt land deals in Tweed Shire on the state’s far north coast. The inquiry began in April 1989 and its final report was released 15 months later. In the meantime, the public hearings provided regular negative publicity for the National Party.8 The situation was worse in Queensland. The divisions created by the Joh campaign and Bjelke-Petersen’s demise as premier still lingered. The revelations of an inquiry into corruption under Tony Fitzgerald QC, which had run from May 1987 until reporting in July 1989, uncovering corruption and vice in the government and the police, were too great for the state National Party to withstand. It was swept from office at the election on 2 December, suffering a swing

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against it of 16 per cent and losing 23 seats. Thirty-nine consecutive years of National Party-dominated government came to a crashing end as a triumphant Labor Party extended its representation from 30 to 54 seats. A key concern for Blunt was the extent to which the mud hitting the National Party in New South Wales and Queensland would stick federally. Hawke called the federal election for 24 March 1990. Blunt launched his campaign at Bathurst, in central west New South Wales, under the slogan Nationals For a Safe Future. He drew his campaign launch speech from the highlights of a 37-page Election ’90 Policy Statement, one of which was a commitment to end Labor’s three mines uranium policy and establish a uranium enrichment industry in Australia, along with increased research and development of other alternative sources of power as a means of meeting the challenge of climate change.9 The election saw Labor returned with its majority slashed from 24 after the 1987 election to just nine. The governing party’s share of the primary vote, at less than 40 per cent, was lower than the almost 43 per cent it polled in 1975, when it lost office.10 This would not be an easy term for the government. The Liberal Party improved its position from 43 seats in 1987 to 55. For the National Party, the result was a disaster. Its House of Representatives numbers slumped from 18 going into the election (Groom had been lost at the by-election in April 1988) to 14, the lowest since 1946 and representing only 9.5 per cent of the seats in the 148-member lower house. In 1946, with 12 seats, and in 1943, with only nine, the party could still boast that it held just over 16 per cent and 12 per cent respectively of the electorates in the 74-member House of Representatives.11 The main carnage was again in Queensland, where the party suffered a swing against it of 12 per cent. Katter’s sprawling inland seat of Kennedy fell to Labor. Katter, battling cancer, had retired at the end of the previous parliament and died two weeks before election day. The swing against the new candidate, Ross Shannon, was 14 per cent. Stone, who had resigned from the Senate to contest the retiring Adermann’s seat of Fairfax, was unable to resist the anti-National mood. Adermann held

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Fairfax in 1987 with a margin of 7.4 per cent. The swing against Stone was 13 per cent, with the seat falling to the Liberals. Another casualty was Robinson in the northern New South Wales seat of Page. He had previously held the seat with a margin of 4.6 per cent. While he contained the swing against him to two per cent, he lost on the strength of Independent and Australian Democrats preferences, which gave the seat to Labor. The ICAC land development investigation no doubt had an impact on the result, as the local state National Party MP and Minister for Natural Resources, Ian Causley, whose electorate of Clarence fell within the boundaries of Page, was embroiled in the allegations. The most staggering blow was in Richmond. Blunt became the first incumbent leader in the party’s history to lose his seat. It was totally unexpected, even though he knew that demographic changes as well as the swing against the party would make it more difficult to hold. Additionally, he was up against the fallout from the ICAC allegations, which were centred on Tweed Shire in the heart of the electorate, and the Fitzgerald Inquiry, just over the border. Blunt’s undoing was an Independent anti-nuclear activist, Helen Caldicott, who had nominated just four weeks out from the election. Blunt’s pro-nuclear power policy gave her campaign a free kick. She won 23 per cent of the primary vote and her preferences were largely responsible for Labor’s Neville Newell taking the seat, even though his primary vote was less than 27 per cent. Realising his future was bleak, Blunt announced on 6 April that he would not recontest the leadership when the party room met in four days’ time. He conceded defeat in Richmond in a brief statement on the evening of 8 April. His once promising political career was over. He had been leader for just 334 days, or almost exactly 11 months, the shortest tenure for a federal leader in the party’s history.12 The carnage flowed through to the Senate. Julian McGauran was defeated, as expected, due to the joint Senate arrangement with the Liberals in Victoria. Queensland’s Glen Sheil lost his seat. The two would vacate the Senate from 30 June 1990. Stone had already gone, resigning his Senate position from 1 March 1990 and failing to win

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Fairfax. His casual vacancy was not filled by fellow Queensland National, Bill O’Chee, until 8 May, so when the party room gathered on 10 April to elect its new leadership team it comprised 14 members and six senators, a total of 20. It seems unlikely that a Sinclair-led campaign would have salvaged anything more in Queensland, although it might have enabled Blunt to spend more time in Richmond and hang on. It might also have helped Robinson in Page. But in both cases there was the impact of the ICAC inquiry. With the benefit of hindsight, the party would have been wiser to stick with Sinclair until after the election and then deliver the blow to his leadership if the result was as bad. Sinclair was one of five contenders for the leadership at the party meeting, the others being Fischer, Sharp, Peter McGauran, and Nehl. Fischer won the final count with a margin of four votes over Sharp, much to the surprise of many in the press gallery and not a few in the party, who were tipping a Sharp victory. Sharp had not helped his pitch by publicly supporting consideration of amalgamation with the Liberals – the old issue, which re-emerged in the wake of the election. Complete with Akubra hat, Fischer pledged at his first press conference to win back the ‘provincial bush’ through a concerted outreach program. Lloyd was re-elected deputy leader. Peacock did not recontest the Liberal leadership. The party chose John Hewson, a former executive director of Macquarie Bank and economic adviser to previous treasurers Phil Lynch and John Howard. The Member for Wentworth in Sydney, he had only been in parliament for three years. Hewson, Fischer and Lloyd negotiated a new Opposition Coalition agreement in which the Nationals held six of the 30 shadow portfolios, three of which were in the shadow cabinet – Fischer in energy and resources, Lloyd continuing in primary industry, and Sharp, shipping and waterfront reform. In the outer shadow ministry, Braithwaite continued in community services and aged care, Peter McGauran retained science and technology, and the CLP’s Tambling was given regional development, external territories and northern Australia.

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The party lost control of its long-held and traditional position of trade. Hewson relegated trade and trade negotiations to the outer shadow ministry, giving them to Alexander Downer (Mayo, South Australia). It also lost the major land transport portfolio – roads. Sharp had done well in this area in the previous parliament and was largely responsible for the Coalition’s considerable emphasis on the need for a major injection of road development funding, especially in regional areas, in the election campaign. Now the shadow portfolio went to the Victorian Liberal David Hawker. Hewson drove a hard bargain and the National Party was hardly in a position to object if it wanted to stay in Coalition. The core points of the agreement signed between Fischer and Hewson were much the same as those agreed between Sinclair and Howard in August 1987 and later between Blunt and Peacock. Hewson added four innocuous clauses, but also insisted on a new sentence being included in the second clause. This was the one that had been such a problem for Sinclair, requiring members of both parties to advocate only Coalition policies. Hewson’s addition stipulated: ‘In particular, Shadow Ministers shall only speak as Coalition Shadows on Coalition policies.’ 13 It meant that shadow ministers theoretically could not comment at all on any National Party policies, even in their own meetings and conferences. Sinclair would never have got away with it. Now there were no objections. Fischer launched his outreach program at the Victorian party’s annual conference in Mildura on 4 May. It would involve surveying the party’s membership on the successes and failures of the last campaign and the direction and emphasis the party should highlight in the future; developing new promotional material; and organising more visits to key electorates by parliamentarians. He convened a two-day think-tank of the parliamentary party in Canberra in mid-June to further develop the program and pinpoint policy priorities, after which he hit the road, setting a cracking pace. His nickname was Two Minute Tim, an allusion to the fact that he moved around so fast, in and out of meetings and functions so

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To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

Not everyone was impressed with Fischer’s think-tank concept, The Canberra Times, 14 June 1990 (Geoff Pryor)

quickly that people were lucky to get two minutes of his time. He was regarded as somewhat eccentric. The 44-year-old Vietnam veteran was tall and lanky, almost to the point of appearing clumsy. He nurtured the Akubra hat into a personal trademark, was a train buff with a passion for very fast train systems, was equally passionate about bush walking and trekking, and was a king of clichés and one-liners. He was medi-savvy. He gained extensive photographic coverage in the The Weekend Australian magazine, modelling gents clothing from doublebreasted suits and camel hair overcoats to trendy country gear.14 He frequently rang The Sydney Morning Herald’s ‘Granny’ column with political titbits, or ABC Radio’s Ian McNamara to get a nationwide grab on Australia all over on Sunday mornings. He hammered the need for

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Australia to develop an ‘export ethic’, to engage more with the ‘economic tigers of Asia’, for the National Party to be the ‘party of productivity’, and for the government to make ‘an economic U-turn’. While the professional image makers might have cringed, the public warmed to this rather eccentric character. They especially liked the fact that he often travelled between his electorate capital of Albury to Canberra by train and bus, rather than by charter flight or chauffeur-driven Commonwealth car.

k Just after nine o’clock on election night, 24 March 1990, with the failure of the Coalition campaign clear, the Liberal Party’s Victorian president, Michael Kroger, commented on national television from the tally room: ‘I’ll stick my neck out and say the Liberal and National parties should merge.’ His words set off an avalanche of amalgamation speculation. Former federal leader Doug Anthony was quick to become reinvolved in what had become one of his favourite political subjects. He supported amalgamation. So too did the former president of the National Farmers Federation (NFF) and now Liberal Member for Barker in South Australia, Ian McLachlan, and the current president, John Alwright. Peter Nixon spoke positively about a merger. Within 48 hours, amalgamation was a major story across the nation. National Party leadership contenders Sharp and McGauran said amalgamation had to be given serious consideration, as did Michael Cobb.15 All this was happening while some 3000 Australians still had to vote. Floods had forced the suspension of polling at several booths in Kennedy on 24 March. The Australian Electoral Commission made provision for affected people to vote on subsequent days. Physical voting in Kennedy was not completed until 28 March. Prospective National voters must have wondered what they were voting for with such concentrated comment, including from sitting National Party MPs, flooding the media.

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Anthony was given centrepage space in The Sydney Morning Herald to argue the ‘electrifying’ case for a united conservative force. Four days later, the same newspaper gave Sinclair similar space to present the alternative view under the headline A marriage won’t solve the Nats problems.16 The Liberal Party took up the prospect of amalgamation with enthusiasm. Its federal president, John Elliott, announced on 8 April, the same day Blunt conceded defeat in Richmond, that he had set up a special committee to look into the issue.17 The committee was to be chaired by Tony Eggleton, who had just announced his retirement as Liberal federal director and who was to work on special projects for the party. This was to be the first. Eggleton explained his mission the next morning: This committee is designed to give additional momentum to the whole objective of merging the Liberal and National parties because I firmly believe, as does the federal president, and I believe a lot of people in both the parties, that a strong, single force on our side of politics is exactly what we need in the years ahead. … My committee will be talking to the state Liberal parties, seeing how they view it, the kind of timetable they’d have in mind. … And, at an appropriate stage, I would hope we can open up talks with the Nationals to see where we might begin the mergers in which particular states.18

No indication of this committee had been given to the National Party. Not that it was necessary; the Liberals were entitled to do any work they wanted on the matter, just as were the Nationals. By putting it into the public arena, however, the Liberal Party gave the impression that it was trying to set the pace in something of a dictatorial manner. It created suspicion within the National Party that, far from seeking amalgamation, it was trying to achieve a corporate-like takeover. The National Party’s federal management committee, annual conferences in all states between May and August, and the Young Nationals, all overwhelmingly carried anti-amalgamation motions.

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The National Party’s federal president, McDonald, had been invited to present a paper to a seminar being organised by the University of Southern Queensland School of Management. Titled Amalgamate or Perish – the Future of non-Labor Parties in Australia, the seminar was to be held in Brisbane on 28 July. McDonald saw this is an opportunity to present a detailed case against amalgamation. He produced a 34-page booklet, An Assessment of Amalgamation, which argued the reasons why a merger should not take place. These included lack of evidence that a single party would win more seats in the federal parliament; the prospect of more determined National Party members reforming a country party; the prospect of a drawn-out amalgamation process leaving a political vacuum which could be filled by minor parties; evidence in the postelection period that the National Party was overwhelmingly against amalgamation; and the fact that Australians living beyond the capital cities had different political priorities which were best met by the existence of the two non-Labor parties. He concluded that amalgamation ‘should never be considered unless it can be proved beyond any reasonable doubt that more seats will be won. That cannot be done’.19 The document was distributed to party branches throughout Australia. McDonald hoped it would put the matter to rest. He was wrong. To his surprise, the new Liberal federal director, Andrew Robb, emerged from a Liberal executive meeting in Adelaide on 3 August to tell reporters his party favoured the establishment of ‘vanguard branches’, meaning local branches of both parties that wanted to amalgamate of their own accord. There was such a branch already, at Mullewa in Western Australia, as well as suggestions that one or two National Party branches in the central west of New South Wales were considering combining with local Liberal branches. McDonald was annoyed that he had been given no warning of this announcement. He had provided the Liberal Party with an advance copy of his amalgamation publication and thought he should at least have been alerted to the ‘vanguard’ concept. He was also somewhat amazed that the Liberals still seemed unable to comprehend that the National Party around Australia was not interested in amalgamating.

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interests

21: Moulding party and Coalition interests

As he began the job of rebuilding the party and juggling the sometimes differing interests of the party and the Coalition, Tim Fischer might have called to mind the remark often associated with Malcolm Fraser, ‘life wasn’t meant to be easy’. He soon found that assertions that Sinclair had been too close to the Liberals were simplistic. A growing crisis in the wool industry brought this into focus within weeks of the election. A burgeoning over-supply of wool, brought about by record national flock numbers and a softening of the Japanese economy hitting sales to Australia’s biggest wool market, prompted speculation by the end of April 1990 that the reserve or floor price for wool, set at 870 cents a kilogram in 1989–90, was unrealistically high. The Australian Wool Corporation (AWC) had to intervene at auctions and buy more wool for stockpile than would normally be the case. There was a danger the corporation would exceed its borrowing limits. On 25 May, the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, John Kerin, made it clear to the AWC that the reserve price could no longer be sustained. Three days later, sensing Kerin’s intervention would

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cause an international loss of confidence, Fischer called on the minister to allow the industry to determine the reserve price and other strategies. He said Kerin should immediately obtain government approval to ‘compensate the Wool Corporation (on a one-off basis) for the $300 million extra it was forced to spend buying wool at sales following the Easter break directly as a result of the uncertainty caused in the market place because of the Minister’s speculation on the future of the floor price’.1 There was no argument to this from the National Party membership or from most woolgrowers. Like single-desk wheat marketing, the reserve price scheme for wool was hallowed ground. The party had fought hard pioneering its development in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Liberal Party did not share its Coalition partner’s enthusiasm. Many Liberals, including McLachlan, himself a prominent woolgrower, wanted abolition of the scheme to be part of Opposition policy. Hewson told Fischer his statement could be taken to mean that the Coalition would pay compensation if it was in government, which, he said pointedly, would not be the case. He demanded Fischer clarify the position. In a brief statement, Fischer acknowledged that any proposals ‘being floated at the present time, including the issue of compensation, are not Coalition policy’.2 His supporters of 24 hours earlier were stunned: here was another leader buckling to the Liberals. The following day, Kerin announced that the wool reserve price, normally set for 12 months at the start of the selling season on 1 July, would be reduced to 700 cents a kilo in an attempt to stimulate sales. The AWC sought $600 million in compensation for the depreciation of the value of wool stocks – something Kerin described as ludicrous.3 The crisis continued for a long time. On 28 October, the National Party’s federal council carried a motion, moved by Sinclair, expressing its ‘unqualified support’ for the maintenance of the reserve price scheme, and calling on the Prime Minister to confirm the 700 cents reserve price for the current 1990–91 and the 1991–92 seasons, and to introduce measures to stimulate demand at auction. The AWC suspended wool sales from 1 February 1991 and the

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To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

Tim Fischer: his popularity as leader of the National Party, and later also as Deputy Prime Minister, was perhaps helped by a degree of idiosyncrasy. Nonetheless, he frequently had differences with the party organisations (The Nationals – NSW)

government announced legislation ten days later to wind up the scheme from 30 June. The National Party found itself in a difficult position. If it upheld party policy and voted against the legislation, it would deny woolgrowers any income. It was effectively wedged. Ron Boswell said ‘there is no opportunity to vote against the legislation, because to vote against that legislation would not allow any money to be paid to the woolgrowers’. He was disappointed that a system that had ‘worked like a charm for 17 years and gave Australia $6 billion of export earnings, and gave the farmers and graziers a secure income, has been destroyed by Mr Kerin’.4

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The government abolished the reserve price scheme from the start of the new selling season, on 1 July. Over the ensuing two years, wool prices continued to collapse at auction. It was not until the latter part of 1993, after sweeping changes to the structure of industry bodies, and to selling, marketing and promotion arrangements, that confidence began to be restored. Fischer’s problems were compounded on 15 August 1990, when the Coalition announced that if it came to government it would abolish wholesale sales tax and replace it with a broad-based goods and services tax (GST) as part of a major package of economic reform. The National Party had long held reservations about such a tax because of its potential to increase living costs, particularly in country areas, and its adverse impact on farm incomes. Existing federal council policy did not support a GST. Hewson, however, was a known supporter of consumption taxes well before he was elected Liberal Party leader. But to commit to such a policy barely five months after the election, with no details being provided, was a surprise to many in the National Party. They were especially surprised – and more than a little concerned – at Fischer’s enthusiastic embrace of the idea. In addition to the joint media release with Hewson on 15 August, Fischer issued his own statement: The major decision, reached over several weeks of careful deliberation, is a major breakthrough and will greatly help Australian economic performance and help boost the standard of living of all Australians. I strongly support the joint decision now reached and commend Peter Reith MP [shadow treasurer] on his consultative approach.5

Having committed himself so unequivocally to the policy, Fischer had to work on the party as a whole to win its backing, or at the very least ensure no overt opposition. Most state party annual conferences had already been held. His concentration had to be on the federal council, to be held at the end of October, and then the state conferences

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in 1991. He did some extensive lobbying in the ensuing two months, and was also helped by a desire within the parties around Australia to rebuild, rather than again divide. The federal council replaced two clauses in the tax policy with an objective to ‘totally streamline the indirect tax system by abolishing the wholesale sales tax and replacing it with a broad-based and uniformly applied Goods and Services Tax’. There were conditions, but none that Fischer feared might be unachievable.6 Not all the state parties were prepared to accept the policy of the federal council, Queensland being a notable dissenter. Fischer, facing some tough questions from the state conferences in 1991, stuck to highlighting the positives – replacement of the whole gambit of wholesale sales taxes, many as high as 20 and 30 per cent, with a single, acrossthe-board, flat rate GST. He also advocated the abolition of fuel excise, which would reduce transport costs and therefore retail prices, especially in the regions. His pitch was all very well, but lacked a key detail – what would be the rate of GST? To calm this concern, he authorised the federal secretariat to develop a pamphlet, GST – Not the big bad wolf, which indicated those goods that would cost less than under the existing system, the benefits and allowances that would increase, and the boost to export industries. On the level of the GST, the pamphlet said that while the actual rate had yet to be finalised, it ‘is unlikely to be as high as 15 per cent’, which was the figure being touted by the Labor Party. Fischer gave final approval for the pamphlet to go to print as he left a federal management committee meeting in Brisbane on 28 June. Within three days, the first batches were being circulated throughout country Australia. It began to calm the bush, but it enraged the Liberals, who demanded it be recalled and pulped because it was ‘full of inaccuracies’. Fischer resisted, saying that it was an ‘organisational publication’ and anyway how could it be inaccurate when the details were not yet known. The details ultimately became known with the launch on 21 November 1991 of the Fightback! economic package, a document of three volumes, including supplementary papers, totalling more than

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650 pages. The essence of the policy was the abolition of wholesale sales tax, payroll tax and fuel excise, combined with income tax cuts for middle-income earners and pension increases, in exchange for a GST of 15 per cent. Broader areas of reform included slashing government spending, a program of significant privatisation, and deregulation of the labour market. The reservations of the state National parties dissipated as business and industry groups, farm and export organisations welcomed the potential of the package to pull Australia out of its deepening recession.7 Bringing the party round on Fightback! was an achievement for Fischer. Better still, the year was ending well for the Opposition. The former Treasurer, Paul Keating, who had unsuccessfully challenged Hawke for the Labor leadership in June and then moved to the back bench, was successful on 19 December, when Hawke himself called a spill and lost the caucus ballot by 51 votes to 65. He resigned from parliament the following February.

k A niggling issue for Fischer was the ghost of Charles Blunt. Blunt had extensively used direct mail during the 1990 election, funded from his parliamentary leader’s postage entitlement, despite the reservations of the party organisation. He had checked and double-checked his entitlement and was certain that what he did was within the guidelines. On 9 July 1990, after he had ceased to be a member of parliament, he received a letter from the Department of Administrative Services asking him to account for postage expenditure totaling more than $271 500 incurred between 1 January and 19 March 1990. Blunt replied saying all the expenditure had been incurred ‘strictly for the duties of my office for Parliamentary or electorate business’. He said the mail was always on his approved letterhead and over his signature and ‘it was never on behalf of the National Party Organisation or a specific candidate’.8

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There the matter rested until 7 November, when the Liberal’s David Hawker rose at the start of question time and asked Prime Minister Hawke to confirm that the rules governing postage allowances permitted the leaders of the major parties unlimited funds to write to Australians on any subject. Hawker also asked that the details of all postage allowances paid to members in the last financial year be published. Hawke said he would find out the details and give a considered reply. Blunt was staggered when he learned the question had been asked. He had not been forewarned about it. Fischer said the question had to be asked because the Minister for Administrative Services, Senator Nick Bolkus (South Australia), was ‘about to drop something on stamps’.9 The Opposition hoped it could head off a potential Labor attack. It was a forlorn idea. At the start of question time the next day, Hawke gave his answer. During the 1989–90 financial year, Hewson, who had not long been leader of the Opposition, spent $3000 on postage; his predecessor, Peacock, had spent $5100; the former leader of the Australian Democrats, Senator Janine Haines (South Australia) had spent $5 500; and Hawke had spent $10 255. Blunt had spent $278 922. The lower house erupted, with incredulous government members asking Hawke to repeat the Blunt figures. The PM relished the occasion: ‘I am advised that Mr Blunt spent $255 560 during the period 2 March to 19 March – $255 560 in 17 days – with the remainder, some $23 000, being spent during the rest of 1989–90.’10 Blunt was now very agitated. He had recently been appointed executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia and the organisation was concerned about the situation. He needed support from former political colleagues and demanded a statement from the party. Fischer was reluctant to become involved, but Blunt kept up the pressure. He believed the party had a responsibility to him because everything he had done, including the direct mailing, had been undertaken in good faith with the sole objective of helping the party increase its representation. Fischer eventually issued a statement on 11 November, saying he

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and the party were satisfied that Blunt was a person of the highest integrity who had not acted ‘in any way other than within his entitlements’. He questioned a number of postage expenditures by the government during the 1990 election campaign, such as the cost of a prime ministerial letter to every pensioner in the country, and said that to try and single out one man and ‘turn him into some kind of scapegoat is something neither I nor the National Party will tolerate’.11 On 20 February 1991, Bolkus announced the matter had been referred to the Australian Federal Police. The ensuing months added to the strain on Blunt, his family and his former personal staff, most of whom sought their own legal advice as they were interviewed in turn by the police. Warrants were executed on 8 May to search National Party secretariats in Brisbane and Melbourne.12 On 23 October, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Mark Weinberg, decided not to proceed with criminal charges. No written statement was issued, but inquirers to the director’s office were told: ‘In accordance with the prosecution policy of the Commonwealth, on the available and admissible evidence, a criminal prosecution against Mr Blunt is not warranted. However, this office makes no comment on whether or not civil proceedings will be considered or instituted.’ 13 A civil suit would be a matter for the government solicitor. Bolkus said advice would be sought from the Attorney-General, Michael Duffy (Holt, Victoria). No further action was initiated. Fischer was in Tasmania when the DPP’s decision became known. He was again reticent about making a statement, leaving it to the federal president, John Paterson, who said the DPP’s finding was ‘the only just decision that could have been reached’. He condemned the fact that Blunt had been subjected to a long and public inquiry which had ‘all the hallmarks of a politically inspired witch hunt’ and said the timing and content of virtually all media reports during the 15 months of the investigation were ‘obviously politically motivated’ and raised the suspicion of the government having interfered with the

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course of justice.14 Later in the day, Fischer had second thoughts, for he too issued a statement welcoming the DPP’s finding. Blunt’s views on the matter have never changed: There was never anything wrong with the stamps. The Labor Party had given leaders unlimited stamp allowances for leadership work. They provided you with unlimited stationery and they made the electoral roll available electronically. So all I did, with the full knowledge and agreement of the parliamentary [National Party] executive, my front benchers, was get the roll, get the stationery printed, and charge it up to the entitlement.15

k There was little going for the government as it headed towards the election, which Prime Minister Keating called for 13 March 1993. By December 1992, seasonally adjusted unemployment reached 11.2 per cent, or nearly 980 000, and was still nudging 11 per cent in early 1993. Bankruptcies were at record levels. Keating’s One Nation economic package, launched 12 months earlier and aimed at creating 800 000 jobs by 1996, looked dead in the water. In January 1990, Keating, then the Treasurer, had declared that ‘in three years time there will be no Government debt, domestic or external’. It had continued to rise every year since, reaching a net amount of more than $167 billion in 1992– 93, or more than 40 per cent of gross domestic product.16 Hewson and Fischer looked to be heading into an unloseable election. The Coalition campaign began to unravel over Fightback! Even though it had been public for 16 months, and modified in December 1992 to exempt food and child care from GST, it was complicated and Keating ruthlessly attacked it. Confusion over the Coalition’s plans for Medicare caused problems and helped persuade a hesitant electorate to stick with the devil it knew, particularly as Keating emphasised that forthcoming tax cuts were not election promises, but had been

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legislated and were ‘L-A-W law’. The return of Labor staggered even its most ardent supporters, with Keating admitting to a Labor election night celebration at the Bankstown Sports Club in Sydney that this was ‘the sweetest victory of all’. The government improved its lower house representation by two, to 80 seats, on its performance of three years earlier. The Liberals slipped from 55 seats in 1990 to 49. There were two Independents, representing North Sydney and Hawke’s former seat of Wills.17 Fischer was able to heave a sigh of relief at the performance of the National Party. It increased its representation by two, regaining Hinkler and Kennedy in Queensland, taking its seats in the lower house to 16, and beginning the haul back from its less than impressive result in 1990. The election also saw the return of Julian McGauran to the Senate.18 The result strengthened Fischer’s hold on the leadership. There was criticism in the post-election party meeting that the Coalition had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory because of Fightback!, but Fischer easily fought off a challenge from Sinclair to be re-elected. Lloyd did not re-contest the deputy’s job, with the post going to John Anderson. The weakened position of the Liberal Party presented an opportunity for the Nationals to become more assertive in the Coalition. Fischer insisted on the return of the shadow trade portfolio as a Nationals responsibility, and its inclusion in the shadow cabinet. He also negotiated an additional shadow ministry, giving the National Party seven Opposition portfolios, four of them in the shadow cabinet.19

k In November 1992, Fischer married a former electorate staffer and long-time National Party member, Judy Brewer, and 12 months later the couple celebrated the birth of their first child, Harrison. Early in 1994, Fischer was lucky to escape serious injury or worse in a car smash in his Farrer electorate in which two other people were killed.20 While Fischer bore no responsibility for the incident, he said he seri-

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ously considered giving politics away. Ultimately, however, he reconsidered. He had been a member of parliament for more than 18 years – nine of them in the New South Wales parliament, the first five as a member of the state Coalition government. All the rest of the time he had been in Opposition. While the federal Coalition was currently in no great shape, neither was the re-elected Keating government. There was a chance, not only of returning to government, but also of becoming Deputy Prime Minister.

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Is this the joy of government?

22: Is this the joy of government?

John Howard, re-elected to the Liberal leadership in January 1995, reunited the Liberal Party and together with Fischer gave the Coalition a new sense of direction and determination. Fischer was impatient for an election, sensing the Opposition was finally heading for victory at the polls after more than 12 years. He used a speech to the New South Wales National Party’s annual general conference in Mudgee in June 1995 as a direct election pitch: ‘I have only one closing thought, one message to Paul Keating: Let’s go to the elections, the earlier the better, because there is a big job for us to do and, frankly, it is beyond you.’ 1 In the light of future events, it was interesting that he also used the occasion to point to the need for gun law reform, even though this was the responsibility of the states and a touchy subject for the party, many of whose members were gun owners. Asserting that such debate should not be held in the wake of ‘some repugnant incident’, Fischer said the time was right to raise the matter. The right of individuals to own firearms should not extend to people who had a record of instability, violent crime or unsafe use of weapons, he said. Rapidfire automatic weapons, large-calibre weapons or other military-style

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firearms should not be available to the general public, and the federal government should ‘exercise relevant import controls in relation to these’. The federal party, he said, supported setting up a national register of people who should not be allowed to own firearms or hold a shooter’s licence, and a uniform gun licensing system throughout Australia: ‘While making proper allowance for legitimate sporting and recreational activities, and the proper needs of our rural community, every effort should be made to limit the carrying of guns in Australia.’ When the election came, on 2 March 1996, nearly another nine months later, the Coalition scored a convincing victory, with the Liberals winning an impressive 76 seats, including one CLP in the Northern Territory – enough to govern in their own right, if they so wished – and the ALP reduced to 49. The National Party improved its tally by two to 18, winning back Page and Richmond on the New South Wales far north coast, and returning its lower house representation to respectability. Richmond was won by Larry Anthony, the third successive generation of the family to represent the seat – a unique achievement in federal political history.2 The party also boasted its first woman elected to the House of Representatives, with De-Anne Kelly in Dawson replacing Ray Braithwaite, who had retired. There were five Independents elected to the House of Representatives, the highest number in the post-war period, and the minor parties held the balance of power in the Senate.3 Fischer and Anderson were uncontested for their leadership positions and in the new ministry the National Party had seven members, holding nine posts – Fischer, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade; Anderson, Minister for Primary Industries and Energy; Sharp, Minister for Transport and Regional Development; Peter McGauran, Minister for Science and Technology; Bruce Scott (Maranoa, Queensland), Minister for Veterans’ Affairs; Brownhill, Parliamentary Secretary (Trade) and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy; and Tambling (CLP), Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Transport and Regional Development.4

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k Fischer had hardly settled into his office when the unthinkable happened: 35 men, women and children were shot dead and 18 others wounded by Martin Bryant in the historic Tasmanian tourist spot of Port Arthur on Sunday, 28 April. It was the largest massacre by a single gunman in the world.5 Bryant had used an AN-15 and an FN·308, rifles that were both banned in all states and territories except Queensland and Tasmania. A horrified nation clamoured for gun law reform and Howard, an anti-gun man who confessed to never understanding why individuals should have firearms, immediately called for tighter controls and uniform state licensing laws.6 Fischer, a licensed gun owner, backed the Prime Minister.7 The ‘repugnant incident’ had happened and the gun debate took on all the emotion and fury that Fischer knew it would. Pro-gun lobbyists and more extreme right-wingers predicted that people would bury their guns rather than surrender them and suggested the disarming of the civilian population would be a threat to national security. A special meeting of the Australasian Police Ministers’ Council in Canberra on 10 May agreed to sweeping changes to the gun laws, as well as a 12-month amnesty for people to hand in banned weapons and receive compensation based on a March 1996 valuation. The Commonwealth would immediately prohibit the importation of all banned weapons.8 Given the enormity of the Port Arthur tragedy, few in the parliamentary National Party opposed Howard’s determination for reform – the political imperative for the new government was that it simply had to be done, quickly and decisively. However, there were opponents, such as Queenslanders Bob Katter junior and De-Anne Kelly.9 And the party generally wanted to ensure the reforms were fair, so that people with a recognised need to own a gun, particularly farmers and sporting shooters, would not be unduly penalised. Fischer said some ‘sensible fine tuning’ in the registration and licensing policy mix, mainly relating to some categories of semi-automatic weapons, notably shot

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guns, was ‘repeatedly blocked by Howard’s people for fear it would make Howard look weak in his first year as Prime Minister’. He also regretted that the Commonwealth was ‘slow to crank up the relevant and necessary import bans’, meaning that for some time weapons that were declared illegal could still be imported. Overall, however, he was satisfied with the outcome: ‘The gun fatality rate per 1000 people in the USA today is 15 times greater than in Australia.’ 10 There were heated meetings in party branches, conferences and across electorates as the debate unfolded. Fischer was critical of the hypocrisy that shone through on occasions: ‘We got belted over the head at party conferences, especially in Queensland, where I said “hang on, I’m missing something here – your state [police] minister, a National Party state minister [Russell Cooper] went to Canberra and agreed [with the outcome of the police ministers’ council], so don’t bore it up me”.’ When Queensland Premier Rob Borbidge said rank and file members would determine the National Party’s position, Fischer warned that if gun laws were not tightened a total ban could be the end-result. Pro-gun rallies were held across the country. Peter McGauran facilitated the convening of a rally at the Sale football ground in his Gippsland electorate, to be addressed by Howard: I agitated early for Howard to do a rally in the bush, to confront the issue and show he was listening. I could see the tsunami coming. When he decided he wanted to do it, he rang me and we decided on Sale as the venue. There was a great rush to get all the sound equipment organised. Security was a major concern and there was this great debate about how the Prime Minister would get from his car to his position on the stand. In the end he drove to the football ground and walked to the stand without any problem.

Howard wore a bullet-proof vest, the tell-tale signs of which were picked up by television cameras. McGauran said it gave the event greater prominence: ‘I was sitting right behind him. No one offered

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me a flak jacket! I’d say there were three to five thousand people there, not the ten thousand the media reported.’ He came under criticism in his electorate for championing Howard’s stand and not supporting gun owners: ‘But what a lot of people didn’t realise was that I facilitated a meeting for shooters’ representatives with Howard after the event – and that gave them direct access to the Prime Minister, which they would never have otherwise had.’ 11 Reform of gun laws might have been politically imperative after Port Arthur, but it resulted in a serious bleeding of members from National Party ranks. Some irate members rang party head offices to tell them what they could do with their party. Most simply let their membership lapse. They were further motivated to leave the party when Pauline Hanson, elected to the House of Representatives as an Independent in 1996 after having been disendorsed by the Liberal Party in her Queensland seat of Oxley for making comments that were contrary to party policy, announced in April 1997 that she was forming a new political party, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation.12 Hanson took a populist stand on sensitive issues, opposing Asian immigration, Aboriginal land rights, multiculturalism, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), trade liberalisation – and gun law reform. While appealing to right-wing views, including among some Labor voters, she offered little by way of policy alternatives. That hardly mattered. She injected a new dimension into national politics and gained extensive and sustained publicity. One Nation’s ‘principles of direction’ on firearms declared that Australians should have the right to defend themselves and their families in their own home, that shooting was a legitimate sport and pastime, and that disarming law-abiding citizens ‘is not in the national interest and will do nothing to reduce crime’.13 Many country people agreed with her ideas. She seemed to be responding to political standpoints that were normally National Party territory. An anti-National Party mood began to deepen in 1997–98, despite some notable achievements. These included: the introduction of a new Black Spots program to make known road crash sites safer; a

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major Roads of National Importance scheme to upgrade inland freight routes – pioneered by Sharp in the Transport portfolio; retention of the diesel fuel excise rebate; retention of the analogue mobile telephone system beyond its scheduled shut-down date and provision for CDMA phones to ultimately replace analogue; maintenance of Export Market Development Grants for small exporters; extra funding for rural health; and a $500-million-plus Agriculture – Advancing Australia (AAA) package, promoted as the biggest single program ever introduced for the nation’s farm industries. The AAA program was a direct result of a National Rural Finance Summit, inspired by Fischer, developed by Anderson and his parliamentary secretary, Brownhill, and held in July 1996 under Brownhill’s chairmanship. Its aim was to focus on sustainable agriculture by moving from the subsidy mechanisms of the Rural Adjustment Scheme towards capacity-building, self-reliance, and increased on-farm efficiencies. Rather than focus on these positives, party members looked more to negatives: the quality of Telstra services in the bush and the government’s proposed partial sale of the telco; the threat to security of tenure of pastoral land from native title claims following High Court judgments on the Mabo and Wik cases in June 1992 and December 1996; the impact of international trade liberalisation and free trade, which appeared to be working against the interests of Australia’s strict quarantine laws and allowing cheap imports of food already produced in Australia. Deregulation. Rationalisation. Privatisation. Globalisation.14 Hanson was against all these, but where was the National Party? To many party members the answer was clear: cuddling up to the Liberals! This was not true. The party had fought and won important cabinet decisions, as evidenced by the media. For instance The Australian reported on 29 August 1997 that ‘ … John Howard has been forced to accept significant changes to his ten-point Wik native title plan following the threat of a National Party grassroots revolt’. Three weeks later, on 19 September, The Land said ‘ … Primary industries Minister John Anderson must have had the dickens of trouble getting his

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$517 million Agriculture – Advancing Australia package through Federal Cabinet. … The Minister should be congratulated’. And The Sydney Morning Herald in its 28 January 1998 edition reported that ‘ … Under pressure from the National Party, the federal government has jettisoned the planned closure of the analogue phone network in 2000’. The wins did not come without fights or intervention. Don McDonald, the National Party’s federal president between 1996 and 1999, was possibly the most directly involved of its organisational leaders in trying to change policy directions. One of Australia’s largest cattle producers, with enterprises centred on his Cloncurry property in north Queensland, McDonald had a deep understanding of the impact of government policies on the outback. He had ‘blazing rows’ with Howard over native title, the application of fringe benefits tax on remote rural enterprises, and Telstra. He was critical that his party’s parliamentary wing too often kept the organisation in the dark on policy developments: ‘There was never enough consultation between the party and our [parliamentary] executive. When the leaders were developing policies, they never informed us adequately so that we could offer advice or get out and help sell them. Too often we were playing catch up.’15 Sharp, as well as developing new roads programs, was jointly involved with the Minister for Industrial Relations, Peter Reith, in reforming the waterfront with the stevedoring company Patricks and its chief executive, Chris Corrigan. Sharp saw the reform as essential to cleaning up criminal activity and making the waterfront efficient and internationally competitive: There was theft, malicious damage, graft, corruption, bribery. Reith and I developed the reform plans and did a lot of scenario planning. Patricks lined up with the National Farmers’ Federation and came up with an alternative workforce plan. Our job was to provide the industrial relations environment and moral and financial support, which we did. If we hadn’t had a Chris Corrigan, it wouldn’t have happened. Howard was absolutely

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determined to do it, but some senior ministers thought the gains wouldn’t be worth the cost.16

Sharp also began work to privatise Australian National Railways, reform aviation safety and privatise airports. Together with the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, Bruce Scott, he instigated the development of Victoria Cross rest areas and memorials on the Remembrance Driveway – the Hume and Federal highways – between Sydney and Canberra. The driveway was originally established in the early 1950s to honour those who had served during World War II. Now each rest area was dedicated to one of Australia’s VC winners.17 Peter McGauran battled to maintain budget funding levels for the CSIRO and initiated the program to replace the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation’s HIFAR research reactor – Australia’s first nuclear reactor, opened by Menzies in April 1958 – with a new OPAL facility to take nuclear science into the future.18 Warren Truss (Wide Bay, Queensland), who became Minister for Customs and Consumer Affairs from October 1997, found a department with low morale and a virtual siege mentality: Customs was doing a lot of good things, but the public didn’t know. So we talked up their successes – a major drug bust in Adelaide one Christmas, the beagle dog teams, and so on. They were good stories and the customs people were very proud of the coverage they received. Now you’ve got TV programs, which are enormously popular, and people understand far more what customs is all about. We doubled the size of the quarantine service, increased baggage checks at airports to almost 100 per cent, installed new sensors, X-ray machines and remote surveillance equipment, and tightened northern Australian quarantine barriers to stop diseases coming in from Asia.19

There was much the party was achieving; the trouble was public perception. Nearly all announcements for the bush and regional Australia

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were made in the name of ‘the Government’ or ‘the Coalition’. The words ‘National Party’ were rarely used, even by its own ministers. Having been in coalition almost constantly since 1949, the electorate at large equated the word ‘Coalition’ with ‘Liberal’. The National Party’s identity was sliding into oblivion. Fischer’s profile was high, but largely because of his quirkiness and self-promotion – he was leading the Tim Fischer party rather than the National Party. Anderson said the party had a ‘very substantial’ impact on the Coalition and its policy directions. For example, he said that on coming to office the Liberals were determined to cut the diesel fuel rebate, move to 100 per cent cost recovery for export inspection charges, and abolish dollar-for-dollar research and development grants. He had heated arguments in the cabinet: ‘I told them “you can’t go charging full cost recovery for export inspection when the system is in such a shambles; you’ve got to reform it first, make it efficient and cut costs”.’ 20 All three proposals were dropped, although not before Anderson had considered resigning from cabinet – but nobody in the community knew of that.21 He was particularly proud of the AAA package: There was deathly silence in Cabinet when I put the proposal forward, asking for $500 million in funding, deathly silence. Then Howard said ‘we can’t do this’ and I said ‘we have to’. John Fahey [finance minister] said he’d get his people to assess the costings. He came back to a subsequent Cabinet meeting and said it couldn’t be done for $500 million, it needed $525 million.

A key element of AAA was the replacement of Income Equalisation Deposits with a more attractive Farm Management Deposits scheme (FMDs), to encourage farmers to set aside taxable income in profitable years so that it could be drawn down in times of low income. Within four years, 50 000 farmers had invested more than $2 billion in FMDs. Other programs included FarmBis, which subsidised farmers for undertaking professional business and natural resource man-

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agement training, and Farm Help, which provided financial assistance to farmers who could not borrow further against their assets.22 A problem for the party, and particularly many in its grassroots membership, was that much had changed in society and politics. Labor was no longer the socialist party it used to be. The divide between Labor and non-Labor had narrowed. Hawke Labor deregulated the financial system and floated the dollar, privatised organisations such as Qantas and the Commonwealth Bank, transformed the Industries Assistance Commission into the Productivity Commission, reduced tariffs, pursued international trade liberalisation through the World Trade Organisation and the 17-member Cairns Group, and deregulated many agricultural industries, including those of tobacco, cotton, egg, apple and pear production, and domestic wheat marketing. The remaining vestiges of market support and protection were being whittled away, substantially with the support of the NFF. The number of farm enterprises continued to decline as adjustment and reconstruction programs, together with new production technologies, encouraged farmers to become more efficient and internationally competitive or leave the industry.23 Greater emphasis was placed on the environment and soil and water conservation, and the formula for providing drought assistance was changed to a system for calculating exceptional circumstances. Howard and the Liberals had no intention of winding back these developments – they were intent on progressing them. Fischer and his senior colleagues similarly accepted that the course was set and was basically right for the nation’s future. But habits die hard, especially among the older generation, which is more resistant to change – and the party’s membership was ageing.24 While most accepted that the Country Party of old – supporting stabilisation, orderly marketing and a range of subsidies, depreciation allowances and tax concessions for primary producers – was history, they were sceptical of the new directions. If the parliamentarians understood the whys and wherefores of such policies, they failed to adequately explain the rationale to their members and nurture their support.

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The mood was not helped by a government decision in 1997 to revoke a substantial number of exceptional circumstance drought declarations in Queensland. Anderson said he was ‘aghast’ when he received a brief from his department recommending that 48 areas be removed from exceptional circumstances: I knew that if the recommendation went to Cabinet, they would all go. So I contacted Larry Acton at the Queensland United Graziers’ Association and asked for his assessment. My Cabinet colleagues would have rung my neck if they knew I was seeking outside advice from industry. Acton came back saying 36 should be revoked and 12 should not. So the 36 went and [Queensland premier] Borbidge went into the media saying I’d be lynched if I dared to cross the border. There wasn’t one word of support from the [Queensland] Graziers’ Association. I was singularly unimpressed after going out on such a limb.25

k Soon after coming to government, Howard developed a new code of ministerial conduct to show that his government’s standards on ministerial behaviour, disclosure of personal pecuniary interests and conflict of interest were higher than those of the previous administration. The code was so tough that it soon began to claim scalps. Between October 1996 and July 1997, two ministers and two parliamentary secretaries, all Liberals, were forced to resign over breaches of the code.26 Barely two months later a group of people, including National Party ministers Sharp and McGauran, were caught in a controversy over travel allowance claims. Both had repaid overpayments and both denied any impropriety. Sharp announced his resignation from the ministry on 24 September ‘to avoid the government experiencing any embarrassment or any distraction from the good work that

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it has been doing for the past 18 months’.27 The issue also implicated the Minister for Administrative Services, David Jull (Liberal, Fadden, Queensland), and, indirectly, two Howard staffers, including the Prime Minister’s chief of staff and friend, Graeme Morris, for misleading parliament on the detail of Sharp’s repayments. Jull resigned from the ministry on 25 September and the staffers from their jobs. Four days later Howard informed the House of Representatives of McGauran’s resignation as Minister for Science and Technology.28 Sharp was succeeded in the Transport and Regional Services portfolio by Mark Vaile (Lyne, New South Wales), while McGauran was not immediately replaced, his responsibilities being taken over by the Minister for Industry, Science and Tourism, John Moore. The National Party, however, maintained its numerical strength in the ministry with the elevation of Truss to Customs and Consumer Affairs.29 Smarting from the loss of two of his ministers, Fischer said the code, while well intentioned, was a product of the Coalition’s inexperience in being out of office for 13 years: ‘Cabinet, of which I was a senior member, stuffed up in having a code which technically was very difficult to comply with.’ 30 While no charges were brought against McGauran or Sharp, both said their experiences devastated them. McGauran later returned to the front bench, but Sharp found the political fire in the belly had ‘gone out’: It was terrible. It knocked me around. I’ve gone over it a thousand times. I dobbed myself in because I found mistakes in the TA [travel allowance] claims. I was owed money on one hand but had apparently over-claimed on the other. So I retreated to the back bench and sat there pretty morose. I had to use the party room as my office for about two weeks. It was pretty depressing. 31

He tried to get himself re-invigorated, but was ‘still not enthused’ after the 1997 Christmas break. By August 1998 he had decided not contest the next election, and told Fischer and Anderson:

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They said I couldn’t go because they both wanted to! Tim had problems with his son, Harrison, who was autistic. John had just lost a child and wanted to step back from the deputy leadership. They had a plan whereby John would retire as deputy leader and I would be elected and so be back in the ministry. Then Tim would retire at the next election and I would take over as leader.

Sharp would not be persuaded. For him, front-line political involvement was over. He wanted out. He retired at the election on 3 October 1998. The run of ministerial and parliamentary secretary resignations – seven in all in less than two years – increased public cynicism about politics and the major political parties and boosted the appeal of Independents and One Nation. The danger of One Nation was starkly illustrated at the Queensland election in June 1998, when the party won 11 seats in the Legislative Assembly and contributed to the defeat of the Borbidge Coalition by the Labor Party under Peter Beattie. Opinion polls suggested there could be a repeat performance federally, with One Nation poised to take up to 20 per cent of the primary vote in key rural and regional electorates. Adding to the National Party’s, and Fischer’s, problems was the federal Coalition’s decision to revisit the GST. In August 1998 the government announced a tax-reform package that included the introduction from 1 July 2000 of a 10 per cent GST in return for the abolition of wholesale sales taxes, personal income tax cuts and increased benefits for small businesses, families, pensioners, self-funded retirees, and first-home buyers. GST on business inputs, imported or sourced domestically, would be refundable, exports would be free of GST, boosting competitiveness by an estimated $4.5 billion a year, and transport costs would be reduced by allowing businesses to claim a GST credit on petrol and diesel of seven cents a litre. Heavy road and rail transport operators would be able to receive a credit that would cut diesel excise from 43 to 18 cents per litre.

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Selling the GST: Tim Fischer with National Party candidates for Hunter, New England and Riverina, Rob Macaulay, Stuart St Clair and Kay Hull, Sydney, 14 August 1998 (The Nationals – NSW)

The National Party’s federal management committee endorsed the package, with federal president McDonald, after many interventions during its development, describing the policy as being ‘full of National Party footprints’ and an ‘exciting opportunity to fix Australia’s decrepit tax system in a way that genuinely helps everyone’.32 Despite the endorsement, many in the electorate were dubious and again questioned why the party leadership was so willing to go along with Liberal policy. The party succeeded in having the government’s plan to sell its majority shareholding in Telstra modified to no more than 49 per cent, unless and until an independent inquiry was satisfied the telco was fulfilling specific performance criteria, including service levels to country and remote-area customers. Still the doubts lingered and the march of One Nation continued. Some in the Queensland National Party plotted to have Fischer dumped.33

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Howard was determined to isolate One Nation. Declaring that Hanson’s policies were divisive and dangerous to Australia’s international reputation, especially in Asia, he said Liberal Party candidates throughout Australia would put One Nation last on their how-to-vote cards. Labor had announced it would do likewise. Fischer and Anderson also wanted to do so, but they had difficulty convincing some of their colleagues and candidates, many of whom faced rivals in the Citizens Electoral Council, Democratic Socialist Electoral League, Socialist Equality Party, and others political groupings – all of which were arguably greater anathemas to the National Party than One Nation. Moreover, Fischer had no party constitutional power to direct the state parties on how to allocate their preferences. He decided to bring matters to a head by declaring the leadership vacant at a party meeting on 5 August 1998. To demonstrate support for Fischer, Anderson also declared his position vacant, although he disagreed with the party leader’s tactic.34 No one challenged and both were re-elected.35 Fischer could not deliver a commitment from all the party’s candidates to put One Nation last on their how-to-vote cards. Sitting Queensland members Katter, Kelly, and Paul Marek (Capricornia) ignored his plea, as did two New South Wales candidates, Stuart St Clair and Rob Macaulay. He was successful in persuading Truss not to issue half his how-to-vote cards with Labor last and the other half with One Nation last, on the grounds that, as a minister, he needed to show solidarity with the rest of the ministry. The Queensland Nationals agreed to put One Nation last on their Senate how-to-vote card, a decision that endangered its second candidate on the ticket, O’Chee.36 The campaign for the 3 October election was hard, with National Party candidates having to defend the GST, partial Telstra sale, and gun law reform, as well as fight One Nation, several Independents, the Labor Party, and, in some three-cornered contests, the Liberal Party. Anthony was convinced he was going to lose in Richmond, but managed to scrape back with a two-party preferred majority of 1257 votes, ironically delivered by One Nation preferences in a deal he had done with its candidate without having to reciprocate with his preferences.

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The government was returned, but there were casualties. Its numbers went from 94 in the House of Representatives following the 1996 election to 80, while Labor improved from 49 to 67. Of the five Independents elected in 1996, only one survived, Peter Andren, in Calare. Hanson was defeated in Oxley by the ALP and, despite standing in 139 electorates across the Commonwealth and winning 8.43 per cent of the primary vote – more than the National Party’s 5.3 per cent – not a single One Nation candidate was elected. The best it could achieve was one senator in Queensland, replacing the National Party’s O’Chee.37 The National Party weathered the Hanson storm better than many expected, although not without pain. In addition to the loss of O’Chee, New South Wales Senator Sandy Macdonald fell to the Australian Democrats, due to the One Nation preference flow. In the lower house, Capricornia was lost to Labor and Sharp’s seat of Hume went to the Liberals in a bitter three-cornered contest, taking the party’s lower house numbers back to 16. It also suffered hefty swings in heartland seats. The highest One Nation primary vote in a National Party electorate was a whopping 26.33 per cent in Wide Bay, slicing Truss’s 1996 primary vote of nearly 60 per cent to just under 31.5 per cent. In New South Wales, One Nation candidates scored more than 10 per cent of the primary vote in all National Party electorates. The highest was nearly 21 per cent in Anderson’s seat of Gwydir, followed by the north coast electorate of Cowper, held by Garry Nehl, where One Nation polled over 15 per cent, and in Fischer’s seat of Farrer, where it claimed 14 per cent of the primary vote. The election brought new blood into the party room, with Kay Hull in Riverina, Tony Lawler in Parkes, and Stuart St Clair in New England – all New South Wales seats. Nonetheless, a concern was that the inroads made by One Nation would make several seats vulnerable at the next election. The post-election reshuffle enabled Fischer to bring Peter McGauran back into the ministry as Minister for the Arts and Centenary of Federation, a reasonably junior portfolio but one that was handy for the National Party, enabling it to build up regional tours of performing

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arts and exhibitions and make grants to local government for special projects to mark the upcoming centenary of federation in 2001. Anderson moved from Primary Industries and Energy to Transport and Regional Services, while Vaile went to the renamed portfolio of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. Scott added Minister assisting the Minister for Defence to his Veterans’ Affairs responsibilities, Tambling moved from parliamentary secretary to the Minister for Social Security to that of Health and Aged Care, and Anthony came into the ministry as parliamentary secretary (Trade), replacing Brownhill, who stood aside to facilitate Anthony’s elevation.38

k The buffeting the party took in the first term of government – the criticisms levelled at it by its members, the rise of One Nation and the vitriol of the election campaign – took their toll on Fischer. He began to seriously plan an exit strategy. In the meantime, however, his commitment and outward enthusiasm did not falter. As the Minister for Trade, Fischer concentrated much effort on shoring up relations with countries in Asia, reassuring them that, in spite of Hanson, Australia truly was an open, multicultural and nonracist country. He built trade deals under the Supermarket to Asia program and boasted of exports ‘going gangbusters’. He charted success in typically Fischeresque parlance – rice to Japan, pasta to Italy, Taree tail lights to Europe, car parts to South Korea, and Mick’s Whips (a small outback Northern Territory enterprise making stock whips) selling worldwide via the internet. He pursued new trade opportunities, travelling far and wide, complete with his Akubra, which was blessed by the pope on one occasion. In the reshuffle of October 1997 the Primary Industries parliamentary secretary’s post was given to Liberal Senator Judith Troeth (Victoria), enabling Brownhill to concentrate on being parliamentary secretary (Trade) and relieve Fischer of some travel responsibilities, allowing him to focus more on domestic and party issues. But the party leader was

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as much an enthusiast of travelling as he was of trains. As Brownhill said, the plan that he should do more overseas travel did not eventuate.39 Brownhill said Fischer had a succession plan in place, even at the height of his deputy prime ministership: ‘He expected Sharp would take it [the leadership] on because Anderson didn’t want it. Then Sharp lost his job and Tim’s plan was to hand over to Anderson who would later hand over to Vaile.’ Fischer announced on 30 June 1999 that he would retire to the back bench ‘on or about 20 July’. He received plaudits across party lines. Opposition leader, Kim Beazley (Brand, Western Australia) noted that Fischer had held his party firm in the face of internal opposition to gun law reform, native title and distancing itself from One Nation: ‘At different points of time, it looked as though your political party was to be destroyed. You had an exceptionally difficult task of it to lead your political party in those circumstances where naturally – and I do not make this as a mocking point – there was flat panic in your ranks.’ 40 Fischer stood down as party leader, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade on 20 July, and served on the back bench until he retired from parliament at the election in November 2001. Anderson was elected the new leader, with Vaile becoming his deputy. Anderson was determined not to attempt to emulate Fischer by trying to juggle the responsibilities of Minister for Trade and party leader. While McEwen and Anthony had established the tradition and managed it well, politics was now a different game – faster and more demanding, 24 hours a day seven days a week. Anderson also knew a priority of his leadership must be to cuddle the state organisations, especially Queensland, and heal the wounds of gun law reform, native title and Hanson, and rekindle a unified purpose and direction at all state and federal levels. He decided to keep his Transport and Regional Services portfolio and let Vaile handle Trade, with Truss taking over Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and Anthony moving to Community Services.

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Delivering for the bush

23: Delivering for the bush

Anderson was almost an accidental leader. He would have been happy for Sharp to have taken over from Fischer so that he could be setting his sights on retirement. Sharp’s stumble over travel allowances and his subsequent retirement from parliament put paid to such plans. Now that he had the job, however, he was determined to use the opportunity to press for more programs and development beyond the major cities. He was a different personality to Fischer, more serious and never at ease with the media. His family had always believed it was not good to be in the newspapers. A beef and wheat producer from Mullaley, at the foot of the Warrumbungles in New South Wales, with a passion for cars, he seemed in many ways an unlikely candidate for the sometimes nasty business of politics. Anderson had suffered personal tragedy that few could begin to comprehend. His mother died of cancer when he was three. Then, on Easter Sunday 1970, when he was 13 and home from boarding school, he was playing cricket on the lawn with his father when he struck a ball which hit his younger sister Jane in the neck. The freak accident

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killed her almost instantly. His father was never the same again and, in many respects, neither was Anderson. More recently, in 1998, he and his wife Julia lost a baby son, Andrew, who had been born with serious medical complications and lived only six months. To overcome these traumas – the death of his young son coincided with the intense pressure of the 1998 federal election and tensions in the cabinet on management of the wool stockpile – and reach senior ministerial status, and now the deputy prime ministership, required an inner strength and determination that few could muster. A comment he made to Brownhill after being sworn in as Minister for Primary Industries and Energy in 1996 indicated the sort of man he was: ‘We’ve got a big job to do here. At the end of the first year I might not be the most popular man in agriculture, but I’m going to do my best for agriculture’.1 His focus was to do what he thought best in the national interest and in the interests of people in country and regional communities, even if from time to time it brought him into conflict with that constituency. He had frequently been the government’s front-line defender against criticism – Fischer often being overseas when controversy flared. Fischer had held a grudging Queensland to the anti-Hanson and pro-Coalition policy course during the 1998 election campaign and never enjoyed a good relationship with the state party. Anderson’s relationship had been little better. He was hammered for having revoked drought exceptional circumstance declarations and defending national competition policy and trade liberalisation. Arguing that the rural decline was the fault of neither state nor federal governments, but rather a global problem, cut little ice with the rural electorate, even if The Land newspaper’s consulting editor, Peter Austin, saw Anderson’s strengths: If it’s an understanding of their problems and a sense of genuine empathy that country people look for in a National Party leader, then the present incumbent, John Anderson, is their man. It’s

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doubtful whether anybody else in Cabinet, or indeed, in the parliament, has a clearer picture of the problems besetting regional Australia and the global factors causing them, than the person who succeeded Tim Fischer as federal National Party leader and Deputy Prime Minister last July.2

The new party leader had to heal internal rifts, notably with Queensland. He began by having Boswell appointed his parliamentary secretary and Truss promoted into the cabinet. He promoted a long-serving and well respected staffer in the state party organisation, Wendy Armstrong, to his personal staff and made a point of regularly meeting with the state party’s key movers and shakers and attending as many of its conferences and executive meetings as possible. Gradually, relations improved, to the point where Anderson and Borbidge, after a breakfast meeting in Brisbane, were able to announce they had reached an accord and would work closely together – much to the disappointment of the media, which was hoping for a story of ongoing division. Anderson was convinced the rise of One Nation had been caused by the government being too economically driven and not caring enough about the impacts of its policies on regional Australia: ‘To be frank, Tim Fischer was overseas too much and I was too tied up in Budget committees. Support for One Nation was driven not by farmers, but by country towns, especially in Queensland. People were worried by the pace of change.’ 3 In response, and sensing that Fischer would soon stand down as leader, he had used the opportunity of a National Press Club speech to emphasise his priorities for regional development. The speech was titled One Nation or Two? and in it Anderson acknowledged that rural and regional Australia was feeling alienated, left behind and not recognised for its contribution to the economy. He warned that unless this was changed Australia was at risk of splitting into two nations, and announced that he would convene a Regional Australia Summit later in the year.4 The combination of outcomes from this and the earlier finance summit delivered billions of dollars’ worth of programs, arguably

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the biggest financial commitment to regional Australia and agriculture in the nation’s history. Highlights of the regional summit, held in Canberra from 27 to 29 October 1999, three months after Anderson became leader, were a commitment to build the Alice Springs to Darwin railway, thus finally completing the north-south rail link, a new $90-million Regional Solutions program to help regional development, and the establishment of Australia’s first philanthropic foundation to specifically help country communities – the Foundation for Rural and Regional Renewal. With Ian Sinclair as its chairman, the foundation began work in 2000 and had allocated more than $20 million to regional projects by 2009.5 Anderson was frequently exasperated at the lack of appreciation for these federal party successes shown by his own party. He bluntly told a federal convention, held at Tweed Heads in June 2000 to mark the party’s 80th anniversary, that ‘some of our own are too quick and ready to talk us down – they do not think before they blandly assert that this very active government has done nothing for regional Australia and they effectively encourage people to vote against us whenever they do’. He rejected the need to differentiate: I hear some comment that sometimes seems to suggest that we are only seen to be performing when we are, quote, differentiating the product. I don’t feel any need at all to be defensive about this party’s identity or its performance. We are dedicated to improving the lives of people who live outside the major cities. Each member of the [parliamentary] National Party team contributes to the government team. Each player, whether ministers or members of backbench committees or whatever, pull their weight as part of the team – and I am proud of what we achieve.6

One person in his sights on that occasion was the federal president and New South Wales party chairman, Helen Dickie, who three days earlier told the state party’s annual general conference, also at Tweed Heads to coincide with the convention, that the Nationals should stop

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using the word ‘Coalition’ in speeches and media releases: ‘We must talk about the National Party, be it in government or in opposition. We must highlight National Party achievements, not make coalition announcements.’7 Anderson said he would not ‘stop using the “C” word’, although, interestingly, did concede three years later that the party had not sold itself well enough to the electorate: In the past, I think we’ve been too modest about our role and what we’ve done. In particular, I think perhaps at times we’ve been too content to talk proudly about Government achievements, rather than the things that we ourselves are particularly focused on and worked to achieve ourselves. From now on, in the interests of all, we intend to point out – in a very determined and upfront way – the things we’ve been fighting for and to claim credit for the role that we have fulfilled and continue to fulfill on behalf of our people.8

Such confessions highlighted the difficulty faced by the party’s leaders in Canberra, particularly in government, in trying to walk the line between being part of a cohesive Coalition and at the same time quelling frustration in the broader membership of not being independent enough. Sinclair felt strongly about this, saying the test of the party’s success should not be measured by specific achievements but by understanding who and what the party was and how Australia as a whole had benefited from the loyalty and support it brought to stable government: The most important achievement for any of us was being elected in the first place. We had strong and close ties with our communities and understood their issues. That was the knowledge we brought to Canberra and that made us collectively an important part of making Australia what it is today. The party has been the catalyst for consolidating the progress of Australia in many, many ways. We didn’t necessarily sell the party as

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much as we might. We were concerned about playing our part as a constructive participant in government, but with our own emphasis and priorities.9

When the party is looked at in total it is evident that, while issues and priorities changed over the years, it continued to be a significant contributor to government outcomes and national development, and placed an overriding emphasis on the interests of country and regional areas. McEwen expressed similar views on the party’s role in 1968: The most important thing is that we have a total national concept of the Australian need. … So we conceive our role as a dual one of being at all times the specialist party with a sharp fighting edge, the specialists for rural industries and rural communities. At the same time we are the party which has the total coordinated concept of what is necessary for the growth and safety of the whole Australian nation. … Summed up, our philosophy and our intent are the determination to have a safe Australia and a secure Australia, a growing Australia, a rich Australia.10

A problem for Anderson was that his political philosophy was much in line with Howard’s: On the really major issues – economic policy, social policy – I lined up very closely with Howard, so there was not much room to differentiate there. And add to that, if Howard thought what I was asking for the bush was halfway reasonable, he’d do anything to help me get it. So politically there’s an extension in which he killed me with kindness! He out-pointed me in the bush. On a couple of things, like drought and flood relief for example, he’d want to go farther than I’d want to go.11

Nonetheless, he believed the National Party brought an ‘earthiness’ to the Coalition and the cabinet because its members understood

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John Anderson: a private passion for cars prompted him to restore one of his family’s oldest farm vehicles, a 1959 Land Rover (The Nationals – NSW)

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how life outside the cities worked. Ian Robinson identified the same strength, saying National Party people had a resilience that came from experiences of rural life, where ‘you are not necessarily master of your own destiny’.12 The Tweed Heads conference was controversial for other reasons, notably dairy deregulation and GST on caravan parks. The Victorian dairy industry, the largest in Australia, had championed a push for deregulation, which was supported by the Commonwealth and the states and due to take effect from 1 July 2000. Dairy farmers elsewhere opposed the move, saying they had been misled over the extent to which prices would fall after the guaranteed farm gate price was scrapped by deregulation. Truss confronted angry meetings, including at the Tweed Heads conference, to say that the Commonwealth would provide $1.78 billion to help the industry adjust – a package steered through the cabinet by the National Party. Anderson said when the proposal was put before the cabinet, the initial reaction was ‘you want what, John?’ Truss received little support from smaller farmers, who saw their livelihoods on the verge of going down the drain. Deregulation of the sugar industry, for which the Commonwealth put forward a $150-million adjustment package, caused similar controversy two years later. The GST, to be implemented from 1 July 2000, threw up a particular anomaly in its application to caravan park owners that almost saw Anthony thrown out of his job as Minister for Community Services. The concern was that as caravan park owners would be charged GST on site fees and rental income they would offset the tax by increasing rents. In Anthony’s seat of Richmond there were more than 6000 low-income earners living in caravan parks. Landlords of other rental accommodation would not face the same problem – houses, flats and units would be GST-exempt. The government argued caravan park owners were being fairly treated because they would be liable for a 5.5 per cent GST – only slightly over half the standard rate – and also eligible for a refund of taxes paid on business input costs. The new tax system would also provide an increase of seven per cent in the rental

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allowance for low-income families, so everyone should be better off, or at least nobody would be worse off. The electors of Richmond were not convinced, with no fewer than 71 per cent of respondents to a National Party poll taken in May 2000 saying that GST exemption for caravan park owners was important or very important.13 Anthony was stuck with an unenviable choice – support government policy, as expected of a minister, and risk losing his seat, or champion the wish of his electors and risk serving the rest of his time in parliament on the back bench. On the morning of 15 June – the day the New South Wales party’s annual general conference was to open in his electorate and was to consider an urgency motion calling for the scrapping of GST on caravan park owners – Anthony was interviewed by the ABC’s AM radio program. He said if the conference motion was passed and became party policy ‘then it is appropriate for the government to seriously consider changing this policy’, adding that ‘the party will be making certain decisions and so will I’.14 Anderson did not hear the rest of the program. An enraged Howard rang him as soon as the interview was over and demanded that he haul the junior minister into line or accept that Anthony would have to be sacked from the ministry. Anderson was sympathetic to his party colleague’s situation, but also angry that the comments had caused him some embarrassment. During the conference debate, following which the urgency motion was overwhelmingly carried, Anderson undertook to talk to his cabinet colleagues, but added that ‘it’s the government’s position that what we’ve done is fair and equitable’.15 A compromise was reached. The government increased the rent assistance payable to low-income working families, social security pensioners and veterans’ pensioners paying private rent from seven per cent to ten per cent. The measure would benefit more than 500 000 people living in rented accommodation, including those in caravan parks. It was a win for Howard, because he had not done a backflip by abolishing the GST on caravan park owners.16 It was a win for Anthony

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as he had achieved a worthwhile concession and kept his position in the ministry.

k An issue that had dogged the parliamentary National Party and its relations with the broader membership and the regional community since the election of the Coalition in 1996 was the sale of Telstra. Yet the matter illustrated the party’s influence on government policy. As part of its policy for the 1996 election, the Coalition pledged to sell up to one third of Telstra in its first term of office, with any further sale proposals to be considered towards the end of the term. The so-called T1 sale went ahead in 1997 without much controversy because the government maintained a substantial majority ownership. But when Howard announced on 15 March 1998 that the government would sell its remaining shareholding alarm bells began ringing across country Australia. The concern was that a commercial Telstra would be less willing to continue funding infrastructure improvements in less profitable areas, namely the bush. Many country people complained that their phone services were not good enough anyway, that mobile phone coverage was non-existent across wide areas, and that Telstra’s response to connecting new phones and fixing faults was woefully inadequate. National Party conferences across the country carried motions demanding no further sale until these problems were solved. The government was forced to change its plan and guarantee that an independent inquiry must certify that Telstra met prescribed service standards before the Commonwealth could relinquish majority ownership. Instead, it proceeded with the T2 sale, offloading a further 16 per cent of its ownership of the company towards the end of 1999, which left the government with a nominal majority shareholding of 51 per cent. While the bulk of the proceeds from both sales went to reducing Commonwealth debt, substantial funds were set aside for rural programs. There was: more than $1 billion to establish the Natural Heritage

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The sort of image many Liberals do not enjoy: the National Party exerting influence; Nicholson’s cartoon in The Australian, 21 March 2000 (Peter Nicholson)

Trust; $250 million for a regional telecommunications infrastructure fund; and $1 billion for a package of social bonuses to improve country and regional services, including $70 million for Rural Transaction Centres (providing access to services such as banking, Centrelink and Medicare), $295 million for Networking the Nation (a program to fund telecommunications in rural Australia), $36 million to improve internet access, $25 million to improve mobile phone coverage along major highways, and $150 million to provide untimed local calls for remote Australians. The independent inquiry was announced in March 2000 under the chairmanship of Tim Besley, and required to report by 30 September. In the meantime, Telstra established a new arm, Telstra Country Wide, in June, to lift its level of service provision across regional Australia. The Besley report resulted in a further $163 million for regional, rural and remote telecommunications.

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Continuing reticence in the bush and in the National Party constituency forced the government to be cautious about proceeding with its final sale. It announced another inquiry, on 2 August 2002, this time under Dick Estens, to ascertain whether the government’s response to the Besley inquiry had been adequate. The former National Party Member for Dawson, Ray Braithwaite, was a member of both the Besley and Estens inquiries. The Estens report found that generally the government had responded positively to Besley, but that some additional improvements could be made. Another $181 million was invested in regional telecommunications. Legislation to sell the rest of Telstra was introduced into the House of Representatives on 26 June 2003, but, highlighting continuing concern about the proposal, the National Party’s Member for Riverina, Kay Hull, abstained from voting on 21 August and instead unsuccessfully moved an amendment that the bill be not acted upon until the full sale proposal was put to a referendum at the next election. She had supported the first and second tranche sales because the injection of equity was providing upgrades to telecommunications infrastructure in country areas, and because the company remained in public ownership. The full sale was a step too far for this tenacious and self-proclaimed ‘avid protectionist’.17 ‘Telstra was the toughest part of my life. I abstained twice and it cut my soul out. I should have voted against it.’18 The saga continued for another two years, with the legislation hived off to a Senate inquiry. On 13 July 2005, the NSW Farmers’ Association released the results of a survey it had conducted among its members across 14 federal electorates, which showed a continuing high level of dissatisfaction with the quality of services and 80 per cent of respondents opposed to the full sale.19 Anderson’s successor, Mark Vaile, called for $2 billion to be set aside for a special fund to ensure the continuing improvement of country services. The annual conference of the Queensland National Party – now, like all state and federal organisations, widely known as The Nationals – indicated that $5 billion should be quarantined for a ‘permanent and significant

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Trust fund’ with earnings used to provide future technological and infrastructure upgrades in regional, rural and remote areas ‘at parity price and service with metropolitan services’. It further called for Telstra Country Wide to be maintained by law and for the retention of the universal service obligation. By this time, such sabre-rattling by The Nationals was significant. The October 2004 election gave the Coalition government a slender majority of one in the new Senate from 1 July 2005, meaning the then six Nationals, including the CLP’s Nigel Scullion, had the whip hand when it came to critical policy and legislation. In the first sitting week of the new Senate, the government announced a $1.1-billion Connect Australia package to improve telecommunication shortfalls, notably in the bush, and a $2-billion perpetual Communications Fund to ‘future proof’ regional telecommunications services. To the annoyance of the Liberals, Vaile headlined his media release The Nationals deliver on regional telecommunications, and the New South Wales party’s central executive said that without the ‘relentless efforts’ of the party ‘the package would not have been achieved’.20 The Telstra (Transition to Full Private Ownership) Act finally received royal assent on 23 September 2005.21 Virtually all the funding allocations resulting from the Telstra sales, as well as the establishment of the Besley and Estens inquiries, and even Telstra Country Wide resulted from pressure exerted by The Nationals and some regional Liberal MPs. The debate was protracted and complicated, but The Nationals won outcomes that might well not have come about had it not existed as an independent party in the Coalition. Despite it all, Anderson believed the government missed the opportunity to develop cutting-edge communications technology: For a whole variety of reasons, the nation needed a proper bandwidth roll-out – for aviation, the monitoring of natural resources, including what was to become the National Water Initiative, aviation and transport security. I wrote to Howard saying the greater national interest lay, not in what we did with

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Telstra, and not what we did with the proceeds of Telstra, but in such a bandwidth roll-out. Not doing it was one of our greatest failings. There wasn’t much heart for it in the government and there should have been a lot of heart for it. Now we’ve got the [Rudd] Labor government doing what we should have done, but spending far too much money on it.22

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Internal issues and international disaster

24: Internal issues and international disaster

Telstra was an ongoing issue, but for Anderson there were other pressing matters as he took over the party leadership, not the least of them being that the federal party organisation was facing serious financial problems. Since its establishment in 1967, the management of John McEwen House had been in the hands of a company, John McEwen House Pty Ltd. For several years during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the company chairman, David Thomson, had been pressing for a redevelopment of the building. No one disagreed with his case. The existing building was ‘tired’, its roof leaked, its internal appointments were out of date, it lacked appeal to prospective tenants, and it was now woefully underdeveloped. However, Thomson could never get past the priority need for the party to have funds to fight elections, and his redevelopment ideas did not get past first base – until 1994. Finally, the federal management committee and board of John McEwen House Pty Ltd agreed that a redevelopment could no longer be delayed. A mortgage of just over $3 million was taken out to help fund the project and maintain the federal secretariat in temporary premises. An extensive

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fund-raising campaign, similar to that for the original project, encouraged party members throughout Australia to ‘buy a brick’ for $100 each. The new John McEwen House was opened on 8 November 1996 by McEwen’s widow, Lady Mary. An ageing John Gorton, who had opened the original building, was among the guests. The redeveloped building was a modern three-storey one. The secretariat would occupy a small proportion of the ground floor, leaving most space for commercial leasing, and quick repayment of the loan was confidently predicted. The secretariat would soon become self-funding and leasing revenues would generate funds. An unforeseen circumstance was that the newly elected Coalition government was intent on reducing the public service, dampening demand in the national capital for office accommodation. It also made little secret of its belief that departments seeking office space should try to find it in Commonwealth-owned buildings rather than commercial ones, and particularly those owned by political organisations – a tactic aimed at reducing the ALP’s ability to earn considerable income from Commonwealth agencies through its four-storey Centenary House in Canberra. This caused no hardship to the Liberal Party, which occupied all the space in its federal secretariat building, but John McEwen House Pty Ltd board members and National Party organisational leaders were exasperated at Fischer’s apparent lack of concern over the mounting financial plight of the party. The federal president, Don McDonald, said that as a result of the government’s actions ‘most corporates decided it was not appropriate’ to rent space in party political buildings and ‘no government agencies would go near them either’.1 The situation caused ‘huge financial problems’ to the point where McDonald and the federal finance committee ‘thought that we almost had to close the secretariat down’. Most of John McEwen House remained unleased throughout 1997 and towards the end of the year the secretariat was scaled back to one administrative officer, Sue Mitchell. Three other staff, including the federal director, Cecile Ferguson, were made redundant. The New South Wales party chairman, Helen Dickie, unsuccessfully tried to have Ferguson retained. The director

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To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

A victim of circumstance: the newly elected Coalition government’s tightening of the public sector and its attitude to Commonwealth departments leasing space in nonCommonwealth-owned buildings initially had a serious impact on the ability of the redeveloped John McEwen House to return revenues to maintain the National Party federal secretariat (photo by the author)

had worked at the secretariat since 1982, had managed the 1993 and 1996 election campaigns and had overseen the John McEwen House redevelopment. McDonald arranged for former Queensland MP Ray Braithwaite to take on the director’s job in an honorary capacity from March 1998. Braithwaite was reluctant: ‘I tried to suggest Bruce Lloyd and just about anybody else for the job! But I took it on for the rest of the year.’2 He said the most frustrating part was trying to get the office space rented: ‘I remember sitting with Don McDonald and Sue Mitchell at the Argentine embassy, trying to negotiate for them to take space. It got harder and harder, but eventually they came in.’

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Braithwaite said Ferguson kept in touch with the secretariat, frequently visiting to offer advice: ‘She never resented me being there. She understood.’ She was asked to come back to run the 1998 federal election campaign, which she did. The New South Wales party general secretary succeeded Braithwaite, also in an honorary capacity, from the end of 1998 until December 2000, by which time finances were more secure and a new director, Gaye White, was appointed.3 Funding for the party at the federal level, however, was still, tenuous. The secretariat was unable to undertake much by way of policy research and lacked the resources to run a central campaign for elections. Anderson wanted to change this, to give the federal office more meaning and credibility. Since the introduction of public funding for Commonwealth elections in 1984, there had been tension between the federal and state party organisations over just where the funds went. Public funding returns were paid to the state parties, not the federal party. There was suspicion among federal parliamentarians and some on the party’s federal management committee that the states were putting this money towards paying for their state election campaigns, rather than quarantining it for federal purposes. The states denied this, but not to the satisfaction of the feds. In August 2001, the government proposed amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act to allow the federal secretariat of the Liberal Party to determine the distribution of public funding between it and the party’s state and territory divisions. The rationale was that the federal secretariat was responsible for federal election campaigns and should therefore be the body to decide how much should go to which divisions. The legislation passed the House of Representatives and was introduced into the Senate on 23 August, but lapsed when parliament was prorogued for the 2001 election. The re-elected government reintroduced the bill in the next parliament, on 14 March 2001, and the legislation was subsequently passed with the support of the National Party.4 Anderson used the episode to argue to the state parties that unless they agreed to provide a percentage of their Commonwealth public funding to support the federal

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secretariat he would support a further amendment to the law to make it apply to the Nationals as well as the Liberals: ‘I had to put on quite a tantrum at federal management [committee] to get the states to come on board, but I think they now all realise the value of having a more financially secure federal secretariat operation.’ 5 It was a winning manoeuvre. While there was opposition at having to prop up the federal secretariat, especially when federal fundraisers continued to raid the Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne corporate sectors for donations without advising the relevant state party, it was better for state parties to forgo a proportion of public funding than lose it all. Another initiative was to transform the Sir Earle Page Memorial Trust, established by the New South Wales party in 1984 to honour the memory of Page with an annual lecture, into an independent national research foundation. Known as The Page Research Centre Limited, it came into being in 2002. The centre continued to organise the Page memorial lecture and undertook research and policy development focused on regional Australia so that ‘ … regional Australians can share fairly in the growth and prosperity of the nation’. The centre carried out work on zonal taxation, policy directions sought by regional small business, regional development, urban and suburban water use to encourage householders to save water, and undertook a major study in 2005 into telecommunications, Future Proofing Telecommunications in Non-Metropolitan Australia. While the centre’s work is publicly available, it provides an additional stream of academic study on which the party can draw for its policy development.6 More recently the organisation established a Page Research Centre Library at the Charles Sturt University Archives in Wagga Wagga to collect party documents, photographs and other records.

k In September 2002, the federal council changed the party’s federal constitution to provide for a standing federal campaign committee, made up predominantly of the state and federal directors. Such a

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Changing party branding: the stylised Australia roundel as used by the federal party prior to October 2003 (left) was replaced by The Nationals brand from that time. State parties soon followed suit (The Nationals federal secretariat)

committee had been established on the recommendation of the 1988 Nixon Report, but did not have constitutional recognition. Now it did and its role was to ‘conduct general elections, by-elections and continuous campaigning for the Party within the framework of a budget agreed by the Federal Management Committee’.7 A federal conference in Canberra in October 2003 adopted a new form of branding for the party. This replaced the stylised Australia roundel that had been used in varying forms since 1975 and formalised what had long been an abbreviated reference to the party as the Nationals with a new ‘The Nationals’ brand. While not a constitutional name change, the conference recommended that the new logo be adopted by the state parties and used by all organisations and parliamentarians on letterheads, media releases, promotional material, and in state and federal election campaigns. The states agreed, generating a greater degree of uniform presentation of the party around Australia. Three years later, in October 2006, the federal party’s constitutional name was changed from National Party of Australia to The Nationals.8 While state parties were by then presenting themselves as The Nationals, their constitutional names generally remained unaltered. For instance, the Queensland party was constitutionally the National Party of Australia – Queensland until its merger into the Liberal National Party of Queensland in July 2008, and the New South

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Wales party was still officially the National Party of Australia – NSW in 2010.9 For the purpose of this story, October 2003 has been taken as the date from which the federal and state parties became known as The Nationals, unless expressed otherwise in direct quotes. As the party prepared for the 2004 federal election, opinion polling was for the first time managed from the federal secretariat, rather than state parties using their own agencies. The federal director, Andrew Hall, had more involvement in the development of television advertising and candidates’ promotional material. Instead of the federal secretariat taking a secondary role to state party organisations in federal campaigns, the roles were substantially reversed. The 2004 election also saw a higher level of co-operation between The Nationals and Liberal campaigns. Since the early 1990s, the National Party had placed one campaign staffer in the Liberal Party’s national campaign headquarters in Melbourne, mainly to liaise between that office and its own campaign headquarters in John McEwen House. In 2004, Hall and four party staffers were located in the Liberal headquarters, where they had access to all its resources. This was a substantial boon to The Nationals, but it brought the party’s campaign more closely into line with that of its larger partner. There was virtually no differentiation, something that was thrown into sharper relief by the scrapping of an independent campaign launch by The Nationals leader. Anderson was pleased that the joint arrangements meant a better resourced campaign support structure, but regretted having agreed to a joint campaign launch. The decision to have one had been driven largely by the view that, in the age of presidential-style campaigns, there was no longer much media interest in a separate launch. Fischer’s in Albury in 1998 and his own in 2001 had not generated the enthusiasm and media focus of those of a decade or more ago.10 Under the joint arrangements, the Liberals were to ensure that grabs of Anderson’s speech introducing the Prime Minister would be included in the ABC radio and television free-time broadcast of the election campaign launch. It did not happen: ‘The Liberals gutted us.

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That was one of the few times when I had a really firm telephone conversation with Howard. He acknowledged the point and made sure the Liberals gave us some additional ABC free time advertising spots. In retrospect, the joint launch was a mistake and I would not have done it again in 2007 if I had still been leader’.11 Obviously, nobody sought Anderson’s views in the lead-up to the 2007 election, for which there was again no separate launch. Vaile said his advice was that the joint launch had worked well in 2004 and he was happy to do the same.12

k The government’s popularity was not strong by the end of 2000 and early 2001. The Liberal Party lost the Brisbane seat of Ryan at a byelection on 17 March 2001 for the first time since the electorate’s creation in the 1948 redistribution, and only just held the equally strong Liberal seat of Aston, in Victoria, at a by-election three months later. An electoral drama of a different nature was unfolding in the Northern Territory Country Liberal Party. The CLP senator, Grant Tambling, who sat with the Nationals in Canberra and was parliamentary secretary to the health and aged care minister, lost his endorsement for failing to heed a direction from his party to vote against federal government legislation banning online gambling. The CLP argued that the legislation intruded on the Territory’s rights and could damage Australia’s only operational online casino, Lasseters. Apart from the fact that Tambling believed in the legislation and had successfully managed to have amendments included to minimise potential damage to the Territory’s gambling industry, he would have been forced to resign from the ministry if he voted against the government. He had been re-endorsed by the CLP on 18 February 2001 to head its Senate ticket at the next election. On 3 July, five days after supporting Canberra’s legislation in the upper house, a special central council meeting of the party voted to revoke the endorsement. Tambling challenged his disendorsement in the Northern Territory Supreme Court and succeeded in having the Senate Committee of

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Privileges conduct an inquiry into whether the CLP’s attempt to direct him how to vote amounted to contempt of the Senate. In the end Tambling and the CLP settled their differences when the party agreed to conduct a new preselection in September 2001 and pay his legal costs. Tambling lost the subsequent preselection battle, being replaced at the top of the CLP’s Senate ticket by Nigel Scullion, a former commercial fisherman. Subsequently, the privileges committee determined that the CLP had purported to direct Tambling as to how he should vote; had imposed a penalty on him by twice revoking his endorsement, had been ‘reckless and ill-judged’, but, on balance, and given that Tambling and the CLP had reached a settlement, ‘a contempt of the Senate should not be found’.13

k A series of events in the second half of 2001 dramatically changed the national and international political landscape. On 26 August, a Norwegian freighter, MV Tampa, rescued 433 asylum-seekers, mostly Afghans, from a sinking Indonesian vessel off northern Australia. The government banned the ship from landing them on the Australian mainland, insisting they be processed offshore on Christmas Island. On 11 September, two hijacked airliners slammed into the World Trade Center in New York, another into the Pentagon in Washington DC, and a fourth, the target of which was the White House, into a field in Pennsylvania. Howard was in Washington at the time. As the enormity of the terrorist outrage became apparent, US President George W Bush declared no effort would be spared in tracking down the perpetrators: the war on terror had begun. Back in Australia, Anderson was the acting Prime Minister: The immediate concern was that this might be the first of a coordinated set of attacks around the world that could involve us in some sort of strategic mayhem. In fact, several attacks were planned – there were to have been eight planes in the US, and

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Westminster [London] was to have been the first European target. It was very frightening at every level. All sorts of things raced through my mind – what if something’s planned for here in Canberra, what would it mean for my kids, for the government, was this the beginning of Armageddon? And I had no way of knowing what would fall on my shoulders if for some reason the Prime Minister was not able to be brought home safely. I began to run through my mind and work out who I would need to gather round me in such an eventuality.14

Security at Australian airports, ports, around foreign embassies and at other strategic locations was dramatically increased, defence and police forces placed on higher alert, coastal patrols increased, and a rapid reassessment undertaken, under Anderson’s direction, of the nation’s defence procurement program. The Americans began bombing raids into Afghanistan as they tried to obliterate the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation and its leader Osama bin Laden, identified as the mastermind behind what became known as 9/11. Australia pledged its support for the American cause and the international coalition against terrorism.15 The day was doubly besetting for Anderson because he had known for the previous two days that the airline Ansett was on the verge of collapse, threatening the livelihoods of thousands of workers and their families. Attempts to find a buyer for the ailing carrier – Singapore Airlines was one prospect, and then a consortium of Australian businessmen – failed to materialise. Ansett’s fate was sealed by events in New York. No one wanted to buy airlines and no one wanted to fly in aeroplanes. The government introduced a temporary $10 air passenger ticket levy to meet shortfalls in redundancy payments to Ansett employees and a $30-million program to encourage other airlines to take up routes previously flown by Ansett and its subsidiaries.16 On 5 October, Howard called an election for 10 November. National security was the central theme of the campaign.

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The government’s policy on asylum-seekers was brought back into focus three days after the election was announced when the Royal Australian Navy’s HMAS Adelaide intercepted a boat codenamed the SIEV 4 (the letters stand for Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel) with 187 Iraqi refugees on board. It was claimed at the time, and later disproved, that the asylum-seekers threw children overboard while a boarding party from the Adelaide was attempting to sail the vessel back to Indonesian waters.17 The SIEV 4 ultimately sank and the people on it were taken aboard the Adelaide to be processed offshore under a policy that became known as the Pacific Solution. The incident, which became known as the children overboard affair, proved helpful to Howard’s campaign and the re-election of the Coalition. For the Nationals, however, the victory was less sweet. In the Senate, the party’s representation remained at four. Sandy Macdonald returned to replace New South Wales Senator David Brownhill, who resigned, and Scullion, Tambling’s CLP replacement, chose to sit with the National Party. They joined Queensland’s Ron Boswell and Julian McGauran from Victoria. In the House of Representatives, the Independent and one-time member of the New South Wales National Party, Tony Windsor, unseated Stuart St Clair in New England. In an equally bitter result, the retiring Tim Fischer’s seat of Farrer was won in a three-cornered contest by the Liberals. Two seats held by former federal leaders – Farrer and New England – lost in one election. Combined with the loss of Kennedy in Queensland – where the sitting member, Bob Katter junior, who had quit the party in July in protest against its free trade and deregulatory policies, and successfully campaigned as an Independent – the National Party’s lower house numbers slipped to 13. It was a disappointing result for Anderson’s first election as leader and made him all the more determined to strengthen the resources and campaign involvement of the federal secretariat. One Nation’s vote was generally halved from its 1998 level in most electorates held by the National Party. But not all of that reversal returned to the party. For instance, Anderson himself had polled a

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primary vote of just over 46 per cent in 1998 in his Gwydir constituency, while One Nation polled nearly 21 per cent. In 2001, One Nation support fell by nearly 11 per cent, but Anderson’s vote only increased by 6.5 per cent.18 It indicated a worrying number of former National Party voters were still opting to support other candidates rather than return to the fold. Anxieties about national and international security proved electorally helpful to the Howard-Anderson government over an extended period. The start of the second Iraq war in March 2003, justified on incorrect intelligence that the regime of Sadam Hussein was accumulating weapons of mass destruction, saw Australia commit forces to the American-led ‘coalition of the willing’. Anderson said he had no reason at the time to doubt the intelligence and accordingly ‘tried to play a constructive role’ in the cabinet decisions.19 While the military phase of the war was quickly over, the aftermath continued for much longer, with Australian combat troops still deployed six years later as attempts to establish stability and democracy in Iraq proved frustratingly difficult. At home, the electorate became increasingly disillusioned with the country’s involvement in Iraq, but was still sufficiently supportive of the war against terror and persuaded by the national security arguments to return the Coalition in 2004.20

k After the 2001 election, Anderson concentrated on increasing the party’s electoral appeal against the background of changing demographics, economic circumstances and community expectations of government. Rural inland electorates were declining in number and expanding in geographic size as country populations shrank. Agriculture, while still essential to national economic wealth, was no longer the priority it once was to many communities, including those in another traditional National Party stronghold, the coastal regions, where populations were increasing with an influx of retirees and alternative lifestylers from the cities. People generally were more interested in the

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quality of health services, education, aged care, indigenous welfare, telecommunications, and social and community facilities than the state of the farming sector. These changes in community emphasis made it important for the National Party to have a profile in broader policy areas through portfolios such as Community Services, Arts and Centenary of Federation, Veterans’ Affairs, Children and Youth Affairs, and parliamentary secretary positions for Social Security, and Health and Aged Care.21 The party’s ministers in these areas managed the direction of many and varied programs. These included: developing Centrelink from the old Department of Social Security and Commonwealth Employment Service into an agency handling all Commonwealth welfare payments; applying the first set of legislation on genetically modified food; developing the Stronger Families and Communities Strategy and the National Agenda for Early Childhood (which relaxed the qualifications for welfare support and family tax and child care benefits, almost doubling the number of child care places); establishing the Regional Women’s Advisory Council and the Rural Medical Infrastructure Fund. The list went on. The Regional Solutions and later Regional Partnerships program was providing useful assistance to local communities. It was often controversial, criticised by Labor for allegedly being rorted to favour National Party or Coalition electorates.22 Similar allegations were to be levelled at the allocation of funds from the Labor government’s community infrastructure program in September 2009.23 With the help of growing budget surpluses, funding was available for other regional programs, such as Roads to Recovery. Originally initiated by Anderson, this did much to build a better relationship with local government. Allocating funds for the maintenance and upgrading of local roads, the program provided $1.2 billion from February 2001 to June 2005 and was renewed with a similar budget for a further four years to June 2009. The Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) said the program was ‘an outstanding example of a partnership between the national and local government’.24 But to what

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extent did the ALGA understand that the National Party, and, under its subsequent branding, The Nationals, was behind the initiative? Bruce Scott was the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs for nearly six years and Minister assisting the Minister for Defence for three. He extended gold card health entitlements for veterans and war widows, improved and privatised repatriation hospitals, and implemented programs to alleviate the impact of war service on veterans and their families. Under Scott’s tenure of the Veterans’ Affairs portfolio, an information kit about the meaning of Anzac was sent to every school in the country, $10 million provided for a new Anzac Hall in the Australian War Memorial, a new site built at Gallipoli for the Anzac dawn service, and new memorials built at Sandakan in Borneo and Hellfire Pass in Thailand, and the Cobbers sculpture unveiled at the VC Corner Australian Cemetery and Memorial at Fromelles, in France. Another program implemented under Scott, Their Service – Our Heritage, was developed to preserve the memories of older veterans for younger generations. And more than 10 000 war memorials across rural and regional Australia were improved or restored.25 At the electorate level, back bench members of the party have always been good at understanding local issues and getting results for their communities. These MPs represent some of the most economically disadvantaged regions and also those with large Aboriginal populations. They understand and support initiatives to help improve health, housing and education for Aborigines, and reduce infant mortality, domestic violence, and alcohol and child abuse among the indigenous population. They also promote a wider community appreciation of Aboriginal languages, art and culture. While the party’s objectives had long been based on the principle of ‘equality for all’, by 1984 it was calling for recognition that special consideration was required in education, health, housing, employment and legal service policies to enable Aborigines to ‘progress as independent, self-sustaining members of the community with true equal opportunity’.26 National Party parliamentarians frequently presented detailed discussion papers to the party room on a broad range of issues; for instance, one by David

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Brownhill in 1995 highlighted the importance of water as a political and social issue: ‘It is curious why it [water] does not currently attract as much media and community attention as issues such as AIDS, forestry or interest rates. Every Australian, no matter where they live, is directly affected by water every day, yet public interest in the issue is limited.’27 Meanwhile, Vaile pushed forward with new trade agreements. Bilateral agreements became a more important priority after the collapse of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ministerial round in Seattle in 1999: ‘Up to Seattle, we were totally focused on WTO multilateral agreements. All the bilateral free trade agreements we now have in place had their genesis in Seattle – Thailand, Singapore, the USA.’ 28 His concentration was on completing similar arrangements with Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, Japan and China, and between Australia and New Zealand and the member nations of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). He believed the party membership generally came to accept that trade liberalisation had improved Australia’s competitiveness and opened new markets for the country’s exports, from agricultural and mineral exports to manufactures and goods and services. Vaile acknowledged that subsidies for overseas farmers, notably in the United States and European Union, continued to raise the ire of non-subsidised Australian producers, but tried to placate them by assuring their representatives and National Party conferences that a successful conclusion to the Doha round of multilateral negotiations, opened in November 2001, would answer their concerns. Doha was a slow process, still limping along in 2009.29 Vaile said trying to get the 148 WTO member countries to a point of agreement was akin to ‘herding cats’.30

k Campaigning heavily on the mantra ‘who do you trust to manage the economy and national security’, the Coalition increased its majority

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and secured a fourth term at the election on 9 October 2004. It would also have a majority of one in the Senate from 1 July 2005. The Nationals won two new Senate seats, in Queensland (Barnaby Joyce) and New South Wales (Fiona Nash), increasing its strength from four to six, given the CLP’s Scullion was one of its number. The party’s House of Representatives numbers, however, slipped to 12, with Anthony’s Richmond seat falling to Labor. This was its lowest representation in the lower house since 1946, when its tally was also 12. However, a mere numbers comparison is misleading because in 1946 the House of Representatives numbered 76 members, compared to 150 in 2004. The Liberals increased their strength from 69 in 2001 to 75, a total that included one CLP member on both occasions. Labor dropped from 65 to 60. There were three Independents.31

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Timing for change

25: Timing for change

Anderson and Vaile first discussed leadership succession in 2003, with Anderson at one point considering handing over after the New South Wales election in March that year.1 As it turned out, a prospective change did not become more definitive until August–September. In between, Anderson worked hard to develop the National Water Initiative – a new national agreement that would increase the efficiency of water use, address river flows and salinity, and provide farmers with property rights, trading rights and compensation for loss of water entitlements. All governments, the federal and the states, finally signed on to the initiative at the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting on 29 August, leading to the establishment of a $2-billion Australian Water Fund. Anderson felt this was a pinnacle achievement, providing an opportune time to hand over. He telephoned Vaile on 3 September and told him he intended to announce his retirement from the leadership before a forthcoming federal party conference, to be held in Canberra from 10 to 12 October. At a meeting in the western New South Wales town of Bourke the following day, the chairman and chief executive officer of Clyde

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Agriculture, David Boyd, told Anderson that what he had achieved on water reform was ‘only the end of the beginning’. Boyd hoped press speculation that Anderson might retire was wrong, adding ‘I plead with you to hang around’.2 Anderson realised ‘the end of the beginning’ was right, not only was there more work to do on water reform, but also in his other major political project, developing a national land transport system to modernise and interlink road and rail freight corridors and port facilities. He had unfinished business. Two days later, on 6 September, he again contacted Vaile, who was on the verge of travelling to Mexico for the fifth ministerial conference of the WTO, in Cancun, to tell him of his change of mind.3 Disappointed and frustrated, Vaile accepted his leader’s decision. In light of their earlier discussions, even before Anderson’s 3 September phone call, Vaile believed that while ‘there was no exact date or timeframe worked out, my impression was that he had reached the view that during 2004, before the election, there would be a change. I was disappointed [with the 6 September telephone call]. If there had been no talks [between us] it would not have concerned me at all. I was happy to support him as deputy. It was unfortunate that expectations had been raised’.4 Ultimately, the transfer transpired smoothly. Having successfully bedded down a $15-billion, five-year national land transport program, AusLink, Anderson, like Fischer, moved to the back bench, announcing his retirement from the leadership and the ministry on 23 June 2005. He cited family and health issues as the reasons. He also confessed to not sharing ‘the great personal passion for politics that many parliamentarians so admirably possess’. He gave his blessing to Vaile as his successor – ‘he certainly has my total backing as the next leader’ – and identified Truss as the person best suited to become the party’s deputy leader, singling him out as someone who had been ‘a wonderful colleague in the often-difficult agriculture portfolio’.5 Of the many tributes paid to him across party lines, the one by Treasurer and deputy Liberal leader Peter Costello was interesting in that it recognised the difficulties faced by The Nationals:

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I know the burden it was on John to have the demographics and the economics moving against him almost continuously throughout the period of his leadership of the National Party. It made every issue almost an issue of identity and survival. I know how deeply it affected his soul and how he agonised over decisions that we were making in the Cabinet and in the budgetary process. I often wondered whether it was taking a toll on his health, because he agonised so deeply about those particular issues. And maybe they did.6

A party meeting that evening unanimously endorsed Vaile as the new leader. The election for deputy proved interesting. There were five nominations – Queenslanders Warren Truss and De-Anne Kelly, Victorian Peter McGauran, and Ian Causley and John Cobb from New

To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

Handing over the symbol of leadership: John Anderson (right) presents the carved wooden wombat to Mark Vaile (The Nationals federal secretariat). The wombat developed into the party’s unofficial mascot after press gallery journalists dubbed the National Party leader’s election campaign the Wombat Trail in the early 1970s.

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South Wales. The ballot ended in a tie between Truss and McGauran, with the deadlock broken by McGauran, who agreed to withdraw. Anderson did not stand down from the ministry immediately. There was a brief transition period, during which he was acting Prime Minister for a week while Howard took some leave. New ministerial arrangements became effective from 6 July. Vaile, deeply involved in trying to bring a successful end to the Doha round of trade negotiations and in developing prospective free trade agreements, notably with China, elected to stay with the Trade portfolio. Truss moved to Transport and Regional Services. McGauran came into the cabinet, with Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. Cobb took over Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs and Senator Sandy Macdonald became parliamentary secretary (Trade). Kelly remained as Minister for Veterans’ Affairs and Minister assisting the Minister for Defence. While the transfer between Anderson and Vaile was not seamless, it was not destabilising to the party or the government. More damaging was the protracted debate over whether and when Howard would hand over to Costello. Following a similar timeframe to that involving Anderson and Vaile, the Howard-Costello succession debate had been bubbling – at times intensely so – since before the 2004 election. Ultimately it never happened. But for a number of circumstances, Vaile believed, Howard would have retired towards the end of 2006 and Vaile himself would have been happy to work with Costello: ‘I was close to Costello and had no problem with the prospect of him taking over’.7

k Less than three months after assuming the leadership Vaile was diagnosed with melanoma. It came as a shock to this apparently healthy, outdoor-loving, former real estate and stock and station agent, who was still not 50 years old. Surgery to his shoulder left it ‘looking like a shark bit me’ and made him realise how fragile life could be: ‘One of the things I came to learn about cancer is that its progress is sped up by

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high levels of stress and I had to try and manage that. I began to take a hard look at my life and reassess my priorities.’ 8 Vaile’s father died in February 2006 and the combination of these events was part of the reason for a minor reshuffle in September 2006 which saw Vaile and Truss swap portfolios. Truss took over trying to revive the Doha round and began expanding free trade arrangements, opening discussions with Japan, the Gulf Co-operation Council in the Middle East, Chile, South Korea and Mexico.9 The Transport and Regional Services portfolio was not much less stressful for Vaile. The year 2007 was hectic as the government rolled out new initiatives, including $22 billion to extend Auslink for a further five years to 2014, $1 billion in extra drought assistance, $42 million to take Roads to Recovery funding to $350 million a year, a $2-billion extension of the Natural Heritage Trust to improve water quality, reduce land degradation and enhance vegetation growth, and $200 million for a new Growing Regions program. Progress towards the T3 Telstra sale, in agreeing to which The Nationals won the $2-billion regional Communications Fund, was particularly drawn out and testing. In August, Vaile’s mother-in-law died suddenly, again making the family reflect on the future. Howard gifted the trade union movement a new lease of life when he flagged that the re-elected government, which would control the Senate from 1 July 2005, would introduce further workplace reforms. Up to that point, the union movement had for several years struggled to find a solid national issue that would galvanise its broad membership and even the non-unionised workforce. Howard’s legislation to establish WorkChoices came into effect from 26 March 2006. Key objections of Labor and the unions were that it removed workers’ unfair dismissal rights in companies with fewer than 100 employees, forced more workers into individual contracts, or Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs), reduced penalty rates, overtime, holiday loadings and other entitlements, and reduced the power of the Industrial Relations Commission to act as an independent umpire. The ACTU mounted a $30-million anti-WorkChoices campaign that

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included extensive prime time television advertising, which ran for the best part of two years, up to the 2007 election. Amidst mounting concern within its own ranks as opinion polls consistently showed the unpopularity of WorkChoices, the government tried to soften the appearance of the policy by ditching the name in May 2006. It had little effect. The word was by then embedded in people’s minds. The state and territory governments, all Labor, challenged the legality of WorkChoices, but the High Court found on 14 November that the Commonwealth had the right to implement its reforms.10 There was an embarrassment for Howard in August 2006, when legislation to make it law that all asylum-seekers arriving by boat be sent offshore for processing came before the parliament. In the House of Representatives, three Liberals crossed the floor to vote against the government, while one other Liberal MP and The Nationals’ chief whip, John Forrest (Mallee, Victoria), abstained. Vaile had tried and failed to persuade Forrest to support the bill. Almost immediately after the vote Forrest resigned. When the legislation was due to be debated in the Senate the following week, Howard, faced with the knowledge that it would be voted down by at least one of his senators crossing the floor, withdrew it.11 The Nationals elected Kay Hull as the party’s new chief whip – the first woman to hold the position: ‘They voted me in because I’m an organiser, but they found it difficult to have a woman cracking the whip!’ 12 The government seemed unable to win a trick. It was coming under increasing pressure over the United States’ continued detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, of suspected terrorist David Hicks, an Australian from Adelaide. By 2006, Hicks had been held without trial for five years. Meanwhile, a commission of inquiry into $300 million in alleged kickbacks indirectly paid by the privatised wheat exporter AWB Ltd to Iraq, contrary to the United Nations oil-for-food program, was unearthing incompetence, naivety and possible criminal activity on the part of some AWB executives.13 Then the tighter detention rules for illegal immigrants came under renewed scrutiny when it was discovered that a former Qantas flight attendant, Cornelia Rau, an

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Australian citizen who suffered from schizophrenia, had been held in the Baxter detention centre in South Australia for at least five months. On top of these events, higher-than-average temperatures, a seemingly endless drought across much of the continent, floods and bushfires brought into question the government’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and chart a course to tackle climate change. The Iraq conflict was dragging on with no end in sight, and the decision to intervene in the Northern Territory’s Aboriginal communities in a bid to stamp out child and alcohol abuse won as much criticism as it did acclaim. The replacement of Kim Beazley with Kevin Rudd (Griffith, Queensland) as Opposition leader, on 4 December 2006, added to the Coalition’s woes and reignited the issue of Howard’s leadership. The government tried to respond, reaching agreement with the United States to have Hicks returned to Australia, apologising for the wrongful detention of Rau, unveiling a new $10-billion package to save the nation’s rivers, $700 million more for drought aid, trying to soften WorkChoices, and committing to ‘move towards a domestic emissions trading system … beginning no later than 2012’.14 Nothing gave a worthwhile boost in the polls. Then Australia was hit with an outbreak of equine influenza. The news shocked agriculture minister McGauran in much the same way as the beef substitution racket did his predecessor, Nixon, in 1982: On Friday, 24 August 2007, I was informed that samples had been taken from horses in the Centennial Park Equine Centre in Sydney. They were showing signs of coughing and were to be tested for equine influenza. I was in my office in Melbourne. My heart sank because I knew we had a horse from Japan which had equine ’flu in the Eastern Creek [Sydney] quarantine facility. It was supposed to be completely secure and had an unblemished record. But now we were faced with the prospect of equine ’flu having escaped into the general horse population. It was the equine industry’s worst nightmare. It was a long and anxious day. The results came through at about midnight and they confirmed my worst fears.

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The next morning we instigated a 72-hour national ban on the movement of all horses. No horse could move from where it was standing.15

With 11 horses confirmed to have contracted equine influenza at Eastern Creek by the Saturday morning, thoroughbred and harness race meetings were cancelled across Australia, except in the Northern Territory. Even people with ponies, recreational and work horses were urged not to move them from their paddocks and properties. A program to test horses for the disease was put in place. Strappers and trainers were laid off as the racing industry came to a virtual standstill. The government implemented an emergency assistance package of $235 million to cushion the industry from the worst of its losses. As the disease was gradually contained, the restrictions on movements and races were eased, with the epidemic beaten in six months. McGauran said the outbreak revealed the ‘best and the worst’ of the quarantine system, particularly the ‘incompetence and negligence in running a quarantine centre which was designed to be fail safe, but at which visitors were allowed to come and go with little scrutiny’: Our scientific reputation remained unscathed, but our quarantine reputation was in tatters. That’s all changed now. Eastern Creek is like Fort Knox. Everybody has to shower in and out, change protective clothing every time they come and go; there are 24hour guards and restricted gate keys.16

The last roll of the dice for the government to get back on the front foot before the election seemed to be the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, to get under way in Sydney from 3 September, and to culminate in leaders’ meetings on 8–9 September. It was the first time Australia had staged a gathering of such powerful world leaders, which brought together presidents George W Bush of the USA, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, China’s Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe among others. A key objective for Howard was to

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gain agreement to a declaration, effective from 2012, to set an aspirational global target for reduced greenhouse gases. A Newspoll survey published in The Australian on 4 September, which gave Labor leader Kevin Rudd an 11-point lead over Howard as preferred prime minister and the Labor Party a 14-point lead over the Coalition on primary votes, sent the hares running again. In twoparty preferred terms, Labor led the Coalition by 59 per cent to 41 per cent.17 Howard recognised immediately that if the poll was right, not only was the government doomed, but he would almost certainly lose his Sydney seat of Bennelong. APEC turned from a potential public relations triumph to a disaster as Howard held news conferences with international heads of state only for the media to ask about his leadership.18 He was so concerned that he asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, to sound out his cabinet colleagues on whether or not he should go, even at this late stage. Vaile said he was ‘kept aware of the consultative process that was afoot, but not approached for a view’. He thought it was far too late to consider a change and the media coverage the issue was receiving ‘smacked of desperation’.19 The message Downer delivered back to Howard at Kirribilli House on the evening of 7 September, was that a majority of his Liberal cabinet colleagues thought that the Prime Minister should stand down. But Howard would not go unless the cabinet publicly requested him to, which it would not do.20 On 14 October, Howard announced the election would be held on 24 November. It was a rout for the Coalition. Labor won 23 seats, taking its House of Representatives numbers from 60 after 2004 to 83. The Liberals lost 19 seats, to be returned with 55, while The Nationals lost two, dropping to ten – an all-time low of just 6.7 per cent of seats in the lower house. De-Anne Kelly fell in Dawson with a two-party preferred swing of more than 13 per cent to Labor. Page was lost with a swing to Labor of nearly eight per cent, while the new Queensland seat of Flynn, nominally a Nationals electorate, went to Labor with a twoparty preferred majority of 253 votes. Hopes of regaining Richmond,

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won by Labor in 2004 with the slimmest of margins, were dashed as Justine Elliot extended her lead to nearly 7.5 per cent. There was no greater sign of the extent of the government’s defeat than the leader’s fate. Howard, the man who had survived so many political highs and lows in Liberal Party and Coalition politics, and who had risen to become the second-longest-serving prime minister after Robert Menzies, was gone – dusted out of Bennelong by a former ABC television journalist and presenter, Maxine McKew, who took the seat for Labor with a swing of 5.5 per cent.21 Howard became only the second incumbent prime minister in the nation’s history to lose his seat, the previous one being Stanley Bruce in 1929.22 The shattered Liberal Party was further stunned the day after the election when Costello told a Melbourne news conference anticipating an announcement that he would take over the leadership that, in fact, he would ‘not seek nor will I accept the leadership or the deputy leadership of the Liberal Party’.

k Vaile doubted whether he should seek re-election as the leader of The Nationals. Personally, he was determined to better look after his health. Politically, he believed he was too closely associated with policies that had arguably cost the government the election. He and his wife Wendy began the drive to Canberra from their Taree home on the Sunday afternoon, discussing options on the way and stopping overnight in Goulburn. By the time they reached the capital on Monday morning, his mind was made up. Vaile telephoned his deputy, Truss, to tell him he was relinquishing the leadership. Half an hour later, he told a news conference that he would serve on the back bench as the member for Lyne, saying: ‘We are at a point in the history of politics in Australia where I believe it is time for … a bit of a change of the leadership of our party’. He rejected suggestions that the party was finished, insisting that it would ‘kick on again’, and saw no reason for a merger: ‘As far as amalgamation is concerned, I’ve opposed it

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in the past and I’ll oppose it in the future. I have an absolute belief in the future of our party.’ 23 He remained convinced that standing down when he did was the right thing to do: People have said ‘you could have stayed six months and then gone’, but I tell you, that just doesn’t happen, it doesn’t work, it only creates disruption that can be avoided by taking the decision immediately after the election. Everything was happening at a hell of a bat. The election result was clear on the Saturday night and we had to get out of our offices. I thought the job would go to Warren [Truss]. He was the obvious choice in terms of experience and ability. I knew Peter [McGauran] was not going to seek a senior position again and that would open the opportunity for a younger person to come into the deputy’s job, which would keep the renewal process going. And the process of renewal doesn’t just mean a change of leader; it means bringing younger people into senior positions, as happened with Doug Anthony, Ian Sinclair, Peter Nixon – people like that.24

His announcement was a bolt from the blue because no one in the party room had thought he would not stay on as leader. Truss said the telephone call from Vaile was totally unexpected and ‘I didn’t see myself as being leader’.25 Hull said no one knew that Vaile was going to stand down and his announcement caused considerable confusion: ‘There was a lot of pressure on me to take on the leadership. Truss said he’d support me entirely for the job. I felt very torn about it.’ 26 She ‘agonised’ over the matter with her family before deciding that, with a husband not enjoying the best of health, the leadership was simply not an option. Had personal circumstances been different, Kay Hull may then have become the party’s first female federal leader. Instead, she looked to McGauran: McGauran could have done it. I worked very hard on him. He wanted the entire support of the party. He argued that in the

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position we were in we didn’t need to be tearing ourselves apart; we didn’t need a contest for the leadership, we needed one hundred per cent solidarity. The message came back to me that he would be contested, so he said he wouldn’t run. At first I thought he was being self-indulgent, but now I agree with him.

But McGauran was not interested: I had already decided that after 25 years I couldn’t bring the dedication that the position required. I had actually told my family in January 2007 that I would not contest the next election. Then Rudd scored the first major opinion poll win over Howard, and I thought there was time to wait. But month after month the polls were bad for the government. Then it was too late, too close to the election; a minister couldn’t desert the ship. I had to run again, but against that background I could never have been a serious contender to take over from Mark.27

It seemed nobody really wanted to be the parliamentary leader. The hunt for contenders went on for several days, with Boswell a central negotiator between Truss and McGauran. Truss went to see McGauran to tell him he would not run for the job: ‘Peter was not budging. He had a press release in his pocket announcing he would not run. I said “I’ve got one of those too!” But he wasn’t budging. So in a moment of weakness I said “yes”.’ McGauran announced he would not be standing for the leadership on 28 November.28 The party room met on 3 December and unanimously confirmed Truss as party leader. Eight years older than the retiring 51-year-old Vaile, this farmer, with an impressive record of service on the Kingaroy Shire Council and the Burnett District Local Government Association, hardly reflected a process of renewal.29 But he was solid and safe and offered the steadying influence the party needed. When it came to the deputy leadership, the position, for the first time in the party’s history, went to someone who was not in the party,

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and to a senator rather than a member of the lower house – the CLP’s Nigel Scullion, who was also elected unopposed as the first nonparty leader in the upper house.30 Scullion enjoyed a rapid rise in The Nationals, becoming its Senate whip in February 2006 and its deputy Senate leader 12 months later. Now he was deputy leader and leader in the Senate. On the surface, the elevation of someone not in the party to such prominent positions reflected a lack of confidence by The Nationals own parliamentarians. Vaile was disappointed that people like Fiona Nash and Luke Hartsuyker (Cowper, New South Wales) did not ‘step up to take a bigger role’. Scullion’s elevation did not mean a lack of interest among The Nationals, but rather an acknowledgment of the need for compromise and unity. The former Senate leader, Boswell, who had held the post for 17 years, was happy to stand aside providing the job did not go to Barnaby Joyce, who had been an outspoken critic of many government policies, notably on Telstra and industrial relations, since assuming his seat in July 2005. With Macdonald not supporting Joyce, that was assured. Boswell stepped down to the position of the party’s deputy Senate leader, but only until 27 June 2008, when the five Nationals senators (Julian McGauran having defected to the Liberals in January 2006) reconsidered the leadership in light of John Williams replacing Macdonald as a senator from New South Wales from 1 July. Nash replaced Boswell as Senate deputy leader, while retaining her position as the party’s whip in the upper house, to which she had been appointed in February 2007.31 The defeated Coalition began the task of coming to terms with being in Opposition, amidst rising media speculation about how long people such as Costello, Downer, Vaile and McGauran would stay in parliament. Brendan Nelson (Bradfield, New South Wales) narrowly defeated Malcolm Turnbull (Wentworth, New South Wales) to become leader of the Liberals and the Opposition. In the shadow ministry, The Nationals held six positions, the first three in the shadow cabinet – Truss, infrastructure and transport, and local government; Scullion, agriculture, fisheries and forestry; Cobb, regional development and

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water security; Hartsuyker, business development, independent contractors and consumer affairs, and deputy leader of Opposition business in the lower house; Forrest, shadow parliamentary secretary for trade; and the newly elected Mark Coulton (Parkes, New South Wales) shadow parliamentary secretary for ageing and the voluntary sector.32 The new Rudd government pleased many people with immediate symbolic gestures – flying to Bali for a United Nations climate change conference and ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, and saying ‘sorry’ to Aborigines, particularly ‘The Stolen Generation’, for past policies – two steps that Howard had steadfastly refused to take. There was the 2020 summit, involving a cross-section of the nation’s brightest and best charged with coming up with new ideas for the future. Elated supporters anticipated seeing Labor wind back a raft of Coalition reforms by: abolishing WorkChoices and AWAs; dismantling the Pacific Solution; withdrawing combat troops from Iraq; and setting up an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). They also looked forward to the appointment of a petrol price commissioner, establishment of a grocery price-watch website, and implementation of the promised $1-billion ‘education revolution’, which promised a computer on the desk of all year 9 to 12 students.33 Hull said the hardest part of her job as the party’s chief whip was trying to get former ministers to understand they had to attend divisions: ‘They had a total loss of capacity to function without someone telling them how to function! They had virtually no staff. They’d been people in high positions who often had not had to attend divisions. It was hard for them to realise that they now did have to.’ 34

k McGauran announced his resignation from parliament on 4 April 2008.35 He gave the Victorian party organisation some weeks’ warning, enabling it to be well prepared to preselect a candidate and fight the ensuing by-election, which was held on 28 June. There was intense interest in the campaign, with the Liberals also deciding to

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run, as well as Labor, the Greens and the Liberty and Democracy Party. McGauran had held Gippsland at the general election with a two-party preferred vote of nearly 56 per cent, when there had been no Liberal opposition. Given the momentum building around the new Rudd government, the entry of the Liberal Party into the contest and The Nationals dwindled parliamentary representation, a key question was whether voters believed the party was worth supporting any more. Not only would the loss of Gippsland reduce its lower house numbers to nine, but it would also increase pressure for amalgamation, particularly as The Nationals and Liberals in Queensland were close to agreeing a merger. Somewhat surprisingly, the Labor vote went backwards, with its candidate, Darren McCubbin, a teacher and part-time town crier, losing eight per cent of the primary vote achieved by the ALP seven months earlier. The Liberal Party’s Rohan Fitzgerald, a senior manager with the East Gippsland Health Service, picked up nearly 21 per cent of the vote, which accounted for a decline in primary support for The Nationals of just under nine per cent. Darren Chester, a 40-yearold former journalist and chief of staff to Peter Ryan, the leader of The Nationals in Victoria, won Gippsland with a two-party preferred vote of nearly 62 per cent, an increase of six per cent on the general election result.36 It was a morale-boosting victory for The Nationals. Less satisfactory was Vaile’s departure from Lyne. Despite having said he would continue on the back bench, he spoke to a number of colleagues who had gone through the change of government at the conclusion of the Fraser-Anthony years and also, early in 2008, with Downer. Both had been party leaders – Downer only briefly – and both had held senior ministerial positions: It probably was to an extent a selfish decision, but I didn’t want to be there to get the same criticism that Costello was getting – sitting on the back bench and doing nothing … I’d always said that I wanted to be in politics to do things and to change things. I was not going to stay around to be a seat warmer. 37

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Downer announced his departure at the beginning of July and Vaile followed less than three weeks later, announcing his resignation on 19 July. Even though it was half-expected, it came as another surprise. He telephoned the New South Wales party chairman, Christine Ferguson, and told her the evening before of his announcement, saying his timing had also been prompted to enable the by-elections for Downer’s seat of Mayo and for his own of Lyne to be held on the same day. The party scrambled to open nominations for a new candidate on 21 July, with the preselection set for 2 August. The Mayo and Lyne by-elections would be held on 6 September. For some time, Vaile had earmarked the former mayor of Port Macquarie, Robert Drew, as a potential successor, and he won the party’s preselection. The Port Macquarie-Hastings Council had been controversially sacked by the New South Wales Labor government at the end of February after the cost of a new cultural and entertainment centre in Port Macquarie, known as the Glasshouse, had blown out by millions of dollars.38 Vaile did not see this as too damaging to Drew’s election prospects; there were counter-arguments to the critics of the Glasshouse and the sacked council. What he did see as dangerous was the decision, just before the close of nominations, of the state Member for Port Macquarie, Rob Oakeshott, to run for the federal seat. All of his electorate was within the boundary of Lyne, so not only was he well known in Port Macquarie, he was also widely known across the federal constituency. Oakeshott had originally won Port Macquarie as a National Party candidate in 1996, but had left the party to sit as an Independent from March 2002 after becoming disillusioned with the National and Liberal parties.39 Vaile knew Oakeshott well – he had been a member of Vaile’s staff for three years before moving into New South Wales politics. He was popular, having retained his seat at the March 2007 state election with a commanding 78 per cent of the twoparty preferred vote.40 Vaile was right to be worried. As with Mayo, the Labor Party did not contest Lyne. Oakeshott’s popularity transferred into the federal seat and he polled nearly 64 per cent of the primary vote. Primary

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support for The Nationals collapsed by more than 29 per cent, giving a two-party preferred result of nearly 74 per cent to Oakeshott and just over 26 per cent to Drew.41 It was a disaster, made worse by the fact that the New South Wales party would have to fund a by-election campaign for Port Macquarie within a matter of weeks.42 Vaile admitted he took a gamble that Oakeshott would not move to federal politics: ‘I took a punt and I was wrong. It’s the one serious thing I regret. Losing the seat was a great disappointment to me.’ 43 Oakeshott said Vaile’s resignation made the prospect of running federally an ‘enticing’ opportunity: The day before Mark’s [resignation] announcement, I was quite happy [in state parliament]. There had been some flirtation at the 2004 federal election that I might run against Mark, but that was never a serious consideration. This time it was a matter of weighing everything up and Canberra offers bigger and broader issues. If you do give a damn, this is where the action is.44

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Rebelling or reverting to type?

26: Rebelling or reverting to type?

The Nationals began to take on a more independent and assertive role after Barnaby Joyce took up his seat from July 2005. At first it was Joyce being a maverick. He became a serial floor-crosser, frustrating and at times infuriating the Coalition leadership in its last two years in office, and even almost coming to blows with some Liberal senators. He was a nuisance on the government’s back bench. Even his Queensland colleague and veteran of 22 years in the Senate, Boswell, was unable to bring him to heel. Progressively, Joyce, and not the parliamentary leader, became the party’s spokesman on just about anything, unafraid to criticise government policy and even offer advice on the Liberal leadership. Many grassroots Nationals saw him as the breath of fresh air for which they had been waiting too long. The thrust of his approach, accompanied by the publicity he received, became infectious. This was what the party should be about – standing up more in its own right for the issues that concerned country people, and holding the government to account on their behalf.

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A casualty of the mood was New South Wales Senator Sandy Macdonald. He was stripped of his endorsement for another term by the state’s central council on 10 February 2007. In his place, the council opted for a fiery and outspoken small businessman from Inverell, John Williams, known to his mates as Wacka. Macdonald had been in the Senate since 1993, with the exception of the period from June 1999 to May 2000. He had served on numerous parliamentary committees, had a special interest in defence, foreign affairs and trade, and had been parliamentary secretary (Trade) from July 2005 to January 2006, when he took over as parliamentary secretary to the defence minister. He was proud of his contribution to the parliament, the nation, and the government. Therein lay his problem: he spoke of Government or Coalition achievements, but rarely promoted his party’s role. Macdonald was a victim of circumstance: Williams was a member of The Nationals first and coalitionist second. It was as simple as that. The import of the preselection was a foregone conclusion. Macdonald would leave the Senate on 30 June 2008, no matter which party won the election. Williams would take his place. Partly in preparation for that event, Howard announced a reshuffle on 30 January 2007 that saw Macdonald leave the ministry, Cobb move to become Assistant Minister for the Environment and Water Resources, and Scullion Minister for Community Services. The Rudd government introduced legislation, The Wheat Export Marketing Bill 2008, into the House of Representatives at the end of May 2008. It envisaged the winding up of the single desk export arrangements for the wheat industry, something The Nationals were bound to resist. After reaching an understanding with the Liberal Party that The Nationals could vote as they wished, thereby relieving shadow ministers of their responsibility to adhere to Coalition policy, all the party’s lower house members, as well as Independents Katter and Windsor, voted against the bill, while the Liberals voted in favour. The bill was passed by 113 votes to 10.1 Truss made no secret of his position on the matter before the vote: ‘The National Party’s views on organised marketing in the wheat industry are well known and

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they’ve been a fundamental tenet of the party for many years.’ 2 A similar voting pattern was followed in the Senate two weeks later, with The Nationals, Family First Senator Steve Fielding (Victoria), and one Liberal, Philip Lightfoot (Western Australia) voting against, and the rest of the Liberals voting with Labor.3 For all the perception in the New South Wales central council that Macdonald was ‘not National enough’, he crossed the floor with his party colleagues in the wheat single desk vote, one of his last as a senator. In contrast, former Nationals Senator Julian McGauran – who defected to the Liberals in January 2006, and who said of Labor’s deregulation of the domestic wheat market in 1989 that the ghost of John McEwen would ‘haunt the Senate chamber this evening’ – now said it was ‘impossible to breathe life back into the single-desk arrangements’. Citing changed circumstances, including the privatisation of the AWB, the findings of the Cole inquiry into the Iraq kickbacks scandal, and the election of a Labor government, McGauran said it was his ‘firm belief that it is in the best interests of wheat growers now and into the future to proceed with the principles outlined in the legislation’.4 The 76-member Senate was finely balanced from 1 July 2008. The government had 32 senators, as did the Liberal Party. There were five Nationals, including Scullion, five Greens, one Family First and one Independent, meaning that for Labor to secure its legislation it needed the support of the Greens, Family First and the Independent if all Liberals and Nationals voted together. As the transition to Opposition continued, Brendan Nelson was replaced by Malcolm Turnbull as Liberal Party and Opposition leader on 16 September 2008, just after the start of the spring session of parliament. One reason for the leadership challenge was that Nelson favoured pedalling back from the previous government’s policy on an emissions trading scheme (ETS) to tackle climate change. Turnbull had been environment minister in that government and helped forge the ETS policy it took to the 2007 election. The resulting reshuffle of the shadow ministry saw changes to The Nationals’ representation:

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Hartsuyker became spokesman on competition policy and consumer affairs, as well as keeping his Opposition deputy business manager’s position; Scullion moved to human resources, with Cobb taking agriculture, fisheries and foresty – a position that, as a former president of the NSW Farmers’ Association, he had long been interested in when the Coalition was in power; Forrest became shadow parliamentary secretary for regional development; and Nash was elevated to shadow parliamentary secretary for water resources and conservation. Truss stayed with trade, transport, regional development and local government.5 The day after the Liberal leadership change, a quiet coup occurred in The Nationals’ small Senate team. The arrival of Williams gave Joyce the numbers to be elected leader. By this time, he had voted against his Coalition colleagues 21 times over the past three years – ‘people start off thinking you’re mad, then they think you’re bad, and then they agree with you’.6 He defined what he saw as the party’s role in the Senate: ‘We Nationals have to give the people clearer reasons to vote for us. You’ll probably see less differentiation of Barnaby and more differentiation of The Nationals.’ 7 Even though he was now a member of the joint Liberal National Party of Queensland, he had no difficulty with the fact that he emphatically represented The Nationals arm of that entity.8 Boswell also felt that Joyce was now suitable for the Senate leadership role: ‘I think it was right that when I stood down as leader I probably didn’t want Barnaby in the job. But he’s doing alright. He’s good.’ 9 Customarily, the leader of The Nationals in the Senate would join the shadow ministry, but Joyce declined. By so doing he avoided being bound to support shadow ministerial policy and could continue to cross the floor with virtual impunity when he felt it was necessary. It was not long before he did so. On 1 December, the four Nationals senators, Joyce, Boswell, Nash and Williams, crossed the floor to support a Greens motion to disallow Labor legislation to give up-front tax breaks for carbon sinks – a policy Turnbull had designed in government when he was

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environment minister. Nash’s seven-week tenure as a parliamentary secretary was over; she was forced to resign for defying shadow ministerial policy. Deputy party leader Scullion avoided a similar fate by abstaining, which had the effects of not openly dividing the Senate

To view this image, please refer to the print version of the book

The Nationals federal parliamentary leadership team from September 2008: (left to right) deputy leader Nigel Scullion, leader Warren Truss, and Senate leader Barnaby Joyce – all officially members in their state and territory of a party other than The Nationals (The Nationals federal secretariat)

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Nationals and not further embarrassing Truss and Turnbull, in whose shadow ministry he served. 10 Nash told the Senate the legislation gave tax breaks to large corporate entities – ‘the big end of town’ – to plant carbon-sink forests, but not to farmers, thereby threatening prime agricultural land, food production capacity and sustainable agriculture.11 Truss said he respected Nash’s position and that of the other Nationals senators, but understood that ‘because of her stand there was a price to be paid in terms of her [shadow] ministerial position’.12 Nash had replaced Coulton as one of the two Nationals shadow parliamentary secretaries in Turnbull’s original line-up. Now he came back to take over the job.13 Before the week’s end the ‘fearsome four’ gave a repeat performance, voting against a $26-billion package of legislation to set up a Building Australia Fund. Part of the proposal involved dumping the $2-billion Communications Fund to future-proof regional telecommunications. This had been pivotal to the party supporting the final sale of Telstra and it was not going to let it go without making its point in the Senate. Affairs became somewhat shambolic, with the Opposition voting against the legislation in the House of Representatives but not planning to block it in the Senate. The result was that the four Nationals, two Liberals, the Family First’s Steve Fielding and the Independent Nick Xenophon crossed the floor, while Scullion and all but five of the Liberal Party’s remaining 30 senators abstained.

k World economies began going into free fall after the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States became an international calamity with the collapse of America’s fourth largest investment bank, Lehman Brothers, in September 2008. Sub-prime mortgages – loans to borrowers with a poor credit history unable to qualify for standard (lower interest) loans – accounted for about 20 per cent of the US mortgage market in 2004. US property prices began falling from the end of 2006

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and by July 2007 the fifth-largest securities firm in America, Bear Stearns, revealed that two of its investment mortgage funds, previously worth $US1.5 billion, had little or no value. Lehman’s announcement on 15 September 2008 that it was filing for bankruptcy caused international shockwaves, with fears that banks worldwide would collapse and personal savings become worthless. The Reserve Bank of Australia injected $1.3 billion into the finance sector to ease market nerves and began slashing interest rates. The government assured the public that deposits in the major banks were guaranteed and implemented two multi-million-dollar stimulus packages to encourage spending and save jobs, particularly in the retail sector.14 The federal budget, brought down by Treasurer Wayne Swan on 12 May 2009, illustrated the impact of the global crisis on the Australian economy. Tax receipts were projected to fall by $219 billion by 2013– 14, caused largely by a contraction in world demand for minerals. The stimulus packages to consumers were augmented with a Nation Building program of $22 billion for road, rail and port infrastructure and a $43-billion plan for a high-speed national broadband network. The bottom line was that within 18 months, a budget surplus of more than $20 billion had been transformed into a projected deficit for 2009–10 of $58 billion. Gross debt was forecast to rise to more than $300 billion by 2013–14 and unemployment expected to hit 8.5 per cent – more than a million people – by 2011.15 To many conservatives, this was typical Labor. When the Keating government was defeated in 1996, the Coalition inherited a $10-billion deficit and $96 billion worth of debt, which took ten years to pay off. The outgoing Coalition had left the Rudd government with a balanced budget and a handsome surplus. Irrespective of the dramatically changed world and national economic circumstances, the battle lines for the political debate to follow were clearly defined, setting a core theme for the next election. Truss said the reality of Labor’s ‘Alice in Wonderland approach to spending and bungling has caught up with Australia tonight, with the delivery of a budget that Australians will be paying off for generations’.16

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Infiltrators and dissidents

27: Infiltrators and dissidents

A combination of domestic and international factors in the mid-1960s and early 1970s began to seriously fracture the Country Party and its core primary industry constituents, making many of its members and branches susceptible to external influence. The post-war global demand for food and commodities had eased and the domestic and international economies were in a downturn, causing a decline in farm incomes. World trading patterns were readjusting, with the formation of the European Economic Community and Britain’s impending membership. In Australia, the Basic Industries Group (BIG), made up mainly of wealthy or influential graziers, began a campaign in 1966 against McEwen’s tariff policies, claiming that while they featherbedded inefficient domestic manufacturers they increased the cost of imported machinery to farmers. McEwen tried to offset the impact, but found few friends among farm organisations, which pressed for major reductions in, if not the abolition of, tariffs. Similar motions were regularly and vigorously debated at Country Party forums and conferences.

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A slump in world wheat prices in the late 1960s, coinciding with a record Australian crop for the 1968–69 season, caused a crisis in the domestic industry. The Wheat Stabilisation Scheme provided growers with a guaranteed minimum price, which under the circumstances became unrealistically high and encouraged increased plantings, notably by larger growers. The area sown to wheat almost doubled from 4.9 million hectares to 9.5 million hectares in the decade between 1960 and 1970. The government’s answer, reluctantly initiated by the Australian Wheatgrowers’ Federation and overseen by Doug Anthony as the Minister for Primary Industry, was the introduction from the 1969–70 harvest of wheat delivery quotas to reduce plantings.1 While the federation saw the policy as the best way of returning stability to the industry, the growers themselves were not so enthusiastic. There were angry meetings, sometimes of several hundred growers, across the country. Similar meetings, this time of dairy farmers, greeted the Marginal Dairy Farmers’ Reconstruction Scheme, introduced by Anthony in July 1970. Many dairy enterprises were too small to sustain reasonable incomes for the farmers and their families. The scheme, supported by the Australian Dairy Industry Council, enabled those farmers who could to apply for low-interest loans to buy neighbouring properties, thereby increasing their productivity while allowing the vendors to leave the land with some dignity. Anthony had warned almost from the day he was appointed to the Primary Industry portfolio towards the end of 1967 that because of changing international marketing circumstances and new farming technology family farms would have to readjust so producers could maintain international competitiveness. The dairy reconstruction scheme was the first evidence of this philosophy being put into practice – hence the accusations that under the Country Party farmers had to ‘get big or get out’.2 The party was accused of deserting its fundamental tenet of supporting family farms. Even some of the farm organisations suffered, with breakaway groups such as the Rural Action Movement in New South Wales and the Edenhope Agricultural Bureau in Victoria being formed.

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Into the cauldron of discontent and bewilderment that permeated many party branches came the extreme right-wing Australian League of Rights. In 1969, the league published a booklet titled They Want Your Land, which argued that inflation was a socialist/Marxist strategy to wipe out individual farmers. The way to beat this was through a combination of initiatives. These included: the decentralisation of political, financial and economic power – meaning the creation of new states – something the Country Party had championed since its inception; elimination of the inflationary trends and financial constraints forcing farmers off their land; and the renegotiation of farm debt through long-term low-interest loans. The league’s publication On Target proudly admitted that the organisation had been ‘a thorn in the side’ of the Country Party since its publication of the booklet.3 It followed this up with a brochure in March 1971 asking Can we save the Country Party?, which urged the reader to ‘Help us to ensure that the Country Party does not go down into oblivion, but moves on to take the initiative on the road back to stability and responsible government’. Ostensibly, the league’s campaign was aimed at returning the party to its origins by supporting family farms and denouncing farm aggregation. The campaign won considerable support among the Country Party’s rank and file and caused serious concern to the federal leadership, which saw it as a façade for an organisation that was anti-Semitic, generally racist, and rejected the party political system as corrupt and corrupting. The Country Party Member for Lyne, Phil Lucock, told the New South Wales party’s annual general conference in 1971 that ‘the radical right has made significant gains in some Country Party branches in New England, and were in larger numbers in Queensland’. Sinclair recalled having ‘many battles’ with the league’s deputy director and national secretary of the Institute of Economic Development – a league offshoot – Jeremy Lee. There were claims that by 1972 the league had infiltrated branches in Maranoa, Kennedy, Fisher and McPherson in Queensland, Gwydir, Calare and Hume in New South Wales, and Gippsland and Wimmera in Victoria.4

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The league promoted a theory known as social credit, under which all citizens would receive a national dividend, financed by created credit and the profits of industry, to make up the gap between their wages and the cost of goods. The Victorian Country Party leader, Peter Ross-Edwards, said such theories were ‘open to the gravest question’.5 Addressing the annual conference of the South Australian Country Party at Nurioopta in August 1971, Anthony described social credit as ‘dangerous and the worst way to stimulate the economy’.6 He came under sustained questioning from the larger than usual number of delegates: I was asked what I thought about the League of Rights. I said I thought they were racist, anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi. Half the audience got up and walked out! That started a war with the league – a barrage of letters attacking me and supporting the league and its supposed campaign to restore the party to its origins. I had to stamp on league sympathisers and unequivocally demonstrate our party’s absolute opposition to it. Its campaign was destabilising and a front to try and make the league look respectable and to suck people in.7

The league has never been far from the party and has from time to time snared senior representatives, organisational and parliamentary, into unwittingly attending its functions, or those of its front groups, and supporting some of its policies. This is not surprising, given its public face was for God, Queen and Country, and support for states’ rights, new states, free enterprise, the constitution, family farm and small business – similar to the objectives of the Country Party and, successively, the National Party and The Nationals. Ron Boswell, a steadfast and long-time campaigner for small business, admitted in April 1988 to having been sucked into launching a book that he later found had been published by a press with close links to the league. The confession came in a lengthy speech about the league to the

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Senate in which he spoke of his fears of the organisation’s expanding influence on Australian politics: The League thrives wherever there is discord, dissension, frustration, fear, resentment and financial hardship. It flourishes in times of drought, low commodity prices, high foreign debt, and high interest rates. … Its directors are sophisticated strategists; they promote League ideology to small business groups, churches, women’s organisations and other disaffected groups. The emphasis is not on attracting League members per se but on getting those groups to use League thinking, arguments and literature.8

Boswell and then federal leader Tim Fischer saw the league’s hand behind the campaign against gun law reform in 1996, and Boswell suggested in 2001 that the league was involved in a ‘reverse takeover attempt’ of One Nation. At the time, campaigning under the banner He’s not pretty, but he’s pretty effective, Boswell was fighting off a bid by Hanson to take his Senate seat. The allegation prompted Hanson to declare: ‘One Nation has not and will never be associated with the League of Rights.’ John Anderson also believed the league was influential in the rise of One Nation. 9 Boswell saw the National Party as the bulwark that protected the political system from the radical right. In this context, its role was to give the rural constituency ‘constant reassurance’ that it was being listened to and that the party, not some ‘lunar right’ entity, was best able to solve its problems: ‘Every time the bush gets into trouble on native title or any issues, it’s not the Liberal Party that carries the debate. … It’s always the National Party that has carried the debate. … If you take the National Party out, you will get a right wing group that will take over.’10 Infiltration is dangerous to political parties – the Labor party split of the late 1950s over communist influence in its ranks and in the trade union movement, which led to the birth of the Democratic Labor Party, is perhaps the most graphic illustration of the impact it

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can have. So far as it is possible to tell, The Nationals have managed to protect themselves reasonably well. Boswell certainly thought so: ‘Absolutely, yes. I think my exposé of the league was one of the most important speeches I’ve made.’11

k Less dangerous when taken individually are party defections. But if they occur too regularly they can send a message to the wider party membership and the electorate that something must be wrong. They have the potential to become destabilising. Particularly galling for The Nationals was that the three Independent members of the House of Representatives from September 2008 were former party members, with two of them sitting in former leaders’ seats. New England and Lyne were held by Tony Windsor and Rob Oakeshott. Like Oakeshott (see chapter 25), Windsor had switched from New South Wales to federal politics. Failing to win National Party endorsement for the state seat of Tamworth in 1991, Windsor successfully contested the election as an Independent and then moved to New England in 2001, defeating the incumbent National Party member, Stuart St Clair. The third Independent in the lower house was Bob Katter, the Member for Kennedy in Queensland, whose father had held the seat for the Country Party and then the National Party from 1966 to 1990. Katter junior, who regarded John McEwen as one of his heroes, deserted the National Party on 9 July 2001, saying it no longer championed the interests of rural industries, but had become captive to the philosophies of free trade, economic rationalism, deregulation and corporatisation, and the so-called level playing field. He was old style Country Party, believing the industries he represented in Kennedy, notably sugar, beef and tropical fruits, needed and deserved government support. He said his decision to resign from the party had been ‘one of the harder, if not the hardest decision I have ever had to make’:

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I thought that I could change Canberra by working inside the mainstream parliamentary system and believe that I have influenced the system as much as anyone. But I have failed to change the fundamental policy direction – a direction that has damaged and is seriously damaging this country.12

On the other side of the coin, Bruce Lloyd, then deputy leader, described Katter as a ‘disappointment’, saying he would argue his point in party meetings and ‘then leave without waiting for any response’.13 Possibly worse than becoming an Independent, Julian McGauran, a former Melbourne city councillor and National Party Victorian senator since 1987, jumped ship to the Liberals in January 2006, saying the Liberal Party ‘is and will remain the preferred rural and regional party in Victoria’ and ‘there is no longer any real distinguishing policy or philosophical difference between The Nationals and the Liberal Party in Victoria at the Federal level’.14 Peter McGauran tried to dissuade his brother: ‘We’ve been close since we were boys. I worried for him knowing the personal abuse he’d attract. I warned him his former colleagues would be unforgiving and history may not treat him well. He thought long and hard.’15 One of the first of the defectors of recent times was Peter Slipper. He won the Queensland seat of Fisher for the National Party in 1984, but was defeated by Labor at the following election in 1987. He regained the seat in 1993, but this time as a Liberal.16 He gave considerable thought to his political future during his six years in political exile: The National Party in Queensland was a blend of city and country, so the false division of country versus city was not relevant in Queensland. The federal National Party was much more rural and seemed to be marching back to the bush. I’ve never been a country person. I’ve never lived on a farm. I felt comfortable with the Nationals in Queensland, but found I had more in common

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with the Liberals in Canberra. I was a conservative National and now I’m a conservative Liberal.17

After the Queensland National Party government of Russell Cooper was defeated by Labor under Wayne Goss at the end of 1989, Slipper made the decision not to seek re-endorsement for the National Party and instead joined the Liberals. Interestingly, he had been a keen supporter of Bjelke-Petersen and the plan to harness the Queensland premier’s popularity to boost the federal Coalition’s electoral prospects in the 1987 election, even though he conceded the development of the Joh for Canberra campaign was badly handled: ‘When Joh decided not to run for a federal seat, the sensible thing to do would have been to drop the whole thing and reform the Coalition. At least that would have given some sense of unity. It didn’t happen and the whole Joh campaign became a joke.’ Moreover, it cost Slipper his seat. But his support for Joh made Howard suspicious of him when he returned to parliament: ‘It took the whole three years of that parliament to convince Howard and others that I really was a Liberal!’ Arguably the most notorious defector from the party was Archie Cameron, who stormed out after failing to be re-elected leader following the September 1940 election and sat with the United Australia and later Liberal Party until his death in 1956. There were others, for example, Alexander Hay, the member for New England, who joined the Country Party on its formation in 1920, but sat as an Independent for a year until his defeat in December 1922, and Bern Kilgariff, the Northern Territory CLP senator, who switched from the National Country Party to the Liberals in 1979 to ensure a balance in CLP representation in Canberra between the Liberals and the then NCP. But the party also attracted defectors. More than a few switched to the party, especially in the earlier years. Among them were: William Fleming (Robertson, New South Wales, 1913–22), who sat as a Nationalist from 1917 and then joined the Country Party from 1921; Henry Gregory (Dampier and Swan, Western Australia, 1913–40), who joined the Nationalists from 1917 and then the Country Party from 1920;

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Arnold Wienholt (Moreton, Queensland, 1919–22), who started as a Nationalist and also joined the Country Party in 1920; the Queensland senator Walter Cooper, who sat as a Nationalist from 1928 to 1932 and then returned as a Country Party senator from 1935 to 1968, becoming its Senate leader from 1949; and Agnes Robertson, a Western Australian Liberal senator from 1950 to 1955 and then a Country Party senator until her retirement in 1962. There have been similar changes of allegiance in state politics. Bjelke-Petersen did not complain in 1983 when two Liberals defected to the National Party, enabling it to govern in its own right. Charles Cutler in New South Wales was happy to accept three Liberals and one Independent into the Country Party’s Legislative Council ranks in September 1959. The defections took the Country Party’s council numbers to 14 and made it the largest party after Labor in the Legislative Council, but Cutler resisted the temptation to insist that the party take over the Opposition leadership of the council from its Liberal partner in coalition.18 Smiles turn to snarls when the defections are the other way round. They become particularly noticeable when they compound over a fairly short period of time. In the 16 years between 1993 and 2009, one Senate and four House of Representatives seats have been won by people who were once National Party or Nationals parliamentarians or former members of the party. Over the same period, the party’s numbers in the House of Representatives shrank from 16 to nine. These are the circumstances that bring amalgamation back into the spotlight.

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Amalgamators

28: Amalgamators

John McEwen observed at the end of 1968 that he had never supported amalgamation with the Liberal Party and neither had the Country Party. He said the Country Party was a middle party that attracted to its ranks ‘a tremendous number of people’ who had been shearers, share farmers or soldier settlers, many of whom had originally been Labor supporters: They remained Labor people for a time, and then recognised that the Country Party had particular policies and they became Country Party. But they never lose something of a hankering for the Labor Party. I’m utterly sure that the Country Party could not carry all its membership into a merger [with the Liberals]. I’m absolutely sure that quite a sizeable chunk of the Country Party voters in those circumstances would revert to Labor. From the point of view of stable Government, we are carrying into the nonLabor side of the House a substantial proportion of voters who still have an affinity with Labor.1

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This is still true today, albeit to a lesser degree because of economic, political and demographic changes. Some among The Nationals’ membership quip that they have more Labor mates than Liberal ones, or that they would vote Labor before voting Liberal. But the party’s strength has progressively diminished, from 18 to nine in the lower house in the 12 years to 2008, contributing to renewed debate on amalgamation – debate that after the 2007 election was largely restricted to the party itself. Several events took place in the wake of the election – not all related, but all having a bearing on the future directions of the state and federal parties. First, the federal leadership changed from Vaile to Truss. On 4 December, the federal management committee appointed John Anderson and the former New South Wales party state director, Michael Priebe, to examine key issues for the future, namely: • The role of The Nationals and their position in Australian society and politics • The implications of current political, financial, demographic and media trends • Future options for the Party, including maintaining present strategies and approaches; adopting a more vigorous, independent role outside the constraints of Coalition; adopting, within electorates and regions, a stronger regional identity; participating in a single consolidated non-Labor Party.2 Three days later, the New South Wales party’s central council decided to also conduct a review, one that would look into its internal structures and organisation as well as external issues involving market research.3 On 21 January 2008, Lawrence Springborg rose like Lazarus to regain the leadership of the Queensland parliamentary Nationals. Springborg, who had taken the party to electoral defeats in 2004 and 2006, dusted off his shelved plans to bring about a merger of the National and Liberal parties in the state. He had almost achieved this

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in 2006, but was thwarted when Howard and Vaile lent it no support. Vaile demanded the resignation of the party’s federal president at the time, David Russell, who had been aware of the merger plans but had failed to tell the federal leader about them.4 Springborg had been on a mission to merge since 2003, when he visited Canada and learned how the conservative parties in that country successfully amalgamated into a single organisation.5 He passionately believed that a new, single non-Labor force in Queensland was the only way to beat the incumbent Labor government of Premier Anna Bligh. The Queensland party president, Bruce McIver, was of a like mind. A driving incentive for a single party was optional preferential voting, introduced in Queensland for the 1992 election.6 The Nationals and Liberals in Queensland, used to competing against one another and exchanging preferences in elections, were finding that three-cornered contests under these circumstances simply did not work – with the passage of time, more and more voters simply voted ‘1’ and left the rest of their ballot paper blank, no matter what party how-to-vote cards recommended. The same happened in New South Wales, where optional preferential voting replaced compulsory preferential from 1979 (effective from the September 1981 election). But in New South Wales the Coalition was generally more co-operative and, unless by prior agreement, the parties have avoided contesting one another at state elections since 2003. The day after being re-elected leader, Springborg, widely known as the Borg, met with his Liberal counterpart, Mark McArdle, and the two agreed to progress the concept of a single party. With Vaile replaced as federal leader by Truss, there was no longer any opposition from the federal party. Truss said that ‘if one state wants to step forward in a particular direction, so long as we can accommodate satisfactory arrangements at a federal level, then that shouldn’t be a barrier’.7 A ‘principles agreement’ was signed between the two Queensland parties on 25 May 2008, and plebiscites of each organisation’s membership resulted in overwhelming grassroots support for amalgamation.

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The pro-merger debate was given a fillip when Doug Anthony, writing on behalf of himself, Ian Sinclair and Peter Nixon, said union between the parties ‘must be seen as an inevitable step that The Nationals must accept’.8 In an article published in The Australian, he said the party’s numbers would continue to decline as geographic changes of population led to fewer rural electorates. This in turn would lead to reduced influence, less support from members and, critically, the corporate sector: It is our belief that if all the rural representatives of the two parties could speak with one voice then more positive action would occur and be a greater challenge to the Labor Party, which is infiltrating territory that it is not traditionally dedicated to. It is quite obvious that over the past two or three decades the cost of campaigning has increased substantially. The ability to raise the funds necessary to maintain a competitive level of campaign advertising is a challenge we don’t like to think about … One party representing conservative interests is likely to do much better.

Saying that he, Sinclair and Nixon, who collectively represented ‘as much experience and involvement in the party as anybody in its long and illustrious life’, were fearful for its future, he urged prompt action, even though ‘it will not be easy for many of our people to have to digest the proposal’. He predicted that if moves to merge were not put in train, The Nationals would ‘slowly fade out of existence; wither on the vine. Not a very proud way to be remembered. We would rather go out holding our heads high’. One wonders whether McEwen would have added his name to the article. In the meantime, the Victorian Nationals decided in February 2008 to renew state coalition arrangements, which had ended with the defeat of the Kennett Coalition government in 1999. In Western Australia, The Nationals, who had abandoned Opposition Coalition in January 2006, entered a power-sharing government with the Liberals,

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but not a full-blown Coalition, after the September 2008 election. The party’s one sitting member in South Australia, Karlene Maywald, continued to enjoy the fruits of being a member of the Rann Labor government’s ministry – effectively in Coalition with the Labor Party.9 New South Wales remained pro-coalition and anti-amalgamation. Its annual general conference in Sydney in June 2008 debated amalgamation for two hours before resolving to ‘totally reject any move to amalgamate with the Liberal Party of Australia’. Only three delegates were prepared to support entering into negotiations with a view to merging.10 Anderson, who by then had completed his review, although its contents were still unknown, urged the party to defer any decision until his options had been considered. He said the report made no recommendations, but drew conclusions, and he hinted strongly that the evidence would show that amalgamation was the only realistic option for the future. In Anderson’s view, the way forward was to have a single nonLabor party with a united, strong rural and regional base – a faction that could impress the needs of the bush on its city-based colleagues: ‘It is hard for us [The Nationals] when the rural Liberals [MPs] fall into line with their city cousins just to do us over. Our numbers could help prevent that from happening.’11 Sinclair had similar thoughts: There’s still some chance of having rural strength in one party. It’s not the party we need to consider, it’s the people we represent, because they put us there. It’s doing our best to achieve outcomes for them. I think we could do that better now as part of a single conservative party. 12

How could such representation bring better results, when country and regional members of a single party would still be dominated by those representing city seats? Sinclair’s answer was to hold an annual conference of country members to consider policy and vote on motions, ‘so that the majority from the city is forced to recognise that there is a

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groundswell of public support within rural and regional Australia for particular policy positions’. On the other hand, Vaile remained opposed to amalgamation: ‘I still think there is a strong argument for two separate entities working in partnership. The amalgamation in Queensland generated support and confidence in the business community, but it didn’t win them the [2009] election.’13

k The Queensland merger into the Liberal National Party of Queensland, or LNP, was achieved on 26 July 2008, but not without some lastminute dissent from some in the hierarchy of the Liberal Party who feared the new entity would be dominated by former members of The Nationals, and who unsuccessfully challenged the validity of a scheduled joint convention in the Queensland Supreme Court.14 Each party held a separate conference at Brisbane’s Sofitel Hotel to endorse the draft constitution of the proposed joint party and vote on merging. Russell said the merger vote at The Nationals conference was unanimously carried by 650 votes, which included some proxies, while the vote by about 450 Liberal delegates won 95 per cent support.15 The delegates then convened as a joint convention to formally endorse the constitution and elect the leadership positions. McIver and former Liberal president Gary Spence contested the presidency, with McIver winning with about 75 per cent of the vote. Spence was elected vice-president.16 Springborg and McArdle were automatically deemed to be the leader and deputy respectively of the new parliamentary LNP. The party was formally launched the following morning in a slick and professional show, with an atmosphere of enthusiasm more akin to an American electioneering convention than what is usually seen in Australia. Doug Anthony travelled from his Murwillumbah home to be present and declared it was ‘a marvellous day’. Amidst a sea of T-shirts, stickers and placards proclaiming I’m for a new Queensland – LNP; A new party – LNP; and Go the Borg, and to the strains of the U2 song

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Beautiful Day a jubilant Springborg declared: ‘Today we take away from Labor the greatest asset they previously had, and that was the previous disunity’.17 It was an historic event. Followed by an intensive two-week television advertising campaign across Queensland, it closed the book, for the time being at least, on a country party in the state. The Country Party first emerged in Queensland on 13 July 1915, morphed into the Nationalists by 1918, re-emerged in 1920, and then merged to become the Country and Progressive National Party for 12 years from 1925. A separate Country Party was reformed from 1936, largely because ‘there was never any enthusiasm for the Country and Progressive National Party beyond the City’ and because control of the party was ‘mainly by city representatives’. The separate party continued, becoming the National Party of Australia – Queensland from October 1973, until the July 2008 merging into the LNP.18 The LNP became affiliated with The Nationals’ federal organisation from August 2008. The Liberal Party’s federal executive on 2 October 2009 accepted the LNP as a division, backdated to the date of the merger. The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) notified its acceptance of the LNP to be registered as a political party on 18 February 2009.19 Establishment of the party caused some interesting side-effects. First, Truss was now strictly speaking a member of the LNP, but was also leader of The Nationals in Canberra. Indeed, the federal party was now substantially led by non-party members – Truss and the CLP’s Scullion, who was deputy leader and Senate leader. Second, up to now the Northern Territory CLP could only be associated with The Nationals and Liberal Party at the federal level because of the Liberal Party’s previous insistence that it could not accept as a division a party that was affiliated with another political organisation. The arrangements for the LNP’s relationship with both the nonLabor parties at federal level changed the rules. Presumably, the CLP could now affiliate with the federal parties if it so wished. CLP president Rick Setter began sounding out possibilities over the coming

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months and advised The Nationals’ federal management committee on 21 August 2009 that his organisation would seek full affiliation over the coming year: ‘We believe now that it is better for us to be fully involved with both parties in Canberra, rather than having a limited relationship.’20

k Against the background of the Queensland merger, The Nationals’ 2008 federal council considered how to progress the conclusions of the Anderson report, which came down to: • Stay as you are – the party will ultimately die • Become more independent – this will increase confusion for voters already questioning what the party is and what it stands for • Become more regionalised – this will fracture the party, diminishing the opportunity to raise substantial corporate funds, and lead to uncoordinated election campaigns • Amalgamate – Advantages: bigger membership and influence; a regional MP could become prime minister; save money by avoiding three-cornered contests and duplication; dilute Liberal factions; increase corporate support. Disadvantages: could lead to a new Country Party movement; a staggered implementation by the state parties would split the conservatives more and create greater uncertainty; could be seen as a Liberal takeover.21 New South Wales put forward a motion to assert, first, that there was ‘no desire by the National Party of Australia to amalgamate with the Liberal Party of Australia in the near future’, and, second, to propose a range of reforms to improve cost efficiencies and working relationships between the state and federal organisations of The Nationals. The first part of the motion was defeated, while the rest was accepted. The Victorian delegation moved that in light of the issues arising

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from the Anderson report, ‘the general membership of The Nationals throughout Australia participate in a plebiscite on the question as to whether there should be a consolidation of conservative representation in Federal politics in Australia’. It was acknowledged that the federal council had no power to conduct such a plebiscite without the agreement of the state parties. The motion was carried by 24 votes to 21, with, significantly, three members of the New South Wales delegation, abstaining. Nonetheless, when the proposal was put before the New South Wales party’s central council in November it was rejected without dissent.22 South and Western Australia were also less than enthusiastic and the idea proceeded no further. Instead, The Nationals’ federal director, Brad Henderson, and the state directors of Victoria, New South Wales and Western Australia developed proposals to better co-ordinate the activities of the parties across the country. The result was a proposal to essentially amalgamate the party, bringing all state and federal organisations under a single constitution, with a single, nationwide membership database and a uniform nationwide system for preselecting candidates for state and federal elections. Again the New South Wales party baulked. While it was prepared to consolidate some inter-party resources and co-operative arrangements, its central executive on 31 January 2009 agreed the party should stay as an independent organisation with its own constitution and rules, maintaining its own confidential membership database, managing its own candidate preselection processes, and maintaining its own administrative head office. The executive position was endorsed by central council on 28 February. New South Wales was not going to amalgamate with anyone.

k Anna Bligh inherited the Queensland premiership when Peter Beattie resigned from parliament mid-term, on 13 September 2007. Beattie had taken Labor to victory over the Coalition government of Rob Bor-

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bidge in June 1998, mightily helped by the election of 11 One Nation candidates in predominantly National Party seats, and had not been threatened by the conservatives at any of the ensuing three elections. After the 2006 poll, he led a government with 59 seats to the then Coalition’s 25 – 17 Nationals and eight Liberal. There was a single One Nation member and four Independents. Even with such a commanding margin, many saw Beattie’s departure as handing Bligh a poisoned chalice. The state government, in its fourth term, was in trouble. The health system was a mess, the state was $74 billion in debt and had lost its AAA international credit rating, and growing congestion in the Brisbane, Sunshine Coast and Gold Coast regions – the very electorates that could make or break governments – had become a major political issue. But for the extent of its majority, the government was widely seen as terminal, while the new LNP offered a rejuvenated and fresh start. Bligh decided to chance an election six months early, on 21 March 2009. Opinion polls were predicting a close result and The CourierMail’s final election editorial concluded that the challenges facing the state needed a fresh approach and a willingness to shed the past: ‘Mr Springborg offers it and deserves a chance to do the job.’ On election day the polls were still tipping a neck-and-neck race, with the prospect of a hung parliament and the likelihood of no certain result for several days. It never came to that. Bligh claimed victory shortly before 9pm, and made history by becoming the nation’s first woman to be elected a state premier.23 After losing three campaigns, Springborg congratulated his opponent and announced he would not seek re-election as Opposition leader.24 Springborg had fought a protracted and tenacious campaign to realise his dream of a single conservative party. He had improved the non-Labor representation by five seats in each of the 2004 and 2006 elections. A further increase of nine seats, against the background of a tired and discredited Labor administration that had been in office

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for 11 years, may have happened irrespective of any merger – the ‘it’s time’ factor. The result was reasonably good for the LNP, but at the same time disappointing, not because it did not win government, but because it did not come closer to doing so. In the blood-letting that followed, ex-Liberals, labelling themselves as moderate Liberals, claimed that Springborg, a Darling Downs farmer, was never the right leader to appeal to Brisbane and southeast Queensland voters, and insisted that if the LNP was to survive its next leader must be a former Liberal who appealed to those regions.25 Surfers Paradise MP and dentist, John-Paul Langbroek, first elected to parliament as a Liberal in 2004, became the new leader of the LNP, beating fellow former Liberal Tim Nicholls and former state deputy leader of The Nationals, Fiona Simpson. Springborg won the deputy leadership in a contest with former Nationals Jeff Seeney and Rob Messenger.26 Kevin Rudd would have been mightily relieved by the Queensland result. While it was an election fought predominantly on state issues, it was also an underlying test of the way the federal government was handling the impact of the world economic crisis on Australia. Since coming to office in November 2007 Labor had made no inroads in a by-election in Gippsland, had not contested by-elections in Mayo and Lyne, had been mauled in elections in the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory, and had lost government in Western Australia. All these contests had been before the full extent of the world recession hit home. For Rudd, the Queensland result could be seen as an endorsement of the federal government’s efforts to protect the national economy from the worst of the crisis. The Queensland election result stalled any lingering impetus towards amalgamation in other states, or federally. There was little doubt in the hierarchy of the New South Wales Nationals that a strong LNP result would have increased pressure for a similar amalgamation in that state, which would logically have flowed through to the federal party. Even though Truss had acknowledged in January that there would be no mergers in states other than Queensland, or federally, in

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the foreseeable future, there were those who had hoped it might still come about on the back of the Queensland election.27 Peter Slipper, a long-time amalgamationist, was confident the LNP would continue into the future, but agreed more widespread mergers were on the backburner: The concept of the LNP appeals because people got sick and tired of the Libs and Nats slinging off at each other. That did not happen this time. There was none of the ridiculous situation we saw in the last two elections where there was debate over who would be Premier – the Liberal leader or the National leader. The LNP campaign was united and the election result was strong and we won seats. I think people allowed reality to be seduced by hope: to win was almost impossible. Had we won, you would have seen amalgamation spread elsewhere. It will happen, but it will take a bit longer.28

His enthusiasm for amalgamation was partly based on his belief that a combined party would be more conservative than the Liberal Party. He noted in his first parliamentary speech after being re-elected in 1993 that there was an ‘overwhelming similarity’ in the hopes and aspirations of the rank and file membership of the two parties in Queensland, adding that ‘if one did not know the individuals, it would not be an easy task to identify the party they attended’. He said Liberals and Nationals in his electorate believed that ‘our continued existence as two separate organisations is a luxury we can no longer afford’.29

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After 90 unbroken years, the National Party of Australia – The Nationals – continues. Moreover, as noted by Truss in a statement marking its anniversary on 22 January 2010, ‘Since federation no party has been in government as long as the Nationals’.1 The party’s more eager detractors will say that, with such small parliamentary representation, the party’s condition is terminal and point to the merger of the National and Liberal parties in Queensland as evidence of its inevitable, imminent, and frequently predicted demise. Part of the reason why detractors want to see the party disappear is jealousy – jealousy over the seeming undue influence it has been able to exert, notably in government, an influence that is directly linked to its being an independent party. Coalition – and the ability occasionally to threaten to break it – has suited the party more than being hamstrung as part of a single organisation dominated by MPs from city electorates. The party’s parliamentarians have always been determined people, who bring to Canberra a deep knowledge of the diverse issues and concerns of the people they represent. Their political priorities are

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different from those of organisations whose representatives straddle the city-country divide. The party can fight with a single-minded intensity for the betterment of services and facilities across the regions. One of Labor’s favourite sons, the jovial Fred Daly, who was born at Currabubula, south of Tamworth in New South Wales, once said the Country Party’s leaders followed the practical philosophy of when you have the numbers or power, use them: ‘These men can make Liberal members look like novices. They are generally tough debaters and trade insults like they trade cattle.’ 2 Today’s representatives are faced with vastly changed circumstances to those of their forebears. Demographics have changed, reducing the number of traditional rural electorates and generating new boundaries based on large regional towns, cities and coastal communities. The nation has become more urbanised and environmentally conscious. The concentration of media ownership has almost wiped out locally owned country newspapers and radio stations, with the result that country people get much of their news and information from citybased media concerns. The internet has brought the world to the bush, even if it is only by dial-up or satellite service in remoter regions. The economic mix has changed, with less dependence on agriculture to support national wealth. The number of farms and farm workers has decreased. The global economy has become an irreversible fact of life. Increased involvement by the Commonwealth in areas including education, health and social services has heightened community expectations of the responsibility of government – if something goes wrong the government should fix it. Attitudes have changed. There is a greater cynicism about politics, with fewer people joining political parties and more inclined to change their voting patterns. All of these have been used to argue that the time has come for The Nationals: it’s time to merge. More recent arguments have been that the party’s membership is ageing and declining and that fewer parliamentary numbers must lead to reduced influence and therefore less ability to raise corporate financial support for maintenance and election campaigns. But 2009 saw something of a turnaround: the parties in New

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Outlining new directions: Warren Truss addresses the federal council in Canberra, 22 August 2009 (The Nationals federal secretariat)

South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia all reported increases in memberships, as did the LNP in Queensland. Contemporary proposals to severely restrict corporate donations to political organisations and instead increase taxpayer funding for elections and party maintenance could also help The Nationals, which is a poor cousin to Labor and the Liberals when it comes to private-sector financial support. A key question for The Nationals is to what extent such changes might curb the ability of the trade unions to contribute to the ALP’s coffers or fund independent campaigns in support of Labor, such as the antiWorkChoices campaign. The Nationals and its predecessors struggled for years to throw off the image of being a highly conservative farmers’ party. Its 2009 federal council gave the impression it might at last be succeeding and positioning itself as a modern, progressive political enterprise in tune with its constituency. If it can maintain this momentum – and expand its appeal more effectively to the younger voting demographic – it can

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regain lost ground and claim new territory, which in turn will consolidate its independent future. It is fair to say the party’s electoral fortunes after the November 2007 election were virtually at the bottom of the cycle. What caused the turnaround in less than two years? Henderson put the credit squarely on the Anderson/Priebe review: It freed us to confront ourselves. It challenged us to determine whether we wanted to keep the party alive. The answer was ‘yes’ and we realised we had to change. We undertook the rebranding to ensure a consistent message. We are stating the direction at all state and federal levels of what the party stands for. That’s a huge cut through.3

The federal council adopted a new policy platform, charting priorities in 12 key areas – regional health, education, food security and agriculture, land and water management, the economy and taxation, regional development, small business and tourism, transport, communications, social justice, climate change, and trade. It was unambiguously Nationals in flavour, differing from Liberal policy in some areas, and unashamedly directed towards regional Australia. The party settled on for regional Australia as the brand identifying its raison d’être. Gone were such cluttered slogans as for country and coast, rural and regional, or remote, rural and regional. The first motion at the 2009 federal council meeting, carried unanimously, opposed Labor’s Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) – the instrument that would set up an ETS – because it would ‘cost thousands of Australians their jobs, place unnecessary burdens on business and have no meaningful impact on carbon emissions’. The position distinguished the party from the Liberals and was underlined by Truss later in the day. Noting that the party had the previous week voted against the CPRS legislation, he declared: ‘The Nationals will never support the Rudd model of a carbon pollution reduction scheme.’ 4 This did not mean the party was full of climate change

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sceptics or deniers. The federal council policy acknowledged that ‘climate change is occurring, and that a robust and realistic policy response is necessary’. It went further: The Nationals support an effective global program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to insure against the risk of climate change. It is important that wealthy industrialised countries like Australia take a lead role in implementing a global response if we are to expect developing countries to contribute to a solution. But a solution that weakens the Australian economy and creates unemployment helps no one. The Nationals therefore support an Australian objective of a 5 per cent reduction in emissions below 2000 levels by 2020, with larger reductions dependent on a strong international agreement being reached.5

The policy set out a number of emissions-reducing measures that ‘should be taken now’ to meet the target, but said an ETS was not necessary: ‘An ETS will only become necessary if an international agreement is reached on tougher targets and similar schemes are introduced by the United States and other major economies.’ Therefore, it argued, Australia should await the outcome of the United Nations summit on climate change, in Copenhagen, in December 2009 before proceeding. Joyce raised the ante by suggesting that if people were genuinely concerned about climate change and reducing carbon emissions they should look seriously at the development of nuclear power – a position previously supported by the party, but not specifically included in its latest climate change policy. Here was a party showing there was still fire in the belly, still an ability to take an independent stand, and still determined to remain a force in Australian politics. To secure its long-term future, the party needs to return to at least 15 lower house seats and six or seven Senate ones – a tall order, but not an impossible task, even with redistributions that erode the number of traditional rural electorates. The LNP has thrown up some

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Taking a more independent stand: Barnaby Joyce, flanked by (left to right) Senate colleagues Ron Boswell, Fiona Nash, John Williams and Nigel Scullion, explains why the senators voted against the Rudd government’s ETS – ‘employment termination scheme’, Canberra, August 2009 (Fiona Nash)

complications in the federal context, although probably not for the immediate future. The party was developed specifically with Queensland state politics in mind. It was to be the tool by which the nonLabor parties could regain the treasury benches in Brisbane. So far as Canberra is concerned, LNP members and senators continue to sit with the parties with which they sat before the amalgamation. Sitting MPs have been guaranteed re-endorsement for the next federal election – so-called ‘grandfathering’ – and the non-LNP seats of Dawson, Flynn, Capricornia and Kennedy have all been deemed to be ‘Nationals’ seats if they are regained. In New South Wales, the party needs to win back former territory

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such as New England, Eden-Monaro, Lyne, Page, Richmond, Farrer and Hume, and in Victoria, Murray and Indi. The party should look more seriously at some of the provincial seats, such as Paterson, Hunter, Macquarie and Gilmore in New South Wales, and McMillan and Bendigo in Victoria – not a new strategy, but one that would require a determined investment of time and money. The resurgence of the party at state level in Western Australia, combined with the latest federal redistribution in the state, has opened new potential for The Nationals to again be represented in Canberra. Even in South Australia, renewed federal representation should not be discounted as an impossible target. Some of these scenarios might increase tensions between The Nationals and Liberals. But they must be faced if The Nationals is serious about its future. In essence, the party must expand its electoral appeal by bolstering community understanding of what it is, what it has achieved over the years, what it offers for the future, and why it is a necessary entity in the political system. Climate change policy proved to be a key differentiating factor and one that, in October/November 2009 caused the deepest crisis in the Liberal Party since its formation. Turnbull, apparently with the agreement of most of his party room, entered into negotiations with the government to amend its CPRS legislation. He would have felt reasonably confident to do this, given the last Howard administration’s policy to reduce carbon emissions. After four weeks of negotiations a deal appeared to have been struck. The shadow ministry (although not The Nationals members, who, it was accepted, would not support the Labor legislation at all) signed off on the amendments and Turnbull indicated the legislation would quickly pass the Senate and become law before the Copenhagen summit. It all went awry. For whatever reasons – Turnbull’s arrogant interpretation of Liberal party room numbers, a growing unease among Liberal parliamentarians over doing deals to help the Labor government, an apparent hardening public view that no ETS should be concluded before the outcome of the Copenhagen summit, or a combination of

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all three of the above – the party imploded. A spill motion to roll Turnbull as leader on 25 November was defeated by 48 votes to 35. Turnbull persisted with his determination to have the amended legislation carried by the Senate. He refused suggestions from senior colleagues to delay the vote by referring the bills to a Senate committee. This prompted mass resignations from his front bench the following day and a further demand for another leadership spill motion. A party meeting on 1 December voted 48 to 34 in favour of the spill. In the ensuing three-way contest the shadow Treasurer, Joe Hockey (North Sydney), widely tipped to take over, was overpowered by both Turnbull and the other aspirant, the former shadow spokesman on families, housing, community services and indigenous affairs, Tony Abbott (Warringah, New South Wales).6 Abbott went on to defeat Turnbull by just one vote, 42 to 41, becoming the Liberal Party’s third leader in two years.7 In a subsequent secret ballot, 55 party members voted in support of Abbott’s position that the CPRS bills should be referred to a Senate committee, or defeated, highlighting how badly Turnbull had misjudged his party room. That evening the Senate rejected a motion to refer the legislation to a committee, but the following day, just after midday, voted it down by 41 votes to 33. The government pledged to re-introduce the bills at the start of the 2010 parliamentary session. The Nationals stood out prominently as the Liberals went into their acrimonious meltdown. Its united and unequivocal anti-CPRS position was in stark contrast to the confused and divided position of the Liberal Party. As Abbott began the task of rebuilding the Opposition, The Nationals won an extra position in the shadow cabinet – Barnaby Joyce, an accountant before entering parliament, was appointed as shadow finance and debt reduction minister, the first time the party had been involved in such a senior fiscal portfolio since Fadden was Treasurer. This gave The Nationals four shadow cabinet spots: Truss, continuing as shadow trade, transport, regional development and local government minister; Scullion becoming shadow indigenous affairs minister; Cobb continuing in agriculture, fisheries and

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forestry and with the added responsibility of food security; and Joyce. The price was the loss of one shadow parliamentary secretary’s position, John Forrest in regional development. Mark Coulton retained his parliamentary secretary role, moving from water resources and conservation to regional development and emerging trade markets. Luke Hartsuyker stayed in the outer shadow ministry and also kept his role as deputy manager of Opposition business in the House of Representatives. His shadow portfolio responsibilities were expanded to include consumer affairs, financial services, superannuation and corporate law.8 It was interesting that Joyce accepted a front bench position as he had previously refused as much. It seemed he was beginning to position himself as a prospective party leader at some time in the future by gaining experience on the front bench and eyeing a move to the lower house if an opportunity arose after the next election.9 More immediately, political observers wondered how long it would be before Joyce found himself at odds with a policy of the shadow cabinet and what his response would be. Compromise looked to be in the wind. Joyce said that while there would be differences between The Nationals and Liberals from time to time ‘I’m sure we’ll be able to manage them’.10 Abbot said Joyce understood the rules, adding that while the senator might not be looking forward to the discipline of shadow cabinet solidarity, ‘he’s happy to accept it’.11 Abbott began repositioning the Opposition’s policy on climate change along similar lines to that of The Nationals. He indicated that future Opposition policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would not involve a tax or an emissions trading scheme. The unimpressive outcome of Copenhagen – a non-legally binding accord under which the developed countries, including Australia, would set emissions targets to limit global warming to below two degrees Celsius by 2020 – was seized on by Truss to justify The Nationals anti-CPRS stand. The Prime Minister, who had travelled to Copenhagen, said the outcome, although not perfect, was a significant global step forward. Truss said it was a ‘spectacular failure’. Pointing

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The Nationals parliamentary team in July 2008. Left to right (back row): John Williams, Mark Coulton, John Forrest, Luke Hartsuyker, Bruce Scott, Paul Neville, Darren Chester, Ron Boswell; (front row): Barnaby Joyce, Fiona Nash, Nigel Scullion, Warren Truss, Kay Hull, John Cobb (Auspic)

out that no other country represented at Copenhagen had ‘even suggested that a CPRS was the solution to climate change’, he said the summit proved that Labor’s CPRS was ‘just another giant tax’: It is frightening that Australia went close to having a legislated CPRS locked in place before the Copenhagen fiasco. Australian households would have been paying more, Australian industry would have been producing less, Australian jobs would have been exported overseas, and our food and manufactured goods would increasingly have been imported from countries without a CPRS.12

Abbott said the outcome ‘vindicates the stance the Opposition took’, adding ‘it suggests Mr Rudd was always very, very unwise to try to

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rush into a great big emissions tax’.13 It was an echo of the argument The Nationals had been putting forward for months and emphasised the leading role the party had adopted on the issue. A Country Party brochure titled Mileposts, charting achievements over its first 30 years between 1920 and 1950, ended with the exhortation: ‘You can’t afford to be without a Country Party … Thank your stars there is a Country Party.’ Arguably, it still applies to the contemporary party.

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Appendices

Appendices

Appendix 1

Formation and Name Changes 22 January 1920 The Australian Country Party is formed in the Commonwealth parliament. 24 March 1926 A conference convened by the Australian Farmers’ Federal Organisation (AFFO) of state and federal Country Party delegates in Melbourne adopts the first constitution of The Australian Country Party Association (federal constitution). 9 March 1974 The party’s federal council agrees by 18 votes to six to recommend the federal party name be changed from Australian Country Party to National Country Party of Australia. 2 May 1975 The party’s first federal convention in Canberra agrees to change the federal name to National Country Party of Australia. 16 October 1982 Federal conference in Canberra votes to change the federal name to the National Party of Australia. 11 October 2003 Federal conference in Canberra endorses the use of ‘The Nationals’ as the party’s uniform shortened name and logo for all promotional material and federal election campaigns and recommends the state parties do

likewise, which they subsequently do. 14 October 2006 Federal conference in Canberra agrees the federal party’s constitutional name should be changed to The Nationals. Federal council endorses the change. Sources

Aitkin, The Country Party in New South Wales; Ellis, History of the Country Party; Introduction to National Party, federal secretariat, Canberra; Minutes, joint Country Party and Australian Farmers’ Federal Organisation conference, Melbourne, 23–24 March 1926; Minutes, federal council, March 9 1974, 15 October 1982; Minutes, federal conference 16 October 1982, 10–12 October 2003, 14 October 2006; The Nationals federal secretariat, Canberra. See Select Bibliography and Further Reading for full details of publications cited.

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Appendix 2

Electoral Performance, House of Representatives Election Year

Seats Won

Seats Contested

Seats in House

Primary Votes

% of Seats

% of Vote

Notes

1919 1922 1925 1928 1929 1931 1934 1937 1940 1943 1946 1949 1951 1954 1955 1958 1961 1963 1966 1969 1972 1974 1975 1977 1980 1983 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007

11 14 14 13 10 16 15 15 13 9 12 19 17 17 18 19 17 20 21 20 20 21 23 19 20 17 21 19 14 16 18 16 13 12 10

19 32 18 14 18 27 29 24 27 29 25 37 22 22 18 24 25 24 27 26 36 49 45 30 31 32 72 83 47 46 31 32 33 24 24

75 75 75 75 75 75 74 74 74 74 74 121 121 121 122 122 122 122 124 125 125 127 127 124 125 125 148 148 148 147 148 148 150 150 150

176884 197513 313363 271686 295640 388544 447968 536100 531397 514615 493736 500349 443713 388171 347445 465320 446475 489498 561926 523232 622826 796577 869919 793444 745037 799609 921151 1060976 833557 758036 893170 588088 643926 690275 682424

14.7 18.7 18.7 17.3 13.3 21.3 18.9 20.2 17.6 12.1 16.2 15.7 14.0 14.0 14.7 15.6 13.9 16.4 16.9 16.0 16.0 16.5 18.1 15.3 16.0 13.6 14.2 12.8 9.5 10.9 12.2 10.8 8.7 8.0 6.7

9.3 12.6 10.7 10.5 10.3 12.3 12.6 13.1 13.7 12.5 11.4 10.9 9.7 8.5 7.9 9.3 8.5 8.9 9.8 8.6 9.4 10.8 11.3 10.0 8.9 9.2 10.6 11.5 8.4 7.2 8.2 5.3 5.6 5.9 5.5

(a)

(b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)

(j)

(k) (l)

(m) (n)

(o)

Notes (a) A total of 15 candidates who were endorsed by state farm organisations or jointly with the Nationalists as Nationalist and Farmers candidates, or as Nationalists supporting the objectives of the Australian Farmers’ Federal Organisation (AFFO) were elected. Nine of these agreed on 22 January 1920 to form the Australian Country Party (ACP) and were soon joined by two more, so that when parliament opened on 26 February 1920 the ACP had 11 members in the House of Representatives. (Ellis, Country Party, pp. 50, 51; Page, Earle Page, pp. 72, 74; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 26 February 1920, p. 41).

Appendices

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(b) Does not include the breakaway Country Progressives in Victoria, led by Percy Stewart in Wimmera, who was re-elected. (c) Again excludes the breakaway Country Progressives in Victoria. (d) The Country Party and Country Progressives in Victoria re-united during 1931. (e) Excludes Federal Country in Victoria, which endorsed the state organisation’s pledge not to support composite governments and whose elected member for Wimmera, Alexander Wilson, sat as an Independent Country Party member. (f) Again excludes Wilson in Wimmera. (g) Includes two Country Party groupings in Queensland, but excludes Liberal and Country League in South Australia, whose member for Barker, Archie Cameron, quit the parliamentary Country Party shortly after the 1940 election after failing to retain the party leadership and instead sat with the United Australia Party. The party’s representation increased to ten soon after the election when the Victorian party re-united, enabling Alexander Wilson to sit with the parliamentary Country Party. (h) Includes the Liberal-Country endorsed candidate for Capricornia, Charles Davidson, who sat with the Parliamentary Country Party (Ellis, Country Party, p. 269) (i) Note the substantial increase in the size of the House of Representatives, resulting from a redistribution in 1948, from 74 to 121 members. (j) Includes the Australian Country Party – Northern Territory, whose candidate, Sam Calder, won the seat from Labor’s Norman Nelson. The Member for the Northern Territory had voting rights in the Commonwealth parliament limited to Territory issues, until granted full voting rights through the Northern Territory Representation Act 1968. (k) Includes National Party in Queensland and National Alliance in Western Australia. (l) Includes Country Party (New South Wales), National Party (Queensland, Victoria), National Country Party (South Australia, Western Australia), and Country Liberal Party (Northern Territory). The federal party was renamed the National Country Party of Australia from 2 May 1975. (m) Excludes the National Party of Western Australia, which unsuccessfully contested one seat in the election. The party split from the state’s National Country Party in 1978 and did not re-unite until October 1984. The federal party became the National Party of Australia from 16 October 1982. (n) The reason why there were so many candidates for this election (82) was because the Queensland National Party, under the auspices of the Joh for Canberra campaign, helped fund the running of National (Joh Independent) candidates in 13 seats in each of South Australia and Western Australia, none of whom were successful. (o) Known as The Nationals from October 2003, the federal party’s constitutional name became The Nationals from 14 October 2006. Sources AEC, Electoral Pocketbook 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009; AEC, 2007 election and 2008 by-election results – see ; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook; Davey, The Nationals; Ellis, Country Party; Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics, 1890–1964, Hughes, Government and Politics, 1965– 1975, 1975–1984, 1985–1994; Introduction to National Party; Nixon Report; Page, Earle Page. See Select Bibliography and Further Reading for full details of publications cited.

Appendix 3

Parliamentary and Organisational Leaders Leader

State

Period of Service

McWilliams, William James Page, Earle Christmas Grafton Prime Minister Cameron, Archie Galbraith Fadden, Arthur William

Tas NSW

24 Feb 1920 to 5 Apr 1921 5 Apr 1921 to 13 Sept 1939 7 Apr to 26 Apr 1939 13 Sept 1939 to 16 Oct 1940 16 Oct 1940 to 12 Mar 1941 (Acting)* 12 Mar 1941 to 26 Mar 1958 29 Aug 1941 to 7 Oct 1941 7 Oct 1941 to 16 Sept 1943 26 Mar 1958 to 1 Feb 1971

Prime Minister Opposition Leader McEwen, John

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SA Qld

Vic

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Leader

State

Period of Service

Prime Minister Anthony, John Douglas Sinclair, Ian McCahon Blunt, Charles William Fischer, Timothy Andrew Anderson, John Duncan Vaile, Mark Anthony James Truss, Warren Errol

NSW NSW NSW NSW NSW NSW Qld

19 Dec 1967 to 10 Jan 1968 2 Feb 1971 to 17 Jan 1984 17 Jan 1984 to 9 May 1989 9 May 1989 to 6 Apr 1990 10 Apr 1990 to 20 July 1999 20 July 1999 to 23 June 2005 23 June 2005 to 3 Dec 2007 3 Dec 2007–

Deputy Leader

Jowett, Edmund Gregory, Henry Fleming, William Montgomerie Gibson, William Gerrand Paterson, Thomas Thorby, Harold Victor Campbell Fadden, Arthur William Vacant McEwen, John Davidson, Charles William Adermann, Charles Frederick Anthony, John Douglas Sinclair, Ian McCahon Hunt, Ralph James Dunnet Lloyd, Bruce Anderson, John Duncan Vaile, Mark Anthony James Truss, Warren Errol Scullion, Nigel Gregory (CLP)

Vic WA NSW Vic Vic NSW Qld Vic Qld Qld NSW NSW NSW Vic NSW NSW Qld Sen, NT

24 Feb 1920 to 5 Apr 1921 5 Apr 1921 to 2 Dec 1921 27 June 1922 to 16 Dec 1922 16 Jan 1923 to 12 Oct 1929 19 Nov 1929 to 30 Nov 1937 30 Nov 1937 to 21 Sept 1940 16 Oct 1940 to 12 Mar 1941 12 Mar 1941 to 22 Sept 1943 22 Sept 1943 to 26 Mar 1958 26 Mar 1958 to 1 Nov 1963 25 Feb 1964 to 8 Dec 1966 9 Dec 1966 to 2 Feb 1971 2 Feb 1971 to 17 Jan 1984 17 Feb 1984 to 23 July 1987 23 July 1987 to 23 Mar 1993 23 Mar 1993 to 20 July 1999 20 July 1999 to 23 June 2005 23 June 2005– 3 Dec 2007–

Notes * Page and McEwen tied in the ballot for the leadership. To break the deadlock, the party room agreed to proceed with the election of its deputy leader – for which Fadden had overwhelming support – and then appoint the deputy as acting leader. With the deepening war crisis and Prime Minister Menzies overseas, the party room confirmed Fadden as leader on 12 March 1941 and agreed to leave the deputy’s position vacant. Sources Argus, Melbourne, 28 June 1922, p. 11; Australian Dictionary of Biography, various volumes – see ; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, various editions; Ellis, Country Party; Ellis, Pen in Politics; Fadden, They called me Artie; Golding, Black Jack; Lundie, R, Commonwealth Parliamentary Library Research Service, Canberra; McEwen – His story; Page, Earle Page; The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1920, p. 2; 6 April 1921, p. 10; 3 December 1921, p. 17; 17 January 1923, p. 13; 20 November1929, p. 17; 13 March 1941, p. 6; 23 September 1943, p. 4; Who’s Who in Australia, various volumes. See Select Bibliography and Further Reading for full details of publications cited.

Appendices

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Senate Leaders Leader

State

Period of Service

Hardy, Charles Cooper, Walter Jackson Wade, Harrie Walter McKellar, Gerald Colin Drake–Brockman, Thomas Charles Webster, James Joseph Scott, Douglas Barr Collard, Stanley James Stone, John Owen Boswell, Ronald Leslie Doyle Scullion, Nigel Gregory (CLP) Joyce, Barnaby (LNP–Q from July 2008)

NSW Qld Vic NSW WA Vic NSW Qld Qld Qld NT Qld

1935–1938 1949–1960 1961–1964 1964–1969 1969–1975 1976–1980 1980–1985 1985–1987 1987–1990 1990–2007 2007–2008 2008–

Notes The party did not elect a formal Senate leader prior to 1935. In the period 1938 to 1949, the party’s Senate numbers gradually diminished from four to one, making it hardly necessary to elect a leader. Interestingly, despite being the only Country Party senator from July 1947 to December 1949, Walter Cooper was deputy leader of the Opposition in the Senate from 19 March to 31 May 1947 and Senate Leader of the Opposition from 1 July 1947 to 19 December 1949. Party numbers increased to five at the December 1949 elections, from which time leadership positions were regularly filled. Sources Australian Dictionary of Biography; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 3 October 1935, p. 462; 9 October 1935, pp. 522–3; 10 October 1935, pp. 598–600; 22 October 1935, p. 867; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, 1945–1953, p. 79; 2005, pp. 594–616; Madden, C, and Lamb, M, Commonwealth Parliamentary Library Research Service; Senate Biography, vol 2, p. 32. See Select Bibliography and Further Reading for full details of publications cited.

Party Whips, House of Representatives Name

Electorate

Period of Service

Page, Earle Christmas Grafton Gibson, William Gerrand Stewart, Percy Gerald Prowse, John Henry Hunter, James Aitchison Johnston Thompson, Harold Victor Campbell Nock, Horace Keyworth Corser, Bernard Henry Davidson, Charles William Turnbull, Winton George England, John Armstrong Corbett, James Fisher, Peter Stanley Hicks, Noel Jeffrey Forrest, John Alexander Hull, Kay Elizabeth

Cowper (NSW) Corangamite (Vic) Wimmera (Vic) Forrest (WA) Maranoa (Qld) New England (NSW) Riverina (NSW) Wide Bay (Qld) Dawson (Qld) Mallee (Vic) Calare (NSW) Maranoa (Qld) Mallee (Vic) Riverina (NSW) Mallee (Vic) Riverina (NSW)

Jan 1920–Apr 1921 Apr 1921–Jan 1923 Jan 1923–Feb 1923 Feb 1923–Aug 1924 Aug 1924–Nov 1934 Nov 1934–Nov 1937 Nov 1937–Sept 1940 Sept 1940–Apr 1951 Apr 1951–Jan 1956 Feb 1956–Nov 1972 Nov 1972–Nov 1975 Nov 1975–Aug 1980 Aug 1980–Apr 1983 Apr 1983–Oct 1998 Nov 1998–Aug 2006 Aug 2006–

Notes Since its formation as the Australian Country Party in January 1920, the party has declared parliamentary party positions, including that of whip, vacant after each election. Up to the 1950s, the whip was also referred to as the secretary of the party. From the mid–1970s the party elected a deputy whip. The contemporary party elects a chief whip and a whip. The above list nominates those parliamentarians who have been elected to the senior whip position.

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Federal Presidents President

State

Period of Service

Page, Earle Moss, William Hunt, Ralph Roberts, Sidney Solomons, Adrian Drake–Brockman, Tom McKerrow, Shirley McDonald, Stuart Paterson, John McDonald, Don Dickie, Helen Russell, David Tanner, John

NSW Vic NSW Qld NSW WA Vic Vic WA Qld NSW Qld Vic

1926–1961 1962–1968 1968–1969 1969–1974 1974–1978 1978–1981 1981–1987 1987–1990 1990–1996 1996–1999 1999–2005 2005–2006 2006–

Notes The federal organisation was founded as The Australian Country Party Association at a conference in Melbourne on 24 March 1926.

Federal Directors Director

Period of Service

Warwick, Peter Cassell, Barry Bailey, Jenny (Acting) Osmond, Bryce Harvey, John Davey, Paul Ferguson, Cecile Braithwaite, Ray (Honorary) Davey, Paul (Honorary) White, Gaye Hall, Andrew Henderson, Brad

1968–1976 1976–1977 1977–1979 1979–1981 1981–1983 1983–1992 1992–1997 1998–1998 1998–2000 2000–2001 2001–2007 2007–

Notes and sources Prior to the establishment of the federal secretariat, the general secretary of the New South Wales Country Party acted as the honorary secretary to the federal party association and later federal council. These were HP Williams, 1920–1923; JJ Price, 1923–1927; EJ Munro, 1927–1948; John F Dredge, 1948–1967; and Bill Ford, 1968. The Nationals federal secretariat, Canberra; The Nationals – NSW, head office, Sydney.

Appendices

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Appendix 4

Party Senators and Members The Senate Name

Born/Died

State

Abbott, Macartney Abbott, Percy Phipps

3.7.1877–30.12.1960 14.5.1869–9.9.1940

NSW NSW

Abbott, Richard Hartley Smith

1859–28.2.1940

Vic

Andrew, David Badman, Albert Oliver

10.11.1866–18.11.1928 18.12.1885–24.4.1977

Vic SA

Bjelke-Petersen, Florence Isabel Boswell, Ronald Leslie Doyle Brownhill, David Gordon Cadell

11.8.1920– 9.12.1940– 16.11.1935–

Qld Qld NSW

Bull, Thomas Louis Carroll, William

7.9.1905–11.8.1976 3.1.1872–30.5.1936

NSW WA

Chapman, John Hedley Collard, Stanley James

16.12.1879–14.3.1931 25.3.1936–

SA Qld

Cooper, Walter Jackson

23.4.1891–22.7.1973

Qld

Drake-Brockman, Thomas Charles Elliott, Robert Charles Dunlop Gibson, William Gerrand Hardy, Charles Johnston, Edward Bertram Joyce, Barnaby Thomas Gerard Kilgariff, Bernard Francis Latham, Charles George Lawrie, Alexander Greig Ellis Macdonald, John Alexander Lindsay McGauran, Julian John James McKellar, Gerald Colin Maher, Edmund Bede Marwick, Thomas William Maunsell, Charles Ronald Nash, Fiona Joy Neal, Laurence William O’Chee, William George Piesse, Edmund Stephen Roper Prowse, Edgar Wylie Rankin, George James Reid, Albert David Reid, Donald David Robertson, Agnes Robertson Robinson, William Charles Scott, Douglas Barr

15.5.1919–28.8.1992 28.10.1886–6.3.1950 20.5.1869–22.5.1955 12.12.1898–27.8.1941 11.1.1880–6.9.1942 17.4.1967– 30.9.1923– 26.1.1882–26.8.1968 19.6.1907–13.12.1978 10.5.1954– 5.3.1957– 29.5.1903–13.4.1970 8.6.1891–31.12.1982 29.4.1895–3.4.1960 8.5.1922– 6.5.1965– 18.7.1947– 19.6.1965– 5.1.1900–25.8.1952 22.3.1905–2.6.1977 1.5.1887–28.12.1957 1887–22.5.1962 10.5.1933– 31.7.1882–29.1.1968 4.10.1907–21.1.1981 12.5.1920–

WA Vic Vic NSW WA Qld NT WA Qld NSW Vic NSW Qld WA Qld NSW Vic Qld WA WA Vic NSW WA WA WA NSW

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Party

Period of service

CP CP

1.7.35–defeated 30.6.41 14.11.25–defeated 30.6.29

CP

*18.12.28–retired 30.6.29

CP LCL, sitting with CP

14.11.25–died 18.11.28 1.7.32–resigned 30.9.37

NCP; NPA from Oct 1982 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006# NPA

*12.3.81–retired 30.6.93 5.3.83– 1.12.84–resigned 14.4.2000

CP CP

1.7.65–defeated 30.6.71 1.7.26–died 30.5.36

CP NCP; NPA from Oct 1982

1.7.26–died 14.3.31 13.12.75–retired 5.6.87

NAT CP CP; NCP from May 1975 CP CP excluded from party room until 1943 CP CP NPA; Nats from Oct 2006# NT-CLP, sitting with NCP to March 1979, then LIB CP CP; NCP from May 1975 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 NPA; LIB from Feb 2006 CP CP CP CP; NCP from May 1975 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 NCP NPA CP CP CP CP CP LIB; CP from 1955 CP CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982

17.11.28–defeated 30.6.32 1.7.35–retired 30.6.68 *12.8.58–retired 30.6.78 1.7.29–defeated 30.6.35 1.7.35–retired 30.6.47 1.7.32–defeated 30.6.38 1.7.29–died 6.9.42 1.7.2005– 13.12.75–retired 10.7.87 *8.10.42–defeated 20.8.43 1.7.65–retired 11.11.75 1.7.93–defeated 30.6.99; *4.5.2000–retired 30.6.2008 11.7.87–defeated 30.6.90; 1.7.93– 22.11.58–died 13.4.70 22.2.50–retired 30.6.65 *19.8.36–defeated 22.10.37 1.7.68– defeated 30.6.81 1.7.2005– *11.3.80–defeated 30.6.81 *8.5.90–defeated 30.6.99 22.2.50–died 25.8.52 1.7.62–resigned 31.12.73 22.2.50–retired 30.6.56 22.2.50–died 22.5.62 *16.1.74–retired 11.4.74 22.2.50–retired 30.6.1962 *30.9.52–defeated 8.5.53 *6.8.70–defeated 20.11.70; 18.5.74–retired 30.6.85

Appendices

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Name

Born/Died

State

Scullion, Nigel Gregory Seward, Harrie Stephen Sheil, Glenister Stone, John Owen Tambling, Grant Ernest John Tehan, Thomas Joseph Wade, Harrie Walter Webster, James Joseph Williams, John Reginald Wilson, Reginald Victor

4.5.1956– 26.2.1884–23.7.1958 21.10.1929–29.9.2008 31.1.1929– 20.6.1943– 18.1.1916–1.6.1996 10.1.1905–18.11.1964 14.6.1925– 16.1.1955– 20.6.1877–13.7.1957

NT WA Qld Qld NT Vic Vic Vic NSW SA

* Selected under section 15 of the constitution to fill a casual Senate vacancy # LNP-Q from July 2008, following the merger of the National and Liberal parties in Queensland, and continuing to sit in the Commonwealth parliament with The Nationals.

House of Representatives Name

Born/Died

Electorate

State

P

Abbott, Charles Lydiard Aubrey Abbott, Joseph Palmer Adermann, Albert Evan Adermann, Charles Frederick Allan, Archibald Ian Anderson, Charles Groves Wright Anderson, John Duncan Anthony, Hubert Lawrence Anthony, John Douglas Anthony, Lawrence James Armstrong, Adam Alexander Atkinson, Llewelyn

4.1.1886–30.4.1975 18.10.1891–7.5.1965 10.3.1927–3.11.2001 3.8.1896–9.5.1979 3.1.1916–13.2.2000 12.2.1897–11.11.1988 14.11.1956– 12.3.1897–12.7.1957 31.12.1929– 17.12.1961– 1.7.1909–22.2.1982 18.12.1867–1.11.1945

Gwydir New England Fisher; Fairfax Maranoa; Fisher Gwydir Hume Gwydir Richmond Richmond Richmond Riverina Wilmot

NSW NSW Qld Qld NSW NSW NSW NSW NSW NSW NSW Tas

Badman, Albert Oliver Bandidt, Henry Norman Charles Barnes, Charles Edward Blunt, Charles William Bowden, George James Braithwaite, Raymond Allen Brand, William Alfred Brimblecombe, Wilfred John Calder, Stephen Edward

18.12.1885–24.4.1977 12.10.1906–6.1.1990 13.11.1901–24.10.1998 19.1.1951– 17.3.1888–8.6.1962 6.12.1933– 22.8.1888–26.10.1979 6.2.1898–14.9.1973 10.8.1916– 30.9.2008

Grey Wide Bay McPherson Richmond Gippsland Dawson Wide Bay Maranoa Northern Territory

SA Qld Qld NSW Vic Qld Qld Qld NT

Cameron, Archie Galbraith Cameron, Ian Milne Dixon Carige, Colin Lawrence Causley, Ian Raymond Chester, Darren Jeffrey Cobb, John Kenneth Cobb, Michael Roy

22.3.1895–9.8.1956 8.3.1938– 19.7.1938–14.5.2002 19.10.1940– 13.9.1967– 11.2.1950– 16.3.1945–

Barker Maranoa Capricornia Page Gippsland Parkes; Calare Parkes

SA Qld Qld NSW Vic NSW NSW

C C C C C C N C C N C AN 1 L C C N C NC C C C NC L NC NC N N N N

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Party

Period of service

NT–CLP sitting with NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 CP CP; NCP from May 1975;NPA from Oct 1982 NPA NT-CLP, sitting with NPA NCP CP CP; NCP from May 1975 Nats Nats CP (did not attend party meetings)

10.11.2001– 28.4.51–died 23.7.58 18.5.74–resigned 6.2.81; 1.12.84–defeated 30.6.90 11.7.87–resigned 1.3.90 11.7.87–retired 9.11.2001 13.12.75–defeated 30.6.78 1.7.56–died 18.11.64 *9.12.64–resigned 28.1.80 1.7.2008– 1.7.20–defeated 30.6.26

Party

Period of Service

CP CP CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 CP CP CP NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 CP CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 NPA CP ANTI-SOC; Liberal from 1910; NAT from 1917; CP 1923–25; NAT from 1925 LCL, sitting with CP (IND CP Apr–Nov 1939) CP CP NPA CP NCP; NPA from Oct 82 CP CP CP; NT-CLP from July 1974, sitting with CP, then NCP from May 1975 LCL, sitting with CP until 1940, then UAP and LIB NCP; NPA from Oct 1982 NCP NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 Nats NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 NPA

14.11.25–defeated 12.10.29; 19.12.31–resigned 28.3.37 21.9.40–retired 31.10.49 2.12.72–retired 19.2.90 21.8.43–retired 2.11.72 *19.12.53–resigned 30.4.69 10.12.49–defeated 28.4.51; 10.12.55–defeated 9.12.61 *15.4.89–retired 24.11.2007 23.10.37–died 12.7.57 *14.9.57–resigned 18.1.84 2.3.96–defeated 9.10.2004 *27.2.65–defeated 25.10.69 12.12.06–defeated 12.10.29 23.10.37–defeated 21.8.43 22.11.58–defeated 9.12.61 22.11.58–retired 2.11.72 *18.2.84–defeated 24.3.90 21.8.43–retired 2.11.61 13.12.75–retired 29.1.96 29.5.54–retired 14.10.58 28.4.51–retired 31.10.66 26.11.66–retired 19.9.80 15.9.34–died 9.8.56 18.10.80–retired 19.2.90 13.12.75–defeated 10.12.77 2.3.96–retired 24.11.2007 *28.6.2008 – 10.11.2001 – 1.12.84–retired 31.8.98

Appendices

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Name

Born/Died

Electorate

State/Territory

P

Collins, Maurice

1878–9.8.1945

Wakefield

SA

C

Collins, Thomas Joseph Conquest, Bryan Joseph Cook, Robert Corbett, James Corser, Bernard Henry Coulton, Mark Maclean Cowan, David Bruce Davidson, Charles William Drummond, David Henry Eggins, Eldred James England, John Armstrong Fadden, Arthur William

6.4.1886–15.4.1945 20.7.1930– 18.4.1868–21.5.1930 17.7.1908–3.3.2005 1882–15.12.1967 3.2.1958– 15.1.1926– 14.9.1897–29.11.1985 11.2.1890–13.6.1965 1898–28.1.1952 12.10.1911–18.6.1985 13.4.1895–21.4.1973

NSW Qld Vic Qld Qld NSW NSW Qld NSW NSW NSW Qld

C N V C C N NC C C C C C

Failes, Laurence John Fischer, Timothy Andrew Fisher, Peter Stanley Fleming, William Montgomerie

16.10.1899–7.7.1976 3.5.1946– 19.9.1936– 19.5.1874–30.7.1961

Hume Hinkler Indi Maranoa Wide Bay Parkes Lyne Capricornia; Dawson New England Lyne Calare Darling Downs; McPherson Lawson Farrer Mallee Robertson

NSW NSW Vic NSW

Forrest, John Alexander Gibson, William Gerrand Gilmore, Thomas Vernon Green, Roland Frederick Herbert Gregory, Henry Hallett, John Mead Hamilton, Leonard William Hartsuyker, Luke Hay, Alexander

24.8.1949– 20.5.1869–22.5.1955 7.5.1908–15.11.1994 29.10.1885–27.4.1947 15.3.1860–15.11.1940 9.10.1917–9.8.1999 7.7.1899–31.5.1987 28.4.1959– 8.1.1865–8.5.1941

Mallee Corangamite Leichhardt Richmond Dampier; Swan Canning Swan; Canning Cowper New England

Vic Vic Qld NSW WA WA WA NSW NSW

C N C L 1 N V C C L C C N NA

Hewson, Henry Arthur Hicks, Noel Jeffrey

31.12.1914–20.11.1999 4.11.1940–

Vic NSW

C NC

Hill, William Caldwell Holten, Rendle McNeilage Hull, Kay Elizabeth Hunt, Ralph James Dunnet Hunter, James Aitchison Johnston Jowett, Edmund Katter, Robert Carl Katter, Robert Cummin Kelly, De-Anne Margaret Killen, William Wilson King, Robert Shannon Lawler, Anthony John Leslie, Hugh Alan Lloyd, Bruce Lucock, Philip Ernest

14.4.1866–15.11.1939 29.3.1922–12.10.1996 3.2.1954– 31.3.1928– 1882–26.10.1968 6.1.1858–14.4.1936 22.5.1945– 5.9.1918–18.3.1990 21.3.1954– 1860–20.2.1939 22.3.1920–30.6.1991 18.10.1961– 17.4.1900–2.9.1974 24.2.1937– 16.1.1916–8.8.1996

McMillan Riverina; RiverinaDarling; Riverina Echuca Indi Riverina Gwydir Maranoa Grampians Kennedy Kennedy Dawson Riverina Wimmera Parkes Moore Murray Lyne

Vic Vic NSW NSW Qld Vic Qld Qld Qld NSW Vic NSW WA Vic NSW

V C N C C NA N C N C C N C C C

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Party

Period of service

CP

17.11.28–defeated 12.10.29

CP (IND CP Apr–Nov 1939) NPA VFU; CP from 1920 CP; NCP from May 1975 CP (IND CP Apr–Nov 1939) Nats NCP; NPA from Oct 1982 CP CP CP CP; NCP from May 1975 CP (IND CP Apr–Nov 1939)

19.12.31–defeated 21.8.43 1.12.84–defeated 11.7.87 13.12.19–retired 9.10.28 26.11.66–retired 19.9.80 *3.9.28–retired 21.4.54 24.11.2007– 18.10.80–retired 8.2.93 28.9.46–retired 1.11.63 10.12.49–retired 1.11.63 10.12.49–died 28.1.52 *5.11.60–retired 11.11.75 *19.12.36–retired 14.10.58

CP 10.12.49–retired 29.9.69 NPA 1.12.84–retired 8.10.2001 CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 2.12.72–retired 8.2.93 Liberal; NAT from 1917; NAT & FARMERS from 31.5.13–defeated 16.12.22 1919; CP from 1921 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 13.3.93– VFU; CP from 1920 *14.12.18–defeated 12.10.29; 19.12.31–retired 7.8.34 CP 10.12.49–defeated 28.4.51 CP 16.12.22–defeated 23.10.37 Liberal; NAT from 1917; CP from 1920 31.5.13–died 15.11.40 CP 30.11.63–defeated 18.5.74 CP 28.9.46–retired 2.11.61 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 10.11.2001– NAT & FARMERS; CP from 1920; IND from Oct 1921 13.12.19–defeated 16.12.22 CP; NCP from May 1975 NCP; NPA from Oct 1982

2.12.72–defeated 13.12.75 18.10.80–retired 31.8.98

VFU; CP from 1920 CP; NCP from May 1975 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 CP NAT; VFU from 1919; CP from 1920 NPA; IND from July 2001 CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 CP CP; NCP from May 1975 NPA CP CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 CP; NCP from May 1975

*20.9.19–retired 7.8.34 22.11.58–defeated 10.12.77 3.10.98– *7.6.69–resigned 24.2.89 *30.7.21–retired 27.8.40 *27.10.17–defeated 16.12.22 13.3.93– 26.11.66–retired 19.2.90 2.3.96–defeated 24.11.2007 16.12.22–retired 27.11.31 22.11.58–retired 10.11.77 3.10.98–retired 8.10.2001 10.12.49–defeated 22.11.58; 9.12.61– retired 1.11.63 *20.3.71–retired 29.1.96 *22.3.52–retired 19.9.80

Appendices

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Name

Born/Died

Electorate

State/Territory

P

Lusher, Stephen Augustus MacKenzie, Alexander John McClelland, Hugh McEwen, John McGauran, Peter John McNicoll, Walter Ramsay McVeigh, Daniel Thomas McWilliams, William James

18.10.1945– 29.8.1941– 27.12.1875–14.12.1958 29.3.1900–20.11.1980 16.11.1955– 27.5.1877–24.12.1947 7.5.1930– 12.10.1856–22.10.1929

Hume Calare Wimmera Echuca; Indi; Murray Gippsland Werriwa Darling Downs; Groom Franklin

NSW NSW Vic Vic Vic NSW Qld Tas

Maisey, Donald William Marek, Paul Marwick, Thomas William Millar, Percival Clarence Nehl, Garry Barr Neville, Paul Christopher Nixon, Peter James Nock, Horace Keyworth O’Keefe, Frank Lionel Page, Earle Christmas Grafton Paterson, Thomas Pettitt, John Alexander Prowse, John Henry Rankin, George James Roberton, Hugh Stevenson Robinson, Ian Louis Russell, Charles Wilfred St Clair, Stuart Roy Scott, Bruce Craig Sharp, John Randall Shaw, George William Sinclair, Ian McCahon Slipper, Peter Neil Stewart, Percy Gerald Sullivan, John William Tambling, Grant Ernest John Thompson, Victor Charles Thomson, David Scott Thorby, Harold Victor Campbell Treloar, Thomas John Truss, Warren Errol Turnbull, Winton George Vaile, Mark Anthony James Whitsitt, Joshua Thomas Hoskins Wienholt, Arnold Wilson, Alexander

6.5.1915–20.4.2005 25.7.1964– 29.4.1895–3.4.1960 15.6.1925– 19.2.1934– 28.3.1940– 22.3.1928– 26.10.1879–2.8.1958 6.10.1912–21.4.1989 8.8.1880–20.12.1961 20.11.1882–24.1.1952 25.9.1910–25.12.1977 16.6.1871–20.5.1944 1.5.1867–28.12.1957 18.12.1900–13.3.1987 27.3.1927– 24.4.1907–21.10.1977 21.11.1949– 20.10.1943– 15.12.1954– 28.7.1913–9.1.1966 10.6.1929– 14.2.1950– 18.10.1885–14.10.1931 7.2.1929– 20.6.1943– 10.9.1885–11.5.1968 21.11.1924– 2.10.1888–1.1.1973 1.8.1892–15.11.1953 8.10.1948– 13.12.1899–14.1.1980 18.4.1956– 1870–14.9.1943 25.11.1877–10.9.1940 7.6.1880–26.1.1954

Moore Capricornia Swan Wide Bay Cowper Hinkler Gippsland Riverina Paterson Cowper Gippsland Hume Swan; Forrest Bendigo Riverina Cowper; Page Maranoa New England Maranoa Gilmore; Hume Dawson New England Fisher Wimmera Riverina Northern Territory New England Leichhardt Calare Gwydir Wide Bay Wimmera; Mallee Lyne Darwin Moreton Wimmera

WA Qld WA Qld NSW Qld Vic NSW NSW NSW Vic NSW WA Vic NSW NSW Qld NSW Qld NSW Qld NSW Qld Vic NSW NT NSW Qld NSW NSW Qld Vic NSW Tas Qld Vic

C NC C C N C C R NA C N C C N N C C C A C C C C C C C N N N C C N V C N C NC C C N C N C NA IND

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Party

Period of service

CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 18.5.74–defeated 1.12.84 NCP; NPA from Oct 1982 13.12.75–defeated 5.3.83 CP 19.12.31–defeated 23.10.37 CP 15.9.34–resigned 1.2.71 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 5.3.83–resigned 9.4.2008 CP 19.12.31–resigned 2.8.34 CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 2.12.72–resigned 29.2.88 REV TAR; ANTI-SOC from 1906; Liberal from 1910; 16.12.03–defeated 16.12.22; 17.11.28–died 22.10.29 NAT from 1917; CP from 1920; IND from 1928 CP 30.11.63–defeated 18.5.74 NPA 2.3.96–defeated 3.10.98 CP *21.12.40–defeated 21.8.43 CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 18.5.74–retired 19.2.90 NPA 1.12.84–retired 8.10.2001 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006# 13.3.93– CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 9.12.61–retired 4.2.83 CP 19.12.31–defeated 21.9.40 CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 25.10.69–retired 26.10.84 AFFO; CP from 1920 13.12.19–defeated 9.12.61** CP 16.12.22–retired 7.7.43 CP 30.11.63–defeated 2.12.72 CP 13.12.19–defeated 21.8.43 CP (withdrew from Party Room from 1939–43) 23.10.37–retired 31.10.49 CP 10.12.49–resigned 21.1.65 CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 30.11.63–defeated 24.3.90 CP 10.12.49–defeated 28.4.51 NPA 3.10.98–defeated 10.11.2001 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006# 24.3.90– NPA 1.12.84–retired 31.8.98 CP 30.11.63–died 9.1.66 CP; NCP from May 1975; NPA from Oct 1982 30.11.63–retired 31.8.98 NPA; LIB from 1993 1.12.84–defeated 11.7.87; 13.3.93– VFU; CP from 1920; C PROG from 1926; CP from 1930 13.12.19–died 14.10.31 CP; NCP from May 1975 18.5.74–defeated 10.12.77 NT-CLP sitting with NCP; NPA from Oct 1982 18.10.80–defeated 5.3.83 CP 16.12.22–defeated 21.9.40 NCP; NPA from Oct 1982 13.12.75–defeated 5.3.83 CP 19.12.31–defeated 21.9.40 CP 10.12.49–died 15.11.53 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006# 24.3.90– CP *9.2.46–retired 2.11.72 NPA; Nats from Oct 2006 13.3.93–resigned 30.7.2008 CP 16.12.22–retired 3.10.25 NAT; CP from 1920 13.12.19–retired 6.11.22 IND CP; CP from 1943 23.10.37–resigned 31.12.45

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Abbreviations AFFO = Australian Farmers’ Federal Organization ANTI-SOC = Anti-Socialist Party CP = Australian Country Party C PROG = Country Progressive Party (Victoria) FSU = Farmers and Settlers Union IND = Independent IND CP = Independent Country Party LCL = Liberal and Country League (South Australia) LIB = Liberal Party of Australia Liberal = Liberal (not Liberal Party of Australia) LNP-Q = Liberal National Party of Queensland NAT = Nationalist Party NAT & FARMERS = Nationalist and Farmers Nats = The Nationals NCP = National Country Party of Australia NPA = National Party of Australia NT-CLP = Northern Territory Country Liberal Party REV TAR = Revenue Tariff UAP = United Australia Party

VFU = Victorian Farmers Union * By-election ** While the election was held on 9 December 1961, the Cowper result was not declared until 20 December, a few hours after Page died. # LNP-Q from July 2008, following the merger of the National and Liberal parties in Queensland, and continuing to sit in the Commonwealth parliament with The Nationals. Sources Australian Dictionary of Biography; Biographical Dictionary of the Australian Senate; Commonwealth Parliamentary Library; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook; Ellis, Country Party; Page, Earle Page; Who’s Who in Australia. See Select Bibliography and Further Reading for full details of publications cited.

Appendix 5

Party Ministers in the Commonwealth Parliament* Bruce-Page Ministry – Nationalist/CP Coalition – 9 February 1923 to 22 October 1929

Earle Christmas Grafton Page William Gerrand Gibson Percy Gerald Stewart William Caldwell Hill Reginald Victor Wilson *** Llewellyn Atkinson **** Thomas Paterson Charles Lydiard Aubrey Abbott

Treasurer [Deputy Prime Minister] ** Postmaster-General; Minister for Works and Railways from 10 Dec 1928 Minister for Works and Railways to 5 Aug 1924 Minister for Works and Railways 8 Aug 1924 to 29 Nov 1928 Honorary Minister to 16 Jan 1925 Minister for Markets and Migration 16 Jan 1925 to 18 June 1926 Vice-President of Executive Council to 18 June 1926 Minister for Markets and Migration 18 June 1926 to 19 Jan 1928; Minister for Markets 19 Jan 1928 to 10 Dec 1928; Minister for Markets and Transport from 10 Dec 1928 Minister for Home and Territories 29 Nov 1928 to 10 Dec 1928; Minister for Home Affairs from 10 Dec 1928

Lyons-Page Ministry – UAP/CP Coalition – 9 November 1934 to 7 November 1938

Earle Christmas Grafton Page

Minister for Commerce [Deputy Prime Minister]; Minister for Health from 29 Nov 1937 Harold Victor Campbell Thorby Minister for Defence from 29 Nov 1937; Minister assisting Minister for Commerce 1 Sept 1935 to 29 Nov 1937; Minister assisting Minister for Repatriation to 1 Sept 1935; Minister without portfolio in charge of War Service Homes to 11 Sept 1936 Thomas Paterson Minister for the Interior to 29 Nov 1937 John McEwen Minister for the Interior from 29 Nov 1937 James Aitchison Johnston Hunter Minister without portfolio in charge of War Service Homes 11 Sept 1936 to 29 Nov 1937; Minister assisting Minister for Repatriation 1 Sept 1935 to 22 Nov 1937; Minister assisting Minister for Commerce 18 Mar 1937 to 25 July 1937; Minister assisting Minister for the Interior 23 Sept 1935 to 29 Nov 1937; Minister without portfolio representing Postmaster-General in House of Representatives to 1 Sept 1935

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Victor Charles Thompson Archie Galbraith Cameron (LCL)

Minister assisting Treasurer from 29 Nov 1937; Minister assisting Minister for the Interior from 1 Feb 1938 Minister assisting Minister for Commerce from 29 Nov 1937

Lyons-Page Ministry – UAP/CP Coalition – 7 November 1938 to 7 April 1939

Earle Christmas Grafton Page Harold Victor Campbell Thorby John McEwen Archie Galbraith Cameron (LCL) Victor Charles Thompson

Minister for Commerce [Deputy Prime Minister] Minister for Works; Minister for Civil Aviation Minister for the Interior Postmaster-General; Minister without portfolio administering External Territories Minister assisting Minister for Commerce

Page Ministry – CP/UAP Coalition – 7 April 1939 to 26 April 1939

Earle Christmas Grafton Page Harold Victor Campbell Thorby John McEwen Archie Galbraith Cameron (LCL) Victor Charles Thompson

Prime Minister; Minister for Commerce Minister for Works; Minister for Civil Aviation Minister for the Interior Postmaster-General Minister assisting Minister for Commerce

Menzies-Cameron Ministry – UAP/CP Coalition – 14 March 1940 to 28 October 1940

Archie Galbraith Cameron (LCL) Harold Victor Campbell Thorby John McEwen Arthur William Fadden Horace Keyworth Nock

Minister for Commerce [Deputy Prime Minister]; Minister for the Navy Postmaster-General; Minister for Health Minister for External Affairs Minister for Civil Aviation from 14 Aug 1940; Minister assisting Treasurer; Minister assisting Minister for Supply and Development Minister without portfolio in charge of External Territories; Minister assisting Prime Minister; Minister assisting Minister for the Interior

Menzies-Fadden Ministry – UAP/CP Coalition – 28 October 1940 to 29 August 1941

Arthur William Fadden Thomas Joseph Collins

John McEwen Earle Christmas Grafton Page Hubert Lawrence Anthony Joseph Palmer Abbott

Treasurer [Deputy Prime Minister] Postmaster-General from 26 June 1941; Minister assisting Prime Minister dealing with External Territories to 26 June 1941; Minister assisting Minister for the Interior to 26 June 1941; Minister assisting Minister for Supply and Development from 26 June 1941 Minister for Air; Minister for Civil Aviation Minister for Commerce Minister for Transport from 26 June 1941; Minister assisting Treasurer; Minister assisting Minister for Commerce Minister for Home Security from 26 June 1941; Minister assisting Minister for Defence Co-ordination from 26 June 1941; Minister assisting Minister for Army from 26 June 1941

Fadden Ministry – CP/UAP Coalition – 29 August 1941 to 7 October 1941

Arthur William Fadden John McEwen Earle Christmas Grafton Page Thomas Joseph Collins Hubert Lawrence Anthony Joseph Palmer Abbott

Prime Minister; Treasurer Minister for Air; Minister for Civil Aviation Minister for Commerce Postmaster-General Minister for Transport Minister for Home Security

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Menzies-Fadden Ministry – Lib/CP Coalition – 19 December 1949 to 11 May 1951

Arthur William Fadden John McEwen Earle Christmas Grafton Page Hubert Lawrence Anthony Walter Jackson Cooper

Treasurer [Deputy Prime Minister] Minister for Commerce and Agriculture Minister for Health Postmaster-General Minister for Repatriation

Menzies-Fadden Ministry – Lib/CP Coalition – 11 May 1951 to 11 January 1956

Arthur William Fadden John McEwen Earle Christmas Grafton Page Hubert Lawrence Anthony Walter Jackson Cooper

Treasurer [Deputy Prime Minister] Minister for Commerce and Agriculture Minister for Health Postmaster-General; Minister for Civil Aviation to 9 July 1954 Minister for Repatriation

Menzies-Fadden Ministry – Lib/CP Coalition – 11 January 1956 to 10 December 1958

Arthur William Fadden John McEwen Charles William Davidson Walter Jackson Cooper Hugh Stevenson Roberton

Treasurer [Deputy Prime Minister] Minister for Trade Postmaster-General; Minister for the Navy from 24 Oct 1956 Minister for Repatriation Minister for Social Services from 28 Feb 1956

Menzies-McEwen Ministry – Lib/CP Coalition – 10 December 1958 to 18 December 1963

John McEwen Charles William Davidson Walter Jackson Cooper Harrie Walter Wade Hugh Stevenson Roberton Charles Frederick Adermann

Minister for Trade [Deputy Prime Minister] Postmaster-General Minister for Repatriation to 29 Dec 1960 Minister for Air 29 Dec 1960 to 22 Dec 1961; Minister for Health from 22 Dec 1961 Minister for Social Services Minister for Primary Industry

Menzies-McEwen Ministry – Lib/CP Coalition – 18 December 1963 to 26 January 1966

John McEwen Charles Frederick Adermann Harrie Walter Wade John Douglas Anthony Hugh Stevenson Roberton Ian McCahon Sinclair Gerald Colin McKellar Charles Edward Barnes

Minister for Trade and Industry [Deputy Prime Minister] Minister for Primary Industry Minister for Health to 18 Nov 1964 Minister for the Interior from 4 Mar 1964 Minister for Social Services to 21 Jan 1965 Minister for Social Services from 22 Feb 1965 Minister for Repatriation from 22 Dec 1964 Minister for Territories

Holt-McEwen Ministry – Lib/CP Coalition – 26 January 1966 to 14 December 1966

John McEwen Charles Frederick Adermann Charles Edward Barnes John Douglas Anthony Gerald Colin McKellar Ian McCahon Sinclair

Minister for Trade and Industry [Deputy Prime Minister] Minister for Primary Industry Minister for Territories Minister for the Interior Minister for Repatriation Minister for Social Services

Holt-McEwen Ministry – Lib/CP Coalition – 14 December 1966 to 19 December 1967

John McEwen

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John Douglas Anthony Charles Frederick Adermann Charles Edward Barnes Gerald Colin McKellar Ian McCahon Sinclair Peter James Nixon

Minister for the Interior to 16 Oct 1967; Minister for Primary Industry from 16 Oct 1967 Minister for Primary Industry to 16 Oct 1967 Minister for Territories Minister for Repatriation Minister for Social Services; Minister assisting Minister for Trade and Industry Minister for the Interior from 16 Oct 1967

McEwen Ministry – CP/Lib Coalition – 19 December 1967 to 10 January 1968

John McEwen John Douglas Anthony Ian McCahon Sinclair Charles Edward Barnes Gerald Colin McKellar Peter James Nixon

Prime Minister; Minister for Trade and Industry Minister for Primary Industry Minister for Social Services; Minister assisting Minister for Trade and Industry Minister for Territories Minister for Repatriation Minister for the Interior

Gorton-McEwen Ministry – Lib/CP Coalition – 10 January 1968 to 28 February 1968

John McEwen John Douglas Anthony Ian McCahon Sinclair Charles Edward Barnes Gerald Colin McKellar Peter James Nixon

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Trade and Industry Minister for Primary Industry Minister for Social Services; Minister assisting Minister for Trade and Industry Minister for Territories Minister for Repatriation Minister for the Interior

Gorton-McEwen Ministry – Lib/CP Coalition – 28 February 1968 to 12 November 1969

John McEwen John Douglas Anthony Ian McCahon Sinclair Charles Edward Barnes Gerald Colin McKellar Peter James Nixon

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Trade and Industry Minister for Primary Industry Minister for Shipping and Transport; Minister assisting Minister for Trade and Industry Minister for External Territories Minister for Repatriation Minister for the Interior

Gorton-McEwen-Anthony Ministry – Lib/CP Coalition –12 November 1969 to 10 March 1971

John McEwen

Deputy Prime Minister to 5 Feb 1971; Minister for Trade and Industry to 5 Feb 1971 John Douglas Anthony Minister for Primary Industry to 5 Feb 1971; Deputy Prime Minister from 5 Feb 1971; Minister for Trade and Industry from 5 Feb 1971 Ian McCahon Sinclair Minister for Shipping and Transport to 5 Feb 1971; Minister assisting Minister for Trade and Industry to 5 Feb 1971; Minister for Primary Industry from 5 Feb 1971 Peter James Nixon Minister for the Interior to 5 Feb 1971; Minister for Shipping and Transport from 5 Feb 1971 Ralph James Dunnet Hunt Minister for the Interior from 5 Feb 1971 Charles Edward Barnes Minister for External Territories Thomas Charles Drake-Brockman Minister for Air Minister for Repatriation Rendle McNeilage Holten

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McMahon-Anthony Ministry – Lib/CP Coalition – 10 March 1971 to 5 December 1972

John Douglas Anthony Ian McCahon Sinclair Peter James Nixon Charles Edward Barnes Thomas Charles Drake-Brockman Rendle McNeilage Holten Robert Cummin Katter Ralph James Dunnet Hunt Robert Shannon King Ian Louis Robinson

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Trade and Industry Minister for Primary Industry Minister for Shipping and Transport Minister for External Territories to 25 Jan 1972 Minister for Air Minister for Repatriation; Minister assisting Minister for Trade and Industry from 20 Aug 1971 Minister for the Army from 2 Feb 1972 Minister for the Interior Assistant Minister assisting Minister for Primary Industry from 5 Oct 1971 Assistant Minister assisting Postmaster-General from 20 Aug 1971

Fraser-Anthony Ministry – Lib/NCP Coalition – 11 November 1975 to 22 December 1975

John Douglas Anthony

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Overseas Trade; Minister for Minerals and Energy Ian McCahon Sinclair Minister for Agriculture; Minister for Northern Australia Peter James Nixon Minister for Transport; Postmaster-General Thomas Charles Drake-Brockman Minister for Aboriginal Affairs

Fraser-Anthony Ministry – Lib/NCP Coalition – 22 December 1975 to 20 December 1977

John Douglas Anthony Ian McCahon Sinclair Peter James Nixon Ralph James Dunnet Hunt Albert Evan Adermann James Joseph Webster

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for National Resources; Minister for Overseas Trade Minister for Primary Industry Minister for Transport Minister for Health Minister for the Northern Territory; Minister assisting Minister for National Resources Minister for Science

Fraser-Anthony Ministry – Lib/NCP Coalition 20 December 1977 to 3 November 1980

John Douglas Anthony Ian McCahon Sinclair Peter James Nixon Ralph James Dunnet Hunt Albert Evan Adermann James Joseph Webster David Scott Thomson Douglas Barr Scott

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Trade and Resources Minister for Primary Industry to 27 Sept 1979; Minister for Special Trade Representations from 19 Aug 1980 Minister for Transport to 8 Dec 1979; Minister for Primary Industry from 27 Sept 1979 Minister for Health to 8 Dec 1979; Minister for Transport from 8 Dec 1979 Minister for the Northern Territory to 28 Sept 1978; Minister for Veterans’ Affairs from 4 July 1978; Minister assisting Minister for Primary Industry Minister for Science to 5 Dec 1978; Minister for Science and the Environment from 5 Dec 1978 to 8 Dec 1979 Minister for Science and the Environment from 8 Dec 1979 Minister for Special Trade Representations from 8 Dec 1979 to 19 Aug 1980; Minister assisting Minister for Trade and Resources from 8 Dec 1979 to 19 Aug 1980

Fraser-Anthony Ministry – Lib/NCP Coalition – 3 November 1980 to 7 May 1982

John Douglas Anthony Ian McCahon Sinclair

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Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Trade and Resources Minister for Communications

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Peter James Nixon Ralph James Dunnet Hunt David Scott Thomson Daniel Thomas McVeigh

Minister for Primary Industry Minister for Transport Minister for Science and Technology Minister for Housing and Construction; Minister assisting Minister for Trade and Resources

Fraser-Anthony Ministry – Lib/NCP (NPA from Oct 16 1982) Coalition – 7 May 1982 to 11 March 1983

John Douglas Anthony Ian McCahon Sinclair Peter James Nixon Ralph James Dunnet Hunt David Scott Thomson Daniel Thomas McVeigh

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Trade and Resources Minister for Defence Minister for Primary Industry Minister for Transport and Construction Minister for Science and Technology Minister for Home Affairs and Environment; Minister assisting Minister for Trade and Resources

Howard-Fischer Ministry – Lib/NPA Coalition – 11 March 1996 to 21 October 1998

Timothy Andrew Fischer John Duncan Anderson John Randall Sharp

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Trade Minister for Primary Industries and Energy Minister for Transport and Regional Development to 25 Sept 1997 Mark Anthony James Vaile Minister for Transport and Regional Development from 9 Oct 1997 Peter John McGauran Minister for Science and Technology to 9 Oct 1997 Warren Errol Truss Minister for Customs and Consumer Affairs from 9 Oct 1997 Bruce Craig Scott Minister for Veterans’ Affairs David Gordon Cadell Brownhill Parliamentary Secretary (Trade); Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Primary Industries and Energy to 9 Oct 1997 Grant Ernest John Tambling (CLP) Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for transport and Regional development to 14 Oct 1996; Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Social Security from 14 oct 1996 Howard-Fischer-Anderson Ministry – Lib/NPA Coalition – 21 October 1998 to 26 November 2001

Timothy Andrew Fischer

Deputy Prime Minister to 20 Jul 1999; Minister for Trade to 20 Jul 1999 John Duncan Anderson Deputy Prime Minister from 20 Jul 1999; Minister for Transport and Regional Services Mark Anthony James Vaile Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry to 20 Jul 1999; Minister for Trade from 20 Jul 1999 Warren Errol Truss Minister for Community Services to 20 July 1999; Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry from 20 Jul 1999 Peter John McGauran Minister for the Arts and Centenary of Federation Bruce Craig Scott Minister for Veterans’ Affairs; Minister assisting Minister for Defence Lawrence James Anthony Parliamentary Secretary (Trade) to 20 Jul 1999; Minister for Community Services from 20 Jul 1999 Ronald Leslie Doyle Boswell Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Transport and Regional Services from 20 July 1999 Grant Ernest John Tambling (CLP) Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Health and Aged Care Howard-Anderson Ministry – Lib/NPA Coalition – 26 November 2001 to 26 October 2004

John Duncan Anderson Mark Anthony James Vaile

Deputy Prime Minister; Minister for Transport and Regional Services Minister for Trade

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Warren Errol Truss Lawrence James Anthony Peter John McGauran Ronald Leslie Doyle Boswell De-Anne Margaret Kelly

Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Minister for Children and Youth Affairs Minister for Science Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Transport and Regional Services to 7 Oct 2003 Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Transport and Regional Services from 7 Oct 2003 ; Parliamentary Secretary (Trade) from 7 Oct 2003

Howard-Anderson-Vaile Ministry – Lib/NPA (The Nationals from 14 Oct 2006) Coalition – 26 October 2004 to 3 December 2007

John Duncan Anderson Mark Anthony James Vaile Warren Errol Truss Peter John McGauran John Kenneth Cobb

Nigel Gregory Scullion (CLP) De-Anne Margaret Kelly

John Alexander Lindsay Macdonald

Deputy Prime Minister to 6 July 2005; Minister for Transport and Regional Services to 6 July 2005 Deputy Prime Minister from 6 July 2005; Minister for Trade to 29 Sept 2006; Minister for Transport and Regional Services from 29 Sept 2006 Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry to 6 July 2005; Minister for Transport and Regional Services 6 July 2005 to 29 Sept 2006; Minister for Trade from 29 Sept 2006 Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs to 6 July 2005; Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry from 6 July 2005 Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Transport and Regional Services to 6 July 2005; Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs 6 July 2005 to 27 Jan 2006; Minister for Community Services 27 Jan 2006 to 30 Jan 2007; Assistant Minister for the Environment and Water Resources from 30 Jan 2007 Minister for Community Services from 30 Jan 2007 Minister for Veterans’ Affairs to 27 Jan 2006; Minister assisting Minister for Defence from 16 Nov 2004 to 27 Jan 2006; Parliamentary Secretary (Trade) 27 Jan 2006 to 29 Sept 2006; Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Transport and Regional Services from 29 Sept 2006 Parliamentary Secretary (Trade) 7 July 2005 to 27 Jan 2006; Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Defence from 27 Jan 2006 to 30 Jan 2007

Notes * Includes ministers from the South Australian Liberal and Country League (LCL) and Northern Territory Country Liberal Party (CLP) who sat with the Country, National Country, National Party, and The Nationals. ** While acknowledged as the second most senior member of the ministry, and acting as Prime Minister during absences of the Prime Minister, the title of Deputy Prime Minister was not included in official parliamentary records until January 1968. *** Elected as a South Australian senator on a joint Farmers and Settlers’ Association–Nationalist ticket. While sitting as a Country Party senator, he declined to attend party meetings. **** Elected to Wilmot, Tasmania as a Nationalist, he sat with the Country Party from 1923 to 1925 when he again sat with the Nationalists after the collapse of the Tasmanian Country Party.

Appendix 6

Landmark Achievements in Government The 1920s to 1950s

• • • •

First radio broadcasting licences (1923) National Debt Sinking Fund (1923) and Loan Council (1924) restructured the Commonwealth Bank as a central bank (1924) chaired the first Cabinet meeting on federal territory, at Yarralumla homestead in the ACT (30 January 1924)

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• tax averaging for primary producers (1924) • Department of Markets, forerunner of departments of Commerce, Commerce and Agriculture, Primary Industry, Primary Industries and Energy, and Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (1925) • Rural Credits Department within the Commonwealth Bank (1925) and the Commonwealth Savings Bank (1927) • Council for Scientific and Industrial Research – today’s CSIRO (1926) • Commonwealth funding for roads through the Main Roads Development Act 1923 and the first Federal Aid Roads Agreement (1926) • Paterson Butter Plan, a voluntary equalisation scheme which pioneered statutory marketing schemes and implemented the Country Party principle of the home consumption price (1926) • development of rural automatic telephone exchanges (1928) • the first Commonwealth-State Transport Advisory Council (1929) • new Commonwealth-State financial arrangements through the States Grants Act 1927 • Australian Trade Commissioner Service – now Austrade (1934) • Australian Agricultural Council (1935) • National Health and Medical Research Council (1936) • Beef Roads Development Program in Qld, NT, WA and northern SA (1949-74) • abolition of petrol rationing (1950) • free milk for children under 13 in schools (1950) • Wool Sales Deduction Scheme (1950–51) • free medical treatment for pensioners (1950–51) and free medicine for pensioners (1951–52) • 15-year Meat Agreement with Britain (1951) • abolition of Commonwealth land tax (1952) and Commonwealth entertainment tax (1953) • expanded hospital benefits scheme (1952) and introduced the first medical benefits scheme (1953) leading to the comprehensive national health service (1955–56) • Australia’s first regional university, the University of New England (1954) with Earle Page its first chancellor (1955) • Export Payments Insurance Corporation (1954) • expansion of manufacturing and secondary industries (1955–65) • introduction of television (1956) • Australia-Japan Agreement on Commerce (1957) • Reserve Bank of Australia and Commonwealth Banking Corporation (1958) The 1960s to 1980s

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

The live sheep export trade (1960) Ord River Irrigation Scheme (1963-1972) State Aid to Independent schools (1964) fluoridation of Canberra’s water supply (1964) devaluation compensation for export industries (1967) Australian Design Rules for motor vehicle safety, quality and emission controls (1969) Australian Wool Commission and flexible wool reserve price scheme (1970) national campaign to eradicate brucellosis and tuberculosis from cattle herds (BTEC) (1970) standard gauge Indian Pacific railway between Sydney and Perth (1970) National Agricultural Outlook Conference, now including resources and known as the National Outlook Conference (1971) Australian Industry Development Corporation – the ‘McEwen Bank’ (1971) Rural Reconstruction Scheme (1971) expansion of the Australian Trade Commissioner Service (1972) Australian Wool Corporation (1972) diversification of Australia’s international trade following Britain’s entry into the European Economic

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• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Community from January 1973 National Marine Science Research Centre, Hobart (1976) Rural Adjustment Scheme (1976) expansion of uranium mining and export (1977-1982) National Water Resources Program (1977) peaceful use of nuclear energy agreements with Finland, Sweden, the Philippines, South Korea, USA, UK, France, Canada, European Atomic Energy Community, and Japan (1977–82) Australian National Animal Health Laboratory, Geelong, Victoria (1978) self-government for the Northern Territory (1978) abolition of Commonwealth death and gift duties, effective from 1 July 1979 (1978) Primary Industry Bank of Australia (1978) ban on commercial whaling in Australia (1978) low cost advance early purchase (apex) international air fares (1978) 200-mile Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) (1979) ban on the exploration and drilling for oil on the Great Barrier Reef and declaration of the Capricornia section as the first stage of a protected Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (1979) AUSSAT, one of the world’s first national satellite telecommunications systems (1980–82) Burdekin River Dam, creating Queensland’s largest lake, Lake Dalrymple (1980) ban on all whaling activities within the 200-mile AFZ (1980) Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1981) Australian Bicentennial Road Development Program (1982) Closer Economic Relations with New Zealand (1982) Bicentennial Water Resources Program (1983)

The 1990s

• Victoria Cross Memorial Rest Areas on Remembrance Drive (Hume and Federal highways) between Sydney and Canberra (1996) • Supermarket to Asia (1996) • Rural Finance Summit and subsequent $525 million Agriculture – Advancing Australia package (1997) • Natural Heritage Trust (1997) • Their Service – Our Heritage Program to preserve the memory of veterans for future generations and Regional War Memorials Project to restore country and regional war memorials (1997) • National Land and Water Resources Audit (1997) • Centenary of Federation Community Projects Program (1998) • new Australian war memorials, including at Hellfire Pass, Thailand (1998), Sandakan, Borneo (1999), and for the Gallipoli Dawn Service, Turkey (2000). • increased child care places from 306 000 to nearly 562 000 between 1996–97 and 2004–05 • Regional Australia Summit and Regional Solutions Program (1999) • $1 billion from the partial sale of Telstra for social bonus initiatives to improve country and regional telecommunications services (1999) • Rural Transaction Centres for smaller communities (1999) 2000 and beyond

• Foundation for Rural and Regional Renewal (2000) • $1.78 billion for dairy deregulation adjustment (2000) • continuation of analogue mobile phone system beyond scheduled shut down until replaced with CDMA (2000) • Telstra Country Wide (2000) • Australia-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (2001)

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• Sustainable Regions Program (2001) • Roads to Recovery Program (2001) • Besley inquiry (2000) and Estens inquiry (2002) resulting in further $344 million to improve country and regional telecommunications’ services • $150 million for sugar industry deregulation adjustment (2002) • Stronger Families and Communities Strategy, including $8.8 million for National Agenda for Early Childhood (2003) • National Water Initiative, supported by $2 billion Australian Government Water Fund (2003) • Completion of The Ghan extension to Darwin (2004) • $1.1 billion Connect Australia package (2005) • Free Trade Agreements with Thailand and the USA (2005) • $2 billion for perpetual Communications Fund for regional telecommunications (2005) • Drought assistance funding totalling $1.25 billion over five years to 2005–06 • negotiations for Free Trade Agreements with the Republic of China, Japan, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates and between Australia, New Zealand and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (2005-2007) • $15 billion Auslink national land transport program (2005) and $22 billion Auslink 2 program (2007). Sources Bills Digest, Commonwealth Parliamentary Library; Financial Record of the Menzies-Fadden Government 1949–55; Mileposts – Thirty years of Australian Country Party achievements (1920–1950); select Australian Country Party Speakers’ Notes 1955–60; select Country, National Country, National Party, and The Nationals election policy speeches 1923–2007; select Commonwealth budget papers; select Commonwealth departmental websites; select media releases; The Nationals archives, federal secretariat, Canberra; as otherwise sourced in manuscript notes.

Appendix 7

April 1987 Coalition Agreement We believe the maintenance of an effective Coalition between the Liberal Party and the National Party is still the best vehicle to defeat the Hawke Labor Government thus leading to the implementation of policies which will benefit all Australians. Although our two Parties are separate and distinct entities and will remain so, their goals and objectives have much in common. The Federal Coalition has been one of the great success stories of Australian politics. The present threat to that Coalition comes from the Queensland Branch of the National Party whose unilateral action is not in accordance with resolutions of the New South Wales and Victorian [National] Party organisations nor that by the [National Party] Federal Council in the run down to the next election. It is also relevant to note that the last annual conference of the Queensland National Party endorsed a continuation of the existing Federal Coalition arrangement. It is the desire of the overwhelming majority of the members of both our Parliamentary Parties that the Coalition arrangements continue. As a consequence of the resolution of the Management Committee of the Queensland National Party [on 10 April] it is necessary to establish an altered basis on which the Coalition might continue. We believe the following can be a proper and honourable basis on which the Coalition can operate: The Coalition shall comprise 73 Liberals and a minimum of 14 members of the National Party. i. Representation in the Shadow Ministry will reflect the numerical inputs to the Coalition from the two Parties. ii. There will be Coalition policies for the forthcoming election. All members of the Coalition are bound to support those policies in the normal way. iii. Arrangements regarding endorsements, three cornered contests, etc., will continue to be entirely a matter for the respective State organisations of the two Parties as in the past.

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iv. Joint Party meetings will continue as in the past with Liberals and Coalition Nationals only attending those meetings. v. Separate meetings of the Liberal Party will be held as in the past. vi. Regular meetings of the Coalition Nationals will replace normal meetings of the full Parliamentary National Party. vii. Full meetings of the Parliamentary National Party will only be held in special cases, eg: internal Party ballots. viii. There will be no joint policy development between Coalition and non-Coalition Nationals. ix. Non-Coalition Nationals will be welcome to rejoin the joint Party room on the basis of their supporting the Coalition and Coalition policies. x. The Parliamentary Leaders of the two Parties will do all in their power to secure the honouring by their respective Parliamentary Parties of any arrangements concluded between State organisations of the two Parties concerning three cornered contests. Sources Joint press release by John Howard and Ian Sinclair, Sydney, 15 April 1987.

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Notes

Chapter 1 1 In November 1958, the Labor Party was still disunited over communism, enabling the Menzies-McEwen government to be returned with 77 seats to Labor’s 45. By December 1961, Labor had substantially re-united and Treasurer Holt’s November 1960 economic measures were pushing unemployment towards 131 500, the highest since World War II. Hogan M and Clune D, (eds) The People’s Choice – Electoral Politics in 20th Century New South Wales, vol 2, Parliament of New South Wales and University of Sydney, 2001, pp. 383–84 (hereafter Hogan and Clune, People’s Choice); Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30th edition 2005, Parliamentary Library, Department of Parliamentary Services, Canberra, 2005, pp. 462, 649, 655 (hereafter Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook); Davey P, The Nationals – The Progressive, Country and National Party in New South Wales 1919 to 2006, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2006, pp. 164– 5 (hereafter Davey, The Nationals). 2 The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 November 1961, p. 6.

3 Interview with Ian Robinson, Grafton, 21 July 2009; The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1961, p. 1; 28 November 1961, p. 1. 4 The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 December 1961, p. 9. The Menzies government was narrowly returned with 62 seats to Labor’s 60. Hughes CA and Graham BD, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1890–1964, Australian National University Press, 1968, pp. 397, 403, 409 (hereafter Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics). 5 The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 December 1961, p. 4. 6 See chapter 5 – Tragedy, triumph and downfall. McGuren was a ‘oncer’, being defeated at the next election on 30 November 1963, when Cowper returned to the Country Party with Ian Robinson transferring from state to federal politics. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 462, 505. 7 Hughes was a member for 51 years and seven months, compared to Page’s 42 years. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 669. 8 Page E, Earle Page – Prime Minister of Australia 1939, Schwartz Publishing, Melbourne,

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2001, pp. 59, 62, originally published as Page, E, Truant Surgeon – The Inside Story of Forty Years of Australian Political Life, Angus & Robertson, 1963, (hereafter Page, Earle Page). 9 The Nationalists were also referred to as the National Party. The author has used the term Nationalist in this text to avoid confusion with the National Party of Australia or The Nationals. 10 Page said he was offered endorsement by the AFFO (Page, Earle Page, p. 68). However, he told author BD Graham in an interview in Canberra on 7 March 1956 the endorsement had come from the FSA. Graham also notes that the AFFO ‘had little to do with the endorsing of candidates’. Graham BD, The Formation of the Australian Country Parties, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1966, p. 131 (hereafter Graham, Formation of Country Parties). There is a grammatical tendency to place an apostrophe after the word Farmers, as well as Settlers, in the FSA name. However, the NSW organisation’s Memorandum and Articles of Association 1921 states in clause 1 that the name ‘is the Farmers and Settlers’ Association of New South Wales’. 11 Ellis U, A History of the Australian Country Party, Melbourne University Press, 1963, p. 1 (hereafter Ellis, Country Party). The FSA and Graziers’ Association in New South Wales jointly established the forerunner of The Country Party of New South Wales, The Progressive Party, on 13 October 1919. Davey, The Nationals, p. 10. 12 Separate from and different to the contemporary Liberal Party of Australia. 13 On 22 January 1918, the VFU’s general secretary, JJ Hall, wrote to the Prime Minister calling for the introduction of preferential voting and warning that while the VFU had refrained from standing candidates at the last election, so as not to split the vote with Nationalist candidates, it had decided ‘to run candidates in all future elections’. Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 127. 14 Davey, The Nationals, p. 8. The Hughes government put the issue of conscription before the Australian people for a second time, on 20 December 1917. This plebiscite was also lost. Commonwealth

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Parliamentary Handbook, p. 578. 15 Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 127. 16 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 633; West Australian Premiers. See – ; Crowley, FK, Forrest, Sir John [Baron Forrest] 1847– 1918, Australian Dictionary of Biography, vol 8, Melbourne University Press, pp. 544–51 (hereafter Dictionary of Biography). See also 17 Graham, Formation of Country Parties, pp. 127, 128. 18 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 651. 19 The Hughes government was elected with 53 seats to Labor’s 22 at the 5 May 1917 election. Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 315. 20 The act was assented to on 21 November 1918 and the proclaimed dates for its commencement were 25 November 1918 for the provisions relating to preferential and postal voting, 21 March 1919 for the bulk of the act, and 14 December 1920 for the complete act (Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, 1918, p. 2257; 1919, p. 401; 1920, p. 2277); Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 128. 21 Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 128. 22 Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 130. The Nationalist Member for Echuca, Albert Palmer, died on 14 August 1919. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 656. The ability to ensure a tight exchange of preferences was enhanced in 1924 with the introduction of compulsory voting for federal elections, first used in 1925, with a voter turn-out of more than 91 per cent. Australian Electoral Commission, Canberra, Electoral Pocketbook 2009, p. 28 (hereafter AEC, Electoral Pocketbook). 23 Ellis, Country Party, pp. 47, 48. 24 Page, Earle Page, pp. 70, 74; Ellis, U, Research Notes, Australian Country Party (Federal) 1902–1923, Office of Rural Research, Canberra, 28 July 1954, p. 5 (hereafter Ellis, ACP Research Notes). 25. Hughes and Graham, Government and

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Politics 1890–1964, p. 320; AEC, Electoral Pocketbook 2005, p. 94. 26 Graham says the eventual make up of the 75-seat House of Representatives was 34 Nationalists, three Liberals, two Independents, 11 Country Party and 25 Labor. (Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 132). 27 Ellis, Country Party, p. 50. The Commonwealth parliament sat in Melbourne until moving to Canberra in May 1927. 28 Ellis, Country Party, p. 51; The Argus, Melbourne, 23 January 1920. 29 Ellis, ACP Research Notes, p. 5. 30 Page, Earle Page, pp. 74–77. 31 Ellis, Country Party, p. 51. 32 The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 February 1920, p. 7. Page said McWilliams and Gregory were chosen as temporary leader and deputy at the meeting on 24 February (Page, Earle Page, p. 84). Ellis said Jowett was voted deputy leader on 25 February (Ellis, Country Party, p. 52). The Ellis view is supported by the Dictionary of Biography, which says ‘on 25 February 1920 [Jowett] was chosen as deputy leader of the new parliamentary Country Party’. Rydon J, Jowett, Edmund 1858–1936, Dictionary of Biography, vol 9, 1983, pp. 525–526. The Sydney Morning Herald report appears to put Jowett’s election as deputy leader on 25 February 1920 beyond doubt. 33 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 26 February 1920, p. 41. 34 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 10 March 1920, p. 250. Page was more definitive as to the role of the Country Party: ‘Though we lacked parliamentary experience, our aim was clear. The socialist policies of the Labour Party were anathema to us. While dissatisfaction existed among some members with the Hughes regime, we were in agreement that it would be better to keep the Government on the rails than assist a Labour Government into office.’ Page, Earle Page, p. 84. 35 Ellis, Country Party, p. 59. While he joined the Country Party, Wilson declined to attend party meetings because of his joint endorsement with the Nationalists. He did, however, actively involve himself in Country Party election campaigns, such as that for the Queensland parliament in late 1920.

(Ellis, Country Party, p. 57). When he was appointed an honorary minister and then Minister for Markets and Migration from 1923 to 1926 in the Bruce-Page government, Wilson believed he should not have to seek party preselection. The South Australian Country Party, by that time fully handling candidate endorsements, took a dim view of this and relegated him to fourth place on the non-Labor ticket for the Senate at the election in December 1925. Wilson lost his seat, effective from 30 June 1926, to be replaced by the Country Party’s John Chapman. Saunders M, Wilson, Sir Reginald Victor, 1877–1957, Dictionary of Biography, vol 12, 1990, pp. 530–31; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 597, 616, 688, 689. 36 Ellis, Country Party, p. 61; The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 April 1921, p. 9; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 633. See also: Appendix 1, Formation and Name Changes; Appendix 2, Electoral Performance, House of Representatives; Appendix 3, Parliamentary and Organisational Leaders; Appendix 4, Party Senators and Members.

Chapter 2 1 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 10 March 1920, p. 250. 2 Country Party, Ellis, pp. 53, 54. 3 Country Party, Ellis, pp. 53–55. 4 Page, Earle Page, pp. 86, 87; Ellis, Country Party, pp. 62–64. Comprehensive accounts of the early activities of the Australian Country Party are contained in Page, Earle Page, chapters 7–12, Ellis, Country Party, chapters 4-12, and Graham, Formation of Country Parties, chapters 4–6. Souter G, Acts of Parliament – A narrative history of the Senate and House of Representatives, Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne University Press, 1988, chapters 6 and 8–13 also contain valuable reference material (hereafter Souter, Acts of Parliament). 5 Federal Political Platform of the Australian Country Party, March 1921. 6 Page, Earle Page, p. 88; Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 176. 7 Page, Earle Page, p. 88.

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8 The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 April 1921, p. 19. 9 He was made a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St Michael and St George (GCMG) in January 1938 for services as Deputy Prime Minister and a Member of the Order of the Companion of Honour (CH) in June 1942 for services as Prime Minister in 1939. It’s an Honour – Australians celebrating Australia. See – (hereafter It’s an Honour). 10 From Earle Page’s parliamentary speeches, The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 December 1961, p. 1. 11 Interview with Ralph Hunt, Sydney, 11 September 2007. 12 Interview with Doug Anthony, Murwillumbah, 9 December 2005. Doug Anthony won the Richmond by-election. 13 Interview with Ian Robinson, Grafton, 21 July 2009. 14 Not related to the Country Party Member for Indi, Victoria, Robert Cook. 15 Page, Earle Page, pp. 88–91; Ellis, Country Party, pp. 62, 63; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 14 April 1921, p. 7462; Souter, Acts of Parliament, p. 186. 16 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 642, 656. James Page was not related to Earle Page. 17 Ellis, Country Party, pp. 64, 65; Page, Earle Page, pp. 91, 92; Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 177; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 483. At this time, the New South Wales Progressive/Country Party often endorsed more than one candidate for the same electorate, partly because New South Wales had a system of multimember representation in its parliament (five members per metropolitan electorate and three for country electorates) from 1920 to 1927. Hogan and Clune, People’s Choice, vol 1, pp. 187, 334. 18 One question sought to extend the Commonwealth’s powers in relation to trade and commerce, corporations, industrial matters and trusts. The second sought to give the Commonwealth power to make laws regarding monopolies. Both were rejected. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 558. 19 The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 December

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1921, p. 17. 20 Ellis says the deputy leadership ‘remained vacant until July the following year, when Fleming … was appointed’. Ellis, Country Party, p. 66. Page records that ‘Fleming had assumed the deputyleadership at Gregory’s resignation in November 1921’. Page, Earle Page, endnote 1 to chapter 11, p. 447. Page also says Gregory ‘subsequently’ resigned the deputy leadership following the November party meeting. Page, Earle Page, p. 96. The Australian Dictionary of Biography says Gregory ‘was deputy leader from 5 April 1921 until 2 December 1921 when he resigned … ’. Davies P, Gregory, Henry 1860–1940, Dictionary of Biography vol 9, 1983, pp. 98, 99. Page’s reference to Gregory’s ‘subsequent’ resignation, lends weight to the accuracy of the 2 December date. 21 Ellis, Country Party, pp. 87, 88; Page, Earle Page, pp. 109, 110. 22 Souter, Acts of Parliament, p. 193. The slogan was also a play on words, with Green happily going along with its other meaning as ‘Vote for the Green without a knee’. 23 Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 326; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 488, 666. 24 Page, Earle Page, p. 114. 25 The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 1923; Country Party, Ellis, p. 91. 26 The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 1923. 27 Country Party, Ellis, p. 92. 28 Ellis, Country Party, pp. 95, 96; Page, Earle Page, pp. 120, 121. Ellis and Page provide detailed accounts of these negotiations, including transcripts of several of the memoranda. Ellis, Country Party, pp. 90–97 and Page, Earle Page, chapter 11 and appendices 1 and 2, pp. 463, 464. 29 Ellis, Country Party, p. 98; Page, Earle Page, p. 125; The Argus, Melbourne, 9 February 1923; Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 191. Page and Ellis record that the meetings with Bruce were on 5 and 6 February. Graham says they took place on 6 and 7 February. The Senate dictionary of biography records that a friend and fellow newspaper proprietor of Page, Robert Elliott, who served as a Victorian Country Party senator from 1929 to 1935, met Page at

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30

31

32

33 34 35

36

37

North Melbourne railway station on 6 February to convey him to Bruce’s flat in Toorak. Millar, A, (ed) The Biographical Dictionary of the Australian Senate, vol 2, Melbourne University Press, 2004, p. 112 (hereafter Senate Biography). Paterson said the party room had authorised Page to discuss a composite ministry on the understanding that he [Page] should have the deputy prime ministership. Farmers’ Advocate, Melbourne, 15 February 1923; Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 189. Who’s Who in Australia XIV edition 1950, Alexander, JA, (ed), Colorgravure Publications, Melbourne, pp. 414, 415 (hereafter Who’s Who 1950); Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 646. The Progressive Party of New South Wales split on 15 December 1921, with the seven Bruxner Progressives becoming known as the ‘True Blues’ and paving the way for the formation of The Country Party of New South Wales from 12 August 1925. Davey, The Nationals, p. 452. Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 158 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 8 March 1923, pp. 221, 273. Detailed discussion on the development of the Bruce-Page Coalition and the attitudes of the state parties to coalition can be found in Ellis, Country Party, chapter 8, and Graham, Formation of Country Parties, chapters 4 to 8. 19 March 1923. Graham, Formation of Country Parties, p. 194; Costar, BJ, Paterson, Thomas 1882–1952, Dictionary of Biography, vol 11, 1988, pp. 157, 158. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 688–760. See also Appendix 5, Party Ministers in the Commonwealth Parliament.

Chapter 3 1 These entities were formalised by the 1927 Commonwealth-State Financial Agreement and ratified by referendum on 17 November 1928. Ellis, Country Party, pp. 106, 107; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 560. 2 Senate Biography, vol 2, p. 127. 3 Davey, The Nationals, pp. 95, 96.

4 Page opened the Nymboida scheme when he was Treasurer in 1924. Bridge, C, Page, Sir Earle Christmas Grafton (1880–1961), Dictionary of Biography, vol 11, 1988, pp. 118–122. 5 Page bought the first Rover motor car in Australia in 1904 so he could better travel the pioneering roads and tracks of the Clarence district to visit his patients. He estimated ‘at that time it is doubtful whether more than thirty cars were on the roads in all Australia’. Page, Earle Page, p. 51. 6 In his History of the Australian Country Party, Ellis described the Paterson Plan as ‘a landmark in Country Party history’, p. 117. 7 Information from Earle Page’s grand daughter, Helen Snyders, 26 October 2009. 8 Crisp LF, The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901–1951, Longmans, Green and Co., Melbourne, 1955, pp. 127, 266 (hereafter Crisp, Labour Party). See also Appendix 6, Landmark Achievements in Government. 9 Page, Earle Page, pp. 198–201. The Commonwealth parliament met in Melbourne from 9 May 1901 before moving to the provisional Parliament House in Canberra on 9 May 1927. The permanent Parliament House was opened by Queen Elizabeth II on 9 May 1988. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 10, 11. 10 These and following details of the BrucePage electoral pact are drawn from comprehensive accounts contained in Ellis, Country Party, pp. 121–131 and Graham, Formation of Country Parties, pp. 221–235. 11 Prowse was the Member for Swan until successfully contesting Forrest in December 1922 following a redistribution. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 657. 12 Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 331. 13 Ellis, Country Party, says (p. 139) that in the absence of a Tasmanian Country Party organisation, Atkinson ‘chose to sit again with the Nationalists’. He had been a Nationalist from 1917 until sitting with the Country Party from 1923. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook records that Atkinson sat as a Nationalist from 1925, implying from

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the time of the November election (p. 618). However, Atkinson was recorded in the minutes of a special AFFO conference in Melbourne on 23– 24 March 1926 as a Country Party delegate. It therefore seems he moved back to the Nationalists at some point after this. The other Tasmanian Country Party member, Joshua Whitsitt, in the seat of Darwin, retired at the 1925 election and his seat was won by Nationalist, George Bell. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 463, 666. The Tasmanian Country Party was reformed in 1963 and a small organisation maintained until closing in 1975. It was briefly reformed as the National Party of Australia -Tasmania in 1994 and finally disbanded in 1996. Jupp J, Australian Party Politics, Melbourne University Press, 1964, p. 153 (hereafter Jupp, Party Politics); Townsley, WA, The Government of Tasmania, University of Queensland Press, 1976, p. 62; Davey, The Nationals, p. 452. 14 The Victorian Country Progressive Party was formed in May 1926. Stewart, who, like Atkinson, was a Country Party delegate to the March 1926 AFFO conference, returned to the parliamentary Country Party in 1931 after reconciliation between the Victorian parties. Ellis, Country Party, p. 150. 15 Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, pp. 331–36; Graham, Formation of Country Parties, pp. 233–35; Page, Earle Page, p. 205. 16 Ellis, Country Party, p. 150; Playford, J, Cameron, Archie Galbraith 1895–1956, Dictionary of Biography, vol 13, 1993, pp. 346–48 (hereafter Playford, Cameron, ADB). Cameron won the Commonwealth seat of Barker in 1934 and was Country Party leader in 1939– 40. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 624; Davey, The Nationals, p. 496. 17 Jaensch D, The Government of South Australia, University of Queensland Press, 1977, pp. 19, 28, 47–52. 18 Hughes, CA, The Government of Queensland, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1980, pp. 16–19 (hereafter Hughes, Queensland) 19 Cribb, MB, Fadden, Sir Arthur William 1894–1973, Dictionary of Biography, vol 14, 1996, pp. 123–26 (hereafter, Cribb,

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Fadden, ADB). 20 Hughes, Queensland, pp. 16–19. 21 Parliament of New South Wales Parliamentary Record, Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly 1824–2003, vol VII, first edition, Sydney, 2003, pp. 80, 268 (hereafter NSW Parliamentary Record); Ellis, Country Party, pp. 132–140. 22 No alteration was made to affiliation fees until 1943 when they were set at £50 annually for all state parties. They increased to £150 for New South Wales, £100 each for Queensland and Victoria, and £50 for Western Australia in 1952. The Australian Country Party Constitution, 1943; Australian Country Party Federal Constitution, 1952. 23 Minutes of AFFO conference, Melbourne, 23–24 March 1926. 24 The Australian Country Party Association minutes, 30 September 1926; Ellis, Country Party, pp. 143, 144. 25 The Australian Country Party Association Constitution 1927. 26 The Australian Country Party Association, Platform, June 1927. By 1957, the Platform and Policy, declaring that the party was ‘truly National in character, embracing ALL sections of the community’, covered most areas of government administration, including external affairs, trade, national development, closer settlement, repatriation, transport, finance and taxation, industrial relations, communism and socialisation, communications, population and migration, education, housing, health and social services. The Australian Country Party Platform and Policy, as Amended and Re-Affirmed by Federal Council, 15 November 1957. 27 Minutes, The Australian Country Party Association conference, Melbourne, 17 July 1937. 28 Minutes, The Australian Country Party Association conference, Melbourne, 4 to 6 December 1943; The Australian Country Party Federal Constitution, 1952. 29 This arrangement continued under successive New South Wales general secretaries until the party built a national (federal) secretariat in Canberra and appointed a full time federal director from 1968. 30 Ellis, U, A Pen in politics, Ginninderra

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Press, Canberra, 2007, pp. 59, 67, 128, 165, 202 (hereafter Ellis, Pen in Politics); Davey, The Nationals, p. 63.

Chapter 4 1 Graham, Formation of Country Parties, pp. 231, 245–47; Greenwood, G, Australia, A Social and Political History, Angus and Robertson, 1955, pp. 304, 305 (hereafter Greenwood, Australia). 2 Ellis, U, New Australian States, Endeavour Press, Sydney, 1933, p. 200 (hereafter Ellis, New States). The report of the Peden commission was presented just before the Scullin Labor government came to office in October 1929. 3 Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 337; Ellis, Country Party, pp. 157, 158. 4 Senate Biography, vol 2, p. 115; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 25 June 1931, p. 3003. 5 Page, Earle Page, pp. 216, 217; Ellis, Country Party, pp. 159, 160. 6 Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, pp. 342–45; Neilson, WA, McWilliams, William James,1856–1929, Dictionary of Biography, vol 10, 1986, pp. 369–70. 7 Ellis, Country Party, p. 161; Propaganda Points for Australian Country Party Speakers, Publicists, Organisers and Supporters, 1934, pp. 5–7. 8 The total value of Australia’s exports reached a record £161.3 million in 1924/25 and then fell every year to £104.3 million in 1930/31. Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Commonwealth Government Printer, Melbourne and Canberra, No 24 – 1931, p. 401; No 25 – 1933, pp. 423, 743. 9 See 10 One wonders how welcome he would have been, given he was among those who had brought down the Bruce-Page government in 1929. 11 Ellis, Country Party, p. 171. 12 Page, Earle Page, p. 241. 13 On 24 September 1931. The Nationals – NSW archives, head office, Sydney. 14 The no confidence motion, moved by Latham, was defeated by 38 votes to 33.

Ellis, Country Party, p. 173. 15 Ellis, Country Party, p. 171. 16 ——, pp. 168–71; Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890-1964, p. 345. 17 The motion was defeated 34 to 32. Ellis, Country Party, p. 176. 18 Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 345. 19 Ellis, Country Party, p. 178. 20 Royal Commission on the Constitution report, 1929; Page, Earle Page, p. 466. 21 Page, Earle Page, p. 467. 22 Six of the UAP members were elected in South Australia as members endorsed by a non-Labor Emergency Committee, which was developing the joint Liberal and Country League, formed in June 1932. Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics, 1890–1964, pp. 345, 346. 23 Page, Earle Page, p. 253. 24 The Lyons government’s tariff policy is discussed in detail in Page, Earle Page, chapter 25, The Lyons Tariff Controversy, and Ellis, Country Party, chapter 17, The Lyons Tariff, 1932–1934.

Chapter 5 1 Page, Earle Page, p. 226; Page, J, The History of Heifer Station, McPhee Printers, Grafton, 2004, p. 10. 2 Ellis, Pen in Politics, p. 162. 3 Page, Earle Page, p. 263. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 4 October 1933, p. 3195. 4 Page, Earle Page, p. 263. 5 The Australian Agricultural Council was formed on 28 May 1935. Page, Earle Page, p. 271. See also Australian Science at Work . The Bruce-Page government formed the first Transport Advisory Council in 1929. Ellis, Country Party, p. 205. 6 Page, Earle Page, pp. 264, 265. 7 Golding P, Black Jack McEwen – Political Gladiator, Melbourne University Press, 1996, pp. 59, 60 (hereafter Golding, Black Jack); Ellis, Country Party, pp. 204, 206, 207. 8 One of these was William Moss, who succeeded Earle Page as federal president of the Australian Country Party from 1962 to 1968. Davey, The Nationals, p. 497.

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9 Senate Biography, vol 2, p. 128. He was readmitted to the party room when the Victorian party reunited in 1943. Ellis, Country Party, pp. 204, 207, 335. 10 Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890 to 1964, pp. 351–55; Golding, Black Jack, p. 61. 11 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 23 October 1934, p. 58. 12 Ellis, Country Party, p. 211. 13 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 690–93. 14 Page, Earle Page, p. 267. 15 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 3 October 1935, p. 462. The New South Wales party at this time was named United Country Party to further the political interests of new state movements. 16 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 9 October 1936, p. 522, 523. 17 ——, 22 October 1935, p. 867. 18 ——, 10 October 1935, p. 599. 19 See Appendix 4 – Parliamentary and Organisational Leaders. 20 Page, Earle Page, p. 280. See chapter 27, pp. 280–91, The London Missions of 1936 and 1938. 21 Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, pp. 357–59. The Country Party’s numbers were maintained by offsetting the loss of Wimmera with the addition of Bendigo. 22 Hubert Anthony, the father of future leader, Doug Anthony, was generally known in Canberra as Larry. To avoid confusion with his grandson, Lawrence James (Larry) Anthony, who represented Richmond from 1996 to 2004, the author has referred to the senior Anthony as Hubert in this text. 23 Jackson, RV, (ed), McEwen J, John McEwen – His Story, edited text of an interview given in November 1974 to the National Library of Australia, privately published, p. 16 (hereafter McEwen – His Story). There is no reference to publishing date or publishing house for this book of 93 pp., although the foreword, by McEwen’s former Trade and Industry Department head, JG Crawford, is dated December 1982; Costar B and Woodward D, (eds), Country to National, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985, p. 99 (hereafter Costar and Woodward, Country to National); Golding, Black Jack, pp. 67–73; Ellis, Country Party, pp. 220, 222–26.

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24 Interview with Ian Robinson, Grafton, 21 July 2009. 25 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 690–93. 26 Playford, Cameron, ADB, pp. 346–48. 27 Davey P, Politics in the Blood – The Anthonys of Richmond, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2008, pp. 31, 32 (hereafter Davey, Politics in the Blood); Brown E, Corser, Bernard Henry, 1882–1967, Dictionary of Biography vol 13, 1993, pp. 504, 505; Senate Biography, vol 2, p. 276. 28 Page, Earle Page, p. 306; Ellis, Country Party, pp. 233–37. 29 ——, p. 305. 30 ——, p. 315. 31 ——, p. 316. Chapter 30, The Nineteen Days, pp. 310–20 covers Page’s negotiations with Bruce in detail, including reproducing transcripts of radio-telephone conversations. 32 This and following extracts are from Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 20 April 1939, pp. 14–21. 33 The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 April 1939. 34 Fadden, A, They called me Artie – The Memoirs of Sir Arthur Fadden, The Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1969, p. 41 (hereafter Fadden, They called me Artie). 35 Tweed Daily, Murwillumbah, 27 April 1939. Hubert Anthony and Menzies were never good friends, although the latter recognised Anthony’s political skills and appointed him to senior ministerial positions in later years. 36 Page, Earle Page, pp. 297, 324. 37 Letter from Joseph Abbott to Earle Page, 19 July 1939, The Nationals - NSW archives, head office, Sydney. 38 The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 September 1939. 39 Ellis, Country Party, p. 253.

Chapter 6 1 Hughes, CA, and Graham, BD, Voting for the Australian House of Representatives 1901– 1964, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1974, pp. 188 and 194 (hereafter Hughes and Graham, House of Representatives Voting). 2 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 668, 669. 3 Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 14 August 1940; Fadden, They called me Artie, p. 43. 4 Hughes and Graham, Australian

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Government and Politics 1890–1964, pp. 357–58, 363–64; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 586, 624, 633–34. 5 Page, Earle Page, pp. 334, 335; Ellis, Country Party, p. 257. Cameron remained with the UAP and subsequent Liberal Party and was elected Speaker of the House of Representatives from February 1950 until his death in August 1956. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 624, 793. 6 Fadden, They called me Artie, pp. 43– 45; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 669–71. 7 McEwen – His Story, p. 28. 8 The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 March 1941. 9 The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 May 1941. 10 Page said ‘at least fourteen’ of the UAP parliamentary membership of 23 was ‘known to be hostile to him [Menzies]’. Page, Earle Page, p. 340. 11 Daily Telegraph, 15 May 1941. 12 Tweed Daily, Murwillumbah, 31 July 1941; The Northern Star, Lismore, 19 July 1941. 13 Page, Earle Page, pp. 342, 343. 14 Page provides detailed accounts of his work as special envoy to the British War Cabinet and Pacific War Council in Earle Page, chapters 33 to 40. He served on the Australian War Cabinet in 1941 and the Advisory War Council in 1942–43 and 1944–45. Prime Facts 11, The Australian Prime Ministers Centre, Old Parliament House, Canberra. See – (hereafter Prime Facts). 15 Page, Earle Page, p. 348. 16 The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 October 1941. Fadden was a member of the Australian War Cabinet in 1940 and 1941, and of the Advisory War Council from 1940 to 1945. Ellis, Country Party, p. 308. 17 Golding, Black Jack, pp. 117–18; Ellis, Country Party, p. 264. 18 The Age, 28 July 1943. 19 The Courier-Mail, 28 July 1943. 20 Ellis, Country Party, p. 264; Fadden, They called me Artie, pp. 88, 96; Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, pp. 369–74. 21 The New South Wales party’s central council unanimously recommended that the party sit in the Commonwealth parliament as a separate party with its own leader ‘who shall be Leader of that Party alone’. Central council minutes, 16 September 1943.

22 Wilson’s Wimmera seat was successfully defended at a by-election on 9 February 1946 by Winton Turnbull, who went on to become the Country Party’s longest serving whip. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook p. 664. 23 The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 March 1943. 24 Liberal Party of Australia NSW Division website ; Hogan and Clune, The People’s Choice, vol 2, pp. 248–50; Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 374. 25 Report by New South Wales central executive to its central council, 14 February 1946, The Nationals – NSW archives, head office, Sydney. 26 The New South Wales Countryman, official newspaper of the NSW Country Party, March 1946, p. 2 (hereafter NSW Countryman). 27 Arthur Fadden election policy speech, 3 September 1946, NSW Countryman, September 1946. 28 Robert Menzies, election policy speech, Camberwell, Victoria, 20 August 1946; Ellis, Country Party, p. 267. 29 The new Member for Capricornia was Charles Davidson, who was endorsed as a Liberal-Country candidate and who sat with the Country Party, becoming deputy leader from 1953 to 1963. Who’s Who in Australia XXIII edition, 1980, Herald and Weekly Times Ltd., Melbourne, p. 243; Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 377. 30 Hughes and Graham, House of Representatives Voting 1901–1964, pp. 375–78; NSW Countryman, October–November 1946. 31 NSW Countryman, October–November 1946. 32 Fadden said in his 1946 election policy speech: ‘The Country Party regards the Communist Party as a venomous snake to be killed before it kills.’ Menzies was more reticent: ‘We must be extremely reluctant to put down the Communist Party. We must not let it be thought that they are such a force in political philosophy that we cannot meet them.’ He later hardened his attitude. Fadden, They called me Artie, pp. 97, 99; Ellis, Country Party, p. 274. 33 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 593. The House of

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Representatives sizes include the member for each of the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory, who at this time had voting rights limited to issues affecting their respective Territory. The NT was granted such a member in 1922 and the ACT in 1948. Full voting rights were extended to the ACT member in 1966 and to the NT member from 1968. AEC, Electoral Pocketbook 2005, p. 99. 34 Ellis, Country Party, p. 271. 35 Robert Menzies election policy speech, 10 November 1949. 36 Robert Menzies election policy speech, 10 November 1949. 37 Fadden, They called me Artie, pp. 107, 108. 38 Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 380. 39 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 705, 706. 40 Fadden, They called me Artie, p. 108.

Chapter 7 1 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 333. 2 The bill aimed to outlaw and dissolve the Australian Communist Party and associated organisations. Members of the Communist Party were to be ‘declared’ and banned from being employed by the Commonwealth, holding office in a trade union, or working in certain industries. While they could appeal to the High Court, the onus was on them to prove their innocence. The Labor Party in the Senate was divided over the bill, with Menzies in late June moving that it be laid aside. An amended Communist Party Dissolution Bill (No 2) was introduced into the House of Representatives on 27 September 1950, but again met Labor opposition in the Senate. It eventually passed, after the ALP federal executive instructed its senators to withdraw their opposition. The legality of the law was successfully challenged in the High Court, by a majority decision of six to one on 6 March 1951, paving the way for the September 1951 referendum, which was narrowly lost. National Archives of Australia – see

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(hereafter NAA, Cabinet Notebooks); Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 566; NSW Countryman, September 1951, p. 1. 3 Fadden, They called me Artie, p. 114. Australia sent more than 17,000 voluntary forces to Korea from 1950 to 1953. Casualties were 339 killed and 1584 wounded. Also in 1950, Australia committed voluntary troops to the Malaya Emergency and remained there until 1960, a 10-year commitment which equalled the 1962–1972 involvement in Vietnam. Australia also committed forces to Malaysia for three years from 1963. Australians in War, RSL – see 4 Cabinet Notebooks 1950. 5 NAA: A11099, 1/11, 15 February 1951, pp. 53–56, Cabinet Notebooks 1951. 6 Australian Treaty Series – see ; NAA, Cabinet Notebooks 1951. 7 NSW Countryman, November 1950. 8 Fadden, They called me Artie, p. 116. 9 Fadden, They called me Artie, pp. 115– 20. 10 Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 386. 11 Fadden, They called me Artie, p. 114. 12 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 566. 13 The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 September 1951, p. 1; 28 September 1951, p. 3. 14 The Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, 3 October 1951, p. 2. 15 Cribb, Fadden, ADB. 16 The Duke of Gloucester was GovernorGeneral from 30 January 1945 to 11 March 1947. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 583. 17 Fadden, They called me Artie, p. 130. 18 Princess Elizabeth and Prince Philip were in Kenya, on a trip scheduled to take them on to Australia, when her father died and she returned home. 19 Fadden, They called me Artie, p. 132. 20 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 443; Victorian Parliamentary Handbook, the 55th Parliament, Parliament of Victoria 2004, p. 188; Jaensch, D, The Government of South Australia, University of Queensland Press, 1977, p. 47. 21 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 471; Mayer, H, and Rydon, J, The Gwydir By-election 1953 – A Study in Political Conflict, Australian National

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University Social Science Monographs 3, p. 5, f/n 1, 17, Canberra, 1954 (hereafter Mayer & Rydon, Gwydir By-election). 22 Earle Page speech to federal council, Canberra, 20 November 1953. 23 The Northern Daily Leader, Tamworth, 30 November 1953; Maher & Rydon, Gwydir By-election, p. 35. 24 A major part of the Liberal Party’s rationale for this was that it held more ‘extra-metropolitan’ seats (25) in the House of Representatives than did either of the Country (17) or Labor (19) parties. Maher & Rydon, Gwydir Byelection, p. 192. 25 Maher & Rydon, Gwydir By-election, pp. 39, 40. 26 ‘At no time did he [Menzies] indicate that he would prefer a preference for his own Liberal candidate.’ Daily Mirror, Sydney, 16 December 1953. 27 Inverell Times, 9 December 1953. 28 Maher & Rydon, Gwydir By-election, p. 125. 29 Tim Bruxner – his first names were James Caird, but he was always known as Tim – held Tenterfield from May 1962 to August 1981. NSW Parliamentary Record, pp. 87, 113. Interview with Tim Bruxner, Sydney, 2 April 2009. 30 Inverell Times, 16 December 1953; NorthWest Courier, Narrabri, 14 December 1953. 31 Mayer & Rydon, Gwydir By-election, p. 154. 32 For further details on the Petrov affair see The Royal Commission on Espionage 1954–55 and Conflicts and resolutions arising from the Petrov defections, an essay by Nicola Connell, National Archives of Australia – see 33 Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, pp. 394. 34 Fadden, They called me Artie, pp. 139, 140. 35 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 705–708. 36 Menzies’ views were shared by British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, who dismissed television as a ‘tuppennyha’penny Punch and Judy show’. Churchill never gave a television interview. Holmes, R, In the footsteps of Churchill, BBC Books, London, 2005, photo caption before p. 257. 37 Davey, Politics in the blood, pp. 64, 65, 74, 78, 94, 96. Chapter 4, The long road to television, covers this subject in

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detail. Anthony suffered increasing ill health, largely due to contracting nephritis, an inflammation of the kidneys, during service at Gallipoli in World War I. He died of a cerebral haemorrhage on 12 July 1957. Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 397. The Labor split led to the formation in 1957 of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). Murray, R, The Split, in Manne, R (ed) The Australian Century – Political struggle in the building of a nation, Text Publishing, Melbourne, pp. 153, 169, 174–76; Davey, The Nationals, pp. 164, 165. Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 397. Women previously elected were Enid Lyons (UAP/LIB, Darwin, Tasmania) and Dorothy Tangney (ALP, Western Australia) in 1943; Doris Blackburn (IND LAB, Bourke, Victoria) 1946; and Annabelle Rankin (LIB, Queensland) 1947. Ivy Wedgwood (LIB, Victoria) was also elected at the same time as Agnes Robertson. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 670–73. Birman, W, Robertson, Agnes Robertson, 1882–1968, Dictionary of Biography, vol 16, 2002, pp. 107–108 (hereafter Birman, Robertson, ADB); Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 611. Information from Doug Anthony, 25 November 2008. Minutes of the first conference of the Country Party’s women representatives, Hotel Canberra, 24 November 1960 and of federal council, Canberra, 7–8 December 1962, federal secretariat, Canberra. In October 1956, she was the first woman appointed to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs. She died on 29 January 1968 in Melbourne. Birman, Robertson, ADB. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 595, 611. Interviews with Shirley McKerrow, 3 June 2009; Helen Tiller, 4 June 2009; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 670–73; The Nationals – NSW archives, head office, Sydney, federal secretariat, Canberra. National Country Party of Australia federal constitution, 1976, Rule 10 (h).

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Chapter 8 1 Fadden, They called me Artie, pp. 146, 147. 2 ——, p. 147. 3 McEwen, His Story, p. 57. All trade ministers in Coalition governments from McEwen up to and including the Howard-Vaile government to November 2007 were from the Country Party/The Nationals. McEwen was succeeded by Doug Anthony, followed by Tim Fischer, Mark Vaile and Warren Truss. Ian Sinclair said Bill McMahon offered him the job of Minister for Foreign Affairs when McMahon succeeded John Gorton as Prime Minister in 1972, but he declined for reasons similar to those of McEwen – that foreign affairs was not central to the party’s interests. Interview with Ian Sinclair, Sydney, 6 May 2009. 4 State Grants (Encouragement of Meat Production) Act 1949–54 and beef cattle roads agreements and acts, 1961, 1962, 1966 and 1968. Burke, RH, History of Commonwealth Government Legislation Relating to Roads and Road Transport, 1900–1972, Bureau of Transport Economics, Canberra, 1977, pp. 14, 15. 5 McEwen, His Story, p. 54. In an interview in 1969, McEwen reflected that ‘no public man has taken a greater risk of his own reputation than I took when I negotiated the Japan trade treaty’. NSW Countryman, February 1969, p. 5. 6 Davey, Politics in the Blood, p. 118. 7 Interview with Rob Chalmers, 10 July 2007. 8 Interview with Doug Anthony, Murwillumbah, 9 December 2005. 9 Interview with Ralph Hunt, Sydney, 11 September 2007. 10 Interview with Peter Nixon, Melbourne, 19 September 2007. Nixon succeeded Anthony as Minister for the Interior in October 1967, when Anthony was appointed Minister for Primary Industry. Country Party ministers for the interior – McEwen (1937–39), Anthony (1964– 67), Nixon (1967–71) and Hunt (1971– 72) were responsible for many key developments in the national capital. 11 Interview with Stuart McDonald, Melbourne, 18 September 2007. McDonald was a Victorian legislative councillor for Northern Province from 1967–79, leader of the party in the upper

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house for three years, Victorian National Party state president from 1982–86 and federal president from 1987–90. Davey, The Nationals, p. 497. 12 Interview with John Fuller, Sydney, 26 September 2007. 13 Golding, Black Jack, pp. 209, 210. 14 Interview with Ian Sinclair, Sydney, 6 May 2009. 15 McEwen, His Story, p. 80. 16 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 707–710. 17 Golding, Black Jack, pp. 181, 182. 18 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 710. 19 Golding, Black Jack, pp. 182–85. 20 McEwen, His Story, p. 68. 21 Robert Menzies, election policy speech, 15 November 1961; John McEwen election policy speech, 20 November 1961. See and National Library of Australia catalogue 22 John McEwen speech to business leaders’ conference, Lennons Hotel, Brisbane, 6 October 1961. 23 John McEwen election policy speech, The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 November 1961, p. 6. 24 AEC, Electoral Pocketbook 2005, pp. 96, 97; Hughes and Graham, Government and Politics 1890–1964, p. 409. 25 Minutes, Country Party federal executive, Sydney, 8 January 1962, federal secretariat, Canberra. 26 McEwen, His Story, pp. 68, 69. 27 The Basic Industries Group was instigated by a former Queensland Country Party Member for Maranoa, Charles Russell (1949 until defeated in 1951), and comprised mainly wealthy or influential graziers. Hancock, I, John Gorton, He did it his way, Hodder, Sydney, 2002, p. 132 (hereafter Hancock, Gorton). 28 Davey, The Nationals, p. 211. 29 His nickname in the parliamentary press gallery was ‘Billy the Leak’. Golding, Black Jack, p. 181; Menzies accused McMahon of showing a Liberal back bencher another minister’s Cabinet submission in September 1959 and apparently extracted from McMahon a written commitment to resign if he was caught leaking again. Hancock, Gorton, p. 132. 30 The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 January 1968.

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31 Minutes, federal executive, Melbourne, 7 July 1967, federal secretariat, Canberra. 32 John McEwen speech to federal council, Canberra, 20 January 1968; Golding, Black Jack, pp. 263–67. As an example, by 1972 the fruit industry had received $5 million in devaluation compensation. Doug Anthony election policy speech, Lismore, 20 November 1972. 33 Heatley, A, The Territory Party: The Northern Territory Country Liberal Party 1974–1988, Northern Territory University Press, Darwin, 1998, pp. 2–7 (hereafter Heatley, Territory Party). The seat of Northern Territory was established in 1922, but up until 1968 its member had limited voting rights in the House of Representatives, restricted to matters affecting the Territory. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 484. 34 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 624. 35 Ellis, Pen in Politics, pp. 165, 202, 263. 36 The executive agreed ‘in principle to the establishment of a Federal Secretariat under a Management Committee appointed by the Federal Leader and the Federal Chairman, and that the overall control be under the Federal Executive. It is understood that the autonomy of the affiliated States be maintained’. Minutes of federal executive, Wagga Wagga, 23 June 1965, federal secretariat, Canberra. 37 Interview with John Fuller, Sydney, 26 September 2007. Rowland Smith, a woolgrower and processor, held several executive positions in the wool industry and was a National Country/National Party member of the New South Wales Legislative Council from 1974–99. See – 38 NSW Countryman, September 1968, p. 3; Davey, The Nationals, pp. 216, 217. 39 ——, July 1968, p. 1. See also Appendix 4, Parliamentary and Organisational Leaders. 40 McEwen, His Story, pp. 80, 81. 41 ——, p. 80. 42 Charles Adermann retired from parliament on 2 November 1972, handing his seat of Fisher to his son, Evan, at the elections a month later. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 617. 43 McEwen, His Story, p. 81.

Chapter 9 1 Interview with Doug Anthony, 5 June 2006. 2 McEwen – His Story, p. 76. 3 Transcript of Governor-General Casey’s statement, 18 December 1967. National Archives of Australia. See – www.naa. gov.au 4 NSW Countryman, February 1968, p. 1. 5 The Sydney Morning Herald, in a report on Holt’s disappearance on 18 December 1967, noted that Holt ‘was suffering from a muscular complaint’. 6 Half Senate election held on 25 November 1967. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 333. 7 Interviews with Doug Anthony, 5 April 2006, 20 November 2007. 8 HMAS Voyager and HMAS Melbourne collided on 10 February 1964 during night manoeuvres off Jervis Bay, resulting in the death of 82 sailors aboard Voyager. It was the Navy’s worst peacetime disaster. 9 Hancock, Gorton, pp. 93, 94, 123–32. 10 The hurt of the RSL resolution was ameliorated in October 1968 when the Victorian branch president, William Hall, moved a vote of thanks to McKellar at the RSL’s national congress. Schneider, R, McKellar, Gerald Colin, 1903-1970, Dictionary of Biography, vol 15, 2000, pp. 241–42. 11 NSW Countryman, February 1968, p. 1. 12 McEwen, His Story, p. 77. Gorton served as a Liberal senator for Victoria from 22 February 1950 until resigning on 1 February 1968 to successfully contest Holt’s Victorian seat of Higgins at the by-election on 24 February 1968. He was Prime Minister without being a member of parliament for 23 days, during which time the parliament was in recess. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 715; The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 January 1968. 13 John McEwen speech to federal council, Canberra, 20 January 1968. 14 Golding, Black Jack, pp. 309–310. 15 Hughes, C, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1965–1974, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977, pp. 79, 87 (hereafter Hughes, Government and Politics 1965–74). 16 Constructed between 1966 and 1972 at a cost of $22 million, the Ord

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scheme created Australia’s largest dam, Lake Argyle, with an area of 741 square kilometers, used for irrigation and electricity generation. Kimberley Development Commission. See – . The conversion to standard gauge of the railway between Sydney and Perth resulted in the first Indian Pacific service running on 23 February 1970. See and . Gough Whitlam turned the first sod to begin construction of the Tarcoola to Alice Springs line on 12 April 1975, with the railway opening on 9 October 1980. See

17 The Age, 4 January 1971. McEwen later said that ‘gradually I came to the conclusion that Anthony was more ready to go into the fight than Sinclair’. McEwen, His Story, p. 81. 18 John McEwen press statement, 3 November 1969. 19 Australian Industry Development Corporation Act 1970. McMahon and Treasury opposed the AIDC to the last, putting forward 13 separate submissions against the proposal in cabinet’s final deliberations on the matter. Golding, Black Jack, pp. 258–60. 20 Anthony’s recollection was that he was uncontested for the leadership, but Sinclair was sure he stood. Nixon and Robinson also believed this to be the case. See Davey, Politics in the Blood, p. 146. 21 Transcript, Doug Anthony press conference, Canberra, 2 February 1971. 22 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 717, 718. See also Appendix 5, Party Ministers in the Commonwealth Parliament 23 The Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1970. 24 Interview with Malcolm Fraser, Melbourne, 9 October 2006. 25 McEwen, His Story, pp. 77, 78. 26 Interview with Doug Anthony, 20 November 2007. 27 Hancock, Gorton, pp. 42, 52–59; National Archives. See –

28 Interview with Bruce Lloyd, Shepparton, 10 November 2008. Lloyd was president

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of the Victorian Country Party from 1969–71. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, 25th edition, p. 149. Doug Anthony, Murray by-election campaign launch, Shepparton, 1 March 1971. Gorton announced on 3 March 1975 that he would not re-contest his seat of Higgins at the next election. He resigned from the Liberal Party on 23 May 1975 and sat as an Independent until retiring on 11 November 1975. A strong opponent of blocking Supply, he was appalled at the sacking of the Whitlam government and unsuccessfully contested an ACT Senate seat as an Independent at the 13 December 1975 election. Hancock, Gorton, pp. 376, 377, 380, 381; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 636. Doug Anthony speech to the Victorian section of the Australian Institute of Management, Melbourne, 25 March 1971. The Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, 29 April 1971.

Chapter 10 1 Anthony speech to the Australia-British Trade Association, London, 22 June 1971, The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 June 1971. 2 Interview with Doug Anthony, Murwillumbah, 2 May 2006. 3 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 2000, Canberra – see . 4 Doug Anthony press release, Canberra, 21 August 1972. By 2009, the Trade Commissioner Service, known as Austrade, was represented in more than 110 locations in over 60 countries, with key locations being China, the United States of America, Japan and India – see

5 Stoneham, G, and Johnston, J, Occasional Paper 97, The Australian Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Campaign, Australian Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Canberra, 1987. 6 The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 December 1971, described it as the ‘worst crisis in 22 years of government’. 7 The Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, 22 December 1971; 23 December 1971.

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8 Interview with Doug Anthony, Sydney, 13 March 2006. 9 There were two HS748s attached to the RAAF’s VIP fleet from 1967 to 1990. RAAF Museum, Point Cook – see

10 Doug Anthony election policy speech, Lismore, 20 November 1972. 11 Davey, Politics in the Blood, pp. 137–44. 12 Hughes, Government and Politics 1965– 1974, pp. 87, 94. 13 Transcript, Doug Anthony press conference, Canberra, 13 December 1972. 14 Interview with Doug Anthony, Sydney, 13 March 2006. 15 Doug Anthony press release, Canberra, 8 January 1973. 16 Lloyd, CJ, and Reid, GS, Out of the Wilderness, Cassell Australia, 1974, pp. 351–54 (hereafter Lloyd and Reid, Out of the Wilderness). 17 Resolutions of NSW Country Party annual general conference, Ballina, 27 June 1973. 18 Doug Anthony address to federal council, Canberra, 30 November 1973. 19 The Western Australians formed a brief and electorally disastrous National Alliance with the DLP in 1974. The party then split in 1978 over state coalition, with a breakaway minority forming a cross-bench National Party. The split, often acrimonious, continued until the parties reunified as the National Party of Australia – Western Australia in October 1984. Costar and Woodward, Country to National, pp. 109–110; Committee of Review into the Future Direction of the National Party of Australia, The Future, federal secretariat, Canberra, May 1988, p. 10 (hereafter Nixon Report). The Victorian name change, adopted by the April 1975 state annual conference, was formally launched on 24 July 1975. Minutes, Victorian Country Party central council, 26 February 1975; National Party of Australia (Victoria) constitution and rules, as amended by conferences to 1975 (inclusive); Interview with Shirley McKerrow, 16 June 2009; Davey, The Nationals, pp. 452, 453. 20 NSW Countryman, April 1975. Delegates paid a $5 registration fee, with Young Country Party delegates paying $1.00. 21 NSW Countryman, June 1975. Commonwealth Parliamentary

Handbook, p. 678. 22 Reserve Bank of Australia statistics – See . Financial Review, 4 January 2005. 23 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Official Year Book of Australia No. 61, 1975 and 1976, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1977, pp. 277, 305, 559, 723. 24 NSW Country Party membership records; Norton & Faviell, Chartered Accountants, audit reports for the years ended 31 March 1974–76; central council minutes, 29 August 1975, The Nationals – NSW, head office, Sydney.

Chapter 11 1 AEC, Electoral Pocketbook 2005, p. 24. 2 Lloyd and Reid, Out of the Wilderness, p. 384. 3 AEC, Electoral Pocketbook 2005, p. 60. 4 Lloyd and Reid, Out of the Wilderness, p. 385. 5 The Australian, 3 April 1974, p. 1. McManus was a devout Roman Catholic. 6 Costar BJ, Gair, Vincent Clare (Vince) 1901–1980, Dictionary of Biography vol 14, 1996, pp. 239–41 (hereafter Costar, Gair, ADB). 7 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 2 April 1974, pp. 803–809. 8 Interview with Doug Anthony, 1 July 2008. 9 The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 April 1974, p. 1. 10 Unless otherwise specified, this and other quotes in this chapter by Ron Maunsell are from an interview in Cairns, 28 July 2008. 11 Souter, Acts of Parliament, p. 521. The parliamentary DLP formally expelled Gair on 3 April 1974, The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 April 1974, p. 1. 12 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 2 April 1974, pp. 520, 556, 557. 13 ‘The night of the long prawns’ story ran on the front page and the colourful description stuck. The Australian, 4 April 1974. 14 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 2 April 1974, p. 572. 15 The Australian, 4 April 1974, p. 13. 16 The Australian, 4 April 1974, p. 2. 17 Transcript, ABC TV This Day Tonight, 3 April 1974; The Australian, 4 April 1974, p. 2. Gair said he did not know who had

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written the original draft, but The Australian asserted it was written with the advice of Murphy and officials of his department. 18 The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 April 1974, p. 1. Section 45 of the Constitution provided that if a member or senator directly or indirectly received payment for services rendered to the Commonwealth ‘his place shall thereupon become vacant’. 19 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 4 April 1974, p. 999; Gough Whitlam press conference, Canberra, 2 April 1974; Lloyd and Reid, Out of the Wilderness, p. 392. 20 Lloyd and Reid, Out of the Wilderness, pp. 394, 395. For further detail, see Out of the Wilderness, chapter 15, The Gair Affair, pp. 384–400. 21 The National Times, 8–13 April 1974. 22 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 4 April 1974, p. 664. 23 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 4 April 1974, p. 670. 24 Appropriation Bill No 4 and No 5 1974. 25 The Australian, 5 April 1974, p. 1. 26 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 4 April 1974, p. 1054. 27 ——, 10 April 1974, pp. 884, 885. 28 ——, p. 1359. Hasluck’s term as Governor-General was completed soon after and he was succeeded by John Kerr from 11 July 1974. C,ommonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 584. 29 Lloyd and Reid, Out of the Wilderness, p. 400. 30 The Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, 5 April 1974, p. 6. 31 Hughes, C, Government and Politics 1965–1974, pp. 98–104. 32 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 570. 33 Doug Anthony election policy speech, Lismore, 2 May 1974. NSW Countryman, May 1974, p. 6. 34 The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 June 1974; The Australian, 15 June 1974. 35 Costar, Gair, ADB. 36 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 601, 608.

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1931, the Labor Party secured the appointment of one of its own, Henry Kneebone, at a joint sitting of the state parliament, until his defeat at the elections in December that year. Senate Biography, vol 2, p. 253; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 597, 605. Interview with Ron Maunsell, Cairns, 28 July 2008. The authority was reduced to $2 billion on 27 January 1975 and revoked altogether on 20 May 1975. Schneider, R, War without blood – Malcolm Fraser in power, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1980, pp. 32–34 (hereafter Schneider, War without blood).. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 16 October 1975, pp. 1240–42. The vote on each division was 29 in favour of the Opposition deferral amendment to 28 against. Senators Tom Drake-Brockman (NCP, Western Australia) and William Brown (ALP, Victoria) were paired. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 6 November 1975, pp. 1830, 1836, 1837. Again the vote was 29 in favour of the deferral amendment to 28 against, with two senators paired, Ian Wood (Liberal, Queensland) and James McClelland (ALP, New South Wales). Interview with Doug Anthony, Murwillumbah, 7 September 2006. Daly, F, From Curtin to Kerr, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1977, p. 229 (hereafter Daly, Curtin to Kerr). Interview with Doug Anthony, Murwillumbah, 2 May 2006. Interview with Malcolm Fraser, Melbourne, 9 October 2006. The Age, 11 November 1985. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 726, 727. Doug Anthony election policy speech, Brisbane, 26 November 1975. The Senate had been enlarged from 60 to 64 senators with the addition of two senators each from the Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory; Hughes, CA, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1975–1984, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1987, pp. 129–40 (hereafter Hughes, Government and Politics 1975– 1984); Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 603. Interview with Doug Anthony, Murwillumbah, 2 May 2006.

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16 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 726, 727. During the term of the Whitlam government, the Senate rejected 93 bills, more than the total number of 68 rejected since federation. Prime Facts 21, The Australian Prime Ministers Centre, Old Parliament House, Canberra, 2007. See – . 17 Doug Anthony, reflecting 10 years after the dismissal, The Age, 11 November 1985. 18 Harry Gibbs speech, Old Parliament House, Canberra, 10 November 1995.

Chapter 13 1 Interview with Peter Nixon, 30 July 2006. 2 The Australian, 13 November 1975, page 8. 3 Oration by Doug Anthony to the Australian Academy of Technical Sciences and Engineering, Australian National University, Canberra, 20 November 2005 (hereafter, Anthony, ATSE Oration). 4 A mini-budget on 20 May and the budget on 17 August cut the estimated 1976–77 budget deficit to $2608 million. National Archives of Australia, Cabinet records, Stokes J, Events and issues in 1976. See – (hereafter NAA, Events and issues). 5 Australian tobacco growing reached its peak in the 1970s when nearly 16 000 tonnes of leaf were sold annually. By 2006 the annual crop yielded less than 4000 tonnes. There is now no commercial tobacco growing in Australia. See – 6 NAA, Events and issues, 1976; Biggs, A, Medicare – Background Brief, Social Policy Section, Commonwealth Parliamentary Library. See – (hereafter Biggs, Medicare). 7 Interview with Ralph Hunt, Sydney, 9 March 2003. By 1976–77, health expenditure reached $6.2 billion, representing 7.7 per cent of GDP. The government progressively made further changes to reduce costs. The election of

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the Hawke government in March 1983 saw Medibank restructured along its original lines and becoming known as Medicare from 1 February 1984. NAA, Events and issues 1978; Biggs, Medicare. Joh Bjelke-Petersen called on the Commonwealth to ‘get right out of the mining field and leave it to the States’ at the Queensland National Party annual conference in Cairns on 30 July 1976. The Sydney Morning Herald, 31 July 1976. Wage increases were running at just over 14 per cent for the 12 months to February 1977 and unemployment, at 314 000, or 5.1 per cent of the workforce in May 1977, rose to 393 000, 6.2 per cent, by May 1978. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 571, 572. Cabinet submission 1327, 16 June 1977 See – Interview with Jim Webster, Canberra, 24 October 2008; NAA, Events and issues, 1978. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 20 August and 9 September 1981, pp. 678, 679, 1110, 1111. The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources was adopted in 1980 in response to concern that fishing for krill might threaten the marine ecosystem of Antarctica. It came into force from 7 April 1982 See – The Antarctic Treaty 1961, article IVa. Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Australian Antarctic Division. The Geelong laboratory became the Australian Animal Health Laboratory in 1985. See – . The Metric Conversion Act 1970 set in train Australia’s transfer to metric measurement, which was ultimately completed in 1982. Interview with Peter Nixon, 4 September 2009. Costar and Woodward, Country to National, pp. 101, 102; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 609, 615. Interview with Doug Anthony, Murwillumbah, 2 May 2006. The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 July 1976. The Australian, 8 October 1976. Fraser introduced the requirement that all ministers, including himself, take

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22 23 24 25

26

27

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36 37

two weeks holiday a year. Up to that point there was no formal provision for ministers to have holiday leave. Peter Nixon press release, 31 December 1976. Interview with Peter Nixon, Melbourne, 19 September 2007. The Australian, 2 February 1977. Parliament of Australia, Senate, The Fox Report. See – ; Uranium in Australia: A Detailed Timeline 1970 to 1996. See – The July 1977 national conference of the ALP adopted a policy of total opposition to the mining, milling and export of uranium, a position that remained until the 1982 conference, which restricted mining and export to existing mines. The existing mines policy was dumped in 2007 and the Rudd Labor government gave the go ahead for the Four Mile mine, in South Australia, in July 2009. Peter Garrett media release, 14 July 2009; Uranium in Australia: A Detailed Timeline 1970 to 1996. See . Davey, Politics in the Blood, pp. 344, 345. See also Uranium – the 800 reasons why, article by Doug Anthony, Sydney Sun, 31 August 1977. Schneider, War without blood, pp. 85–97 History of Tax Law. See – . Doug Anthony election policy speech, NSW Countryman, December 1977, pp. 1, 2. Hughes, Government and Politics 1975–84, pp. 141–45. The Australian, editorial, 19 December 1977, p. 3; 20 December 1977, p. 1. ——, 21 December 1977, pp. 1, 6, 7. Interview with Doug Anthony, 3 March 2009. Malcolm Fraser media release, 21 December 1977. Sheil’s appointment to the Executive Council was gazetted on 20 December and his termination notified two days later. Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S 290, 20 December 1977, and S 295, 22 December 1977. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 731. Minutes, Australian Country Party

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federal executive, 19 April 1971. 38 Minutes, CLP special conference, Darwin, 3 February 1979. 39 Heatley, Territory Party, p. 62. 40 Forrest, P and S, They started something – A biography of Bern and Aileen Kilgariff, Everbest Printing, 2005, p. 225. The balance of parliamentary representation was maintained when Calder retired in September 1980 to be replaced by Grant Tambling, who sat with the NCP until defeated at the elections in March 1983, but went out of kilter when former NT Chief Minister, Paul Everingham was elected to the seat of Northern Territory and sat in Canberra with the Liberals from December 1984 until retiring in June 1987, while Kilgariff was also sitting as a Liberal. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 604, 624, 632, 663. 41 In more recent times, the CLP, marketing itself as Country Liberals, instructed its federal parliamentarians where to sit in Canberra: ‘CLP members of the Federal Parliament are directed by the CLP where they are to sit. This could be with the National Party, the Liberal Party, or on the cross benches’. History of the Country Liberals. See –

Chapter 14 1 As ministers for primary industry, Sinclair and Nixon were extensively involved in international trade negotiations affecting Australia’s rural industries. 2 Formal trade relations between Australia and New Zealand date back to 1922 with the signing of what was, for both countries, the first trade agreement they had initiated with another. Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, The Negotiation of the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 1983, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Andre, P, Payton, S, and Mills, J, (eds) Brown Prior Anderson printers, 2003, Introduction p. xxi (hereafter CER Negotiation). 3 CER Negotiation, pp. 685–89. 4 ——, Introduction, p. xxiii. 5 Doug Anthony, CER Speech, Wellington,

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New Zealand, 27 March 2003. 6 Interview with Ian Cameron, Brisbane, 26 July 2008. 7 Doug Anthony election policy speech, October 1980, pp. 2, 3. 8 Transcript, ABC Television Countrywide, 1 October 1980. 9 Hughes, Government and Politics 1975 to 1984, pp. 129, 141, 152; AEC, Electoral Pocketbook 2005, pp. 97, 98, 108. 10 Sheil returned as a Queensland senator from December 1984 until his retirement in June 1990. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 479, 595, 611, 613, 666. 11 Australia’s Prime Ministers, Malcolm Fraser. See – < www.primeministers. naa.gov.au> 12 Anthony referred to the worsening drought situation in each of his election policy speeches for 1977, 1980 and 1983. 13 Peter Nixon, speech opening the National Agricultural Outlook Conference, Canberra, 25 January 1983. Nixon said 60 per cent of Australia’s agricultural land was drought declared, wheat production was down by half, and 65 per cent of the national sheep flock, or more than 87 million sheep, and 62 per cent of the national cattle herd, or 14 million head, were in drought areas. 14 Doug Anthony 1980 election policy speech, p. 7. 15 Doug Anthony letter to Malcolm Fraser, 30 November 1980. 16 Malcolm Fraser press release, 25 January 1983. 17 Doug Anthony election policy speech, 21 February 1983, p. 4. The post-March 1983 Hawke Labor government cancelled the studies and the proposed five year supplementary water resources program. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 19 May 1983, p. 803. 18 Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, A History of Australian Road and Rail. See – 19 Interview with Peter Nixon, 3 April 2007. Nixon said the previously lowest available return fare to London was $730.70 in 1971, which, when expressed in 1979 dollar terms, equated to $1644, Ministerial Statement on International Air Fares, 6 March 1979.

20 Interview with Peter Nixon, Melbourne, 19 September 2007. See also Australian Design Rules, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government – . 21 The new line to Alice Springs, replacing the old narrow gauge line, opened in October 1980. Northern Territory Chronicle 1975. See – 22 Whaling history. See – 23 NAA, Events and issues, 1977, 1978; The Australian, 1 January 2008 on the release of the 1978 Cabinet papers. 24 The office was restored to Prime Minister and Cabinet by Bob Hawke in 1983 and is now known as the Office for Women. See – ; ; Quentin Bryce biography. See – . Interview with Tom McVeigh, Brisbane, 25 July 2008. 25 Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, Research paper No 20 2008–09, McKeown, D, and Lundie, R, Conscience votes during the Howard Government 1996–2007, appendix 3, Conscience votes in the federal parliament 1950– 2007. The vote on the Lusher bill took place in the House of Representatives on 22 March 1979. 26 Information from Stephen Lusher, 22 June 2009. 27 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 632, 648. 28 Interview with Doug Anthony, Murwillumbah, 19 June 2006. 29 ABC Television Nationwide, 26 September 1979. 30 Sinclair was leader of government business in the House from 1975–79 and 1980–82, and of Opposition business in the House from 1974–75 and 1983–87, Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, 25th edition, 1991, p. 202. SBS radio began operations in 1978 and expanded into a television service from October 1980. AUSSAT was created by the government in 1979 as one of the first national communications satellite systems in the world. Incorporated as AUSSAT Pty Ltd in November 1981, it was sold to Optus Communications in

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1991. Australian Science at Work: AUSSAT Pty Ltd 1979–1992. See –

31 Interview with Ian Sinclair, Sydney, 15 February 2005. 32 Davey, The Nationals, p. 270.

Chapter 15 1 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 11 November 1965, p. 3044. 2 Establishment of the IAC was a key reason for the formation of the National Farmers Federation in July 1979, so that fully researched submissions, taking into account national and international economic trends, could be put forward. See Botterill, L, From Black Jack to the Cairns Group – Reform in Australian agricultural policy, National Europe Centre Paper No. 86, Australian National University, 2003. 3 Agricultural policy – issues and options for the 1980s, Working Group Report to the Minister for Primary Industry, September 1982, p. 2. 4 Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government Operations, The Australian Dairy Corporation and its Asian Subsidiaries, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1981; Grabosky, PN, The Asia dairy case in Wayward governance: illegality and its control in the public sector, Australian Institute of Criminology, 1989, pp. 185 to 195; Senate Legislative and General Purpose Committees, The First 20 Years 1970–1990, Finance and Public Administration, Reports on statutory authorities, Parliament of Australia, The Senate – see 5 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 26 August 1981, p. 790; 8 September 1981, p. 996; 9 September 1991, p. 1113; Information Paper on Meat Substitution, Peter Nixon, 27 August 1981; Peter Nixon statement to the Royal Commission into the Australian Meat Industry, 12 July 1982 (hereafter Nixon evidence). 6 Report of the Royal Commission into the Australian Meat Industry, September 1982, The Hon Mr Justice AE Woodward, Commissioner, p. 14 (hereafter Woodward Report).

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7 Nixon evidence, pp. 10, 11. 8 Interview with Peter Nixon, Melbourne, 19 September 2007. 9 Peter Nixon letter to Malcolm Fraser, 19 September 1982. 10 Interview with Doug Anthony, Murwillumbah, 19 June 2006. 11 Interview with Malcolm Fraser, Melbourne, 9 October 2006. 12 Malcolm Fraser, ministerial statement, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 21 September 1982, p 1621. 13 The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 and 22 September 1982. Senator Withers, known as the ‘Toe cutter’ for the way he held potentially dissident Liberal senators to the 1975 tactic of deferring Supply, was sacked from the Ministry on 7 August 1978. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 729. 14 Fraser pointed out that Sinclair had stood aside while his case was being heard, that he acted promptly to dismiss Sheil for his pro-South Africa comments, and that he reached his own conclusion regarding Nixon. Interview with Malcolm Fraser, Melbourne, 9 October 2006. 15 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 587, 590. 16 Virtue, B, Nineteen years on Anthony’s staff, 1984, article by Doug Anthony’s press secretary and principal private secretary for a total of 20 years, Barry Virtue (hereafter Anthony, Virtue). As leader, Anthony worked with Liberal leaders John Gorton, Bill McMahon, Billy Snedden, Malcolm Fraser and Andrew Peacock. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 646, 647. 17 Interview with Peter Nixon, Melbourne, 19 September 2007. 18 Interviews with Doug Anthony, Murwillumbah, 3 May 2006; Malcolm Fraser, Melbourne, 9 October 2006. 19 The Queensland National Party used a different logo which emphasised the geographic boundary of the state.

Chapter 16 1 There is no Legislative Council in the Queensland parliament – it was abolished by Labor on 23 March 1922. See – 2 Interview with former Joh Bjelke-

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Petersen press secretary and Queensland National Party state director, Ken Crooke, Canberra, 12 October 2003. 3 The Australian, 3 November 1986. 4 Addressing the NSW party’s annual general conference at Coffs Harbour on 24 June 1977, Anthony called for a flat rate of tax of around 20 per cent; NSW National Party magazine, National Leader, September 1985, p. 6. 5 The Sydney Morning Herald, 16 February 1987. 6 Ian Sinclair media release, 17 February 1987. 7 Interview with Bruce Cowan, Sydney, 13 October 2008. 8 Interview with Ian Robinson, Grafton, 21 July 2009. 9 The federal management committee on 5 February and 27 March rejected the NT Nationals’ application for affiliation, despite support from the Queensland National Party. Bjelke-Petersen campaigned on behalf of NT Nationals’ candidates at the Northern Territory election on 7 March 1987. Although winning nearly 18 per cent of the primary vote, only one of its 25 candidates was elected, Ian Tuxworth, the former CLP Chief Minister. 10 John Howard-Ian Sinclair media release, 17 February 1987. 11 Who’s Who in Australia 2000, Information Australia Group, Melbourne, 1999, p. 1576. 12 Queensland central council resolutions, Hervey Bay, 27 February 1987, Queensland party National Outlook magazine, March 1987, p. 2. The resolutions overrode a decision of the Queensland party’s annual conference on the Gold Coast in July 1986, where a motion that ‘this Conference recommend to the Federal Parliamentary Party that it withdraw from the Coalition in Opposition’ was lost. Federal secretariat background note, 14 April 1987. 13 Interview with Ray Braithwaite, 10 December 2008. 14 Roll call of delegates, federal council minutes, 27 March 1987. 15 Ian Sinclair address to federal council, Canberra, 27 March 1987. 16 Sinclair did similar in the 1984 election campaign, releasing an 80-page National Party Federal Platform, Policy Objectives and Constitution.

17 The Australian Bill of Rights Bill 1985 passed the House of Representatives on 15 November 1985, but was rejected in the Senate and finally withdrawn by the government in November 1986. Subsequently put to a referendum on 3 September 1988, it was rejected by voters in all states and territories. Williams, G, The Federal Parliament and the Protection of Human Rights, Commonwealth Parliamentary Library research paper 20 1988–89, 11 May 1989. See ; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 574. The Australia Card Bill 1986 was defeated in the Senate at the end of 1986 and again in April 1987. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 2 April 1987, p. 1787. 18 Interview with Peter Nixon, Melbourne, 19 September 2007. 19 Transcripts, Ian Sinclair news conference, Canberra, 27 March 1987; Joh Bjelke-Petersen address to federal council, Canberra, 28 March 1987. 20 Resolutions of federal council, Canberra, 27–29 March 1987. 21 Bob Hawke media release, 1 April 1987. 22 Bob Sparkes, The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 April 1987. 23 Transcript, Ian Sinclair news conference, Wangaratta, 10 April 1987. 24 The Courier-Mail and The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 February 1987. 25 Letter to Ian Cameron from Queensland National Party administration director, Helen Maybury, 19 March 1987. 26 The Age, 22 April 1987. 27 ——, 22 April 1987. 28 Interview with Ian Cameron, Brisbane, 26 July 2008. 29 See Appendix 7, April 1987 Coalition Agreement. 30 The leaders’ dinners, to discuss strategy and tactics, were a monthly event when parliament was sitting. 31 Ian Sinclair media release, 28 April 1987. 32 Interview with John Sharp, Sydney, 29 October 2008. 33 Noel Hicks, Keeping the hounds in the pack, The Page Review, vol 4, no 1, June 2008, p. 18. 34 Interview with Flo Bjelke-Petersen, Brisbane, 25 July 2008. 35 Bob Katter senior held Kennedy from 1966 until retiring in 1990. His son, Bob Katter junior, won the seat in 1993.

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Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 644. 36 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook 1991, p. 401. 37 Transcript, Ian Sinclair news conference, Canberra, 30 April 1987. 38 Ian McLachlan finally told BjelkePetersen he would not join his campaign at a meeting at The Hotel Windsor, Melbourne, on 1 June. The Australian, 2 June 1987, p. 1. 39 Interview with Tom McVeigh, Brisbane, 25 July 2008. 40 Interview with Ken Crooke, 31 May 2005. 41 The Australian, 4 June 1987, p. 1. 42 Interview with Flo Bjelke-Petersen, Brisbane, 25 July 2008. 43 Ian Sinclair election policy launch, Cessnock, 21 June 1987. 44 Bob Sparkes media release, 21 June 1987. 45 The Courier-Mail, Brisbane, 22 June 1987. 46 They also ran against Treasurer Paul Keating in Blaxland and in the two ALPheld ACT seats, Canberra and Fraser. Federal secretariat briefing note, Joh for Canberra Candidates, 31 July 1987; Hughes, Government and Politics 1985–1999, pp. 220–34. 47 Hughes, C, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1985 to 1999, The Federation Press, Sydney, pp. 220, 221 (hereafter Hughes, Government and Politics 1985 to 1999). 48 AEC, Electoral Pocketbook, 1988, pp. 64, 79, 83, 112-122. 49 The Australian, 16 March 1987. 50 Morning Bulletin, Rockhampton, 30 April 1987. 51 Daily Telegraph, 15 June 1987, p. 2. 52 The Age, Melbourne, 13 July 1987. 53 The Courier-Mail, 13 July 1987. 54 Transcript, media conference by Ian Sinclair, 13 July 1987. 55 Interview with Tom McVeigh, Brisbane, 25 July 2008.

Chapter 17 1 Ray Braithwaite letter to Bob Sparkes, 17 July 1987. 2 Bob Katter letter to Bob Sparkes, 14 July 1987. 3 Transcript, ABC Radio, World Today, 17 June 1987. 4 Attendance of National Party Senators;

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5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Speeches and Questions, National Party Senators, 34th Parliament, Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, July 1987. Stan Collard, newsletter to the electorate, 21 July 1987. Ralph Hunt media release, 20 July 1987. Note for file, Liam Bathgate, principal private secretary to Ian Sinclair, 23 July 1987. Transcript, ABC Radio AM, 24 July 1987. National Party of Australia, federal constitution, 1987, rule 12. Minutes, federal management committee, Sydney, 28 July 1987. Bob Sparkes, ABC Radio News, 31 July 1987. Coalition agreement letter from John Howard to Ian Sinclair, 6 August 1987. John Howard, Shadow Ministry, 14 August 1987.

Chapter 18 1 Hunt was elected the party’s federal treasurer at this federal council meeting, succeeding Melbourne businessman, Hugh Rogers, who retired. federal council minutes, 16–17 October 1987. 2 The Future – A Report by The Committee of Review into the Future Direction of the National Party of Australia, Better Printing Service, Queanbeyan, NSW, May 1988, pp. 16–19 (hereafter Nixon Report). 3 Nixon Report, pp. 78–82. 4 ——, pp. 52–75. 5 Minutes, federal council, Canberra, 29–31 July 1988. 6 National Party of Australia federal constitution, July 1988, clauses 44–47, 53. 7 These flowed from Nixon Report recommendations 20 and 24 (Nixon Report, p. 79), but were not specifically provided for in the federal constitution until some years later. National Party of Australia, federal constitution, 1988; The Nationals federal constitution, 2006. 8 Davey, P, Positive progress to 2000 and beyond, Review into the National Party of Australia, 18 July 1996, federal secretariat, Canberra, pp. 4, 9, 10. 9 Communication, Communication, Communication, Report of the Committee of Review into the National Party of Australia – New South Wales, June 1999, pp. 32–39.

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10 The Anderson-Priebe report 2008 (hereafter Anderson report) is discussed in more detail in chapter 28.

Chapter 19 1 Sunday Telegraph, 17 April 1988, pp. 1, 4, 5. 2 Ian Sinclair media release, 17 April 1988; personal explanation, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 18 April 1988, pp. 1685–87. 3 Sunday Telegraph, 17 July 1988, pp. 8, 9. 4 Interview with Ian Robinson, 15 January 2009. 5 Notes for verbal report to the party room on Sunday Telegraph allegations, Ian Robinson, personal files. 6 Melbourne Herald, 11 July 1988. 7 Charles Blunt, Melbourne Sun Pictorial, 12 July 1988. 8 Charles Blunt, ABC Canberra radio, 19 July 1988. 9 Clarrie Millar, ABC Radio AM, 20 July 1988. 10 Ian Sinclair media release, 20 July 1988. 11 Interview with Charles Blunt, 11 December 2008. 12 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 23 November 1987, p. 2198; The Australian, 24 November 1987. Stone also rocked the Coalition boat by saying that any tax policy that included a consumption tax would be ‘a crazy idea’ and that if the Coalition’s policy, at the time under review, ultimately included a broad based consumption tax he ‘wouldn’t, of course, in that case be in the Coalition’. ABC Radio AM, 3 December 1987. 13 The party’s 1987 election policy summary supported ‘Constitutional recognition of Local Government’, p. 34. 14 The referendum was held on 3 September 1988. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 574, 575. 15 Brownhill, D, The Wheat Industry Wrangle – A layman’s guide to the whys and wherefores, 10 October 1988. 16 Interview with Bruce Lloyd, Shepparton, 10 November 2008. 17 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 13 April 1989, p. 1613. 18 Information from Bruce Lloyd, 23 November 2008. 19 Ian Sinclair letter to National Party branches, 20 April 1989.

20 Interview with David Brownhill, Sydney, 5 December 2008. 21 Interview with Bruce Lloyd, Shepparton, 10 November 2008. 22 Interview with Charles Blunt, 8 January 2009. 23 Interview with John Sharp, Sydney, 29 October 2008. 24 Davey, The Nationals, p. 323. 25 Interview with Noel Hicks, Griffith, 7 November 2008. 26 Rees, P, The Boy from Boree Creek – The Tim Fischer Story, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001, p. 132 (hereafter Rees, Boy from Boree Creek). 27 Interview with John Stone, 15 December 2008. 28 Interview with John Anderson, 10 December 2008. 29 Interviews with Ian Robinson, 15 December 2008, 15 January 2009. 30 Interview with Peter McGauran, Sydney, 28 October, 16 December 2008. 31 Gallagher, P, Faith & Duty – The John Anderson Story, Random House Australia, 2006, p. 75 (hereafter Gallagher, Faith & Duty). 32 Interview with Peter Fisher, 11 December 2008. 33 Interview with Ian Cameron, Brisbane, 26 July 2008. 34 Interview with David Brownhill, Sydney, 5 December 2008. 35 Interview with Ian Sinclair, Sydney, 6 May 2009. 36 Interview with Ray Braithwaite, 10 December 2008. 37 Ian Sinclair news conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 9 May 1989. 38 Interview with Ian Sinclair, Sydney, 6 May 2009. 39 Interview with Ian Robinson, Grafton, 21 July 2009. 40 John Hewson replaced Andrew Peacock as Opposition Leader from April 1990 until May 1994, when he was replaced by Alexander Downer until January 1995, when John Howard was again elected to the position. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 678. 41 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 669. 42 Sinclair served in the Legislative Council from March 1961 until resigning in October 1963 to become the Member for New England. 43 Interview with John Anderson, 2 May 2009.

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44 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 5 May 1989, pp. 1180–81. 45 Steele Hall, who resigned from the Senate in 1977 and entered the House of Representatives as the Liberal Member for Boothby, South Australia, in 1981, supported one of Fisher’s amendments along with Adermann, Cameron and Millar, although did not cross the floor on the final vote. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 3, 4, 5, May 1989, pp. 1869–2067, 2070, 2084. Information from Peter Fisher, 20 November 2008. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp.603, 638. 46 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 10 May 1989, p. 3163. 47 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 1 June 1989, p. 3254. 48 Information from John Stone, 18 January 2009.

Chapter 20 1 Charles Blunt speech to Nationals in the North seminar, Longreach, 13 May 1989. 2 Letter from Bob Sparkes to National Party federal treasurer, Ralph Hunt, 16 May 1989. 3 Charles Blunt letter to Andrew Peacock, 23 May 1989. 4 Charles Blunt news conference, Parliament House, Canberra, 27 June 1989. 5 Davey, The Nationals, p. 327; Interview with Charles Blunt, 11 December 2008 6 Nationals, Federal Policies, 1989, pp. 30, 31. 7 Brownhill, D, Green Politics: History and Political Implications, p. 1, 1987. 8 The ICAC North Coast Land Development report was released on 11 July 1990. It cleared Wal Murray and state Natural Resources minister, Ian Causley, of dishonesty or corruption, but found they had acted in a manner which had ‘created a climate conducive to corrupt conduct’. No further action was taken against them. The ICAC report found there was evidence warranting consideration of the prosecution of Don Page (Ballina) – Earle Page’s grandson – for an offence of common law bribery and Don Beck (Murwillumbah) for two such offences. No charges were forthcoming. ICAC North Coast

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Development Report, pp. 468, 525, 526, 574, 642, 643. The Local Court found that general secretary, Jenny Gardiner, had breached the disclosure provisions of the New South Wales Election Funding Act, but recorded no conviction. 9 Charles Blunt, Election ’90 Policy Statement, 28 February 1990, p. 23. 10 Hughes, Government and Politics 1985 to 1999, p. 235; Hughes, Government and Politics 1975 to 1984, p. 129. 11 See Appendix 2, Electoral Performance, House of Representatives. 12 Archie Cameron’s leadership was slightly longer – 13 months from 13 September 1939 to 16 October 1940, while William McWilliams was leader for 14 months from 24 February 1920 to 5 April 1921. See Appendix 4 – Party and Organisational Leaders. 13 Coalition agreement, 10 April 1990. 14 The Weekend Australian magazine, 21 July 1991. 15 Michael Cobb produced an 18-page discussion paper for the party room on the pros and cons of amalgamation in May 1990. 16 The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 March and 2 April 1990. Sinclair would no doubt have been hoping his article would help boost numbers for his renewed leadership bid at the 10 April party meeting. 17 John Elliott, Channel 9 Sunday program, 8 April 1990. 18 Tony Eggleton, ABC Radio AM, 9 April 1990. 19 McDonald, S, An Assessment of Amalgamation, Better Printing Service, Queanbeyan, 28 July 1990, pp. 2, 32, 34.

Chapter 21 1 Tim Fischer media release, 28 May 1990. Easter in 1990 fell between 13 and 16 April. 2 Tim Fischer media release, 29 May 1990. 3 John Kerin, ABC Radio, PM, 31 May 1990. 4 Ron Boswell, ABC Radio, PM, 12 February 1991. 5 Tim Fischer media release, 15 August 1990. 6 Minutes, federal council, 26 to 28 October 1990. 7 John Hewson Fightback! policy,

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21 November 1991; Transcript, Paul Keating and John Hewson, The Great Debate, moderated by Kerry O’Brien, Channel 9, 60 Minutes, 14 February 1993. Rising community concern about the impact of the GST on household disposable income saw Hewson launch Fightback! Mark 2 a year later, in December 1992. Key concessions were the removal of GST from food and child care. Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, Harrison, J, The GST Debate – A Chronology, background paper No 1, 1997/98, 22 September 1997 (hereafter Harrison, GST). 8 Charles Blunt letter to Department of Administrative Services, 31 July 1990. 9 Interview with Tim Fischer, Sydney, 20 April 2005. 10 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 7 November 1990, p. 3400; 8 November 1990, p. 3579. 11 Tim Fischer media release, 11 November 1990. 12 The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 1991, p. 3. 13 National Party of Australia archives, federal secretariat, Canberra. 14 John Paterson media release, 23 October 1991. 15 Davey, The Nationals, p. 336. 16 Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Labour Force, catalogue 6202.0; Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, Bankruptcies – Australia 1982–83 to 1994–95; Foreign Debt 1986–87 to 1994–95. 17 Hawke resigned from parliament on 20 February 1992. Independent Phil Cleary won the by-election on 11 April and was re-elected in March 1993. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 626, 639. 18 Hughes, Government and Politics 1985–1999, pp. 235, 249–255. 19 Coalition shadow ministries 1983 to 1996, Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook online. See – . 20 The head-on collision, at an intersection near Lockhart, happened at 6.30pm on 10 January 1994 while Fischer was driving to his Boree Creek property, Peppers, from his Albury electorate office. Rees, Boy from Boree Creek, pp. 178, 179.

Chapter 22 1 Tim Fischer, speech to NSW National Party annual general conference, Mudgee, 18 June 1995. 2 The Anthonys are the only family in the history of the Commonwealth parliament to have had three successive generations elected to the House of Representatives, all for the same electorate and all attaining ministerial status. Davey, Politics in the Blood, p. vii. 3 Hughes, Government and Politics 1985–1999, pp. 265, 268. 4 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 751–54. See also Appendix 5, Party Ministers in the Commonwealth Parliament. 5 International Action Network on Small Arms. See – 6 John Howard, ABC Television, The Howard Years, episode 1, Change the Government, Change the Country, 17 November 2008 (hereafter The Howard Years). 7 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 30 April 1996, p. 26. 8 Australasian Police Ministers’ Council resolutions, Canberra, 10 May 1996. The gun buy-back, funded by a one-off increase of 0.2 per cent in the Medicare levy and implemented in most states from 1 October 1996, secured the surrender of more than 643 000 firearms with $320 million being paid in compensation to owners. Audit Report No. 25, The Gun Buy-Back Scheme, Summary, Australian National Audit Office, 1997. 9 Katter succeeded his father by winning Kennedy back from Labor in 1993. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 644. 10 Interview with Tim Fischer, Sydney, 20 April 2005. 11 Interview with Peter McGauran, Sydney, 18 November 2008. Howard later said he wished he had not worn the vest, but did so on police and security advice. The Howard Years, episode 1, 17 November 2008. 12 One Nation was launched in Hanson’s Oxley electorate on 10 April 1997. Hughes, Government and Politics 1985–1999, p. 281. 13 Pauline Hanson’s One Nation newspaper, vol 1, issue 1, May 1998, p. 11. 14 The Mabo judgment of 3 June 1992

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overturned the doctrine of terra nullius, which held that Australia was unoccupied until the arrival of white settlers, and ruled that there had been native title on land since the arrival of the First Fleet in 1788. 15 Interview with Don McDonald, Brisbane, 25 July 2008. 16 Interview with John Sharp, Sydney, 29 October 2008. 17 By the end of 2006, 22 Victoria Cross memorial rest areas had been completed. See – 18 Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation. See – 19 Interview with Warren Truss, Wagga Wagga, 13 June 2009. 20 Interview with John Anderson, Mullaley, 8 May 2005. 21 Gallagher, Faith & Duty, pp. 95, 96. 22 Department of Transport and Regional Services, Canberra, Regional Information Directory, 2007, pp. 36, 38. 23 The number of farm enterprises fell from a peak of more than 205 000 in the mid-1950s to 150 000 by 2007. Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), Canberra, Commodity Statistical Bulletin, 1992; Australian Commodity Statistics, 2007. 24 By 2008, 55 per cent of the National Party’s membership in New South Wales was aged 65 or more and 86 per cent was 51 or older (Anderson report). 25 Interview with John Anderson, 16 May 2009. The Queensland United Graziers’ Association, Cattlemen’s Union of Australia and Queensland Graingrowers Association merged into AgForce Queensland in 1998.See – 26 Assistant Treasurer, Jim Short, Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, Brian Gibson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Health and Family Services, Bob Woods, and Minister for Small Business and Consumer Affairs, Geoff Prosser. See Ministerial Resignations and Dismissals since 1901

27 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 24 September 1997, p. 8320. Sharp notified irregularities in travel allowance claims on 27 May 1997, saying claims for 144 nights should have been for 97,

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and repaid $8740. 28 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 29 September 1997, p. 8629. McGauran repaid over payments totaling $9200. He returned to the ministry as Minister for the Arts and the Centenary of Federation after the 1998 election, at which Sharp retired from parliament to become a consultant in private enterprise. Sharp also became secretary and, in 2003, treasurer of the National Party of Australia federal council, a position he continued to hold in 2010. 29 Howard Ministry 9 October 1997–21 October 1998, Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, Chronology of the 38th Parliament. See – 30 Rees, Boy from Boree Creek, pp. 259–61. New South Wales National Party back bencher, Michael Cobb, was charged with misusing travel allowances and did not contest the 1998 election. He was later convicted, fined and given a suspended jail sentence. Parkes electorate profile, 31 Interview with John Sharp, Sydney, 29 October 2008. 32 National Leader, Spring 1998, pp. 3–5. 33 Rees, Boy from Boree Creek, pp. 322, 323. 34 Interview with John Anderson, 2 June 2009. 35 Interview with Larry Anthony, Murwillumbah, 14 April 2007; Gallagher, Faith & Duty, pp. 124, 125; Rees, Boy from Boree Creek, pp. 282, 283. 36 Rees, Boy from Boree Creek, p. 287; Davey, The Nationals, p. 391; Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 609. 37 Hughes, Government and politics 1985–1999, pp. 281–89. 38 Interview with David Brownhill, Sydney, 5 December 2008. 39 Interview with David Brownhill, Sydney, 5 December 2008. 40 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 30 June 1999, pp. 7936–38.

Chapter 23 1 Interview with David Brownhill, Sydney, 5 December 2008. 2 Peter Austin, The Land, 2 March 2000, p. 3.

Notes to pages 303 –18

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3 Interview with John Anderson, Mullaley, 8 May 2005. 4 John Anderson speech, National Press Club, Canberra, 17 February 1999. 5 See – ; John Anderson media release, 18 June 2000. The Alice Springs to Darwin extension of The Ghan was opened 1 February 2004. 6 John Anderson speech, National Party federal convention, Tweed Heads, 18 June 2000. 7 Helen Dickie, address to NSW party annual general conference, Tweed Heads, 15 June 2000. 8 John Anderson, address to federal conference, Canberra, 10–12 October 2003. For instance, completion of the Alice Springs to Darwin railway and establishment of the Foundation for Rural and Regional Renewal were announced by John Howard in his speech to the Regional Australia Summit. 9 Interview with Ian Sinclair, Sydney, 6 May 2009. 10 John McEwen, NSW Countryman, May 1968, pp. 2, 7. 11 Interview with John Anderson, Sydney, 16 May 2009. 12 Interview with Ian Robinson, Grafton, 21 July 2009. 13 Opinion polling of issues of importance in Richmond, May 2000, The Nationals – NSW archives, head office, Sydney. 14 ABC Radio AM, 15 July 2000. 15 The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June 2000. 16 Compensation Measures Legislation Amendment (Rent Assistance Increase) Bill 2000, introduced into parliament on 27 June 2000. 17 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 21 August 2003, pp. 18794, 18795. 18 Interview with Kay Hull, Canberra, 24 October 2008. 19 NSW Farmers’ Association media release, 13 July 2005. 20 Mark Vaile media release, 17 August 2005; NSW party chairman, Patrick Maher, media release, 22 August 2005. 21 This discussion on the privatisation of Telstra is drawn from O’Leary, G, Telstra Sale: Background and Chronology, Chronology no. 3 2003–04, Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, 15 September 2003; Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth of Australia Law. See – . 22 Interview with John Anderson, Sydney, 16 May 2008.

Chapter 24 1 Interview with Don McDonald, Brisbane, 25 July 2008. A section of the Department of Foreign Affairs had leased part of the old John McEwen House for many years up to the time of the redevelopment. The visa section of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade rented space in the new building from March 1999 to October 2001. Beyond that, no government agency had leased space in the building up to 2010. Information from federal secretariat financial manager, Sue Mitchell, 22 January 2010. 2 Interview with Ray Braithwaite, 29 April 2009. 3 Helen Dickie, federal president, media release, 29 November 2000. 4 Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, Bills Digest No. 141 2001–02, Commonwealth Electoral Amendment Bill (No.1) 2002. 5 Interview with John Anderson, Mullaley, 8 May 2005. 6 Interview with The Page Research Centre Ltd director, Troy Whitford, Canberra, 30 June 2009. See also 7 The Nationals federal constitution, 2006, clauses 50A, 50B, 50C. 8 ——, clause 1. 9 National Party of Australia – Queensland constitution, 2005, clause 1; National Party of Australia – NSW, constitution, 2009, rule 1.1.1. 10 Not all previous party campaign launches attracted large crowds. For instance, ‘about 150 people quarter-filled the theatre’ for John McEwen’s launch at the Star Theatre, Shepparton, on 20 November 1961. The Sydney Morning Herald, 21 November 1961, p. 6. 11 Interview with John Anderson, Sydney, 16 May 2009. 12 Interview with Mark Vaile, 13 May 2009. 13 Report of the Senate Committee of Privileges hearing into Possible Improper Influence and Penalty on a Senator, 103rd Report, June 2002, p. 19. 14 Interview with John Anderson, Sydney, 16 May 2009. 15 Howard announced the deployment of 1550 Australian Defence Force personnel on 17 October 2001. John Howard media release.

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16 The ticket levy ended on 30 June 2003, by which time $335 million had been paid to 12 900 former Ansett workers. Gallagher, Faith & Duty, pp. 150–52, 160–61. 17 Shades of the children overboard saga returned on 16 April 2009 when a small vessel with 49 asylum-seekers on board blew up while under the escort of two naval patrol boats, HMAS Albany and HMAS Childers, off Ashmore Reef in the Timor Sea, killing five people and injuring 31. It was apparent the explosion had been caused by the boat’s fuel, but whether it had been deliberately spilled and set alight became the subject of lengthy investigation by the NT Police. The Weekend Australian, 18–19 April 2009. 18 AEC, Electoral Pocketbook, 1999, p. 104; 2002, p. 107. 19 Interview with John Anderson, Mullaley, 8 May 2005. 20 In the lead up to the November 2007 election, Opposition leader, Kevin Rudd, committed to withdrawing Australian ground forces from Iraq by mid-2008. The Australian, 1 September 2007. 21 These were portfolios held by the National Party/The Nationals between 1996 and 2004. Larry Anthony’s appointment as Minister for Children and Youth Affairs from 20 November 2001 to 26 October 2004 marked the first time Australia had a specific Minister for Children. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 751–59. 22 An Australian National Audit Office report on the Regional Partnerships Program released on 15 November 2007 – in the midst of the election campaign – found the 10 electorates that received the highest levels of funding were all Coalition seats and the program did not meet the standards required of public administration. The Sydney Morning Herald online, 15 November 2009; Hartcher, P, To The Bitter End – The dramatic story behind the fall of John Howard and the rise of Kevin Rudd, Allen&Unwin, Sydney, 2009, p. 257. 23 Financial Review, 8 September 2009, p. 1. 24 Australian Local Government Association, Transport. See – . The Labor government extended the program to 2014 with $1.75 billion

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allocated in the May 2009 budget. 25 Interview with Bruce Scott, 2 May 2009. 26 National Party of Australia, Federal Platform, Policy Objectives and Constitution, November 1984, pp. 54–56. 27 Brownhill, D, Water – The Big Issue, June 1995. 28 Interview with Mark Vaile, Gunnedah, 18 June 2005. 29 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s Trade Policy, June 2007. See – 30 Mark Vaile speech, The Nationals - NSW annual general conference, Gunnedah, 17 June 2005. 31 AEC, Electoral Pocketbook, 2005, pp. 99, 108.

Chapter 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8 9. 10 11

12 13

Gallagher, Faith & Duty, p. 185. The Age, 14 September 2003. Gallagher, Faith & Duty, pp. 169–89 Interview with Mark Vaile, Sydney, 6 March 2009. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 23 June 2005, pp. 47, 48. ——, p. 52. Interview with Mark Vaile, Sydney, 6 March 2009. See also The Howard Years, episode 4, Walking on Water, 8 December 2008. Interview with Mark Vaile, 25 April 2009. Warren Truss, Trade Statement 2007, p. v. Chronology of WorkChoices, The Australian TAFE Teacher, Spring 2007, pp. 20, 21. Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006, voted on in the House of Representatives on 10 August and withdrawn from the Senate on 14 August. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 10 August 2006, p. 45, 14 August 2006, p. 1; ABC Radio AM, 11 August 2006; ABC Radio PM, 14 August 2006. Interview with Kay Hull, Canberra, 24 October 2008. The inquiry under Terence Cole, QC, reported on 27 November 2006. It found that inland transport fees paid by AWB Ltd to a Jordanian trucking company, Alia, were a means of funnelling money to Sadam’s regime, contrary to the oil-

Notes to pages 339 – 51

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for-food program. It recommended that 11 former AWB staff, including a former chairman, Trevor Flugge, be investigated for possible criminal or corporate offences. Australian Associated Press, 27 November 2006. The Australian Federal Police announced on 28 August 2009 it would not proceed further with its investigation after a review of the evidence found the prospect of convictions was limited and not in the public interest. The Weekend Australian, 29–30 August 2009, p. 3. 14 John Howard speech to Liberal Party federal council, Sydney, June 2007; The Australian, 27 November 2009, p. 5. 15 Interview with Peter McGauran, Sydney, 28 October 2008; ABC Radio News, 25 August 2007. McGauran had long had an association with the racing industry and, after leaving parliament in April 2008 was appointed chief executive officer of Thoroughbred Breeders Australia. 16 An inquiry by Ian Callinan QC found in April 2008 that ignorance, incompetence, inefficiency and systemic failures in the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service had contributed to the introduction and spread of the influenza. Following a further independent investigation, the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry announced on 31 August 2009 that no disciplinary action would be taken against eight former or current departmental officials as they had not been in breach of the Australian Public Service code of conduct. The Sydney Morning Herald, 1 September 2009, p. 3. 17 Newspoll, The Australian, 4 September 2007, p. 1. See also The Weekend Australian, Inquirer, 8–9 September 2007, p. 21. 18 One such occasion was when Howard and Putin held a news conference to announce an agreement for Australia to export $1 billion worth a year of uranium to Russia for its nuclear power industry. Putin was the first Russian president to visit Australia, but the historic occasion was debased by questions about Howard’s leadership, causing him to take a bemused Putin aside after the event to explain. The Sydney Morning Herald, 7–9 September 2007, p. 1. 19 Interview with Mark Vaile, 13 May 2009. 20 The Howard Years, episode 4, Walking

on Water, 8 December 2008. 21 AEC, Official Election Results, Election 2007. See – . 22 Bruce briefly returned to parliament at the 1931 election as the Member for Flinders, until resigning on 6 October 1933 to become Australia’s High Commissioner to London. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 623. 23 The West Australian online, 26 November 2007. 24 Interview with Mark Vaile, Sydney, 6 March 2009. 25 Interview with Warren Truss, Wagga Wagga, 13 June 2009. 26 Interview with Kay Hull, Canberra, 24 October 2008. 27 Interview with Peter McGauran, Sydney 28 October 2008. 28 The West Australian online, 28 November 2007. See – 29 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 278, 279. 30 There had been a non-party member as federal leader, Archie Cameron in 1940–41, who was a member of the South Australian Liberal and Country League. Following the establishment of the Liberal National Party of Queensland in July 2008, Truss also became a nonparty federal leader. See chapter 28. 31 Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook online. See – 32 Brendan Nelson media release, 6 December 2007. 33 The government’s Fuel Watch petrol price monitoring scheme was abandoned in November 2008 after it was blocked in the Senate. The Grocery Choice website, launched in August 2008 at a cost of $13 million, was found to be unworkable and scrapped in June 2009. Competition Policy minister, Craig Emerson, ABC TV News, 26 June 2009, The Weekend Australian, 27–28 June 2009, p. 1. 34 Interview with Kay Hull, Canberra, 24 October 2008. 35 Peter McGauran media release, 4 April 2008. 36 AEC virtual tally room, Gippsland byelection, final results. See – 37 Interview with Mark Vaile, Sydney, 6 March 2009. 38 Announcing the council’s dismissal,

Notes to pages 351– 61

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NSW Local Government minister, Paul Lynch, said the state’s Public Inquiry Commissioner, Frank Willan, had found the council misled the community about the development, but made no recommendation to take any action against specific councillors, putting the affair down to incompetence more than anything else. Daily Telegraph, 27 February 2008. 39 Rob Oakeshott media release, 21 March 2002. 40 NSW Electoral Commission, 24 March 2007 NSW election results, Port Macquarie, preferential count. See –

41 AEC, virtual tally room, Lyne byelection, 6 September 2008. See –

42 The Nationals – NSW did not regain Port Macquarie at the by-election on 18 October 2008, although its candidate, Leslie Williams, gained a 24 per cent swing. The seat was won by former Oakeshott staffer and Waratah rugby union player, Peter Besseling. 43 Interview with Mark Vaile, Sydney, 6 March 2009. 44 Interview with Rob Oakeshott, 20 October 2008.

Chapter 26 1 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 4 June 2008, pp. 4402–04. Bruce Scott, as deputy speaker, was in the chair at the time, and therefore did not vote, and the National Party Victorian seat of Gippsland was vacant, pending the by-election which followed Peter McGauran’s resignation from parliament in April. 2 The Land, 1 June 2008. See – The single desk export arrangements were first introduced by the Chifley Labor government in 1949. 3 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 19 June 2008, p. 2968. Nash, who was absent due to a family bereavement, had her vote against the legislation recorded in Hansard, meaning seven voted against the legislation. 4 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 1 June 1989, p. 3254; 16 June 2008, p. 2292.

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5 Malcolm Turnbull shadow ministry, 22 September 2008. 6 ABC Radio, AM, 18 September 2008. 7 The Age, 18 September 2008. 8 See chapter 28, Amalgamators, for detail on the development of the Liberal National Party of Queensland. 9 Interview with Ron Boswell, Canberra, 22 August 2009. 10 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 1 December 2008, p. 7776; The Age, 2 December 2008. The carbon sink legislation was carried in the Senate with a majority of 37 votes. 11 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 1 December 2008, p. 7746. 12 The Age, 2 December 2008. 13 Malcolm Turnbull shadow ministry, 23 January 2009. 14 The Australian, 28 July 2007; ABC Radio News, 15 September 2008; What caused the sub-prime crisis. See – 15 Wayne Swan budget speech, 12 May 2009. The 2008–09 budget deficit, estimated to be $32.9 billion, was later revised to $27.1 billion, indicating the 2009–10 deficit might not be as high as $58 billion. Wayne Swan media release, 29 September 2009; Daily Telegraph, 30 September 2009, p. 7. Seasonally adjusted unemployment fell by 0.1 per cent in November over October, to 5.7 per cent – below earlier forecasts – further indica-ting a strengthening in the Australian economy. Australian Bureau of Statistics media release, 10 December 2009. 16 Warren Truss media release, 12 May 2009.

Chapter 27 1 Pollard, J, A hundred years of agriculture, Year Book Australia 2000, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra. See – ; Year Book of Australia 1974, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, p. 844 (hereafter Year Book Australia 1974). 2 When the scheme expired in July 1974, 1136 dairy farms had been offered for acquisition, sale of 576 had been arranged, 348 applications had been rejected, and 205 applications withdrawn or lapsed. The cost of the

Notes to pages 361–71

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3

4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

purchases was just under $15 million. Year Book Australia 1974, p. 857. Brockett, R, The Australian Country Party, the Australian League of Rights, and the Rural Crisis of 1968–1972, Electronic Journal of Australia and New Zealand, 1997. See – (hereafter Brockett, electronic journal). See also Greason, D, The League of Rights: a reply to Brockett, electronic journal; On Target, Vol 37, No 18. See – . Interview with Ian Sinclair, Sydney, 6 May 2009; The Australian, 26 June 1971; The Age, 29 February 1972. The Age, 9 August 1971. The Advertiser, Adelaide, 7 August 1971. Interview with Doug Anthony, 10 December 2007. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 27 April 1988, p. 1941. Boswell tabled a list of league front organisations which included Electors’ Associations, Voters’ Policy Associations, Christian Institute for Individual Freedom, Ladies in Line Against Communism (Lilac League), Institute for Economic Democracy, Australian Heritage Society, and Conservative Speakers’ Club. The Australian, 8 May 2001, p. 2; ABC Radio, PM, 21 May 2001; Interview with John Anderson, Sydney, 16 May 2009. The Courier-Mail, 22 April 2000. Interview with Ron Boswell, Canberra, 22 August 2009. Bob Katter media release, 9 July 2001. Interview with Bruce Lloyd, Shepparton, 10 November 2008. Julian McGauran media release, 23 January 2006. Interview with Peter McGauran, Sydney, 29 October 2008. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, p. 661. Interview with Peter Slipper, 1 April 2009. Cutler believed that not pressing the Liberals for the Legislative Council Opposition leadership paved the way for a vastly improved relationship with the Liberal Party, which led to the formation of the 1965 to 1976 Coalition government, the longest period of nonLabor government in the state’s history. Davey, The Nationals, pp. 180, 181.

Chapter 28 1 John McEwen, The Age, 20 November 1968; NSW Countryman, February 1969, p. 5. 2 The Nationals federal president, John Tanner, media release, 16 July 2008. 3 Minutes, The Nationals – NSW central council, 7 December 2007. 4 Mark Vaile media release, 9 June 2006. Russell was replaced by John Tanner, from Victoria. He remained as the federal party’s honorary legal advisor and a delegate to federal management committee and federal council as immediate past president, until becoming vice-president of the Liberal Party of Australia in June 2009, when he stood down from active involvement in The Nationals organisation. John Tanner advice to federal management committee, 3 July 2009. 5 On 16 October 2003, the leaders of the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance and the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada announced an agreement in principle to amalgamate. The merger was ratified in December, resulting in the creation of the Conservative Party of Canada. See – 6 Optional preferential voting had previously existed in Queensland from 1892 to 1942, when it was replaced with compulsory preferential. Electoral Commission Queensland. See – 7 Warren Truss, The Weekend Australian, 19–20 January 2008, p. 8. 8 The Australian, 13 March 2008. 9 The Victorian Liberals and Nationals reestablished a Coalition from 11 February 2008, The Australian, 12 February 2008, p. 5. Maywald first accepted a position in the South Australian Labor government in July 2004, Premier & Ministers of South Australia. See – . 10 The Nationals – NSW annual general conference resolutions, Sydney, 12–14 June 2008, National Leader, winter edition 2008, p. 13. 11 Interview with John Anderson, Sydney, 16 May 2009. 12 Interview with Ian Sinclair, Sydney, 6 May 2009. 13 Interview with Mark Vaile, 13 May 2009.

Notes to pages 371– 84

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14 The Courier-Mail, 26–27 July 2008, pp. 4, 5. 15 Interview with David Russell, 12 August 2008. 16 Gary Spence had been replaced as Queensland Liberal president eight weeks earlier by former Howard government minister, Mal Brough, who said he would not be joining the LNP. ABC Radio, AM, 28 July 2008. 17 The Courier-Mail, 28 July 2008, p. 1. 18 Hughes, CA, The Government of Queensland, University of Queensland Press, 1980, pp. 16–19; Davey, The Nationals, p. 452. 19 Federal director, Brad Henderson, letter to AEC to ‘confirm that the Liberal National Party of Queensland is an affiliated Party of The Nationals’, 13 August 2008; Liberal Party federal president, Alan Stockdale, media release, 2 October 2009; AEC, file ref: Reg3099a 08/1129, Party Registration decision: Liberal National Party of Queensland, 18 February 2009. 20 Interview with Rick Setter, Canberra, 22 August 2009. 21 John Anderson briefing to NSW party central executive, 8 September 2008. 22 Minutes, The Nationals – NSW central council, Sydney, 20–21 November 2008. 23 Labor premiers Joan Kirner in Victoria and Carmen Lawrence in Western Australia also inherited their premierships mid-term, but both lost their subsequent elections to the Liberals. 24 The Australian online, 21 March 2009. See – 25 See Queensland election reports, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Australian, The Courier-Mail, 23 March 2009; The Australian, 24 March 2009. 26 The Courier-Mail, 3 April 2009. 27 The Weekly Times, 28 January 2009. 28 Interview with Peter Slipper, 1 April 2009. 29 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 10 May 1993, p. 495.

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Chapter 29 1 More than 54 years, compared to over 35 years for the ALP, nearly 42 years for the Liberal Party, 10 years for the UAP, and a little under 13 years for the Nationalists. Commonwealth Parliamentary Handbook, pp. 679, 680. 2 Daly, F, From Curtin to Kerr, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1977, p. 229. 3 Interview with Brad Henderson, 23 December 2009. 4 Resolutions, federal council, Canberra, 22–23 August 2009; Warren Truss speech to federal council, Canberra, 22 August 2009. 5 The Nationals policy platform 2009, pp. 48–51. 6 Abbott was one of 12 Liberal shadow ministers, parliamentary secretaries and party whips who resigned from their positions on 25 and 26 November 2009. The Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 2009, p. 1. 7 One MP, Fran Bailey (McEwen, Victoria), a Turnbull supporter, was absent due to ill health and another unidentified MP cast an informal vote by writing ‘no’ on his or her ballot paper. Daily Telegraph, 2 December 2009, p. 2. 8 Tony Abbot shadow ministry, 8 December 2009. 9 Barnaby Joyce, ABC Television, Insiders, 6 December 2009. 10 Barnaby Joyce, ABC Television, Insiders, 6 December 2009; The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 2009, p. 10. 11 Tony Abbott, The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 2009, p. 10. 12 Warren Truss media statement, 21 December 2009. 13 Tony Abbott, Sunday Telegraph, 20 December 2009, p. 5. The Nationals supported Abbott’s new climate change policy, released on 2 February 2010. Warren Truss media release, 2 February 2010.

Notes to pages 384 – 401

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Select bibliography and further reading

Select bibliography and further reading

Official party records Agendas and resolutions of federal and state party annual conferences, conventions and councils 1926 to 2009. Federal parliamentary leaders’ speeches to state annual conferences, federal councils, federal conferences, federal conventions and election campaign launches, 1920 to 2009. Federal party platforms and policies 1920–2009. Minutes, Australian Farmers’ Federal Organisation conference, Melbourne, March 23–24, 1926. Minutes, Victorian Country Party central council, 26 February 1975. National Country Party of Australia Federal Constitution 1975. National Party of Australia Federal Constitution 1982, 1988, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2005. National Party of Australia (Victoria) Constitution and Rules 1975. Select minutes, federal council 1943 to 2009; federal management committee 1985 to 2009; NSW central council and central executive 1919 to 2009; The Australian Country Party Association 1926 to 1943.

The Australian Country Party Association Constitution, 1926, 1927, 1930. The Australian Country Party Federal Constitution 1937, 1943, 1952. The Nationals Federal Constitution, October 2006.

Party journals, newspapers, publications and reports An Introduction to the National Party of Australia, federal secretariat, Canberra, 1990. Balance, journal of the Australian Country Party, 1973 to 1974. Communication, Communication, Communication – Report of the Committee of Review into the National Party of Australia – New South Wales, June 1999, The Nationals – NSW, Sydney. Davey, P, Positive Progress to 2000 and beyond – Review into the National Party of Australia 1996, federal secretariat, Canberra, 1996. ——, The Nationals – Driving Australia’s development since 1920, federal secretariat, Canberra, 2006. Financial Record of the Menzies-Fadden Government 1949–55, Australian Country Party, Canberra.

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McDonald, S, An Assessment of Amalgamation, federal secretariat, Canberra, 1990. Milestones, Australian Country Party, Canberra, 1951. National Leader, 1982 to 2002; 2007 to 2009. National News, 2003 to 2006. The Australian Country Party Monthly Journal, 1934 to 1938. The Black Book – An account of how the Federal Labor Government is destroying Your Country, federal secretariat, Canberra. The Future – A Report by The Committee of Review into the Future Direction of the National Party of Australia, federal secretariat, Canberra, 1988. The New South Wales Countryman, 1946 to 1982. This is as good as it gets – The facts in black and white: How Federal Labor has Hurt You from 1983–1995, federal secretariat, Canberra, 1995.

Select national and regional newspaper clippings and radio and television transcripts as identified in Notes Private papers Hunt, R, A Journal of a Bush Life – personal dairy notes from 1946 to 1970, unpublished. Jackson, RV, John McEwen – His Story, edited text of November 1974 recordings for the National Library of Australia, privately published, 1982.

Secondary sources and further reading ABC Television, The Howard Years, 2008. ABC Television, Dynasties, episode 6, The Anthonys, 14 December 2004. Andre, P, Payton, S, and Mills, J, (eds), Documents on Australian Foreign Policy – The Negotiation of the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 1983, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 2003. Aitkin, DA, The Country Party in New South Wales – A study of Organisaton and Survival, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1972. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Official Year Book

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of Australia No 61, Canberra, 1975 and 1976. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book Australia 2000 – Australian Dictionary of Biography online –

Australian Electoral Commission, Electoral Pocketbook, Canberra, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009. Botterill, LC, Policy Change and Network Termination: The Role of Farm Groups in Agricultural Policy Making in Australia, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol 40, No 2, 205. Botterill, LC, and Cockfield, G, (eds), The National Party: Prospects for the great survivors, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2009. Clune D and Hogan M, editors, The People’s Choice – Electoral Politics in 20th Century New South Wales, vols 1, 2 and 3, Parliament of New South Wales and University of Sydney, Star Printery, Sydney, 2001. Costar, B, and Woodward, D, (eds), Country to National, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives and Senate, Canberra. Crisp, LF, The Australian Federal Labour Party 1901– 1951, Longmans, Green and Co, Melbourne, 1955. Daly, F, From Curtin to Kerr, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1977. Davey, P, Politics in the Blood – The Anthonys of Richmond, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2008 ——, The Nationals – The Progressive, Country and National Party in New South Wales 1919 to 2006, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2006. Davey, P, (ed) The Page Review, vol 4, no 1, Canberra, June 2008. Department of the Parliamentary Library, Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 25th edition 1991, 28th edition 1999, 30th edition, 2005, and online – see . Department of Transport, Domestic Air Transport Policy Review, vol 1, Canberra, 1979. Department of Transport and Regional Services, Regional Information Directory, Canberra, 2007. Ellis, UR, A History of the Australian Country Party, Melbourne University Press, 1963. ——, A Pen in Politics, Ginninderra Press, Canberra, 2007. ——, New Australian States, The Endeavour Press, Sydney, 1933. ——, The Country Party – a Political and Social History of the Party in New South Wales, FW

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Cheshire, Melbourne, 1958. Fadden, AW, They called me Artie – The Memoirs of Sir Arthur Fadden, The Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1969. Forrest, P&S, They started something – A biography of Bern and Aileen Kilgariff, Everbest Printing, 2005. Gallagher, P, Faith & Duty – The John Anderson story, Random House Australia, 2006. Golding, P, Black Jack McEwen – Political Gladiator, Melbourne University Press, 1996. Graham, BD, The Formation of the Australian Country Parties, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1966. Greenwood, G, (ed), Australia – A social and political history, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1955. Hancock, I, John Gorton – he did it his way, Hodder Australia, 2002. Heatley, A, The Territory Party: The Northern Territory Country Liberal Party 1974–1998, Northern Territory University Press, 1998. Hughes CA, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1965–1974, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1977. ——, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1975–1984, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1987. ——, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1985–1999, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2002. Hughes CA and Graham BD, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1890–1964, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1968. Jupp, J, Australian Party Politics, Melbourne University Press, 1964. Lloyd CJ and Reid GS, Out of the Wilderness – the

return of Labor, Cassell Australia, 1974. Lunn H, Joh – The Life and Political Adventures of Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1978. Manne, R, (ed), The Australian Century – Political struggle in the building of a nation, Text Publishing, Melbourne, 1999. Mayer, H, and Rydon, J, The Gwydir By-election 1953 – A study in political conflict, Australian National University, Canberra, 1954. Millar, A, (ed), The Biographical Dictionary of the Australian Senate, vols 1 and 2, Melbourne University Press, 2000 and 2004. Miller, JDB, Australian Government and Politics – An Introductory Survey, Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd, London, 1954. National Archives of Australia – references as identified in notes – Page E, Truant Surgeon – The Inside Story of Forty Years of Australian Political Life, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1963. Page, J, The History of Heifer Station, McPhee Printers, Grafton, 2004. Rees P, The Boy from Boree Creek – The Tim Fischer Story, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001. Schneider, R, War without blood – Malcolm Fraser in power, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1980. Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government Operations, The Australian Dairy Corporation and its Asian Subsidiaries, Canberra, 1981. Souter, G, Acts of Parliament – A narrative history of the Senate and House of Representatives, Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne University Press, 1988. Woodward, AE, Report of the Royal Commission into Australian Meat Industry, Canberra, 1982.

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Index

Index

Note: page numbers for illustrations are shown in italic text. 9/11 attack 338–40 2020 Summit 359 A History of the Australian Country Party ix A strong Country Party keeps the balance 139 Abbott, Joseph 66–7, 72, 74 Abbott, Macartney 57 Abbott, Tony 398 Aboriginal policy under Anderson 343 apartheid suggested 183–4 land rights 174 Native Title 303–4 NT intervention 352 abortion policy 195 accidents and illnesses Anderson family 316–7

Doug Anthony’s hepatitis 54 Fadden car crash 95 Fischer family 296–7 Page family 2–3, 53–4, 106–7 RAAF plane crash 70 Vaile melanoma treatment 349–50 Acton, Larry 308 ACTU 174–5, 350–1, 393 Adelaide (ship) 340 Adelaide electorate 250 Adermann, Charles 109, 119–20 Adermann, Evan 168, 184 enters parliament 258 portfolios held by 169, 183–4 retirement of 279 votes against wheat deregulation 273 AFFO see Australian Farmers Federal Organisation Afghanistan invasion 339 agricultural policies see Primary Industry portfolio Agriculture – Advancing Australia package 303, 306–7

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airline agreements 193 Aitkin, Don ix Alice Springs to Darwin railway 319 All for Australia League 48 Allan, Ian 92, 94 Alwright, John 284 Amalgamate or Perish – the Future of non-Labor Parties in Australia 286 Amalgamated Wireless Limited 16 amalgamation proposals 284–6, 379–90 under Fadden 73–4, 79 in Nixon Report 252, 254 Vaile opposed to 355–6 An Assessment of Amalgamation 286 Anderson, Andrew 317 Anderson, Jane 316 Anderson, John 322, 348 on dairy policy 323 elected deputy leader 296, 312 Howard’s relations with 321 as leader 315–23, 330 in leadership challenge 267–8 party review by 256, 380, 383 personal life 316–7 portfolios held by 299, 303–4, 306–8, 314 retires as leader 346–7 swings against 340–1 on Iraq war 341 on terrorism 338–9 Anderson report 386–7, 394 Andren, Peter 313 Ansett, Bob 231 Ansett collapse 339 Antarctic policy 175–6 Anthony, Doug 119, 129, 141, 147, 166, 168, 196, 206, 208, 211 on ABC 171–2 as acting PM 197 on Agnes Robertson 99 on amalgamation 284–5, 382 BIG and 113–4 on British trade relations 135–6 as deputy leader 120 on Earle Page 19 election campaigns 160, 181–2 enters parliament 105–6 on Finnane report 199 in Gair affair 152–3 hepatitis attack 54, 178–9 Holt’s last meeting with 124 as leader 129–30 McEwen as mentor to 105–6 McMahon’s relations with 138–9 in Opposition 142–4 portfolios held by 130, 167, 169, 177–8, 183, 187–8

on Queensland merger 384 resigns leadership 211 role in Whitlam dismissal 165 shadow portfolios 143 in Sheil affair 183–4 on social credit movement 373 suggests history ix–x Anthony, Hubert Lawrence abstains from deputy leader ballot 60–1 after Page attack on Menzies 66 as acting deputy leader 92 opposes amalgamation 74 portfolios held by 72, 74, 84, 95–6 welfare policy 62 Anthony, Larry caravan park GST crisis 323–5 portfolios held by 314–5 wins Richmond 299, 312–4 Anthony, Margot 141, 147 Anzac material for schools 343 ANZUS treaty 86–7 appropriation (Supply) bills see Supply bills Arbitration Commission 173 Armstrong, Wendy 318 Asia Dairy Industries 201–2 Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation summit 353–4 Assessment of Amalgamation 286 Aston electorate 337 Asylum-seeker policy 338–40, 351 see also security issues Atkinson, Llewellyn 24, 29, 37 Atkinson, Sallyanne 250 Auslink extended 350 AUSSAT communications system 198 Austin, Brian 214 Austin, Peter 317–8 AusLink 347 Austrade 34 Australasian Police Ministers’ Council 300 Australia Card Bill 223, 247 Australia–Japan trade treaty 87 Australian,The 113 Australian Agricultural Council 34, 58 Australian Bicentennial Road Development Program 193 Australian Broadcasting Commission see also communications policy accusations of bias 170–1 relations with 61 Australian Capital Territory, establishment of 35 Australian Country Party see also National Party of Australia, National Country Party and The Nationals constitutional reform 254–5 dissent in 370–8

Index

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early MPs 20 electoral performance 403–4 foundation of 9–13 landmark achievements 422–5 leadership 404–7 membership numbers 148 name change by 402 name change to 41 parliamentary representatives 168 reforms to 144–8 Australian Country Party Association 39–41 Australian Country Party – Northern Territory 115-6 NSW party funds 116 Australian Dairy Corporation 201–2 Australian Dairy Industry Council 371 Australian Democrats 181 Australian Design Rules 193–4 Australian Farmers Federal Organisation attitudes to coalition 36 convenes conference 39 electoral platform 7 founds ACP 4–5, 9 Australian Federal Police 294 Australian Fishing Zone 194 Australian Industry Development Corporation 129 Australian Labor Party 16 see also names of Labor administrations Australian League of Rights 372–3 Australian Local Government Association 342 Australian National Animal Health Laboratory 176 Australian National Railways 305 Australian National University 35 Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation 305 Australian Party 48 Australian Trade Commissioner Service 34, 136–7 Australian Transport Advisory Council 193 Australian War Memorial 35 Australian Water Fund 346 Australian Wheat Board 262, 351 Australian Wool Commission/Corporation 141, 287–9 Australian Workplace Agreements 350–1 Badman, Oliver leaves parliamentary ACP 65, 67–8 as Senator 57 welfare policy 62 Bailey, Jenny 100 Balderstone, James 201 bank nationalisation threat 82–3, 88 Barambah electorate 250–1

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Barnard, Lance 142 Barnes, Ceb 105, 130 Basic Industries Group 113–4, 370 Baudino, Bob 155 Bavin, Thomas 39 Bayley, James 45 Beasley, John 50 Beattie, Peter 387–8 Beazley, Kim 315, 352 beef roads 103 Bell, George 24 Bendigo electorate 23, 397 Bennelong electorate 355 Besley, Tim 326–7 Beyers, Maurice 157 bibliography 459–61 Bicentennial Water Resources Program 192 BIG 113–4, 370 Bjelke-Petersen, Florence 101, 208 as party deputy Senate leader 247 enters parliament 99, 191, 257 Joh for Canberra campaign and 229, 232 Bjelke-Petersen, Joh 215, 232 see also Joh for Canberra campaign abandons campaign 231–2 abolishes death and gift duties 182 appoints Field to Senate 163–4 in Gair affair 153, 156 relations with Fraser government 174 resigns from parliament 250 on tax policy 234–5 Black Book 276 Black Spots program 302 Bligh, Anna 387–8 Blunt, Charles 271, 277 challenges for leadership 263–4, 266, 268 enters parliament 257 as leader 269, 275–80 postal expenditure 292–5 in Richmond electorate 208, 211–2 runs for deputy leader 243 shadow portfolios 230, 246 Sinclair criticised by 260 welfare policy 258 Bolkus, Nick 293–4 Borbidge, Rob 301, 308, 318 Boswell, Ron 208, 340, 396, 400 becomes parliamentary secretary 318 does not run for party Senate leader 247 enters parliament 257 Joh for Canberra campaign and 221 on Joyce 363, 366 in leadership negotiations 357 on party infiltration 373–5 retires as party Senate leader 358 supports Greens motion 366–8

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on wool reserve price 289 Botterill, Linda ix Bowen, Lionel 182, 188 Boyd, David 347 Braithwaite, Ray 168, 208, 271 becomes secretariat director 332–3 challenges for leadership 242–3, 263–4, 268–70 enters parliament 258 on Joh for Canberra campaign 220–1, 240–2 retirement 299 shadow portfolios 226, 230, 246, 281 on Telstra inquiries 327 Brewer, Judy 296 Britain declares war on Germany 67 joins EEC 111–2, 135–7 trade relations with 58, 103 War Cabinet representation 74–5 Brown, Wallace 155 Brownhill, David 211, 215 enters parliament 257 in leadership challenge 263–4, 269 as parliamentary secretary (Trade) 314 portfolios held by 299, 314 resignation of 340 on water resources 344 on wheat deregulation 262 Bruce, Stanley becomes PM 27 loses seat 46 offered prime ministership 63–5 Bruce Coalition government 27–8, 31–5 Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Campaign 137 Bruxner, Mick 28, 92 Bruxner, Tim 93 Bryant massacre 300 Bryce, Quentin 194 Building Australia Fund 368 Bunton, Cleaver 163–4 Bury, Les 125, 133 Bush, George W 338 by-elections 132–3 Adelaide electorate 250 Corangamite electorate 6–7 Echuca electorate 7 Flinders electorate 91 Gippsland electorate 359–60 Groom electorate 250–1, 259, 279 Gwydir electorate 91–3 under Holt 124 Maranoa electorate 21 Port Adelaide electorate 250 Ryan electorate 337 Swan electorate 6

Cahill State government, NSW 93–4 Calder, Sam 116, 168, 185 Caldicott, Helen 280 Calwell, Arthur 92–3 Cameron, Archie 38, 71, 270 becomes leader 68 defection of 377 leadership challenged 71–2 portfolios held by 61, 69 sits with ACP 55–6 Cameron, Ian 208 on coalition 243 enters parliament 257 on leadership challenge 269 on parity pricing 188 shadow portfolios 246 threatened with expulsion 226 votes against wheat deregulation 273 Campbell, TJ 4 Can we save the Country Party? 372 Canberra, construction of 35 Capricornia electorate 81, 396 lost to Labor 182, 313 caravan park GST 323–5 Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 394–5 carbon tax vote 366–8 Carige, Col 168 Carrick, John 213 Carroll, William 57 Casey, Lord 121, 123 Casey, Richard 69 Causley, Ian 280, 347 Centenary House 331 centralisation, opposition to 12 Chaffey, Bill 273 Chalmers, Rob 105 Chanter, John 9–10, 23 Chester, Darren 360, 400 Chifley, Ben 44, 79 Chifley Labor government 82–3 ‘children overboard’ affair 338–40 Chipp, Don 180–2 cigarette advertising banned 173 Citizens’ Electoral Council 251 Clarence and Richmond River Examiner 32 Cleary, WJ 61 Clemenger advertising 278 climate change policy 397–401 Closer Economic Relations (CER) with New Zealand 188 CNO 73 coalition with other parties see also amalgamation proposals after 1922 election 25–8 agreements relating to 435–6 under Anderson 319–21 under Blunt 275–6

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under Bruce 35 collapse in 1987: 228–9 in election campaigns 336–7 under Fadden 82 under Fischer 281–2, 303–7 under Fraser 161–2 future of 391 under Gorton 125–7 under Howard 226–8, 243–6 under Hughes 21–2 Joh for Canberra campaign 219, 221–5 under Lyons 50–1, 56 under McMahon 133 under Menzies 69–71 in Opposition 76 policy on 41 under Snedden 143–4 State Liberal parties opposed to 176–7 State party arrangements 382–3 Cobb, John 400 portfolios held by 349 runs for deputy leader 347 shadow portfolios 358–9, 364, 366, 398–9 Cobb, Michael 236, 257, 284 Cockfield, Geoffrey ix Coles, Arthur 70, 76 Collard, Stan 168, 208, 241 dumped from Senate ticket 237–8, 240–2 Joh for Canberra campaign and 221 resigns shadow portfolio 226 shadow portfolios 230 Collins, ASR 33 Collins, Thomas leaves parliamentary ACP 65, 67–8 portfolios held by 72, 74 Colston, Mal 163 Commerce portfolio 58, 103 see also Trade portfolio Common Market (EEC) 58, 111–2, 187–8 Commonwealth Bank Bill 88 Commonwealth Banking Corporation 31–2, 102 Commonwealth Development Bank 102 Commonwealth Electoral Act amendments 333 Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 34, 176, 305 Communications Fund 328, 368 communications policy 16 under Cameron 61 under Gibson 32 under Howard 325–9, 368 under Hubert Anthony 96 media bias 170–1 under Nixon 170–1 under Sinclair 198

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Communist Party 48, 79 attempts to outlaw 81, 83, 85, 89 seen as threat 94–5 composite ministries see coalition with other parties conferences 1921: Sydney 17 1923: Melbourne 24–6 1926: Melbourne 39–40 1927: ACPA 40–1 1937: Melbourne 41 1960: Canberra 98 1973: State party conferences 145 1975: Canberra 146–7 1979: Darwin 185 1982: Canberra 205 1989: Canberra 276–7 2000: Tweed Heads 323–5 2003: Canberra 335 timing of 255 Connect Australia package 328 Connellan, Eddie 115–6 Connor, Rex 164 constitutional reform 22, 272 Cook, Joseph 5, 20–1 Cook, Robert 9–10, 20, 44 Cooper, Russell 301 Cooper, Walter defects from Nationalists 378 portfolios held by 84, 96 as Senator 57 Co-ordinating Committee of Longterm Climatic Change in Australia 276–7 Copeman, Charles 231 Copenhagen conference 399–400 Corangamite electorate 6–7, 46, 55 Corbett, Jim 168 Corboy, Edwin 6 Cormack, Magnus 151–2 Corrigan, Chris 304–5 Corser, Bernard 62, 65, 67–8 Costar, Brian ix Costello, Peter 326, 347–8, 355 Coulton, Mark 359, 399, 400 Country National Organisation 73 Country Party see Australian Country Party Country Party and Liberal Federation (SA) 38 Country Party Bulletin 42 Country Party in New South Wales – A Study of Organisation and Survival ix Country Party of New South Wales see New South Wales State party Country Party Weekly Bulletin 42 Country Progressive Party (Vic) 37, 47 Country to National – Australian rural politics and beyond ix Court, Charles 174

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Cowan, Bruce 208 on coalition agreement 227 enters parliament 257 Joh for Canberra campaign and 217–8 on leadership challenge 267–8, 272 Cowper electorate 1–3, 313 Crean, Frank 148, 165 Crooke, Ken 222–3 CSIRO 34, 176, 305 Cumming, Fia 259 Curtin, John death of 79 declines all-party administration 67 enters parliament 44 relations with Page 75 Customs and Consumer Affairs portfolio 305 Cutler, Charles 378 Daily Examiner,The 32 dairy industry Australian Dairy Corporation 201–2 Australian Dairy Industry Council 371 deregulation of 323 Marginal Dairy Farmers’ Reconstruction Scheme 371 Paterson Butter Plan 34 Daly, Fred 93, 165, 392 Daniel, Greg 278 Darwin electorate 24, 37 Davey, Paul 265 Davidson, Charles 103 Dawson electorate 108, 396 death duties abolished 182 decentralisation policy 12 defections from Country/National Party 375–7 to Country/National Party 377–8 Democratic Labor Party Gair’s connections with 151 losses by 161 relations with 127 demographic changes after 2000 341–2 ageing membership 307 under Anthony 144 future of NP and 392–3 tariff policy and 110 depreciation allowances 33 devaluations 52, 114–5, 137–8 Dickie, Helen 331 diesel fuel rebate see petrol policies Doha talks 344 Doohan, Jack 112 double dissolution elections 159–61 Downer, Alexander 272, 354, 360–1 Drake-Brockman, Tom 130, 167, 168

Dredge, John 88 Drew, Robert 361 drought in 2000s 352 under Fraser 172, 192 in Queensland 308 Duffy, Michael 294 Durack, Peter 151 Duthie, Lindsay 201 Echuca electorate 7, 55 Edenhope Agricultural Bureau 371 Eden–Monaro electorate 396 Eggleton, Tony 191, 265, 285 Election ’90 Policy Statement 279 elections (federal) see also electoral reform; voting systems 1919: 13 December 7 1922: 16 December 22–4 1925: 14 November 35–9 1928: 17 November 44 1929: 12 October 45–6 1931: 19 December 50–1 1934: 15 September 54–5 1937: 23 October 59 1940: 14 September 70 1943: 21 August 76–7 1946: 28 September 80–1 1949: 10 December 84 1951: 28 April 85, 88–9 1953: 9 May 85 1954: 29 May 85, 95–6 1955: 10 December 85, 97 1958: November 102 1961: 9 December 1–3, 111 1969: 25 October 127–8 1972: 2 December 139–42 1974: 18 May 159–61 1975: 13 December 167–9 1977: 10 December 181–2 1980: 18 October 162, 191 1983: 5 March 188, 205–7 1984: 1 December 209–10 1987: 11 July 216, 231–7 1990: 24 March 279–80 1993: 13 March 295–6 1996: 2 March 299 1998: 3 October 312–4 2001: 10 November 339–41 2004: 9 October 328, 336–7, 345 2007: 24 November 354–5, 380 ACP/NP performance in 403–4 electoral reform corporate donations 393 in funding arrangements 333–4 under Hawke 209, 261–2

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in Nixon Report 252 optional preferential voting 381 Page promotes 31–2 voting systems 4–5 Elford, Richard 70 Elizabeth II, Queen of England 90–1 Elliot, Justine 355 Elliott, John 285 Elliott, Robert Charles Dunlop 44, 55 Ellis, Ulrich 42, ix on Page’s bereavement 53 retirement of 116 emissions trading scheme 365–6, 394–5 England, John 105 environmental issues Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 394–5 carbon tax vote 366–8 climate change policy 397–400 Co-ordinating Committee of Longterm Climatic Change in Australia 276–7 emissions trading scheme 365–6 equine influenza 352–3 Estens, Dick 327 ETS 365–6, 394–5 European Economic Community 58, 111–2, 187–8 Evatt, Herbert ‘Doc’ 92–3, 97 exchange rate policy 52, 114–5, 137–8 Export Market Development Grants 303 F-111 contract 124 Fadden, Arthur 78, 104 appointed acting leader 72–4 car smash 95 commits troops to Korea 85–6 Gwydir campaign 92–3 leaves parliamentary ACP 65, 67–8 meets Royal Family 90–1 on Menzies 76 on petrol rationing 83–4 as PM 75–6 portfolios held by 69–70, 72, 84, 95 re-elected leader 77, 82 retires from parliament 102–3 rural policies 79–80 as State MP 38–9 as Treasurer 87–90, 102–4 Fahey, John 306 Fairbairn, David 128 Fairbairn, James 70 Fairfax electorate 279–80 Fairhall, Allen 127 Farm Management Deposits 306 Farmbis 306–7 Farmers and Settlers’ Association of NSW 4

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Farmers and Settlers’ Association of WA 6 FarmHelp 307 Farrer electorate 313, 340, 396 Father of the House, Sinclair as 273 federal campaign committee 334–5 federal council 221–2, 248–50 Federal Country Party Bureau of Publicity, Research and Information 42 federal elections see elections (federal) Federal Health Council 34 federal management committee 41, 244–5 Federal National Party Policy Objectives 222 Federal Roads Act 1926 32 federalism under Fraser 174–5 new states movement 3–4, 48, 50, 372 Fenton, James 48–9 Ferguson, Cecile 100, 101, 331–3 Ferguson, Christine 360–1 Field, Albert 163–4 Fielding, Steve 365, 368 Fife, Wal 196, 236 Fightback! economic package 291–2, 295–6 Finnane report 197–9 firearms see gun law reform Fischer, Harrison 296 Fischer, Tim 289, 311 Blunt supported by 293–5 enters parliament 257 on gun law reform 298–301 as leader 281–4, 287–90, 306, 312 in leadership challenge 268–9 personal life 296–7 portfolios held by 299, 314–5 relations with Queensland party 317–8 retirement 315, 340 runs for deputy leader 243 shadow portfolios 227, 230, 246, 281 Fisher, Peter 168, 208 on coalition agreement 227 enters parliament 258 on leadership challenge 269 overlooked for ministry 258 votes against wheat deregulation 273 Fisher electorate 237 Fitzgerald, Rohan 360 Fitzgerald Inquiry 278–9 flat tax policy 216–7, 232–3 Fleming, William 14, 17, 20, 377 becomes deputy leader 22 loses seat 23 Flinders electorate 6, 91 Flynn electorate 354, 396 For Australia 235 for regional Australia 394 Forde, Francis 79, 81 foreign investment policy 174–5

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Formation of the Australian Country Parties ix Forrest, John (1847–1918) 6 Forrest, John (1949–) 400 abstains from vote 351 shadow portfolios 359, 399 Foundation for Rural and Regional Renewal 319 Fowler, James 21 Fox Ranger Uranium Inquiry 180 Fraser, Malcolm 166 on NCP in Whitlam dismissal 166 as caretaker PM 166 cigarette advertising banned by 173 establishes Medibank Private 174 as Liberal leader 163 on McEwen 130–1 portfolios held by 132, 144 relations with National Party 211–2 on Woodward report 203–4 Fraser, Peter 75 Fraser Coalition government 167, 170–1 Freeth, Gordon 127 Fromelles 343 fuel policy see petrol policies Fuller, John 107–8, 118 Future,The – A Report by The Committee of Review into the Future Direction of the National Party of Australia see Nixon Report Future Proofing Telecommunications in Non-Metropolitan Australia 334 Gair, Nell 162 Gair, Vince 151–8, 162 Gardiner, Jenny 100 Garland, Vic 180, 184 GATT 187 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 187 George VI, King of England 90 Georges, George 157 Ghan railway 128, 194 Gibbs, Harry 169 Gibson, William ‘Billy’ 7, 20 elected deputy leader 24 loses seat 46 portfolios held by 28–9, 32 refuses to sign Victorian CP pledge 55 as whip 18 gift duties abolished 182 Gilmore electorate 397 Gippsland electorate 24, 37, 359–60 Gleneagles agreement 184 Gloucester, Duke of 90 Goods and Services Tax 290–2, 310–1, 323–5 Gorton, John 117, 180 leadership challenges to 128

opens John McEwen House 118 as PM 122, 125–7 relations with ACP 131 unrest under 132–3 Gowrie, Lord 62 Graham, BD ix Grains Council 263 Grampians electorate 23 Great Depression 46–9 Green, Roland 23, 37 Green Politics: History and Political Implications 277 Greenwood, Ivor 181 Gregory, Henry 16, 20, 377–8 as deputy leader 17–8, 22 founder member of ACP 8–9 nominates Cameron for re-election as leader 72 opposes coalition 25 opposes tariff policy 44 Greiner, Nick 250, 278 Groom, Littleton 27, 45, 51 Groom electorate 46, 231 by-election loss 250–1, 259, 279 GST 290–2, 310–1, 323–5 GST – Not the big bad wolf 291 Guantanamo Bay 351 Gullett, Henry 70 gun law reform 298–302 Gwydir electorate 37, 82, 313 by-elections 91–3 primary votes at 2001 election 340–1 lost to Labor 46 threat to abolish 108 Haines, Janine 293 Hall, Andrew 336 Hall, JJ 6 Hall, Steele 161, 164, 168, 205 Hanson, Pauline 302, 374 see also One Nation Hardy, Charles 57–8 Harradine, Brian 168 Hartsuyker, Luke 358, 400 shadow portfolios 359, 366, 399 Hasluck, Paul 122, 131, 150 Hawke, Bob as ACTU president 174 becomes Labor leader 205 election campaigns 207, 225, 231 loses Labor leadership 292 postal expenditure 293 Hawke Labor government 209, 236, 307 Hawker, David 282, 293 Hay, Alexander 20, 21 defection of 377 founder member of ACP 9–10 Hayden, Bill 217

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becomes Labor leader 182 challenges for leadership of Labor 181 resigns leadership 205 Sinclair criticises wife of 259–60 Health Insurance Commission 174 health policy 34–5, 173–4, 195 Henderson, Brad 387, 394 He’s not pretty, but he’s pretty effective 374 Hewson, John 272 becomes Liberal leader 281 postal expenditure 293 on wool pricing 288 Hicks, David, detention of 351 Hicks, Noel 208, 229 enters parliament 257 in leadership challenge 265–6, 268 runs for deputy leader 243 in party executive 230 Hill, CR 55, 89 Hill, William 7–9, 20 founder member of ACP 8–9 portfolios held by 37 Hinkler electorate 237, 296 History of the Australian Country Party ix Hockey, Joe 398 Holm, Charles 225, 249 Holt, Harold becomes PM 114–5 disappearance of 121–3 as Treasurer 1, 102–3 Holten, Mac 105, 118, 168 portfolios held by 130 shadow portfolios 143 honours lists 142 horsemeat scandal 202 Howard, Arthur 91–2, 94 Howard, John 326 addresses gun lobby rally 301–2 Anderson’s relations with 321 Bjelke-Petersen campaign and 231–2 caravan park GST modified by 324–5 coalition reformed under 243–6 gun law policy 300 industrial relations policy 350–1 leadership challenge to 264–9 as Liberal leader 258, 298 loses seat 355 One Nation and 312 retirement issues 349, 353–4 Sinclair coalition deal with 226–8 supports wheat deregulation 273 as Treasurer 181 Howard Coalition government, code of ministerial conduct 308–9 Howson, Peter 125 Hughes, William ‘Billy’ Morris forms Australian Party 48

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as Independent Nationalist 46 motion defeats government 45 offers composite government 21–2 in Opposition 44–5 overseas travel by 19–23 relations with ACP 15–6 resigns as PM 27 in UAP 49, 76 voting system endorsed by 5–6 Hughes Must Go slogan 22 Hughes Nationalist administration 5–6 Hull, Kay 100, 101, 311, 400 as Chief Whip 351, 359 enters parliament 313 offered leadership 356 on Telstra sale 327 Hume electorate 313, 396 Hunt, Alfred 39 Hunt, Ralph 168, 208, 212 on Earle Page 19 enters ministry 120 enters parliament 258 in Gair affair 153 Joh candidates stand against 236 McEwen as mentor to 105–6 member of party review committee 249 portfolios held by 130, 169, 173–4, 193–4 retires as deputy leader 242 hadow portfolios 143, 227, 230 supports coalition 250 Hunter, James 21, 37, 56 Hunter electorate 397 illegal immigrants see asylum-seeker policy immigration and refugee policies 194 see also security issues ‘immunity clause’ 36 import parity fuel pricing 188–90 Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW) 278, 280 Independent Country Party 65 Independent Nationalists 46, 48 Indi electorate 44, 396 lost to Liberals 182 McEwen elected for 59–60 Indian Pacific railway 128 industrial relations policy compulsory unionism 94 under Fadden 86 under Fraser 173, 175, 191–2, 213 under Howard 350–1 under Page 45 under Whitlam 148 Industries Assistance Commission 200–1 infiltration of Country/National Party 370–5

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inflation under Fraser 172, 191–2 under Menzies 87, 89–90 under Whitlam 147–8 Institute of Economic Development 372 Institute of Science and Industry 34 Iraq, AWB in 351 Iraq conflict 352 Irvine, William 6 Japan 86–7, 104 Joh for Canberra campaign 214–25 candidates defeated at election 235–7 fallout from 240–2 Peter Slipper on 377 John McEwen House 117, 118, 332 financial issues 330–3 rebuilding of 331 Johnson, Elliot 11 Johnston, Edward 44, 57–8 Jones, Paul 44 Jowett, Edmund 8–9, 11, 20–1, 20 Joyce, Barnaby 396, 400 becomes party Senate leader 366 blocked from party Senate leadership 358 enters parliament 345, 363 on nuclear power 395 shadow portfolios 398 supports Greens motion 366–8 Jull, David 309 Katter, Bob (Jnr) defection of 340, 375–6 One Nation preferences and 312 opposes gun law reform 300 Katter, Bob (Snr) 168, 208 criticises Joh for Canberra campaign 240–2 enters parliament 258 retirement 279 in party excutive 230 Keating, Paul 181, 292, 295 Keating Labor government 369 Keeping Australia Strong 188 Kelly, Bert 202–3 Kelly, De-Anne 100, 101 elected to parliament 299 loses seat 354 One Nation preferences and 312 opposes gun law reform 300 portfolios held by 349 runs for deputy leader 347 Kennedy electorate 396 delayed polling in 284 lost to Independent 340

lost to Labor 279 regained 296 Kerin, John 262–3, 287–8 Kerr, John 164, 166–7, 166 Khemlani loans affair 164 Kilgariff, Bern 168, 168, 185–6, 377 Killen, Jim 111 Killen, William 23–4, 29 King, Bob 105, 168 King, Mackenzie 75 Kirkby, Thelma 92, 94 Korean War 85–7 Kroger, Michael 284 Labor party see Australian Labor Party Lane, Don 214 Lang, John ‘Jack’ Thomas 48–9 Lang Labor candidates 49, 51, 55 Langbroek, John-Paul 389 Latham, John assists ACP 24–6 drafts coalition documents 28 joins Nationalist Party 37 leads Nationalist Party 46 leaves parliament 55 as UAP deputy leader 49 Lawler, Tony 313 Leard, John 231 Lee, Jeremy 372 Lehman Brothers bank 368–9 Lewis, Tom 163 Lexcen, Ben 231 Liberal and Country League (SA) 38, 55–6, 91 Liberal Democrat Party 77 Liberal National Party (Qld) 385, 388–9, 395–6 Liberal Party of Australia see also amalgamation proposals; coalition with other parties; names of Liberal and Coalition administrations attitudes to amalgamation 285–6 foundation of 79 joint election campaigns with 336–7 Liberal–Country Party (Vic) 60 Lightfoot, Philip 365 Lloyd, Bruce 132–3, 168, 208 on Bob Katter Jnr 376 as deputy leader 243, 281 enters parliament 258 at Howard meeting 265 in leadership challenge 268 shadow portfolios 227, 230, 246, 281 on wheat deregulation 262–3 Loan Council 31, 49 Lucock, Phil 168, 372 Lusher, Stephen 168, 208, 258 on abortion 195

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on welfare policy 195-6 Lynch, Phil as acting PM 197 family trust investigated 181–2 as Liberal deputy leader 143 portfolios held by 179, 182–3 role in Whitlam dismissal 165 Lyne electorate 361–2, 396 Lyons, Joe 42 leads UAP 49 Page’s relations with 50–1 resignation from Labor 48–9 sudden death of 62–3 Lyons Coalition government 56 Lyons UAP government 51 Macaulay, Rob 311, 312 Macdonald, Sandy loses endorsement 364 loses Senate seat 313 portfolios held by 349 returns to Senate 340 crosses floor 365 MacKenzie, Sandy 168, 258 Macquarie electorate 397 Main Roads Development Act 1923 32 Manifold, James 6–7 Mann, Edward 46 Maranoa electorate 21 Marek, Paul 312 Marginal Dairy Farmers’ Reconstruction Scheme 371 Maritime Industries Bill 1929 45 Markets and Migration portfolio 34 Marks, Walter 46 Marshall, Jack 33, 138–9 Mason, Colin 182 Massy-Greene, Walter 16, 23 Maule, TG 156 Maunsell, Ron 154–8, 154, 162, 168 Maxwell, George 46 Mayo electorate 361–2 McArdle, Mark 381, 384 McClelland, Hugh 55, 59 McCubbin, Darren 360 McDonald, Don 304 on GST 311 on John McEwen House 331–2 McDonald, Stuart 106–7, 132, 225 on amalgamation 286 in party review process 249 McEwen, John 104, 107, 117, 126, 147 on ACP 321 on amalgamation 379 becomes PM 121–6 becomes deputy leader 77

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enters parliament 55–6 Fadden supported by 72 on Gorton 131 industry policy 110–2 as leader 103, 105–9 McMahon’s relations with 108, 114–5 Menzies’ relations with 108 moves to Indi electorate 59–60 at Page funeral 3 Page’s relations with 61 portfolios held by 60–1, 69, 72, 84, 95, 103 on Primary Industry portfolio 200 relations with DLP 144 retirement 128–9 runs for deputy leader 60 runs for leader 68 successors to 128 on working hours 86 McGauran, Julian 340 defection of 376 enters parliament 237, 257, 296 joins Liberal Party 358 in leadership challenge 267 loses Senate seat 275–6, 280 Senate preselection position 261 on wheat industry 274, 365 McGauran, Peter 208 on amalgamation 284 on brother’s defection 376 on equine influenza 352-3 enters parliament 257 in leadership challenge 267 organises gun law reform rally 301–2 portfolios held by 299, 305, 313–4, 349, 352–3 runs for deputy leader 243, 347–8 runs for leader 281 shadow portfolios 230, 281 travel allowance claims 308–9 offered leadership 356–7 resigns from parliament 359–60 McGibbon, David 205 McGregor royal commission 204–5 McGuren, Frank 2 McIver, Bruce 381, 384 McKell, William 88 McKellar, Colin 125 McKerrow, Shirley 100 heads National Party 99–100 Joh for Canberra campaign and 221, 223 retires as federal president 225 McKew, Maxine 355 McLachlan, Ian 231, 284, 288 McMahon, William 126 Doug Anthony’s relations with 138–9 as Liberal deputy leader 128

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as Liberal leader and PM 133 McEwen’s relations with 108–9, 114–5, 121–4 suspected of leaks 113 McManus, Frank 151 McMillan electorate 397 McPhee, Ian 265 McVeigh, Tom 168, 194, 208 enters parliament 258 Joh for Canberra campaign and 231, 238 leaves parliament 250 withdraws from Coalition 221 McWilliams, William 10, 13, 20, 270 death of 46 founder member of ACP 8–10 as leader 11–2, 17–8 loses seat 23 moves to limit Supply 15 returns to parliament 44 votes with Labor 16, 45 meat exports 202 media relations 170–1, 239 Medibank health scheme 173–4 Melville, Leslie 112 Menzies, Robert 104 absent from Page funeral 3 attitudes to television 96 Doug Anthony meets with 165 enters parliament 55 Fadden’s relations with 81 Gwydir campaign 92–3 Hughes attacked by 76 leads Liberal Party 79 McEwen’s relations with 108 Page’s relations with 63–7 relations with ACP 69–71 resigns as Attorney-General 62–3 retirement 114 Menzies Coalition government 103–5 mergers see amalgamation proposals Messenger, Rob 389 metric system adoption 176 Mileposts 400 Millar, Clarrie 168 critical of Sinclair 260 enters parliament 258 votes against wheat deregulation 273 Miller, Harry M 147 Milliner, Bertie 163 Ministers from ACP/NP 416–22 Mitchell, Sue 331 Moore, John 264, 309 Moore electorate 108 Morgan, Arthur 46 Morris, Graeme 309 Moss, Bill 114 Muldoon, Robert 188

Munro, EJ 42 Murphy, FJ 59 Murphy, Lionel 150–1, 158, 163 Murray, Wal 250, 256, 278 Murray electorate 132–3, 396 Nash, Fiona 100, 101, 358, 396, 400 on carbon sinks vote 366–8 enters parliament 345 resigns as parliamentary secretary 367 shadow portfolios 366 Nation Building program 369 National Agenda for Early Childhood 342 national anthem 142 National Country Party see also Australian Country Party; National Party of Australia; The Nationals, name changes to 166, 327–8, 335–6 National Debt Sinking Fund 31 National Federation 36, 49 National Health and Medical Research Council 34 National Health and Pensions Insurance Bill 62 National Marine Science Research Centre 175 National Party of Australia see also The Nationals Anderson review of 380 branding for 146–7, 213, 335 constitutional reform 254–5 electoral performance 403–4 financial difficulties 330–3 future of 391–401 landmark achievements 422–5 leadership of 404–7 membership age 307 membership numbers 148 name change to 145–6, 205 name changes in 402 The Nationals adopted as name for 327– 8, 335–6 Nixon Report on 248–56 outside coalition 230 on Queensland merger 384 Sinclair on role of 320–1 succession planning 258 National Party: Prospects for the great survivors ix National Rural Finance Summit 303 national secretariat 116–8 National Water Initiative 346 National Water Resources Program 192 National Works Council 80 nationalisation of banks 82–3 Nationalist Party (Federal) ACP coalition with 25–7 losses in 1922 election 24, 46

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Nationalist Party (Qld) 38 Nationals deliver on regional telecommunications 328 Nationals for a Safe Future 279 Natural Heritage Trust 325–6, 350 Neal, Laurie 177 Nehl, Garry 257, 266, 281 Nelson, Brendan 358–9, 365 Nelson, Jock 115 Networking the Nation 326 Neville, Paul 400 New Brighton caravan 197 New Caledonia, flying-boat base in 130 New England electorate 23, 340, 396 New Guard 48 New South Wales Cahill government 93–4 electorates lost in 396 Liberal Party 91 Progressive Party 28, 39 New South Wales Farmers’ Association 327 New South Wales State party 48 attitudes to amalgamation 386 change of name from Progressive Party 39 defections in 378 federal MPs from 257–8 federal relations with 118 funds NT branch 116 ICAC allegations against 278 opposes amalgamation 73 postwar losses 91 response to Page attack 66–7 reviews of 256, 380 new states, movement for 3–4, 48, 50, 372 New Zealand, relations with 188 Newell, Neville 280 Newton, Maxwell 113 Nicholls, Tim 389 Nixon, Peter 168, 206, 211, 252 on amalgamation 284 becomes acting deputy leader 179, 198 on exchange rates 137 forms agricultural working group 201 on Fraser 211–2 in Gair affair 153 Joh for Canberra campaign and 223 McEwen as mentor to 105–6 on McEwen 106 no leadership aspirations 179 on parity pricing 188 portfolios held by 120, 130, 167, 169– 71, 192–3, 201–4 relations with Victorian party 177 retirement of 207 runs for deputy leader 129 shadow portfolios 143 Sparkes negotiates with 244

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supports coalition 250 Walsh debate 190–1 Nixon Report 248–56 Nock, Horace 69–70 Northern Australia Party 116 Northern New State Movement 3–4 Northern Territory 174, 352 Northern Territory electorate 115–6 NT Nationals 218–9 Northern Territory Country Liberal Party formation of 184 relations with federal parties 184–6, 385–6 Tambling disendorsed by 337–8 nuclear power 395 Oakeshott, Rob 361–2, 375 O’Chee, Bill 281, 312–3 Office for Women’s Affairs 194 Office of Rural Research 42, 116 Office of the Status of Women 194 Oil Agreement Bill 1920: 16 oil pricing see petrol policies O’Keefe, Frank 168 On Target 372 One Nation economic package 295 One Nation or Two? 318 One Nation Anderson on 318 Australian League of Rights and 374 electoral performance 313 gun law policy 302 losses at 2001 election 340–1 public appeal of 310, 312 opinion polling 336 Ord River Irrigation Scheme 128 Ottawa Agreement 51–2, 109 Pacific War Council 75 Page, Charles 3 Page, Earle Christmas Grafton 18, 20, 33, 59 chairs ACPA 40 chairs first meeting in Canberra 35 death of 2–3, 112 favours constitutional reform 22 as first party secretary and whip 11 forms caretaker government 62–7 founder member of ACP 9–10 in Health portfolio 61 Hughes’ relations with 19–23 as leader 1–4, 17–9, 24, 60–1 loses Cowper electorate 1 maiden speech 15 McEwen’s relations with 61 Menzies’ relations with 63–7

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again contests leadership 71 portfolios held by 35, 56, 72, 84, 95 resigns leadership 67 son’s death 53–4 as Treasurer 45 wartime liaison duties 75–6 wins Cowper electorate 7 Page, Earle Jnr 53 Page, Iven 2, 53 Page, James 21 Page, Robert 32 Page, Thomas 32 Page electorate 280, 354, 396 Page Research Centre, The 334 Paterson, John 245 opposes coalition 250 on party review committee 249 support for Blunt 294–5 Paterson, Thomas 24 as acting leader 53–4 as deputy leader 46, 60 portfolios held by 56 refuses to sign Victorian CP pledge 55 supports coalition 29 supports parliamentary ACP 60 Paterson Butter Plan 34 Paterson electorate 397 Patricks stevedoring 304–5 Peacock, Andrew challenges for leadership 265 as Liberal leader 209, 269 loses Liberal leadership 258, 281 postal expenditure 293 Pearce, George 21 Peden, John 44 Peden royal commission on new states 50 Pendarvis, Jay 231 petrol policies diesel fuel rebate 306 oil pricing 188–90 pricing initiatives 179–80 rationing 83–4 taxation rates 33 Petrov affair 94–5 platforms see policy statements ‘pledge, the’ 28 policy statements 1916: 4 1920: 15–6 1921: 17 1922: 22–3 1927: 40–1 1934: 54 1943: 76–7 1945: 78–9 1946: 79–81 1961: 111–2

1971: 133 1980: 188 1983: 205–7 1987: 233 1990: 279 2000: 342 2008: 394 Port Adelaide electorate 250 Port Arthur massacre 300 portfolios held by ACP/NP/The Nationals 416–22 see also titles of portfolios and names of Ministers postal expenditure issue 292–5 Postmaster-General’s Department see communications policy preferential voting 4–6 premiers’ conferences 31 Priebe, Michael 256, 380 Primary Industry portfolio see also agricultural policies; dairy industry; tariff policy; wheat industry Agriculture – Advancing Australia package 303, 306–7 under Anderson 303 European Economic Community and 187–8 under Fadden 76–7, 79–80, 83, 87–8 under Kerin 287–8 under McGauran 352–3 under McMahon 140 under Nixon 192, 201–4 under Sinclair 172–3, 194, 200–1 wool industry 87–9, 141, 287–90 Production and a Fair Deal 17 Progressive Party (NSW) 28, 39 proportional voting 4–5 Prospectus for Prosperity 80 protectionism see tariff policy Prowse, John 9–10, 20, 37, 44 Pryor, Ross 7 quarantine system 353 Queensland see also Joh for Canberra campaign 2009 State election 388–9 drought in 308 Liberal National Party 385, 388–9, 395–6 Nationalist Party 38 Queensland Labor Party 151–7 Queensland State party see also Joh for Canberra campaign; Sparkes, Bob amalgamation proposals 380–1 Anderson’s relations with 318 Fischer’s relations with 317–8 Fitzgerald Inquiry into 278–9 forms government 214 loses power 279

Index

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mergers and separations by 38–9, 384–6 One Nation preferences and 312 votes for name change 145–6 Quinn, Les 92, 94 RAAF 70, 125 railways 194 see also Transport portfolio Alice Springs to Darwin 128, 194, 319 Indian Pacific 128 Rankin, George 60 Rattigan, Alf 112 Rau, Cornelia 351–2 referenda 1926: on Commonwealth powers 45 1951: on communism 85 1974: on electoral reform 161 1977: on electoral reform 175 1988: on electoral reform 261–2 on bank nationalisation, proposed 82–3 Hughes promises 22 on new states, proposed 50 refugee policies see immigration and refugee policies Regional Australia Summit 318–9 Regional Solutions/Partnerships program 319, 342 Regional Women’s Advisory Council 342 Reith, Peter waterfront reform and 304–5 Remembrance Driveway 305 Representation Act 1983: 209 Reserve Bank of Australia 102, 369 revaluations see exchange rate policy Richmond electorate 23, 396 Anthonys hold for ACP/NP 208, 299, 312–4 loss of 280, 345, 354 three-cornered contest in 37 Rippon, Geoffrey 136 Ritchie, T Malcolm 79 Riverina electorate 23, 82, 182 rivers, turning inland 192–3 roads see Transport portfolio Robb, Andrew 286 Robertson, Agnes ‘Aggie’ 97–9, 98, 378 Robertson, Jessie 99 Robinson, Ian 168, 208 on coalition agreement 227 on Earle Page 19 enters parliament 258 Joh for Canberra campaign and 218 on leadership challenge 272 loses seat 280 on McEwen vs Page 61 on National Party 323 overlooked for ministry 258

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Page taken ill at home of 2 runs for deputy leader 243 Sinclair charges reviewed by 259 Ross-Edwards, Peter 373 Rowland Smith, Bob 118 royal commissions on the Constitution 44 into meat exports 204–5 into new states 50 into Soviet espionage 94–5 RSL, attacks Holt ministers 125 Rudd, Kevin 352, 354 Rudd Labor government 359, 389 environmental policies 394–5, 400–1 Rural Adjustment Scheme 200 Rural Agricultural Movement 371 Rural Credits Department 32 Rural Medical Infrastructure Fund 342 rural policies see Primary Industry portfolio Rural Reconstruction Scheme 200 Rural Transaction Centres 326 Russell, David 220 contests Groom by-election 250 opposes coalition 250 on party review committee 249 on Queensland merger 384 resigns as federal president 381 Russia see Soviet Union Ryan electorate 337 Sale (Vic) football ground rally 301–2 SBS television service 198 Science and Industry Bill 1920: 16 Science portfolio 176–7 Scott, Bruce 400 portfolios held by 299, 305, 314, 343 Scott, Doug 168, 208 Scullin, James 7, 46–8 Scullin Labor government 48–51 Scullion, Nigel 328, 367, 396, 400 abstains from carbon sinks vote 367–8 becomes deputy leader 358 replaces Tambling on Senate ticket 338 shadow portfolios 358, 364, 366, 398 sits with Nationals 340 Scully, Jim 188 Scully, William 91 security issues 338–41, 344–5, 351 See, John 3 Seeney, Jeff 389 Senate ACP leaders in 57–8 ACP/NP members of 408–16 Bjelke-Petersen’s candidates for 236 under Bruce government 37–8 Nationals leaders in 247

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role in Whitlam dismissal 163–4 under Rudd government 365 under Whitlam government 149–58 Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Government Operations 201–2 Setter, Rick 385–6 Shannon, Ross 279 Sharp, John 243 on amalgamation 284 on waterfront reform 304-5 enters parliament 257 in leadership challenge 264–6, 268 portfolios held by 299, 303–5 retirement 310 runs for leader 281 shadow portfolios 246, 281 travel allowance claims 308–9 Sheil, Glen 168, 191 on apartheid 183–4 enters parliament 258 loses Senate seat 280 portfolios held by 183 SIEV 4: 340 Simon, Barry 195 Simpson, Fiona 389 Sinclair, Ian 166, 168, 206, 208, 211, 212, 235 as acting leader 179 on amalgamation 285, 383–4 on Australian League of Rights 372 chairs FRRR 319 on coalition constraints 320–1 as deputy leader 129 enters ministry 120 enters parliament 258 on exchange rates 137 Finnane report into family companies 197–9 in Gair affair 152–3 Howard’s coalition deal with 226–7 Joh candidates stand against 236 Joh for Canberra campaign and 217, 221–3, 225–6 as leader 211–2, 242–3, 258–62 leadership aspirations 208–9 loses leadership 270–2 McEwen as mentor to 105–6 on Menzies and McEwen 108 portfolios held by 128, 130, 167, 169, 172–3, 193–4, 198, 200–1, 272 runs for leader 281, 296 shadow portfolios 143, 227, 246 as Speaker of the House 272–3 staff allowance claims 259 taxation policy under 233 on wool pricing 288 Sir Earle Page Memorial Trust 334 Slipper, Peter 376–7, 390

Smith, Dick 231 Smith, Ewart 247 Smuts, Jan 75 Snedden, Billy 125, 138 deposed by Malcolm Fraser 163 elected Liberal leader 143–4 in Gair affair 152 social credit movement 373 social policies 139–40 social security see welfare policies Solomons, Adrian 178 South Africa 184 South Australia attitudes to coalition 38 coalition arrangements in 383 Country Party and Liberal Federation 38 Liberal and Country League 38, 55–6, 91 Soviet Union 94–5, 127 Sparkes, Bob 219–21, 223 coalition negotiations with 244–5 Joh for Canberra campaign and 231–2, 238 on Joh Independent candidates 235–6 Sinclair’s relations with 234, 258 threatens to withdraw funding 274–5 Spence, Gary 384 Spooner, William 3 Springborg, Lawrence 380–1, 384–5, 388–9 St Clair, Stuart 311, 312, 313, 340 State parties see also under names of States attitudes to amalgamation 386–7 attitudes to coalition 28–9 defectors to and from 378 Fraser government and 174 funding arrangements 333–4 Joh for Canberra campaign and 224–5 membership numbers 148 name changes in 145–6, 335–6 One Nation and 312 postwar losses in 91 relations with 107–8 in State governments 38 States Grants Act 1927: 31 Stephen, Ninian 260 Stewart, Percy 20, 44, 46 elected secretary-whip 24 forms Country Progressive Party 37 founder member of ACP 9–10 opposes coalition 36–7 portfolios held by 28–9 rejoins parliamentary party 47 Stone, John 232–3 becomes party Senate leader 247 enters parliament 237–8, 257 in leadership challenge 266–7 fails to win Fairfax 279–80 resigns from Senate 280–1

Index

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runs for deputy leader 243 shadow portfolios 246, 261 on wheat deregulation 273–4 Street, Geoffrey 70 strong Country Party keeps the balance, A 139 Stronger Families and Communities Strategy 342 sub-prime mortgage crisis 368–9 Sullivan, John 168 superphosphate bounty 172–3 Supply bills blocked in Senate 164–5, 169 threats to block 150, 158–61 Swan, Wayne 369 Swan electorate 6, 81 Swinney, Stella 99, 100 Tambling, Grant 219 disendorsed by NT-CLP 337–8 elected party Senate whip 247 enters parliament 237, 257 portfolios held by 299, 314 shadow portfolios 281 Tampa affair 338–40 tariff policy see also protectionism under Anthony 133, 188 campaigns against 370 early clashes in 16–7 under Lyons 51–2 under McEwen 110–2 in Murray by-election 132 in Opposition 47 opposition to 113 under Page 43–4, 56 under Whitlam 200–1 Tasmania 23, 37, 300 Tasmanian Farmers, Stockowners and Orchardists’ Association 23 taxation policy see also petrol policies under Bjelke-Petersen 216–7 capital gains taxes 190 death and gift duties abolished 182 under Fadden 81, 89 flat tax policy 232–3 GST 290–2, 310–1, 323–5 under Labor 295–6, 369 Tehan, Tom 168 telecommunications policy see communications policy television, introduction of 96 Telstra see also communications policy, privatisation of 311, 325–9, 350 terrorism see World Trade Center attack The Australian 112 The Country Party in New South Wales – A Study of Organisation and Survival ix

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The Daily Examiner 32 The Formation of the Australian Country Parties ix The Future – A Report see Nixon Report The National Party: Prospects for the great survivors ix The Nationals see also National Party of Australia adoption of name 327–8, 335–6 The Nationals deliver on regional telecommunications 328 ‘the pledge’ 28 Their Service – Our Heritage 343 Theodore, Edward 48 They Want Your Land 372–3 Thompson, Victor 21, 23, 72 opposes coalition 29 portfolios held by 61 Thomson, David 168, 176–7, 330 Thomson, John 4, 7 Thorby, Harold loses seat 70 moves to exclude renegades 68 nominates for deputy leader 60 portfolios held by 56, 61, 69 Thornthwaite, F 70 three-cornered contests in Bruce–Page pact 36–7 under Lyons 54 under Menzies 91 in Queensland 381 Tiller, Helen 100 tobacco growers 173 Townley, Michael 161, 164 Trade portfolio under Doug Anthony 177–8 under Fischer 314–5 under McEwen 103, 109 under Truss 350 under Vaile 344, 349 trade unions see ACTU; industrial relations policy Transport portfolio Nationals lose 282 under Nixon 193 roads 32–3, 302, 342–3 under Sharp 302–5 under Sinclair 128, 193 under Vaile 350 travel allowance claims 308–9 Treasury portfolio 29, 87–90, 102–4 Treloar, Thomas 91 Trethowan, Arthur 4 Troeth, Judith 314 Truman, Harry 86 Truss, Warren 367, 393, 400 on Copenhagen conference 399–400 on dairy policy 323

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as deputy leader 347–9 on ETS 394–5 as leader 356–8, 380 as LNP member 385 One Nation preferences and 312 portfolios held by 305, 309, 315, 318, 350 on 2009–10 budget 369 shadow portfolios 358, 366 on wheat marketing 364–5 Turnbull, Malcolm 365, 397–8 unemployment levels 47, 172, 191–2 United Australia Party 28 after 1934 election 54–6 collapse of 77 formation of 49 governs in own right 51–2 United Country Movement (NSW) 48 United Country Party (NSW) see New South Wales State parties United Kingdom see Britain United Party 38 see also Nationalist Party United States, sub-prime mortgage crisis 368–9 Unsworth, Barry 250 uranium policy see also fuels policy under Anthony 174, 180 under Blunt 279 nuclear power issue 395 Uren, Tom 181 Vaile, Mark 348 on amalgamation 384 as deputy leader 315 on joint election campaigns 337 as leader 346–9 melanoma treatment 349–50 portfolios held by 309, 314, 344, 349–50 resigns as leader 355–7 retires from parliament 360–2 on Telstra sale 327 vanguard branches 286 Veterans’ Affairs portfolio 305, 343 Victoria 97, 396 Victorian Farmers’ Union 4, 6, 7 Victorian Liberal Party, opposed to coalition 176–7 Victorian State parties attitudes to amalgamation 386–7 attitudes to coalition 28–9 coalition arrangements 382 Country Progressives 47 Liberal–Country Party 60

lose government 91 McEwen’s relations with 60 pledge required by 55 unification of 77–8 Vietnam War 124–5, 142 Vietnamese immigrants 194 voting systems see electoral reform Voyager disaster 124 Wakefield electorate 44, 46 Walker, Frank 197–9 Walsh, Peter 190–1 war on terror 338–40 Ward, Eddie 49 Warwick, Peter 118–9 water resources policy 192–3, 343–4, 346 Watt, William 6 WD Scott and Company 145 Webster, Jim 168, 169, 175–7 Weiley, Neville 2 Weinberg, Mark 294 welfare policies National Health and Pensions Insurance Bill 62 rural relief policy 54 West, Katharine 231 Western Australian State party attitudes to coalition 28–9 in Barnett government 397 coalition arrangements 382–3 postwar losses 91 whaling industry closed down 194 wheat industry deregulation of 262–3, 273 Wheat Export Marketing Bill 364 Wheat Stabilisation Scheme 371 White, Brudenell 70 White, Gaye 100, 333 Whitlam, Gough as Labor leader 138 leadership challenges to 181 media use by 170 rejects Supply compromise 165 Whitlam Labor government 142, 147–8 attempts to manipulate Senate 149–58 dismissal of 163–7 IAC established by 200–1 Supply bills of blocked 158–61 Whitsitt, Joshua 24 Wide Bay electorate 44, 313 Wienholt, Arnold 20, 21 defects from Nationalists 378 founder member of ACP 9–10 retirement 23 Williams, Barbara 265 Williams, John 358, 364, 366–8, 396, 400

Index

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Wilmot electorate 24 Wilson, Alexander 59, 76–8 Wilson, Reginald 13, 24, 29 Wimmera electorate 44, 59, 182 Windsor, Tony 340, 375 Wise, George 24 Withers, Reg 153, 205 Wombat Trail 139, 238 women 97–101, 139–40, 194 Women’s Federal Council 99 Wood, Alan 138 Woodward, Denis ix Woodward Report 202–3

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wool industry 87–9, 141, 287–90 WorkChoices 350–1 World Trade Center attack 338–40 World Trade Organisation 344 World War II 62–3, 67, 74–5 Wran, Neville 198–9 Xenophon, Nick 368 Young National Country Party/Young Nationals 101

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