New Zealand and the World: Past, Present and Future 9813232390, 9789813232396

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NEW ZEALAND AND THE WORLD Past, Present and Future

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NEW ZEALAND AND THE WORLD Past, Present and Future

Editors

Robert G. Patman Iati Iati Balazs Kiglics University of Otago, New Zealand

World Scientific NEW JERSEY

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LONDON

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SINGAPORE

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BEIJING

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TAIPEI

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Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Patman, Robert G., editor. | Iati, Iati, editor. | Kiglics, Balazs, editor. Title: New Zealand and the world : past, present and future / edited by Robert G Patman, Iati Iati, Balazs Kiglics. Other titles: New Zealand and the world (World Scientific) Description: New Jersey : World Scientific, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: LCCN 2017039478 | ISBN 9789813232396 (hardcover) Subjects: LCSH: New Zealand--Foreign relations--21st century. | New Zealand--Foreign economic relations. | New Zealand--Military relations. | National security--New Zealand. Classification: LCC JZ2015 .N39 2018 | DDC 327.93--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017039478

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Copyright © 2018 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the publisher.

For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.

For any available supplementary material, please visit http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/10773#t=suppl Desk Editor: Philly Lim Typeset by Stallion Press Email: [email protected] Printed in Singapore

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Dedication This book is dedicated to the memory of Mr. Arnold Entwisle, a senior lecturer at the University of Otago, who not only anticipated the emergence of an independent New Zealand worldview in the 1960s but also had the drive to expand the parameters of public education in international affairs to help prepare for that eventuality.

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Acknowledgments

The editors would like to express their gratitude to a number of people and institutions for their assistance in the preparation of this book. The idea for this volume evolved from the occasion of the 50th University of Otago Foreign Policy School. As co-directors of that School and editors of this book, we wish to fully acknowledge the support that helped transform this concept into a book. First, we would like to thank our colleagues on the Academic Committee of the 50th School: Ms Jan Brosnahan, the Coordinator, Associate Professor Jenny Bryant-Tokalau, Associate Professor Paola Voci, Associate Professor Jacqueline Leckie, Dr Maria Pozza, Mr Elliot Lynch, Dr SungYong Lee, Dr Marcelle Dawson, Professor David Fielding, Dr Heather Devere, Professor Henry Johnson, and Mr Simon Ancell. Second, we would like to thank all the contributors to this book. They constitute a formidable team of specialists on the foreign policy of New Zealand. They graciously accepted our editorial advice and took the time and effort to revise their drafts into polished and insightful chapters. Third, we wish to express our sincere thanks for the encouraging and patient support that was given to this book project by the staff at World Scientific Publishing. Such assistance was much appreciated by the editors of this volume. Fourth, we wish to thank those organisations whose support and generosity helped play a significant role in bringing together our team of contributors. Without this support, it would have been more difficult to develop the concept

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Acknowledgments

of this book. We are grateful to the Australian High Commission, Wellington; the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington; the National Assessments Bureau, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Wellington; and the University of Otago. Finally, and most significantly, we would like to thank our families, particularly our partners, Martha, Fara and Pattama. Their support was invaluable throughout the endeavour to produce this book. Robert G. Patman, Iati Iati and Balazs Kiglics University of Otago New Zealand 4 August 2017

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About the Editors

Robert G. Patman’s research interests concern US foreign policy, international relations, global security, great powers and the Horn of Africa. He was an editor for the journal International Studies Perspectives (2010–2014), and is the author or editor of 11 books. Recent publications include a volume called Strategic Shortfall: The Somalia Syndrome and the March to 9/11 (Praeger, 2010) and three co-edited books titled The Bush Leadership, the Power of Ideas, and the War on Terror (Ashgate, 2012); China and the International System: Becoming a World Power (Routledge, 2013); and Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn? (World Scientific Publishing, 2015). He is a Fulbright Senior Scholar, an Honorary Professor of the NZ Defence Command and Staff College, Trentham, and provides regular contributions to the national and international media on global affairs and events. Iati Iati is a senior lecturer in the Department of Politics, at the University of Otago. His research covers good governance with a focus on civil society’s role in strengthening political transparency and accountability, New Zealand foreign policy, land tenure reform, regionalism and China-Pacific relations. Dr Iati has recently published on New Zealand foreign policy with a focus on security and trade, Pacific regionalism and the Polynesian Leaders Group, land alienation through the Torrens land registration system, and alternative perspective on China-Pacific relations. He was a co-director for the 48th and 50th University of Otago Foreign Policy Schools, and is the vice president of the Pacific Island Political Science Association (PIPSA).

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About the Editors

Balazs Kiglics works as a Japanese language and East Asian cultures tutor and lecturer in the Department of Languages and Cultures at the University of Otago, and is a PhD candidate. He holds a BA in Physical Education, a BA in Business Administration and a Postgraduate Diploma in International Economics. He is a founding member and former president of the Hungarian Philosophy of Sport Foundation. Kiglics has worked as the coordinator of the annual University of Otago Foreign Policy School since 2015. His research interests encompass Japanese studies, international relations of East and Southeast Asia, and the more general and pressing issues around the morality of power and human progress.

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About the Contributors

Paul G. Buchanan (MA Georgetown, PhD Chicago) is the founding director of 36th Parallel Assessments, a geopolitical and strategic analysis consultancy headquartered in Auckland, New Zealand. Prior to entering the private sector, he alternated US government service with academic appointments in the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, New Zealand, Portugal and Singapore. An independent consultant to private and public agencies, he is the author of three books and dozens of scholarly articles. He specialises in comparative politics and foreign policy, intelligence analysis, strategic thought and the study and practise of terrorism and unconventional warfare. Joe Burton is senior lecturer in the Political Science and Public Policy Programme and the New Zealand Institute for Security and Crime Science, University of Waikato, New Zealand. Dr Burton has a Doctorate in International Relations and a Master of International Studies degree from the University of Otago and an undergraduate degree in International Relations from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. His research focuses on regional responses to global security challenges, the evolving role of NATO and its partners, US foreign and security policy, cyber security, and the impact of science and technology on international security. Andrew Butcher is CEO and dean of Bethlehem Tertiary Institute in Tauranga, New Zealand. His PhD in sociology is from Massey University. Dr Butcher was previously Director of Research and Policy at the Asia New Zealand Foundation and president of the Population Association of New Zealand. He has held visiting fellowships in migration studies at Otago University and Massey University, and in international relations at Victoria University of Wellington xi

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About the Contributors

and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. He is an alumnus of the International Visitor Leadership Program at the US State Department. Kevin P. Clements is the foundation chair of Peace and Conflict Studies and former director of the New Zealand Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand. Professor Clements is also director of Toda Peace Institute, Tokyo, Japan. Prior to taking up these positions, he was the professor of Peace and Conflict Studies and foundation director of the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. Secretary General of International Alert London and Professor and Director of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University. He has written or edited eight books and over 160 chapters/articles on conflict transformation, peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy and development with a specific focus on the Asia-Pacific region. His most recent publication is Trust, Identity and Reconciliation in East Asia: Dealing with a Painful Past to Create a Peaceful Present (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). Peter Cozens joined the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington in 1995, after a lengthy maritime and naval career. He retired after nearly nine years as the director in 2010. He maintains a lively interest in the maritime affairs and foreign policy issues of New Zealand and the Indo-Pacific. Lucy Duncan was a member of the Senior Leadership Team of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade from 2012 to 2017 responsible initially for the Strategy and Governance portfolio followed by the Multilateral and Legal Affairs Group. The latter included responsibility for New Zealand’s term on the United Nations Security Council 2015–2016, as well as counter-terrorism, disarmament and arms control, climate change negotiations, Antarctica and the Southern Ocean and international resources, humanitarian and trade law. She was Ambassador in Argentina accredited to Uruguay and Paraguay from 2006 to 2009. She is currently Chargé d’Affaires ad interim at the New Zealand Embassy in Mexico and will take up the position of New Zealand’s first resident Ambassador in Colombia in early 2018 upon the opening of a new Embassy. Previous postings include Geneva (Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament), Vienna (Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency) and Singapore (Deputy High Commissioner,

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accredited to Sri Lanka and the Maldives). She has a First Class Honours degree in History from the University of Otago (1982) and is a graduate of the Executive Fellows Programme of the Australia/New Zealand School of Government (2013). She is fluent in Spanish. Austin Gee is an historian of 18th-century Britain who has taught courses in international and early modern European history at the University of Otago. He is the author of The British Volunteer Movement 1794–1814 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003) and several articles in local and regional New Zealand history. Peter Greener is a senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington and an Honorary Professor at the Command and Staff College of the New Zealand Defence Force, where he was previously academic dean and has taught since 2008. Dr Greener is also an adjunct professor in the Faculty of Health and Environmental Sciences at AUT University. His research interests include international peacekeeping and the aetiology, management and resolution of conflict; capability development; and the politics of defence acquisition decision-making. He brings to these interests the perspective of his many years’ experience as a psychoanalytic psychotherapist. Colin Keating was Special Envoy for the Prime Minister of New Zealand from 2012 to 2016 in support of the NZ campaign for election to the Security Council. Previously he was the founding executive director of the Security Council monitoring organisation in New York, Security Council Report (www.securitycouncilreport.org). He was concurrently a senior research fellow at Columbia University. From 1993 to1996, he was the New Zealand Ambassador to the UN in New York and represented New Zealand on the Security Council. In 1997, he was appointed New Zealand Secretary for Justice. From 2000 to 2004, he worked in New Zealand as a partner in legal practise. Jane Kelsey is a professor of law, policy and international economic regulation at the Faculty of Law at the University of Auckland, New Zealand where she specialises in the political economy of international trade and investment agreements. She has actively monitored the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and other new generation mega-regional agreements, and written extensively on them for a wide range of international and New Zealand audiences.

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Patrick Köllner is vice president of the Hamburg-based GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies and director of the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies. He is also professor of political science at the University of Hamburg. In 2013 and 2015, he was a visiting scholar at the University of Otago, New Zealand. His research interests revolve around political organisations, institutions, and regimes in Asia and from a comparative perspective. He currently works on think tanks in Asia and is co-editor of a forthcoming volume on comparative area studies (Oxford University Press, 2018). Brian Lynch is a former member of the New Zealand Foreign Service, with postings in New York (United Nations), Singapore and London. For 10 years, he was deputy chief executive of the New Zealand Ministry of Transport and following that for 12 years as chief executive of the New Zealand meat industry association. He subsequently held government appointments in the horticulture and meat industries. From 2004 to 2012, he was director of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. He is currently chair of the New Zealand chapter of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), and a Senior Fellow in Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. David B. MacDonald is professor of political science, and the research leadership chair for his college, at the University of Guelph, Canada. He has written three books related to issues comparative indigenous politics and the politics of memory, as well as numerous book chapters and articles. His books include Thinking History, Fighting Evil (Lexington/Rowman & Littlefield) and Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide (Routledge). His work is funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. He has also been a faculty member at the University of Otago and the Graduate School of Management, Paris. Adrian Macey is adjunct professor at the New Zealand Climate Change Research Centre and a senior associate of the Institute for Governance and Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. Dr Macey was New Zealand’s first climate change ambassador, and served as vice-chair then chair of the UN Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 2010–2011. He earlier served as chief trade negotiator, and was ambassador in Bangkok and Paris. Murray McCully is the Member of Parliament for East Coast Bays. Mr McCully first entered Parliament in 1987 after winning the Auckland seat of East Coast Bays and was appointed a Minister in October 1991.

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He has held a number of cabinet portfolios including Foreign Affairs, Customs, Housing, Tourism, ACC, Rugby World Cup, and Sport, Fitness and Leisure (which included responsibility for the America’s Cup and Millennium events). Mr McCully was born in Whangarei and has lived in the East Coast Bays electorate for over 30 years. He holds an LLB from the University of Auckland and is a qualified barrister and solicitor. Prior to entering Parliament, he was a principal of a public relations company. Ian McGibbon ONZM, formerly general editor (War History) at the Ministry for Culture and Heritage, wrote official histories of New Zealand involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars and edited the Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History. From 2009 to 2014, Dr McGibbon was New Zealand’s representative on the tri-nation Joint Historical and Archaeological Survey of the Anzac Battlefield at Gallipoli. His most recent publication is New Zealand’s Western Front Campaign (2016). In 1997, he was appointed an Officer of the New Zealand Order of Merit for services to historical research. He is managing editor of New Zealand International Review Tracey McIntosh (T¯uhoe) is a professor of Indigenous Studies and co-head of Te W¯ananga o Waipapa (School of M¯aori Studies and Pacific Studies) at the University of Auckland. She is the former co-director of Ng¯a Pae o te M¯aramatanga New Zealand’s M¯aori Centre of Research Excellence. Her recent research focused on incarceration (particularly of M¯aori and indigenous peoples) and issues pertaining to poverty, inequality and social justice. Terence O’Brien is a former NZ diplomat, served as NZ Ambassador to EU; as Ambassador to GATT/WTO and UN Office in Geneva; and as Ambassador to UN in New York during which represented NZ on UN Security Council and acted as Council President. He completed other diplomatic assignments in Bangkok, London, Rarotonga. He led several official NZ delegations including to the Rio Environment Summit. He was founding director of the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS:NZ) and remains a senior fellow at the Centre. He taught international relations at graduate level for seven years at Victoria University of Wellington (VUW) in NZ. He writes and broadcasts on NZ foreign policy and international relations and has contributed chapters to numerous books and magazines. He is author of Presence of Mind: NZ in the World (2009).

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Nigel Parsons is senior lecturer at the School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University. Dr Parsons was awarded a Special Commendation in the College of Humanities and Social Sciences Teaching Excellence Awards for 2013, received the Vice-Chancellor’s Award for Sustained Commitment to Teaching Excellence in 2011 and was voted Massey University Students’ Association Lecturer of the Year in 2009. His work has been published in peer-reviewed outlets including the Middle East Journal, Geopolitics, Social Theory and Practice and translated for the Arabic journalOmran. He has also published, The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: from Oslo to al-Aqsa (Routledge, 2005 and 2012) and a follow-up volume, Palestine: Evolution toward Statehood? is underway. Anna Powles is a senior lecturer in Security Studies with the Centre for Defence and Security Studies and specialises in geopolitics and security in the Pacific, security governance, peacekeeping and civil-military relations. Dr Powles is one of the founding members of the Security, Politics and Development Network (SPDN) at Massey University which focuses on security, political and development issues and provides a critical nexus between rigorous multidisciplinary academic research and policy. She was formerly with the United Nations Development Programme as a Security Sector Reform Monitoring Specialist, the International Crisis Group’s Timor-Leste Analyst, and an advisor to the Timorese Government on the 2006–2007 humanitarian emergency. She has consulted widely on humanitarian, civil-military and protection issues including for the Australian Civil Military Centre, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam and World Vision. Recent publications include United Nations Peacekeeping Challenge: The Importance of the Integrated Approach (Ashgate: 2015); Ungoverned Spaces: Private Security in the Pacific (forthcoming: 2018); Securing the Neighbourhood. When Regional Peacekeeping Works: Lessons from the Pacific and Southeast Asia (forthcoming: 2018). Andreas Reitzig specialises in defence and security studies and has lectured in International Relations at the University of Otago and Victoria University of Wellington. Dr Reitzig’s publications include Trans-Tasman Defence Relations: The Anzacs, ANZUS and Beyond (Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010) as well as a co-edited volume entitled Public Participation in Foreign Policy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). He currently works as director at Lingua, a language school based in New Plymouth, New Zealand.

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Jim Rolfe is a senior fellow at the New Zealand Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. Dr Rolfe’s work focuses on a range of security issues relevant to New Zealand and the Asia-Pacific region. He has previously worked in the public service, in think tanks in Australia, Indonesia and Hawaii and with the UN in East Timor and Libya. Ken Ross was an analyst with the External Assessments Bureau, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet from 1976 until 2012. He has been a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London and at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra. Ross is writing a book evaluating New Zealand and Australian prime ministers engagement in global diplomacy since 1945. Christopher Rudd is a senior lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Otago. He is co-editor of Politics and the Media (2016), Informing Voters (2009) and Political Communications in New Zealand (2004). Robert Scollay is director of the New Zealand APEC Study Centre and associate professor of economics at the University of Auckland, New Zealand. He has researched and written extensively on regional trade agreements and regional economic integration, including recent initiatives such as the TransPacific Partnership (TPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), as well as on APEC, multilateral liberalisation, the global trade architecture, and trade issues and agreements in the Pacific Islands. Anthony Smith is a manager of assessed intelligence products in the National Assessments Bureau (which forms part of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet). His immediate previous role was a diplomatic posting to Washington, DC as Deputy Head of Mission. Prior to joining New Zealand government service, Dr Smith held various academic roles, including at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawai’i (a think tank within the US Pacific Command). He has degrees from Waikato University and Victoria University, and a PhD in political studies from Auckland University. Jon Stephenson is a New Zealand journalist with extensive experience reporting on conflict and trauma. Since the “9/11” terrorist attacks his work has

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focused on issues and events related to America’s “war on terror” — in particular, New Zealand’s involvement in the transfer of detainees to authorities with a record of mistreatment and torture. Maria Tanyag is a PhD candidate in the School of Social Sciences at Monash University, Australia. She is also a member of the Monash Gender, Peace and Security (GPS) Centre. Her research explores the intersections of global political economy processes, religious fundamentalisms and the politics of women’s bodies and health in crisis settings. She has published in the journals Women’s Studies International Forum, Gender & Development and the International Feminist Journal of Politics. Jacqui True is an Australian Research Council Future Fellow, professor and director of the Gender Peace and Security Centre at Monash University. She is also a Global Fellow, Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo. Her current research is focused on women’s participation after conflict and the implementation of the gender provisions of peace agreements with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Her book, The Political Economy of Violence against Women (Oxford, 2012) won the American Political Science Association’s 2012 biennial prize for the best book in human rights. She is co-editor of the Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security (2018). James Watson has recently retired as associate professor in history at the Palmerston North Campus of Massey University. His research interests are largely focussed on the relationship between New Zealand and the United Kingdom, particularly in the 20th century. Dr Watson’s most recent book was W.F. Massey: New Zealand in the Haus Makers of the Modern World series on the Paris Peace Conference (London, 2010). He is currently writing a book on the “home front” in New Zealand during the First World War. Hugh White AO is professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University. He has worked on Australian strategic, defence and foreign policy issues since 1980. He has been a journalist, a ministerial adviser and a senior official in the Defence Department. His recent publications include Power Shift: Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing published in September 2010, and The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, first published in 2012 and since republished in Chinese, Japanese and Korean. In the 1970s, he studied philosophy at Melbourne and Oxford Universities.

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Contents

Dedication

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Acknowledgments

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About the Editors

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About the Contributors

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Introduction: New Zealand and the World: Past, Present and Future

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Iati Iati and Robert G. Patman Part I.

History and National Identity

Chapter 1.

Building Foreign Policy in New Zealand: The Role of the University of Otago Foreign Policy School, 1966–1976

1

3

Austin Gee, Robert G. Patman and Chris Rudd Chapter 2.

The New Zealand Prime Minister and the 1985 Otago Foreign Policy School — A Pivotal Moment for the Labour Government’s Foreign Policy

25

Ken Ross Chapter 3.

Gallipoli, National Identity and New Beginnings Ian McGibbon xix

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Contents

Chapter 4.

National Identity and New Zealand Foreign Policy

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Terence O’Brien Chapter 5.

Exporting Aotearoa New Zealand’s Biculturalism: Lessons for Indigenous-Settler Relations in Canada

67

David B. MacDonald Chapter 6.

What Does New Zealand’s Changing Demography Mean for Its Place in the World?

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Andrew Butcher Part II.

Economics and Regionalism

Chapter 7.

New Zealand and Its Asia-Pacific Destiny: Sailing the Waka in Ever-Widening Circles

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Brian Lynch Chapter 8.

New Zealand’s Evolving Response to Changing Asia-Pacific Trade and Economic Currents Since 1989

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Robert Scollay Chapter 9.

New Zealand and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations: Strategy, Content and Lessons

145

Jane Kelsey Chapter 10.

New Zealand’s Strategic Influence and Interests in an Increasingly Global Pacific

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Anna Powles Chapter 11.

Old Friends in the New Asia: New Zealand, Australia and the Rise of China Hugh White

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Contents

Part III.

Morality

Chapter 12.

K¯awanatanga, Tino Rangatiratanga and the Constitution

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Ranginui Walker and Tracey McIntosh Chapter 13. What Happened to the New Zealand Peace Movement? Anti-Nuclear Politics and the Quest for a More Independent Foreign Policy

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Kevin P. Clements Chapter 14.

The Globalisation of the Human Security Norm: New Zealand/Aotearoa Leadership and Followership in the World

239

Jacqui True and Maria Tanyag Chapter 15.

The Price of the Club: How New Zealand’s Involvement in the “War on Terror” has Compromised Its Reputation as a Good International Citizen

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Jon Stephenson Chapter 16.

New Zealand, a Comprehensive Maritime Strategy, and the Promise of a New Atlantis

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Peter Cozens Part IV.

Geopolitics and National Security Interests

Chapter 17.

New Zealand Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Leading United Nations Security Council in July 2015 Murray McCully

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Contents

Chapter 18.

Recalibration, Rapprochement and Resocialisation: US-New Zealand Relations and the Obama Administration’s “Pivot” to Asia

307

Joe Burton Chapter 19.

Continuity and Change in New Zealand Defence Policymaking

323

Peter Greener Chapter 20.

Informing the National Interest: The Role of Intelligence in New Zealand’s Independent Foreign Policy

343

Anthony L. Smith Chapter 21.

Intelligence, Accountability and New Zealand’s National Security

359

Jim Rolfe Chapter 22.

Foreign Policy Realignment, Issue Linkage and Institutional Lag: The Case of the New Zealand Intelligence Community

373

Paul G. Buchanan Part V.

Diplomatic Engagement and Multilateralism

Chapter 23.

The Contours of New Zealand Foreign Policy

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Andreas Reitzig Chapter 24.

The Evolving Role of the New Zealand Diplomat

411

Lucy Duncan Chapter 25.

New Zealand’s 2014 Election to the UN Security Council: How Was It Achieved and What Does It Mean? Colin Keating

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Contents

Chapter 26.

New Zealand’s Climate Change Diplomacy: A Country Punching Above Its Weight or the Survival Strategy of a Small State?

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Adrian Macey Chapter 27.

The European Union as “a Partner of First Order Importance” for New Zealand

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Patrick Köllner Chapter 28.

New Zealand, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the United Nations: 2012 and 1974 in Comparative Perspective Nigel Parsons and James Watson

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INTRODUCTION New Zealand and the World: Past, Present and Future Iati Iati and Robert G. Patman

The aim of this book is to provide the reader with an overview of New Zealand’s international relations. New Zealand is a relatively small and isolated settler society. Yet it is a country that has often shown an international presence that is out of proportion to the modest spectrum of national economic, military and diplomatic capabilities at its disposal. A useful starting point for understanding New Zealand’s relations with the external world is its domestic context. Geographically, New Zealand is about 1250 miles (2012 km) southeast of Australia and consists of two main islands and a number of smaller, outlying islands. The country has a population of 4.83 million people as of 2 November 2017, according to Statistics New Zealand’s online population clock, and is dominated by two cultural groups: New Zealanders of Caucasian descent and Polynesian M¯aori. According to M¯aori oral history, M¯aori arrived in New Zealand about 800 years ago. European settlement of New Zealand during the 19th century led to the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 between representatives of the British Crown and M¯aori chiefs. The pact formed the basis of the British annexation of New Zealand, but conflicting land claims gave rise to the “New Zealand Wars”. The British colony of New Zealand became a self-governing dominion in 1907 and in 1947 obtained the status of a fully independent, sovereign state. The size of the New Zealand economy remains quite small. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated to be $186.4 billion in 2017 (International Monetary Fund, 2017), and the economy is based largely on agriculture. xxv

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The main exports are currently wool, food and dairy products, wood and paper products. Natural resources include natural gas, oil, iron ore, sand, coal, timber, hydropower, gold and limestone. Not surprisingly, the military capabilities of New Zealand are decidedly limited. The country has a small, but well-trained army of 7000 soldiers. New Zealand is a democratic society that is based on political and legal traditions derived from the Westminster parliamentary model of governance. The Cabinet is the formal foreign policy decision-making body, consisting of the senior ministers of the governing party or coalition. Unless a foreign policy decision requires the ratification of a treaty or the enactment of legislation, the Cabinet can largely bypass Parliament in the decision-making process. While the Prime Minister and the relevant ministers for foreign affairs may choose to consult with interested parties such as business, academic, interest groups or the wider public, they are under no obligation, in institutional terms, to do so in what appears to be a centralised model of foreign policy decision-making. And, as might be expected, polling evidence indicates that the New Zealand public remains much less focused on foreign than on domestic policy. Moreover, New Zealand government ministers are heavily dependent on the advice of public officials, in this case the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), in the making of foreign policy. Although organisations such as the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (NZIIA), the Centre of Strategic Studies (CSS) in Wellington, and the annual University of Otago Foreign Policy School have enhanced the level of foreign policy debate, they are too small and too few in number to seriously reduce MFAT’s dominance as the major source of advice for government on foreign policy (Patman, 2003, p. 533). Nevertheless, New Zealand has some quite distinctive national features that may offset the lack of institutional pluralism in the foreign policy-making process. For one thing, the intimacy and transparency of the New Zealand political system means that public opinion is potentially a far more potent factor in the shaping of foreign policy than is often the case in larger democracies. In addition, New Zealand has developed some quite distinctive national characteristics not typically associated with a small state. These include a set of values commonly described as “the No. 8 wire mentality” or “Kiwi ingenuity” — an ability to improvise and innovate within the constraints imposed

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by limited resources and the vast physical distance from what was historically its political and economic centre of gravity in Britain. In many ways, New Zealand’s experience as a colony defied conventional interpretations of hegemony. It demonstrated considerable autonomy in a number of areas. It was the world’s first country to give women the right to vote (1893); adopted old-age pensions (1898); introduced a 40-hour workweek and unemployment and health insurance (1938); and socialised medicine (1941). Meanwhile, New Zealand citizens often enjoyed a higher standard of living than their British counterparts. By 1953, New Zealand was ranked as the third richest country in the world in terms of per-capita GDP (Gould, 1982, p. 21). Nevertheless, New Zealand’s strong sense of political identification with Britain slowed the emergence of a fully independent New Zealand foreign policy. Wellington had supported the UK militarily in both world wars. But three factors ensured that the pattern of New Zealand’s external relations began to change significantly after 1945. First, there was a gradual realisation that Britain was no longer in a position to defend New Zealand in military terms. Doubts had surfaced with the British defeat in Singapore in 1942. In 1944, New Zealand and Australia signed their first major bilateral agreement without Britain when they concluded a mutual defence pact in Canberra (Catley, 2001, pp. 51–52). The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) Treaty, as it was known, provided for cooperation in the South Pacific and progressively expanded as the two allies fought together in wars in Korea, Malaya and Vietnam. Second, international pressures stemming from the Cold War propelled both New Zealand and Australia into a strategic alignment with the United States. In 1951, New Zealand, Australia and the United States signed the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty. Over the next 30 years, the United States displaced Britain as the principal strategic partner of the ANZAC countries as the former colonial power retreated to Europe following the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the 1968 decision to withdraw the British Royal Navy from stations “East of Suez” (Patman, 1997, p. 13). New Zealand contributed troops to the American-led efforts to contain communism in Korea, 1950–1953, and South Vietnam, 1964–1975. Third, New Zealand had to deal with the consequences of Britain joining what was then called the European Economic Community (EEC) in January

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1973. This move had been foreshadowed by Britain’s unsuccessful EEC application in 1961. Forewarned, New Zealand was able, with British support, to negotiate a special access agreement with the Community for its farm produce when Britain obtained full membership (Brown, 1997). In these new and challenging circumstances, New Zealand developed new markets and trade links, notably in Australia, the United States and Japan. Taken together, these factors marked the beginning of a New Zealand perspective that was increasingly centred in Wellington rather than London. Thus, in the pre-globalisation era, New Zealand manifested some, though by no means all, of the characteristics commonly associated with the foreign policy of an independent small state. The scholarly literature suggests that two of the typical characteristics of small states are an internationalist orientation, consisting of keen participation in international and regional organisations, and a moral emphasis in external policy (Henderson, 1991, p. 6). Certainly, New Zealand’s strong support for the UN and multilateralism, in general, has been consistent with this pattern. However, when viewed in the regional context of the South Pacific, New Zealand appeared to be a relatively significant power in its own right. As well as retaining the status of an administrative trustee power, and having constitutional responsibilities towards the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, New Zealand was also notable for its distinctive colonial experience, the absence of any direct security threat to its territory, and the fledgling nature of its independent foreign policy. By the early 1980s, New Zealand’s consciousness as a sovereign state had matured and deepened. Wellington still had close links with Britain, but the nature of this linkage had been significantly changed. New Zealand had intellectually moved from a world-view that was rooted in London to one that was increasingly centred in Wellington. This development intersected with the emergence of the complex, multifaceted and contested globalisation process. Globalisation is the term popularised during the 1980s to describe revolutionary changes in communication and information technologies during this period — advances in personal commuting and the development of the Internet — that have intensified links between societies, institutions, cultures and individuals on a worldwide basis. This dynamic process has had a particularly significant impact on a geographically remote country like New Zealand (Patman and Rudd, 2005).

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In this volume, the editors have called upon a range of specialists representing a variety of views drawn from the worlds of academia, policy making and civil society. It is an attempt to present a rounded picture of New Zealand’s place in the world, one that does not rely exclusively on any particular perspective. The book does not claim to be exhaustive. But it does seek to present a more wide ranging treatment of New Zealand’s foreign relations than has generally been the case in the past. Five broad themes help shape and organise the contributions to the text.

History and National Identity The first major theme concerns the significance of the domestic context for understanding New Zealand’s foreign relations. In recent decades, New Zealand has been redefining itself and how it relates to the external world. Extraordinary changes in New Zealand challenge the old view, once held, that it is a “small corner of England out in the Pacific” (Woods, 1997, p. 27). Above all, there has been some recognition of the special constitutional and cultural position of M¯aori people (expressed in the Treaty of Waitangi in terms of rangatiratanga [dominion] and k¯awanatanga [government]). New Zealand now has two official languages: English and M¯aori. Concepts from M¯aori culture have also been extended into law, policy and social institutions. And there has been a general acceptance of the idea of compensation for lands unjustly taken or purchased and for the recognition of rights conferred under the Treaty of Waitangi to the M¯aori people (Woods, 1997, p. 38). In 1995, there was even a formal apology from Queen Elizabeth II for the previous actions of the Crown. Then, in March 2004, New Zealand’s first dedicated M¯aori Television station was launched (New Zealand Herald, 2004b). It should be emphasised that globalisation is an important driver in the revival of indigenous rights and culture of New Zealand. While access to symbols of globalisation, such as the Internet, remains uneven, particularly in rural New Zealand, this technology has, in the words of one observer, provided “unprecedented opportunities” for M¯aori to project its language and culture, nationally and internationally (Zwimpfer, 2001). But the forces of globalisation have also eroded the social position of M¯aori. Between 1986 and 1996, New Zealand moved from being a fairly egalitarian society to becoming one of the more unequal ones behind the United

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States and Italy. The growth of social inequality impacted more on M¯aori than P¯akeh¯a, a M¯aori language term for New Zealanders who are of European descent. The re-distribution of income and the decline of the welfare state, in terms of subsidised state housing and accessible medical care, contributed to this (O’Dea, 2000, pp. 38, 103; Flynn, 2002). It should be added that new social divisions were linked to a programme of radical economic change undertaken by the Fourth Labour government in 1984. Amongst other things, New Zealand quickly deregulated its economy, abolished all subsidies for farmers, stripped away its tariff and import control barriers, and privatised many of its state companies. This economic liberalisation was paralleled by significant cutbacks in social provision and by labour market deregulation. A new sense of national identity has been further affected by the many new links New Zealand is building to other parts of the Pacific and the AsiaPacific region. These ties have been forged mainly for economic and diplomatic purposes. Languages for this region are now being taught in New Zealand schools. Many students from Asia-Pacific locales are studying in New Zealand universities. New Zealand is a leading member of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and a foundation member of APEC. However, the deepening of links to Asia and the Pacific have involved major changes in migration flows to and from New Zealand. In addition, people-to-people contacts between New Zealand and the rest of the world have rapidly expanded. The declining cost of international travel, a steady increase in international telephone traffic and startling advances in communications technology such as the Internet made geography less of an obstacle than previously. In 2002, the number of tourists visiting New Zealand during a 12-month period exceeded the two million mark for the first time. This came only a decade after New Zealand had first recorded a million visitors in a year (Sunday Star Times, 2002). In 2016, nearly 3.5 million international tourists visited New Zealand in the course of that year (Statistics New Zealand, 2017). However, while former National Party prime minister, John Key, believed that a changing sense of national identity warranted a new flag for the country, the majority of New Zealanders believed otherwise. In a referendum in March 2016, 56.6 per cent voted to keep the Union flag-centred emblem, and 43.2 per cent opted to back a new design (Roy, 2016).

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It should be emphasised that in historical terms New Zealand’s emergence as a foreign policy actor in its own right is a fairly recent development. Austin Gee, Robert Patman and Chris Rudd indicate in their chapter that the University of Otago Foreign Policy School was established in the mid1960s to promote public awareness of international issues in anticipation of a more independent foreign policy. The chapter by Ken Ross notes that a speech by New Zealand Prime Minister, David Lange, in May 1985 at the University of Otago Foreign Policy School was a defining moment in confirming the country’s non-nuclear stance on the international stage. Meanwhile, Ian McGibbon examines the claim that the Gallipoli battle in 1915 marked the birth of New Zealand nationhood, and argues it is largely based on myths about the campaign. In another contribution, Terence O’Brien argues New Zealand’s international identity has been significantly affected by external developments beyond its control since the 1980s, but that the soft power of the country can still help the process of adjusting to such pressures. Meanwhile, David MacDonald contends that while New Zealand biculturalism may serve in some ways as a benchmark for indigenous-settler reconciliation in Canada, the low economic status of M¯aori in relation to the P¯akeha continues to be a challenge in New Zealand. Furthermore, Andrew Butcher’s chapter shows that New Zealand governments in the next three decades must not only negotiate the tension between biculturalism and the growing realities of a diverse, multicultural society but also recalibrate their foreign policies to reflect major demographic changes at home.

Economics and Regionalism The second theme concerns the relationship between New Zealand’s economic interests and the arrangements for advancing them through international trade. Today, New Zealand is a country that has wide ranging trade relations. But that was not always the case. Efforts to diversify New Zealand’s trade only began after Britain attempted to join the EEC in the early 1960s. In 1965, the New Zealand Australia Free Trade Agreement (NZAFTA) was signed. The positive listing trade agreement had its limitations; only those items agreed on by both countries would be subject to free trade terms. However, it signalled the start of a more regionally focused economic policy, and by the late 1970s, resulted in the removal of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on 80 per cent of trans-Tasman trade (Australia Government Department of

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Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014). New Zealand also sought stronger trade relations with Asian countries, particularly on the multilateral front. The Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (known as ANZCERTA or the CER Agreement) replaced NZAFT in 1983. The negative listing agreement opened the doors for significantly greater trade flows; all tariffs and quotas were eliminated by 1990. Not surprisingly, between the mid-1980s and 2000, trade between the two countries had increased by over 400 per cent (Patman and Rudd, 2005). Currently, the two countries have adopted a Single Economic Market (SEM) approach to CER, which aims to “harmonize the two economies”. New Zealand has further expanded its free trade portfolio, particularly with its neighbouring regions. It has concluded free trade agreements with 16 World Trade Organization (WTO) countries, with the majority being with Asian countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally.1 Among these, the NZ-China FTA is notable, and indicative of New Zealand’s enthusiasm for free trade. In 2008, New Zealand became the first developed country to enter into a free trade agreement with China. It followed this up by being the first developed country to launch an FTA upgrade with China (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.a). The relationship has grown stronger; in 2014, the two countries signed the New Zealand-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which enumerates a number of aims and commitments, including expanding practical cooperation and exchanges, promoting and protecting human rights, and working constructively in the Pacific region (Key, 2014). New Zealand-China relations, particularly those involving trade, have strengthened despite concerns with China’s human rights violations expressed by organisations such as Human Rights Watch (2017) and Amnesty International.2 New Zealand’s enthusiasm for free trade remains strong, despite encountering some obstacles. On 4 February 2016, New Zealand was among the 12 signatories to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was designed to liberalise trade and investment. New Zealand stood to gain better access 1The

16 countries are China, Korea, Hong Kong, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Australia and Chile. 2 Amnesty International NZ Executive Director Grant Bayldon cited in Sam Sachdeva, “China anti-corruption drive stymied by extradition issues”, Newsroom, 11 May 2017: https://www.ne wsroom.co.nz/2017/05/10/26116/china-anti-corruption-drive-stymied-by-extradition-issues (retrieved 10 July, 2017).

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to globally significant markets. However, the TPP never came into force; on 23 January 2017, US President Donald Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum, withdrawing the United States. Unless it is modified, the agreement cannot come into force without the United States (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.b). Despite this, New Zealand remains optimistic; then Minister of Finance, Bill English, suggested the remaining 11 countries could continue without the United States (Small, 2017). TPP is not the only multilateral trade agreement New Zealand has been pursuing. In 2009, New Zealand and countries from the Pacific region began negotiating the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus, a comprehensive free trade agreement covering goods, services and investment. The agreement was concluded in Australia, in April 2017, and signed in Tonga, in June 2017. Notably, Fiji, PNG and Vanuatu, the region’s main economies, did not sign; Fiji and PNG are the largest Pacific island “economies”.3 Despite some setbacks, TPP and PACER are still moving forward. Globalisation, particularly as facilitated by international organisations like the WTO, has been a key driver of New Zealand’s economic and trade policy readjustment. New Zealand was one of the chief beneficiaries of the 1994 Uruguay GATT round which began to liberalise trade in agriculture. It also has a lot to gain from further liberalisation of trade in agriculture that was agreed at Geneva as part of the Doha Round of world trade talks in August 2004. According to the Labour Minister for Trade Negotiations, Jim Sutton, a successful completion of the Doha Round could be worth something “in the order of $1 billion a year” (quote by New Zealand Herald, 2004c) to the New Zealand dairy industry alone. While some observers have claimed the WTO has weakened the sovereignty of the nation-state, there is little evidence to support this proposition with respect to New Zealand. Consider, for instance, the rules that the WTO introduced for settling trade disputes between states. Far from weakening New Zealand’s national sovereignty, these rules have in a sense actually enhanced it by levelling the playing field for small, less powerful trading nations. The WTO disputes resolution mechanism is binding and sets

3The

14 countries participating in PACER Plus are New Zealand, Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

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parameters for a country to pursue a trade dispute against another over a trade problem. This allows the dispute to be sealed off from the rest of the bilateral relationship. Since the mid-1990s, New Zealand governments have been involved as a principal complainant in seven WTO disputes. These disputes were with neighbouring Australia concerning Canberra’s apple quarantine measures; Hungary over export subsidies in respect of agricultural products; the EU over measures affecting butter products; India over quantitative restrictions on imports of agricultural, textile and industrial products; Canada over measures affecting the importation of milk and the export of dairy products; and the United States over safeguard measures on imports of fresh, chilled and frozen lamb from New Zealand, and definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.c). In each case, New Zealand governments have successfully resolved the dispute in their favour without significantly damaging relations with any of the parties involved. For a small state like New Zealand, these outcomes represent a significant boost for its external sovereignty. During the last four decades, the focus and scope of New Zealand’s international engagement has significantly expanded. In a chapter by Brian Lynch, it is noted, in particular, that New Zealand has become deeply involved in the Asia-Pacific and has developed close links with many of the region’s trade and security organisations. The chapter by Robert Scollay acknowledges that after decades of effort New Zealand had been accepted as a full participant in the Asia-Pacific’s trade arrangements by the end of 2015, but argues Wellington now faces new uncertainties after the withdrawal of the Trump administration from the TPP in early 2017 and possibly worsening trade and security ties between the United States and China. In a chapter on New Zealand’s participation in the TPP negotiations, Jane Kelsey says Wellington’s involvement was troubled by contradictions analogous to those identified by Karl Polanyi in his book, The Great Transformation — a democratic deficit, an attack on affordable medicines provided by the Pharmaceutical and Management Agency (Pharmac), and the privileging of foreign states and corporations over the rights of M¯aori. With respect to the link between New Zealand’s Pacific identity and its strategic interests, Anna Powles argues such claims are subject to increasing contestation in a region characterised by an uneasy mix of fragility and transformation. Furthermore, Hugh White’s chapter observes that while New

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Zealand and Australia had both established close ties, their responses to a rising China will probably differ; a diplomatic pattern that paradoxically could make the trans-Tasman relationship even closer.

Morality A third theme concerns the perception that New Zealand is a moral actor in international relations. Rightly or wrongly, New Zealand governments have considered some of their foreign policy priorities as pursuant of moral objectives. The Labour Party of the 1930s, for example, considered its emphasis on upholding collective security through the League of Nations as a moral foreign policy stance (Bennet, 1988, pp. 10–12). If supporting collective security through international organisations is a standard for a moral foreign stance, then New Zealand’s consistent support for the United Nations, bar certain exceptions, would be testament to the morality of its foreign policy to the present. In the era of globalisation, New Zealand governments have continued to uphold the notion of a rules-based international order and to firmly support the UN as the embodiment of the multilateral process. Faced with a new global context, New Zealand governments have generally reacted with a “can do” approach to diplomacy which rejects the traditional realist view that nation-states must rely on power to obtain international influence (Walter, 2000). New Zealand governments, whether led by National or Labour, have also demonstrated a continuing international commitment to promote human rights. As one of the founding members of the UN, New Zealand strongly advocated the inclusion of human rights in the UN charter, and was closely involved in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. This commitment has, if anything, deepened with the global upsurge of intra-state conflict and the expansion of the human rights agenda in New Zealand. Since the beginning of the groundbreaking attempt to improve relations between M¯aori and P¯akeh¯a through the Treaty settlement process, New Zealand governments have become conscious that they have a distinctive contribution to make internationally in the fields of ethnic conflict and indigenous rights. For example, the country has played an active role in the drafting of the UN’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In the 1980s, New Zealand’s “moral” foreign policy was epitomised by the adoption of a nuclear-free policy. The policy included prohibiting port

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entry by any ships either under nuclear power or carrying nuclear weapons. That decision led ultimately to the United States excluding New Zealand from its ANZUS obligations and from military and naval exercises, and also limiting the exchange of strategic information with New Zealand. Thereafter, the United States relegated New Zealand to the status of a friend, from that of an ally. Notably, it was developed amidst considerable opposition and political pressure from its most important big power-ally, the United States. Even its closest ally, Australia, expressed both publicly and privately its concern with New Zealand’s stance (Hensley, 2013). Despite this, David Lange publicly defended his government’s policy on moral grounds, no less so than in the now well publicised 1985 Oxford Union debate, in which he persuasively argued that nuclear weapons are morally indefensible. Ironically, if a moral foreign policy is to be judged according to this standard, it raises questions about the morality of New Zealand foreign policy prior to its nuclear-free policy. Today, 30 years on, the non-nuclear policy has not only survived, but has become a core national interest. In fact, the consistently high level of support for this policy has been something of a surprise for both its critics and its most ardent supporters. Critics charged that a small state like New Zealand could only find relative security by enlisting the protection of a big power. The nuclear age, it was argued, had not fundamentally changed this logic. Thus, many commentators expected the rupture of the ANZUS alliance to expose and endanger New Zealand’s political interests. However, supporters maintained that New Zealand’s nuclear-free stance was a powerful symbol of the country’s global support for nuclear disarmament, and a demonstration of its firm opposition to nuclear weapons proliferation in the South Pacific region in particular. The working assumption here was that ideas and norms do matter at the international level, and a small country like New Zealand could make a positive difference through its own actions to the global security situation. Notably, the policy became a symbolic expression of national resolve to forge a distinctive, and moral foreign policy in the face of strong opposition from a world superpower. New Zealand has also parted ways with the United States on other “moral” issues such as the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, which seeks to place international limits on factors contributing global warming. Shortly after taking

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office, President George W. Bush announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Kyoto agreement, citing fears of the effect it would have on the US economy. Australia almost immediately followed America’s lead. The Australian Environment Minister, Senator Robert Hill, said the Kyoto agreement was “dead” without the US’s agreement. But New Zealand disagreed and made it clear that it intended to stick by the Kyoto Protocol.4 Various aspects of New Zealand’s role as a moral international actor are reviewed in this volume. In a chapter by Ranginui Walker and Tracey MacIntosh, the authors empirically challenge the view that M¯aori ceded sovereignty to P¯akeh¯a settlers during the 19th century and contend that the process of confronting the country’s history will continue to have foreign policy implications. Kevin Clements observes that the reluctance of the Fourth Labour government (and all subsequent New Zealand governments) to promote the country’s anti-nuclear stance has somewhat diluted the international credibility of the policy. At the same time, Jacqui True and Maria Tanyag argue in their chapter that, despite the absence of an explicit strategy, New Zealand has nevertheless made key contributions to promoting human security concerns in the Asia Pacific. In contrast, Jon Stephenson contends that New Zealand’s reputation as a good international citizen has been tarnished by its involvement in the war on terror in Afghanistan where apparent complicity in detainee mistreatment has been compounded by the unwillingness of successive New Zealand governments to squarely address such issues in its public domain. In addition, the chapter by Peter Cozens says the possession of the fourth largest maritime estate in the world presents New Zealand with a golden opportunity to become a New Atlantis, but the realisation of this lofty aspiration will require, amongst other things, the development of a maritime vision and an articulated oceans policy.

Geopolitics and National Security Interests A fourth theme centres on the interface between geopolitics, security interests and New Zealand foreign policy. Until the mid-1960s, security and defence issues appeared to be among the least contested aspects of New Zealand’s foreign policy agenda. New Zealand’s heavy involvement in the two World Wars was followed by post-1945 engagement in the Malayan Emergency and the 4Teletext

National and World News, 7 July 2001.

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Korean Wars, and a realignment of major security partner alliance with the signing of the ANZUS treaty. To be sure, Britain remained pivotal in New Zealand security considerations, drawing the latter into the Malayan Emergency and the first Korean War, and remaining security allies via the United Kingdom United States of America (UKUSA) agreement that established the Five Eyes intelligence sharing network, and the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA). However, following Winston Churchill’s wartime advice, New Zealand advanced security relations with the United States Post-World War II as its new key major power ally, particularly in the Pacific and Asian regions. By the 1960s, either through exhaustion after its contributions to key conflicts or the lull in the number of relevant conflicts to engage with, or both, New Zealand saw less action than in the previous decades. This changed when the United States sought assistance from its allies, including New Zealand, in its military campaign in Vietnam. The collective security agreement under ANZUS prompted a positive New Zealand response, in rhetoric at least; New Zealand could not have been a more reluctant ally. Of the Keith Holyoake government’s attitude, McAloon states, “[p]ublicly, Holyoake gave full rhetorical support to the United States but the military commitment was as small as he could get away with…” (McAloon, 2010, p. 33). New Zealand’s apparent resignation to its ANZUS treaty obligations soon prompted a new turn in New Zealand foreign policy. On the heels of a publicly unpopular contribution to the Vietnam war (Hoadley, 2000, p. 41), greater public intolerance of particularly French nuclear testing in the Pacific (Clements, 1988, pp. 52–66), a changed international outlook from what Dalby refers to as “bipolar geopolitics” to “antigeopolitics” (Dalby, 1993, pp. 445–447), the 1972 Kirk government initiated a drastic reversal of New Zealand security policy. Up to that point, New Zealand made no issue of the United States policy of “neither confirm nor deny” in relation to whether its ships were carrying nuclear weapons and/or were nuclear capable. Under the Kirk government, US nuclear power warships were denied entry to New Zealand ports. Although the policy was reversed, after the United States congress passed legislation accepting liability for any wrongdoing on their part (Hoadley, 2000, p. 42), it signalled an important change in New Zealand’s approach or at least attitude towards the ANZUS alliance. What had been obvious for decades, and acknowledged by different New Zealand governments, that ANZUS was not a nuclear alliance (Lange, 1984,

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p. 1011), was suddenly brought to the fore of New Zealand-United States relations. What the Kirk government started, the 1984 Lange-led Labour government finished. David Lange became the front man, probably reluctantly at first, of a revised foreign policy stance that refused entry to ships that did not declare their nuclear status, whether powered or armed or not. The ANZUS treaty became the focal point, and eventual casualty, of the stand-off: New Zealand demanded that ships declare their nuclear status, and the United States refused. New Zealand, probably correctly, asserted the Treaty was not a nuclear one; nothing in the approximately 700-word document said anything of the sort. The United States disagreed and implied the nuclear aspect was involved. (Hoadley, 2000, p. 44). Despite multiple warnings from the United States that it would cease security obligations under ANZUS, the Labour Party led the charge towards a nuclear-free New Zealand policy. The writing was clearly on the United States foreign policy wall, even before the passing of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987. In June 1986, then United States Secretary of State, George Schultz, declared the suspension of security obligations to New Zealand, unofficially ending the 35-year relationship. The Broomfield Act, passed by the United States Congress in 1987, downgraded New Zealand’s status from an ally to a friend, and was reminiscent of Schultz’s comments a year earlier, “we part company as friends, but we part company, as far as the alliance is concerned” (Gwertzman, 1986). For the first decade or so of the post-Cold War era, the ANZUS rupture did not seem to affect the capacity of New Zealand to work co-operatively with Australia and the United States in the security realm. Wellington backed the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991; the US-UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia, 1992–1993; and worked closely together with Australia to achieve a peace settlement in Bougainville in 1998. Furthermore, New Zealand’s forces served under Australian command in East Timor as part of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) and close cooperation between both military forces has continued under the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). According to the former Deputy Secretary of the Australian Defence Department, New Zealand’s very rapid and professional commitment to support INTERFET made “a massive impression” in Canberra

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(White, 2000). New Zealand has also been a strong supporter of the Australianled multinational force, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which intervened in July 2003 to restore law and order at the behest of the Solomon Islands government in the South Pacific (New Zealand Herald, 2004a). Further refinements in policy followed. While New Zealand focussed on security and defence issues closer to home in the 1990s, and 2000s, it has once again restored close ties with the United States. The signing of the Closer Defence Relations (CDRs) with Australia in 1991, a stronger engagement in Pacific security issues, notably the Bougainville conflict, the Solomon Islands conflict through the RAMSI, and the Fiji coups of 2000 and 2006, demonstrated an upgraded commitment to the region. This complemented a heightened environmental and economic/trade engagement with the region, marked in the 1980s by treaties and agreements such as the 1980 South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Agreement (SPARTECA), and the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga. At the same time, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC on 11 September 2001 created an opportunity for New Zealand to re-energise its approach to relations with Washington. This culminated in the signing of the Wellington Declaration 2010, and the Washington Declaration 2012, both focusing on strengthening New Zealand-US security and defence relations in the Asia and Pacific regions. The friendship has been upgraded to an alliance, albeit as de facto allies. While the ANZUS relationship between New Zealand and the United States has not and may never be fully restored, legally, in all other senses the breach in the security relationship has in substance been mended. In September 2014, New Zealand was one of 60 plus states that joined the US-led anti-ISIS coalition, and in February 2015 Wellington deployed 143 military personnel to Iraq to train government forces there in the conflict with ISIS. In his chapter on New Zealand’s presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in July 2015, Murray McCully indicates that New Zealand’s priorities were the security challenges of Small Island Developing States (SIDS), reinvigorating the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and curbing the use of the veto by P5 members to make the UNSC more functional. With respect to the substantial improvement in security cooperation between New Zealand and the United States in the 21st century, Joe Burton argues that an eclectic theoretical approach best explains the positive turnaround in this

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relationship. More generally, Peter Greener highlights significant changes in New Zealand defence policy making during the past 50 years, and concludes the two major political parties in the country have now moved toward a largely bipartisan approach in this area. In a chapter that examines the interface between intelligence gathering and foreign policy making, Anthony Smith maintains that a multifaceted intelligence process actually bolsters the capacity of a small state like New Zealand to adopt independent positions on a range of complex international security questions. Acknowledging that the concept of national security has substantially evolved in the post-Cold War period, Jim Rolfe argues successive New Zealand governments have largely struck the appropriate balance between meeting the intelligence needs of the state and protecting the rights of their citizens. However, Paul Buchanan says the New Zealand intelligence community has experienced some degree of institutional lag and has not kept pace with the post-Cold War realignment of Wellington’s foreign policy and the security challenges of the 21st century.

Diplomatic Engagement and Multilateralism The fifth broad theme considered here concerns the role of diplomacy and multilateralism in New Zealand’s international relations. Since New Zealand established its Department of External Affairs in 1943, it has been a committed multilateralist. In 1945, it played a role in the formation of the United Nations; it was a founding member that actively opposed the veto rights of the permanent members (something it continues to advocate), was instrumental in having human rights provisions included in the Charter, and along with Australia played a key role in the formation of the Trusteeship Council and including trusteeship issues in the UN’s mandate. To be sure, New Zealand does not have a perfect record of supporting UN action. For example, it did not support six UN resolutions calling for Indonesia to withdraw after it invaded East Timor in 1976. However, actions such as these are not characteristic of New Zealand-UN relations; New Zealand can proudly boast of signing all the major UN treaties and ratifying nearly every UN convention (Patman, 2006, p. 92). New Zealand has contributed troops and personnel to UN peacekeeping operations since they began in 1948, have played a role in some of the UN’s “most challenging missions”, and have provided sustained contributions to other UN peace support operations, such as in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2004, Bougainville from 1990 to 2003, Korea from 1950 to

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the present, Solomon Islands from 2003 to 2013, and in the Sinai Peninsula from 1982 to the present (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Website, n.d.d). The significance of these facts should not be overstated; Greener notes that New Zealand’s recent contributions to missions such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Sudan/South Sudan and the Middle East were small scale, typically involving “military observers sent in ones and twos” (Greener, 2014). Nevertheless, New Zealand’s contributions invariably show a small country that is committed to the United Nations as the most legitimate actor to exercise force in international relations. Notably, when the United States invaded Iraq, in 2003, and requested international support, New Zealand refused to send combat troops because the invasion was not mandated by the United Nations (Patterson, 2016). The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phil Goff, expressed the government’s clear preference for the enforcement of resolution 14415 through multilateralism as opposed to unilateral action, and stated, “[a]t the end of the day, the United Nations must be able to sanction the use of force, otherwise compliance with its resolutions could not be secured, and it could never achieve the purpose for which it was established” (Goff, 2003). It should be added that in October 2014, New Zealand — competing with Spain and Turkey for two seats on the UNSC — resoundingly won a seat in the first ballot in New York. This was the second time in the postCold War era that New Zealand had been elected to the Security Council, and went some way to substantiating the claim in the 2016 Defence White Paper that “New Zealand actively supports the rules-based international order through its support for institutions and arrangements that reinforce global stability, including the United Nations” (New Zealand Government, 2016, p. 40). Despite New Zealand’s strong commitment to multilateral ideals, its performance in the area of development aid seems to be at odds with these aspirations. In 2014, New Zealand spent just 0.27 per cent of gross national income (GNI) on development aid (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.e) — a figure well below the target level of 0.7 per cent of GNI set by the United Nations in 1970. The New Zealand aid programme falls below those offered by most OECD countries, including Australia. 5 UNSNC

Resolution 1441, adopted unanimously in 2002, declared Iraq to be in material breach of the ceasefire terms presented under the terms of Resolution 687, and served as a platform for action to be taken under Chapter VII of the Charter, such as determining appropriate action to take against the existence of a threat to peace or act of aggression.

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Notwithstanding this, New Zealand’s focus on multilateralism is particularly evident in the Pacific. New Zealand was one of the founding members of the Pacific Community,6 formerly the South Pacific Commission, in 1947, which is the oldest, largest and most inclusive of the regional organisations. The Pacific Community did not engage in political issues, which bred frustration among Pacific island countries, particularly those undergoing decolonizing between the 1950s and 1960s. This led to the formation of the PIF, formerly the South Pacific Forum. During the planning stages for the PIF, New Zealand was not included. However, after petitioning together with Australia for membership it was eventually included as a founding member (Graham, 2008, p. 27) in 1971,7 and the first meeting was held in Wellington. Through the PIF and other regional organisations, New Zealand has played an important role in the Pacific. One of the PIF’s first major resolutions was the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), under which New Zealand, along with Australia, agreed to progressively provide duty free and unrestricted access to their markets from Pacific island countries.8 Another resolution was the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), which passed in 1985; the PIF pursued this in response to a 1975 proposal by the Rowling-led Labour government, which called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the region. In 2003, then New Zealand Prime Minister, Helen Clark, proposed a review of the PIF (Huffer, 2006, p. 160). This eventually led to the adoption, in 2005, of the Pacific Plan, arguably the PIF’s most comprehensive reform agenda for the region (Huffer, 2006); it has been described as “the master strategy for strengthening regional cooperation and integration in the Pacific” (Slatter, 2015, p. 49). More recently, New Zealand, along with Australia, spearheaded the PACER-plus region wide free trade agreement, signed in Tonga on 16 June 2017. According to the Pacific Cooperation Foundation, PACER-plus ushers in a “new era of closer

6The

other founding members were Australia, Britain, France, Netherlands, and the United states. The Netherlands withdrew in 1962, after the transfer of West Papua to Indonesia, and the Pacific island countries were included much later. 7The others were Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Samoa, Tonga and Australia. 8 South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), Tarawa, Kiribati, 14 July 1980. Available online at: www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attach ments/documents/SPARTECA%20text1.pdf, accessed 4 August 2017.

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economic relations” (Pacific Cooperation Foundation, 2017). New Zealand has played an integral role in multilateral action in the Pacific, perhaps more so than elsewhere. In a chapter that evaluates the impact of rival theories — realism, liberalism and constructivism — on national security, trade and multilateral diplomacy, Andreas Reitzig contends that the evidence suggests New Zealand foreign policy is a pragmatic mixture of different paradigms and hostage to none. While Lucy Duncan acknowledges in her chapter that revolutionary changes in information and communications technology have enlarged the role of political leaders in directing diplomacy, many of the characteristics that define a good New Zealand have remained and will remain critical for a successful foreign policy in the 21st century. An analysis by Colin Keating of New Zealand’s successful campaign for a seat on the UNSC in October 2014 highlighted the potential for Wellington to move towards a more active foreign policy orientation than had generally been the case in the past. Using climate change policy to illustrate New Zealand’s environmental diplomacy, Adrian Macey argues in his chapter that while New Zealand had not “punched above its weight”, it had nevertheless provided ideas and actions consistent with both the national interest and the wider common good. Furthermore, in a chapter that squarely challenges New Zealand’s self-perception as a small state, Patrick Köllner concedes Brexit will probably have repercussions for Wellington’s relationship with the EU, but the 2016 Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation (PARC) could nevertheless serve as a springboard for deeper ties, including a bilateral free trade agreement, between the two parties. With respect to diplomacy in the Middle East, Nigel Parsons and James Watson maintain that New Zealand’s willingness to support Palestinian interests in two crucial UN votes in 1974 and 2012 — and vote differently from its traditional Anglosphere allies on these occasions — seemed to be linked to a distinctive New Zealand international identity.

References Australia Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade website (2014). Retrieved from http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/anzcerta/pages/australianew-zealand-closer-economic-relations-trade-agreement.aspx#documents [15 June 2017].

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Bennet, B (1988). New Zealand’s Moral Foreign Policy 1935–1939: The Promotion of Collective Security through the League of Nations. Wellington: New Zealand Institution of International Affairs. Brown, B (1997). From bulk purchase to butter disputes. In New Zealand and Britain: A Special Relationship in Transition, RG Patman (ed.), pp. 41–66. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press. Catley, B (2001). Waltzing with Matilda: Should New Zealand Join Australia? Wellington: Dark Horse Publishing. Clements, K (1988). Back from the Brink: The Creation of a Nuclear-Free New Zealand. Wellington: Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press. Dalby, S (1993). The ‘Kiwi disease’: Geopolitical discourse in Aotearoa/New Zealand and the South Pacific, Political Geography, 12(5), 437–456. Flynn, JR (4–6 April 2002). New Zealand Democracy: On the Brink of Failure? Paper delivered at the International Forum on Democracy in Institute for the Study of Future Generations, Kyoto, Japan. Goff, P (11 February 2003). Debate on Prime Minister’s statement — Iraq. Beehive.govt.nz. Retrieved from https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/debateprime-minister039s-statement-iraq [June 2017]. Gould, J (1982). The Rake’s Progress: The New Zealand Economy Since 1945. Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton. Graham, K (2008). Models of Regional Governance for the Pacific: Sovereignty and the Future Architecture of Regionalism. Christchurch: Canterbury University Press. Greener, B (3 April 2014). Peacekeeping contributor profile: New Zealand. Providing for Peacekeeping. Retrieved from http://www.providingforpeacekeeping. org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-new-zealand/ [19 June 2017]. Gwertzman, B (28 June 1986). Shultz ends U.S. vow to defend New Zealand. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/28/world/shultzends-us-vow-to-defend-new-zealand.html [13 June 2017]. Henderson, J (1991). New Zealand and the foreign policy of small States. In Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s, R Kennaway and J Henderson (eds.), pp. 3–16. Auckland: Longman Paul. Hensley, G (2013). Friendly Fire: Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS, 1984– 1987. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Hoadley, S (2000). New Zealand United States Relations — Friends No Longer Allies Wellington: The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Human Rights Watch (2017). World Report 2017: Events of 2016. United States: Human Rights Watch. Huffer, E (2006). The pacific plan: A political and cultural critiques. In Redefining the Pacific?: Regionalism Past, Present and Future, J Bryant-Tokalau and I Frazer (eds.). Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Infoplease New Zealand (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/ A0107834.html.

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International Monetary Fund (April 2017). World economic outlook database. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/weo rept.aspx?pr.x=26&pr.y=13&sy=2017&ey=2021&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=count ry&ds=.&br=1&c=196&s=PPPGDP%2CPPPPC&grp=0&a= [30 April 2017]. Key, J (20 November 2014). Joint statement between New Zealand and the people’s republic of China on the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership. Beehive.govt.nz. Retrieved from https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/jointstatement-between-new-zealand-and-people%E2%80%99s-republic-china-esta blishment-comprehensive- [June 15, 2017]. Lange, D (1984). New Zealand’s security policy. Foreign Affairs, 63, 1009–1019. McAloon, J (2010). New Zealand since the war. In New Zealand Government and Politics, R Miller (ed.). Melbourne: Oxford University Press. New Zealand Government (2016). Defence White Paper 2016. Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of Defence. (2004a, February 18). New Zealand Herald. (2004b, March 29). New Zealand Herald. (2004c, August 2). New Zealand Herald. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n.d.a). NZ-China FTA upgrade. Retrieved from https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements-in-force/nz-china-free-trade-agreement/ [15 June 2017]. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n.d.b). Retrieved from https://www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz/ [15 June 2017]. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n.d.c). New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Legal Division-WTO. Retrieved http://www.mft. govt.nz/support/legal/disputes/wtodispute.html#third%20party. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n.d.d). Our work with the UN. Retrieved from https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/peace-rights-and-security/workwith-the-un-and-other-partners/ [19 June 2017]. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n.d.e). Where our funding goes. Retrieved from https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/aid-and-development/ourapproach-to-aid/where-our-funding-goes/ [12 June 2017]. O’Dea, D (2000). The Changes in New Zealand’s Income Distribution, Working Paper 00/13. Wellington: New Zealand Treasury Working Paper. Pacific Cooperation Foundation (2017). PACER Plus signed in Nuku’alofa. Retrieved from https://pcf.org.nz/news/2017-06-15/pacer-plus-signed-in-nuku-alofa [20 June 2017]. Patman, RG (ed.) (1997). New Zealand and Britain: A Special Relationship inTransition. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press. Patman, RG (2003). Foreign policy. In New Zealand Government and Politics, R Miller (ed.), pp. 532–544. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

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Patman, RG and C Rudd (2005). New Zealand sovereignty in the era of globalization. In Sovereignty under Siege? Globalization and New Zealand, RG Patman and C Rudd (eds.), pp. 1–19. Aldershot: Ashgate. Patman, RG (2006). New Zealand’s place in the World. In New Zealand Government and Politics, R Miller (ed.). Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Patterson, J (7 July 2016). NZ govt made ‘right judgment’ over Iraq. RadioNZ. Retrieved from http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/308164/nz-made-%27 right-judgement%27-over-iraq [19 June 2017]. Roy, EA (24 March 2016). New Zealand votes to keep its flag after 56.6% back the status quo. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian. com/world/2016/mar/24/new-zealand-votes-to-keep-its-flag-in-referendum [29 June 2017]. Slatter, C (2015). The new framework for Pacific regionalism: Old kava in a new tanoa? In The New Pacific Diplomacy, G Fry and S Tarte (eds.). Canberra: ANU Press. Small, V (24 January 2017). Trump signals one-on-one NZ trade deal but English says his terms are ‘unattractive’. Stuff. Retrieved from http://www.stuff.co.nz/nat ional/politics/88712011/Trump-signals-one-on-one-trade-deals-with-NZ-TPPcountries [6 June 2017] Statistics New Zealand (2 February 2017). International visitor arrivals to New Zealand: December 2016. Retrieved from http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_ stats/population/Migration/international-visitor-arrivals-dec-16.aspx [15 June 2017]. (22 December 2002). Sunday Star Times, Auckland. Walter, N (2000). New Zealand’s changing place in the World. Record: New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, 9(2), 16–19. White, H (29 June 2000). An Australian Viewpoint on Strategic Issues. Paper presented at the 36th University of Otago Foreign Policy School, Dunedin, New Zealand. Woods, N (1997). Converging challenges and diverging dentities. In New Zealand and Britain: A Special Relationship in Transition, RG Patman (ed.), pp. 27–40. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press. Zwimpfer, L (22 June 2001). Digital divide or digital opportunities-two sides of the same coin? Paper presented at UNESCO one-day seminar on New Zealand and the World in Royal Society of New Zealand, Wellington.

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CHAPTER 1 Building Foreign Policy in New Zealand: The Role of the University of Otago Foreign Policy School, 1966–1976 Austin Gee, Robert G. Patman and Chris Rudd

This chapter considers the role of the University of Otago Foreign Policy School in shaping the evolution of New Zealand’s foreign policy between 1966 and 1976.1 First, it will consider the establishment and organisation of the School during its first decade. The second part outlines a conceptual model developed by Michelle Hale Williams to help assess the impact factor in public life. In the third section we examine the role of the School in facilitating public and political debate in New Zealand. The fourth part examines the interaction between the School and the foreign policy institutional environment within New Zealand. The fifth section considers the relationship of the School with New Zealand foreign policy-making during the period under review. The final section provides an overall assessment and concludes that the role of the School in its first decade was most clearly shown in expanding the parameters of public engagement with foreign policy issues at the agendas and institutional levels.

1This

chapter draws on some research from the authors’ “Debating New Zealand’s Foreign Relations: The Role and Impact of the University of Otago Foreign Policy School 1966–1976,” Kotuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences, 12(2) (2017): 256–276. 3

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The Founding of the University of Otago Foreign Policy School More than 50 years ago, Arnold Entwisle, a senior lecturer in international relations in the Department of University Extension, directed the first Foreign Policy School at the University of Otago. Entwisle believed, as he stated in an opening address to the first School in 1966, there was an urgent need for a “do-it-yourself kit” (Entwisle, 13 May 1966) in the area of New Zealand foreign policy-making. His assessment “originated wholly in some private ruminations” (Entwisle, 1975) but was shaped by several factors. First, the world in the mid-1960s was rapidly changing. Entwisle pointed out that of the 134 independent states in 1966, 53 had been established during the preceding two decades (Entwisle, 13 May 1966). Second, Entwisle recognised New Zealand faced looming and quite distinctive international challenges. Britain had signalled its intention in the early 1960s to join what was then known as the European Economic Community (EEC; Patman, 1997) and New Zealand in 1965 sent a military combat unit to fight alongside America in the Vietnam War. The central purpose of establishing the Foreign Policy School, therefore, was “to provide [an] opportunity for informed consideration of New Zealand’s foreign policy” (Entwisle, 27 January 1965) and facilitate a wider debate on the challenges the country faced, directly or indirectly, in the international arena.

Organisation of the school The Foreign Policy School was organised by University Extension, the adult education department at Otago University, and was developed out of the courses on world affairs and current events the department had offered since the mid-1950s. Significantly, though, the Schools sought a more committed, nationwide audience and anticipated the emergence of a world view that would be centred in Wellington, rather than London. Entwisle directed the first 10 Schools. They were closely associated with him personally: in 1975 the historian William Laws referred to the by now annual event as “Arnold Entwisle’s Foreign Policy School” (Laws, 1975). During this period, Entwisle drew on considerable support from the External Affairs Department in Wellington and also specialist academics, particularly in the Department of History and Political Science at Otago.2 2 Which

was divided into two separate departments in 1967.

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For instance, the programme for the 1974 School drew on the advice of H. S. Lang, Secretary to the Treasury, J. M. Howells of the Economics Department at Otago, and Hew McLeod of the History Department (Entwisle, 7 December 1973b, 11 April 1974). But Entwisle remained “very much in command” of the Schools. According to the senior diplomat Malcolm Templeton, “the School was started and kept going by two enthusiasts, Arnold Entwisle and Angus Ross, head of the History Department, with modest financial support from the University” (Templeton, 1993, p. 219) While Ross was very well connected in the foreign policy world, Entwisle was the point of contact between the External Affairs Department and University Extension, a relationship that was to play an important part in the development of the Schools. By 1966, Entwisle had taught a range of adult education courses in current foreign policy questions for the past decade. An indication of his thinking that led to the establishment of the Foreign Policy School the following year is provided by two new courses he offered in 1965. The first was a “World Affairs Commentary” and the other a course on “New Zealand and the World” (Extension Department, University of Otago, 1965). The planning and organisation of the School until 1976 remained largely in Entwisle’s hands. He emphasised the Schools were all about expanding foreign policy knowledge in New Zealand, and believed they should be bipartisan occasions that fostered links between academics, policy practitioners and interested members of the public. The first School developed the themes of his programme of adult education lectures into a four-day residential course designed to attract a range of both students and members of the public. Its purpose was to discuss “the question of how to make a foreign policy” and to “assist members in isolating the governing factors in the making of a foreign policy for New Zealand” (Entwisle, 24 September 1965). The first Foreign Policy School was held in May 1966 over a long weekend.3 Arnold Entwisle considered it to have been “very successful ... despite its relatively low enrolment” of 22 people, and he immediately started planning for the following year, with a view to make it “an annual affair” (Entwisle, 20 May 1966). That aspiration was duly realised over the next decade. The 1967 School on National Security attracted 39 enrolments, but the numbers dropped back 3The

previous year’s abortive School was to have run from a Monday to a Thursday.

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in 1968 to about 23 (University Extension 1966a, 1967b; Brown, 1968b) when the School focused on International Agencies. Further Schools followed in the next three years on the History of New Zealand’s Foreign Policy, New Zealand and the Pacific Basin, and Europe in New Zealand’s Foreign Policy. Though there was a “slight fall in enrolments” in 1971 (Entwisle, 26 May 1969), the total was limited to the break-even number of 40 formally in 1972 (University Extension, 1972). There was little need, as that year’s School on New Zealand Foreign Policy saw only 25 enrolments (Entwisle, 1972). After the 1973 School concerning New Zealand in a Multipolar World, the attendance of 20 for the School in 1974 devoted to New Zealand in the World Economy was again considered disappointingly low (Entwisle, 27 May 1974; Extension Department, 1974), but the numbers revived to the “nearly record” level of 34 in 1975 when Asia in New Zealand’s Economy was the subject (Entwisle, 1975; Extension Department, 1975). After Entwisle’s retirement, the cap on enrolments was removed, and the numbers rose rapidly, to reach about 130 in 1977 (Norrish, 1977; Palmer, 1977).

Measuring Impact: The Williams Conceptual Model In order to help evaluate the role of the University of Otago Foreign Policy School, a model of public impact developed by Michelle Hale Williams can be drawn upon. Here the concept of impact is broadly defined in terms of influence (Williams, 2006). Influence is understood as “the capacity to change a course of events that might develop differently without the introduction of the impact stimulus … influence determines the ability to alter political discourse, to introduce important issues, to develop fresh ideas, and to induce action” (Williams, 2006, p. 42). A pyramid model has been used to represent the different possibilities for impact (see Fig. 1). Williams’ “agendas” level emphasizes the degree of influence that events have on popular discourse, public attention, and society at large. This broad level includes the “informal political discourse in a society and the way actors in the political system respond”. For Williams, “political agenda-setting incorporates a variety of actors outside of the legislature including political parties, interest groups, social movements and the priorities of the general public or voters that all combine to affect agendas” (Williams, 2006, p. 44). Williams’ institutional level is concerned with the impact of events on the political system, or the “institutional structure of government”. This is

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Policy

Institutions

Agendas

Figure 1. Levels of impact. Source: Williams (2006, p. 44).

a narrower level of impact. According to this view, political and institutional structures can change in response to the impact of an event stimulus (Williams, 2006, p. 45). An impact stimulus may force parties to shift along the ideological spectrum, or to expand into new areas in order to deal with perceived challenges in an electoral context. It is in the top tier of Williams’ model at the policy-making level where influence is most visible. Here the formulation and implementation of legislation or policy could be seen as a “concrete” indicator of impact. This level represents the clearest expression of influence because legislative activities and policy outputs are relatively easy to document (Williams, 2006, p. 46).

The Otago Foreign Policy School at the Agendas Level The establishment of the School in 1966 was a major departure from the past because it provided one of the few forums in New Zealand for the discussion of foreign policy among policy practitioners, academics, students and the interested public. Until the mid-1960s, foreign policy debates in New Zealand had largely been conducted within organisations such as the Department of External Affairs, the Annual General Meeting of the Returned Services Association, and the Royal Overseas League, or through conferences of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (NZIIA) and its bimonthly publication, the New Zealand International Review, as well as university departments, societies and conferences. The Foreign Policy School was intended in its first years to be what its name suggests, a school or workshop rather than an annual conference or symposium. The term “School” was retained deliberately when the occasions

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had become much more like conventional conferences. The historian Ann Trotter recalled: “Entwistle’s idea was to educate people about the significance and importance of foreign policy — hence School in the title. The first Schools were just that” (Trotter, A., personal communication, 5 March 2014). Entwisle tried to create “a forum where the varied perspectives could be shared without rancour and intelligently” (Ross, 11 February 2014). The historian David McIntyre recalled that the debates could become quite heated during the early Schools: “There were furious debates on the Vietnam issue and the radicals were always wanting to pass resolutions to send to government. Arnold Entwistle was very firm in not allowing anything like that. He insisted that the meetings were a ‘School’ not a conference or convention” (McIntyre, W. D., personal communication, 24 January 2014). The residential nature of the early Schools was an important factor in creating a comfortable learning environment. The good-natured conviviality of the occasion, and the value of informal and after-hours discussions, came as a pleasant surprise to many of the outside speakers. Each year Entwisle emphasised in the enrolment leaflet that the “programme has been arranged to provide for the maximum participation by the students. Each lecture will be followed by one and half hours of discussion”. The final evening’s student debate was replaced in 1969 with an “Open Forum”, “a session which will permit of rather more free-ranging discussion” (University Extension, 1969). This was in turn replaced in 1970 with “a panel discussion during which the lecturers will be able to deal with questions not covered during the weekend” (University Extension, 1970a). From the beginning, students had been “expected to prepare a short paper on a selected topic, to be left with the School staff for criticism”.4 “The organizers and lecturers attach considerable importance to these papers as being the most effective means of assessing the impact of the school on its members” (University Extension, 1968). With the introduction of longer discussion sessions in 1970 “the request for a written paper from each student” was dropped (University Extension, 1970b). The same general arrangements were followed until 1975 when at “the suggestion of the members of the 1974 School, the panel-discussion, which has hitherto ended the school, has this year been brought forward to Monday 4 By

1969 this had become simply “comment”: University Extension (1967a).

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afternoon. This leaves the final evening free for the important round-up view of the general theme, which will be offered by a member of New Zealand’s diplomatic service” (University Extension, 1975). This final paper was “devoted to bringing the themes of [the] preceding papers into direct relationship with New Zealand’s foreign policy requirements” (Entwisle, 24 September 1974). Little regard was given to seniority at the School. Chairing a session was a revolving role: “We all had to take turns at introducing speakers, acting as recorder for sessions, thanking speakers, making tea or coffee”, Helen Stead, who attended as a mature student, remembers: “Arnold Entwisle arranged the 1975 FPS along the most democratic lines I had then, or later ever, experienced” (Stead, H., personal communication, April 14, 2014, 31 May 1979a). Don Matheson, a farmer, also recalled a “constructive atmosphere — controversy with no trace of acrimony whatsoever” (Matheson, 1979). However, Lance Beath of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought the workshop discussions were too short and needed greater “structuring” and stronger leadership to produce more disciplined thinking (Beath, 1979). The proceedings of the early Schools received little coverage in the New Zealand media. First, Entwisle and the leadership of the University Extension Department preferred not to court media attention. As related above, Entwisle believed the core purpose of the Schools was to educate those present on New Zealand foreign policy and did not want the presence of the media to constrain what could be said by some speakers. Further, he was sensitive to the concerns of the Department of External Affairs. At the first School in 1966, External Affairs had insisted that “we would not wish [Tom Larkin’s] speech to be reported for either press or radio coverage” (McIntosh, 1966). Second, the media for its part showed little independent interest in the Schools until 1976. The Otago Daily Times merely sent a photographer to the opening of what it called “a school on foreign affairs”. It printed a photograph of Entwisle addressing about 10 of the participants, though it did not publish any report of the proceedings (Otago Daily Times, 14 May 1966).5 A pair of similar photographs appeared two years later, again without any report (Otago Daily Times, 11 May 1969).

5 It

was by no means unusual at this time for the newspaper to publish only a photograph of any local conference without an accompanying report.

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The first item of any substance to appear was Ray Jermyn’s lecture on the history of the Department of External Affairs, published in shortened form in the Otago Daily Times’s regular series of “World View” features (Otago Daily Times, 21 May 1969, see also 16 May 1972). Nevertheless, press interest in the event remained sparse during the first decade of the School. However, newspapers and television began to take a much greater interest after Entwisle’s retirement. The topicality and controversial nature of New Zealand’s sporting links with South Africa helped to ensure that the 1976 School on Sport, Politics and Foreign Policy gained much greater media coverage. James Kember, who attended as Executive Secretary of the NZIIA, said this event was the “coming of age” for the School because it attracted widespread television coverage (Kember, J., personal communication, 24 February 2014, 20 July 2014, 1976). With respect to publication outputs during the first decade, some papers presented to the School appeared in a variety of publications, but the proceedings of each School were not published formally until 1976 when the University Extension Department began to undertake that task. From the beginning in 1966, Entwisle kept copies of all papers presented at the Schools with a view to their publication “sooner or later”, though this did not eventuate on a systematic basis (Brown, 1968b). Instead, individual speakers occasionally published their contributions in academic journals. From an early stage, the Department of External Affairs published some of the contributions of its officials to the Schools. Its monthly publication the External Affairs Review6 was distributed free to subscribers within New Zealand and overseas. Excerpts from Bruce Brown’s address to the third School, “The Work of the United Nations: The Security Council”, were published in the Review in 1968. Two years later, Bryce Harland’s paper “New Zealand’s Relations with the United States of America” and Graham Ansell’s “New Zealand’s Relations with Australia” appeared in the journal. Ralph Mullins on “New Zealand’s Defence Policy” appeared in 1972, Merwyn Norrish on “Economic Considerations in New Zealand’s Foreign Policy” in 1974, and Brian Lynch on “Asia in New Zealand’s Foreign Policy” in 1975 (Brown, 1968a; Harland, 1970; Ansell 1970; Mullins, 1972; Norrish, 1974; Lynch, 1975).7

6Titled 7 We

New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review from 1970. owe these references to Ken Ross.

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From 1970 onwards, speakers were told that the NZIIA had first option on publishing papers presented to the Schools, and they were asked to prepare them with this possibility in mind (Entwisle, 4 November 1970, 7 December 1973a). Bruce Brown published the two papers he gave at the 1969 Foreign Policy School in his pamphlet New Zealand Foreign Policy in Retrospect (Brown, 1970), and a collection of six papers from the 1972 School was published as Defence Perspectives, edited by Ken Keith, who was to become Brown’s successor as Director of the NZIIA (Keith, 1972; Ross, 10 February 2014). In 1973, Wang Gungwu’s paper on the re-emergence of China was also published by the Institute (Wang, 1973). The NZIIA’s decision to publish the papers of the 1976 School on “Sport, Politics and Foreign Policy” was in direct recognition of the importance of the topic, its wide public canvassing, and because of the subsequent (tour) events (Kember, 20 July 2014). The journal Political Science had also offered to publish a selection of the papers delivered at the 1976 School, something it had not done since publishing Keith Sinclair’s paper a decade earlier which will be discussed later in this same chapter (Goldstein, 1976; Carr, 3 March 1976, 7 April 1976).

The Otago Foreign Policy School and the Institutional Setting of Foreign Policy From the outset, the Department of External Affairs was closely linked with the Schools. Starting in 1965, Entwisle had kept the Department informed about his plans and sought the advice of the then Secretary of External Affairs, Alister McIntosh, on speakers and topics. At the first School in 1966, two senior officials from External Affairs — Tom Larkin and Ralph Mullins — had prominent speaking and chairing roles respectively (Palmer, M., personal communication, 24 June 2014; University Extension, 1966b). This supportive response from the Department gave the School a head start and meant it was taken seriously in academic and foreign policy circles almost immediately. The close relationship between External Affairs and the School developed into what Entwisle termed “an easy, predictable partnership” (Entwisle, 1975), beneficial to both sides.

Involvement of the External Affairs Department Several years after the first School, Entwisle acknowledged that “we have always leaned heavily on [the External Affairs] Ministry for advice, and assistance

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in running this school” (Entwisle, 3 October 1973). He admitted that in organising the first two Foreign Policy Schools he had “occasionally found it necessary to deal with the criticism that they were ‘officially’ inspired. The idea was somewhat naively based, as far as I could gather, upon the fact that [the Department] had met our requests for assistance. It is now very clear that this idea has been completely dispelled” (Entwisle, 26 May 1969). Following the 1966 School, Entwisle reported that “Mr Larkin and Mr Mullins rendered us splendid service, though their patience must have been greatly tried at times. Everyone agreed that it was most useful to have their comment and guidance as a corrective to some of our thinking” (Entwisle, 1969b). The writer and peace campaigner Elsie Locke, a prominent member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Joint Council on Vietnam (the anti-war protest movement) attended the first two Schools. She returned with a “much greater regard” for the External Affairs Department, finding the two officials she met at the 1966 School (almost certainly Larkin and Mullins) “extremely knowledgeable and well informed” (Gilbert, 1966). Stead, who attended several of the Schools from 1975 onwards, thought they were among the best conferences she had ever attended: everyone was given an opportunity to contribute and the “rapport between all participants was constantly commented upon” (Stead, 31 May 1979a). Not all participants were so complimentary. The writer Charles Brasch commented on the first School in 1966 that “I couldn’t help feeling that the School forgot realities in most of its discussion” (Brasch, 1966). Nevertheless, Entwisle informed the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1970 that the speakers sent by his department had “sent our students away with a gratifying sense of having glimpsed the centre of things” (Entwisle, 29 May 1970). Entwisle believed that the presence of “professionals” from Wellington (Entwisle, 1971) helped to solidify foreign policy discussions “where every simple soul knows he has the right answer”, and was convinced that the involvement of the ministry had made a significant contribution to the success of the School during its first decade (Entwisle, 1971). For its part, the External Affairs Department (from 1969 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) viewed the School as the sort of serious public forum for the discussion of foreign policy it was happy to encourage. By the mid-1960s, there were new pressures for External Affairs to deepen its engagement with the

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public, press and academic world. Ray Jermyn argued in 1968 that “the Department was now coming increasingly under the microscope of a demanding and enquiring public, and was found wanting. The question was whether, in our own defence, we should get across to at least selected elements of the public the limitations we worked in when preparing policy recommendations at departmental level. Mr [George] Laking [Secretary of External Affairs 1967–72] said that the single most important barrier to creating good relations between the Department and the general public was the sheer ignorance of so many people, often the most vocal critics, of the basis of New Zealand’s foreign policy” (External Affairs Department, 1968). This was something that External Affairs, in its involvement in the Schools, sought to address. The first few Schools “became in effect confidence building measures for establishing intelligent dialogue between government officials and the protest movement” (Ross, K., personal communication, 30 July 2014). Under the leadership of George Laker, External Affairs sought greater public engagement in order to provide facts to inform public debate rather than engaging in those debates themselves (Laking, 1968). Kember believes “that the interaction between practitioners and academics is critical ... the practice benefits absolutely from the challenge of the broader f[oreign] p[olicy] thinking that comes from the school and other similar meetings” (Kember, J., personal communication, 24 February 2014). McIntyre, who spoke at the 1967, 1968 and 1972 Schools, strongly agreed, saying “that the mix of officials, politicians, military, academics, students, and foreign visitors [at the Schools] was very fruitful”. On the one hand, the “official side was able to lay out the difficulties of policy making to educate the more woolly-minded academics”. On the other hand, “academics with various wide perspectives I think gave the official/military side some useful thoughts and contact with overseas opinion” (McIntyre, W. D., personal communication, 24 January 2014). One aspect of this engagement was the practice, started in 1973, of Foreign Affairs sending a group of its new recruits to the School as part of their induction programme. Five trainees were selected and accompanied Graham Fortune, a senior administrative official, to Dunedin in 1973 (Parkinson, 5 April 1973, 26 April 1973, 18 April 1974; Director of University Extension, 1973; Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 1974), and the experiment was considered a success. Entwisle noted the presence of diplomatic trainees gave the

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School “a special attraction for the students whom we have from the beginning sought to recruit. It enables them to see something of the Ministry’s work from the inside” (Entwisle, 1975). Another five trainees were sent in 1974, accompanied by a middle-ranking official, Peter Bennett of the Administration Division. Entwisle believed the School profited “immensely from this contact with young, knowledgeable people, professionally committed to work on the issues we are discussing” (Entwisle, 27 May 1974). By the mid-1970s the School had become so much a part of the foreign policy calendar that it was seen as if a deliberate point was intended when the ministry failed to provide at least one speaker. The “mainstays of the engagement” between External Affairs and the Foreign Policy School were Ralph Mullins, Bryce Harland and George Laking. Norman Kirk, elected Prime Minister in November 1972, was much more actively engaged in foreign policy than his predecessors had been. Frank Corner and his senior officials were “utterly focused” on assisting the new prime minister, so liaison with the School was handed to more junior officials. The tradition of the School being opened by the Minister of Foreign Affairs developed only after 1975.

The Interface between the Otago Foreign Policy School and New Zealand’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making There is little evidence that the first decade of Foreign Policy Schools directly influenced the substance of New Zealand’s foreign policy. Kember believes “that the interaction between practitioners and academics is critical”, adding that “for new diplomats this is a very helpful and formative process though I would be hesitant to say the school actually influenced foreign policy formulation directly” (Kember, J., personal communication, February 24, 2014). Nevertheless, there are indications that the new “three-way interface” (McMechan, 1980) between officials, members of the academic community and the public did have some significant indirect effects on certain aspects of New Zealand’s foreign policy, fostering new thinking on foreign policy issues such as the Vietnam War, China, Europe and sporting ties with the apartheid regime in South Africa. The 1966 School examined New Zealand’s relationships with Pacific and South-East Asian countries, including Wellington’s military commitments in Malaysia and Vietnam, and other dimensions of the country’s external relations. The School ended with a debate on New Zealand’s

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intervention in South Vietnam in 1965 (University Extension, 1966c). In what was the first serious challenge to the widely held belief that New Zealand’s strategic circumstances made it essential to remain involved in South-East Asian Affairs (McKinnon, 1993), Keith Sinclair spoke on “New Zealand’s Future Foreign Policy: A New Pacific Pact” (Sinclair, 1993). Sinclair advocated a regional defence alliance of New Zealand, Australia, and neighbouring Polynesian states with the aim of avoiding involvement in conflicts outside the region, especially nuclear war (Sinclair, 1993, p. 187). When published in Political Science a few months later (Sinclair, 1966), Sinclair’s argument was influential among other academics, and certainly played a part in shaping the strategic focus on the Pacific region that eventually became part of New Zealand’s foreign policy. The 1970 School on New Zealand and the Pacific Basin8 looked at relations with Australia, the United States, the Pacific Islands, the Malay world, Japan and China. The political scientist Robert Taylor gave the final lecture, on “New Zealand and Mainland China”. Looking back, he “would like to think that the conference contributions would have had some influence on policymaking”. New Zealand did not yet have diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. “There was at the time discussion of changing allegiance to Beijing in an international context where China was still in the throes of the Cultural Revolution and Nixon’s visit to China which led to Sino-American rapprochement was yet to come”, Taylor recalls (Taylor, R., personal communication, 31 January 2014). The subsequent advent of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, together with rapidly improving American relations with the People’s Republic of China, shaped the context in which the 1972 Foreign Policy School considered New Zealand’s Foreign Policy. Laking thought the theme “timely” (Laking, 1971). By December 1972, New Zealand became one of the first Western-oriented states to establish diplomatic relations with China in the era of superpower détente. Meanwhile, the topic for 1971, Europe in New Zealand’s Foreign Policy, was prompted by the final stages of the negotiations regarding the United Kingdom’s joining the then EEC (Alley, 2014). Hugh Templeton, a National MP and formerly an External Affairs official, gave the concluding lecture,

8This

topic was proposed by Richard Northey, one of the students present in the 1969 School and later a Labour MP.

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on “Europe and Our Foreign Policy”. He recalls that the School did not influence National Party thinking on the question of Europe as the debates had already been resolved by this time (Templeton, H., personal communication, 10 February 2014). After Britain’s accession to the EEC, New Zealand was forced to diversify its trade relations, and the 1975 School concerning Asia in New Zealand’s Economy may have been something of a building block in this process. Entwisle, who had himself worked in Malaya, explained: “New Zealand’s interest in Asia is of long standing … In recent years however the range of New Zealand’s Asian interests has been further widened … This 1975 Foreign Policy School programme is a first attempt to bring all these themes together”. Brian Lynch of the Asian Division of Foreign Affairs concluded the 1975 School with an overview of “Asia in New Zealand’s Foreign Policy” (University Extension 1975). The theme of the School proved significant in that it foreshadowed a massive expansion of New Zealand’s trade with the Asia-Pacific region. By 1997, over 60 per cent of New Zealand’s exports went to this region.9 The 1976 topic, Sport, Politics and Foreign Policy, focused on the controversy over the New Zealand rugby team’s planned tour of South Africa.10 The speakers included well-known critics of Apartheid. Foreign Affairs declined to provide a speaker on the topic of “New Zealand’s image in the United Nations as affected by sporting ties with South Africa” (Scott, 1976). However, the Schools were by now so well established in the foreign policy calendar that the absence of an official representative would be interpreted as conveying a deliberate message. With a fortnight to go before the 1976 School was to open, it became clear to the ministry that if it failed to send anyone “Our total absence would be noted ... and probably misinterpreted” (Willberg, 1976). With this in mind, the Ministry sent two officials as representatives only. The topicality and controversial nature of sporting links with South Africa ensured the 1976 School gained widespread coverage. Kember, for example, still has “vivid memories of the TV cameras outside on the lawn” recording interviews (Kember, J., personal communication, March 3, 2014). Thus, it is highly likely that the School provided a stepping stone for

9 New Zealand Official Yearbook 1998, 25.4, “Major trading partners”. www3.stats.govt.nz. New_Zealand_Official_Yearbooks/1998/NZOYB_1998.html#idsect2_1_193559. 10 It took place from 30 June to 18 September 1976. See also McKinnon (1993, pp. 242–245).

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the intensification of a national debate over sporting links with South Africa that would eventually convulse the country during the Springbok rugby tour of 1981. However, there does seem one case where the School did have a direct and tangible impact on the making of New Zealand foreign policy. In June 1968, a controversy suddenly arose concerning American plans to install a navigational beacon in New Zealand. This was to have been part of the Omega network, a worldwide positioning system allegedly for civilian purposes only. As its signals could be received under water, it was widely suspected that Omega could also be used for positioning by strategic nuclear missile-armed submarines, which might as a consequence make New Zealand itself a target for attack in the event of a nuclear war. External Affairs moved quickly to defuse the controversy. In particular, Mullins made use of contacts at the School to make the case within government that it was not in New Zealand’s best interests to proceed with the commitment he had given to the United States. Ken Ross, who was invited to an “off-the-record gathering” to discuss the issue with External Affairs officials, believes in retrospect that the process of extracting New Zealand from its commitment to the Omega station “was unlikely to have been so successful without the earlier contribution” of the first three Foreign Policy Schools, where “the contacts had been developed” (Ross, K., personal communication, July 30, 2014).

Evaluation of the Impact of the Foreign Policy School’s First Decade Between 1966 and 1976, the School had a significant impact at the agendas and institutional levels of the Williams model. The agendas level emphasises the degree of influence that events have on popular discourse, public attention and society at large. It has to be recognised that the establishment of the School in 1966 constituted a break with the past: it was complementary to but different from the NZIIA, which regularly organized meetings, presentations and conferences on international matters throughout the country. The School brought together informed people who had previously had little sustained contact with one another. Interested members of the public outside the university world, academics, students, protestors and foreign policy professionals now had a forum within which to interact and vigorously debate international issues. On the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993, Malcolm Templeton acknowledged “the role the Foreign Policy School has played in promoting public discussion and understanding of New Zealand’s foreign policy ... Otago University is, as far as I know, the only institution that provides a regular annual opportunity in this country for the discussion of foreign policy issues in a forum outside the Ministry’s control” (Templeton, 1993, p. 218). The fact that there were no simultaneous sessions and that each speaker addressed the whole of the audience present helped facilitate in-depth discussions on foreign policy topics. In addition, and no less significantly, these early Schools helped to promote informal discussions and personal contacts. In other words, they provided important “networking opportunities” for the participants. Initially, the publication of the proceedings of the Schools was an uneven and intermittent process, but it became a regular feature from the mid-1970s on. Indeed, the School was, by the 1980s, a major builder of research capacity in the area of foreign policy. Similarly, the media coverage of the early Schools was quite patchy and uneven. However, this pattern began to change in the mid-1970s when the media began to pay more attention to this annual event. According to one observer, the Schools were increasingly seen as providing “an intelligent briefing” for senior journalists with interests in the foreign policy area (Webb, 1990). At the institutional level — which is concerned with the impact of events on the structure of government — the commencement of annual Foreign Policy Schools had a cumulative effect on certain government departments and departmental relationships. From the beginning, the Department of External Affairs (and its successor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) responded positively to Entwisle’s requests for its involvement in the Schools. Senior officials such as Mullins, Laking and Harland spoke at the Schools, and suggested speakers and topics. The close relationship between the School and the Department evolved and deepened in the course of the first decade. Entwisle believed that the presence of External Affairs officials enhanced the credibility of the School and was critical to consolidating the event as an annual fixture (Entwisle, 12 October 1971). From the standpoint of External Affairs, the relationship with the School seemed to be a beneficial one. The School provided a forum for the engagement of the department with expert outside speakers and interested members of the public. The Schools provided an opportunity for what is now called outreach

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and enabled foreign policy professionals to find out what New Zealanders outside the government were thinking on a range of foreign policy issues. Stead thought the informal aspects of the Schools were very important both because officials could speak off the record and because “Less involved/informed participants and particularly Foreign Affairs Trainees [had the] opportunity to join [the] discussion” (Stead, 31 May 1979b). As was mentioned above, it was during this first decade that External Affairs began the practice of sending a number of newly recruited staff to attend the School as part of their induction programme. This development was encouraged by the experience of “Past speakers from the Ministry who have participated in the Foreign Policy School [and who] have commented on its potential usefulness as a training seminar for junior diplomatic officers” (Parkinson, 27 March 1973). The attendance of new diplomatic recruits was one of the most important developments in the nature of the Schools in the early 1970s, and an indication of the event’s importance to the ministry. For the first time in 1973, an official was sent specifically with a view to recruitment (Parkinson, 13 April 1973). For students or recent graduates, the School was an excellent opportunity to make themselves known to potential employers or other influential people. Peter Entwisle, son of the School’s founder, points out that attending it was potentially a “good career move” for students (Entwisle, 7 February 2014). Other government departments, such as the Ministry of Defence, also saw the value of attending the School and exposing staff to a range of ideas that they may not have encountered in their daily routines in Wellington. The establishment of the School also affected the NZIIA. The two institutions built a close, co-operative relationship, sharing membership and speakers. The institute’s Executive Secretary always attended the School from 1970 on and the New Zealand International Review began to regularly publish detailed articles and reports on the proceedings of the various Schools. Moreover, the establishment of the School reinforced a trend in New Zealand that had already begun in many universities overseas where programmes in foreign policy and international relations were taught under the auspices of independent political science departments. In 1967, the Department of Political Studies at the University of Otago was established as an independent academic department.

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However, with the possible exception of New Zealand’s rescinding its commitment to the Omega station, it is difficult to pinpoint other examples where Foreign Policy Schools directly influenced foreign policy decision-making during this period. The political scientist Roderic Alley spoke at the 1971 and 1973 Schools. Looking back, he observed: “You could say the School influenced New Zealand foreign relations to the extent that this was an excellent sounding board for officials. Ideas and comments would have been gathered for subsequent consideration” (Alley, 2014). As one young secondary school teacher who attended the 1967 School later put it, “Evolving policy seem[ed] to get a bit of a workout off-Broadway at Otago’s Foreign Policy School” (Lukey, 2014). Stead agreed that the School “acts partly as a catalyst and partly as a sounding board for academics and officials” (Stead, 31 May 1979b). In light of this, it could be argued that the School probably helped to foster new ideas about a more distinctive New Zealand approach towards the Vietnam War, the global significance of China, the priority of diversifying trade links in the Asia-Pacific region after Britain joined the EEC, and reassessing the costs and benefits of sporting links with the apartheid regime in South Africa. On balance, the impact of the Otago Foreign Policy School during its first decade was most directly and clearly shown at the societal (or agendas) and institutional levels. While the School generated few concrete results at the level of policy — the possible exception being the retreat from the Omega commitment — the consequences at the agendas and institutional levels combined to help accelerate a world-view that was increasingly based on New Zealand values and interests and thus paved the way for a number of policy initiatives in the coming decades that were associated with the emergence of a more independent foreign policy. In this vein, Arnold Entwisle’s early and enduring vision of the School as a forum for expanding the boundaries of foreign policy knowledge in New Zealand was largely realised (Patman, 2015).

References Alley, R (2 February 2014). Otago Foreign Policy Schools:The early years [unpublished typescript]. Ansell, GK (November 1970). New Zealand’s relations with Australia. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 20, 3–14. Beath, LA (21 May 1979). Hocken 95-184 Box 22, RB/280 — 1979, conference assessment form.

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Brasch, C (18 May 1966). Hocken 95-184 Box 22, RB/280 — 1979, letter to AR Entwisle. Brown, BM (1968a). The work of the United Nations: The security council. External Affairs Review 18, 16–25. Brown, BM (1968b). PM 55/2/2 part 4, Third Residential School on New Zealand’s Foreign Policy, 10–14 May 1968, p. 1. Archives New Zealand, Wellington. Brown, BM (1970). New Zealand Foreign Policy in Retrospect (1947–54 and the 1960s): Papers read to the 1969 Otago University Extension Foreign Policy School. Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Carr, N (3 March 1976). Hocken 93-080 Box 18, letter to R Goldstein. Carr, N (7 April 1976). Hocken 93-080 Box 18, letter to M Bassett. Director of University Extension (26 April 1973). PM 7/4/8 part 2, letter to GC Fortune. Entwisle, AR (27 January 1965). PM 55/2/2 part 2, Suggested Content of the Course. Entwisle, AR (24 September 1965). PM 55/2/2 part 2, New Zealand’s Foreign Policy. A Short Residential School, provisional scheme, fol. 2. Entwisle, AR (13 May 1966). New Zealand’s Foreign Policy — A General View, fol. 1 [unpublished opening address; a copy is in the Hocken collections at OCG + E]. Entwisle, AR (20 May 1966a). PM 55/2/2 part 2, letter to AD McIntosh. Entwisle, AR (20 May 1966b). PM 55/2/2 part 2, letter to RM Mullins. Entwisle, AR (26 May 1969). PM 55/2/2 part 5, letter to Secretary for External Affairs. Entwisle, AR (29 May 1970). PM 55/2/2 part 5, letter to GR Laking. Entwisle, AR (4 November 1970). PM 55/2/2 part 5, letter to JG McArthur. Entwisle, AR (24 May 1972). PM 55/2/2 part 6, letter to GR Laking. Entwisle, AR (11 April 1974). PM 55/2/2 part 7, New Zealand’s Foreign Policy … Information for Students. Entwisle, AR (27 May 1974). PM 55/2/2 part 7, letter to F Corner. Entwisle, AR (22 May 1975). PM 55/2/2 part 7, letter to F Corner. Entwisle, AR (24 September 1974). PM 55/2/2 part 7, letter to Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Entwisle, AR (12 October 1971). PM 55/2/2 part 5, letter to GR Laking. Entwisle, AR (3 October 1973). PM 55/2/2 part 6, letter to Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Entwisle, AR (7 December 1973a). Letter to RA Farrell. Entwisle, AR (7 December 1973b). PM 55/2/2 part 6, New Zealand’s Foreign Policy. Ninth Annual Residential School. Dunedin 17–21 May 1974. Draft Programme. Entwisle, P (7 February 2014). Interview with A. Gee. Extension Department (1974). Hocken 93-080 Box 9, enrolment forms. Extension Department (1975). Hocken 93-080 Box 8, enrolment forms. Extension Department, University of Otago (1965). Hocken MS-3884 Box 3 [2-1], 1965 Programme: Dunedin Courses, p. 4.

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External Affairs Department (9 August 1968). PM 1/2/27 part 6, Division Head’s [sic] Meeting. The Omega Controversy, p. 9. Gilbert, HE (14 July 1966). PM 55/2/2 part 2, W.E.A. [sic] School at Dunedin in May 1966. Goldstein, R (26 February 1976). Hocken 93-080 Box 18, letter to Director, University Extension. Harland, WB (May 1970). New Zealand’s relations with the United States of America. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review 20, 3–16. Keith, K (ed.) (1972). Defence Perspectives: Papers read at the 1972 Otago Foreign Policy School. Wellington: Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Kember, J (ed.) (1976). New Zealand, South Africa and Sport: Background Papers. Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Laking, GR (22 October 1971). PM 55/2/2 part 5, letter to AR Entwisle. Laking, GR (August 1968). The formulation of foreign policy. External Affairs Review, 18, 33. Laws, W (4 February 1975). Hocken 93-080 Box 2, folder 93-080 2/4, letter to ICL Kent-Johnson. Lukey, L (2 February 2014). Otago Foreign Policy School 1967 — Reminiscences [unpublished typescript]. Lynch, B (May 1975). Asia in New Zealand’s foreign policy. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 25, 37–45. Matheson, DL (25 May 1979). Hocken 95-184 Box 22, RB/280 — 1979, conference assessment form. McIntosh, AD (2 May 1966). PM 55/2/2 part 2, letter to AR Entwisle. McKinnon, M (1993). Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World since 1935, pp. 173–175. Auckland: Auckland University Press. McMechan, P (12 February 1980). Hocken 93-080 Box 7, RB/280, letter to Y Vivian. Mullins, RM (July 1972). New Zealand’s defence policy. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 22, 4–36. New Zealand Official Yearbook (1998). www3.stats.govt.nz.New_Zealand_Official_ Yearbooks/1998/NZOYB_1998.html. Norrish, M (May 1974). Economic considerations in New Zealand foreign policy. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 24, 7–18. Norrish, M (9 June 1977). PM 7/4/8 part 3, Foreign Policy School, University of Otago. Otago Daily Times (11 May 1968), p. 2. Otago Daily Times (14 May 1966), p. 8. Otago Daily Times (16 May 1972), p. 10. Otago Daily Times (21 May 1969), p. 4. Palmer, M (1977). Foreword. In New Zealand Foreign Policy and Defence. Foreign Policy School 1977, 12–15 May 1977, E Olssen and WW Webb (eds.) Dunedin: Department of University Extension, University of Otago.

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Parkinson, GN (27 March 1973). PM 7/4/8 part 2, Induction Course: Foreign Policy School. Parkinson, GN (5 April 1973). PM 7/4/8 part 2, Induction Course: Foreign Policy School. Parkinson, GN (13 April 1973). PM 7/4/8 part 2, Induction Course: Foreign Policy School. Parkinson, GN (18 April 1974). PM 7/4/8 part 3, Induction Course: Foreign Policy School. Patman, RG (1997). Introduction. In New Zealand & Britain: A Special Relationship in Transition, RG Patman (ed.). Palmerston North: Dunmore. Patman, RG (26 June 2015). Foreign policy vision enduring. Otago Daily Times. Ross, K (10 February 2014). Otago Foreign Policy School — Origin and the Entwisle years: some notes [unpublished typescript]. Ross, K (11 February 2014). Otago Foreign Policy School — Origin and the Entwisle years: Second set of notes [unpublished typescript]. Scott, JV (26 April 1976). Hocken 93-080 Box 18, letter to N Carr. Secretary of Foreign Affairs (14 May 1974). PM 7/4/8 part 2, letter to PV Wright. Sinclair, K (September 1966). New Zealand’s future foreign policy: A new pacific pact. Political Science, 18(2), 68–77. Sinclair, K (1993). Halfway Round the Harbour: An Autobiography, Auckland: Penguin. Stead, HA (31 May 1979a). Hocken 95-184 Box 22, RB/280 — 1979, letter to R Hayburn. Stead, HA (31 May 1979b). Hocken 95-184 Box 22, RB/280 — 1979, conference assessment form. Templeton, M (1993). Foreign policy school: A commentary. In Fifty Years of New Zealand Foreign Policy Making: Anniversary Volume. Papers from the Twenty-Eighth Foreign Policy School, A Trotter (ed.). Dunedin: University of Otago Press in association with University Extension. University Extension (1966a). Hocken 95-184 Box 22, 1966 Report. University Extension (1966b). New Zealand’s Foreign Policy. A Residential School … 13–17 May 1966. University Extension (1966c). Hocken MS-3884 Box 3 [2-1], 1966 Programme: Dunedin Courses. University Extension (1967a). Hocken 126/93 [1-1] UE 79/44, New Zealand’s Foreign Policy [enrolment leaflet]. University Extension (1967b). Hocken 93-080 Box 8, enrolment forms, Second Residential School. University Extension (1968). PM 55/2/2 part 4, New Zealand’s Foreign Policy. Third Residential School … Information for Students. University Extension (1969). Hocken 126/93 [1-2] UE 79/45, History of New Zealand’s Foreign Policy. Fourth Residential Foreign Policy School … 16–20 May 1969 [programme leaflet].

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University Extension (1970a). Hocken 126/93 [1-3] UE 79/46, New Zealand and the Pacific Basin. Fifth Residential Foreign Policy School … 15–19 May 1970 [programme leaflet]. University Extension (1970b). PM 55/2/2 part 5, New Zealand’s Foreign Policy. Fifth Residential School … Information for Students. University Extension (1972). Hocken 126/93 [1-5] UE 79/48, New Zealand’s Foreign Policy. Seventh Residential Foreign Policy School … 12–16 May 1972 [programme leaflet]. University Extension (1975). Hocken 126/93 [1-8] UE 79/51. Asia in New Zealand’s Foreign Policy. Tenth Residential Foreign Policy School … 16–20 May 1975 [programme leaflet]. Wang, G (1973). The Re-emergence of China: A paper read to the University of Otago Extension Foreign Policy School May 1973. Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Webb, WW (11 May 1990). Hocken 93-080, Lists of files of University Extension Department, Background Notes on the Foreign Policy School Programme. Willberg, H (1976). PM 7/4/8 part 3, Otago University Foreign Policy School, 20–23 May. Williams, MH (2006). The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Parties in West European Democracies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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CHAPTER 2 The New Zealand Prime Minister and the 1985 Otago Foreign Policy School — A Pivotal Moment for the Labour Government’s Foreign Policy Ken Ross

Thirty-two years ago, New Zealand’s Labour Prime Minister, David Lange, made the University of Otago Foreign Policy School his stage on which to declare to Bob Hawke, Margaret Thatcher, the Reagan White House and his own officials that, to quote Thatcher, he was “not for turning”. New Zealand was about to become nuclear free — it did on 9 June 1987. Lange’s May 1985 presentation is the only time a prime minister has addressed the School in its 52-year history. The presentation was to become a pivotal point in the Lange government’s foreign policy, and helped to tighten his grip on his prime ministership. It was his first foreign policy speech as prime minister to a New Zealand audience. Despite the entire razzle dazzle since he had become prime minister 10 months before he had not spoken publicly in a formal presentation at home about his government’s foreign policy. Lange’s next major foreign policy speech in New Zealand would be two years later. The presentation to the School set Lange on a path that culminated in an important speech at Yale University on 24 April 1989. His Yale speech would, 25

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in turn, pave the way for New Zealand to secure its one Everest Moment at the White House (18 October 1995). The presentation at the School was a straightforward survey of recent international developments as seen from the perspective of the new prime minister. The presentation’s importance was not explicit in the text though the prime minister made clear “nuclear weapons have been excluded from New Zealand because it is not in New Zealand’s interest to have them here. They cannot defend us and the burden of confrontation and escalation they bring with them have no place here” (Lange, 1985a, p. 31). There was no announcement by Lange of his new firm commitment to make New Zealand nuclear free. The lack of any display of atmospherics was what actually underscored Lange’s unspoken message that he was now committed completely to New Zealand becoming nuclear free. The School was very crowded when Lange spoke. Primarily, the audience wanted to see him perform — maybe there would be another virtuoso Oxford Union Debate song and dance? Instead, taking a leaf from Norman Kirk, he spoke quietly, simply and clearly. This time Lange allowed for none of his renowned superb ambiguity. He wanted to be heard, understood and comprehended. There were no theatrics — it was the season for being prime ministerial and statesmanlike, not a performance artist who had a daytime job as New Zealand’s prime minister. When Lange spoke to the School, three of the five most important defining moments of his global diplomacy were already history — the rejection of the visit of the USS Buchanan (in late January 1985), his Oxford Union Debate engagement (on 1 March 1985) and the two-week visit to Africa in April 1985. The fourth of his defining moments was to be the Rainbow Warrior bombing two months later, on 10 July 1985. His final defining moment was to be the Yale speech on Anzac Day 1989. When Lange turned up in Dunedin, he was widely perceived on the nuclear issue as being caught between the rock of the protest movement’s expectations and the hard place of his opponents within New Zealand and with traditional partners overseas. The former still had big doubts that Lange had the courage, or stamina, to commit to their cause. The latter were, as Gerald Hensley shows so well in his 2013 book, Friendly Fire: Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS, 1984–1987, still not comprehending that this could be a prime minister determined not to be swayed by them.

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The speech’s preparation heralded a new dynamic developing around Lange. Malcolm Templeton (2006) alerts us to the tussle. The speech’s contested composition was the first such between the New Zealand Foreign Ministry and Lange. The speech has been published in two versions, with different titles. In Gold (1985), it was “The Fourth Labour Government: New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy” (Lange, 17 May 1985a). In New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review as “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy: New Interests, New Paths” (Lange, 17 May 1985b). In Gold’s book, the text of the speech has a first paragraph that is absent from the version in New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review. Other differences are lightly sprinkled through the two versions. The 1985 School offered more than Lange. Helen Clark gave her perspective on New Zealand’s non-nuclear stance. Owen Wilkes, then the doyen of the anti-nuclear protestors, spoke. David McIntyre delivered a historical overview of previous Labour prime ministers’ global diplomacy. Prominent New Zealand diplomats — Chris Laidlaw and Witi Ihimaera — spoke. Jim McLeay, in his brief stint as the Leader of the Opposition in New Zealand, spoke on, “managing the ANZUS alliance” — a stance that was subsequently overtaken by the fact that the National Party embraced a bipartisan position on the non-nuclear issue in March 1990. Among the international speakers, Andrew Mack, a British academic then at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in Canberra, was prominent. (He was later to be one of Kofi Annan’s inner sanctum in the middle years of his UN secretary-generalship.) With his own stark analysis of ANZUS, and connected to a wide array of progressive networks, Mack (1985) was also the conduit to the global audience interested in what Lange and Clark were saying on non-nuclear security policy.

Lange Commits to a Nuclear-Free New Zealand As Templeton (2006) noted, Lange had decided in late April that it was to be full speed ahead in terms of legislating New Zealand as a nuclear-free state. The Otago Foreign Policy School was seen as the public launch pad for Lange to define his government’s foreign policy. It was the moment Lange cemented his own leadership in the international arena. If he had succumbed to the pressures from Washington, London and Canberra, he would in that overused phrase have been politically “gone by lunch-time”.

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At the time of the 1985 Otago Foreign Policy School, the would-be regime changers, intent on assuming Lange’s nuclear-free mantle, faded after Lange’s presentation (Alley, 1987). Jim Anderton’s wannabe heroic status evaporated. Meanwhile, Helen Clark and other non-nuclear advocates, including Margaret Wilson (1989), promptly put their all into the Labour government’s nonnuclear stance. Lange himself readily acknowledged the supreme importance of Clark to New Zealand in facilitating the legislation that enshrined the country’s nuclear-free position (Lange, 1990).

Lange’s Global Diplomacy The foreign policy side of Lange’s prime ministership — which gave him his greatest sense of accomplishment — is the story here. It also gave him much fun, enjoyment and pleasure and most of the moments that he savoured after walking out of the Beehive’s prime ministerial suite on 8 August 1989. John Henderson was right when he reflected that: In Lange’s case what attracted him to politics was not power over others, but the stage it provided on which he could perform. The additional attraction of the foreign affairs area was that it provided a world stage. (Henderson, 1991, p. 217)

That made Lange a most unusual New Zealand politician and a rare prime minister. Global diplomacy is my concept for assessing what prime ministers do to advance their government’s foreign policy. Since my own May 2014 article in New Zealand International Review on Lange’s global diplomacy, little new thinking on his global diplomacy, or his government’s foreign policy, has emerged (Ross, 2014a). Lange is arguably the most discussed prime minister New Zealand has had since 1945. John Henderson, as Lange’s “chief of staff ”, was heavily engaged in the prime minister’s global diplomacy from June 1985. Henderson has been an important source of information with a number of short reflections on Lange’s leadership (Henderson, 1991, 1999, 2005a,b, 2009). Lange was a prime minister who wrote considerably about his leadership experience, particularly in the area of global diplomacy. As well as two memoirs (1990 and 2005), much of Lange’s portfolio of post-prime ministerial journalism survives in two collections, Broadsides (1992) and Cuttings (1994), each of which contain many observations on his global diplomacy.

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Lange’s global diplomacy is best captured by Margaret Clark (2005). This study encompasses the swirling advice that Lange received from his mandarins and political advisors like John Henderson, Gerald Hensley, Denis McLean, Merwyn Norrish, Bruce Brown and Ross Vintiner. The anti-nuclear protest movement receives little attention here. Writers such as Ian McGibbon (1999) and Malcolm McKinnon (1999) have landscaped the global contours that Lange faced as he pursued his diplomatic goals. Rod Alley’s study in 1999 enabled the strength of the anti-nuclear protest movement to be assessed. Many of Lange’s principal foreign interlocutors have been exceedingly spare in their accounts of his diplomacy. George Shultz’s lengthy memoir Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (1993) has no reference to Lange, ANZUS or New Zealand. Bob Hawke and Bill Hayden seemed to write off Lange in their memoirs. In Hawke’s case, there seems to be a personal edge. Lange returned the compliment when he reviewed the Hawke Memoirs at length for The Bulletin (Sydney) (Lange, 1994). In his memoir, Hayden (1996) devotes 20 pages to Lange’s spell as prime minister, including the implications for Canberra. Hayden’s assessment of the dynamic between Lange and Shultz is one of the most astute given by the foreign interlocutors who tangled with Lange. In the early 1980s, Hayden, while serving as the Australian Labor Party (ALP) leader, had sought to have the party adopt a non-nuclear stance akin to what the Lange government later introduced. The prime consequence was Hawke replaced Hayden as the ALP leader on 3 February 1983, the day an early general election was called by Malcolm Fraser. Hawke became prime minister a month later, on 11 March 1983.

Lange Champions Nuclear-Free New Zealand Lange was a surprise champion of the nuclear-free New Zealand stance. Before he became prime minister, he rarely showed the sort of interest in world affairs that Norman Kirk, Helen Clark, Walter Nash and Peter Fraser were renowned for. There seemed to be little indication in his early political career or his educational background that Lange was solidly prepared for the task of global diplomacy (Wright, 1984; Lange, 2005b). Yet he made a massive contribution to New Zealand’s projection as a good international citizen, what I term the [Norman] Kirk Brand — New Zealand as a progressive small state,

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with a deep internationalism that is central to our national identity (Ross, 2014b). Lange came to be the foremost exporter of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance. Russell Marshall (2005) captured this aspect of Lange’s diplomacy very well in his Guardian obituary — “originally lukewarm on the anti-nuclear policy … Lange came to be its principal champion and advocate”.

Lange’s Top 10 Global Diplomacy Presentations While prime minister, Lange gave at least 25 speeches on foreign policy — most of them outside New Zealand and most after stepping down as foreign minister in August 1987. Before stepping down from that role, Lange had kept to a minimum his speeches on foreign policy. He had ample opportunity as prime minister with his many press conferences and his numerous interviews with media, foreign and local, when he could have sparked foreign affairs controversy, but he did not. It suited his style to be in control more directly of the content and direction of his official utterances. Lange’s speech to the 1985 Otago Foreign Policy School must rank as the only one given in New Zealand that can be bracketted in the top 10 of Lange’s most important presentations on global diplomacy. Just two other speeches on this list were made outside the United States, both in the first week of March 1985 — the Oxford Union Debate and his address to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Prime Minister David Lange’s Top 10 Speeches on Foreign Policy United Nations General Assembly, New York. (Lange, 28 September 1984) The Oxford Union Debate, Oxford. (Lange, 1 March 1985) United Nations Conference on Disarmament, Geneva. (Lange, 5 March 1985a; Lange, 5 March 1985b) University of Otago Foreign Policy School, Dunedin. (Lange, 17 May 1985a; Lange, 17 May 1985b) United Nations 40th Anniversary Special Session, New York. (Lange, 23 October 1985) Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco. (Lange, 25 October 1985) East West Centre, Honolulu. (Lange, 1987b) Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara. (Lange, 30 April 1988)

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United Nations General Assembly, New York. (Lange, 28 September 1988) Yale University, New Haven. (Lange, 24 April 1989a) This selection of Lange’s top 10 foreign policy speeches is not determined by their textual content. More pertinent considerations concern the audience, context and location. The Oxford Union Debate appearance, for example, helped to establish Lange as a gifted communicator who possessed the skills to project New Zealand’s nuclear concerns on the global stage. Lange reflected in 2005 that: The Oxford Union speech was not the best speech I ever made but it was the one that mattered most . . . . This night was the highest point of my career in politics. (Lange, 2005a, p. 208)

Lange deserved to make his own judgement on that, but it could be argued he actually made a greater impact eight months later. Lange’s speech in New York on 24 October 1985 at the United Nations 40th Anniversary Special Session generated some real international interest. New Zealand was proposing that the orthodoxy of nuclear deterrence be reconsidered. He and Rajiv Gandhi were the lead speakers for the “Rest of the World”. Leaders of the Permanent Five — Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the United States — spoke. Immediately after addressing the UN General Assembly, Lange attended a lunch hosted by the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar. Lange sat with Ronald Reagan at the top table, with Perez de Cuellar in between them. Lange was at Reagan’s early evening reception, shaking hands with the president after the Netherlands’ Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, and immediately before Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortega — both well-known leftists. Lange had dinner with Rajiv and Sonia Gandhi before going to ABC’s Nightline studio to appear live with Ted Koppel. Lange then crossed America to speak in San Francisco — to the Commonwealth Club of California: the topic — “New Zealand’s Anti-Nuclear Policy. A Firm Ally that thinks for Itself ”. The speech was broadcast live on the 270 stations of the National Public Radio network. The San Francisco audience, and many at the United Nations, would have read Lange’s “nuclear-free New Zealand” article (1985) in Foreign Affairs, America’s leading international affairs journal, published by the Council of Foreign Relations. The California speech wrapped up a hectic 72-hour period when Lange was actively promoting New Zealand’s non-nuclear security policy to an American audience.

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Exporting the Not-For-Export Nuclear-Free Policy The fact that Lange gave seven speeches on New Zealand’s non-nuclear policy in the United States between 1984 and 1989 somewhat undercut the New Zealand government’s public declaration that the policy was not for export. On each of his seven trips to the United States during his prime ministership, Lange made one or more presentations explaining New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance to “top-flight” audiences. Honolulu, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, Dallas, New Haven (that is the Yale one), and New York several times heard him. In the wheeling and dealing that occurred between Washington and Wellington in early 1985, New Zealand government officials seemed satisfied following the Oxford Union Debate and the Geneva speech that Lange would adhere to his undertaking New Zealand would not export its nuclearfree policy. Lange (1987a) stated publicly, on many occasions, that the policy was not being advocated for other countries to adopt — it was particular to New Zealand’s circumstances. Lange soon tested official expectations. Within a month, in April 1985, the iconic photograph of a rain-drenched Lange, wearing a Nukebusters T-shirt, at Victoria Falls went global. The image highlighted the old adage a picture is worth a thousand words, and it continues to have a long life, including in Africa. In May 1985, when Lange spoke to the Otago Foreign Policy School, there was little public comprehension in New Zealand of Lange’s public relations campaign in support of the new non-nuclear policy. But in Washington, the Reagan administration quickly recognised that Lange was effectively exporting the not-for-export anti-nuke stance. That is, Lange was open to explaining the policy to audiences that were interested.

Yale Lange appears not to have designated what was arguably his best foreign policy speech. The speech at Yale in April 1989 was tightly structured, substantial in terms of content, cogently argued and insightful. He knew this was to be his last testament on the anti-nuclear policy while prime minister. In fact, Lange’s speech at Yale was not the depressing finale that he apparently believed. On 2 May 1989, Lange wrote a personal note to his hosts at Yale, Robin and Avril Winks, explaining he was “back home to considerable

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turbulence. The speech may be forgotten in Yale but it won’t go away here” (Lange, 1989b). Lange was wrong — the speech was not forgotten at Yale and its hinterland, which came to include the Clinton White House. Robin Winks had a long association with New Zealand. He wrote These New Zealanders (1954) after spending 1952 in New Zealand as a Fulbright scholar. By the late 1980s, Winks was a distinguished history professor and master of Yale’s Pembroke College. He had first initiated the Yale invitation to Prime Minister Lange in 1986. But an envisaged trip to the United States that year was canned. Lange made tentative arrangements to get to Yale in September 1987 and again a year later. On both occasions, Lange’s travel plans were altered and he could not make the scheduled visits. By the time Lange arrived at Yale in April 1989, he appreciated that he was on borrowed time. Harvey McQueen (1992) has detailed how seriously Lange’s health was declining. At the same time, Lange’s political leadership was no longer what it had been. He later reflected that: In 1984 or 1985 I could and did say what I thought about our foreign policy, or even muse aloud about it, and cabinet came along for the ride, but in 1989 I could not work that trick. (Lange, 2005a, p. 271)

When, on 24 April 1989 (then Anzac Day in New Zealand), Lange gave the third-ever George Herbert Walker Jr Annual Lecture on International Security, the occasion was august. Subsequently, a highly distinguished queue formed to give the lecture. But the likes of political leaders such as Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Bob Hawke, John Howard and Kevin Rudd were not in this queue. Nor has any other New Zealander presented the lecture. The heart of the story of the Yale speech is not about who inserted the socalled fateful eight lines — the “ANZUS is a dead letter” paragraph. (For what it is worth, it was Lange himself who did that!) Rather, it is a quite different tale that I sense is not yet well known. The international impact of Lange’s Yale speech proved to be a powerful legacy and helped sustain New Zealand’s nuclear-free status to the present time.

Post-Yale Legacy — The Finest Illustration Is… The Yale speech became a key stepping stone in a process that led to New Zealand’s finest moment at the White House since World War Two. On 18 October 1995, the White House announced unexpectedly that Jacques Chirac’s already public state visit for early November was to be rescheduled to

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the following year (White House, 18 October 1995). When the French president finally turned up in February 1996, his nuclear test programme had ended early — the final two tests of the eight scheduled never happened. Clinton praised Chirac for his willingness to heed global concern (White House, 1 February 1996). I also turned up at the White House in February 1996. As a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, I went to “the basement” — actually the Old Executive Building — where the National Security Council was located, to meet friends of my new colleagues at the IISS. By the end of my IISS year, I learned from some of those Clinton staffers, and their colleagues, of their regard for Lange. I also received a telling acknowledgement from the French side that — yes — Chirac had got the message that he simply was not welcome at the White House until the French nuclear tests ended. And that acknowledgement confirmed that the Lange government and its successors had played a major role in mobilising and inspiring global opposition to French nuclear tests. It was this context that had prompted the humiliation that Chirac had gone through with the public re-scheduling of his appearance at the White House. In the midst of it, neither Lange’s speech at Yale nor his handling of the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior had been forgotten by either the United States or France. The French admission occurred in the course of the numerous encounters I had with French officials in London in 1996. One such encounter occurred during a panel session on “Nuclear Tests in the Pacific: Did the Media and Producer Boycotts change Policy?” at Wilton Park on 21 November 1996. (The panel was the last session of the 483rd Wilton Park Conference, titled “The Media and International Relations”.) A key American in the scenario was Leon Panetta, who in August 1984, then a Democrat Congressman from Los Angeles, wrote a letter, to a constituent, in which he aligned his sympathies on the ANZUS standoff with Lange and New Zealand, rather than his president (Panetta, 1984). On 18 October 1995, Panetta was President Clinton’s chief of staff and the instrumental actor that day at the White House. As Panetta shows clearly in his memoir, Worthy Fights (2014), he controlled the decision-making process at the White House. Thus, his willingness to buy into the proposal to push Chirac’s visit back was crucial. At the time, no precedent could be found for

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such a move. Nor could a New Zealand link be readily ascertained even though the then New Zealand Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, had already established a good working relationship with Clinton. But the dots are now connectable to show that New Zealand had been influential on this issue. Could we have foreseen that Lange’s legacy, publicising our nuclear-free policy internationally, would have had such influence behind the scenes? Certainly not. It was not apparent at the start of Lange’s “diplomatic” journey when he was pitched into the prime ministership, going in the words of The Dominion’s Richard Long “from novice to statesman in a single bound” (11 February 2006). On reflection, Lange’s presentation to the 1985 Otago Foreign Policy School was a pivotal moment in the journey he made in securing New Zealand’s nuclear free status.

References Alley, R (1987). ANZUS and the nuclear issue. In The Fourth Labour Government: Radical Politics in New Zealand, M Holland and J Boston (eds.), pp. 198–213. Wellington: Oxford University Press. Alley, R (1999). The public dimension. In New Zealand in World Affairs Vol. III: 1972–1990, B Brown (ed.), pp. 219–317. Wellington: Victoria University Press. Clark, M (ed.) (2005). For the Record: Lange and the Fourth Labour Government. Wellington: Dunmore Press. Gold, H (ed.) (1985). New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy. Auckland: Benton Ross. Hayden, B (1996). Hayden: An autobiography. Sydney: Angus & Robertson. Henderson, J (1991). Foreign policy decision making in New Zealand: An Insider’s view. In Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s, R Kennaway and J Henderson (eds.), pp. 211–225. Auckland: Longman Paul. Henderson, J (1999). New Zealand and Oceania. In New Zealand in World Affairs Vol. III: 1972–1990, B Brown (ed.), pp. 267–294. Wellington: Victoria University Press. Henderson, J (2005a). Advising a prime minister: Reflecting on supporting David Lange. Public Sector, 28(4), 12–14. Henderson, J (2005b). The warrior peacenik: setting the record straight on ANZUS and the Fiji coup. In For the Record: Lange and the Fourth Labour Government, M Clark (ed.), pp. 136–43. Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press. Henderson, J (2009). Public interest and change in New Zealand’s foreign policy. In In the Public Interest: Essays in honour of Professor Keith Jackson, M Franklin and J Tully (eds.), pp. 157–164. Christchurch: Canterbury University Press.

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Lange, D (28 September 1984). Nuclear disarmament: The prime minister in New York. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 34(3), 7–14. Lange, D (1985). New Zealand’s security. Foreign Affairs, 63(5), 1009–1019. Lange, D (1 March 1985). The Oxford Union debate. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 35(1), 7–11. Lange, D (5 March 1985a). New Zealand statement — “as delivered”. A Selection of Recent Foreign Policy Statements by the New Zealand Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rt Hon. David Lange, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Bulletin No. 11, pp. 22–31. Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Lange, D (5 March 1985b). New Zealand statement — “as issued”. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 35(1), 12–17. Lange, D (17 May 1985a). The fourth labour government: New directions in New Zealand foreign policy. In New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy, H. Gold (ed.). Auckland: Benton Ross. Lange, D (17 May 1985b). New Zealand’s foreign policy: New interests, New paths. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 35(2), 10–16. Lange, D (23 October 1985). UN’s 40th birthday.New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 35(4), 19–24. Lange, D (25 October 1985). New Zealand’s Anti-Nuclear Policy. A Firm Ally that thinks for Itself. Commonwealth Club, San Francisco. This speech appears not to have been reprinted by the New Zealand government. Lange, D (1987a). Nuclear free zone act. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 37(3), 18. Lange, D (19 October 1987b). A South Pacific identity. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 38(4), 8–12. Lange, D (30 April 1988). The P.M. at Santa Barbara. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 38(3), 24–25. (This is an extract; the complete speech appears not to have been reprinted by the New Zealand government.) Lange, D (28 September 1988). The New Zealand statement. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 38(4), 11–18. Lange, D (24 April 1989a). The nuclear weapons issue. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 39(3), 38–44. Lange, D (1989b). Letter to the Winks. The Lange Papers. Wellington: Archives New Zealand, file R22498906. Lange, D (1990). Nuclear Free–The New Zealand Way. Auckland: Penguin. Lange, D (23 August 1994). Street fighter with a poison pen. The Bulletin (Sydney), 116(5934), 24–29. Lange, D (2005a). My Life. Auckland: Penguin New Zealand. Lange, P (2005b). A life with David. In For the Record: Lange and the Fourth Labour Government, M Clark (ed.), pp. 13–17. Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press.

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McGibbon, I (1999). New Zealand defence policy from Vietnam to the gulf. In New Zealand in World Affairs Vol. III: 1972–1990, B Brown (ed.), pp. 111–142. Wellington: Victoria University Press. McKinnon, M (1999). Realignment: New Zealand and its ANZUS allies. In New Zealand in World Affairs Vol. III: 1972–1990, B Brown (ed.), pp. 143–176. Wellington: Victoria University Press. McQueen, H (1992). The Ninth Floor, pp. 19, 22, 75, 84–85, 94 and 96. Auckland: Penguin. Mack, A (1985). The Pros and Cons of ANZUS: An Australian perspective. In New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy, H Gold (ed.), pp. 69–82. Auckland: Benton Ross. Marshall, R (15 August 2005). David Lange. The Guardian. Panetta, L (14 August 1984). Letter to Phyllis Macy. Archives New Zealand, file R17722439. Panetta, L (2014). Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace. New York: Penguin Press. Ross, K (2014a). David Lange’s global diplomacy. New Zealand International Review, 39(3), 7–10. Ross, K (2014b). Norman Kirk’s global diplomacy. New Zealand International Review, 39(2), 6–9. Templeton, M (2006). Standing Upright Here: New Zealand in the Nuclear Age 1945– 1990. Wellington: Victoria University Press. White House (18 October 1995). Administration of William J. Clinton, p. 1890. White House (1 February 1996). President William J. Clinton 114th Press Conference at the White House. Wilson, M (1989). Labour in Government: 1984–1987. Wellington: Allen & Unwin. Wright, V (1984). David Lange Prime Minister. Wellington: Unwin Paperbacks with Port Nicholson Press.

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CHAPTER 3 Gallipoli, National Identity and New Beginnings Ian McGibbon

In April 2015, 2000 New Zealanders gathered at Gallipoli to commemorate the landings on the peninsula that began an eight-month-long and ultimately unsuccessful struggle. Like the men they honoured, they had come from the “Uttermost Ends of the Earth”, the inscription on the New Zealand Memorial standing atop the highest point attained by the Allies during the campaign, Chunuk Bair.They heard the Prime Minister, John Key, state during his oration that “Our losses and achievements here and elsewhere in the First World War, had a profound effect on New Zealand’s view of its abilities, its identity and, ultimately, its sovereignty”. His predecessor Helen Clark during her first visit, in 2000, had referred to Gallipoli having “a special meaning”. It was here, she claimed, that “New Zealanders began to develop their own unique identity”, a continuing development. Five years later she stated that “It was here that our young nations began to become of age. It was from here that we began to think of ourselves as not just servants of the British Empire, but as distinct national entities. Thus, out of catastrophe, each of our nations emerged with a new sense of certainty about our own destiny and our place in the world”. The common theme in these statements is that Gallipoli has a key place in the development of the New Zealand nation. The focus in 2015, as previously, was on the performance, suffering and endurance of our troops in an extraordinary situation, hemmed into a tiny enclave at Anzac in the most rugged of terrain. The presence of so many 39

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New Zealanders in an isolated spot in the territory of a country that was the enemy in 1915 was, however, a reminder that the event is part of New Zealand’s modern-day relationship with the Republic of Turkey. In this chapter, I will look at the roots of the Gallipoli nationalist legend, and argue that it is a relatively recent phenomenon based on myths about the campaign. Any sense of nationhood that emerged from the struggle on the peninsula was largely set within a colonial framework, and differs markedly from that which underpins the present-day New Zealand perception of the events of 1915. So, too, the Turkish–New Zealand relationship is relatively recent and based on Gallipoli nationalist myths.

Unusual Relationship New Zealand’s modern-day relationship with Turkey is unusual. It is based almost entirely on former enmity. New Zealand lost 2700 men out of the 17,000 men who landed on the peninsula during the course of the campaign1 — a shock to a small country of just on a million citizens in 1915. The Turks lost more than 80,000 dead. Despite the scale of these losses, the enmity between the two countries was never more than superficial, a product of external forces rather than of close contact and interaction over a prolonged period. There was none of the virulent hatred that often exists between people in close proximity and conscious of past grievances. There was no quarrel between the Ottoman Empire and New Zealand. Indeed, there had been little contact before 1914, and no trade to speak of. This was not unique. New Zealand had little contact with anywhere outside the United Kingdom in this period. Governor-General Dame Silvia Cartwright drew criticism when she stated in 2003 that “New Zealanders had nothing to gain from the fight at Gallipoli. It was someone else’s war. Turkey was not our enemy”. Her statement overlooked the context of the time, the firm belief of most New Zealanders of 1Te

Papa launched an exhibition in 2015 that included a display claiming that New Zealand suffered 93 per cent casualties among 8556 men who landed, far above the rate suffered by the Australians they served alongside. This was based on a misapprehension of the number of New Zealanders who landed, including both the initial force and the very substantial number of reinforcements that joined it. Recent research by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage and New Zealand Defence Force has determined that 17,000 men landed on the peninsula, though the figure could be even higher because 19,000 reached Egypt in time to serve.

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European descent — more than 90 per cent of the population — that their own security, both economic and physical, depended upon the British Empire, with which they identified completely. The British Empire’s war was very much New Zealand’s war. But in one sense Dame Silvia was correct. New Zealand had no direct issues at stake in the conflict that began between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies in November 1914. The war that stands at the heart of the relationship was not one of New Zealand’s choosing. As an element in the British Empire, New Zealand became involved in the First World War as a result of King George V’s declaration of war on Germany on 4 August 1914. Once New Zealand was at war, it was hostage to the fortunes of that war. The Ottoman Empire became New Zealand’s enemy when it attacked the British Empire’s ally Russia, and drew upon itself declarations of war from both London and Paris. The early 1915 decision to attack the Ottoman Empire by seeking to force the Dardanelles strait was made in London. Once again there was no input from New Zealand. Even so, there was no concern in Wellington about this lack of consultation. The New Zealand government did not expect to be consulted on such matters at this stage of the war. Nor was it consulted about the disposition of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force — its grouping with Australia’s in the Australia New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) and the inclusion of the ANZAC in the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force that would make the landing on the Gallipoli peninsula in April 1915. Turks now tend to excuse New Zealand and Australia for their former enmity on the basis that they were not instrumental in creating the situation, although New Zealanders were not reluctant participants. As a member of the British club New Zealand had no objection to attacking the Ottoman Empire — a military operation quite within the bounds of international law at the time. Assertions occasionally heard today, even by some historians, that New Zealand had no business attacking Turkey and should apologise for doing so imply an element of wrongdoing; in reality the invasion of the Ottoman homeland was a legitimate act of war. They also imply a degree of independent decisionmaking on New Zealand’s part that simply did not exist in a country that had no qualms about its status as part of the British Empire. The nature of the campaign itself was conducive to ensuring that enmity was not lasting. In the first place the campaign was relatively short, just eight months. Second, at Anzac at least, the main New Zealand battlefield, there

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were no civilians present to complicate matters. The terrain was so rugged that the area was virtually uninhabited. It was a pure military contest in contrast to most other battlefields of the First World War (similar in this respect to the Desert Campaign in the Second World War). Third, a grudging respect developed between New Zealanders and Ottomans (as is often the case in bitter wars where both sides’ troops suffer privation). Finally, there was, by the end of the campaign if not at the beginning, a perception among the New Zealanders that the Ottomans were an honourable opponent, unlike the nefarious Germans who were believed, with some justification, to be running the Ottoman war effort. Another important reason why enmity was relatively short-lived was the satisfactory resolution of the one major outstanding campaign-related issue New Zealand had following the Allied withdrawal from Gallipoli — the fate of its dead, a concern shared by Australia and Britain. These were not only men who had been buried in makeshift graves during the campaign but also many soldiers still lying unburied on the battlefield. New Zealand played a key role in the British Empire’s approach to the graves issue. Prime Minister William Massey was the first to suggest British control of the area where the Anzacs had fought, doing so on Anzac Day 1916 (“A Sacred Memory”, 1916). This would in due course result in the creation of the so-called Anzac Area, to be under the control of the Imperial (later Commonwealth) War Graves Commission. This was something unique among the commission’s responsibilities; it covers the initial Anzac area at Gallipoli (though not New Zealand’s most important site, Chunuk Bair). The limits of the area were specified in Map 3 of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which formally ended the war, after some vigorous negotiation between British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon and the chief Turkish negotiator ˙Ismet ˙Inönü (Sagona et al., 2016).

Nationalist Underpinning The graves regime met New Zealand’s primary national concern in relation to its former Ottoman enemy. However, a graves accommodation and grudging respect are not enough to base a relationship on. There is a more important factor. This relates to the strange alignment that is evident on Anzac Day each year, at least in the last quarter century. The main participants are Turkey, Australia and New Zealand and the focus is on the battlefield at Anzac Cove, one of three main theatres of the Gallipoli land campaign but by no means

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the most important. The main players on the Allied side during the campaign, Britain and France, take a back seat. Essentially this anomaly arises from the perceived place of the Gallipoli campaign in the emergence of the three countries, whereas for Britain and France Gallipoli is just one of many lost campaigns. Gallipoli’s significance is easily explained in Turkey’s case — Mustafa Kemal, the first president of the Republic of Turkey and later Atatürk, made his name in the Anzac sector, fighting mainly against Australians and New Zealanders. For most of the subsequent century, this has resonated with the Turkish government and people, even though Turkish commemorations of the campaign focus on an event in which Kemal played no part, the victory over the Anglo-French fleet on 18 March 1915. Atatürk’s role in the land battle was highlighted by the installation of a massive statue of him on Chunuk Bair in the 1990s, alongside the New Zealand Memorial. However, the Turkish government’s approach more recently has, it appears, been to downgrade the role of Atatürk, as part of a wider challenge to the secular tradition that he bequeathed to the republic. The million or more Turks who visit this site today, many with local government assistance, are apparently being influenced to see the place as one where Moslems defeated Christians, as opposed to where Atatürk achieved his victory. This is part of the creeping attack on secularism by the governments led by Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan. For Australia and New Zealand, Gallipoli is now at the heart of their current sense of nationalism. Today, it is common to hear statements that New Zealand’s nationhood was born on the slopes of Gallipoli. The prime ministerial words mentioned above all spoke of Gallipoli’s special place in the emergence of New Zealand as a nation. Ormond Burton, a Gallipoli veteran (and in the Second World War, a pacifist who caused the New Zealand government no end of trouble), appears to have been the first to articulate this nation-building conception of Gallipoli, 20 years after the campaign. After referring to the gradual development of differences between New Zealanders and Britons, he wrote: it needed only some catastrophe, some great suffering, borne together, some great deed done in common, to make New Zealanders conscious of their identity as a nation. Such a deed and such suffering they found on the slopes of Sari Bair. When the August fighting died down there was no longer any question but that the New Zealanders had commenced to realize themselves as a nation. The process was not complete, but it was well begun (Burton, 1935).

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New Zealand nationhood, as even Burton suggested, was rooted in New Zealand itself, having developed in the 19th century and been reflected in New Zealand’s involvement in the South African War. The Gallipoli campaign heightened New Zealand’s sense of difference within the British world. It seemed to resonate with the “Better Briton” aspirations that James Belich detected in pre-1914 New Zealand (Belich, 2001). Gallipoli encouraged this because of negative perceptions among the New Zealanders of British troops they served alongside, especially during the August offensive. The campaign (and the subsequent Western Front experience) certainly heightened the New Zealand participants’ sense of national identity, but it was very much an identity rooted within the British framework (and separate identities within that framework were numerous, even in the United Kingdom with its Scots, Welsh and Irish). To be sure, a sense of national identity was further highlighted by warrelated developments after the Gallipoli campaign, including the involvement of New Zealand leaders in high-level imperial talks in London on war strategy and more importantly participation in the British Empire Delegation at the Versailles peace conference. New Zealand not only signed the peace treaty with Germany but also became a founding member of the League of Nations in its own right (surely its first step to becoming an independent nation). When it came to the long drawn out settlement with Turkey, however, New Zealand was absent, being represented by the British delegate at both peace conferences. New Zealand’s pride in its achievement at Gallipoli is reflected in the construction of its memorial atop Chunuk Bair — the only national memorial of the British participants located on the peninsula.2 New Zealand’s war did push it towards an international role. But how much of a change was there at the time? New Zealanders might have been angry about perceived British failings at Gallipoli, and been contemptuous of some of the British troops they served alongside, but this did not prevent them from still seeing themselves as very much part of the British club. And any perception of nationhood that developed during the conflict was still very incipient. That the empire remained paramount in New Zealand’s approach to the world was highlighted by events that followed the war leading up to the

2There

is an Empire Memorial at Cape Helles and an Anzac Memorial at Lone Pine. Many people today incorrectly assume that the latter is the Australian national memorial.

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final Turkish peace settlement at the Lausanne conference. This was evident during a crisis that erupted in September 1922, which brought New Zealand to the brink of a new war with Turkey. This crisis had its roots in the repudiation by Mustafa Kemal of the Treaty of Sèvres, the initial instrument designed to formally end the war with the Ottoman Empire. Kemal presided over a nationalist movement that rejected the Ottoman government and, more importantly, stood firm against the Greek forces that had pushed deep into Anatolia. After Kemal routed the Greeks in 1922, his victorious forces swept down to Smyrna (now Izmir). They then advanced towards Chanak (now Çanakkale), the town opposite the Gallipoli peninsula on the Asian side of the Dardanelles. It appeared they would clash with the British battalion and small French and Italian forces that had occupied the area and the peninsula following the armistice in 1918. There is some evidence that elements in the British government, making the same mistake as in 1915 of underestimating the Turks, were not unhappy at the prospect of resumed hostilities with the Turks (Harington, 1923, 1925). As the possibility of war grew, London contacted the Dominion governments asking if they would support the British if war were to break out. New Zealand’s response to this crisis provides a counterpoint to the stirrings of nationhood perceived during the campaign. It responded as a member of the club — and when given the choice, something it had not had to make in 1914, it opted for war. The cable from London arrived at Government House on the evening of 16 September 1922 just before the Governor-General, Lord Jellicoe, then the channel of communication between the British and New Zealand governments, was to dine with Prime Minister Massey and five of his Cabinet. When they arrived Jellicoe apprised them of the cable and suggested an early reply. Adjourning to an adjacent room, the ministers quickly decided that they would reply in the affirmative, and an hour after the cable’s receipt “a reply telegram saying New Zealand would certainly do her utmost to help the Mother Country in the crisis was being coded and sent off ”. This rapid response was the product of fortuitous circumstances, but the full Cabinet soon endorsed the action of the ministers and there was overwhelming support in the Parliament (“Loyal New Zealanders”, 1928; McGibbon, 2000) The government was proud of its loyal and rapid assurance of support for the empire. This differed markedly from August 1914, when New Zealand was committed without any consultation. However, New Zealand in 1922

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was hardly in a position to make an informed choice. What information it had about the situation in Anatolia or Kemal’s forces came from the Colonial Office, and New Zealand, as it did so often, was content to follow the British government’s lead and commit itself to hostilities in advance. Its response contrasted sharply with Canada’s outright refusal and Australia’s more measured support (“Turkey, An Overview …”, n.d.). This was not a decision made by a government out of touch with public opinion. The reaction to the extensive preparations made by the Defence Department was dramatic. Within a fortnight more than 13,000 New Zealanders, including nearly 400 women, had volunteered to take part in a new expeditionary force (a level of enthusiasm comparable to that of 1914). Any sense of nationhood was subsumed within the imperial framework; New Zealanders would prove their loyalty to the empire by once again flocking to the colours. Fortunately the commanders on the spot ensured that fighting did not break out and the crisis subsided. These events provided the essential backdrop to the negotiations at Lausanne, which would finally achieve a peace settlement and herald the formation of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923.

Little Contact If New Zealanders’ response to the Chanak Crisis demonstrated that little had changed in their world outlook, notwithstanding the wartime enhancement of their sense of national identity, so too did its response to Gallipoli — and Turkey — for most of the rest of the century. Once the issues had been resolved, and the graves effectively dealt with, New Zealand’s interest in either Gallipoli or Turkey waned. There was little contact between the two countries. Turkey appointed an honorary consul in Auckland in 1937, but the consul-general was resident in London. Turkey was well off New Zealand’s diplomatic radar, which focused almost exclusively on the British capital. At least until the Labour Party took power in 1935, the government resisted developments pushing New Zealand towards a more independent stance, though New Zealand participated in the League of Nations and was one of the 29 members that supported Turkey’s admission to the organization in 1932 (“Proposal …”, 1932). The rise of fascism drew New Zealand’s attention elsewhere, and Turkey’s neutrality during the Second World War ensured that it was peripheral to New Zealand’s main concerns. Some Australians made pilgrimages to the peninsula in the 1930s, but access became difficult after the remilitarization of

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the peninsula, which followed the renegotiation of the Lausanne Treaty’s terms governing the usage of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits that resulted in the Montreux Convention of 1936. The peninsula was essentially closed as a military area for the following four decades. With the onset of the Second World War, there was no public pressure for change. New Zealand and Turkey had little to do with each other except during the Korean War. Turkey was, like New Zealand, among the 16 countries that contributed combat units to the United Nations (UN) Command. Consideration was given to inviting Turkish officers to New Zealand for Anzac Day in 1953, but Cabinet baulked, not wanting to invite the Greeks and French as well (“Memorandum”, 1953). However a visit did finally take place the following year, the first time Turkish officers set foot on New Zealand soil. Turkey’s role as a Western ally was cemented when it became part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Nevertheless, the relationship between New Zealand and Turkey was virtually non-existent till almost the end of the century. No interest was shown when, in the early 1950s, large parties of Turkish veterans made August pilgrimages from Istanbul to the peninsula to commemorate the very battle that lies at the heart of New Zealand’s modern-day Gallipoli focus. The pilgrimages continued for a number of years without any Anzac involvement. In Wellington, there was no sign that Gallipoli was anything other than a battlefield of note, among numerous others. Although a visit to Istanbul by the cruiser HMNZS Black Prince in 1954 allowed a party from the ship to lay a wreath on the New Zealand Memorial at Chunuk Bair, the government evinced no interest in any ongoing involvement with commemorations on the peninsula (Leslie Pott, 1952; “Memorandum”, 1953). Neither was there any public pressure in this direction. Although a delegation of New Zealand veterans went to Gallipoli in 1965 to commemorate the 50th anniversary, references to the battlefield’s importance in the forming of the New Zealand nation were conspicuously absent. Not even a visit to the peninsula by the Queen in 1971 — emulating a visit by her uncle Edward VIII in 1936 — aroused great public interest. New Zealand’s response to indications in the early 1970s that the Turkish authorities were beginning to ignore provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne relating to the Anzac Area further demonstrated its uninterest in the developments at Gallipoli. Plans were drawn up for a wider park encompassing the

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area, potentially compromising access to the Anzac graves. Wellington did not react. Neither did it express any strong views when the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC), on which it was represented, discussed the matter. The British were authorized to act on New Zealand’s behalf (Acting Secretary of Internal Affairs, 1972; Acting High Commissioner, 1972). Political instability, economic weakness and military coups in Turkey — all contributed to New Zealand’s lack of interest in closer bilateral ties in this period. It did agree in 1968 to the Turkish ambassador in Canberra being accredited to New Zealand (Secretary of External Affairs, 1968). However, the proposal fell through at the last minute, mainly, it seems, because of New Zealand’s lack of interest in reciprocating by cross-accrediting an ambassador to Ankara. It would not be until 1977 that the first Turkish ambassador to New Zealand presented his credentials (and another 12 years before New Zealand reciprocated by cross-accrediting its ambassador in Tehran). New Zealand’s lack of enthusiasm for a closer relationship at this time derived in part from distaste for Turkish intervention in Cyprus, a Commonwealth country. Turkey’s invasion of the island in 1974 pushed New Zealand towards the Greek position — in contrast to its anti-Greek predilection immediately following the First World War. This was helped by the presence of a substantial Greek community in New Zealand. Until the United Kingdom’s turn to Europe forced diversification, there was little incentive to seek alternative markets that might have brought Turkey into the picture. Even after that seminal moment in New Zealand’s international development, Turkey did not beckon as a place of trade. It was not until 1988 that an effort was made to promote trade, when Mike Moore led a mini-trade mission to Turkey. But the results were meagre. Even today Turkey is no higher than 44th on New Zealand’s list of trading partners. In a briefing paper prepared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 1978, there was only a brief mention of Gallipoli — an allusion to the feelings of goodwill widely reported to exist in Turkey “largely based on respect for our action at Gallipoli”. Any sense that Gallipoli occupied a special place in the New Zealand psyche was entirely absent. There seemed little immediate prospect of change: “It appears unlikely”, the paper concluded, “that there will be compelling reasons for New Zealand to devote greater attention to developing our relations with Turkey over the next few years” (“Turkey”, 1978).

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This contrasts sharply with the situation today, where Gallipoli is at the forefront of the relationship and the presence of the head of state or a government minister at the Anzac Day commemoration is de rigueur. New Zealand, Australian and Turkish officials are in consultation for months in advance of the annual event, and the ceremonies are replete with statements that not only propound myths about the events of 1915, but also emphasize the importance of those events in the development of the nation. Nationalism lies at the heart of this situation.

New Nationalism The relationship between New Zealand and Turkey has its roots in the emergence of a new sense of nationalism in the former following the British turn to Europe in the early 1970s, with its impact in the economic sphere matched in the political and security by that of British withdrawal east of Suez. New Zealand finally began to shift its focus away from Britain, to expand its horizons. A new mood emerged as New Zealand’s old certainties disappeared. This was paralleled by a new focus on Anzac Day, driven at least in part by recognition that the First World War generation was rapidly fading away and helped by the passing of tensions surrounding that commemoration that had arisen during the Vietnam War. Maurice Shadbolt’s play Once on Chunuk Bair, written in 1982 and echoing Burton’s assertions, provided the core of the nationalist myth that would underpin New Zealand’s approach to Gallipoli in the next 30 years. One reviewer asserted that it was “about the birth of a nation”; another claimed that on 8 August 1915 New Zealand “acquired nationhood in its own right” (Shadbolt, 1982). Shadbolt’s essential nationalist message was reinforced almost immediately by a TV documentary fronted by Sir Leonard Thornton, and associated book by Christopher Pugsley (Pugsley, 1984). All these efforts, eschewing rigorous analysis of the place of Chunuk Bair in the campaign, hammered home the idea that on that summit on 8 August 1915 New Zealanders had glimpsed victory and that inadequate British leadership had let the opportunity slip. The link between Gallipoli and nationhood now began to penetrate more directly into the national consciousness, just as the last New Zealand veterans of the campaign were passing from the scene. It was a link based on modern-day conceptions of what had happened in 1915, and one bound up with the Anzac legend and an emerging “good New Zealander, bad British” syndrome.

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Australian initiatives helped promote public interest. In the early 1980s, the Australians, who had always shown greater awareness of Gallipoli than New Zealanders, pressed the Turks to rename the landing beach “Anzac Cove”. When the Turks agreed on condition Australia and New Zealand made a reciprocal gesture, New Zealand agreed to name a piece of Defence land near the entrance to Wellington harbour the “Atatürk Memorial Park” and to build a memorial to him (Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 1985). Former Deputy Prime Minister Bob Tizard attended the renaming ceremony at Gallipoli, the Cabinet agreeing that a minister should lead the delegation because of “the significance of this commemoration of the forging of the ANZAC spirit seventy years ago” (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). In his speech at Ari Burnu, Tizard stated that “In defeat were forged those strong bonds of sentiment, courage and shared experience, that have both drawn New Zealanders, and Australians together and set them apart from their colonial background as new nations in war and in peace” (Rome, 1985). However, in the aftermath of the event Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke went further, suggesting to the Turkish leader, Turgut Ozal, that for Australians and New Zealanders “the tradition of Anzac is an enduring symbol of nationhood” (“Extract from letter”, 1985). Commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the landing on 25 April 1990 cemented the place of the Gallipoli campaign in the public consciousness. Hawke attended, the first prime minister to do so (it would be another 10 years before New Zealand followed suit). Australia took more than 50 veterans over the age of 90 to the 1990 commemoration at Gallipoli. This caught the public imagination, but perhaps more significantly during the 1990s young Australians and New Zealanders on their working holidays in the United Kingdom began making Anzac Day at Anzac Cove a rite of passage. So many did so that a new commemorative site had to be created, just north of Anzac Cove. The flag followed in these Anzac tourists’ footsteps. A key to this increasing engagement with Gallipoli was accessibility. The military restrictions on the peninsula were lifted in the 1970s, though a military presence remained strong even as late as 2009. At the same time the jumbo jet was making it easier for New Zealanders to travel abroad generally — along with easing restrictions on taking foreign currency out of the country. Gallipoli’s central place in New Zealand’s remembrance of the First World War and indeed other wars is also important. The day of the landing became Anzac Day, ensuring a Gallipoli focus is always brought to the fore, even

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though New Zealand’s effort on the Western Front following the evacuation was more extensive and costly. As Anzac Day became more significant to the general public, as opposed to veterans, from the 1980s, so Gallipoli penetrated further the New Zealand’s consciousness. This renewed interest in Gallipoli is enhanced by the preservation of the actual site of the fighting (in contrast to most other First World War battlefields, which reverted to farmland). Many thousands of New Zealanders have now visited the site of the battles, and ceremonies at Gallipoli have become an important expression of modern New Zealand nationhood. It is perhaps fitting that these ceremonies at Chunuk Bair take place in the shadow of the statue of Atatürk. Matching this nationalism is Turkish receptiveness. Certainly there are economic advantages in the annual visit of large numbers of Australians and New Zealanders. The influx of money to the Çanakkale region has been noticeable in the last decade in the provision of new facilities such as hotels and shops. But the motivation is not just mercenary. Generosity towards its former enemies was impressed on Turks by a magnanimous statement that Atatürk was believed to have prepared for a visiting Australian group in the 1930s; he supposedly suggested that the Allied dead were now Turkey’s sons. Although their provenance is now being questioned (“Tracking Ataturk”, n.d.), his purported words have formed a central element in recent commemorations, constantly repeated in speeches. Turkish attitudes to Gallipoli have also evolved. Although the park proposals of the 1970s fell through, the Turks eventually created a Peace Park, which is now the primary element in the administration of the area and the CWGC is very much subordinate to it. Public pressure for commemoration pushed the Turkish government towards creating more commemorative structures on the peninsula, especially at Anzac. Those at the latter include the Atatürk statue on Chunuk Bair and a memorial to the 57th Regiment, which played a key role in stopping the Anzac advance on the day of the landing. In the last decade Gallipoli, and especially Chunuk Bair, has become a place of pilgrimage for Turks: the number visiting the Anzac Area has exploded. It is now estimated that more than a million visit the site each year (some even say two million). Except in winter buses endlessly grind up the narrow one-way road to the summit. Coming from all over Turkey, with local government assistance, the Turks visit the Turkish memorial to the 57th Regiment then

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Chunuk Bair. The Gallipoli commemorations have become an opportunity for the expression of Turkish nationalism. Turkish interest used to be focused on 18 March (the anniversary of the victory over the Anglo-French fleet), but is now just as evident on Anzac Day. Gallipoli has become a nationalist icon to modern-day New Zealanders, a place where their forebears fought with fortitude and distinction. For a nation whose path to independent statehood was not clearly defined, Gallipoli provides a convenient starting point in the process of nation-building, a place where New Zealanders embarked on their first large-scale military enterprise on the world stage. But this is a relatively recent development. Ormond Burton may have perceived that New Zealanders at Gallipoli began to recognise their nationhood, but most New Zealanders at the time continued to see themselves firmly within a colonial context, and as demonstrated in their response to the Chanak Crisis were willing once again to commit themselves wholeheartedly to taking part in another imperial conflict. The modern-day perception of Gallipoli rests on a reinterpretation of the events of 1915, which emphasizes differences with the British that did not have the same resonance at the time, and could hardly do so when a quarter of New Zealand’s force had been born in the United Kingdom. It also rests on the myth that New Zealanders stood at the heart of the imperial effort, and almost pulled off a great victory by taking Chunuk Bair, from which they could see the holy grail of the Narrows in the Dardanelles. This new nationalist focus on Gallipoli parallels, and to some extent was encouraged by Australia’s preoccupation with Gallipoli. For a nation with a more obvious foundation point — the formation of the Commonwealth in 1901 — Gallipoli provides a unifying myth, one that was given expression in the remarkable official history produced by Charles Bean. But even Australia’s modern engagement with Gallipoli is also relatively recent, a product of the late 20th century changes in communications technology that allowed more direct public involvement with the site. For Turks, Gallipoli’s importance in the nationalist firmament always took second place to the victory over the Greeks in the War of Independence. Nevertheless, it was important because it elevated to prominence the man who won that war, Mustafa Kemal.Today, though, with Atatürk’s legacy under siege, and his role downplayed, new interpretations of Gallipoli — or the Çanakkale battle, as Turks know it — are challenging long-held understandings of the

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battles. A contest between secularist and Islamist interpretations of the events of 1915, mirroring those in wider society, has yet to be resolved. Whatever the outcome, Gallipoli will continue to provide a focus for Turkish nationalism as a place where Turks — as the main component of the Ottoman Empire — stood up to the great powers. The convergence of nationalist narratives of the three countries in Gallipoli will not only ensure for the time being an enduring focus on the battlefield but also continue to underpin the friendly relationship between them.

References “A Sacred Memory” (26 April 1916). Evening Post (Wellington), p. 3. Acting High Commissioner to Secretary of Foreign Affairs (1 November 1972). Archives New Zealand, Wellington, ABHS, 87/14/4/25. Acting Secretary of Internal Affairs to Minister of Internal Affairs (14 June 1972). Archives New Zealand, Wellington, ABHS, 87/14/4/25. Belich, J (2001). Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000, p. 1. Auckland: Penguin Group. Burton, OE (1935). The Silent Division, New Zealanders at the Front: 1914–1919, pp. 121–122. Sydney: Angus & Robertson Limited. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum for Cabinet (n.d.). “Anzac Cove: New Zealand Attendance at Re-naming Ceremony”. Archives New Zealand, Wellington, ABHS, 58/274/1. Extract from Letter to Turkish Prime Minister (c. 10 May 1985). Archives New Zealand, Wellington, ABHS, 58/274/1. General Sir C. Harington to F.B. Maurice (8 January 1923, 25 December 1925). Liddell Hart Centre for Military History, London, Maurice Papers, 3/2/1. Leslie Pott (UK Consul-General, Istanbul) to Anthony Eden (23 August 1952). Archives New Zealand, Wellington, ABHS, 87/14/4/25. “Local New Zealanders” (5 March 1928), New Zealand Herald (Auckland), p. 11. McGibbon, I (ed.) (2000). The Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History, p. 82. Auckland: Oxford University Press. Memorandum for J.V. Wilson (30 June 1953), “Visit of ‘Black Prince’ to Turkey”. Archives New Zealand, Wellington, ABHS, 87/14/4/25. “Proposal Regarding an Invitation to Turkey to Become a Member of the League of Nations”, A. (Extr. 124) 1932. VII (1 July 1932). Archives New Zealand, Wellington, EA2, 114/2/42. Pugsley, C (1984). Gallipoli, The New Zealand Story. Auckland: Hodder & Stoughton. Rome to Wellington, No. 358 (22 April 1985). Archives New Zealand, Wellington, ABHS, 58/274/1.

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Sagona, A, M Atabay, CJ Mackie, I McGibbon, and R Reid (eds.) (2016). Anzac Battlefield, A Gallipoli Landscape of War and Memory, pp. 193–201. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. Secretary of External Affairs to Prime Minister (15 March 1968). Archives New Zealand, Wellington, ABHS, 61/274/1. Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Foreign Affairs (12 March 1985). Archives New Zealand, Wellington, ABHS, 58/274/1. Shadbolt, M (1982). Once on Chunuk Bair, pp. 4–5. Auckland: Hodder & Stoughton. “Tracking Ataturk: Honest History research note” (n.d.). http://honesthistory.net. au/wp/tracking-ataturk-honest-history-research-note/. “Turkey, An Overview — Opportunities for New Zealand Exports to Turkey” (n.d.). Archives New Zealand, Wellington, AATJ, 2/24/5/7. “Turkey” (8 December 1978). Archives New Zealand, Wellington, ABHS, 58/274/1.

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CHAPTER 4 National Identity and New Zealand Foreign Policy Terence O’Brien

Many influences, external and internal, shape a country’s identity. There is no single definition. There can be, for example, a clear difference between what a country affirms itself to be (large powers often expect their own self-assessment to be widely accepted) and how other countries might actually perceive that country. Furthermore, just as the context for international affairs frequently shifts, there is also, for most countries, more than one identity internationally. Certainly, New Zealand’s identity in the South Pacific tends to differ significantly from its identity on the global stage. Identity is influenced by such things as originality, values, reputation, relationships and transformational change in the international system.

The Impact of Values In essence, New Zealand’s sense of identity is shaped by its values — what New Zealand is, and what it seeks as a society. New Zealand’s distinctiveness resides in the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840. The Treaty places the ideas of partnership and reconciliation at the heart of New Zealand democracy, and strives to blend M¯aori and European aspirations into a cohesive nation building effort. At the same time, it motivates both parties to adjust to the prospect of a multicultural future. The task of reconciliation is complex, diversified and sometimes controversial but it represents an enduring New Zealand rite of passage to nationhood. 55

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Although New Zealand possesses no real hard power of its own, the ideals behind the Treaty provide what could be termed soft power for the country in an era when values-driven international relations are emphasised and promoted. Soft power is not the monopoly of the strong. The Treaty distinguishes New Zealand from other countries, including those that are part of the so-called Anglosphere. How New Zealand utilises this soft power externally to fulfil its interests remains a question of choice in the context of pursuing an independent foreign policy. It is reasonable to suppose that soft power provides a sufficient and essential foundation for a conscientious contribution to, and the safeguarding of, New Zealand’s interests in the international arena. Three examples briefly illustrate this point. First, a defining event in New Zealand’s modern international experience was the decision by Britain in the 1960s to negotiate its admission into the European Community (EC). This development presented an ominous danger to New Zealand’s trade and economic interests; Britain might adopt agricultural protectionism as the price of EC entry. Nonetheless, New Zealand had to presume that British–EC negotiations would succeed whilst striving to influence highly complex discussions from which it was excluded (O’Brien, 2005). Both British and European negotiators had to be convinced through discreet but persistent New Zealand advocacy that special provisions to safeguard New Zealand interests were indispensable. Long before the notion of soft power ever became topical in the vocabulary of international relations (Nye, 1990, p. 226, 2004, p. 99). New Zealand vigorously employed arguments of equity, kith and kin, shared values, battlefield sacrifices in Europe, and appeals to European self-esteem. How could an enlarged EC ever deal effectively with important players such as the United States and Japan if it could not accommodate the vital interests of a small, responsible democracy that would otherwise be disembowelled as the price of European unity? Vast European farm surpluses at the time meant there was little actual need for New Zealand supplies. Classical trade policy arguments also cut little ice. However, after 10 years of unremitting diplomatic advocacy, New Zealand’s soft power arguments finally produced special transition arrangements for Wellington when the British joined the EC in 1973. These arrangements, in turn, helped pave the way for the emergence of today’s more diverse New Zealand trade economy and a substantially broader foreign policy

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perspective. In many ways, it was the exercise of soft power that helped generate New Zealand’s only multinational enterprise, the dairy giant, Fonterra. A second example of soft power concerns the fallout from the implementation of New Zealand’s non-nuclear policy in the mid-1980s. This development produced a quarter of century of estrangement in New Zealand’s political and security relations with the United States. However, it was the soft power that protected New Zealand from the worst consequences of a policy stance, which profoundly annoyed Washington. A strong disposition existed in the Reagan administration to punish New Zealand severely for its perceived dereliction of duty amid fears that the “Kiwi disease” might spread to other members of Western alliance. However, more level-headed observers in America foresaw difficulties in adopting a heavy-handed approach towards a small and friendly democracy exercising its sovereign right of choice in the area of security policy. New Zealand’s soft power effectively stayed the hand of New Zealand’s strongest critics. Both inside New Zealand and in the United States, there were those who firmly believed New Zealand had “lost its way” through an “irresponsible” policy. Yet, over the ensuing 25 years, the record under successive New Zealand governments belies such negative judgements. The country purposefully established positive relationships with East Asian countries; in the South Pacific, it spearheaded a notable peace and reconciliation effort in Bougainville; in a global context, it lodged two successful United Nations (UN) Security Council bids for non-permanent membership, and an unprecedented succession of victorious candidatures for top jobs in the UN, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Commonwealth and at the World Court. More specifically, in an era where non-proliferation of nuclear weapons emerged as the paramount international security concern, New Zealand’s non-nuclear policy appeared to be eminently compatible with curbing such a threat. The reinvigorated US–New Zealand relationship, symbolised by the Wellington and Washington Declarations signed in 2010 and 2012, respectively, reflected the shift in strategic context and owed as much to American initiative than New Zealand prompting. A clear inference to be drawn from the quarter of a century of the New Zealand experience of American disfavour is that a small democracy endowed with authentic soft power and equipped with effective diplomacy can operate successfully in an interdependent world as a friend, rather than a formal ally, of great powers such as the United States.

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Thirdly, New Zealand’s fruitful relationship with China has had a soft power dimension. China — an intensely, realist great power — perceives some utility in a cooperative relationship with a small, non-threatening, democratic, free market economy. Beijing probably sees this bilateral relationship as a dress rehearsal for building ties with larger, more powerful western democracies; and for shaping Chinese involvement in established regional and global institutions. The Chinese relationship with Wellington may be grounded in a formal free trade agreement of 2008, but its origins are crucially political in nature and linked to the fact that New Zealand vigorously pursued and cultivated a good diplomatic relationship with Beijing since the early 1970s. In doing so, New Zealand has had to take account of attitudes amongst traditional friends, notably the United States and Australia, as well as partner governments in East Asia, many of which are conscious of living in China’s long shadow. At times, the United States and Australia seem ready to favour policies that inhibit or even constrain China. Indeed, the United States does not seem to have finally decided whether China is predestined to be perennial strategic competitor or partner — but China too is similarly undecided on this matter. A particular attitude prevails in Washington that US regional security interests trump those of China; while China also thinks that its regional interests trump those of the United States. The task of protecting New Zealand’s regional and global interests in this sometimes fraught environment is an unparalleled challenge for Wellington’s diplomacy (Elder and Ayson, 2012), with undeniable significance for New Zealand’s international identity.

International Order Change These examples illustrate the obvious point that New Zealand’s modern foreign policy is determined by external developments beyond its control, but that soft power can assist adjustment to such developments. The impressive emergence in the past 40 years of fast growth, newly industrialising economies (NIE) in East Asia is reshaping the global economy, widening opportunities for New Zealand prosperity, and altering the balance of its political interests. The relative proximity of New Zealand to new opportunities provided by Asia’s economic dynamism supersedes the country’s traditional perception that it is geographically distant from the sources of its prosperity and well-being in the Trans-Atlantic region. This sense of changing place emphatically influences international identity.

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At the same time, it has become clear during the new century that there is a “democratic deficit” inside many institutions responsible for good global governance (Malloch-Brown, 2011, p. 213). Full support by NIE countries for rules-based international systems is indispensable. That must be a basic premise for New Zealand foreign policy. Yet major western powers, New Zealand’s traditional mainstays — the inventors and supervisors of the system — appear hesitant about sharing responsibility with NIE states in key political/security and financial/economic institutions. This has caused impatience and frustration among NIE states and prompted them to consider the creation of alternative or substitute bodies. This, in turn, fuels misgivings in Washington and elsewhere that NIE states (and notably China) are bent upon supplanting the international rules system. Here is a real chicken and egg dilemma. A further and larger obstacle to an equitable rules-based international order resides with the embedded US sense of “exceptionalism”, according to which the United States exempts itself from negotiations or rules it considers unsatisfactory. History also indicates China possesses strong “exceptionalist” instincts. It is likely, therefore, that a rising China could be tempted to reproduce America’s equivocal approach to a rules-based international order. Such tendencies could contribute to the making of a non-virtuous circle. It is in New Zealand’s interests to identify clearly with the principle of equality of responsibilities and obligations between major powers as the basis for an inclusive international system. It is essential that New Zealand remains evenhanded and we disavow “exceptionalism”. However, this challenge is intermingled with geopolitical factors that, for example, shape American trade policy. The United States has purposefully excluded NIE states from American-led negotiations of key trade and economic integration agreements — the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) in the Asia-Pacific region and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the European Union (EU). If implemented, these agreements will together and individually divide the world trade economy. When combined with the exclusion of NIE states from helping to manage existing global institutions, such trends point to the prospect of harmful segregation within the international system. On the surface, at least, much of this appears incompatible with the underlying rationale for the creation in 2008 of the G20 Summit, involving the world’s largest top 20 economies. Those attending the G20 Summit recognised the principles of interdependence, economic policy coordination

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and preservation of an open global economy. As a small country that will never remotely qualify for G20 inclusion, New Zealand will have to confront some awkward questions about where its essential interests are best served if harmful segregation of the international system proceeds. In the Asia-Pacific, New Zealand has a foot in two camps — the American-led TPP venture, which excludes China (currently New Zealand’s largest trade partner), and the Chinese backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) free trade proposal that excludes the United States. The major New Zealand political and diplomatic task of navigating China–US rivalry to its best advantage extends well beyond the regional domain to the broader question of which great power influences behaviour and rule making for the world trade economy in the 21st century.

Politics and Security In straight political terms, New Zealand’s identity is influenced increasingly in a post-9/11 world by the “war against terrorism”, devised in Washington as an organising principle for US leadership. New Zealand possesses little hard power of its own, threatens no other actor and, given its geographical remoteness, has only a low sense of danger to its own physical existence. That does not, of course, imply immunity from external strife, nor does it absolve New Zealand from the responsibility of contributing to international peace and stability. In this context, a small professional New Zealand defence force has remained a definite national asset. However, fresh institutional changes within New Zealand after 9/11 have altered the country’s approach to national security. Apart from important domestic surveillance provisions those changes involved a strengthening of the prime minister’s office with enhanced powers extending to important external intelligence connections through the Five Eyes alliance. As a result, New Zealand began to resemble a smaller version of the so-called national security state structures favoured in Washington and Canberra with key external relations authority centred around the executive. The defining characteristics of the US national security state could be said to combine a staunch threat mentality with a firm conviction about the utility of hard power. Diplomacy in the shape of the State Department often seems relegated to a secondary role. Given that soft power is New Zealand’s sole attribute when cultivating trust and opportunity diplomatically with old and

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new international partners, it seems counterintuitive to reshape New Zealand institutional arrangements for the conduct of important external relations along the lines of a national security state model that prioritises hard power. At this particular time of complex and competing international trends, it is vitally important to retain balance and even-handedness in New Zealand’s external evaluations, especially, as Wellington continues to lay claim to independent foreign policy. Recent reforms at the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) have diluted long established levels of professional expertise, and it will take time to mitigate these effects. It is necessary for New Zealand’s diplomatic network to constantly re-sharpen and amplify its capabilities for external political, economic and security judgement(s). In this way, New Zealand’s diplomats could help provide relevant analytical input which complements or challenges assessments that flow from the Five Eyes channel to the current government. Intelligence sharing does not in itself shape foreign policy. Nevertheless, it can influence government thinking and, given the tight exclusivity of the Five Eyes Alliance, generates perceptions amongst the global majority beyond the small select small inner circle, about New Zealand international identity.

International Reputation Identity is also influenced by reputation. This factor is fashioned and illuminated in different ways. For most foreign governments, the UN system provides the window through which they judge New Zealand’s merits. The periodic success of New Zealand in securing United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent membership understandably provides some confirmation to New Zealand’s political leadership of the international standing of the country. However, deft New Zealand contributions behind closed doors at the UNSC may be, they provide less evidence to the great majority of the people in the world of New Zealand reputation when compared to actual New Zealand performance in more transparent areas of the international stage. Indicators include levels of Overseas Development Aid (ODA), effective contributions to poverty alleviation and disaster relief, generosity with refugee and asylum seeker resettlement, constructive contributions to negotiations on climate change and environmental protections, commitments to UN peacekeeping and postconflict reconstruction as distinct from North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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(NATO)-centred coalitions of the willing. New Zealand’s decisions across this wider spectrum of issues provide more tangible benchmarks for assessing whether the country is a “good global citizen”. Any sense here that New Zealand might be losing momentum, and there are indeed some worrying signs — New Zealand, for example, has virtually no UN peacekeeping commitments at present, which in previous times it advertised explicitly as proof of good global citizenship — will affect reputation and, therefore, identity.

Neighbourhood New Zealand’s identity derives too from neighbourhood relationships with the Pacific Islands Region (PIR) and with Australia. Cultivation of stable, friendly, prosperous ties with the PIR, where New Zealand has specific constitutional responsibilities and extensive political and cultural ties, constitutes a firm national interest in its own right. Such concerns, however, should not be presented narrowly in terms of a contribution to guarding against possible threats to New Zealand security from or through the PIR. Pacific Island governments do not seem to relish simplistic characterisation as the “achilles heel” of Australian, or New Zealand, security. Moreover, some Pacific Islander politicians resent what they perceive to be enduring metropolitan instincts and attitudes. Ideas circulate periodically for new regional institutions to exclude New Zealand and Australia. Amongst other things, Australia’s uncompromising approach to the arrival of refugee boats fuels tensions and provokes public criticism in both the PIR and the international community in general. The PIR disappointment is also evident over New Zealand and Australian reluctance to pledge resettlement assistance for Pacific islands threatened by the rise of sea level caused by climate change. At the same time, regional governments remain uncomfortable about terms for a new and fully reciprocal regional free trade agreement. Overall, the situation of the Trans-Tasman partners in relation to regionalism in the PIR (where New Zealand had played a leading part in advancing this conception) is not as comfortable as it once may have been (Fry, 2015). Both New Zealand and Australia continue to direct significant sums of ODA into the region and the PIR governments are conscious of that, but they also aware of the fact that alternative external sources of development support are more readily available now than before. New Zealand needs to work cooperatively with others, most notably Australia with whom it shares geography, history, culture and attitude.

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Australia is New Zealand’s most important external relationship. The 1944 Canberra Pact and the 1983 Closer Economic Relations (CER) initiative anchor the relationship. Yet New Zealand occupies the classic position of junior partner in this relationship where the senior partner sometimes pursues interests with little obvious concern for the other party in the arrangement. With a larger baggage train of foreign policy interests, middle-level power ambition, and a consistently closer security treaty relationship with the United States, Australia tends to conceive of its PIR role as that of metropolitan power with responsibility for supervision of security. Canberra’s highly developed sense of security vigilance fosters interventionist instincts. In a region described by some pundits as Australia’s “arc of instability”, New Zealand needs to be careful in ensuring that its policies and motivations in the Pacific are not seen in the same light. New Zealand’s ability “to think small” is traditionally identified as its “comparative advantage” for building PIR relationships. However, a stubborn combination of the aforementioned impediments and a growing perception of New Zealand loyalty to major power priorities could diminish that asset. Burgeoning interest in the PIR and its resources by other states is hardly surprising in the context of globalisation. Both China and Japan are enhancing their roles in the Pacific. New Zealand has authentic “think small” interests in cooperating and indeed coordinating with Pacific Island states in the face of increasing external involvement in the region.

Middle East Finally, New Zealand is affected by the resurgence of religion as a force in international relations and the cruel violence committed by Islamic extremists throughout the Middle East, parts of Africa and on the territory of major powers. Responsibility for meeting this growing challenge cannot be confined to governments, diplomats or military commanders. Dialogue within the Muslim world as well as between Christians and Muslims and other faith communities is a global priority. Secular authorities, including New Zealand, should encourage this dialogue. However, political causes behind Middle Eastern strife cannot be simply ignored by New Zealand or other foreign policy players. It is self-deception to assign sole responsibility for incessant conflict to radical, Islamic forces, and to ignore the harmful repercussions of the prolonged intrusion by a particular succession of powerful outside governments

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that have redrawn boundaries, imposed their version of order and tied the Middle East region’s resources, particularly oil, to their own interests. Taking sides in the internal conflicts of other states, especially when the conflicts have a religious dimension, is extremely hazardous. Modern experience indicates that enforcing regime change to remove uncongenial leadership in the Middle East very often produces widespread chaos and instability. The lesson for outsiders is that any attempt to impose peace or secure victory for one faction, sect or community over another in an internal conflict is likely to be counter-productive, at least until a tipping point is reached where exhausted contestants themselves are ready to lay down arms. At that point, outside mediation and peace support as well as post-conflict reconstruction becomes feasible. Yet when push comes to shove, fortune makes strange bedfellows and shared values count for little. At present in the Middle East, New Zealand is providing military training assistance to the army of the Iraq government in a conflict where the forces of democratic human rights advocates are combining with forces of autocratic flagrant human rights abusers to confront jihadists and separatists. For the outsider, it is often impossible to distinguish friend from foe. Repercussions from devastating and chaotic violence will likely persist. A simple return to status quo ante is highly improbable. Previous New Zealand military involvements do not necessarily provide a clear pointer for future decisions about the most appropriate New Zealand contributions to the region to help restore stability and sanity.

Conclusion New Zealand’s international identity significantly evolved during the late 20th century from what was once a small, dependable, distant outpost of an unrivalled Atlantic world. Since the 1980s, striking changes in the world have helped to refashion New Zealand’s international relations. The advent and power of instant communication, the swift transfer of money, ideas, technology and people across boundaries, changes in New Zealand’s demographics, plus the globalisation of the world economy and shifts in the centre of international economic gravity, present a combination of reasons why the traditional 20th New Zealand identity has been transformed. This does not mean that New Zealand values will change. Nevertheless, a globalising interdependent planet is not “making the world all the same”.

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All the signs are that diversity will not only endure but increase. Values-driven international relations will remain influential and the cause of human rights continues to be prominent, but changes to behaviour will result from the persistent eloquence of example rather than from the power of force. As noted earlier, New Zealand possesses distinctive soft power that equips it for this task. A conviction that there is only one model for progress — the Western brand of democratic capitalism spread on the back of a globalising economy led from the West — is challenged by the case of Asian success. The latter displays indigenous versions of capitalism and of democracy, or governance that do not conform necessarily to Western practice or preferences (Gray, 1999). New Zealand should therefore remain wary about any 21st century “crusade” to impose Western practices and preferences in Asia. The growing sense amongst many nations that human security ranks alongside national security fortifies human rights as a consequential cause in international relations. Nevertheless, the response of several democracies to the modern threat of radicalised extremism has involved national security measures that intrude on individual human rights — to privacy, to freedom of movement, to humanitarian treatment as refugees and involve detention without trial or due process, even illegitimate methods of interrogation; and the right to be truthfully informed. As a result, the pursuit of values-driven foreign policy has been complicated by the implicit message that “securing freedom requires the curtailment of freedoms”. Domestic policy decisions and their impact upon international identity have never been as interrelated as in the present era. The boundary line between national and international policy is blurring. That is a lesson as relevant to small independently minded New Zealand and its soft power as it is for larger more powerful countries and their grand agendas.

References Elder, C and R Ayson (2012). China’s rise and New Zealand interests: Policy primer for 2030. Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Discussion Paper No. 11. Fry, G (2015). Recapturing the spirit of 1971: Towards a new political settlement in the Pacific. Australian National University: State, Society & Governance in Melanesia. Discussion Paper. No. 2015/3. Gray, J (1999). False Dawn: Delusions of Global Capitalism, pp. 4–21. London: Granta Books.

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Malloch-Brown, M (2011). The Unfinished Gl-b-l R-v-lution. London: Allen Lane. Nye, JS (1990). Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books. Nye, JS (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. O’Brien, T (2005). Britain, the EU and NZ. In Celebrating New Zealand’s Emergence: A Tribute to Sir George Laking and Frank Corner, B Lynch (ed.), pp. 27–37. New Zealand: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.

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CHAPTER 5 Exporting Aotearoa New Zealand’s Biculturalism: Lessons for Indigenous-Settler Relations in Canada David B. MacDonald

In essence our exports need to reduce in weight and become heavier in knowledge and value. To achieve this we need a vibrant and well integrated innovation system which is capable of creating wealth from ideas. (Clarke, 2002, p. 32)

Introduction Canada is currently undergoing a process of reconciliation between Indigenous peoples (First Nations, Metis and Inuit) and settler populations. Aotearoa New Zealand is arguably ahead of Canada in terms of its bicultural relationships between P¯akeh¯a and M¯aori (or even the more inclusive tangata tiriti and tangata whenua). Since its creation in 1840, New Zealand has exported many things aside from wool, dairy products and world-class rugby. One salient export has been ideational — a unique idea of biculturalism between Indigenous peoples and European settlers. Ideas, as the Clark Labour government noted a decade and a half ago, are very important to how New Zealand is seen in the world, and the idea of exporting “knowledge and value” was attractive then, as it is now (Office of the Prime Minister, 2002, p. 32). While biculturalism was at first far more myth than reality, providing an “illusion of superiority” amongst British settler states, there are many aspects of NZ biculturalism that can act as benchmarks for 67

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helping settler Canadians articulate how reconciliation might work in practice (Murphy, 2009, p. 64). Canada has traditionally excluded Indigenous peoples from both how the country is governed and represented to its own people and the outside world. This chapter explores some of the positive aspects of the New Zealand bicultural model and contrasts this with Canada’s English–French biculturalism and its multiculturalism of diverse ethnic communities, both of which suppress the Indigenous origins of what is now Canada. This country has recently undergone some interesting changes, which make this chapter timely. In October 2015, the long-serving Conservative government of Stephen Harper was defeated by the Liberal Party of Justin Trudeau, the young and charismatic son of one of Canada’s best-known former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. By December of that year, Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) wrapped up its six-year mandate. Earlier that year, they issued 94 recommendations for fundamentally changing the relationship between the settler population and Indigenous peoples. The purpose of the TRC has been to come to terms with the intergenerational legacies of Indian Residential Schools. This system was operated by the federal government and the four main Christian churches; some 150,000 Indigenous children were forced over a period of 150 years to attend a network of 125 schools located across the country. They were stripped of their cultures, languages and traditions, in what the TRC has called “cultural genocide”. Verbal, physical and sexual abuse ran rampant through the schools. The schools created high levels of post-traumatic stress disorder and other serious problems that have passed and continue to pass inter-generationally. At least 6000 children died there. An estimated 80,000 residential school survivors are alive today (MacDonald, 2015, pp. 413–414). As Canada goes through a process of reconciliation, many aspects of New Zealand biculturalism appear attractive. However, there are obvious differences between the two countries which make lessons difficult to apply. First, New Zealand was colonised much later than North America, New Zealand has only one Treaty, and one fairly culturally and linguistically cohesive Indigenous population, concentrated within a geographic area the size of the British Isles. From 1902, M¯aori had forms of political representation in settler institutions (although their population warranted far higher representation). Christian conversion for M¯aori was widespread and seemed to synthesise better with

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M¯aori value systems than it did for many First Nations, in part perhaps because M¯aori leaders managed to create syncretic forms of religion, such as the Ratana Church and political movement. M¯aori were not forced to attend residential schools, although the integrated schooling system was designed to assimilate and indoctrinate just as day schools were in Canada. M¯aori were similarly not as geographically isolated and maintained a larger population base relative to settlers relative to Indigenous peoples in Canada. This made a difference in terms of visibility and political power, which while relatively weak in a P¯akeh¯adominated society was nevertheless stronger than any comparable situation in Canada. Ranginui Walker notes his people’s “success in maintaining cultural continuity in the face of tremendous assimilative pressures” (Walker, 1987, p. 96). Despite these positive developments, many point (quite rightly) to the low economic status of M¯aori relative to P¯akeh¯a populations, in part a result of successive neoliberal policies from the 1980s onwards. While symbolically M¯aori are in a relatively stronger position than they were historically, their social and economic indicators have fallen considerably since the free market reforms, M¯aori unemployment has risen significantly, as well as the percentage of M¯aori living below the poverty line. Similarly, access to housing has plummeted. An exception is the iwi-based M¯aori elites who have profited somewhat by the Treaty settlement process. However, these people make up only a small fraction of the M¯aori population (Rashbrooke, 2013, p. 27). The percentage of prisoners who are M¯aori has also increased since the 1980s; currently, 52 per cent of male prisoners are M¯aori, alongside a staggering 63 per cent of women. This marks a shocking change from the 1988 report on M¯aori and the criminal justice system (Jackson, 2014). New Zealand thus offers a model but also a cautionary warning. First, symbolic recognition of M¯aori, official bilingualism, the spread of Te Reo in schools and the rapid pace of treaty settlements would indicate that M¯aori are doing better than before. However, the pace of economic reforms has created much higher levels of economic inequality for M¯aori than before the “M¯aori renaissance” of the 1980s. What then can Canada learn from the New Zealand experience? This chapter explores several themes: Indigenous-settler biculturalism, the relational concept of P¯akeh¯a, electoral change through mixed member proportional (MMP) representation and Indigenous conceptions of interdependence with the natural world.

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Biculturalism One of the most striking aspects of New Zealand society for outsiders is Indigenous settler biculturalism. Many social scientists suggest that until the 1970s, biculturalism was primarily rhetorical, used to disguise P¯akeh¯a monocultural hegemony (see Maaka and Fleras, 2005, p. 98). De facto forms of bi-nationalism grew out of M¯aori protest during the 1960s and 1970s, and the idea of a M¯aori–P¯akeh¯a partnership developed through such signposts as the 1975 Waitangi Tribunal; Te Reo M¯aori as an official language (by 1987); the creation of M¯aori educational systems and the widespread introduction of M¯aori names for institutions, M¯aori culture and M¯aori rituals. Overall, the relationship was reframed during this period as one between tangata whenua (people of the land) and the tangata tiriti (settlers represented by the Treaty of Waitangi) (Poata-Smith, 2013). Biculturalism as it has evolved has consisted of various policies designed to implement an ethos of sharing power, at least symbolically between the two founding peoples of the state. Mason Durie outlined two broad themes — one giving recognition to the cultural traditions of M¯aori and P¯akeh¯a, the other favouring a redistribution of resources to M¯aori (Durie, 1998, p. 101). Ranginui Walker promoted the idea of transforming all monocultural institutions into bicultural ones. As such: biculturalism is the coexistence of two distinct cultures, M¯aori and P¯akeh¯a, within New Zealand society with the values and traditions of both cultures reflected in society’s customs, laws, practices and institutional arrangements, and with both cultures sharing control over resources and decision making. (Durie, 1998, p. 101)

Biculturalism can also lead to calls for institutionalised bi-nationalism, which, as Fleras and Maaka observe, implies a reworking of dominant institutions and narratives, privileging both narratives and practical realities of a “majority-tomajority partnership”, shared sovereignty and “complementary co-existence”, where respect for difference is embedded into the way the state is structured (Maaka and Fleras, 2005, pp. 275–76). Related aspects could include a M¯aori justice system, something Moana Jackson and others have been promoting in their work, given the deplorable prison statistics that echo similar problems in Canada. Others such as Whatarangi Winiata have sought parallel political institutions for M¯aori at the national level, with legislative branches for P¯akeh¯a and M¯aori based on separate governance traditions (Hayward, 2015).

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Canada has little experience of biculturalism or bi-nationalism with Indigenous peoples in the sense that both our biculturalism and multiculturalism exclude Indigenous peoples. Although Canada is consistently rated as one of the top countries in the UN Human Development Index, Indigenous peoples rank alongside citizens of Panama, Belarus and Malaysia in terms of their social and economic prospects, and these gaps are not narrowing (Daschuk, 2013, p. 9). Bilingualism/biculturalism between the descendants of British and French settlers is ostensibly a consociational arrangement between two colonizing powers — a battle over who shall play the host and where. Commissioner Wilson of the TRC has put it that “both English and French have been used as weapons to destroy indigenous languages and cultures” (Wilson, 2012). Multiculturalism, perceived as tolerance for ethnic communities who are neither British nor French, likewise excludes Indigenous peoples. The largesse of Euro-Canadian society as host to non-white newcomers is a prominent part of this process. Efforts to include Indigenous peoples as ethnic minorities within a multicultural paradigm are sometimes undertaken as a means of deliberately downplaying their sui generis rights and the treaty relationships they maintain with the crown (MacDonald, 2014). The tendency to lump Indigenous peoples together as one or possibly three groups out of a multitude of ethnic minorities has worked to dilute and suppress Indigenous rights and occlude the reality of their distinctiveness, which is culturally diverse as Europe. Voyageur and Cailliou have noted the wide range of genographical, legal, social, cultural and linguistic differences between Indigenous peoples, with 633 Indian bands, some 20,000 reserves, 11 language families, and 53 languages (Voyageur and Calliou, 2000/2001, p. 103). We see the marginalization of Indigenous people demonstrated in a variety of ways, what we might call examples of a sort of Foucauldian micropolitics of settler colonialism. For example, in Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s publication Discover Canada, we see a settler state largely devoid of Indigenous presence, a country composed of immigrants with some groups more important than others. Indeed, Indigenous peoples are presented as the nation’s first immigrants (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012, p. 10). However, “Canadian society today stems largely from the English-speaking and Frenchspeaking Christian civilizations that were brought here from Europe by settlers.

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English and French define the reality of day-to-day life for most people and are the country’s official languages” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012, p. 12). What elements and symbols comprise the nation? First we have the British monarch and English law, “an 800-year old tradition of ordered liberty, which dates back to the signing of Magna Carta in 1215 …” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012, p. 8). Followed by this are the “Canadian Crown”, then the Canadian flag which in part comes from the “the flag of the Royal Military College, Kingston”, and its colours coming from the “colours of France and England since the Middle Ages”. The maple leaf was “adopted as a symbol by French Canadians in the 1700s”. The fleur-de-lys “was adopted by the French king in the year 496”. The Canadian coat of arms, “contain symbols of England, France, Scotland and Ireland as well as red maple leaves”. Finally, the two official languages are “important symbols of identity”. The guide concludes: “English speakers (Anglophones) and French speakers (Francophones) have lived together in partnership and creative tension for more than 300 years” (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2012, pp. 38–39). The guide demonstrates rather well the sort of studied exclusion we as a state promote when welcoming newcomers to Canada, and also epitomises the larger problems of strategic forgetting at the centre of the settler colonial project. The professed symbols of Canada are all tied to either one or both of Canada’s founding European peoples, or to choices made by European settlers (such as the maple leaf ). This guide illustrates well how successful the settler colonial project has been in Canada. We do not need to acknowledge Indigenous peoples as part of the integration process, and the guide confirms that a relationship with Indigenous peoples is not necessary as part of being Canadian. Another illustration of the same type of alienation is Rudyard Griffith’s 2008 book 101 Things Canadians Should Know About Canada. Sponsored by the federal government and the Dominion Institute (also known for their glorification of John A. MacDonald), not one of the 101 “things” pertain to Indigenous peoples or their contributions. This project, initiated by a rightwing institute tied with a conservative government, was based on an online survey of over 3000 adult respondents throughout the country as to the seminal events and people in Canadian history. Respondents included “522 educators who deal with subject areas related to social sciences, history, geography, civics,

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music, art or culture, as well as 274 members of the Order of Canada”. Of interest is that Indigenous leaders, events, places and symbols are notably absent (Dominion Institute and Angus Reid Polling, 2008). Ultimately, this glaring omission was identified and Indigenous peoples were tacked on as the 102nd spot on the list (Canadian Press, 2008). Again this particular issue says a great deal about the importance accorded to Indigenous peoples when even the educated public has a chance to voice their opinions. These examples illustrate well what Marie Battiste has called “cognitive imperialism”, to describe how Indigenous peoples have been obliged to internalise the worldviews of the “dominant society” (Rice and Snyder, 2008, p. 55). In a recent reflection on what it means to be a white settler, Fitzmaurice observes that to be white in Canada is to be, at a macro/structural level, free of colonial/racial encumbrances; it is also to be the source of the downward push on all other nonwhites. It is to be perceived as “normal” and unmarked, always transforming oneself within a sea of others’ conspicuous, fixed differences. (Fitzmaurice, 2010, p. 354)

In the New Zealand context, the New Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils embraces what they call a “Treaty-based multicultural society in which M¯aori have particular status as Tangata Whenua” (New Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils, 2015). The Treaty and its obligations are central to this vision of what New Zealand should look like in the future. The annual meeting I attended in Gisborne in 2013 was on a Marae and featured M¯aori Party president Naida Glavish as the keynote, speaking on Manaakitanga or M¯aori hospitality. The idea of promoting a strong biculturalism first, followed by multiculturalism is indeed the reverse of what we have done in Canada, with highly negative effects for Indigenous peoples. This squares well with Ranginui Walker’s view that the Treaty was the first immigration agreement between M¯aori and representatives of the settlers, and heralds an actual period of legal and political relationships, with negotiated forms of governance for each group (Spoonley and Bedford, 2012, p. 230). One way in which the idea of indigenous settler biculturalism is being mooted is through the idea of all Canadians being treaty people, a sort of echo of the tangata whenua — tangata tiriti division. The TRC stresses that “We are all Treaty people who share responsibility for taking action on reconciliation” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a, p. 12). In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, the idea of everyone being a treaty person has

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become more popular as educational kits are prepared for use in school classrooms. Currently, Saskatchewan and Manitoba have Indigenous demographics of about 15 to 17 per cent of the population, which is roughly comparable to New Zealand; which is perhaps why things are possibly changing at the provincial levels (Friesen, 2016).

P¯akeh¯a Identity An aspect of identifying as a treaty person is reflected in another innovation unique to New Zealand — the concept of P¯akeh¯a, about which I have undertaken a detailed study (MacDonald, 2016). These terms go back to the 19th century at least in common usage as Salmond recalls (Salmond, 1997, p. 279). As with M¯aori, P¯akeh¯a was a culturally heterogeneous category, as Belich (2002) and others have observed. It began largely as a description of non-M¯aori Europeans, but has evolved since the 1970s to refer toan aspirational identity based on a relationship with Indigenous peoples. Liu and Ward observe “Perhaps as many as a quarter of New Zealanders of European descent self-identify as P¯akeh¯a, which is a self-designation that acknowledges a relationship with M¯aori as a part of one’s own group identity” (Ward and Liu, 2012, p. 21). Here the process of reconciliation between settlers and indigenous peoples has involved political, economic, cultural and ideational power-sharing, which have come about through a M¯aori renaissance and the development of economically powerful iwi (tribal entities) through the treaty settlement process. David Pearson has viewed the P¯akeh¯a self-description as “an explicitly nationalist endeavour to create a postcolonial identity that fully acknowledges the bicultural, possibly binational, foundations of the settler state” (Pearson, 2009, p. 49). Avril Bell’s definition takes things a step further, in that P¯akeh¯a can embody a form of self-criticism, the ability to highlight white privilege. Thus P¯akeh¯a is the majority culture, the “White, ‘political descendants’ of the group who colonized Aotearoa [and who] inherit the political (and material and symbolic) privileges ‘secured’ by the practices of colonization . . . . In this sense, all White New Zealanders inherit a colonial relationality to M¯aori” (Bell, 2004, p. 17). There is an emancipatory potential embodied in P¯akeh¯a in that as Bell argues, “displaces white New Zealanders from their position of discursive exnomination as the (normal, ordinary) New Zealanders”. In other words

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“P¯akeh¯a identity recognises and names white New Zealanders as one group among many who co-exist in the New Zealander nation-state. Discursively, this goes some way towards undermining white hegemony” (Bell, 1996, pp. 153–154). In Canada, there is no shorthand term to denote a European settler Canadian in a relationship with Indigenous peoples, except perhaps “settler ally”, which is primarily an aspirational category that remains marginal and contested. The idea of having a settler identity contingent on honouring treaty and other commitments to Indigenous peoples is compelling, which can and should form an important part of the reconciliation process going forward. Ironically, terms for white people such as the Anishnaabe term shahganash is, as Fitzmaurice explains, “someone who does not understand the Aboriginal perspective of the world and fully believes him/herself to be superior to, and to know what is best for, Aboriginal people” (Fitzmaurice, 2010, p. 355). This type of a P¯akeh¯a-like relational identity could help Canadian settlers better reflect on the centrality of their relationship to Indigenous peoples.

Mixed Member Proportional MMP representation, which has been in New Zealand since 1993 and is based on the German electoral system, has allowed for a stronger representation of M¯aori in the centralised institutions of government (Grey and Fitzsimons, 2012). The New Zealand experience shows that MMP and coalition governments can produce better descriptive representation for M¯aori, with possibly better substantive representation as well at the national level, although not at the local council levels of course, where there are serious problems of underrepresentation. On the positive side, the M¯aori Party was able to get New Zealand to sign on to the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous People (UNDRIP), which had a strong influence on Canada’s participation (Watkins, 2010). Ministers of M¯aori Affairs have been M¯aori, unlike Canada where no minister of Indian affairs or Indigenous affairs has been Indigenous. New Zealand’s bi-national model is not perfect, and academics and activists have criticised its application in practice, especially when M¯aori are treated as a “junior partner” in the relationship. Some point to the legal challenges between M¯aori and the Crown (Durie, 1998), while others note how traditional M¯aori governance structures have been altered to accommodate European political practices, privileging iwi over hap¯u and whanau

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(Fleras and Maaka, 2005). Some present settler colonialism as an “ongoing project” (Smith, 2012). On the positive side, M¯aori have achieved parliamentary representation higher than their percentage of the overall population, alongside prominent M¯aori in cabinet and in other positions of leadership. Further, recent studies demonstrate that M¯aori and P¯akeh¯a under a bi-national system are equally committed to common New Zealand symbols and national culture, a unique situation relative to other western settler societies (Sibley and Liu, 2007). Additionally, there are M¯aori-based parties in parliament: the M¯aori Party in alliance with the National government, which also has several M¯aori cabinet ministers. The co-leader of the Green Party is M¯aori, as is the leader of New Zealand First. In the elections in late 2014, 21 per cent of the composition of parliament was M¯aori (Parliament of New Zealand, 2014). In the 2017 elections, M¯aori representation dipped somewhat. The M¯aori Party disappeared from Parliament, and Mana did not gain any seats, either as a party or in Hone Harawira’s former constituency. Prominent M¯aori politician Metiria Turei resigned as co-leader of the Green Party during the election cycle. The new Labour-New Zealand First coalition government brings together a large number of M¯aori and Pasifika MPs, including Labour taking all seven M¯aori seats. Thirteen cabinets ministers are M¯aori or Pasifika, one of the most diverse cabinets in the country’s history. In Canada, the electoral systems both provincially and federally are first past the post, which means that Indigenous interests are rarely represented. In the previous Parliament, there were only 7 Indigenous MPs, which increased to 10 in the October elections last year. Of the eight Liberal Indigenous MPs election, two became cabinet ministers, including our new Attorney General (Fontaine, 2015). This marks a change, albeit a minor one. In the entire history of Parliament prior to 2015, we have had 33 Indigenous MPs. The majority have been Metis (16). The first First Nations MP (that is an MP with Indian status) was elected in 1968, making him the first of 11 First Nations MPs in the history of Parliament. There have also been five Inuit MPs since 1867 (“Inuit, Métis or First Nation Origin”, 2015). As well, Anishinaabe broadcaster and political Wab Kinew became leader of the Manitoba provincial New Democratic Party. Things are changing in the sense that Indigenous voters are now being encouraged to vote tactically. The Assembly of First Nations in 2015 identified 51 key swing ridings where Indigenous voters could tip the balance in favour of

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parties promoting treaty implementation and federal investment in education, training and better housing. This sort of tactical voting signals the beginning of what could be a major change in how Indigenous peoples in Canada are understanding and articulating their interests (Kirkup, 2015). The larger question is whether Indigenous peoples want to engage with settler state institutions. Low voter turnout stems in part from a sense that the treaties confer the right to have self-government, not dilution and submergence within the institutions of the colonisers. There is thus the sense that to participate in the settler voting process is to legitimate a system, which has no capacity to actually bring meaningful and positive change. There has been extensive discussion about reforming the electoral system — both the Liberals and the New Democratic Party (NDP) pledged to do so. However, after a rather half-hearted and poorly executed consultation process, Prime Minister Trudeau reneged on his promise in 2017, stating that the first past the post system would remain.

Interdependence Recent treaty settlements in New Zealand have also embedded M¯aori views of the environment in some dimensions of national life. The ideal of reconciliation is one of binational co-governance structures, where various institutions share power, both political and ideational. Power-sharing consists of dividing up tasks where each group has some level of expertise. For example, the Whanganui iwi act as guardians of the Whanganui River and speak in its interests, as this is something P¯akeh¯a are less able to do. This would be an example of restoring hostness, of returning mana to an iwi that was stolen during colonization. The deep interdependence of the Whanganui iwi with the river is recognised in the 2014 Treaty settlement, which restores the M¯aori role as guardian of the river. As the settlement outlines: “The iwi and hap¯u of the Whanganui River have an inalienable interconnection with, and responsibility to, Te Awa Tupua and its health and wellbeing” (Te Awa Tupua, 2014). The result is a form of co-management where the river is seen to “own itself ” in the words of the Minister of Treaty Settlements. Whanganui iwi and the national and regional governments would then work towards administering the river in the best interests of the river, which is perceived to have its own interests and to also be the ancestor of the Whanganui (Stowell, 2014).

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Nothing of the kind exists in Canada officially, although Indigenous leaders have been promoting forms of interdependence and respect of the earth for many centuries. For example, in The Sacred Tree, a team of authors including Elders outline a holistic vision of humanity and the natural world. A key aspect of Indigenous thought is the centrality of “wholeness”, the recognition that “All things are interrelated. Everything in the universe is part of a single whole. Everything is connected in some way to everything else” (Lane et al. 2004, p. 26). This connectedness obliges us to take responsibility for our actions, and to realise that nothing we do happens in isolation. McGaa (Oglala Sioux) puts it that “The hard part of what it means to be interrelated to all things is that our neglect comes back full circle to affect us as negatively as it affects other species. Our existence is being threatened too. We are held accountable for our actions (or lack thereof ) towards the Earth, even to generations unborn” (McGaa, 2004, p. 243). For the TRC, respect for the environment has been a key aspect of overcoming some of the legacies of colonization. As the Commissioners have stressed: Reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians, from an Aboriginal perspective, also requires reconciliation with the natural world. If human beings resolve problems between themselves but continue to destroy the natural world, then reconciliation remains incomplete. …Reconciliation will never occur unless we are also reconciled with the earth. (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015a, p. 18)

If this aspect of reconciliation squares with indigenous laws, another aspect of the recommendations, we may see changes similar to those here. Of course I am aware that the river settlement is but one aspect of a much larger settlement process.

Conclusion For many outside observers, New Zealand demonstrates that increased control by M¯aori over M¯aori education, law, health care and governance makes an important difference in generating positive outcomes. A mixture of recognition and control over things M¯aori has been very important. In Canada, the 94 recommendations of the TRC released in late 2015 provide a solid road map on the way to a respectful and mutually beneficial

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partnership ethos. Biculturalism in New Zealand has helped set a precedent for what many Indigenous leaders envisage arising from the reconciliation process. A few of their recommendations are the following: • Increased Indigenous language recognition and rights, but even this falls short of asking for official language status as in New Zealand. • Recommendations for the “recognition and implementation of Aboriginal justice systems” and a systematised effort to reduce structure racism and overrepresentation of Indigenous peoples in prisons and other aspects of the justice system. • Recommendation for a “Royal Proclamation of Reconciliation”, which would “reaffirm the nation-to-nation relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown”, repudiating the Doctrine of Discovery, as well as “Renew or establish Treaty relationships based on principles of mutual recognition, mutual respect, and shared responsibility for maintaining those relationships into the future. Reconcile Aboriginal and Crown constitutional and legal orders to ensure that Aboriginal peoples are full partners in Confederation, including the recognition and integration of Indigenous laws and legal traditions in negotiation and implementation processes involving Treaties, land claims, and other constructive agreements”. (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015b, pp. 4–5.) Both Canada and New Zealand have many challenges regarding issues of race relations and Indigenous-settler relations. New Zealand has a growing gap between rich and poor which continues to impose severe impediments for M¯aori, leading to economic, political, and social marginalization; structural racism, particularly in the judicial system, remains of serious concern. However, the situation in Canada is far more serious in many respects, not only in terms of social indicators, but also as I have discussed here, in terms of ideational power, in terms of how the state is presented and understood. Models of English-French biculturalism and multiculturalism both elide the sui generis legal rights of Indigenous peoples and their unique and central role in the history of what is now Canada. There is certainly hope for the future, and Indigenous peoples and settler Canadians have worked to change the federal government, replacing it with something more progressive and more likely to promote the sort of reforms that will put Canada on a road to reconciliation.

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References Belich, J (2002). Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders, from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Bell, A (1996). “We’re just New Zealanders:” P¯akeh¯a identity politics. In Nga Patai: Racism and Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand, P Spoonley, D Pearson, and C MacPherson (eds.) pp. 144–158, 280–281. Palmerston North: Dunmore. Bell, A (2004). Relating M¯aori and P¯akeh¯a: The politics of indigenous and settler identities. PhD Thesis, Massey University. Canadian Press (17 July 2008). First Nations added to list of defining Canadian Icons. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/first-nations-added-to-list-ofdefining-canadian-icons-1.719768 Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2012). Discover Canada: The rights and responsibilities of citizenship. http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/discover.pdf Clarke, H (February 2002). Growing an innovative New Zealand. United Nations Public Administration Network. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/pub lic/documents/apcity/unpan005946.pdf Daschuk, J (2013). Clearing the Plains: Disease, Politics of Starvation, and the Loss of Indigenous Life. Regina: University of Regina Press. Dominion Institute and Angus Reid Polling (27 June 2008). Canadians choose the people, places, events, accomplishments and symbols that define Canada. https://www.historicacanada.ca/sites/default/files/PDF/polls/canada101_part1_ en.pdf Durie, M (1998). Whaiora: M¯aori Health Development. Auckland: Oxford University Press, pp. 98–102. Fitzmaurice, K (2010). Are white people obsolete? Indigenous knowledge and the colonizing ally in Canada. In Alliances: Re/Envisioning Indigenous–non-Indigenous Relationships, L Davis (ed.), pp. 351–367. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Fontaine, T (20 October 2015). Record 10 indigenous MPs elected to the House of Commons: 8 Liberal and 2 NDP MPs of indigenous heritage will take a seat in Parliament. CBC News. http://www.cbc.ca/news/Indigenous/indigenous-guideto-house-of-commons-1.3278957 Friesen, J (26 December 2016). Canada’s growing indigenous population reshaping cities across the country. Globe and Mail. https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/ news/growing-indigenous-population-reshaping-cities-across-the-country/article Macdonald 33436120/. Grey, S and M Fitzsimons (2012). Defending Democracy: “Keep MMP” and the 2011 Electoral Referendum. In Kicking the Tyres: The New Zealand General Election and Electoral Referendum of 2011, Johansson J and S Levine (eds.). Victoria University Press. Hayward, J (2015). Biculturalism. Encyclopedia of New Zealand. http://www.teara. govt.nz/en/biculturalism

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“Inuit, Métis or First Nation Origin”. http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/Compilatio ns/Parliament/Indigenous.aspx?Menu=HOC-Bio&Role=MP&Current=True& NativeOrigin=; Jackson, M (17–18 February 2014). Presentation on M¯aori Prison Populations. UN Expert Seminar on Restorative Justice, Indigenous Juridical Systems and Access to Justice. Auckland. Kirkup, K (14 June 2015). AFN identifies 51 swing ridings ahead of October’s federal election. CTV News. http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/afn-identifies-51swing-ridings-ahead-of-october-s-federal-election-1.2422157 Lane, P, et al. (2004). The Sacred Tree, 4th Ed. Twin Lakes, WI: Lotus Press. Maaka, R and A Fleras (2005). The Politics of Indigeneity: Challenging the State in Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand. Dunedin, NZ: University of Otago Press. MacDonald, D (2014). Genocide in the Indian Residential Schools: Canadian History through the Lens of the UN Genocide Convention. In Colonial Genocide in Indigenous North America, A Woolford, J Benvenuto and AL Hinton (eds.), pp. 465–493. Durham: Duke University Press. MacDonald, D (2015). Canada’s history wars: Indigenous genocide and public memory in the United States, Australia and Canada. Journal of Genocide Research, 17(4), 411–431. MacDonald, D (2016). Do We Need Kiwi Lessons in Biculturalism? Considering the Usefulness of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s P¯akeh¯a Identity in Re-Articulating Indigenous Settler Relations in Canada. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 49(4), 643–664. McGaa, EEM (2004). Nature’s Way: Native Wisdom for Living in Balance with the Earth. New York: HarperOne. Murphy, N (2009). “M¯aoriland” and “Yellow Peril”: Discourses of M¯aori and Chinese in the Formation of New Zealand’s National Identity 1890–1914. In The Dragon & the Taniwha: M¯aori & Chinese in New Zealand, M Ip (ed.). Auckland: Auckland University Press. New Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils (2015). Treaty based multiculturalism. http://multiculturalnz.org.nz/uploads/sites/multiculturalnz/files/ pdfs/2014/Multicultural-NZFMC-broch-A4-print.pdf Office of the Prime Minister (2002). Growing an innovative New Zealand. Office of the Prime Minister. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/ apcity/unpan005946.pdf Parliament of New Zealand (2014). The 2014 New Zealand general election: Final results and voting statistics. http://www.parliament.nz/resource/ennz/00PLLawRP2015011/1cb65e1e0919e68b3048392636652383f18cd7c1 Pearson, D (2009). The “Majority Factor”: Shaping Chinese and M¯aori Minorities. In The Dragon & The Taniwha: M¯aori & Chinese in New Zealand, M Ip (ed.). Auckland: Auckland University Press.

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Poata-Smith, ETA (2013). Inequality and M¯aori. In Inequality: A New Zealand Crisis, M Rashbrooke (ed.). New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books Limited. Rashbrooke, M (2013). Why inequality matters. In Inequality: A New Zealand Crisis, M Rashbrooke (ed.). New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books Limited. Rice, B and A Snyder (2008). Reconciliation in the context of a settler society: Healing the legacy of colonialism in Canada. In From Truth to Reconciliation: Transforming the Legacy of Residential Schools, M Brant-Castellano, L Archibald, and M DeGagne (eds.) pp. 43–63. Ottawa: AHF Research Series. Salmond, A (1997). Between Worlds: Early Exchanges between M¯aori and Europeans. Auckland: Viking. Sibley, CG and JH Liu (2007). New Zealand = bicultural? Implicit and explicit associations between ethnicity and nationhood in the New Zealand context. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 1222–1243. Smith, LT (2012). Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. Auckland: Penguin Spoonley, P and R Bedford (2012). Welcome to Our World? Immigration and the Reshaping of New Zealand. Auckland: Dunmore Publishing. Stowell, L (6 August 2014). Historic day as Whanganui River settlement is signed. Wanganui Chronicle. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/wanganui-chronicle/ news/article.cfm?c_id=1503426&objectid=11304613 Te Awa Tupua (5 August 2014). Te P¯a Auroa N¯a Te Awa Tupua/The Te Awa Tupua Framework. http://nz01.terabyte.co.nz/ots/DocumentLibrary/140805 RurukuWhakatupua-TeManaOTeAwaTupua.pdf Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015a). Honouring the truth, reconciling for the future summary of the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Ottawa. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015b). Calls to Action, Ottawa. Voyageur, C and B Calliou (2000/2001). Various shades of red: Diversity within Canada’s indigenous community. London Journal of Canadian Studies, 16, 109–124. Walker, R (1987). Nga Tau Tohetohe Years of Anger. Auckland: Penguin. Ward, C and J Liu (2012). Ethno-cultural conflict in Aotearoa/New Zealand: Balancing indigenous rights and multicultural responsibilities. In Handbook of EthnoCultural Conflict, D Landis and R Albert (eds.). New York: Springer. Watkins, T (2010). NZ does U-turn on rights charter. Stuff. http://www.stuff. co.nz/national/politics/3599153/NZ-does-U-turn-on-rights-charter. Wilson, M (29 November 2012). Truth and reconciliation in Canada: Lessons learned from Canada’s residential school experience. Jeanne Sauve Address, Montreal. http://www.myrobust.com/websites/trcinstitution/File/pdfs/2012%20Jeanne% 20Sauv%20Address.pdf

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CHAPTER 6 What Does New Zealand’s Changing Demography Mean for Its Place in the World? Andrew Butcher

Introduction This chapter1 considers the question of “what does New Zealand’s changing demography mean for its place in the world?” It begins answering this question by detailing what New Zealand’s population was at the last Census 2013 and how it has changed over time and by considering New Zealand’s place in the Asia-Pacific where it is at once geographically remote and is an integral member of the Asia-Pacific region. Overlaying the discussion throughout this chapter is the hypothesis that as New Zealand’s Asian populations grow, they may expect the New Zealand government to respond to events in their home countries and in the Asian region. As a subsidiary point, we are thus concerned with the effect of this changing demography — especially the “Asianisation” of New Zealand — on its foreign policy outcomes. In short, New Zealand foreign policy will have to walk a tightrope. It will have to confront (or be confronted with) questions including “which values should be advanced, and which should not?” Values, in other words, are woven through foreign policy, whether they are articulated or not. In its careful response to matters of foreign policy, the New Zealand government will want to ensure peaceable relations 1I

am very grateful to the constructive input of Paul Spoonley, Nicholas Khoo and Peter Mumford on an earlier draft of this chapter. 83

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with its major Asian trading partners and others and its own security and economic growth. We may argue, for example, that stability is as much of a value as human rights and democracy. Assuming a likely increase in this cycle of demands by New Zealand’s diversifying domestic population and responses by the government, this chapter further discusses the role that values play in the articulation (if not necessarily in the implementation) of New Zealand’s foreign policy. In this context, consideration is also given to the potentially formative role played by media and by social attitudes. The matter here is less about how public opinion has affected New Zealand foreign policy and rather more a discussion of the role of public opinion in New Zealand foreign policy: a subtle but critical difference.

The People of New Zealand New Zealand is approximately 745 miles from its nearest neighbour, New Caledonia, 1240 miles from Australia (McMillan, 2010), and has a population of only 4.3 million people. At the bottom of the South Pacific, New Zealand is about as close as one can get to the end of the world. For most of its history, the majority of New Zealand’s population was homogeneous — of British, Scottish or Irish stock (Bedford and Spoonley, 2012, p. 9). This reflected, too, New Zealand’s orientation and warmth to Great Britain. When New Zealand (but Australian-born) Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage said of Britain at the start of the Second World War “where she goes, we go” he was stating the views of most New Zealanders of the time. New Zealanders were British, in orientation if not in birth, and New Zealand’s place in the world was as a loyal member of the British-led Commonwealth of Nations. This changed in the second half of the 20th century with large-scale migration first from Polynesia and then from Asia. Even so, at the 2013 Census, 74 per cent of New Zealanders identified themselves as European: a diminishing ethnic majority over time, but a majority nonetheless. To illustrate further: for the first time, Scotland was not among the top 10 birthplaces for New Zealanders. In 1961, by contrast, the countries of Great Britain, Northern Ireland and Australia dominated. The Netherlands, India and Western Samoa also made that list. But by 2013 the top 10 birthplaces reflected the radical changes that had occurred in the half century since. New Zealand and England still took first and second place, as they had done in 1961, and Australia and Samoa also remained. China (3rd), India (4th), South Africa (6th), Fiji (7th),

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the Philippines (9th) and South Korea (10th) joined them. Gone were most of the countries and colonies of Great Britain. The countries of the Asia Pacific replaced them. If anything reveals the radical shift in New Zealand’s population, it is this. A diversifying population, openness to migrants for their skills and an economic shift toward Asia: these have all contributed to multicultural, super-diverse New Zealand. The ethnic diversification of its population is hardly unique to New Zealand. Comparable migrant-receiving countries, including Australia and Canada, have also experienced large-scale and rapid migration. In each country, there are significant indigenous and ethnic minorities and a national population of which a quarter are migrants. Each country also has strong emphasis on immigration as a crucial part of nation-building (at the point of colonisation and since); a recruitment system that privileges “economic” migrants (i.e., those that contribute to labour, capital and trade in the destination societies); and general social acceptance of cultural diversity (Spoonley, 2015, p. 2). But there are also important differences. Canada has three major multicultural projects (Aboriginal peoples, English-French charter groups and multicultural minorities). Australia and (less so) New Zealand were early adopters of official multiculturalism. Over four decades, New Zealand has invested considerable resources into recognising indigeneity and biculturalism. It has not, yet, advanced policies supporting cultural diversity as far as either Australia or Canada (Spoonley, 2015, p. 3). New Zealand differs further in that its inbound Asian migration was into a homogeneous climate, rapid, and from a low base: between 1986 and 2006 New Zealand’s Asia-born population increased by almost 700 per cent (Bedford and Ho, 2008, p. 11). New Zealand’s premier city of Auckland shares many of the same characteristics of major global cities. The 2013 Census recorded that 39 per cent of Aucklanders were born overseas. That is a lower proportion of overseas-born than in Toronto (46 per cent) but is higher than many other cities of migration (Bedford et al., 2014, p. 6). Projected to be 30 per cent of Auckland’s population by 2021, Asian communities currently make up almost a quarter, more than M¯aori (11 per cent) or Pasifika (15 per cent). As a result Auckland has “increased levels of familial and community links and transborder activity with Asia and the Pacific” (Cain et al., 2015, p. 244). These demographic shifts illustrate the continuing role that migration plays in New Zealand’s nation-building project. They also show the diversifying New Zealand-born population.

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It is not only Auckland that is changing; research reveals significant demographic shifts for rural and provincial New Zealand too (Friesen, 2015b). But what the changes in Auckland reveal especially is how New Zealand’s changing population is reflecting both high levels of all types of migration (and Auckland is the major migrant-receiving city for New Zealand) and also increasing numbers of New Zealand-born with Asian ethnicity. One further illustration of this is that in 2014 a New Zealand schoolchild in Auckland is more likely to have the surname Wang, Li, Chen or Liu than Smith (Howie, 2014). As the changing birthplaces of New Zealanders also demonstrate, these surnames reveal a New Zealand that demographically is very much a part of the Asia Pacific region. It has, of course, always been part of that region geographically, where our attention turns to now.

New Zealand’s Place in the Asia-Pacific Almost simultaneously with New Zealand’s changing ethnic population, so its place in the dynamic Asia-Pacific has comprehensively changed. David Capie (2009) describes it thus: New Zealand pressed for access in the “tiger” economies and looked to entice tourists and lucrative fee-paying foreign students to the country’s language schools and universities. In October 1990 the Secretary of Foreign Affairs concluded that “New Zealand’s long-term future is inextricably linked with the economies of East Asia”. Foreign Minister Don McKinnon called for the country to make “a great, dramatic leap into Asia”. New embassies were opened, funding was doubled for Asian language training for diplomats and a foundation was created to press for greater understanding of the region. Japanese language classes mushroomed in the nation’s schools, soon attracting as many students as French.” (2009, p. 594)

Political recognition of the growing economic weight of Asia saw business interests move their enthusiasm to Asia’s markets, and support Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and trade deals with Asian countries. Increasing demand from Asia led to growth in New Zealand’s tourism and education industries. New Zealand’s place in the Asia-Pacific was, for the most part, a good news story. Galvanised by Britain’s entry into the EEC in 1973, New Zealand embraced the new economic opportunities generated by Asia. China, which did not appear among New Zealand’s top 20 trading partners in 1994, was number one 20 years later. Australia remained New Zealand’s most important bilateral relationship. But what had changed for New Zealand was true for Australia too. The centre

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and growth of the global economy is closer to Australia and New Zealand than it has ever been. New Zealand joined Asia-led regional organisations, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led East Asia Summit. Even so, there was no certainty that Asian countries would pay much attention to “New Zealand being the most geographically isolated country in the world” (Cook, 2010, p. 2). The exclusion of both Australia and New Zealand from the ASEAN+3 processes initiated in 1997 and the Asia-Europe meeting in 1994 fed “Australia’s and New Zealand’s long-held fears about their geographical location” (Cook, 2010, p. 2). New Zealand has the added problem of being tiny in comparison to Australia, let alone to most of the countries of Asia. Some in Australia see New Zealand’s departure from Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) treaty as further diminishing its status in the region (Cook, 2010, pp. 6, 10). Rob Ayson has described former Australian Prime Minister Rudd’s “gaze to the great power dynamics of Asia” as reinforcing “the essential irrelevance of New Zealand as a defence actor in the wider region” (Cook, 2010, p. 5). But there are a several forces pulling in various directions which could change the landscape. For example, maintaining the stability of the South Pacific will involve both Canberra and Wellington. But the porous borders between Australia and New Zealand may also provide challenges for New Zealand’s strongest bilateral relationship. There were approximately 650,000 New Zealanders living in Australia in 2013 (which translates to 15 per cent of the New Zealand-residing population) and 23 million Australians have unrestricted right of access to the New Zealand labour market and welfare entitlements (Bedford et al., 2014, p. 29). This may change in New Zealand (as it already has across the Tasman) in response to changing demography. A significant explanation for the presently historic high net migration into New Zealand is the return migration of New Zealanders from Australia, promoted by a slowing Australian economy (Kiernan, 2014; Weir, 2014). A reversal of fortunes could change the direction of migration back to Australia. Beyond Australia, New Zealand’s relationships also matter. The stabilising role of the United States in the region is undergoing change. This will have both positive effects, such as the warming bilateral relationship between Wellington and Washington, DC, and negative, as regional countries, seeing a weakened United States, look to strengthen their own security by increasing military expenditure and forming new alliances. New Zealand’s near neighbourhood is

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an important part of its role in the world. This is demonstrated through: New Zealand’s large Pasifika populations; the high levels of remittances between Samoa and New Zealand2 ; New Zealand’s support for Samoa, Fiji (Moir, 2016) and Vanuatu (McCully, 2015) in recent natural disasters; collaborative aid and development efforts by China and New Zealand in the Cook Islands (Xinhua, 2014); the difficult relationship New Zealand has with Fiji (Green, 2013; One News, 2015) and the support of Pacific Island countries for New Zealand’s bid for the United Nations Security Council (Gulliver, 2014). The concerns of New Zealand’s Pacific populations, many New Zealand-born, will shape how New Zealand responds not just in times of crisis, but also in its stabilising and development role as a major player in the South Pacific.

Linking People and Place So how can we link the growing diversity of New Zealand with the country’s reorientation to the Asia-Pacific? What does New Zealand’s changing demography mean for its place in the world? This section considers three main areas: values, the media and social attitudes. These are discussed in turn.

Values As New Zealand’s Asian populations grow they might expect to play a greater role in shaping how New Zealand’s governments respond to events in their home countries. Three examples illustrate this. (i) In 2008, protests in capital cities around the world (including Wellington) centred on the international torch relay of the Beijing Olympics (Ayson and Taylor, 2008, pp. 5–6). For China, the Olympics was “the platform from which China will announce its arrival as a great power and shed its ‘victim mentality’ resulting from a ‘century of shame’ under Western domination”’ (Ayson and Taylor, 2008, p. 9). (ii) In May 2015, in a leaked letter written by New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully, it was revealed that he had advised his National Party colleagues to not accept invitations to events by Falun Gong, a religious group. He said that “The Chinese Embassy is likely to monitor 2 In

2007, annual remittances between Samoa and New Zealand amounted to approximately $80 million, according to Bertram (2010).

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attendance at events, and can be expected to protest officially should Ministers, Members of Parliament or other officials be present” (Allan, 2015). This is reminiscent of international leaders not meeting the Dalai Lama for fear of upsetting China (Otago Daily Times, 2013). (iii) The rapid growth of the Filipino population in New Zealand, particularly for the Christchurch rebuild, has prompted the Filipino government to tighten its recruitment laws to match New Zealand’s legislation (McClure, 2015) and the New Zealand government to tighten its labour and immigration laws in light of claims of labour exploitation of migrants (Cain et al., 2014). Foreign governments as well as migrant populations may pressure the New Zealand government to protect their own interests. As New Zealand’s economic links with Asian countries deepen and its Asian populations grow, we might expect this external pressure to increase. The extent to which New Zealand government is swayed by these pressures thus far is revealing. It is reluctant to upset its principal trading partner, China. But it is also willing to tighten up legislation to protect its reputation. To what extent, we might ask, is New Zealand willing in principle to compromise on its support of democracy for the sake of more trade with China? These matters are hardly ever clear-cut. The government of the day will weigh up risks and benefits to making a statement, registering a protest or altering legislation. As Robert Ayson (2015b) cautions: Just because you decide to work with close partners does not mean you surrender your sense of what is good for you… It is too easy to fall into the trap of thinking that because you disagree with the government’s calculation, New Zealand must have been dancing to someone else’s tune. That is the foreign policy equivalent of the dangerous conclusion that because your favourite political party loses an election, the system is not democratic.

What is unclear is if there are overriding values that shape these decisions. There is rhetoric that “New Zealand needs to stand up for its values” (Then Prime Minister, John Key quote by Ayson, 2015a). But, as Ayson (2014) notes elsewhere, for “many strategic analysts, material interests are more reliable and concrete than the values that encourage misty-eyed sentimentalism about traditional friends (like the United States) and obscure the importance of new partners (like China)”. But defending material interests is arguably concerned with defending a different set of values (such as the value of stability, certain

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ideas that underpin the international trading system, etc.). Are there, even so, immutable values, from which New Zealand would not back down and which are not subject to the vagaries of realpolitik? And, in any case, what might those values be? In 2006 then Trade Minister Phil Goff articulated them in this way: We… have an overriding commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights and freedoms… [and] are members of a relatively small group of countries that over the last century have been consistent in the advocacy and practice of these principles. (Ayson, 2015b)

As a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, New Zealand’s bilateral relationships with Asian countries may be put under scrutiny as New Zealand plays its part to “make a positive difference to world affairs and provide a unique and independent voice at the world’s top table” (Key, 2014), “providing a voice for small states… achiev[ing] practical results and... [making] a positive impact on international peace and security” (New Zealand Government, 2015). But in the context described in this chapter — of tighter economic engagement with Asian countries, of larger Asian populations in New Zealand — the question Ayson (2015b) raises in a different context is salient: “what price are we really willing to pay for those values?” Values, and the ability to act with them, can be constrained or enabled by public opinion, which we turn to shortly. In the meantime, the media, which plays a substantial role in shaping that opinion, is our focus.

Media The fragmentation of both “traditional” and “ethnic” media and proliferation of social media diminishes the prospect of a dominant narrative of events. Indeed, a fragmented media landscape may instead reinforce prejudices. Migrants to New Zealand can increasingly access media from their countries of origin and in their own languages. An enumeration of New Zealand’s “ethnic” media in 2006 identified 15 Chinese and 12 Korean newspapers and magazines in Auckland alone, as well as nine Indian, three Filipino and four Japanese print media. More recent data suggest there are multiple national Chinese newspapers, at least three main Cantonese and Mandarin radio stations, three Chinese stations on Freeview, and eight paid Chinese subscription channels. Indian media sources are also extensive. In 2014, there were an estimated seven print media publications, three main radio stations and at least

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one Freeview television station (Friesen, 2015a, p. 37). Many international broadcasters also provide Internet-streaming and an individual with access to the Internet can read news from anywhere in the world. The media has played some role in shaping foreign policy, though it is probably less influential than is often claimed and its impact is, in any case, difficult to measure. Until recently, the media in New Zealand was controlled by a few well-connected proprietors. Some of these media actors still occupy the landscape, but it is now much more crowded terrain. They are competing against everyone who has an opinion and a blog, a Twitter account and a Facebook page. Public commons in terms of mainstream media is rapidly being replaced by what Gitlin terms “sphericles”; that is, there are fewer options to talk as a broad community instead issues are discussed in common with quite specific and small communities of interest (Butcher and Spoonley, 2011, p. 100). In addition to a proliferation of terrestrial media for ethnic communities, media is also more cross-border with significant homeland media availability. A reliance on the mass media as a dominant source of information has now faded, replaced by online technologies that have increased options, which may democratise, reinforce or resist media portrayals and ideologies of place and of people. “Traditional” media outlets find themselves in an environment reshaped by the rise of social media. It should be noted that the social media have apparently played a major role in the “Arab spring”, in recent Iranian elections, and in the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes. The role of the social media in drawing these events to international attention is clear, and complemented traditional media reportage. But it is less clear whether the social media played a significant role in mobilising political subsets of the population and in calling citizens to the streets (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011, p. 105). Even so, where the media becomes a threat to the interests and order of a government, it can shut it down or censor it. Governments may respond, to borrow Reilly’s categorisations, with a sophisticated strategy of tolerance, responsiveness, persuasion and repression (Reilly, 2012, p. 1). However, the internationalisation of media and the ubiquity of social media may make such actions counter-productive (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2011, pp. 104–105). One of the fundamental features of a democratic society is that the press is free and that public expression is not just tolerated but allowed. The formation of foreign policy, even in just its articulation to the public, will

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need to take account of social media and ethnic media. One reason is because of how these media shape social attitudes.

Social attitudes New Zealanders’ attitudes to migrants — and ethnic minorities more broadly — differ significantly from other countries’. New Zealand does not, for example, have comparable social, economic or political divisions, or antiimmigration rhetoric, revealed in recent European and British elections. To be sure, New Zealand has experienced similar sentiments with Winston Peters and his New Zealand First party, but after anti-immigrant rhetoric peaked in the mid-1990s and in the early 2000s, such language has significantly quietened. This may reflect a changing and ethnically diversifying society as much as journalists who are engaging with immigrant communities and media employing reporters from ethnic communities (Butcher and Spoonley, 2009, pp. 365–366). The absence of strong anti-immigrant protest appears all the more remarkable given that the New Zealand government has taken a laissezfaire approach to immigration settlement and has largely ignored various calls for policies that support social cohesion (Peace and Spoonley, 2007). One indicator of social cohesion is the maintenance and acceptance of the religious beliefs and practices of ethnic minority populations. Religious diversity in New Zealand, revealed in Census 2013 data, is likely to increase. This diversity will be both within religions (e.g., the increasing Filipino population in the Catholic Church) and between religions (e.g., the increasing number of Buddhists, Muslims and Hindus). There is also an increasing number of New Zealanders that register no religious affiliation. However, anxiety about Muslim populations, which was particularly evident after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, may present ongoing challenges for New Zealand’s relations with the Muslim world. Recent public opinion polling suggests that concern about terrorism in the Middle East is furthering anti-Islamic attitudes (Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2015, p. 27). New Zealand’s own Muslim populations have also voiced concerns about changes to New Zealand’s security and intelligence legislation (Tan, 2014; Edwards, 2015). Given these various cross-currents, might there be a tipping point at which the number, location and type of migration disrupt social cohesion? Is there a scenario in which anti-immigrant voices become more shrill? Is there good

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as well as bad social cohesion (i.e., social cohesion of ethnically homogeneous communities might be a barrier to diversity recognition)? Are there, or can there be, different forms of social cohesion that may compete with each other? Might there be competing sets of values about what a society tolerates, looks like and aspires to be? And might there be importation of values that do not fit in with values generally subscribed to by New Zealanders (e.g., genetic mutilation)? These questions are not necessarily straightforward to answer. Historically, for example, New Zealand has had strong anti-immigrant attitudes, against Asians, Catholics and Samoans (Butcher, 2014). One reason for this opposition was because the dominant population of the time saw these groups as a threat to its values. The place of “values” and “interests” has a long pedigree in international relations literature (Ayson, 2011). What might contribute to changing the scene? One dominant characteristic of the countries in which we find strong anti-immigrant feeling is a recessionary economic climate. A strong relationship between these two variables is identified in an extensive literature (Beets and Willekens, 2009; Fetzer, 2009; Aghazarm et al., 2010). It is also supported, in a moderate way, by New Zealand surveys around the time of the global financial crisis (Butcher et al., 2013). Large-scale and rapid migration flows to New Zealand, by Pacific peoples in the 1970s and 1980s and Asians in the 1990s and 2000s also generated public disquiet. In the context of the latter: the Auckland community newspaper the Eastern Courier ran the articles headlined “Inv-Asian” (Butcher and Spoonley, 2011); a popular primary school in a well-heeled Auckland suburb imposed language tests on its prospective students (Pang, 2003); and Winston Peters began his New Zealand First party, which had a platform with a strong anti-Asian immigration theme. The government of the time, partly in response to Peters, tightened up on English language requirements for migrants. As a result, there was an almost immediate decline in migrants from Taiwan and Hong Kong (Bedford et al., 1998; Ho, 2003). In other words, liberal immigration policies can quite quickly, and with relative ease, become illiberal ; migrants who had intended to come to New Zealand might find that opportunity is closed off to them. Public attitudes towards immigration can reveal ambivalent, if not negative, attitudes. For example, in the annual Asia New Zealand Foundation polling, the proportion of New Zealanders who see immigration from Asia benefiting New Zealand’s future barely reaches above 50 per cent. Other surveys show similar findings

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(Butcher et al., 2013). Attitudes to immigration can serve as an important proxy to broader social attitudes about who is welcome and who is not. Immigration policy may also be conceived as one tool of foreign policy. Countries that limit, restrict or otherwise prevent immigrants or refugees may not be seen as countries-of-choice for prospective migrants. Restrictive immigration policies may damage a country’s reputation internationally, though they can attract significant domestic political support. For example, the limits that the United Kingdom has placed on migrants from outside the European Union (whom it is obliged to receive under the Schengen agreement) are seen by its own business people, as much as by commentators, as being damaging to its long-term interests (The Economist, 2012, 2014), even while it has domestic political appeal. The explicit “White Australia” policy and the implicit version of the same for New Zealand, which while seemingly defensible at the time, still lingers on in the consequences for subsequent migrant and ethnic minority groups. One example would be the poor treatment of the first Chinese settlers to New Zealand, subjected to the poll tax, and the subsequent apology almost a century later by the then Prime Minister Helen Clark (2002). If we treat immigration policies as one form of a country’s “soft power”, then a liberal immigration policy could be seen as favourable to the interests of a country such as New Zealand (Nye, 2012).

Conclusion: Beyond Trade and Towards People and Place In their report on Our Futures, Bedford et al. (2014) note that: The ethnic diversity of 21st century Aotearoa also provides a significant contrast with mid-twentieth century New Zealand. The racially discriminatory approach to immigration has been abandoned and the composition of immigrant flows reflects new connections and interests. Has the thinking of those of European descent — long accustomed to being in the majority — kept pace? New Zealanders who grew to adulthood before 1990 grew up in a more ethnically homogeneous society than the New Zealand of 2013, let alone the likely New Zealand of 2030 or 2050. For many of those generations a “New Zealander” is someone like them, ethnically speaking, or is of M¯aori or Pasifika descent. They now also share the country with New Zealanders of Latin American, Indian, East Asian or African origin, often with different cultural attitudes and preferences (2014, p. 8).

This chapter has argued that New Zealand’s changing demography has profound implications for its changing place in the world, especially in the AsiaPacific. As New Zealand’s demography shifted so did its foreign policy, not

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necessarily in lockstep but in recognition of and response to the economic growth of the Asian region. Demographic diversification is not unique to New Zealand. It is one of the several predominantly migrant-receiving countries which are adjusting to super-diversity. Where New Zealand differs is in the prominent place given to M¯aori, in particular in how this bicultural relationship has played such a formative role in shaping New Zealand’s narrative. To a limited extent, this biculturalism shapes New Zealand’s outward orientation, if only in how it markets itself as a tourist destination. How New Zealand’s government and public navigate the tension between this biculturalism and the realities of a multicultural society will be the test for the next 30 years. Alongside managing these demographic challenges, New Zealand needs to navigate its relationships in the region. In the Pacific, New Zealand has responsibilities for those countries that are part of its realm as much as a ensuring a safe, stable and secure region without undue interference from external powers. Moreover, New Zealand’s responsibilities for the Pacific link directly back to its own significant population of Pacific peoples. These Pacific populations will have expectations of New Zealand’s government meeting their own expectations, addressing grievances and supporting its causes. In the case of a natural disaster in the Pacific, the support of New Zealand is both axiomatic and proven. Matters are less clear-cut on decisions of foreign policy, the distribution of aid, the protection of natural resources, and trade arrangements. The same applies to how New Zealand engages with the countries of Asia. In that region, New Zealand has stronger economic interests than in the Pacific: it is the home to over half of New Zealand’s major trading partners. These vested interests are the reality of its foreign policy, though it is a policy that is wider than building the New Zealand economy. The free flow of goods to and from New Zealand relies heavily on a safe, secure region. New Zealand’s participation in the various regional organisations, alongside its bilateral relationships, is towards that end. Into this delicate diplomacy, however, is the added issue of managing the expectations and demands of New Zealand’s growing Asian populations. But these decisions, of how, when and if to act, are moderated by the realities of a democracy. Decisions may be informed by the values and interests with which New Zealand articulates its foreign policy, by the informing role of a range of media, and by the opinions and perceptions of the voting public. New Zealand’s place in the world will, inevitably, be shaped by events beyond

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its control. But it is the foreign policy decisions it makes in response to its changing populations that concern us here. Those decisions, whether they are on immigration policy, attending cultural events or tightening labour laws, will also be shaped by and influence its bilateral relationships with the countries of Asia and the Pacific. As New Zealand’s population becomes more ethnically diverse, so its place in the world will need to adjust and recalibrate. And it will be a series of increasing but incremental decisions and responses that will follow.

References Aghazarm, C, J Koehler, F Laczko, and J Schad (2010). Migration and the Economic Crisis in the European Union: Implications for Policy. Paris: OECD. http://publica tions.iom.int/bookstore/free/Migration_and_the_Economic_Crisis.pdf [15 July 2017]. Allan, M (6 May 2015). No Falun Gong events, MPs told. Radio New Zealand. http:// www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/272920/no-falun-gong-events,-mpstold [15 July 2017]. Asia New Zealand Foundation (2015). New Zealanders’ Perceptions of Asia and Asian peoples–2014 Annual Survey. Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation. http://asianz.org.nz/reports/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ANZF1046Perceptions-of-Asia-Report2.pdf [15 July 2017]. Ayson, R (19 July 2011). Interests, values and New Zealand’s engagement with Asia. Inaugural lecture. Victoria University of Wellington. Ayson, R (3 February 2014). Why values count. The strategist. http://www. aspistrategist.org.au/why-values-count/ [15 July 2017]. Ayson, R (26 February 2015). Professor Robert Ayson: Anarchy can only end using regional leadership. New Zealand Herald. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/ nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11408287 [15 July 2017]. Ayson, R (7 April 2015). Standing up for values? Lecture, National Library of New Zealand. https://natlib.govt.nz/blog/posts/standing-up-for-values [15 July 2017]. Ayson, R and B Taylor (2008). Carrying China’s torch. Survival, 50(4), 5–10. Bedford, R, Y-Y Chen, J Goodwin, E Ho, and J Lidgard (1998). Immigrants from Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong in New Zealand in the mid-1990s: Macro and Micro Perspectives. Hamilton: Population Studies Centre, University of Waikato. Bedford, R, G Hawke, T Kukutai, M McKinnon, E Ollsen, and P Spoonley (2014). Our Futures: Te Pae Tawhiti: The 2013 Census and New Zealand’s Changing Population. Wellington: The Royal Society of New Zealand. Bedford, R and E Ho (2008). Asians in New Zealand: Implications of a Changing Demography. Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation.

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Bedford, R and P Spoonley (2012). Welcome to Our World? Immigration and the Reshaping of New Zealand. Auckland: Dunmore Publishing. Beets, G and F Willekens (2009). The Global Economic Crisis and International Migration: An Uncertain Outlook. The Hague: Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute. Bertram, G (11 March 2010). South Pacific economic relations — Aid, remittances and tourism. Te Ara — The Encyclopedia of New Zealand. http://www. teara.govt.nz/en/south-pacific-economic-relations/page-4 [13 July 2017]. Butcher, A (December 2014). The cross in cross-cultural: The church, three encounters and the struggle for national identity. In Lecture Presented to the Migrant CrossCultural Encounters Conference. Dunedin: University of Otago. Butcher, A, P Gendall, and P Spoonley (2013). New Zealanders’ Perceptions of Asia and Asian Peoples, 1997–2011. Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation. Butcher, A and P Spoonley (2009). Reporting superdiversity: The mass media and immigration in New Zealand. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 30(4), 355–372. Butcher, A and P Spoonley (2011). Inv-Asian: Print media constructions of Asians and Asian immigration. In Localising Asia in Aotearoa, J Leckie and P Voci (eds.), pp. 98–115. Wellington: Dunmore Press. Cain, T, C Meares, and P Spoonley (2015). Immigrant economies in action: Chinese ethnic precincts in Auckland. In Asians and the New Multiculturalism in Aotearoa New Zealand, G Ghosh and J Leckie (eds.), pp. 237–264. Dunedin: Otago University Press. Cain, T, P Spoonley, and S Yuan (March 2014). Temporary Migrants as Vulnerable Workers: A Literature Review. Wellington: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/fms/Research/ntom/ Yuan%20Cain%20and%20Spoonley%202014.pdf?23A2F083283EE192CA49 A530EA4B72F8 [15 July 2017]. Capie, D (2009). New Zealand and the world: Imperial, international and global relations. In The New Oxford History of New Zealand, G Byrnes (ed.), pp. 573– 598. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clark, H (12 February 2002). Address to Chinese new year celebrations. New Zealand Parliament. http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/address-chinese-newyear-celebrations [15 July 2017]. Cook, M (2010). Standing Together in Single File: Australian views of New Zealand and Asia. Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation. Edwards, B (5 February 2015). Religious groups “snubbed” on spy law. Radio New Zealand. http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/265326/religiousgroups-%27snubbed%27-on-spy-law [15 July 2017]. Fetzer, J (2009). The Evolution of Public Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe and the United States 2000–2010. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: San Domenico di Fiesoli & European University Institute.

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Friesen, W (2015a). Asian Auckland: The Multiple Meanings of Diversity. Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation. Friesen, W (2015b Forthcoming). Beyond the Metropoles: The Asian Presence in Small City New Zealand. Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation. Green, M (2013). Persona Non Grata: Breaking the Bond: Fiji and New Zealand 2004– 2007. Wellington: Dunmore Press. Gulliver, A (8 August 2014). Pacific leaders back NZ’s UN bid. Stuff. http:// www.stuff.co.nz/world/south-pacific/10363659/Pacific-leaders-back-NZs-UNbid [13 July 2017]. Ho, E (2003). Reluctant exiles or roaming transnationals? The Hong Kong Chinese in New Zealand. In Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: The Chinese in New Zealand, I Manying (ed.), pp.165–184. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Howie, C (10 August 2014). The changing face of New Zealand: Putting faces to our names. New Zealand Herald. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm? c_id=1&objectid=11306582 [13 July, 2017]. International Institute of Strategic Studies (2011). Strategic Survey 2011: The Annual Review of World Affairs. London: IISS. Key, J (17 October 2014). New Zealand wins Security Council seat. Press release, New Zealand Government. http://beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-wins-securitycouncil-seat [15 July 2017]. Kiernan, G (2014). Migration shows New Zealand’s popularity. http://www. infometrics.co.nz/migration-shows-new-zealands-popularity/ McClure, T (10 January 2015). Philippines change recruitment-fee law. Business Day. http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/64820923/philippines-changes-recr uitmentfee-law [15 July 2017]. McCully, M (23 March 2015). NZ boosts cyclone aid to $3.5 million. New Zealand government press release. https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-politics-ofimmigration-and-multiculturalism-in-new-zealand. McMillan, K (16 November 2010). The politics of immigration and multiculturalism in New Zealand. Policy Network. http://policy-network.net/pno_detail. aspx?ID=3918&title=The+politics+of+immigration+and+multiculturalism +in+New+Zealand [13 July 2017]. Moir, J (22 February 2016). More aid and another NZDF flight bound for Fiji in the wake of Cyclone Winston. Stuff. http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/polit ics/77146977/more-aid-and-another-nzdf-flight-bound-for-fiji-in-the-wake-ofcyclone-winston [30 July 2017]. New Zealand Government (2015). New Zealand United Nations Security Council Website 2015–16. http://www.nzunsc.govt.nz/ [15 July 2017]. Nye, JS (10 December 2012). Immigration and American power. Project Syndicate. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-needs-immigration-refo rm-to-maintain-america-s-strength-by-joseph-s–nye [15 July 2017].

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One News (29 January 2015). New Zealand’s relationship with Fiji thaws, military ties resume. Television New Zealand. http://tvnz.co.nz/national-news/nzs-relationship-fiji-thaws-military-ties-resume-6225716 [13 July 2017]. Otago Daily Times (3 April 2013). Who else has side-stepped the Dalai Lama? http://www.odt.co.nz/news/dunedin/254872/who-else-has-sidesteppeddalai-lama [15 July 2017]. Pang, D (2003). Education, politics and Chinese New Zealander identities: The case of the 1995 Epsom Normal Primary School’s “residency clause and English test”. In Unfolding History, Evolving Identity: The Chinese in New Zealand, I Manying (ed.), pp. 236–257. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Peace, R and P Spoonley (2007). Social cohesion and indicator frameworks in New Zealand. Metropolis World Bulletin No. 7, pp. 9–10. http://carleton.ca/ metropolis/wp-content/uploads/World_Bulletin_vol7socialcohesion_e.pdf [15 July 2017]. Reilly, J (2012). Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy. New York: Columbia University Press. Spoonley, P (2015). New diversity, old anxieties in New Zealand: the complex identity politics and engagement of a settler society. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38(4), 1–15. Tan, L (31 October 2014). Muslim leaders to discuss new terror law. New Zealand Herald. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=113 50922 [15 July 2017]. The Economist (20 October 2012). Immigration: The Tories’ barmiest policy. http:// www.economist.com/news/leaders/21564841-britains-immigration-policy-crip pling-business-and-economy-wake-up-mr-cameron-tories [15 July 2017]. The Economist (28 November 2014). The more, the miserabler. http://www.eco nomist.com/news/britain/21635186-david-cameron-proposes-make-britain-lesshospitable-immigrants-more-miserabler [15 July 2017]. Xinhua (21 February 2014). China, Cook Islands, NZ tripartite water project launched in Rarotonga. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/843899.shtml [30 July]. Weir, J (19 September 2014). Migration boom hits record high. New Zealand Herald. http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/10519443/Migration-boomhits-record-high [13 July 2017].

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CHAPTER 7 New Zealand and Its Asia-Pacific Destiny: Sailing the Waka in Ever-Widening Circles Brian Lynch

Introduction Over the past 40 years, the focus and content of New Zealand’s external engagements has experienced fundamental changes. In the first century and a half of European settlement, the country’s outlook on the world was largely determined by its historical background and ancestry. Long-held links with Europe still count and will endure, but New Zealand’s geography now sets its horizons of primary interest. This reorientation has major significance for the country’s vision of its place in the world. It also influences how other nations perceive New Zealand, particularly as a potential partner. New Zealand’s relative isolation remains a preponderant foreign policy consideration, but the level of external connectivity, particularly with the Asia-Pacific, has grown in importance. New Zealand is hard-wired into the region in manifold ways for which there is no precedent in its history.1 This chapter title is a metaphorical reference to New Zealand redefining its place in the world and gaining comfort in the new regional setting. “May this fine waka launch heartily, May it sail in ever widening circles to find its place”. Drawn with permission from a mihi by Patricia Grace in Anderson et al. (2014). 1The content of this chapter draws on previous research carried out for the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. New Zealand and Asia-Pacific Integration, Wellington, 2015. 103

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At the same time as New Zealand’s focus has relocated, the Asia-Pacific region has assumed a pre-eminent position in the global economy and is providing much of the energy driving international trade. The region hosts seven of New Zealand’s 10 main trade partners. It is home to an expanding network of significant trade and security groups, and New Zealand is closely associated with most of them. Asia-Pacific is a springboard for foreign direct investment (FDI) in New Zealand, sustains the growth in tourism numbers, is a major supplier of overseas students and is the point of origin for the most rapidly growing group of migrants to New Zealand (Hawke et al., 2014). What happens in the region, and not least the way neighbours behave towards each other, bears heavily on New Zealand’s ability to promote its regional ambitions and presence.

Asia-Pacific: An Overview The most congenial setting for New Zealand’s regional aspirations would be one where rules-based conduct was the norm. The view from the region’s southern extremity is far from clear; resembling a shifting mosaic of features; some confidence building, others less comforting. There is evidence in most countries of better governance, impressive economic growth, and measureable welfare improvement. There are also unmistakeable signs that aspects of the regional power structures in place since the late 1940s are under stress and their relevance is in question. The established order displays no sign yet of wholesale unravelling, but the evolving scene has excited fresh interest in theories of power transition (Foot, 2014). The once pre-eminent US presence is being tested, confronted in particular by China’s assertive “rise”. The region’s geostrategic environment is further complicated by a resurgent Japan, Russia in muscle-flexing mood and the eccentric behaviour of the DPRK (North Korea). There is greater willingness among others, such as India, South Korea, Taiwan and some Southeast Asian countries to project and protect their interests amid recurrent incidents of violent sectarian extremism. Along the region’s eastern rim are indications of restiveness in South America over continued US political and economic dominance. To interested observers, these swirling regional currents are seldom at rest, uncertain, and a tad scary.

Tackling familiar challenges New Zealand cannot contemplate that volatile situation with idle concern. In a large and diverse region experiencing strain and substantial change,

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promoting a small country’s national interests and maintaining a meaningful regional profile presents numerous practical difficulties. Furthermore, there is the inescapable reality that New Zealand is “small, developed and distant”.2 Overcoming the “tyrannies” of scale and relative remoteness, or at least mitigating their most egregious effects, is as pressing for New Zealand in today’s context as at any earlier period in the country’s history. This, of course, is New Zealand’s customary lot. In a competitive world, no concessions are made for size. That is not to say the “geographic imperative” is devoid of benefit. The country’s coastline is the world’s eighth longest; few other nations are blessed with an extended economic zone of greater size than New Zealand’s. However, there are no known reserves of precious minerals or large fuel deposits (geothermal energy aside), and strategically located maritime straits are not within easy reach. New Zealand is bereft by choice of the collateral benefits, such as privileged market access and peace of mind, which are said to be the bounty minor players derived from being embedded in an alliance relationship with a dominant partner. New Zealand faces formidable odds in its quest for a regional identity and to safeguard its four key national interests: a safe, secure and resilient country; a network of strong international relationships; a rules-based international order and access to international markets via secure sea, air and electronic lines of communication.3 Yet, there is no way New Zealand could be content with some secluded form of South Pacific irrelevance. The country has to earn and retain the respect of others for its readiness to influence factors that affect its interests and well-being, and for its unwavering adherence to generally accepted beliefs and values (Ayson, 2015). The transition New Zealand is experiencing affects the composition of its multiracial domestic society, changing the basic nature of the economy and helping to mould the country’s emerging national character.

Shifts in regional dynamics and the New Zealand dimension For New Zealand, consolidating a place in the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century has unique features in the country’s evolving nationhood. At the heart of the 2 On

this theme, see James (2013). Zealand Government 2010 Defence White Paper, also 2014 Defence Assessment, Wellington. 3 New

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New Zealand response to its regional challenges has been the belief that a policy of active involvement in areas of particular interest is the only sensible economic and strategic choice for a small nation that wants its aspirations, concerns and opinions taken into account.4

Small state relations There is an immutable fact of life for players of modest means like New Zealand — there are only a few subjects of global or regional significance, which they can influence single-handedly in any meaningful way. Much of New Zealand’s successful regional trade effort to date has depended on effective cooperation with countries such as Brunei, Chile, Singapore, Malaysia, Peru and Vietnam. The point also applies further afield in contexts that address broad-based global political and security-type problems, and where small developed nations such as New Zealand and European partners can find common accord. These include nuclear materials issues or measures to combat the menace of cluster munitions.

Refocusing New Zealand’s trade and economic interests The wider Asia-Pacific region is now pivotal to New Zealand’s economic ambitions and performance. Prior to Britain’s entry into the Common Market, formation of a comprehensive trade strategy and its execution across many markets never featured among New Zealand’s economic priorities. As a direct result of a deliberate approach in the past 40 years, seven of New Zealand’s top 10 trading partners are now in the Asia-Pacific (Statistics New Zealand, 2014). China takes around 21 per cent of New Zealand’s exports and Australia about 18 per cent. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a group attracts more than 10 per cent of New Zealand’s exports, the European Union (EU) and the United States both absorb 10 per cent, Japan about 6 per cent, and South Korea 4 per cent. Collectively, the EU remains a significant destination, but the shift to markets closer to home means the bulk of New Zealand’s exports now travel half the distance they did in the 1970s. 4The

challenge of reconciling traditional links New Zealand had to the Atlantic Community with its physical location in the world was a topic of debate even from the early days of the country’s Foreign Service. “We are a nation in search of a regional identity”, Alister McIntosh address to Canterbury University 1965, in Templeton (1993).

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New Zealand’s open economy is heavily reliant on enforceable rules-based systems. There was and is no choice other than to participate robustly in the closer economic integration process that has occurred in the Asia-Pacific since the early 1990s. The region now hosts all of New Zealand’s trade agreements and economic partnerships currently in place. No other global markets offer the same level of demand and potential for New Zealand exports than those in the Asia-Pacific due to the rise in income levels in East Asia, the emergence of a sizeable middle class, and the dietary trend towards higher protein consumption. Penetration of the new regional markets by New Zealand exporters has not come easily. New Zealand companies have succeeded because of their persistence and hard work, a reputation for ethical business behaviour, offering customer-focused products and sensitivity to different business cultures and regulatory frameworks. New Zealand exporters have learned that a profitable market presence is never guaranteed; it must be continually refreshed.

Economic Integration Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: Agenda and contribution Since 1989, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has been the main institution promoting Asia-Pacific regional economic growth and integration. Its 21 members, including New Zealand, are responsible for 40 per cent of global population and close to 60 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP). About three-quarters of New Zealand’s exports now go to APEC economies. APEC decisions are made by consensus, are non-binding, but carry weight because of the dominant economies involved. Over time, APEC has served a useful purpose in drawing together the “Western” preference for reciprocal, enforceable, and verifiable economic and trade agreements, and the “Asian” emphasis on community building and inclusivity.5 APEC’s main pillars of activity are trade and investment liberalisation, business facilitation and capacity building. APEC’s supporters do not disguise its limitations, but highlight the economic gains the region has made “on its watch”. By APEC’s own reckoning, since 1989 average regional tariff barriers have fallen from 17 per cent to under 5 per cent, business transactions costs have dropped by over 10 per cent, 5 Gary

Hawke has written extensively on this topic. See, for example, Hawke (2012, 2013).

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intra-APEC trade has risen six-fold, the region’s total trade has increased five-fold, and more than 50 trade agreements have been signed among APEC members (APEC Secretariat). Individual members are free to accept, ignore or modify the annual output of APEC’s codes of best practice, framework agreements, model measures, and other recommendations in order to suit their circumstances.

Free trade area of the Asia-Pacific: Concept and content As the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Doha Round languished, APEC’s attention increasingly turned inwards to actions that might realise the vision of a “Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific” (FTAAP). This is an arrangement that offers the broadest possible form of regional economic integration. Since 2010 the concept has assumed notable prominence; APEC Leaders have given FTAAP the status of “a major instrument” with a commitment to take “concrete steps” to establish it.

The mega-regionals: RCEP and TPP A FTAAP would have real meaning if it is comprehensive, modern in content, binding and rules-based. APEC Leaders anticipate the FTAAP being achieved outside APEC but parallel to the APEC process. It would be the outcome of successful negotiations along adjacent but eventually converging paths, one with an East Asian focus, the other trans-Pacific. The former was expected to revolve around the ASEAN+Six (China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, New Zealand) negotiating processes. This, in practice, became a single set of negotiations for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which started in May 2013. The 16 participating economies are responsible for nearly one-third of global GDP and take 60 per cent of New Zealand’s exports. Twelve of the current RCEP members belong to APEC; the United States is not among them. The cross-Pacific approach is dominated by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, begun in 2010. Eventually, this involved 12 economies that account for one quarter of global trade flows and attract 40 per cent of New Zealand’s goods shipments. The TPP group are all APEC members; China is absent. Trade ministers from the 12 economies concluded the TPP negotiations with an agreed text on 6 October 2015. The TPP requires formal

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ratification before it comes into effect, a process that could take two years to complete. Assessment of the potential gains from a positive result to the “megaregional” negotiations, RCEP and TPP, or their successful convergence to form the FTAAP or an entity like it, is not an exact science. However, in 2012, the Petersen Institute for International Economics concluded that the economic benefits from a full-scale, all-inclusive regional FTAAP-type accord could, by 2025, reach nearly US$2 trillion annually (Petri et al., 2012, 2014; Basu Das, 2014). A successful TPP would promise yearly gains of close to US$300 billion, and the RCEP could provide US$500 billion; the larger sum in the latter case anticipating substantial flow-on effects from liberalising trade and encouraging competition among the three big north Asian economies and between them and India. The two mega-regional projects will not be easy to harmonise. There are significant disparities between them, which include differing levels of importance attached to the coverage of modern-day global trade and economic integration issues, where the need for new rules has emerged since the Uruguay Round concluded (Scollay, 2001, 2014). The critical ambition for the megaregionals is that they emerge as comprehensive agreements of high quality, or come together in a manner to achieve that goal. In the time-honoured tradition of multilateral trade negotiations, both RCEP and TPP have proved to be intense, tough and protracted. The former remains a work in progress. Neither set of negotiations has an obvious advantage over the other as a model “template” for what the FTAAP could become. The approach adopted by the two major powers is a crucial consideration; neither China nor the United States would readily accept an arrangement largely fashioned to suit the ambitions of one of them but not the other. An accommodation of their essential interests will be required for the FTAAP to become a reality. In the first instance, if the US Congress were to reject or stalemate the TPP process, it would fuel doubts about the United States resolve to retain leadership in the region (White, 2015). On the Asia-Pacific’s eastern rim, four South American neighbours, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, have formed the “Pacific Alliance”. They plan to merge their separate trade agreements and provide another strategic “building block” towards wider regional economic integration (see Bartesaghi, 2014). The “Pacific Alliance” appears to have history on its side and New Zealand has observer status.

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Economic integration: What it means for New Zealand Where does New Zealand fit as a relatively minor cog in this mix of emerging big and complex regional economic entities? There are positive signs of reassurance for New Zealand in the growth of export volumes, their geographic spread and the rise in the level of returns. There is reason for satisfaction in the pleasing number of quality agreements to which New Zealand has become a full-fledged party and earned first-mover advantage (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2009). Participation in the “mega-regional” negotiations offers potential for additional market access benefits and allows New Zealand to influence the rules under which the two agreements would operate. In the TPP negotiations, it was possible to build consensus around complex “new generation” issues such as currency manipulation, intellectual property, data flows and investor-state dispute resolution. Since the Uruguay Round concluded in 1994, New Zealand’s trade with some large partners such as Canada, India, Japan, and the United States has continued to confront obstacles to competitive entry by New Zealand companies. Barriers persist in the form of distortionary tariffs, quota schemes that favour other suppliers and subsidies that benefit local producers. Until the TPP is in place, New Zealand exporters are also handicapped compared to their competitors from Australia, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, which already have preferential trade deals in place with major regional markets. The balance of advantage reached between potential trade gains and possible social policy losses will determine whether the results of these sets of negotiations appeal to New Zealand. However, to walk away would mean “locking-in” the present discrimination against New Zealand, and erode current access arrangements. Further appreciable gains for New Zealand through trade accords will not come from putting scarce negotiating resources into stand-alone bilateral deals with major partners such as India, or the big European economies. Success for New Zealand in dismantling residual trade constraints and pursuing deeper economic integration is likely to be obtained primarily through broad membership-based results. The Petersen Institute modelling estimated the economic benefits for New Zealand from a successful TPP that embraced Japan and the North American North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) trio could exceed US$5 billion annually by 2020. The New Zealand government’s more conservative assessment of the agreement estimated that

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yearly gains could reach NZ$2.7 billion by 2020. Positive benefits would also come from a successful RCEP negotiation that includes India, and the three large north Asian economies. A 2014 study predicted an income gain of 5.2 per cent for New Zealand, one of the highest foreseen among RCEP members (Wignaraja, 2014). A huge amount of potential trade benefit is still at stake for New Zealand in the field of Asia-Pacific economic integration. The country’s particular agenda can influence but not determine the way things turn out. New Zealand has many trade partners with allied interests, and they are economies of all shapes and sizes and at all stages of development.

Asia-Pacific: The Security Dimension In the security context, different dynamics are involved. There is no parallel in this arena to the close mutuality of interests and incentives for interaction that governments and business generally share in the economic and trade sphere. Defence and security are public goods; dealing with troublesome issues falls squarely on governments and their relevant agencies, which can be held accountable for the results.

Regional security mechanisms: ASEAN centrality What contribution to managing the combustible regional environment is being made by the existing cluster of security-oriented organisations? They have arrived on the scene by a largely ad hoc process and from a distance appear at risk of over-crowding the institutional space the region has to offer. At the core is the ASEAN-centric group consisting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). There is some duplication and overlap in what these three primary ASEAN-sponsored bodies discuss and do. What distinguishes them is that the ARF offers a structured foreign policy-diplomatic-security setting and the ADMM-Plus group has a focus on practical security collaboration and confidence building measures. The ARF and the ADMM-Plus are biased towards humanitarian and disaster relief activities and are underpinned by committees and working parties. The EAS is the formally agreed context for leaders’ dialogue on “broad strategic, political, and economic issues of common interest”. It is not yet a decision-making body, has no coercive powers, and is without a permanent support structure.

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Other forums or annual gatherings exist. Some are quite informal; others have gained a regular place on the regional calendar. These include the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative and the, presently moribund, Six Power Party Talks on North Korea. Three other groupings are primarily sponsored by China: the Boao Forum, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). A wider audience at senior ministerial level is drawn to the longer-established “Shangri-La Dialogue”, held yearly in Singapore. The Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), formed in 1971, is another variant of security cooperation. The FPDA is not an alliance, but has proved to have continuing relevance over time, and is valued by its two Southeast Asian participants (Sinclair, 2013; also Emmers et al., 2011). Among the cluster of security-related forums, those pertinent to ASEAN’s centrality are given priority by New Zealand. The conventional ASEAN approach in these forums is to be process focussed rather than functionally oriented. The group are not highly institutionalised or equipped to intervene on controversial matters. Meetings are choreographed and the nontraditional security agenda has pride of place. With rare exceptions, discussion of current “mainstream” regional security issues is largely confined to corridor exchanges that are not exposed to open scrutiny that might tempt participants to attribute “blame”.6 The multi-layered institutional scene makes it difficult to glimpse the makings of a unitary “regional security architecture” for the Asia-Pacific.

Regional security instruments: Limited utility In attempting to address vexatious security issues such as those currently in the South China Sea, the problem for the Asia-Pacific is two-fold. First, there is a strong inclination towards non-intervention in any concrete manner. Second, the existing security infrastructure is not yet adequately well-formed or widely accepted as a first-recourse vehicle for the tempering of national aspirations. The present security framework is not equipped to tackle the root causes or overt manifestations of regional tensions. As forums for reconciliation, the available security apparatus compares poorly with the mechanisms for 6The

“dominance of form over function” in these institutions has been identified as a serious strategic weakness. See Feigenbaum (2013).

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integration and collaborative conduct that the Asia-Pacific regional economic counterparts have in place (Asian Development Bank, 2010). Nothing existing in the security context offers the positive interaction opportunities provided by the focused agenda of the annual APEC Leaders meeting, the work of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the mandate of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the role in regional economic dialogue being played by ASEAN. Nor do the current security forums espouse the level of deep integration commitment explicit in some bilateral and broader trade contexts, including the TPP and potentially the RCEP, or in the ambitions of the Pacific Alliance. There is no objective yet in the regional security theatre as visionary as the goal of a free trade area for the entire Asia-Pacific. The challenge for the region’s leadership is to agree on the purpose and mechanisms of an effective institutional way of avoiding the spectre of an unpredictable and nerve-racking series of regional crises.

Economic and Security Integration: Moving Along Different Paths A mix of incentives and instruments in the Asia-Pacific are nudging its member countries towards greater integration. They are present in the core areas of trade and economic engagement, and political and security interaction. However, these are evolving in different directions and not at the same pace. Dual integration processes driven by a shared regional purpose, which are mutually reinforcing and complementary, have yet to manifest.7 It must be acknowledged that for all their flaws the security institutions in place have offered settings for formal and informal exchanges that have allowed the Asia-Pacific region to escape any altercation remotely approaching a zero sum conflict. In the political arena, the EAS is still in its formative stage and a constructive work in progress towards becoming the preeminent regional forum for high-level exchanges on economic development, human security, mediatory influence, security interaction and trust building (Bisley and Cook, 2014; Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 2014). 7 “… patterns

of integration are not converging in a simple linear sense nor are they diverging in some sort of inevitable way ... there are elements of integration and fragmentation in both spheres ... there is cooperation and competition in both …”. Capie (13 November 2013).

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Implications for New Zealand: Challenges and Opportunities What does all this mean for New Zealand? Successive governments have promoted the profile and pursued the agenda of an independent-minded participant in the international arena. These have not been rare occurrences. Resistance to aspects of American and British policies towards the Pacific in World War II went beyond merely irritating the two large allies (Hensley, 2009). The United Nations (UN) Charter sections on Trusteeship owed much to New Zealand’s interventions. Opposition to the privileged use of a Security Council veto by the five Permanent Members was firmly put to the UN founding conference in San Francisco, and this position has not changed (Templeton, 1993).8 The country was driven further towards independence by Britain’s decision to join with Europe, and a decade later, by the severance of the Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) treaty connection. In today’s unruly world, New Zealand has been wary of entering into formal alliance-style arrangements beyond the collegiality encouraged by common interests, shared values, binding trade rules and the membership obligations of multilateral organisations. The approach has not implied any weakening of traditional adherence to the norms of international behaviour, respect for law and the rights of the individual, which New Zealand is committed to alongside old world partners. But the independent posture has called for strong emphasis on the country’s ability to think for itself, and to apply even-handed deliberation before major policy choices are made. There has been a reluctance to take sides when the interests of big powers are engaged, unless the argument favouring a particular course of action has been consistent with declared New Zealand beliefs. An instance of this was a carefully worded statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in June 2014 outlining New Zealand’s concern about events in the South China Sea (Ayson, 2014). An example in late 2014 was the decision to be among the first developed countries to indicate readiness to join the China-sponsored AIIB. A further case was the affirmation of willingness in the Security Council to be non-partisan on intractable Middle East issues. In early 2015, there was a careful weighing of arguments in the controversial decision to provide training to the Iraq defence forces in the struggle against the “Islamic State” (“Prime Minister…,” 24 February 2015). In September 2015, the Minister 8 Also

remarks by McCully (2015).

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of Defence addressed a Beijing audience on the behaviour expected of “big states” (Brownlee, 2015). To date, New Zealand governments of all persuasions have regarded active participation in the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing arrangement with Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States as being in the country’s best interests and not incompatible with pursuit of a balanced approach. That approach to external issues, evident over the past 80 years and more so since the mid-1980s, has sustained a reputation for active engagement, moderation and reliability. It has required maintaining continuity of presence in a variety of forums, and constancy of purpose and performance. These respected qualities underpinned the successful Security Council campaign in 2014. Overall and generally around the Pacific, it has been New Zealand’s latter day modus operandi to align itself with the community of smaller players and a selection of middle powers without any sense of being out of place. This has called for assiduous cultivation of contacts and joint endeavours with small nations with shared interests, notably individual ASEAN members and that group collectively as it progresses at its own pace to acceptance of a common set of core values (Capie, 2013). The close relationship New Zealand has built with ASEAN will evolve as it moves beyond the 40th year of “dialogue” relationship to formal “strategic” partnership.9 There is a redoubtable challenge looming for both ASEAN and New Zealand as the new regional order unfolds. They will both need strategies to manage their responses to the way that major and perhaps muscular middle powers may try to influence the stand smaller partners adopt on particular issues. For New Zealand, situations will arise in the Asia-Pacific where the country will share a mutuality of interest with a single or several regional partners. That eventuality could involve China and/or the United States. Alternatively, it could mean engagement with one or more of the second echelon group such as Australia, but also Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico and South Korea. A common perspective in particular contexts may show that New Zealand’s national interests converge with those of others and justify some form of joint response. This includes collective action to deal with drug smuggling and other transnational crime, provide disaster relief, promote trade and further economic integration or improve interoperability among defence assets. 9 A proactive approach to ASEAN has also been recommended for Australia. See Evans (2014).

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However, the mix of common interests will not always be transparently obvious. In specific situations, New Zealand will have difficult decisions to make. Whether to stand up, as in the case of the current Iraq deployment or support for the AIIB, or on rarer occasions step back to the sidelines. These will not be minor considerations for the country to weigh as it pursues its regional destiny. Shepherding external engagement in uncertain times is a massive task and a messy undertaking for a small country. “How did we deal with this sort of situation before?” is not a fail-safe guide, because the dynamics around particular long-standing issues have a tendency to change over time. Experienced practitioners know there is an irritating inclination among foreign policy permutations and the swirl of economic forces to divert on to less travelled paths as often as they are to adhere to a well-trodden route. An extraordinary range of possible contortions and policy dilemmas for New Zealand is at large in the Asia-Pacific regional context. On any single issue, there will be a group of partners to consult. However, in the final count, New Zealand must single-handedly determine the best course to follow. This will mean making its own judgements rather than accepting at face value the assessments of others. The challenge has been thrown into sharp relief by the emergence and manifold implications of a unique situation; New Zealand’s leading export market is not one of its intimate long-term security partners. Although it is not peculiar to New Zealand, it is unusual for it to be in such a sharp-edged dichotomous position. A view has been advanced that the country is in danger of becoming misty-eyed over the China relationship, a mind-set that might descend into a state of over-reliance, which could then take many undesirable forms (Shambaugh, 2014). The riposte would be that New Zealand learned a painful lesson from its previous all-consuming ties with Britain. Now, through its extensive regional networks, the country has counterweights in place to limit the risk of undue dependence. New Zealand has shown itself adept at managing big power relationships in the recent past, even when their ways have parted on particular issues. Nor is there any domestic anxiety over whether it is possible for New Zealand to respect and continue to reap benefits from historic links near and far, and at the same time come to terms with the contours of the country’s regional economic and political geography. The discourse around future opportunities has moved on to one of finding ways to maximise the country’s comparative and competitive advantages.

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A proactive stance will be the order of the day. It has never been New Zealand’s style to merely turn up at international meetings and express an occasional opinion. That practice can be expected to continue. Creative influence on the region’s modalities as they develop will call for close collaboration with like-minded counterparts. In specific areas, for example climate change, community building and human rights, it will be important that the New Zealand position is not beholden only to “traditional friends”, but constructed with understanding of and in consultation with old and newer regional partners of similar persuasion.

A coherent “regional strategy” for New Zealand The assorted strands of New Zealand’s involvement with the Asia-Pacific can be woven into a coherent strategic and policy “package” with relevance for practitioners in all fields, including civil society and the export community. Priority lies with underscoring New Zealand‘s credentials as an active, concerned and committed partner, devoid of doubt about the locus of its core national interests. Solid input would be made to regional integration forums, their agendas and work streams, to help achieve greater harmony between economic and security goals through improved integrative mechanisms. For New Zealand, the perennial downsides of population size and distance would be offset through energetic participation in regional connectivity initiatives, ranging from humanitarian measures, to infrastructure enhancement, to facilitation of exporter participation in global and regional value chains. Rigorous prioritisation would be required to meet the pressures and sometimes competing demands of important bilateral relationships and significant regional agency responsibilities. Management of those four main areas of focus would be demanding. Each core field would involve tough decisions on the appropriate level of policy engagement and resource commitment. What developments and trends are crucially important for New Zealand? Could any, without unwanted repercussions, be merely monitored, left untendered or ignored? With whom among regional partners is there an existing or potential convergence of interest on particular subjects? Where and on what grounds is the choice to be made between collaborating with one, a few, or many partners, or with the full regional congregation?

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Looking ahead, New Zealand’s hierarchy of core interests will revolve around the challenges of successfully completing both of the mega-regional economic agreements; advancing the concept of a free trade area for the AsiaPacific in an unhurried manner; constructing a more effective regional security architecture; implementing broad-based efforts to tackle non-conventional scourges. In pursuit of a peaceful and prosperous region for its own national interests and for the common public good, New Zealand will have to skilfully balance its relations with the major players. There will be constant reminders of the importance of working with the cluster of smaller states, particularly those of ASEAN. The fluid regional context is one in which the dual processes of regional economic and security integration underway are not currently on parallel paths and are not in step with each other. There is no clear-sighted outcome to indicate where and when either process might conclude and, if both do, what the final regional landscape and its overarching institutional framework could look like. Inevitably at times, tensions will exist between the two integration processes. There will be a familiar need on a regular basis for New Zealand to select among a range of options. Periodically, activity along one pathway to closer regional integration will have the greater claim for priority attention from policy makers and practitioners. That is a complex but not unfamiliar challenge. It will not prevent the waka from continuing “to sail in ever-widening circles”.

References Anderson, A, J Binney and A Harris (2014). Tangata Whenua: An Illustrated History. Wellington: Bridget Williams Books. APEC Secretariat. About Us: Achievements and Benefits. Singapore. Asian Development Bank (2010). Institutions for Regional Integration: Towards an Asian Economic Community. Manila. Ayson, R (September–October 2014). Asia’s maritime order and New Zealand’s response. New Zealand International Review, 39(5), 2–6. Ayson, R (September–October 2015). “Standing up for values”. NZIIA New Zealand International Review, 40(5). Bartesaghi, I (July 2014). Latin America and the Asia-Pacific: Realities Defining the Agenda. Latin America-Asia Pacific Observatory. Basu Das, S (2014). RCEP and TPP — Can they Converge into an FTAAP?, Vol. 60. Singapore: ISEAS Perspective. Bisley, N and M Cook (2014). How the EAS can achieve its potential. ISEAS Perspective, No. 56.

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Brownlee, HG (28 September 2015). New Zealand and Security in the Asia-Pacific Century. Beijing: National Defence University. Capie, D (June 2013). Mind the Gap: New Zealand and Regional Institutions in Southeast Asia. Asia New Zealand Foundation. Capie, D (13 November 2013). CSS/NZIIA Seminar on Asia-Pacific Integration, Wellington. Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (June 2014). Towards an effective regional security architecture for the Asia Pacific. CSCAP Memorandum No. 26. Emmers, R, D Singh and I Storey (2011). Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty. Singapore: ISEAS. Evans, G (17 December 2014). Australia needs to refocus on ASEAN. East Asia Forum. Feigenbaum, EA (14 August 2013). Multiplex world: Steps towards a new global order. East Asia Forum. Foot, R (2014). Constraints on Conflict in the Asia Pacific. 2014 Kippenberger Lecture, Discussion Paper 15/14. Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. Hawke, G (2012). What Kind of Economic Integration? Background Paper, Economic Research Institute of ASEAN. Hawke, G (August 2013). Economic Integration with Asia: Bridging the Divide. Asialink Essays, University of Melbourne. Hawke, G. et al. (2014). Our Futures: Te Pae Tawhiti. The 2013 Census and New Zealand’s Changing Population. Wellington: Royal Society of New Zealand. Hensley, G (2009). Beyond the Battlefield New Zealand and its Allies 1939–45. Rosedale: Penguin Viking. James, C (May/June 2013). “Alone, alone, all, all alone”. NZIIA New Zealand International Review, 38(3), 9–12. McCully, HM (26 June 2015). Otago Foreign Policy School. Dunedin: University of Otago. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (December 2009). FTA Exporter Survey Report. Wellington. Petri, PA, M Plummer and F Zhai (2012). The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia Pacific Integration: A Quantitative Assessment. 2012. Petri, PA, M Plummer and F Zhai (2014). “The TPP, China and FTAAP”. In New Directions in Asia-Pacific Economic Integration, T Guoqiang and P A Petrie (eds.). Honolulu: East West Center. “Prime Minister announces contribution to coalition against ISIL” (24 February 2015). Wellington: New Zealand Government. Scollay, R (2001). Trans-Pacific Partnership: Challenges and Potential. Auckland: University of Auckland, APEC Study Centre. Scollay, R (2014). The TPP and RCEP: Prospects for Convergence. In New Directions in Asia Pacific Economic Integration, T Guogiang and P Petri (eds.). Honolulu: East-West Center.

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Shambaugh, D (18 July 2014). Remarks to a conference on “China at the Crossroads”. Auckland: Victoria University of Wellington. Reported in The National Business Review. Sinclair, P (September 2013). Five Power Defence Arrangement. Wellington: CSS Background. Statistics New Zealand (2014). Overseas Trade Indexes. Coriolis Analysis of New Zealand Food and Beverage Exports. Auckland: Statistics New Zealand. Templeton, M (1993). An Eye, an Ear and a Voice. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. White, H (18 June 2015). The failure of the TPP matters but not for economic reasons.In The Interpreter. Sydney: Lowy Institute. Wignaraja, G (2014). The regional comprehensive economic partnership: An initial assessment. In New Directions in Asia-Pacific Economic Integration, AT Guoqiang (ed.). Honolulu: East West Center.

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CHAPTER 8 New Zealand’s Evolving Response to Changing Asia-Pacific Trade and Economic Currents Since 1989 Robert Scollay

Setting the Scene APEC and the emergence of an Asia-Pacific regional identity For almost 40 years, the Asia-Pacific has been a central focus of New Zealand’s external trade and economic policy. The concept of Asia-Pacific as an economic entity took on institutional form in 1989 with the inaugural meeting of (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Canberra. The proximate trigger for this development was the end of the Cold War, which reinforced a growing perception among governments in the region of the need to create a new framework for economic cooperation and provision of support for an open multilateral trading system then facing an uncertain future in the middle stages of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (Elek, 2005). At the insistence of the United States, encapsulated in the often-quoted statement by then Secretary of State James Baker that the United States would oppose any arrangement that involved “drawing a line down the middle of the Pacific”, APEC was established from the beginning as a trans-Pacific organisation drawing members from both sides of the Pacific. The 12 foundation members of APEC were the United States, Japan, Korea, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the then six members of

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the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).1 This founding membership coincided with the then existing membership of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), the independent tripartite organisation that had been working since 1980 to foster closer economic interaction and cooperation among the countries of the region, building in turn on work by business interests in Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and academics in Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD). Exploration of the possibility of trade integration between the established developed countries in the region — United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand — dated back to the work of Kojima (1966), but the question took on added significance in the 1980s with the economic emergence of the East Asian developing economies as important participants in regional and world trade and production. The membership of PECC and then APEC reflected recognition of the importance of including these emerging economies in initiatives aimed at promoting economic cooperation and market-driven integration across the region. Over the following years, APEC progressively added new members to reach its current 21 members by 1998, as illustrated in Fig. 1.

The economic rise of East Asia and the Asia-Pacific At the beginning of the 1990s, East Asia had already emerged as a third growth pole in the world economy, accounting for almost 20 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP) in 1990, some way behind Europe (defined here as the existing and future members of the European Union) and North America, accounting, respectively, for 33 per cent and 30 per cent of world economic activity. At that time, Europe was the world’s largest market for imports, with the then current and future members of the European Union accounting for 43 per cent of world imports, followed by North America and East Asia with 19 per cent and 17 per cent of world imports, respectively. The European Union had since 1986 been pursuing creation of the European “single market”, scheduled for completion in 1992, while in North America, negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) began in 1990, following on from conclusion of the Canada-United Stated Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) in 1989. NAFTA entered into force at the beginning of 1994. Academics

1 Indonesia,

Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei Darussalam.

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Russia

Viet Nam Malaysia

123

Canada

China Japan Korea

Thailand

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USA

Chinese Taipei Hong Kong China

Mexico

Philippines Brunei Darussalam Papua New Guinea

Singapore Indonesia

Peru Australia

since 1989

Chile

since 1991 New Zealand

since 1993 since 1994 since 1998

Figure 1.

APEC members and their joining dates.

had begun to debate the implications of a world economy organised around three dominant “economic blocs” (see for example Krugman, 1991). At that time, Japan was the dominant economic power in East Asia, accounting for almost 14 per cent of world GDP and over two-thirds of East Asian GDP in 1990. The “flying geese” model of East Asian development, originally conceptualised by Japanese economist Akamatsu (1962), emphasises an orderly pattern of development based on Japanese leadership. The bursting of a rapidly ballooning economic “bubble” in Japan at the beginning of the 1990s would, however, usher in two “lost decades” of economic stagnation. China on the other hand, after a little over a decade of economic reform since 1978, still exerted relatively little economic impact, accounting for only 1.6 per cent of world GDP and an even smaller share of both world imports and exports (Figs. 2 and 3).

The Asia-Pacific and the changing pattern of New Zealand’s trade An increasing emphasis on the Asia-Pacific as a central arena for the pursuit of trade liberalisation coincided happily with the stage that New Zealand had reached in the lengthy re-orientation of its trade relationships following the entry of the United Kingdom into the European Common market in 1973. In

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0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 China

East Asia

NAFTA

1990

APEC

EU-28

2015

Figure 2. Shares of world imports 1990 and 2015. Source: World Development Indicators. 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

China

Japan

East Asia

East Asia

N. America

APEC

EU-28

minus Japan

1990

2015

Figure 3. Shares of world GDP 1990 and 2015. Source: World Development Indicators.

1970, over a third of New Zealand’s exports had been directed to the United Kingdom and just under a half to Europe as a whole. By 1990, these shares had fallen precipitously to 7 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively. Corresponding increases in export shares had occurred to Australia (from 9 per cent to 19 per cent), partly attributable to the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) agreement concluded in 1983, and also to East Asia (from 13 per cent to 30 per cent). Within East Asia, the principal increases in export shares were to Japan (from 10 per cent to 16 per

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cent) and ASEAN (from 2 per cent to 6 per cent), with smaller increases in the shares to Korea and Taiwan. China did not yet register as a significant market for New Zealand, accounting for only 1 per cent of exports, and in fact China’s share of New Zealand’s exports actually fell between 1980 and 1990. With the share of exports directed to North America remaining relatively stable, in 1990 almost 70 per cent of New Zealand’s exports were directed to APEC’s existing and future members. This share of exports would increase only slightly over the following quarter century, rising to 73 per cent in 2015, but there would be large shifts in the distribution of the share among APEC members. East Asia’s share of New Zealand’s exports would continue to increase dramatically, from 29 per cent in 1990 to 45 per cent in 2015, primarily reflecting an increase in China’s share from 1 per cent to over 20 per cent, while Japan’s share dropped from 16 per cent to 6 per cent. The shares of New Zealand’s exports directed to Australia and North America over the same period also dropped significantly (Fig. 4). The rising share of New Zealand’s exports directed to fast-growing East Asian economies was particularly welcome in light of concerns expressed in the 1980s and early 1990s over the relatively slow growth rate of New Zealand exports, which was slower than the growth rate in world trade over the entire period from 1970, especially the sub-period up to 1985 (Lattimore and McKeown, 1995). The slow growth rate of exports had been attributed to 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 UK

Europe

Australia 1970

NAFTA 1980

1990

Japan 2000

2010

China

ASEAN

East Asia

2015

Figure 4. Changes in shares of New Zealand exports to major regions 1990 and 2015. Source: Comtrade.

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a concentration of exports both on relatively slow-growing and in some cases increasingly protected markets, and also on slower-growing product markets. The increasing share of exports directed to East Asia helped to reverse the former trend, while an increase in manufactured exports helped to offset the latter. Nevertheless, the rise in exports to East Asia was not sufficient to completely eliminate the gap between New Zealand export growth and world trade growth. New Zealand’s ability to benefit from diversification of export markets and export product diversification was also enhanced by the far-reaching reform of its trade policy regime from the mid-1980s onward, progressively involving the elimination of the import licensing system of quantitative restrictions as well as the removal of many tariffs and reduction of others. The implicit export tax that these import barriers represented was thus removed (Lattimore and McKeown, 1995), helping to offset any detrimental effect from the accompanying withdrawal of export subsidies.

The World Trade Organisation, APEC’s “Open Regionalism” and New Zealand Trade Policy New Zealand has traditionally accorded the highest priority to what it has described as the “multilateral track” of trade policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993): supporting and strengthening the multilateral trading system, and seeking to advance New Zealand’s trade interests through successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT and, since 1994, the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This is in accordance with one of the most widely accepted propositions in the economic analysis of trade liberalisation: that multilateral liberalisation is always in principle the first-best approach to trade liberalisation between countries. As noted earlier, APEC was founded during the middle stages of the GATT Uruguay Round, arguably the most complex and significant negotiating round in the history of the GATT. The negotiations took place against a background of growing concern over dual threats to multilateralism from protectionism and regionalism. Indeed, one of the objectives of the founders of APEC was to support a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round and therefore strengthen and support the multilateral trading system in what was seen to be an increasingly challenging environment.

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In the event, after a number of near-collapses, the Uruguay Round was successfully concluded, resulting in some significant trade liberalisation, a substantial expansion of the scope of multilateral trade rules supported by a muchstrengthened dispute settlement system and the establishment of the WTO as the successor organisation to the GATT. For New Zealand, the results included both the achievement of some new market access and substantial increases in both the security and value of existing market access for key agricultural exports in particular. In the meantime, an APEC trade agenda based around the idea of achieving free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific began to take shape, stimulated by the work of an Eminent Persons Group established in 1992 by APEC ministers to “enunciate a vision for trade in the Asia Pacific Region”, and encouraged by consensus reached at the first APEC economic leaders’ meeting held at Blake Island, Seattle, at the end of 1993. The fact that most APEC members, such as New Zealand, conducted 70 per cent or more of their trade with other APEC members (Scollay, 2001) indicated that the likely economic gains from achieving free trade in the Asia-Pacific would be very large, both absolutely and relative to the slower pace of liberalisation that could be expected from multilateral negotiations. There was intense debate over how the pursuit of free trade in the Asia-Pacific could be reconciled with the APEC members’ determination to give full support to the processes and principles of the multilateral trading system. The outcome was the announcement in 1994 at the APEC leaders’ meeting in Bogor, Indonesia, of its members’ commitment to the so-called “Bogor Goals” that have been a guiding set of objectives for APEC thereafter. These goals target the attainment of “free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific” by developed APEC members in 2010 and by 2020 by developing economy members. For operational purposes, the goals set at Bogor were expanded in 1995 into the “Osaka Action Agenda”, establishing targets in a range of policy areas to be attained as part of the achievement of the “Bogor goals”. The Osaka Action Agenda included not only the traditional trade concerns of tariffs, non-tariff measures, standards and conformance, and customs procedures, but also a wide range of other concerns that have become increasingly familiar in modern trade negotiations: trade in services, investment, intellectual property, competition policy, government procurement, deregulation and regulatory review and reform, strengthening the economic legal

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infrastructure, mobility of business people and dispute mediation. It also included action plans covering a wide range of areas of economic and technical cooperation. In their 1995 Declaration, APEC leaders sought to reconcile their commitment to regional free trade with full support for multilateralism by adopting a position of “resolute opposition to an inward-looking trading bloc” and choosing instead “the unique approach of concerted liberalization grounded in voluntarism and collective initiatives by member economies” (APEC, 1995). Under the “concerted unilateralism” approach, APEC members would work together to reduce and eliminate their trade barriers not only against each other but against all countries in the multilateral trading system. For New Zealand this was an ideal outcome, allowing for full complementarity and consistency in the pursuit of three of the four tracks of its announced trade policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993) — unilateral, multilateral and regional. The fourth track, a bilateral one, was conceived in terms of vigorous pursuit of new trading opportunities with key partners rather than establishment of any new preferential trading agreements. Furthermore, as an APEC member, New Zealand found itself part of a “club” of partners accounting for 70 per cent of its exports, all of whom were committed to the “Bogor goals” of free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific. The 21 eventual members of this “club”, moreover, accounted for just over half of world GDP, and the “club” included some of the world’s fastest growing economies. From the wider perspective of New Zealand’s international relations, it was also important that APEC included both key traditional partners such as the United States and also the emerging East Asian powers, thus lowering the risk of any future need to “choose between the two”. Pursuit of the “Bogor goals” occupied much of the trade liberalising energy of APEC governments for the rest of the decade. While existing free trade agreements (FTAs) — ANZCERTA, NAFTA and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) — continued to operate, little attention was given to the pursuit of new FTAs,2 in contrast to the situation elsewhere in the world at the time.3 In a burst optimism, APEC members sought to accelerate achievement

2The

two new agreements established in this period, between Canada and Chile and between Mexico and Chile, could reasonably be interpreted as by-products of NAFTA, substituting for the aborted earlier effort to bring Chile into NAFTA (Scollay, 2001).

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of the Bogor goals by adopting an Early Voluntary Sector Liberalisation (EVSL) initiative, whereby free trade in selected sectors would be achieved earlier than the target dates of 2010 and 2020. Unsurprisingly, New Zealand was an enthusiastic supporter of the APEC agenda, with New Zealand officials such as Ambassador Peter Adams and Ambassador Christopher Butler playing key roles in these developments.

Three Watershed Events and a Sea-Change for New Zealand’s Trade Policy Environment New Zealand and East Asian regionalism Three watershed events towards the end of the 1990s led to a dramatic change in the trade policy environment for New Zealand and the rest of the AsiaPacific region. First, reactions in East Asia to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, and in particular to the perceived demonstration of both the inability of APEC to provide meaningful support and the East Asian subservience to the unhelpful if not malign policy dictates of the western-dominated International Monetary Fund, quickly led to a strong sense that East Asia needed to develop its own separate economic identity, including its own institutions for promoting economic cooperation and mutual economic assistance in times of crisis. A sense of East Asian regionalism quickly supplanted Asia-Pacific economic cooperation as the preferred concept of regional economic integration (REI) in the minds of most East Asian policymakers and their governments. Initially formed to promote monetary and macroeconomic cooperation among its members,4 the ASEAN+3 group, comprising the 10 members of ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea, quickly turned its attention to trade. A proposal for an East Asian Free Trade Agreement surfaced in 1999 3 During

the 1990s, the ANZCERTA was augmented by a number of measures designed to deepen economic integration between Australia and New Zealand. These included a TransTasman Mutual Recognition Agreement (TTMRA), a Government Procurement Agreement, and establishment of joint Australian and New Zealand food standards. 4 In fact the main concrete institutional developments attributable specifically to the ASEAN Plus 3 Group are the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and its subsequent multilateralisation (CMIM), essentially a regional liquidity support mechanism, and the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), a regional surveillance unit intended to provide support for the CMIM.

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and was the subject of a recommendation by an East Asian Vision Group in 2001. Working groups were established to scope out the possible East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA), but attention was somewhat diverted by China’s separate approach for its own trade arrangement with ASEAN, which led through a series of steps to the establishment of the ASEAN China FTA (ACFTA), Japan responded by initiating a series of bilateral FTAs with individual ASEAN members, together with the ASEAN–Japan Closer Economic Partnership (AJCEP), which entered into force in 2008, and South Korea responded by negotiating the ASEAN Korea FTA (AKFTA), which entered into force in 2007. From New Zealand’s perspective all of these developments — the proposed EAFTA and the various ASEAN agreements with China, Japan and Korea — represented steps towards eventual free trade across the East Asian region, from which New Zealand, along with other non-East Asian countries in the Asia-Pacific, was pointedly excluded.

New Zealand and the “noodle bowl” The second watershed event at the end of the 1990s was the acknowledgement of the failure of the APEC’s Early Voluntary Sector Liberalization (EVSL) initiative, which demonstrated the limitations of a liberalising process based on non-binding voluntary commitments that did not provide for the formal reciprocity in commitments on which larger economies and even some smaller economies tend to insist (Scollay, 2006). Recognition of this accelerated a loss of confidence in APEC and its “concerted unilateralism” as a vehicle for achieving regional-free trade in the Asia-Pacific. As a result, New Zealand’s hosting of APEC in 1999, which may have been seen earlier as a potentially substantial step towards implementation of APEC’s trade agenda, had to settle for a more modest though not necessarily insignificant set of outcomes, including agreement on a non-binding set of competition principles for voluntary adoption by APEC economies.5

5The

Leaders’ meeting in 1999 was also notable for the prominence given to the East Timor crisis, providing a stern test of APEC’s capacity to address a serious international issue affecting one of its members.

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The third watershed event, also in 1999, was the collapse of the WTO’s Seattle ministerial meeting, which had been convened for the purpose of launching a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, to build on the progress made in the Uruguay Round.6 The Seattle collapse seemed to dash expectations of APEC governments that multilateral liberalisation through the WTO could make a significant contribution to achievement of their Bogor goals. Whether as a direct result of these two watershed events or not, they were followed by a sudden upsurge of interest by APEC members in negotiating bilateral FTAs with each other, leading to East Asia’s own “noodle bowl”7 of bilateral FTAs. Although a further WTO ministerial meeting in Doha in 20018 did manage to launch the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations, this came too late to divert APEC governments from their new-found enthusiasm for bilateral FTAs, and the subsequent (and by now seemingly insoluble) difficulties encountered in the Doha Round did little to change their perceptions. By 2008, over 40 new FTAs had been concluded among APEC members. New Zealand, perhaps surprisingly in the light of its traditional strong support for multilateralism and non-discrimination, was a first mover in this “FTA fever”, announcing the conclusion of its FTA with Singapore (the “New Zealand-Singapore Closer Economic Partnership” [NZSCEP]) at the time of the 1999 APEC leaders’ meeting.9 Soundings began to identify other potential 6The Seattle meeting was the first World Trade Organisation (WTO) ministerial meeting chaired

by former New Zealand Prime Minister Mike Moore as the newly installed director general of the WTO. There is no suggestion here that Mike Moore was in any way to blame for the collapse of the ministerial, which rather reflected deep and as it turned out irreconcilable divisions among various WTO members and groups of members. His role is mentioned here rather as another illustration of the prominent role played by New Zealanders in trade developments during this period. 7 “Noodle bowl” is an “Asianised” version of the term “spaghetti bowl” introduced by Bhagwati (1995) and subsequently popularised by him to describe the complex patterns of discrimination and exclusion created by the proliferation among groups of countries of multiple bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between pairs or subgroups of countries within the group, with the FTAs also differing significantly from in each other in provisions relating to rules, especially rules of origin, and to the phasing out and elimination of trade barriers. 8 Also presided over by Mike Moore as WTO director general. The Doha meeting came two months after the “9/11” terrorist attacks, and perceptions of the need to respond positively to the terrorist threat undoubtedly contributed to the positive outcome. 9 In a slightly earlier development, Japan and Korea had shocked the region in 1998 by announcing their intention to negotiate a bilateral FTA. Japan and Korea had hitherto been among the

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Figure 5. 2008.

Asia-Pacific integration and the “noodle bowl”. The situation and outlook around

Source: Inter America Development Bank.

FTA partners. At the same time, New Zealand, along with two other small APEC members, Singapore and Chile, continued to hanker after a “transPacific” approach to trade liberalisation, and in 2002 began exploratory discussions towards a possible “P3” FTA between the three of them, conceived as the possible nucleus of a future trans-Pacific FTA involving a larger group of APEC members. Australia was drawn into these discussions at one point but eventually dropped out, perhaps to prioritise its proposed FTA with the United States. Negotiations for a “P3” agreement began towards the end of 2003. Initial enthusiasm following the conclusion of the NZSCEP for the market access gains potentially available from new FTAs was quickly tempered by the recognition that New Zealand, as a small country with relatively few remaining trade barriers to “trade away”, and exports concentrated on agricultural products that were often sensitive for potential partners, would not necessarily strongest supporters (and also beneficiaries) of GATT Article 1 (the non-discrimination principle). The Japan–Korea negotiations quickly proved abortive, and no FTA between the two countries has yet been concluded, despite periodic attempts to revive the concept.

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find it easy to attract willing FTA partners. The agreement with Singapore was a relatively “easy” FTA to negotiate, because both partners shared a similar approach to trade and the exporters of each country did not constitute major competitive threats to the domestic industries of the other.10 It would, however, not be until 2004 that negotiations began with Thailand, New Zealand’s next FTA partner. In the meantime, it became clear that the spread of FTAs could be a threat as well as an opportunity for New Zealand, with competitors, and in particular Australia, also seeking FTAs with new partners. Australia, for example, secured its own FTA with Singapore soon after the conclusion of the NZSCEP, but its FTA with Thailand came into force prior to that of New Zealand. In the former case, Australia’s FTA would in principle neutralise any advantage over it gained by New Zealand with its earlier FTA, while in the latter case the New Zealand FTA with Thailand was needed to restore parity of market access to that market with Australia. The exclusion of New Zealand from major proposed FTA developments in East Asia has already been noted earlier. The vulnerability of New Zealand in these situations was starkly highlighted when the United States agreed to begin negotiations in 2003 for an FTA with Australia, but subsequently rebuffed a request to negotiate a parallel FTA with New Zealand. The Australia–US FTA (AUSFTA) entered into force soon afterwards, in January 2005. This differentiation in treatment was widely perceived as a reward to Australia for its support for the Iraq War in 2003, and punishment for New Zealand’s refusal to follow suit.11 By the beginning of 2004, New Zealand faced threats of exclusion from two important trade developments in the Asia-Pacific region. In East Asia it was excluded both from the proposed EAFTA and from the network of FTAs with East Asian partners being developed by ASEAN. Economic modelling showed that significant welfare losses from New Zealand would follow from

10 In

order to assure domestic political support for the NZSCEP, and by extension for future FTAs, the New Zealand government had to commit itself to securing satisfactory commitments from its partners in relation to labour and environmental issues, if not in the main text of the agreement at least by way of side agreements. 11 On the other hand, the United States did sign an FTA in 2003 with Chile, which had also opposed the Iraq War. Negotiations for this FTA had been concluded prior to the US invasion of Iraq, but the decision to subsequently sign the agreement was made only after considerable hesitation on the United States’ part.

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the EAFTA or the completion of ASEAN’s FTAs with China, Japan and Korea (Scollay, 2006). The FTA with Singapore and the FTA under negotiation with Thailand offered only modest mitigation of these potential welfare losses. At the same time, New Zealand faced exclusion from the preferential access to the US market being offered to Australia, and also to Chile, another significant competitor for New Zealand. Less obviously, but perhaps even more significantly in economic terms, the preferential access to the Australian market being offered to the United States under AUSFTA would erode the hitherto almost unique preference12 provided to New Zealand in the Australian market under ANZCERTA. Indeed, every new FTA negotiated by Australia would have a similar though smaller effect.

The Push for Inclusion in East Asia The tide began to turn for New Zealand in 2004 when China agreed to negotiate an FTA with New Zealand. This would be China’s first FTA negotiation with a developed country. Its decision to negotiate was based first, on New Zealand’s concession in agreeing to accord market economy status to China in terms of its WTO membership,13 and second, on its perception of New Zealand as a small and therefore relatively non-threatening potential partner with whom to experiment in negotiating an FTA with a developed country partner.14 It would take until 2008 for the FTA with China to be concluded and enter into force. It has subsequently become New Zealand’s most important trade agreement in quantitative terms, with China becoming New Zealand’s largest export market by a considerable distance. A second important step towards inclusion was the agreement of ASEAN to commence negotiations in 2005 for an FTA with Australia and 12 Previously

the only preferential access to Australia other than that provided to New Zealand under ANZCERTA had been the access available to the Pacific Islands (under SPARTECA). 13 Classification as a market or non-market economy makes an important difference to China’s rights in the WTO under the terms of its accession. In particular, classification as a market economy reduces China’s vulnerability to anti-dumping action. 14This perception of New Zealand as a non-threatening “experimental” FTA partner has surfaced in other contexts as well. The author heard a Singaporean negotiator at a conference in Washington, DC, describe Singapore’s FTA negotiation with New Zealand as a “warm-up match” for the “main match” of its FTA negotiation with the United States.

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New Zealand. An earlier history of discussions in the 1990s on the possibility of linking ANZCERTA with the AFTA made it natural for ASEAN to negotiate jointly with Australia and New Zealand, in contrast with Australia’s normal preference to negotiate FTAs with its partners independently of New Zealand.15 It would take until 2009 for the resulting ASEAN–Australia– New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) to be concluded, with entry into force for the various ASEAN parties following between 2010 and 2012. The AANZFTA quickly became recognised as the most ambitious and comprehensive of the ASEAN FTAs (Lee and Okabe, 2010). A third vital step towards inclusion for New Zealand came with the establishment of the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005, which was preceded by a debate among the ASEAN+3 members on whether participation in the EAS should be extended beyond the ASEAN+3 group, with Japan being the main proponent of an expanded membership. A proposal to include the United States was not agreed, but in the end agreement was reached to admit Australia, New Zealand and India, all of whom were involved at the time in negotiating FTAs with ASEAN.16 The EAS membership thus became known as “ASEAN+6”. A proposal by Japan for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) based on the ASEAN+6 group then began to be discussed. Japan backed up its proposal with the provision of substantial finance for the establishment in 2007 of a research institute in Jakarta, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, ostensibly for the purpose of promoting ASEAN integration within East Asia, but also involving all members of the ASEAN+6 group as supporting participants. By 2009 the CEPEA proposal was firmly on the agenda of the EAS, while the earlier EAFTA proposal had not been abandoned. The upshot was that parallel but separate working groups continued to work separately on EAFTA and CEPEA, with some ASEAN+3 members continuing to prefer the EAFTA.

15The

other case of a joint Australia–New Zealand approach to an FTA is the PACER-Plus FTA with the Pacific Island countries, again based on a history (longer in this case) of joint partnership with the Pacific Islands in the earlier SPARTECA agreement and in the Pacific Islands Forum. 16 Negotiations for the ASEAN-India FTA (AIFTA) began in 2003. The agreement was signed in 2009, and entered into force in 2010. In contrast to AANZFTA, the AIFTA is recognised as by far the weakest of the “ASEAN Plus” FTAs.

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Some steps were taken towards merging the work of the two working groups. However, before any agreement could be reached on how the two proposals could be brought to fruition in one or two agreements, they were overtaken by subsequent events, as will be described below. The CEPEA proposal meant that New Zealand now had a “seat at the table” in one of the two proposals for a comprehensive East Asian trade agreement. For New Zealand, as for Australia and India, its membership of the ASEAN+6 group and participation with CEPEA, together with its involvement in one of the “ASEAN+” FTAs, would subsequently be critical in securing participation in the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), described below. New Zealand continued to take further steps to consolidate its inclusion in East Asian trade developments. FTAs were concluded with Malaysia in 2009, and with Hong Kong, China,17 in 2010, after a negotiation process spanning almost 10 years. An earlier effort to establish an agreement with Taiwan was abandoned due to political opposition from China. But in 2010 New Zealand concluded an FTA known by the acronym ANZTEC with Taiwan, following a relaxation of China’s position.18 With the conclusion of these agreements, New Zealand had secured FTAs covering all East Asian members of APEC together with ASEAN, with the important exceptions of Japan and Korea.

Revival of the Trans-Pacific Dimension In the meantime, interest began to revive in the trans-Pacific approach to regional trade and economic integration, beginning with the proposal by the Canadian APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) members for a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), effectively a FTA covering all APEC members (Scollay, 2004).19 The FTAAP proposal initially received a lukewarm response from most APEC governments, and more enthusiastic governments 17The

agreement with Hong Kong is formally known as the New Zealand Hong Kong, China Closer Economic Partnership. 18The agreement with Taiwan is formally known as the agreement between New Zealand and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu on Economic Cooperation, nomenclature that avoids any recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign nation. It was concluded after China let it be known that it would not object to trade agreements with Taiwan by countries that had already concluded an FTA with China. New Zealand, along with Singapore, was the first beneficiaries of this modified stance.

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such as New Zealand were cautious in expressing their support. Support for the concept began to build gradually, however, beginning with the recognition by APEC leaders in 2006 of the FTAAP as a “long-term prospect”, and the subsequent inclusion of the FTAAP as an item on APEC’s REI agenda. New Zealand, Singapore and Chile continued to pursue their concept of a “P3” agreement. With the addition of Brunei Darussalam as a fourth participant the agreement was concluded in 2006 as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP), or “P4”. The announced intention of the “P4” members to use their agreement as the nucleus of a broader trans-Pacific trade initiative elicited little response initially, however. The situation changed dramatically towards the end of 2008 when the United States under President George W. Bush decided that an agreement based on the “P4” concept would be an appropriate vehicle for the United States’ “pivot to Asia”, and the intention to participate in an expanded “P4” was announced by President Bush at that year’s APEC leaders’ meeting. Following the confirmation of the United States’ participation by the new Obama administration in 2009, the “P4” concept was reformulated as a proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would effectively constitute a new agreement. In addition to the United States, Australia and Peru quickly joined the initiative, and formal negotiations began early in 2010 among seven initial TPP participants, with Vietnam added as an observer. Vietnam quickly converted its status to that of full participant, and Malaysia also joined the TPP negotiations, which would be highly contentious and stretch over almost six years. The trade importance of the TPP in quantitative terms would be dramatically increased, and the balance of the negotiations significantly altered, by the addition as participants of Canada and Mexico in 2011, and Japan in 2013. For New Zealand, the TPP-12 promised the extension of the coverage of its FTAs to include the United States, Japan, Canada and Mexico, respectively, the largest, 3rd largest, 10th largest and 13th largest economies in the world, as well as Peru. The trans-Pacific approach received a further boost at the end of 2010, when APEC leaders declared that the time had come “for APEC to translate

19The

title Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific clearly echoed the proposed Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) then under negotiation, in which all APEC members in the Americas were involved. The FTAA negotiations would, however, be abandoned in 2005.

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FTAAP from an aspirational to a more concrete vision”, and instructed their governments to “take concrete steps toward (its) realization”. They proposed furthermore that this should be achieved “by developing and building on ongoing regional undertakings, such as ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and the TransPacific Partnership, among others”. This posed a potential problem for ASEAN and its partners, in that while negotiations for the TPP were already under way, no agreement had been reached to proceed to negotiation of either the ASEAN+3’s EAFTA or the ASEAN+6’s CEPEA. After some jockeying for position with China and Japan, ASEAN took charge of the issue and after considerable deliberation produced a proposal for an RCEP, to be open for participation by all members of the ASEAN+6 group. Agreement was reached in 2012 with all ASEAN+6 partners to proceed with negotiating the RCEP, and negotiations began in 2013. There is a widespread perception that the TPP involved the imposition of the United States’ preferred trade rules on other members while the RCEP is “China-led” and will essentially reflect China’s preferences. The reality is more nuanced. While the United States was clearly the central player in the TPP, a large part of the contestation during the negotiations involved push back from other participants against aggressive US positions on a number of issues, such as intellectual property and related pharmaceutical issues, to arrive at an outcome acceptable to other participants. While China is clearly the most important participant in the RCEP, ASEAN continues to insist that the RCEP is in fact ASEAN-led, and it is certainly true that the somewhat limited levels of ambition set out in the RCEP “Guiding Principles and Objectives” essentially reflect ASEAN preferences. Difficulties in making faster progress in RCEP often appear to have been related to India’s reluctance to match the commitments of other parties, for example, on tariff reduction and elimination. Parallel to developments around the TPP and RCEP, work continued within APEC on the FTAAP, in fulfilment of the leaders’ 2010 instructions. In 2014 China, as the APEC host economy for that year, took on the role of “champion” of the FTAAP, securing agreement of the APEC members to a “Beijing Roadmap” for realisation of the FTAAP. A key initial step in the road map was the undertaking of a Collective Strategic Study (CSS) on Issues Relating to Realization of the FTAAP, to be chaired jointly by China and the United States. New Zealand, as an enthusiastic supporter of the FTAAP, undertook principal responsibility for one of the chapters of the CSS. It was

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agreed from the beginning that while APEC would act as “incubator” for the FTAAP, the actual negotiation and implementation of the FTAAP should take place outside APEC, reflecting a consensus that APEC’s voluntary, nonbinding character should be maintained. The CSS was duly completed and resulted in the APEC leaders’ “Lima Declaration”, essentially endorsing an ongoing APEC agenda directed towards eventual realisation of the FTAAP. For New Zealand, the position reached at the end of 2015 could be regarded as the culmination of over two decades of effort to establish a secure position within developing Asia-Pacific trade arrangements. New Zealand was accepted as a full participant in each of the three principal components of the emerging Asia-Pacific “trade architecture” depicted in Fig. 6. The TPP and RCEP together covered all of New Zealand’s major trading partners in the Asia-Pacific region,20 even if neither agreement

Figure 6. Configurations of region-wide and sub-regional Asia-Pacific integration.

20 An exception should perhaps be noted for the Pacific Island countries, which together account

for a not insignificant portion of New Zealand exports. New Zealand and Australia have, however, also now concluded the PACER-Plus FTA covering the majority of Pacific Island countries.

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would completely satisfy all of New Zealand’s trade objectives within those relationships.21 The “architecture” described in Fig. 6 was superimposed on the ongoing operation of the “noodle bowl” depicted in Fig. 5, in which New Zealand had also carved out a stronger position than had perhaps seemed likely at the turn of the century. A significant gap in that position was also filled in 2015, with the entry into force of the New Zealand–South Korea FTA, no doubt to the relief of New Zealand exporters who had been concerned at the erosion of their market position in Korea following the progressive conclusion by South Korea of FTAs with formidable competitors for New Zealand in some key export product markets: Chile in 2003, the United States in 2008 and Australia in 2014. The main remaining gaps could be filled by Japan’s participation in both the TPP and the RCEP, and by the participation of the United States, Canada, Mexico and Peru in the TPP. The catch, of course, was that none of the three major “trade architecture” elements depicted in Fig. 6 were guaranteed to proceed. The TPP negotiations had concluded but the agreement awaited ratification by its members, including most significantly the United States. The RCEP negotiations would clearly miss the 2015 deadline initially set for their conclusion, have subsequently extended into 2017 and will almost certainly continue into 2018 and possibly beyond. The FTAAP is on a much longer timetable, with no possibility that negotiations could start in the near future, and a general understanding that realisation of the FTAAP will not occur — if it does — until somewhere in the 2020s.

Renewed Uncertainty The apparently favourable Asia-Pacific trade environment that had developed for New Zealand by 2015 has since begun to unravel somewhat. Most 21This

is not the place for a comprehensive assessment of the TPP and RCEP, both of which have been controversial in New Zealand. For a reasonably neutral assessment of the TPP, see the series of assessments of TPP chapters at interest.co.nz The final assessment, available at http://www.interest.co.nz/business/83382/ryan-greenaway-mcgrevy-says-ithas-been-hard-slog-liberalise-international-trade, includes links to all the chapter assessments. Detailed assessments of the RCEP are difficult to find, given the secrecy of the ongoing negotiations. For a recent assessment see Pambangyo (2017). There is a general consensus that the RCEP is targeted at a significantly lower level of ambition than the TPP.

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obviously, following the election of President Trump in November 2016, the United States in early 2017 withdrew from the TPP. President Trump indicated an intention to instead negotiate bilateral agreements with individual TPP members as well as with other countries. This has thrown the future of the TPP into doubt, both for the technical reason that there will have to be agreement on amending the TPP provisions on entry into force if it is to proceed without the United States, and for the economic reason that the absence of the United States may substantially reduce the value of the TPP to some if not all other participants. However Japan, after initially expressing serious doubts about the value of the TPP without the United States and appearing to prioritise a strong bilateral relationship with the United States, has since appeared to have adopted a more cautious approach to the bilateral relationship and has thrown its weight behind efforts to proceed with a TPP based on the remaining 11 participants (the so-called “TPP-11”). From New Zealand’s perspective, the absence of the United States will reduce somewhat the potential market access gains from the TPP, and it is also unlikely that Japan or Canada will budge from the restrictive stance they took in the TPP to opening markets for key agricultural products to New Zealand and other participants. On the other hand, the absence of the United States means that New Zealand will not need to share TPP market access to other TPP participants with the United States, which is a formidable competitor in some of New Zealand’s key export product markets. The bilateral FTAs that President Trump has indicated he wishes the United States to negotiate with individual countries could also be problematic. The President’s statements clearly indicate that he views the bilateral approach as a means to skew the balance of advantages in trade agreements heavily in favour of the United States. For TPP participants this is likely to mean that the United States will insist in bilateral negotiations on acceptance of its positions that were eventually rejected in the TPP negotiations. More generalised disruptions to New Zealand’s trading environment would also follow from other features of the trade policy foreshadowed in the statements of President Trump, including an apparent willingness to consider engaging in trade wars with major Asia-Pacific economies such as China and Korea, a determination to aggressively use trade negotiations and trade enforcement measures in pursuit of mistaken objectives such as elimination of trade deficits on both a bilateral and global basis, and even the possibility

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of action to disrupt or perhaps withdraw from the WTO if it fails to modify itself in line with United States’ wishes. Some of these developments, as well as others such as the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Accord on climate change, could place New Zealand in the unwelcome position of having to take sides between China and the United States, a dilemma that it has so far been able to avoid, except in the unusual case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) promoted by China, which New Zealand along with many other countries joined at the end of 2015 against the wishes of the United States. A possible breakdown of trade relations between China and the United States would also throw doubt on the future of the FTAAP, given that the joint participation of China and the United States is essential to the economic case for the FTAAP and also to its role in maintaining the trans-Pacific approach to Asia-Pacific trade and economic integration. Doubts also remain as to when and perhaps even if the RCEP negotiations will be successfully concluded, and the extent of the contribution that a completed RCEP may make to deepening trade relations among its participants. New Zealand has also faced challenges in its trade relations with China. After several years of first-mover advantage as the only developed country having an FTA with China, the competitive aspect of FTAs has asserted itself as increasing numbers of other countries negotiate FTAs with China. Australia, in particular, in 2014 concluded an FTA with China that provided it with significantly better market access than New Zealand for some important agricultural exports. This prompted New Zealand to seek negotiations with China to “upgrade” its own FTA with China, by addressing remaining market access issues under the existing agreement. The “upgrade” negotiations are proceeding but will not be easy. New Zealand is also challenged to identify advantageous ways to engage with China’s curiously named Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), designed to intensify China’s trade and investment relations with countries to its west, extending as far as Africa and Europe. There are suggestions that the European Union may see an opportunity to displace the United States as China’s prime economic partner, a change that could have significant implications for the Asia-Pacific, including New Zealand.22

22 New

Zealand meantime is pursuing its own FTA with the European Union. A separate trade agreement with the United Kingdom is also envisaged, although it will not be possible

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These developments are occurring against a background of formidable challenges presented to New Zealand and many other countries by changes in the nature of international trade, in particular the increasing prevalence of global value chains, and also the backlash against globalisation, fuelled by factors such as anger at the unequal distribution of the gains from trade and (contested) perceptions that national sovereignty is being infringed by the increasing emphasis on “behind the border” provisions in modern trade agreements. The uncertainties now surrounding the future of New Zealand’s trade relationships in the Asia-Pacific are likely to persist for a considerable time to come.

References Akamatsu, K (1962). A historical pattern of economic growth in developing countries. The Developing Economies, 1(1), 3–25. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (1995). APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration for Action, Osaka, Japan, 19 November. http://mddb.apec.org/Pages/Bro wseLeadersDeclarations.aspx?Setting=browseLeadersDeclaration&DocType=% 22Leaders%27%20Declaration%22. Bhagwati, J (1995). U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Agreements. New York: Columbia University Discussion Paper series. Elek, A (2005). Back to Canberra: Founding APEC. In The Evolution of PECC: The First 25 Years, A Elek (ed.), Singapore: Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. Kojima, K (1966). A Pacific economic community and Asian developing countries. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 7(1), 17–37. Krugman, P (1991). The move toward free trade zones. Economic Review–Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 76(6), 5. Lattimore, RG and P McKeown (1995). New Zealand’s International Trade Performance: Pre and Post Deregulation: 1970–1985 and 1985–1993. Canterbury: Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit, Lincoln University. Lee, CJ and M Okabe (eds.) (2011). Comprehensive Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia. ERIA Research Project Report 2010 No. 01. Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1993). New Zealand Trade Policy. Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

to determine the modalities for that until the terms of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union become clearer.

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Pambagyo, I., “RCEP: Progress, Challenges and Outlook”, presentation at Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 22 March 2017. https://iseas.edu. sg/images/centres/asc/pdf/RCEPIman.pdf Scollay, R (2001). The changing outlook for Asia Pacific regionalism. The World Economy, 24(9), 1135–1160. Scollay, R (2004). Preliminary Assessment of the Proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific. Singapore: Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. Scollay, R (2006). New Zealand and the Developing FTA Architecture of the AsiaPacific Region, Report for Asia New Zealand Foundation and New Zealand Treasury. Wellington: Asia NZ Foundation.

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CHAPTER 9 New Zealand and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations: Strategy, Content and Lessons Jane Kelsey

In 1999, in a presentation to the University of Otago Foreign Policy School entitled “Polanyi revisited: globalisation and its contradictions in the new millennium”, I argued that Globalisation is represented as inevitable and irreversible. Even if the results are disappointing or unfair, there is no alternative. Enthusiasts seek to advance the process more swiftly. ‘Realistic’ critics suggest ways to mitigate the adverse effects, especially on labour and the environment. ‘Unrealistic’ critics denounce the growing inequalities and poverty, and warn of the erosion of democracy and the potential for unregulated capitalism to suffer a systemic collapse. (Kelsey, 2000)

Several decades later, the title would read “Polanyi revisited: the implosion of neoliberal globalisation”. The contradictions that Karl Polanyi articulated in his iconic book The Great Transformation (Polanyi, 2001) have become more explicit and widely recognised. He insisted that economic relations, politics and ideology do not exist in a social vacuum. The economy is embedded in the social, and the social purpose of the state is to give effect to that reality. Polanyi attributed the collapse of the previous era of laissez faire to the futility of attempts to disembed the social from the market. He described a “double movement” that provided the catalyst for change: as unrestrained market forces wreaked havoc, social forces within nation states organised to 145

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protect themselves. Polanyi emphasised the spontaneous, localised resistance of communities whose lives had been turned upside down. Today, even former champions of the neoliberal era admit that the international regime they helped to create and legitimise is relatively fragile and unstable. When the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund Christine Lagarde talks of the need for “inclusive capitalism” (Lagarde, 2014), and leading Financial Times journalist Martin Wolf urges significant reforms to pre-empt the need for more radical change (Wolf, 2014), the foundations of post-1970s neoliberalism are definitely shifting. In the late 2000s, critical attention was focused on the barely regulated and speculative nature of financialised capitalism, as the financial crisis triggered by the collapse of US sub-prime mortgages was followed by a sovereign debt crisis in Europe. More recently, opposition to the international economic regime, especially the scale and scope of mega-regional agreements, has taken centre stage. Democratic and Republican candidates in the 2016 American presidential election campaigned against the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) as the epitome of a failed model that has led to job losses, inequality and disempowerment. That seems ironic, given that critics in other countries see the TPPA as a deal made by and for American corporations. Yet there is a common narrative of inequality and alienation. The same message can be read into the choice by a majority of voters in the UK referendum to leave the European Union (EU), triggering what is known colloquially as Brexit. At the same time, there is growing outrage over the right of foreign investors to sue governments in controversial international arbitral tribunals for massive compensation over domestic policy decisions that are taken in the national interest. Countries have been withdrawing from bilateral investment treaties (BITs)1 and developing more balanced alternatives (Kelsey, 2015a). Resistance to new agreements is also evident in the global South. Tanzania and Uganda announced they would not to sign the East Africa Community’s Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU (No deal with EU…, 2016), and Papua New Guinea and Fiji said they would not join the enhanced Pacific Economic Relations Trade Agreement (PACER-plus) with Australia and New Zealand (Kisselpar, 2016).

1 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4H4

AAPJPf

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In New Zealand, the TPPA has been the focus of dissent. An opinion poll conducted by TV3 when the negotiations were concluded in November 2015 showed 34 per cent of New Zealanders favouring the TPPA and 52 per cent opposed (Kiwis…, 2015). The unprecedented groundswell of opposition was driven by quite simple sentiments, expressed by many in their submissions to the select committee on the agreement: here was a secretive deal designed to benefit an elite that would erode people’s capacity to influence decisions that affect their daily lives. The evidence suggests that attempts to brand the TPPA as a “free trade” treaty were not credible. At a purely economic level, very few of the TPPA’s chapters were about traditional commodity trade, even though that was the preoccupation of the New Zealand government, and none were “free” of tariffs and other border barriers in sectors of particular sensitivity, such as dairy. The main focus was “behind the border”, targeting domestic laws, policies and regulations that are the mandated responsibilities of the elected parliament, and restricting the right of future governments to regulate in the public interest as they, and their electorates, see fit. In Polanyian terms, people were rejecting a deal in which the state privileged economic objectives and corporate interests ahead of its responsibility and accountability to them. Opposition to the TPPA coalesced around four issues that people could readily relate to: the democratic deficit of the negotiations and threat to sovereignty the agreement posed; impacts on access to affordable medicines provided through the Pharmaceutical Management Agency known as Pharmac; the special rights conferred on foreign investors, especially from the United States, and their enforcement of those rights through private international arbitration; and the privileging of foreign states and foreign corporations over the rights of M¯aori under Te Tiriti o Waitangi and other international instruments. These factors outweighed the purported economic gains, which appeared large when described in ballpark figures but greatly diminished when viewed in the context of the broader economy and critiques of the modelling it relied on. This paper examines these various elements and the failure of the government to acknowledge the legitimacy of people’s concerns and the need to address them. The conclusion reflects on the consequences as New Zealand continues to negotiate ever-more extensive and intrusive agreements that aim to shut and bolt the door against a different paradigm.

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The Democratic Deficit The first leaked documents from the TPPA negotiations revealed on their cover sheet that the parties had agreed at their first formal round to keep all documents secret for four years beyond the entry into force or the negotiations were formally abandoned.2 This period of non-disclosure would not only preclude informed critique; it also effectively removed accountability from the governments for the positions they have taken. Those seeking to develop informed debate relied on leaked negotiating texts, primarily on the intellectual property and investment chapters and a “transparency” annex on pharmaceutical subsidy schemes, with a one-off posting of texts on regulatory coherence and environment.3 The author and several others organised to attend the actual venue of meetings and talk with negotiators from other countries. Specialist media coverage from the United States, especially Inside U.S. Trade, was another important source, often reporting official briefings and statements and information from industry lobbyists who enjoyed privileged access to draft texts and negotiators through a formalised advisory committee structure. The New Zealand government was among the most secretive. Trade Minister Tim Groser refused a request under the Official Information Act 1991 for eight categories of information, without looking at a single document. The resulting judicial review resulted in a High Court order that the Minister comply with his statutory obligations.4 Of equal concern was an opinion from the Chief Ombudsman that upheld the Minister’s decision not to view any documents, raising serious questions about the effectiveness of the parliamentary watchdog (Chief Ombudsman…, 2015). Groser’s successor as New Zealand Trade Minister, Todd McClay, delayed the court-ordered reconsideration of the request until the day after the TPPA was signed (Kelsey, 2015b). While 2 Letter

from Mark Sinclair TPP Lead Negotiator, New Zealand, undated, http://www.mfat. govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/TPP%20letter.pdf 3 For example, Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, 10 February 2011, http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf; TPP, Investment chapter, 20 January 2015, Section B, Wikileaks, posted 25 March 2015, https://wikileaks. org/tpp-investment/WikiLeaks-TPP-Investment-Chapter.pdf; https://wikileaks.org/tpp/heal thcare/; Trans-Pacific Partnership: Regulatory Coherence, http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificRegulatoryCoherence.pdf; Report from Chairs from Environment Chapter for all 12 nations, https://wikileaks.org/tpp2/static/pdf/tpp-chairsreport.pdf. 4 Kelsey v Minister of Trade [2015] NZHC 2497.

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the Minister’s lawyers told the court the request potentially applied to some 30,000 pages (a number that was never substantiated), the actual release was just 1100 pages, which were heavily redacted. Despite the secrecy, the New Zealand government adopted a mantra that “this is the most open consultation there has been for any trade agreement”. Constant repetition does not make it true. This level of secrecy has not been normal practice in the multilateral arena, where the World Trade Organization (WTO) publishes reports from chairs of negotiating committees and periodic negotiating texts (Kelsey, 2011). The EU Ombudsman called for greater disclosure in the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), given its potential implications for the rights of European citizens, noting that ongoing secrecy made for bad democracy and bad decisions.5 Former Trade Minister Groser himself welcomed the release of the draft text for the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) as “making the negotiations more accessible to the public”, after the text had been leaked.6 The secrecy of the TPPA negotiations was hardly a fringe concern. In December 2013, legislators from nine TPPA countries sent an open letter to the Trade Ministers calling for release of the draft text before it was signed to enable effective legislative scrutiny and public debate. The signatories from New Zealand were Hon Tariana Turia and Te Ururoa Flavell (Co-leaders of the M¯aori Party), Rt Hon Winston Peters and Tracey Martin (Leader and Deputy Leader of New Zealand First), Russel Norman and Metiria Turei (Green Party co-leaders) and Hone Harawira (Leader of Mana Movement) (Kelsey, 2014). The New Zealand Labour Party chose to issue its own separate statement. Polling by Consumer Link in December 2012 showed 65 per cent of those surveyed opposed keeping the text secret with only 14 per cent in favour (Kelsey, 2012). A petition calling for an inquiry into the TPPA led by Helen Kelly, the President of the New Zealand National Centre of Trade Unions (NZCTU), in 2011, and for the release of the negotiating documents was not heard by the government-controlled Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee until July 2015, and then it was peremptory.7 The government even 5 Decision

of the European Union Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry OI/10/2014/RA concerning the European Commission, 6 January 2015. 6 Groser Welcomes Release of ACTA Negotiating Text, 18 April 2010, http://www.scoop. co.nz/stories/PA1004/S00184.htm. 7 Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on Petition 2008/129.

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refused to release any documents to the Waitangi Tribunal, or even confirm whether the previous Treaty of Waitangi Exception had been adopted, until the text was signed.8 The government’s standard rationale was that disclosure would jeopardise New Zealand’s bargaining position in the negotiations and future bargaining positions with other countries. Yet the other TPPA parties had already seen the text and tabled documents; it was New Zealanders, including Members of Parliament, who were denied similar access. Likewise, there was abundant information available to current and future negotiating parties and New Zealand’s negotiating position on WTO matters and from the outcomes of other negotiations. People’s unwillingness to accept “trust me” democracy was not helped by the Trade Minister’s belligerence and denigrating comments about the TPPA’s critics.9 A change of Minister altered the demeanour but not the practices for subsequent negotiations, attracting criticism even from journalists who supported the government’s goal (O’Sullivan, 2016). Shortening the select committee examination of the TPPA, and production of an anodyne report that echoed the equally anodyne National Interest Analysis (NIA) reflected a blatant attempt to shut down debate. That became all the more apparent by the release of the draft select report that engaged in detail with the critique of the agreement. While the Labour opposition announced it would not support ratification of the agreement, it did so on very limited grounds that allowed it to avoid aspersions being cast on any of the previous agreements the Labour government had negotiated (Andrew Little…, 2016). The Green Party and New Zealand First were more forthright in their opposition to the deal itself. The formal politics of the TPPA seem to be lagging far behind the popular debate, a position that will be unsustainable if critique of the underlying model of these agreements is sustained.

Busting the Pharmac Model The US pharmaceutical industry lobby (PhRMA) and its New Zealand affiliate Medicines New Zealand never aimed to dismantle Pharmac, the agency responsible for deciding which medicines and medical devices will receive 8 Waitangi Tribunal, 9 For

Decision of the Tribunal, Wai 2522, 31 July 2015, paras 55–56. example, Monasterio et al. (2015).

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government subsidies. They seemed more concerned to blunt its effectiveness, which is based on the negotiating leverage of a tightly capped budget and use of cheaper generic medicines in the calculus of possible subsidies. The New Zealand market was not important in itself; it was more likely concerned with the precedent Pharmac set for other countries. There were two prongs to PhRMA’s strategy to “bust the cap” on Pharmac’s budget. Annex 26-A: Transparency and Procedural Fairness for Pharmaceutical Products and Healthcare Devices guarantees the industry, and in some instances the public, opportunities to intervene in the process of deciding which medicines will be listed for funding and at what level. The final version does not go as far as previous leaked texts (Gleeson, 2015; Keating et al., 2016). That backdown reflects concerted pressure from the health communities in New Zealand and internationally which increased the political cost of conceding to US demands and the determination of New Zealand’s intellectual property and health negotiators. Nevertheless, the Annex still gives added leverage to the pharmaceutical industry to contest decisions and to mobilise campaigns for funding of expensive medicines. Concerns have already been expressed about their shadowy presence behind campaigns for Pharmac to fund breast cancer medicine Herceptin and the melanoma medicines Opdivo and Keytruda (Kirk et al., 2016). In the 2016 budget, the government announced an increase of $124 million over four years in Pharmac’s budget to a handful of expensive new medicines (Pharmac reveals…, 2016). The second line of attack was through the intellectual property chapter. The combination of provisions on patent term extension, patents for new uses, and patent linkage is designed to extend monopoly rights and delay the advent of generics.10 However, the most controversial measure with a serious impact on Pharmac’s funding cap was a minimum monopoly period for marketing new generation biologics medicines, which derive from biological sources rather than chemical compounds and may or may not be patented. The TPPA’s inclusion of biologics medicines is unprecedented and was the last matter to be settled in the negotiations. Australia secured a last minute agreement to two options in Article 18.51.1. Option (a) requires an eight-year monopoly. Effective market protection in Option (b) combines five years of data exclusivity from the date of 10 See

discussion in Australian Productivity Commission (2016).

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marketing approval, with unspecified “other measures”, and a contribution of “market circumstances” to “deliver a comparable outcome”. The language is constructively ambiguous. Australia and New Zealand say this will allow them to preserve their current regimes (Robb Rejects TPP…, 2015; Slight changes to Pharmac…, 2015). As discussed below, that position was attacked by Congressional allies of PhRMA, who called for an unambiguous 12-year monopoly (Hatch Discusses Biologics…, 2016), which is currently US law although President Obama had wanted to reduce it to seven years (President’s Budget…, 2016). The US Trade Representative (USTR) committed to addressing those concerns about pharmaceuticals and biologics using “implementation plans”, meaning side-letters and requiring domestic implementation to US satisfaction (Froman…, 2016). If the agreement was unchanged, a narrow interpretation of option (b) was likely to be challenged by the United States in the Committee on Intellectual Property Rights and the TPP Commission set up under the agreement, and if necessary through state-state dispute settlement. Further, negotiations had to begin within 10 years to revisit the period of protection and the mechanism in option (b), unless the parties agree otherwise.11 A paper from Ministry of Health Officials on the impact of higher biologics protections, released under the Official Information Act, made it clear that “early and strong competition in the markets for small molecule and biologic medicines (“biologics”) through early regulatory approval and market entry of generics and “biosimilars” (the biologics equivalent of a generic) is central” to achieving the goal to manage medicines expenditure through regulation and purchasing arrangements so as to maximise health benefits for consumers and value to taxpayers.12 The Ministry paper went on to say that the market share of biologics is expected to increase significantly over the coming years, but the price of most products is unlikely to reduce markedly. Delaying competition in the biologics market will mean that the government will pay higher prices for innovator biologics for longer and savings within the capped pharmaceutical budget will therefore be foregone. This will mean either that health gains for patients are foregone, or the government will have to pay more to maintain the same health outcomes, or a combination of both.13 11 Article

18.51.3. of Health, Biologics in Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations. Full Analysis, undated, released under the Official Information Act. 13 Ibid, paras. 74–75. 12 Ministry

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The problem was not just the prospect of an extended period beyond the current five-year term in New Zealand. Freezing the status quo removes the flexibility for New Zealand to opt for a lower period of protection, as exists many other countries. While the outcome could have been worse, the Pharmac model was significantly undermined by the TPPA. If implemented, the medium term impacts on affordable medicines would be significant, presenting future governments with the choice of either increasing the pharmaceutical budget or shifting the costs onto patients, while weathering the critique of an increasingly informed and critical public health community.

Foreign Investment Rules The investment chapter of the TPPA (Chap. 9), especially investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, was the third highly contentious issue. Again, this needs to be seen in the context of an international backlash against such arrangements. The United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2012 listed eight “welldocumented shortcomings of the arbitral system” (UNCTAD, 2012): (i) An expansive use of International Investment Agreements that reaches beyond what was originally intended; (ii) Contradictory interpretations of key provisions of those agreements by ad hoc tribunals, leading to uncertainty about their meaning; (iii) The inadequacy of the annulment mechanisms in the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or national judicial review mechanisms to correct substantive mistakes of first-level tribunals; (iv) The emergence of a “club” of individuals who serve as counsel in some cases and arbitrators in others, often obtaining repeated appointments, thereby raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest; (v) The practice of nominating arbitrators who are likely to support the position of the party appointing him or her; (vi) The secrecy of many proceedings; (vii) The high costs and considerable length of arbitration proceedings; and (viii) Overall concerns about the legitimacy and equity of the system. That, alongside the incursions into domestic regulatory domains, concerns about the bias of arbitrators, has generated what is commonly described as a crisis of legitimacy in the international arbitral regime.

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By 2015, UNCTAD was describing a legitimacy crisis in the international investment regime (UNCTAD, 2015). The number of known investment disputes had risen exponentially over the past decade. This was fuelled by an increasingly aggressive approach by investors and the boutique law firms that dominate the field, and the rise of third party funders bankrolling ISDS claims for a share of the proceeds. The number of disputes against affluent countries had risen to 40 per cent of those lodged in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2016). The TPPA would intensify this trend. Investors from the United States are the most litigious users of ISDS, accounting for one fifth of known investorinitiated disputes under such agreements (UNCTAD, 2016). The TPPA rules impose more extreme obligations than New Zealand’s existing treaties and contain fewer safeguards (Kawharu, 2001). For example, the government agreed for the first time to allow investment contracts, including mining and public-private partnership (PPP) contracts, to be enforced using the ISDS section of the chapter where those contracts do not specify the enforcement mechanism.14 Moreover, New Zealand’s obligations in existing agreements to provide most-favoured-nation treatment entitle investors from the parties to those agreements to any better treatment given under the TPPA. In relation to China, that means new rights of non-discrimination when making an investment, including the higher threshold for vetting foreign investment in the TPPA. There are also weaker protections. The United States refuses to apply even the weak general exception in Chap. 29 to the investment chapter. Instead, a circular provision in Article 9.15 says a government can ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives — but only where those measures are consistent with the chapter. There is an equally vacuous provision on corporate social responsibility in Article 9.16. The interpretation of indirect expropriation of investments in Annex 9-B gives weaker protection for public policy than some other New Zealand free trade agreements (FTAs). Annex 9-A seeks to circumscribe the adventurism of investment tribunals when interpreting Article 9.6 Minimum Standard of Treatment. But the reference to customary international law still has to be interpreted by the tribunals, and they have produced quite inconsistent interpretations. 14TPPA,

Article 19.9.

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The TPPA made a few adjustments to the ISDS procedures. But these changes fall far short of those being promoted elsewhere (e.g. the recent Australia China FTA) (Nottage, 2016), let alone addressing the long list of concerns cited earlier from UNCTAD, including the absence of precedent through stare decisis, no appeal system and no independent judiciary. The government’s NIA of the TPPA argued the investment chapter is not a problem because New Zealand has never been subject of an ISDS dispute (Ministry of Foreign Affairs…, 2016). Yet that is largely because New Zealand has very few agreements and most countries with which they exist are not large capital exporters or are not traditionally litigious. Australia could have said the same before it was sued by Philip Morris Asia over the plain packaging legislation. Even though Australia won that investment dispute on a matter of jurisdiction the government reportedly spent $50 million to defend it (Teinhaara, 2015).15 Nor is there a pressing need to protect New Zealand’s limited offshore investments. The court systems in virtually all TPPA countries are robust. Business New Zealand told the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2012 that ISDS was not required in such situations (Investor-State…, 2012). If there are concerns about protecting investors in Peru or Mexico with whom New Zealand does not currently have investment agreements, a prudent investor could and should take out risk insurance, as any other commercial actor is expected to do. The government’s approach further illustrates the Polanyian contradictions: it embeds New Zealand more deeply in an investment regime from which other countries have been withdrawing because of political and popular outrage over disputes that challenge domestic regulatory sovereignty.16 South Africa began terminating BITs in 2012 and in December 2015 passed a domestic law to provide for more balanced rights and responsibilities to be enforced in its national courts.17 Brazil developed a new model agreement that preserves regulatory authority for the state (Trevino, 2015).18 Indonesia

15 At

the time of writing, no award of costs had been made. example, South Africa, Indonesia, Argentina, Poland. 17 Republic of South Africa, The Protection of Investment Bill 2015. Gaye Davis, Protection of Investment Bill passed by Parliament, Eyewitness News, undated, http://ewn.co.za/2015/11/ 03/Protection-of-Investment-Bill-passed-in-Parliament. 18 Federal Republic of Brazil, model Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement (CIFA). 16 For

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announced its withdrawal from more than 20 BITs; India followed suit and adopted a very different new model BIT in December 2015 (Peterson, 2015). France and Germany rejected the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP between the United States and EU (Barbiere, 2015); the EU responded by proposing an alternative court system with an appeal option, which it belatedly included in its agreements with Canada and Vietnam.19 The presumption that New Zealand will not face a similar challenge in the future, and a consequent political and popular backlash that requires a similar response, is a gamble that flies in the face of abundant evidence to the contrary.

The TPPA v Te Tiriti o Waitangi In July 2015, a number of prominent M¯aori individuals, hapu and organisations lodged a Waitangi Tribunal claim, arguing that the process and substance of the TPPA breached the Crown’s obligations to M¯aori.20 According to the claimants, the evidence clearly showed a denial of their independent authority under Te Tiriti o Waitangi and rights over taonga, including natural resources, indigenous knowledge and well-being. They pointed to outstanding intellectual property matters arising from the Wai 262 claim (Tribunal, 2011), including conflict with the requirement in TPPA for New Zealand to adopt an equivalent to the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), revised in 1991 (UPOV 1991) convention on plant variety rights into domestic law. The claimants also stressed the risks from investors enforcing their special rights under the TPPA through ISDS. Reiterating concerns expressed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, they pointed to the potential for ISDS to have a chilling effect on the government’s willingness to provide effective redress for Tiriti breaches, or to adopt protective measures sought by M¯aori in relation to mining or water that foreign investors would object to. Other significant concerns included risks from ISDS to the government’s Smokefree 2025 policies, on which Parliament’s M¯aori Affairs 19 See

Articles 8.28 and 8.29 of Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, on the one part, and the European Union, final legal text, February 2016. 20The documents from the claim can be accessed on https://tpplegal.wordpress.com/waitangitribunal/.

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Committee had taken the lead, and reduced access to affordable medicines, with the increased cost and longer protections to new generation biologic medicines impacting disproportionately on M¯aori given their poor health status. The Crown effectively blocked an urgent hearing until the TPPA had been signed and the text made publicly available in November 2015. Then it said it was too late to make any changes. The urgent hearing was held in mid-March 2016 with final submissions a month later. For comity reasons, the Tribunal had to report before implementing legislation was introduced to Parliament. The Crown originally said this would be early June 2016, but in mid-April the Tribunal was told the date had been moved forward to 9 May. Because of urgency the Tribunal narrowed the claimants’ arguments to two questions: first, whether the Treaty of Waitangi exception provided effective protection for M¯aori interests, which excluded key parts of the claim, such as intellectual property and healthcare; second, whether the Crown’s proposals for engagement with M¯aori after the signing of the TPPA were consistent with the Tiriti, meaning the manifest failure to consult before and during the negotiations was relegated to background context. Time and again the Tribunal’s report said it was “troubled” about aspects of the TPPA and its implications for M¯aori. It had reservations about the Crown’s assurance that “nothing in the TPPA will prevent the Crown from meeting its Treaty obligations to M¯aori” (Tribunal, 2016), and disagreed that claimants’ concerns about ISDS were overstated. The Tribunal accepted that the Treaty of Waitangi exception was limited in scope and the “full constitutional reach of the Treaty relationship may not be as clearly protected and preserved under the TPPA as it might be” (Tribunal, 2016). The Crown had failed to show any attempt to review the Treaty exception since 2001, despite the much higher risks in the TPPA, or any strategy to actively engage with M¯aori to hear and respond to their concerns. Yet the final report found no breach of the Crown’s obligations to M¯aori. The Tribunal’s mandate under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 is to inquire into claims that an action or omission of the Crown is inconsistent with the “principles of the Treaty”. The jurisprudence on Treaty “principles” dates back to court cases in the 1980s, when M¯aori successfully challenged the implementation of the State-owned Enterprises Act 1986 and the privatisation of fisheries, coal and the broadcasting spectrum, among others. The principles,

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as enunciated by the courts, government agencies, and the Waitangi Tribunal, effectively override te Tiriti and vest constitutional authority in the Crown. Accordingly, the Tribunal said the Crown had the right to govern but must provide active protection for M¯aori interests, which in turn meant steps it was “reasonable for the Crown to take in the situation” (Tribunal, 2016). Applying that weak test the Tribunal held that the Crown “did not breach the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi because the Treaty exception is likely to operate in the TPPA substantially as intended and therefore can be said to offer a reasonable degree of protection to M¯aori interests” (Tribunal, 2016). In welcoming the report, the Trade Minister reiterated the claim that “nothing in the TPP will prevent the Crown from meeting its obligations to M¯aori” (Minister of Trade, 2016). That was not what the Tribunal said, as it acknowledged the legitimacy of M¯aori concerns and urged the government to enter into dialogue with M¯aori to develop stronger protections: Despite this finding, we do have concerns. The protections and rights given to foreign investors under the TPPA are extensive. The rights foreign investors have to bring claims against the New Zealand Government in our view raise a serious question about the extent to which those claims, or the threat or apprehension of them, may have a chilling effect on the Crown’s willingness or ability to meet its Treaty obligations or to adopt otherwise Treaty-consistent measure. This issue and the appropriate text for a Treaty exception clause for future free trade agreements are matters about which there should, in our view, be further dialogue between M¯a ori and the Crown. (Tribunal, 2011)

One matter remained before the Tribunal. Following concerns raised in the Waitangi Tribunal, New Zealand belatedly tabled what became Annex 19-A to the Intellectual Property chapter relating to UPOV 1991. This implicitly recognised that the Treaty Exception would be inadequate protection if the government refused to adopt the Convention. However, it still required New Zealand to adopt a plant variety system that gives effect to UPOV 1991 at the end of three years, either by adopting the Convention or a domestic equivalent, and would require outstanding matters from the Wai 262 claim to be addressed. The Tribunal was the culmination of many years of interventions by M¯aori over the potential impact of these agreements on their Tiriti rights. Hard-won engagement on similar negotiations in the 1990s, and the recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal’s Wai 262 report for improved and more effective

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engagement, had been set aside (Jones et al., 2015). The Tribunal claim created a new level of awareness, and a greater capacity and confidence among M¯aori to challenge such agreements, reflected in their prominent role in the Auckland protests on the day the Agreement was signed. Yet the government ignored requests from the claimants and the Iwi Chairs Forum to engage in dialogue over what was being negotiated and what protections are provided, as the Tribunal proposed. The failure to take M¯aori seriously, and instead to roll over the Treaty exception in future agreements, seemed destined to become another provocation.

The Flawed Economics of TPPA The burden of proving a treaty is in the national interest must rest with the government negotiating it on behalf of its current and future citizens. However, the NIA written by Ministry officials who drafted the TPPA and tabled in parliament along with the text was a promotional document, not an independent cost-benefit analysis. The inadequacy of the NIA and the overall parliamentary process has been challenged by several parliamentary members’ bills and during reviews of standing orders. Both the NIA and the lack of public engagement on the TPPA were strongly criticised by all opposition parties in their minority reports to the select committee hearing on the TPPA. Again, this failing is not unique to New Zealand. The Australian Productivity Commission made a similar call for independent scrutiny in its 2010 report on Australia’s FTAs, saying the government “should commission and publish an independent and transparent assessment of the final text of the agreement, at the conclusion of negotiations but before it is signed” (Australian Productivity…, 2010). The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Senate hearing on the Korea-Australia FTA in 2014 reiterated that call from a business perspective, urging that future NIA on trade treaties are “independent from negotiations, well-researched and relevant to tangible business activities on the ground, and contain empirical information in the national interest, rather than being developed behind closed doors resulting in inaccuracies and omissions”.21 Australia Labor Party members of the Joint

21 Australian Senate, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Korea-Australia

Free Trade Agreement, October 2014, p. 24.

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Standing Committee on Treaties examination of that FTA expressed similar sentiments.22 A key feature of the New Zealand NIA and the government’s sales pitch was an economic study prepared by Petrie et al. from the Peterson Institute, updated on several occasions and reviewed by the New Zealand Institute for Economic Research. The projected gains were a minimal 0.9 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030, even if the modelling methodology was valid. A series of economic studies challenged the studies’ reliance on untenable assumptions and the failure to analyse the quantitative and qualitative costs of the agreement. These included several Australian Productivity Commission reports on FTAs (Australian Productivity Commission, 2010, 2015), a submission to those inquiries by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (Australian Competition…, 2015), a paper produced by economists associated with Tufts University (Capablo et al., 2016; Wise and Sundaram, 2016), and prominent New Zealand economists (Coates et al., 2016; Harrison, 2016), as well as in commentaries by leading international economists such as Stiglitz (2016), Reich (2015), and Krugman (2015). Indeed, the Tufts University study projected 6000 job losses and a fall in labour’s share of output for New Zealand by 2025 (Capablo et al., 2016, p. 17, Table 5). The Ministry rejected all such criticisms in comments to the select committee (Walker, 2016). The failing of the economic analysis was one of the two grounds on which the Labour party said they would not support the ratification of the agreement. Continuing to rely on such heavily discredited studies in a process that lacks robust cost-benefit analyses, including matters such as impacts on human rights and health (Freeman et al., 2015; Labonte et al., 2016), will deepen the legitimacy deficit for any future agreements.

Rewriting the TPPA Script The “final” text signed in Auckland on 5 February 2016 was never the final deal. Under Article 30.5, the TPPA would enter into force once all parties notified the completion of their domestic processes in relation to other parties. If that had not occurred within two years of signing (being February 2018), such 22The

Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Korea, Report 142, 13 May 2014, p. 49.

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notification by parties that comprised 85 per cent of the GDP of the 12 negotiating parties would be sufficient for the TPPA to come into force in relation to those countries. That meant the United States and Japan had to notify before the Agreement could enter into force, giving them an effective veto. The United States thus enjoyed special leverage, bolstered by the constitutional authority of the House of Representatives over international trade agreements. While Fast Track authority constrained the ability of Congress to pull the final text apart, the administration still needed a majority of votes in each house for the introduction and adoption of the implementing legislation. Key members of Congress demanded changes were made (Administration, 2016). The demands focus on three matters: the period of the marketing monopoly for biologics medicines, the option for a TPPA party to block an investor-state dispute over a tobacco control measure, and Wall Street’s complaint that the prohibition on localisation requirements for data and servers does not apply to financial services, something the US Treasury itself had not supported. Other matters, such as automobiles, dairy, disciplines on “currency manipulation”, and more effective labour protections, have also been mentioned. Even if the US Congress approved the legislation, the United States had a second point of leverage known as “certification”. The United States would only notify completion of its own processes in relation to a party once that party had complied with the United States understanding of its TPPA obligations.23 The certification requirement is spelt out in the legislation which granted Trade Promotion Authority or Fast Track negotiating authority for the TPPA and similar agreements, which requires a yes or no vote from Congress to the text as a whole. The United States has used the leverage of certification extensively in the past decade to require other countries to take additional measures relating to the interpretation and application of the text, at times changing a treaty’s substantive content.24 The United States Trade Representative (USTR) routinely vets other countries’ proposed laws, sometimes even drafting them, and has required additional amendments to legislation already

23 Q&A

on Certification requirements for “certification” of trade partners’ compliance before an agreement like TPPA goes into effect, 22 February 2015, http://tppnocertification.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/Certification-memorandum.pdf/. Note that this was written before the granting of Fast Track authority. 24 See documented examples at http://tppnocertification.org/.

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passed, as it did with Australia’s copyright laws before allowing the Australia US FTA to come into force.25 In 2015, senior legislators from five of the TPPA countries, including New Zealand, signed a letter urging their governments to ensure effective protection of sovereign law-making authority from external influence through certification and to resist attempts to influence the drafting of domestic laws during the certification process.26 New Zealand signatories included the leaders of the Labour Party, New Zealand First, Green Party and the M¯aori Party. Yet, according to the deputy counsel for the USTR the provisions for entry into force of the TPPA were specifically designed to protect the US certification requirement, and the other trading partners are aware of the US process. She also confirmed that certification could be applied on a country by country basis to different signatories to the TPPA (U.S. Official…, 2016). A lack of support in the US Congress means the Obama administration never presented the legislation to implement the TPPA. One of the first executive orders of incoming President Donald Trump effectively withdrew the United States from the agreement. On 30 January 2017, the acting USTR notified New Zealand, as the depositary, that the United States did not intend to become a party to the TPPA and had no legal obligations arising from its signature on 4 February 2016.27 The original twelve party agreement was effectively dead. Within days a number of the other parties, including New Zealand, were scrambling to rescue an agreement that had come to symbolise the failures of neoliberal globalisation (TPP Signatories Consider…, 2017).

Conclusion In Polanyi’s “double movement” social forces felt abandoned by an economic model that stripped out the social and locked out democracy. Popular mobilisations achieved change through the national polity. There are signs internationally, and in New Zealand, that a similar dynamic is unfolding in opposition to

25 How

the US forced Australia to rewrite aspects of its copyright law during certification of compliance with the AUSFTA, http://tppnocertification.org/australias-experience/. 26 An open letter to the political leaders of the countries negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 21 April 2015, http://tppnocertification.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/ Legislators-letter-rev.pdf. 27 Mariá Pagán to New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 30 January 2017.

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new generation mega-agreements such as the TPPA. The outcome will not necessarily be progressive. The potential to transform the current failing paradigm in ways that are participatory and constructive requires those who are driving these deals to engage in a positive and active way with this challenge. Instead, they seem intent on moving as rapidly as possible to bind states through evermore extensive and intrusive integration agreements. Before Brexit that process was presumed to be inescapable and irreversible. Hopefully, that debate and a change of direction can take place in New Zealand without a similar degree of turmoil.

Acknowledgment The research in this chapter was funded, in part, by a Marsden Fund grant.

References Administration (18 March 2016). Hatch hold high-level talks on TPP biologics, Inside US Trade. Andrew Little on the TPPA (29 January 2016). http://www.labour.org.nz/ andrew_little_on_the_tppa Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (November 2015). Submission to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into Intellectual Property Arrangements in Australia, pp. 18–19. https://www.accc.gov.au/ system/files/ ACCC%20Submission%20-%20PC%20inquiry%20into%20IP%20arrangeme nts%20in%20Australia%20-%2030%20November.pdf Australian Productivity Commission (2015). Trade and Assistance Review 2013-14, pp. 83–86. Australian Productivity Commission (April 2016). Intellectual Property Arrangements. Draft Report, pp. 253–294. Australian Productivity Commission (November 2010). Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements, pp. 292–293. Australian Productivity Commission Research Report (November 2010). Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements. Rec 5(c), p. 312. Barbiere, C (15 January 2015). France and Germany to form united front against ISDS, Euractive. http://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/franceand-germany-to-form-united-front-against-isds/ Capablo, J, A Izureita and JK Sundaram (16 January 2016). Trading down: Unemployment, inequality and other risks of the trans-pacific partnership agreement. Global Development and Environmental Institute Working Paper. Chief Ombudsman shows how not to be an information watchdog (7 December 2015). Dominion Post. http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/comment/

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editorials/74763977/Editorial-Chief-Ombudsman-shows-how-not-to-be-an-inf ormation-watchdog Coates, B, R Oram, G Bertram and T Hazledine (January 2016). The Economics of the TPPA, TPPA Expert Paper No. 5. Freeman, J, G Keating, E Monasterio, P Neuwelt and D Gleeson (14 February 2015). Call for transparency in new generation trade deals. Lancet, 385, 604–605. Froman Says He Seeks TPP Implementation Plans Now to Ensure Enforcement, Inside US Trade, 18 May 2016. Gleeson, D (12 December 2015). Preliminary analysis of the final TPP healthcare transparency annex: Annex 26-A: Transparency and procedural fairness for pharmaceutical products and healthcare devices. http://infojustice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Gleeson-Preliminary-Analysis-Transparency-Annex12-Dec-2015-1.pdf Harrison, I (February 2016). Garbage In, Garbage Out. A review of the modelling of the benefits of the TPPA. Tail Risk Economics. Hatch Discusses Biologics with Obama, Sees Chance for white house movement on demands (12 July 2016). Inside US Trade. Investor-State Dispute Settlement. Public Consultation 16 May–23 July 2012, OECD, pp. 21–22. Box 1. Jones, C, C Charters, A Erueti and J Kelsey (December 2015). Maori Rights, te Tiriti o Waitangi, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Expert paper no. 3, pp. 6–9. https://tpplegal.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/tpp-te-tiriti.pdf. Kawharu, A (2001). New Zealand Trade and Investment Treaties since 2001: Investment Commitments by New Zealand, in Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 2522, p. 72, appendix 11. Keating, G, J Freeman, A Macmillan, P Neuwelt and E Monasterio (19 February 2016). TPPA should not be adopted without a full, independent health assessment. New Zealand Medical Journal, 129(1430), 7–13. https://www.nzma.org. nz/journal/read-the-journal/all-issues/2010-2019/2016/vol-129-no-1430-19-fe bruary-2016/6809 Kelsey, J (12 April 2011). Too many precedents to refuse to release TPPA text and papers. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1104/S00167/too-many-precedentsto-refuse-to-release-tppa-text-papers.htm Kelsey, J (13 February 2014). Parliamentarians call for the release of Trans-Pacific Partnership text to enable scrutiny and debate, press release. http://www.scoop.co. nz/stories/print.html?path=PO1402/S00156/call-for-the-release-of-trans-pacif ic-partnership-text.htm, links to letter at http://www.tppmpsfortransparency.org/ Kelsey, J (19 December 2012). Opinion polls show PM out of touch with public opinion on TPPA. https://itsourfuture.org.nz/opinion-polls-show-pm-out-of-touchwith-public-on-tppa/ Kelsey, J (2000). Polanyi revisited: Globalisation and its contradictions in the New Millennium. In Globalisation and International Trade Liberalisation. Continuity and Change, M Richardson (ed.). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 170–183.

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Kelsey, J (2015a). Towards a new international investment paradigm? Taking the BRICS seriously. New Zealand Business Law Quarterly, 21(1), 328–350. Kelsey, J (26 November 2015b). High Court says it can’t make Groser provide TPPA information faster ‘for now’. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO1511/S00428/ high-court-cant-make-groser-provide-tppa-information-faster.htm Kirk, S and C Owen (20 March 2016). Keytruda debate: Big Pharma spends millions to woo political support for expensive drugs, Stuff. http://www.stuff.co. nz/national/politics/77886595/Keytruda-debate-Big-Pharma-spends-millionsto-woo-political-support-for-expensive-drugs Kisselpar, J (5 August 2016). Papua New Guinea Trade Minister says PNG ‘not interested’ in PACER Plus trade with Australia, ABC Pacific Beat. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-05/png-says-no-to-pacer-plus/7695538 Kiwis still to be convinced on TPPA (22 November 2015). TV3 Newshub. http:// www.newshub.co.nz/nznews/kiwis-still-to-be-convinced-on-tpp-2015112017#a xzz4HCRi8Zug Krugman, P (22 May 2015). Trade and trust, New York Times. http://www.nytimes. com/2015/05/22/opinion/paul-krugman-trade-and-trust.html?action=click&pg type=Homepage&module=opinion-c-col-right-region®ion=opinion-c-col-ri ght-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region Lagarde, C (27 May 2014). Economic Inclusion and Financial Integrity, address to the Conference on Inclusive Capitalism, London. https://www.imf.org/external/ np/speeches/2014/052714.htm Minister of Trade (5 May 2016). Trade Minister welcomes Tribunal TPP report. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1605/S00102/trade-minister-welcomestribunal-tpp-report.htm Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (25 January 2016). Trans-Pacific Partnership. National Interest Analysis, p. 16. Monasterio, E, P Pattemore and G Laking (15 July 2015). Critics of Trans Pacific Partnership are not politically relevant. http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominionpost/comment/70236755/critics-of-trade-deal-are-not-politically-irrelevant No deal with EU as Tanzania, Uganda Refuse to Sign Up (July 2016). The East African, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/No-deal-with-EU-as-Tanzania–Ugandarefuse-to-sign-up/2558-3297270-view-printVersion-83pd1w/index.html Nottage, L (13 February 2016). ISDS Investment chapter. Mainly more of the same, Conventus Law. http://www.conventuslaw.com/report/isds-in-the-tppinvestment-chapter-mostly-more-of/ O’Sullivan, F (16 June 2016). Sceptics unmoved by spirit of glasnost, New Zealand Herald. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid =11657170 Peterson LE (20 November 2015). Indonesia ramps up termination of BITS — and kills survival clause in one such treaty — but faces new $600Mil claim from Indian Investor, Investment Arbitration Reporter.

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Pharmac reveals new drug funding list (9 June 2016). Radio NZ. http://www. radionz.co.nz/news/national/305986/pharmac-reveals-new-drug-funding-list Polanyi, K (2001). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston: Beacon Press. President’s Budget Repeats Call for Seven Years of Biologics Exclusivity (6 February 2016). Inside US Trade. Reich, R (17 February 2015). This very bad deal with make Wall Street Richer and Bust the Rest of America. http://www.alternet.org/robert-reich-very-bad-dealwill-make-wall-street-richer-and-bust-rest-america?akid=12801.38156.zd2RzZ &rd=1&src=newsletter1032029&t=13 Robb Rejects TPP Changes on Biologics, Citing Strong Market Protection (19 December 2015). Inside US Trade. Slight changes to Pharmac with TPPA but fears allayed, says Groser (6 October 2015). Pharmacy Today. http://www.pharmacytoday.co.nz/news/2015/october-2015/ 06/slight-changes-to-pharmac-with-tppa-but-fears-allayed,-groser-says.aspx Stiglitz, J (10 January 2016). In 2016, let’s hope for better trade agreements and the death of the TPP, The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/ jan/10/in-2016-better-trade-agreements-trans-pacific-partnership Teinhaara, K (2015), The dismissal of a case against plain cigarette packaging is good news for taxpayers, The Age. http://www.theage.com.au/comment/the-dismi ssal-of-a-case-against-plain-cigarette-packaging-is-good-news-for-taxpayers-201 51218-glrb53.html. TPP Signatories Consider Next Steps Following US Withdrawal (9 February 2017). International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. http:// www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/tpp-signatories-consider-next-stepsfollowing-us-withdrawal Trevino, C (10 April 2015). A closer look at Brazil’s two new investment treaties. Investment Arbitration Reporte. Tribunal, W (July 2011). Ko Aotearoa Tenei. A Report into claims concerning New Zealand law and policy affecting Maori culture and identify, Wai 262. Tribunal, W (May 2016). Report on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Wai 2522, pp. 49–50. U.S. Official: TPP Designed to Accommodate U.S. Certification Requirement (4 March 2016). Inside US Trade. UNCTAD (2012). World Investment Report 2012. Geneva: UNCTAD, p. 88. UNCTAD (June 2015). World Investment Report 2015. Reforming International Investment Governance. Geneva: UNCTAD, p. 128. UNCTAD (June 2016). Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2015, UNCTAD Issues Note 2, p. 1. Walker, D (17 February 2016). Chief Negotiator, to Mark Mitchell, chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, pp. 2–17.

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Wise, T and JK Sundaram (20 March 2016). Assuming away unemployment and trade benefits from the TPP. Global Development and Environmental Institute, Tufts University. http://triplecrisis.com/assuming-away-unemploymentand-trade-deficits-from-the-tpp/ Wolf, M (2014). The Shifts and the Shocks. What We’ve Learned — and Still have to Learn — From the Financial Crisis. New York: Penguin Press.

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CHAPTER 10 New Zealand’s Strategic Influence and Interests in an Increasingly Global Pacific Anna Powles

Introduction New Zealand’s immediate strategic environment includes the Pacific Islands Ocean Region (PIOR) which comprises of 22 island states and territories1 spanning across the world’s largest ocean. The islands equate to approximately 2 per cent2 of the region’s total area of 26 million km with the independent nations more accurately described as “large ocean states”. New Zealand’s “near abroad” is large, diverse and complex. It encompasses stable governments and governance under duress, emerging economies and developing countries, tensions between fragility and resilience, and the challenges of the

1The

Pacific Community includes 22 Pacific Island states and territories: American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna. See Pacific Community list of members at http://www.spc.int/our-members/. As Wallis notes, regions are political constructs, and the definition of the Pacific Islands region is contested, however, the Pacific Community, headquartered in Noumea, provides the best example of what Pacific Island states themselves define as their region. See Joanne Wallis. (2016) Pacific Power?, Melbourne University Press. 2Two per cent equates to 560,000 km of land mass. 169

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non-conventional threats ranging from resource competition to climate security (Powles, 2017, p. 89). The Pacific Islands region is both a region under pressure and a region transformed. It is a region with which New Zealand has deep historical linkages and realm responsibilities; and from which New Zealand draws its Pacific identity — an essential element of New Zealand’s soft power in the region. It is also the only region in which New Zealand plays a leadership role borne out of both a sense of responsibility and right as well as the expectations of the international community that New Zealand will “manage” its neighbourhood. As New Zealand’s prime minister Bill English stated in June 2017: regardless of the volatility in the rest of the world, the Pacific still remains our primary focus and the part of the globe where we can exercise our influence as part of our contribution to global stability. And we are very much tied to them.3

This chapter is concerned with the link between New Zealand’s “Pacific identity” and New Zealand’s influence and strategic interests in the Pacific. It first examines the commonly held assertion that New Zealand is a Pacific nation and the assumption that this correlates with influence and a regional leadership role. This chapter then examines New Zealand’s strategic interests in the Pacific considering examples of diplomacy, defence assistance and development as well as crisis management and response. The final section considers whether New Zealand’s claim to a Pacific identity has translated into effective influence and by extension a regional leadership role.

New Zealand’s “Pacific Identity” New Zealand, unlike its continental neighbour to the west, has long regarded itself as part of the Pacific. This sentiment has been driven by three factors: geography, its constitutional obligations towards the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, and its indigenous t¯angata whenua 4 and its later migrant tagata Pasifika 5 populations. It is the latter which has underscored a sense of New Zealand 3 Rt. Hon Bill English, Prime Minister of New Zealand, Speech to NZ Institute of International

Affairs, Wellington, 23 June 2017. whenua translates as “people of the land” in Te Reo M¯aori. The t¯angata whenua are the people who have authority in a particular place. In this instance, it refers to New Zealand’s indigenous M¯aori population. 5Tagata Pasifika translates as Pacific Peoples’. 4T¯ angata

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exceptionalism and cultural capital in its interactions with the Pacific (Goldsmith, 2017). First, as noted in “Introduction” section, New Zealand’s geography is defined by its isolation located in the southern Pacific Ocean and an expansive maritime domain which is the fourth largest Exclusive Economic Zone in the world. Its near abroad consists of Australia and the islands and territories of the Pacific. Second, New Zealand has three constitutional obligations. It is in free association with its former dependencies, the Cook Islands and Niue, now both self-governing states. New Zealand conducts foreign and defence policy on behalf of the Cook Islands and Niue albeit with their consent. The third, Tokelau, is a non–self-governing territory for which New Zealand provides approximately 60 per cent of its annual Government budget and is responsible for their defence and security. New Zealand also has a special relationship with Samoa underpinned by the Treaty of Friendship signed on Samoa’s6 independence in 1962 following 40 years of New Zealand administration. The third factor is demographics. New Zealand has a rapidly growing Tagata Pasifika population with more than 40 different Pacific ethnic groups7 which together comprise the fourth largest major ethnic group, behind European, M¯aori and Asian ethnic groups.8 By 2026, it is projected that New Zealand’s Pacific population will have grown to 10 per cent of the total population, compared to 7.4 per cent in 2013.9 Coupled with New Zealand’s t¯angata whenua, the indigenous M¯aori, this has contributed to New Zealand’s “ideology of relations glossed as kinship between New Zealand and its Pacific, especially Polynesian neighbours” (Goldsmith, 2017). Goldsmith argues that the framing of New Zealand as uniquely and favourably positioned on cultural grounds to be a strategic diplomatic actor in the South Pacific is justified by two linked complexes: the history of New Zealand’s colonial and post-colonial 6 Samoa

was known as Western Samoa until 1997.

7 Samoa remains the largest Pacific Peoples ethnic group with 48.7 per cent of the Pacific people’s

population (144,138); Cook Islands M¯aori 20.9 per cent (61,839 people); Tongan 20.4 per cent (60,333 people); Niuean 8.1 per cent (23,883 people). See Statistics NZ Census 2013 at http://m.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census.aspx. 8The New Zealand 2013 census showed that 295,941 people identified with one or more Pacific ethnic groups; Pacific peoples were the fourth largest ethnic group, making up 7.4 per cent of the population; however, the Pasifika population grew by 11.3 per cent compared with 14.7 per cent the previous census period. http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census.aspx. 9 Ministry for Pacific Peoples. http://www.mpp.govt.nz/pacific-people-in-nz.

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involvement in a number of Polynesian territories in the Pacific; and the related history of relations between P¯akeh¯a settlers and M¯aori in New Zealand itself (Goldsmith, 2017).

New Zealand exceptionalism? From a policy perspective, New Zealand’s Pacific identity has translated into a widely held assumption that New Zealand has the right to “lead” — or at the very least “influence” — in the region. This has led to a belief system similar to that articulated by Fry writing about Australia: At the center of such conceptions has been an unquestioned, and often unacknowledged, belief that Australia has a right, or even a duty, to speak for the inhabitants of this region, to represent them to themselves and to others, to lead, and to manage them. (Fry, 1997)

In that respect, the rhetoric of belonging is “the language of informal empire” (McKinnon, 1993). The assumption that New Zealand has a special relationship with the Pacific because of its tagata Pasifika population has been rightly contested. To what extent New Zealand has adopted a stronger Pacific identity or Pacific foreign policy orientation is also contested (McKinnon, 1993, p. 271). McGhie contends that while rhetoric on New Zealand’s Pacificness and engagement with the region is often repeated, the country has yet to fully address the complex nature of the problems facing Pacific states, which requires a change in attitudes as to how issues are approached. Others contend that while New Zealand has been more focused on “its near north” since the mid-1980s, it is “not fully part of a shared Pacific region” (David and McGhie 2010). Within the region, perceptions of New Zealand as a Pacific nation and a key influencer are similarly nuanced. Frustrations over New Zealand and, more specifically, Australian,10 dominance of the pre-eminent political grouping, the Pacific Islands Forum11 came to the fore with Fiji’s call in 2015 for 10 As Lawson notes, Australia “occupies a dominant position vis-˘a-vis its island neighbours and is therefore often depicted as a regional hegemon with neo-colonial tendencies” (Lawson, 2017; see also Greg and Sandra 2016). 11The members of the Pacific Islands Forum are Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

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New Zealand and Australia to withdraw from the Forum. These concerns reflect long standing and profound frustration with colonial dominance of the Forum’s forerunner, the South Pacific Commission (Lawson, 2017; Iati, 2017). Although Fiji’s demand was not shared publicly by other Pacific leaders (ABC News, 2014; Samoa Observer, 2016), frustrations do exist over the failure of New Zealand (and Australia) to prioritise issues of high significance to the region. Where New Zealand (and Australian) policy has been at the greatest odds with Pacific interests is over climate change resulting in strong calls for a Pacific-driven agenda.

A Pacific leader? New Zealand has historically sought a leadership role in the Pacific. From the 1840s onwards following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, early New Zealand politicians such as George Gray, Robert Stout and Julius Vogel actively promoted a vision of New Zealand as the centre of a great South Pacific empire (Ministry for Culture and Heritage) consistently seeking greater influence for New Zealand in the islands and bombarding the British Colonial Office with petitions and memoranda (Ross, 1969). New Zealand’s ambitions in the Pacific (like Australia’s) were largely underpinned by the imperative of strategic denial as evidenced by New Zealand’s dismay that Britain’s failure to develop a Monroe Doctrine for the Pacific enabled the United States, Germany and France to extend their influence into the region (Condliffe, 1930). It has been suggested that the legacy of these desires for a “South Pacific sphere of influence” can be seen in New Zealand’s constitutional relationships with Tokelau, Niue and the Cook Islands and through its Treaty of Friendship with Samoa (Vaughn, 2012, p. 7). From the 1970s onwards, New Zealand became increasingly more aware of its Pacific connections, and that its security is intrinsically linked with the region. Prime Minister Norman Kirk (1972–1974) pursued a proactive policy of engagement with the Pacific and directly linked New Zealand’s international reputation with its regional influence (Ross, 2016, p. 2). The 1978 Defence Review pointed to the need to incorporate the fact that “New Zealand is a Pacific country” into the formulation of defence policy.12 A 1984 report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to examine New Zealand’s relations with its Pacific 12 Defence

Review 1978, Government Printer, Wellington, 1978.

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neighbours declared that “New Zealand should recognise that we are part of the Pacific” (John, 2006) indicating that the consensus suggested otherwise. Successive foreign ministers have drawn links between New Zealand’s Pacific population and the responsibility and ability to “lead” in the region. In 2002, the then minister for foreign affairs and Pacific affairs, Phil Goff, stated that “We no longer see ourselves as an isolated British outpost somehow misplaced at the bottom of the Pacific. We see ourselves as a Pacific nation with key responsibilities in the South Pacific”.13 Goff later expanded on this asserting that the presence of a strong Pasifika community has enabled a “unique interaction between New Zealand and the Pacific which gives us a sense of identity with and a greater ability to work alongside our Pacific neighbours” (Goff, 2007). The 1990 New Zealand policy review, Towards a Pacific Island Community, declared that New Zealand was coming to terms with its place as a Pacific Island nation and was perceived by the Pacific Island countries as in, and of, the region; however, the report also warned that New Zealand did not necessarily understand the Pacific and should not presume to take a proprietary or colonial approach to Pacific Island affairs.14 Subsequent research has indicated that New Zealand has been viewed as harbouring neo-colonial attitudes towards the Pacific (Frazer and Bryant-Tokelau, 2006; Baker, 2016). In 2009, then foreign minister Murray McCully drew a direct link between identity and regional leadership stating that “New Zealand is truly a Pacific nation, not just in terms of geography, but also in terms of our increasing Pasifika population… This rich demography gives New Zealand both a responsibility and a unique capacity to play a leadership role... in this region” (McCully, 2009). A 2010 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee parliamentary review of New Zealand’s relationships with the Pacific Islands further suggested that the close personal and family connections with the region distinguish New Zealand from other countries that seek engagement in the region which in turn lends itself to a “unique and intimate understanding of the region” (Foreign Affairs, p. 12). The review found that “New Zealand is increasingly part of the

13 Hon

Phil Goff, New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, speech at the Otago Foreign Policy School, 2002, quoted in McDonald (2005). 14 New Zealand. South Pacific Policy Review Group and Henderson (1990).

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regional fabric” and that “key partners expect New Zealand to strongly support the maintenance of peace and stability in this region” (Foreign Affairs, p. 12). The 2014–2018 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Statement of Intent states that New Zealand is viewed as a “trusted bridge builder between countries in the Pacific and the wider Asia–Pacific region” and that New Zealand continues “to seek to play a leadership role in the Pacific, with other countries with regional interests” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014).

Friends and allies in the Pacific New Zealand’s oldest and most long-standing partnership is with Australia and it is one of both convergence and divergence; competition and collaboration. Dating back to the 1944 Canberra Pact in which they jointly claimed responsibility for leadership, post-war settlements, defence and social welfare in the Pacific (McIntyre, 1999), New Zealand and Australia have worked closely to maintain peace and stability in the region. In official Australian documents, New Zealand is referred to as its “principal strategic partner in the region”.15 The 2011 review of New Zealand’s defence relationship with Australia specified that the two states have a “mutual commitment to each other’s security and overlapping interest in the security, stability and cohesion of our neighbourhood and the broader Asia Pacific” (Watt et al., 2011, p. 2). The close alliance with Australia has also reinforced New Zealand’s perceived (and often promoted) cultural currency in the Pacific. In leaked diplomatic cables, a New Zealand intelligence official is quoted as saying that “New Zealand is a more Pacific country than Australia and the latter is not always attuned to Pacific developments” (qtd. in Paskal, 2011). Moreover, claims that New Zealand has been more sensitive to the opinions of Pacific Island states, and has acted as the “good cop” to Australia’s “bad cop” in the region (Nicola, p. 141) have reinforced New Zealand’s Pacific identity cum leadership aspirations. New Zealand’s renewed strategic partnership with the United States is articulated in the Wellington Declaration (2010) and Washington Declaration (2012). The latter refers to “a shared commitment to a stable and peaceful Asia-Pacific region and common approaches to address the region’s defence and security issues, including contemporary non-traditional security 15 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, A Pacific Engaged, p. 227.

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challenges” (Washington Declaration, 2012). Vaughn argues that one area where New Zealand and US strategic interests are converging is in the overlapping strategic geography between the two partners, stating that “New Zealand’s Pacific identity and focus on its South Pacific neighbourhood means that New Zealand is, and will likely increasingly be, an active player in South Pacific regional economic and security affairs” (Vaughn, 2012). Despite concerns voiced about rising Chinese influence in the Pacific,16 the Obama Administration’s pivot to the Asia Pacific was underwhelming for the region. The extent of the Trump Administration’s interest in the Pacific is even less clear.

Taking Pacific votes (and issues?) to the international stage New Zealand’s small state Pacific identity17 was a cornerstone of its campaign for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during the 2015–2016 term. The credibility of New Zealand’s message that it would be a trusted and independent advocate (Powles, 2014) for nonpermanent member states, particularly Small Island and Developing States (SIDS), was built in part by its international reputation as a committed leader within the Pacific. Pacific votes — a sizable voting bloc within the UN General Assembly — were integral to New Zealand’s win. Then Foreign Minister Murray McCully lobbied hard in the region’s capitals and New Zealand’s candidacy was endorsed at the 45th Pacific Islands Forum in 2014 (Gulliver, 2014). There are indications that although support was forthcoming, it was not without deliberations and it certainly was not without expectations. New Zealand’s win was viewed as an opportunity to champion issues that impact the Pacific at the global level. During its presidency of the Security Council in July 2015, New Zealand sponsored an open debate on the peace and security challenges facing SIDS with New Zealand stating it is “a Pacific country with a significant stake in the peace and security of the small island developing states in our region” (McCully, 2015). McCully iterated that New Zealand’s own peace and security is directly affected by the prosperity and

16 “China

aid to Samoa: A friend in need is a friend — or what have you done for us lately?”, diplomatic cable, 2 February 2010, https://wikileaks.org. Cited in Wallis (2016), Kindle Locations 7068-7070. 17 It remains perplexing for many that within the UN system, New Zealand is located in the Western Europe and Others Grouping.

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stability of the Pacific SIDS and challenged the UNSC and wider UN community to take “meaningful steps to make SIDS less vulnerable in the face of threats to their security from natural disasters and from man-made challenges” (McCully, 2015).

Regional discord: Out of step with the neighbours Two months later, at the 46th Pacific Islands Forum, New Zealand and Australia refused to support Pacific leaders who were seeking a unified regional position calling for key shared commitments on mitigation and emission targets which will restrict global warming temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius, fearing a 2 degree Celsius target will risk the survival of the low-lying Pacific island states (Powles, 2015). Consensus at the Forum meeting was critical in the lead up to the United Nations Climate Change Summit (COP 21) in Paris later that year. Considerable work has been done to pave the way for a Forum consensus in Moresby. This year a network of climate change declarations have been issued by sub-regional groupings and NGO collectives. The Oceania 21 Leaders’ Summit released the Lifou Declaration and the Pacific Islands Climate Action Network (PICAN) agreed on a draft Moresby Declaration in June; in July, the Polynesian Leaders Group issued the Taputapuatea Declaration. Earlier this month, the Pacific Islands Development Fund (PIDF) 3rd Summit delivered the Suva Declaration. Collectively, these declarations lay down a challenge to the Forum to achieve a climate policy accord. New Zealand and Australia’s emission reduction targets are inconsistent with keeping global temperature rise below 2 degrees. A 2015 Oxfam report, A Question of Survival, claimed that the New Zealand and Australian Governments are “threatening the very survival of some Pacific nations” (Oxfam, 2015). Then New Zealand Prime Minister John Key said he was comfortable with his country’s work on climate change despite mounting pressure for Pacific Island Forum leaders to do more (Radio New Zealand International, 2015). This example more than most reflects the tension between national interest in the interests of the Pacific, even at the expense of reputation, credibility and by extension, influence. A secondary but significant area of discord is the issue of selfdetermination. The inclusion of West Papuan self-determination on the 2015 Forum Leader’s Meeting agenda was a result of strong regional advocacy by long-standing supporter, Vanuatu, particularly. The United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) called for a Forum fact-finding mission to

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conduct an assessment of human rights abuses in the Indonesian-controlled province. The ULMWP had campaigned for membership of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and was granted observer status in June 2015. New Zealand and Australia successfully leveraged the discord amongst Pacific leaders. Neither Fiji nor PNG, two of the most powerful Pacific states, support West Papuan self-determination. The issue, however, is bigger than West Papua alone and speaks to the growing number of diverse voices — especially civil society — being heard in the Pacific. In mid-2017, the New Zealand Parliamentary Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee rejected a civil society petition calling for New Zealand to support a UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression to visit Papua (Radio New Zealand, 2017). The issue of Papua also reflects a significant regional dynamic: the rise of a robust issues-based agenda which has galvanised Pacific leadership on the global stage over issues such as climate change, resource security and self-determination.

New Zealand’s Strategic Interests in the Pacific New Zealand’s primary strategic interests are to protect and advance New Zealand’s interests and influence in the region; and to ensure the region’s security and stability (Ministry of Defence, 2016, p. 34). The 2016 New Zealand Defence White Paper states that the Pacific, as part of New Zealand’s immediate neighbourhood, is a “fundamental priority for the Government” (New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 2010, p. 33). The previous White Paper identified the Pacific as one of the three top security priorities for New Zealand, stating that it is in New Zealand’s interest to play a leadership role in the South Pacific for the foreseeable future, acting in concert with our South Pacific neighbours… A weak or unstable South Pacific region poses demographic, economic, criminal, and reputational risks to New Zealand ... It will remain in our interests for Pacific Island states to view New Zealand as a trusted member and friend of the Pacific community. (Ministry of Defence, 2010)

This is dependent on New Zealand’s ability to leverage its influence in the region in pursuit of both national interest and regionalism. To secure influence, New Zealand’s soft power instruments consist of the “everyday business” of engagement with the region through diplomacy, development and defence assistance; the “exceptional” which refers to crisis management such as the interventions in Bougainville, the Solomon Islands and Tonga, and

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humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations to tropical cyclones Pam and Winston. The third element of New Zealand’s soft power within the region is drawn in some measure from its proclaimed “Pacific identity”. New Zealand’s ability to uphold its strategic interests in the Pacific have, for the large part, met with little resistance either from within the region or from external actors. However, it is increasingly acknowledged that the geopolitical order of the Pacific is changing (Powles, 2017, p. 89; Powles and Sousa-Santos, 2016) and, as a consequence, the traditional security orthodoxy is weakening. These warnings are by no means new. A 1984 report cautioned that external state competition for diplomatic and commercial advantage and influence in the region was rising and that if New Zealand “does not give sufficient attention to the Pacific this will allow other players who may be less attuned to Pacific issues and aspirations to take on larger roles and exercise more influence” (John, 2010). Competition between China and Taiwan in the 1990s in the form of “chequebook diplomacy” within the region in the 1990s was a prominent example. The 2016 Defence White Paper further observes that Pacific states are “seeking to broaden their potential support bases by forming links with countries beyond their existing traditional partners” (Ministry of Defence, 2016, p. 34). This has been a calculated strategy on the part of several Pacific states, such as Papua New Guinea and Fiji, who have adopted “look north” policies in order to diversify their economic and security relationships18 and prevent over-reliance on traditional relationships. The emergence of new patrons and partnerships has contributed to the changing geopolitical landscape in the Pacific. Prime Minister Bill English noted that during his inaugural Pacific Mission19 in June 2017 “much of the discussion… was about the relative 18 Under

Prime Minister Paias Wingti (1985–1988; 1992–1994), PNG adopted a “look north” foreign policy which has latterly been described as “Working the Pacific and Looking North”. Radio Australia, Papua New Guinea continues to “look north”, 31 March 2012. http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2006-01-28/papua-new-guineacontinues-to-look-north/751026. Fiji’s “look north” policy was first pursued by the military government of Sitiveni Rabuka following the 1987 coups with the aim of diversifying Fiji’s trade and aid relationships away from New Zealand and Australia (see Tarte, 2010) Fiji’s look north policy has increasingly been linked to Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama’s government. 19 Prime Minister Bill English’s inaugural Pacific Mission visited the Cook Islands, Niue and Tonga, 13–17 June 2017, accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gerry Brownlee, and the Minister for Pacific Peoples, Alfred Ngaro, and a delegation of iwi, community and

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influence of a range of countries in the Pacific, whether it’s New Zealand, Australia, China, the US, or Russia to some extent”.20 Dame Meg Taylor, Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum, expanded further, stating that “the geopolitical and development context of the Pacific has shifted and the region faces a range of external and internal factors that are acting to reshape it, including increasing plurality of regional actors, shifts in global power, and unmet development challenges”.21 China is the most significant non-traditional external power in the Pacific Islands (Wallis, 2017; Jian, 2009; Yongjin, 2010) which has generated substantial debate about China’s strategic intentions in the region.22 China’s significant interests in the Pacific are threefold: strategic influence, access to resources (particularly fisheries) and military access, the most important aspect of which is signals intelligence monitoring. For example, China built a satellite tracking station in Kiribati in 1997, although it was subsequently dismantled after Kiribati switched diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. The Chinese fishing fleet operating out of Fiji is said to provide cover for signals intelligence monitoring, particularly of US bases in Micronesia. China is also seeking naval access to the region’s ports and exclusive economic zones, engages in military assistance programs, and is negotiating access to facilities for maintenance and resupply purposes. Moreover, between 2006 and 2016, China transferred at least US$1.781 billion in aid to Pacific nations (Brant, 2015). China’s recent deal with the Solomon Islands to install an undersea Internet cable from Honiara to Sydney has raised the Australian Government’s ire who have cited national security concerns (Wroe, 2017). Wallis provides a succinct view of the spectrum of Chinese perspectives on its engagement in the Pacific. In 2006, Wallis notes that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao observed that “as far as China is concerned, to foster friendship and cooperation with the Pacific Island countries is not a diplomatic expediency. business leaders. Radio New Zealand International, “New Zealand’s PM touches down in Rarotonga”, 14 June 2017. http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/332970/newzealand-s-pm-touches-down-in-rarotonga. 20 Prime Minister Bill English, Speech to New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 23 June 2017. 21 Secretary General Dame Meg Taylor’s remarks to 2017 Pacific Update, Suva, Fiji, 20 June 2017. 22 Dobell, “China and Taiwan”; Henderson and Reilly, “Dragon in paradise”; Shie, “Rising Chinese influence”; Windybank, “The China syndrome”; Lanteigne, “Water dragon?”, p. 23.

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Rather it is a strategic decision”.23 Six years later, Cui Tiankai, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared in 2012 that China is “here in this region not to seek any particular influence, still less dominance”.24 And in 2015 China’s Blue Book of Oceania specifically noted that the Pacific Islands are the only sea route between China and South America, Antarctica, Australia and New Zealand, as well as part of China’s claimed second and third island chains of defence.25 The inclusion — or exclusion — of the Pacific in China’s ambitious One Belt One Road (OBOR) infrastructure project focused on building, securing and accessing markets, bases and resources will have significant influence in the shaping of the regional order. Currently, the Pacific lies beyond the maritime belt which links China with Southeast Asia; however, China’s increasing demand for resources (fisheries, seabed minerals, oil and gas) will likely extend OBOR’s reach into the Pacific. In 2017, Pacific leaders attended a summit in Beijing on OBOR with Fiji and New Zealand signing up to the plan (SBS, 2017) and President Xi Jinping has announced a new “strategic partnership” with Pacific states (Riordan, 2017). Heightened Chinese engagement in the Pacific does not need to equate to the weakening of New Zealand’s relevance and influence. However, if New Zealand genuinely does want to “improve [New Zealand’s] [our] position as a trusted, influential, and principal partner with key Pacific countries” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014), considerable thought will need to be given to how New Zealand can strengthen its reputation in the region.

Conclusion While there is substance to New Zealand’s Pacific identity claims as evidenced by the three elements of geography, constitutional obligations and demographics, it remains a highly contestable and politically fluid strategic narrative. Despite this, it underscores a sense of New Zealand exceptionalism and cultural capital in its interactions with the Pacific. It is arguable that New Zealand’s Pacific identity has greater currency — and perhaps even greater strategic utility outside of the region and notably within international fora 23 Wallis

(2016). quoted in Flitton (2012) in Wallis (2016). 25 Yu, “The Pacific Islands in China’s strategy” quoted in Wallis (2016), 24 Cui Tiankai

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where New Zealand’s credibility and reputation are indisputably tied to its “Pacificness”. Moreover, the link between “identity” and “influence” in the region is even less clear. As Wallis notes in the case of Australia, Australia’s preponderant material power has not translated into influence in its neighbourhood. In New Zealand’s case, the question of whether its Pacific identity translates into influence in the changing geopolitical landscape of the Pacific demands further consideration.

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Papua New Guinea PM Peter O’Neill dismisses Fiji’s push to remove Australia from Pacific Islands Forum (28 November 2014). ABC News, http://www. abc.net.au/news/2014-11-28/png-pm-wants-australia-to-remain-in-pacific-regio nal-body/5926014. Paskal, C. Wikileaks: New Zealand sells itself as “a more Pacific country”. World Post, www.huffingtonpost.com/cleo-paskal/wikileaks-new-zealand-sel_b_ 796293.html [25 May 2011]. Powles, A. What will New Zealand do with its UN Security Council seat? The Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-will-new-zealand-doits-un-security-council-seat [5 November 2014]. Powles, A. What’s at Stake at the 46th Pacific Islands Forum for New Zealand? Incline. http://www.incline.org.nz/home/whats-at-stake-at-the-46thpacific-islands-forum-for-new-zealand [9 September 2015]. Powles, A (2017). New Zealand and the Pacific Islands region: Change, challenges and new ideas. In New Zealand National Security: Challenges, Trends and Issues, W Hoverd, N Nelson and C Bradley (eds.). Auckland: Massey University Press, p. 89. Powles A and J Sousa-Santos (2016). Principled Engagement: Rebuilding Defence Ties with Fiji. Analysis. Lowy Institute for International Policy. https:// www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/principled-engagement-rebuilding-defence -ties-fiji. P.M. stands by N.Z. and Australia (4 October 2016). Samoa Observer, http://www. samoaobserver.ws/en/04_10_2016/local/12270/PM-stands-by-NZ-and-Austral ia.htm. Radio New Zealand. NZ govt rejects West Papua human rights petition. http://www. radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/336400/nz-govt-rejects-west-papua-hum an-rights-petition [3 August 2017]. Radio New Zealand International. NZ PM happy with his country’s climate change stance. http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/283662/nzpm-happy-with-his-country’s-climate-change-stance [9 September 2015]. Riordan, P. Taking a lend: Concerns over China aid to Pacific. The Australian. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/australia-conce rned-about-transparency-in-chinas-belt-road/news-story/7549b1826c5e142b86 de571c1122296d [June 21, 2017]. Ross, A (1969). ‘Introduction’, in New Zealand’s Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century, pp. 1–2, 7–8. Auckland: Longman Paul for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Ross, K (2016). New Zealand’s Prime Ministers and Regional Diplomacy. Pacific Policy Brief. Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies. SBS. China woos Pacific nations for Silk Road. http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/ 2017/05/29/china-woos-pacific-nations-silk-road [29 May 2017].

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Tarte, S (2010). Fiji’s “look North” strategy and the role of China. In China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific? TW Smith and EA Porter (eds.). New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books. Vaughn, B (2012). The United States and New Zealand: Perspectives on a Pacific Partnership. Wellington: Fulbright New Zealand. http://www.fulbright.org.nz/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/axford2012_vaughn.pdf. Wallis, J (2016). Pacific Power? Australia’s strategy in the Pacific Islands. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Washington Declaration on Defence Cooperation between the Department Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defence of New Zealand and the New Zealand Defence Force (2012). Washington. Watt, IJ, JW McKinnon, DJ Hurley and RR Jones (2011). Review of the Australia–New Zealand Defence Relationship. Joint Report to Defence Ministers. www.defence.gov.au. Wroe, D. Australia refuses to connect to undersea cable built by Chinese company, Sydney Morning Herald. http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/politicalnews/australia-refuses-to-connect-to-undersea-cable-built-by-chinese-company20170726-gxj9bf.html [26 July 2017]. Yongjin, Z (2010). A regional power by default. In China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific?, TW Smith and EA Porter (eds.), pp. 49–66. New York: Berghahn Books.

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CHAPTER 11 Old Friends in the New Asia: New Zealand, Australia and the Rise of China Hugh White

Like cousins, or even siblings, the relationship between New Zealand and Australia often seems to be defined by family things: things that the two countries share and which sets them apart from the rest of the world. Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), New Zealand–Australia closer economic relations (CER), endless sporting rivalries, slights and triumphs, niggling resentments and genuine grievances with one another encapsulate the rivalry, antagonism, support and closeness that is more often than not found in a family. This gives the relationship a feeling of self-containment. That is, from both sides of the Ditch the New Zealand–Australian relationship seems as if it exists in a little trans-Tasman world of its own. But of course there are limits to this sense of intimacy: both New Zealand and Australia have always been profoundly shaped by the world beyond — and, as we see, there have always been real differences in the way the two countries have approached that wider world. So the best way to illuminate the past, present and future of the New Zealand–Australia relationship is to step beyond the bilateral frame of reference to see how those external forces have shaped it hitherto, and to speculate how they might do so henceforth. That is what this essay, in a big-picture way, will attempt to do. My basic point is simple: central elements of the global and the regional international order, in particular, are changing very fast, and 187

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in ways we have not yet fully understood and with implications we have not yet comprehended. These changes will reshape both Australia and New Zealand and their relationship with one another. The bad news is that many of these changes will be difficult. The good news is that the two countries are likely to be drawn even closer together.

Past The existence of Australia and New Zealand in this corner of the world is the result of a quite specific set of circumstances relating to the global distribution of wealth and power as it emerged in the late 18th century and has persisted remarkably unchanged until the present moment. The presence of these communities on these islands is the direct result of the extraordinary preponderance of power achieved by Britain from the mid-18th century and sustained until the start of the 20th century. Britain was able to seize, occupy, populate, develop and defend these islands because of the Industrial Revolution, which made it the world’s wealthiest state, and also — in a telling demonstration of the direct link between wealth and strength — the most powerful. In particular, it made Britain the first truly global power, able to deploy and sustain a major and often decisive economic and strategic presence anywhere in the globe — even the remotest Southwest Pacific — and in many parts of the globe simultaneously. This constituted what was probably the biggest and fastest shift in the global distribution of power in history. As Britain, with a few other countries around the North Atlantic (and, uniquely, Japan), reaped the benefits of the Industrial Revolution, they left other countries — including countries that had previously been among the world’s richest and strongest — far behind. Economic historians have called this “the Great Divergence”. Perhaps most strikingly, China, which had always been the world’s richest and most powerful state because of its huge population, was overtaken by Britain in the early 19th century. This change was linked to the Industrial Revolution’s unprecedented surge in per capita productivity, and meant Britain’s 12 million people were producing more than China’s 300 million people. When Britain, in turn, was overtaken in the late 19th century, it was by America, a country that had simply replicated the per capita productivity miracle of the Industrial Revolution on a larger scale. As recently as 1990, America’s 250 million people — less than one quarter of China’s population — were

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producing a gross domestic product (GDP) 18 times larger than that of China. In the era of industrialisation, the division of the world into rich and poor, weak and powerful, developed and undeveloped, has fundamentally shaped the international system over the last 200 years. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the world as we know it has been created by the distribution of wealth and power that resulted from the uneven impact of the Industrial Revolution. Moreover, when the last of the great contests between the powerful industrialised states came to an end in 1990, America emerged at the apex of what seemed a permanent and uncontested global order. It did indeed appear reasonable to think that we had reached “the end of history”, and the world could look forward to an indefinite period of stable and peaceful relations between the world’s strongest state. This new international order would still face challenges, sometimes quite serious ones, but they would come from the margins of the international system, former relatively weak actors — rogue states, weak and failing states or non-state actors — that had the power to disturb and in places disrupt but not fundamentally challenge let alone overturn the US-led global order. The major changes in the international context have worked very well for New Zealand and Australia. These two countries were on the right side of the Great Divergence from the start, so these societies quickly became among the richest in the world. Moreover, the international system was from the start dominated and shaped by Britain — the colonial patron of New Zealand and Australia — and its navy dominated the Southwest Pacific region. And when Britain’s power faltered, its place was taken by America, a superpower with whom New Zealand and Australia shared many of the same bonds. It is a remarkable fact that throughout their histories, New Zealand and Australia have both been the beneficiaries of a global system and a regional order dominated by what Sir Robert Menzies called ‘great and powerful friends’. They have not always taken that for granted, because the global and regional leadership roles of Britain and America were so seriously challenged by the upheavals of the Twentieth Century, and of course Britain’s leading role in Asia did not survive those challenges. But it is now many decades since New Zealand and Australia have had any reason to fear that America too would face a challenge in Asia from which its position as leader could not recover. Not surprisingly, therefore it has been easy for the two countries to assume that America will always be here to keep Asia safe for them.

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Present However, New Zealand and Australia are now living through a radical re-ordering of the global distribution of wealth and power, which is perhaps even bigger and faster than the Great Divergence that created the world as they know it 200 years ago. Moreover, the new transformation is driven by the same forces that drove the Great Divergence — another Industrial Revolution, but this time the great change is happening in some of the countries that missed out previously. In particular, it is happening in China. The key to understanding China’s experience since 1980 is to recognise the parallels with Britain in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. There has been a massive and sustained increase in per capita output as hundreds of millions of people have moved from low-productivity subsistence work to much higher-productivity industrial jobs. This is happening in other counties as well, but what makes China special is the scale of such activity. China is one of only two countries with a population bigger than America’s, and thus one of only two that can credibly challenge America’s position as the richest, and strongest, country in the world. The other state, India, will probably follow China’s example in time, but it has not yet done so. For a decade or two at least, China will lead the “Great Convergence”, which is bringing to an end the pattern of distribution of wealth and power that has shaped the world since New Zealand and Australia were founded as British settlements. Today China has already overtaken America to become technically the largest economy in the world on one measure — purchasing power parity (PPP) — and will, almost certainly, overtake it on market exchange rate terms in the next decade. Given the trajectory of China’s rise over more than three decades, it is possible to understate its momentous implications. The economic turnaround in China represents a radical shift in the material foundations of world power and politics, but this shift has often been received internationally with something like psychological denial. One form of that denial is to assume that China’s growth will stop before a turning point is reached. There are, of course, all kinds or reasons why this might indeed happen. China’s economic progress is not pre-ordained, and faces formidable challenges — environmental, political, demographic and institutional. But there is a difference between noting this possibility and assuming a loss of economic momentum. China cannot keep growing at 10 per cent per year, or even 7 per cent per year, indefinitely, and certainly not by

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sticking to the old growth model, which drove those growth levels in the 1990s and 2000s. If China is going to keep growing it has to change significantly — and, above all, it has to keep expanding per capita output by developing more sophisticated industries and moving away from the relatively low-wage manufacturing that has been so central to its growth thus far. This is exactly what China is trying to do through a massive investment in education at home, and by trying to position the country at the centre of ever-expanding global production networks as lower-wage work moves to less developed countries in South and Southeast Asia. This is what the One Belt One Road initiative is all about. No one can be sure it will work, but do China’s competitors, including the United States, have any better ideas? Is there any reason to assume that China will not, on balance, grow more swiftly than other big economies? What does this shift in material power mean for New Zealand and Australia? Any answer depends on what it means for the global and Asian regional international order. Before we can make any sense of that, we have to be clear on what we mean by “order” and how it is determined. By “order”, I am simply describing the set of expectations held by a group of states about their interactions with one another, which shape their behaviour towards another. Those expectations might, to some degree, be enshrined in formal institutions, but that is not necessary for an order to exist, or for it to function effectively in managing relations between states. There are two basic views of how international orders are determined or created. One is that they are shaped primarily by a set of values that come to be shared by a large proportion of states in the system and their communities, and the more widely shared those values become, the more robust the order will be. The other is that orders are shaped primarily by the strongest states in the system — the great powers — that assert their strength to win the biggest possible role for themselves in competition with other great powers. Ultimately, one might say that order in an international system is determined by what the great powers in the system are willing to go to war with one another over. These are among the great questions of the International Relations discipline, and it is difficult to address them here, except to note that ideas concerning the relative weight of values and power in shaping an international order have been formed in an era when the preponderance of power has overwhelmingly favoured countries — or rather a country — whose values we broadly share. This has perhaps made it a little easy to attribute greater weight

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to values and less to power than is warranted. A longer historical perspective suggests that relative power is decisive in shaping orders, and that shifts in power mean shifts in the weight and influence of different states in shaping the orders of which they are part. The situation today in some ways resembles that of Qing Dynasty mandarins in the early 19th century when they were confronted with the unfamiliar power of a rapidly growing West. They struggled to understand a world in which their systems of ideas, backed by their material power, would have to confront other systems of ideas backed by even greater material power. The mandarins assumed that nothing could or would change. Perhaps there is a similar danger today that — confronted with another equally momentous shift in the distribution of power — states like New Zealand and Australia will underestimate what this means for their societies. So what does a change of this magnitude potentially mean for the current international order? First, we should expect the international system to become a more regional and less global order. As noted, one of the consequences of the asymmetrical distribution of wealth and power that followed the initial wave of the industrial revolution were the emergence of a handful of global powers — countries with sufficient strength to project and sustain decisive strategic weight anywhere in the globe. By the mid-19th century, for example, the European great powers and America were able, for the first time, to project such power into the Northwest Pacific and dominate the regional powers they found there. The relations between these powers, therefore, became decisive for shaping international events, and creating a global strategic system centred on the North Atlantic. America’s position at the head of a unipolar global order after the end of the Cold War could be seen as the final stage of this era. However, as a more equal distribution of wealth and power re-emerges with the rise of new developed economies, especially in Asia, this era seems to be coming to an end. In its place, there are the beginnings of a more equal distribution of wealth and power around the world. In the future, no country will be able to sustain their strategic weight globally as they had in the previous two centuries. Neither America nor Europe will be able to determine strategic events in Asia, any more than China will be able to determine strategic events in Europe or the Western Hemisphere. That means a return to the pattern, more usual in history, of a series of regional orders shaped by regional great powers.

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Second, what sort of regional system might New Zealand and Australia find themselves part of? That could depend primarily on policy choices made in Delhi and Beijing. One possibility is that the two countries will find themselves in an integrated “Indo-Pacific” strategic system that encompasses the whole of South, Southeast, East and perhaps also Central Asia. Such a system would likely emerge if either Delhi or Beijing decides to intrude into the strategic space of the other. This could be triggered by, for example, China seeking a major strategic role in the Indian Ocean or India seeking a major role in the Western Pacific. This outcome would be shaped primarily by rivalry between them. Each state would find it almost impossible to dominate the whole IndoPacific region against the opposition of the other, so there would most likely be an endless struggle to dominate and to avoid being dominated, which would be immensely costly and very dangerous to both of them, and for the rest of us. Many people, especially in Australia, assume that an Indo-Pacific system will nonetheless emerge. That is because Australian observers often assume that India and China will both find they have no choice but to intrude into the strategic space of the other. But this scenario is by no means inevitable. It would be possible for India and China to tacitly agree to avoid one another’s nearer region, at least, strategically. If so we would see the emergence of two strategic systems, one in the Western Pacific and one in the Indian Ocean, with Australia and New Zealand sitting somewhere on the boundary between them. That would present both risks and opportunities for these two countries, but economic factors among others would most likely mean New Zealand and Australian interests would draw them more into an East Asian–Western Pacific than towards a South Asian–Indian Ocean system. Third, what kind of role might America play in such a system? It remains very unclear. Many observers believe it depends to some extent on whether Asia-Pacific region ends up as one “Indo-Pacific” strategic system or two. Such observers tend to assume that America will be able to sustain its familiar regional leadership role in an integrated Indo-Pacific system, because India would almost certainly support US leadership to prevent Chinese domination. Yet this perspective underestimates India’s power and ambition over the coming decades. If India’s power continues to grow sufficiently to substantially counterbalance China’s, then Delhi will probably try to use that power to maximise India’s influence, not America’s. The power politics of an IndoPacific system would therefore be much more complex, and the US role in it

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very different than we have been used to. Irrespective of whether Asia evolves into two strategic systems or one, America’s role is going to be very different. That new role will be linked to decisions taken in Beijing and Washington. The question for Beijing is how much, and how far, do they want to reduce America’s strategic role in Asia? The question for Washington is how much cost and risk is America willing to incur to in order to maintain a significant strategic role in this region? These decisions mark the end of a remarkable period in the history of Asia, which has lasted since 1972. After Nixon met Mao that year, China effectively accepted American strategic primacy in Asia as the price for protection from the Soviets and economic opportunities to generate growth. Now, however, the Soviet Union no longer exists, China’s economy has grown massively, and China no longer needs to accept American primacy in Asia. It seeks “a new model of great power relations” in Asia, in which it plays a much bigger role, and America plays a much smaller one. It is unclear what China is aiming for, but the possibility that Beijing is seeking to displace the United States as the uncontested leader of an East Asian–Western Pacific strategic system cannot be ruled out. Whether China will settle for less depends, in part, on how much resistance it faces — especially from America. This is what is being tested today in the maritime confrontations between the two states in the Western Pacific. China–United States tensions in the South China Sea are not primarily about sovereignty, freedom of navigation or international law. They are about the demonstration of power and resolve. China is using the territorial dispute to show the world that it can now defy American power at sea where the latter has always been strongest. America is trying to show that it cannot by demonstrating continued strategic preponderance in naval terms. To date, it seems that China is winning this contest, in part, because America’s response has been somewhat half-hearted. The US strategic and foreign policy community still tends to assume that China cannot be really serious about challenging America’s primacy. Consequently, there seems to have been relatively little thought given to the question of what Washington is prepared to do to preserve a strategic position in Asia. Essentially, there appears to be three options. Washington could try to resist China’s challenge completely and preserve intact the old status quo based on US leadership. It could seek an accommodation, preserving a smaller but still significant role in Asia but conceding a larger role to China in some kind of

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power-sharing deal. Alternatively, it could withdraw from Asia. The costs and risks of the first option would be very high if, as it appears, Beijing is really determined to claim a bigger leadership role. After all, China is by far the wealthiest and most powerful rival America has ever faced. Is America willing to pay the costs and risks of confronting such a power in its own backyard? Is primacy in Asia worth more to America than it is to China? The answer is probably “no”. Nor is it clear that America would be willing to confront China to defend some lesser role in a power-sharing deal, and if not than no such deal can be expected to last long. So, the option of withdrawal is much less improbable than most observers expect — in America, in Asia and in New Zealand and Australia. Based on current trends, here is a preliminary and speculative answer to the question of what kind of order Australia and New Zealand might expect to face over the next few decades. Unless China abandons its challenge to American primacy — through internal economic or political collapse, failure of nerve or a sudden revulsion against power politics — the Asian order over coming decades will be shaped either by systemic and probably very intense strategic rivalry between America and China, an uneasy and potentially unstable power-sharing arrangement between them, or by a US withdrawal. The latter could lead to Chinese hegemony in East Asia or systemic hostility between China and its Asian neighbours, especially Japan. Whichever outcome eventuates, and several of them could occur in different sequences, Western — and specifically “Anglo-Saxon” — strategic influence in Asia is likely to be lower than at any time since European settlement of New Zealand and Australia, and may disappear almost entirely. This will be a major departure from the past.

Future How will New Zealand and Australia respond to the prospect of international change, and what will those responses mean for their bilateral relationship? It helps to start by recognising that, despite the family closeness, there are real and deep differences between the two countries’ approaches to international relations. These differences became starkly evident in the later stages of the Cold War, when divergent nuclear ship visit policies highlighted much more fundamental divisions over major questions of global order. The differences have become less evident since the end of the Cold War because both sides of the Tasman have enthusiastically supported the post-Cold War international

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order. But the persistent differences in the international thinking of the two countries have been reflected in the different reasons each has had for welcoming the post-Cold War order. New Zealand has welcomed it because it has been — and to the extent it has been — global, liberal and multilateral. These are all long-standing New Zealand preferences. New Zealand has always preferred to see itself as part of a global order rather than a regional one. This is in part, perhaps, as a way of managing the looming bulk of Australia: better for New Zealand to be a small fish in a very big pond in which Australia is also a small fish, than a small fish in a smaller pond in which Australia is relatively much larger. But it also reflects ideas that go back to the later stages of the British Empire: the vision of a global order based on universal values created, promoted and upheld by the liberal intellectual traditions of the 19th century, which New Zealanders played no small role in developing, and which they consequently regarded as their own as much as anyone else’s, and which they considered a duty to support. Moreover, New Zealand was encouraged by the hope that global multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) could be empowered to play an ever-bigger role in upholding and promoting the liberal rules-based global order. Australia, on the other hand, welcomed the post-Cold War order not so much because it was global, liberal and multilateral — ideas to which Australian leaders tend to pay lip service rather than show real enthusiasm. Canberra liked it because it was US-led, provided a strong foundation for regional order in Asia and was upheld by a strong American alliance system. These preferences and attitudes also reflect deep elements of Australia’s strategic and foreign policy culture. It follows that neither New Zealand nor Australia will find much to like in any of the range of possible new orders that seem likely to emerge in Asia over the coming decades, though for somewhat different reasons. From New Zealand’s perspective, any new Asia order is likely to be markedly more regional and less global, less liberal and rules based, and more governed by power politics. Consequently, the new order should provide a reduced role for multilateral institutions than the post-Cold War order New Zealand found so agreeable. For Australia, a new Asian order is likely to be less dominated by America. Ironically, the more America aims to maximise its role in this region, the more demands it is likely to make on its allies. And such pressures, in turn, are likely to sharpen the choices Australia will face between its alliance with

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America and its economic relationship with China, not to mention its desire to avoid begin drawn into a major strategic contest against such a powerful adversary. Alternatively, if America withdraws from the contest with China over Asia, Australia will find itself deprived of an alliance, which has been so central to its sense of security and identity. What options do New Zealand and Australia have in responding to the shifts in regional order that are already underway? One possibility is to cling closer to America as US power becomes increasingly challenged, in the hope that with this support, and hopefully others’, it will be able to resist China’s challenge and reassert the old status quo. To many Australians, and even a few New Zealanders, this seems the most natural, and even the only possible, thing to do. But it would involve great costs, both in terms of the increased support provided to the United States and also the damage to relations with China. Whether those costs would be worth paying depends largely on just how strongly China opposes such moves. The more Beijing appears determined to impose a harsh, militarised, Stalin-style hegemony on Asia, the bigger the sacrifices New Zealand and Australia would feel impelled to make to support US leadership in the region. On the other hand, the more China’s ambitions are limited to creating a lighter Monroe-doctrine style of regional primacy, the less it would make sense to incur the cost and risk of opposing it. If the United States decides to withdraw from Asia, New Zealand and Australia would arguably have little choice but to accept an enhanced China role in the region. A second option would be to recognise the consequences of the shift in power and acquiesce to China’s emergence as a much more powerful player in Asia. One possibility is that it could replace America as the region’s primary power or hegemon. Many people in New Zealand and Australia do not seem to have entertained this prospect, but it remains a real possibility. How would these countries feel about living in a region dominated by China? It may be very different from anything they have experienced. Even if they did not feel directly threatened, one assumes the values and interests that would shape a Chinese-led order would be very different from those that have shaped regional and global affairs over the centuries of Anglo-Saxon preponderance, and less congenial to New Zealand and Australian approaches to international relations. Living in a Chinese-led Asia could, among other things, help to drive a profound shift in the identities of New Zealand and Australia.

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The third option seeks a middle ground between the first two — New Zealand and Australia should accept a bigger role for China in Asia’s new order, but to seek to maximise counterbalancing influences to avoid falling too much under China’s shadow. That would mean encouraging America to play the biggest role it can without escalating rivalry with China, which, in turn, means it would need to be based on some sort of mutually agreeable powersharing deal. This would be far from easy to create or sustain, especially as it would need to involve other powers as well, but it would be one of the more attractive options available, and therefore it would make sense. Here, most obviously, the interests and objectives of New Zealand and Australia converge. Their differences may become submerged as neither finds the world they are looking for in the Asia of the 21st century. It seems New Zealand is not going to live in a rules-based, multilateral liberal global order, and Australia is not going to find itself in a US-dominated, alliance-managed Asia. Both will look for an Asia in which China’s power is accommodated, American influence is maximised, strategic competition is minimised and small and middle powers are given as much breathing space as possible. One might observe that New Zealand, with its more complex and nuanced “post-alliance” relationship with America, is better placed to navigate these tricky waters than Australia, with its rusted-on “all the way” instincts towards Washington. One might also observe that Australia’s more overtly realist approach to international relations better equips it to navigate the new and intense traditional power politics that is already emerging as the contests over Asia’s new order take shape. So it may be that each has a lot to offer the other as New Zealand and Australia together face what is, for both countries, an unprecedented diplomatic challenge: how to maximise their role in shaping a new regional order, as the old order based on the Anglo Saxon primacy — that is inextricably intertwined with the establishment of New Zealand and Australia — begins to fade away.

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CHAPTER 12 K¯awanatanga, Tino Rangatiratanga and the Constitution Ranginui Walker and Tracey McIntosh

In September 2016, New Zealand lost one of its most influential public intellectuals. Emeritus Professor Ranginui Walker’s careful analysis of the condition of M¯aori provided significant political and cultural critique of New Zealand and New Zealanders and directly informed how we have come to see ourselves. His clear identification of the causes of M¯aori marginalisation and restricted participation in national life was deemed radical when first pronounced and yet has shaped the work of the nation and our present political landscape, including how we present ourselves on the international stage. His pronouncements were unflinching and he never steered away from confrontation and speaking truth to power. His acuteness of thought and word remained with him till the end and there was always an urgency in his work. As a M¯aori academic, I acknowledge the significant debt I have to him. His intellectual labour provided the foundation for mine and the work of many others. Certainly, he was supportive of the idea of the University of Otago Foreign Policy School. Places of discussion, debate, research, experience and evidence were important to him. It aligned with his values as an educator. While Ranginui is known primarily for his M¯aori activism his role as an educator was Much of the research in this chapter was presented at the 2015 University of Otago Foreign Policy School. A chapter entitled Rangatiratanga, K¯awanatanga and the Constitution was subsequently published in Avril et al. (2017). Permission to reproduce parts of this chapter has been granted by Auckland University Press. 201

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lifelong. He was an educator in M¯aori communities but perhaps most critically he was also an educator to P¯akeh¯a, particularly through his regular columns in the Listener from 1973 to 1990. Many of these columns demanded that P¯akeh¯a rethink mainstream narratives of New Zealand. A consistent theme of these columns was colonisation and its enduring impact on M¯aori and modern New Zealand society. In looking at the actions of the state and state actors, his analysis demonstrated a huge historical knowledge that offered an uncompromising critique. In his discussions of comprehensive and consistent Treaty breaches, the alienation of M¯aori from their land and resources and hence their economic base, interactions with agents of the state and the failings of mainstream media he was able to give example after example of historical and contemporary racism. His work, while confronting, challenging and contested created the conditions for reflection and change. He created a space for what could be called productive discomfort. He was able to make people who were unused to reflecting on their own privilege think about how it must feel, as many M¯aori did, of being on alien turf within your own country. Paul Spoonley’s (2009) biography Mata Toa: The Life and Times of Ranginui Walker explicates the role that Ranginui played as an author, biographer, historian, academic, commentator and activist who was able to act as a cultural broker and make P¯akeh¯a understand both themselves and M¯aori better. I want us to not forget what we have been taught by Ranginui Walker. How is New Zealand depicted within a foreign policy frame? In presenting ourselves to the outside world, we have to be careful that we do not present a work of fiction or an imaginary. Here I am not evoking Benedict Anderson’s imagined community, but rather an orientation that renders invisible the historical fabric of this country. How does a history of dispossession and alienation of M¯aori from our economic base, our cultural base and our spiritual base inform the way we think about foreign policy? What are the implications nationally and internationally? How are we training our young people today who will be serving us in international arenas in the near future? How can we ensure that there is not a wilful forgetting or legitimate ignorance of our own history as we seek to shape the histories of other nations? Given that the University of Otago’s Foreign Policy School’s timeline largely corresponds to Ranginui’s activism these questions are pertinent.

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As Spoonley’s book notes Ranginui was not a natural activist. He came from conservative roots and had a shy disposition without aspiration for either politics or a public life. Events and circumstance meant that from 1970 he found himself at the interface of cultural politics between M¯aori and P¯akeh¯a. His piece that follows demonstrate the social and political historical significance of M¯aori–P¯akeh¯a relationships that details specific aspects of M¯aori political confederation from around 50 years post-European contact to the present state of affairs. It is ambitious in terms of scope and scale as it looks at different tribal responses to colonialism. There is a focus on the 1835 Declaration of Independence, on the Treaty and on the Kingitanga movement. The inclusion of significant background information on battles that were fought on our own soil is notable in that they are largely absent from our mainstream consciousness of the narrative of the nation. While the narrative of Anzac Cove is embedded into our consciousness and evoked as the emergence of nationhood, battles fought literally on the soil under our feet are removed from our history. His work was always on struggle encapsulated in his most well-known work Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End (1990; 2004). So the following is about those battles fought here. His work belies a claim made by a recent New Zealand Prime Minister who asserted that this country was settled peacefully by P¯akeh¯a. There is something about this willful legitimated ignorance that is deeply embedded within the New Zealand nation. As a settler state, New Zealand has a history it must confront. A present that it must articulate, and a future that it needs to navigate. And what are the implications of this in foreign policy and for those who represent the nation? Ranginui Walker (1932–2016)

Introduction M¯aori are the tangata whenua, the indigenous people of the land known today as Aotearoa New Zealand. They connect to the land by whakapapa, the systematic layering of knowledge in a sequential narrative chronicling voyages of discovery, settlement and naming, claiming and demarcation of tribal territories. The basic sociopolitical land holding groups of pre-European M¯aori

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society were hap¯u, independent clans led by rangatira. Rangatira considered themselves first among equals, responsible for the political and economic welfare of the hap¯u. But as the population increased, competition over resources saw the rise of warfare and the evolution of tribal confederations, so that hap¯u sometimes acted together as iwi against common enemies. This is a brief overview of the evolution of rangatiratanga as a response to the arrival of P¯akeh¯a. New systems of rangatiratanga became necessary to defend hap¯u lands, autonomy and well-being. While there have been a number of new tribal confederations across Aotearoa at different points since P¯akeh¯a arrival, this chapter centres of the examples of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the K¯ıngitanga, or King Movement, as two crucial tribal confederations that are still politically significant today (see Cox, 1993, for an extensive history of M¯aori unity movements).

Emergence of the M¯aori Nation As early as 1808, rangatira of the numerous hap¯u in Taitokerau (Northland) created an assembly known as Te Whakaminenga to regulate trade with P¯akeh¯a traders and settlers. In 1828, Kawiti, the rangatira of Ng¯ati Hine visited Hongi Hika at Whangaroa to suggest unifying the hap¯u more formally into a confederation under Hongi. Unfortunately, Hongi died and the moment was lost, but Whakaminenga continued to develop towards becoming the governing body of a unified M¯aori nation. The Whakaminenga’s first tentative step towards nationhood occurred in 1831 when 13 rangatira assembled at Kerikeri and wrote a petition to King William IV seeking British protection from a potential takeover of their land by the French (Healy et al., 2012, Appendix IV). King William responded to the Whakaminenga by appointing James Busby British Resident in 1833 (Waitangi Tribunal 2014, pp. 118–119). The Whakaminenga’s second step towards nationhood was the selection of the national flag of the United Tribes. The impounding of a New Zealand (i.e., M¯aori) ship, Sir George Murray, in Sydney for not flying an ensign was a threat to M¯aori trade. The rangatira wrote again to King William asking for a flag. When the flag arrived, it was run up alongside the Union Jack and given a 21-gun salute by HMS Alligator — an affirmation of the sovereignty of the Whakaminenga. The Whakaminenga’s third move towards nationhood was to assemble at Waitangi at the instigation of James Busby to sign He Whakaputanga o Te

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Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni, The Declaration of Independence of the United Tribes of New Zealand. There were 35 signatories from Taitokerau (Northland) and as far south as the Hauraki Gulf. The document, signed on 28 October 1835, declared: • All sovereign power and authority within New Zealand resides exclusively in the hereditary chiefs of tribes who declare they will not permit any legislative authority separate from themselves, nor any function of Government to be exercised in their territories unless by persons appointed by them. • The hereditary chiefs agree to meet in Congress at Waitangi in the autumn of each year to frame laws for the dispensation of justice, preservation of peace and regulation of trade. • The chiefs agreed to thank the King for acknowledging their flag and, in return for the friendship and protection they give to his subjects who came to trade or settle in New Zealand, they entreated the King to be a parent for the infant state and its protector from external attempts on its independence. With the signing of He Whakaputanga, the hap¯u in the Whakaminenga entered into the world of international trade and politics with at least some attributes of statehood. Their independence was recognised by Britain with whom they established a protective relationship for their infant state. They had a name, “Nu Tirani”, for their country. Ships sailed from their harbours under the national flag of the United Tribes (Waitangi Tribunal, 2014, p. 153). The establishment of a tribal congress to make and enforce laws was the only missing element of statehood because, despite the intention to hold an annual congress, rangatira returned home to rule their own tribes as before. Although Busby was disappointed, the Whakaminenga did not set up an instant government with himself and the missionary Henry Williams as puppet masters, the rangatira went about the business of nation building at their own pace. Over the next four years, another 10 rangatira signed the Declaration, including the influential T¯amati W¯aka Nene, Panakareao, Tirarau, Taonui, Te Hap¯uku, Te Wherowhero and Te Heuheu. The signing of three ariki Te Wherowhero of the Tainui Confederation, Te Heuheu of the T¯uwharetoa Confederation and Te H¯apuku of the Ng¯ati Kahungunu

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Confederation ranging from Hawke’s Bay down to the Wairarapa, spread the mantle of the Declaration over the whole of the North Island (Healy et al., 2012, p. 90). In the meantime, Busby lost faith in Te Whakaminenga’s ability to form a government to control wrongdoers. In 1937, his pessimistic dispatch to the Colonial Office describing M¯aori diseases, mortality and exposure to European vices influenced a change in British policy. The Colonial office replaced Busby with a higher official, Captain William Hobson, who was appointed British Consul (Waitangi Tribunal, 2014, pp. 302–303). Hobson arrived at the Bay of Islands on 29 January 1840 with a set of instructions from Lord Normanby of the Colonial Office. Normanby’s instructions acknowledged New Zealand’s independence as a sovereign state, and instructed Busby to persuade rangatira to sign a treaty surrendering their sovereignty to the British Crown for the benefits of British protection, law and citizenship (Walker, 2004, p. 90).

Te Tiriti o Waitangi Under the resulting Te Tiriti o Waitangi signed by rangatira on 6 February 1840, something less than sovereignty was ceded to the British Crown in the first article of the M¯aori language version, that is, the one agreed to by M¯aori signatories: The rangatira of the Confederation and all the rangatira not in the Confederation cede to the Queen of England forever the K¯awanatanga (Governance) of all their lands.

In the second article, rangatira ensured their mana was kept intact: The Queen of England guarantees the rangatira, the hap¯u and all the people of New Zealand the “tino rangatiratanga” (absolute chieftainship) of their lands, their homes and all their treasured possessions.

Paradoxically that guarantee was circumscribed in the same article by rangatira ceding to the Crown the right to purchase their land thereby denying access to the open market. In the third article: The Queen guaranteed the safety of all the M¯aori people of New Zealand and granted them all the rights and privileges of British citizenship.

On the basis of the Treaty, Hobson proclaimed sovereignty over the North Island, the South Island and Stewart Island on 21 May 1840 (Healy et al., 2012, p. 387). Despite the imprecise translation of sovereignty as K¯awanatanga

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instead of mana, the K¯awana (Governor) behaved as if the Crown had sovereignty, while rangatira behaved as if they had never surrendered it.

K¯awanatanga In the 20 years after Te Tiriti was signed, rangatira continued to rule their hap¯u as before. They adapted their political economy by growing crops for the Auckland market and investing in capital goods such as agricultural equipment, flour mills and coastal trading vessels (Walker, 2007, pp. 63–66; Petrie, 2006, pp. 120–124). This was a time of prosperity and peaceful coexistence with the Governor and settlers, but it was short lived. Despite assurances made that M¯aori lands would be protected, the establishment of a settler government in 1852 and the waning influence of the Colonial Office, settler interests in gaining M¯aori land were given free rein. Governor Grey went about Empire’s business, extinguishing native title to land by “fair purchase” and flooding the land with settlers. In the face of Governor Grey’s aggressive land-buying in the Taranaki, Waikato and Wellington districts, rangatira now had a compelling reason to implement the objective of nation-building proclaimed in He Whakaputanga. To transcend tribalism, rangatira in Taranaki developed the political ideology of kotahitanga, of unification of the tribes as a precondition for the appointment of a king. The idea of a M¯aori King as a symbol of national unity was conceived by Wi Tako, T¯amihana te Rauparaha, Matene Te Whiwhi and Wiremu Kingi at ¯ Otaki in 1853. In 1855, they began preaching kotahitanga among the tribes, and over the next three years, promoters of the King Movement toured the country offering the kingship to ariki and high ranking rangatira in every tribal district (Sinclair, 1959, pp. 111–112). All demurred. Ng¯ati Porou ariki, Te Kani a Takirau, for example, declined saying his mountain, Hikurangi, was immovable, meaning he had no desire to be king outside his own domain (Grace, 1966, pp. 443– 445).

Wiremu T¯amihana The rangatira who brought three years of tribal discussions over the election of a king to a head was Wiremu T¯amihana of Ng¯ati Haua, one of the most sagacious leaders of 19th century New Zealand. He established a model Christian village at Peria south of Matamata. The clusters of wh¯anau houses in the community

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were surrounded by orchards and fields of wheat, maize, k¯umara and potatoes. There was a meeting house, a church, a post office, a flour mill, a school house and a boarding house for a 100 students. There was a code of laws and a r¯unanga to administer justice (Stokes 1990, p. 516). When T¯amihana realised rangatira had no representation in the first parliament, set up in 1854, he sought Crown approval for his system of government for Ng¯ati Haua. Despite Section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 having provision for self-governing M¯aori districts, T¯amihana was rebuffed. He then turned his considerable talents to support the King Movement.

Te Wherowhero In 1856, a candidate for the kingship was identified when the ariki, Iwikau Te Heuheu, nominated Te Wherowhero for the office. Te Wherowhero belonged to Ng¯ati M¯ahuta whose lineages linked him to the commanders of the Tainui and the Arawa waka. He was a formidable warrior in his own right, who had driven Te Rauparaha out of K¯awhia and put up stout resistance against Ng¯apuhi muskets at M¯atakitaki in 1822. Te Wherowhero had also refused to sign Te Tiriti, knowing intuitively he was being asked to surrender his mana to the British Crown. Te Wherowhero’s mana was recognised by the colonial governors as well as by M¯aori. A story that demonstrates this relates to a huge feast Te Wherowhero put on at Remuera in 1844 to honour Governor FitzRoy. It was also a conspicuous display of mana. A mock battle of 800 warriors armed with muskets entertained the Governor. A thousand blankets were gifted to visiting rangatira. FitzRoy realised the security of Auckland depended on the goodwill of Te Wherowhero. Two days later, FitzRoy staged a reception at Government House with Te Wherowhero as the guest of honour (Jones, 1959, pp. 174– 175). Governors Gore Browne and Grey also often consulted Te Wherowhero on native affairs, and in 1849 Governor Grey persuaded Te Wherowhero to sign an agreement to protect Auckland and to move to M¯angere to guard the southern approach to the town. Te Wherowhero’s mana as the most powerful ariki in the land underpinned his nomination as king by Te Heuheu. That nomination was endorsed in 1857 by Ng¯ati Maniapoto at a meeting named Te Puna Roimata (Well of Tears) (Jones, 1959, pp. 206–207). Although Te Wherowhero was reluctant, he capitulated to the will of the assembly. In February 1857, T¯amihana sent

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a circular notifying the rangatira of Waikato that Ng¯ati Haua supported Te Wherowhero for the office of king. The protracted tribal discussions were brought to a conclusion at Ng¯aruaw¯ahia on 2 May 1858 when P¯otatau Te Wherowhero was installed as king. The King’s flag, Tapaue, was unfurled and run up the flagpole (Jones, 1959, p. 223). The K¯ıngitanga also adopted Te Paki o Matariki, incorporating the symbolism of peace and calm associated with the Pleiades, as the King’s coat of arms. The motto “Ko te Mana Motuhake” on the coat of arms signifies the discrete sovereignty of all the tribes under the sheltering mantle of the King (Jones, 1959, p. 231). T¯amihana set out the objectives of the K¯ıngitanga. The King would • • • •

hold mana whenua, the territorial and political authority of the hap¯u keep the peace between the tribes be joined in concord with the Queen of England with God over them both protect tribes from aggression (Stokes, 1990, p. 517).

King P¯otatau declared Mangat¯awhiri as the boundary between himself and the Governor. He envisaged a dual administration, sharing the land in peaceful coexistence with the Crown, and set about establishing his economic base and system of governance. P¯otatau’s kingship was supported economically by the fertile lands along the banks of the Waikato and Waip¯a rivers. His territory yielded abundant harvests of wheat, maize, potatoes, k¯umara and fruit. Pigs were reared and fattened by the thousand. Tainui traders in the Auckland market levied their own taxes to contribute to the King’s treasury to help defray the costs of inter-tribal assemblies (Jones, 1959, pp. 166–167). P¯otatau governed with a r¯unanga, a council of advisers. In 1859, the King’s r¯unanga promulgated a code of criminal offences (Brookfield, 2006, p. 115). The power to make and enforce law in the King’s domain is the hallmark of sovereignty, but unlike the unitary sovereignty of the Crown, the K¯ıngitanga was a federal system of government where adherent hap¯u had their own r¯unanga and local autonomy. When Te Wherowhero was crowned King P¯otatau I of the emergent M¯aori nation, he was no longer welcomed in official circles (Oliver, 1990, p. 528). Governor Grey tried to dissuade P¯otatau saying “Let your Kingship be put down”. P¯otatau replied, “I cannot do that. It is not mine, it belongs to the rangatira of this country” (Jones, 1959, p. 201). When P¯otatau refused to

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bend to the Governor’s will, the Empire reverted to what empires do: military invasion and conquest of peaceful Tainui territory. By the time Grey invaded the Waikato in 1863, P¯otatau was dead. His successor, Matutaera, presided over the most turbulent time in the history of Waikato (Mahuta, 1993, p. 509). Grey issued a proclamation ordering tribes living along the military road pointing south into the King’s territory, the Great South Road, to swear an oath of allegiance to the Queen or leave their homes. Most, being related to the Waikato people, left in the middle of winter to rally to the K¯ıngitanga. Their homes and properties at Ihum¯atao, M¯angere, P¯uk¯aki, Patum¯ahoe, Tuakau and P¯okeno were looted by the troops and their horses sold in the Auckland market. Without declaring war, Grey ordered General Cameron to invade Waikato. Cameron’s troops crossed the Mangat¯awhiri Stream on 12 July 1863 (Parker, 2005, pp. 38–39). The Waikato Tainui defenders were outnumbered and outgunned. Their strategy for such asymmetric warfare was to build lines of defensive redoubts capable of resisting British tactics of artillery bombardment, and to carry out frontal assaults by swift, surprise attacks. Redoubts had no intrinsic value, so after an engagement they were abandoned to the British. These strategies were at odds with those of the British, who were used to pitched battles in open fields, being decisive in war, and to the overrunning of redoubts leading to surrender. Many significant battles were fought in the Waikato at Meremere, ¯ akau, with Cameron’s army never being able Rangiriri, Rangiaowhia and Or¯ to achieve a decisive victory in the face of M¯aori strategy (Belich, 2015, pp. 119–176). ¯ akau, K¯ıngitanga supporters from Tauranga returned home and After Or¯ fought a final battle against the British at Gate Pa, a site close to the sea, which allowed the British to utilise even more artillery than in previous battles. With the Pa’s defences pulverised the British stormed in, only to find that the M¯aori defenders remained safe in anti-artillery bunkers dug within the Pa. Cameron’s army was routed, with many killed and wounded (Belich, 2015, pp. 178– 188). Governor Grey, appalled by the disaster of Gate Pa, decided to make peace. Cameron’s campaign on the other hand tipped the balance of power away from the K¯ıngitanga, enabling Governor Grey to confiscate 1.2 million acres of Waikato Tainui lands. Although the K¯ıngitanga was debilitated, it remained a cohesive force unified by grievance against the government and T¯awhiao predicted that in years to come a “child” would arise to reclaim the confiscated lands (Mahuta, 1993, p. 509).

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The King Country While the Tauranga K¯ıngitanga forces had been engaged at Gate Pa, on the other side of the Waikato Rewi Maniapoto and Wiremu T¯amihana had laid down the aukati, the closed boundary, between themselves and the Governor. They informed the British that if their territory was invaded, they were ready to fight again (Belich, 2015, p. 175). Matutaera, subsequently known as King T¯awhiao, lived within the boundary of the territory known as the King Country, and for years this region was closed to white men under penalty of death. In 1878, Sir George Grey, then Prime Minister, tried to settle the unquiet peace with the K¯ıngitanga by offering to recognise T¯awhiao’s authority over what was left of the Waikato district. T¯awhiao refused, holding out for the return of the confiscated lands. Tension between the Crown and the K¯ıngitanga was not alleviated until July 1881 when T¯awhiao made peace with the Government in Alexandra (King, 1977, p. 28). Making peace with the Crown did not signify submission. Even as late as the close of the 19th century, the K¯ıngitanga was still collecting taxes, administering justice and discouraging land sales to the Crown (Brookfield, 2006, p. 114). In 1886, T¯awhiao converted the King’s treasury into a bank, for which cheques and banknotes are still extant (Brookfield, 2006, p. 115). T¯awhiao also continued to struggle for recognition of the mana of the tribes and for restitution of the confiscated lands. In 1884, he led a deputation of rangatira to England. The deputation petitioned the Crown for a Royal Commissioner from England to investigate the injustices carried out in New Zealand. Lord Derby, Secretary of State for the colonies, met the deputation and exonerated the Crown by referring the petition back to the New Zealand Government. T¯awhiao also sought government approval to establish a M¯aori council, but was rebuffed. The Government, committed to controlling and assimilating M¯aori, again disregarded the provision for self-government in M¯aori districts under Section 71 of the 1852 Constitution. Undeterred by an uncooperative government, T¯awhiao established his own parliament named Te Kauhanganui at Maungakawa in 1895. Before he died, T¯awhiao also established the institution of poukai, feasts where widows and orphans were fed. Poukai served to maintain social cohesion, and commitment to the K¯ıngitanga and settlement of the raupatu. Throughout the 20th century iwi and hap¯u within the K¯ıngitanga and elsewhere across the country continued to protest and struggle against the

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injustices of land confiscations and sales they had experienced, continuing to assert their rangatiratanga at every opportunity. Most recently, since the 1980s, the Waitangi Tribunal and Office of Treaty Settlements have led to significant redress for historical injustices; even if the money and land returned remains a small fraction of what was lost. At the same time, Treaty settlements and new political developments have resulted in further evolution of rangatiratanga into the 21st century.

Treaty Settlements and Rangatiratanga By the era of Treaty settlements, Te Atairangikaahu was the K¯ıngitanga leader, crowned Queen on 23 May 1966. It was an inspired choice as she graced the ¯ office with dignity and humility. In her first year of office, Te Atairangikaahu replaced the English title Queen with Te Arikinui. She was now the national figurehead portended by Lord Bledisloe, a monarch above politics, refraining from public comment and leaving that field to her adopted brother Robert Mahuta. In 1972, Mahuta was appointed director of the M¯aori Studies Research Centre at Waikato University. The Centre produced The Tainui Report 1983 which set the stage for the tribe’s raupatu claim to the Waitangi Tribunal. In 1992, the Minister of Treaty Settlements, Doug Graham, introduced direct negotiations to settle claims that were well founded and Robert went into negotiations with the Crown. Tainui’s position was succinct; “I riro whenua atu, me hoki whenua mai”. Land was taken, land must be returned. “Ko te moni te utu mo te hara”. Money is payment for the crime. In 1993, the Crown ceded the Hopuhopu military base to Waikato Tainui as a down payment on their claim. The land was vested in the Te Wherowhero Trust. On 22 May 1995, Tainui and the Crown signed the Waikato Deed of Settlement, the terms of which were incorporated in the Waikato Raupatu Claims Trust Settlement Act 1995. The Crown apologised for invading Waikato and labelling the people rebels. Waikato Tainui received $170 million in compensation and 3500 acres of Crown land. The Tainui Trust Board was dissolved by the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act. The Waikato Land Acquisition Trust was established to receive the cash settlement of $170 million. Tainui Group Holdings (TGH) was established as the commercial arm of the iwi. Initially, TGH made a number of high-risk investments, some of

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which led to a write-off of $42 million in 2000. TGH was the restructured and directors experienced in business and finance were appointed, leading to a recovery in 2002 (Walker, 2004, pp. 304–306). In 2014, TGH assets amounted to $1.1 billion. With a net profit of $70.9 million, a return of 6.7 per cent on assets and a debt to assets ratio of 21.3 per cent, the company is soundly based (Tainui Group Holdings, 2014, p. 6). The Tainui Raupatu Lands Trust is the charitable arm of the iwi, responsible for distributing funds for social, educational and cultural purposes. Since 2004, the trust has distributed $104.5 million to education, sports, health, marae, kaum¯atua, poukai, cultural events and community programmes. In 2014, $2.5 million was spent on education, $1.2 million on marae grants and $1.7 million on the K¯ıngitanga (Tainui Group Holdings, 2014, p. 14).

Iwi Chairs Forum The iwi that created the K¯ıngitanga, and elsewhere across the country, now have their own rangatiratanga underpinned by tribal trust boards and corporations. These are statutory bodies for managing treaty claims settlement funds for beneficiaries. Triennial elections for trustees have become the mechanism for iwi to appoint their leaders. Qualifications, business experience and high achievement are now standard for aspirants to office. Tribal corporations controlling farming, forestry, fishing, property and business interests are the modern manifestation of rangatiratanga, with considerable business interests both nationally and internationally. With economic power comes political influence. In 2005, the chairs of iwi corporations established the Iwi Chairs Forum (ICF), the latest in a long line of tribal confederations. The ICF appointed Iwi Leaders Groups to enter into talks with the Crown on particular issues including water, climate change, conservation, Wh¯anau Ora, education, housing, minerals and foreign charter vessels. With the M¯aori economy estimated at upwards of $37 billion (Nana et al., 2011, p. 4), the ICF is now an influential lobby group. Meetings at different venues are attended by upwards of a hundred delegates. When the ICF meets annually at Waitangi in February, it invites the prime minister for high-level discussions on M¯aori policy. The prime minister acknowledges the mana of the ICF by attending in person with the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of M¯aori Affairs. ICF leaders are direct with the prime minister, saying, “We are interested in investment for the future of our beneficiaries. If you want to sell

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state assets, talk to us. If you want to engage in public-private partnerships, talk to us”. While iwi now have considerable and growing economic sovereignty and political influence, the issue of their political sovereignty remains unresolved. In view of these transformations in the Treaty settlement era, there is now a need for a national conversation on M¯aori sovereignty, K¯awanatanga and the constitution. That conversation is needed because decolonisation remains unfinished business.

Addressing the New Zealand Constitution The most recent opening to this constitutional conversation arises from the Ng¯apuhi Treaty claim, heard by the Waitangi Tribunal in 2011. Central to the claim was the argument from Ng¯apuhi that when their ancestors signed Te Tiriti, they did not cede sovereignty to the Crown (Huygens et al., 2012). In their report released in 2014, the Waitangi Tribunal concurred, concluding that in signing Te Tiriti: • rangatira did not cede their sovereignty to the British Crown • they agreed to a Governor having authority to control British subjects in New Zealand, to keep the peace and protect M¯aori interests. • the Governor and the rangatira were to be co-equals with different spheres of influence • rangatira agreed to enter into land transactions with the Crown • the Crown would protect rangatira from foreign threats and represent them in international affairs (Waitangi Tribunal, 2014, p. 529). Those findings by the Tribunal have enormous implications for the history of colonisation, M¯aori resistance, decolonisation and the issue of where Te Tiriti o Waitangi sits in the New Zealand constitution. The finding that rangatira did not surrender their sovereignty to the British Crown means that the Declaration of Independence 1835 and the Te Tiriti o Waitangi 1840 are the founding documents of K¯awanatanga, and the rule of law in New Zealand. On the P¯akeh¯a side also, in recent decades, there have been shifts to the view that the Treaty must be given a place in the New Zealand constitution. Stimulated by the dogged M¯aori struggle for recognition of their rights under Te Tiriti o Waitangi, during the term of the Fourth Labour Government, The Hon Geoffrey Palmer, as Minister of Justice, was the first to respond to

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the emerging Treaty discourse and jurisprudence from the hearing of M¯aori claims against the Crown before the Tribunal and the High Court. Judges, lawyers and academics at these hearings couched Treaty discourse in terms of partnership inherent in the “principles of The Treaty of Waitangi”. This evolutionary process of social change prompted measures to update New Zealand’s constitution. The legal measures taken by the Fourth Labour Government include: • The Constitution Act 1986 nullified the NZ Constitution Act 1852 so that the laws from the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall cease to have effect as part of New Zealand law. The act sets out the basic elements of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary as the three branches of government (McGuiness and White, 2011, p. 96). • The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 affirms, protects and promotes fundamental freedoms of the people of New Zealand and recognises M¯aori as tangata whenua (McGuiness and White, 2011, p. 101). However, these acts are not entrenched, which means they can be altered or rescinded by a simple majority of Parliament at any time. Palmer believes New Zealand should have a written and entrenched constitution, which would mean that certain key statutes that embody the fundamental values of our political system could only be altered by a popular referendum or a 75 per cent majority in the house. Palmer also thinks the Treaty of Waitangi should be entrenched in the constitution (Palmer, 2013). As matters stand now, all references to the Treaty in statutes can be repealed by Parliament. Law Professor, Paul McHugh, is even more explicit than Palmer in characterising the Treaty of Waitangi as the “M¯aori Magna Carta”, the document that sets out the fundamental political rights of hap¯u and iwi. McHugh argues that any constitution emerging out of New Zealand soil must incorporate the Treaty of Waitangi. The evolving norm arising out of Treaty discourse and jurisprudence is “tino rangatiratanga” sitting alongside and equal to “k¯awanatanga”. The discourse arising out of Treaty claims supersedes the old-fashioned notion of sovereignty as absolute and singular (McHugh, 1991, pp. 63–64). M¯aori of course have always understood that to be the case from the time that the Treaty was signed. It has taken 150 years to convince the Crown signatory to the Treaty that “k¯awanatanga” and “tino rangatiratanga” are partners in enterprise New Zealand.

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In 2010, the Institute of Policy Studies and the New Zealand Centre for Public Law reiterated the ideas propounded by Palmer and McHugh. Decolonisation means that a new relationship between M¯aori as tangata whenua and later immigrants must develop a framework for a non-colonial form of governance. This means repositioning the Treaty of Waitangi as a relationship between equal sovereign powers. P¯akeh¯a hegemony is being replaced by a more ethnically diverse power structure. Increased recognition of biculturalism, cultural pluralism and devolution has influenced the way the public sector operates (McLeay, 2011, pp. 6–17). These propositions are now evident in the composition of Parliament, the bicultural operations of the public service and the behaviour of the Government towards iwi in the settlement of claims against the Crown. The Treaty is in effect a de facto but not a de jure element in our constitutional arrangements. This ambivalent status prompted the M¯aori Party to press for a review of the constitution in its coalition agreement with the National Party in 2008. However, the review did not put that ambivalence to rest, opting for the status quo by affirming the Treaty as a foundational document (Constitutional Advisory Panel, 2013, p. 16). Even so, the new thinking of judges, lawyers and intellectuals is cause for optimism in the future. Decolonisation of New Zealand is well advanced. M¯aori are now recognised as tangata whenua with a special relationship as kaitiaki, guardians of the natural world. A new relationship is being developed in the spirit of partnership between M¯aori and the Crown. Power has shifted from P¯akeh¯a hegemony towards a more ethnically diversified power structure. The problem arising out of awareness of the significance of Te Tiriti o Waitangi is to determine where it fits in the constitution. The Treaty is not a legal document. It is an historical fact, an agreement between two sovereign nations to co-exist in New Zealand for the mutual benefits of trade and development of the county’s resources. As McHugh says, the underlying “grundnorm”, or basis for New Zealand’s legal system, has always been one where rangatiratanga sits alongside and equal to k¯awanatanga (McHugh, 1991, p. 64). That being the case the Crown has to learn to deal with the multiple sovereignties of the K¯ıngitanga, the ICF and the iwi economic power houses of Waikato Tainui, Ng¯ai Tahu, Ng¯ati Wh¯atua and other iwi corporations aspiring to join the billion dollar club.

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Conclusion By the 19th century, a number of disparate M¯aori tribes had formed tribal confederations. This natural process of evolution to higher levels of political organisation was accelerated by the advent of European settlement, culminating in the Declaration of Independence 1835, the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 affirming M¯aori sovereignty and the election of a M¯aori king in 1858. In developing their sovereign right to nationhood, rangatira conformed to McHugh’s “grundnorm” in the Treaty where rangatiratanga sits alongside and equal to K¯awanatanga. Governor Grey made the serious mistake of not conforming to that grundnorm and neglecting to set up the semi-autonomous M¯aori districts for which there was provision in Section 71 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852. Instead, Grey made war on Waikato Tainui, debilitating the K¯ıngitanga but not conquering it. With the beginnings of decolonisation in 1984 through Waitangi Tribunal treaty settlements, the K¯ıngitanga as the symbol of M¯aori nationhood recovered as have the loose federation of iwi that support the K¯ıngitanga. There is a need to update New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements to accommodate the multiple sovereignties of iwi, the K¯ıngitanga and the ICF as the political expression of M¯aori nationalism. Ng¯apuhi, at the instigation of Ng¯ati Hine, responded to the Waitangi Tribunal finding in November 2014 by convening a hui on sovereignty at Otiria Marae on 30th January 2015. The hui rejected the proposition, made by Jock Brookfield (2006, pp. 11–12), that the Crown’s sovereignty was achieved by the revolutionary overthrow of rangatira which with the passage of time became legitimate. However, Brookfield also admits that ‘injustice in a legal order is necessarily a deficiency in legitimacy [. . .] and if not remedied by constitutional and legal means, it may prompt a revolutionary overthrow’ (2006, pp. 42–43). Ng¯apuhi and Ng¯ati Hine are not advocating revolution. They want a national conversation on M¯aori sovereignty and recognition of their first nation status as tangata whenua. Let the conversation begin. In that last line of Ranginui’s work we sense his excitement at the possibilities of an informed, even enlightened, conversation on M¯aori sovereignty. He was a realist and recognised that timeframes for attitudinal changes that transform the body politic can be long and convoluted. Yet he had witnessed

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and indeed influenced significant changes in the way the place of M¯aori in the state is understood. In his lifetime he saw the iconography of the nation state increasingly turn from the symbols of the British Empire to M¯aori symbology. The implications for foreign policy must be considered. Is it possible to imagine a time that moves beyond the symbol and gives true expression to M¯aori sovereignty and the right to self-determination including the rights to political, social, economic and cultural development (as noted in Article 3 in the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). Dominic O’Sullivan (2017) frames indigeneity as a politics of potential. He argues that the politics of indigeneity seeks space for indigenous politics to return or emerge and enjoy meaningful policy influence (2017, p. 1). Do M¯aori as individuals or as a collective see themselves and their aspirations reflected in New Zealand foreign policy? How legitimate is it to determine the nature of nation to nation relationships without recognising the Indigenous nations within? As Ranginui has demonstrated these issues may be dismissed by others but for M¯aori the struggle continues. M¯aori do not operate within the confines of short political cycles but have a gaze that reaches across generations to attain positive and just social change.

References Avril, B, E Vivienne, McIntosh Tracey and W Matt (eds.) (2017). A Land of Milk and Honey? Making Sense of Aotearoa New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Belich, J (February 2015). The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Brookfield, J (2006).Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation. Rev. Ed. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Constitutional Advisory Panel/Te Ranga Kaupapa Ture (2013). New Zealand’s Constitution: A Report on a Conversation. Wellington: New Zealand Government. http://www.ourconstitution.org.nz/store/doc/FR_Full_Report.pdf Cox, L (1993). Kotahitanga: The Search for M¯aori Political Unity. Auckland: Oxford University Press. Grace, JTH (1966). T¯uwharetoa. Dunedin: A.H. & A.W. Reed. Healy, S, H Ingrid and M Takawai (2012). Ng¯apuhi Speaks: He Wakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni and Te tiriti o Waitangi Independent Report, Ng¯apuhi Nui Tonu Claim. Whangarei: Te Kawariki & Network Waitangi. Jones, PTH (1959). King Potatau: An Account of the Life of P¯otatau Te Wherowhero, the First M¯aori King. Wellington: Polynesian Society. King, M. (1977). Te Puea: A Biography. Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton.

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Mahuta, R (1993). Tawhiao, Tukaroto Matutaera Potautau Te Wherowhero, ?-1894. In The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, C Orange (ed.), Vol 2. Wellington: Bridget Williams Books & Dept. of Internal Affairs. McGuiness, W and M White (2011). Nation Dates. Wellington: McGuiness Institute. McHugh, P (1991). The M¯aori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi. Auckland: Oxford University Press. McLeay, E (2011). Building the constitution: Debates; assumptions; developments 2000–2010. In Reconstituting the Constitution, M Caroline, J Boston and P Butler (eds.), pp. 3–33. Heidelberg: Springer. Nana, G, F Stokes and W Molano (2011). The Asset Base, Income, Expenditure, and GDP of the 2010 M¯aori Economy. Wellington: Te Puni K¯okiri & BERL Economics. http://www.berl.co.nz/assets/Economic-Insights/EconomicDevelopment/M¯aori-Economy/BERL-2011-The-Asset-Base-IncomeExpenditure-and-GDP-of-the-2010-Mori-Economy.pdf Oliver, S (1990). Te Wherowhero, Potautau, ?-1860. In The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, WH Oliver (ed.), Vol. 1, pp. 526–528. Wellington: Allen & Unwin & Dept. of Internal Affairs. O’Sullivan, D (2017). Indigeneity; A Politics of Potential: Australia, Fiji and New Zealand. Bristol: Policy Press. Palmer, G (2013). Reform: A Memoir. Wellington: Victoria University Press. Parker, J (2005). Frontier of Dreams: FromTreaty to Nationhood, 1830s-1913. Auckland: Scholastic. Petrie, H (2006). Chiefs of Industry: M¯aori Tribal Enterprise in Early Colonial New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Sinclair, K (1959). A History of New Zealand. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Spoonley, P (2009). Mata Toa: The Life and Times of Ranginui Walker. Auckland: Penguin. Stokes, E (1990). Te Waharoa Wiremu Tamihana Tarapipipi, ?-1866. In The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, WH Oliver (ed.). Vol. 1, pp. 515–518. Wellington: Allen & Unwin & Dept. of Internal Affairs. Tainui Group Holdings (2014). Waikato-Tainui Annual Report, 2014. http://tgh.co. nz/admin/documentlibrary/waikato-tainui%20annual%20report%202014. pdf Waitangi Tribunal (2014). He Whakaputanga me te Tiriti The Declaration and the Treaty: The Report on Stage 1 of the Te Paparahi o te Raki Inquiry. WAI 1040. Wellington: Legislation Direct. Walker, R (2004). Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou Struggle Without End. Rev. ed. Auckland: Penguin. ¯ otiki-Mai-Tawhiti: Capital of Whakat¯ohea. Auckland: Penguin. Walker, R (2007). Op¯

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CHAPTER 13 What Happened to the New Zealand Peace Movement? Anti-Nuclear Politics and the Quest for a More Independent Foreign Policy Kevin P. Clements

In 1993 when I gave a paper at the University of Otago Foreign Policy School on “The Influence of Individuals and NGO’s on New Zealand Foreign Policy Making 1943–1993” (Trotter, 1993), I was able to report that the 1980s had been a period of intense social and political ferment; the peace movement was at its zenith; the left of the New Zealand Labour Party had achieved the Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987 and the right of the party had introduced “Rogernomics”. In many ways, the influence of the anti-nuclear movement on New Zealand’s foreign policy peaked during this time.

The New Zealand Peace Movement: “The Mouse That Roared” A broad-based New Zealand peace movement in collaboration with many sympathetic politicians had successfully challenged New Zealand’s reliance on extended US nuclear deterrence. It also ensured that no nuclear-armed or powered warships from any country could enter New Zealand ports, managed to enshrine this in national law, and as a consequence got New Zealand suspended from Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Council meetings. That suspension effectively meant that New Zealand was no longer 221

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an active part of an alliance that had existed throughout most of the Cold War period. Because New Zealand was suspended, it was, in theory, able to pursue a more independent foreign policy and assess decisions without having to align immediately with its major alliance partners. Being “freed” to pursue a more independent foreign policy, however, did not result in New Zealand actually doing so. In fact, under both Labour and National governments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) did all in their power to ensure that New Zealand deepened and maximised “old traditional relationships” with the United States, Australia and other “like-minded” Western countries. New Zealand strengthened these relationships in numerous ways. First, it continued to participate in and contribute to the Five Eyes Alliance intelligence sharing network, comprising itself, Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Second, successive New Zealand foreign ministers irrespective of political party, ensured the non-security dimensions of New Zealand’s diplomatic relations with its old allies were unaffected. To be sure, New Zealand did act more independently in relation to the, “Post-ANZUS Defence Arrangements”. Although these policy discussions may, to some extent, have made a virtue out of necessity, they did focus more diplomatic and security attention on the defence and security needs of the South Pacific. These “Post-ANZUS” conversations were preceded by the Fourth Labour Government prompting a nationwide public discussion — before New Zealand had been formally suspended from the alliance — on how New Zealand might defend itself conventionally after choosing to be nuclear free. The New Zealand Defence Committee of Enquiry was the first attempt to stimulate a nationwide public debate about how New Zealanders should defend themselves, inside or outside of the ANZUS alliance and with or without reliance on US extended deterrence (Clements, 1985; Corner et al., 1985). At this time, New Zealand was widely respected for being “the mouse that roared” on nuclear deterrence. Peace movements all around the world took hope from the fact that the New Zealand movement had managed to get the New Zealand government to take unilateral action against a possible nuclear threat (Clements, 1988). Even though the stand resulted in a series of punitive measures from New Zealand’ allies — such as limited and uneasy access to high officials in the US administration, suspension from joint military exercising and suspension from ANZUS Council Meetings — it was seen by

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peace movements around the world as an exemplary illustration of how a determined social movement could make a major contribution to a nuclearfree world. The contagious effect of the New Zealand peace movement in places like Australia, Palau, the Philippines, Mexico and Japan — to name a few — generated a very swift backlash from the governments of those countries. The United States chose to limit the damage from the New Zealand challenge to its deterrent strategy by insisting on Alliance obedience and allied opposition to such movements in other parts of the world.1 This meant that successive New Zealand governments chose the cautious path and did not actively promote New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy externally. Different Labour governments did try and maintain their anti-nuclear credentials by working with like-minded countries at the United Nations (UN) and outside on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) and different multilateral initiatives to control and abolish nuclear weapons. From a Peace Movement perspective, however, there was a disappointing unwillingness to promote unilateral disarmament initiatives in order to placate United States and allied government sensibilities. The anti-nuclear stance of the New Zealand Government did not happen by accident. What is now seen as a “defining part of New Zealand’s Foreign Policy identity” came about through the political will of the people. Arguably, it would not have happened had it been left to MFAT officials or New Zealand’s Foreign Ministers. Leaders and officials found themselves defending a policy which few wanted to defend and which provided complications to normal diplomatic exchanges with allied nuclear powers.

This generated a certain degree of political schizophrenia in New Zealand. In terms of national identity, New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy is enshrined in legislation and has been celebrated and promoted as a domestic political 1 For example, the US Ambassador to New Zealand, in the 1980s, Paul Cleveland took my wife

and me to dinner on the conclusion of the Defence Committee of Enquiry. One of the purposes of this dinner was to ask me to let Helen Clark (then Chair of New Zealand’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee) and Fran Wilde, MP, know that the United States did not take kindly to their export of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and that if they persisted in promoting it in places of strategic importance to the United States (Japan and Mexico in particular), they were likely to be “neutralised”. When I queried what neutralised meant he indicated that it meant death. It was delivered as a threat to two prominent Labour Party anti-nuclear campaigners. I mention this to indicate how hard line the US government was at the time and how opposed they were to the export of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy. This was before it had become a defining feature of New Zealand’s foreign policy identity.

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achievement. Former Prime Minister John Key, for example, said as recently as 2014 in Washington. We have anti-nuclear legislation and New Zealanders wear it as a badge of honour. There ain’t any time in the future of [New Zealand] that we’re ever going to nuclear power, nuclear weapons ... or nuclear anything; it’s just not happening.

John Key understood the “pragmatics” of popular opinion. To move against New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance would arouse considerable domestic opposition. Because of this, all political parties, for example, are committed to maintaining New Zealand’s Nuclear-Free legislation and support for the policy remains high among the New Zealand public. What makes this position particularly schizophrenic is that the Fourth Labour government (and all governments since) decided that the anti-nuclear policy was not for export. Furthermore, it was also decided the policy should not interfere with New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible member of the Western and Other Group at the UN. Moreover, successive New Zealand governments have refrained from using the anti-nuclear policy as a justification for radical unilateral or multilateral anti-nuclear positions in regional organisations or at the UN. In fact, since 1987, both the Labour and National Governments have opposed resolutions at the UN calling for the non-use and no first use of nuclear weapons, negative security assurances or a Convention on the Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons. New Zealand’s nuclear-free legislation addresses domestic political unease about nuclear weapons and makes New Zealanders feel slightly detached from extended deterrence strategies, but it has not resulted in any sustained critique of Western dependence on the nuclear umbrella. Oddly, while there was a deliberate decision not to promote the policy, New Zealand officials have found this legislation convenient in defining part of the country’s national identity when making a bid for the Security Council, or when seeking greater political traction by demonstrating some degree of independence from the United States. Successive New Zealand prime ministers and foreign ministers have, therefore, accepted the domestic political advantage of adherence to the anti-nuclear position but not wanted to export it for fear of touching the nuclear neuralgic nerve of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, all of whom continue to adhere to policies of nuclear and extended nuclear deterrence. Despite commitments to global nuclear abolition as a long-term goal, the New Zealand government has not voiced any national or international concern

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about the nuclear modernization programmes of any nuclear power. In the United States, for example, which is ostensibly committed to the reduction of nuclear weapons, the nuclear modernization programme is continuing apace and looks set to continue for the next 30 years (Arms Control Association, 2015).2 To ensure the country has some continuing claim as a serious player in nuclear and conventional arms control and disarmament debates, the New Zealand government needs to reappoint a minister for Disarmament Affairs, reactivate and re-invigorate the Arms Control and Disarmament section of MFAT and work actively with the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa) to generate more momentum behind innovative ways of reactivating stalled disarmament talks in Geneva and New York. It might also help if MFAT mentions New Zealand’s Nuclear Free Legislation on the Arms Control and Disarmament Section of its Ministry website. The 2016 Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations is a good example of a process that New Zealand should be actively promoting. New Zealand was one of the countries that voted for this resolution at the General Assembly in February, but there are many delicate negotiations needed to bring the five nuclear powers into the multilateral negotiating process in Geneva. Furthermore, there is a need to reconcile the different negotiating stances of both non-nuclear and nuclear weapon states. A minister for Disarmament, with the support of a MFAT research unit could put the New Zealand government in a position to help nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states break the negotiating impasse. However, despite

2The

US military is in the process of modernising all of its existing strategic delivery systems and refurbishing the warheads they carry to last for the next 30–50 years. These systems are in many cases being replaced with new systems or completely rebuilt with essentially all new parts. Though the president and his military advisors have determined that US security can be maintained while reducing the size of its deployed strategic nuclear arsenal by up to onethird below the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) levels, the proposed spending is based on maintaining the New START levels in perpetuity. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work testified to the House Armed Services Committee on June 25 that “modernizing and sustaining” the nuclear arsenal will cost an average of $18 billion per year between 2021 and 2035 in FY 2016 dollars. When combined with the cost to sustain the current arsenal as the new systems are built, this will roughly double spending on nuclear weapons from the current level of approximately 3 per cent of the overall defense budget to about 7 per cent.

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some anodyne commitments to the OEWG process, New Zealand seems to prefer a “wait and see” rather than a pro-active approach to the discussions. This does not mean that the achievements of the past are not important in the present; they are now part of New Zealand’s national identity. Political leaders and public servants ignore such values at their peril. This was reflected in the swift and bi-partisan opposition to Don Brash’s 2004 desire to review the anti-nuclear policy in order to quickly reactivate the old alliance relationship with the United States.3 However, there is a big difference between celebrating that moment in the 1980s when New Zealand had “15 minutes” of global attention standing up to its nuclear ally, and an ongoing commitment to ensuring the abolition of nuclear weapons. When social movements feel that they have accomplished their mission and take the pressure off their elected leaders and representatives, often their achievements are quietly subverted, reinterpreted or observed in the breach.

Components of New Zealand’s Evolving National Identity There are four important components of New Zealand’s national identity in the 21st century. Each dimension can be attributed to the actions of dedicated social and political movements over the years, and now shape what is known as “Brand New Zealand”. Arguably, each of these components provide a benchmark for determining whether New Zealand political and economic decision-making advances values and norms that many New Zealanders believe contribute to their personal and collective well-being. There are important links and connections between all four of these value systems, and each of the movements that played a part promoting them have important roles to play in ensuring their persistence. The first is a sustained commitment to a “fair go” and egalitarianism. These values were established when the first colonists argued for an 8-h working day and liveable wages. They were consolidated in the struggles of the New Zealand Labour Movement and in the establishment of the New Zealand Welfare State after the Labour Party gained power in 1935 (Sutch, 1966; Sutch et al., 1975). The basic commitment to equality has generated resistance to inherited power, wealth and social disparities. 3 See

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Economic, social and political differences have asserted themselves in recent decades as the neo-liberal agenda has been promoted by successive governments of the Left and the Right. The aforementioned values remain, however, as important aspirations for many citizens and, despite growing disparities, New Zealanders like to see themselves as members of a relatively egalitarian society. The second major value that many New Zealanders hold is opposition to nuclear power, and the maintenance of the Nuclear-Free legislation prohibiting the visits of nuclear armed or powered ships to the country. This value (and the policies giving expression to it) represents 30 years of peace movement activity and campaigning (Clements, 1988; Locke, 1992).The Nuclear-Free legislation is not just about nuclear-powered and armed warships, it is also a symbol for some independence from the hegemonic powers that have shaped New Zealand’s character as a post-colonial nation. However, despite the wishes of the Peace Movement, the Nuclear-Free legislation did not result in the direction of resources and the mobilisation of political will to secure the abolition of nuclear weapons. New Zealand’s anti-nuclear reputation has been maintained by people like Ambassador Dell Higgie, on a shoestring budget, doing what she can to keep making modest moves in support of the long-term goal of abolition. For example, alongside Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria, Switzerland and Sweden (the so-called De-alerting Group), New Zealand urged the OEWG to recommend that States possessing nuclear weapons share information on their alert status and plans for de-alerting within the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons review process or other multilateral body.…The United States of America and the Russian Federation conclude an agreement to eliminate launch-on-warning from their operational settings and carry out a phased stand down of high-alert strategic forces …States possessing nuclear weapons, while moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons, develop and implement nuclear weapons policies that reduce and eliminate any dependence on early launch or launch on warning postures and refrain from increasing the alert levels of their nuclear forces. [Finally]…that all States possessing nuclear weapons begin developing a long-term formal agreement to lower the alert level of nuclear weapons, with all agreed steps to be measurable and carried out within an agreed timeframe.4

4A

/AC.286/WP.18 United Nations General Assembly Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations; De Alerting p. 4.

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Actions such as these are important incremental steps towards nuclear abolition, but most New Zealanders are probably oblivious that this proposal had been made in their name and, if they had known, would not have known how it fitted into a wider arms control and disarmament agenda. It is vital that the New Zealand government and peace movement consider ways to place such initiatives in a wider and more comprehensive abolitionist framework, generate support for the abolition of weapons of mass destruction, and find ways to translate this into concrete action, to ensure consistency between the aspirations of the 1980s and 21st-century political realities. The third major value that New Zealanders like to promote is the 100 per cent “clean green New Zealand”. Born out of the environmental movement Tangata Whenua, it is often claimed New Zealanders have long paid attention to sustainable consumption and the protection of the environment, but active concern for environmental issues and the development of legislation to give expression to them was essentially a product of the environmental movements of the 1970s and 1980s (McVarish, 1992; Buhrs and Bartlett, 1993). There is considerable evidence that New Zealand is far from clean and green (in terms of water and soil pollution and renewable energy) but the value of being “green” is certainly deeply imbedded in its national consciousness, and love of the outdoors. The fourth major value component is a low tolerance for sexism and a high tolerance for gender equality. This was born out of the feminist movements of the 1980s and 1990s (Du Plessis and Alice, 1998). However, these movements were built on a long tradition of affirmative action for women (Grimshaw et al., 2001). New Zealand was the first self-governing country in the world, for example, in which all women had the right to vote in parliamentary elections. This became law in 1893 (Grimshaw, 1987). These 19th-century feminist gains were consolidated in the 20th and 21st century with the development of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs. During the Prime Ministership of Helen Clark, the appointment of women to the positions of Governor General, Speaker of the House, Attorney General and Chief Justice were milestones in the representation of women at very high levels. Although this feminist record has slipped somewhat since then, there is no doubt that gender equality remains an important value for many New Zealanders. These aforementioned values lie at the heart of New Zealand’s national identity, framing conditions for both positive and negative peace and are

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articulated and promoted by the country’s diplomats and politicians as integral parts of “Brand New Zealand”, yet each one is under some degree of threat at the moment. Any attack on organised labour, for example, places fairness and equality in jeopardy, as does schizophrenia around New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance. The government’s commitment to real progress on climate change and the environment appears to be shallow and women have to constantly guard against their status being eroded by discriminatory economic and political decisions. The fragility of values that are supposed to lie at the heart of New Zealand national identity, therefore, means that the movements which fought for them over the years will have to reactivate their efforts in the future. There are material and symbolic links between all four issues and all four movements. The reactivation of an active Labour movement, for example, may serve the interests of women and also be useful for the peace movement. Whether it will have a significant impact on environmental issues is moot. It is in the interests of the peace movement, however, to have close links with the Labour movement, the women’s movement and the environmental movements because there are issues which unite all four in terms of a search for both positive and negative peace.

The Peace Movement after the 1980s After the passage of the anti-nuclear legislation in 1987, the New Zealand peace movement focused most of its attention on the development of New Zealand defence policies rather than on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. It may have been assumed that the passage of the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Disarmament and Arms Control Act was sufficient to promote internationally New Zealand’s position on the control and elimination of nuclear weapons. To some extent, this assessment was correct. There are definite limits to unilateral disarmament initiatives, and critical symbolic gestures are only important when the actor being criticised is listening to what is being said. However, observers like Kate Dewes, Alyn Ware, Robert Green and Ian Prior were notable exceptions in continuing to take a specialist interest in arms control and disarmament issues. The critical mass of the movement moved on to other things. The Fourth Labour Government did appoint a minister for Disarmament and a Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament (PACDAC). The minister for Disarmament portfolio continued until the election of John

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Key’s National Government in 2008 when it was eliminated.5 In relation to defence, for example, there was widespread opposition to the purchase of new frigates for the New Zealand Navy in the late 1980s. In fact, 75–80 per cent of the population opposed their purchase on grounds that no compelling strategic case had been made, and they had limited utility for coastguard, fisheries protection and relief (Leadbeater, 2013). There was similar opposition to the purchase of new fighter jets and a growing appreciation that New Zealand continued to occupy one of the most benign defence environments of any country in the world. In the circumstances, issues other than defence and security attracted the attention of peace movement activists. The New Zealand peace movement, during the 1990s placed considerable emphasis on securing justice for indigenous peoples, both at home and overseas. This resulted in a strong emphasis placed on how New Zealand might work for peace in the South Pacific and in other parts of the world. There were continuities and discontinuities in this work. The New Zealand anti-nuclear movement always had a close collaborative relationship with a number of similar movements in the South West Pacific.6 So, it was quite logical to move from this issue to focusing on the support for independence movements in Timor Leste, Kanaky and West Papua. There was also considerable attention dedicated to supporting the Democracy movement in Fiji. The campaign to seek a legal judgement at the World Court on the legality of nuclear weapons was a continuation of movements for denuclearization at a global judicial level. This occurred alongside strong non-governmental organisation (NGO) and governmental support for the Middle Powers Initiative, which brought seven international NGOs to work primarily with “middle power” governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps to reduce nuclear danger, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons.7 Both of these initiatives were aimed at ensuring the integrity of the NPT and working towards the de-legitimization

5This

was not resisted by the peace movement very strongly because it had shifted a lot of its focus away from arms control and disarmament onto other parts of the defence, security and peace agenda. 6There has long been solid peace movement support for a nuclear-free and independent Pacific as enunciated in the Pacific Charter. See http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/pacchar.htm. 7 see http://www.middlepowers.org/about.html.

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of the production, ownership, deployment, threatened use and actual use of such weapons. These two initiatives took up a considerable amount of time for the peace movement, and the clear anti-nuclear focus got somewhat lost in the growing opposition to Western engagement in the Middle. East Along with the peace movements in other parts of the world, there were considerable mobilisations against the 1991 Gulf War, and this later helped generate widespread opposition to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. However, even though the invasion of Iraq was justified in part as a nuclear and chemical non-proliferation initiative, it did not reinvigorate the anti-nuclear side of the New Zealand peace movement. More recently, the peace movement has focused its opposition to New Zealand’s engagement with Echelon and the United Kingdom–United States of America Agreement (UKUSA) intelligence arrangements (focused on the Waihopai station). This could be justified in terms of the vast expansion of governmental capacity to place citizens under surveillance and has been vindicated in the light of the Snowden revelations and the challenges posed by gathering of meta data by the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. However, it is plain that the New Zealand peace movement has been somewhat distracted over the past 14 years. The efforts of Helen Clark’s Labour-led Government and that of the current National Government to restore military and intelligence ties with the United States (most of which were suspended after the Nuclear-Free legislation was passed in 1987) has gone largely unchallenged. This thawing of the security relationship with the United States, while generally seen as positive by politicians and officials, poses problems for New Zealand’s nuclear-free claims. By restoring a “conventional security relationship” with the United States, New Zealand is implicitly if not explicitly accepting some degree of extended nuclear deterrence if its military ally chooses to engage in activities involving a nuclear military threat or counter threat. During the past decade, the New Zealand prime minister was invited to several White House nuclear security summits. These nuclear security summits, while rather narrow in focus, provided an opportunity for New Zealand to remind the world of its national desire to be nuclear free and work towards a nuclear-free world. However, former Prime Minister Key did not take advantage of these meetings to raise questions about current nuclear threats, nuclear

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modernisation programmes or how to reactive negotiations on the abolition of nuclear weapons. Despite highlighting the gravity of nuclear materials coming into the hands of terrorists, and stating what New Zealand had done to secure its own nuclear materials and those of others, John Key’s statement ended with a rather anodyne aspiration.8 He stated New Zealand views nuclear security as part of our broader long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We are mindful that much of the most dangerous nuclear material remains in nuclear weapons programmes, not subject to international controls or transparency. It remains our view that the greatest possible contribution to global nuclear security will be complete and verifiable nuclear disarmament.9

If New Zealand is not being innovative, critical and slightly independent in such fora, and if it is unwilling to take advantage of such high-level conversations to push for more anti-nuclear boldness, then it might be argued that the anti-nuclear stance of New Zealanders is more symbolic than a policy guide and runs the risk of becoming a constitutive myth rather than an important political reality. The reality is that despite the mass mobilisations of the 1980s and 1990s, the New Zealand peace movement has been relatively quiet over the past few years; it appears to be living on its 1980s anti-nuclear laurels. It is not solely to blame. While the peace movement wanted to promote an anti-nuclear policy globally, successive governments in Wellington have opposed its export. Budget resources have been removed from developing solid arms control and disarmament expertise within and outside of government. At the same time, New Zealand’s close allies, and largest trading partners, are all declared nuclear powers or “virtual nuclear weapon states”. They are reluctant to place nuclear abolition squarely on the table because they wish to maintain the nuclear option in perpetuity. Peace activists who remain committed to nuclear disarmament have often made tactical and strategic decisions to foster close relations with elite policy makers in Wellington, Geneva and New 8 Key

was not alone in not sufficiently highlighting the issue. Ironically, despite the fact that some 52 world leaders were meeting in Washington to discuss ways of strengthening the security of nuclear materials in civilian use, they studiously avoided talking about the 83 per cent of the nearly 1800 metric tons of the world’s nuclear weapon-usable materials — highly enriched uranium and plutonium — in their own hands. Nor was there any mention of the 15,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of the declared nuclear powers. 9 New Zealand National Statement to Nuclear Security Summit, 1 April 2016.

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York. At this level, efforts to advance the NPT, Nuclear Weapons Conventions and Nuclear abolition are commendable, but this focus has also resulted in a disconnect between peace movement experts and grass roots constituents. There has been little transmission of in-depth knowledge or expertise amongst those New Zealanders who were fervent peace supporters in the 1970s and 1980s. The expert knowledge that exists tends to be monopolised by a handful of activists but they have not, by and large, taken the peace movement with them.

Facing the Future: What Does the New Zealand Peace Movement Need to Do? The question is whether this elite level strategy has generated an illusion of influence rather actual influence. It is important to get the right language into UN resolutions, but if there is no grass roots momentum behind such resolutions at the national and global levels there will still be little political will for change. If New Zealand — a small country with a distinctive national culture and character — is going to honour its responsibilities to the 145 countries that supported its bid for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), it should articulate creative alternatives to standard realpolitik assumptions and theories. What innovative ideas does New Zealand have? It is not just a question of reforming the Security Council or dealing with the veto it is a question of working out ways in which small, and intermediate-sized states like New Zealand can effectively promote respect for the international rule of law and strengthen multilateral systems capable of protecting it. The challenge is how “we” as a nation and “we” as a peace movement can begin thinking creatively about 21st century solutions to 21st century problems. There was no mention, for example, in the foreign minister’s speech to the 50th University of Otago Foreign Policy School, about New Zealand using one of its debate slots at the UNSC to focus attention on pushing the P5 and other nuclear powers to become more actively involved in negotiations for nuclear risk reduction, de-lerting, or a fissile material conventions en route to a world without nuclear weapons. Nor was there much discussion on the development of new concepts of security for the 21st century. Notwithstanding, the debates and research that was conducted in the 1980s on notions of cooperative and common security

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narrow (Evans, 1993) views of national security now seem to prevail in the 21st century. What part does New Zealand want to play in generating new mechanisms for conflict prevention or reinvigorating old ones? How does it collaborate with like-minded countries to develop new coalitions of interest around security, development, human rights and environmental issues? What role does New Zealand want to play in challenging traditional mind sets that have delivered so much suffering and replacing them with something more empathetic and compassionate? It is likely nuclear weapons will always be around if underlying sources of conflict and violence are not addressed. The following issues need urgent consideration: development and peacebuilding, enhancing the power of civil society groups and other social movements in the building of stable and peaceful states, environmental conflict and conflict resolution and promoting and protecting basic human rights. These issues are critical to peace and stability in the 21st century and New Zealand might be judged over the next few years by how much it can contribute to these problems. In this context, MFAT and the Defence Ministry should more actively engage with academic and NGO expertise and experience on many of these challenges. The United States and even the United Kingdom has many more contact points between its foreign affairs professionals, academics, practitioners and think tanks. The New Zealand government needs to stimulate greater dialogue and interaction between these communities. For those observers interested in positive social change, it is equally important to discern ways in which they might be able to revitalise the peace movement, labour movements, women’s movements and environmental movements around these and other issues. These movements are all critical to the goal of advancing peace and stability in the 21st century. In terms of nuclear issues, there are some pressing problems that should be addressed immediately if New Zealand is to retain any anti-nuclear credibility globally. The New Zealand government needs to work closely with both nonnuclear and nuclear weapon states to reactivate meaningful negotiations for disarmament. This might establish a clear pathway to the abolition of nuclear weapons. It should join forces with the New Agenda Coalition and others to actively promote the abolition of nuclear weapons through an approach that bridges the differences between those countries that favour a treaty banning nuclear weapons or a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention and those

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countries (the nuclear powers and their closest allies) who favour an incremental “progressive” (but really reactionary) building blocks approach. This hybrid approach, championed by many NGOs and sympathetic governments, could support strategies that create new anti-nuclear norms for the 21st century. In these new normative frameworks, New Zealand should support the criminalisation of the employment of nuclear weapons through the International Criminal Court, and encourage the prohibition of nuclear weapons through national legislation by actively promoting New Zealand’s anti-nuclear model. New Zealand should also support the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and/or a treaty banning the threat, use and possession of nuclear weapons. “Such a process could also include building blocks that are not as ambitious, but have more widespread support such as stockpile reductions, CTBT entry into force, a fissile materials treaty, establishment of additional nuclear weapon Free zones, and [development of a wide range of other] verification measures”.10 There is also a pressing need for a new kind of nuclear summit, one which has at its heart, not just the safeguarding of nuclear materials and their protection from terrorist attack, but one aimed at mobilising nuclear and nonnuclear powers to pursue their security without nuclear weapons — as New Zealand did in a traditional Kiwi way in the 1970s and 1980s. It is easier not to develop nuclear weapons than it is to dismantle them which is why the non-proliferation norm is so critical. New Zealand should protect the NPT at every turn and oppose any proposal for other countries to join the nuclear club. Arguably, if the New Zealand peace movement could debate the above issues, they could reactivate national pressure for change and in this globally interconnected world inspire other movements to do the same. To do this, the New Zealand peace movement and the country’s political parties must start thinking of alternative ways of talking about and generating security. In particular, they need to focus more attention on the well-being of all people not just the nation state. One cannot promote national or global well-being, for example, while promoting the conditions for human extinction. The New Zealand peace movement has to focus attention on removing the

10 See

Basel Peace Office for an excellent elaboration of all these proposals. http://www.baselp eaceoffice.org/sites/default/files/imce/oewg/2016/working_paper_to_oewg_-_basel_peace_offi ce.pdf p. 1.

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sources of violence and building the conditions for common security while keeping its eyes on abolishing all weapons of mass destruction. If this task can be re-engaged, it might be possible to start breathing new life into dormant peace movements all around the world. If New Zealanders really believe that they are clean, green, nuclear-free and good global citizens, they need to develop movements and policies to ensure that these values and aspirations are promoted and realised at home and abroad. If they do not engage with these issues with renewed passion and fervour, New Zealand will risk losing credibility in the eyes of the 145 countries that voted for it to be on the UNSC between 2015 and 2016.

References Arms Control Association (December 2015). U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs. Fact Sheets & Briefs p. 1. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclear Modernization. Buhrs, T and RV Bartlett (1993). Environmental Policy in New Zealand: The Politics of Clean and Green? Auckland: Oxford University Press. Clements K (1985). Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want. Wellington: Government Printer. Clements, KP (1988). Back from the Brink: The Creation of a Nuclear-Free New Zealand. Wellington: Allen & Unwin. Corner, F, D Hunt and B Poananga. (1985)Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want. Wellington: Government Printer. Du Plessis, R and L Alice (1998). Feminist Thought in Aotearoa/New Zealand: Differences and Connections. Auckland: Oxford University Press. Evans, G (1993). Cooperating for Peace. Australia: Allen and Unwin. Grimshaw, P (1987).Women’s Suffrage in New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press; Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grimshaw, P, K Holmes and M Lake (2001). Women’s Rights and Human Rights: International Historical Perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Key, J (20 June 2014). Speech delivered in Washington http://www.stuff.co.New Zealand/national/politics/10180275/Key-emphasises-New Zealands-anti-nucle ar-stance. Leadbeater, M (2013). Peace, Power & Politics: How New Zealand Became Nuclear Free. Dunedin: Otago University Press. Locke, E (1992). Peace People: A History of Peace Activities in New Zealand. Christchurch: Hazard Press. McVarish, S (1992). The Greening of New Zealand: New Zealanders’ Visions of Green Alternatives. Auckland: Random Century.

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Sutch, WB (1966). The Quest for Security in New Zealand, 1840 to 1966. Wellington: Oxford University Press. Sutch, WB, JL Robson and J Shallcrass (1975). Spirit of an Age: New Zealand in the Seventies: Essays in Honour of W.B. Sutch. Wellington; London: A.H. and A.W. Reed. Trotter A (1993) (ed.). Fifty Years New Zealand (Foreign Policy School). Dunedin: University Press.

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CHAPTER 14 The Globalisation of the Human Security Norm: New Zealand/Aotearoa Leadership and Followership in the World Jacqui True and Maria Tanyag

Introduction In October 2014, New Zealand/Aotearoa1 once again successfully secured a seat as a non-permanent member to the United Nations (UN) Security Council for a two-year term from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2016, having served as a non-permanent member in 1954–1955, 1966 and 1993–1994. New Zealand’s triumphant bid was widely regarded as a “litmus test” for whether smaller states can run campaigns against countries with larger resources, to win a seat in the most important decision-making body in international peace and security.2 Then Prime Minister John Key acknowledged that this success owed largely to “[putting] on display the credentials of New Zealand, which is a country that’s seen as an honest broker, someone that stands up for what’s right” (BBC News 2014). Indeed, former national leaders such as Helen Clark 1 We deliberately use the bilingual name, New Zealand/Aotearoa to recognize the biculturalism

of the state, the institutionalization of the Treaty of Waitangi in national legislation, and the recognition of M¯aori as an official language of New Zealand (1987). 2 See also the transcript of New Zealand Parliamentary Debate “United Nations Security Council — Election to Non-permanent Seat.” 21 October 2014. https://www.parliament.nz/ en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/document/51HansD_20141021_00000044/motions-united-natio ns-security-council-election-to-non-permanent [13 June 2017]. 239

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have viewed the country’s size and location as key assets rather than constraints in shaping a foreign policy built on multilateralism and on principled, constructive positions on global security issues, including a long-standing call to reform the Security Council itself (see also McLay, 2011; McCully, 2012). New Zealand last served on the Council between 1993 and 1994 — a time when the legitimacy and efficacy of the UN were put to a test in the face of mass atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Together with a small group of countries in early 1994, New Zealand pushed for the deployment of UN forces and to declare the violence in Rwanda as genocide. These efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful. Nevertheless this legacy, as Jim McLay (2011) argues, served as an added mana 3 for the country at the UN. Moreover, it also helped solidify a reputation among other states that is characterised by a “willingness and capacity to stand up and take leadership on many occasions — even when it involved taking public positions against the views of the Council’s Permanent (P5) members” (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.). In this chapter, we examine New Zealand/Aotearoa’s global leadership in promoting the human security norm drawing on constructivist and critical international relations scholarship. Human security refers to the approach emerging in the post-cold war era that takes seriously the individual as referent for security and the range of non-traditional issues, such as environmental degradation and change, disease epidemics, entrenched poverty, the spread of human trafficking and slavery, proliferation of small arms, sexual and genderbased violence that affect the security of individual women and men, boys and girls in our world today (see Kaldor, 2007). Our aim is to illustrate how in the context of economic, political and cultural globalisation, understanding contemporary state foreign policies increasingly requires that we judge or interpret them based on what states actually “do” with respect to their tangible impacts on individuals and communities, rather than simply in terms of what they “say they will do”. That is, we argue that foreign policy can be understood through the analysis of practice more than policy statement or strategy and that practice itself is ultimately what constitutes foreign policy. This argument stems from New Zealand’s brand of pragmatism whereby in the absence of a contemporary

3 Mana is a common M¯aori term used in New Zealand referring to the prestige and/or respected

reputation of a person or actor.

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developed or explicit strategy for advancing human security, it has in practice made key contributions to promoting human security concerns in the Asia Pacific as well as in championing the non-traditional security interests of other smaller states. Indeed, a country’s foreign policy is not simply shaped by geographic size and location or entirely by material capabilities with respect to military force and the degree of resources able to be deployed internationally. The New Zealand case shows us how support for the human security norm in foreign security and aid policy is mediated by domestic politics and policies of biculturalism, women’s rights, peace, social justice activism. Importantly, New Zealand/Aotearoa’s changing national identity, the self-understanding of “who we are”, has reshaped the aspirations for “what we should do” in the world. This chapter is divided into three parts. First, we outline the theoretical and conceptual links between foreign policies and state social identities with a specific focus on the mediating role of domestic politics for New Zealand’s foreign policy. Second, we identify two human security issue areas to further demonstrate how New Zealand/Aotearoa’s distinct state identity and pragmatism have influenced its approach internationally on climate change and on the women, peace and security (WPS) agendas. Finally, we conclude by emphasising the unique vantage point New Zealand can offer for further deepening and broadening the promotion of the human security norm as an alternative to state-centric approaches to national and international security. New Zealand/Aotearoa has the potential leverage its legacy and its future to mobilise global solutions that are attentive to the intersectionality of gender, indigeneity and climate justice.

Globalisation, Foreign Policy and New Zealand/Aotearoa State Identity Globalisation can be conceptualised as a process through which the state is mutually constituted and transformed rather than just an independent or external phenomenon from the state (Cox, 1996; Clark, 1999). With globalisation, states increasingly mediate domestic demands with global economic and political imperatives. According to constructivists in international relations, it is the identity that forms the basis of national interest (Wendt, 1992). States have a social identity consisting a self-image and self-understanding about their moral role and purpose. This identity is expressed through a set of historical

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narratives and in the articulation of values that ought to guide their changing interactions with other states (Reus-Smit, 1999; Devetak and True, 2006). Importantly, demographic changes over time mean that state identity is open to contestation within and across countries. Consequently, foreign policies as extensions of state identity represent not just economic and political interests but also serve as sites where norms are constructed and defined in relation to the social and moral purposes of states in the global stage (Devetak and True, 2006). They are therefore simultaneously domestic and international; and historically contingent as well as dynamic. In the case of New Zealand foreign policies, the country has been positioning itself globally by means of projecting a particular identity vis-à-vis global trade, human rights and security. Global economic competition conditions states to position their distinct competitive advantage through moral capital too by means of deploying cultural and normative identities (True and Gao, 2010). For example, as Devetak and True (2006) argue, economic globalisation has opened for New Zealand opportunities to demarcate a unique national and cultural identity deployed across a range of government agencies. It allows it to “create an external brand that will distinguish New Zealand internationally, better support key sectors and enhance its established and emerging areas of competitive advantage” (2006, p. 245). As a small state, the economic development of New Zealand depended on it actively projecting and undertaking policies that rendered it as an exemplar of trade liberalisation. However, while globalisation has made positive impacts on economic development, it also enables as well as exacerbates the effects of multiple and intersecting human insecurities. The concept of human security represents an ideological shift in the international relations from a stance that privileges the state as the object and provider of security to where the daily concerns of individuals such as physical security, health and the environment are considered of primary importance (Paris, 2001). As a normative framework, human security places the enhancement of human freedom and development at the heart of global peace and security (UNDP, 1994; UN Human Security Unit, 2009). The paradox is that New Zealand/Aotearoa has never used the concept of human security and nor have national leaders developed an explicit strategy to develop the concept of human security nationally and internationally. What has been clear and reiterated even during the country’s most recent tenure as a non-permanent member to the Security Council is that its foreign policy

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is intimately tied to a principled commitment to furthering the international rule of law and multilateralism. To understand New Zealand/Aotearoa’s foreign policy and implicit support for advancing human security, we need to examine the role of biculturalism nationally and the interrelationship between norms, identity and interests in New Zealand through the Treaty of Waitangi. Devetak and True point out that the Treaty domestically promotes a symbolic shared belonging and cooperation between indigenous M¯aori and P¯akeh¯a (descended from European settlers) within Aotearoa/New Zealand. By extension it has also served as “a foundation for a principled foreign policy stance promoting human rights, particularly the rights of minorities in international society” (2006, p. 248). First, the influence of the Treaty of Waitangi on New Zealand foreign policy is pragmatic in that it directly determines the country’s foreign policy commitments from a worldview defined by the domestic negotiation of both M¯aori and P¯akeh¯a interests as well as historically between Labour-led and Nationalled governments. As Patman argues, New Zealand relates to external others in the process of redefining itself given the “recognition of the special constitutional and cultural position of M¯aori people (expressed in the Treaty of Waitangi…)” (2005, p. 8). Second, the Treaty is also influential to New Zealand foreign policy in terms of symbolic representation and how the behaviour of national leaders can be read as emblematic of biculturalism. For example, Liu notes that biculturalism is an important and distinguishing feature of New Zealand identity internationally because through it, the country stands in contrast to the “more brutal treatment of indigenous peoples by Australians and Americans” (Liu, 2005, p. 79). This partnership between settler and indigenous populations serves as both a historical and contemporary positive identity that sets New Zealand apart (Liu, 2005). Consequently, New Zealand/Aotearoa foreign policy makers draw upon this bicultural identity in advocating for indigenous rights globally and the reconciliation of ethnic conflict in the AsiaPacific region (Devetak and True, 2006, p. 248). At the same time, M¯aori alliances with other indigenous groups help translate global developments and international norms on indigenous rights locally (Iorns Magallanes, 1999). New Zealand/Aotearoa is thus strategically positioned to advocate for solutions to global insecurities given its national history and a moral reputation, rather than through any overt platform promoting the human security

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norm. Such a global leadership style is indicative of how smaller states operate; and precisely why small states matter in international politics (cf. Ingebritsen, 2002). Through the deliberative measures and stances New Zealand has taken both domestically and internationally, it has in effect also innovated on the abstract concept of human security by translating it into actual outcomes. Leadership in this sense is about experimentation, pragmatic negotiation and openness to “trial and error” processes in order to transform existing institutions and practices at the global level. This is akin to how women’s human rights activists operate as “cross-cultural theorists” of universal human rights (Ackerly, 2014 2001). According to Ackerly, “the activists’ model of universal human rights allows for the tentative embrace of international norms of universal human rights when promoting change in local practice, and the revision of those norms to be better informed by women’s experience of rights violations” (2001, p. 325). In the same vein, New Zealand/Aotearoa has espoused a human security approach through practice in different policy areas at various junctures thereby rendering the concept of human security concretely in relation to real-life or contextualised experiences of insecurities especially in Asia and Pacific regions. This implicit application of the human security norm as we discuss in the next section is evident in New Zealand’s positioning vis-à-vis climate change and WPS agendas. We can see that in these issue areas, the country has actually made some novel contributions to theorising and implementing human security globally.

He iti te mokoroa n¯ana te kahikatea i kakati (Even the small can make a big impact on the big) Leadership on Anti-Nuclear Security, Indigenous Rights and Environment New Zealand has a long history of “punching above its weight” in the international community through a globalist mentality and in the context of nuclear disarmament and environmental politics (Devetak and True, 2006). Burford (2011) documents how the country has emerged as a global norm leader on international nuclear disarmament diplomacy. In particular, New Zealand’s 1987 Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act is the most comprehensive national ban on nuclear weapons in the world. The domestic adoption of this “nuclear-free” policy also translates to how New Zealand has facilitated global disarmament campaigns by engaging with transnational non-governmental organisation (NGO) networks (Burford, 2011).

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The anti-nuclear norm has continued to shape New Zealand’s defence force capacity in the ensuing decades and New Zealand’s anti-nuclear anti-militarist orientation has largely become a bipartisan foreign policy. This anti-nuclear national identity was reaffirmed during New Zealand’s recent term on Security Council whereby as a founding member of the New Agenda Coalition, New Zealand “worked with Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa and Sweden towards nuclear disarmament” (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.). Moreover, New Zealand’s anti-nuclear identity has opened up many subsequent multilateral policy commitments to human rights and environmental causes built on a “clean and green” identity as well. For example, New Zealand was among the first countries to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol on global climate change, which stem from and run consistent with its domestic human rights and environmental activism. Here again we see how the distinct history and progress of M¯aori indigenous rights contribute to shaping the country’s identity in the world stage. More recently, the promotion of M¯aori indigenous rights over ancestral domains in New Zealand are setting international legal precedents through the Te Urewera Act 2014 and granting of personhood for the Whanganui River under a Treaty of Waitangi settlement in 2017. Under Section 3 of the Te Urewera Act, “Te Urewera is a place of spiritual value, with its own mana and mauri…[it] has an identity in and of itself, inspiring people to commit to its care.”4 The Whanganui River is the country’s third largest river regarded by local M¯aori custodians as an “indivisible and living whole” not only intricately connected with other bodies of water, flora and fauna in the country. From an indigenous worldview, there is also a continuity or lack of distinction between indigenous self-identity and nature which means that “I am the river and the river is me” (Rousseau, 2016).5 These reforms, increasingly regarded as domestic and international legal landmarks, mean greater protection is afforded to the Te Urewera and Whanganui River. Granting legal personhood and rights to “nature” also matter symbolically (see Kauffman, 2015). Human beings are designated as custodians and

4A

full copy of the Act can be retrieved from http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/ 2014/0051/latest/whole.html. 5 See also Davison (2017) and Roy (2017).

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protecting the environment is of utmost importance in the legal duties of citizens. In addition, these settlements are regarded as representing the essence of shared sovereignty under the Treaty of Waitangi (Ruru, 2014). New Zealand implicitly promotes the human security norm by embracing, at least from a domestic legal standpoint, the M¯aori epistemological view of wholeness. This epistemology when projected at the international level can further advance both the status of indigenous groups globally as well as legitimate transformative, global solutions to climate change. However, it is important to note that New Zealand’s state identity as both bicultural and pro-environmental conservation is a product of ongoing contestations to deepen commitments for both M¯aori indigenous rights and implementing the tenets of the Waitangi Treaty. Indeed, there are a number of ongoing debates and negotiations on incorporating Treaty perspectives and on broadening the role for all M¯aoris (and not just powerful and politically influential iwis) within domestic and global environment policy processes thus underscoring how identities and interests are fluid and mutually constitutive (see Macdonald and Muldoon, 2006; Bargh, 2013). This also further substantiates the non-linear relationship between the diffusion of domestic to foreign policy interests. Instead of a fixed set of decisions and actions, New Zealand foreign policy effectively illustrates the political performance of state identity through the internationalisation of domestic moral purposes (Devetak and True, 2006, p. 243). Importantly, the practice of foreign policy by various New Zealand/Aotearoa governments has also broadened human security norm in new ways by opening spaces to examine the intersection of promoting sustainable development and indigenous rights. The potential for solidifying New Zealand’s global leadership on the environment and climate change, however, requires that it goes beyond “shortterm” governance and that it takes decisive steps to deepen climate change commitments to in supporting Pacific Island leaders in addressing their “slowburning” environmental problems (Boston, 2016; Hall and Harris, 2017). For instance, Boston argues that New Zealand can do more to strengthen its “anticipatory governance” and to protect future security interests in the Pacific region. This means thinking of human security not just in terms of the protection from present threats but also anticipating forms of “slow violence” such as the imminent threat of mass displacement for people in island countries such as Tuvalu as a result of rising sea levels (see also Nixon, 2011; George, 2014). Hall and Harris (2017) argue that in practice this means among others

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balancing adaptation and mitigation in climate financing such that developing countries are not often left on their own to address future risks. In the case of New Zealand especially, decisive action in mobilising other states to do more in protecting against climate-induced displacement is “a question of values” requiring moral leadership given the already significant population of Pacifica New Zealanders.

Leadership on WPS Another issue area where New Zealand has advocated human security is through the WPS agenda. Specifically, New Zealand has been a global advocate for conflict and atrocities prevention, including the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, as well as for peacebuilding and promoting genderequal participation in peace and security processes. In its Security Council campaign, New Zealand did not mention the country’s efforts to advance the WPS agenda at the UN and through its foreign development and security policies even though the country has a significant record on peace, human security and WPS. We identify several examples below to show New Zealand’s commitment to promoting gender equality as part of human security. This can be traced back to the country’s suffragette legacy underpinned, then by an explicit desire to be the first in the world to extend the franchise to women in 1893 (see Daley and Nolan, 1994). This history has established a global reputation for New Zealand for pioneering women’s suffrage which started in “lesser places in the geography of wealth and power and then advanced to more central locations” (Towns, 2010, p. 83). More recently, New Zealand has been consistently among the top 10 countries globally for progressively addressing gender inequalities based on the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index. Indeed, the country can be considered a regional leader for Asia Pacific in this regard, and at 9th place in the world for gender equality is only surpassed by a regional neighbour, the Philippines at 7th place (WEF, 2016). In addition, New Zealand’s own anti-nuclear history was founded on widespread women’s peace activism in local communities and at the national level during the 1970s and 1980s (see Dann, 2015). Hence, we can see a continuation between domestic anti-nuclear norm and anti-militarist state identity with New Zealand civil society’s promotion of women’s empowerment and non-violence as features of this broader human security orientation. This helps explain an indirect foreign policy characterised less by

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what is explicitly said and more by concrete efforts in promoting women’s participation in peacebuilding and in enhancing mechanisms for conflict prevention. First, outside of the Security Council and even before the country’s campaign for the non-permanent seat, New Zealand has consistently promoted peacebuilding in the Pacific region, including facilitating local women’s unique roles in ending violence and brokering peace. This is exemplified by the role New Zealand played in the 2002 Papua New Guinea — Bougainville Peace Agreement. Bougainville rebel leaders expressed a preference for New Zealand involvement throughout the peace process (Henderson, 1999; Hayes, 2005). Devetak and True point out that because of New Zealand’s bicultural identity and given a substantial Pacifica diaspora community, it has been perceived as a benign regional actor (2006, p. 249). This is in contrast to Australia which has been perceived as a more belligerent regional leader as result of past foreign policy decisions such as endorsing President Bush’s invasion of Iraq despite the lack of UN mandate and the 2003 intervention in the Solomon Islands (Devetak and True, 2006). New Zealand’s role in resolving the conflict in Bougainville can be interpreted as another application of how the Treaty of Waitangi shapes foreign policy in the region by symbolically representing non-violent paths to redressing domestic historical and present grievances. Consequently, the Treaty imbues New Zealand with a perspective that it can uniquely offer for the Papua New Guinea–Bougainville Peace negotiation process as well as in promoting peacebuilding regionally. Importantly, during that peace process and over a number of years, the New Zealand government had funded gender-inclusive peacebuilding initiatives in Bougainville including convening several talks where official delegations of leaders from women’s organisations travelled to New Zealand (True and Powles, 2014; Powles and True, 2015; WPSAC, 2015). The objective was to forge a united voice and to enable their greater inclusion in peace processes at home (see, e.g., Garasu, 2002). Bougainville is a matriarchal culture, but despite having important roles in that society, women have struggled to participate in the formal political process, which is still male-dominated. Nonetheless, during the peace process, women’s groups and individual women leaders emerged as an important influence on the peace agreement outcome with New Zealand as a strong facilitator and advocate for women’s political influence.

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Another example is represented in Helen Clark’s bid to be the first female UN Secretary-General which carried strong echoes from New Zealand’s identity in securing another “world’s first” in the promotion of gender equality globally. A core pillar for the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the WPS agenda more broadly is promoting women’s political participation in building and preventing peace. Yet, with Clark’s unsuccessful campaign, the UN reinforces a narrative contrary to the WPS agenda that there is a lack of leadership and representation of qualified women to lead the UN. Indeed, Clark’s own words, “there can be no lasting peace without ensuring that women’s voices and perspectives are well-represented” (Clark, 2012). The need for greater gender equal representation within the UN itself builds on New Zealand’s expressed commitment for reforming the UN Security Council. It is also consistent with New Zealand’s actual contributions for advocating the human security norm through its practice-based support of Pacifica women peacebuilders. Clark draws the connections between these two issues. For example in a 2016 interview on her plans for the UN, identified a two pronged approach: [f ]irst, addressing root causes of conflict, which include poverty, social marginalization, and lack of opportunity, especially for youth; second, improving our field support for peacekeepers and our understanding of the complex environments in which we are asking them to operate (quoted in Bremmer, 2016).

In addition, she viewed the role of the Secretary-General once again through language encompassing human security: Better connections begin at home, within the U.N. family. The links between peace operations, humanitarian responses, human rights, peacebuilding and development programs need to be seamless. As Secretary-General I would ensure that the heads of the U.N.’s pillars work together as a tight team (quoted in Bremmer, 2016).

Finally, though New Zealand only enacted its National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security in 2015 the 49th country to do so, behind its regional neighbours Australia, which created a plan in 2012, and the Philippines in 2010,6 the country can no longer afford to be implicit in its promotion of gender empowerment and human security. To leverage further its state identity and global reputation, there is an opportunity with the national 6 National

Action Plans are available through PeaceWomen, http://www.peacewomen.org/ member-states.

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action plan to advance a coherent, context-appropriate and sustained strategy for the inclusion of women in nation-building and at all levels of governance within and beyond New Zealand especially in the broader Asia and Pacific region (WPSAC, 2015).

Conclusion In this chapter, we have examined the indirect and direct ways through which New Zealand/Aotearoa has advanced the human security norm through its foreign policy and state identity. We demonstrated how the lack of explicit conceptual engagement with human security is nonetheless outmatched by the louder sound of its actions. In the case of climate change New Zealand has made contributions to mitigation in the Pacific but could do more to address long-term adaptation as key advocates and critics point out. Moreover, New Zealand’s distinctive style of performing state identity on the global stage is shaped by its efforts to negotiate and overcome the limits of its far-flung geographic location and size. It could be explained by simple policymaking framework that this strategy is about “muddling through” as Charles Lindblom (1959) first put it which is also a kind of pragmatism that small countries frequently have. Yet, as we have argued in this chapter, it actually suggests the potential for a deeper insight to the kind of consistency in the moral and value positioning held by New Zealand across a range of human security issues, with respect to violence against civilians, human rights, indigenous rights, environmental and gender security. States conceive their social identity in relation to how they respect international rules and norms. This is increasingly a measure of foreign policy maturity rather than the ability of the state to use force and assert sovereign autonomy through military capabilities. As a result of New Zealand/Aotearoa’s practice, the country has deepened the meaning of human security through its concrete actions such as in the domestic legal innovation vis-à-vis M¯aori ancestral domains, as well as in its support for Pacific women peacebuilders. In M¯aori there is a saying: “Whakapuputia mai o manuka, kia kore ai e whati” which translates into English as, “cluster the branches of a manuka so they will not break”. We propose that the challenge ahead is for foreign policy to reflect the unity that New Zealand/Aotearoa’s identity within diversity promises. National leaders could do well to leverage the country’s own domestic lessons, its biculturalism and respect for minorities, as well as its record on

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gender equality to a greater effect not only in shaping the national narrative but to promote and better realise international peace and security. More to the point, human security from a distinct New Zealand perspective can be made more meaningful through a practice-based leadership that understands beyond rhetoric that security is indivisible and interdependent with gender, indigeneity and environmentalism.

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Women, Peace and Security Academic Collective (WPSAC) (2015). New Zealand DraftWomen, Peace & Security National Action Plan. https://wpsac.files.wordpress. com/2015/06/wpsac_submission.pdf. World Economic Forum (WEF) (2016). The Global Gender Gap Report 2016. Geneva: WEF. http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2016/rankings/ [16 June 2017].

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CHAPTER 15 The Price of the Club: How New Zealand’s Involvement in the “War On Terror” has Compromised Its Reputation as a Good International Citizen Jon Stephenson

On Sunday 10 March 2002, locals noticed unmarked Gulfstream jets flying into Queenstown airport in the South Island of New Zealand. During the next few days, there was unusual activity at a nearby resort, where bodyguards enforced strict security and shadowed a group of casually dressed men (NZ Herald Staff Reporters, 2002; Suskind, 2006, p. 83; Sutton, 2002; New Zealand Press Association, 2002). Six months after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks at New York; Washington, DC; and Pennsylvania, intelligence chiefs from the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand — nations comprising the so-called “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance — were gathering for a meeting of unusual significance. As Pulitzer Prize-winning author Ron Suskind puts it in his book, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11: On Monday morning, the team that would fight the global “war on terror” settled in for a long day at the end of the earth: an inconspicuous stone house on the edge of a resort on an island with more sheep than people. (2006, p. 83)

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According to one of those present, whom Suskind quotes in his book, George Tenet, the then-director of America’s Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA, began by telling the meeting: “Gentlemen, we are at war”. “This,” Tenet continued, “is a challenge unlike any other we’ve faced. It is a challenge which redefines the way we work, the way we think, the way we act….We must work as one,” Tenet said, once his opening was complete. “As for CIA, I can tell you this. There is nothing we won’t do, nothing we won’t try. The shackles, my friends, have been taken off ”. (2006, pp. 82–83)

It is certainly no secret that “taking off the shackles” in the post-9/11 world has led to numerous instances of demonstrably illegal acts by the CIA and some of the CIA’s partners in the Middle East and Europe (Mayer, 2005; Grey, 2007; Mazzetti, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2015; Center for Constitutional Rights, 2015).1 Nor are the misdeeds of US military personnel in places like Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prison unfamiliar to the public. What is less well-known are the actions (or inactions) during America’s so-called “war on terror” of smaller Western nations like New Zealand — nations widely respected for their commitment to human rights and the observance of international law. This chapter focuses on one aspect of New Zealand’s participation in the “war on terror”: the involvement of New Zealand’s special forces in the transfer of detainees in Afghanistan to authorities with a record of mistreating or torturing detainees, or suspected of doing so. This writer argues that the New Zealand Government, its officials and its military not only had knowledge, from an early stage, of what New Yorker journalist Jane Mayer has described as 1 According

to the Center for Constitutional Rights (2015), “[o]n December 9, 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) released a declassified executive summary and the conclusions and findings of its inquiry into the CIA’s post-9/11 interrogation and detention program. The Senate report proves that after 9/11 the CIA engaged in a sophisticated program of calculated, aggressive, and egregious state-sanctioned torture and lied about how the program operated and the utility of the information obtained.” See also Human Rights Watch (2015), “[i]t is now well established that following the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated a global, state-sanctioned program in which it abducted scores of people throughout the world, held them in secret detention — sometimes for years — or ‘rendered’ them to various countries, and tortured or otherwise ill-treated them.” For details on the CIA’s rendition of detainees to Middle Eastern nations known to torture, see Mayer (2005): “The most common destinations for rendered suspects are Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Jordan, all of which have been cited for human-rights violations by the State Department, and are known to torture suspects.” See also Grey (2007).

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“The Dark Side” of that war (Mayer, 2008) but that they have been complicit in — and, in the military’s case, guilty of — significant breaches of international law in Afghanistan, albeit on a much smaller scale than their allies in America (Stephenson, 2009a, 2011; Hager and Stephenson, 2017). In doing so, the chapter critiques the claim that New Zealand has a principled foreign policy based on the rule of law, as a former foreign minister has claimed (McCully, 2015). It raises the question of whether key players in New Zealand’s political, military, intelligence and foreign affairs community have at times paid little more than lip service to international law, going along to get along with the United States and other Five Eyes partners in Afghanistan and, more recently, Iraq because, as former Prime Minister John Key has put it (Young, 2015; TVNZ, 2015), that’s just “the price of the club”. Back in Queenstown in March 2002, when George Tenet told his audience that the shackles had come off in the “war on terror”, that information should have come as no surprise to a select group of New Zealanders from the country’s political and foreign affairs establishment as well as its military and intelligence community: since late 2001, when planning began for the deployment of New Zealand troops to Afghanistan, concerns had been raised by New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) lawyers about detention-related issues2 ; from early 2002, concerns had been raised by NZDF members on the ground in Afghanistan about the actual treatment of detainees.3 Some New Zealand politicians and their officials would have been as aware as Defence Force personnel of the manner in which the Bush Administration was likely to be prosecuting its “war on terrror” in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Indeed, like anyone with access to a television, a radio, a newspaper or an Internet connection, such observers would have known of the controversy surrounding the legality of the US invasion of Afghanistan. They would have read, heard or watched reports about the Bush Administration’s unwillingness to treat those detained there according to international laws like the Geneva Conventions. As Human Rights Watch has pointed out, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld labelled the first “war on terror” detainees to arrive at

2 Confidential 3 Confidential

New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) legal documents, seen by the writer. sources.

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America’s Guantanamo Bay detention centre on January 11, 2002, as “unlawful combatants”, thus “automatically denying them possible status as prisoners of war (POWs)” (Human Rights Watch, 2004b). “Unlawful combatants do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention”, Mr Rumsfeld said, overlooking that the Geneva Conventions provide explicit protections to all persons captured in an international armed conflict, even if they are not entitled to POW status. (2004b)

Rumsfeld’s words “signaled a casual approach to US compliance with international law” by stating, inter alia, that America would, “for the most part, treat [detainees] in a manner that is reasonably consistent with the Geneva Conventions, to the extent they are appropriate” (2004b). However, as the Danish legal scholar Jens Elo Rytter later observed, “If prisoners only have rights when the US finds it suitable and consistent with military necessity, they have no rights at all” (Guldbrandsen, 2006). Meanwhile, behind the scenes, a series of legal memoranda written in late 2001 and early 2002 by the [US] Justice Department helped build the framework for circumventing international law restraints on prisoner interrogation. These memos argued that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to detainees from the Afghanistan war. (Human Rights Watch, 2004b)

The extent of the Bush Administration’s efforts to subvert international law was not fully evident by early 2002, but the warning signs were clear: New Zealand politicians and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) were aware of the implications of Rumsfeld’s statements; NZDF chiefs received written briefings from military lawyers expressing concern about similar statements by President Bush that limited the rights of detainees in US custody.4 Moreover, New Zealand officials would have known from late 2001 or early 2002 what the public did not know: that anyone detained in Afghanistan by New Zealand’s elite Special Air Service (SAS) troopers would be transferred to US custody. They also knew, by February 2002 at the latest, about detailed reports that some US personnel in Afghanistan were mistreating detainees.5 4 Confidential sources and NZDF legal documents seen by the writer. One briefing document,

prepared by a senior military lawyer, discussed what he described as President George W. Bush’s 2002 “edict” about certain detainees not being eligible for prisoner of war status. It stated: “[T]hat is a decision for a competent tribunal, not a ruling by the President of the United States.” It added: “NZDF and MFAT are alive to the issue in question…” 5 For example, New Zealand SAS troopers were involved in a 23 January 2002 raid with US Green Berets on the village of Hazar Qadam in Uruzgan province which led to the death of up

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In fact, detainees were being mistreated in the early stages of the “war on terror” at the same place in Afghanistan that New Zealand’s SAS troopers were based: Kandahar airfield. Among those mistreated there by US personnel were detainees transferred by Denmark, whose commandos were part of the same US-led task force as the New Zealand SAS: the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-South (CJSOTF-South). That mistreatment included detainees being placed in painful stress positions for extended periods; severe beatings; sleep deprivation; and being made to lie on frozen ground until they were numb (Human Rights Watch, 2004a, pp. 37–40). Some members of the Danish special forces, who witnessed or were otherwise aware of mistreatment, expressed concern, as did others from the multinational contingent (Guldbrandsen, 2006; Stephenson, 2009a, 2009b, 2011). Political and military leaders in New Zealand who were not aware of allegations of mistreatment at Kandahar from official reports should have known: there were detailed stories about this in The New York Times, among other media, from January 2002. There were front-page headlines; the allegations were not a secret. As the “war on terror” continued, New Zealand’s political, diplomatic and military leaders would undoubtedly have been aware from additional news coverage, if not from secret briefings, of reports about the widespread abuse of detainees in US custody. Later, they would learn of CIA “black sites”, of America’s prisoners being tortured there by methods such as water-boarding, and of detainees being “rendered” by the CIA to countries like Egypt and Jordan, where the Americans’ dirty work was done for them (Mayer, 2005; Priest, 2005; Wilkinson, 2005). They would learn, like the rest of the world, of detainees in US custody being murdered or “disappeared”. Yet leaked documents this writer has seen show that, from the earliest stages of the “war on terror”, senior NZDF personnel in particular not only knew and were concerned about the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo (Stephenson, 2011), they were aware that detainees captured in Afghanistan by SAS troopers and transferred to US custody could be sent to Guantanamo Bay. Senior NZDF legal officers were well aware that people captured by their country’s SAS to 21 men and the detention of 27. Those detainees were transferred to the Kandahar detention centre and their allegations of mistreatment and treatment that arguably meets the definition of torture were widely reported in major US media (Smith, 2002; Gall, 2002; Moore 2002). Confirmation of New Zealand’s involvement can be found in Briscoe et al. (2006, p. 236) and Gopal (2009, p. 125).

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troopers and later transferred to Guantanamo potentially faced execution if convicted of certain charges. They also knew that permitting the transfer of detainees to US custody in such circumstances would be a clear violation of New Zealand’s policy to refuse to extradite people to countries where the death penalty might be imposed (Stephenson, 2011).6 Faced with such knowledge, at various stages of the “war on terror”, how have New Zealand’s officials and its political and military leaders responded? The evidence this writer has seen, while admittedly incomplete, suggests their reaction for the most part has been muted at best; at worst, it has amounted to turning a blind eye to conduct deemed illegal under international law, actively covering it up and, in the military’s case, even participating in it. This impression is not based on one or two examples alone. Humans are fallible, and organisations and the individuals that comprise them make errors of judgement and occasional mistakes. But the actions and inactions of New Zealand political and diplomatic as well as military leaders — from the aftermath of 9/11 to the present day — more closely resemble a pattern of behaviour than an aberration. It is easy to be wise in retrospect. In the aftermath of 9/11, the world was rightly revolted by the terrorist attacks in New York; Washington, DC; and Shanksville, PA. America, the global superpower, was wounded and angry. On 20 September 2001, President Bush told the world: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001). But sympathy for, or pressure from, the Bush Administration in the post-9/11 era does not adequately explain why political and military leaders in New Zealand turned a blind eye to potential and actual breaches of human rights. There was selfishness and opportunism, too. As the author Nicky Hager has shown, after years in the cold following a dispute with the United States about access for its navy’s nuclear ships, some NZDF commanders — those from the SAS, in particular — saw the “war on terror” as a chance to rebuild relations with the US military (Hager, 2011; Hager and Stephenson, 2017, p. 149, footnote 17). New Zealand’s political leaders almost certainly knew less about the mistreatment and torture of detainees in the “war on terror” than their counterparts in the military and intelligence services — in the early years, at least. Yet they knew enough. However, perhaps delighted by the warming of their country’s relationship with 6 Confidential

sources and NZDF legal documents seen by the writer.

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America, concerns in Wellington about US conduct were invariably expressed in diplomatic language and through diplomatic channels rather than in muscular terms or in public (Stephenson, 2011).7 In short, it seems that a desire to avoid embarrassing a major ally, as well as a degree of opportunism from the government and Defence Force has frequently dictated New Zealand’s response to America’s abuse of human rights. Did such factors come into play when NZDF bosses learnt that Afghans captured on a January 2002 mission involving SAS personnel and US special forces had been allegedly mistreated after being transferred to the US detention centre at Kandahar airfield? It is difficult to believe they did not. The allegations of detainees being severely beaten there — in some cases, until they lost consciousness — were widely published in America, with details of how the bungled US-led night raid on the village of Hazar Qadam in Uruzgan province led to the death of 21 men as well as the detention of 27, none of whom were insurgents (Gall, 2002; Moore, 2002; Shanker, 2002; Smith, 2002); there were also serious questions raised later about the possibility of extra judicial executions or the denial of medical treatment to wounded Afghans (Human Rights Watch, 2004a, p. 39; Smith, 2002). No mention was made in US media reports of the New Zealand troopers’ role. Indeed, it seems likely that the NZDF pressured its US allies to suppress the fact of their involvement in the operation.8 Any publicity linking the SAS troopers to allegations of unsavoury and illegal conduct by their American colleagues would have undermined New Zealanders’ support for their country’s commitment to the “war on terror” in Afghanistan; the allegations of US brutality and mistreatment would have demanded a response from the New Zealand Government and military that would either have upset some New Zealanders by downplaying the issue or upset the Americans by expressing concern at the accusations about their troops’ behaviour.

7 Confidential

sources and officials with whom the writer has had communication regarding the US treatment of detainees. 8 It is a matter of record that Pentagon officials acknowledged the involvement in the Hazar Qadam operation of troops from another coalition nation but that they refused to reveal the country concerned. See Shanker (2005): “Special Operations soldiers from one other allied nation also participated, but the United States has declined to identify it”. The writer (Stephenson) understands this refusal was due to the NZDF asking for its involvement to be kept secret.

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Similarly, was a desire to keep quiet to avoid embarrassing America a factor when the NZDF learnt that Afghans detained by its SAS troopers on a mission in May 2002 had been mistreated by US forces at the Kandahar detention centre? Again, it is difficult to believe they did not. The early-morning raid on a village near the border of Kandahar and Helmand provinces was, like its January predecessor, a disaster. Operating on flawed intelligence, a large contingent made up of Canadian special forces and US airborne infantry, led by the New Zealand SAS, raided a series of compounds in Band-e-Timur. Two men aged around 70 were shot dead. There were also multiple accounts of a young girl drowning in a well as she tried to flee the raiders (Ware, 2002; Stephenson, 2011). For the 55 Afghan males detained in the raid, ranging in age from 12 to 70, a fate some considered worse than death was to follow: roughed up by US guards during their transfer to American custody at Kandahar airfield the men were later stripped naked inside the detention centre and paraded in front of US soldiers, including female personnel (Gopal, 2014, pp. 110– 111; Stephenson, 2011). One detainee, Abdul Wahid, has told this writer that “[w]hen they made us walk naked in front of all those Americans I was praying to God to let me die”, so great was his sense of shame (Stephenson, 2011).9 The detainees then had their hair, beards, moustaches and even their eyebrows shaved off. Some reported being dragged across gravel on their knees while fastened to a chain, being placed for extended periods in stress positions, being denied food, being kept awake for prolonged periods and being beaten by their guards, in some cases severely. One detainee reportedly was so badly beaten that he was partially crippled (Stephenson, 2011).10 The New Zealand SAS troopers were unhappy about the conduct of their US allies; they had noted the rough treatment of their prisoners during their transfer at the detention centre and soon heard details of the more serious abuse. Some SAS troopers even expressed misgivings about continuing to

9 See

also Gopal (2009, p. 111), who describes this treatment as “inspiring a humiliation that, in the Pashtun ethos, was difficult to even imagine”. 10These claims of mistreatment were made in interviews with multiple villagers from Bande-Timur who were detained in the raid and held at the detention centre at Kandahar airfield and supported by statements from NZDF and Afghan personnel. The reports of the detainee so badly beaten he was partially paralysed were also provided by Band-e-Timur villagers, and confirmed by a range of sources including Malalai Ishaqzai, a former Kandahar MP.

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work with US forces, and the issue of the Americans’ mistreatment of detainees was raised at a meeting of New Zealand, Danish, Norwegian, German and Canadian special forces that was called by the New Zealanders in the wake of the Band-e-Timur operation (Stephenson, 2011). One SAS trooper has told this writer it was clear at the time that they would have to “blow the whistle” on the Americans and deal with any fallout or “manage” the problem and hope it did not become public.11 The NZDF adopted the latter approach. Indeed, despite being aware of his troops’ misgivings, the SAS commander in Afghanistan, who had failed to ensure that his men observe one of the basic requirements of the Geneva Conventions — taking the names of those they had detained — then failed to check on the detainees the SAS had transferred, despite the evidence of their mistreatment (Stephenson, 2011).12 Whether deliberate or unintentional, this was a breach of international law: the Geneva Conventions prohibit signatory nations like New Zealand from transferring people they detain to other authorities where there is evidence those authorities are unwilling or unable to treat detainees well — evidence that the NZDF had access to after the abortive January 2002 operation at Hazar Qadam (to say nothing of other evidence that was shared by the SAS internally as well as with their non-US allies based on observations and experience on the ground).13 Where there is evidence that detainees have been mistreated following their transfer, as was clear following the May 2002 Band-e-Timur raid, the “detaining power” — in this case New Zealand — must ensure the situation is rectified. Failing that, it must demand the return of its detainees (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1949, 1960).14

11 Confidential SAS source who was deployed to Afghanistan in 2002 and had direct knowledge

of the Band-e-Timur raid and of New Zealand SAS concerns about the US treatment of detainees. Also, a special forces officer from a NATO country who was present at the meeting referred to in this paragraph has confirmed to this writer that SAS members expressed concern about the conduct of US personnel at the Kandahar detention centre, including their treatment of detainees. 12This information has also been confirmed to the writer by confidential sources. 13 Confidential sources in the New Zealand SAS and the Danish special forces who were based in Afghanistan in the first half of 2002. 14The NZDF has consistently said that it was applying the Geneva Conventions in its operations in Afghanistan, irrespective of any statements by the United States about the applicability of those Conventions.

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The available evidence suggests New Zealand did little to pursue the issue, although it is unclear how much the country’s political and military leaders were told at the time about the mistreatment of the Band-e-Timur detainees. Indeed, what could any of them have done? For those in the military who had lobbied hard to get the SAS involved in the Afghanistan conflict, withdrawing the troopers would have seemed unthinkable. To demand the return of the detainees from the Americans would have been impractical; New Zealand had no facilities in which to hold them. To protest in the strongest terms would have been a sensible course of action but would have risked alienating the Americans. As the commentator Russell Brown (2011) has written: No one should pretend that the SAS and its political masters weren’t in a terribly difficult position here: the lawlessness of both the Americans and, later, the Afghan security forces presented a problem that was in some ways intractable.

Moreover, the NZDF and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand politicians were not alone in looking the other way while the Bush Administration made a mockery of its legal obligations to treat detainees well. Military and civilian leaders in Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Germany and Norway, among others, were eager to support America without supporting — or being seen to support — her excesses.15 Perhaps, they all believed or hoped that incidents of heavy-handed and brutal US treatment of detainees in the early days of the “war on terror” were aberrations that would soon be corrected. If so, such sentiments proved to be misplaced. In April 2004, the Abu Ghraib scandal erupted. Later, New Zealand political and military leaders would claim that this was the first they knew of detainee abuse in the “war on terror” (Stephenson, 2009a, 2011).16 That claim is simply not credible.

15 Confidential sources (including military officers) in New Zealand, Denmark, Britain and the

United States. 16 See, for example, the comments by then-NZDF chief Lieutenant-General Jerry Mateparae in

Stephenson (2009a). Mateparae, told The Sunday Star-Times that “the rules about the handing over of prisoners had been tightened since the SAS first went to Afghanistan. At that time, ‘our understandings of how others would operate were quite different, and subsequently we’ve seen some untoward things in terms of Abu Ghraib. That wasn’t on the landscape [in 2002]”’. See also the comments of then-NZDF legal chief Brigadier Kevin Riordan and Phil Goff, who was foreign affairs minister 1999–2005 and defence minister 2005–2008, quoted in Stephenson (2011): “Kevin Riordan in 2009: ‘We weren’t getting any of that [information about prisoner mistreatment] in 2002. We knew at Abu Ghraib’. Phil Goff, foreign affairs minister in 2002, has also claimed the truth became clear only after Abu Ghraib”.

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Human Rights Watch has noted that [T]he only exceptional aspect of the abuse at Abu Ghraib may have been that it was photographed. Detainees in US custody in Afghanistan have testified that they experienced treatment similar to what happened in Abu Ghraib — from beatings to prolonged sleep and sensory deprivation to being held naked — as early as 2002. (Human Rights Watch, 2004b)

To be clear, America’s abuse of detainees in the “war on terror” did not begin at Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo Bay or even at the notorious Bagram detention centre north of Kabul. It had begun at the US detention centre at Kandahar airfield which, as mentioned earlier, was the very same airfield New Zealand SAS troopers were based at from December 2001. A Danish special forces officer who was stationed at Kandahar from early 2002 and discussed the conduct of US detention centre personnel with SAS troopers there told this writer that “[w]e knew the prisoners were not being treated the way they should be treated” (Stephenson, 2009a). Similar statements were made in a documentary by other members of the Danish special forces who were based at Kandahar airfield at the same time. “Trust me, the interrogations were no tea party”, said one. Another added: “We knew that bones were being broken in the detention center” (Guldbrandsen, 2006). An SAS trooper based at Kandahar in early 2002 has told this writer that while the SAS treated detainees well themselves, “[w]e sort of knew what would happen to the prisoners, Americans being Americans” (Stephenson, 2009a). After Abu Ghraib, it was impossible not to know. The same month that Abu Ghraib became a globally recognised name, MFAT had sent a cable to its embassies and a dozen government departments noting the considerable public interest in America’s treatment of detainees. That cable referred to a March 2004 Human Rights Watch report, Enduring Freedom: Abuses by US Forces in Afghanistan, which said The United States is maintaining a system of arrests and detention as part of its ongoing military and intelligence operations that violates international human rights law and international humanitarian law (the laws of war). (Human Rights Watch, 2004a, p. 1)

The report pointed out that “[n]ot a single person detained in Afghanistan since the start of US operations in 2001 has been afforded prisoner-of-war status or other legal status under the 1949 Geneva Conventions” (2004a, p. 4). Moreover, “[n]o one held by the United States since the start of

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hostilities to the present has been charged or tried for any crime…” (2004a, pp. 4–5): The United States continues to treat all detainees it has captured in Afghanistan as “unlawful combatants” it considers not entitled to the full protections of the Geneva Conventions or of human rights law [emphasis is from the original text]. (2004a, p. 5)

“Simply put,” the report continued, “the United States operates its detention facilities in Afghanistan in a climate of almost total impunity” (2004a, p. 5). Human Rights Watch went on to accuse the United States of “committing the same abuses it has rightly criticized elsewhere” (2004a, p. 6), and referred to “beatings, use of sleep deprivation, continuous shackling, and long-term isolation” (2004a, p. 10). That should have been enough to concern any country committed to human rights and international law which was operating in Afghanistan as a member of the US-led coalition. But there were other passages in the 60-page document that must have been of particular concern to the New Zealand Government and Defence Force: among them were multiple references to detainee abuse at the Kandahar detention centre in 2002, including the abuse in January 2002 of prisoners taken during the joint United States-New Zealand operation at Hazar Qadam (referred to in the report as Khas Uruzgon) (2004a, pp. 38–39); another mentioned “a raid involving U.S. Army and Special Forces troops” on the village of Band-e-Timur (2004a, pp. 19–20). New Zealand’s involvement in these raids and its transfer of detainees to US custody at Kandahar were not mentioned in this Human Rights Watch report; however, the overwhelming evidence of detainee abuse in Afghanistan and the publicity surrounding Abu Ghraib appear to have encouraged New Zealand to act, albeit belatedly, and from less-than-altruistic motives. MFAT officials approached their US counterparts to find out what had happened to the Band-e-Timur detainees that New Zealand SAS troopers had transferred to US custody in May 2002 — specifically, whether they were still being detained. The Americans asked for the detainees’ names so they could check on their status — names the SAS troopers had not taken and were therefore unable to provide (Stephenson, 2011). This matter was not effectively dealt with until August 2006 (2011). Yet evidence that the United States was willing to “take off the shackles” in its “war on terror” had been there for years. New Zealand’s intelligence officials had

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heard about it from the head of the CIA back in March 2002; New Zealand’s soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan had learnt about it in January and May the same year; the NZDF’s legal officers had expressed concerns about it from late 2001, even before New Zealand’s forces were deployed in support of US operations — but none of them, or any of the politicians and diplomats in New Zealand, had confronted effectively the issue of detainee mistreatment and torture. Now, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal and other revelations, it was not only impossible not to know about this, it was impossible not to act. In 2005, one of the NZDF’s top legal officers and his counterparts from Australia, Britain and Canada confronted the US Navy’s most senior civilian lawyer at a conference in Singapore. They told him that their countries’ cooperation with the United States “across the range of military, intelligence, and law enforcement activities in the war on terror would continue to decline” so long as Washington persisted in using torture. (Johnson, Mora and Schmidt, 2016)

The Americans were reportedly unmoved by this démarche,17 and the Labourled Government declined to send the SAS back to Afghanistan after 2005. The public rationale for this decision was that the SAS needed time to “regroup”; the real reason is likely to have been that they felt it would be indefensible to do so. The Labour Party leader Phil Goff, who had been Minister of Defence at the time, made the telling comment in a 2011 interview that “[w]e pulled [the SAS] out in 2005 not as a reflection on their integrity or professionalism but because they could be compromised by those they were working with” (Tumeke Blogspot, 2011). Here Goff is surely referring not only to US troops but to Afghanistan’s security forces; the NZDF knew all to well in 2005 that Afghan forces had also been implicated in the mistreatment and torture of prisoners, including those transferred by US forces and countries belonging to the US-led coalition (Porter, 2011). Either way, the New Zealand Labour-led Government kept the country’s SAS troopers out of Afghanistan until 2008, the rest of its term in office. However, in August 2009, New Zealand’s National-led Government announced that it was sending an SAS contingent back to Afghanistan (New Zealand Press Association, 2009); while the SAS troopers’ mission was initially 17 Confidential

with this issue.

source who served at a high level in the US military in 2005 and was involved

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kept secret, it was soon confirmed that they would be based in Kabul and would, among other tasks, be training police commandos from Afghanistan’s Crisis Response Unit, or CRU (Stephenson, 2009c). It was later revealed that this “mentoring” role had seen the SAS assist the CRU in detaining suspected insurgents who were then transferred to Afghan authorities (Stephenson, 2011). In August 2010, this writer reported that these authorities included Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), an organisation with a record for mistreating and torturing prisoners that was so bad the British High Court had banned its nation’s military from transferring prisoners to some NDS detention centres (Stephenson, 2010). What had the Defence Force learnt from its previous encounters with detainee abuse? The answer, in this writer’s view, is: not very much. Confronted by the August 2010 report, the New Zealand Government and Defence Force did not deny that the SAS was involved in operations where those detained were transferred to the NDS. Instead, they repeated the claim that SAS troopers were only “mentoring” their Afghan colleagues, claimed that the CRU commandos were leading the operations, and insisted that the Afghans — not the New Zealand SAS — were the “detaining authority”. Then-Defence Minister Wayne Mapp later told a parliamentary select committee that there had been no reports of torture following the transfer of suspects detained on joint missions. He added that the SAS had taken the names of those detained during SAS-CRU operations and passed them to the Red Cross, and that the Red Cross would have told New Zealand representatives if any detainees taken on joint operations had been subsequently mistreated (Stephenson, 2011). But that is not how the Red Cross works: it only reports abuse to the detaining authority. So, unless Afghan authorities were passing on Red Cross complaints that the Afghans were torturing prisoners that the SAS had helped capture, New Zealand officials would have had no way of knowing. In short, the “Red Cross defence” was misleading. It is likely that it was deliberately misleading, as the head of the Red Cross in Afghanistan made clear to the New Zealand Government in mid-2010 (Hager and Stephenson, 2017, p. 28). The “Red Cross defence” had also been misleading when Mapp’s predecessor, Labour Party Defence Minister Phil Goff, and a previous NZDF chief, Air Marshal Bruce Ferguson, had used it in similar circumstances when addressing concerns about the US treatment of detainees transferred by New Zealand forces (Stephenson, 2011).

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All this was reported in an extended article this writer published in May 2011, which outlined the story of the 2002 SAS-led raid on Band-e-Timur, with accounts from SAS troopers involved with the mission as well as from a number of the abused detainees. The article argued that the New Zealand Government and Defence Force had adopted an “eyes wide shut” approach to the misconduct of US personnel and suggested the SAS was still complicit in the mistreatment and torture of detainees through its involvement in detaining suspects who were being transferred to Afghan authorities with a record of torture — namely the NDS (Stephenson, 2011). The National-led Government and NZDF launched a sustained attack on the article’s central claims, which they strongly denied. Curiously, it emerged in subsequent legal action that while the NZDF was attacking the article in public its leaders were telling then-Defence Minister Mapp in private that this writer’s account of what had happened during and after the raid at Band-e-Timur was overwhelmingly correct.18 Questioned in the Parliament about the Band-e-Timur allegations, the minister eventually confirmed that “mistreatment” had occurred — the word “torture” was not mentioned — and added that the SAS had complained about it at the time. Given this confirmation, and the extensive and uncontested reporting in the article about the mistreatment and torture of the Band-e-Timur detainees, what would a good international citizen have done? After years of spin, obfuscation and denial, the New Zealand Government and Defence Force had acknowledged part of the truth (New Zealand Parliamentary record, 2011)19 ; it now had an opportunity to right the wrong. At a minimum, the New Zealand Government should have reached out to survivors of the raid and offered to discuss an apology and compensation for what was done to them. Yet the victims of Band-e-Timur were never contacted by the NZDF, were never offered compensation and were never given an apology. Instead, the New Zealand Government simply said the mistreating authority was the United States, and suggested — contrary to international law — that

18 Confidential

written briefing by the NZDF to then-Defence Minister Wayne Mapp in May 2011, obtained by the writer. 19 In response to a parliamentary question from the then-Green Party MP Keith Locke, thenDefence Minister Wayne Mapp stated: “It is certainly acknowledged that there was mistreatment in 2002…the mistreating authority was in fact the United States…”.

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New Zealand had no responsibility in the matter (New Zealand Parliamentary record, 2011).20 The allegation in the article that the New Zealand SAS had been involved, since its re-deployment to Kabul in 2009, in detaining and transferring people to Afghan authorities known to torture was dismissed out-of-hand. This was done in spite of evidence that, after mistakenly raiding a NATO contractor in Kabul and killing two of its guards in the process, the SAS had detained 15 people and handed them to the NDS — all without an Afghan police commando in sight (Field and Fox, 2010; Stephenson, 2011). This account had been essentially confirmed by Afghanistan’s interior ministry spokesman (Beatson, 2011a). But despite such inconvenient facts, the New Zealand Government and Defence Force continued to claim that the Afghan CRU commandos, not the SAS, were leading all joint operations, and that the CRU commandos, not the SAS, were invariably the “detaining authority” when people were arrested. The ongoing spin and denial did not impress journalist David Beatson, who wrote in August 2011 that New Zealand and Australian governments have been dodging behind the legal fiction of not being “detaining authorities” for the last 10 years. They are both involved in combat and security actions that result in captives being taken — but pretend they have no responsibility for what happens to them in American or Afghan detention. (Beatson, 2011b)

Put bluntly, the spin and denial had now reached embarrassing levels. On 16 August 2010, Defence Minister Mapp had been interviewed in response to this writer’s report the previous day that the SAS were involved with the CRU in detaining people who were then transferred Afghan authorities with a reputation for torture: he said it was not possible to rule out that people whom the SAS had been involved in detaining had been tortured by the NDS and said a recent British legal judgement confirming NDS torture of detainees 20 Hon Dr Wayne Mapp: It is certainly acknowledged that there was mistreatment in 2002…But

essentially that is the responsibility of the United States Government, which realises of course that the events that occurred back then would not meet appropriate standards. Keith Locke: Has the Government done anything to follow up on the welfare of the Afghan civilians who were mistreated and tortured on that occasion, in order to provide some form of compensation, for example, given that it was the SAS that handed them over to mistreatment at that point? Hon Dr Wayne Mapp: Well, the mistreating authority was in fact the United States; surely the responsibility must lie with the United States, not New Zealand.

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made for “sobering reading”. Yet he sounded an upbeat note by adding that the torture issue was of concern to the US-led coalition in Afghanistan and that the coalition was working with the Red Cross and the Afghan government to rectify the problem (Radio New Zealand, 2010). In April 2011, however, a US State Department report described what Beatson aptly summarised as “a continuing pattern of prisoner abuse in Afghanistan” (Beatson, 2011b). While noting efforts by the US-led coalition to address mistreatment and torture by Afghan authorities, the State Department’s findings were damning. Human rights organizations reported that local Ministry of Interior (MOI) and NDS detention center authorities tortured and abused detainees. Torture and abuse methods included…beating by stick, scorching bar, or iron bar; flogging by cable; battering by rod; electric shock; deprivation of sleep, water and food; abusive language; sexual humiliation; and rape. [Human Rights Watch] received many reports of torture and mistreatment during interrogations by the NDS…(US Department of State, 2011)

Despite this report (and others of a similar nature), then-Prime Minister John Key dismissed concerns about NDS mistreatment and torture when pressed on the matter the following month, claiming “that’s all been cleared up now and [the NDS] are now the place of choice to take detainees”. As Beatson observed: The history of detainee torture and abuse in the early years of the war is now largely undisputed, even by the “detaining authorities”. However, a new fiction has been created that the situation has improved since then. (Beatson, 2011b)

The absurdity of Key’s claim was reinforced in October 2011 when the UN released the results of an extensive investigation into detention facilities across Afghanistan. Among the findings of the almost year-long inquiry was compelling evidence that 125 detainees (46 percent) of the 273 detainees interviewed who had been in NDS detention experienced interrogation techniques at the hands of NDS officials that constituted torture, and that torture is practiced systematically in a number of NDS detention facilities throughout Afghanistan. (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 2011)

The list of torture techniques outlined in the UN investigation was disturbingly similar to those the State Department report had listed. Not only the UN but Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and even the US equivalent of New Zealand’s foreign affairs ministry were raising concerns about detainee abuse — yet

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the New Zealand Government and its Defence Force continued to minimise their role and responsibility in the matter and to downplay the extent of the problem. Not surprisingly, the issue of detainee mistreatment and torture in Afghanistan, and New Zealand’s potential complicity therein, received less attention after the SAS deployment ended in March 2012. But in March 2017, information was published that shed new light on the activities of New Zealand’s special forces: in the book Hit and Run: The New Zealand SAS in Afghanistan and the Meaning of Honour, this writer and his co-author Nicky Hager presented evidence that the SAS had led a raid in 2010 on the villages of Naik and Khak Khuday Dad in Baghlan province that resulted in 6 civilians being killed and 15 wounded. The insurgents the SAS and their Afghan and American colleagues were hunting were not there. But when one of them was located months later in Kabul, he was beaten by an SAS trooper while blindfolded and flexi-tied before being handed directly by the SAS to an NDS detention facility whose name was a by-word for torture. Not surprisingly, he was then tortured (including by electric shock). Hit and Run alleged that the NZDF, having learnt of this, did nothing about it, in clear contravention of the Convention Against Torture, among other international and domestic laws. Indeed, the NZDF received intelligence from the NDS that had been extracted from this insurgent under torture (Hager and Stephenson, 2017, pp. 88–89). The NZDF’s response was to vigorously defend its actions during the raid on Naik and Khak Khuday Dad. But it did not deny that the SAS, rather than the CRU, had led the raid. Indeed, it is clear from the evidence presented in Hit and Run that the SAS, not the CRU, would have been the “detaining authority” had the targeted insurgents been captured, and therefore would have been responsible for their treatment had they been transferred to Afghan authorities. Moreover, the NZDF was almost silent about the allegation that when one of the targeted insurgents was captured later he was beaten by an SAS trooper before being transferred to the NDS and tortured. There was no serious attempt to contest the claim. This writer would argue that the evidence points to an inescapable conclusion: that in its 2009–2012 deployment of the SAS to Afghanistan, as in previous deployments to that country, the NZDF had been passive at best on the issue of detainee abuse by its allies and had now been shown to be directly complicit in such abuse.

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Some might ask whether any of this really matters. Bad things happen in war, and it is not as if New Zealand forces have committed war crimes of the significance or on the scale seen in other conflicts. Some might even argue that looking the other way while US (and later Afghan) personnel were mistreating and torturing detainees was a price worth paying for closer military and political relations with America. As someone who has spoken to many of those Afghans whose lives were damaged by the actions of New Zealand troops or their allies in Afghanistan, this writer finds such arguments impossible to accept. How would New Zealanders feel if foreign military forces in their country treated them the way the villagers of Band-e-Timur were treated? How would they feel if an SAS member captured by the Taliban was blindfolded, flexi-tied and beaten, then transferred to torturers and tortured? Values matter. International law matters. Justice matters. As victims of the Band-e-Timur raid and of the raid on Naik and Khak Khuday Dad have asked: Is what was done to us right? Would New Zealanders accept such treatment as just?21 And surely that is the point: New Zealand supports international law on the basis that “right is might” as opposed to “might is right” (Denny and Freedland, 2003); New Zealanders surely expect their Government and Defence Force to ensure that people their forces detain or are involved in detaining are well treated — not only because this is right in itself but because they expect New Zealand forces to be treated well should they be captured. Even the most hardcore of hardcore realists — those who favour pragmatism over principle and can stomach international law violations provided they achieve results — will surely question what has been achieved in America’s “war on terror”. The fallout from the illegal 2003 invasion of Iraq has been clear for all to see. But what of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, which some legal scholars (e.g., Williamson, 2016) have argued was also illegal?22 What good has come from the countless night raids and detentions and the mistreatment and torture that have occurred since 9/11? Today, Afghanistan is a mess. The Ishaqzai tribe that was raided at Band-e-Timur in May 2002 is 21 Such

statements, and many of a similar nature, have been made to this writer in multiple interviews and conversations with victims of the Band-e-Timur raid and the raid on Naik and Khak Khuday Dad. 22 Williamson argues that the main ground for the use of force in Afghanistan in 2001, selfdefence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, was not met because each element of Article 51 was not satisfied by the United States and its allies.

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at the heart of the insurgency. After their release a week later, many of those who had been detained and mistreated moved from their village; most went to Pakistan and joined the insurgency to seek revenge for the mistreatment and humiliation they had suffered. So great was the fallout from the raid at Band-e-Timur that it arguably outweighs all the good things the NZDF did in Afghanistan in the following decade. The August 2010 raid on the villages of Naik and Khak Khuday Dad holds an identical lesson: many of the friends or relatives of the civilians who were killed and injured or had their homes destroyed soon swore allegiance to the Taliban; the insurgents who had been targeted but escaped that night redoubled their efforts to resist the foreign forces and the Afghan authorities those forces were supporting. The insurgent who was beaten by an SAS trooper and transferred to, and tortured by, the NDS eventually managed to escape. He is now a prominent Taliban leader in his province, embittered and motivated by the brutality he experienced (Hager and Stephenson, 2017, p. 94).23 It seems incontestable that New Zealand’s complicity in the mistreatment and torture of detainees, and in the night raids and civilian deaths that have alienated countless Afghans and helped to fuel the insurgency, has been a disaster in tactical and strategic as well as moral terms. Moreover, the damage has not been confined to Afghanistan. In concluding, it is worth briefly emphasising a related concern: the manner in which politicians from successive New Zealand governments as well as defence officials have responded in recent years when the detainee issue and other significant “war on terror”-related matters have been raised at home. Answers to parliamentary and select committee questions have at times been selective, evasive, perfunctory and occasionally false. Not only Defence Force and MFAT officials but government ministers have been cynical and restrictive in the way they have responded to Official Information Act requests for details on what New Zealand troops have been doing in the country’s name, frequently declining such requests on the basis that making that information available “would be likely to prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand” (New Zealand Legislation, 23The statements in this paragraph are based on multiple interviews by the writer with Afghan

villagers from Tala wa Barfak and interviews with senior Taliban insurgents from that district as well as on interviews with military and intelligence personnel from Afghanistan and New Zealand.

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1982). Media academic Donald Matheson has argued that the Afghanistan deployment, the longest in our history, “has been conducted under a cloak of secrecy and lack of scrutiny, accompanied at times by quite overt management of news media personnel” (Matheson, 2010). Ironically, New Zealanders sometimes learnt more about what their troops were doing from foreign governments or media than from their own (Stephenson, 2009; Beatson, 2010). As Matheson has argued, since New Zealand troops were first deployed to Afghanistan, government and defence officials have succeeded, for the most part, in setting the news agenda and have established the dominant narrative as focusing on the courage of New Zealand soldiers rather than considering the political, legal and moral implications of what became New Zealand’s longest-ever war. “The half-truths and omissions of the government have been given little scrutiny” (Matheson, 2010). A handful of journalists, most of them independent, have challenged or contradicted the official narrative, and they have frequently been obstructed (Beatson, 2010), marginalised and even intimidated (Editors of The Australian, 2013). Ensuring public support for the mission is of critical importance for any democratic nation engaged in a war. In simple terms, this means controlling the flow of information to the public, and, in pursuit of this goal, NZDF media managers have preferred to deal in Afghanistan with “embedded” correspondents. The columnist Chris Trotter has written that Nothing strikes fear into the NZDF like the news that an independent Kiwi journalist is in the field asking questions, interviewing locals, following leads and painstakingly assembling stories that owe nothing to, and may sharply contradict, the official narrative. Operating in regions where New Zealand forces are deployed, un-embedded war correspondents are considered little better than terrorists. (Trotter, 2015.)

“This”, argues Trotter, “is how New Zealand’s wars are brought back home”. Ultimately, “managing” the media means subverting the media. It’s about co-opting and corrupting the profession upon whose independence and integrity a healthy democracy depends [emphasis is from the original text.] (Trotter, 2015.)

Such anti-democratic attitudes cannot be allowed to take root. If questions about New Zealand’s role in the “war on terror” can be met by politicians and the military with dismissal, defiance or derision; if the NZDF can label “certain investigative journalists” as “a subversive threat” (Daly, 2013; Hager, 2013; The Australian, 2013a, 2013b); and if prime ministers can get away with

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misleading the public about New Zealand’s actions in Afghanistan (Newshub, 2011), then New Zealand’s reputation as a good international citizen — already diminished by its complicity in detainee mistreatment and torture — will be even more seriously compromised.

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Gall, C (11 February 2002). Released Afghans tell of beatings. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/11/world/a-nation-challengedcaptives-released-afghans-tell-of-beatings.html [29 June 2017]. Gopal, A (2014). No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan Eyes. New York: Henry Holt. Grey, S (2007). Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Rendition and Torture Program. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin. Guldbrandsen, C (Director). (2006). Den Hemmelige Krig. Denmark. Cosmo Film A/S. Hager, N (2011). Other People’s Wars: New Zealand in Afghanistan, Iraq and the War on Terror. Nelson: Potton & Burton. Hager, N (28 July 2013). US spy agencies eavesdrop on Kiwi. The Sunday Star-Times. http://www.stuff.co.nz / national / 8972743 / US-spy-agencies-eavesdrop-on-Kiwi [12 July 2017]. Hager, N and J Stephenson (2017). Hit and Run: The New Zealand SAS in Afghanistan and the Meaning of Honour. Nelson: Potton & Burton. Human Rights Watch (8 March 2004a). “Enduring freedom”: Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. Vol. 16, No. 3(C). https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/afghanistan 0304/afghanistan0304.pdf [29 June 2017]. Human Rights Watch (8 June 2004b). The road to Abu Ghraib. https://www.hrw. org/report/2004/06/08/road-abu-ghraib [29 June 2017]. Human Rights Watch (1 December 2015). No more excuses: A roadmap to justice for CIA torture. https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/01/no-more-excuses/ roadmap-justice-cia-torture [29 June 2017]. International Committee of the Red Cross (12 August 1949). Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 12: General Protection of Prisoners of War. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/375?OpenDocument [29 June 2017]. International Committee of the Red Cross (1960). Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Commentary of 1960. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action= openDocument&documentId=DACF84D8317ACEB5C12563CD00425AA8 [29 June 2017]. Johnson, DA, A Mora and A Schmidt (2016). The strategic cost of torture: How ‘enhanced interrogation’ hurt America. Foreign Policy (September/October). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/strategic-costs-torture [29 June 2017]. Matheson, D (2010). ‘Can’t talk now, mate’: New Zealand news media and the invisible Afghan war. In Afghanistan, War and the Media: Deadlines and Frontlines, RL Keeble and J Mair (eds.), pp. 276–288. Suffolk: Abramis. Mayer, J (14 February 2005). Outsourcing torture: The secret history of America’s ‘extraordinary rendition’ program. The New Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2005/02/14/outsourcing-torture [29 June 2017].

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Mayer, J (2008). The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned Into a War on American Ideals. New York: Doubleday. Mazzetti, M (9 December 2014). Panel faults C.I.A. over brutality and deceit in terrorism interrogations. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 12/10/world/senate-intelligence-committee-cia-torture-report.html?_r=0 [29 June 2017]. McCully, M (26 June 2015). Speech presented at Otago Foreign Policy School: “New Zealand and the World” in St. Margaret‘s College, Dunedin. Moore, M (11 February 2002). Villagers released by American troops say they were beaten, kept in ‘Cage’. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost. com/archive/politics/2002/02/11/villagers-released-by-american-troops-say-theywere-beaten-kept-in-cage/6cce7fd9-bcb6-4490-ad08-901ffddd1bc5/?utm_term =.00b79d8ffb27 [29 June 2017]. Newshub (20 September 2011). PM accused of sugar coating SAS role in Afghanistan. 3News. http://www.newshub.co.nz/nznews/pm-accused-of-sugarcoating-sas-role-in-afghanistan-2011092917 [29 June 2017]. New Zealand Legislation (1982). See Section 6A of the Official Information Act 1982. http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1982/0156/latest/whole.html#DLM6 5366 [29 June 2017]. New Zealand Parliamentary Record (3 May 2011). Keith Locke Hansard Debate. https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/document/49HansS_20 110503_00000362/locke-keith-questions-for-oral-answer-questions-to [29 June 2017]. New Zealand Press Association (13 March 2002). Government silent on FBI chief ’s visit. The Southland Times. New Zealand Press Association (10 August 2009). SAS to be deployed in Afghanistan. http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/2737700/SAS-to-be-deployed-in-Afgh anistan [29 June 2017]. NZ Herald Staff Reporters (13 March 2002). FBI chief in top-secret NZ talks. The New Zealand Herald. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_ id=1&objectid=1191386 [29 June 2017]. Porter, G (26 April 2011). Why U.S. and NATO Fed Detainees to Afghan Torture System. Inter Press Service. http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/04/why-us-and-natofed-detainees-to-afghan-torture-system/ [29 June 2017]. Priest, D (2 November 2005). CIA holds terror suspects in secret prisons. The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html [29 June 2017]. Radio New Zealand (16 August 2010). NZ role in Afghan prisoner transfers probed. Morning Report. http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/296/nz-rolein-afghan-prisoner-transfers-probed [29 June 2017]. Shanker, T (22 February 2002). U.S. says 16 killed in raids weren’t Taliban or Al Qaeda. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/22/world/na

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Wilkinson, T (26 November 2005). Europe in uproar over CIA operations. The Los Angeles Times. http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov/26/world/fg-flights26 [29 June 2017]. Williamson, M (2016). Terrorism, War and International Law: The Legality of the Use of Force Against Afghanistan in 2001. Oxford: Routledge. Young, A (20 January 2015). Prime Minister John Key: Isis fight ‘price of the club’. The New Zealand Herald. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm? c_id=1&objectid=11389202 [29 June 2017].

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CHAPTER 16 New Zealand, a Comprehensive Maritime Strategy, and the Promise of a New Atlantis Peter Cozens

An necsis, mea amici, quantilla prudentia oceanus, regatur?1 Anon

In 1974, the incoming Malaysian High Commissioner presented his credentials to the Government of New Zealand. After the customary greetings, the High Commissioner designate addressed the Governor General and said, “…New Zealand is set like a jewel far across the South Pacific Sea, unencumbered with borders, a population at peace with itself and enjoying the many benefits of wealth generated by maritime trade, and the sea itself…”. Such perceptions of New Zealand echo notions of the fabled city of Atlantis. The myth of Atlantis (Hammond and Scullard, 1970, p. 143) has fascinated the imagination and curiosity of people from antiquity to modern times. Inspired by the legend, the great English philosopher, Sir Francis Bacon wrote, The New Atlantis, published after his death in 1627, which expressed utopian ideas of an ideal state (Macropedia 1987, pp. 544–548). Plato recorded the details of Atlantis in the dialogues of Timaeus and Critias with Socrates and Hemocrates. There are two themes to the story: the physical characteristics of the city and its environs, and an idealised ethical and moral society. A latent aspect is the maritime nature of Atlantis and its dependence on the sea for 1 Don’t

you know my friends with how little wisdom the ocean is governed? 281

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wealth generation and security. This chapter explores the similarities of what can be deduced about the maritime aspects of the myth and legend of Atlantis and New Zealand’s contemporary and possible future circumstances in a foreign policy context. The genesis of the legend apparently stems from Solon, the great statesman and lawmaker of sixth century BCE, Athens (Hammond, 1987, pp. 162–165). At that time, Solon had proposed a number of controversial policies, which caused a great deal of consternation (Fine, 1983, pp. 202–209). Consequently, he took a 10-year leave of absence, and travelled the world. During his time in Egypt, Solon met with two influential priests at a temple in the Nile delta who told him about the fabled city and the empire of Atlantis far across the sea. The essential elements of the story were that the Atlantans enjoyed a superior lifestyle (even the domestic use of hot and cold water) and lived in great felicity with nature. The description of the island city includes detailed explanations about the palaces, temples and harbours as well as the fertile lands that produced ample harvests. One day, an almighty cataclysm sank Atlantis. Solon returned to Athens and, given his reputation as a lawmaker, related the details of his research in Egypt to a relative by the name of Dropides, who passed it on to his son Critias the elder, who later told it to his grandson, another Critias, an Athenian statesman of Plato’s time (Mavor, 1973, p. 12). Unfortunately Plato’s story is incomplete, apparently finishing mid-sentence, but nonetheless leaving a tantalising question of whether or not there is any substance to the myth of Atlantis. Was it the product of a colourful imagination or indeed a real place that did in fact exist?

Attributes of the Sea In his seminal work, Seapower: A Guide to the Twenty-First Century, Geoffrey Till informs the reader of what he terms the “four attributes of the sea”: • • • •

The sea as a resource; The sea as a medium for transportation; The sea as a medium of information and The sea as a medium for dominion (Till, 2013, p. 6).

One could add a fifth, namely, the sea as a new frontier for discovery. These attributes are all interconnected, and each has significant implications for foreign policy and trade. Seafaring and trade produce wealthy merchants whose

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values influence the nature of governance. According to Peter Padfield, a noted maritime historian, these values include “…dispersed power and open, consultative rule, since concentrated power and the arbitrary rule of closed cabals are unresponsive to the needs of trade and fatal to sound finance….” (Padfield, 1999, p. 3). These attributes have been constants in human affairs ever since the first seagoing venture. However, the world now has to continually adjust to the effects caused by new international maritime law, increased demand for maritime resources from burgeoning populations, climate and environmental concerns, the emergence of a new world order as the Vasco da Gama era comes to an end, the breathtaking invention and introduction of new technologies and the pervasive effects of globalisation. In New Zealand’s case, each of these issues individually as well as collectively has become more important strategically. How should New Zealand address these developments from a policy perspective? Indeed, what sort of seapower is there in the hands of government to utilise that power to the best effect?

Seapower Curiously, the term “seapower” is extremely difficult to define. It first came to light when used by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan in his book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783. The slipperiness of the term should be noted — are we referring to “seapower” or “Sea Power”? Conceptually, many maritime scholars agree that the sources and elements of “seapower” are composed, to varying degrees, of an amalgam of the following: Sources A Maritime People, i.e. being nautically aware; Resources, both intellectual and physical; Style of Government, democratic, totalitarian or whatever; Geography; proximity to the sea and other powers. Elements Ports and Bases to support trade and maritime activities; Merchant shipping and The Fighting Instrument or Navy.

Since the advent of cheap international travel facilitated by jet aircraft beginning in the 1960s, and the effects of container shipping services from the 1970s, the number of people directly associated with the waterfront has dramatically declined. The Union Steam Ship Company, once known as the Southern

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Octopus with a fleet of over 70 ships and with routes or lines in between and as far away as Calcutta and Canada, no longer exists (Waters, 1951). Firms of New Zealand shipping agents, such as the Scales Corporation, whose business was to ship New Zealand produce to offshore destinations, have been wound up (McLean, 2002). Shipping companies such as Richardsons of Napier whose ships were once a familiar sight on the coast are seen no more (McLean, 1989). Even though the New Zealand government ventured into owning its own shipping company, The Shipping Corporation of New Zealand, that too has been sold off (Farquhar, 1996). The effect has been to diminish awareness of the attribute of the sea as a medium for transportation within the New Zealand polity. Additionally, awareness of the vulnerability of the sea lines of communication, on which New Zealand’s prosperity depends, is compromised (Cozens, 2012, pp. 37–43). Although New Zealanders have a well-deserved reputation for sailing and yachting, this does not equate to the professional seafaring expertise necessary for operating and maintaining merchant shipping. The nation therefore relies on large shipping companies that trade internationally to move the imports and exports necessary for economic well-being and prosperity. Within the country, freight is now shifted by a huge fleet of powerful lorries (on a roading system not necessarily designed for heavy haulage trucks) rather than by locally owned and operated coastal shipping. Foreign companies use less than capable ships crewed by seafarers of dubious competence, as the grounding of the M.V. Rena on Astrolabe Reef in the Bay of Plenty on 5th October 2011 showed. Senior politicians despairingly questioned how a perfectly sound ship could hit a well-charted reef, but were then quick to explain that it was not their fault! The news media revealed that professional seafaring knowledge in New Zealand is limited and a far cry from what it was just 30 years or so ago (Cozens, 2012, p. 42). One may ask what caused the demise of this seafaring industry in such a relatively short period. First, part of the answer is to be found on the waterfront itself, with the advent of containerisation. The efficiencies of this type of cargo transfer, unlike the loading and unloading of freight into ships to and from dockside warehouses, ensured the dilution of the power of the large waterside union. Second, the backlash of business interests and primary producers against seamen’s unions, which frequently disrupted the ordered flow of either people or freight, ensured a law change that severely reduced their power.

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Seaborne freight rates are extremely low when compared to shifting the same commodity across land, whether locally or internationally. Because of the globalised nature of international shipping services and the competition to reduce rates, this helps to reduce the cost of living, creating upward pressure on inflation. Moreover, there appears to be an uncoordinated approach to port services in New Zealand. Many ports are presently geared to handle container ships, but New Zealand, either as a destination for cargoes or indeed as an exporter of large quantities of freight, simply does not make it economically viable for international ships on a round-the-world service to make calls to several of its ports during one voyage. Some of the vital aspects of the sources and elements of New Zealand’s seapower has been seriously eroded and continues to decline caused by the many changes in international shipping during the past 40 or 50 years. The public’s awareness of the importance of what happens at sea is limited. Wellestablished shipping companies, both local and international, that traded to New Zealand have disappeared, as has the professional seagoing expertise that made them profitable. The ancillary industries that once supported maritime endeavour are likewise much reduced. Arguably, the only constant in the classical analysis of seapower is the maritime geography of the group of islands known as New Zealand.

The Law of the Sea One of the first tasks for the newly created United Nations after the Second World War was to codify under the new International Law Commission a new Law of the Sea (Cozens, 2010, pp. 155–171). The most important of a series of three consultations is the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS III), which was negotiated between 1972 and 1981. It is from the intentions of this agreement that the New Zealand Parliament passed the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977 on 26th September 1977.2 The provisions of the Act came into force on 1st April 1978 but it was not until 19th July 1996 that New Zealand ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which is now usually termed “The Law of the Sea Convention” or LOSC for short. In 2Territorial

Sea, Contiguous Zone and the Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977, House of Representatives, 1977 No. 28.

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2008 and in response to a claim by the New Zealand government, the United Nations Commission for the Limits of the Continental Shelf agreed to an extended continental shelf. Most New Zealanders are aware of the large maritime estate of the nation, but not necessarily of how it is composed. Essentially, there are three distinct zones. The first is a 12 mile territorial sea — this zone used to be 3 miles, somewhat loosely described as being the range of a cannon shot (Kemp, 1988, p. 863). In other words, this is the area of control that could be exercised by force from the shore. Its importance is that from the perspective of jurisdiction that area is treated as if it is terra firma and subject to the same laws pertaining on land. The second area is the Exclusive Economic Zone, which is measured from a point on the shore at “Mean Low Water Springs” (MLWS), that is, that place on the shoreline where the tide recedes the furthest, and stretches in a perpendicular 200 nautical miles to the seaward. Within that zone, the coastal state may enjoy exclusive economic sovereign rights to everything in the water column, on the seafloor and everything beneath it. The water column is described as the total amount of water measured from the surface to the seafloor within the limits of the point at MLWS and the boundary of the 200 miles from it. The third area is known as the Claimable Continental Shelf. This zone is measured up to a further 150 nautical miles perpendicular from the limit of the 200 miles zone or, however, far the shelf may project within that 150 miles. The maritime estate of New Zealand is said to be the fourth largest in the world comprising of over four million square kilometres.

Oceans Policy The acquisition of such a huge maritime estate would, one would have thought, provoke a significant policy response from the New Zealand Government. Indeed, the New Zealand Prime Minister at the time said that it would be, “…the most important economic event in this country’s recent history, and will require from New Zealand a vast effort to exploit and administer the fourth largest area of sea in the world…” (Muldoon, 1976, p. 1581). The then Secretary of Defence reportedly said that New Zealand was woefully unprepared to administer the proposed zone because it lacked a basic knowledge of the minerals lying offshore. He said: “Some critics have described this as the biggest land grab in history — ten countries stand to get 30 percent of the land appropriated” (The Evening Post, 1976). He did say, however, that some

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sort of coordinating authority would be required to manage offshore activities under what is now increasingly referred to as Oceans Policy. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs wrote to his minister suggesting that on the initiative of the prime minister, a Cabinet Policy Committee would be created for the development of New Zealand’s offshore resources. Converting political rhetoric into substance, however, is another matter — no such committee was formed. Since the New Zealand prime minister’s remarks, and those of his senior advisers, there have been a number of initiatives to address the matter of how to “administer” this enormous maritime asset. The Australian government sought to do so by the introduction of a so-called Oceans Policy in 1998. This instrument or policy is neatly phrased as follows: To provide a strategic framework for the planning, management and sustainable development of Australia’s fisheries, shipping, tourism, petroleum, gas and seabed resources while ensuring the conservation of the marine environment. (Bateman, 2000, p. 7)

A similar or analogous statement could also be made for New Zealand. Aspirational initiatives of a comparable nature have also surfaced in the Pacific Islands. This statement from the Pacific Islands merits mention • You may have your eyes turned towards exploration of the galaxies; • But here, on the home planet, there are many secrets and wonders waiting to be revealed; • Mother Ocean has already given much; • What further gifts has she to offer the family of the Pacific and the world? • Join with us in discovering and protecting them.3 In 1999, a major conference was convened to address the potential of the New Zealand maritime estate and led to a report in 2001 called “Our Oceans: A Journey of Understanding ” The report contains seven brief sections addressing the following topics: a. b. c. d. e.

Introduction: Identifying Opportunity; Governance: Taking Responsibility; Ocean Resources: Apprehending the Potential; Stewardship: Balancing Exploitation and Protection; Economic Significance: Appraising the Resource;

3The

Honourable Laisenia Qarase, Prime Minister of Fiji, 2 February 2004.

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f. Knowledge and Technology: Building Understanding g. The Future: Prioritising Effort At the time, several knowledgeable authorities in New Zealand society suggested that the nation’s ocean estate could be worth billions in earnings (The Dominion Post, 2001) Nonetheless, it is clear that this priceless asset and its security have, as yet, to capture the imagination of many New Zealanders. At the conference, Sir Frank Holmes observed that Given how close all of us living here are to the sea, and given the size of our marine estate, it is perhaps surprising that the oceans and our maritime interests do not feature more prominently in our national life and in the policies of our governments.

In March 2005, onboard HMNZS RESOLUTION, the New Zealand Navy’s oceanographic research ship, two Ministers of the Crown launched the Oceans Survey 20/20 project. The intent of the programme was to gain information about the maritime estate to improve decision-making. The purpose of the project was to provide New Zealand with the knowledge of its ocean territory, defined primarily as the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, by • Demonstrating stewardship and the exercise of sovereign rights; • The intent to conserve, protect, manage and sustainably utilise the ocean resources therein and • Facilitate safe navigation and enjoyment of the oceans around New Zealand. This was a welcome initiative and received widespread support from those who had been advocating an Oceans Policy. However, notwithstanding these good intentions, the project foundered on two unforeseen navigational hurdles. The first concerned the maladroit political handling of the rights of M¯aori people to certain seabed and foreshore assets enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi. The resultant political upheaval led to the formation of the M¯aori Party and effectively consigned Oceans Policy to the “too hard” basket. The second navigational hurdle was that the business of managing the Oceans 20/20 Project was given to an association of 18 separate government departments under the direction of Land Information New Zealand. Even with the best will in the world, arrangements of this nature are problematic. To date, of the 56 separate projects identified in the heady days of the inception of the scheme only three

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have been completed.4 It appears that the scheme is essentially moribund, due in part to economies imposed by the John Key-led National Party Government. To make matters worse, and in the interests of economy, the New Zealand Ministry of Defence decommissioned HMNZS RESOLUTION in April 2012 because there were insufficient funds to maintain the programme (Cozens, 2014, pp. 41–48).5 The Key government has also sought to allay concerns about effects on the maritime environment by introducing the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012 which came into force on 1st July 2014. The essence of the legislation is to regulate resource extraction that might affect the marine environment. It is effectively a precautionary form of control to ensure minimum damage to the sea and seafloor as a consequence of mining operations. It is a welcome piece of legislation, but once again does not address Oceans Policy. If one were to accept that the main tenets of a comprehensive Oceans Policy would include shipping and transport services, fisheries and other resource extraction, scientific research, conservation and protection of the environment and human enjoyment of the sea, it follows that some form of integrated coordinating mechanism is required to manage the maritime estate. In this respect, rather than approach the whole matter from a bottom-up, one at a time policy, it seems logical to determine what outputs are required using a top-down approach. The parameters of an Oceans Policy, therefore, could be grouped under the following headings: 1. Sovereignty and Security a. Including the integrity of the environment 4 See

http://www.linz.govt.nz/about-linz/what-were-doing/projects/ocean-survey-2020/oceansurvey-2020-projects [23 June 2015]. 5 Other initiatives to tackle the tricky matter of Oceans Policy include a major study by Dr Michael Vincent McGinnis, who was the Director of the Ocean and Coastal Policy Center in the University of California and who spent two years at the Institute of Policy Studies in the School of Government at Victoria University of Wellington. (MV McGinnis, Oceans Governance: The New Zealand Dimension, Institute of Governance and Policy Studies, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, 2012.) This excellent study however focuses on the planning and management tools to support an integrative, ecosystem-based approach to the maritime environment of the New Zealand nautical estate; it could be fairly said to cover one of the five outcomes of a comprehensive Oceans Policy.

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2. Shipping a. International services b. Coastal shipping 3. Scientific Research a. b. c. d.

Hydrography and Oceanography Geophysics Ichthyic, zoological, botanic and biological Applied science

4. Resource use and extraction a. b. c. d. e.

Fisheries Aquaculture and fish ranching Pharmaceuticals Mining Energy generation

5. Enjoyment a. Messing about in, on and under the water b. Marine tourism

Sovereignty and Security The policy aspects of upholding sovereignty and maintaining security are usually articulated in New Zealand Defence White Papers. Unfortunately, these documents address only the hard-edged goals for the Armed Services. They tend to camouflage the often acrimonious competition between the services for a larger than logical share of available resources. The authors of these documents use language that often has to be read carefully in order to distinguish rhetoric from substance. This is not always a good way to do business. An example of a refreshing break from such nuances was when the Australian Chief of Army at a Royal Australian Naval Conference on Sea Power in Sydney in 2012 said …the foundation to Australia’s national security is a maritime strategy. That has been articulated and re-articulated in a series of Defence White Papers. But a maritime strategy is not a naval strategy, it is a joint, indeed an interagency, and perhaps coalition strategy and Army has an essential role to play if that strategy is to have relevance in the coming decades…. (Morrison, 2013, p. 7)

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He did not go on to explain what a maritime strategy would encompass and include. However, it is quite clear from this statement that the nautical dimensions of Australia’s geographic circumstances, and all that it entailed including maritime commerce, resource use, environmental protection, etc. determined Australia’s security posture. In this respect, one might suggest that strategy is informed by history, economics and geography, rather a simplistic military analysis of what lethal force may achieve. Furthermore, the Australian General apparently wants a force capable of performing operations not unlike that of a Marine Corps. He may have appreciated how the issue of national security dovetails with Oceans Policy in a domestic context, which therefore has implications for “seapower” and foreign policy overtones. Seapower or Sea Power may have different meanings, and it is important in terms of strategic reasoning and foreign policy to be quite clear about what it is that is intended. Given the enormous size of New Zealand’s maritime estate, is there any chance similar perspectives about the foundation of this country’s security could find favour? All of these topics contribute to the “seapower” of New Zealand and therefore have undeniable foreign policy credentials and implications.

Shipping and Ship Operating As previously described, most of this country’s imports and exports are carried to and from New Zealand by international around-the-world routed container carrying ships. These ships are not small — in order to produce competitive freight rates the trend is for larger ships that can carry up to 18,000 containers or more. Smaller ships will be required by importers and exporters alike to service New Zealand’s trade to regional hubs, but even these ships are quite large by New Zealand port standards. Consideration will have to be given to moving freight to only one or possibly two deep water ports in New Zealand by coastal shipping for onward conveyance by round-the-world services. The benefits of such a scheme include the redevelopment of coastal shipping services in New Zealand, thus reducing the need for expensive roading infrastructure and a huge fleet of trucks. The conveyance of cargo by sea is considerably cheaper. Arguably, some members of the public and business interests have poor opinions of organised labour, especially that associated with stevedoring and seafaring. There is no reason to return to those practices — airlines

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for example operate similar services, albeit with airliners, but largely without industrial acrimony. There is no reason why New Zealand could not have a highly professional, efficient and well-regarded merchant shipping service on her coast as well as to and from Australia and the Pacific Islands. Such a vision should be written with extended detail into the outcomes under the heading of a comprehensive Oceans Policy. The previous Labour Government appears to have recognised the need to redevelop the coastal shipping industry of New Zealand and made provision of $36 million for this. A policy announced by the Minister of Transport, the Honourable Annette King, in May 2008 stated The aim of Sea Change is for coastal shipping to make a major contribution in managing future freight growth. Total freight movements are expected to more than double by 2040, putting huge pressure on the transportation system. Shipping has a vital role to play in meeting this expected growth in freight movement, and is a key part of an integrated transport network

Unfortunately, and as part of the incoming National Government’s stewardship of the nation’s resources, the policy was axed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the largesse that was put aside for this important policy was used instead to support New Zealand’s bid for the America’s Cup.

Scientific Research There is no doubt that the 20/20 Project previously described to survey the maritime estate is indeed a vital element of the nation’s responsibilities under the provisions of UNCLOS III. Several agencies, including the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA), the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences (GNS) and the Cawthron Institute have numerous scientific projects to expand the frontiers of knowledge about New Zealand’s maritime circumstances. The MV TANGAROA, however, is the only research ship available to support these endeavours. The Navy’s hydrographic and oceanographic capabilities have been emasculated by the decommissioning of HMNZS RESOLUTION whose operating costs were in the region of a mere $5 million per annum. Perhaps, it is time to examine the proud record of the Royal Navy’s contribution to scientific knowledge.6 6 Several

expeditions and ships come to mind including Captain James Cook and the scientists on board HMS ENDEAVOUR and RESOLUTION Charles Darwin and HMS BEAGLE likewise made a contribution that reverberates to this day. Lesser known was the voyage of HMS

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Measuring the costs of acquiring raw oceanographic and hydrographic knowledge at sea by naval ships and then making decisions about whether or not they contribute to so-called “Defence” outputs is not necessarily in the best interests of New Zealand. The capture of any scientific knowledge by either a sea voyage or a dedicated research programme of a naval ship must surely be of use within an outcome of Oceans Policy. The sea and what goes on in the oceans cannot be territorialised. The taxonomy of seapower from merely a military standpoint is therefore facile. A much more enlightened and broader perspective about how seapower or Sea Power contributes to the national good, not driven by purely balance sheet accountancy or inter-departmental turf battles is required.

Resource Use and Extraction The extraction of hydrocarbons, particularly Maui gas from the Taranaki Bight has been of great benefit to New Zealand for many years. Notwithstanding the prognostications of some well-intentioned but possibly single issue-oriented critics there have been no catastrophes to date. Seabed mining for ironsands, gas hydrates, other hydrocarbons, gold, phosphates and other materials offer great rewards if properly regulated and engineered. The trick, of course, is not for wholesale exploitation causing unwanted damage to the natural environment, but a measured approach to build the capital base of the New Zealand economy. In other words, a strategic approach for specific ends is required. The quota management system for the management of commercial fisheries and other regulations for the management of recreational fishing are said to be amongst the best arrangements of their type in the world. Articles 60–62 of UNCLOS III suggest that any surplus stock has to be made available to other nations. Given the eagerness of the New Zealand fishing industry this is unlikely to happen. However, as demand for maritime resources increases CHALLENGER — one of National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) shuttles was named in honour of her contribution to science. Her remarkable voyage around the oceans of the world lasted almost four years. The scientific report compiled from her observations and empirical research eventually ran to 50 volumes and took 20 years to complete. Part of the research led to the understanding and knowledge of tectonic plate movement as well as laying the foundations for the discipline of Oceanography. The immense maritime territory of New Zealand is as yet an unknown cornucopia of knowledge — who knows what secrets there are yet to be discovered. Such knowledge has international or foreign policy implications.

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worldwide it is perhaps inevitable that some pressure may be placed on New Zealand to utilise her other maritime resources accordingly. This is a foreign policy issue requiring great prudence.

Enjoyment of the Maritime Environment New Zealanders have a well-deserved reputation for enjoying maritime recreational pursuits. Indeed the largest city of the nation is affectionately known as the City of Sails. Whether it be swimming, or being at the beach, diving or watching seabirds, New Zealanders love the water. It is a curious fact that more economic activity has been generated by whale-watching and swimming with the dolphins at Kaikoura than there ever was from commercial fishing in the area. Marine reserves bring great understanding of the marine environment that in turn create not only new forms of wealth generation, but also a wealth of understanding about the maritime environment itself.

What to Do? From the foregoing, it is evident that a great deal of informed consultation and leadership is required, as surmised by former New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon and other notable leaders to “exploit and administer” the fourth largest maritime estate in the world. Some specific actions could include, for example: • Develop a Vision for New Zealand as a Maritime Nation • Articulate an Oceans Policy — White Paper Perhaps? • Develop International Partnerships for governance, stewardship and intelligent resource use. • Institute significant government-led initiatives for investment in scientific, technological, engineering, social and cultural research about nautical and maritime issues. • Reorient New Zealand’s Naval outputs to reflect maritime circumstances, responsibilities and the likely ambitions of her people. All of these issues fall under the rubric of Foreign Policy but have inputs from many agencies of state as well as from deep recesses of interest and expertise throughout the whole of society. It will not be an easy task and will necessitate great wit and tenacious dedication from all echelons of this country’s population. The end result, however, should be well worth the effort.

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Conclusion The foregoing discussion briefly touches on the fact that Atlantis or the Minoans of Thera over three and a half thousand years ago, enjoyed many benefits conferred by being an island nation, far across the sea and with no land borders. Her citizens apparently enjoyed a superior lifestyle in harmony with nature and the maritime environment. The accumulation of wealth by seaborne trade underpinned by competent shipping services was a fundamental element of her prosperity and security. The arts and sciences flourished as evidenced by the excavations at Akrotiri on Thera itself. Clearly, an enlightened and sound knowledge of the precepts and use of seapower contributed to the serenity and good fortune of these people. Thus, it is that the islands of New Zealand might also aspire to become a New Atlantis far across the sea where her people might prosper and live in harmony with nature and the maritime environment. But that depends in large part on the outcomes of an informed, comprehensive Oceans Policy dovetailed with this country’s Foreign Policy. Notwithstanding Plato’s musings about a bygone Atlantis, he may well also have envisioned a new one, far across the sea in the southern hemisphere — I rest my case.

References Bateman, S (January–March 2000). Australia’s oceans policy and maritime community. Journal of the Australian Institute, 26, 7. Cozens, P (2010). Maritime security and oceans policy. In Maritime Security — International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand N Klein, J Mossop and DR Rothwell (eds.). London: Routledge. Cozens, P (2012). Some reflections on the security of sea lines of communication. Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs, 4(2), 37–43. Cozens, P (2014). Some reflections on recent oceans policy and oceans governance issues in New Zealand Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs, 6, 41–48. The Dominion Post (11 October 2001). Wellington. The Evening Post (31 May 1976). Wellington. Farquhar, I (1996). Jack of All Trades, Master of None: The Shipping Corporation of New Zealand, 1973–1989 Wellington: New Zealand Ship and Marine Society. Fine, JVA (1983). The Ancient Greeks — A Critical History. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Hammond, NGL (1987). A History of Greece to 322BC. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hammond, NGL and HH Scullard (eds.) (1970). The Oxford Classical Dictionary Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Kemp, P (ed.) (1988). The Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea, p. 863 Oxford: Oxford University Press. Macropedia (1987). The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 14, 15th Ed. London. Mavor, JW (1973). Voyage to Atlantis. London: Collins. McLean, G (1989). Richardsons of Napier. Wellington: New Zealand Ship and Marine Society. McLean, G (2002). Rocking the Boat? A History of the Scales Corporation Ltd. Christchurch: Hazard Press. Morrison, D (2013). Keynote — Address, Chief of Army, In The Naval Contribution to National Security and Prosperity, A Forbes (ed.), p. 7. Canberra: Seapower Centre, Royal Australian Navy. Waters, SD (1951). Union Line A Short History of the Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand Ltd., 1875—1951. Wellington: Union Steam Ship Company, Coulls Somerville Limited.

Further Reading Bradford, E (1971). Mediterranean — Portrait of a Sea. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Corbett, JS (2004). Principles of Maritime Strategy. New York: Dover Publications. Corfield, R (2005). The Silent Landscape. London: John Murray. Gilbert, GP (2008). Ancient Egyptian Seapower and the Origin of Maritime Forces. Canberra: Royal Australian Navy, Seapower Centre. Moscati, S (1973). The World of the Phoenicians. London: Cardinal. Muldoon, RD (12 August 1976). Prime Minister Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 405, p. 1581. Hansard-New Zealand. Norwich, JJ (2006). The Middle Sea — A History of the Mediterranean London: Vintage Books. Padfield, P (1999). Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind. London: John Murray. Pedley, JG (2002). Greek Art and Archaeology. London: Lawrence King Publishing. Strachan, H (2013). The Direction of War — Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Till, G (2013). Seapower — A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 3rd Ed. London: Routledge.

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CHAPTER 17 New Zealand Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Leading United Nations Security Council in July 2015 Murray McCully

I want to start by stating the glaringly obvious. In international relations, size matters. It is not the only thing, but in reality the bigger you are, and the more resources you have, the more options you have. New Zealand currently has a population of around 4.5 million. That is about 0.06 per cent of all the people in the world. Our economy makes up about 0.29 per cent of the world economy. And as you know, the majority of New Zealand’s trading markets are thousands of kilometres away. But thankfully for New Zealand, brute force and size are not the only tools countries can use in their dealings with each other. While at times it seems like the Wild West out there, there are some global rules and norms. As a small country, we benefit from a rules-based system, which extends to pretty much every sovereign state. And as an Asian-Pacific nation we benefit from the security, stability and prosperity of our region. Finally, as a global trading nation New Zealand benefits from robust international rules because these rules level the playing field for all countries. Over a decade ago, New Zealand began a campaign for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) because as a country we believe in global rules and institutions. The country’s campaign showed that it can work with the majority 299

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of the 193 states that make up the UN. On 1 January 2015, New Zealand joined the UNSC with the support of three quarters of the member countries in last year’s ballot. On 1 July 2015, New Zealand assumed the presidency of the Council for one month — a position it would also hold in the month of September 2016. Countries that supported New Zealand’s UNSC campaign, and New Zealanders themselves are entitled to ask: what can we expect to achieve during New Zealand’s time as the UNSC chair? First we need to understand that there is not unlimited flexibility to shape the Security Council agenda. Events, past and current dictate much of the Council’s workload. Historical events will play a part in shaping the Council’s agenda in July this year: the 20th anniversary of the massacre of 8000 in Srebrenica and the marking of the anniversary of the downing of MH17. New Zealand’s Presidency will also see the six monthly rollover of the Cyprus peacekeeping mandate — a 50-year-old dispute, which at last shows signs of moving to a positive resolution. New Zealand’s task in July will be to keep what is shaping up as a positive process clear of any obstructions and focusing the Council on supporting good leadership from the key parties. Events in today’s trouble spots: Burundi, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, South Sudan and the list goes on — will play a large role in shaping the Council’s daily agenda. New Zealand as chair will obviously have to respond to these matters, and sometimes with urgency. The New Zealand government has made clear its determination to see the Council become more transparent and more inclusive in the manner in which it deals with these challenges. Greater consultation with, and more listening to, key neighbours are qualities New Zealand particularly values and hopefully will be able to display in a way in which we effect the leadership of the Council. New Zealand has also made it clear that it intends to bring a sense of impatience to the Council. The Security Council has become both the architect and the victim of a culture of low expectations. We have all been conditioned to expect it to fail — and it almost always meets our expectations. A key element of this culture is the use, or the threat to use, the veto — a topic I shall return to later. When the UNSC is paralysed or is incapable of acting, the world pays a very high price. There is something wrong when we are spending over US$8 billion per year on peacekeeping and a further US$10.5

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billion on providing assistance to people affected by conflict but virtually nothing on the prevention of situations escalating into intractable conflict — in other words, using Chapter 6 tools for those who follow UN affairs.

Small Island Developing States New Zealand’s high-level event during its presidency of the UNSC will focus on the security challenges faced by small island developing states (SIDS). The reasons for this are straightforward. New Zealand is a Pacific nation. New Zealand’s closest neighbours and the majority of its development partners are Pacific Island nations. This has given New Zealand an understanding of what vulnerability and security — and insecurity — mean for small isolated states with limited resources. New Zealand’s long-standing commitment to helping its small island friends address these unique challenges was one of the reasons Wellington received such strong support from SIDS, in the Pacific and elsewhere, during the country’s campaign for a seat on the Council. It is clear, however, that this understanding is not broadly shared by the international community. Despite making up over 20 per cent of the UN membership, only three SIDS have ever served on the Security Council; none of these from the Pacific. And when others have sought to bring the concerns of SIDS to the Council, this has often met strong resistance, with some questioning whether this represents a legitimate topic for the Council at all. New Zealand will convene an Open Debate on the security challenges faced by SIDS — ranging from the theft of natural resources, particularly fisheries, to climate change and natural disasters, to transnational crime and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons — these are matters that often do not immediately come to the attention of the world’s major nations as key security challenges but for many SIDS they very much are, and if countries like New Zealand refuse to help in giving them a voice, who will? That is a new high-level priority during our chairing of the UNSC in July.

Middle East Peace Process New Zealand has not come on to the Council with a shopping list. But as a small player in the world, it has been clear that our governments think we can help simplify and streamline the way the Council works — and New Zealand is prepared to share its ideas. Of course, New Zealand needs to pick its targets

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and identify where it can contribute the most given the size of the country. You may ask why New Zealand has been especially focused on one of the world’s most intractable challenges — the Middle East Peace Process. While New Zealand is small and geographically remote, it is amongst a relatively small group of states that enjoys excellent relations with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Over recent months, New Zealand has been looking constantly for opportunities to find a way in which the UNSC can energise direct negotiations between the parties. Five decades is long enough for us to wait. Indeed, since the beginning of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, New Zealand has sought to approach this issue even-handedly. We have long called for a two-state solution. New Zealand has condemned acts of violence by both sides, as it did last year with respect to Gaza. And the New Zealand government wants the peace process energised back into life. New Zealand believes that if the UNSC fails to bring leadership to this issue, at this critical time, this would amount to an absolute abdication of its responsibilities. That is not to diminish in any way the importance of US leadership, or to undervalue the outstanding work that has been done by Secretary Kerry. US leadership in the Peace Process is indispensable — but is not sufficient by itself. Stronger international support needs to be marshalled behind this process, and the UNSC is the right place to start that process. Indeed, with its “primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security”, if the Security Council doesn’t have a role in the current circumstances, it’s hard to envisage when it might have a role. Let’s look at the specifics. I’ve recently returned from Jerusalem and Ramallah, where I discussed the peace process with Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel and President Abbas of the Palestinian Authority. New Zealand staunchly supports the existence of the State of Israel and supports its right to defend that existence in accordance with international law. New Zealand accepts that security arrangements will be fundamental to any final agreement. We also need to be realistic — nothing will happen in this space if Israel’s security concerns are not appropriately accommodated. Israelis look at rocket attacks from Gaza, and insecurity in the Golan Heights, for example, and ask who will underwrite their security situation in any permanent solution. They look across to the West Bank and ask whether the current high level of security cooperation can be maintained after a new government is installed following

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elections. Equally the Palestinians watch the continuation of settlement construction and wonder if it will be possible to construct a state at all out of what is left. There are solutions to these questions, and I believe they could be arrived at more quickly and easily than most would think. The impression I’ve gained from being on the ground — and I’ve been a reasonably regular visitor to the capitals in the region — was that the leaders aren’t that far apart. They know what any final deal looks like. When you start talking about 1967 boundaries possibly minus 5 or 6 or 7 per cent, they are basically talking about an outcome that is not very different. There are some very sensitive issues that will require compromise. The question is: how is it possible to get them back to the negotiating table? While it’s clearly for the parties themselves to reach final agreement, I believe that the time is rapidly approaching when the Security Council needs to use its moral and legal authority, and the practical tools at its disposal, as well as the good offices of the Secretary General, to shift the dynamics back to productive negotiations. New Zealand does not want to multilateralise a process that should involve direct negotiations between the two parties, but we do want to lend multilateral support to assist those parties to the table and to ensure that their negotiations succeed. Some of New Zealand’s close friends in the Security Council, notably France, are also active in this space, and I remain in close contact with Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius. I also recently visited Egypt, and it’s even clearer to me that they will be a key player in any negotiation both because of their weight in the neighbourhood and their own success in achieving peace with Israel, a very important set of learnings to be shared. When I was a young man, the accepted view was that peace between Egypt and Israel was just impossible. But with visionary leadership, the collective wisdom of the day was proved wrong in 1979 when a peace agreement between the two was signed at Camp David. This agreement included mutual recognition and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai. Peace has endured since then between the two. That alone should have been enough to show the world that anything is possible in this space. For 33 years now, New Zealand has supported that peace through its contributions to the Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) group in the Sinai. Something that is actually well acknowledged in that part of the world, but not so much in this country. As I say, the Egyptians have a key role in

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satisfying Israel’s security concerns, sharing a border with Gaza. The Egyptians also have an interest in the security situation in Gaza, having serious concerns over the actions of Hamas. The key question now is to pick the moment of opportunity to try and kick start the Peace Process. There will be many reasons why now is not the right time. As President Abbas said to me a few weeks ago in Ramallah: first we had to wait for the formation of the new Israeli Government. Now we have to wait for the Iran nuclear deal to go through. Then we’ll have to wait for the US primaries to take place. Then it’ll be the US elections. After that, what will be the excuse — elections in Zimbabwe? I took from this comment that there is a palpable sense of desperation emerging now on the side of the Palestinians. And I can understand why. Unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza is impossibly high. The economic situation is often challenging. And as the Foreign Minister commented to me: to visit his mother who lives in Nablus, which should be no more than an hour away by car from Ramallah, due to check points and detours, what should be a simple journey can last a whole day, if indeed it is even possible. The sense of frustration that exists is something that always runs a risk of a boil over. We cannot have another generation of young Palestinians grow up without any hope for improvement, and expect the outcome to be any different to the violence and strife we have witnessed over recent years. If it is possible to progress the Middle East Peace Process, we’ll be able to tackle so many challenges in the region more easily. As I told Prime Minister Netanyahu, while we fully understand Israel’s security concerns, the long-term security of Israel is ultimately undermined by a failure to resolve the Palestine issue. So this is an issue on which New Zealand is certainly engaged, and consulting closely with the parties to the dispute, as well as key stakeholders on the Council. New Zealand is doing this because we think the Security Council has a role to play. New Zealand’s term on the Council is a short two years, and we don’t want to die wondering if we could have made a difference. But the Peace Process represents the ultimate challenge in cracking what can sometimes appear like an international culture of low expectations.

Veto A significant driver of the culture of impotence in New York is the use, or threat to use, the veto. During our July Presidency, New Zealand will opt for

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quiet, constructive engagement with Security Council members on this topic. This is a subject that benefits little from public grandstanding. New Zealand will therefore be seeking to engage with permanent members because this is an issue that goes to the heart of the reputation and effectiveness of the UN. Whether the issue is Syria or the Middle East Peace Process, the veto’s impact today far exceeds what was originally envisaged in the UN Charter — to the huge detriment of the Security Council’s effectiveness and credibility. The original intent of the veto was to provide the large powers with an “out” in the case that their national interests were directly threatened. However, the use of the veto today has turned out to be a serious impediment to the Security Council’s ability to take on difficult issues. While the New Zealand government congratulates France on its initiative concerning the voluntary retirement of the veto in the case of mass atrocities, we’d like the idea to be taken further and to change the behaviour in all of the P5 group when it comes to the veto. As I have noted, this is the sort of area that requires deft diplomacy, patience and perseverance and I won’t go into the detail here, except to note that this is an issue that deeply concerns New Zealand and we intend to use our two years on the Council to start a discussion that is, in my view, long overdue. It’s going to be a busy July, both in Wellington and in New York. But hopefully both that large block of countries that supported us in our candidacy, and the New Zealand public, will see some notable progress in relation to the Security Council’s performance as a result of our presidency and our membership over the next two years.

Conclusion As I said at the outset, New Zealand is small in world terms. Ten years ago when New Zealand put itself forward as a candidate for the Security Council, we profiled ourselves as independent. It was said New Zealand would provide a voice for small states, aim to achieve practical results, and strive to make a positive impact on international peace and security. New Zealand campaigned on the basis this country could guarantee any UN member state that if any issue of importance came up on the Council’s agenda, such an issue will be given a fair hearing. The security issues facing the world are becoming more complex every year. This requires all states to play their part in looking for solutions. That means if multilateral institutions are

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broken, we need to help fix them. They are vitally important to New Zealand, and the world’s security — both globally and regionally. New Zealand’s term on the Council provides a chance to demonstrate that multilateralism can work. The UN is not perfect, but I would like to think that a little bit of pragmatism can go a long way in finding effective solutions.

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CHAPTER 18 Recalibration, Rapprochement and Resocialisation: US–New Zealand Relations and the Obama Administration’s “Pivot” to Asia Joe Burton

Introduction New Zealand’s security cooperation with the United States has strengthened in recent years. In fact, bilateral relations are closer than at any time since the Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) treaty split in 1984, when New Zealand’s policy of prohibiting the entry of nuclear-powered and armed ships into its territorial waters led to the suspension of America’s alliance commitment to New Zealand and a significant curtailing of security cooperation between the two countries. The most tangible evidence of the rejuvenated security partnership is contained in the Wellington and Washington declarations of 2010 and 2012, which established an enhanced strategic partnership between the two countries, including an increase in high-level political dialogues, joint military exercises in New Zealand and the United States, enhanced intelligence sharing and a range of new measures to cooperate on emerging security challenges, such as cybersecurity and maritime security. In purely symbolic terms, the HMS Canterbury’s entry into the US naval base at Pearl Harbour in October 2014 heralded a significant shift in the two countries’ outlook. As the then New Zealand Minister of Defence, Jonathan Coleman explained, “HMNZS Canterbury’s docking at Pearl Harbour marks the first time in thirty 307

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years since a New Zealand ship entered a US naval base for RIMPAC. It is a tangible sign of the warmth of our relationship with the US” (IANS, 2014). The purpose of this chapter is to explain this new found closeness. Why have New Zealand and the United States decided that the relationship should move forward on a much more positive footing? In the 30 years since the ANZUS split, what has changed that necessitates a closer security partnership? Was it indeed a conscious decision, or a natural and organic response to a changing security environment? Perhaps more importantly, what explains the apparent speed and momentum of the changes in the political and military relationship between the two countries, which have occurred quickly and to the surprise of many observers? In answering these questions, this chapter draws on three different theoretical approaches to international relations — realism, liberalism and constructivism — to advance three different (but complimentary) explanations for the rejuvenation of the United States–New Zealand relationship. First, at the level of the international system, or “structural” level of analysis, the strengthening of the relationship is founded, according to realists, on a changing international order. The international system is undergoing a transition from a fleeting period of uni-polarity after the Cold War to a multipolar world order in which there are simultaneous challenges to the US position in the global hierarchy and to international order more generally. This structural change has created incentives for a heightened US presence in the Asia-Pacific region and recalibrated and enhanced security relations with a host of countries in the region, including New Zealand. Second, liberalism emphasises that changes in domestic and democratic politics in both countries in the mid-2000s, and around 2007/2008 in particular, provided a window of opportunity for a rapprochement in the US–New Zealand relationship. The recognition within the George W. Bush administration of the need to build bridges with countries after the unilateralism of its first term (2001–2004), and the deteriorating security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, were catalysts for a more multilateral approach to the foreign policy. Perhaps more importantly, changes in the leadership of both countries in 2008, with President Obama and John Key elected to office in the same year, led to a situation where there were opportunities for rapprochement that were stronger than under the leaderships of George W. Bush and Helen Clark. These domestic and democratic factors worked in tandem with the structural changes to precipitate a new and closer security

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relationship. Third, from a constructivist perspective, the shared experience of working together in Afghanistan has created common bonds that both countries have been keen to maintain, if not strengthen, as that operation has scaled down. This process of “resocialisation” has helped to create new perceptions on either side of the partnership of the value in working together on shared challenges, particularly in combating transnational, identity-based security concerns.

Structural Determinants — The Return of Geopolitics? Realist scholars, and neo-realists in particular, have typically emphasised changes in the structure of the international system as being the driving force behind changes in patterns of alignment between states (Snyder, 1997; Waltz, 2000; Walt 1990 , 2009). Alliances are often formed because of changes in polarity, they often dissolve because of them and states will shape their foreign relations in accordance with the type of international system in which they find themselves — including bipolar, unipolar and multipolar international environments. As the Cold War ended, the bipolar system that had shaped international relations for the previous 40 years dissolved. Many observers heralded a new period of cooperation made possible by the end of geopolitics as the driving force in international relations. As we entered the mid to late 2000s, however, the resurgence in geopolitical considerations has been a noteworthy feature of international relations and has begun to affect the policymaking of both the United States and New Zealand in a way not experienced since the end of the Cold War. In particular, the relative decline of the United States, and the rise of a number of other power centres, most notably China, but also an apparently resurgent Russia, has recalibrated international relations. What evidence is there currently of structural change and its influence on foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region? The most discussed aspects of this structural change concern the rise of China as a political and military hegemon and the US “pivot” to Asia-Pacific. The United States has always been a Pacific power, but geopolitical changes in the Asia-Pacific region have given the region a heightened importance in overall US strategy since the mid2000s. The Obama administration made this recalibration of US priorities and resources a cornerstone of his first-term foreign policy, announcing in 2011 an enhanced US naval presence in the region, moving towards a 60–40 per cent split in naval resources between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. “The center

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of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests is shifting towards Asia”, the administration declared (Chen, 2013). The naval/strategic/military aspects of the “pivot” have captured the most attention and discussion, and also caused the most concern within China, with many viewing the US strategy in the region as an effort to contain China and restrict its naval power (Goldstein, 2014). In many ways, however, the US “pivot” is a continuation of US grand strategy, which has always been based on defending freedom of navigation in international waters and defending the ability of the United States to export its goods. To take a historical view, in World War I, the United States entered the conflict after its economic interest began to be threatened by the sinking of its merchant vessels by German U-boats. In World War II, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was intended to cripple the US navy, thereby shutting the US military out of the Pacific and giving the Japanese a freer hand in East Asia. Similarly, in the current context, and since the mid-2000s in particular, China’s military modernisation and new naval capabilities have created fears that the United States and other powers could be shut out of China’s maritime region, and have been interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as a strategy based on China increasing its control over the region. Most recently, the prominence of China’s A2AD (anti-access area-denial) strategy and the implementation of an Air Defence Identification Zone (AIDZ) in 2014 have caused much consternation among the United States and its Asia-Pacific allies, and at the time of writing China’s building on disputed islands is proceeding apace. Competition for economic resources and conflict stemming from that competition is a real possibility, particularly in respect of disputed island chains in the South and East China seas. These dynamics have given the United States a military/strategic justification for the pursuit of the “pivot” and have galvanised the United States and its allies and partners, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand. The most common interpretation of the overall change in US foreign policy is that it is intended to balance China’s increasing military strength in the region. It should be noted, however, that the US position may be considerably more nuanced than a case of simply military rebalancing. It also involves renewed economic, diplomatic and development-focused policies. Politically, the United States is much more active in regional organisations than it has been for some time, and US diplomats regularly visit the region to

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take part in dialogues and consultations with their counterparts. The “pivot” has also been based on a recognition that the region is economically vibrant and US economic recovery after the 2008 financial crash is tied to exports to Asian markets and the success of those markets in broader terms. As John Bruni (2013) argues: Washington is as dependent on the free movement of goods and services to China as Beijing is dependent on the free movement of its goods and services to the US. Neither party wants to risk a strategic impasse that could lead to war, the mere threat of which could profoundly disrupt trans-Pacific trade, the global economy and international power trajectories.

As part of the “pivot” or “rebalancing” as it is now referred to by US officials, the United States, under the Obama administration, pursued the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) as the economic arm of its Asia-Pacific strategy, which has been countered by efforts by China to create alternative economic institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Where does New Zealand fit into this new environment of geopolitical competition? And how supportive have political leaders been of the new US strategy? International Relations scholar Christopher Layne’s argument is worth mentioning here: in order to prevent Chinese regional hegemony, he argues, it is necessary for the United States to build up and consolidate the region’s security architecture — to have allies do more — in a strategy of “offshore balancing” (Layne and Schwarz, 2002). Engaging with countries in the Asia-Pacific (such as New Zealand) is a key part of this strategy. In this context, New Zealand policymakers have welcomed increased US attention, despite concerns over military disputes between the two rival hegemons. A common refrain among New Zealand’s political leaders is the importance of norms — particularly those governing freedom of navigation and freedom of the seas — and these are particularly important to New Zealand given the country’s isolated geographical position and its dependence on imports, including energy imports, through regional shipping channels. Enhanced naval cooperation and interoperability — the sort of thing that New Zealand’s recent participation in the US-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise off Hawaii is based on — is seen as vital to New Zealand’s interests. Moreover, New Zealand has expressed concern in the past about a lack of US engagement in the region and trends towards increased isolationism in US foreign policy circles. Any decline in US leadership in the Asia-Pacific region is widely seen as detrimental

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to New Zealand’s interests. Former Foreign Minister, Winston Peters (2013), for example, has said: The US seems to be entering a more diffident phase around its engagement with the world. Its domestic politics are fractured to say the least and seem unlikely to improve anytime soon. Its economy, while still strong by any international measure, faces deeply-rooted and difficult challenges. And the US is just coming out of two major wars in the Middle East. It seems to be entering a more inwards looking phase. Many wonder whether it means we might be witnessing the beginning of the end of what Madeleine Albright called the US’s “indispensable” role in the world — in other words the willingness to lead?

Potential US weakness in the region, in maritime affairs in particular, and a growing sense of vulnerability because of Chinese assertiveness and naval strategy on the New Zealand side, is pivotal to explaining the recent recalibration of US–New Zealand relations.

Domestic Determinants — Domestic/Democratic Politics and Alliance Rejuvenation While these systemic geopolitical changes are important, political changes within the two countries have also had an influence on the rejuvenation of the US and New Zealand Security partnership. In other words, at a theoretical level, structural change is important, and ignoring it would lead to a reductionist approach to changes in alignment, but changes within the United States and New Zealand can also be viewed as influential factors in allowing the relationship between the two countries to evolve. Realists scholars have tended to see states as “black boxes” and to underestimate the influence of actors and beneath the state level on alliances, including the role of political parties, civil society and individual leaders. Wallace Thies (2009), for example, argues that alliances exhibit “self-healing” tendencies and changing leadership in particular has historically had a positive impact on allowing intra-alliance disputes to be overcome. If one sees the US–New Zealand relationship in these terms, the question becomes: to what extent has the domestic level of analysis, including changes in political leadership, been important in removing barriers to cooperation that existed previously? Perhaps the most important domestic change that enabled a shift in the relationship with New Zealand was the end of the George W. Bush administration in the United States. This was an administration which had been widely viewed internationally and in New Zealand as showing a disregard for

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international law, adopting a unilateral approach to foreign policy, underestimating the importance of allies and basing US foreign policy on US military strength and unilateral use of force. To be fair to the administration, there was a marked shift during its second term (2004–2008) towards a more multilateral approach to foreign policy; this was founded on an increasingly dire security environment in both Iraq and Afghanistan (the period 2005–2007 were the bloodiest years of both conflicts), and a desire to build bridges with allies, in Europe in particular, who had been so opposed to the invasion of Iraq. If the Bush administration was going to try to make amends with France and Germany, and overcome the animosity that had been generated to their opposition to Iraq, then there was no reason that the United States would not look at its approach to New Zealand in the same light. On the New Zealand side, Helen Clark was a leader who historically was sceptical about New Zealand’s participation in a formal, collective-defence type alliance relationship with the United States. At an individual and personal level, this made the sort of rejuvenation we have seen in the US and New Zealand relationship after her leaving office more problematic. In 1993, she stated that the ANZUS alliance was “out of time” and had “no relevance to New Zealand’s security needs today” (quote by McCraw, 2005) and suggested that there was no interest in resuming the US–New Zealand defence relationship, even if the dispute over nuclear-powered and armed ships could be resolved. Under the administration of George W. Bush, an administration that had shown antipathy towards the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), and was placing missile defence at the heart of its strategic outlook before the attacks of 9/11, the domestic alignment of interests and values was not in place for a rapprochement between the two countries, at least during President Bush’s first term, and especially in the context of the Clark government’s opposition to Iraq. Despite this, the Clark government should be credited for laying some of the groundwork for the rapprochement between the two sides. New Zealand sent New Zealand Defence Force personnel to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq subsequent to the US invasion, and in 2005 participated by invitation of the United States to Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise off Singapore. New Zealand’s contribution of Special Forces and a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan province in Afghanistan was a highly valued contribution to the war on terror, as will be further discussed later in the chapter, and, as

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Helen Clark highlighted, “per capita, we’ve probably made on of the highest contributions to the military effort against terrorism”. In an address to the Oxford Union in 2007, towards the end of her period in office, Clark framed the US relationship in different terms, emphasising common bonds, and a desire to overcome the issues that had divided the two countries: For more than twenty years, it came to be characterised by the issues which divided us, which given the overall commonality of views and values, was inappropriate. A lot of work has been done by both of us now to strengthen the relationship without either resiling from strongly held views, and we have made a lot of progress.

At the end of their respective periods of office, there was significant movement in the positions of the two governments and a willingness to accommodate the other side. If it had not been for the events of 9/11 and the political tensions that followed, opportunities for rapprochement may have come earlier. Important here was New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark’s visit to Washington, DC in 2007, which helped pave the way for a renewed relationship. President Bush tacitly acknowledged that the United States no longer sought to change New Zealand’s position on nuclear ships, indicating in a closed-door session that the position was something the administration could live with. Winston Peters, New Zealand’s Foreign Minister between 2005 and 2008, also played an important role in pursuing a closer US–New Zealand relationship and his first international visit was to Washington to develop that relationship. In fact, Peters’ desire for a stronger US relationship may have exceeded many of his cabinet colleagues. A significant turning point in the US–New Zealand relationship stemmed from two new leaders coming into office in 2008–2009. Barack Obama’s election in the United States softened the US position on alliance politics and placed multilateralism much more firmly on the US agenda, while simultaneously the incoming John Key government shifted the New Zealand political balance in favour of a rejuvenated relationship with the United States. One of Obama’s most prominent and famous speeches was in Prague in the first few months of his presidency. He declared the US government’s desire to work towards a nuclear-free world — a lofty commitment but one that would have resonated with many in New Zealand’s political establishment. The Obama administration’s initial commitment to disarmament served to immunise domestic political opposition in New Zealand to a rejuvenated partnership. Obama was an American President many New Zealanders could get

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behind. Additionally, John Key’s National Party has traditionally been more supportive of bilateral security partnerships and a strong New Zealand–US relationship than Labour governments. This basic divide should not be overstated, but it has been a regular observation made about New Zealand party politics and their influence on New Zealand foreign policy (McCraw, 2008). As well as changes in leadership in New Zealand there has arguably been a broader trend in New Zealand society and public opinion, which places less emphasis on New Zealand’s anti-nuclear position as a core pillar of New Zealand foreign policy. That is not to say that New Zealanders are not committed to the policy, and polls still indicate strong support for retaining the long-held anti-nuclear position, but the nuclear issue, as far as New Zealand– US relations are concerned, has become “a rock in the road to be driven around” (Vaughan, 2012), rather than an insurmountable obstacle to cooperation. One poll in 2004 indicated that 53.4 per cent of New Zealanders were supportive of a National Party proposal to ease the ban on nuclear propelled ships, but keep in place the prohibition on warships, for example (Tunnah, 2004). As Terence O’Brien (2013) has noted, this waning influence has been reflected in New Zealand’s official foreign policy statements: …the decision to omit mention of non-nuclear policy from New Zealand’s current foreign policy narrative is notable. The 2012 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Annual Report makes no mention of it, nor does their Statement of Intent in its present and earlier versions, as the annual contract between the Ministry and its Minister.

Shifts in domestic politics, as well as changes in leadership, have thus had a marked impact on the rejuvenation of the US–New Zealand relationship.

Resocialisation, Identity and Transnational Security Challenges Alliances are not just based on the material power of state actors or the structure of the international system, or indeed on shifts in domestic politics and the emergence of new leaders. They are also founded on shared identity, social interaction over sustained periods of time in the security sphere and the rise of identity-based conflicts within the international system and the need for security cooperation to manage them. These types of conflicts have defined the post–Cold War era, and have played an equally important role in galvanising the US and New Zealand security partnership. In other words, as well as

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structural and domestic determinants, there are also social and identity factors involved in the rejuvenation of the New Zealand–US security relationship. First and foremost, while there was a degree of acrimony generated in the Bush White House by Helen Clark’s decision not to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, New Zealand’s commitment to participating in the mission in Afghanistan had a major impact on the rejuvenation of the US–New Zealand relationship and started a process of “resocialisation” after a long period of fairly minimal contact between US and New Zealand security personnel. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, in particular, acted as an agent of socialisation through which the United States and New Zealand have reinterpreted and redefined their mutual relationship and their national interests with respect to each other (Gheciu, 2005). New Zealand participated in the multilateral NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan under a United Nations (UN) mandate and focused its security efforts on the Bamyan province, where it provided a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). As part of a broad grouping of 49 countries in Afghanistan, New Zealand and US armed forces had sustained opportunity for interaction for over a decade. To date, Afghanistan has been New Zealand’s longest overseas military commitment and it has been highly valued by the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners. At NATO headquarters, officials talk warmly about the alliance’s partnership work with New Zealand and Australia — and have noted that the New Zealand and Australian commitment to ISAF has been greater than a number of NATO members (NATO, 2015). In 2012, the Key government signed a formal agreement in Brussels that made it a party to NATO’s Partners Across the Globe (PAG) arrangement. NATO officials have also talked prominently about how in future missions partners such as New Zealand and Australia should have a greater say in decision-making (or at least decision shaping), and there is broad support for this development in the alliance (NATO, 2015). The scale of New Zealand’s contribution to Afghanistan has been truly significant. Even now, after the end of ISAF and under Operation Resolute Support, New Zealand has personnel in the country (NATO, 2017). In 2011, the New Zealand contribution by number of troops per one million population was 54.9 — higher than many NATO members, including Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Hungary, Greece and Belgium — all ISAF contributors.

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Afghanistan was not just a numbers game, however. New Zealand’s significant contribution to ISAF may have sent a signal to the United States that New Zealand was a serious and effective security partner in a changing security environment. In the 1990s, and after the ANZUS split, New Zealand governments prioritised peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in its defence force development. This period also saw the disestablishment of New Zealand’s combat aircraft capability — two squadrons of Skyhawk fighter aircraft. After 9/11, and the Clark government’s major defence restructuring in 2001, the New Zealand military was better equipped to make a contribution to efforts to restore stability in Afghanistan, which after the initial invasion was focused through the PRT on human security and infrastructure development across Afghanistan. In this sense, there was a growing symmetry between how New Zealand’s defence outlook had changed and what the United States needed from New Zealand in a new security environment. In other words, scrapping the Skyhawks in May 2000 facilitated a process by which the Clark government sought to strengthen and modernise the capabilities of the New Zealand military and provide what was needed most by the American government as the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated: peacekeepers and peacebuilders. New Zealand’s 2014 commitment of 143 military personnel to train the Iraqi security forces as part of a US-led coalition to fight Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has apparently resolved a debate about Wellington’s possible retrenchment after Afghanistan and demonstrated to the United States that New Zealand remained a serious and helpful security partner. Finally, while the New Zealand government opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 on political and strategic grounds, there is still a broad recognition that terrorism constitutes a real and present danger, and one that New Zealand’s geographical isolation offers no protection against in the 21st century. While there has been some controversy over intelligence reforms based on the threats from transnational terrorist groups, there is also widespread recognition that terrorism affects New Zealand and that the New Zealand government should continue to be part of international coalitions to address that challenge. In addition, and not unrelated, while changes in the geopolitical conditions in the Asia-Pacific region have been influential in the rejuvenation of the relationship between the United States and New Zealand, there has also been a diversification of the security issues faced by both countries. These include globalised, transnational threats that have provided incentives

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for renewed partnership, including cybersecurity, the threat from transnational terrorism, the increasing impact of environmental change in the Asia-Pacific region and the need for military interoperability with the United States particularly in the maritime sphere because of an increased number of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions in the region. David Capie (2015) has argued that the US emphasis on making a contribution to these types of missions in Asia has been a tool to encourage allies and extend its military capabilities in the region. This appears to be the case with respect to New Zealand. These issue areas featured prominently in the Washington and Wellington Declarations and the 2010 and 2016 New Zealand Defence White Papers. Cybersecurity especially is seen as an area potentially ripe for cooperation with the United States. Cyber threats do not respect New Zealand’s geographical isolation, and New Zealand government networks have been subjected to sustained cyber intrusions from foreign powers. The growth of transnational security challenges in what is a smaller, more connected, globalised environment has thus helped to foster the convergence of New Zealand and US interests.

Conclusion The New Zealand–US bilateral relationship is in better shape than it has been for decades and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. While there are some concerns about China’s economic health, and Beijing’s ability to challenge the United States militarily should not be overstated, the rise of China as a global actor will continue, and the United States is likely to experience decline in a relative sense within the international system. The extent to which China is willing to use its power to shape the Asia-Pacific order will be a key variable in New Zealand’s relations with Beijing and the United States. In this respect, New Zealand is conducting its own balancing act — trying to reinvigorate its security relationship with the United States while simultaneously maintaining a good political and economic relationship with China. There has been some concern in the Asia-Pacific region that the “pivot” has stalled and that US commitments in Europe and the Middle East are affecting its ability to follow through on its Asian Grand Strategy. In this context, it is difficult for the United States to project power and influence simultaneously in multiple world regions. But this also remains a reason for the United States to continue to rely on strategic partnerships

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with countries such as New Zealand rather than to leave them to neglect and decay. The other reason that the New Zealand–US relationship is likely to continue to be a close one is the changing nature of the security environment. As this chapter has demonstrated, the post–Cold War shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world has been accompanied by a diversification and broadening of the security environment, to include, most prominently, identity-based conflicts, as well as a host of other emerging security challenges, such as cybersecurity, terrorism, maritime disputes and the effects of climate change. These security challenges will inevitably require multilateral solutions and the United States and New Zealand governments have firm incentives for cooperating because of that. As has been demonstrated in this discussion, domestic politics is important, and there remains, for the most part, a cross-party consensus within New Zealand for a close US security partnership. However, the situation is rather more uncertain after the election of Donald Trump to the US Presidency in November 2016. Since taking office, President Trump has reassured Asia-Pacific allies of the US commitment to their defence and has softened some of his inflammatory campaign rhetoric over China’s currency manipulation and US commitment to the One China policy. Yet some real concerns remain as Trump’s Asia-Pacific policy develops. The US withdrawal from the TPP leaves a hole in the economic side of the US rebalance to Asia and the announcement that the United States has ended its policy of strategic patience with North Korea has served to increase regional tensions over North Korea’s nuclear program. The impact of the Trump Presidency on the Asia-Pacific region will likely require a further reformulation of New Zealand’s relationship with Washington, and may, as Robert Ayson (2017) has argued, “push New Zealand closer to China’s orbit”. Finally, this chapter demonstrates the futility of focusing on just one theoretical approach when considering changes in patterns of alignment. It remains an ongoing blight on international relations scholarship that the discipline builds and maintains intellectual silos that diminish our understanding of international affairs. Hostility to realist-based explanations to international affairs, in particular, often borders on the vitriolic and there is tendency to view the framework as constituting a framework for action and policy — and the world it depicts as something that academics endorse — rather than one that

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seeks solely to explain what is happening in the world. Domestic politics cannot be separated from structural changes but can be an important variable in alliance formation and rejuvenation in and of themselves, as has been shown in this chapter. Similarly, excluding social and identity-based interactions within the international system and focusing just on material power considerations is detrimental to a rounded analysis. Arguably, an eclectic theoretical approach to the New Zealand–US relationship that draws on realism, liberalism and constructivism provides a more nuanced, balanced and insightful account of the positive turnaround in this relationship during the 21st century than is otherwise available.

References Ayson, R (24 January 2017). Robert Ayson: Trump will push New Zealand closer to China. The Dominion Post. http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/comment/ 88681282/robert-ayson-trump-will-push-new-zealand-closer-to-china [12 May 2017]. Bruni, J (22 February 2017). ANZUS and the Asia pivot: A fork in the road. Stratfor. https://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/anzus-and-asia-pivot-fork-road [12 May 2017]. Capie, D (2015). The United States and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in East Asia: Connecting coercive and non-coercive uses of military power. Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(3), 309–331. Chen, R (2013). A critical analysis of the U.S. “Pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific: How realistic is neo-realism? Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 12(3), 39–62. Clark, H (2 October 2007). Oxford Union — New Zealand’s Foreign Policy. Speech at the Oxford Union Debating Chamber. New Zealand Parliamentary Record. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/oxford-union-newzealand039s-foreign-policy [12 May 2017]. Gheciu, A (2005). Security institutions as agents of socialization? NATO and the “New Europe”. International Organization, 59(4), 973–1012. Goldstein, LJ (29 October 2014). How China sees America’s moves in Asia: Worse than containment. National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-chinasees-americas-moves-asia-worse-containment-11560 [12 May 2017]. IANS (27 June 2014). New Zealand Ship Enters Pearl Harbour After 30 Years. One India Portal. http://www.oneindia.com/international/new-zealand-ship-enterspearl-harbour-after-30-years-1473043.html [12 May 2017]. Layne, C and B Schwarz (January 2002). A new grand strategy. The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/01/a-new-grandstrategy/376471/ [12 May 2017].

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McCraw, D (2005). New Zealand Foreign Policy under the Clark Government: High tide of liberal internationalism. Pacific Affairs, 78(2), 217–235. McCraw, D (2008). New Zealand’s Defence Policy: From realism to idealism? Defense & Security Analysis, 24(1), 19–32. NATO (2015). Interviews with officials in the Public Diplomacy Division and Emerging Security Challenges division, NATO HQ. NATO Global Perceptions Project. https://www.ttu.ee/projects/nato-global-perceptions/about-us-15/ [June 2015]. NATO (2017). Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key facts and figures. http:// www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_2017-03RSM-Placemat.pdf [27 June 2017]. O’Brien, T (19 March 2013). Some Ingredients of New Zealand Foreign Policy. Wellington: Centre for Strategic. http://www.victoria.ac.nz/hppi/centres/strategic-stud ies/documents/Terence-OBrien-Paremata-Probus.pdf [12 May 2017]. Peters, W (8 November 2013). Big global challenges: How we are faring and what else we should be doing. Winston Peters Speech to Institute of International Affairs. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1311/S00139/winston-peters-speechto-institute-of-international-affairs.htm [12 May 2017]. Snyder, GH (1997). Alliance Politics. Cornell: Cornell University Press. Thies, W (2009). Why NATO Endures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tunnah, H (4 June 2004). Poll reveals support for easing nuclear ban. New Zealand Herald. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=357 0315 [12 May 2017]. Vaughan, B (August 2012). The United States and New Zealand: Perspectives on a Pacific Partnership. Fulbright New Zealand. http://www.fulbright.org.nz/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/axford2012_vaughn.pdf [12 May 2017]. Walt, SM (1990). The Origins of Alliances. Cornell: Cornell University Press. Walt SM (2009). Alliances in a unipolar world. World Politics, 61(1), 86–120. Waltz, KN (2000). NATO expansion: A realist’s view. Contemporary Security Policy, 21(2), 23–38.

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CHAPTER 19 Continuity and Change in New Zealand Defence Policymaking Peter Greener

In 1966, the National party Government released a Defence White Paper which was unequivocal about who the potential enemy was: “In the longer term (the 1970s and beyond) the greatest threat to New Zealand’s interests, and to our own security, comes from the growing power of an uncompromising China” (New Zealand Government, 1966, p. 8). Illustrating just how quickly the strategic environment can change the Third Labour Government, led by Norman Kirk, established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in December 1972. This chapter highlights the significant changes in New Zealand defence policy that have taken place over the last 50 years, and at the same time identifies those areas where there has been continuity of policy, regardless of the Government in power. It does so by exploring the following themes: the strategic environment and New Zealand’s areas of strategic interest, together with the place of alliances and defence relationships; then defence capability and the defence force in action, over the period from 1966 to 1999. It then moves on to examine the development of defence policy in the 21st century and the moves towards a largely bipartisan approach to defence planning.

The Strategic Environment and the Place of Alliances The Review of Defence Policy 1966, echoing the previous Review of 1961, noted that New Zealand’s area of primary strategic concern was South-East Asia and 323

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the South-West Pacific. It went on to note that two of the most dangerous conflicts in the world were those with Vietnam and Indonesia, each of which New Zealand was involved with, and noted with concern Britain’s intention to draw down her military presence in the Far East in the future. China’s role as the “exporter of revolution” throughout South-East Asia was seen as a threat to New Zealand’s interests. New Zealand and Australia’s wish for a formal defence alliance with the United States culminated in the Pacific Security (ANZUS) Treaty which was formally signed on 1 September 1951. Keen to expand its involvement in collective security, New Zealand became a signatory to the Manila Treaty (the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, referred to as SEATO) along with Britain, the United States, Australia, France, the Philippines, Pakistan and Thailand, on 8 September 1954. Both ANZUS and SEATO would lead New Zealand to a commitment in Vietnam. New Zealand Forces were heavily involved in South-East Asia in 1966, with forces in Malaysia and Singapore, South Vietnam and Thailand. Collective defence was central to New Zealand’s defence policy at this time. In deploying forces to these countries, New Zealand was responding to its responsibilities under the ANZAM agreement, the ANZUS Treaty and the SEATO. After World War II, the Australians had developed a Commonwealth defence contingency plan known as ANZAM —The Australian, New Zealand, Malayan area (McGibbon, 1991, pp.147–148). This was essentially a consultative agreement under which Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand would coordinate defence arrangements for the area, and would lead eventually to the commitment of New Zealand troops to conflict on two occasions. By the time of the next Review in 1972, the strategic situation had changed considerably. The threat of major hostilities that might involve New Zealand had reduced significantly, with this new White Paper noting that “We face no immediate direct military threat to our security” (New Zealand Government, 1972, p. 4). Nonetheless, it was noted now that in addition to New Zealand’s primary concern for the South-West Pacific and South-East Asia, a more general strategic interest was in the balance of power in the broader Pacific region. This would appear to have been driven by the growing rift between China and the Soviet Union, and China’s development of nuclear weapons, as well as the growing economic might of Japan.

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The Review also spoke of the need to take account of “the changes apparent in the last few years in the policies and attitudes of New Zealand’s major allies, the United States, Britain, and Australia” (New Zealand Government, 1972, p. 4). The United States and particularly Britain had reduced their presence in the region substantially, though it was noted that the United States continued to provide its “nuclear umbrella”. Whilst the importance of each of the treaties mentioned above in the 1966 Review was reiterated, along with the centrality of the United Nations, a new agreement had come into being, the Five Power Defence Arrangements entered into by Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and Singapore on November 1, 1971. Under these arrangements, New Zealand Forces were to remain stationed in Malaysia and Singapore for as long as they were welcome. Within weeks of the Review being released, the Third Labour Government came to power, intent on establishing a new sense of New Zealand independence. It did not initiate a new defence review, but acting on its election manifesto withdrew the final troops from Vietnam, and ended National Service. In proclaiming the Government’s new position, the Prime Minister, Norman Kirk, said New Zealand for its part intends to follow a more independent foreign policy…From now on when we have to deal with a new situation, we shall not say, what do the British think about it, what would the Americans want us to do? Our starting point will be, what do we think about it? (NZFAR, June 1973, p. 7, cited in McKinnon, 1993, p. 185)

At the same time, there was determined opposition to French nuclear testing in the Pacific with the French having begun atmospheric tests in French Polynesia in 1966. New Zealand and Australia had both protested to the International Court of Justice, and in 1973 they joined together to protest in the Pacific, with HMNZS Otago and the Australian tanker Supply sailing together to Mururoa. Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) frigates were to stay on station for five weeks in total. To reinforce its opposition to nuclear weapons, in 1975 the New Zealand Government promoted a resolution at the United Nations which called for the development of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific (Clark, 1988, p. 178). Without having delivered a Defence White Paper, the Third Labour Government had laid the groundwork which was to force major policy changes a decade hence.

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Later in 1975, the Third National Government came to power and some three years later released the Defence Review 1978. In the six years since the previous review, New Zealand’s strategic concerns had changed yet again. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union had eased; Britain had joined the European Union and withdrawn its forces from the Far East; the Vietnam War had ended; most of the islands in the South-West Pacific had gained independence and, perhaps most significantly, United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea had made it possible for the establishment of a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around New Zealand (New Zealand Government, 1978). With the drawdown of United States and British forces, New Zealand’s relationship with Australia became even more important. “Above all, the future of Australia, our closest neighbour and most important partner, will affect our own situation. In a strategic sense the two countries are one” (New Zealand Government, 1978, p. 14). Whilst acknowledging that no direct military threat to New Zealand was anticipated, the review noted that the global outlook was less predictable than it had ever been. The potential for competition by major powers, particularly China and the Soviet Union, for influence in the South Pacific was seen as a possible threat to New Zealand’s interests and the review went on to say that “In present circumstances New Zealand can best contribute to the strength of the western world by helping preserve peace and security in our own part of the world, particularly the South Pacific” (New Zealand Government, 1978, p. 11). With the conclusion in 1982 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the concentration on defence in the region was reinforced in the next White Paper, the Defence Review 1983. Yet global concerns remained (New Zealand Government, 1983, pp. 9–10). Given this context, the Review went on to emphasise that the ANZUS relationship with the United States, as well as with Australia, remained fundamental. However, after sweeping into power in the 1984 election with a landslide victory, the Labour government wrought fundamental changes to ANZUS. In January 1985, the United States requested that the USS Buchanan be allowed to visit New Zealand. As the vessel was capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the request was declined. Instead New Zealand asked that the United States substitute a Perry class frigate. The United States would not agree and the visit did not proceed. Whilst David Lange was to say, during the same month as the

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Buchanan crisis that, “our commitment to ANZUS and the broader Western community remains firm (Kennaway and Henderson, 1991, p. 68), the United States was to subsequently withdraw from most of its military and intelligence cooperation with New Zealand” (Clark, 1988, p. 179). In July 1985, the Greenpeace vessel here to protest French nuclear testing, the Rainbow Warrior, was sunk by the French whilst tied alongside in Auckland harbour, killing a crew member. There was no condemnation from any Western nation. The following year, after the ASEAN ministerial meeting, US Secretary of State George P. Shultz told David Lange that as a result of their Governments’ rift over nuclear policy, the United States no longer felt bound to come to New Zealand’s defence under the 35-year-old ANZUS treaty. “We part company as friends, but we part company, as far as the alliance is concerned” (Gwertzman, 1986). Notably, Labour’s policy was by and large commensurate with public opinion during the mid-980s (Hoadley, 2000, pp. 47–48) In 1986, the Fourth Labour Government released its Defence White Paper, the Defence of New Zealand, Review of Defence Policy 1987. Given the withdrawal of United States’ defence cooperation, New Zealand’s relationship with Australia took on even more importance. The Australian Government had made it clear that it would continue “active defence ties with New Zealand under the ANZUS alliance” (New Zealand Government, 1987, p. 14), and New Zealand would upgrade its contribution: New Zealand will itself be doing more to enhance the effectiveness of the role it can play in protecting the strategic interests we share with Australia and it must be recognised that this will inevitably involve additional expenditure on our part (New Zealand Government, 1987, p. 15)

To be clear, the Government had no intention of abrogating its defence responsibilities, the Review noted that, “New Zealand continues to adhere to the ANZUS Treaty as signed at San Francisco in 1951” (New Zealand Government, 1987, p. 18). However, New Zealand would meet the obligations of ANZUS and contribute to Western security by focusing on maintaining peace and security in “our own part of the world” (New Zealand Government, 1987, p. 19). Perhaps to reassure the public and respond to criticism that New Zealand was becoming isolationist, the Review emphasised that New Zealand enjoyed a “benign strategic environment” and was maintaining its capabilities to operate over its area of direct strategic concern, some 16 per cent of the globe (New Zealand Government, 1987, pp. 26–27).

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In 1990, the National Party came into power, and in 1991, a new White Paper, The Defence of New Zealand 1991, was published.The strategic situation had changed dramatically over the four years since the release of the previous White Paper. The Berlin Wall had come down; the Cold War had ended and Iraq had invaded Kuwait. Closer to home there had been coups in Fiji and conflict in New Caledonia and Bougainville. Perhaps overlooking the commitment by the Labour Government of four Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) aircraft and a (civilian) medical team to the Gulf in August 1990, the Prime Minister Jim Bolger in his Preface to the White Paper said Before the election we signalled that New Zealand’s defence policies were too isolationist in their thrust and that we would bring New Zealand back to its correct place in the international community. This statement of defence policy sets out my Government’s commitment to an intenationalist (sic) approach to New Zealand’s foreign and defence policies rather than a purely regional outlook (New Zealand Government, 1991, p. 5)

Acknowledging that with “the world’s widest moat” New Zealand did not face any direct security threat, the White Paper emphasised that it was New Zealand’s security interests, rather than any security needs, that drove New Zealand defence planning and that defence planning needed a wide focus. In reviewing the strategic outlook, whilst the White Paper saw a global war as less likely it did see the revival of regional conflicts, accurately anticipating what was to come. Within the White Paper, the importance of the relationship with Australia was stressed again and in May 1991 a new initiative, Closer Defence Relations (CDR) was announced, aimed at strengthening the relationship even further. New Zealand remained committed to collective security and also central to this was working “to re-establish an effective defence relationship with New Zealand’s other traditional partners, especially the United States and the United Kingdom” (New Zealand Government, 1991, p. 9). The new defence strategy was to be defined as self-reliance in partnership, with the provision of a credible minimum defence force. Nonetheless, it was acknowledged that there were some real fiscal challenges to achieve this, as the defence budget had been reduced some 20 per cent in real terms over the previous four-year period. Whilst noting critically that New Zealand had taken a peace dividend ahead of other countries, the White Paper ended with an expectation that, given the economic difficulties of the time, defence funding would fall further still.

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Achieving a credible defence force was to be the focus of the next White Paper, The Shape of New Zealand’s Defence (1997), with the majority of the document given over to capability development and force structure. As the Prime Minister, still Jim Bolger, was to note in his Foreword, “This document…sets out a future path of investment for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and outlines the expected evolution of our force structure in the next decade and beyond” (New Zealand Government, 1997, p. 5). By the time The Shape of New Zealand’s Defence was published, the strategic situation had changed considerably and the realists were once more in the ascendency. The Soviet Union had ceased to exist in December 1991. The break up of Yugoslavia that had begun with the declaration of Slovenian and Croatian independence in June 1991 was followed by wars in each country and subsequently war in Bosnia. Massacres were to take place across the region, and the West was almost unbelievably to witness once more the spectre of prisoners starving in concentration camps. In 1994, the world watched as 800,000 people were massacred in the Rwandan genocide. Within the SouthWest Pacific the conflict in Bougainville was looming large. The revival of regional conflicts anticipated by the 1991 White Paper had come to pass, and New Zealand was once more involved in conflicts in the northern hemisphere. Acknowledging this involvement and again a portent of things to come, the White Paper noted that in looking to future operations it was expected that in most cases New Zealand forces would operate as part of a multi-national force “whose capabilities are likely to be shaped by NATO standards” (New Zealand Government, 1991, p. 27).

Defence Capability and New Zealand’s Armed Forces in Action Operating alongside other nations’ forces has been a part of the heritage of New Zealand’s Armed Forces since the raising of armed militia to fight alongside British troops in the New Zealand Wars, a practice that was to continue well into the 20th century. In 1966, New Zealanders had once more been fighting alongside the British as the period of Confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia was coming to an end. Whilst initially reluctant to commit New Zealand troops because of the danger of souring relationships with Indonesia, it was New Zealand troops that were closest to the scene when Indonesian paratroopers took the conflict beyond Borneo to the Malay Peninsula in September 1964. The 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment was to be part

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of the 28th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Group from August 1964 until August 1966. In 1965 and 1966, New Zealand SAS detachments served once more with the British 22nd SAS Regiment (Clayton, 1990, p. 142). The RNZAF had deployed six Canberra bombers in September 1964 (Bentley and Conly, 1987, p. 145), and the RNZN crewed two British mine sweepers, which were commissioned into the RNZN for 16 months from April 1965 (MacGibbon, 1991, pp. 147–148). New Zealand’s defence forces held traditions that were inherently British, and new equipment for the armed forces continued to be procured from Britain until the mid-1960s. By the time of the 1966 Review that was already changing. Whilst the RNZAF were using Canberra bombers in Singapore, and forces were being supported by Bristol freighters, the Air Force was in the process of re-equipping with American made aircraft. The 1966 Review determined that combat, transport and maritime roles would be the focus of Air Force operations. Three Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules transport aircraft had arrived in 1965, and two more were planned. That same year helicopters were introduced for the first time, with two Wasp maritime helicopters for frigates, and the first six Bell Sioux training helicopters and six of what were to be 15 Bell Iroquois. Agreement had been made to purchase five new Lockheed Martin Orion maritime patrol aircraft which were to arrive in 1967. In June 1968, New Zealand ordered 14 McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawk aircraft for the attack role. At the same time as forces were deployed in Malaysia and Singapore, New Zealand forces were fighting in Vietnam. This was to be the first time that New Zealand forces had fought a war without British involvement. Initially, the request from the United States to send forces to the growing conflict was met less than enthusiastically. As early as 1961, the observation had been made in Wellington that, “The vital issue for Australia and New Zealand was not to restore stability in South Vietnam, but to preserve our position with the United States as our major ally” (Rabel, 1991, p. 44). Conscious of public opinion in an election year, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake’s Cabinet ultimately agreed to send a non-combatant field engineer team. Facing growing pressure from President Lyndon Johnson, Cabinet approved the commitment of 161 Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery. Initially under American command, the Battery joined the first Australian task force in June 1966 (Clayton, 1990, p. 141). At first, the battery was equipped with 105mm L5 pack howitzers but these were

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replaced in 1967 with 105mm M2A2 howitzers which could sustain fire for longer periods. (Today 16 Field Regiment still operates 105mm guns.) In May 1967, a small rifle company from the 1st Battalion was added, complemented by a second in December 1967, both companies forming part of an ANZAC battalion. New Zealand troops were to remain involved in a combat role until December 1971, supported throughout that time by aircraft of RNZAF No. 40 Squadron. After the withdrawal from Vietnam of the first and second Army Training Teams after the election of the Labour Government in December 1972, many New Zealanders would serve overseas on missions as diverse as mine clearing in Cambodia and Laos to peacekeeping and peace support in Somalia and the Middle East. However, New Zealand forces were not to be substantially involved in conflict again in numbers until the Bosnian war in the mid-1990s. Conflict of a different kind was to take place during the 1980s. The 1978 Defence Review had previously noted that the cost of modern combat vessels was making a decision on the future replacement of the frigates increasingly difficult. In fact, subsequently “extensive enquiries to find a replacement for HMNZS Otago made it clear that the cost of a new frigate had gone beyond what New Zealand could afford”. In exploring possibilities for replacements, the 1983 Review commented that the “frigate force of three combat capable ships as envisaged in the 1978 Review, will be phased out as the combat core of the RNZN as — and if — submarines are introduced ” (New Zealand Government, 1983, p. 23, author’s emphasis). Submarines were subsequently dismissed as an option, and a new Government came to power. With the advent of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy and the rift with the United States, it was clear that New Zealand needed its defence relationship with Australia. As previously noted, the Fourth Labour Government had acknowledged that helping protect the strategic interests shared with Australia would incur additional expense. A large percentage of the public was not prepared for just that would mean. The commitment to maintaining a bluewater navy and to ongoing cooperation with Australia, that was to be spelt out in the 1987 Defence Review, ensured that the New Zealand Government took seriously the opportunity to purchase ships jointly with the Australians. A Defence Review Officials Committee had been exploring the possibilities for surface combat ship replacements throughout 1986, and published their report in November of that year. They noted that, as a consequence of ongoing

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close liaison between the navies of each country, it was found that the desired ship characteristics for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) new vessels and the RNZN replacement combat ships were virtually identical. The signing of a memorandum of understanding between Australia and New Zealand in March 1987 was to be followed over the next two years by raging debates, both in Parliament and publicly. Ultimately, the Labour government followed through with the promise of upgrading its vessels (Lange, 1990, p. 167). In September 1989, the new Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, announced that the Government had agreed in principle to buy two ANZAC ships, with the Australians to purchase eight. The cost of the total project for the two ships was to be $942 million. There was an option to buy a further two ANZACs, but that was not to happen. The first ship to be built for New Zealand was HMNZS Te Kaha and the first steel for the vessel was cut in February 1993, with the first steel cut for HMNZS Te Mana two years later. In 1992, New Zealand was elected to the UN Security Council. Amongst the reasons cited for New Zealand’s success in the election were the nation’s consistent support for collective security; its significant contribution to peacekeeping operations; and its independent voice — characteristics which had been developed over more than half a century (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995, p. 4). The significant contribution to peacekeeping was about to grow during New Zealand’s term on the Council. In September 1994, New Zealand sent 250 troops to the former Yugoslavia (Greener, 2007). Whilst the deployment of three contingents of troops to Bosnia was an enormous public relations success, both politically and for the NZDF, there was clearly some domestic disagreement and a large amount of risk involved. From 1969 onwards, the Army had been re-equipped with the first of what were to be 77 new M113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs). By the time they were committed to Bosnia, the M113s were over 25 years old. The 1997 White Paper acknowledged the changing demands of peacekeeping, noting that increasingly missions were being launched whilst there were still ongoing hostilities. Peace enforcement missions were seen as increasingly dangerous, often of higher intensity and requiring suitably equipped combat-capable forces. Recognising the dangers involved, in the White Paper, the Government committed to rectifying those capabilities that were now seen as essential to robust peace support operations, and that meant re-equipping the Army. In March 1998, Cabinet approved in principle the purchase of

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armoured vehicles. That same year though, two more significant decisions had to be made: whether to purchase a third ANZAC frigate, and the opportunity lease of 28 F-16 strike aircraft. A year beyond the original deadline for making a decision on the purchase of further ANZAC frigates, Cabinet was asked to give authorisation for the purchase of a second-hand ANZAC frigate. In papers accompanying the memorandum to Cabinet the Minister of Defence Max Bradford, who had negotiated for the purchase, made a strong case for the purchase of a third ANZAC frigate, and highlighted that this would be the last opportunity to buy a third ship (Office of the Minister of Defence, 1998). However, along with this request, was another of the same date, asking for agreement in principle that the lease of 28 F-16s from the United States be negotiated. In November 1998, Jenny Shipley was elected Prime Minister and led a minority Government. In the lead-up to the decision on whether or not to purchase a third ANZAC frigate, Shipley knew the importance of seeking consensus and maintaining political support from a varied group of MPs. The decision on the frigate had to be made that month and, fighting for political survival, the Cabinet rejected the deal and a decision for a replacement vessel was delayed until 2002. Perhaps surprisingly in the circumstances on 1 December 1998, having lost the battle over the third frigate, the Minister was able to announce that approval had been given to pursue the negotiation of the lease of the F-16s. What this meant in fact was that the Army had received no significant upgrades by the time it was called upon for its next major operation, this time much closer to home than Bosnia. In 1999, New Zealand personnel were deployed to Dili, East Timor, to help quell violent attacks by pro-Indonesian militias following a referendum on independence (Taonui, 1999). They were armed with ageing M113s. By the beginning of the following year, up to 40 per cent of the New Zealand Army APCs in East Timor were unserviceable (Reid, 2000). Following the decision to deploy New Zealand troops to East Timor, Labour was returned to power in the November 1999 election.

New Zealand Defence Policy for the 21st Century By the time the Labour-led Government returned to power in 1999, defence funding was at a critical level, under 1 per cent of GDP. In 1997, in an unusual move, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, chaired by ACT

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MP (and former National Party MP) Derek Quigley, had begun its Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000. The Committee’s Interim Report was published in November 1998, with the final report being published in August 1999. One of the major observations of this report was that, given the constraints on finance, air combat capabilities were seen as being of lesser utility than other NZDF force elements. Helen Clark, the leader of the Labour Party, was strongly supportive of the report’s findings, and indicated that a Labour Government would adopt its recommendations. When the Labour-led Coalition came to power, it was on the clear basis that they would not support the F-16 purchase, and that the Government was intent on following an independent policy on defence purchases. Drawing on the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 report, and not undertaking a Government-led Defence White Paper, this new approach was to be spelt out in the Government’s new policy statement, the Defence Policy Framework, in June 2000. When weighing up the options available for future defence expenditure the Labour-led Government, which had already chosen to cancel the propose lease of the F-16s, redefined New Zealand’s role in the world with its requirement “for well-equipped, combat trained land forces which are also able to act as effective peacekeepers, supported by the Navy and Air Force” (p. 7). The main theme of the Framework was depth rather than breadth. Having made much of defence decision-making as an election issue, it was time for the Labour-led Government to demonstrate its commitment. At a meeting of the Cabinet on 21 August 2000, it approved in principle the purchase of 105 LAV III light armoured vehicles, at a cost of $612 million. The Government then set in motion a number of capability reviews, and on 8 May 2001 released its Government Defence Statement, A Modern Sustainable Defence Force Matched to New Zealand’s Needs (New Zealand Government, 2001). In this statement the Government confirmed its decision to disband the air combat force, to cancel the projected upgrade of the Orions’ surveillance systems, and to sell the Navy’s sealift ship, HMNZS Charles Upham. The statement did promise a modernised Army, a practical Navy fleet and a refocused Air Force. How this was to be done was to be spelt out in some detail with the release of a Defence Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP) in June 2002 (New Zealand Government, 2002). The LTDP sought to identify and prioritise major defence acquisition projects over a 10-year period, and ensure that spending for those projects provided the best value for money. The 2002 plan was to be the first of five

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such plans over the period to 2008. During this time, decisions were made on the purchase of new ships for the Navy with Project Protector. This provided for the acquisition of seven ships at a project budget of $500 million.1 For the Army, the LAV III light armoured vehicles were all delivered by the end of 2004, and 320 Pinzguaer Light Operational Vehicles had been delivered by 2006. Medium-range anti-armour weapons were purchased in 2006, as was an upgrade for very low-level air defence. For the Air Force, two new Boeing 757 strategic lift aircraft were purchased in 2005; decisions were made to replace the RNZAF’s helicopter capability, including a commitment to spending $771million to purchase eight new NH90s; a sophisticated systems upgrade for the P-3K Orion began in 2005; and the five Hercules C-130 aircraft began a life-extension project.

Deployments under the Fifth Labour Government Before any of the new capability was delivered, developments of a quite different sort were to have a major impact on New Zealand’s strategic relationships and defence outlook. The Defence Policy Framework had spelt out that there would be “shift towards a range of military capabilities which are sustainable, safe and effective in combat and in peacekeeping, and structured for maximum operational and political impact” (p. 6. author’s emphasis). Shortly after, the opportunity to make an operational and political impact arose, following the terror attacks in New York on 9 September 2001. Within days of the attack, the Government had made an offer to the United States to send the SAS to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The SAS were deployed on four occasions between 2001 and 2012, whilst there were to be 21 rotations of NZDF personnel to the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan Province between 2003 and 2013. More than 3500 NZDF personnel were deployed to Afghanistan over this period, and NZDF personnel remain in mentoring roles at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy.2 This commitment by the Clark Government, followed through by the National-led 1These

ships were the HMNZS Canterbury, a multi-role vessel (MRV) with space for up to 250 troops and two helicopters; two 85 meter offshore patrol vessels, HMNZS Otago and HMNZS Wellington, also with helicopter carrying capacity, and four 55 meter inshore patrol vessels, Hawea, Rotoiti, Taupo and Pukaki. 2 Over 50 New Zealanders were awarded US medals for heroism or meritorious service over this period.

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Government which came to power in 2008, was to significantly change the nature of New Zealand’s relationship with the United States. This period was in fact to be one of the busiest for the NZDF in modern history. The NZDF had for over 50 years been involved in peacekeeping operations around the world. In the South-West Pacific, NZDF personnel had already been involved in the peace process in the Solomon Islands from 2000 to 2002, but by October 2003 there were 230 NZDF personnel working with the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. This commitment was subsequently cut back to an Army platoon, but continued until 2013. Whilst the main mission in East Timor had come to an end by November 2002 with the NZ Battalion Group returning to New Zealand, help was again requested in 2006. The President of Timor-Leste Xanana Gusmau had asked the Australians to lead an intervention force to help quell the violence that was then taking place. New Zealand joined the International Stabilisation Force, with at times up to 180 personnel. During New Zealand’s commitment to Timor-Leste, over 7400 personnel were deployed.

Defence Developments Since 2008 For a generation, New Zealanders have been actively arguing about our role in the world. This debate has spilled over into the shape and purpose of the Defence Force. In 2007 it is time to put those old debates aside. (National Party, 2007, p. 11)

So began the Defence opening paragraph of the National Party’s Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Discussion Paper released in 2007, prior to the election the following year. Very much like the defence policy of the Labour Government, National noted that its priorities would be deployable land forces with appropriate air and sea lift, along with capability to patrol and provide surveillance in the oceans around New Zealand. National’s Defence spokesperson Wayne Mapp stated that “he was confident that a future National Government would keep military funding at the current 1.1%” (New Zealand Herald, 2010). The Discussion Paper also noted that New Zealand was “committed to being part of the group of nations that have long been at the forefront of international security. These include our traditional partners, Britain, Canada and the United States” (p. 13). It was not long before those traditional relationships became more substantive. A National-led Government was returned in 2008 with a promise to deliver a new Defence White Paper in its first year. Two years later, the Defence

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White Paper 2010 was published, the first since 1997. New Zealand’s defence policy objectives as set out as follows: • To defend New Zealand’s sovereignty; • To discharge our obligations as an ally of Australia; • To contribute to and, where necessary, lead peace and security operations in the South Pacific; • To make a credible contribution in support of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region; • To protect New Zealand’s wider interests by contributing to international peace and security, and the international rule of law; • To contribute to whole-of-government efforts at home and abroad in resource protection, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; • To participate in whole-of-government efforts to monitor the international strategic environment; and • To be prepared to respond to sudden shifts and other disjunctions in the strategic environment. (New Zealand Government, 2010, p. 37) Many of these themes would have been familiar to defence planners some four decades previously. Echoing the Discussion Paper of 2007 it confirmed that the NZDF needed to maintain sufficient capability to deter aggressors from New Zealand’s shores; to have the means to monitor and protect New Zealand’s maritime area; and to be able to provide support to uphold New Zealand’s interests in Antarctica. In order to achieve this, the Government emphasised that it wished to maintain a range of credible combat capabilities. It also made a commitment to replacing the core capabilities provide by the C-130 Hercules, the P-3K2 Orions and the ANZAC frigates. Financial constraints, however, led to a search for greater efficiencies within the Defence Force in order to free up funding for front-line activities, and along with the White Paper a Value for Money Review was published (Pacific Road Corporate Finance, 2010). The intent was for the New Zealand Defence Force to realise ongoing annual savings of $350 million. To assist with meeting this target a programme of “civilianisation” was proposed. The intent was to convert 1400 military positions to civilian posts, with the aim of saving over $20 million per annum. Ultimately, in addition to the planned redundancies that took place, attrition rates spiked with many very experienced personnel

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leaving, and the net effect was to hollow out the Defence Force. Perhaps worse was the impact that it had on morale. In March 2012, the Minister of Defence and Chief of Defence Force told the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee that: “…because of the high rates of attrition and the damage caused by the civilianisation process, further civilianisation will not be undertaken” (Office of the Auditor General, 2012, p. 17). Ongoing savings though were still expected. Emphasis was placed in the White Paper on relationships with longstanding security partners. Not surprisingly the White Paper highlighted that New Zealand needed to make a credible contribution in support of Australia. It was unequivocal in the way the New Zealand Government views the defence relationship with Australia (New Zealand Government, 2010, p. 18). The relationship with the United States was by now much warmer than at any time since the anti-nuclear debacle, and was characterised in the White Paper rather differently than on previous occasions. “Our security also benefits from New Zealand being an engaged, active, and stalwart partner of the US. The recent US review of bilateral defence relations was welcomed” (New Zealand Government, 2010, p. 19). The same month that the Defence White Paper had been released, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton was in New Zealand to sign the Wellington Declaration on a New Strategic Partnership between New Zealand and the United States (US/NZ Council, 2010). This new US-NZ strategic partnership was to have two fundamental elements: a new focus on practical cooperation in the Pacific region, and enhanced political and subject-matter expert dialogue. Unlike 30 years previously there were no protests. Two years later in June 2012, a new US-NZ defence arrangement was agreed with the signing of the Washington Declaration (New Zealand Government, 2012). This new arrangement provided a framework for cooperation which was to substantially strengthen and expand the bilateral relationship. Once again New Zealand had a formal defence agreement with the United States. Whilst not a return to ANZUS, Robert Ayson Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, said that the Declaration essentially confirmed New Zealand was now “a de facto ally of the United States” (Watkins, 2012). Later that year tangible evidence of the renewed relationship with the United States would come when the NZDF was, for the first time in 28 years, invited to participate in RIMPAC, the largest maritime exercise in the world.

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Conclusion Although there was significant concern in the 1966 Review of Defence Policy about the strategic situation in South-East Asia and what this might mean for New Zealand’s interests, by 1972 the White Paper was able to make the observation that, “We face no immediate direct military threat to our security” (New Zealand Government, 1972, p. 4). Thirty-eight years later the 2010 White Paper was to comment, “New Zealand and its associated states are highly unlikely to face a direct military threat over the next 25 Years” (New Zealand Government, 2010, p. 10). Geography has continued to play an important role in defining New Zealand’s strategic context. Yet the most recent White Paper acknowledges that whilst it is highly unlikely that New Zealand will face a direct military threat, a significant security event might be possible. Global terrorism, people smuggling, illegal resource extraction and cyber threats are real challenges that New Zealand may have to deal with. Whilst intra-state conflict has been and will continue to be the dominant form of conflict there remains the threat, still small, of state on state conflict as major powers redefine the strategic landscape. In 1978 concerns about the relationships between the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan, and concern over the Korean Peninsula were to the fore; similar concerns remain, in different form, today. Throughout the last 50 years, New Zealand has been keen to maintain a position as a good international citizen, playing its part to foster a safe and secure global environment. It has chosen to do so through a range of treaties and alliances, with commitments particularly to Australia, the South-West Pacific, and in Southeast Asia through the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Deployments of New Zealand’s defence forces further afield, in coalition, UN or UN-mandated missions, have been undertaken as both Labour and National-led Governments have seen necessary. None of this has changed substantially in half a century. There are signs that the two major parties have accepted a bipartisan approach to defence policies. The watershed in defence policy came with the anti-nuclear policy of the Fourth Labour Government in the mid-1980s, which then led to a breakdown in the defence relationship with the United States. Throughout the initial debates over the anti-nuclear policy, the National Party remained adamant that it would repeal the legislation when it came to power. That determination had changed by 1990. After National returned to

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power in 1990, it governed through a period of significant fiscal challenge, and oversaw a reduction in defence expenditure from 2 per cent of GDP to less than 1 per cent. Publicly National wished to maintain a balanced force, but as early as 1991 Wayne Mapp had suggested that if cuts in capability needed to be made, the Air Force strike wing was the most suitable candidate (Mapp, 1991). As National were ready in 2007 to return to Government Mapp, then the National Party spokesperson on defence, was reported to say “he shared, albeit very quietly, Labour’s judgement that the F-16s did not make operational sense for the NZDF. They would simply soak up too much funding” (New Zealand Herald, 2010). When the National Government presented their newest defence policy in the 2010 White Paper, it was quite clear that they intended to maintain the defence force structure much as they had inherited it from the Labour Party. Whilst National had no plans to replace the strike wing, the White Paper nevertheless did make the point that “…a New Zealand Government may want to contribute militarily to (an inter-state) conflict. We therefore have, and should retain, some particular high-end capabilities…” (New Zealand Government, 2010, p. 42). Amongst those capabilities are the ANZAC frigates, which the current Government have committed to replace. Although it was a Labour Government which had made the decision to purchase the vessels in 1989 it is noteworthy that, the year before, the Labour Party national conference had rejected the frigate deal. When asked in 2015 about replacing the frigates, Labour’s Defence Spokesperson, the Honourable Phil Goff commented that, “Not to replace the frigates with a modern version would remove significant combat capability and utility from the Navy. It’s a big cost but my first instinct would be to maintain that capability” (Goff, P. [2015 May 15]. Personal communication). In discussing defence policy in the National Party’s Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Discussion Paper of 2007, John Key had noted that, “The old debates of the 1980s are over” (p. 4). Perhaps they are.

References Bentley, G and M Conly (1987). Portrait of an Air Force. Wellington: Grantham House. Clark, H (1988). New Zealand’s non-nuclear initiative. In The Pacific, Peace, Security & the Nuclear Issue, R Walker and W Sutherland (eds.), Tokyo: The United Nations University, pp. 175–184.

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Clayton, GJ (1990). The New Zealand Army, A History from the 1840’s to the 1990’s. Wellington: New Zealand Army. Greener, P. (ed.) (2007). The Balkan Question — Is There an Answer in Sight? Auckland: Auckland University of Technology and Auckland War Memorial Museum. Gwertzman, B (26 June 1986). Shultz Ends U.S. Vow to Defend New Zealand. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/28/world/shultz-ends-us-vow-todefend-new-zealand.html Hoadley, S (2000). New Zealand United States Relations: Friends No Longer Allies. Wellington: The New Zealand Institute for International Affairs. Kennaway, R and J Henderson (1991). Beyond New Zealand II, Foreign Policy into the 1990s. Auckland: Longman Paul. Lange, D (1990). Nuclear Free-The New Zealand Way. Auckland: Penguin Books. Mapp, W. (1991). Restructuring New Zealand’s Defence Force. Policy. Spring. pp. 26–29. McGibbon, IC (1991). The defence of New Zealand 1945–1957. In New Zealand in World Affairs Volume 1 1945–1957, M McKinnon (ed.). Wellington: NZIIA, pp. 143–76. McKinnon, M (1993). Independence and Foreign Policy, New Zealand in the World since 1935. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1995). New Zealand in the Security Council: 1993-94. Information Bulletin, No. 52. Wellington: Author. National Party (2007). Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Discussion Paper. Wellington: The Office of the Leader of the Opposition. New Zealand Government (1966). Review of Defence Policy 1966. Wellington: Government Printer. New Zealand Government (1972). Review of Defence Policy 1972. Wellington: Government Printer. New Zealand Government (1978). Defence Review 1978. Wellington: Government Printer. New Zealand Government (1983). Defence Review 1983. Wellington: Government Printer. New Zealand Government (1987). Defence of New Zealand, Review of Defence Policy 1987. Wellington: Government Printer. New Zealand Government (1991). Defence of New Zealand 1991, A Policy Paper. Wellington: Government Printer. New Zealand Government (1997). The Shape of New Zealand’s Defence, A White Paper. Wellington: Government Printer. New Zealand Government (2000). The Government’s Defence Policy Framework. Wellington: Ministry of Defence. New Zealand Government (2001). A Modern Sustainable Defence Force Matched to New Zealand’s Needs. Wellington: Ministry of Defence.

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New Zealand Government (2002). Defence Long Term Development Plan. Wellington: Ministry of Defence. New Zealand Government (2010). Defence White Paper 2010. Wellington: Ministry of Defence. New Zealand Government (19 June 2012). Washington Declaration on Defense Cooperation between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defence of New Zealand and the New Zealand Defence Force. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/all/files/WashingtonDeclaration.pdf New Zealand Herald (23 December 2010). WikiLeaks Cable: National Party Defense Policy Continues Labour Course. New Zealand Herald. www.nzherald.co.nz/ wikileaks/news/archive.cfm?c_id=1503014 Office of the Auditor General (2012). New Zealand Defence Force: The Civilianisation Project. Wellington: Author. Office of the Minister of Defence (1998). Replacement Frigate Project. Paper attached to Cabinet Paper CAB (98) 852. Wellington: Author. Pacific Road Corporate Finance (2010). Value for Money Review of NZ Defence Force. Wellington: Author. Rabel, R (1991). Vietnam and collapse of the foreign policy consensus. In New Zealand in World Affairs Volume II 1957–1972, M McKinnon (ed.). Wellington: NZIIA. Reid, P (17 February 2000). The Lessons of East Timor. Paper presented at the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs Seminar Defence Policy After East Timor. Wellington: NZIIA. Taonui, R (30 September 1999). Peacemakers on dangerous, delicate mission in East Timor. New Zealand Herald. p. A17. UMR Insight Limited (1995). Ministry of Defence Quantitative Summary. Wellington: Author. US/NZ Council (4 November 2010). Wellington declaration on a new strategic partnership between New Zealand and the United States of America. http:// usnzcouncil.org/us-nz-issues/wellington-declaration/ Watkins, T (20 June 2012). Agreement with US sees NZ as ‘de facto’ ally. Dominion Post. http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/7133939/Agreementwith-US-sees-NZ-as-de-facto-ally

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CHAPTER 20 Informing the National Interest: The Role of Intelligence in New Zealand’s Independent Foreign Policy Anthony L. Smith

Introduction The last few years have seen the New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC) thrust into the spotlight more regularly than it was previously accustomed to. A series of accusations and scandals have rocked New Zealand’s two large intelligence collection agencies in a pretty public way. At the same time, the Prime Minister and the Director of the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) have had to address the issue of New Zealanders who have become involved in the Syrian conflict; most probably the first time that New Zealanders have made their way to a jihadist war of this nature. It is important that the Intelligence Community engages in a new level of openness, where that proves possible, in a world where it is of paramount importance that methods and sources are protected. Rebecca Kitteridge, SIS Director, and Una Jagose, the outgoing Director of the Government Communications and Security Bureau (GCSB), have made themselves available to media interviews and public forums. Some critics have interpreted this public engagement as merely a gloss for agencies that are still unaccountable and mired in the past. I will argue that this overlooks some significant factors 343

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within the modern NZIC, including some substantive changes such as the independent role of the Inspector General. The primary purpose of this chapter is to explain how intelligence informs New Zealand’s foreign policy formation. Intelligence is defined here as the utilisation of secret information, obtained through covert means, that relates to national security issues. Intelligence material will often be combined with a much wider range of other government sources of information to provide context. While the GCSB and the SIS have an important link with senior policymakers and relevant ministries, there is a third component to the NZIC that provides important connective tissue between the world of intelligence and the world of policy — namely the Security and Intelligence Group (SIG) of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC). This article explains the important difference between intelligence collection and intelligence assessments, and, in particular, the role of the largest SIG agency, namely the National Assessments Bureau (NAB), in providing a “sense making” function within security and intelligence. It is the analytical (sometimes also called “estimates”) part of the intelligence cycle that is often missed in public commentary in New Zealand. I will argue that NAB’s role is an important element of independent decision-making by the New Zealand state, and also that DPMC now provides an important interagency coordination function — a situation far more preferable than intelligence agencies working in isolation from each other. Along the way, it will be important to tackle some questions that emerge in the public debate from time to time. In what ways is intelligence useful to New Zealand? Are there sufficient checks and balances in place? Is the 5-Eyes arrangement still relevant? Does New Zealand’s current orientation make it either a target for harm and/or is it out of step with an emergent set of relationships? This chapter advances some points in this regard. There are four caveats to make with regard to this chapter. The first note to the reader is that the chapter is written by someone inside the intelligence community. That affords me a particular set of insights, but I fully admit that I am not a disinterested party in this discussion. The second is that everything highlighted in this chapter is in some way available publically elsewhere, either from officially released information, the statements of leaders (including those of prime ministers) and what is otherwise broadly known. Third, this chapter was completed prior to the release of a 2016 intelligence review,

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and changes may have occurred between the time of writing and publication. Fourth, this chapter will not comment directly on the veracity of the allegations of leakers/whistle blowers, and in particular Edward Snowden. Some of what is noted here may indirectly refer to this, but I will leave it to readers to draw the comparisons.

The Iraq War and Its Implications It is critical to learn from mistakes. Failures around the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a watershed in intelligence, particularly in the United States, but in other jurisdictions as well. Given the high stakes and the errors made, events from this time were to prove seminal to intelligence methodology. (Germany and France, two countries opposed to the Iraq War, also got the Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD] question wrong — Daniel Byman’s review article of 2015 makes that plain.) Dwelling on the specific example of assessments of Saddam Hussein’s WMD programme, and notably those made by the United States, offers the following advantages. First, it was one of the rare instances that drew to public attention the entire intelligence cycle, from the collection of information through to the ultimate analytical judgements as to whether Saddam Hussein still possessed WMD. Second, the question around WMD stocks in Iraq had a conclusive answer — namely it was soon realised post-invasion that Saddam had abolished the programme, contrary to most assessments at the time. Third, although the events around the use of intelligence in the case of Iraq prior to the US-led invasion are hotly disputed, a great deal of the material surrounding this has made its way into the public domain through the release of estimates, public speeches, recollections of senior decision-makers and officials and external reviews. There is an ongoing debate as to whether the Bush Administration’s decision to go to war against Iraq was politically predetermined, or the result of intelligence failure. In fact, both factors were at play. John Mearsheimer’s (2011) study on the role of deception in international relations argues persuasively that for at least a few key figures in the Bush Administration the decision to invade Iraq was already set before the intelligence picture was fully assessed. Broadly, that Administration had two concerns: (1) that Saddam Hussein may have had a link to Al-Qaeda and ultimately to the events of 9/11; and (2) that Saddam Hussein represented a serious threat to regional

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stability, magnified by a WMD programme. There were also fears that the two threats could merge — a fear articulated by then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, including well after he left office to justify his own decision-making. President Bush and Prime Minister Blair also thought that regime change in Iraq would drain away the conditions that bred extremism — a belief that seems ironic given that it arguably gave Osama bin Laden the conflict with the West that he had wanted. What was the role of intelligence in all of this? Intelligence was used in part to convince domestic and international audiences of the case to invade Iraq. Interestingly, despite allegations that Vice President Dick Cheney applied political pressure to find the goods on Saddam Hussein, the US intelligence community ultimately discounted any connection to 9/11 and remained steadfast on this point — a persuasive account of this and other events appears in the memoirs of former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Deputy Director Michael Morell, who through much of this time was the President’s daily briefer (Morell, 2015). This did not prevent senior members of that Administration openly and publicly discussing a possible link to terrorism. Morell notes that a senior Al-Qaeda suspect, once in US custody, had recanted a false confession of a link between Saddam and Al-Qaeda, which the suspect had previously given to Egyptian authorities (presumably under some duress). Mearsheimer (2011), noting this type of evidence, makes the damning judgement that the Bush Administration deliberately withheld information that would have undermined the connection between Baghdad and 9/11. The WMD question was a rather different story. While political leaders may have made the threat of Iraq’s WMD sound more certain then it was, mistakes were made in the assembling of intelligence — intelligence that was used to convince sceptics, possibly to include the then Secretary of State, Colin Powell. Powell has never made any secret of the fact that he felt he was let down by the CIA and others. In a 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, that is a combined report from the US agencies that constitute the US intelligence community (which then numbered 16, and is now 17), intelligence was presented that gave the strong impression of an existing WMD programme. While the report did raise cautions about the levels of certainty around particular programmes, and the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) did dissent from part of the report, the key judgements at the front of the paper gave a level

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of assurance that was seen as regrettable in hindsight. (A thorough account of this is found in Thomas Fingar’s 2011 study on intelligence analysis; Fingar is a former director of INR.) Those key judgements were publically released and widely read as reaffirming that Saddam Hussein continued to maintain a dangerous arsenal of WMD material. In particular, in that report, over 100 pieces of intelligence that formed the basis of the Chemical Weapons reporting were derived from the reports of an Iraqi exile, Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, who went by the unwittingly appropriate name of “Curveball”. Despite the huge number of reports, these still count as “single source” intelligence — and a highly unreliable one as it turned out. To compound the problem, much of the Curveball material would also weave its way into Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations (UN) in 2003, which involved a combination of intelligence reporting and imagery — all with the heavy symbolism of the CIA director sitting behind him. Powell, who had some early scepticism about the Iraq situation, would later express his public distrust of what had been provided for him by the CIA and noted that he was owed an apology. In the aftermath of a lot of finger pointing within Washington and beyond, we will probably never know the exact truth of what went wrong. But a careful examination of the facts reveals that the intelligence failure around WMD was more a failure of method and interpretation then a deliberate attempt to mislead. Alternative evidence was largely ignored in what seems to be a classic case of confirmation bias, such as the findings of Hans Blix who led the UN inspectors, and evidence from another set of defectors that noted that Iraq had already ended its WMD programme. Saddam Hussein’s refusal to allow inspectors back into his country was taken as guilt, whereas in fact it was the Iraqi regime’s attempt not to appear weak in the face of external and internal pressures. The Americans would come to understand that Saddam had probably pulled this bluff to keep Iran, in particular, in check, thinking that US intelligence was all-knowing enough to work out the reality (Morell, 2015). The episode resulted in a major overhaul (or re-learning) of how to undertake the interpretation of intelligence, particularly in murky and unreliable circumstances. Major reviews and reforms were launched in Washington, London and Canberra — all of whom participated in the invasion of Iraq. (Two of the 5-Eyes partners, New Zealand and Canada, had opposed the invasion.)

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Intelligence, however, is also about getting the questions right. Given that much of the world (and not just the Bush Administration) believed that Saddam was likely still in possession of an extant WMD programme, may in some sense have been beside the point. The key questions really were: how would the Iraqi public react to a US-led invasion? How would it impact on the regional balance of power? And what would it mean for the future course of Islamic extremism? From the vantage point of 2016, with the devastation of the Iraq War, and the dramatic re-emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Daesh in Iraq and Syria, the answer seems obvious; an invasion was only going to exacerbate regional instability. Morell (2015) notes that many analysts in the CIA were extremely pessimistic about what an invasion of Iraq would mean. If true, that would appear to be in direct contrast to the heroic assumptions of the Bush and Blair administrations. Morell notes that these concerns were not as forcefully put to the Bush Administration by CIA analysts as they could have been. No equivalent National Intelligence Estimate was ever issued on the consequences of invading Iraq. It is a compelling argument to make that whether WMD existed or not becomes almost a moot point, as the invasion of Iraq would have had disastrous impacts either way. This question of “what happens next” is more an assessments question than an intelligence collection issue. In intelligence assessments, an important distinction is made between “secrets” and “mysteries”. “Secrets” are required to answer the question of whether or not Saddam Hussein still has a WMD programme; whereas it remains an analytical “mystery” (placing ourselves on the eve of the 2003 invasion) as to how Iraqis (and the disbanded Iraqi army) will react to an invasion. Intelligence assessments need to be able to address both. There is also an interesting postscript to the Iraq newly industrialising economy (NIE). The US intelligence community issued a 2007 version on the Iranian nuclear question, which essentially concluded that Iran had halted the weaponisation of its nascent programme some years earlier. The Iran NIE proved controversial for a different reason, that is, that it was far too cautious for some in the Administration and some on Capitol Hill (Fingar, 2011). This case also illustrates the role of intelligence in clarifying situations, when in history a great deal of conflict has resulted from fear of the unknown and miscalculation.

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For intelligence to be at all useful to policy, it must be both free of policy bias and be prepared to speak honestly. Like evidence acquired at a crime scene, the veracity of intelligence can only be trusted if it is not tampered with.

The Structure of the Intelligence Cycle The two larger New Zealand intelligence agencies are involved in collection via various means. But the raw intelligence seldom speaks for itself. An individual piece of information might be wrong, the musings of a low-level official, or an interception of an individual who knows he/she is being listened to and is obfuscating. It can also be a mass of detail that may or may not be relevant to any particular intelligence question. It has to be judiciously sorted, examined and placed in context. There is a general division of labour then between collection of intelligence (including the processing and traffic analysis of relevant material) on one hand and the provision of expert analytic intelligence on the other. In other words, the division between what one former British intelligence commentator called the “big battalions of technical collection” and the far smaller all-source intelligence assessment output (Herman, 1996). In the New Zealand system, intelligence collection (either by direct means or sourced through partners) is the responsibility of the GCSB and the SIS. The National Assessments Bureau, which sits separately within DPMC, is responsible for finished assessments. New Zealand Defence Intelligence has a similar role, focusing on core defence matters, and also produces finished assessments. Police, customs and immigration also have agencies that interface with the intelligence community, and can be considered part of it. This division between collection and assessments largely reflects the division of responsibilities found in the British system and is also replicated in Canada and Australia. The division is found in the US system too, but it is more complex to characterise given the range of agencies. While there will be cases where single source intelligence is passed directly to policy officials and decision-makers, often of greater utility on complex questions is the wider assessment picture. The function of all-source intelligence analysis also, in theory, ought to get around the problem of simply taking at face value the claims of other systems. How can intelligence assessment offer an assurance of accuracy and certainty? Simply, it cannot entirely guarantee that, but there are important methodological steps to take to mitigate the risks of intelligence failure and

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to weed out misleading material. For intelligence analysis and estimates, it involves what we might think of as “layering”, or triangulating the findings of different information sources. All-source intelligence is, ultimately, another expression for information pieced together from an array of sources, including secret intelligence, other government information and publically available material (known in the community as “open source”). One might think of the piecing together of any complex intelligence question as a large jigsaw puzzle where the analyst will have to carefully put the puzzle together, avoiding pieces that do not fit and with an incomplete set of inputs. This makes producing useful intelligence a painstaking task — an exercise in sorting wheat from chaff. One historian of MI6 has likened the business of intelligence work to being more like a pointillist painting than James Bond (Jeffrey, 2010, p. xiv). Intelligence analysis relies on the following layers, all of which have their strengths and weaknesses, but with the passage of time will almost always get us to a deeper set of insights: • Open Source: The findings of academics, commentators and media sources are often the first layer of intelligence analysis. Open Source material is usually the basis of finding the bigger picture. Thanks to social media, blogs and general commentary on the Internet, this avenue is rapidly increasing in significance. Obviously, none of this is exclusive to the intelligence community — for example, various news organisations used Instagram and other digital footprints to track the movements of Russian troops in Ukraine. (Apparently it is not just governments that can track the movements of others when they choose to put their lives on social media!) • Diplomatic Reporting: The “eyes and ears” of New Zealand are its range of diplomatic posts. The findings of diplomats, which essentially constitutes ordinary information gathering from their everyday contacts and their insights, are often foundational on a range of international questions. • HUMINT/Human intelligence: The collection of information from wellplaced individuals or “assets”. • SIGINT/Signals intelligence: The collection of electronic and telecommunications material. • Imagery: The use of satellites (principally) to provide imagery on intelligence questions, from, say, missile launches to the size of a demonstration/riot during a “people power” uprising, or the extent of devastation in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

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All of these layers have their strengths and weaknesses. Human intelligence, often portrayed by some commentators as a silver bullet, may prove unreliable (like Curveball). Intelligence from imagery is a snapshot in time and is seldom useful in isolation — the movement of a truck on a “suspected” WMD site will not tell us the exact contents of the truck (to cite a real example from Powell’s UN speech). Some assessments will require no secret intelligence, whereas other important questions are heavily reliant on insights that are not obtainable in any other way. In seeking to understand intelligence successes and failures, there is now also a huge amount of professionalisation that has gone into countering cognitive bias. The neurological problem of heuristics — or mental shortcuts — is now well recognised in a lot of fields (and popularised by economics Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman’s (2011) book Thinking, Fast and Slow). Intelligence analysts, just like academics, journalists and other commentators, can easily fall into the trap of making up their minds early and disregarding all contrary evidence. Intelligence analysts need a mental toolkit to force them to consider the alternatives to any given problem. (Once a conclusion is reached, can the analyst turn around and consciously find evidence that knocks down the original findings? This is more honestly arrived at through formalised arrangements that amount to someone else playing the role of Devil’s Advocate, or forming an adversarial “Red Team”.) The conclusion from this is that intelligence gathering is only useful if it is set against particular priorities and security threats. There is a problem that accrues with time in the age of vast information flows; information is like water, too little and one dies of thirst, and too much and one drowns.

Controversial Questions This leads us to the discussion about bulk data collection, a particular controversy in the United States (far more of a domestic argument there than the issue of foreign intelligence collection), after the Snowden revelations. In the New Zealand context, Section 14 of the GCSB Act states that interception is not for the purpose of targeting citizens for the purpose of intelligence gathering, unless that person meets the definition of being an agent of a foreign power. Any GCSB access or intercept must fit the government’s priorities and authorisation is achieved through the Minister Responsible for GCSB, a consultation process with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in

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cases where the communications of New Zealanders are targeted, agreement is needed from the Commissioner of Security Warrants who is a former Court of Appeal judge (Jagose, 2015). Likewise, surveillance of New Zealanders, as part of an SIS investigation, ordinarily needs to be approved through the warrant process. Former GCSB Director Una Jagose (2015) has noted a “popular myth” about GCSB collection: “We do not simply randomly hoover up information and rummage through it, hoping to find something useful. This image of ‘mass surveillance’ is one of the biggest myths about our work”. The Prime Minister and the Inspector General of Intelligence have all issued assurances to the public that there is no indiscriminate inception of the data of New Zealanders. Furthermore, a bulk data programme would involve a substantive data collection facility and a staff of thousands — GCSB has around 350 staff stretched across government cybersecurity and foreign intelligence requirements. Critics would need to point to the infrastructure that underpins claims of a broadly intrusive data collection programme. Another argument regularly encountered is that the New Zealand intelligence community has lagged behind the realities of New Zealand foreign policy goals, and that membership of the 5-Eyes arrangements is a relic. It is important, however, not to confuse cause and effect. While it is true intelligence cooperation in this sphere is an outgrowth of alliance relationships forged during World War II, it is equally the case that intelligence diplomacy and cooperation by New Zealand still very much reflects the broader security orientation of the country. The 5-Eyes intelligence cooperation has its roots in the diplomatic, defence, police, customs and consular interests (i.e., the safety of New Zealanders travelling overseas) spheres of New Zealand foreign policy. To a considerable degree, New Zealand has retained a capability to be interoperable in a military sense with its traditional partners. New Zealand’s primary defence relationship is with Australia, and this is borne out in missions such as the current training mission in Iraq. The role of intelligence is critical to the safety of our troops abroad; in fact it would be dangerous for our troops to deploy anywhere without the forewarning that intelligence can offer. While the Iraq deployment remains domestically contested, as was the case to a lesser extent with Afghanistan, cooperation for a small country with traditional security partners has also been the case in important peacekeeping missions like Bosnia (with the United Kingdom) and East Timor (with Australia) where

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New Zealand Defence Force personnel performed serious roles and were not there to simply make up the numbers. The use of intelligence is not just about the safety of our troops, but can also be significant in the goals of the actual mission itself. Bellamy (2015, p. 18) notes that intelligence is in fact a key enabler of any UN peacekeeping mission’s capacity to act effectively. Furthermore, while the 5-Eyes arrangements are extensive and do afford New Zealand access to the world’s leading intelligence arrangement, it is not, as former senior diplomat Terence O’Brien (2016) describes it, a “hermetically sealed cabal”. Not only does every parliamentary democracy of any size have an intelligence function, but many countries understand that the world is a latticework of intelligence relationships of varying degrees of depth and functional cooperation. Most are deliberately hidden from view, but occasionally they surface. Michael Herman, a former UK intelligence official writing in 1996, noted then that Britain had relationships with something in the order of 120 countries (although he offers no further elaboration). North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries have an intelligence sharing agreement, which includes the three NATO members of the 5-Eyes. To offer another example, the United States and Germany have long had an advanced intelligence relationship (as the Curveball example shows), although this has more recently hit the headlines over a bilateral spat between the two countries after which President Obama announced that it was unnecessary to spy on the leaders of like-minded countries. As a general rule, it is largely the case that countries that fundamentally share both interests and values are going to find it easier to engage in sharing arrangements. The fact that New Zealand maintains intelligence relationships and engages in foreign collection is not going to come as any surprise to the broader set of countries that we have diplomatic and commercial transactions with, as many are themselves engaged in something similar. It would also be a mistake to assume that New Zealand, or any other 5-Eyes member, is “beholden” to the wishes of any other member. Often loosely termed an “alliance”, it is clear that 5-Eyes members have on some landmark occasions taken quite different foreign policy decisions. The United Kingdom and Canada famously refused to enter the Vietnam War at any point during its long duration. In the case of the Iraq War, not only did New Zealand refuse to be part of the US-led coalition, but so did one of Washington’s actual formal allies, Canada. In 2012, New Zealand joined with the bulk of the

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international community in voting in favour of Palestine becoming a nonmember observer state at the UN — whereas the United States and Canada were amongst only nine countries voting against. There was, of course, also a time when New Zealand was partially removed from intelligence cooperation within the arrangement. During the Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) treaty dispute between the Lange and Reagan administrations, the then head of the Prime Minister’s Department has noted that in 1985 the United States ended formal intelligence briefings and the provision of imagery, while maintaining signals intelligence and interactions around the safety of New Zealand troops abroad (Hensley, 2013, p. 150). During Hillary Clinton’s 2010 visit to New Zealand, as Secretary of State, she publicly noted that the relationship had been fully restored. The process of restoration started during the Clark government and was maintained by the subsequent Key government. It is difficult to argue that New Zealand’s intelligence relationships and priorities have suffered from some kind of inertia, or have got out of step unnoticed, when they have been actively reconsidered, and in the case of the 5-Eyes, reinvigorated by two successive governments. Another charge levelled against the New Zealand intelligence community is that it is not subject to enough checks and balances. There is a legitimate ongoing discussion to be had as to whether New Zealand has the balance right. But it is not correct to suggest that intelligence collection in New Zealand has somehow gone rogue and/or is unresponsive to the considered priorities of government. I will limit the evidence to four lines of accountability that have come into the system in recent years: (1) The 2013 GCSB legislation significantly bolstered the staff of the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS), an entirely separate entity from the intelligence community. Anyone in New Zealand who suspects they have been unfairly or unlawfully the subject of the intelligence community can lay a complaint to the IGIS. And while some critics have questioned the independence of Inspector General Cheryl Gwyn, who is appointed by Government, an IGIS investigation into a release of information concerning a briefing to the then leader of the opposition resulted in the unprecedented sight of an SIS director apologising to Phil Goff and the prime minister for the episode. (The accompanying report is quite candid, and I would invite readers to make up their own minds by viewing it

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on the IGIS website.) The Inspector General has the power, in fact, to go anywhere she chooses within the intelligence community. (2) Another significant advance was the decision in 2014 to expand the role of DPMC to provide national security leadership, including the coordination and performance of the NZIC. While to O’Brien this is “a small cameo of the American national security state”, I would argue instead that this was actually intended to strengthen independent accountability and policy frameworks. (The Kitteridge review of GCSB in 2013 — another document that ought to be required reading — found that well-meaning staff had misinterpreted the law, that there had arisen some conflicts of interest and that performance culture needed to change.) Therefore, it is important that the New Zealand public have some assurance that overarching legal and policy considerations will be subject to DPMC’s ongoing facilitation. (3) In 2015, it was announced that there would be periodic independent reviews of the intelligence community. The first of these reviews, due in early 2016, is being led by former Deputy Prime Minister Sir Michael Cullen and Dame Patsy Reddy. Although some have dismissed this review process as pro forma, many would find it hard to accept that a senior member of the last Labour government would fail to forge an independent view. (4) The Intelligence and Security Committee, established in 1996, consists of five members — namely the prime minister (plus two nominees) and the leader of the opposition (plus one nominee), and the GSCB and the SIS are required to report to it. Beyond this statutory obligation to bring intelligence matters to this bipartisan committee, the New Zealand intelligence community has always been prepared to engage with a cross section of parliamentary representatives. The intelligence community has made mistakes, as evidenced in IGIS reports and the aforementioned Kitteridge review that highlighted some legal confusion and a need for institutional change. In the world of intelligence, it is hard to strike a balance between what can and should be revealed to the public, and what needs to be withheld. But the above attests to efforts to make the NZIC more professional, and, critically in a democracy, to keep it accountable. On the subject of priorities, these will change over time, and are directly approved by the New Zealand cabinet. Some of the areas that would

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currently concern New Zealand intelligence (collection or analysis) include the following: • Cybersecurity: New Zealand is subject to thousands of attacks a day from state and non-state actors. While it might be tempting to argue that New Zealand’s intelligence relationships explain this flurry of attacks on public and private infrastructure, it is the case that every developed country in the world experiences pretty much the same level of exposure. Intelligence material provides critical information to staunch the damage. • Extremism: Former Prime Minister John Key has noted that there are in New Zealand a relatively small number of individuals sympathetic to ISIS/Daesh. To put the problem in perspective, we are talking about a tiny fringe of a fringe of an otherwise very well integrated New Zealand Muslim community. Unfortunately, the problem of extremism, while low, is present both in New Zealand and to New Zealanders who travel. (During the conference itself, there was some discussion about the probabilities of a terrorist event to any given individual. We can all agree that the chances of any one individual being caught in such an event are quite remote and should not be overwrought. Nonetheless, terrorism by its nature is a horrifying event to the public which has a reasonable expectation of protection. And we could reasonably expect that decision-makers are subject to the same psychological pressures. Furthermore, the reality is that Daesh has now inspired a reasonably large number of mass killings. Arguing that the money is better spent on, say, seat belt safety, becomes a false dichotomy.) • South Pacific: New Zealand has a special relationship with the countries of the South Pacific, and has chosen to bear responsibility for questions of stability, including challenges from external actors, natural disasters and (in rare instances) social upheaval. • Asia-Pacific: The shifting power relativities across the Asia-Pacific are the leading question of our time. Currently, there are rising tensions within Asia, as well as flashpoints such as the Korean peninsula and the rise of maritime issues.

Conclusion Piecing together useful and reliable intelligence material is a painstaking and multi-layered task, involving many inputs and individuals. The classic “spying”

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component, or espionage, is one important information stream but it sits alongside many other inputs when it comes to informing foreign policy. Many of the most valuable insights, and certainly much of the surrounding context of any complex problem, are not always found in the world of secrets. If intelligence is to be of value, it is important that it is not tainted. Mistakes cannot be eliminated, but rigorous safeguards in the intelligencegathering process can minimise that possibility. It is important that the intelligence process, including analysis, avoids policy capture and that it remains neutral in foreign and domestic policy considerations. There is a dilemma here though, in that intelligence, to be useful, must also be prepared to engage closely with policymakers in order to address their immediate concerns. Furthermore, intelligence analysts do not have a monopoly on the truth and critiques by policymakers cannot automatically be regarded as unwarranted “political pressure”. Intelligence analysis can often throw up conclusions that are uncomfortable for decision-makers, and frequently reveal situations to be more confusing and complex. However, the goal of intelligence assessment is, ultimately, to give government an advantage in making decisions. New Zealand maintains both a foreign intelligence capability and a set of liaison relationships, notably the 5-Eyes arrangements, to improve its own awareness of increasingly challenging global events. Without effective intelligence — something which cannot be achieved by New Zealand alone — it would be unwise to deploy a single Kiwi soldier overseas. More generally, a lack of access to intelligence would also compromise our ability as a small country to make sense of complex international security questions. The other part of the equation is, however, that New Zealand must be in a position to make its own determination of the intelligence it receives (to which the example of Iraq’s WMD programme is a leading exhibit). Material from overseas channels needs to sit alongside all of the other evidence at the New Zealand government’s disposal. This makes the intelligence assessments function, and the general exercise of a critical enquiry, the crucial endpoint of the use of intelligence material if it is to be tailored to New Zealand policymakers. On that basis, one intrinsic motivation factor for members of the New Zealand intelligence community is the belief it exists to serve the national interest — not the interests of any other country/countries. There is a strong sense of New Zealand as an independent country that can make up its own mind, and largely functions as a good citizen on the international stage. That factor

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goes a long way to explaining why individuals choose to join the New Zealand intelligence community.

References Bellamy, A (2015). Unity of effort in UN peacekeeping. In United Nations Peacekeeping Challenge: The Importance of the Integrated Approach, A Powels, N Partow and N Nelson (eds.). Farnham Surrey: Ashgate. Byman, D (December 2015). Intelligence and its critics. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 39(3), 260–280. Fingar, T (2011). Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Hensley, G (2013). Friendly Fire: Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Herman, M (1996). Intelligence Power in War and Peace. Cambridge: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Jagose, U (29 September 2015). Speaking notes: Speech to the technology and privacy forum. Government Communications Security Bureau. http://www.gcsb. govt.nz/publications/news/speaking-notes-for-speech-to-the-technology-and-pr ivacy-forum-by-una-jagose-acting-director-government-communications-securi ty-bureau/ [30 November 2015]. Jeffrey, K (2010). MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949. London: Bloomsbury. Kahneman, D (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux. Mearsheimer, J (2011). Why Leaders Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morell, M (2015). The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism from Al Qa‘ida to ISIS. New York: Twelve. O’Brien, T (January/February 2016). Should war define New Zealand’s self-view? New Zealand International Review, 41(1), 6–10.

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CHAPTER 21 Intelligence, Accountability and New Zealand’s National Security Jim Rolfe

The Context of National Security New Zealand, like all countries, faces many possible threats to its national security. They range from the obvious and localised (flood and earthquakes), through to the international effects and consequences of globalisation (pandemics, mass immigration), to the unlikely but extremely consequential such as an armed attack on New Zealand itself (New Zealand Government, 2011). By and large, these threats are recognised as possible at some level, but are not as controversial as threats to the national well-being. One category of threat is controversial, if not as a threat in fact, then certainly as to the policy and operational responses mooted for or adopted by New Zealand and many other states towards it as a potential threat. This is the threat of terrorist activity aimed not at political ends that New Zealand has any control over, but at the nature of the international state and social system to which New Zealand and most countries adhere. There are three propositions related to this threat, two of which are probably not contested but all of which are worth making. They are • That the state should protect itself and its citizens; and • That information is an essential early step in being able to carry out the protection task effectively; but

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• That the state should not have unfettered access to information about a citizen’s activities and communications and that we need to be able to assure ourselves that it does not. To an extent, the second two of those three propositions may come into conflict with each other. Much of this chapter discusses the relationship between the needs of the state and the rights of its citizens. This chapter concludes with some normative thoughts about how the state should conduct itself when carrying out its protective role.

The Changing Nature of National Security The concept of national security has evolved somewhat in the last few decades. A “traditional” view of national security would have some idea of the protection of the state against its enemies, and those enemies would probably be military ones. The state’s response focused primarily on armed force as a deterrent and on the search for information about the armed forces of potential enemies as a guide to necessary actions. This was (and remains) an almost completely unproblematic role for the state and receives little dissent from its citizens. Nonetheless, there was and always has been a component of the state’s security activities that focused less on the activities of enemy armed forces and more on the (potential) enemy within. This enemy used his or her skills to subvert the country through the promotion of ideologies inimical to the more or less liberal democratic one adopted by the “west”, including, of course, New Zealand. In the second half of the 20th Century, this activity was focused on the activities of the various forms of Communist Party and the ways the Party (whether of the Soviet or Chinese variety) attempted to promote revolution from within through support for a range of domestic “workers” and “revolutionary” groups (Rolfe, 2003, pp. 16–19). The activities of the security services were generally supported by the public, to the extent that they received any publicity at all. Two events in the Cold War years put the spotlight on the state’s activities in attempting to counter externally funded subversive activities. The first was the arrest of Dr William Sutch in 1974 on charges under the Official Secrets Act 1951 of obtaining information that would be helpful to an enemy. Sutch was eventually acquitted of the charges, but the processes by which the state acquired some of its limited evidence “involved clear breaches of the

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law” (Powles, 1976, p. 10). The second was the expulsion in January 1980 of the Soviet ambassador to New Zealand, Vsevolod Sofinsky, after he allegedly handed over a large sum of money to a member of the New Zealand Socialist Unity Party and was recorded by security intelligence officers doing so (Gustafson, 2013, pp. 94–95). These are different cases that raise different questions about the role of the state and its security agents in protecting the country from espionage, subversion or, indeed, terrorism. In the Sutch case, the actions were judged by independent analysis to be illegitimate, despite many subsequent claims and contested new evidence that Sutch was an agent for the Soviet Union (Bennetts, 2006; Kitchin, 2014). In the Sofinsky case, the facts were clearer, but the policy consequences of expelling him were closely debated by the New Zealand government. The two cases have continuing relevance in the discussion around the legitimate role of the state in working to keep the country safe, and the best security policy approach. In recent decades, the concept of national security and the threats to it have evolved considerably. Omand (2010, p. 17) gives a definition that puts the security focus firmly on citizens and their relationship with their government: “a state of trust on the part of the citizen that the risks of everyday life, whether from man-made threats or impersonal hazards, are being adequately managed to the extent that there is confidence that normal life can continue”. In 2011, New Zealand used the following central thought in its official definition (New Zealand Government, 2011, p. 3): “the condition which permits the citizens of a state to go about their business confidently, free from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life”. The New Zealand definition goes on to explain that security encompasses the preparedness, protection and preservation of people and of property and information, both tangible and intangible. Omand (2010, pp. 10–12) traces the shift in the concept of security since the end of the Cold War (and the commencement of the war on terror) as moving from protection from major disruptive events, through an emphasis on the need to anticipate such events and develop mitigating strategies, to an approach that focuses on resilience as the key component in the equation. He (2010, p. 9) notes that the state has moved from a concept of “security” in the sense that secrets needed to be kept and the state’s activities needed to be hidden, to one of “protection” which argues that if protection is achieved

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the citizen is indeed made secure and if the citizen is secure, so too is the state. There is a clear shift here from protecting the state itself to the active protection of the state’s citizens. The shift reflects a change from the assumption that a secure state was sufficient in itself to safeguard citizens to the premise that citizens should be protected directly by the state. In part, this shift has occurred as concepts of human security have achieved greater prominence in the security discourse (Paris, 2001) and in part it must be a reaction to the terrorist attacks that in modern times began in Europe in the 1970s, and achieved international prominence in 2001 with the declaration of a “war on terror”, reinforced most recently by the re-assertion by President Hollande of France that “we are at war” with the Islamic state (Breeden, 2015).

Intelligence Whatever specific elements of national life are included in concepts of security (and the New Zealand government has a particularly comprehensive list that also takes in the international environment, the economy and the environment), there will in every case be a need for intelligence, for information that informs decision-making. As Cline (1976, p. xii) notes: “a free nation with accurate knowledge of the world around it, particularly of hostile and secretive closed societies, is more likely to survive and prosper than one that relies on wishful thinking”. There is little doubt that there are conflicts between the secrecy needs of the state as it attempts to keep us secure across the wide range of “security” components and the more limited understanding held by many of what security does and should entail. This more limited understanding is perhaps especially prevalent in a state such as New Zealand, which faces no physical or traditional form of threat and where there is scepticism in some quarters that it faces any threat at all. This conflict goes to the heart of the issue. Security as a concept is contestable. And it is contested. One area of contestation is over the state’s collection and use of “intelligence”. At its heart, intelligence is information that has been processed through a system so that it becomes relevant to the needs of policy makers. It (Omand, 2010, pp. 22–25) improves the quality of decision-making by reducing ignorance; helps build situation awareness; allows for the development of explanations about past events, and helps predict future events.

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There are caveats around each of these points, but the overall theme remains. When framed in terms of analysed information, intelligence cannot be considered as anything but a necessity. Every aspect of the state’s attempt to provide security, whether at the level of the state or of the citizenry, needs good information upon which to make decisions. This is so no matter whether it is the size of the armed forces of a putative enemy, the likelihood of a major flood in a given area, or the intentions of non-state actors as they attempt to alter political outcomes using non-constitutional means that is being addressed. Information is required for action. But “intelligence” has other meanings in common understanding if not in the lexicon of intelligence professionals. And, other understandings can lead to contested and contentious issues. The first alternative understanding relates to the nature of the information held or used by the government. To many, the fact that the government holds secrets and collects other people’s secrets is absolutely wrong, perhaps with some caveats relating to personal information allowing the citizen to deal with the state and the need to keep that kind of legitimately collected information secure. Otherwise, for these groups, there is no legitimacy in either collecting or protecting information, and the practice of intelligence is thus to be abhorred (Scott and Hughes, 2008). The second problematic understanding of “intelligence” relates to the collection of information. Clearly, information has to be collected; it generally does not just appear. However, the transformation of the intelligence task from its focus on external enemies, primarily on armed forces and the secret agents of foreign states, to the collection of information about the possibility that citizens will support ideologies devoted to removing the state by force has altered the collection target somewhat. Thus, according to ManninghamBuller (2012, p. 39), “…some threats to us are obvious, [but] some of the most dangerous are not. In order to expose and counter such threats a state needs to acquire intelligence about them”. The changed focus of the collection effort comes alongside the rise in professional, commercial and social uses of the virtual world that makes it difficult, at best, to keep private information private. Furthermore, the collection of information can involve the surveillance of citizens, whether through visual means such as following someone or watching their house, or electronically through intercepting communications and finding traces of people in

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the virtual world. All these methods are problematic to many, not just those in New Zealand. Intelligence agencies argue that the new technological environment, which can be used by enemies of the state, must also be able to be used by the state itself in its efforts to protect itself and its citizens. This is a fair argument. Opponents of state collection, sometimes characterised as the rise of the “surveillance state”, argue that the state should not be collecting information about citizens unless there is clear prima facie evidence of wrong-doing or attempted wrong-doing, and that in any case the state cannot be trusted either to limit its collection activities or to protect the information it does collect. The revelations from the so-called Snowden leaks tend to make both points. Herman (2003) and Omand (2006) rehearse the issues involved. Arguments around a “right to privacy” usually assert that the state should keep out of the private affairs of citizens. However, we should note that there is no absolute right to privacy. The UN (1948, Article 12) highlights the right to freedom from “arbitrary interference with privacy”; “arbitrary” is important here, and Europe (1950, Article 8.2) defines the right to a private life that should not be interfered with “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security…”. In other words, necessity justifies intrusions on privacy, but necessity must be tempered with proportionality. In all democratic jurisdictions, there are national discussions about how “necessity” is defined, what is “proportionate” in this area, and who decides.

The New Zealand Case Perspectives on the collection of intelligence cover as much ground in New Zealand as elsewhere. There are arguments that “in this day and age” an intelligence collection and analysis system should not be needed at all, be of limited scope, and should not need blanket carte blanche authority to collect (Grant, nd). This argument seems to rely on a belief either that the world has entered some kind of post-modern age in which there are no enemies, or that New Zealand itself is so remote from the world’s concerns that it can divorce itself from it because decisions about New Zealand’s place in it does not need the kind of information gained by intelligence activities. A softer critique is that this line of argument calls for caution and transparency in the process, even as the threat becomes ever more sophisticated.

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A second line of argument is that New Zealand acts immorally in that it collects intelligence against “friends”. Evidence of New Zealand’s collection plans are second-hand (Hager, 1996; Bushnell and Wilson, 2014), but it would be surprising if, given the purposes of intelligence described earlier by Ormond (2010), New Zealand did not collect both for its own purposes (perhaps against “friends” although that definition is difficult in the international relations and international security arena) and on behalf of its close intelligence partners. A slight variation of that argument is that New Zealand collects information about “powerful states”, which would be dangerous (Hager, 2015), or that it collects against inappropriate targets for inappropriate purposes. There are also arguments about what New Zealand does with the information it possesses. The fact that it shares with the electronic intelligence cooperative grouping of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (the Five-Eyes), is held to be bad in itself, or bad because it means that New Zealand shares the blame for any bad actions committed by a partner agency, or dangerous if it might make New Zealand a target as an ally of the other countries. Widening the problems with sharing is the revelation that, as part of international activities against transnational terrorist groups, information is shared with states that do not hold the same values as New Zealand and that have poor records in human rights actions. New Zealand’s information, the argument goes, could be used in ways that would not be allowed in New Zealand. Other concerns are that, even if collection against foreign targets could be justified, New Zealander’s communications might be intercepted as a byproduct of legitimate activities and there is no protection against this. There are even stronger concerns that New Zealand’s agencies may target citizens in direct violations of the law and that the oversight system, such as it is, is wilfully weak and certainly not weighted to keep the state out of people’s lives. All of these concerns about New Zealand’s collection activities may be characterised under five headings: • Moral, it’s wrong for New Zealand; • Normative, New Zealand should not do this kind of thing; • Prudential; if New Zealand does this, we might suffer either reputational or material damage; • Legal because it is likely to contravene New Zealand laws; and • Fearful of the system that should be protecting New Zealand citizens.

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Most of these arguments could have an element of logic or reason on their side, but only if the beliefs are that the New Zealand government is out of control, determined to do what it wants, and that there is no independent oversight or accountability systems in place at all. None of these beliefs are sustainable. The question of government determination is ultimately one of politics and there are well-developed mechanisms to hold governments accountable. Independent oversight and accountability however deserve more consideration.

Oversight and Accountability The concerns held by many have validity at some level and all need to be taken seriously by New Zealand policymakers if the state’s intelligence activities, especially when collecting information about citizens, are to retain legitimacy. Two sometimes competing imperatives need to be reconciled. The first is that the New Zealand state does in the course of its role as guardian of the country’s citizens, territory and freedoms, legitimately need to be able to gather information, process it, act on it when necessary, and sometimes share it with other countries. The second is that the New Zealand state has to ensure that not only does it not exceed its legal authorities, but also that it can be seen to meet them in practice. We must first acknowledge that for some observers the New Zealand state should never indulge in covert activity domestically and it should never form intelligence relationships with other states. People who hold this view are unlikely to be persuaded to accept any justification for state activities in this area. Others may hold a different position. For them, raisons d’état are more important than any concerns about civil liberties, or the nature of the countries with whom New Zealand has intelligence relationships. The suggestions in this section will appeal to neither of these groups. For the rest, it is important to endeavour to square this particular circle. We need to acknowledge that too much “intelligence” without accountability is likely to make us just as insecure (certainly from a human security perspective) as will too much accountability at the expense of intelligence. There seem to be four areas in New Zealand that need to be addressed. They are • The activities of the intelligence agencies; • The law that underpins their activities;

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• Verification that the law is being followed in spirit as well as in the letter; and • The culture within the agencies against which the activities are undertaken. At least two of these areas are susceptible to continual, formal and independent oversight around matters of fact, and all of them to independent judgement and public commentary. We should welcome both oversight and commentary. Oversight is necessary because the intelligence system will inevitably start to act for its own convenience and in its own interests (no matter how alert the leaders of the system are) without it, and will eventually have no legitimacy. Commentary is necessary because outside voices can often raise unwelcome truths that may not be seen from within the system. Ideally, commentary, no matter how misguided, should be welcomed, listened to, and objectively assessed as any other piece of information would be, and acted on if necessary. Few disagree as to the need for oversight of intelligence activities and for accountability to be held by the government for the activities of its agencies. There is less agreement as to what is necessary and what is sufficient. Born and Wills (2012) have a toolkit. Chesterman (2011) notes that not only must the law address what is collected, but also how the collection is used. Furthermore, he calls for accountability within and independent oversight of the intelligence system (2011, pp. 205–222). Anderson (2015) lays down what he describes as five principles: Trust in the system to work effectively; minimum “no go” areas; limited powers to be held by the agencies themselves; clarity and transparency of the agencies’ activities and a unified approach is applying oversight mechanisms. For her part, Manningham-Buller (2012, pp. 36–44) argues that civil liberties are as important as “security” and that security is as important as civil liberties. We cannot have one without the other, but any intrusion into privacy must be “necessary and proportionate to the threat it aims to counter”. All these tend to beg the question of determining what is necessary, what is proportionate, and who decides. At one level, it is the New Zealand Parliament that decides these big questions because it helps to make the law. In late 2016, the opportunity to refine the law relating to the intelligence and security agencies has again arisen with the introduction into Parliament of the New Zealand Intelligence and Security Bill 2016. Open debate within the country and within the Parliament seem to be the obvious ways that we get the laws that collectively work for us. No doubt the final answer will not be satisfactory to many, but they will probably be a

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minority within parliament. That is the nature of the parliamentary system. Arguably, a government thinking prudentially will not wish to alienate too many voters by using its majority to pass unpopular legislation, but equally a government has a duty to do what it believes is necessary to ensure security. A transparent process is the best assurance we have that legislation is fit for the purpose it was designed for, but it is no guarantee. New Zealand, like most Western states, has both parliamentary and independent and quasi-judicial statutory oversight. Parliamentary oversight is through an Intelligence and Security Committee (of parliament), while independent oversight is through a Commissioner of Security Warrants who advises the Responsible Minister, and in conjunction with the Minister issues surveillance warrants allowing the Security Intelligence Service to conduct surveillance. The Commissioner has to have been a judge of the High Court of New Zealand. Additionally, an Inspector General of Intelligence and Security is responsible for ensuring compliance and investigating complaints about the conduct of the intelligence community (NZ Government, 2015). This is a considerable range of oversight bodies, to which can be added the various central agencies focused on general oversight of the public sector: the Auditor-General; the Privacy Commissioner; and the Ombudsman. There are criticisms of oversight systems. Horton (2015) summarises these. He argues, oversight systems do not work because they are ineffectual, can be by-passed, and are captured and probably lied to by the agencies themselves. Furthermore, even if nominally independent, selection of the members of the oversight agencies is from a group that is inclined to accept conventional wisdom and not to challenge executive agencies. This argument, if valid, points to potentially greater problems within the body politic. If independent watchdogs in any area cannot be trusted to be independent, much of this discussion becomes redundant. There is no evidence, however, that the statutory independent bodies are anything but independent. Issues around the spirit of the law and the culture within the agencies are more difficult, but not insuperable. They require judgement (which is, or should be, one of the characteristics of those working within the oversight agencies), and they require agencies to be receptive of ideas generated externally. The oversight agencies should make it their business to examine the working culture of the system and its people, and the system should encourage not only examination from the formal oversight agencies, but also from independent

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and non-official scholars and analysts. The latter is difficult. Because of the nature of the work, people outside the system cannot comment with full knowledge of the system’s activities. They will probably make egregious errors of fact or interpretation. However, that should not matter. These analyses need to be accepted, objectively examined and acted upon if they reveal weaknesses of process and where other information (perhaps not publicly available) does not contradict the analyses. Although the New Zealand intelligence agencies work within a legal framework, society still needs guarantees that the agencies follow the law, and society by and large will not accept a “trust us” argument from the government. This is recognised in all Western democracies and all have a system of oversight of the intelligence and security agencies that is at least formally independent of government or political control. New Zealand’s system is as robust as any, and is probably sufficient for its size. There have been a number of reviews of the intelligence system, all of which have found problems with different aspects of it (Murdoch, 2009; Kitteridge, 2013; Cullen and Reddy, 2016). These problems and issues are addressed, by and large, as they come to light.

Conclusion There is nothing startling in the preceding discussion. It may be summed up by two quotations: “The balance to be struck is not between security and rights …but between different rights within an overall rights framework” (Omand, 2010, p. 267), or more succinctly: “trust but verify” (Reagan in Shipler, 1987). New Zealand has an intelligence system, as it should. If it is to benefit national policy makers, whether those developing international trade policy or those responsible for ensuring the country is kept safe, the system must be able to collect and analyse information, and disseminate its conclusions, all within a separate and independent system of checks and balances, so as to ensure the process contributes to the national good rather than being used for narrow political or other purposes. Assertions that the intelligence system is unaccountable need to be supported by evidence if they are to be taken seriously. New Zealand’s intelligence system has suffered its share of failures, especially in its process, in recent years; no doubt earlier as well. If the system were truly unaccountable, we would have seen few changes in the structure, its processes or its oversight mechanisms. Instead, there has been a steady stream of reports and reviews on

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different components of the system, some mentioned in this chapter, which have prompted changes to the system’s legal foundations and its processes. These are the hallmarks of a resilient and accountable system.

References Anderson, D (2015). A Question of Trust. Report of the Investigatory Powers Review Presented to the Prime Minister pursuant to section 7 of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Bennetts, CH (2006). Spy. Auckland: Random House New Zealand. Born, H and Wills, A (eds.) (2012). Overseeing Intelligence Services: A Handbook. Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Breeden, A (16 November 2015). Hollande Says “France Is at War’. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/live/paris-attacks-live-updates/hollandesays-france-is-at-war/ [29 January 2016]. Bushnell, P and Wilson, G. (lead reviewers) (2014). Review of the Agencies in the Core New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC). Performance Improvement Framework, Unclassified Summary. Wellington: New Zealand Government. Chesterman, S (2011). One Nation under Surveillance: A New Social Contract to Defend Freedom without Sacrificing Liberty. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cline, RS (1976). Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA. Washington: Acropolis Books. Cullen, M and Reddy, P (2016). Independent Review of Intelligence and Security. Wellington: New Zealand Government. Grant, K (n.d.). Submission of Dr Karen Grant on the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill. Wellington: New Zealand Parliament. http://www.parliament.nz/ resource/en-nz/51SCFDT_EVI_00DBHOH_BILL60721_1_A413343/b0eb01 0855ad9e1bffe2c302c7dfa6a410ba6b87 [30 January 2016]. Gustafson, B (2013). His Way: A Biography of Robert Muldoon. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Hager, N (1996). Secret Power: New Zealand’s Role in the International Spy Network. Nelson: Craig Potton Publishing. Hager, N (20 April 2015). Radio New Zealand Morning Report. Herman, M (2003). Counter-terrorism, information technology and intelligence change. Intelligence and National Security 18(4), 40–58. Horton, M (2015). Anti-bases campaign’s submission to independent review of intelligence and security. http://lists.cafca.org.nz/mail.cgi/archive/nz-news/2015081 4095127/ [30 January 2016]. Kitchin, P (11 August 2014). Fresh twist in 40-year-old Cold War spy mystery. Dominion Post. http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/10369208/Fresh-twist-in40-year-old-Cold-War-spy-mystery [29 January 2016].

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Kitteridge, R (2013). Review of Compliance at the Government Communications Security Bureau. Wellington: New Zealand Government. Manningham-Buller, E (2012). Securing Freedom. London: Profile Books. Murdoch, S (2009). Intelligence Agencies Review. Report to the State Services Commissioner. Wellington. New Zealand Government (2011). New Zealand’s National Security System. Wellington: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. http://www.dpmc.govt. nz/sites/all/files/publications/national-security-system.pdf [30 January 2016]. New Zealand Government (2015). New Zealand intelligence community. http:// www.nzic.govt.nz/ [30 January 2016]. Omand, D (2006). Ethical guidelines in using secret intelligence for public security. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4), 613–628. Omand, D (2010). Securing the State. New York: Columbia University Press. Paris, R (2001). Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air? International Security 26(2), 87–102. Powles, G (1976). The Sutch case. A report for the New Zealand Government. http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/media/SutchOmbudsmanReport.pdf Rolfe, J (2003). Threats from abroad: organizing for the secret war. New Zealand International Review, 28(3), 16–19. Scott, L and Hughes, RG (2008). Intelligence, Crises and Security: Prospects and Retrospects. Abingdon: Routledge. Shipler, DK (9 December 1987). Reagan and Gorbachev Sign Missile Treaty and vow to work for greater reductions. New York Times. United Nations. (10 December 1948). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Paris.

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CHAPTER 22 Foreign Policy Realignment, Issue Linkage and Institutional Lag: The Case of the New Zealand Intelligence Community Paul G. Buchanan

Introduction This chapter examines the subject of institutional lag following foreign policy realignment, using as an example the “core” institutions of the New Zealand intelligence community (NZIC) — the Security Intelligence Service (SIS), Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) and National Assessments Bureau (NAB) — in the post–Cold War era. The chapter argues that New Zealand (NZ) intelligence agencies have been slow to adapt to changes brought by the country’s foreign policy realignment in the mid-1990s as well as broader changes in the geopolitical and technological landscape. The study focuses on the post–Cold War period because modern New Zealand’s intelligence community was born of and deeply influenced by the Cold War, which made the latter’s termination a milestone in the history of NZIC. As will be elaborated ahead, how the NZIC responded to the changes wrought by the end of the Cold War and subsequent geopolitical shifts were not necessarily attuned to the actualities of the moment. Instead it reflected the clash between old ways of viewing things, reliance on foreign intelligence partners (and their perspectives), as overlaid on the practical necessities of coping 373

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with new technologies, areas of focus, non-traditional threats and changes in foreign policy orientation. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section explicates the concepts used as foundational stones of the argument. The chapter then proceeds to brief case overviews before concluding with an explanation as to why things happened as they did.

Institutional Lag Institutional lag refers to the time gap between external events or exogenous conditions and institutional (bureaucratic) adjustment or response. There is varying depth to the delay in organizational change given historical and contextual conditions both internal and external to the agencies involved. Influenced by the work of Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) on cultural lag, the term “institutional lag” was coined by philosopher and economist Charles Ayers in his Theory of Economic Progress (1944). Ayres propounded a theory of “institutional lag” whereby technological changes inevitably kept economic technology one step ahead of inherited sociocultural institutions. “The process of Veblenian ‘evolution’ Ayres envisaged was that technological changes were generated by spurts of instinctive inventive activity to innovate in technological processes, but that the relatively slow and inherited socioeconomic structures would be maladapted to these changes. With glacier-like gradualness, institutions would eventually respond to the new technology. However, by the time they adjusted, the next round of inventive activity would have been skipping along further ahead, thus maintaining a permanent lag and incongruity between social structures and economic technology.”1 Used as a means of explaining the delayed response of firms to technological change in a cycle of perpetual catch-up, the concept has now been expanded to include slow or belated public bureaucracy responses to cultural, socioeconomic, political and diplomatic change (as well as technological change). More specifically, policy shifts announced by governments as new initiatives

1 Anonymous

correspondent. Phillip H. quoted in Smith (2010).

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often occur before the public agencies responsible for implementing them have undertaken the necessary organizational reforms. Delays in bureaucratic responses to shifts in environmental conditions extend to foreign policy and security. This is particularly true when nation-states reconfigure their international orientation due to external or internal factors (such as when war prompts alterations in trade regimes or domestic politics). New Zealand’s response to the elimination of British export preferences in the early 1970s and declaration of its non-nuclear status in the mid-1980s are examples of external and internally motivated foreign policy realignment. Foreign policy realignments can be brought about precipitously or after much deliberation. The former is often reactive to externalities, whereas the latter is the product of calculations of longer-term costs and benefits. Either way, the institutional apparatus underpinning the old status quo has to adapt to the change in orientation, and that may take time, especially if there is bureaucratic resistance within the affected agencies. Two further syndromes compound the problem of institutional lag following foreign policy realignment. On the one hand, there is the issue of institutional rippling, whereby a government opts for realignment but does not involve agencies other than those most immediately and directly affected by and involved in the shift. Whereas the diplomatic corps and foreign affairs bureaucracy are integrally involved in implementing the details of foreign policy realignment, other affected government agencies can be slower to follow and may do so in uncoordinated and uneven fashion. This may be seen in military and intelligence agencies as well as organisations such as New Zealand Customs and Immigration New Zealand, which are often not fully involved in the decision-making process leading to a foreign policy realignment (e.g., immigration adapting to the passenger processing requirements occasioned by new visa schemes or Customs and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [MAF] having to confront the import inspection challenges resultant from new trade agreements). That brings into play the second syndrome, that of institutional “depth”. Institutional depth refers to the historical legacies of institutional tradition and practice. Some public agencies, such as the police and the military, have long traditions and standards of practice. Other relatively new agencies, such

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as those involved in the oversight and regulation of information technology and telecommunications, are less constrained by the accumulated “weight” of institutional mores and practices when confronting significant change in their operating environments. Institutional rippling often begins with agencies directly involved in the policy transition and “newer” agencies lacking in relative institutional depth, which are then followed by agencies less directly involved in the realignment decision and/or which have greater institutional depth. The overall effect is that institutional lag becomes a process as well as a distinct organizational phenomenon, with some agencies suffering less institutional lag than others. In sum, significant change in a nation’s foreign relations often leads to a process of institutional lag that is determined largely by the relative institutional depth and degree of involvement of the agencies affected.

Foreign Policy Realignment Foreign policy realignment refers to a policy shift in a nation-state’s geopolitical and diplomatic relations. Such realignments may be sudden and/or forced upon states or they may be the product of lengthy deliberation. The end of the Cold War is an example of an external event that produced rather quick foreign policy realignments on the part of many states, while New Zealand’s decision to continue to broaden its trade relations in the 1990s is an example of an internally directed foreign policy realignment that was deliberate and measured in light of systemic changes in the international environment over the previous decade. Foreign policy realignment does not occur easily. Whether they are consulted in advance or not, government agencies must adapt to the required change in posture. This can well involve significant and discrete organizational and policy changes as well as alterations in their relationship with private sector and public interest groups, some of which may be resistant to change. The end of the Cold War illustrates the reality of institutional lag in the wake of foreign policy realignment. Although the international community first shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar system, then to a loose multipolar configuration, many defence and security organizations, to include intelligence agencies on both sides of the Berlin Wall, continued to view the world and organize themselves according to Cold War precepts. It was only when these precepts were shown to be inadequate in the post–Cold War era that military

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and intelligence agencies undertook the necessary organizational, doctrinal and perspective changes. This trend was evident in the NZIC. The most obvious recent example of the lag in intelligence community adjustments to the shifting world order was the failure to recognize and respond to the emergence of non-state irregular warfare actors holding pre-modern ideological views. These actors were either ignored or their threat downplayed in favour of ongoing focus on more traditional forms of inter-state espionage, to include continued emphasis on sophisticated technical means of intelligence gathering against high-tech opponents rather than the human intelligence skills required to penetrate smaller groups using low-tech methods of communication.

Issue Linkage Issue linkage in international relations refers to the tying together of two or more foreign policy concerns in a “holistic” approach to bilateral and multilateral relations. During the Cold War, the most important example of issue linkage was that of trade and security, whereby security partners on both sides of the ideological divide traded preferentially with each other, thereby reinforcing their alliance commitments. After the Cold War, there was a movement towards the uncoupling of trade and security. Australia and New Zealand are good cases of this type of uncoupling. This was primarily due to two factors, these being the loosening of security alliances in a unipolar security environment dominated by the United States and the globalization of production, communications and exchange connected by international commodity chains (Buchanan and Lin, 2006). The key to success of this new paradigm was to ensure that the new trade and security relationships were not juxtaposed in a contrary or contradictory manner, for example, by attempting to trade with a state at war while maintaining security relations with its main antagonist. So long as this did not occur, states were free to loosen the linkages between their trade relations and national security.

The New Zealand Intelligence Community Three “core” intelligence agencies in New Zealand: the SIS; GCSB; NAB (formerly titled the External Assessments Bureau), which is part of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), are central to this analysis.

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A number of other agencies that serve as intelligence collection and analysis units are also important. The GCSB is a signals (SIGINT) and technical (TECHINT) intelligence gathering agency that is part of the Anglophone Five Eyes alliance. The primary focus of the GCSB is foreign intelligence collection but in specific circumstances and increasingly as of late it can undertake domestic SIGINT and TECHINT work in a “partner” role at the behest of other New Zealand government agencies (such as the police or customs). The SIS is responsible for domestic intelligence gathering, counter-intelligence operations and foreign human intelligence collection. It also has a “hand in glove” relationship with other New Zealand security agencies when required. The NAB is the ultimate recipient of intelligence streams from all of the NZIC, where it prepares assessments for the prime minister within the confines of the DPMC. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 produced a proliferation of intelligence “cells” in a host of New Zealand public agencies. New Zealand Police, Immigration New Zealand, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Enterprise, New Zealand Customs Service and Treasury have their own specialized units. There are also interagency intelligence cells such as the Counter-Terrorism Assessment Group (CTAG), Security and Risk Group (SRG), Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG) and the National Assessments Committee (NAC), with the intelligence from all of these agencies as well as the SIS and GCSB flowing to the NAB, which in turn answers to the Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on Intelligence and Security (CSSIS). In total, there are 12 intelligence agencies encompassed with the NZIC. A significant question is whether the proliferation of these intelligence agencies has increased the accuracy, efficiency and reliability of the information obtained and processed by the NZIC. That raises the issue of how the NZIC sees the world around it, how it frames and assesses threats and how it responds to them. In order to determine this, it is important to note the research methodology underpinning this analysis.

Methodology The focus is on the SIS, GCSB and NAB, because the first two are the lead human and signals/technical intelligence agencies in New Zealand and the latter is the ultimate intelligence assessment and evaluation unit in the country. To study the perspectives of these agencies on international security matters, the

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essay uses the secondary literature dedicated to the theme as well as summary diachronic analysis of the annual reports of the NAB, GCSB and NZSIS (where available), which postulate what are perceived as New Zealand’s most pressing security and intelligence concerns. The summary analysis is diachronic in that it is both chronological and covers four separate governments: the Jim Bolger-led National government from 1990 to 1996, the Jenny Shipley-led National/New Zealand First government of 1996–1999, the Helen Clark-led Labour government from 1999 to 2008 and the John Key-led National government of 2008–2015. Viewing core NZIC assessments over time and across governments allows us to determine if there were variations in threat perception under each or if they remained constant regardless of who was in power.

The Bolger Years The Bolger government faced significant shifts in its domestic and foreign environment. Domestically, it inherited and was charged with deepening marketoriented economic reforms initiated by its Labour predecessor. Externally, it witnessed the official end of the Cold War. It focused on the former rather than the latter for, arguably, two reasons. First, because the transition from the welfare state to a market economy was contested, controversial and polarizing, something that demanded the full attention of policy-makers as they embarked on efforts to “deepen” and institutionalize structural reforms. Second, because the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its Warsaw Pact allies was not seen as directly or fundamentally altering New Zealand’s (largely proNATO) foreign policy orientation, regardless of the tensions between New Zealand, France and the United States over the issue of nuclear weapons testing and the presence of nuclear powered and armed warships in the South Pacific. This had an interesting effect on the two main intelligence agencies. Under the terms of the Five Eyes signals intelligence alliance “reciprocity agreement”, in which New Zealand collected and shared information on the Pacific region (and elsewhere when designated) in exchange for global intelligence collected from its larger signals partners, the GCSB basically served as the local storefront for this alliance. It continued to focus its attention on targets that were mainly of interest to the partners rather than New Zealand itself. This included

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the communications of former Warsaw Pact members as well as Pacific and Eastern Asian nations and Iran in particular, with the emphasis placed on military, political and diplomatic communications. It included (and includes) monitoring of French communications in the Pacific.2 It was important for New Zealand to continue to support its Anglophone partners in the Five Eyes signals intelligence network because that was one of, if not the primary method of secure and trustworthy contact after the diplomatic and military fallout from New Zealand’s 1985 non-nuclear policy (which had the effect of banning nuclear powered and armed vessels from New Zealand waters, which, in turn, led to the United States excluding New Zealand from the Australia–New Zealand–US (ANZUS) defence alliance). For the next decade or so, New Zealand and Australia continued to have a downscaled military-to-military relationship independent of the US–Australia bilateral ties. Since ANZUS was a trilateral military agreement, the suspension of US–New Zealand ties officially ended it. The SIS likewise maintained a special relationship with its Anglophone partners, but given its small size and domestic orientation this was not as crucial to alliance relations as was the reciprocity agreement within the Five Eyes. However, when the Berlin Wall fell the SIS was left without a mission. Its primary focus was (and is) domestic espionage, and in the Cold War period that meant identifying “reds under beds”. With that concern removed, the SIS was hard pressed to justify its existence beyond assisting the police on criminal matters, at least when it came to domestic intelligence gathering and counter-espionage (since the thrust of SIS counter-espionage efforts during the Cold War were directed at Soviet intelligence gathering activities in New Zealand and, in the wake of the Rainbow Warrior bombing by French operatives in Auckland harbour, on French clandestine activities in the South Pacific). The SIS assigned itself the task of uncovering new domestic threats, and fortuitously for the agency this was provided by the move to market-driven economics. Besides an ongoing interest in criminal enterprise, opponents to the market-oriented policy shift became the new focus of domestic intelligence

2The

French Pacific Fleet is headquartered in Papeete and the French Pacific Army is headquartered in Noumea. Concern with French nuclear testing and instability in former French territories drove New Zealand’s interest in them.

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concern. These came in the form of unionists, environmentalists, human rights, fair trade and social welfare activists, community organisers, Maori separatists, anarchists and other domestic Left activists unconnected to the former Soviet Union and its satellites. The trouble for both spy agencies was that with the end of the Cold War the ideological conflict between East and West largely died, especially with the adoption of capitalist economics by former communist countries such as the People’s Republic of China and Vietnam. This meant the end of “exporting” revolution by supporting indigenous Left groups, particularly those who advocated armed struggle. As for the French, the arrest, trial and conviction of two French agents over the Rainbow Warrior bombing signalled the downsizing of French intelligence operations in New Zealand in exchange for improved diplomatic relations. This meant that the SIS had little foreignbased espionage or subversion to be concerned about when it came to domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. The result was that threat assessments provided by NAB’s predecessor, the then External Assessment Bureau (EAB) focused on domestic actors, regional instability and criminal enterprise. Little emphasis was placed on foreign conflicts further afield and little to no mention was made of terrorism beyond the potential for low-level violence on the part of domestic militants.

The Shipley Government The first elected government under the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system the Jenny Shipley-led National/New Zealand First coalition (Bolger was ousted in a cabinet coup some months after the 1996 election and replaced by Shipley), deepened market-oriented policies, the most significant being making trade the centrepiece of foreign policy and developing export markets in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. This ran in parallel with the further opening of the New Zealand market to foreign imports and investment. What this meant in practice was significant foreign policy realignment, arguably one that built on and yet was more significant than those occasioned by the end of the special trade relationship with the United Kingdom and the declaration of nuclear free status. Foreign policy otherwise ran in concert with the “independent and autonomous” stance favoured by both major parties, with continued emphasis on non-proliferation, disarmament and peacetime military

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operations (particularly regional conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping). But the dye was recast: henceforth New Zealand would put trade diversification at the centre of its foreign policy and it no longer would privilege the Anglophone world when it came to commercial relations. There was no “issue linkage” between the shift in foreign policy and the orientation of the NZIC. Issue linkage is pursued in order to provide coherency in the approach to foreign affairs. The challenge for New Zealand was that its intelligence orientation did not match the new trade-diversification approach to the international system. Instead, it remained focused on pre-existing domestic threats and the external preoccupations of its foreign partners. The problem was that its security/intelligence orientation was not congruent with its trade orientation. Not only did that leave it blind on security-related matters that were crucial to the New Zealand economy, but it also counterpoised the security perspectives of its allies against those of its main trading partner. The GCSB focus continued to respond to the strategic requirements of its Five Eyes partners, especially the United States and United Kingdom. It shared eavesdropping duties in the South Pacific with Australia and traded selected intelligence with France even as it monitored French military and diplomatic communications in the region. The emphasis did shift to include communications in failed, failing and rogue states and those of non-state armed actors. But the mainstay of its eavesdropping and intercepts were focused on South Pacific states, North and Southeast Asia, extra-regional diplomatic communications, international and non-governmental organizations and telemetry from nonFive Eye satellites that disclosed military, particularly naval, communications (Hager, 1996). The SIS maintained the focus it had under the preceding government, to include monitoring of anti-status quo ideological activists, Asian criminal organizations and foreign spy networks operating in New Zealand and the English-speaking South Pacific. According to various annual reports put out by the SIS, its foreign intelligence collection efforts centred on the South Pacific, specifically focusing on domestic sources of instability and the growing influence of extra-regional actors. Foreign terrorism was not a priority even though it began to impact on New Zealand’s major security partners such as the United States. All of this was reflected in the EAB reports during this period.

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The Clark Government The Fifth Labour-led government headed by Helen Clark looked to be serious about abandoning New Zealand’s Euro- and Anglo-centric view of the world and embracing the notions of trade internationalism, security multilateralism and a diplomatic independence marked by a commitment to human rights, non-proliferation and disarmament, regional development in the South Pacific and environmental sustainability. This was evident, among other things, by the Clark government’s cancellation of a purchase order for F-16 tactical aircraft to replace the aging A4 fleet, which left New Zealand without a combat air wing. It reduced the defence budget across the board and ramped up the trade component of its foreign affairs bureaucracy as it moved to expand and deepen the initiatives begun under the Shipley government. Initially, the NZIC perspective did not change significantly after the Clark government was installed in 1999, although increased attention was given to international disarmament, non-proliferation and support for peace-keeping and military missions other than war. Both the GCSB and SIS continued a priority focus on instability in the South Pacific while tending to the requirements of foreign partners on the one hand (GCSB) and the necessities of domestic espionage on the other (SIS). But 9/11 changed this. The unconventional attacks by al-Qaeda on New York and Washington DC, precipitated President George W. Bush’s global “war on terrorism”. The United States opted for pre-emptive war on al-Qaeda, saber rattling at the so-called “Axis of Evil” and other rogue states, and started a war of aggression on Iraq. It sent out a call for solidarity and assistance to the international community, and given its traditional ties to the United States, New Zealand could not refuse the request. The question for the Clark government was how to do so without betraying the Left wing of the Labour Party and other Left parties in Parliament (especially the Greens). The answer was found in image management and quiet diplomacy. NZ sent a company of engineers and the NZSAS (incognito) to Basra and both the NZSAS and a company sized Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)to Afghanistan as part of its contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It also contributed intelligence assets from both the GCSB and SIS to each deployment (Hager 2011). The public relations cover for these missions emphasized the humanitarian aspects of the NZDF deployments and denied or downplayed the combat and intelligence aspects of NZ’s role in both countries.

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Security conservatives in the NZDF, MFAT, NAB and DPMC urged the Clark government to use the opportunity to finally repair ties with the United States, strained since the 1985 non-nuclear declaration. This extended to supporting specialised defence niche businesses based in New Zealand, but was primarily centred on improving bilateral military-to-military and intelligence links with the United States as well as strengthening security training and cooperation agreements with Australia, United Kingdom and other Western powers (including France). For the intelligence community, the impact was two-fold. The SIS re-directed its energies towards counter-terrorism, specifically in detecting socalled “home grown” jihadis who might be planning attacks on New Zealand soil as well as those who supported al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremist groups financially or politically (such as via the use of non-profit organizations as fronts for extremist recruiting or for sending money to al-Qaeda-affiliated non-governmental organisations [NGOs]). Later, under the Key government, this concern turned to the subject of so-called returning “foreign fighters”, that is, New Zealand citizens and permanent residents who left for Middle Eastern war zones and were suspected of trying to return to New Zealand having been radicalized and trained by violent extremist groups like the Islamic State. This tasking extended to monitoring the activities of suspected Islamist extremists in the English-speaking South Pacific and became the dominant preoccupation of its domestic espionage program. The problem with the sudden focus on domestic Islamic terrorists was that there were few to be found. This led to some awkward moments, such as when the 2005 SIS annual report claimed that the primary threat to domestic security were “home-grown” jihadis and al-Qaeda supporters, only to have the 2006 report, under a new Director, abandon the claim entirely in favour of foreign espionage on New Zealand soil (Buchanan, 2007). Likewise, there was a brief media frenzy about a New Zealand-based plot to bomb targets in Australia to which the government replied cryptically (thereby fuelling public speculation about local jihadis), but in the end not a single person was detained, much less charged for Islamist-inspired terrorist offenses during the entire term of the Fifth Labour government. The SIS continued monitoring non-Islamic domestic radicals, particularly Marxists, Anarchists, Maori separatists, environmental and animal rights activists.This culminated in the “anti-terrorist” raids of 15 October 2007 where

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18 individuals fitting at least some of these descriptors (including one with pro-Palestinian sympathies) were arrested on grounds that they were part of an armed criminal conspiracy plotting to commit politically motivated violent acts against high-profile targets (all terrorism charges were eventually dropped and only four were convicted and sentenced for firearms related charges). The SIS also increased its counter-espionage activities. A growing number of Chinese migrants generated a concern about PRC espionage activities in New Zealand. Although the SIS did not name the countries it believed were engaged in foreign espionage in New Zealand, successive annual reports indicate that such activities remained a primary concern for the duration of the Fifth Labour government. One effect of the focus on counter-terrorism and domestic extremism is that the SIS lost some of its ability to engage in South Pacific–based human intelligence collection. This was particularly evident in its failure to anticipate (or at least warn against) the 2006 Fijian coup or the 2009 hardening of the military bureaucratic regime installed by it. The GCSB also refocused its energies on the terrorist threat, but its role included using its assets in support of and supplying personnel to the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Hager, 2011). GCSB involvement in locating, identifying and targeting al-Qaeda and Taliban “high value” individuals in Afghanistan and Pakistan occurred in spite of the government’s claim that New Zealand was only engaged in non-combat roles (Hager, 2011). The push to show concrete support for the war on Islamist extremism made for a difficult juxtaposition. By the early 2000s, New Zealand was firmly committed to expanding its commercial relations with Asia and the Middle East, yet some of the countries that it was working to establish deeper commercial ties with such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were hotbeds of violent Wahhabist and Salafist thought. The contradiction was evident in New Zealand signing bilateral education agreements with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia by which thousands of students from those countries were given visas to pursue university studies in New Zealand without any rigorous security vetting. Moreover, the move to re-establish security ties with the United States and its allies in the War on Terrorism brought with it the possibility of alienating Chinese economic and diplomatic interests that saw better New Zealand–US security ties as a threat to China’s growing role as a great Pacific power. Since New Zealand was the first Western country to sign a bilateral trade agreement with the PRC in 2008, the rebuilding of its security relationship with

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the United States placed New Zealand in a particularly awkward diplomatic position vis-a-vis the two rival powers, one that has a distinct possibility of becoming a “Melian Dilemma” (Buchanan, 2010b). The reassertion and extension of New Zealand’s security ties with the United States counterbalanced the thrust of New Zealand’s trade-oriented foreign policy realignment away from its traditional sources of patronage and alliance. For the NZIC, there was no contradiction inherent in the juxtaposition of an East-focused trade policy and a West-focused security policy and was, in fact, seen as having the best of both worlds (Buchanan, 2010a). Even so, there was an increased awareness within the NAB that in spite of claims about New Zealand’s “benign” strategic environment, the country was increasingly exposed to the repercussions of foreign conflicts, something driven home by the deaths of Kiwis on 9/11 and in the 2002 Bali and 2005 London bombings perpetrated by affiliates of al-Qaeda (none of which were foreseen by the NZIC or its major allies). This forced the NZIC to focus priority attention on irregular threats originating or inspired from abroad, to include domestic sources of funding and recruitment for foreign extremism.

The Key Government The process of rapprochement between New Zealand and the United States came to fruition with the election of the John Key-led National government in late 2008. Key makes no secret of his affection for the United States and was determined to overcome the final barriers to full restoration of bilateral security ties with it. The task was accomplished with the signing of the Wellington and Washington Declarations in 2010 and 2012, respectively. These restored New Zealand as a first tier military partner of the United States. In parallel, after a number of breaches and spy scandals, then the Edward Snowden leaks, the GCSB saw a series of systems and protocol upgrades designed to address the problem of cyber security while increasing its ability to engage in mass surveillance and hacking operations against targets of interest to the United States and other Five Eyes partners. The GCSB was fully integrated into the Five Eyes mass data collection schemes as well as providing technical support for US drone operations in the Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan and Pakistan (Hager, 2011). Beyond that, its targets include foreign diplomatic and commercial

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communications, notably those of neighbouring Pacific states, diplomatic allies, trade partners, other friendly nations as well as international and nongovernmental organizations, interest groups, charities and foreign regulatory agencies. The SIS continued its attention on counter-terrorism, accentuating its focus on Muslim extremists (including so-called foreign fighters and homegrown jihadis) while continuing its long-standing interest in Maori separatists, Marxists of various persuasion and anti-free trade groups and individuals. As had occurred under the Fifth Labour government, the heightened concern with counter-terrorism continued to divert resources away from overseas human intelligence operations, particularly within the South Pacific. One area that continued to grow in importance for the SIS was counterintelligenc. This was mainly due to the increase in Chinese influence operations in New Zealand, which targeted the resident Chinese expat population as well as New Zealand cultural, economic and political organisations. It extended to countering Chinese and other espionage efforts against New Zealand political and military-diplomatic targets at home and abroad. In concert with GCSB efforts to thwart Chinese and other foreign-based cyber-espionage and theft, the SIS focus on counter-espionage became the fourth pillar of its institutional orientation (along with counter-terrorism, domestic political espionage and criminal investigations). Added to issues such as fisheries poaching, whaling, arms proliferation and people smuggling, these concerns comprised the bulk of the threat assessment packages delivered to the prime minister by the NAB. In 2010, a reform process was initiated within the NZIC under the banner “one community, many agencies”. The ICG was created and along with the NAB and SRG was re-located in the same building as the GCSB with an eye towards improving information sharing and coordination between them. The SIS was urged to improve its coordination with domestic security agencies and other members of the NZIC in an age of globalised threats. Based on recommendations made in the 2009 Intelligence Agency Review commissioned by the State Services Commission (known as the Murdoch Review), the reforms were driven by the understanding that the NZIC was the product of historical legacies that included adoption of doctrines, precepts, perceptions and policies from foreign intelligence partners that led to a patchwork approach to intelligence gathering and analysis and some “tribal” outlooks on inter-agency dynamics (Whibley, 2014).

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Notwithstanding these reform efforts, subsequent reviews (Kitteridge, 2013) of the GCSB and SIS found serious issues with legal compliance, organizational dysfunction and misunderstanding or uncertainty about specific responsibilities within the larger division of labour within the NZIC. Public revelations of these failings led to the creation of the Intelligence Review Committee whose review and recommendations were published in2016.

Conclusion The NZIC suffered some but not a particularly uncommon degree of institutional lag after the Cold War and the foreign policy realignment of the mid1990s. Its priorities slowly changed over the 20 plus years that followed the end of the Cold War, but its core areas of interest remained largely unchanged. That was because New Zealand basically followed the lead of its larger intelligence partners when it came to foreign intelligence priorities and assessments and, at their behest, added terrorism to its list of domestic intelligence priorities. It was slow to react to the threats posed by Islamic extremism and cyber warfare as well as the use of social media for untoward ends, but that was a common problem for all of its intelligence partners prior to 9/11 and the subsequent introduction of “smart” mass communication technologies. Institutional lag in the NZIC is the product of five factors: over-reliance on foreign intelligence streams for information, subservience to allied intelligence requirements and priorities, limited autonomous signals and human collection capabilities, organizational sclerosis and misplaced focus (on the nature of domestic “threats”). The combination saw the NZIC respond reactively rather than proactively to the emerging threat environment in which it is located. The continuity in intelligence gathering ran counter to the thrust of New Zealand’s 1990s foreign policy realignment, particularly with regard to its relations with China and a variety of Central Asian and Middle Eastern nations. That has left New Zealand in the unenviable position of straddling the fence when it comes to its trade and security orientation and partners, something that is arguably untenable over the long term given the divergence interests of and growing strategic competition between the larger partners (Buchanan, 2010b). The primary solution to the problem of institutional lag within the NZIC is to develop more autonomous priorities and capabilities. Although doing so in the context of the Five Eyes system is difficult given alliance commitments,

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it is not impossible to add a New Zealand centric focus to signals and technical intelligence targeting that does not interfere with ongoing alliance priorities. Even more so, the SIS has the opportunity to redefine its role in a way that is more in line with its relatively limited capabilities, for example, by divesting itself of domestic espionage duties (to the police) in order to concentrate on foreign human intelligence and counter-intelligence work. For all the good intent of the 2010 reforms and proliferation of intelligence agencies and cells through government departments, it remains unclear if the intelligence gathering, analysis and assessment process in New Zealand have improved or been streamlined to the point of increased efficiency and accuracy of intelligence products. The 2016 review of New Zealand’s intelligence and security agencies, conducted by former Labour Deputy Prime Minister Sir Michael Cullen and lawyer Dame Patricia Reddy, recommended the GCSB should have more powers to conduct surveillance of New Zealanders to protect national security but also said the GCSB and the SIS should be governed by a single law to strengthen oversight of these organisations. One thing is clear. If the NZIC is going to confront the security challenges of the 21st century it will have to continue to adapt and reform. Only by doing so can it overcome the problem of institutional lag and the contradictions inherent in issue de-linkage. Because being small and distant is not a secure barrier to global threats, and be they foreign or domestic, the threat environment in New Zealand is constantly evolving and posing new challenges to those entrusted with its safe-keeping.

References Buchanan, PG (2007). A Change of Focus at the SIS. Scoop. http://www.scoop. co.nz/stories/HL0702/S00257.htm [15 April 2015]. Buchanan, PG (2010a). Lilliputian in fluid times: New Zealand foreign policy after the Cold War. Political Science Quarterly 125(2), 255–279. Buchanan, PG (14 September 2010b). New Zealand’s coming Melian Dilemma. Scoop. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1009/S00097/paul-buchanan-new-ze alands-coming-melian-dilemma.htm [13 April 2015]. Buchanan, PG and KC Lin (2006). Symmetry and asymmetry in Pacific rim approaches to trade and security agreements. Asia-Pacific Research Universities Research Paper/36th Parallel Assessments Working Paper. http://36th-parallel. com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Symmetry_and_Asymmetry_in_Pacific_Rim_ approaches_to_trade_and_security_agreements-final1.pdf [15 April 2015].

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Hager, N (1996). Secret Power: New Zealand’s Role in the International Spy Network. Nelson: Craig Potton Publishing. Hager, N (2011). Other People’s Wars: New Zealand in Afghanistan, Iraq and the War on Terror. Nelson: Craig Potton Publishing. Kitteridge, R (March 2013). Review of compliance at the government communications security bureau. http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/assets/GCSB-ComplianceReview/Review-of-Compliance.pdf [13 April 2015]. Smith, CH (2010). Institutional Darwinism: Adapt or Perish. www.oftwominds.com [18 February 2015]. Whibley, J (2014). One community, many agencies: Administrative developments in New Zealand’s intelligence services. Intelligence and National Security, 29(1), 122–135.

Recommended Other Sources Government Communications Security Bureau. Annual Reports. http://www.gcsb. govt.nz/publications/annual-reports/ Government Communications Security Bureau. Review of Compliance. http://www. gcsb.govt.nz/assets/GCSB-Compliance-Review/Review-of-Compliance.pdf Hunt, G (2007). Spies and Revolutionaries: A History of New Zealand Subversion. Auckland: Reed Publishing. Inspector General of Intelligence and Security. Annual Reports. http://www.igis. govt.nz/publications/investigation-reports/ New Zealand Intelligence Community. About us. http://www.nzic.govt.nz/aboutus/nab/ New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. Annual Reports. http://www.nzsis.govt. nz/publications/annual-reports/ Patman, RG and Southgate, L (2016). National security and survelilance: the public impact of the CGSB Amendment Bill and the Snowden revelations in New Zealand. Intelligence and National Security, 31(6), 871–887.

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CHAPTER 23 The Contours of New Zealand Foreign Policy Andreas Reitzig

Over the course of the 20th century, New Zealand gradually evolved from a colony with close ties to the United Kingdom to become a sovereign nation in its own right. While New Zealand’s foreign policy outlook was initially still strongly influenced by Great Britain and later, during the Cold War years, by the United States, New Zealand began to place greater emphasis on its own views and interests, even when they differed from those of its close friends and allies. In other words, the transformation in New Zealand’s political status also brought about an increasingly independent stance in New Zealand’s foreign policymaking. This chapter traces New Zealand’s foreign policy into the 21st century and analyses it in relation to the competing theoretical frameworks that have dominated the discipline of International Relations, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism. The aim is to identify longer-term trends in the overall foreign policy direction that New Zealand has taken over the decades. This chapter focuses on three broad foreign policy strands: national security, trade as well as New Zealand’s contribution to multilateral efforts undertaken within the framework of the United Nations (UN). While New Zealand likes to portray itself as a liberal country that primarily pursues moral foreign policy objectives, recent governments have become increasingly guided by realist concerns for New Zealand’s economic interests, leading to decisions that have, at times, come at the expense of some of the country’s liberal values.

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A Theoretical Overview At the outset, it is important to discuss the parameters of realism, liberalism and constructivism. Of the three, realism has the oldest roots, dating back to the ancient Greeks. As a result, realism is often regarded as the founding school of thought about international relations. One of the central assumptions of realism is that the world exists in a constant state of anarchy. This brings with it the potential, even likelihood, of war between states because states are driven by their own self-interest rather than by what might be deemed morally right. The focus on self-interest in the formulation of foreign policy leads states to distrust one another. Realists believe that war is the norm and peace is the aberration because of the inherent competition amongst states. The only way to ensure the survival of the state in a volatile environment is to focus on the acquisition of power. In realist thought, the best way to minimise the risk of conflict is through the establishment of a balance of power. Smaller states in the system will have no choice but to align themselves with one of the predominant powers to benefit from their ally’s security umbrella (Dunne and Schmidt, 2011; Wohlforth, 2011). Liberalism, which traces its origins back to the time of enlightenment, takes a drastically different approach to international relations. Liberals start from the assumption that peace is the norm in the world and that war is the aberration. Instead of puzzling over the causes of war, liberal thinkers are more interested in the causes of peace. Altogether, Liberals offer three factors that can contribute to global peace: One is that peace depends on the protection of life, individual liberties and property. Another is that global free trade is a source of peace by bringing states closer to one another. In addition, liberalism and its advocates have argued that the international spread of democratisation might well lead to world peace. Generally speaking, in liberalist thought, the state is only one of many actors involved in the making and shaping of foreign affairs. There are also various players at the domestic level, a multitude of non-governmental organisations as well as intergovernmental organisations like the UN that provide a framework for multilateral cooperation. Unlike realists who stress the importance of national interest, liberals also give greater weight to morality. The issue of morality in international relations encompasses the promotion of human rights, disarmament and environmental stewardship amongst others. It is believed that by pursuing a moral foreign policy, positive

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change can be achieved, bringing about a more secure future for everyone (Dunne, 2011; Doyle, 2011). Having only emerged at the end of the Cold War, constructivism is the youngest of the three theoretical frameworks under consideration here. From a constructivist perspective, international relations are characterised by a constantly evolving interplay between actors and the wider world. As a result of this interaction, reality itself can be regarded as socially constructed. On this view, the anarchic international system does not in itself automatically prompt states to accumulate power to ensure state survival, as realists would assert. Rather, how states react to anarchy depends on how they interpret it. It follows that different states will pursue different interests. In constructivist thought, it is national identity that determines how a nation will behave. So before a nation can embark on a certain foreign policy course, it first has to decide what kind of state it is or what sort of state it wishes to become. National identity is an organic construct that is shaped by domestic discourse and interaction with other states (Barnett, 2011; Flockhart, 2011). Each theoretical framework, therefore, offers a different set of lenses to explain foreign policy behaviour. As a result, all three frameworks can shed light on different aspects of New Zealand’s outlook on international relations.

Security in New Zealand Foreign Policy Historically, New Zealand’s foreign policy was almost entirely security-focused and could, therefore, be “characterised as purely Realist in nature” (McCraw, 2002, p. 353). As a British colony, New Zealand’s survival depended on the security of the British Empire. That conviction led to New Zealand’s involvement far afield in the Boer War in South Africa and, ultimately, brought about New Zealand’s participation in two world wars, with devastating consequences for thousands of Kiwi soldiers and their families. Throughout most of the Cold War years, security concerns continued to dominate New Zealand’s foreign policy agenda: In an attempt to counter the perceived threat of communism, New Zealand signed the trilateral Australia, New Zealand and United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty in 1951 and, subsequently, joined the now long defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954. More importantly, the alliance with the United States boosted New Zealand’s sense of security because New Zealand could benefit

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from America’s nuclear umbrella. But the ever-increasing number of nuclear tests conducted in nearby Pacific locations, coupled with a rising number of reports about the associated environmental and health risks, caused more and more New Zealanders to start questioning the utility of nuclear weaponry. Growing anti-nuclear sentiments led David Lange’s Labour government to declare New Zealand nuclear-free in 1984. This decision, which caused a rift with the United States, effectively ended New Zealand’s alliance with the United States. The nuclear-free policy warrants further analysis because it is widely seen as a major milestone in the progression towards a more independent foreign policy. First of all, it is important to note that the nuclear-free policy was not designed to take New Zealand out of the ANZUS alliance. Lange himself argued “the ANZUS Treaty is part of our defence arrangement. It will continue” (cited in Defence Committee of Enquiry, 1986, p. 88). Only after it became clear that New Zealand could not remain in ANZUS whilst being nuclear-free did Lange begin to “disparage the value of the treaty” (McGibbon, 1999, p. 125) as an outmoded framework with little significance to New Zealand — a view that eventually caught on. Second, by declaring New Zealand nuclear-free, Lange attempted to pursue a more moral foreign policy. New Zealand’s outspokenness on nuclear matters helped propel the country to the forefront of the global disarmament movement. Lastly, the government wished to ensure that New Zealand’s environment would be kept safe from nuclear radiation. As such, the nuclear-free policy served to bolster New Zealand’s so-called “clean and green image”. Clearly, there were many facets to the anti-nuclear policy, which go far beyond matters of national security. As a result, it appears that the nuclear-free policy was largely influenced by liberal sentiments although the majority of New Zealanders initially continued to cling to the realist assumption that the ANZUS alliance remained central to New Zealand’s security. In the end, the anti-nuclear policy has had a lasting effect on New Zealand’s national psyche. For many New Zealanders, the nuclear-free policy became synonymous with a declaration of independence from its more powerful allies. Former Prime Minister Mike Moore (1984), for example, stated “New Zealand will be a good friend and a good ally, but never again a good colony”. Several years later, David Lange argued “our assertion of independence had lifted our spirits as a country. Our nuclear-free policy was becoming part of our

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national identity” (Lange, 1990, p. 201). The anti-nuclear discourse and its consequences in terms of New Zealand’s relationship with the United States struck a chord with many people and invoked a sense of pride among many New Zealanders. From a constructivist perspective, it became an integral part of New Zealand’s perception of itself and made a powerful statement about how New Zealand wished to be seen internationally: as a good international citizen that would promote what was perceived as morally right. After the end of the Cold War, New Zealand’s defence and security policy became increasingly informed by liberal thought. To begin with, defence expenditure, which had always been comparatively low, continued to drop throughout the 1990s (Reitzig, 2010, p. 153; SIPRI, 2017). Due to a reduced defence budget, the incoming Clark government proceeded to restructure the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) in 2000 and, in the process, eliminated New Zealand’s air combat capability. This reflected growing anti-militarist sentiments. One of the aims of the restructuring process was to ensure that the NZDF remained suitably equipped to effectively contribute to UN peacekeeping missions. Clearly, it was deemed important for New Zealand to be in a position to help strengthen the rules-based international system provided by the UN. New Zealand’s support for the UN also became clear in the Clark government’s response to the US-led “War on Terror” While New Zealand supported the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the government made it plain that New Zealand would not participate in the so-called “coalition of the willing” against Iraq in 2003 because there was no UN mandate justifying military action (Goff, 2003, p. 3294). Altogether, a relatively low level of defence spending, the decision to eliminate a crucial component of the NZDF and the support for the UN are all factors that seemed to indicate a liberal approach in New Zealand’s security policy formulation in the post-Cold War years. Generally, New Zealand’s defence outlook has dramatically evolved over the decades. From a defence policy that used to be deeply embedded in realist thought, New Zealand began to embrace a relatively liberal outlook on defence and national security. However, there are signs indicating that this is changing again: John Key’s National government first published a defence white paper in 2010, followed by another one in July 2016. While previous white papers tended to emphasise New Zealand’s financial constraints in terms of defence spending, the 2016 Defence White Paper announced the government’s intention to spend up to $20 billion on defence before 2030 (Ministry of Defence,

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2016). Another notable change was the Key government’s decision to abolish the portfolio of Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, which was first introduced by the Lange government. This may be a sign that the issue has diminished in importance and that the National Party government is less interested in being involved in strengthening international arms control regimes. Ultimately, the government’s new emphasis on greater defence spending, in conjunction with the downgrading of nuclear disarmament and arms control, suggest a return to a more realist view of the world. Whether this is a mere reflection of the more conservative leanings of the National Party or part of an overall trend that future governments of other political colourations will continue to embrace remains to be seen. In any case, due to New Zealand’s geographic location in a relatively isolated, low-threat environment, security has not been the main foreign policy concern for New Zealand governments in recent decades. In an ever more globalising world, trade has emerged as a major foreign policy priority. As a result, the National governments under John Key and Bill English have spent significant resources to advance New Zealand’s international trading links.

Trade and the International Economy For much of New Zealand’s history, matters of trade, like matters of defence and security, were closely tied to Great Britain. Since national security was New Zealand’s number one priority in the early days, trade was more of an afterthought. New Zealand traded primarily with Great Britain because Britain was the country that ensured New Zealand’s security. After the end of the Second World War, New Zealand became one of the 23 founding members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which set out to liberalise global trade multilaterally. But in Bruce Brown’s opinion, New Zealand was initially “unenthusiastic” about GATT and “weary” of its intentions (Brown, 1999, pp. 45–46). So it should not come as a surprise that by the 1960s, New Zealand still managed to have “one of the world’s most protected economies” (Hoadley, 1995, pp. 19–20). This suggests that while New Zealand may have been willing to embrace the idea of trade liberalisation in principle, subsequent governments lacked the vision as to how this could work to the benefit of the local economy. The one-dimensional approach to trade meant that New Zealand’s economy was hard-hit when exports to Britain diminished after the

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United Kingdom finally joined the European Economic Community in 1973. With few alternative markets, New Zealand was forced to embark upon a policy of rapid trade diversification. At a time of considerable economic uncertainty, New Zealand concluded its first ever free trade agreement (FTA) with neighbouring Australia. Meanwhile, far-reaching domestic economic reforms significantly liberalised the New Zealand economy in the early 1980s. On the international front, New Zealand began to work towards the establishment of a regional free trade zone within the framework of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as set out by the 1994 Bogor Goals. But when it became clear these goals would not materialise anytime soon, New Zealand and Singaporean negotiators decided to work towards a small-scale bilateral FTA instead, in the hope that it would eventually lead to the sought-after FTA amongst all APEC members (Hoadley, 2002, p. 22). This development reflects the realisation that New Zealand would only be able to prosper if it fully engaged in global trade. So by the late 1990s, New Zealand had recognised the potential economic benefits of free trade and was now an open advocate of trade liberalisation. In the absence of an APEC-wide FTA, New Zealand began to conclude a series of other bilateral FTAs. As McCraw (2005, p. 232) points out, “the prime motivation [for concluding bilateral free trade agreements] is not the Liberal Internationalist one of advancing peace, but the Realist one of increasing New Zealand’s economic security”. The most controversial FTA New Zealand has concluded to date is the 2008 FTA with China. Many of China’s policies are evidently at odds with New Zealand’s. While New Zealand emphasises a moral approach to foreign policy and advocates environmental sustainability, China is well known for its human rights abuses as well as its disregard for the environment in its push for economic development. In this vein, the government made it clear that “New Zealand [does not] have the luxury of trading only with countries with similar political and social values as ours” (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015). This has led to a clash of policies: on the one hand, policy makers were following national interest, which dictated that an FTA with China would boost New Zealand’s economic well-being. But in their search for free trade and prosperity, New Zealand’s moral foreign policy emphasis risked being side-lined. In New Zealand, external trade has arguably risen to the top of the foreign policy agenda. In 2012, former Prime Minister John Key admitted “the

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government’s focus, outside of building better relationships internationally, is economic growth. Unashamedly that is an essential part of what we are doing” (Key, 2012, p. 10). At the launch of the government’s new ambitious Trade Agenda 2030, his successor, Bill English, also spoke of the gains of free trade and promised that “on behalf of New Zealanders this Government will continue working to achieve them” (English, 2017; New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017). The downside of this determined pursuit of free trade is the clash with several liberal foreign policy ideals that New Zealand has traditionally prided itself on. As a result, the question has arisen whether New Zealand has taken it a step too far because the government is now well on track to intimately engage “with regimes with deplorable human rights records and with countries that are serial weapons proliferators or in which it has little diplomatic expertise or even language capabilities” (Buchanan, 2012). Indeed, New Zealand has several FTAs currently under negotiation, of which some appear rather problematic. In 2010, bilateral negotiations proceeded with India, a country that purposefully breached the international disarmament and non-proliferation norms in its quest to become a nuclear weapons state. In 2011, the Key government proceeded with free trade talks with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Although the government decided to suspend negotiations in 2014 following Russia’s unilateral annexation of Crimea, it is questionable why the government opened negotiations with these countries in the first place: According to the Economist’s Democracy Index (2014, pp. 7–8), all three countries have authoritarian regimes. Similarly, the Human Rights Watch’s World Report (2014, pp. 419–471) criticised Russia’s “crackdown on civil society and government critics”, pointed to the continuation of the suppression of “virtually all forms of dissent” in Belarus and condemned Kazakhstan’s deteriorating human rights situation. And in 2008, Russia was actively involved in a conflict with Georgia over South Ossetia. It would appear that outside of the trade area, there is little common ground between these states and New Zealand, an alleged proponent of small states and human rights. Simply put, New Zealand’s opportunist “trade for trade’s sake” (Buchanan, 2012) approach could threaten the country’s credentials because long-held values like morality, human rights and nuclear non-proliferation are no longer deciding factors in determining the country’s direction. What counts is the realist concern for economic prosperity.

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Clearly, New Zealand has come a long way in opening up new markets. It is interesting to note that the diversification of New Zealand’s trade network went hand-in-hand with the expansion of the country’s diplomatic representation across the globe. By the 1960s, New Zealand only maintained embassies and high commissions in culturally similar nations in Europe and North America as well as with a select number of strategically important countries in Southeast Asia. Beginning in the 1970s, diplomatic missions were opened in East Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Oceania. While some posts were later shut down again mainly for financial reasons, the overall trend of establishing new diplomatic ties continues largely unabated. The most recent additions to New Zealand’s diplomatic portfolio are the new embassies in Myanmar (2014), Ethiopia (2014) and Iraq (2015) with new embassies due to open in Colombia and Ireland. It is a clear sign that globalisation is indeed in full swing. As constructivists might say, globalisation is what people make of it. In New Zealand’s case, it is clear that politicians decided to embrace the opportunities presented by the growing interconnectedness amongst states. But the question remains whether New Zealand’s increasing engagement, through trade or otherwise, with repressive regimes will prove detrimental to New Zealand’s carefully cultivated image as a good international citizen.

New Zealand as a Global Citizen The last foreign policy dimension to be explored in this chapter is New Zealand’s contribution to multilateral efforts. Despite initial scepticism towards international institutions during the days of the League of Nations, New Zealand has become a strong proponent of multilateral cooperation, of international norms and institutions. After the failure of the League of Nations, New Zealand took the opportunity to push for the creation of a strong successor organisation, the UN. Several of New Zealand’s early suggestions, such as the removal of the veto power as well as compulsory jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice, were repelled by the great powers. Nonetheless, New Zealand’s input as a founding member of the UN was of great significance: in conjunction with other states, New Zealand ensured that human rights commitments were included in the UN Charter and helped to establish both the Trusteeship as well as the Economic and Social Councils (Jackson, 2005, p. 199). In other words, the initial scepticism towards multilateralism rooted in realist thought had given way to a more liberal outlook on global

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cooperation. Moreover, New Zealand clearly hoped that nascent norms such as the protection of human rights and the international rule of law would gain increasing traction on a global level. Altogether, New Zealand has served four separate terms as a nonpermanent member on the UN Security Council, most recently between 2015 and 2016. While the Labour Party is traditionally more liberally inclined than the National Party, each of New Zealand’s four terms on the Security Council has taken place during times when the National Party headed the New Zealand government. This demonstrates that support for the UN is largely bipartisan. During each term on the Security Council, New Zealand attempted to promote peace in regions of conflict, supported the interests of small states and pushed for the adherence to international law. New Zealand’s consistent support for the UN is testament to the fact that consecutive governments, regardless of their political leanings, have been quite liberalist in their approach to the UN. One of the UN’s most fundamental tasks is the management of numerous international peacekeeping efforts. Over the last 60 years, New Zealand has contributed military personnel to more than 40 peacekeeping missions in over 25 countries worldwide (NZ UN Security Council, 2015). The Labour-led government under Helen Clark even restructured the NZDF partly with the intention of making it more effective in peacekeeping missions. At the time, Clark went so far as to assert that New Zealand’s peacekeeping record was “second to none” (qtd. in McMillan, 2005, p. 5). Although this may have once held true, more recent data shows that New Zealand’s contributions to peacekeeping have dramatically declined in more recent years, leaving New Zealand in 101st place in international comparison (Greener, 2015). There appeared to be little effort on the part of the Key government to reverse this new trend: when questioned, Key stated that New Zealand’s current contribution to peacekeeping was “about right” (qtd. in Greener, 2015). The 2016 Defence White Paper barely even mentions peacekeeping. This shows that while New Zealand governments have displayed liberal leanings in their support for the UN, New Zealand has behaved in an increasingly realist fashion by shouldering less and less of the global peacekeeping burden. Apart from peacekeeping, the UN also coordinates development assistance to countries in need. Given the fact that Helen Clark, a former New Zealand Prime Minister, headed the UN Development Programme between 2009 and

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2017, it is worthwhile exploring New Zealand’s track record regarding the provision of aid to developing countries. Clearly, providing aid to other nations in need goes beyond what simple national interests would dictate. It is an altruistic gesture that has its roots in the liberal school of thought. Back in 1964, the UN announced that countries should provide 0.7 per cent of their Gross National Product (GNP) in aid. But New Zealand’s aid contribution has always been comparatively modest. Despite increasingly difficult economic circumstances, Norman Kirk’s Labour government in the 1970s brought New Zealand’s contribution up to 0.55 per cent of GNP. Yet in the years that followed, New Zealand’s contribution slipped so low that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reprimanded New Zealand as being one of the three OECD nations that contributed the least aid (McCraw, 1994, p. 10). Reviewing these figures strongly suggests that in terms of the provision of official development assistance (ODA), New Zealand followed a realist rather than a liberal approach. In an effort to make the provision of ODA more of a foreign policy priority, the Clark government established the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) as a semi-autonomous body in 2002. Over the following seven years, economic growth helped increase New Zealand’s aid budget, which more than doubled in Dollar values from $243 million to $500 million per annum. While these figures look impressive, the percentage of GNP only increased slightly, from 0.24 per cent to 0.30 per cent (Adams, 2010, pp. 8–9). In 2009, John Key’s National government ended the experiment and re-integrated NZAID into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). The most recent figures available show New Zealand’s aid contribution in 2014 stagnant at 0.27 per cent of GNP (New Zealand Aid Programme, 2014). Many New Zealand governments have talked the talk, but with the notable exception of the Kirk government, none have really walked the walk. Although New Zealand has significantly stepped up its aid programme in the Pacific, it could be argued that the motivation behind this has as much to do with national security concerns as it does with the development of neighbouring countries. Overall, New Zealand’s approach to aid appears to be largely driven by realist considerations of national interest. The UN also coordinates the international effort on climate change mitigation, another one of New Zealand’s declared foreign policy priorities. Since New Zealand is remote and sparsely populated with a large agricultural sector,

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New Zealand has long been regarded as a “clean and green” country. New Zealand’s “100% Pure” nation-branding campaign “conveys that NZ is clean, green [and] uncrowded (in a congested world)” (Tourism New Zealand, 2009). The nuclear-free policy further added to the impression that New Zealand took environmental concerns seriously. From a constructivist perspective, it is interesting to note how the clean and green image became embedded in New Zealand’s national identity. As Minister for the Environment, Nick Smith (2011), put it, we “depend on the effective management of our natural resource for our economic well-being. Being clean and green is part of our brand, part of our national identity”. As a result, it should not come as a surprise that Helen Clark as Prime Minister felt that New Zealand “must lead by example” (qtd. in Yang, 2003, p. 6) regarding global efforts to combat climate change. Specifically, this meant that New Zealand wished to be among the first countries to ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which obligated developed nations to limit their greenhouse gas emission. New Zealand ratified the protocol in December 2002. But after the first commitment period ended in 2012, at a time when it would have been important to demonstrate leadership to help properly enshrine the importance of the global effort towards climate change mitigation, New Zealand refused to commit to further binding measures under the Kyoto Protocol. The government instead announced a non-binding commitment under the Kyoto Protocol’s parent body, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Ministry for the Environment, 2016). Environmental lobbyists were quick to condemn the move, arguing that New Zealand had “joined an infamous club of the world’s dirtiest economies and most belligerent climate wreckers” (TVNZ, 2012). Although New Zealand has ratified the non-binding Paris Agreement, which will come into effect in 2020, it remains unclear what concrete steps the country will take to achieve the promised reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. While New Zealand has one of the highest greenhouse gas emissions levels amongst industrialised nations, the English government has thus far refused calls to introduce any climate change laws (Gudsell, 2017). This seems to be a missed opportunity for New Zealand to show leadership on the multilateral climate change effort. In the end, New Zealand’s record as a global citizen is patchy. On the one hand, New Zealand’s strong support of the UN is a sign of some liberal institutionalist views. This is testament to New Zealand’s willingness to do its share to help alleviate suffering and to establish peace. But this has not

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always worked out in practice because of New Zealand’s seemingly decreasing enthusiasm for sharing the burden of multilateral efforts. Peacekeeping, once a foreign policy priority, has become increasingly marginal and only few New Zealand peacekeepers remain deployed in overseas theatres. Efforts to increase the provision of ODA to countries in need stalled a long time ago. And New Zealand’s lack of leadership on climate change mitigation efforts raises doubts about the country’s international image and the credibility of its 100% Pure brand. New Zealand’s approach to peacekeeping, ODA and climate change mitigation gives the impression that realist concerns over what is in New Zealand’s nation interest have become more important than liberal aspirations of working together towards what is in the best common interest.

Conclusion Aspects of all three theoretical frameworks considered in this chapter are reflected in New Zealand’s foreign policy. Liberalism explains many aspects of New Zealand’s defence and security framework: Alliances have become less significant and, against all odds, the anti-nuclear policy has survived despite strong international pressure and several internal political challenges. After three decades, it still stands as a reminder that a world without nuclear weapons is possible and desirable. In addition, due to curtailed defence spending throughout the 1990s, New Zealand no longer maintains a balanced defence force, but a force with capabilities particularly suitable for involvement in multilateral peacekeeping efforts. However, the recently announced pledge to increase New Zealand’s defence budget over the coming years, coupled with New Zealand’s lessening participation in international peacekeeping and the scrapping of the portfolio of Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control all suggest a return to realist thinking. From a constructivist perspective, it is interesting to note that the nuclear-free policy is now viewed as part of New Zealand’s national identity. Beyond that, as a result of the nuclear-free policy, New Zealand was able to help strengthen the international norms of non-proliferation and disarmament. It remains to be seen whether future governments will continue to support these norms to the same extent as past governments, even without a minister specifically designated to this important portfolio. In terms of trade, New Zealand has come a long way from its protectionist past to become a keen proponent of international trade liberalisation. New Zealand has embraced the opportunities presented by an increasingly

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globalising world and has, thereby, successfully diversified its trade network beyond its traditional partners. While free trade is a core ideal in liberalist thought, New Zealand’s prioritisation of bilateral free trade negotiations is primarily driven by realist concerns for economic interests. This has put at risk several long-held liberalist notions: New Zealand is the keen advocate of international human rights that became the first developed state to sign an FTA with China in 2008. Likewise, New Zealand is the spokesperson for nuclear non-proliferation that wishes to engage more intimately with India. And lastly, New Zealand is a proponent of small states but was willing to look past Russia’s poor treatment of its small neighbours in its quest to advance free trade. The delicate challenge for New Zealand will be to balance an expansion of its free trade network without eroding New Zealand’s image as a good international citizen. Finally, New Zealand’s initial scepticism towards multilateralism in the inter-war period has given way to strong support for the UN and has seen New Zealand succeed in securing its fourth term on the UN Security Council. Although New Zealand’s backing for a rules-based international system and institutions like the UN shows New Zealand’s liberal inclinations, New Zealand’s actions have not always been up to par. As shown above, New Zealand has a defence force particularly well suited for peacekeeping but has become hesitant to contribute troops to multilateral deployments. Similarly, New Zealand is a strong supporter of international development but has taken no significant steps towards reaching the 0.7 per cent of GNP threshold that was set nearly half a century ago. In addition, New Zealand is the clean and green country that declined to make further binding commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. In all three cases, realist considerations of New Zealand’s national interest have come into conflict with liberal aspirations of pursuing cosmopolitan goals. If New Zealand wishes to be seen as a good international citizen, progress on all of these fronts seems essential. Ultimately, New Zealand’s foreign policy is a pragmatic mixture of different approaches. Liberalism explains many aspects of New Zealand’s approach to defence and the country’s support for the UN. Constructivism is useful when analysing the emergence of international norms like disarmament, nonproliferation, human rights, the provision of development aid and environmental stewardship. All of these have been important and recurring themes in New Zealand’s approach to foreign policy. New Zealand has embraced some of

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these norms to such an extent that they are now considered to be part of New Zealand’s identity. But realism is also part of the foreign policy equation. And these days, it is mainly the realist concern for New Zealand’s economic interests that has become an obstacle to the pursuit of a moral foreign policy. Plainly, New Zealand governments have not simply followed a single theoretical framework in their foreign policy formulation. In response to international events, most governments have pursued liberal goals whenever possible but acted in accordance with the realist framework whenever this was deemed necessary.

References Adams, P (2010). Why does New Zealand have an aid programme? New Zealand International Review, 35(5), 8–10. Barnett, M (2011). Social constructivism. In The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, S Smith, P Owens and J Baylis (eds.), 5th Ed. pp. 155–168. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brown, B (1999). New Zealand in the world economy: Trade negotiations and diversification. In New Zealand in World Affairs III, 1972–1990, B Brown (ed.), pp. 21–61. Wellington: Victoria University Press. Buchanan, P (2012). Deconstructing New Zealand foreign policy. 36th Parallel Assessments Ltd. http://36th-parallel.com/2012/08/01/deconstructing-newzealand-foreign-policy/. Defence Committee of Enquiry (1986). Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want. Wellington: The Committee. Doyle, M (2011). Liberalism and foreign policy. In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, S Smith, A Hadfield and T Dunne (eds.), 2nd ed. pp. 54–77. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dunne, T (2011). Liberalism. In The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, S Smith, P Owens and J Baylis (eds.), 5th ed. pp. 113–125. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dunne, T and Schmidt, B (2011). Realism. In The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, S Smith, P Owens and J Baylis (eds.), 5th ed. pp. 99–112. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2014). Democracy Index 2014: Democracy and its discontents. The Economist Intelligence Unit. http://www.eiu.com/public/ topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy0115. English, B. (2017). PM launches ambitious trade agenda. beehive.govt.nz. https:// www.beehive.govt.nz/release/pm-launches-ambitious-trade-agenda. Flockhart, T (2011). Constructivism and foreign policy. In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, S Smith, A Hadfield and T Dunne (eds.), 2nd ed. pp. 78–93. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Goff, P (2003), Debate on Prime Minister’s Statement — Iraq. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 606, 3294. Greener, BK (2015). Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: New Zealand. Providing for Peacekeeping. http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/con tributor-profile-new-zealand/. Gudsell, K (2017). NZ seventh-worst on emissions of 41 nations. RNZ. http:// www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/331646/nz-seventh-worst-on-emissions-of41-nations. Hoadley, S (1995). New Zealand and Australia: Negotiating Closer Economic Relations. Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Hoadley, S (2002). Negotiating Free Trade: The New Zealand — Singapore CEP Agreement. Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Human Rights Watch (2014). World Report 2014. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2014_web_0.pdf. Jackson, R (2005). Multilateralism: New Zealand and the United Nations. In Sovereignty under Siege? Globalization and New Zealand, R Patman and C Rudd (eds.), pp. 193–212. Aldershot: Ashgate. Key, J (2012). Finding a way in a changing world. New Zealand International Review, 37(5), 10–13. Lange, D (1990). Nuclear Free: The New Zealand Way. Auckland: Penguin. McCraw, D (1994). New Zealand’s foreign policy under national and labour governments: Variations on the ‘Small State’ Theme? Pacific Affairs, 67(1), 7–25. McCraw, D (2002). The zenith of realism in New Zealand’s foreign policy. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 48(3), 353–368. McCraw, D (2005). New Zealand foreign policy under the Clark government: High tide of liberal internationalism? Pacific Affairs, 78(2), 217–235. McGibbon, I (1999). New Zealand defence policy from Vietnam to the Gulf. In New Zealand in World Affairs III: 1972–1990, B Brown (ed.), pp. 111–142. Wellington: Victoria University Press. McMillan, S (2005). ANZAC defence: Finding a way ahead. New Zealand International Review, 30(4), 2–6. Ministry of Defence (2016). Defence White Paper 2016. Wellington: Ministry of Defence. Ministry for the Environment (2016). New Zealand and the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. Ministry for the Environment, http://www.mfe.govt. nz/climate-change/international-forums-and-agreements/united-nations-frame work-convention-climate. Moore, M (11 October 1984). Evening Post. New Zealand Aid Programme (2014). Aid statistics. New Zealand Aid Programme. http://www.aid.govt.nz/about-aid-programme/aid-statistics.

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New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2015). Frequently asked questions about the NZ-China FTA. New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement. http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/5-FAQ/. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2017). Trade Agenda 2030: Securing our place in the world. New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade. https://www. mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade2030/Trade-Agenda-2030-Strategy-document.pdf. NZ UN Security Council (2015). Our Track Record. New Zealand United Nations Security Council 2015–16. http://www.nzunsc.govt.nz/our-track-record.php. Reitzig, A. (2010), Trans-Tasman Defence Relations: The Anzacs, ANZUS and Beyond, Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing. SIPRI (2017), Military Expenditure (% of GDP), World Bank, https://data.world bank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2016&start=1960&view= chart. Smith, N (2011). Address to Resource Management Law Association Conference, Hamilton. National Party. https://www.national.org.nz/news/news/mediareleases/detail/2011/10/07/address-to-resource-management-law-association-co nference-hamilton. Tourism New Zealand (2009). Pure as: celebrating 10 years of 100% pure New Zealand Tourism New Zealand http://www.tourismnewzealand.com/media/1544/pureas-celebrating-10-years-of-100-pure-new-zealand.pdf. TVNZ (2012). Govt slammed for pulling out of Kyoto Protocol. TVNZ. http://tvnz. co.nz/national-news/govt-slammed-pulling-kyoto-protocol-5208183. Wohlforth, W (2011). Realism and foreign policy. In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, S Smith, A Hadfield and T Dunne (eds.), 2nd ed. pp. 35–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Yang, J (2003). New Zealand’s foreign policy: Independence, realism and idealism. New Zealand International Review, 28(4), 18–21.

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CHAPTER 24 The Evolving Role of the New Zealand Diplomat Lucy Duncan

I will begin with some context and nomenclature.

The New Zealand Diplomats are Public Servants New Zealand diplomats are, first and foremost, public servants employed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Ministry has foreign and trade policy, development, consular and other specialist and corporate staff in New Zealand and throughout our network of 56 posts offshore. Offshore, we number 234 staff who are seconded from our organisation in New Zealand. As public servants, we have a central partnership with other public servants who share responsibility for our country’s and citizens’ future prosperity and security. These include people who work for New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, the Ministry of Primary Industries, Tourism New Zealand, the New Zealand Defence Force, New Zealand Police, the Immigration Service and several others. Offshore, in total, there are 1823 people deployed across the network working for the New Zealand Government, of which about 1400 staff are recruited from the local labour markets in the countries in which we are represented. To this extent, New Zealand diplomats are fully part of what I regard as one of New Zealand’s national taonga — that is, our country’s professional public service which two years ago celebrated its centenary. We have the same 411

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role as other public servants: to serve the government of the day with free and frank advice and to implement fully their decisions.

The Enduring Functions of a Diplomat There is, however, something particular to the role of diplomats from whatever country or culture they come from. Let us first address why this role exists at all and its enduring functions. States benefit from having mutually recognised and respected transmission mechanisms, embassies, international rules, the Vienna Convention, norms of behaviour — governments do not lie to other governments — and representatives who can authoritatively represent the state, negotiate on its behalf, and commit the state to formal undertakings. These representatives are the diplomats, whether they be ambassadors or high commissioners or their diplomatic staff. The main function of diplomats revolves around the representation and protection of the interests and nationals of the sending state to one or more other states or international organisations. Diplomats assigned to posts offshore collect, analyse and report information that could affect the national interests of their state, often with advice about how the home country government should respond. Then, once any policy response has been determined in the country’s capital by the government of the day, the diplomats bear the major responsibility for implementing the policy response. Diplomats have the job of conveying in the most persuasive way possible the views of the home government to the governments to which they are accredited. In doing so, they try to convince those governments to act in ways that suit their country’s interests and are consistent with their country’s values.

Characteristics We Look for in a New Zealand Diplomat What makes a good diplomat in New Zealand eyes? • Integrity and identity The intelligence, integrity, cultural and linguistic understanding, and energy of individual New Zealand diplomats are critical. Being strongly grounded in who we are as New Zealanders, and what we stand for as a country, is fundamental. Not for us the “de-nationalised, internationalised,

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dehydrated, elegant empty husk”, that Sir Harold Nicholson famously attributed to his colleagues in his own diplomatic corps. • Creating relationships of trust Our national interests are best advanced if our negotiating partners trust us. Trust is founded in relationships. Relationships require familiarity, and familiarity requires a continuity of presence and a constancy of behaviour. Relationships, of course, are only meaningful if they help us advance the direct and indirect interests of our country. For that reason, our best diplomats spend some years in their country of posting and may go back to that country of posting several times in their career. They develop relationships grounded in trust and mutual understanding with influential members of the country in which they are accredited. They work hard to understand the motives, the thought patterns and the culture of the other side. They know who needs to be influenced, what will persuade them, who are the potential allies and adversaries, and the best game plan to achieve the right outcome. • Effective negotiators and collaborators Our best diplomats are excellent and persistent negotiators, whether in formal or informal contexts. They are also excellent collaborators with partners from wider government, sector groups and the community. • Sense of adventure Our best diplomats are adventurers. They enjoy going to new frontiers and they are resilient in adverse circumstances.

A Case Study In his memoirs, called “Final Approaches”, Gerald Hensley describes his life as a diplomat in the Ministry from 1958 as one of adventure, where new frontiers constantly presented themselves. Hensley’s first posting was in Samoa in 1959, where he found himself involved in the final stages of colonialism as New Zealand offered Samoa full independence and divested itself of its tiny Pacific empire. He recalls diplomatic life before instant communications and 24/7 news access. Mail back to Wellington went by a monthly steam ship or fortnightly flying boat, which could be delayed by as much as six weeks during bad weather. After Apia, Hensley moved to New York where he was presented with an environment that he described as overwhelming, loud and unfamiliar

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compared to the peaceful shores of Samoa. Posted to the New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations (UN), he worked in an institution that was being pulled in multiple directions by the Cold War superpowers, an influx of newly independent member states, many of whom had their own interests and agenda and whose numbers threatened to crowd out the likes of a country such as New Zealand. Hensley subsequently served in Washington, DC as counsellor. During his tenure there, he witnessed first-hand the debates that raged over the Vietnam War, the United States establish a relationship with China, and he had a front row seat in the unravelling of the Nixon Presidency. Throughout that, as an excellent diplomat he analysed and reported to Wellington what was important for our country to know in terms of our national interests. He built relationships and sustained them and passed them on to those who came behind him. And he retained his New Zealand identity and represented the country in an outstanding way.

Fast-Forward to the Present Continuity If we fast-forward to the campaign for New Zealand’s election to the UN Security Council, we find the same requirement for a sense of adventure, a readiness to face new frontiers as well as resilience in adverse circumstances, in the diplomats of New Zealand’s Ministry today. In quite an extraordinary and successful campaign, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, our ambassadors and high commissioners, Special Envoys, alongside their advisers and supporters, fanned out across the globe. Our aim was to ensure every single member of the UN met us, heard us, and had their say on what they wanted from the Security Council in the future. In my case, as Special Envoy to Spanish-speaking countries, this meant flying two-day visits to Latin American Summits in Central America for which I had no formal invitation, no programme and few relationship connections. But I did have a BlackBerry, an intrepid policy officer alongside, and a locally engaged staff member from our Embassy in Mexico who was very good in Spanish and up for the challenge. My role also entailed a two-day trip to the top of the Andes, La Paz in Bolivia, 4200 m above sea level, accompanied again by another intrepid policy officer and locally engaged staff member from our Embassy in Santiago de Chile.

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I came away from those trips and meetings with a dozen or so foreign ministers and presidents with new understanding and insight into their expectations of the Security Council and its members, and some promises to consider our request for their support.

... and change Of course, a lot has also changed since the days of Gerald Hensley. New Zealand diplomats now deploy from their posts and the capital more frequently at a moment’s notice and more widely across the world with mobile devices that allow us to work pretty much anywhere at any time. Our post network has expanded into parts of the globe not previously anticipated: we have new footholds in Chengdu, Addis Ababa, Myanmar, Abu Dhabi, Honolulu, Bridgetown, Accra, and we are soon to be back in Baghdad. That’s all in five years. We may be the professionally trained and mandated actors of diplomacy, but our political leaders text and call each other directly. Some tweet. They meet much more frequently at summits than ever before. They are constantly on planes, undertaking bilateral visits and leading business delegations. They very much lead diplomacy in a way that would not have been possible or conceivable a couple of decades ago. The New Zealand diplomat is not now just a thoughtful expert, a spokesperson for the government and a negotiator. We organise major events onshore and offshore, whether to support small island developing states gather in Samoa to set their future agenda, or to support major sporting events in New Zealand such as the Rugby World Cup. Whereas the Pacific traditionally has been our focus for humanitarian and disaster relief, the New Zealand diplomat, consular and development specialist now deploys to secure the safety of New Zealand citizens and contribute humanitarian assistance pretty much wherever that is required — following the tsunami in Thailand, in the aftermath of the Bali bombings, the Japanese earthquakes and most recently in Nepal. New Zealand diplomats are more agile, more flexible, better skilled, more versatile, more “can-do” than they have ever been.

What Does the Future Hold? Drivers of Change We have heard many perspectives on future trends and drivers of change in the foreign policy context in which diplomats from New Zealand will work.

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Our Ministry’s senior leadership team is working on a long-term strategy to ensure that our organisation and our people anticipate these trends and adapt. We know that our country’s demographics, technology developments, the expectations of our citizens and the global governance environment in which we work are shaping — and will continue to shape — the role of the New Zealand diplomat, the work we do, and so the workforce that we need to build for the future.

Demographics and diversity In terms of demographics, within 10 years there will be four generations: Baby Boomers, Generation X, Generation Y and Millennials in the Ministry’s workforce. Greater life expectancy and lifestyle expectations will change the composition of our workforce, and the work patterns of our staff and what they choose to do across their professional career. Already we draw from New Zealand’s diverse cultural base and we will need to do more, be more deliberate, to ensure that our diplomats remain truly representative of our identity and so that we leverage the wider cultural and linguistic capabilities of new New Zealanders.

Technology In terms of technology development, we are asking ourselves the questions: what are the opportunities of data analytics for the world of domestic and international affairs? And what does this mean for the key role of a diplomat to analyse and make sense of her/his accredited country? Given foreign policy requires communication and connections across geographies, what digital presence can we overlay on our physical network of posts in the world? And what does this mean for where and how our work will be done? Are there more opportunities for our work to be done by smart systems and machines? Are language translation technologies a future game changer for us?

Citizens’ expectations In terms of the legitimate expectations of New Zealand citizens, every event of international importance can be captured and posted instantly online and so public demand for rapid government response is growing rapidly. Diplomacy will have to move faster under the light of public scrutiny, as well as be more transparent, as citizens demand the opportunity to participate.

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Global governance environment In terms of the global governance environment in which we work, as the geopolitical landscape changes, more complex transboundary issues are coming to the table. Global institutions are expanding in scope and membership, sometimes with negative effects on their ability to find solutions. This means our Ministry and other government agencies are increasingly pressured in terms of our ability to service these relationships and retain influence at the table. The number of state actors in the world of global governance has grown 300 per cent in the last 70 years. Given we are unlikely to grow our budget by 300 per cent in the next 10 years, we are asking ourselves as a consequence: • What future mix of generalist and specialist skills will we need for future global problem-solving? • How can we amplify our presence and influence through wider partnerships and more flexible and agile deployments of our people? • Who else will amplify the New Zealand voice and the New Zealand identity on the world stage and therefore help project the image of New Zealand, the work that in past times was essentially the work of diplomats?

Strategic Framework for New Zealand’s Place in the World In the Ministry today we are not leaving our future to chance. Earlier this year we launched a new strategic framework with an ambitious 10-year horizon, concrete 4-year objectives and work programmes. These are well aligned to current government priorities and take also a stewardship lens for the longer term. We have identified our people, our systems, our networks and our relationships as the enablers in which we will invest to achieve these longer term ambitions. The New Zealand diplomat, alongside our specialist and corporate staff and our partners in the wider public sector and in the community, will remain critical to our success. And that’s the real constant of the past, present and future.

The opinions expressed in this chapter are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the New Zealand government.

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CHAPTER 25 New Zealand’s 2014 Election to the UN Security Council: How was It Achieved and What Does It Mean? Colin Keating

On 16 October 2014, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly elected New Zealand to be a member of the UN Security Council. The two other contenders, Spain and Turkey, were decisively beaten. New Zealand gained 145 votes in the first ballot. Three quarters of the UN membership supported New Zealand — far above the threshold of 129 votes required for election. Spain and Turkey were relegated to a runoff, passing through two further ballots before Spain eventually prevailed. Turkey had won an overwhelming victory in its previous campaign in 2008, getting 151 votes. However, in 2014, it could only garner 60 votes. By any standards, this was an historic victory for New Zealand. This chapter provides personal insights into how New Zealand emerged victorious, and some thoughts on what it means for the future of New Zealand foreign policy. It is important to put this election into context. New Zealand’s failed bid for election to the Security Council in 1982 is an important benchmark. That campaign resulted in the tiny country of Malta roundly defeating New Zealand. In 1992, New Zealand defeated Sweden, coming from behind to scrape into the Security Council on the third ballot. Other important points to 419

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consider include Portugal’s defeat of Australia and Canada, in 1996 and 2010, respectively, and Luxembourg’s defeat of the much larger Nordic candidate, Finland, in 2012. This history suggests a pattern; larger powers cannot simply assume victory in these elections. Moreover, Security Council elections can be a telling mechanism for international accountability — a benchmark or reality check about the health of a country’s foreign policy. In this regard, the 2014 election outcome can be seen as an important guide for New Zealand’s future foreign policy settings. New Zealand’s victory can be attributed to a number of factors. First, the New Zealand campaign was based on strong and sustained highlevel political involvement. The then Prime Minister, John Key (2013), engaged strongly with his counterparts in support of the New Zealand’s Security Council campaign, travelling to the UN Headquarters in New York several times. The then Foreign Minister Murray McCully undertook a hugely demanding programme of travel for several years, visiting both large and small countries in all parts of the globe, in a determined effort to advance both New Zealand’s Security Council bid and the country’s wider foreign policy interests. The message was not simply “vote for us”. It was also coupled with active strengthening of bilateral relationships across much of Africa, throughout the Caribbean and with countries in North Africa and the Middle East. New posts were opened in Africa (Mateparae, 2014) and the Caribbean and strong relationships were forged with regional institutions such as the African Union, CARICOM and the League of Arab States. New Zealand clearly indicated an intention for these enhanced bilateral and regional relationships to endure beyond the campaign period, and this influenced the vote. This kind of high-level political energy and engagement was noticeably absent from some of the Security Council campaigns run by other countries that have failed in recent years. Second, New Zealand’s campaign was visibly bipartisan; the National and Labour parties worked together to support the bid Feedback from other countries strongly suggested this was an important consideration. Most countries were aware that an election was scheduled in New Zealand in late 2014, and many were nervous, based on experience in other cases, about the policy implications of a change of government. This bipartisan approach was critical in this respect. Third, New Zealand was able to consolidate and maintain the support of the Pacific and Asian countries, which constitute its political base in

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international relations. The strong unanimous support of the Pacific Forum countries (Gulliver, 2014) was extremely important in underlining New Zealand’s credibility and the reliability of our promises to stand up for small countries. The UN Small Island Developing States (SIDS) conference in Apia in 2014 (Radio New Zealand, 2014) was an outstanding opportunity to showcase to the world the genuine partnership between New Zealand and its neighbours. New Zealand was hugely encouraged going into the final days of the campaign to know that it had support right across the whole of the Asian regional neighbourhood. It clearly indicated that the campaign was in good shape, but more importantly, that New Zealand’s efforts to foster stronger relations with Asia were being rewarded, not just in terms of economics and trade but also in a political and security context as well. Fourth, New Zealand benefitted from the outstanding work of its Security Council campaign team. The contributions of the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the UN, Sir Jim McLay and his team in New York as well as the work of McLay’s successor, Gerard van Bohemen, the responsible Deputy Secretary in the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and his team in Wellington were pivotal. At the same time, the planning and organisation by New Zealand’s United Nations Security Council (UNSC) campaign manager, Mr Simon Draper, proved highly effective in mobilising international support for the New Zealand Security Council bid.1 By 2011, it was clear that reaching out to capitals would be vital for victory. In the past, a successful Security Council election campaign could be run out of New York. UN Ambassadors were often delegated a lot of decision-making power. However, changes in communications technology and increased interest by political leaders in capitals around the world meant that by 2014 UN Ambassadors would be less decisive than in the past. Accordingly, the New Zealand campaign had to engage directly with governments and political leaders. This was no easy task with an electorate of 193 UN member states; it would be almost impossible for the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr McCully, to visit all of them. An added complication was that

1 Draper

came to the role of Divisional Manager for UN in 2012 with a reputation second to none for planning and managing and delivering project outcomes. These were the skills that the campaign needed.

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New Zealand had to anticipate that in many of the target countries there would be changes of government and perhaps multiple changes of key ministers and senior officials. Sustaining a positive view of New Zealand and its case for election through to October 2014 would often require repeated lobbying in many capitals. Turkey and Spain possessed large diplomatic networks spanning the globe, with local embassies that could achieve this. New Zealand did not have comparable facilities. This challenge led to the decision by Prime Minister Key (Key, 2012) in 2012 to appoint a number of UN Special Envoys as his personal representatives. New Zealand needed to increase its highlevel lobbying footprint, but this meant that logistics would be more complicated and difficult. It would involve visits to many countries where New Zealand did not have a diplomatic presence or accreditation. Nevertheless, the effort paid off. Indeed, many countries appreciated the decision to reach out at the governmental level to capitals. The use of Special Envoys changed the playing field significantly; New Zealand was able to effectively neutralise the advantages Spain and Turkey had through their networks of embassies. In this regard the New Zealand Security Council campaign had the ideal campaign manager. Simon Draper came to the role of Divisional Manager for UN in 2012 with a reputation second to none for planning and managing and delivering project outcomes. These were the skills that the campaign needed. As a result, the New Zealand campaign needed to be and was run efficiently. It was also extremely well targeted. New Zealand’s limited human and financial resources were maximised to the full. And the campaign really did achieve effective grass roots impact. Fifth, New Zealand’s foreign policy settings played a major role in its success. In 1982, New Zealand lost to Malta because of its dreadful policy on sporting contacts with apartheid South Africa. The 1981 Springbok tour (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2013), undertaken in flagrant violation of UN and Commonwealth decisions, had just finished. It left a bitter legacy. It divided New Zealand and, at the international level, was fresh in the minds of African and other decision makers when the vote was taken in 1982. Policy matters. In the years that followed, New Zealand developed a strongly independent foreign policy approach, highlighted by its nuclear free policy. New Zealand’s resolute opposition to nuclear testing in the Pacific (Greenpeace, 2006) was

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much appreciated globally — especially by smaller states. New Zealand garnered respect not only for this policy, but also for its principled handling of the Rainbow Warrior affair (Palmer, 2015) and New Zealand’s willingness and capacity to stand up to France, a permanent member of the Security Council. Similarly, New Zealand’s nuclear ships policy (Clements, 1987), and its demonstrated determination to stand its ground in the face of strong pressure from the United States, also played an important role in encouraging many states to have confidence that New Zealand would pursue an independent foreign policy as a member of the Security Council. In 1992, New Zealand occupied a fundamentally different foreign policy space from a decade earlier. Terence O’Brien, the New Zealand Permanent Representative at the time, was able to steer the country to a narrow third round win over Sweden. Thanks to its new foreign policy approach. New Zealand had been able to regain a lot of support in African states in its successful bid for a seat on the Security Council. The New Zealand brand has not only benefited from its independent foreign policy position, and non-nuclear stance, but also from its conduct within the UN and other multilateral forums. A notable factor of the 2014 election was the enduring memory of the strong role New Zealand played in the Security Council in 1993/94, in relation to a number of crises. It was no coincidence that countries like Bosnia, Rwanda and Kuwait were very strong advocates for New Zealand and champions of the New Zealand campaign. Within the UN, and other multilateral forums, New Zealand also has a reputation for being balanced, even-handed and demonstrating constructive leadership. Its role in the peacekeeping efforts in Timor Leste (CSS Strategic Briefing Papers, 2000) is notable in this regard; Timor was a strong supporter of and advocate for New Zealand, particularly among small countries and the Lusophone community. New Zealand’s position on the Middle East issues, particularly in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, was also appreciated by much of the international community. New Zealand’s critique of the performance of the Security Council, particularly the role of the five permanent members (P5 group), was aired initially by the New Zealand Foreign Minister Mr McCully (2012) in a speech to the General Assembly in September 2012. Similar speeches were given by the Prime Minister in his statement to the General Assembly in 2013 (McCully, 2012) and again by the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs in September 2014 (McCully, 2014). These speeches were positively received

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by many states in the UN General Assembly. Despite its size, New Zealand showed a willingness to stand up to the big powers and project leadership among the small states. New Zealand’s style of engaging with other countries has also complemented its foreign policy agenda. Many countries found New Zealand’s diplomatic approach refreshing and different; the open, polite and friendly style of New Zealand diplomatic representatives were often favourably compared with envoys from Western countries that tended to bend ears, lecture and to present Western perspectives. In contrast, New Zealand came across as an actor that wanted to listen and learn in order to try to understand political and security issues from a variety of local perspectives. For example as a Special Diplomatic Envoy, the author led the New Zealand observer team to the annual meeting of the NonAligned Movement (NAM) in 2014.2 The New Zealand team at the event followed its usual low-key style, attending all the sessions, listening to all the speakers and organising dozens of bilateral meetings with individual NAM members. By way of contrast, both Spain and Turkey flew in teams for a mere few hours, demanded the right to make a statement (which caused some disruption at the NAM meeting), had a few quick bilateral meetings and then flew out. The contrast in styles was stark. It would have been obvious to many NAM members that New Zealand’s approach was committed, more inclusive and matched its promises to bring an open approach to the Security Council. Policy and style tends to work best when they reinforce each other. New Zealand’s diplomatic style, particularly its willingness to listen to other countries, certainly paid dividends. Months before the UNSC vote its interactions with leaders in various capitals had provided a real sense of the policy issues that were seen as important to the large majority of the UN membership. As a result, New Zealand was subsequently able to speak directly to those concerns in its campaign for a Security Council seat. In 1992, when New Zealand won a narrow victory over Sweden in the third round of voting, the expectations of what New Zealand could achieve in its two years as a member of the Council were modest. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that when New Zealand left the Council at the end of 1994, many observers concluded that New Zealand’s performance had exceeded expectations. The victory in 2014, with 145 votes in the first round, presented a very different 2 New

Zealand has observed this meeting for most of the lifetime of the NAM.

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situation. Three quarters of the UN member states had voted for New Zealand, many of them with very high — and sometimes contradictory — expectations of New Zealand. The challenge for this two-year term is much steeper. Second, the overwhelming support New Zealand received in the General Assembly vindicated the foreign policy directions of the past 20–30 years. The strong New Zealand focus on the Pacific region and its extensive outreach to Asia has built a solid base of friendships and partnership with neighbours. The willingness to respond quickly and resolutely with peacekeeping and other military and civilian support when security threats have endangered stability, whether in the Pacific, as in the case of Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, or further afield in Timor Leste or Afghanistan, has earned New Zealand respect and credibility in the international arena. Furthermore, under both Labour and National Governments, a careful balance has been achieved between maintaining a strong independent thrust in New Zealand foreign policy, sustaining and enhancing friendships and partnership with old friends such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and reaching out through fresh diplomatic initiatives to new partners in Latin America and the Middle East. This measured form of diplomacy has contributed greatly to positive impressions about New Zealand. Third, it would be a mistake for New Zealand to assume that maintaining the current status quo on the diplomatic front is all that is required. In a changing and volatile international stage, New Zealand must build on past diplomatic efforts. The initial steps made over the past few years to increase diplomatic outreach to Africa, is one way to do this, and goes well beyond the UNSC campaign context. The agricultural potential of Africa is huge. As Asia developed it became a major market for New Zealand — but not a competitor. In contrast, as peace and development expands in Africa an increasing number of African countries will have the potential to become very serious competitors to New Zealand. China and the big European and American multinationals are already recognising the new economic opportunities in Africa. New Zealand also has the option, in its own way, to be involved on the African continent. This move will require New Zealand investment, just as Wellington invested in building relationships in Asia. However, it will require a very different approach from the way we built the New Zealand-Asia connection. But old policy settings should not be ignored. Global volatility is particularly evident in the areas of peace and security. There is a distinct upsurge in

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the number of intra-state conflicts and their intensity in the post-Cold War era. Security risks are increasing. It is clear that the UN and many traditional security partners are looking to New Zealand to do more in the field of peacekeeping and conflict prevention. In the modern era peacekeeping and peace operations are not just a matter for the military, as shown in Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands. A troop deployment works best when it is supported by an integrated New Zealand diplomatic and development effort. New Zealand foreign policy must continue to focus on conflict prevention and conflict management, even after its two-year term on the Security Council ends. Finally, if there is any single lesson to be learned from New Zealand’s recent Security Council campaign, it is the importance of shedding false or feigned humility about the country. Too many New Zealand officials and commentators have made a habit of presenting a view of New Zealand as a “small” country — as if this was the only important point about New Zealand. And, it is often underpinned by the implicit assumption that New Zealand must not trouble itself with big foreign policy issues or make a serious effort to contribute to the resolution of major international problems. Saying New Zealand is only a “small” country is simply not accurate, and seems for some to be a coded way of justifying a limited international role for the country. By contrast, many New Zealand politicians have demonstrated a bolder vision and a willingness to push the envelope. The recent New Zealand efforts on the Middle East, led by Minister Murray McCully, were a very good example of leadership driven from the top on a difficult policy issue. This was not the first such example. In 1993, against official advice from officials New Zealand Ministers decided to send peacekeepers to the Former Yugoslavia. Similarly, bold leadership from politicians of different political parties resulted in the New Zealand positions on disarmament and antinuclear issues, mediating peace in Bougainville and outreach to Latin America. The fact is that “smallness” is relative. In terms of population and economy, New Zealand may be smaller than many countries, but geographically, it is larger than the United Kingdom, Italy and Japan. If New Zealand people think small in terms of foreign policy, it will act small. But New Zealand has demonstrated it can be an effective player on the international stage. This issue also emerged in the Security Council campaign itself. Early on in the campaign some officials argued that the right pitch for New Zealand was the traditional line “we are small . . . so vote for us”. However several foreign

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Ambassadors kindly advised that this was not the right approach; most UN members do not see New Zealand as “small”. New Zealand was advised that the small country narrative was both false and counterproductive; what they wanted to see in the Security Council was a confident and bold New Zealand, one willing to take risks. The advice was heeded and provides a lesson for the future. If New Zealand is to continue to thrive in this increasingly volatile and dangerous world, then the next generation charged with implementing foreign policy needs to think much more about options and possibilities, and much less about the risks. It is time for New Zealand officials and commentators to move away from their traditional risk averse posture and find ways to bring to foreign policy the same sense of energy, innovation and determination that we find in other spheres of New Zealand life.

References Clements, K (July/August 1987). New Zealand paying for nuclear ban. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43(6), 41–44. CSS Strategic Briefing Papers (February 2000). Strategic and military lessons from east timor. Centre for Strategic Studies 2, Part 1. http://www.victoria.ac.nz/hppi/ centres/strategic-studies/publications/strategic-briefing-papers/East-Timor.pdf. Greenpeace (14 December 2006). History of the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand. http://www.greenpeace.org/new-zealand/en/campaigns/nuclear/ nuclear-free-nz/anti-nuke-history-NZ/. Gulliver, A (8 August 2014). Pacific leaders back NZ’s UN bid. Stuff. http://www.stuff. co.nz/world/south-pacific/10363659/Pacific-leaders-back-NZs-UN-bid. Key, J (12 June 2012). NZ’s UN Security Council campaign and reform. Cited in Scoop. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1206/S00151/nzs-un-security-cou ncil-campaign-and-reform.htm. Key, J (27 September 2013). New Zealand’s statement to the UNGA General Debate. New Zealand Government. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/newzealand%E2%80%99s-statement-unga-general-debate. Mateparae, J (21 May 2014). Opening of the New Zealand Embassy in Ethiopia. Office of the Governor-General. https://gg.govt.nz/publications/opening-newzealand-embassy-ethiopia. McCully, M (30 September 2012). Speech to the United Nations General Assembly. New Zealand Government. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-unitednations-general-assembly McCully, M (30 September 2014). Speech to the United Nations General Assembly. New Zealand Government. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/speech-unitednations-general-assembly

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Ministry for Culture and Heritage (13 January 2013). The 1981 Springbok tour — Impact. https://nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/1981-springbok-tour/impactof-the-tour. Palmer, G (4 May 2015). The Rainbow Warrior — a game changer? A speech at the Victoria University of Wellington. http://www.victoria.ac.nz/law/about/staff/ petra-butler/the-rainbow-warrior-a-game-changer/Palmer.pdf. Radio New Zealand (24 April 2014). New Zealand happy to support Samoa with SIDS conference. http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/242434/newzealand-happy-to-support-samoa-with-sids-conference.

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CHAPTER 26 New Zealand’s Climate Change Diplomacy: A Country Punching Above Its Weight or the Survival Strategy of a Small State? Adrian Macey

New Zealand has been an active and sometimes influential player in international environmental negotiations. This has been for two broad reasons. First, being a good international citizen has been important to governments of whatever political persuasion, reflecting expectations of New Zealand society. That is seen in New Zealand’s successful campaigns to win a seat on the United Nations Security Council.1 Second, because of the importance of the environment to New Zealand, the country has had a logical interest in related global issues. Using climate change to illustrate New Zealand’s environmental diplomacy has its upsides and downsides. An upside is that climate change is the most prominent global environmental question today. A downside is that climate change is hugely complex and goes well beyond environmental issues — it is probably more accurately viewed as an economic and social challenge. Long-term choices about energy and the effects on society are involved. So the 1 As

emphasised by the Prime Minister John Key in November 2014: “New Zealand as a good international citizen, and as a country now elected to serve on the UN Security Council …” (Key, 2014). 429

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specificity of our environmental diplomacy may be difficult to discern. But it would be odd to ignore one of the most demanding fields where New Zealand government ministers and officials need to deploy their diplomatic skills. It is often said both at home in New Zealand and abroad, that the country “punches above its weight”.2 That is to say, New Zealand achieves more, or has a greater influence, than would be expected of a country of its size. Is this true, or is it rather the reflection of a survival strategy of a small state, which cannot use hard power to pursue its interests? New Zealand’s small size is nowhere better illustrated than in climate change, where its emissions hardly register on the global scale, being less than 0.2 per cent of the total.3 The history of international climate change negotiations has three phases.4 The first was the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992. This Convention identified the problem and set a goal to deal with it: stabilising the concentrations of anthropogenic greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a safe but unquantified level (Article 2). It also obliged all countries to take action to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions so as to mitigate climate change. But little happened after the entry into force of the Convention in 1994. Serious efforts to reduce emissions only started with the second phase of negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol, which was negotiated in 1997 but only entered into force in 2005. Here the developed countries took the lead, as required by the Convention. Kyoto introduced binding carbon budgets, sanctions for non-compliance and international trading in emissions units or carbon credits. Overall, developed countries (“Annex I” in UNFCCC parlance) undertook to reduce their emissions to 5 per cent below 1990 levels during the period 2008–2012. But despite its innovations, Kyoto had flaws. It had no built-in mechanism to bring the developing countries on board, whereas they were coming to be responsible for both a larger share of global emissions and for most of the increase. The Kyoto Protocol also suffered from the absence of the

2 At

home: “Diplomacy and sport are areas where New Zealand punches above its weight on the international stage” (Snively, 2015). Abroad: in 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described NZ as a country that “punches way above its weight” (Young, 2010). 3 Global emissions by country as well as other comparisons are found at the World Resources Institute’s Climate Data Explorer: see cait.wri.org. 4 For a more detailed account of the three phases of the negotiations see Macey (2012).

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United States, which at the time the Protocol was negotiated, was the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. To achieve the objective of the Convention, something more was needed. Kyoto’s inbuilt requirement to start negotiations on further commitments for Annex I parties was the catalyst for the third phase of the negotiations, which began in 2005. The task of this negotiation was to produce a longer-term and more inclusive framework adapted to the present day world economy. It had a difficult start. It began falteringly in 2005, got fully underway in 2007 and then failed spectacularly in 2009 at Copenhagen. But it recovered with a renewed negotiating mandate agreed at Durban in 2011. This achieved a new international goal of limiting warming to 2◦ above pre-industrial levels, and was “applicable to all”, meaning that the dichotomy of developed countries with binding commitments and others with no binding commitments had been superseded. The negotiations were now on the road to reaching a new, more robust and comprehensive agreement in Paris at the end of 2015. The Paris Agreement strengthened the temperature goal, which became “well below 2 degrees” and with efforts to achieve 1.5◦ (Macey, 2016). New Zealand’s national interest in climate change negotiations is threefold. First, and foremost, it is important for New Zealand, as a country that will feel the effects of global warming, that the world acts. Without the major economies — China and the other BRICS5 countries, the United States and Europe — there is no chance of reaching the necessary critical mass of emissions reductions. Second, New Zealand has some specific interests dictated by the nature of its economy. The role of plantation forestry, the treatment of agriculture and the availability of international carbon markets are the three New Zealand priorities. Forestry is important because the absorption of carbon by growing trees — the “carbon sink” — reduces New Zealand’s net emissions by a quarter or more. New Zealand seeks international recognition of its limited mitigation potential on two grounds: that most electricity is already from renewable sources, and that almost half its emissions come from agriculture, where there are few available and affordable technologies to reduce emissions. These limitations on New Zealand’s ability to reduce national emissions make carbon markets essential, because they allow it to make a contribution to global 5 Brazil,

Russia, India, South Africa.

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emissions reductions commensurate with those of other countries. Without recognition of these factors, any burden-sharing comparisons based solely on percentage reductions of national emissions would be unfavourable to New Zealand. Finally, there are reputational factors: the clean, green image, much invoked in New Zealand’s branding as a tourist destination, and the desire to be seen as taking a fair share of the burden in keeping with New Zealand’s role as a responsible international citizen, as mentioned earlier. New Zealand was involved from the early days of climate change negotiations, but its national interests clearly came to the fore first in the Kyoto Protocol. The New Zealand Minister of the Environment at the time, Simon Upton, was prominent in the discussions. Upton and his officials worked hard to secure international recognition of forest sinks, which were and still are controversial. Retaining recognition of sinks and shaping the accounting rules accompanying forestry have been priorities for New Zealand diplomacy during all subsequent climate negotiations. Setting an internationally acceptable but affordable target in light of New Zealand’s limited mitigation potential was also important. Accordingly, New Zealand negotiated a less stringent target of limiting emissions to 1990 levels for the first Kyoto commitment period (2008–2012) rather than the overall 5 per cent below 1990 average under the agreement. The international climate change negotiations are a complex environment of alliances and interests (see Annex). This is challenging for a small state like New Zealand, particularly since its specific interests are not well aligned with those of the major players. But there are also opportunities to turn this lack of alignment to New Zealand’s advantage. New Zealand accordingly participates in the negotiations as a small independent state. How does this translate into climate diplomacy? First, New Zealand usually wants to be seen as a constructive partner, which means not taking on extreme positions, and being focused on solutions. Not all small states choose this approach. In the climate change negotiations, some of the most prominent voices and uncompromising positions, at least judged by speaking time and volume, are from small states, in some cases very small states.6 6Tuvalu, population 10,000, land area 26 km2 , and Nicaragua, population six million, are two examples.

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Another area where a small state can be constructive is ideas leadership. A complex and difficult negotiation like climate change is always a market for good ideas. Indeed, in the United Nations (UN) climate change negotiations, New Zealand is widely credited with coming up with the current so-called “hybrid” legal model of the 2015 Paris Agreement. Such creativity is aided by the freedom that New Zealand representatives have to pursue ideas. New Zealand diplomats are less constrained by their negotiating brief than the major players — typically because they are tasked with achieving objectives rather than advocating detailed and fixed positions. This flexibility reflects both the nature of New Zealand as a small open democracy, and its relative freedom from formal alliances. It is perhaps no coincidence that the principal body New Zealand consults with during the climate change negotiations, the Umbrella Group,7 has as its motto “working together, not bound together”. New Zealand is also known for its innovations at home on environmental matters, many of which have had international influence. These include the fisheries quota management system, the Resource Management Act, the concept of kaitiakitanga (stewardship), the granting of legal personality to a river8 and more generally the partnership between the Crown and Indigenous people in management of natural resources. In climate change, the emissions trading scheme remains, in its design if not its application, the first and only all sectors all gases scheme, covering almost 100 per cent of New Zealand’s emissions. It found innovative solutions on agriculture, such as the point of obligation being placed at processor rather than farm level. As the processing sector is highly concentrated in New Zealand, this provision avoided thus avoided thousands of individual farmers having to gear up to report greenhouse gas emissions at farm level. These innovations in the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) remain useful, even if agriculture’s full entry into the scheme has been delayed indefinitely. New Zealand diplomacy can also be characterised as broker and facilitator. Because it is not seen as being strongly aligned and with a reputation for fielding competent representatives, New Zealand gets a disproportionate number of 7The Umbrella Group comprises the non-EU Western European and Other states. It is chaired

by Australia and includes some of the major players in the negotiation, the United States, Japan and the Russian Federation. 8 In March 2017 the Whanganui River was granted legal personality, a world first. http://www. legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2016/0129/latest/DLM6830851.html.

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facilitating or chairing roles. In this respect, New Zealand finds itself among a group of well-regarded countries, including Switzerland, Norway, Colombia and Singapore. The high point of New Zealand’s facilitating role was the important Durban conference, which led directly to the Paris Agreement on climate change. Two of the three key Durban outcomes were brokered by New Zealand representatives. Another feature of New Zealand’s diplomacy is gaining a place at the “top table”. This starts with maintaining good relations with major players. In climate change negotiations, prominent players include the United States, China and the EU and the small island states. Here, New Zealand diplomacy has been strikingly successful. Bilateral cooperation with China and the United States has been particularly strong, both at ministerial and official levels. Demonstrating subject expertise is also useful in negotiations. New Zealand is a leading player on LULUCF (land use, land use change and forestry) and agriculture as well as on carbon markets. Its experts have participated widely in formal and informal meetings on these topics. This means that when any of these areas is discussed, there is an expectation that New Zealand will be present. New Zealand also keeps a flexible approach to formal and informal alliances during negotiations. The Cartagena Dialogue, of which New Zealand is a founder member, is one such example. This was set up among moderate countries to try to create some middle ground in the highly polarised climate change negotiation. It was effective in moderating some more extreme positions of the G77. While not a member of AOSIS (Association of Small Island States), New Zealand maintains good contacts with the Pacific Island nations who are prominent in this group. Other ministerial and senior official level meetings with restricted invitations, such as the “pre-COP”, the informal meeting held by the Conference of the Parties presidency a month or two before the main conference, routinely include New Zealand. Beyond these efforts, New Zealand engages in active diplomacy of its own. Recently, this has included conceiving and organising “Blue Skies” informal dialogues in New Zealand. These have attracted some leading climate change negotiators and have helped develop ideas that have gained currency. Among the issues addressed by these dialogues were the all-important transparency provisions of the Paris Agreement, which were one of the more controversial areas because of concerns about intrusion into sovereignty. With the Kyoto model of binding commitments and sanctions being replaced by one of non-binding

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“contributions” and peer review and peer pressure, transparency will become a cornerstone of the post-2020 climate change regime. Not all climate change diplomacy is directly linked to the UNFCCC negotiations New Zealand is a member of a number of so-called “carbon clubs”. These are alliances formed around particular aspects of climate change policy and action. New Zealand has been prominent in the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform,9 a grouping which aims to eliminate harmful and wasteful subsidies to fossil fuels — thus both creating a more level playing field for renewables, and freeing up money to promote them. New Zealand has also joined the Climate and Clean Air Coalition,10 with the United States as a prominent member. This focuses on what are called “short-lived climate pollutants” such as black carbon and methane. Probably the most important group outside the central climate change negotiations is the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change (MEF),11 a group comprising the 17 major economies, which meets twice a year at ministerial level. It goes without saying that these countries will determine the success or failure of global mitigation efforts. New Zealand cannot be a full member of the MEF, but for several years was invited to MEF meetings because of a reputation as a constructive partner with good ideas. New Zealand has also created its own carbon clubs. The Asia-Pacific Carbon Markets Roundtable is an informal New Zealand-led initiative to explore possibilities for regional and bilateral carbon markets among countries in the region. At COP 21 in Paris, New Zealand led the Ministerial Declaration on Carbon Markets, which was endorsed by 19 countries. New Zealand, quite sensibly, is not relying on the UN to deliver a comprehensive international carbon market, at least in time for the 2020 start of the new climate regime under the Paris Agreement. The Global Research Alliance (GRA)12 on agriculture and climate change harnesses New Zealand’s leading expertise on agricultural research and now comprises over 40 countries. The overall aim of the GRA is described as growing more food without growing emissions. This is closely aligned with New

9 www.fffsr.org. 10 www.ccacoalition.org/. 11 www.majoreconomiesforum.org/. 12 http://globalresearchalliance.org/.

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Zealand’s interests since, apart from the potential to make technological breakthroughs on greenhouse gases in agriculture, it is a way to shape the appropriate treatment of agriculture within international climate change agreements. To what extent have these factors which make up New Zealand’s climate change diplomacy been reflected in political discourse? International positioning has varied over the years. In 2007, the Labour-led government had aspirations for New Zealand to be the “first truly sustainable nation”,13 and had begun to implement a programme for a carbon neutral public service. The internationally linked emissions trading scheme was also a creation of this government. Since 2008, following the change to National party-led administrations, the emphasis has been more on being a fast follower, and taking on a “fair share” of the international effort, accompanied by leadership in selected areas. During this period, the balance of the official narrative has shifted towards emphasising the costs and difficulties of ambitious action by New Zealand. It will not get any easier for New Zealand to advocate its case in international climate negotiations. A small state soon realises that once it is no longer useful to the major players, it will have a difficult job protecting its interests. The Doha conference of the parties to the international climate change negotiations (COP 18) was salutary for New Zealand. From a position of high influence, and centrality in the negotiations only a year earlier in Durban described earlier, New Zealand found itself on the outer. New Zealand’s awkward negotiating position there (having no 2020 target, expecting to table a future one sometime in the future under the Convention rather than Kyoto Protocol, but wanting access to the Kyoto market mechanisms) caused confusion and irritation to the extent that it could not count on support from its usual allies. The consequences were a temporary loss of influence in the negotiations, and some cost to New Zealand’s interests in the outcome, especially through the loss of access to international carbon markets (Macey, 2014). In future, there will need to be more integration of domestic and international climate change policy. The new climate regime will become more focused around domestic policies and measures rather than a simple quantified commitment entered into internationally. This is because the Paris Agreement

13 “I

believe New Zealand can aim to be the first nation to be truly sustainable — across the four pillars of the economy, society, the environment, and nationhood” (Clark, 2007).

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foresees a global transition to net zero emissions before the end of the century, at least of long-lived gases. This implies all countries eliminating fossil fuels. New Zealand already has a 2020 international target of 5 per cent below 1990 levels, and a 2030 one under the Paris Agreement of 11 per cent below 1990 (expressed as 30 per cent below 2005). The expectation is that successive emissions reductions contributions will need to be progressive, that is, no “backsliding” will be allowed. This will inevitably bring domestic and international dimensions together as the economic implications of a new target, and how it will be achieved, are assessed sector by sector as well as by distributional effects on households. To some extent, New Zealand has tended to rest on its international laurels in the area of climate change. Domestic policy has stagnated and has failed to link with the wealth of ideas that the country has put forward in the international negotiations on climate change. In the more challenging environment ahead, New Zealand will need to work hard to protect its specific interests in forestry, agriculture and carbon markets in and outside the international negotiations, as well as to demonstrate that it is taking on a fair share Annex: International climate change negotiations: a complex environment. Some main players and alliances • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Annex I AOSIS BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) Cartagena Dialogue China EU G77 OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) Japan LDCs (Least Developed Countries) Like-minded Rainforest Coalition Russian Federation Umbrella Group United States

AOSIS, Association of Small Island States.

Competing interests • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Survival Protecting fossil fuels Competitiveness Fair burden-sharing Costs Comprehensiveness Effective markets No markets Finance for adaptation Transfer of technology Access to intellectual property Protection of intellectual property Trade restrictions Agriculture Forests Avoiding binding commitments

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of global efforts. Credibility in international climate change diplomacy may come to rest increasingly on policy settings and action at home. It should be noted that by early 2017, domestic efforts were belatedly stepping up, with a number of government-initiated workstreams, and a groundbreaking cross-party initiative in Parliament to look at low-carbon transition scenarios for New Zealand.14 So what is the verdict on New Zealand climate change diplomacy? Despite an occasional glitch, the overall picture is of a well-regarded small state legitimately and effectively pursuing its national interests and contributing to the common good through useful ideas and actions. New Zealand is punching very effectively at its weight rather than beyond it.

References Clark, H (14 February 2007). NZ’s sustainable future. New Zealand Government. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/feature/nz039s-sustainable-future. Key, J (5 November 2014). Speech to NZ Institute of International Affairs. NZ National party. https://www.national.org.nz/news/2014-11-05-speech-to-nz-ins titute-of-international-affairs. Macey, A (2012). The road to Durban and beyond. Policy Quarterly, 8(2), 23–28. Macey, A (2014). Climate change, towards policy coherence. Policy Quarterly, 10(2), 49–56. Macey, A (2016). The Paris agreement on climate change, text and contexts. Policy Quarterly, 21(1), 77–79. Snively, S (July 2015). From the Chair. Transparency International New Zealand. http://www.transparency.org.nz/Transparency-Times-July-2015. Young, A (5 November 2010). Clinton ready to build on friendship. New Zealand Herald. www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10685461.

14The report for the cross-party GLOBE-NZ parliamentary group, entitled “Net Zero in New

Zealand, scenarios to achieve domestic emissions neutrality in the second half of the century”, is available at www.vivideconomics.com.

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CHAPTER 27 The European Union as “A Partner of First-Order Importance” for New Zealand Patrick Köllner

Introduction During the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has signed a host of treaty-level agreements governing political and economic relations with partner countries in its neighbourhood and in other world regions. No EU partner country is located further away than New Zealand — nearly 19,000 km and a travel time of more than 24 hours separate Brussels and Wellington. Despite the vast geographical space separating the two sides, bilateral relations are fairly solid and diverse. Long-standing historical ties of a political, economic, social and cultural nature bind the EU and New Zealand together. Significant local adaptation notwithstanding, the institutional legacies of British rule as well as more recent institutional imports from Europe, such as a German-style mixed electoral system, shape New Zealand’s political system, while waves of migration from Europe have contributed in important ways to New Zealand’s social and cultural fabric. Building on this history of substantial flows of people, goods, capital, ideas and institutions, New Zealand and the EU are in the Parts of this chapter were first published as a briefing paper of the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies (Köllner, 2016). The author would like to thank the editors of this volume and World Scientific Publishing for their kind permission to draw on material from that briefing paper in this chapter. He also gratefully acknowledges research assistance provided by Robin Bozek, Marius Sältzer and Jeonghyun Seong. 439

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process of effectively moving towards a comprehensive partnership. In October 2016, the comprehensive character of bilateral relations was reaffirmed with the signing of a Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation (PARC). This treaty-level agreement will serve as a framework for future joint endeavours in a number of areas and may also pave the way for a free-trade agreement (FTA). This chapter first offers a European perspective on New Zealand, which — going against the grain of prevailing local self-perceptions — depicts New Zealand as a medium-sized country with a relatively low trade-intensity. The second part of the chapter takes stock of bilateral relations, surveying diplomatic and political, economic and social ties between the EU and New Zealand, and discusses the rationales for an FTA. Finally, the concluding sections highlights, against the backdrop of the planned departure of the United Kingdom from the EU (Brexit), promising fields of future cooperation between the EU and New Zealand.

Putting New Zealand into Perspective: A “Small, Trade-Dependent Country”? New Zealanders, official representatives as well as ordinary citizens, like to portray their country as a small and trade-dependent nation. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) states on its website: “As a small nation with limited resources, we are dependent on trade to survive” (MFAT, n.d.). Elsewhere, MFAT notes that “[t]he WTO and its negotiations are of enormous significance to a small trade-dependent nation such as New Zealand” (MFAT, 2006). Academics tend to agree with such a selfidentification. For example, Kevin Clements characterises New Zealand as a “relatively small, isolated, economy heavily dependent on trade” (Clements, 1988, p. 167) while David Capie speaks of New Zealand as a “small state [with a concomitant] strong interest in a rules-based international order and in the peaceful resolution of disputes” (Capie, 2012, p. 1). What are we to make of such portrayals of New Zealand as “small, tradedependent country”? Let us examine the “smallness” aspect first. The size of a country can refer to at least two features of a country: its area and its population size. How does New Zealand compare to other countries in these two regards? According to the data from One World Nations Online, among the 234 countries and territories in the world, New Zealand with its

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270,500 km2 ranks at 75th place in terms of area covered, that is, it still features within the top third. New Zealand is substantially bigger than the median countries in this regard, Serbia and Panama, which both cover about 75,500 km2 . In terms of area, New Zealand is bigger than, for example, Great Britain, Uganda or Laos. And even if one takes the non-independent territories out of the picture and just focuses on the currently 193 members of the United Nations (UN), New Zealand still ranks in terms of area among the top half.1 If, in terms of physical space, New Zealand is not really a small but rather a medium-sized country, does it at least deserve the attribute “small” given its population size? Even here things are not as obvious as might seem to many New Zealanders. With its current population of around 4.6 million people, New Zealand ranks 127th among 233 countries and territories in the world, according to recent data.2 New Zealand here finds itself in the middle group, even — if only barely so — when one only takes UN member states into account. It is therefore no great surprise that even the World Bank or the Commonwealth, which both draw the line at 1.5 million inhabitants, do not categorise New Zealand as a “small state”.3 In sum, although there might be good analytical reasons to conceptualise New Zealand as a “small power” in the International Relations literature, it is arguably not a small country or state in terms of either area or population. How about the self-identification of a “trade-dependent country” then? According to Cambridge University Press’ Business English Dictionary, the term ‘trade dependent’ is used to describe “a country for which exports are very important”.4 However, this raises the issues of why imports are not taken into account and how the importance of New Zealand’s exports should be measured. In this connection, some economists have distinguished “export propensity” — defined as the ratio of exports to the gross domestic product (GDP) of a given country, from “trade intensity”, which is 1 See

http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/countries_by_area.htm [3 February 2016]. http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/ [4 February 2016]. 3 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/smallstates/overview [4 February 2016] and http://thecommonwealth.org/our-work/small-states [4 February 2016]. 4 See http://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/business-englisch/trade-dependent [24 May 2015]. 2 See

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understood as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by GDP. Comprehensive, up-to-date data for the trade intensity of the world’s economies is hard to come by, but the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has calculated the trade-intensity of 32 of its member countries. According to the organisation, New Zealand’s trade intensity in 2012 of 57.8 per cent put the country squarely into the group of OECD countries for whose overall economic output trade mattered the least in relative terms.5 According to the OECD, there were only four countries among the 32 with lower trade intensities: Japan (31.3 per cent), the United States (31.4 per cent), Australia (41.6 per cent) and France (57.2 per cent).6 As the OECD notes, “trade intensity is low in New Zealand compared to other OECD countries of similar size […] and has remained roughly unchanged since the 1980s, despite increasing globalization” (OECD, 2013, p. 60). Geographical remoteness is considered as one core factor accounting for the relatively low trade intensity of the New Zealand economy. But also New Zealand’s limited participation in global value chains — the agriculture and foods sectors being a notable exception — plays a role in this regard (OECD, 2013, pp. 60–61). In sum, there are some reasons to question the prevailing self-identification of New Zealand as a “small, trade-dependent country”.7 Of course, the perhaps more accurate identification of New Zealand as a “medium-sized country with a low trade-intensity economy” might not be considered useful or desirable in terms of constructing a national identity or for the purpose of external image-projection. In any case, placing New Zealand in global and comparative perspective can help to put the country’s external relations, including those with the EU, into a broader perspective.

5 Which,

of course, does not imply that trade is not important for New Zealand. But then all nations need to trade and to earn foreign currency. What matters here is how (relative) dependence on trade can be adequately conceived and compared. 6 Notably, these four nations have considerably bigger domestic markets. 7The prevailing self-identification might be connected to the tendency to see and understand the own nation in relation primarily with some important “other”, in New Zealand’s case perhaps the more populous former “motherland” Great Britain or the far bigger neighbouring country of Australia. In addition, self-perceptions might not have kept up with the substantial increase of population over the past few decades and/or the decreasing trade intensity relative to some other major economies.

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Taking Stock of EU–New Zealand Relations Durable and stable political and diplomatic relations Political and diplomatic relations between the EU and New Zealand have become fairly institutionalised over the past few decades. Taking a cue from Philip Selznick’s conceptual take on institutionalisation, organisations — but arguably also processes and structured sets of relations — can be considered institutionalised when they have not only achieved a substantial degree of durability, stability and internal complexity but have also become infused with value (Selznick, 1948, 1957). In terms of durability, official ties between New Zealand and the EU have existed for well over 50 years. Diplomatic contacts were formally established in 1961, when a New Zealand ambassador became accredited to the then European Economic Community (EEC). New Zealand’s interest in closer contact with the EEC was stimulated by the United Kingdom’s interest in joining the EEC and the possible ramifications of this for New Zealand’s close trade ties with the former “motherland” (Holland and Kelly, 2012). New Zealand’s relations with individual EU member states have traditionally focused on the United Kingdom and the two big EU core countries Germany and France. In terms of stability, diplomatic and political relations between New Zealand and the EU, at both the supranational level and the level of individual member states, have become much more organisationally developed and structured over the past few decades. Important steps in this regard were taken with the opening of New Zealand embassies in Athens (since 1991 a consulate), Bonn, Brussels and Rome in the 1960s and more recently also in other capital cities such as Madrid, Stockholm, or Warsaw. Of the 28 EU member states, 8 have embassies in Wellington and 15 other member states are being accredited to New Zealand. There are also close to 50 consuls general and honorary consuls representing EU countries in New Zealand’s main cities. The collective EU diplomatic presence in New Zealand started with the accreditation of the European Commission Delegation in Canberra to New Zealand in 1984. In 2004, a direct diplomatic presence was established in Wellington, and six years later the Commission Delegation was transformed, in the context of the establishment of a joint EU External Action Service, into the European Union’s Delegation to New Zealand (Holland and Kelly,

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2012). In September 2016, the Delegation became a full mission led by a resident ambassador. Consultations between the EU and New Zealand at the level of political leaders, ministers, commissioners and parliamentarians are frequent, and annual meetings of senior officials alternate between Brussels and Wellington.

The expanding scope of EU–New Zealand cooperation Besides their considerable duration and stability, diplomatic and political relations between New Zealand and the EU are characterised by the increasing complexity of the issues at play. Given the strong economic thrust of the initial European integration project and New Zealand’s long-standing quest to secure access to the European market for its exports, particularly agricultural products, it is not surprising that relations have until recently focused very much on trade and other economic matters, including quotas and regulatory issues. As an EU paper on relations with New Zealand put it bluntly some years ago: “Trade is a dominant feature of the bilateral relationship” (EEAS, 2008). Indeed, many of the 15 bilateral agreements signed since 1980 by New Zealand and the EU (and its institutional precursors) deal with trade and business-relevant matters such as trade in cheese, mutton, lamb and goat meat; sanitary, phytosanitary and health issues; air services and the mutual recognition of conformity assessments. Still, both the range of multilateral treaties, conventions and protocols signed by the EU and New Zealand on issues such as climate protection and combating corruption or transnational organised crime as well as the issues covered in more recent bilateral agreements indicate that the scope of mutual interests, concerns and cooperation is expanding. As a result, there are now sectoral dialogues involving officials from both sides on issues such as human rights and science and technology. Moreover, both sides also participate in the annual meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and in the bi-regional Asia–Europe Meeting process. The two sides also share a particular interest in regional cooperation, sustainable development and stability in the South Pacific. Both the EU and New Zealand are important providers of development assistance for the nations in the South Pacific. Together with Australia, they have been engaged since 2008 in trilateral consultations on development cooperation in the region. They both also work together within the framework of the EU–Pacific Islands Forum, where issues

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of climate change mitigation and adaptation have featured prominently in recent years. The basic foundation for developing bilateral relations in recent years has been the 2007 EU–New Zealand Joint Declaration on Relations and Cooperation, which superseded the first Joint EU–New Zealand Declaration, signed in 1999. Underscoring the growing scope of issues at play, the 2007 declaration devoted only seven of 46 paragraphs dealing with the substance of the bilateral relations to trade and economic matters. The Joint Declaration was followed by a bilateral agreement on scientific and technological cooperation as well as two agreements dealing with security issues. The latter included one very specific agreement signed in 2007 that concerned New Zealand’s participation in the civilian EU Police Mission in Afghanistan — as one of four non-EU countries, New Zealand contributed police officers to the mission — and one agreement covering New Zealand’s participation in military crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A much broader framework agreement governing the participation of New Zealand in EU crisis management operations followed in 2012. Building on the Joint Declaration and the subsequent bilateral agreements, the EU and New Zealand agreed in 2009 to further elevate the bilateral relationship by means of a comprehensive and legally binding EU–New Zealand treaty-level agreement. Formal negotiations on this PARC took place between 2012 and 2014. After some legal “scrubbing” of the text, EU High Representative Frederica Mogherini and the then New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully finally signed the PARC in October 2016. This 60-articlestrong document covers the whole gamut of bilateral cooperation and dialogue in 10 sections, if not from A to Z, then at least from A for agriculture, rural development and forestry (Article 49) and animal welfare (Article 16) to T for transport (Article 48) or tourism (Article 28). Particularly lengthy and detailed articles concern cooperation in combating terrorism (Article 11), dialogue on economic and trade matters (Article 14), education and training (Article 40), energy (Article 47) and fisheries and maritime affairs (Article 50) (EEAS, 2016b). Finally, a word on whether bilateral relations have become infused with value. The official discourse on EU–New Zealand cooperation, as displayed in documents and in statements by high-level representatives, emphasises the like-mindedness of the two parties. As the European External Action Service

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puts it: “The EU and New Zealand are like-minded partners who share many common values and interests and see eye-to-eye on key international and global issues” (EEAS, n.d.). Moreover, at the time of signing the PARC, Frederica Mogherini noted that the agreement testified to “a good friendship and close partnership” between the EU and New Zealand (EEAS, 2016a). In turn, former New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully has called the EU “a partner of first order importance for New Zealand” while also pointing to “the high level of cooperation with the EU in the Pacific, including on development delivery” (European Union, 2011). Arguably, the high esteem in which the two sides hold each other has contributed to the institutionalisation of political and diplomatic relations between the EU and New Zealand over the past few decades.

EU–New Zealand trade relations While two elements of the “holy trinity” of the EU’s modern agreements with other countries and regions — the framework agreement for participation in EU crisis management operations mentioned above and an all-encompassing political agreement — are now in place with New Zealand, the often invoked “like-mindedness” of the two sides has yet to be translated into a bilateral FTA. Prior to Britain joining the EEC in 1973, New Zealand’s trade was largely conducted with the United Kingdom. In view of the gradual phasing out of preferential trading links with the United Kingdom, New Zealand had to reorient its trade relations. It did so by successfully diversifying its trade relationships with geographically closer Asian nations, as well as Australia. Nevertheless, the EU has remained an important partner for New Zealand in terms of trade in both goods and services. In 2015, the EU was New Zealand’s third-most-important trade partner after Australia and China. New Zealand’s trade in goods and services with the EU accounted for approximately NZD 20 billion in that year, more than one-eighth of New Zealand’s total trade.8 The main goods exported to the EU were meat products, wine and fruit. In the same year, the EU was the number one source of imports to New Zealand. Approximately 18 per cent of the goods and services imported came from the EU (Statistics New Zealand, 23 May 2016). The main EU merchandise items exported to New Zealand were transport equipment, mainly 8The

average value of the New Zealand dollar relative to the euro was 0.63 in 2015.

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motor vehicles (close to 30 per cent of the total); machinery and appliances (approximately 25 per cent) and chemical and related products (European Commission, 21 June 2016). Bilateral trade between the EU and New Zealand has continued to grow in recent years. According to EU statistics, EU imports increased on average by 2.2 per cent annually between 2011 and 2015, while EU exports to New Zealand increased by 7.4 per cent. New Zealand was the EU’s 50th most important trading partner worldwide in 2015, with 0.2 per cent of total EU trade being conducted with New Zealand. New Zealand has run a trade deficit with the EU since 2011, which amounted to EUR 1.1 billion in 2015 (European Commission, 21 June 2016). Slightly less than half of the deficit with the EU derived in 2015 from New Zealand’s bilateral trade with Germany, its most important trade partner within the bloc. In 2015, New Zealand’s trade with Germany amounted to over NZD 3.1 billion, whereas trade with the United Kingdom stood at NZD 3 billion. The fairly balanced trade with the United Kingdom accounted for approximately 21 per cent of New Zealand’s total trade with the EU (Statistics New Zealand, 23 May 2016) and thus, reflecting the long-standing trade ties between the two countries, a higher share than the United Kingdom’s contribution to the EU’s total external trade (close to 13 per cent for exports and 15 per cent for imports in 2015).

Rationale for and prospects of an FTA New Zealand has long desired a bilateral FTA with the EU. As New Zealand’s then minister of trade, Tim Groser, noted in 2014 in a letter to EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, “New Zealand is now one of only six WTO members without a preferential access arrangement to the EU either concluded or under negotiation. This is out of keeping with our otherwise warm political relationship” (Groser, 2014). In the absence of an FTA, New Zealand is at a disadvantage in terms of market access to the EU relative to some competitors (cf. MFAT, 2014). Given the political sensitivity of free trade in agricultural products for a number of member states, the EU has long been reluctant to initiate negotiations on such an agreement with New Zealand (or Australia for that matter).9 However, in view of the upcoming 9 New

Zealand’s agricultural exports to the EU do not, however, include products that exacerbate core EU sensitivities, such as grains or sugar. Also, the EU has already liberalised key New

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PARC and given New Zealand’s record of having successfully negotiated a number of high-quality FTAs with EU competitors such as China and South Korea, the EU and New Zealand committed in October 2015 to start the process of bilateral FTA negotiations. Formal preparations got underway in early 2016 with public consultation processes on both sides. The EU Commission is in fact preparing to negotiate FTA s with both New Zealand and Australia, with the one with New Zealand leading the way. According to the roadmap presented by the EU Commission in early 2016, the Commission could request permission from the European Council to begin FTA negotiations in the first part of 2017 (European Commission, 27 January 2016). The Commission’s preparations — impact assessment and scoping — for the negotiations with New Zealand and Australia have been unaffected by the outcome of the June 2016 referendum in the United Kingdom on leaving the EU. If anything, the spectre of Brexit has provided impetus for trade officials to conclude and ratify pending trade pacts sooner rather than later. However, given the rise of anti-globalisation sentiments (not only) in the EU, which in October 2016 nearly scuttled the signing of a trade pact between the EU and Canada (Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement [CETA]), the more important question these days is whether an FTA between the EU and New Zealand will be sellable in all the EU member states, which need to agree to the final deal. Despite New Zealand’s limited importance for the EU’s external trade, concluding an FTA with New Zealand is arguably of interest to the EU on a number of counts. First, such an FTA could serve as a blueprint for future FTAs with partners in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. The content and explanation of such FTAs should address not only tariff issues, non-tariff barriers and regulatory cooperation but also public concerns about trade- and investment-related issues (e.g., concerning data privacy, consumer protection, labour standards or the investor-state dispute settlement system). The fact that such concerns are shared by many citizens in the EU and New Zealand as well as the already high level of regulatory cooperation between the two sides, even with regard to sensitive issues such as data privacy, provide good starting points, which

Zealand export items such as sheep meat and wool. Furthermore, there are strong seasonal complementarities or specialisations with respect to other agricultural products that New Zealand exports to the EU (see Lee-Makiyama, 2015, pp. 6–9).

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do not exist with many other countries, for negotiations (cf. Lee-Makiyama, 2015, pp. 11–13). Second, an FTA with New Zealand would open up opportunities for additional market access and provide links to existing trade pacts. New Zealand is not only connected to Australia by a common market scheme — the Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement, which represents one of the world’s rare cases of deep regional integration — but also boasts a number of comprehensive FTAs with partners such as China and the ASEAN with which the EU does not have FTAs. Indeed, due to its persistent, pragmatic, incremental and multilaterally attuned approach to trade diplomacy over the past few decades, New Zealand is now enmeshed in a web of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific (see Leslie, 2015), making it an attractive potential partner for the EU. An FTA with New Zealand could provide additional opportunities at the micro level for EU enterprises in Oceania and East Asia and could also provide a stepping stone at the macro level for wider interregional trade cooperation. Third, given the EU’s and New Zealand’s expertise and experience in achieving high-quality FTAs as well as the already high degree of trade-related liberalisation and harmonisation between the two sides, there is the possibility that a bilateral FTA could be negotiated in a relatively swift and clean fashion. As Lee-Makiyama (2015, p. 9) has argued, if an FTA cannot be agreed upon with New Zealand, it cannot be agreed upon at all. With the EU’s ability to deliver in terms of external trade diplomacy — a core area of European integration — in doubt in recent times, the successful conclusion and ratification of an FTA with New Zealand could help rebuild trust and regain momentum in this policy domain. An EU–New Zealand FTA could be used to seek a new equilibrium between technocratic ambition on the one hand and public concerns on the other. In any case, such an FTA will have to be more creative and more ambitious with respect to addressing citizen concerns about tradeand investment-related issues. Also, given the public outcry in a number of EU member states about the secret character of negotiations between the EU and the United States over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the EU Commission and member states will need to discuss and decide on how much (more) information will be made available to the public before and during the envisaged FTA negotiations with New Zealand. Preparations for the trade pact might thus take longer than anticipated but will be vital for the trade pact to gain

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public approval and thus stand a chance of ratification. In a nutshell, the public will need to be convinced that such an FTA will be beneficial for them and not just for some vested interests. While an EU–New Zealand FTA has finally moved into sight with the signing of the PARC, actually concluding the FTA will still require substantial preparation and explanation.

Direct investment, tourism and migration In terms of accumulated foreign direct investment (FDI), the EU ranks second in importance for New Zealand, trailing Australia by a wide margin. At the end of 2015, the total stock of EU FDI in New Zealand amounted to NZD 8.3 billion or close to 9 per cent of the total. By country, most FDI from the EU has originated from the United Kingdom (NZD 4.2 billion), followed by the Netherlands (NZD 3.5 billion). In terms of New Zealand’s overseas direct investment (ODI), the EU has been the third-most important destination for such investment, with accumulated ODI amounting to NZD 2.9 billion or 11.4 per cent of the total stock at the end of 2015. More than half of New Zealand’s ODI in the EU has gone to the United Kingdom (Statistics New Zealand, 23 May 2016). Tourism is of vital importance to New Zealand’s economy, contributing in direct and indirect terms over 8 per cent of the country’s GDP. Growth in the tourism sector has in recent years been driven by the increasing number of Asian, in particular Chinese, visitors to New Zealand. Still, the number of visitors from the EU remains high and continues to grow. According to New Zealand statistics, approximately 463,000 people from Europe visited the country in 2015, making it the third-largest source of worldwide visitors after Oceania and Asia but before the Americas. By country, visitors from both the United Kingdom and Germany featured in the top 10 in 2015 — with the United Kingdom at fourth place with close to 204,000 visitors and Germany at sixth place with close to 85,000 visitors (Statistics New Zealand, 3 February 2016). The high number of visitors from the United Kingdom can be easily understood in light of New Zealand’s immigration profile. Nearly three-quarters of the population — roughly three million people — identify themselves as being of European ethnicity. A quarter of the population was born overseas. While the largest group of overseas-born New Zealanders now hails from various parts of Asia, England still ranks at the top by country — well ahead

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of China, India and Australia — with close to 216,000 people, or 21.5 per cent of New Zealand’s overseas-born population, originating from there. The other European source of overseas-born citizens in the top 10 is Scotland, where close to 26,000 New Zealanders were born (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). Permanent migration from the EU to New Zealand remains substantial. In the year ending March 2016, over 26,500 EU citizens resettled in New Zealand, accounting for more than one-fifth of all immigrants in that year. Collectively, EU citizens were in fact the most important group of new immigrants, outnumbering Australians and Chinese. Europeans arriving on a permanent or long-term basis in New Zealand in 2015 included nearly 13,400 Brits, over 3,900 Germans and close to 3,800 French citizens (Statistics New Zealand, 23 May 2016).

Beyond Brexit: The Potential for Closer EU–New Zealand Cooperation While New Zealand’s ties with Australia and various parts of Asia have grown by leaps and bounds in recent decades, the EU undoubtedly remains a firstorder partner for New Zealand. Very substantial trade, investment, tourism and migration ties continue to underpin bilateral relations. Shared values and interests also make New Zealand a well-regarded partner of the EU — at the bilateral level, in the regional context of the South Pacific, where New Zealand features as a “middle power” in its own right, and on the international stage. Relations between the EU and New Zealand have clearly outgrown the “trade only” stage. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom’s planned exit from the EU will have significant ramifications for the relationship. Because of the United Kingdom’s historically based special place in New Zealand’s relations with Europe and because the United Kingdom still accounts for a disproportionate share of the EU’s trade, investment, travel, migration and other links with New Zealand, Brexit will undoubtedly mean a net loss for the EU’s relationship with New Zealand. Given the still-unclear timing and conditions of Brexit, including whether the United Kingdom will remain connected to the Single Market in some way or for some time, the only thing that can be said with certainty at this point is that New Zealand will need to negotiate of host of separate agreements with the United Kingdom after Brexit has occurred — that is, most likely after 2019.

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The spectre of Brexit notwithstanding, there is substantial scope for further developing relations between the EU and New Zealand. The treaty-level agreement signed in 2016 is bound to serve as a launching pad for future joint endeavours in a number of areas and may also pave the way for a bilateral FTA. Areas of cooperation with particular potential for further development include research and education as well as maritime affairs. For a country with a population of 4.6 million, New Zealand boasts fairly substantial links with the EU and its member states in terms of research, innovation and education. Innovation systems in the EU and New Zealand are in alignment, and some of the key priorities of publicly funded research in the EU and New Zealand are the same. The number of New Zealand participations within the EU Framework Programmes (FP) for Research and Technological Development has significantly increased since the signing of the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement in 2009. While less than 30 participants from New Zealand took part in FP 6 (2002–2006), there were approximately 230 such participants in FP 7 (2007–2013), including the Marie Skłodowska-Curie mobility programme and joint research in the areas of food, agriculture and fisheries, biotechnology, information and communications technology and health (European Commission, 2013). The current EU Research and Innovation Programme, Horizon 2020 (2014–2020), which also includes public– public partnership networks, should see even more New Zealand participation, particularly given New Zealand’s expertise and interest in additional areas such as renewable energy, resilient structures, sustainable urban development and Antarctic research (cf. European Commission, 13 October 2016, pp. 33–34). Beyond, but in some ways also linked to, cooperation in research, innovation and education, there is also scope for more in-depth cooperation between New Zealand and the EU concerning maritime affairs. As noted above, New Zealand is a significant maritime nation with one of the longest coastlines and also one of the largest exclusive economic zones (EEZs) on the globe. Future cooperation and dialogue between the EU and New Zealand should better reflect shared maritime and marine interests, as well as responsibilities, by addressing issues across a range of policy areas including, but certainly not limited to, climate change (e.g., ocean acidification), energy (e.g., generation of energy from ocean currents), natural disaster management (e.g., the improvement of relevant governance structures in the South Pacific), research and innovation (e.g., aquaculture, ocean monitoring), security governance

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(e.g., peaceful settlement of maritime disputes) and the sustainable development of the marine environment (including conservation, protection and rehabilitation of ocean ecosystems). While such issues can be addressed on an issue-by-issue basis, a more integrated approach could build on existing and yet-to-be-established framework policies for ocean governance in the EU and New Zealand. A comprehensive maritime partnership between the EU and New Zealand could form a bedrock of bilateral relations in the years to come.

References Capie, D (2012). Peacekeeping. Te Ara — The encyclopedia of New Zealand. http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/peacekeeping/print [4 March 2015]. Clements, KP (1988). The politics of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear initiatives. In Asia: Militarization and Regional Conflict, Y Sakamoto (ed.), pp. 167–183. London: Zed Books. European Commission (2013). European Union–New Zealand science and technology cooperation roadmap 2014–2016: Research and innovation priorities. https://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/new_zealand-eu_priorities.pdf [20 October 2016]. European Commission (27 January 2016). Inception impact assessment: EU– Australia and EU–New Zealand free trade agreements. http://ec.europa.eu/smartregulation/roadmaps/docs/2015_trade_040_aus_nz_trade_agreement_en.pdf [14 October 2016]. European Commission (21 June 2016). European Union, trade in goods with New Zealand. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_ 113425.pdf [16 August 2016]. European Commission (13 October 2016). Priorities for international cooperation in research and innovation, SWD (2016) 329 final. www.kowi.de/de/Portal data/2/Resources/horizon2020/wp/annex_roadmaps_oct-2016.pdf [26 October 2016]. European Union (2011). European Union and New Zealand to pursue Framework Agreement. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1288_en.htm [28 April 2015]. European Union External Action Service (EEAS) (2008). Political and economic relationship with New Zealand. http://eeas.europa.eu/new_zealand/docs/politi cal_economic_en.pdf [24 May 2015]. European Union External Action Service (EEAS) (6 October 2016a). Statement by High Representative/Vice President Frederica Mogherini at the occasion of the signing of the EU–New Zealand Partnership Agreement for Relations and

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Cooperation. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/ sanctions-policy/11318/statementby-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-at-the-occasion-of-thesigning-of-the-eu-new-zealand-partnership-agreement-for-relations-and-cooper ation_en [7 October 2016]. European Union External Action Service (EEAS) (2016b). Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation between the European Union and its member states, of the one part, and New Zealand, of the other part. https://eeas.europa. eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_new_zealand_partnership_agreement_on_relations_and_ cooperation.pdf [17 October 2016]. European Union External Action Service (EEAS) (n.d.). EU’s relations with New Zealand. http://eeas.europa.eu/new_zealand/index_en.htm [28 April 2015]. Groser, T (November 2014). Congratulations letter to Commissioner Malmström. http://ec.europa.eu/carol/index.cfm?fuseaction=download&documentId=0901 66e59b144f7a&title=Commissioner_Malmstr%C3%B6m%20-%20from%20 NZ%20MoT%20Tim%20Groser.pdf [15 April 2015]. Holland, M and S Kelly (2012). Britain, Europe and New Zealand. Te Ara — The Encyclopedia of New Zealand. http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/britain-europeand-new-zealand/print [4 March 2015]. Köllner, P (2016). Towards a comprehensive partnership between the EU and New Zealand. GIGA Focus Asia, No. 7/2016. https://www.giga-hamburg.de/ en/publications/giga-focus/asia [10 November 2016]. Lee-Makiyama, H (2015). New Zealand: The EU’s Asia-Pacific partnership and the case for a next generation FTA. ECIPE Policy Brief No. 07/2015. http://ecipe. org/publications/new-zealand-eus-fta/ [24 October 2016]. Leslie, J (2015). New Zealand trade strategy and evolving Asian-Pacific regional economic architecture. Asia New Zealand foundation report. www.asianz.org.nz/rep orts/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ANZF1034-Trade-Strategy-Report-_-FA.pdf [25 October 2016]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand (MFAT) (May 2006). Trade matters:The WorldTrade Organisation. http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/mediaand-publications/tradematters-wto-overview.pdf [12 May 2015]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand (MFAT) (August 2014). The European Union: Its economic significance and the case for an FTA. https://www. mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAs-in-negotiations/EU-FTA/The-European-Union-Its-Ec onomic-Significance-and-the-Case-for-an-FTA.pdf [25 October 2016]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand (MFAT) (n.d.). New Zealand High Commission London, United Kingdom: New Zealand and the United Kingdom. http://www.nzembassy.com/united-kingdom/relationship-betweennz-and-the-united-kingdom/nz-and-the-united-kingdom [12 May 2015]. Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) (2013). OECD Economic Surveys: New Zealand 2013. Paris: OECD.

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Selznick, P (1948). Foundations of the theory of organization. American Sociological Review, 13(1), 25–35. Selznick, P (1957). Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation. Evanston/New York: Row, Peterson and Company. Statistics New Zealand (3 December 2013). 2013 Census QuickStats about national highlights. http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/profile-and-summaryreports/quickstats-about-national-highlights.aspx [28 April 2015]. Statistics New Zealand (3 February 2016). International visitor arrivals to New Zealand: December 2015. www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/ Migration/international-visitor-arrivals-dec-15.aspx [3 February 2016]. Statistics New Zealand (23 May 2016). Global New Zealand — International trade, investment, and travel profile: Year ended December 2015. www.stats. govt.nz/browse_for_stats/industry_sectors/imports_and_exports/global-nz-dec15.aspx [16 August 2016].

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CHAPTER 28 New Zealand, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the United Nations: 2012 and 1974 in Comparative Perspective Nigel Parsons and James Watson

Introduction In common with fellow members of the United Nations (UN), New Zealand has been required to take a position on the question of Palestine numerous times over a period of 70 years. The results have been surprisingly distinctive and so merit further investigation. By way of advancing such an investigation, this chapter compares New Zealand’s position on Palestine in two standout instances: the 2012 vote at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on whether or not to upgrade the status of Palestine to non-member observer state; and the 1974 vote on issuing an invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO’s) iconic third chairman Yasser Arafat to address the same body. In both instances, New Zealand voted in favour of Palestine, two votes that contrasted directly with all four of the country’s traditional Anglosphere allies in Australia, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. While allowing for fluctuating interpretations of self-interest such as trade, oil and so on, or contingency and the possibility that seeming diplomatic consistency may be as much a matter of accident as design, New Zealand’s record on Palestine at the UN is at the very least intriguing. Indeed, looking further back to 1947, New Zealand defied imperial ties to the United Kingdom by voting in favour 457

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of the partition of Palestine even as the United Kingdom abstained. It would appear then that New Zealand does have a habit of going its own way on the question of Palestine. Four subsequent sections to this chapter outline the diplomatic background to Palestine’s more recent initiatives at the UN before focusing in on New Zealand’s vote in 2012 and then again in 1974; concluding remarks reflect on the role of Palestine at the UN in the construction of New Zealand’s international identity.

Diplomatic Background Among the parties striving to shape New Zealand’s engagement with Palestine at the UN is the PLO, for whom Palestinian statehood comprises a core ambition. Drawn since the mid-1990s to the West Bank hub of Ramallah, and led since 2004 by aging chairman Mahmud Abbas, the PLO understood that the most direct route to statehood via the UN was to obtain full membership, a standing strictly in the gift of the Security Council (UNSC). In this “Plan A” scenario, the Palestinians knew full well they would likely face US opposition; even if they were able to generate a successful 9/15 majority, the United States (as one of the permanent members or “P5”) would probably veto the resolution. Unfolding in 2011, “Plan A” was essentially a non-issue for New Zealand as the country was not then a serving member of the UNSC. However, “Plan B” saw the PLO appeal to the UNGA; the prize was a lesser upgrade to non-member observer state, but the advantage would be the absence of any P5 or other veto. In this instance then, New Zealand would be compelled to take a position. How did the PLO, the UN and New Zealand arrive at this point? Stretching back unevenly to the early 1990s, direct PLO–Israel negotiations effectively ceased in 2008; briefly revived by the 2007 Annapolis conference, they soon stalled over the first of the three major Israeli assaults on Gaza — the 22-day Operation Cast Lead ending in early 2009. Talks briefly recommenced in September 2010, with an opening session in Washington, DC and a further round at the Egyptian Red Sea resort town of Sharm El Sheikh and then Jerusalem, but the momentum proved short lived; Israel declined to extend a US-brokered West Bank settlement freeze and the Palestinian leadership, under considerable public pressure, withdrew from discussions. Talks relaunched in July 2013 at the behest of US Secretary of State John Kerry; such movement

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as did occur secured agreement on the release of 104 long-term Palestinian prisoners in four tranches. However, Israel refused to release the fourth and final group scheduled for March 2014; combined with a usefully provocative announcement of the construction of hundreds of new homes in Jewish settlements in the West Bank, plus a PLO initiative to repair national ranks via an outreach to Hamas, talks broke down once again. In lieu of meaningful bilateral negotiations with Israel mediated by the United States, and having decisively eschewed armed struggle, the PLO cast around for alternatives, alighting on the pursuit of multilateral diplomacy at the UN. As noted, full membership required a 9/15 majority at the UNSC; this was thought to have been secured but relied on the support of fellow Sunni Muslim–majority state Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bowing to colossal US pressure in the context of having been saved from Serbia, Bosnia abstained, thus sparing the United States the embarrassment of wielding the veto; instead, the question of full membership of the UN for Palestine was parked in the Committee on the Admission of New Members where it proceeded to gather dust. And so did the PLO opt for “Plan B”, applying for non-member state standing to the UNGA and requiring New Zealand to take a position. In the event, Wellington determined to vote with the clear majority of 138/193 UNGA members in favour of the resolution. Besides Israel, the only votes against were cast by North American neighbours the United States and Canada, a single European state in the Czech Republic, Panama and a collection of small Pacific island states dependent on US largesse. Australia and the UK abstained.

New Zealand and the PLO at the UN in 2012 The UN’s documents of record, draft resolution A/67/L.28 plus meetings coverage and press releases no. GA/11317 (2012), established Palestine’s upgrade to non-member observer state on 29 November 2012.1 The key excerpt records that the UNGA (1) Reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to independence in their State of Palestine on the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967.

1The

relevant UNGA resolution was subsequently listed as A/RES/67/19.

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(2) Decides to accord to Palestine non-member observer State status in the UN, without prejudice to the acquired rights, privileges and role of the PLO in the UN as the representative of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and practice. (3) Expresses the hope that the Security Council will consider favourably the application submitted on 23 September 2011 by the State of Palestine for admission to full membership in the UN (UNGA, 2012a, p. 3). New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs Murray McCully issued a statement, excerpts from which read as follows: We have discussed the proposed text of the resolution with Palestinian representatives over recent weeks and they have delivered a resolution that is moderate, constructive, and reflects our commitment to a two-state solution. We will therefore vote for it.

He added that: The New Zealand Government is under no illusions as to the utility of a UN resolution. It will solve nothing. But in the absence of the direct talks we have called for, we will deal with the UN resolution on its merits. That means we will vote in favour of the resolution before the General Assembly this morning. (Watkins, 2012, paras. 8, 12)

New Zealand’s Permanent Representative to the UN Jim McLay noted that the country’s “vote in favour of the resolution was consistent with its longheld support for the aspirations of the Palestinian people …[including] an independent Palestine living within clearly defined borders”. He went on to express “the hope that with today’s decision both sides would do whatever was needed to return to the negotiating table” (UNGA, 2012b, paras. 90, 91). Beyond the question of Palestine, but including and pertinent to it stood New Zealand’s campaign for a two-year rotating seat on the UNSC. In support of that campaign, Wellington signed-off on a high-quality brochure entitled New Zealand: Candidate for the United Nations Security Council 2015– 2016. The brochure put forward a strong case for a vote for New Zealand; excerpts noted that: New Zealand has a consistent and independent foreign policy. New Zealand has a proven track record of working with partners from all regions to solve problems and achieve political results. New Zealand is committed to fairness at the UN and comes with an open mind. New Zealand will work to ensure that all states are heard and respected, regardless of size or allegiance.

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Further into the brochure and specific to the Middle East it was noted that: As a Security Council member in 1993–94, New Zealand led the way in making sure that small states in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and former Yugoslavia got a fair hearing in the Security Council.

On the question of Palestine, the same brochure was able to point out that: As a long-standing supporter of a two-state solution in the Middle East, New Zealand voted in favour of the resolution on the status of Palestine at the UN General Assembly in November 2012. New Zealand continues to call for direct negotiations between the parties (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [MFAT], n.d.).2

New Zealand then, packaging itself as protective of the interests of small states and as fair minded, could point to solid evidence in support of both claims with the 2012 vote for Palestine.

New Zealand and the PLO at the UN in 1974 New Zealand’s independent-minded vote for Palestine in 2012 can be usefully compared with another, perhaps even more controversial decision in 1974; at a time when significant elements of the Anglosphere viewed Arafat and the PLO as terrorist pariahs, UNGA Resolution 3210 determined as follows: The General Assembly, Considering that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine, Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings (UNGA, 1974a).

Wellington voted with 105 members of the UNGA, and while only four states voted against (including Israel and the United States), of New Zealand’s typical allies in the Western European and Others Group, most stayed neutral with a total of 20 abstentions (UNGA, 1974b). Clearly a New Zealand vote against the proposal would not have prevented Arafat’s attendance, during which he delivered his famous speech declaring, “Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighters gun. Do 2The

wording in the online record harvested by the National Library of New Zealand varies at times from the original PDF. A record of New Zealand’s tenure at the UNSC can be accessed at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/peace-rights-and-security/work-with-the-un-andother-partners/new-zealand-and-the-un-security-council-2015-16/.

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not let the olive branch fall from my hand” (Musolff, 2016, p. 97).3 And yet the vote in its favour saw Wellington part company not just with most of WEOG but also ignore the strong opposition of the United States. Consistent with the 2012 vote, the New Zealand Permanent Representative, Malcolm Templeton, proceeded to remind the General Assembly that it had voted for the creation of an Arab Palestinian state in 1947 and to declare that such a state should now be created. Two subsequent resolutions on Palestine launched the then Beirut-based PLO into its financial, diplomatic and military pomp: UNGA Resolution 3236 defined Palestinian rights as including “(a) The right to self-determination without external interference; (b) The right to national independence and sovereignty”. UNGA Resolution 3237 invited the PLO “to participate in the sessions and work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer” (UNGA, 1974c). In contrast to 2012, archival records and biographical sources give us rather more to work on when analysing New Zealand’s diplomatic decisionmaking. The context to 1974s vote was the ascension to office of a new Labour government to office in 1972 under the affable Norman Kirk. The prime minister himself appears to have held a somewhat conflicted position on Palestine but one that was not uncommon at the time on the progressive left: Kirk was pro-Zionist on the one hand but pro-decolonisation on the other. This circle could seemingly be squared by interpreting Zionism as a national liberation movement for a persecuted people rather than a typical European colonization project unfolding out of time but at a similarly catastrophic cost to the indigenous population. Kirk died suddenly on 31 August 1974 to be succeeded as prime minister by Bill Rowling, and it was Rowling (in office from 6 September 1974 until 12 December 1975) who would actually oversee the vote. The text of communications at the time reveals something of the mood of New Zealand’s representatives overseas. For instance, one Kiwi staffer in New York reported to Wellington that, “Within the Assembly, Israel walks a lonely path. Her representatives make strident speeches attuned to an audience in the United States rather than the United Nations ... More and more, she is

3 Musolff

notes that, 37 years later, Arafat’s successor at the head of the PLO, Mahmud Abbas, would recycle only the more benevolent aspect of the same speech at the same venue in 2011: “Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand!”

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coming to be regarded, with South Africa and Portugal, as one of the pariahs of the organisation” (New York to Wellington, 1973). Another noted that the Organization of African Unity had adopted the view that “the attainment of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people is a prerequisite to a just and durable peace in the Middle East” and recognized “the legitimacy of the struggle of the Palestinian people to restore their national rights by all means available to them” (Mansfield, 1973). Telexing from New York to Wellington, Templeton advised, “My own view is that there is a good chance that the degree of recognition accorded the PLO by admitting them to observer status at a wide range of meetings will set them on the road to international respectability” (Templeton, 1974). When justifying in parliament New Zealand’s vote to permit the PLO to participate in the debate on Palestine, Prime Minister Rowling made the same argument: “If the PLO had been denied its right to make its voice heard in this United Nations debate, it might well have concluded that it had no alternative to a resurgence of violence and terrorism” (Rowling, 1974). In summary, which factors might be said to be bearing on the New Zealand government as it makes this decision to vote in favour of the invitation to Arafat with huge implications in international law for Palestine? First, decolonisation, in which national liberation movements such as the PLO were visibly gaining currency and increasingly transitioning to independent statehood. Second, the changing context in which decision-making at the UN unfolded, profoundly altered as it was by advances in decolonization. Third, Israel was doing very little to endear itself to analysts in the New Zealand public service; in this respect, it’s interesting to note the comparison with apartheid South Africa being drawn and recorded decades ahead of this now mainstream debate led by the contemporary Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign.4 And in related terms of political culture, Israeli intransigence sat ill alongside New Zealand’s characteristic articulation of an “even-handed” position. Four, we might note that there have always been limits to the capacity of organized Zionism in New Zealand in a way that is not the case with fellow Anglosphere allies.

4 See

the BDS homepage here: https://bdsmovement.net/ The inspiration for BDS is acknowledged to be the anti-apartheid struggle here: https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds

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Conclusion: Palestine and the UN in the Construction of New Zealand’s International Identity By way of conclusion, the international relations paradigm of constructivism is deployed as a sort of paradigmatic spanner; it offers to turn the empirical bolt for us, that is, to help us interpret the role of the PLO at the UN in the construction and evolution of New Zealand’s international identity. For the constructivist Christian Reus-Smit, this model of international relations theory is “characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action, and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures” (ReusSmit, 2001, p. 209). How does this help us understand New Zealand’s record on Palestine? It does so in three ways. First, we have presented here a short comparative analysis of two episodes in New Zealand–PLO–UN history, the two episodes separated by nearly four decades. This is then, at heart, an historical study. For Reus-Smit, “If ideas, norms and practices matter, and if they differ from one social context to another, then history in turn matters” (2001, p. 226). To recap that history, in 2012 New Zealand voted for UNGA Resolution 67/19, contrary to all of its Anglosphere allies and in direct opposition to the United States. And further back in 1974, New Zealand voted for UNGA Resolution 3210 to invite Arafat to address the UNGA; again Wellington was at odds with typical partners and took a position directly contrary to that of the United States. Further back in time, we noted that Wellington voted for UNGA 181 in 1947 (the partition resolution), contrary to the United Kingdom, which abstained. By engaging with history, might we then aggregate certain votes and establish a case that responding to the question of Palestine at the UN has helped New Zealand to market itself as independent, or at least distinct, from traditional allies at certain moments? Second, besides being comparative and historical, our focus has been on New Zealand’s responses to PLO initiatives at the UN, the primary if flawed forum for international society. If, as Reus Smit would have it, this society is understood “as a constitutive realm, the site that generates actors” (2001, p. 219), then might we track ways in which changes to that society through history have impacted New Zealand as an international personality that is seen to change, act and not least of all to vote on the world stage? The society with which we are concerned and within which New Zealand has been compelled

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to vote is the UNGA. This society has been reshaped by decolonisation and that process (while not over yet for Palestine) has matured to such an extent that it reads very clearly in the relative composition of the UNGA over time: in 1947 the UNGA had 57 members; by 1974 that had increased to 127 and by 2012 reached 193. As t-shirts across Palestine made clear during the campaign for a diplomatic upgrade, Palestine aspired to be member 194. Third, New Zealand’s track record examined albeit briefly here does show how the construction and maintenance of this identity — “fair-minded”, “even-handed” and “consistent” — has not only taken place but appears to have become an asset; allowing for on the hoof decision-making in the real world of diplomacy, casting a vote and taking a public position remains a powerful performative moment. Moreover, one such moment in 2012 and the constructed identity behind it were evidently (and successfully) marshalled in support of Kiwi aspirations to a seat on the UNSC. To dabble for a moment with counterfactual history, what would have happened had New Zealand not voted for Palestine or gone even further and followed the United States by voting against? For these two analysts, such an outcome seemed far from unthinkable, not least of all under a National Party-led government that expressly sought to improve ties to Washington. Could New Zealand still have secured the UNSC seat? This is of course unknowable. But we can say with some confidence that it would not have made the task any easier. The 2012 vote, and others behind it, might then be deemed an unambiguous asset, rendering New Zealand distinct from allies in the Anglosphere and the Five Eyes surveillance cooperative but in tune with a decolonized and pro-Palestine majority of international society members working alongside the Kiwi delegation to the UN.

Addendum: UNSC Resolution 2334: Rupture and Repair in New Zealand–Israel Relations 2016–2017 Two subsequent incidents in New Zealand–PLO relations make for an interesting addendum to our piece: the vote on UNSC Resolution 2334 at the tail end of 2016 and the subsequent reset of New Zealand–Israel diplomatic relations six months later. On 23 December 2016, New Zealand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Murray McCully ensured that the Kiwi vote on the Security Council supported Resolution 2334. The text of the resolution was unambiguously critical of the

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ongoing Zionist colonisation of Palestinian space; in key sections, the Security Council (1) Reaffirms that the establishment by Israel of settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the achievement of the two-State solution and a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. (2) Reiterates its demand that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and that it fully respect all of its legal obligations in this regard. (3) Underlines that it will not recognize any changes to the 4 June 1967 lines, including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties through negotiations. (4) Stresses that the cessation of all Israeli settlement activities is essential for salvaging the two-State solution, and calls for affirmative steps to be taken immediately to reverse the negative trends on the ground that are imperilling the two-State solution. (5) Calls upon all States, bearing in mind paragraph 1 of this resolution, to distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967 (UNSC, 2016). According to an account in the Israeli daily Haaretz, just prior to the vote, a senior official in the [Israeli] Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem called New Zealand’s ambassador to Israel, Jonathan Curr,5 and warned that if New Zealand’s move came to a vote, Israel might close its embassy in Wellington in protest. Ambassador Curr noted this and reported it to his government …

Upon learning that New Zealand remained steadfast, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reported to have called McCully in person. A friendly exchange it was not. “This is a scandalous decision. I’m asking that you not support it and not promote it”, Netanyahu told McCully, according to the Western diplomats, who asked to remain unnamed due to the sensitivity of the matter. “If you continue to promote this resolution from our point of view it will be a declaration of war. It will rupture the relations and there will be consequences. We’ll recall our ambassador to Jerusalem”. McCully refused to back down from the vote. “This resolution conforms to our policy and we will move it forward”, he told Netanyahu (Ravid, 2016). 5 New

Zealand’s ambassador to Turkey also serves as ambassador to Israel.

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This vote at least did not set New Zealand at odds with the United States; frustrated over two terms by Israeli intransigence, outgoing US president Barack Obama permitted the US delegation to withhold the veto and the resolution passed with fourteen votes in favour and the one US abstention (UN Meetings Coverage, 2016). Israel did withdraw its ambassador to Wellington. McCully stood down as Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 2017; he was succeeded in office by former Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee. Almost immediately upon assuming his new role, Brownlee criticized his predecessor’s initiative as “premature” and set about warming relations with Israel. Questioned on this apparent shift in foreign policy, Prime Minister Bill English responded that he felt Brownlee was “still trying to find the right language and it hasn’t changed the Government position”. He also noted that the resolution expressed “longstanding government policy, in fact, a longstanding commonly-held international view” (Kirk, 2017). However, Brownlee’s outreach continued to the point that Netanyahu and English were said to have agreed on a formula to repair relations. Following that conversation, Netanyahu’s office said, English sent Netanyahu a letter saying he “regrets” the damage done to the bilateral relationship by New Zealand’s sponsorship of Resolution 2334. English also said his country would welcome the return of Israel’s ambassador.

English then expressed “regret” for the “damage done” but not for New Zealand’s role in expediting the resolution. Israel was also said to have demanded that New Zealand adjust its voting record at the UN to concord with Israeli preferences. No official commitment appeared to have been given in this regard (Ravid, 2017). But the record going forward would seem to merit close attention. If such an adjustment were indeed to take place, that really would muddy the waters of New Zealand foreign policy, question the country’s commitment to a rules-based international order and jeopardise the international persona constructed around it. For those very reasons, Minister Brownlee notwithstanding, we might remain sceptical as to how much will actually change.

References Kirk, S (8 May 2017). Gerry Brownlee “premature” in making Israel comments: Prime Minister Bill English. Stuff. http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/92352570/ gerry-brownlee-premature-in-making-israel-comments-prime-minister-bill-engl ish [14 June 2017].

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Mansfield, JMR (19 December 1973). New Zealand permanent representative to secretary for foreign affairs. ABHS W5579 6958 Box 113. New Zealand National Archives (NZNA). MFAT (n.d.). New Zealand: Candidate for United Nations security council 2015–16, harvested by the National Library of New Zealand on 10 June 2014. http://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/ArcAggregator/arcView/frameView/IE209152 41/http://www.nzunsc.govt.nz/ [1 June 2017]. Musolff, A (2016). Political Metaphor Analysis: Discourse and Scenarios. London: Bloomsbury. New York to Wellington, Commentary No. 2: Middle East, 18 December 1973, ABHS W5579 6958 Box 113, NZNA. Ravid, B (28 December 2016). Britain pulled the strings and Netanyahu warned New Zealand it was declaring war: New details on Israel’s battle against the UN vote. Haaretz. http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.761706. Ravid, B (13 June 2017). Israel and New Zealand end diplomatic crisis sparked by anti-settlement resolution. Haaretz. http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-printpage/.premium-1.795524. Reus-Smit, C (2001). Constructivism. In Theories of International Relations, S Burchill, R Devetak, A Linklater, M Paterson, C Reus-Smit, and J True (eds.), 2nd Ed., pp. 209–230. Houndsmills, Basingstoke/Hampshire, UK: Palgrave. Rowling, W (31 October 1974). New Zealand Parliamentary Debates. Templeton, M (23 October 1974). Telex from New York to Wellington. ABHS W4628 6958 Box 42, NZNA. UN Meetings Coverage and press releases (23 December 2016). Israel’s settlements have no legal validity, constitute flagrant violation of international law, Security Council Reaffirms, SC/12657. http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12657. doc.htm [14 June 2017]. UNGA, A/RES/3210(XXIX) (14 October 1974a). http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3210(XXIX) [1 June 2017]. UNGA, A/RES/3210(XXIX) (14 October 1974b). Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Organization: Resolution/adopted by the General Assembly, voting summary. http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=14QJ03494127C. 57619&menu=search&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=vot ing&ri=&index=.VM&term=A%2FRES%2F3210%28XXIX%29&matchoptb ox=0%7C0&oper=AND&x=12&y=6&aspect=power&index=.VW&term=Pale stine&matchoptbox=0%7C0&oper=AND&index=.AD&term=19741014&ma tchoptbox=0%7C0&oper=AND&index=BIB&term=&matchoptbox=0%7C0 &limitbox_1=VV01+%3D+vv_rec&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&ultyp e=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&sort= [1 June 2017]. UNGA, A/RES/3236(XXIX) and 3237(22 November 1974c). http://www.un.org/ en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3236(XXIX) [1 June 2017].

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UNGA, A/RES/67/19 (4 December 2012a), p. 3. http://research.un.org/en/docs/ ga/quick/regular/67 [1 June 2017]. UNGA citing Jim McLay (29 November 2012b). General Assembly votes overwhelmingly to accord Palestine “Non-member observer state” status in United Nations. https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm [1 June 2017]. UNSC, S/RES/2334 (23 December 2016). http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2334(2016) [14 June 2017]. Watkins, T, reporting with Reuters, citing statement by Murray McCully (30 November 2012). NZ votes to recognise Palestinian state. http://www.stuff.co. nz/national/politics/8018501/NZ-votes-to-recognise-Palestinian-state.