Nigeria, a Country under Siege : Issues of Conflict and Its Management [1 ed.] 9781527512184, 9781527505438

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Nigeria, a Country under Siege

Nigeria, a Country under Siege: Issues of Conflict and its Management Edited by

Dele Babalola and Hakeem Onapajo

Nigeria, a Country under Siege: Issues of Conflict and its Management Edited by Dele Babalola and Hakeem Onapajo This book first published 2018 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2018 by Dele Babalola, Hakeem Onapajo and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-0543-X ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-0543-8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ................................................................................... vii Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Dele Babalola and Hakeem Onapajo Chapter One ................................................................................................. 8 Problematising Conflict: The Concept, Theoretical Perspectives, and Trends in Nigeria Hakeem Onapajo Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 21 Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflict and the Elusive Quest for Peace in Post-Military Nigeria Dele Babalola Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 47 Citizenship Right versus Ethnic Nationality Claims: The Causal Factors of Communal Conflict in Nigeria Bakut tswah Bakut Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 69 The Political Economy of Ethno-Religious Conflict in Nigeria: A Case Study of Jos, Plateau State Hakeem Onapajo and Christopher Isike Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 92 The ‘Jihadism’ of Boko Haram in Nigeria: The ‘Glocal’ Dimension Benjamin Maiangwa Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 114 Climate Change, Migratory Adaptation and Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Oyo State, Nigeria Temitope Edward Akinyemi

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Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 141 Drivers of Violence: Commercial Drivers and Urban Conflicts in Ekiti State, Nigeria Azeez Olaniyan and Akeem O. Bello Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 157 Conflict Management Mechanisms and the Management of the Niger Delta Conflict: An Appraisal Abdul-Wasi Babatunde Moshood Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 180 Interrogating the Role of Religious Leaders and Institutions in Conflict Management in Plateau State, Nigeria Dorcas Ettang and Olusola Ogunnubi Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 202 A Dialogue between the Cross and the Crescent: Towards Effective Peacebuilding and the Transformation of Religious Conflicts in Nigeria Sunday Paul C. Onwuegbuchulam Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 227 The Boko Haram Insurgency: Gendering Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building in Nigeria George Akwaya Genyi Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 246 A Gender Perspective on African Indigenous Conflict Resolution Practices Benedicta Daudu Chapter Thirteen ...................................................................................... 267 The Relevance of Peace Education in Addressing Boko Haram and Extremism in Nigeria Ahmad Rufai Saheed Contributors ............................................................................................. 291 Index ........................................................................................................ 295

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is important to start by specially acknowledging the funding provided by the management of Baze University, Abuja, Nigeria, at a disturbing time in the course of the production of the book. Clearly, this intervention gave life to the book when the project was about to crumble because of financial challenges and disappointments from other potential sponsors. We are immensely thankful to all the authors who contributed to bringing the main ideas behind this book to life. Our persistent demand for chapter revisions, which was apparently exhausting and frustrating, was accepted with an incredible show of humility and patience by each of them. We also express our profound gratitude to Cambridge Scholars Publishing for agreeing to work with us in transforming the manuscript into publishable material. We appreciate their professional management of the publication process right from its preliminary stage to completion. We thank our individual families, especially our wives Yinka FolaranmiBabalola and Mariam Adedeji-Onapajo, and our kids, for their overwhelming support and understanding during this project. Above all, we thank God, the Almighty, for giving us wisdom and guidance throughout the entire process. Dele Babalola and Hakeem Onapajo.

INTRODUCTION DELE BABALOLA AND HAKEEM ONAPAJO

One hundred years after the British colonialists unified two protectorates to create Nigeria, the problems inherent in lumping together a myriad of people with different histories, cultures, languages and religions continue to generate debate and controversy. Nigeria is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Africa, with three dominant ethnic identities territorially concentrated: Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo together with some 350 supposedly linguistic minorities spread across a population of approximately 200 million people. One of the biggest challenges that has continued to confront Nigerian leaders since independence in 1960 is how to genuinely bring together the different people that inhabit the country. Political battle lines and alliances are often made with regional, ethnic, and sometimes religious divides in mind. This explains why accusations and counter-accusations of inequalities, marginalisation, and domination have remained a regular feature of politics and society in Nigeria. Indeed, the above phenomenon has accounted for the country’s plethora of conflicts and other forms of internal convulsions experienced since independence. It was believed that violence associated with military governments, given Nigeria’s many years of military rule, was responsible for the upsurge of violent conflict in the country. Hence, there were increased calls by civil society groups and the international community for a democratic transition based on the belief that a democratic change would represent a panacea to the overwhelming conflict. However, contrary to this belief and their expectation of a positive outcome, the successful return to democracy in 1999 has been surrounded by a wave of conflict which has resulted in a huge number of deaths and the destruction of property. This clearly contradicts the underlying principles of a democracy characterised by pacifism, negotiation and civility, which the prodemocracy activists anticipated would usher in a more peaceful era. This perhaps explains why recent events in the country are attracting significant attention.

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Introduction

Some have perceived the increasing conflict in democratic Nigeria as an indication that democracy may not be the best system for the Nigerian people. Nigerians are seen as people of an entirely different specie who are perhaps best governed with the instrumentality of force. Thus, some have called for a return to the old military state, while others are of the opinion that a Nigerian version of democracy (with a touch of militarism) in congruence with the character and values of the people could be the best way to have an organised and peaceful society. These perceptions are faulty as they reflect the Western stereotype of Africans as uncivilised and ungovernable in a democratic system, which apparently supports the thinking of Western cultural superiority. What can be deduced from the above is the clear fact that there were some unresolved issues before the country returned to democracy in 1999. Perhaps this is because of the hasty manner in which the military government of Abdul-Salami Abubakar arranged the transition programme, and the scepticism of the political elite and civil society groups about the sincerity of the transition exercise. It has formed the basis for the outbreak of violent conflicts in the post-transition period. Unfortunately, attempts to organise national conferences to discuss the root problems and find a generally acceptable solution to tackle the issues have not been successful because of clandestine moves by incumbent presidents to hijack the process for their own personal and political interests. Although there have been useful studies on the problem of conflict in Nigeria, we can argue that they have not been sufficient because conflicts in the country have been on the increase rather than abating. More worryingly, there are ominous signs that new forms of conflict will soon emerge with the change of government following the overthrow of the erstwhile ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in 2015. The aim with this book is not to replace the array of existing studies on conflict and conflict management in Nigeria. Instead, it is a modest attempt to offer a compendium of resourceful studies dealing with the problem of conflict and the methods for its management in the Nigerian contemporary democracy. This research effort is considered most useful at this time when Nigeria has been seriously battered by bloody conflicts from insurgencies, ethno-religious conflicts, election conflicts, communal conflicts, and others. Thus, the book aims not only to analyse the nature and causes of conflicts in Nigeria, but also to contribute to the search for more robust mechanisms for managing the conflicts that have become synonymous with Africa’s most populous country. In light of this, the

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book is predicated on three major thematic areas: concept and theories of conflict; nature of conflicts; and conflict management strategies.

Outline of the Book The book is composed of thirteen chapters organised under three different themes. The first section deals with the conceptualisation of and theories concerning conflict. The second section focuses on studies dealing with the different forms of conflict that characterise the democratic era in Nigeria. The third section is composed of studies that analyse the methods for addressing the different forms of conflict in the country. The first chapter, by Hakeem Onapajo, analyses the concept and theories related to conflict and sets the stage for the other studies in the book. The author examines the existing literature to demonstrate the usage of conflict as a concept amongst scholars. The author further illustrates the existing explanations for the causes of conflict. This chapter is used as an explanatory framework to search for reasonable elucidations of the complex situation in Nigeria. The author argues that, despite the usefulness of each of the theories, they do not have the capacity to speak individually to the Nigerian situation because of the intersections of identities and the interests of conflicting parties. The chapter also usefully identifies — with the aid of empirical data — the magnitude and trends in the forms of conflict in Nigeria’s democratic era. The second chapter opens the discussion on the nature of conflicts that have surfaced in the post-military era in Nigeria. The chapter by Dele Babalola focuses on ethnic conflicts in contemporary Nigeria. The author builds his argument on the fact that the problem of ethnic conflict is driven by the age-old problem of ethnicity in African societies, which is a feature of post-colonial states. The author shows that although ethnic conflicts have existed in Nigeria since independence and the military era, they have been on the increase in the democratic era. The author pays particular attention to the proliferation of ethnic militia groups after democratic transition and the politics of ethnicity used by politicians, from the Obasanjo to the Jonathan presidential eras. The third chapter, by Bakut tswah Bakut, is built upon a critique of Western concepts in the literature concerning conflicts in Nigeria. He argues that there has been much focus on the concept of ‘communal conflicts’ while less emphasis has been placed on what ‘communal’ actually is. According to him, this is one of the reasons why scholars and

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Introduction

policy makers have not developed useful and practical strategies for conflict resolution in the country. The chapter addresses this concern in the literature and therefore focuses on the problem of indigene-settler conflict in Plateau State. The author argues that a lack of clear definition of the rights and entitlements of host nationalities and citizenship rights in the constitution plays a role in the problem of indigene versus settler conflicts and communal conflicts in Nigeria. The fourth chapter, by Hakeem Onapajo and Christopher Isike, advances a political economic analysis of some of the incidents of conflict in the democratic era. The authors, using the issue of recurrent conflicts among the ethno-religious groups in Jos, Plateau State, argue that some of the prevalent analyses of conflicts in Nigeria fail to understand the significance of the economic factor in some of the incidents. To demonstrate the salience of the economic factor in the case of Jos City, the authors employ the Marxist political economy approach. They show that the different conflicts taking place in the city are about a struggle for economic space by the competing groups in the state. Other factors including politics, religion, and ethnicity, which are advanced as reasons in other writings, are secondary to the economic factor. The Boko Haram terror, which is clearly the most apparent form of conflict presently in Nigeria, is discussed in Chapter Five by Benjamin Maiangwa. He challenges the clash of civilisations thesis of Samuel Huntington on the phenomenon of religious extremism and terrorism in contemporary times. The author argues that because religion has undergone globalisation, it has been a victim of interpretations and misconceptions, and he employs the case of Boko Haram and its violent interpretation of Islam as a basis to substantiate his argument. The author further argues that the propensity by the so-called jihadist groups, including Boko Haram, to engage in violence in their clamour for an Islamic state, is about asserting a sort of theological or political power and not necessarily a civilisation war. Temitope Edward Akinyemi brings to the fore the under-researched topic of conflicts and climate change in Nigeria, in Chapter Six. According to him, concerns about the conflict-multiplier effects of climate change and, in particular, its environmental variability outcomes have been a source of concern, especially given the importance of renewable natural resources to livelihood systems among the population. He examines conflict and environmental resource scarcity pressures on Fulani herdsmen, in the context of resource-based communal conflicts in arable agricultural

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ecologies, using the case study of Oyo State. The author demonstrates that inter-annual climatic changes, primarily, and the resultant migratory adaptations were the remote and immediate variables (respectively) in environmental vulnerability-conflict transformation accounting for farmerherder conflict in host communities. In Chapter Seven, Azeez Olaniyan and Akeem Bello analyse another important but overlooked issue of conflict in Nigeria. This concerns the case of urban conflict, which is increasingly becoming a regular feature in Nigerian cities. In this case, the authors focus on commercial bus drivers and consistent violent activities in Ado-Ekiti, the major urban centre in Ekiti State. They present an empirical analysis of the major instances of violence that have been perpetrated by the drivers, including the causes and consequences and state responses to the phenomenon. Abdul-Wasi Babatunde Moshood examines the different mechanisms used by the federal government to address the Niger Delta conflict, in Chapter Eight. The author adopts a historical approach to understand the failures of the government’s interventions and why the amnesty programme introduced in the area seems to be working. The author argues that the government’s lack of political will explains why the problem lingered for some time: this particularly escalated the conflict from a peaceful protest to an intense, armed conflict against the state. According to him, the components of the amnesty programme introduced in 2009 — especially the reintegration aspect of the programme — have proved to be positive in addressing the problem. For this reason, there is a need for the government to sustain the programme to achieve sustainable peace in the region. In Chapter Nine, Dorcas Ettang and Olusola Ogunnubi examine the role of religious leaders and religious institutions in conflict management in Plateau State, Nigeria. They acknowledge that the state has been one of the major zones of conflict during the democratic era. In addition, they identify the important roles of religious leaders and religious institutions in the management of conflict. The chapter therefore analyses the role of religious leaders and religious institutions within the context of conflictmanagement strategies, and examines how these actors and institutions have exacerbated or managed the conflict in Plateau State. The authors also identify the limitations that religious leaders face in contributing to peace efforts. The chapter concludes by providing lessons for other religious leaders and religious institutions involved in peace work.

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Introduction

In a similar vein, in Chapter Ten, Sunday Onwuegbuchulam emphasises the importance of religion in conflict resolution in Nigeria. The principal focus is placed on religious conflicts, particularly between the Christian and Muslim populations. Thus, the chapter looks at the phenomenon of conflict in Nigeria from a religious angle, while acknowledging religion has been overly abused in the country to serve ethno-political and socioeconomic ends, which provokes animosity and sustains conflict between the adherents of the religions. Using John Paul Lederach’s integrated model of peacebuilding as a theoretical framework, the study argues that Christianity and Islam have resources that can be used to transform animosity and conflict into sustainable peace. The author argues that dialogue is a mechanism that will enable the members of these religions in Nigeria to come together towards reconciliation and rebuild their relationship. In his own contribution in Chapter Eleven, George Akwaya Genyi examines the neglected role of women in finding a solution to the Boko Haram conflict in the north-east of Nigeria. This is anchored on the advocacy efforts by civil society groups for gender mainstreaming in public policy. The author notes that, despite the significance of women in Nigerian society and their apparent roles in maintaining peace, the state is yet to accord them respect by appointing them to take active roles in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This is the case with the women in the Boko Haram case. Notwithstanding their lack of recognition, the author demonstrates the useful roles women have taken to mobilise against insurgency in an environment that is traditionally hostile to women’s voices and to actively challenge the religious extremism that fuels terrorism. In Chapter Twelve, Benedicta Daudu offers a gender perspective on addressing the problem of conflict in Nigeria. The author analyses the participation and contribution of women in the traditional processes of resolving conflicts in Africa. She argues that women's involvement in traditional conflict resolution, unfortunately, remains almost insignificant. The author notes the valuable role that indigenous methods play in resolving conflicts in Africa (depending on the type of conflict) and argues for their application as opposed to the Eurocentric method (litigation) which is applied with little success to the conflict challenges in African societies. In the final chapter, Ahmad Rufai Saheed offers an educational perspective on the issue of conflict in Nigeria. The author studies the potential of peace

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education for the enthronement of a civilised and peaceful existence in Nigeria. The chapter highlights the ingredients of peace education in the Islamic tradition and articulates how such ingredients became dominant in the Western educational tradition and deficient in contemporary Muslim education. The author concludes that there is an urgent need for curriculum review and innovation in Nigerian Muslim settings, with a view to integrating peace principles into the education system and building Muslim personalities who would be more peaceful in their conduct.

CHAPTER ONE PROBLEMATISING CONFLICT: THE CONCEPT, THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, AND TRENDS IN NIGERIA HAKEEM ONAPAJO

Introduction This chapter provides the conceptual and theoretical background of the book. It examines the existing literature with the aim of demonstrating the usage of conflict as a concept amongst scholars. Most especially, it shows the analytical difference between the concepts of ‘conflict’ and ‘violence’. Analysis of the difference between these concepts is deemed important given the erroneous use of them interchangeably. Furthermore, the chapter illustrates the existing explanations of the causes of conflict. The review of the theoretical literature shows that four major perspectives are most prominent, particularly in the field of political sciences, as frameworks for the causes of conflict. They are the ‘civilisations/cultural’ perspective, the ‘relative deprivation’ perspective, the ‘greed and grievance’ perspective, and the ‘state capacity’ perspective. Despite the usefulness of each of these theories, they do not have the capacity to individually speak to the Nigerian situation, given the intersections of identities and interests of conflicting parties. Hence, the specific situation being studied and the parties involved might require a range of theories.

Conflict versus Violence: A Conceptual Analysis Given the realisation that conflict is ‘normal, ubiquitous, and unavoidable’ in human societies (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman, 2008: 3), the concept has been overly studied across disciplines, especially in the social and management sciences. In light of its appeal to many disciplines, there are different conceptualisations around the concept, which essentially reflect the differences in the meaning, usage, and purposes it serves in the

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various disciplines. In political science, which is the overarching discipline upon which this book is founded, conflict is essentially seen in the context of a ‘struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the groups or individuals involved are to neutralise, injure or eliminate rivals’ (Coser, 1956: 8). Clearly, this conceptualisation captures the underlying idea of politics itself — going by the definitional perspectives — suggesting that politics is more about ‘the struggle for power’ (Morgenthau, 1978). Notwithstanding the differences that characterise the conceptualisation of conflict, one theme that indisputably features prominently in most definitions is the fact that conflict is about different parties and their pursuit of incompatible goals. For a proper understanding of the concept of conflict, it is also useful to clarify the concept of violence, which is often erroneously used interchangeably with conflict in different writings. Violence is an aspect of conflict behaviour where the use of force (or its threat) is employed to express disagreements in the pursuit of opposing goals by the parties involved. Remi Anifowose’s (1982: 4) definition of the concept of violence is instructive in this regard. He conceives violence as the ‘use or threat of [a] physical act’ carried out by groups or individuals against one another with objectives that affect the structures of the society, leading to mass death and the destruction of property. As such, Samuel Huntington (1993: 25) argues that ‘differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence.’ What this suggests is that violence may not be the only means through which conflict manifests. Other types of conflict behaviour, which are non-violent, are persuasion and reward (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman, 2008: 8-9). Persuasion is a verbal approach involving ‘reasonable arguments, appeals to common interests, and reference to generally accepted values and norms of fairness and equity’ (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman, 2008: 9). Reward is a positive strategy of pursuing different goals, which involves the use of inducements to get the other party or parties to comply. In light of the above clarification, conflict in this book is conceived in its violent form given that conflicts in Nigeria, which is the case study of this book, very often get to the point of violence. Therefore, the concern of the book’s contributors is violent conflict — which characterises modern Nigeria — and the ways in which it can be addressed. It should be mentioned that the parties in a conflict give meaning to the nature of that conflict. Several parties may engage in conflict. These could be state (nation states and their agencies) or non-state actors (individuals,

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religious groups, ethnic groups, business organisations, and terrorist groups, etc). In terms of state and non-state parties in conflict, since its independence, Nigeria has witnessed a huge number of conflicts involving ethnic groups, religious groups, political parties, indigenes/settlers, terrorist and secessionist groups, amongst others. Quite often, the overlapping identities of the conflicting parties, because of background and location, make the nature of conflict more difficult to define. A good illustration is the case of the northern region. Given that people in the region are predominantly Muslims, conflicts arising from the region or involving northerners are usually seen as religious (Islamic) in nature, regardless of apparent signs that they are only ethnically based or politically motivated. This explains the huge amount of misleading writings, in both scholarly and media circles, about the conflicts in Nigeria.

Theoretical Perspectives Given our conception of conflict, there are contending arguments concerning its causes. An extensive survey of the literature shows that four major perspectives have gained more prominence in modern times. Modern, in this sense, implies that they are products of the last two decades, mostly applied to study events of violence and conflict in recent times. They are, in some cases, modifications or nullifications of older theories of violence, such as the relative deprivation or frustrationaggression, systemic and group-conflict/primordial theories. In this chapter, the perspectives are classified as follows: civilisational/cultural; relative deprivation; greed and grievance; and state capacity.

The civilisations/cultural perspective This perspective explains conflict in terms of the identity groups formed along religious, ethnic and customary beliefs, as major parties pursuing different goals which are primarily associated with their group interest. It derives its popularity from such writings as Samuel Huntington’s piece, which was first published in Foreign Affairs in 1993. According to Huntington, the source of contemporary conflict will cease to be ideological or economical and will occur as a result of divisions among humankind from different civilisations, defined in religio-cultural terms. Civilisations shape the worldview of the people living in them and thus create a fundamental difference amongst people of the world on issues such as governance, economics, diplomacy, familyhood and, most

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especially, divinity (Huntington, 1993: 22-24). Huntington puts much emphasis on religion in his theory. According to him, in contemporary times, nation states are weakened as a source of identity and ‘religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labelled fundamentalist’ (Huntington, 1993: 26). He further opines that ‘even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people’ (1993: 27). The situation described by Huntington is not only limited to the international arena, as argued by some scholars. He postulates that clashes also occur at the ‘micro-level’ as ‘adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilisations struggle over the control of territory’ (1993: 29). Buttressing Huntington’s thesis are arguments raised in some scholarly circles which lay claim to the fact that identity groups — through their belief systems — promote violence. In the case of religion, there have been positions which state that most religions in contemporary times support the use of violence as it can be perceived as a sacred duty to sustain, promote and protect their interests (for example, Fox, 1997; 1999; Fox and Sandler, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2003; 2007; McTernan, 2003; and Nelson-Pallmeyer, 2005). Ethnic nationalities also justify the use of force to secure their interests. In Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon holds the view that the success of anti-colonialism is dependent on the extent to which a ‘greater violence’ is employed as a response to the violent process that gave birth to colonialism. Thus, violence is justified for the colonised Algerians (natives) against their colonisers (settlers), in their struggle for independence. This was also applied against the successors of the colonial masters in the post-colonial era, conceived as the new species of men who replaced the other species (Joseph, 2008).

The relative deprivation perspective Under this perspective, theorists challenge the hypothesis of the culturalists in explaining the source of conflict. To them, ‘the social fact that many people value shared identity is not intrinsically a source of conflict with other identity groups or the state’ (Gurr, 2000: 5). Rather, what actually explains conflict in societies, especially the plural ones, is that it is a result of accumulated grievances from minority ethnic groups or excluded groups over matters of discrimination and deprivation. A major proponent of this position is Ted Gurr, who was synonymous with the relative deprivation thesis in the 1970s, on the cause of conflict. His recent research is predicated on the position that violent conflicts can be traced to the collective political actions of identity groups. Identity groups,

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according to him, invoke their shared commonalities in situations where identity becomes the major determinant for the distribution of wealth and power in states. In situations where this is prevalent, there are bound to be advantaged and disadvantaged groups, as this promotes discrimination and repression of some groups against others. At this point, leaders of the minority groups mobilise members, who are mostly unemployed youths, to collectively address the structural anomalies responsible for their predicament (Gurr, 2000). According to Gurr: For the disadvantaged groups, invidious treatment and repression are primary incentives for ethno-political action. Discrimination against members of ethnic groups contributes to poverty, powerlessness, and resentment of advantaged groups […] discrimination and repression increase the strength of most people’s identification with their kindred and motivate them to seek collective remedies. Skillful leaders build on these psychological dispositions to mobilise support for new and renewed campaigns of protest and ethno-rebellion (Gurr, 2000: 105).

Gurr further argues that discrimination in this context consists of various restrictions which might be political, economic or cultural and are imposed on a particular group as a result of public policy or social practice. Discrimination causes material inequalities, disempowerment, debasement of cultures and social victimisation. This therefore explains reasons why groups resort to violence in societies. Similarly, based on her empirical study of twelve countries with cases of conflict, Beverly Crawford (1998) posits that groups do have the tendency to resort to violence, owing to their different interests. This happens, however, not on the basis of ‘primordialism’ or ‘accumulated hatreds’ but as a result of drastic changes in the structure of the society on account of economic globalisation and political liberalisation, ‘where old social contacts permitted ethnic and religious criteria to guide the allocation of political and economic resources’ (Crawford, 1998: 6). In other words, violent conflicts reign in a society where cultural identities shape the distribution of opportunities and privileges as a result of the feeling of favour or discrimination generated. Where identities dictate the status quo, there is an intense struggle between advantaged and disadvantaged groups. The advantaged group struggles to maintain the status quo, while the discriminated group strives to displace it with the aim of effecting a reordering that favours its interests.

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The greed and grievance perspective This perspective which was originally developed to analyse the causes of rebellions and civil wars clearly depart from the preceding theories. Paul Collier, who is popular in this perspective, challenges the set of assumptions that characterise the culturalist and relative deprivation theses. Supported by several empirical studies, his studies advance the argument that there is no significant relationship between grievances over repression and discrimination by ethnic groups and conflict. According to him, ‘ethnic minorities are just [as] likely to rebel with or without discrimination’ (Collier, 2007: 23), and ‘rebels usually have something to complain about’ (Collier, 2007: 24). He has also invalidated the argument that plural societies are prone to conflict because of divergent interests. According to him, most societies which are peaceful in the world are multi-ethnic, while Somalia, a ‘completely ethnically pure’ state, has been thrown into a persistent ‘bloody civil war’ (Collier, 2007: 25). Collier’s theory agrees that poverty is a major cause of conflict. To him, lowincome countries are more prone to conflict and civil wars than highincome ones. The relationship between poverty and conflict is simultaneous. As much as poverty fuels conflict, conflict also leads to poverty. Capable young, unemployed men can easily be recruited in poor states to advance the cause of rebels because ‘life itself is cheap, and joining a rebel movement gives these young men a small chance of riches’ (Collier, 2007: 20). Although poverty has been revealed as a strong variable to consider in explaining conflict, Collier and Hoeffler contend that the ‘greed’ variable (the selfish material motivations of the main actors in a conflict) is a stronger explanatory factor. They argue that poverty exemplified by low income and a slow or stagnated growth rate is connected to the greed of rebel leaders in states where the economy is strongly attached to natural resources such as oil, diamonds or timber. Natural resources increase the chances of leaders looting and acquiring funds to not only enrich themselves but also finance the conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Therefore, according to this perspective, a resource-rich country is at a higher risk of conflict than countries that are less dependent on natural resources.

The state capacity perspective This relates conflict to the failure or weakness of states. It derives its source from the ‘failed states’ literature which conceives a state as failed

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or failing when it has a weak capacity to deliver public goods, of which security is most paramount (Rotberg, 2002). States are expected to provide security against internal and external threats; protect the fundamental human rights of the people; ensure justice through an effective judicial system; provide effective health care; provide affordable housing to the people; and guarantee a good educational system for the citizens. The logic of state failure is premised on two major theoretical perspectives on the raison d’etre of the state. These are the Weberian and welfarist conceptions of the state. Given Max Weber’s theory (1958), the state is required to possess the legitimacy for the monopolisation of the use of force in order to maintain order in its defined territory. On the other hand, according to the welfarist, a state evolves for the purpose of ensuring the economic wellbeing of its citizens and the management of the economy (Milliken and Krause, 2002: 760). In accordance with this, Ali Mazrui highlights six functions of the state: sovereign control over territory; sovereign supervision of the nation’s resources; effective and rational revenue extraction from people, goods, and services; building and maintaining an adequate national infrastructure; rendering basic social services; and governance and maintenance of law and order (Mazrui, 1995: 28). A state that lacks the capacity to fulfil its primary obligations, as highlighted above, is more prone to conflict and violence. Thus, violent conflicts are expected in such states as a result of the following realities in a weak or failed state: (i) a deregulation of the use of force, as failed or failing states lack the capacity to monopolise the use of force expected from an ideal state; (ii) the loss of capability to control the borders and a loss of authority over sections of territory; (iii) the widespread use of arms due to their easy availability because of smuggling across the borders; (iv) high rates of urban crime and a rise of criminal syndicates, as a consequence of the porousness of borders; (v) the privatisation of security with high levels of patronage from mercenaries, private guards and security consultancy services in response to increased rates of crime; (vi) a loss of faith in the government’s ability to provide security, resulting in citizens seeking refuge with non-state and informal actors such as the warlords, religious and ethnic leaders, and political elites; (vii) activation of ethnic, religious or clan solidarity and absolute loyalty to them for security; (viii) weak and corrupt law enforcement capacities, providing opportunities and lower costs for terrorist organisations to flourish; and (ix) easy recruitment of large numbers of insecure, aggrieved and unemployed youths for terrorist activities (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2002; Piazza, 2008).

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Nigerian Conflicts and the Theories As alluded to earlier, there are overlapping identities in the parties involved in conflicts in Nigeria. This makes it difficult for a social scientist to rely on just one theory to analyse the phenomenon of conflict in the country. For instance, Nigeria is indeed a country composed of an army of unemployed youths, and is a place where poverty prevails. This makes the relative deprivation perspective and the grievance strand of Collier’s theory relevant to explaining some of the conflicts bedevilling the country, especially if emphasis is to be placed on finding the root cause. It should further be noted that, to mobilise against competing groups in order to promote their own personal interests, ethno-religious and regional leaders often exploit the problem of unemployment and poverty. These personal interests are usually couched in ethnic and religious terminologies, hence giving the conflicts that emerge in the process an ethnic and religious outlook. Obviously, this might mislead some scholars into employing the civilisational perspective to analyse the conflicts. Clearly, this would be wrong as a lens to explain the phenomenon, as the real truth about the incidents would not be meaningfully unravelled if emphasis is placed just on ethnicity and religion. Furthermore, the fact that the issue of natural resources is central to conflict in the Niger Delta region, for example, could make the ‘greed’ element of the greed and grievance theory plausible on the surface, to explain that type of violence. In fact, many studies have explained the Niger Delta crisis only from this angle, which has produced some useful outcomes. Yet, other inter-related factors such as poverty, unemployment, and state inability to address the grievances of the people in the region — which the rebel leaders build upon — cannot be neglected. Indeed, this brings to the fore the factor of state ability in explaining the many conflicts in Nigeria. It cannot be disputed that Nigeria is a country that has clearly exhibited degrees of failure in its institutional and functional capabilities over the years, which are caused by deliberate human errors. The state has not been able to deliver public goods to its citizens and has especially lacked the capacity to properly distribute goods among its people and resolve the conflicts that have arisen. Clearly, this makes the variable of the state’s capacity an important factor in analysing conflict in Nigeria. Therefore, social scientists involved in the enterprise of researching conflict in Nigeria must take into consideration the different theoretical perspectives, as highlighted above. The Nigerian situation defies a particular theory. The phenomenon of conflict in Nigeria is far more

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complicated than can be meaningfully explained using the many variables that exist in the different theories.

Conflict in Nigeria, 1999 - 2014: Trends and Magnitude Unfortunately, reliable data on the incidents of conflict, like any other important events in Nigeria, are difficult to access given the poor management of records. Scholars researching the topic often rely on media reports, which have the major shortcoming of limited coverage of all conflict events in the country. In fact, media coverage of events is, in most cases, influenced by the special interests of the media organisations concerned. More pathetically, most of the existing databases that have been created for useful data on conflict events in the country are from foreign institutions. For example, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), which has its origins at the University of Sussex under the leadership of Clionadh Raleigh, provides country reports (including on Nigeria) on incidents of political violence and conflicts in developing countries, especially Africa and Asia. Also, the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), created by the Council on Foreign Relations of the United States, documents conflict events in the country since 2011 after the emergence of the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan. In a similar vein, the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the John Hopkins University, under the leadership of Peter Lewis, established the database under the label of the Nigeria Social Violence Dataset (NSVD), to track events related to conflicts since 1998. A close reading of the reports suggests that, since the return to demoncracy in 1999, Nigeria has been in transition from one conflict to the other in all corners of the country, with a painfully high number of fatalities. The conflicts are categorised under the following types: communal conflict, state-related violence, political violence, secessionist claims, and Boko Haram insurgency. As demonstrated in Figures 1 and 2, Nigeria has apparently been under the siege of conflict since its return to democracy in 1999. This has manifested in different forms with wanton loss of life and property. The postdemocratic transition period was immediately followed by increased communal conflicts defined by ethnic, religious, tribal, or cultural cleavages. Political conflicts, characterised by partisanship, have also featured prominently as a type of conflict in the country. The idea of politics in Nigeria based on the ‘do-or-die’ philosophy has been a major driver of this type of conflict, usually on the rise during the electoral period.

Problematising Conflict

Source: Nigeria Social Violence Dataset (NSVD) (accessed 15 January 2016)

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Source: Nigeria Social Violence Dataset (NSVD) (accessed 15 January 2016)

electoral period. As shown in Figure 1, the electoral years of 2007 and 2011 were notorious for this pattern of conflict (with 252 and 1561 deaths respectively). Insurgency in the Niger Delta reared its ugly head amidst intense inter-ethnic conflicts from 2003 until 2009, following the introduction of the amnesty programme. Clearly, this accounted for many deaths over the years in conflicts in the country. The most significant has been the Boko Haram insurgency, which surfaced in 2009 and has been a major contributor to conflict fatalities recorded over the years, as well as a major source of international concern. In geographical terms, as shown in Figure 2, the northern region has recorded more incidents of conflict than other regions. Before Boko Haram started and overwhelmed the north-east, the north-west and northcentral had experienced a series of ethno-religious and herders-farmers conflicts, especially during the 2000s. The ethnic conflicts and insurgency in the Niger Delta account for the prominence of the south-south in Figure 2. Other geo-political zones, the south-west and south-east, have relatively fewer incidents, although the regions have been a significant contributor to various incidents of ethnic, political, and urban conflicts.

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Conclusion As a natural occurrence in human societies, the phenomenon of conflict is a well-researched topic in various disciplines, especially the social sciences. There have been sufficient analyses of its conceptualisation and causes in the literature. In this chapter, it has been revealed that the concept of conflict, as seen by scholars, is the pursuit of incompatible goals by different parties, which may be expressed in violent and nonviolent forms. The chapter further highlighted the major perspectives surrounding the understanding of the causes of conflict in the contemporary literature: the cultural/civilisational, relative deprivation, greed and grievance, and state capacity perspectives. It was suggested that the usefulness of each of these theories may not individually provide answers to the Nigerian situation because of the intersections of identities, and interests of parties involved in the different conflicts characterising the state. Using empirical data, the chapter further illustrated the trends and extent of conflict in Nigeria. Given the revelation that the democratic era has been much characterised by different forms of conflict in all the zones of the country, there is no denying the need for more research on the topic in Nigeria.

References Anifowose, R. (1982), Violence and politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba experience, Nok Publishers International. Collier, P. (2007), The bottom billion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002), Greed and grievance in civil war, CSAE Working Papers. Coser, L.A. (1956), The functions of social conflict, New York: The Free Press. Crawford, B. (1998), ‘The causes of cultural conflict: An institutional approach’, in Crawford B. and Lipschutz R.D. (eds.), The myth of ‘ethnic conflict’: Politics, economics, and cultural violence, Global, Area, and International Archive. Research Series. Fox, J. (1997), ‘The salience of religious issues in ethnic conflicts: A largeǦN study’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol. 3, no. 3, pp.1-19. Fox, J., and Sandler S. (2003), ‘Quantifying religion: Toward building more effective ways of measuring religious influence on state-level behaviour’, Journal of Church and State, pp.559-588. Fox, J. (1999), ‘Do religious institutions support violence or the statusquo?’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 22, no. 2, pp.119-139.

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Gurr, T. (2000), People versus states: Minorities at risk in the new century, U.S. Institute of Peace Press. Huntington, S.P. (1993), ‘The clash of civilisations?’ Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, pp.22-49. Jacob, B., Kremenyuk, V. and Zartman, I.W. (eds.) (2008), The SAGE handbook of conflict resolution, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Joseph, T. (2008), ‘Frantz Fanon´s thesis of violence: What relevance for modern Africa?’ http://www.afroarticles.com/article-dashboard/Article /Frantz-Fanon-s-thesis-of-violence--What-relevance-for-modernAfrica-/106197 (accessed 12 February 2015). Juergensmeyer, M. (2003), Terror in the mind of God: The global rise of religious violence, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. —. (2007), ‘Terror mandated by God’, Terrorism & Political Violence, vol. 9 no.2, pp.16–23. Mazrui, A.A. (1995), ‘The blood of experience: the failed state and political collapse in Africa’, World Policy Journal, pp.28-34. McTernan, O.J. (2003), Violence in God's name: religion in an age of conflict, Orbis Books. Milliken, J. and Keith, K. (2002), ‘State failure, state collapse, and state reconstruction: concepts, lessons and strategies’, Development and Change, vol. 33, no.5, pp.753-774. Morgenthau, Hans J. (1978), Politics among Nations (revised), New York: Knoph. Nelson-Pallmeyer, J. (2005), Is religion killing us? Violence in the Bible and the Quran, A&C Black. Nigeria Social Violence Dataset (NSVD) ‘Social violence in Nigeria’, http://www.connectsaisafrica.org/mockup4/research/african-studiespublications/social-violence-nigeria/ (accessed 15 December 2015). Piazza, J.A. (2008), ‘Incubators of terror: Do failed and failing states promote transnational terrorism?’ International Studies Quarterly, vol.52, no.3, pp.469-488. Rotberg, R.I. (2002), ‘The new nature of nationǦstate failure’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 3, pp.3-96. Zartman, I.W. (1995), Collapsed states: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

CHAPTER TWO ETHNICITY, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR PEACE IN POST-MILITARY NIGERIA DELE BABALOLA

Introduction The Nigerian state has, since its creation, continued to contend with certain centrifugal forces, such as ethnic diversity, and its leaders have continued to struggle with the task of ensuring that the people occupying the geographic space continue to live together in peace. The description of Nigeria as ‘multi-ethnic’, ‘deeply-divided’, and ‘multi-national’ stems partly from the fact that people of diverse ethnic backgrounds populate the country. Nigeria is the most ethnically diverse country in Africa with the exact number of ethnic groups unknown. There are three dominant territorially-concentrated ethnic identities – Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo – together with some 350 linguistic minorities distributed across the country.1 As in other deeply-divided countries, ethnic cleavage in Nigeria ‘appears permanent and all-encompassing, predetermining who will be granted and denied access to power and resources’ (Diamond and Plattner, 1994: xviii). This inherent centrifugal force explains why ethnic conflicts have become almost inevitable in the country. We are aware of the need to avoid the pitfalls of ethnic determinism when dealing with the issue of conflict, especially in a multi-ethnic country like Nigeria, but it is also important to understand that this social phenomenon remains a considerable factor in the distribution of Nigeria’s scarce resources. In Nigeria, ethnicity plays an important part in determining who gets what 1

Kirk-Greene (1967) and Otite (1990) identified over 400 and 374 ethnic groups, respectively.

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and when, and the competition with ‘others’ more often than not provokes tension. Therefore, the social and political, as well as the economic, import of ethnicity cannot be ignored if a thorough analysis of Nigerian politics and society is to be undertaken. The resurgence of ethnic conflicts following the termination of military dictatorship in 1999, and the challenges this has posed to the country’s nascent democracy, deserves a special place in any political discourse on Nigeria. Conflicts that had been suppressed by successive military juntas were rekindled, manifesting in agitation for resource control,2 true federalism,3 self-determination4 and outright secession, among others. In particular, there have been cries of marginalisation by the country’s ethnic groups. This dates back to the 1950s when minority groups, out of fear of domination, clamoured for separate constituent units. They became louder, especially in the south-south and south-east geo-political regions of the country, and citizens there have neither ceased to demand their own exclusive political space nor stopped decrying the lopsided nature of their country's distributive politics. The central argument in this chapter is that ethnicity has not disappeared in modern African societies, and ethnic conflicts are real. There is no denying that ethnic conflicts have been the hallmark of Nigerian politics and society, even before independence, but they assumed an unimaginable proportion in the post-1999 era and have clearly threatened the fabric of the country. What follows is, therefore, an examination of the causes and nature of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. By ethnic conflict, we simply mean the ruthless rivalry that characterises ethnic relations. The remainder of the chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section is conceptual, in which we draw on mainstream literature on ethnicity in Africa to discuss such concepts as ethnic groups, ethnicity and ethnic conflicts, especially in relation to Nigeria. The second section focuses on the ethnicisation of politics in the post-independent era, and demonstrates that ethnic groups’ competition for political and economic resources engenders 2

In the Nigerian context, the term ‘resource control’ means the right of a region or community to control the oil resources found in its domain. 3 By ‘true federalism’, Yoruba elite and their counterparts in the south-east in particular mean a federal practice in which the constituent units of the Federation enjoy more fiscal powers than the federal centre. 4 In Nigeria, ‘self-determination’ means the right of an ethnic group to manage its affairs. Generally, self-determination is a political weapon usually employed by marginalised groups in their struggle for a just society.

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ethnic conflicts in the country. Using the 2011 and 2015 presidential elections as case studies, the third section examines the manipulation of ethnic identity by the country's political elites in their quest for political, and sometimes economic, advancement.

Theorising Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria This section focuses on the different perspectives on ethnicity and ethnic conflict but the starting point is to define an ethnic group. Ethnic groups, according to Bates (1974: 458) are groups of people ‘who share a conviction that they have common interests and a common fate; and they propound a cultural symbolism expressing their cohesiveness.’ Similarly, Nnoli (1978: 5; 1995: 1) defines ethnic groups as social formations distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries, with the relevant communal factor being language and culture. Central to these definitions is that common identity or the perception of belonging to a distinct social space differentiates one ethnic group from another, and the relations between ethnic groups within the same political system produce ethnicity. What then is ethnicity? Ethnicity signifies the perceptions of people’s common origins, historical memories, and ties. It has its foundations in combined remembrances of past experience and in common aspirations, values, norms, and expectations (Chazan et al., 1992: 106; Hameso, 2001: 9). Nnoli (1978: 5; 1995: 1) also notes that ethnicity is a social phenomenon associated with some forms of interaction among members of different ethnic groups within political societies. Likewise, Osaghae (1995: 11) defines ethnicity as the mobilisation of ethnic identity to seek advantage in situations of competition, conflict, or cooperation. Thus, ethnicity is a product of a conscious effort by social actors, and arises from a situation where an ethnic group enters into a relationship with another in competition for scarce resources within the same political system. In this chapter, we therefore refer to ethnic groups as the classification of people into groups considered different from each other in terms of history, language, culture, belief and other ways of life. Moreover, ethnicity is the manipulation of ethnic identity by elites in a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria for the political and economic advancement of the elites and, sometimes, of their ethnic groups. In deeply-divided societies, the political salience of ethnicity cannot be exaggerated because politics is more often than not practiced along ethnic lines and ethnic politics engenders ethnic conflicts. So, what is ethnic conflict?

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There are different perspectives in the study of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts but primordialism has dominated earlier work in this field. For the primordialist theorists, ethnicity is not an individual attribute but rather is a social phenomenon in the sense that every individual is born to an ethnic group and has no control over where he is born. Thus, the insignia of ethnicity is inescapable (Agbu, 2011; Ukiwo, 2005). Logically, therefore, ethnic identity is fixed and ethnic division and conflicts are natural. However, the primordialist failure to account for variations in the level of conflict over time has not helped their cause. Moreover, the assumption that ethnicity is inherently conflictual has been dismissed by the modernisation theorists who posit that ethnic conflict is rather a byproduct of modernisation (see Anber, 1967; Bates, 1974; Melson and Wolpe, 1970). Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (1970; 1971) meticulously brought the modernisation-conflict nexus to the fore when they used Nigeria as a case study. The authors argued that Nigeria was a worthy case study given the high rate of social mobilisation that accompanied the modernisation experienced in the country in the decade immediately following independence. In other words, Nigeria's progress both in the economic and social spheres sowed the seeds of inter-ethnic conflicts that have come to characterise Nigerian society. It is, however, important to point out that there is no evidence to suggest that modernisation leads to conflict everywhere. As Horowitz (2000: 97) argued, the modernisation theory does not take ethnic conflict in the pre-modern period into consideration; neither does it give sufficient attention to the conflict motivations of nonelites who have little or no stake in the benefits of modernity. The Marxists — who characteristically study a society in terms of the simple base-superstructure model — conceive of ethnicity as an inconsequential aspect of the superstructure. For them, ethnic identity is ‘false consciousness’, which contrasts with ‘true’ class consciousness, and ethnic groups are ‘false groups’ (Nnoli, 1978: 12). Hence, there is no such thing as an ethnic conflict. Ethnic identity, they argue, is a machination of the dominant class, employed to mask the economic contradictions inherent in capitalism. It is also a means of preventing the exploited from forming alliances that could result in class conflicts that could culminate in a coup to overthrow the dominant class. It is important to point out at this juncture that this perspective is inadequate for explaining the politics of difference that characterises African societies, in the sense that in Africa, class divisions are not that pronounced, unlike in Western societies. Furthermore, in Africa, the class factor is (more often than not) defined in

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ethnic terms because members of certain ethnic groups have easier access to certain opportunities than members of other groups (Hameso, 2001: 15). Another theory worth considering is the one referred to as 'ethnicity as a colonial legacy', which seeks to trace ethnic consciousness to colonialism. Crucial to this theory is that colonialism partly sowed the seeds of ethnic conflict in the former colonies, including Nigeria. The impact of colonial rule on ethnic identity formation, especially the divide-and-rule policy which pitched one ethnic group against the other, is crucial to our understanding of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. According to James S. Coleman (1958: 52-3), indirect rule in Nigeria ‘complicated the task of welding diverse elements into a Nigerian nation.’ Indeed, one colonial legacy that has continued to haunt the Nigerian state since its creation is the regionalisation of politics that began under the Richards Constitution of 1946. The process gave rise to a situation in which the three major ethnic groups in the country – Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo – see themselves as constituting the tripod upon which the country stands, believing that the fate of the country lies with them (Babalola, 2014a). It also brought into sharp focus the majority/minority dichotomy, marking the cradle of ethnic minority problems in Nigeria (Osaghae, 1991: 239). These are in congruence with Nnoli's (1978; 1995) argument that colonialism divided Nigerians into competitive hostile groups, thereby setting the stage for inter-ethnic rivalries. Nonetheless, a major criticism of this thesis is that, just like the modernisation school, it has failed to accord pre-colonial antecedents a special place. Moreover, blaming colonial rule for the acceptance and rejection that characterises social relations in contemporary Nigeria, decades after political independence, may amount to an unnecessary blame-game. None of the approaches examined thus far can be dismissed as being completely irrelevant. Any one of them — or a combination of them — may be adopted in the study of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in any given African society. In fact, they have provided us with multiple routes through which questions concerning ethnic conflicts may be answered. However, our discussion of ethnic conflict in post-military Nigeria will be situated within the context of the modernisation theory, though this is not without giving other theories the attention they deserve.

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Ethnicisation of Politics in Post-independent Nigeria (1960-1999) In Nigeria, as in other parts of Africa, the state is usually at the heart of everything and this explains why access to state power is vital for members of the various ethnic groups that inhabit the state. As noted earlier, Nigeria has a tripodal ethnic structure in which the three majority ethnic groups constitute a pole in the competition for political and economic resources. In addition to this ethnic structure are the horizontal inequalities that characterise the country (Mustapha, 2009a: 562). It is, therefore, not surprising that this form of ethnic structure and the inequalities among the ethnic groups have given rise to a politics of suspicion, a fear of domination, and zero-sum competition for resources amongst political elites. In Nigeria, each ethnic group lives in fear of being marginalised. For instance, the educationally advantaged Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups often express the fear that the educationally disadvantaged but more populous Hausa-Fulani ethnic group would use their numeric advantage to out-compete other groups in the struggle for national resources. Kirk-Greene (1975: 19) captures this more aptly when he observes that: Fear has been constant in every tension and confrontation in political Nigeria. Not the physical fear of violence, not the spiritual fear of retribution but the psychological fear of discrimination, of domination. It is the fear of not getting one’s fair share, one’s dessert.

Nigeria's political elites tend to promote a cleavage structure for their own selfish interests, which may be an explanation for the inability of leaders to foster any agenda capable of bringing about a national identity. It is not unusual for leaders to rally their kinsmen and women to promote their political aspirations. This situation is what Richard Joseph (1987) describes as ethno-clientelism, where political actors woo their kinsfolk for support while the latter expect patronage in return. In a society where ethno-clientelism is somehow the norm, politics becomes a zero-sum game and members of some ethnic groups become marginalised in the scheme of things and, when the cry of marginalisation sets in, the clamour for selfdetermination becomes part of the political lexicon. Evidence of the strength of ethnicity in election dynamics in Nigeria was first witnessed during the federal elections of 1959, which were meant to decide which party was going to control the central government after independence in 1960. The elections were contested by three main

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regional parties: the Action Group (AG), based in the Yoruba speaking area of western Nigeria; the Northern People's Congress (NPC), in the north; and the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC), based in the east. As rightly remarked by Nnoli (1978: 157), the formation of these parties completed the ethnicisation of Nigerian politics. Electoral support for the parties demonstrated their alignment with the major ethnic groups in their respective regions of pre-eminence, culminating in a situation where no single party was able to win enough seats to form the central government (see Babalola, 2004). Consequently, a coalition government of the NPC and NCNC was put in place. It must be pointed out that the NCNC had entered into the coalition, not on principle, but because the leadership of the party thought that, in the opinion of Osaghae (1998: 33), it would be better assured of government patronage and other privileges than it would in a partnership with AG, the rival Yoruba party. The coalition was indeed a marriage of convenience because, in terms of ideology, the two parties were on the extremes of the political spectrum. While the NPC was a conservative party, the NCNC looked a bit progressive. The coalition continued even after the 1964 national election, which was partly boycotted in the west and completely boycotted in the east. Nigeria's First Republic was scuttled by the military in 1966. The failure of democracy in the First Republic (1960-1966) was connected with, among other things, the ethnicisation of politics (see Kirk-Greene, 1975; Panter-Brick, 1970). The 1966 coup that ushered in the era of military rule drew the military — a hitherto apolitical institution — into the arena of discourse on ethnicity as coups and countercoups were perceived as having ethnic colouration. The ensuing crisis of hegemony, particularly between the Hausa-Fulani military elites and their Igbo counterparts, combined with other factors and plunged the country into a civil war in 1967. As Armstrong (1967: 5) particularly remarked, the civil war was ‘a struggle for very high stakes’ which included, among other things, the protection of great economic resources and the fact that Nigeria would be a great oil producer in the not too distant future. There is also no reason to disagree with Forrest (1995), who contended that oil wealth was a contributing factor in the war because oil held out the prospect of a solid economic base, especially to the then Eastern Region, where most of Nigeria’s oil was produced. It may also be argued that the Igbo elite perceived secession as an opportunity to control oil wealth, and it is equally credible to argue that the fear of losing that same oil wealth contributed to the then federal military government’s determination to

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prevent secession. Moreover, with the fast-declining revenues from agriculture, the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba elites would, expectedly, not be in favour of secession because they were not oblivious to the potential political and economic gains that could be derived from oil wealth. The military was on the political stage until 1979. However, with the demise of the First Republic, successive military regimes embarked on certain constitutional engineering aimed at discouraging ethnic politics. For example, the country was further divided to ensure that ethnic groups were spread around regional areas. However, the inadequacy of these measures resulted in the resurgence of ethnic politics during the Second Republic (1979-1983). Among the five parties registered to contest the 1979 elections, the following three stood out: the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), which developed from the rump of the defunct NPC, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), whose origin was traceable to the Yorubadominated AG, and the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP), which was also a reincarnation of the defunct NCNC (Babalola, 2004: 36-9). The ethnic character of these parties was reflected in their electoral fortunes in the 1979 presidential election (Babalola, 2004: 42-4). As if the fall of the First Republic had not been enough of a lesson for the political elites, they withdrew into their ethnic cocoons and allowed ethnicity to determine their political calculations. Just like in the First Republic, manipulation of ethnicity by political actors for political gains partly resulted in the termination of the Second Republic in a military coup in December 1983. Again, the country was returned to military rule. Another process of democratisation, which began in 1985 under the tutelage of the then military president, General Ibrahim Babangida, was to usher in a new democratic order in 1993 but culminated in a stillborn Third Republic. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Nigerian electorate ignored their ethno-regional differences during the 1993 presidential election, which was believed to have been won by the Social Democratic Party's (SDP) candidate, the late Moshood Abiola. In spite of the fact that he was from the south, he won the election in ten of the 14 states in the south and nine of the 16 states in the north, including Kaduna (the power base of the northern ruling elite) and Kano (the home state of his National Republican Convention (NRC) opponent, Bashir Tofa) (Babalola, 2004: 156). This election was eventually annulled by the military. It would be intellectually dishonest not to recognise the influence of ethno-regional forces on the annulment. Evidence abounds that the election was annulled to prevent a power shift from the north, which had

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dominated the political scene of the country since independence, to the south (Babalola, 2004).

Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Military Era Agitations in the period immediately following the termination of military rule have centred on either the dismantling of the country's federal structure or a restructuring of the federal state. The Yoruba elite, who had not hidden their ill-feeling towards their Hausa-Fulani counterparts for the annulment of the 1993 presidential election — presumably won by the Yoruba business mogul, Abiola — were in the forefront of the clamour for reform. Yoruba leaders, through such ethnic-based groups as the Afenifere, Yoruba Council of Elders (YCE) and the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) had, before 1999, vigorously campaigned for a ‘power shift’ to the south. In other words, an end to the northern elite’s stranglehold on political power and, by extension, economic power (Babalola, 2004). This agitation yielded results when the ethno-regional alliance between the north and the west produced a president in 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba man. This development rendered the campaign for a power shift moribund. One feature of ethnic politics in the post-1999 period was an upsurge in the perception of ethnic favouritism by the leaders. No sooner had the new civilian government of President Obasanjo taken charge in 1999 than the Hausa-Fulani and Igbo elites began to complain of marginalisation in the appointment of their people to federal positions (Mustapha, 2009b: 74). The Hausa-Fulani elite particularly complained that the people from the Middle Belt dominated top positions in the defence sector. Another challenge of ethno-regional conflict during this period was the adoption of sharia law in the 12 northern states of the country. In October 1999, Zamfara State introduced the sharia legal system, which was later adopted by 11 other states: Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto and Yobe. Whilst the northern Muslims supported the full implementation of the sharia system, believing that it would address issues of moral and political corruption in their society, the Christians opposed it on the grounds that Nigeria is a secular state and that the system was a threat to their interests. Some scholars argued that the Sharianisation of the northern region was indeed a political strategy advanced by the Hausa-Fulani political elite, to force a re-balance in the prevailing political calculus, which was considered inimical to northern interests (see Adamolekun, 2005). Between 2000 and 2004 the issue

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developed into a full-blown conflict between Muslims and Christians in some parts of north, especially Kano, Kaduna and Plateau states. This period also witnessed the resurgence of an ethno-regional clamour for an equitable distribution of Nigeria's oil wealth, a cause championed by ethno-regional groups such as the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), both localised in the oil-rich Niger Delta. The Niger Delta elites claimed that they were being marginalised by the majority ethnic groups who controlled political power at the centre and whose members used oil wealth to develop their own areas at the expense of the area from where oil was derived (see Babalola, 2014b; Naanen, 1995, 2007; Obi, 2006). Thus, the Niger Deltans have consistently decried the lopsided nature of Nigeria's revenue allocation system which they believe has been unfavourable to them. They were disillusioned as their region depicts a scenario of 'wants in the midst of plenty'. The failure of the Nigerian state to adequately address the fundamental socio-political issues raised by the myriad of ethno-regional groups in the area resulted in the series of violence that pervaded the region in the immediate post-1999 period. The issue of Boko Haram, an Islamist terrorist group localised in the northern part of the country, also brought to the fore the ethnicisation of politics in the post-1999 period. This chapter does not intend to discuss in detail the emergence and the activities of the group, which have been well documented elsewhere (see Babalola and Ayuba, 2015; Maiangwa et al., 2012; Onapajo et al., 2012; Onuoha, 2012; 2014). The group claims its main objective is the establishment of an Islamic society governed by Sharia law. It came into the limelight in 2009, following its clash with security agents, and has since been a major threat to the security of Nigeria and the West African sub-region. In 2013, the Jonathan-led federal government granted the group amnesty, hoping that the move would put an end to its reign of terror, but this was greeted by dissenting voices from other parts of the country. Whilst the Hausa-Fulani elite concurred that the group deserved to be pardoned, just as the Niger Delta militants were pardoned by the late president Yar'adua (a Fulani), their counterparts from other parts of the country insisted that the government would be setting a dangerous precedent if it went ahead with the plan. Boko Haram nonetheless rejected the olive branch, which necessitated the government’s increased militarisation of the north-eastern Nigeria.

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Ethno-regional Politics and Jonathan’s Presidency Nigeria's Fourth Republic is laden with many unresolved issues. One such issue is the contestation over the ethnicisation of politics. The political elite that took over power from the military institutionalised ethnic politics in the emergent party system through a power-sharing formula between the northern and southern regions. As noted earlier, it was this arrangement that ensured the emergence of Olusegun Obasanjo as the president in 1999. This move was primarily aimed at appeasing the Yoruba ethnic group over their grievance following the annulment of the 1993 presidential election. Shortly after becoming the PDP candidate in the 2007 presidential election, which he eventually won, the late Umar Yar'Adua (a Fulani Muslim from Katsina) chose Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the Ijaw ethnic group in Bayelsa State, as his vice-presidential candidate. The ruling party's (PDP) rotational presidency arrangement was put to the test in late 2009 when Yar'Adua could no longer continue in his capacity as president due to ill health. The President became incapacitated but failed to handover power to the vice-president as the constitution required. The struggle to install Jonathan took ethno-regional and religious dimensions. For instance, the Save Nigeria Group, a civil society group led by a Lagosbased Pentecostal pastor, Tunde Bakare (Onapajo, 2012: 54), and a host of ethnic minority advocates, particularly from the Niger Delta region (such as the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)) mounted pressure on the Federal Executive Council and the country's parliament to declare Jonathan as the president. In early February 2010, the Senate used the ‘doctrine of necessity’ to declare Jonathan the Acting President until Yar'Adua fully recovered. Unfortunately, Yar'Adua never recovered and died in May 2010, allowing Jonathan to become president under ‘very sad and unusual circumstances’ (Aljazeera, 8 May 2010). Jonathan’s declared intention to contest the 2011 presidential election generated controversy, especially in the north, as the Hausa-Fulani elite argued that the move would undermine the party’s agreement to rotate the presidency every two terms. Their argument was that a northern candidate should be presented to complete Yar'Adua's second term. Hence, the emergence of a northern consensus candidate in the person of Atiku Abubakar, a former vice-president to Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), in the PDP’s primary elections. Jonathan triumphed at the primaries but this did not deter the Hausa-Fulani elite from their search for a northern candidate to support for the general election. In shopping for that

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candidate outside the ruling party, General Muhammadu Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) emerged. Buhari, a former military Head of State (December 1983 - August 1985) and a northern Muslim from Katsina, was seen by the Hausa-Fulani masses as a man with zero-tolerance for corruption, hence the epithet, Mai Gaskiya (the truthful one) (Onapajo, 2012: 55). The party enjoyed the support of the HausaFulani masses but had little or no presence in the southern part of the country, and this explains why it was perceived, especially in the south, as an Islamic northern party (Onapajo, 2012: 55). Jonathan won the presidential election but the results showed that his candidacy did not enjoy nationwide support. As demonstrated by Onapajo (2012: 56), the votes in the election were a reflection of a voting pattern determined by religion and ethnicity. For example, Buhari swept the entire northern votes and, voters in the south (with the exception of Osun which was won by Nuhu Ribadu of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN)) voted massively for Jonathan. Jonathan's victory nonetheless put an end to the perception that the ethnic minorities were mere resources for the majority groups to increase political power or to weaken the power of their rivals. The violence that trailed the outcome of the election, particularly in the north where Buhari’s supporters had cited election rigging, deserves some mention. In the ensuing violence, homes displaying posters of Jonathan were set on fire (CNN, 19 April 2011). Similarly, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) staff, members of PDP, and other prominent northerners perceived to have conspired with the ruling party to rig elections in the south were also targeted (Aljazeera, 20 April 2011; CNN, 19 April 2011; Onapajo, 2012: 58-9). Overall, an estimated 800 people lost their lives and some 65,000 were displaced (Campbell, 2015; Hoffman, 2014; and Lee, 2015). This confirms that the perception of electoral malpractice was a major source of post-election violence in Nigeria. The unfortunate situation in the 2011 election year showed the potential for such post-election violence to escalate into a large-scale ethnic war in the country. The 2015 presidential election presented a similar scenario. Although the election was contested by fourteen candidates, it turned out to be a rematch of the 2011 elections in which President Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP and Muhammadu Buhari of the APC were the main contenders. The two major candidates were popular in their respective geo-political regions. In the oil-producing Niger Delta region and the south-east,

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support for Jonathan was very strong, with ex-Niger Delta militants vowing to stage a war against the rest of the country if Jonathan was not re-elected (BBC, 27 March 2015). Jonathan’s poor management of the Boko Haram crisis and the feeling of having cheated the north after the 2011 elections were major reasons for his unpopularity in the region. Buhari was equally popular in the north, an area dominated by Muslims, but his earlier support for the adoption of Sharia law in the north seemingly alienated him from the Christian population across the country. Clearly, this shows again that the issues of ethnicity and religion have been accorded more significance than a candidate's capacity to deliver in Nigeria’s elections. The policies of the two main parties — APC and PDP — were strikingly similar, with their candidates pledging to end the Islamist insurgency that has become synonymous with the north-east. The APC was formed in early 2013 from a merger of three ethnically and regionally based political parties: the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP), and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). In Nigeria, political parties are not an association of people with similar ideologies but the establishment of ethnic coalitions led by regional barons with strong financial backing (International IDEA, 2006: 7 cited in Angerbrandt, 2011: 25). Securing a majority of the vote of any two of the three major ethnic groups, and a few from the remaining minorities would be enough to win a presidential race. This perhaps informs the political calculation that resulted in the ethno-regional alliance between the HausaFulani elite and their Yoruba counterparts that culminated in the formation of the APC. The party stormed the political stage at a time when many Nigerians were prepared to try out another person and another party but not necessarily another system. Undeniably, the party lived up to expectations in providing formidable opposition to the PDP, which had been the ruling party since the return to democratic rule in 1999. Before the emergence of the mega party, which attracted leading politicians from the southwest as well as from the north, ‘opposition parties were mostly fragmented along regional and ethnic lines, making it impossible for them to mount a credible challenge to the ruling PDP’ (Adibe, 2015: 3). In fact, it was difficult for observers of Nigerian politics to fathom how a party formed barely two years before the election could be so formidable. Having crossed the difficult hurdle of selecting the parties' flagbearers, each party was then saddled with the responsibility of selecting their

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respective running mates. The PDP had no difficulty in presenting a ‘balanced’ ticket since the Vice President, Namadi Sambo, is a northern Muslim, whereas it took the APC considerable time to choose a running mate in the person of Yemi Osinbajo, a Christian pastor and Professor of Law from the south-west. Except in the 1993 annulled presidential election, in which the Social Democratic Party (SDP) presented a MuslimMuslim ticket, when a candidate is running for political office the running mate is usually from a different ethnic and religious background. The burning issues in the election included how to fight corruption (which had almost paralysed the country) and how to end the Islamist insurgency rocking the northern part of the country. However, the campaign was characterised by verbal diatribe and hate speeches and, in most cases, these were presented along ethnic and religious lines. Intolerance among the country’s ethnic groups played out during this contest. In Nigeria, the issue of ethnicity and religion in elections usually trumps ideas and policies, and politicians whip up these sentiments to their advantage. Politicians and their followers, already divided along ethnic and religious lines, heated up the polity to the extent that election analysts and social media commentators were unequivocal in predicting post-election violence (Campbell, 2015; Hoffman, 2014; Lee, 2015). It is common for Nigerian politicians to manipulate primordial sentiments for political gain but what was witnessed during this election made past occurrences seem mild. For example, in 2014, the PDP called the APC, ‘Nigeria’s Muslim Brotherhood’ (This Day, 2014). Similarly, anywhere he went in the north during the campaign, the Vice President, Namadi Sambo, was always quick to remind his listeners that he is a devout Muslim and has sponsored many fellow Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. Also, during a campaign rally in Niger state, he openly urged Muslims to vote for his party (PDP), arguing that it had more Muslims in its hierarchy than the opposition party (APC) and was more suited to cater for the needs of northern Muslims (Iyatse, 2015). However, in a swift reaction, the APC urged voters ‘to disregard anyone peddling religion as a tool for securing votes in any part of the country […]’ (Whitman, 2015). The invocation of religious identity no doubt heightened tensions which had already enveloped the entire country. Already unpopular in the north where the Hausa-Fulani elite had accused him of favouring the south-south and the south-east in federal appointments, Jonathan made frantic efforts to consolidate his stronghold by openly pursuing Christian endorsements, visiting one church after

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another for electoral ‘blessing’. An examination of the role of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), the umbrella body of the multitude of Christian denominations in Nigeria during the elections, deserves to be mentioned here. The hierarchy of CAN under the headship of Ayo Oritsejafor was very active in whipping up religious sentiment in an effort to mobilise support for Jonathan's re-election. It was widely rumoured that President Jonathan, using Oritsejafor as a middleman, gave certain Christian clerics across the country huge sums of money to campaign for him (Isenyo, 2015). It must be pointed out that Jonathan’s romance with CAN’s leadership pre-dated the election season. In September 2014, Nigerians were fed with stories of how Oritsejafor's private jet was used by the presidency to transport huge amounts of hard currency (about $15 million) to South Africa, purportedly to buy military hardware for the Nigerian intelligence services. The cash was allegedly smuggled into South Africa by two Nigerians and an Israeli national, leading to the South African government seizing Oritsejafor's jet and the money involved, and alleging that the CAN president was dealing in illegal arms (This Day, 2014). The cash-for-arms deal fuelled suspicion amongst the Muslim population in the country that their Christian counterparts were preparing for an impending war. Furthermore, in October 2014, President Jonathan allegedly led a delegation of more than 200 Nigerians on a Christian pilgrimage to Jerusalem. This entourage included Oritsejafor and several other prominent members of CAN (Paden, 2015: 4). The Muslims, too, through the Jamaatul Nasril Islam (JNI) were, to some extent, not left out in the battle over who was to become the president of the country. The JNI, which in English means Society for the Support of Islam, is an umbrella group for the entire Muslim community in Nigeria and its president is the Sultan of Sokoto. The group was founded in early 1962 by Ahmadu Bello, the late Sardauna of Sokoto, and Premier of the northern region. In its original form, JNI sought to coordinate Muslim efforts in the country. The apex Islamic organ urged former Niger Delta militants, who were beating war drums should Jonathan lose, to desist from heating up the polity. According to the group, it finds it necessary to discharge what it believes is its obligation to ‘call on all Nigerians to shun violence in any way, in any form and at all phases of the elections and its aftermath’ (BBC, 2015). Given the scenario, Katy Lee (2015) opined, ‘regardless of who wins, it's feared the result could trigger violence by exacerbating pre-existing tensions along religious and ethnic lines, which overlap with political grievances.’ In other words, a loss for Jonathan would enliven the violence

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that rocked the Niger Delta region in the immediate post-1999 period, while a loss for Buhari would ignite violence in the north. Simply put, with the main contenders from different ethno-religious groups in the country, the stage was set for yet more ethno-regional violence. Predicting the outcome of the election was a Herculean task. Campbell (2015), for instance, observed that, despite the strength of the opposition, Jonathan remained the likely — but not certain — winner, while Lee (2015) predicted that the election could go to a runoff, as a clear winner may likely not emerge. The presidential election, considered the most keenly contested in the history of the country, culminated in the election of Muhammadu Buhari, who garnered 15,424,921 votes, or 53.96% of the 28,587,564 total valid votes cast against Jonathan's 12,853,162, which amounted to 44.96% (see Table 1). Buhari won by 2.57 million votes and also marshalled more than 25% of the votes in 27 states. Moreover, Buhari won in 21 states of the Federation while Jonathan won in 15, plus the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja (see Map 1). Table 1: State by State Summary of the 2015 Presidential Election Results 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

State Abia Adamawa Akwa Ibom Anambra Bauchi Bayelsa Benue Borno Cross River Delta Ebonyi Edo Ekiti Enugu Gombe Imo Jigawa Kaduna Kano

APC 13,394 374,701 58,411 17,926 931,598 5,194 373,961 473,543 28,368 48,910 19,518 208,469 120,331 14,157 361,245 133,253 885,988 1,127,760 1,903,999

PDP 368,303 251,664 953,304 660,762 86,085 361,209 303,737 25,640 414,863 1,211,405 323,653 286,869 176,466 553,003 96,873 559,185 142,904 484,085 215,779

Ethnicity, Conflict and the Quest for Peace in Post-Military Nigeria

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37

Katsina Kebbi Kogi Kwara Lagos Nasarawa Niger Ogun Ondo Osun Oyo Plateau Rivers Sokoto Taraba Yobe Zamfara FCT TOTAL

1,345,441 567,883 264,851 302,146 792,460 236,838 657,678 308,290 299,889 383,603 528,620 429,140 69,238 671,926 261,326 446,265 612,202 146,399 15,424,921

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98,937 100,972 149,987 132,602 632,327 273,460 149,222 207,950 251,368 249,929 303,376 549,615 1,487,075 152,199 310,800 25,526 144,833 157,195 12,853,162

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

As in the previous election, the voting pattern reflected an election determined by ethnic, regional, and religious considerations. It is always difficult to ignore the relationship between these primordial identities and voting patterns in Nigeria, as voters tend to identify with aspirants from their own ethno-regional and religious background. As shown in Figure 1 (below), Buhari won overwhelmingly in the Muslim-dominated northwest and the north-east, while voters in the south-south and south-east predictably voted massively for Jonathan. The north-central and southwest votes were shared almost fairly between the two candidates.5

5

Nigeria's geo-political regions/zones are: north-west (Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara); north-east (Adamawa Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe); north-central (Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau); south-east (Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo); south-west (Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo); and south-south (Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River Delta, Edo, Rivers). The north-west is populated mainly by the Hausa-Fulani Muslims; the majority of the inhabitants of the north-east are also Muslim. The north-central is culturally and religiously mixed, and the south-west, inhabited mainly by the Yoruba, is also religiously mixed but culturally homogenous. In the south-east are the Igbo, who are predominantly Christian. The south-south, also referred to as the

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Map 2: 2015 Presidential Election Results by State

Source: INEC Niger Delta region, is home to minority ethnic groups who are just as clearly Christian. These groupings are political realities in Nigeria, where ethnic identity also overlaps with religious and regional identities.

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Figure 1: 2015 Presidential Election Results by Region

As Figure 2 (below) shows, the APC candidate did well in his geopolitical zone — north-west — which accounted for about 46% of his total votes. He also did well in the other two northern regions but these were not enough to secure him the needed votes to clinch the presidency. Figure 2: Percentage of APC Total Votes by Region

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Likewise, as expected, the south-south region accounted for 37% of the total PDP votes, followed by the south-east with 19% (see Figure 3). Figure 3: Percentage of PDP Total Votes by Region

Clearly, the south-west was the main battleground in the election. The APC had hoped that the combination of votes from the populous northwest and the north-east (which constituted Buhari's support base), along with a fair share of south-west votes, would guarantee their candidate's victory. That hope was not dashed as the votes from the region proved highly significant in Buhari's victory. The importance of the south-west votes cannot be overemphasised given the fact that President Jonathan came to power in 2011 after winning 59.6% of the country's total vote, despite Buhari's impressive performance in the north. It is difficult to argue that voting patterns in this part of the country reflected ethnoreligious identification because events during the campaign showed that Yoruba voters paid less attention to religion than the two candidates and their leading supporters. In this region, there are about as many Muslims as there are Christians and many extended families are a mixture of both, providing an explanation for the rarity of inter-confessional conflicts. In fact, there is an ‘exceptional religious toleration’ in Yorubaland, where people are influenced more by communal ties than by religious alignment (Laitin, 1982: 427). Although there is no evidence to suggest that religious sentiment was completely ignored, evidence from social media postings as well as this author's private conversations with other researchers suggests that voters in this region voted based on issues and the personality of the candidates.

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Certain sociological factors, such as religious, ethnic, and regional sentiments have contributed to our understanding of how the election was won and lost. However, it would be erroneous to suggest that these factors solely determined the outcome of the election. The frantic effort by the leadership of CAN to ensure that Jonathan was re-elected ended in futility, meaning that the alliance between the religious body and Jonathan's camp had no electoral value. It may even be suggested that the undue romance limited his chances. One plausible explanation for Buhari's victory at the polls may therefore be connected to the strength of the APC, which campaigned aggressively on a mantra of ‘change’, promising to tackle corruption and insecurity, among other issues. The former dictator ran a strict campaign against corruption and, party chieftains did not fail to highlight their candidate's past record in fighting corruption, as well as his military feat in the fight against the Maitatsine insurgency in the 1980s. For the issue-based voter, Jonathan's nonchalance towards corruption was enough reason to vote for Buhari, whose 20-month period as a military head of state stood him in good stead as a man of integrity. As noted earlier, the election took place against the backdrop of an Islamist insurgency in the north-east of the country. Boko Haram's reign of terror subjected the country and its military to international ridicule and this cannot be ruled out as Jonathan's re-election albatross. The Nigerian Army, no doubt, made some gains against the insurgents, especially in the months preceding the election, but this was not enough to convince the ‘neutral’ voter that Jonathan was the right man for the job. The growing public perception, especially in the north, that the administration was incapable of bringing to an end the reign of terror plaguing the country helped to increase support for Buhari. Although the presidential election was devoid of the large scale ethnoreligious violence that characterised previous elections, there is no denying that the election once again split the country along ethnic and religious lines. The anxiety over possible post-election violence was doused when Jonathan openly conceded defeat even before the final results were announced by the electoral commission. The presidential candidates’ apparent commitment to the Abuja Accord, organised by a peace committee for the 2015 elections under the leadership of General Abdulsalami Abubakar (retired), where they pledged to avoid inflammatory statements and activities capable of inciting violence, proved effective. Members of the international community, who also saw the strategic importance to the world of a united and violence-free Nigeria, preoccupied themselves with constant ‘no violence’ messages to Nigeria's political elites and engaged in

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a series of meetings with them. For instance, the United States Secretary of State, John Kerry, in a pre-election visit to Nigeria underscored the importance of free, fair, and credible elections in the most populated country in Africa (Campbell, 2015).

Conclusion In Nigeria, rather than a vestige destined to disappear, ethnicity has continued to wax stronger and ethnic conflict has continued to be a constant threat to the existence of the multi-ethnic state. Given the unending ethnic affiliations, it would be foolhardy to expect the disappearance of ethnic conflicts. Political elites are still locked in political and economic competition and have continued to employ ethnicity as a mobilisation tool in their quest for a share of the country's resources. As witnessed in Nigeria over the years, mobilising ethnic identities in the pursuit of self-defined goals has some implications for national cohesion. Some forms of ethnic arithmetic have, therefore, become a necessity in Nigeria, where the politicisation of ethnicity is profound; it is unavoidable if the inherent imbalances in the state are to be redressed. There is no denying the existence of those measures, as can be seen in the adoption of the ‘federal character’ principle and the constant changing of the geographical structure of the Federation (the division and re-division of the country into smaller manageable units) to mention but a few, but more needs to be done if Nigeria is to continue to exist as one entity and in peace. Contemporary Nigerian leaders should put certain affirmative actions into place which are capable of serving as antidotes to ethnic disgruntlement. As demonstrated, the inability of the country's leaders to manage the social relations among the diverse ethnic groups that make up the country is partly at the heart of the ethnic conflicts ravaging the country. Nigeria, being a distributive state, places excessive emphasis on distribution instead of production, and its leaders distribute national resources along ethnic lines, thereby causing ethnic conflicts. Therefore, diminishing the economic centrality of the Nigerian state will go a long way to ameliorate those ethnic conflicts associated with competition for national resources. The country's federal system needs to be reformed to ensure fair distributive politics.

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—. (1975), The genesis of the Nigerian civil war and the theory of fear, Nordic African Institute: Uppsala. Laitin, D. (1982), ‘The Sharia debate and the origins of Nigeria's Second Republic’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 411430. Lee, K. (2015), ‘Nigeria's high-stakes presidential elections: A very basic guide’, Vox 2016 Presidential Election, http://www.vox.com/2015/3/28/8305235/nigeria-elections-basic-guide (accessed 01 February 2016). Maiangwa, B., Uzodike, U., Whetho, A., and Onapajo, H. (2012), ‘Baptism by fire: Boko Haram and the reign of terror in Nigeria’, Africa Today, vol. 59, no.2, pp. 40-57. Melson, R. and Wolpe, H. (1970), 'Modernisation and the politics of communalism: A theoretical perspective', The American Political Science Review, vol. 64, no. 4, pp.1112-1130. Melson, R. and Wolpe, H. (eds.) (1971), Nigeria: Modernisation and the politics of communalism, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. Mustapha, A.R. (2009a), ‘Institutionalising ethnic representation: How effective is the affirmative action in Nigeria?’ Journal of International Development, vol. 21, no. 4, pp.561-576. —. (2009b), ‘Nigeria since 1999: A revolving door syndrome or the consolidation of democracy?’ in Mustapha, A. R and Whitfield L. (eds.), Turning points in African democracy, New York: James Currey. Naanen, B. (1995), 'Oil-Producing minorities and the restructuring of Nigerian federation: The case of the Ogoni people', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vo1.33, no.1, pp.46-78. Nnoli, O. (1978), Ethnic politics in Nigeria, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. —. (1995), Ethnicity and development in Nigeria, Aldershot: Avebury. Obi, C. (2006), Youth and the generational dimensions to struggles for resource control in the Niger Delta, CODESRIA Monograph Series, Dakar, CODESRIA. Obi, C. and Rustad, S.A. (eds.) (2011), Oil and insurgency in the Niger Delta, London, New York: Zed Books. Onapajo, H. (2012), 'Politics of God: Religion, politics and conflict in democratic Nigeria', The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol. 4, no. 9, pp.42-66. Onapajo, H., Uzodike, U. and Whetho, A. (2012), ‘Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: The international dimension’, South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 19, no. 3, pp.337-357.

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Onuoha, F. (2012), 'The audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, analysis and emerging trend', Security Journal, vol. 25, pp.134-151. —. (2014), Why do youth join Boko Haram? Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. Osaghae, E.E. (1991), ‘Ethnic minorities and federalism in Nigeria’, African Affairs, vol. 90, pp.237-258. —. (1994), Ethnicity and its management in Africa: The democratisation link, Lagos: CASS, Malthouse Press Ltd. —. (1995), ‘The Ogoni uprising: Oil politics, minority agitation and the future of the Nigerian State’, African Affairs, vol. 94, no. 376, pp.325-344. —. (2003), ‘The state and ethnic autonomy in Nigeria’, Regional & Federal Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, pp.84-105. Otite, O. (1990), Ethnic pluralism and ethnicity in Nigeria, Ibadan: Shoneson. Paden, J. (2015), 'Religion and conflict in Nigeria: Countdown to the 2015 elections', United States Institute of Peace Special Report, Washington, DC. Panter-Brick, S.K. (1970), ‘From military coup to civil war, January 1966May 1967’, in Panter-Brick, S.K. (ed.), Nigerian politics and military rule: Prelude to the civil war, London: The Athlone Press. Smock, A. (1971), Ibo politics: The role of ethnic unions in Eastern Nigeria, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Suberu, R. (1996), Ethnic minority conflicts and governance in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. —. (2009), ‘Religion and institutions: Federalism and the management of conflicts over Sharia in Nigeria’, Journal of International Development, vol. 21, no. 4, pp.547–560. This Day (2014), ‘PDP Condemns Dominance of APC executive by Muslims’, 8 January http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/pdp-condemnsdominance-of-apc-executive-by-muslims/168306/ (accessed 01 February 2016). —. (2014), ‘Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, private jet and matters arising’, 11 October, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/pastor-ayo-oritsejafor-privatejet-and-matters-arising/190966/ (accessed 01 February 2016). Ukiwo, U. (2005), On the study of ethnicity in Nigeria, CRISE Working Paper No. 12, University of Oxford. Whitman, E. (2015), ‘Nigeria elections 2015 Muslims and Christians: Religion being used to divide voters, opposition party says’, 19 February, International Business Times, http://www.ibtimes.com/nigeria-elections-2015-muslims-christiansreligion-being-used-divide-voters-1822142 (accessed 03 January 2016).

CHAPTER THREE CITIZENSHIP RIGHT VERSUS ETHNIC NATIONALITY CLAIMS: THE CAUSAL FACTORS OF COMMUNAL CONFLICT IN NIGERIA BAKUT TSWAH BAKUT

Introduction: The Polity – Nigeria Nigeria is a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-religious state with a vast geographical size composed of many different people. According to the 2006 national census (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2009: B2), the population is 140,431,790, but it is currently estimated to be over 170 million people. Interestingly, the 2006 demographic head-count excluded questions on ethnic or religious categorisation in an effort to discourage the growth of ethnic and religious cleavages. That decision has made it difficult to determine how many different ethnic groups there are in the country, as well as their religious affiliations, and has equally failed to achieve the objective of the exclusion. The assumption that excluding and ignoring the question of ethnicity and religious categorisation of the people in the country would pave the way to lasting peace is a fallacy. It is easy to see this fallacy, taking into consideration the increase in the number of ethno-communal/religious conflicts in the country since the return to democracy in 1999. This chapter provides a historical narrative of the root causes and triggers of communal conflicts in the country, focusing on what we have categorised as ethno-communal/religious conflicts. These are located in the dehumanisation of the ‘other’ and perpetuated inclusion and exclusion from 1914-2014. While, hitherto, conflicts in Nigeria have been depicted as ‘communal’ in the context of the so-called big three (Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the west, and Igbo in the south), it is interesting to note that, since the beginning of the 1990s, Nigeria has

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witnessed various incidences of conflict which tend to be expressed in the form of religious intolerance but which, in reality, have root causes far away from religion. Instead, they are located in the dualism of ‘us’ (selfdefined groups) versus ‘them’ (other defined groups). It is in that context that the communal conflicts experienced in the posttransition period can be explained. These include conflicts between the Ijaws and Itsekiris in Warri in May 1999; Hausas and Yorubas in Shagamu in July 1999; Hausas and Igbos in Aba in February 2000; Ifes and Modakekes in March 2000; Tivs and Jukun in Wukari in May and October 2001; and Hausas and Yorubas in Idi Araba in February 2002, as well as the Tiv and Jukun feud, sectarian violence in many communities such as Kaltungo (September, 2000), Hadieja (2000), Kano (2001), Gwantu (2001), Kaduna (2001), Numan (2004), Kano (2004), Yelwa-Shendam; and Jos; the Dogo Nahawa, Ratsa and Zot Massacres; the Biye Riyom killings and the myriads of other ‘communal’ conflicts since 2003 in virtually all states of the Federation, including the Federal Capital Territory (Abolurin, 2010). Essentially, these conflicts are increasingly taking the form of ‘indigenes versus settlers’ contestation due to struggles over resources, whether in the northern, western or eastern parts of the country. As a multi-ethnic country, each group of people — or what is generally classified as ethnic nationality — has a claim to a particular area, which serves as its homeland (Babangida, 2002). It is, therefore, safe to assert that all ethnic nationalities in Nigeria have a particular homeland exclusively linked to them in that context, and that we can view or understand the policy of the creation of ‘new settlements’ for visitors or strangers by certain communities, albeit indirectly. The subtle discriminatory and deliberate pattern of demographic composition of ‘Nigerians’ in the different parts of the country popularly known as ‘Sabon Gari’ and ‘Tudun Wada’ (Fwa, 2003) has further entrenched the divide between the ‘old’ (original inhabitants – owners) and the ‘new’ (new arrivals – strangers). These settlements had previously witnessed peaceful coexistence and Nigerians of different ethnic nationalities lived together, inter-married, and traded and farmed side by side. However, the complexities of inter-communal relations were brought into focus in the 1990s. Historically, Nigerians of different ethnic nationalities — individually or in groups — migrated from one place to the other in search of economic survival. While some migrants returned to their homeland, or simply established links, others ‘settled’ in the ‘newly’ found homeland. Although in most cases these ‘settled’ migrants tended not to assimilate

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into the host communities, maintaining distinct identities and cultures, and could easily be differentiated, they were not threatened. Instead, were accepted as ‘settler’ residents in the host communities. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the ‘settler’ residents have increasingly become dispossessed of the right to residency and entitlement in the host communities in virtually all parts of the Federation. There has been a reaction to this perceived discrimination, hence the contestation between ‘indigenes’ versus ‘settlers’ – a central root cause of communal conflict in Nigeria. However, it appears that attempts by Nigerian scholars, whose research responsibility it is to seek out and identify the causal variables and develop policy for government intervention to protect the rights of all Nigerians within the country, have failed. This becomes obvious when we take into consideration the content of the preceding part of this chapter, and identify the limitations imposed by the use of colonial scholars’ opinions as the basis of the claims of knowledge. Nigerian scholars, like their Western counterparts, seem to dwell on concepts freely without locating them within the ontological claim of the people. In this regard, much scholarship has focussed more on the concept of ‘communal’ conflicts without interrogating what is defined as ‘communal’ by the subject of study — in this respect, Nigerians. Consequently, scholars and policymakers have been unable to develop appropriate methods for investigating the conflict variables of the development of appropriate resolution mechanisms. It is hoped that this chapter will assist Nigerians, and indeed African social scientists, to begin the process of engaging with the issues and enable the development not only of problem-solving policies but, equally, proactive, conflict-preventive policies, utilising the early-warning indicators.

Conflict The Latin word for conflict refers to ‘clash’, fight’ or ‘confrontation’ among parties whose means or ends are incompatible (Yakubu et al., 2005). Thus, conflict is broadly viewed as a philosophical category denoting the clash of powers or interests, hence a distinct category of social behaviour where parties try to get something to the disadvantage of the other. Conflicts are inevitable in any human society and cannot be restricted to any particular level of human relations; they occur at inter- or intra-family, community, country and organisational levels. Since the 1980s, Nigeria has recorded innumerable communal conflicts which have left unfathomable problems in their trail. These conflicts have posed

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serious challenges to the Nigerian state, including challenges that threatened and continued to threaten the corporate existence of the country. At the community or communal levels, there have been numerous conflicts that have destroyed the social fabric and cohesion that characterises such communities. Gesiye Angaye (cited in Jimoh, 2013) noted that the divisive interplay of politics, ethnicity and religion in the country has led to rising nationalism and militancy of various ethnic movements seeking self-determination, local autonomy, separate identity and true federalism by engaging in violence with manifold loss of lives and property, investment opportunities, and threats to human security. These agitations by communal groups in the country are connected to perceived neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimisation, discrimination, marginalisation, nepotism, intolerance and secessionist demands (Jimoh, 2013). Equally, the growing sense of insecurity, coupled with environmental factors such as drought and desertification, erosion and massive urbanisation further exacerbates the situation (Kwaja, 2009). Nigeria is infamous for its tremendous ethno-communal/values conflicts, which are the starting place for any inquiry into conflict dynamics in the country. The sheer size of the country has ensured that international actors continuously view it as an important strategic partner in the African continent and its diversity has helped in creating pluralism in the polity, serving as a check on authoritarianism. As a country, Nigeria has mystified both external and internal observers due to its resilience, persistence and continuity as a single political entity, despite the US National Intelligence Council in 2005 ‘worrying’ that the country ‘might’ disintegrate by 2015 and face total collapse by 2020.1 Nevertheless, the country is still surviving and moving forward amidst a myriad of communal conflicts and the activities of insurgents and terrorists groups. Ethnicity has been the primary social category upon which political mobilisation has been built; it has become a conflict factor when the interests served by one ethnic group are perceived by its members as threatened by another ethnic group. Sadly, such ethnic nationality-induced conflicts often manifest through values (religious) contestations in such a way that when a particular ethnic nationality is perceived to be socially ranked below other ethnic nationalities, the entrenched perceived fears of marginalisation and exclusion are roused and the group members find 1

National Intelligence Council, ‘Mapping Sub-Saharan Africa’s future,’ Conference report, March 2005, http://www.dni.gov/nic/confreports_africa_future.html (accessed 11 November 2014).

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reasons for assaulting members of the perceived enemy from the ethnic nationality, using the guise of values (religious) differences.

Plateau State – A Microcosm of Nigeria While the characteristics of ethnicity have remained dormant in the polity, they were played out and became conflictual shortly before and just after independence in 1960, and have continued to intensify, particularly since the return to democratic governance in 1999. For the purposes of illustration, clarity and focus, we draw our example from Plateau State, which is a microcosm of Nigeria due to the myriad of ethnic groups and nature of contestation which has resonance for the communal conflicts in the Federation. Plateau State is located in the Middle Belt zone, or the northern-central geo-political zone, with a total area of 26,899 square kilometres. It derives its name from Jos Plateau’s ubiquitous and predominant geographical landscape. It was part of the Old Bauchi Emirate, until May 1967 when the twelve states were created and it became part of Benue-Plateau State. It gained autonomy in 1976. It is bordered in the north-west and north-east by Kaduna and Bauchi states, and in the south-west and south-east by Nasarawa and Taraba states respectively. Although the State is situated in the tropics, it has a near temperate climate with an average temperature of between 18.7o and 51.7o centigrade while the annual rainfall varies from 131.75cm in the southern part to 146cm on the Plateau. The weather is cool, hence its attraction and the significant concentration of expatriates. In addition to the estimated 54 ethnic nationalities in the state, there are high numbers of settler-residents. The 2006 census figure shows the population of the state to be 3,206,531 people (Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, No. 2, 2009: B39). In common with most parts of the Federation, the host nationalities of Plateau State were already settled in the region prior to the Fulani jihad of 1800, which they fiercely resisted, hence its failure in the region. The host nationalities were nevertheless welcoming and receptive to traders and settlers without great confrontation. By the late 1800s, the Royal Niger Company (RNC) operation was advancing towards the region, intent on subduing the host nationalities, and it faced stiff resistance (Nengel, 2002, cited in Plateau Resolves: Report of the Plateau Peace Conference, 2004). Nengel asserts that because the socio-economic and political structures of the host nationalities were not organised with power vested on one individual or institution, but diffused among the different host communities, the conquest of one did not imply the submission of the

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others (cited in Plateau Resolves: Report of the Plateau Peace Conference, 2004: 25). These host communities are, therefore, familiar with previous attempts to dominate them, which informs their suspicion of certain government policies, actions and inactions, as well as the claims of Hausa and Fulani residents in the State. Nevertheless, the State remained in relative peace until the early 1990s, when the disquiet between host nationalities and Hausa/Fulani residents began to manifest. Still, the disquiet remained at suspicion levels only, until the creation of Jos South local government area (LGA) out of Jos LGA. The host nationalities interpreted the creation of the new LGA as an attempt to divide Jos and create a domain inhabited by Hausa/Fulani residents in the now Jos North LGA. This belief was further strengthened when a Hausaman was appointed as Caretaker Chairman. His appointment led to an outburst of violence and expressions of deep resentment against Hausa/Fulani residents in April 1994. This appointment triggered what have been named the ‘indigenes/settlers conflicts.’ These permeate Nigerian society and form the basis upon which communal conflicts have become entrenched in the polity.

The Indigenes versus Settlers Contestation Almost every Nigerian has an opinion on what constitutes or defines ‘indigene’ and ‘settler’, yet the majority of the opinions tend to confuse the concept of ‘indigene’ with ‘citizen’. The general definition of the term ‘indigene’ is explained in relation to claims by people who see themselves as either the ‘first’ to occupy a particular place or are ‘aborigines’ (natives of the place). While this definition is simple to understand, however, it does not explain the concept but only assumes ‘indigene’ to be the same as ‘citizen’, and confuses it with citizens’ rights. This was the trap into which Saminu Turaki, a former Governor of Jigawa State, fell when he was quoted as stating that ‘every Nigerian past leader was a settler’. To buttress the point, Turaki cites former Presidents Sheu Shagari, Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida and Abdulsalami Abubakar as examples, arguing that their ancestry can be traced to Fouta Djallon (National Democratic Party Bulletin, 2004). Turaki uses the jihad of 1804 as the cut-off point in tracing the migratory history of the forebears of these former leaders to what is now called Nigeria. For him, the ‘indigene’ can only be defined in relation to the Nigerian state, since all people migrated from somewhere to their present location. This is the position held by those who argue that everyone is a ‘settler’ in Nigeria because

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people’s forebears migrated from one part of the world to the territory before it became a single country in 1914. Jibrin Ibrahim (2004) not only agrees with Turaki, but also argues that the origin of the concept of ‘indigene’ in the country can be traced to the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which defines the indigene as ‘a person whose parents or grandparents were members of a community indigenous to a particular state’. While Ibrahim appears to have made a cogent and plausible argument, a careful look at the basis of his conclusion reveals the problem with this position. By using the 1979 Constitution’s definition, Ibrahim argues that ‘the indigene’ is someone who can trace his or her ancestry to the given community. However, he fails to define a cut-off point upon which the assertion can be measured. Is it grandparents before 1960 or as of 1979? This lack of clarity complicates the matter. Mahmood Mamdani (2004), a respected Africanist, conceives the ‘indigene’ in relation to colonial legacy. He argues that, in colonial Africa, only natives were said to belong to ethnic groups; non-natives had no ethnicity but were identified racially, not ethnically. Colonial law made the fundamental distinction between those who were and were not indigenous: natives and non-natives. Consequently, ‘indigene’ can only be defined and explained in relation to colonial legacy, due to the difficulty in distinguishing who is indigenous to a particular country, given the history of migration. Mamdani (2004: 8) also took Plateau State as an example to illustrate the difficulty and contestation: […] I spent a month travelling through different parts of Nigeria […] My visit to Plateau state was cancelled because of political violence between two types of residents: those who could trace an ancestry prior to the Fulani Jihad and those who immigrated to the area during and after. In this case, the test of indigeneity was not residence prior to the establishment of the colonial state, but residence prior to the Fulani Jihad.

It is obvious that Turaki, Ibrahim, and Mamdani conceive ‘indigene’ in relation to the state, which is a purely legal/political construction. They have replaced ‘indigeneship’ with ‘citizenship’, consequently making it difficult to establish the basis of claims. Fortunately, however, the claims upon which the contestation of indigenes versus settlers are made are not about ‘rights’ as citizens of the polity (Nigeria), but over the ownership of certain geographical space, based on ancestral links. This is the central issue in communal conflicts in Nigeria. In essence, the problem and confusion associated with defining ‘indigene’ has influenced the definition of ‘settler’, thereby perpetuating the incidences

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of communal conflicts in the country. Based on Turaki’s view, the ‘settler’ is someone whose ancestry is not aboriginal to Nigeria. However, the former President, Ibrahim Babangida (one of those Turaki linked to a Fouta Djallon ancestry) argued that every Nigerian citizen is a native of a particular homeland and is protected by rights accorded by the 1999 Constitution (2002), although he failed to define the ‘settler’ in the context of the contestation between indigenes versus settlers. Furthermore, Jibrin Ibrahim’s summation of who a ‘settler’ is leaves us even more confused. This is because while he acknowledges the provision of the concept of indigene in the 1979 Constitution and, by implication, a non-indigene, he concludes that every Nigerian is a settler. Ibrahim concludes that ‘a long history of migrations which [made] all Nigerians to be settlers [led …] the early nationalist settled for a Federal System of Government as a mechanism for coping with problems associated with […] the deep ethnic and religious division that exists’ (2004: 6). By implication, he acknowledges that certain groups have historical claims to particular areas either as ‘first residents’ or as the ‘oldest and longest to reside’ in the area, hence the claim of ‘ownership’ status. Consequently, the earliest nationalists recognised the existence of ‘owners’ and ‘settlers’ and made legal provision on the basis of citizenship. Unfortunately, Ibrahim lumps ‘citizenship’ and the rights associated to it with ‘indigeneship’. In grouping them together and confusing issues, his argument makes it even more difficult to define a ‘settler’ and resolve the claims at the heart of communal conflicts in Nigeria. For his part, Mamdani sees the concept of ‘settler’ as only being applicable to the dominant colonialist who settled in Africa. Thus, he places the blame on the colonialists who introduced the division between the ‘native’ and ‘settler’: the ‘native’ being one who is indigenous or ‘ethnic’ to the continent or country; the ‘settler’ being a member of the races. Therefore, for Mamdani, the concept of ‘settler’ is purely a legal construct created by colonial administrators to distinguish between the races and ethnic groups and hence should not be used in modern Africa. To sum up, we see Turaki, Ibrahim and Mamdani arguing against the use of the concept of ‘settler’ in modern Africa — and therefore in Nigeria — but they are in agreement that a ‘settler’ is not a native of a particular place. For Mamdani, Europeans are the settlers, while Turaki and Ibrahim say it is those not recognised by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This refusal to accept that every Nigerian citizen is a native of a particular homeland, as argued by former President Ibrahim Babangida and as also implied in the Willink’s Commission Report (1958), makes it difficult to understand the problem perpetuating the ethno-

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communal/religious conflicts in Nigeria. In reviewing the Willink’s Commission Report, Bakut observed that: […] while a specific criterion establishing both indigeneship and settlership is not specified, the explicit and implicit recognition of the status of such categories however implied definitive criteria based on a historical and territorial (land) claims. Thus, in chapter 2, paras 2-6 and 12, the Commission employed the historical antecedents of the various people of the Western region in trying to establish the difference between the Yorubas, Ijaws, Binis and others. The same pattern of historical narrative was utilised in relation to the people of the eastern and northern regions in distinguishing between the various people and identifying their localities. Therefore, a non-native of the defined area belongs to another area – s/he is a ‘foreigner’ (Bakut, 2004: 9).

Furthermore, in acknowledging the existence of natives and non-natives, Sir Henry Willink notes that while the northern region was administered by Emirs: […] a mainly pagan area which formed part of an Emirate (as in the southern Zaria and southern Ilorin), was usually knitted into the system by the appointment of District Heads usually Fulanis or Hausas but sometimes a local traditional chief […] This method however was scarcely applicable to large areas where there had been no Fulani or Hausa administration for example among the Tivs or Jukuns (Willink, 1958: 103104).

Based on these, we can conclude that colonial administration recognised the existence of natives and non-natives and their claims to particular homelands. Therefore, to explain the indigene-settler induced conflict we must accept that a ‘settler’, according to Justice Feberesima, is ‘one whose ancestor […] left his native home for […] as a fixed home, domiciled there as of choice for life […]’ (1994: 48). In other words, a ‘settler’ is one whose ancestor left their native home to settle in another part of the country. The reason for such migration and the time spent in the new place does not constitute the justification for a claim of indigeneship. Hence, Justice Feberesima ruled on the contestation in Jos, thus: ‘But as to the Hausa-Fulani people’s assumption, we make bold, on the evidence at our disposal, to advise them that they can qualify only as ‘Citizens’ of Jos […]’ (Faberesima, 1994: 48). In essence, while Nigerians who are resident in other parts of the country (not their native home) are settlers, their rights as citizens of Nigeria are recognised by the Constitution. This ruling by the Justice, however, has further confounded the situation. What does citizenship mean now that judicial determination has accepted

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discrimination as the basis of indigeneship, if indigeneship-induced communal conflict is to be prevented, resolved, and/or managed? It will appear that the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 is the source of the indigene/settler-induced communal conflicts. Although we have concluded that Turaki, Ibrahim and Mamdani's definition of indigeneship is synonymous with citizenship, it confuses issues, as their conception of citizenship is based on the law and is hence applicable to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Both Turaki and Ibrahim hold the view that since Nigeria is a sovereign country governed by a Constitution, there should only be citizens. Therefore, the existence of the concept of indigenous in the Constitution — hence indigene — contradicts the rights of the citizen. In Mamdani’s explanation, since ‘civil law spoke the language of rights’ based upon which African states are now governed, citizenship should be the defining concept for all indigenous people in the continent. Yet, as good as these explanations are, they have not defined citizenship. Citizenship, according to Marshall (1950: 14) is ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. Consequently, all those who possess the status ‘are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed’. Marshall explains that since humanity learnt to organise politically, the issue of citizenship has been a major political issue, because of the tendency to exclude others from enjoying some rights and benefits attached to membership of the political community. Roche concludes that the liberal tradition which presumes that individual citizens have equal status, equal rights and duties tends to overlook inequality deriving from gender, ethnicity, class and other contexts that may appear to have nothing to do with citizenship (n/d: 363-99). The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria spells out the qualification for citizenship and obligations in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. Chapter 3 focuses on citizenship, stating that it can be obtained by birth, registration and naturalisation, while also allowing dual citizenship, renunciation and deprivation of citizenship. Chapter 4, on the other hand, details the fundamental rights of all citizens. Therefore, citizenship is a legal concept ‘bestowed’ on an applicant who may be eligible due to the circumstance of birth, marriage or naturalisation. According to Chapter 4 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, citizenship could be denied or withdrawn. However, if the applicant is indigenous to a particular place in Nigeria, his/her kinship or lineage cannot be denied or withdrawn by such legal constructs because there is no law that can abrogate such endowment. In discussing the nature of Africans, Bakut

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(2008) asserts that Africans' distinctiveness is based upon kinship, lineage, or genealogy with an autochthonous geographical space called homeland. This observation had earlier been made by Julius Nyerere, who asserted that ‘[Africans’] present day attitude and reactions cannot be properly understood without reference to the economy, social organizations and religious basis of the society of fifty years ago; and so on through time’ (cited in Ranger, 1968: 1). Moreover, Africans’ social organisation, according to Davidson, is bound up in their religion and economy which is linked to ‘the living, the dead and the yet unborn’ (1967: 78) or, as Wilks put it, ‘the continuous application of the past to matters of everyday life’ (cited in Fage, 1970: 10). In essence, because the concept of citizen is politically and legally defined, it cannot deny the individual African his kinship or lineage ties to an ancestry by birth. The failure to accept the intricate nature of Africans’ claims of indigeneship and the legal limitation of citizenship based on the Westphalian state system tends to generate conflict and perpetuates the dichotomy between indigenes versus settlers, hence the perpetuation of communal conflicts in Nigeria.

Self-Realisation and Identity — Definition Difficulties The conflicts in Plateau State, as with other ethnic groups in Nigeria — particularly in the north — while historical, are located in self-realisation due to a self-awareness and the need to be self-defined. This is a reflection of a global phenomenon among minority groups, which asserts a new form of ethnocentric ‘nationalism’ whereby ethnicity is politicised to assume a ‘national identity’. A particular ethnic nationality becomes politicised to the extent that it uses its perceived ‘difference’ and its homeland as a basis for the claim of autonomy, self-determination or statehood, as observed in the people of the defunct Yugoslavia (Bakut, 2014). This phenomenon has been manifesting in Nigeria with the prominent example in the demand for Biafra (Nixon, 1972; Okonkwo, 2015).2 Northern Nigeria, in particular, is home to numerous ethnic groups and communities which are largely rural, non-Hausa or Fulani, and organised into autonomous or community-based polities. These communities have only had rudimentary state structures with no imperial rulers and no expansionist ambitions. The ‘Hausa’, who 2

Nwabueze Okonkwa, ‘Biafra’s Self-determination suit against Nigeria continues September 22, 2015’ in www.vanguardngr.com, accessed on 24/12/15. The Supreme Council of the Elders of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), led by Mr. Nnamdi Kanu, had taken the Federal Republic to the High Court in Nigeria, over their desire to secede from Nigeria in exercising their right to selfdetermination.

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are partly aboriginal and partly came from migrations (Jemkur, 1992; Hiskett, 1984; Falola and Heaton, 2008) became an identifiable (and selfidentifying) group in roughly the 12th century. While internal rivalries inhibited the formation of a unified empire, however, they established seven major city-states and seven other associated-states – collectively now known as Hausaland – extending into what is the present-day Niger Republic. By the 13th century, the Hausa states had gained control over much of the region, incorporating some smaller groups into multi-ethnic, Hausa-speaking polities. Beyond migrations and early settlements, the initial interactions were also shaped by wars, slavery, commerce and the spread of Islam. Many Hausa states waged wars to expand territorial claims and acquire slaves for working feudal plantations or export to North Africa. From the colonial proclamation of 1900 until independence in 1960, the British-controlled Nigeria created a compliant local power base that furthered British interests. It achieved this through indirect rule by restructuring local traditional authorities and deposing holders of office who resisted. The British used local rulers to control the populace and raise revenue while being careful to avoid any direct disruption of the regions’ social structures, including the dominant religion and culture. Its defeat of the caliphate and establishment of Kaduna as the region’s new capital diminished the authority and influence of the Sultan in Sokoto, who was left with the spiritual leadership of all Muslims in the region. By implication, this ushered in the process of partial transfer of power from the aristocracy to a new political class. Decades later, in preparation for independence, the colonial administration introduced reforms that further reduced the influence of traditional authorities, in seeking to separate judicial from traditional powers (Lovejoy, 1986: 236). In some ways, British indirect rule reinforced the Emirate administration by further subordinating many minority areas to Emirate power, with little regard for their own distinct identities. The non-Hausa and Fulani communities responded with conversions to Christianity in reaction to the perceived power of Emirate administration, in addition to the expression of a fear of domination in a post-colonial Nigeria, which the Sir Willinks Commission of 1957 dismissed. Therefore, colonial rule facilitated the domination of Hausa and Fulani elites, especially in areas that minority groups had historically considered to be their exclusive domains, and sowed the seeds for conflicting claims to political space, economic rights and societal values. This is now being manifested through the contestation between the indigenes and settlers, thereby perpetuating communal

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conflict in Northern Nigeria. The British also retained the Islamic law established by the caliphate. However, over time this was limited to civil cases, and the application of punishments such as lashings was restricted and there was subsequently a scaled-down enforcement of Sharia, which was kept to the jurisdiction of local-level native courts. However, during the final period of colonial rule, in 1959, the British wiped out sharia content on the grounds that some of its provisions were incompatible with the rights of all citizens in a religiously plural society. Nevertheless, they allowed the northern region’s government a compromise code (the ‘Penal Code’) which established a Sharia Court of Appeal, with jurisdiction only for Muslim personal law to be practiced in the north. However, many northern Muslim leaders viewed those changes as elevating Christian jurisprudence over their own Islamic judicial heritage. Culturally, the colonial administration generally discouraged Western innovations but allowed Christian missionaries and their schools into the non-Muslim fringes of the defunct caliphate and introduced Roman script to replace ajami for writing the Hausa language. A European-style education system was also introduced alongside the Islamic system. All of these jeopardised much pre-existing scholarship and diminished the status of clerics and others who were not educated in English. In time, these educational and cultural policies sharpened the older cleavages between Muslim Hausa/Fulani and the non-Hausa/Fulani groups3 (see Uwazie, Albert and Uzoigwe, 1999: 73; Gumi, 1992; Miners, 1971; Luckham, 1970). At the time of independence in 1960, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (the Sardauna of Sokoto, a descendant of Usman Dan Fodio) became the Premier of the northern region and was the dominant force in the emergent coalition federal government. He pursued a ‘northernisation’ policy which favoured northerners (of all religious persuasions) in employment in regional and local administrations, due to fears that ‘migrants’ from the south (Igbos 3

The goal of ‘northernisation’ went beyond public administration, as articulated by Umar I. Kurfi in his article ‘Beyond Remembering the Legacies of the Sardauna (1)’, Leadership Newspaper (Abuja), 8 January 2010. Kurfi quoted the late Sardauna thus: ‘the Northernisation policy does not only apply to clerks, administrative officers, doctors and others. We do not want to go to Lake Chad and meet strangers [i.e. southern Nigerians] catching our fish in the water, and taking them away to leave us with nothing. We do not want to go to Sokoto and find a carpenter who is a stranger nailing our houses.’ This position has been reinforced by the House of Chiefs Debates (mimeo), 19 March 1965, p.55, quoted in Isaac O. Albert, ‘The sociocultural politics of ethnic and religious conflicts’, in Ernest E. Uwazie, Isaac Olawale Albert and Uzoigwe (eds.) (1999), Inter-ethnic and religious conflict resolution in Nigeria, p.73.

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and Yorubas) with the advantage of Western education would continue to establish themselves in the administration and economy of Nigeria. He worked assiduously to replace non-northern employees in the regional and provincial civil services with northerners, by introducing crash training programs to equip northern civil servants with the qualifications to assume greater control of their government at regional and federal levels (KirkGreene, 1967: 8). Indeed, this policy fostered solidarity among all people across the region, which the mostly Christian minority groups benefited from extensively due to their high levels of missionary school education. This gave them a sense of belonging as religious differences were minimised. However, it is instructive to note that the Sardauna did not undertake any major administrative reforms in response to the longstanding fears of the region’s minorities and their demands for local autonomy from Emirate rule. Rather, he promoted Islam, both as a unifying instrument and as a means of preserving the region’s cultural identity, and established the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) as an umbrella body to unite the Muslim sects, propagate Islam and provide an ideological base for the north. The campaigns were intended to convert ‘pagan’ minority groups to Islam, supported by state resources and sometimes led by Bello himself, particularly in Zaria and Niger provinces. They were largely successful but were resisted in some places like the Bauchi province. While Sir Ahmadu Bello drew strong support from the Muslim majority, for the non-Muslim minorities and Christian ‘migrants’ from the south his campaign and subsequent election as vice president of the World Muslim League in 1963 only served to raise fears of an Islamic hegemony. This alarm, whether it was reality or mere perception, affected community relations and contributed to the first military coup against the northern regiondominated federal government in January 1966, during which Sir Ahmadu Bello and several northern political and military leaders were killed, subsequently leading to the 1967-1970 civil war (Gumi, 1992; Miners, 1971; Luckham, 1970). Although the war was fought far away in the eastern part of the country, it planted the seed of long-term conflicts based on inter-group relations, mainly due to the many northern youth from the non-Hausa and Fulani groups who enlisted, thereby reinforcing the perception that the military was being used as a means for maintaining the north’s dominance in the Federation. Therefore, decades later, the many recruits and new officers from northern minority groups had become very senior officers. Upon retiring from service and searching for new relevance, they no longer

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accepted a Hausa-Fulani leadership as they strove to become leaders of their own ethno-religious groups. Furthermore, the expansion of federal administrative units by successive military administrations (to 36 states by 1996) altered relations between majority and minority groups all over the country. This was implemented by fracturing the regional platforms of the major ethnic groups and thus eroding their domination over minority groups. Consequently, the break-up of the northern region, initially into six (of the 12 nationwide) states in 1967, and eventually into 19 (out of the of 36 nationwide), including the Federal Capital Territory (1996) undercut the Hausa-Fulani vision of regional unity. While in the north, the process did not fully lead to the emergence of a minority group as the majority in any state, in the north-central region and in Kaduna State in the north-west in particular, it reduced Hausa and Fulani power over the minority populations. Thus, there were claims of ownership of the land and the political space through the indigenes versus settlers’ contestations (Bakut, 2008).

Return to Democracy: From 1999 to Now While the return to democracy in 1999 was celebrated in most parts of the country, it was a sobering experience for some in the north. On the one hand, it seemed to lead to a loss of power at the federal level to the south under the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo, and the elite in the region were therefore faced with the challenge of designing new strategies for regional self-assertion in the Federation. On the other hand, the emergence of new political elites in the post-transition era, by virtue of their different political appointments at various levels including the federal, state, and local government levels, produced an atmosphere of competition between the old (traditional) and the new elites. While these new leaders may not have enjoyed the allegiance that traditional rulers and religious authorities once did, their control of funds placed them above traditional institutions. The availability of funds and political control over traditional institutions gave them the leverage not only to challenge, but also to erode traditional institutions’ authority, while increasing the layers of bureaucracy. The advantages conferred by access to state machinery and its resources also created new tensions between ethnic and religious groups. In essence, while democratic rule has calmed tensions in some places and allowed for freer expression, in other places it has brought to the fore communal competition for resources and religious revival.

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Although the return to democracy opened up public space and generated possibilities for conflict-prevention and peacebuilding, Nigeria continues to suffer from debilitating communal polarisation, with public figures and the media escalating social tensions into a dangerous game of ‘them’ and ‘us’, thereby entrenching ethno-regional politics. It is enlightening to note that most of the conflicts in the north, although located in the contestations over resources between ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’, are ostensibly centred around the (religious) values of each group. While religion may only be one factor in these conflicts, in combination with other political and economic issues, it is nevertheless a major motivating aspect of violence. It provides a legitimising framework for violence that would otherwise be considered unacceptable, given the desire of some to impose their faith on others or to fight any perceived imposition or discrimination, with each group reacting to actions by the other with suspicions of hidden agendas and a sense of insecurity. Nevertheless, religion is just a cover for deeper antagonisms causing and driving communal conflicts which derive from a complex mix of historical, political, economic, ethnic and other factors (Golwa and Ojiji, 2008). Indeed, there is a rising tide of Christian movements – some radical, some established – seeking to spread their religion in the north and across traditionalist and Muslim communities, while at the same time there is an expression of Islamic renewal and radicalism sweeping the Muslim world. These trends are clashing not only across Nigeria’s mixed-religion regions, but equally producing intra-religious conflicts (particularly within the Nigerian Islamic community) that have escalated into violence in several parts of the country. While manifested along religious lines, these conflicts are deeply rooted in Nigeria’s pre-colonial and colonial history and heavily influence communal identities and political structures to this day. For some Muslims, a mental map of the former Sokoto Caliphate has remained active in their minds; hence they eschew contemporary institutions and structures. At the collapse of the caliphate some utopian (hijrah) groups migrated to Sudan but maintained links with their coreligionists at home, while others chose internal exile and established communities isolated from the wider world, to maintain pure Islamic societies. When mobilised by charismatic preachers, these hijrah groups are capable of violence to resist or overturn the existing national system in favour of an idealised vision of an Islamic state, as was the case with Maitatsine and now Boko Haram. Such sentiments are not only confined to groups that operate at the fringes, but rather have salience for a great many Northern Nigerian Muslims, since efforts to re-establish the Sharia criminal codes in 1999-2000. For them, sharia, in the broadest sense,

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remains a key identity marker for many Muslims in Northern Nigeria who view it as their right to an orderly society and a link to their historical memory of the caliphate. For them, maintaining sharia is as much an issue of religious freedom as it is viewed by Christian Nigerians as an attack on theirs (Bunza, 2002: 49-65). The states in north-central and the north-east have been particularly prone to ethno-communal and inter-religious unrest as the numbers of Christian converts have sky-rocketed, and the number of Muslim converts from the traditional religions have also increased. USAID (2010: 37) sources estimate that the percentage of Christians in Kaduna State is approximately 50%; in Bauchi State it is 35-40%; roughly 50% in Gombe State; and in Borno State it is as high as 35%. Similarly, states such as Adamawa, Taraba, and Benue, hold a Christian majority as well. In response, the propensity for identity-based conflicts across the Northern region has grown dramatically in recent years, with conflicts elsewhere in Nigeria provoking violent retaliation in the region. Although groups of Muslim vigilantes often initiate episodes of conflict for Christian minorities, in recent years many Christian communities have been organising their own vigilantes or militias, and initiating violent attacks as well. More often, however, local political and resource disputes ignite religious anger that boils over into specific localities. As Christian numbers have perceptibly grown in recent years, their complaints of political marginalisation have risen. Christian leaders have further complained of discrimination in the distribution of state resources and development funds, stating that Muslim communities have enjoyed more local governments and traditional rulers and chiefdoms, which are also channels of state funds (USAID, 2010: 38). In essence, the indigene/settler contestations serve as the basis for routine religious discrimination against Christians in Northern Nigeria, as much as it has been used against Muslims in Jos. Since 1999, Christian groups have resisted the Shari’a criminal codes being applied to them through legal means as well as through violence. Consequently, the Shari’a criminal code generally has not been applied to non-Muslims, but subtle discrimination exists that transfers to Christians and followers of traditional beliefs being treated as second-class citizens. Particularly as Christian groups continue to proliferate and gain adherents in the northern, traditionally Muslim states, both through internal migration and conversion, their demands to build churches or conduct other religious activities are often rebuffed by local authorities. While instances of this sort are sometimes managed through legal channels, in most cases

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grievances remain unaddressed, in part because they are built upon the indigene/settler dichotomy that allows Christian groups to be discriminated against on the basis of their settler status rather than directly on a religious basis. Nonetheless, discrimination solely on the basis of religion also takes place, as converts from Islam to Christianity who are indigenes of northern states often point out (USAID, 2010: 38). The contestation over political and economic control of states in which religious populations are nearly balanced has broader symbolic importance, which manifests through discrimination and/or violence against minorities in other areas. These pressures, however, are generally felt more severely by Christian minorities in traditionally Muslim states where insecurities about maintaining the Islamic character of northern states are acute, due to internal migration and shifting religious loyalties. The lack of a shared sense of Nigerian citizenship that locates the identity of place within a broader national context will continue to exacerbate these tensions, which ultimately rest in the politics of indigeneity, thereby entrenching communal conflicts in the polity.

Conclusion: Linking Indigenes, Settlers and Citizens’ Rights To resolve the indigenes versus settlers’ dichotomy and thereby address the ethno-communal/religious conflicts in Nigeria, there must be clear understanding and acceptance of the concepts, and their distinctions and inherent contradictions, for a robust and effective discussion. Bakut’s (1999) elaborate discussion on indigenes and citizens’ rights and claims in Africa gives insight to the relationship. He states that: […] while the question of territory is central to the African sense of identity, it is however, not conceived as property to be exploited. Rather, it is a communal space kept in trust for the benefit of the [ethnic group]. Consequently, while a claim of territorial uniqueness is central, it is however, not based on individual ownership […] Thus, we can accept the claim of territorial uniqueness as the basis of asserting an ethnic particularity, however, only to a limited degree. This is because the territory […] is conceived as a frontier […] and not boundary as defined by the Westphalian state system. The ownership, […] while belonging to ‘ethnic group’ is actually made available for the benefit of all resident (including foreigners) within the frontier, not on the basis of citizenship, but based on the understanding that while the foreigner is free to reside and pursue his socio-economic interest, he must recognise the ownership of the land as belonging to the [ethnic group …] In essence, the claim of

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territorial ownership is central to the identity of the people as well as their cultural, religious, aesthetic, and linguistic uniqueness (p.249).

From this position, one understands that Africans’ attachment to specific land is not merely physical, but spiritual. The claim to ownership or indigeneship is not based on the deeds of purchase or the citizenship bestowed by the state, but on the link of the ethnic nationality to their ‘dead’ (ancestors), and the living and the ‘yet to be born’. This position is further explained in the conceptual difference between indigeneship and citizenship, and in their relationship. Bakut has argued that ‘the individual is an extension of the nation [ethnic group] and that most of the names of the nations (not states) in Africa are translated ‘people’. Thus, the name of the ‘people’ is synonymous to the nation, which is ‘a web of kinship’ – that is, the tribe or clan’ (Bakut, 2008). The citizen, on the other hand, is co-opted by legislation. ‘He can assume a state’s membership and also can renounce/change it for another. This is however not the case with the membership of the nation [ethnic group]’. Therefore, while the rights of citizens are protected, the exercise of those rights must not infringe on the claims of the indigenes. Citizens, who are resident outside their native home, are, as far as the African ontology is concerned, settlers who need to respect the cultural and religious values of the indigenes. Based on these observations, particularly on the relationship between indigenes and settlers’ rights, we can conclude that the challenge posed in managing the indigene versus settler dichotomies in general, and communal conflicts in Nigeria in particular, is located in the lack of a clear and precise definition and identification of ‘the rights and entitlements’ of host nationalities, and citizenship rights as recognised by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is to this task that scholars and policy-makers must turn.

References Abolurin, A. (2010), Democratisation, conflict management and the amnesty question in Nigeria; John Archers, Ibadan. Babangida, I.B. (2002), ‘Ethnic nationalities and the Nigerian state: The dynamics and challenges in a plural Nigeria’, a paper delivered at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, Jos, on 22 November. Bakut, tswah B. (1999), Self-determination and national self-determination: The marriage between macro International Relations (IR) and micro

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Historical Sociologies as a framework for Understanding Africa, PhD thesis, Nottingham Trent University, UK (unpublished). —. (2004), The Willink’s commission report of 1958 in relation to citizenship issue in Nigeria, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja (unpublished). —. (2008), ‘The idea of “the people” and the challenge of conceiving citizenship in Nigeria’, in Joseph Golwa and Ochinya Ojiji (ed.), Dialogue on citizenship in Nigeria, Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolutions. —. (2014), The human quest for physiological-security: An evaluation of the creation and disintegration of Yugoslavia, Saarbrucken: Scholars’ Press. Bunza, M. (2002), Islamism vs. secularism: A religious-political struggle in modern Nigeria, JSR1, no. 2, http://www.jsri.ro/old/html%20version/index/no_2/mukhatarumarbunz a-articol2.htm (accessed 11 November 2014). Davidson, B. (1967), Which way Africa? London: Penguin Books. Falola, T. and Heaton, M. (2008), A history of Nigeria, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Feberesima, A. (1994), Commission of inquiry report on Jos riots of April 12th 1994. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2009), Official gazette, no. 2, vol. 96. —. 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Fwa, L.F. (2003), ‘Ethno-religious conflict in Kaduna State’, in Thomas A. Imobighe (ed.) Civil society and ethnic conflict management in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Golwa, H. P. J and Ojiji, O. (eds.) (2008), Dialogue on citizenship in Nigeria, Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolutions. Gumi, A. (1992), Where I stand, Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Hiskett, M. (1984), The development of Islam in West Africa (London). Ibrahim, J. (2004), ‘The citizenship question: All Nigerians are settlers’, Daily Trust, 22 June. International Crisis Group (2010), Northern Nigeria: Background to conflict, Brussels: International Crisis Group. Jemkur, J. F. (1992), Aspects of Nok culture, Zaria: Gaskiya. Jimoh, A. (2013), Rising deaths from communal crisis in Nigeria, http://yadingeria.wordpress.com/2013/02/19/rising-deaths-fromcommunal-clashes-in-nigeria/. (accessed 30 October 2014). Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. (1967), ‘The peoples of Nigeria: The cultural background to the crisis’, African Affairs, vol. 66, pp.3-11.

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Kwaja, A.M. (2009), ‘Strategies for rebuilding state capacity to manage ethnic and religious conflict in Nigeria,’ The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.3, no. 3, pp.105-115. Luckham, R. (1970), The Nigerian military, A sociological analysis of authority and revolt, 1960-1967, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lovejoy, P.E. (1983), Transformations in slavery: A history of slavery in Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —. (1986), ‘Problems of slave control in the Sokoto Caliphate’, in Curtin P. D. and Lovejoy P.E. (eds.), Africans in bondage: Studies in slavery and the slave trade: Essays in Honour of Philip D. Curtin, University of Wisconsin-Madison: African Studies Program. Mamdani, M. (2004), ‘Beyond settler and native as political identities: Overcoming the political legacy of colonialism’, paper delivered at the First Conference of Intellectuals from Africa and Diaspora by the African Union in Dakar, Senegal, from 6-9 October. Marshall, T.H. (1950), Citizenship and social class, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Miners, N.J. (1971), The Nigerian Army 1956-1966, London: Methuen. National Democratic Party (2004), In-house Bulletin, vol. 1. no.9, Abuja: National Headquarters. Nengel, J.G. (2002), ‘Subjugation of the polities of Jos-Plateau and central Nigerian highland to colonial dominion, 1898 -1930’, in Aliyu A. Idrees and Yakubu A. Ochefu (eds.) Studies in the history of central Nigerian Area (vol. 1), Lagos: CSS Limited. Nixon, C.R. (1972), ‘Self-determination: The Nigeria/Biafra case’, World Politics, vol. 24, no.4, pp.473-497. Nyerere, J. (1968), Introduction, Ranger T. (ed.), Emerging themes of African history Nairobi: East African Publishing House. Plateau Resolves: Report of the Plateau peace conference 2004, 18 August-21 September, 2004 (main report), vol.1. Roche, M. (1987), ‘Citizenship, social theory and social change’ Theory and Society, vol.16, no.3, pp.363-399. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2010), Politics by other Means: Nigeria Conflict Assessment, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaeb010.pdf. (accessed 27 November 2015). Uwazie, E.E., Albert, I.O. and Uzoigwe, G. N. (eds.) (1999), Inter-ethnic and religious conflict resolution in Nigeria, Ibadan: Lexington Books.

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Wilks, I. (1970), ‘African historiographical tradition, old and new’ in Fage J.D. (ed.), Africa discover her past, London: Oxford University Press. Willink, H. (1958), The Willink’s Commission report (Nigeria), reproduced by the League of Human Rights. Yakubu, A.M., Adegboye, R.T., Ubah, C.N. and Dogo, B. (2005), Crisis and conflict management in Nigeria since 1980, Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy.

CHAPTER FOUR THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ETHNORELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF JOS, PLATEAU STATE HAKEEM ONAPAJO AND CHRISTOPHER AFOKE ISIKE

Introduction Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has been characterised by different forms of conflict. In their work, Azareem and Saka (2007) demonstrate that a total of 36 different cases of violent conflicts were recorded in the country between 1999 and 2005 alone. It has also been demonstrated in Chapter 1 of this book that violent conflict has manifested in all the geo-political zones of the country since democratic transition in 1999. Data presented in this chapter shows that inter-group conflict is a major type of conflict occurring in contemporary Nigeria. The case of Jos, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious city in the Plateau State of Northern Nigeria, is a good example of an area that has recorded a high incidence of this type of conflict. From 2001, Jos City degenerated into a war zone because of the intense violence which arose from a series of conflicts among the major ethno-religious groups inhabiting the city. In these cases, numerous lives and property were lost. For instance, in September 2001, 915 lives were reportedly lost following one of the clashes. In November 2008, a large number of people lost their lives and property in another crisis (Reuters, 2010). Jos City has since been the site of occasional clashes, which clearly makes it not only one of the major conflict zones but also one of the major sources of insecurity in democratic Nigeria. Against the backdrop of the above, the phenomenon in Jos has been an area of interest for researchers. Various studies have been produced from different perspectives aiming to explain the situation (Danfulani and

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Fwatshak 2002; Blench and Dendo 2003; Egwu 2004; Harnischfeger 2004; Ginifer and Ismail 2005; Adetula 2005; Sodiq 2009; Alubo 2009; Ostien 2009; Boudreaux 2006; Dung-Gwom and Rikko 2009; Ambe-Uva 2010; Ojukwu and Onifade 2010). In the studies, various issues are highlighted to explain the circumstances surrounding the outbreak and recurrence of ethno-religious conflicts in Jos. To some, it is occasioned by religion (Harnischfeger, 2004; Sodiq 2009), while others argue from the angles of the politics of ethnicity or identity (Egwu, 2004; Adetula 2005; Alubo 2009; Ostien 2009; Ambe-Uva 2010; and Ojukwu and Onifade 2010), competition over resources (Blench and Dendo, 2004; and Boudreaux 2006), urbanisation (Dung-Gwom and Rikko, 2009), and poverty (Ginifer and Ismail, 2005). These viewpoints may offer plausible explanations for the situation as all of the highlighted factors do indeed precede conflict in any society, particularly a plural one. However, no research has offered a systematic analysis of the conflict from a political economy theoretical framework. In other words, there has not been adequate consideration of how the social structure of the society considers the differential distribution of wealth among its social groups, and the nexus between its economy and politics, which may explain the recurring conflicts in Jos. Therefore, taking into consideration the political economy approach to understanding societies, this study is conceived to present a materialist explanation of the conflict in Jos. The study hinges on the central argument that the protracted conflict experienced in Jos is an outcome of the struggle between different social groups to secure a suitable social space for the security and promotion of their individual economic interests. All other variables that have been advanced in the existing research that attempts to explain the phenomenon are conditioned by the salience of the economic factor. This chapter will argue that this is occasioned by the history of Jos society from as far back as its colonial era. In fulfilling this task, this chapter is organised into six sections. The first section discusses the political economy of social conflict from the Marxist perspective as a framework for analysis. The second section probes the economy and society of Jos from the time of its colonial history to explain its emergence and social formation. The third section explains the various phases of the post-colonial economy and how they periodically shaped the structure of the City’s society. The fourth section demonstrates the intersection between politics and economy in the City and how this accounts for the heightened tensions between the groups. In the fifth

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section, there is an analysis of group consciousness and the formation of ethno-religious associations. The fifth section chronicles the series of conflicts in the city as a reflection of the competition between the social groups characterising the society, in line with their economic interests. In the conclusion, policy recommendations are offered in consideration of this fresh insight into the understanding of the conflict bedevilling the city of Jos.

The Political Economy of Social Conflict: A Marxist Perspective Despite the rush towards liberalism and its theories in recent times, the Marxist theoretical framework is still useful as ‘a powerful framework for the understanding of our society’ (Anderson, 1974: 3). This informs its reconsideration in a theoretical analysis of society for this study. A simple revision of some relevant points in Marxist theory should, therefore, be in order here. The theory is founded on the argument that the economy is the most important factor in understanding history and society: developments within the economic structure are predominant and an explanation for the transformation of human society. According to Marx, a society ‘could neither be understood by themselves, nor explained by the so-called general progress of the human mind, but they are rooted in the material conditions of life’ (cited in Hilferding, 1981: 125). Furthermore, the economy represents the foundational structure of society. It is the superstructure which shapes other structures within a society including its politics, culture and ideology. This is captured in Marx’s assertion that ‘the mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual process of life’ (cited in Hilferding, 1981: 125). In the analysis, the concept of social stratification is prominent as it explains the classification of social roles because of the existing mode of the economic structure of a society. The different roles being played by the group of individuals in a society explain their division into the social classes of privileged and underprivileged. This engenders the institutionalisation of social inequality as the privileged groups have better access to the acquisition and consumption of the material products of society at the expense of the underprivileged. The privileged do not only control the economic space but the political space as well, as political power is shaped by the economic power of the society (Ake, 1981: 2). According to Giddens (1981: 28), a ‘dichotomous division of classes’ presupposes a ‘division of

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both property and power’ because ‘economic domination is tied to political domination.’ This explains the inherent conflict between the social classes in a society. Since the existing social order favours the privileged, they expectedly and vehemently strive to preserve it, while the underprivileged, being the disadvantaged in a society, push for a displacement of the social order. This tug of war explains the logic of social struggle in a society. The intensity of this struggle takes different forms which might be expressed through ‘passive opposition’ or ‘hostile confrontation’ (Mudenda, 1983: 96). It is significant that the internal struggle in a society is launched on a platform of well defined socio-political organisations and alliances. In this situation, cultural (religious, ethnic and racial) affinities are effectively explored as a means of social mobilisation and consciousness. Ake (1981: 2) rightly notes this while suggesting that tribalism thrives in Africa because of its usefulness in securing economic interests. To him, ‘it serves the economic and political interests of the African bourgeoisie by promoting solidaristic ties across class line.’ The instrumentality of cultural similarity is most viable in activating social consciousness and mobilisation as it possesses an ‘emotional dimension’ that goes beyond that of class affinity (Young, 1982). Furthermore, Mudenda also notes the salient point that ‘class consciousness is mediated by a host of other subjective factors such as race, religion, ruling class ideology, [and] other ideologies’ (1983: 97). By implication, group leaders find it easy to mobilise their subjects on the basis of religion, tribalism, ethnicity or race, to form alliances for the contestation of resources in society.

The Colonial Economy and the History of Social Formation in Jos Jos City has its location in Plateau State, in the north-central geo-political zone of modern Nigeria. It is characterised by several ethnic and religious groups from across Nigeria and beyond. It is observed by Leonard Plotnicov (1967; 1970) that, in its earlier times, the city possessed some special characteristics which distinguished it from other urban areas in Africa. It was isolated from the congestion and housing problems that were prevalent in other popular city centres. It also possesses an attractive climate and beautiful landscape that qualifies it as a perfect tourist destination (Plotnicov, 1967: 3 and 1982: 271-272). Its history and societal formation derive from European colonialism. Historical studies have proven that the primary motive behind the colonial invasion of Africa was

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economic (Rodney, 1972; Williams, 1976; Awolowo, 1977; Ake, 1981; Isichei, 1983; and Wallerstein, 1985). In this regard, Walter Rodney states that ‘imperialism meant capitalist expansion’ as the Europeans in Africa sought ‘opportunities to control raw material supplies, to find markets, and to find profitable fields of investment’ (1972: 150). The case of Jos is a good example of Rodney’s assertion. In 1885, William Wallace, a representative of the British-owned National African Company, discovered that tin products were being produced in commercial quantities on the Jos Plateau. This introduces the story of the city of Jos. Upon this discovery, there were a series of expeditions in 1886, 1902 and 1903 to properly locate the minefield (Fell, 1939: 246) and the capitalists launched a war against the natives of the area — the Berom, Anaguta and Afisare — because of their resistance to the occupation of their land (Grace, 1982; Isichei, 1983). By the end of 1906, the colonial masters had fully established their presence on the Plateau and set in motion the machinery for full mining operations. Human labour was primarily used to transport the extracted products to the trading posts for many years before a railway line was constructed between 1913 and 1914 (Grace, 1982: 181-182; Isichei, 1983: 426-427). Movement in the international economic arena further shaped the tin production economy in Jos. Price fluctuations in the international market naturally had a direct effect on the production of tin on the Plateau (Fell, 1939: 254). For instance, in 1909, when the British established Tin Fields of Northern Nigeria Limited, and therefore demonstrated such an expression of interest in the fields, there was a boom in the industry which included an exponential rise in mining operations in the area. This period recorded a sharp increase in the number of companies operating on the Plateau, legally and illegally. By 1912, 82 companies had established their presence there. World War I, however, had a negative effect on the tin industry as its early period recorded some forms of economic recession. This resulted in the closure of operations by many of the companies on the fields. However, this setback was short-lived as events during the War increased the demand for tin products and stimulated growth in the sector, which brought about rapid production between 1914 and 1917 (Grace, 1982: 3). In order to militate against these undesirable disruptions in the industry, some measures were put in place in the 1930s to moderately regulate the market at the international level (Fell, 1939: 254-255). Later, mining on the Plateau was monopolised by the colonialists. In the early days of their control of the area, the colonialists had permitted activities by local miners but, by the end of 1913, these operations were stopped and

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compensation of GBP 40 was paid so that private British investors could be favoured (Grace, 1982: 184; Isichei, 1983: 427). Social life on the Plateau — and indeed across Nigeria — was dramatically shaped by the thriving enterprise of tin mining during this period. In the first instance, the colonial mining economy triggered a high rate of human migration to the area (Freund, 1981; Grace, 1982; and Isichei, 1983). The locals, with the exception of a few, looked unfavourably at the prospect of working in the tin fields because of their traditional socio-economic inclination towards farming. Moreover, the working conditions in the mining industry were extremely harsh and only attracted meagre wages (Isichei, 1983: 427). Due to these challenges in the employment of local labour in the production process, the British capitalists moved in nonindigenes from the Hausa-Fulani geographical region to work in the tin fields (Rasmussen, 1990: 156-157). It must further be noted that these labourers were compelled to work in the tin mines in order to acquire the cash to pay their taxes, as the colonial masters had already monetised the economy and introduced taxation. Isichei (1983: 433) shows that men from places as far away as Sokoto travelled on foot to the Plateau — a 488 kilometre journey — in search of a job in the tin mines. The tin industry, coupled with the roads and railway line constructed for the easy transportation of tin products, opened space for other economic activities in Jos. This manifested in the vibrant transportation and other small scale business activities recorded there during that period. As a result, people from other parts of Nigeria, including the Igbo and Yoruba from the south, also migrated to Jos Plateau (Plotnicov, 1967: 35-36). Southerners, employed by Europeans as labourers or clerks, were separated from the northerners in their settlements and, having been exposed to Western education and acquired some relevant occupational skills for the British production and administrative processes, experienced a slight elevation in social status (Plotnicov, 1967: 41-42). Clearly, this transformed Jos City into a model cosmopolitan society composed of Africans (Nigerians from the south and north and other West Africans), Levantines, a few Indians, and a large European population (Plotnicov, 1967: 271272). From the 1930s, there was an increase in the city’s population of the Hausa ethnic group. This is shown in the 1930/31 official census of the Jos division, where the Hausa topped the list by a population of 6,498 out of a total of 14,817 (cited in Egwu, 2004: 120). Numerically, the Hausa had become the dominant group in society and would begin to have an edge over others, most especially over the locals, in the acquisition and allocation of resources. The increasing influence of this ethnic group was

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becoming more conspicuous among the other ethnic groups, raising fear and mutual suspicion. For instance, Plotnicov (1971: 298) shows that a civil riot nearly broke out amongst the ethnic groups in 1932 due to rising fears that the increasingly dominant Hausa group would use its influence to take over all European property and economy, following speculation about the possible departure of the colonial masters. Furthermore, retrenched or unemployed Hausa migrant labourers had (through their acumen and historical business networks) shifted to various trading activities and therefore dominated the trading sector (Egwu, 2004: 230). In addition, the invasion of land by the colonial masters was followed by the destruction of the traditional local economy, therefore affecting the economic strength of the natives. Firstly, the low-scale tin-mining activities of the locals were negatively affected. According to Grace (1982: 183184), traditional tin production had assisted in the local needs of the people, and also represented their source of income before the British occupation and monopolisation of the industry. Secondly, the traditional agricultural activity of the people was also negatively affected by the industrial extraction of tin. A large portion of land was ring-fenced for mining and other areas were licensed or leased to farmers. For this, local farmers had to pay cash to the colonial authorities in order to use the land for cultivation. Moreover, mining destroyed the farmlands in the area. The monetisation of the economy coupled with the introduction of taxation and the imperative of paying taxes forced able-bodied locals to work in the mines in order to acquire waged labour (Rasmussen, 1990: 158-159). All of the above factors economically disempowered the locals which reduced their influence in the scheme of competitive events in the society.

Post-Independence Economy and Society Systematic analyses of the character of the Nigerian post-colonial economy have been well advanced by a number of scholars (e.g. Williams, 1976; Ake, 1981). To Ake, the concept of a ‘post-colonial’ economy is a façade as the economy remained dependent and was significantly conditioned by the former colonial masters, even after independence (1981: 88). Williams is rather of the opinion that a post-colonial economy presupposes ‘the transfer of state authority into indigenous hands’ (1971: 28). Both views hold true for the nature of the economy after independence. Multi-national corporations owned by the former colonial masters still dominated the economy. These corporations depended on ‘foreign, or rather foreigncontrolled, capital, supplies of intermediate goods, and technical and

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managerial skills’ (Williams, 1971: 29). However, the nationalist leaders, with their ‘developmentalist’ economic philosophy, heavily intervened in the economy to stimulate speedy development. As a result, the state had much influence on the direction of the economy, while its public sector represented an important and powerful component of the nation’s economic structure. This environment shaped socio-economic events in Jos. Before the flourishing tin-mining economy suffered a decline in the 1980s, owing to several reasons which will be discussed shortly, five foreign companies principally dominated the industry (Egwu, 2004: 218). Three of these were the Nigerian Embel Tin Smelting Company (Portuguese-owned); Consolidated Tin Smelters Limited (British-owned); and the Makeri Smelting Company (British-owned) (Kilby, 1969: 174-177). There were also other African-owned enterprises which flourished in the metropolis before the 1980s. An example includes NASCO Nigeria Limited, established in 1963 by an Eritrean businessman, Alhaji Abdul Nasredin (Egwu, 2004: 220). NASCO’s products included detergents, soaps, biscuits, cornflakes, and others and were very popular in many homes in all parts of Nigeria, including the south (www.nascogrp.com). The Nigerian workers occupying higher positions in these companies and state departments are classified as the ‘modern elites’ of society by Plotnicov (1970). As most of them were from the south, they had early exposure to Western education and had acquired managerial and administrative skills. Before 1966, they only formed about 1% of the whole of the population of urban (Plotnicov, 1970: 278). There was another social class of the modern elite in the society which Plotnicov neglects, given his emphasis on the acquisition of Western education as a major indicator for the identification of this group. These were the Nigerian entrepreneurs that occupied the informal sector. For example, the Hausa merchants who systematically controlled the trading sector represent a significant group which can be included in the elite class. Apart from engaging in direct trading, they also occupied the ‘middle men’ positions because they were in control of the thriving transportation business which gave them the opportunity to serve as a link between the farmers and the markets (Egwu, 2004: 230). Plotnicov further identifies the ‘incipient middle class’ as the workers below managerial level, skilled workers, school teachers, clergymen, and traders with some formal education (1970: 275). This social class can also be identified mostly as originating from the south given their Western education. Others of lower status were the peasant farmers, petty traders and artisans that had their

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occupations in house construction, lorry-body building, tailoring, and others (Plotnicov, 1967: 36). Subsequent internal and external economic events significantly affected the social configuration. The tin industry started facing difficulties due to the sharp decline in the value of tin products in the global market in the 1960s (Rasmussen, 1990: 231). Additionally, the radical transformation of the economy because of the 1970s’ oil boom and the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the 1980s, were two major economic phenomena in the history of Nigeria that further contributed to the collapse of the tin economy. The age of the oil boom presupposes an historical phase of the country during which emphasis dramatically shifted away from other economic sectors towards the oil sector. This period recorded a drastic fall in the mining, agricultural, and industrial sectors of the country, while there was significant expansion in the state agencies as a major source of employment and wealth generation. Apart from the tin industries, other manufacturing companies in the Jos metropolis also started facing hard times around this period. However, the increased access to cash brought about by the ‘petrodollars’ of the oil boom era stimulated growth in some non-oil and public sectors of the society. One example of this is the fruit and vegetable market which recorded a boost in the wake of rapid urbanisation and high demand for the products from the society’s middle class who emerged from the expanded state agencies (Porter et al., 2003: 371). The implementation of SAP by the military regime of Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB) in 1986 later became a major onslaught on the companies in the metropolis and many of its other economic sectors. In light of the negative effects of SAP, Adejumobi (1995: 176), for example, reported that the national growth rate margin in the industrial sector fell sharply from 12% in 1988 to 4.0% in 1992, while other sub-sectors of manufacturing, oil and gas dropped from 14.1% in 1989 to 2.6% in 1992, and from 8.1% in 1988 to -0.4% in 1992 respectively. Furthermore, the agricultural sector recorded its decline caused by the sharp increase in agricultural technology and non-technological inputs in the wake of currency devaluation and the government’s removal of subsidies as fundamental principles of SAP (Adejumobi, 1995: 177). SAP, therefore, caused multi-dimensional levels of disruption in Nigerian society. According to Adejumobi (1995: 180), ‘[…] the impact of SAP on most social groups and classes in the Nigerian society has been quite excruciating and far-reaching’ which, in the case of the working class, was

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demonstrated by ‘mass retrenchment, stagnating wages, devalued pay packets, low nutritional intake and a restricted access top social facilities’. This suggests that the existing elite groups in Jos were also seriously affected and most of them were relegated under the regime of SAP. Many of the companies that represented a source of wealth and social status closed down their businesses. Furthermore, the restructuring of state enterprises championed by SAP, suggesting a ‘downsizing’ or ‘cutting’ of the large number of governmental staff, led to the massive disengagement of this social class from state agencies. Going by Bonat’s study (1995), which demonstrates how the regime of SAP severely affected the Kaduna peasant farmers of Northern Nigeria because of the government’s removal of subsidies on agricultural inputs, coupled with an exponential rise in agricultural inputs and increasing dominance of the MNCs, one may logically conclude that the farming sector in Jos also experienced some dislocation during this era. The effects of SAP generated rising interest and pressure on the informal economic sector in Jos. There was a great scramble for market stalls in choice areas of the city for the purpose of trading activities. As a result, who controlled the market and what was being controlled started becoming a major issue in the metropolis. As shown earlier, the Hausa had established their dominance in the informal trading sector right from the period of colonialism, and this was not a big deal to the other ethnic groups, especially the indigenes, as they derived satisfaction in whatever ventures they were involved in. The Igbo and Yoruba also maintained their spaces in the sector based on their individual specialisations. Egwu (2004: 226) shows the ethnic distribution of stalls in the ‘Ultra-Modern’ market in Jos in 2000: the Hausa owned the highest number of the stalls (31.29%), while the Igbo and Yoruba followed with 29.47% and 12.55% respectively. This arrangement is now a source of tension between the natives and the supposed migrants: the natives now see the settlers as an obstacle to their economic prosperity. In addition, the farming sector also became a major issue. Porter et al. (2003: 378) observe that in the early 1990s, the natives (particularly the Berom) suddenly shifted their interest to dry-season farming production, which had previously been dominated by the Hausa. It was in this period that the natives (Berom) began realising that ‘they have learned their skills in irrigated vegetable production from the Hausa, and having learned these skills, saw little point in retaining a Hausa presence on their land’ (Porter et al., 2003: 379). Given this, the natives began laying claim to the natural

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ownership of land for cultivation in the area and, as a result, prevented the Hausa from acquiring land for the same purpose. It is against this backdrop that Ambassador Yahaya Kwande, a prominent Nigerian politician and citizen of the Jos metropolis, asserted that: […] I don’t know what is happening in Jos now. I would say that things began to change when the natives began to get jealous of the fact that settlers in the city are prospering more than them. If you look at the city, you will notice that most of the areas were founded and developed by the Hausa. You ask yourself, how come that those places still bear Hausa names? (The Sun, 27 February 2011).

Furthermore, the informal real estate sector has also been under increased pressure. In the midst of harsh economic conditions occasioned by the implementation of SAP, the downgraded members of the middle class who had acquired many properties in their heyday had no option but to begin to commercialise and over-price their properties in the metropolis for survival. In light of this, Dung-Gwom and Rikko’s (2009) study demonstrates that there has been a consistent increase in the annual cost (rents and sales) of residential properties in the metropolis since 1990. This has also manifested in the peri-urban areas where there has been a sharp rise in the cost of landed properties for commercial and residential purposes. Apart from the fact that this development also constitutes another source of hostility among the social groups in Jos (as ownership of land and property translates into intense group competition), it also contributes significantly to the proliferation of a series of urbanisation crises in the city. Rising unemployment in the peripheral areas of Plateau State and the consequential massive influx to the metropolis for elusive job opportunities has further fuelled the social crises that bedevil the city.

Politics, State and the Economy Nigerian politics is driven by a ‘do or die’ political philosophy because the state owns ‘virtually everything including access to status and wealth’ (Ake 1981, cited in Olaitan, 1995) and also represents a viable instrument of domination in the structure of the society (Olaitan 1995: 129). This maxim on the philosophy of politics in Nigeria succinctly explains the underlying factor of politics in the intense struggle among the ethnic groups in the city of Jos. It should be noted from the onset that there had been a history of acrimony between the Hausa-Fulani and the people of Jos Plateau prior to the era of colonialism, as a result of the violent resistance of the latter to the Fulani Holy Jihad and the foiled attempt to

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annex the Jos Plateau territory by the Sokoto Islamic caliphate in the 18th and 19th centuries (Morrisson, 1982). It was colonialism that brought these two warring parties together. The Imperial British regime, administered under indirect rule, strongly allied with the traditional ruling class of the north as a major strategy to successfully actualise their identified economic interests in the territory. Thus, an influential Emirate system was established with autocratic traditional leaders, while methods were employed to relate well with the existing Islamic institution. This required maintenance of the Islamic status quo, non-interference in matters of religion (Islam), and categorisation of Islam as the official religion of Northern Nigeria (Dudley, 1968: 18-20). In this process, non-Muslim societies of the north were classified as ‘pagan areas’ and made subordinate to the hierarchical political structure of the Emirate system, while the British northern administration was extended to the ‘dispersed’ societies, which included the Jos Plateau (Dudley, 1968: 57; and Tseayo, 1976). The town councils of these areas, especially in Jos, Makurdi, Lokoja and Minna, were classified as subordinate native authorities (Tseayo, 1976: 78). Elective principles were not applicable to these towns, which were thus controlled by the colonial administration, unlike the ‘first-class’ townships of the central Hausa-Fulani territory of the north (Plotnicov, 1967: 42). This structural arrangement provided the Hausa-Fulani with the impetus to establish their dominance over the people of the non-Muslim areas in matters of power and privileges in the region, right from the era of colonialism until post-independence. In Jos, the British, while establishing social segregation of the ethnic groups in their residential areas (as earlier mentioned), settled the HausaFulani and the natives in one residential area classified as the Native Town. In this town, higher privileges were accorded, especially in religious matters, given the alliance the colonial masters had with the traditional ruling elites. For example, the sale of alcohol was prohibited and an ‘Alkali’ (Sharia) court was established in Jos Native Town (Plotnicov, 1967: 43-45). Furthermore, the political space was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani in the local politics of the metropolis (Egwu, 2004: 193). Political competition was, therefore, significantly shaped by this structural disparity between the ethnic groups, most especially between the natives and the Hausa-Fulani. This became more pronounced in the early ages of regional politics after political parties were formed in Northern Nigeria. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC), being the ruling party with a strong connection to the Hausa-Fulani elites, faced major opposition in non-Muslim areas. The non-Muslims were opposed to the dominant regime of the NPC, as they believed that the party was an

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instrument for the promotion of the hegemonic interests of the HausaFulani and their Islamic religion, which gave them a second-class status in the scheme of affairs in the northern region (Dudley, 1968: 90-105; and Tseayo, 1976: 83-89). Due to this dominance, opposition parties such as the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and the Middle Belt People’s Party (MBPP) were established to challenge the NPC/Hausa-Fulani hegemony. Of these, the natives of Jos were strongly represented and much of the opposition activities were launched from Jos. In response to this, the NPC-led regional government ‘diverted commercial, industrial, and other development away from Jos’, which affected economic progress in the city (Plotnicov, 1967: 38). In the midst of this political bickering, tensions further heightened and assumed a new dimension after the 1976 landmark reform of the local government system in Nigeria. Amongst the fundamental elements of this reform was the granting of substantial financial autonomy to local governments. Local governments were in this sense given the legal status to generate and manage their revenue without the interference of other higher levels of government, as had earlier existed in the country (Smith, 1982: 2). This development apparently suggested that politics at the local government level would also become a profitable business venture, as control of local governments automatically translated to unhindered access to wealth and other material privileges that were accruable from increasingly rich local governments. This period overlapped with the the era of massive oil wealth and increased governmental allocation to the different tiers of government in Nigeria, during the 1970s. Given the many years of military regime in the country, there was major recruitment into the new local governments through political appointments at the behest of state military governors (Egwu, 2004: 197). This clearly suggests that political recruitment would be conditioned by the patron-client system that had permeated Nigerian politics. Egwu (2004: 197-202) points to the fact that the pendulum of political power swung to the natives’ side between 1976 and 2000. They accounted for nine out of the 15 different chairmen or sole administrators appointed as heads of government during the period. However, the Hausa had a history of higher representation in the office of councillorship, as indicated by Egwu, who shows that between 1988 and 2001 the office was ethinically composed in the following manner: Hausa, 13; Berom, 10; Afizere, 7; Igbo, 6; Anaguta, 4; and Yoruba, 3. The heightened competition informed by the irresistible material allure of the administration of local governments was pushed further during the period of local government creation during the Second Republic and its

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succeeding military regimes. In the Second Republic, the civilian state governors over-used the 1979 constitutional provision for the creation of local governments, chiefly to create a viable support base or reward their political loyalists, and to oppress their political adversaries. Given this, there was a sharp rise in the number of local governments created across the country. According to Adejumobi (1995: 285), barely three years after the 1979 commencement of the democratic regime, 383 new local governments were created in different parts of the country, including in Plateau State where Jos is located. New local governments were created which served ulterior motives. It was the puritanical regime of Buhari/Idiagbon, after it overthrew the troubled democratic order in 1983, that dissolved the ill-conceived and needless local governments created by the civilians and reverted to the 1979 status quo in terms of the number of local governments. The regime of IBB, known for its penchant for political manoeuvrings and patronage, once again revisited the issue of local government creation as a major political strategy to garner support for the government. The creation of local governments was employed as a ‘settlement’ strategy, in Momoh’s words (1995: 23), by IBB to create vibrant economic opportunities for political loyalists. In line with this agenda, IBB further increased federal allocations to local governments from 10% to 20% and constitutionally restructured local governments so that they would be able to receive their allocations directly from the federal government (Adejumobi, 1995: 290). It must further be stated that the Hausa-Fulani ‘northern elites’ constituted an ‘important element of Babangida’s political support’, as suggested by Reno (1993: 72). This was taken into consideration in the creation of an additional local government in Jos. The existing local government was split into two — Jos North and Jos South — in such a way that six wards shifted to the Hausa community, out of the 11 wards of the newly-created local government structure in Jos (Egwu, 2004: 204). In light of this, the Berom Elders Council complained: Jos North Local Government Area was created by the General Ibrahim Babangida (IBB) administration in 1991 in clear negation of the wishes and demands of the indigenes. The design of the Hausa/Fulani was to carve out the indigenous groups and so claim the L.G.A as their own. Despite our protest to Dodan Barracks, Babangida did not botch (sic). This is the most unnatural Local Government ever created as it cuts Du District Chiefdom into two without regard to traditional institutions; it has amorphomous (sic) boundaries, with the State Secretariat and Governor’s Office in Jos South L.G.A and not in the supposed State Headquarters, Jos North (Commission of Inquiry Report, 2009).

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When Sani Abacha — in similar fashion to IBB — embarked on local government creation, the natives clamoured for a displacement of the status quo. They were favourably disposed towards the creation of Jos East and Jos West local governments, in opposition to the two local governments earlier created by the IBB regime. The Hausa-Fulani, on the other hand, responded to this demand by making a counter-demand for the creation of a new Jos Central local government which would still be a reflection of the geographical and administrative boundary of the Jos North local government (Egwu, 2004: 208-209). In 1994, the appointment of a descendant of the Hausa-Fulani group, Mallam Aminu Mato, as Chairman of the caretaker committee of Jos North local government created tension in the metropolis, following his outright rejection by the natives. The renewal of democracy in Nigeria in 1999 further created ample room for intense political competition between the groups in the metropolis. In September 2001, crisis followed the appointment of Mallam Mukhtar Muhammed as the Director of the federal government’s Poverty Alleviation Programme for Jos North’s local government (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002: 248; Adetula, 2005: 228). Furthermore, in 2008, there were high levels of violence following the outcome of the intenselycontested local government elections in the metropolis, between the natives and the Hausa-Fulani.

Group Consciousness and Ethno-Religious Organisations According to Plotnicov’s (1967) study, there had existed different tribal or cultural organisations in Jos since its emergence. A peaceful relationship existed between the people of these tribal groupings, except for a few skirmishes which would be considered normal for inter-group coexistence in a social setting. Providing a picture of the camaraderie that existed among the tribal groupings in the city in earlier times, Plotnicov writes: More common than this type of conversion [few instances of skirmishes] is the expression of friendship between persons of different tribes. The ‘Young Juju Society’ performs Ibo masker-plays during Christmas and Easter, is made of young Ibo and Yoruba boys. Men of different tribes work together aid one another by mutually offering hospitality, loaning money, and finding employment (1967: 66).

The peaceful atmosphere among tribal and ethnic groups radically changed upon the realisation (or increased perception) that some of them were

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being marginalised, short-changed and dominated by others in the allocation of opportunities. Hence, the invocation of ethnic and religious sentiments as a basis for mobilisation against each other. It is useful to digress a bit here and mention the strong nexus between religion and ethnicity in the context of Northern Nigeria. According to Bienen, ‘it is not always possible to separate ethnicity from religion’ in Nigeria (1985: 117). Islam is synonymous with the Hausa-Fulani, just as Christianity is synonymous with the people of the Middle Belt of which Jos is a part. Earlier, we mentioned the historical animosity between both groups prior to colonialism due to Dan Fodio’s holy jihad. Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002: 245) note that this contributed significantly to the mass acceptance of Christianity by the non-Muslim members of the north as a mark of their strong resistance to the Hausa-Fulani Muslims. Clearly, this makes it somewhat difficult to separate the different religious identities of these opposing groups from their activities. Two inter-related factors can explain the rise in group consciousness and ethno-religious (especially minority) political organisations in the north: the first is Christianity, which changed ‘the outlook and attitudes of the people’ (Rasmussen, 1990: 180); the second is the acquisition of Western education by some members of the minorities and the rise in the number of newly educated professionals among them (Dudley, 1968: 92; and Rasmussen, 1990: 183). Their concerns were chiefly around the perceived hegemony of the Hausa-Fulani in the north (Dudley, 1968: 90). As a result, the following ethnic and religious groupings were formed: The Tiv Progressive Union (TPU) in 1938; the Idoma Hope Rising Union (IHRU) in 1944; the Birom Progressive Union (BPU) in 1945; the Northern Nigerian Non-Muslim League in 1950; and the Middle Zone League (MZL) in 1951 (Dudley, 1968: 90-105). These groups formed different political alliances and political parties as a strategy for overturning the status quo of the ruling NPC in the north in pre- and post-independence politics. While this shaped major events in the early political history of Jos and Northern Nigeria, a new set of ethno-religious groupings later emerged in Jos. The groups were originally established to promote associational life among people of the same ethnic and religious backgrounds and provide welfare services to their members in the midst of increasing economic hardships experienced in the country in the era of SAP (Egwu, 2004: 246). This would later assist in the process of ethno-religious mobilisation. Most of these groupings have successfully been transformed into agitation groups in Jos. For example, the Jassawa Development Association (JDA),

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which was originally established in 1983 by youths of the Muslim HausaFulani community for associational activities, has been at the forefront of their demands to be recognised as ‘indigenes’ of the Jos North local government because they were born and raised there, which guarantees their access to the privileges of the city (Adetula, 2005: 217). This is because of their perception of being discriminated against in terms of employment and educational opportunities (Egwu, 2004: 252). On the other hand, the largely Christian Berom, Afizere and Anaguta, being the natives of Jos, also transformed their associational groups to respond to the demands and claims of their major adversary, the HausaFulani Muslims. Some examples of these include the Berom Youth Association and the Afizere Cultural and Community Development Association. They are notable for laying claim to the natural ownership and indigeneship of Jos. They perceive others as intruders who are not only sharing their resources but are also dominating the socio-political and economic space at their expense (Egwu, 2004: 263). As a result, they have been involved in a series of violent clashes with the JDA. In this regard, the history of the emergence of Jos and its genuine indigenes are being manipulated to suit the interests of each of these ethno-religious groups (See Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002; and Egwu, 2004). Other groups of inhabitants such as the Igbo Cultural Union (ICU) and Ogbomoso Parapo are less concerned with contesting these opposing groups, especially in terms of political power, as their major focus is centred on their economic endeavours. It must be further noted that these groups of ‘natives’ also have clashes among themselves over the rightful ownership and indigeneship of Jos.

The Outburst of Conflict As stated in the analyses advanced so far, conflicts have been recorded in the metropolis of Jos since the period of colonialism. We have alluded to the fact that a violent conflict nearly broke out between the groups in 1932 following speculation that the Hausa were scheming to take charge after the departure of the colonial masters. This event prepared the ground for a violent clash which later occurred between the Hausa and Igbo in 1945 in the metropolis. Plotnicov (1971) studied this phenomenon, which he conceived as the first inter-tribal war Nigeria would experience after colonialism. The crisis, which started at the market and was centred around struggle and competition for economic survival, left two people dead. This occurred during a period when there was increased migration of

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Igbo traders into Jos, which posed a threat to the Hausa traders who had already established their dominance in the market. Furthermore, the economic depression of World War Two and the general strike that followed in Nigeria also contributed to the rising frustration of the people (1971: 305). In 1976, following the attempt by the military governor of Plateau State, Colonel Dan Suleiman, to extend citizenship to the supposed nonindigenes in Jos by virtue of his 1976 proposed amendment of the Plateau State General Order, there was tension in the metropolis. The natives nurtured the fear of domination by the settlers, especially the HausaFulani. It was in the midst of this tense atmosphere that violence broke out between the groups on 12 April 1994 (Egwu, 2004: 276-281). This episode of conflict in the city was sparked by the natives’ outright rejection of the appointment of Mallam Aminu Mato (from the HausaFulani community) as Chairman of the caretaker committee of Jos North’s local government. Mato’s appointment was suspended following a series of protests. In response, the Hausa youths, under the auspices of JDA, embarked on a demonstration which led to a clash with other groups, particularly natives (Adetula, 2005: 227-228). The September 2001 episode of conflict was considered to be one of the most severe at the re-emergence of democratic rule in Nigeria. This happened after the appointment of Mallam Mukhtar Muhammed (of the Hausa-Fulani group) as the Director of the federal government’s poverty alleviation programme in Jos North’s local government. This was followed by intense protests by the natives, similar to those in 1994. They saw his appointment as another opportunity for the Hausa-Fulani to gain control of the privileges accruable from a profitable governmental agency at the natives’ expense. Messages such as ‘trace your roots before it is too late’ and ‘this office is not meant for Hausa-Fulani or any non-indigene’ were passed across to the Hausa-Fulani. On the other hand, the HausaFulani responded in a similarly violent tone with statements such as ‘let’s see who will blink first […] the seat is dearer to us than our lives [...] blood for blood, we are ready’ (Adetula, 2005: 228). The violence that eventually followed this altercation left many people dead. In 2008, a violent clash broke out after elections were conducted in Jos North’s local government. It was followed by the outcome of the election, which had been tensely contested between Timoty Gyang Buba (a Christian Berom and candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)) and the candidate of the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP), Aminu

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Yusuf Baba, who was a Muslim Hausa-Fulani. Before the former was declared the winner, the members of the latter’s community had already started protesting because of their belief that the election was rigged by the state’s electoral body in connivance with the state governor, Jonah Jang, to favour the ruling party and a kinsman of the governor (Ostien, 2009: 2627). The warring parties engaged in a series of occasional attacks against each other, which accounted for massive killings and the large-scale destruction of property.

Conclusion This chapter has attempted to illustrate the importance of the economy to the crisis bedevilling Jos. It has examined the role of the economy, right from the period of colonialism, in the formation of Jos, and discussed how this laid the foundations for inter-group clashes in the city. Further, it has surveyed the phenomenal changes to the post-independence Nigerian economy and the different responses of the groups to these changes. It has also explained the link between the economy and the various political intrigues in the city and how these relate to the phenomenon of violence in Jos. The aim of this chapter has been to propose an argument which is significantly different from the set of arguments presented in a number of other writings which restrict the violent conflict in the city to a singlefactor analysis, such as religion, ethnicity, politics, or economy. While noting the salience of the economy and the structural disparity in Jos society, it is important that great emphasis should be placed on the distribution of opportunities in the city. This should take into consideration all ethno-religious groupings in matters of political appointments and nominations, as well as admission into educational institutions. Most importantly, there is a need for the state to embark on a viable empowerment programme for the army of unemployed, aggrieved and angry youths who represent ready-made tools for the political elites in the promotion of their selfish interests.

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Momoh, A. (1995), ‘The political economy of the transition to civil rule’, in Adejumobi S. and Momoh, A. (eds.), The political economy of Nigeria under military rule: 1984-1993, Harare: SAPES, pp.16-56. Morrison, J.H. (1982), ‘Plateau societies’ resistance to Jihadist penetration’, in Isichei, E. (ed.), Studies in the history of the Plateau State, Nigeria, London: Macmillan. Mudenda, G.N. (1983), Class formation and class struggle in contemporary Zambia, in Mugabane B. and Nzongala-Ntalaja (eds.), Proletarianization and class struggle in Africa, San Francisco: Synthesis Publications. Ojukwu, C.C. and Onifade, C.A. (2010), ‘Social capital, indegeneity and identity politics: The Jos Crisis in perspective’, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, vol. 4, no. 5, pp.173180. Olaitan, W.A. (1995), ‘The state and economy: A conceptualisation’, in S. Adejumobi and Momoh, A. (eds.), The political economy of Nigeria under military rule: 1984-1993, Harare: SAPES. Ostien, P. (2009), ‘Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Nigeria’, Muslim christian relations in Africa, http://www.shariain-africa.net/media/publications/ethno-religious-conflict-in-JosNigeria/Ostien_Jos.pdf (accessed 15 December 2010). Plotnicov, L. (1967), Strangers to the city: Urban man in Jos, Nigeria, Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press. —. (1970), ‘The modern elite of Jos, Nigeria’, in Tuden A. and Plotnicov, L. (eds.), Social stratification in Africa, New York: The Free Press, pp.269-302. —. (1971), ‘An early Nigerian civil disturbance: The 1945 Hausa-Ibo riots in Jos’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, pp.297305. Porter, G., Harris, F., Lyon, F., Dung, J. and Adepetu, A.A. (2003), ‘Markets, ethnicity, and environment in a vulnerable landscape: A small-scale vegetable production on the Jos Plateau, 1991-2001, The Geographical Journal, vol. 169, no. 4, pp.370-381. Rasmussen, L. (1990), Religion and property in northern Nigeria, Copenhangen: Academic Press. Reno, W. (1993), ‘Old brigades, money bags, new breeds, and the ironies of reform in Nigeria’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. 27, no. 1, pp.66-87. Reuters (2010), Timeline: Ethnic and religious unrest in Nigeria’s Jos, 23 January.

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—. (2011), Timeline: Ethnic and religious unrest in Nigeria’s Jos. 18 February. Rodney, W. (1972), How Europe underdeveloped Africa, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House. Smith, B.C. (1982), ‘The revenue position of Local Government in Nigeria’, Public Administration and Development, vol. 2, pp.1-14. Sodiq, Y. (2009), ‘Can Muslims and Christians live together peacefully in Nigeria?’ The Muslim World, vol. 99, pp.646-688. The Sun (2011), Jos killings: Questions Jonathan must answer. 27 February. Tseayo, J.I. (1976), ‘The Emirate system and the Tiv reaction to “pagan status” in Northern Nigeria’, in Williams. G. (ed.), Nigeria: Economy and society, London: Rex Collings Ltd. pp.11-54. Wallerstein, I. (1985), ‘The three stages of African involvement in the world economy’, in P.C.W. Gutkind and I. Wallerstein (eds.), Political economy of contemporary Africa (2nd edition), Beverly Hills, London and New Delhi: Sage Publications. Williams, G. (1976), ‘Nigeria: A political economy’, in Williams. G. (ed.), Nigeria: Economy and society, London: Rex Collings Ltd, pp.1-54. Young, C. (1982), ‘Patterns of social conflict: State, class, and ethnicity’, Daedelalus, vol. 111, no. 2, pp.71-98.

CHAPTER FIVE THE ‘JIHADISM’ OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA: THE ‘GLOCAL’ DIMENSION BENJAMIN MAIANGWA

Introduction Boko Haram has been linked with thousands of deaths since the group’s first violent uprising in July 2009. The group has routinely attacked such institutions as the police, the army, immigration offices, prisons, churches, mosques, schools, and media houses, inflicting death and mayhem in its wake. These attacks have mostly occurred in north-eastern Nigeria. The group has declared a goal of purifying Islam of its alleged Western corruptive influences as well as turning Nigeria, a country of immense ethnic and religious diversity, into an Islamic state (Maiangwa et al., 2012). Boko Haram has evolved from its origins as a largely Kanuri tribalbased militant group and once included what later became a splinter faction named Ansaru (Supporters of Muslims in the Land of Black Africa).1 It may actually be impossible to speak of a single ‘Boko Haram’ entity given that there are significant divisions and variations within the

1

According to Jacob Zenn (2014: 99), the Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, otherwise known as Ansaru, was a faction of Al-Qaeda-trained Boko Haram members formed around 2011. On the one hand, its creation was regarded as a reaction to Boko Haram’s method of attacking Muslims and defectors, whereas on the other hand, Zenn (2014: 99) argues that ‘the creation of Ansaru was part of former Al-Qaeda commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s strategy to leave AQIM North African zone of operations and spread throughout the entire Sahara.’ In this sense, then, the formation of Ansaru could be said to have had significant implications on the ‘globalised’ and ‘local’ contexts of jihadist terrorism in Nigeria. This is partly because, unlike Boko Haram, ‘Ansaru almost exclusively targeted foreigners for kidnapping’ (Zenn, 2014: 111). Ansaru has since regrouped with Shekau’s-led faction of the Boko Haram group as it could not sustain itself.

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jihadist militants that the Nigerian authorities and media are trying to label collectively as Boko Haram. Since the first violent outbreak of the Boko Haram crisis took place in July 2009, several scholars and commentators on Nigeria have attempted to conceptualise and unravel the identity and raison d’etre of the group. For the most part, issues of religious sensitivity, widespread socio-economic dislocations, and party politics (Adesoji, 2010) have been cited as factors propelling the crisis in Northern Nigeria. Conditions of state fragility, bad governance, and corruption in Nigeria have also been cited as root causes (Onuoha, 2010; Maiangwa et al., 2012). In addition, Simeon Alozieuwa (2013) has examined the state failure theory, the vengeance theory, the human needs theory, the political feud narrative, and the Islamic theocratic state theory, and concluded that while all these theories offer some degree of insight into the Boko Haram phenomenon, they are nevertheless insufficient explanations for the radicalisation and changing dynamics of the group. Alozieuwa acknowledges the difficulties involved in getting to the root causes of the Boko Haram crisis, but recommends that the Nigerian government should, nonetheless, address the issues related to former President Goodluck Jonathan’s decision to contest the 2011 presidential elections, which was seen to conflict with the so-called power rotation principle agreed upon by the then ruling party (PDP: People’s Democratic Party) (Alozieuwa, 2013). What flows from these explanations is the notion that the Boko Haram phenomenon is a symptom of state failure and a culture of bad leadership and politicisation in Nigeria. The assumption, then, is that in order to silence Boko Haram, the Nigerian government needs to alter the conditions of state failure and bad governance. Whatever the merits of the state failure and bad governance arguments, it seems legitimate to question why Boko Haram’s terrorism has also taken on a religious character in the fashion of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which is averse to everything Western. The question remains whether Nigerian Christians are not equally frustrated with the governance and economic challenges in Nigeria and, if this is the case, how are they responding to the challenges they face? Will a corruption-free and stable governance in Nigeria result in the ‘death’ of Boko Haram? There are, for example, some parts of the globe where there are relatively stable governments yet despite this, Islamic militancy and efforts to establish Islamic theocracy have emerged, thus challenging the arguments linking Islamism to poor governance or state fragility. The rise of People

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against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in South Africa is an example of such a phenomenon where, in a relatively stable democratic state, a militant Islamic organisation took root in a region (Western Cape) where the problem of gangsterism and drugs could have been dealt with in a more secular manner. .

Admittedly, however, issues of poverty, corruption, and widespread unemployment often provide terrorist groups with recruits, especially from disenchanted individuals and the jobless. In this sense, then, creating job opportunities, fighting corruption, and imposing greater state control on the execution of terrorist activities in Nigeria can be influential in stemming the terrorism of Boko Haram. Still, such efforts may not necessarily touch the religious and anti-Western sentiments that the group espouses and defends. In order to expand on an understanding of the Boko Haram phenomenon, this chapter will reflect on whether there is a link between a more globalised ‘agenda’ by some Islamic groups to establish an Islamic theocracy (in response to perceived injustices arising from colonialism/imperialism/a neoliberal world order) and the aims of Boko Haram in Nigeria. This reflection will be undertaken against the backdrop of such events as the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Gulf War, and the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. homeland and the corresponding ‘global war on terror’. It is argued that while issues of state fragility and sectarianism in Nigeria are important factors to consider in understanding the emergence and radicalisation of Boko Haram, the group also constitutes an element of a section of the radicalised Islamic groups in the Middle East and the Arab world that aim to establish a core Islamic culture, free from the perceived corruptive influences and interference of Western countries. This chapter will therefore depart from the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis between the West and Islam as advanced by the American political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington. The chapter argues that the tendency of groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria to react violently to perceived local and global injustices, while seeking the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, does not necessarily point to a civilisational clash between Islam and the West, but emanates more from the need to exercise power and control, and to respond to their deteriorating livelihood circumstances and repressive counter-terrorism strategies. The rest of the chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section is theoretical and locates Islamism within the context of a modern world order. It also examines Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis

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and asks whether the West is indeed at war with the Islamic world and vice versa. The second section explores how certain global events, including the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the emergence of the Mujahideen and Al-Qaeda movements, the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 9/11 attacks and the corresponding invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and allied forces have fuelled Islamic activism and engendered strong anti-Western animosity in some parts of the globe where there are Muslim majorities. This is more so in societies where liberal democratic governance has failed to yield the expected dividends. Section three locates Boko Haram terrorism first within the domestic forces in Nigeria and, second, as part of the response in some parts of the Islamic world to Western domination and a neo-liberal world order. The affinity between the religious aims and activities of Boko Haram and those of Al-Qaeda and ISIL is also underscored. The final section summarises the arguments of the chapter, and makes a few recommendations.

The Rise of Political Islam: A Clash of Civilisations? In his thought-provoking book entitled The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel P. Huntington argues that the end of the Cold War era ushered in a wave of civilisational clashes, with culture at the heart of the distinction between people (Huntington, 1996: 21). He argues that since the Cold War ended, culture and cultural identities have been ‘shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict’ in the world (Huntington, 1996: 121). Huntington avers that Western civilisation has also been declining due to the resurgence and rise of other competing civilisations in various parts of the world, particularly Islamic civilisation (Huntington, 1996). He claims that religion has taken centre stage in motivating people towards a new idea and vision of society that rejects Western culture in the Islamic world, but embraces modernity (Huntington, 1996). He also asserts that the revival of ‘non-Western religions— particularly Islam—is the most powerful manifestation of anti-Westernism in non-Western societies […] it is a rejection of what has been termed the Westoxification of non-Western societies, a declaration of cultural independence’ (Huntington, 1996: 101). Huntington further maintains that the population growth that many Muslim societies are witnessing, has been largely responsible for providing recruits for fundamentalism, terrorism, and insurgency (Huntington, 1996: 103). He surmises that the ‘large numbers of young people with secondary education

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will continue to power the Islamic Resurgence and promote Muslim militancy, militarism, and migration’ (Huntington, 1996: 121). However, Huntington concedes that bad governance and economic stagnation within some Islamic societies may also be behind the activism of some Islamist groups who have been posing as benefactors to the poor and less privileged in their societies (Huntington, 1996: 111). He asserts that the benevolent activities of some Islamist groups take place in Muslim societies which have benefited from the financial support of oil-rich Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Libya, especially during the 1970s when the said countries reaped oil windfall gains (Huntington, 1996: 116). One obvious flaw of Huntington’s clash of civilisations thesis is that he reduces Islam to one single civilisation with no variation or differences. As Edward Said so pointedly noted, ‘Huntington did not have much time to spare for the internal dynamics and plurality of every civilisation, or for the fact that the major contest in most modern cultures concerns the definition or interpretation of each culture, or for the unattractive possibility that a great deal of demagogy and downright ignorance is involved in presuming to speak for a whole religion or civilisation’ (Said, The Nation, 4 October 2001). David Augsburger (1992: 7) has clarified that pluralism is a core characteristic of almost every civilisation, whether in South Africa, Canada, Iraq, or Switzerland. He argues that cultural diversity increases ‘both the possibility of conflict and the possibilities within conflict to reveal the richness of human society and its cultural treasures’ (Augsburger, 1992: 7). On this count, there is no single civilisation and hence no single Islam as depicted by Samuel Huntington. Otherwise, how can one make sense of ‘Saudi Arabia’s autocratic King, or the democratically elected Indonesian President, Saddam Hussein, the former dictator of Iraq, or symbolic public figures of the current Green democratic movement in Iran?’ (Mahdavi and Knight, 2012: 6). There are, for instance, a good number of minority groups in almost every civilisation who generally live together without any significant conflict. Some examples include ‘Asians and Africans in the United States; Africans, Caribbeans, and Indians in Britain; Chinese and Indians in Canada; and, North Africans in France’ (Mahdavi and Knight, 2012: 7). Indonesia and India both have large Muslim majorities that have lived in relative peace with the non-Muslim populations within their societies. This is not to imply that cultural differences do not stimulate conflict. There are cases, like in Nigeria and the Central African Republic, where violent conflicts have been fought due to the politicisation of cultural differences. Even so, while such conflicts may be the result of elite politicisation or bad

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governance, they are also partly the result of the ‘failure of Western postcolonial policy toward the global south’ (Mahdavi and Knight, 2012: 7-8), coupled with excessive interference in developing societies by Western countries (e.g. France’s role in the CAR and, indeed, the entire francophone countries in West Africa). Moreover, the impression that the West is locked in an interminable clash with the Islamic world has been sustained by certain global events. In his chapter on the ‘Fourth Wave of terrorism’, David Rapoport lists some of these events including ‘the 1979 Iranian revolution, and the soviet invasion of Afghanistan’ (Rapoport, 2004: 61). Rapoport argues that even though the Iranian Revolution was regarded as an unexpected event by several Muslim societies, ‘some Muslims had always believed that the year [1979] would be very significant because it marked the beginning of a new Islamic century’ (Rapoport, 2004: 62). It is striking that at the same time the Iranian Revolution happened, there was an upsurge of violent extremism in some parts of the Islamic world such as in ‘Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, the Philippines, and Indonesia’ (Rapoport, 2004: 62). In more recent years, radical Islamist groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levent (ISIL) have been parading themselves as the champions and purveyors of a new Islamic world order. Both groups have captured territories in their jurisdictions by way of establishing an Islamic caliphate. But as Mahdavi and Knight (2012: 16) argue, the activities of such groups should not be viewed as Islamic hatred against Western civilisation, but as an extreme political response to perceived Western, or more specifically, hostile U.S. policies (regime change, sanctions, and military confrontations, etc.) and practices in certain [Islamic] countries (Mahdavi and Knight, 2012: 16). Thus, contemporary global tensions can more accurately be described not as ‘a clash of civilisations’ but instead as a clash between two aggrieved minorities who capitalise on religious/cultural rhetoric, discourse, or differences for political or religious purposes (Mahdavi and Knight, 2012: 12). The next section sheds light on how the said global events and forces in the West and the Arab world created and sustained the apparent civilisation fissure between Islam and the West.

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Examining the Events that Led to the Rise of Modern Jihadism Terrorism gained popularity both as a concept and a tactic of political violence during the French Revolution (1789-1799). Some elements of religious terrorism have been identified prior to that among some religious sects within Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism (Nacos, 2011: 36). Some of these religious sects include the Jewish Zealots (1st -14th centuries) and the Hindu Assassins (14th–18th centuries) (Nacos, 2011). For the purposes of this chapter, this section will not dwell on the history of terrorism. It will mainly examine how certain global events and trends in the Middle East and the Arab world, from the 1970s onwards, informed the rise of some of the most violent jihadist terrorist groups in the world. During the 1970s, the Middle East experienced a rise in several religious millenarian movements whose goal was to reverse the legacies of colonialism, resist the trend of globalisation, and establish a theocracy functioning under strict Islamic laws. Nowhere was this trend more noticeable than in Iran where, in 1979, a renowned and respected cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini, staged a religious revolution that toppled the Shah Pahlavi regime. Khomeini refused to recognise the legitimacy of the Shah regime, which he regarded as oppressive and modelled on the U.S. system, to which he was opposed. With the successful ousting of the Shah government, Khomeini became the religious — supreme — leader of Iran, Islamising the Iranian state in the process (Haynes, 2014). The Khomeiniled revolution in Iran was regarded as ‘the first modern revolution where the dominant ideology, forms of organisation, leading personnel, and proclaimed goals were all religious [Islamic] in appearance and inspiration’ (Haynes, 2014: 275). According to David Rapoport, the Revolution sent a clear message to Muslims the world over of the political appeal of Islam (Rapoport, 2004: 62). Moreover, the Revolution also ‘altered the relationships among all Muslims, as well as the relationship between Islam and the rest of the world’ (Rapoport, 2004: 62), leading to claims by scholars like Huntington of a clash of civilisations between Islam and the West. Abiodun Alao (2009: 16) argues that shortly after the Revolution, many Muslim youths contending with the forces of market neo-liberalism in their societies ‘began to see in Islam a viable alternative to the bi-polar systems of capitalism.’ It was no coincidence, therefore, that from the late 1970s onwards, several militant Islamic groups began to emerge in such countries

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as Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Nigeria (Rapoport, 2004: 62). In Nigeria, for instance, the Iranian Revolution led partly to the manifestations of religious militancy among some Islamist groups in the late 1970s. Some of these Islamist groups included the Derika, the Izala, the Kaulu, the brotherhoods (including the Tijjaniyya and the Qadiriya), the Shiite, the Ahmadiyya, the Muslim Students Society (MSS), the Islamist Movement of Nigeria (IMN),2 and the Maitatsine movement. These Islamic groups were united both by their desire to establish Islamic dominance in Nigeria and by their denigration of the West and modernity. Quite aside from its impact on Nigerian society, the Iranian Revolution also affected other African countries. To cite one example, it is said to have inspired the formation of the Qibla movement3 in South Africa (Ousman, 2004: 83). Formed in 1980 by Achmaid Cassiem, a Muslim cleric of Ayatollah Khomeini’s persuasion, Qibla was initially an antiapartheid movement before it morphed into a militant Shiite organisation (Ousman, 2004). The group’s aim was to ‘create an Islamic political and oppositional consciousness to mobilise and give direction to the South African Muslim community’ in the post-apartheid era (Ousman, 2004: 83). The Iranian Revolution also coincided with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which, according to Ousman (2004: 69), created the perfect storm for the breeding of ‘jihad warriors’. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Russian-led Soviet forces was instigated by the rebellion of the Mujahideen (‘people doing jihad’) and other ethnic factions in Afghanistan, who resisted the pro-Soviet Afghan government of the time. The Mujahideen membership comprised many Afghan citizens, as well as foreign fighters from Pakistan and Algeria. The Mujahideen was said to have benefited from the financial and technical support of the U.S. government, the Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, India, the United 2

According to Zenn (2014: 100), the IMN, led by Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, is an Iranian-funded organisation in Nigeria, which also drew inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, though it was on Khomeini’s Iranian-style revolution that the IMN modelled itself. The IMN was also anti-American and even trained a ‘paramilitary wing for providing security to members of the movement modelled after the Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Hesbollah’ (Zenn, 2014: 101). Although initially considered as an IMN member, Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, accused the IMN of espousing a Shi’a agenda and thus preferred to align himself to the Saudi-inspired Salafist school (Zenn, 2014: 101). 3 Qibla is an Arabic word which means ‘direction to the holy city of Mecca’.

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Kingdom, Pakistan, and Egypt (Rapoport, 2004). The group was emboldened by this stream of financial support and defeated the Soviet forces in 1989. The Soviet defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan was viewed in many quarters as a significant event which was to carry important consequences for religious/jihadist terrorism in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia in years to come (Rapoport, 2004: 62). With the collapse of the Soviet regime, the Mujahideen turned its attention — and anger — towards the U.S (Nacos, 2011: 46). This was partly because they felt that the U.S demonstrated little interest in rebuilding Afghanistan after the collapse of the Soviet regime (Ousman, 2004). The group may also have feared that the U.S would take advantage of the collapse of the Soviet regime to dominate the internal affairs of Afghanistan and, by extension, the entire Middle East. This fear was especially entertained by Osama bin Laden who felt that the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia after the first Gulf War posed a threat to the political and economic stability of the Middle East. Consequently, the jihadists, now under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, declared war on the U.S. and the West in general; calling for the liberation of the whole Islamic community (Ousman, 2004: 69). In 1988, Osama bin Laden formed Al-Qaeda as the base from which to foster his Islamic expansionist and anti-Western agenda. His intention was to use Al-Qaeda as a springboard for the establishment of a global Islamic ‘Ummah’ (community) that would counter Western imperialism in Muslim societies. According to Alao (2009: 5), Nigeria was one of two African countries that Osama bin Laden alluded to in several of his video releases in 2002. In these videos, Osama encouraged Nigerian Muslims to rise up against an unjust modern world order represented by their democratic governments (Alao, 2009). Meanwhile, the Gulf War, involving the U.S. and Iraq in Kuwait, changed the dynamics of the relationship between the Osama-led Al-Qaeda group and the West (Rapoport, 2004: 63). Samuel Huntington claims that: The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny (Huntington, 1993).

In addition, James Gow and Funmi Olanisakin claim that the first and second Gulf Wars, the Afghan War, and the manner in which the U.S. and the UN favoured Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian war ‘heightened

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perception of Muslims and Muslim countries being unjustly attacked’ (2009: 21). This perception exacerbated anti-Western animosity among several radical Islamist groups in a number of countries in the Muslim world. Al-Qaeda bombed of the North Tower of the World Trade Centre in February 1993. Further attacks against the U.S. were conducted in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, when Al-Qaeda simultaneously attacked U.S. embassies in the capital cities of both countries, killing hundreds of people. These attacks ‘ushered in a new era of security concerns in East Africa linked to the perceived growth and interaction of domestic and transnational expressions of militant Islam’ (Haynes, 2005: 1321). In the same year, the U.S. launched retaliatory cruise missile strikes against Khartoum Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant, claiming that the factory had been hijacked by Osama bin Laden for the manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Ousman, 2004: 93). With the 9/11 attacks and the attendant U.S. ‘global war on terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq, Al-Qaeda received unprecedented support in some Muslim societies. In 2010, a poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre’s Global Attitudes Projects on Muslim support toward Al-Qaeda in Nigeria revealed that some sections of Nigerian Muslim communities were enthusiasts of Osama bin Laden (Thornberry and Levy, 2011). The data indicated that 49% of Nigerian Muslims supported Al-Qaeda’s antiWestern crusade (cited in Thornberry and Levy, 2011: 7). Abiodun Alao also claims that shortly after the 9/11 attacks, there were ‘celebrations in some parts of Northern Nigeria, with many people hailing Osama bin Laden as a new hero’ (Alao, 2009: 70). As a result of the war against terror in Afghanistan and Iraq, anti-Western animosity intensified in several other Muslim societies. In his book Interventions: My Life in War and Peace, the erstwhile Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, discussed the consequences of the global war on terror and the way it was perceived in certain Muslim societies: What became known as the war on terror had initially been launched in response to the attacks of 9/11 with broad international support. But as the United States increasingly went its own way – with Iraq and with the way it executed its operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere on a global hunt for Al-Qaeda cells – global consensus began to fracture. Among the people of the Muslim world, reeling from the impact of these wars,

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The U.S. ‘global war on terror’ and the international criticism that greeted the implementation of sharia criminal codes in 12 states of Northern Nigeria was said to have irked several Islamic scholars and Muslim politicians (Casey, 2014). Moreover, Casey (2014: 6) claimed that Sheik Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), began appearing in local and global media, venting diatribes against Western military incursions of Muslim societies. In addition, Casey notes that Muslim journalists highlighted the arrogance and brutality with which the U.S. conducted the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq and they recounted the plight of the Palestinians, stressing the need for Muslims to resist such injustices (Casey, 2014: 10).4 Mamdani (2004: 253) argues that after the 9/11 attacks, the West saw the need to create a civilisational clash by distinguishing ‘between “good Muslims” and “bad Muslims”, so as to cultivate the former and target the latter.’ According to Mark Juergensmeyer (2004: 4), such an us/them binary ‘caused many concerned citizens in the Islamic world to see America’s military response to the September 11 attacks as an imperialistic venture and a bully’s crusade, rather than the righteous wrath of an injured victim.’ Richard Bernstein asserts that the ‘popular discourse of post-9/11 about who is “good” and who is “evil”’ (Bernstein, 2005: 95) projected Islam and its adherents in a negative light, especially in Western societies. The post-9/11 discourse further intensified the animosity between the West and militant Islamist groups such as Boko Haram, who found it convenient to lay the blame for the awful plight of their societies at the feet of corrupt Western-oriented governments, believing that a better future could only be achieved through strict adherence to Sharia law and embracing the core values of their brand of fundamentalist Islam.5

4

It bears mentioning that the 9/11 attacks, more than any other terrorist attack in history, gave rise to Islamophobia, which has led to marginalization, discrimination, and even violent attacks against Muslim minorities in certain European and Western societies (Mamdani, 2004). 5 Some political leaders in the Middle East are also adept at taking advantage of the unresolved conflicts and grievances in the region to maintain their hold on power. As Kofi Annan (2012: 310-11) argues, ‘regional leaders in the Arab world continually exploited the deep feelings of their people about the plight of the Palestinians to divert attention from the mix of authoritarianism, sectarianism,

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Thus, for groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria, religion provides the moral legitimacy to use violence ‘to assault the symbols of global economic and political power’ seen to represent the West and adhered to by their governments (Juergensmeyer, 2004: 2). On the whole, these events and trends have served to create and sustain an apparent clash of civilisations between Islam and the West. But, as Mark Juergensmeyer (2004: 2) cautions, those in the Islamic world and in the West who create this notion of a clash of civilisations are only a small fraction within the larger Muslim world who are ‘no more representative of Islam than Timothy McVeigh is of Christianity or Japan's Shoko Asahara is of Buddhism.’ In essence, then, Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis — that the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations and particularly between Islam and the West (Huntington, 1993) — is ‘not a clash driven by deep, unbridgeable civilisational differences but by extremists, in both the West and the Muslim world, who concur with the desirability of exploiting post-9/11 instability and suspicion between the world’s cultures’ (Haynes, 2014: 184-5).

The Jihadism of Boko Haram: The ‘Glocal’6 Dimensions At the local level within Nigeria, the existence of Boko Haram has been explained as a by-product of the deteriorating socio-economic and governance situation in the country, particularly in the north-east where the group thrives. Writing for Global Research, Chandra Muzaffar states that: Nigeria is one of the most unequal societies in the world with an everwidening gap between the rich and the poor. There is also massive corruption at all levels of society. A weak delivery system has increased the burden of the people. All this has fuelled anger and disillusionment with the State. As a movement fighting the State, Boko Haram has been able to tap into some of that frustration (Muzaffar, 2014).

fanaticism, poverty, and ignorance that grew more potent in the region over several years.’ 6 I have chosen the term ‘glocal’ – taken from the American sociologist Roland Robertson’s notion of ‘glocalization’ – to stress the bifurcated nature of the globalisation process as being both a global and a local phenomenon (Hermer and Tufte, 2005: 20). This helps explain the dual nature of the jihadism of Boko Haram as being simultaneously inspired by both global and local factors.

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Whatever the merits of the corruption and inequality arguement, the manner in which the Nigerian authorities have handled the Boko Haram crisis has also compounded the security situation instigated by the group. The lack of transparency by the Nigerian government regarding the security situation in the country has led to a general sense of distrust in the government’s capacity, sincerity, and willingness to contain the crisis. The manner in which the Nigerian authorities handled the aftermath of the disastrous Baga attacks in the north-eastern state of Borno in January 2015 exemplifies this lack of sincerity in their dealings with the crisis. The Nigerian military reported that only 150 people were killed (Reuters, January 2015), whereas satellite images and investigations carried out by the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International alleged that about 2,000 people died in the Baga attacks (Segun, 2015; and Amnesty International, 2015). Equally concerning was the international (non) response to the Baga incident. Unlike the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris that killed 17 journalists, the Baga attacks in north-eastern Nigeria attracted little media coverage and global solidarity. Forty heads of states assembled in France to commiserate with the French government and people after the Charlie Hebdo shooting (Bohen, 2015), while no such solidarity was extended to Nigeria in the wake of the Baga attacks. Further, media reports on the Boko Haram crisis have been lopsided vis-à-vis the reports on atrocities committed in the West by radical Islamist groups. While reporting atrocities in the developed world is often conducted with sensitivity and empathy toward survivors, survivors of atrocities in the developing world are often forgotten or remembered through despicable images (Jackson, 2002). That notwithstanding, it should be stated that the sole responsibility for the protection of lives in Nigeria lies with the Nigerian government. In contrast to the Baga attacks, the kidnapping of 276 school-girls by Boko Haram on the night of 14 April 2014 attracted international concern from renowned celebrities and politicians. However, more than a year since the abduction of the girls, about 100 of them remain in captivity. Given the pattern of kidnapping young women by radical Islamist groups like ISIL and the Taliban in Afghanistan, it may not be unwarranted to claim that the abducted girls may have been sold into slavery, utilised for logistical and operational purposes, or married off to terrorists. It is worth noting that the Chibok abduction is the longest single mass kidnapping in history. Previously, the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) held the record for the longest single mass abduction,

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when they kidnapped 189 people from a Cali Church in Colombia in 1999 (ELN News). The ease and audacity with which Boko Haram conducted subsequent attacks, including the kidnapping of women in Damasak in March 2015, reflects the weakness of Nigeria’s security mechanisms and the general failure of the state to exercise its responsibility to protect its citizens against mass atrocities. The attacks also show striking commonalities with the activities of ISIL, who may have been inspired by Boko Haram after the Chibok abductions. Jacob Zenn claims that ISIL ‘cited the “Nigerian mujahidin” in the October 2014 edition of its magazine Dabiq as a precedent for its own kidnapping of several hundred non-Muslim Yazidi women in Northern Iraq, who were turned into sex slaves’ (Zenn, 2014: 7, cited in Maiangwa and Amao, 2015: 134-5). It has been reported that ISIL sells its female slaves to Islamic fighters in local communities in Mosul and Syria (Lynch, 2014; Tadros, 2014). Both Boko Haram and ISIL appear to be feeding off each other in terms of doctrine and tactics. As contended by Allison (2014: 4), the ‘influence of the Islamic State’s global jihadist narrative, the success of its operations in Iraq and Syria and its sharing of experiences and tactics online may inspire African [terrorist] groups [such as Boko Haram] to copy its approach.’ However, in the 2015 Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram is said to be the deadliest terrorist group in the world on the basis that ‘Nigeria witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country in 2015, increasing by over 300% to 7,512 fatalities.’ In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIL and changed its name to ‘The Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) 2015 (Global Terrorism Index, 2015: 2). Despite an attempt to strengthen the regional response against Boko Haram through the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising armed forces from Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, the group has continued to wage attacks unabated. Boko Haram has changed tactics since the MNJTF began their offensive, and prefers to use young females to conduct suicide bombings. According to Elizabeth Pearson, in 2015 more than 90 female suicide bombers killed over 500 people (Pearson, 2015). The rate at which Boko Haram is using female suicide bombers has surpassed that of the progenitors of the tactic, such as the Tamil Tigers, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the Chechen rebels (Pearson, 2015). Moreover, the pervasiveness of suicide bombing by Boko Haram refutes an earlier claim by Abiodun Alao (2009: 86) that ‘Islamic radicalism in Nigeria is distinctly different from some other parts of the world where there have

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been cases of terrorist activities, including suicide missions’. Alao’s (2009: 86) assertion that suicide missions are unthinkable in Nigeria due to the people’s socio-cultural perceptions of life and violence does not hold true in the face of the countless, coordinated, and indiscriminate bombings of public and private places by Boko Haram suicide bombers in Northern Nigeria since 2010. What can be deduced from the above is that Boko Haram is essentially a Nigerian problem. However, it would be a grave mistake to think that the group is merely a domestic threat. Perhaps the discussion on the rise of Islamism in the Arab world and the Middle East, as occasioned by strings of Islamic revolutions and uprisings as well as repressive tactics by the West, is appropriate to the emergence of Boko Haram. As shown in the theoretical section, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the first and second Gulf Wars; the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the attendant massacre and torture of innocent civilians; NATO intervention in Libya; the French intervention in Mali and the Central African Republic; and the alienation and humiliation of Muslims in many Western countries in the post-9/11 era, have all served to incubate and sustain anti-Western sentiments among groups like Boko Haram and ISIL (Muzzafar, 2014). Thus, whatever the domestic factors fuelling their activities, groups like Boko Haram and ISIL nurture a strong sense of divine responsibility to avenge some perceived injustices of Western civilisation and their interventions in their societies. Therefore, considering its local and global sources of grievances and inspiration, the Islamism of Boko Haram could unequivocally be described as ‘glocal jihadism’ (Atzori, 2012). Boko Haram has issued several statements alluding to the global sources of its grievances and inspiration. In November 2012 video footage was released by the group on YouTube. In it, Abubakar Shekau, the group’s current leader said that he and his fighters ‘support jihad in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, Libya, and Mali’ (Roggio, 2012). In subsequent videos released by the group, Shekau referred to all members of the wider jihadist groups as his ‘brothers’ who were doing jihad for the great cause of Allah (Roggio, 2012). In addition, Shekau often threatens and warns the West, particularly Britain, France, the U.S., Russia, and Israel against the killing of jihadist leaders and Muslims in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, and Palestine. For instance, in 2013, ‘Shekau consistently threatened U.S. President Obama, French President Francoise Hollande, Queen Elizabeth, UN Secretary General Ban ki Moon, former U.K. Prime Minister Margaret

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Thatcher, mocked the U.S. designation of Shekau [himself] as a terrorist, and promised that Boko Haram would attack the U.S. tomorrow’ (Zenn, 2014: 110). A common denominator in Shekau’s sermons is that they evince a combination of local salafist preaching with calls for international jihadism and attacks on the Western world order, which is to be replaced with a divinely-instituted Islamic caliphate (Karmon, 2014: 75). The fact that Boko Haram’s modus operandi, ideology, and ambitions to establish an Islamic caliphate are strikingly similar to the practices of other like-minded jihadist groups in Africa and the Middle East underlines the need to appreciate how the group’s religious ideology and its violent activities fit into the global agenda, via a section of the radicalised Islamic community, to establish some form of Islamic theocracy as a reaction to a neo-liberal/imperialist world order. This global dimension of the group’s activities should not, however, deflect attention from the overwhelming threat that Boko Haram poses to the Nigerian state and her people.

Conclusion This chapter began by noting the domestic factors that may have instigated and sustained the terrorism of Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria. These include the corruption of Nigeria’s politicians and leaders, illiteracy, underdeveloped infrastructures, unemployment, and bad governance. Boko Haram’s leaders, including the late Mohammed Yusuf, and Abubakar Shekau may have thrived on the frustration and discontent of the youth in the country (particularly in the northern region) to promote their brand of religious teachings and practices. More importantly, this chapter discussed how Boko Haram and other Islamist groups perceive the problems in their societies as the outcome of cultural corruption instigated by Western colonialism and an unjust neoliberal world order, which have presumably undermined and distorted their Islamic faith (Zenn, 2014: 113). This indignation with the West explains Boko Haram’s outrage and media outbursts against Western civilisation, as well as its attacks on structures regarded as Western symbols, including the Nigeria state and its liberal democratic institutions, as well as the UN headquarters in Abuja, which the group destroyed in August 2011 (Maiangwa et al., 2012). The chapter asserted that it is this anti-Western stance of groups like Boko Haram that partly reflected the apparent ‘clash of civilisations’ between Islam and the West, but the author also demonstrated that this was

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instigated by some global factors and events in the pre- and post-Cold War era, which galvanised the activities of several radical Islamic groups in Africa, the Middle East, and the Arab world. These events include the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the invasion and collapse of the Soviet regime in Afghanistan (1979-1989), the rise of the Mujahideen, the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Gulf Wars, the rise of Al-Qaeda, the 9/11 attacks, the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq, and ‘the growing opposition to the effects of modernisation and globalisation’ in some parts of the Islamic world (Nacos, 2011: 53). The major conclusion of this chapter is that Boko Haram’s desire to establish an Islamic theocracy in Nigeria as a religious duty represents part of the reaction by a section of the globalised Muslim community — as championed by groups like the Taliban and ISIL — against what they have perceived to be an imperialist world order, albeit partly as a consequence of poor governance and bad leadership in Nigeria. In the final analysis, to say that groups like Boko Haram and other militant groups in the Middle East and Africa may be harbouring genuine grievances — for example, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Indian occupation of Kashmir or the Israel-Palestine issue — is not to imply that these groups are justified in their use of terror (Roberts, 2006: 109). Rather, they ‘reflect larger concerns in society that need to be addressed in some way’ (Roberts, 2006: 109). The challenge for the international community, particularly for global hegemons like the U.S. and the U.K., is to find ways of engaging politically with the terrorists without inducing more violence or playing directly into their hands through a repressive counter-terrorism strategy, as has been the case in Syria. At the same time, the challenge for the Nigerian government is to rethink its counter-terrorism strategies and consider exploring avenues of countering the radical ideology of the group. In the short term, this engagement may entail exploring opportunities for dialogue with Boko Haram members, as well as providing the survivors of the violence with basic social, health, and economic services. Survivors’ support groups can also be established to assist the government in assessing their needs and attending to the concerns of survivors of terrorism in the country. It is also disheartening to see that many Nigerians who have been affected by the terrorism of Boko Haram are taking refuge in deplorable circumstances in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, while there are safe places within Nigeria where they could be accommodated. The Nigerian government may need to set up a refugee response committee to spearhead the relocation of its refugees and re-integrate them into safe

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areas within the country until it is safe for them to return to their communities. In the long term, the Nigerian government will need to implement counterradicalisation and de-radicalisation programs in order to significantly defeat the radical ideology of groups like Boko Haram. The deradicalisation programs should be inclusive of former Boko Haram members who are in detention, and children and young females who have been rescued or may have escaped from the camps of Boko Haram. Moreover, since education is crucial in countering radicalisation, the government should work with peace education scholars and practitioners in the country to develop a peace education curriculum for secondaryschool students throughout the country. Considering the extent of religious manipulation and ideological indoctrination that is taking place in some religious schools in the country, it may also be necessary to mandate state governments to form a monitoring and evaluation team to examine the nature and modalities of the education that children are receiving in such religious schools. In addition, the revitalisation and reconstruction of the moribund agricultural and educational institutions in Northern Nigeria, and indeed the entire country, cannot be overstated. Such short and long term strategies, if vigorously pursued and implemented by the Nigerian government, can help win the hearts and minds of the citizens, and also have a preventive effect on jihadist activism in the country.

References Adesoji, A.O. (2010), Restoring peace or waging war: Security agencies management of ethno-religious uprisings in Nigeria’, African Security Review, vol.19, no.3, pp.2-14. Alao, A. (2009), Islamic radicaliation and violence in Nigeria, Country Report. http://www.securityanddevelopment.org/pdf/ESRC%20Nigeria%20Ov erview.pdf (accessed 15 June 2014). Allison, S. (2014), The Islamic State: Why Africa should be worried. Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief 68. http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PolBrief68.pdf (accessed 16 September 2014). Alozieuwa, S.H.O. (2013), ‘Contending theories on Nigeria’s security challenge in the era of Boko Haram terrorism’, The Peace and Security Review,

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Ousman, A. (2004), ‘The potential of Islamist terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, vol. 18, no.1, pp. 65-105. —. (2012), ‘The power of radical Islamist ideas in fragile states in parts of sub-Saharan Africa.’ A thematic paper supporting the OECD DAC INCAF project ‘Global Factors Influencing the Risk of Conflict and Fragility’, OECD Development Cooperation Working Papers. http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/WP7%20Radical%20ideas.pdf (accessed 25 February 2013). Pearson, E. (2015), ‘Boko Haram and Nigeria’s female bombers’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 29 September, https://www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/ref:A560AB20CAE487/#. ViPW81TnVZh (accessed 18 October 2015). Rapoport, D. (2004), ‘Four waves of modern terrorism’, in Kurth A., James, C. and M. Ludes (eds.), Attacking terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, pp.46– 73. Reuters (2015) ‘Nigeria's military says 150 killed in Boko Haram clashes in Baga’, 12 January, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violenceidUSKBN0KL26J20150112 (accessed 1 January 2016). Roberts, A. (2006), ‘The “War on Terror” in historical perspective’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 47, no.2, pp.101-130. Roggio, B. (2012), ‘Boko Haram Emir Praises Al-Qaeda’, The Long War Journal, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/boko_haram_emir_pr ai.php (accessed 29 September 2014). Said, E. (2001), ‘The clash of ignorance’, The Nation, 22 October, 2001 Issue. http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance/ [accessed 24 September 2015]. Segun, M. (2015), ‘Dispatches: What really happened in Baga’ Human Rights Watch, 14 January, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/14/dispatches-what-reallyhappened-baga-nigeria (accessed 29 October 2015). Tadros, M. (2014), Missing the woods for the trees: Responding to global Christian persecution, Religious Freedom Project, Berkeley Centre for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/cornerstone/global-christianpersecution/responses/missing-the-woods-for-the-trees (accessed 25 September 2014). Thornberry, W. and Levy, J. (2011), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQAM Futures Project. Case Study Series no 4, pp.1-11.

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CHAPTER SIX CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATORY ADAPTATION, AND FARMER-HERDER CONFLICTS IN OYO STATE, NIGERIA TEMITOPE EDWARD AKINYEMI

Introduction Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed resurgence in diverse forms of violent conflicts ranging from religious upheavals, ethnic conflicts, inter- and intra-political party violence, militant insurgency, and Islamic insurgency, to the proliferation of natural resource conflicts, all of which combine to adversely impact on security and development in the country.1 While the social impetus for violent conflicts is not a creation of Nigeria’s democratisation —many conflict-precipitating factors have been historically engrained in the social fibre of the country — the new democratic horizon arguably widened the social space for public demonstrations of aggression. There has been increased awareness of the diverse impact of climate change, particularly its effects on the natural environment, since the early 1980s. Experts have been concerned about its potential to upset security in poor regions of the world where natural resources remain the basis of populations’ livelihoods. Such fears hinge on an awareness that a struggle for shrinking resources is imminent, and that conflicts are therefore likely among the predominantly agro-reliant population, as scarcity and population growth have tendencies to unleash strenuous resource contestations (Ahmed and Yusof, 2010). While the relationship between climate change and conflict has been more a subject of academic controversy than a consensus, 1

Conflict as used here refers to contestation and struggle that may result from incompatible interests and which involves threats of, or actual execution of, violent acts (see: Klein and Ritti, 1980; Ekong, 2003).

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conflicts in natural resource-dependent communities remain instructive in the need to revisit climate-change-conflict discourse. Illustrative of this potential for environmental difficulties to aggravate conflict is the increasing incidence of farmer-herder conflict in the West African Sahel region, including Nigeria. Although this form of conflict is not a novel development, its frequent incidence has shifted a focused analysis towards understanding underlying causes and proffering possible remedies. Indeed, the history of pastoral-related conflicts dates back several ages and forms a significant component of the historical-cum-mythological narrative of tribal state and cultural formations in many parts of the globe (Chatwin, 1989). It is noteworthy for example, that the Great Wall built by the Chinese emperors was motivated by the need to shield its territory from marauding pastoral hordes, just as the presence of peripatetic pastoralists became historically synonymous with warfare (Blench, 2003). In West Africa prior to colonialism, pastoral people were known for armed invasions and conquests of indigenous people (see, for example: De Haan, 1997; Kaberry, 1959; Blench, 1984, 2001; Awogbade, 1983; and Tonah, 2000). Is there a climate change adaptation link in the frequent outbreak of conflict over natural resources across Nigerian arable farming communities?

Statement of the Problem Since the mid-1980s, Nigeria’s central and southern regions have witnessed increased migration of pastoral farmers. As a result, the hitherto symbiotic relationship between the two dominant agricultural ecologies of Nigeria — arable and pastoral farming — has been altered. Incessant outbreaks of violent conflict between peripatetic pastoral farmers and their host communities have, as a result, raised the index in Nigeria’s portfolio of security challenges, as clashes over resource and farm encroachment have become increasingly intense between migrant Fulani pastoralists and their arable-farming host communities. This is associated with an increased rate of southward migratory adaptation by pastoralists from Nigeria’s arid regions, where climate change and environmental degradation have adversely impacted pastoral livelihood systems (de Bruijn et al., 2011; and Okoli and Atelhe, 2014). Analysts identify a sequence of events as precipitating farmer-herder conflict. Prominent among these is the effect of climate change in the form of increased drought and desertification in the lower Sahel climatesensitive ecologies (Fasona and Omojola, 2005; Obioha, 2008; Abbass, 2011). Another factor is environmental degradation arising from

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overgrazing, over-cultivation, and bush-burning (Ahmadu and Yusof, 2010). When combined, these factors aggravate environmental pressure on pastoral farmers, thereby necessitating migration as an adaptation strategy. It is with this in mind that Eichelberger (2014) links the current impasse to strings of drought that have taken place from the 20th century onwards and which have resulted in a change from a traditionally east-west-patterned Fulani migration across the lower Sahelian region, to the north-south pattern of migration which began around the mid-1960s. Conflict-aggravating factors are not limited to the ‘sending’ ecologies. In the ‘receiving’ areas, scholars note the effects of increased farming activities and prolonged inter-seasonal farming made possible by advances in seed adaptation, enabling multiple cropping seasons. This is aided by irrigation farming, as well as improvements in pastoral medicine, specifically cattle vaccination. These developments have both lengthened farming seasons and expanded the movement of pastoralists to areas hitherto feared to have diseases carried by the tse-tse flies searching for pasture (Blench, 1994; Nzeh, 2015; Ofuoku and Isife, 2009). In effect, the volume of migratory adaptation has increased while its geographic orientation has changed from a traditionally transitory transhumance to more sedentary relocations among pastoralists (Azuwike and Enwerem, 2010; Trench et al., 2007). While migratory adaptation is often viewed as an ‘avoidant maladaptation’ (Smith et al., 2011: 187), societies in which a vulnerable population lacks the capacity for the innovation necessary for in situ adaptation are often left with migration as the only option, when confronted with unsustainable climatic conditions. This is a common trend in Nigeria. It is against this backdrop that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its first assessment report in 1990, identified human migration as possibly the ‘greatest single impact of climate change’ (Brown, 2007: 4). Climatechange conflict researchers have, as such, taken a keen interest in migration (Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1998; Kabanda and Munyati, 2010; Buseth, 2009; Malone, 1996; Homer-Dixon, 1994; Adekunle and Adisa, 2010). Shifts in Fulani migratory systems, including cross-border, inter-zonal, and short-span migrations, have created new systems of cultural and ethnic contacts and consumption incongruities, which underlie the rising incidence of resource battles. The trajectory of effects associated with these factors is also shaped by contextual factors, such as religious intolerance and the nature of local economic life (e.g. the pastoral ecology

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of the lower Sahel region is increasingly related to the southern crop-based ecologies — Azuwike and Enwerem, 2010). Oyo State is particularly exposed to pastoral migration from many sides because it borders Benin Republic. In addition to its suitable ecological attributes, including water sources and vegetation, it is a target destination for herdsmen. As a result, it has been the scene of constant struggle between the two agricultural traditions. This narrative underpins the imperative of contextualising the theoretically controversial subject of climate-conflict discourse in environmentalsecurity literature. As the global community increasingly strategises towards combating the effects of climate change, its social dimensions remain peripherally explored, and findings remain confounded in epistemological controversies between theoretical replicability of climatechange-conflict submissions and the complex socio-contextual linkages in specific vulnerable contexts. The result is a continued gridlock in the development of pragmatic policies for conflict-sensitive adaptation. This chapter contextualises the discourse on climate-change-conflict transformation within the milieu of farmer-herder vulnerabilities in the Saki East and Iseyin local government areas in Oyo State, Nigeria.

Methodology In exploring the transformation of vulnerabilities from climate change and environmental variability to resources conflict, this study used face-to-face interview data collected from the Saki East and Iseyin local government areas of Oyo State. Interviewed participants included farmers, herdsmen, community youths, traditional rulers as well as heads of local governments. Designated participants, such as the heads of the local governments, police authorities and traditional rulers were purposively selected, while snowball sampling methods were used to identify pastoralists and their leaders. A sample composed of 24 people participated in face-to-face, in depth interview sessions across affected communities in the Saki East and Iseyin local government areas of Oyo State. The data is further augmented by a critical review of extant literature.

Theoretical Framework Since the emergence of the environment-security discourse in the late 1970s, scholars have attempted to give structure to an understanding of

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resource scarcity and conflict trajectory in environmental change. One of the popular theoretical frameworks is eco-violence theory, popularised in the works of Homer-Dixon (1991 and 1994), Schwartz, Deligiannis and Homer-Dixon (2008), Percival and Homer-Dixon (1998) and Nill Gleditsch and Henrich Urdal (2002). Eco-violence theory is predicated on the view that per capita reduction in the amount of renewable resources available in a given population can potentially instigate violent civil conflict among competing groups (Isiugo and Obioha, 2015). To Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1996), eco-violence’s core postulation is that the depletion ‘occurring in the amount or quality of resources are reducing the overall total available, while increases in population divide what remains into smaller portions.’ Hence they opine that ‘population growth and resource depletion converge to produce conflict in many parts of the developing world’ (p.164). According to Homer-Dixon (1994), scarcity results from changes in the environment as events such as drought, flooding, and other forms of vulnerability that exacerbate changes impact on the availability of fresh water, forests and cropland (Homer-Dixon, 1994: 5-40). Highlighting the complex chain of events that contributes to environmental scarcity, Schwartz, Deligiannis and Homer-Dixon (2008: 319) point out that: [...] severe environmental scarcity can produce a number of identifiable ‘intermediate’ social effects: it restricts local food production, aggravates poverty of marginal groups, spurs large temporary or permanent migrations, enriches elites that capture resources, deepens divisions among social groups, and undermines a state’s moral authority and capacity to govern. Marginal groups that directly depend on renewable resources find themselves trapped in a vice between rising scarcity on one side and institutional and policy failures on the other. In many cases, these social impacts are aggravated and amplified by weak or dysfunctional governance capacities in developing states. These long term, tectonic stresses can slowly tear apart a poor society’s social fabric, causing chronic popular unrest and violence by boosting grievances and changing the balance of power among contending social groups and the state.

Two causal paths are identified as leading to a natural resource struggle: the environmental effects of human activities in a given ecological zone; and the level to which the ecosystem in that region is vulnerable (Isiugo and Obioha, 2015). Conflict may develop from environmental scarcity since the degradation of the environment depletes its resource supply, spurring migration into new regions and thereby increasing strife in the new territory as demand increases because of the population influx

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(Clarke, 1999). Similarly, four interrelated effects of degradation are important here, as espoused by Homer-Dixon: reductions in the level of agricultural production; increased economic decline; population displacement; and a disruption in regular and legitimate social relations (Barnett, 2000: 280281). The contextual dynamics of these effects may give rise to various forms of violent conflicts, ranging from insurgency and rebellion to clashes among ethnic groups, especially in developing countries. Homer-Dixon and Blitt (1998) highlight two environmental processes that are likely to produce resource scarcity and precipitate violent conflict. Firstly, changes such as increased temperatures, precipitation anomalies, extreme weather and other factors may aggravate environmental degradation and competition for available resources. Secondly, a rise in sea levels, drought, flooding and other extreme weather events may force millions of people to migrate away from risky areas. Migration poses resource struggle risks for the destination, especially in less developed regions that have limited mitigation and adaptation capabilities (HomerDixon and Blitt, 1988: 2-5). These processes, they argue, cause three forms of scarcity: supply-induced scarcity, caused by environmental degradation and depletion; demand-induced scarcity, due to population growth within a region or increased per capita consumption; and structural scarcity, caused by inequalities in social access to existing resources due to their domination by powerful groups (Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1998).

Contextualising Eco-Violence Theory How does eco-violence explain Nigeria’s farmer-herder confrontations? Drawing a chain of causal association between environment and conflict is a major and challenging task for environment-security researchers. This contentious connection divides security-policy research and theoryoriented scholarship on environmental-conflict linkages. A common understanding, however, is the effect that climate change has on environmental capital — critical resources which have the capability to alter relations among groups. A number of studies have examined the resource factor as a climate-conflict connective. Reliance on natural resources in poor regions makes the depletion of the natural environment a conflict-precipitating event (Barnett, 2003; Gleditsch and Urdal, 2002; and Wolt, 2011). In the context of vulnerability associated with climate-induced natural-resources scarcity, violent conflicts and other forms of insecurity often arise (Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1998; and Gleditsch and Urdal, 2002). Scarcity, according to Bauhaug Gleditsch and

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Theisen (2008: 7) refers to a situation of ‘low per-capita access to a resource’ which ‘arises when there is a low per capita availability to a population of a vital renewable resource such as fresh water.’ Such resource scarcity, as the study noted, may result from one or both of two processes: a dwindling resource base or an increase in the demand for existing resources which often follows a population increase. Contextual factors are also noted to play a decisive role in aggravating or attenuating the impact of resource scarcity on the population. Percival and Homer-Dixon (1998) argue that the relationship between environmental scarcity and violent conflicts lies in determinants that are context-specific. Such factors reflect the ‘quantity and vulnerability of environmental resources, the balance of political power, the nature of the state, patterns of social interaction, and the structure of economic relations among social groups’ (p. 280). All of these factors influence how resources are used and the extent to which groups are vulnerable to the changing availability of critical resources. They also shape socio-systemic responses and processes, as well as the potential for scarcity to engender grievances and aggravated violence. Apart from scholarly expositions on the scarcity-conflict transformation, policy-makers have also highlighted the implications of scarcity for conflict. For example, the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, argued: ‘If we don’t respond adequately to the challenge of global climate change over the course of these next years there will be people fighting wars over water and over land’ (U.S. Department of State, 2013). Similarly, the United Nations’ Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, observed that competition between communities and countries for scarce resources (especially water) was on the increase and was likely to exacerbate old security dilemmas or create new ones, even as environmental refugees continued to reshape the face of human geography, globally fuelled by desertification and a rise in sea levels.2 Achim Steiner, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), once identified climate change as a threat multiplier which fuelled ‘competition over scarce water and land, exacerbated by regional changes in climate, [which is] already a key factor in local conflicts in Darfur, the Central African Republic, Northern Kenya and Chad.’3

2

Security Council Meetings Coverage Security Council 6587th Meeting, 20 July 2011. http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10332.doc.htm. 3 Ibid.

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This understanding of the scarcity-conflict linkage has caused more controversy than consensus in academic attempts to find generally applicable causal factors in the environment-conflict transformation process. A number of quantitative studies have suggested links between intrastate conflict and low levels of precipitation (Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012; and Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012) or scarcity of freshwater resources (Raleigh and Urdal, 2007; and Gizelis and Wooden, 2010). Others have challenged these propositions, arguing against any significant causal relationship (Wischnath and Buhaug, 2014; and O’Loughlin et al., 2014). Some yet find a negative correlation between resource scarcity (e.g. the incidence of low rainfall), water scarcity, and the occurrence of intrastate violent conflict (Salehyan and Hendrix, 2014; and Hendrix and Glaser, 2007). Against the backdrop of controversies, how can we advance the knowledge of environmental-resource scarcity and its connection to conflict? It is agreed among scholars that renewable resource scarcity is linked to violent conflict only in the presence of certain conditions or a combination of conditions (see Hauge, Wenche and Tanja Ellingsen, 1998; Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1998; and Scheffran et al., 2012). Hence, it is the belief that answers to the underlying factors in conflict transformation lie in the context of incidence (Peluso and Watts, 2001). This explains the call for a contextualised study of the phenomenon (Solow, 2013; and Meierding, 2013). In the Nigerian context, studies note the importance of understanding ideational factors in the transformation of resource conflict. Isiugo and Obioha (2015) describe ideational factors as the broad and complex social and psychological context of environment-conflict actualities, including: [...] the patterns of land distribution; family and community structure; the economic and legal incentives to consume and produce goods, including the system of property rights; perceptions of the probability of long-term societal stability; historically noted patterns of trade and interaction with societies; the distribution of coercive power within and among nations; the form and effectiveness of institutions of governance; and metaphysical beliefs about the relationship between humans and nature. This constitutes a threshold beyond or within which given societies could respond effectively to the inbuilt stress induced by climate/environmental change which differs among societies. Particularly, if we wish to understand a society’s propensity towards conflict, given certain social effects due to the environmental stress, we need to understand the relationship, between the ideational factors and conflict (Isiugo and Obioha, 2015: 157-158).

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It is within the context of subsistance material and ideational circumstances that the chain of events engenders conflicts among groups (Isiugo and Obioha, 2015). Umar (2002) corroborates this in noting the effect of intergroup perceptions among Fulani and host communities of different ethnic groups. As a remedial intervention, proponents of eco-violence highlight innovation (described as ingenuity) in the form of adaptation as being particularly needed in the context of farmer-herder conflicts in Oyo State and Nigeria as a whole.

Climate Change and Ecological Diversity in Nigeria Nigeria has witnessed notable changes in its climate associated with increased frequency and severity of both drought and floods throughout the 20th century. This has resulted in increased drought in the country, especially in the drier regions of the north. Odjudo (2010) traces temperature changes in Nigeria back to 1901 and notes that there has been an increasing pattern temperatures beyond the 0.74oC global mean increase since the beginning of scientific temperature measurement in 1860. This change, he notes, was initially gradual until the late 1960s, when there was a sharp increase in air temperatures that has continued ever since. According to him, the measured mean air temperature was 26.6oC between 1901 and 2005, with the temperature increasing by 1.1oC for that period of 105 years. This heralds a middle risk increase of 2.5oC, and a high risk temperature increase of 4.5oC by the year 2100 if the observed increases continued unabated. A similar trend is observed in precipitation which, according to Nkomo et al. (2006), has decreased by an average of 25% in the Nigerian Sahel region in the last 30 years, although this has been a more moderate decline in other parts of the continent. Fasona and Omojola (2005) highlight the impact of environmental variability on agricultural and ecological systems. According to the authors, there has been drastic ecological and economic transformation in the northern and Middle Belt regions of Nigeria where the traditional cereal-productive soils of the Sudan savannah ecology have been transformed into pure Sahel. The Sahara has been extending towards the south, and the Guinea savannah traditional root and tuber ecology has increasingly transformed into Sudan savannah grassland. Such alterations, they argue, are a result of the prolonged drought of the 1940s during which

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most stations within the upper Sudan and Sahel zones4 suffered ‘more than 5% decline in rainfall between two decades’ (Fasona and Omojola, 2005: 14). This decline was made worse by the decade-long Sudano-Sahelian drought (1971-1980) from which the region never recovered, increasing the rate of desertification in the region. Highlighting the pace of desertification in the northern region, Odoh and Chilaka (2012: 117) note that: [...] fully two-thirds of Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara states could turn desert or semi-desert in the twenty-first century. Already the Sahel creeps south by approximately 1,400 square miles a year, swallowing whole villages; government geological data show a 400 percent increase in sand dunes over twenty years (Odoh and Chilaka, 2012: 117).

One of the effects of this transformation, according to them, is that pastoral Fulani herdsmen of the lower Sahel and Sudan savannah are increasingly forced to move southwards into the forest belts and the Guinea savannah ecologies of the south in order to find more regular pasture for their herds, thereby resulting in conflict with their hosts (the Guinea savannah farmers), most of whom grow root and tuber crops, as they resist crop destruction. How has eco-diversity aggravated conflict in Nigeria? Nigeria’s varying climatic and ecological attributes imply that it is exposed to two forms of environmental risk: drought and desertification in the lower Sahel ecology of the upper northern region; and coastal erosion and flooding in the mangrove ecology of the delta region (see map). These variations across its regions also imply that ‘climate change events will impact on [the] variegated ecologies differently’ (Amobi and Onyisi, 2015: 206). This explains Olufemi and Samson’s (2012: 17) assertion that the consequence of climate change for the country is ‘a geographical pincer threat from desertification in the north to rising sea levels threats in Nigeria’s southern coastal regions.’

4

Some of the most affected locations within the upper Sudan and Sahel zones include Birnin Kebbi, Gusau, Kano, Maiduguri, Sokoto, Yola, Nguru, Potiskum and Katsina. Worst affected are Nguru, Maiduguri and Katsina, which are located in the interior of the Sahel zone.

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Figure 1: Ecological zones in Nigeria

Source: Adapted from Okpara, Tarhule and Perumal (2013).

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This regional ecological diversity can also be seen in the forms of rural productive economies, as the diverse topographic features influence agricultural practices across regions (Fasona and Omojola, 2005; and Aregheore, 2009). Oyenuga (1967) further notes that Nigeria’s topography and soil composition is influencing agro-based systems across the country because of the variation in the quality of the soil structure across ecoclimatic regions; each region’s varying crop productivity advantages are different because of susceptibility to environmental conditions.

Climatic Factors in Pastoral Migration and Conflict Nigeria’s varied agro-ecological regions demonstrate divergence in farming practices across the country. These regional differences in agroproductive traditions have come under increasing threat in recent times due to increased climatic and ecological pressures. Given the traditional techniques compared to the modern ranch system of livestock production that has become popular elsewhere, nomadic pastoral farmers have faced one of the greatest direct impacts of climate change, forcing a reliance on migratory adaptation into new terrains and thus making conflicts inevitable. According to Azuwike and Enwerem (2010: 3), ‘cattle production has been a preoccupation of the Fulani tribe of Northern Nigeria for centuries.’ The south, on the other hand, has often offered two attractions to the herders: as a refuge for the cattle herders during the scarcity seasons; and as a cattle market for the pastoralists. According to Lambrecht (1976: 26), they are a socially conservative people who, despite their migratory nature, ‘integrate neither socially nor politically with other ethnic groups.’ As Adekunle and Adisa (2010: 2) note, conflicts arising from the search for resources such as water, forage and land in host communities have remained a ‘most important’ problem faced by Fulani herdsmen in the course of tending to their herds. This has brought about enmity between them and the host community’s mostly arable crop farmers. The relationship between Fulani herders and their southern farming hosts was originally a symbiotic one. During their temporary stops around villages, they provided the farmers with organic manure from cow dung, in addition to rich protein from the beef and dairy products. Nomads have also depended on farm produce from farmers for food (Ofem and Inyang, 2014). Nzeh (2015: 21) explains that, apart from the barriers of language and culture which usually differentiate nomads from their host communities, ‘the audacity with which they shepherd their flocks to graze

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on available vegetation on their route often attracts protests from communities’. This situation, he further notes, often creates unhealthy rivalry that leads to violence. There is also substantial cross-border movement in the Fulani livestock rearing trade, although the actual figures on the inflow of herds has been difficult to assess. According to Nzeh (2015), Nigeria’s cattle market has significant inflow from Niger, Mali, and Chad; there is regular crossborder movement of herders and cattle during the yearly migration circles, with Nigeria accounting for 50% of beef consumption in the ECOWAS region and importing over 25% of this to meet the needs of the population that is also fast increasing. At the national level, the sector adds about 5% to national GDP as a fragment of agriculture which, in general, contributes 35% of GDP, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN, 2013). However, while this presents a boost to the livestock market, it also creates problems as small arms find their way into the country and become available to herdsmen, thereby contributing to an escalation of farmerherder violence (Shettima and Tar, 2013).

An Empirical Study on the Saki and Iseyin LGAs of Oyo State This study was conducted in the Saki and Iseyin local government areas of Oyo State, which is located in the south-west geo-political zone of Nigeria. The state is situated at longitude 4° 00' 00" E and latitude 8° 00' 00" N. It spreads over a land mass of about 27,249 square kilometres and shares boundaries with Ogun State in the south, Kwara in the north, partly with Ogun and the Republic of Benin in the west, and with Osun State to the east (Government of Oyo State, 2015). The state was initially created in 1976 as one of three formed out of the old Western State. It is populated mainly by Yoruba people and, according to the 2006 headcount, has a population of about 5,591,589. Local administration in Oyo consists of 33 local government areas including Saki West and Saki East. The climate in Oyo State is equatorial with dry (November-March) and wet (April-October) seasons, along with its rainforest vegetation pattern in the south and a guinea savannah in its northern axis. The state is largely agrarian and its climate is highly suitable for growing crops like maize, yams, cassava, millet, rice, plantain, cocoa trees, palm trees and cashew (Government of Oyo State, 2015).

Climate Change, Migratory Adaptation and Farmer-Herder Conflicts Figure 2: Map of Oyo State.

Source: Ibadan Media (2015).

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The Saki East and Iseyin local government of Oyo State are reputed for their endowments as major agricultural destinations in the south-west region. According to the 2011 estimates, Saki East has a population of 129,150 and is located in the Oke Ogun area, known as the food capital of the state. Iseyin’s local government area, on the other hand, is estimated to have a population of about 302,990 as of 2011, according to the National Population Commission.5 Both areas have witnessed frequent conflict between migrant Fulani herdsmen and their hosts, the local arable farmers.

Exploring Field Data 1. Farmer-herder conflict from the farmers’ perspective: Farming activities in both communities are dominated by men ranging from the ages of 18 to 75 years old. All of the farmers who were interviewed have previously been exposed to adverse impact on farm produce through encroachment from Fulani cattle, with varying degrees of destruction. Other significant tensions that were highlighted included water pollution and the rape and armed harassment of community members. In response, farmers explored one or more of four measures: coped and did nothing; sought community leaders’ intervention; confronted the herders; switched crops or quit farming. Farmer 08 at Oje owode lamented that ‘our wives can no longer move freely on the way to the farm. Herders rape them or machete those that resist. Their cattle also pollute our stream which serves as only source of water in the community (Interview with Farmer 08, at Oje Owode, June 2014). Farmers identified the change from transitory to sedentary migration as a major factor contributing to increased conflict between herders and farmers. One farmer put it thus: There is no area where they are not destructive, especially the Bororo people. The Bororo people who used to be here during the peak dry season have now refused to go back [...] They have built homes in our community. If you go to Wiligi, they are in Itage. They have built ironroofed houses, not even thatched ones. That tells you they are not leaving any time soon. They are no longer transitory and farmers are no longer making headways in farming. Although we used to be the biggest farming 5

City Population (2015), ‘States and Local Government Areas’, Nigeria: Administrative Division, City population. http://www.citypopulation.de/php/nigeria-admin.php.

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communities in the whole of Saki: we used to buy cars and build houses from proceeds of our farm. But now all that is gone [...] (Interview with Farmer 07, Iseyin, June 2014).

Sharing similar narratives, about 70% of the farmers who were interviewed reported previous violent confrontation with herdsmen; 5% reported switching crops; 10% of the interviewees did nothing; while 15% quit farming. While all farmers recalled damage to their farms, inefficiency of mediatory processes in compensation payments contributed to a loss of confidence in seeking institutional resolution (such as the police force) because allegations of bribery, diversion of compensation intended for farm owners, and poor compensation for a degree of loss, encouraged farmers to resort to helping themselves and, ultimately, an escalation into violence. Although farmers attribute destructive behaviour to both sedentary and transitory Fulani herders, particular attention is paid to the transitory migrant Bororo, a sub-group of the Fulani herders alleged to be more daring, and engaging in nocturnal grazing activities, making the identification of culprits difficult. Forty per cent reported machete attacks and armed harassment upon confrontation with the herders in an attempt to halt cattle encroachment, while 60% of the farmers reported uncompensated loss to the Bororo group.

2. The herders’ perspective on farmer-herder conflict Most of the herdsmen interviewed were sedentary pastoral migrants. Herdsmen unanimously identified environmental resource scarcity as the driving factor in pastoral migration. Most perceived over-cultivation in the host communities as a problem for the survival of herdsmen. One herdsman who migrated from the Republic of Benin explained that: Over there, in recent times, there is rarely any difference between the dry season and the rainy season. Everywhere is dry and we can only feed our herd from the bark of trees which is also scarce. Here, there is abundance during the wet season and also enough to feed the cattle during the dry season (Interview with PH2, Oje Owode, June 2014).

Herders understand climate change in terms of inter-annual patterns of variability and inter-annual decline in cattle-sensitive resources. For example, PH4 notes that ‘rainfall has become less and made water and grass scarcer for the cattle […] and as a Fulani man, we move according to

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the supply of grass and water’ (Interview with PH4, Ago Amodu, June 2014). Most of the herdsmen also highlighted some adverse effects resulting from the Bororo herders. These included cattle theft and accusations by farmers regarding damage and the harassment of community members, which are behaviours mostly exhibited by the Bororo group. For example, PH2 in Saki East argues that ‘both of us (Fulani herders and farmers) are equally concerned about the safety of our goods because Bororo Fulani often stole cattle as well as damage farmers’ crops’ while ‘farmers always accuse us of damaging their crops.’ The majority of the farmers also expressed acceptance of innovative livestock keeping if backed by assistance from the state. Most herdsmen argued in favour of an overarching policy reform on pastoral farming if this is assisted by the government. In Iseyin, for example, PH4 noted that ‘it will mean security for our cattle and it will bring peace and comfort to us and the community. It is not true that some cattle cannot be camped. It is about what one wants and how one trains the cattle.’

3. Community youths in farmer-herder conflict Youths form the bulk of the farming population in rural communities in Nigeria. As a block, youths play a major role in the incidence of conflict between farmers and herdsmen, and 80% of the youths reported losses of capital due to cattle destruction. Most argue that loss to cattle farmers constituted a discouragement for youth involvement in farming, identifying it as one of the key factors in livelihood decline and ruralurban migration among youths. A native youth lamented thus: All the places where we farm are also their grazing land. And you know it is impossible for us to stay permanently in the farm from morning till night. Once they see that we have left the farms, they allow their cattle to go into our farms. As a result their cattle destroy our farms. People who invest to grow two acres of crops don’t make harvest up to half of it (Interview with Native Youth, NCY4, Iseyin LGA, June 2014).

Another young farmer corroborates this view and argues that the activities of herders ‘affect the opportunities available in because many youths have already left farming. Many of us who can’t find alternatives are away in the cities whether they have a job or not. It can contribute to crime, hooliganism, and armed robbery’ (Interview with NCY5, Oje Owode, June 2015). Against the backdrop of the bellicose state of group relations between farmers and the community it is easy to understand the escalation

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of community grievances in the event of adverse impact from pastoral farmers and their cattle. This view was echoed by the head of the local administrative structure who stated that many of the vulnerable youths, who previously engaged in farming, have migrated to the cities and suburban areas and are at risk of joining criminal groups since they do not have the required skills to function in the cities (interview at Saki’s local government headquarters, June 2014). Patterns of Relationship and Fault-lines in Community-Herder Conflicts S/N

Factors

1 2

No conflicts Ethnocultural conflict8 Civil Conflicts9 Resource conflict

3 4

No. of participants Source: Author.

Community Actors6 Farmers Herders Youths 0 1 0

Institutional Actors7 TR LGH PCH FCH + _ _ _ _

2

0

0

7

1

4

+

+

+

10

3

5

+

+

+

10

5

5

1

1

1

_ _ 1

Summary of Findings This chapter has examined conflict transformation in a population vulnerable to climate-change-related variability, particularly resource scarcity experiences among migrant pastoral herders and resource conflict in migrant host communities. The study found the following:

6 Responses in terms of affirmation (+) and negation (-), as reported by each member of the conflict-active community groups, are summed up and recorded in figures. 7 Since these categories consist of individuals, responses (i.e. either affirmative or negative) are indicated as such. Abbreviations: TR-Traditional Ruler; LGH-Local Government Head; PCH-Pastoral Community Head; FCH- Farmers’ Community Head. 8 Cultural conflicts refer to those centred around tribalism, ethnicity, and religion. 9 Civil tension refers to conflicts arising from alleged cattle theft, rape, and armed robberies, cutting across groups.

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1. That migratory adaptation arising from a poor capacity for in-situ adaptation to climatic and environmental pressures among nomadic farmers underlies vulnerability in geophysical and socio-ecological transformations, which manifest as resource conflicts between pastoralists and arable farmers in the Iseyin and Saki local government areas of Oyo State. 2. That migratory adaptation among herdsmen is highly potent in constricting livelihoods in rural host communities, thereby increasing rural-urban population drift, particularly among youths. 3. That there is significant linkage between climate-change-conflict transformations and increasing urban crime and insecurity in proximate cities and urban areas. In summary, the transformation of vulnerabilities from climatic/environmental pressures into conflict can be modelled as shown below. From the diagram below, it can be seen that unattended exposure to primary geophysical climatic vulnerabilities may combine with sociocontextual factors (such as migratory adaptation) to amplify secondary socio-ecological vulnerabilities in migrant-receiving destinations. On a broader socio-political spectrum, the civil implications of such transformation and extension of vulnerabilities may further aggravate the strains on state capacity to ensure the security of its citizens. Sociocontextual factors which amplify these effects vary according to the context. In the case studied, the factors included: a high level of population dependence on the natural environment, for both migrant pastoral farming and arable peasant farming, which are nature-sensitive livelihood systems; levels of efficiency, innovativeness, and credibility of conflict management structures; existing socio-economic conditions such as youth engagement versus unemployment; clarity and thorough implementation of legal frameworks relevant to land-use management systems; and the volatility of the systems in terms of ease of acquiring arms and carrying out violent acts.

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A Model of Environmental Vulnerability and Conflict Transformation

Source: Author-improved, adaptation from Odo and Chilaka (2012).

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Conclusion The main hypotheses of this chapter are: that climate change is an important factor in the recently worsening relationship between farmers and herdsmen, as indicated by the increasing levels of resource-related conflicts between farmers and pastoral farmers in host communities; that although there are other intervening factors determining a variety of social responses and degree of conflict, there is migratory-adaptation link between climatic vulnerabilities in ‘sending’ regions and agro-pastoral ecological vulnerabilities in migrant ‘receiving’ communities. This migratory adaptation is a response to natural-resource scarcity, manifesting through drought and desertification, which have increased largely due to the impact of climate change. Against the above backdrop, this chapter recommends the following steps: 1. The Nigerian state should introduce and effectively implement a conflict-sensitive climate-change adaptation support system, by enabling vulnerable populations (in this case, the Fulani herders) to cope in-situ rather than migrate. 2. In the receiving communities, state and local governments may deploy extension workers to educate arable farmers on safety such as preventing road-side farming which exposes crops to cattle damage. 3. In the short term, governments at all levels, as well as other relevant stakeholders such as traditional rulers and trade associations, must synergise and synchronise their efforts in order to develop a holistic approach to farmer-herder conflict mediation in Nigeria. 4. In the era of technology and innovation, the Nigerian government needs to develop modern infrastructure and overhaul the practice and processes of livestock management in Nigeria. 5. To this end, traditional pastoral farmers who constitute the bulk of the livestock production sector in Nigeria need to be reoriented, sensitised and assisted to embrace innovation through a phased introduction of modern livestock management systems.

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References Abbass, I.M. (2011), ‘No retreat, no surrender: Conflict for Survival between Fulani Pastoralist and Farmers in Northern Nigeria’, European Scientific Journal, vol. 8, no.1. pp. 331-346. (Accessed 5 March 2013). Adekunle, O.A. and Adisa, S.R. (2010), ‘An empirical phenomenological psychological study of farmer-herder conflicts in North-central Nigeria’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, vol. 2, no. 1, pp.1-27. Ahmadu, H.J. and Yusof, R.B.T. (2010), ‘The dynamics of resource conflict: Lessons from Nigeria and Malaysia’, College of Law, Government and International Studies (COLGIS) University Utara Malaysia (UUM), 06010 Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia. http://repo.uum.edu.my/2489/1/Hamman_Jumba__The_Dynamics_of_ Resource_Conflicts.pdf. (Accessed: 10 December 2015). Amobi, D. and Onyisi, T. (2015), ‘Governance and climate change in Nigeria: A public policy perspective’, Journal of Policy and Development Studies vol. 9, no. 2, pp.199-209. Aregheore, E.M. (2009), ‘Country pasture/forage resources profile, Nigeria’, in Suttie J. M and S.G. Regnolds (eds.), Agriculture and education services, Apia Samoa: Marfel consulting. Awogbade, M.O. (1983), Pastoral Fulani reaction to grazing reserve development: The case of Ruma-Kukar-Jangarai, Kaduna State, Nigeria, London: Agricultural Administration Unit, Overseas Development Institute. Azuwike O.D. and Enwerem, E. (2010), ‘Nigeria’s changing environment and pastoral nomadism: Redistribution of pains and gains,’ Imo State University, http://www.diss.fuberlin.de/docs/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDO CS_derivate_000000001383/AzuwikeNIGERIAS_CHANGING_ENV IRONMENT_AND_PASTORAL_NOMADISM- 329.pdf (Accessed 20 October 2015). Barnett, J. (2000), ‘Destabilizing the environment-conflict thesis’, Review of International Studies, vol. 26, pp.271-288. —. (2003), ‘Security and climate change’, Global Environmental Change, vol.13, pp.7-17. Bauhaug, A., Gleditsch, N.P., and Theisen, O.M. (2008), ‘Implications of climate change for armed conflict’. Paper presented at the World Bank Workshop on Social Dimensions of Climate Change. The World Bank, Washington DC. 5-6 March.

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CHAPTER SEVEN DRIVERS OF VIOLENCE: COMMERCIAL DRIVERS AND URBAN CONFLICTS IN EKITI STATE, NIGERIA AZEEZ OLANIYAN AND AKEEM O. BELLO

Introduction The transportation sector is a major employer in Nigeria (Olubomehin, 2012). The contribution of the sector to the development of the Nigerian economy is substantial (Olubomehin, 2012; and Ajaegbo, 2013). This has positioned commercial drivers as important partners in the development of the Nigerian state. Given that not all citizens can provide themselves with a means of transportation, it is obvious that citizens and commercial drivers are necessary partners in daily activities. However, the reality all over Nigeria is that commercial vehicle drivers frequently exhibit dangerous behaviour (Ogunmola, 2015; Bolashodun, 2015). A major part of such a disposition is violent tendencies which manifest as an incessant unleashing of mayhem on themselves and the citizens, with devastating consequences for order, peace and security (Sulaiman, 2007; Ogunmola, 2015; Ogundele, 2015; Bolashodun, 2015). Without a doubt, commercial drivers have emerged as major instigators and perpetrators of violent conflict in most parts of Nigeria. This is congruent with the opinion of Omobowale and Fayiga (2015), who believe that drivers come from a pool of individuals who have technical skills in violence and are recruited for reasons that are mostly political, or for personal advancement. Perhaps, one of the areas where the transportation crises is more prominent is in Ekiti State, which has witnessed an orgy of violence perpetrated by various groups from the drivers’ unions. Prominent among them are the Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (RTEAN) and National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). As members of the

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RTEAN, they are fondly called ‘employers’ and are supposedly a union of commercial vehicle owners. Members of the NURTW are referred to as ‘national’ and are hired drivers. However, this distinction is not as clear as it seems, as several members of the two unions are either owners of vehicles or hired drivers. However, both unions are known for engaging in violence and militancy amongst themselves and towards members of the public. The incessant conflicts include the politics of succession in motor parks: intra-union disagreements, inter-union rivalries, state instigation, political patronages, and disagreements over fare hikes, loading arrangements and the movement of parks. Although insufficient, there have been a number of studies on the phenomenon of driver-induced conflicts in Nigeria. However, a micro study of the Ekiti State scenario is not available. Within one year, commercial drivers triggered no less than five instances of violence that claimed lives and the destruction of property in the state. Specifically, this study engages in a micro study of the violent activities and consequences of commercial drivers in the state. It is an ethnographic study carried out in the Ado Ekiti metropolis. Respondents were members of the public and those who cut across the two unions. The primary data was supplemented by data collected through secondary sources such as newspapers, texts, and the Internet. The data were then subjected to qualitative analysis.

Commercial Drivers and Violent Conflict: A Theoretical Analysis The phenomenon of drivers’ violence in Nigeria can be looked at through the general framework of urban violence, as most incidents of violence take place in cities. This makes the case that there is a strong link between their activities and urbanisation. Urbanisation has been identified as a major factor that influences modern conflict and, more often than not, city centres are epicentres of violence. Such violence — including demonstrations, riots, gang warfare, gun-running, revolution, drug trafficking, assassination, armed robbery and muggings — occur or originate in cities (Gussing, 2012, and Vasconcelos, 2012). Urban violence has been described as the most serious form of lethal violence over the last decade and is mostly triggered by forces operating at political, social and economic levels (Koonings, 2012). The phenomenon of urban violence, interestingly, is neither culture-bound nor regime specific. There are records of violence occuring in virtually all

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continents, including in countries considered peaceful and democratic (Koonings, 2012). Quite as expected, the rising phenomenon of urban violence has attracted the attention of scholars studying conflict, which has given birth to a plethora of research. However, in spite of the volume of study in this area, an overarching theory of urban violence is yet to emerge, due largely to the complexity of the phenomenon (Adisa, 1997: 91). However, there is a kind of unanimity of opinion on key contributory factors: inequality and the poverty of low income groups; inadequacy of urban environment protection; the dearth of social control; the phenomenon of youth bulge; state responses and the fractured criminal justice system, in most societies (Vandershuren, 1996; Adisa, 1997). However, within the precinct of urban violence theory, Mary Kaldor’s concept of ‘new war’ holds much analytical prospect. Kaldors has argued that what the world gained in a reduction in the spate of interstate wars (due largely to the blunting of politico-ideological edges) was lost to the emergence of new war actors on the horizon. These new actors are neither formally organised military groups nor armed rebels, but largely irregular groups like gangs, pimps, underground mafias, racketeers, terrorist cells, assassins, and cultists, etc. (Kaldor, 1999; Koonings, 2012:). These new actors are mostly based in urban centres and are responsible for what Koonings (2012: 15) describes as ‘undeclared wars’ in urban spaces. What this boils down to, according to Caroline Moser and Cathy Mcllwaine, is the notion that conflict is increasingly transferring from the rural to the urban, and that movement represents a major distinguishing factor between the nature of conflicts in the 20th and 21st centuries (Moser and Mcllwaine, 2014). With reference to Nigeria, there have been some attempts to analyse the phenomenon of commercial driver-induced conflicts in Nigeria. A review of the literature clearly shows that both NURTW and RTEAN basically emerged as trade unions to champion the cause of members in terms of welfare and the promotion of the status of commercial driving as a profession in Nigeria (Oladipo, 2012). This is in line with the philosophy of most trade unions within the civil society discourse. However, over the years, violence has become so ingrained in the unions that major defining characteristics of commercial drivers in Nigeria are belligerency and unnecessary rivalries, meaning that the motor parks have become epicentres of disorderliness. The transformation from the humble background of trade unionism to violent groupings is, therefore, a clear demonstration of what Augustine Ikelegbe described as the perverse manifestation of civil society in Nigeria. Ikelegbe demonstrated how civil

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society, of which the drivers’ union is a member, is instrumental in the challenges of democratisation as well as the spate of instability and insecurity in the country, due largely to the antediluvian consequences of their negative activism (Ikelegbe, 2001). Contributing largely to the travesty, in the case of the drivers, is the intrusion of political contractors into the sphere of motor parks. This intrusion manifests in the courting of the unions’ leaderships for political ends. The invasion of the motor park space works in a number of ways: it makes the drivers a force to be reckoned with in the political sphere; it turns the motor parks into spots of political mobilisation to the extent that the drivers constitute a major aspect of political campaigns; during election time, the drivers become ready tools as bodyguards to politicians, intimidators of political opponents, snatchers of ballot boxes or outright fomenters of trouble to achieve election cancellations. Using Ibadan as a case study, Isaac Albert (2007), Omobowale and Olutayo (2007), and Gbemisola Animasahun (2013) show the political class as engaging in an orgy of violence perpetrated by two major factions within the fold of NURTW, in the quest for political succession and supremacy. In particular, their studies connect the violence in the motor parks with the struggle for political ascendancy between godfather and godson, Lamidid Adedibu and Rashidi Ladoja. For a long time, Ibadan city was turned to a war zone, with human and material casualties. The role of the state — particularly the incumbent state managers — is located within this framework of political interference. Every occupier of a state governorship seat always seeks the support of the leaders of the drivers and the unions. To this end, there is always the tendency to influence the emergence of leaders who will be helpful in mobilising members for political ends during election time. A major consequence of this is rivalry among the drivers’ bodies (Nwagu, 2014; Adeyemi, 2015). The pattern of succession in the motor parks has become a major source of violence and leadership is rarely changed through the ballot box or negotiation, but through the barrel of a gun or other violence (Adekambi, 2011; Kayode-Adedeji, 2013; Ezeobi, 2012). Directly related to this is the contest between the unions for supremacy. This flows from the historical emergence of the union: NURTW was basically a breakaway faction from the RTEAN and, ever since, the rivalry has been a contest for supremacy, with the mentality of settling such through violence across many states in Nigeria (Akinyemi, 2015; Olesin, 2015; Ugwueze, 2015; Ahmad, 2015). Our fieldwork shows clearly that, to a large extent, Nigerian commercial drivers constitute irregular group of actors waging a new war in Nigeria.

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Using crude weapons of knives, cutlasses, and local charms, the war is waged on their own members and rival factions in the park, as well as on members of the public. Each violent outing often leaves death, destruction, vandalism, and traffic disruption in its trail and ultimately poses a challenge to peace and order. In essence, the commercial drivers constitute a menace to city life and are therefore part of urban violence.

Chronology of Violent Outings in Ado Ekiti Our study reveals that commercial drivers in Nigerian cities constitute a major challenge to peace and orderliness, because of their violent activities. However, the study also shows that most of the violent acts associated with drivers are not actually carried out by gainfully employed drivers. One respondent argues that most of the violent acts are perpetrated by some drivers without vehicles, and touts (known as Agbero) who earn their livings at the mercy of motor owners and leaders in the motor parks. He concludes that this group of people are puppets in the hands of drivers, leaders and politicians (fieldwork, 2015). This sentiment is in line with the position of Effiong et al. (2015) that ‘a high rate of unemployment, poverty and an uncontrolled informal sector among others have led to more than a proportionate increase in deviant careers, violence and criminal activities, loss of lives and properties in most urban centres.’ The need to fill the gap created by unemployment certainly motivates most of these drivers and touts to become instruments for crime and other deviant activities for their masters (Salau, 2009; Lana, 2011; Fayeye, 2007, cited in Effiong, 2015). As an integral part of the Nigerian state, Ekiti has experienced its own share of violent activities perpetrated by commercial drivers, with devastating consequences for lives, order, peace and property. In a way, the Ekiti case validates these reasons and exemplifies the perversion of civil society, as explained by Ikelegbe. A chronology of violent events between 2014 and 2015 shows this and will be discussed below.

The disruption of MOB political campaign In 2014, Opeyemi Bamidele was a governorship candidate in the Ekiti state governorship election, under the Labour Party. Thursday 18th September 2014 was the day earmarked for his formal declaration. To this end, his political supporters and party members started trooping into Ado Ekiti, the capital city, from different local government areas to attend the political rally, as early as 6am, Nigerian time. However, there were

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indications of violence as early as 7am when members of the Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (RTEAN) and National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) barricaded all roads leading to the town (Popoola, 2014). These drivers were believed to have been sponsored by the state government under the leadership of Kayode Fayemi, who was seeking re-election under the platform of APC. Supporters coming into the town were prevented from entering the city, which created lots of tension and it wasn’t long before a crisis broke out. Several people were wounded or maimed. Most of the injuries were actually caused by tear gas and stray bullets fired by the anti-riot police who had been drafted to salvage the situation. Despite the early-morning violence by the drivers, Bamidele entered Ado Ekiti through Akure at about 12:37pm in a long convoy and was received by his supporters at Mobil in Ajilosun. He also mobilised his own thugs to counter the drivers’ show of might. In the course of their blockade, the drivers brandished dangerous weapons including guns, cutlasses, Dane-guns, cudgels and sticks, harassing passers-by and driving recklessly around the town in a manner that created fear in the minds of the residents. The violence forced many markets to abruptly close and prevented commercial motorcyclists and drivers from operating (Adebusuyi, 2014). Some of the drivers were arrested but later released despite the havoc they caused to both human lives and property. This is one instance of how the state influences drivers to engage in violent conflicts.

The barricading and sacking of members of Ekiti State’s House of Assembly Section 188 of the 1999 amended constitution of Nigeria empowers a state’s House of Assembly to remove the governor in a case of gross misconduct, and it is expected that this would be executed through a procedure outlined by the constitution. The 4th Assembly of Ekiti decided to carry out this constitutional function when the House members sat on 3rd March, 2015, resolving that governor Ayo Fayose had committed a certain number of offences, to which he needed to respond. Rather than respond to the issues, though, the governor rallied the commercial vehicle drivers, Okada9 riders, artisans, party supporters and the general public to act against the legislators. The commercial drivers took over the House of Assembly, driving away the workers and legislators. The actions of the drivers paralysed activities, including commercial ones, in the state capital for over two months. The drivers’ action was supported by the state government. People could not go to work, children could not go to school,

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traders could not go to the market, banks could not open for business and the state became a dangerous place in which to move about. This was vividly captured in the report by Ibekwe (2015): Although vehicular movements were not restricted in Ado-Ekiti, there were minimal commercial activities in the town as a large group of Mr Fayose’s supporters from three transport unions in the states gathered at the House of Assembly Complex in anticipation that the APC lawmakers would attempt to meet there.

The law-makers were effectively prevented from entering the chambers of the Assembly for the rest of their tenure. Suffice to say that the drivers were a stumbling block to effective performance of that arm of government, though, with the collusion of President Jonathan, administration was still carried out.

Unleashing mayhem over the death of Omolafe Aderiye At around 8:00pm on 25th September 2014, Omolafe Aderiye, one-time Chairman of the Drivers’ Union (NURTW), was assassinated in front of his office. Earlier in the day, Aderiye had led some drivers in attacking a State High Court judge, preventing the court from operating in Ado-Ekiti, allegedly on the orders of Ayo Fayose, the governor-elect on the platform of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Aderiye was in the office with Okeowo. One of his men later confirmed that his boss was severely shot at close range, in what was clearly intended to be an assassination. Aderiye died before getting to hospital. On 26th September 2014, members of his drivers’ union took over the streets of Ado-Ekiti, attacking every available object related to the All Progressives Congress (APC) or opponents of the late Aderiye. A respondent, Akintola, who was the personal assistant to the slain man, captured the situation as follows: There was pandemonium in the morning in Ado-Ekiti, the capital of Ekiti State when drivers and other members of the NURTW in Ado Ekiti, stormed the streets to raze the office of APC in the state over the death of their former chairman, Aderiye Omolafe, who was brutally murdered on Thursday in Ado Ekiti by four unknown gunmen. Notorious drivers in the state allegedly stormed the APC offices in Ado Ekiti including the Local Government party office at Ereguru and the Party Secretariat in their hundreds and burnt them to ashes. Metilo’s1 house at Oke Ila was also 1

Mentilo was the former leader of RTEAN, the rival union, when Aderiye was the leader of NURTW.

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On the above-mentioned date, all activities were paralysed, causing significant hardship for the people. With the government and its security agencies almost helpless, the drivers had a free day of destroying property worth hundreds of millions of Naira, as well as injuring large numbers of people. In an interview, a respondent stated that the Governor-elect, Ayo Fayose, had a hand in the aftermath violence when he (Fayose) described the crisis as ‘a clear reaction of the people to what is happening in town’ (personal communication, 2014). The crisis overwhelmed the capacity of the police and the Federal Troop had to be drafted in before the situation could be contained. A dawn to dusk curfew was imposed on the state capital to prevent a relapse of the gains of the military. The situation in the city was akin to war.

Drivers-students violence The drivers are also known to constantly engage in violent conflicts with students in the state capital. The non-residential nature of the state’s university means that the students live in the town and have to commute every day. In the absence of the university arranging viable transportation, the students have no option but to rely on commercial transportation. In turn, the drivers rely heavily on the students’ patronage for survival. It is essentially a symbiotic arrangement. The Student Union Government have an ongoing dialogue with the drivers, particularly regarding chargeable transport fares and other matters related to the drivers’ activities on campus. More often than not, disagreements about transport fares and the passenger capacity of the bus used for transportation are sources of conflict. The bus, tagged ‘Akoto’,13 measures about 8 feet long and 4.5 feet wide. Ordinarily, it should not take more than five people at once. However, the drivers have insisted on taking ten students, charging 100 Naira ($0.5) per trip (about 10 kilometres). This did not often go down well with the students, who felt cheated and requested to have a dialogue with the drivers, but this did not yield any fruitful results — the drivers always stuck to their guns. In the absence of any agreement, the students often tried to force their wishes on the drivers, resulting in violent conflicts between the two on several occasions. In the latest occurrence in 2015, one of the respondents captured the scenario thus: On the day of the incident, commercial bus drivers and students of Ekiti State University (EKSU), Ado Ekiti clashed over the numbers of

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passengers that should be on a seat row. In the melee that ensued, an official of the directorate of State Security, DSS, was manhandled. The students had protested that the drivers should reduce the number of passengers on board their bus from four to three per seat thus drawing the ire of the operators. The argument which began at the Bawa area along Ado – Iworoko Road soon snowballed into a free-for-all and caused traffic gridlock from Bawa to the University area. Some of the drivers brandished clubs, cudgels and sharp objects to scare passengers and motorists plying the road as they ordered the university students out of different vehicles conveying them to school. The drivers were equally armed with cutlasses, knives and charms (fieldwork, 2015).

On several occasions, the student-driver conflicts resulted in university closure for several days (if not weeks), to forestall further destruction of lives and property.

Attack on Hausa community On 20th May 2015, commercial drivers in Ado metropolis unleashed violence on the Hausa community in the central market and in the Atikankan Sabo area of the town. The violence was precipitated by allegations that the wife of a senior member of NURTW had been raped on the night of 19th May 2015, along Ijigbo Street in Ado-Ekiti. It was also assumed that the suspected perpetrator ran into the Atikankan area (the base of the Hausa community) of Ado-Ekiti, for refuge. It was further alleged that when the inhabitants of Atikankan were asked to produce the suspected perpetrator, they refused, using the excuse that they did not know the suspect and could not produce a ghost. The refusal of the Hausa residents to produce the suspect angered the drivers who then attacked the Hausa community (fieldwork, 2015). At the end of the mayhem, several Hausas were injured and property worth millions was destroyed. Atikankan — the economic heartland of the Hausa community in Ekiti State — was turned into a battleground. The violence spread like a wild fire through Erekesan market, the old garage, Mugbagba axis to Atikankan area, which is a converging point for Hausa traders in the state (Ogundele, 2015). The shops and business activities of the Hausa were destroyed. Later in the night, the main market was set ablaze, allegedly by the Hausa on a revenge mission. In addition to the toll on lives and property, the attacks affected trading activities, transportation business, banking operations, and the education of children, as schools were forced to close down for the period. A number of the Hausa community were displaced and they had to be evacuated by the state government to a camp at the new Sasa market (fieldwork, 2015).

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Implications When commercial vehicle drivers engage in violence, the consequences are better imagined than experienced. As can be seen in some of the instances described above, it is imperative to categorise the implications of the violent dispositions of commercial vehicle drivers, for the purpose of analysis. This shall be done under five sub-headings.

1. Economic implications Transportation is a major part of the economic life of people in any given state. Whenever this aspect of life is disrupted, it has adverse effects on every aspect of the system. Drivers’ violence always comes with devastating implications that paralyse the system. This is because the unemployed youth use the drivers’ crisis to loot, rob, steal, vandalise, and destroy. As a result of this, all commercial activities are affected, creating serious economic challenges which make it difficult for people to engage in serious economic activities.

2. Security implications The drivers’ violence crisis clearly poses a threat to the security of lives and property. The extent of the violence and the impunity that follows is enough for us to question the capacity of the state to maintain order. In the course of this research, we found that drivers were hardly ever prosecuted for these heinous offences. A key informant (who is also a senior security officer) posited that: The policemen are handicapped in most cases of drivers’ violent acts because they are partners to politicians. In those cases, lives are lost, properties destroyed, people displaced and serious psychological challenges are created to victims of these dastardly acts. There is nothing the police can do without the required directive (personal communication, 2015).

This statement and the drivers’ actions clearly show that Nigeria is faced with serious security challenges which require a total overhauling of the security system.

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3. Implications for governance Section 14 (sub-section 1(b)) of the Constitution of Nigeria states that ‘the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.’ Indeed, a state that fails in this respect is considered a failed state. The persistent drivers’ violence in Ekiti questions the affairs of governance in the state insofar as they relate to curbing the excesses of the commercial vehicle drivers, though it is on record that Lagos State was able to reform her transportation sector by weeding out the touts who, in the past, presented themselves as problematic in numerous respects. The question then is: if Lagos was able to do it, why not others? This brings us to the conclusion that it was deliberate. Research findings show that state governments often encourage the lawlessness of the drivers for political reasons. This stems from the fact that commercial drivers can effectively be used for political violence during election time. Therefore, successful governments court and finance them for the election period.

4. Education implications Drivers’ violence affects the education of children. Sometimes, pupils are caught in the crossfire, which has led to their injuries and even death. The sight of violence that has occurred in the metropolis affects the pupils psychologically, besides the physical injuries caused. In a number of instances, schools have had to close down to guarantee the safety of their pupils. This clearly affects their academic progress.

5. Social implications The phenomenon of drivers’ violence in the state also has social implications as it affects social cohesion and peaceful coexistence. For example, when ethnic groups are targeted and attacked — as in the case of violence against the Hausa community in 2015 — it is a recipe for interethnic conflicts within the state. To a large extent, the drivers’ violence that took place between May 20th and 24th 2015 almost resulted into an intense ethnic conflict between the Yoruba and the Hausa. It took the understanding of the Hausa that it was an attack against them by the drivers and not the Yoruba as an ethnic group to prevent reprisals in the northern part of the country, as would usually happen.

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Conclusion This chapter has been devoted to an analysis of commercial driver-induced violence in Nigeria, using Ekiti State as a study. The study is situated within the general framework of urban violence because the activities of the group are mostly concentrated in the cities. It uses Mary Kaldor’s theoretical concept of new war as a frame of analysis. Specifically, it argues that the activities of commercial drivers constitute a form of new war in the Nigerian state, which is under-studied in the literature. It argues that the drivers have become a major source of conflict and have been responsible for the deaths of a number of people and the destruction of property, among other consequences that have been identified in the study. Images of a cutlass- and cudgel-bearing group parading the streets of the state capital are common and, in the Ado metropolis, it is frequently the case that people have to hurriedly close their shops or scamper for safety. The violence often catches people unaware because the crises have sometimes been spontaneous reactions to increases in transport fares, disagreements over motor parks, inter-union disagreements, or politicallydriven. During such violence, members of the general public often become victims. Findings also show that the state is complicit in the perpetration of the violence and, by implication, found wanting in the management of the excesses of the drivers. As argued in the study, this attitude is largely due to the state political leaders’ tendency to establish relationships with the leadership of the unions for political reasons. In essence, the political patronage of the government enjoyed by the drivers is a major reason that the group continues to be a nuisance. A solution to the problem of the commercial drivers should start at state level. As argued, state patronage plays a significant role in the impunity of the drivers. Therefore, the state needs to put forward a robust policy to tackle the menace. Part of this is the need to take over the management of the parks. The establishment of motor parks is basically a state issue, backed by relevant laws and edicts. It therefore behoves the government to attend to the effective governing of the space. However, in Nigeria, it is becoming clearer by the day that motor parks are grossly ungoverned by the state, leaving the commercial drivers to fill the vacuum and operate under their own laws. This ‘management’ involves the collection of rates and levies at the parks. Currently, all levies that are supposed to go into the state’s purse end up in the pockets of the motor park leadership. This accounts for the sit tight syndrome in the parks, which is a recipe for violence and bloodletting.

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Another way to resolve the issue is proper intelligence-gathering by the security forces. Most of the time, security forces are reactionary rather than proactive. A proper intelligence-gathering system will know when crises are brewing and effectively nip them in the bud. Added to this is the need for regular education and the sensitisation of the drivers in their duties and obligations to the state and the citizens they are servicing. Lastly, a major solution would be for political contractors to stop courting the drivers for nefarious political ends. At this point, the drivers will no longer see themselves as indispensible to the political process.

References Adebusuyi, D. (2014), ‘Ekiti 2014: Bamidele’s rally disrupted’, Daily Trust, 20 September, http://dailytrust.com.ng/daily/index.php/politics/5950-ekiti-2014bamidele-s-rally-disrupted (accessed 10 January 2016). Adeyemi, M. (2015), ‘Ekiti APC kicks as police arrest ex-RTEAN boss, Olanbiwonu’, Nigerian Guardian, 28 July, http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/07/ekiti-apc-kicks-as-policearrest-ex-rtean-boss-olanbiwonu/ (accessed 15 November 2015). Adisa, J. (1997), ‘Lagos: Street culture and families in the street’, in Herault, G. and Adesanmi, P. (eds.), Youth, street culture and urban violence in Africa, Ibadan: IFRA. Ahmad R. (2015), ‘Road transport employers kick against merger with NURTW’, The Nation, 20 August, http://www.thenationonlineng.net/archive2/tblnews.Details.php?id=46 575 (accessed 02 December 2015). Ajaegbo, D. (2013), ‘Road transport entrepreneurs and road transportation revolution in Igboland, 1920-1999: A case study of the Nnewi Igbo of Nigeria’, African Research Review, vol.7, no.4, pp.162-173. Ajayi, O. (2015), ‘Ibadan NURTW Members on rampage over alleged extortion by leaders’, Vanguard, 26 June, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/06/ibadan-nurtw-members-onrampage-over-alleged-extortion-by-leaders (accessed 05 December 2015). Akintola, S. (2014), ‘Riots in Ekiti as drivers protest murder of ExNURTW Chairman’ The Street Journal, 26 September, http://thestreetjournal.org/2014/09/riots-in-ekiti-as-drivers-protestmurder-of-ex-nurtw-chairman/ (accessed 15 September 2016). Akinyemi D. (2015), ‘11 remanded over Kwara NURTW, RTEAN clash’ Vanguard, 6 August, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/08/11-remandedover-kwara-nurtw-rtean-clash/ (accessed December 2015).

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Albert, I.O. (2007), ‘Between the state and transporter unions: NURTW and politics of managing public motor parks in Ibadan and Lagos, Nigeria’, in L. Fourchard (ed.), Gouverner les villes d’Afrique, etat gouvernement ocal et acteurs prives, Karthala et CEAN, pp.125-138. Animasahun, G.A. (2013), Godfatherism in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: The pyramid of violence and political insecurity in Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria, IFRA Nigeria E-papers No. 27-29, March 2013. Bolashodun O. (2015), ‘Doctors, nurses at Ekiti hospitals attacked by thugs”, Naij online, 5 May http://www.naij.com/432534-doctors- nursesat-ekiti-hospitals-attacked-by-thugs.html (accessed 15 November 2015). Ezeobi, C. (2012), ‘Another bloody day in Lagos as NURTW clash claim 10’, Thisday, 21 February, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/another-bloody-day-in-lagos-asnurtw-clash-claim-10/109745 (accessed 12 December 2015). FGN (2014), Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 CAP. C23. L.F.N file:///C:/Users/AKBABA2/Downloads/constitution-ofthe-federal-republic-of-nigeria.pdf (accessed 15 January 2016). Gussing, A. (2012), ’Opening address’, in Apraxine, P., Duquenne, A., Fetta, S. and Helly, D. (eds.), Urban violence and humanitarian challenges, EUISS-ICRC Colloquium, Brussels. Ibekwe, N. (2015), ‘Ekiti Crisis: Schools shut, civil servants desert offices, as Okada riders, commercial drivers invade Assembly complex’, 20 April http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/181742-ekiticrisis-schools-shut-civil-servants-desert-offices-as-okada-riderscommercial-drivers-invade-assembly-complex.html (accessed 14 January 2016). Ikelegbe, A. (2001), ‘The perverse manifestation of civil society: evidence from Nigeria’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, pp 1-24. Kaldor, M. (1996), New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era, Oxford: Polity Press. Kayode-Adedeji D. (2013), ‘Nine persons injured, 20 vehicles destroyed in Ogun motor parks clashes’, Premium Times, 14 February, http://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/ssouth-west/120349-ninepersons-injured-20-vehicles-destroyed-in-ogun-motor-parks-clashes/ (accessed 14 Dec 2015). Koonings, K. (2012), ‘Definitions and trends of urban violence’, in Apraxine, P., Duquenne, A., Fetta, S. and Helly, D. (eds.), Urban violence and humanitarian challenges, Brussels: EUISS-ICRC Colloquium.

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Nejo, A. (2014), ‘Ekiti burns over killing of ex-NURTW boss,’ National Mirror, 27 September, 27http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/ekitiburns-over-killing-of-ex-nurtw-boss/ (accessed 15 January 2016). Mose, C. and Mcllwaine, C. (2014), ‘New frontiers in 21st Century urban conflict and violence’, Environment and Urbanization, Brief 30. Nejo, A. (2015), ‘DSS personnel attacked as drivers, students clash in Ekiti’, The Nation, 14 February, http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/dss-personnel-attacked-as-driversstudents-clash-in-ekiti/ (15 September 2015). Nwagwu, J. (2014), ‘RTEAN election: President urges members to eschew violence’, NAN News, 28 October, http://www.nannewsnigeria.com/rtean-election-president-urgesmembers-to-eschew-violence/ (accessed 28 December 2015). Offiong, V.E. et al. (2015), ‘An assessment of touting activities in selected urban motor parks in Ibadan metropolis’, Journal of Environment and Earth Science, vol. 5, no.9. Ogundele K. (2015), ‘Drivers, traders clash in Ekiti’, Punch, 20 May, http://www.punchng.com/news/mayhem-in-ekiti-as-drivers-tradersclash/ (accessed 4 December 2015). Ogunmola O. (2015), ‘Ekiti mayhem and agony of non-indigenes’, The Nation, 27 May, http://thenationonlineng.net/new/ekiti-mayhem-andagony-of-non- indigenes/ (8 November 2015). Oladipo, O.O. (2012), ‘The Nigerian motor transporters since the 1920s’, International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences vol.2, no.12, pp.230-237. Olesin, A. (2015), ‘Court remanded 11 Over NURTW, RTEAN workers’ clash’, Leadership, 6 August, http://www.leadership.ng/news/452166/court-remanded-11-overnurtw-rtean-workers-clash/ (accessed 6 December 2015). Olubomehin O. (2012), ‘Road Transportation as Lifeline of the Economy’ in Western Nigeria, 1920-1952’, African Journal of History and Culture, vol. 4, no. 3, p.37. Omobowale A.O. and Olutayo A.O. (2007), ‘Chief Lamidi Adedibu and patronage politics in Nigeria’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 45, no.3, pp. 425-446. Omobowale, A.O. and Fayiga, O.O. (2015), ‘Commercial motor drivers in governance: Democratization, transport unions and violence in Southwestern Nigeria’, A paper presented at the conference on Between Democracy and Big Man Politics: the Micro-Level Dynamics of Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic Africa Institute, 23-24 October 2015.

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Popoola, Y. (2014), ‘Many injured, as police, drivers’ union stop Bamidele’s rally in Ekiti’, Daily Independent, 19 September, http://dailyindependentnig.com/2013/09/many-injured-as-policedrivers-union-topbamideles-rally-in-ekiti/ (accessed 12 January 2016). Sulaiman T. (2007), ‘NURTW, RTEAN Clash in Ado-Ekiti’, This Day, 28 September, http://www.thisdaylive.com/Articles/drivers-unions-clashin-ado-ekiti/99779 (accessed 30 June 2015). Ugwueze U. (2015), ‘NURTW, RTEAN trade words over extortion, violence,’ Orient Daily, 14 August, http://www.nigerianorientnews.com/nurtw-rtean-trade-wordsoveextortion-violence/ (accessed 14 August 2015). Vandershuren, F. (1996), ‘Urban violence: Justice and insecurity in cities’, Environment and Urbanization, vol. 28, no.4. Vasconcelos, A. (2012), ‘Welcoming remarks’ in Apraxine, P., Duquenne, A., Fetta, S. and Helly, D. (eds.), Urban violence and humanitarian challenges, Brussels: EUISS-ICRC Colloquium.

CHAPTER EIGHT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT: AN APPRAISAL ABDUL-WASI BABATUNDE MOSHOOD

Introduction The Niger Delta region is the main source of Nigeria’s abundant oil and gas resources. The revenue generated from the region accounts for over 80% of its foreign earnings (Davidheiser and Nyiayaana, 2011). Ironically, the people of Niger Delta have experienced little benefit from the enormous wealth the region provides for the country: they live in one of the poorest and least developed areas of the country, with unemployment at over 70%, which is almost double the national average of 40% (see Davidheiser and Nyiayaana, 2011; Idemudia, 2009). The political economy of oil and the insensitive nature of previous regimes have exposed the region to land degradation and pollution through the unregulated activities of the oil multinationals. The implication of this is that the people whose means of survival are mainly agriculture and fishing, have been systematically uprooted and deprived of their basic sources of livelihoods. The environmental pollution and degradation also impacts on the life expectancy of the people in the region which, having previously produced its own food and water, now depends on food importation. People travel several miles to the city in order to access the goods to meet their basic needs (Ahonsi, 2011). From the outset it is clear that the people of Niger Delta experience poverty in the midst of abundant oil-wealth. This paradox is at the heart of the conflict that characterises the region, especially since 1999 when Nigeria returned to civilian rule. The people of the Niger Delta have

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demanded an end to the deplorable state of the region, and have requested employment opportunities for local people in the oil industry and an equitable revenue allocation formula. There have been several forms of local peaceful protest since the 1960s. However, the ineffectiveness of this later changed the dynamics of the struggle from a peaceful protest into a violent struggle. Successive governments at the federal level have intervened in one way or another to stem the spate of violence in the region, as well as address the developmental challenges. These interventions range from persecution in the form of military diplomacy to pacification. This is what Frynas (2001) refers to as concession, repression and public relations. Similarly, as Aghalino (2009) observes, the Nigerian state has adopted three main strategies to address the conflict in the Niger Delta: the institutional approach (the establishment of commissions); the legislative approach (the making of relevant laws); and the military approach. According to Shoremekun (2012), the most recent of these strategies is based on cooptation which is characterised by a system of appointing certain elites in the Niger Delta to strategic positions and awarding them worthwhile contracts. These interventions have apparently failed to address the hydraheaded conflict because of the government’s lethargy, weak capacity, and several other complications, including a lack of political will to address the conflict. Hence, failure on the part of the government to realise ab initio that the Niger Delta issues are salient and require strong political resolve, explains in part why the conflict has lingered for so long and seems intractable. This chapter focuses essentially on various intervention efforts on the part of the federal government of Nigeria and the reason why they failed. This is necessary because understanding the various hindrances to resolving the conflict in the Niger Delta in the past will provide us with hindsight from which to strengthen the present discourse on how certain mechanisms can be utilised to guarantee sustainable peace in the region. Cicero was reported to have said: ‘not to know what happened in history is to ever remain a child […] to make the same mistakes as of old […] and to invent old discoveries and think they are new’ (cited in Osokoya, 1995: 18). The management of the conflict in the Niger Delta has gone through different phases, which are categorised in this study for ease of reference and in accordance with the period the intervention was initiated.

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The Early Attempt to Manage the Conflict, 1958-1990 The first attempt at responding to emerging issues in the Niger Delta came up at the turn of independence. The people of Niger Delta feared the dominance of the major ethnic groups and were apprehensive that they may not have a voice in the emerging state. This concern was expressed in the 1957 constitutional conference which took place in London. In response to the minority ethnic group, a commission of inquiry was set up by the colonial government, which was headed by Sir Henry Willink, to look into the peculiar developmental needs of the Niger Delta region and the clamour for the creation of a separate state. Although the creation of a separate state was not granted, the government later established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) to look into the developmental challenges of the region. This was based on the recommendation of the Commission, which submitted its report in 1958. According to Aigbokhan (2007: 244), the Commission recommended as follows: a. The development of a special area should be placed on the concurrent list. i. The special area should be created in the Niger Delta region to cover the Rivers Province except Ahoada and Port Harcourt, and including the Western Ijaw Division. A board with a federal chairman should be created for the special area to which the Federal, western and eastern region should contribute funds and staff for the purpose of a survey of the particular problems of the special area, and which would be the draw up plans for its development. b. The board should initiate schemes to supplement the normal development of the special area which should be carried out by the government concerned. c. The federal government contribution being one-third of the capital cost and one-third of the recurrent cost for periods which may extend to ten years. d. A report regarding the plans made by the board and the progress made in carrying them out should be laid annually on the tables of the Federal House of Representatives and the western and eastern Houses of Assembly. The existence of any special area should be reviewed continually. As soon as the features that made it a special area are reduced, the need to terminate the special area status or to convert it to a minority area should be considered.

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The Tafawa Balewa government established the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) with an Act of Parliament in 1961, to fulfil the above needs. The Board, however, could not provide any meaningful development for the Niger Delta region due to factors including failure to include the indigenous Niger Delta people, who actually expressed their needs and feared being dominated by the majority groups; funding; intense regional politics where the focus on development was based on individual regions rather than the collective. Furthermore, there was obvious lethargy on the part of the government with a lack of commitment to provide a prompt response to the developmental problem in the region (Obi, 2009; Adeyeri 2012; Aigbokhan, 2007). Above all, the Board ceased to operate when the Federal Military Government came to power in 1966, having suspended the country's constitution and abolished the regional autonomy previously enjoyed by the then regional governments. On the eve of the civil war (1967-1970), the military government created more states from the existing four, thereby making the country a Federation of 12 states. The Niger Delta then had three (Mid-Western state, Rivers state, Southeastern state) of the twelve states created. This move was to enable the military government to have a firm grip on the region. It also meant that the then eastern region would not be able to lay exclusive claim to the oil resources in the region. Hence, the creation of states was a good political/war strategy during the civil war. The move also served as compensation for the Niger Deltans for fighting on the side of the Federal government. Isaac Adaka Boro, a retired police officer who led the twelve-day revolution against the Nigerian state in 1966, participated in the civil war on the part of the Federal government. Some scholars argue that the reason behind this was to ensure the liberation of the Niger Deltans from the eastern region domination, who are in the majority. Moreover, for the people of the Niger Delta to gain autonomy, a unified Nigeria had to become a reality (Obi, 2009; and Idemudia, 2009). The move, according to Idemudia (2009), helped to calm the people of the Niger Delta so that they could live a peaceful existence for a reasonable period in the 1980s. Idemudia further argues that this move serves as an assurance that the Nigerian state was ready to include the Niger Delta in the affairs of the region and allowed it to have substantial control over its resources. Contrary to expectations, the failure on the part of the federal government to devolve the envisaged autonomy to the region and improve the socio-economic conditions, explains in part the violent dimension of the agitation (see Obi 2014; Idemudia 2009).

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It should be noted that in 1969, the federal government promulgated the Petroleum Decree, which vested the state with control of oil exploitation and laid the foundations for the relegation of the principle of derivation as the basis for allocation of federal revenue. The implications of this decree were that the Niger Delta people could not challenge in court any unregulated activities of the oil multinationals, and if there was need for compensation due to oil spillage, it was only the state government that could determine who gets what. Tactically, the Decree rendered the people helpless, and gave all the powers of land ownership to the state. In the same vein, the military regime of General Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1979) established ten River Basin Development Authorities (RBDAs), via Decree 87 of 1979, in all parts of the country, even in places where no rivers existed. Its objectives as stated in Schedule 4 of the Act included: a) to undertake comprehensive development of both surface and underground water resources for multipurpose use with particular emphasis on the provision of irrigation infrastructure, the control of floods and erosion, and for watershed management; b) to construct, operate and maintain dams, dykes, polders, wells, boreholes, irrigation and drainage systems, and other works necessary for the achievement of the Authority's functions and hand over all lands to be cultivated under the irrigation scheme to the farmers; c) to supply water from the Authority's completed storage schemes to all users for a fee to be determined by the Authority concerned, with the approval of the Minister; d) to construct, operate and maintain infrastructural services such as roads and bridges linking project sites: provided that such infrastructural services are included and form an integral part of the list of approved projects; e) to develop and keep up-to-date a comprehensive water resources master plan, identifying all water resource requirements in the authority's area of operation, through the adequate collection and collation of water resources, water use, and socio-economic and environmental data from the river basin (RBDAs ACT, 1979: 3). It is worth noting that the regime proceeded to fund the additional RBDAs much more than the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA), which was already saddled with the same responsibility. This, of course, angered the Niger Delta people and it was seen as a deliberate attempt to

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cripple the development of their area. This ignited another round of protests, particularly as the Niger Delta had by that time become the economic nerve centre of Nigeria, as a result of the oil boom of the 1970s (Adeyeri, 2012: 102). President Shehu Shagari’s administration responded to the problem of the emerging youth restlessness in the region by making sure the principle of derivation that was already in place was adequately implemented. Before the advent of oil, the derivation principle1 was 50% to the state or region where such revenue is derived. The derivation principle during this time held that each region (then the eastern, western and the northern regions) would receive allocation from the federal revenue in proportion to what the region produced. With the discovery of oil, the principle of derivation was gradually jettisoned and the principle of need was emphasised. This suggests a system of allocation where federal allocation was based on the extent of the needs of each region. The Niger Deltans found the new allocation system unacceptable and unfair. In addition to payment of 1.5% derivation, the Shagari-led government created a Presidential Task Force to manage the fund. However, the amount allocated was considered to be grossly inadequate, which heightened the level of disaffection in the region (Etekpe, 2009; Obi 2009; Idemudia, 2009). During the period under review, the government used an admixture of both concession and military diplomacy (persecution). The establishment of the NDDB, the creation of states, the establishment of river basins, the restoration of the derivation principles, and promulgations of the decree were all methods used to respond to the Niger Delta’s needs. All these policy interventions have, from the outset, exposed the lack of willingness on the part of the government and continue to add to the grievances of the Niger Delta people.

1

In the Nigerian context, derivation means that, in addition to the regular federal statutory transfer, some proportion of the revenues collected from a federating unit should be returned to the government of that unit (see Babalola, 2014). Accordingly, the littoral states of the Niger Delta are, in addition to the statutory allocation from the centre, also entitled to 13% from Nigeria’s oil revenues, according to the 1999 constitution. Babalola (2014) notes that there have always been issues around derivation principles in Nigeria’s fiscal federalism. The principle was dominant in the country’s sharing formula until the early 1970s when oil rents crept into the country’s national revenue. According to him, the principle witnessed a progressive decline from 1970 when it was put at 25%, to 3% towards the terminal end of military rule in 1999 (Babalola, 2014: 121).

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The 1990s promised to be compensatory. It was believed that the economic importance of oil and the continued agitation from the Niger Delta people would result in the government learning lessons and improving on previous policies. However, even though there were incremental policy innovations and slight improvements, the response was not enough to prevent the level of degeneration the region witnessed and this contributed to the escalation of conflict.

The Force and Conciliation Approach, 1990-1999 During this period, Babangida’s government adopted a combination of force and conciliation in the Niger Delta issue. In the 1990s, the regime repressed popular protests in Umuechem through military bombardment, which resulted in massive loss of life and the destruction of property (personal communication, 2014). In July 1993 and April 1994, the government and oil companies orchestrated violence against the Ogoni, through a military expedition — the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force embarked on a series of raids on Ogoni villages. These raids were characterised by flagrant human rights abuses including extra-judicial executions, indiscriminate shootings, arbitrary arrests and detention, rape, looting, and extortion (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Two Nigerian soldiers’ reports for Human Rights Watch described their participation in clandestine military raids designed to appear like communal clashes. Shell officials admitted to Human Rights Watch that they had requested the assistance of the military government to protect their oil installations. Human Rights Watch reported that even after Shell suspended production in the Ogoni area in mid-1993 (due to increasing local and international protests), the abuses set in motion by relying on military protection still continued (Human Rights Report, 1995). Human Rights Watch further confirmed that military occupation, agitating oil communities and harassing those who were protesting the injustices in the areas became common — a view corroborated by Isumona (Isumona, 2003). The government’s use of military repression was notable in the Egbena crisis (1989-1991), Oburu violence (1989), the Bonny Ijugba Square tragedy (1992), the Egi-Obaji Mayhem (1994), the Tai-Biara massacre (reportedly sponsored by Wilbrose, a servicing company to Shell (1994)), and the Ubima tragedy of 1995 (Ovwasa, 1999 cited in Adeyeri, 2012: 104). Notwithstanding the military action, the agitation in the Niger Delta region continued unabated. Coupled with the failure of previous intervention efforts by the government, it informed the need to accede to some of the

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demands of the people. In 1992, the government therefore increased the derivation formula from 1.5% to 3% and created the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC). The aim of this organisation was to boost the infrastructural development of the region. OMPADEC’s major task was to judiciously administer the 3% (N13.6 billion in 1998) allocation and coordinate development projects in the oilproducing communities (Agbu 2005; Frynas 2001; and Ovwasa 1999). According to Omotola (2007: 79), its major responsibilities were: a) To receive and administer the monthly sums from the allocation of the Federation account in accordance with confirmed oil-production ratio in each state: i. for rehabilitating and developing oil-mineral-producing areas; ii. for tackling ecological problems that have arisen from the exploration of oil minerals; b) To determine and identify, through the commission and the oilmineral-producing states, the actual oil-mineral-producing areas and foster the development of projects agreed upon with local communities in those areas. With the establishment of OMPADEC and the increased federal allocation to the region, it was envisaged that most of the Delta's environmental concerns could be appropriately dealt with. At an earlier stage, the Commission was involved in improving the education of people in the area, but the achievements were lower than expected (Gabriel, 1999: 95). Contrary to expectations, this Commission also performed woefully because of rampant corruption (Okumagba and Okereka, 2012). Although it carried out some projects, such as building schools and providing electricity and pipe-borne water in the communities, most of its funds were misappropriated. Alluding to the corruption in the agency, Frynas (2001) reported that the first two sole administrators of the OMPADEC — Albert K. Horsfall and Professor Eric Opia — were dismissed because of corruption-related cases. Opia was removed in September 1998 for his inability to account for N6.7 billion (an estimate then of USD $80 million) (Frynas, 2001: 38). Omotola (2007) argued that OMPADEC was known ‘for its wastefulness, massive mismanagement and corruption’ and that the situation worsened partly due to the lack of an appropriate regulatory mechanism. Equally, Sanya (2006) argued that in the first three years of its existence, OMPADEC committed itself to projects worth $500 million, but that the bulk of the money paid out for ‘completed’ projects was to contractors whose addresses could not be traced. Other major problems

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with OMPADEC included the inadequacy of its funds and its eventual politicisation. The federal government reportedly withheld about N41 billion that was due to go to the Commission, while the agency only received N20 billion in the six years that it really functioned (IRIN, 1999). There was also a general feeling among the Delta people that OMPADEC was not representing their interests and only marked another arm of the federal government’s bureaucracy (Omotola 2007: 79). The Abacha government (1993-1998) — which marks another era in the government’s management of the Niger Delta crisis — was extreme in its ruthless repression of popular agitations in the Niger Delta. The regime stationed what Adeyeri (2012) called an ‘army of occupation’ in the oilproducing communities to suppress protesting youths, individuals and groups through brutal force, with the aim of maintaining a free flow of oil for export. Environmental, minority and human rights activists in the area were often harassed, arrested and incarcerated indefinitely without trial, or even murdered by the government (Adejumobi, 2005 cited in Adeyeri, 2012: 101). The Ogoni revolt2 that followed the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other Ogoni nationalists in 1995 compelled the oil companies in the Niger Delta to establish the Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES), with the aim of assessing the environmental conditions in the region and making suggestions for ameliorating the hardship of the people in the oil communities. However, violent agitations continued because the issues that originally gave rise to them still remained. The establishment of OMPADEC, NDES and state repression could not prevent the agitations of the Deltans. Rather than reducing discontent in the Delta, OMPADEC and NDES appear to have increased it. With the failure of these commissions to make a meaningful impact on environmental and developmental concerns, the search for alternative institutional measures that could adequately address the environmental and ecological degradation of the area, continued. This later resulted into the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC).

2

Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists were alleged to have incited the youth in the region, which led to the death of some oil workers in the Ogoni land. Their grievances were that the oil exploration activities of the oil multinationals continued to destroy the land and hence deprived the people of their basic subsistence.

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Managing the Conflict in the Democratic Era: The Pre-Amnesty Phase Following the return of Nigeria to civilian rule in 1999, the Obasanjo-led federal government (1999-2007) came up with a potentially lasting solution to the Niger Delta conflict. In his assumption of office, Obasanjo sent a bill to the National Assembly to establish the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The bill, however, received much criticism, especially from the Deltans, on the grounds that the major stakeholders were not involved in the drafting of the bill. However, the bill was eventually passed in 2000. The mandate of the NDDC was comprehensive, although it was essentially limited to addressing the environmental and developmental concerns of the Delta. The essential provisions of the Commission as stated in Section 7 of the Act include: a) Formulate policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger-Delta area; b) Conceive, plan and implement, in accordance with set rules and regulations, projects and programmes for the sustainable development of the Niger-Delta area in the field of transportation including roads, jetties and waterways, health, education, employment, industrialisation, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water supply; electricity and telecommunications; c) Cause the Niger-Delta area to be surveyed in order to ascertain measures which are necessary to promote its physical and socioeconomic development; d) Prepare master plans and schemes designed to promote the physical development of the Niger-Delta area and the estimates of the costs of implementing such master plans and schemes; e) Implement all the measures approved for the development of the Niger-Delta area by the Federal Government and the member States of the Commission; f) Identify factors inhibiting the development of the Niger-Delta area to assist the member States in the formulation and implementation of policies to ensure sound and efficient management of the resources of the Niger-Delta area; g) Assess and report on any project being funded or carried out in the Niger Delta area by oil and gas producing companies and any other company including non-governmental organisations, and ensure that funds released for such projects are properly utilised;

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h) Tackle ecological and environmental problems that arise from the exploration of oil minerals in the Niger Delta area and advise the federal government and the member states on the prevention and control of oil spillages, gas flaring and environmental pollution: a. Liaise with the various oil mineral and gas prospecting and producing companies on all matters of pollution prevention and control; and i) Execute such other works and perform such other functions which, in the opinion of the Commission, are required for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta area and its people (NDDC ACT, 2000: 103). The basic mandate of the Commission was to coordinate a development plan in the region. It was also empowered to access the contributions made by each of its member states, to achieve this plan. In this regard, the Act also provided other sources of funding, including the statutory allocations from the Federation’s account (i.e. the general account where all revenues accruing to the Federation are deposited before being allocated to the three tiers of government in accordance with constitutional provisions). Section 14 of the Act provided that all stakeholders in the Delta area and oil companies should support financing the NDDC. For instance, it stipulated that the federal government would contribute 15% of the total monthly statutory allocations that were due to member states of the Commission, from the Federation account (NDDC ACT, 2000). Oil-producing and gas-processing companies operating onshore and offshore in the Delta were mandated to pay 3% of their total annual budgets to the Commission (NDDC ACT, 2000). With these sources of potential income for the Commission, it was expected that it would have enormous financial resources at its disposal. The Commission also recognised that effective regulatory mechanisms were sine qua non for the effective discharge of its duties. This was addressed by providing monitoring and accountability mechanisms for the Commission. Section 18 of the Act stated that the President should always present the annual budgets to the National Assembly for approval, and should keep a proper book of accounts which must be audited at specified intervals. It equally empowered the President to appoint a monitoring committee to monitor the management of the Commission's funds and the execution of its projects; they would have unhindered access to the Commission's accounts and other records and would be expected to submit periodic reports to the President (NDDC ACT, 2000).

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These provisions created a feeling of hope that the NDDC would provide a real solution to the problems facing the Niger Delta region. As Okumagba and Okereka (2012) note, the Commission was saddled with the task of implementing a comprehensive development master plan in the region. Omotola (2007) reports that between 2002 and 2003, the NDDC executed 810 projects in different parts of the region. Okumagba and Okereka (2012) state that the focus of the Commission since inception has being on quick impact projects (QIP) such as education, regional power supplies, road construction, human capital development, health, jetties and agriculture (see also Aghalino, 2009). According to Aghalino (2009), an assessment of the activities of the Commission has shown that, in ten years, it has engaged in programmes that it claims have impacted on all strata of human life in the Niger Delta. Within the ten years of its operation, it recorded expansive achievements: it awarded a whopping 3,112 life-enhancing infrastructural projects across the 112,110 kilometres that make up the region. Out of this staggering figure, 1,412 projects have been completed and commissioned (Aghalino, 2009: 45). However, Omotola (2007) has expressed reservations that, in spite of these huge projects being carried out, the Commission has not been able to significantly impact on the social and environmental development of the region. He further states that some of the official claims of the projects may be fictitious or exaggerated and that, where projects were actually executed, they were public relations exercises (Omotola, 2007). Table 1 shows some of the projects executed by NDDC between 2002 and 2003. Consequently, with this in mind, measuring the effectiveness of NDDC presents us with what Omotola (2007) called a measurement dilemma. The popular view, according to scholars like Jack-Akhibge, Omotola, and Aghalino, is that the NDDC has failed to live up to expectations and thus does not have any more relevance in the development discourse of the region. Despite the discontented view about the operations of the Commission, a group of people (predominantly traditional rulers) are supporting the Commission. These people are referred to as collaborators of the government and oil multinationals. What matters to them most, then, is their own selfish interest. Omotola states that ‘opinions are sharply divided regarding the effectiveness of the NDDC in discharging its responsibilities, and a large proportion of available views on the issue are negative’ (Omotola, 2007: 83).

2002 projects 402 9 130 1 41 40 91 714

Source: Omotola (2007: 82).

Building Canalisation Electrification Flood control Jetty Roads/Bridges Water Grand Total

Project type

2003 projects 15 9 24 0 6 18 24 96

Completed projects 316 0 125 1 32 20 76 570

Commissionable projects 275 0 106 1 31 12 70 495

Commissioned projects 138 0 46 0 11 4 21 220

Summary of Projects Executed by the NDDC in various sectors between 2002 and 2003

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Total no. of projects 417 18 154 1 47 58 115 810

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Some views within the region further suggested that the NDDC has been underproductive and ineffective. This view has been so strong that, in an advocacy workshop on oil revenue management and budget monitoring in Niger Delta states held on 22nd December 2004 and chaired by Gordon Abiama of the Centre for Geo-Classical Studies, Yenegoa, Bayelsa State passed a vote of no confidence in the NDDC. The majority of its attendees called for an outright scrapping of the NDDC, while only a few maintained that the federal government should strengthen it. The workshop’s communiqué called for the NDDC to be scrapped for its alleged inefficiency, corrupt dispositions, and unresponsiveness to the plight of the people (African Network for Environment and Economic Justice, 2004, cited in Omotola, 2007: 83). In a similar vein, Jack-Akhigbe (2013) reported several abandoned or poor quality projects in the region: In Ebedie and Umutu communities in Ukwani Local Government Area of the Delta State and Ologbo in Ikpoba Okhia Local Government Area of Edo State, as a result of poor execution, none of the facilities provided by the Niger Delta Development Commission has made any appreciable impact on the people’s lives. Although there are overhead water tanks with taps in different locations, the taps do not flow. In these communities, the bulk of the people still depend on the streams for their main source of supply. Also a multimillion Naira hospital project initiated by the same Commission at Ologbo, has been abandoned for several years. To the community this facility is more of a monument than a development project (Jack-Akhigbe, 2013: 259).

Similarly, the present researcher also noticed some abandoned projects in Umuechem village in Port Harcourt on his visit. The people in the area informed the researcher that some of the projects, even those that have been completed, have been abandoned and not put into use for close to a decade. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the NDDC, despite the number of developmental projects it was involved in, has clearly failed to live up to expectations. The rising conflict and incessant break down of law and order in the region are clear testimonies of the disappointment in the NDDC. This situation is not unconnected to the inherent problems with which the Commission contends. First, the Commission suffers from financial limitations. Chief Onyema Ugochukwu, the former Chairman of the Commission, noted that comprehensive development of the region would require more than N400 billion (NDDC, 2004, cited in Omotola,

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2007: 83). As of October 2004, the NDDC had spent N80 billion. Moreover, oil companies in the Delta have not been contributing the statutory 3% of their annual budget to the NDDC. Furthermore, the states in the Niger Delta have not been fully responsive in their contributions to the Commission (Ojameruaye, 2004, cited in Omotola, 2007: 84). Corruption remains another problem and is very obvious in the leadership changes that have taken place three times in the less than six years of its existence. In addition to the establishment of the NDDC, in 2001 the federal government initiated the Special Security Committee on Oil Producing Areas. The outcome of the Committee indicated that the Niger Delta issue was primarily political and thus required political solutions (Adeyeri, 2012). In order to guarantee greater oil security, the Committee recommended a review of policies and laws (such as the Petroleum Act and the Land Use Act) that have fuelled discontent and agitation in the region. It also recommended an increase in the derivation principle to 50% (cited in Adeyeri, 2012: 101). Like other reports, the government failed to implement this, which suggests that it was not ready to address the problem. On 18th April 2006, an Obasanjo-led administration inaugurated the Consolidated Council on Social and Economic Development of Coastal States of the Niger Delta (CSEDND), to undertake what he described as a ‘marshall plan’ that would create new jobs in the military and police forces, and initiate a $1.8 billion road project (Adeyeri, 2012: 101; and Aghalino, 2010: 47). This was expected to improve development in the region and provide jobs for the Niger Delta youth in the military. However, from inception, the Council suffered serious legitimacy problems: it consisted of the governors of the oil-producing states and other local elites who had been accused of wasting funds and siphoning the federal allocation meant for the development of the region. Moreover, leaders and representatives of credible civil society groups in the Niger Delta were not appointed to the Council. This, of course, raised serious doubts about the government’s sincerity for the development of the region. Again, militant groups and people of the region felt insulted and angered by Obasanjo’s offer of employment in the same military and police forces which had, over a period of time, killed Niger Delta civilians and razed their villages (International Crisis Group, 2006, cited in Adeyeri 2012: 102; Aghalino, 2010: 47). Therefore, the militant groups rejected the Council. Similarly, the proposal received much criticism from the Abia

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and Imo State governments, which the NDDC Act recognised as part of the Niger Delta but which were excluded from the CSEDND (Adeyeri, 2012: 102). The two state governments viewed the initiative as a design to erode solidarity among oil-producing states. Thus, MEND launched its first car bomb in Port Harcourt. As the attack occurred a day after Obasanjo inaugurated the Council in Abuja, it seems the intention was to show their disapproval of the plan. It is worth noting that the military approach employed in the resolution of the Niger Delta issue has only succeeded in escalating the problem — a few examples may suffice here. In response to increasing numbers of militant attacks, the federal government launched Operation Restore Hope, by deploying a joint military task force (JTF) involving the army, navy and personnel from other security agencies. The JTF used force to reduce issues such as interethnic conflicts and oil bunkering in the Niger Delta. In many instances, the operational tactics resulted in destruction and deaths in various villages. One such instance is a case reported by the International Crisis Group (2006): while on a security patrol in August 2006, the JTF killed nine Ijaw youths and a Shell Community Liaison Officer (International Crisis Group, 2006, cited in Adeyeri 2012: 102). The military expedition which led to the killing of people in Odi1 village in Bayelsa is another example. It was reported that over 2000 people were killed in that expedition (Aghalino, 2010). The aftermath of this was the overmilitarisation of the region, which created an atmosphere of uneasy calm in the region. Due to the intensity of the conflict at the time of Umar Musa Yar’Adua’s emergence as the president in 2007, the resolution of the Niger Delta problem was identified as part of the Seven Points Agenda of the government. On his assumption of office, President Yar’Adua instituted the Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee to broker peace agreements with militants in the core Niger Delta states. This resulted in the release of Asari Dokubo, the leader of the Niger Delta Volunteers Force (NDVF), the impeached governor of Bayelsa State, Dipreye Alamiyesegha (popularly known as the ‘Governor-General’ of the Ijaw), and Henry Okah2 (the leader of MEND). These actions were seen by the militants as a 1

The people of Odi village killed 17 soldiers in protest of their discontent with the government, the activities of oil multinationals and the brutal occupation of the region by the military. The Odi massacre came as a reprisal to the killings of the soldiers. 2 Asari Dokubo and Henry Okar were arrested for disturbing the peaceful coexistence of the state as the leaders and spokespersons of their respective groups

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precondition for peace negotiations with the government. It was also believed to be necessary in building the required trust of the Niger Delta people about the sincerity of the government to actually make peace with the militants (Aghalino, 2010: 50; Adeyeri, 2012: 103). Furthermore, the administration also involved the militants in monitoring the waterways. In December 2007, the Bayelsa state chapter of the Niger Delta Conflict Resolution Committee gave out ten speed boats to some militant groups. The boats were to be deployed for the surveillance and monitoring of criminal activities along the waterways. Due to their knowledge of the terrain, it was believed that incorporating the militants into the measures to secure the Niger Delta waterways would ensure effectiveness and reduce criminal activity. The government also encouraged some of the militants to establish and register private security outfits which would be engaged by the government for the protection of pipelines and other oil installations (Aghalino, 2010: 50; Adeyeri, 2012: 103). In addition, on 10th September 2008, the Yar’Adua government established the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs. The new ministry was created with a substantive Minister and Minister-of-State whose primary responsibility was the development of the region. The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) would be a parastatal under the ministry. The purpose of creating the ministry was to coordinate efforts to tackle infrastructural development, environmental protection and the development of youth in the region (This Day, 2008). All these efforts prepared the ground for the peaceful acceptance and implementation of the amnesty programme which was introduced in 2009.

The Amnesty Phase: from 2009 to the present The Yar’Adua government set up a 44-member technical committee to collate previous reports and suggest solutions to the problem in the region. Part of the recommendation of the committee was the granting of amnesty to the willing militants. The amnesty that was conceived by the government would grant absolute pardons for militants who unconditionally renounced militancy and would make themselves available for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (after rehabilitation) into society. The programme was also supported by oil multinationals operating in the responsible for a series of attacks and hostage-taking. Alaiyesegha was imprisoned for embezzling state funds but the people of the region felt that his arrest was a witch-hunt and an attempt to ridicule one of the leaders of the Ijaw people.

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country, and the United Nations, with the aim of achieving a sustainable peace that would end disruption to oil production, increase oil earnings, and promote development in the region (Eke, 2014: 6). While development was a key factor, the government realised that no meaningful development could be achieved if there was no peace in the region. Thus, it was essential to consider the implementation of some of the aspects of the technical committee’s report that would lay the foundation for peaceful coexistence. So far, amnesty as a home-grown peace initiative has successfully disarmed and demobilised militants and continued the reintegration process of the former militants. Out of a total of 30,000 former militants that accepted the amnesty programme, over 16,000 people have successfully completed either a formal or vocational training programme (personal communication, 2014). The quality of training given to the former combatants is instructive. Many of them were sent to study in the United Kingdom, Malaysia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates, among other reputable countries. In those countries, former militants underwent various training programmes in welding and fabrication, automobile mechanics, carpentry and others, including formal education up to PhD level (personal communication, 2014). According to Lawrence Pepple:3 One of the strong points of the programme is that the training package is carefully selected to put the former combatants and people from the 4 impacted community the opportunity to favourably compete in the job market (personal communication, 2014).

One other issue to note is that despite some shortcomings in the selection of the trainers, and corruption allegations levelled against the managers of the programme, the programme has succeeded in bringing immediate cessation to hostilities in the region. This has equally helped to increase the production capacity in the country. The atmosphere of peace that the amnesty programme provides has helped to bring about incremental development in the area and also helped to increase the capacity of the youth in the region, thus preparing them for valuable employment. It has impacted positively on the behaviour of former combatants by instilling in them civic culture and orientation (Onapajo and Abdul-Wasi, 2015).

3

Lawrence Pepple was the Technical Assistant/Head of Reintegration at the office of the Special Advisor to the President on Niger Delta. 4 These are the people who have experienced the direct impact of militant activities in their community but did not necessarily take up arms against the state.

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With this gesture from the government, it is believed that the federal government was prepared to find lasting solutions to the Niger Delta conflict. Moreover, if such a position can be sustained, this can help to reignite the people’s trust and confidence in the government, thus preparing the way for sustainable peace in the region.

Lessons Learnt These narratives have given an account of the various mechanisms employed to resolve the Niger Delta conflict over an extended period. As mentioned earlier, the government — in its bid to gloss over important concerns of the Niger Delta people — presented a nonchalant attitude to their clamour for involvement. This dismissive attitude contributed to the escalation of conflict and changed the dynamics from a peaceful protest to a full-blown armed conflict against the state. The state dismissed all the early-warning signals and initially thought it could dominate with the use of force to quell the conflict. It is important to note that the army of occupation and repression experienced by Niger Deltans succeeded in the long run to inculcate a culture of militancy in the people. Another useful point to note is that the government’s lackadaisical attitude escalated the problem of joblessness in the region, which fuelled youth restiveness and made them vulnerable to being manipulated by unscrupulous politicians. The political elite exploited the situation to further their own selfish interests. In the long run, this promoted criminality and introduced another dimension to the conflict: some people saw that there were gains and benefits in criminality. This actually clouded the realities of the initial difficulties and made room for corruption and crime to fester, which further complicated the conflict.

Conclusion In conclusion, it is important to note that some of the oil multinationals supported government efforts to assuage the problems and challenges facing the people in the region, in connection with government intervention efforts in the Niger Delta. This was carried out in the form of corporate social responsibility to facilitate the smooth operation of the companies in the troubled region. Reporting on the efforts of Shell (one of the major oil companies in Nigeria), Ite (2007: 12) stated that in its effort to develop the community where it operates, the company embarked on various programmes ranging from community assistance (CA) and

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community development (CD) to sustainable development (SD). However, these efforts have not reduced the dependency of the people on the oil company and have not brought about meaningful development in the region. Moreover, most of the projects embarked upon are aimed to launder the image of the company and to enhance its smooth operation and are not geared towards alleviating the people’s suffering (see also Frynas, 2001). He therefore suggests that a true intervention in the Niger Delta problem should include a tri-sector partnership approach and framework between the oil companies which Shell represents, the Nigerian government and civil society (Ite, 2007: 13). A good example of this was noted in the support given by some oil companies to the training of excombatants under the amnesty programme. In this regard, government efforts to involve other useful agencies like Shell, civil societies, the people in the region and elsewhere will help to provide a useful and long lasting solution to the Niger Delta conflict. The recent effort by the government to demilitarise and decriminalise the militiants by offering them amnesty is a step in the right direction. Using the same amnesty to bring about an immediate truce, employing it to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate the militants into society, is a first step and a necessary precondition for a complete transformation in the region. With the introduction of an amnesty programme, peace has gradually returned to the region: the militants have been disarmed and demobilised and the process of reintegration is already taking place. Former militants and people from the community which experienced militant activities and military onslaught are included and benefit from the amnesty programme package. The rationale is that by reducing animosity, capacity-building extends around the community. Government should leverage on this and encourage other stakeholders such as the state, local government, government agencies (i.e. NDDC) and oil companies to partake in the capacity-building and development of the area. The NDDC should be strengthened to coordinate all these activities, while the Ministry of the Niger Delta should take a policy or supervisory role. In the interim, the amnesty committee should be given a period of grace to offer further help, specifically in the training and capacity-building of the people in the region, with necessary oversight from the federal government.

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http://leadership.ng/features/388144/amnesty-programme-impact-far (accessed 12 December 2015). Osaghae, E.E. (1998), ‘Managing multiple minority problems in a divided society: The Nigerian experience’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 36, no.1, pp.1 -20. Osokoya, O.I. (1996), Writing and teaching history: A guide to advanced study, Ibadan: Laurel Education Publishers. Ovwasa, L. (1999), ‘Oil and the minority question’, in Saliu H.A. (ed.), Issues in contemporary political economy of Nigeria, Ilorin: Haytee Books. River Basin Development (1979), River Basin Development Authorities ACT. Sanya, O. (2006), ‘Slow death in the Niger Delta’, www.codesria.org/Links/Publication (accessed 11 December 2015). Soremekun, K. (2011), ‘Nigeria’s oil diplomacy and the management of the Niger Delta crisis’, in Obi, C. and Rustard, S.A. (eds.), Oil and insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the complex politics of petroVvolence, London: Zed Books. This Day (2008), ‘Why we created Niger Delta ministry - Yar’Adua’, 12 September.

CHAPTER NINE INTERROGATING THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND INSTITUTIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN PLATEAU STATE, NIGERIA DORCAS ETTANG AND OLUSOLA OGUNNUBI

Introduction In more than 55 years of Nigeria’s independence, the country has been plagued by incessant conflict in virtually all of its geo-political zones. From the civil war of 1967-1970, to the unending conflict in the Niger Delta, to the more recent Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria has evidently wrestled with the tensions that have arisen over decades of its political history. In common with most African states, the negative experiences of inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts in Nigeria are not unconnected to the vestiges of colonialism. Among these conflicts, the Plateau State crisis reveals more clearly how ethnicity, religion and violence have become increasingly woven together in setting the stage for endless bloodletting. Needless to say that, despite rich scholarship in this area, relatively little analysis has been devoted to examining the role of non-state institutions in conflict management, particularly in relation to Plateau State. A survey by the Pew Forum shows that more people in Nigeria than in any other African country believe that religion is a major source of conflict (Marshall, 2013). As a concept and practice, religion holds much weight in Nigeria and, mostly among the elites, has become a powerful tool in claiming political privileges, opportunities and advantages (Danfulani, 2006: 19). In addition to ethnicity, religion also comes to the fore in conflicts over resources and political control. These two variables are at the heart of many of the conflicts that have plagued Nigeria, particularly in the north, since the return of the country to civilian rule in 1999. In Nigeria, it is not unusual for settler communities to hold on to the religion of their homes of origin rather than their host communities, which can

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inhibit social integration and interaction between these groups and communities (Danfulani, 2006). The importance of religious actors and institutions in preventing or managing religious conflicts across the country cannot be over-emphasised. A wide range of actors including peace actors, the state, religious leaders and the public look to religion (Islam and Christianity) to provide solutions to the different forms of religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria. This chapter focuses on religious leaders and institutions and critically examines their role in religious conflicts. Within this context, we explore the usefulness of conflict management strategies and note the necessity of conflict transformation in addressing the root causes of the Plateau conflict in the long term. According to the United States Institute of Peace (2011: 15), conflict management is defined as ‘efforts to prevent, limit, contain, or resolve conflicts, especially violent ones, while building up the capacities of all parties involved’, prior to undertaking peacebuilding. Similarly, for Lederach (2003: 14), conflict transformation seeks ‘to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships.’ This chapter therefore examines the role of religious leaders and institutions (from the two dominant religions) in the country in the management of conflict in Plateau State, Nigeria. This is undertaken in the context of conflict-management strategies. The chapter also identifies limitations faced by these leaders and institutions in contributing to peacebuilding in the state. The last segment of the chapter makes some recommendations for how to achieve successful religious conflict management.

Background: Plateau State Profile Plateau is one of Nigeria’s 36 states and is known for tin-mining and agriculture. According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA, 2013), the State's population was estimated at 3,899,856 in 2013, making it ‘the 12th largest in the country.’1 Geographically, the state is located in the Middle Belt region of the country. With 17 local government areas (LGA), Plateau State is surrounded by Bauchi State to the north-east,

1

Plateau State Government Official Website, http://www.plateaustate.gov.ng/page/at-a-glance, accessed: 15 January 2016.

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Kaduna State to the north-west, Nasarawa State to the south-west and Taraba State to the south-east. According to the official government website2, over 40 ethno-linguistic groups can be found in the state, including indigenous ethnic groups such as the Berom, Afizere, Anaguta, and Goemai, among others. Other ethnic groups such as the Igbo, Yoruba, Efik, Ijaw, Bini and Ibibio from across the country have also settled in the state. The indigenous ethnic groups (Berom, Mwaghavul, Ngas, and Tarok, among others) mostly practice Christianity, alongside their various traditional religions, while the HausaFulani are predominantly Muslim. Equally, other groups in the state, such as the Yoruba, practice Christianity, Islam and traditional religions, while the Igbos mainly practice Christianity and traditional religions. These diverse ethnic and religious orientations further illustrate the complexities of inter-group relations in the multi-cultural and multi-religious state. This also brings particular attention to the role of religious institutions since many of these groups are strongly affiliated and committed to their respective religions. While a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2005) notes that accurate statistics are not available on which group constitutes the majority in Plateau State, with differing views by both Christians and Muslims on their specific numbers, the report estimates that Christians make up the majority while Muslims are a large minority group. Modibbo (2012: 5) notes that Muslims believe that they make up about 40% of the population in Plateau State, while emphasising that the issue of statistics is a highly controversial and disputed matter. This is reflective of the contentious nature of Nigeria’s population distribution by religion, an indicator not reflected in the last nationally-held census in 2006.3 This problem is compounded by the fact that Nigeria’s national census is administratively gruelling, politically disputed, and plagued by issues of over-counting as states and religious and ethnic groups clamour for power and resources. A review of pertinent literature on the crisis has yielded little information on the estimated number of Christians and Muslims in Plateau State.

2

Plateau State Government Official Website, http://www.plateaustate.gov.ng/page/the-people, accessed: 15 January 2016. 3 Nigeria’s 2006 census focused on population distribution according to age, sex, marital status, local government area, state and senatorial district. For more information, see: http://www.population.gov.ng/index.php/censuses, accessed: 17 January 2016.

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In Plateau State, although the victims and perpetrators of violent conflicts are from different ethnic groups, the religious fault-lines are mainly between Islam and Christianity. The Governor, Simon Lalong, in a speech shortly after the gubernatorial election in 2015, called for both Christians and Muslims in the state to love one another and forgive and forget, in an effort to rebuild the state.4 His speech was set against the backdrop of a history of violent clashes in the state, where once peaceful groups were pitted against each other.

Conflict and its Management Strategies Conflict, according to scholars of conflict and peace studies, is a recurring nature of human and social relations (Miall, 2004; Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse, 2011) and ranges from intrapersonal, interpersonal, and group, to national and international levels. Conflict may be defined as a ‘perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously’ (Rubin et al., 1994: 5). Following these conceptualisations, we conclude in this paper that conflict is an interaction, clash or struggle between two or more actors due to their perceived incompatible and competing values, ideas, goals and position, where one actor seeks to neutralise, defeat or eliminate the other in order to achieve a defined objective. Conflict management is about the reduction of volatility or the control of instability when a conflict arises. It offers a short-term rather than a durable solution to conflict. Since many conflicts are long term, it becomes difficult to resolve them in the short term or permanently. Some perspectives argue that conflict management, as an approach, fails to ‘address structural elements and assumes that the process (alone) can bring peace’ (McCandless, 2007: 92). While conflict-management focuses on short-term political settlements that fail to address the root causes and transform violent conflict (McCandless, 2007; and Schirch, 2008), the conflict-transformation approach is a long-term process that involves building relationships and resolving the underlying causes of conflict. This does not downplay the importance of conflict management, as its focus is on reframing the positions and views of stakeholders in order to reach an amicable outcome (Miall, 2004). Conflict-management strategy can thus be useful in curbing immediate violence because it addresses the 4

Enietan-Matthews, Timothy (2015), ‘I will unite all the Tribes in Plateau State – Lalong’. Daily Post, 1 June.

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realistic question of bringing together protagonists who may later cooperate, by designing a practical and constructive way of managing their differences (Bloomfield and Reilly, 1998). Conflict management is well situated to provide responses to conflict, particularly the type that breeds violence and destruction of human life. Since conflicts are ineradicable, ‘the best that can be done is to manage and to contain [conflicts], and occasionally to reach a historic compromise in which violence may be laid aside’ (Miall, 2004: 3). Due to the conflicts that society experiences, advocates of conflict management argue that powerful interveners have resources they can use to induce warring parties to abandon the use of violence. However, such interveners are not interested in addressing the deep-seated causes of conflicts (Miall, 2004) but rather to bringing violence to a close. In this regard, conflict-management achieves its goal of controlling the volatility of conflict and therefore paves the way for conflict transformation that deals with the deep-seated causes of conflicts. However, Lambourne (2004) suggests that constructively dealing with conflict is not to address its volatility but to develop strategies that are designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which basic human needs are met and violent conflicts do not recur. Criticism of this nature is directed towards conflict management. Firstly, conflict management’s emphasis on reducing volatility or controlling instability is seen as undermining all attempts supposed to be put in place to build sustainable peace, and overlooks underlying breeders of conflict. Secondly, conflict management is seen as a perspective that wants to direct or control people as physical objects and seeks to manage conflicting parties in ways similar to how companies are managed. Thirdly, conflict management is criticised for its continuous attempt to reduce volatility while overlooking the persisting effects of conflict. Consequently, conflict management is not a durable solution to socio-political conflicts. Despite this, conflict management uses similar approaches and strategies to those employed in conflict resolution and conflict transformation, to attempt to reduce the volatility of a conflict. It restricts itself to processes such as reconciliation, forgiveness and justice (Bloomfield and Reilly, 1998). Although some scholars argue that conflict management is a peacemaking strategy, it is devoid in itself of bringing sustainable peace because it is restricted to forming new relationships among disputants without addressing the root causes of the conflict (McAskie, 2006).

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Justice, reconciliation and forgiveness are some of the essential conflictmanagement strategies, although their application depends on the actors and the causes of conflict. These strategies are different yet interwoven, but as Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse (2011) argue, the uniqueness of each conflict situation determines which of these strategies can be used in its management. One actor in a conflict may not reconcile with another if s/he cannot forgive him/her. Furthermore, justice within a conflicting society can be attained only if all actors to the conflict reconcile and acknowledge their wrong and subsequently ask for forgiveness. Let us now turn our attention to these strategies.

Justice Mani (2005) proposes three main approaches of justice in conflict management: legal, rectificatory, and distributive. Legal justice, or what is termed ‘the rule of law’, addresses issues that are connected to the commercial or political manipulation of legal systems, such as corruption (in companies, law-making bodies, or with judges), and a lack of legal redress for injustices and grievances experienced by the population (Mani, 2005). In Mani’s (2005) view, in most situations, people are compelled to violence when provisions for legal justice are denied. For example, in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) government has continuously been in the limelight for failing to honour its 1994 promise of free housing, medical care and security for all. The persistence of violence among the indigenous black South African populations can be associated with anger towards the government’s failure to respond to the hardships they are experiencing. Instead, this anger is directed at foreign nationals, primarily because foreigners are construed as being the cause of all their difficulties (Harris, 2002: 13). When conflicting parties are delegitimised and/or devastated by violence, restoring the apparatus of legal justice can be an important component in opening up the pathway to eventual reconciliation. In particular, when there is experience of arbitrary violence, as in the case of Plateau state, improvements in the dispensation of justice can indeed strengthen conflicting parties’ confidence in the peace process and legal system. The provision of justice, establishment of the rule of law, as well as the protection of social and political rights should, in the first instance, cater for the needs of people who have been affected by the conflict (Pankhurst, 1999). Rectificatory justice addresses the past abuse that happened in a previous conflict and is aimed at setting right previous unjust situations. For

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example, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the international ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) all made efforts to address human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Mani, 2005). This form of justice principally focuses on structural and systemic injustices such as commercial, political and economic discrimination and the inequalities of distribution. Distributive justice, on the other hand, concerns itself with the nature of a socially just allocation of rights and goods in society. It is evident that underlying causes of conflict in society are inherent in structural and systemic injustices (Lambourne, 2004). This means uneven distribution of resources and the neglect of individual needs and overall common good.

Reconciliation Reconciliation as a concept is understood at four different levels or processes: acquiescence; cognisance of accounts; mending the opposites; and a relationship (Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse, 2011). As acquiescence, reconciliation is accomplished by making all or one of the parties to a conflict seek peace and accept conditions which may not be palpable. As cognisance, reconciliation seeks to take into account the contribution of different people or parties to past conflict for further consideration. As mending the opposites, reconciliation aims at establishing mutual interest and equal access to opportunities for both the victims and perpetrators of a conflict. As a relationship, reconciliation allows both parties to put aside their differences and be willing to accept ways of forming new relations at the end of a conflict. However, healing plays a key role in reconciliation and prevents potential violence. This is mainly achieved when the parties of a conflict deal with the painful and traumatising memories of a past conflict, rather than trying to avoid them. In essence, merely ‘forgetting’ about the conflict does not necessarily bring about healing.

Forgiveness Forgiveness is described by Hartwell (2000: 1) as a ‘collective turning from the past that neither ignores past evil nor excuses it.’ Through forgiveness, wrongs committed by one group against another are moderated through truth-telling, expression of sorrow or rendering of a public apology and the renunciation of vengeance. As Shrivers (1995) argues, true forgiveness is a complex and prolonged evolutionary process

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and is both separate from and interwoven with justice, apology, truth, and reconciliation. Just as in reconciliation, forgiveness demands that victims look at the perpetrators with a certain degree of empathy and forgo the option of revenge. Thus, ‘the abandonment of revenge seeking and the intent to seek genuine renewal of human relationships are forgiveness’ most important principles’ (Diegeser, 1998: 24). This genuine renewed human relationship brings healing effects to both perpetrators and victims. As a result, it addresses the lingering social wounds and historical wrongs. As mentioned earlier, these strategies are different yet intertwined. One approach appears embedded in the other. In some cases, one process leads to the other but there is no sequence for how they follow each other or which process begins. While reconciliation and forgiveness may be achieved without many challenges, the application of justice in managing a conflict poses a formidable challenge. However, although there is no preferred conflict management approach, justice, reconciliation and forgiveness are integral to the peaceful resolution of conflict. Only an approach that is appropriate to the specific country and context that takes the existing options for action into account and is sensitive to local traditions and conflict resolution practices can hope to succeed.

Religion and Violence in Plateau State Religious relationships in Plateau State date back to the 19th century with the British conquest, the arrival and settlement of the Hausa-Fulani in parts of the state, and the presence of Christian missionaries (Goshit, 2006). As the Hausa-Fulani settled across the state and in the capital city of Jos, and built Koranic schools and mosques, Christian missionaries established missions and rapidly converted indigenes (Goshit, 2006). For a long time, residents enjoyed peaceful and harmonious relationships between various ethnic and religious groups. Jos was particularly known more for its ‘diversity and tranquillity than for conflict’ (Best and Hoomlong, 2011). Its official slogan — ‘The Home of Peace and Tourism’ — aptly captures the peaceful coexistence that once existed in the state. Although Goshit (2006) states that the policies of colonial powers already divided groups in Nigeria along racial, religious and ethnic lines which led to bloody conflicts, Plateau State only began to experience religious conflict in the 1990s. Since 1994, religion has been significant in shaping group allegiances, dividing formerly peaceful communities and leading groups to act violently against those of a different religion, deepening existing ethnic divisions. The motive and target of attacks usually have a

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religious element, as evidenced by the attacks on churches, mosques and individuals (based on their religious identity). The endemic nature of the situation in Jos was such that petty quarrels or minor conflicts between groups and individuals were easily attributed to religion (Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network, 2010). The conflict transformed from being of a political nature (where there was conflict over political control of traditional and other spaces) to deeply religious polarisation and increased polarised conflict (Best and Hoomlong, 2011: 58). While the causes of the conflict have been attributed to disputes about ownership, feelings of political exclusion, economic marginalisation and perceptions of bias and favouritism, these causes of violence have been mainly along religious lines. There are reported cases of violence across the state, many of which have pitted ethno-religious identities against each other. In 2001, a confrontation between a young woman and a Muslim group having their Friday Jum’at prayer in the Congo Russia slum of Jos, was the final trigger for violent clashes between Christians and Muslims (7-12 September).5 The death toll was estimated at about 1000, and places of places of worship and other property were destroyed. In the Yelwa local government area (LGA) in 2002, many were killed and displaced, and churches and mosques were destroyed. According to the Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network (2010: 107-108), the outgoing Plateau State Commander at the time noted that the January 2010 conflict was triggered by attacks by armed Muslim youths against Christians during their Sunday worship. An examination of the above examples and various other attacks, such as in 2008, show a trend where religious centres and places of worship are attacked and groups divided along religious lines. The impact of the violence has been disheartening and alarming. The destruction of worship centres, markets, and private property has continuously affected the economy of the state. For instance, post-election violence in 2008 led to the destruction of the Igbo-controlled largest timber market in Jos, the Hausa-controlled grain and yam markets, car dealerships belonging to Hausa car traders and other businesses (ICG, 2012: 12). The conflict has greatly limited economic activities like agricultural and livestock production, commerce, and transportation. High levels of violence leave limited access to essential public services like 5

The immediate cause of the conflict was the appointment of Alhaji Muktar, a Hausa Fulani, supported by the Muslims and the indigenous groups and Christians generally.

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water and electricity. According to the ICG (2012: 2), more than $180 billion worth of property had been lost due to violence since 1994 in Plateau state. Another consequence of conflict in the state is the displacement of populations because of loss of income, livelihood, and fears of attack or death. According to Human Rights Watch (2005: 44), ‘each of the major attacks in Plateau State has resulted in large movements of population.’ After the May 2004 attacks, for instance, Muslims fled in large numbers to the neighbouring states of Nassarawa and Bauchi (HRW, 2005: 44). Clearly, conflicts have negatively influenced the State’s socioeconomic structures. It is worth noting that a potential challenge for conflict management is the erosion of trust and tolerance among groups. For instance, a significant outcome of the conflict has been the segregated spaces, or Jos now being a ‘post-conflict partitioned city’ (Best, 2011). Areas such as Angwan Rogo, Rikkos, Angwan Rimi, Bauchi Road, Yan Shanu, Yan Kaji, Ali Kazaure, and parts of Nassarawa, among others, are dominated by Muslims, while other areas such as Apata, Angwan Rukuba, Jenta Adamu, Alheri, and Tina Junction, among others, are dominated by Christians (Best, 2011: 189). This presents not only a major challenge for rebuilding peace and positive relationships but also highlights the importance of the role of religious actors and religious institutions in conflict management, restoring trust and building tolerance in society. From these examples, we can see that there is a strong relationship between religion and violence in the State. Thus the statement by Sisk (2011: 4), that religious belief ‘constructively shapes the terms of conflict and provides an ideational framework through which conflict is interpreted’ holds true in the case of Plateau State. This implies that, when religion is central to a people’s way of life, religious institutions hold much weight in society, have a significant physical presence in the community and create an environment where groups are easily mobilised and conflicts can emerge rapidly and easily. The desire to retreat to one’s ethnic or religious grouping and employ violence is fuelled when there is an established or perceived threat to one’s wellbeing, livelihood and safety. This is in line with Schirch’s (2008) view that violence of an ethno-religious nature emerges when structures contribute to social and economic inequities and to the systematic exclusion of ethnic or religious groups from participation in public policy decisions. The more active the group can then become in political activities like protests and rebellions.

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The nexus between religion and violence is evident through the key stakeholders' involvement in conflicts. In Plateau State, in particular, the two main groups involved in conflicts are the Berom-Afizere-Anaguta (BAA), who deem themselves as the indigenes of Plateau State and practice Christianity, and the Hausa/Fulani, who are identified as settlers and are mainly Muslim. There is a notion (real or perceived) by the latter that they are on an unequal footing, as they are subjected to discriminatory acts and excluded from opportunities, including access to land, educational benefits and participation in the political institutions controlled by the ‘indigenous’ state governments (Krause, 2011: 25-26). The role of religious actors and institutions in contributing to conflict is a strong indicator of how religion has been used to cause division in communities and encourage groups to engage in religious attack. At the Catholic Bishops Conference in 2002, it was noted that religion, just like ethnicity, has been used by both religious and ethnic leaders to achieve self-centred and self-seeking agendas (Best, 2011). The Conference noted that: Some religious leaders control the minds of their adherents who are often ignorant and needy, exploiting them for selfish advantage. The God preached by some religious leaders seems not to be the God of justice and love, but an intolerant God who fosters hatred and division (Gwamna, n.d.: 40).

In his report in Plateau State in 2009, Ostien (2009: 30) noted the view that pastors informed church members not to vote for Muslim candidates during the local government elections of 2008. Furthermore, there have been reports of ‘religious militancy’ by both Muslims and Christians in the State as mosques and churches have been used to store weapons (Higazi, 2011: 19). Krause (2011: 11) reports that religious leaders have called for a more ‘militant response from their community.’ The prominence of religion is evident in direct attacks on both mosques and churches and their occupants in 2001, 2008 and 2015. According to HRW (2005: 10), ‘religious rhetoric and prejudice’ is prevalent among Christian and Muslim leaders. Borrowing from Akinade (2002), these actions can be described as the ‘combative dimension in Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria’, something attributable to the manipulation of religion by the political elite. Religious leaders have also fuelled violence through their words (Ashton, 2013). In some areas, Christian pastors forbid women from marrying Muslim men while other pastors advise that a Christian woman caught with a Muslim man must be taken back by force (Krause, 2011: 22). There are others who are doubtful of various inter-religious dialogue processes

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which have failed to rebuild communal trust. Politically, religion has surfaced in various ways. For example, most key positions in the Plateau State government and the LGAs are filled by Christians, and this has contributed to feelings of marginalisation and resentment on the part of Muslims (HRW, 2005: 7). This may explain the militancy of Muslims, especially if the choices of Christians for these positions are seen to have been determined by their religious affiliation. In many instances, the aggrieved have resorted to violence as a means of redress and this, more often than not, takes on a religious dimension. Therefore, religious actors, as well as institutions, must be at the core of religious conflict-management.

Religious Leaders, Institutions and Conflict Management in Plateau State Almost every Christian denomination found in Nigeria (including the Catholic Church, Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), Evangelical Churches Winning All (ECWA), Lutheran, Presbyterian, Baptist, Anglican Communion, Wesleyan, Apostolic and Assemblies of God) have a presence in Plateau State. There is also a considerable presence of Muslims in the State. In the absence of accurate data, Modibbo (2012: 5) estimates that Sunni Muslims (composed of Sufis, anti-Sufis and moderate-Salafi) make up about 95% of all Muslims, with Shia being 23% and the Qur’aniyyun/Qala-Qato/Yan Tatsine composing about 1-2%. In talking about religious institutions and their role in conflict management, a distinction then must be made between religious institutions (churches and mosques) and autonomous faith-based organisations (FBOs). Clarke and Jennings (2008: 6) define the latter as ‘any organisation that derives inspiration and guidance for its activities from the teachings and principles of the faith or from a particular interpretation or school of thought within that faith.’ In some instances, these faith-based organisations are known as organisations that collaborate with religious institutions or are linked to them. In some cases, however, as James (2011: 2-3) notes, some FBOs work separately from local faith groups. Faithbased organisations are also conceptually different from religious institutions because they focus more on community development, while religious institutions focus on the spiritual life of their congregation and the relationship with their God and neighbour. FBOs therefore focus on providing development services and the needs of the poor, bringing a

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faith-based perspective to secular views of development and encouraging civil society engagement (James, 2011: 2). Principally, religious institutions focus on providing teaching, encouragement, and preaching the message of faith, divine purpose, reconciliation and forgiveness. In Plateau State, religious leaders are important stakeholders because they are trusted by the people. Also, they shape the views and actions of their members, raise awareness on various political and social issues, and challenge their followers, which of course includes political leaders. They also represent their religious groups at peacebuilding meetings and are involved in peace work in their respective congregations and communities. While the focus of this chapter is on conflict management strategies, it is equally important to note the role of religious leaders and institutions in broader relief and support efforts. For instance, churches have been involved in distributing first aid, household goods, medication, food and clothing to displaced persons. Church leaders have also provided counselling to victims who have lost relatives, houses, and businesses. Church premises have been used as camps while others have donated resources to various local NGOs. Congregations have also provided psychological, spiritual and material support to victims of violence, particularly to fellow members. Similarly, mosques have distributed clothing, provided sanctuary for displaced people, distributed food and other relief materials, paid for the medical treatment of victims, used sermons to pacify victims of violence, and carried out search and rescue missions. Without a doubt, religious leaders and institutions have become a central component of peacebuilding and conflict management efforts in Plateau State. While inter-religious tensions and violence exist in the state, positive working relations between both Muslims and Christians play out through economic collaboration, inter-religious dialogue, youth engagement and peacebuilding efforts. For example, in 2001, the state government set up an inter-religious council made up of ten Christians and ten Muslims involved in peacebuilding initiatives across the state (Best, 2011). This body remains active and continues to contribute to interreligious dialogue between adherents of the two dominant religions in the state. Have the efforts towards achieving a peaceful coexistence in the State been easy? This question is answered in the next section.

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Religious Conflict-Management Efforts and their Limitations Admittedly, the efforts by religious leaders and institutions have been useful in curtailing violence and restoring peaceful relations between groups. However, they face numerous gaps and challenges in achieving this goal. Some of these challenges include political interference and problems associated with segregation, among others.

Political interference In Nigeria, politics is characterised by the ruthless competition for resources. More often than not, the political elites resort to the manipulation of religion and ethnicity for their political and economic advancement. The elites create patron-client networks to benefit members of their religion. This explains why it is difficult to delink ethnic and religious identities from the state. As Ashafa and Wuse (2006: 21) note, politicians contribute to violence by planting seeds of hatred and anger and influencing the youth to engage in violence. It is a common practice among Nigerian politicians to use religious rhetoric to gain support or entice groups to use violence, thereby creating negative mindsets and opinions of other groups and limiting the efforts towards forgiveness, reconciliation and repentance. Mindsets that view the other group as the enemy breed distrust and mutual suspicion, which does not bode well for managing conflict. The erosion of trust limits efforts towards unity and amicability. In other words, politicians who make negative comments have the tendency to mar peacebuilding efforts.

Segregated spaces The attempt to manage conflict requires interaction between groups. However, the segregation of some residential areas and markets poses a great threat to forgiveness and reconciliation. These segregated spaces have led to the creation of ‘no-go’ areas which have negatively affected ‘patterns of residency, business, transportation and trade’ (Krause 2011: 9). For instance, areas around the University of Jos, known as Angwan Rogo, Ali Kazaure and Nassarawa Gwom, are predominantly inhabited by Muslims. The Igbos (mainly Christians) reside in Apata, while Christians live in segregated areas in the neighbourhood (Krause 2011: 33). Traffic routes have even become more separated after attacks around the Jos bus terminal in 2011 (Krause 2011: 45). Deep-seated animosity, anger and

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lack of trust have made it harder for Christians and Muslims to interact and work together, which has contributed to further segregation. Segregation as a result of the fear of attacks, lack of trust, and increased animosity will challenge any effort to manage conflict because one group cannot rely on the other for their safety.

The presence of long-standing root causes Plateau State’s politically and economically imbalanced systems have remained a major limitation to successful conflict management and longer term conflict transformation efforts. These are deep-rooted issues that have created despair and dissatisfaction and fuelled deep grievances easily triggered by violence and more exclusionary acts. As Sisk (2011: 7) notes, Nigeria as a whole now needs to move from a place of ‘religious balancing in its state-society relations and address more effectively the underlying causes of media insensitivities, marginalisation, and managing disputes over resources and development.’ In the specific case of Plateau State, the feeling of inequality, favouritism, injustice and uneven development have to be addressed; otherwise the efforts of religious actors and institutions will deal merely with surface problems and only put a temporary lid on conflict triggers and escalation.

Discord amongst religious leaders and religious institutions The lack of unity between Christian and Muslim leaders has, on many occasions, impeded conflict management efforts. For example, as reported by Smock (2006: 18), during the work of the Inter-Faith Mediation Centre (IMC) in Nigeria, the initial interactions between leaders of both warring communities were tense and confrontational, making it harder to resolve the underlying issues. By the third day, though, both Muslim and Christian leaders apologised and sought the forgiveness of each other. Linked to this is the disharmony and rift within religions. For example, in April 2010, Pandang Yamsat (President of COCIN) observed that the crisis in Plateau State lingered on because of a lack of consensus among Christian leaders (Best, 2011: 167). This statement was made in light of the contradictory public statements made by many Christian leaders. Ashafa and Wuye (2006: 22) also noted issues like intolerance, ignorance, lack of true love, denominational differences, sectionalism, leadership tussles, and a lack of unity among Christian and Muslim communities as contributing to the slow pace of peacebuilding efforts in the country.

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In separate dialogue sessions for Christians and Muslims held in 2003 in Kaduna State, Christians noted their fear of Muslims being insincere and that disagreements with them would turn violent, while Muslims feared that Christians would misrepresent the facts and that their joint sessions would be characterised by arguments, confusion, and misunderstandings (Ashafa and Wuye, 2006: 22). Pointedly, the feelings of competition, bias, dislike, and discord between religious leaders are all harmful to the success of conflict management. Furthermore, the lack of honesty and transparency in their comments and statements of the ‘other’ impedes any group effort to forgive and reconcile. These factors combine to result in hostile dialogue, negotiation and mediation efforts.

Lack of capacity for religious actors While workshops and training have helped religious leaders to interact better with each other, much more is needed in the development of skills such as negotiation, accommodation, mediation and other non-violent approaches to resolving conflict. Many are unequipped to prevent violence in their communities or manage conflicts. The lack of understanding and requisite skills, such as those listed above, limits conflict management because religious leaders are not be able to manage and quell tensions before they escalate. Without training that tackles issues such as ignorance and stereotypes, for example, it becomes very difficult to create space to forge stronger relationships and build bridges between Christians and Muslims. As argued by Sisk (2011: 11), without an understanding of how religion is manipulated and manifested in society, it becomes difficult to understand how it can contribute to peace and security. For Sisk (2011: 10), religious leaders are useful in creating a shift from very simple and basic notions of tolerance to deeper and more meaningful coexistence. However, this cannot be done if they are not equipped and sufficiently educated on what coexistence is, how it can be achieved, and how they can contribute to it. Without these capacity-building exercises in conflict-management and peacebuilding, their contributions to peace reap very few results. With the right capacity, religious leaders can find solutions to communal problems that trigger violence and cause societal divide. In addition, religious leaders can be empowered to provide counselling, trauma support, and assistance on an ongoing basis to members of their communities.

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Recommendations Based on the above, the following recommendations are pivotal in strengthening the effectiveness and ensuring the success of the conflict management roles of religious actors and institutions. 1. Religious leaders are well placed to promote the idea of tolerance in society based on the values and ideals of their religions. Religious institutions and leaders can reverse the tide of conflict and promote peace through inter-religious activities. Inter-group celebrations of specific religious holidays and ceremonies like Christmas and Ramadan have also been pivotal in positively changing the relationships, attitudes, and behaviours of adherents of the two dominant religions, and should be encouraged. In doing this, individuals can learn to respect the views of others. In dialogue involving political leaders, religious institutions are well placed to preach values of tolerance, forgiveness and unity — factors that are significant in restoring trust and rebuilding relationships amongst communities and individuals. They can also encourage their members who are political leaders, to work together on issues that affect their constituents. Using common goals, like poverty reduction and infrastructural development, that cut through religious divides and benefit all of society, religious leaders can bring these actors together. 2. It is important for religious leaders and institutions to abide by and preach principles and values of justice, compassion, reconciliation and forgiveness. Emphasis on the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy in churches and mosques delays the peace process and prevents the rebuilding of relationships across the religious divide. On the basis of their importance and value, and the fact that individuals respect and strive to abide by their precepts, religious leaders should strongly rely on the content of religious texts in their preaching. As James (2011: 4) remarks, teaching faith emphasises key principles like justice, compassion, reconciliation and stewardship, which are equally important in managing conflict. In addition, forgiveness and reconciliation are important and central to many religions in the world today. Islam and Christianity, for example, identify the need for love. In fact, various verses in the Bible call for loving one’s enemies, encouraging harmony and sympathy (Best, 2011). Islam has equally been described as a religion of unity because it ‘acknowledges the individual and group work for the purpose of uniting the society and uplifting it spiritually, socially,

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economically, and in whichever way that is positive in the development of the society physically or mentally’ (Idris and Usman, 2006: 823). Values like reconciliation and social justice are accepted and valued in religious environments and are embedded in religious texts. Their relevance can be used by religious leaders in exhorting their congregations and communities to follow and abide by the values. It is worth noting the fact that many of these values are shared across both religions, making it easy to find areas of convergence and unity. 3. There is also the need to increase the frequency of consultative meetings between religious leaders to share information, exchange views and perspectives on the threats that face their communities, and how these can be resolved. Borrowing from the Bible, particularly Acts 15, Best suggests that the most effective way to achieve accord and harmony among Christians (and in this case between Muslims and Christians) is to bring leaders and scholars together to achieve consensus on problems they face and agree on the way forward (Best, 2011: 168). For him, this would include taking the following steps: a. Inviting leaders to a meeting; b.Articulating the problem by allowing input from all sides; c. Reaching a consensus in a culturally appropriate manner; d.Publishing the results in a clearly written statement; e. Distributing the letter to those affected; f. Holding constituents responsible for its implementation. 4. Christian and Muslim leaders can work together on social problems, like fighting corruption, calling for political change, and addressing various social, health and environmental challenges in their communities. Efforts like these are capable of improving relationships within communities. Religious leaders can also continue to speak out against perpetrators, refrain from inciting violence, and engage more with the youth in preventing further conflict. In Plateau State, there are examples of how Muslim and Christian clerics have shifted from a view of disliking the other to preaching non-violence, and the importance of working together to promote peace (Ashton, 2013). 5. There is the need to discourage politicians from manipulating religious identities for political gain. As advised by the National Peace Policy (2009), government actors at all levels in Plateau State need to encourage inter-group dialogue and interests and commit to the strengthening of structures that contribute to peaceful

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coexistence. This is in line with Smock’s (2006: 36) view that faith-based mediation processes cannot work without ‘secular and political processes and authorities,’ as exemplified by the work of the Plateau State governor in ensuring that the peace agreement from the Yelwa-Nshar process was endorsed and given government approval. This cross-sector engagement speaks to the fact that political actors and institutions must be held accountable for their role in exacerbating violence. In addition, governments should not discriminate while distributing relief and support efforts to victims of violent conflict.

Conclusion It is clear from this discussion that non-state actors like religious leaders play a pivotal role in bridging relationships across religious divides. Their inclusion, particularly at the state, local and district government levels needs to be encouraged. In this context, religious leaders need to be more accommodating in their actions and attitudes and encourage their congregations to do likewise. They must constantly preach messages capable of bringing about tolerance and peace. It is also important to put in place punitive measures against religious leaders who sponsor, fuel or engage in religious conflict. In reducing tensions amongst groups, state legislation is required to regulate preaching in religious centres and gatherings, and comments likely to jeopardise peace efforts should be sanctioned by an impartial regulatory body. Furthermore, religious institutions should provide appropriate capacitybuilding exercises for religious leaders that cover issues like stereotypes, tolerance, coexistence, conflict, violence, positive leadership, conflict management and peacebuilding, so that they are better equipped to prevent and mitigate conflict. These exercises are particularly relevant in ensuring that religious leaders and institutions positively contribute to conflict management. Clearly, religion will continue to play a prominent political and social role in Nigeria, and so must be given its rightful place in conflict management.

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References Akinade, A.E. (2002), ‘The precarious agenda: Christian-Muslim relations in contemporary Nigeria’, (Lecture, Essentials of Christian-Muslim Relations), North Carolina: High Point University. Ashafa, M.N. and Wuye, J.M. (2006), ‘Training peacemakers: Religious youth leaders in Nigeria’, In Smock D.R. (ed.), Religious contributions to peacemaking: When religion brings peace, not war, Washington: DC: United States Institute of Peace. Ashton, C. (2013), Preventing inter-religious violence in Plateau State Nigeria: Final program evaluation, Jos: Search For Common Ground. Best, S.G. (2011), Religion and post-conflict peacebuilding in Northern Nigeria, Jos: University of Jos Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies. Best, S.G. and Hoomlong, K.N. (2011), ‘Literature review of academic publications and international reports’, in Para-Mallam O.J. (ed.), Finding durable peace in Plateau. Kuru: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, pp.58-76. Bloomfield, D. and Reilly, B. (1998), ‘The changing nature of conflict and conflict management’, in Harris, P. and Reilly, B. (eds.), Democracy and deep-rooted conflict: Options for negotiators, Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pp.7-28. Clarke, G. and Jennings, M. (2008), Development, civil society and faithbased organisations: Bridging the sacred and the secular, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Danfulani, U.H.D. (2006), The Jos peace conference and the indigene/settler question in Nigerian politics, Leiden/Nigeria: African Studies Centre/University of Jos. Diegeser, P. (1998), ‘Forgiveness and politics: Dirty hands and imperfect procedures’, Political Theory, vol. 26, no. 8, pp.700-723. Goshit, Z.D. (2006), ‘Economic, politics and ethno-religious relations in Jos Plateau Area during the colonial period (1900-1960)’, in Akinwunmi, O., Okpeh O.O., and D. Gwamna, J. (ed.), Inter-group relations in Nigeria During the 19th and 20th Centuries, Aboki Publishers: Makurdi, pp.471-480. Gwamna, D.J. (n.d.), ‘The turning tides of religious intolerance’, in Nigeria: The External Connections and Internal Dynamics. Unpublished. Harris, B. (2002), ‘Xenophobia: A new pathology for a New South Africa’, in Derek, H. and Gillian, E. (eds.), Psychopathology and

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social prejudice, Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, pp.169184. Hartwell, M.B. (2000), ‘The role of forgiveness in reconstructing society after conflict’, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, http://www.jha.ac/articles/a048.htm (accessed 17 December 2015). Higazi, A. (2011), The Jos crisis: A recurrent Nigerian tragedy. Nigeria: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Human Rights Watch (2005), Revenge in the name of religion: The cycle of violence in Plateau and Kano State, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria0505.pdf (accessed 17 December 2015). International Crisis Group (2012), ‘Curbing violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos crisis’, Africa Report, no. 196. Idris, A.S. and Usman, M.B. (2006), ‘Islamic religious organizations and national integration in Nigeria,’ in Akinwunmi, O., Okpeh O.O., and D. Gwamna, J. (eds.), Inter-group relations in Nigeria during the 19th and 20th centuries Aboki Publishers: Makurdi, pp.825-836. Interfaith Mediation Centre Official Website: www.imc-nigeria.org. James, R. (2011), ‘Handle with care: Engaging with faith-based organisations in development’, Development in Practice, vol. 21, no. 1, pp.109-117. Krause, J. (2011), A deadly cycle: Ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria, Working Paper, Geneva Declaration Secretariat. Kukah, M.H. (1993), Religion, politics and power in Northern Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Lambourne, W. (2004), Post-conflict peacebuilding: Meeting human needs for justice and reconciliation’, Peace, Conflict and Development, vol. 4, pp.1-24. Lederach, John P. (2003), Little book of conflict transformation, PA: Good Books. Mani, Rama (2005), ‘Balancing peace with justice in the aftermath of violent conflict’, Development, vol. 48, no. 3, pp.25-34. Marshall, K. (2013), Global institutions of religion: Ancient movers, modern shakers, New York: Routledge. McAskie, C. (2006), ‘From peacekeeping to peacebuilding’, UNACanada’s 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping Project Ottawa Conference, November 23. McCandless, E. (2007), ‘Synopses of major concepts’, in McCandless, E. and Bangura A.K. (eds.), Peace research for Africa: Critical essays for methodology, Addis Ababa: University of Peace. Miall, H. (2004), Conflict transformation: A multi-dimensional task, in Austin, A., Fischer, M., and Ropers, N. (eds.), Transforming

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ethnopolitical conflict, Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Modibbo, M.S.A. (2012), Survey of Muslim groups in Plateau State of Nigeria, NRN Background Paper 4, Oxford Department of International Development. National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) (2010), The challenges of ethnic/religious conflicts in Central Nigeria, Policy Paper. National Peace Policy (2009), Federal Republic of Nigeria, Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution. Ostien, P. (2009), ‘Jonah Jang and the Jasawa: Ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Nigeria’, http://www.sharia-in-africa.net. (accessed 20 May 2015). Pankhurst, D. (1999), ‘Issues of justice and reconciliation in complex political emergencies: Conceptualising reconciliation, justice and peace’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 20, no.1, pp.239-256. Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network (PIDAN) (2010), The history, ownership, establishment of Jos and misconceptions about the recurrent Jos conflict, Jos: Dan-Sil Press. Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, T., and Miall, H. (2011), Contemporary conflict resolution, Bradford: Bradford University Press. Rubin, Jeffrey, Pruitt, D.G. and Kim, S.H. (1994), Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate and settlement, New York: McGraw Hill. Schirch, L. (2008), ‘Strategic peacebuilding: State of the field’, South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, vol. 1, no.1, pp.2-17. Shriver, D.W. (1995), An ethic for enemies: Forgiveness in politics, London: Oxford University Press. Sisk, T.D. (2011), Between terror and tolerance: Religious leaders, conflict and peacemaking, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. Smock, D.R. (2006), Religious contributions to peacemaking: When religion brings peace, not war, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. United States Institute of Peace (2011), Peace terms: Glossary of terms for conflict management and peace-building, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace.

CHAPTER TEN A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE CROSS AND THE CRESCENT: TOWARDS EFFECTIVE PEACEBUILDING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA SUNDAY PAUL C. ONWUEGBUCHULAM

‘Until there is peace between religions, there can be no peace in the world.’ ~ Thich Nhat Hanh (1995: 1) ‘Reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups’ affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humansin-relationship […] Reconciliation, in essence, represents a place, the point of encounter where concerns about both the past and the future can meet […] For this to happen, people must find ways to encounter themselves and their enemies, their hopes and their fears.’ ~ John Paul Lederach (1997: 27)

Introduction Although latest statistics show a significant drop in social hostilities involving religion (from 33% in 2012 to 27% in 2013), ‘roughly a quarter of the world’s countries are still grappling with high levels of religious hostilities’ (Pew Research Center, 2015: 4). In particular, religious conflicts in which Christians and Muslims are the main actors are widespread, and these have been traditionally linked to exclusivist attitudes among adherents. Extremists, due to their non-tolerant attitudes, have created an atmosphere of animosity and violence against members of other religions (Thomson, 2012; and Samson, 2012). This has been exacerbated by ethnic, political, economic, and cultural variables in recent

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years (Fox, 1999 and 2000; and Smock, 2008). The unending conflict in the Central African Republic between Muslim rebels and Christian vigilante groups is a good example. Nigeria, which has Christianity and Islam as its two dominant religions, is another good example of a site of increasing Christian-Muslim conflict. Historically, the conflictual relations between Christians and Muslims in the country have resulted in large-scale violence including the Fagge riots in Kano (1982), the Kaduna crisis (1987), the Jalingo riots (1992), the Zangon-Kataf crisis (1992), the sharia riots in Kano and Kaduna (2000), the Jos Plateau ethno-religious crises (2001), and the post-2011 general elections crisis in Northern Nigeria, to name a few cases (Kukah and Falola, 1996; Muhammad, 2008; Onapajo and Usman, 2015; Salawu, 2010). These violent conflicts have led to the deaths of many from both sides — the cross (Christians) and the crescent (Muslims) — and serves to demonstrate the seriousness of the problem. The Nigerian situation has largely been fuelled by the politicisation of religion, right from the pre-independence era (Kukah, 1993; Enwerem, 1995; Muhammad, 2008; Onapajo, 2012; Ntamu et al., 2014). Nothing has changed in this regard as the country's elites continue to manipulate religious identities in their quest for political power. The emergence of the Islamist terrorist group, Boko Haram (which means ‘Western education is a sin’) in the north of Nigeria, whose raison d’etre keeps changing from political to religious, reinforces this idea (Maiangwa and Uzodike, 2012; Mustapha, 2012). Boko Haram's mission is shrouded in inconsistencies and this highlights the underlying issue of mixing religion with politics in a multi-religious state. Scholars have, to different degrees, proffered solutions to the religious conflicts in Nigeria. For example, Onapajo (2012) recommends a political solution in which dignified roles are assigned to religious leaders, whilst Sampson (2012) suggests the establishment and sustenance of neoreligious education practice in which the youth will be educated in the culture of religious tolerance. For Aleyomi (2012), the causes of ethnoreligious conflicts in Nigeria are multi-dimensional — from the politics of the country in general to issues of poverty, corruption, oppression, domination, exploitation, and religious intolerance — and these conflicts have to be strategically managed in order to save the country from collapse. Similarly, Onwe (2014) suggests an economic management strategy which should include provision for all ethnic and religious groups, and the elimination of existing economic and socio-political policies capable of engendering and sustaining ethno-religious differences in the

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country. Additionally, Fan, Jummai and Onuoha (2014) recommend establishing an inter-religious commission mandated to work towards improving religious tolerance in all states of the country. In the light of the ongoing Boko Haram crisis, which further strains the relationship between Christians and Muslims in the country, Onapajo and Usman (2015) additionally advocate greater unity among members of the two religions. As a point of departure from the previous solutions proffered in extant literature, the current study presents a religious peacebuilding strategy based on the resources of peace found in Christianity and Islam. This strategy is inspired and embedded in John Paul Lederach’s integrated model of peacebuilding. The remaining part of the chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section presents the theoretical framework that guides the study, while the second section focuses on a brief literature review of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, as well as the scholarly efforts to find solutions to the conflicts. The third section is an historical analysis of the factors that have given rise to the animosity that has characterised Christian-Muslim relations in the country. The fourth section examines the resources and fundamental values reinforcing the peacebuilding potential of both religions. The final section presents ‘dialogue’ as a strategy to harness the peacebuilding potential of the religions.

Theoretical Framework In his groundbreaking book, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (1997), John Paul Lederach develops an integrated model of peacebuilding in which he contends that, in order to achieve lasting peace in situations of conflict in the contemporary world, new approaches need to be developed. For Lederach ‘building peace in today's conflicts calls for long-term commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of a society, an infrastructure that empowers the resources for reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the contribution from outside’ (1997: xvi). The components of this model include structure, process, reconciliation, resources and coordination. For Lederach, therefore, reconciliation is an encounter and, in this encounter, there is a need to create space in which the conflicting parties can come together to look at the issues of conflict between them and move on with the project of peace. The concept of ‘nested paradigms’ adopted by Lederach is an additional approach that provides structure for reconciliation, with a focus on the

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relationship that exists between the parties and how the levels of leadership can coordinate themselves effectively towards achieving short and long term objectives in the task of reconciliation (Lederach, 1997: 5558). This paradigm was first proposed by the peace-worker and theorist, Maire Dugan, and it views a specific incident as part of the relationship between parties (for further explanation, see Wright, 2004). On the whole, the ‘structure’ component exists at three levels: top-level leadership (governments and authorities); the middle leadership (civil groups and leaders of the conflicting groups); and the grassroots (the masses). Lederach’s peacebuilding framework is, without a doubt, useful in many respects to the religious conflict situation that has plagued Nigeria. Firstly, the framework integrates certain elements of other well-known peacebuilding theories, especially Adam Curle’s (1971) ‘restructuring relationships,’ which enriches the model. Secondly, the model embodies religious peacebuilding principles like reconciliation and the rebuilding of relationships which are relevant to realising sustainable peace in conflict societies. These are also values that underpin the peacebuilding potential of both Christianity and Islam. This study will make recommendations for how the different structural levels in Lederach’s framework should participate in Nigeria’s peacebuilding process.

Establishing the Factors that have Negatively Influenced the Relationship between Christianity and Islam in Nigeria A brief history of Christianity and Islam in Nigeria Islam arrived in the central Sudan states1 between the 11th and 12th centuries AD during the era of the Kanem Bornu Empire. The visible progress and proper Islamic reform in that region was during the 19th century jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio, aimed at restoring Islam to its pure state within the region (Ibrahim, 1991; and Kenny, 1996). Nolte, Danjibo and Oladeji (2009: 10) also affirm that ‘while Islam has been entrenched in pre-colonial Hausa cities for centuries, many other northern groups converted to Islam in the wake of the nineteenth century Islamic jihad 1

This is the area in which present Northern Nigeria falls which includes ‘the region stretching between the Songhay of the middle Niger and Waday lying beyond the Lake Chad, which is orientated partly towards the Niger and the partly towards Lake Chad’ (Trimingham, 1962: 104).

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under Uthman dan Fodio (1754-1817).’ Moreover, according to Komolafe (2012:1), ‘the ostensible religious objectives of the jihad were to bring Islamic reforms to the state and its populace and to oppose the oppression, corruption, self-indulgence, and technical offences against the Islamic code by the ruling Hausa-Habe families of the time.’ Dan Fodio’s jihad and Islamic reformation of the area of present-day Northern Nigeria was out of religious conviction but it also had a political nuance. The jihad effectively signalled and installed an Islamic leadership and politics within the areas he conquered (Paden, 2005: 25). Politics and religion became intertwined in this area as the Islamic leader and social reformer Uthman Dan Fodio deposed pagan chiefs and Hausa rulers and effectively established the Fulani hegemony in Northern Nigeria (Alao, 2010). The Fulani jihad also affected the northern part of the Yoruba kingdoms, influencing trade with the Fulani. The south-west Yoruba kingdoms saw the introduction of Islam among the Yoruba people around 1840 (Gbadamosi, 1978; Ejiogu, 2011). On the other hand, the successful Christian mission into the area which constitutes present-day southern Nigeria came with the advent of the British explorers to the area around the River Niger. Earlier Christian missionary efforts into Nigeria started between 1472 and 1621, when several Portuguese kings commissioned Christian missionary activities in the then Warri and Benin Kingdoms.2 However, the said mission failed because of the Portuguese explorers’ interest in trade rather than in missionary activities, and because most of them died of malaria (Ezegbobelu, 2009). Missionary hopes were rekindled (with the return of ex-slaves from Sierra Leone) by Bishop Ajayi Crowther, whose Church Missionary Society (Anglican) started in the region around 1857 (Baur, 1994: 49). The Catholic Niger Mission, comprising Igboland and the Benin area, also started in the late 1880s. The Society of African Missions Missionaries and the Congregation of the Holy Ghost are the major missionary congregations who followed the Niger River into the interior, reaching the then Benin Kingdom in the west and the Igbo villages to the east of the Niger (Baur, 1994: 147). This signalled the presence of Christian missionaries in the area of southern Nigeria. The missionaries later arrived in the Igbo hinterlands and the Middle Belt area. Parts of the south-west area had also already experienced Protestant Christian

2

Hiskett (1984: 202) also notes that the presence of the early Portuguese missionaries in the West African coastal areas, supported by Pope Nicholas V’s Bull, was also part of the Catholic Church’s effort to forestall Islam in that region.

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missionaries, who were mostly freed slaves from Sierra Leone, Latin America and Brazil (Ezegbobelu, 2009: 23-24).

Proselytisation as a factor that led to mutual animosity It is clear from this history that these two religions thrive on the mission to convert. This brings us to the issue of proselytisation, which is also a factor in Nigerian ethno-religious conflicts. According to An-Na’im (1999: 5): Proselytisation is about people’s freedom to propagate their own religious commitments in an effort to reach out and share with others the merits and benefits that the religion is held to generate and sustain in the individual and communal life of believers. Proselytisation is also represented as a religious imperative for believers to pursue for their own personal salvation and self-realisation […] The underlying claim is that target groups would probably ‘see the light’ if only they were allowed to hear the message or observe the living example of the believers.

The above description was, and still is, true of the missionary activities of both Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. Proselytisation has also resulted in the politicisation of religion, which continues to escalate the animosity between the adherents of both religions. For instance, Uthman Dan Fodio's mission to purify Islam may be understood in the context of mixing religion with politics, hence the politicisation of religion in Northern Nigeria. In this part of the country, particularly among the Muslim population, these two social variables represent two sides of the same coin. This is understandably so because as Oguntola-Laguda (2008: 123) notes, ‘Islam is a way of life, which dictates, the political ideology and practice in any Islamic society’. Likewise, the Christian missionaries intended to expand and bring in more converts but their agenda was halted by the colonialists who reached an agreement with the northern rulers to forestall such activity into the defunct northern region (Trimingham, 1962: 230; and Salamone, 2010: 52). The northern rulers were very skeptical about Western culture and education, which the south had already embraced, because they felt it would corrupt their religio-cultural values and ways of life. This aids our understanding of the ideology guiding the Boko Haram group. The founder of this group (Yusuf) criticised other Islamic scholars and their preachings as being watered down by Western influences and education.

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He mobilised his followers along the teaching that Western values run contrary to Islamic values, hence the need to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria and introduce sharia (Danjibo, 2010: 7).

Pre-Independence politics and the politicisation of religion in Nigeria Nigeria's history suggests that the mixing of religion with politics catalyses ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. In this, there is a conscious effort by politicians and stakeholders from the two dominant religions to maintain control of power to further their own ethno-religious agenda. This could be inferred even from the pre-independence era. As already noted, during that period, there was a fear by northern Muslims that their religious beliefs and ways of life may be corrupted by Christians from the south. As rightly observed by Muhammad (2008: 122): the sowing of the seed of antagonisms between Islam and Christianity dates back to pre-independence period when the British colonialists embarked on the policy of protecting the Muslim North from the ‘destructive influence’ of the Christian South but went ahead to amalgamate the two into one political entity.

The politicisation of the religion of the pre-independence era was carried forward to the post-independence period. The formation of the Jamaatul Nasril Islam (JNI), in 1962, by Sir Ahmadu Bello, the late Sardauna of Sokoto and the Premier of the Northern Region may be seen in this light. The raison d’etre of the Islamic congress was to participate and lobby for the Islamic interests of the northern people in the politics of the new nation (Komolafe, 2012). Furthermore, the political mobilisation of the northern people was underpinned by religious motivations, since ‘Islam allows for a spiritual relationship between religion and politics’ (Oguntola-Laguda, 2008: 128). Christians' foray into politics and the use of Christianity to mobilise political support and negotiate power became apparent following the establishment of many political associations and parties with strong connections to the Church. These include: Tiv Progressive Union (TPU); Middle Zone League (MZL); Middle-Belt People’s Party (MBPP); United Middle-Belt Congress (UMBC); Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League; and Birom Progressive Union (BPU). These were established with the ultimate ambition of challenging a perceived Islamisation of the northern region (Onapajo, 2012: 48). In addition, the Christian Association of

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Nigeria (CAN), which was formed in 1976 against the backdrop of promoting the interests of Christians in Nigeria, has played a prominent role in rallying support for Christian candidates at elections and negotiating for political appointments on their behalf. Hence, there was apparent political power play as this phenomenon pitted the politicians along both religious and ethnic lines, which set the pace for the subsequent power play in Nigeria in the years after independence. Consequently, Nigerian politicians have become divided along both religious and ethnic lines. Matters of national importance are reduced to ethnicity and religion. In Nigeria, religion is ‘a potent political force that cannot be ignored in any national issue, be it foreign or domestic, while it has continued to be manipulated in furtherance of the objectives of politicians’ (Muhammad, 2008: 122). The historico-political encounters in the country have conditioned some of the adherents of the two religions to become mutually prejudiced against each other. This paper therefore argues that the animosity which feeds into the politicisation of religion in the first place emanates from the mutual prejudice and exclusivist perceptions held by Christian and Muslim adherents, even before the inception of these religions in Nigeria. It is this mutual prejudice that is then played on by political elites in order to foment conflict. Therefore, the aim in the next section will be to posit a way forward by analysing the values that constitute the abilities of the two conflicting religious parties to contribute to sustainable peace in Nigeria. This is situated within our chosen theoretical framework of dialogue. This agrees with Lederach’s (1997) view that conflicting parties are not just recipients of peacebuilding interventions; they are also resources to transform the conflict they generate.

A Dialogue towards the Transformation of Religious Conflict in Nigeria According to Gülen (2006: 1), ‘dialogue means the coming together of two or more people to discuss certain issues, and thus the forming of a bond between these people. In that respect, we can call dialogue an activity that has human beings at its axis.’ For Langmead (2009: 2), ‘initsbroadestsensedialogueisallabout respectful conversation in which two or more parties share what they believe while open to learning from each other.’ On its own, inter-religious dialogue is a concept which defines the encounter between religions that come together in order to better understand each other through different means and to foster peace

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among them. Likewise, according to Mandour (2010: 889), ‘dialogue […] is not an end in itself but a means to achieve tolerance, which in turn promotes culture exchange, common understanding, and positive and peaceful coexistence, and consolidates the roots of mutual cooperation in all spheres and at all levels.’ Evidently, dialogue, particularly interreligious dialogue, is essential to realising peace as an end in the religious conflicts in Nigeria. Inter-religious dialogue is presented in this chapter as a strategy to addressing those religious conflicts that have continuously threatened the unity of the country. Banchoff (2012: 204) further explains that inter-religious dialogue ‘refers to communication and interaction with other religious traditions in a cooperative spirit […and] its primary aims are not to prevail over the other but to reduce conflict and promote understanding and cooperation across issues of common concern.’ Fitzgerald and Borelli (2006: 140) identify four forms of dialogue: dialogue of life, dialogue of action, dialogue of discourse and dialogue of religious experience. In the dialogue of life, members of these religions will come to realise that their neighbours deserve respect, love and dignity. In the dialogue of action, members come together to engage in action towards any project that leads to reconciliation and the progress of the society in which they live. Peacebuilding is one such project and, in coming together in a dialogue of action, they then work together actively to realise the value of peace in their societies. Coming together in this form of dialogue will also enable members to actively contribute towards a faith-based response to any humanitarian crises in Nigeria.3 The dialogue of discourse provides the opportunity to listen to one another as religious leaders meet to seek consensus on doctrinal issues and other theological disputes. Engaging in the dialogue of sharing religious experience will enable Christians and Muslims in Nigeria to respect each other. It will also lead to openness as one comes to understand the spirituality, tenets and values that other religions hold in esteem.

3

An example of this kind of faith-based response is seen in the emergence of the faith-based organisation, Gift of the Givers, in South Africa. The NGO was established by Dr. Imtiaz Sooliman in 1992, on the instruction of a Sufi Sheik and spiritual teacher, Muhammed Saffer Effendi al Jerrahi. Since it started, the faithbased NGO has helped people in different parts of the world — in the midst of different disasters — with humanitarian aid. For more, see the Gift of the Givers website: http://www.giftofthegivers.co.za/

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Based on the realisation that a common teaching on the love of God and one’s neighbour should lead Christians and Muslims towards a dialogue of reconciliation and peacebuilding, Islamic leaders around the world wrote an open letter (A Common Word between Us and You) to Christian leaders in 2007, on the need for global peace. The letter highlights the value of love and peace which can be found in the two religions and which constitutes the foundation for peace among the adherents of the two. It further calls on Christian and Muslim adherents to come together to foster a relationship of peace wherever they are in the world. The letter was positively received by Christian leaders who, in turn, gave a ‘Christian response to A Common Word Between Us and You’ (see the Yale Center for Faith and Culture, 2008). The number of responses the letter has attracted shows the importance of the call to the task of peacebuilding that is extended to these two religions. In the foreword to the book, which focuses on the responses to the Common Word, the former Prime Minister of Britain, Tony Blair, noted that: The significance of religion in this world and in the lives of billions of people is something we simply cannot ignore or write off as a vestige of antiquity. Faith in God guides and gives meaning to the lives of billions of people around the world, myself included. Yet none of us can at the same time ignore the potential for conflict between religious populations – not limited to but including Christians and Muslims (2010: ix-x).

Blair’s comment suggests that the capacity of religion to precipitate or sustain conflicts in contemporary society cannot be ignored. However, the essence of Blair’s assertion is to highlight the influence of religion which, in spite of its potential for conflict, can also be utilised to promote peacebuilding. This is why according to Blair, the Common Word is crucial as it allows Christians and Muslims embroiled in religious conflict to understand the potential of peace in their religions and bring it to bear in peacebuilding efforts. Blair (2010: x) added that: With the momentum of globalisation, countries and cultures are being drawn closer and closer together with astonishing speed, creating a world that is becoming ever more interdependent. As such, not only peaceful coexistence but active cooperation between Christians and Muslims – who together comprise about 55% of the earth’s population – is a necessary component in making the 21st century work more humanely and the earth a better place for all its inhabitants […] as ‘a Common Word’ reminds us, active cooperation with one’s neighbours, grounded in mutual love and respect, is part and parcel of being a Muslim or a Christian […] Christians

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Chapter Ten and Muslims are called to compassionate cooperation with other (sic), regardless of their particular religious affiliation, not in spite of their different faiths, but because of their respective faiths. The shared commandments to love God and to love one’s neighbours are at the core of both religions.

These remarks also point to the idea that, in the current global village in which cultures intersect and people are dependent on one another, peace is paramount. The impacts that the War on Terror has had on the global economy and how religious tensions in major oil-producing countries impact on the prices of oil, serve to illustrate the importance of peace to sustaining normal living conditions. The second point from Blair’s comment is the assertion that active cooperation, and love and respect for one’s neighbour are important values in both Christianity and Islam. This factor underscores participation by faith-based actors in the peacebuilding process. It necessitates cooperation between religious actors with a view to eschewing all forms of violence while promoting peace. According to Volf (2010: 25), the Common Word initiative ‘holds the potential for providing a good platform for Christians and Muslims together to engage great and troubling problems facing humanity today.’ Hence, the most strategic and pragmatic way to realise the project of bringing the potential of peace in Christianity and Islam to bear will be in their ability to freely engage each other in the different aspects of encounter. Lederach (1997) envisions that this encounter is necessary for the paradigm he proposes towards the reconciliation of conflicting groups. In the second quote of the epigraph of this study, Lederach asserts that ‘reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimise the conflicting groups affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humansin-relationship’ (1997: 26). It is clear from this discussion that dialogue is a tool that can be deployed in the process of religious peacebuilding and conflict transformation in situations of conflict among religions. Furthermore, it is important in the rebuilding of relationships between conflicting religions. Banchoff (2012: 204) affirms that ‘when people of different faiths exchange views and engage in dialogue, they typically seek to identify differences and commonalities and build greater understanding.’ Hence, when they come together in any encounter of dialogue, the members of these religions develop an affinity that goes beyond the political, ethnic and religious animosities which cause problems, and learn to live together in peace, as they know it is important to the invaluable process of helping their society.

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This is what Anderson (1984: 188) means when he asserts that ‘[…] our contact may leave us both changed and for the better, not the worse. This can be, and often is, the result of almost any genuine encounter with some other person.’

Appraising the Different Forms of Dialogue for the Nigerian Situation The different forms of dialogue mentioned above are quite appropriate for transforming the spate of religious conflicts in Nigeria as they will help bring the conflicting parties to an encounter geared towards reconciliation, rebuilding relationships and fostering peace. The dialogue of discourse is important and can help when there is a spirit of openness and respect to listen to one another but, as asserted above, this is not always the case. This form of dialogue may result in a deadlock between theologians of the two religions as they may not be able to reach an agreement on certain theological issues. However, the opportunity of an open encounter is important and has the potential to lead to a mutual and respectful dialogue. There is a further possibility that a consensus on shared discourse will be reached. This form of dialogue can be very helpful in realising understanding between the members of the religions and in fostering the atmosphere of peaceful coexistence from which the other forms of dialogue can grow. The other three forms of dialogue are also very important and relevant to the Nigerian situation: dialogues of life, action and the sharing of religious experience are basic forms of dialogue which can allow a closer relationship between the religions, especially at the grassroots level. As Lederach (1997) envisions, these forms of dialogue can bring the adherents of the religions towards engaging in the process of reconciliation and effectively lead the conflicting parties to the realisation of their resources and potential for peace. In the context of Nigeria, these forms of dialogue have the potential to bring Christians and Muslims to those practical aspects that get them to know one another on a day-to-day experiential level. This is important because religious conflicts, as experienced in the north and Middle Belt of Nigeria, do not emanate from theologians or from a theological debate gone awry, but from the grassroots who are aware of the mutual acrimony existing among them. Moreover, when it comes to religious conflicts which are motivated by political and ethnic factors, it is the members at the grassroots that carry out violent acts on one another, as well as on churches and mosques.

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Therefore, to realise dialogue which is geared towards reconciliation and the rebuilding of relationships, Christians and Muslims should engage more in those forms of dialogue which bring them closer to respect themselves as people of God (Ezegbobelu, 2009). Engaging in the dialogues of life, action and the sharing of religious experience will help realise this as adherents can meet each other on the practical levels of life and spirituality, which are important in moving towards a peaceful coexistence. It will also help to establish those resources, analysed earlier by this study, that will lead to actualising the potential for peace among the members of these religions in Nigeria.

A Dialogue between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria: What Roles for the Different Levels? It is important to reiterate that dialogue offers different avenues for religious encounters in attempting to achieve overall peace for a society. Lederach’s (1997) paradigm offers an integrated peacebuilding approach that incorporates dialogue which will bring the conflicting parties (in this case, Nigerian Christians and Muslims) to an encounter that has the potential to lead them towards being more respectful and sensitive to one another. It may also lead them to learn to discuss the issues and distinguish religious from ethno-political issues. Religious issues can then be amicably resolved through various meetings and the political issues can be tackled differently using other forms of secular peacebuilding strategies, such as political settlements, credible elections, good governance and public administration, as well as the constitutional reforms that recognise the equality and rights of different ethnic groups (Toole, 2006: 7). In his effort to establish the overall framework for sustainable peace, Lederach (1997: 37) identified a pyramid of structures. The structures are called ‘levels of leadership’ and include the top-level, middle-range and grassroots level. These levels also translate to three approaches to peacebuilding, including the ‘top-down’, ‘middle-out’ and ‘bottom-up’ approach (1997: 44). Let us now discuss these levels in turn.

The top-level leadership in the religious conflicts in Nigeria As noted earlier, political elites from the cross and the crescent have, in one way or another and at one point or another, contributed to the politicisation of religion, which has become a potent source of religious acrimony in Nigeria. Examples abound: Sir Ahmadu Bello, who many

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believed had an agenda to turn the Nigerian nation into an Islamic fiefdom (see This Day Live, 2012); the bitter debate over the incorporation of Nigeria into the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), by the Babangida administration in 1986; the allegations by Christian leaders, especially the Orkar-led coup plotters, that Christians are major targets of marginalisation in the country; some northern politicians’ adoption of sharia law which resulted in religious conflicts in those states; and the over-religionalisation of the 2015 electoral process by Goodluck Jonathan, by bribing religious leaders and using the altar to campaign for votes, etc. (Falola, 1998; Komolafe, 2012; Onapajo, 2012; and Onapajo and Usman, 2015). These have been sources of conflict between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria and have negatively affected relations between the two. These examples make Lederach’s top-level leadership relevant to the Nigerian context. The form of dialogue that can work at this level is the dialogue of action, in which political leaders from the religious divide use their influence to engender peace. These leaders can, and should, engage in a conscientious effort to realise peace in the country, however elusive it may seem. Politicians in Nigeria should be involved in peacebuilding projects which can run alongside faith-based projects and gain supporters both at the middle and grassroots levels, to work towards peace. These leaders are in a better position to do this as they are already revered and, in most cases, their words are respected. Establishing such a dialogue of action strategy is very important to the realisation of a ‘top-down’ approach to peacebuilding in Nigeria. An example of this kind of top-down effort can be seen in the establishment of the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC), for which President Olusegun Obasanjo’s government provided support in 1999. NIREC includes leaders from the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the Nigeria Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA). Obasanjo's support for this inter-religious body reflects a top-down approach to peacebuilding. It may be argued that Obasanjo's efforts were the result of his realisation that what the country needed was peaceful coexistence. Other leading politicians in Nigeria could take a cue from Obasanjo's example. They should endeavour to use their visibility, influence and ability to command control to initiate avenues in which the conflicting religious parties can come together in a dialogue, to engender peace in the country. The top-down approach should not end in establishing avenues to realise a dialogue of action, though. Leaders within the top-level should also, for

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effective and sustained peacebuilding and the rebuilding of relationships between Christians and Muslims, supervise viable projects like NIREC. The lack of success of NIREC came under criticism by the then governor of Kano State, Shekarau, who lamented that the organisation had not made any positive impact on resolving religious conflicts in the country (Daily Trust, 2008). Similarly, Ezegbobelu (2009: 159) bemoans the failures of NIREC, branding the organisation as a ‘Gala Club of prominent Nigerian religious leaders, who meet occasionally at Nigeria's most costly hotels to enjoy themselves. To pacify the masses, one or two statements are issued to reassure the helpless citizens that the causes of the conflicts and violence are being looked into’ (2009: 155). He further lamented the fact that NIREC has not been effective in initiating ‘active projects that impact cordial relationships among diverse religious groups’ (2009: 159). NIREC can play a better role in resolving the issue of acrimonious relationships between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. This can be realised if the religious leaders who are its members and the politicians from the different religions spearhead the project of dialogue. It is evident that NIREC is not connected to the middle and lower levels. The strategy of coordinating the dialogues of discourse can help to establish the connection that is needed, as NIREC can then have access to the middle level religious leaders who themselves can easily reach the grassroots. This study therefore recommends that this organisation should be at the forefront of organising and moderating a dialogue of theological discourse among the leaders of the two religions. This is with a view that a consensus reached at the theological level will help forge a better understanding among the leaders of the religions (middle level) and, subsequently, for members at the grassroots. This strategy has the potential to bring harmony and the value of peace, as religious leaders will meet to tease out doctrinal and other theological problems that have led to acrimonious relationships between the religions. We also recommend that NIREC should organise, moderate and facilitate discourse between the politicians and religious leaders, in which the issues of the politicisation of religion in Nigeria should be addressed. This form of dialogue would be an avenue through which politicians and religious leaders can reach positive agreement on how to effectively distinguish religious issues from political ones. Undoubtedly, in bringing together religious leaders and politicians to discuss peace, NIREC and other similar organisations will go a long way towards achieving a peaceful Nigeria.

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The middle-range leadership in religious conflicts in Nigeria At this level, we can situate different religious leaders in the different areas of Nigeria where the intermittent eruption of religious conflicts are rife. The leaders here include the different bishops, priests, imams, and so forth, in different religious communities. As Lederach (1997: 51) notes, the middle-out approach is strategic, as religious actors at this level serve as the link between the top and the grassroots in the agenda of peacebuilding. Hence, in an effort towards realising a strategic religious peacebuilding in Nigeria through dialogue, leaders at the middle-range level are very important and their job is crucial. They have a big role to play in rebuilding the relationship between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria through effective religious dialogue. Similarly, as Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana and Abu-Nimer (2005: 15-17) observed, these sets of people are important in realising a faith-based strategy to peacebuilding, because in most cases they are educated in spirituality and the demands of their faith. Further, they are influential in society and their words can move people to action. Their words can lead to conflict in the same way they can lead to peace. The extent to which the middle-out approach can work in Nigeria can be seen in the example of the story of Pastor James Wuye and Imam Nuryan Ashaffa, in Kaduna State. These two were sworn enemies as a result of their religious convictions and their status as upper level leaders of two religio-political groups in Kaduna State.4 They trained local militias to intimidate and kill members of the other’s religion (Global Post, 10 March 2014). However, according to Griswold (2010: 22), both men later found ways of achieving reconciliation and peace, rebuilding their relationship by utilising the resources and tenets of peace and love found in their religions. Having realised the need to build peace among the members of their different religions in their communities they engaged in a dialogue of action and founded a faith-based organisation called the Interfaith

4

Mohammed Ashafa was then a leader of a militant Islamic group in the north and the Secretary General of the Muslim Youth Councils, while James Wuye was involved in militant Christian activities and served as the Secretary General of the Kaduna State Chapter of the Christian Association of Nigeria. See the profiles of the Imam and the Pastor, prepared by Ashoka Innovators: .

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Mediation Centre (IMC), ‘which seeks to resolve crises between these rival groups’ (2010: 22). It could be surmised that the IMC was established to help these middlerange leaders realise the role that Lederach accorded to them, to coordinate the short- and long-term visions of transforming religious conflicts in some communities in Northern Nigeria. The efforts of this group and their leaders (the pastor and the imam) have seen them transforming their violent community (Kaduna town) into a peaceful one. It has also seen them engaging in different faith-based projects, bettering their community and healing the wounds caused by religious conflicts, both in their community and other parts of the country. For example, in November 2004, by invitation of the administrator of Plateau State, the duo carried their religious peacebuilding message of dialogue to the religious-conflictridden town of Yelwa-Nshar (see Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana and AbuNimer, 2005; and Griswold, 2010). This substantiates the importance of dialogue as a peacebuilding strategy in rebuilding relationships among Christians and Muslims in Nigeria. Therefore, this author recommends that Christian and Muslim leaders in different communities engage in open discussion on theological doctrines which have previously led to exclusivist attitudes in their respective religions. The aim of this discourse is to create avenues for greater understanding of these religions’ spiritual and theological resources that can help members work towards peaceful coexistence with members of other religious groups. The fruits of a consensus reached on shared theological and doctrinal tenets, principles and resources can help to improve relationships among members of these religions and can subsequently lead to a successful dialogue of life. Hence, this study also recommends that, at this level, religious leaders should help coordinate and encourage the different avenues of day to day encounters between members of these religions living in their communities. They should encourage their adherents to learn to be cordial with people of other religions, who live in the same community. In addition, it is the duty of the middle-range leaders to communicate to the grassroots members that Christians and Muslims share the same word of love for God and one’s neighbour, and encourage them to endeavour to live in harmony and peace with members of the other religion. The challenge for religious leaders will be to work with government to achieve a form of discourse that understands their grievances and then work

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towards peace. These strategies can lead to a peaceful coexistence and sustained peace in different communities. However, it is worth noting that groups like Boko Haram may not be amenable to this strategy of peace as their violent actions and fundamentalist stance show that perhaps they do not want peace, let alone dialogue.

The grassroots leadership in the religious conflicts in Nigeria As observed by Lederach (1997: 42), the grassroots level ‘represents the masses [at] the base of the society. Individuals at this level are involved in the day to day activities in the conflict areas.’ In the Nigerian context, at this level, are the adherents of the two dominant religions in the country who bear the brunt of religious conflict. They are the ones who feel the fear and the suffering that characterises the conflicts around them, and witness first-hand the deep-rooted hatred generated by the conflicts on a daily basis (Lederach, 1997: 43). They are Christians and Muslims living together in different communities in the country, and the irony is that when there is any form of provocation, members at this level unleash mayhem on each other. It is most often the case that the grassroots members are used by those at the top and middle-range (because of their political and economic interests) to foment conflict in the name of religion. They are financed and supplied with arms by politicians, wealthy individuals, and traditional rulers, etc., who may have ethno-political motives different from religious ones for unleashing mayhem on people of other ethno-religious backgrounds (Krause, 2011). They are mobilised easily, as they have the utmost respect for these top level actors who, in most cases, represent them in the politics of the country at large. However, grassroots members of these different religions have a role to play in realising the project of establishing sustained peace in their communities and in wider Nigerian society. Due to their position, which enables them to have day to day meetings and interact with members of other religions who live in the same community, they are well suited to engage in the dialogues of life, the sharing of religious experience, and action. However, the dialogues of life and action are envisaged as being more effective at this level because they help towards rebuilding relationships between neighbours of different religions, and in improving their lives as humans living close to each other. Encouraging grassrootslevel leadership to engage in these forms of dialogue is a worthwhile

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venture, as it will not only help to establish peace among them, but also help to create human, social, economic, and political progress in their communities, as envisaged by Dupuis (1991: 235). This study therefore recommends that Christians and Muslims at the grassroots level engage in the dialogues of action and life. They should be helped by their leaders at the middle-level who have the role of encouraging these forms of dialogue, basing them on the resources and tenets of their religion. The middle-level leadership (because of their revered position as teachers and theologians) should be able to interpret for these members the resources of peacebuilding in their religions (Bouta, Kadayifci-Orellana, and Abu-Nimer, 2005). This will help to rebuild the relationship between Christians and Muslims living together, and encourage them to make the potential for peace that exists in their religions become a reality. On the dialogue of sharing religious experience, the religious leaders have the task of encouraging the grassroots leaders to engage in such things as the sharing of religious experiences, engaging in prayer meetings, organising visits to the other religion’s places of worship, and felicitating with them in their different religious ceremonies. These are the basic aspects of dialogue which will help to rebuild relationships among conflicting parties, and is the recommendation to the grassroots Christians and Muslims in Nigeria for achieving reconciliation and sustainable peace. Furthermore, it is important to stress that youths should be involved as peace-builders in religious conflict areas like Jos. Mecha (2013: 4) first bemoans the fact that the youths who are part of the grassroots in the conflicts are often neglected at project level and in the efforts towards peacebuilding. However, the author established that youths often play constructive roles (usually in the shadows) in the peace process (2013: 4). Taking into consideration this assertion, and the reality that youths do make up the grassroots of Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, this study makes a recommendation that youths in different communities affected by religious conflicts should not be neglected in the search for sustainable peace. They should be mobilised in the process of a dialogue of action as actors and this should also be co-ordinated by top-level and middle-range leaders. The ability of the youths to be resourceful peace-builders, as Mecha (2013) established, should be the basis of their involvement in a grassroots-level dialogue of action.

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Conclusion The epigraph of this work first presents the wise words of the Tibetan monk, Thich Nhat Hanh, which establishes the nexus between peace in the world and peace among the religions of the world. These words bring to the fore the awareness that religion is a force that has engendered conflict. This is true in Nigeria, where Christians and Muslims are complicit in the ethno-religious conflicts that have bedevilled the country. However, the assertion that if there is peace among religions there will be peace in the world also provides the motivation to encourage maximum effort in religious peacebuilding strategies. In order to realise such strategies, this study adopted Lederach’s (1997) model which envisages that encounters between conflicting parties are important to achieve reconciliation and rebuild relationships. Hence, this study has posited that the best way to find sustainable peace under the circumstances of religious conflicts in Nigeria is to get actors from the two dominant religions to engage in the search for sustainable peace through different forms of dialogue. Ezegbobelu (2009: 91) rightly notes that ‘dialogue seeks truth by trusting another. It is the optimism of the heart and not necessarily the optimism of reason in the case of dialectics.’ This optimism is needed in the efforts to resolve religious conflicts in Nigeria. The way to peace through reconciliation between Christians and Muslims in the country is dialogue, which emanates from the need to reconcile conflicting parties and the need to establish peace among them. According to the renowned Islamic peacebuilding leader, Gülen (2006: 3), ‘if we start our efforts for dialogue with the belief that “peace is better” […] then we must demonstrate that we are on the side of peace at home and abroad.’ Therefore, dialogue in its various forms should be established and used as a tool for getting the conflicting religions in Nigeria to encounter one another at different levels.

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Onapajo, H. (2012), ‘Politics for God: Religion, politics and conflict in Democratic Nigeria’, The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.4, no.9, pp.42-66. Onapajo, H. and Usman, A. (2015), ‘Fuelling the Flames: Boko Haram and deteriorating Christian–Muslim relations in Nigeria’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 35, no. 1, pp.106-122. Onwe, O.J. (2014), ‘Economic management of ethno-religious crises in Nigeria: A strategic model’, Journal of Business Law and Ethics, vol. 2, no.1, pp.117-136. Paden, J.N. (2005), Muslim civic cultures and conflict resolution: The challenge of democratic federalism in Nigeria, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Pew Research Center (2015), ‘Latest trends in religious restrictions and hostilities’, http://www.pewforum.org/2015/02/26/religious-hostilities (accessed 18 March 2015). Salamone, F.A. (2010), The Hausa of Nigeria, Maryland: University Press of America. Salawu, B. (2010), ‘Ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria: Causal analysis and proposals for new management strategies’, European Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 13, no. 3, pp.345 360. Sampson, I.T. (2012), ‘Religious violence in Nigeria: Causal diagnoses and strategic recommendations to the state and religious communities’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 12, no. 1, pp.103-133. Sanneh, L. (1999), ‘Church and state relations: Western norms, Muslim practice, and the African experience: A comparative account of origin and practice’, in An-Na’im, A.A. (ed.), Proselytization and communal self-determination in Africa, Maryknoll: Orbis Books, pp.77-108. Schmidt-Leukel, P. (2004), ‘Part of the problem, part of the solution’, in Schmidt-Leukel P. (ed.), War and peace in world religions: The Gerald Weisfeld Lectures. London: SCM Press, pp.1-8. Smock, D. (2008), Religion in world affairs: Its role in conflict and peace, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. Thich, N.H. (1995), Living Buddha, living Christ, New York: Riverhead Books. This Day Live (2012), ‘A peep into the past’ 01 October http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/a-peep-into-the-past/126490/ (accessed 18 June 2013). Thomson, V. (2012), ‘Boko Haram and Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria’ Global Security Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, p.46.

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Toole, D. (2006), Peace-building strategies: Transition from relief to development: Why children and early intervention matter, UNICEF Emergency Programmes Report. Trimingham, J.S. (1962), A history of Islam in West Africa, London: Oxford University Press. Volf, M. (2010), A common word for a common future, in Volf, M., Bin Muhammad, G., and Yarrington, M. (eds.) A common word: Muslims and Christians on loving God and neighbour, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, pp.18-27. Wright, W.A. (2004), John Paul Lederach: A Peacebuilder Bibliography [Online article]. http://www.mediate.com/articles/wrightw2.cfm (accessed 5 February 2014). Yale Centre for Faith and Culture (2008), ‘Loving God and neighbour together: A Christian response to the “A common word among us and you”’, http://www.yale.edu/faith/acw/acw.htm (accessed 25 May 2013).

CHAPTER ELEVEN THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY: GENDERING CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING IN NIGERIA GEORGE AKWAYA GENYI

Introduction Gender concerns are crucial in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in conflict-ridden societies, especially in any long-term peace project that seeks to avoid or reduce the recurrence of violence. At every stage of conflict resolution, including post-conflict, gender concerns are indispensable if the aim of the peace process is to rebuild an equitable society and enhance sustainable development (Varisco, 2010). In rebuilding postconflict societies, the role of women as agents of socio-economic development is especially important as they represent an ‘untapped resource in peace building’ (Norville, 2011: 4). The neglect of the significance of the role of women in conflict resolution is connected to the stereotypical and patriarchal images of the female gender across societies, particularly in Africa. In war-torn and conflict-ridden societies, women have usually been seen just as victims, which is an over simplification of the reality of women’s role in conflict situations (Kumalo, 2015). Women participate as fighters, supporters of combatants, offering care to their partners. In the worst cases, women and girls have been subjected to various forms of sexual abuse, slave labour; they dominate camps that house refugees and internally displaced people. Despite the active roles played by women in conflict situations, they are rarely involved in peace processes, especially in Africa, as most peace agreements or ceasefires have been conducted solely by men. These ‘outside-down’ approaches have failed to tap into the huge potential for women to unlock the forces of war and facilitate the peacebuilding process (Varisco, 2010: 4).

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This chapter examines women’s contribution to peacebuilding in Africa, with a specific emphasis on the efforts of women in north-eastern Nigeria where Boko Haram's reign of terror has continuously destroyed people's livelihoods. The chapter is situated within the context of the efforts by civil society groups to advocate for gender mainstreaming in public policy. Female activists have emerged across Northern Nigeria and have been putting pressure on the authorities to end or resolve conflicts using frameworks that include women. Recently in Nigeria, a number of women have taken to activism to challenge religious extremism that fuels terrorism. They have also mobilised against insurgency in an environment traditionally hostile to women’s voices.

Feminism and Theories of Women in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Feminist intellectual roots can be traced to Plato’s (c. 427-347 BC) elevation of women alongside men in his idealised republic. For Plato, political life is incomplete without the participation of women. Aristophanes (c. 446-386 BC) advanced this position by portraying women as peaceoriented and less belligerant than men. Similarly, Nicolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) argued that women mattered in society. It therefore follows that, if women play important roles in a society, it is only a matter of justice to allow them to operate in the interests of that society. The expositions on freedom and justice by philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, John Rawls and John Stuart Mill that inspired the core of the liberal feminist’s belief that men and women are equally capable of reason and that both should be educated in its use, is important to the discourse on feminism (Berger, 1979). It was from this premise that liberal feminism began to challenge patriarchal notions of male-female characterisation of the power relations that tend to shape all aspects of women’s roles in society. Mary Astell (1666-1731), a liberal feminist, rejected the sex differences between men and women and advocated treating them as equal. In a patriarchal society, sex differences are foregrounded and exaggerated to account for gender differentiation in roles and to justify stereotypes. Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) argued that men and women equally possess reason and should be educated on equal terms to use it. Wollstonecraft further argued that education was crucial to women as it would enable them to exercise reason optimally and realise their inner virtues as fellow human beings. In this sense, it seems fair to assert that men and women are equal in the rights they possess.

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These thoughts serve as the bedrock for the development of theories that offer gendered analysis of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. The theories are based on two major perspectives: the inclusivity and institutional perspectives. The former acknowledges differences in men and women’s experience in conflicts and seeks to ensure that women’s interests and needs are met, whilst the latter suggests that the critical role played by women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding should be recognised and effort should be made to ensure that women continue to perform these roles (Rehn and Johnson-Sirleaf, 2002). The two perspectives are a mix of several approaches to the topic of women and conflict resolution and peacebuilding theorisation. These approaches include practical needs, protection, and transformative frameworks. The practical needs approach questions the neutrality of humanitarian organisations operating in conflict areas, which eventually play into the existing gender power structures of societies that subordinate women (Clifton and Gell, 2001). For example, gender neutral programs end up enforcing existing inequalities. It is also argued that women’s practical needs arising from reproductive and sexual health, and motherhood and care, require special consideration in the distribution of food, sanitary towels and other resources in camps for internally-displaced people (Rehn and Johnson-Sirleaf, 2002). The protection approach contends that peacebuilding perspectives and measures must acknowledge the gendered vulnerabilities of women and girls and hence offer them special protection. For instance, women and girls undergo systematic brutality in the form of sexual violence and other attacks on their bodies during conflict. Similar forms of violence against women still occur after the formal cessation of hostilities. In the face of these vulnerabilities, women and girls require special protection in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes because the widespread use of sexual violence has reached the scale of ‘feminicide’ in the 21st century (Frieyro de Lara and Carillo, 2012: 50). The transformative approaches are informed by radical feminist arguments in support of a gendered path to peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Puechguirbal (2010), for instance, blames patriarchy as the principal reason for violence. The transformative argument therefore calls for a fundamental shift in gender power relations and, if this is not achieved, post-conflict efforts only seek to re-establish pre-wartime roles. Similarly, stereotypes of femininity are re-emphasised in the post-war period,

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extolling women’s roles as wives and mothers while ignoring the roles they are capable of playing in matters of peacebuilding.

International Norms for Gender Inclusivity in Peace Processes International responses to the call for gender inclusivity in all phases of the peace process only recently gained momentum. The build-up of efforts towards gender inclusivity began more concretely in 1979 with the establishment of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The Convention addressed issues of rights for women and the need to open up space for access to opportunities that were encumbered by various forms of cultural and legal discriminations against women. It was expected that, by eliminating the tendency to discriminate against women, participation would be expanded. Indeed, the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action has remained the most progressive blueprint ever for advancing women’s rights (UN WOMEN, 2015). Its first strategic objective set the target to increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decisionmaking levels, and to protect women living in conflict areas. The fourth objective of the declaration particularly seeks to promote women’s contributions to fostering a culture of peace. It may not be out of place to assert that this declaration laid the foundation for UN Resolution 1325. It was in the attempt to advance the ambitions of the Beijing Declaration that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were formulated, with goal number three underscoring the importance of gender equality. Like the Beijing Declaration, emphasis was laid on closing the gap between males and females in socio-economic opportunities including access to education, employment and government positions. These elements would be activated through public policy driven by state-centric institutional responses. The UN has acknowledged that significant progress has been made along these lines, particularly with the average proportion of women in parliament around the world nearly doubling in the last 20 years (UN, 2015: 1). Thus, on 31st October 2000, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1325, which represented a profound consideration of the ‘unrecognised, underutilised and undervalued contribution of women to preventing war, building peace and working toward social justice’ (Munuve, 2010: 14). The resolution stressed the importance of women’s

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equal participation and full involvement in maintaining and promoting peace and security. In other words, the resolution addressed the issue that makes women and indeed, a gender perspective, crucial to all aspects of peacebuilding. The resolution has not only called for, but has strengthened the demand for increased representation of women at peace negotiations and at all levels of decision-making regarding security, inclusion of women in post-conflict reconstruction efforts, disarmament, demobilisation, re-integration efforts, increased protection from sexual violence, and an end to impunity for crimes affecting women (Norville, 2011: 2). It may therefore be argued that Resolution 1325, for the first time, recognised women as actors and contributors to the peace process and not just as war victims. Women’s voices are needed in these places to frame public policies and peace agreements. Resolution 1325 is anchored on four pillars: participation; protection; relief; and recovery. These pillars address the impact of war on women and seek to allow them to play a pivotal role in conflict management for sustainable peace. The UNSC acknowledged the changing nature of warfare that targets more civilians and where women are excluded from any peace process. By involving women as critical actors, it is hoped that they will offer vital perspectives on the understanding of conflict and provide strategies towards peacebuilding that focus on creating ties across opposing factions and increasing the inclusiveness, transparency and sustainability of peace processes (USIP, 2012: 4). As mentioned earlier, protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence in humanitarian and refugee camps is important. Prevention of these acts of violence against women and girls, as well as the prosecution of culprits, would support women’s rights and promote the effectiveness of international law. Relief and recovery measures are also important in resolving conflicts from a gender perspective in respect of civilians in refugee camps, considering the special gender needs of women and girls. By October 2015, about 43 countries had rolled out national action plans for the implementation of Resolution 1325. The list includes the following African countries: Cote d’Ivoire (2007); Uganda (2008); Liberia (2009); DRC (2010); Rwanda (2010); Sierra Leone (2010); Ghana (2010); Burundi (2011); Guinea (2011); Guinea Bissau (2011); and Nigeria (2013) (Peace women, 2015). In order to ensure the effectiveness of Resolution 1325, the UNSC also passed the following: Resolution 1820 (2008); Resolution 1888 (2009); Resolution 1889 (2009); and Resolution 1960 (2010). These Resolutions acknowledge that sexual violence is used as a tactic of warfare and thus

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demand for troops to be trained in preventing and responding promptly to sexual violence allegations. They also demand that political leaderships across the world address sexually-related violence perpetrated by combatants in conflicts. Not only that, they also seek to address women’s participation in peace processes and establish global indices for tracking the implementation of Resolution 1325. Furthermore, they seek to improve national and international responses to addressing the special needs of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations (USIP, 2012). At the regional level, the African Union (AU) has also evolved closelyrelated gender units for refining the integration of the continent. In its declaration it notes that ‘women’s empowerment and their equality with men has become the foundation for gender mainstreaming in the AU; both are the backbone for socio-economic and political integration of Africa’ (AU, 2009: 11). The AU has created several instruments that address the question of women in Africa, which can be leveraged for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. These include: the ‘Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the Rights of Women in Africa’ (2003-2005); the ‘Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa’ (2004); ‘the African Union Gender Policy’ (2008) and ‘the Fund for African Women’ (2010). It should also be noted that the AU has within its system the Women, Gender and Development Division (DFDG), whose responsibility it is to facilitate the implementation of the organisations’ commitments to gender issues. At the sub-regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has equally framed instruments that acknowledge the role of women in conflict management. Some of them include the Community’s ‘Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution Peace-Keeping and Security’ (1999), and the supplementary ‘Protocol on Democracy and Governance’ (2001). Women’s organisations are identified as key actors in activating early-warning systems. The Community encourages member states to involve such organisations in developing a relevant data bank on the potential conditions for conflict. Since conflict can be prevented or averted through warning systems, ECOWAS seeks the promotion training of women in relevant skills acquisition, as a way of mobilising women to participate in mediation, conciliation, or the facilitating of other measures for effective preventive diplomacy (ECOWAS, 2008). Considering that democracy as a form of political governance has a greater propensity for peace, ECOWAS’s conflict-prevention framework seeks to involve civil society organisations (CSOs) in those activities that can

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strengthen or deepen democracy in West Africa. In these processes, women are to be included in appropriate positions in various national commissions to enhance their representation. Closely related is the issue of women, peace, and security as a major component of the ECOWAS conflict-prevention strategy. The framework aims to strengthen women’s roles in conflict management by enhancing their participation in all stages of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Arising from a resilient structure of international and regional instruments, promoting women’s roles in conflict management, a survey of a few African countries reveals the active engagement by women as a result of the existing institutions of conflicts and peacebuilding in their war-torn countries. The Democractic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example has, since the 1990s, been embroiled in violent conflicts. Militia and rebel fractionalisation have frustrated peace efforts in the country. In fact, a UN official had, in 2010, described the experience of women who go through sexual violence in Africa, as horrible, and termed the DRC the ‘rape capital of the world’ (ActionAid, 2012: 5). Congolese women began to mobilise and demand inclusion in the peace process through the formation of organisations and by building peace networks. For instance, in 1998, Femmes Afrique Solidarite (FAS) and Synergy Africa sponsored a symposium on women and peacebuilding processes, and drew women from Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda to share their experiences (Mpoumou, 2013). Supported by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), members of FAS and Women as Partners for Peace in Africa (WOPPA), organised several meetings that culminated in the ‘Nairobi Congregation’ in 2012. The meeting called for an immediate ceasefire and the inclusion of women and their concerns in all aspects of the peace process. Though women had previously been completely excluded in the process that produced the Lusaka Peace Agreement in 1999, sustained mobilisation by FAS and WOPPA, with support from UNIFEM, saw 40 women included in the 340 delegates in the Sun City talks in South Africa in 2002 (Mpoumou, 2013). These efforts were not without challenges. For instance, mobilisation by women in Kivu to attend the Sun City talks were interrupted by harassment and threats from the rebel Rasemblement Congolaise Pour la De’mocratie (RCD). The office of the women’s group, the Reseau de Femmes Pour la Defense Des Droits et la Paix, was ransacked several times but this did not deter them from sending effective representation to South Africa (Carlman, 2013). Clearly, the women in the DRC were successful in their demand for inclusion through advocacy and resilience in the face of sustained violence from rebels.

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In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the focus of women was not directly related to their inclusion in peace negotiations, but to mobilising and sustaining pressure on key actors for an end to the conflict, through a variety of innovative activities. For instance, the Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET) and Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET), were instrumental in mobilising women through organised protests and mass rallies to draw attention to the destructive impact of the war (Amedzrator, 2014). MARWOPNET participated in the 2003 Accra talks on Liberia as an observer group and pressurised mediators to continue to ensure uninterrupted negotiation, when at a point it appeared that the rebel group (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)) would withdraw. The women also engaged the warring factions on the margins of the talks to save the peace talks from collapse. WIPNET further mobilised women to appeal to warring factions to embrace peace talks for a negotiated settlement (Brownell, 2011). The group facilitated peace talks across the parties through delegations that interfaced directly with rebel groups. The climax of women’s role in the resolution of the Liberian War came when parties to the peace talks in Accra refused to sign the agreement and hostilities were quickly renewed into Liberia. Women’s groups mobilised and blocked access to the venue of the peace talks to prevent the departure of the negotiators, which compelled them to endorse the agreement. The warring parties took the women as hostages but in response, the women leaders decided to disrobe in public. The male negotiators fell for their blackmail and in fear of the consequences of disrobing by women, the men agreed to sign the peace agreement (Brownwell, 2011). This was unusual and a creative tactic, leveraging traditional knowledge that thrived on the efficacy of the threat to violate the sanctity of women by exposing themselves in public. Women also mobilised their counterparts in rural communities in Liberia to promote reconciliation by appealing to victims of atrocities to forgive perpetrators. By 2005, a significant number of women registered and voted to elect Liberia’s first female president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Behoe and Parajon, 2007; Amedzrator, 2014). As in Liberia, the women in Sierra Leone organised themselves into robust movements, many of which emerged during the war years, with the objective of bringing the conflict to an end. Some of the notable groups include the Women’s Forum-Sierra Leone (WF-SL), MARWOPNET and the Sierra Leone Movement for Peace (SLMP), the Women’s Movement for Peace, and the 50/50 group (Bangalie, 2011). The Women’s Movement for Peace was formed in 1995 with the aim of facilitating the resolution of the Sierra Leonean conflict through peaceful means. It became part of the

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Women’s Forum and established a presence across the country. The various women’s movements mobilised a peace march in February 1995 that was held in all major towns in Sierra Leone including Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Makeni and Kabala. The march drew people from all sections of the country who were unanimous on the theme “try peace to end this senseless war” (Diop, 2005: 7). The march mobilised the entire country against the war and encouraged the nation to prioritise peace. A series of advocacy marches for peace could not move the peace process along but the women did not relent. Once the proposal for democracy as an option or route to peace was made, it was utilised by women to organise their members across the country. For example, in August 1995, at the Bintumani Consultative Conference for Good Governance, women’s groups demanded that elections take place in February 1996. The government’s efforts to shift the election were rebuffed by the opposition to women. The second Bintumani Conference to facilitate the shift in election was heavily influenced by women and ended with a resolution to hold elections on the 26 February 1996, thus, defeating the Junta’s attempt to shift the polls. The post-election Abidjan peace accord was threatened by a coup to overthrow President Ahmed Tijjan Kabba. The WF, Accord 97 and Crusade for Peace and Campaign for Good Governance mobilised women for prayers, vigils, marches and rallies against the coup plotters, and they demanded the restoration of democracy (Ifeoha, 2000: 10). These groups provided support to mothers who delivered babies during the conflict. They organised mass rallies and civil disobedience activities that paralysed the country into demanding a restoration of democracy. They also called on ECOWAS to intervene in the country, an intervention that restored peace and democracy and paved the way for the UN-brokered Lome Peace Accord in July 1999. The peace negotiations witnessed two Sierra Leonean women as representatives of women’s groups. Given the preponderance of conflicts in Nigeria, especially in the face of the Boko Haram insurgency, it is pertinent to examine the ways in which national actions derived from these international norms and experiences of women in other parts of Africa have enhanced the participation of Nigerian women in the resolution of the conflict in north-eastern Nigeria.

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Women and Peace Efforts in the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria The Boko Haram insurgency came into the limelight in 2009, with coordinated attacks on government facilities and security agents. The central focus of attacks is in north-eastern Nigeria including Borno, Yobe, Bauchi and Adamawa states, with occasional attacks in other parts of Northern Nigeria including Kano, Kaduna and Bauchi States. This crisis also has a transnational dimension, as it extends to Nigeria's neighbouring countries including Cameroon and the Republics of Niger and Chad. The gendered context of the conflict attracted global attention on 15 April 2014 when the group claimed responsibility for the abduction of 276 girls from Chibok Government Secondary School, in Borno State (BBC News, 2014). Since then, the group has shown more interest in targeting women and girls, using them as suicide bombers and domestic/sex slaves (Campbell, 2014). Boko Haram's earlier targets were government facilities but the group changed its tactics in 2013 to include the kidnapping of women and girls. The group had threatened to kidnap wives of government officials in retaliation for the arrest and detention of their own wives (Associated Press, 2012). Following this threat, the group kidnapped 12 women and children in an attack on the Bama Police Barracks on 7 May 2013, after a fierce battle with state security agents (Zenn and Pearson, 2014: 47). The release of these women and children was conditional on the release of wives of the group members held by security forces. The group used kidnapped victims as pawns and bargaining chips with the Nigerian authorities. Boko Haram then introduced the tactic of using women’s Islamic clothing, the hijab and niqab to carry out attacks. For example, in September 2013, security forces in Maiduguri arrested male Boko Haram members who were dressed as women and were hiding rifles in their veils (Daily Trust, 2013: 6). In the aftermath of some of these events, it was revealed that the idea of kidnapping women and girls by Boko Haram goes beyond ‘retaliation’. It is a strategy used to attract more attention from the government and the international community. As was previously discussed, women have been used for sexual and domestic slavery, suicide bombings, and so forth. Kidnapped women and girls have been subjected to a series of abuses including murder. Some of the non-Muslim abductees who have resisted forced conversion have either been killed or subjected to a range of horrendous treatment.

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At the height of the insurgency in 2013, the wives of northern governors organised a conference in Kaduna that drew participants from across the political spectrum, civil society and religious bodies. The forum drew attention to the horrific experiences of women in the north-east, as well as the overall impact on the development of the entire region. A call was made to halt hostilities and find a peaceful resolution to the conflict. To maintain pressure on political leaders to address the insurgency, the Northern Governor’s Forum Committee on Reconciliation, Healing and Security was created. This 41-member peace committee has six female members. However, the Committee's strong ties to political leaders constrained its freedom to operate, given the partisan interpretation of its activities. The Committee was, therefore, perceived as projecting a particular political party’s view of issues in the conflict. In addition, the civil society organisations in Northern Nigeria, which have been preoccupied with improving women’s and children’s health, education and environmental issues, have played a major role (Nwadinobi and Maguire, 2013). In 2011, Women in New Nigeria (WINN) organised the only public rally against insurgency in Maiduguri. Other organisations, such as the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) and the Gender Equality, Peace and Development Centre (GEPaDC) have sustained advocacy for peace and offered care and humanitarian support to victims in IDP camps. They have also offered support for orphans and run advocacy campaigns through press conferences and workshops in urban centres. Faith-based women’s organisations such as the Muslim Sisters Organisation (MSO), Women in Da’awa, Zumuntan Mata (EYN), Church Women, Kanem Women’s Association and the Women Wing of Christian Association of Nigeria (WOWICAN) have also used prayer sessions, vigils and public rallies to appeal for peace. In March 2010, for example, the Women Without Walls Initiative (WWWI), in collaboration with Christian Women for Excellence and Empowerment in Nigerian Society (CWEENS), and other women leaders under the auspices of Plateau for Peace, organised a 10,000-women rally after a prayer session, to press for peace and an end to ethno-religious violence (Nwadinobi and Maguire, 2013). The women told political authorities that they’d had enough of the violence that killed their fellow women and undermined development and peace. Female activists like Hafsat Mohammed, Aisha Yesufu, and Pastor Esther Ibanga have chosen to speak out against extremism. They have also called

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on other women to join hands with them in order to defeat violent ideologies such as the ones that drive Boko Haram. The case of Hafsat is very useful. After coming face-to-face with insurgents on her way to Maiduguri, and surviving the encounter, she began to use social media and public places to challenge extremism (Hogan, 2015). Clearly, the boldness exhibited by the women is uncommon and actually unprecedented in a traditional northern environment, especially at a time when Boko Haram’s near free reign in the region can be evidenced by multiple abductions of women. Given the huge number of women displaced by the insurgency, one would expect that formal national responses and strategies would be open to a sizeable number of women in order to learn from their experiences and facilitate a resolution to the conflict. However, this has not been the case. For example, on 17 April 2013, the government set up the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North, with a mandate to develop a framework that would grant amnesty, develop a comprehensive victim support programme, and institute mechanisms for dealing with the causes of the insurgency to avoid recurrence (Sahara Reporters, 2013). The 26-member committee had only one female member. This suggests the government’s insensitivity to gender concerns in resolving the conflict whose major victims are women and girls. Another committee, the ‘Victims Support Fund,’ was set up on 14 July 2014. This committee was intended to deal with victims of the insurgency and was made up of 30 men and two women who represented the National Council for Women Societies and Civil Society and Youth groups (Usman, 2014). With no women appointed from the areas under insurgency, the federal government’s typical attitude of imposing solutions was on display. The government’s blatant disregard for local knowledge and the experience of women from the affected areas was another demonstration of their insensitivity to issues of gender. It is fair to suggest that the focus on a military solution to the conflict has been a major contributing factor to the marginalisation of women, as combat strategies have appeared in the traditional masculine nature of patriarchal male dominance. Nigeria's security sector is male-dominated. For instance, all of Nigeria’s military chiefs (Army, Navy, Air force and Defence) are male. It appears, therefore, that formal efforts to address the conflict have limited or no opportunities for the involvement of women. It is in response to this challenge that street protests by women in Abuja and

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Port-Harcourt, demanding the rescue of the Chibok girls and championed by the Bring Back Our Girls campaign, took centre stage. This group, led by two women activists, Oby Ezekwesili and Mariam Uwaise, has been supported by the girls' parents and other Nigerians, but seemed not to enjoy much support from the Jonathan-led government. Following the administration’s defeat at the polls in April 2015 by the All People Congress (APC), the new president, Muhammadu Buhari, met with the group on the 8 July 2015. However, the group's 13 demands did not address the broad theme of resolving the conflict, which would include women. Rather, its focus was on how to rescue the abducted girls and a comprehensive strategy for the recovery, rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration of all rescued citizens in the conflict (Nwabughiogu, 2015). This gap in strategy appears to be part of a general failure by women as a group to develop a comprehensive and robust demand for a holistic framework for the resolution of the Boko Haram insurgency that would include women. Though Nigeria has affirmed Resolution 1325 and other supporting UNSC resolutions dealing with gender concerns in conflict management, national efforts are yet to evolve through the lens of gender. So far, traditional, male-dominated military strategies have continued to overshadow efforts to resolve the Boko Haram insurgency.

Challenges for Gender Inclusivity in Nigeria The genderisation of the peace process may have received global attention — as evidenced by international regimes in the UN resolutions and regional frameworks — but the reality of their effect is still a long way off at a national level. As noted by Antonia Potter Prentice (2012), culture and religion are inevitably still creating complicated cross currents which are responsible for the national government’s delayed efforts to consider gender in the peace processes. Closely related to this are political issues on representation and the weak political will to radically alter the dynamics in order to consider gender in any plans for sustainable peace and security. Women’s presence in negotiations, mediation or even preliminary engagements with conflicting parties, is low in Nigeria, as the Boko Haram case has shown. This reflects the general patriarchal system in Africa, which fuels systemic discrimination against women through culture and religion. Unfortunately, women are still not considered to be relevant actors in the peace process. As mentioned earlier, UNSCR 1325 is instrumental in raising global awareness on the importance of protecting women in conflict, as well as

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ensuring their participation in peace processes. However, beyond encouraging the public and institutions, the resolution is weakened by its dependence on the willingness of governments to support implementation (Hendricks and Sitton, 2015). Where governments fail to prioritise the activation of the resolution, countries will suffer from a lack of drive in implementation, as is the case in Nigeria. With preponderant conflicts in democratic Nigeria, especially the Niger Delta insurgency, communal conflicts (e.g. the Ife-Modakeke conflict), conflicts in the south-west and south-east (e.g. the Aguleri-Amuleri conflict), the Fulani herdsmen and farmer conflicts in many parts of the country, and the Boko Haram insurgency, the Nigerian state could only muster a national action plan in 2013. This only arrived after Resolution 1325 had been in existence for ten years, and suggests that implementing 1325 is a low priority for the government. This ambivalence stems largely from a dearth of women in important political institutions. For example, women’s share of representation in Nigeria’s national legislature has been declining. As observed by Eme and Onuigbo (2015: 10), from 2007 to 2011, barely nine (8.25%) women made it to the Senate, rising from a mere four (3.67%) who were Senators between 2003 and 2007. In 2011, only 32 women (a mere 8%) made it to the National Assembly. Of the 109 Senators, only seven (6.4%) were women, and of the 360 seats in the lower chamber, only 19 were taken by women (5.27%) in the same period. Though women achieved 33% membership of the cabinet between 2007 and 2011, they could not effect a radical departure on women’s issues in practical terms (Eme and Onuigbo, 2015: 10). In the absence of a critical mass of women in a key decisionmaking institution like the National Assembly — to influence the passage of gender-focused legislations — it is a Herculean task to place sufficient pressure on the government to prioritise women’s issues, even in conflict management.

Conclusion Over the last decade (2000-2010), making gender issues a priority in conflict resolution has received tremendous international attention. However, national rhetoric has taken a privileged place over the reality of implementing critical strategies to achieve effective women’s participation in the peace process in Nigeria. The absence of a critical mass of women has contributed to the inertia in introducing gender-sensitive legislation and agreements for consideration, which were further impeded by

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entrenched cultural and religious constraints to the inclusion of women in the process to end the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Implementing international norms has been met with a lack of political will and weak political institutions. Therefore, as a group, women in Nigeria should rise to the challenge of evolving a comprehensive notion of their priorities and develop an effective voice for the national consideration of gender concerns in conflict. The existence of large numbers of women’s groups across the country which focus on low-level advocacy but lack a central mobilising capacity for the critical issues of concern to women in conflict, is not helping to bring the issue of gender into the mainstream. Individualisation of activism has failed to generate national cohesion around issues. Underlining this tendency is the political polarisation of women’s groups and the glamour of the limelight rather than the focus on critical women issues in conflict and sustaining the demand for national action.

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Offen, K. (1988), ‘Defining feminism: A comparative historical approach. Chicago Journals, vol. 14, no.1, pp.119-157, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3174664. Retrieved 27 December 2015 (accessed 11 December 2015). Puechguirbal, N. (2001), ‘Discourses on gender, patriarchy resolution 1325: A textual analysis of UN documents’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 17, no. 2, pp.172-187. Peacewomen (2015), ‘List of National Action Plans for implementation of UNSCR 1325’, www.peacewomen.org/naps/list-of-naps (accessed 9 December 2015). Prentice, A.P. (2012), ‘Women and gendered perspectives in peace processes: Why this matters, why it is challenging and what we have achieved so far’, DPI roundtable meeting on the role of women in conflict resolution, www.demcoraticprogress.org, (accessed 23 December 2015). Rehn, E. and Johnson-Sirleaf, E. (2002), Women, war, peace: The independent experts’ assessment on the impact of armed conflict on women and women’s role in peace building, New York: UNIFEM. Roach, P.R. (1987), Women and peace: Theoretical, historical and practical perspectives, Croom Helm. Strickland, R. and Duvvury, N. (2003), Gender equity and peace building, from rhetoric to reality: Finding the way. Washington: International Centre for Research on Women. UNIFEM (2009), ‘Women’s participation in peace negotiations: Connections between presence and influence’, http://wwww.unifem.org/news/events/storydetail.php?storyID=753 (accessed 13 December 2015). —. (2015), The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA/%20E.pdf (accessed 15 December 2015). —. (2015), ‘Promote gender equality and empower women’, www.un.org/milleniumgoals/gender.shtml (accessed 13 December 2015). USIP (2012), ‘What is UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and why is it so critical today?’ http://www.usip.org/gender_peacebuilding/about_UNSCR_1325 (accessed 10 December 2015). Usman, T. (2014), ‘Boko Haram: Nigeria constitute committee on Victims Support Fund’, Premium Times, 14 December, www.premiumtimes.com (accessed 14 December 2015).

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CHAPTER TWELVE A GENDER PERSPECTIVE ON AFRICAN INDIGENOUS CONFLICT-RESOLUTION PRACTICES BENEDICTA DAUDU

Introduction The post-colonial African states have provided sufficient information for the analysis of underlying factors in both inter- and intra-state conflicts. Between 1960 and 1990, Africa recorded more than 80 violent changes of governments, with 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa experiencing different types of civil strife, conflicts, and wars (Adedeji, 1999: 3). These conflicts have varied in duration, from 27 years in Angola, to 30 years in Eritrea, up to 40 years in the case of the fratricidal war in Chad, and over 40 years in the Sudan (Araoye, 2012: 10). Interestingly, they cut across linguistic barriers and challenged the boundaries created by colonial governments, as exemplified in the West African conflicts of the Casamance region, which engulfed five countries of Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone. Similarly, the eastern African region has continued to witness raging armed conflicts that traverse Uganda, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Of course the Central African states have been subjected to internecine violent contestations in Sudan, South Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) with a number of casualties (Araoye, 2012: 10). As rightly observed by Gordon-Summers: A snapshot of explosive conflict in today’s Africa presents a worrying picture: of Eritrea and Ethiopia; of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, the last with the longest-running civil war on the continent; of Sierra Leone with gruesome atrocities against civilians; of Somalia, Burundi, Guinea Bissau and Lesotho, the latter reeling from South Africa’s recent intervention (cited in Adedeji, 1999: 328).

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The categorisation of the root causes of violent conflicts in post-colonial Africa is not closed. Three main causes are self-evident to scholars of conflict. First, conflicts arising from the politics of cultural subnationalism and ethnic differences manifest at two levels: conflict between the state and the cultural sub-nationalist groups, and conflict between subnationalist groups for ascendancy and dominance of the state (Olorunsola, 1972). These conflicts could emanate ‘[…] from the state to society and from the society to the state’ (Araoye, 2012: 12). The second category is located in the religious interpretation of social reality and the conflict arising from the different interpretation of this reality by adherents of different faiths, and even by sects within the same faith (Ellis, 1998). The third category can be seen in psychological uncertainty about the future, and the state’s ability to be a neutral arbiter in guaranteeing civil liberties, the dignity of the person, the protection of cultural rights and ensure equity and justice (Lake and Rothchild, 1996). Putting this in the Nigerian context, Kirk-Greene (1975: 19) wrote: Fear has been constant in every tension and confrontation in political Nigeria. Not the physical fear of violence, not the spiritual fear of retribution, but the psychological fear of discrimination, of domination. It is the fear of not getting one’s fair share, one’s dessert.

In all these settings, however, conflict revolves around four related yet conceptually distinct issues: identity, participation, distribution and legitimacy. These arenas form the backdrop to Harrold Lasswell's famous definition of politics as the struggle over 'who gets what, when and how' (Lasswell, 1936). Conflict in Africa arises from differences in identities, the differential distribution of resources and access to power, and competing definitions of what is right, fair and just (Marshall and Gurr, 2003). When individuals and groups turn to violence to solve such problems, conflict takes on a second dimension: security and survival. Conflict resolution becomes as multifaceted as conflict itself. Solutions must therefore seek not only to satisfy the hunger of individuals for justice but must also allay the fears of the participants because conflicts, if not carefully handled and resolved, can lead to unimaginable derogation in the dignity of the person and generate grave humanitarian challenges. To prevent this situation, a variety of techniques to resolve conflicts should be enshrined in society. The aim of conflict resolution in African societies is to remove the root causes of conflict. It also seeks the reconciliation of conflicting parties, to ensure peace in society, set the milieu for societal production and

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development, and to promote good governance, law and order, security of life and property, collective well-being and happiness in society. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is not only to examine the nature of conflicts and to review the indigenous methods of conflict resolution in pre- and post-colonial Africa, but above all, to provide an understanding of the African indigenous methods of conflict resolution. The discourse will be illustrated with examples from Burundi, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan. We will examine the participation and contribution of women in the traditional processes of resolving conflicts (which is the thrust of this chapter), observing that women's involvement in traditional conflict resolution remains almost insignificant. The chapter notes the valuable role that indigenous methods play in resolving conflicts in Africa (depending on the type of conflict), and argues for their application, as opposed to the Eurocentric method (litigation) which is applied with little success to the handling of conflict challenges in African societies.

The Concept of Tradition Tradition, like culture, is a set of unwritten rules, norms and practices which are accepted as the way of life for a particular group of people who transmit them from one generation to the next. Tradition can also be defined as long established and accepted customs, ideas, principles, knowledge and usages, handed down from one generation to the next (Braimah, 2012: 169). These include culture, norms, principles, values and beliefs. Traditions are dynamic, not static, and have the capacity to internally transform, even if this may be at a slow rate. In this regard, it has been stated that ‘traditions are relatively more enduring and resistant to change rather than simply permanent and unchanging’ (Omah, 2012: 161). In relating this concept of tradition to conflict resolution, Osaghae (2000: 204) states that: The search for traditional strategies of conflict management then looks for the past in the present-day social formations that can be applied to modern conflicts and stresses the ‘indigenous’ content. The essence of this is to separate practices and institutions that may have crept into the legacy of the past from external influences such as Islam, Christianity, capitalism, and other western influences from those left that are essentially autochthonous. Such indigenous formations, which can rarely be found in pure form, will as much as possible, be emphasised in characterising the 'traditional'.

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It is therefore logical to talk of traditional conflict-resolution practices in the sense that such practices exhibit variables that are used as reference points by people who identify with the norms and values of that particular society. Members of the community claim such practices, which reflect the values and preferences of the society, and draw inspiration from them. Therefore, traditional methods of conflict resolution which are not based on a legal framework take place through existing traditional social institutions operated by local, traditional and political leaders.

The Nature of Conflicts Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable accompaniment to choices and decisions, resulting from incompatible goals and actions (Deng and Zartman, 1999: 369). There is no society which does not experience conflict of one kind or another (Cohen, 1970: 110). What can be deduced from this is that conflict is a natural phenomenon which is present in all human societies and stems from necessary human interdependency: in order for individuals to meet their basic needs they depend on the active participation of other individuals. In other words, conflict arises from the interaction of individuals who have partly incompatible ends and is brought on by the presence of several actors and compounded by choice. The inevitability of conflict is captured by Omah (2012: 161), who argued that: […] it is not out of place for human societies to have conflictual relationship at one point or the other in the process of regular interactions. This is obvious because when people live together, they must of necessity interact as they try to avail themselves of the necessities of life […] In the process of doing so, they are bound to disagree and have clashes of interest from time to time, as individual preferences play on their relationship and consequently, lead them to pursue incompatible goals, or use incompatible means to pursue chosen goals.

Conflict is multi-dimensional and takes various forms; it can be difficult to define, especially from the perspective of African societies. Rage, rift, misunderstandings, family squabbles, market brawls, skirmishes, public insurrection, chieftaincy, boundary disputes and wars are all magnitudes of conflict. All of these forms of conflicts are widespread in Africa but the most endemic are wars and ethno-religious, inter-ethnic and intracommunal conflicts. Locating the factors responsible for the existence of conflicts in African societies is a Herculean task. However, it is important to mention factors such as the arbitrary use of power and authority, claims

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of rights and privileges, and territorial encroachment, etc. Whatever the factors, they are not beyond resolution, meaning that reconciliation is available for implementation and execution. It is significant to note that indigenous methods of dispute resolution in Africa took the form of peace talks, treaties and dialogue. These were resorted to whenever conflicts arose. Efforts to formalise reconciliation distinguishes Africans from the rest of the world. According to Braimah (2012: 161): Before the advent of colonialism and the introduction of the Western models of conflict management, Africa had an efficient cultural mechanism by which conflicts between groups, communities, or even states and kingdoms were settled […] such mechanism is part of the culture of the social formations in which it was practiced. It flows from the accumulation of the people's experiences in fighting disorder in society through the ages, and have been transmitted from generation to generation, thus constituting a tradition.

Conflict resolution practices in indigenous African societies are never allowed to injure the integrity of the disputants. Reconciliation is purposeful, functional and performable. The mediators in such conflicts who are not lawyers or professional mediators, but members of the community, are guided by the society’s notion of justice. They (the mediators and interveners) are expected to understand the beliefs and values of the community, have a very good knowledge of the history, culture and belief systems of the community, be people of proven integrity and character, truthful and transparent in their dealings, and deliver their verdict devoid of bias, fear or favour. They intervene in the conflict in order to assuage injured feelings, to restore peace and reach a compromise acceptable to both disputants (Matson, 1953: 48). This is accompanied by a ceremony to serve as a confirmatory test of the end of the conflict, as well as ensure that each party in the conflict ‘gives-a-little-gets-a-little’ (Nader, 1993: 909), suggesting that there exists no victor or vanquished in the process of reconciliation. What this signifies is that the adoption of traditional methods of dispute resolution remove resentment and tension, give a sense of belonging to all, eradicate fear, instability and disorder, generate security, and make peaceful coexistence possible between individuals and groups.

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Indigenous Conflict-Resolution Practices in Pre-Colonial Africa In pre-colonial Africa, great emphasis was placed on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the promotion of social harmony, while upholding the principles of fairness, custom and tradition. The maintenance of peace within most African communities followed four principles. Firstly, instead of the use of force, deliberation and discussion were used to resolve disputes. Secondly, compensation was used to correct wrong-doing. Thirdly, there was the principle of adjudication and assessment by elders who were considered to be impartial. Lastly, there was the principle of fairness. Before colonial rule in Nigeria, for instance, social conflicts were monitored, prevented, managed and resolved through established mechanisms which were generally accepted by the communities. These included traditional institutions such as traditional rulers, a council of elders, a general assembly of the people, age-grade, chiefs, local deities and others. Individual and group attitudes and behaviours were also controlled using these mechanisms (Suberu, 1996). The principles and values guiding conflict resolution included impartiality, fairness, accommodation, reciprocity, moderation, compromise and reconciliation. According to Braimah (2012: 149), this is related to the principles of accommodation, compromise and genuine reconciliation, as opposed to the principle of winner-takes-all. It would do no good at all if the parties in a conflict did not possess a spirit of tolerance sufficient to encompass the opposition. There must be a willingness to live and let live. Thus, before the advent of colonialism, African societies had already evolved and established elaborate mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and made efforts to maintain peace and harmony between individuals and groups before the Western models of conflict resolution became prevalent. The reason for this has been suggested by Haruna (2003: 5): […] from oral sources and some existing written accounts, it is clear that all African indigenous cultures, customs, traditions and civilisations had emphasised not only the value and significance of peace in society, but also the necessity of having to ensure that there was peaceful co-existence and harmony among the various groups that lived in a community, and between them and their neighbours. This sort of premium which was placed on peace, and the essence of ensuring peaceful co-existence in precolonial Africa, stemmed from the realisation by the people about the

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This meant that when conflicts arose in African societies, the restoration of peace was not only the concern of the parties involved, but also of their neighbours. It also meant that voluntary mediators and arbitrators intervened, motivated both by the indigenous concept and practice of being a brother's keeper, and their general and collective concern and strong natural desire for peace, order and social harmony in their society. Two models could be employed in this regard to resolve conflict. The first model could be direct intervention by a group extraneous to the conflict, or using dialogue to persuade the parties involved in the conflict to avoid or stop fighting. The use of force could also be applied by the mediating group. This was the case in the 19th century in Yorubaland, when peaceful persuasion could not stop Ijaye (under Aare Kurunmi) invading Ibadan. Oyo Empire and other Yoruba states joined Ibadan to ‘teach’ Kurunmi's Ijaye a ‘lesson’ in the famous Ijaye War of 1860-1862 (Haruna, 2003). The second model of conflict resolution is where a third party is invited to intervene in the conflict, by a party to the conflict. For example, when the Bini Kingdom encountered a crisis of succession in the days of Oba Evian, who wanted his son to succeed him against the wishes of the people, the Bini people invited Oduduwa (the legendary ancestor of the Yoruba) to intervene. Oduduwa sent one of his sons (Oranmiyan) to resolve the conflict (Egharevba, 1968). In Igboland, since pre-colonial times, Igbo women have developed various methods and ways of resolving conflicts and building peace (Okoro, 2013). They organise themselves into groups based on the notion of ‘the daughters of the clan,’ or Umuada (as they are called in local parlance) who usually meet on specific occasions or at least once a year (Okoro, 2013). They help to foster peaceful coexistence within the extended family, the clan, the community, and the town. Igbo women are remarkable in being able to organise themselves around their places of birth and matrimonial homes. In their places of birth, they are referred to as Umuada (daughters of the clan who are married within or outside the community), while at their marital homes, they are called Nwunye di (cowives — the married women within a family, kindred, clan, or community). The Umuada exercise remarkable power in their places of birth as peacebuilders, more so than in their marital homes (Okoro, 2013). This is because of the immunity they enjoy as autochthonous, or ‘daughters of the

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soil,’ in contrast to wives, who are viewed as outsiders or foreigners to their clans and communities by virtue of being married to male members. Nwolise (2004) captures the unique role of women in the reconciliation process, extolling the part played by the Umuada in a land dispute between the Umunebo and Umuokuzu communities of Obinze, in the Owerri local government of Imo State in eastern Nigeria. On that occasion, they came out en masse to establish a strong position from which to encourage dialogue between the disputing parties. These women usually meet and deliberate on actions taken by members of the clan or community that are perceived to work against community interests or harmony (Okoro, 2013). They most often stage a march and surround the offenders’ houses armed with either palm fronds or pestles, while singing to inform the inhabitants of their ills and to urge them to desist from such actions (Okoro, 2013). This is done continuously until an offender is made to atone for the offence or succumb to their collective demands to change the offensive behaviour. The Umuada further serves as a pivotal link between women and the clan or community. They have the power to take action against erring members of the Nwuye di, sometimes going as far as sending unfaithful wives or women deemed to have inflicted grievous harm on their husbands out of their marital homes or imposing fines on them (Okoro, 2013). In most Igbo cultural areas, women are recognised as great arbiters, peace-brokers, and enforcers (Okoro, 2013). Although Igbo society is in many ways patriarchal, women certainly play supportive and dynamic roles as midwives of peace in the land of their birth.

Indigenous Conflict-Resolution Practices in Post-Colonial Africa In traditional African settings, some societies rely on oath-taking and divination. Oath-taking in the process of conflict resolution in hinges on the recognition of ancestral power and authority. It confirms the ritual sanctions of the ancestors in dispute settlements and this often induces fear of the supernatural. These methods are still available today in some areas. However, the African traditional method utilises a council of elders, king's court, people's assemblies and so forth to resolve disputes (Nwolise, 2005: 153). The use of arbitration, negotiation, mediation and oaths has also been very common.

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In Ghana, conflict settlement has been achieved through the chiefs, elders, heads of families, and clans in each community (Nwolise, 2005). Disputes in the family are referred to the head of the family. When the efforts fail, the clan head is called in to help. The last resort is normally the chief, who gives a final and binding determination. In Kenya, the traditional conflictresolution structures are closely bound up with the socio-political and economic realities of the lifestyles of the communities (Nwolise, 2005). These structures are rooted in the culture and history of the people and are in one way or another unique to each community. Likewise, in Ethiopia, communities have their own structures of using elders to negotiate an end to conflicts. They believe in negotiations through traditional leaders. The situation in Nigeria is not different. For example, amongst the Igbo people of eastern Nigeria, the traditional institutions for conflict resolution include: the family, the council of elders, the Umunna (clan), the Umuada (indigenous daughters married elsewhere), the age-grade, Ohaneze (Assembly of the People and the King) and the local deities. The Yoruba traditional institutions for conflict resolution are the Oba, the council of elders, family, ward heads, the Ogboni, and so on. In Northern Nigeria, there are Emirs, the Mai Ungwa (ward heads) and other traditional rulers. A typical example of the application of traditional methods of conflict resolution in post-colonial Nigeria is the case of the Aguleri-Umuleri war over the ownership of Otuocha land located in the Anambra East local government area of Anambra State (Nwolise, 2005: 162). The dispute lingered on for over 70 years, culminating in a riot in 1995 and full scale war, 1999-2000 (Nwolise, 2005: 162). The land in dispute had been laid claim to by both parties since 1933 (Nwolise, 2005: 162). The peculiarity of this conflict is the fact that the Aguleri and Umuleri people share one ancestral origin and had been living together peacefully before anarchy set in. Attempts to resolve the conflict through conventional means proved fruitless until traditional strategies were applied (Nwolise, 2005: 162). Prior to this, between 1933 and 1984, the dispute was played out in courts, passing through the colonial court, the West African Court of Appeal (WACA), the Privy Council (with intermittent riots in between), the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court in 1982. The parties were never satisfied with the verdicts, so the conflict remained unresolved (Nwolise, 2005: 162). In 1995, a judicial commission of inquiry headed by Justice Nweje recommended the clear demarcation of the Aguleri-Umuleri boundary lines, but this recommendation was not implemented by the state government (Nwolise, 2005: 162). The failure to implement this

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recommendation resulted in the devastating war of 1999-2000, leading to the terrible consequences of the wanton destruction of lives and property. With the encouragement and support of the state government, the efforts of the traditional rulers and leaders led to the traditional formula being applied, which led to the resolution of the conflict. This formula involved oath-taking, the declaration of a ‘no more war’ peace treaty, and the performance of a blood cleansing ritual called Iko mmee (Nwolise, 2005: 162). The oath was binding for every indigene of the participating communities and taken to the effect that the contracting parties accepted peace, and that there would be no more war and bloodshed between them. Violators of the oath were promised the wrath of the deities and the ancestors who constitute the source of moral sanctions and guarantors of peace. As expected, the oath-taking relaxed tensions and paved the way for other processes that brought about the restoration of peace, true reconciliation and social harmony in the warring communities (Ifediora, 2000: 43; Nwolise, 2005: 166). It will not be out of place therefore to assert that the abandonment of traditional methods of conflict resolution for foreign methods is largely responsible for the multiplicity of avoidable (violent) conflicts in Africa. For instance, in contemporary times, a land dispute between two communities could lead to murder and the wanton destruction of lives and property, whereas in traditional African settings, the systems put in place to monitor, prevent, manage and resolve conflicts would endeavour to prevent such damage. Obviously, the adoption of Western methods of conflict resolution does not reflect the cultural realities of African societies, resulting in alarm, as raised by scholars. According to Gaya Best (2006): […] the application of theories and methodologies of peace research and conflict resolution in Africa has largely neglected the simple fact that Africa had well developed and tested indigenous approaches and methods of conflict management, resolution, pacific settlement of disputes and peace building. It becomes necessary therefore, to peep into the cultural resources of African's rich past to discover the strategies that minimised conflicts and promoted peaceful co-existence.

By implication, therefore, a reliance on Western models of conflict resolution has created confusion and occasioned the application of haphazard measures in addressing interpersonal and intergroup discords in Africa. Furthermore, conflicts that are assumed to be resolved using such models later re-surface and manifest in other forms and contexts, leading

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to a long and interminable cycle of socio-political and economic altercations that have taken a remarkable toll on the development of the African continent (Omah, 2012: 161). Consequently, peace and conflict scholars now call for the re-consideration of the traditional model of conflict resolution. Lending his voice to this call, Francis Deng, a nonAfrican scholar who appreciates the role and effect of the traditional method of conflict resolution, has insisted that the Western style of conflict management, with the winner-takes-all outcome, runs counter to the African indigenous principles of power-sharing and conciliation, and therefore cannot be a basis for conflict-resolution in the African cultural context (Deng, 1999: 301).

The Gender Perspective in Indigenous African Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms The quest for peace in Africa has been largely driven by the determination to prevent, manage, or reverse the traumatic and destructive effects of violent conflicts on a continent where violent conflicts are becoming an almost everyday occurrence (Nnoli, 1998: 417). Unfortunately, the victims of war and the vulnerable groups in society, particularly women, are sometimes conspicuously absent from or under-represented during peace negotiations. A worrying trend in the indigenous conflict-resolution system in Africa is the fact that the process is male dominated (Alubo, 2006). There is a lack of or near absence of women in the indigenous practice of conflictresolution processes in most African societies (Alubo, 2006). In essence, a common feature of indigenous practices of conflict resolution is their lack of a gender-analytic approach. Women and children — those who are usually worst hit by violent conflicts — are often excluded from conflict resolution or decision-making structures and processes. Women's views and concerns are also sometimes absent from the processes and institutions concerned with conflict management, resolutions and peace-keeping in Africa. The traditional rulers (chiefs, kings, obas, emirs), other councils of elders and mediators who make vital decisions about the resolution of conflicts are mostly men (Alubo, 2006). This bias in the underrepresentation of women is a huge anomaly. The most serious obstacle to the inclusion of women in conflict-resolution processes has to do with the rhetorical commitment of African men to the gender cause. Under the guise of preserving tradition, which perpetuates women's subservience to

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men, it is unofficially condoned and maintained. This situation probably propelled Zartman (1999: 299) to observe that: What is particularly disturbing about traditional reconciliation practices is [that] the office holders are, almost universally men. In addition, where these practices have been seen to work, they normally exclude women from active roles, and tend to be about peace building between men. Women needs tend to be completely marginalised and excluded.

In our view, involving women in conflict resolution is beneficial with respect to achieving an all-encompassing outcome which will take care of the needs that are specific to women. The inclusion of more women will lead to an enriched outcome, which will further promote conflictresolution efforts. The underlying argument in this chapter is based on the assumption that women's contribution to conflict resolution is positive and real (Kuehnast, 2011). However, this issue necessitates some qualification as it does not foster dichotomies of men as aggressive and women as being innately peaceful; such stereotypes will only reinforce the fallacy that women are too weak to participate in any form of conflict resolution, and that is not the intention of this piece.

Women and Peacebuilding in Contemporary Times Women have contributed their fair share to peacebuilding and the resolution of conflicts in their communities, as can be gleaned from the underlisted case studies. Hence, their efforts in peacebuilding cannot be over-emphasised. However, these initiatives are not exercised in conjunction with men. On their own initiative, women take steps to bring about peace or resolve conflicts in their communities, but this effort is not the same as men and women participating together to fashion out ways and means to resolve a conflict in that community. Let us examine some of the peace processes in which women have played an active role.

Burundi peace process Burundi has been in conflict since the 1960s, a conflict that has left hundreds of thousands either dead or displaced, property destroyed and a country devastated (see Human Rights Watch, 2000). The crisis escalated in the early 1990s following the assassination of President Melchier Ndadaye. As a result, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU — now African Union (AU)) and the international community committed to a peace process, and the late Tanzanian President Mwalimu Nyerere was

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assigned the responsibility of facilitating the talks that started in 1998 with all 17 political parties (Human Rights Watch, 2000). One major characteristic of the peace process was that, throughout the negotiations, the question of inclusiveness was brought to the surface. Other groups also sought to be included, such as civil society organisations and women. Although women were not initially given any prominence in the negotiations, they were nevertheless able to prove themselves to be a force capable of positively affecting national interests. Women were initially invited to attend as observers, from which they were able to appreciate the negotiation process and give feedback to other women’s groups (Human Rights Watch, 2000). While the women from the different factions stood for distinctly different political ideals, they chose to optimise on their commonalities. For instance, all women were clear about the need for the inclusion of women in the peace talks, which they believed would ensure the rights of all Burundi women were included in the agreements that were signed.

Nigeria In Rivers State, Nigeria, women play active and persuasive roles in peace processes (Nwoye, 2015). In the Etche community, for example, which is made up of two local government areas – Etche and Omuma – women’s peace process methods are usually employed when the methods initiated and dominated by men have failed to yield positive results (Nwoye, 2015). Methods of conflict resolution usually adopted include the Ikpe Umu Ngboto (which literally means ‘mediation by female married Indigenes’) and Igba Oso Umu Nwanyi (which means ‘dispute resolution through selfexile by married women’). In Ikpe Umu Ngboto, the married female indigenes of any village convene in their home village to mediate on any dispute that may have lingered and which is adjudicated by the male folks (Nwoye, 2015). For reasons like this and others, these women usually maintain an association which unites them. In the event of conflict resolution, which they have decided to mediate upon, notice is sent across to all members and they converge on the agreed date to mediate on the dispute (Nwoye, 2015). Their decision is usually heeded to and binding and can be used as evidence for subsequent adjudication (if any) on the same dispute. In Igba Oso Umu Nwanyi, in the face of unresolved or lingering disputes which the male folks are unable to resolve, the married women of the village will go on an unannounced exile to a neighbouring village of their choice (Nwoye, 2015). The characteristics of

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this method are the fact that the exile mission is usually sudden and unannounced and the women take along kitchen utensils (in other words, making the kitchen non-functional). They go along with their children of less than two years old; they assemble at a traditional ruler’s house, who feeds them and are morally bound to accept these visitors without notice (Nwoye, 2015). The cost of their stay during the exile is usually borne by the unsuccessful party in the dispute or male members of the women’s village (Nwoye, 2015). Consequently, the male folks in the community concerned are usually eager to resolve the dispute and seek the return of these women, so that they can resume their traditional roles as wives and mothers. It is clear from this that women play a significant role in the peace processes of the Etche community of Rivers State. However, their intervention is usually employed when the men have failed to do justice to any dispute. The resolutions are usually heeded to and deemed exceptional. These methods are very significant, too, as the male folks usually bear them in mind while resolving any dispute.

Somalia peace process Somalia is an example of a state that collapsed following decades of civil war that ended in 1991 with the fall of Siad Barre’s rule. Several peace initiatives were made to bring lasting peace and stability in the war-torn country (Bradbury and Healy, 2010). One of the peace initiatives, however, presents a unique case with regard to the participation of women. It all started during a symposium which was held to collect the views of Somali people in diaspora, in preparation for the 14th peace initiative (Fach, 2010). Among other recommendations from the symposium, it was suggested that negotiation would be on a clan basis and any participation of women would be to rally behind their respective clans. Four major clans were identified as parties to the negotiations, with a fifth being a coalition of all the other minor clans. Women were expected to participate within these five clans, with 92 women selected as some of the representatives of these clans (Fach, 2010). This proposal was not acceptable to the women, who strongly objected and opted to participate across clan lines and break out of these clan-based allegiances — a major step towards developing a broad vision of the issues involved in the Somali crisis. After serious negotiations, women were granted their own quota as women and were assigned a status equivalent to a clan. Hence, they became the sixth clan. The women helped to create a

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national charter that guaranteed 25 women seats from the 245 seats in the Trans National Assembly (to ensure clan representation, the 25 seats were equally divided so that each of the five clans reserved five seats for women). The women who formed the sixth clan were able to effectively act as a unifying force in bringing together other delegates from different clans (Fach, 2010). They were seen as a rather neutral force in the talks. The sixth clan also formed a much-needed critical mass in advocating for the participation of women in national issues, and they promoted making gender a mainstream issue in the development of a national charter. The women eventually got 25 seats in the Interim Somali Government. Although the resulting government fell apart, mainly due to the exclusion of the warlords (who remained main stakeholders and were hence important for the success of any peace talks), the role played by women was commendable and leaves several lessons to be learnt. It showed that it is possible for women not only to work together across political divides towards a common goal, but also to unify parties in a conflict. It is worth noting that the women made up 10% of the membership (less than the 15% asserted by the critical mass theory), but they made a difference (Berwind-Dart, 2012). Somali women have continued to be very active in their efforts towards creating a peaceful Somaliland.

Sudan peace process In 1997, the Royal Netherlands Embassies in Nairobi and Khartoum launched ‘The Initiative to facilitate the participation of Sudanese women in peace processes’ (SUWEP). It was observed that men generally dominated both politics and conflicts in Sudan, whilst women’s contribution extended only to inter-clan disputes (Ayo and Suthanthiraraj, 2010; ElBushra, 2012; and Plaut, 2014). The initiative was predicated on the assumption that women’s participation was limited due to constraints such as: a lack of recognition of their role; a low level of formal education; poor access to information; and lack of space for debate. Principally, the initiative sought to redress the balance and the women were exposed to various relevant skill-building workshops, as well as regional and international conferences (Ayo and Suthanthiraraj, 2010; El-Bushra, 2012; and Plaut, 2014). This not only built their skills, but also their confidence in articulating the issues that affect them. The initiative also sought to establish working groups representing different communities and parties from the north and south. The committees were able to establish links between different conflicting

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communities and provide space for women to voice their concerns. Joint north-south meetings were held and, although there were sharp differences between women from different parties (particularly in north versus south), in the long run they effectively showed that women across the divide were able to work together, despite their different political affiliations towards the common goal of peace. SUWEP was effective in calling for an end to the conflict in Sudan. In January 2000, the body came up with a 10-item Sudanese woman’s minimum agenda for peace and, in April of the same year, produced the Maastricht Declaration of Sudanese Women’s Peace Initiative (Ayo and Suthanthiraraj, 2010; El-Bushra, 2012; and Plaut, 2014). In addition, some women were invited to the Machakos talks as observers. This not only exposed them to the issues and the process first-hand but also gave them an opportunity to make contributions and suggestions. The women, while appreciating the recognition, still felt that they were not adequately represented at the talks, particularly on three counts: numerical underrepresentation; the limitation of observer status; and the process of selecting female representation by the party instead of by women themselves. While women have not achieved the inclusion they desired at the negotiation table, they have nevertheless continued to support the peace process at the periphery and have continued to mobilise support through statements and position papers.

The Way Forward The conflict situation in Africa and the inadequacies of contemporary Eurocentric methods of dispute resolution calls for the adoption of new, more effective, and efficient ways of conflict management and resolution. In this regard, a better understanding is needed of the processes of successful traditional methods of conflict resolution, so that they may be adapted for contemporaneous needs. For any peacebuilding, conflict resolution or management to be successful in contemporary times, capacity and political will are needed and these prerequisites are largely absent on the African continent (Anderlini, 2007; Anderson, 2000; Cockburn, 1998; Fung, 2005; Jordan, 2003; and Zeigler and Gunderson, 2006). The relevance of traditional methods of dispute resolution to contemporary conflict situations in Africa cannot be over-emphasised. In fact, it has been opined that: The time has indeed come for us in Africa to seek new ways and means of conflict prevention, conflict management and resolution. This call has

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Beyond the obvious need for further research into traditional methods of conflict monitoring, prevention, management and resolution, there is the need to rise beyond the limitations imposed on traditional peacebuilding mechanisms by patriarchal society. This will enrich the outcomes of research because it will include the input of women, who represent a large percentage of society and who are adversely affected by conflict; women and children are often forgotten stakeholders in conflict-ridden societies and their voices often go unheard. Consequently, relevant aspects of these methods should be adopted and incorporated into frameworks and mechanisms for a more peaceful, orderly, and harmonious society which can support and ensure development.

Conclusion This work has attempted to highlight the benefits of applying the traditional methods and techniques of conflict resolution. It has noted the significant evidence that demonstrates the continued efficacy of both the indigenous practices and sanctions for conflict resolution. The AguleriUmuleri episode, for instance, brings to light the weaknesses and inadequacies of the Western mechanisms and processes of conflict prevention, management and resolution, and the lack of political will on the part of government to implement the recommendations of the panels and commissions it set up. One then wonders about the purpose and significance of setting up the panels if their recommendations are just swept under the carpet. The cited examples demonstrate that, in conflict resolution and dispute settlement, traditional African methods are capable of arriving at truth, justice, reconciliation, peace, and the welfare and happiness of the conflicting parties and society at large. It was also observed that Africa had (and still has) an efficient and effective cultural mechanism for conflict management which has been left undeveloped in the name of modernity. This has led to efforts to resolve conflicts using Eurocentric models which, in most cases, have left the parties unsatisfied, resulting in the re-emergence of conflicts which were assumed to have been resolved. A feature of conflict resolution in Africa

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that makes it attractive is the inherent ‘give and take’ that the process involves in order to reach a consensus agreeable to all parties. This paper also examined the role of women in peacebuilding, based on case studies from Burundi, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan. It explored the actions and strategies women adopt when making or building peace within their communities and how, by acting as peace mediators, they can serve as guides who can connect women and peace, not only in Nigeria but across Africa as a whole. Finally, the paper noted the near exclusion of women in the traditional peace structures, and called for adequate gender representation in the traditional processes of conflict resolution. By introducing gender into the areas of traditional conflict resolution, the marginalising of women will be curbed and female ideas and input will be beneficial to the disputants, and society in general. This paper therefore advocates for an increase in the number of women involved in conflict resolution processes and for issues of gender to become mainstream in peacebuilding processes in Africa.

References Adedeji, A. (ed.) (1999), Comprehending and mastering African conflicts, London: Zed Books. Albert I.O. (ed.) (2012), Peace, security and development in Nigeria, Abuja: John Archers Publishers Ltd. Albert I.O. (ed.) (2005), Perspectives on peace and conflict in Africa: Essays in honour of General (Dr) Abdulsalami A. Abubakar, Abuja: John Archers Publishers Ltd. Anderlini, S.N. (2007), Women building peace, Boulder & London: Lynn Rienner Publishers. Anderson, S. (2000), Crossing the lines: Women’s organisations in conflict resolutions, The Society for International Development, vol. 43, no.3, pp.34-39. Araoye, A. (2012), ‘Hegemonic agendas, intemesticity and conflicts in the post-colonial state’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol. 12, no. 1, pp.33-60. Suthanthiraraj, K. and Ayo, C. (2010), ‘Promoting women’s participation in conflict and post-conflict societies’, Global Action to Prevent War, NGO Working Group on Women: Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Berwind-Dart, C. (2012), ‘Women, gender and peace building: Do contributions add up?’ Cambridge: Collaborative Learning Project.

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Best, G. (2006), ‘Peace and conflict research: Conceptual and methodological issues in relation to history and culture in Nigeria,’ in Report of the National Workshop of Stakeholders of Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution. Bradbury, M. and Healy, S. (eds) (2010), ‘Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking’, London: Conciliation Resources. Braimah, A. (2012), ‘Culture and tradition in conflict resolution’, in Albert I.O. et al. (eds.), Peace, security and development in Nigeria, Abuja: John Archers Publishers Ltd. Cohen, R. (1970), ‘Traditional society in Africa’, Paden, J. and Soja, E. (eds.), The African experience, Evanston: North Western University Press. Cockburn, C. (1998), The space between us: Negotiating gender and national identities in conflict, London: Zed Books. Deng, F. and Zartman, W. (eds.) (1999), Conflict resolution in Africa, Brookings Institute. Egharevba, J. (1968), A short history of Benin, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. Ellis, S. (1998), The mask of anarchy, New York: St. Martin’s Press. El-Bushra, J. (2012), Gender in peace building: Taking stock, London: International Alert. Fach, A. (2010), Women’s political participation and influence in postconflict Somalia, Burundi and Nepal, Oslo: Peace Research Institute. Fung, L. (2005), ‘Engendering the peace process: Women’s role in peacebuilding and conflict resolution’, in Durham, Helen and Gurd, Tracey (eds.), Listening to the silences: Women and war, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Haruna, H. (2003), A guide to peace education and peace promotion strategies in Africa, Lagos: Africa Refugee Foundation. Human Rights Watch (2000), Emptying the hills: Regroupment in Burundi, New York: Human Rights Watch. Ifediora, C.N. (2000), Odera's first goal in Anambra State: Casting the devil out of Aguleri-Umuleri, Onitsha, Creative Forum Publishers. Jordan, A. (2003), ‘Women and conflict transformation: Influences, roles, and experiences’, Development in Practice, vol. 13, no.2-3, pp. 239251. Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. (1975), The genesis of the Nigerian civil war and the theory of fear, Uppsala: Nordic African Institute.

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Kuehnast, K. (2011), ‘Why women’s involvement in peacebuilding matters,’ Foreign Service Journal vol. 88, p.17. Lake, D.A. and Rothchild, D. (1996), Containing fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict’, International Security, vol. 21, no. 2, pp.41-75. Lasswell, H. (1936), Politics: Who gets what, when, how, McGraw-Hill. Matson, J.N. (1953), ‘The Supreme Court and the customary judicial process in the Gold Coast’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 1, pp.47-59. Monty G. and Gurr, T. (2003), Peace and conflict: A global survey of armed conflicts, self determination movements and democracy, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. Nader, L. (1993), ‘On studying the Ethnography of Law and its Consequences’ in Honigman, J.J. (eds.), Handbook of social and cultural anthropology, Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. Nnoli, O. (1998), Ethnic conflicts in Africa, Nottingham: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. Nwolise, O.B.C. (2004), ‘Traditional approaches to conflict resolution among the Igbo People of Nigeria: Reinforcing the need for Africa to rediscover its roots,’ AMANI Journal of African Peace, vol.1, pp.5980. —. (2005), ‘Traditional models of bargaining and conflict resolution in Africa’ Perspectives on Peace and Conflict in Africa: Essays in Honour of General (Dr.) Abdulsalami Abubakar, John Archers Publishers Ltd. Nwoye, M.A.C. (2015), Role of women in peace building and conflict resolution in African traditional societies: A selective review, http://www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/chinwenwoye.htm. (accessed 15 December 2015). Okoro, K. (2013), ‘Women and peace initiative in Igbo traditional Society: A viable option for peace building in modern Africa,’ Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 1, pp.58-69. Olorunsola, V.A. (ed.) (1972), The politics of cultural sub-nationalism in Africa, NewYork: Doubleday. Omah, E. (2012), ‘Rethinking African traditional methods of conflict resolution’ in Albert I.O. et al. (eds.), Peace, Security and Development in Nigeria, Abuja: John Archers Publishers Ltd. Osaghae, E.E. (1991), ‘Ethnic minorities and federalism in Nigeria,’ African Affairs, vol. 90, pp.237-258.

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—. (2000), ‘Applying traditional methods to modern conflict: possibilities and limits,’ in Zartman W.I. (ed.), Traditional cures for modern conflicts: African conflict ‘medicine’, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp.201-218. Plaut, M. (2014), ‘South Sudan: Traditional conflict resolution and the current crisis’, https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2014/11/23/southsudan-traditional-conflict-resolution-and-the-current-crisis/ (16 December 2015). South Sudan Human Rights Commission, Interim Report on South Sudan Internal Conflict, December 15, 2013-March 15, 2014. Zeigler, S.L. and Gunderson, G.G. (2006), ‘The gendered dimensions of conflict’s aftermath: A victim-centered approach to compensation’, Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 20, no.2, pp.171-278.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN THE RELEVANCE OF PEACE EDUCATION IN ADDRESSING BOKO HARAM AND EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AHMAD RUFAI SAHEED

Introduction The need to provide peaceful coexistence in a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious or multi-lingual school setting has, for some time, troubled the minds of stakeholders in the field of teacher education. (Villagas and Davis, 2008). However, early initiatives by scholars and researchers in the discipline was subsumed under such subheadings as ‘multi-cultural education for prospective teachers’, ‘race and ethnicity in teacher education’, ‘preparing teachers for classroom diversity’, and ‘cultural and linguistic diversity of teacher trainees and others’ (Glazer, 2008). Nonetheless, it is obvious from the purposes of these various curricular provisions that they were variously aimed at bringing about a peaceful coexistence among people of different cultures, races, languages or even socio-political backgrounds (Lucas and Grimberg, 2009). According to Banks (1996), the earliest initiative in peace education started with a small group of African Americans who applied the campus activism they learned in ethnic studies programmes, the Civil Rights Movement, and the war against vietnam to the field of teacher education. By the early 1970s, a good number of the individuals involved in such efforts had become professors in schools and colleges of education and therefore used their past activism strategies to push for the adoption of No One Model American in 1972 (Banks, 1996). This turned out to be an epoch-making development and a ground-breaking statement by the American Association for Colleges of Teacher Education (AACTE) (Jacobowitz and Michelli, 2009).

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According to Irvine (2008), the document that originated from that struggle called for support for cultural diversity, alternative and emerging lifestyles, multiculturalism, and multilingualism. Relying on McCormick (1984: 3), Irvine (2008: 76) adds that ‘the AACTE’s approval of the No One Model American was followed by the adoption of a multicultural education standard by the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE)', which became effective in 1979, with a view to promoting peaceful, tranquil and harmonious coexistence in a culturally plural society. However, the codification of peace education and its integration into the American system of education did not materialise until 1972, when the AACTE established the Commission on Multicultural Education for the sole purpose of alleviating continued social crises, incessant pandemonium and repeated unrest, through the instrumentality of education (Ethridge, 2010). At this juncture, it is of great value to highlight the fact that stakeholders in education felt the need to establish the commission in the aftermath of the Kent State and Jackson State tragedies, which almost turned the whole of America into war territory in the early 1970s. It is worth noting that it was pointed out by the board of directors of the AACTE, from the outset, that the term ‘multicultural’ is not a euphemism for ‘disadvantaged’. Rather, it encompasses broad ethnic and cultural spheres that are capable of aiding the realisation of peace and harmony (AACTE, 1972), hence its conception as an instrument for peace education. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the potential of peace education in addressing the Boko Haram insurgency and Islamic extremism in Nigeria. The ultimate aim is to attempt to utilise specific provisions of peace education in developing a framework for anti-insurgency education in the country. The rationale for this undertaking lies in the potential of such a study to adjust our views of the Boko Haram insurgency and ultimately alter the landscape of operations in addressing the threat that the group constitutes.

The Evolution of Peace Education All people, nations, cultures, classes and institutions are faced with the problem of conflict and violence (Clarke-Habibi, 2005). It is even remarkable that, despite the numerous efforts being made in the area of preventing or seeking to resolve such conflicts, their frequency and intensity in contemporary human society seems to be increasing (p.33).

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Consequently, the continued increase in conflicts or violent activities informed the need to reconceptualise the focus of peace education, and place priority on the struggle for peace and progress, ‘so that the notions of “peacekeeping” and “peacemaking” take priority over the prevention of war’ (Reardon, 1988: 15). As a consequence of the reconceptualisation of peace education, a handful of scholars ‘join those peace educators who, perceiving the central problem as the way conflict is handled, base their efforts on teaching conflict management and for conflict resolution’ (p.15). It should be noted that conflict studies, though related to peace education, is a distinct field from either peace education or peace studies in a number of ways. Conflict studies which, at times goes with the nomenclature ‘peace and conflict studies’, may be described as a modern academic discipline associated with the field of social sciences. The concept is also concerned with the identification and treatment of violent and non-violent behaviours in the context of social explanations for conflicts, with the purpose of underscoring and promoting the need to understand the variables at play in striving for ideal human experience or existence (Bellany and Williams, 2013). The linkage between the intertwined concepts of peace and conflict in this context is that, within this branch of social sciences, the study of conflicts is for the purpose of proffering solutions and thereby paving the way to peace. However, peace education — otherwise called peace and justice education — has attracted contributions from scholars in various fields such as religion, political science, economics, psychology, sociology and education, each of which has attempted to define the concept from their own perspective. Nonetheless, there are certain common denominators in the various viewpoints offered by such scholars. Different scholars have defined peace education as follows: ‘a social process through which peace is achieved’ (Brock Utne, 1985, in Koylu 2004: 60); ‘learning intended to prepare the learners to contribute toward the achievement of peace’ (Reardon, 1982, in Koylu, 2004: 60); education intended ‘to provide knowledge and skills, as well as capacities and commitment, to overcome obstacles to peace, and to build a global community which encompasses the entire human family and accords equal value and full dignity to all human beings’ (Reardon, 1982, in Koylu, 2004: 60); education whose ‘basic purpose is to help students design strategies of action which can contribute to the shaping of a world order characterised by social justice and absence of exploitation’ (Monez, 1973, in Koylu, 2004: 60); as well as an education meant ‘to create a world of justice, peace and love to remove

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whatever breeds oppression, be it personal, structural, or systematic […] and build structures, that foster unity of people with people and people with God’ (Toton, 1985, in Koylu, 2004: 60). It is therefore obvious that peace education assumes that human beings are capable of learning the ways of peace. However, Clarke Habibi (2005: 34) maintains that an examination of peace education discourse reveals that ‘most theoretical framework and applied programmes are based on the postulate that conflict constitutes an inherent, inevitable – perhaps even beneficial – dimension of human life.’ It has been argued that most scholars seem oblivious to the fact that since the first decades of this past century, peace education programmes around the world have represented a spectrum of focal themes, including environmental responsibility, communication skills, non-violent behaviour, conflict resolution techniques, democracy, human rights awareness, tolerance of diversity, coexistence, and gender equality, among others (Groff and Smoker, 1996; Harris, 1999; Johnson, 1998; Swee-Hin, 1997; Clarke-Habibi, 2005). The various issues listed above have formed the basis of some wellgrounded religious perspectives on what can facilitate the attainment of internal bliss or inner harmony. By the same token, some of the issues involved, especially the concerns and themes that assume a rationale for peace education, have been carefully analysed for the possible formulation or synthesis of principles into practicable programmes for world citizenship (Clarke-Habibi, 2005). Further, the academic discourse on peace education has recognised the need to accommodate a broader and more holistic approach to the subject (Swee-Hin, 1997; Fitts, 2002) and there are three specific variations of peace education that have been identified as the most common (Clarke-Habibi, 2005): peace education as conflict-resolution training; peace education as democracy education; peace education as human rights awareness training. With regard to peace education as conflict-resolution training, attention is normally paid to the social-behavioural symptoms of conflict, training individuals to resolve interpersonal disputes through techniques of negotiation and (peer) mediation. Essentially, recipients of knowledge are taught and guided to manage anger and improve communication through skills such as listening, turn-taking, identifying needs and separating facts from emotions. They are also taught and guided to take responsibility for their actions and to brainstorm together on compromises (Deutsch, 1993; Harris, 1999; Clarke-Habibi, 2005).

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In terms of peace education as democracy education, Clarke-Habibi (2005) identifies its focus as the political processes associated with conflict. This direction is grounded in the thinking that ‘with an increase in democratic participation, the likelihood of societies resolving conflict through violence and war, decreases more so that democracy needs the commitment of citizens who accept the inevitability of conflict as well as the necessity for tolerance’ (Clarke-Habibi, 2005: 35). Specific provisions are made for the participants or recipients of knowledge to develop ‘the skills of critical thinking, debate, coalition building, and promote the values of freedom of speech, individuality, tolerance of diversity, compromise, and conscientious objection,’ with the aim of making the learners responsible citizens who will be capable of holding their governments ‘accountable to the standards of peace, primarily through adversarial processes’ (Clarke-Habibi, 2005: 35). With regard to peace education as human rights awareness training, the focus is on the level of policy that humanity ought to adopt in order to move closer to a peaceful global community, with a view to securing ‘a commitment among participants to a vision of structural peace in which all individual members of the human race can exercise their personal freedoms and be legally protected from violence, oppression and indignity’ (Swee-Hin, 1997). According to Clarke-Habibi (2005:36), ‘approaches of this type of familiarising participants with the international covenants and declarations of the United Nations System, train students to recognise violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and promote tolerance, solidarity, autonomy, and self-affirmation at the individual and collective levels.’ In summary, this discussion represents the various dimensions of, or approaches to, peace education in contemporary scholarship. Such an analysis shall form the basis of our discussion on the rationale for peace education.

Peace Education in the Islamic Tradition In the early period of Islam, teachers were concerned primarily with the teaching of the Qur’an and its message as a means of educating the Muslim mind. This means that the curriculum of that period revolved around the Holy Qur’an. It was this Qur’an-based education system that later developed into what was later named kuttab (Stanton, 1990: 14). Under that system of education, the major pedagogical activities were reading and writing (Shalabi, 1954: 17). It was only in the informal oral presentations and preaching that later took place in the mosque that

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instructions were given on the teachings of Islam. The reason for this, according to Shalabi, was that the formal teaching (as in the case of Makkah) was quite often conducted by Christian teachers. It is pertinent to note that until copies of the Qur’an were widely circulated during the administration of the third successor after the death of Prophet Muhammad, Uthman bn ‘Affan, and specifically in 651 C.E., the teaching and transmission of the Qur’an were conducted orally, ‘as poetry had been in all the times prior to the rise of Islam.’ The teacher’s role in what could be called ‘formal education’ in the first century, consisted of giving basic instructions in the kuttab in reading and writing: ‘using Arabic poetry as the text – while religious training centered around the proclamation of the Qur’an and its meaning in sermons at the local mosque’ (Stanton, 1990: 15). However, it is pertinent to know what was taught at the higher level in order to determine whether there was ever anything like peace education or education for peace in the Islamic tradition. This is the subject of the following section of this chapter. The curriculum of higher education in early Islam was both extensive and intensive in nature and, in this respect, characteristic of the curricular programmes of modern advanced systems of education (Nakosteen, 1964). Yet there was no special provision for peace education as the subjects that were taught were as follows: mathematics (algebra, trigonometry and geometry); science (chemistry, physics, and astronomy); medicine (anatomy, surgery, pharmacy, and specialised medical branches); philosophy (logic, ethics, and metaphysics); literature (philology, grammar, poetry, and prosody); social sciences; history; geography; political disciplines; theology (comparative religions, history of religions, study of Qur’an, religious tradition (Hadith)); and other religious topics (Nakosteen, 1964). A meaningful description of what the teachers taught at the higher levels in the early centuries of Islam is further given by Nakosteen (1964: 53), who observed that ‘the extent and depth of Muslim curriculum can be detected by references to a number of encyclopaedia of general knowledge and specific disciplines, among scholars especially, the Encyclopaedia of the Ikhwan al-Safa (the Brethren of Purity or Sincerity), which was known to and respected by European schoolmen.’ Nakosteen also observed the indication that ‘manifested in the fact that one Arabic dictionary contained sixty volumes, with an illustration for each definition.’ In further articulation of the depth of the Muslim curriculum of that period, he writes that the richness of the curriculum is evident in its all-encompassing nature, as there is no body of knowledge that it excludes. For instance, the curriculum provides for both learning experiences and activities

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concerning the ‘calculation of the angle of the ecliptic, measuring the size of the earth, calculating the procession of the equinoxes, inventing the pendulum clock, explaining in the field of optics and physics such phenomena as refraction of light, using the globe in teaching the geography of a round earth, developing observatories for the empirical study of heavenly bodies’, and making advances in several other areas (1964: 33). It is worth mentioning that the curriculum of Muslim higher education in the Abbasid period (750-1258) interestingly included ‘such legal subjects (Shariyyat) as Jurisprudence, exegesis, and tradition; literary studies (adabiyyat) in philology, syntax, rhetoric, prosody, composition, reading, and history; mathematics (riyadhiyyat) including geometry, astronomy; rational (aqliyyat) studies in logic, dialectic, dogmatic theology, metaphysics, natural science, medicine and chemistry and such miscellaneous subjects were approved as surveying, veterinary agriculture, phrenology, dream interpretation, astrology and magic’ (p.53). Alluding to the treatises of the Ikhwan.al-Safa, Nakosteen (1946: 53) identifies the following branches of learning as constituting the curriculum of Muslim higher education in early Islam. 1. Mundane Studies: Reading and writing, lexicography and grammar, calculation and computation, prosody and poetic art, the science of omens and portents, the science of magic, amulets, alchemy and legerdemain, trades and crafts, buying and selling, commerce, agriculture and cattle farming, and biography and narrative. 2. Religious Studies: Knowledge of the scriptures (i.e. the Qur’an), exegesis of the scriptures, the science of tradition, jurisprudence, the commemoration of God, admonition, the ascetic life, mysticism (Sufism), and the ecstatic or beatific vision. 3. Philosophical Studies: Mathematics, logic, numbers, geometry, astronomy, music, arithmetic and geometrical relations; natural science and anthropology; the elements; meteorology, mineralogy; the essence of nature and its manifestations; botany; zoology; anatomy and anthropology; sense perceptions; embryology; man as the microcosm; the development of the soul (physical evolution); body and soul, the true nature of psychical and physical pain and pleasure; diversity of languages (philology); psychology – understanding, the world soul, etc., and theology – esoteric of Islam, the ordering of the spirit world; the occult sciences.

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Similarly, Nakosteen (1964: 54) alludes to al-Khatib’s Mafatih al-Ulum (the Keys of the Sciences), which he regards as containing a similar scope but different classification of knowledge which excludes the mundane studies and is, rather, of two main branches, as follows: The Indigenous Sciences: Jurisprudence (Figh), principles and (Furu’) application, such as legal purity, prayer, fasting, alms, pilgrimage, buying and selling, marriage, homicide, wounding, retaliation, compensation and bloodwit, etc. (eleven sections); scholastic philosophy (Kalam) ‘the various schools and sects of Muslims, Christian, Jews and Gentiles (Persians, Indians, Chaldeans, Manichaean’s, Marcionites, Bardescenians, Mazdakites, Sophists, etc.), Arabian heathenism, and the first principles of religion’ (seven sections); grammar (Nahw) (twelve sections); the secretarial art (Kitabat) including explanations of all prosody and the poetic art (Arieth and Shir) (five sections); history (Akhbar) ‘the history of Ancient Persian, Muhammadan history, pre-Muhammadan history of Arabia, especially Yaman and the history of Greece and Rome’ (nine sections). The Exotic Sciences: Philosophy (Falsafa) (three sections); logic (mantigh) (nine sections); medicine (Tibb) – diet, weights and measures (eight sections); arithmetic, including algebra (Hisab, Arithmatighi) (five sections); geometry (Handasa, Jumetriya) (four sections); astronomy (Ilmun’nujum) – ‘planets and fixed stars’ the composition of the universe according to the ptolematic system; judicial astrology’ (four sections); music (Musighi) (three sections); mechanics, hydrostatics (IlmuIhiyal) (two sections); and alchemy (kimiya) (three sections). As the above illustrates, the curriculum of Muslim higher education is both all-encompassing and all-embracing as there is hardly a body of knowledge that is not represented therein. Yet there is no mention — directly or indirectly — of peace education as a subject. This may be understood against the background that education in early Islam was not approached as an exercise that could be compared or juxtaposed with other ideas or perspectives, as is the case among contemporary Muslims. The point being made here is found in the words articulated by Panjwani (2004: 1), who writes that there was a significant shift in the understanding of Islam, evident in its treatment in contemporary writings as an object of study or ‘an idea that is to be

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juxtaposed with other ideas.’ Panjwani argues that this line of thinking is supported by the biographical work of al-Nadim (1970, but originally from the 10th century), which does not suggest a juxtaposition of Islam with others (such as Islam and democracy, Islam and capitalism, Islam and science, Islam and the West, and certainly Islam and education). Panjwani’s words show that ideas such as ‘Islam and peace education’, ‘Islamic peace education’, or ‘peace education’ were non-existent during the first few centuries of Islam and Islamic education. This confirms the earlier analysis of the educational curriculum among early Muslims, which revealed with specific details the subjects taught at every level of education. Relying on such authorities as Sardar (1989), Hoodbouy (1992), Tibi (1995), Iqbal (1996), Soroush (1997), Mukadam (1997), Wan Daud (1998), Ali (2000), Conway (2001), and others, Panjwani offers four perspectives on the relationship between education and other ideas among contemporary Muslims. One such perspective is that there is a distinct Islamic position on education. Another perspective is the one represented by Muslim scholars who question this fundamental assumption. Yet another perspective revolves around an inter-faith framework of education. Yet there is a perspective that is grounded in a belief in the superiority of the Islamic approach to education in comparison to other religions. The implication of this is that the idea of juxtaposing Islam with other ideas or concepts is a product of contemporary thought and that, as such, it was an experience that was alien to the Islamic tradition. However, there is a need to trace, in specific terms, the evolution, formulation or conceptualisation of the idea of peace education among Muslims. This in fact is the subject of the next section of the chapter.

The Conception of Peace Education among Contemporary Muslims The conception of education in contemporary Muslim settings is grounded in the contemporary Muslim conception of Islam itself. In other words, the place of peace education, in the estimation of contemporary Muslims, is closely connected to their perception of Islam itself. Islam is conceived of as being synonymous with peace. The word Islam originates from the root verb aslama, which implies submission or surrender and connotes peace. Pursuant to this line of argument, Saritoprak (2005: 413) states that, ‘the core values of Islam constitute the foundation of nonviolent action in the tradition.’ He supports this with the prophetic tradition that describes ‘a Muslim as one whose fellow brothers are safe from the harm of his tongue

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and hands,’ and another which stresses the significance of peaceful and non-violent dealings i.e. La Dharar wa la Dhirar, meaning ‘not to harm and not to be harmed.’ The implication of this is that peace and non-violence are embedded in the teachings of Islam. Accordingly, the idea of peace and non-violent education may be regarded as being embedded in the education of Muslims from their earliest times. Within a simple logic, one may now wonder why there was no such subject as peace education in the educational curriculum of early Muslims. This may be explained through the implications of the positive attitude of the holy prophet of Islam to his opponents at various times, especially during the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah when, according to Saritoprak (2005: 413): The prophet accepted the hard conditions of his opponents for the sake of peace. Disarming himself to enter the city of Mecca, he placed himself and his followers at great risk so they could perform their pilgrimage peacefully. The prophet’s action against the Meccans was a great example of non-violent resistance to the oppression in Mecca by the elite. Although his message did not prohibit the use of force when needed, he never considered this an essential aspect of his message.

It is paradoxical that, notwithstanding the centrality of the concept of peace to Islamic teachings, Islam is, in the contemporary world, identified as a religion advocating and promoting warfare and militarism. Such a misconception of the thinking of Muslims may not be unconnected with the growing perception that Muslims are not favourably disposed to the promotion of peace, especially through the instrumentality of their contemporary system of education. However, such a perception may be regarded as suffering from some defects, especially when viewed against the background of such informed opinions as those expressed by Hassan (1987: 90), who argues that ‘although there is no course or project related to peace education in Muslim countries, there are some hopes for peace education, at least for the future.’ Pursuing this argument further, Hassan writes: […] the content of peace education was emphasised in the First, Second and Third World Conferences on Muslim Education, held in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in 1977, in Islamabad in 1980, and Dacca in 1981, respectively. Peace and justice were central themes in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights prepared by the Islamic Council of Europe in 1980.

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As an outcome of those world conferences on Muslim education, Hassan sees the inclusion of peace and non-violent educational objectives in the educational blueprints of some Muslim countries, one of them being Malaysia, where the Ministry of Education stated in 1982 that one of its country’s educational goals was: To promote international peace and understanding in the individual through the study of other nations from geographical, historical, sociopolitical, economic, and political perspectives and their relationship with Malaysia. To sensitise individuals to issues comforting human-kind and develop in them understanding and appreciation of international effort toward peace and cooperation (p.73).

As insignificant as this provision appears with regard to peace education, it is an effort in a laudable direction. Unfortunately, there are no other instances of such conceptual provisions for peace education in the contemporary Muslim world. Such a situation calls for a justification of its rationale, as will be seen in the next section.

Conflict in the Muslim World and the Rationale for Peace Education In December 2010, a jobless Tunisian graduate, Mohammed Bouazizi, resorted to selling vegetables. He had his cart seized by police and, now without hope, set himself ablaze and died in the process, on 17 December 2010. Another Tunisian youth, Mohsen Bouterfif, like Bouazizi, also burnt himself to death after failing to find a job and a house. This development ignited a protest by young Tunisians who took to the streets and faced Tunis, the administrative seat of the country, where they embarked upon a protest which culminated in the overthrow of President Zain al-Abideen Bn Ali, who was forced out of power and fled to Saudi Arabia via Malta on 14 January 2011. The ripple effect of this was that Egyptian youths followed suit after 11 days, when they organised themselves into what is now known as Egypt’s largest demonstration in a generation. The effect of this later spread to Bahrain, Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria and other Arab countries. Consequently, Muammar Gaddafi was killed after being captured alive by protesters who, from February 2011, had rebelled against his regime. Today, the Bashar Assad administration of Syria faces the danger of being truncated amid the warfare and militarism that currently pervades the country, where the highly dreaded and unrepentantly bellicose Muslim

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insurgency group, the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) currently holds sway. ISIS militancy has accounted for several hundred fatalities in its areas of operations across the Middle East, and the effect of such operations has been colossal and almost inestimable. While an enumeration of the deaths resulting from the incessant attacks on both civilian locations and military installation may be a Herculean task for any individual investigator, the United Nations published a report in November 2015 stating that the internationally renowned Middle East-based terrorist group solely, through its operations in Iraq and in the first eight months of 2014 alone, claimed the lives of no fewer than 9,347 civilians. Demonstrating that ISIS casualties are being recorded in the various war-ravaged parts of the Middle East at an alarming rate, the report reveals that Iraq, Lebanon and Syria are most affected by the insurgency. The United Nations report is supported by another report released in September 2015 by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR). Based on testimonies of 58 defectors from ISIS, the report exposed the group as both belligerent and blood-thirsty. It is obvious from this that the Muslim world is engulfed in crises which are occasioned by a clamour for political and socio-economic change. This situation is not very different from the experiences that culminated in the introduction of peace education as a subject or course of study in the Western educational tradition, as noted in the introductory section of this chapter. For instance, Banks (1996) attributes the earliest initiatives in peace education to the efforts of a small group of African Americans who applied the campus activism they had learned in their ethnic studies programme, the Civil Rights Movement and the war against vietnam, to the field of teacher education. It is also pertinent to note, as stated earlier, that the codification of peace education and its integration into the American system of education was recorded in 1972, when the AACTE established the Commission on Multicultural Education with a view to alleviating social crises, incessant pandemonium and repeated unrest, through the agency of education. There is nothing to be gained by saying that the Arab Spring is the Muslim version of the tragedies that led to the introduction of what later developed into peace education in the American system of education. Accordingly, it is not out of place to state that the Muslim world is in dire need of peace education being introduced into its school curricula, following the clamour for change that has culminated in violence and militarism in various Muslim countries.

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Given the large population of Muslims in Nigeria, and considering the ongoing Boko Haram conflict, which is driven by the activities of supposed Islamists who aim to introduce their own version of an Islamic state, it is important to analyse the prospect, or possible place of a peace education curriculum in the country. This subject will be addressed in the next section, in the Nigerian context.

Religion and the Rationale for Peace Education in Nigeria Religion is a major way in which Nigerians identify themselves and, increasingly, this manifests as a perception that there is a ‘Muslim north’ and a ‘Christian south’ in the country. However, the Yoruba of the southwest are more prone to defining themselves ethnically, while the HausaFulani of the north identify themselves by their Islamic religion (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). It should be pointed out that Nigerians are not only of Christian and Muslim religions, as there is yet another group: the traditional religion which, incidentally, ‘is the least politically active, numbering several hundreds of ethnic groups and subgroups, villages, clans and kin groups; and involving the worship of different gods and goddesses’ (p.11). Similarly, there are several sects and denominations among Muslims such as the Ahmadiyyah, Tijaniyyah, Sanusiyyah, Qadiriyyah and Izalah, just as there are among Christians, such as Protestants, Anglicans, Baptists, Methodists, Catholics, the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA), Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and others. Such incidents, as may be recorded from time to time, constitute a good rationale for the incorporation of peace education in Nigeria’s school curricula and in the curricula of teacher education. The argument of this section of the chapter is supported by the centrality of education to the terrorist ideology of the Boko Haram insurgents, as will be demonstrated below.

Opposition to Education in Boko Haramism There have been various scholarly attempts at tracing the roots of the concept, ‘Boko Haram’, which has been largely accepted as a label by which the current, dominant Muslim insurgents in Nigeria are known. According to Aghedo and Osuma (2012: 858), ‘the phrase “Boko Haram” literally means “Western education is evil”’, in the Hausa Language. This view is backed up by Onapajo, Uzodike and Whetho (2012: 343), who posit that the term ‘Boko Haram’ is taken from the Hausa language for ‘the book is sin’, which has the connotation that ‘Western education is

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forbidden.’ However, it should be noted that while Aghedo and Osuma see the term as literally meaning ‘the book is forbidden’, Onapajo et al. see the characterisation concerning the forbidding of the book as a mere ‘connotation’. This line of analysis becomes more evident in Onapajo et al.’s (2012) further analysis that ‘the terminology is derived from the public perception of the ideology and operation of the group, and clearly shows the group’s anti-Western nature’ (p. 343). This is better articulated in the words of Onapajo and Uzodike who, in another interesting study (2012: 26) reveal that ‘the popular term “Boko Haram” implying “education is forbidden” in the Hausa language is not a registered name given to the group by its founders […] but a media construct that is derived from the perception of the public on the operation of the group.’ This position was earlier articulated by Abimbola (2010: 99), who rationalises that ‘the group might not have given the name “Boko Haram” to itself, rather the name could come from the external view of its basic beliefs.’ However, Abimbola also fully subscribes to the view that the term ‘Boko Haram’ is derived from a combination of the Hausa word boko meaning ‘book’ and the Arabic word haram which is something ‘forbidden, ungodly or sinful.’ A clear picture of the status of the term was, however, provided by Onuoha (2010: 57), who revealed a rejection of this position by the acting leader of Boko Haram, Mallam Sanusi Umaru, in a statement attributed to him: Boko Haram does not in any way mean ‘Western education is a sin’ as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means ‘Western Civilisation’ is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West […] which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western education (Vanguard, 14 August 2009).

This viewpoint of the Boko Haram leader is self-explanatory. His perspective was later confirmed by David Cook (2011), who produced the full text from the leader in his seminal work, Boko Haram: A Prognosis. However, there is a concern over the leader’s attempt to draw a line of demarcation between the attitude of the movement to Western education and its attitude to Western civilisation, in the context of their operations. The knotty question here seems to have received successful attention by the International Crisis Group (2014: 7), which recorded the literal interpretation of the Qur’an by Mallam Yusuf, the founder of the initial movement which metamorphosed into the present Boko Haram. He advocated that aspects of Western education he considered to contradict

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that holy book should be forbidden in Hausa ‘Boko Haram’. Such aspects of the book include evolution, the big bang theory of the universe’s development, and elements of chemistry and geography. It is not out of place to remark that the explanation offered in this regard by the International Crisis Group seems to have captured the essence of the term ‘Boko Haram’. It may also serve as a good basis for the invalidation of Cook’s (2012) erroneous view that Boko Haram, in the opinion of most scholars, ‘is the combination of a Hausa word, Boko, and an Arabic word, Haram, with Boko referring to book, or the noun, ilimin which means education, while Haram refers to forbidden.’ There certainly cannot be a more injurious and absurd myth than the argument that the word Haram in the context of Boko Haram, is an Arabic word. It may be a useful addition to state that what the author fails to capture is that the word Haram, as a Hausa word, simply exposes the indebtedness of the Hausa language to Arabic. This was addressed in the report on the Boko Haram Tragedy (2009) by the Da’wah Coordination Council of Nigeria (DCCN) which stated that, ‘Haram is a Hausa word adopted from Arabic, and means Islamically unacceptable, forbidden or prohibited’ (p.10). However, Aliyu Tilde, in a piece entitled ‘We are Boko Haram’ (2013) offers a fresh perspective on the background from which to understand the Boko Haram ideology. He argues that book means fake bride (amaryar book) and elucidates that such a bride was normally used in place of the real bride, to ride the horse of the original bride when being taken to her new home, where the groom would be awaiting her arrival. Tilde added that ‘she will be escorted in convoy of celebrants as if she was the real bride.’ Such arrangements were made in a rather comical fashion: the bride’s grandmother may disguise herself as the ‘amaryar boko’ just to create fun when the groom gets to see who his ‘bride’ is. While all this was happening, arrangements would have been made for the passage of the original bride, who would normally be escorted by two or three women. Tilde argues that Boko, which in classical Hausa language means deceit or deception, was later consigned to Western education when it was introduced to Hausaland, because the Islamic scholars rejected it. Consequently, the derogatory connotation ‘ilmin boko’ (fake education) was regarded as appropriate in discouraging Northern Nigerian Muslims from giving their children access to Western education. The term ‘makarantar boko’/‘fake school’, which later became dominant in Hausaland, was a derivative of this line of thinking. In his article, ‘What makes Boko Haram?’ (2009), Abu Firdaus describes ‘boko’ as both an ideology and the antithesis of the boko ideology. However, the interplay of the various views and perspectives as offered in the discussion here

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deserve further exploration, which is beyond the scope of this chapter, restricted as it is to the question of peace education in the context of Muslim settings with a focus on Nigeria. This focus of the chapter informs the need to examine the dominant system of education among Muslims in the country, especially the northern part. Hence, the need for an analysis of the madrasah system in the Nigerian context.

The Traditional Madrasah System in Nigeria The traditional system of Arabic Islamic education, otherwise known as the madrasah system in Nigeria, covers four categories which can be divided into three main phases (Gbadamosi, 1978). The first phase begins at an early age of about five, when the young Muslim children are sent down to the piazza schools managed by some mallams (i.e. teachers). The pupil, according to Gbadamosi, could be in this long but crucial stage for about four to seven years. In such a setting, a single mallam could have as many as forty pupils, some of whom might attend the schools regularly. Historically, in some of the schools, the teachers were not paid as there were no school fees or special levies. This was indeed the case in the informal settings where the Arabic teachers normally had their own vocations such as farming, weaving and so forth, to support themselves. Gbadamosi further opines that even when they were professional teachers and clerics, they drew no salaries from these schools, relying only on the various gifts and alms which the parents of their wards might send them from time to time. The history of the madrasah system in Nigeria is replete with information on private enterprises in the area of traditional Islamic education. Such personal efforts made by individual Muslims culminated in the establishment of madaaris in various parts of the country, which explains why individual ownership of such schools prevailed more than community ownership. Most of the notable traditional Arabic schools in Nigeria are identified by some leading Islamic scholars and personalities in the country. For instance, the Al-Mahad traditional Arabic school, which later evolved into the Shariah College of Kano, was founded in 1934 through the individual efforts of Shaykh Nasir Kabara. Similarly, the efforts that led to the founding of an Arabic school known as Al-Mahad al-Azhari of Ilorin, in 1947, is associated with Shaykh Kamalu-d-din Al-AdabiyyI. By a similar token, the founding of Markaz-ut-Ta’limil Arabiyyi in Abeokuta in 1950, and later in Lagos in 1952, both in the south-western part of the country, was attributed to Shaykh Adam Abdullah Al-Iluriyy. This is in

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the same manner that Al-Mahadal-Arabiyyi founded the school in Ibadan, in the south-western part of the country, in 1957, which was a product of the individual efforts of Shaykh Murtadha Adbdus-Salam. This is the situation with several other Arabic schools in the country. Individual ownership of these schools is prevalent but there are also a few which were established through joint action or community effort. For instance, Olurode found that in two of the 21 traditional Arabic schools studied at in Epe, there was substantial community participation (Olurode, 2009: 83). He added that ‘these were mainly the result of youths’ activism because in an attempt to give a competitive start to their children, Muslim youths have come together in Epe, Iwo and Ilorin to influence the direction of Madrasah.’ In Ilorin, however, individual ownership was prevalent together with community participation in the founding of a madrasah which ‘flourished through the involvement of parents among other stakeholders, who could be invited to the board to serve as advisers’ (p. 84). Although individual ownership was prevalent in Iwo, too, it is interesting to note — as gathered from interviews — that most sole proprietors of madrasah had resisted past attempts by communities to be involved. In Lagos, where most Arabic schools are owned by individuals, the Jamat-ulIslamiyyah of Nigeria operates what could be regarded as a good example of a community-owned Madrasah, where classes are tuition-free and teachers are paid by the Jamaah. In most parts of Nigeria, the ownership of traditional Arabic schools is normally passed from one generation to the other. This explains why some of the first and second generations of madaris are currently in the hands of the second and third generations of owners, as is the case with AzZumratul-Adabiyyah (Ilorin), Markaz-ut-Ta’lim (Lagos), and AlMa’hadul-Arabiyy (Ibadan). The transfer of the ownership of a madrasah after the demise of its original owner is normally regulated by inheritance features which usher in a new leader to continue the Islamic work of the deceased. The survival of the madrasah system in Nigeria is not unconnected with the perception that such an endeavour is meritorious and spiritually fulfilling. In other words, the thinking that founding and running a Madrasah is a source of barakah (Allah’s blessings) is central to the survival of the Madrasah in the Nigerian system. Another factor contributing to its survival is school fees paid by students or their parents, as most teachers take such fees as their means of livelihood. Yet another factor in the survival of the madrasah system is the walimah ceremonies

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which most proprietors of such schools exploit to make money: they maximise the material benefits of such an event by prescribing the payment of money at every stage of the programme. Other events that have been used as money-making devices by some owners of Arabic schools in Nigeria are the mawlid nabiyy (the commemoration of the birth of the Holy Prophet), Lailat-ul-Qadri (searching for the Night of Majesty during Ramadan), Hijrah (celebration of the Muslim New-Year), and others. All these, in some form, are also known to both the pondok and pesantren systems. However, Olurode (2009) found that some of the traditional Islamic schools in Nigeria are enjoying funding support from external sources, although he maintained that there was no disclosure about the specific form of external funding (p.83). He opines that the external funding, enjoyed by such schools, ‘was known to include staff development, book donations, and personnel support’ (p.91). Traditional Islamic teachers, as noted earlier, are remunerated by both pupils and their parents. The remuneration of teachers, described by Total (1926) and known in early Islam, still holds sway in connection with madrasah education in contemporary Nigeria. Such remuneration took the form of donations of eggs, milk, bread and vegetables; such teachers were treated as clergymen, in a way that is similar to the treatment of the clergy in certain rural districts in America today. Their meagre salaries need to be supplemented with donations of food stuffs, clothing, and other items. This is also true of the madrasah system in contemporary Nigeria where teachers, who are mostly former students of the proprietors of such schools, depend on this kind of remuneration. It is not out of place to add here that such teachers also benefit from some of the money-making events described earlier, to some extent at least. In terms of salaries, most of the madrasah teachers in today’s Nigeria earn salaries ranging from a monthly pay of about N10,000.00 to a sum of N15,000.00. These salaries are equivalent to USD 70.00 and USD 100 respectively. It is remarkable to note that a handful of Arabic teachers earn relatively lower salaries, while others do not earn anything other than the voluntary donations of food by students and parents, as well as proceeds from prayer offerings. In the northern part of Nigeria, particularly after the influx of Europeans to Nigeria, much of the responsibility for financing Islamic education fell to the parents. According to Malami (1994), teachers’ salaries came from weekly parental contributions every Wednesday. Locally, these contributions were known as kudin larba, which literally means ‘Wednesday contributions.’ The intention is that such contributions cover

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all the expenses involved in running the school, but such meagre salaries are not sufficient to meet the essential needs of the teachers. This explains why Malami holds the government responsible for the deplorable conditions of Islamic schools and their teachers. He argues that the government provides basic education in Islamic studies, in the school curriculum, without adding any incentives for either the students or their teachers to pursue the studies vigorously, ‘which is why there are limited job opportunities for graduates of Islamic schools which now experience neglect from the government to finance Western education at all costs, and at the expense of Islamic Education’ (p. 50). Trimingham has accurately observed that there are two grades of schools distinguished in Hausa as Makarantar allo/‘tablet school’, and Makarantar’ ilmi’/‘law school’ (Trimingham, 1959). In the first school, children are taught to recite the Qur’an without understanding. The second school embraces all further studies. Generally, an ilmi school merely teaches details about the performance of salat, prayers for occasional events like funerals, some exposition of Qur’anic texts, and perhaps the study of a book of law. Commenting on the nature of the subjects taught in the Arabic schools, Doi maintains that the courses of instruction differ from school to school, and they do not have a well-planned uniform mode of instructional operations (Doi, 1981). The inappropriateness of the instructional strategies used in the Arabic school system is normally a product of the careless or deficient handling of education. The quality of the teachers goes a long way towards successfully implementing any curriculum (Adedeji, 1995). Islamic education normally started with the proper grounding of the young in the Qur’an. The learner was made to read and memorise the Qur’an in well structured stages. There were (and are still) cases where the course was occasionally punctuated by some kind of festivities following the pupils’ successful completion of the study of certain parts of the Qur’an. Needless to say, the Qur’an was central to the formal education of pupils. This stage normally dovetailed gradually into the second stage, where attention was concentrated on the translation of the Qur’an. In the third stage, there was specialisation, and students could also go down to what Gbadamosi calls ‘the major centres of Islamic education’ (Gbadamosi, 1978: 81), located in nearly all towns such as Epe, Ibadan, Iseyin, Ilorin, Kaduna, Kano, and some towns in Bornu.

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Peace Education for Muslims and Conflict Management in Nigeria It should be pointed out from the onset that this section of the chapter is derived from Clarke-Habibi (2005) and Danesh (2011). Both authors have separately worked extensively on peace education for Bosnia and Herzegovina. For Muslim countries and others which have just emerged from violent experiences, the purpose of peace education is to equip the citizens with appropriate knowledge that will enable them to pursue the same goals, but in a peaceful rather than violent manner. The learning experiences that will constitute the content of such peace education will be designed for the Muslim settings in question, and the following fundamentals of peace education must be given prominent attention: 1. Biological, psychological, social, moral and spiritual aspects of human development and the role of the society in rearing peaceoriented youth; 2. The nature and dynamics of unity in the context of diversity; 3. The dynamics of violence in the family, school environment, and society, and how to deal with these dynamics; 4. The impact of the home environment, media, and society on the peaceful development of children; 5. The transformation of worldviews and behaviour from a conflictorientation to a peace-orientation; 6. Universal principles of human rights and responsibilities, including gender equality as a prerequisite for peace, and the application of these principles in daily life; 7. Principles, practices, and ethics of democracy and leadership for peace, including the practice of conflict-free conflict resolutions and non-adversarial decision-making; 8. The psychological needs of traumatised children and adults and the dynamics of the process of healing (Clarke-Habibi, 2005: 43). The above statements constitute principles that should shape the direction of peace education in the various Muslim countries mentioned earlier. In a joint study by Danesh and Clarke-Habibi (2007), further curricular directions that may be relevant to Muslim settings are provided. These directions have taken the form of questions asked as follows: 1. What could have been done to prevent the war once the processes of conflict had started?

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2. Why did the people who had lived peacefully decide to become hostile to one another and violent among themselves? 3. Why was there brutality and barbarism among people who are so educated and sophisticated? 4. What are the best ways to solve conflicts at various levels? 5. How can we avoid the mistakes of the past in the future? 6. How can we be sure that the cycle of conflict and war won’t happen again? 7. How can intentional violence be explained? 8. What do children and women who have been victims of violence experience psychologically, and how can victims undertake a process of healing? 9. By what processes can people who have committed terrible acts regain their integrity? There is no contradicting that the incorporation or integration of peace education into Muslim education curricula requires a clearly stated purpose, carefully selected learning experiences, well organised content, effective teaching methods, and a results-oriented evaluation. To start with, peace principles may be integrated into every subject or course in Muslim settings. Such principles have to be carefully formulated in consonance with the peculiarities of the educational setting, or local context involved. It should be noted that, three tasks are required of any educational setting seeking to embrace the idea of integrating peace education into its schooling system. The three tasks are: curriculum framework development; teacher re-training; and textbook preparation.

Conclusion This chapter has articulated the place of peace education in the Islamic tradition. Focusing on the Nigerian context, the chapter situated the rationale for peace education in the recent socio-political crises that engulfed various Muslim countries where people have clamoured for leadership change and improved socio-economic conditions. It highlighted the contagious effect of such crises by portraying them as portentous of large-scale unrest in the entire Muslim world. The chapter studied the potential of peace education in establishing civil, civilised and peaceful existence in the contemporary Muslim world, and articulated how such education would have informed a peaceful, rather than a violent clamour for a change of government in the affected countries. The chapter highlighted the ingredients of peace education for Muslim settings, and

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concludes that there is an urgent need for the integration of peace principles into contemporary Muslim education.

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Federal Republic of Nigeria (2004), National policy on education, Lagos: NERDC Press. Gandonu, A. (1978), ‘Nigeria’s 250 ethnic groups: Realities and assumptions, in Holloman, R.E. and Arutuinov, S.A. (eds.), Perspectives and Ethnicity, The Hague: Manton. Gbadamosi, T.G.O. (1978), The Growth of Islam among the Yorubas, London: Longman. Glazer, N. (1993), ‘Is assimilation dead?’ The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 530, no.1, pp.122-136. Harris, I.M. (1999), ‘Types of peace education’, in Raviv, A., Oppenheimer, I. and Bar-Tal, D. (eds.), How Children understand war and peace, San-Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp.299-317. Irvine, J.J. (2008), ‘Diversity and teacher education people, pedagogy and politics’, in Cochran-Smith, M., Feiman-Nemser, S., McIntyre, D.J. and Demers, K.E. (eds), Handbook of Research on Teacher Education: Enduring questions in changing contexts, New York and London: Routledge, pp.675-678. Jacobonwitz, T. and Michelli, N.M. (2009), ‘Diversity and teacher education: What can the future be?’ in Glazeri, N. (ed.), Education today, Florida: Hunwick. Johnson, L. (2008), The hidden secret, Johannesburg: Impression Publishers. Johnson, M.L. (1998), ‘Trends in peace education’, http://www.indicana.ed/-ssdc/pcdig.htm (accessed 15 December 2010). Koylu, M. (2004), ‘Peace education: An Islamic approach’, Journal of Peace Education, vol. 1, no.1, pp.59-76. Malami H. (1994), Financing Islamic Education in Muslim Minority States: The case of Nigeria, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs vol.14, no. 1 & 2, pp.46-52. Makdisi, G. (1981), The rise of colleges: Institutions of learning in Islam and the West, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. McCornick, T.E. (1984), ‘Multiculturalism: Some principles and issues’, Theory into Practice, vol. 28, no.2, pp.93-97. Monez, T.B. (1973), ‘Working for peace: Implications for Education’, in Henderson G. (ed.), Education for Peace Focus on Mankind, Washington DC, ASCD. Murdock, G.P. (1975), Outline of world cultures, New Havens: Human Relations Area Files. Nakosteen, M. (1978), History of Islamic origins of Western education AD 800-1350, Boulder: Shambalaha Publication.

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Olurode, L. (2009), Glimses of Madrasa from Africa, Lagos: Islamic Network for Development. Onapajo, H. and Uzodike, U.O. (2012), ‘Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria,’ African Security Review, vol.21, no.3, pp.24-39. Onapajo, H., Uzodike, U.O. and Whetho, A. (2012), Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: The international dimension’, South African Journal of International Affairs, vol. 19, no.3, pp.337-357. Onuoha, C. (2010), ‘The Islamist challenge: Nigeria’s Boko Haram crisis explained’, Africa Security Review, vol. 19, no. 2, pp.54-67. Osaghae, E.E. and Suberu, R. (2005), A history of identities, violence and stability in Nigeria, Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity. Otite, O. (1990), Ethnic pluralism and ethnicity in Nigeria, Ibadan: Shaneson. Panjwani, F. (2005), ‘The ‘Islamic’ in Islamic education’, Current Issues in Comparative Education, vol. 1, no. 7, pp.1-11. Pitts, D. (2002), ‘Human rights education in diverse, developing nations: A case in point – South Africa’, Issues of Democracy, http://usinfo.state.gove/journals/itdhr/0302/ijde/pit/s1.htm (accessed 12 January 2003). Reardon, B.A. (1982), Militarization, security and peace education, Valley Forge, P.A: United Ministries in education. —. (1988), Comprehensive peace education: Educating for global responsibility, New York: Teachers College Columbia University Press. —. (1993), Women and peace: Feminist vision of global security, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. Shalabi, A. (1954), History of Muslim education, Beirut: Dar Al-Kashshaf. Student Handbook (2014), University of Winsconsin, Madison, School of Education. Swee-Hin, T. (1997), ‘Education for peace: Towards a millennium of well-being’, Paper for the Working Document of the International Conference on Culture of Peace and Government, Maputo, Mozambique. Temba J. (2008), Implementation of peace education programme, AprilSeptember 2008, Kenya: Ministry of Education, Kenya. Toton, S.C. (1985), ‘Structural change: The next step in justice education’, Religions Education, vol. 80, no.3, pp.447-459.

CONTRIBUTORS

Temitope Edward, AKINYEMI is a lecturer at Ekiti State University. He completed his PhD in political science at the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He completed master’s and bachelor’s degrees at University of Ibadan and University of Ado-Ekiti (now Ekiti State University) in Nigeria, respectively. He specialises in climate-change conflict and environmental politics. Dele, BABALOLA is a senior lecturer at Baze University, Nigeria. He formerly lectured in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, the United Kingdom. He holds a PhD in politics and government from the University of Kent and also obtained an MPhil in West African politics from the University of Birmingham (United Kingdom). He further holds an MSc in research methods in the social sciences from London South Bank University (United Kingdom), and a BSc in political science from Ahmadu Bello University (Nigeria). His research areas focus on federalism, political economy, ethnicity, and terrorism in Nigeria. Bakut tswah, BAKUT is Director of Defence and Security Studies at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Nigeria. Dr. Bakut served as Director of the Nottingham Trent University African Studies Group from 1997-2000 and was the convener of the Forum on Africa and International Relations (FAIR), a British International Studies Association (BISA) Working Group, between 1998 and 2002. He holds a PhD in international relations from Nottingham Trent University, United Kingdom, where he also had a teaching career. Akeem, BELLO is a graduate student of peace and conflict studies at the Institute of Peace, Security and Governance, Ekiti State University, Nigeria. He earned a bachelor’s degree in mass communication/Hausa language at Bayero University, Kano. He currently teaches the same module at the College of Education, Ikere Ekiti.

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Benedicta, DAUDU is Associate Professor of Law at the Department of International Law and Jurisprudence, Faculty of Law, University of Jos, Nigeria, where she also obtained her PhD in law. She attended the University of Pretoria, South Africa, where she obtained a certificate in gender equality. She also holds a postgraduate diploma in monitoring and evaluation from the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, and a certificate in the programme of advanced studies on human rights and humanitarian law from the American University, Washington College of Law. She was a recipient of the Carnegie Corporation New York Scholarship and a Fulbright Visiting Research Scholar to the American University, Washington College of Law. Dorcas, ETTANG is a senior lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, where she obtained a PhD in conflict transformation and peace studies. Her areas of research focus broadly on conflict prevention, peace-building, conflict transformation, and non-violence with a grassroots focus. George Akwaya, GENYI is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Federal University Lafia, where he is also Head of Department. He taught in the Department of Political Science at Benue State University, Makurdi, until 2015. Genyi holds a PhD in political science and a master’s in international relations, both from Benue State University. He acquired his bachelor’s in political science at Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria. He has participated in numerous empirical research projects, including ones funded by the DFID on the 2003 general elections in Nigeria, and the prevalence of domestic violence in Benue State in 2004. Christopher, ISIKE is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. An Africanist scholar by research standpoint, Isike’s teaching and research interests revolve around the quality of women’s political representation in Africa, women and peace-building in Africa, human security, human factor development in Africa, and African politics and development dynamics. He has published scores of quality articles in national and international journals. Professor Isike consults for the UNFPA, UNICEF, UN Women, and the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government on gender equality and female empowerment issues in the province. He has just finished a one-year sabbatical as Senior Research Advisor at the Shell Petroleum Development Company in Nigeria, where he was a programme monitoring and evaluation specialist in the External Relations Department of the company.

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Benjamin, MAIANGWA is a PhD candidate in the Arthur V. Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice, St Paul’s College, University of Manitoba, Canada. He holds a master’s degree in conflict transformation and peace studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, and a master’s in sustainability, development and peace from the United Nations University, Japan. His research and writing has focused on jihadist terrorism, cultural ‘othering’ in Africa, Nigerian politics, West African regionalism, and the recovery of terrorism survivors. Abdul-Wasi Babatunde, MOSHOOD holds a PhD in conflict transformation and peace studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He attended the University of Ibadan and the University of Lagos where he achieved a B.Ed in educational management/political science, and MA in peace and conflict studies, and an MSc in political science, respectively. He specialises in peace and conflict transformation, international relations, and Middle East politics. He teaches political science at Lagos State University, Nigeria. Olusola, OGUNNUBI, is a research fellow at the Centre for African Studies, University of the Free State, South Africa. He taught political science and international relations modules at the International and Public Affairs Cluster of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. His research interests are mainly concerned with the power dynamics of Africa’s regional powers. Azeez, OLANIYAN is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Ekiti State University, Ado Ekiti, Nigeria. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. His research interests revolve around issues related to peace and conflict, social movements, ethnic politics, and democracy and governance. Hakeem, ONAPAJO is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Nile University, Abuja, Nigeria. He was a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Zululand, South Africa. He has taught at the International and Public Affairs Cluster of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa having received a PhD in political science from the same institution. He completed his master’s degree in political science at the International Islamic University, Malaysia, and his bachelor’s degree in political science at Lagos State University, Nigeria. He researches in the areas of religion and politics, conflict and terrorism, elections and democratisation, and Africa’s international relations.

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Contributors

Sunday Paul Chinazo, ONWUEGBUCHULAM, holds a PhD in political science from the International and Public Affairs Cluster, School of Social Sciences of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Onwuegbuchulam has research interests in African philosophy, conflict transformation and peace-building, and practical theology. Ahmad Rufai, SAHEED is Acting Dean in the Faculty of Education, Sokoto State University. Dr. Rufai, who has teaching specialisations in curriculum, pedagogy and religion, has also lectured at the University of Lagos, Akoka, and Lagos State University, Nigeria. He holds a bachelor’s degree and a master’s from the University of Lagos, and a doctorate in curriculum and pedagogy from the International Islamic University, Malaysia (IIUM). His research interests are restricted to the highly specialised areas of curriculum, pedagogy and religious education. He has been providing professional services in such varied capacities as UNESCO expert/Chief Judge, Africa Inter-University Debate/Africa Inter-Collegiate Debate, UNESCO Institute for African Culture and International Understanding (IACIU), Olusegun Obasanjo Presidential Library, Abeokuta – Nigeria.

INDEX

Abacha, Sani, 90, 180 Action Congress of Nigeria, 32, 33 Action Group, 27 Afenifere, 29 African Union, 43, 67, 232, 241, 245, 257 All Progressives Congress, 147 bad governance, 93, 96, 97, 107 Baga, 104, 110, 112 Berom, 73, 78, 81, 82, 85, 86, 182, 190 Boko Haram, 4, 6, 16, 18, 30, 33, 41, 45, 46, 62, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 137, 180, 203, 204, 207, 219, 222, 224, 225, 227, 228, 235, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 267, 268, 279, 280, 281, 288, 290 Christian Association of Nigeria, 35, 209, 215, 217, 237 Christianity, 6, 58, 64, 84, 98, 103, 181, 182, 183, 190, 196, 203, 204, 205, 208, 212, 222, 223, 248 Citizenship, 47, 56, 67, 88 civilisation, 4, 95, 96, 97, 106, 107, 280 Climate Change, 114, 116, 122, 135, 137, 138, 140 coalition government, 27 colonialism, 11, 25, 67, 72, 78, 79, 84, 85, 87, 94, 98, 107, 115, 180, 250, 251 Communal, 47 communal conflict, 16, 56

conflict behaviour, 9 Conflict Management, 43, 157, 180, 191, 199, 201, 265, 286 conflict resolution, 6, 184, 187, 227, 229, 233, 248, 249, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257, 261, 262, 263, 269, 270 Conflict Transformation, 133 Congress for Progressive Change, 32, 33 Ecological Diversity, 122 Economic Community of West African States, 232 Eco-Violence Theory, 119 Ekiti State, 5, 141, 142, 146, 147, 148, 149, 152 ethnic cleavage, 21 ethnic conflict, 19, 24, 25, 66 ethnic groups, 10, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 33, 34, 38, 42, 47, 51, 53, 54, 57, 61, 75, 78, 79, 80, 83, 119, 122, 125, 151, 159, 182, 183, 214, 279, 289 ethnicity, 3, 4, 11, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 33, 34, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50, 51, 53, 56, 57, 70, 72, 84, 87, 90, 91, 131, 180, 190, 193, 209, 267, 290 Farmer-Herder Conflict, 136 federal government, 5, 30, 59, 60, 82, 83, 86, 158, 159, 160, 161, 165, 166, 167, 170, 171, 172, 175, 176, 238 Force and Conciliation Approach, 163 Fulani herders, 125, 129, 130, 134

296

Index

Gender, 227, 230, 232, 237, 239, 242, 244, 246, 256, 264 General Abdulsalami Abubakar, 41 governance, 10, 14, 46, 51, 88, 93, 95, 103, 108, 118, 121, 151, 155, 177, 214, 224, 232, 248 greed and grievance, 8, 10, 13, 15, 19

Jamaatul Nasril Islam, 35, 208 Jihad, 53, 79, 105, 111, 113 Jos, 4, 48, 51, 52, 55, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 187, 188, 189, 193, 199, 200, 201, 203, 220, 223

Hausa, 1, 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 47, 52, 55, 57, 58, 60, 74, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 149, 151, 182, 187, 188, 190, 205, 225, 279, 281, 285 Hausa-Fulani, 1, 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 47, 55, 61, 74, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 182, 187, 279 herdsmen, 4, 117, 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 132, 134, 139, 240 Huntington, 4, 9, 10, 11, 20, 94, 95, 96, 98, 100, 103, 110, 223

Kaduna State, 61, 63, 66, 88, 135, 182, 195, 217 Kanuri, 92

Ibadan, 43, 46, 65, 66, 67, 127, 138, 144, 153, 154, 155, 177, 178, 179, 200, 222, 224, 252, 264, 283, 285, 288, 290 Ibrahim Babangida, 28, 52, 54, 82 Igbo, 1, 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 37, 47, 74, 78, 81, 85, 153, 182, 188, 206, 252, 253, 254, 265 Ijaw Youth Congress, 30 Independent National Electoral Commission, 37 Indigenes, 52, 64, 89, 258 international community, 1, 41, 108, 236, 257 Islam, 4, 6, 35, 58, 60, 64, 66, 80, 84, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 103, 107, 110, 181, 182, 183, 196, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 212, 221, 223, 224, 226, 248, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 284, 288, 289

Madrasah: Madrasah system, 282, 283 marginalisation, 1, 22, 26, 29, 50, 63, 188, 191, 194, 215, 238 Marx, 71, 89 Middle Belt People’s Party, 81 Middle Zone League, 84, 208 military, 1, 2, 3, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 41, 46, 60, 67, 77, 81, 82, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 97, 100, 102, 104, 112, 143, 148, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 171, 172, 176, 177, 238, 239, 278 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, 30, 31 Muhammadu Buhari, 32, 36, 52, 239 National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons, 27 National Union of Road Transport Workers, 141, 146 Niger Delta, 5, 15, 18, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 38, 43, 44, 45, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 240, 243 Niger Delta Basin Development Authority, 161 Niger Delta Development Board, 159, 160

Nigeria, a Country under Siege Northern Nigerian Non-Muslim League, 84 Northern People's Congress, 27, 80 O’odua People’s Congress, 29 Obasanjo, 3, 29, 31, 61, 161, 166, 171, 178, 215 Ogoni, 45, 46, 163, 165, 177 Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission, 164 oil multinationals, 157, 161, 165, 168, 172, 173, 175 Oyo State, 5, 114, 117, 122, 126, 127, 128, 132, 137, 154 Pastoral Migration, 125 peace education, 7, 109, 264, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 282, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290 Peacebuilding, 201, 202, 210, 227, 228, 257 People’s Democratic Party, 2, 86, 93, 147 Plateau State, 4, 5, 51, 53, 57, 69, 72, 79, 82, 86, 88, 89, 90, 180, 181, 182, 183, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 197, 199, 200, 201, 218, 223 Political Islam, 95 political parties, 10, 33, 80, 84, 258 poverty, 12, 13, 15, 70, 86, 89, 94, 103, 118, 143, 145, 157, 196, 203 Qur’an-based education, 271 radicalisation, 93, 94, 109, 221 religion, 4, 6, 11, 15, 19, 20, 32, 33, 34, 40, 46, 48, 50, 57, 58, 62, 64, 70, 72, 80, 81, 84, 87, 95, 96, 103, 110, 131, 180, 181, 182, 187, 189, 190, 191, 193, 195, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219,

297

220, 221, 222, 223, 239, 269, 274, 276, 279 religious actors, 181, 189, 190, 191, 194, 195, 196, 212, 217 Religious Conflicts: religious conflict, 202 religious groups, 4, 10, 36, 61, 69, 72, 85, 187, 189, 192, 203, 216, 218 religious leaders, 5, 181, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 203, 210, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220 Rivers State, 139, 163, 258, 259 Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria, 141, 146 Save Nigeria Group, 31 Settlers, 52, 64 Sharia, 30, 33, 43, 45, 46, 59, 62, 80, 89, 102, 223 Sokoto, 29, 35, 37, 58, 59, 62, 67, 74, 80, 123, 208 state capacity, 8, 10, 13, 19, 67, 132 state failure, 14, 20, 93 Structural Adjustment Programme, 77 Tafawa Balewa, 160 terrorism, 4, 6, 20, 45, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 140, 228, 242, 288, 290 Umar Yar'Adua, 31 United Middle Belt Congress, 81 United States, 16, 42, 46, 67, 95, 96, 101, 181, 199, 201, 224, 225, 243 urban conflict, 5 urban violence, 142, 143, 145, 152, 153, 154 Usman Dan Fodio, 59 violence, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 88, 119, 141, 155, 187, 222, 223

298 Willinks Commission, 58 Yoruba, 1, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 37, 40, 47, 74,

Index 78, 81, 83, 88, 126, 151, 182, 206, 223, 252, 254, 279 Yoruba Council of Elders, 29