New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region: A Comparative Perspective 3031151348, 9783031151347

Citation preview

Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region

Leonid Issaev Andrey Korotayev   Editors

New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region A Comparative Perspective

Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region Series Editor Almas Heshmati, Jönköping University, Jönköping, Sweden

This book series publishes monographs and edited volumes devoted to studies on the political, economic and social developments of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Volumes cover in-depth analyses of individual countries, regions, cases and comparative studies, and they include both a specific and a general focus on the latest advances of the various aspects of development. It provides a platform for researchers globally to carry out rigorous economic, social and political analyses, to promote, share, and discuss current quantitative and analytical work on issues, findings and perspectives in various areas of economics and development of the MENA region. Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region allows for a deeper appreciation of the various past, present, and future issues around MENA’s development with high quality, peer reviewed contributions. The topics may include, but not limited to: economics and business, natural resources, governance, politics, security and international relations, gender, culture, religion and society, economics and social development, reconstruction, and Jewish, Islamic, Arab, Iranian, Israeli, Kurdish and Turkish studies. Volumes published in the series will be important reading offering an original approach along theoretical lines supported empirically for researchers and students, as well as consultants and policy makers, interested in the development of the MENA region.

Leonid Issaev · Andrey Korotayev Editors

New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region A Comparative Perspective

Editors Leonid Issaev HSE University and Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Moscow, Russia

Andrey Korotayev HSE University and Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Moscow, Russia

This work was supported by Russian Science Foundation. ISSN 2520-1239 ISSN 2520-1247 (electronic) Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region ISBN 978-3-031-15134-7 ISBN 978-3-031-15135-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Revolutions always bring surprises, turmoil, and disappointments. Surprises, because not only do revolutions usually occur where they are least expected, their origins and unfolding often involve new patterns of events. Turmoil, because revolutions rarely follow a smooth and direct path, instead they generally unleash violence, have international spillovers, and produce protracted struggles for power. And disappointments, because revolutions usually begin with grand ambitions to bring freedom, or democracy, or greater economic equality or other benefits, only to have those benefits prove illusory, or be monopolized by a few leaders or a particular group, while the costs of regime change and upheaval are widely distributed. Yet new revolutions also bring new insights, precisely because even if they fit older patterns, they have novel elements. New revolutions also create new configurations in the relationships among nations and peoples, thus having potential world-historical impacts. Explaining those novel elements, and elucidating those new configurations, is the task that every new wave of revolutions sets before scholars. In this volume, an outstanding set of scholars addresses these questions for the new wave of revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa that swept across the region in the late 2010s and early 2020s. While not as dramatic as the 2010–2012 wave of revolutions that became known as the “Arab Spring”, these later events are equally interesting, for they show how the earlier wave did not resolve the problems that brought instability to the region. Indeed, the Arab Spring not only failed in its hopes to bring democracy and better economic conditions to the people of the MENA region, but also it unleashed new tensions and spread the seeds of instability that sprouted in the region a decade later, in places such as Algeria, Sudan, and Lebanon. The revolutions in this new wave, like those of the 2010–2012 wave, were varied in their aims and their results. They generally began with nonviolent protests centered in the cities (e.g., Tunis, Algiers, Beirut, Khartoum). In Sudan and Algeria, the protests sought, and successfully overturned, longstanding autocratic leaders; but they were unable to create new democracies as the military seized power to maintain order. By contrast, in Tunisia, the protests were demanding better governance from the existing democratic regime; but the growing disorder provided an excuse for a new autocratic leader to dissolve the Parliament and seize power. In Jordan, Morocco, v

vi

Foreword

Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt and Iran, the protests did not overturn the regimes. In the first four, they were met with varying degrees of concessions and reforms, while in the latter two they were met with harsh repression and a stronger security state. The new wave of unrest spread even more deeply into the Sahel than the first wave, with major regional uprisings leading to a revolutionary coup in Mali in 2020. At the same time, just as there were nations that in 2010–2012 seemed to escape the wave of revolutionary unrest sweeping across the region, so too there were exceptions in 2019–2022, such as Kuwait and Bahrain. In sum, as is so often the case, once the MENA region experienced a wave of revolutions, it did not then quickly settle into a stable new order. Quite the reverse: some leaders who had survived the first wave were toppled in the subsequent wave; protests continued and sometimes provoked new state violence or regime change in the post-revolutionary regimes; and across the region people continued to advocate for themselves and challenge the existing order. This brief summary notes the breadth and importance of these events, but cannot begin to offer explanations. For these, one must delve into the strength and composition of regimes and state elites, the issues and coalitions that produced the protests, and the mechanisms of protest diffusion and state repression both within and across states. It is these tasks that are skillfully executed by the authors in this volume. It is unusual to have analysis of this depth and sweep regarding events that have only happened recently. This is possible here because the authors bring extraordinary expertise in the politics and history of the MENA region to this task. This volume will provide a treasure-trove of information and insights to students and scholars seeking to understand the course of politics in the MENA region in the decade following the Arab Spring. At the same time, the analysis presented here of this new wave of revolutions is essential for understanding how the very nature of revolution is evolving, and how the latest wave of revolutions (those in the MENA region being just part of the global wave of revolutions in 2018–2022) reflects the continued transformation of the current world-system. In fact, the World System is being shaken by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine even as I write, bringing another major spike in food prices and global inflation. If prior patterns hold, that means still more protest and turmoil is likely to arise across MENA and other developing regions. The revolutionary wave of the late 2010s and early 2020s may therefore be just beginning. Understanding what has happened in the MENA region in the last few years is essential for understanding what may now unfold. That makes this volume critical reading for anyone seeking to understand the challenges to stability and security across the region and around the world. July 2022

Prof. Jack A. Goldstone Schar School of Policy and Government George Mason University Fairfax, USA

Acknowledgements

Putting together a volume with the scope and diversity of this one requires the help of many able collaborators. We are all grateful to Springer and to our editors—Almas Heshmati and Johannes Glaeser—for patience and support in pulling together this diverse volume. This monograph is the result of the authors’ study of the revolutionary processes in the Middle East and North Africa region over the last ten years. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to HSE University in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, the Lomonosov Moscow State University, the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which the editors and some authors of this volume belong to. Through our academic and educational work at these institutions, we have had the opportunity to deepen our understanding of the new wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A great contribution to the preparation of the publication was made by the materials of field research undertaken by Leonid Issaev, Andrey Korotayev, Anna Kashina, Alina Khokhlova, Sergey Kostelyanets, Nikolay Kozhanov, and Anton Mardasov in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and other MENA and Sahel countries in the 2010s and early 2020s. This volume is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at HSE University in 2022 with support by the Russian Science Foundation (Project No. 18-18-00254).

vii

About This Book

The late 2010s have seen a new wave of revolutions in the MENA region comparable in some respect to the Arab Spring events. The scale of these revolutionary protests approached the one of the Arab Spring; they led to the fall of regimes in Sudan, Algeria, and Mali, became permanent in Lebanon and Iraq, and were suppressed in Egypt and Iran at the cost of heavy civilian casualties. This book offers a comparative perspective on the new wave of revolutions in MENA region. Presenting case studies on the protests in ten MENA countries, it offers a better understanding of the varied forms, features, and historical backgrounds of revolutionary and quasi-revolutionary episodes, as well as their causes. Accordingly, it highlights recent revolutions in their historical and world-system contexts. The new revolutionary wave in the MENA region coincided with the downswing phase of the fifth Kondratiev wave, which manifested itself especially clearly in the form of a slowdown in economic growth and the aggravation of economic problems. Thus, it was dissatisfaction with the ongoing economic policy that became the root cause of the protest moods of the late 2010s. However, the economic agenda quickly gave way to the political one and actualized long-standing unresolved problems in each of the countries, which, as a rule, were of a systemic nature. The events of the new revolutionary wave were distinguished by their pronounced orientation “against everyone”, the political class as a whole, and “All Must Go” (with variations) became the main slogan. Given its scope, the book will appeal to scholars from various disciplines interested in MENA politics, conflict resolution, sociopolitical change, and revolutionary processes involving both nonviolent campaigns and political violence.

ix

Contents

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Leonid Issaev and Andrey Korotayev

1

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sergey Kostelyanets

33

The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles Has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yahia H. Zoubir

57

17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis . . . . . Dania Koleilat Khatib Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anton Mardasov

75

95

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Andrey Zakharov and Leonid Issaev Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Anna Kashina Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Shady Mansour and Hala Elhefnawy Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Andrey Korotayev and Alina Khokhlova Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots of Iran’s Domestic Instability (2010–2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Nikolay Kozhanov

xi

xii

Contents

Why Has the Recent Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region Missed Kuwait and Bahrain? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 Elena Melkumyan Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events in the World System Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 Leonid Grinin and Anton Grinin

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Leonid Issaev (Ph.D. in Political Science) is currently an Associate Professor at the Department for Asian and African Studies and the Deputy Chair of the Laboratory for Sociopolitical Destabilization Risk Monitoring at the HSE University in Moscow. He is also the Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Civilization and Regional Studies of the Institute for African Studies, which is part of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He teaches courses in Islamic political philosophy and political systems and political processes in the Arab world. Andrey Korotayev heads the Laboratory for Monitoring of the Sociopolitical Destabilization Risks at the HSE University in Moscow, Russia. He is also Senior Research Professor at the Institute of Oriental Studies and Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as at the Faculty of Global Studies of the Lomonosov Moscow State University and the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. He has authored or co-authored over 650 scholarly publications, including such monographs as Ancient Yemen (Oxford University Press, 1995), World Religions and Social Evolution of the Old World Oikumene Civilizations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth (URSS, 2006; with Daria Khaltorina and Artemy Malkov), Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends (URSS, 2006; with Daria Khaltorina and Artemy Malkov), Great Divergence and Great Convergence. A Global Perspective (Springer, 2015; with Leonid Grinin), Economic Cycles, Crises, and the Global Periphery (Springer, 2016; with Leonid Grinin), Islamism, Arab Spring, and the Future of Democracy. World System and World Values Perspectives (Springer, 2019; with Leonid Grinin and Arno Tausch), Handbook of Revolutions in the 21st Century: The New Waves of Revolutions, and the Causes and Effects of Disruptive Political Change (Springer, 2022; with Jack A. Goldstone and Leonid Grinin). He is a laureate of a Russian Science Support

xiii

xiv

Editors and Contributors

Foundation Award in “The Best Economists of the Russian Academy of Sciences” Nomination (2006); in 2012, he was awarded with the Gold Kondratieff Medal by the International N. D. Kondratieff Foundation.

Contributors Elhefnawy Hala Future for Advanced Research and Studies, Abu Dhabi, UAE Grinin Anton Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia Grinin Leonid HSE University, Moscow, Russia; Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia Issaev Leonid HSE University, Moscow, Russia; Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia Kashina Anna Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia Khatib Dania Koleilat Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University, Beirut, Lebanon Khokhlova Alina HSE University, Moscow, Russia Korotayev Andrey HSE University, Moscow, Russia; Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia; Faculty of Global Studies, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia Kostelyanets Sergey Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia Kozhanov Nikolay Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar Mansour Shady Future for Advanced Research and Studies, Abu Dhabi, UAE Mardasov Anton Middle East Institute, Washington, DC, USA Melkumyan Elena Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia; Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia Zakharov Andrey Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia Zoubir Yahia H. KEDGE Business School, Paris, France

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective Leonid Issaev and Andrey Korotayev

Abstract In the late 2010s, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa were swept by a new revolutionary wave, which was also called “Arab Spring 2.0”. In this introductory chapter, Issaev and Korotayev offer a preliminary description and analysis of this revolutionary wave in the MENA region. The scale of the protests of the late 2010s approached the one of the Arab Spring and led to the fall of regimes in Sudan, Algeria and Mali, the protests became permanent in Lebanon and Iraq, and in Egypt and Iran they were suppressed at the cost of substantial casualties among the civilian population. As in the case of the events of the Arab Spring, the new revolutionary wave was characterized by a domino effect, when the success of the revolutionaries in one of the countries of the region gave rise to increasing protest sentiments in another. An important synchronizing factor was also dissatisfaction with rising food and fuel prices, which caused people to take to the streets in every country of the Arab Spring 2.0. At the same time, the economic agenda quickly gave way to the political one and actualized long-standing unresolved problems in each of the countries, which, as a rule, were of a systemic nature. On the other hand, the events of a new revolutionary wave were distinguished by their pronounced orientation “against everyone”, against the political class as a whole, and not just against a specific autocrat, as was mostly observed during the Arab Spring. It is no coincidence that the main slogan of the new revolutionary wave was “All Must Go” (with variations). In other words, faced with situations in which the departure of the dictator does not solve anything, or the political system does not in principle imply his existence, the dissatisfaction of the protesters was directed against the L. Issaev (B) · A. Korotayev HSE University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, Russia A. Korotayev Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia Faculty of Global Studies, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_1

1

2

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

entire political establishment. The chapter ends with a description of how the present volume is organized.

Revolution is in All the Countries! One of the revolutionary chants that could be heard in the streets of the Lebanese cities (incidentally, it was performed exclusively by female protestors) in 2019, during the October Revolution in this country, sounded as follows (17 October Revolution 2020a, b; Hassan 2020; Kaul 2020):

‫ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺒﻨﺎ ﺑﺪﻳﻬﻴﺔ \\ ﺧﺒﺰ ﻭﻋﺪﺍﻟﺔ ﻭﺣﺮﻳﺔ! \\ﺛﻮﺭﺓ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﺪﺍﻥ! \\ ﻣﻦ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻰ ﻫﻮﻧﻎ ﻏﻮﻧﻎ \\ ﺑﺪﻧﺎ‬ ‫ﻧﻐﻨﻲ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻟﺼﻮﻧﻎ \\ ﻭﺛﻮﺭﺓ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﺪﺍﻥ! \\ ﻣﻦ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻰ ﺍﻳﺮﺍﻥ \\ ﺍﻟﺸﻌﺐ ﻣﻌﺜﺮ ﻭﻁﻔﺮﺍﻥ \\ ﻭﺛﻮﺭﺓ‬ ‫ﺑﻜﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﺪﺍﻥ! \\ ﻣﻦ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﺮﺍﻕ \\ ﺛﻮﺭﺓ ﻭﺍﺣﺪﺓ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺴﺮﺍﻕ \\ ﻭﺛﻮﺭﺓ ﺑﻜﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﺪﺍﻥ! \\ ﻣﻦ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺸﻌﻮﺩﻳﺔ \\ ﺑﺪﻧﺎ ﻧﻘﻀﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺮﺟﻌﻴﺔ \\ ﻭﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺮﺍﺱ ﺍﻟﻄﺎﺋﻔﻴﺔ \\ ﻭﺛﻮﺭﺓ ﺑﻜﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﺪﺍﻥ! \\ ﻣﻦ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥ‬ ‫ﺍﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺠﺰﺍﺋﺮ \\ ﺑﺪﻧﺎ ﻧﻘﻀﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺤﻜﻢ ﺍﻟﺠﺎﺋﺮ \\ ﻭﺛﻮﺭﺓ ﺑﻜﻞ ﺍﻟﺒﻠﺪﺍﻥ! \\ ﻣﻦ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺩﺍﻥ \\ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﺣﻘﻨﺎ ﻧﻌﻴﺶ ﺑﺎﻣﺎﻥ \\ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺸﻴﻠﻲ ﺍﻟﻰ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥ \\ ﺍﻟﺸﻌﺐ ﻛﻠﻪ ﻋﻨﻔﻮﺍﻥ \\ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻭﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥ \\ ﺿﺪ ﺍﻟﺴﻴﺴﻲ \\ ﻭﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﺑﺪﻧﺎ ﻧﻈﺎﻡ ﺑﻮﻟﻴﺴﻲ \\ ﻳﺎ ﺑﺤﺮﻳﻦ \\ ﻋﻠﻴﻲ ﺻﻮﺗﻚ \\ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺪﻧﺎ ﺃﺣﺪ ﻳﻬﻤﺸﻚ \\ ﺍﻟﺸﻌﺐ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺭﻱ \\ ﻧﺤﻦ ﻣﺶ‬ ...‫ﻧﺎﺳﻴﻨﻚ \\ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻈﺎﻣﻚ ﷲ ﻳﻌﻴﻨﻚ \\ ﻳﺎ ﻓﻠﺴﻄﻴﻦ ﻳﺎ ﺣﻠﻮﺗﻨﺎ \\ ﺣﺮﻳﺘﻚ ﺃﻭﻟﻮﻳﺘﻨﺎ‬ The following translation of this chant can be suggested: Our demands are self-evident: // Bread, justice and freedom! // Revolution is in all the countries! // From Lebanon to Hong Kong, // we want to sing this song.1 // Revolution is in all the countries! // From Lebanon to Iran // the people are unhappy and impoverished. // Revolution is in all the countries! // From Lebanon to Iraq // there is one revolution against the thieves. // Revolution is in all the countries! // From Lebanon to Saudi Arabia, // we want to get rid of the backwardness // and the guardians of sectarianism. // Revolution is in all the countries! // From Lebanon to Algeria // we want to end the unjust rule. // Revolution is in all the countries! // From Lebanon to Sudan // we have the right to live in peace. // From Chile to Lebanon // the people are all furious. // Egypt and Lebanon against Sisi, // we don’t want a police regime. // Oh Bahrain! // Raise your voice! // We don’t want anyone to marginalize you. // Syrian people! // We don’t forget you, // may the God assist you [in your struggle] with your regime. // O Palestine, our sweet! // Your freedom is our priority…

One cannot but be impressed by a very wide picture of the global revolutionary wave of 2019 depicted in this Lebanese revolutionary chant, and the feeling that the Lebanese Revolution is an organic part of this global wave. The Lebanese revolutionary ladies did not even forget to allude to the revolutionary movement in Hong Kong and Estallido Social in Chile (of special interest is the fact that the 2019 revolutionary events in Chile were indeed typologically very similar to the ones in Lebanon 1

Note the use of the English word “song” in the Arabic text; in general, English words are occasionally found within the Arabic texts of some modern Arab revolutionary songs (e.g., UWKmedia 2012). In a version of this song (17 October Revolution 2020a, b in contrast with Hassan 2020) we find “ping pong” (al-bingh bungh) in place of “this song” (hadha-l-sungh).

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

3

and Iraq, see below). In fact, this Lebanese revolutionary chant just puts quite squarely the new wave of revolutions in the MENA region in the global perspective, supporting the inference of Chapter “Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events in the World System Context” (Grinin and Grinin 2022) that the revolutionary events in the MENA region (that began in 2018) can be regarded as an integral part of the third global revolutionary wave of the twenty-first century that followed the first wave of the color revolution of the 2000s, and the second wave of the Arab Spring accompanied by its global revolutionary echo2 (for a general description of the twenty-first century global revolutionary waves see Goldstone et al. 2022a, b; see also Chapter “Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events in the World System Context” (Grinin and Grinin 2022, this volume) for an analysis of the recent global revolutionary wave and the place of the recent revolutionary events in the MENA region within this wave).3 However, quite naturally the main attention of the author of the Lebanese chant is attracted just by the 2019 revolutionary events in the MENA region – in Sudan,4 Algeria,5 Iraq,6 Iran,7 and, of course, Lebanon8 itself. She even alludes to the September 2019 protests in Egypt.9 In fact, those protests are to be qualified as a “quasirevolutionary” rather than revolutionary episode.10 However, this quasi-revolutionary episode still impressed significantly the revolutionary-minded public in the MENA region fitting quite organically the revolutionary wave in the region. Lebanon was not an exception. Note that, quite predictably, a rather active role in September 2019 protests in Egypt was played by the soccer ultras (e.g., Korotayey et al. 2019a) who manifested themselves as one of the most active revolutionary forces of this country during the revolutionary events of the early 2010s. Against this background, it is highly 2

See, e.g., Akaev et al. (2017), Issaev et al. (2022a), Khokhlov et al. (2021), Korotayev et al. (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019b, d, 2020, 2022, c), Ortmans et al. (2017). 3 Note that the recent revolutionary wave should be regarded as the fourth (rather than third) global wave of the twenty-first century revolutions if we identify as the third global revolutionary wave of this century “the Revolts against hybrid regimes (a wave of ‘Central collapse’ in Thailand, Ukraine, Bosnia, Venezuela, Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt) (in 2013–2014)” Rozov (2022: 250); see also Korotayev et al. (2015a, b). 4 See Chapter “Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” (Kostelyanets 2022, this volume) for detail. 5 See Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” (Zoubir 2022, this volume) for detail. 6 See Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume) for detail. 7 See Chapter “Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Routs of Iran’s Domestic Instability (2010–2020)” (Kozhanov 2022, this volume) for detail. 8 See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail. 9 See Chapter “Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?” (Mansour and Elhefnawy 2022, this volume) for detail. 10 On the notion of “quasi-revolutionary episode” see Beissinger (2022).

4

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

remarkable that one of the most famous songs of the Egyptian ultras, Hikayitna (“Our story”),11 could be rather frequently heard in the streets of Beirut during the 17 October Revolution (17 October 2019a, 2020c; b, c, d). One has an impression that the author of the chant expected that revolutions would engulf the whole MENA region–Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria, Palestine… Those expectations materialized only partly. Goldstone et al. (2022: 24) still characterize the 2021 events in Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza as a national liberation revolutionary episode. One can mention the renewal of revolutionary protests in Syria (June 2020, Suweida), which were still rather far from a revolutionary episode. On the other hand, one may mention the revolutionary episode in Libya in July 2022 (e.g., Elumami and al-Warfali 2022) that can be regarded as a continuation of the recent wave of revolutions in MENA; note in particular that it shares many common features with the recent revolutionary events in Algeria, Lebanon, and Iraq. But as regards Saudi Arabia and Bahrain those expectations have not materialized at all. The Arab monarchies have shown once again their impressive abilities to resist the revolutionary destabilization (see Chapter “Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan” (Zakharov and Issaev 2022, this volume); see also Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022b). Bahrain looks especially impressive here, as in the early 2010s, it (together with Kuwait) was an arena of a very pronounced and intensive revolutionary destabilization. Against this background, the total absence of any revolutionary protests in both monarchies during the recent revolutionary wave in the MENA region is particularly impressive. This phenomenon is explained in Chapter “Why has the recent wave of revolutions in the MENA region missed Kuwait and Bahrain?” (Melkoumyan 2022, this volume).

Chronicle of Events In 2018, a new wave of protests began in Tunisia, just as it was at the beginning of the Arab Spring. On January 1, 2018, a new financial law came into force in the country, increasing value added tax, as well as sales tax on cars, alcohol, telephone calls, Internet, hotel accommodation and other goods (Smith-Spark 2018). In addition, it was planned to increase import duties on cosmetics and agricultural products. The adoption of the new law was part of the austerity policy pursued by the government of Youssef Chahed, trying to bring the country out of the economic crisis that resulted from the events of the Arab Spring. The need for fiscal cuts in Tunisia was also brought to the attention by the IMF, whose main demand was to reduce the public sector workforce, which accounted for half of all spending in the country (Blaise 2018). The dissatisfaction of the protesters was used by the left-wing opposition forces, including the Popular Front Party led by Hamma Hammami. The protesters 11

This song describes tragic events in the soccer stadium of the Egyptian city of Port Said that took place on the 1st of February, 2012.

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

5

announced a new demonstration on the seventh anniversary of the events of the Arab Spring in Tunisia on January 14, 2018. Protests and strikes swept through all the major cities of the country. The main demand of the protesters was the government’s rejection of austerity measures. Among the slogans of the Tunisian protests were “I will not forgive”, referring to the anti-corruption movement of 2015, and “What are we waiting for?” (Blaise 2018). At the same time, realizing the dissatisfaction of the population with the government’s unpopular economic decisions, the ruling elite tried to do everything possible to ensure that the demands of the protesters would not become political. The head of the Tunisian cabinet, Youssef Chahed, initially recognized the right of the protesters to peaceful demonstrations, but opposed violent protests (Malaysian Digest 2018). The ruling coalition party al-Nahda also accepted the right to legitimate citizen protest, but warned against “the exploitation of citizens’ legitimate demands by certain anarchist groups” (Smith-Spark 2018). The events in Tunisia did not lead to regime change in the country and did not even affect the premiership of Youssef Chahed, but again, as seven years before, they became the first harbinger of a new protest wave in the Middle East and North Africa. In May 2018, right after the events in Tunisia, Jordan saw the largest protest wave since the Arab Spring. The Jordanian case is very similar to the Tunisian one. Just like Tunisia, Jordan had been undergoing a serious economic crisis for many years. Economic difficulties already led to mass protests in 2011, but the anger of the protesters was calmed largely due to external financial injections, primarily from the Gulf and the West. However, throughout the 2010s, the Jordanian government was stuck between two fires. On the one hand, it was necessary to take austerity measures, which, as in the case of Tunisia, the IMF constantly spoke about, demanding a significant reduction in the share of employment in the public sector. On the other hand, the King Abdullah II feared that the adoption of unpopular economic decisions would lead to a politization of economic protests (see Chapter “Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan” [Zakharov and Issaev 2022, this volume]). Against this backdrop, the attempts of the Jordanian government to sequester the budget led to dissatisfaction on the part of the citizens and the need for intervention on the part of the King. This was also the case in 2018, when protests erupted across the country against higher taxes and food prices. The protesters chanted maanash, which means “we don’t have” in the local Arabic dialect (The Indian Express 2018). In terms of geographic coverage and mass character, these were the largest protests in the country since 2011. The government of Hani Mulki announced that the measures they had taken should save the Jordanian economy from sliding into a debt crisis. However, the protesters were not satisfied. The reaction from the King was immediate: the next day, Abdullah II demanded to stop the rise in fuel prices. As in previous times, the solution was another financial injection, which cost the budget $ 20 million and called into question Mulki’s austerity policy. As a result, the prime minister resigned and was replaced by Jordanian Minister of Education Omar Razzaz (Al Jazeeera 2018a), whose first decision was to withdraw the new tax code (Akour 2018).

6

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

Abdullah again managed to find a way out of the current situation due to a successful foreign policy. After talks with Gulf leaders as well as the United States, Washington promised to provide Jordan with a total of almost $6.4 billion through 2022. In the immediate aftermath of the 2018 protests, Saudi Arabia and the UAE pledged $2.5 billion in aid within five years. Following them, Qatar pledged $0.5 billion of investment in Jordanian infrastructure (France24 2018; The Indian Express 2018). In July 2018, long-standing echoes of protests in Iraq against the government of Haider al-Abadi emerged. As in the case of Tunisia and Jordan, the protesters expressed dissatisfaction with the high level of corruption and the inability of the authorities to cope with the economic crisis. Citizens of Oman also came forward with demands for more jobs and fighting unemployment. The first demonstration took place in early 2018 and ended with the decision of the authorities to make concessions to the demonstrators and create 25,000 jobs during the first half of 2018 (Gill 2018). Nevertheless, in December 2018, demonstrations again began in Oman against austerity measures, and rising fuel prices (Abouzzohour 2021). Several thousand people took to the streets of Oman’s largest cities demanding that government austerity measures be eased and the issue of unemployment resolved. As a result, the Omani government decided to make partial concessions and initiated the creation of a National Employment Center to help find jobs (Arab News 2019). However, the real wave of revolutionary events in the region began at the end of 2018, when mass protests swept the Sudanese city of Atbara, and then Dongola, Port Sudan and Khartoum.12 Dissatisfied with the increase in prices for fuel, bread and essential goods, as well as the high level of inflation, Sudanese took to the streets of cities in December 2018. One of the slogans of the Sudanese protest has become famous since the days of the Arab Spring: al-sha‘b yurid isqat al-nizam! – “The people want the fall of the regime” (Al Jazeera 2018b). At the same time, the leading role in organizing, planning and coordinating the actions of the protesters in Sudan was taken not by the political opposition, which was in a weakened and disunited state, but by the Sudanese professional associations (see Chapter “Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” (Kostelyanets 2022, this volume)). This way, one could observe the start of the December Revolution in Sudan, which marked the beginning of not only a new revolutionary wave, but a series of changes in political regimes. As in the case of the Egyptian revolution of 2011, the authorities attempted to forcefully disperse the demonstrators. Almost immediately after the protests began, the Sudanese authorities blocked access to social media and censored the Internet (Saban and Eltahir 2019). Many protesters, especially among student representatives, were arrested. However, this was not enough to quell the protest. On the contrary, as the governor of the Nile River state Hatem al-Wassilah noted, “the protests began peacefully and then turned to violence and vandalism” (Al Jazeera 2018b). 12

See Chapter “Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” (Kostelyanets 2022, this volume) for detail.

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

7

In January 2019, an intra-elite conflict began to surface: the ruling National Congress Party announced its withdrawal from the government and proposed the transfer of power to the transitional council (el-Gizouli 2019). In response to protests and sabotage by some representatives of the political establishment, Omar al-Bashir attempted to increase pressure on the demonstrators, as well as purges among representatives of regional authorities. In February 2019, the Sudanese authorities declared a state of emergency and a curfew. In view of the demarche by the National Congress Party, al-Bashir dismissed the government of Motazz Moussa, which was replaced by Mohamed Tahir Ayala. In addition, in order to preserve the monolithic control over the heads of 18 states, they were replaced by people from the armed forces and special services (Amin 2019). After that, repression against the protesters only intensified (Alamin 2019). However, the militarization of government (see, e.g., Hurst et al. 2019) did not help Omar al-Bashir stay in power. In early April 2019, the Sudanese revolution received a second wind after Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced his resignation from the presidency after massive protests. On April 6, 2019, the Sudanese Associations of Professionals announced a march towards the headquarters of the Sudanese Armed Forces. At this moment, another intra-elite split in the country was exposed, this time between the military and special services. While the latter, following the order of al-Bashir, tried to stop the crowd, the army, on the contrary, went over to the side of the protesters (Air Force 2019). On April 11, 2019, Sudanese Minister of Defense and Vice President Ahmad Awad ibn Auf announced the removal of President al-Bashir from office and placing him under house arrest, as well as the dissolution of the government, parliament and regional authorities (El Sirgany et al. 2019). The logic of events in Sudan was broadly similar to the Egyptian revolution of 2011. Mass protests against the authorities rather quickly exposed the intra-elite conflict inside the power block. As a result, at the final stage of the protests, the armed forces took the initiative, carrying out a coup against the incumbent president. At the same time, the success of the Sudanese revolution was partly due to the events in Algeria, where protests against President Bouteflika gained traction. Algerian protests against the already incapacitated President Bouteflika’s running for a fifth term had been brewing for a long time, but they managed to gain mass and wide geographical coverage in early 2019, when protests against al-Bashir in Sudan were already in full swing.13 Protests began after Bouteflika announced his candidacy for the upcoming presidential election on February 10, 2019 (Zerrouky 2019). After that, in the city of Kherrata in the east of Kabylie, there were calls for “a peaceful march against the fifth term and against the existing system” (Zerrouky 2019; Algerie patriotique 2019). This was the starting point for new Algerian revolutionary protests, which turned out to be the largest in the country since 2001 (according to some sources, the number of protesters in Algeria reached 3 million people see, e.g., Ouali 2019). 13

See Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” (Zoubir 2022, this volume) for detail.

8

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

On February 24, 2019, protests began throughout the country with slogans such as “There is no president, there’s a poster”, “This people do not want Bouteflika”, “The people want the fall of the regime” and “We are not going to stop” (La Tribune 2019). President Bouteflika tried to make point-to-point reshuffles in his electoral headquarters. Abdelmalek Selall, who had headed Bouteflika’s electoral headquarters since 2004, was dismissed and replaced by Abdelghani Zaalane. However, the demands of the protesters did not have the desired effect. Despite voiced calls to postpone the presidential elections in Algeria to a later date (RFI Afrique 2019), on March 3, 2019, Bouteflika nevertheless filed documents on the movement of his candidacy to the electoral commission. In protest of Bouteflika’s actions, opposition candidates Ali Benflis and Louisa Hanoune withdrew their candidacies from the presidential elections (L’Obs 2019). This was followed by a series of resignations of Algerian officials who disagreed with the participation of Bouteflika in the presidential elections (see, e.g., Zmirli 2019; Metaoui 2019). As a result, the demonstrations flared up with renewed vigor, forcing Bouteflika to withdraw his candidacy and postpone the elections indefinitely. However, the Algerian protests did not stop there. The protesters continued to push for Bouteflika’s resignation and feared that the unfinished protest would allow Bouteflika to be re-elected for the fifth term when the situation in the country returned to normal. In mid-March 2019, the Algerian protests took on a feminist flavor. On March 16, 2019, Algerian activists created the organization Femmes Algériennes pour un changement vers l’égalité, demanding equal rights for men and women, which made it possible to mobilize women’s protest potential (El Watan 2019). It is important to note here that similar processes were observed in Sudan at the same time. In early March 2019, Sudanese women took to the streets of Khartoum demanding equal rights and chanting “You women, be strong” or “This revolution is a women’s revolution” (Brown 2019). It is noteworthy that the young Sudanese woman Alaa Salah, addressing the protesters from the roof of the car, became the symbol of the December Revolution (Griffin 2019). As a result, the army played a key role in Bouteflika’s resignation. The first signal that the army is inclined to support the protesters was the statement of the head of the Algerian General Staff, Ahmed Gaid Salah. On March 10, 2019, he publicly announced that “the army and the people had a common vision of the future” (RFI 2019). Two weeks later, he also applied to the Constitutional Court of the country with a demand to recognize President Bouteflika as incompetent and to remove presidential powers from him, transferring powers to the head of the Council of the Nation (Nossiter 2019a). Bouteflika’s attempts to pacify the protesters with statements that he would not run for president after his current term expired and attempts to change the government proved fruitless. As a result, on April 2, 2019, under pressure from the army, Bouteflika was forced to resign ahead of schedule (Nossiter 2019b).14 14

See Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” (Zoubir 2022, this volume) for detail.

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

9

Together with the protests in Algeria and Sudan in March 2019, a wave of sociopolitical instability also affected the Gaza Strip. Here, as in the case of Jordan, Tunisia, Iraq and Sudan (at least at the initial stage of the protest), there was traditional for the region dissatisfaction with the socio-economic policy pursued by the authorities. On March 14, 2019, Gazans took to the streets against higher taxes and rising prices (Humaid 2019). The protest in Gaza immediately became associated with the main slogan “We want to live” (Hass 2019). While the protest in Gaza was not successful, it can be seen as the biggest anti-Hamas protest since they came to power and part of a new revolutionary wave in the Middle East and North Africa. The next surge of protest activity in the Middle East and North Africa came in the fall of 2019. It all started with a corruption scandal against President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. In September 2019, the Egyptian businessman Mohamed Ali first publicized information about the involvement of Sisi in corruption, and then called on the Egyptians to go on a “march of millions” against the current government (The Guardian 2019). In response to the calls of Muhammad Ali, thousands of protesters, mostly young people, took to the streets of Egyptian cities demanding that the president resign. The protesters chanted “Rise Up, Fear Not, Sisi Must Go” and also Arab Spring slogan “The People Demand the Regime’s Fall” (Al Jazeera 2019). Quite quickly, the protests swept the largest cities of the country. However, despite the initial feeling that the demonstrators would be able to replicate the success of the 2011 revolution (see, e.g., Younes and Allahoum 2019) and lay the foundations for a new regime, the authorities were able to quickly crush the protest (see Chapter “Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?” [Mansour and Elhefnawy 2022, this volume] for detail). One of the components of Sisi’s success was harsh suppression of protest. Since the very beginning, the police were instructed to disperse the protesters in every possible way (see Mada Masr 2019a). The protests ended in mass arrests among both demonstrators and politicians (according to the Egyptian commission on rights and freedoms, about 3,000 people were arrested in the first two weeks of the protests [Trew 2019]). At the same time, such a harsh reaction on the Sisi’s part became possible largely due to the favorable foreign policy situation: Sisi did not experience such a pressure on the part of the international community as Hosni Mubarak did in 2011. Even the pressure on the Egyptian military in the summer of 2013 was felt much stronger than in the fall of 2019. There has been no strong reaction on the part of the European Union, the United States, Russia or the Gulf to Cairo’s violent dispersal of protesters in Egyptian cities (see, e.g., Wingrore and Wainer 2019). The Egyptian protests could have continued in November 2019, when Ahmed Tantawi, an elected member of parliament, addressed the speaker of the House of Representatives, Ali Abdel Aal, demanding that Sisi’s term of office expire in 2022, and not 2024, as it is written in constitutional amendment. However, this initiative did not find support even among the House of Representatives. The overwhelming majority of deputies spoke out against the initiative and even accused Tantawi of undermining the Egyptian statehood (Mada Masr 2019b). In addition, the harsh

10

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

suppression of protests in September–October 2019 had a negative impact on the protest potential in Egypt. Many protesters, discouraged by such a harsh reaction from the authorities, ended up either arrested or completely disappointed in the success of the protest as such.15 Together with the Egyptian protests in the fall of 2019, discontent surged through Lebanon and Iraq. Moreover, in both countries, the reasons for dissatisfaction on the part of citizens had existed for a long time, but a new wave of revolutions in the region served as a trigger to actualize the protest against traditional Lebanese and Iraqi problems. Thus, just as during the Arab Spring, a domino effect appeared, when discontent and especially the success of the opposition in one country provoked the growth of protest moods in another (see, e.g., Malkov et al. 2013; Korotayev et al. 2014; Korotayev et al. 2022a; Rozov 2022). In the case of Lebanon, the protests were once again directed against the sectarian system of power/factional democracy,16 which has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the socio-economic policy.17 The current political system in Lebanon is based on compromise and a shaky balance of power between a huge number of ethnoconfessional groups. Considering the social structure of Lebanese society, even before the formalization of statehood, a consociative system had developed in the country, which assumed the confessional principle of the division of power (see, e.g., Issaev and Korotayev 2013; Sapronova 2007). Remaining unstable, the Lebanese political system repeatedly caused discontent among the population and led to civil conflicts and protracted political crises. The events of the Arab Spring were no exception, as they actualized the demand for political reform in Lebanon and the need to overcome the socio-economic crisis in the country caused by the dysfunction of power (Issaev and Korotayev 2013). In October 2019, Lebanese dissatisfaction was caused both by those factors that were integral to the new revolutionary wave (rising prices for fuel and essential products, as well as unemployment, especially among young people—e.g., Hamadi 2019), and purely local factors, such as the unresolved issue of disrupted electricity supplies (Bianchi and Colombo 2019), the environmental crisis, and major forest fires (Saouli 2019). The active phase of the protest began on October 17, 2019, when protesters dissatisfied with the tax policy took to the Martyrs’ Square in Beirut.18 It is noteworthy that the “last straw” of Lebanese’s patience turned out to be “WhatsApp tax” (Reuters 2019). However, the authorities’ concession not to impose a tax on WhatsApp failed to satisfy the demonstrators. Protest actions took on a mass and widespread character, 15

See Chapter “Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?” (Mansour and Elhefnawy 2022, this volume) for detail. 16 On the notion of “factional democracy/partial democracy with factionalism” and the particular vulnerability of this type of political regimes to sociopolitical destabilization see, e.g., Goldstone et al. (2010), Slinko et al. (2017), Korotayev et al. (2021b). 17 See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail. 18 See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail.

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

11

over time actualizing all those unresolved issues that had previously served as a cause of discontent on the part of the population. In turn, the lack of sufficient political and economic levers of influence in the hands of the Lebanese government actually limited it in its ability to effectively respond to the demands of the protesters. As a result, the protests in Lebanon acquired a permanent character and were already aimed at dismantling the entire system of power. It is no coincidence that one of the main slogans of the Lebanese protest was Killun ya‘ni killun –“Them All Means Them All!”.19 Similar reasons for civil unrest were observed in the autumn of 2019 in Iraq, where dissatisfaction with the sectarian system of power was also expressed. Socioeconomic reasons associated with chronic unemployment and deteriorating living conditions served as a trigger for people to take to the streets. As in the case of Lebanon, the government of Adil Abdul-Mahdi, formed in 2018, was criticized by protesters for ineffective socio-economic policies. Spontaneous demonstrations that began on October 1, 2019 in Baghdad and the southern provinces of Iraq quickly spread throughout the country and acquired a political color. While the Mahdi cabinet can be described as one of the most socio-economically successful governments since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein,20 the sectarian nature of the Iraqi political system played an important role here. First of all, this was due to an external factor and an attempt by internal Iraqi forces to use it for political reconfiguration in Iraq. As in the case of Lebanon, the Iraqi political system is highly influenced by external actors (Young 2019). This also manifested itself during the events of 2019. A serious trigger for protest activity was the dismissal of the deputy commander of the Iraqi counter-terrorism bureau, Abdel-Wahab al-Saedi, independent of Iranian influence (Habib 2019). Considering this move as an act of pressure from Iran on the Iraqi authorities, on October 24, 2019, thousands of protesters gathered at Liberation Square in Baghdad to protest against external influence on the country’s politics (Voice of America 2019). However, the Iraqi protest quickly took on a spontaneous character. The search for ways out of the current situation was further complicated by the disunity of the Iraqi political establishment. For example, the pro-Iranian military-political group Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha‘bi) opposed the departure of the Mahdi cabinet that was convenient for it. In turn, the Kurds represented by the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, as well as the Sunni movement of Khamis al-Khanjar, were interested in weakening the central government in Baghdad. In addition, there were those who wanted to take advantage of the current situation and lead the protest (for example, Muqtada al-Sadr). Such a complex political reconfiguration has made the Mahdi government hostage to the current situation. The situation gradually began to get out of the control of 19

See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail. 20 See Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume) for detail.

12

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

the authorities, and by November 2019, it escalated into clashes between supporters and opponents of the government. The apogee was on November 29, 2019, when 44 people died during the riots in one day (Politico 2019), which led to the resignation of Adil Abdul-Mahdi. As in the case of Lebanon, where the resignation of the Saad Hariri cabinet in 2020 did not lead to an end to the protest, the departure of Mahdi did not result in a decrease in protest activity in the country.21 In both cases, the problems to which the protesters appealed were of a deep nature and demanded the dismantling of the entire political system. It is no coincidence that both the October 17 revolution in Lebanon and the October revolution in Iraq were followed by a pronounced revolutionary episode in Iran, which went down in history as “Bloody November”. As noted above, the protests in both Arab countries, among other things, were aimed at reducing Iranian influence on domestic political processes. In this regard, it is absolutely natural that the active Iranian participation in the events in Lebanon and Iraq eventually became one of the factors in the spread of protest activity in Iran itself (Mardasov 2022, this volume).22 As an example, one of the slogans of the Iranian protests can be mentioned here: “Not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life only for Iran” (see, e.g., Radio Farad 2019). The protests in Iran were as well provoked by a rise in fuel prices up to 200% (Fassihi and Gladstone 2022). This, in turn, was a consequence of the Western sanctions policy towards Iran in combination with economic mismanagement (Kozhanov 2022, this volume). The civil unrest began on November 15, 2019 and quickly spread throughout almost the entire territory of Iran, largely due to social media. The day after the authorities restricted Internet access, students took to the streets of Iranian cities, and the protest began to take on a pronounced anti-government character. At the same time, the indignation of the protesters was directed not only towards President Rouhani (“Rouhani, leave the country alone”), but also towards the Supreme Leader (one of the slogans said: “Death to the dictator!”) (see, e.g., Radio Farad 2019). In response to the riots, the Iranian authorities headed for the violent suppression of the protest. As a result, by November 21, 2019, most of the protesters were dispersed. At the same time, the suppression of protests in Iran became one of the bloodiest in the history of the Islamic Republic. According to The New York Times, up to 450 people were killed during the acute phase of the protest (November 15–21, 2019) alone (The New York Times 2019).

21

See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) and Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume) for detail. 22 Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume) for detail.

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

13

For centuries, countries of the Sahel have been rather tightly connected with North Africa. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that a dramatic wave of destabilization in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 (Arab Spring 1.0) had a large effect on the political trends in most parts of the world including the Sahel states, and in some cases this effect was observed with significant lags (Akaev et al. 2017; Issaev et al. 2022a; Khokhlov et al. 2021; Korotayev et al. 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019b, d, 2020b, 2022b, c; Ortmans et al. 2017). On the one hand, the echo of the Arab Spring was felt immediately in 2011 in the Sahel countries (where, as in many other parts of the world, the Arab Spring provoked mass revolutionary protests that were especially pronounced in Burkina Faso see, e.g., Chouli 2012; Phelan 2016; Harsch 2017; Korotayev et al. 2019b). But the Arab Spring also had a second echo, noticeably bloodier than the first one. One of the consequences of the Arab Spring was the collapse or sharp weakening of several fairly effective authoritarian regimes. In Libya, Syria, Yemen (and to some extent in Egypt), protracted internal conflicts began. Meanwhile, even before the Arab Spring, it was shown that such a sharp weakening of the state organization (state failures/breakdowns) and the related protracted internal conflicts create excellent conditions for the intensification of terrorist activities (Testas 2004; Piazza 2007, 2008a, b; Campos and Gassebner 2009, 2013; Gassebner and Luechinger 2011). The Arab Spring is simply no exception. As is shown by Schumacher and Shraeder (2021), the leaders of Islamist terrorist organizations already in 2011 appreciated that the revolutionary events of the Arab Spring opened up opportunities for increasing terrorist activity in the Middle East. The weakening and transformation of political regimes in Libya, Yemen and Syria have had the strongest impact on the expansion of terrorist activities. In Libya, a relatively strong authoritarian regime was replaced by an unstable factional democratic regime, which finally led to onset of the second wave of the Libyan civil war (see, e.g., Barmin 2022; Grinin et al. 2019: 195–202; Korotayev et al. 2021a). The fall of the regime in Yemen has led to the elimination of one of the main deterrent forces of terrorism in the Arabian South (see, e.g., Grinin et al. 2019: 190–195; Issaev et al. 2022b). The sharp weakening of the Assad regime in Syria led to the absence of effective state power in the non-regime-controlled territories (see, e.g., Akhmedov 2022 and Grinin et al. 2019: 202–204). On the border of Syria and Iraq (the main hotbed of terrorism before the Arab Spring), ideal conditions were created for the emergence of the Islamic State. As a result, a favorable situation developed in the Arab countries for the growth and global diffusion of terrorist activity. This led to a significant improvement in the ability of terrorist organizations of various kinds to act, a rapid increase in their strength, influence and effectiveness of organizational forms, which was realized after 2011 in an explosive global growth of terrorist activities, including the Islamist revolutionary terrorism (see, for example, Kalyvas 2015; Wege 2015; Abboud 2016; Fraihat 2016; Simons 2016; Weiss and Hassan 2016; Baczko et al. 2017; Bandeira and Alberto 2017; Hill 2017; Blumi 2018; Grinin et al. 2019; Lia 2016; Schumacher and Schraeder 2021). This process took a certain amount of time, therefore this aspect of the influence of the Arab Spring on the World System manifested itself with a noticeable lag.

14

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

With respect to the Sahel countries, a special role was played be the precipitous fall of the regime in Libya with its ramifications like the illegal arms and ammunition spread inside the Sahel. The Tuareg participation in Muammar Qaddafi’s militaries also mattered as after 2011 they contributed to the power gaining of the Malian north militias; the proliferation of radical Islamism from North Africa to the Sahel also played here a very important role (Cline 2013; Keenan 2013; Shaw 2013; Solomon 2013; Moseley 2017). In early 2012, this resulted in the fourth Tuareg uprising in the Malian North, the proclamation of the independent state of Azawad, with the subsequent Islamist revolution within this state in summer 2012, the Islamist radicals advance towards the Malian South, the French intervention, that is to a whole chain of events that transformed Mali into a profoundly unstable polity (see, e.g., Luengo-Cabrera 2012; Lecocq and Klute 2013; Thurston and Lebovich 2013). In summer 2020 the growing instability in this country led to a mass revolutionary protests accompanied by an “endgame coup” in August 2020 and one more coup in May 2021—the so-called “Malian Coupvolution” discussed in detail in Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” (Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022b, this volume). One more coupvolution in the region followed in July 2021 in Tunisia (socalled “25 July Revolution”—see Chapter “Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?” Kashina 2022, this volume). We will discuss both of these coupvolutions in more detail in the next section.

Definitions In this volume we apply the following set of definitions of revolution: Revolution is “an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities” (Goldstone 2001: 142); a revolution is a collective mobilization that attempts to quickly and forcibly overthrow an existing regime in order to transform political, economic, and symbolic relations (Lawson 2019: 5); a mass siege of an established government by its own population with the goals of displacing the incumbent regime and substantially altering the political or social order (Beissinger 2022: 3); revolution is anti-government (very often illegal) mass actions (mass mobilization) with the following aims: (1) to overthrow or replace the existing government within a certain period of time; (2) to seize power or to provide conditions for coming to power; (3) to make significant changes in the regime, social or political institutions (Goldstone et al. 2022a: 1).

Note that none of those definitions imply that a revolution should be necessarily armed or violent. Neither they imply that revolutions should be necessarily successful. In fact, in the human history one could hardly find any entirely successful revolutions. Almost always a substantial part of the revolution participants sooner or later found

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

15

themselves dissatisfied with the revolution outcomes, thus refusing to call their revolutions really successful. Of course, this is entirely relevant with respect to all the revolutions considered in this volume, which, naturally, in no way disqualifies them as “revolutions”, or, at least, “revolutionary episodes” (see Beissinger 2022 on the notion of “revolutionary episodes”). In fact, most revolutionary events described in this volume fit quite well all the above mentioned definitions of revolution/revolutionary episodes: the December Revolution in Sudan, the Algerian Revolution of Smiles, the 17 October Revolution in Lebanon, the Iraqi October Revolution, the November 2019 protests in Iran, the revolutionary events in Mali can well be understood as “efforts to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities”. In the meantime, the recent revolutionary events in Iraq and Lebanon (together with such important revolutionary events of the recent global revolutionary wave as Estallido Social in Chile, or the “Yellow Vests”23 movement in France) can also be interpreted as “revolutionary movements without revolution” (Goldstone et al. 2022a, b; Grinin et al. 2022). On the other hand, the recent revolutions in Sudan and Mali may be characterized as coupvolutions/coup-volutions. For the first time, as we know, coupvolution or coup-volution notion (a combination of coup and revolution) was used to describe the events of 2011 in Egypt (Toronto 2011; Springborg 2015, 2016) as well as Egypt events of 2013 (see, for example, Moll 2014). The term was also used for description of 2019 Bolivia events (Cassell 2021). Mark R. Beissinger suggested to use the term to describe events of 2018–2019 in Sudan (Beissinger 2019).24 It seems possible to use the concept of “coup-volution” as a general term for describing a rather specific type of revolutionary processes, when the revolutionary mass mobilization of the first phase leads to a coup, which can be regarded as the second phase of the revolutionary/coup-volutionary process; at the same time, during this second phase, some important demands of the first phase participants of the coup-volutionary events are realized (see Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022, this volume). Note also that the “25 July Revolution” in Tunisia25 can also be characterized as a “coupvolution” – in fact, the main difference between the coupvolutions in Sudan and Mali, on the one hand, and the one in Tunisia, on the other, is that in the former cases we deal with military coups, whereas in the latter case the “endgame coup” was constitutional, rather than military. On the other hand, the coupvolution in Tunisia was closer to the Malian coupvolution, as (in 23

Note, by the way, the use of yellow vests by the participants of the revolutionary protests in Libya in July 2022 (e.g., Elumami and al-Warfali 2022) that share many common features with the recent revolutionary events in Algeria, Lebanon, and Iraq. 24 In his monograph The Revolutionary City. Urbanization and the global transformation of rebellion (Beissinger 2022) whose proof Mark R. Beissinger kindly shared with after this chapter had been already finished, he offers a general definition of “coup-volution” that is quite close to ours, but not identical with it. 25 See Chapter “Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?” (Kashina 2022, this volume).

16

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

contrast with Sudan) in Tunisia and Mali the revolutionary protestors (at the mass mobilization phases of the respective coupvolutions) were demanding the establishment of strong, effective, uncorrupted political power, rather than the transition from dictatorship to democracy. And finally, the recent protests in Egypt, Gaza, Syria (Suweida, June 2020), Libya, Jordan, and Morocco can well be classified as “quasi-revolutionary episodes” (cf. Beissinger 2022).

New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective: Factors and Peculiarities The global revolutionary waves are usually associated with certain world-system events and processes (e.g., Goldstone et al. 2022a, b; Rozov 2022). As we have noted above, the new wave of revolutions in MENA can be seen as part of the third global revolutionary wave of the twenty-first century. In the case of the global revolutionary wave of the late 2010s, the downswing phase (or Phase B/B-phase) of the fifth Kondratieff wave26 became such a world-system process. The beginning of this phase is usually dated to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009 (e.g., Akaev et al. 2011, 2012, 2017; Korotayev and Grinin 2012; Korotayev et al. 2020a) However, it was precisely towards the end of the 2010s that the downward dynamics of this phase began to manifest itself especially clearly in the form of a slowdown in economic growth, rising unemployment and inflation. It is easy to see that in the MENA region, such economic factors (rising fuel and food prices, unemployment, etc.) acted as triggers for protests in all countries of the new revolutionary wave. At the same time, starting as a reaction to the unpopular economic decisions of the governments, the protests of the new revolutionary wave quickly developed into political movements. At the same time, the demands put forward by the protesters, as a rule, were not new and had already caused dissatisfaction with the authorities for a long time. Thus, in Lebanon and Iraq, the new wave of protests actualized the demand of society to overcome the sectarian/factional political system, while in Iran, the main demand was to abolish the Islamic Republic. In Sudan and Algeria, protesters demanded the departure of the head of state, who has held power in his hands for decades. In Morocco, the question arose again about the transition to a real constitutional monarchy. The second revolutionary wave in the Middle East and North Africa, just as the Arab Spring, experienced the so-called “domino effect" with two main phases. The 26

On Kondratieff waves in global dynamics see, e.g., (Kondratieff 1926, 1935, 1984; Schumpeter 1939; Mensch 1979; Freeman 1987; Mandel 1980; Goldstein 1988; Berry 1991; Modelski 2001; Hirooka 2006; de Groot and Frances 2008, 2012; Korotayev et al. 2011; Linstone and Devezas 2012; Grinin et al. 2016, 2017; Norkus 2016; Thompson 2016; Akaev et al. 2017; Nefiodow 2017; Gallegati et al. 2017; Modis, 2017; Coccia, 2018; Korotayev et al. 2020a).

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

17

first phase happened in late 2018 and early 2019 in Sudan, Algeria and the Gaza Strip. The second one started in the fall of 2019 when mass revolutionary protests swept Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. At the same time, an important feature of the new revolutionary wave was its orientation against the entire political establishment. While the main slogan of the Arab Spring was “The People Want to Bring Down the Regime”, then the protests of the late 2010s were already held under the slogan “All Must Go” (Yetnahaw Gaa), which was first heard during the protests in Algeria (Bulos 2019) and its varriations. Similar slogans were used by protesters in Lebanon and Iraq. In other words, the pronounced maximalist orientation of political protest in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa significantly distinguished the second revolutionary wave from the first one, which was quite personalized and anti-dictatorial in nature. In the late 2010s, the protesters mostly faced a qualitatively different situation, when it was necessary to achieve change in the absence of an authoritarian leader. In turn, the second revolutionary wave actualized such a phenomenon as “coupvolution”, which was first used to describe events in Egypt in 2011. The term means a revolutionary event in which, at the first stage, mass protests against the current government take place and the revolutionary movement is mobilized, and at the second stage, the military comes to the fore and takes the situation into their own hands, arranging a military coup but fulfilling many demands of the mass mobilization of the first phase. A similar logic of the development of the revolutionary process manifested itself within a new revolutionary wave in countries where the overthrow of the ruler was achieved (Sudan, Algeria and Mali).

Book Organization The book is organized to analyze the main events of new wave of revolutions in the MENA region in the global perspective. Sergey Kostelyanets analyzes December Revolution in Sudan (Chapter “Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” (Kostelyanets 2022, this volume)). In April 2019, Sudan’s long-serving President Omar Al Bashir was deposed in a blood-less military coup d’etat by his own Vice President and a group of generals. The coup was preceded by four months of mass popular protests and civil disobedience, now dubbed the December Revolution, which started in late 2018 and regularly escalated into violent clashes between protesters and security forces.27 Sudan’s military-Islamist regime, which had governed the country since 1989, by 2018 had been critically weakened both politically and economically due to 27

Note that this revolution can be also interpreted as a “coupvolution”, that is, “a rather specific type of revolutionary processes, when the revolutionary mass mobilization of the first phase leads to a military coup, which can be regarded as the second phase of the revolutionary/coup-volutionary process; at the same time, during this second phase, some important demands of the first phase participants of the coup-volutionary events are realized” (see Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” [Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022b: 201–202, this volume]).

18

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

internal fissures and policy failures, international isolation and unending insurgency, economic ineptitude, institutionalized corruption, and the loss of the oil-rich southern region. Once the regime could no longer fulfill its social obligations and subsidize food, fuel and medicine, riots in the country spread like a wildfire. While political opposition was debilitated by disunity and internal bickering, the Sudanese Professionals Association—a coalition of independent trade unions—assumed responsibility for planning and facilitating mass protests, coordinating with other stakeholders, and articulating demands of the street, in effect becoming the principal driving force of the revolution. The December Revolution has achieved only partial success, as the military still remains in power, yet it has facilitated the appearance of a vibrant civil society in Sudan, which has gained confidence in its own strength and is now unlikely to yield without a fight to a new authoritarian regime. In this regard, the December Revolution has undoubtedly been a successful movement for political change. Yahia H. Zoubir considers the Revolution of Smiles in Algeria (Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” (Zoubir 2022, this volume)). The year 2019 marked the 20th anniversary of Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s reign. Few expected that a peaceful social protest movement (the Hirak) of historical proportions would roar like a tsunami to demand that the ailing president not have a fifth term in office, and to bring an end to the Algerian political system in place since the country’s independence in 1962 and the removal of all officials that served in it. While the military responded favorably to the Hirak by forcing Bouteflika out of office and imprisoning a large number of officials and officers involved in corruption, the new authorities have yet to show real determination to change the system or embark on genuine political and economic reforms despite the rhetoric. Two years after the Hirak protests, police and judicial intimidation and harassment have continued unabated. Faced with political, economic, and social constraints, the current regime has so far failed to eliminate the conditions that had generated the Hirak. Instead of creating the conditions for a representation of the Hirak and involving it in political decisions in the aftermath of the removal of Bouteflika, it has not only imposed its own roadmap but has also sought to take advantage of the pandemic to break the Hirak and to rejuvenate the old system. This chapter seeks to elucidate the reluctance of the authorities to break from the practices of the past and explain the reasons for the failure of the Hirak in producing leaders who could negotiate a transition to a new political order. Dania Koleilat Khatib analyzes 17 October Revolution in Lebanon (Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume)). Khatib studies the 2019 revolutionary protest movement in the Lebanese political economic and social context. The October 17 Revolution erupted following the imposition of the WhatsApp tax because the social contract between the rulers and the people was no longer valid. The Taif agreement that ended the Lebanese Civil War rewarded different warlords for accepting to make peace by putting them at the helm of the state. Sectarianism that resulted in power sharing and clientelism

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

19

is the source of corruption. Due to corruption, the state suffered from bloated and inefficient bureaucracy, inflated expenses, and meagre revenues. The government covered for its deficit by borrowing from the Central Bank which is in fact depositors’ money. At one point in time the system was no longer sustainable. This is when the revolutionary protests erupted under the slogan Kullun Ya‘ni Kullun (“Them all means them all!”). The protest signaled a new collective awareness that the ruling class and its power sharing scheme are the source of ailments the country suffers from. The 2019 revolution is a continuation of a movement that erupted in 2015 as a reaction to the trash disposal problem. However, the movement then quickly became politicized and fizzled out. The groups that emerged in 2019 are as diverse as the Lebanese society. However, there are two main differences, one is their approach to change and one is their approach to Hezbollah. Some groups are demanding reform and are ready to work with traditional parties that are not involved in corruption. The other group wants a total break with the past and is not ready to collaborate with any existing political party that is in power. Groups on the right which are called sovereign groups categorically reject Hezbollah possession of arms and consider it illegal while groups on the left have a softer approach towards the armed group. Despite the several waves of revolutionary protests, the ruling elite did not flinch. The international community is putting a lot of pressure on the ruling elite to reform however, the political class is playing the same game with international community as with the Lebanese people; it is banking on outlasting them. Despite the general dissatisfaction with the political class, they still have an advantage over the nascent civil society. They are better organized and still they control the state and control the services and jobs that can be provided to the people. When the currency lost 90 percent of its value and the majority of the people are reduced to poverty, it is easier for them now to buy people loyalty and votes. Though the civil society group can win seats in elections, it is improbable that they will make a radical change. In addition to controlling a large part of the Lebanese population livelihood, the political elite benefits from an election law tailored to perpetuate the current power structure. Nevertheless, the revolutionary protests signal the beginning of a social change, and political change will have to follow even if after a while. Anton Mardasov considers revolutionary protests in Iraq (Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume)). Massive revolutionary protests that began in Iraq in 2019 led to the resignation of Adel Abdul Mahdi’s government, widely considered as the most effective cabinet since Saddam Hussein’s regime was overthrown in 2003. However, spontaneous rallies, used by internal actors opposed to a strong central power, did not lead to a new political collapse in Iraq. On the contrary, they contributed to the country’s exit from another crisis. The awakening of nationalism among Iraqi youth forced both local forces and external players to transform their policies. This mainly applies to Iran, which simultaneously tried to prevent the fall of the government in Baghdad and preserve the structure of the Shiite militia “Popular Mobilization Forces” (PMF or Al-Hashd Al-Sha‘abi) without major changes. During

20

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

this period, Tehran’s interests once again aligned with the interests of Washington, busy with optimizing the presence of its troops in the Middle East in general and in Iraq in particular. Ironically, the withdrawal of American troops, which the proIranian press presented as “another defeat of Washington”, became the factor that helped Iran and the United States (despite the elimination of the commander of the IRGC special forces, Qassem Soleimani) eventually find a compromise replacement for the Mahdi in the person of Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. In turn, Kadhimi himself has found a way to successfully balance in foreign and domestic policies. Andrey Zakharov and Leonid Issaev analyze protests in Jordan and Marocco (Chapter “Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan” (Zakharov and Issaev 2022, this volume)). Among the countries that, as a result of the events of the Arab Spring, showed resistance to political instability, one finds Morocco and Jordan. At the same time, outbreaks of protest activity throughout the 2010s were observed in both of them. The authorities of the kingdoms responded to the disturbing events with varying degrees of political virtuosity, however, in both cases, the monarchs managed to localize and suppress the protests. At the same time, when analyzing the policy of adaptation of Jordan and Morocco to revolutionary trends, researchers often noted the sacred nature of power: both the Hashemites and the Alaouite are direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Such an opinion seems erroneous, since the principle of untouchability in relation to crowned leaders, even with such a respectable pedigree, does not always work. The reasons for this lie both in the political-practical and religious-doctrinal planes. Undoubtedly, both Moroccan and Jordanian monarchs deliberately used religious rituals and institutions to consolidate their own power. However, based on the analysis of the Jordanian case, in this chapter Zakharov and Issaev show that the sacred nature of the Hashemite government does not give the ruling regime "immunity" from possible shocks. Jordan was also affected by the new revolutionary wave. In 2018, the largest protests since the Arab Spring took place in the country, which were caused, like in many countries in the region, by the increase in the price of fuel and food. The protesters expressed their dissatisfaction with the unpopular reforms of the government of Hani Mulki. As a result, king Abdullah II again had to resort to another resignation of the government and to sacrifice economic expediency in exchange for the political loyalty of citizens. Zakharov and Issaev conclude that the Jordanian experience in creating in the 2010s the “island of stability” in the MENA region testifies to the art of political maneuvering and pragmatism of Abdullah II, rather than the use of his religious status. Anna Kashina analyzes events in Tunisia (Chapter “Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?” (Kashina 2022, this volume)). The presidential and parliamentary elections, which were held in Tunis in autumn 2019, were characterized as a protest vote or a “revolution of ballot boxes”. The new political elite, which made its way after the Arab Spring, failed to cope with the deep socio-economic crisis or establish effective governance mechanisms and thus failed. President Kais Saied, formerly unrelated to any political establishment, received a high credit of trust, but soon

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

21

also failed to confront political opponents. The fierce struggle between the President and the Prime Minister, as well as between parliamentary factions, accompanied by insults and scuffles, has become a familiar feature of the Tunisia’s political landscape, forming a persistent lack of confidence in the government. The wave of popular protests in January 2021 resembled a violent riot, full of despair and devoid of optimistic expectations of a decade ago. This time demonstrations chanted slogans against Ennahda Islamists. The degradation of the socio-political situation against the background of the spread of the Covid-19 paved the way for the “exceptional measures” taken by the Tunisian president on July 25, 2021 and qualified by some sources as a “constitutional coup”.28 The main purpose of these measures was to “restart” the political system, adjust the course to preserve the achievements of the revolution and restore the economy. Shady Mansour and Hala Elhefnawy consider Egyptian protests that took place in September 2019 (Chapter “Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?” (Mansour and Elhefnawy 2022, this volume)). In 2019, Egypt witnessed short-lived protests that called for the ousting of the President El Sisi. Some regarded these events as a genesis of a new revolution, that even if suppressed will put the seeds for a new revolution that will ultimately end the current regime. Still, others argue that the Egyptian government has been successful at handling the protests, not only by security measures, but also by adopting policies that were able to assert the legitimacy of the current regime through adopting developmental policies. Mansour and Elhefnawy assess both views by resorting to the historical methodology, and try to compare between the protests of 2011 and 2019, and discern the driving forces and factors that led to the eruption of 2011 protests, and assess whether it is present in 2019 protests or not. Finally, Mansour and Elhefnawy try to understand the implications of 2019 protests within the regional context. Andrey Korotayev and Alina Khokhlova analyze recent revolutionary events in Mali (Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” (Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022b, this volume)). On August 18, 2020, Malian Army officers led by Col. Assimi Goïta seized power in the country and arrested President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta alongside with several government officials. The President Keïta resigned the same date and dissolved the government. He was later allowed to leave the country for the UAE. The coup followed 11 weeks of protests in Bamako, and was welcomed by most protesters regardless the fact that their leaders did not receive any direct access to power. On 24 May 2021, another coup took place, which proved the fact that the new military regime in power still had capacity to control the current political trends. Meanwhile, the revolutionary instability in the late second decade of the twenty-first century in Mali cannot be separated from the instability period that started in the 1990s in the country, subsequently grew into the destabilization of 2011 and resulted into the events mentioned above. Also, taking into account events in Egypt in 2011 and 2013, as well as similar events in other countries of MENA and

28

Note that it can well be interpreted as a “coupvolution” (see above the definitions’ section of this chapter).

22

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

the Sahel, it is highlighted that the revolutionary events which happened in Mali in 2020–2021 may be classified as “coup-volution”. Nikolay Kozhanov considers the 2019 revolutionary protests in Iran against the background of the American sanctions (Chapter “Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots of Iran’s Domestic Instability (2010–2020)” (Kozhanov 2022, this volume)). Since 2006 (if not before), sanctions imposed by the US and some other countries on Iran were aimed at depriving Tehran of financial sources allowing the country’s leadership to buy the loyalty of its population. And, at the first approach, this policy seemed to bring expected results: the popular unrest of 2009, 2012, 2018, 2019 as well as occasional minor protests in between became a serious stress-test for the regime. Yet, the Iranian political system managed to leave through it. Kozhanov looks into the socio-economic routes of the Iranian protest trying to explain the reasons for the durability of Iran’s political system even in the conditions of the economic crisis caused by the sanctions. Elena Melkoumyan discusses the factors that allowed Kuwait and Bahrain to avoid destabilization during the recent wave of revolutions in the MENA region (Chapter “Why has the recent wave of revolutions in the MENA region missed Kuwait and Bahrain?” (Melkumyan 2022, this volume)). Bahrain and Kuwait were the place of revolutionary protests in 2011. In both cases the demands were similar: political reforms and fight against corruption. But the Kuwaiti power was trying to make compromises with the protesters/revolutionaries, headed by parliamentary opposition. Sabah Al Ahmed Al Sabah–Emir of Kuwait at that time, dismissed the Prime Minister–Naser Mohammed Al Sabah who was blamed by the protestors in corruption. After this Emir’s decision, the protests stopped and further actions were moved to the legislative area. The confrontation between government and parliamentary opposition became the permanent factor of Kuwaiti political environment. The case of Bahrain was aggravated by the fact that the country was divided and the Shia majority consider themselves suppressed by the Sunni power. The opposition was represented mainly by Shia community and was blamed to have support from Iran. State power took sever repression against participants of mass revolutionary protests and parliamentary opposition. A lot of them were arrested or had to emigrate. The opposition weakened by repressions was not unified and was not able to continue its protest activity. All these explains why the recent wave of revolutions in the MENA region has missed Kuwait and Bahrain. Finally, Leonid Grinin and Anton Grinin consider the world-system context of the new wave of revolutions in the MENA region (Chapter “Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events in the World System Context” (Grinin and Grinin 2022, this volume)). The chapter examines the 2018–2022 revolutionary events in the Afrasian instability macrozone, in general, and the MENA region, in particular, in their connection with the previous wave of revolutionary events—with the Arab Spring, whose aftermath was still felt in the Sahel zone in 2016–2019, and somewhere it still echoes even today. The authors show the connection between the latest events in the MENA region and the global wave of revolutionary events that started in 2018. The impact of new events on the adjacent world-system zones and the World System as a whole is studied in connection with the previous wave and

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

23

in comparison with its impact. It is shown that the recent events in in the MENA region continue the World System reconfiguration process within the framework of transformation of the world order.

References 17 October Revolution (2019a) Ughniyat al-ultras al-ahli fi shawari‘ Lubnan. YouTube 13.11.2019a. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TX7OXima_SY 17 October Revolution (2019b) Ughniyat al-ultras al-ahli fi shawari‘ Lubnan ila-l-sha‘b al-misri. YouTube 26.11.2019b. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3cG6GrJR-w 17 October Revolution (2019c) Ughniyat ultras ahlawi hikayitna min shawari‘ Bayrut. YouTube 13.11.2019c. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TX7OXima_SY 17 October Revolution (2020a) Thawrah fi kull-l-buldan. YouTube 05.01.2020a. https://www.you tube.com/watch?v=I3g5gdKRB8I 17 October Revolution (2020b) Thawrah fi kull-l-buldan – min Lubnan ila-l-Yaman. YouTube 21.01.2020b. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3g5gdKRB8I 17 October Revolution (2020c) Ughniyat al-ultras al-ahli fi shawari‘ wa-sahat Lubnan. YouTube 14.01.2020c. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cUbvFzMavLE 17 October Revolution (2020d) Wa-lamma-l-thawrah amit nizilna fi kull-l-bilad, mutna ‘ala-lhurriyyah wi-squt rmuzi-l-fasad–ultras ahlawi. YouTube 03.02.2020d. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=kRLwRPILeH0&t=109s Abboud SN (2016) Syria. Polity Press, Malden Abouzzohour Y (2021) Oman, ten years after the Arab spring: the evolution of state-society relations. Arab Reform Initiative 09.02.2021. https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/oman-tenyears-after-the-arab-spring-the-evolution-of-state-society-relations/ Akaev A, Korotayev A, Issaev L, Zinkina J (2017) Technological development and protest waves: Arab spring as a trigger of the global phase transition? Technol Forecast Soc Chang 116:316–321. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.08.009 Akaev A, Sadovnichy V, Korotayev A (2011) Huge rise in gold and oil prices as a precursor of a global financial and economic crisis. Dokl Math 83(2):243–246. https://doi.org/10.1134/S10645 62411020372 Akaev A, Sadovnichy V, Korotayev A (2012) On the dynamics of the world demographic transition and financial-economic crises forecasts. The European Physical Journal Special Topics 205:355– 373. https://doi.org/10.1140/epjst/e2012-01578-2 Akhmedov V (2022) The Syrian revolution. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 707–723. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03086468-2_27 Akour O (2018) New Jordan PM says he will cancel tax bill. US News 07.06.2018. https://www. usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-06-07/new-jordan-pm-says-working-on-changes-to-taxplan Al Jazeera (2018a) Jordan PM Hani al-Mulki resigns amid mass protests over tax bill. Al Jazeera 04.06.2018a. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018a/6/4/jordan-pm-hani-al-mulki-res igns-amid-mass-protests-over-tax-bill Al Jazeera (2018b) Several killed in Sudan as protests over rising prices continue. Al Jazeera 21.12.2018b. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018b/12/21/several-killed-in-sudan-as-protestsover-rising-prices-continue/ Al Jazeera (2019) In rare protests, Egyptians demand President el-Sisi’s removal. Al Jazeera 21.09.2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/9/21/in-rare-protests-egyptians-demand-pre sident-el-sisis-removal

24

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

Alamin M (2019) Protesters face whippings and tear gas in Sudanese crackdown. Bloomberg 27.02.2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-27/protesters-face-whippingsand-tear-gas-in-sudanese-crackdown#xj4y7vzkg Amin M (2019) Protesters defiant in Sudan amid fears crackdown could lead to military rule. Middle East Eye 26.02.219. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/protesters-defiant-sudan-amidfears-crackdown-could-lead-military-rule Arab News (2019) Oman launches new job center service for locals as expat visa ban continues. Arab News 06.01.2019. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1431146/business-economy Baczko A, Dorronsoro G, Quesnay A (2017) Civil war in Syria: mobilization and competing social orders. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Bandeira M, Alberto L (2017) The second cold war. Springer International Publishing, New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54888-3 Barmin Y (2022) Revolution in Libya. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 725–738. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03086468-2_28 Beissinger MR (2019) Personal communication of 26 October 2019 Beissinger MR (2022) The revolutionary city. Urbanization and the global transformation of Rebellion. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ Berry BJL (1991) Long wave rhythms in economic development and political behavior. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore MD Bianchi A, Colombo S (2019) As energy problems fuel protests, Lebanon eyes gas revolution. Al Jazeera 28.10.2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/10/28/as-energy-problems-fuelprotests-lebanon-eyes-gas-revolution/ Blaise L (2018) ‘You can’t survive anymore’: Tunisia protests rising prices and taxes. The New York Times 09.01.2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/world/africa/tunisia-protests.html Blumi I (2018) Destroying Yemen: what chaos in Arabia tells us about the world. University of California Press, Oakland Brown R (2019) ‘A women’s revolution’: why women are leading calls for change in Sudan. The Christian Science Monitor 12.04.2019. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2019/0312/Awomen-s-revolution-Why-women-are-leading-calls-for-change-in-Sudan Campos NF, Gassebner M (2009) International terrorism, political instability and the escalation effect. Discussion Paper No. 4061. Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn Campos NF, Gassebner M (2013) International terrorism, domestic political instability, and the escalation effect. Econ Politics 25(1):27–47. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12002 Cassell K (2021) Representation in the Americas: perceptions of external efficacy in the 2018/19. Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN Cline LE (2013) Nomads, Islamists, and soldiers: the struggles for Northern Mali. Stud Confl Terror 36(8):617–634. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.802972 Chouli L (2012) Burkina Faso 2011: chronique d’un mouvement social. Tahin Party, Lyon Coccia M (2018) A theory of the general causes of long waves: war, general purpose technologies, and economic change. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 128:287–295. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tec hfore.2017.11.013 de Groot B, Frances PH (2008) Stability through cycles. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 75:301–311. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2007.07.004 de Groot B, Frances PH (2012) Common socio-economic cycle period. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 79:59–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2011.06.006 El Sirgani S, Elbagir N, Abdullah Y (2019) Sudan’s President Bashir forced out in military coup. CNN 11.04.2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/11/africa/sudan-unrest-intl/index.html Elumami A, Al-Warfali A (2022) Angry protests against feuding leaders grip Libyan cities. Reuters 02.07.2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/power-cut-protests-hit-libyancities-showing-anger-factional-leaders-2022-07-01/

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

25

Fassihi F, Gladstone R (2022) Iran abruptly raises fuel prices, and protests erupt. Iran Watch 15.11.2019. https://www.iranwatch.org/news-brief/iran-abruptly-raises-fuel-prices-pro tests-erupt Fraihat I (2016) Unfinished revolutions. Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring. Yale University Press, New Haven France 24 (2018) Qatar pledges 10,000 jobs, $500 mn in investment for Jordan. France24 13.06.2018. https://www.france24.com/en/20180613-qatar-pledges-10000-jobs-500-mn-invest ment-jordan Freeman C (1987) Technical innovation, diffusion, and long cycles of economic development. In: Vasko T (ed) The long-wave debate. Springer, Berlin, pp 295–309. https://doi.org/10.1007/9783-662-10351-7_21 Gallegati M, Ramsey JB, Semmler W (2017) Long waves in prices: new evidence from wavelet analysis. Cliometrica 11(1):127–151. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11698-015-0137-y Gassebner M, Luechinger S (2011) Lock, stock, and barrel: a comprehensive assessment of the determinants of terror. Public Choice 149(3–4):235–261. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-0119873-0 Gill J (2018) Oman jobs protest spreads to other cities as arrests reported. Middle East Eye 29.01.2018. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/oman-jobs-protest-spreads-other-citiesarrests-reported Goldstein J (1988) Long cycles: prosperity and war in the modern age. Yale University Press, New Haven CT Goldstone JA (2001) Toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory. Annu Rev Polit Sci 4:139– 187. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.139 Goldstone JA, Bates R, Epstein D, Gurr T, Lustik M, Marshall M, Ulfelder J, Woodward M (2010) A global model for forecasting political instability. Am J Polit Sci 54(1):190–208. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (2022a) Introduction. Changing yet persistent: revolutions and revolutionary events. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_1 Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (2022b) Waves of revolutions in the 21st century. PolisPoliticheskiye Issledovaniya 4:108–119. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2022b.04.09 Griffin T (2019) People can’t stop talking about this iconic photo from the protests in Sudan. BuzzFeed News 09.04.2019. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/tamerragriffin/sudan-pro tests-woman-car-iconic-photo-alaa-salah Grinin L, Grinin A (2022) Conclusion. New wave of Middle Eastern revolutionary events in the World System context. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 257–274. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3031-15135-4_12 Grinin L, Grinin A, Korotayev A (2017) Forthcoming Kondratieff wave, cybernetic revolution, and global ageing. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 115:52–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016. 09.017 Grinin L, Grinin A, Korotayev A (2022) 20th century revolutions: characteristics, types, and waves. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 9(1):1–13. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-022-01120-9 Grinin L, Korotayev A, Tausch A (2016) Economic cycles, crises, and the global periphery. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41262-7 Grinin L, Korotayev A, Tausch A (2019) Islamism, Arab spring and democracy: world system and world values perspectives. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91077-2 Habib M (2019) Iraq’s foreign ’Allies’ are killing Iraq’s hope for a better future. Niqash 02.10.2019. https://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/5999/ Hamadi G (2019) Unemployment: the paralysis of Lebanese youth. An-Nahar 02.08.2019. https:// www.annahar.com/english/article/1004952-unemployment-the-paralysis-of-lebanese-youth Harsch E (2017) Burkina Faso. A history of power, protest and revolution. Zed, London

26

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

Hass (2019) Fatah spokesman in Gaza attacked by masked assailants amid protests. Haaretz 19.03.2019. https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/2019-03-19/ty-article/.pre mium/fatah-spokesman-attacked-near-home-by-masked-assailants-amid-gaza-economic-pro tests/0000017f-e7d3-da9b-a1ff-efff87690000 Hassan (2020) Thawrah bi-kull-l-buldan. YouTube 10.01.2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=AyZXGGuRz1Y Hill G (2017) Yemen endures: civil war, Saudi adventurism and the future of Arabia. Oxford University Press, Oxford Hirooka M (2006) Innovation dynamism and economic growth. A nonlinear perspective. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Humaid (2019) Gaza rights groups denounce Hamas crackdown on protests. Al Jazeera 19.03.2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/3/19/gaza-rights-groups-denounce-hamas-crackdownon-protests Issaev L, Korotayev A (2013) Livan: ray na vulkane. Sistemnyi Monitoring Globalnyh i Regionalnyh Riskov 4(1):187–213 Issaev L, Korotayev A, Bobarykina D (2022a) Impact of the Arab Spring on the Black Spring in Burkina Faso. Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 13. Vostokovedenie 1:98–109 Issaev L, Khokhlova A, Korotayev A (2022b) The Arab Spring in Yemen. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 685–705. https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_26 Kalyvas SN (2015) Is ISIS a revolutionary group and if yes, what are the implications? Perspect Terror 9(4):42–47 Kashina A (2022) Tunisia. Revolution of ballot boxes?. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 137–168. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_7 Kaul S (2020) Lebanon revolution slogans. YouTube 23.01.2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=XLtpwkhQo0s&t=22s Keenan J (2013) The dying Sahara. US imperialism and terror in Africa. Pluto Press, London Khatib DK (2022) 17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 75–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_4 Khokhlov N, Vasiliev A, Belichenko A, Kirdyankina P, Korotayev A (2021) Echo of Arab spring in Western Europe: a quantitative analysis. Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy 19(2):21–49. https://doi. org/10.17994/IT.2021.19.2.65.7 Kondratieff N (1926) Die langen Wellen der Konjunktur. Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 56(3):573–609 Kondratieff N (1935) The long waves in economic life. Rev Econ Stat 17(6):105–115. https://doi. org/10.2307/1928486 Kondratieff N (1984) The long wave cycle. Richardson & Snyder, New York NY Korotayev A, Zinkina J, Bogevolnov J (2011) Kondratieff waves in global invention activity (1900– 2008). Technol Forecast Soc Chang 78(7):1280–1284. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2011. 02.011 Korotayev A, Grinin L (2012) Kondratieff waves in the World System perspective. In: Grinin L, Devezas T, Korotayev A (eds) Kondratieff waves. Dimensions and prospects at the dawn of the 21st century. Uchitel, Volgograd, pp 23–64 Korotayev A, Issaev L, Shishkina A (2014) The Arab Spring. A quantitative analysis. Arab Stud Q 36(2):149–169. https://doi.org/10.13169/arabstudquar.36.2.0149 Korotayev A, Issaev L, Vasiliev A (2015a) Quantitative analysis of 2013–2014 revolutionary wave. Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya 8:119–127 Korotayev A, Issaev L, Zinkina J (2015b) Center-periphery dissonance as a possible factor of the revolutionary wave of 2013–2014: a cross-national analysis. Cross-Cult Res 49(5):461–488. https://doi.org/10.1177/1069397115595374

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

27

Korotayev A, Shishkina A, Issaev L (2016) Arab Spring as a global phase transition trigger. PolisPoliticheskiye Issledovaniya 3:108–122. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2016.03.09 Korotayev A, Shishkina A, Lukhmanova Z (2017) The global socio-political destabilization wave of 2011 and the following years: a quantitative analysis. Polis-Politicheskiye Issledovaniya 6:150– 168. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2017.06.11 Korotayev A, Meshcherina K, Shishkina A (2018) A wave of global sociopolitical destabilization of the 2010s: a quantitative analysis. Democr Secur 14(4):331–357. https://doi.org/10.1080/174 19166.2018.1517337 Korotayev A, Issaev L, Mardasov A (2019a) Protesty 2019 g. v Egipte. Predvaritelnyi analiz. Sistemnyy Monitoring Globalnyh i Regionalnyh Riskov 10:518–534 Korotayev A, Meshcherina K, Katkova V (2019b) Arab Spring and its echo in Sub-Saharan Africa: a quantitative analysis. Asia and Africa today 1:17–24. https://doi.org/10.31857/S03215075000 3339-4 Korotayev A, Romanov D, Medvedev I (2019d) Echo of the Arab Spring in Eastern Europe: a quantitative analysis. Sociologiceskoe obozrenie 18(1):31–81. https://doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x2019d-1-56-106 Korotayev A, Bilyuga S, Shishkina A (2020a) Which countries generate Kondratieff waves in global GDP growth rate dynamics in the contemporary world? J Glob Stud 11(1. C.):33–63. https://doi. org/10.30884/jogs/2020a.01.03 Korotayev A, Medvedev I, Slinko E, Shulgin S (2020b) The effectiveness of global systems for monitoring sociopolitical instability: a systematic analysis. Sociologiceskoe Obozrenie 19(2):143–197. https://doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-2020b-2-143-197 Korotayev A, Issaev L, Shishkina A (2021a) Second wave of the Libyan civil war: factors and actors. World Econ Int Relat 65(3):111–119. https://doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021a-65-3-111-119 Korotayev A, Vaskin I, Romanov D (2021b) Terrorism and Democracy. A Reconsideration. Comp Sociol 20(3):344–379. https://doi.org/10.1163/15691330-bja10033 Korotayev A, Khokhlova A (2022a) Effect of the Arab Spring on stabilization capacity of the MENA monarchies. J Asian Afr Stud 57(2):289–307. https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096211017309 Korotayev A, Khokhlova A (2022b) Revolutionary events in Mali, 2020–2021. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 191–218. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_9 Korotayev A, Issaev L, Malkov S, Shishkina A (2022a) The Arab Spring: a quantitative analysis. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 781–810. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_30 Korotayev A, Medvedev I, Zinkina J (2022b) Global systems for sociopolitical instability forecasting and their efficiency. A comparative analysis. Comp Sociol 21(1):64–104. https://doi.org/10.1163/ 15691330-bja10050 Korotayev A, Shishkina A, Khokhlova A (2022c) Global echo of the Arab Spring. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 813–849. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_31 Kostelyanets S (2022) Sudan’s December revolution and the demise of the Al Bashir Regime. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 33–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_2 Kozhanov N (2022) Sanctions and the socio-economic routs of Iran’s domestic instability (2010– 2020). In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 219–242. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_10 La Tribune (2019) Manifestations massive en Algérie contre un cinquième mandat de Bouteflika. La Tribune 02.03.2019. https://www.latribune.fr/economie/international/manifestationsmassive-en-algerie-contre-un-cinquieme-mandat-de-bouteflika-809355.html Lawson G (2019) Anatomies of revolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

28

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

Lecocq B, Klute G (2013) Tuareg separatism in Mali. Int J Canada’s J Global Policy Anal 68(3):424– 434. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702013505431 Lia B (2016) Jihadism in the Arab World after 2011: explaining its expansion. Middle East Policy 33(4):74–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12234 Linstone HA, Devezas T (2012) Technological innovation and the long wave theory revisited. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 79(2):414–416. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2011.11.001 L’Obs (2019) Présidentielle en Algérie: Benflis, principal adversaire de Bouteflika, renounce. L’Obs 03.04.2019. https://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20190303.OBS1105/presidentielle-en-algeriebenflis-principal-adversaire-de-bouteflika-renonce.html Luengo-Cabrera J (2012) Symptoms of an enduring crisis: prospects for addressing Mali’s conflict catalysts. Afr Policy J 8:9–19 Mada Masr (2019a) Heavy security clampdown on anti-Sisi protests as state mobilizes supporters to rally. Mada Masr 27.09.2019a. https://www.madamasr.com/en/2019a/09/27/news/politics/ong oing-coverage-of-september-27-protests-in-egypt/ Mada Masr (2019b) MP referred to ethics committee over reform initiative calling for Sisi’s early departure from office. Mada Masr 09.11.2019b. https://www.madamasr.com/en/2019b/11/09/fea ture/politics/mp-referred-to-ethics-committee-for-proposing-reform-initiative-calling-for-sisisearly-departure-from-office/ Malkov S, Korotayev A, Issayev L, Kuzminova Y (2013) On methods of estimating current condition and of forecasting social instability: attempted quantitative analysis of the events of the Arab spring. Polis-Politicheskiye Issledovaniya 4:137–162 Mandel E (1980) Long waves of capitalist development. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Mansour S, Elhefnawy H (2022) Egyptian protests 2019: harbingers of a new revolution?. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 169–190. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_8 Mardasov A (2022) Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region. A Comparative Perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 95–108. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-151 35-4_5 Melkoumyan E (2022) Why has the recent wave of revolutions in the MENA region missed Kuwait and Bahrain? In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 243–256. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_11 Mensch G (1979) Stalemate in technology–innovations overcome the depression. Ballinger, New York NY Metaoui F (2019) Les mobilisations anti-Bouteflika s’intensifient en Algérie. Le Parisien 04.03.2019. https://www.leparisien.fr/international/les-mobilisations-anti-bouteflika-s-intensifi ent-en-algerie-04-03-2019-8024841.php Modelski G (2001) What causes K-waves? Technol Forecast Soc Chang 68:75–80. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/S0040-1625(00)00125-6 Modis T (2017) A hard-science approach to Kondratieff’s economic cycle. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 122:63–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2017.04.015 Moll Y (2014) The wretched revolution. Middle East Report 273:34–39 Moseley W (2017) The minimalist state and donor landscapes: livelihood security in Mali during and after the 2012–2013 coup and rebellion. Afr Stud Rev 60(1):37–51. https://doi.org/10.1017/ asr.2017.11 Nefiodow L (2017) The sixth Kondratieff: a new long wave in the global economy. CreateSpace, Scotts Valley CA Norkus Z (2016) On global social mobility, or how Kondratieff waves change the structure of the capitalist world system. Kondratieff Waves 3:121–152 Nossiter A (2019a) Algeria army chief opens path to end of Bouteflika’s rule. The New York Times 26.03.2019a. https://www.nytimes.com/2019a/03/26/world/africa/algeria-army-pre sident-bouteflika.html

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

29

Nossiter A (2019b) Algerian leader Bouteflika resigns under pressure from army. The New York Times 02.04.2019b. https://www.nytimes.com/2019b/04/02/world/africa/Abdelaziz-Bouteflikaresigns.html Ortmans O, Mazzeo E, Meshcherina K, Korotayev A (2017) Modeling social pressures toward political instability in the United Kingdom after 1960: a demographic structural analysis. Cliodynamics 8(2):113–158. https://doi.org/10.21237/C7clio8237313 Ouali (2019) Algérie : et le camp “Boutef” flippa. Liberation 07.04.2019. https://www.liberation. fr/planete/2019/03/07/algerie-et-le-camp-boutef-flippa_1713690/ Phelan C (2016) Plus ça change: trade unions, the military and politics in Burkina Faso, 1966 and 2014. Labor History 57(1):107–125. https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2016.1140701 Piazza JA (2007) Draining the swamp: democracy promotion, state failure, and terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern countries. Stud Confl Terror 30(6):521–539. https://doi.org/10.1080/105761007 01329576 Piazza JA (2008a) Do democracy and free markets protect us from terrorism? Int Polit 45(1):72–91. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800220 Piazza JA (2008b) Incubators of terror: do failed and failing states promote transnational terrorism? Int Stud Quart 52(3):469–488. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00511.x Politico (2019) Iraqi PM formally submits resignation amid more violence. Politico 29.11.2019. https://www.politico.com/news/2019/11/29/iraq-prime-minister-resign-worseningcrisis-074396 Radio Farad (2019) Iran fuel protests ongoing. Radio Farad 06.07.2019. https://translate.google. com/?sl=fa&tl=en&text=%DB%B2%DB%B5%2F%D8%A2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86% 2F%DB%B1%DB%B3%DB%B9%DB%B8&op=translate Reuters (2019) Lebanon scraps WhatsApp fee amid violent protests. Reuters 17.10.2019. https:// www.reuters.com/article/ctech-us-lebanon-economy-calls-idCAKBN1WW1ZA-OCATC RFI Afrique (2019) Algerie: l’option report presidentielle bien ete evoquee. RFI Afrique 17.01.2019. https://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20190117-algerie-option-report-presidentielle-bien-ete-evoquee Rozov N (2022) Typology and principles of dynamics of revolutionary waves in world history. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 241–264. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_9 Saba Y, Eltahir N (2019) Sudan restricts social media access to counter protest movement. Reuters 02.01.2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-protests-internet/sudan-restrictssocial-media-access-to-counter-protest-movement-idUSKCN1OW0Z7 Saouli (2019) Lebanon: what protests against the sectarian elite mean for Hezbollah. The Conversation 04.11.2019. https://theconversation.com/lebanon-what-protests-against-the-sectarian-elitemean-for-hezbollah-126224 Sapronova M (2007) The highest authorities of the Arab Republics. AST, Moscow Schumacher MJ, Schraeder PJ (2021) Does domestic political instability foster terrorism? Global evidence from the Arab Spring Era (2011–2014). Stud Confl Terror 44(3):198–222. https://doi. org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1538124 Schumpeter JA (1939) Business cycles. McGraw-Hill, New York Shaw S (2013) Fallout in the Sahel: the geographic spread of conflict from Libya to Mali. Can Foreign Policy J 19(2):199–210. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2013.805153 Simons G (2016) Islamic extremism and the war for hearts and minds. Global Aff 2(1):91–99. https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1152446 Slinko E, Bilyuga S, Zinkina J, Korotayev A (2017) Regime type and political destabilization in cross-national perspective: a re-analysis. Cross-Cult Res 51(1):26–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1069397116676485 Smith-Spark L (2018) Tunisia protests: why are people taking to the streets? The Property Gazette 11.01.2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20180711093429/, https://thepropertygazette.org/2018/ 01/11/tunisia-protests-why-are-people-taking-to-the-streets/

30

L. Issaev and A. Korotayev

Solomon H (2013) Mali: West Africa’s Afghanistan. RUSI J 158(1):12–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 03071847.2013.774635 Springborg R (2015) President Sisi’s Delegative Authoritarianism. Istituto affari internazionali, Roma Springborg R (2016) Caudillismo along the Nile. Int Spect 51(1):74–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 03932729.2016.1120975 Testas A (2004) Determinants of terrorism in the Muslim world: an empirical cross-sectional analysis. Terror Polit Violence 16(2):253–273. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550490482504 The Guradian (2019) Protesters and police clash in Egypt for second day running. The Guradian 22.09.2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/22/protesters-and-police-clashin-egypt-for-second-day-running The Indian Express (2018) Jordanian PM rejects demands to scrap tax law after protests. The Indian Express 03.06.2018. https://indianexpress.com/article/world/jordanian-pm-rejects-demands-toscrap-tax-law-after-protests-5202054/ Thompson W (2016) Revising a long-term perspective on Kondratieff phenomena. Kondratieff Waves 3:203–209 Thurston A, Lebovich A (2013) A handbook on Mali’s 2012–2013 crisis. Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa, Evanston IL Toronto N (2011) Egypt’s ‘Coup-volution’. Middle East Insights 6:1–3 UWKmedia (2012) Shams el 7orya. YouTube 18.02.2012. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NIw lKmKbJh8 Voice of America (2019) Two-day death toll in violent Iraq protests reaches 67. Voice of America 26.10.2019. https://www.voanews.com/a/middle-east_two-day-death-toll-violent-iraqprotests-reaches-67/6178307.html Wege C (2015) Urban and rural militia organizations in Syria’s less governed spaces. J Terror Res 6(3):35–61. https://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1123 Weiss M, Hassan H (2016) ISIS: inside the army of terror. Simon and Schuster, New York Wingrove J, Wainer D (2019) Trump backs Egypt’s Sisi after rare protests spark crackdown. Bloomberg 24.09.2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-23/trump-shr ugs-off-egypt-protests-says-el-sisi-highly-respected#xj4y7vzkg Young M (2019) How deep is anti-Iranian sentiment in Iraq? Carnegie Middle East Center 14.11.2019. https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/80313 Zakharov A, Issaev L (2022) Roots of new wave of protests in Jordan. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 109–136. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_6 Zerrouky M (2019) A Kherrata, aux sources du soulèvement algérien. Le Monde Afrique 08.06.2019. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/06/08/a-kherrata-aux-sources-du-sou levement-algerien_5473351_3212.html Zmirli (2019) Annonces de Bouteflika: les Algériens plus que sceptiques. Le Point Afrique 04.03.2019. https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/annonces-de-bouteflika-les-algeriens-plusque-sceptiques-04-03-2019-2298039_3826.php Zoubir Y (2022) The crisis of the rentier state: how the revolution of smiles has brought down the sultanistic regime in Algeria. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-031-15135-4_3

Leonid Issaev is currently an Associate Professor at the Department for Asian and African Studies and the Deputy Chair of the Laboratory for Sociopolitical Destabilization Risk Monitoring at the HSE University. He is also the Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Civilization and Regional Studies of the Institute for African Studies, which is part of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He teaches courses in Islamic political philosophy and political systems and political processes in the Arab world.

Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region …

31

Andrey Korotayev heads the Laboratory for Monitoring of the Sociopolitical Destabilization Risks at the HSE University in Moscow, Russia. He is also Senior Research Professor at the Eurasian Center for Big History and System Forecasting of the Institute of Oriental Studies and Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as at the Faculty of Global Studies of Lomonosov Moscow State University. He has authored or co-authored over 650 scholarly publications, including such monographs as Ancient Yemen (Oxford University Press, 1995), World Religions and Social Evolution of the Old World Oikumene Civilizations: A CrossCultural Perspective (The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth (URSS, 2006), Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends (URSS, 2006), Great Divergence and Great Convergence. A Global Perspective (Springer, 2015), Economic Cycles, Crises, and the Global Periphery (Springer, 2016), Islamism, Arab Spring, and the Future of Democracy. World System and World Values Perspectives (Springer, 2019). He is a laureate of a Russian Science Support Foundation Award in ‘The Best Economists of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Nomination (2006); in 2012 he was awarded with the Gold Kondratieff Medal by the International N. D. Kondratieff Foundation.

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime Sergey Kostelyanets

Abstract In April 2019, Sudan’s long-serving President Omar Al Bashir was deposed in a bloodless military coup d’etat by his own Vice President and a group of generals. The coup was preceded by four months of mass popular protests and civil disobedience, now dubbed the December Revolution, which started in late 2018 and regularly escalated into violent clashes between protesters and security forces. Sudan’s military-Islamist regime, which had governed the country since 1989, by 2018 had been critically weakened both politically and economically due to internal fissures and policy failures, international isolation and unending insurgency, economic ineptitude, institutionalized corruption, and the loss of the oil-rich southern region. Once the regime could no longer fulfill its social obligations and subsidize food, fuel and medicine, riots in the country spread like a wildfire. While political opposition was debilitated by disunity and internal bickering, the Sudanese Professionals Association—a coalition of independent trade unions—assumed responsibility for planning and facilitating mass protests, coordinating with other stakeholders, and articulating demands of the street, in effect becoming the principal driving force of the revolution. The December Revolution has achieved only partial success, as the military still remains in power, yet it has facilitated the appearance of a vibrant civil society in Sudan, which has gained confidence in its own strength and is now unlikely to yield without a fight to a new authoritarian regime. In this regard, the December Revolution has undoubtedly been a successful movement for political change.

The crisis in the Arab world that came to be known as the Arab Spring and that manifested itself in a major political upheaval and conflicts throughout the MENA region in the early 2010s did not spare Sudan, which experienced a significant wave of popular protests that started in 2011, lasted actively until 2014, but never ceased completely. The contagion effect of mass street rallies in neighboring and other Arab states fell S. Kostelyanets (B) Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_2

33

34

S. Kostelyanets

on a fertile ground in a country that had just lost its oil-rich southern provinces in the wake of the January 9, 2011 independence referendum in South Sudan. In January– February 2011, amid the announcement of the results of the referendum, riots took place in Khartoum under the slogan “Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan together!” and “No to high prices and corruption!” Rioters were mostly university students who organized themselves by the means of social media. They threw stones at security forces that tried to disperse them. On January 31, a student died from injuries inflicted by armed police, becoming the first “martyr” of Sudan’s Arab Spring. The loss of the country’s South on June 9, 2011, when the Republic of South Sudan proclaimed itself independent, contributed simultaneously to the delegitimation of the regime and the depletion of its coffers. Neither could the Sudanese militaryIslamist regime boast of achieving peace in the country, as the exorbitantly costly and ineffective armed struggle against insurgent movements in Darfur in the West and in the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile on the new border with South Sudan dragged on (see, e.g., Kostelyanets 2014a). These wars were increasingly unpopular in Sudan and fueled civil discontent with the regime. In December 2011, the assassination by regime forces of one of the leaders of the Darfurian rebels, Khalil Ibrahim, prompted 16,000 students to start a sit-in at the University of Khartoum and demand the overthrow of Sudan’s President Omar Al Bashir. Sudan’s police and security personnel as usual resorted to brute force to restore order. In 2014, Sudan’s ruling regime managed to curtail the wave of protests and defer a revolution, in fact by almost five years, removing certain odious figures from the government, promising to start the process of the National Dialogue and to implement economic reforms, but it never achieved the kind of political legitimacy—or, rather, its subjects’ motivation to obey—that it had enjoyed before the beginning of the demonstrations that openly called for its fall. In 2011, Omar Al Bashir announced that he would not seek reelection in the 2015 presidential election in order to appease both the protesters and the reformist wing of his own party, but he later retracted his pledge to the dismay of many Sudanese. 2014–2018 were marked by the regime’s increasingly chancy political maneuvering, a deepening financial crisis, failed economic reforms, and a stalling peace process for Sudan’s marginalized peripheral provinces. A new wave of protests that arose in late 2018—now popularly referred to as the December Revolution—brought the country’s economy to an effective halt by spring 2019 and prompted the army and security forces to carry out a military coup d’etat on April 11, 2019 in an obvious attempt to preempt the victory of the street opposition. In terms of its drivers and triggers, the 2018–2019 revolutionary wave in Sudan differed little from the one that preceded it during and immediately after the events of the Arab Spring, but this time the regime entered the crisis weakened both politically and economically, while the opposition formed an uncharacteristically broad coalition led by independent trade unions. In April 2019, trade unions led a march to the headquarters of the armed forces in Khartoum, which became a turning point of the protests as soldiers came out to defend the protesters from security personnel; fearing the loss of control over the army, the generals ousted Al Bashir on April 11,

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise …

35

2019. The coup interrupted Al Bashir’s almost thirty years in power and put an end to the alliance of the military and the Islamists that had ruled the country since June 1989.

The Path Toward the Al Bashir Regime While Sudan indisputably belongs to the Arab World and is also often included in the MENA region, its level of instability—the incidence of wars and violent conflicts, mass protests, coups and revolutions—characterizes it best as a country of the SaharaSahel zone of turbulence. Sudan is not only Africa’s leader in terms of the absolute number of coup attempts—at least 20 since independence (Harkness 2012), but also up until 2019 underwent six successful revolutions and military coup d’etats, and all that against the backdrop of two major civil wars and numerous smaller insurgencies. These successful revolutions and coups seemed to form a certain pattern, wherein they drew a firm line under the preceding political period and the corresponding political and economic impasse, and opened new horizons for the country, yet ultimately the incoming regime, whether pluralistic or authoritarian, accumulated a critical mass of policy mistakes, failed to address the grievances of main social classes or co-opt key political actors, and in turn encountered a forceful ouster either through a military coup, a revolution, or a combination of both.1 It thus seems that the Sudanese political system has been developing predominantly in a spiral or even in a circle. This also had an adverse effect on the economy: it is instructive that Sudan’s per capita GDP in 2018 (current US$) was lower than that in 1987 (World Bank 2022). Moreover, it is important to note the traditionally outsized influence of two political camps—the Islamists and the military. The clout of the Islamists of various stripes goes back to the times of the Mahdiyya (1885–1889)—the first independent state in Sudan, which was formed on the basis of Islam and a strict adherence to Sharia law. Islamist-leaning Sudanese consider the Mahdiyya the Golden Age in the history of their country (Polyakov 2000). The Sudanese military, on the other hand, was built on the basis of the developed and relatively well-educated military establishment of the colonial period (Denisova 2016). During the Second World War, the Sudan Defense Force fought along the British army in North Africa and in the Middle East, where it gained both experience and a reputation. With the independence, Sudan emerged as “…the one African country south of the Sahara…with a modern military establishment possessing the attributes of an independent national army” (Abdel-Rahim 1978). The top brass also gradually acquired significant economic assets during the post-colonial period. 1

Note that such a combination of a revolution and a coup can be denoted as a “coupvolution/coupvolution” (thus, the December Revoluton in Sudan may be seen as a rather vivid example of a coupvolution) (see, e.g., Chapter “Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective” (Issaev and Korotayev 2022, this volume) and Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” (Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022, this volume] for detail)—Editors.

36

S. Kostelyanets

The first coup in the history of independent Sudan took place on November 17, 1958 and was led by General Ibrahim Abboud, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces since Sudan’s independence. The coup d’etat aimed at ending the failing civilian rule and alleviating the financial crisis. Having put an end to what was known as Sudan’s first democracy in the course of the bloodless coup, General Abboud became the head of the new military government. In late 1964, the socalled October Revolution overthrew Sudan’s first military regime. Despite certain economic successes, the escalation of the war in the south and excessive police brutality were the key triggers of the upheaval. After five days of protests and 34 deaths, Ibrahim Abboud resigned on November 16, 1964. A period of democratic governments followed, but political in-fighting led to yet another military takeover, which took place on May 25, 1969. This time it was carried out by nationalist officers, who were also supported by trade unions. The coup d’etat was later dubbed the May Revolution. Colonel Jafaar Numeiri, leader of the coup, came to power and stayed the head of state for the following sixteen years until 1985. In July 1971, a group of pro-Communist army officers carried out a coup attempt and declared their intention to reverse Numeiri’s pro-Western policies and to oppose neocolonialism. This new regime lasted only three days and was crushed with the help of the British, Egyptians and Libyans. The failed coup was followed by a campaign of brutal repression against Sudan’s Communists. There were also abortive coup attempts against Numeiri in 1975 and again in 1976, carried out by right-wing officers supported by Sudan’s traditionalists—the Islamic orders Ansar and Khatmiyya. These attempts to overthrow the government, however, failed to attract broad masses and were suppressed by the regime within hours. Nonetheless, they once again exposed the socio-political, military and administrative fragility that was typical of Sudanese regimes. Even though popular masses did not support the plotters, neither did anyone come out to defend the regime. On April 6, 1985, another military coup occurred in Sudan. It took place after more than a week of civil unrest, caused by increasing food prices and growing dissatisfaction with the government. It was headed by Colonel General Abdel Rahman alDahab, who had been appointed the Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by Numeiri himself shortly before that. Al-Dahab announced the establishment of the Transitional Military Council and in his address to the nation explained that the armed forces had taken power because of the dire economic situation in the country and the looming political crisis. The situation in the country continued to remain extremely unstable: a civilian government was formed after a national election, but it was torn apart by internal contradictions, being unable to bring the country out of the economic crisis, improve the lot of the working masses, or win the war in the South. It did not take long for the discontent to culminate in a new military coup, orchestrated by Islamist elements within the military that were connected to the international Muslim Brotherhood movement. The coup was officially called the National Salvation Revolution. Power, accordingly, was concentrated in the hands of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, headed by Lieutenant General Omar Al Bashir.

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise …

37

Political Preconditions of the Revolution Just as recent popular revolts in other Arab states (see, e.g., Grinin et al. 2018), and the country’s own historic precedents, the December Revolution in Sudan was brought about by a convoluted combination of structural political and economic deficiencies and related factors that literally created a “perfect storm”, which the ruling regime could not survive. There are three major destabilizing factors that have historically prompted or facilitated popular uprisings and unconstitutional regime changes in Sudan, including the 2018–2019 events. These include, firstly, the lack of a working mechanism for democratic change of power in the country, which ensued from the regime’s rigidity, i.e., its intent to control everything, but also unavoidably its becoming responsible for everything (Grinin et al. 2018). Secondly, the unfair, underdeveloped and corrupt system of distribution of the existing material wealth in the country, including regionally unbalanced infrastructure investment. Thirdly but not less important, ethnopolitical issues and conflicts that had plagued Sudan since independence and had emerged largely within the framework of the strenuous center-periphery relations. Sudan’s military-Islamist regime not only possessed many typical features of authoritarian regimes—electoral fraud, impunity of security forces, corruption and nepotism (Grinin et al. 2018)—but also certain totalitarian characteristics, all of which in sum contributed to the regime’s extreme rigidity. The ultimate goal of Islamists that came to power in Sudan in 1989 was to establish complete control over the state by eliminating the factional schisms that typified the previous regimes, while publicly they insisted that they were building a form of Islamic democracy (Moorcraft 2015). Sudanese Islamists were intolerant of political dissidence and social diversity and in the early 1990s formed bodies such as “Al-Dawa Al-Shamla” (the Comprehensive Call to Islam) and “Bina Al-Sudan” (Sudan Construction) responsible for mass indoctrination, which aimed at leading the transformation of social, economic and administrative institutions according to the principles of an Islamic state (Verney 1995). Youths, indoctrinated with militant Islamic ideology at mosques and schools, were recruited to an irregular militia—the Popular Defense Forces—that was tasked with guarding the political gains of the Islamists (Verhoeven 2015). Islamic philanthropic agencies took over the government’s social functions, while public institutions engaged in jihadist mobilization (De Waal and Abdel Salam 2004). In the late 1990s, however, as the program of nearly total Islamization of Sudan proved unachievable, largely due to the military impasse in the south, economic failures, and international isolation, the country started down the path from an aspiring totalitarian theocratic state toward accomplished bureaucratic-military authoritarianism (see, e.g., Bellucci 2000; Kostelyanets 2021). Some vestiges of democracy were introduced even before the split of the Islamist movement and the triumph of its pro-army wing in December 1998: in March 1996, the first general elections in ten years were held, and in June 1998, the ban on political parties was lifted and political pluralism was formally reinstated within the framework of the new Constitution. However, while popular vote was institutionalized, its implementation fell far short

38

S. Kostelyanets

of the expectations. In effect, the resultant political system in Sudan could be best described as hegemonic pluralist authoritarianism, wherein opposition activity was impeded, electoral integrity was low, and no real competition in terms of access to power was in place (Szmolka and Moral 2019). Sudan’s first multi-party election in 2010 and the second one in 2015 aptly illustrate the above conclusion. The 2010 election was marred with repressions and arbitrary arrests of opposition figures, intimidation of voters, ballot-stuffing, etc. (Human Rights Watch 2010). What followed it 2015 was even worse, as major opposition parties saw no reason to participate in a fraudulent election and boycotted it, publicly referring to it as a “political charade” (Smith 2015). According to a 2017 survey, Sudan occupied the second-to-last place among 47 countries in terms of the trust of its citizens in a fair count of the votes in elections (Kerr and Lührmann 2017). As a result, as is often the case in the region, the elections did not enhance the legitimacy of the regime, but caused public disillusionment, discontent and led to street violence (Denisova 2015). In addition, the legitimation of pluralism opened the Pandora’s box of alternative interpretations of Sudanese politics in general and the effectiveness of the military-Islamist rule in particular. According to a leak made public in 2014 by Eric Reeves, an American scholar who specializes in Sudan, the regime’s methods of countering increasingly loud opposition voices included financing “pocket” opposition parties, recruiting leading members of real opposition movements, sowing discord among the latter, monitoring their contacts with foreign diplomats, censoring opposition publications, etc. Special services and police received the order not just to fire live munitions to disperse peaceful protesters, but shoot to kill, and were to be assisted by paramilitary groups (Reeves 2014). Naturally, Sudanese security forces, which followed unlawful orders from above, enjoyed immunity from prosecution from criminal proceedings. Thus it is not surprising that one of the key slogans of the December Revolution was “Justice to martyrs!”, as the street opposition demanded an investigation of the crimes committed by military and security personnel during the rule of Al Bashir. Rampant corruption and nepotism were not new to Sudan prior to 1989, but under Al Bashir they reached their zenith. Not only did these phenomena fuel popular discontent, but they also severely impaired the government’s ability to implement policies and reforms. For many years, Sudan occupied some of the worst places in the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, and its position worsened over time. While in 2003, when Sudan was first included in the Index, the country occupied the 106th place out of 133, in 2019 it was placed in the 173th place, above only Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, South Sudan and Somalia, which were considered to be more affected by corruption (Transparency International 2022). The problem was so glaring amidst mounting economic difficulties and deepening poverty that in 2014 in an unprecedented move opposition members of Sudan’s National Assembly explicitly accused several ministers of engaging in corruption schemes. Corruption became a structural feature of the political and economic system in Sudan not in the least because most large industries and businesses belonged to government officials, and most officials ran some sort of private business. For example, the health minister for the state of Khartoum—an official responsible for

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise …

39

administering public healthcare—openly owned several private medical facilities in Khartoum in an obvious conflict of interest (Syeed 2014). Unlike the reputable minister, Sudan’s high-ranking army and security “oligarchs” did not advertise their properties, but according to a report (Fisayo-Bambi 2020), the military still controls about 250 companies operating in key sectors of the economy—gold mining, telecommunications, the transport industry, the production of gum arabic, meat, flour, and sesame—aside from managing the extensive military-industrial complex. These companies are exempt from taxation, depriving the state treasury of much-needed resources, and resort to corrupt contracting practices, which provides them with an unfair competitive advantage. Thus it may be said that corruption under the Al Bashir regime became in effect institutionalized. Corruption, and the lack of political will to fight it, resulted in a deeper distrust in the government, and were further exacerbated by another structural cause of social unrest and political instability in Sudan—the marginalization of the periphery. The national statistics in Sudan is not always accurate, but, according to some estimates, almost half of the national income is spent in the capital, which accounts for just a fifth of the population. Khartoum and its satellite cities have become an enclave where most of the middle- and high-income strata of society live. It is a modern city with high-rise buildings, industrial enterprises, shopping malls and developed infrastructure; it also boasts a large concentration of medical facilities, with three fourths of Sudan’s healthcare personnel working in the capital. Meanwhile, in the periphery most of the population lives in poverty and lacks elementary facilities. Economic and political domination of the center and marginalization of the regions have perhaps been the main feature of political life of Sudan since its Independence. In 2005, one of the Sudanese opposition groups published The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan, known popularly as The Black Book, which demonstrated conclusively that in 1954 –2000 the government was made up almost exclusively from members of a few tribes of Nile Arabs, who lived in the north and the center of the country and made up less that 5% of the national population. Some politicians from the south were co-opted in the government in attempt to restrain rebellious Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups, but other regions of the country were excluded almost completely (El-Tom 2008). Consequently, tribal leaders and local populations in the periphery—in particular, in Darfur, South Kordofan’s Nuba Mountains, and eastern Sudan—resented their political and economic marginalization and exclusion from decision-making processes, as a result of which their regions not only were poor and lagged noticeably behind Sudan’s core areas in terms of social and economic development, but were also objects of political suppression and economic exploitation (see, e.g., Kostelyanets 2019). This led to distrust on their part not just of the Sudanese government, but also of most political parties in Sudan, who failed to represent their interests at the national level. The problem of marginalization and interregional disproportions was occasionally acknowledged as a source of social instability by members of Al Bashir’s government, but it never set off any political or economic reforms. A possible explanation may be that the elite in Khartoum was just too greedy to share the country’s limited resources. It is more likely, however, that political and economic marginalization

40

S. Kostelyanets

was a purposeful means to prop up the ruling group and its main support base, which encompassed the ethno-tribal core and co-opted peripheral leaders, against the rest of the population and to maintain the hegemonic dominance of the center (Kostelyanets 2011). This strategy seems to have been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it helped the regime survive many years of fruitless war in the south, the separation of South Sudan, and the end of Sudan’s oil bonanza. On the other hand, the politicization of tribalism in Sudan incited permanent ethnopolitical tensions between the center and the periphery, which often escalated into violent conflicts that drained away the regime’s resources. In fact, the conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile were major determinants of poor economic performance. In March 2014, Salem al-Safi Hajeer, the chairman of the parliament’s subcommittee on economic affairs, claimed that if Sudan did not stop these conflicts, it would not stabilize the economic situation and would not solve its problems. He argued that the anti-crisis program failed to achieve its objectives because the conflicts diverted millions of dollars to war efforts. During the rule of Al Bashir, up to 70% of Sudan’s annual budget went to security- and defense-related spending (Quartz Africa 2016). Not only did the ethnopolitical issues and conflicts necessitate enormous military expenditures, but they also disrupted economic activity and deterred future investment. South Kordofan and Blue Nile are the regions where Sudan’s oil fields with greatest potential are located. The fighting with the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), the largest alliance of armed opposition groups of the country, led to the general deterioration in security conditions in these regions. In addition, local communities, which felt marginalized, regularly demanded their share of the oil wealth pumped out of their land (Denisova 2013). It became a normal practice for them to force oil companies to cease the operations until community demands were met, in effect contributing to the derailment of the government’s plans to attract investment and boost oil exports. In sum, the regime’s rigid, corrupt and tribalist nature simultaneously bred social discontent and made political and economic reforms that could have mitigated it, unfeasible or half-hearted. Policy failures and economic hardship became associated directly with the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and President Al Bashir himself because they monopolized the political decision-making process. The defects of electoral fraud, corruption, abuse of power by security forces and officials, ethnotribal discrimination and peripheral marginalization were clearly impossible to mend within the existing ossified political structure in Sudan. On December 4, 2018, the pro-presidential majority in parliament led by the NCP voted in support of an amendment to the Constitution that would allow Al Bashir to run for president for the fifth consecutive time in 2020. In the absence of any prospects of voluntary transformation of the regime, which was already weakened by an eroding economic base, or of Al Bashir’s uncoerced departure, revolution became a seemingly valid mechanism of political change.

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise …

41

Socio-Economic Preconditions and Triggers of the Revolution Poor economic performance in Sudan has rarely met the expectations of the masses, business elites, or even the state apparatus, including the armed forces, and has served as a permanent source of instability throughout the country’s independent history. A great majority of the violent overthrows of incumbent governments in Sudan have historically taken place amid deepening economic and financial crises. The 2018–2019 political upheaval in Sudan was no exception, apparently having been triggered by a severe exacerbation of the economic crisis in the country and shortages of essential products. The economic crisis manifested itself in the surging deficit of convertible currency, which greatly limited the supply of essential imported goods. Indeed, this deficit became a structural feature of the country’s economy since 2011, when the separation of South Sudan led to the loss by the North of 61% of foreign trade receipts and 75% of oil fields. South Sudan’s secession put a decisive end to the oil era of fast economic growth, which had started when Sudan entered the global oil market as a major exporter in 2000. While in 2008 the annual oil exports reached the peak of $12 billion, in 2012 the country exported a mere $2 billion worth of oil. The loss of oil production translated into a large fiscal and balance-of-payments shock, involving the loss of almost 60% of total fiscal revenues and two-thirds of current account payment capacity, which the government never succeeded in compensating for (IMF 2013). In 2011, according to the World Bank, Sudan’s nominal GDP fell by 3.3%, and in 2012 it fell by further 10.1%. Sudan’s real GDP in 2012 fell by 17%. Sudan’s financial authorities were forced to monetize the arising fiscal deficit by the means of printing money, which led to high inflation that peaked at nearly 50% in annual terms in April 2013. This could not but affect currency exchange rates: a devaluation took place in September 2013, when the official rate was brought down from 4.4 to 5.7 Sudanese pounds per US dollar. After nearly a decade of relative stability of the pound, this devaluation came as a major shock. The black market rate soon reached 9.3 pounds per dollar. The widening gap between the official and parallel market exchange rates clearly indicated the level of uncertainty in Sudan’s economy and its structural trade imbalances that emerged after the split of the country (IMF 2014). The situation was further aggravated by the 2013 decision by banks from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and a number of other countries to suspend transactions with Sudan’s banks in compliance with US sanctions against Khartoum and US anti-money laundering regulations. These countries not only were among Sudan’s largest trading partners, but were also important sources of remittances from Sudanese who worked abroad. Over half a million Sudanese was working in Saudi Arabia alone. While Sudan’s authorities at the time promised to resolve the situation quickly, the ban remained in force until the lifting of US sanctions in 2020. Furthermore, the government could not rely on external borrowing, including IMF loans, as the country’s debt had only been partly serviced for many years. In 2013,

42

S. Kostelyanets

the country owed almost $45 billion, or 88% of GDP and 800% of annual exports (IMF 2013). Sudan’s strained relations with the West and even some rich oil Arab Gulf states made it very difficult to achieve debt relief. Only in Summer 2021 did Sudan reach an agreement with international creditors on a conditional restructuring of the external debt, which by that time exceeded $50 billion. In mid-2012, the Sudanese government adopted an anti-crisis plan, which emphasized the development of new sources of state revenue, especially gold mines and agricultural enterprises, but also involved curbing imports and government spending. Besides, the government introduced a number of austerity measures, including the abolishment of food and fuel subsidies, and raised a number of taxes. The boost in gold exports was Sudan’s greatest economic success in 2011–2012, but the sector did not become the engine of Sudan’s growth like the oil industry used to be. In 2012, gold became Sudan’s most important export earner as the country became Africa’s third largest gold producer behind only South Africa and Ghana, but in 2013 gold was marginally overtaken by oil, which reclaimed the usual first place. The figures were initially quite impressive: in 2008, Sudan exported $112 million worth of gold, two years later—$1 billion, and in 2012 the figure reached the peak of $2.2 billion (IMF 2013). Yet over the following years exports leveled off at around $1 billion annually and thus could only partially offset Sudan’s lost revenues. The sector experienced serious logistical and security risks because main extraction facilities were located in Darfur, a region engulfed in insurgency, and also a significant portion of gold (nearly two thirds of the total, or over $2.8 billion worth of gold) was annually smuggled out of the country due to the unfavorable terms of processing the metal at the monopolistic government-owned refinery, criminalization of the industry, and the porosity of borders (FNVP 2018). Meanwhile, the traditional source of revenue—the oil sector—continued to face serious challenges. Sudan’s remaining oil fields in Darfur and South Kordofan provinces were compromised by insecurity in these far-off regions. The Sudan Revolutionary Front, an umbrella organization for Sudan’s armed rebel groups, posed a serious threat to the central government’s military and economic assets in the region and effectively stemmed foreign investment. Sudan was also expecting to earn approximately $1.4 billion in oil transit fees in 2014, but the start of a civil war in South Sudan (2013–2020) led to a drastic fall in the latter’s oil production and a corresponding decline in Juba’s payments to Khartoum (Kostelyanets 2014b). In 2011–2014, protests against economic hardship, as well as censorship and war in Darfur, were taking place in the capital and other major cities almost every month, resulting in clashes with riot police and mass arrests. The bloodiest protests took place in September 2013 following a reduction in fuel subsidies. Independent media claimed that 60 protesters had been killed in these protests, while the government admitted fewer than 30 casualties (BBC 2013). As a measure to stabilize the foreign exchange market, in 2014 the Central Bank of Sudan prohibited foreign firms in Sudan from repatriating their profits abroad. It also limited sale of convertible currency to individuals, who were required to prove that they needed currency for going abroad. Businesses and individuals who were unable to buy dollars from official venues resorted to the black market. While

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise …

43

the measure temporarily saved the country’s foreign exchange reserves, it greatly limited its attractiveness for foreign investors. Thus new economic policies somewhat stabilized the economy, but their overall success was rather limited and short-lived. In 2013, the economy grew 2% in real terms and in 2014 it reached the decade’s peak of 4.7% annual growth. In 2014, inflation decreased to 35%, and fiscal deficit also fell. This helped promote optimism in society and quell the protests. However, in March 2014 Sudan’s finance minister acknowledged stagnation in all non-oil exports except for gold. Despite the attempts at diversifying economy, the non-oil exports fell from $3.11 to $3.07 billion in 2013. In the following three years, the GDP growth averaged the meager 2%, until it entered the red zone in 2018–2020, which saw the decreases by 2.7, 2.2 and 3.6% correspondingly. Given that Sudan imported most of its food, food prices were especially affected by the crisis that entailed currency devaluations and fuel shortages, contributing to social instability and triggering bread riots, one of which eventually became a harbinger of the December Revolution. Food security was further undermined by the demographic situation and government policies: the population of Sudan increased dramatically since the early 1990s (from 20 million in 1990 to 35 million in 2011, according to the World Bank data), but little investment was made in agriculture, so by the end of the 2010s food products constituted about a third of total imports. By 2018, Sudan’s population reached 42 million, and food imports kept on increasing, making the consumers ever more vulnerable to currency fluctuations. In mid-2010s, the government sold large swaths of farmland to companies from Gulf countries in a bid to both attract investment and fill the state coffers, but the sell-offs provoked mass popular protests as foreign investors exported almost all produce and could freely employ workers from abroad, which neither improved food security nor employment situation (Gadkarim 2012). Unemployment rate in the country hovered at around 17% since 2011, but youth unemployment stood considerably higher at 22%, contributing immensely to socioeconomic destabilization. Some sources put the rate of unemployment in Sudan at nearly 30% in 2017 (FNVP 2018). In 2017, the Sudanese government resumed negotiations on accession to the WTO, which led to trade liberalization in accordance with the IMF recommendations and a subsequent further increase in imports amid lagging export growth, with the negative trade balance of over $5 billion annually, and, accordingly, new problems with filling the budget (FNVP 2018). The government then again resorted to printing money, raising inflationary pressure. In November 2018, the annual inflation rate reached 70%. Inflation was accompanied by currency devaluations, three of which took place in 2018 alone. In January 2018, the pound fell from 6.7 to 18 per dollar; in February— from 18 to 28; in October—from 28 to 47.5. On the black market, the rate grew to 20, 40 and 75 Sudanese pounds per dollar, respectively. It became virtually impossible to acquire foreign currency at the official exchange rate. Private importers were forced to purchase currency on the black market, which further spun the flywheel of inflation. As Sudan critically depended on imports of food (especially wheat), petroleum products and medicines, this had immediate political repercussions.

44

S. Kostelyanets

In September 2018, President Al Bashir dissolved the government and appointed Motazz Moussa Abdulla, former Minister of Water Resources, Irrigation and Electrification, as Prime Minister. Motazz began by promising to use shock therapy to tackle inflation and the exchange rate. He soon fulfilled his promise: the government carried out the October devaluation of the pound. In November, fuel prices and transport tariffs skyrocketed, while gas queues grew. In December, on the eve of the revolution, he sharply cut the amount of flour subsidies in several states. A slice of bread made from subsidized flour cost 1 pound, while that from unsubsidized flour would sell at 3 pounds. Many bakeries simply closed after using up all subsidized flour. Then public schools began to close, unable to provide students with lunches and dinners. School students were in fact among the first to join protests, but soon doctors, pharmacists, factory workers, and other professionals also went on strike. Amid rising popular discontent, the government continued to step up austerity measures. On December 17, a 60% increase in prices on medicines was announced. At the same time, prices for certain types of drugs, for example, for the treatment of diabetes and hypertension, rose by 150% in a few days. The Minister of Health reported that the country lacked $400 million to import necessary medicines. On December 18, the Central Bank of Sudan for the second time that year lowered the limit on cash withdrawals from ATMs from 60 to 20 thousand pounds per month. The shortage of gasoline and diesel fuel became so acute that police buses were dispatched to transport commuters. The lack of fuel led to a shortage of drinking water because water pumps stopped, as well as to problems with harvesting and delivering crops. Most international airlines canceled flights to Sudan due to the inability to convert pounds at an acceptable rate. By late 2018, Sudan’s government exhausted its options and could no longer fulfill social obligations and subsidize food, fuel and medicine. The Central Bank’s foreign reserves amounted to just 1.1 months of imports (FNVP 2018). The end of the oil economy made these subsidies, which cost billions of dollars annually, unsustainable. The IMF and the World Bank claimed that these subsidies benefited mostly the urban population and the better-off and, accordingly, advised Sudan to replace them with more targeted mechanisms. They also advised the Sudanese government to remove subsidies in December or March before the main harvest season when the prices were lowest (Lange 2018). Thus, the immediate catalyst of the December Revolution—major price hikes in essential goods, in particular bread—was sufficiently predetermined by structural economic weaknesses, as evidenced by international experts, and facilitated by international financial institutions. The implementation of the government’s longterm anti-crisis plan, on the other hand, had been undermined by rapid population growth and the resultant youth bulge in Sudan (Ahmed 2014), which became a serious factor of social instability. Yet fundamentally it was the Al Bashir regime that bore full responsibility for the crisis in the eyes of most Sudanese who resented it for failing to improve the economy after the separation of South Sudan due to the regime’s political decay, ineptitude, and corruption.

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise …

45

External Factors of the Revolution A few days after the escalation of protests, on December 21, 2018, the head of Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) held a press conference and claimed that 290 rebels had been recruited by the Israeli Mossad and deployed to Sudan to commit arson; allegedly, seven of them had been caught. On December 24, President Al Bashir’s issued an address to the nation, in which he accused Israel of funding the rebel group Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), which supposedly was behind the unrest in the country. Al Bashir publicly called the protesters traitors, foreign agents, mercenaries and saboteurs. Yet even though both the SLM/A, which had been fighting against the central government since 2003, and Israel, which had repeatedly carried out airstrikes on Iranian and Hamas targets in Sudan in 2009– 2015, were undoubtedly staunch enemies of the Al Bashir regime, no evidence has emerged that any of the regime’s allegations were true. In a separate development, Western media were actively accusing Russian private military company Wagner of interfering in the revolution in support of Al Bashir. The Times and other papers published photos of uniformed white men, allegedly Russian, travelling through Khartoum in a Ural utility truck and even referred to witness accounts of their participation in the dispersal of protests. The Russian Embassy in Khartoum acknowledged the presence of independent Russian military contractors in Sudan, but strongly rejected the allegations that they had engaged in any operations in the country other than training local personnel. Indeed, Sudan had long become an important arena for the competition between leading global powers (see, e.g., Kostelyanets and Okeke 2018), so the revolutionary events became a convenient cover for propaganda. What is true, however, is that Western NGOs had actively been involved in training Sudanese civil society groups. For several years leading to the revolutionary events, such organizations as the US Institute of Peace, National Democratic Institute, and Freedom House conducted workshops in Sudan that would empower citizens to participate in politics, hold the government accountable, monitor elections, carry out non-violent political actions, etc. (Zunes 2021). These workshops also helped develop progressive networks under the radar of the regime (Bashri 2021). In addition, there was an important link between the opposition, including trade unions, and the Sudanese diaspora. The diaspora provided financial support of the revolution and lobbied foreign governments to push for change in Sudan. Demonstrations in support of Sudanese protesters were held across Europe, North America and Australia (Zunes 2021). Owing to the influence of the Sudanese diaspora, many European and other countries actively criticized the Al Bashir regime for the excessive use of force and urged the president to step down.

46

S. Kostelyanets

Moving Forces of the Revolution and Their Aims During most of its nearly 30 years in power, the alliance of the military and the Islamists faced two principal domestic adversaries—the previous ruling elites, largely represented by the two oldest, moderately Islamist parties—the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party, as well as armed opposition groups from the periphery, most of which by 2018 had become parties to an umbrella organization—the Sudan Revolutionary Front. The vast majority of opposition parties in Sudan, including the aforementioned two, were part of the coalitions National Consensus Forces and Sudan Call, which supported the protests that began in December 2018 and called upon President Al Bashir to resign his post. However, the systemic opposition had lost much of its popularity due to incessant internal bickering and periodic compromises with the regime, including their participation in the National Dialogue initiative in the mid 2010s. The armed opposition, on the other hand, which also supported the demands of the protesters, never rallied a sufficiently broad coalition of Sudan’s marginalized groups and was situated too far from Khartoum, where the outcome of any power struggle in Sudan was decided traditionally, and also seemed foreign to the Arab masses in the capital, whose support has always been critical to the success of revolutions in the country. Furthermore, leading members of opposition parties and armed groups were often co-opted by the regime, eroding public trust in their organizations’ aims. Accordingly, it may be argued that the role of these two groups of actors in the December Revolution was only secondary and they did not lead the street in Khartoum and other major cities or enjoyed its full trust, not in the least because they were “negative coalitions”, i.e. those that opposed the rule of the regime but did not offer a positive vision of the future that would be embraced by the popular masses. At the local level, one should highlight the role of the so-called neighborhood resistance committees, which undoubtedly were critical to the success of the December Revolution. These youth-led organizations, which engaged in the mobilization of residents of local communities, emerged back in 2013 as a reaction to the deadliest dispersals of protests in Khartoum. In 2016, these committees organized a three-day civil disobedience campaign against new austerity measures, and since 2017 they had been developing a national resistance network, which came to have an elected leadership council and branches in most of Sudan’s towns. Over the following years, the resistance network distributed anti-regime pamphlets, sprayed revolutionary graffiti, and accumulated various physical tools necessary for street protests, including old tires. However, these committees, which were excellent at keeping the momentum of the revolution going at the community level, lacked the vision and larger purpose to define the course of the protests. Their important contribution to the toppling of the regime may largely be ascribed to their close cooperation with the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA)—an alliance of independent trade unions, which should be viewed as the main driving force of the December Revolution. Trade unions have historically been an important actor of revolutionary change in Africa (see, e.g., Denisova 1993), including Sudan. In 1964, another trade union

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise …

47

alliance—the Syndicated Front—spearheaded Sudan’s October Revolution, while the Alliance of Professional and Trade Unions led the protests that brought about the May Revolution in 1985. In 1985, negotiations between the military and the Alliance resulted in the establishment of a civilian cabinet. The military-Islamist regime that came to power in 1989 realized the threat of independent trade unions, so all existing labor organizations were abolished alongside the political parties. In response, 51 professional unions and 51 trade unions joined 11 political parties in signing the National Democratic Alliance charter in October 1989, which called for the overthrow of Omar Al Bashir’s regime. By 1996, there were only 13—tightly controlled—legal trade unions in Sudan, yet underground anti-government union activity never ceased. There took place major worker strikes almost every year in 1994–2000, and even the adoption of the new 1998 Constitution, which reinstated the right to establish trade unions, did not change much in this regard as the regime continued to restrict union activity and imprison union leaders, and independent labor unions kept on struggling for their rights (LaVerle 2015). The Sudanese Professionals Association (then—the Sudanese Professionals Federation) was unofficially organized in 2012—in the wake of the separation of South Sudan and the following economic crisis—by doctors’ and lawyers’ independent labor committees. In 2014, they were joined by a professional union of journalists. Initially, the SPA focused its demands on better wages and working conditions and stayed away from the political discourse. Importantly, the SPA never marred itself with close relations with the regime, and thus retained an unblemished political reputation. In 2016, the SPA was formally set up as an alliance of three professional unions—the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors, the Sudanese Journalists Network, and the Democratic Coalition of Lawyers. They adopted the charter of the SPA, which prioritized, among other things, the restoration of freedom and independence of professional groups and the struggle against opportunistic progovernment trade unions. By December 2018, the membership of the SPA included 17 professional groups (El Agati et al. 2021). Largely unknown to the Sudanese masses prior to the revolution, the SPA boldly entered the center stage of the protest that began at schools and universities and quickly spread to most towns in the country. In late 2018, the SPA announced a plan to submit a minimum wage proposal to parliament in a mass procession, but the extraordinary wave of protests across the country upped the ante (El-Gizouli 2019). While the aforementioned neighborhood resistance committees were responsible for maintaining the initial impetus of the protest wave, which had been launched by schoolchildren, at the grassroots level, as well as for passing on instructions of the opposition to those that did not have Internet access, it was the SPA that formulated the demands of the street protesters and then in coordination with other political forces put together the Declaration of Freedom and Change, which became the platform that united the broad opposition coalition of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). The SPA’s leading role was determined by the successful organization of a march to the presidential palace that took place on 25 December 2018 and drew an unprecedented number of participants; security forces had to respond with live bullets to disperse the crowd, wounding at least 6 people. Khartoum, with its large population

48

S. Kostelyanets

of professionals, became the natural epicenter of protest activity inspired by the SPA. The role of doctors, teachers, university professors, pharmacists, lawyers, engineers, bank employees was very visible during the protests in particular because many of them were organized in professional unions. Doctors’ committee, for instance, announced a boycott of all military and police hospitals in the country, as well as of private medical facilities that belonged to Al Bashir loyalists; lawyers picketed the Supreme Court; pharmacists closed most of the pharmacies; bank clerks held demonstrations near their banks. These professionals were united by their hatred of corrupt Islamists in power, whom they observed regularly and knew well, and whose greed was popularly referred to as the koz (scoop in Arabic) (El-Gizouli 2019). Culturally, these people were “middle class” (Elnaiem 2019), but materially they were not due to the collapse of the economy. After they joined the protests, Khartoum’s economy was severely disrupted. It is important to note that the protesters more eagerly responded to the calls by trade unions represented by the SPA and other civil society organizations rather than largest opposition parties, which did cautiously announce their support of the protests, but whose mobilizing potentials were undermined by decades of shady politicking. It has been argued that the unity of the grassroots struggle led by the SPA was a critical factor of the success of the revolution (Elnaiem 2019). Indeed, the disunity of other actors—the regime, armed opposition groups, and opposition parties was stark in comparison. Due to its internal cohesion, the growing movement of illegal trade unions became the cement that united extremely diverse and often competing political players—both rebel and civilian, including the Sudanese resistance committees, the Sudan Revolutionary Front, the two competing coalitions of opposition parties—the National Consensus Forces and the Sudan Call, and various other civil groups and associations, all of which accepted the leadership of the SPA and on January 1, 2019 signed the Declaration of Freedom and Change. In total, the Declaration was signed by 22 organizations; among them were also those which were active in the 2011–2014 wave of protests, such as The No to Oppression against Women Initiative, Girifna (“we are fed up” in Arabic), Change Now, etc. The Declaration put forward three concrete political demands: the removal of President Al Bashir and his regime, the formation of a transitional government for a period of four years, and the cessation of violence against peaceful protesters. The Declaration also outlined most important steps to be taken after a regime change, which included resolving armed conflicts in the periphery, rewriting the Constitution, strengthening the rule of law, introducing an independent judicial system, empowering Sudanese women, and improving relations with South Sudan (Declaration 2019). It was also assumed that such demands of the street opposition as investigating all crimes of the regime, including the ones of Al Bashir himself, who was wanted by the International Criminal Court for his war crimes in Darfur, repelling Sharia law, and secularizing social life in the country would be met in due time. The signing of the Declaration was announced by a representative of the SPA on YouTube. The SPA also repeatedly called on non-signatory parties and civil groups to join the FFC, demonstrating its role as inspirer and coordinator of the coalition. Over

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise …

49

the following weeks, the original Declaration was endorsed by further 150 groups, each of them nominating representatives to the coordinating committee (Zunes 2021). The SPA coordinated protests and communicated with other groups through its Facebook website, WhatsApp chats, Twitter and other social media, which remained accessible to many Sudanese through VPN services despite the regime-imposed Internet blockade, which lasted for over two months. Given Sudan’s relatively high Internet penetration rate of 30% (ITU 2020), digital space became an important conduit for coordination among the protesters and played a major role in the success of the revolution. Slogans of protest that were propagated on the SPA’s social media accounts inspired millions of Sudanese, who then replicated them and spread them around the revolting country. In sum, the SPA took advantage of its non-partisan and independent stance, which received popular approval in a country accustomed to incessant opposition infighting, employed effective digital tools to reach its target audience, succeeded in articulating the overarching goals of the revolution which united the protesters, made the effort to reach out to every party and civil group in Sudan that was fed up with Al Bashir’s three-decade authoritarian rule, and also made sure the protests remained mostly non-violent. All of this positioned the SPA uniquely as the preeminent driver of revolutionary change. The SPA’s original goals of higher wages and better working conditions did not seem achievable under Al Bashir’s despotic and corrupt regime that perpetuated ethno-tribal discrimination and peripheral marginalization and stood as a barrier to much needed political and socio-economic reforms, so the revolutionary strategy adopted by the trade unions was structurally predetermined by the nature of the Sudanese regime.

The Course of the Revolutionary Events and Their Results President Al Bashir was only two months away from celebrating his 30th anniversary at the top of the Sudan’s pyramid of power when on April 11, 2019 he was overthrown in a military coup. This coup was preceded by four months of mass popular protests and civil disobedience, often escalating into violent clashes between protesters and security forces. According to official figures, between December 19, 2018, when protesters set fire to a government building for the first time, and April 11, 2019, 65 people were killed (according to independent researchers, between 112 and 117 [Dahab et al. 2019]). The first protest that may be attributed to the December Revolution erupted in Mairno, a small town on the Nile in Sennar state, on December 7, 2018, when schoolchildren came out to the streets shouting slogans against a major hike in bread prices that had led to school closures in many regions of the country. On December 13, amid growing queues for bread, fuel and cash, student protests began in Ed Damazin in Blue Nile state not far from the Ethiopian border; police had to use tear gas and batons to disperse the demonstration. On December 17, unrest spread to three more towns, student demonstrations took place in Khartoum, and first tires were put

50

S. Kostelyanets

on fire in streets of the capital. Paramilitary personnel that were deployed to Atbara to crack down on protesters were reportedly obstructed by army units (Mada Masr 2018), which demonstrated deep cleavages within the system very early on in the uprising. By December 20, the protests spread to most of Sudan’s urban centers, at least six protesters were killed and dozens injured by the security forces. In a number of towns, protesters burned down buildings of the ruling National Congress Party, the National Intelligence and Security Service, and local administrations. Al Bashir attempted to suppress the protests by force and propaganda. In December 2018—January 2019, a state of emergency and a curfew were introduced in the towns most affected by the protests; many leaders of the protest were arrested. The NISS and paramilitary units were deployed to assist the police in enforcing the state of emergency. Schools, universities, and student dormitories were closed; printing of most of the newspapers in Sudan was suspended; licenses of many foreign correspondents were revoked; and access to social networks and many other Internet resources was blocked. In February, Al Bashir imposed a yearlong state of emergency on the entire national territory of Sudan for the first time in twenty years. Civilian governors were simultaneously replaced with military generals, and the central government was overhauled. These measures, however, did not curb the rising wave of the protests. In December 2018 alone, about 400 protest actions took place in the country. In January, the number of demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience increased even further. According to experts, the country had not seen such a large-scale protest movement in Sudan since independence. By March protesters started to lose hope as the regime was still in place, so the SPA leadership decided to change tactics and organize a major march to the General Command of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) at the center of Khartoum, where the protesters would occupy the square in front of the building until their demands were met. Their strategy was to exploit the tensions between the army, which was more sympathetic toward the protesters and would rarely get directly involved in crackdowns, and security personnel. On April 6, 2019, on the 34th anniversary of the coup that concluded the 1985 May Revolution and four days after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika stepped down amid fierce popular protests in Algeria,2 about 800,000 protesters joined the march to the headquarters building. According to an estimate, over the following days the number of protesters in the streets of Khartoum reached millions. Not only in the capital but all over the country, crowds gathered at army facilities and demanded that the military joined the revolution. The oppositionists also made an effort to keep the protests non-violent by organizing checkpoints to ensure that no person gets through with firearms or potential projectiles. Mostly they feared that government agents would infiltrate the protests and provoke violence (Zunes 2021). The FFC, but in particular SPA structures, ensured that protesters would receive medical care, drinks, and even transportation to and from their encampments. In response, the authorities shut down electricity throughout Sudan in a desperate attempt to disrupt communication channels of the opposition. 2

See Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” (Zoubir 2022, this volume) for detail.

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise …

51

Already on the first day of the sit-in, SAF soldiers were seen supporting and protecting the demonstrators, distributing water and snacks and chanting revolutionary slogans. Simultaneously, the SPA called for a nationwide general strike. On April 8, a gunfight erupted between SAF soldiers who formed a protective cordon around the sit-in and the security forces; one soldier was killed, at least 4 others were wounded. Security personnel was forced to retreat. By April 10, 5 pro-opposition soldiers had been killed in downtown Khartoum. Paramilitary forces, however, declared that they would not attack the sit-in again. This apparently became a wakeup call for the top brass. On April 11, Sudan’s Defense Minister Awad Ahmed Ibn Auf announced that the army deposed President Al Bashir and formed the Transitional Military Council (TMC) that would supervise a political transition for two years until elections. The TMC, which arrested Al Bashir and took the reins of power, apparently acted to forestall a popular revolution led by the opposition forces, which aimed at a radical transformation of the entire political system and an immediate investigation of corruption and war crimes of the regime, which threatened the interests of all key stakeholders—the security forces, top officials, and economic elites of the country. After Al Bashir was ousted, the TMC and the opposition represented by the FFC entered months of talks about the conditions on which power in Sudan would be transferred to the civilians. Awad Ibn Auf stepped down on April 12 amid continuing mass sit-ins and was replaced by General Abdelfattah El Burhan, Inspector-General of the Armed Forces, who had previously liaised with the protesters and was considered not as close to Al Bashir as Ibn Auf. Otherwise, the TMC rejected the demands that power be handed over to the oppositionists or independent civilians immediately or that the security forces and the NISS be disbanded. The standoff between the military and the opposition, accompanied with regular anti-military demonstrations and sit-ins, continued until June 2019, when the TMC used force to disperse protesters at their main encampment near the army headquarters in Khartoum. According to official data, 64 people were killed (according to unofficial counts—118). Under mounting international pressure, the military did agree to a power-sharing agreement with the opposition, yet did not yield to the opposition’s most important demand to hand over supreme power (Kostelyanets 2021). In July 2019, the parties agreed to a power-sharing agreement, which stipulated the following conditions: the Sovereign Council of Sudan (SCS) would be established and would consist of 11 seats, 5 for each of the sides and 1 for an independent figure, and would govern the country for 39 months. The military would retain the chairmanship until April 2021 and the right to veto all decisions of the SCS until November 2022. In August 2019, the TMC and the FFC represented by a member of the SPA signed the Constitutional Declaration that became the framework document for the transition period. The agreement transformed the conflict and reduced the level of violence, but political differences between the parties to the agreement, as well as within them, remained a key factor influencing the course of political transition in Sudan. The FFC, being a motley coalition of more than two dozen opposition parties and movements, did not see through the transition period intact: the SPA, which never wanted to transform into a political party, broke away in July 2020, preferring to maintain its

52

S. Kostelyanets

trade union essence, and in early October 2021 sixteen political and armed groups split from the FFC, forming the National Consensus Charter. The fragmentation of the civilian component of the ruling coalition was swiftly capitalized on by the military, which carried out a coup on October 25, 2021, essentially tearing apart the 2019 power-sharing agreement.

Concluding Remarks The December Revolution in Sudan fell short of achieving all of its goals. Indeed, Al Bashir has been ousted and stays in jail, but the military wing of his regime still stays in power and does not demonstrate any intent to submit to civilian oversight. The transitional civilian cabinet of ministers lasted only 14 months before it was unilaterally dissolved by the TMC. After the 2021 coup, violent protests returned to the streets of Sudanese cities. The SPA once again became the most active and consistent opponent of the military regime and utilized its experience in organizing regular street demonstrations. The structural characteristics of Sudan’s society, economy and politics have not improved substantially: the country is still to hold the first free and fair election since 1986; the regime remains authoritarian, even if more pluralist and less hegemonic; the demarginalization of the periphery has not even started but in any case shall be a very long-term process. In terms of the ethnopolitical conflicts, while some armed opposition groups have now endorsed the new regime, several other movements remain committed to the cause of the December Revolution, making the resumption of hostilities with the SAF a probability. Besides, by the fall of 2021, Sudan found itself in an even deeper economic crisis than before the start of the protests in 2018, which expectedly resulted in the fall of popularity of the transitional government and the FFC. The two bodies that were established within the framework of the 2019 Constitutional Declaration—the Empowerment Elimination, Anti-Corruption, and Funds Recovery Committee (the Empowerment Removal Committee—ERC) and an independent Investigation Commission to probe the June 3rd brutal dispersal of the sitin—have also produced very limited results. By Summer 2021, the ERC recovered over $1 billion in assets to Sudan’s treasury, yet it has been blocked from auditing the property of the top military brass (Baldo 2021). The Commission is also yet to release a report on its investigation of killings by the security forces, which has been going on for almost two years. In response to sharp criticism caused by the lack of results, in May 2021 the head of the Commission, Nabil Adeeb, said publicly that the publication of the report would lead to serious political consequences, such as a coup d’etat. The question of handing Al Bashir over to the International Criminal Court in the Hague for prosecution has also remained in limbo, though it may be assumed that the TMC has kept the former president in Sudan’s notorious Kobar prison as a bargaining card. In a nutshell, over the two years since the December

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise …

53

Revolution the street opposition represented by the FFC has achieved very few of its stated objectives. The revolution, nonetheless, has drastically changed Sudan. Al Bashir’s National Congress Party was banned in 2019, its assets were confiscated, and its members were prohibited from running in elections for the next 10 years. Everyday life has noticeably liberalized as the transitional government managed to abolish discriminatory laws against women, public floggings, the apostasy law, and even allowed imports of alcoholic beverages for consumption by non-Muslims. It seems that the process of secularization is likely to proceed uninterrupted despite the political perturbations because, firstly, the popularity of Islamist ideas in Sudan has dropped dramatically and, secondly, it is one of the fundamental provisions of the peace agreement with the armed opposition. Even more importantly, the December Revolution has facilitated the emergence of a very vibrant and independent civil society in Sudan, which has believed in its own strength and is now unlikely to yield without a fight to a new authoritarian regime. In this regard, the December Revolution has undoubtedly been a successful movement.

References Abdel-Rahim M (1978) Changing patterns of civilian-military relations in the Sudan. Research report no. 66. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala Ahmed H (2014) The socio-economic and political impacts of youth bulge: the case of Sudan. J Soc Sci Stud 1(2):224–235 BBC (2013) Sudan fuel protests: ‘50 shot dead’. BBC, 27 September 2013. https://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-africa-24297347 Baldo S (2021) Sudan struggles to control its parastatals. The Sentry, May 2021. https://thesentry. org/reports/sudan-parastatals Bashri M (2021) Networked movements and the circle of trust: civil society groups as agents of change in Sudan. Inf Commun Soc 24(3):470–489 Bellucci S (2000) Islam and democracy: the 1999 palace coup in Sudan. Middle East Policy 7(3):168–174 Dahab M, Abdelmagid N, Kodouda A, Checchi F (2019) Deaths, injuries and detentions during civil demonstrations in Sudan: a secondary data analysis. Confl Heal 13(1):1–6 De Waal A, Abdel Salam AH (2004) Islamism, state power and Jihad in Sudan. In: De Waal A (ed) Islamism and its enemies in the Horn of Africa. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, pp 88–99 Declaration (2019) The declaration of freedom and change, 1 September 2019. https://www.dab angasudan.org/uploads/media/5cf94b02b2055.pdf Denisova TS (1993) Zapadnaya Afrika. Profsoyuzy i vlast’. Institute for African Studies, Moscow Denisova TS (2013) Konflikty v afrikanskikh stranakh: formirovanie “ekonomiki voiny.” J Inst Afric Stud 31:158–172 Denisova TS (2015) Volna demokratizatsii i elektoral’nye protsessy v Tropicheskoi Afrike. J Inst Afric Stud 1(32):27–37 Denisova TS (2016) Tropical Africa: the evolution of political leadership. Institute for African Studies, Moscow

54

S. Kostelyanets

El-Gizouli M (2019) The Fall of al-Bashir: mapping contestation forces in Sudan. Arab Reform Initiative, 15 April 2019. https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/the-fall-of-al-bashir-mappingcontestation-forces-in-sudan El-Tom A (2008) The Black book of Sudan: imbalance of power and wealth in Sudan. J Afric Natl Aff 1(2):25–35 El Agati M, Samir O, Ahmed AMS, Srour Z (2021) Sudanese Professionals Association: structure, evolution, roles and coalitions—challenges and future prospects. Arab Reform Initiative, 9 November 2021. https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/sudanese-professionals-associationstructure-evolution-roles-and-coalitions-challenges-and-future-prospects Elnaiem M (2019) Armed, unarmed, and non-violent: the Sudanese Resistance in Sudan’s 2018– 2019 revolutionary uprising. Fletcher Forum World Aff 43(2):5–26 FNVP (2018) Provedenie reform dlya dostizheniya ekonomicheskogo rosta na dolgosrochnyi period. Foundation for National Values Protection (FNVP). https://fznc.ru/wp-content/uploads/ 2019/09/Obshhaya_prezentacziya.pdf Fisayo-Bambi J (2020) Sudan’s PM laments army’s role in the country’s economy. Africa News, 15 Dec 2020. https://www.africanews.com/2020/12/15/sudan-s-pm-laments-army-s-role-in-eco nomy Gadkarim HA (2012) Will the Sudanese paradox continue? Insecure investment climate and substantial foreign direct investment inflows. Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen. http://www.cmi.no/pub lications/file/4595-will-the-sudanese-paradox-continue.pdf Grinin L, Korotayev A, Tausch A (2018) Islamism, Arab Spring, and the future of democracy. World System and world values perspectives. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-910 77-2 Harkness KA (2012) The origins of African Civil-Military relations: ethnic armies and the development of coup traps. Doctoral dissertation. Princeton University, Princeton Human Rights Watch (2010) Sudan: flawed elections underscore need for justice. Human Rights Watch, 26 April 2010. https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/04/26/sudan-flawed-elections-und erscore-need-justice IMF (2013) Sudan. Selected Issues. International Monetary Fund, September 2013. http://www. imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13320.pdf IMF (2014) Press release: statement at the conclusion of an IMF mission to Sudan to conduct the first review under the staff-monitored program. International Monetary Fund, 9 April 2014. http:// www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr14214.htm ITU (2020) Measuring digital development: facts and figures 2019. International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 2020. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/facts/default.aspx Issaev L, Korotayev A (2022) Introduction. New Wave of revolutions in the MENA region in the global perspective. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_1 Kerr N, Lührmann A (2017) Public trust in elections: the role of media freedom and election management autonomy. Afrobarometer, March 2017. https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/public ations/Working%20papers/afropaperno170_public_trust_in_elections.pdf Korotayev A, Khokhlova A (2022) Revolutionary events in Mali, 2020–2021. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 191–218. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_9 Kostelyanets SV (2014a) Darfur: a history of conflict. Institute for African Studies, Moscow Kostelyanets SV (2014b) Sudan posle razdela strany: poisk putei preodoleniya krizisa. Asia Africa Today 10:31–35 Kostelyanets SV (2021) The rise and fall of political Islam in Sudan. Polit Relig J 15(1):85– 104. https://doi.org/10.54561/prj1501085k Kostelyanets SV (2011) Sotsial’no-politicheskie i gumanitarnye aspekty konflikta v sudanskom regione Darfur. Ph.D., dissertation. Institute for African Studies, Moscow

Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise …

55

Kostelyanets SV (2019) Historical and cultural roots of the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region. In: Bondarenko DM, Butovskaya ML (eds) The omnipresent past. Historical anthropology of Africa and African diaspora. LRC, Moscow, pp 212–236 Kostelyanets SV, Okeke OAU (2018) Russia in the global competition for Africa: the military dimension. Vostok/Oriens 6:184–198. https://doi.org/10.31857/S086919080002877-1 LaVerle B (2015) Sudan: a country study. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress 2015. https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/pdf/CS_Sudan.pdf Lange S (2018) Sudan: welfare impacts of recent food price hikes, November 2017–July 2018. Poverty & Equity Global Practice, September 2018. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bit stream/handle/10986/36098/Sudan-Welfare-Impacts-of-Recent-Food-Price-Hikes-November2017-July-2018.pdf?sequence=1 Mada Masr (2018) 12 killed in nationwide anti-austerity demonstrations in Sudan as police use tear gas and live rounds to disperse protesters. Mada Masr, 21 December 2018. https://www. madamasr.com/en/2018/12/21/feature/politics/12-killed-in-nationwide-anti-austerity-demonstra tions-in-sudan-as-police-use-tear-gas-and-live-rounds-to-disperse-protesters Moorcraft P (2015) Omar Al-Bashir and Africa’s longest war. Pen and Sword, Barnsley Polyakov K (2000) Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan. Institute for Middle East, Moscow Quartz Africa (2016) Sudan could spend up to 70% of its budget on several war fronts this year. Quartz Africa, 12 February 2016. https://qz.com/africa/615938/sudan-could-spend-up-to-70-ofits-budget-on-several-war-fronts-this-year Reeves E (2014) English translation of leaked 31 August 2014 minutes of high-level security, military meeting. Sudan Research, Analysis and Advocacy, 29 September 2014. https://sudanreeves.org/2014/09/29/arabic-original-and-hand-written-english-translationof-31-august-2014-meeting-pages-3-6 Smith D (2015) Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir extends 26-year presidency with 94.5% of the vote. The Guardian, 27 April 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/27/sudan-bashir-ele cted-majority-vote Syeed N (2014) Sudan’s hospitals: ‘Ravaged by privatisation’. Al Jazeera, 6 January 2014. https:// www.aljazeera.com/features/2014/1/6/sudans-hospitals-ravaged-by-privatisation Szmolka I, Moral L (2019) A proposal of party systems typology for democratic and pluralist authoritarian regimes. Its application to Maghreb countries. Revista Espacola De Investigaciones Sociolygicas 168:93–110. https://doi.org/10.5477/cis/reis.168.93 Transparency International (2022) Corruption Perceptions Index. https://www.transparency.org/ en/cpi Verhoeven H (2015) Water, civilisation and power in Sudan: the political economy of militaryIslamist state building. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO 9781107447769 Verney P (ed) (1995) Sudan: conflict and minorities. Minority Rights Group, London. https://www. minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-881-Download-full-rep ort.pdf World Bank (2022) GDP per capita (current US$). World Bank 2022. https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD Zoubir Y (2022) The crisis of the rentier state: how the revolution of smiles has brought down the Sultanistic regime in Algeria. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-031-15135-4_3 Zunes S (2021) Sudan’s 2019 revolution. International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 5 April 2021. https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Zunes-Sudans2019-Revolution-1.pdf

56

S. Kostelyanets

Sergey Kostelyanets heads the Centre for Sociological and Political Sciences Studies at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a senior research fellow at the National Research University Higher School of Economics and an associate professor at Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia. His research interests include the study of armed conflicts and conflict resolution in Africa, particularly in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, terrorism, secessionist movements, international military cooperation, and relations between Russia, Turkey, GCC countries and Africa, from the perspectives both of Political Science and Cultural Anthropology. Dr. Kostelyanets is the author or editor of five books, including the monograph “Darfur: A History of the Conflict”, and over 100 research papers in scholarly journals and anthologies. He worked previously at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the sections for human rights and for combating human trafficking.

The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles Has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria Yahia H. Zoubir

Abstract The year 2019 marked the 20th anniversary of Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s reign. Few expected that a peaceful social protest movement of historical proportions would roar like a tsunami to demand that the ailing president not have a fifth term in office, and to bring an end to the Algerian political system in place since the country’s independence in 1962 and the removal of all officials that served in it. While the military responded favorably to the Hirak by forcing Bouteflika out of office and imprisoning a large number of officials and officers involved in corruption, the new authorities have yet to show real determination to change the system or embark on genuine political and economic reforms despite the rhetoric. Three years after the Hirak protests, police and judicial intimidation and harassment have continued. Faced with political, economic, and social constraints, the current regime has so far failed to eliminate the conditions that had generated the Hirak. Instead of creating the conditions for a representation of the Hirak and involving it in political decisions in the aftermath of the removal of Bouteflika, it has not only imposed its own roadmap but has also sought to take advantage of the pandemic to break the Hirak and to rejuvenate the old system. This chapter will seek to elucidate the reluctance of the authorities to break from the practices of the past, and explain the reasons for the failure of the Hirak in producing leaders who could negotiate a transition to a new political order.

Introduction Following his coming to power in 1999, despite his declarations for change, Bouteflika sought in fact to preserve the system in place since independence while personalizing it. The robustness and stability organized around Sultanism constituted the main characteristics of the regime he concocted and commanded. However, Bouteflika’s regime failed to sustain itself precisely because of the rentier logic upon Y. H. Zoubir (B) KEDGE Business School, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_3

57

58

Y. H. Zoubir

which it rested and the erosion of the revolutionary legitimacy it had misappropriated. Algeria’s protest movement that began in February 2019 is the result of the inevitable crisis of the rentier system, exacerbated by president Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s 20-year sultanistic rule. The crisis was the most severe that the political system has experienced since independence in 1962. While after various previous crises and challenges, especially the crisis of the 1990s, successive regimes were able to overcome them through a variety of instruments (Kilavuz 2017), such as the introduction of façade liberalism, today’s ongoing crisis, unlike those in the past, might augur the end of the system and the birth of a new one, or what the protest movement (hirak) refers to as the “second republic.” To understand the present situation, it is necessary to provide, first, a brief perspective on the period that preceded the uprising. In a second step, we will assess the twenty-year rule of Abdelaziz Bouteflika and analyze the reasons that triggered the massive demonstrations. We will also analyze the demands/grievances of the millions of protesters and how they articulated those demands, which have matured in response to the actions of the fragile government and the decisions of the military’s strongman, Ahmed Gaïd Salah (aka AGS). We will then analyze the way the post-Bouteflika has implemented the roadmap to end the Hirak and purportedly build the new Algeria.

Usurped Revolution One cannot understand the Algeria crisis since 2019 without comprehending the foundations of the Algerian political system, which was conceived prior to Algeria’s independence, and whose dismantling the Hirak had demanded. The underpinning of the system is in essence authoritarian; it reflected the nationalist movement’s narrow vision which made independence its exclusive slogan, thus failing to produce a social program for the post-independence era. Due to the specific nature of the nationalist movement, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), whose claim to authority rested solely on historic rather than democratic legitimacy, was proclaimed in 1963 the only lawful party. Progressively, the FLN, made up of opportunists, resorted to ‘inheritance capture’ (Kilavuz 2017), more precisely, an appropriation of the historical legitimacy of the genuine FLN (1954–1962) and filled its membership without regard to the interests of the nation. The FLN has served as a mere vehicle of control and repression in the hands of the ruling bloc (in the Gramscian sense), which wrested the reality of power held by the military, which always used civilians as a façade of power. Until today, a polarization between state and civil society has been the most distinguishable corollary of the policies various regimes have pursued. The institutions put in place have rarely represented the real interests of society but the interests of the clans in power regardless of the redistribution of part of the rent. The real function of institutions served to provide the illusion of legitimacy and to prolong the power of the incumbent regime of the nascent local oligarchic clienteles whose interests were linked to their patrons in the regime, remained opposed to the masses, which they disdained. The incumbent regime empowered various clienteles within these

The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution …

59

institutions because of the factionalism that has pervaded the system. Corruption, clientelism, nepotism and favoritism were only a few of the characteristics of the system. Undoubtedly, the nature of the political system explains the long-lasting, detrimental, influence this has had on the transformation of the system into a democratic polity. The regime’s legitimacy of its continued rule drew from the war of liberation (legitimacy which had already been eroded by the late 1980s), but also from the hydrocarbons revenues. Algeria is a rentier state that has resisted making genuine economic reforms; the rent helped guarantee both social and political peace. This explains why upheavals usually follow the drop in the oil prices when the regime could no longer keep the ‘rentier social pact’ (Safir 2019)1 that ties it to society, i.e., the redistribution of part of the rent to the population and to the clienteles. Although the popular masses experienced substantial improvement in their standards of living, due in large part to the hydrocarbon earnings, an initially successful industrialization program (in the late 1960–1970s), and a substandard welfare system, the existing gap between the masses and the wealthier class, led to recurrent social discontent. The absence of democratic mechanisms constrained Algerians to adopt attitudes of apathy toward the regime and its populist discourse, thus strengthening the growing suspicions vis-à-vis the state and to totally distrust the élites in power. The prevalent expression of this general dissatisfaction came in the form of passive resistance: complete apathy toward public affairs, strikes, riots, absenteeism, lack of civism, disrespect for state symbols, brain-drain, and illegal and legal migration of the youth, and a waning of ancestral values.

The Missed Opportunities of a Negotiated Pact Transition Prior to Bouteflika’s rule (1999–2019), Algeria had missed two opportunities for a transition to a democratic polity, or at least to a system based on good governance, rule of law and political participation. The first was in 1976 when the regime had, despite its shortcomings, enormous positive achievements, especially in the socioeconomic realm and when it elaborated a National Charter (1976) following democratic public debates. However, the regime reverted to authoritarianism shortly thereafter. The second occasion, more opportune, occurred after the 1988 bloody riots. The rioters had called for the ejection of all officials whom they believed had betrayed the promises of the struggle for independence. They also called for justice, the end of the hogra (bullying/injustice), and for the respect of their dignity and the enjoyment of full citizenship (see Zoubir 1996). The liberalization process that ensued, under what one may term the “reformers” was quite promising. That transition, however, failed because the actors did not arrange for a negotiated pact, which would have clearly delineated the roles of the government or of the opposition parties legalized 1

This article explains convincingly how the two pillars of the regime’s legitimacy eroded and eventually triggered the protests that began in February 2019.

60

Y. H. Zoubir

following the riots, and the military. It was also because the hawks in the regime opposed any real change. A negotiated pact (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 40), would have made such transition possible, perhaps one unique in the Arab world. The absence of such a pact before the fateful elections of 1990 and 1991, which saw the overwhelming victories of the unconstitutional, illegally authorized Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was one of the primary reasons for the military’s intervention in January 1992 and the civil strife that followed. Like might be happening today, the strategy that the regime pursued after the October 1988 events consisted of ousting a few of the most detested public figures and resorted to the familiar stratagem: while the whole political system was delegitimized, the regime sacrificed a few figures (e.g., the secretary-general of the FLN and the head of intelligence services), but the system remained intact, the push of the reformers notwithstanding. The “reforms” the regime allegedly introduced were cosmetic because the regime obeyed the same logic: the perpetuation of the system and regime survival. The reforms were not thought out through a democratic, consultative debate; the few that the conservatives conceded were forced upon the regime by the “street” and the momentary tenacity of the reformers. The pouvoir (deep state) foremost objective in allowing them was to thwart further outbreaks from happening. Thus, the reforms from above were part and parcel of the power struggle among the various clans. In sum, the regime used the multiparty system it initiated in 1989 as a mere instrument of preservation and an astute way of controlling any opposition. It did not even attempt a transition from the above as had happened successfully in some Latin American countries. The five years following the cancellation of the electoral process in 1992 were marked by political violence. To break the deadlock of violence, the rulers, implemented from the end of 1995 onward institutional normalization (e.g., new Constitution in 1996, legislative elections in 1997…). The regime oscillated between authoritarianism and fragile forms of ‘democracy’. The transition period in which Algeria engaged was extended indeterminately; it had become a protracted transition with no end in sight. Therefore, as a result, the political system has since become neither democratic nor authoritarian in the strict definition of the concept. Like many other regimes in the region, it corresponds to the hybrid types with different appellations, such as competitive, electoral, hegemonic or semi authoritarian, although under Bouteflika’s rule the system reintroduced many characteristics of classical authoritarianism and neopatrimonialism.

Bouteflika’s Rule: The Investiture of Sultanism Although he was credited with reestablishing peace in the country, through the Civil Concord soon after his questionable election in April 19992 and the Charter on 2

The military imposed him as the candidate; aware of the maneuver, the six presidential contenders withdrew on the eve of the election.

The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution …

61

National Reconciliation in 2005, it was in reality his predecessor Liamine Zeroual, who had begun the Rahma policy (1994), whose objective was to induce Islamist fighters to surrender in return for amnesty. In addition to the reinstatement of revolutionary legitimacy and the redistribution of the hydrocarbons revenues, restoration of peace and security served as the main sources of legitimacy of the Bouteflika regime. Bouteflika was not content to serve two terms in office as inscribed in the 1996 constitution and neither was a transition to genuine democratic governance part of his program (Zoubir 2000). Being confident about his “achievements,” during his first and part of his second terms, mainly owing the high price of oil, Bouteflika introduced in 2008 amendments to the 1996 Constitution, adopted overwhelmingly by parliament, which removed the limit on the number of presidential terms, thus making Bouteflika a president for life (Aghrout and Zoubir 2009). As both commander-inchief of the armed forces and defense minister, Bouteflika gradually forced into retirement senior officers with officers loyal to him in an attempt to lessen the military’s political role, that is, military predominance over the presidency. His reelection in 2004 confirmed that he had, at least in appearance, succeeded in curtail sultanistic regimes (Erdmann, Engeling the military’s influence. But, while he established equilibrium with the military owing to the support of Ahmed Gaïd Salah (AGS), who owed his position to the president, Bouteflika did not fully control the intelligence services (Roberts 2007: 15), although he managed to remove in late 2015 powerful Major-General Mohamed Médiene, alias “Toufik,” who had headed the Directorate of Security and Intelligence (DRS) for 25 years. Bouteflika ruled Algeria virtually unrestrained, especially since the rent allowed for the professionalization of Armed Forces, which acquired the most sophisticated weaponry in the international market, primarily from Russia, its traditional supplier. From a conceptual perspective, Bouteflika’s rule fell within the definition of neosultanistic regimes (Erdmann and Engel 2006), that is, neopatrimonial regime marked by personal rulership. Indeed, Bouteflika used his power without restraint, at his own discretion and above all uninhibited by rules or by any dedication to an ideology or value system. He surrounded himself largely with people he had chosen directly; these people were mainly members of his family, individuals from his (western) region, friends, business associates, or individuals who ensured that the regime sustained itself. The position of Bouteflika’s entourage grew from their total personal submission to his person. Government officials acted as personal servants of Bouteflika despite his incapacity to oversee government affairs, and they obtained their power solely from this relationship with Bouteflika.3 The so-called ‘oligarchs’ that emerged under his rule owed their new wealth to their allegiance to Bouteflika and his brother Saïd. The absence of rule of law and utter corruption were the hallmark of Bouteflika’s regime. Bouteflika generally used the parliament as a rubber stamp for his policies. Still, to ensure support for the constitutional revisions and for his candidacy for a third term (2009–2014), for instance, parliamentary deputies—and later governors (walis) and high government officials—received a 300% salary increase two months 3

This analysis reflects the works in Sultanistic Regimes (Chehabi and Linz 1998).

62

Y. H. Zoubir

prior to the election, even though their salaries and benefits were already considerable compared to those of the average citizen. Opposition political parties—secular and religious—had been coopted and thus have shown no proclivity for acceding to power or contesting in any credible way their opposition to the Sultan. They were content with having representatives in the parliament partly because part of their salaries went to the parties’ coffers. Algerians in general ignored the political parties, which they did not see as playing a consequential role in politics or as having the potential to generate any change; the low turnout for the May 2012 and 2017 legislative elections and the 2014 presidential election confirmed this pessimism toward the political system and its capacity to effect far-reaching transformation. Likewise, Bouteflika sought to tame civil society and tolerated only those associations that supported him. Worse still, he ensured that he would remain president for life, although in 2016 an amendment to the Constitution reinstituted the two-term limit since this did not affect his perpetual tenure in office. Bouteflika created a real vacuum around him and eliminated any genuine opposition to his rule. The political parties were atomized to prevent them from ever forming a mass party like the Islamic Salvation Front (Zoubir and Aghrout 2012), which was the first ever movement to challenge potently the existence of the regime. Despite the seeming apathy of society, Algerians did in fact pose resistance to the regime (Zoubir and Dris-Aït Hamadouche 2018) through independent unions or through dissensions within the regime itself, as well as through limited riots or through low participation at the polls during elections; yet, Bouteflika and his cronies were convinced that Algerians can be coopted via a redistribution of the oil revenues (cheap housing, food subsidies…). Bouteflika’s cronies still believed this scenario even when the economy was at a standstill (International Crisis Group 2018). While the situation in the country was explosive (Zoubir 2016), and despite warnings, the regime was far from anticipating the massive, unstoppable protests that began in February 2019 because officials were convinced that since Algeria was able to elude the Arab Spring (Zoubir 2011; Volpi 2013) they would be able to overcome the economic crisis and contain the countless protests. In fact, officials were persuaded that Algerians had become apathetic and would thus not dare defy the regime. The regime persisted in reminding the population that any mass upheaval would result in a situation like Libya, Syria or Yemen, ignoring the fact that more than 70% of Algeria’s population is below 35 years old and that most of them have not lived through the bloody decade of the 1990s.

End of Bouteflikism or End of the Regime? Like it happens in most oil rentier economies, the drop in the prices of commodities usually results in suffering for the population, especially the middle class and the poor. The regime’s unwillingness to transform a rentier economy into a productive one has come back to haunt it in exactly the way experts had predicted. To avoid resorting to borrowing from the International Monetary Fund, the government had

The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution …

63

to cut budgets, increase prices of some basic commodities, and reduce imports. The challenges were made even worse by other factors, particularly corruption. Indeed, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 ranked Algeria in the 108th place out of 180 countries, and the World Bank’s Doing Business 2016 put Algeria at 163 out of 189. Corruption scandals had become widespread, resulting in heavy losses for the country’s economy, while infuriating the citizens. The Bouteflika regime did not transform the rentier economy into a productive and diversified economy; Algeria has remained a one-commodity producer (hydrocarbons), where revenue from hydrocarbons account for about 60% of Algeria’s GDP and 97% of its foreign earnings. The government had recourse to the printing of money to survive the economic crisis; however, this did not alleviate the impoverishment of Algerians. Regardless, officials continued to claim that under Bouteflika Algeria has been a beacon of stability and that the program of austerity put in place would help overcome the crisis. Clearly, the balance sheet of the economy under Bouteflika’s rule has been disastrous and the country still faces dire challenges to transform it and get the country out of the quandary in which Bouteflika’s regime has left it (Zoubir 2021).

The Inexorable Social Outbreak Like in 1988, a social explosion was predictable even if no one knew its timing. Similarly, while an uprising was inevitable in 2019, no one knew when it would happen. The question is of course how would one account for the eruption of the protests? We contend here that Bouteflika seeking a fifth mandate was only the trigger; however, Algerians had cumulated grievances against the kleptocratic regime whose corruption had attained staggering proportions for years. Already in 2014, it was evident that Algerians opposed Bouteflika’s presidency. Owing to rigging and regardless of his poor health (he suffered a stroke in April 2013), Bouteflika was reelected for a fourth term in April 2014, campaigning through proxies since he could not walk or give speeches (his last speech to the nation was on 8 May 2012!). Bouteflika’s reelection for a fourth mandate in 2014 was clearly inflated and was well below the alleged 51.7% rate of participation; in reality, participation was 30% at best. During the fourth term, the prospects of Bouteflika, whose health had deteriorated considerably (moving on a wheelchair and unaware of his surroundings), seeking a fifth mandate in 2019 was a prospect that discredited the regime and disconcerted and humiliated Algerians. Clearly, the cronies who had greatly benefited from Bouteflika’s rule supported a fifth mandate to preserve their interests. Through his powerful brother and advisor Saïd Bouteflika and a constellation of cronies, including bureaucrats, government officials, party members (FLN, RND, Taj, and MPA), senior military officers, the official workers’ union (UGTA), all part of the so-called presidential clan that ran the country, Bouteflika, via a spokesperson, declared on 10 February that he would seek a fifth term in violation of the constitution and despite his extremely poor

64

Y. H. Zoubir

health. However, opposition to a fifth term did not derive from Bouteflika clan’s violation of the constitution; it resulted mostly from the humiliation Algerians had felt throughout his fourth term. One should not underestimate this element in deciphering the protest movement that erupted in Bordj Bou Arreridj on 13 February (with the slogan “Makach ouhda khamsa,” “no 5th term”), then in Kherrata and Khenchela on 16 February 2019 (with the call “no to the 5th term of shame”) before reaching a national dimension, which saw participation in the marches in the millions. In the Algerian psyche, the kind of humiliation or assault on their dignity (as was the case under colonialism) that the Bouteflika regime inflicted upon them was unforgivable. This kind of humiliation has historically always provoked insurgences, though the timing is often unexpected (for example, the Berber Spring in April 1980 or the October Riots in 1988, which had been preceded by limited protests in the country throughout the 1980s). Prior to the Hirak, Algerians used social media to express their highly critical attitude of the president’s appalling rare appearance in public and their repugnance of the regime. They were infuriated seeing government and party officials offering a picture to Bouteflika’s portrait or offering a horse to his photo! The indignant behavior of his cronies nauseated Algerians of all walks of life who understood nonetheless that such insistence in seeking to keep Bouteflika in power derived from the predation they were engaged in (access to lucrative contracts, high pay, professional advancement, and other unimaginable privileges). Algerians sensed that they had become the laughing stock of the world and that all the sacrifices they had made and all the horrors they had gone through were in vain. The regime had all the hallmarks of despotic rule. The massive protests from February 2019 onward had been remarkably peaceful; the role of social media was considerable in propagating the message of nonviolence and how to circumvent provocations by security forces or other unidentified forces. Obviously, the presidency would have preferred violent riots, so that violence could force the military to intervene and impose a state of emergency. This proved to be a serious miscalculation on the presidential clan for two main reasons: (1) the military was unwilling to intervene, suggesting that the military institution had decided to abandon Bouteflika’s clan; (2) the millions of protesters decided to manage the demonstrations peaceably (silmiyyah), denying any justification for the security services to use force. In fact, the most stunning development was the advent of a powerful civil society, with incredible organizational, pacific talents. No less amazing was the progressive politicization of the movement. The determination of the regime to maintain the election strengthened the determination of the protesters to oppose the possibility of a fifth term for Bouteflika. Fissures within the regime multiplied as state employees began denouncing the regime. More importantly, the high military command showed signs of impatience with the Bouteflika clan. Ahmed Gaïd Salah threatened to use Art. 28 of the Constitution, part of which stipulates that, “[the National People’s Army] shall also assume the task of protecting the unity of the country and the integrity of its land…” (Constitution 2016). Undeniably, the president’s insistence not to resign constituted a threat to the country’s national security and therefore even his entourage would have been held accountable. Although AGS

The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution …

65

had been one of Bouteflika’s main supporters, he had then changed his position, claiming to be siding with the protesters who had kept the pressure to prevent a fifth term. In fact, without this pressure and AGS change of position, which no doubt was the result of consensus inside the military command to see Bouteflika forsake his candidacy of a fifth term, Bouteflika would have clung to power indefinitely since his cronies had so many interests at stake. On March 26, AGS called for the application of Article 102 of the Constitution4 to force Bouteflika to step down. The next day, the parties of the so-called Presidential Alliance, such as the FLN and RND, supported this call, hence confirming the fractures inside the regime. On 2 April, under unbearable pressure from the high military command, Bouteflika announced his resignation.5 But, Algerians were no longer content with Bouteflika’s removal even if that represented first victories and empowered the movement. The protesters insisted that the system must be dismantled and all the principal figures that served Bouteflika’s regime must also leave (Tetnahaw ga’a, “you must all go”). They singled out all those figures, some of whom were removed and/or arrested, including major figures of the regime, such as Tewfik, Bachir Tartag, Saïd Bouteflika, former prime ministers, ministers, and oligarchs. While the Hirak welcomed these arrests, it remained suspicious of AGS and of the military command; the movement was aware of the scheme the regime had concocted after 1988 and sought to avoid a repeat of that scenario. Justifiably, the Hirak rejected all the government’s subterfuges aimed at keeping the system in place, including the appointment of a so-called commission of dialogue. The Hirak rejected the holding of a presidential election whose main objective was providing a civilian façade for the military’s hegemony and the rejuvenation of the system. Thus, the protesters maintained the same momentum and hundreds of thousands continued to march on Tuesdays (students) and Fridays (all citizens). Although AGS had enjoyed some initial support, voices began calling for his departure not only because he was linked intimately to Bouteflika but also because he was the main hindrance to genuine democratic change. The ANP (L’Armée nationale populaire) remains quite popular in Algeria; however, the demonstrators made clear that they rejected a military regime and delinked the ANP, which they insist belongs to the people, from the high command, which they believed was made up of corrupt generals seeking to preserve their privileges under a “fifth term” without some members of Bouteflika’s clan. They welcomed the imprisonment of those members, but they opposed any move that would simply replace one clan by another while Algerians

4

Article 102 stipulates that, “When the President of the Republic, because of a serious and lasting illness, is totally unable to perform his functions, the Constitutional Council shall meet de jure and, after having verified the reality of the impediment by all appropriate means, it shall propose, unanimously, to Parliament to declare the state of impediment”. 5 Note that this resignation produced a very strong impression in Sudan and influenced significantly the fall of Omar Al Bashir there—see Chapter “Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” (Kostelyanets 2022, this volume) and Chapter “Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective” (Issaev and Korotayev 2022, this volume)—Editors.

66

Y. H. Zoubir

aspire to a democratic, republican state, one where transparency and accountability prevail. Something striking about the social movement emerged beyond the awakening of civil society, one that seemed to have vanished: the reawakening of the revolutionary figures of the war of independence. Djamila Bouhired, an icon of the battle of Algiers and a critic of the regime marched with the protestors who showed an incredible support to her person and what she represents for Algerian history. Bouhired is not the only one. The Hirak continuously carried the portraits of Abane Ramdane, Larbi Ben Mhidi, Mostefa Benboulaid, Cl. Amirouche, Didouche Mourad and many others. In place of the picture frame that had served to mock Bouteflika, they carried the pictures of the national heroes, martyrs of the war of independence. Clearly, the resurgence of the martyrs of the revolution and the symbols they represented signified that the regimes since independence have been illegitimate and have appropriated the revolution while true legitimacy rests with those heroes who died during the war or those war veterans the regime has ostracized such as Lakhdar Bouregaâ, whom the regime imprisoned for supporting the Hirak and criticizing AGS. Undoubtedly, this marked the definitive end of the revolutionary legitimacy that successive regimes have usurped since independence, that is, the ‘inheritance capture’ by the Group of Oujda at independence. In fact, the interim secretary-general of the National Organization of the Mujahideen (War Veterans), Mohand Ouamar Benlhadj, called on 12 June 2019, to return the acronym of the National Liberation Front (FLN) to Algerians, and thus put the former single party in the museum (Liberté 2019). He accused members of the current FLN of having grabbed the acronym to serve their own interests (Fethi 2019). Undoubtedly, the bonding between the protesters with the revolutionaries6 delegitimized totally the regime and explains calls for a “second republic;” this also suggests that the protesters viewed the current system as the heir of the colonial state (Tlemçani 2019). This bonding between the war heroes and the new generation means that the latter is also willing to rise, albeit peacefully, against an oppressive regime that resembled the colonial state. This has been the attachment of Algerians to a common, glorious past. This strong unity of Algerians, who have put aside their ethnic, regional, or ideological differences, which the regime has used constantly to its own purposes, is reviving values that were buried for decades, especially under Bouteflika’s rule. Allegorically, the Algerian Hirak is calling for a new, genuine 5 July 1962 (Independence Day), that is the founding of a second, genuinely democratic republic.

6

In a 2014 text Algerian writer Kamel Daoud wrote, ‘I dream of freeing Larbi Ben M’Hidi’s memory from the present of Belkhadem and Saadani. It [FLN] is my enemy. The insult that is being made to me. My first shame.” www.algerie-focus.com/2014/06/fln-je-te-deteste-par-kamel-daoud/.

The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution …

67

The Revolution of Smiles and the Hirak’s Demands Although there had been previous protests, the amazingly peaceful Hirak was an exceptional event in post-independence Algeria’s history whose impact will be felt for many more years to come. The millions who took to the streets demanded the erection of a new system, a genuinely democratic system. However, due to its leaderless nature, the Hirak was unable to stop the presidential election held on December 12, 2019 that the movement had objected to, though it forced the authorities to postpone it twice. Unsurprisingly, voter participation for that election was the lowest in the history of Algeria hitherto. While officially, 41% of eligible registered voters participated, independent estimations oscillated between 10 and 15%. Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who served briefly as prime minister and many times as minister under Bouteflika purportedly won 58% of the votes and thus succeeded to Bouteflika. His election did little to ease the protesters’ demands because the authorities pursued the roadmap that had been proposed by the presidential coterie just before the army removed the ailing Bouteflika. The election did not end the Hirak’s weekly marches, for the Hirak, like society in general, do not trust the regime which explains the Hirak’s rejection of the election (Saih 2019). Nor did the election provide Tebboune wide legitimacy. In fact, the trust between state and society was broken long ago and elections—clean or not—did not provide the authorities with any noticeable degree of legitimacy. One explanation for society’s pessimism is that Algerians are accustomed to successive regimes using deceiving methods (Kilavuz 2017), such as the introduction of façade liberalism after the riots of 1988, for instance, to overcome crises and avoid introducing authentic reforms to maintain the existing system. The appointment of officials in the new government of individuals who had served under Bouteflika’s regime aggravated the mistrust between state and society. And, while the military wished to keep a low profile (the new chairman of the chiefs-of-staff refused to serve in the government like his predecessor did), its weight in the political system was unmistakable. Regardless of the real intention of the authorities, the Hirak rejected dialogue with what they saw as an illegitimate president and an illegitimate government. This was a strategic mistake for the movement because its lack of leadership and rejection of dialogue made its legitimate demands (fight against corruption, end of oppression, political participation, etc.) mere slogans. The Hirak could have transformed into a real political force. For instance, the movement rejected any former official no matter his ideas as to how to make such transformation because of the senseless belief that anyone who served in the government could not be trusted. The slogan of yatnahaw gâa (“they must all go” in reference to the system) lacked realism. In most transitions to democratic orders, moderate members from the incumbent regimes (the so-called doves) and moderates in the opposition played instrumental roles in the transition to democracy. The problem in Algeria is that even if such scenario occurs, the bureaucracy will remain most opposed to any democratic change for fear of losing the vested interests that it receives under the rentier state. In sum, both the

68

Y. H. Zoubir

Hirak and the regime missed yet another opportunity for the transformation of the system. The post-Bouteflika government did initiate unmistakable fight against corruption, but society perceived it as a settling of accounts with the previous regime. The government made gestures, like freeing some political prisoners; however, the imprisonment of others and journalists discredited the government’s rhetoric about the “new Algeria.”7 Objectively, the new government inherited a complicated situation and is still paying the price of Bouteflika’s sultanistic rule (Zoubir 2021). It was common knowledge that corruption under Bouteflika had reached staggering levels. So, after he was removed, the government needed to demonstrate that “the new Algeria” was serious about fighting corruption; therefore, two prime ministers, two dozen ministers, tens of high-ranking officers, a dozen oligarchs, and directors in ministries have been tried and imprisoned (TSA 2021). Algerians were certainly content to see many of the detested officials be imprisoned; however, they did not feel any change in the contemptuous attitude of members of the new government. Neither did they believe that genuine change was underway. Although the authorities made some piecemeal concessions, genuine change was not palpable notwithstanding the rhetoric about the “new Algeria.” The authorities gave no sign that the political system in the “new Algeria” would be based on popular legitimacy as the foundation of the new system. Clearly, the regime clung to its own roadmap without including society. One year after the removal of Bouteflika, the regime sent contradictory signals, which suggests that there was a power struggle inside the system. Tebboune pardoned 5000 prisoners on March 31, 2020, but prisoners of conscience and imprisoned leaders of the Hirak remained in jail. Later, and until today, journalists and activists have faced imprisonment for reasons that are always doubtful. No matter the justification, this relentless intimidation against freedom of the press did not help improve the regime’s image. Thus, even before the COVID-19 pandemic forced the Hirak to suspend its weekly marches, it was clear that the authorities sought to close the Hirak’s chapter. Thus, the pandemic was a godsend since it ended the marches and enabled the authorities to act in the usual authoritarian style. The president rebuffed accusations that Algeria resembled a totalitarian regime, arguing that “freedom of expression and the democratic climate” prevailed in the country (APS 2020). But the actions that Tebboune undertook contradicted his acclaim of the Hirak, which he referred to as the ‘blessed Hirak’, and his pledge to instate a system based on the rule of law. For instance, he could have repealed the 2001 decree that prohibits gatherings in Algiers as a goodwill gesture toward the Hirak. Worse still, while the government took adequate measures to contain the pandemic, the approach was quite authoritarian and exploited the confinement to pass a penal law (Committee to Protect Journalists 2020) that controverts Tebboune’s statements on the democratic climate in the country.

7

This was meant to acquiesce to the Hirak’s call for a “second republic”.

The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution …

69

A New Constitution To consolidate his power, president Tebboune decided to organize a referendum on a revised constitution; the referendum was scheduled for November 1, 2020. The two houses of Parliament had voted the revision of the Constitution in September 2020 without real debate. The choice of November 1, the day Algeria’s war of independence against France had begun in 1954, was a futile attempt to gain legitimacy. The revised constitution consolidated Tebboune’s power, for he also holds the title of minister of defense. Furthermore, the president exerts control over the judiciary and chairs the Supreme Council of the Judiciary and appoints six members. In sum, Tebboune did what his predecessors had done: tailor a constitution to his own ambitions (Rachidi 2020). From the Hirak’s perspective, the fact that Ahmed Laraba, who crafted the revised the text is the same person who revised Bouteflika’s, confirmed suspicions that Bouteflika was gone but Bouteflikism was alive. Unsurprisingly, the turnout at the referendum was the lowest in post-independence Algeria, with a feeble 23.7% of the electorate; the constitution was approved by 66.8% of voters (DW 2020). Interestingly, the constitution stressed “the profound political and social changes for the construction of a new Algeria as peacefully expressed since the original popular Hirak of February 22, 2019” (Constitution 2020: 5). The word “original” suggested that the nature of the Hirak had been distorted from its original by subversives. Later, it became clear that the word “subversives” refers to the secessionist Movement for the Autonomy of the Kabylie (MAK) and the Islamist-conservative group Rachad, both of which based overseas. They were labelled terrorist organizations in May 2021, one month before the legislative election scheduled for 12 June 2021. The constitution is replete with references to human rights, the protection of the fundamental freedoms of citizens, guarantee of rights and freedoms and social justice, and the inviolability of freedom of opinion. However, like what happened with previous constitutions, such notable statements remain unfulfilled promises. The violations of such principles are rather puzzling because, should the regime decide to practice those principles, it could gain a much higher degree of legitimacy than it currently does.

The Legislative Elections: Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est La Même Chose Soon after he returned for the second time from Germany, where he was treated for nearly four months for COVID-19 and another undisclosed complication, which required surgery (Aichoun 2021), President Tebboune announced the dissolution of parliament. He also declared that a cabinet reshuffle would take place within the next few days (Liberté 2021). Three days before the first anniversary of the

70

Y. H. Zoubir

Hirak, Tebboune made a gesture toward the protest movement by granting a presidential pardon to some sixty prisoners detained for their political opinions (Touati 2021). This seemed like a golden opportunity to prove that the new regime genuinely believed that the Hirak was a blessing and that it had saved Algeria. The authorities could have opened the public space to demonstrate that they were serious about building a new Algeria. Unfortunately, the same patterns of ‘one step forward, two steps back’ remained. Thus, while the authorities release detainees of political opinion, they imprison new ones. Clearly, they seem uninterested in changing the system or introducing authentic reforms; the main objective seems to be the preservation of the system. It is this contested system that has generated the Hirak and will prompt new, cyclical movements. Such resistance to freedoms inevitably widens the mistrust between state and society. Therefore, the elections organized by the system tend to delegitimize its further. The legislative elections of June 2021 were no exception. Though it cannot produce change, the large boycott proved, once again, that it served as society’s strong political signal, a popular demonstration of disavowal of the current regime. The turnout was even lower than the 23.7% during the referendum on the revision of the Constitution held on November 1, 2020. This time, only 5.6 million electors, that is, 23.03% of voters, cast ballots. Of the total number of electors, more than one million ballots were tainted. As a result, the new National People’s Assembly (APN) was elected with only 4.6 million votes cast, while the Algerian electorate is composed of more than 24.4 million voters. More than 18 million of them did not vote in the election.8 Though it lost many seats, the FLN, which is virtually a party of the government since independence, arrived at the first place with 105 seats but without absolute majority. Independents came in second place. However, when one knows the mistrust that Algerians have toward political parties, it is questionable how capable the APN will be. Under Bouteflika, the APN was largely a corrupt institution which rubber stamped the decisions of the president (Zoubir 2019: 194). It remains to be seen whether the APN in the post-Bouteflika era will be any different. To appease the internal situation marked by increased criticism toward the government, Tebboune made two gestures toward the Hirak in July 2021. On the eve of the anniversary of Algeria’s independence, Tebboune announced the release of 18 Hirak activists who had been imprisoned for having participated in marches. He ordered the release of a much larger number, 101, two weeks later (Le Monde 2021). The government had practically banned the Hirak marches in May, when the government cracked down heavily on the marchers and imprisoned dozens (YD et Rédaction 2021). While it had tolerated the marches from February 2019 until their suspension due to COVID-19 in March 2020, the government decided to ban the marches of the Hirak by demanding that any march required permission from the authorities. To complete its roadmap, the authorities have announced the holding of local elections on November 27, 2021. Unlike the legislative elections, the local elections in Algeria are more significant because electors have more knowledgeable about the candidates. Several political parties had announced that they would participate in 8

Makedhi (2021); the final results can be found in MB (2021).

The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution …

71

the local elections. But, afterwards, they have rescinded their decision. The main grievances they advanced for refusing to participate are because of the exacting requirements imposed by the authorities for establishing candidate lists. They highlight the hurdles concerning the collection of sponsorship signatures from citizens. To run in all municipalities in the country, a party must collect no less than 800,000 signatures. The political parties argue that such a number is excessive, especially knowing that only 50,000 signatures of citizens are needed during the presidential elections and only 25,000 signatures for the legislative elections of June 2021 (Amir 2021). The authorities often reject candidates based on reports by security services.

The Economy: The Achilles’ Heel of Algeria Being a rentier economy that relies on hydrocarbons revenues, Algeria was hit hard by the sharp drop in oil prices. The pandemic has exacerbated already dire socioeconomic conditions. This forced the government to reduce its public spending. In May 2020, the government announced that it would reduce public spending by 50% (a second cut in a month, from an initial 30% reduction), halting state projects and slashing its $41 billion import bill by 25% while expanding agricultural production. Even the national oil company SONATRACH had to cut planned investment by half to $7 billion. One positive outcome of the economic crisis was the increased awareness that reforms were inevitable and that reliance on hydrocarbons was not sustainable. Though after each decline in oil prices the government would make promises to diversify the economy and stop relying on the oil rent, it seems that following this crisis, the government is more willing about restructuring the economy. Thus, it has begun developing other natural resources including gold, uranium, and phosphates and to encourage exports outside the hydrocarbons sector. The daunting task of the government is the creation of jobs, especially for young people. The government has also pledged to encourage the development of agriculture (TSA 2020). Prime Minister Aïme ne Benabderrahmane, an experienced technocratic financier was appointed in June 2021 (Saleck 2021) and assigned the task of redressing the economy. In July 2021, the government announced the resumption of the process of dialogue and negotiations for its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the past, they had held reserves about the conditions of admittance (Rabia 2021). Nevertheless, the COVID-19 crisis and its impact on the national economy have further underlined the weakness of the Algerian economy due to its dependence on hydrocarbons. This has represented a foremost hindrance for the country, which wishes to become financially and economically self-sufficient. Having regularly announced the necessity to diminish this dependency (Bourdillon 2018; Sanz 2021), Algeria is seeking to join the WTO and begin real reforms. It has shown, at least in rhetoric, more pragmatism with respect to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). There are signs of a political resolve to review the country’s economic approach (ABBC 2021).

72

Y. H. Zoubir

Today, the authorities seem more cognizant than even before that dependency on hydrocarbon revenues is untenable. Undoubtedly, as a recent study (Kwasi and Cilliers 2021) has proven, Algeria has the human and material resources to begin a real departure, which, of course, necessitates political will and an authentic fight against the bureaucracy and the hurdles it creates for a takeoff. With the elimination of the 51/49% rule, which required 51% of all ventures be held by Algerian nationals (except for strategic sectors), the possibility for FDI is real.

Conclusion The peaceful protest movement (Hirak) has marked an extraordinary turning point in Algeria’s post-independent history. Algerians have sapped the hybrid, yet robust, authoritarian rentier regime that had wounded their dignity and defamed the reputation of their nation. For the last seven months, Algerians have marched to end the discreditable political system and the inauguration of a genuinely democratic republic. Transitions from authoritarianism to more democratic polities have shown that the old regimes will not go down without a fight due to their entrenched interests.

References ABBC (2021) Algeria resumes dialogue with WTO. Algeria British Business Council (ABBC) website, 22 July 2021. https://www.abbc.org.uk/2021/07/algeria-resumes-dialogue-with-wto/ Aghrout A, Zoubir YH (2009) Introducing Algeria’s president for life. Middle East Report Online 4. https://merip.org/2009/04/introducing-algerias-president-for-life/ Aichoun A (2021) Après un mois de soins en Allemagne: Tebboune de retour au pays. El Watan, 12 February 2021. https://www.elwatan.com/edition/actualite/tebboune-de-retour-au-pays-1202-2021 Amir N (2021) Les élections locales et la problématique des parrainages—Des partis politiques se retirent de la course électorale. El Watan, 7 October 2021. https://www.elwatan.com/edition/act ualite/des-partis-politiques-se-retirent-de-la-course-electorale-07-10-2021 APS (2020) Président Tebboune: l’Algérie a suffisamment de capacités non encore utilisées contre le COVID-19. APS, 1 April 2020, https://www.aps.dz/algerie/103604-l-algerie-a-suffisammentde-capacites-non-encore-utilisees-contre-le-covid-19 Bourdillon Y (2018) L’Algérie multiplie les efforts pour diversifier son économie. Les Echos, 16 July 2018. https://www.lesechos.fr/2018/07/lalgerie-multiplie-les-efforts-pour-diversifier-soneconomie-998144 Charte Nationale (1976) Available from: https://archive.org/details/charte-nationale-1976-alg/Cha rte__nationale_1976/page/100/mode/2up [Accessed 10th May 2022]. Chehabi HE, Linz JJ (eds) (1998) Sultanistic regimes. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD Committee to Protect Journalists (2020) Algeria blocks 3 news websites and criminalizes false news. Committee to Protect Journalists, 22 April 2020. https://cpj.org/2020/04/algeria-blocks-3news-websites-and-criminalizes-fa/ Constitution (2016) The constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria-Edition. http:// www.conseil-constitutionnel.dz/pdf/Constitutioneng.pdf

The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution …

73

Constitution (2020) The constitution of Algeria-Edition 2016. J Officiel de la République Algérienne 82. http://www.joradp.dz/TRV/FConsti.pdf DW (2020) Algeria passes constitutional changes after historically low turnout. DW, 2 November 2020. https://www.dw.com/en/algeria-passes-constitutional-changes-after-historica lly-low-turnout/a-55473708 Erdmann G, Engel U (2006) Neopatrimonialism revisited-beyond a catch-all concept. GIGA Research Program: legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems, No. 16. https://core.ac.uk/ download/pdf/71729549.pdf Fethi S (2019) L’ONM sort de sa reserve: ‘Ceux qui dirigent le FLN sont des voleurs. Algerie Patriotique, 13 June 2019. https://www.algeriepatriotique.com/2019/06/13/lonm-sort-de-sa-res erve-ceux-qui-dirigent-le-fln-sont-des-voleurs/ International Crisis Group (2018) Breaking Algeria’s economic paralysis. International Crisis Group Report 192. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/algeria/ 192-breaking-algerias-economic-paralysis Issaev L, Korotayev A (2022) Introduction. New wave of revolutions in the MENA region in the global perspective. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_1 Kilavuz T (2017) Reconfiguring the Algerian regime: on the stability and robustness of authoritarianism in Algeria. Al-Sharq Forum. https://research.sharqforum.org/2017/05/02/reconfiguringthe-algerian-regime-on-the-stability-and-robustness-of-authoritarianism-in-algeria Kostelyanets S (2022) Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 33–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3_2 Kwasi S, Cilliers J (2021) Stagnation or growth? Algeria’s development pathway to 2040. Institute for Security Studies, 31 March 2021. https://issafrica.org/research/north-africa-report/stagnationor-growth-algerias-development-pathway-to-2040 Le Monde (2021) En Algérie, 101 détenus du Hirak libérés. Le Monde, 15 July 2021. https://www. lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/07/15/en-algerie-101-detenus-du-hirak-liberes_6088294_3212. html Liberté (2019) L’ONM appelle à mettre le FLN au musée. Liberté, 12 June 2019. https://www.lib erte-algerie.com/actualite/lonm-appelle-a-mettre-le-fln-au-musee-317715 Liberté (2021) Tebboune annonce la dissolution du parlement. Liberté, 18 February 2021. https:// www.liberte-algerie.com/actualite/tebboune-annonce-la-dissolution-du-parlement-354300 Makedhi M (2021) L’ANIE a rendu publics hier les résultats des législatives du 12 juin-Le désaveu populaire confirmé. El Watan, 16 June 2021. https://www.elwatan.com/edition/actualite/le-des aveu-populaire-confirme-16-06-2021 MB (2021) Résultats définitifs des législatives: Le FLN perd 7 sièges. El Watan, 26 June 2021. https://www.elwatan.com/edition/actualite/le-fln-perd-7-sieges-26-06-2021 O’Donnell G, Schmitter P (1986) Transitions from authoritarian rule-tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore Rabia S (2021) Commerce multilatéral: L’Algérie reprend son long chemin vers l’OMC. El Watan, 19 June 2021. https://www.elwatan.com/edition/economie/lalgerie-reprend-son-long-che min-vers-lomc-19-06-2021 Rachidi I (2020) Algérie. Une Constitution pour en finir avec le Hirak. Orient XXI, 12 October 2020. https://orientxxi.info/magazine/algerie-une-constitution-pour-en-finir-avec-le-hirak,4195 Roberts H (2007) Demilitarizing Algeria. Carnegie Paper no. 86. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp_86_final1.pdf Saih Y (2019) Algérie: Rejet en masse de l’élection de Tebboune. Hespress, 13 December 2019. https://fr.hespress.com/114536-algerie-rejet-en-masse-de-lelection-de-tebboune.html Safir N (2019) Algérie 2019: une crise majeure. Diploweb.com: La Revue géopolitique. https:// www.diploweb.com/Algerie-2019-une-crise-majeure.htmlAbdel-Rahim

74

Y. H. Zoubir

Saleck H (2021) Nouveau premier ministre en Algérie: Face aux menaces extérieures, Tebboune cherche l’unité ‘à l’intérieur du pays. Sputnik news agency, 01 July 2021. https://fr.sputniknews. com/international/202107011045820527-nouveau-premier-ministre-en-algerie-face-aux-men aces-exterieures-tebboune-cherche-lunite-a/ Sanz A (2021) L’Algérie mise sur la vente de participations pour diversifier son économie. Atalayar, 9 October 2021. https://atalayar.com/fr/content/lalg%C3%A9rie-mise-sur-la-vente-de-participa tions-pour-diversifier-son-%C3%A9conomie Tlemçani R (2019) Algeria: inventing new political rules. Arab Reform Initiative. https://www. arab-reform.net/publication/algeria-inventing-new-political-rules/ Touati N (2021) En Algérie, la libération des prisonniers du Hirak, vrai tournant ou faux-semblant? Huffington Post, 20 February 2021. https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/en-algerie-la-liberationdes-prisonniers-du-hirak-vrai-tournant-ou-faux-semblant_fr_60315574c5b6cc8bbf3bf485 TSA (2020) Rencontre de Tebboune avec des médias: l’intégralité de l’interview. TSA, 2 May 2020. https://www.tsa-algerie.com/video-rencontre-de-tebboune-avec-des-medias-lintegral ite-de-linterview/ TSA (2021) Marchés publics, voie royale à la corruption en Algérie. TSA, 10 June 2021. https:// www.tsa-algerie.dz/marches-publics-voie-royale-a-la-corruption-en-algerie/ Volpi F (2013) Algeria versus the Arab Spring. J Democr 24(3):104–115 YD et Rédaction (2021) Empêchement des marches: est-ce que c’est la fin du Hirak? TSA, 27 May 2021, https://www.tsa-algerie.com/empechement-des-marches-est-ce-que-cest-la-fin-du-hirak/ Zoubir YH (1996) The failure of authoritarian developmentalist regimes and the emergence of radical protest movements in the Middle East and Africa: the case of Algeria. J Third World Stud 13(1):127–184 Zoubir YH (2000) Algerian democratic transition under Bouteflika’s rule: one step forward or two steps back? Civil Soc 9(101):4–9 Zoubir YH (2011) Arab Spring: is Algeria the exception. EuroMeSCo-IEMed Policy Brief 17. https://www.euromesco.net/publication/the-arab-spring-is-algeria-the-exception/ Zoubir YH (2016) Algeria after the Arab Spring. Foreign Affairs, February 2016. https://www.for eignaffairs.com/articles/algeria/2016-02-09/algeria-after-arab-spring Zoubir YH (2019) Algeria. In: Angrist MP (ed) Politics & society in the Contemporary Middle East. Lynne Rienner, Boulder CO Zoubir YH (2021) Bouteflika ruled for two decades: his legacy will haunt Algerians for many years to come. Allafrica.com, 30 September 2021. https://allafrica.com/stories/202110020028.htmlhe Zoubir YH, Aghrout A (2012) Algeria’s path to political reforms: authentic change? Middle East Policy 19(2):66–83 Zoubir YH, Dris-Aït Hamadouche L (2018) Algérie: résistances et contre-résistances. Alternatives Sud. État des luttes-Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord: Points de vue du Sud 25(4):109–116

Yahia H. Zoubir is Professor of International Relations and International Management, and Director of Research in Geopolitics at KEDGE Business School. He has been international visiting faculty in numerous universities and business schools for the last 30 years in China,the United States, and various European and Asian countries. He has published dozens of scholarly works, including books, articles, entries in encyclopedias, and book chapters in international politics, foreign policy, governance, and security issues. He has served as consultant for governments and companies worldwide. In 2020, he was Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar.

17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis Dania Koleilat Khatib

Abstract Khatib studies the 2019 protest movement in the Lebanese political economic and social context. The October 17 Revolution erupted following the imposition of the WhatsApp tax because the social contract between the rulers and the people was no longer valid. The Taif agreement that ended the war rewarded different warlords for accepting to make peace by putting them at the helm of the state. Sectarianism that resulted in power sharing and clientelism is the source of corruption. Due to corruption, the state suffered from bloated and inefficient bureaucracy, inflated expenses, and meagre revenues. The government covered for its deficit by borrowing from the Central Bank which is in fact depositors’ money. At one point in time the system was no longer sustainable. This is when the protests erupted under the slogan Kullun Ya’ni Kullun (“Them all means them all!”). The protest signaled a new collective awareness that the ruling class and its power sharing scheme are the source of ailments the country suffers from. The 2019 revolution is a continuation of a movement that erupted in 2015 as a reaction to the trash disposal problem. However, the movement then quickly became politicized and fizzled out. The groups that emerged in 2019 are as diverse as the Lebanese society. However, there are two main differences, one is their approach to change and one is their approach to Hezbollah. Some groups are demanding reform and are ready to work with traditional parties that are not involved in corruption. The other group wants a total break with the past and is not ready to collaborate with any existing political party that is in power. Groups on the right which are called sovereign groups categorically reject Hezbollah possession of arms and consider it illegal while groups on the left have a softer approach towards the armed group. Despite the several waves of revolutionary protests, the ruling elite did not flinch. The international community is putting a lot of pressure on the ruling elite to reform however, the political class is playing the same game with international community as with the Lebanese people; it is banking on outlasting them. Despite the general dissatisfaction with the political class, they still have an advantage over the nascent civil society. They are better organized and D. K. Khatib (B) Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University, Beirut, Lebanon e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_4

75

76

D. K. Khatib

still they control the state and control the services and jobs that can be provided to the people. When the currency lost 90% of its value and the majority of the people are reduced to poverty, it is easier for them now to buy people loyalty and votes. Though the civil society group can win seats in elections, it is improbable that they will make a radical change. In addition to controlling a large part of the Lebanese population livelihood the political elite benefits from an election law tailored to perpetuate the current power structure. Nevertheless, the revolutionary protests signal the beginning of a social change, and political change will have to follow even if after a while.

17 October Revolution in Lebanon cannot be called successful, mainly due to the limited change it was able to impose on the political landscape. Unlike the Iranian, the French or Bolshevik revolution that eradicated an existing system, replaced it with a new one and took a violent form, the 17 October Revolution did not have the intensity required to completely change the existing regime. However, those revolutions occurred when the social contract was no longer valid as the mutual beneficial exchange between the ruled and the ruler no longer existed. The 17 October Revolution failed to create a quick and decisive change in regime similarly to the Iranian or French revolution and the armed forces were able to control them. Nevertheless, the revolutionary protest movement is the beginning of a social change that ultimately will result, in the future, in a political change. The expiry of the social contract is a signal that the current political elite is living on borrowed time.

Background: The Taif Agreement and the Second Republic The Lebanese civil war erupted in 1975 (Chamie 1976). The country was divided; the Muslim sided with the Palestinians while the Christians wanted to preserve the privileges given to them by the French (Cobban 1985). The conflict extended into a fifteen-year civil war; however, the last episode was the most destructive one. It was the one where the Christians fought each other (Rasler 1997). In 1989, President Amin Gemayel fifteen minutes before the end of his presidency appointed Michel Aoun, the commander of the army, as head of a transitional government. Aoun dissolved the parliament and announced a military government. The Muslim generals of the government resigned. The government was not accepted by Arab countries who thought that the position should be filled by a Sunni. Internally, Michel Aoun clashed with the Lebanese Forces which was the militia controlling the Christian areas. The clash was more destructive to Lebanon than the fifteen years of civil war that preceded it. However, the Aoun Lebanese Forces fight ended in 1989 with the Taif agreement, which was part of a regional deal (it was officially called Wathiqat al-Wifaq alWataniyy—“National Reconciliation Accord”). The Syrian regime did side with the US against Iraq in the first Gulf war and Lebanon was Assad’s reward. The Syrian

17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis

77

air force bombed the presidential palace where Michel Aoun was residing (Avi Ran 1991). He fled to France where he was exiled. The agreement led to the imprisonment of Samir Geagea the head of the Lebanese Forces. This was the beginning of a new era for Lebanon. The regional factors also facilitated the regional and international agreement on Lebanon. The participation of Syria in the First Gulf War gave the US an Arab cover. In return, Syria was given a free hand in Lebanon; the anti-Syrian factions were outlawed whereas the pro-Syrian factions were allowed and accepted. The Lebanese forces and Aounists were banned whereas parties like the Syrian Social Nationalist Party were permitted to function. There was a tacit Saudi Syrian agreement with American blessing to give the Syrian regime a free hand in Lebanon. This led to the botched execution of the Taif. The agreement changed the Lebanese constitution and removed many powers concentrated with the Christian faction. While the parliament was divided with a six to five ratio between Christians and Muslims, the Taif changed the division to fifty fifty. The Taif was supposed to abolish the sectarian system and put in place a civic state, however, in practice the Taif engrained sectarianism in state institutions (Larkin 2012). Warlords were included in the post war system. State institutions were divided among the different sects. This arrangement created a breeding space for clientelism. Each sectarian leader in the name of his denomination took over government departments and used them as platform to enhance his constituency whereby only his supporters would get a government position in the department he controls. This led to mediocrity in government departments and inefficiency. Politicians also enriched themselves from inflated government contracts. Sectarianism that led to clientelism and to corruption at a certain point rendered the system dysfunctional. However, there were many reasons why the system lasted thirty years. The first factor was the inflow of funds from the Gulf. The first wave of money coming with the agreement for the reconstruction created a multiplier effect and cascaded through the economy. Funds were mainly spent on construction projects rewarded through opaque and inflated contracts. Benefiting the politicians at stake was the priority over the usefulness of these projects. The effect started to dwindle down by the end of the nineties and the country was slowly experiencing a recession. Nevertheless, the inflow of donations that came post the 2006 clash with Israel (e.g., Wilkins 2013) to reconstruct destructed buildings, facilities and infrastructure led to reviving the economy (Ashkar and Warschawski 2007). However, the injection of cash coming from abroad namely from the Gulf did not help generate real growth due to corruption. The post 2006 inflow of funds dwindled down after few years and the country went again into a recession. The turning point in Lebanon politics was the assassination of Lebanon’s prime minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005 (Geukjian 2016). Prior the assassination of Hariri, there was a certain accommodation between Hariri and the Syrian regime. During Hariri time the Christian factions had hardly any representation, as of the two main leaders, one was in prison and the other was in exile. Hariri had an arrangement with the other leaders whereby government contracts were awarded to companies affiliated to the different leaders. Hence, the power sharing agreement in the Taif

78

D. K. Khatib

led to a revenue sharing agreement whereby the state and its institution became cash cows to the different confessional leaders (Aboultaif 2019). Nevertheless, Hariri managed to keep the country afloat. Due to his connections, money was pouring in the country and the different leaders paused no opposition as they were compensated by lucrative government contracts and privileges. This artificial stability collapsed with the assassination of Hariri. The assassination of Sunni prime minister unleashed protests1 against the Syrian regime as fingers were pointing at Assad as the culprit behind the murder. This drove the Syrians outside Lebanon but created two camps; the 8 March which is mainly in the Syrian fold and it included Hezbollah, their Shia ally Nabih Berri, the Lebanese branch of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Druze Leader Talal Arslan and the Christian leader in the North Sulaiman Frangieh as well as Michel Aoun, on one hand, and on the other hand, another front was created under the name 14th of March which is the pro West, pro Saudi and it included the Druse leader Walid Jumblat, the Sunni leader Saad Hariri and the Christian leader Samir Geagea (Zovighian 2008). However, despite their apparent animosity, the two camps as well as the leaders of the different sects were bound by what we called “mithakia” which is the code of power sharing between the different confessions (Geha 2019).

The Collapse of the Regime and the Role of the Central Bank The system incurred huge deficit. As explained before the government contract were inflated to enrich the politicians and their acolytes. The system also suffered from an inflated bureaucracy as people were hired to vote for a certain leader. This was also a way to control people’s livelihood and secure their allegiance. On the other hand, tax evasion was rife. Tax evasion was due to corruption on the administrative and political level. A trader could bribe an employee in order to get his import with a reduced tax. To give an example, the Lebanese law exempts products imported for disabled people from taxes. There is an example where one person imported a Ferrari car and registered it in the name of his down syndrome nephew who was two years old to evade paying the tax due on the import. To add to that, many areas under the jurisdiction of influential people did not pay dues to the government, like electricity bills. Stealing from the electricity supply is a common practice in Lebanon. Therefore, 1

These protests are also known as “Cedar Revolution” that is sometimes considered as one of the “color revolutions” of the 2000s (Goldstone et al. 2022). Note, e.g., the active participation in those events of the Center for Applied Non-Violent Actions and Strategies (CANVAS) ascending to the famous Serbian revolutionary group “Otpor!” (Filin et al. 2022) that played a central role in the first color (so-called “Bulldozer”) revolution (Khodunov 2022); it also tried to take an active part (mostly through the CANVAS) in almost all the subsequent color revolutions, including the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon (Filin et al. 2022). It appears that this was during the Cedar Revolution when the famous Otpor symbol—clenched fist—penetrated Lebanon; note that it still figured rather prominently during the 17 October Revolution events.—Editors.

17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis

79

the country suffered from inflated expenses and meager revenues. To add to that, Lebanon did not really have a productive sector that can generate important tax revenues. To start with, the cost of energy is very high. The high cost is due to the inflated contracts used to buy the fuel. The other reason is that the corruption and the lack of transparency turn off investors. The third reason is the high interest rates where the cost of lending becomes prohibitive for investments. An investor finds it more lucrative to deposit their money in the bank and earn high interest rate and not incur any business risk. The high interest rates were set by the central bank to encourage depositors to put money in the Lebanese pounds with the purpose of stabilizing the exchange rate. The funds of the depositors were invested in treasury bond with the Central Bank and the Central Bank used the funds to lend the government to finance its expenses. Hence the monetary that was supposed to control the money supply replaced the fiscal policy that is supposed to balance the budget of the government. Therefore, at the end, the buck stops with the average Lebanese citizen who puts his savings in a Lebanese bank, in addition to some foreign depositors. After a while the government needed more dollars to finance its international transactions. The Central Bank started extending debt in dollars. People accounts in dollar financed the government debt. Moreover, the Central Bank had been for the three years prior to eruption of the uprising conducting financial engineering, though which banks had made outstanding profits at the expense of a growing national debt. Through financial engineering the Central Bank conducted fictitious operations by lending banks amounts to borrow from them the same amount at a much higher interest, giving the banks the spread as profits (Blair 2020). Those excessive rates were intended to lure depositors into the Lebanese banking system. All those practices for years led to a growing debt that the economy cannot afford. For months experts were speculating of a looming crisis. Regional events affected remittances to the country aggravating the situation. However, the straw that split the camel back was the liquidity shortage the Assad regime faced because of American sanctions. This pushed the Syrian regime to ask his allies to withdraw dollars from the Lebanese market and channel them to Syria. The liquidity crunch started affecting people. The system decay had reached its peak by 2019. However, the action taken by the government that instigated the protests was the tax put by the government on WhatsApp calls (BBC 2019). This was the signal of the crisis that experts were expecting. Protests started and the Prime minister Saad Hariri resigned. The anger that was triggered by the taxes compounded when people could no longer withdraw their hard-earned savings while news were coming out that politicians had trafficked their funds to banks outside the country (Mroue 2021). As the protests erupted, the banks started a capital control policy, whereby they capped the amount a depositor can withdraw. Later on, they started allowing the depositors to withdraw from their dollars account in Lebanese pounds at a rate far lower than the market rate hence undergoing indirectly a haircut. Nevertheless, the Central Bank and his governor were in a state of denial claiming that the deposits were safe and that there was no cap on withdrawal while the banks were bluntly undergoing those unlawful practices.

80

D. K. Khatib

Previous Movements The 2019 movement is a continuation of the 2011 movement that started with the Arab Spring and demanded the end of confessionalism. The 2011 was a relatively light movement, however it resulted in the collapse of the government after the minister of energy announced that 10 ministers had resigned. The civic awareness that started in 2011 was followed in 2015 by a civic movement “you stink” which was caused by the failure of the government to provide a solution for the trash disposal crisis (DW 2015). In 2015, Lebanon landfill was closed because it reached it capacity. The main trash collector contract ended without the government providing any alternatives. This crisis gathered the people from the different political orientations as the garbage was piling up in the streets of Beirut. However, the movement failed. The movement that started as a protest for the trash disposal morphed into political demands. They wanted to end corruption, hold elections and push the government to resign. The movement kept gathering momentum around those demands then it fizzled out. To start with, the protests did not materialize into a structure that can stand against the current deep rooted political configuration. However, the protests led to the rise of many civil society activists that are outside the political class. But the different people that were demanding change did not manage to institutionalize their activity, hence the reach of the protests remained limited. Most Lebanese people remained affiliated to their political parties. Also, the political class skillfully repressed the movement. By using violence and through infiltrators and the “fifth column” that resorted to vandalism, the political class managed to discredit the movement and to throw accusations that its members are either affiliated to ISIS or are American agents. In 2016 Bayrut Madinati (“Beirut is My City”), which was a civic coalition, ran for municipal elections. The second attempt for the civil society to organize happened in 2018 with the Kulluna Watani (“We All are My Homeland”), which was a coalition of fourteen civil society organizations including nine lists for nine districts gathering 66 candidates. However, they could not win a seat in the parliament except for Paula Yacoubian. The National Dialogue Party also won one seat in Beirut. The head of the list who was a wealthy businessman was able to gather enough votes to garner a seat in Beirut. All those developments created a momentum for the 2019 movement.

The Groups The civil society groups are diverse. They vary from the extreme right to the extreme left. They feature feminist groups, LGTB, greens as well as others. Despite their differences, they agree on the need to change the political regime hence the slogan Kullun Ya‘ni Kullun (“Them All Means Them All”). Some are associated with NGOs while others are not. Some participated in an organized manner in the protest such as Muntadayat (“Meetings”) that transported people to the protest location,

17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis

81

prepared banners and had a tent in the downtown while others did not participate as organizations and left for their members the choice to participate as individuals. Some groups had a specific task—Bala Ism (“Nameless”), for example, was solely focusing on detecting where a politician is in a restaurant and going and harassing him to leave the place. Some had a full fledged economic plan—like Muwatinun wa-Muwatinat fi-l-Dawla (“Male and Female Citizens in the State”). Some groups were new and were incepted in 2019 with the spark of the protests while others were older and had a certain degree of maturity. As mentioned before, Bayrut Madinati gathered public figures non-affiliated with any political party and ran in the 2016 municipal elections. Beirut was a good testing ground, as the capital is a microcosm of Lebanon with its diversity. Though the group did not win the elections, it did score high, losing to its traditional competitors by a small margin. Today the civil society has shown an increasing maturity and ability to organize. Following the October uprising, several alliances are being formed. The two main one is I’tilaf Lubnani— “Lebanese Allience” (Bou Mujahed 2021) and is adamantly anti Hezbollah while the other, which is spearheaded by Charbel Nahas, has a softer position on the group. The two alliances roughly include 30 political groups. The two alliances agree on the major points which are: a transition to a civil state, abolishing the sectarian system and the need for major reforms. However, the main point of contention remains the arms of Hezbollah. While one alliance demands the dismantlement of the group’s arsenal, the other one is soft on the issue and considers Hezbollah as a resistance movement. The creation of coalitions among the new and emerging opposition groups is a step in the path to engage in democratic process of change and in pushing for serious reforms. However, there is a problem as there is no real measurement of each group weight when it comes to popular mobilization. The groups differ in their approach. While some groups are radical and refuse any cooperation with any political party like Lihaqi “My Right”, some have cooperated with existing parties. Taqadom (= Taqaddum, “Progress”) has cooperated with the Phalangists party that is positioning itself as “pro Thawra” (“pro-Revolution”) and has asked its deputies to resign from the parliament. Other groups like Pyramids are said to have ties to the Lebanese Forces. The Lebanese Forces ministers resigned when the protests started. Some groups are registered and hence are legal entities and some are informal and remain a discussion platform on WhatsApp. Some are registered as political parties—like Taqadom. The groups have had a relatively good support mechanism. Despite the fact that many groups don’t have a political experience or the base or the funding of the traditional parties they can access help from some supporting organization, like the voluntary group of lawyers who defended protestors (Abdul Reda 2019). Nahwa Watan (“Towards one National”) is another supporting organization. The organization is an electoral machine seeking to create a list of 128 candidates and offering them services like media, outreach with the grassroots, tally of the votes etc., i.e., basically the services and experience that will allow them to compete with traditional parties. Nahwa Watan has even poached elections specialists who worked previously for traditional parties and have the expertise. The protests groups have also good access

82

D. K. Khatib

to media outlets, Al Jadeed and MTV channels give them good amount of airtime. In addition to that, new media have emerged focusing on covering the protests like Thawra TV and Seventeen.

The Political Elite and the International Community The international community has put a lot of pressure on the political elite. At different points in time, when the country was on the brink of collapse, the international community and the Gulf came to its rescue. However, the money poured in the different international conferences to help Lebanon did not really affect the economy or the provision of social services as it went down the drain due to corruption. The funds pledged to Lebanon in Cedre 2018 were not disbursed, as Lebanon did not conduct the needed reforms. The political elite is also trying to blackmail the international community by playing the card of refugees. Prior to the 2019, as the economy was deteriorating when Angela Merkel visited Lebanon Hariri, then prime minister said that unless Europe pumps funds to Lebanon, the refugees will be put in ships and sent to Europe (DW 2018). However, the international community is realizing that catering to the corrupt Lebanese political class will only be prolonging the problem and not solving it. Hence, it has taken a firm stand and asked the political class for reforms as dictated by the International Monetary Funds. Initially, the political elite resisted. Hezbollah was vocal in refusing loans from the IMF. However, after the situation became unbearable, the political class accepted to enter into discussions. Nevertheless, those discussions never amounted to anything, as the political class was not transparent and did not provide the necessary documentation required for an audit. The company Marshall and Alvares left the mandate as it was not provided with the necessary documents (Reuters 2020a, b). The current political class that is in a survival mode was faced with two “evils”. The first one was to conduct an audit which will expose corrupt politicians; hence it will be their end. The other path would be not to conduct the audit and not to be exposed at the price of letting the country sink. They chose the second option. The lame excuse they gave for blocking the forensic audit is that it breaches the banking secrecy. On this the French and the Americans have diverging policies. The French want a quick fix in which the same political structure is reproduced with cosmetic reforms. After the port blast came to Beirut (on August 4, 2020), French president Emanuel Macron promised the Lebanese reforms but at the end he caved in and accepted that the current political elite remains as long as they agree on a government. The Americans, on the other hand, during the Trump era, had a much firmer stand toward the political elite. Trump refused to alleviate some sanctions on Hezbollah when asked by the French as a trade off in order for them to make concessions on the government formation (Reuters 2020b). Following thirteen months of void, Hariri resigned. However, unlike 2011, when his resignation raised havoc in the “Sunni street”, his resignation 2021 had little

17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis

83

effect on the Sunni audience. This shows how much the people lost faith in their traditional sectarian leadership. At the same time, the political elite is not caving in to international pressure. The situation is best summarized by the President statement: “I said my word and I will not go”. While the Lebanese Crisis Observatory predicted in July 2021 that Lebanon will become soon the Venezuela of the Mediterranean, the political elite does not seem at all bothered by the suffering of their citizens (Houssari 2021). The political elite has attracted a lot of criticism for being engulfed in bickering instead of focusing on saving the country. As the civil society, the political elite is gearing up to the next parliamentarian elite as it will be the mean to renew their legitimacy and to present themselves as the legitimate interlocutor representing the Lebanese people with the international community. Hezbollah has geared all its resource to support its ally Gibran Basil who has lost a lot of popularity to his opponent, the Lebanese Forces. The situation was at a standstill after Aoun insisted on the blocking third which led to inconclusive discussions with Hariri that ended with his resignation. However, the French intervention pushed for the formation of a government, though according to Aoun’s terms. The Prime minister Najib Mikati who has a chequered past did reach an agreement with Aoun while banking on international support to make his premiership a success. Hezbollah, on the other hand, is banking on Mikati and the international support his government can bring. Their calculation is that Mikati will be able to bring some funds to Lebanon which he will use to cultivate his popularity to become the Sunni leader replacing Saad Hariri and since he is an ally to the Assad regime, he is more palpable to Hezbollah than other Sunni leaders. The political elite is playing with the international community the same game it is playing with the civil society groups. It seeks to outlast them. While the Americans were pushing for reforms, they ended up being satisfied with the formation of a government. Similarly, the people who took the street and wanted a clean government outside the political elite after being exhausted by the terrible financial situation seem to settle for a government no matter how corrupt it is. However, the Mikati government did not seem able to take off properly. Since its inception, Mikati government faced problems with the remarks of the minister of information that criticized the Gulf for the Yemen war (France 24 2021). This led to Gulf countries breaking relations with the Lebanese government. Despite the possible resignation of the minister of information, the damage is already done. The Arab Gulf, despite the talks with Iran on a regional level, do not seem ready to accept and help a government that is controlled by Hezbollah.

Hezbollah Among the different political groups, Hezbollah is the strongest. It has an armed militia and has the most loyal constituency. Hezbollah started in the eighties and has built a solid base by offering social services that the government itself did not provide, especially that the Shia were considered as the deprived faction (Kumar

84

D. K. Khatib

2012). The 17th of October uncovered the group. The group that was claiming to be above the corruption proved to be the main status quo power as it was the main power preventing change. There is a certain arrangement from which the group benefits. The group has had an important role in suppressing the 17th of October protests and the position it took during the demonstrations created an inertia against change. Hezbollah is the group that has most political capital that it accumulated through the years. To start with, Hezbollah offered social services to the Shia communities. It topped the services with ideology. The main pillar of the ideology is based on resistance against Israel. The second pillar is the ideology of the deprived that is engrained in the Shia dogma (Halawi 1992). However, though the group has promoted itself against corruption and as the pioneer of resistance, the 17th of October proved that the group is covering up for the political elite and it is the spinal cord of the current power configuration. It has beaten up protestors who were demanding change. The protests in Hezbollah’s areas were brutally silenced. Those who criticized Nasralla were beaten up and forced to apologize. The 17th of October events showed that Hezbollah was on the system side and not on the people side. Also, the revolution that was against corruption also became partly against Hezbollah describing the group as making the country hostage to Iran’s whim. While the revolution started demanding social services and basic needs and was a call to fight corruption the revolution morphed and migrated to sovereignty issues. As said before the uprising groups were divided between the ones on the right (called sovereign groups) that took a hostile stand against Hezbollah (even some describe the group as terrorist), while the groups on the left were sympathetic to the resistance concept. However, within each camp there are nuances when it comes to attitudes towards Hezbollah. On the right, some groups consider the group as a terrorist organization and want the immediate execution of 1559 calling for the disarmament of all militias and also for the execution of 1701 which calls for the UN forces to the deployed on the borders, while other groups say that the issue of arms should be discussed according to a national strategy. On the left, the concept of resistance varies among the different groups. Some groups believe the issue of arms should be part of a regional agreement. Others, like Charbel Nahas, say that resistance has been a process, a journey that had many episodes and had many players and hence it should be inclusive and not restricted to one faction basically refuting Hezbollah monopoly over the resistance. Though Nahas is considered as an ally of Hezbollah, such a proposition was not well received by the group. Hezbollah wants to keep the monopoly over the resistance, the monopoly of the arms outside the state. However, the legitimacy of its arms is proving to be harder and harder to justify by the day. Also, the aura of Hezbollah was shattered. People are daring to stand out against the group. The group’s secretary general patronizing attitude has put off many factions in Lebanon. The group’s excess of power has created a lot of resentment. Few days before the 4th of August, 2021, which is the first anniversary of the Beirut blast, a person from the Arab tribes in Khalde killed a member of Hezbollah to revenge the killing of his younger brother by the victim a year earlier.

17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis

85

The event had a sequel. Hezbollah had armed vehicle in the funeral and its members went down to tear down the poster of the boy that was killed a year earlier. The tribes opened fire on Hezbollah and five fell dead. However, this act broke their aura and prestige of the group. Two days later the Druse stopped a vehicle that was about to launch rocket at Shebaa farm, the contested Lebanese land occupied by Israel (Khatib 2021). Hezbollah members responded by kicking out Druse fruit sellers from Saida. However, their action generated a reprisal. Trucks coming from Beqaa were stopped in Druse area and drivers were beaten up. Also, on the 14th of October, 2021, Hezbollah was faced with snipers when it tried to enter Christian areas following a protest asking the removal of the investigator of Beirut blast Tarek Bitar (Al Arabiya English 2021b). The other blow was the position of the army where they confronted and even shot a Hezbollah fighter, whereas in the past they avoided any skirmishes with the group and allowed the group to operate freely. All those events, show that the protest movement weakened the prestige of the group greatly. Hezbollah is no longer perceived as invincible. At the beginning of the uprising, the group went and used violence to suppress the protests. This has helped the movement to morph partially and to develop into an anti-Hezbollah movement. The anti-Hezbollah movement that started with 17 October gained momentum with the Beirut blast as the discourse that followed blamed Hezbollah for storing highly explosive material which led to the incident. Nasrallah tried to belittle the Fourth of August protest and claimed the investigation is politicized. However, more and more people were talking about the involvement of Hezbollah with the Nitrate; this has been circulating in the Lebanese media, especially MTV, which is pro-Lebanese Forces and adamantly anti Hezbollah. Facing loss of popularity and respect, Hezbollah is struggling. The group faces a situation similar to that in 2005, when fingers were pointed at Hezbollah over the assassination of Rafik Hariri. The confrontation with Israel a year later, and Hezbollah’s “heroic” resistance against the Israeli army, restored its tarnished image and made it immune from attack. The 2006 confrontation also gave Hezbollah an additional source of income. Parliament passed a decree whereas goods entering Al-Dahiya, Hezbollah’s stronghold of south Beirut, are not subject to customs. The aim was to reduce the cost of reconstruction of the areas destroyed by Israel, but Hezbollah has used the law to import all sorts of goods without paying any taxes. Hence Hezbollah emerged from the Hariri assassination crisis stronger. However, a 2006-style confrontation with Israel is not an option for Hezbollah now. The Gulf states that financed rebuilding of the south will not put a dime into Lebanon. The homes in Beirut, the mountains and the north that received Hezbollah supporters will no longer welcome them. The southern front is heating up as Israel responds to missiles launched by the Palestinians factions. Nor can Hezbollah confront opponents as it did in 2008. Then, faced with moves by Walid Jumblatt and Saad Hariri that would have uncovered its communications network, the group took over Beirut by arms and forced the Doha agreement, which gave Hezbollah the upper hand in the government. However, today facing the public anger and its inability to feed all the Shia community, Hezbollah is in a tough corner with its own support group while the so-called Sovereign groups accuse the group of

86

D. K. Khatib

corruption. Also facing the liquidity crunch, Hezbollah is being accused of smuggling diesel and petrol to Syria while the south does not have water because of the lack of diesel to operate the water pumps. Also, more and more accusation and proofs are coming out with Hezbollah being involved in drugs smuggling operations, namely the Captagon. Despite the heavy campaign by the army, Hezbollah has been removing the factories to Qusair (Chulov 2021). All those damaging facts have greatly tarnished the image of Hezbollah. Sovereign protest groups talk about Hezbollah as a proxy for Iranian occupation. Protests are going on cursing the secretary general of Hezbollah and bluntly calling the group a terror group. At the same time there is discontent among its constituency as Hezbollah cannot cater for all its support base and only caters for its members. Also, the devaluation has created a lot of friction between Hezbollah members and Amal members. Whereas Hezbollah pays its members in dollars, Amal resorts to employing its members in government jobs. However, a manager from Amal due to devaluation makes a 100 USD whereas a junior Hezbollah member makes five hundred dollars. In a nutshell, Hezbollah show of power has had its effect on the revolution where the demand for accountability and rejection of corruption extended to sovereignty and neutrality. The public discourse of the protests is more and more targeting them explicitly.

Role of the Army and Security Forces When the protest broke up the commander took a clear position in a break with the political system by stressing the right of people to protest peacefully. This put him at odds with Gibran Basil, the son in law of the president. This also put him at odd with Hezbollah. Already Hezbollah mistrusts the commander due to his close relation with the US. The US is the main country that provides arms to the Lebanese armed forces. The army is receiving a lot of criticism from the political elite as it is accused of not being firm enough with the protestors. At the same time, it is being accused by protest groups of suppressing their freedom of expression. The army has prevented protestors from marching to the presidential palace. At several instances during the protests, the situation gets out of control, especially as infiltrators start using violence. In this case the army is pushed to respond and it is very difficult to discern properly the peaceful protestors from the infiltrators, and this is when clashes happen. Having said that, so far, the toll of casualties has been kept to a minimum if compared with the revolutionary protests in Iraq or Iran (see Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” [Mardasov 2022, this volume] and Chapter “Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective” (Issaev and Korotayev 2022, this volume)). However, there is a real problem in the protest groups, as they see the army as part of the regime. On the other hand, the army in Lebanon is accountable to the political will, hence its room to maneuver is limited. On the other hand, the army itself is experiencing difficulties. The salary of a military went down from five hundred

17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis

87

dollars to fifty dollars. The army witnessed many cases of soldiers deserting duty. Also, the security forces do not represent one cohesive organization. While the army has shown a certain degree of independence, this is not the case of internal security forces and the parliament police. The internal security forces are more subjugated to the political regime and have shown more brutality facing the protestors. On the other hand, the parliament police which is more like a private squad for the speaker of the parliament has shown a lot of brutality and have used live ammunition facing the protestors. The parliament police is notoriously known for targeting people eyes with rubber bullets (Molana-Allen 2020).

The 4th of August, 2020 The protest died down with the Covid 19, the lockdown that the government enforced and the difficult economic situation when people were busy getting by every day and had little energy to organize and protest. The Hirak disintegrated into several mini Hiraks as the protests lost their oomph. However, the situation was revived with the 4th of August blast, though for a short while. Following the blast people protested under the slogan “hang the gallows”. However, people were mainly busy with relief. Though Beirut was put under emergency, hence under the army control, nevertheless the state of emergency was not properly implemented and control was not properly given to the army. The declaration was more of a stunt to appease people. People were promised with result of the investigation after five days, however a year after the blast the investigation did not come to a conclusion. The first judge put on the case, when he summoned officials for investigation, was intimidated by a slain cat put at his doorsteps (Lakani 2021). The purpose was to send the judge a message in case he goes deep into the investigation and uncovers the real culprits. In parallel, a new judge, Tarek Bitar, has been assigned to investigate the Beirut blast. The current judge has asked to remove immunity from three parliamentarians who are former ministers in order to summon them for questioning. In response to that, members of the parliament asked that the officials be questioned by a special jury for ministers and parliamentarians. A jury that in reality does not exit. It was a way to let the official weasel their way out of the investigation. However, there is an increasing pressure for the truth. A year later the memory came back to the Lebanese. While at the time of the explosion people were busy with relief, one year later commemoration of the groups started thinking of accountability. Some fights were instigated, like a fight between the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Lebanese Forces, to create distraction from the protest. However, despite many attempts by the political elite to strangle the protests of 4th of August, 2021, they gathered a large number of people. Nevertheless, there was no real coordination in the movement. This is why the following day the protests stopped. However, the memory of the blast reignited the discontent of the people.

88

D. K. Khatib

The memory of the blast put Hezbollah in a tough situation as media report that came after the blast showed that the nitrate was entered by businessmen close to the Assad regime and they were stored by Hezbollah which transferred them to Assad to use them as barrel bombs (Al Arabiya English 2021a). The journalist Loqman Slim spoke about it (BBC 2021). He directly accused Hezbollah, Bashar Al Assad and Russia on conspiring to bring in and store the nitrate ammonium in the port of Beirut in warehouse number 12 and of taking batches of it to Assad to make chemical weapons to be dropped on Syrians. Loqman in his famous interview pointed at the discrepancy between the quantity that arrived port of Beirut and was stored in port of Beirut and the quantity that exploded and that according to him was turned into barrel bombs.

Discussion and Conclusion It is unfair to say categorically that the revolution failed. Despite the fact that the political elite is still in place it is in a precarious position. The uprising groups have also been able to score success in student elections in universities against traditional parties. The bar of lawyers’ elections has resulted in electing Melhem Khalaf who is outside the political elite and is a fierce defendant of the protesters. However, the political elite has also been able to use its privileges to score gains. For example, while there was no petrol in the entire north, two station owned by the Fenyanous family were providing petrol. Fenyanous is affiliated with the Marada party of Sulaiman Franjieh. As a result, from providing this service in the time of need, Marie Therese Fenyanous got elected to the bar of Tripoli. Hence, despite the awareness people have and their rejection of the current political class, the latter is still being able to use services to reignite the allegiance of their constituency. Nevertheless, the eyes are opened on the political elite, therefore their margin to embezzle funds is limited. Without embezzlement their time is limited. The contract they have with their constituency is not based on good governance but on fear and profiteering. In this sense sectarianism has been used to create the fear from the other. Each politician convinces his denomination that he is the only guarantee for their rights as a community. They use the fear of other. However, this fear is starting to fade out as the group have been cross confessional and the first demand of the groups has been to abolish the confessional system on which the political structure is built. Every politician, has been, in the name of the denomination he represents taking over some government facilities. Therefore, he deals with government institutions and departments as if they belong to him or his political party. Therefore, he allows himself to employ his followers in government department over which he has control, even if they do not have the credentials, in order to retain their loyalty to him. The effrontery of the political system has reached a point where an applicant to a government post either needs to pay a sum to the politician controlling a certain government department or needs to get his blessing or wasta as we call it in Lebanese slang in order to get the position.

17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis

89

Therefore, the system pushes the employee to look at the job as a droit aquis. Those who have paid for it look at it as an investment therefore legitimizing for themselves the bribe as a form of return on investment. Those who got it because of their connection to the politician or their wasta know that they are above the accountability system. Therefore, they take the job for granted and only come to work at the end of the month to get their monthly pay. Therefore, the corruption was able to last because the citizen was part of it. The citizen became captive to the corrupt political class because the state does not provide services to him and therefore the only viable alternative for him is to get the services he needs from the office of the politician he follows, and the only way for him to get employment with the government is through his connection or wasta with this politician. Today, people are realizing that this arrangement, this entire system has led to corruption whereby the cost of services provided to the citizen is high while their availability is scarce and their quality is mediocre. But this entire system is collapsing. The system has reached its end. The international community is refraining from pouring any money into the system unless reforms are conducted. At the same time the system has reached the limit for borrowing. The government exuberant expenses were financed by the treasury bill issued by the Central Bank. After defaulting, the Central Bank no longer can issue debt. Hence the sources of finances are drying out. Nevertheless, Lebanon faces a deadlock as the political elite will not relinquish power nor they have been offered an exit plan. However, given this deadlock the role of the international community remains limited. There is a general agreement on preserving the Lebanese army. Somehow the international community is protecting the commander from political influence. Hence, the army have had a certain margin of movement and has to a certain extent been protected from dismissal. As stated before, there is a certain inertia in the patronage system where the system is designed to recreate the power structure and to keep its grip on the people by being the main source for social services and jobs and not the state. The example of the election of Fenyanous incarnates how people tend to look for the politicians as the provider of services the government should offer naturally to everyone. Therefore, the upcoming elections might not bring a drastic change and the general anger towards the political elite might not result in the proper political activism needed to create the change needed to eradicate the corrupt system. As long as the political elite is in power, it will use its influence to recreate itself. It is very difficult for someone who got a job because he is a supporter to Nabih Berri, the speaker of the parliament, to vote for someone else, despite the fact he might know that Berri is part of the corrupt system that dragged the country to the drain. The system has inertia that it is very difficult to break as long as they are in power, they create a system of inertia to prevent real change because of the system of clientelism they have installed. While groups represent a rejection of the current system there is no real measurement of their reach or how many people each group represent. Even as the groups are running for elections there are no primaries that can show how much each group and each person weigh. Also, not all the groups are developed enough to become political entities that can challenge the current traditional political parties and offer a viable alternative to them. Some groups like Takadom have developed into political

90

D. K. Khatib

parties while others’ role remains restricted only for calling people for protest, or they have become WhatsApp groups to discuss current affairs. While the oomph has faded out, the anger is still growing. Also, the lack of organization among the different groups does not offer in most of the cases a viable alternative to the current political class. Though differences are normal as the Lebanese society is not a monolith, the different groups are gathered by common demands which are mainly reforms and rejection of confessionalism. However, despite being bound by common general demands, the different groups are failing to represent a common organized political front that can seriously challenge the political elite. Also, there are no primaries so each candidate cannot know his political weight. Primaries would have created a selection process where the fittest could run and has a chance to beat the traditional leader. However, the protest did not go into the process of organizing internally with the focus of removing the traditional elite, though this has been their common goal since the beginning. The groups have been consumed by bickering on priorities as well as how to achieve this common goal. Some see elections as the path to change while others stress the need for a transitional government. Also, while some see the priority is to fight corruption, others see this cannot be achieved without “sovereignty” hence their call for Hezbollah to disarm as a priority. Some see the way for change is through a federal system perspective, while others demand the execution of the Taif agreement. In addition to that, there is the ego problem and clash of personalities where concessions for the common good are hard to achieve. Additionally, the election law favors the current political configuration in addition to the inertia created by the political system. Therefore, the most likely outcome is to have a small block of independent members of parliament representing the forces of change. However, that does not mean they will have any change to the current power sharing. Also, there is little hope that the leaders will call it a quit. The politicians know that if they ever leave the system they will not be in again. Reforms are not an option as reforms are self-incriminating and they will destroy the self-profit schemes they have created to enrich themselves. 11 billion dollars has been pledged for Lebanon if reforms are conducted yet they were unable and unwilling to conduct reforms. Though the uprising has lost its oomph, the anger runs deep and the situation is getting worse by the day. The removal of the subsidies has removed the last products the average citizen can afford. At the same time the removal of subsidies has not been compensated with social protection. However, the subsidies goods did not benefit the Lebanese citizens much as subsidized goods were smuggled into Syria. Indirectly the removal of subsidies will weaken the elite as they were benefitting from the smuggling. Despite their attempt to show they are serious in conducting reforms, little has been done. The parliament lifted banking secrecy and Marshall and Alvares resumed audit from which it withdrew in 2020, however the obstructionism of the establishment remains (Sabaghi 2021). Though uprising did not succeed in removing the political class however it made its survival much harder. The eyes are all open; it will be difficult to continue in

17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis

91

their predatory behavior and the banking sector is broken, it will take a long time to sanitize it. As mentioned before, the banking sector that was providing funds to feed corruption no longer can borrow. The political elite is facing a dead end; however, the alternative is not mature enough and the alternative needs years to develop properly. The revolution suffers from a lack of leadership around which people can gather and that can sustain the momentum of the movement. For example, on the 4th of August, 2020 there were calls to do sit ins at politicians’ homes and list of addresses were distributed and they planned to keep those sits in until the 10th of August, however the movement fizzled out. The movement do not have stamina and consistency however the reason for anger did not change. Hence, it will be a phase of turbulence while the international community cannot impose a solution and politicians prefer to bear sanctions than to leave which makes them subject to accountability from which, so far, they have been immune. The likely solution is that international community will support the armed forces as it is the only unitary organization that is functional and cohesive and national; more and more aid will be channeled through the army civil military directorate and through civil society organizations. However, for aid to be deployed properly a state is needed and state institutions are needed and in the current conditions there will be no changes. The political class is paying a lip service to the international community and banking on the upcoming parliamentarian elections. It is betting on the poverty of the people where it will be able to buy the votes to renew its legitimacy and then address the international community as the “legitimate” representative of the “Lebanese people”. On the other hand, the “Hirak” or popular protest has lost its oomph and people are busy with providing for daily necessities. To add to that, the different groups are not organized, unlike the current political elite, and do not have the electoral machine nor the funding to make a breakthrough in the coming elections. In a nutshell, though the uprising has failed to change the political elite and bring a government free from corruption, it made a dent and started a process that will take years to materialize properly. The uprising most important achievement is the social change, the new collective consciousness about the need for change and the new public perspective that the different political parties are part of one corrupt system, hence the slogan “them all mean them all” (killun ya‘ni killun). And when social change happens, political change is bound to follow even though after a while.

References Abdul Reda N (2019) These lawyers in Lebanon offer free legal support to protesters fired from their Jobs. the961.com, 24 October 2019. https://www.the961.com/these-lawyers-in-lebanonoffer-free-legal-support-to-protesters-fired-from-their-jobs/ Aboultaif EW (2019) Power sharing in Lebanon: consociationalism since 1820. Routledge, London. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429448225

92

D. K. Khatib

Al Arabiya English (2021a) Syrian-Russian businessmen with ties to Assad regime linked to Beirut blast: report. Al Arabiya English, 15 January 2019. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/ middle-east/2021/01/15/Syrian-Russian-businessmen-with-ties-to-Assad-regime-linked-to-Bei rut-blast-Report Al Arabiya English (2021b) Six killed in Beirut following protest clashes involving Hezbollah supporters. english.alarabiya.net. Al Arabiya English, 14 October 2021. https://english.alarabiya. net/News/middle-east/2021b/10/14/Lebanon-court-dismisses-case-against-Beirut-blast-judgeallowing-probe-to-continue Ashkar G, Warschawski M (2007) 33 Day war. Israel’s war on Hezbollah in Lebanon and its consequences. Routledge, London Avi-Ran R (1991) The Syrian involvement in Lebanon since 1975. Routledge, London. https://doi. org/10.4324/9780429315183 BBC (2019) Lebanon protests: how WhatsApp tax anger revealed a much deeper crisis. BBC, 7 November 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50293636 BBC (2021) Lokman Slim: prominent Hezbollah critic shot dead in Lebanon. BBC, 4 Febraury 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55933222 Blair E (2020) Explainer: Lebanon’s financial meltdown and how it happened. Reuters, 17 September 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-lebanon-crisis-financial-explainer-idU KKBN268223 Bou Mujahed M (2021) Annahar, 28 April 2021. https://www.annahar.com/arabic/section/76-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8% A9/28042021034210266 Chamie J (1976) The Lebanese civil war: an investigation into the causes. World Aff 139(3):171–188 Chulov M (2021) A dirty business’: how one drug is turning Syria into a narco-state. The Guardian, 7 May 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/07/drug-captagon-turning-syria-intonarco-state Cobban H (1985) The making of modern Lebanon. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/978042931 2465 DW (2015) . DW, 29 August 2015. https://www.dw.com/ar/%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9% 85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8% AD%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9% 84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-72-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8% A9-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9% 8A%D8%AF/a-18681555 DW (2018) Germany’s Angela Merkel in Lebanon amid pressure to find refugee solution, 22 June 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-angela-merkel-in-lebanon-amid-pressure-to-findrefugee-solution/a-44353116 Filin N, Khodunov A, Koklikov V (2022) Serbian “Otpor” and the color revolutions’ diffusion. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 465–482. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_17 France 24 (2021) Saudi Arabia recalls envoy to Lebanon over ‘insulting’ remarks on Yemen war. France, 24 October 2021. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211029-saudi-arabia-rec alls-envoy-to-lebanon-after-insulting-remarks-on-yemen-war Geha C (2019) Civil society and political reform in Lebanon and Libya. Routledge, London Geukjian O (2016) Lebanon after the Syrian withdrawal: external intervention, power-sharing and political instability. Routledge, London. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315591940 Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (2022) Introduction. Changing yet persistent: revolutions and revolutionary events. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_1

17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis

93

Halawi M (1992) A Lebanon defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shi’a community. Routledge, London. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429042225 Hossari N (2021) Report: Lebanon could turn into ‘Venezuela of the Mediterranean’. Arab News, 21 July 2021. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1898076/amp Issaev L, Korotayev A (2022) Introduction. New wave of revolutions in the MENA region in the global perspective. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_1 Khatib DK (2021) Now the Lebanese are standing up to Hezbollah. Arab News, 8 August 2021. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1907811 Khodunov A (2022) The Bulldozer revolution in Serbia. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 447–463. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-030-86468-2_16 Kumar RM (2012) Martyred but not tamed: the politics of resistance in the Middle East. Sage, Thousand Oaks CA Larkin C (2012) Memory and conflict in Lebanon: remembering and forgetting the past. Routledge, London. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203137970 Lazkani S (2021) Former Beirut Blast judge received threats right to his doorstep while investigating official. the961.com, 3 July 2021. https://www.the961.com/judge-sawan-slain-cat-threat/ Mardasov A (2022) Revolutionary protests in Iraq in the context of Iranian-American confrontation. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 95–108. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_5 Molana-Allen L (2020) ‘Their main weapon is fear’: human rights observers accuse Lebanese security forces of abuses. France 24, 23 January 2020. https://www.france24.com/en/20200123a-closer-look-at-protesters-injuries-and-security-forces-violence-in-lebanon Mroue B (2021) As Lebanese got poorer, politicians stowed wealth abroad. LA Times, 6 October 2021. https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-10-06/as-lebanese-got-poorerpoliticians-stowed-wealth-abroad Rasler K (1997) Conflict and escalation in Lebanon: a dynamic analysis of civil war and intervention. UMI Dissertation Information Service, Ann Arbor MI Reuters (2020a) Alvarez & Marsal withdraws from Lebanon central bank audit—finmin. Reuters, 20 November 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/lebanon-crisis-audit-int-idUSKBN2801JO Reuters (2020b) On Lebanon, Macron told Trump sanctions can play into Iran’s hands, official says. Reuters, 8 October 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-security-blast-france-idU SKCN2540QR Sabaghi D (2021) Lebanon resumes forensic central bank audit amid obstructionism. DW, 17 Sepetember 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/lebanon-resumes-forensic-central-bank-audit-amidobstructionism/a-59199464 Wilkins H (2013) The Making of Lebanese Foreign Policy: understanding the 2006 HezbollahIsraeli War. Routledge, London. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203553640 Zovighian L (2008) Lebanon is not two camps Part 2. Middle East Institute, Washington DC

Dania Koleilat Khatib is Co-Founder and President of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace Building (RCCP), a Lebanese NGO. A member of the steering committee and an advocacy consultant for the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) National Agenda for the Future of Syria (NAFS) program. Dania is editor of The Syrian Crisis: Effects on Regional and International Relations (2020) and has previously authored The Arab Lobby: Factors for Success and Failure (2016). She is a weekly columnist in the Saudi newspaper Arab News and makes regular appearances on a series of Middle Eastern TV stations. She has co-directed, participated and presented scholarly papers in numerous conferences and workshops.

Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation Anton Mardasov

Abstract Massive revolutionary protests that began in Iraq in 2019 led to the resignation of Adil Abdul-Mahdi’s government, widely considered as the most effective cabinet since Saddam Hussein’s regime was overthrown in 2003. However, spontaneous rallies, used by internal actors opposed to a strong central power, did not lead to a new political turbulence in Iraq. On the contrary, they contributed to the country’s exit from another crisis. The awakening of nationalism among Iraqi youth forced both local forces and external players to transform their policies. This mainly applies to Iran, which simultaneously tried to prevent the fall of the government in Baghdad and preserve the structure of the Shiite militia “Popular Mobilization Forces” (PMF or Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi) without major changes. During this period, Tehran’s interests once again aligned with the interests of Washington, busy with optimizing the presence of its troops in the Middle East in general and in Iraq in particular. Ironically, the withdrawal of American troops, which the pro-Iranian press presented as “another defeat of Washington”, became the factor that helped Iran and the United States (despite the elimination of the commander of the IRGC special forces, Qassem Soleimani) eventually find a compromise replacement for the Mahdi in the person of Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. In turn, Kadhimi himself has found a way to successfully balance in foreign and domestic policies.

Starting Point Spontaneous demonstrations against unemployment, poor quality of public services, deteriorating living conditions and pervasive corruption, organized by youth groups through social networks, began on October 1, 2019 in Baghdad and the southern provinces of Iraq. Subsequently, they quickly escalated into a broader protest movement demanding a change in the government. Clashes between security forces and protesters took place in Baghdad, as well as the cities of Al-Diwaniya, Al-Nasiriya, A. Mardasov (B) Middle East Institute, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_5

95

96

A. Mardasov

Karbala, Al-Najaf and in the provinces of Basra, Babil, Kirkuk, Diyala, Maysan and Baakuba (O’Doherty 2019). It needs to be noted that social protests in Iraq began almost simultaneously with Lebanon,1 a country that is also part of the zone of the so-called “Shiite axis”, which since November 2017 has become a geopolitical project of Tehran (Vasilyev et al. 2019). It was from this period that the deliveries of weapons and ammunition from Iran to Syria through Iraq began to be recorded (The New Arab 2019). However, the real reasons for the internal political crisis and social protest in Iraq and Lebanon were much deeper: the revolutionary crises in both countries were united by the fact that the governments formed in 2018 could not stay in power stably. At the same time, the reasons for the protests were not only economic in nature. In contrast to the catastrophic situation in the Lebanese economy, Iraq, after getting rid of the Islamic State, on the contrary, demonstrated a steady rate of economic growth due to growing oil revenues. However, the nature of the anti-government demonstrations, lacking an organized structure and clear political leaders, as well as the set of demands of the protesters were largely similar in Iraq and Lebanon. The protesters accused the authorities of corruption, demanded changes in the electoral system, the creation of better employment conditions and new jobs, pointed to the inefficiency and the need for an urgent reform of the political management system through the formation of a more flexible technocratic government cabinet. An important common thread was the growing dissatisfaction of the population with external influence on politics, hence the cases of anti-Iranian speeches in both Lebanon and Iraq (Young 2019). A serious trigger of popular discontent was the dismissal of the deputy commander of the Iraqi counter-terrorism bureau, AbdelWahab Al-Saedi: many protesters took to the streets with photographs of the military official. The resignation was opposed by some political forces in Iraq, who considered this to be the result of the fulfillment of demands from Tehran, since Al-Saedi was considered an officer independent of Iranian proteges (Habib 2019). In addition, the incident of Iraqi diplomats from the Iraqi consulate in Mashhad, reportedly beaten and humiliated by Iranian security forces, did not go unnoticed. At the same time, manifestations of secular nationalism were a positive factor, since it spoke of the awakening and growth of a healthy sense of secular nationalism aimed at overcoming the consequences of the ISIS rule and ethnic and religious dividing lines. At the same time, the pro-Iranian forces in Iraq and Lebanon behaved differently during this period: while in Lebanon Hezbollah tried to divert the protest from itself, redirect it to Amal and use the mistakes of Sunni politicians, in Iraq Tehran tried to maintain the current power structure and participated in the suppression of actions, including by providing snipers, whose shooting was not supposed to provoke, but sow panic among the protesters. Besides that, in Iraq, the Iranians attempted to 1

See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A Preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail. On connections between revolutionary protests in Iraq and Lebanon see also Chapter “Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective” (Issaev and Korotayev 2022, this volume)—Editors.

Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context …

97

benefit from the aggravation, trying to advance the constitutional reform for the more explicit formation of a Shi’a state on Iraqi soil, and to strengthen the protest wave against the presence of American troops in Iraq (which eventually affected the timing of the withdrawal of combat units of the international coalition).

Attempts to Use the Protests On October 31, 2019, Iraqi President Barham Salih announced that Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi had agreed to step down in line with the demands of the protesters. Nevertheless, a number of commanders of the Popular Mobilization Forces militia and the Iranian leadership were extremely dissatisfied with the president’s decision, as they were determined to keep the loyal prime minister in power. On the same day, General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, visited Baghdad (Reuters 2019a). The situation was affected by the fact that the internal players had different motivations to overcome the political crisis that had arisen. For example, Hadi Al-Amiri’s Al-Fath bloc, representing the interests of Popular Mobilization Forces, as well as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of the Barzani clan and the Sunni movement of Khamis Al-Khanjar were not interested in having a strong central government. At the same time, there were forces that immediately tried to lead the protest wave, desiring to strengthen the opposition to the Mahdi government. Thus, the demonstrators, without any outwardly noticeable hesitation, were supported by influential Shiite clerics Muqtada Al-Sadr and Ammar Al-Hakim, having close relations with Iran, but not associated with the forces of the “Shi’a axis”. However, Al-Sadr’s efforts to score political points against the backdrop of mass demonstrations did not lead to success, primarily, because of the specifics of the protest wave. Thus, in Baghdad, protest moods were especially strong in the poorest Shia district of Sadr City (the former Madinat Al-Thaura). But if the previous protest actions here were initiated and directed by Al-Sadr, then in the fall of 2019, the wave of demonstrations acquired a completely spontaneous character. As a result, the protesters not only rejected Al-Sadr’s leadership, but in Karbala they did not even allow him to get out of the car (Salim and Cunningham 2019). However, for Al-Sadr, these were just tactical failures. As the dynamics of the development of the country’s political course showed, strategically, he managed to benefit from the situation primarily due to his traditional nationalist position, which turned out to be especially relevant during this period. The secret of the success of the “Sadrist” movement was that even before the protests in 2019, it had attracted a variety of political forces, even communists, as long as they declared themselves as opponents of Iran’s “special role” in Iraq’s domestic politics. Nevertheless, in Tehran the “Sadrists” were also respected and listened too. As a result, they managed to maneuver between the position of Iran’s privileged operator in Iraq and the position of a player who can act as a deterrent to Iranian influence.

98

A. Mardasov

This situation can be explained by the paradox of Shi’a Islam in Iraq: the majority of Iraqi Shi’a Muslims are religiously oriented not to the Iranian ayatollahs from Qom, but to the so-called “Big Four of Al-Najaf”, which includes four great ayatollahs: Ali Al-Sistani, Bashir Al-Najafi, Mohammed Al-Fayyad and Mohammed Said AlHakim. The position of Ali Al-Sistani is especially noteworthy: being a follower of Ayatollah Abu Al-Qasim Aal-Khoei, who did not accept Khomeini’s “Guardianship of the Jurist” doctrine, he openly supported the protesters and their demands (Hasan 2019; Asharq Al-Awsat 2019). All this also provided an opportunity for dialogue (Crisis Group 2018) between the Shi’a leaders of Iraq and Sunni regional players.

The Paradox of Demands At the same time, a paradoxical situation was developing in Iraq: the objective data of the growth of the Iraqi economy clearly contrasted with the social unrest in the country. According to the World Bank, in 2019, after a two-year recession, the country’s economy showed positive signs for the first time, which was an undoubted achievement of the government team led by Prime Minister Mahdi (World Bank 2019). In September 2018, for the first time in Iraq’s post-conflict history, an attempt was made to form a government of competent professionals rather than political appointees, at least in most cases (Mansour 2019). Of course, the Mahdi government also gave many reasons for criticism, but in general, it was impossible to expect from his cabinet a quick solution to serious and stagnant structural problems, such as the Kurdish separatism or the independence of the Shi’a militia. At the same time, the new government managed to achieve impressive results in a number of important economic tracks in a short time. Only in the first half of 2019, Iraq’s GDP grew by 4.8%, partially restoring the losses of the economy in 2017–2018, and the growth was not only due to the oil revenues. In other sectors of the economy, the growth was also significant—up to 5.6% in the first half of 2019. However, such economic successes did not prevent the opposition from criticizing the Cabinet because of two unsolved problems. First, due to budget deficit problems and rising national budget expenditures, skyrocketing oil prices undermined the government’s social policies, forcing the curtailment of social assistance programs. Secondly, the issue of displaced people and refugees required the government to implement targeted policies to provide social protection. Despite its vulnerable position, the Mahdi government tried to smooth things over and demonstrate political flexibility after the start of the first wave of protests (the second began in mid-October). For example, the Cabinet of Ministers formulated measures that should have been implemented to support the population. Thus, the Council of Ministers of Iraq adopted a decision to provide 150,000 unemployed people with a monthly allowance of $150 per person for three months, to prepare and implement a national housing program for the construction of 100,000 housing units distributed among the provinces, to establish modern marketing complexes

Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context …

99

in commercial zones and to prepare a program for additional training for the unemployed. Besides that, the government authorized the allocation of land in the province of Basra for construction for low-income citizens (Kurdistan 24, 2019). Mahdi’s cabinet also approved the voluntary recruitment of young people aged 18–25 through Internet portals or recruitment centers and decided to review the basic procedures for the return of terminated contracts. It is worth noting that the Mahdi government tried to demonstrate external independence, and commitment to Iraq’s political sovereignty. Iraqi officials established an unprecedented number of contacts since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, both with representatives of neighboring Iran and with politicians from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Turkey. Thus, the purpose of the prime minister’s two trips to Iran, in addition to the traditional points on the economic cooperation, involved three problems: (a) the actions of Israel, where Benjamin Netanyahu, in the wake of the political crisis in the Jewish state, tried to strengthen his positions by attacking pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq; (b) the initiative to organize a dialogue between the parliaments of Iran and Saudi Arabia aimed at easing regional tensions (Reuters 2019b), (c) tensions in relations between Iran and the West which hypothetically could have a negative impact on the Iraqi economy. Paradoxically, it was under the Mahdi, despite all the contradictions that would emerge later, that the Americans and Iranians began to search for a political and economic compromise. However, on November 29, 2019, after Ali Al-Sistani’s Friday sermon in which he urged parliament to consider a change of government due to bloody protests, Adil Abdul-Mahdi resigned (The National 2019). Riots in southern Iraq erupted after protesters stormed the Iranian consulate in Najaf, accusing the neighboring country of supporting the Mahdi government. Tehran demanded decisive action from Iraq against the protesters, and in response, the prime minister ordered the military to deploy in several provinces to “ensure security and restore order.” Instead, chaos reigned as people in civilian clothes opened fire on demonstrators and militants who took to the streets in their defense. Notably, Iranian experts believe that Al-Sadr was the beneficiary of fueling these riots (Iranian diplomacy 2019). The resignation of Mahdi was hardly a spontaneous step: despite the impressive and at the same time rational concessions, the political crisis at that time became too obvious. Against this background, the November 23, 2019 visit of US Vice President Mike Pence to Iraq (NYT 2019) “prearranged with Baghdad” and his, nevertheless, only telephone conversations with the prime minister were obvious harbingers of new political upheavals that Washington was preparing for. Despite the criticism and accusations, Mahdi was not seen in forcing a scenario of violent suppression of the protests, as he probably understood the inevitability of his resignation. Thus, by releasing of 2,500 detainees during the protests (WSJ 2019), he admitted that the actions of the security forces on the ground were erroneous. But not only the tense political situation, protests and ISIS activity forced Mahdi to resign. Even then, the steps that the United States began to take indicated that the security situation in the country would soon become much more complicated.

100

A. Mardasov

Firstly, despite the ultimatum rhetoric of the Shi’a and pro-Iranian factions about the need to withdraw foreign troops, Washington decided to optimize its presence again. Thus, the State Department proactively submitted to Congress detailed plans for the rapid reduction of the number of diplomats in Iraq by the end of May 2020 by 28%, at the embassy, the consulate and the diplomatic support center (CNN 2019). Secondly, the pro-Iranian factions tried so persistently to influence the United States and force them to leave (through shelling of objects and organizing supposedly spontaneous rallies) that the Americans constantly had to adjust the timing of the reduction of their presence. So, contrary to plans, as part of anti-crisis measures, Washington decided, on the contrary, to strengthen the military contingent from among the ground forces and the marine corps to guard the embassy in Baghdad, while American diplomats and the military continued to voice “red lines” for numerous detachments of the Shiite militia formally integrated into the Iraqi armed forces. On December 30, 2019, the United States, in response to the death of an American contract soldier during another rocket attack, was forced to officially admit responsibility for the raid of its Air Force on the positions of pro-Iranian militants. The recognition of attacks on Iranian proxy forces in Iraq by the Pentagon led to an escalation of the situation around the US embassy in Baghdad. The White House was again in a difficult position: the Trump administration needed to suppress a new round of anti-American activity supported by Tehran in order not to become an object of criticism inside the country. Until December 30, the United States tried for quite a long time to maintain a balance and distance itself from Israeli attacks on Iranian proxy forces, although the experts had no illusions: the Israeli unmanned and manned aircraft could not operate over the territory of Iraq without coordination with the American security agencies. The activity of the Israeli Air Force led to numerous reports that Israel, in order to contain Iranian ambitions, was acting in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, which the Jewish state embraced as an ally in recent years (NEWS.ru 2019). Part of the American diplomatic mission in the “green zone” of Baghdad was evacuated even before the PMF militants began their attempts to storm the embassy (Mardasov 2020b). On December 31, 2019, protesters set fire to the outer wall of the embassy complex and broke down the gate to allow vehicles to enter, but were stopped by US military personnel who fired tear gas. The demands of the demonstrators remained the same: in the wake of the ongoing protests and political crisis, they wanted to force the Iraqi authorities to take another series of anti-American legislative steps. It is worth saying that attempts to shake up the situation had been made for a long time: from February 2019 to December 27, pro-Iranian detachments carried out 19 missile attacks on facilities with the presence of US military and contractors. Numerous Shi’a parties and militants from a number of al-Hashd al-Shaabi factions, incited by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, did not hide the fact that they aimed to force the US contingent to leave the country. This was publicly stated back in December 2018 by one of the leaders of the militia, Qais Khazali. Back then, Trump’s unannounced visit to the troops and his speech about spying on Iran from

Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context …

101

Iraq caused an uproar. The vice-speaker of the legislature, Hassan Al-Kaabi, accused the American president of ignoring the fundamental laws of the country. “If the US wants to impose its military presence by force, bypassing the Iraqi constitution and parliament, then Iraq can respond in kind and force them to leave”, Khazali noted.

The 2020 Events The elimination of General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Forces special forces unit, and the deputy commander of the PMF militia, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, on January 3rd 2020, was the logical result of numerous attacks on US bases and attempts to storm the embassy in Baghdad. Washington decided to “cross the red line” itself and go for the elimination of the famous Iranian commander. And although this step was just a response to the actions of Tehran, Iran and its allied forces tried to present the White House as the aggressor and to strike back. The assassination of Soleimani called into question Tehran’s future regional strategy and its implications for the Middle East. In this sense, Iran, most likely, outplayed itself: the construction of the “instability belt” that Tehran was building in the region was too dependent on the chief architect, Soleimani himself. Therefore, as events will show, Tehran almost immediately began to consolidate forces in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon in order to improve their manageability in times of crisis. Moreover, the background was quite favorable: on January 5th 2020, the Iraqi parliament adopted a resolution that called on the national government to put an end to the presence of foreign troops on the Iraqi soil. Despite loud statements, this resolution was more declarative than realistic: a significant part of the parliament did not take part in the vote: only 170 out of 328 members were in place (NEWS.ru 2020). In fact, lawmakers voted in favor of the recommendation to withdraw from the international coalition against ISIS. It was clear that even if this legislative initiative was implemented, this would have little effect on cooperation between Iraq and the United States and only slightly complicate the supply of troops in Syria, which, if desired, could be provided in cooperation with the authorities of Iraqi Kurdistan. In addition, the resolution did not mention any legal obligation to withdraw the foreign troops and could not cancel the bilateral US-Iraq agreement of 2008. A larger PR stunt took place a little later, when Iran decided to launch a “retaliation” strike against the US contingent in the region.

A Non-aggression Pact The IRGC attacked two military bases in Iraq where American troops were stationed: the Ain Al-Assad base in Anbar province and a facility near Erbil Airport in Iraqi Kurdistan. Although Iranian propaganda claimed there were many killed and

102

A. Mardasov

wounded US Army personnel, in fact, almost all Americans received minor injuries, since they had been placed in bomb shelters in advance (Stars and Stripes 2020). There is no doubt among experts that the attack was “staged”. Firstly, the group missile attack on US targets in Iraq was not sudden (CNN 2020) either in time or location and was coordinated with Washington through a chain of intermediaries in Baghdad and Doha (Mardasov 2020a). Secondly, while analyzing satellite images from Planet Labs, it can be seen that the command and missile crews of the IRGC tried to avoid unnecessary casualties and chose aircraft hangars as targets (Yuri Lyamin’s blog 2020). The main blow was dealt to the base from which the attack on Soleimani was carried out. Ironically, Iran, while criticizing the United States for disrespecting the sovereignty of Iraq, did itself neglect Iraqi statehood during the missile attacks, especially since the US facility in Erbil is located on the territory of the international airport. From this point of view, an attack against an American ship in the Persian Gulf would look more justified, but it could have more serious consequences leading to an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict. As a result, Iran chose not to take risks, which also served as another groundwork for the continuation of Tehran’s and Washington’s behind-the-scenes coordination on the Iraqi dossier. The main reason was that the Trump administration’s decision to carry out the operation to eliminate Soleimani has demonstrated that the strategy of “maximum pressure” on Iran is indeed effective, although it is a common opinion that it is Tehran who is used to operating in the “grey zone” on the brink of war and peace (Eisenstadt 2019). In this situation, President Bahram Saleh and Mahdi, who at that time still retained the post of head of the transitional government, were forced to maneuver between the interests of Iran and the United States, playing along with both and at the same time imitating steps aimed at containing them. There was a growing understanding among political forces that a period of political turbulence could lead to a protracted crisis, so attempts should have been made to negotiate a new prime minister, to form a cabinet. However, at that time, the disputes of numerous Iraqi political forces did not lead to any result (Numan 2020). On the 20th of January 2020, the former Minister of Communications, Mohammed Tawfiq Alawi, was nominated for the post of prime minister, but immediately abandoned the mission to form the Cabinet. On January 29th 2020, Iraqi President Saleh gave the Shi’a blocs time until January 31st 2020 to nominate a prime minister, threatening otherwise to nominate a figure that the “crowd” would accept. In the course of additional coordination, Alawi, nevertheless, agreed to take the post of prime minister. Thus, on February 1st 2020, Saleh approved his candidacy and instructed to form a new government, the relevance of which increased due to the approaching execution date of the new budget for 2020. The “crowd” did not express much enthusiasm, thereby confirming that it would not be satisfied with a passing candidate: the demonstrators issued a statement in which they categorically rejected Alawi for being “a compromised candidate belonging to a sectarian political system of power sharing” (Alsaafin 2020).

Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context …

103

During formation of the cabinet, a new problem arose: it was needed to pass a vote of confidence in the Alawi government. This task caused a number of Iraqi parties to change their position every day (Al Kli 2020). At the same time, Iraqi media sources claimed with confidence that political parties were close to consensus and agreed on the personalities of 19 out of 22 ministers. However, after a while everything began to crumble again: first, the “Alliance of Iraqi forces” demanded to replace Alawi with another politician who would be respected by the “crowd”. After that several extraordinary sessions of parliament were completely disrupted due to the lack of a quorum. By March 1st 2020, the parliamentarians still failed to approve the new cabinet of Alawi, forcing him to finally withdrew his candidacy. The next day, on March 2nd 2020, Mahdi’s established period of tenure as interim Prime Minister came to an end. A new round of political storm began, which surprisingly, did not drag the country into a new abyss, but led to a completely opposite result.

An Unexpected Compromise One of the main beneficiaries of bringing Alawi to the chair of the prime minister was, without a doubt, Muqtada Al-Sadr. This, in turn, angered Kurds, Sunnis, but also part of the Shi’a parties (primarily al-Sadiqun, associated with the militant group Asaib Ahl Al-Haqq, and “State of Law” of Nouri Al-Maliki), who were not satisfied with the strengthening of the populist cleric. This also contributed to the fact that the views of Tehran and Washington on the political space of Iraq began to turn in one direction. On March 16, 2020, the period allotted to the president for the appointment of a new prime minister expired, and the next day Saleh approved Adnan Al-Zurfi as head of government. Adnan Al-Zurfi, a former member of the opposition to Saddam Hussein who lived in exile in the United States, enjoyed the tacit support of Sunni and Kurdish parties, as well as a significant number of Shi’a MPs, apart from those with strong ties to Iran. However, on the way to forming a government, Al-Zurfi tried to take steps that would help him get rid of his pro-American reputation and find some kind of balance. So, he unexpectedly called for the lifting of US sanctions on the Iranian government to help Tehran in its fight against the coronavirus (The National 2020). In the fight against Adnan Al-Zurfi Shi’a parties were hampered not so much by his behind-the-scenes and public maneuvers, but by the ongoing consolidation of Kurdish and Sunni forces, namely, the need for a clear vertical of power during the coronavirus pandemic raging in Iraq and the decrease of the US troops. The last factor was quite important, since with the decline of the American presence in Iraq, the Iranian presence came to the fore. On April 9, 2020, Esmail Gaani, the successor to the assassinated Soleimani as head of the IRGC’s Al-Quds Special Forces, visited Iraq, trying to unite numerous

104

A. Mardasov

Shi’a forces. However, Muqtada Al-Sadr and Ali Al-Sistani refused to meet with him (Hassan Ali Ahmed 2020). On the same day, Al-Zurfi was planning to announce the completion of a government formation, but pro-Iranian groups again accused the prime minister of having links with American intelligence services and offered an alternative candidate: the head of counterintelligence, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. After a lengthy debate, Al-Zurfi resigned, and Barham Saleh instructed the formation of a new government under Al-Kadhimi, who also had extensive connections both in Washington and in Tehran. This personnel decision was the quintessence of the US and Iran’s search for an acceptable political compromise. According to some reports, the unexpected reshuffling and promotion of Al-Kadhimi were closely connected with the course of the US-Iranian negotiations (Hearst 2020), which ended in a deal: the pro-Iranian forces in Iraq agreed to support the Al-Kadhimi cabinet, and the Americans agreed to unfreeze part of the Iranian assets. However, the new cabinet immediately faced new challenges: the growing COVID-19 pandemic and a decrease in revenues due to falling world oil prices. On May 9, 2020, the World Bank released a forecast for Iraq, from which it followed that the country’s economy would contract significantly, and the budget deficit would rise to 29%. The new Iraqi government included technocrats with considerable experience, with little or no affiliation to political parties. The new Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi outlined the need to diversify the country’s economy and develop agriculture, realizing that it will be extremely difficult to overcome the consequences of the pandemic (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies 2020). Externally, one of the first activities of Mustafa Al-Kadhimi government was the dialogue with the United States on the normalization of bilateral relations, but with taking into account the influence of the elimination of Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Al-Kadhimi’s program called for “an integrated system of common interests designed to make an effective contribution to the settlement of regional and international crises, the fight against terrorism, money laundering and international organized crime” (Aygün 2020). Al-Kadhimi immediately began to put pressure on the Shi’a paramilitary formations, as a result of which four factions (the Imam Ali Brigades, Ali Al-Akbar Brigades, Abbas Brigades and Ansar Al-Marjayi Brigades) broke away from the PMF. The head of the militia was notified that the future “operations and administration” of the four groups would be carried out by the “Prime Minister’s Office and the Department of Defense”. According to media reports, the factions did not accept the candidacy of Al-Muhandis’ successor in the person of Abu Fadak Al-Muhammadawi, the former commander of the Iraqi Hezbollah. However, Al-Kadhimi did not only use the “stick”, but also the “carrot”: on May 16, 2020, during a visit to the PMF headquarters, he stated that he considered the militia “the strength of the Motherland.” At the same time, speaking about the threats to the country, he put some “non-state players with weapons” in line with the “sleeping cells” of ISIS (Mardasov 2019). In addition, the Prime Minister

Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context …

105

made an eloquent political gesture: the well-known Lieutenant General Abdul-Wahab al-Saadi returned to service and received broad powers. Obviously, Al-Kadhimi’s actions were an attempt to balance various opposing forces, and not only internal ones (Dagher 2020). During a May 9, 2020 meeting with US Ambassador to Iraq Silliman, who stressed the need to protect stability and security in the country, Al-Kadhimi explicitly stated that he would not allow Iraq to become a springboard for attacks on neighboring countries. At the same time, at a meeting with the head of Iranian diplomacy Masjedi, he stressed that “Iraq will not be a corridor or hotbed of terrorism against any country or a place for settling disputes.” As a result, the parliament’s approval of the composition of the new Iraqi government received broad support abroad. The first foreign leader to congratulate Al-Kadhimi on his new appointment was Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In his greeting, he expressed hope that the new Prime Minister of Iraq will continue the efforts of his predecessors in the mediation mission to reduce tensions between KSA and Iran. The emergence of an Iraqi administration that enjoys Washington’s support and is apparently ready to reform the military apparatus close to Tehran prompted Riyadh to continue its efforts as part of the intensification of economic diplomacy, which it began to implement back in 2017. In addition to the economic sphere of cooperation, which is important in the struggle for influence against Iran, Saudi Arabia began to search for partners and allies among the Najaf nationalists, close to Ali Al-Sistani. After four militia factions severed their ties with PMF, Riyadh took a closer look at Najaf as a new starting point for dialogue with the Iraqi Shi’as, which did not go unnoticed by Washington.

Conclusion Mustafa Al-Kadhimi became prime minister after months of political instability. Since October 2019, the country has been rocked by massive revolutionary antigovernment protests that have forced Adil Abdul-Mahdi to step down despite some impressive economic achievements. Formally, Al-Kadhimi’s rise came after two other president-appointed prime ministers had failed to form a government, but in reality, his appointment was the result of a behind-the-scenes deal between Iran and the United States, which managed to put aside numerous contradictions and reach a compromise. In addition, in terms of domestic politics, the Al-Kadhimi government, formed after a popular uprising, was perceived as a response to the demands of the Iraqis. Al-Kadhimi’s willingness to put pressure on Shi’a militia groups, despite the limited capacity of his security forces, earned him a lot of political points in Iraq and the US. And although efforts to conduct a US-Iraqi strategic dialogue did not lead to any noticeable result, Baghdad was eventually able not only to find a balance in relations with Washington, but also to get rid of the “failed state” stigma and even

106

A. Mardasov

noticeably strengthen its role in the international arena, for example, to become a platform for Iranian-Saudi rounds of negotiations. Skillful maneuvering between the United States and Iran by the Iraqi government, on the one hand, allowed attracting investments and influenced further successes in the fight against Islamic State cells, on the other hand, to change the quality of the Iranian presence in Iraq. Since the US invasion of 2003, Iran has created a powerful network of political, religious and armed groups that made Tehran’s influence in the country a system-forming factor, but the chain of events in 2019–2020 led to the fact that a single centralized body for managing these forces at least ceased to work effectively; and as a maximum—ceased to exist. The organizational weakness of IRGC General Esmail Ghaani, who replaced Qasem Soleimani as commander of Al-Quds, helped Mustafa Al-Kadhimi maintain a balance between public demands for the United States to finally withdraw troops from Iraq and a real desire to maintain a high level of cooperation with Washington. For the Americans, the deployment in Iraq, which they have reduced to the limit, has always meant having levers of influence on the situation not only in Iraq, but also in Syria. For Iraqis, American troops are the main guarantee of maintaining military-technical ties with the United States and security in terms of preventing the revival of the Islamic State. At the same time, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi did not become a hostage to the Iranian-American compromise: from the moment he came to power, he began to develop relations with the Arab countries, realizing that they are a more effective counter-balancer in the sphere of economy and investment than Tehran and Washington.

References Al Kli S (2020) The difficult ordeal of forming a new Iraqi government. Middle East Institute 12.03.2020. https://www.mei.edu/publications/difficult-ordeal-forming-new-iraqi-government Alsaafin L (2020) Mohammed Allawi appointed new Iraq PM, protesters reject him. Al Jazeera 01.02.2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/01/mohammed-allawi-appointednew-iraq-pm-protesters-reject-him/ Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (2020) Iraq’s Al-Kazemi government: real change or a temporary settlement? Arab center for research and policy studies 13.05.2020. https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/The-Formation-of-Al-Kaz emi-Government-in-Iraq.aspx Asharq Al-Awsat (2019) Al-Sistani fi khandaq al-muhtajjin wa-yuhadhdhiru as-sasa alwahimin. Muwajahat wa-l-tafdgir fi wasati baghdad wa-suqut qatla wa-jarha. Asharq Al Awsat 16.11.2019. https://aawsat.com/home/article/1993476/‫ﻱﻥﺍﺕﺱﻱﺱﻝﺍ‬-‫ﻱﻑ‬-‫ﻕﺩﻥﺥ‬-

‫ﻥﻱﺝﺕﺡﻡﻝﺍ‬-‫ﺭ ّﺫﺡﻱﻭ‬-‫ﺓﺱﺍﺱﻝﺍ‬-«‫ﻥﻱﻡﻩﺍﻭﻝﺍ‬. Aygün FT (2020) The vote of confidence test of Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies 27.04.2020. https://www.orsam.org.tr/en/the-vote-of-confidence-test-of-mus tafa-al-kadhimi/ CNN (2020) Iran attacks bases housing US troops. CNN 08.01.2020. https://edition.cnn.com/mid dleeast/live-news/us-iran-soleimani-tensions-intl-01-07-20/index.html

Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context …

107

Crisis Group (2018) Saudi Arabia: back to Baghdad. Crisis Group 22.05.2018. https://www.crisis group.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/186-saudi-arabia-back-bag hdad Dagher M (2020) Is Mustafa al-Kadhimi Good News for Iran? Center for Strategic and International Studies 21.04.2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/mustafa-al-kadhimi-good-news-iran Eisenstadt M (2019) Operating in the ‘Gray Zone’ to Counter Iran. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 18.09.2019. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/operatinggray-zone-counter-iran Habib M (2019) Iraq’s Foreign ‘Allies’ Are Killing Iraq’s Hope for A Better Future. Niqash 02.10.2019. https://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/5999/ Hasan H (2019) The subtle power of Sistani. Carnegie Middle East Center 14.11.2019. https://car negie-mec.org/diwan/80346 Hearst D (2020) Revealed: the secret US-Iran deal that installed Kadhimi in Baghdad. Middle East Eye 14.05.2020. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/revealed-secret-us-iran-deal-installed-kad himi-baghdad Issaev L, Korotayev A (2022) Introduction. New wave of revolutions in the MENA region in the global perspective. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_1 Khatib DK (2022) 17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 75–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_4 Kurdistan 24 (2019) Special Iraqi cabinet session passes resolutions in response to protests. Kurdistan24 06.10.2019. https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/6cad4223-48f8-420d-bd3e-bed 95378f7ca Mansour R (2019) Iraq’s 2018 Government formation: unpacking the friction between reform and the status quo. LSE Middle East Center Report 19.11.2019. https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100099/1/ Mansour_Iraq_s_2018_government_formation_2019.pdf Mardasov A (2019) “Caliphate” prepares the ground for “Al-Qaeda”. Independent Newspaper 08.06.2019. https://www.ng.ru/courier/2019-06-02/10_7588_khalifat.html Mardasov A (2020a) Source: Iran coordinated attacks with the US through Qatar and Iraq. NEWS.ru 08.01.2020a. https://news.ru/near-east/iran-predupredil-ssha-ob-atakah-na-kon kretnye-obekty-cherez-irak-i-katar/ Mardasov A (2020b) Who and why is storming the US embassy in Iraq. NEWS.ru 31.12.2020b. https://news.ru/near-east/kto-i-zachem-shturmuet-posolstvo-ssha-v-irake/ Numan H (2020) Iraq needs a new prime minister. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 23.01.2020. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraq-needs-new-primeminister O’Doherty M (2019) The Legacy of Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi’s Government—A Study of Human Rights Violations, Corruption, Poverty and Political Instability in the Republic of Iraq. Lulu.com 31.10.2019 Reuters (2019a) Exclusive: Iran intervenes to prevent ousting of Iraqi prime minister—sources. Reuters 31.10.2019a. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests-iran-exclusive/exclusiveiran-intervenes-to-prevent-ousting-of-iraqi-prime-minister-sources-idUSKBN1XA2DI Reuters (2019b) Iraq hosts regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia at conference. Reuters 20.04.2019b. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-parliament/iraq-to-host-regional-rivals-iran-and-saudiarabia-at-conference-idUSKCN1RW08B Salim M, Cunningham E (2019) As protests rattle Iraq, influential Shiite cleric calls to overhaul political system. The Washington Post 29.10.2019. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/tens-of-thousands-of-iraqis-protest-in-defiance-of-government-curfew-as-casualtiesmount/2019/10/29/0a3ad034-fa3a-11e9-8906-ab6b60de9124_story.html

108

A. Mardasov

Stars and Stripes (2020) 29 soldiers to receive Purple Hearts for injuries in Iranian missile attack. Stars and Stripes 04.05.2020. https://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/29-soldiers-to-receivepurple-hearts-for-injuries-in-iranian-missile-attack-1.628441 The National (2019) Iraqi PM Adel Abdul Mahdi announces resignation after bloody protest crackdown. The National 29.11.2019. https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/iraqi-pm-adelabdul-mahdi-announces-resignation-after-bloody-protest-crackdown-1.944391 The New Arab (2019) Tehran-Damascus road ‘launched’ as Iranian military convoy enters Syria. The New Arab 16.12.2019. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/12/16/tehrandamascus-road-launched-as-iranian-military-convoy-enters-syria Vasiliev A, Isaev L, Korotayev A, Kozhanov N, Mardasov A, Semenov K, Khairullin T (2019) Scramble for the Middle East. Regional actors in the context of the reconfiguration of the Middle East conflict. LENAND, Moscow World Bank (2019) Iraq’s economic update—October 2019. The World Bank 09.10.2019. https:// www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq/publication/economic-update-october-2019 Young M (2019) How deep is Anti-Iranian sentiment in Iraq? Carnegie Middle East Center 14.11.2019. https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/80313

Anton Mardasov is non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute (Washington, DC). He is also served as an expert of the Russian International Affairs Council and regular columnist of AlMonitor magazine. His area of interest includes political process of the Arab countries, militarytechnical cooperation in MENA region and radical movements in Syria and Iraq.

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan Andrey Zakharov and Leonid Issaev

Abstract Among the countries that, as a result of the events of the Arab Spring, showed resistance to political instability, one finds Morocco and Jordan. Outbreaks of protest activity throughout the 2010s were observed in both of them. The authorities of the Kingdoms responded to the disturbing events with varying degrees of political virtuosity, however, in both cases, the monarchs managed to localize and suppress the protests. At the same time, when analyzing the policy of adaptation of Jordan and Morocco to revolutionary trends, researchers often noted the sacred nature of power: both the Hashemites and the Alaouite are direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Such an opinion seems erroneous, since the principle of untouchability in relation to crowned leaders, even with such a respectable pedigree, does not always work. The reasons for this lie both in the political-practical and religious-doctrinal planes. Undoubtedly, both Moroccan and Jordanian monarchs deliberately used religious rituals and institutions to consolidate their own power. However, based on the analysis of the Jordanian case, in this chapter, Zakharov and Issaev show that the sacred nature of the Hashemite government does not give the ruling regime “immunity” from possible shocks. Jordan was also affected by the new revolutionary wave. In 2018, the largest protests since the Arab Spring took place in the country, which were caused, like in many countries in the region, by the increase in the price of fuel and food. The protesters expressed their dissatisfaction with the unpopular reforms of the government of Hani Mulki. As a result, King Abdullah II again had to resort to another resignation of the government and sacrifice economic expediency in exchange for the political loyalty of citizens. Zakharov and Issaev conclude that the Jordanian experience in creating in the 2010s the “island of stability” in the MENA region testifies to the art of political maneuvering and pragmatism of Abdullah II, rather than the use of his religious status. A. Zakharov (B) Russian State University for Humanities, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] L. Issaev HSE University, Moscow, Russia Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_6

109

110

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

In November 1920, Abdullah, the eldest son of Mecca’s Sharif Hussein, travelled a thousand kilometers from his hometown to Ma’an, a small village in the middle of the desert, situated on the outskirts of British-ruled postwar Palestine. Shortly before that, London had divided the Palestinian mandate into two, enabling the territory where the noble guest from Hijaz had arrived to acquire its own name on the map. The place was now called Transjordan, stating in the name the fact that one of the most famous rivers of the Middle East—and of the whole world—divided it in two. The expedition led by Abdullah consisted of three hundred armed men equipped with six machine guns. They were to establish a state literally from scratch—despite the total lack of what the British orientalist Philip Robins calls “the raw material of statehood” in Transjordan (Robins 2019: 16). This peculiarity of the national history was explained by the fact that the appearance of Jordan on the world map did happen without the prior cultivation of its own and distinctive political institutions. The country became a “new creation” brought to life by the ambitions of the British imperialists, who after World War I reorganized the piece of the Middle East they had inherited: Transjordan was almost biblically created out of nothing. However, young states have not only obvious weaknesses, but also undeniable advantages—free from a heavy, and sometimes uncomfortable, historical past, they are freer in their development, sometimes making such breakthroughs, which cannot be achieved by solid powers with a great past. Perhaps this point partly explains the almost miraculous and rather rapid transformation of an “artificial creature” into a modern “nation-state” (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: XIV). Along the way, Jordan was repeatedly predicted to collapse, sometimes as if the collapse was just around the corner; but not only was the state not torn apart by dangerous neighbors and internal enemies, it was able to withstand the storms of the Arab Spring in 2011–2012, which thoroughly cleaned out the attics and the closets of Middle Eastern politics. The expedition led by Abdullah was preceded by significant events. It must be said that before World War I, the dynastic ambitions of the Hashemites who had settled in the Arabian Peninsula at the time of the Prophet were quite modest: the Turkish Sultan in his capacity of “Caliph of the Faithful” entrusted them the hereditary care of the Muslim shrines of Mecca and Medina, which they handled very well, without annoying their suzerain and taking obvious benefits from their guardianship status. However, this seemingly eternal state of affairs was shaken by the Young Turk revolution of the late 1900s. The reformers who took power were motivated by the desire to turn a deteriorating cosmopolitan empire into the likeness of a modern nation-state—with Turks as the state-forming people. In Arabia, as in many other parts of the Ottoman world, such initiatives were viewed with suspicion: educated and ambitious local townsfolk were reluctant to change from Ottoman subjects to Turkish citizens, and the “sons of the desert”, the Bedouin, feared the excessive interference of a centralized—and therefore increasingly ubiquitous—state in their cherished nomadic existence. The streamlining of the imperial periphery by Constantinople meant, among other things, the incorporation of Bedouin communities into state law enforcement structures, which deprived them of the opportunity to collect the traditional security tax from the lands bordering the Arabian Peninsula from the

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

111

north, which now went into the imperial treasury. Finally, it is worth noting that the local population was unenthusiastic about the construction of the Hijaz railroad, which was launched by the Ottoman authorities in the early years of the twentieth century. This line, designed by the engineers to connect Damascus with Mecca, hurt the economic interests of the big tribes, which were used to collecting money from the numerous pilgrims whose caravans had been passing through their lands (Robins 2019: 8). These circumstances could not but prompt Abdullah and Feisal, the eldest and youngest sons of the Sharif of Mecca, to intensify contacts with Arab nationalists from Damascus and Beirut, who, already on the eve of 1914, were beginning to dream of replacing Sultanic patronage with the scepters of Arab royal dynasties (MiltonEdwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 15–16). In turn, World War I, which soon broke out, finally convinced Sharif Hussein, their father, to look to London, which could do far more for Arab self-determination (and the Arabian purse) than Constantinople. A detailed description of how this discontent matured, how it culminated in the 1916 Arab Revolt, and how Arab expectations were shamed in the post-war settlement is beyond the scope of this paper (Eugene Rogan, for example, offers a detailed description of this drama [Rogan 2012: 182–216]); in discussing how modern Jordan came into being, we will limit ourselves to selected aspects of this fascinating story directly related to the transformation of the sons of the Sharif of Mecca into newly crowned Arab monarchs. When the world war broke out, Abdullah was the first of the two brothers to interact with the British, helping them to make contact with their father. Communication was mutually beneficial: it was important for the British to prevent the jihad threatened by the German-backed Porte, while the Sharif of Mecca, who could influence such plans, hoped, with London’s help, to expand his political and economic ambitions beyond his native Hijaz. After the repeated promise of an Arab state to the Hashemites failed to materialize, Hussein’s sons tried to arrange their own destiny. Although troops under Prince Faisal occupied the port city of Aqaba in July 1917 without a fight, and quietly took Amman the following September, the land where Jordan is located today was not seen as a separate territorial entity at the time—unlike, say, neighboring Iraq. Damascus remained the center of almost all political activity in the Arab world. Of course, this city was also an object of lust for the heroes of the recent Arab Revolt. In November 1918 an Anglo-French declaration was published and it blessed the establishment of local governing structures in Iraq and Syria. Encouraged by this document, Faisal, with the help of Iraqi and Syrian nationalists, as well as British officers, established a government under his authority in the Syrian capital. But, as British experts on Jordan write, “Sadly for Arab ambition, autonomy was one thing, independence quite another as far as victorious European allies were concerned” (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 18). In the summer of 1919, the Syrian Congress, meeting in Damascus, first called on the Allied powers to recognize the independence of Syria (including Palestine) under King Faisal, and then proclaimed Abdullah King of Iraq. Since the Entente ignored these decisions, Faisal himself went to the Paris Peace Conference to prove the righteousness of the cause espoused by the Hashemites. His argument was based on three statements: firstly, the correspondence between the Sharif of Mecca and the British high commissioner in Egypt, which took

112

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

place in 1915–1916 and unequivocally promised the Arabs their own state; secondly, the aid given to the Allies during the Arab Revolt; finally, the actual establishment of a monarchical administration in Damascus under his own authority. Meanwhile, the French, who considered Faisal an Anglophile, did not like his elevation at all; wanting to limit the high-handedness of the Prince of Hijaz, they reminded the British of that paragraph of the Sykes-Picot-Sazonov agreement signed in 1916, which provided for the transfer of postwar Syria to the control of the French Republic.1 The Allies solved the problem by relying on the system of mandated territories established by the Paris Conference: in 1920, the British abandoned the Syrian lands and the French troops who replaced them forced the younger brother of the Shariff of Mecca to withdraw from Damascus. After Faisal was compensated a year later by receiving from London the prerogatives of the King of Iraq, the British were faced with the question of the employment of his elder brother. The Hashemite possessions in the Arabian Peninsula were shaking under the onslaught of the local Wahhabis: many already realized that the Sharif of Mecca would not be able to hold the Hijaz in his hands. It was then that Abdullah undertook the desert march with which this chapter began. He needed an empire of his own, if only a small one, but there was hardly any free space around. After staying in Ma’an for three months, the elder prince moved to Amman. It is hard not to agree that in the end Abdullah’s whole adventure was “an attempt to bring himself back to the attention of the British, from whose favour he would have hoped to benefit” (Robins 2019: 19). British officials, who were engaged in setting up a mandate system in the former Ottoman lands, were both annoyed and alarmed by Abdullah’s presence. To them, who were pondering whether the territory of Transjordan should be incorporated into Mandate Palestine or whether it would be better to establish a military administration there, the presence of a representative of one of the most ancient Middle Eastern dynasties in their midst did not seem at all appropriate. But they did not dare to use force against a former comrade-in-arms who was left without a Kingdom; that was how, by default, the future Jordanian King gradually put down roots in the land of his future Kingdom. Contributing to his entrepreneurial spirit was the fact that Westminster realized fairly quickly: a political vacuum left on the banks of the Jordan would threaten communications between the extremely important British acquisitions of Iraq and Palestine (Robins 2019: 14). This is how Transjordan, quite unexpectedly for its rare inhabitants, acquired strategic significance, if only as a “buffer” or “bridge” connecting more important lands for the British – and the prospect of political selfdetermination that flowed from it. Eventually, in March 1921, at a conference in Cairo organized by the British Ministry of Colonial Affairs, the crowned brothers were finally given what they deserved: Feisal was entrusted with the establishment of Arab statehood in Iraq and Abdullah was in Transjordan. The British, who trusted the younger brother more, offered him a really important position. Iraq was very important to their political games. The older one received only a “consolation prize,”

1

Although the publication of the document caused a great scandal in the Arab world, it was not revoked.

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

113

with the latter, as Philip Robins notes, feeling “contempt for the apparently unviable state of Transjordan” (Robins 2019: 17). Interestingly, the elder was put on a sort of probationary period: for six months he had to prove that he was capable of governmental work. “The British had doubts about Abdullah’s competence, but in the end it was thought easier and above all cheaper to leave him where he was” (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 19). In September 1922 the League of Nations formally withdrew Transjordan from the Palestinian mandate (Abu Nowar 2006: 3), and in May 1923 Britain recognized the Transjordanian Emirate as an “independent constitutional state”. The final touches to this state-forming process were put by the Saudi Wahhabis: in 1925, having secured the abdication of Ali, another son of the Sharif of Mecca, from the throne of the ruler of the Hijaz, they finally expelled the Hashemites from their historic homeland— depriving Abdullah of his last hopes of returning home. At the same time, the Bedouin tribes mobilized by the Transjordanian Emir—assisted, it should be said, by the British air force—not only repulsed repeated attempts by Ibn Saud’s followers to move north, but also reclaimed the borderlands of Ma’an and Aqaba for the newborn state. They were annexed and remain safely within Jordan to this day—the Saudis did not take them back, in part because the British wanted to limit Saudi expansionism to the western part of the Hijaz lands, leaving the eastern part under their control. “While they had not defended the Hashemites in the Hijaz, the British had ensured their dynastic survival in Transjordan,” the historian concludes (Robins 2019: 28). The demographic profile of the newborn state was at first as shaky as its borders. In 1922 there were about 225,000 people in Transjordan; this population was divided into “sedentary” and “nomadic” roughly equally. With the annexation of Ma’an and Aqaba the figure rose to 300,000.2 However, unlike some of its neighbors, Transjordan was characterized by outstanding ethnic and religious homogeneity. Arabs comprised 94% of the population, and the next largest ethnic group was the Circassians, who comprised five percent. Religiously, Sunni Muslims dominated the country, while Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics together accounted for 10% (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 20). This homogeneity not only spared the young country from “sectarian” strife—land, rather than religion or ethnicity, has traditionally been the main point of contention here—but also provided it with a margin of safety for the future: it is this point that can reasonably be seen as one of the reasons why the Jordanian Kingdom survived the Arab Spring of 2011–2012 while many neighboring states collapsed. The local society was a hierarchically organized tribal structure. At first, Abdullah, who did not abandon his dreams of a Syrian throne—he saw the new possession only as a “territorial point of departure from which to expand the Hashemite domains” into Palestine or Syria (Robins 2019: 21)—tried to govern without any local notables and relying exclusively on his companions from the Hijaz and English local officials, but this scheme could only be temporary. As the prospect of a Syrian throne became increasingly shaky and the Hijaz was lost to the Hashemites altogether, the ruler 2

Jordanian population numbers “floated” further, which was due to several waves of refugees received by the country in the 1940s–1990s.

114

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

of Transjordan relied more and more heavily on the local Bedouin nomads. “An expert in tribal affairs, he applied the old doctrine of ruling through shaikhs and notables, and while he allowed his cabinet to run the administration of the country, he directly communicated with the traditional leaders of the people,” Ma’an Abu Nowar writes.—“He kept the sheikhs and notables informed of his wishes and aims and convinced them that they were their own” (Abu Nowar 2006: 6). By 1930 the Bedouin nomads made up about 140,000 of the country’s approximately 300,000 inhabitants. The new state borders that appeared on the map of the Middle East after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire dramatically complicated the lives of the Bedouin tribes, who lost one of the most important attributes of their lives: freedom of movement: “They could no longer ignore their government as they did when their capital was in Istanbul” (Abu Nowar 2006: 82). This situation, in turn, made new demands on the governments as well: limiting the practice of raiding, long prevalent in the desert, required channeling the Bedouin’s energy in a more positive and safe direction for the new authorities. It must be said that Amir Abdullah was up to the task. Since the British treasury covered one third of all state expenditures until 1939, the newly emerged state could not claim even a semblance of independence: the British, to the considerable annoyance of the ruler, for a long time refused to call his possessions “amirate”, and this level of dependence allowed them to interfere without hesitation not only in any matters of state life, but also in the functioning of the court itself. “Every pound paid to the Amir’s Civil List was subject to the approval of the British Government,” notes a local author, not without bitterness.—“In the case of the Amir Abdullah, although” (Abu Nowar 2006: 71, 73). Moreover, the holdings of the Amir were by no means increased: from 1923 to 1926, in just three years, the personal allowances allocated to him by the British Commissioner in Jerusalem were reduced from 36,000 to 12,000 pounds (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2006: 21). The main reason was that “the Amir treated the national budget as his private purse, and his Arab ministers were unwilling or unable to curb his spending” (Robins 2019: 31). For a time, the British representative in Amman even considered replacing Abdullah with Said, another son of the Sharif of Mecca. In the eyes of the colonial administration, Abdullah remained for a long time a “lazy, feckless and a spendthrift” (Robins 2019: 22). Of course, in addition to finances, the colonizers also kept the newly born Transjordanian army, the so-called Arab Legion, under their vigilant oversight; in 1923 it consisted of 1,300 men, with natives making up only 65% of its strength. In February 1928, the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty was signed, permanently predetermining the path of constitutional development of Transjordan. According to this document, Britain was to maintain tight control over the Middle Eastern country’s foreign and defense policy, as well as its communications and finances. Historian Mary Wilson describes the treaty as “inequality written into every clause” (Wilson 1987: 102). To the chagrin of Jordanian leaders, British officials did not miss a chance to emphasize the contrast between the obvious progress of state-building in Iraq and the equally undeniable backwardness of Transjordan. Nevertheless, once the treaty was signed, the country received some additional bonuses: in particular, the

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

115

Amir was radically strengthened in his personal power, his possessions were ordered to have their own constitution, and Jordanian lands were permanently immunized against Zionist colonization (Abu Nowar 2006: 11). Subsequently, the Organic Law of Transjordan, whose basic provisions were included in the aforementioned treaty, was revised in 1939 and 1946, serving as the basis for the Jordanian Constitution of 1952.3 In turn, the enactment of this state-forming act enabled the establishment of a national Legislative Council consisting of 21 members: fourteen were elected, two represented Bedouin tribes without electoral rights, and another five were delegated by the executive. In assessing the activities of this institution, historians differ markedly: while local specialists consider the appearance of parliament a major breakthrough in the country’s social development, calling it a “real political force” (Abu Nowar 2006: 22), their foreign colleagues tend to see it as an insignificant decoration through which the monarch sometimes intimidated the British (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 23). The facts, however, make the second point of view more convincing: in its subsequent history, Jordan managed for decades without a parliament, which was “frozen” at the behest of the crown, which appropriated its law-making powers. However, for all its powerlessness, in the Transjordanian context the Legislative Council remained the only forum in which the interests of other socio-political actors nascent in the country could be represented to the state (Robins 2019: 42). At the turn of the 1920s and 1930s Transjordan underwent an agrarian reform, initiated by the British administration, with profound social and political implications. The British, claiming a desire to create a stable middle class of landowners in the country, forcibly fragmented large tracts of land formerly owned collectively by the tribes and distributed them into private hands. The transformation changed not only the principles of land use but also the system of government. In the process of “redistribution” a small group of really big land magnates appeared in Transjordan, represented by the sheikhs of the most important tribes, and Abdullah himself joined them in 1931—wanting to compensate the Amir for the frustrations caused by the constantly reducing allowances, the colonial authorities allocated him vast areas of land as his personal property. With the emergence of a new agrarian elite, led by the monarch himself, the former collective rights on which tribal economic (and political) life had been based were undermined. A small oligarchy began to form intensively in the country, whose loyalty became for a long time the main guarantor of the welfare of the Hashemite monarchy. Although the Bedouin tribes were officially exalted and revered, the real power was in the hands of a small clique that had no need for democratic means of political representation at all and invariably preferred forceful ways of solving problems. This helps explain not only Jordan’s hypertrophied disregard for mass political expression over the following decades, but also the relatively recent failure of the local Arab Spring. Land reform was an important, but not the only part of the “taming” of the tribal periphery, without which it was impossible to build a modern state. The need to streamline socio-economic practices entailed adjustments in traditional nomadic 3

Interestingly, the Organic Law did not mention that Islam was the official religion of the new state.

116

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

life. The semi-nomadic tribal confederations were initially viewed with considerable suspicion by the British administration: “These tribesmen were regarded as lawless marauders, whose brigandage was a threat to the principle of the rule of law, and specifically to the peaceable and hardworking peasants of the country’s marginal, cultivable areas” (Robins 2019: 42). The nomadic population had to be transformed into a settled population without quarreling with the crown and with new sources of livelihood. As mentioned above, land grants were given to prominent sheikhs to compensate them for abandoning their former way of life. As for the ordinary members of the tribal unions, the Transjordanian state offered them a peculiar employment program by creating new power structures. Thus, in 1926, the Transjordanian Frontier Service was established, which, on the one hand, stopped the disorderly circulation of the population between the newly formed state borders and, on the other hand, turned some militant nomads into disciplined “budget workers”. The new formation coordinated its activities with the Arab Legion and the British army. “The incorporation of the tribal periphery into the state,” notes Robins, “removed the last major socio-economic obstacle to the consolidation of the state in Transjordan” (Robins 2019: 46). Hierarchy, elitism and hermeticism became the main features of the newborn power structure. In the 1930s, Abdullah began to assess with more sobriety his hopes for the throne of “Greate Syria”, undermined not only by the weakness of his state, but also by the Hashemite kin who settled in neighboring Iraq and took advantage of the oil wealth of that country. The establishment of the Vichy regime’s administration in Damascus in 1941 gave him new hopes: in 1942–1944 the Lord of Amman repeatedly launched new initiatives of Syrian-Jordanian integration. The first ruler of Transjordan was still cramped for space in his small Kingdom (for more on Abdullah’s integration aspirations, see Zakharov and Issaev 2021; Porath 2013). Continuing to put forward various projects of pan-Arab unification of neighboring countries—under his own leadership, of course—Abdullah looked with growing lust to the nearby territories that adjoined the Jordan River. In the middle of that decade, ignoring the indignation of the Arab world, he supported the British plan for the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab parts, which would have placed the Arab-populated territories under Transjordan’s patronage. In 1921, during the very first negotiations with Winston Churchill, then head of the Colonial Office, Abdullah mentioned the prospect of uniting Transjordan and Palestine under the scepter of one Arab ruler. Now, however, Palestinian nationalists categorically refused to discuss partition, but Abdullah was guided by his own goals, cooperating pragmatically even with Zionist organizations in their realization (see Robins 2019: 49–54). It was then that the seeds were sown of the mutual aversion that repeatedly manifested itself in Jordanian politics, and for the Amir himself ended prematurely—in death at the hands of a Palestinian terrorist. The outbreak of World War II delayed Abdullah’s “Palestinian intrigue”—his country, as a staunch ally of London, was one of the first to officially enter the conflict with Germany. It is fair to say, however, that the belief in the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition was not immediately cemented in the monarch’s heart: in the first months of the battles, as Robins testifies, “Abdullah became quite depressed at the direction that the war had taken, and feared that he had backed the wrong horse”

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

117

(Robins 2019: 55). During the mobilization of the colonies, Transjordan managed to strengthen its military capacity: by 1945 the Arab Legion, the backbone of its army, had quadrupled to 7,400 men, and the number of vehicles had risen from 27 in 1937 to 600 in 1943 (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 26; Robins 2019: 58). At the same time, the increase in political prestige was much worse, since the post-war Jordanian monarchy was far inferior in this respect to the monarchies of Iraq and Egypt. The establishment of the Arab League was a real blow to Abdullah’s aspirations: the emir had hoped that this new political association would help to fulfill his dreams of a pan-Arab federation of the “Fertile Crescent”, but Arab politicians categorically refused to give up even a small piece of sovereignty. “Seven heads thrust into a sack,” was how the Jordanian monarch later characterized the new League (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 27). Disillusioned with pan-Arab integration, after the war ended, Abdullah focused on his country’s full independence: by then the archaic status of his possession looked like a blatant anomaly—Jordan was the only country without sovereignty among the founders of the League of Arab States. By March 1946, when an “eternal peace and friendship” treaty was signed between Amman and London, Jordan was a fullfledged Kingdom. It was, however, a rather convenient form of independence, since the young state continued to live on British funds, and its security was ensured by the British military presence, calculated, according to the treaty, for the next quarter of a century. Pointing to these facts, the Soviet Union vetoed Jordan’s admission to the United Nations, and paradoxically the United States of America, which was sensitive to its own Zionists, also at first solidarized with it. But while the United States did establish diplomatic relations with the newborn country in 1949, the Soviet veto remained in effect until 1955. In the postwar period, Abdullah returned to promoting a project he had first supported in 1937: the partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs, which the new King hoped would enrich his country with new lands. Amman was in constant and unspoken contact with the Jewish leadership, because without Zionist support the plan would not have been feasible. The Jordanian line was radically at odds with what not only the Palestinians, but also other Arab states that opposed such a deal, insisted on. Nevertheless, the extreme aggravation of the Arab–Jewish conflict, stimulated by the British withdrawal from Palestine in mid-May 1948, nevertheless dragged Abdullah into a large-scale and armed confrontation that neither he nor his state absolutely needed. When the Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi troops, backed by the volunteer (and very ill-prepared) Arab Liberation Army, invaded Palestine on May 14–15, it was Abdullah who was their nominal commander: it was a deliberate attempt to revive the spirit of the 1916 Arab Revolt led by the Hashemites. As is well known, the war did not go well for the Arabs; the troops of the newly proclaimed State of Israel crushed them everywhere. The only army unit that was able to put up a few weeks of fighting was the Jordanian Arab Legion, which, by the end of the battle, had managed to take the Old City of Jerusalem and all its Muslim holy places, as well as Hebron to the south and Samaria to the north. These successes helped the Jordanians greatly in the territorial bargaining that followed: with the successes of the Arab Legion, Abdullah I “had legitimized and realized his expansionist ambitions in

118

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

Palestine” (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 30). He now acted as patron and protector of the Palestinians humiliated by the Israelis: “though perennially thought of as small and weak, Transjordan had emerged both diplomatically and militarily as the most effective of all the Arab states” (Robins 2019: 62). In 1950, Jordan legitimized its Palestinian acquisitions by formally announcing the annexation of the territories occupied by its troops, and its parliament unanimously passed a resolution to unite the East and West banks of the Jordan River. On the eve of the fateful vote, the court went to great lengths to ensure that the action would not appear to world public opinion as a whim of an ambitious dynasty traditionally concerned with expansionism, but rather as the satisfaction of a longstanding popular demand (Robins 2019: 74). While Britain recognized Amman’s initiative immediately, the Arab League obliged Abdullah to declare that the unification was temporary and would remain in effect until the complete liberation of Palestine. The practical consequence of this development was not only the isolation of the Hashemite Kingdom in the Arab world, but also the emergence of the eternal “Palestinian question” for the Jordanian monarchy. By incorporating the West Bank, which had more advanced agriculture, the country won economically, but these gains were eaten away by the great influx of refugees fleeing the newly proclaimed State of Israel. By May 1949, the number of such exiles was half a million, and the population of the national capital had grown from 50,000 in 1948 to 120,000 in 1950 (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 31). Nevertheless, those Palestinians who opposed the partition of their historic homeland hated Abdullah as its accomplice and executor; in July 1951, one such outraged man shot and killed the King on the steps of the al-Aqsa Mosque, nearly killing his grandson, the future King Hussein. However, before Hussein began his reign, which lasted nearly half a century, the country waited for a brief interregnum during which his father Talal, the eldest son of Abdullah I, was on the throne. The new monarch, who suffered from mental illness, reigned for less than a year, and his tenure was marked in 1952 by the adoption of a new Fundamental Law of the Kingdom. The document had two distinctive features: first, it enshrined the role of Islam in public life by confirming the coexistence of Sharia courts with a secular judicial system; second, it established a parliamentary form of government, with a bicameral system and a rather broad power of the deputy corps. According to the Constitution, the adoption of the new legislation required the consent of both houses, the first of which was elected by universal male suffrage, and the second appointed by the monarch, with deputies even having the power to dismiss individual ministers and dismiss the government.4 In 1952, however, Talal, who was beginning to suffer from schizophrenia, abdicated the throne, giving power to his young son, who did not appreciate all this parliamentary gerrymandering. To be fair, it was not some inborn dislike of assemblies and multi-party systems—after all, Hussein had an English education and his mother was an Englishwoman—but rather a rational choice, driven by the very serious challenges that the 18-year-old monarch began to face in the first months of his nearly endless reign. 4

Over the next half century, however, this has only happened twice in Jordanian history—despite numerous streaks of political turbulence.

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

119

Probably the most significant of these was the rise of leftist nationalism, which after the 1952 Egyptian revolution affected almost the entire Arab world. In the euphoria of the time, “Jordanian public opinion, especially in the urban areas, was overwhelmingly in favour of Nasser” (Robins 2019: 99). The charismatic and popular Egyptian president made the unsophisticated Jordanian monarch seem like a political midget, and the years 1953–1957, marked by demonstrations, riots, and even an attempted coup, were not easy for him. The same period also saw the Iraqi revolution, which ended the Baghdad branch of the Hashemites with unprecedented cruelty. Nevertheless, Hussein held out. At first, the maneuvering tactics he learned from the early days of his rule allowed him to bypass the sharp corners, one by one, dealing with enemies and point by point bribing political actors. Then, when conventional ways of coping with more and more crises dried up, Hussein turned from 1957 to the rigid consolidation of his political regime, dissolving all political parties, freezing the work of Parliament, taking control of the press, isolating the opposition and purging the power structures. The Legislature and the cabinet became purely deliberative institutions, providing a technical service to the royal entourage and the crown prince. As a result, a distinctly personalistic and typically authoritarian regime was established in Jordan for decades, the main pillars of which were the royal court and the armed forces. While the first of these institutions, comprising representatives of the ruling dynasty, noble families and tribal leaders, symbolized the power of the few, the second, known as the “Hashemite Arab Army”, “is intimately associated and tied to the monarch rather than the state per se” (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 37), cemented oligarchic rule. Moreover, the army also played a key role in the very legitimization of Jordanian statehood, cherishing the memory of the 1916 Arab Revolt and Bedouin loyalty to the former masters of Mecca and Medina. In assessing Jordan’s capacity for socio-political reform, one must by no means forget the country’s long history of this ugly system that radically and comprehensively restricted all political participation. It certainly helps to understand why the “Arab Spring” in this country was limited to a minor thaw. At the same time, the man-made calm in domestic politics by no means spared the young monarch from anxiety and unrest. The steadily worsening Arab–Israeli relations in the first half of the 1960s, against the backdrop of powerful pressure exerted on Hussein by the passionate Egyptians and Syrians who had joined them, brought his country into an unnecessary conflict with Israel. Just as realists and pragmatists had expected, in the early hours of the Six-Day War in 1967, the Jordanian army—this time far from up to expectations—ceded the Arab part of Jerusalem and the whole of the West Bank to the Jewish state. With the loss of these territories, the Jordanian economy lost 40% of its GDP, almost 50% of its industrial capacity, and 25% of its irrigated land (Robins 2019: 131). In addition to the economic shock and psychological trauma, the Jordanian monarch had to deal with the gravest threat to his rule. The problem was that external troubles were turning before his eyes into internal challenges. It was not limited to new refugee flows, although of course they destabilized the Hashemite Kingdom. Far more serious in terms of the consequences was the forced relocation of the Palestine Liberation Organization established in 1964,

120

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

which in the new situation had chosen the possessions of Hussein as its main outpost in an irreconcilable struggle with Israel. The Israeli occupation of the last remnants of historical Palestine provoked a sharp radicalization among the exiles. The mass influx of armed Palestinians unnerved Amman, and the extension of martial law, imposed during the conflict, had no effect on the activity of the uninvited guests: during 1968, the Palestinian guerrillas actually established a “state within a state” on Jordanian territory, outside local government control. The Fedayeen’s forays into Israel prevented the Jordanian government from normalizing relations with Tel Aviv, which it needed for economic reasons. Moreover, the Palestinian “liberty” could not but excite the remnants of opposition within Jordan itself: Palestinian radicals, who also enjoyed local hospitality—in particular the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—did not hesitate to call for the overthrow of reactionary Arab monarchies, including, of course, the Jordanian one. The more moderate and dissenting Yasser Arafat had no leverage over his own extremists. For several years, the division in Jordanian society deepened, accompanied by mutual hatred of “insiders” and “outsiders”: as Robins writes, “for Palestinians the Transjordanians were al-hufa (“the barefoot ones”), implying that they were ignorant backwoodsmen; for the Transjordanians the Palestinians were cowards, who had run like rabbits in 1967” (Robins 2019: 134). The growing tensions culminated in a short but bloody civil war in the fall of 1970, in which the Hussein regime won an unqualified victory. The Jordanian army used the element of surprise to outplay the Palestinians everywhere, while repelling any outside help: the 12,000 Iraqi soldiers stationed on Jordanian soil went home without firing a single shot, and the Syrian armored column that was advancing to help Arafat was stopped by the Jordanians— more than half of their tanks were lost by the Syrians in that fight. The willingness to help Amman was declared by the Israeli authorities, and, though it did not go beyond words, those declarations noticeably cooled the fervor of some Arab allies of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The truce that was brokered in October 1970 by the Egyptians did not solve all the problems, and so a year later the conflict flared up again, this time ending with the expulsion of the guerrillas altogether. The cumulative result of the civil unrest was to make the conflict between (immigrant) Palestinians and (native) Jordanians part of everyday life. “While officially the Palestinian and East Bank populations were viewed as ‘one nation,’ in practice the legacy of the civil war resulted in a variety of informal practices of discrimination emerging from this period onwards” (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 44–45). In the 1980s, Jordan was in a kind of political hibernation, due to the endless extension of martial law and the efficiency of the repressive apparatus. At the same time, the stagnation of conventional politics led to the emergence of new forms of political action, in which non-state organizations—primarily student and professional associations, but also religious groups led by the Muslim Brotherhood—played a key role. However, the regime did not sleep either: it was at this time that the norm that their annual conferences, congresses, and meetings became legally valid only if a member of the state security (Mukhabarat) was officially present at the event (MiltonEdwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 45) was almost universally established in the statutes of non-profit organizations.

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

121

In 1986, after student riots at the state-run Yarmouk University caused by tuition increases, the King introduced new electoral legislation in parliament. Although it gave voting rights to Jordanian women for the first time, the continued ban on all political parties rendered the innovation meaningless. External and internal observers, however, saw in this initiative a hint of a possible launch—sometime in the future— of long-awaited reforms. The “calming” effect of this measure in 1988 was complemented by Hussein’s unprecedented decision to renounce any legal claim to the West Bank and the Arab part of Jerusalem, put forward by the Kingdom in 1950. Despite the controversial consequences—twenty thousand civil servants in the West Bank lost their jobs overnight, and the rest of its inhabitants lost their rights to Jordanian citizenship—it was an important gesture: the King was implicitly declaring that he was giving up forever his intention to represent the Palestinians on the international stage—and handing this right over to the increasingly recognized Palestinian Liberation Organization. The immediate political outcome of the demarche was a reconciliation between Jordanians and Palestinians; in other words, the Jordanian monarch’s diplomatic act further “froze” his country, weakening a long-standing source of internal destabilization. Nevertheless, the social capital of all these measures was squandered very quickly, because of the economic crisis that struck Jordan in the late 1980s, resulting in rampant inflation and rising unemployment. In 1988, the Jordanian dinar lost nearly a quarter of its value in just six months, and the government was forced to default on its foreign debts. Because the generosity of rich neighbors had accustomed the local elite to living beyond their means, by then the Kingdom’s per capita foreign borrowing was the highest in the world (Robins 2019: 176). The IMF’s request for help triggered shock measures, which inevitably provoked the first serious protests in many years. In the spring of 1989, mass unrest broke out in the south of the country, in what had traditionally been considered the strongholds of Hashemite loyalism. “Though not representing a direct challenge to the regime, the protesters were complainig about the conduct of the King, who was generally regarded as having become out of touch with popular sentiment” (Robins 2019: 180). The demand for sweeping political reforms with which people took to the streets in Ma’an, Karak, and Tafilah was unprecedented for Jordan; yet in responding to the popular outcry, the authorities were rather mild, which was not surprising. Had the outrages been in the Palestinian neighborhoods of the capital or in the refugee camps, the state’s response would have been very different. But here the instigators of the protests were “insiders”— the social groups that the regime was counting on and trying to encourage. The authorities immediately realized that “the protests came from the heartland of the state and reflected concern not only at the economic crisis the country faced but also reflected a conviction among many Transjordanians that they had become a disadvantaged minority in their own land” (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 48). The rise of the Palestinian population not only ensured parity between the two key groups in Jordanian society, but also the imminent future numerical superiority of “outsiders” over “locals”; immigration and the historically entrenched dominance of Palestinians in certain areas of the economy also contributed to this. In other words, in protesting against their native power, Transjordanians demanded political

122

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

and constitutional guarantees for their own future survival—and they got them. As was to be expected, the monarch was quite fatherly to the people’s aspirations: he personally exhorted the crowds, going out to the people in the streets, which could not but impress the demonstrators. After all, let us not forget that the Hashemite lineage comes from the Prophet himself. In principle, the events of 1989 can be considered a kind of rehearsal for the Arab Spring, which came to Jordan after two decades. The fact is that any manifestation of social protest in this country inevitably bears the imprint of the deepest and most insurmountable divisions within Jordanian society, as described above. The existence of the “Palestinian problem” and the achievement by the Palestinians of parity with the natives automatically reduce the degree of opposition to the regime and devalue protest sentiments: If, for example, the Sunni population in Syria could easily rally a masse against the Alawite regime of al-Assad, and Colonel Gaddafi’s Jamahiriya in Libya, which bored everyone to death, could just as easily set almost the entire national community against itself, such bitterness is technically unattainable in a 50/50 society. Any more or less widespread protest here would be unleashed with caution: the authorities, of course, can cause extreme indignation—as, for example, the Jordanian state has traditionally angered even loyal citizens with its incredible corruption—but one cannot be too harsh on them: the costs of a weakened regime may be worse than its vices. Of course, rulers who have been fortunate enough to rule in such situations take advantage of this. Another specific factor that has made the Jordanian protests of recent decades a special process is the country’s resource poverty. Compared to other states in the region, the potential prize in the struggle for power here has always looked rather modest. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, thanks to friendly relations with Saudi Arabia and, especially, Iraq—the historical grievances inflicted on the Hashemites by both of these powers were by then forgotten—“Jordan effectively began to acquire some of the economic attributes of an oil economy without itself producing any oil at all” (Robins 2019: 150). A special contribution to this transformation came from Baathist Iraq, whose leader not only supported the neighboring state’s economy (in the late 1980s 75% of Jordan’s exports were destined for Iraq), but also since 1976 had donated large sums of money personally to his “friend,” King Hussein. Nevertheless, even despite this strange relationship, which Robins ironically calls “the friendship of peasant and patrician” (Robins 2019: 160) and which led Hussein first to fervently support Saddam Hussein in his war with revolutionary Iran and then to refuse to help the Americans in liberating Kuwait, the point remained the same: Any potential opposition in that country could not fail to realize that it would not gain too much from gaining power. Further, since the country’s welfare in such circumstances depended not so much on entrepreneurial activity as on the monarch’s ability to negotiate with generous partners, the crown itself was the main generator of public welfare. Hence, in turn, there were two consequences that helped to muffle protest sentiments: first, the country always had a lot of state employees, who are “guardians of the unwilling” all over the world, and, second, the degree of state intervention in the economy has always been very high.

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

123

Having settled the crisis and anticipating the coming political “thaw,” Hussein initiated amendments to the electoral law: according to the innovations, the norm of parliamentary representation in the country was changed in favor of districts located in villages and small towns, where the vast majority of indigenous Transjordanians lived. And the Palestinians, who occupied the big cities, including the capital, were being perceptibly—though legitimately—disadvantaged by this measure. It was against this background that the throne announced the first more or less fully-fledged parliamentary elections in 22 years, scheduled for the fall of 1989. The bid for liberalization, however, was received with understandable skepticism by experts: given the oligarchic nature of Jordanian statehood, many considered “façade democracy,” which changed nothing in substance, to be the limit of what was possible. Nevertheless, the election was a resounding success, even though political parties were excluded, with a turnout of over 70%. Although 34 of the eighty parliamentary seats went to Islamists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, the monarchy had no cause for alarm, since the King retained the right to dissolve the representative body at any time. Aware of the strength of its position, the authorities made a number of liberal reverences to society after the vote: first, the government announced that it was abandoning the shameful practice of prior “screening” by the intelligence services of all applicants for government jobs; second, a directive was promulgated to reinstate those civil servants who had been fired due to political activity. The ruling regime’s prestige within Jordanian society was paradoxically further strengthened by an act in which most observers (and investors) saw an obvious foreign policy failure— namely, Hussein’s categorical refusal to support the military operation to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation. Despite huge economic losses and almost total isolation in the Arab world, the King’s authority, which refused to keep pace with the Americans, increased greatly in the eyes of his subjects. In 1992, the monarch was spontaneously greeted by cheering crowds of hundreds of thousands of Jordanians as he returned to his homeland after another round of treatment in an American cancer clinic. In 1991, the monarchy, implementing a new course, authorized the formation and registration of political parties, forbidding them to receive financial or other assistance from abroad. Shortly afterwards, martial law, in force in the country since 1967, almost a quarter of a century, was lifted. The first multiparty elections in many years were scheduled for 1992. The renewal of the electoral districts, a consequence of the 1989 protest movement, paid off: during the election of the new convocation of parliament, the Muslim opposition, united in the Islamic Action Front, lost almost half of its previous mandates, although it remained the largest faction with sixteen deputies. The same algorithm worked in 2003, already under the new monarch Abdullah II. Until his death from cancer in 1999, the veteran King Hussein, quite satisfied with the results of his “pacification” of Jordanian society, no longer remembered the democratic reforms: in the last years of his life in the country the pressure on the press, trade unions, civil organizations renewed. The phenomenon that experts call the “Franz Joseph effect” also worked in the King’s favor: after 46 years in power, his impending departure seemed unimaginable or even catastrophic, which clearly strengthened social cohesion (Robins 2019: 210). It is fair to say, however,

124

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

that even so, Jordan was very, very far from the standards of a “police state” functioning in Syria or Iraq at the time. King Hussein, for example, when prosecuting Islamic radicals, did not allow them to be executed, not wanting to create martyrs; not all of his neighbors were similarly circumspect. In any case, even barely audible hints of reform were enough to ensure that “at the beginning of the 1990s Jordan was often cited as the most encouraging example of democratization in the region” (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 56). The change of power strengthened this image at first. Many of the country’s residents, enthusiastic supporters of the young and dynamic leader, hoped that he would revive the liberalization program initiated by Hussein and later reversed by him. Particular hopes for the “new Jordan” were pinned on the young professionals who made up quite a solid stratum of local society. The broader citizenry expected a purging fight against corruption, because in their eyes, by the time the new leader arrived, “the throne had become tarnished by its association with a small group of self-serving individuals” (Robins 2019: 217). In 2002, the new King Abdullah II tried to divert public attention away from the regional issues that traditionally affect Jordan’s domestic political situation and proposed the concept of “Jordan First”. The purpose of this doctrine was to limit the negative impact of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as well as the crisis in Iraq, on the situation in the country. This is especially important in view of the specific structure of Jordanian society, where up to 60% of the population are Palestinian refugees and their descendants who are full citizens (Aganin and Solovyova 2003). One should not forget that “Palestinians, unlike the East Jordanian population of Bedouin origin and the descendants of natives of the North Caucasus (Circassians and Chechens who migrated to Jordan in the early twentieth century), have never been considered absolutely loyal to the ruling dynasty” (Demchenko 2013: 86). Palestinians are poorly represented in government, but they are well positioned in business. They are traditionally more politicized, sensitive to the events surrounding the Middle East conflict and “make up the social base of the Islamists, not so much out of interest in political Islam, but because they are close to the hardline approach of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, to Israel” (Demchenko 2013: 86). By the end of the 2000s, Abdullah II had markedly succeeded in ridding himself of the influence of the “old guard” rallied by his father who did not feel change, but he did not dare to make serious changes. “Although there was some criticism of human rights violations and electoral manipulation and a widespread feeling that the security services were too pervasive, there was also recognition that in an unstable region with a constant threat of terrorism fairly draconian measures might be necessary to ensure the security of the state” (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe 2009: 61). With such a public mood, neither the opposition nor democracy had much of a chance. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, the Islamic Action Front managed to win only six seats, the worst result since the “unfreezing” of the multiparty system. And this should come as no surprise: thanks to the manipulation of constituencies, in big cities like Amman, with its “problematic” electorate, there were 95,000 voters per

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

125

legislator, while in the pro-regime hinterland each legislator represented about 2,000 voters (Milton-Edwards, Hinchcliffe 2009: 62). On November 24, 2009, the King dissolved the parliament, which had served half of its term. Two weeks after the dissolution of parliament, the King dismissed the cabinet of Nadir al-Dahabi, who was replaced by the technocrat Samir al-Rifai. Formally, Abdullah II’s decision was explained by popular criticism of the government, which by the end of the 2000s was exacerbated by the global financial and economic crisis. However, the changes in the higher echelons of power were not aimed at carrying out radical changes in the country. Rather, the King once again resorted to a frequent maneuver in Jordanian political culture, in which the discontent of the population was managed by reshuffling political figures. The changes in the legislative and executive branches were welcomed by the opposition, including Islamists. However, the fact that the changes were cosmetic became clear by May 2010, when the new Election Law was adopted. The new procedure for parliamentary elections retained the principle of “one voter, one vote,” in which a voter can vote for only one candidate. Jordanians with the most traditional views (especially from the provinces), who prefer to vote primarily for representatives of their clans and tribes, were not able to cast additional votes for candidates from parties whose political platforms they are close to. The number of parliamentarians increased from 110 to 120. The number of seats reserved for women doubled from 6 to 12. Another 12 seats were allocated to representatives of ethnic and religious minorities: nine deputies from the Christian community and three from the North Caucasus. Reserved seats in the lower house for representatives of religious and ethnic minorities supporting the King meant that these quotas would be used by politicians loyal to the authorities. The authorities divided the Kingdom into electoral zones so that sparsely populated rural areas and provincial towns with indigenous Jordanians who vote for clan candidates loyal to the King are disproportionately represented in parliament. The division of geographic constituencies into so-called virtual subdistricts, which have no geographic boundaries, has become highly controversial. One deputy from each of the 108 sub-districts was elected (the remaining 12 members of parliament were elected according to a “women’s quota”). A person registered in his electoral zone had the right to vote for a candidate nominated from any virtual district (Al-Shorfa 2010). As a result, the country’s division into electoral zones and virtual districts meant that East Jordanians had the final say in elections, voting based on tribal preferences. The 2010 elections to the House of Representatives confirmed the opposition’s fears. A coalition of opposition forces (The Democratic People’s Party [HASHD], the Jordanian Ba’athist Party, the Communist Party of Jordan, and the National Union Party) put forward eight candidates. However, only one candidate managed to enter parliament. Also, only one candidate out of seven who ran as independents on behalf of the Islamists was able to get into the House of Representatives. As Alexander Demchenko notes, “in addition to the absence of Islamists, a feature of the 16th parliament in the history of Jordan was the reduction in the number of Palestinian deputies, who previously did not exceed 20%, but in the new parliament there were almost half as many. The parliament remained traditionally loyal to the King, as

126

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

the majority of deputies were representatives of the East Jordanian tribes and clans” (Demchenko 2013: 92). As in the case of Egypt, where parliamentary elections in late 2010 led to a sharp decrease in the Islamist presence in the House of Representatives, Jordan’s November 2010 elections also resulted in a significant reduction of the political spectrum in the House of Representatives. This, in turn, became an important factor of protest activity in early 2011, contributing to the involvement of Islamists in the Arab Spring (see Issaev and Shishkina 2012; Vasilyev 2011; Korotayev et al. 2014, 2016). The first protests in Jordan began on 22 January 2011, soon after the news of the resignation of Tunisian President Ben Ali. The protesters’ main demand was for a broad constitutional reform that would significantly limit the powers of the King and increase the role of the legislature in governing the country. Protesters also expressed dissatisfaction with rising fuel and food prices and high inflation. During the protests, the Jordanian monarch proved to be a very intransigent politician when it comes to radical constitutional changes. This is not so much due to his unwillingness to share power with the parliament, but rather to “the understanding that the traditional weakness of political parties in the country, as well as the rivalry between Jordanian Palestinians and East Jordanians (of Bedouin descent) could lead to destabilization if the reform process is forced” (Demchenko 2013: 85). Nevertheless, the Jordanian authorities immediately tried to meet, if not political, then at least socio-economic demands of the protesters. The government allocated about $0.5 billion to increase the salaries of civil servants and regulate fuel prices, as well as 12 socially important goods. Jordan also received $1.6 billion in aid from the Gulf monarchies, and the unpopular al-Rifai government was dismissed. General Marouf al-Bakhit, from the powerful East Jordanian clan of Abbadi, was appointed as the new prime minister. The Islamists were invited to join the new government, but they refused (Krylov 2013: 118). The protesters considered the authorities’ financial measures insufficient and designed for short-term effect. Al-Bakhit, an outspoken strongman rather than a socially oriented reformer, was the source of discontent. Not only the new government was attacked, but also the parliament, which voted almost unanimously (111 out of 120 deputies) after the elections to prolong the powers of the unpopular al-Rifai cabinet. The opposition demanded that the constitution be amended so as to increase the government’s accountability to parliament, as well as to introduce a norm that the cabinet be formed not by the King but by parliamentary parties (Demchenko 2013). This, in turn, would lead Jordan to become a real constitutional monarchy, rather than being considered a constitutional monarchy only on formal grounds. In turn, the 2011 Jordanian protests differed from the events in the republican states in that the protesters in Jordan did not question the very fact of royal authority. In other words, they were not talking about the abolition of the Hashemite dynasty as such, but about a significant reduction in its powers and giving them more ceremonial and symbolic functions. The Jordanian opposition has repeatedly stressed that “Jordan is not Egypt,” and that their goal is not regime change, but political reform. As alMansour stated, “we recognize and acknowledge the legitimacy of the Hashemites” (Maan News Agency 2011).

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

127

However, the Jordanian monarch also had his supporters, above all the East Jordanian elite, who also did not want major political change. During the Arab Spring protests, they drafted a petition to Abdullah II in which they criticized Queen Rania, expressing dissatisfaction both with her Palestinian origins and her political and social activism, which ran counter to the patriarchal values of the “desert” and contributed to the strengthening of the Palestinian influence. The authors of the appeal stressed that ignoring their warnings could lead to similar events in Jordan as in Tunisia and Egypt (The Royal Hashemite Court 2011). “The response of the country’s leadership to the opposition can be characterized as restrained, cautious and partly compromise. While actively discussing issues related to the social sphere and the fight against corruption, the authorities tried not to focus on the opposition’s demands for constitutional change, limiting themselves to promising to revise the law on elections, increase the role of parties, promote the development of free media and civil society” (Demchenko 2013: 94). On March 15, 2011, King decided to establish a National Dialogue Committee consisting of 52 representatives of social and political circles: opposition activists, public figures, one minister, representatives of trade unions, academics, and human rights activists. The committee was headed by the speaker of the Senate. However, the authorities failed to attract Islamists to participate in the committee, as they perceived the new body as too loyal to the King, created in order to allow the authorities to avoid serious concessions to the protesters, and to present the legislative changes as a result of a broad social and political dialogue. In order to prepare amendments to the basic law, on April 26, 2011, Abdullah II created a Royal Committee to review the constitution. A month later, Abdullah II announced the constitutional amendments drafted by the royal committee. They called for the creation of a Constitutional Court, the functions of which had previously been performed by the Supreme Court, headed by the speaker of the Senate. It was also decided to create an independent central election commission to monitor the elections (previously this was the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior). The King proposed lowering the minimum age of members of parliament from 30 to 25, prohibiting the government from passing laws while parliament is dissolved, and limiting the King’s right to terminate the powers of members of the lower house prematurely. Under the new rules, the government would also automatically resign if the lower house was dissolved. The authorities have pledged to improve respect for human rights, including increased criminal liability for infringement of citizens’ rights and freedoms. The principle of non-interference in the private life of citizens and the secrecy of correspondence was emphasized. King stated that for political reforms to succeed “it is essential that all forces and institutions, political party supporters, trade union supporters, or community supporters, be involved in and contribute to the reform process” (National Public Radio 2011). As a result, in September 2011 constitutional amendments were approved by parliament and adopted by the King, thus drawing a line under constitutional reform. Their main outcome was to preserve the monarch’s broad powers with only minor changes to the country’s political system, which, however, was in the interests of East Jordanian society.

128

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

But the monarch’s unwillingness to sacrifice his powers also had negative consequences for royal power. After the constitutional reforms, for the first time there were voices of criticism against Abdullah II himself among the Jordanian opposition. The attacks on the monarch “ranged from accusations of unwillingness to carry out reforms to establish a real, rather than declarative, constitutional monarchy in the opposition’s viewpoint, to hints of the possibility of removing the ruler from power for his inability to carry out reforms” (Demchenko 2013: 97). At the same time, however, criticism of the King was not widespread or dominant among protesters and the opposition in 2011. This, in turn, gave Abdullah II a greater flexibility in responding to the protesters’ demands, which Hosni Mubarak in Egypt or Ben Ali in Tunisia did not have (see Truevtsev 2011; Malkov et al. 2013). Researchers have repeatedly noted that for Jordan, unlike for most of its neighbors, the events of the Arab Spring were not fateful: local dissatisfied people took to the streets and demanded changes in government, but did not insist on the removal of the monarch or the abolition of the established regime. This left Jordanian elites wide latitude to maneuver and substitute cosmetic reforms for real change. The authorities, for their part, actively supported the legend that only one person died in the Jordanian Spring, and that person died of a heart attack, while the young monarch Abdullah II, pointing to the rampant bloodshed in neighboring Syria, said that he would rather abdicate than order the shooting at his people (Robins 2019: 221–222). There was indeed relatively little violence—the authorities simply did not see the need for it, since significant segments of the protest movement, such as the National Committee of Retired Military or the National Teachers’ Union, represented quite moderate loyalists. As a result, “King Abdullah II responded to protests with political and economic concessions, but this left political system substantively unchanged” (Teti et al. 2018: 3). Jordan also managed to avoid a classic “Arab Winter,” during which, in some countries, the main beneficiaries of the protest movement were Islamists, who quickly blocked any hope of democratization. The local Muslim Brotherhood, which had felt the iron hand of King Hussein for decades, barely showed up on the streets in the spring of 2011. To be more precise, when they routinely held their Friday rallies with the participation of 600–6000 people, they tried not to mix with other groups of protesters. The weakness of the trade unions, which Jordan has few and inexperienced because they do not have a long history, and the apathy of civil society, focused not on political issues but on providing services, allowed the regime once again to pit the “natives” against the “outsiders” to its advantage. While the former, whose ancestors have inhabited the Jordanian state since its inception, have always been offered special employment opportunities in the administrative apparatus or in the security forces, the latter, dominated by exiles from Palestine, have had none of this. Even though Palestinians have considerable influence in business, they struggle to exercise it, because local electoral law is skewed in favor of rural areas where the “natives” live, to the detriment of urban agglomerations where the “outsiders” are settled. For a country where refugees constitute 17% of the population, this is a very important factor (Teti et al. 2018: 10).

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

129

In Jordan, as in other countries of the Arab Spring, “people who took part or even just supported protests came from a wide variety of social and economic backgrounds and displayed a broad range of political allegiances” (Teti et al. 2018: 29). Nevertheless, the concerns and aspirations of the Jordanians were markedly different from the demands with which the Egyptians or Tunisians, for example, took to the streets of their cities. Moreover, in Jordan, the level of protest sentiments was not as widespread: according to post-revolutionary sociological surveys, while only one in twenty citizens over the age of eighteen participated in local demonstrations in 2011, for Egypt this was one in ten, and one in four for Tunisia (Teti et al. 2018: 36). In other words, the Jordanian youth were not the driving force behind the protests—the generational composition of the people here was more heterogeneous than, say, in Tunisia. Moreover, the political component of the protest slogans was, as already noted, more muted here than elsewhere: while in Jordan economic problems were the main cause of popular indignation, according to 63.7% of respondents, the same figure was 55.7% in Egypt and 48.5% in Tunisia (Teti et al. 2018: 41). The flip side of this was that Jordan’s authoritarian regime was ahead of the Tunisian and Egyptian dictatorships in providing such a service as security: while gaps in this area worried half the population in Egypt and a third in Tunisia, in Jordan only a fifth of the population was concerned about it (Teti et al. 2018: 45). However, such figures are hardly surprising in the context of the fact that 150,000 of the 350,000 civil servants in this small country serve in the army, police, or paramilitary structures (Robins 2019: 229). Surveys have also indicated that the protection of the state has been exchanged by Jordanians for some civil rights. According to a 2011 poll, an overwhelming majority of Egyptians and Tunisians (92.1% and 85.7%) felt that they were free to criticize their own governments; among Jordanians, only 44% of respondents held the same view (Teti et al. 2018: 46). Nevertheless, the King feels fairly confident. The authorities, balancing between the opposition and the East Jordanian elite, chose a wait-and-see tactic. Abdullah II saw the events of the Arab Spring primarily as a consequence of people’s dissatisfaction with their socio-economic situation, not as a result of the lack of political change. “The Arab Spring did not start because of politics; it started because of the economics—poverty and unemployment,” the Jordanian monarch noted (The Washington Post 2011). As a result, the Jordanian authorities saw their main task as ensuring that the traditional Friday rallies would remain speeches of party and trade union activists with the participation of a few thousand people at most and would not turn into a broad wave of popular discontent. Since the degree of radicalism in Jordan was lower than elsewhere, the cumulative results of the Arab Spring were assessed more optimistically by Jordanian residents. According to the Arab Barometer research service, Jordanians felt freer in 2013 than they did on the eve of the 2011 upheaval (Teti et al. 2018: 63). At the same time, in contrast to the value evolution of citizens in some other Arab countries, their post-revolutionary attitudes have been much more conservative in some crucial respects than they were before 2011. In 2014, for example, a substantial proportion of Jordanians were convinced that the parliamentary form of government had alternatives that were no worse: about 20% of those surveyed had no objection to an

130

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

authoritarian leader, an equal number believed that only Islamist parties should be allowed to participate in parliamentary elections, and 38% were willing to live by Islamic law and without parliament or parties (Teti et al. 2018: 69). Interestingly, a couple of years later, when the “Islamic State” gained strength, only 7% of Jordanians welcomed acts of jihadist violence, and there were 6,000– 7,000 Jordanians in the ranks of ISIS fighters—for a population of ten million (Robins: 250). Neither Egypt nor Tunisia could have imagined such a scenario. Of course, such sentiments could not but affect the rather smooth course of pacification of Jordanian society. In fact, the result of the street protests in this country was only a reshuffling of the government by the monarch, backed by promises of some minor reforms, such as an expansion of electoral quotas for women or the admission of voting from the age of 16. Unlike, say, Morocco, where stability was bought at the price of a new constitution, in Jordan the return to tranquility cost the ruling elites much less. Overall, “Jordan has managed to maintain its position as an ‘island of stability in the Middle East’ despite the regional turmoil, most notably the civil war in Syria and the conflict in Iraq” (Teti et al. 2018: 84). However, while the political component of the protest activity in Jordan has actually faded into the background and did not have a serious impact on the socio-political stability of the country after the Arab Spring, the economic reasons still contributed to the formation of anti-government sentiments. Throughout the 2010s, the Jordanian opposition failed to win broad public support for the demand to reduce the monarch’s power and for deeper constitutional reforms. Moreover, the demands that emerged at the end of 2011 against the King personally did not gain traction either. At the same time, the minimization of political demands after the Arab Spring did not mean the end of protest activity. The measures taken by Abdullah II to curb inflation and price increases in basic commodities in 2011 were short-lived and largely the result of foreign policy support for the Jordanian regime (primarily from the Gulf countries and the EU). At the same time, the structural problems of the Jordanian economy continued to have a negative impact on the socio-economic wellbeing of citizens, which became the trigger for new anti-government demonstrations. Jordan’s foreign debt reached $35.1 billion (93% of GDP) by 2016, doubling from 2011 (Kirk 2016). This was largely due to both Abdullah II’s reluctance to implement unpopular economic changes for fear of increased protest sentiment, and the deteriorating regional situation caused by the Syrian crisis, the growing number of refugees (second highest per capita in the world [The Jordan Times 2018]), spreading of terrorist structures in the Middle East, which lead to increased military spending and the decrease of foreign investments. The difficulties the Jordanian economy continued to face were exacerbated by cuts in foreign aid that the royal budget had received since the Arab Spring protests. For example, Saudi Arabia and the UAE suspended $1 billion in annual economic aid (The New York Times 2018), which was aimed at creating new jobs and overcoming unemployment in the country. Moreover, external funds are no longer sufficient to support Syrian refugees, who, according to World Bank estimates, cost the budget $2.5 billion a year (Khetam 2016).

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

131

This, in turn, caused discontent on the part of the Jordanian citizens themselves. In this context, King Abdullah II appealed to the international community to provide financial aid to Jordan, which would be used to support Syrian refugees. The Jordanian monarch noted that “Jordanian society has reached ‘boiling point’ … and expects help not only for the Syrians, but also for its own future” (BBC 2016). In 2016, the Jordanian government was headed by Hany Mulki, who had previously headed the Aqaba Special Economic Zone. The main task of the new cabinet was to stabilize the financial and economic situation in the country through austerity measures. In this regard, Mulki succeeded in obtaining a loan from the IMF with the condition that the volume of public debt be reduced to 77% of GDP by 2021. However, Mulki’s tenure as prime minister provoked strong public discontent, as the country’s recovery from the debt crisis was accompanied by a rise in the price of basic foodstuffs. The situation reached a tipping point in May 2018, when the government submitted a new version of the tax code to the House of Representatives, which included an increase in the tax rate for individuals as well as certain sectors of the economy (banking, leasing and insurance companies, etc.) (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2018). The situation was exacerbated by the fact that consideration of the new tax bill coincided with rising global oil prices, forcing the government to raise fuel and electricity prices (Reuters 2018). As a result, on May 30, 2018, a general strike began in Amman (and later in other major cities in the country), organized by Jordanian trade unions, against the cabinet’s economic policies. Protesters chanted maanash, which means “we do not have” in Arabic (The Indian Express 2018). The protests were the largest in the country since 2011, both geographically and massively. And, as Rana Sweis notes, “the protests have drawn diverse crowds—unemployed youth, women, store owners, families, Bedouins, and employees of high-tech companies. They have been eager to show that they do not come from any particular political or demographic group, but represent a broad spectrum of poor and middle-class Jordanians” (Sweis 2018). In turn, Islamists did not play a big role in the 2018 protests, nor did the traditional opposition groups that had been the driving force behind the street demonstrations during the Arab Spring. The reaction from the King was immediate: the next day, Abdullah II demanded that fuel prices stop rising. As on previous occasions, the solution was another financial infusion that cost the budget $35 billion, casting doubt on Mulki’s austerity policies. As a result, the prime minister resigned and was replaced by Jordanian Education Minister Omar Razzaz (Al Jazeera 2018), whose first decision was to withdraw the new tax code (Akour 2018). The arrival of a new prime minister and the rejection of unpopular measures by the Mulki government led to an end to the strikes. But Razzaz’s cabinet still faced the same problem of balancing between foreign creditors and the disgruntled masses. In other words, the new prime minister had to assuage public anger over economic policies that many Jordanians consider unfair, and at the same time implement reforms that can bring Jordan’s debt-to-GDP ratio down to a level acceptable to international creditors (The Indian Express 2018).

132

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

At the same time, the new prime minister’s hopes were more related to the success of foreign policy negotiations with the Gulf countries and the West on the issue of additional funds for financial assistance. By this point, Washington had pledged a total of nearly $6.4 billion to Jordan through 2022. Saudi Arabia and the UAE promised $2.5 billion in aid over five years. And following them, Qatar promised $0.5 billion of investment in Jordan’s infrastructure (The Indian Express 2018). In addition, the new prime minister’s hopes were pinned on the IMF, from which Amman wanted a delay in the implementation of tax reform. In 2019, already the Razzaz government faced new strikes, this time by teachers dissatisfied with low salaries (Al Jazeera 2019). The protests started by the teachers’ union, traditionally highly influential in Jordan, quickly turned into protests in general against the country’s low wages and dissatisfaction with the Razzaz’s government. As a result, the new government quickly enough became hostage to the old problems of austerity in a country with one of the highest levels of spending on public sector salaries and pensions ($13 billion) (Al Jazeera 2019). A month after the strikes began, King Abdullah II had to intervene again, ordering the government to revise the original plan to raise teacher salaries by 35%, which the protesters called nothing short of “bread crumbs” (Voice of America 2019). As a result, the Razzaz government had to make concessions to the teachers’ union and increase salaries by 60% (Voice of America 2019). Thus, the Jordanian authorities once again managed to cope with the protests at the cost of the absence of overdue economic reforms. Attempts by the cabinet of Hany Mulki and then Omar Razzaz to impose austerity in the country have once again met with popular discontent. In turn, the royal court, choosing between immediate political benefits and the need for unpopular economic reforms, chose political stability over economic development. The Jordanian royal court, unlike the Moroccan one, managed in the 2010s to buy off political discontent rather quickly and to push the issue of real constitutional reforms to the back burner. At the same time, the events of the Arab Spring and especially its regional consequences, manifested in the sharp growth of terrorist structures,5 the growth of refugees numbers made socio-economic state of the country worse. As a result, the royal court faced a dilemma: to carry out unpopular economic reforms amid high levels of protest activity in the region, or to continue economic stagnation and patch holes in the budget by attracting foreign injections. The Jordanian experience of the 2010s is more about prioritizing political stability over economic expediency. So far the royal court has been able to avoid serious economic difficulties largely due to the monarch’s relatively successful foreign policy, which is able to convince international institutions and the Gulf countries of the need to invest in supporting the Jordanian economy. This makes it possible, on the one hand, to reduce the discontent of citizens and, on the other hand, to postpone harsh economic reforms. Moreover, Abdullah II, who has the final say in all politics, uses his ability to reshuffle governments to quell public discontent without giving 5

See Chapter “Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective” (Issaev and Korotayev 2022, this volume); see also Issaev et al. (2020, 2021).

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

133

the green light to fundamental reforms. This, in turn, also allows him to act as a protector of public interests, channeling the anger of protesters toward undesirable governments, of which there were eight in the 2010s alone. As Jordanian analyst Amer al-Sabayleh notes, “what we are dealing with is a purely political, not an economic recipe” (The Indian Express 2018). Not surprisingly, such a strategy makes the royal court quite vulnerable and dependent on external factors. And it is possible that the issue of constitutional reforms, which Abdullah II managed to solve safely in 2011, may in the short term come to the fore again and become a factor of a new wave of quasi-revolutionary or revolutionary destabilization in the country.

References Abu Nowar M (2006) The Development of Trans-Jordan 1929–1939: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Ithaca Press, Reading UK Aganin A, Solovyeva Z (2003) Sovremennaya Iordaniya. Institut Blizhnego Vostoka, Moscow Akour O (2018) New Jordan PM Says He Will Cancel Tax Bill. U.S. News June 07.06.2018. https:// www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-06-07/new-jordan-pm-says-worKing-on-changesto-tax-plan Al Jazeera (2018) Jordan PM Hani al-Mulki resigns amid mass protests over tax bill. Al Jazeera 04.06.2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/6/4/jordan-pm-hani-al-mulki-resigns-amidmass-protests-over-tax-bill Al Jazeera (2019) Jordan teachers end four-week strike in pay deal with government. Al Jazeera 06.10.2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/6/jordan-teachers-end-four-weekstrike-in-pay-deal-with-government Al-Shorfa (2010) Jordan cabinet adopts temporary election law for 2010. Al-Shorfa 24.05.2010. http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/main/2010/05/24/feature-02 Demchenko A (2013) Zatyanuvshayasya “vesna” v Iordanii. Sistemnyi Monitoring Globalnyh i Regionalnyh Riskov 4(1):85–106 Issaev L, Fain E, Korotayev A (2021) Impact of the Arab spring on terrorist activity in the Sahel. Ideology Politics J 3(19):34–49. https://doi.org/10.36169/2227-6068.2021.03.00003 Issaev L, Korotayev A (2022) Introduction. New wave of revolutions in the MENA region in the global perspective. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_1 Issaev L, Korotayev A, Medvedev I, Aysin M (2020) Islamskiy terrorizm na Blizhnem Vostoke i ego vliyaniye na mirovuyu bezopasnost. Vestnik Rossiyskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seriya: Politologiya 22(4):713–730 Khetam M (2016) Syrian refugees cost Kingdom $2.5 billion a year—report. The Jordan Times 06.02.2016. http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/syrian-refugees-cost-Kingdom-25-billionyear-%E2%80%94-report Korotayev A, Issaev L, Shishkina A (2014) The Arab spring: a quantitative analysis. Arab Studies Quarterly 36(2):149–169. https://doi.org/10.13169/arabstudquar.36.2.0149 Korotayev A, Issaev L, Shishkina A (2016) Egyptian coup of 2013: an ‘econometric’ analysis. J North African Stud 21(3):341–356. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2015.1124238 Krylov A (2013) Osobennosti demokraticheskih reform v Iordanii. Vestnik MGIMO Univesiteta 29(3):113–119 Maan News Agency (2011) Islamists, State Open dialogue in Jordan. Maan News Agency 01.01.2011. http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=355897

134

A. Zakharov and L. Issaev

Malkov S, Korotayev A, Issayev L, Kuzminova Y (2013) On methods of Estimating current condition and of forecasting social instability: attempted quantitative analysis of the events of the Arab spring. Polis-Politicheskiye Issledovaniya 4:137–162 Milton-Edwards B, Hinchcliffe P (2009) Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy. Routledge, London National Public Radio (2011) King Abdullah: Jordan needs stable “middle class”. National Public Radio 22.09.2011. http://www.npr.org/2011/09/22/140670554/King-abdullah-jordan-needs-sta ble-middle-class Porath Y (2013) In Search of Arab Unity: 1930–1945. Routledge, London PricewaterhouseCoopers (2018) Jordan: proposed amendments to the income tax law. PricewaterhouseCoopers Report 5. https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/tax/documents/2018/jordan-proposedamendments-to-the-income-tax-law.pdf Reuters (2018) Jordan King asks Omar al-Razzaz to form new government: ministerial source. Reuters 04.06.2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jordan-protests-razzaz/jordanKing-asks-omar-al-razzaz-to-form-new-government-ministerial-source-idUSKCN1J01G3 Robins P (2019) A History of Jordan, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Rogan E (2012) The Arabs: A History, 2nd edn. Penguin, London Shishkina A, Issaev L (2012) Egipetskaya smuta XXI veka. URSS, Moscow Sweis R (2018) Jordan’s Prime Minister Quits as Protesters Demand an End to Austerity. The New York Times 04.06.2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/world/middleeast/jordan-strikeprotest.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FJordan Teti A, Abbot P, Cavatorta F (2018) The Arab Uprisings in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia: Social, Political and Economic Transformations (Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean). Palgrave Macmillan, London The Indian Express (2018) Jordan PM Omar Razzaz caught between angry public, international lenders. The Indian Express 15.06.2018. https://indianexpress.com/article/world/jordanpm-omar-razzaz-caught-between-angry-public-international-lenders-5217894/ The New York Times (2018) Jordan’s Prime Minister Quits as Protesters Demand an End to Austerity. The New York Times 05.06.2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/world/mid dleeast/jordan-strike-protest.html The Royal Hashemite Court (2011) Speech from the Throne by His Majesty King Abdullah II. Opening the Second Ordinary Session of the 16th Parliament on October 26. The Royal Hashemite Court 26.10.2011. http://www.Kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/speeches/view/id/493/videoD isplay/0.html The Telegraph (2016) Jordan is at ‘boiling point’ as it struggles with Syrian refugees, King Abdullah warns. The Telegraph 02.02.2016. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/mid dleeast/jordan/12136259/Jordan-is-at-boiling-point-as-it-struggles-with-Syrian-refugees-KingAbdullah-warns.html The Washington Post (2011) Interview with His Majesty King Abdullah II. The Washington Post 25.10.2011. http://Kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/interviews/view/id/478/videoDisplay/ 0.html Truevtsev K (2011) God 2011—novaya demokraticheskaya volna? HSE University, Moscow Vasilyev A (2011) Tsunami Arabskih Revolutsii. Asia Africa Today 3:2–18 Wilson MC (1987) King Abdullah, Britain and the making of Jordan. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Zakharov A, Issaev L (2021) Beskonechnaya istoriya: federalizm i arabskaya ideya. Neprikosnovennyy Zapas 5(139):102–114

Andrey Zakharov is currently an associate professor at the Faculty of Oriental Studies and Communication Sciences at the Russian State University of Humanities, Moscow. The area of his research is comparative federalism, on which he has published several books. He is an editor of “Neprikosnovenny Zapas: Debaty o Politike i Kulture” (Neprikosnovenny Zapas: Debates on Politics and Culture) magazine, one of the leading intellectual periodicals in Russia. From 1990

Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan

135

to 1995, he served as a member of the Russian Parliament. He is an expert of the Gorbachev Foundation. Leonid Issaev is currently an associate professor at the Department of Political Science and International Affairs and the Deputy Chair of the Laboratory for Sociopolitical Destabilization Risk Monitoring at the HSE University, Moscow. He is also the senior research fellow at the Center for Civilization and Regional Studies of the Institute for African Studies, which is part of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He teaches courses in Islamic political philosophy and political systems and political processes in the Arab World.

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes? Anna Kashina

Abstract The presidential and parliamentary elections, which were held in Tunis in autumn 2019, were characterized as a protest vote or a “revolution of ballot boxes”. The new political elite, which made its way after the Arab Spring, failed to cope with the deep socio-economic crisis or establish effective governance mechanisms and thus failed. President Kais Saied, formerly unrelated to any political establishment, received a high credit of trust, but soon also failed to confront political opponents. The fierce struggle between the President and the Prime Minister, as well as between parliamentary factions, accompanied by insults and scuffles, has become a familiar feature of the Tunisia’s political landscape, forming a persistent lack of confidence in the government. The wave of popular protests in January 2021 resembled a violent riot, full of despair and devoid of optimistic expectations of a decade ago. This time demonstrations chanted slogans against Ennahda Islamists. The degradation of the socio-political situation against the background of the spread of the Covid-19 paved the way for the “exceptional measures” taken by the Tunisian president on July 25, 2021 and qualified by some sources as a “constitutional coup”. The main purpose of these measures was to “restart” the political system, adjust the course to preserve the achievements of the revolution and restore the economy.

Introduction In the ten years since the Arab Spring, Tunisia has passed several phases of development. During the transition phase, provisional authorities were established, legislation was revised and the crisis of 2013, provoked by political assassinations against the backdrop of sharp social polarization, was resolved. The second phase, which began in January 2014 with the adoption of a new constitution, was marked by the first free democratic elections and a policy of consensus within the alliance A. Kashina (B) Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_7

137

138

A. Kashina

of the secular Nidaa Tounes party and the Islamists of Ennahda. However, this consensus was broken due to the political maneuvers of the Islamists, who, in 2016, announced the evolution of their ideology towards a reformist and modernized Islam. The emerging trend of a tough confrontation between President Beji Caid Essebsi and Prime Minister Youssef Chahed ended with the death of the president in July 2019 and the holding of the next elections. The 2019 presidential-parliamentary elections in Tunisia took the form of a protest vote, which the media described as a “political earthquake” or “second revolution”. Why the revolution? Apparently, by analogy with the Revolution of January 14, 2011, which overthrew the regime of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, with the difference that now has failed the new political elite, which was making its way after the Arab Spring. This time there were no bloody riots and demonstrations— democratic institution of elections turned out to be enough. This idea was succinctly expressed by the newly elected President Kais Saied. At the inauguration on October 23, 2019, he noted that there was a “revolution of ballot boxes”, in the sense that what happened in Tunisia in 2019 is a true revolution with the help of exclusively legitimate mechanisms (Carthage 2019). The new stage of Tunisia’s development, which began after 2019, was characterized not just by the transformation of the political space. It raised new questions. How reasonable is it to perceive the events of 2019 as a “revolution”? Why is there no end to the nationwide political protest in Tunisia? Which political players determine the country’s agenda? What are the new political elites and what strategy are they adhering to? Why does Tunisia raise the question of changing the form of government again and again? And the most important question is: will this North African country, under the weight of economic difficulties exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic, continue to develop in the direction of democratization or choose an alternative path?

Tunisia After the 2011 Uprising. Transitional Period The flight in January 2011 of the former autocrat Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his family to Saudi Arabia was followed by a transitional period during which the National Constituent Assembly (NCA, the interim parliament) was formed through elections held on October 23, 2011. It was expected that within a year of that date, legislation would be revised and the system of political governance would be updated, and subsequent general elections would be organized. However, the transitional period was delayed, and the elections were repeatedly postponed due to various circumstances, in particular, the acute political crisis of 2013, and became possible only by 2014, a few months after the adoption of the new constitution. Then the “period of political consensus” began—in our classification the second stage of the country’s development after the 2011 Revolution. In the first ten months that Tunisia lived without the dictatorship of Ben Ali, dozens of new print media, radio and TV channels were registered. Like mushrooms after the rain, new political parties and associations arose. In the summer of 2011,

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

139

their number exceeded a hundred, and the same number were denied registration due to non-compliance with the requirements of the law on parties. Tunisians began to joke that people at café-bars then discuss only politics, not football. At this stage, it is worth emphasizing the awakened interest of the previously depoliticized masses in political processes, which, however, soon faded. It is also noteworthy that in Tunisia, unlike Algeria or Egypt, where the role of the army in the political space is traditionally high, immediately after the transfer of power to the provisional government, the army refused to become a participant in the struggle for power. First, the relative size of the Tunisian army (35,000 men) was small when compared with the armed forces of other Arab countries. Second, Ben Ali relied on the Interior Ministry’s personally recruited guard and security services but did not trust people in uniform and limited funding for the Defense Ministry. And even despite the victory of the Islamists in the elections of the NCA on October 23, 2011, the military remained on the sidelines, considering the process of transition of power through the national elections legitimate. The moderate Islamist movement of Ennahda won the sympathy of 41% of the active electorate, which corresponded to 89 seats in the NCA out of 217. Islamists conducted a hugely successful election campaign, conducting propaganda in mosques, won “people’s quarters” with sermons and charity events, and promising the secular elite not to go beyond moderate Islam. By increasing its share to 138 seats in the NCA, in alliance with two secular parties, the Congress for a Republic (also referred to as CPR, its French acronym) and the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties (Ettakatol or FDTL) Ennahda formed the leading parliamentary coalition, named the Troika. This coalition independently distributed key state posts: the leader of the FDTL, Mustafa Ben Jaafar, became chairman of the NCA, Moncef Marzouki was appointed interim president, who at his inauguration at the Carthage Palace on December 13, 2012, dressed in the traditional brown Tunisian burnous, stressed that Tunisia would develop an Arab-Muslim identity while remaining open to the world. In December 2011, the Secretary General of the Ennahda Movement, Hamadi Jebali, was appointed Prime Minister. The victory of the Islamists in the elections to the NCA could not be predicted in advance. Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of Ennahda, for whom 1.6% of respondents would have voted in February 2011, according to opinion polls, was inferior in popularity to the leader of the left-wing Democratic Progressive Party, Ahmed Najib Chebbi (8% of the vote), the head of the Army, Rachid Ammar (4.4%) and the then acting Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi (3.7%). The prediction, considered most likely for Tunisia on the eve of the elections, was that the Islamists, allegedly relatively weak in that country, would enter parliament and obey the rules of the game imposed on them by the secular counter-elite that overthrew the autocratic regime. This forecast of 2011 was not justified. The Islamists were neither inspirers nor active participants in the 2011 uprising, but at that moment they instantly spread their wings and managed to push into the background left-wing parties and movements, which seemed to be able to seize the moment and gain strength (the Democratic Progressive Party, the Democratic Modernist Pole, created at the initiative of the Ettajdid Movement, etc.).

140

A. Kashina

The phenomenon of politicization of Islam dates back in Tunisia to the 1970s, when the core of the Islamic Group was formed here, which 11 years later was renamed the Islamic Movement and applied for registration. On the eve of the parliamentary elections of 1989, the Islamic Movement adopted the neutral name “Ennahda”. But since this party, which then had 8–10 thousand members, was denied registration for the second time, its nominees ran on the lists of independents, and scored, according to the most plausible estimate, about 15% of the vote. Since the early 1990s, the Tunisian authorities, who had occasionally flirted with the Islamists to create a counterweight to the left-wing student movement, have abandoned this tactic. Adherents of Ennahda were subjected to repression (arrests, prisons, torture), and therefore Ennahda moved its center to London. The overthrow of Ben Ali gave the Islamists a new chance to return into the political game. The Islamists of the Ennahda movement have taken an active position in international and domestic political life. In 2011–2013, they tried to draft a constitution where Islam would become a source of law and deny gender equality, strengthen the position of Islam, introduced in 2012 a law against insulting religion, attacked the media, restored the work of Quranic schools, tried to revive waqfs (Muslim endowments). Regarding the internal policy of Islamists in Tunisia, fears immediately began to arise since the party used double rhetoric. On the one hand, the leader of the movement, Rachid Ghannouchi, stressed on November 20, 2011, upon his arrival in Algeria, where he was greeted with presidential honors, that “Tunisia wants to build a model of society where Islam is not associated with terrorism, fundamentalism, extremism and is not perceived as hostile to democracy” (Asharq al-Awsat 2011). According to him, Tunisia was moving towards a model of society where Islam reconciles with modernism and democracy. On the other hand, the leading figures of the movement willingly recognized democratic procedures, but not democratic values. The program of this party firmly defends the Arab-Muslim identity of Tunisia and condemns the dominance of the French language. “We are Arabs, our language is Arabic,” Rachid Ghannouchi said in a radio interview on October 26, 2012, condemning Tunisia’s “linguistic enslavement” and calling for education reform. Absolutely scandalous was the statement of Ennahda Secretary General Hamadi Jebali, sounded on November 15, 2011 in Sousse: “We are on the verge of a historic moment, perhaps the sixth caliphate,” said this allegedly the most moderate of the moderate Tunisian Islamist leaders. The Islamist party immediately assured that Jebali’s words were taken out of context. Attention was also drawn to the phrase of a woman deputy of the NCA from Ennahda Souad Abderrahim, who later took the post of mayor of the capital in 2018, saying, “single women are unimaginable in a Muslim state, they need to get married urgently,” and the statement of another Islamist activist, Sadok Chourou: “We will work to consolidate the Islamic identity of the people. We will try to lay in the constitution articles that guarantee the primacy of Islam … The opposition has the right to object, but we see that the Tunisian people are close to the tradition of Islam and want life to be imbued with the spirit of Islam.” Before the official ban imposed on the activities of the ultra-radical party Ansar al-Sharia in 2013 (included in the list of terrorist organizations in Tunisia and other

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

141

countries), members of Ennahda did not condemn the actions of the radical Salafis, and sometimes teamed up with them (Marks 2015). For example, in late June 2011, radical Salafis staged a violent demonstration near a cinema located next to the Ministry of Internal Affairs building in order to disrupt the premiere of a documentary whose female director did not hide her atheism. On October 9, 2011, in Tunisia, the capital, police dispersed a mass demonstration of Islamists outraged by the ban on wearing the niqab in universities, because students in it were not allowed to classes. On December 6, 2011, classes at the Faculty of Humanities of Manouba University were interrupted and then did not resume for a long time, as the Salafis took the dean hostage and demanded not only the freedom to wear the niqab, but also the introduction of separate education for men and women, as well as the opening of a mosque on campus. The reaction of the Islamists of Ennahda to these actions was, if not approving, then calm. Another terrorist movement banned in a number of countries—Hizb ut-Tahrir received in 2012 from the government of Islamists official registration and freely promoted the idea of “unity of the Ummah”, the reestablishment of the caliphate, etc. in the framework of activities that for incitement to extremism were suspended by a court decision for a period of one month only a couple of times—in 2016 and 2017. At the international level, Islamists have proved to be pragmatists, assuring of their respect for the principles of democracy, readiness to comply with international norms of respect for human rights, trying to inspire a sense of trust in potential creditors. The strengthening of the Islamic component in the financial sector (the opening of branches of Islamic banks, the reorientation to the business circles of the Gulf countries) made it possible to diversify the sources of financial assistance to the Tunisian economy. Shocked by the plans and steps taken by the Islamists, representatives of the secular part of Tunisian society in 2011–2013 repeatedly demonstrated with slogans: “For the freedom of women!”, “Hands off the Law on Personal Status!” and “No to extremism!”. Such speeches have taken on a regular character. In higher education institutions, actions were organized for university autonomy and personal freedoms. The situation became explosive when in 2013 there were two political assassinations of leftist leaders: Chokri Belaid (February 6, 2013) and Mohamed Brahmi (July 25, 2013). Rallies swept across the country demanding the resignation of the Islamist government, the dissolution of the NCA and the formation of a government of national unity. Tunisia was on the brink of revolution (the summer 2013 events in Tunisia may be characterized as a revolutionary episode anyway), but managed to avoid a civil war, primarily thanks to a tolerant political culture, which realized in the efforts of the National Dialogue Quartet [The Tunisian General Labor Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail; UGTT), the Tunisian Order of Lawyers (Ordre National des Avocats de Tunisie), the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisinat; UTICA), and the Tunisian Human Rights League (La Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme; LTDH), which advocated in August 2013 the search for a peaceful way out of the crisis.

142

A. Kashina

Attention should be drawn to the increasing politicization of the Tunisian General Labour Union (Elayah 2020), which, even before the crisis, initiated a tripartite “social contract” between the Government, the UGTT and the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts. This pact, signed on the second anniversary of the 2011 Tunisian revolution, January 14, 2013, was intended to alleviate the economic situation, but in addition to the economic component (to ensure the economic recovery of the country, to implement vocational retraining programs, to launch a fight against unemployment, etc.), it provided for the formation of a commission to eliminate possible contradictions between the signatories. However, the effect of this pact, concluded in the meeting room of the NCA and approved by the deputies, and therefore received the force of law, did not last even three weeks due to destabilization and political assassinations. In turn, this pact by the autumn became the basis of the “road map” of the National Dialogue. Two dozen parties, including Ennahda, and the abovementioned Quartet of the country’s most influential NGOs signed a road map on October 5, 2013, which provided for the following stages: first, a radical change in the composition of the government, secondly, the completion of work on the draft of the new constitution and, thirdly, the definition of a clear schedule for future parliamentary and presidential elections. This step was a huge concession, both on the part of Ennahda and on the part of the secular camp, which did not want to bring the matter to mass violence. Of course, the attempt of the Islamists to make a sharp socio-cultural change in a short time, coupled with their inability to radically improve the socio-economic situation of citizens, predetermined the victory in the parliamentary elections of 2014 of the modernists led by the Nidaa Tounes party built on an anti-Islamic platform. At the same time, the Islamists were not forced out of the political arena, like the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt in 2013. The leaders of Ennahda timely showed pragmatism, retained a significant part of the electorate, and received several ministerial portfolios and posts in the Assembly of People’s Representatives (replaced the NCA in 2014) and it was a victory for the Islamists.

“Consensus Politics” Between Modernists and Islamists In January 2014, the National Constituent Assembly finally approved a new constitution in its fourth edition, and the international reaction to it was full of enthusiasm. The Tunisian constitution was literally recognized as the most democratic in the Arab world. Despite the pressure of Islamists, it consolidated the “civil character of the state” and the “rule of law”. The status of Islam as the state religion remained, but without mentioning it as an official source of law. In addition, the basic law gives women equal rights with men. Art. 20 states: “All men and women have the same rights and duties and are equal before the law.” It is worth paying attention to the fact that when considering the first draft of the future constitution in 2012, the Islamists of Ennahda began to pursue a principled line, insisting on replacing the presidential republic with a parliamentary one and

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

143

rejecting the option of a mixed form of government (as in France), proposed then by the partners of the Troika. It is obvious that the leadership of Ennahda sought to preserve the existing de facto system, in which the president occupies a very modest place, and the prime minister is delegated with expanded powers. Realizing the weakness of his position and intending to turn the tide, in early 2013 acting President Moncef Marzouki proposed to reorganize the government and make it non-partisan, technocratic. The idea of a non-party cabinet would limit the ability of the ruling coalition through its ministers to influence the political course, and, in fact, would devalue the presence of the Troika and neutralize the victory of the Islamists in the parliamentary elections. Despite the differences in the Troika on this issue, Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali expressed readiness for compromises, but the formation of a non-party cabinet was too much for him—on February 19, 2013, he resigned. His successor, Ali Larayed, limited himself to inviting non-partisan figures to the posts of only key ministers— foreign affairs, interior, justice and national defense. However, after the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi in July 2013, the opposition continued to strongly insist on the demand to dissolve the Islamist-led government and create a completely non-party cabinet, with which Ennahda seemed to agree at the end of September, but the matter dragged on. The stumbling block was the issue with the choice of the Prime Minister. Without delay, the head of the UGTT, Hussein Abbasi, who spoke on behalf of the Quartet, set December 14, 2013 as the deadline for the appointment of an interim prime minister. Unexpectedly, the then Minister of Industry Mahdi Jumaa agreed to take this position. The sixth transitional government of Mahdi Jumaa, formed on a non-party basis, began to withdraw from the policy of the Troika, restored state control over mosques and cleansed the state apparatus of functionaries associated with Ennahda (in this regard, two-thirds of the governors were dismissed), but it was not possible to restore order in the security sphere and radically improve the economic situation. Preparations for the organization of the next elections also progressed slower than it was desired. Meanwhile, the political space was constantly reformatted, and the motley variety of parties and movements was misleading, causing a sense of confusion. Many parties consisted of only a few activists, and their programs resembled each other. In this polyphony of political appeals, at first, only the call of the Islamists, whose language was clearly heard by anyone, was well distinguished by its primitive simplicity: “Islam plus democracy is the best combination.” However, in the face of the danger of the country sliding into a “theocratic regime”, as columnist Mounir Charfi noted, the opposition went “to regroup to balance two main forces: the Islamists who want to implement Sharia and the liberals who defend a democratic, modern and secular state” (Al Arabiya 2012). The project of consolidating of the secular parties’ camp by 2012 was implemented in the form of establishing of the Nidaa Tounes party on July 7, 2012, under the leadership of Beji Caid Essebsi, then the former prime minister of the transitional government. The main aim of the party was seen as the consolidation of all democratic forces that will put forward a “united front” at the next elections. It should be observed

144

A. Kashina

that this was not the only such a project of the association, but that moment it gained success. First, more than 100,000 former members of the Democratic Constitutional Rally (or RCD, the party that ruled until 2011) joined the ranks of Nidaa Tounes, and a year later, on the eve of the elections, Nidaa Tounes formed a coalition with the Republican Party and Al-Masar party. In fact, this project attracted not only liberals, but also some left-wing parties. By the beginning of 2014, Nidaa Tounes was able to form even its own parliamentary bloc thanks to the transition to its side of 4 former members of the FDTL, one former member of the CPR and one fugitive from the dissolving pro-Islamist People’s Petition party. At the same time, the modernists regrouped and built mini blocs, but differences on ideological and personal grounds between secular political forces closed for Nidaa Tounes the prospect of forming a “united front” against the Islamists. The 2014 election, as expected, recorded a shift in the sympathy of the electorate. The Nidaa party won more seats in parliament than any other party −85 seats out of 217, pushing the moderate Islamists of Ennahda to the second place (69 seats). 16 seats were taken by the Free Patriotic Union, 15 by the Popular Front, 13 by the FDTL, 9 seats by The Wafa Party, and 8 seats by Afek Tounes party. Four seats went to Congress for the Republic (CPR). Three seats each were taken by the Democratic Movement and the National Destourian Initiative. The Current of Love won two deputy mandates. The Democratic Alliance won one seat; the Republican Party also got one (that was a failure!). Six more seats (out of 217) went to other deputies. Mohamed Ennaceur of Nidaa Tounes became the speaker of the parliament since December, Abdelfattah Mourou of Ennahda became his first deputy, and Fouzia Ben Fouda of the Free Patriotic Union became the second. The 2014 presidential elections were held in two rounds, which lasted until December 21. Tunisian citizens elected the leader of the secular Nidaa party Beji Caid Essebsi as the new president of the country, who, gaining 56% of the vote, bypassed the transitional president Moncef Marzouki. In total, 27 candidates ran for the highest state post in the 2014 elections, and another 43 candidates did not meet the formal requirements and did not receive the approval of the National Election Commission. Continuing to adhere to the logic of the “road map” of the National Quartet, in 2016 an alliance was concluded between Beji Caid Essebsi on behalf of secular forces on the one hand, and Rachid Ghannouchi on behalf of Islamists, on the other hand, enshrined in the so-called Carthage Agreement. This alliance of political players so opposed in views gave grounds to designate this period as a “stage of consensus policy”. The Cabinet, which was approved by parliament only by February 2015, led by the non-partisan Habib Essid, was a coalition. After some reshuffle in January 2016, this government included 7 ministers from Nidaa Tounes, one minister from Ennahda (employment and career guidance), and the rest of the ministers represented other parties. However, as soon as the ministers started their work, the terrorist attack on the Bardo National Museum was committed on March 17, 2015, and a few months later in June a high-profile terrorist attack on the beach of Sousse resort followed. Some

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

145

80 “suspicious” mosques were immediately closed, the Anti-Terrorism Act (June 2015) was approved, and the state of emergency was re-introduced. However, the law enforcement forces barely coped with their task—sabotage, explosions, hostagetaking of citizens continued indefinitely. The tourism sector suffered, the economic situation deteriorated. In July 2016, the government of Essid was dismissed. Instead, the president convened a “parallel” government in the Carthage Palace of representatives of political parties and civil society associations, i.e. a kind of “popular unity government” temporarily arose. In August, President Caid Essebsi proposed Youssef Chahed as prime minister. Parliament did not hesitate to approve the composition of the new government on August 26, 2016. The Cabinet headed by Youssef Chahed was a government of national qualified personnel, which included two ministers from Ennahda. In addition, it had 8 women, of whom two were with important ministerial posts: finance and health, and 14 ministerial portfolios were given to young people, five of them under the age of 35. By 2016, there was an important turning point in the ideology of the Ennahda movement. Fearing to lose ground, the Nahdhaouis pointedly supported the fight against radical extremist beliefs, in addition, they advocated the adoption of the above-mentioned Anti-terrorist law. Convened in May 2016, the 10th Congress of Ennahda documented the transition to modernist-reformist positions. The movement announced a change in its identity—an exit from political Islam that “does not reflect its current identity and vision of the future”. It came to define itself as “a national democratic party dedicated to political work, with a national reference inspired by the values of Islam” (Lahmar 2020). The flexibility shown by the Islamists did not mean that they finally abandoned the idea of promoting an ideology on an Islamic basis—especially in the case of a likely revenge in the future (for example, if secular forces lose popularity against the background of another crisis). Constantly evading the recognition of Ennahda as part of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the leaders of the Tunisian movement still thought of themselves in the bosom of global Islamic unity. After the US announcement of Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel on December 6, 2017, Rachid Ghannouchi wasn’t slow to sharply criticize the move and describe it as “aggressive and hostile”. He stressed: “No other problem unites Muslims as the problem of Jerusalem and Palestine”, seeing in the unified position of the Muslim community on this issue a kind of “continuation of the Arab Spring”. It was obvious that Rachid Ghannouchi thought himself not so much as the leader of a national movement, but more as one of the leaders of the Islamic world, the Islamic Ummah, linking the fate of Tunisia and the world Islamic movement. Signs of a decline in the popularity of Islamists and at the same time the withering of Nidaa party appeared in the municipal elections on May 6, 2018. According to the National Election Commission, the best results were demonstrated by independent candidates who scored 32.27% of the vote (2 thousand 367 seats in municipal councils), while Ennahda took second place −28.64% (2 thousand 135 seats in municipal councils), and Nidaa—only the third −20.85% (1 thousand 595 seats in municipal councils). The remaining seats went to the left Popular Front with 3.6% of the vote

146

A. Kashina

(256 seats in municipal councils). The significance of the first municipal elections, which since 2016 were postponed due to the protracted development of the Law on Municipal Elections (was adopted only in February 2017), was that they were the first local elections since 2010, contributed to the decentralization of power and put an end to the practice of appointing heads of municipalities by direct decree of the President of the Republic. Dissatisfied with the results of the 2018 elections, Beji Caid Essebsi on September 24, 2018, tore up the Carthage Agreement, and ended the alliance of secular forces with Islamists. Turning 180 degrees, the Nidaa party decided to refocus on a hostile, offensive tactic against Ennahda’s Islamists, once again hoping to bring together disparate secular parties. In the fight against Islamists, Caid Essebsi began to promote the investigation into the involvement of the Ennahda movement in the political assassinations of 2013. As a result, in early 2019, the court convicted Moustafa Hazr of the premeditated murder, who, judging by the materials of the investigation, headed the secret combat wing of the Ennahda movement and cooperated directly with the “black department” of the Ministry of Interior, which existed during the rule of the Troika in 2011–2013. Proceedings in this case have since been constantly postponed and served as an instrument of pressure on the Islamists, whereas Ennahda flatly refuted its connection with any combat wing. Against this background, the line of confrontation between two political forces that found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades was even more clearly formed: Islamists in the face of the Ennahda movement and modernists—supporters of secular views of all shades. Surprisingly, in Tunisia, the ideological divide was not left–right, but depending on the attitude to religion (Dennison and Draege 2020).1 In January 2018, the parliament adopted an extremely tough state budget, which greatly cut social guarantees, subsidies and salaries. This sparked popular protests, and in the wake of anti-government demonstrations, President Caid Essebsi proposed a vote of no confidence in Prime Minister Youssef Chahed, who was suspected of favoring Islamists, which was unpleasant given Youssef Chahed’s membership in Nidaa party. Chahed did not hesitate to react. He left Nidaa party and really enlisted the support of Ennahda, and in addition, rallied around himself associates from among the deputies of the center-right parties and wished to leave the ranks of Nidaa, where the leadership was in full swing because of the attempts of President Caid Essebsi to prepare the “inheritance” of power into the hands of his son Hafedh, who by that time became the executive director of Nidaa and quarreled with Chahed. In September 2018, the creation of a “National Coalition” of 33 parliamentarians from Chahed’s supporters was announced, a month later the Chahed faction (41 deputies) was comparable in number to the parliamentary faction of Nidaa party. Under the patronage of the Prime Minister, the Tahya Tounes Party was established in January 2019.2 In its composition and platform, it recreated Nidaa, and together 1

Of course, it has nothing to do with atheism, because even the most secular politicians in Tunisia never abandon Islam in general. What is meant is the separation of the state and religion and the possibility of interpreting Islamic norms in a reformist way. 2 Officially, Chahed announced that he was heading Tahya Tunisia only in June 2019, he could not do it earlier and waited for the time closer to the elections, because the prime minister is forbidden

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

147

with Ennahda was able to secure 60% of the votes of parliament. At the same time, the popularity of Chahed grew incredibly, and the Islamists no longer needed Nidaa party, which was forced to move into opposition and faded in no time. Thus, the distinctive features of the transitional phases up to 2019 in Tunisia were the fragmentation of political forces and at the same time a high degree of organization of the Islamist movement; polarization according to the binary division not into left–right, but Islamists-modernists and emphasis on value aspects: identity, perception of religion, gender, etc.; a crisis of confidence in political parties and state institutions among Tunisians. In addition, a formula developed in the system of governance according to which Islamists entered into coalitions with secular parties, and if the coalition party subsequently went into opposition to the Islamists, then there was necessarily another relatively large secular party that was ready to cooperate and make allies with the Islamists. Thus, the Islamists formed a dominant bloc in parliament, elected a politically loyal prime minister and pursued an independent policy in coordination between parliament and the government, subsequently displacing and destroying partner parties. Meanwhile the 2014 constitution did not give the president enough authority to pursue a course independent of the government.

2019 Presidential Election Presidential-parliamentary elections were held in Tunisia in several stages from September 15 to October 13, 2019. Initially, the next presidential elections were scheduled for November 17, 2019, but due to the premature death in July 2019 of the first democratically elected President Beji Caid Essebsi,3 the deadlines were shifted. In the future, this was important. Since the 2014 constitution established a parliamentary republic in Tunisia, the president has a more modest position than he held before 2011, when all power was concentrated in the hands of the president. In turn, the prime minister is elected by the party that received the most votes in the elections, and it naturally seeks to minimize the number of its political opponents. If the parliamentary elections preceded the presidential elections, their results could well have had an impact on the presidential elections. Meanwhile, that did not happen. The outcome of Tunisia’s second free democratic presidential elections after the Arab Spring in both the first round (September 15) and the second round (October 6) remained intriguingly unpredictable until the very last day. First, because of the lack of an evident leader or movement. And secondly, because of the large number of political competitors. The Independent High Authority for Elections admitted 26 candidates (two of them women) to the presidential elections. Even though two of them withdrew their candidacies the day before the official vote, and more than 60 to combine civil service and party activities. He resigned his powers as prime minister ahead of schedule on August 22, 2019, in order to be able to conduct election campaigning. 3 The vacant post of president was temporarily occupied by the speaker of the parliament, 85-yearold Mohamed Ennaceur.

148

A. Kashina

applications were previously rejected due to non-compliance with formal requirements, citizens had to spend a lot of effort and nerves to understand the election programs of politicians. The political space remained fragmented. The turnout rate was registered at a relatively low level −45% (just over 3 million 10 thousand people) of the 7 million voters who had the right to vote and expressed a desire to go to the ballot boxes. For example, in the previous elections of 2014, citizens more actively expressed their civic position, and the turnout rate reached 65% (Election Guide 2014). Security was provided by about 70 thousand law enforcement officers. In the final of the first round, the leaders were a constitutional law professor Kais Saied, who received 18.8% of the vote, and media mogul Nabil Karoui (15.7% of the vote). None of them were among the favorites who were predicted to win. One could expect that the victory would go to, for example, the candidate of the movement of moderate Islamists Abdelfattah Mourou (12.8%), but he finished in the presidential race in third place. He did slightly better then Defense Minister Abdelkarim Zbidi, who was in fourth place (10.5%). Many also bet on him, especially since Zbidi positioned himself as “the Tunisian Abdel Fattah al-Sisi”. The top five also included former Prime Minister Youssef Chahed (7.3%), who pretended to break the alliance with the Islamists in the hope of winning their opponents to his side. Thus, the alleged favorites of the 2019 elections were forced to admit defeat, although they all enjoyed the support of a certain party and attracted large funding or administrative resources. Even the pressure on journalists and the lavish expensive campaigns proved useless. Kais Saied (61-year-old) had no experience of political activity but won the sympathy of the majority of Tunisians. While he didn’t ever receive help from any political party, he also declared his rejection of the existing “political establishment”. He conducted a very modest and low-cost campaign, relying mainly on volunteers. There was a joke that his election campaign cost “a cup of coffee and a pack of cigarettes”. Therefore, it is difficult to suspect him of getting foreign financing. Kais Saied relied on personal communication with the potential electorate, so in the days of agitation—from 2 to 12 September (abroad it lasted from 1 to 11 September)—he tried to visit as many markets, squares and other crowded places as possible. Since 2011, he began to appear on the television screen as a commentator or participant in analytical programs. He was involved several times as an expert in constitutional law in parliamentary discussions. Despite this, in general, Saied did not fit into the description of a typical representative of the Tunisian political establishment. The election program of Kais Saied boiled down to the phrase he often cited: “An independent judiciary is better than a thousand constitutions”. He also called for a return to a presidential republic through constitutional change, empowerment of organizations, and overall political and economic decentralization. Some accused him of populism because he chose his motto “Power to the people!”. On some issues, he was a true conservative: he opposed the bill to grant men and women equal inheritance rights and clung to pan-Arabism, clothed in the form of support for the Palestinian people. For his monotonous manner of speech, Saied was dubbed a “Robocop”. In addition, Kais Saied did not announce any likely coalitions or sympathies for major political forces, including Islamists. In general, the honesty of Saied’s victory is hard to doubt.

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

149

According to the results of the second round of the presidential election, where the turnout was 45–55% of the 7 million registered voters, Kais Saied scored about 73% of the vote. Notably, more than 90% of young people aged 18–25 and more than 80% of middle-aged people aged 26–44 voted for him (France-24 2019). In addition, student volunteers willingly assisted Saied in his election campaign, which allowed the Tunisian French-language daily La Presse to title one of its articles, “Awakening the Youth”. This trend should be viewed in a rather positive way, given the prevalence of apolitical youth after 2011 (Kashina 2019). Kais Saied refused at first to move to the Carthage Palace, willing to stay in his capital apartment among middle-class people. He first refused the guards, who tried to escort him to his favorite café-diner. Such a person is inappropriate to be suspected in corruption. At the same time, the policy of the new president was still poorly predictable. The most serious fears of Tunisian modernist democrats were related to the friendliness with which the moderate Islamists of Ennahda agitated to vote for Saied in the second round of the elections. Others were frightened by the populism of the new president. Kais Saied’s rival in the 2019 election was his complete opposite. Nabil Karoui (56 years old) owed his popularity to the influential TV channel Nessma, which he founded in 2007. Before that, Karoui was engaged in business, was on the governing board of Tunisian branches of foreign companies: Colgate, Palmolive, Henkel. After becoming the owner of a private media, Karoui used this resource for his own purposes. For instance, there is evidence that he managed to greatly help in the election campaign of 2014 to the former President Beji Caid Essebsi. Long before the 2019 election, Karoui began filming a series of programs demonstrating himself personally visiting slums and disadvantaged neighborhoods of cities and villages across the country and providing material assistance to the population. He made it a well-known fact that he owns a charitable foundation, and before anyone else announced his desire to run for president. Already in May 2019, he indicated that he allegedly has a program of economic salvation of the country. At the same time, Karoui assured that he considers his main enemy not one of his political rivals, but poverty. In June 2019, he headed the Heart of Tunisia party, which was born after the renaming of the Al-Silm al-Ijtima’iyy al-Tunisiyy party (Tunisian Public Peace Party). Meanwhile, as soon as opinion polls witnessed the growing popularity of the media mogul coming to their first lines, Karoui immediately began to be subjected to various kinds of oppression. In May 2019, the National Commission on Audiovisual Media adopted a resolution to terminate the activities of Nessma, after which materials and equipment were withdrawn from the TV channel building. However, soon the channel restored broadcasting. Then, in June 2019, the parliament began to discuss the possibility of amending the election law that would prohibit media or NGO owners from running for election. Realizing that the bill would not entitle the owner of a charitable foundation (registered as an NGO) Nabil Karoui to participate in the elections, the then President Beji Caid Essebsi refused to ratify it. Therefore, the bill was never passed. The following month, on July 8, Nabil Karoui was accused of illegal money laundering by a court decision, his bank accounts were seized, and he was deprived of the right to leave the country.

150

A. Kashina

Karoui and his brother Ghazi were put under investigation in 2017 because of the appeal in the case of financial embezzlement, presented by the non-governmental organization “I Watch”. However, the case again came to consideration just in time for the 2019 elections, and on August 23, a week before the election campaign, the Ministry of Interior announced the arrest of Nabil Karoui, whose car was intercepted by a group of police cars. As a result, Karoui was sent to one of the prisons in the capital suburbs on the basis of a court order issued in the case of money laundering and tax evasion. Election Commission Chairman Nabil Baouon said on August 24 that Karoui would not be removed from the list of presidential candidates until he received a formal conviction. During the election campaign, Karoui gave several interviews to TV channels, but then went on a hunger strike, and his wife Salma Samaoui continued to campaign. As soon as the election was over, Karuoi was released from the investigation.

2019 Parliamentary Election To participate in the 2019 parliamentary elections, 1592 appeals from candidates were accepted, of which 695 lists of party, 190 coalition and 707 lists from independent candidates were admitted. According to an opinion poll published on July 10, 2019, three months before the election, in the Maghreb newspaper, the Heart of Tunisia party steadily overtook its competitors in the popularity rating among potential voters: it could count on almost 30% of the vote. The Ennahda movement could claim only 15%. The Tunisian Free Destourian Party lagged slightly behind the Islamists at 12%, followed only by Prime Minister’s Tahya Tounes party (8%). A consolidated party of secular forces that would balance the Islamists did not appear, although negotiations on this were held from time to time (between Nidaa and Machrou, the Tahya Tounes party and Badil, etc.). Tunisian political analyst Mansour Aouni noted in his interview with Deutche Welle that Tunisians are tired of the fact that coalitions between Islamists and symbols of the former regime, for example, in the face of the Nidaa party, invariably led to catastrophic consequences, especially in the economic sphere (DW 2019). Observers called the victory of the Islamists of Ennahda4 in the parliamentary elections “Pyrrhic”, because having formed the largest faction of 52 deputies in the 217mandate parliament, they could only ensure their policy by ensuring at least a simple majority of 109 votes. Secular parties with relatively numerous mandates—the Heart of Tunisia5 (38 seats), the Democratic Movement6 (22 seats) and the People’s Movement7 (16 seats)—then announced their withdrawal into opposition to the Nahdouis.

4

No 1 in Fig. 1. No 2 in Fig. 1. 6 No 3 in Fig. 1. 7 No 6 in Fig. 1. 5

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

151

Fig. 1 Distribution of seats in the 2019 Tunisian Parliament. Source ISIE (http://www.isie.tn/res ultats/)

The Tunisian Free Destourian Party8 (17 seats), led by eccentric leader Abir Moussi, has always had a sharply anti-Islamist rhetoric. Ennahda’s leaders immediately realized that even after teaming up with the pro-Islamic Al-Karama coalition9 (21 seats), the Nidaa Tounes (3 seats), as in 2014, and Tahya Tounes10 (14 seats), for the party of former Prime Minister Youssef Chahed, once loyal to the Islamists, it is still difficult to get the desired result. Hoping to soften the position of the intransigent coalition negotiating partners, the Ennahda movement presented on November 1, 2019, a preliminary program of action for the future technocratic government. This program, drawn up as an agreement of intent, was designed to attract representatives of parliamentary factions who treated Islamists with distrust. The main points of the agreement were the fight against corruption, poverty, strengthening security, economic growth, improving the quality of education and social services, as well as strengthening local institutions and completing the formation of constitutional bodies. However, even this measure, just like the election of non-partisan Habib Jemli as prime minister on November 15, 2019, did not accelerate the formation of the cabinet. Habiba Jemli (60 years old), who served as Secretary of State under the Minister of Agriculture in the governments of Hamadi Jebali and Ali Larayed in 2011–2014, i.e. during the “time of political glory” of the Islamists, this native of Kairouan province worked most of his life in the private sector, including one of the largest national agro-industrial companies—Mediterranean Grain Production Company. In the two months allotted by the constitution since Jemli’s appointment, moderate 8

No 5 in Fig. 1. No 4 in Fig. 1. 10 No 7 in Fig. 1. 9

152

A. Kashina

Islamists were unable to submit cabinet lists. As a result, a legally provided mechanism has come into force, when the appointment of the prime minister takes place at the choice of the president. Newly elected President Kais Saied appointed Elyas Fakhfakh, who had nothing to do with the party that won the parliamentary elections, as prime minister in February 2020. However, due to a corruption scandal, six months later, Fakhfakh was replaced by another non-party prime minister appointed by the president, Hichem Mechichi. Under the circumstances, having been forced to “sacrifice” the post of prime minister, the Islamists of Ennahda found a way to preserve, if not strengthen their influence. The leader of the movement, Rachid Ghannouchi, achieved the post of speaker of parliament when, after cunning intrigues in order to find the favor of parliamentarians, 123 deputies out of 217 cast their votes for him on November 13, 2019. Thus, the charismatic leader of the Islamists, Rachid Ghannouchi, saved his reputation, and in addition, hoped to put under his control the legislative branch of government. In the decade since 2011, Ghannouchi has had serious ambitions. Arriving in Tunisia on January 30, 2011, after 22 years of emigration, he said that the ideal of the Ennahda party led by him is the Turkish Justice and Development Party, in whose footsteps moderate Tunisian Islamists intend to follow (Marks 2017), and that he himself does not strive for the presidency. Indeed, Ghannouchi at the beginning chose to remain without public posts, participating in all public events of Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali (December 2011–February 2013), and thereby demonstrating his role as the true conductor of the existing political concert. However, by 2019, his ambitions led him to the chair of the Speaker of Parliament. Combining this state post with the simultaneous leadership of the Ennahda movement, Ghannouchi was repeatedly subjected to sharp criticism. Becoming not just an Islamic ideologue but a leading political figure, he forged a friendship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, as well as the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamadi Al Thani, and dragged Tunisia into a big geopolitical game on the side of these two regional players (for more detail on the Turkish-Qatari-Ikhwani alliance see, e.g., Vasiliev et al. 2019). Thus, the crisis of confidence in the political elite was converted into a radical change of power with the help of the democratic institution of elections, which turned out to be an effective mechanism not only for the social elevator for intellectuals, in particular President Kais Saied, but also demonstrated the work of the “conversion process” adjusted in systems theory—i.e., the transformation of inputs into outputs. At the same time, Ennahda actually maximized its political influence by establishing its leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, as speaker of parliament, and the latter resorted to outright abuse of his position. The essence of the Islamists’ strategy turned out to be purely pragmatist in order to stay in power; taking democratic forms, they did not accept democratic values (McCarthy 2018).

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

153

Between Carthage and Bardo Yesterday’s university professor, Kais Saied, who found himself in office, initially showed restraint and did not try to enter into a “tug of war” with the Islamists, which gave the public the impression of either his obedience to the Islamists or his spinelessness. Some of the views of Kais Said were really appealing to the Islamists. For example, he flatly rejected the idea of normalizing relations with Israel. On the other hand, the entourage of Kais Saied did not indicate his loyalty to the Islamists. In early December 2019, apparently at the instigation of the left-wing movements, the media leaked information about the imminent establishment of a new political party—“the October 13 Movement” (the date of Kais Saied’s election as president), which will be headed by Ridha Lenin (Ridha Chiheb el-Mekki), a well-known left-wing ideologue and trade union activist since the 1970s. The latter took an active part in the work of the election headquarters of Kais Saied, although the president himself rather emphasized the coincidence of their points of view on the future of reforms in the country than supported the left-wing beliefs of the “Tunisian Lenin”. Especially popular in the 1960s and 1970s among the Tunisian intelligentsia, left-wing parties always opposed Islamists, they did not show themselves well in elections, and after the assassinations of left-wing opposition leaders Mohammed Brahmi and Chokri Belaid in 2013, they were bled dry. Meanwhile, Kais Saied wanted to be the president for all Tunisians, the left, the right, and Islamists as well. However, once in the political game, he found himself in a narrow framework, where the conditions were dictated by Islamists and their proxies who held key posts. They did not need a strong president who prevented the formation of the political agenda, the trajectory of which was set back in 2011. The permanent political crisis due to the confrontation between the president and the government since 2016 has been flaring up with renewed force, until at the end of 2020 it took a serious turn. In September 2020, Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi formed a non-partisan government of technocrats and with an eye on the president’s will did not seem to succumb to the Islamists, whose arguments were that if the composition of the cabinet did not correlate with the results of the parliamentary elections, then this meant deceiving voters. Meanwhile, six months later, in January 2021, Mechichi undertook a radical personnel reshuffle and submitted to parliament a government that now fully reflected the aspirations of Ennahda. It should be noted that in the year since the parliamentary elections, the Islamists have found allies in the face of the pro-Islamic Al Karama coalition and the Heart of Tunisia party, together making up two-thirds of the parliament, i.e. a qualified majority. It is not surprising that in parliament the new composition of the Cabinet of Ministers was approved on time, but unexpectedly President Kais Saied refused to conduct the procedure for the oath of ministers. The formal basis of the refuse was non-compliance with constitutional requirements, as well as the absence of women in the Cabinet’s composition. The procedure for approving the new Cabinet of Ministers has not been officially completed.

154

A. Kashina

Already in March 2021, when the socio-economic situation heated up to an extent that the country lived in anticipation of the National Dialogue (like the National Dialogue of 2014), the president put forward the resignation of Prime Minister Mechichi as a condition for the start of negotiations. The latter refused. A few weeks later, Kais Saied made a statement that the president’s prerogatives include supremacy not only over the armed forces, but also over the forces of the Interior Ministry. At that time, Mechichi took over the duties of the previously deposed Interior Minister Taoufik Charfeddine, close to Kais Saied. Thus, the president was looking for a way to position himself as the head “determining the general policy of the state”, aggressively raising the issue of the division of powers. It should be mentioned that when the fourth draft of the constitution was discussed in early 2014, Article 90, which gave the prime minister the prerogative to “determine the general policy of the state”, provoked heated objections on the part of the opposition and some independent deputies. After all, if according to the third draft of the constitution, the powers of the president and the prime minister were balanced, then the fourth draft, corrected by the hand of deputies from Ennahda, returned to the idea of a parliamentary republic. The goal of the Islamists was very clear and transparent—to consolidate the model of the political system that had de facto developed in Tunisia since the end of 2011: a weak president and a strong (in terms of his powers) prime minister, relying on a parliamentary majority. If Ennahda remained predominant in parliament, it would remain a puppet master of the executive branch, regardless of who personally occupied the Carthage Palace. As a result, a compromise was reached, which was embodied in the triumph of a mixed parliamentary-presidential republic, since according to Art. 77 (of the 2014 constitution), the president of the republic determines the general policy of the state in the field of defense, foreign relations and national security after consultations with the prime minister. And according to Art. 91, the head of government determines this policy within the framework provided for in the text of Art. 77, and implements it. However, in fact, before Kais Saied, all presidents left domestic policy to successive governments, where the role of the first violin invariably belonged to Ennahda. In a separate development, friction arose between President Kais Said and Speaker Rachid Ghannouchi. There was a paradoxical situation when Rachid Ghannouchi actually conducted parallel diplomacy, which went against the official line, for example, in the issue of neutrality over the Libyan conflict, where Islamists sided with the government of Fayez Sarraj and in every possible way demonstrated support for Turkey’s military intervention. Leaving aside numerous contacts with the Sarraj government itself, attempts to organize the transfer of Turkish troops to Libya from the territory of Tunisia, the transfer of medical equipment to the Government of National Accord and the deployment of mobile hospitals with the financial assistance of Qatar in the sparsely populated Tunisian territories bordering Libya, of course, in aid of Turkish units, scandalous visits and telephone conversations of Rachid Ghannouchi with the Turkish leadership and Muslim Brotherhood leaders in neighboring Libya received a great public response. Rachid Ghannouchi’s visit to Turkey on January 11, 2020 was presented by the Turkish press not as private, but as public. Ghannouchi did not notify the protocol

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

155

service about the visit and agreed to a meeting with the Turkish president behind closed doors without any journalists, i.e. violated diplomatic custom, which raised suspicions of the exchange of confidential information. (On the same day, Erdogan held a similar meeting with Fayez Sarraj.) Thanks to the support of allies in parliament, Rachid Ghannouchi miraculously managed to avoid a vote of no confidence put forward because of his contacts on May 4, 2020, with the leading figure in the Justice and Construction Party of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya Khalid al-Mishri, just a few days after discussing with Turkish President Erdogan the possibility of Turkish aviation using the Tunisian Ramada air base. In flagrant violation of protocol, Rachid Ghannouchi congratulated Fayez Sarraj by phone on May 20, 2020, on the capture of the al-Watiya base, which had been recaptured from Field-Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces. And no matter how much the presidential channels made it clear to Turkey that Tunisia officially adheres to neutrality in the Libyan conflict, thanks to the position of Ennahda, Tunisia remained in the zone of influence of Turkey, which allocated about $ 226 million to Tunisia in the form of official development assistance in 2012– 2014 (1.5 times more than the United States did during the same time), registered in Tunisia more than 75 companies with the participation of Turkish capital (they provided 2.5 thousand jobs) and increased bilateral trade, which in 2011–2016 was about $ 5.3 billion, of which more than 80% were Turkish exports to Tunisia. For his part, the President of Tunisia has repeatedly expressed his rejection of bloc politics, condemning attempts to draw Tunisia into regional conflicts and the orbit of influence along the Turkey-Qatar axis. In defiance of Rachid Ghannouchi, he remarked on September 23, 2020, at the 38th annual session of the Forum of Diplomatic Missions, Permanent Missions and Consulates, that Tunisia has “one state, one president and one foreign policy”, stressing that it is necessary to preserve Tunisia’s sovereignty and prevent external interference in internal affairs. Following the Political Dialogue Forum on Libya held in Tunisia in December 2020 and Kais Saied’s personal visit to Libya in March 2021, the situation in bilateral relations between the neighbors was clarified. Ghannouchi’s behavior greatly irritated not only the president, but also the parliamentarians who rallied around the Free Destourian Party, led by Abir Moussi. At the instigation of this “Tunisian Iron Lady”, several votes of no confidence were consistently put forward against Ghannouchi from the initiative group of deputies, but each time Ghannouchi managed to avoid failure. Perhaps, Moussi’s assertiveness, turning into scandalous, forced the Islamists to no less sharply repel her attacks. Ghannouchi, being a biased speaker, could not put an end to those endless squabbles between MPs, hunger strikes and protests. In confirmation, a few episodes should be provided. Thus, on December 4, 2019, the adoption of the budget was disrupted by verbal insults exchanged between deputies of the Free Destourian Party and deputies of Ennahda. In May 2020, Moussi initiated a vote of no confidence in Rachid Ghannouchi, demanding that he be interrogated for “secret contacts” and “parallel diplomacy,” after which, according to her, she received a death threat in the mail. In June 2020, Moussi put forward an initiative before the parliament to recognize the Ennahda movement as a terrorist one, but it was not possible to collect the necessary number of votes in support. The following

156

A. Kashina

month, to disperse the sit-in of parliamentarians and remove these within a month protesting “elected representatives of the people” from the assembly hall, Ghannouchi resorted to the help of the police. The President strongly condemned the use of the police in the parliament building. In December 2020, as a result of a fight with deputies of the pro-Islamic coalition Al Karama at a meeting of the parliamentary Committee on Women, Family and Children, deputies of the Democratic Movement got bruises. Seeking an official condemnation of political violence, deputies of the Democratic Movement went on a hunger strike in January 2021, but there was no reaction from Ghannouchi. The UN condemned the aggression against Abir Moussi and demanded action after a member of parliament from Al Karama coalition, Sahbi Samara, who ran for an independent candidate in 2019, slapped Moussi while she was broadcasting live from her phone a meeting of parliament on June 30 turning into debate over the establishment of a branch of the Qatar Development Fund in Tunisia. Meanwhile, in the summer of 2020, the media spread reports about the preparation by parliamentary commissions of a bill to extend the term of office of the speaker for 3–5 years, and in early 2021, when Kais Saied refused to accept a new Cabinet of ministers, Rachid Ghannouchi moved on to calls to establish a parliamentary republic in the country in its pure form. Within the Ennahda movement itself, dissatisfaction with the activities of Rachid Ghannouchi also grew. In September 2020, a petition against his running for the post of chairman of the movement collected more than a hundred signatures from the movement’s leading functionaries. They appealed to Article 31 of the Internal Statutes of the movement, which stated that the tenure of the chairman of Ennahda did not exceed two consecutive terms (Ghannouchi was re-elected in 2012 and 2016). Meanwhile Ghannouchi insisted on postponing the XI Congress of the movement, which was planned for 2020, and extending his powers until 2022, after which he will retain the honorary title of “party leader” and will prepare closely for the next presidential election. Hatem Boulabiar, who left the ranks of Ennahda in August 2019, was previously a member of the movement’s Shura Council, accused the leadership of the movement of harsh pressure and suppressing dissent by means of threats and dark PR. An odious figure, comparable to the corrupt Ben Ali-Trabelsi family, was Rachid Ghannouche’s son-in-law, Rafik Abdessalam, the owner of luxury cars, whose children got private education in the United States. He managed to be foreign minister, but in 2012 he appeared in court after sacking one million dollars as a gift from the Chinese government (Kaush 2013). His wife, Soumaya Ghannoushi, who worked modestly in London as a babysitter until the Arab Spring, according to social networks, in 2020 became the wealthiest woman in Tunisia. Even without confirmation, this social media information reflected the general mood of the Tunisian street. According to the Financial Commission, which audited the accounts of the Ennahda movement in April 2019, 3 years before that, the movement received about $5 million in the form of “donations from the dead”. According to the inspectorate, 68 citizens who provided material assistance to the Nahdhaouis were listed as dead from 3 to 11 years before that according to the civil status register. In addition, the financial accounts of party candidates for 138 lists in the 2018 municipal elections

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

157

were fictitious. Seven accounts were found in the possession of the movement, which directly violates the law on party activities, which establishes the obligation for the party to have only one bank account to conduct all operations. The reaction of the Islamists was quite expected—they tried to pretend that there are violations in all parties, and they have the minimal ones. Of course, the harbinger of the fall of the ten-year hegemony of the Islamists was the emergence of politicians like Abir Moussi, who desperately and without fear rocked the boat, gaining points from the electorate. According to the results of an opinion poll published in November 2020 by the Maghreb newspaper, in the event of early parliamentary elections, the Free Destourian Party would have come out on top, gaining 35.4% of the vote, Ennahda would have gained only 17%, the Heart of Tunisia—about 9.6%, and the Al-Karama Coalition −8.8%. Abir Moussi ranked second in terms of trust among potential voters (11.5% of respondents), while President Kais Saied consistently enjoyed the highest level of support −55% of votes (Middle East Online 2020). An exceptional feature of Kais Saied was his ability to build relationships of trust with citizens. He sincerely believed that Tunisia is a consolidated state, the president is a symbol of this unity, a guarantor of independence, progressive development, guardian of the letter of the law and the Constitution. He timed his “constitutional coup” to coincide with the national holiday—Republic Day, which Tunisians celebrate on July 25, as if marking the coming of the Third Republic (after the First Republic of Habib Bourguiba and the Second Republic of Zina El Abidine Ben Ali). Thus, the logic of the internal development of events after 2019 in Tunisia was expressed in a directly proportional relationship between the concentration of increasing power in the hands of the Islamist leader Rashid Ghannouchi and the growth of confidence in President Kais Saied, who was on the other side of the barricades. Polarization within parliament and political violence have blocked the legislature with the connivance of a biased speaker. To manage the internal situation, Kais Saied needed control not only over the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs, but also over the Ministry of the Interior, which had been supervised by the head of government. When it turned out that Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi joined the entourage of Islamists, the issue of the division of powers between him and the master of the Carthage Palace escalated. The question of the establishment of a presidential party remained a subject of speculation.

Tunisia After 25 July 2021 In early July 2021, Islamists still believed in the possibility of reaching a compromise with President Kais Saied. The leader of the Ennahda movement, Rachid Ghannouchi, invited the president and all parliamentary factions to make concessions for the sake of forming a “consensus government” on a party basis and the maximum political spectrum. Parliamentary factions critically assessed this prospect because of irreconcilable ideological differences between the parties.

158

A. Kashina

The government crisis worsened after the resignation of Health Minister Faouzi Mehdi on July 21. The reason was the minister’s call for the population to be vaccinated as soon as possible at a time when Tunisia was experiencing a shortage of vaccine: a little more than 3 million of them were available for the 12 million population of Tunisia. As of July 2021, only 8% of the Tunisians were able to be vaccinated. There was a shortage of medical personnel, equipment, beds, oxygen, and other factors that contributed to the high mortality from the coronavirus. In terms of relative mortality from the coronavirus, Tunisia ranked first in North Africa and one of the first in the world. In Tunisia, 300 people died from the coronavirus every day. The President ordered in early August 2021 to transfer the management of the campaign to vaccinate and combat the spread of coronavirus infection to the military medical command.11 The frequent alteration of cabinets of ministers, which had replaced each other in Tunisia more than a dozen of times since 2011, certainly did not add stability and, together with centrifugal forces, led to economic stagnation. In ten years, Tunisia has failed to solve socio-economic problems, partly inherited from the overthrown regime of Ben Ali. The first three months of the revolution alone cost the national economy $5–8 billion, or 4% of GDP. The economic growth rate from 2011 to 2019 in Tunisia did not exceed 1.8%, compared with 4.2% in the previous decade (2000– 2010). The tourism sector suffered great damage, especially after the terrorist attacks of March 18, 2015, at the Bardo Museum and on June 26, 2015, at the Sousse Hotel. Large losses of the tourism sector, up to 65% compared to 2011, are explained mostly not by the spread of coronavirus, but by a low level of safety. According to the 2020 Global Peace Index the situation in Tunisia that recorded the largest number of riots, protests or general strikes in the region, was comparable to the situation in Georgia or Belarus (Global Peace Index 2020). Tough measures to prevent the pandemic weakened the labor market. In 2020, nearly half a million Tunisian citizens were on the brink of poverty. The unemployment rate rose from 13% in 2010 to 16.3% in 2020. For ten years, this figure fluctuated within 15–18%, not falling below, and in some cities reaching 30%. In absolute terms, the unemployment rate among university graduates doubled from 130 to 300 thousand people. According to the 2016–2020 development plan provided by the Government of National Unity in 2016, annual GDP growth in Tunisia was planned at 5%, and the rate of reduction of the unemployment rate from 15.2% to 11% by 2020. These goals remained a desirable and impossible dream. In ten years after the Jasmin Revolution, food prices went up dramatically. Inflation, which in 2011 barely exceeded 4%, by 2018 for the first time since 1990 reached its peak −7.8%, but by 2020 returned to the level of 4.9%. By 2021, however, external public debt amounted to 90% of GDP. In 2010, Tunisia ranked third in the world in 11

It has been already noted that COVID-19 pandemic, anti-COVID measures, and socio-economic disruption they caused contributed significantly to the emergence of a number of revolutionary events of the third waves of the twenty-first century revolutions (see, e.g., Goldstone et al. (2022a, b); see also Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” [Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022, this volume]).—Editors.

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

159

terms of phosphate exports, but in 2020, for the first time since the 1950s, it became an importer of this raw material. Lacking significant domestic resources, the Tunisian Government placed the main hopes for reconstruction, in particular, on loan agreements with IMF. So, in 2013, the IMF approved a loan for Tunisia in the amount of $1.7 billion, in 2016–$2.9 billion, in 2021 negotiations were held on the provision of $4 billion. At the same time, the loans of international institutions are due to the implementation of structural economic reforms, which do not do without reducing wages, cutting social programs and abolishing subsidies for essential goods, exacerbating social tensions. Endless demonstrations markedly undermined the activities of enterprises and even entire economic sectors. For example, in 2019, more than 9,000 protests and strikes were recorded (Fahmi 2021). Perhaps the most massive and prolonged was the uprising in the southern Tunisian province of Tataouine, where for more than six months unemployed youth took to the streets, besieged state institutions and smashed police stations, demanding that the government fulfill its earlier promise and provide residents with jobs. After the residents of the south were calmed down in the spring of 2021, the protests spread in a chain reaction to the interior provinces of Kasserine and Gafsa, where protesters blocked highways, obstructed the work of factories and mining mines. In general, the protests continued to grow. An unknown group, later called Mouvement 25 Juillet, began campaigning on Facebook in July 2021 to break the curfew and go out to protest on Republic Day. At first, not many people came to the parliament building, and law enforcement officers did not see fit to resist them. When the number of people grew like an avalanche, it was impossible to stop them. Suddenly, thousands of citizens gathered on the central streets of the capital and other cities (Nabeul, Kairouan, Sfax, Tozeur, etc.) to express anger and again, as 10 years ago, they carried banners “The people want the resignation of the government!”, “ Dégage (Leave)!”, “The people want the dissolution of the parliament!”. Videos were broadcast on social media with the Ennahda offices set on fire and looted. One of the deputies of the Democratic Bloc, Badraddine Gammoudi, commented on these events: “This is a natural reaction, reflecting the complete rejection of the ruling elite, which is asked to leave so that a deep reform of the political sphere can take place, the request of the Tunisian street to achieve at least minimal progress has come true”. Apparently aware that mass protests could get the situation out of control, President Kais Saied announced on the evening of July 25 the imposition of “exceptional measures”, which included, among other things, the dissolution of the government, the freezing of the work of parliament for a period of 30 days (subsequently extended) and the deprivation of immunity of deputies, as well as the resignation of the prime minister. The President was vested with full power (legislative, executive, and judicial) with unwavering respect for human rights and civil liberties. By virtue of Law No. 117–2021 of September 22, 2021, the presidential decree was not subject to appeal and had priority over the provisions of the constitution. Repeatedly rejecting accusations of intending to establish a dictatorship and appealing to the constitutional legitimacy of the relying on Art. 80 of the Constitution, President Kais Saied

160

A. Kashina

promised to rid the country of corrupt officials, quickly return to working order state institutions and carry out the necessary reforms. How reasonable was to invoke Art. 80, which in the event of a threat to national security gives the president exclusive powers? This question was not answered, firstly, because of the inability to objectively assess the degree of threat, which, according to Kais Saied, was represented by the record spread of the pandemic, the socio-economic crisis, and the inoperability of state bodies as a result of party lobby and corruption. Does all this correspond to “a state of imminent danger threatening the integrity of the country and the county’s security and independence,” as the above-mentioned Article 80 says? Secondly, the text of the article suggests that before assuming exclusive powers, the President conducts a preliminary consultation with the Head of Government, the Speaker of Parliament and the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, and only after this makes an appeal to the people. However, neither Hichem Mechichi nor Rachid Ghannouchi, according to their own assurances, knew about the intentions of the president, and if they did, they most likely would not approve of them. The Constitutional Court did not act in the country—its proposed composition was the subject of disputes, because the unbalanced representation of Islamists in it made one doubt the impartiality and adequacy of this institution. In addition, Article 80 did not provide for the dissolution of parliament, but in fact, the “freezing” and deprivation of deputies of the status of immunity with the prospect of announcing early parliamentary elections just meant a delayed dissolution. Given the ambiguity of the situation, some political commentators qualified the events that occurred on July 25, 2021, as a coup d’état, a “soft bloodless coup” or a “constitutional coup”, which in the legal sense means a violation of the continuity of political power within the state and a cardinal change in constitutional norms, which does not follow directly from the own provisions of the constitution. Accordingly, the first aspect concerns the rupture of the continuity of political power. Indeed, the hegemony of the moderate Islamists of Ennahda seems to have come to an end. After the deputies were deprived of immunity status, judicial investigations were opened against a number of Islamists, primarily on charges of corruption. The Islamist movement has been greatly weakened not only because of corruption scandals. The catalyst for the intra-party split was, in particular, the maneuvers of Rachid Ghannouchi, who insisted on a two-year postponement of the XI Congress of the Ennahda, scheduled earlier in 2020, in order to extend his term of office as chairman of the movement contrary to its internal charter. As a result, in the winter of 2021, a group of prominent politicians, former ministers, parliamentarians and activists who broke away from Ennahda (Samir Dilou, Abdellatif Mekki, Mohamed Ben Salem, etc.) were already making plans to create an alternative pro-Islamic party that would “inherit” the best traditions and authority of Ennahda, but without Rachid Ghannouchi. As for the second factor—a radical change in the provisions of the constitution, at the time of the adoption of “exceptional measures” by the Tunisian president, his intention to change the form of government and replace the mixed republic with a presidential one was announced as part of the amendments to the 2014 constitution by referendum, which, strictly speaking, fully corresponded to his pre-election

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

161

rhetoric. The roadmap, submitted to the President in September 2021 by the Tunisian General Labor Union (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail, UGTT), proposed the establishment of a National Advisory Committee to draft constitutional amendments as well as revise the Electoral Law in order to hold early presidential-parliamentary elections as soon as possible. Thus, on the one hand, the planned change of form of government in Tunisia partly gives grounds to consider the actions of President Kais Saied as a “constitutional coup”. On the other hand, the replacement of elites actually took place during the 2019 elections, and “exceptional measures” did not essentially disrupt the continuity of the political process. The “coup” of Kais Saied was a logical continuation of the “revolution of the ballot boxes” of 2019, the legitimately elected president made every effort to fulfill election promises and meet the expectations of the electorate. In the absence of a Constitutional Court in Tunisia that could act as an arbitrator between the president and parliamentarians challenging the legitimacy of the president’s application of Article 80, the head of state remains the only sovereign, the guarantor of the constitution, who, according to the concept of Carl Schmitt, has the right to legitimately apply “emergency powers”, while enjoying a fairly wide support of the people. Against the background of a high credit of trust in the president from the population, his actions did not meet with mass resistance, even after a few months after July 25, no matter how hard the Al Jazeera TV channel, whose local office, by the way, was closed in Tunisia on July 26, 2021, tried to convince the international audience in huge protests. International and local non-governmental organizations (the journalists’ union, local branch of Human’s Rights Watch, etc.) limited themselves to warnings that Tunisia must be put back on the path of democracy. The Arab League expressed “full support for the Tunisian people”, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation also assured of the need to overcome difficulties “in accordance with the will of the people.” The governments of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Algeria did not condemn the actions of Kais Saied and wished a speedy exit from the crisis. The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed hope for a settlement “within the framework of the law.” The EU representative claimed it was necessary to “respect the constitution, constitutional institutions and the rule of law.” The United States expressed concern and insisted on respecting the “principles of democracy”, but, like the EU countries, did not officially recognize the actions of the Tunisian president as a “coup d’état” and did not curtail material assistance programs in Tunisia. Even the Qatari Foreign Ministry called for “dialogue and overcoming the crisis” while preventing the escalation of violence, and a week later, a prominent Israeli Arab political scientist and the General Director of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Doha), Azmi Bishara, condemned Rachid Ghannouchi between the lines, noting that if his party (Ennahda) had been in opposition, it would have been in a better position, and “the leader of the movement should not have drawn himself and the party into these whirlpools.”

162

A. Kashina

The press service of the President several times stated that the measures taken on July 25 are temporary, that all the president’s actions do not violate the constitution, are aimed at stabilizing and continuing the democratic transition. The President several times went to Avenue Habib Bourguiba for personal communication with citizens and repeated that he was acting within the law. In addition, Kais Saied held two important meetings, the first with representatives of the security forces and the second with representatives of civil society, namely the heads of UGTT, Tunisian confederation of industry, commerce and handicrafts (Union Tunisienne de l’industrie, du commerce et de l’artisanat, UTICA), the Tunisian Order of Lawyers, the head of the Peasants’ and Fisheries Union and the leaders of two women’s movements—The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women and the National Union of Tunisian Women. In this context, the domestic support provided to President Kais Saied, particularly by the army, was of great importance. On the evening of July 25, Kais Saied warned potential opponents: “… whoever thinks of resorting to arms and opening fire will be answered by fire by the armed forces.” The next morning, the soldiers blocked the entrance to the parliament building and replied to the deputies who appeared saying they had the right to pass as “defenders of the constitution”, that they would not let them in as “defenders of the motherland”. Therefore, the Tunisian army fulfilled its traditional role—it supported the will of the people (in this case, delegated to the president) and went to the barracks. The army in Tunisia is traditionally a secular structure that has no party ties and enjoys the unquestioning authority of the population, in contrast to the police, which was discredited in 2011 and later repeatedly found itself under the heel of Islamists. The second pillar of the President was civil society, in particular the UGTT. The Secretary-General of UGTT Noureddine Taboubi rejected Ghannouchi’s idea of National Dialogue in September and reiterated in November 2021 that “there is no going back before the events of July 25,” hinting at his approval of the president’s “exceptional measures” taken. The drastic and unilateral steps that President Kais Said took in the absence of a road map or National Dialogue have raised serious concerns about the prospect of restoring the authoritarian regime. At the end of July 2021, a series of dismissals and a campaign of prosecution of officials involved in corruption began. Among others, the Minister of Justice, the head of the National Anti-Corruption Commission were removed from their posts, the heads of departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, mayors and heads of governorates were replaced. At the end of August 2021, Amnesty International reported a violation of the legal right to freedom of movement against some 50 people involved in anti-corruption proceedings. Fearing persecution, the chairman of the Heart of Tunisia party, Nabil Karoui, illegally fled to Algeria in panic with his brother Ghazi, also a parliamentarian. In September 2021, the public began to put pressure on the president, who hesitated to take the next step while leaving the country without a parliament and a government for almost two months. In the end, Najla Boden Romdan, the first female prime minister not only in Tunisia but also in the Arab world, was appointed to head the new Cabinet of Ministers on September 29. In November, Kais Saied announced that he intended to hold a referendum on amending the constitution and would not

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

163

delay the organization of early presidential-parliamentary elections. These elections were scheduled only for December 2022. Due to the delay in decision-making and the apparent lack of consultation with the party-civil structures, Kais Saied began to lose popularity. The concentration of all power in the same hands, the abolition of the Supreme Judicial Council in February 2022 and the final dissolution of parliament almost immediately in March, created for Kais Saied the image of a “new dictator” or “royal pharaoh” (the image to which Islamists turn when describing a godless ultimatum ruler). The referendum on the adoption of a new constitution, in fact completely rewritten by Kais Saied alone and in his own interests, was held on July 25, 2022 and clearly testified to the “political bankruptcy” of the tough presidential course. Against the backdrop of a public boycott, the turnout was about 27%, which, although provided support for the draft constitution (94% of the votes “for”), in fact, meant a categorical rejection of the new course by two-thirds of the country’s population. Thus, the “constitutional coup”12 of July 25, 2021, was a logical continuation of the “ballot box revolution” of 2019, when the Islamists and their allies, who had ruled for ten years, actually received a “vote of no confidence” from the people. Not having enough political experience, Kais Saied, a representative of the capital’s intelligentsia, showed himself decisively at a critical moment, making efforts to fulfill election promises. After assuming “emergency powers” in July 2021, he retained a high credit of confidence until the end of 2021, but by the time of the referendum on the draft of a new constitution in the summer of 2022, about two-thirds of Tunisians were already opposed to the course of Kais Saied. The president was blamed for the usurpation of power.

Conclusion The “revolution of ballot boxes” in Tunisia, which began in 2019 and developed in the form of “a coup” by Kais Saied, fits into the general trend of the second wave of Middle Eastern revolutions, which, almost ten years after the 2011 Arab Spring, swept a number of countries in the Middle East—Algeria (2019 “revolution of smiles”13 ), Sudan (Sudan’s December Revolution of 2018–201914 ), Iraq (revolutionary mass 12

Note that it can well be interpreted as “an endgame coup” within the Tunisian July “coupvolution”—see Chapter “Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective” (Issaev and Korotayev 2022, this volume) and Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” (Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022, this volume); see also Grinin et al. (2022) for a discussion of types of revolutionary events.—Editors. 13 See Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” (Zoubir 2022, this volume) for detail. 14 See Chapter “Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” (Kostelyanets 2022, this volume) for detail. Note that this revolution can be also interpreted as a “coupvolution”, that is, “a rather specific type of revolutionary processes, when the revolutionary mass mobilization of the first phase leads to a coup, which can be regarded as the second phase

164

A. Kashina

protests of 201915 ), Lebanon (revolutionary protests against the “fat political elite” in 2019–202016 ) and so on; this revolutionary wave is the subject of this volume. The difference in the Tunisian scenario was that the revolution took place through legitimate electoral mechanisms, and the subsequent “coup of July 25” resembled a bloodless coup on November 7, 1987, when for medical reasons, President for life Habib Bourguiba was removed from power, and his place was taken by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who then sat “on the throne” for 24 years. In 2019, the political Islam movement stepped away and the next political period was at the door. The main accusation against the moderate Islamists of the Ennahda movement, who dominated the decade after the Arab Spring, as well as once against the Ben Ali regime, was the inability to stop the paralysis of state institutions due to corruption and party lobbying. Tunisia’s experience has demonstrated that the model of governing the state through the instruments of political Islam is no different from that of a similar secular model, and that the Ennahda Islamist movement is no different, in fact, from any other secular political party. Ideological contradictions did not prevent the conclusion of alliances between Islamists and secular parties. The pragmatism of the Islamists and their readiness for dialogue made it possible to avoid the Egyptian option in Tunisia, when the Muslim Brotherhood was outside the legal field, and saved Tunisia, which was on the verge of civil war in 2013. Moreover, Islamists turned out to be a necessary and compulsory element of consolidated democracy, and in this sense Tunisia received a certain political bonus, described in the concept of “twin tolerations” by Alfred Stepan (Stepan 2000). At the same time, the desire of the new elite to gain a foothold in power and the exorbitant ambitions of the Islamist leader Rachid Ghannouchi made the Ennahda domination look like the former corrupt regime of Ben Ali with its inherent nepotism and the priority of party loyalty against the effectiveness of governance and professionalism. The solution of socio-economic and structural crises did not become the main merit of the Tunisian Islamists, so in 2021 the socio-political climate was close to the situation at the time of 2011, only the change of power occurred not through a typical revolution, but through the institution of elections. This is the great victory of the 2011 Tunisian Revolution of Freedom and Dignity. The optimistic forecast is that the electoral cycles in Tunisia will approach those generally accepted in democratic societies: Bourguiba ruled for 30 years, Ben Ali for 24 years, and the consolidated period of Ennahda’s stay in power is 10 years. No matter how long the transition period that began on July 25, 2021, lasts, it is unlikely that the next president will be in power for more than a ten-year term, and then only if he is re-elected. A pessimistic of the revolutionary/coup-volutionary process; at the same time, during this second phase, some important requirements of the first phase participants of the coup-volutionary events are realized” (see Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” [Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022: 201– 202, this volume], as well as Chapter “Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective” (Issaev and Korotayev 2022, this volume).—Editors. 15 See Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume) for detail. 16 See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail.

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

165

forecast is also not excluded: in the event of the suppression of civil opposition and a change in the trajectory of the political course, a return to an authoritarian regime is rather likely. Among scholars, there is also an approach to considering the change of power in Tunisia as a process of changing elites. According to this logic, in 2011 there was a replacement of the Sahel elite with a new one, which came from the interior of the country. After 2019, there was a trend of another renewal of the elite at the expense of the capital’s intelligentsia, which surrounded the former professor of constitutional law, President Kais Saied. This led Le Monde to call Kays Saied “an atypical president who declared war on the political elite” (Blaise 2021). Also, the Director of Center for Arab and Islamic Studies in the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences Vasiliy Kuznetsov supposes the cause of the social conflict in Tunisia not so much in the confrontation of secular forces and Islamists, as in the conflict of elites (Kuznetsov 2021). However, whatever the opposition, the struggle of the “poles” in Tunisia first led to the dominance of the Islamists, which, having reached its apogee, was abruptly replaced by their isolation in 2021, and then the regrouping of their forces and new alliances. In this regard, one might share the optimism of the well-known Tunisian journalist Ziad Krichen, who wrote on the eve of the 2019 elections: “First the Tunisians tried the power of Islamists, then the centrists. There will probably be new experiences. But I believe that the principles and components of democracy will not change” (Monte Carlo Doualiya 2019). The success of the future Tunisian model of political structure is a guarantee that mass popular unrest in the Middle East region will be understood in a positive way, and the Tunisian way will become a kind of factor of “soft power” in the perception of other Arab countries. Among the Arab states, only Tunisia, according to Freedom House experts, received the status of “free democracy” in 2020 (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2020). In the region, only Israel enjoys this status. At the same time, about 50% of Tunisian citizens, according to polls, support democratic development, 15–20% are apolitical, only a third are ready to put up with violence “under certain circumstances” (apparently they made up the turnout in the 2022 referendum). Meanwhile, it is unlikely that Tunisia will develop according to the model where the army is incorporated into state institutions (incompatible with a democratic way), or according to the model of Islamic theocracy, given the not particularly successful experience of the Islamists of Ennahda in power and the movement’s efforts to serve as an ordinary secular party.

References Al Arabiya (2012) Tunisia’s Secular Opposition Unites against Islamists. Al Arabiya 23.03.2012. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/23/202572.html Asharq al-Awsat (2011) Bu‘alam Ghamrasa. El-Ghannouchi: Tounis tur¯ıd insha’ num¯uzaj yadra’ ‘an el-isl¯am sifa el-irhab wa mu’¯ad¯at dimuqratiya. Asharq al-Awsat 22.11.2011. http://archive.aaw sat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=12047&article=650985&feature=#.WzpGbHQh3X4

166

A. Kashina

Blaise L (2021). Kaïs Saïed, l’atypique président tunisien, en lutte contre “les élites politiques”. Le Monde 27.07.2021. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2021/07/27/kais-saied-latypique-president-tunisien-en-lutte-contre-les-elites-politiques_6089653_3212.html Carthage.tn (2019) Maoukab ada’ el-qasm wa kalima ra’is el-jumhuriya el-muntakhab Kais Saied. Carthage.tn 23.10.2019. http://www.carthage.tn/?q=ar/%D9%85%D9%88%D9%83% D8%A8-%D8%A3%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3% D9%85-%D9%88%D9%83%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A% D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A% D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A8-%D9%82% D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF Dennison J, Draege J (2020) The dynamics of electoral politics after the Arab Spring: evidence from Tunisia. J North African Stud 26(2020):756–780 Deutshe Welle (2019) Al-Basnali, D. Mufaja’a al-intikh¯ab¯at at-tunisiya: h¯al ma z¯alat r¯uh ath-thaura b¯agiya?. Deutshe Welle 16.09.2019. https://www.dw.com/ar/%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7% D8%AC%D8%A3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE% D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86% D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7% D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88% D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9/a-50449720 Economist Intelligence Unit (2020) Democracy Index 2020: in sickness and in health? The Economist Intelligence Unit 2020. https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/ Elayah M (2020) UGTT in Tunisia empowered or overpowered. A Reassessment of the role of the labor movement in Tunisia. Research Gate preprint. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.34497. 38242 Election Guide (2014) Election for Tunisian assembly of people’s representatives. Election Guide 2014. http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2746/ Fahmi G (2021) The Arab Spring 10 Years On. Chatham House 26.01.2021. https://www.chatha mhouse.org/2021/01/arab-spring-10-years France24 (2019). ‘Alifa Qadd¯ara. Al-Intikhab¯at al-ri’asiyyah: limadha sawwat al-shab¯ab al-tunisiyy bi-kath¯afah li-Kais Saied? France24 14.10.2019. https://www.france24.com/ar/20191014-% D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A8%D8%A7% D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%82%D9%8A% D8%B3-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D8%A7%D8%B3% D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9 Global Peace Index (2020) Global peace Index 2020: measuring peace in a complex world. https:// www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/GPI_2020_web.pdf Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (2022a) Introduction. Changing yet persistent: revolutions and revolutionary events. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the Causes and Effects of Disruptive Political Change. Springer, Cham, pp 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_1 Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (2022b) Waves of revolutions in the 21st century. PolisPoliticheskiye Issledovaniya 4:108–119. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2022b.04.09 Grinin L, Grinin A, Korotayev A (2022) 20th century revolutions: characteristics, types, and waves. Humanities Soc Sci Commun 9(1):1–13. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-022-01120-9 Issaev L, Korotayev A (2022) Introduction. New wave of revolutions in the MENA region in the global perspective. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A Comparative Perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_1 Kashina A (2019) Youth as a political actor after the “Arab Spring”: the example of Tunisia In: Abramova I (ed) The Youth in the political and socio-cultural life of Africa. Institute for African Studies of RAS, Moscow, pp 128–135 Kaush K (2013) “Foreign Funding” in Post-revolution Tunisia. Fride working paper. http://fride. org/download/WP_Tunisia.pdf

Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?

167

Khatib DK (2022) 17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A Comparative Perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 75–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_4 Korotayev A, Khokhlova A (2022) Revolutionary events in Mali, 2020–2021. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 191–218. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_9 Kostelyanets S (2022) Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region. A Comparative Perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 33–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_2 Kuznetsov V (2021) Svoy ritm. O vnutrinney logike sobitiy v Tunise. Global Affairs 29.07.2021. https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/svoi-ritm-tunis/ Lahmar M (2020) Islamists and politics in Tunisia today: is the foundation of a democratic Islamic party possible? In: Mohamed E, Fahmy D (eds) Arab Spring. Critical political theory and radical practice. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp 39–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24758-4_3 Mardasov A (2022) Revolutionary protests in Iraq in the context of Iranian-American confrontation. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 95–108. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_5 Marks M (2015) Tunisia’s Ennahda: rethinking Islamism in the context of ISIS and the Egyptian coup. Brookings Institution, Washington DC Marks M (2017) Tunisia’s Islamists and the “Turkish model.” J Democr 28:102–115. https://doi. org/10.1353/jod.2017.0009 McCarthy R (2018) Inside Tunisia’s al-Nahda: between politics and preaching. Cambridge University Press, Camdridge Middle East Online (2020) Ad-Desteur al-hurr yuhliq wah¯ıdan f¯ı nawaya al-tasw¯ıt li al-tashri’iyyah. Middle East Online 19.11.2020. https://middle-east-online.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF% D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1-% D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%82-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7-% D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84% D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4% D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9 Monte Carlo Doualiya (2019) 7 Malay¯ın tunisiy bada’u f¯ı intikh¯ab ra’¯ısihim al-jad¯ıd. Monte Carlo Doualiya 15.09.2019. https://www.mc-doualiya.com/articles/20190915-7-%D9%85%D9%84% D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A-% D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86% D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%87% D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF Stepan A (2000) Religion, democracy, and the “Twin Tolerations.” J Democr 11:37–57. https://doi. org/10.1353/jod.2000.0088 Vasiliev A, Khayrullin T, Korotayev A (2019) Qatari-Turkish alliance challenge for regional leadership. Aziya i Afrika segodnya 10:2–9; 11:2–8. https://doi.org/10.31857/s03215075000 6519-2 Zoubir Y (2022) The crisis of the rentier state: how the revolution of smiles has brought down the Sultanistic regime in Algeria. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A Comparative Perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-031-15135-4_3

Anna Kashina has Ph.D. in Political Science and works as a senior lecturer at the Department of Oriental languages at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution? Shady Mansour and Hala Elhefnawy

Abstract In 2019, Egypt witnessed short-lived protests that called for the ousting of the President el-Sisi. Some regarded these events as a genesis of a new revolution, that even if suppressed will put the seeds for a new revolution that will ultimately end the current regime. Still, others argue that the Egyptian government has been successful at handling the protests, not only by security measures, but also by adopting policies that were able to assert the legitimacy of the current regime through adopting developmental policies. Mansour and Elhefnawy assess both views by resorting to the historical methodology, and try to compare between the protests of 2011 and 2019, and discern the driving forces and factors that led to the eruption of 2011 protests, and assess whether it is present in 2019 protests or not. Finally, Mansour and Elhefnawy try to understand the implications of 2019 protests within the regional context.

In 2019, Egypt witnessed short-lived protests that called for the ousting of the President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.1 Some regarded these events as a genesis of a new revolution, that even if suppressed will put the seeds for a new revolution that will ultimately end the current regime. Still, others argue that the Egyptian government has been successful at handling the protests, not only by resorting to security measures, but also by adopting policies that were able to enhance the regime legitimacy through embracing developmental policies. The chapter will assess both views by resorting to the historical methodology, and try to compare between the protests of 2011 and 2019, and discern the driving forces 1 Some additional detail on those protests can be found in Chapter “Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective” (Issaev and Korotayev 2022, this volume).

S. Mansour (B) · H. Elhefnawy Future for Advanced Research and Studies, Abu Dhabi, UAE e-mail: [email protected] H. Elhefnawy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_8

169

170

S. Mansour and H. Elhefnawy

and factors that led to the eruption of 2011 protests, and assess whether it is present in 2019 protests or not. The chapter argues that the main variable that explains why the revolution of 2011 managed to oust the Egyptian president Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, while the 2019 failed to have a similar effect is the regime legitimacy. The chapter will try to assess the factors that pushed the people to participate in the 2019 protests, and analyze the main differences between 2019 with the mass protests of 2011. In addition, the chapter will analyze the factors that led to the eventual demise of the 2019 protests, and its implications for the future stability of the regime.

Protests and Political Legitimacy Political legitimacy could be defined as “the conviction on the part of individuals that it is right and proper to accept and obey the authorities and conform to the norms of the regime” (Funderburk 1975). Max Weber regards political legitimacy as a belief or faith in the authority on the part of the governed. There are three main sources of legitimacy. The first one is tradition, unwritten rules that are respected over time. The second, is Charisma; as leaders with strong personalities have the ability to draw obedience from citizens. The third, is Rationality, or the rule of law (Fabienne 2017). According to a study commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, and French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, there are four main sources of regime legitimacy, which could be elaborated as follows; 1. Input legitimacy: It assesses whether the people participated in the formulations of governmental decisions, either directly (by referendum) or indirectly (by electing their representatives) (Strebel et al. 2019). Thus, this type of legitimacy is related to the rules and procedures that organize the participation of the people in elections to choose the officials, whom they represent. Those elected officials are, in return, take binding decisions on behalf of the people. Thus, the level of participation in elections is directly proportionate to the regime legitimacy. Another dimension of this legitimacy is accountability, which take many forms, like checks and balances, auditing of public funds, media coverage and open political debate (Bellina et al. 2009). 2. Output legitimacy: It refers to the effectiveness of government’s decisions to defend people’s interests, and solving the social and economic problems they face (Piattoni 2010), or in other words, the ability of the state to effectively deliver public goods and services, as well as its quality. Hence, this type of legitimacy is directly proportional to how governmental policies attain the common welfare of the society (Strebel et al. 2019).

Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?

171

The governmental failure in providing services, regardless of being democratic or not, undermines its own legitimacy, and could be removed from power, thus threatening the credibility of the whole system, as in the Weimar Republic of Germany (Piattoni 2010). One of the essential services provided by any state is providing security. Consequently, the government would be considered legitimate if it is capable of delivering this service in a more effective way than any other actor. This is essentially true, as one main feature of the modern state is its monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. Thus, the absence of any other entity capable of providing this service is translated directly as state legitimacy. On the other hand, the existence of any militant groups who are capable of providing security, and the absence of state authority is a clear indication that the state legitimacy is suffering a deficit (Bellina et al. 2009). The other side of output legitimacy is the ability of the government to provide goods and services to the people. The implicit implication is that state’s legitimacy is enhanced through improving access to services. Some refer to this as penetration, which is equated with the obvious presence of state institutions in the society, and providing services in return for taxes (Nixon et al. 2017). 3. Shared beliefs: The rules that governs how the state authority rule should conform to certain sets of rules that are justified according to the people’s belief, traditions, or religious beliefs (Weigand 2015). 4. International legitimacy: It means the acknowledgment of the state’s sovereignty and legitimacy by external actors. Such recognition of state legitimacy means that the state is perceived by others as operating in accordance with the international norms, like respecting human rights (Massing 2010). Some countries, like Afghanistan prior to mid 2021, enjoyed an international legitimacy, but did not retain internal legitimacy, and hence its legitimacy was fragile and questionable. Consequently, after the American withdrawal of its forces in 2021, the government collapsed rapidly. On the other hand, Somaliland, which does not enjoy an international recognition, retains an internal legitimacy, and hence was capable of providing a stable regime. Aid dependent countries, on the other hand, which is expected to meet conditions imposed by donor countries might undermine the relations between the state and society, and hence erode its internal legitimacy (Massing 2010). There is a common agreement in the literature of social protests and revolutions that the main cause of protests is the perceived unjustified threat to the physical and economic security, of individuals in the society (Worchel et al. 1974). Others describe this as relative deprivation (e.g., Korotayev and Shishkina 2020). The relative deprivation of individuals, or certain segments within the society is in itself not sufficient to push people to violent protests, if it perceived as necessary or legitimate. In war situation, for instance, all people can sustain deprivations, and even can accept that certain classes are not equally deprived, if it is perceived as a necessity. For example, doctors during wartime might be allocated more gasoline than the ordinary people. However, it is justified on the basis that the preferable

172

S. Mansour and H. Elhefnawy

treatment will enable them to carry on their duties in saving lives (Worchel et al. 1974). Consequentially, if the allocation of rewards and deprivation is perceived as arbitrary, or unjustified, this might undermine the legitimacy of the government, especially if the allocation of resources is directed to enrich the ruling regime, or certain groups that are well connected to the regime (Worchel et al. 1974).

Understanding the Causes of 2019 Protests On September 20, 2019, hundreds of protestors in Cairo and other cities responded to the call of Mohamed Ali, an Egyptian businessman living in Spain and self-exiled ex-military contractor, who urged his followers on YouTube to take to the streets (The Economist 2019). It should be noted here that the level of participation of protests in 2019 was incomparable to 2011, when millions of Egyptians decided to oust the former Egyptian president Mohamed Hosni Mubarak. The reasons behind 2019 sporadic protests could be attributed to the following factors. 1. The Economic Austerity measures. The Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el Sisi based his legitimacy, not only on ending the rule of the former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi, affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, based on the popular protests who demanded his removal, but also, on his ability to deliver economically, and rebuilt the Egyptian economy after years of Turmoil, and economic mismanagement after 2011 revolution until the ousting of Mohamed Morsi in 2013. The developmental policies of president El Sisi were based on building mega projects, such as the expansion of Suez Canal, the construction of new cities, especially, a new capital, in addition to building a nuclear reactor with Russian support. These mega-projects came along with applying the much-needed economic reforms, like removing energy and commodity subsidies (Miehe 2019), and the flotation of the Egyptian pound. Cairo received credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for implementing difficult economic reforms that successive governments failed to carry on, and for its success as an emerging market (Aftandilian 2019). One of these measures was increasing energy prices by 50% since 2014, as a part of the IMF deal (Ghafar 2018). The Egyptian economy, under Sisi managed to achieve an economic growth of 4.08, 5.31 and 5.56% in 2017, 2018 and 2019 respectively (O’Neill 2021a), after the GDP growth averaged 2% in the years that followed 2011, due to the political instability. However, these positive macroeconomic indicators came at high societal price, as decreasing subsidies resulted in inflation, which is estimated to be 30.7, 20.85

Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?

173

and 13.88% in 2017 (Piazza 2018), 2018 and 2019 respectively (O’Neill 2021b). In addition, the prices of some goods and services were doubled. As in all economic reforms, the burden falls directly on the shoulders of the middle and lower classes of the society (Mandour 2020). Despite these shortcomings, the Egyptian economy was capable of attracting foreign investments that was withdrawing from the country until 2014, due to the poor infrastructure and chronic instability. Sisi managed to restore stability and security, in addition to investing in massive infrastructure projects, thus creating the environment suitable for business. 2. Questioning the legitimacy of the regime. Sisi was capable of portraying himself as the strong man who is willing to take bold decisions and the right reforms, without any consideration to how that might impact his popularity (Gaballa 2018). Central to this image is Sisi’s insistence that he feels the suffering of the people, and the hardships they are going through. In July 2018, he declared his frustration with the online postings on social media that asks him to step down from office because of the deteriorating economic conditions. Sisi responded to these demands by defending his economic policies arguing that he was left with no options but to adopt painful economic measures to stimulate an economy hurt by years of political turmoil and violence (Hendawi 2018). Sisi’s economic policies were also attacked on the ground that his megaprojects were draining Egypt’s financial resources and diverted them from the most pressing sectors. Sisi countered these arguments, in January 2018, by insisting that “no country wants to build an ambitious economy without sophisticate infrastructures”. Sisi hinted that this criticism was directly orchestrated by the banned Muslim Brotherhood (Hendawi 2016). Mohamed Ali, an Egyptian building contractor living in his self-exile in Spain, who is the main figure calling for 2019 protests, aimed mainly at delegitimizing Sisi’s moral authority, by accusing him, his family and some leaders of the military establishment of corruption. One of the main arguments presented by Ali is that massive amounts of public money has been directed at building luxury palaces. This came at a time, when Egypt was applying severe austerity measures to stimulate economic growth (O’Driscoll et al. 2020). Thus, these allegations aimed at derailing the legitimacy of Sisi. This came at a delicate time, as the president was asking the Egyptians to be patient, as some of the positive repercussions of his economic policies were to be felt later on (Hendawi 2018). President Sisi refuted any claims of corruption, while admitting that he is building presidential palaces. He defended his position, by arguing that he is not building these palaces for himself, but rather for the Egyptian government, and he even challenged Ali by insisting that he would continue to build more palaces (Reuters 2019). On the other hand, Ali was popularly perceived, especially among Sisi’s supporters, as a puppet used by the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Qatari government to delegitimize Sisi’s regime, in order to enhance the prospects of the Muslim Brotherhood to return to power in Egypt (Atef 2019). This view was supplemented

174

S. Mansour and H. Elhefnawy

by the fact that he was hosted by Al Jazeera, the mouthpiece of Doha (YouTube 2019). In addition, Doha’s Al Jazeera backed Ali by fabricating video footage for mass protests that dates back to 2013, and presented it as if it represented fresh protests in 2019 against Sisi rule. These videos went viral through pro-Muslim Brotherhood networks on social media platforms and their channels (Egypt Today 2020). Thus, Ali’s legitimacy was undermined by the fact that he was supported by Qatar.

Enhancing Government’s Inclusion And Popularity One of the main causes of the failure of the protests is attributed to the capability of the government’s legitimacy to withstand attacks from Mohamed Ali on Sisi’s credibility before the people. This could be elaborated by analyzing the sources of legitimacy that the Egyptian government enjoyed by 2019, and how they represented a reservoir that the government have capitalized on to defend its legitimacy, and preventing protests from turning into another mass revolutionary protests of 2011. The first source of state legitimacy is input legitimacy. Just before the 2019 protests, Sisi held a referendum on amendments to the Egyptian constitution in April 2019. These amendments included expanding the president’s Judicial role, in addition to increasing the presidential term to six years, while maintaining the limits for running the presidency to two terms (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy 2019). Another major amendment is emphasizing the armed forces’ role as the guardian of the constitution, the foundation of the state, and its civilian nature. This article could be seen as an attempt to prevent the return of Muslim Brotherhood to power. President Mohamed Morsi established, during his tenure, an alliance with terrorist organizations inside the country, as well as endangering national security by leaking damaging military Egyptian intelligence to Qatar (Nicks 2014), the main supporter of Muslim Brotherhood branches in the Middle East. Sisi, according to another transitional amendment extended his term in presidency from 2022 to 2024. These amendments were approved by 88.8% of the people who participated in the referendum, while the turnout was about 44.3% (after the referendum, the Egypt president could rule until 2030 [BBC 2019]). On the other hand, Sisi’s government was active in finding new ways to incorporate youth to participate in various ministries affiliated to the Egyptian government through “The Presidential Leadership Program”, which El Sisi launched in September 2015 (Presidential Leadership Program 2015). The program, which is affiliated to the presidency, aims at training the youth on theories of management, planning, as well as raising awareness of Egypt’s problems, and their capacity to solving them, and hence establishing competent civil servants. In a sense, the program is focusing on incorporating the youth in the decisionmaking process, and thus, taking part in shaping future decisions, thus enhancing their participation in state institutions. It should be recalled here that one of the demands of the 2011 revolution is ending the youth marginalization.

Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?

175

Another method to promote the youth participation is trying to make use of information technology, namely mobile applications and online surveys to encourage the youth to express their opinion regarding the governmental policies. The Minister of Planning, Monitoring, and Administrative Reform launched the application “Sharek 2030” (Participate in Arabic), so as to allow the youth to share their views on Egypt’s strategic vision 2030, and related projects. In March 2018, an online survey was circulated by the Ministry of Planning among youth through the social media platforms in an attempt to inform the youth of the updated version of the mission, engaging them and understanding their opinion (Mohamed 2019). Utilizing online platforms and social media could be understood against the background that 90% of the young people in Egypt believe that the Internet will enhance citizens influence over governmental policies according to a survey conducted in 2014, while 87% assumed that the internet will help citizens understand what the governments are doing, and finally, 89% of them believe that online platforms will support their expression of their opinions about the government (Osman and Girgis 2016). Another group that Sisi empowered is women. That is due to the fact that women are perceived as one of the ardent supporters of president Sisi. In one of his speeches that dates back to 2017, Sisi emphasized his respect to “Egyptian women’s resilience”, in reference to their support for Sisi despite the painful economic reform policies. He also added that “I knew that in every house, I, or rather Egypt, had a prop” (Egypt Today 2018). In return, Sisi empowered Women’s participation in the public life. Under 2014 constitution, and its amendments in 2019, one quarter of the parliamentary seats are to be allocated for women (al-Hay’ah al-‘Aammah li-l-Isti‘lamat 2019). In the executive branch, the Egyptian cabinet of 2018 witnessed the inclusion of eight female ministers, for the first time, or about one quarter of the cabinet (Egypt Today 2018). Another indicator for the empowerment of women is the appointment of Nadia Ahmed Abdou Saleh as a governor of Baheira, in February 2017, for the first time, while in August 2018, the Christian female Manal Awad Mikhael was appointed as a governor for Damietta (Shaban 2018). Thus, Sisi tried to enhance the participation of the youth and the women in his government, to enhance the inclusion and representation of different social groupings.

Providing Security and Delivering Services One of the main causes of the January 2011 revolution was the eroding legitimacy of Hosni Mubarak’s government, because of the neoliberal policies of privatization, and the governmental plans to end subsidies, coupled with the increased prices of basic goods and commodities, in addition to the widespread perception that the government

176

S. Mansour and H. Elhefnawy

is corrupt (Joya 2011). That is why the main moto of the January 2011 revolution was “bread, freedom and social justice”. From the period extending from January 2011 until mid 2012, Egypt witnessed social unrest, where the transitional governments, which assumed power during this period were unable to face the rising economic crisis, or address people’s frustration with the deteriorating social and economic conditions. After Mohamed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed power in 2012, he pursued the same economic policies of neoliberalism. Hassan Malek, a Senior businessman affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood declared in October 2011, that the group were not against the neoliberal policies of Mubarak, but were only against the corruption of the businessmen close to his regime, thus echoing Mubarak’s failure to address public dissatisfaction with social and economic conditions, that eventually led to his ouster (Gamal 2019). On the other hand, Morsi tried to disrupt any sort of opposition to his rule, and empower the Muslim Brotherhood to infiltrate and dominate the Egyptian bureaucracy and government. This led to rising opposition to his rule, which eventually led to mass protests and his ouster in July 2013. After Morsi’s removal from power, Cairo was facing immense challenges, as deteriorating security situation, especially in Sinai, and rising economic challenges meant that the new regime has to deliver wide services that ranges from restoring security to delivering economic and social services to the restive population, that failed to reap the benefits of the Egyptian revolution of January 2011. This could be elaborated in the following points.

Provision of Security and Combating Terrorism Egypt enjoyed stability before 2011 protests. However, in the aftermath of 25th revolution, the security situation deteriorated significantly. This was related, in part, due to the fact that the protestors targeted the police, and regarded it as the main tool for repressing the people. The end result was the failure of the Egyptian military and security forces in restoring order, preventing crimes, or controlling the borders. This situation was accompanied with the high level of armed robbery, car theft, and other violent crimes, which significantly increased people’s fear and frustration from the lack of security (Blaydes 2019). Against this background, terrorist groups residing in Sinai were emboldened to carry out attacks inside Sinai, as well as trying to extend its areas of operation to Egypt’s mainland. Ansar Beit al-Maqdes, later came to be known as “Welayat Sinai” after it shifted its allegiance from Al Qaeda to ISIS, were one of the few groups that witnessed a significant increase in their attacks after the ouster of Morsi (Ragab 2021) and tried to increase its area of operations from Northern Sinai to Egypt’s interior, especially Cairo and Delta.

Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?

177

Former members of the Muslim Brotherhood joined Welayat Sinai (Dentice 2021), and several assessments argued that there was a complicity between the Muslim Brotherhood, and Welayat Sinaii (Dentice 2021). The threat of Welayat Sinai was severe, due to the fact that the group possess advanced weaponry, in addition to the support they received for ISIS branches in Syria, Iraq and Libya (Mansour 2015). Furthermore, Hamas, which is the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood has tactically cooperated with Welayat Sinai. Hamas turned its blind eye to the defection of some elements of its military wing, Iz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and Nukhba, Hamas’ commando wing, to join Welayat Sinai, making use of the tunnels between Gaza and Sinai, which is directly controlled by Hamas itself (McKernan 2017). The Muslim Brotherhood did not resort only to tacit cooperation with other terrorist grous, but started directly to sponsor and found new terrorist groups after the ouster of Mohamed Morsi from power in 2013, namely Hasm (or Harakat Sawa’d Misr) and Liwaa al Thawra, which include in their ranks former members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Horton 2017a). The leaders of the MB always claim that they renounce violence, but given their history of their tacit and explicit cooperation with terrorist groups, these claims cannot be accepted. Both US (US Department of State 2021) and UK (Al Arabiya 2017) designated Hasm and Liwaa al Thawra as terrorist organizations. Hasm, from its inception in July 2016, was more focused on assassinating a number of senior government officials, including failed attempts in August and September 2016 to murder the former Grand Mufti of Egypt, Ali Gomaa, and Assistant Attorney General Zakaria Abdel Aziz (Horton 2017b). The level of violence of the Muslim Brotherhood could not be underestimated. In the aftermath of Morsi ouster, the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations attacked police stations, killing personnel, taking weapons, and releasing prisoners, as in Kerdassa police station, where 14 police officers were murdered. Thirty seven churches were burned down, and between June 2013 to the end of February 2016, the Muslim Brotherhood and Welayat Sinai killed nine hundred police officers and committed 1,494 acts of violence across Egypt (Obaid 2020). Another terrorist threat came from Libya starting from early 2015, as ISIS send its members from there to carry out terrorist attacks in upper Egypt. In February 2015, ISIS Libya murdered 21 Egyptian Copts working in Libya. Another attack carried by the same group came in Menia governorate on June 7, 2017, when they attacked a bus carrying Copts (El-Ghobashy and Kholaif 2017). These attacks were mainly aimed at instigating sectarian conflict between Muslims and Copts, and taking revenge on the Copts, who supported the Sisi regime. Taking in consideration the geographical locations, where these groups operated, one can reach to the conclusion that there was a sort of geographical coordination among these various groups. While the terrorist activity of Welayat Sinai was mainly concentrated in Northern Sinai, Hasm and Liwaa al Thawra focused mainly on Cairo, Giza, and the Delta, and finally ISIS elements from Libya carried out attacks in upper Egypt.

178

S. Mansour and H. Elhefnawy

Thus, in the years that came after the ouster of Morsi, Egypt was fighting terrorist groups on three different fronts; in Sinai, in Delta and upper Egypt. The message that the Muslim Brotherhood was trying to send that Egypt will not secure stability after the ouster of Morsi. The Leading Muslim Brotherhood figure Mohamed el-Beltagy made clear that this is the official strategy of Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013, when he announced that “Terrorism in Sinai will stop at the moment ousted president Morsi returns back to power” (Sayed 2017). Sisi responded to this mounting terrorist threats by adopting many strategies, like launching the one of the largest military campaigns in Sinai history since 1973 war with Israel, which came under the name “Desert Storm” (Dentice 2021). The Egyptian military destroyed tunnels stretching from the Egyptian border town of Rafah to Gaza (Mansour 2015) to stop smuggling of terrorists and weapons. The Egyptian security forces also continued to target terrorist cells in Cairo, Giza, and Delta. In an attempt to stop ISIS threats from Libya, the Egyptian military conducted attacks inside Libya. In May 26, 2017, for instance, the Egyptian army launched six strikes against ISIS’ camp near Derna in eastern Libya, which was responsible for the killing of Egyptian Copts in Menia (CBC 2017). Another strategy, Cairo adopted is coordinating heavily with the Khalifa Haftar, the commander of Libyan National Army, in an attempt to control the borders, and combat terrorist organization endangering the national security of both countries (Mansour 2017). As mentioned before, President Sisi has been supportive to the Egyptian Copts after their churches sustained attacks from the Muslim Brotherhood (Fahmi 2014). The Egyptian Orthodox church was rather calm in dealing with these attacks, and asked its followers to be patient. Therefore, Sisi expressed his support for the Copts by regularly attending Christmas Eve Mass at the Cathedral starting from 2015 until 2020. The significance of such visits could not be overestimated as he was the first president to attend such a ceremony (Yerkes 2016). In addition to this symbolic support, Sisi tried to retaliate against some terrorist attacks against the Copts by targeting ISIS’ camps in Libya (Kirkpatrick 2015). In the aftermath of these counterterrorism strategies, Egypt was capable of improving the security situation significantly. This was evident in the decline in the number of attacks in 2018 from 169 to 45 in 2017, according to the 2019 Global Terrorism Index (Wilson Center 2019).

Maintaining Social Safety Net for the Poor Obviously, the main source of the regime legitimacy is thwarting the Muslim brotherhood attempt to instigate civil strife, countering terrorist groups, whether affiliated to ISIS or Muslim Brotherhood, and restoring security again. Still, one of the main challenges to the government was its ability to deliver economic and social services to the restive masses. Sisi tried to build his legitimacy

Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?

179

by undertaking bold economic measures that aimed at restoring growth and correcting the structural problems that Egypt’s economy suffered from. The economic reform under Sisi started in 2014, which included phasing out energy subsidies, imposing new VAT tax, and fully floating the Egyptian pound. Sisi adopted flexible exchange rates in 2016, which devaluated the Egyptian pound by almost 50% against the dollar (BBC 2016). This was one of the decisions that was met with widespread anger among all strata of the Egyptian society. The deteriorating economic conditions gave Mohamed Ali a window of opportunity to delegitimize the regime before the benefits from the megaprojects that Sisi built were to materialize. He tried to portray Sisi’s government as corrupt by making allegations that he was one of the close associates of the regime, a contractor who benefited from the lavish spending on the presidential palaces. This came at a time, when Sisi was urging the Egyptian people to accept the austerity measures to revive the economy. However, Mohamed Ali failed in mobilizing mass protests to a level comparable to 2011 protests against Mubarak or 2013 protests against Morsi. Even, the protest movement which amassed thousands of protesters waned rapidly, without seriously endangering the regime survival. This could be attributed to the fact that Mohamed Ali failed to understand how Sisi was capable of presenting several economic projects that targeted the poor, and aimed at mitigating the negative impact of his economic policies on them. One such program is Takaful wa-karama, or “solidarity and dignity”, which is one of the social protection programs that aimed at protecting the poor and the needy from the negative impacts or reforms. These efforts were twofold, as they aimed at increasing the coverage of the program to cover the poor people, in addition to increasing the amounts on the food subsidy card (World Bank 2018). The program was launched in 2015 with the support of the World Bank. The program has covered to date 2.26 million households, or approximately 9.4 million individuals, which compromises about 10% of Egypt’s population (World Bank 2018). Takaful also provides conditional income of 325 LE/monthly to families in return for retaining their children in school, while providing them with health care. Thus, in a sense, the program also targeted enhancing human capital, by providing education, and by utilizing it as a mean to “give them a path out of poverty”. The program covers a maximum of 3 children per family and recertifies beneficiaries every 3 years (World Bank 2018). The “Dignity” or “Karama” program aspires to protect Egypt’s poor elderly citizens above 65 years of age and citizens with severe disabilities as well as orphans, by providing them with unconditional monthly pension of 450 LE per month. This program has covered 306,016 households or about 13% of the program’s total households (World Bank 2018). Both programs managed to decrease malnutrition to its members, especially among children, while preventing families from falling below the poverty line, according to an independent study carried on by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (Breisinger et al. 2018).

180

S. Mansour and H. Elhefnawy

Due to the positive assessment of the program, it was institutionalized as a national program that receives direct allocations from the annual budget. It is estimated that this budget reached to about LE 19 billion in the fiscal year 2021 (Mohamed 2020). It should be noted here that one outcome of the 2019 protests was that Sisi reinstated a food subsidy program to 1.8 million Egyptians who had been removed from the food staples program (Bush and Greco 2019). Another public project that targeted the people living under the line of poverty is trying to improve the livelihood of the people living in slums, or informal areas. These areas were one of the chronic urban problems that successive Egyptian governments failed to tackle (Habib 2017). According to official figures, 22 million Egyptians, approximately a quarter of the population, live in slums, of whom 850,000 people live is unsafe areas that is at risk of landslides and floods. In addition, 60% of Greater Cairo’s population live in slums (Farouk 2020). In fact, the governmental efforts to deal with informal areas could be dated back to the last years of Mubarak rule, namely in 2008, with the creation of Informal Settlements Development Fund (ISDF). The main aim of the program is to try to locate unsafe areas such as Duweiqa, where 119 people were killed in a rockslide in 2008. However, the fund was criticized for two reasons. Its narrow geographical focus, which prioritized the capital Cairo, particularly, down town and old Cairo. In addition, the residents of these areas were relocated to other areas, and their land were stripped for the sake of land value and investors’ development plans (Ezz 2019). Sisi, starting from 2016, adopted different policies in dealing with the informal areas. At least, he tried to overcome three main pitfalls in the previous policy. First, the policies dealing with informal areas were no longer focused on Cairo. Rather, he extended the developmental scheme to cover most of the informal areas throughout Egypt, like Zerzara in Port Said (on the Suez Canal), and Samakeen in Sohag (Upper Egypt). Second, the government built new cities for the slum dwellers, like Asmarat, which included schools, health, educational, recreational services and sports facilities and access to public transport. In return the residential units were rented for only 19$ monthly (Farouk 2020). On the other hand, due to the fact that some of the dwellers lost their jobs due to their relocation, the government sponsored a number of programs dedicated to creating new jobs. In other areas, like in Samakeen, Sohag, stores were offered to the residents with reduced rent prices to suit their financial situations (Diab et al. 2020). Third, the governmental policies were highly flexible, as they adopted different policies. Some of the slums were demolished and its inhabitants were relocated, while other slums were upgraded and “re-planned by building a sewage system and electricity and potable water networks”, in addition to connecting them to basic services, and paving roads. Furthermore, families have been granted different relocation and re-development agreements (Goussous and Tayoun 2020). A case in point is Maspero triangle, which is a slum in the heart of Cairo. The inhabitants were presented with different options, as some of the dwellers agreed to relocate to Asmarat, which is a new low-housing neighborhood project, and they were

Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?

181

offered usufruct contracts for their units, for which they also have to pay 19$ Egyptian pounds (Mohie 2018). Others preferred to receive compensation. Still others insisted to stay, and hence, they were supposed to be provided with new residential units within Maspero triangle after three years (al-Munìm 2019). It should be recalled that improving the slums could be regarded not only as a developmental project in its own right, but also has a security implication, as these slums were in some cases uncontrolled by the government, lawless areas that terrorists and criminal could find shelters in, that was hard for security forces to penetrate. Thus, by demolishing these slums, the government has been able to control these spaces, and prevent any future threat to the order it imposed.

Extending the Reach of the Health Services President Sisi put improving health services on the top of his agenda. One of the chronic health problems that Egypt suffered from is hepatitis C virus, which is responsible of killing about 40,000 people annually. In addition, it is estimated that 5–7% of the adult population are infected by the virus. This major public health threat has also negative implications on the economy, as it is responsible for a loss of about 1.5% of the GDP annually, and the people who suffer from the virus are estimated to be five times more prone to fall into poverty (World Bank 2019). In parallel, Egypt suffered from the spread of Noncommunicable diseases (NCD), namely high blood pressure, sugar levels and increased body weight. It is estimated that 92% of all deaths and 67% of premature deaths were caused by NCD. In an attempt to counter these chronic health problems, Sisi endorsed the “100 million healthy lives” initiative, which is a national screening campaign that was launched in July 2018, and intended to screen all the Egyptians for free, making it the “largest of its kind in the whole globe”. The screening was made available in either specified hospitals or in mobile vehicles, that is easily accessible to all the people. In addition, if people who suffer from these diseases were detected, they would be treated without any charge (State Information Service 2020). The initiative managed to meet the initial goal of the campaign, which is to screen half of the Egyptian people, and treat about 2.2 million people from Hep C (State Information Service 2021).

Shared Belief In Strong Man As mentioned before, shared beliefs refer to the existence of a common understanding over the rules that should govern the relation between the authority and the people governed. Such convergence facilitates the implementation of governmental policies, and make it retain support from the people governed.

182

S. Mansour and H. Elhefnawy

In the Egyptian context, it could be argued that there is a shared belief that there is a need for a strong man, who could counter the challenges that Egypt faced in the post 2011 period, retains stability, and achieve people’s aspiration in achieving development and economic prosperity. Another shared belief is that Muslim Brotherhood should not be allowed to participate in politics again. The longing for a strong man in times of crisis, has been negatively perceived in the western academia, especially in the literature that focused in the Middle East region. Such writings argued that authoritarian leaders try to legitimize their hold on power by emphasizing the national security threats that the country face, and the need to establish a stable order (Marzo and Cavatorta 2019). Such logic suffers from two problems. The first is that it fails to acknowledge the fact that in time of crisis, the role of leaders increases both in democratic or non-democratic countries. According to neo-institutionalism, it is during time of crisis, the agents (the leaders) not the institutions play a key role in providing their assessments of the problems that faced the old regime or policy paradigm, and the appropriate measures taken to resolve the crisis (Hay 2006). Second, countries in the Middle East faced real challenges in the aftermath of the Arab Spring of 2011, as evident in the Arab countries that witnessed civil wars and rise of terrorist groups, like the case in Syria and Libya. Still, in other countries, where democratic elections were held, like in Egypt, the material benefits, represented in achieving economic growth did not materialize. In addition, the new government of Freedom and Justice party, which was affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood resorted to violence to counter the rising popular protests that challenged their regime, which further aggravated the people, making them feel that change had not materialized, whether politically or economically. Consequentially, the return of strongman was seen as the only acceptable solution to prevent further chaos (Marzo and Cavatorta 2019). The popular belief in the need for a strong man could be asserted by resorting to public surveys. According to the fifth wave of Arab Barometer (2018−2019), a nonprofit research network that is responsible for conducting public opinion surveys in the Middle East and North Africa, the most important challenge facing the Egypt in 2018 was economy (36%), fighting terrorism (18%), and public services (15%) (Arab Barometer 2019). On the other hand, 66% of the Egyptian reported that they trust or have a great deal of trust in the Sisi government in 2019, which is a significant increase compared to 2013, when 22% of the people only reported that they trust the government. This reflects that widely held perception that Sisi has been capable of portraying himself as the leader who is capable who stir the country to stability, despite the fact that only 40% of the Egyptians were optimistic that the economic conditions would improve in the next few years. Thus, taking these two figures together, this reflects a clear indication that many ordinary people tend to trust Sisi, despite holding a pessimistic outlook to the economy (Arab Barometer 2019). It could be assumed that there is another shared belief between the government and the people in Egypt, which is countering political Islamic groupings, like the Muslim

Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?

183

Brotherhood. This belief is not only evident in Egypt only, but also is acquiring regional momentum. According to the Arab Barometer, the trust in the Muslim Brotherhood had declined from its peak of about 44% in 2011 to 17% in 2019, which means that 83% of the Egyptians lack trust in the group (Arab Barometer 2019). It could be argued that the decline in the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood is not a development that is related to Egypt alone, but that development is echoed regionally, especially in 2019 and in 2021. In December 2018, Sudan witnessed a popular uprising that ended the regime of President Omar al-Bashir, who is closely affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood (France24 2019; see also Chapter “Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” [Kostelyanets 2022, this volume] for more detail). This trend also continued unabated in Tunisia (July 2021, see Chapter “Tunisia. Revolution of ballot boxes?” [Kashina 2022, in this volume] for detail) and in Morocco (September 2021 [see Vasiliev et al. 2019 for the background]). Following popular protests against the Tunisian parliament, which was dominated by Ennahda party, President Kais Saied suspended the parliament in July 2021, and ousted the Youssef al-Shahed, the prime minister, who was aligned to Ennahda (Amara 2021), while in Morocco, the Justice and Development party (PJD), affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, which was leading the country from 2011 until 2021, gained only 13 seats in the parliamentary elections of September 2021 down from its original 125 seat in the previous elections (Monjib 2021), which was a clear indication that the parties affiliated to the group are declining in popularity after one decade of the Arab Spring.

Conclusion The 2019 protest of Egypt, which was instigated mainly by the former contractor Mohamed Ali failed to materialize in wide spread mass protests akin to the Arab Spring of 2011. Neither can these protests be considered as a harbinger for forthcoming revolution. One main reason that makes 2019 protests remarkably different from 2011 revolution is the fact that by 2011, there was a widespread frustration among different segments of the Egyptian society, which felt that their interests are undermined, and there is no prospect or hope for any change. Thus, the legitimacy of the regime was critically undermined. In addition, by 2011, the Egyptian people thought that removing Mubarak regime would end all the problems that they suffer from. However, to the contrary their conditions deteriorated. Not only the economic growth stalled in the years following ousting Mubarak, but also security situation deteriorated with the rise of ISIS, in Sinai and mainland Egypt. Thus, people lost faith in utilizing protests as a main tool for improving the economic and social conditions. Rather it raised the fear that these demonstrations

184

S. Mansour and H. Elhefnawy

might result in chaos, similar to what other countries in the region suffered from, like Libya or Syria. Thus, ordinary people refused participating in demonstrations not because they approve the economic policies of the regime, but rather because they were afraid from the repercussions of the demonstrations that might usher into a period of chronic instability. On the other hand, Sisi government managed during his tenure to adopt policies that satisfy the needs of certain social strata, and enhancing the legitimacy of the regime. He managed to adopt developmental policies that were directed mainly to the poor, and that aimed at undermining the impact of the economic reform policies over them. In addition, the government managed to empower the youth, the women, and the Copts politically, and hence increased their participation in the decision-making process. In a sense, there was no broad coalition of different social groupings that perceives that their interests are harmed by the governmental policies, and hence they are united in ousting the regime. Furthermore, Sisi managed to launch a successful war against terrorist groups. He neutralized the threats emanating from the terrorist groups allied to the Muslim brotherhoods, as well as ISIS which tried to infiltrate the western borders of Egypt, while ISIS in Sinai was undermined. Even, the middle class, that suffered most from the economic reform policies, was loath to participate in another round of protests fearing of entering a new cycle of unrest and turmoil. Finally, it could be argued that by 2019, there was no realistic alternative to the Sisi regime, as it appears that majority of the Egyptian people still support his policies and reject the Muslim Brotherhood.

References Aftandilian G (2019) Positive economic growth in Egypt belies mounting problems. Arab Center. August 21, 2019. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/positive-economic-growth-in-egypt-beliesmounting-problems/ Al Arabiya (2017) UK designates ‘Hasm’, ‘Liwaa el-Thawra’ militant groups in egypt as ‘terrorist’. Al Arabiya. December 22, 2017. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2017/12/23/UKdesignates-Hasm-Liwaa-el-Thawra-militant-group-in-Egypt-as-terrorist al-Hayàh al-Àammah li-l-IstiÌamat (2019) al-Mar’ah fi-l-sultah al-tashri‘iyyah. al-Hay’ah al‘Aammah li-l-Isti‘lamat. April 25, 2019. https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/116462/%D8%A7%D9% 84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A3%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8% B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9% 8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9?lang=ar al-Munìm MM (2019) Siyasat al-dawlah fi tatwir al-manatiq al-sakaniyyah al-mutadahwirah wamada istidamati-ha. Dirasat halah: hayy al-Samarat wa-muthallath Masbiru. Majallat Jami‘at al-Malik ‘Abd al-‘Aziz: al-‘Ulum al-Handasiyyah 30(2):57–77 Amara T (2021) Supporters of Tunisian president celebrate government ousting with cheers, fireworks. Reuters. July 26, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/supporters-tunisianpresident-celebrate-government-ousting-with-cheers-fireworks-2021-07-26/

Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?

185

Arab Barometer (2019) Arab barometer V Egypt Country Report. Retrieved, from https://www. arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Egypt_Report_Public-Opinion_Arab-Barometer_ 2019.pdf Atef M (2019) Egypt’s economy: the next challenge for the regime. Fikra Forum. October 28, 2019. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/egypts-economy-next-challenge-regime BBC (2016) Egypt allows its currency to float freely. BBC. November 03, 2016. https://www.bbc. com/news/business-37857468 BBC (2019) Egypt president could rule until 2030 as constitutional changes backed. BBC. April 24, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48035512 Bellina S, Darbon D, Eriksen S, Sending O (2009) The legitimacy of the state in fragile situations. Institut gouvernance 02.2009. http://www.institut-gouvernance.org/docs/the_legitimacy_of_the_ state_in_fragile_situations.pdf Blaydes L (2019) Challenges to stability in Egypt. Hoover Institute. April 22, 2019. https://www. hoover.org/research/challenges-stability-egypt Breisinger C, Gilligan D, Karachiwalla N, Kurdi S, El Enbaby H, Jilani A, Thai G (2018) From Impact Evaluation Study for Egypt’s Takaful and Karama Cash Transfer Program. IFPRI, Washington DC Bush R, Greco E (2019) Egypt under military rule. Rev Afr Polit Econ 46(162):529–534. https:// doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2019.1775427 CBC (2017) Egypt strikes Libya after deadly bus attack against Christians. CBC. May 26, 2017. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/coptic-attack-egypt-1.4132418 Dentice G (2021) The geopolitics of violent extremism: the case of Sinai. IEMed Papers. September 30, 2021. https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/EuroMeSCo36-Geo politics-of-Violent-Extremism.-The-Case-of-Sinai.pdf Diab Y, El Shaarawy B, Yousry S (2020) Informal settlements in the arab region. UN-Habitat Regional Office for the Arab States, Giza Egypt Today (2018) For the first time, 8 female ministers in Egypt’s Cabinet. Egypt Today. June 14, 2018. https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/52152/For-the-first-time-8-female-minist ers-in-Egypt-s Egypt Today (2020) Al jazeera fabricates video on alleged protests in egypt. Egypt Today. September 25, 2020. https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/92357/Al-Jazeera-fabricates-video-on-allegedprotests-in-Egypt-AFP El-Ghobashy T, Kholaif D (2017) Gunmen in egypt attack bus carrying coptic christians, Prompting Airstrikes on Libya. The Wall Street Journal. May 26, 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/gun men-in-egypt-attack-bus-carrying-coptic-christians-1495796748 Ezz M (2019) How Egypt deals with informal areas. Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. April 12, 2019. https://timep.org/people/contributors/mohamed-ezz/ Fabienne P (2017) Political legitimacy. In: Zalta N (ed) Online Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford University, Stanford. Retrieved from https://stanford.io/2XNoUel Fahmi G (2014) The Coptic church and politics in Egypt. Carnegie. December 18, 2014. https://car negie-mec.org/2014/12/18/coptic-church-and-politics-in-egypt-pub-57563 Farid S (2019) Can Egypt’s slums be replaced by ‘safe zones’? Al Arabiya. March 31, 2019. https:// english.alarabiya.net/features/2019/03/31/Can-Egypt-s-slums-be-replaced-by-safe-zones Farouk MA (2020) Cautious hopes for slum dwellers relocated in Egypt housing project. Reuters. August 14, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-cities-housing-feature-trfn-idUSKC N25A0DP France24 (2019) Timeline: four months of protests in Sudan. France24. April 11, 2019. https:// www.france24.com/en/20190411-sudan-timeline-four-months-mounting-protests-bashir Funderburk C (1975) Political legitimacy and approval of political protest and violence among children and adolescents. J Youth Adolesc 4(2):109–125. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01537436 Gaballa A (2018) Citing stability, reforms, big businesses in Egypt cheer for Sisi. Reuters. March 29, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-election-business-idUSKBN1H52BB

186

S. Mansour and H. Elhefnawy

Gamal W (2019) Lost Capital: the egyptian muslim brotherhood’s neoliberal transformation. Carnegie Middle East Center. February 01, 2019. https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/02/01/lost-cap ital-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-s-neoliberal-transformation-pub-78271 Ghafar AA (2018) A stable egypt for a stable region: socio-economic challenges and prospects. European Parliament 01. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603858/ EXPO_STU(2018)603858_EN.pdf Goussous J, Tayoun L (2020) A holistic approach to slum reduction: finding gaps in cairo’s ‘howto-deal’ model with international collected experience. Cities Health 6(1):22–36. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/23748834.2020.1735156 Habib SM (2017). Dealing with slums in Egypt: learning from the success factors of international experiences. Thesis. American University in Cairo, Cairo Hay C (2006) Constructivist Institutionalism. In: Rhodes RA, Binder SA, Rockman BA (eds) The Oxford handbook of political institutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 68–74 Hendawi H (2016) Egypt’s el-Sissi defends handling of nation’s ailing economy. AP News. August 06, 2016. https://apnews.com/article/c30d8254e5e54ff99047628d3152be57 Hendawi H (2018) Egypt president defends painful austerity measures. AP News. July 29, 2018. https://apnews.com/article/4026adc6be2d44aaa842027ebaed4578 Horton M (2017a) Crossing the canal: why egypt faces a creeping insurgency. CTC Sentinel 10(6):22–28 Horton M (2017b) Why Egypt’s nationalist hasm movement could gain greater traction. Terrorism Monitor 15(8):3–5 Issaev L, Korotayev A (2022) Introduction. New wave of revolutions in the MENA region in the global perspective. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_1 Joya A (2011) The Egyptian Revolution: crisis of neoliberalism and the potential for democratic politics. Rev Afr Polit Econ 38(129):367–368. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2011.602544 Kashina A (2022) Tunisia. Revolution of ballot boxes? In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 137–168. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_7 Kirkpatrick DD (2015) Egypt launches airstrike in Libya against ISIS branch. The New York Times. February 17, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/world/middleeast/isis-egypt-libya-air strikes.html Korotayev A, Shishkina A (2020) Relative deprivation as a factor of sociopolitical destabilization: toward a quantitative comparative analysis of the Arab Spring events. Cross-Cult Res 54(2– 3):296–318. https://doi.org/10.1177/1069397119882364 Kostelyanets S (2022) Sudan’s december revolution and the demise of the Al Bashir regime. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 33–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_2 Mandour M (2020) Sisi’s War on the poor. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. September 23, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/82772 Mansour M (2015) Egypt struggles with jihadist challenge in sinai. Terror Monit 13(5):3–5 Mansour S (2017) Regional dimension implications of the rising terrorist attacks in Egypt. FARAS. July 21, 2017. https://futureuae.com/ar/Mainpage/Item/3026/regional-dimension-implicationsof-the-rising-terrorist-attacks-in-egypt Marzo P, Cavatorta F (2019) The demise of the Arab strongman? Authoritarianism and the future of the Middle East. In: Akbarzadeh S (ed) Routledge handbook of international relations in the Middle East. Routledge, New York, pp 273–275 Massing S (2010) The state’s legitimacy in fragile situations: unpacking complexity. OECD, Paris McKernan B (2017) Elite hamas soldiers defecting to Isis from Gaza-based group in increasing numbers. Independent. February 08, 2017. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/hamas-fighters-defect-isis-islamic-state-nukhba-commando-iz-ad-din-al-qassam-gaza-pal estinian-group-increasing-numbers-a7569786.html

Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?

187

Miehe L (2019) Three scenarios for the development of the Sisi regime in Egypt. SWP Comments. March 28, 2019. https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C18/ Mohamed MH (2019) Efforts to involve youth in policy making in Egypt post-2014. Thesis. American University in Egypt, Cairo. http://dar.aucegypt.edu/bitstream/handle/10526/5655/spa ceConc3112FinalThesis%20Draft%20M.Hesham%20after%20defense%20gb%20%281%29. pdf?sequence=3 Mohamed H (2020) Egypt’s 20/21 budget biggest in history with LE1.71T expenses: finance Min. Egypt Today. March 30, 2020. https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/3/83189/Egypt-s-20-21-bud get-biggest-in-history-with-LE1 Mohie M (2018) Interview: on developing the Maspero Triangle and the future of the Asmarat housing project. Mada Masr. August 04, 2018. https://bit.ly/3dwyVE7 Monjib M (2021) The local notables unseat islamists in Moroccan elections. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. November 09, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/85743 Nicks D (2014) Toppled Egyptian president Morsi charged with leaking state secrets. Time. September 06, 2014. https://time.com/3281801/morsi-charges/ Nixon H, Mallett R, McCullough A (2017) Are public services the building blocks of state legitimacy? Input to the World Bank’s 2017 World Development Report. Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium, London O’Driscoll D, Bourhrous A, Maddah M, Fazil S (2020) Protest and state—society relations in the Middle East and North Africa. SIPRI, Stockholm Obaid N (2020) The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World. Praeger Security International, New York O’Neill A (2021a) Egypt: growth rate of the real gross domestic product (GDP) from 2016 to 2026. Statista. Retrieved 2021a, from https://www.statista.com/statistics/377340/gross-domesticproduct-gdp-growth-rate-in-egypt/ O’Neill A (2021b) Egypt: inflation rate from 1986 to 2026. Statista. Retrieved 2021b, from https:// www.statista.com/statistics/377354/inflation-rate-in-egypt/ Osman M, Girgis H (2016) Towards effective youth participation. Population Council, New York Piattoni S (2010) The theory of multi-level governance: conceptual, empirical, and normative challenges. Oxford University Press, Oxford Piazza BA (2018) The consolidation of authoritarianism in al-Sisi’s Egypt. IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook. https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-consolidation-of-authoritarianism-in-al-sisisegypt/ Presidential Leadership Program (2015) From presidential leadership program: overview. Presidential Leadership Program. Retrieved September 2015, from https://plp.eg/ar/home/ Ragab E (2021) Counter-Terrorism policies in Egypt: effectiveness and challenges. IEMed. September 26, 2021. https://www.iemed.org/publication/counter-terrorism-policies-in-egypt-eff ectiveness-and-challenges/ Reuters (2019) Egypt’s Sisi rebuffs videos alleging corruption. Reuters. September 14, 2019. https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-politics-idUSKBN1VZ0KO Sayed N (2017) Did Beltagy keep his word amid repetitive terrorist attacks? Egypt Today. August 14, 2017. https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/17206/Did-Beltagy-keep-his-word-amid-repeti tive-terrorist-attacks Shaban AR (2018) Egypt’s first Coptic Christian female governor: Manal Awad Mikhael. Africa News. August 31, 2018. https://www.africanews.com/2018/08/31/egypt-s-first-coptic-christianfemale-governor-manal-awad-mikhael/ State Information Service (2020) ‘100 Million Healthy Lives’ campaign ‘turning point’ in Egypt’s healthcare system. State Information Service. July 29, 2020. https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/ 150325/Health-min.-%27100-Million-Healthy-Lives%27-campaign-%27turning-point%27-inEgypt%27s-healthcare-system?lang=en-us

188

S. Mansour and H. Elhefnawy

State Information Service (2021) ‘100 Million Seha’ initiative saved lives of 2.2. million Egyptians. State Information Service. April 08, 2021. https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/150325/Health-min.-% 27100-Million-Healthy-Lives%27-campaign-%27turning-point%27-in-Egypt%27s-healthcaresystem?lang=en-us Strebel MA, Kübler D, Marcinkowski F (2019) The importance of input and output legitimacy in democratic governance: evidence from a population-based survey experiment in four West European countries. Eur J Polit Res 58(2):488–513. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12293 Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (2019) Constitutional amendments. Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. April 17, 2019. https://timep.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2019-ConstitutionalAmendments-4-17-2019-1.pdf The Economist (2019) Sisi’s pain in Spain Muhammad Ali, a former actor living abroad, is riling up Egyptians. The Economist. September 26, 2019. https://www.economist.com/middle-east-andafrica/2019/09/26/muhammad-ali-a-former-actor-living-abroad-is-riling-up-egyptians US Department of State (2021) State department terrorist designations of HASM and its leaders and maintenance of PIJ FTO designation. US Department of State. January 14, 2021. https://2017-2021.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-hasm-and-itsleaders-and-maintenance-of-pij-fto-designation/index.html Vasiliev A, Khayrullin T, Korotayev A (2019) Qatari-Turkish alliance challenge for regional leadership. Aziya i Afrika segodnya 10:2–9; 11:2–8. https://doi.org/10.31857/s03215075000 6519-2 Weigand F (2015) Investigating the role of legitimacy in the political order of conflict-torn spaces. Security in Transition. Retrieved, from http://www.securityintransition.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/04/Legitimacy-in-the-Political-Order-of-Conflict-torn-Spaces.pdf Wilson Center (2019) Report: terrorism on decline in Middle East and North Africa. Wilson Center. December 11, 2019. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/report-terrorism-decline-middle-eastand-north-africa Worchel P, Hester P, Kopala P (1974) Collective protest and legitimacy of authority; theory and research. J Conflict Resolut 18(1):37–54. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277401800102 World Bank (2018) The Story of Takaful and Karama Cash Transfer Program. World Bank. November 15, 2018. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/11/15/the-story-of-tak aful-and-karama-cash-transfer-program World Bank (2019) A healthier tomorrow for all Egyptians. The World Bank. October 07, 2019. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2019/10/07/a-healthier-tomorrow-for-all-egyptians Yerkes S (2016) What Egypt under Sissi is really like for Coptic Christians. Brookings. June 20, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/06/20/what-egypt-under-sissi-is-reallylike-for-coptic-christians/ YouTube (2019) Muhammad Ali to Al-Jazeera: I prepare a plan for a shadow government composed of Egyptian experts to be an alternative after the ouster of #Sisi (In Arabic). YouTube. November 21, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qQVD92oU-Yk

Shady Mansour serves as Editor-in-Chief of Trending Events Periodical and Head of Security Studies Unit in “Future for Advanced Research and Studies” (FARAS), Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE). Previously, Dr. Shady worked at the “Information Decision and Support Center” (IDSC), the Egyptian Cabinet’s think tank. Research interests include MENA political and security affairs with a special focus on regional security and conflict management. Dr. Shady holds a Master and PhD degree in Comparative politics from Faculty of Economics and Polit-ical Science, Cairo University. Dr. Shady published several chapters and papers, most im-portant of which are “The Wedge Strategy: How Saudi Arabia is Attempting to Influence the Syrian Conflict” (Springer, 2021); “Rising challenges to the US-led regional security architec-ture in EU and the Gulf region” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?

189

Hala Elhefnawy heads the Societal Transformation Unit at the “Future for Advanced Research and Studies” (FARAS), Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 2009–2014, she worked as Socio-Political Expert in the President Executive Office and the Information and Decision Support Centre of the Egyptian Cabinet of Ministers. Hala holds two Masters degrees, one in international relations from university of Wollongong, the other in political sociology from Cairo university. She published several papers related to Arab and MENA societal issues, like deradicalization, second generation of migrants, the national character and international crisis, and the irrational behavior in international relations.

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021 Andrey Korotayev and Alina Khokhlova

Abstract On August 18, 2020, Malian Army officers led by Col. Assimi Goïta seized power in the country and arrested President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta alongside with several government officials. The President Keïta resigned the same date and dissolved the government. He was later allowed to leave the country for the UAE. The coup followed 11 weeks of protests in Bamako, and was welcomed by most protesters regardless the fact that their leaders did not receive any direct access to power. On 24 May 2021, another coup took place, which proved the fact that the new military regime in power still had capacity to control the current political trends. Meanwhile, the revolutionary instability in the late second decade of the twenty-first century in Mali cannot be separated from the instability period that started in the 1990s in the country, subsequently grew into the destabilization of 2011 and resulted into the events mentioned above. Also, taking into account events in Egypt in 2011 and 2013, as well as similar events in other countries of MENA and the Sahel, it is highlighted that the revolutionary events which happened in Mali in 2020–2021 may be classified as “coup-volution”.

Socio-political Development of Mali Since Independence till Internal Destabilization of 2011–2012 The periods of rule of the first two Mali presidents, Modibo Keita (1960–1068) and Moussa Traore (1968–1991), were characterized by the presence of strong authoritarian regimes, although both political leaders searched for patronage in the opposite camps of the Cold War. While Keita tried to build strong partnership with the A. Korotayev (B) · A. Khokhlova HSE University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] A. Korotayev Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia Faculty of Global Studies, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_9

191

192

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

USSR and proclaimed Marxism-Leninism as the official state ideology (Grundy 1962; Hazard 1967; Snyder 1967: 81), the increasingly repressive and authoritarian rural socialism on the part of the Mali government ultimately led to the collapse of the regime (Wolpin 1980; Bingen 2000: 246). The popular discontent with the ruling party’s attempts to seize food from the peasants grew. Those attempts were strongly resisted by the population and the situation was used in his advantage by Traore, who led a coup d’état and established an authoritarian one-party regime headed by the Democratic Union of the Malian People (Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien, UDPM) in 1968 (e.g., Bennett 1975: 251). President Traore’s external policies were determined by his ambitions to keep good relations with France, so several intergovernmental financial agreements were concluded in 1973 (Bennett 1975: 259). On the other hand, President Traore’s internal political course was devastating for the country because of mismanagement as well as environmental issues that aggravated during his rule. The droughts of 1972–1974 and 1985 led to the conflict with the Tuareg who suffered the most from the natural calamities. However, the financial aid from the West was used by Mali government mostly for the improving of the elite class living conditions (Turrittin 1991: 98). In 1977, protests took place against Traore’s authoritarian regime; during the anti-governmental demonstrations of 1980 the leader of the protests Abdoul Karim Kamara was killed (see, for instance, Coulibaly 1981), the unrest lasted for two years, but after that, the period till the end of the decade was comparatively stable. New confrontation between the elites and the people started in October 1990, with the largest demonstration occurring on December 31, 1990, when 30,000 people got into streets, many of the protesters carried the Koran in their hands (Diop 2006). Besides the mass protests, another revolutionary event of 1991 trigger was a new Tuareg uprising. It must be noted that the issue of political marginalization1 of the population of the Malian north had been critical since the state got its independence from France on August 5, 1960. Neither France nor Mali central government was interested in the real political integration of the northerners since the independence, which led to the first Tuareg uprising of 1962–1964, which was almost an internal political issue (Boilley 1999; Keita 1998; Lecocq 2002; Nathan 2013) and may be classified as internal national-liberation movement; the second Tuareg uprising (1990−1996) covered northern Mali and Niger as well (see, for example, Lecocq 2004) and was caused, among other factors, by the drought of the 1970s (Chauzal and van Damme 2015; Turrittin 1991: 98; Boilley 1999), the third Tuareg uprising took place just before the Arab Spring n 2006–2009 (see, for example, Emerson 2011). The first uprising was limited by state boarders, the other two, due to the peculiarities of socio-political development trends in the region, may be described as regional / international events due to the growing influence of the al-Qaeda terrorist group on the international arena, which spread across the countries of North Africa (“Al-Qaeda 1

It is important to mention that the Malian north does not include only the geographically northern territories, but also the central parts of the country, including the Mopti region to Taoudenit in the north and Gao in the east. Usually, the concept includes territories that remain uncontrolled by the center, which make up two-thirds of the country (Moseley and Hoffman 2017).

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

193

in the Islamic Maghreb”, AQIM) and which the radical Islamist opposition of Algeria pledged allegiance to (Steinberg and Werenfels 2007; Smith 2009). The outbreak of the second full-scale confrontation between the Malian government and the Tuareg separatists took place in 1990 (Bensimon et al. 2018); significant progress was made in resolving the conflict only after the military coup of 1991 which led to Traore overthrow. In 1992, the transitional government signed a pact with the northern separatists providing the northerners with broad autonomy and economic assistance (Mace 2016). The peace agreement between the parties was signed only in 1996; on March 27, 1996, a ceremonial peace meeting was held in Timbuktu, during which 3,600 weapons of former insurgents were eliminated (Benjaminsen 2008: 831). The described above endogenous and exogenous factors facilitated the coup d’etat of March 26, 1991, by the officers of the presidential guard led by Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure. A Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (Comité de transition pour le salut du people, CTSP) was formed, a new constitution was adopted and the first democratic elections took place in 1992, during which the leader of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali-African Party for Solidarity and Justice (Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali—Parti Africain pour la Solidarité et la Justice, ADEMA-PASJ) Alpha Oumar Konaré got the majority of votes (Clark 1995: 213−216; Couloubaly 2004). The transfer of power by the military to a civilian government took place peacefully, with Amadou Toumani Toure resigning voluntarily from his post as a “soldier of democracy”, as he was called by the Western media. The Mali events of 1990s fit into the general context of the “African awakening” (Riley 1992). Turrittin notes that the protest movements in Eastern Europe, including the USSR, had a demonstrative effect for Mali as well as the political developments in the neighbouring West African republics (Turrittin 1991: 98). The same effect was made by the anti-communist revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (including 1989 Beijing’s Tiananmen Square protests and massacre) (Decalo 1992). The crisis of communist ideas in general and the ideas of one-party authoritarian rule in particular, as well as the weakening of the USSR, led to the fall of the Mohammad Najibullah regime and the victory of the Islamic revolution in Afghanistan in 1992, as well as to the fall of the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime and the establishment of multiparty democracy in Ethiopia in 1991. It is not a coincidence that in the same time, similar processes were be observed in neighboring Niger, where the transition to multiparty democracy took place through a “negotiated revolution” with mass mobilization demanding multiparty democracy (see, e.g., Ibrahim 1994; 1999; Moestrup 1999). Note that the revolutionary events in Mali in 1991 which combined mass revolutionary mobilization with an endgame coup (Koehler and Albrecht 2021) with whose help the key requirements of protesters are implemented, is proposed to be called “coup-volution” (from the English coup + revolution, the result of the English words “coup” and "revolution" combination, for more details on this concept, see in the section dedicated to the events of 2020−2021).

194

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

Events of 1990–1992 in Mali also fit well into the fifth revolutionary wave of the twentieth century (Grinin and Grinin 2022; Grinin et al. 2022). Since March 1991 coup-volution in Mali, the country witnessed socio-political changes, among them democratic transition and liberalization of public life (see, for example, Soares 2006: 85; Wing 2008: 61–80). It is observed that, under Alpha Oumar Konare’s rule, Mali socio-political life democratized, a multi-party political system was established, mass communications freedom was observed (Vengroff 1993), but it is hardly possible to say that Mali turned into a consolidated democracy (Sborgi 1998). One of the factors was the point that ADEMA-PASJ started to merge with the state apparatus, and opposition parties had little influence on government decision-making (de Jorio 2003). Konare was re-elected in 1997, but was unable to run for elections in 2002 due to the Mali constitution limitation to two presidential terms (which indicates that the process of establishing democracy in Mali was quite real)(Couloubaly 2004). On the other hand, Toure returned to power by democratic procedures as a nonparty candidate during the presidential elections of 2002 when he received more than 60% of votes during the second round and defeated ADEMA-PASJ representative and was re-elected in 2007 with 71, 20% of votes (African Elections Database 2021). The 1991–2012 period in Mali (Konare and Toure periods of rule before the events of the Arab Spring) is considered to be a time of relatively stable functioning of Malian democracy (Ems-Bléneau 2021; Moseley 2017: 39). At the same time, a number of acute problems remained unresolved, such as a high level of corruption, political marginalization of the desert regions inhabitants and their subsequent militarization. This happened among other things due to the worsening economic situation of the northerners as long as the central government had not made any effective attempt to change the political course towards their integration. The priority was rather given to the expansion of the territory under cultivation to the detriment of herding which is extremely important for such ethnic groups of the Malian North as the Fulbe and Tuareg (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009), which worsened Bamako political positions as long as the north started to be integrated more in the political and economic life of the North Africa countries, where Islamist factor escalated and effected the moods of the desert inhabitants of the Malian North.

Arab Spring as a Trigger of New Revolutionary Events in Mali A dramatic wave of destabilization in the countries of the Arab World in 2011 had a large effect on the political trends in most parts of the world including the Sahel states, in some cases this effect was observed with significant lags (Akaev et al. 2017; Issaev et al. 2022; Khokhlov et al. 2021; Korotayev et al. 2020, 2022a, b; Korotayev et al. 2018, 2019a, b; Korotayev et al. 2019a, b; Korotayev et al. 2016, 2017; Ortmans et al. 2017).

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

195

In the Republic of Mali, the overthrow of the previously democratically elected President Toure was quite unexpected for the political experts, although the road to consolidated democracy was still long due to the high level of corruption and political extraction among the predominant part of the Malian society (Hagberg and Körling 2012: 113).

National-Separatist and Islamist Revolutions in Mali as Consequences of the Arab Spring Unresolved status of Malian northerners political marginalization problem turned out to be the most vulnerable point of Mali socio-political system after the Arab Spring insurrections. In 2011, National Movement for Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad, MNLA) was created on the basis of a few militias of Malian northerners which announced its goals as national liberation, autonomy status and even the creation of independent state for the representatives of Arab, Fula, Tuareg and Songhai ethnic groups as the final aim (Downie 2015). The crucial difference of the 2012 conflict between the central government and Malian northerners from the previous conflicts was increasing importance of the following two external factors: firstly, it was Islamist factor in the framework of the 2011 Arab Spring in the region and, secondly, the precipitous fall of the regime in Libya with its ramifications like the illegal arms and ammunition spread inside Mali. The Tuareg participation in Muammar Qaddafi’s militaries also mattered as after 2011 they contributed to the power gaining of the Malian north militias (Cline 2013; Keenan 2013; Shaw 2013; Solomon 2013; Moseley 2017). The northern militias broad-based offensive against the disorganized and underresourced forces of the Mali central government started on January 16th 2012 (Lecocq, and Klute 2013: 430) with MNLA militants carrying out an attack at the military barracks of the city of Menaka, then at the north-eastern city of Tessalit where they targeted Malian army units with heavy weapons (Luengo-Cabrera 2012). On January 24th, the rebels took Aguelhok after the Malian army ran out of ammunition (Aljazeera 2012b). Due to the persistent complaints by Malian soldiers about inadequate supplies of ammunition and military hardware, poor strategic planning and their sense of abandonment near the Malian boarders, on the frontline, fighting a war that could have been prevented, the president tried to reorganize his senior command, and military communiqués pointed to critical requirement of a rapid recovery of lost territory (The New Humanitarian 2012). On February 1st 2012, the MNLA took control of the city of Menaka and on February 6th, rebel forces attacked the northern capital Kidal (Aljazeera 2012c). In March, Ansar al-Din radical Islamist group which previously pledged its alliance to al-Qaeda in Maghreb (AQIM), publicly emerged on Mali social media with a video of its fighters seizing the military base at Aguelhok. In the video, Cheikh Ag Aoussa explained the group’s goal of establishing shari‘a in Mali. With the help of the

196

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

Islamists, the northern militia took the important military base at Tessalit in early March 2012 (Thurston and Lebovich 2013: 12). By March 4th, several Malian army units abandoned their attempts to relieve the MNLA siege of the base and after a week they retreated to Algeria, leaving the base and the airport in the hands of the northerners. Their struggle to recapture this strategically important point ended with a large number of soldiers killed, taken captive or deserted, and Malian army ammunition was either destroyed or captured by MNLA (Aljazeera 2012c). Those crucial loses to the northern rebels coupled with the information on radical Islamists expansion in Mali led to the coup d’etat of 2012 (see the next section for detail). Within 10 weeks since the beginning of the offensive, the rebels took control over the whole Mali northern region and some part of the center including the capture of the cities of Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao via displacing government troops from them. In April of 2012 the rebels declared the creation of Azawad state (Bruguière 2012; Giraud 2013; Huckabey 2013; de Castelli 2014; Harmon 2014; Lounnas 2014; Walther and Christopoulos 2015). Note that the success of the nationalist-separatist militias of the Malian north was possible due to the Islamist factor growth in the North Africa region after the events of the 1990s in Algeria and 2011 Arab Spring, which included, first of all, Qaddafi regime fall (Benjaminsen and Ba 2019: 6); anyway in the Malian North, in early 2012, nationalists and Islamists acted as allies, which to a considerable extent accounted for the success of their offensive. However, soon the interests of the northern nationalist militias and Islamist radicals diverged: while the first side aimed to limit themselves to the territory of the northern regions and proclamation of an independent state in these territories, the “imported” and domestic Islamist radicals sought to establish Islamic rule on a much broader scale throughout Mali and neighboring states. This difference in views and goals led to the Islamist revolution in Azawad in June 2012: battles between the northern nationalist militias and Islamists quickly revealed the superiority of the “imported” and domestic Islamist rebels/jihadists: they were the Islamists, not the Malian army, that played the decisive role in the defeat of the military formations of the nationalists of the Malian north (Downie 2015). Besides, it must be noted that the alliance between the MNLA and the Islamists (that was observed in earlier 2012) resulted in the delegitimation of the Tuareg movement as a whole, predominantly on the part of the Western states as well as the international community. As a result, on February 20th 2014, another peace agreement was signed between the Malian government and the northern nationalist armed groups, which made the MNLA abandon their goals of achieving independence in order to stabilize the region, although it mentioned development of local political structures in the Malian North. After defeating the northern nationalist militias, in early January 2013 the Islamists launched a rapid offensive into the south of Mali, forcing the interim President of Mali, Dioncunda Traore, to seek help from France. The French leadership ordered the transfer of 4,000 troops and significant quantities of military equipment to Mali on January 11th 2013, which helped to defeat the Islamists during the offensive on the city of Kona in the frameworks of “Operation Serval”, to halt the Islamist advance and to launch a counteroffensive (Hanne 2014). Already in January, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS)

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

197

started to assist the central government of Mali (Akpasom and Lotze 2014). On April 25th 2013, United Nation Security Council adopted resolution 2100 on the establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali, MINUSMA) to contribute to the fight of the Malian government against Islamist and nationalist militias (Gauthier Vela 2021). Already in 2013, the center recaptured almost all the cities of the Malian north from the Islamists (but French aid within the framework of “Operation Serval”2 still played the most important role in the fight against Islamists), but the resistance of the radical Islamists grew into a large-scale guerrilla warfare that is proceeding till the present day. All in all, the problem of the northerners’ separatism was somehow managed by the Malian government or at least postponed, the radical Islamist threat still remains the main factor of destabilization in the country to this day. In 2022, dozens of Islamist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda are operating in Mali, among which it is worth highlighting AQIM and its branch, Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin (JNIM), led by Iyad Ag Ghaly and formed in 2017 as a result of the merger of AlMurabitun, Katibat Macina and Ansar al-Din radical Islamist groups (Lewis-Stempel 2020; Nsaibia 2021; Raineri 2020). Since 2012, Islamist groups have carried out dozens of guerrilla and terrorist attacks against both the Malian military and civilians, killing thousands (Baldaro and Seydou 2020; Zimmerman 2020). Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS/Daesh) began to operate in Mali (as well as in the Sahel region as a whole) through its Islamic State in the Greater Sahara branch (ISGS), which appeared after a part of the members of Al-Mourabitun under the leadership of Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahraoui pledged their allegiance to the ISIS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2015. The militants initially chose the vicinity of Gao city in northern Mali as their base, where their ranks were significantly replenished due to sympathizers from the local population. ISGS gained a particular popularity among representatives of the Fulbe people, whom the militants promised patronage and protection from Tuareg raids (Pellerin 2019). Since that time, ISGS has expanded significantly in the Greater Sahara and by 2022 it controlled quite confidently Liptako Gourma region, located at the junction of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso borders (Raineri 2020; Nsaibia 2021). For four years, while waging an armed struggle against the Malian and French armed forces, the proxies of al-Qaeda and ISIS in Mali coexisted with each other in relative peace (this phenomenon was called by the researchers the “Sahel exception” or “Sahel anomaly”) (Baldaro and Seydou 2020; Nsaibia and Weiss 2020.). However, the “jihadist idyll” ended in 2019, when a conflict erupted between JNIM and the ISGS. In April 2020, the conflict escalated reaching its all-time highs: real armed clashes between Islamist organizations of AQIM and ISIS took place over a large territory which claimed the lives of about thousand militants3 (Dieng 2019; Baldaro

2

In July 2014, Operation “Serval” was replaced by Operation “Barkhane”. This, however, did not prevent al-Qaeda and IS militants from continuing to carry out armed attacks on soldiers and civilians (e.g. Reuters 2020a, Aljazeera 2021).

3

198

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

and Seydou 2020; Bere 2017; Pellerin 2019; Nsaibia and Weiss 2020; Varin 2020; Raafat 2021).

Military Coup (Unsuccessful Revolution Analogue?) of 2012 in Mali as a Consequence of the Arab Spring As a result of the government’s loss of control over substantial part of the country territory in January-March 2012 (see above), unrest broke out in the army, which blamed the president for weakening the state and inability to provide the civilians with an adequate level of protection. Mali’s military group led by Amadou Sanogo attacked the government and seized the presidential palace and television on March 21st, 2012, whereas President Toure was forced to resign.4 The junta of military commandos created the National Committee for the Re-establishment of Democracy and the Restoration of the State (Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’État, CNRDRE) chaired by the rebel military leader Sanogo. This committee claimed that their priority goals were to restore the stability and order in the state. During March 2012, a number of demonstrations took place in Bamako: some of the protesters did not support the coup d’etat, but we note that a noticeable part of those who took to the streets came out in support of it (George Herald 2012), others called for order under any rule. We would like to note that these features are quite symptomatic for the Sahel countries political tendencies, the further events would show that the idea of transferring power to the military during crisis periods has a massive support in Mali, and later this idea tended to become more and more influential, event after event. The idea of transferring power to the military, noted in Mali during the spring of 2012 due to the defeats on the part of the militias of the north, is not accidental for the political history of African countries. Similar sentiments in the context of socioeconomic and political upheavals had been previously noted during the “New Year’s Revolution of 1965–1966” in Burkina Faso. Then unrest began after the October 1965 presidential elections that resulted in incumbent President Maurice Yameogo re-election, who received 99.98% of the vote with a turnout at the rate less than 10% (Phelan 2016: 113). A number of economic problems, as well as corruption scandals around the president, coupled with the government’s attempt to replenish the empty state treasury by cutting budget payments and, at the same time, to raise taxes in late December 1965, provoked the trade unions (and later the youth) to take to the streets. On January 3rd 1966, strikes broke out in major cities of the country; the capital of the country, Ouagadougou, was paralyzed. The procession of the rebels moved from the very morning to the presidential palace, chanting the slogans “Bread and democracy”, “We are the 0.02 per cent”, “The army to power” and “The army of the people and for the people” (Phelan 2016: 114). Part of the country’s military leadership took advantage of the situation to fulfill the main demand of the protesters—the removal of 4

Subsequently, Toure fled to Senegal, returned to Mali in 2017 where he died in 2020.

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

199

Yameogo from power and the establishment of the military rule. The same evening, Colonel Sangoule Lamizana announced that he took control of the country into his own hands (Harsch 2017: 24–26). The revolutionary episodes described above, in Burkina Faso of 1966 and in Mali of 2012, reflect the fact that in some African countries practically from the very independence in the 1960s, an idea of the honesty and fairness of the army rule lived in the hearts of some people. The coups of 1966 and 2012 are of considerable interest, first of all, because of the support of the people for the military coming to power. Therefore, it is fair to believe that the events in Mali during the spring of 2012 foreshadowed the Malian revolution (or “coup-volution”) in 2020. Although the military coming to power in Mali in March of 2012 was widely supported by the Malian population, the international community, represented by Western countries and international organizations, condemned the change of power in the country. The international community made attempts to put pressure on the central state apparatus and force the military to abandon the power they had seized. As early as March 27th, 2012, ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Mali, closed borders and froze bank accounts, the leaders of the West African bloc demanded the military who seized the power to leave before April 6th, 2012 (Hagberg and Körling 2012: 119; BBC News 2012a, b). On that same date, Captain Sanogo, the CNRDRE and ECOWAS signed a framework agreement for the return to civilian rule under the mediation of the Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré. Dioncounda Traoré, who was the speaker of the National Assembly, was installed as interim president, and Cheikh Modibo Diarra (a candidate at presidential elections that were scheduled for 2012) was appointed prime minister to lead the formation of an interim government (Hagberg and Körling 2012: 119). The political transition was marked by tension and by the frequent resurfacing of conflicts and disagreements. The new government was announced on April 25th 2012; although a transitional government was in place, Sanogo seemed to remain the “real” head of state (Hagberg and Körling 2012: 119). The quasi-revolutionary events of 2012 exposed all the regime shortcomings that existed at the time of its fall: behind the facade of the gradual democratization of the country’s socio-political life, there was a central-peripheral imbalance and a worsening humanitarian situation. Facade democracy and lack of adherence to the principles of “good governance”, lack of the rule of law and constitutional legitimacy (Wing 2008), as well as absent reconciliation with the northerners, in 2012 exploded as a result of the 2011 destabilizing wave in the region, as well as the growing institutional weakness of the state and poor governance (Bøås and Torheim 2013). In May 2012, thousands of Malians protested shouting slogans including “Down with ECOWAS!” and “Down with Dioncounda!” (BBC News 2012b) in order to restore Sanogo’s rule, in other words, they took to the streets to encourage the return of the military to power. Among other factors, it was predominantly due to the serious losses of the Malian army to the separatists and invaders from the Malian north. As the result of those mobilization movements, the protesters dissatisfied with President Traore appointment burst into his office, “grabbed him by the collar and beat him on the head into unconsciousness” (Nossiter 2012; Aljazeera 2012a).

200

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

A Bamako-based journalist mentioned that these were some governmental soldiers who let the demonstrators into President Traore’s office (BBC News 2012b). On the other hand, because of the president bodyguards’ actions three of the protesters were killed during the attack. The incident came a day after the ECOWAS brokered a deal with the military (Aljazeera 2012a), which granted Captain Sanogo the status of a former head of state, along with a government pension, housing and a vehicle, in the exchange for Traore’s staying as an interim president for a year (Nossiter 2012).

Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s Presidency The 2013 presidential elections resulted in Ibrahim Boubacar Keita coming to power. The 68 years-old politician was a prominent experienced statesman in the Malian establishment, he joined ADEMA-PSJ in 1991, in 1994 was already elected as the party leader (BBC News 2013). In the same year, President Konare appointed him as the prime minister, and he remained in this position until 2000. Then, as a result of internal party frictions, Keita left the post of the head of the government and left ADEMA-PSJ. In 2001, the politician founded a new party called Rally for Mali (Rassemblement pour le Mali). In the presidential elections of 2002, he participated as that party representative (withdrew in the first round). He also took part in the presidential elections of 2007, losing to Toure in the second round (Aljazeera 2020b). Keita’s third run for the presidency was successful in part due to the provided support of influential Islamist leaders (primarily Imam Mahmoud Dicko), as well as the military, including the leaders of the 2012 coup (Thurston 2013). Thus, the revolutionary events of 2012−2013 did not result in the change of political elite class: once again, a career politician turned out to be in power, who belonged to the same establishment as the former presidents Toure and Konare. According to some experts, Keita’s regime was one of the worst in Mali’s 60-year history since independence. It is noted that the regime failed to solve any of the deeply rooted problems which the country faced (Morgan 2020), including diversifying the country’s economy, which is dependent on exports of raw materials by more than 80% (Wroblewska 2015). At the time of Keita’s coming to power, the Malian army, thanks to the support of the French, African and international armed forces, was able to regain control over most of the territory previously occupied by Islamists and Tuareg nationalists. However, after several years of Keita in power, the situation again got out of the center’s control (Devermont 2019). Moreover, the situation deteriorated sharply: the zone of jihadist activity expanded from the northern regions of Mali to the center of the republic and by 2020, according to some estimates, only one third of the country was controlled by the government (BBC News 2020). In addition to military losses, Keita’s rule was marked by an escalating corruption and nepotism. For example, the president’s son Karim Keita was appointed head of the National Defense Committee, whose funds, according to some journalist investigations, were wasted on the personal needs. In summer 2020, footage of Karim Keita’s luxurious yacht vacation appeared on the social media and caused outrage among the Malians who survived barely making ends meet (Daniel 2021). Moreover,

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

201

the international community suspects Keita Jr. of involvement in the disappearance of Le Sphinx journalist Birama Toure, who allegedly investigated president’s son affairs (Le Temps 2021). Corruption and nepotism were far from Mali’s only problems during President Keita’s rule between 2013 and 2020. The mismanagement of the administration led to the virtual collapse of such areas as education, health care and justice (Morgan 2020). In turn, the natural calamities coupled with multiple hostilities became the reasons for the massive famine. The coronavirus pandemic and the restrictive measures imposed because of it further aggravated the already deplorable economic situation (Accord 2020); at the same time, during the August 2020 revolution, the presidential administration was directly blamed for the deterioration of the economic situation due to the imposed counter-COVID restrictions (Melly 2020: 79−80). The abovementioned multiple problems did not prevent Keita from running for a second term in 2018. Massive protests in Bamako were observed even before the July 2018 presidential elections (Africa News 2018). After Keita’s election in the second round in August 2018 where he defeated his rival Sumaila Cisse from the Union for the Republic and Democracy (Union pour la République et la Démocratie, URD), anti-government demonstrations grew even more numerous; as a result, the government began to use force to suppress them (Ifex 2018).

Revolution/Coup-volution of 2020 and the Coup d’état of 2021 Malian 2020−2021 revolution fits well into the context of the coup-volutions of the late 20th—early twenty-first centuries. For the first time, as we know, coupvolution or coup-volution notion (a combination of coup and revolution) was used to describe the events of 2011 in Egypt (Toronto 2011; Springborg 2015, 2016) as well as Egypt events of 2013 (see, for example, Moll 2014). The term was also used for description of 2019 Bolivia events (Cassell 2021). Beissinger suggested to use the term to describe events of 2018−2019 in Sudan (Beissinger 2019).5 It seems possible to use the concept of “coup-volution” as a general term for describing a rather specific type of revolutionary processes, when the revolutionary mass mobilization of the first phase leads to a military coup, which can be regarded as the second phase of the revolutionary/coup-volutionary process; at the same time, during this second phase, some important requirements of the first phase participants of the coup-volutionary events are realized. To denote the military coup of the second phase of the coup-volutionary process, the “endgame coup” concept (proposed by Koehler and Albrecht 2021) can be used. 5

In his monograph The Revolutionary City. Urbanization and the global transformation of rebellion (Beissinger 2022) whose proof Mark R. Beissinger kindly shared with us after this chapter had been already finished, he offers a general definition of “coup-volution” that is quite close to ours, but not identical with it.

202

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

Almost the majority of such kind of special events that happened in the late 20th— early twenty-first centuries was recorded precisely in the North and West African states, among them the most obvious cases are the events in Mali of 1990−1991, the coup-volution of 2009–2010 in Niger, coup-volutions of 1966 and 2014−2015 in Burkina Faso, Egyptian coup-volution of 2011 and 2013 as well as Sudanese coup-volution of 2018−2019 (see Chapter “Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” [Kostelyanets 2022, this volume] for detail).6 It should be especially noted that the Malian events of 1990−1991 were very similar to the Malian revolutionary events of 2020−2021 from the perspective of the levels of mobilization and the courses of the military coups (during which the military implemented some important requirements of the first phase protesters). However, in terms of their content, these two destabilization periods turn out to be contrary to each other: during the first coupvolution of 1990−1991, the protests took place under the slogans of establishing multi-party democracy (which was realized to a very considerable extent), the second revolution slogans called for establishing order and justice, without any explicit calls for democracy. One could note that the Malian events of 2020−2021 remind Egyptian coupvolution of 2013 (which can be subdivided into the revolution of June 30th and the coup of July 3rd) in lots of aspects. In 2012, the representative of the “The Society of the Muslim Brothers”, Mohammed Morsi, became the first democratically elected president in the entire history of the country. At the same time, the revolutionary mobilization in Egypt of 2013 led to the military coup, and the coup organizers intercepted lots of the revolutionary demands voiced during the June protests. Additionally, the Egyptian revolution reminds the Malian revolution not only by this aspect, but also by the fact that the demands made during the protest did not call for the establishment of democracy but for installing the order in the country. So, the events of June-July of 2013 in Egypt are quite consistent with the concept of coup-volution formulated above.7 Malian events of 2020−2021 may also be analyzed from the perspective of the third revolutionary wave of the twenty-first century (Goldstone et al. 2022a, b) that started in 2018 and continues into the 2020s, and, consequently, generally coincides 6

It is possible that operation “Dignity” (‘amaliyyat al-Karamah) of May 2014 led by Khalifa Haftar may be considered as a specific form of coup-volution (although it failed and led to a full-scale war, at the same time the methods and the ideology of the coup were quite alike the similar events in Egypt of 2013). 7 However, one could observe important differences between the events in Egypt and Mali. An important element of the Egyptian Revolution of 2013 was that it was highly anti-Islamist by its nature (secularization demand was in fact one of the main ones). In Mali, during the revolution, one of the recognized leaders of the opposition was imam Mahmoud Dicko, who can be described as a moderate Islamist although he does not advertise this. At the same time, during an interview we conducted on October 18th 2021 in Bamako, imam Dicko noted that he had never abandoned his ideology of moderate Islamism and considered the corresponding trajectory of the country’s development as one of the most probable, due, by his words, to the special nature of the Islamization of Malian society (he, for example, drew attention to the fact that Islamic education in Mali was very popular and continued to develop, there were many private Islamic educational institutions whose diplomas were recognized at the state level, etc.).

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

203

with the logic of socio-political trends in the region and the world. These events may be also classified as the continuation of the Arab Spring events, but at the same time they possess their unique peculiarities (predominantly those peculiarities are the demands for a strong and effective as well as non-corrupted political power that differ from the demands voiced during the mass mobilization wave of 2011−2012 in the MENA countries) (see Chapter “New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective” [Issaev and Korotayev 2022, this volume]; Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” [Zoubir 2022, this volume], Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” [Mardasov 2022, this volume]; Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” [Khatib 2022, this volume]; Chapter “Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Routs of Iran’s Domestic Instability (2010–2020)” [Kozhanov 2022, this volume]; Chapter “Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?” [Kashina 2022, this volume]; see also Goldstone et al. 2022a, b). Let us spell out now the main sequence of 2020−2021 revolutionary events in Mali. Parliamentary elections were held in Mali on March 29th 2020. They were originally scheduled for November 25th of 2018, but were postponed to April 2019 and then to June 2019, and after that they were postponed until 2020. The postponement of the election date itself became a trigger for dissatisfaction among the political opposition groups of the country (Jeune Afrique 2020a) among many other factors which are mentioned below. Then, after the second round of elections, the Constitutional Court of Mali canceled their results which were announced on April 30th 2020, namely, the victory of 31 candidates from opposition parties, as well as the losses of nominees supported by the president. Thus, as the result of constitutional court decision, Keita’s political party RPM got ten additional seats in Mali National Assembly, making it the largest bloc. In addition, over 270 polling stations were closed for security reasons during the elections, which deprived a large part of population from the possibility to vote. It is noted the elections turnout was under 40%, whereas in Mali’s capital, Bamako, it was as low as 12% (VOA 2020a). It is also worth noting that the COVID-19 pandemic also played a role in protest mobilization of 2020 in Mali.8 The economic situation in the country was deteriorating, and the president did not take any serious action to resolve it. Moreover, it was noted that the first case of COVID-19 in Mali was announced the day before the first round of elections on March 29th, which was interpreted as indicating the government reluctance to manage the critical situation in the country (Golubski and Schaeffer 2020). The scandal surrounding the opposition candidate kidnapped during the election campaign also added fuel to the fire. Three days before the elections, on March 26th, 8

It has been already noted that COVID-19 pandemic, anti-COVID measures, and socio-economic disruption they caused contributed significantly to the emergence of a number of revolutionary events of the third waves of the twenty-first century revolutions (see, e.g., Goldstone, Grinin, Korotayev 2022a, 2022b; see also Chapter “Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?” [Kashina 2022, this volume]).

204

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

70-year-old opposition leader Sumaila Cisse was kidnapped by JNIM Islamists; at the same time, the pre-election process was not interrupted, though the opposition candidate was held captive till October 2020 (Akinwotu 2020). Thus, there were several factors for mobilizing protest actions in the second quarter of 2020, however, it is often stressed that these were the allegedly unfair elections that became the main catalyst for this destabilization (Duhamel 2020; Jeune Afrique 2020b). The aforementioned gross violations of democratic procedures as well as economic and social problems in the country undermined Keita’s position severely: despite the nominal victory of his RPM party in the parliamentary elections of March−April 2020, demonstrations took place in Bamako in May 2020, where the protesters demanded Keita’s resignation. One of the opposition leaders was the charismatic “people’s imam” Dicko, already mentioned above, who initially supported Keita at the beginning of his rule but later changed his mind on him (BBC News 2020; The New York Times 2020). Educated in Mauritania and at the Islamic University of Medina, the imam considered it necessary to reconcile the north with the south of the country and even maintained contacts with the armed Islamist militias of the north (Thomas-Johnson 2020). The association called Coordination of Movements, Associations and Sympathizers (Coordination des Mouvements, Associations et Sympathisants, CMAS) formed by imam was an important force which organized the protests against President Keita in 2020 and was actually led by the imam. Since May 2020, peaceful anti-government demonstrations were taking place throughout the country, particularly in its major cities of Bamako, Sikasso, Bouguni, Kati, Yanfolila, Mopti and Nioro. The plans to held the protests were announced in advance by the political opposition on June 2nd, but the announced anti-government protest actions were banned by the Malian government. However, the protests against the president on June 5th drew tens of thousands of people to the capital and other cities (Aljazeera 2020c) for rallies in which various military, political, civil and religious figures of Mali took part. Dissatisfaction with the president’s policies brought together the military involved in the 2012 coup, former officials who served for President Keita administration, as well as religious leaders, among them the aforementioned Imam Dicko. Three main opposition groups of protesters stood out: the Front for Safeguarding Democracy (Front pour la sauvegarde de la démocratie, FSD), which consisted of about thirty opposition parties (it was created after the re-election of Keita in 2018), “Hope for a new Mali” (Espoir Mali Koura)9 , a civil society movement led by filmmaker and former Minister of Culture Cheick Oumar Sissoko; and the already mentioned above CMAS movement of Imam Dicko (Díaz 2021: 171). As a result, the united opposition consolidated as “The 5 June Movement—Rally of Patriotic Forces” (Mouvement du 5 Juin—Rassemblement des Forces Patriotiques), the actual leader of which was Imam Dicko, although he officially declared that he was neither its participant nor its organizer; at the same time, CMAS entered that movement as its leading force (VOA 2020a, b). The protests were accompanied by

9

The name of this movement incorporates French espoir (hope) and Bamana koura (new).

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

205

clashes between the protesters and the police, which soon became of a violent nature (Slim 2020: 214). “The 5 June Movement” stood against slow reforms implementation, ineffective work of governmental services and worsening education system as well as presence of the French forces in the country. After the first demonstration on June 5th, Keita made an attempt to make concessions, including the creation of a united government that would include representatives from political movements that took to the streets, but the protesters were not satisfied with the proposed concessions (Reuters 2020b). A letter written by the opposition alliance was sent to the presidential palace demanding Keita to resign (BBC News 2020). Two weeks later, on June 19th, new protests erupted at the Independence Square in Bamako, drawing tens of thousands of demonstrators to the streets. The protests were attended by observers from ECOWAS, who arrived to the country trying to arrange a dialogue between the government and the protesters (Reuters 2020b). During the demonstrations, Imam Dicko led a prayer and opposition politicians gave speeches calling for civil disobedience in order to force the president to leave. Protesters sang the national anthem, and the squares were filled with posters with anti-government slogans. In July 2020, the protests turned violent. President Keita tried to reduce the tensions level by announcing on Thursday July 9th, just before another Friday demonstration, during his national television speech, the dissolution of the constitutional court, which was in focus of legal disputes because of the rigged March−April 2020 parliamentary elections. However, the attempt to stabilize the situation did not work as it was supposed by the president: clashes with the police on Friday and the weekend of July 10–12 turned out to be bloody for the first time during the 2020 protests: 11 people died (Aljazeera 2020a) and more than 120 were injured (Garda World 2020), while demonstrators seized and set fire to the building of the National Assembly of Mali (Diallo and Kontao 2020), several government buildings were occupied and three main bridges in the capital were blocked, and the youth were burning car tires on several of Bamako’s main roads. Later investigation report of those incidents showed that on July 10–13, 2020, 14 people died in Mali, two of whom were children, and 158 people were injured (The Africa Report 2021). Several leaders of July 10th demonstrations were arrested immediately after the event, including former ministers. Imam Dicko surrendered himself to the police in solidarity with other arrested protest leaders (Ifex 2020). Violence in Mali in July 2020 led to its condemnation on the part of the African Union, as well as the UN and the EU. After a month-long interlude, demonstrations resumed again in Mali on August 11th. Opposition groups took to the streets with such slogans as “We want real change in Mali, get out, IBK”. This demonstration went forward despite pleas from Goodluck Jonathan, the mediator for Mali’s crisis for the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS). “Demonstrations do not solve problems per se,” Jonathan, a former Nigerian president, told a news conference, adding that opposition figures needed to enter a dialogue. (Aljazeera 2020a). During the August 12th protests, the Malian police used water cannons and tear gas to disperse the demonstrators, but these measures were ineffective. On

206

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

August 17th, opposition leaders announced the continuation of daily protests until Keita resigns (Le Monde 2020). On August 18th 2020 President Keita and Prime Minister Boubou Cisse were arrested by rebel soldiers led by Special Forces Colonel Assimi Goïta in an endgame coup. The next day, Keita dissolved parliament and announced his resignation, stating that he did not want to retain power at the cost of bloodshed (Aljazeera 2020b). Representatives of the new leadership, the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (Comité national pour le salut du people, CNSP), gave speeches on television in which they criticized the current situation and noted that the arrests of President Keita and Prime Minister Cisse were justified by years of bad governance, corruption, nepotism and deteriorating security. They criticized political patronage, which existed in the country, as well as cronyism in public affairs that eventually destroyed any possibility of development in “what little was left of this beautiful country” (The New York Times 2020). It is noted that the coup and restoration of the power of the military was met with hope by most of the country’s young population, while a significant part of the middle class and intellectuals opposed the method that the new leaders used to seize power (The New York Times 2020). While the coup d’état was greeted with jubilation in the streets of Bamako, it was predictably condemned by outside players like ECOWAS, the African Union, France and the EU as a whole. All the organizations issued statements condemning the rebels and demanding the release of President Keita. Moreover, ECOWAS withdrew Malian representatives from its decision-making bodies, and the UN Security Council convened an emergency meeting, after which a resolution was adopted condemning the coup (Robert 2020). The concern of France and its allies (both in Africa and beyond) was further heightened by the fact that, since 2013, foreign partners had invested huge amounts of time and resources in Mali, relying specifically on Keita’s regime. It is obvious that the coming to power of a military government, suspected in ties with Russia (Mackinnon 2021; Obaji 2020; Ramani 2020; Slaski 2018), alarmed Mali’s traditional partners. On September 25th 2020, a board of 17 people, including Goïta, appointed Bah N’Daw, a retired military man and former defense minister, as the new president of the country. The decision was supported by the population and the opposition, including “the June 5 Movement” representatives. In his presidential speech, N’Daw mentioned that he would fight corruption, electoral fraud and respect previous international agreements. He also indicated that he would continue to fight terrorist forces and to prevent the mistreatment of civilians by the Malian armed forces (Diallo 2020). N’Daw was a suitable compromise figure in his own way, since he was a retired military man, so he reflected the growing influence of the military in the country, and on the other hand, met the demand of ECOWAS, the African Union and others in point that a civilian should become again the head of the country. On December 5th 2020, the National Transitional Council (Conseil national de la transition—CNT) was created—an extra-constitutional body consisting of 10 committees. It was argued that the members of these committees would be mainly non-party representatives of the people and leaders of civil society and civil initiatives.

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

207

It was presumed that N’Daw would be a figurehead carrying out orders from the shadow military leadership (due to the fact that Goïta being a military person could not become a president, since the West was objecting to having militaries at the head of the state). Therefore, in order to avoid international pressure, N’Daw was appointed a president, and the National Committee for the Salvation of the People was dissolved in January 2021. However, after coming to power, with the support of France, N’Daw began to oppose some members of the Committee, namely Vice-President Goïta and Minister of Defense Sadio Camara (The Washington Post 2021). As a result of intraelite perturbations, two camps were formed: Goïta and Camara, on the one hand, and N’Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane, on the other. These camps had very different positions in their views on the development of the country: while N’Daw focused on France, Goïta camp looked towards cooperation with Russia. On May 24th 2021 N’Daw and Ouane were detained by the military and taken to Kati military base near the capital Bamako. On May 26th N’Daw announced his resignation. In his turn, Vice President Goïta released a video message to the nation announcing that N’Daw and Ouane had been stripped of their powers because they allegedly attempted to sabotage the transition of power to a democratically elected government (The Guardian 2021). In addition, Goïta announced that elections would be held in 2022. After N’Daw’s resignation, Goïta became the president of Mali and chief executive, whereas the functions of the legislative body were transferred to CNT. On May 28th 2021, the constitutional court of Mali recognized Goïta as the president of the country, which implied that the judicial branch became subordinate to the executive branch. After 2021 coup, the role of the CNT increased dramatically. As was noted during our October 18th 2021 interview with the leader of the CNT International Affairs Committee, Sidiki Kohne, the members of the committee described themselves as “technocrats, not politicians.” They paid great attention to the so-called National Refoundation Conference (Les assises nationales de refondation—ANR), the meeting which some of our respondents expected to develop a new constitution for the country, so some of them even called this platform a “constituent assembly”. Before those consultations took place, it had been planned that the platform should have included representatives of all administrative divisions of the country and would have consisted of 1500 people. It should be noted that the system of formation of the National Transitional Council and the National Refoundation Conference was characterized by extreme opacity, the absence of any clearly understandable rules for introducing Malian citizens into their composition, which provided exceptionally great opportunities for their manipulation by the presidential administration. The debates on how new Mali would be formed started on December 11th, 2021 and proceeded till December 23rd in 725 communes out of 749 and in 51 circles out of 60, leaving 9 circles of Kidal and Ménaka of the northern Mali uncovered because of the Islamist insurgency issues, at the same time the debates were also held in 26 Malian embassies abroad (Le Point Afrique 2021). There were 13 main

208

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

issues highlighted during those debates, which ranged from economics and politics to culture and security challenges (Anadolu Agency 2021). The final phase of the National Refoundation Conference started on December 27th, 2021 and ended on December 30th in the Mali capital Bamako under the chairmanship of President Goïta. The meetings were attended by 1600 participants who together approved 534 resolutions whose application allegedly would enable Mali to carry out political and institutional reforms, including electoral one (Anadolu Agency 2021). Electoral institutions reformation was one of the main challenges for the new Malian administration as international community demanded a civil government in power in Mali under the threat of imposing additional sanctions since the August 2020 coup-volution. At the same time, there was no benefit for some Malian elites in satisfying the international community demand which said that in order to get at least partial recognition of the new authorities after the coup of August 18th 2020 the new regime had to hold presidential elections within 18 months. February 27th 2022 was conditionally considered as the date of their arrangement. Interviews conducted on October 18th 2021 with representatives of the CNT and other prominent political figures of the country on the part of our field research team already indicated that the elections were going to be postponed to a later date, and the fact that that they would indeed be held later was already in October 2021 beyond any doubts. However, while everyone had been talking about postponing elections before the National Refoundation Conference took place, the expected timing of new elections varied. Our interview held on October 21st, 2021 with one of the leaders of the ADEMA-PSJ party, ex-President of Mali Dioncounda Traore, suggested that representatives of the moderate opposition in Mali, primarily the ADEMA-PSJ, by the middle of October 2021 agreed that the elections should be postponed because the party was in the process of overcoming a split in those times and they were not sure that the party would be able to mobilize itself by February 2022. Their opinion on new elections implied that the democratic procedures should have been organized after February 2022, but no later than half a year after that date. The most radical position on the issue of the elections postponing was shared by the members of CNT, who were going to delay the elections for up to three years in order to maintain the political status quo as well as their influence, which they could lose if the elections had been held in 2022. An intermediate position belonged to the representatives of the already mentioned above CMAS movement, whose actual, not formal leader was imam Dicko. They were afraid to postpone the elections for more than one year because of the well-founded fear of economic and political sanctions on the part of ECOWAS and the EU. At the same time, regarding these sanctions implementation possibility, it seemed that the members of the CNT were not afraid of them, they were quite ready to take this risk for the sake of maintaining their positions in power. During the National Refoundation Conference final phase in late December 2021, the elections deadlines proposed by different groups varied from six months to five years, making it possible to hold the next elections even in December 2026 (Le Point Afrique 2021). This suspension led to ECOWAS additional sanctions being imposed on Mali in January 2022, which also included the closure of the land and air borders

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

209

with Mali, the suspension of non-essential financial transactions, and the freezing of Malian state assets in ECOWAS central and commercial banks (Aljazeera 2022).

Conclusion The events of May 24th 2021 may be regarded as a classic coup, since they were not accompanied by a pronounced mass mobilization: one part of the elite just replaced another. At the same time, in a broader context, it can be considered as a part of the Malian revolution of 2020−2021 just as the coup d’état carried out by Napoleon Bonaparte on 18 Brumaire / 9 November 1799 may be considered as an important phase of the French Revolution. In reality, the coup of October 25/November 7 1917 (Bolshevik coup) is often considered as an integral part of the Russian Revolution (although, of course, in terms of its scale and scope, the Malian revolution cannot be compared with the revolutions in Russia and France). The events of May 2021 in Mali resemble the Bolshevik coup as the both coups involved the radicalization of revolutionary demands that took place within their framework, the transition to a more pronounced desire to break with the past and create a fundamentally new political system in the country. This is currently being implemented with the help of the National Refoundation Conference decisions. Some experts (see especially Morgan 2020) have already drawn attention to the fact that the 2020 revolution in Mali, unlike the vast majority of urban revolutions of the twenty-first century, is distinguished by the absence of any democratic slogans. As Andy Morgan notes, the Malian revolution advocated order, establishing control over the territory and building a more just society, without corruption. He believes that the events of 2020 in Mali may be considered as a revolution against the president, who was closely associated with France, since in large part it was caused by the dissatisfaction of citizens with security, corruption and nepotism problems which was expressed during the protests of summer 2020, when military forces were in position to capture the situation in their favor. According to Morgan, the Malians had long suspected France of interfering in their multi-party democracy in order to ensure the victory of those candidates who were most favorable to its interests. Obviously, the interests of the former metropolis and the interests of the Malian people did not coincide. While ordinary Malians expected basic security, jobs, education, community-based health care and accountability, France was focused relentlessly on counter-terrorism measures implementation and curbing migration programs as well as strong adherence to democratic procedures (Morgan 2020). It was also mentioned that among the key security considerations highlighted during the final phase of the National Refoundation Conference was “to develop new military partnerships with military powers to better defend national sovereignty implying Russia” (Le Point Afrique 2021). Morgan notes that 2020 revolution in Mali was far from demanding the expansion of political rights and civil liberties. According to him, hundreds of thousands of Malian citizens who took to the streets in the summer to protest against the corruption,

210

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

incompetence and venality of the democratically elected Keita government saw the army as the salvation of the country, which until 2011 was associated with peace, stability, openness and African democracy (Morgan 2020: 42). The military who came to power are popular among the young part of the population, mostly the poor, while protégés of the West found support among the white-collar workers of the capital. So, it is no coincidence that the military was supported by the June 5th Movement. A few words should be said about the general connection of the Malian 2020−2021 Revolution/Coupvolution with the recent revolutionary wave in the MENA region that is the subject of the present volume. On the one hand, one may notice certain features that are found both for the recent Malian revolution and some events of the current revolutionary wave10 of 2018–2022 in the other regions of the world—e.g., we have already noted that COVID-19 pandemic, anti-COVID measures, and socio-economic disruption they caused contributed significantly to the emergence of a number of revolutionary events of the third wave of the twenty-first century revolutions (e.g., Goldstone et al 2022a, b). The feature which is common both for the Malian 2020–2021 Revolution and many other events of the recent revolutionary wave in the MENA region is their connection with the Arab Spring: in Algeria,11 Jordan,12 Egypt,13 and Sudan,14 the protesters tried to achieve what they failed to achieve in 2011, though, unlike the protestors in these countries, the Malian revolutionaries did not demand democracy. In this respect, the Malian Revolution turns out to be closer to the recent revolutionary events in Lebanon15 and Iraq16 (as well as July 25, 2021 coupvolution in Tunisia17 ) where revolutionaries were demanding the establishment of strong, effective, uncorrupted political power, rather than the transition from dictatorship to democracy.

10

It can be considered as the third wave of the twenty-first century revolutions (Goldstone, Grinin, Korotayev 2022a, 2022b). 11 See Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” (Zoubir 2022, this volume) for detail. 12 See Chapter “The Roots of the New Wave of Protests in Jordan” (Zakharov and Issaev 2022, this volume) for detail. 13 See Chapter “Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?” (Mansour and Elhefnawy 2022, this volume) for detail. 14 See Chapter “Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” (Kostelyanets 2022, this volume) for detail. Note that this revolution can be also interpreted as a “coupvolution”. 15 See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail. 16 See Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume) for detail. 17 See Chapter “Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?” (Kashina 2022, this volume) for detail.

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

211

References Accord (2020) The effects of COVID-19 on the situation in Mali. Accord. September 30, 2020. https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/the-effects-of-covid-19-on-the-situation-in-mali/ African Elections Database (2021) African elections database. Retrieved, from https://africanelect ions.tripod.com/ml.html Akaev A, Korotayev A, Issaev L, Zinkina J (2017) Technological development and protest waves: Arab spring as a trigger of the global phase transition? Technol Forecast Soc Chang 116:316–321. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.08.009 Akinwotu E (2020) Kidnapped Mali politician and French aid worker freed. The Guardian. October 6, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/06/kidnapped-mali-politicianand-french-aid-worker-freed Akpasom Y (2014) Lotze W (2014) The shift to stabilisation operations: considerations for African peace support operations. Confl Trends 2:18–25 Aljazeera (2012a) Mali interim president injured in attack. Aljazeera. May 22, 2012. https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2012/5/22/mali-interim-president-injured-in-attack Aljazeera (2012b) Mali’s Tuareg rebellion: what next? Aljazeera. March 20, 2012. https://www.alj azeera.com/opinions/2012/3/20/malis-tuareg-rebellion-what-next/ Aljazeera (2012c) Tuareg rebels attack Mali town of Kidal. Aljazeera. February 06, 2012. https:// www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/2/6/tuareg-rebels-attack-mali-town-of-kidal Aljazeera (2020a) Anti-government protests resume in Mali after weeks-long pause. Aljazeera. August 11, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/11/anti-govt-protests-resume-in-maliafter-weeks-long-pause Aljazeera (2020b) Mali’s deepening crisis: key questions answered. Aljazeera. June 25, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/6/25/malis-deepening-crisis-key-questions-answered Aljazeera (2020c) Mali’s Keita resigns as president after military coup. Aljazeera. August 19, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/19/malis-keita-resigns-as-president-after-mil itary-coup Aljazeera (2021) At least 51 killed in Mali rebel attacks: Officials. Aljazeera. August 09, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/9/dozens-killed-in-mali-rebel-attacks-officials Aljazeera (2022) West Africa bloc ECOWAS hits Mali with sanctions after poll delay. Aljazeera. January 09, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/9/west-africa-bloc-ecowas-hits-maliwith-sanctions-after-poll-delay Anadolu Agency (2021) Mali: national meetings lead to 534 resolutions. Anadolu Agency. December 30, 2021. https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/mali-les-assises-nationales-d%C3%A9b ouchent-sur-534-r%C3%A9solutions/2461730 Baldaro E, Seydou YD (2020) The end of the Sahelian exception: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State clash in Central Mali. Int Spect 55(4):69–83 BBC News (2012a) Mali president Traore beaten up by protesters. BBC News. May 21, 2012. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17591322 BBC News (2012b) West African ECOWAS leaders impose Mali sanctions. BBC News. April 03, 2012. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17591322 BBC News (2013) Ibrahim Boubacar Keita wins Mali presidential election. BBC News. August 13, 2013. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23677124 BBC News (2020) Thousands of protesters call for resignation of Mali president. BBC News. June 19, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53117095 Beissinger MR (2019) Personal communication of 26 October 2019 Beissinger MR (2022) The revolutionary city. Urbanization and the global transformation of rebellion. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ Benjaminsen TA (2008) Does supply-induced scarcity drive violent conflicts in the African Sahel? The case of the Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali. J Peace Res 45(6):819–836

212

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

Benjaminsen T, Ba B (2009) Farmer–herder conflicts, pastoral marginalisation and corruption: a case study from the inland Niger Delta of Mali. Geogr J 175(1):71–81. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1475-4959.2008.00312.x Benjaminsen T, Ba B (2019) Why do pastoralists in Mali join jihadist groups? A political ecological explanation. J Peasant Stud 46(1):1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1474457 Bennett VP (1975) Military government in Mali. J Mod Afr Stud 13(2):249–266 Bensimon C, Bozonnet C, Gubiert B, Tilouine J, Zerrouky M (2018) Iyad Ag-Ghali, l’ennemi numéro un de la France au Mali. Le Monde. July 27, 2018. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/art icle/2018/07/27/mali-iyad-ag-ghali-l-ennemi-numero-un-de-la-france_5336668_3212.html Bere M (2017) Armed rebellion, violent extremism, and the challenges of international intervention in Mali. Afr Confl Peacebuilding Rev 7(2):60–84. https://doi.org/10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.7.2.03 Bingen J (2000) Overview – the Malian path to democracy and development. In: Bingen RJ, Robinson D, Staatz JM (eds) Democracy and development in Mali. Michigan State University Press, Ann Arbor MI, pp 245–250 Bøås M, Torheim L (2013) The trouble in Mali—corruption, collusion, resistance. Third World Quarterly 34(7):1279–1292. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.824647 Boilley P (1999) Les Touaregs Kel Adagh. Dépendances et révoltes: du Soudan français au Mali contemporain. Karthala, Paris Bruguière P (2012) Backed by popular support, Mali’s Islamists drive Tuareg from Gao. France 24. June 29, 2012. https://observers.france24.com/en/20120629-mali-backed-popular-supportislamists-drive-tuareg-separatists-north-city-gao Cassell K (2021) Representation in the Americas: perceptions of external efficacy in the 2018/19. Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN Chauzal G, van Damme T (2015) The roots of Mali’s conflict: moving beyond the 2012 crisis. Clingendael, The Hague Clark AF (1995) From military dictatorship to democracy: the democratization process in Mali. J Third World Stud 12(1):201–222 Cline LE (2013) Nomads, Islamists, and soldiers: the struggles for northern Mali. Stud Confl Terror 36(8):617–634. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.802972 Coulibaly T (1981) Mali: la dure lutte des scolaires et étudiants ou la longue marche pour la dignité d’un peuple. Peuples Noirs, Peuples Africains 4(19):36–59 Couloubaly P (2004) Le Mali d’Alpha Oumar Konaré: ombres et lumières d’une démocratie en gestation. L’Harmattan, Paris Daniel S (2021) Karim Keita: Mali’s fallen princeling. Yahoo News. July 09, 2021. https://news. yahoo.com/karim-keita-malis-fallen-princeling-141328781.html de Castelli L (2014) Mali: from sanctuary to islamic state. RUSI J 159(3):62–68. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/03071847.2014.928016 de Jorio R (2003) Narratives of the nation and democracy in Mali. Cah D’études Afr 172(4):827–855 Decalo S (1992) The process, prospects and constraints of democratization in Africa. Afr Aff 91(362):7–35 Devermont J (2019) Politics at the heart of the crisis in the Sahel. Center for strategic and international studies (CSIS), Washington DC Diallo A (2020) Mali: who is Bah N’Daw, the new transitional president? The Africa Report. September 25, 2020. https://www.theafricareport.com/43146/mali-who-is-bah-ndaw-the-newtransitional-president/ Diallo T, Kontao F (2020) Mali police fire gunshots and tear gas to disperse protesters. Reuters. July 10, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-politics-idUSKBN24B2M9 Díaz OT (2021) Islamic fundamentalism framing politics in Mali: from the Middle Ages to the Age of Pandemic. In: Käsehage N (ed) Religious fundamentalism in the age of pandemic. TranscriptVerlag, Bielefeld, pp 149–178. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839454855-006 Dieng M (2019) The multi-national joint task force and the G5 Sahel joint force: the limits of military capacity-building efforts. Contemp Secur Policy 40(4):481–501. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 13523260.2019.1602692

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

213

Diop O (2006) Partis politiques et processus de transition démocratique en Afrique Noire: recherches sur les enjeux juridiques et sociologiques du multipartisme dans quelques pays de l’espace francophone. Ed Publibook, Paris Downie R (2015) Collective insecurity in the Sahel: fighting terror with good governance. Georg J Int Aff 16(1):70–78 Duhamel S (2020) Crise politique au Mali: les raisons de la colère. Tv5monde.com. July 23, 2020. https://information.tv5monde.com/video/crise-politique-au-mali-les-raisons-de-la-colere Emerson SA (2011) Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion. Small Wars & Insur 22(4):669–687. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.573406 Ems-Bléneau V (2021) Les grandes dates du Mali: des origines à la fin de la IIe république par Alpha Oumar Konaré, et Adame Ba Konaré. Fr Rev 94(4):222–223. https://doi.org/10.1353/tfr. 2021.0177 Garda World (2020) Mali: protest organizers postpone Bamako march planned for July 17/update 2. Garda World. July 16, 2020. https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/360351/mali-protestorganizers-postpone-bamako-march-planned-for-july-17-update-2 Gauthier Vela V (2021) MINUSMA and the militarization of UN peacekeeping. Int Peacekeeping 28(5):838–863. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2021.1951610 George Herald (2012) Mali protesters seek return to order after coup. George Herald. March 26, 2012. https://www.georgeherald.com/News/Article/International/mali-protesters-seek-return-toorder-after-coup-20170711 Giraud G (2013) Cinquante ans de tensions dans la sahélo-saharienne. In: Galy M (ed) La guerre au Mali. Comprendre la crise au Sahel et au Sahara. Enjeux et zones d’ombre. La Découverte, Paris, pp 27–57 Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (2022a) Introduction. Changing yet persistent: revolutions and revolutionary events. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_1 Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (2022b) Waves of revolutions in the 21st century. PolisPoliticheskiye Issledovaniya 4:108–119. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2022.04.09 Golubski C, Schaeffer A (2020) Africa in the news: impacts of COVID-19 on African economies and elections updates. Brookings. April 04, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-infocus/2020/04/04/africa-in-the-news-impacts-of-covid-19-on-african-economies-and-electionsupdates/ Grinin L, Grinin A, Korotayev A (2022) 20th century revolutions: characteristics, types, and waves. Humanities Soc Sci Commun 9(1):1–13. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-022-01120-9 Grinin L, Grinin A (2022) Revolutionary waves and lines of the 20th century. In: Goldstone J, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 315–88. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_12 Grundy KW (1962) Marxism-Leninism and African underdevelopment: the Mali approach. Int J 17(3):300–304. https://doi.org/10.2307/40198638 Hagberg S, Körling G (2012) Socio-political turmoil in Mali: the public debate following the coup d’etat on 22 March 2012. Afr Spectr 47(2–3):111–125. https://doi.org/10.1177/000203971204 702-306 Hanne O (ed) (2014) Mali, une paix à gagner. Analyses et témoignages sur l’opération Serval. Lavauzelle, Panazol Harmon SA (2014) Terror and insurgency in the Sahara—Sahel region. Routledge, London Hazard JN (1967) Mali’s socialism and the Soviet legal model. Yale Law J 77(1):28–69 Harsch E (2017) Burkina Faso. A history of power, protest and revolution. Zed, London Huckabey JM (2013) Al Qaeda in Mali: the defection connections. Orbis 57(3):467–484. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.05.008 Ibrahim J (1994) Political exclusion, democratization and dynamics of ethnicity in Niger. Africa Today 41(3):15–39

214

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

Ibrahim J (1999) Transition et successions politiques au Niger. In: Diop MC, Diouf M (eds) Les figures du politique en Afrique: des pouvoirs hérités aux pouvoirs élus. Karthala, Paris, pp 189– 216 Ifex (2018) Security forces in Mali brutally break up demonstration. Ifex. November 29, 2018. https://ifex.org/security-forces-in-mali-brutally-break-up-demonstration/ Ifex (2020) Ongoing media freedom violations during Mali unrest. Ifex. July 14, 2020. https://ifex. org/ongoing-media-freedom-violations-during-mali-unrest/ Issaev L, Korotayev A (2022) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region in the global perspective. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_1 Issaev L, Korotayev A, Bobarykina D (2022) Impact of the Arab Spring on the Black Spring in Burkina Faso. Moscow State University Bulletin. Series 13. Vostokovedenie 1:98–109 Jeune Afrique (2020a) Mali: adoption d’un projet de loi prolongeant le mandat des députés jusqu’en 2020. Jeune Afrique. June 01, 2020. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/786365/politique/mali-ado ption-dun-projet-de-loi-prolongeant-le-mandat-des-deputes-jusqua-2020a/ Jeune Afrique (2020b) Mali: Moussa Timbiné, du syndicalisme au perchoir, parcours d’un fidèle d’IBK. Jeune Afrique. May 20, 2020. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/972689/politique/mali-mou ssa-timbine-du-syndicalisme-au-perchoir-parcours-dun-fidele-dibk/ Kashina A (2022) Tunisia. Revolution of ballot boxes? In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 137–168. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_7 Keenan J (2013) The dying Sahara. US imperialism and terror in Africa. Pluto Press, London Keita K (1998) Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel: the Tuareg insurgency in Mali. United States Government Publishing Office, Washington DC Khatib DK (2022) 17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 75–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_4 Khokhlov N, Vasiliev A, Belichenko A, Kirdyankina P, Korotayev A (2021) Echo of Arab Spring in Western Europe: a quantitative analysis. Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy 19(2):21–49. https://doi. org/10.17994/IT.2021.19.2.65.7 Koehler K, Albrecht H (2021) Revolutions and the military: endgame coups, instability, and prospects for democracy. Armed Forces Soc 47(1):148–176. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X1 9881747 Korotayev A, Meshcherina K, Shishkina A (2018) A wave of global sociopolitical destabilization of the 2010s: a quantitative analysis. Democr Secur 14(4):331–357. https://doi.org/10.1080/174 19166.2018.1517337 Korotayev A, Medvedev I, Zinkina J (2022a) Global systems for sociopolitical instability forecasting and their efficiency. A comparative analysis. Comp Sociol 21(1):64–104. https://doi.org/10.1163/ 15691330-bja10050 Korotayev A, Shishkina A, Issaev L (2016) Arab Spring as a global phase transition trigger. PolisPoliticheskiye Issledovaniya 3:108–122. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2016.03.09 Korotayev A, Shishkina A, Lukhmanova Z (2017) The global socio-political destabilization wave of 2011 and the following years: a quantitative analysis. Polis-Politicheskiye Issledovaniya 6:150– 168. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2017.06.11 Korotayev A, Meshcherina K, Katkova V (2019a) Arab Spring and its echo in Sub-Saharan Africa: a quantitative analysis. Asia and Africa Today 1:17–24. https://doi.org/10.31857/S03215075000 3339-4 Korotayev A, Romanov D, Medvedev I (2019b) Echo of the Arab Spring in Eastern Europe: a quantitative analysis. Sociol Obozrenie 18(1):31–81. https://doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-20191-56-106 Korotayev A, Medvedev I, Slinko E, Shulgin S (2020) The effectiveness of global systems for monitoring sociopolitical instability: a systematic analysis. Sociol Obozrenie 19(2):143–197. https://doi.org/10.17323/1728-192x-2020-2-143-197

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

215

Korotayev A, Shishkina A, Khokhlova A (2022b) Global echo of the Arab Spring. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 813–849. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_31 Kostelyanets S (2022) Sudan’s december revolution and the demise of the Al Bashir Regime. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 33–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_2 Kozhanov N (2022) Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Routs of Iran’s Domestic Instability (2010–2020). In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 219–242. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_10 Le Monde (2020) Au Mali, l’opposition annonce de nouvelles manifestations contre le président Keïta. Le Monde. August 18, 2020. https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/08/18/au-mali-lopposition-annonce-de-nouvelles-manifestations-contre-le-president-keita_6049211_3212.html Le Point Afrique (2021) Mali—Assises nationales de la refondation : ce qu’il faut retenir. Le Point Afrique. December 31, 2021. https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/mali-assises-nationales-de-larefondation-ce-qu-il-faut-retenir-31-12-2021-2458696_3826.php Le Temps (2021) Karim Keïta, fils de l’ex-président malien, visé par un mandat d’arrêt international. Le Temps. July 09, 2021. https://www.letemps.ch/monde/karim-keita-fils-lexpresident-malienvise-un-mandat-darret-international Lecocq B (2004) Unemployed intellectuals in the Sahara: the Teshumara nationalist movement and the revolutions in Tuareg society. Int Rev Soc Hist 49(S12):87–109. https://doi.org/10.1017/S00 20859004001658 Lecocq B, Klute G (2013) Tuareg separatism in Mali. Int J Canada’s J Glob Policy Anal 68(3):424– 434. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702013505431 Lecocq JS (2002) That desert is our country: Tuareg rebellions and competing nationalisms in contemporary Mali (1946–1996). Doctoral dissertation, Universiteit van Amsterdam Lewis-Stempel J (2020) France’s African forever war. Unherd. July 31, 2020. https://unherd.com/ 2020/07/frances-african-forever-war/ Lounnas D (2014) Confronting Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghrib in the Sahel: Algeria and the Malian Crisis. J North African Stud 19(5):810–827. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2014. 974033 Luengo-Cabrera J (2012) Symptoms of an enduring crisis: prospects for addressing Mali’s conflict catalysts. African Policy J 8:9–19 Mace C (2016) Processus de paix: ô mirages, ô des espoirs. Liberation. July 14, 2016. https://www. liberation.fr/planete/2016/07/14/processus-de-paix-o-mirages-o-des-espoirs_1466246/ Mackinnon A (2021) Who blessed the Vlads down in Africa? Foreign Policy. September 24, 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/russia-wagner-group-mali-africa-putin-libya/ Mansour S, Elhefnawy H (2022) Egyptian protests 2019: harbingers of a new revolution?. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 169–190. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_8 Mardasov A (2022) Revolutionary protests in Iraq in the context of Iranian-American confrontation. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA Region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 95–108. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_5 Melly P (2020) The Mali crisis: security, democracy, and protest in the Sahel. SAIS Revue Int Aff 40(2):77–85. https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2020.0025 Moestrup S (1999) The role of actors and institutions: the difficulties of democratic survival in Mali and Niger. Democratization 6(2):171–186. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510349908403616 Moll Y (2014) The wretched revolution. Middle East Report 273:34–39 Morgan A (2020) Democracy versus the people: Mali has seen a government coup following escalating protests. What has caused the unrest?. Index on Censorship 49(4):42–45. https://doi. org/10.1177/0306422020981273

216

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

Moseley W (2017) The minimalist state and donor landscapes: livelihood security in Mali during and after the 2012–2013 Coup and Rebellion. Afr Stud Rev 60(1):37–51. https://doi.org/10.1017/ asr.2017.11 Moseley W, Hoffman B (2017) Introduction: hope, despair, and the future of Mali. Afr Stud Rev 60(1):5–14. https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2017.12 Nathan R (2013) Democracy in early Malian postcolonial history: the abuse of discourse. Int J Canada’s J Glob Policy Anal 68(3):466–478. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702013505439 Nsaibia H, Weiss C (2020) The end of the Sahelian Anomaly: how the global conflict between the Islamic State and al-Qaida finally came to West Africa. CTC Sentinel 13(7):1–14 Nsaibia H (2021) The conflict between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the Sahel, a year on. Italian Institute for International Political Studies. March 03, 2021, https://www.ispionline.it/en/ pubblicazione/conflict-between-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state-sahel-year-29305 Nossiter A (2012) Mali mob assaults president after pact. The New York Times. May 21, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/world/africa/mali-protesters-attack-interim-pre sident-dioncounda-traore.html Obaji P (2020) Mali coup leaders seized power days after returning from military training camp in Russia. The Daily Beast. August 21, 2020. https://www.thedailybeast.com/russia-trained-themali-coup-leaders?ref=scroll Ortmans O, Mazzeo E, Meshcherina K, Korotayev A (2017) Modeling social pressures toward political instability in the United Kingdom after 1960: a demographic structural analysis. Cliodynamics 8(2):113–158. https://doi.org/10.21237/C7clio8237313 Pellerin M (2019) Armed violence in the Sahara. Are we moving from Jihadism to Insurgency? Etudes de l’Ifri. Institut Français de Relations Internationales, Paris Phelan C (2016) Plus ça change: trade unions, the military and politics in Burkina Faso, 1966 and 2014. Lab Hist 57(1):107–125. https://doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2016.1140701 Raafat L (2021) The schism of Jihadism in the Sahel: how Al-Qaeda and the Islamic state are battling for legitimacy in the Sahelian context. The Middle East Institute, Washington DC Raineri L (2020) Explaining the rise of Jihadism in Africa: the crucial case of the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara. Terror Polit Viol. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1828078 Ramani S (2020) Why Russia is the geopolitical winner in Mali’s Coup? Foreign Policy Research Institute. September 16, 2020. https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/09/why-russia-is-a-geopoliticalwinner-in-malis-coup Reuters (2020a) Suspected jihadists kill 25 in central Mali attacks. Reuters. October 13, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mali-security/suspected-jihadists-kill-25-in-cen tral-mali-attacks-idUKKBN26Y1SA?edition-redirect=uk Reuters (2020b) Thousands of protesters demand Mali president step down. Reuters. June 19, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-politics-protests-idUSKBN23Q334 Riley S (1992) Africa’s’ new wind of change’. The World Today 48(7):116–119 Robert A (2020) Au Mali, coup d’État dans un pays sans État. Le Monde Diplomatique 10:4–5. https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2020/10/ROBERT/62316 Sborgi E (1998) Assessing democracy in Mali: a procedural analysis. Il Politico 63(3):449–477 Shaw S (2013) Fallout in the Sahel: the geographic spread of conflict from Libya to Mali. Can Foreign Policy J 19(2):199–210. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2013.805153 Slaski B (2018) Quelles réalités et intentions derrière les avancées russes en Afrique du Nord? Revue Défense Nationale 806(1):101–105 Slim H (2020) Electoral process in Africa: the impact of COVID-19 and challenges for the EU. Eur View 19(2):212–221. https://doi.org/10.1177/1781685820971223 Smith GA (2009) Al-Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb. J Strat Sec 2(2):53–72. https://doi. org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.2 Snyder FG (1967) The political thought of Modibo Keita. J Mod Afr Stud 5(1):79–106. https://doi. org/10.1017/S0022278X00014026 Soares BF (2006) Islam in Mali in the neoliberal era. Afr Aff 105(418):77–95. https://doi.org/10. 1093/afraf/adi088

Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021

217

Solomon H (2013) Mali: West Africa’s Afghanistan. RUSI J 158(1):12–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 03071847.2013.774635 Springborg R (2016) Caudillismo along the Nile. Int Spect 51(1):74–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 03932729.2016.1120975 Springborg R (2015) President Sisi’s delegative authoritarianism. Istituto affari internazionali, Roma Steinberg G, Werenfels I (2007) Between the ‘near’and the ‘far’enemy: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Med Polit 12(3):407–413. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390701622473 The Africa Report (2021) Mali: July protests killed 14, including 2 children—MINUSMA report. The Africa Report. January 05, 2021. https://www.theafricareport.com/57347/mali-minusma-rep ort-details-unlawful-actions-at-july-protests/ The Guardian (2021) Mali: leader of 2020 coup takes power after president’s arrest. The Guardian. May 25, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/24/mali-presidentprime-minister-and-defence-minister-arrested-sources-say The New Humanitarian (2012) Rebellion claims the president. The New Humanitarian. March 22, 2012. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/95127/mali-rebellion-claims-president The New York Times (2020) Tens of thousands protest in Mali amid growing opposition to Keita presidency. The New York Times. June 19, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/world/ africa/mali-protests-keita.html The Washington Post (2021) Another coup in Mali? Here is what you need to know. The Washington Post. May 28, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/05/28/another-coup-maliheres-what-you-need-know/ Thomas-Johnson A (2020) Mahmoud Dicko: the ‘people’s imam’ challenging Mali’s Keita. Aljazeera. July 20, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/20/mahmoud-dicko-the-peo ples-imam-challenging-malis-keita Thurston A (2013) Towards an “Islamic Republic of Mali?” Fletch For World Aff 37(2):45–66 Thurston A, Lebovich A (2013) A handbook on Mali’s 2012–2013 crisis. Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa, Evanston IL Toronto N (2011) Egypt’s ’Coup-volution’. Middle East Insights 6:1–3 Turrittin J (1991) Mali: people topple Traoré. Rev Afr Polit Econ 18(52):97–103. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/03056249108703927 Varin C (2020) No opportunity lost: the ISWAP insurgency in the changing climate of Lake Chad region. Afr Conf Peacebuild Rev 10(2):141–157. https://doi.org/10.2979/africonfpeacrevi.10. 2.07 Vengroff R (1993) Governance and the transition to democracy: political parties and the party system in Mali. J Mod Afr Stud 31(4):541–562. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00012234 VOA (2020a) Elections continue in Mali despite virus, violence fears. VOA. April 19, 2020. https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_elections-continue-mali-despite-virus-violence-fears/ 6187825.html VOA (2020b) Who is behind Mali’s surging protest movement? VOA. July 17, 2020. https://www. voanews.com/a/africa_who-behind-malis-surging-protest-movement/6193002.html Walther O, Christopoulos D (2015) Islamic terrorism and the Malian Rebellion. Terror Polit Viol 27(3):497–519. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.809340 Wing S (2008) Constructing democracy in transitioning societies of Africa: constitutionalism and deliberation in Mali. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230612075 Wroblewska A (2015) Mali’s cotton industry: come rain or come shine. AFK Insider. Febuary 16, 2015. http://afkinsider.com Wolpin MD (1980) Legitimising state capitalism: Malian militarism in third-world perspective. J Modern African Stud 18(2):281–295. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00011344 Zakharov A, Issaev L (2022) The roots of the new wave of protests in Jordan. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA Region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 109–136. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_6 Zimmerman K (2020) Salafi-jihadi ecosystem in the Sahel. American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC

218

A. Korotayev and A. Khokhlova

Zoubir Y (2022) The crisis of the rentier state: how the Revolution of Smiles has brought down the sultanistic regime in Algeria. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-031-15135-4_3

Andrey Korotayev heads the Laboratory for Monitoring of the Sociopolitical Destabilization Risks at the HSE University in Moscow, Russia. He is also Senior Research Professor at the Institute for African Studies and Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as Professor at the Faculty of Global Studies of the Lomonosov Moscow State University. He has authored or co-authored over 650 scholarly publications, including such monographs as Ancient Yemen (Oxford University Press, 1995), World Religions and Social Evolution of the Old World Oikumene Civilizations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth (URSS, 2006), Intro duction to Social Macrodynamics: Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends (URSS, 2006), Great Divergence and Great Convergence. A Global Perspective (Springer, 2015), Economic Cycles, Crises, and the Global Periphery (Springer, 2016), Islamism, Arab Spring, and the Future of Democracy. World System and World Values Perspectives (Springer, 2019). He is a laureate of the Russian Science Support Foundation Award in ‘The Best Economists of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Nomination (2006); in 2012 he was awarded with the Gold Kondratieff Medal by the International N. D. Kondratieff Foundation. Alina Khokhlova is a Junior Research Fellow in the Laboratory of Monitoring of Risks of SocioPolitical Destabilization at School of Politics and Governance, HSE University, Moscow, Russia. Her areas of research include political economy, political regimes, autocracies survival, Islamism and socio-political dynamics in the MENA region and the Sahel.

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots of Iran’s Domestic Instability (2010–2020) Nikolay Kozhanov

Abstract Since 2006 (if not before), sanctions imposed by the US and some other countries on Iran were aimed at depriving Tehran of financial sources allowing the country’s leadership to buy the loyalty of its population. And, at the first approach, this policy seemed to bring expected results: the popular unrest of 2009, 2012, 2018, 2019 as well as occasional minor protests in between became a serious stress-test for the regime. Yet, the Iranian political system managed to leave through it. Kozhanov looks into the socio-economic routes of the Iranian protest trying to explain the reasons for the durability of Iran’s political system even in the conditions of the economic crisis caused by the sanctions.

Introduction American sanctions have been affecting Iran’s economy for the last forty years. During this time, their pressure on Iran’s economy was uneven. Thus, the most sensitive measures of economic pressure against Tehran was applied in 2010–2015 and 2018–2020. These sanctions cut the country from the international banking and insurance systems. Tehran’s access to foreign investments, advanced technologies and international sea carriage services was restricted. Its options to sell oil in external markets and import gasoline were also limited. Consequently, the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, the so called “nuclear deal”) signed between Tehran and the international group of negotiators in 2015 was welcomed by the Iranian population and large part of the country’s elite. This document lifted most of the previously imposed nuclear-related sanctions and gave Iran hopes for less troubled economic development. Yet, the decision of US president, Donald Trump, voiced in Spring 2018 to leave the JCPOA changed the situation in Iran once again. The re-introduction of US sanctions pressure on Tehran caused significant concerns among the international N. Kozhanov (B) Gulf Studies Center, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_10

219

220

N. Kozhanov

community. The authorities of the European Union (EU), Russia and China were rightfully worried that the re-introduction of the US sanctions could create difficulties for doing business with Tehran and provoke the Iranian elite to consider options for Tehran to leave the nuclear deal. According to these concerns, sanctions might have negative impacts on the domestic situation in Iran causing the growth of social unrest and strengthening of the position of conservative forces less prepared for dialogue with the outer world. The hypothetical transition of powers from ayatollah Ali Khamenei to his successor will take place in the very unstable time and might not be smooth. These concerns were only strengthened when, in November 2018, Trump imposed an oil embargo on Tehran (with the provision of oil sanctions waiver for only eight countries and for a limited period of six months).

Sanctions and Green Movement (2009–2010) Economic sanctions against Iran adopted by the US and the EU in 2010 pursued a number of aims. One of these includes the change in the balance of political powers inside Iran through the support of liberal (and, thus, more loyal to the West) forces and the weakening of government’s positions (Clawson 2010: 16–17; Katzman 2010: 37; Ottolenghi 2010: 249–306). The initial plans of the West concerning the support of the domestic opposition in Iran were connected to the “Green Movement” which emerged in Iran after the presidential elections of 2009 in the wake of the public protests against the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the election race. This revolutionary opposition movement seemed to have some advantages in the political struggle (Clawson 2010: 3–17). Thus, during the revolutionary protests of 2009, it clearly demonstrated its capabilities to gather people together. As stated by the mayor of Tehran, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, only on June 12, 2009, the numbers of the opposition supporters who joined the demonstrations in the capital, reached 3 million people (Clawson 2010: 3). The hypothetical relationship between the intensity of the domestic instability in Iran and the changes in Tehran’s position concerning the development of its nuclear programme also potentially played an important role in the decision made by the American and European authorities to support the Green Movement (Clawson 2010: 4). As stated by US analysts, the revolutionary social instability which was caused by the Green Movement during the summer of 2009 compelled the Iranian government to be more flexible during the discussion of its nuclear issue. In October 2009, the domestic unrest even made the Iranian authorities agree on a “fuel swop” proposal that implied the transfer of Iran’s enriched uranium to the third side in exchange for nuclear fuel for Iranian needs. Moreover, some researchers explain that the subsequent refusal of Tehran to comply with the achieved agreements was the result of the stabilisation of the situation inside Iran by November 2009. Under these circumstances, the opposition was considered by the West as a possible means to manage the nuclear problem (Clawson 2010: 4).

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots …

221

New sanctions were supposed to improve the positions of the “Green Movement” by broadening its social base. This necessity indeed existed. The narrowness of the social base of the opposition appeared to be one of the reasons which partly explain the failures and misfortunes of the Green Movement in 2009–2010. The majority of its supporters were represented by students, intelligentsia, and some parts of the middle and upper classes. However, the majority of the lower strata of the Iranian society who constitute up to 60 per cent of the population did not support the Green Movement and, indeed, partly helped the authorities to suppress the revolutionary protests of 2009 (Nasseri 2010). The lower classes of Iranian society mostly preserve a conservative political orientation. Since 1979, the government has spared no expense to support (through direct and indirect subsidies) the lower layers of urban society (Nasseri 2010). Nevertheless, initially, it seemed that the sanctions of 2010 could tangibly change the situation. By that time, the economy of Iran was experiencing difficulties. It was burdened with structural problems1 and was severely damaged by the international economic crisis (Shayerah 2010). Some analysts state that in this situation, only immense subsidies which were set apart to secure the low level of prices on fuel and some consumer goods could reduce social tensions inside the country and guarantee the loyalty of the lower classes of the population to its government (Nasseri 2010). However, the financial burden of these subsidies gradually grew. Since 2006–2007 it became difficult for the authorities to cover expenses in this field (Khanlu 1386). As a result, the US and EU considered 2010 to be a convenient moment for another blow for the government of Ahmadinejad. The sanctions of 2010 were supposed to limit the income sources of the Iranian budget and to increase government spending. This, in turn, would constrain the capabilities of the Iranian government to provide the population with subsidies. This situation would divert the lower classes from Ahmadinejad and encourage them to join the Green Movement (Clawson 2010; Katzman 2010; Ottolenghi 2010). Nevertheless, the leaders of the opposition such as Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi did not appreciate this support. In August 2010, they not only called the adopted sanctions a “mistake” made by the West, but doubted that the sanctions were properly targeted as stated by the US and EU. Karroubi also argued that instead of undermining the positions of government the sanctions hit regular people and, first of all, the most vulnerable lower classes (Dehghan 2010). The opposition concerns about the welfare of Iranians were possible but not the main reason for its harsh reaction to the sanctions. First and foremost, the leaders of the Green Movement were afraid of the possibility that the punitive measures of the US and EU would give the Iranian authorities another opportunity to increase their pressure on the opposition (LaFranchi 2010). These fears of the protestors were caused by strong nationalist feelings existing in contemporary Iranian society. This nationalism emerged as an outcome of the Iranian history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the superpowers of that time used Iran as a playground for their own games for superiority in the region 1

Such as unemployment and high inflation rates.

222

N. Kozhanov

without taking the interests of the Iranians into account. Since then, any attempt by foreign countries to influence the decision-making process in Iran is seen by the population as an infringement of Iranian interests. In this situation, it was enough for the authorities to accuse the Green Movement in close relations with the West or in benefiting from sanctions, and, thus, any oppressions against the opposition would be legitimate (Nasseri 2010; LaFranchi 2010). Under these circumstances, the decision of the West to supply the opposition with wider support through sanctions created nothing but problems for the Green Movement. In this sense, some statements which were made by Karroubi during his interview with The Guardian in August 2010 seem to be very meaningful. Thus, several times the prominent Iranian politician assured British readers of his loyalty to the idea of an Islamic republic. He also emphasized that the Green Movement should not be seen as a revolutionary group. As stated by Karroubi, its members are reformists, and they only demand free elections (Reuters 2010). This interview with The Guardian appeared to be an attempt made by the opposition leaders to dissociate themselves and their movement from the sanctions and foreign support. This also served as a signal to the Western countries that the Americans and Europeans should not expect much from the Green Movement whose goals had nothing in common with the change of the political regime in Iran. However, the threat of a new wave of political persecution by the government was not the only concern of the opposition. Apart from this, the leaders of the Green Movement predicted the possible strengthening of the grip of the Ahmadinejad’s supporters over the country’s economy with the simultaneous weakening of the opposition’s position (LaFranchi 2010). Thus, after the adoption of the sanctions of 2010, the Iranian government spare no efforts to support companies affiliated with the political groupings loyal to the President (first of all, with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)) (Mansourian 2010). For instance, most of the investment projects which were abandoned by foreign firms after the implementation of the new punitive measures by the US and EU were almost immediately given to such companies without conducting any competitive biddings (for example, this was the case of “Khatam-ol-anbia” owned by the IRGC) (Faucon 2010). The business of the opposition, on the other hand, was left without support, and, subsequently, suffered from the negative effect created by the sanctions (Mansourian 2010). Moreover, the way in which control over the economy was divided between opposition and Ahmadinejad’s supporters also appeared to be important. Due to a number of reasons, the opposition established their capital in the service sector and light industries.2 For instance, this was the case of the pistachio business of HashemiRafsanjani’s clan (Tisdall 2009). The supporters of the President formed their business in the other sectors of the Iranian economy. In 2005, under the pretext of the necessity to specify the limits between the public, private and cooperative sectors of the economy, Ahmadinejad adopted new regulations concerning the implementation

2

Before the privatization introduced by Ahmadinejad, heavy industry, mines, transport and banking solely belonged to the public sector: private companies were not allowed to work in these fields.

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots …

223

of Article 44 of the Constitution.3 This, in turn, allowed him to carry out the partial privatization of heavy industry, mines, communications, and banking sector of the economy according to the interests of his supporters (Azad 2010: 60–71). By 2010, as stated by the World Bank experts, only 14% of public entities offered for sale were bought by the private sector. The rest were privatized by firms affiliated with the government (such as investment company Mehre Eghtesade Iranian, IRGC Cooperation Fund and Bahman Group) (Azad 2010; Economist 2011: 60–71; Wehrey 2009: 55–77). Iranian analysts even invented a special term for these companies: shibhedaulatiha.4 All in all, by 2010 political groups loyal to Ahmadinejad managed to acquire control over most of the Iranian strategic industries (heavy machinery assembly lines, transport, banking, mining and petrochemical production) which before privatization solely belonged to the state (Economist 2011). This division of economic sectors between pro-government political groupings and the opposition became crucial after the implementation of the new international sanctions in 2010. Service and light industries as well as trade were the first sectors of the economy which experienced the negative influence of these punitive measures. They were also the most sensitive to the pressure of sanctions whereas the mining sector, transport and heavy industries appeared to be more resilient to the external challenges. The durability of shibhedaulatihas could be explained not only by government support (due to the connections of the owners of the entities of these sectors with the government and the strategic importance of these industries for the economic security of the country), but by mere economic reasons. These sectors of the Iranian economy remain commercially attractive irrespective of external conditions. This has encouraged foreign and domestic investors to neglect the sanctions regime (Katzman 2010). On the other hand, the demand for the heavy and basic industries as well as for the transportation and banking services traditionally demonstrates less elasticity than the demand for light industries. This means that the incomes of companies in heavy and basic industries are less dependent on market fluctuations. As a result, the entities of the opposition in the light industries appeared to be more vulnerable to the difficult market conditions created by the sanctions. This, in turn, made their owners turn against punitive measures imposed on Iran. Despite the fact that, during 2009–2013, Khamenei often expressed concerns about divisions among the Iranian political elite on the nuclear issue, there was no evidence of such divisions (Clawson 2010: 11). Moreover, the leaders of the Green Movement officially warned their supporters not to make any demands related to changes in the Iranian foreign policy doctrine or the suspension of nuclear research (Clawson 2010: 5). The silence of the leadership of the Green Movement on the issues of the Iranian foreign policy, and the nuclear programme could be explained by a number of factors. 3

This article gives the definitions of the public, private and cooperative sectors of the economy. Term shibhedaultiha could be translated as “semi-governmental economic structures” or “semipublic companies”. This term implies formally private companies and entities with strong unofficial connections with governmental structures.

4

224

N. Kozhanov

On one hand, the nuclear programme, the support of Hezbollah and the assistance to the Palestinian movement were considered to be parts of the Iranian national idea. Any attempts to stand against them were seen by the opposition as a political suicide (Erdbrink 2009; Thaler 2010: 102–103). On the other hand, Mousavi and Kharroubi saw themselves and the future of their movement only within the framework of the Islamic regime (LaFranchi 2010). For both leaders of the opposition, their political struggle had nothing in common with the issues of regime change or the revision of the Iranian foreign policy. They were more concerned about domestic political and socio-economic problems (Clawson 2010: 11–12). As a result, the attempt of the West to help the opposition through the imposition of the new sanctions was doomed from the start. The punitive measures which were applied by the US and EU were aimed to shatter the Islamic regime, whereas the leadership of the Green Movement closely associated itself with the existing political system and only strived for moderate reforms (Dehghan 2010). In this situation, any sanctions could be considered by the opposition to be nothing but harmful for the country and, thus, only provoke a negative reaction. During his second term (2009–2013), in his public speeches Ahmadinejad stated the following points regarding the sanctions’ impact on the socio-economic situation in the country. First of all, he traditionally emphasized that the adoption of the sanctions became another “stupid move” made by the West for which, in the future, both the Europeans and Americans would pay a considerable price. Second, in the opinion of Ahmadinejad, these new punitive measures were unable to make any harm to the economy of the IRI. Finally, since the first days of the adoption of the sanctions, the president of the IRI had been promising to his nation that neither the US, nor the EU measures will be able to hamper the progress of Iran (AFP 2010; Tehran Times 2010). These ideas were completely repeated by the closest fellows and most loyal supporters of Ahmadinajad (Erdbrink 2010; PressTV 2010a). The high-ranking officials of the Iranian ministries were unanimous in their assessments of the situation (Daragahi). Thus, in late October 2010, the spokesman of the Iranian foreign ministry, Mehmanparast, during his usual briefings emphasized that economic measures adopted by the US, EU and their partners were unable to stop or hamper the development of the IRI (World Tribune 2010). Some officials developed this idea even further. For instance, in late September 2010, the minister of Health care, Marzieh Vahid-Dastjerdi, argued that induced reliance on domestic resources would boost the development of the Iranian pharmaceutical industry. Saying this, she additionally stressed that in the pharmaceutical sphere the imposition of the Western sanctions had already led to new achievements (PressTV 2010b). The purge of administrative apparatus conducted by Ahmadinejad in the aftermath of the civil disturbances of 2009, let him guarantee the loyalty of the economic ministries and their subordinate organizations which were traditionally considered to be a stronghold of the liberal and pro-Western forces. As a result, the overall reaction of these structures to the new sanctions was mainly in the line with the president’s vision. For example, during the summer of 2010, the minister of oil, Mir-Kazemi, and his deputies not once declared that the efforts made by the US, EU and their allies were useless (Today 2010). According to them, in spite of adopted sanctions, Iran

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots …

225

continued the development of its energy sector and from a mid-range perspective was going “to astonish the world” by new achievements (such as the mass exports of fuel from 2013) in this sphere (Fars 2010a). Even the members of the administration of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry which managed to retain the high level of political independence stated that the negative influence of the sanctions on the economy of the IRI was detected by them, but it could not be called “crucial” for the development of the country (Iran Times International 2010). Despite its uneasy relations with the executive power, the parliament of the IRI also voiced the support to the presidential position on the sanction issue. The speaker of the majles, Larijani, and the head of the parliament commission for the national security and foreign policy, Borujerdi, were the most active figures in this process. The members of the Iranian majles were also the first to offer their government to undertake retaliatory measures against the countries which adopted new sanctions and their allies (Fars 2010b). However, the above statements did not mean that the government of Iran failed to understand the threats created by the sanctions. The Iranian authorities did not underestimate the negative effect of the punitive measures of 2010 on the economy of the country. Even Ahmadinejad in one of his speeches was made to admit that the current sanctions adopted by the US and EU were nothing but quite a serious attempt to isolate Iran from the rest of the world and to begin its new economic blockade (AlArabiya 2010). The high-ranking officials were also unable to hide their concerns. In October 2010, despite the general line to deny the fact of the negative influence of the punitive measures on the IRI, the minister of the economy of the IRI, Hosseini several times confessed that “it goes without saying that Iran has faced some trouble from sanctions” (PressTV 2010c). Iranian officials were compelled to admit that the sanctions caused certain problems in the financial sector of the IRI and foreign trade. In late August 2010, the director of the Central Bank of the IRI, Bahmani, informed News Agencies that the government of his country was impelled to withdraw the financial assets of the Iranian state-owned companies from accounts in the European banks (TradeArabia 2010). At the beginning of November 2010, the head of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Nahavandiyan, stated that the sanctions of 2010 led to the rise of the cost of imports by15–30% (Iran Times International 2010). Moreover, since the end of September 2010, there have been a number of publications in the Iranian press about special courses opened by the Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry for Iranian businessmen where they were taught how to use loopholes in the sanctions regime and evade punitive measures. The fact of the establishment of these courses (obviously with the permission of the authorities) is quite indicative and significant. These facts mentioned above show that not all members of the Iranian government shared the views that the sanctions of 2010 were harmless to the economy of their country. It could be illustrated by the statements by the foreign policy advisor to Khamenei, Ali Akbar Velayati, who recommended not to consider the sanctions to be completely “futile” (PressTV 2010d).

226

N. Kozhanov

The JCPOA and Its Importance for the Iranian Economy Yet, while Iran was surviving under the 2006–2015 sanctions, it was not developing. Under these circumstances, by 2015, the lifting of sanctions became one of the top priorities of Tehran. The beginning of the constructive dialogue with the international community and subsequent adoption of the JCPOA allowed easing of the sanctions burden and launching the process of the gradual re-integration of the country into the global economy. First and foremost, the JCPOA was lifting limits on the exports of Iranian oil and, thus, increasing the budget incomes of the country. After 2015, foreign investors started to investigate opportunities existing in Iran. This process was accompanied by the partial restoration of Iran’s ties with the international banking system. Nevertheless, during 2015–2018, the Iranian leadership was successful in launching the recovery of the country’s economy, but not in ensuring its sustainable growth and improvement of social conditions. There were several reasons for this. On the one hand, as opposed to other players, the US authorities did not completely remove their extraterritorial sanctions. They justified this by referring to the regional policies of Iran that the American leadership considered as aggressive, as well as the situation of human rights in Iran and alleged facts of money laundering by the Iranian authorities. As a result, most of the financial sanctions imposed by the United States stayed in place, and only nuclear-related sanctions were lifted. This was preventing the complete restoration of Tehran’s ties with the international financial system and made potential investors very cautious about funding projects in Iran. In addition, during 2015–2016, foreign companies were not sure whether Obama’s successors would honor the JCPOA and stick to its principles, thus, raising political risks associated with the investments in Iran. In 2017, the election of Donald Trump only strengthened their beliefs that it was too early to return to the Islamic Republic. By the mid-2018, these fears turned out to be fully justified. On the other hand, while most sensitive sanctions were lifted by the EU, Iran’s economy continued experiencing negative repercussions from their existence in 2006–2012. Thus, due to the lack of access to the foreign technologies and equipment as well as external investments during the sanctions period between 2006 until 2015, Tehran could not timely modernize the production base and repair fixed assets of its enterprises in the key industries. Consequently, by 2015, the large part of these enterprises was either broken or outdated and faced a high degree of depreciation. In a number of industries such as, for instance, steel production, fixed assets demanded almost complete replacement. This determined the initial high volume of investments necessary to revitalize the Iranian domestic production and make it market-competitive. Yet, there were not enough funds available to make these investments. Iran’s domestic financial reserves were exhausted by the years of sanctions whereas low profitability and high investments risks associated with the US policies towards Iran did not allow foreign investors to step in and remedy the situation. Under these circumstances, the economic growth of Iran was uneven. While, in 2016, the country’s economy demonstrated a 13.4% growth (after a–1.3% of recession during 2015), in 2017, this figure was only 3.8%. Moreover, the improvements

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots …

227

in the economic performance did not transfer into the improvement of social indicators. Thus, after slight decrease in 2016, by 2018, the rate of unemployment returned to the level of 12.5% (based on official reports). The depreciation of Iran’s currency continued. This process was accompanied by a gradual decrease in the purchasing power of Iranian households and high rates of consumer prices growth. Thus, during 2015–2017, the growth rates of food prices could reach up to 20% on selected products. The wide gap between the richest and poorest layers of population remained unchanged as well as the share of population attributed to the low-income strata (Abdallahi 1397: 4–6). Iranian youth remained most socially vulnerable with the level of unemployment among them estimated in up to 40%.5 The adoption of the JCPOA also clearly demonstrated that it would be wrong to blame only sanctions for all misfortunes of the Iranian economy. Thus, the structural problems of Iran’s economy should be considered among other key factors that did not allow the country to develop during the short period when the international sanctions were partly lifted. The dominating role of the government in the Iranian economy, high administrative costs, substantial volume of the grey sector of Iran’s economy together with the low effectiveness of the private sector, underdevelopment of the market mechanisms accompanied by protectionist policies that created artificial favorable conditions for Iranian producers are among the list of those problems that continued to negatively affect the development of Iran after the sanctions were lifted. The need for deep structural economic reforms existed in Iran for a long time including the need to further cut the economically unjustifiable large social programs that annually consumed up to 80 bn dollars of the country’s budget (Abdallahi 1397: 4–6). Declaring the protection of oppressed (mostazafin) as one of the main tasks of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers turned populism in one of the main leverages of their domestic policy as well as they made the Islamic authorities eternally dependent on the support of the lower classes. This decision made the ruling regime in Iran extremely durable. At the same time, such social policies had a number of negative economic implications. First, the Iranian authorities were compelled to buy the loyalty of their supporters, and, since 1979, one of the main measures used by the government to ensure the support of the lower layers of the urban population was consumer subsidies and providing cheap basic products. As a result, during the last four decades, the Iranian authorities created an intricate system which allowed them to influence and control the process of imports, production and distribution of main consumer goods. However, the creation of this system resulted in a heavy burden on the budget of the country. Subsidies and extensive social programs were ‘consuming’ those financial assets that could be used to develop the economy. On the other hand, this system turned the government to the main (if not the only) instrument regulating relations between producers, importers, retailers and consumers as well as it almost completely excluded the market economy mechanisms from this process. Subsequently, state involvement, limited market freedom and lack of market competitiveness became one of the curses of the Iranian business environment that suppresses private initiative and discourage foreign investments. 5

Interviews with Iranian economists. October 2018. Tehran.

228

N. Kozhanov

A significant role in exacerbating the Iranian economic problems was also played by the banking regulations. Sole reliance on the ideas of the Islamic economics and ban on the Western models of banking have forced Iranian banks to choose a particular path for development. After the Islamic revolution of 1979, financial sector of the Iranian economy, as well as all of Iranian social activities, were brought in line with requirements of the Quran. Firstly, a strict ban was imposed on the use of interest rates in their traditional meaning. Instead, banks were bound to take part in projects of their borrowers, sharing with them not only profits but also risks. As a result, Iranian financial institutions largely lost interest in the development of loans and became vulnerable to systemic fluctuations of the Iranian economy. Governmental control, lack of competition and seclusion from the outside world all have led to stagnation in the banking system of Iran and weakened its role in the national economic development. Involuntary full-scale participation of Iranian banks in projects of their clients has caused another major drawback of Iran’s banking system. The country’s financial institutions turned into a kind of “state within a state”, mainly providing money to commercial firms affiliated with them. This, in turn, led to a lack of incentives for Iranian banks to find and retain customers as Iranian banks are actually involved in economic, rather than financial activities. In spite of the obvious need for economic reforms, it was, and still is, difficult to implement them in Iran. On the one hand, the reforms of the banking sector and social programs would inevitably go against some ideological principles of the ruling political system in Iran that declared the protection of the social and economic interests of low-income strata of the population one of its key priorities as well as the incorporation of Islamic elements into the management of the country. On the other hand, the Iranian leadership tried to avoid any reforms that could negatively affect the socio-economic situation while the country was experiencing substantial external pressures. Under these circumstances, the adoption of the JCPOA and, at least, partial ease of the sanctions regime, gave the authorities a window of opportunities to bring certain changes in the economy while the country did not experience heavy economic pressures from abroad. Unfortunately, these opportunities were missed with Trump’s decision to leave the JCPOA in May 2018. After the reintroduction of sanctions, the situation in Iran and its economy quickly returned to the pre-2015 stage making the country’s leadership less decisive to bring any structural changes. Moreover, the US exit from the JCPOA strengthened the positions of the conservative forces of the Iranian elite that are not inclined to bring any changes that might question the ideological pillars of the Islamic Republic. The rise of Trump as a new president of the US and his decision to leave the JCPOA instead of lifting the remaining sanctions put the Iranian society in the deep apathy. This feeling was shared by all levels of the Iranian society. However, each stratum had its own reasons for this. The apathy of the low layers of population was determined by the deteriorating socio-economic situation. Interestingly, the macroeconomic performance of the country was not bad. Moreover, in 2016–2017, Rouhani managed to ensure certain growth of the GDP whereas the level of unemployment and inflation cannot be characterized as catastrophic if compared to what was happening in other countries of the region. Yet, the economic development has not led to the

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots …

229

improvement of social parameters of life in Iran. Moreover, according to the local experts, the social disparity and the gap between rich and poor people only widened.6 The purchasing power of the population also decreased. In order to curb the inflation, the government allowed the banks to use high interest rates, imposed artificial limits on cash withdrawals in the banks and money transfers within the country’s banking system. The government also controlled both the exchange rates and the volume of foreign currency available for population. By 2018, the rial was believed to be overpriced (at least by 1/4).7 In February 2018, USD1 was traded at the rate of 44,000 rials (47,000 at the black market). Local analysts reported that the gray and black sectors of the economy were again growing.8 All of these factors caused dissatisfaction of the population. This feeling was also aggravated by the unmet expectations: Rouhani was believed to cancel sanctions and bring socio-economic prosperity to Iran. Yet, this never happened. In addition, the intention of Rouhani’s cabinet to cut some of direct and indirect subsidies in 2018–2019 did not add him popularity. By 2018, the disappointment had not yet reached the level necessary to cause revolutionary explosion. However, serious protests took place culminating in a week of protest around the country in the late December 2017–early January 2018 (for more detail on them see the next section of this chapter). As a matter of fact, in the early 2018, Iran was simmering on the low fire: small demonstrations and protests caused by the bankruptcy of local banks and factories happened on a daily basis.9 The apathy of the mid-class was caused by the mixture of economic and political factors. The mid-class was obviously disappointed by the inability of Rouhani to deliver his promises on the liberalization of the market and the struggle against the dominance of the IRGC people in the economy. However, the main reason for the apathy of the mid-class was related to the political situation in the country. Irrelatively to their political views, people believed that Rouhani was a political dead man walking after failing to reach those goals he set at the beginning of his presidency.10 His popularity was falling. He failed to bring substantial changes (although some social freedoms were introduced) and, thus, discredited the reformist/pragmatics movement. Consequently, the mid-class was persuaded that the next president would be from the conservative camp. In order to confirm their predictions, local analysts referred to the change of moods/preferences among Iranian politicians: after the short period of fashion on liberal and reformist ideas (immediately after the JCPOA was signed) it again became popular to demonstrate loyalty to the conservative-centrists 6

Multiple interviews with Iranian experts on Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Tehran. October 2017, March 2018. 7 Multiple interviews with Iranian experts on Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Tehran. October 2017, March 2018. 8 Multiple interviews with Iranian experts on Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Tehran. October 2017, March 2018. 9 Multiple interviews with Iranian experts on Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Tehran. October 2017, March 2018. 10 Multiple interviews with Iranian experts on Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Tehran. October 2017, March 2018.

230

N. Kozhanov

ideas. By changing camps, Iranian politicians were preparing for the return of conservatives to power. According to some experts, this trend affected not only the political ‘swamp’ of Iran (MPs, young politicians and the politicians of the second echelon), but serious players.11 Finally, the mid-class believed in inevitable social explosion. While these concerns were exaggerated, the mid-class people in Iran were seriously scared by the January 2018 demonstrations.12 They argued that the driving force of these demonstrations was the low layers of population who demanded the real revolution. The members of ‘Green Movement’ openly told to the author that ‘we did not support the January meetings as, in 2009, we were after regime’s transformation within the existing ideological framework. However, the current protestors wanted the Islamic republic to be overthrown’.13 The upper class and ruling elite seemed to believe that the country was stacked in limbo.14 The elite did not expect any serious social uprisings and believed that the country’s economy would avoid any serious collapse. Yet, no political or economic improvements were expected. In other words, the elite and its experts predicted that, under the current circumstances, Iran would continue surviving as it was doing during the previous 10–12 years, but without any prospects for the better life and improvement. By 2019, the Iranian leadership was preparing itself for the new and long period of life under the restored US sanctions that were expected to further damage the Iranian economy. Thus, in October 2018, Rouhani openly acknowledged that the stabilization and subsequent improvement of the economic situation in the country was only possible in a long-term perspective (Mesamed 2018). Trump’s policies toward Iran and his attempts to bind the sanctions’ lifting with the issues not related to the nuclear dossier (such as Tehran’s Middle East policies) clearly proved to the leadership of the country that the main driver behind the current round of sanctions was not international concerns with Iran’s nuclear program but old tensions with the United States. Under these circumstances, Iran was ready to continue confrontation with the US as long as the American side poses demands that the Iranian leadership considers humiliating. On October 4, 2018, when addressing the members of the military establishment of Iran, Khamenei put an end to the discussion on the possibility to provide certain concessions to the US in the dispute over the JCPOA by calling people who think positively about it as ‘traitors’ (Khamenei 1397b: 1, 6). Thus, de-facto outlawed anyone who doubts necessity to confront the American pressure and expressed his confidence that the country would be able to survive the new round of the economic war with the US. 11

Multiple interviews with Iranian experts on Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Tehran. October 2017, March 2018. 12 Multiple interviews with Iranian experts on Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Tehran. October 2017, March 2018. 13 Multiple interviews with Iranian experts on Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Tehran. October 2017, March 2018. 14 Multiple interviews with Iranian experts on Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Tehran. October 2017, March 2018.

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots …

231

Iran’s Protests of 2017–2018 The quasi-revolutionary protests that took place in late December 2017–early January 2018 could not be formally considered a direct result of Western sanctions. Yet, they opened a new page in the story of the protest movement in the country. The main reasons that provoked the protests were the economic issues and intra-elite intrigues. The socio-economic situation in Iran at the end of 2017 was not easy. Although Iran’s GDP had been growing for the second year in a row, these successes had little impact on the social sphere. Unemployment, which decreased in 2016, increased again in 2017 and reached 12.5% (according to official data). The Iranian rial was gradually depreciating, the purchasing power of the population was decreasing, and prices for consumer goods were also rising (for food–up to 20% per year). There remained a significant gap between the incomes of rich and poor segments of the population, and the poor included, according to various estimates, from 40 to 60% of Iranians. Iranian youth was particularly vulnerable, with the unemployment rate among them, according to various estimates, ranging from 20 to 40%. But the socio-economic difficulties themselves would not be enough to cause protests. In past years, Iran already faced a shortage or rise in the price of rice, poultry, vegetables and fruits, but this did not always result in mass protests. Negative socioeconomic indicators did not lead to protests either: high unemployment and inequality remain the main characteristics of the Iranian economy in the last few decades. Moreover, they were not so bad under the Rouhani government. For comparison: in 2009, on the eve of revolutionary mass protests of the Green Movement, only according to official data of the Iranian Central Bank, inflation was 23.6% (against 9–12% in 2017), and consumer price growth was 15% per year (against 12–13% in 2017). It was annoying, but it was not the main factor that brought people to the streets. In 2009, in order for the riots to begin, suspicions of the rigged results of the presidential elections were required. Moreover, Iran’s economic performance when compared with that of the region was not so bad. According to the World Bank, unemployment in the country was close to the average level in the Middle East: in Turkey, 11% unemployment in 2016 did not interfere much with the government’s life. In the case of Iran, domestic political intrigues and unfounded hopes played a role in the beginning of the protests. The Iranian leadership had been promising prosperity to the population for a very long time, referring to the fact that the lifting of sanctions imposed in 2006–2012 would finally lead to the prosperity of the country. Thus, the authorities refused to admit that the structure itself was primarily to blame for the troubles of the Iranian economy. By 2018, the Iranian economic management system was failing to deliver these promises, which were not related to sanctions, but to the state’s unlimited rights to interfere in business affairs, with the dominance of the public sector in the country’s economy, with low production efficiency, living in hothouse conditions of strict protectionism. The Iranian budget remained heavily dependent on the receipt of petrodollars and was overloaded with bloated social programs, and the country’s economic development was hampered by a high level

232

N. Kozhanov

of corruption, significant administrative costs, as well as elements of the so-called Islamic economy. The lack of favorable conditions for the development of the private sector and poor management only complemented the picture. The situation could be improved by full-fledged structural reforms, which no Iranian administration dared to undertake. Instead, for the last ten years, the country’s leaders have been repeating that sanctions are to blame for all the troubles. In 2015– 2016, after the conclusion of the nuclear deal, sanctions were partially lifted, but there was no immediate improvement in the life of the population–for obvious reasons–it disappointed the expectations of ordinary people who believed the promises. The political elite of the country saw people’s disappointment and tried to use it in their internal struggle. Thus, the supporters of the than president Rouhani were actively trying to undermine the positions of religious foundations and the IRGC in the economic and political life of Iran. In early December 2017, they again attacked these structures with criticism, publicly pointing out that the security forces, despite the economic crisis, were trying to deflect the amount of funds allocated to them in the budget for 2018. In response, the conservatives tried to cause mass protests against Rouhani to remind him that he was not as popular among the people as he thought. To do this, they accused Rouhani of the failure of economic policy and the impoverishment of the population. The first protests in Meshed were provoked, according to one version, by the speeches of ayatollah Alamolkhoda, a conservative cleric associated with the country’s supreme leader Khamenei, and a relative of the then head of one of the largest religious foundations (Astan-e Quds-e Razavi) Raisi who lost during the 2017 Iran’s presidential elections to Rouhani. Having provoked the protests, the conservatives quickly lost control over them. Thousands of protesters began to take to the streets all over Iran with a variety of demands. The January demonstrations became a new phenomenon in the rich history of Iranian protests. Unlike in 2009, when the dispute was over the results of the presidential election, now the protesters have put forward a whole set of claims to the authorities: from economic demands to calls for a change of system. The social base of the discontented has also expanded: if in 2009 the middle class, intelligentsia and students protested, now they have been joined by workers and people from the grassroots-the traditional support of the ruling regime. The activity of various unions and professional associations increased. The geography of the protest was also wider: about 70–80 settlements, including not only large cities, but also quiet small settlements and villages, previously considered pro-regime. However, some qualitative changes still did not lead to the emergence of a fullblooded revolutionary protest movement. According to official data, no more than 42 thousand people took to the streets. Most likely, there were more of them, but even if we believe reasonable unofficial estimates, it turned out to be little for an 80million-strong country. Although the January 2018 protests were the largest since 2009, they only were protests of tens of thousands, not millions, as nine years ago. And these people did not represent an organized force. The reasons that contributed to the amorphousness and disorganization of the protesters have yet to be sorted out, but it seems that several factors played a role at once.

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots …

233

Firstly, the initial impetus for the protests was provocation, not a natural explosion, that showed that the situation in the country was not ripe for a serious revolutionary protest yet. Secondly, the Iranian opposition had no leader or anyone who could claim his place. There were no charismatic figures among the Iranian reformers either: after the death of Hashemi Rafsanjani in January 2017, this place remains vacant. Attempts to make Rouhani the new leader of the reform camp failed, and he himself clearly did not want to be so closely associated with the late politician—amid the protests, he actively avoided participating in events dedicated to the memory of Hashemi Rafsanjani. Thirdly, the situation in the Middle East as a whole helped the Iranian authorities. The example of Syria, Egypt and Libya, where attempts to demand changes from the regime did not lead to anything good, cooled many hotheads in Iran. Finally, the authorities were determined to fight the protests. Since 2009, they had done extensive and very effective work to defeat the Green Movement. Past experience was taken into account: the street protests of 2018 were suppressed quickly and harshly (especially since the protests of ordinary people in the province are always less visible, which means that the costs of suppression are less). And yet the January 2018 demonstrations were not in vain. They sent a serious signal to the country’s leadership that there are problems in the state, people are aware of them and they need to be solved. The stability of the Iranian regime always rested on the readiness of the top leadership, if necessary, to use force against those who pose a threat to the existing system, and to purge their own ranks. To do this, a significant punitive apparatus was created in Iran, including the army, police and the IRGC.

New Waves of Protests in Iran Sanctions’ revival became a serious stress-test for the durability of the Iranian regime. Basically, since 2018 and until now, the country is living in the situation of simmering protest actions that occasionally erupts into greater protest actions. After 2018 protests and until 2021 unrest caused by the growing water supplies issues in the country, the November 2019 protests were among most prominent and notorious as they were directly caused by the Iranian government actions to counter the negative impact of sanctions on the economy. The protests were initially sparked by the Iranian government’s sudden decision to raise fuel prices and made clear the country’s fragile socio-economic and political situation. These events left little doubt as to the extent of the negative impact of U.S. sanctions. Since Trump’s decision to reimpose sanctions on Iran and deprive it of access to the international banking system and financial and oil markets, the country’s economic situation has been steadily deteriorating. Sanctions and internal structural problems led to a situation where, by the end of 2019, Iran’s economic growth rate fell below negative 9% (DW 2019). Meanwhile, high unemployment rates, 35% inflation, and

234

N. Kozhanov

a 63% increase in annual food prices created an environment ripe for political turbulence. It was only a matter of time before people took to the streets. Consequently, when deciding to raise fuel prices, Iranian authorities were well aware that protests were likely. The Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that since late 2017, there were a number of protests each month “about such issues as deteriorating economic conditions, environmental degradation, and political grievances” (Jones 2019). Being deprived of access to the global oil market, Iran had to cut its huge social programs, which were ensuring the loyalty of the lower-income strata of society and, consequently, the very survival of the regime that has been in power for four decades (in 2017–18 fiscal year Tehran spent up to 1.6% of its GDP to support low fuel prices). On November 17, 2019, during a cabinet meeting, president Rouhani openly recognized that to provide the adequate support to the low-income layers of the Iranian population the country should restructure and partially cut subsidies (National Interest 2019). During a November 27, 2019, speech, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei recognized that the unrest (or, as he called it, “the plot”) was “broad and very dangerous.” Indeed, the government undertook a series of unprecedented measures to suppress the protests, including completely cutting off the country from international internet traffic. Nevertheless, while the unrests demonstrated the fragility of the socio-political situation in the country they also demonstrated to its leadership that, so far, it still can manage the crisis. First of all, the Iranian authorities obviously developed tools to manage unrest, using a combination of repression by security forces and information control. This made it difficult for protests to ever evolve into a full-scale revolt. And in addition to coercion, Iran has also applied targeted populist measures to dampen unrest, showing the lessons of 2018 were learnt. On November 17, 2019 Rouhani signed a decree to pay compensation to citizens who had suffered as a result of the recent increase in fuel prices. After initially taking a harsh approach toward protestors (especially in regions populated by ethnic minorities such as Kurds), Iranian authorities later switched tactics and tried to allay the population’s concerns, promising to reconsider aspects of the fuel price hike (for instance, by providing cheap gasoline to drivers responsible for delivering consumer goods). In addition, the very nature of the 2019 protests prevented them from evolving into something bigger. They partly repeated the scenario of 2018: though large in terms of geographical scale– protests have been held in up to 100 cities, towns, and villages–the protests have still been limited in terms of the numbers of participants and have lacked united leadership and coordination. Most of the protestors came to the streets driven by economic considerations, while demands for regime change were voiced only by a very limited few. Finally, the Iranian political elite was largely united in its decision to support the fuel price increase and counter the protests, as opposed to the 2017–18 protests, when the initial unrest was caused by a confrontation between Rouhani and his opponents from the conservative camp. This time, the president had Khamenei’s full backing. The supreme leader spoke in support of the current austerity measures, which were

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots …

235

eventually approved by the Supreme Council of Economic Coordination, a group he created in June 2018 to make emergency economic decisions to deal with the negative impact of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s economy. Of course, Rouhani and his “reformist” allies carried on their shoulders the brunt of the political backlash. As a result, during the 2020 parliamentary elections, Iran’s hardline conservatives managed to regain the seats in the parliament they lost in 2016. Moreover, it should not be discounted that there are two levels of impact on the economy: ● Immediate and direct impact. ● Long-term cumulative impact whereby results become obvious over time, but the effect is usually much stronger than that of the immediate impact. Sanctions boost the inflation, depreciate the national currency and push the consumer price growth. However, this is manageable given the experience of Iran to handle these problems in the past. The second impact level is much more dangerous for the Iranian economy as it will last longer and might not be visible at the beginning (usually, it takes years before the influence of this level becomes evident). At this stage, sanctions harm the very basement of Iran’s economy such as its ability to develop the production base, draw foreign investments, use long-term foreign bank loans and enter new markets. More importantly, as was demonstrated before, this impact will not disappear immediately if and when sanctions are lifted: the backlog in the development of certain industries will remain for years to come as a result of Iran being deprived of access to new equipment and technologies. Right now, Iran is still living through the first wave of the sanctions impact using the previous experience of counteraction to the sanctions of 2006–2012. And, in general, if not the outbreak of Coronavirus, Iran would already be able to cope with the first and immediate impact of sanctions on its economy. Thus, according to the IMF data, in 2018 and 2019, the country’s economy shrank by 6% and 6.8%, respectively, demonstrating minimal positive growth trends in 2020 (+1.5% according to the IMF and +0.7% according to independent consulting companies). The latter, however, was largely determined by the growth in oil prices and the volume of Iranian oil exports (Iran Premier 2021). The US was unable to completely cut Iran from the global oil market. The drop in the oil incomes of the budget was compensated by other sources. Thus, the depreciation of rial during the autumn of 2018 already boosted the incomes of Iran’s exporters, including that of non-oil sectors. This, in turn, will bring additional money to the budget. Apart from that, the Iranian authorities managed to maintain the share of taxes in the budget income. Moreover, the effectiveness of tax collection already substantially improved: the share of taxes in Iran’s budget has been growing since 2012. The self-sufficiency strategy brought positive results, as well. While oil, gas, petrochemical sectors and automobile manufacturing (as dependent on the imports of spare parts and raw materials) were inevitably the victims of sanctions, the external economic pressure and the fall of national currency have not hurt that much those sectors of economy that secure the basic needs of people in food, fuel and clothes.

236

N. Kozhanov

Moreover, the failure of Rouhani to ensure the economic development together with the fall of the JCPOA brought the chances of the reformist camp to ensure the victory of its candidate in the 2021 presidential elections at zero. Yet, the task of countering economic sanctions impact will still remain one of the main priorities of conservative Ebrahim Raisi who replaced Rouhani at the president seat in 2021. The second wave of the sanctions negative impact is coming. Meanwhile, the economy remains one of the key factors ensuring the survival of the Iranian political system. From the 1980s, the regime has been relying on the broad social base of support among the low layers of the Iranian population by buying their loyalty through an intricate system of direct and indirect subsidies. Yet, over time, these subsidies have become a heavy burden for the state budget, although, for the last decade, the Iranian government several times tried to reduce it. By 2020, only the volume of energy subsidies was estimated as $75–80 billion, being considered among the highest in the Gulf region (Mohseni-Cheraghlou 2019). The Iranian economy that suffers from economic sanctions, limited sources of budget income and innate structural problems is less and less able to bear this burden, thus, demanding from the country’s leadership to restructure the subsidies system in order to boost economic development while preserving regime’s capacities to buy people’s loyalty. Second, the current economic policies of Iran are aimed at building the so-called “resistance economy”, a partially self-sufficient economic system with a strong state presence and task to ensure the survival of the country in the unfriendly environment. For now, this system copes with its main goal: in spite of the severe 2018–2020 sanctions and the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Iranian economy managed to survive and even convince the country’s leadership in its durability. This inevitably affected Iran’s positions at the nuclear negotiations in Vienna, where its representatives, although interested in lifting sanctions, could afford taking extra time to bargain maximum possible preferences for their country. However, the price of the “resistance economy” success was high: for a number of reasons such a model is able to ensure the economy’s survival, but not sustainable and active development, accompanied by improvement in social indicators. Meanwhile, by 2021, the annual inflation rate was estimated at 36% (with the prospect of further increase in 2021–2022), and the unemployment rate stood at 10–12% with at least 33% of the population living below the poverty line (Bazoobandi 2020). It is not surprising that occasional local unrest caused by popular dissatisfaction with the economic situation in the country became an inseparable part of the Iranian realities. Under these circumstances, the further implementation of the “resistance economy” model can seriously backfire not only through the deepening of the development backlog between Iran and other countries, but also by adding to people dissatisfaction with the country’s leadership. Finally, the need for Raisi to delve into Iran’s economic problems is also determined by purely political motives. The conservative circles have long been criticizing their moderate opponents for inability to ensure not only economic growth, but also improvement of life standards. Now, it is the turn of the conservatives to try to ensure the socially-oriented development of the country. It is extremely important for them to meet the expectations of the population. On the one hand, the failure of

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots …

237

both reformers and conservatives to achieve any kind of sustainable socio-economic prosperity can further undermine people’s faith in the existing political model and its potential to deliver promises of the bright future. On the other hand, success in handling such a difficult issue as Iran’s economic development would further legitimize Raisi’s potential claims to the post of the third Supreme Leader, thus, becoming a successfully passed exam for his ability to manage the economy of the country. These economic considerations will undoubtedly determine a number of steps by the new president at the domestic track. During the next couple of years, Raisi’s actions are likely to be somewhat reactive and driven by inertia. First, the new president has very limited experience in the economic management. Judging by his statements, he will try to avoid innovations getting focused on the experience of his predecessors (Esfandiari 2021). In practice, this means further reliance on the “economy of resistance” model. Secondly, the partial lifting of sanctions that is likely to occur soon will provide a much needed but temporary positive dynamics of the main economic indicators, making the government postpone any new programs to ensure sustainable development “for later”. Finally, positive economic trends (2–3% of GDP for 2021 and possibly even in 2022) could also be guaranteed by the possible gradual recovery of the world economy from the pandemic making Raisi believe that old economic strategies are still working (though the looming global crisis may well undermine all this). However, this period will only be a temporary break before Iran will again face the inevitable need to revise its economic course. According to the experience of the 2015–2018 period, when the economic pressure on the country was partially relaxed, the positive effect of sanctions lifting on Iran’s main economic trends has temporary nature, unless it is supported by additional steps aimed at boosting sustainable development in favorable economic environment. Last time, Iran failed to ensure this. Moreover, at the current stage, it is hard to expect that the restoration of the JCPOA will put an end to all sanctions, and Iran’s difficulties with access to new technologies and international financial system will remain. So does the negative effect of the lifted sanctions on Iran’s economy: in spite of their removal, Iran will be unable to immediately get rid of the image of a country “toxic” for doing business. Meanwhile technological backlog from the global economic leaders created by the sanctions will make the volume and cost of foreign investment required to overcome this gap huge. What’s more important, the lifting of sanctions will not solve the traditional Iranian problems associated with excessive state interference in the country’s economy, inefficiency of Iran’s financial system, underdevelopment of market institutions and private sector, huge size of “grey” and “black” sectors of the economy, cronyism, clientelism and corruption. Also, if existing economic policies are to be preserved, the lifting of sanctions may create the same trap for the Raisi government that his predecessor, Hassan Rouhani, fell into. In 2015–2016, the easing of external pressure on the country’s economy led to economic growth. Yet, this growth failed to transform into improvement of social conditions. Sanctions relief only enriched the top of society, further deepening social stratification in Iran and creating irritation with the moderate Rouhani cabinet.

238

N. Kozhanov

Under these circumstances, in a few years (most probably, by 2023), the conservative government of Raisi will simply be forced to develop a new economic policy, which will inevitably have to be based on more liberal principles, as well as to promote socially oriented economic growth (including the encouraging of employment and income growth in exchange for reduction of indirect subsidies). However, the adoption of such programs will be directly related to the revision of a number of economic principles that are closely related to the regime’s ideological norms. And that’s where lots will depend not only on the president himself, but also on the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, whose efforts brought Raisi to the post of president of the country.

Conclusion In spite of all the negative forecasts, Iran appears to be able to stand up to the new round of US sanctions. The revolutionary protest potential that exists in the Iranian society is still far from becoming critical for the survival of the existing political regime. The failure of sanctions to undermine its foundations is determined by a number of factors, mostly connected to the realities of a sanctioned country. Among the most important of these it is possible to distinguish the following: 1. The resilience of the Iranian economy that is broken but not shattered; 2. The ability of the Iranian government to use efficiently repressive measures which exist at its disposal to guarantee the loyalty of the population and suppress the opposition which could attempt to exploit the imposed sanctions as another pretext to criticize the central authorities; 3. The capacities of Iran’s regime to buy the loyalty of the population using the system of incentive measures (for example, through the direct or indirect subsidies given to the low-classes); 4. The low will of the domestic opposition to support the sanctions and use the opportunities given by the punitive measures as a political leverage to undermine the positions of the government and to improve its own. The durability of the Iranian regime is secured not only by a strong repression apparatus, but also by its willingness to work on mistakes. Having suppressed the revolutionary protest Green Movement after the 2009 elections, the Iranian authorities tried to gradually remove the annoying factors that led to a surge of discontent (including former President Ahmadinejad), and also made certain socio-economic concessions. The mass protests that have been taking place in Iran over the past few years have clearly shown that the main threat to the stability of the Iranian regime comes not from sanctions, but from inside the country—from problems in the economy and domestic political intrigues. The socio-economic situation in Iran over the past ten years has been difficult. However, the socio-economic difficulties themselves would not be enough to cause protests. In past years, Iran has already faced a shortage or rise in the price of

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots …

239

rice, chickens, and rising prices for vegetables and fruits, but this did not result in mass protests. Negative socio-economic indicators did not lead to protests either: high unemployment and social stratification remain the main characteristics of the Iranian economy in the last few decades. Moreover, they were not so bad under the Rouhani government. In the case of Iran, domestic political intrigues and unfounded hopes played a role in the beginning of the protests. The Iranian leadership has been promising prosperity to the population for a very long time, referring to the fact that the lifting of sanctions imposed in 2006–2012 will finally lead to the prosperity of the country. Thus, the authorities refused to admit that the structure itself was primarily to blame for the troubles of the Iranian economy. By 2020, the Iranian economic management system was failing, which was not related to sanctions, but to the state’s unlimited rights to interfere in business affairs, to the dominance of the public sector in the country’s economy, to low production efficiency of the Iranian economy living in hothouse conditions of strict protectionism. The Iranian budget is heavily dependent on the receipt of petrodollars and is overloaded with bloated social programs, and the country’s economic development is hampered by a high level of corruption, significant administrative costs, as well as elements of the so-called Islamic economy. The lack of favorable conditions for the development of the private sector and poor management only complemented the picture. The situation could be improved by full-fledged structural reforms, which no Iranian administration has dared to undertake. Instead, for the last ten years, the country’s leaders have been repeating that sanctions are to blame for all the troubles. In 2015–2016, after the conclusion of the nuclear deal, sanctions were partially lifted, but there was no immediate improvement in the life of the population—for obvious reasons—it deceived the expectations of ordinary people who believed the promises. The political elite of the country caught the disappointment and tried to use it in their internal struggle, which is now going in several directions.

References Abdallahi MR (1397) Tahlil-i Tahavvolat-i Akhir-i Eqtesad-i Iran. Markaz-e pazhukheshkha-ye majles-e shoura-ye eslami, Tehran AFP (2010) Sanctions most ridiculous act against Iran: Ahmadinejad. AFP 31(10):2010 A1-Arabiya (2010) Iran “always Ready” for nuclear talks: Ahmadinejad. A1-Arabiya 18.11.2010. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/11/18/126484.html Azad S (2010) The Politics of privatization in iran. Middle East Rev Int Affairs 4(4):60–71 Bazoobandi S (2020) Deepening poverty threatens the social contract in iran. The AGSIW 22.10.2020. https://agsiw.org/deepening-poverty-threatens-the-social-contract-in-iran/ Chaudhuri PP (2012) Iran’s oil for rupee program. Rhgroup 06.02.2012. http://rhgroup.net/intera ctive/iran-oil-desk.php Clawson P (2010) Much traction from measured steps. The Iranian Opposition, the Nuclear Issue, and the West. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington

240

N. Kozhanov

Clawson P (2013) Iran beyond Oil? Policy watch 2062. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/view/iran-beyond-oil Daragahi B (2010) Iranian officials call latest US sanctions desperate. The Los-Angeles Times 01.10.2010. http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/01/world/la-fg-iran-sanctions-20101002 Dehghan S (2010) Iran sanctions strengthen ahmadinejad regime – kharroubi. The Guardian 11.08.2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/11/iran-elections-mehdi-kar roubi-interview DW (2019) Iran’s economy plummets under weight of sanctions. DW 23.10.2019. https://www.dw. com/en/irans-economy-plummets-under-weight-of-sanctions/a-50950471 Econews Ir (1389a) Juziyat-i Trarkh-i Zarbati-i Benzin E’lam Shod. Econews.Ir. 27.06.1389 Econews Ir (1389b) Sahmiye-i Benzin-i Mehrmah 60 Litr Taain Shod. Econews.Ir 24.06.1389. http://www.econews.ir/fa/NewsContent.aspx?id=140305 Economist (2011) Iran’s struggle. The regime tightens its belts and fists. The Economist 15.01.2011. http://www.economist.com/node/17900396?story_id=17900396 Erdbrink T (2009) Iranian opposition warns against stricter sanctions. The Washington Post 01.10.2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/30/AR2009 093004244_pf.html Erdbrink T (2010) Transcript of interview with ahmadinejad adviser mojtaba samareh hashemi. The Washington Post 23.11.2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/ 23/AR2010112305058.html Esfandiari G (2021) Meet the new Boss. Radio Free Europe 19.06.2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/ iran-raisi-own-words/31316225.html Fars News Agency (2010a) Oil minister: Iran to export gasoline in 3 years. Fars News Agency 28(07):2010 Fars News Agency (2010b) MP: punishment waiting for supporters of US sanctions against iran. Fars News Agency 10(08):2010 Faucon B, Fassihi F (2010) Sanctions force a retreat in Iran. The Wall Street Journal 17.07.2010. http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZW20100717000012/?relcontent=ZAWYA2 0101221053136 Financial Tribune (2017) Budget’s oil dependence declines to 30%. The Financial Tribune 25.04.2017. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/63082/budget-soil-dependence-declines-to-30 Guardian (2012a) Iran currency crisis sparks Tehran street clashes. The Guardian 03.10.2012. https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2012a/oct/03/iran-currency-crisis-tehran-clashes Guardian (2012b) Reports of street protests in iran due to soaring price of chicken. The Guardian 23.07.2012. https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2012b/jul/23/street-protests-iran-chi cken Houser T (2012) Iran’s food supply gets pinched. EconoMonitor 13.02.2012. http://www.econom onitor.com/piie/2012/02/13/iran%E2%80%99s-food-supply-gets-pinched/ . Iran Investment Monthly (2011) Special report: subsidies plan reform. Iran investment monthly 52 Iran Project (2019) Non-oil exports leaving Sanctions behind. Iran Project 18.03.2019. https://the iranproject.com/blog/2019/03/18/non-oil-exports-leaving-sanctions-behind/ Iran Premier (2021) IMF: Iran’s economy grew in 2020. Iran Premier 21.04.2021. https://iranpr imer.usip.org/blog/2021/apr/21/imf-iran%E2%80%99s-economy-grew-2020 Iran Times International (2010) Chamber chief: sanctions add 15–30% to import cost. Iran times Int 05(11):2010 Jones S (2019) Iran’s protests and the threat to domestic stability. CSIS, Washington Katzman K (2010) Iran Sanctions. Congressional Research Center, Washington Khamenei A (1397a) Amrika chehel sal mglub-i jumkhuri-i eslami-i iran shode-ast. arman-i emruz 13 Aban 1397 Khamenei A (1397b) Mardam tahrimha-ra shekast midehand. Arman-i Emruz 14 Mehr 1397 Khanlu M (1386) Pardakhte 52,4 khezar milyard rial yaranei kalahae asasi dar sale 1386. Barnameh 204

Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Roots …

241

LaFranchi H (2010) Dissidents say iran nuclear sanctions are helping Ahmadinejad. The Christian Science Monitor 12.08.2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/0812/Dissid ents-say-Iran-nuclear-sanctions-are-helping-Ahmadinejad?sms_ss=email Mansourian H (2010) The human cost of sanctions on iran. muftah 03.11.2010. http://muftah.org/? p=403 Mattair TR (2010) The United States and Iran: diplomacy, sanctions and war. Middle East Policy 17(2) Mesamed V (2018) O Prichinakh Zabastovok v Irane. Institut Blizhnego Vostoka 17.10.2018. http:// www.iimes.ru/?p=48884#more-48884 Mohammadkhani H (1388) Taasir-i Mostaqim-i Afzayesh-i Qeymat-i Hamleha-i Enerji bar Khazinekha-i Toulid-i Mahsulat-i Sanat va Haml-o-naql. Tehran Mohammadkhani M (1389) Sahm-i Masraf-i Yaraneha-i Enerji dar Bakhshha-i Mokhtaklef. Tehran Mohseni-Cheraghlou A (2019) Déjà vu all Over again: the three “I”s of gasoline subsidies and social unrest in Iran. The MEI 25.11.2019. https://www.mei.edu/publications/deja-vu-all-overagain-three-gasoline-subsidies-and-social-unrest-iran Nasseri L (2010) Iran opposition struggles as ahmadinejad gets boost. Bloomberg 09.06.2010. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-08/iran-opposition-struggles-as-nuclear-sanctionswrangle-boosts-ahmadinejad.html National Interest (2019) A gift to Donald Trump? The National Interest 23.11.2019. https://nation alinterest.org/blog/buzz/gift-donald-trump-irans-fuel-price-hike-costing-it-dearly-98957 Ottolenghi E (2010) Iran. The looming crisis. Profile Books, London PressTV (2010a) Iran VP: sanctions done away with. Press TV 22.10.2010. http://www.presstv.ir/ detail/147775.html PressTV (2010b) Iran’s medicine production growing. Press TV 26.09.2010. http://www.presstv.ir/ detail/144089.html PressTV (2010c) Sanctions not affecting Iran relations. Press TV 18.10.2010. http://www.presstv. ir/detail/147218.html PressTV (2010d) Sanctions sped Iran’s self-sufficiency. Press TV. 28.10.2010. http://www.presstv. ir/detail/148627.html Reuters (2010) Sanctions can’t bring democracy to Iran, Boost Government: Karroubi. Reuters 12.08.2010. http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=62504 Shayerah I (2010) Iran’s economic conditions: US policy issues. Congressional Research Center, Washington Szorm C (2010) Structural patronage in Iran. Implications of Subsidies Reform for Iran and US Policy, Washington Tehran Times (2010) Iranian economy booming despite sanctions: Ahmadinejad. The Tehran Times 24.11.2010. http://www.tehrantimes.com/Index_view.asp?code=230867 Thaler D, Nader A (2010) Mullahs, guards, and bonyads. RAND, Washington Tisdall S (2009) Rafsanjani: Shark or Kingmaker. The Guardian 15(06):2009 Today (2010) Iran produces own petrol to counter sanctions. Today 29.11.2010. http://www.tod ayonline.com/World/Worldinbrief/EDC101129-0000078/Iran-produces-own-petrol-to-countersanctions Torbati Y (2012) Iran budget under pressure, Ahmadinejad says. reuters 09.10.2012. https://www. reuters.com/article/us-iran-economy/iran-budget-under-pressure-ahmadinejad-says-idUSBR E8980X120121009?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_ medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FworldNews+%28Reuters+World+New s%29 TradeArabia (2010) Iran pulls assets from European banks. TradeArabia 29.08.2010. http://www. tradearabia.com/news/newsdetails.asp?Sn=BANK&artid=185080 Trading Economics (2019) Iran unemployment rate. Trading economics. January 2019. https://tra dingeconomics.com/iran/unemployment-rate Tutnchi-Maliki S (1388) Barrasi-i Mosavvabat va Estedlalha-i Tavajohi-i Kamissiyun-i Vizhe-i Tarh-i Tahavvol-i Eqtesadi dar Moured-i Layehe-i Hadafmandkardan-i Yaraneha. Tehran

242

N. Kozhanov

Tutunchi-Maliki S, Hadi-Musavinik S (1388), Ettebarat-i Yarane-i va Asar-i Tavarromi-i An. Tehran Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network (2010) Iranian supreme leader urges unity among Basiji forces. Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 24.06.2010. http://www.irantracker. org/us-policy/sanctions-iran-reactions-and-impact Wall Street Journal (2010) Key to talks is to show Iran the cost of nuclear ambition. The Wall Street Journal 26.11.2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870367840457563644036 6896042.html?KEYWORDS=Gates+Iran Wehrey F, Green JD (2009) The rise of Pasdaran. RAND, Washington World Tribune (2010) Iran: sanctions will not stop insertion of fuel rods into “Peaceful” Bushehr. The World Tribune 28.10.2010. http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_ iran1066_10_28.asp

Nikolay Kozhanov is a Research Associate Professor at the Gulf Studies Center of Qatar University. His research interests are focused on Iran’s economy and international relations, the geopolitics of Gulf energy, as well as Russian foreign policy in the Middle East. Dr. Kozhanov has been a visiting fellow at a number of leading international thinktanks including Chatham House, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Carnegie Moscow Center.

Why Has the Recent Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region Missed Kuwait and Bahrain? Elena Melkumyan

Abstract Bahrain and Kuwait were the place of revolutionary protests in 2011. In both cases the demands were similar: political reforms and fight against corruption. But the Kuwaiti power was trying to make compromises with the protesters/revolutionaries, headed by parliamentary opposition. Sabah Al Ahmed Al Sabah—Emir of Kuwait at that time, dismissed the Prime Minister—Naser Mohammed Al Sabah who was blamed by them in corruption. After this Emir’s decision, the protests stopped and further actions were moved to the legislative area. The confrontation between government and parliamentary opposition became the permanent factor of Kuwaiti political environment. The case of Bahrain was aggravated by the fact that the country was divided and the Shia majority consider themselves suppressed by the Sunni power. The opposition was represented mainly by Shia community and was blamed to have support from Iran. State power took sever repression against participants of mass revolutionary protests and parliamentary opposition. A lot of them were arrested or had to emigrate. The opposition weakened by repressions was not unified and was not able to continue its protest activity. All these explains why the recent wave of revolutions in the MENA region has missed Kuwait and Bahrain.

Introduction Bahrain and Kuwait are Arab monarchic states of the Gulf region. Their standards of living are higher than in many Arab countries and system of social assistance is more developed. However, these two states of the Gulf were the place of active mass revolutionary protests in 2011. Nevertheless, their protest activity sometimes later ended. The analysis of exceptional political development in Bahrain and Kuwait, E. Melkumyan (B) Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_11

243

244

E. Melkumyan

their protest movement, authority’s policy in this period and political activity after Arab Spring will give us the answer to the question why this happened. During the Arab Spring in both states, the demands were similar: political reforms and fight against corruption. However, the Kuwaiti power was trying to make compromises with the protesters, headed by parliamentary opposition. Sabah Al Ahmed Al Sabah—emir of Kuwait at that time dismissed the Prime minister—Naser Mohammed Al Sabah, which was blamed by them in corruption. After this emir’s decision, the protests were stopped and further actions were replaced in the legislative area. The confrontation between government and parliamentary opposition became a permanent factor of Kuwaiti political environment. The case of Bahrain was aggravated by the fact that the country was divided and the Shia majority consider themselves suppressed by the Sunni power. The opposition was represented mainly by Shia community and was blamed to have support from Iran. State power took sever repression against participants of mass protests and parliamentary opposition. A lot of them were arrested or were obliged to emigrate. The opposition weakened by repressions was not unified and was not able to continue its protest activity at the same level.

Political Development in Bahrain and Kuwait: a Historical Dimension Bahrain and Kuwait are the most politically developed countries among Arab monarchies of the Gulf region such as Qatar, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which are members together with Bahrain and Kuwait, of the regional organization—The Gulf Cooperation Council of the Arab States (the GCC). These two countries have many common features in their political structure: the power is concentrated in the hand of ruling families—Al Khalifa—in Bahrain, and Al Sabah—in Kuwait, which have the same origin from the tribe Aneiza, coming to the shores of the Gulf in the eighteenth century from Nejd. The head of the state should be from the ruling family, and its members hold many cabinet posts, first of all, the ones of prime-minister and ministers of defense and interior. Both countries were protectorates of Great Britain and British influence became a factor that encouraged government reforms and accelerated socio-economic development of these countries. In both countries, the oil exploration began earlier than in other Arab Gulf monarchies. Bahrain was the first where the oil was discovered in 1932. In Kuwait, the exploration of the oil fields began in 1938. Both countries became the vanguards of socio-political development, which resulted in the emergence of new social groups of educated people influenced by the reformist ideas. In the 1930th, they had the experience of representative bodies with limited power but their creation as a step to participation in the governance of the country was significant.

Why Has the Recent Wave …

245

In the 1950s, many political societies were formed in Bahrain and Kuwait, which became in the period of their independent development a source of political activism and prepared a basis for future opposition activity. Arab Nationalism ideas were popular in these countries due to their intensive contacts with politically developed Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. Kuwaiti and Bahraini youth received education in their universities. The other channel of Arab influence on their societies were Arab specialists working there. Kuwait became politically independent in 1961 and adopted constitution. According to it, Kuwait’s system of government is democratic; sovereignty is vested in the Nation as the source of all authority. The Emir is the head of State. In conforming to the constitution legislative power shall be vested in the Amir and the National Assembly. National Assembly—parliament has rather broader rights: control over executive power—government, law initiative, and the right to adopt or reject all constitutional decrees. The parliament also participated in appointment of the Heir Apparent. The Amir nominated a candidate and the Nation Assembly swear fealty by a consisting majority of the members of the National Assembly. If it does not swear fealty, the Amir should nominate three candidates and the Parliament should swear fealty to one of them (Melkumyan 2011: 83–84). In the first parliament which was elected by direct elections of Kuwaiti citizens, only men were present (women received the passive and active electoral rights only in 2005); they represented different political groups—democrats, liberals, radical nationalists, technocrats and two Islamist organizations—one was connected with the Muslim Brotherhood and another was composed by Shia community. Parliament criticized State policy and twice was dissolved (in 1976 and in 1986). In the second year after Kuwait liberation from Iraqi occupation in 1991, the National Assembly was reelected. The parliamentary opposition always had many supporters and confronted with the government during the 1990s and early 2000s. The fight against corruption was on the top of questions discussed in Kuwaiti parliament. “The Arab uprisings that began in early 2011 expanded the divisions between the government and the elites in the National Assembly to the broader citizenry” (Congressional Research 2021: 3). Bahrain obtained the independence in 1971. According to the constitution adopted in 1973, the parliament was created. It consisted of three different blocks: Popular, Religious, and Independent. Despite difference in their ideological and political orientations, all of them opposed the government and advocated reforms in political and economic spheres. The conflict between the Emir of Bahrain Issa Al Khalifa and deputies resulted in the dissolvement of the parliament in 1975. The Parliament did not exist until the early 2000s when a new constitution proclaimed creation of two-chamber parliament. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran highly influenced Bahraini political situation. Many Shia groupings were created. The most active among them was Islamic Front for Liberation of Bahrain. After the attempt to carry out a coup in 1981 this organization was banned and acted underground. The political situation in Bahrain in the 1980 and 1990s was very tense. The Shia community organized demonstrations with the demands of equal rights with

246

E. Melkumyan

Sunni citizens. Many political societies, Sunni and Shia, demanded to reelect the parliament. In 1996, the police arrested a group of Shia activists blaming them to be the members of terrorist organization Hezbollah-Bahrain. The Bahraini authorities undertook repressions. In 1999 new emir—Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa—ascended the throne. He formed National Committee, which prepared the document of political reforms called National Action Charter. A public referendum on February 14, 2001 adopted it. According to it, Bahrain became Kingdom. The new constitution adopted in 2002 proclaimed Bahrain constitutional monarchy. In accordance with the constitution, the order of inheritance was changed. The Article 1 stated: “The regime of the Kingdom of Bahrain is a hereditary constitutional monarchy, which has been handed down by the late Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa to his eldest son Sheikh Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, the King of Bahrain. Thenceforward it will pass to his eldest son, one generation after another, unless the King in his lifetime appoints a son other than his eldest son as successor” (Kingdom of Bahrain). A new order of inheritance of king power could be done in conditions of internal political instability and the attempts to remove the ruling family from power to strengthen the ruling branch, and minimized the possibility of other branches of the ruling family to claim power. The same tendencies developed in Kuwait. In 2006, the Parliament voted to remove Emir Saad Al Salim Al Sabah, whose health conditions prevented him from ruling the country, and instead elected Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jabir Al Sabah, who belonged to Al Jabir faction of ruling family instead of a representative from Al Salim branch according to the previously existing tradition. Therefore, the traditional order of succession was changed. The Crown Prince Nawwaf Al-Ahmad became emir in 2020 and the next Crown Prince, appointed by him was his brother—Mashal AlAhmad Al Sabah, which confirmed this tendency to concentrate the power in the hands of close relatives of the ruling emir. According to Bahraini constitution, “the System of governance in the Kingdom of Bahrain is democratic, sovereignty being in the hands of the people, the source of all powers”. The parliament became two chambered. King appointed representatives of upper chamber, and only the deputies of law chamber were elected. Political opposition criticized new constitution and demanded to return to the constitution of 1973 as more democratic. Bahrain is the only GCC state to have a Shia majority. In 2000, the government practiced givinf Bahraini citizenship to Sunni Muslims from Arab and Asian countries to change the religious composition of the nation. The political opposition was against this practice and criticized it as not legitimate. In 2006 during the elections to the parliament, an information that Bahraini authority used all instruments to block Shia candidates to participate in elections caused demonstrations in Manama. Despite these attempts Bahraini’s main opposition Shia Muslim group founded in 2001— National Accord Association—(Al-Wefaq) worn 18 of 40 seats (Katzman 2008: 3). In the elections of 2010, Al-Wefaq preserved the same 18 seats. This organization was supported not only by the Shia community, but also by broader political groups, which expressed solidarity with their demands to begin political reforms and change

Why Has the Recent Wave …

247

the constitution according to which the prime minister is responsible before the king and not the parliament. They all were as well against the appointment of all ministers by the king. The political opposition acted not only inside the parliament but also outside it, because a part of opposition boycotted the elections, and the other one considered that the parliament was controlled by the government and not able to take the decisions which the country needed (Melkumyan 2018: 171). Before the elections of 2010, Shia organizations organized demonstrations protesting their discrimination. The activists stated that “they are second-class citizens, suffering from unemployment, and their house conditions are very bad”. Shia protesters demanded equal rights with Sunni citizens, such as the right to work in the government departments, to obtain high positions in banking and oil sector. The government undertook repressions against demonstrators: 23 activists were arrested (BBC 2010). The confrontation between the authority and the opposition prepared the basis for the uprising in Bahrain.

2011 Uprisings in Kuwait and Bahrain In these two countries, the mass revolutionary protests were more active than in the neighboring countries, because the previous practice of political activity prepared them. It is also important to take into account the fact that political opposition there had long experience of confrontation with the authorities and, in the atmosphere of uprisings in such Arab countries as Tunisia and Egypt, revolutionary protest actions naturally began (Melkumyan 2013a, b). The analysis of uprisings in Kuwait and Bahrain gives us a possibility to make an important conclusion. This period of mass protests in Arab countries was characterized by many common things and at the same time uncovered specific problems of each of them. In Kuwait, it was an unsettled question of those Kuwaitis who were deprived of citizenship (so called—bidun). That is why the first Kuwaiti demonstrations were organized on 19 February 2011 by this category of people which represented Kuwaiti-born persons whose ancestors, mainly from Bedouin origin, did not gave necessary documents to the Ministry of Interim Affairs in order to obtain citizenship according to the related law of 1959. This problem was aggravated in the time of Kuwait’s liberation from the Iraqi occupation of 1990–1991. After the liberation, some Iraqis and representatives of other countries pretended to be bidun, “Kuwaitis without citizenship”, and their number increased (see, e.g. Melkumyan 2011: 57). Despite the fact that the demands of demonstrators were not really political, the police arrested some of them. Bahrain is considered to be a deeply divided country. The existence of a big number Shia population who were discriminated in comparison with Sunni inhabitants was a problem that influenced the development of revolutionary demonstration activity

248

E. Melkumyan

in Bahrain. It was very significant that the first demonstration in Bahrain started in the place were mainly Shia inhabitants lived. If we compare the demonstrations in both countries, we can assume that the uprising in Bahrain was more intensive, huge and critical towards ruling regime. Inspired by revolutions in Arab states—Tunisia and Egypt—Bahraini youth organized, on 14 February 2011, a mass demonstration in which a lot of young people participated, both males and females, and political opposition became the leader of uprising. The date of demonstrations beginning was symbolic because one of protestors’ demands was the adaptation of a more democratic constitution than the constitution that was approved by National Action Charter that came into force exactly the same day—4 February. Kuwaiti mass protests began a little bit later. In Kuwait, similarly to Bahrain, the youth took an active part. In both states, the protests were peaceful and protesters demanded deep reforms. However, in Bahrain all participants of protest activity supported the call to transform the political system into a constitutional monarchy with the government consisting of elected members of the parliament. In Kuwait, some opposition fractions demanded the same transformation, however this demand was not becoming a national aim that united all the protesters. The policy of authorities in the time of uprising in Kuwait and Bahrain was not similar either. Against the demonstrators in Bahrain, security forces used tear gas, rubber bullets, storm grenades and birdshots. Two young Bahrainis were killed (Al-Hayat 2011). On 15 February King Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa pronounced a speech and proclaimed the National Dialogue that should be headed by Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa. Nevertheless, the opposition demanded the resignation of the government and replacement of special military forces used against protesters by police (Al-Hayat 2011). Bahraini youth activists were camped out at the Pearl Roundabout, the focal points of protests. On the 18th of February, the army stormed them and seven people were killed (Reuters 2021). The demonstrations continued and they became more largescale. In the revolutionary protests, representatives of two confessions, Sunni and Shia, participated, but Shia organizations headed them. In late February, a representative of radical Islamists—Hassan Mushaima— returned to Bahrain from Iran and created a new block—Coalition in the Name of the Republic, which opposed royalty and called for the proclamation of a republican system. The other opposition organizations, including Al-Wefaq, did not support it. The authority requested the GCC partners to help them in stabilizing the situation. The King Hamad accused Iran and Syria in inciting a coup (Al-Jazeera 2011). Troops from the Peninsula Shield Force were sent to Bahrain. Many scholars exaggerated the role of the GCC troops, which, in their opinion, helped to end the protests in Bahrain (e.g., Yom and Gause 2012; Truevtsev 2020). The facts indicate that military units from the Peninsula Shield Force (which arrived in Bahrain on the request of Bahraini government, fearing Iranian threat, because it was a strategic enemy for all the Arab Gulf countries) were used to guard key facilities such as oil and gas installations and not to crash the uprising.

Why Has the Recent Wave …

249

On the 15th of March, the king declared a three-month state of emergency. Several opposition leaders and activists were arrested, including Hassan Mushaima. A curfew was imposed and all political gatherings were banned. On the 31st of May, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa called for talks on reforms all political oppositional organizations and the next day lifted the state of emergency. King Hamad announced the formation of a special committee to investigate the cause of the uprising in Bahrain. Bahraini authorities, political discourses stressed the democratic character of Bahraini regime and tried to apply democratic procedures to obtain national unity. On the 2nd of July, National Dialogue was launched. Its aim was to discuss political, economic, social and human rights issues and to initiate proposals for further reform process. Recommendations from the National Dialogue were to be handed over to the king, who would in turn refer the proposals to the respective authority for implementation. Al-Wefaq allocated only five representatives among the participants in a dialogue that included 300 delegates, and soon Al-Wefaq was pulling out. The arrests of the oppositionists and those eight human right activists who were condemned to life sentences also influenced Al-Wefaq decision. National Dialogue was disrupted. Bahraini uprising was characterized by variety of oppositional groups participating in it, but they were not consolidated and had different demands and this fact weakened the protest activity. On the other hand, authority was frightened by largescale protests and took severe mesures against demonstrators. In these circumstances, authorities’ attempts to organize the National Dialogue were not successful. In Kuwait, mass demonstrations were initiated also by youth. Educated youth— “the most dynamic and modern part of society has become the driving force behind popular action in Tunisia and Egypt” (Naumkin 2012: 7).1 This conclusion of Naumkin can be applied to Bahrain and Kuwait. On the 28th of February 2011, a youth group, named Kafi (“It’s enough!”) published a declaration in Internet demanding political reforms and calling for demonstrations. On the 8th of March, the first demonstration took place. Its participants were demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nasser Al-Mohammed Al Sabah, a nephew of Emir Sabah Al-Ahmed Al Sabah, who was accused in corruption. The protests were escalating and parliament opposition led them, because its long fight with incompetency and corruption of some ministers of the government, prepared its active role in protests. As mentioned by Fatiha Dazi-Heni: “The 2011 events were also the result of previous domestic mobilization in a country with a long history of public political debate and political mobilization” (Dazi-Heni 2015: 14). The parliament opposition mobilized different political movements, which do not display a clear ideological identity, but succeeded to organize a lot of demonstrations and meetings during several months. Kuwaiti authorities did not use force against protesters, because they “adhere to conservative positions, striving by all means to preserve the status quo in the country. The national idea of “one family of all Kuwaitis” allows them to preserve the social contract between the ruling Al Sabah

1

On the role of the educated youth in the Arab Spring see also Korotayev et al. (2012, 2022).

250

E. Melkumyan

family and the inhabitants of the country, concluded during the formation of the Kuwaiti statehood” (Melkumyan 2021: 81). The protests reached its peak in October 2011. On the 21st of October, in a meeting which gathered 12 000 participants, Musallam Al-Barrak—a member of parliament opposition fraction “Popular Bloc”, an ideological political organization advocating public oversight of government spending, headed by Ahmed Al-Saadoun, in his speech, provided strong evidence that 70 million dinars ($ 250 million) were transferred to the personal account of Prime Minister Nasser Al-Muhammad from 2006 to 2011 through Kuwaiti pledges abroad. These accusations led to an increase in protests demanding the immediate resignation of the Prime Minister (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 2011a). The fight against corruption of high-level functionaries was always on the agenda of parliament opposition and it was supported by broader segments of Kuwaiti society. That is why the protest activity intensified after these accusations. On the 16th of November 2011, thousands of demonstrators gathered in front of the Kuwaiti Parliament and stormed it, calling for the resignation of Prime-Minister Nasser Al-Mohammed. On the 28th of November, Emir of Kuwait, Sabah Al-Ahmed Al Sabah, signed the indicated resignation and named the appointment of a new Prime Minister Jabir Mubarak Al Sabah, who was the former Minister of Defense. When the emir’s order became known, the opposition stopped protest actions “in respect to the emir who made a historic decision” (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 2011b).

Political Situation in Bahrain and Kuwait After the Arab Spring Bahrain In Bahrain, the opposition organizations headed by Al-Wefaq organized on the 14th of February, 2012 manifestations in the memory of the beginning of uprising. The leader of Al-Wefaq, Ali Salman, appealed to protesters not to use violence. Another demonstration took place after the signature of security agreement between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in May 2012, but without any results. In May 2012 the amendments of the constitution were published. They were based on the proposals of National Dialogue, established on the 2nd of July, 2011. Under the new proposals, the Prime Minister would assume responsibility for selecting the members of his government. The King will continue to appoint the head of government, however members of new government will need to secure the approval of the elected Parliament. If deputies disapprove, they can vote to reject the entire government. The opposition was not satisfied with these amendments and demanded an “elected government”. On the 10th of February, 2013, National Dialogue was restored. The talks were intended to resolve tensions after the government repressions of revolutionary mass

Why Has the Recent Wave …

251

protests in 2011. Nevertheless, it achieved very little up to the point with both sides— opposition and government—blaming each other for the stalemate. In September, National Dialogue was stopped, as oppositional representatives were pulling out in protest against the arrest of one of them. The government ended it officially on the 8th of January 2014. The attempts of the authorities to find a compromise with the opposition failed. The repressions against the opposition continued. On the 28th of December 2014, political leader of Al-Wefaq, Ali Salman, was arrested. Clashes between his supporters and security forces erupted outside his house after his arrest had been announced. In a statement, Al-Wefaq described Ali Salman’s arrest as “a perilous and arbitrary inventory, which will seriously complicate the political and security scene in Bahrain” (BBC 2014). The situation in Bahrain was very unstable. The elections to the parliament were expected to defuse tensions. On the 22nd of November 2014, elections were held for the Council of Representatives (lower chamber of the Parliament). The main Shiite opposition political organization, Al-Wefaq, declared that it would boycott them. Anyway, the government suspended the group’s activities for three months. The majority of seats were won by independents (Election Guide 2014). They were loyal to regime and the government worked towards national reconciliation. It could not be achieved because Shia population was not satisfied and the problem of society division has remained. On the 28th of July 2015, a terrorist attack was committed in Bahrain. An unknown organization claimed responsibility for it and the authorities accused Iran of incitement. In these circumstances, in June 2016, the court decided to dissolve the oppositional organization Al-Wefaq, accusing it of destabilizing the internal situation in the country, supporting confessional strife and financing terrorist organizations. Its leader Ali Salman was sentenced to nine years in prison, and the spiritual leader Isa Qasem was stripped of Bahraini citizenship and expelled from the country. The parliamentary elections in two rounds on November 24 and December 1 resulted in domination of political independents and newcomers. The exclusion of the opposition and new repressions (Ali Salman was sentenced to life in prison on the eve of the election) influenced the results of the elections. Kristin Smith Diwan concluded, that “this election marked the end of Bahrain’s experimental pact in political inclusion” (Diwan 2018). In this situation, the protest activity was not possible. Kuwait Kuwait’s political life after the uprising was marked by confrontation between government and parliamentary opposition in the framework of constitution. In the elections of February 2012, the opposition received the majority of mandates (35 from 50) and Parliamentary Speaker Ahmad Al- Saadoun was one of experienced oppositional deputies. As Shafeeq Gabra mentioned, “it reflected the climate of discontent in Kuwait society” (Gabra 2014). Parliament activity led to dismissal of some ministers—members of the ruling family, and investigations of government’s policy. In this situation, the authority used Constitutional Court as a tool to change

252

E. Melkumyan

the balance of power in its own favor. Constitutional Court declared the results of elections 2012 invalid and ordered to return to the parliament elected in 2009, which was not so oppositional. The 2009 parliament was reinstated, but more than two thirds of its members refused to reconvene. In order to maintain stability Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al Sabah took the decision to dissolve parliament and call new elections to be held on the 1st of December 2012. Before them, a new electoral law was adopted by Emir’s decree. It stipulated that each voter could vote for only one candidate, cancelling a provision of the previous law that allowed voters to vote for up to four candidates and was seen by the opposition as facilitating coalition building. In the eyes of the authority, the new law would help reduce the number of potential opponents to the government (Dazi-Heni 2015:56). The opposition was against this new law and organized demonstration in front of the Parliament. Musallam Al-Barrak directly addressed the emir with the words: “We will not allow you”, meaning that the parliament will not accept this new law. In Arabic—le nasmah leke, are impolite words in the conversation with the head of state, and it was considered that emir was insulted. On the 29th of October 2012, Musallam Al-Barrak was arrested (Kazman 2012). On the 1st of November, a crowded rely was organized in front of the prison to protest his arrest. After two days, he was released on bail (Al-Barrak 2012). On the 15th of April 2013, he was sentenced to two years in prison. On the 21st of April 2017, he was released and, since that time, he has been residing outside Kuwait. Musallam Al-Barrak in his article, published in The Guardian, stated: “A few days before my imprisonment, I had participated in the largest demonstration in Kuwait’s history—approximately 100,000 people attended. I joined another massive demonstration soon after my release. Kuwait is one of the world’s richest countries per capita, and Kuwaitis seemingly enjoy a good lifestyle—wages are high and we do not pay taxes. So, why are we protesting? What do we want? We are protesting against an unconstitutional change in the electoral law pushed forward by the emir” (Al-Barrak 2012). Thus, the revolutionary protest activity in this period was provoked by rather specific circumstances. These were mainly new representatives, loyal to government, who composed the parliament, which was elected in December 2012. However, the parliament’s activities were still directed to control the executive power continued and the tensions between two branches of power remained. Moreover, in 2013 the government passed a new media law, which significantly restricts media freedom and particularly targets social media with penalties for offending the emir, the constitution or formulating open critics of the ruling system. During that year, the authorities brought cases against 29 people (compared to 9 cases in 2012) who expressed critical views during demonstrations but also on Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and other social media platforms (Dazi-Heni 2015: 70). These restrictions were directed mainly not against traditional oppositionists, but against youth activists and were aimed at preventing their consolidation and antigovernment actions. The previous deputies of parliamentary opposition appealed to the Constitutional Court with a request to give an opinion on the legality of the new electoral law. The

Why Has the Recent Wave …

253

Constitutional Court declared the electoral law legitimate, and at the same time, the elections of December 2012 were declared invalid. The new elections were held in July 2013. The majority of groupings that were parts of previous parliamentary opposition did not participate in the elections, because they were against the decision of the Constitutional Court to uphold the emir’s decree about the changes in the electoral law. In the new parliament, the majority of its members were progovernment, but this fact did not change the traditional practice of parliament to fight against corruption and unprofessional actions of ministers. The government was under permanent pressure of parliament and once more tried to use the Constitutional Court to dismiss it. The parliament worked three years and was dismissed by emir’s decree in October 2016, declaring that the regional threats and the challenges of security were the reasons to take this decision. In the parliament elections of 2016, the opposition was able to regain lost positions because of decline in living standards and grows of unemployment due to lower oil prices and budget deficits. Despite disagreements with the government on a number of issues, related to economic development and foreign policy, this parliament corps worked for the prescribed four years. The elections of 2020 were held in a very complicated situation connected with the economic crises and coronavirus pandemic. In early 2020, Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al Sabah passed away and Crown Prince Nawaf Al-Ahmed replaced him. As in the 2016 elections, 24 of the successful candidates were broadly aligned with the opposition, including Islamist and liberal blocs, but there was also significant turnover, with just 19 of the 43 incumbents who ran winning seats. Nine candidates who did not win seats launched an appeal claiming that there were irregularities including vote buying, falsified voter addresses, and failure to check the identities of voters. Alleged vote buying has been a long-standing problem (Freedom House 2021). The majority of candidates participated in the elections as independents. Some elected deputies were tribe-affiliated candidates. It was a new tendency in the political life of Kuwait that tribes were not supporting the government. “Traditionally tribes in Kuwaiti politics have been considered reliable clients of the monarchy and appointed government officials. So-called ‘service MPs’ defended the prerogatives of the ruling family in exchange for the opportunity to broker government services for tribal members” (Freer and Leber 2021). The opposition was composed of nearly half of deputies’ corps. Efforts to negotiate the return of Barrak and other opposition figures to Kuwait in fact forms one of the fraught issues currently dividing government and opposition within the parliament (Freer and Leber 2021). The first session of the parliament saw a drama that was a harbinger of problems ahead. Before the session, the purpose of which was to elect the speaker of the parliament, 42 MPs declared publicly that they would endorse Bader Al-Humaidi, a popular former minister and moderate oppositionist, to challenge the incumbent speaker, Marzuk Al-Ghanem, who was backed by the government. However, the vote for the position of the speaker is by secret ballot, and the government was able to pressure MPs and ensure Al-Ghanem was able to retain his position, with 33 votes. The tension escalated and the government resigned on January 13, 2021 after only

254

E. Melkumyan

two sessions, following an attempt to question the Prime Minister Sabah Al-Khalid in parliament regarding his choice of ministers. On February 18, the emir suspended the parliament for one month under Article 106 of the constitution (Segal 2021). On March 2, almost two months after the resignation of the last government and amid growing speculation about the impending dissolution of the parliament and even a change in the voting system, the Emir announced a new government. Four ministers were replaced in order to ease the tension, including the Minister of Interior, who had stood at the center of the conflict with parliament. However, the Emir’s decision to reappoint Prime Minister al-Khalid raised the possibility for another resignation and a dissolution of parliament. This period after uprising was marked by permanent political crises, the parliament’s activity was paralyzed by series of elections. The authority has been acting in the framework of legality, but always trying to change the situation in its own favor.

Conclusion The events of Arab Spring in Bahrain and Kuwait demonstrated that neither societies nor political elites were ready to deep transformation of their stable political system, especially in the Arab regional context marked in this time by new conflicts and crises. Even in Bahrain where the uprising was very large-scale and intensive, the emergence of a new actor with radical political demands against royal regime, was rejected by opposition that used to be at the forefront of the fight against the government. Traditional leaders of opposition were going to negotiate with the authority to reach some of their goals. Bahrain’s uprising was suppressed in a harsh crackdown by the authority. In Kuwait the situation was different: the authority occupied a position of compromise and that fact helped to end the mass protests and the confrontation between the authority and the opposition continued in the parliamentary area as this was in previous years. The mass protest activity in both countries did not radically change their political situation. After the uprising of 2011, some demonstrations were organized in both countries by the opposition but they were motivated by specific injustice actions of government. The growing political activism of young generation during mass protests in Bahrain and Kuwait did not result in creation of stable political organizations, which continued their struggle in new circumstances. The social network became for them the main platform of their political activity. The unstable regional environment influenced the political atmosphere of these states characterized by the unwillingness on the part of authorities as well as society to lose their national status-quo. This explains why the recent wave of revolutions in the MENA region (see Chapter “Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective” (Issaev and Korotayev 2022, this volume) for detail) has missed Kuwait and Bahrain.

Why Has the Recent Wave …

255

References Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (2011a) Amir Al-Kuwait ‘an iktiham al-barlaman. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 22.11.2011. http://www.aawsat.com/print.asp>did=650991issueno=12047 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (2011b) Amir Al-Kuwait u‘ayyin al-sheikh Jaber. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 01.12.2011. http://www.aawsat.com/print.asp>did=652340&issueno=12056 Al-Barrak M (2012) Kuwait’s democracy is being undermined – that’s why its people are protesting. The Guardian 25.11.2012. https://www.theguardian.com/profile/musallam-al-barrak Al-Hayat (2011) Malik al-Bahrain tushakkil lajnat tahqiq. Al-Hayat 16.02.2011. http://intrenati onal.daralhayat.com/intrenationalarticle/234912/ Al-Jazeera (2011) Mu‘aradat Al-Bahrein: al-hiwar huwa al-hal. Al-Jazeera 27.03.2011. http://www. aliazeera.net/NR/exeres/7PC08023-C8D7-421A-Bfbb-9C BBC News (2010) Torture of British Shia activists in Bahrain. BBC News 25.10.2010. http://www. bbc.couk/news/world/-middle-east-1127814 BBC News (2014) Bahrain opposition leader Sheikh Ali Salman arrested. BBC News 28.12.2014. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30620615 Congressional Research (2021) Kuwait: government, security and US policy. Congressional research service, Washington DC Crass W, Rordorf J (2021) Political mobilization in Bahrain: a historical overview and future prospects. Harvard University Visions 27.03.2021. https://shiablog.wcfia.harvard.edu/blog/pol itical-mobilization-bahrain-historical-overview-and-future-prospects Dazi-Heni F (2015) The Arab spring imposed on Kuwait “exceptionalism” Arabian Humanities 4. https://doi.org/10.4000/cy.2868 Diwan KS (2018) Bahrain’s carefully managed election remake parliament. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington 03.12.2018. https://agsiw.org/bahrains-carefully-managed-elections-rem ake-parliament/ Election Guide (2014) Election for Bahraini Council of Representatives. Election Guide 22.11.2014. https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2483/ Freedom House (2021) Freedom in the World 2021. Kuwait. https://freedomhouse.org/country/kuw ait/freedom-world/2021 Fituni L (2012) Arabskaya vesna i transformatsiya politicheskih paradigm v kontekste mejdunarodnih otnosheniy. Mirovaya economika i mejdunarodniye otnosheniya (1):3–24. https://doi.org/ 10.20542/0131-2227-2012-1-3-14 Freer C, Leber A (2021) The “tribal advantage” in Kuwait politics and the future of the opposition. Brookings 19.04.2021. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/04/19/thetribal-advantage-in-kuwaiti-politics-and-the-future-of-the-opposition/ Gabra S (2014) Kuwait: at the crossroads of change or political stagnation. MEI@75 20.05.2014. https://www.mei.edu/publications/kuwait-crossroads-change-or-political-stagnation Issaev L, Korotayev A (2022) Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region. A Comparative Perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3031-15135-4_1 Katzman K (2008) Bahrain: reform, security and US policy. Congressional Research Service, Washington DC Kazman K (2012) Kuwait: security, reform and US policy. Congressional Research Service, Washington DC Korotayev A, Khodunov A, Burova A, Malkov S, Khaltourina D, Zinkina J (2012) Sotsialnodemograficheskiy analiz Arabskoy vesny. Sistemnyi Monitoring Globalnyh i Regionalnyh Riskov 3:28–76 Korotayev A, Issaev L, Malkov S, Shishkina A (2022) The Arab Spring: a quantitative analysis. In: JA Goldstone, L Grinin, A Korotayev (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 781–810. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_30

256

E. Melkumyan

Melkumyan ES (2011) Noveyshaya istoriya Kuwaita. Aspect Press, Moscow Melkumyan ES (2012) Malye gosudarstva Zaliva i “arabskaya vesna.” In: Naumkin VV (ed) Arabskoe probujdeniye i Rossia: cho dalshe? Institut vostokovedeniya RAN, Moscow, pp 32–47 Melkumyan ES (2013a) Protestnie vystupleniya v Kuwaite. Sistemnyi Monitoring Globalnyh i Regionalnyh Riskov 4(1):108–186 Melkumyan ES (2013b) Protivostoyanie mezhdu vlastiu i oppozitsiei v Korolevstve Bahrain. Sistemnyi Monitoring Globalnyh i Regionalnyh Riskov 4(1):40–63 Melkumyan ES (2016) Istoriya gosudarstv Arabskogo zaliva v XX – nachale XXI veka. Institut vostokovedeniya RAN, Moscow Melkumyan ES (2018) Istoriya arabskih stran. Gosudarstva Zaliva v XX – nachale XXI veka. URAIT, Moscow Melkumyan ES (2021) Kuwait: vnutripoliticheskaya situatsia posle Arabskoi vesni. Vostok/Oriens (3):74–84. https://doi.org/10.31857/S086919080015049-0 Naumkin VV (2012) Vmesto predisloviya. Krugovorot Arabskogo Probujdeniya i Blijniy Vostok. In: Naumkin VV (ed) Arabskoe probuzhdeniye i Rossiya: chto dalshe? Institut vostokovedeniya RAN, Moscow, pp 5–12 Reuters (2021) Timeline. The 2011 uprising in Bahrain and what’s happened since. Reuters 16.02.2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bahrain-uprising-timeline-idUSKBN2AG1K6 Segal E (2021) Kuwait’s new government: a political system in crisis? MDC 11.04.2021. https:// dayan.org/content/kuwaits-new-government-political-system-crisis Truevtsev KM (2020) Globalizatsiya i arabskiy mir. IV RAN, Moscow Yakovlev AI (2021) Arabskaya vesna kak rubej moderniatsii arabskogo mira: protivostoyanie sovremennosti i traditsii. Vostok/Oriens (3): 16–28. https://doi.org/10.31857/S08691908001 5064-7 Yom S, Gause G (2012) Resilient royals: how Arab monarchies hang on. J Democr 23(4):74–88

Elena Melkumyan is a research professor at the Center of Arabic and Islamic studies of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Science and Professor in the Department of Contemporary Oriental Studies in the Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow. Elena Melkumyan is an author of more than 170 scholarly publications including 12 monographs such as “Gulf Cooperation Council in Regional and Global processes” (1999); “Gulf Cooperation Council Relations with Russia” (2005); “Gulf Region: Conflicts, Cooperation, Compromises” (2008); “Modern History of Kuwait” (2011); “Kuwait in the 2000s: Political Development and Foreign Policy” (2014); “History of Arab Gulf States in the 20th and early 21st Century” (2016); “History of Arab Countries. Gulf States in the 20th and early 21st Century” (2019). Her sphere of academic interests includes international relations in the Middle East and the Gulf region, regional organizations, history of Gulf countries.

Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events in the World System Context Leonid Grinin and Anton Grinin

Abstract Grinin and Grinin examine the 2018–2022 revolutionary events in the Afrasian instability macrozone, in general, and the MENA region, in particular, in their connection with the previous wave of revolutionary events–with the Arab Spring, whose aftermath was still felt in the Sahel zone in 2016–2019, and somewhere it still echoes even today. Grinin and Grinin show the connection between the latest events in the MENA region and the global wave of revolutionary events that started in 2018. The impact of new events on the adjacent world-system zones and the World System as a whole is studied in connection with the previous wave and in comparison with its impact. It is shown that the recent events in in the MENA region continue the World System reconfiguration process within the framework of transformation of the world order. Grinin and Grinin point out several aspects of the impact of these revolutionary events on the World System and its parts. First, they weaken the World System core; in particular, the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan heavily influences the positions of the USA and its allies. Secondly, the Middle East is increasingly left on its own due to the planned and forced withdrawal of the United States and due to the search for new vectors in foreign policy. And the revolutionary events contribute to this. Thirdly, the radical Islamist influence continues to be very noticeable, both in connection with the Taliban’s victory and with further penetration of remaining revolutionary terrorists of the Islamic State to the Sahel countries and further to other African countries. In fact, one may say that in the South, the Afrasian macrozone of instability borders on a peculiar zone of instability, which can be called African. The latter is expanding together with intensification of radicalism and may significantly expand in the future at the expense of African countries that have not yet been affected by it. Fourthly, the growing danger of Islamist revolutionary-terrorist radicalism poses a problem for statehood in the countries of Tropical Africa (which L. Grinin (B) HSE University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia A. Grinin Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 L. Issaev and A. Korotayev (eds.), New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region, Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_12

257

258

L. Grinin and A. Grinin

they start to resolve in some places), and also re-quires more active and extensive assistance on the part of the international community.

Introduction In our analysis of the topic, we proceed from the assumption that revolutionary process never occurs in isolation. On the one hand, it is always a part of a wider turbulent process, in which it sometimes occupies a central and sometimes a peripheral place. In addition, the previous revolutionary events can continue along with a new wave of revolutionary processes (as we will see below), thus merging with new ones and influencing them. At the same time, the revolutionary process, especially revolutionary waves, usually require some kind of serious world-system triggers (like an economic crisis or food prices increase, or a sharp weakening of a strong power, etc.), which are an intrinsic part of destabilization processes. Thus, on the one hand, the revolutionary process influences the world-system processes, but on the other hand, it could be a product of the world-system processes and their part. That is why one should search for the peculiarities of revolutionary processes of certain periods not only in the historical and cultural characteristics of societies, but also in the general features of certain world-system situations and mainstream processes. We can identify a number of large zones of instability within the modern World System. Four of them make up the Afrasian macrozone of instability (for details, see Korotayev et al. 2015, 2016; Korotayev, Grinin et al. 2022). In particular, this macrozone comprises the Middle East (with Transcaucasia), North Africa, the Central Asian zone (including Pakistan), and the Macrosahel.

On the Waves of Revolutionary Events of the Twenty-First Century and Revolutionary Process in the Afrasian Macrozone of Instability Basing on the criteria we have formulated and a new approach to identifying waves of revolutions, we have identified three waves of revolutionary events in the twenty-first century.1 The first wave is the ‘color’ revolutions of 2000–2009. The second wave is formed by the Arab Spring and its global aftermath, 2010/2011–2013. The third, unfinished, wave has been unfolding from 2018 until the present. 1

Within our approach we define the following criteria: (1) a real connection between events within the framework of the World System by common factors; (2) the number of revolutions should not be less than 4–5; (3) the time interval between revolutionary events, which should be no more than ten years between the beginning of the first and the beginning of the last event; and (4) one chronological period can experience only one wave (Goldstone et al. 2022a, b; Grinin and Grinin 2020, 2021, 2022; Grinin and Korotayev 2021; Grinin et al. 2022).

Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events …

259

All waves originate from very powerful world-system events. In view of this, it seems appropriate to note that the first wave unfolded against a positive economic and political background, the second did against a negative economic one, and the third unfolded against a negative economic and foreign policy background. All three waves were associated with more or less strong external impact. One may distinguish three main aspects of this impact. The first one covers the attempts at democratization via various structures controlled by Western countries. This was especially evident during the first wave, but one can trace it also in the second and third waves. Second is the geopolitical struggle, in which both Western and Middle Eastern countries participated (the effected countries are Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Mali2 ). This manifested mainly during the second wave. Third is the export of the Islamist terrorist revolution from the regions of Syria and Iraq (primarily to the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, but also to a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, like Afghanistan and Libya). This was observed during the second wave and continues in the third. During the five-year interval between the active phase of the second wave and the beginning of the third wave (2013–2017), there was also observed sufficient revolutionary activity in the world but without obvious waves. However, here it is worth noting that at that time the second wave was still going on in the Sahel zone and some countries of the Middle East. And there emerged a line of Islamist revolutions and uprisings of 2013–2016 (ISIS,activization of Boko Haram in Nigeria, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara [ISGS], the uprising of radical Islamists AQAP in Yemen, and al-Qaeda affiliated Islamists Ansar ul Islam in Burkuna Faso, Islamic State West Africa Province in the Chad Lake Basin, etc. (see, e.g., Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” (Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022, this volume), as well as Shishkina et al. 2022; Fahmy et al. 2022; Grinin 2020d; f). Let us dwell on the indicated waves of revolutions. The first wave began in the last year of the twentieth century– in 2000–with the revolution of 2000–2001 in the Philippines and the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia/Yugoslavia (Khodunov 2022a). The wave comprises revolutions and revolutionary events in Georgia (Khodunov 2022b), the Maldives (Kaigorodova 2021) and Ukraine (Shevsky 2022), Lebanon (Kaygorodova 2020), Kyrgyzstan (Ivanov 2022), Myanmar, Iran, and Moldova (Tkachuk et al. 2022). Sometimes researchers add the events in Africa to this list, and for our topic it is important to take into account the revolutionary events in sub-Saharan Africa in the 2000s, in particular, in Senegal in 2000, Madagascar in 2001–2002, Togo in 2005 and Guinea in 2007–2010 etc. (see Goldstone et al. 2022a, b; Grinin and Korotayev 2022a; Ustyuzhanin et al. 2021). It is important that in this period the general rise of the global economy went along with the rise of democratization in the world (the so-called third wave of democratization – see, e.g., Huntington 1993). The main features of the wave were the following: (1) the revolutions did not coincide or overlap (as in the previous and next waves) but generally followed one another sequentially with some delay, more like a relay race, in a kind of chain, 2

About the revolutionary events in these countries see, e.g., Issaev et al. (2022), Akhmedov (2022), Barmin (2022), Korotayev et al. (2021a, b), Grinin et al. (2016a, b), Grinin (2020a, b, d).

260

L. Grinin and A. Grinin

with only one event per year, or two; (2) at the same time, there is a clear connection between these revolutions as regards (a) world-systemic reasons (see above); (b) external forces and organizations that provided comprehensive guidance, training and assistance to the revolutionaries; (c) their goals; and (d) their methods of revolutionary action; (3) thanks to excellent organization, weak state resistance and Western support, those revolutions were mostly successful. The second wave is the Arab Spring and its aftermath (2010/2011–2013 (Grinin and Korotayev 2022a, b; Grinin et al. 2019; Beck 2014)). In contrast with the previous wave, in the late 2000s the world economy was in crisis. There occurred an unprecedented increase in food prices (agflation), which played a special role as a trigger for revolutionary events in the Middle East. For our topic, it is especially important that the center of revolutionary activity was in the Middle East and North Africa, but at the same time, the revolutionary wave swept many countries outside this region. In addition to revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa, the wave involved a number of revolutionary events in other parts of the world, including revolutionary movements without revolutions in the advanced Western countries (Occupy Wall Street, Indignados, etc.). The main features of this wave were: (1) a rapid spread of revolutions from country to country; (2) strong cultural and linguistic unity of the central region of the wave and a peculiar role of the religious and ethno-confessional factor; and (3) a special role of the educated youth. An important event in the Middle East was the emergence of the Islamic State in the northern regions of Syria and Iraq, whose influence began to spread far beyond the borders of this region. As a result of the defeat of the ISIS, revolutionary terrorists migrated to African countries, where they found fertile ground among the local Islamic population, especially young people. This brought revolutionary-terrorist destabilization to a number of regions of the Sahel and East Africa (see Grinin 2020f). As already mentioned, the second wave actually merged with the third one in these regions. At the moment, a global revolutionary-terrorist network of radicals who swore allegiance to the ISIS has actually been created. The third wave (from 2018 till the present) includes revolutions, revolutionary episodes and revolutionary movements without revolutions in Armenia (2018, 2020), Sudan (2018–2019),3 Bolivia (2019 and 2020), Algeria (2019),4 Hong Kong (2019– 2020), Chile (2019), Kyrgyzstan (2020), Georgia (2020), Iraq (2019),5 Lebanon (2019),6 Iran (2019),7 India (Jammu and Kashmir 2019), Nepal (2020), the USA 3

See Chapter “Sudan’s December Revolution and the Demise of the Al Bashir Regime” (Kostelyanets 2022, this volume) for detail. 4 See Chapter “The Crisis of the Rentier State: How the Revolution of Smiles has Brought Down the Sultanistic Regime in Algeria” (Zoubir 2022, this volume) for detail. 5 See Chapter “Revolutionary Protests in Iraq in the Context of Iranian-American Confrontation” (Mardasov 2022, this volume) for detail. 6 See Chapter “17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis” (Khatib 2022, this volume) for detail. 7 See Chapter “Sanctions and the Socio-Economic Routs of Iran’s Domestic Instability (2010– 2020)” (Kozhanov 2022, this volume) for detail.

Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events …

261

(2021 storming of the United States Capitol), France (Yellow Vests movement in 2018–2020), Belarus (2020–2021), Myanmar (2021), Somalia (2020–2021), Ethiopia (2020–2021, in Tigray region), Mali (2020–2021),8 Haiti (2021), Colombia (2021), Palestine (2021), Chad (2021), Kazakhstan (2022) and Canada (2022).9 Besides, it is necessary to recall events in Morocco, Tunisia,10 Egypt,11 Jordan,12 and Niger (quasi-revolutionary episode). Revolutionary events, whose essence has yet to be comprehended, occur in some other places, for example, in Corsica. As we can see, the revolutionary events in the Afroasian macrozone of instability, in general, and the MENA region, in particular, include a significant part of the third wave events (see Chapter “Introduction. New Wave of Revolutions in the MENA Region in the Global Perspective” (Issaev and Korotayev, 2022, this volume) for a general overview of the recent revolutionary wave in the MENA region). These are: revolutions in Sudan, Algeria, Mali, Somalia, Ethiopia (the Tigray region, failed), Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia; revolutionary movements without revolution in Lebanon and Iraq; revolutionary episodes in Iran, Palestine, Chad, and Kazakhstan; as well as protests in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and a quasi-revolutionary episode in Niger.13 At the world-system scale, this wave is associated with a new deterioration in the global economy, along with greater concentration of wealth and greater inequality, which in many cases led to lower living standards, higher prices and other phenomena that link this wave to the previous one. In 2020, the COVID pandemic and their consequences broke out and significantly worsened the economic and social situation—in particular, the pandemic played certain role in the revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Chad, Jammu and Kashmir, Nepal, Bolivia, Canada, revolution analogue in Tunisia, riot in Sri Lanka (2022), protests in Pakistan and Bangladesh against fuel prices skyrocketing (2022) and others (see, e.g., Chapter “Tunisia. Revolution of Ballot Boxes?” (Kashina 2022, this volume) and Chap “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” (Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022, this volume)). In 2021–2022, a new threat emerged–the rising food prices combined with its shortage. It was already outlined as a result of the pandemic, but became especially severe because of the sharp rise in the price of energy and fuel (in particular, gas and oil). The increase in prices for mineral fertilizers and restrictions on their export, as well as on the export of grain, natural disasters in some countries, in particular in China (failure of winter grain crops), Morocco and some European countries 8

See Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” (Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022, this volume) for detail. 9 About revolutionary events of this wave see also Goldstone et al. (2022a, b), Grinin and Korotayev (2022a); Grinin and Grinin (2020), Ustyuzhanin et al. (2021), Grinin (2020a, b, d), Klochkova (2021), Gallyamova (2021), Stepanischeva (2021), Guliev (2021), Pavlova (2021), Guseinov (2021). 10 See Chapter “Tunisia Revolution of Ballot Boxes?” (Kashina 2022, this volume) for detail. 11 See Chapter “Egyptian Protests 2019: Harbingers of a New Revolution?” (Mansour and Elhefnawy 2022, this volume) for detail. 12 See Chapter “Roots of New Wave of Protests in Jordan” (Zakharov and Issaev 2022, this volume) for detail. 13 Here we must add the ongoing unrest in Libya and civil wars in Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan.

262

L. Grinin and A. Grinin

(drought) as well as adverse weather conditions in some other countries threaten to deteriorate food security in a number of countries in Asia and Africa. In addition, military actions in Ukraine and an avalanche of sanctions against Russia threaten the global grain and food market. Thus, it would be quite logical to assume that the threat of a new agflation is quite real. And this can become a trigger for revolutionary events in a number of countries, as happened during the Arab Spring. The current wave is characterized by the following features: (1) a wide range of revolutionary events; (2) a variety of reasons for revolutions on a common basis, associated with deterioration not only in the economic, but also in foreign policy and international terms; and (3) respective growth of such forms of revolutionary events as revolutionary movements without revolutions. Thus, a new group of revolutionary events in the Afroasian macrozone of instability, in general, and the MENA region, in particular, is a part of the third revolutionary wave of the twenty-first century in the World System, which began in 2018 and continues up to the present. We suppose that it will continue because of the aggravating economic tensions, growing inflation and shortage of food production (including shortage of grain supply from Russia and Ukraine to the MENA region). Accordingly, the above-mentioned main features of the third wave are manifested to varying degrees in the events in the Middle East, North Africa and the Macrosahel. In this regard, we can distinguish two clear lines of the revolutionary process in recent years. The first one—secularist, which is generally in tune with the global line: discontent with governments, anti-clerical actions, a common aspiration for change, a demand for democratization and social policy, etc.; at the same time, far from always there is a clear desire to overthrow regimes (the example of Lebanon is typical here). The second line is Islamist radical and terrorist, especially in African countries, where terrorist activity turns into a revolutionary guerrilla struggle. The Islamist line, of course, characterizes the peculiar causes of some revolutions in the Afrasian macrozone in recent years in comparison with the general causes of the third wave of revolutions. In addition, among the peculiar reasons for the revolutionary events in the Afrasian macrozone one may point out the unresolved problems that caused the Arab Spring (this applies to Egypt, Iraq, and to a certain extent to Lebanon and Palestine), the revolutionary traps in which some countries fall (e.g., Kyrgyzstan, or Mali), the ongoing process of increasing maturity of statehood (examples are Sudan, Algeria) or weakness of state and failure of state functions (Mali), as well as changes in the geopolitical situation, which we will discuss in the third section. One should point out that the countries of the Arab Spring have not calmed down to the end and revolutionary epochs (as in Egypt) or vestiges (as in Tunisia) continue there, not to mention Libya and Syria.

About Revolution and Reconfiguration of the World System Since 2009, we have been studying changes in the World System in connection with the forthcoming Arab Spring and have come to a conclusion that in the following

Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events …

263

decades the international system will start to transform faster and to a more considerable degree. In other words, we are entering a period of searching for new structural and systemic changes within the World System. We have also come to the conclusion that the turbulent events of the Arab Spring can be considered as the starting point of the global reconfiguration of the World System, which will eventually lead to its dramatic transformations. The main reason for this reconfiguration, as we have shown, is associated with a noticeable lag between the political component of globalization and its economic component. However, this will be a rather long and turbulent period (Grinin and Korotayev 2010:173; see also Grinin 2009, 2010, 2012a, b; Grinin and Korotayev 2011, 2012a, b, 2016; Grinin et al. 2017). We also argue that some revolutionary waves have additional important world-system reasons for their emergence (Grinin 2022). In our opinion, the Arab Spring wave refers to such waves (Grinin 2012a, 2022; see also Beck 2014). At the same time, we rely on our own theory stating that the political component of the World System lags behind its economic component and from time to time starts to catch it up. When such a catch-up occurs, it often turns out to be complicated and turbulent. Revolutions in this case appear a part of a broad and conflicting process of the world-system political component catching-up with its economic component (Grinin 2022). Therefore, we consider the Arab Spring as a period of drastic upheavals (still far from being over) that launched the world-system reconfiguration process. It also became a harbinger of the coming serious structural transformations of the world (see: Ibid.; see also Grinin 2016; Grinin et al. 2019). We also pointed out that the future revolutionary process might be associated with general processes of destabilization in various parts of the World System, and in particular, in the Afrasian instability macrozone, since revolutionary process never occurs in isolation and it is always a more or less important part of a wider turbulent process. Thus, political relations often do not keep up with economic growth. Meanwhile, rapid economic development requires a certain pulling of the political system to an appropriate level. Otherwise, internal tensions and contradictions in society increase. And the stronger they are perceived, the greater is the possibility of revolutionary crises. However, the change of political and social institutions in many societies is hampered by their rigidity, as well as by the interests of the elite. Such a situation of a strong gap between the level of technological and economic development, on the one hand, and the backwardness of political system, on the other, can be found in many societies during the period of growing revolutionary crisis. Such a lag between two vectors leads to the emergence of various disproportions that contribute to the strengthening of opposition, the growth of protests and revolutionary ideologies. As the processes of globalization develop, such a gap between economic development (globalization) and institutional changes at the level of international relations and the world order (political globalization) becomes generally obvious within the World System. And in our opinion, this is becoming a more and more important cause of internal crisis in the World System and significant changes in it. By the 2010s, the economic and financial globalization had considerably advanced in its development in comparison with international law and political globalization.

264

L. Grinin and A. Grinin

In other words, within the framework of globalization, the political process lagged noticeably behind the economic one. But the lag in the development of one component from another cannot last endlessly, and when the gap becomes too large, a period of catching up of the political component begins. In this situation, the development of economy should have slowed down, which happened as a result of the 2008 crisis. And it is important to understand that the lag between social and political components and the economic one was one of the most important causes of this (as well as subsequent) crisis (Grinin et al. 2011). This did not become clear immediately, however, along with other reasons (in particular, due to the dynamics of long Kondratieff cycles (see, e.g., Grinin and Grinin 2014; Grinin et al. 2017)) this afforded ground for us to making predictions that in the following 15–20 years the world economy would develop more slowly than in previous years (Grinin and Korotayev 2010: 172–174; see also Grinin 2009, 2010, 2012b; Grinin and Korotayev 2012b, 2015; Grinin et al. 2016a, b). In the current (pandemic) period we have even witnessed a negative growth (Efimovich 2020). While economic development will slow down, globalization will freeze or go backwards, the political transformation of the World System will intensify. Under the conditions of the World System reconfiguration, “the breaks” occur in its most unstable and weak places, and, as a rule, these regions are a place of confrontation between various interests and vectors of power.14 From this we may conclude that the processes of reconfiguration in the Afrasian instability macrozone can hardly cease. As already mentioned, we assume that the events of the Arab Spring from late 2010 launched the World System reconfiguration. The subsequent events in the Middle East, North Africa, Ukraine, and the Far East (Grinin 2014) more and more indicate that the reconfiguration of the World System has started and is proceeding quite actively. For our study, it is extremely important that while the World System reconfiguration started with the events of the Arab Spring in 2010–2011 and the central events of this revolutionary wave took place in the Middle East and North Africa, the situation with the third revolutionary wave would significantly differ. The fact is that starting from 2016, the World System reconfiguration process began to shift to its center.15 It has largely affected the United States and Europe, 14

We can see this by the Ukrainian example. This country (as it was several times in its history) today has become a stumbling block between Russia and the West. The Russian-Ukrainian war will influence greatly the World System reconfiguration. 15 We have witnessed unexpected turns in the UK, which is leaving the European Union, in Spain, for example, in connection with the events in Catalonia, in France, which was shaken by the “Yellow Vests” protests, in the USA, from the coming to power of Donald Trump and to the ongoing unrest of the black population and white sympathizers. It is worth mentioning also the protests in Canada and Corsica in 2022. All of these and other phenomena are elements of this reconfiguration. Finally, the 2020 coronavirus pandemic even became a completely global event which has been contributing to the destruction of the old world order. And the current temporary denial of the basic rights of citizens, the closure of borders, the uncontrolled use of artificial intelligence, etc., coupled with economic difficulties, will give impetus to significant changes in the future. As a result, the process of World System reconfiguration will intensify.

Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events …

265

where the main events of the reconfiguration process seem to take place at present.16 And inevitably this will significantly and in different ways impact the destiny of the societies of the Afrasian macrozone of instability, in general, and the MENA region, in particular. As a result, since 2018, the main revolutionary events of the third revolutionary wave took place in different places of the World System; and the confrontations in the USA in 2020–early 2021 became especially significant in this context. Thus, the events in the MENA region can no longer be considered as leading in the third revolutionary wave. They continue the world-system reconfiguration but already as a part of the global revolutionary process. Pulling up the political component to the economic one actually means a transition to a new world order. But such a transition will take quite a long time. And it is important to understand that its initial phase implies weakening, loosening and/or destruction of the old order (while the formation of a new order is the following phase). Consequently, with regard to the near future, one may speak about a very unstable and turbulent period full of conflicts and complicated, as already mentioned, by depressive economic development. Any political change that occurs at a national or regional scale, even any noticeable socio-political action that leads to destabilization or its threat, especially a revolution, in principle leads to an increase in crisis phenomena in the world. Unfortunately, we have also witnessed wars. The studies show that the possibility of revolutions and their victory largely depends on the existence of favorable international context (see, e.g., Goldfrank 1979; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Wickham-Crowley 1992). We believe that the World System reconfiguration will rather be favorable than negative for future revolutions.

On the Impact of Revolutionary Events in the Afrasian Instability Macrozone on the World System Revolutions or other manifestations of instability affect, in one way or another, the neighbors and sometimes also countries that are far from the zone of events. Thus, the ongoing civil war in Syria created the migrant crisis in Europe in 2015–2016. In 2021, the wave of refugees from Afghanistan and other places of the MENA region turned out to be a geopolitical weapon in Belarus hands and created a problem in relations between Belarus (which also experienced a failed revolution in 2020– 2021) and Europe. As is well-known, migrants from these and other countries tried to pass through Belarus to Poland, Lithuania and further on to other EU countries. Of course, the United States and also a number of other countries experience the 16

Based on the foregoing, two interrelated systems of global development vectors can be distinguished: weakening of the World System core, that is, of the United States and the West, and simultaneous strengthening of the positions of a number of peripheral countries, and in general, strengthening of developing countries in the world economy and politics. These two opposite vectors, however, together make up a single process which we call the Great Convergence (Grinin and Korotayev 2014, 2015).

266

L. Grinin and A. Grinin

influx of refugees from Afghanistan. Due to the Islamist terrorism, the problem of refugees is relevant and painful in the Sahel and beyond it, in other African regions (see Grinin 2020a, b, c, d, f). In particular, twenty million people live in the zone of terrorist attacks in the Sahel countries, which creates serious humanitarian problems and prerequisites for destabilization. According to the UN Secretariat, from January to November 2019, 488 terrorist attacks were carried out in Burkina Faso compared to 150 in 2018, in Niger–118 against 69. In 2019, 1,507 people were killed in terrorist attacks in Mali, 918 in Burkina Faso, and 404 in Niger. The number of displaced people reaches 1 million (UN 2019: 2/26; Korendyasov 2020; see also Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” (Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022, this volume)). All this makes these countries a zone of attention and geopolitical interests of large countries, including China, the USA, Russia, France, the EU and others. But the influence of this radicalism extends far beyond the Macrosahel zone. Thus, at the beginning of 2021, hundreds of thousands of refugees left Cabo Delgada, a province in northeastern Mozambique, as a result of an attack by radicals on the city of Palma, in particular tens of thousands fled to neighboring Tanzania (Fokina 2021; Volkov 2021). Terrorists carried out mass executions in the city. After 2018, the following revolutions can be considered as the major ones (the most important events): the revolutions in Sudan, Algeria, Mali, Kyrgyzstan, and especially the victory of the Taliban. But, as has already been mentioned above, each revolutionary event contributes to loosening of the world order, and in general, the events of recent years in the Afrasian macrozone of instability continue the process of the World System reconfiguration as a part of the transformation of the world order. We would like to dwell on several aspects of the impact of these revolutionary events on the World System and its parts. First, we should speak about geopolitical consequences which weaken the World System core. In particular, the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan produced a strong effect on the positions of the USA and its allies in terms of declining confidence in the USA, who had again betrayed the allies in the country. After the late 1970s, Afghanistan entered a long period of revolutions, civil wars, interventions, an actual decentralization of the country, and other disasters. It was not just a revolutionary epoch, but a significantly more difficult epoch of unrest and revolutions full of disasters and devastation, which, unfortunately, is still going on.17 Having started with a social-type revolution (with initial claims of a socialist type), it then turned into a religious one. With respect to the concepts of a revolutionary era and an era of unrest 17

The revolutionary epoch is a long period of change in which revolutions, revolutionary changes, counter-revolutions, various revolutionary episodes occur, which are associated with the struggle of various political and social forces for a political/social regime, power, and so on (see Grinin and Grinin 2022; Grinin and Korotayev 2020, 2021). Epochs of unrest and revolutions are the periods after revolutions, when the old order disappeared, and the new one is not established throughout the country; there are endless civil wars; centralization is lost in the country for a long time, the importance of the central government sharply declines, or the country splits into a number of territories, states or polities, none of which has the power to become a winner and unite the country. For characteristics of revolutionary epochs and epochs of unrest and revolutions, see Grinin and Grinin 2022).

Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events …

267

and revolutions, it is important to keep in mind that revolutionary events that occur in their course must be characterized as related, while the revolutionary events that happened in other periods—as independent. In this sense, the victory of the Taliban is not an organic part of the third revolutionary wave (and of any other wave). But it gave the third wave and the events in the Afrasian macrozone a very significant world-systemic resonance. The defeat, a shameful one at that, of the United States in Afghanistan along with the collapse like a house of cards, of the regime that they had been establishing for 20 years, (a) weakened the influence of the United States in the Greater Middle East and in the whole world; (b) demonstrated that in recent decades the United States could easily betray its allies that relied on them (and there are millions of such loyal people in Afghanistan); (c) strengthened the position of Islamic fundamentalists not only in Afghanistan, but throughout the Islamic world. It also exacerbates concerns of neighboring countries (including Russia) that all sorts of uncontrolled people and cargoes as well as perilous impact would now penetrate through the Afghan border. In addition, the geopolitical struggle between major powers, including China, for influence in Afghanistan, is intensifying. Finally, the defeat in Afghanistan has deepened the rift in American society (and even in the Democratic Party) and the general crisis there, which will undoubtedly resonate in the world in a variety of ways. Perhaps, the defeat in Afghanistan may for some time restrain the aggressive aspirations that incite the American hawks to choose the course of aggravation of relations with Russia and in its turn gave the latter hope that the USA would not help Ukraine as actively as the USA does now. As to Afghanistan, on the one hand, the country will suffer a cultural and legal setback (which is already observed) with respect to the role and position of women, secular education, etc. But on the other hand, perhaps the country will find some peace, as far as it is actually possible under this regime.18 Finally, the Taliban’s victory intensified rivalry among radical Islamist forces, in particular between the remaining members of the Islamic State/Daesh, representing extreme radicals, and the Taliban, as moderate radicals. The clash between the two trends of extreme radicalism (Al-Qaeda and Daesh) has been going on in African countries since 2015 and especially intensified in 2019–2020 (see, e.g., Chapter “Revolutionary Events in Mali, 2020–2021” (Korotayev and Khokhlova 2022, this volume)). Secondly, the Middle East is gradually left on its own due to the planned and forced withdrawal of the United States from there (and the above-mentioned defeat in Afghanistan) and weakening of American support for Israel, the search for new directions in foreign policy (Grinin et al. 2016a, b: Conclusion). And revolutionary events contribute to this. All this leads to growing independence of the Middle Eastern countries from the United States.19 In general, over the past few years, the influence of global and regional geopolitics on destabilization in the Middle East has greatly 18

At least the Taliban have already banned the cultivation of opium poppy throughout Afghanistan. Yet, a direct or indirect influence of the United States on the revolutionary events, say, in Sudan cannot be entirely excluded. The Americans really disliked al-Bashar, the former president of Sudan,

19

268

L. Grinin and A. Grinin

increased, and the situation of instability has become permanent. The vacuum of external influence that emerged as a result of the US withdrawal from the Middle East is being filled by other players: Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Let us repeat that the vacuum also affected the revolutionary process, and, in turn, contributes to the weakening of the US position. We assume that this factor of destabilization will preserve its unceasing impact for a long time. Thirdly, the radical Islamist influence continues to be very noticeable, both in connection with the Taliban’s victory and with further expansion of the remaining revolutionary terrorists of the Islamic State into the Sahel countries and further to other African countries. Any rise of Islamism may produce an impact on regions in India and China where Muslims are a minority and feel themselves disadvantaged. There are a huge number of Muslims living in India, while there are such states as Jammu and Kashmir which border Pakistan and where Muslims make an absolute majority. This creates centers of instability. In China, a large number of Muslims live in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, where Western countries have long dreamed of making a revolution. And this may happen if China ever loosens the reins (for details see Grinin 2020f). But the most important, both in terms of scale and duration, is the impact of radical Islamism on Africa south of the Sahel. The phenomenon of Islamic renaissance together with a wide spread of Islamism actually creates an important basis for destabilization, since it generates radicalism as its extreme wing. In the Sahel and beyond, Islamism is mostly undeveloped. As a result, these societies, on the one hand, turned out to be susceptible to radicalism and terrorism, since radicals from the countries of the Middle East and North Africa quite easily recruit supporters and volunteers here, and on the other hand, these countries (due to the lack of experience, insufficient level of development of the state apparatus, a rapidly growing population, including urban, so cold youth bulges and other reasons) appeared in many respects helpless against terrorists. As a result, some of them have become bases for the spread of terror. Therefore, a number of countries, such as Mali and Niger, are in need of external assistance against terrorism. Radicals are active in many countries outside the Sahel. So, in 2016, a new terrorist organization was created (on the basis of the Somali Al-Shabaab) with a very characteristic name “Islamic State of Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda” (ISISSKTU), known as “Jahba East Africa”. In addition to these East African countries, radicals operate in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other countries. Thus, outside the Sahel, as a result of the activities of the radicals, an African zone of instability is being created, which tends to merge with the Afrasian one. The former can and probably will expand significantly. The terrorist revolutionism with Islamic characteristics is rapidly spreading. Let us point out a distinctive fact. As mentioned above, after the capture and burning of the city of Palma in Mozambique, tens of thousands of Mozambicans fled to Tanzania. However, the Prime Minister of Mozambique, Carlos Agostinho do Rosario, urged caution in dealing with refugees, since and imposed sanctions against his regime for supporting terrorists, and constantly incited separatists in South Sudan and Darfur against the central government.

Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events …

269

they may be trying to attract recruits for the ISIS (Fokina 2021). That is, radicalism is spreading via refugees. Thus, a new wave of revolutionary events does not simply continue the process of the world-system reconfiguration. While earlier we pointed out that this break associated with the Arab Spring happened in the MENA region, now Tropical Africa, and not only the Sahel, but also countries to its south gradually join it. At the same time, while the Middle East catches up to the level of developed countries (the first line of revolutionary directions), then in Tropical Africa, where the level of development is much lower, there are processes similar to the Reformation in Europe in the 16–17th centuries (Grinin 2019; Grinin, Korotayev 2019; Grinin et al. 2019), or at least to the Islamic revival of 50 years ago (see about this in Huntington 1996). But one way or another, revolutionary events bring many countries (especially from the hinterland) out of isolation. Let us also note that the growing danger of Islamist revolutionary-terrorist radicalism poses the problem (which they start to resolve in some places) of strengthening statehood in the countries of Tropical Africa, and also requires more active and extensive assistance from developed countries. The world needs African minerals, but the terrorist threat hinders their mining (similar to Afghanistan). Thus, the attack on the city of Palma in Mozambique had apparently the main goal of preventing the construction of an LNG plant and development of the Mozambique LNG project, on which the government of the country bet big. In 2011, the gas deposits were discovered on the shelf and in the basin of the Rovuma and Mozambique rivers which attracted leading mining and service companies to Mozambique, including Total, ExxonMobile, Mitsui, Oil India and others (Volkov 2021). Concluding the article, let us say that in one way or another, Tropical Africa (especially the part with Islamic population) will become a very restless territory for a long time. Moreover, we predict that this zone of instability in Africa will expand, capturing more and more countries. One may expect Africa to become the most vibrant zone of the World System. This is due to the fact that as society advances and transitions to more mature relations, there appear ideology, social, national and political forces and conditions for certain processes, which can simultaneously have a destabilization effect. This refers to the following factors: the aspiration for a nation state, for democracy and social justice, the elites’ desire to get some benefits and power, the struggle for resources and privileges, the strengthening contradictions between regions of a country, and many others. All this can lead to internal confrontation and, as a result, to possible destabilization. Modernization continues in the Sahel countries, in a number of countries in the Near and Middle East, as well as in the countries bordering the Afrasian instability macrozone. As a result, these societies form an increasingly complex conglomerate of modern and archaic features in all spheres of production and life. The archaic features will, of course, disappear, but this will take a long time. And with rapid modernization, a tough conflict arises between the advanced and the archaic, which in itself is a source of instability. At the same time, this will accelerate the activities to strengthen statehood, order and necessary legislation in African countries, so the attention to this continent will increase.

270

L. Grinin and A. Grinin

References Akhmedov V (2022) The Syrian revolution. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 707–723. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03086468-2_27 Barmin Y (2022) Revolution in Libya. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 725–738. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03086468-2_28 Beck CJ (2014) Reflections on the revolutionary wave in 2011. Theory Soc 43:197–223 Efimovich A (2020) Negative rates and other financial technologies in modern economic reality on the world-system scale. J Global Stud 11(2):63–75. https://doi.org/10.30884/jogs/2020.02.05 Filin N, Fahmy S, Koklikov V (2022) Two experiences of the Islamic “revival”: the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and the formation of the Islamic state in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 865–883. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_33 Fokina A (2021) Afrikanskiy khalifat. Kak “Islamskoye gosudarstvo” stalo franshizoy i pochemu okonchatel’no pobedit’ terroristov ne udayetsya? Lenta.ru 09.06.2021. https://lenta.ru/articles/ 2021/06/09/isis_africa/ Gallyamova A (2021) Dzhammu i Kashmir. Revolyutsionnyy epizod / protesty protiv otmeny avtonomii shtata i osobykh statey v konstitutsii v 2019 g. Sistemnyi Monitoring Globalnyh i Regionalnyh Riskov 12:615–626 Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (2022a) Introduction. Changing yet persistent: revolutions and revolutionary events. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_1 Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (2022b) Waves of revolutions in the 21st century. PolisPoliticheskiye Issledovaniya 4:108–119. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2022.04.09 Goodwin J, Skocpol T (1989) Explaining revolutions in the contemporary Third World. Politics & Society 17(4):489–507 Goldfrank WL (1979) Theories of revolution and revolution without theory: the case of Mexico. Theor Soc 7:135–165 Grinin L (2009) Privedet li global’nyy krizis k global’nym izmeneniyam? Vek Globalizatsii 2:117– 140 Grinin L (2010) Which global transformations would the global crisis lead to? Age of Globalization 2:31–52 Grinin L (2012a) Arabskaya vesna i rekonfiguratsiya mir-sistemy. Sistemnyi Monitoring Globalnyh i Regionalnyh Riskov 3:188–223 Grinin L (2012b) Rekonfiguratsiya mira, ili nastupayushchaya epokha novykh koalitsiy (vozmozhnyye stsenarii blizhayshego budushchego). Istoria i Sovremennost 2:3–27 Grinin L (2014) Risks of modernization and instability in Afro-Eurasia: past and present. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 5:95–127 Grinin L (2015) Novyy mirovoy poryadok i epokha globalizatsii. St. 1. Amerikanskaya gegemoniya: apogey i oslableniye. Chto dalshe? Vek Glob 2:2–17 Grinin L (2016) Indiya i Kitay: modeli razvitiya i perspektivy v mire. In: Akaev AA, Korotayev AV, Malkov SYu (eds) Strany BRIKS: kompleksnyy sistemnyy analiz, matematicheskoye modelirovaniye i prognozirovaniye razvitiya: Predvaritel’nyye rezul’taty. KRASAND, Moscow, pp 246–276 Grinin L (November, 2019) Islamism and globalization. J Globalization Stud 10(2) 21–36. https:// doi.org/10.30884/jogs/2019.02.02

Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events …

271

Grinin L (2020a) Dvizheniye k ustoychivym demokraticheskim otnosheniyam i natsional’nomu gosudarstvu kak dlitel’nyy faktor vozmozhnoy destabilizatsii v stranakh Afraziyskoy makrozony nestabil’nosti. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 11:694–724 Grinin L (2020b) Dvizheniye obshchestv k zrelym sotsial’no-politicheskim i ekonomicheskim otnosheniyam kak dlitel’nyy faktor vozmozhnoy destabilizatsii v stranakh afraziyskoy makrozony nestabil’nosti. Sist Monit Glob i Regnalnyh Riskov 11:666–693 Grinin L (2020c) Demograficheskiye protsessy kak bazovyy i dlitel’nyy faktor vozmozhnoy destabilizatsii v stranakh afraziyskoy makrozony nestabil’nosti. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 11:179–197 Grinin L (2020d) Islamizm, radikalizm, postislamizm v ikh otnoshenii k svetskim rezhimam i gosudarstvennoy ideologii. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 11:829–853 Grinin L (2020e) Revolyutsii kak faktor destabilizatsii i rekonfiguratsii mir-sistemy v XXI stoletii i afraziyskaya makrozona nestabil’nosti. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 11:144–178 Grinin L (2020f) Radikal’nyy islamizm, religioznyy faktor i destabilizatsiya v stranakh afraziyskoy makrozony nestabil’nosti. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 11:810–828 Grinin L (2020g) Prodolzhayushchayasya rekonfiguratsiya mir-sistemy i vozmozhnyye protsessy destabilizatsii v Afraziyskoy makrozone nestabil’nosti. Sistemnyi monitoring globalnyh i regionalnyh riskov 11:5–14 Grinin L, Grinin A (2022) Revolutionary waves and lines of the 20th century. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 315–388. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_12 Grinin L, Grinin A (2020) Revolyutsii XX veka: teoreticheskiy i kolichestvennyy analiz. Polis. Pol Stud 5:130–147 Grinin L, Grinin A (2021) Revolyutsii XX veka: obshchiye prichiny i klassifikatsiya. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 12:36–69 Grinin L, Korotayev A (2011) The coming epoch of new coalitions: possible scenarios of the near future. World Futur 67(8):531–563. https://doi.org/10.1080/02604027.2011.625749 Grinin L, Korotayev A (2012a) Does “Arab Spring” mean the beginning of world system reconfiguration? World Futur 68(7):471–505. https://doi.org/10.1080/02604027.2012.697836 Grinin L, Korotayev A (2012b) The coming epoch of new coalitions: possible global scenarios. In: Ilyin I, Korotayev A, Grinin L (eds) Globalistics and Globalization Studies. Uchitel, Volgograd, pp 366–393 Grinin L, Korotayev A (2020) Metodologicheskiye poyasneniya k issledovaniyu revolyutsionnykh sobytiy. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 11:853–861 Grinin L, Korotayev A (2021) Revolyutsionnyye sobytiya XXI veka i teoriya revolyutsii. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 12:543–567 Grinin L, Korotayev A, Tsirel S (2011) Tsikly razvitiya sovremennoy mir-sistemy. LIBROKOM, Moscow Grinin L, Issaev L, Korotayev A (2016a) Revolyutsii i nestabil’nost’ na Blizhnem Vostoke, 2nd edn. Uchitel, Moscow Grinin L, Korotayev A, Tausch A (2016b) Economic cycles, crises, and the global periphery. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41262-7 Grinin L, Grinin A, Korotayev A (2017) Forthcoming Kondratieff wave, cybernetic revolution, and global ageing. Technol Forecast Soc Chang 115:52–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016. 09.017 Grinin L, Grinin A, Korotayev A (2022) 20th century revolutions: characteristics, types, and waves. Humities Soc Sci Commun 9(1):1–13. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-022-01120-9 Grinin L, Grinin A (2014) The sixth Kondratieff wave and the cybernetic revolution. In: Grinin L, Devezas T, Korotayev A (eds) Kondratieff waves, Juglar––Kuznets––Kondratieff. Uchitel, Volgograd, pp 354–378 Grinin L, Korotayev A (2010) Will the global crisis lead to global transformations? 2. The coming epoch of new coalitions. J Glob Stud 1(2):166–183.

272

L. Grinin and A. Grinin

Grinin L, Korotayev A (2014) Globalization shuffles cards of the world pack: in which direction is the global economic-political balance shifting? World Futur 70(8):515–545. https://doi.org/10. 1080/02604027.2014.982474 Grinin L, Korotayev A (2015) Great Divergence and Great Convergence. A global perspective. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17780-9 Grinin L, Korotayev A (2016) MENA region and the possible beginning of world system reconfiguration. In: Erdogdu MM, Christiansen B (eds) Comparative political and economic perspectives on the MENA region. Information science reference, Hershey PA, pp 28–58. https://doi.org/10. 4018/978-1-4666-9601-3.ch002 Grinin L, Korotayev A (2022a) Revolutions, counterrevolutions, and democracy. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 105–136. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_4 Grinin L, Korotayev A (2022b) The Arab Spring: causes, conditions, and driving forces. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 595–624. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_23 Grinin L, Korotayev A, Tausch A (2019) Islamism, Arab Spring and democracy: world system and world values perspectives. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91077-2 Grinin L (2022) Revolutions of the 21st century as a factor of the World System reconfiguration. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 973–996. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_38 Guliev K (2021) Revolyutsionnyy epizod v Respublike Chad (fevral’–may 2021 g.). Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnykh Riskov 12:638–646 Gusseinov R (2021) Revolyutsionnyye i kvazirevolyutsionnyye sobytiya v Zakavkaz’ye (2020– 2021 gg.). Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnykh Riskov 12:603–614 Huntington S (1996) The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. Simon and Schuster, New York Huntington S (1993) The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman OK Issaev L, Korotayev A (2022) Introduction. New wave of revolutions in the MENA region in the global perspective. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) new wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_1 Issaev L, Khokhlova A, Korotayev A (2022) The Arab Spring in Yemen. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 685–705. https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_26 Ivanov E (2022) Revolutions in Kyrgyzstan. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 517–547. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03086468-2_20 Kaygorodova M (2021) Revolutionary events in the Republic of Maldives in the 21st century: background, chronology, consequences. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnykh Riskov 12:682–695 Kashina A (2022) Tunisia. Revolution of ballot boxes?. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 137–168. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_7 Kaygorodova M (2020) K voprosu o revolyutsionnykh sobytiyakh XXI v. v stranakh Azii. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnykh Riskov 11:899–918 Khatib DK (2022) 17 October (2019) Revolution in Lebanon. A preliminary analysis. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 75–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_4

Conclusion. New Wave of Middle Eastern Revolutionary Events …

273

Khodunov A (2022a). The Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 447–463. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-030-86468-2_16 Khodunov A (2022b). The Rose Revolution in Georgia. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 483–499. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-030-86468-2_18 Klochkova I (2021) Belorusskaya revolyutsiya 2020–2021 gg. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 12:588–602 Korendyasov E (2020) Sahel: dzhikhadisty vnov nastupayut. Chto delat? Inafran 22.01.2020. https:// www.inafran.ru/node/2141 Korotayev A, Issaev L, Rudenko M (2015) Formirovaniye Afraziatskoy Zony Nestabilnosti. Vostok (Oriens) 2:88–99 Korotayev A, Issaev L, Shishkina A, Rudenko M, Ivanov E (2016) Afrasian instability zone and its historical background. Social Evol Hist 15(2):120–140 Korotayev A, Grinin L et al. (2021a) Sotsial’no-politicheskaya destabilizatsiya v stranakh afraziyskoy makrozony nestabil’nosti: kolichestvennyy analiz i prognozirovaniye riskov. Lenand/URSS, Moscow Korotayev A, Liokumovich Y, Khokhlova A (2021b) Revolyutsionnyye sobytiya v Mali (1960–2021 gg.). Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnykh Riskov 12:329–370 Korotayev A, Khokhlova A (2022) Revolutionary events in Mali, 2020–2021. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 191–218. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_9 Korotayev A., Shishkina A., Khokhlova A. (2022). Global echo of the Arab Spring. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 813–849. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_31 Kostelyanets S (2022) Sudan’s December Revolution and the demise of the Al Bashir regime. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 33–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_2 Kozhanov N (2022) Sanctions and the socio-economic routs of Iran’s domestic instability (2010– 2020). In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 219–242. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03115135-4_10 Mansour S, Elhefnawy H (2022) Egyptian protests 2019: harbingers of a new revolution?. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 169–190. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_8 Mardasov A (2022) Revolutionary protests in Iraq in the context of Iranian-American confrontation. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 95–108. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_5 Pavlova A (2021) Revolyutsionnyy epizod v bolivii (iyul’–noyabr’ 2020 g.) v retrospektive revolyutsionnoy epokhi. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 12:654–671 Shevsky D (2022) Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds), Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 851–863. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-030-86468-2_32 Stepanishcheva Y (2021) Vystupleniya za vosstanovleniye monarkhii v Nepale (dekabr 2020 – yanvar 2021 gg.). Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 12:627–637 Tkachuk M, Romanchuk A, Timotin I (2022) ‘Moldovan Spring’ 2009. The atypical ‘revolution’ of April 7 and the days that followed. In: Goldstone JA, Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) Handbook of revolutions in the 21st century: the new waves of revolutions, and the causes and effects

274

L. Grinin and A. Grinin

of disruptive political change. Springer, Cham, pp 549–569. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03086468-2_21 UNO (2019) Security Council. Seventy-fourth year. Preliminary report. 8670th meeting. Wednesday, November 20, 2019, 3:30 pm New York. https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=ru/S/PV. 8670 Ustyuzhanin V, Grinin L, Korotayev A (2021) Revolyutsionnyye sobytiya XXI veka v afraziyskoy makrozone nestabil’nosti i nekotorykh drugikh mir-sistemnykh zonakh: predvaritel’nyy kolichestvennyy analiz. Sist Monit Glob i Regionalnyh Riskov 12:106–144 Volkov K (2021) V Mozambike terroristy zakhvatili gorod, 35 tysyach chelovek stali bezhentsami. Rg.ru 29.03.2021. https://rg.ru/2021/03/29/v-mozambike-terroristy-zahvatili-gorod-35-tysiachchelovek-stali-bezhencami.html Wickham-Crowley T (1992) Guerrillas and revolution in Latin America. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ Zakharov A, Issaev L (2022) Roots of new wave of protests in Jordan. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) new wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 109–136. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15135-4_6 Zoubir Y (2022) The crisis of the rentier state: how the Revolution of Smiles has brought down the sultanistic regime in Algeria. In: Issaev L, Korotayev A (eds) New wave of revolutions in the MENA region. A comparative perspective. Springer, Cham, pp 57–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-3-031-15135-4_3

Leonid Grinin is Senior Research Professor at Laboratory for Monitoring of Sociopolitical Destabilization Risks at the HSE University in Moscow, as well as Senior Research Professor of the Oriental Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is coeditor of the international journals Social Evolution & History and the Journal of Globalization Studies, as well as coeditor of the international almanacs Evolution, History and Mathematics, and Kondratieff Waves. He is author of more than 600 publications, including 30 monographs on Russian, English, Spanish, German, and Chinese. His current research focuses on MENA region, comparative political studies, theory of revolution, political anthropology, global economy, global history, historical sociology, and futures studies. Anton Grinin is a Russian scholar of modern technological trends and future studies, as well as evolutionist and philosopher. He has a Ph.D. in Biology and works as a Research Fellow for Moscow State University, Russia. He is an author of more than 100 publications in Russian and English, including 2 monographs. Anton Grinin focuses on the issues of the technological revolution (the Cybernetic revolution) evolving in the current decades of the 21st century and the resultant profound transformations in economy and society as well as related economic, political, ethiclegal and other risks, including political revolutions.