Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition (International Nietzsche Studies) 0252027353, 9780252027352

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INTERNATIONAL NIETZSCHE STUDIES

Richard Schacht, series editor Editorial Board Rüdiger Bittner (Bielefeld) Eric Blondei (Paris-Sorbonne) Maudemarie Clark (Colgate) David Cooper (Durham) Arthur Danto (Columbia) Kathleen Higgins (Texas-Austin) Bernd Magnus (California-Riverside) Alexander Nehamas (Princeton) Martha Nussbaum (Chicago) Gary Shapiro (Richmond) Robert Solomon (Texas-Austin) Tracy Strong (California-San Diego) Yirmiyahu Yovel (Jerusalem) A list of books in the series appears at the back of this book.

I N T E R N A T I O N A L N IE T Z S C H E S T U D IE S

Nietzsche has emerged as a thinker of extraordinary importance, not only in the history of philosophy but in many fields of contemporary inquiry. Nietzsche stud­ ies are maturing and flourishing in many parts of the world. This internationaliza­ tion of inquiry with respect to Nietzsche’s thought and significance may be ex­ pected to continue. International Nietzsche Studies is conceived as a series of monographs and es­ say collections that w ill reflect and contribute to these developments. The series w ill present studies in which responsible scholarship is joined to the analysis, in ­ terpretation, and assessment of the many aspects of Nietzsche’s thought that bear significantly upon matters of moment today. In many respects Nietzsche is our contemporary, with whom we do well to reckon, even when we find ourselves at odds with him. The series is intended to promote this reckoning, embracing di­ verse interpretive perspectives, philosophical orientations, and critical assess­ ments. The series is also intended to contribute to the ongoing reconsideration of the character, agenda, and prospects of philosophy itself. Nietzsche was much con­ cerned with philosophy’s past, present, and future. He sought to affect not only its understanding but also its practice. The future of philosophy is an open question today, thanks at least in part to Nietzsche’s challenge to the philosophical tradi­ tions of which he was so critical. It remains to be seen—and determined—wheth­ er philosophy’s future w ill turn out to resemble the “ philosophy of the future” to which he proffered a prelude and of which he provided a preview, by both precept and practice. But this is a possibility we do well to take seriously. International Nietzsche Studies w ill attempt to do so, while contributing to the understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophical thinking and its bearing upon contemporary inquiry. — Richard Schacht

Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition

Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition M IC H A E L

STEVEN GREEN

U niversity o f Illin o is Press U R B A N A A N D C H IC A G O

© 2002 by the Board o f Trustees o f the University o f Illin o is A ll rights reserved M anufactured in the United States o f America c 5 4 3 2 l © This book is printed on acid-free paper. L ibrary o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Green, M ichael Steven. Nietzsche and the transcendental tra d itio n / Michael Steven Green, p.

cm. — (International Nietzsche studies)

Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-252-02735-3

1. Nietzsche, Friedrich W ilhelm , 1844-1900. 2. Neo-Kantianism. I. Title. II. Series. B3317 .G722 193— d c2 i

2002 2001005761

To Kiersten

Contents

Acknowledgments Abbreviations Intro d u ctio n

xi

x iii 1

1.

The Problem o f Nietzsche’s “ E rror Theory”

2.

Nietzsche’s Neo-Kantian Roots

3.

Nietzsche’s “ E rror Theory” Explained

4.

Antirealism and N oncognitivism

5.

N ihilism , Hedonism, and the Self-Reference Problem Conclusion

17

36 58

95 127

163

Appendixes 1. Concordance between The W ill to Power and Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe ι6γ 2. Dates o f C om position fo r Passages from Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe iy i Notes

173

Bibliography Index

193

183

Acknowledgments

M any o f the ideas in this book reach back to my doctoral dissertation, which I wrote at Yale in the late 1980s, and m y firs t debt o f gratitude is to those who helped me through that process. These include m y D oktorvater, Karstèn Harries, and a num ber o f people who were graduate students in philosophy at Yale at the tim e, particularly Sarah Buss and M ark M ig o tti. I w ould also like to thank the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst, w hich supported m y research in Berlin fo r a year from 1987 to 1988, and the Stiftung Luftbrück­ endank Berlin, w hich did the same during 1990. W hile in Berlin, I p a rtic i­ pated in a sem inar fo r N ietzsche-D oktoranten ru n by the late W olfgang M üller-Lauter. I w ould like to express m y gratitude to him and to the semi­ nar’s other participants, particularly M a rtin Bauer, fo r their helpful advice concerning some o f m y arguments. M y very heartfelt thanks also go to Gün­ ter Abel o f the Technische Universität, an insightful interlocutor and a good friend, and to Roswitha Paul-Walz o f the Technische Universität fo r her warm welcome and helpfulness. I w rote the firs t draft o f what are now the first, fourth, and fifth chapters o f this book as a philosophy professor at Tufts U niversity in 1991-93.1w ould like to thank a form er colleague at Tufts, Stephen W hite, fo r providing me w ith a num ber o f ideas that I made use o f in the final chapter, and the other members o f the philosophy departm ent fo r creating an exemplary setting w ith in w hich to do philosophy. The Stiftung Luftbrückendank B erlin again provided me w ith generous research support in B erlin during the summers o f 1991 and 1992. In 1993, 1 q u it m y job at Tufts to go to law school. A t the tim e I was unsure about whether I was going to return to academia, but shortly before leaving

x ii

Acknowledgments

fo r New Haven, Richard Schacht asked to look at m y m anuscript fo r the new Nietzsche series he was founding. Both he and the reader fo r the U niversity o f Illin o is Press, Brian Leiter, offered invaluable advice concerning im prove­ ments. In addition to inspiring me to sim plify and clarify m y often im pene­ trable prose, it is largely to address their concerns that I added the m aterial on A frikan Spir in what are now the second and th ird chapters. I don’t like to th in k about what this book w ould have looked like had they not exerted th e ir influence on it. U nfortunately I didn’t return to the m anuscript u n til almost six years had passed— after a career as a law student and a lawyer. Remarkably, Richard Schacht and the U niversity o f Illin o is Press stuck w ith me during those six years. I fin a lly finished the book as a law professor, and I want to express m y gratitude to m y current home, the School o f Law at George Mason U niver­ sity, and its Center fo r Law and Economics, fo r cheerfully supporting me w hile I worked on a project utterly unrelated to the law. Two o f m y colleagues at George Mason, Frank Buckley and Peter Berkowitz, provided helpful com­ ments on a draft. Thanks also go to the School o f Law at K ing’s College Lon­ don fo r providing me w ith a home w hile com pleting the fin a l editing o f the m anuscript, during m y sabbatical leave from George Mason. I also owe a debt o f gratitude to the follow ing people: M audemarie Clark, fo r her support and advice over the years and fo r providing a w onderful model o f what a clear and careful study o f Nietzsche is like; Ric Brown, M ark Cohen, Robin Small, Friedrich Ulfers, and Greg W hitlock, fo r their criticism and encouragement concerning a po rtio n o f this book that I presented at a meeting o f the Friedrich Nietzsche Society at Cambridge U niversity in Sep­ tember 2001; Thomas Brobjer, fo r his careful recommendations concerning the chapters on Spir’s influence on Nietzsche; Karen Schutjer, fo r her help w ith translating some problem atic passages from Nietzsche’s notebooks; M att M itchell, Terry Sears, and D ick M artin o f the U niversity o f Illin o is Press, fo r th e ir extensive help and in fin ite patience; and Koethi Zan and m y form er employer o f Paul, Weiss, R ifkind, W harton, and Garrison, fo r providing free legal advice concerning book contracts.

Abbreviations

Below are the abbreviations I use fo r referring to Nietzsche’s w ritings; fo r complete publication info rm a tio n , see the bibliography. A ll references to Nietzsche’s works w ill be to section num ber unless otherwise noted. AC AOM BGE BT D EH GM GS GSid HA KSA PTG TI TL WP WS z

The Antichrist Assorted Opinions and Maxims Beyond Good and Evil Birth of Tragedy Daybreak Ecce Homo On the Genealogy of Morals The Gay Science, ist ed. The Gay Science, 2d ed. Human, A ll Too Human Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe (see appendix 2) Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks Twilight of the Idols “ On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” The W ill to Power (see appendix 1) The Wanderer and His Shadow Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Introduction

i. Nietzsche and the C ulture Wars In 1990, w hile I was livin g in Berlin, I often worked in the philosophy lib ra ry at the Free U niversity in Dahlem, further down the red (now the green) sub­ way line from my apartm ent in Friedenau. One day, w hile m aking the trip to Dahlem and reading through m y dog-eared copy o f The W ill to Power, I noticed across from me a rather th in , nervous man in his m id-thirties, who was eyeing both me and my book rather strangely. He suddenly jum ped up and tried to p u ll it out o f m y hands. Had it been any other book I w ould have let him take it. But this wasn’t just any book. M uch o f it was underlined and highlighted, the margins were fille d w ith notes, and it bulged w ith strips o f paper on w hich I had jotted down ideas and marked particularly im portant pages. I was not going to let go o f it w ith o u t a fight. For a rem arkably long tim e— close to a m inute— we struggled, tryin g to p u ll or tw ist the book out o f one another’s grip, w hile the other people in the subway car stared at us in passive silence. Finally it became clear to him that I was not going to give it up. He sat back down, adopting an expression as if nothing had happened at all. I slumped back into m y seat, panting and cursing. He got out at the next stop. This bizarre incident is not that fa r out o f keeping w ith Nietzsche recep­ tio n in general, w hich has always been abnorm ally passionate and vitupera­ tive. For the firs t seventy years or so it was Nietzsche’s ethics that was the center o f controversy. For A lfred Bäumler (1937) and other Nazi interpreters o f Nietzsche’s thought, his ethics provided a philosophical legitim ization o f Nazi eugenics, anti-Sem itism , and authoritarianism . A movement w orthy o f

2

Introduction

respect in Germany had to have its philosopher, and Bäumler decided that Nietzsche w ould be the Nazis’. Against Bäum ler was W alter Kaufm ann (1974) and other “ soft” N ietzscheans, fo r whom freeing Nietzsche from the tain t o f Nazism was something like the final battle o f W orld War II. The image o f Nietzsche that emerges from Kaufm ann’s w ritings is o f someone who is not only not anti-Sem itic but a liberal and a democrat to boot. The more disturbing aspects o f his ethics tu rn out to be mere metaphors. Nietzsche doesn’t really advocate the cultivation o f strength at the expense o f the weak, it seems, only a Freudian sublim ation o f the passions. The Übermensch w ould not look out o f place in the Prince­ ton philosophy department. I f one were to choose between Bäumler’s and Kaufmann’s interpretations, one w ould, o f course, choose Kaufm ann’s, w hich does far greater justice to Nietzsche’s w ritings. But why make such a choice? To recognize that Bäum­ ler was not one hundred percent wrong about Nietzsche does not make one a Nazi sympathizer; it does not even make Nietzsche a Nazi sympathizer. It only means recognizing that there is much about Nietzsche’s ethics that is tro u ­ bling. Since the 1960s or 1970s, Nietzsche’s views on tru th and knowledge have become the focus o f a new proxy war. A good deal o f postm odernist skepti­ cism about tru th can be traced to Nietzsche’s influence (R orty 1989,27-29). The literature generated by this strand o f Nietzsche reception is heteroge­ neous, but the general idea is that Nietzsche intended to liberate us from stiflin g or in h ib itin g structures o f thought, particularly those employed in the natural sciences; that he praised playfulness, creativity, and aestheticism in our interpretation o f the w orld; and that he embraced paradox or selfcontradiction as not merely inevitable but the very p o in t o f the philosoph­ ical enterprise.1According to the most extreme examples o f this literature, Nietzsche sought to liberate us from tru th itself and from the hegemonic and cultu ra lly chauvinist forces standing behind claims o f tru th . In response, there is now a large and growing literature intent upon res­ cuing Nietzsche from the ta in t o f irrationalism and cognitive irresponsibil­ ity, most notably by philosophers who w ork w ith in the analytic tra d itio n .2 A lthough here too the interpretations o f Nietzsche differ, the general idea is that he was not a c ritic o f the goal o f tru th — indeed, he took his own views to be true. Instead, Nietzsche sought to provide a philosophical understand­ ing o f tru th that is naturalistic and nonmetaphysical in outlook. N or was Nietzsche an enemy o f science— he wanted more scientific rig o r and selfdiscipline, particularly in the study o f man him self, w hich fo r too long had been a refuge fo r fantasy and self-deception.

Introduction

3

As this essay w ill show, there is a good deal in these analytic readings o f Nietzsche that I th in k is correct. However, much o f this literature gives one the feeling that the issue is no longer understanding what Nietzsche has to say on these matters— it is instead the vindication o f reason and rigorous argum entation in academic discourse in general. To concede that Nietzsche him self questions the possibility o f tru th is to give aid and com fort to the enemy: to legitim ize in some way the barbarians who have taken over com­ parative literature and English and have now set their sights on philosophy. To understand F riedrich Nietzsche, we need to stand back from the cul­ ture wars. It is im portant to remember that he wrote in late nineteenth-cen­ tu ry Germany. H is exposure to philosophy p rim a rily came from two sources. He knew a great deal about ancient philosophy, especially Plato and the pre-Socratics, by virtu e o f his philolog ica l train in g . A nd he had read a num ber o f philosophers in the nineteenth-century Neo-Kantian tra d itio n , such as Schopenhauer, F riedrich A lb e rt Lange, Gustav Teichm üller, and A frika n Spir. It is to these w riters that we should p rim a rily look to under­ stand what Nietzsche was talking about, not D errida or Foucault and not Tarski or Quine. This is not to say that we cannot arrive at an understanding o f Nietzsche that has relevance fo r contem porary debates about tru th . N or do I want to suggest that Nietzsche's thoughts cannot overlap sufficiently w ith the w ork o f current philosophers to make comparisons between the two enlightening. To the contrary, I w ill m yself offer such comparisons. But the starting p o in t fo r any interpretation o f Nietzsche m ust be the traditions w ith in w hich he worked. Furtherm ore, the desire to protect the academy should not blin d one to the passages where Nietzsche claims that science falsifies the w orld or that cognition is impossible. For, as I w ill argue, such passages can be found ev­ erywhere in his w ritings. We should instead try to understand these passages and see how they can coexist w ith those where Nietzsche expresses a respect fo r tru th . This essay w ill attem pt to make sense o f Nietzsche's views on tru th and knowledge by looking at him from the perspective o f the Kantian tra d itio n o f transcendental idealism .3 In particular, I w ill look to the w ritings o f the philosopher A frikan Spir, whose book Denken und W irklichkeit was an ex­ tra ordinarily im portant influence on Nietzsche's thought, and who offers an im portant bridge between Nietzsche and Kant. By drawing on the detailed arguments in Spir, we can make sense o f Nietzsche's more cryptic and e llip ­ tical form ulations. The picture o f Nietzsche that w ill emerge is o f someone firm ly grounded in the Neo-Kantian tra d itio n . I f Nietzsche's thought has relevance fo r cur-

4

Introduction

rent philosophical and cultural debates it is only because this tra d itio n does so as well. To the extent that our interests are different, we should look else­ where fo r our intellectual hero.

2. N aturalism and N o rm a tivity M y interpretation o f Nietzsche is not organized around a particular position but around a problem that, I w ill argue, stands at the heart o f the transcen­ dental tra d itio n in epistemology and generates the variety o f epistem ologi­ cal positions that one finds in Nietzsche’s w ritings. I hope to show that there is a strong them atic u n ity to Nietzsche’s thought despite its inconsistencies. The problem is the tension between two ideas. The first is naturalism. I take naturalism to be the demand that explanations o f what hum an beings do be causal, that they be confirm ed em pirically, and that they be seamlessly inte­ grated in to our theories o f nature as a whole. An antinaturalist approach to epistemology w ould be an account o f human judgm ent in noncausal and nonem pirical terms.4It w ould appeal to faculties not subject to determ inis­ tic laws (that is, faculties that are free in an incom patibilist sense) and hav­ ing no causal connection w ith anything in nature. A good example, w hich w ill be explored later in this essay and which provided a m odel o f antinatu­ ralism fo r Nietzsche, is Kant’s account o f descriptive and m oral judgm ent. I once asked Ken Gemes, an analytic philosopher who him self has more than a modest interest in Nietzsche, what accounts fo r the sym pathy fo r Nietzsche that one often finds among philosophers trained in the analytic tra d itio n . Professors who have devoted their academic life to problems in m odal logic and tru th -fu n ctio n a l semantics and who w ould never dream o f reading Heidegger or D errida often have an interest in and some opinions about Nietzsche. Gemes said that it is because Nietzsche, unlike most other continental philosophers, “ respects the causal order.” I agree. Nietzsche is fundam entally a naturalist.5He identifies the goal o f “ tra n sla tin g ] man back in to nature” (BGE 230) as a distinctive element o f his philosophical m eth­ od. Like any good naturalist, Nietzsche rejects explanations that appeal to religious or otherw orldly entities and forces (D 86). Indeed, his naturalism sometimes reaches rem arkably reductive levels, fo r example, when he iden­ tifies religious and intellectual transform ations w ith changes in diet (GS134; GM 3:17). Nietzsche’s approach to epistemological issues is no different. His episte­ m ological naturalism goes beyond emphasizing the role o f sensation in knowledge to providing naturalistic accounts o f human judgm ent itself. A t

Introduction

5

times these accounts bear a strong resemblance to Hume; at other times they sound much like evolutionary epistemology (GS n i; WP 480,494,507).6 It is this naturalist, antimetaphysical Nietzsche that appeals to members o f the analytic tradition. W hat then explains Nietzsche’s appeal to postm od­ ernists, fo r whom naturalist interpretations o f the w orld are not cognitively privileged and the concepts relied upon by natural science are among those restrictions from w hich Nietzsche sought to liberate us? There is ample m aterial to satisfy them as well. A t points, Nietzsche argues that the w orld is something that we make rather than discover and that it admits in fin ite possibilities o f interpretation. Rather than privileging naturalistic and scientific explanations, Nietzsche argues that the concepts upon which they depend— including causality, substance, space, and tim e—falsify the w orld. Furtherm ore, as interpreters o f Nietzsche such as Heidegger (1986) and John Richardson (1996) have emphasized, Nietzsche is inclined toward apparently metaphysical accounts o f the w orld, in terms o f the w ill to power or “ becoming” (see also Schacht 1983,187-89). Nietzsche’s metaphysics o f the w ill to power is offered, somewhat tentatively in his pub­ lished works and more wholeheartedly in his notebooks, or Nachlaß, as an attempted explanation o f what the w orld is like in its intelligible character, that is, independent o f scientific and em pirical explanations o f it (BGE 36; KSA 11:40[53]). Furtherm ore, this apparently metaphysical account is often presented by Nietzsche w ith a self-conscious awareness o f its incoherence. Rather than being a straightforw ard theory about the w orld, it looks as i f the contradictions in the w ill to power are its very message. There are, it seems, two Nietzsches. I w ill argue that this second, seemingly postm odern Nietzsche has its source in the tension between naturalism and a second idea, w hich stands at the heart o f the transcendental tra d itio n in philosophy: I f our judgm ents are true or false, this cannot be solely because o f what is the case about them. It must also be because o f what ought to be the case about them. That a judgm ent is true or is false is a normative fact about that judgm ent. The n orm ativity o f tru th is evident in what I take to be a very clear and simple requirem ent fo r judgm ents to be true or false, a requirem ent once again drawn from the Neo-Kantian tradition w ith in which Nietzsche worked. O ur judgm ents cannot be true or false unless they apply concepts. We can, w ith Kant, th in k o f concepts as rules fo r m entally associating objects and o f a judgm ent as applying a concept to an object in the sense that the judger sees the object as appropriately associated w ith the other objects that fa ll under the concept.7When I judge something to be green, I see it as green, that

6

Introduction

is, as appropriately associated w ith those other objects that fa ll under the concept green. If, when lum ping objects together under the w ord “ green,” I am not act­ ing in a rule-bound fashion— if I lum p things together the way I do under a term , like “ frob,” that has no meaning (not even an idiosyncratic one that I have assigned to it) — then it is not possible fo r m y judgm ent that something is green to be true or false. Concepts are the oughts through w hich the tru th or falsity o f judgm ents comes into being. There is a conflict between naturalism and the normative character o f tru th because a naturalistic account o f our judgm ents is able to do w ith o u t nor­ mative facts, and so tru th , entirely. Perhaps the best example o f this prob­ lem is Hum e’s account o f causal judgm ents. Hume understands these judg­ ments naturalistically as the habitual associations o f events that result from observing their constant conjunction. This makes the concept o f causality unnecessary, because our judgm ents w ill proceed according to these habits whether or not we have such a concept. A ll that matters is that I do associate events, not that I ought or ought not to associate them. Hum e’s “ solution” to the problem is to deny that we have any concept o f the causal. We cannot think about causality; instead we m erely associate events on the basis o f habit. These associations are as meaningless as those that m ight coalesce around the word “ frob.” Because causal judgm ents are not about anything, they cannot be assessed according to the norm o f tru th . Hume offers in the place o f tru th more pragmatic reasons to affirm our causal judgm ents, in particular the role that habit or custom plays in our lives. W hy then is there a tension between naturalism and tru th , rather than sim ply the trium ph o f the form er over the latter? The problem is that it seems impossible to understand our judgments as not bound by the norm o f tru th . The very act o f naturalistic explanation appears to be bound by this norm . Consider, once again, Hum e’s account o f causal judgments: this account is itse lf causal. Hume argues that if one has observed the constant conjunction o f two events, the idea o f the antecedent event w ill cause the idea o f the con­ sequent. To be consistent, Hume w ould have to adm it that his account o f causal judgm ents is itse lf neither true nor false. And yet it appears to be pre­ sented to us as true. The conflict is even more serious than it seems because it extends w ell beyond causal judgments. Hume, o f course, does not th in k that a ll judgments are noncognitive. He allows fo r the existence o f a cognitive space w ith in which true and false judgm ent can proceed and from w hich causal judgm ents are excluded. For example, we can make true judgm ents about our sensations. In doing so, however, Hume is insufficiently comprehensive in his natural-

Introduction

7

ism. In particular, he does not examine the naturalistic causes o f judgm ents about sensations but instead sim ply identifies a sensation w ith a judgm ent about it.8But once they are naturalized, judgm ents about sensations look no more sensitive to em pirical concepts than causal judgm ents were to the con­ cept o f causality under Hum e’s account. I w ill argue that the radical, postm odernist nature o f Nietzsche’s episte­ mologies proceeds from the fact that he naturalizes a ll o f our judgm ents, including the e m piricist’s favored judgm ents about sensations and other foundational judgm ents in the natural sciences. As a result, Nietzsche casts doubt upon the possibility o f any tru th , including the tru th o f the very nat­ uralism that motivates his philosophy. In a sense, Nietzsche thinks that nat­ uralism is insufficiently naturalistic because it assumes the a b ility to make tru th fu l judgm ents about nature, and it is only on the basis o f a non-natura listic conception o f hum an judgm ent that such tru th fu l judgm ents are possible. The position that Nietzsche is inclined toward is, paradoxically, a form o f naturalism in w hich naturalism cannot be thought. In denying that cognition9is compatible w ith naturalism , Nietzsche shows him self to be strongly influenced by Kantian and Neo-Kantian accounts o f objectively valid judgm ent. For Kant, a judgm ent cannot be true or false if it proceeds through Humean laws o f association. O nly necessary and atemporal m ental associations can say anything about the w orld. C ontingent laws o f association merely carry the m ind b lin d ly from one image to another. Furtherm ore, like others in the transcendental idealist tradition, Nietzsche believes that the non-naturalistic presuppositions fo r thought can be drawn out o f the very objects about w hich one thinks. I f one is able to describe the w orld at all, one m ust apply to it concepts o f “ being”— including substance, causality, absolute space, and absolute tim e— that are incom patible w ith the change and p lu ra lity shown by the senses. As a result, there are latent con­ tradictions— the Kantian antinomies— w ith in our descriptions o f the world. Kant argues that the antinom ies show that em pirical reality is transcendentally ideal. In contrast, Nietzsche, under the influence o f Spir, argues that the antinom ies show that these descriptions o f the w orld are necessarily false. Finally, in an attem pt to provide an account o f reality that does not rely upon problem atic concepts o f being, Nietzsche at times offers a theory o f absolute becoming that does violence to practically every fundam ental con­ ception we have about the natural w orld. A w orld o f absolute becoming is w ith o u t substances and causal relations, w ith in which things happen at no particular rate o f tim e and things exist in no particular place. It is in these reflections that the postmodernists see their Nietzsche. I agree w ith the postm odernists that such theories, w hich alternatively deny the

8

Introduction

possibility o f cognition and claim that it falsifies the w orld, are present in Nietzsche’s thought. Indeed, they make up the b u lk o f his reflections on epistemological matters. But the lesson to draw from this radical strand o f Nietzsche’s philosophiz­ ing is not that our judgments about the w orld should be a m atter o f play and aestheticism or that science should be abandoned. As analytic readers o f Nietzsche emphasize, when m aking his own judgments about the w orld and particularly m an’s place in it Nietzsche is scrupulous, deadly serious, and by and large naturalistic. The dom inant theme in his ethics, fo r example, is the evaluative consequences o f a naturalization o f our evaluations. Getting these naturalistic accounts rig h t— being a good psychologist, historian, and gene­ alogist o f morals— is a m atter o f fundam ental im portance fo r Nietzsche. The postm odernists ignore the fact that the radical nature o f Nietzsche’s epistemological reflections is m otivated by his fundam ental commitment to naturalism and empiricism. Nietzsche is interested in denuding naturalism o f its secret antinaturalist elements, not replacing naturalism w ith aesthetic or playful interpretations o f the w orld. Nietzsche’s goal can be accomplished only by providing an account o f our judgm ents that does not presume an antinaturalistic conception o f the self and by offering a theory o f nature that does justice to what is provided to us by the senses. U nfortunately, these at­ tempts to create a purified naturalism suffer from incoherence and self-con­ tradiction. It is this problem that is the dom inant theme o f Nietzsche’s epis­ tem ology and the organizing principle o f this essay.

3. O utline o f M y Argum ent Chapter 1: The Problem o f Nietzsche's “E rror Theory

”

Nietzsche repeatedly argues that all o f our judgm ents are false. A reading o f Nietzsche’s epistemology that fails to do justice to this aspect o f his thought cannot be adequate. But the difficulties w ith providing a plausible interpre­ tation o f the error theory are form idable. In the firs t chapter, I outline these problems. Nietzsche’s arguments fo r the error theory take two form s. The firs t type o f argum ent, w hich is particu la rly prom inent in his early, posthum ously published essay O n Truth and Lies in a N onm oral Sense,” is that our sen­ sations are responsible fo r error. But because such arguments suffer from intractable problems, past interpreters o f Nietzsche’s epistemology, who tend to consider only arguments o f the firs t type, have deemphasized Nietzsche’s error theory in general.

Introduction

9

The second type o f argument is that our concepts, not our sensations, are responsible fo r error. O ur concepts err because they categorize or schema­ tize the flu x and becoming that is provided by sensations. I believe that these are the prim ary and most enduring arguments fo r the error theory in N ietz­ sche’s thought. But unless one looks to the transcendental tradition m otivating Nietzsche’s epistemologies, m aking sense o f this second type o f argument is also d ifficu lt. How can it be that our concepts always falsify what our sensations te ll us? Even if the w orld changes far more than our current scientific theories sug­ gest, true conceptualization o f the w orld seems possible. The fact that objects are not stable does not mean that we cannot in principle describe the prop­ erties that they have at a particular instant. Furtherm ore, to ju s tify his claims that the w orld is substantially different from the way we th in k it is, it appears that Nietzsche must have knowledge o f the w orld as it really is. I f the w orld is really flu x and becoming, then the description o f the w orld as flu x and becoming must, it seems, be true. Rath­ er than arguing that all our beliefs are false, Nietzsche appears to be merely offering an alterative, and w ild ly im plausible, quasi-scientific theory about the w orld. Small wonder then that some analytic interpreters o f Nietzsche hope to separate his error theory from his considered epistemological views by at­ trib u tin g it to an earlier stage in his development. In the second h a lf o f chap­ ter 1 1 argue that Nietzsche’s error theory is present throughout his period o f philosophical activity, both in his Nachlaß and his published works, from the early 1870s to the final works o f 1888. This raises the stakes o f m aking sense o f the error theory. I f the theory is indeed incoherent, as some have argued, then there is little chance o f m aking sense o f Nietzsche’s epistemology as a whole

Chapter 2: Nietzsche's Neo-Kantian Roots In chapter 2 1 lay the groundwork fo r a sympathetic interpretation o f Nietz­ sche’s error theory and fo r my general approach to Nietzsche’s epistemologies. I begin w ith Kant’s argument that a naturalistic account o f human judgments is incom patible w ith th e ir tru th or falsity. According to Kant, a naturalistic account can at most explain how the m ind moves b lin d ly from one image to the next according to em pirical laws o f association. It cannot explain how the m ind refers to objects. I then spell out the antinaturalist, transcendental theory o f cognition that Kant provides as an alternative. Under this theory, the unifications by means o f w hich judgm ent is accomplished are necessary

10

Introduction

and atemporal. It is only in this way that we can judge in a manner that says something about the w orld. Kant’s argument fo r an antinaturalist theory o f judgm ent is m otivated by the conflict between naturalism and tru th that I have claimed stands at the center o f Nietzsche’s epistemologies. But the Kantian theory o f judgm ent renders problem atic the connection between the necessary and atemporal u n ity o f thought, on the one hand, and the plurality, tem porality, and be­ com ing o f sensation, on the other hand. Kant attempts to bridge this gap between thought and sensation through the transcendental schematism under w hich the flow o f sensations is brought in to the u n ity o f thought by means o f schematized categories such as substance and causality. W ithout the schematism, the p lu ra lity and becom ing o f sensation could n o t be thought. Kant’s schematism is intim ately connected to Nietzsche’s own epistemo­ logical concerns. The missing lin k between the two is A frikan Spir, whose book Denken und W irklichkeit exerted a strong influence on Nietzsche’s epis­ temology. Spir argues that Kant’s schematism fails and that em pirical judg­ ment, by forcing necessary unity and sim plicity upon the plu ra lity and change o f becoming, always falsifies the w orld. The necessary falsehood o f em p iri­ cal judgm ent shows itse lf in the contradictions that can be drawn out o f our everyday idea o f an em pirical object. Because it is these contradictions that show that our beliefs about the w orld are false, rather than some com pari­ son between the way we th in k about the w orld and the way the w orld is, Spir’s error theory does not suffer from the difficulties I outline in chapter 1. Spir recognizes that a choice between being and becoming m ust be made, and he chooses being. The way o f being is the way o f Parmenides, w hich preserves thought, but at the cost o f m aking it refer only to a simple, neces­ sary, and unchanging One— an absolutely self-identical substance. Under the way o f becom ing, w hich Spir identifies w ith H eraclitus, the change and m u ltip lic ity that show themselves in sensation are affirm ed, but at the cost o f losing the a b ility to think. Nietzsche takes the path o f becoming. It is fo r this reason that we fin d him vacillating between the error theory and a noncognitivist approach. To the extent that he concentrates on the contradictions in our idea o f an e m piri­ cal object— contradictions that show that such objects partake o f both be­ ing and becoming— he offers an error theory that has strong parallels w ith Spir’s. To the extent that he concentrates on human judgm ent itself, w hich Nietzsche insists must take place w ith in becoming, he denies the possibility o f thought.

Introduction

11

Chapter 3: Nietzsche's “E rror Theory" Explained Chapter 3 is devoted to describing Nietzsche's and Spir's error theories in greater detail. Parallels w ith Spir allow me to make sense o f passages in N ietz­ sche that have bedeviled past interpreters, including his arguments that cau­ sality is modeled after free w ill; that nothing moves and nothing happens at a particular rate o f tim e; and that things are not equal to themselves, even at the same m om ent in tim e. A ll o f these arguments have strong analogues in Spir and in Kant's antinom ies. The Spirean and Kantian themes in Nietzsche's error theory also help clar­ ify Nietzsche's theory o f absolute becoming. I argue that Nietzsche agrees w ith Spir that absolute becom ing (Spir's term as w ell as Nietzsche's) is a conception o f the w orld based upon the antithesis positions in Kant's a nti­ nomies. This allows me to make sense o f a num ber o f Nietzsche's seemingly paradoxical claims about becoming. But Nietzsche's argument fo r the error theory suffers from a crucial prob­ lem as well. Thought can falsify becoming only i f thought exists, and N ietz­ sche, by taking the path o f becoming, does not allow fo r the type o f neces­ sary u n ity and sim plicity required fo r thought. This problem leads him to explore theories o f judgm ent other than his error theory; these theories are the topic o f the fo u rth chapter.

Chapter 4: Antirealism and Noncognitivism I begin the fo u rth chapter by returning to the problem that m otivated Kant's theory o f judgm ent, the conflict between naturalism and tru th . I argue that someone m ight be inclined to reconcile the two through a form o f antireal­ ism under w hich the content o f the concepts employed in our judgm ents is tied to the naturalistic causes o f these judgments. The more the content o f our concepts is tied to these causes, the more plausible it is that we are actu­ ally em ploying these concepts when judging. Two antirealist theories o f tru th have most often been attributed to N ietz­ sche: a pragm atic theory and a coherence theory. Under each it is adm itted that we have concepts that outstrip and cognitively constrain our natural dispositions to judge, but the content o f these concepts is more closely tied to these natural dispositions in order to make it more plausible that we judge in response to this content. I argue that both theories, and the interpretations o f Nietzsche that em ploy them, are inadequate because they fa il to overcome the tension between naturalism and tru th . I f the a b ility o f these concepts to norm atively bind our judgm ents is understood in non-naturalistic terms,

Introduction

12

then there appears to be no reason to even begin lim itin g the content o f our concepts: cognition is fu lly com patible w ith naturalism after all. However, i f one sticks to one’s naturalism , how is it that we have any concepts that out­ strip our natural dispositions to judge, including those concepts relied upon by the antirealist? To put the problem in the simplest terms: Concepts are oughts that can assess and condemn what is. That a judgm ent is false is a condem nation o f what is by what ought to be. The tension between naturalism and tru th is the problem o f how such oughts are possible, given that all that exists is. To the extent that one allows oughts that outstrip what is, one has retreated from naturalism . To the extent that one reduces these oughts to what is, one has rid the oughts o f th e ir norm ative a b ility to assess and condemn what is. I end chapter 4 w ith the argument that Nietzsche, fo r this reason, finds him self driven to a noncognitivist theory o f judgm ent under w hich there are no oughts constraining our judgm ents. O ur judgm ents have no content at all; that is to say, we apply no concepts when we judge. We do not think. This noncognitivist reading o f Nietzsche is confirm ed, I argue, by Nietzsche’s views concerning the principle o f noncontradiction; his discussions o f con­ sciousness, intention, and desire; and his views concerning the self.

C hapters N ihilism , Hedonism, and the Self-Reference Problem ·

In chapter 5 1 address two fundam ental objections to a noncognitivist read­ ing o f Nietzsche. The firs t is that the absence o f cognitive constraint upon our judgm ents gives us no reason to judge one way rather than another. I f Nietzsche really were a noncognitivist, he w ould have no reason to recom­ mend certain views about the w orld as true and others as false and so w ould have no reason to engage in his w ell-know n critiques o f C hristianity, ascet­ icism , and Platonism. The essence o f m y response to this objection is that unless one is w illin g to entertain an antinaturalist account o f judgm ent, all feelings o f cognitive constraint must be reducible to one’s current em pirical makeup. The feel­ ing that judgm ents can be mistaken and that one ought to w ork hard to get them rig h t m ust be expressible naturalistically. A ll feelings o f ought m ust be something that is. As a result, feelings o f n orm ativity when judging are no reason to assume the existence o f anything more than what is, and so are no reason to believe that noncognitivism is false. By the same token, any feeling o f a lack o f cognitive constraint— any feel­ ing that one cannot make a mistake in judgm ent and that “ anything goes” in the way o f belief—is likewise expressible in terms o f an em pirical make­ up. And there is no reason that the acceptance o f noncognitivism should

Introduction

13

cause one to have such a makeup. Thus there is no reason to th in k that N ietz­ sche’s acceptance o f noncognitivism w ould lead him to give up his critique o f C hristianity or put less effo rt in to his attem pt to get this critique right. In his ethics and his epistemology Nietzsche him self provides this argu­ ment. The feeling that one should struggle to get judgm ents rig h t is praised by Nietzsche not because one thereby respects one’s cognitive duties but because it indicates a form o f healthy self-control. Likewise, the feeling that mistakes are impossible is rejected by Nietzsche not because it is cognitively irresponsible but because it shows a lack o f self-discipline. Rather than ad­ dressing views about the o bjectivity o f our judgm ents head-on, Nietzsche naturalizes them and assesses them on the basis o f th e ir pragm atic effect on human life. By the same token, Nietzsche argues that, to the extent that we desire a stronger form o f constraint upon our judgm ents than that provided by our own em pirical makeup, we m ust have an ascetic hatred o f our em pirical nature. It is fo r this reason that he sees a relationship between the w ill to tru th and asceticism. But if epistemological noncognitivism is able to preserve all o f our cognitiv is t attitudes, why isn’t this position actually a form o f cognitivism that provides a fu lly naturalized account o f what human thought is like? Against this conclusion, I argue that the error theory and noncognitivism are the dom inant positions in Nietzsche’s w ritings because Nietzsche found h im ­ self convinced by Spirean arguments that cognition has to be understood in antinaturalist terms. He was convinced particularly by Spir’s argument that the antinaturalist presuppositions o f our descriptions o f nature are evident in the antinom ies that can be drawn from our idea o f an em pirical object. As a result, he is compelled to assess our judgm ents according to this a n ti­ naturalist ideal o f what cognition is like. The second problem that I address in chapter 5 is the problem o f self-ref­ erence, that is to say, the problem o f reconciling Nietzsche’s a b ility to a rtic­ ulate his epistemologies w ith the restrictions on human judgm ent demand­ ed by those epistemologies. The self-reference problem can be sim plified as follow s. Each epistem ological position that can plausibly be attributed to Nietzsche puts some lim itations on our referential capacity. Under noncog­ n itivism the referential scope o f our judgm ents shrinks to an extensionless p o in t; under the error theory our judgm ents always m isrefer; and under antirealism the reference o f our judgments is in some way subjectivized. The problem is that articulating these lim its seems to presume a form o f repre­ sentational capacity beyond that allowed by the theories themselves. I do not th in k that the problem can be circum vented. I finish the fifth

14

Introduction

chapter w ith the suggestion that the problem should not be overemphasized in interpretations o f Nietzsche’s epistemology, however. Nietzsche does not seek to condemn our judgm ents on the basis o f these referential lim itations. Instead he hopes to describe these lim itations to encourage us to affirm our judgm ents about the w orld by affirm ing the drives standing behind these judgm ents. The epistemological positions that one can fin d in Nietzsche, in ­ cluding his problem atic theory o f absolute becoming, are presented by him in part because they provide the proper fram ework w ith in which the sources o f our judgm ents can be affirm ed. I f so, the fact that these positions outstrip the lim its that they place upon our judgments may not be a serious flaw, pro­ vided that it does not stand in the way o f Nietzsche’s project o f epistemo­ logical self-affirm ation.

Conclusion In the conclusion, I sum up my interpretation o f Nietzsche’s epistemologies. First o f all, there is no one epistemology that can be found in his w ritings. His epistemology is best seen as a set o f responses to the conflict generated by his dual com m itm ent to naturalism and to transcendental theories o f cognition. The tension between these two ideas, w hich was never adequate­ ly resolved by him , generates a num ber o f epistemological positions in his w ritings. Second, I argue that Nietzsche cannot be seen as arguing fo r a simple nat­ uralistic theory o f cognition under which em pirical subjects can make judg­ ments w ith truth-values. A lthough I personally am attracted to such a theo­ ry, Nietzsche was not. The reason is his continued com m itm ent to the transcendental tra d itio n . As a result, Nietzsche argues that cognition either falsifies the w orld or is impossible. In either case, the foundations fo r our descriptions o f the w orld are underm ined. Nevertheless, I argue that the ultim ate goal o f Nietzsche’s epistemology is quite sim ilar to these naturalized theories o f cognition. He is not interested in rejecting scientific description and replacing it w ith playful or aesthetic descriptions o f the w orld. In the end he seeks to a ffirm the drives standing behind our scientific descriptions o f the w orld. His radical epistemological positions play a role in this self-affirm ation because they provide a fram e­ w ork fo r genuine affirm ation o f these drives.

4. Some Remarks on M ethod Treatments o f Nietzsche’s epistemology com m only include a discussion o f m ethodological issues— particularly the problem o f Nietzsche’s Nachlaß and

Introduction

15

whether it is appropriate to apply to Nietzsche the issues and term inology o f other philosophers. This essay relies heavily on the Nachlaß, although it is unusual in looking not merely to the notebooks o f the m id- and late-i88os but also to the rich m aterial in Nietzsche’s early notebooks, w hich were not included in The W ill to Power10and have not been translated into English. It is d iffic u lt to talk about Nietzsche’s epistemology w ith o u t discussing m aterial in his Nachlaß. Even those who seek to arrive at an interpretation based solely on the published materials (e.g. Clark 1990,25-27) rely heavily on the essay “ On Truth and Lies in a Nonm oral Sense,” w hich Nietzsche never intended to publish. The tem p­ tation to look to the Nachlaß is overwhelm ing because they contain much more m aterial on epistemological topics than the published works. The dan­ ger, o f course, is that one w ill attribute to Nietzsche views that were merely experimental. I don’t believe that any categorical rule concerning use o f the Nachlaß can be form ulated. It is possible that they are a collection o f random thought experim ents that contain nothing o f value to understanding Nietzsche’s epistemology. It is also possible that Nietzsche fe lt that the goal o f clearly articulating his epistemological views in his published works should be com­ prom ised in the lig h t o f broader rhetorical purposes. This could make the published works less useful than the Nachlaß fo r understanding his episte­ mology. We can answer these questions only by exam ining all sources and separating pervasive themes from anomalies. In the end, I th in k that there is less to this debate than meets the eye. There is a good deal o f u n ifo rm ity in what Nietzsche says about tru th and know l­ edge as one moves between his notebooks and the published materials and as one moves from the early 1870s to the late 1880s. The interpretative d iffic u l­ ty is not figuring out w hich source or period one should choose as the real Nietzsche. It is instead m aking sense o f the variety o f contradictory com­ ments that can be found w ith in any source or period. I attem pt to overcome this d iffic u lty by looking at Nietzsche’s epistemology as a set o f different re­ sponses to the same underlying problem rather than as a coherent system. The second issue is m y reliance, like so many interpreters o f Nietzsche before me, on term inology and themes drawn from analytic philosophy. Here too no categorical rule is possible. W hether drawing analogies w ith other philosophers clarifies or obscures Nietzsche’s thought can be answered only by looking at the particular interpretation at issue. There are some philosophers, however, that I believe not only may but must be compared w ith Nietzsche. To understand Nietzsche’s epistemology, we m ust look at him in the lig h t o f his philosophical influences— the philoso-

16

Introduction

phers that Nietzsche him self read. Given the huge volume o f English-lan­ guage literature on Nietzsche's epistemology, the num ber o f historically sen­ sitive studies is sham efully small. Some im portant influences on Nietzsche, such as Schopenhauer, have always been discussed. Lange's influence has been the topic o f a book-length study (Stack 1983; see also Salaquarda 1987), as has Nietzsche's relationship to the pre-Socratics and Plato (Richardson 1996). But other w riters who may have influenced Nietzsche's thought in profound ways are s till ignored. Because Nietzsche so often fails to provide the arguments standing behind his conclusions, looking to philosophical influences is more im portant fo r understanding him than it is fo r understanding other philos­ ophers. It is a fallacy to th in k that only famous philosophers influence famous philosophers, particularly in connection w ith Nietzsche, who, by virtue o f his lack o f professional training, picked up his ideas from unusual and ob­ scure sources. It is easy to succumb to this fallacy, since famous philosophers are more likely to be translated and more likely be the subject o f secondary works that can guide one's interpretation. But ignoring the influences exerted on Nietzsche by obscure philosophers is a luxury Nietzsche studies cannot afford. This essay w ill look to A frikan Spir. As I believe the details show, Spir was a w rite r o f profound im portance fo r Nietzsche, in addition to being an ex­ trem ely interesting philosopher in his own right. But there are other in flu ­ ences that need to be examined, such as Teichmüller, and I invite other p h i­ losophers who want to get to the bottom o f what Nietzsche thought about tru th and knowledge to consider their influence. There are some encourag­ ing signs that such w ork on Nietzsche has fin a lly begun (e.g. Small 2001; Brobjer n.d.). It is only after these studies are completed that any responsi­ ble assessment o f Nietzsche's place in m odern philosophy and culture w ill be possible.

l. The Problem o f Nietzsche’s “ Error Theory”

o f Nietzsche w ill be struck by his repeated argu­ ments that our beliefs about the w orld are false: “ The w orld w ith w hich we are concerned is false, i.e. it is not a fact but a fable and approxim ation on the basis o f a meager sum o f observations; it is ‘in flu x / as something in a state o f becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the tru th : fo r— there is no tru th ” ( WP 616). O ur truths are “ m erely. . . irre fu t­ able errors” (GS 265) “ w ith o u t w hich a certain species o f life could not live” (WP 493).1Nietzsche’s error theory is one o f the most unusual positions in the history o f epistemology, and m aking sense o f it is an im portant test o f the adequacy o f an interpretation o f his epistemology. Some interpreters have accepted this position as Nietzsche’s considered epistemological view (M ittelm an 1984). But most hope to qualify it or explain it away (e.g. Nehamas 1985,65-67).2The desire to m inim ize the error theory is overwhelm ing— despite the frequency w ith w hich it can be found in his works— because taking it seriously appears to render Nietzsche hopelessly inconsistent. I have three goals in this chapter. The firs t is to outline the seemingly in ­ surm ountable philosophical problems w ith the error theory. The second is to spell out two types o f argument that Nietzsche provides fo r the theory, the most im portant and enduring o f w hich has been ignored in the literature. The th ird is to raise the stakes concerning the coherence o f the error theory by showing that it is an essential element o f Nietzsche’s epistem ology throughout his period o f philosophical activity— from the early 1870s rig h t up to his collapse in 1889. I f the error theory does not make sense, then the chances o f m aking sense o f Nietzsche’s epistemology as a whole are slim . Ev

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l. The Problem o f the F le xib ility o f Conceptualization Let me begin w ith some general obstacles to m aking sense o f the error the­ ory. The firs t m ight be called the problem o f the fle x ib ility o f conceptualiza­ tion: no m atter what the w orld is like, it appears possible fo r our concepts to accommodate themselves to the w orld. Consider the position that W illard M ittelm an attributes to Nietzsche: “ This w orld o f becoming can also be called false, since there is no abiding tru th fo r us to get ahold of. That is, as soon as we declare something to be the case, our statement is refuted by the alteration o f the situation w hich we have described” (1984,4). M ittelm an neglects the fact that even if things changed much more than experience suggests, we can always create predicates o f sufficient inclusiveness to allow fo r generally true judgments. Although my chair m ight be shifting around more than I thought it was, it is not shifting around so much that it is not w ith in a lig h t year o f the earth. Furtherm ore, we are able to index our statements about the w orld according to tim e, to avoid falsification by future changes. I don’t have to say that Richard N ixon was, is, and always w ill be president o f the U nited States; I may instead say that he was president from 1969 to 1974. No m atter how fast things change, such a strategy w ill always be open to us (B ittner 1987,74-75; Richardson 1996, 81-82, 87-88; Stack 1983,123). Negation is another means by w hich our concepts can accommodate themselves to the w orld. It seems that the error theory can be refuted by two people, each entertaining a proposition that is the negation o f the other’s. I f A believes something is green, and B believes it is not green, doesn’t logic (specifically, the law o f the excluded m iddle) require that one o f them has a true belief?3 One m ight argue that Nietzsche is merely claim ing that all positive judg­ ments (roughly, judgm ents that predicate something o f the w orld) are false and that all or some negative judgm ents (judgm ents that deny something should be predicated o f the w orld) are true (M ittelm an 1984, 6).4 But it is unlikely that a coherent distinction between positive and negative judgments could be drawn that w ould protect Nietzsche from inconsistency. The prob­ lem is that some negative judgm ents entail positive judgm ents. “ N ot fast,” fo r example, entails “ slow or at rest.” To claim that negative judgm ents are true w ith o u t the positive judgments entailed by them being true w ould deny the laws o f logical im plication, and it was precisely to preserve these laws that we lim ite d Nietzsche’s error theory to positive judgm ents. Furtherm ore, it is not even clear that preserving logic is in keeping w ith the s p irit o f N ietz­ sche’s error theory, fo r he often argues that logic and mathematics themselves falsify reality (GS 111; BGE 4; WP 512, 515-16) because they rely on the pre-

The Problem o f Nietzsche's