New Voices in Greek Orthodox Thought: Untying the Bond between Nation and Religion (Routledge New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies) [1 ed.] 9781472418944, 9781472418951, 9781472418968, 9781315598185, 1472418948

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New Voices in Greek Orthodox Thought New Voices in Greek Orthodox Thought brings to the light and discusses a strand in contemporary Greek public debate that is often overlooked, namely progressive religious actors of a western orientation. International and Greek media tend to focus on the extreme views and to categorise positions in the public debate along well known dichotomies such as traditionalists vs. modernisers. Demonstrating that in late modernity, parallel to rising nationalisms, there is a shift towards religious communities becoming the central axis for cultural organization and progressive thinking, the book presents Greece as a case study based on empirical field data from contemporary theology and religious education, and makes a unique contribution to ongoing debates about the public role of religion in contemporary Europe.

ASHGATE NEW CRITICAL THINKING IN RELIGION, THEOLOGY AND BIBLICAL STUDIES The Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology and Biblical Studies series brings high quality research monograph publishing back into focus for authors, international libraries, and student, academic and research readers. Headed by an international editorial advisory board of acclaimed scholars spanning the breadth of religious studies, theology and biblical studies, this openended monograph series presents cutting-edge research from both established and new authors in the field. With specialist focus yet clear contextual presentation of contemporary research, books in the series take research into important new directions and open the field to new critical debate within the discipline, in areas of related study, and in key areas for contemporary society. Other Recently Published Titles in the Series: Twentieth Century Christian Responses to Religious Pluralism Difference is Everything David Pitman Pannenberg on Evil, Love and God The Realisation of Divine Love Mark Hocknull Averroes and Hegel on Philosophy and Religion Catarina Belo Cassian’s Conferences Scriptural Interpretation and the Monastic Ideal Christopher J. Kelly Naturalism and Our Knowledge of Reality Testing Religious Truth-claims R. Scott Smith Thomas Torrance’s Mediations and Revelation Titus Chung Dalit Theology and Christian Anarchism Keith Hebden Dharma and Ecology of Hindu Communities Sustenance and Sustainability Pankaj Jain

New Voices in Greek Orthodox Thought Untying the Bond between Nation and Religion

Trine Stauning Willert University of Copenhagen, Denmark

First published 2014 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © trine stauning willert 2014 Trine Stauning Willert has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows: Willert, Trine Stauning. New voices in Greek Orthodox thought : untying the bond between nation and religion / by Trine Stauning Willert. pages cm. -- (Ashgate new critical thinking in religion, theology, and biblical studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4724-1894-4 (hardcover) -- ISBN 978-1-4724-1895-1 (ebook) -- ISBN 9781-4724-1896-8 (epub) 1. Orthodox Eastern Church--Greece--Doctrines. 2. Nationalism-Religious aspects. I. Title. BX618.W555 2014 281.9'495--dc23 2013045823 isBN isBN

9781472418944 (hbk) 9781315598185 (ebk)

Contents Acknowledgements   Introduction  

vii 1

1

From National Religion to Pure Religion: Historical and Conceptual Framework  

2

The Bonds between Nation and Religion: The Orthodox Legacy   39

3

Untying the Bonds: New Orthodox Voices on the Nation, Europe and Globalisation   

53

4

The Orthodox Legacy and Education  

83

5

Teaching Religion in the Greek School   

101

6

The Religion Class: Between a National, European and Multicultural Awareness   

115

7

A New Era in Religious Education?  

131

21

Conclusions   

155

Appendix: Interviews and Participant Observations    References   Index  

167 169 189

This page has been left blank intentionally

Acknowledgements I am indebted to The Danish Research Council (FKK) for a generous two-anda-half-year research grant (2008–2010) allowing me to travel to Greece several times to gather research material. Furthermore, I am deeply indebted to my colleagues involved in the research project ‘Between Conservative Reaction and Religious Reinvention: Religious Intellectuals in Central and South-East Europe on Community, Authenticity and Heritage’, research manager Professor Catharina Raudvere and Associate Professor Krzysztof Stala, for many fruitful and inspiring discussions. My special thanks are due to Catharina for her continuous support, encouragement and friendship. It has been a stimulating process preparing this book, and, first and foremost, it has been a very enriching experience to gain insight into the field of Greek Orthodox theology. The success of my endeavour is entirely due to the exceedingly friendly and open-minded treatment I have experienced in my meetings with representatives of the progressive theological milieu in Greece and with Greek theologians teaching religion in secondary school. I wish to thank them all warmly. In particular, I wish to thank Pantelis Kalaitzidis, Director of the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos, who has become a central figure in this book, for sharing his thoughts and texts with me, for welcoming me with open arms at the Academy and for taking the time to answer all my questions and queries. I also extend special thanks to Stavros Yangazoglou, pedagogical advisor and journal editor, for illuminating me on central issues regarding the teaching of religion in public education. Warm thanks are also due to Thanasis Papathanasiou, editor of the journal Sýnaxis, whom I had the opportunity to interview twice and who kindly provided me with many issues of the publication. I could mention many more theologians who have generously taken their time to drink coffee with me and patiently illuminate me on issues regarding Orthodox theology and the teaching of religion in Greece. The list is too long for me to mention everyone here, but I remember you all, and your friendship and kindness has been very dear to me. I wish to thank the following individuals for meeting with me several times and for extending me their friendship: Marios Koukounaras-Liagis, Nikos Asproulis, Georgios Kapetanakis, Eleni Kasselouri and Spyridoula Athanasopoulou-Kypriou. I also thank Thaleia Dragonas for, once again, having led my research in a fruitful direction since she drew my attention to the progressive theological milieu and in particular the Academy of Volos. Lina Molokotos-Liederman has become a supportive friend, and I thank her for sharing with me a part of this long journey in exploring tendencies of change in Greek Orthodoxy. Furthermore, this book owes a lot to her meticulous reading and her comments on the manuscript, and I am more

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grateful than I can possibly express in this acknowledgement. I would like to thank Tore Tvarnø Lind for our inspiring discussions on Greek modernity. Good friends like Kostas Papastathis, Alexandros Sakellariou and Anastasia Christou have read some early drafts of my texts and I thank them for their useful comments. I am also indebted to my colleagues in my new research project ‘The Many Roads in Modernity: The Transformation of South-East Europe and the Ottoman Heritage from 1870 to the Twenty-first Century’, who carefully read the manuscript in its last stages and gave me valuable suggestions for improving the text. Finally, I would like to thank everyone at Ashgate for their invaluable cooperation, professionalism and meticulous handling of my manuscript. It is obvious that I could not have accomplished the writing of this book without the love and support of my husband and children. Thank you for bearing with my absences and crises and for sharing my enthusiasm and fascination with all aspects of Greek culture. Needless to say that any shortcomings, errors or mistakes are exclusively my own. Some of the ideas and results presented in this book have been published in different forms in the following book chapters: Willert, T.S. (2012) ‘An Authentic Cultural Religion or Religious Purism. Discourses on Authenticity, National Identity and Orthodoxy in Greece in the 20th and 21st Centuries.’ In C. Raudvere, K. Stala and T.S. Willert (eds) Rethinking the Space for Religion. New Actors in Central and Southeast Europe on Religion, Authenticity and Belonging, pp. 70–94. Lund: Nordic Academic Press. Willert, T.S. (2012) ‘A new role for religion in Greece? Theologians challenging the ethno-religious understanding of Orthodoxy and Greekness.’ In Willert, T.S. and L. Molokotos-Liederman (eds) Innovation in the Christian Orthodox Tradition? The Question of Change in Greek Orthodox Thought and Practice, pp. 183–205. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing. Willert, T.S. (2013) ‘Religious, National, European or Multi-Cultural Awareness: The Religious Education Class as Cultural Battlefield in Greece.’ In R. Blanes and J. Mapril (eds) Sites and Politics of Religious Diversity in Southern Europe, pp. 331–58. Leiden, Boston and Tokyo: Brill.

Introduction The importance that is often assigned to Orthodoxy as a constituent feature of Greek culture is immense. One can particularly notice how the contribution of religion to the national cultural tradition is viewed as intrinsic, not only to identity politics and to nationalist campaigns organised by ecclesiastic and religious stakeholders, but also to wider intellectual circles and Greek elites. Even some Greek Communist members of parliament seem to value or even promote the links between the Greek nation and Orthodox Christianity in religious or cultural terms. Anna D. Horn, a member of the well-known Goulandri shipping family and founder of the Goulandri-Horn foundation, writes in the prologue of the foundation’s publication The Particularity of Modern Greek Culture:1 We inaugurate our publishing programme with this two-volume work dedicated to Modern Hellenism and Orthodoxy at one and the same time because we believe that the one part cannot be grasped without the other. We cannot imagine what [modern] Hellenism would be like without its faith, without the backbone of Orthodoxy just as we cannot imagine what Orthodoxy would be like without the [Greek] language and the support of Hellenism. The Foundation’s duty is to begin its [publishing] endeavour by underlining and honouring the interlinked involvement of the one with the other, their unbreakable connection, their diachronic engagement. (Horn 1999)2

The need to point out from the outset this intense relationship, which to some may seem entirely obvious and not in need of any particular underlining, has to do with the fact that my previous research has not considered the central role of Orthodoxy in the development and specificity of modern Greek culture. Since the early 1990s I studied Greek language and culture at the University of Copenhagen, studying abroad for several terms at the Universities of Athens and Crete. Since the late 1990s I have focused my research on identity construction and in particular on representations of Europe in the Greek school system (Willert 2006); as part of this project I conducted an extensive interview-based study in Greece. According to my research on Greek perceptions of the national self in relation to Europe, Orthodoxy did not seem to be a decisive factor, since the school pupils I interviewed did not, on the whole, view Orthodox Christianity or Christianity as 1  The publication is in two volumes and the second is devoted to the Church, liturgy, theology, the Church fathers and monasticism. 2  Unless otherwise stated all translations from Greek are by the author.

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a common thread or a dividing factor in the links between Greece and Europe, probably because religion did not occupy a prominent place in their daily lives. In early 2008 I joined a research programme entitled ‘Between Conservative Reaction and Religious Reinvention: Religious Intellectuals in Central and SouthEast Europe on Community, Authenticity and Heritage’. My initial plan was to study the impact of Neo-Orthodox nationalist rhetoric in today’s increasingly culturally heterogeneous Greece. Archbishop Christodoulos, at the time, was to a large extent a proponent of an anti-Western Neo-Orthodox discourse that extolled the Greek Orthodox glorious Byzantine past, while also warning that the sacred Greek Orthodox nation had to be rescued from the ills of modernity, perceived as the cultural decay of Western Europe and the increasing influx of (non-Orthodox) immigrants. However, as I began my research, Christodoulos passed away and the moderate, less politicised hierarch Ieronymos was elected Archbishop of Athens and All Greece. This leadership change in the Church certainly made it more interesting to look ahead and to examine the new directions of the Church and Greek Orthodox lay actors in a post-Christodoulos era. In my search for new religious voices and innovative initiatives, both within the Church itself and among theologians and especially in the field of education, I soon came into contact with the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos.3 I met theologians who positioned themselves as renovating agents of a typically conservative religious discourse in Greece. First of all, they were ardently opposed to the discourse of Christodoulos, but also after the election of a new Archbishop, they continued to act as an alternative institution to the traditional voices identifying Orthodoxy with Greek culture. It became obvious that in the midst of the deep economic, social and ideological crisis in Greece there is a movement which, since the turn of the century, has been attempting to set a new agenda: to change the traditional order of things and start a new era in the contemporary understanding of Greek Orthodoxy and its relationship with Greek national identity. While religion is often used as a conservative force that is typically called upon to safeguard tradition in times of crisis, it is interesting to note that in the case of these renovating efforts religion is used as a progressive and transformative power. At the same time, religion and faith may also be used as a strong ideological platform from which to challenge century-old societal patterns. This book is about such a religiously grounded transformation project carried out by Greek theologians in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In contrast to other studies on Greek Orthodoxy and its place in and relation to modernity, this book approaches a part of the Orthodox tradition in Greece that proposes a rethinking of the relationship with the past and its traditional rejection of modernity. Studies of Orthodoxy in Greece have often focused on the close relationship between religion and nationalism in both the Church and political discourse (for example Halikiopoulou 2011; Grigoriadis 2013). 3  Volos is a coastal port city in Thessaly situated between Athens and Thessaloniki. It is the sixth largest city in Greece.

Introduction

3

Against this backdrop, the present study examines alternative discourses to those that are defined in ethno-religious terms and that have prevailed so far. This book also differs from the majority of studies on Greek Orthodoxy because of its focus on religion in an urban and academic setting. Other studies have considered the Orthodox tradition and religious life from a variety of angles: from an anthropological perspective, from the point of view of everyday life in rural areas (Hart 1992; Dubisch 1995; Stewart 1991, 2012) and monastic life (Lind 2011), or from a political science perspective, looking at the relationship between religion and politics and the politicisation of church discourse in Greece (Stavrakakis 2002, 2003; Halikiopoulou 2011). But, before turning to the particular space of theology, which is at the core of this book, I will present a snapshot of the level of public interest in religion in Greece today. The Religion Market in Contemporary Greece Both fiction and non-fiction literature in Greece have evolved in the past decade towards increasing interest in religion, particularly issues of religious heritage and religious worldviews, with Orthodox Christianity as the point of departure. The thematic issue ‘Orthodoxy and Book(s)’ from the literary magazine Diavázo (505, March 2010) is a representative example of this trend. There are quite a few publishing houses in Greece dedicated to books on religious and theological subjects.4 One of these, Akrítas, taking its name from the mythical warrior hero Digenís Akrítas, who guarded the eastern frontiers of the Byzantine Empire, was founded in 1978 with the explicit aim of playing the role of ‘yet another renewing initiative, through print, in the area of religious renewal movements, which nurtured and continues to nurture the spiritual awakening of the flock of the Church’ (Economidou et al. 2009: 9). In the late 2000s, Akrítas published a series of edited volumes on issues relating to contemporary Greek culture and society from a religious perspective (such as ‘Crisis of the Family’); among the contributors there were clerics or theologians, but also secular intellectuals. The prologue of the edited volume Εσωστρέφεια [Introversion] refers to the ‘Grace of God’ which ‘inspires the work of the publishing house’; it also affirms that ‘the whole-hearted contact with both readers and authors, which is one of the aims of the publishing house’, can only be offered through ‘communication with the First Instigator and Patron’ (Economidou et al. 2009: 9–10). The theme of the volume, introversion, is particularly interesting because it illustrates a new readiness among Greek intellectual religious circles for critical reflection on the tendency towards self-sufficiency of Greek culture, the almost obsessive relationship with tradition, 4  Akrítas, Dómos, Maïstros, Armós, En Plo, and Pournarás are all publishing houses of a considerable size dedicated to books covering religious subjects.

4

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and the transmission of a fear of alienation when encountering someone foreign in cultural and religious terms. Similarly, the publishing house Índiktos has become a platform for progressive theological thinking since it usually publishes the conference proceedings from the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos. The publisher also put out the periodical Índiktos, with Stavros Yangazoglou as Editor-in-Chief, a theologian with an explicit modernising agenda. Magazines and periodicals on religious or theological issues are generally popular in Greece. The academic theological quarterly Sýnaxis has a circulation of 3,000 copies, which has remained stable since the 1980s. Many dioceses publish their own periodicals, some of which have a broad circulation.5 In 2009, the publishing house Maïstros launched an ambitious new magazine, Βημόθυρο [Vimóthyro, meaning ‘sanctuary door’]. Its cover and layout were similar to a contemporary lifestyle magazine, but with religious content addressing a modern non-academic readership. However, the initiative was short-lived, probably due to the economic crisis, so only two issues were published. Another trend in fiction literature is the tendency to publish novels dealing with issues of religious identity in Greece before and after the foundation of the modern Greek state. Several new novels have taken a critical look at corruption within the Church hierarchy and the conservative attitude of the Orthodox Church (Martinidis 2006; Alexakis 2007). Apart from such critical views, there is also an increased focus on religiosity and faith as a personal quest, instead of cultural identity and belonging. In 2001 Maro Vamvounaki, a popular and prolific author who has written best-selling novels and short stories since the early 1980s, coauthored a book entitled When God Dies (Katsiaras and Vamvounaki 2008), about religiosity, doubt and Greek Orthodoxy. The book was dedicated to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, indicating the author’s intention to move away from ethno-religious perceptions of Orthodoxy. Since 2003, there have been five editions of the book, the latest in 2009. In February 2010, a new publisher, Dómos, undertook a re-launching of the book and organised a large-scale book event at the Byzantine and Christian Museum in Athens, with prominent speakers such as the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Metropolitan Ioannis (Zizioulas), a renowned theologian. Both Bartholomew and Zizioulas are figures that represent a broad ecumenical understanding of Orthodox Christianity that is detached from the use of Orthodoxy as a specific marker and exclusive feature of Greek national culture. The distinction between a national and an ecumenical understanding of Orthodoxy is central to the theological phenomena examined in this book.

5  For example Πειραϊκή Εκκλησία [Piraeus Church] from the Metropolis of Piraeus since 2008, which also runs a TV station and a radio station.

Introduction

5

A Note on Ecumenism The term ‘ecumenical’ has several meanings. The first meaning relates to the Ecumenical Patriarch and here the meaning of ‘ecumenical’ applies to the overarching function of this ecclesiastical leader who, with his ecumenicity (referring to ‘the whole world’), has become a point of reference for all constituent Churches of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Since the twentieth century, however, the term ecumenical also refers to the ecumenical movement that attempts to reunite the Christian Churches (denominations) into one united Christian Church. There are several Christian organisations dedicated to the ecumenical movement, but the World Council of Churches (WCC), with more than 300 national and local member Churches, is one of the largest working at the institutional level of Churches. In Greece and in Eastern Orthodoxy in general, there has traditionally been a strong opposition to the ecumenical movement, emanating especially from the Orthodox spiritual centre of Mount Athos. Yet, several prominent Greek Orthodox theologians and Church hierarchs have contributed to the work of the WCC, with Archbishop Anastasios of Albania being one of its current presidents. The concept of ecumenism is problematic because even if it designates attempts to unite Christianity, it remains firmly rooted in a particular denominational context. Thus, ‘an ecumenical understanding of Orthodoxy’ points to a specific position in the Orthodox Church that is open to dialogue with other Churches in the ecumenical movement, yet not a position that has abandoned Orthodoxy as the ‘true’ version of Christianity.6 The Religious Landscape and Religious Pluralism in Contemporary Greece The Orthodox Church in Greece is often viewed as representing the large majority of the population as a homogeneous body of believers.7 Makrides and MolokotosLiederman (2004: 467) had even concluded in 2004 that ‘all in all, Orthodoxy acts as [Greece’s] main cultural backdrop and reservoir’. This is true in general terms, but taking a closer look one can find diverse nuances within the Orthodox Church itself and, as Fokas (2007: 301) has pointed out, one should not ignore the polyphony within Greek Orthodoxy. It is certain that the idea of Orthodox Christian identity, as a unifying religious identity and core element of Greek society, no longer corresponds to the religious composition of the population in Greece at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Apart from the increasingly diverse composition of the population due to immigration, the Orthodox Christian population has also undergone changes itself towards a continually more secularised relationship with religion (Petrou 2001: 30). Thus, today the religious 6 7

 For an overview of the Orthodox participation in the WCC see Tsompanidis (2012).  Stavrakakis (2002: 5) refers to a Eurobarometer survey from 1991, according to

which 98.2 per cent declared themselves members of the Orthodox Church.

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orientation of baptised members of the Church of Greece varies from atheism and indifference to nationalist and/or religious fundamentalism. The internal diversity among Orthodox believers, theologians and Church representatives is at the core of this book; so is external diversity, namely the increasing pluralism of Greek society and the world as a whole in late modernity. Hence, today it is inaccurate and a gross simplification to characterise the religious landscape of Greece, the population in Greece, or the faithful members of the prevailing Christian Orthodox religion as homogeneous. As an example of the increasing pluralism within the Orthodox Church and the different ways in which religious agents can respond to the challenges of pluralism in late modernity, this book focuses on proposals from Greek theologians who have attempted to revive a different collective memory. The version of Orthodoxy in these proposals is not based on the identification of religion and national identity, but rather on an anticipated universal and global, or ecumenical, Christianity, a Christian kind of ‘Ummah’, with roots in a perceived tradition of Orthodox ecumenism originating in the East Roman Empire as a pre-national community but with its main point of reference inspired from early Christianity. The ideal of a pre-national form of Christian identity, unaffected by cultural, political and economic divisions, indicates a longing for religion in a purer religious form than its usual appearance in Greece, for example during national holidays when religion becomes a pompous and ceremonious expression of official national ideology. The desire for a religion that is pure and independent from cultural expressions or national characteristics corresponds to several global trends among religious agents who promote religious messages in a way that is detached from territorial and cultural markers. Olivier Roy (2010), who propounded a theory of ‘religion without culture’,8 has studied extensively such global trends in religion during late modernity. Apart from the global tendency of an increasing preoccupation with religion and its societal role, the interest in religion in Greece has been intensified because of a series of events related to the Church of Greece. In 1998, Christodoulos (1939–2008) was elected Archbishop of Athens and All Greece and thereby head of the Church of Greece.9 He was a charismatic figure who knew how to take advantage of public disaffection, among certain population segments, with 8  I use the expression ‘religion without culture’ from the original French title of Roy’s book (2008) La sainte ignorance: Le temps de la religion sans culture. In the English edition of the book (Roy 2010) ‘religion without culture’ has been translated as ‘when religion and culture part ways’. 9  For historical reasons several dioceses in Northern Greece and the Aegean Islands (the so-called ‘New Lands’) adhere spiritually to the Patriarchate of Constantinople (the ecumenical Patriarch), but are under the jurisdiction of the Church of Greece. The Church of Crete, the dioceses of the Dodecanese islands and Mount Athos are under the direct jurisdiction of the ecumenical Patriarchate and, thus, do not belong to the Church of Greece. However, the Archbishop of Athens symbolically represents the whole Greek nation, for example by blessing the Greek parliament at the opening ceremony in October or after elections.

Introduction

7

Greece’s engagement in the West, primarily through EU membership, and with the country’s supposed de-nationalisation followed by a purported loss of specifically Orthodox religious values. He brought a new populist style to Church leadership and managed to increase the Church’s popularity, as well as, its political influence through a series of events, most notably the ID cards affair. In 2001, the Church claimed to have gathered three million protest signatures, more than 25 per cent of the population, against a government bill to remove religious affiliation from Greek citizens’ ID cards. Christodoulos’ attempt to build another movement of popular mobilisation, this time against the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, was, however, severely damaged in 2005 when a series of economic and sex scandals among high-ranking members of the Church hierarchy were exposed. The negative publicity of religious institutions continued throughout 2008 when the abbot of a large monastery in Mount Athos, the Vatopedi, was charged with alleged fraud and embezzlement. The period from 1998 to 2008, when Christodoulos was Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, witnessed a plethora of critical scholarly articles on the role of religion in Greece, church–state relations and national and religious identity.10 After the passing of Christodoulos, the Church of Greece elected a somewhat older and more moderate leader, Archbishop Ieronymos II (b. 1938). As Archbishop, Ieronymos has acted in almost the opposite manner as Christodoulos. Instead of seeking publicity and media exposure, he kept a low profile during the first year of his tenure, appearing rarely on TV and giving only a few newspaper interviews. In his inaugural speech he said that the role of the Church is ‘to produce spiritual antibodies’ and that clergymen should not act as politicians (Papastathis 2012: 215). One of his first actions in the Archbishopric was to shut down the charity organisation Solidarity (Αλληλεγγύη), inaugurated by his predecessor in 2002, because of allegations of economic fraud, and to replace it with a new organisation Mission (Αποστολή). He seemed to take upon himself the role of cleaning up and restoring the Church’s credibility. Furthermore, by choosing to make only modest and rare public statements, he has attracted much less criticism and scholarly attention than his predecessor. Besides, the crisis that broke out in 2009, which in the past four years has brought increasing poverty to people in Greece, has been a key factor in enabling the Church and the Archbishop to focus on philanthropic action instead of politics. The political and intellectual space in the 1990s and early 2000s witnessed new ideological trends in Greece, expressed as ‘modernisation’, ‘Europeanisation’ and reflexive nationalism. The essentialist, ethnocentric understanding of Greek national identity came under sharp criticism from academics and intellectuals,11

10  Relevant studies include those by Chrysoloras (2004), Molokotos-Liederman (2003), Roudometof (2005), Stavrakakis (2002, 2003) and Prodromou (2004). 11  An ambitious research project on ethnocentrism in education (Frangoudaki and Dragonas 1997) brought attention to representations of the nation in Greek primary and

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particularly from the Left, but also from the progressive theological circles that are the focus of this volume. Against the backdrop of previous Greek theological and cultural positions on a nationalist interpretation of Orthodoxy, this book presents a study of contemporary attempts to renew theological and religious discourse in Greece. The Greek historical context, outlined in Chapter 1, helps explain these new theological positions because much of their argumentation is formed in opposition to the historical development of Orthodoxy in Greek culture. Religious Authenticity and Representations of ‘the Other’ A characteristic feature of the Greek debates over the authentic interpretation of Orthodoxy is that the arguments are almost always formulated as criticism against an external or internal ‘Other’,12 who supposedly causes the obliteration of the true dogma. What follows is a brief introduction to the previously dominant religious–theological paradigm and the way it has expressed Greek Orthodox identity in opposition to various Others that are deemed detrimental to the development of the Orthodox faith. The 1980s witnessed the emergence of the so-called Neo-Orthodox current, which inspired many intellectuals and artists to cultivate a religious, Byzantine dimension of Greek culture. Through their artistic and public activities the proponents of the Neo-Orthodox current encouraged a national identity founded on the Orthodox tradition and spirituality. During this period, religious intellectuals constructed the Other as Greeks who, not (yet) fully aware of the crucial importance of Orthodoxy in an ‘authentic Greekness’, continued to lead a Western, secular lifestyle. A central text from this period is Finis Graeciae by the theologian Christos Yannaras (1987). The Latin title of this publication illustrates the argument that Greece has sold itself to the West. Interest in the significance of the Orthodox heritage for Greek identity continued in the 1990s. In this period, the Other was the West itself in a more general sense, rather than fellow Greeks who were leading a lifestyle imported from the West. Orthodox faith and culture were instrumentalised as strong identity markers vis-à-vis the West: in particular the EU, which demanded that Greece adapt to ‘European’ principles, including human rights and transparency, and the

secondary school and suggested that ethnocentric views resulted in a fragile and defensive national identity. 12  The idea that somebody else is always the cause of one’s own misfortunes, leading to a plethora of conspiracy theories, is of course a universal psychological mechanism, but it has been a recurrent theme in Greek history because Greek nation-building was the product of opposition to dominant Others (Turks, Bulgarians) and/or unequal relationships with powerful Others (French, British, Russian).

Introduction

9

USA, which attracted renewed anti-American sentiment due to its involvement in a NATO-led intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the late 1990s, a new development has also changed the way religious intellectuals relate to Orthodox identity: the waves of immigration to Greece by diverse ethnic and religious groups (i.e. non-Christian and non-Orthodox populations). Foreign immigrants, but also Greek intellectuals advocating human rights and a secular state, attempting to confine religion to the private sphere,13 constituted the new Other within Greek borders. The 1990s were marked by the fall of communism and, thereby, the revival of the Orthodox Churches in the former Eastern Bloc. The break-up of former Yugoslavia into several republics and the subsequent NATO-led military intervention and aggressive military campaign against Bosnian Serbs (who are Orthodox) was perceived in Greece as an attack against coreligionists. These political and military events sharpened the divisions between anti-Western (religious) nationalists and those in favour of Greece’s continuous alliance with the West through EU and NATO membership. The Church’s one-sided official rhetoric was met by a response, also more or less one-sided, from secular intellectuals opposing the ethno-religious nationalistic values propagated by Christodoulos and religious intellectuals such as Christos Yannaras. Thus, during the first decade of the twenty-first century there were very clear lines between these two views. But as this volume shows, in that same decade, voices of discontent from within the Orthodox community of believers, primarily theologians, gradually developed an alternative way of speaking about religion and its role in society; moreover, the open and dialogic outlook of these voices has invited the other, more traditional and conservative ‘camp’ to soften their rhetoric and enter into dialogue. This blurs the picture so it is no longer accurate to speak of ‘two different and polarising options’ as some researchers have put it (Roudometof 2012). The new religious thinking that has emerged since the late 1990s rejects the view that all external and internal Others, as mentioned above, constitute a problem for (Greek) Orthodox identity. On the contrary, they argue that the European context and the advent of pluralism represent a unique chance for Orthodoxy to fulfil its original and true mission of evangelisation. Based on a so-called ‘open theology’, this new current attempts to break down the barriers between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, taking as its point of departure Biblical quotations on the effacement of cultural, social and other differences in the name of Christ. Like earlier religious movements in Greece, including private religious organisations of the 1940s and 1950s (such 13  No Greek government has yet challenged the presence of the Orthodox Church in official ceremonies (for example, in the opening of the Parliament or the inauguration of a new government which is always blessed by the Archbishop of Athens and all Greece), or on national holidays, where the clergy has a dominant presence. For decades, left-wing parties have demanded a civic oath as an alternative to the obligatory religious oath for newly elected MPs, and while their deputies have refrained from taking the religious oath, no Greek government has taken steps to institutionalise a civic oath.

New Voices in Greek Orthodox Thought

10

as Zoí and Sotír) and the Neo-Orthodox movement in the 1980s, this current also views religion as a constituent feature – or the missing link – of (late) modern life. However, instead of turning against secular elements in Greek society, the West or the multicultural composition of society, its proponents seem to have turned against what they see as the abuse of religion in the name of the nation. The fact that Greek theologians from this new current refuse to position themselves and their view of Greek Orthodoxy in opposition to an Other is not specific to Greece, but part of a global trend in theology. Lynch (2000) reports how a new current in international theology has emerged from the preoccupation of theologians with post-colonial studies. The new trend adheres to syncretism as ‘the very essence of all religious identity’ (Lynch 2000: 756). I would not say that the new current in Greek theology applies a syncretic approach to the Christian Orthodox faith, but that the international trends of ‘[breaking] down the violence of self/other categorisation’ (ibid.) apply well to the Greek situation. For these theologians, reflexivity and self-awareness in syncretic ethics can lead to a) liberation from oppressive theologies, and b) the collapse of reified notions of alterity in favour of “religious deterritorialisation”, such that there is no concrete “other” against whom we can engage in exclusivist reaction (ibid.: 757).

Lynch’s above description of the premises of ‘syncretic ethics’ fits well with the recurring themes of reflexivity, theology of otherness, liberation from past theologies and religious deterritorialisation that we are now starting to see in a new Greek theology. Public Education Much of the public debate over identity issues in Greece revolves around the nature and purpose of public education, particularly the history and religion classes and the school textbooks that are published by the Ministry of Education. Textbooks in Greece are written by teams of teachers and/or university professors who have been appointed by the Pedagogical Institute after an open competition.14 The use of the textbooks is mandatory for each year in each subject and there is both a  The Pedagogical Institute (PI) is a state institution established in 1964 with the aim of undertaking the development of curricula and school textbooks. It is a powerful institution that often exerts considerable influence on the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs. In 2012 the name of the institute changed to the Institute of Educational Policy, and it is now a private legal entity supervised by the Ministry of Education. The main aim of the new institute is ‘the scientific research and study of issues related to primary and secondary education, along with the transition from secondary to tertiary education, and the continued scientific and technical support to the design and implementation of educational policy issues’ (http://www. iep.edu.gr/site/index.php/en, accessed 6 June 2012). To avoid confusion and since most of the 14

Introduction

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textbook and a teacher’s guide.15 The religion textbooks that have been in use in lower secondary education since 2006 focus on the Orthodox Christian tradition and faith in a Greek context. However, these textbooks have been subject to criticism from conservative stakeholders because of the new pedagogical methods they introduced. The conservative union of theologians ΠΕΘ (Πανελλήνια Ένωση Θεολόγων) [Pan-Hellenic Union of Theologians/PETH] is against any reform or change in the curricula and the textbooks of the religion class. Through close cooperation with the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, the union has tried to obstruct or reverse new initiatives regarding the teaching of religion.16 The union’s alliance with the Church is important since the Church is entitled to be heard in educational matters regarding religious education. When the Ministry attempts to change schoolbooks in an effort to dilute their ethnocentric, confessional and mono-religious content, the Church and religious intellectuals tend to react very strongly, viewing themselves as the guardians of the nation and the Orthodox tradition. For example, when the Ministry issued a new history book for sixth grade, a fierce public debate broke out in 2007 over the risk of loosening the tight bonds between the Orthodox Church and the Greek nation. The debate started when the head of the Church of Greece at the time, the charismatic Archbishop Christodoulos, protested about the book’s lack of reference to the role of the clergy and the Church during the Greek uprising against the Ottoman Empire in 1821. The head of the team of authors behind the textbook, Maria Repousi, maintained that it was written according to contemporary history schoolbooks in other countries. After more than half a year of protests and signature petitions against the book, the Ministry of Education finally withdrew it.17 The debate illustrated clearly how various public stakeholders, including the Church and the State, attempt to push Greek society in opposite directions: on the one hand, a nation founded on religious (Orthodox) values and inspired by a nineteenth-century romantic nationalism and, on the other hand, a secular state that has developed out of socio-economic and political contexts. The history textbook controversy shows how ethno-religious arguments relating to the survival of the nation still have a strong persuasive power in Greece. Such arguments gain their strength from an opposition of the material collected in this book relates to the period before 2012, the institute is called by its old name throughout this volume, even when referring to the period after 2012. 15  A school reform from 2010 envisions that single mandatory textbooks for each class are replaced by teaching portfolios that allow more freedom in the teaching practice. However, the severe economic problems of the Greek state delay the implementation of the school reform that requires in-service teacher training. 16  A collection of the Union’s critical assessments regarding the development and implications of new curricula in 2010–2013 can be found at the union’s webpage at www. petheol.gr. These are also referred to by Yangazoglou (2013b: 15–34). 17  In this instance, the signatures (11,650 in total) were not collected by the Church, but through a conservative, nationalistic website/periodical antibaro.gr (http://palio. antibaro.gr/upografes.php, accessed 27 May 2013)

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type ‘Us and Them’, or a reference to the Other. In the above case the Other was internal, namely the State and the secular intellectuals who presumably want to diminish the role of the Church in Greek national history. Lately, a growing group of progressive voices with a theological agenda have emerged more particularly in the debates over reassessing the content of the religion class in Greek public education. This is why a large part of this book is dedicated to this issue. Since, according to some observers, a rather small percentage of the Greek population is actively engaged in the life of the Church, the role of religion in education becomes a very crucial issue because this is the only public space and religious training ground for future citizens.18 Therefore, religious education has become the main arena for the opposition of different views within the Church and within theological circles in Greece. The debate over religious education in school seems to be an example of the type of opposition between two groups of intellectuals in Greek society. Schematically speaking, representatives of a group that could be called ‘nationalisers’ use a rhetoric of imminent danger and disaster, suggesting that Greece is under siege by forces aiming to undermine its national identity. They stress the central role of Orthodox Christianity in defining and preserving Greekness. On the other hand, representatives of another group that could be called ‘modernisers’, or alternatively ‘Europeanisers’, are in favour of adjusting Greek institutions to international norms and secularising Greek society by disentangling the State from its bonds with the Orthodox Church. This group also avoids using a nationalistic rhetoric, envisioning Greece as a plural society that does not discriminate citizens according to ethnic belonging or religious belief. Some researchers see these two groups as ‘well-defined’ and refer to them as ‘camps’. Makrides and Molokotos-Liederman (2004: 462) also speak about Greece as a society with a strong cultural dualism, evident in the ongoing controversies between differing value systems and orientations. These can be subsumed under the general rubric of the battle between anti-Western traditionalists (under the influence of Byzantine Orthodoxy and the Ottoman period) and pro-Western modernisers (under the influence of the Enlightenment and Liberalism).

18  Yangazoglou (2013a: 30) estimates that only 1–2 per cent go to church regularly, despite the general belief that 97 per cent of the Greek population are Orthodox Christian. Yangazoglou’s estimation is perhaps extreme and an expression of his own pessimistic estimate of religiosity in Greece today. According to Stathopoulou (2010: 201), presenting figures based on the European Social Survey in 2004–2005, 52.74 per cent of the Greek population go to church once a month or more. However, as with all quantitative data it is difficult to know what lies behind the numbers. Attending church services can cover a broad range of activities, from participating in the liturgy for three hours to entering the church for five minutes to worship the icons and light a candle. In essence, the figures do not say much about the religiosity and devotion of the Greek population.

Introduction

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It is not a false picture to draw up the lines between these ‘two public agendas that have been competing for the hearts and minds of Greece’s public for nearly two decades’ (Roudometof 2012: 244). However, this is only a partial picture, since in the past decade new voices have attempted to soften the dividing lines between the ethno-religious nationalist traditionalist and the secular modernising Europeanist positions. Thus, voices with a Christian Orthodox worldview now argue in favour of pluralism, Europeanisation and modernisation, while secular legal experts and leftist intellectuals express positive views on the role of religion in modern society, or at least the recognition of the pervasive historical influence of the Orthodox Church and Orthodox culture in the development of the Greek nation. Therefore, clear lines can no longer be drawn between nationalists and Europeanists, between secular and religious intellectuals; the boundaries between these two views have become increasingly fuzzy.19 Research Approach The purpose of this investigation is to analyse a case study of religiously grounded intellectual responses among younger Greek Orthodox theologians to the recent social, cultural and political conditions in Greece.20 Drawing on interviews with and selected texts by contemporary Greek theologians and intellectuals, this book attempts to shed light on the recent antinationalistic, pro-diversity discourses that have claimed a place in the abovementioned progressive theological and religious milieus in Greece in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The analysis of these progressive religious views will demonstrate how they draw on global discourses of late modernity and globalisation, including discourses on post-nationalism, in order to advance the message of an ecumenical and universal Christian truth that is claimed to be the basis for, and not an obstacle to, the modernisation of Greek society. On the one hand, these discourses may exemplify a specifically Greek project of religious  It is not the first time in Greek intellectual history that thinkers of apparently opposite worldviews have engaged in dialogue. In the early 1980s, some Marxist/ communist intellectuals attempted to start a dialogue with proponents of the Neo-Orthodox current (Makrides 1998). 20  The main part of the study reported in this book took place before the economic crisis broke out (2008–2009). It is, however, worth noting that the progressive discourses, positions and agendas regarding theological renewal and modernisation of the religion class have not been particularly altered in the period 2010–2013 despite the effects of the economic crisis. This could indicate that discourses, which were favourable towards reform, were developed even before the crisis, thus suggesting an early recognition of the deep structural problems of Greek society, which, in the case of the Orthodox Church, has been expressed as a deep conservatism and traditionalism. In this sense, the crisis only reinforced the demand for change in theological thinking and in the teaching of religion as one aspect of Greek society. 19

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innovation or modernisation; on the other hand, they can also be seen as national expressions of a global phenomenon, namely the detachment of religion from culture, through the dissociation of faith communities from cultural and national identities. Olivier Roy (2010) has argued that the current spreading and resurgence of religion reveals a tendency for religious movements and religious actors to distance themselves from a specific cultural framework or from any geographical embeddedness: ‘Secularisation and globalisation have forced religions to break away from culture, to think of themselves as autonomous and to reconstruct themselves in a space that is no longer territorial and is, therefore, no longer subject to politics’ (Roy 2010: 2). This phenomenon has also been called the deterritorialisation or delocalisation of religion (Hervieu-Léger 2002: 103). This research is focused on the written and spoken discourses of contemporary younger theologians who propose the renewal and modernisation of Greek Orthodoxy while expressing an innovative conception of the role of religion in the Greek nation state and society today. The intention is to examine how the theologians conceive the way Orthodoxy is practiced by their fellow countrymen and how they envisage the future role of the Orthodox Church and Orthodox religious practice in Greece. Discourses on modernisation and globalisation provide the general framework in which this religious innovation takes place. These discourses contain concepts such as ‘modernisation’, ‘modernity’ or ‘late modernity’ and ‘globalisation’, which, in the traditional Orthodox theological and ecclesiastical discourse, have been perceived as negative developments. In the discourse of progressive Orthodox theologians, these concepts are seen as welcome challenges and used as tools to develop a new understanding of Orthodox identity in Greece. While modernisation and globalisation can be seen as purely descriptive categories, albeit open to various value-laden interpretations, cosmopolitanism comprises a set of theories that tend to be normative (idealist) and worldview-based (Weltanschauung). Acknowledging the demise of the ‘container-nation society’ Ulrich Beck (2006, cited in Speck 2012: 159) proposes a ‘cosmopolitan vision’ that he regards as necessary to replace the national focus which is no longer capable of grasping the social relations with ‘cultural others’ (ibid.). Cosmopolitanism, representing a non-religious value system, is not a common point of reference in theological discourse but there are many similarities between the aims of Christian ecumenical theology and cosmopolitanism. Both are proposals that aim towards the overcoming of cultural, ethnic, geographic and other boundaries. For the Orthodox Christian theologians it is specifically the Christian Church that can provide the framework for overcoming divisions and boundaries. Ulrich Beck, one of the fathers of concepts such as ‘reflexive modernity’ and ‘second modernity’, has lately argued in favour of tendencies towards the ‘individualisation of religion’ as supportive to ‘normative cosmopolitanism’ (2010: 175; see also Speck 2012).21 21  Beck apparently welcomes reflexive religiosity and the Greek theological project, described in this book, could be considered such an example because of its potential to ‘save the world’ in the context of what Speck (2012: 170) has called ‘salvific cosmopolitanism’.

Introduction

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The innovative use of concepts like ‘globalisation’, ‘late modernity’ and ‘multi-culturalism’ lends a progressive air to a contemporary Christian theological discourse that could otherwise be expected to be in conflict with the idea of progress, according to the Enlightenment perspective, because of its religious worldview. This apparent contradiction of progressive theological discourse – theology being the voice of religious tradition – and progressive discourse – representing an attack on tradition – is at the core of the research presented in this book. A key to understanding the inherent contradiction in progressive theology can be sought in the concept ‘religious innovation’ (Williams et al. 1992; Willert and MolokotosLiederman 2012). This concept will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1. Methodological Approach Two main analytical frameworks have guided the methodological approach of this book, argumentation analysis and a historical approach. Argumentation analysis is applied to examine questions such as: ‘By which means and on the basis of what criteria do different stakeholders use religion to assume a social, political or economic position in society?’ and ‘Which words and positions are used as powerful rhetorical markers and how are concepts like tradition and modernity used?’. In this Greek case study, argumentation analysis is used more specifically to examine how theologians position themselves as modern, progressive, globally oriented and tolerant, in opposition to reactionary, nationalistic and religious fundamentalist voices in Greece. Their arguments represent and reveal their perception of religion as something rational and modern, while rejecting certain widespread practices in contemporary Greek society that they view as superstitious, unenlightened or even pagan. With their focus on different aspects of Greek Orthodoxy, these progressive theologians position themselves between two undesirable positions: the fundamentalist and the banal.22 In addition to argumentation analysis, the use of a historical approach helps us to view the current theological positions in Greece in light of earlier conflicts and negotiations on the role of religion in Greek culture. It is possible to understand contemporary arguments only as part of an ongoing discussion about the constituent features of Greek culture. This discussion has most often been The confusion of the analytical and normative dimensions in Beck’s approach places his argument somewhere in between social sciences and the religious projects he claims to observe. 22  A fundamentalist religious position is obviously undesirable to anyone wishing to be modern and progressive; yet, also, a ‘banal’ way of perceiving the religious context is undesirable. By ‘banal’ I refer to Michael Billig’s (1995) theory of banal nationalism, where national symbols and identity markers become ‘unnoticed’ because of their constant and pervasive appearance in the public space. Such a ‘banal’ relationship can also exist with regard to religion, and the often non-fundamentalist, i.e. banal, reproduction of nationalism entails religious symbolism, for example, the cross on Greek flagpoles.

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constructed on dichotomist positions and diametrically opposed premises, such as tradition versus modernisation, East versus West, and national versus universal or ecumenical. Research Material23 The inquiry of this book is based on two types of research material that fall within two different spheres. The first sphere comprises the self-proclaimed but by no means homogenous progressive theological milieu, to be found more particularly in the Academy for Theological Studies under the auspices of the Metropolitan of Demetrias in Volos and the independent theological quarterly Sýnaxis. I conducted interviews with theologians and other intellectuals associated with this milieu and examined a broad selection of books and articles written primarily by theologians on the challenges of the Orthodox Church and Orthodox faith in (late) modernity. The second sphere comprises the debate over the teaching of religion in public schools and the creation in 2010 of a new association of progressive religion teachers. I started exploring the teaching experiences of theologically trained religion teachers in secondary school after I became acquainted with members of the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos.24 In spring 2008, the Academy hosted the first of several annual training seminars for religion teachers. Four theologians and religion teachers, three of whom had co-authored the textbooks for the religion class in Greek secondary schools since 2006, taught the seminar. It was announced in early 2008 and received more than twice as many applicants as there were places. I attended the first and last sessions of the four-day seminar. This was a great opportunity to make contacts with the teachers and to conduct both informal and formal interviews about their teaching practices and their views on the place of religion in Greek public schools.25 About a year later, in autumn 2009, the Inter-Orthodox Centre of the Church of Greece launched new activities in the form of its first series of seminars for primary school teachers and secondary school religion teachers.26 In November 2009, I attended two afternoon seminars taught by the advisor of the Pedagogical Institute and a school supervisor. Finally, also in November 2009, I attended a meeting of 35 religion teachers preparing 23  Appendix A provides the list of interviews and participant observations conducted in 2008–2009. 24  See the section below (Note on Translation and Terminology) on why I refer to religion teachers in Greece as ‘theologically trained religion teachers’. 25  The religion teachers I interviewed as part of my research teach in secondary school, and therefore hold a degree in theology from one of the four faculties of theology in Athens and Thessaloniki. 26  The Inter-Orthodox Centre of the Church of Greece (http://dkee.att.sch.gr/ INFORMATION%20INTERORTHODOX%20CENTRE.pdf) provides training seminars for religion teachers and functions as a conference centre of the Church of Greece.

Introduction

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the creation of a new association for the improvement of religious education. In addition to the above-mentioned interviews and participant observations at the seminars, I collected a large corpus of books, articles, web-based texts and official documents on the religion class in Greek public schools. I recorded and analysed all individual and group interviews from the audio files. I also kept detailed field notes of all the training seminars and association meetings I attended. The purpose of the above-mentioned interviews, most of which were conducted between 2008 and 2009, was to get an in-depth picture of the general working conditions, attitudes and views of the theologians. Since 2009 I have been closely following relevant developments through continued research in the press, relevant websites and informal meetings with key figures who were able to inform me on recent events and ongoing issues. The examination of the positions and proposals of progressive theologians teaching religion in secondary education, as well as the challenges they face, and the analysis of the recent developments in academic theological discourse in Greece, have to be viewed in the context of the following two considerations: (1) religion, nation and education have been closely interwoven in modern Greek history – as in the majority of modern national histories. Therefore, in order to understand the relationship between religious and national identity and the official position of religion in contemporary Greek society, it is only natural to turn to education as a field of research; (2) a large number of theological candidates in Greece are educated in state universities, and the majority of them end up as religion teachers in secondary schools. This means all pupils (apart from the very few who are exempted from the religion class) are taught about religion from a theological perspective during the six years of secondary school, from the age of 13 to 18, thus, making theology an integrated part of civic education. Readers will find in this book, particularly in Chapter 3, a predominance of references to articles and papers by Pantelis Kalaitzidis, who is a theologian and the Director of the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos. Kalaitzidis (b. 1961) has an extensive bibliography, yet the frequency with which he is cited here does not entirely reflect his predominance in the corresponding fields of theological thought in contemporary Greece. One could even say that in certain topics such as the ‘theology of multiculturalism’ and ‘theology of mission’ other theologians have made more significant contributions. However, the ambition of this book is not to provide an exhaustive presentation of contemporary theological issues in Greece, but to illustrate how theological arguments and general arguments, based on a religious worldview, are put forward in the Greek public space as an alternative agenda to both secular and other religious worldviews. To this end, it is relevant to focus on contributors who actively pursue a certain agenda in the public arena, in particular those who attempt to do so outside the established platforms of religious discourse. Other contributors, speaking from a position as clerics or university professors, have expressed views similar to those of Pantelis Kalaitzidis. However, Kalaitzidis, in cooperation with the local bishop in Volos, has founded a new platform for developing and communicating an alternative

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theological discourse. It is because of his very active role in providing religion in Greece with a new public presence that I have deliberately focused on the work of this particular theologian and refer only to a limited extent to other theologians. Note on Translation and Terminology In Greece, the teaching of religion in secondary school is undertaken by graduates of the university schools of theology. Therefore, a theologian teaching the religion class in a secondary school is called ‘the theologian’ [ο θεολόγος], rather than the more neutral designation ‘religion teacher’.27 In English, however, it would be confusing to refer to ‘theologians’ when speaking of schoolteachers. For this reason, I have preferred to use the term ‘religion teacher’. However, since it is a rather crucial point in the current debates in Greece that the teachers of religion are educated as Orthodox Christian theologians, I will also refer to the religion teachers as ‘theologically trained religion teachers’. The official designation of the teaching of religion in public school is Ορθόδοξη Χριστιανική Αγωγή [Orthodox Christian Instruction], but in both written and oral discourse it is almost exclusively referred to as Τα θρησκευτικά and Το μάθημα των θρησκευτικών. These Greek designations can be translated as ‘religious topics’ and ‘the religion class’ but I have used the latter translation throughout the book. Other terms, like θρησκευτική εκπαίδευση and θρησκευτική αγωγή, have been rendered as ‘religious education’ and ‘religious instruction’. In Chapters 3 and 6 the concept θεολογία της ετερότητας is introduced. I have translated the concept as ‘theology of otherness’ but sometimes I have used alternative translations of the word ετερότητα, such as alterity or diversity.28 Outline of the Book Following this introduction, Chapter 1 lays out the historical context and conceptual framework of the study. As mentioned above, the research material in this book has been sourced from two interrelated spaces that encompass the emerging progressive theological milieus in Greece. This duality of spaces is mirrored in the structure of the book, so that the first part of the book introduces the new theological approaches in the field of independent theological academic spaces, while the latter part provides insight into attempts to implement a new theological approach in the religion class of Greek public education. Chapter 2 recounts the historical background to the discourses on the relationship between the Orthodox 27  Just as the language/literature teacher is called ‘the philologist’ and the maths teacher is called ‘the mathematician’ and so on. 28  Αlternatively, it is also called Θεολογία της πολυπολιτισμικότητας [theology of multiculturalism].

Introduction

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Church, Orthodox culture and Greek national identity from a cultural–theological perspective and Chapter 3 focuses in particular on new theological initiatives emerging from the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos. Chapter 4 introduces the historical background to the close relationship between religion and education in Greece and Chapter 5 provides an empirical account of the experience of religion teachers in the Greek school today. Chapter 6 presents three contemporary positions on religion in public education, thus, illustrating how the religion class has become a cultural battlefield where new and modernising voices try to gain ground by challenging those who advocate a traditional, conservative and ethno-religious approach in teaching religion. Chapter 7 recounts the creation of a progressive association of religion teachers aiming at modernising the religion class and an analysis of actual changes in the religion class curriculum since 2011. Finally, the Conclusions chapter summarises the whole book and discusses the theoretical implications of the presented case study.

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Chapter 1

From National Religion to Pure Religion: Historical and Conceptual Framework Following the Enlightenment and its inherent critique of the Church and its power, and the subsequent processes of secularisation, the established churches survived by transferring Church power from universal ecumenical units to nationally embedded Churches. Thus, several Protestant and Orthodox Churches became national Churches, while the Catholic Church forged alliances with the new nation states, adopting national identity discourses. Thus, religion, which in the age of pre-modern empires was perceived as universal, became, in the age of nation states, nationally rooted. In Southeast Europe, following the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, the Orthodox Christian churches came to play a significant role in the construction of smaller national entities, nation states. Secularisation also meant differentiation between social, political and economic spheres and cultural particularisation which challenged a solid and all-encompassing religious worldview. Today, western societies are still defined by great differentiation, but the processes of global convergence have also brought about homogenisation and tendencies towards cultural universalism. National communities have gradually lost their strength as providers of prime identities and sources of meaning, thus opening the space for other transnational sources of identity, such as religious worldviews. Therefore, it seems that the break-up of empires and the development of particular national traits in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries coincided with intensified secularisation. At the same time, tendencies towards global universal cultures (globalisation) in the late twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries coincided with signs of de-secularisation. Religious institutions and religious actors are to a large degree still recipients and contributors of changes in the cultural, political and economic landscape. The religious phenomena that are discussed in this book exemplify how certain religious actors may respond to contemporary cultural change, including the processes of global convergence, by changing their religious discourse and agenda from one of national specificity to one of global universalism. The case study in this research is, however, also anchored on a specific geographical and historical context, so the following section will present relevant aspects of the evolution of Greek society over the past three decades. This contemporary historical background may serve as an explanatory framework for the emerging paradigm in Greek theology and the new meanings of religion in Greek public life that have been identified in this research.

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The Historical Context1 Greece in the Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Centuries Since the fall of the dictatorship in 1974 and until the crisis in 2009, Greece experienced unprecedented economic growth and democratic stability. In 1981 the newly founded socialist party, PASOK, won the elections and stayed in power until 1989. The rhetoric of the party leader, the charismatic Andreas Papandreou, was deeply anti-American and anti-European, and before he was elected he had announced that he would prevent Greece from joining both NATO and the European Community (EC). However, Greece in fact became a full member of the EC the same year PASOK came into power. None of these radical proposals were carried out once PASOK was in power and Greece did not ‘pull out from the West’. On the contrary, Greece benefitted from EC membership, for example by increased growth, particularly in the agricultural sector. In fact, by the late 1980s and early 1990s Greece had gradually turned into a Western-European-style consumer society. Greece, as the only Southeast European country not under communist rule, flourished economically mainly because of significant loans and subsidies from its European counterparts. The political life in the country has been characterised by the dominance of two large parties, PASOK, the governing socialist party, in the 1980s and mid-1990s, and New Democracy, the conservative party, that gained power in the early 1990s and again in the mid-2000s. Beyond this opposition between the two dominant ruling parties, Greek internal affairs were frequently marked by ongoing economic scandals involving top politicians (even Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou). At the same time, the country’s external affairs were shaped by severe conflicts with neighbouring countries, such as Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and especially with Turkey, to the point of bringing the two countries to the brink of armed conflict several times. Therefore, on the one hand, Greek citizens experienced increasing prosperity in their country and economic support flowing from Northern Europe. On the other hand, they continued to live in a country tainted by internal polarised strife and conflicts, surrounded by countries that had always been perceived as external enemies (including Bulgaria, Albania and Turkey). Many of these conflicts were real, and the above-mentioned external threats in some cases jeopardised the stability in the region. However, the intensity of the conflicts was in some cases exaggerated by politicians who preferred to direct public attention on these external threats than on the slow 1  This section is a general introduction to cultural, political and economic developments in contemporary Greece in the context of the examined phenomena within the theological sphere. Thus, the section does not refer specifically to the role of religion or the Orthodox Church. Chapter 2 provides a historical account of the specific relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Greek nation, between Orthodox religious identity and Greek national identity.

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progress of necessary modernising reforms and the ongoing economic scandals involving politicians. The Orthodox Church also made use of these conflicts to promote itself as guardian of the Greek nation, especially since many of the conflicts involved ‘enemies’ of the Church, for example Turkey, with which the Church had an ongoing conflict due to the centuries of Ottoman Islamic and Turkish domination over the Christian populations in the region, or Albania, which under the communist regime had suppressed the Greek Orthodox minorities in that country. Furthermore, the more recent conflict with the Republic of Macedonia in the 1990s prompted intervention by the Church because the issue was perceived as one of former Yugoslav Macedonian claims on Greek territory that had been gained after much struggle during the first Balkan War and after the involvement of the new ‘ethnic’ Orthodox Churches in the region trying to win popular support for the Greek, the Bulgarian or the Serbian cause. At the same time, Greece’s booming tourist industry brought significant numbers of Western Europeans to the country, thus exposing the population to new life styles and indirectly bringing about a certain degree of cultural pluralisation. There were also increasing numbers of Greek young middle-class students studying abroad, primarily in Italy and Great Britain, but also in France and, since the 1990s, in the more affordable universities of Eastern European countries (such as in Hungary and Bulgaria). More recently, yet another type of cultural pluralisation can be observed in Greece with the rapidly increasing influx of immigrants since the 1990s, in particular from former communist countries, many of whom claimed to have Greek origins and ethnic ties with Greece. Furthermore, Greece has also become the preferred gateway to Europe for asylum seekers and economic immigrants from Asia and Africa. Apart from these waves of foreign immigrants, one could also notice in the 1990s and early 2000s a wave of return migrants, notably Greeks returning to their homeland after having lived abroad for many years in Western Europe, America and/or Australia (Christou 2006). All of these factors contributed to the intense cultural pluralisation of society in Greece, a country which, until 1974, was poor and more or less isolated, and had an apparently highly homogenous population. These processes revived memories from a not-so-distant past, when Greekspeaking Orthodox Christians coexisted with other linguistic and religious groups. For example, the 1980s brought a popular revival of music such as the Rebetika from the former culturally plural and cosmopolitan city of Smyrna (today’s Izmir in Turkey). Smyrna was until 1922 a cosmopolitan city where Greeks, Jews, Muslims and Western European Levantines coexisted, where the Greek merchants and bourgeoisie were in a position of privilege in public life. This seemingly harmonious coexistence ended abruptly in 1922 after the Greek army was defeated by Kemal Atatürk’s nationalist forces and most of the city’s Greek population was killed or fled to Greece under tragic circumstances. A year later, according to the Lausanne Treaty, all Greek Orthodox Christians living in the newly founded Turkish Republic were forced to leave for Greece as part of the

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population exchange between Greece and Turkey. The principle of homogenous national populations became the dominant norm throughout the twentieth century and, as a result, a centralised public school system was developed as a means to strengthen this type of homogeneity in Greece. In response to the influx of thousands of ethnically Greek populations, coming from Asia Minor, Anatolia and Caucasus, the Church of Greece became a homogenising factor, bringing together the different communities and groups living in Greece in order to compensate for the cultural differences between the newly arrived and the existing Greek populations. The recent increasing heterogeneity of Greek society in the 1990s and 2000s has brought back memories of a multicultural past when Greeks had to live side by side with other ethnic and religious communities. The 1990s, following the collapse of the Iron Curtain and communism, and the decade from 2000 onwards was a period when the socialist project in Greece appeared to have failed. This created an ideological vacuum in Greece, as in other parts of the world, thus prompting a search for new idealist or utopian projects, including nationalism. Since its origins, nationalism has always been able to invoke passion and strong feelings of belonging. To many people nationalism became the answer to the ideological vacuum mentioned above and to the disillusionment after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Prompted by nationalist responses to increasing cultural pluralisation, to what was perceived as western imperialism and to the lack of a long-term vision for the future, a counterreaction can be seen among intellectual religious circles in Greece in search of multicultural or universalist approaches to human coexistence with an ecumenical Christian ethos. This counter-reaction is the focus of this book. The above very brief introduction to some of the most characteristic themes in Greek society since the late 1980s acts as a backdrop for understanding why the ecumenical theological project analysed in this book is gaining ground in this particular historical moment in Greece. A corrupt political system with rigidly polarised camps, increasing cultural plurality creating a space for fluid identities – but also for ethnocentric entrenchment, the challenges of the European project and the European economic crisis, combined with the collapse of a socialist vision for the future have created the settings for a late modern revival of a Greek Orthodox theology of cultural pluralism. Religious and National Identities in the Contemporary Era William Safran has given an illustrative description of the complex relations between state and religion, and the consequences for identity processes in the contemporary era of globalisation: To the extent that globalisation refers to secularisation, national collective identity will doubtless come to depend less on religion; indeed, it may be argued that ethnic (or ethnonational) identity will be a substitute for waning religious belief. National identity, however, may itself be increasingly eclipsed by one or

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another supranational one. To the extent that globalisation implies the growth of supranational or transnational authority, the sovereignty of individual states will be reduced, and their power to “deal” with one or another religion – either to control it or to hold it to their national values, including democratic ones – will be weakened. Whether this development will revive religious sentiment by making it less dependent on national politics is a question that awaits an answer. (Safran 2002: 10)

In this context, the Greek case can be viewed as part of a global trend where national identities are being contested by many academic communities from a constructivist perspective. Global media convergence, as well as multinational companies, are increasingly influencing people’s lifeworld, leaving less room for national identity politics to exert influence on people’s self-understanding. These are contradictory trends where national identities are at the same time deconstructed, reconstructed and re-launched. In the context of global convergence and denationalisation, stakeholders promoting religious worldviews may gain ground by offering religion as a framework providing a solid sense of belonging and as an alternative to the increasingly permeable and deconstructed national identities and fluid late modern identities. Responding to Safran’s earlier question regarding religious revival independently of national politics, I suggest that, while national stakeholders, politicians and nationalist movements, call for the rescue of the nation, there are counter-discourses among academic or other global networks, such as religious circles which are less convinced by the persuasive power of the eternal and territorially defined nation. For some people, national identity is no longer an authentic identity, either as a result of the spill-over effect of the poststructuralist, deconstructionist paradigm within nationalism studies in the past 30 to 40 years, or because of the processes of global convergence where national cultures are becoming less distinct as a result of similar products (including cultural products) and uniform media cultures worldwide. Those who, for various reasons, consider national identities too much grounded on ‘this world’ and effectively powerless (‘a parenthesis in history’) seem to view religious identities as solid and authentic – even more so than national identity. In this context, religion is perceived as more than an identity; it is ‘a way of life’. Since cultural identities have become deconstructed, fluid and plural, religion as ‘a way of life’ may perhaps provide a more permanent choice leaving aside the continuous play with and search for identities in late modernity. Religious identity – as a prime identity, above national, gender or any other identity – may, thus, be perceived as an absolute identity, a fixed reference point against fluid and entangled identities. Furthermore, religion can be proposed as a source of social ethics that the western social welfare model can no longer represent due to the gradual decline of the European welfare states in the past 20 to 30 years. Religion may also provide a space for the expression of societal criticism and social activism at a time when socialist political alternatives are hard to find due to

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the ‘predominance of capitalism’ after the breakdown of communism in 1989 and the general populist turn in European politics. After this brief historical introduction I shall in the following turn to the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study including the concepts of theology, modernisation, innovation in religion, late modernity and, finally, theories of individualisation of faith and the thesis of the ‘untying of bonds’ between nation and religion. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework Theology Theology has been a recognised academic discipline since the first centuries of Christianity. In the early Christian era, theology seemed to be a successor to the discipline of philosophy. The influential Greek Church Fathers in the fifth century AD were educated in Greek philosophy, but they rejected a polytheistic worldview in favour of monotheism. They turned their attention to the ‘knowledge of God’ instead of the ‘love of wisdom’, as the words theology and philosophy literally denote in Greek. For many centuries, theology became a more influential field than philosophy and theologians benefited from a certain status as learned and wise or powerful social agents. After the Enlightenment and since modernisation and secularisation came to affect the lifeworlds of large population segments, modern and late modern European societies witnessed the weakening of the legitimacy and power of theological discourse. In Greece, as in most European countries, the prime faculty of the University of Athens, founded in 1837, was the Faculty of Theology. However, the first modern Greek university was founded much later, six hundred years after the first medieval European universities and several decades after the foundation of many modern universities in Europe. This means that the Faculty of Theology in Athens did not experience or enjoy the benefits of dominating a university, as was the case in other European universities, where for centuries every learned person had studied theology (even Darwin was a theologian) and theology had become a hallmark of high academic standards. In Greece, the Faculty of Theology was founded at the same time as the Faculties of Law, Medicine and Arts and, therefore, theology as an academic discipline never dominated Greek academia, since Enlightenment thoughts were already widespread when the first university was founded. Nevertheless, as Hart (1992: 11) remarks, ‘a strikingly large number of laymen take theology degrees (presumably, they are at least partly motivated by the prospect of employment as secondary-school teachers of religion). Theology is not a remote subject in villages and islands’.

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The two faculties of theology in Greece produce approximately 1,000 theology candidates annually.2 In comparison, the two theological faculties in Denmark, a country half the size of Greece in terms of population, produce approximately 100 candidates per year.3 A theology candidate in Greece may become a secondary school teacher or a priest depending on the chosen direction of studies. Because a university degree in Greece is considered the best way towards upward social mobility – and to secure a much desired lifelong appointment in the public sector – and because admission requirements are very strict in the much-desired faculties of law and medicine, many young people who are not accepted in these two faculties end up studying theology for lack of anything better. This means that a certain number of theology students are not motivated by personal interest in the subject they study and their academic performance is not very good, at least judging by their high-school performance and entrance examinations. Therefore, being a theologian, either as an academic or as a teacher in secondary education, does not have the same high social esteem as a lawyer or a doctor. From the Church’s point of view, the status of theologians is obviously highly accredited. However, the Church values a specific understanding of the Greek Orthodox tradition, and, therefore, theologians with progressive or alternative thinking are often not welcome. In my research, I have chosen to describe theologians with alternative views as ‘progressive’ because their declared goal is to propose a new interpretation of the role of the Orthodox faith and the Orthodox Church in Greece, and of the religion class in public education. The term ‘progressive’ has two related meanings. First, it is typically defined as something ‘favouring or advocating progress, change, improvement, or reform, as opposed to wishing to maintain things as they are’ and as ‘making progress towards better conditions; employing or advocating more enlightened or liberal ideas, new or experimental methods’.4 This definition seems to match the theologians’ own way of presenting their ideas. Second, the term ‘progressive’ according to the Oxford Dictionary denotes ‘favouring change or innovation’,5 and change is exactly what the theologians propose: change in the self-image of the Orthodox Church, change in the way Greek national identity has become identified with Orthodox religious identity and change in the way religion is taught in public education.

 According to the newspaper Ta Néa (18 January 2010), theological schools in Greece produce approximately 1,000 theology candidates per year and there are currently 5,000–6,000 unemployed theologians (http://www.tanea.gr/ellada/article/?aid=4555933). 3  Numbers available at http://www.au.dk/om/profil/nogletal/ and http://us.ku.dk/ studiestatistik/studiestatistikker/produktion/. 4  http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/progressive. 5  http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/progressive. 2

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Religion and Modernisation The question of modernisation has been an important underlying theme in the cultural, political, social, economic and military history of Greece since the modern Greek state was founded in 1830 after independence from the Ottoman Empire. The Orthodox Church, as a powerful administrative institution of the Ottoman Empire and later as a state institution, has been a key element in questions of modernisation in Greece. A Greek historian has noted that ‘without modernisation within the Church, it will be difficult to achieve modernisation within [Greek] society, in the mentality and ways of behaviour’ (Liakos 2005). Even if the modernisation of society can be implemented without the participation of the Church, it is true that modernisation – or the lack of it – in the history of Greece has often been associated with the role of religion and the institutional Church. As part of political attempts to implement modernising reforms in Greece, the PASOK government of Costas Simitis decided in 2000–2001 to remove religious affiliation from citizens’ ID cards, thus complying with EU standards for the protection of personal data. This attempt towards modernisation and the symbolic demarcation between church and state affairs, between citizenship and national identity, and religious affiliation, provoked strong protests from the Church, which emerged as a tradition-bound reactionary institution out of step with modernity.6 The relationship between modernity and the Greek Orthodox Church is a complex and multifaceted issue. With the foundation of the autocephalous Church of Greece in 1833, it came to be identified with the Greek nation state. This was seen by conservative hierarchs and theologians at the time as an attempt for the modernisation and westernisation of the Orthodox Church.7 Throughout the history of the Church of Greece there have been several attempts to introduce various reforms, but as Anastassiadis (2010: 52) has pointed out, innovation in religion has to appear as non-innovative as possible in order to be successful. Therefore, proposals for change in the Church are often presented as a return to an ‘authentic’ tradition. This is also the case with the modernising trends within Greek Orthodox theology and the views of the progressive theologians. They propose a contemporary and renewed theology that is able to embrace cultural plurality and late modern living conditions but their arguments in support of such modernisation are drawn from what is perceived as a pre-national authentic religious identity and a return to the authentic roots of Greek Orthodox theology. This is a key point in the argument of the book, notably the following paradox: while in one historical period, the nineteenth century, the Orthodox Church went through a  The scholarly literature on this church–state conflict is extensive. For a thorough analysis of various aspects of the issue see Molokotos-Liederman 2003, 2007a, 2007b. See also Stavrakakis 2003 and Prodromou 2004. 7  Paraskevas Matalas (2003) offers a detailed account of the various stakeholders and interests at play in the period of the nationalisation of the Church from 1833 to 1872. 6

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process of modernisation by binding itself to the Greek nation state, through the establishment of the autocephalous Greek Church in 1833, in another historical period, the twenty-first century, Orthodox theologians propose a modernisation of the Church through an untying of its bonds with the Greek nation state and in particular from national ideology. Frederic Jameson (2002: 40) has rejected ‘modernity’ as a concept (philosophical or otherwise) and prefers to understand it as a narrative category. This understanding goes well with Herzfeld’s (2002: 202) suggestion to regard the notions of tradition and modernity or the modern as ‘rhetorical markers for […] ideological arguments’ rather than denoting actual conditions or specific cultural expressions. Sotiriu (2010) reports the return of the order of deaconesses in the Orthodox Church of Greece as an example of how ‘tradition’ is being employed as an argument to promote the modernisation of the Church, namely the increased engagement of women in the ministry. Sotiriu (ibid.) evaluates this development as a first step towards greater gender equality in the Orthodox Church. Although I would not be so optimistic, Sotiriu’s example is interesting for understanding the negotiation that goes on between respecting tradition and demanding modernisation in the Orthodox Church today. Innovation in Religion As in the above example, proposals for modernisation can be legitimised by reference to tradition. In this context, tradition is not perceived as a solid continuity; it can be divided into ‘misleading’ tradition and ‘authentic’ tradition. Thus, when progressive theologians today argue for a return to the perceived authentic message of Christianity, i.e. that to Christ there are no differences (in value) between ‘man and woman, Jew and Greek, slave and free’ (Galatians 3: 28), they openly criticise recent Church tradition which has created or accepted such distinctions, especially in ethno-religious rhetoric. They argue that there is a tradition that is more genuine from the one that has been handed down through generations to our modern days. Moreover, they claim that by returning to an older, ‘forgotten’ tradition, the Church will be able to adapt to the present. Advocating change or innovation in the church through reference to a perceived authentic tradition can be seen as an example of what Willert and MolokotosLiederman (2012: 9) have called ‘purist innovation’. Purist innovation is invoked when members of a faith community begin to question an existing hegemonic tradition which they see as a deviation from what they understand as an authentic and pure tradition. Instead of breaking away from a community, that according to them has taken a wrong direction, purist religious innovators try to bring about changes from within. Purist arguments for bringing about change gain authority from their closeness to a perceived ‘original’ tradition. An example could be the claim that clerics in the Orthodox Church should wear ordinary clothes instead of monks’ robes and wear their hair as they wish, because in the early Christian centuries priests did not stand out from their fellow citizens in their physical

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appearance (Zoumboulakis 2013). The argument here is that the traditional dress of a cleric is in fact a modern invention and should therefore be abolished in favour of a more authentic age-old tradition. Another type of religious innovation that also applies to the phenomenon of progressive theology in Greece today is ‘adapting innovation’ (Willert and Molokotos-Liederman 2012: 10). Adapting innovation takes place when religious stakeholders consider that their religious tradition is threatened from external factors. When the social, political or economic contexts of the faith community change conscious or unconscious adaptive innovations may take place. The contradictory worldwide forces of nationalism and globalisation constitute the changed contexts of the Orthodox Church today that make some of its members advocate for making innovations and taking new directions. The recognition that the world around the Church is changing and, therefore, it must change too is the conscious aspect of the adapting innovation. A religious innovation type that certainly does not apply to the progressive theologians is ‘unintentional innovation’ (ibid.). It may well be that there are certain aspects of their theological proposals that, apart from purist and adapting innovation, also contain unintentional innovations. However, unintentional innovation usually applies to initiatives that are considered so fully integrated within the existing recognised tradition that only an outsider will recognise the initiatives as innovative and as a break from an externally observed tradition. This is certainly not the case with the progressive theologians who consciously position themselves in opposition to (parts of) the hegemonic religious tradition and the institution of the church and, therefore, see themselves as intentionally progressive (innovative) and adaptive to the modern context. Their purist approach to innovation, however, ensures that, in their view, they are not breakers but revivers of tradition. Religion in Late Modernity The British Greek Orthodox hierarch Kallistos (Timothy) Ware (2005: 25) has suggested that while in the twentieth century (Orthodox) theology was concerned with ecclesiology, i.e. what is the church (community), the theology of the twentyfirst century will be centred on anthropology, i.e. what is a human (subject). These different spheres of interest in theology are more or less parallel to the spheres of interest in the social sciences. While the twentieth century saw a focus on the level of society and on large structures of human communities, the tendencies towards the end of the century indicated a turn towards anthropology and the study of human life at a more individual level. The subjective and the personal have, thus, dominated in the production of social sciences and in artistic literature in the 1990s and 2000s.8 8  Identity studies and methods, such as the biographical approach, have dominated in the social sciences, while in literature there has been a boom in autobiographical works. A striking example from Scandinavia is the monumental autobiographical six-volume opus

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The 1960s witnessed the beginnings of the linguistic turn in the social and human sciences. The post-structural theories of socially constructed realities (Berger and Luckmann 1971) and the social constructivist approach led to the deconstruction of societal myths, institutions and religions. Yet, the relativism and focus on subjectivity that came with these approaches have also been a factor reinforcing the maintenance and recreation of myths and religious (subjective) worldviews. The so-called return of religion is more or less concurrent with the linguistic turn, which again is concurrent with the ever faster technological development of Western European societies. The industrial and technological revolutions accelerated the sense of time and the pace of change and created a distance between people’s daily lives and the economic spheres of production. This distance – or a sense of alienation – laid the ground for a research tradition (discourse analysis) that interprets social reality as being constructed through language (Potter and Whetherell 1987: 35).9 With ‘realities’ perceived as ‘constructed’ or ‘created’ in linguistic terms, quests for a more stable, ‘authentic’ reality or even a truth may arise. The discourses examined in this book exemplify the search for a stable eternal truth and a constant reference point as a perennial dimension that remains unchanged and independent of the ever-faster changes and challenges of human history. Several scholars have addressed the so-called ‘return of religion’ and general tendencies of de-secularisation (for example Berger 1999) creating a widely accepted post-secular paradigm (Calhoun et al. 2011, von Stuckrad 2013). Yet, there is a need for empirical research on how specific actors make claims on the role of religion in contemporary society. A key question in the line of inquiry of this book is how intellectual religious actors navigate in late modernity. A continuous challenge for transcendental worldviews is, on the one hand, to intend to live by the religious ideals of spiritual purity but, on the other hand, to be bound to live in the material world. Grace Davie has examined this conflict, which is ‘the continuing tension of Christian teaching: how to be in but not of the world’ (Davie 2000: 142) from the point of view of two Christian organisations, the Opus Dei and the Comunione e Liberazione. This tension of being in but not of the world is repeated throughout the texts by progressive Greek theologians examined in this book. However, in contrast to Davie’s case studies, their theology seems neither to perceive the world negatively, nor to use ‘the means of modernity to subvert its ends’ (ibid.). Apparently, their proposals for a new perception of Christian Orthodox identity in Greece do not oppose the message of modernity in its entirety. Directly or indirectly, these My Struggle by Karl Ove Knausgård (published in Norwegian between 2009 and 2011 and subsequently translated into 18 languages), which is just one example of the broad literary trend of autobiographical fiction. 9  The schools of Discourse Analysis vary as to the extent they regard any ‘underlying reality’ as an object of study. However, a common characteristic of Discourse Analysis is the claim that ‘through language people engage in constructing the social world’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000: 205).

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progressive Greek theologians criticise consumerism and late modern globalised capitalism, and propose Christian solidarity and the struggle against exploitation as alternatives. The new theological discourses examined in this book criticise the evils of modernity but also present a theological discourse that is in concordance with modernity, thus apparently avoiding an aggressive opposition to modernity and the West that is more typical of fundamentalist religious groups. The end of the twentieth century witnessed the growth of scholarly literature ‘calling into question the modernist neglect in religious belief’ (Lynch 2000: 757) and seeking to ‘break down the Enlightenment barriers to the study of religion’ (ibid.). In philosophy and religious studies concepts such as post-secularism, the ‘return of religion’ and ‘multiple modernities’ suggested a rethinking of the classical notion of modernity as an inevitable process of rationalisation associated with the prevalence of reason, natural sciences and the Enlightenment (Harrington 2011). I will not focus on whether or not human society ‘needs’ religion, but it is obvious that the arguments of post-secularism are put forward by scholars with both a religious worldview and a somewhat rational point of view (for example Slavoj Žižek, Shmuel Eisenstadt, William Connolly and, since his ‘religious turn’ from 2008, also Ulrich Beck10). A development parallel to the opening of traditionally secular scholarly fields to the point of including religious perspectives can be observed in the field of theology with the increasing application of secular social theories and analytical approaches, for example postcolonial feminist theology (Kwok 2005). Likewise, the theological discourses referred to in this book draw on secular discourses of multiculturalism and the inclusion of the ‘Other’. These new discourses draw on the key values of dialogue and pluralism. From a global point of view, Lynch (2000: 745) has argued that ‘while contemporary political debates continue to regard religion and belief as necessarily exclusivist, theological trends have for some time focused on the boundaries and possibilities of inclusivism and pluralism’: Contemporary theological views on the possibilities of religious pluralism and multiculturalism are enlightening in this regard. Religious thinking has long addressed the problems associated with the existence of multiple forms of belief. Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, and Jewish thought, among others, continue to grapple with problems of particularism versus universalism, authenticity versus the complexity of history, and doctrinally-oriented versus historically contingent identities. Some contemporary religious thought also moves beyond individualist categories of identity to provide new ways of 10  Speck provides the following analysis of the recent directions in Beck’s thinking: ‘… impelled by events and the “post-secular” shift across social theory, Beck now provides a sociologically sensitive account of religiosity which is integrated, without strain, into his overall theoretical framework through the concept of “individualization” and which allows religion a progressive politico-ethical purchase on the crises of world risk society thanks to its constitutive cosmopolitanism’ (2012: 166–7).

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thinking about the socio-political implications of the multiple systems of belief present in the world. While these trends do not form a unified system of thought, religious debates can help point the way towards a nuanced and historically reliable understanding of “multiculturalism”, and hence, the role of religion in world politics. (Lynch 2000: 744–5)

The Greek case exemplifies such global trends where religion and theology accommodate the cultural conditions in late modernity by adopting the discourses of reflexivity, pluralism and fluid identities, a process that, as has already been mentioned, can be termed as ‘adapting innovation’ (Willert and MolokotosLiederman 2012). One of modernity’s distinguishing features was the development of individual free will (the notion of autonomy) and – as a twisted version of this free will – the emergence of autonomous nation states with distinct national cultures. As part of this development, the universal religions that were dominant and worked as cohesive forces in the age of empires withdrew from their role as producers of universal values. Following the emergence of vernacular languages, the overarching religious communities with their lingua franca lost their strength and local expressions of religions emerged in their place combining a universal human message with the local, particularly national, cultural and linguistic traditions. Benedict Anderson (1991) described the emergence of national movements as to a large extent having been caused by the invention of the printing press in combination with the use of vernacular languages to enlighten the lower strata of society, thus creating peoples, the raw material of nations. The print revolution that, according to Anderson, enabled the formation of imagined communities of nations has in late modernity been succeeded by the Internet revolution that dissolves the borders of national print media. In this process, religions also seem to be adapting to the new circumstances as they did when nation states came into being. There is a global trend that religious expressions move towards new directions in search of universal ideals and away from the particularistic paradigm of national religions. These aspects of religious influence are very different today than in the pre-national and pre-Enlightenment period, when religions constituted absolute sources of powers in society. Today the role of religion is rather played out in the ideological sphere and includes a much broader spectrum of players than the usual representatives of religion. This reverse process of ‘de-particularisation’ of religion implies a challenging of the nationalisation of religions, and thereby, also a distancing from the embeddedness of religion in culture. This phenomenon has been the focus of Olivier Roy’s book, Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways (2010). Untying the Bonds between Nation and Religion Roy puts forward the thesis that, in a globalised world, religion thrives to the extent that it has cut off its ties with culture. Instead of a return to traditional religious

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worship, we are now witnessing the individualisation of faith and the dissociation of faith communities from ethnic and national identities. An extreme example of a religious practice detached from any cultural context is Pentecostalism, where God’s word is transmitted through the faithful ‘speaking in tongues’, i.e. speaking in no known language with a cultural and historical rootedness, but in a ‘language’ supposedly detached from culture and history. Pentecostalists, thus, have overcome the problem of translation of the Bible as a historical and cultural text written in Hebrew, Greek and Aramaic. Roy suggests that the religions enjoying success today are those that accept the process of ‘deculturation’ and live according to the myth of ‘religious purity’. However, Roy’s thesis applies more particularly to fundamentalist and extreme versions of religious purification, such as Protestant Evangelicalism, Islamic Salafism, and Haredi Judaism; he views Catholicism and eastern Orthodoxy as being far too culturally integrated to follow this path of deculturation. The aim of fundamentalist movements is to reach a pure religion, free from its embeddedness in secular culture (Roy 2010: 9–11). Fundamentalism, according to Roy, is, among other things, a reaction to the ‘nationalisation of religion’, during the many centuries of nationalism, and to the political secularism that followed the creation of modern nation states. The relativisation of culture (Featherstone 1995), brought about by globalisation processes such as immigration and late modern consumer and media cultures, has paved the way for the detachment of religion from a specific cultural context. The religious fundamentalist position is also characterised by a desire to return to earlier eras when religion was supposed to be pure and authentic. It would be wrong, though, to suggest that the recent turn in Greek Orthodox theology is motivated by a typical fundamentalist position. What refutes any such conclusion is that the theologians and intellectuals advocating a renewal of Greek theology and Orthodox Christian identity in late modernity embrace at one and the same time the Greek Orthodox Christian tradition and the Western European Christian culture and tradition. These new voices illustrate only in part Roy’s deculturation thesis, namely their objection to the tight bonds between a secular national identity and a religious (Orthodox) Christian identity. Roy (2010: 8) observes that the deculturation of religion leads to larger gaps between believers and non-believers because the ‘in-between’ positions, such as ‘cultural Jews’, ‘atheist Muslims’ or ‘moderate Protestants’, disappear from the religious/cultural map, at least in the eyes of fundamentalists. The Greek theologians referred to in this book do not adopt this kind of position, even if they present themselves as faithful members of the Church; they advocate instead a dialogic and open attitude towards non-believers and believers from other religions. Therefore, this new trend in Greece is not an example of Christian fundamentalism, yet it has some elements of religious purism because it argues against an ethnic or cultural understanding of the Christian identity. In this way it calls for a theology based on the earliest Christian testimonies in the New Testament and the experiences of the early Christian Church and Christian communities that were not defined by their cultural, ethnic or racial (i.e. ‘national’) affiliation.

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Personal salvation, which is the aim of fundamentalist movements, such as Pentecostalism, creates a direct bond and communication between God and the individual, thus bypassing the social expression of religion. Praising the Eucharist as the ultimate (Orthodox) Christian event (Academy for Theological Studies 2007),11 the new voices in Greek Orthodox theology are certainly not advocating religious individualism. Yet, they do dispute the assumption that a person gains his Orthodox Christian identity automatically by being born a Greek national citizen. They consider the Orthodox Christian identity a personal choice, something that has not been previously emphasised in a Greek Orthodox context (Kalaitzidis 2003a, 2005a). The theory of individualisation of faith (Roy 2004; Beck 2010) seems relevant in examining religion in contemporary Greece due to the tremendous changes that have occurred in Greek society since the late 1980s. The general level of prosperity among the population has increased and urban centres have expanded, while a large consumer and entertainment industry has flourished. Greece has also become a country of immigration, rather than emigration, thus, receiving immigrants, which has contributed to the diversification of the population, from highly monocultural to multicultural, mostly in the greater Athens area and other large urban centres. These new conditions have prompted the Orthodox Church and religious actors to invent new strategies for putting forward their agendas. In the 1990s and early 2000s a traditional nationalist and community-oriented strategy was strengthened through Church leadership (such as Archbishop Christodoulos) and certain influential religious intellectuals (such as Christos Yannaras). This ‘traditional’ strategy has recently been challenged by a new and more religiously pure and individualistically oriented strategy, which can benefit from being analysed through Roy’s more general thesis of religion in late modernity. According to Roy (2010: 28–9), culture may be viewed in three ways from the standpoint of ‘pure religion’: as profane, i.e. antithetical to religion; as secular, i.e. as complementary to religion in a society; or as pagan, i.e. expressing its own kind of (lost) religion. It is the latter way of viewing culture that is relevant to the analysis of the recent Greek theological proposal for a redefinition of Greek Orthodoxy freed from its entanglement with what could be called the pagan

 The following introduction to the Eucharist as an overarching theme in the Academy’s activities in 2007 can be found on the Academy webpage: ‘“There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3: 28). The eschatological realisation of the mystery of unity within the Church removes and relativises any kind of division and separation, thus also that of the nation (…) In the Eucharist (…) we have a first taste (…) of the overcoming of all kinds of divisions and fragmentations (race, nation, gender, social position), since all these do not exist in the Eschata’. (http://www.acadimia.gr/content/view/70/76/lang,el/). 11

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culture12 of ethnophyletism.13 Considering religion as having a pure essence, independent of any historical or cultural context, does not mean that the religious practice is not embodied in a given culture at a given time, but that it always refers to a transcendent order of truth and of the absolute, thus in essence remaining uncontaminated by earthly cultural traits. Taken literally, Roy’s thesis seems to suggest that religion and culture belong to two different categories and that it is possible to separate them, or at least try to. I believe that Roy’s intention is to describe the phenomenon as it appears in the behaviour of religious actors and not as a theoretical distinction between religion and culture. Lynch (2000: 744) poses a relevant question in relation to this distinction: But the question remains whether religion should be seen as a special cultural category. Of all of the possible categories of culture and identity, including gender, ethnicity, race, and sexuality, ‘religion’ is often seen as the least permeable and most essentialist, that which requires the greatest degree of adherence to given behavioural and prescriptive rules. (Lynch 2000: 744)

Lynch also calls into question whether ‘religious’ culture will always be a divisive feature: Thus, the problem of “identity” or “alterity” is believed to assume greater proportions once it takes on a religious cast. Yet the view of religious identity as uncompromising is historically incomplete and ignores significant and lively debates within religious thought itself. (Lynch 2000: 744)

It seems that the theological debates among progressive Greek theologians correspond to the international debates referred to by Lynch, while the purified religious culture of religious fundamentalists is far from what can be observed in the Greek case:  On the webpage of the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos we find the following statement regarding the nation: ‘The nation and its “worship” further entail the danger of a new paganism since they raise high false gods and constructed perishable realities, while they turn us towards a spiritual primitivism. The “worship” of the nation subjugates us to the infernal powers of race and blood. In contrast, integration within the Church and progress in the spiritual life lead to freedom and the gradual overcoming or removal of discrimination and divisions based on nation, race, language, origin, family relations etc.’ (http://www.acadimia.gr/content/view/70/76/lang,el/). 13  ‘Ethnophyletism’ was the term used by the Patriarch of Constantinople in the first half of the nineteenth century to condemn the establishment of autocephalous national churches. It designates the ethnic division of the Church which, according to a theological interpretation of the Bible, should unite all nations, éthnos meaning nation and phylí meaning race. 12

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Neo-fundamentalists expel culture from the scope of human activities; […]. Their concern for purity pushes them to ignore real life. By fighting to purify religion, fundamentalists tend to objectify religion, to identify it as a closed and explicit set of norms and values separated from a surrounding culture systematically seen as corrupting. (Roy 2004: 334)

Yet, some parallels can be drawn because progressive religious actors in Greece claim that the Orthodox faith has been abused in the name of the Greek nation and this is seen as having corrupted the perceived authentic and pure (religious) values of Orthodoxy. Through the case study presented in this book, I suggest that there are some common features between global tendencies towards the deculturation of religion and new trends in contemporary Greek Orthodox theology. However, since contemporary Greek theologians propose a new cultural framework for Orthodox Christianity in Greece, where the bonds between nation and religion are untied, rather than identifying the Greek case as a deculturation of religion, it is preferable to use the term ‘denationalisation of religion’. A new cultural dimension of this denationalised interpretation of Greek Orthodoxy is, as we shall see in the following chapters, the culture of reflexivity intrinsic to the relativisation of identities, especially national identities in late modernity. However, the intellectual contribution and activities of contemporary progressive theologians should also be seen in the context of the role of religion in contemporary Greek society and against the backdrop of the historic relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Greek nation, and of the former’s historical and theological contribution. To that effect, Chapter 2 will offer a brief introduction on the role of religion and Orthodox theology in the course of modern Greek history.

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Chapter 2

The Bonds between Nation and Religion: The Orthodox Legacy According to the Greek national master narrative, as evidenced for example in school textbooks (Zambeta 2003: 138–9), the Orthodox Church has been instated as a symbol of emancipation, independence and freedom because of its role as guardian of the Orthodox faith and the Greek language during four centuries of Ottoman domination and its supposed unanimous participation in the Greek uprising against the Ottoman empire in the early nineteenth century. The role of the upper Church hierarchy in ardently opposing the Greek national uprising1 and the fact that the revolutionary movement was largely secular, emphasising nationality and the resurgence of the ancient Greek forefathers rather than religion, has been a more or less forgotten story in the official national narrative. In 1833, soon after Greek independence, the newly enthroned Bavarian regent of the Kingdom of Greece, King Otto, declared the Orthodox Church of Greece independent from the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Church became a national Church under the administration of the newly created Greek state. It is not insignificant that this ‘reform’ was carried out by a Catholic Bavarian king and his Protestant advisors who were later accused of undertaking the westernisation or Protestantisation of the Orthodox Church by turning it into a state church (Kokosalakis 1987: 235–7). Once the Greek state was created, along with an autocephalous Greek Church, the joint trajectory of religion and nation developed through the commemoration and canonisation of national heroes and martyrs who were both national and religious figures, such as Germanos the Bishop of Patras, the Monk Samuel of Arkadi Monastery and Chrysostomos the Bishop of Smyrna (Halikiopoulou 2011: 48). Revolutionaries expressing the ideal of the Enlightenment used a rhetoric filled with religious connotations, including the declaration by General Alexander Ypsilantis entitled: ‘Fight for faith and homeland’ (ibid.). Two Interpretations of Greek Orthodoxy in the Early National Era The process of ‘sacralising the nation’ and ‘nationalising the Church’ has not been smooth and straightforward. There is an inherent ambiguity in the Orthodox Church 1  Patriarch Gregory V excommunicated the first Christian rebels against the Ottoman domination in 1821 (Gallant 2001: 18–19).

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when it comes to its relationship with the state and the nation. This ambiguity can be described as a conflict between a cultural/ethnic and a pious/theological interpretation of the Greek Orthodox tradition. In this chapter, we shall trace these two interpretative frameworks that have characterised debates on Greek culture since the foundation of the Greek state. Before turning to the better-known uses of Orthodoxy as an expression and guardian of Greek national identity, let us begin with an account of the transition from Greek Orthodoxy as a recognised religion in the Ottoman Empire, to Greek Orthodoxy as the state religion of the modern Greek state. The process towards the creation of the autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church, proclaimed in 1833, is usually interpreted as one of conflict between ‘Constantinople’ and ‘Athens’, ‘ecumenical orthodoxy’ and ‘nationalism’, religious and national ideology, a traditional and a modern mindset (Matalas 2003: 46). The proclamation of the autocephalous Church of Greece provoked a schism with the Patriarchate in Constantinople that was never unequivocally pronounced; their relations were not restored until 17 years later in 1850 with the Patriarchate’s recognition of the Church of Greece. The reason why this conflict did not develop into a fully-fledged schism was, according to Matalas (ibid.), the existence in Greece of an ‘undeclared division between two versions of Orthodoxy’. On the one side of this split were ardent supporters of the ‘arbitrary’ autocephalous and the submission of the Church to the official will of ‘the nation’, i.e. the organised state; on the other side were those who attributed power, at least ‘spiritually’, to the Patriarchate and, therefore, were seeking to retain ‘a certain degree of autonomy for the Church in relation to the state similar to what it had during Ottoman rule’ (ibid.). The first group saw the autocephalous Church as a natural result of the Greek liberation struggle, while the second conceived it a foreign element imposed by the Bavarian regent and his administration. Needless to say, the Greek uprising against Ottoman rule was inspired and initiated by western ideas of the Enlightenment and national autonomy, but also by ideas favouring a break with patriarchal structures. Therefore, it is not surprising that those who supported the Church’s autocephaly preferred the Church to be linked to a Greek autonomous centre, rather than to an imperial institutional centre under foreign (Ottoman) rule. They viewed national independence and the national imagined community as weighing heavier than the religious (Orthodox) imagined community. By contrast, those who supported the Patriarchate as the religious and main point of reference were not necessarily less national, but they saw the national project as unfulfilled as long as it did not include the entire Orthodox (imagined) community. They saw the Greek nation state as a step towards an (ecumenical) Greek Orthodox state with the Patriarchate as its centre and, therefore, had to oppose the emancipation of the autocephalous Church of Greece from the Patriarchate.2 Matalas (2003: 50) clarifies that this was not only an ideological or religious dispute about the imagined essence of the 2  The vision of a much larger Greek Orthodox state later became part of the official national political ideology, conceived in the term Megáli Idéa [Great Idea] (1844–1922)

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Greek nation; it was also prompted by political convictions. Those who supported the continuous influence of the Patriarchate put their trust in the military and political support of Russia by focusing on the idea of a unified Orthodox Eastern world against a Catholic or Protestant West. By identifying the Orthodox faith as the main characteristic of the Greek nation, they also linked it with an eastern religious culture and tradition, thus exemplifying the perpetual question whether Greece belongs to the East or the West. The establishment of an autocephalous Orthodox Church aimed to integrate the newly created Greek state into the western spheres of influence, associated with the military powers of France and Britain. Therefore, even a symbolic link between the Church in Greece and the wider Orthodox world, represented by the Ecumenical Patriarchate had to be avoided. However, in order to safeguard support from the (future) Greek national citizens who identified themselves as Orthodox Christians, and not as Greek nationals, it was necessary to preserve the Orthodox nature of the Church even if a distance, or even a break, was created with the Patriarchate, the theological and administrative authority of the Orthodox faith. This was achieved by identifying the cultural foundation of the Greek nation state with the Orthodox faith. While the critics of the autocephaly identified the nation with Orthodoxy, they envisaged a much larger nation that they argued would be truly independent, i.e. independent from any non-Orthodox western powers. For this reason, they believed that their worst enemies were not the Ottomans but western Christian denominations, accusing them of trying to infiltrate the Orthodox spirit from within, through political, but also missionary, interference in the affairs of the Greek nation state.3 The above discussion illustrates that along with questions of religious authenticity, representations of East and West have played an important role in the conflict between the two interpretations on the mission of the Greek Orthodox Church, not only as an ideological construct but also as a political entity. The opposition between East and West has dominated the Greek religious and cultural discourse since the early ‘undeclared division between two versions of Orthodoxy’ (Matalas 2003: 46) and, as we shall see, representations of East and West remain central in contemporary debates on the true mission of Orthodoxy in Greece. that aimed at including within the borders of the Greek state all Greek-speaking Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire. 3  Anti-western sentiments in the Orthodox world date back to the Great Schism in 1054 but were intensified after the sack of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade in 1204 and the following settlements of western Catholic rulers (Franks) in certain Orthodox lands, such as the Peloponnese. The Fourth Crusade, which weakened the Byzantine Empire, is usually considered the real reason for the success of the Ottoman conquest. Further anti-western attitudes developed after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople which incorporated eastern Christianity into an equally anti-western empire that had even less in common with the Christian West (Makrides 2012: 21–5). The Ottoman conquest was even seen by anti-unionists as a blessing safeguarding Orthodox Christianity from the heretic West (Pagden 2008: 209).

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The following section will discuss how Orthodoxy and Greek national identity have become synonymous in Greece’s national master narrative. Common Religious and National Commemorations Commemorative practices – or anamneses – are key factors in preserving both religion and the idea of the nation. The anamnesis practice (HervieuLéger 2000: 125) par excellence of Christianity is the Eucharist, where Church members share the flesh and blood of Christ as God’s human incarnation, thus commemorating his last supper where he shared bread and wine with his disciples. The centrality of this religious practice of anamnesis has been highlighted by the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos through a series of lectures on the ‘Eucharist, Church and the World’ that took place in the academic year 2007–2008 (Academy for Theological Studies 2007). This kind of purely religious anamnesis, as illustrated by the specific focus of the Academy lectures, is in contrast to the way Greek Orthodoxy has been usually put in the service of national collective memory. In contrast to Western European countries that have become, according to Hervieu-Léger (2000: 123–40), ‘amnesiac societies’ as a result of secularisation, in Greece there is an obvious ‘“chain of memory” through which individual believers and their communities are bound normatively to the past’ (Makrides and Molokotos-Liederman 2004: 466–7). However, in modern times, anamnesis practices associated with the Orthodox Church of Greece have accentuated the memories of national and religious history rather, than a purely collective religious memory. This is exemplified in the many national holidays that are also religious holidays. One example is the day of the Annunciation, which has been celebrated in Greece since 1838 as both a religious and secular/national holiday, marking at once the Annunciation itself, as a purely religious holiday, and the beginning of the uprising of Greek-speaking subjects against Ottoman rule. This holiday, celebrated on 25 March, symbolises the complete merging of religious and national/secular identities in the history of the modern Greek state, being at one and the same time a celebration of the birth of the (resurrected) Greek nation and of the annunciation of the birth of the son of God. The Metropolis of Athens is also dedicated to the Annunciation, and so on 25 March it becomes the centre of official celebration of Greek national independence in the name of the coming of the Messiah. An example of how the Greek nation has symbolically monopolised the Greek Orthodox Church is the commemoration of the Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory V as an ethnomártyras, a national martyr. At the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821, the Patriarch was accused by the Sultan of being unable to maintain peace among his flock and suppress the Greek uprising against the Ottoman Empire, even though he condemned the rebels. As punishment he was hung in public on Easter Sunday. Later, in 1862, his body was enshrined in the Metropolis of Athens, thus exemplifying the identification of the ecumenical Orthodox Church with the Greek Orthodox Church. Since the Ecumenical

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Patriarchate was against the establishment of nation states in general, especially national churches, there is a particular irony to the canonisation of the Patriarch as an ethnomártyras. In 1833, the Patriarchate (evidently headed by a Patriarch other than Gregory) condemned the establishment of the autocephalous national Church of Greece, recognising it only in 1850 when it became obvious that the power struggle between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek Church could not be won through confrontation. Another more recent example of holidays with a dual function is the joint celebration of Virgin Mary the protector (Agía Sképi) and the refusal by the Dictator Ioannis Metaxas’ to allow Mussolini to occupy Greek lands on 28 October 1940. The holiday of Virgin Mary the protector was celebrated in the Church calendar on 1 October, but in 1952, the Church holiday was moved to 28 October in order to create a double celebration: Greece’s military resistance against German and Italian fascist occupiers and the Virgin Mary as protector of the Greek armed forces. The commemoration of Metaxas’ celebrated ‘Óchi’ [No] to Mussolini is commemorated with military parades and liturgies where Church hierarchs bless the Greek military forces. A third example is that of the three Church Fathers (Hierarchs), John Chrysostom, Basil the Great and Gregory the Theologian, who have been designated as the patron saints of (secular) education and school children. They are celebrated on 30 January to honour both the Orthodox Church and the educational principles and foundations of the modern Greek state (Gazi 2004). This celebration, which was introduced as an official holiday by the Greek state in 1842, serves the purpose of legitimising the Greek nation state, not only through its Christian religious identity, but also through the value of the three Church Fathers’ ancient Greek education. Therefore, Greek national collective memory has been constructed on the historical foundations of both Orthodox Christianity and Greek antiquity.4 The national ideal of Greece embodying the modern continuation of the Orthodox Christian tradition at its peak during the Byzantine Empire and the ancient Greek classical legacy has resulted in a quest for cultural purity but also a negation of anything that cannot be part of the image of a homogeneous national identity based exclusively on these two legacies. The next section will examine the idea of cultural purity in the Greek context since the ‘quest for purity’ or authenticity has been a guiding principle for both national cultural movements and religious movements in Greece.

 The image of modern Greek identity that has been projected internationally, has focused primarily on the ancient Greek legacy, which has received more attention as the nation’s core identity; internally and within the Balkan context, however, the religious identity of Greek Orthodoxy has played a central role (see also Herzfeld 2002: 201). 4

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From Purity to Synthesis The myth of a pure and authentic national character in its Herderian conception has played a decisive role in Greek nation-building. When purity is an ideal, contamination becomes a serious issue. The quest for purity in Greek cultural history has been driven by the fear of oriental contamination from the East or, later, from the modern West. As Bozatzis (2009: 438) notes, ‘oriental cultural pollution constitutes a representational resource deeply embedded in the history of narrating the modern Greek condition’. Quests for cultural purity have been particularly intense due to the persistence of national claims that Greece is the descendant of the ancient Greek civilisation. All nations claim to have existed eternally since prehistoric times, but few other nations in the western world have had a similarly imposing history to live up to.5 This insistence on proving uninterrupted ancestry with ancient Greece has imprinted itself on most of modern Greek cultural history and identity politics. According to several nationalistic blogs,6 a Sunday newspaper (Apogevmatiní tis Kyriakís, 6 November 2005) reported a supposedly scientific result from a Stanford University study proving the 99.5 per cent Caucasian DNA purity of the modern Greek population. The article underlined several times that almost no traces of Slavic or Turkish DNA could be found in the DNA of contemporary Greeks. Such examples indicate how powerful the idea of purity and the fear of contamination have been and still are in contemporary Greek society. The fear of contamination, inherent in the attempts to preserve a pure national Greek culture, has been emphasised by two events: the creation of a purified national language, Katharévousa (literally meaning ‘cleansed’ or ‘purified’), from late eighteenth century onwards, and a theory, introduced during the 1830s by the Austrian historian and philologist Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer, suggesting that the people claiming to be (modern) Greeks had no relationship with the ancient Greek people, but more probably originated from incoming Slav or Albanian tribes (Skopetea 1997).7 Thus, during the nineteenth century discussions on modern Greek identity were framed by two theories regarding purity or contamination in the fields of language and race respectively. The first half of the nineteenth  Other nations with similar heavy burdens of such rich and world renowned ancient history are Egypt, Israel and Italy, but as Herzfeld (1987) has shown, Ancient Greece played a particularly crucial role in the development of European self-understanding in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a role that decisively influenced the development of a Greek national narrative. 6  Some posts from 2011 and 2012: http://katanixis.blogspot.dk/2012/12/dna.html; http://makedonia-is-greece.blogspot.com/2011/01/995-dna.html; http://www.ardin.gr/ node/274; http://orthoboulos.blogspot.com/2011/07/995-dna.html; http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=55CIpVkEqvU. Blogs accessed 15 September 2011. 7  In a contemporary context, the rise of the Greek far-right party, Golden Dawn, illustrates the continuous appeal of theories of ethnic purity. 5

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century saw the founding of a Greek identity, by and large built on the ancient Greek legacy and to a lesser extent on the Christian heritage of the Byzantine Empire. Fallmerayer’s accusation, however, led to a thriving field of folklore studies that sought the original traces of Greek culture from ancient to modern times (Herzfeld 1982). The remnants of classical Greek culture were strongest in religious rituals, so folklorists projected the Orthodox faith as the heir to the ancient pagan culture. Stewart (1994: 128) has used the term syncretism to explain how Greek descent from the ancient Hellenes was rescued through ‘the assertion that [the modern Greeks] possessed a religion which syncretised ancient Greek elements’. He continues: At first sight the strategy of refuting racial mixture by asserting religious mixture appears an original, possibly even progressive, means of establishing cultural authenticity; all the more so when the usual negative reaction to syncretism as indicative of inauthenticity is considered. We should not, however, lose sight of the fact that syncretism in Greece is entirely subordinate to the larger nationalist assertion of cultural continuity. Nationalism created Greek syncretism in the first place, and then demanded its positive evaluation. (Stewart 1994: 142)

The ideal of Greece’s ancient legacy was dominant in the search for an authentic national identity during the first half of the nineteenth century and Orthodoxy was not accentuated as a crucial element in this process of identity construction. However, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a trend for synthesis. From the 1850s to 1870s the philologist Spyridion Zambelios and the historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos consolidated what became the most persistent narrative of Greek national identity, namely, that of the tripartite historical continuity synthesis between Antiquity, Byzantium and Modern Times (Kitromilides 1998). This vision of national continuity prompted the resurrection of the Byzantine legacy, and the recognition of the role of the Orthodox Church and the religious life of the population to whom Antiquity in the nineteenth century was an entirely foreign element. Zambelios was the first to suggest a synthesis between Hellenism and Christianity in the foreword of his 1852 edition of Greek folk songs (Grigoriadis 2013: 26). He further developed his ideas on the crucial importance of Christianity and the Byzantine Empire in preserving Greek culture from ancient to modern times in his Byzantine Studies: On the Origins of the Neohellenic Nation from the Eighth to the Tenth Century AD. In this work he claimed that ‘Hellenism and Christianity unveil their ancient friendship; remembrance and faith wholeheartedly establish an unbreakable alliance’ (citation and translation in Grigoriadis 2013: 27). The historian Paparrigopoulos consolidated the interpretation of the unbroken continuity of Greek identity in his large five-volume History of the Greek Nation. This work established the historical consciousness that has permeated Greek cultural and political life ever since. The tripartite synthesis coined by Paparrigopoulos was also projected in art, for example by the national poet Kostis Palamas (1859–1943). As we saw in the

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Introduction,8 Hellenism and Orthodoxy are today still considered inseparable and the tripartite synthesis of the ancient (Hellenic), medieval (Byzantine) and modern (the resurrected nation) periods constitute the basis of the teaching of history at all levels of the Greek education system (Avdela 2000). The Bonds between Orthodoxy and National Identity in the Twentieth Century National Expansion and the Helleno-Christian Bond In the twentieth century, Greece was troubled by several problems. In 1893, the State was declared bankrupt and four years later Greece suffered a shameful defeat by the Ottoman Empire in the war over Crete. These two defeats, the one in face of the western great powers and lenders, the other against a centuryold enemy and oppressor, meant that popular belief in a national cause was difficult to mobilise. Yet, the irredentist politics of the Great Idea, aiming at a greater Greece, including Asia Minor and Constantinople/Istanbul, were waged unabatedly into the twentieth century. Popular distress and political inefficiency led to social unrest and finally to a bloodless military coup in 1909 carried out by junior officers (Clogg 2002: 73–5). The reforms resulting from this coup, which paved the way for Eleftherios Venizelos’ ascendancy, created some optimism, but during the 1910s Greece fought in the Balkan wars (1912–1913) and was divided between liberalists and royalists (1914–1917), leading to the temporary coexistence of two governments. In 1917, Greece entered the First World War and, in its wake, engaged in warfare in Asia Minor to annex the town of Smyrna and the surrounding territory with its large Orthodox Christian population. This war ended with a disaster: the Greek army was defeated by the new Turkish nationalist forces of Kemal Atatürk, the Greek and Armenian quarters of Smyrna were burnt down and the Christian population was massacred and forced to flee. Subsequently the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne dictated a massive exchange of populations: one million Orthodox Greeks were relocated from the newly established republic of Turkey to the kingdom of Greece, while 300,000 Muslims living in the Greek kingdom were to be moved to the Turkish republic. Both the defeat and the population exchange marked the end of the irredentist national politics that had dominated the history of the first hundred years of the Greek state. The dream of building the modern Greek nation by reclaiming the past Byzantine glory and conquering old Byzantine lands in Asia Minor and Constantinople was lost forever. Therefore, from the late 1920s it became clear that the tripartite synthesis coined by Paparrigopoulos was no longer adequate to provide a persuasive national narrative. Since the irredentist mission of conquering 8  It is obvious how Anna Goulandri-Horn’s prologue to the Foundation’s publication activities in 1999, as cited in the introduction, echoes the above-cited words of Zambelios.

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all previously Hellenic and Byzantine lands was lost, Greece had to develop an entirely new national identity that was suitable for the modern era. Modernism, Hellenism and Orthodoxy The first hundred years of Greek nation-building was characterised by national and international expansion. In contrast, the new era from the early twentieth century onwards was marked by the massive influx into Greece of millions of refugees and exchanged populations and the increasing influence of political and cultural trends from Western Europe. This re-orientation from an outward-directed to an inward-directed national identity became visible in the literary generation that emerged after the 1922 military defeat, the so-called ‘generation of the 1930s’ (Beaton 2004: 128–96; Tziovas 2011). Identifying this new conception of Greek national identity as inwardly directed does not mean that artists, authors and intellectuals attempted to isolate Greece from the surrounding world. However, while expansion was a premise for the fulfilment of previous understandings of Greek national identity, the new identity was sought within the Greek tradition as a metaphysical and symbolic ideal that could be fulfilled without physical expansion. Thus, in the decades following the final settling of the geographic borders of the Greek nation state,9 the legacy of Byzantium no longer played the significant symbolic role for collective identity in Greece as before 1922.10 It was not until the 1960s – with the revival of patristic theology – and the 1980s – with Greece’s accession to the EEC – that Byzantium regained some of its symbolic power. The literary ‘generation of the 1930s’ is considered a landmark in modern Greek literature.11 The authors and poets in this decade brought modernism into Greek literature; they became the architects of a new understanding of Greek national identity after the military defeat in Asia Minor in 1922 and the subsequent population exchange that brought more than one million refugees to Greece, thus increasing the Greek population by more than 25 per cent. These traumatic events called for a complete redefinition of the Greek nation and what it meant to be Greek. These authors, many of whom came from multicultural milieus in Asia Minor and 9  The borders drawn after the First World War and the population exchange as part of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 settled to a large degree Greece’s border issues. However, it was as late as 1945 that the Dodecanese islands were ceded from Italy to Greece and one might also say that the Cyprus issue was, up until 1974, an unsettled border issue. 10  This does not mean that Byzantium disappeared as a source of artistic inspiration; for certain artists, including Fotis Kontoglou, Byzantium and the Eastern Orthodox tradition of Asia Minor were at the core of their artistic production. Since the 1960s, with the revival of patristic Greek theology, and in particular since the 1980s with the revival of monasticism and the neo-Orthodox paradigm, there has been an increase in the popularity of Kontoglou and other artists of the ‘generation of the 1930s’ who drew their inspiration from Byzantium. 11  Dimitris Tziovas (2011) discusses the mythological character that has been allocated to the authors of the so-called ‘generation of the 1930s’.

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Constantinople, found inspiration in a folkloric national identity, as opposed to the bombastic heroic national identities inherent in the visions of reviving the heydays of Antiquity and the splendours of Byzantium. Hence, cultural purity in the twentieth century was not predominantly sought in linguistic or racial terms, but as a new perception of the authentic modern Greek experience. The purity of Greek culture was not to be found or dug up from under layers of contaminated foreign influence from the Slavs, Turks or ‘Franks’. However, as a reaction to purist perceptions of language and racial descent, the deep change in Greek literature and art in the 1930s ended up developing its own purist perceptions. This generation was the first to attribute crucial importance to the term Ellinikótita, meaning Greekness, and Ellinismós (Hellenism). They understood Hellenism as a specific way of being in the world, which its proponents, like the poet and Nobel Prize winner Georgios Seferis, saw at one and the same time as the specific ethnicity of a historical experience embodied in the Greek nation and as a universal ‘state of mind’12 applicable beyond the borders of the Greek nation state. For Seferis, the diachronic and cultural experience of Greekness was more important than the territorially defined Greek nation; as Gourgouris (1996: 213) has put it, Seferis was ready to sacrifice ‘Greece’, the nation state, to Greekness, the ideology. The decade when the prolific ‘generation of the 1930s’ instilled a completely new artistic expression in Greek culture was one of optimism, despite the continuous economic and political instability. The artistic movements sought to create a new cultural synthesis where Greek culture was firmly integrated in the Western European cultural tradition while still drawing on the specific Eastern Mediterranean cultural traditions. With the outbreak of the Second World War and the subsequent Greek Civil War there was not much reason to remain optimistic, and it is obvious that from the 1940s the by then established artistic generation turned increasingly inwards, towards a local cultural framework and in particular towards the Greek past as a source of artistic inspiration. This search for an authentic and viable Greek culture also led to a rediscovery of the folkloric Orthodox culture and the unspoiled religious life of the countryside. From this period onwards, one can discern a religious dimension in the work of many artists, authors and intellectuals, including the novelist Georgios Theotokas and the Nobel laureates Georgios Seferis and Odysseas Elytis. Even declared atheist Marxist artists, such as Yannis Ritsos, used the Orthodox tradition as a source of inspiration, but without adhering to its transcendental messages. Through this influential Greek cultural elite, whose literary influence lasted well up into the 1970s and 1980s, Orthodoxy was projected as an inseparable dimension of Greek culture. Through this cultural endeavour to define authentic ‘Greekness’, Orthodoxy was pursued as a collective cultural heritage rather than as a purely spiritual devotion.

12  Gourgouris (1996: 214) quotes the following from Seferis’ diary: ‘Hellenism means Humanism’.

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Modernity and Orthodox Devotion The spiritual and purely religious dimension of Orthodoxy was particularly accentuated by the brotherhoods of theologians and their associated religious organisations, Zoí and Sotír, where a pietistic purist religiosity was cultivated. The increasing success of such independent Orthodox Christian organisations in the 1940s and 1950s can perhaps also be explained by the traumatic events of occupation and civil war.13 Thus, parallel to the use of the Orthodox tradition by artists, authors and intellectuals in their quest for an ‘ecumenical Greekness’, there was a religious revival seeking religious piety and devoutness in Orthodoxy. Religious organisations became very influential, at times even more influential, than the institutional Church (Makrides 2004: 513). The religious ideal of their members was to lead an ascetic, communal semi-monastic life, purified from any contaminating cultural distractions. The focus of the organisations on ascetic life and the Bible, exemplified in Bible study circles, drawing on the Greek Church fathers, as a supplement to the Orthodox liturgical tradition, may have been inspired by the role of the Bible in western Christianity. In this sense, the organisations were emulating Protestant piety and Biblical fundamentalism, which was quite unlike the usual image of Orthodoxy as a version of Christianity, which traditionally left more room for earthly pleasures than Catholicism and Protestantism. Therefore, they have later been accused of not being faithful to the authentic spiritual tradition of Orthodoxy (Yannaras 2006b: 398–400). Religious organisations were not only ascetic but also played a social and political role in Greek society and as such granted significant support to the monarchy (Kalaitzidis 2012d: 33). Furthermore, these independent Orthodox Christian organisations, as a primarily urban phenomenon, contributed significantly to a mixing of modern urban life and devout religiosity. Some researchers have even examined the organisations as promoters of modernisation in certain spheres of life, including women’s emancipation, as in the case of the sisterhoods of the late 1930s (Athanasopoulou-Kypriou 2012). Neo-Orthodox Revival and Anti-Westernism As a reaction to the success, and the modernising and westernising potential of the above-mentioned religious organisations, several intellectuals, theologians and monks objected in the 1960s to what they called the ‘Protestantisation of Orthodoxy’, and advocated a revival of Orthodoxy’s unique cultural roots in a specifically eastern tradition (Yannaras 2006b: 398–400). The request for an Orthodox revival was in its origin a theological project drawing inspiration from the Orthodox liturgy, the monastic tradition and the writings of the Greek Church 13  The first organisation was founded by Father Eusebius Matthopoulos in 1907 as the Brotherhood of Theologians – Zoi, but it was not until the 1940s that it reached high levels of membership and political influence.

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Fathers. However, in the early 1980s several charismatic figures from theological, monastic and artistic circles embraced the revival of Orthodox theology to the point of forming a widespread popular movement, known as the Neo-Orthodox current (Makrides 1998). At that time, Orthodoxy was used as an identity marker, providing people with a distinctive identity in the face of the country’s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1981. The renewed theological interest in the Greek Church Fathers was an obvious chance to promote the specific Greekness of Orthodox Christianity. The revival of patristic studies also led to a rediscovery of Byzantium as the source and ideal of a living Greek Orthodox tradition.14 As European integration accelerated during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and as Greece remained a relatively poor member state in what subsequently became the European Union (EU), there was a great deal of comfort to be gained by drawing from the collective memory of the past Byzantine Empire. In the 1980s, leftist intellectuals took an interest in a certain rapprochement with the religious milieus of the Neo-Orthodox movement (Makris 1983). However, following the Neo-Orthodox turn to an overtly nationalistic or patriotic ideology in 1990s, the interest from secular intellectuals was lost entirely. The 1990s became the decade that consolidated the new vision for a synthesis between Greek national identity and Orthodox religious identity. This period was, however, also characterised by a purist adherence to the eastern characteristics of Orthodoxy in opposition to western culture, which, with its modern lifestyles, was seen as threatening to alienate what was perceived as a pure spiritual Orthodox Christian tradition. The theological philosopher Christos Yannaras has been one of the key figures representing the Neo-Orthodox movement. His thinking and public persona exemplify the amalgamation of national and religious identity. In an interview with the younger theologian Stavros Yangazoglou, Yannaras estimates that his book, Modern Greek Identity, published in 1978, had the role of a manifesto. The book ‘proposed Greek Orthodox ecclesiastic identity as the most genuine and authentic Greek identity’ (Yannaras and Yangazoglou 2002: 124). In the interview, Yannaras refers to other Greek identity markers as ‘mimetic’, ‘folkloristic or aesthetic’, ‘rhetoric or psychological’; furthermore, he believes that an authentic Greek identity is revealed ‘beneath the rust of alienation’, as the Greek way of perceiving and inducing meaning into reality, expressed through the Greek Orthodox theological tradition. In Yannaras’ interpretation, this tradition is metaphysical and, therefore, precedes language and art in terms of its authenticity. Yannaras describes the contribution of his generation as follows:

14  Patristic studies, i.e. the systematic study of texts by theologians writing in Greek from the fourth to the fourteenth century, experienced a revival in Greece from the 1960s onwards, following inspiration from the influential Russian theologian Georges Florovsky (1893–1979) who argued in the 1930s that the way forward for Orthodox Christianity was to ‘return to the Fathers’, i.e. to study the Greek Church Fathers of the fourth century, and thereby to ‘retrieve the Christian (or holy) Hellenism’ (Papalexandropoulos 2009).

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During the sixties some people realised that the truly alive – and not just folkloric – element of Greekness, the cultural identity and historical specificity of a Greek person, is preserved in the ecclesiastic tradition, in Orthodoxy. (Yannaras and Yangazoglou 2002)

Even if, in this quotation, Yannaras refers specifically to ‘a Greek person’, later in the interview he insists that the Greek Orthodox tradition, rooted in a specific language and a specific geographic topos and time, is universally applicable outside the borders of Greece, as long as it is kept pure and uncontaminated by western influences. The quest for a universal Greekness is characteristic of both the theological and the cultural arguments of the Neo-Orthodox current and the literary ‘generation of the 1930s’. However, the Neo-Orthodox movement rejected the authenticity that the literary generation drew from Greek folklore and added instead a metaphysical religious dimension in order to render its proposal of Greekness even more genuine. In between these two quests for Greek authenticity, the pietistic organisations represented a different quest for authenticity, namely the pure Christian faith expressed through a pious and selfless way of life. The search for an authentic religious identity is also the concern of the progressive theological current that I will present in greater detail in Chapter 3. In 1998, as the peak of the Neo-Orthodox merging of Orthodoxy and modern Greek identity, exemplified above by Yannaras’ book, Modern Greek Identity, Bishop Christodoulos was elected Archbishop of Athens and All Greece. During his leadership, he fully revived and enacted the idea of Orthodoxy and the Church of Greece as guardians of the Greek nation in relation to the country’s local neighbours in the Balkan region and vis-à-vis Greece’s integration in the EU. The literature on Christodoulos’ innovative politicisation of the Church in Greek society is vast and it is not within the scope of this book to provide a detailed account on his contribution to Greek national self-understanding.15 It suffices to say that he skilfully positioned the Church as a powerful political player in the Greek public sphere by staging himself and the Church as protectors of the Greek nation. In his rhetoric, Greece and Orthodoxy became once again synonymous and inseparable, as Zambelios had originally suggested in 1857.16

15  See, for example: Alivizatos 1999; Stavrakakis 2002, 2003; MolokotosLiederman 2003, 2007a, 2007b; Mavrogordatos 2003; Prodromou 2004; Chrysoloras 2004; Oulis et al. 2010. 16  The military junta (1967–1974) had also promoted the close bonds between Greece and Orthodoxy (Christianity) and Christodoulos was not unfamiliar with the rhetoric of the dictatorship since he served as a secretary to the Holy Synod during the dictatorship when he was a young deacon (Oulis et al 2010: 195).

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Conclusion The previous account of how Orthodoxy has been historically related to Greek national identity illustrates that, since the establishment of the Greek state in 1832 and the proclamation of the autocephalous Church of Greece in 1833, the Orthodox Christian heritage and religious identity have been interpreted in different ways as the constituent features of Greek culture and national identity. Therefore, Greek national identity is an example of the equation of a specific Christian religious tradition with a specific people and territory. I have highlighted the most well-known interpretations of the role of the Orthodox legacy in Greek cultural identity in the twentieth century. The cultural interpretations of Orthodoxy are predominant, with the exception of the religious organisations of the 40s and 50s that sought a more pious interpretation of Orthodoxy. The spiritual dimension of the Neo-Orthodox current was to a large extent eclipsed by its proposals for a cultural identification between Greekness and Orthodoxy. Archbishop Christodoulos (1998–2008) can be seen as the culmination of the identification between the interests of the nation and religion, or rather the instrumentalisation of religion in the name of the nation. A recurrent question in the negotiations on the relationship between religion and nation in Greece has been whether the universal values of religion can be used as expressions of an exclusionist national culture. Furthermore, the account on the various interpretations of Greek national and religious identity reveals a constant fluctuation between a local eastern (Byzantine) Christian tradition and a universal western and/or ecumenical Christian tradition.

Chapter 3

Untying the Bonds: New Orthodox Voices on the Nation, Europe and Globalisation ‘Theology in Greece today is in a phase of “euphoria”, with all the advantages, but also the dangers that this entails’ (Thermos 2013: 49). This statement is by a priest and psychotherapist and was published in a special issue on ‘Challenges of the Orthodox Church in the Twenty-First Century’ of the Greek journal Néa Efthíni. Many of the numerous other short contributions in the issue, written by theologians, clerics and intellectuals with an Orthodox involvement or affiliation, testify that there is a general recognition of an emerging new paradigm in Greek theology, but also that there are very different views on the qualities and implications of the new theological discourses. This chapter introduces contemporary Greek spaces where a renewed and progressive theological discourse has developed. I will focus more particularly on the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos and will analyse key features of this progressive new theology, especially those that are related to the nation, Europe, modernity and globalisation. The emergence over the past 10 to 15 years of a progressive Greek Orthodox theology has to be viewed against the thought of Christos Yannaras, who conceived Greekness, or the essence of Greek identity, as rooted in the Greek Orthodox tradition, as a way of giving meaning to the world. This view is now contested by progressive theologians who criticise his understanding of ‘Greekness’ and Orthodoxy for its ethnocentric and exclusive traits. In November 2006, the centre-left newspaper To Víma published a special section on the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Greek nation. Four of the five authors in this section came from emerging progressive theological milieus. The titles of the articles indicate the authors’ views on the problematic relationship between the Greek Church and nation; an indicative article title was ‘The Misfortune of Orthodoxy’ (Dodos 2006), another ‘How Nationalism Undermines both the Church and the Nation’ (Thermos 2006), and a third ‘The Traumatic Relationship between Religion and National Identity’ (Karamouzis 2006). The authors of these articles insisted that the Church of Greece must move away from its nationalistic rhetoric and instead turn towards the existential and ethical dimensions of life. Such critique is not new, but what is different is the argument for a fundamental change in the self-understanding of the Orthodox Church. A prime figure advocating this renewed self-understanding is the theologian and director of the Volos Academy for Theological Studies, Pantelis Kalaitzidis. Just as Christos Yannaras is his generation’s best-known advocate of

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the ‘Helleno-Orthodox’ vision in the latter part of the twentieth century, Pantelis Kalaitzidis is one of the most distinct figures in rejecting this vision in the early twenty-first century.1 The critical attitude of progressive theologians towards the nationalistic leadership of the Church, which reached its peak when Archbishop Christodoulos was prelate (1998–2008), created a silent alliance between secular voices and progressive religious voices, since the former were also critical of the Church’s political influence and ethnocentric discourse.2 The main concern of secular voices in Greece has been for the Greek state to modernise through a process of institutional secularisation, for example church–state separation. The progressive theologians claim that because the Church has become too secularised through its symbolic identification with the Greek nineteenth-century modernist and nationalist project they advocate its detachment from the nation (but not necessarily from the state) so that it can be free to fulfil its transcendental mission. In 2001, when inaugurating the first circle of conferences and seminars at the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos on the general theme of eschatology,3 the director Pantelis Kalaitzidis asked rhetorically: Is it perhaps so, that as many times as the Church accepts to take upon itself the role of being a vehicle for national ideology and invokes its contributions to the struggles of the Nation in order to make its presence accepted and respected, it is a secularised Church that has forgotten its eschatological vision and is

 A large part of Kalaitzidis’ PhD dissertation (2008b) is dedicated to a meticulous study of Yannaras’ writings: ‘A close engagement with the work of Christos Yannaras is absolutely vital for our current discussion, and as such, it takes up Part II of this study in its entirety. […] our study seeks to lay out, in the course of thirteen chapters, the precise manner by which Hellenism and anti-westernism have been theologically transcribed and incorporated in Yannaras’ thought’ (quoted from an English summary of the dissertation provided by Pantelis Kalaitzidis). 2  It is characteristic that the statement of purpose of the Volos Academy underlines that the Academy aims for dialogue with the Greek secular intelligentsia. To what extent this goal has been achieved can be disputed, but the intentions have been clearly stated (http:// www.acadimia.gr/content/view/5/40/lang,en/). 3  Eschatology literally means ‘the knowledge of the last days’ and comprises the anticipation of the Second Coming of Christ and the promised Kingdom of God. Therefore, eschatology entails a future-oriented understanding of Christianity in contrast to the pastoriented focus on tradition as the exclusive source of authenticity in Christianity. As an example of the centrality of eschatology in the work of Kalaitzidis and in the work of the Academy, the first series of lectures and seminars at the Volos Academy was focused on the overarching theme of eschatology (Kalaitzidis 2003b). In addition, the first collective volume published by the Volos Academy for Theological Studies was dedicated to eschatology (Kalaitzidis 2003a). For an English publication on the eschatological dimension of Orthodoxy and the Church’s mission in the world, see Kalaitzidis 2012d, in particular pp. 89–112. 1

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unable to converse with contemporary man? (http://www.acadimia.gr/content/ view/70/76/lang,el/ accessed 7 June 2013)

It is characteristic in the new theological discourses that advocate a new role for the Church that they refer to the Church’s relationship with the nation and not with the state. The issue of church–state separation is not given much attention, at least not in the work of the theologian Pantelis Kalaitzidis. Many of the changes and innovations proposed are of an ethical or ideological nature rather than a practical.4 The Spaces of Progressive Theological Thought The attempt to modernise Greek Orthodox theology and identity seem to be taking place in three ideological spaces and intellectual milieus: the theological journal Sýnaxis;5 the Academy for Theological Studies of the Holy Metropolis of Demetrias in Volos; and KAIROS – the Greek Theological Association for the Improvement of Religious Education.6 Since its foundation in 1982, Sýnaxis was associated with the Neo-Orthodox revival of theological thought. However, since the late 1990s, when the theologian Thanasis Papathanasiou became Editor-in-Chief, the journal has been less associated with the Neo-Orthodox current. Therefore, many new theological voices have addressed controversial issues through the journal, showing its openness and willingness to discuss, revise and rethink the so-called inherited traditions in Orthodox Christianity. The Volos Academy was founded in 2000 with the aim of addressing controversial theological issues in an alternative progressive and academic spirit that was focused on dialogue. The teachers’ association KAIROS was created in 2010 after a year-long discussion on the role of religion in Greek public education and the role of theologians as school teachers. The Association wishes to represent a progressive theological voice in education, an alternative to the established conservative Panhellenic Union of Theologians.7 Many of the participants in one of these platforms of progressive theological discourse are also associated with the other two.

4  As a whole, it is characteristic of the new theological discourses examined in this book that they remain theoretical and ideological, thus, failing to propose more radical changes such as church–state separation or the ordination of women. This point is also made by Stavros Zoumboulakis who instead of ‘general, abstract and ambitious theological proposals that have no relation at all with the daily life of the Church’ (2013: 47) argues for a simple change as the modernisation of priests’ dressing code. 5  Σύναξη [assembly]. 6  ΚΑΙΡΟΣ – Πανελλήνιος θεολογικός σύνδεσμος για την αναβάθμιση της θρησκευτικής εκπαίδευσης. 7  Πανελλήνια Ένωση Θεολόγων (ΠΕΘ).

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The activities of the Academy have been reflected in the other Greek theological forums, the journal Sýnaxis, and the KAIROS Association. The first article criticising the ethno-religious strategy of the Church of Greece published by Academy director Pantelis Kalaitzidis (2001a) appeared in Sýnaxis. By organising training seminars on modern teaching methods for teachers in secondary education, the Academy has become an important stakeholder in the creation of a new forum for progressive theologians and religion teachers. Interestingly, in 2011, critics accused the then Minister of Education, Anna Diamantopoulou, of sending religion teachers to the Theological Academy with the intent of creating ‘a new “secret school”8 for a new religion class’.9 These three forums for the development of new theological discourses in Greece, illustrate the ongoing tendencies towards an ecumenical understanding of Christianity, an openness to the consequences of global convergence and a rapprochement between Greek Orthodox theology and western Christian theologies as an alternative to the Neo-Orthodox anti-western stance. The Volos Academy for Theological Studies This chapter focuses on the Theological Academy in Volos as an ideological pioneering organisation representing new trends in Greek theological thought. In Chapter 7, the new theological association of religion teachers (KAIROS) will be discussed in greater detail. The Director of the Volos Academy and other progressive theologians have always been critical of the ethnocentrism that Archbishop Christodoulos (1939–2008) represented.10 Christodoulos’ Church leadership provoked the  This refers to the national myth of ‘secret schools’, set up by the Orthodox Church under Ottoman rule, where clerics, supposedly illegally, taught Christian children to read and write Greek. According to the national narrative, this is what kept the language alive, together with the Greek national and religious spirit, during the 400 years of Ottoman domination. See Chapter 4 on the myth of the secret school. 9  The citation is from the Facebook profile of Professor and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Thessaloniki, Despo Laliou. It was reproduced in the thriskeftiká blog (http:// thriskeftika.blogspot.com/2012/03/blog-post_5700.html) (accessed 4 June 2012). The ‘new “secret school”’ and the ‘new religion class’ refer to the ‘New School’ reform (Ministry of Education, 2010) undertaken by the Minister of Education, Anna Diamantopoulou, under the PASOK government (2009–2011). On the New School reform see Chapter 7. 10  According to Pantelis Kalaitzidis (personal communication, March 2008) he and two other progressive theologians (Stavros Yangazoglou, principal advisor of the Pedagogical Institute and Thanasis Papathanasiou, chief editor of the periodical Sýnaxis) were on the ‘blacklist’ of the late Archbishop Christodoulos. This meant that the Church refused to appoint them to any position within the Church organisation, and national institutions, including the state owned radio and television stations, and universities were warned against cooperating with them. This antipathy or fear by the late Archbishop seems understandable if his aim was to silence criticism. Kalaitzidis often criticised the 8

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publication of critical voices and the organisation of activities that questioned the ethnocentric role of the Church in Greece. A crucial period was between 2000 and 2001, when Christodoulos’ nationalist, religious and populist goals became overtly clear during the conflict between the Church and the PASOK government over the removal of religious affiliation from Greek citizens’ ID cards.11 Following the ID cards controversy, several new voices advocated alternative understandings of what it means to be Orthodox and the detachment of the Orthodox faith from national identity. The conflict also prompted the publication of three new theological journals,12 though short-lived, which indicated a growing interest in the role of religion in the Greek public sphere. The academic year 2000–2001 was also the inaugural year for the creation of the Volos Academy for Theological Studies under the direction of the theologian Pantelis Kalaitzidis. The Volos Theological Academy is considered a particular and unique institution in the history of Greek theology and in the context of the institution of the Church of Greece.13 Ignatios, Metropolitan of Volos, who was also candidate for the Archbishopric in 2008, was responsible for the initiative to create a theological institution that was to operate independently, not only from the two theological schools which are part of the state universities in Athens and Thessaloniki, but ideological line of the Archbishop, sometimes in a quite disdainful manner, although without mentioning Christodoulos by name (for example Kalaitzidis 2005a: 70). 11  As mentioned in the introduction and in Chapter 1 there are several academic studies on this conflict. For an overview see Molokotos-Liederman (2007a). 12  These are Theós & Thriskeía [God & Religion] (1998–2000), Thriskeiología Ierá/Vévila [Religious Studies Sacred/Profane] (2000–2005) and Analógion [Lectern] (2001–2003). The first two hosted mainly young progressive theologians and sociologists of religion, while the latter was associated with the Metropolis of Serbia and Kozani, and also hosted progressive older generation theologians. The aforementioned periodical Sýnaxis, founded in 1982, is well-known for its spirit of dialogue and for publishing high-quality articles. In 2000 and 2001 it published several thematic volumes on the complexities of the relationship of the Greek Orthodox Church with the Greek nation and state, including articles criticising the popular ethno-religious and political engagement of the Church. 13  In 1968 the open-minded Bishop of Kisamos and Selinon (western Crete), Irineos, founded the Orthodox Academy of Crete under the auspices of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople: ‘The basic mission of the OAC is the dialogical witness and the liturgical ministry of Orthodoxy in the modern world; therefore it is devoted to the cultivation of the spirit of dialogue between Orthodoxy and other confessions and religions, and also between faith, science and culture’ (http://www.oac.gr/ accessed 29 June 2013). Today, the Academy of Crete functions mainly as an international conference centre and it is seldom mentioned in relation to contemporary progressive theological thought. The Academy of Crete has produced several publications on ecological theology and environmental ethics (http://www.oac.gr/publications/books accessed 29 June 2013), a topic that has so far not been addressed by the progressive theological thought dealing with issues of ethnocentrism and multiculturalism.

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also from the various ecclesiastical colleges all over Greece, which are under the authority of the Church of Greece. However, the continuous links between the Volos Theological Academy and the Metropolis of Volos means that the Academy can still be considered part of the institutional Church.14 Yet, this affiliation does not restrict the Academy to follow any particular official line of the Church or of the local bishop. According to Pantelis Kalaitzidis, the Academy Director, the local bishop does not interfere with the academic programmes or activities of the organisation even if he does not always agree with the line chosen by the director.15 The Metropolitan participates in most of the Academy’s conferences and official events and, at least from the outside, the Academy and the local Metropolis seem to have a harmonious relationship.16 The Academy is not an officially recognised educational institution and does not provide academic degrees. It functions as a space where contested theological issues, such as the position of women in Greek Orthodoxy, Islam, fundamentalism, religion and literature, and religion and modernity, can be discussed during lectures, roundtables and conferences. In line with its founding principle of dialogue, the Academy regularly invites speakers from other Christian denominations and religious communities, as well as secular intellectuals. The proceedings of the Academy lectures and conferences have been published by a private commercial Athens-based publishing house, Índiktos, which has no formal links with any official church institution. 14  The building that houses the Academy is a conference centre that was built during the leadership of the previous bishop of Volos. It is ironic that the previous bishop was Archbishop Christodoulos and that the critical voices against him were flourishing, so to speak, in his own house. It is also ironic that the conference centre was built with funds from the European Union, to which Christodoulos was strongly opposed, even though he happily received the funding. 15  In the foreword to one of the Academy’s publications, Kalaitzidis expresses gratitude towards the Metropolitan for ‘the vision of the Academy’ and for his ‘daring to bless an attempt for dialogue between theology and the progressive secular intelligentsia, especially shortly after the crisis of the ID cards’ (2007a: 15). 16  The Metropolitan of Demetrias, Ignatios, is considered one of the more progressive bishops of the Greek Church. He has openly discussed the matter of church–state separation (Ignatios 2010); he also preaches against religious fundamentalism and he partakes in ecumenical activities through the Synodal Committee for Inter-Orthodox and InterChristian Relations. In a 2012 interview with the journalist Aristeidis Viketos, when asked about the strong criticism that the Academy receives from lay people and theologians, Bishop Ignatios said: ‘You must not forget that it is not the pulpit of the church, nor does it [the Academy] express the views of the bishop, the bishopric. It remains always a free space for theological dialogue, where, of course, our primary criterion is the Orthodox speakers and professors’ (27 April 2012, http://synodoiporia.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-post_2218. html). This quote, responding to criticism that the Academy invites non-Orthodox speakers, illustrates how the Bishop attempts to find a balance between openness towards a progressive theological milieu and loyalty towards the institution of the Orthodox Church.

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Kalaitzidis’ publications and activities since the late 1990s reveal that he is a dynamic figure in Greek public life, even if his activities have been limited to primarily ecclesiastical and theological milieus. Recently, the activities he has organised in Greece seem to have expanded towards a broader audience, increasingly involving scholars and intellectuals from other academic circles. Furthermore, the Volos Theological Academy is gradually building an international profile through the participation of its members in academic meetings abroad and the organisation of academic events in Greece in cooperation with international institutions. In January 2010, the ecumenical French journal Istina published a special issue on ‘Church and Culture in Contemporary Greek Theology’, including translated papers by seven Greek theologians from a conference held at the Volos Theological Academy on 7–10 May 2009. The editorial in the issue states that the Academy is ‘well integrated in Greek Church life through its association with the Metropolis of Demetrias’ and that the Academy ‘in the past years, under the influence of its Director Pantelis Kalaitzidis, has established itself as one of the principal forums for encounter and debate on Orthodox theology at an international level’.17 In April 2010, the Academy organised jointly an international conference held at the Saint Serge Institute in Paris on the topic ‘Renewal in Contemporary Greek Theology: From the Generation of the 1960s to the Challenges of Today’. The same year in June, the Academy hosted a large-scale international theological conference ‘Neo-Patristic Synthesis or “Meta-Patristic” Theology: The Demand for a Contextual Theology in Orthodoxy’ organised jointly with the universities of Münster (Germany) and Fordham, (New York), and the Romanian Institute for Inter-Religious Dialogue. More recently, in May 2013 a second international conference on the question of Orthodoxy and contextual theology was held in Cluj-Napoca, Romania, again organised jointly by the Academy and the abovementioned institutions. The New Theological Trends As illustrated, the Theological Academy of Volos has attempted to achieve a central position among several new initiatives whose goal is to rethink the role of Orthodoxy in Greek society and the relationship between national and religious identity, and the teaching of religion in public education. These recent tendencies within Greek Orthodox theology indicate an emphasis on the need to renew and modernise the Greek Orthodox Church and its religious practices and to adapt them to the living conditions in late modern western societies, 17  ‘Cette académie, bien insérée dans la vie ecclésiale grecque par l’intermédiaire de la métropolie de Démétrias, s’est affirmée ces dernières années, sous l’impulsion de son directeur, le Dr Pantelis Kalaitzidis, comme l’un des principaux lieux de rencontre et de débat de la théologie orthodoxe au niveau international’ (http://www.istina.eu/index. php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=156&cntnt01returnid=82 accessed 7 June 2013).

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which have been transformed by religious, ethnic and cultural diversity. Their theological proposals question an earlier modernisation in Orthodox Christianity, namely the creation of a nationally defined Greek Orthodox Church as a result of the Greek uprising against the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the modern Greek state. This current wish for ‘modernisation’ is based on ideals drawn from what is perceived as an authentic pre-national Christian era through the example of a theological turn towards Bible studies. According to advocates of this view, the Bible, as the most authentic Christian source, has been neglected in Greek theology at the expense of patristic studies and concerns about the Greekness of Orthodoxy since the theological revival of the 1960s.18 The proposed ‘new’ theology claims a global and ecumenical Christian identity, independent from any identification with national or cultural traits. So far, this new theological trend has not received much public or scholarly attention or media exposure in Greece. According to Pantelis Kalaitzidis, this is because extreme positions seem to attract more public attention: ‘the critics love persons like Christodoulos, whom they can criticise; they are not very fond of us because we are moderate; they do not want [i.e. they don’t care about] moderate voices from the Church’.19 It is true that the Greek media have a preference for sensationalist figures that are able to attract public attention: when in March 2008 the Holy Synod expressed its opinion on a government bill facilitating registered partnerships (civil union contract), the media focused on the extreme voices of certain members. The media focused on the confrontation between different stances within the Holy Synod: while the recently elected Archbishop Ieronymos represented the view that the Church should not interfere with secular laws, other members wanted the Synod to condemn both the proposal itself and the persons who would make use of such a law and live ‘in sin’, either as an unmarried heterosexual couple or worse (in their view), as a homosexual couple.20 For several days, the media focused persistently on one Synod member, the Bishop of Thessaloniki, who had referred to this type of civil union or cohabitation as ‘officialising prostitution’, while the Archbishop attempted to keep a low profile in the media. In contrast to the foremost advocate of the Neo-Orthodox current Christos Yannaras, representatives of the current generation of progressive theologians do not seem to make a frequent appearance in mainstream Greek media. For  See Chapter 2 for an account of this revival.  Interview, March 2008. 20  Law Ν. 3719/2008 does not allow same sex couples to enter into a civil union 18 19

contract. The issue was brought up in Parliament in February 2013 by two members of Parliament who put a question to the Minister of Justice, Transparency and Human Rights about the discriminatory aspects of the law. In January 2013 there was a hearing at the European Court of Human Rights regarding the protest against the law by four Greek same sex couples (Vallianatos and others vs Greece, http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2013/01/ chamber-hearing-into-protest-at-greeces-civil-union/).

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Kalaitzidis, the absence of extensive popular Greek media coverage is a deliberate choice. Assuming prominence in the Greek media, for example, by appearing in television programmes or writing weekly columns in Greek dailies, as Yannaras has been doing since the early 1990s, Kalaitzidis says that he would have to address the public as a national community – which is exactly what he wants to avoid.21 Kalaitzidis criticises proponents of the previous generation of theologians for turning religious identity into a national project through the so-called NeoOrthodox movement. For his part, Kalaitzidis wishes to avoid becoming the initiator of a mass movement defined according to national criteria. Instead, his activities are directed towards an international and primarily academic audience. This apparently deliberate choice of keeping a distance from the public sphere, which restricts the public visibility and dissemination of the Academy’s views and its work, seems to be its greatest weakness. In the special issue of the journal Néa Efthíni on ‘The Challenges for the Orthodox Church in the Twenty-First century’ Athanasopoulou-Kypriou (2013) indirectly addresses this issue by arguing that even progressive and innovative theologians express themselves in paternalistic ways. She states: ‘Representatives of this strand seem to allow everybody to express their experience provided that they do so with fluency and academic ability’ (ibid.: 13). In the same issue the philologist Stavros Zoumboulakis, who is director of the Greek Bible society Ártos Zoís [Bread of Life], suggests that the theologians put aside ‘general, abstract and grandiose theological proposals’ (Zoumboulakis 2013: 47). He continues: ‘Let’s leave the big words aside and let’s find a way to make small deeds, so that our Church can live in its time and in its society instead of being the prodigious remains of solitude and grandeur’ (ibid.). There seems to be a dilemma in new theological milieus, especially with regard to the Theological Academy in Volos and its Director. On the one hand, there are proposals for the Church to change the way it sees itself and acts in society, i.e. as an ecumenical spiritual institution rather than as a guardian of the nation. On the other hand, the theological proposals are very much directed towards an international Orthodox and/or ecumenical theological milieu and thus seem to have little effect on local Church life in Greece. However, before discussing this dilemma let us look more carefully at the three main thematic strands of this new theology: the nation, Europe and the plural society in the era of globalisation. Nation and Orthodoxy: Untying the Bonds During the 2000s, the central issue in the work of Kalaitzidis has been the critique of the Church’s abuse of its relationship with the Greek nation state. At a seminar in 2004, Kalaitzidis said that the key challenge for the re-evangelisation of the Greeks is nationalism: 21

 Telephone interview, July 2009.

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New Voices in Greek Orthodox Thought Therefore, the adoption of an ecumenical ecclesiastic discourse, free from constant references to the nation […] is not just a demand for genuineness, authenticity and faithfulness towards the Orthodox tradition, it is also an absolutely necessary […] precondition for the Church to cross the threshold of this century instead of finding easy and comfortable refuge in past eras. (Kalaitzidis 2005a: 50–51)

Whereas the previous generation of theologians used the words ‘authentic’ and ‘genuine’ to refer to the Greekness of the Orthodox tradition, Kalaitzidis uses these same words to refer to a form of Orthodoxy that is free from the limits and boundaries of Greek national identity and its national ecclesiastical history. Eschatology is a concept widely used in this new theology, which argues that tradition, as ‘traditionocracy’ [paradosiarchía], has been given too much weight in the movement for ‘a return to the Orthodox tradition’ (Kalaitzidis 2009a).22 At a conference held in New York on the topic of ‘Orthodoxy and Hellenism’, Kalaitzidis explicitly addressed the merging of national and religious identities: The Church, however, is paying a heavy price for forgetting its eschatological perspective and its supra-national mission […], for confusing the national with the religious, by becoming involved in a process of ethnogenesis and national competitions. (Kalaitzidis 2010: 376)

Apart from the overall goal of bringing the Greek Church into the twenty-first century, a central theme in Kalaitzidis’ work has been to examine and show the damage of nationalism to the ethos of the Orthodox Church. He explicitly addresses the relationship between the Church of Greece and Greek national identity as one that has harmed the Church: The price which the Orthodox Church paid and continues to pay for its relationship with the nation is very high. It has to do with the corruption of its ecclesiological identity, with its nearly complete nationalisation and with the abandonment of its universality and ecumenicity for the sake of the particularity of modern Hellenism. … The Church is the way towards the éschata and not a return to the glorious and traumatic history of Byzantium/Romiosýni, Turkish domination or modern Hellenism (Kalaitzidis 2005a: 49–50)

22  At the inauguration of the first thematic unit of the academic activities of the Theological Academy Kalaitzidis introduced the topic of Eschatology as follows: ‘Christianity is inconceivable outside of the eschatological perspective. […], eschatology is not just the discourse about the end of days or the last chapter of the Dogmatics […]. Eschatology is rather an attitude and a reality that regards the eschata’s merging into the present, the first taste in the present life of the future eternity and the waiting for the coming kingdom’ (http://www.acadimia.gr/content/view/70/76/lang,el/ accessed 7 June 2013).

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It is characteristic that Kalaitzidis refers to the relationship between Church and nation, and not between Church and state. There are very few references to church–state relations in the work of this theologian who mainly focuses on the ideological and mythical uses of the Greek imaginary in a historical perspective.23 As explained in Chapter 2, the idea of a national synthesis of three major periods of Greek history, i.e. Antiquity, Byzantium and the modern times (denoting the resurrection of the Greek nation in 1821), was originally coined by the historian Paparrigopoulos in the mid-nineteenth century. Kalaitzidis claims that Paparrigopoulos ‘replaces the Church with the metaphysical idea of the eternal nation’ and that he ‘reverses the history of salvation and turns it into the history of Hellenism […] and its ultimate restoration’ (2003d: 84). The incorporation of Byzantine history into the Greek national narrative facilitated the creation of the ideological term ‘Helleno-Christianity’ in designating the specificity of Greek civilisation. This ideological interpretation of Greek national history and culture has prevailed since the mid-nineteenth century and shaped national spheres of influence as different as warfare, authoritarian regimes and art.24 Kalaitzidis finds that the Church has paid a heavy price for its close ties with the nation state, because, as he claims, it has lost its authentic supranational mission. As a theologian and religious idealist, he believes in an essential authentic spirituality that can exist outside the construction of national communities. He recognises that nations are a part of history and as such will not disappear, yet the Church’s role is to overcome the divisions created by nations: Of course, nations will exist as long as history exists; the notions of nation and Church relate to each other however in a dialectic relationship because they contain an irreconcilable and opposite dynamic. The nation, that originated from the fragmentation and splitting up of a united mankind, signals an itinerary of separation and division while its existence and survival contain the elements 23  Following international discussions on the space of religion in the public sphere (for example by Jürgen Habermas, Richard Falk and John Rawl) Kalaitzidis (2007a: 127–61; 2012d: 81–6) puts forward the opinion that the Church should occupy a space in civil society between the state and the private sphere, and that the Church must respect the distinct roles of church and state, as well as the principles of human rights, religious freedom and respect of diversity. The practical issue of a Greek church–state separation is, however, not addressed. 24  As explained in Chapter 2, Helleno-Christianity formed the foundational ideology behind Greek irredentist politics between 1844 and 1922, known as the Great Idea [Megáli Idéa], seeking to bring together all Greek Orthodox populations under the Greek state. Helleno-Christianity was also the core ideology of the two dictatorships in the twentieth century: the Metaxas regime from 1936 to 1940 and the military junta from 1967 to 1974. Finally, the importance of the Greek Orthodox tradition for modern Greek culture has been a central concern in Greek artistic production from the 1880s to the 1950s, especially in poetry (including Kostis Palamas, Angelos Sikelianos, Odysseas Elytis, Georgios Seferis and Yannis Ritsos).

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New Voices in Greek Orthodox Thought of exclusion and exclusiveness. The Church on the other hand, prepares and eschatologically realises the way of unity, it wishes “for the unity of everything” while its Eucharistic gathering itself contains the power of overcoming all kinds of divisions in Christ. The nation divides what originally was united while the Church unites what was in opposition. (Kalaitzidis 2001c)25

Thus, the new theological paradigm exemplified by Kalaitzidis proposes a deconstruction of the essentialist fusion of national and religious identities. However, the new identity paradigm he proposes is still prone to a certain degree of essentialism and exclusion because it presupposes belonging to a specific religious community, namely Christianity, thus excluding other religious worldviews and in particular secular views. The problem of dealing with the Other in a non-exclusive way is dealt with below in the section on the theology of multiculturalism. At another international conference, Kalaitzidis addressed even more explicitly the damaging effects of culture and the idea of national identity to the idea of an authentic religion: Our Church ought urgently to decide what it defends and preaches: the unity of everything and the universal brotherhood of people or national particularity and fragmentation? Christian catholicity and ecumenicity or fragmentation and particularism, which consist of spiritual, theological and ecclesiastical provincialism? The former, via integration into the Church and progress in spiritual life, entails freedom and the gradual overcoming or stultification of distinctions based on tribe, language, culture, origin, family bonds etc. The latter takes us back to idolatry and to the worship of the nation and national identity, the sacralisation of the land and its transformation into a metaphysical category, to “Judas’ temptation” of ethnophyletism; it takes us back to a spiritual primitivism that subjugates us to the pagan infernal powers of the earth, the tribe and bloodlines. (Kalaitzidis 2011a)

In his presentation, Kalaitzidis refers to a clear distinction between what he regards as good and evil. Using almost the words of a hellfire preacher, he indicates that since all evil originates from human bonding in communities, such as ‘tribe, language, culture, origin and family’, it should be the Church’s mission to supersede them and help liberate the believer from such bonds. There is almost a demonisation of cultural ties from communities, including the nation and its ‘sacralisation of the land’ that ‘subjugates us’ to ‘the pagan infernal powers of the earth, the tribe and bloodlines’. The reference to national culture as pagan corresponds to Roy’s analysis of the three ways in which culture can be seen from the point of view of religion (see Chapter 1). In this case, culture and cultural religion (for instance nationalism) 25  http://www.acadimia.gr/content/view/70/76/lang,el/ accessed 7 June 2013. A slightly altered version of this passage is published in Kalaitzidis 2003b: 371–2.

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are neither secular nor profane, but pagan and primitive, something regressive in comparison with Kalaitzidis’ proposal for a pure religious life that can be reached in a united Christian Church. In Kalaitzidis’ earlier speeches, the rejection of cultural bonds has been more moderate, as for instance in his academic discourse on modernity promoting the view that the Orthodox Church should not reject the conditions of modernity, but rather be open to dialogue because: ‘modernity and post-modernity (or late modernity) and the framework they define constitute the broader historical, social and cultural environment in which the Orthodox Church must live and carry out its mission’ (Kalaitzidis 2008a). By assuming a moderate stance he distances himself from fundamentalist religious positions: In response to the challenge of globalisation, cosmopolitanism and internationalism, today the wind of traditionalism and fundamentalism is once again blowing violently through the life and theology of the Church. Whereas fundamentalism is a flight into the past of pre-modernity and involves turning back the course of history, eschatology is an active and demanding expectation of the coming Kingdom of God, the new world which we await; as such, it feeds into a dynamic commitment to the present, an affirmation and opening to the future of the Kingdom where the fullness and identity of the Church is to be found. (Kalaitzidis 2008a)

Kalaitzidis labels fundamentalism and traditionalism within the Church as premodern in order to situate his theological position firmly within modernity. In contrast to the so-called ‘pre-modern’ ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘traditionalists’ of Greek Orthodoxy, the new theology of eschatology presented by Kalaitzidis attributes a special quality to the present but at the same time it is future-oriented. Eschatology is not just understood as the expectation of the Kingdom of God; the believer is expected to perform ‘a dynamic commitment to the present’ (Kalaitzidis 2008a). In an interesting way this theological discourse follows recent trends in secular psychological, therapeutic and communication discourses where, according to the paradigm of mindfulness, the power of the present is thought to be a crucial key in handling late modern life conditions (Kabat-Zinn 2003; Brown and Ryan 2003).26 Kalaitzidis presents the Orthodox Church as an entity that speaks directly to ‘the modern person’ who should be freed from the past and especially from the restrictive bonds of the nation:

26  In so far as one can compare monastic life with the principles of meditation, Kalaitzidis’ reference to monasticism as ‘the eschatological watchman’ and as ‘based on the spirit of the desert rather than on an imitation of heavy-handed political methods’ (2012d: 138–9) can be seen as a further common aspect between the theological proposal of eschatology, as an answer to the challenges of late modernity, and the emerging secular paradigm of mindfulness.

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The refusal to draw the meaning of religion from the past does not mean that Kalaitzidis rejects tradition as a concept. Yet, he understands the tradition of the Church as solely related to its divine and mythological aspects: In this perspective, Tradition is not identified with habits, customs, traditions or ideas or, in general with historical inertia and stagnation, but with a person, Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory who is coming. It [tradition] does not relate chiefly to the past; or to put it differently, it is not bound by the patterns of the past, by events that have already happened. (Kalaitzidis 2008a)

In order to reach the ‘essential core’ of the Orthodox faith, Kalaitzidis claims that it has to be liberated from its historical relationships across time and space: This first significant and fundamental step has to be taken; people from the Church need to show at least some rudimentary consistency with what they are supposed to believe; and there has to be an awareness that the Church is not identified with any period in history, any society, any given form, that the essential core of its truth cannot be confined to or exhausted by earlier examples of the relationship between world and Church. Only then can the Church address itself to the world and speak to the outside world and secular society or to the community of citizens, to “those near and far” from its faith, its experience and its tradition, in order to proclaim that “Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and forever” (Heb. 13:8). (Kalaitzidis 2008a)

This new theological position in Greece, represented by the work of Kalaitzidis, rejects religion as a source of cultural memory; it also argues that Orthodox Christianity should only value the message of Jesus Christ and the expectation of the Second Coming as the fulfilment of his mission. Therefore, history and the patterns of the past created by humans should not be relevant to the Church. This understanding of the role of religion brings to mind the observations by Roy (2010) on the recent trend of religion becoming detached from a specific cultural context, as referred to in Chapter 1. In a certain way, the theological position of the detachment of religion from a cultural or historical context also reflects the claim by the sociologist of religion Hervieu-Léger that religions in modern societies ‘have become sources of cultural heritage revered for their historical significance’, but they are often ‘poorly mobilised for the production of collective meaning’ (2000: 90). Hervieu-Léger seems to imply that modern societies are in need of religion as a production of collective meaning. Thus, from her point of view, a theological project like that

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of Kalaitzidis would be necessary if religion is to fulfil its role in late modern societies. However, this is a position that recognises religion, especially moderate religion, a priori as a ‘good thing’ rather than using a more neutral point of departure to analyse the actual arguments that are used by various actors to promote a religious worldview. One way in which theologians or advocates of religion in late modernity have tried to reinstate religion as a source of meaning is to point out the ‘abuse’ of religion in the modern ‘national era’ and to make use of the openings given by the ‘era of globalisation’ for a new role for religion in late modernity. The intellectual, philologist, author and journal editor Stavros Zoumboulakis has also observed how ‘pure’ faith has been replaced by memory. Religion becomes an element in the ethnic or cultural identity of a people, a part of historical memory; it becomes tradition and culture, and ceases to be a way of life the basic characteristic of which is obedience to the will of God and the keeping of his commandments; it ceases to be a struggle of faith. (Zoumboulakis 1998, cited in Kalaitzidis 2008a)

Zoumboulakis is part of the circle of theologians and intellectuals who work towards a religious revival in the Greek Orthodox Church. Through his work as director of the foundation Ártos Zoís [Bread of Life], which is dedicated to the publication of biblical studies, he promotes the ‘return’ of Orthodoxy to the original, authentic Christian texts of the Bible. The Bible as a European Link for Greek Orthodoxy We can view the ongoing changes in Greek theology as partly the result of societal and cultural changes in late modernity, such as immigration and global convergence. However, Kalaitzidis and other younger theologians seem also to continue a local tradition of Orthodox ecumenical theology and dialogue with western theologies dating back to the 1960s. This relates to a ‘return’ to fundamental biblical messages that, according to the new theology, have been neglected in favour of patristic studies and studies on the relationship between ancient Greek philosophy and early Christian theology.27 According to Zoumboulakis (2002a), the preference given to patristic studies has resulted in a poor contemporary tradition of biblical studies in Greek Orthodox theology. Biblical quotations, which the contemporary progressive theologians and intellectuals use repeatedly in their texts, refer to conceptions of identity, otherness, equality and social solidarity. These themes seem to suggest a rapprochement with western Christianity, in particular with Protestantism. Before, however, addressing the issue of rapprochement I will shortly refer to the previous tradition of biblical scholarship in Greek theology and 27

 For the relationship between Hellenism and Christianity, see Zizioulas (2003).

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then exemplify how the Bible today is seen as a way for Greek Orthodoxy (and Greece) to remain close to Europe. The theologians Nikos Nissiotis (1924–1986) and Savvas Agouridis (1921–2009), were founders of the tradition of ecumenical studies in modern Greek theology. As advocates of the centrality of the Bible, they were counter voices to the Neo-Orthodox use of patristic texts in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1968, a new periodical, dedicated to patristic studies called Klironomiá [Heritage], exemplified the revival of patristic studies according to the Neo-Orthodox paradigm. Today’s critics of this type of theology from the 1960s do not dismiss patristic texts as irrelevant; they argue, however, that the focus on patristic studies and Byzantium, as the ideal Orthodox society, has removed the focus from the authentic message of Christianity which they claim is to be found in the Bible. Therefore, the renewed interest in biblical studies and frequent use of Bible quotes have become key features characteristic of the new theological discourse. By reinstating the centrality of the Bible in their interpretation of the authentic essence of the Greek Orthodox message, contemporary Greek theologians and religious intellectuals also envision a ‘return to Europe’. Instead of considering eastern Orthodoxy as a demarcating feature of Greece vis-à-vis Europe, they advocate for the common biblical heritage of Europe as a whole, including Greece. Stavros Zoumboulakis has proposed a reform on the teaching of religion in public education by turning it into a ‘biblical class’, arguing that ‘European schools today absolutely need the Bible, just as they also need […] Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato’ (Zoumboulakis 2006). Criticising the anti-European attitude of contemporary Greek Church hierarchs, he has also asked: ‘If Europe is not our socio-political reference then tell us which one it should be’ (Zoumboulakis 2002b). Contrary to the anti-western foundations of the Neo-Orthodox movement that has fuelled Greek ethno-religious sentiment since the 1980s, Kalaitzidis emphasises that The question for me personally is not Orthodoxy or the West, Orthodoxy or Europe, but Orthodoxy and the West, Orthodoxy and Europe. Europe is our path and our way, our present and future. (Kalaitzidis 2012b, emphasis in original manuscript)

There is almost an apotheosis of Europe in the above sentence, ‘Europe is our path and our way’, that seems to relate to the biblical quotation from John 14:6 (‘I am the way’). The reference to Europe as ‘our present and future’ brings to mind the above-mentioned theological importance of eschatology in Kalaitzidis’ work. However, the current socio-economic crisis and the prospects of Greece’s exit from the Eurozone or even, according to some dramatic scenarios, from the EU altogether, have deeply shaken the majority of the Greek population. This may explain why Kalaitzidis may have recently moved away from his otherwise unwavering refusal to speak about the links between Hellenism or Greekness

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and Orthodox theology. In the following excerpt, he quotes an article on ‘The European Spirit and Greek Orthodoxy’ by Metropolitan John Zizioulas: Today’s reality for Greece is Europe. Hellenism must be recast into its basic constituent elements, without losing its Greekness, as it moves into this new reality of Europe. (Zizioulas 1985, quoted in Kalaitzidis 2012b)

Where Kalaitzidis’ arguments for a ‘return to Europe’ have previously been grounded in theological arguments on the common Christian reference to the Bible, the socio-economic crisis seems to have created a need for a more culturally grounded argument with the above reference Zizioulas’ claim that Hellenism must be recast in the new reality of Europe without losing its Greekness. The turn towards culturally grounded arguments could also be observed in the antiwesternism of the previous theological generation of the Neo-Orthodox movement whose theologically grounded critique of western Christianity in the 1960s became a cultural critique during the 1980s and 1990s as a consequence of Greece’s entry in the European Economic Communities and later in the EU. It remains to be seen whether the current theological and ecclesiological critique of the Church of Greece and its ethnocentric orientation will also become a more culturally grounded resistance movement against nationalism and ethnocentrism favouring Europe as the authentic cultural framework for the Orthodox Church. Orthodoxy and Modernity According to Yangazoglou, another progressive theologian, in the context of a ‘post-Christian Europe’, where ‘faith has been gradually transformed into a kind of culture and surrounding atmosphere’, Orthodoxy is called to ‘go beyond modernity’ (2011: 478). He claims that ‘Christian theology and the Church remain in the periphery […] because of their entanglement with a discredited ethics that is unable to formulate a proposal and meaning of life […]’ (ibid.). This discredited ethics is understood as the Church’s integration into the logic of national cultures. He, therefore, defines modernity as the ‘the end of religion in the public sphere, which also implies the de-Christianisation of Europe’ (ibid.). Kalaitzidis is also critical about the role of the national Church of Greece, as an obstacle to the modernisation of religious life in Greece, and its engagement with modernity and the present: Our usual ecclesiastical discourse seems to be more interested in preserving the unique character of the modern Greek identity than in the catholicity and ecumenicity of Christianity. It is a discourse that is ethnocentric and dependent on the state, rather than a word of witness to the living and prophetic presence of the Church in the world. It is a nostalgic discourse, which sanctifies the theocratic structures of the past but lacks openness towards the future and

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New Voices in Greek Orthodox Thought trust in the future. […] and above all it is a discourse that insists on ignoring or dismissing the historical, social and cultural expression of the modern and modernity. (Kalaitzidis 2007a: 21)

The above quotation is clearly a comment on the dominant Church discourse under the leadership of the late Archbishop Christodoulos, but a similar critique is also obvious in Kalaitzidis’ publications after the change of Church leadership in 2008: Today, 190 years since the Greek Revolution of 1821, the Church in Greece seems unable to free itself from the syndrome of identification with the nation, and from its voluntary instrumentalisation for national purposes; it seems unable to see its work, its teaching and preaching, and its mission in general separated from the course of the nation; it seems unable to realize that the boundaries of the Church are no longer identified with the boundaries of the nation. (Kalaitzidis 2012e)

Kalaitzidis argues that even if Christodoulos is gone there are many Church hierarchs continuing his ethnocentric and anti-western rhetoric, who are perhaps even more staunchly anti-modern and anti-European than Christodoulos, who in 2006 made several steps towards reconciliation with the Catholic Church and with the Ecumenical Patriarchate through meetings with Pope John and with Patriarch Batholomew. One such bishop, who according to Kalaitzidis confuses the mission of the Church with the destiny of the nation, is Metropolitan Andreas in Konitsa: Meanwhile, continuing the already long and old tradition of Greek bishops who used to struggle not only for the Christian faith of their flock, but also for the nation and the country, since they feel like local ethnarchs, Metropolitan Andreas intervened publicly in his little town with speeches and sermons in order either to commemorate a national feast or to remind and to defend a national cause. (ibid.)

Kalaitzidis further remarks that the economic crisis has enhanced the antiwestern and anti-globalisation discourse among nationalistic and fundamentalist ecclesiastical circles. He recognises that the current Archbishop keeps a low profile on political matters, but underlines that there are many other voices defining the Church discourse: […] There are of course the exceptions of the cautious and measured attitude of the current Archbishop of Athens Hieronymus, and of a few other bishops […]. But in the end, the vast majority of Greek bishops as well as the ecclesiastical press and the fundamentalist blogs, have adopted a “revolutionary” discourse, which on many points is reminiscent of the anti-western, anti-European discourse of the communist left, repeating meanwhile many of the stereotypes of the discourse of the far right. […] This is hardly surprising, however, for those

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who are familiar with these issues because in reality this “revolutionary” rhetoric simply masks the Church’s fear of an “open society” and the achievements of modernity, as well as the fear of a loss of Greek Orthodox uniqueness. […] more than anything else, ultimately, this “revolutionary” rhetoric masks the fear of globalisation, […] In reality, the issue of globalisation is what draws together religious nationalism and economic nationalism, what unites theological antimodernism and anti-westernism with the anti-Europeanism of the parties at both extremes, […]. (ibid.)

The excerpt above suggests that, according to Kalaitzidis, an essential obstacle to the Church’s modernisation is the anti-western and anti-globalisation discourses expressed by representatives of the Church and other religious actors. A key aspect of the refusal to consider the conditions of modernity is also the refusal to partake in the European context. In Kalaitzidis’ work on Orthodoxy and modernity we find a wish for Orthodoxy to come to terms with modernity through a dialogical stance with the world yet without compromising its metaphysical dimension: We cannot risk putting Orthodoxy on course towards an anti-modernist religious revival and a return to the public sphere which would undo the realities of secularisation and modernity, similar to the return proclaimed by representatives of the “Radical Orthodoxy” movement which seems to be gaining ground among many western Christians (mainly Anglicans and Roman Catholics) and apparently attracts the fascination of some Orthodox theologians as well. What we should be seeking is an Orthodoxy rooted in the tradition of the Fathers, but also an Orthodoxy that is open and in dialogue, conversing and understanding; an Orthodoxy that will not be subordinate to the social and cultural conditions at a given time, but one that will not ignore or disregard and scorn societies and cultures or new cultural forms […]; for in the final analysis everything is of God, everything bears […] breath of the Holy Spirit […] and is not restricted only to the Orthodox, to Greeks, to the Balkans or to the eastern Mediterranean. (Kalaitzidis 2007a: 175–6)

This excerpt – notably the statement that ‘everything is of God’ and that the Holy Spirit is not restricted by any cultural or geographic specificity – reveals a tendency towards a purist religion freed from its embeddedness in cultural contexts resembling Roy’s (2010) thesis of ‘religion without culture’. It is interesting, though, that the author positions himself in opposition to the rigorous purism of the Radical Orthodoxy paradigm.28  ‘Radical Orthodoxy’ is a theological movement founded in Britain in the 1990s by mainly Anglican theologians (Milbank, Pickstock and Ward 1999). The movement represents a postmodern critique of modernity and speaks in favour of a theological interpretation of the world, thus rejecting secular science which is considered atheistic and nihilistic. Greek Orthodox theologians have been in dialogue with the movement (Pabst and 28

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The older theological generation, including Yannaras (2006a), has also forwarded a purist conception of the Orthodox tradition by accusing it of having turned its ‘true message’ into a religion that is into institutions of hierarchy and ritual. In contrast to the younger generation of progressive theologians examined in this book, Yannaras (b. 1935) insists on a specific Greek Orthodox Christianity in opposition to the West claiming that it can at the same time be ecumenical. He blames western civilisation for the contemporary decay of Christianity as a whole, particularly the authentic Orthodox tradition. While this position, with its strong anti-western current, appears anti-modern, progressive theologians like Kalaitzidis present themselves as in favour of modernity and progress, as long as it is a humanistic progress in accordance with true Christian values such as solidarity and respect for the Other. Protestantism is the version of Christianity that has most often been connected with European modernity. Therefore, it is not surprising that one finds in new Greek theological trends a rapprochement with certain Protestant features. As will be shown below, such rapprochement is not unique in the present period but has been a characteristic of modernising movements throughout the modern history of the Greek Orthodox Church. Affinities with Protestantism and Religion as a Personal Choice Religious traditionalists in Greece have often accused certain figures or movements attempting to introduce changes or reform in the Greek Church of being Protestants. This was the case, for example, when traditionalists in the early years of Greek independence saw the autocephalous Church as an unwanted innovation and a Protestant deviation from the Orthodox tradition (Matalas 2003: 54–62; see also Kontogiorgi 2012);29 this was also the case when modernisers, such as the priest Theophilos Kaïris (1784–1853), advocated a church–state separation and, in the spirit of Enlightenment, the teaching of modern science (Matalas 2003: 62–72). In the 1920s, Archbishop Chrysostomos was also accused of transforming the Orthodox Church into a Protestant denomination because he introduced reforms, such as the Gregorian calendar, and was involved in the ecumenical movement and in secular activities, such as social action and charity (Anastassiadis 2010: 50–51). Moreover, private ecclesiastic organisations, such as Zoí, founded in the early twentieth century, have been accused of Protestantisation because of their introduction of lay activities, including Bible study circles, social work and pietism (Yannaras 2006b: 398–400). Therefore, it is not surprising that the director of the Volos Academy has been accused of being a Protestant or a ‘Luther’, i.e. a

Schneider 2009), but Kalaitzidis apparently does not see its relevance to his proposals for a new Greek Orthodox theology. 29  With the arrival in 1833 of the Bavarian King Otto and his Protestant advisors, the Church of Greece was subjected to administrative reforms resembling the Protestant model of churches in northern Europe (Kokosalakis 1987: 236).

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heretic in the Greek Orthodox context.30 Nevertheless, Kalaitzidis regards himself as an absolutely faithful member of the Greek Orthodox Church and his activities, hosted by the Church, do not aim towards a radical break with the institutional Church, but rather towards a renewal and change of awareness.31 There is in particular one aspect in Kalaitzidis’ new theological discourse that does have affinities with Protestantism, notably his emphasis on Christian identity as a personal choice rather than as a cultural tradition into which a person is born: The admission into the ecclesiastical body does not happen on the basis of the communities of people and the nation, but on the basis of an entirely personal action, free of any kind of biological, cultural and national predetermination. Therefore, the radically new thing that the ecclesiastical way of life brings is the personal calling which God directs through Jesus Christ. (Kalaitzidis 2003b: 369, emphasis added; see also Kalaitzidis 2005a)

Even if Kalaitzidis does not advocate a privatisation of religious life, as in the case of Protestantism, he does emphasise the concept of metánoia (repentance) (Kalaitzidis 2005a: 73–4) – meaning the individual’s personal responsibility visà-vis his or her faith, which, according to Weber, is also a characteristic of the Protestant ethos. Kalaitzidis views faith as a conscious personal choice instead of merely accepting an existing cultural relationship with the Orthodox religion: ‘Is our participation in the Orthodox faith, in other words, a custom, a part of a national folklore or a conscious and absolute personal choice with a proportional value?’ (Kalaitzidis 2011a). Religion as a matter of individual choice is a very new idea in a country where slogans such as ‘to be Greek is to be Orthodox’ have been used widely in the media and by the Church hierarchy. According to the dominant ethno-religious paradigm, the majority of Greeks are ‘born Orthodox’ and not ‘baptised Orthodox’.32 Kalaitzidis challenges the view of religious identity as a cultural identity and suggests that a religious identity is not automatically cultural, but rather an existential and conscious choice. The focus on individual religiosity may be interpreted as a Protestant feature in his theology, or as an attempt to adjust the

 Such accusations from contemporary religious traditionalists against progressive theologians and especially against the Volos Academy flourish on private Internet sites and blogs, for example: http://amethystosbooks.blogspot.com/2009/09/blog-post_16.html (accessed 19 April 2013). Kalaitzidis has also received telephone calls from individuals who seek to insult him by calling him a Protestant and a heretic (Interview, May 2008). 31  Telephone interview, February 2008 32  Chrysoloras (2004: 49) cites Mouzelis’ (1978) point that ‘in Greece, being a good Christian means being a patriot and vice versa’ and Ware’s (1983) anecdote of a Greek dentist who claimed: ‘Personally, I am an atheist; but because I am Greek, I am of course a member of the Orthodox Church’. 30

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religious framework of Orthodoxy to a world of global convergence and the prevalence of individual choice and rational theory. In both cases, Kalaitzidis exemplifies the global tendencies observed by Roy (2010) where faith, rather than culture, individualism, rather than community, are on the rise. Roy questions whether these changes in the religion market of late modernity have been brought about by the influence of ‘mainstream culture’, i.e. ‘the predominance of the North American model’ which according to Roy is the predominance of Christianity and Protestantism’s cultural hegemony (ibid.: 25), or whether it is more likely that the religions that define themselves as ‘a-cultural’ are those which are spreading and flourishing. Roy, thus, wonders whether a specific culture helps in disseminating a specific religion or whether a specific religion spreads on its own because it is detached from any specific culture. He concludes that the former is relevant for understanding the success of Evangelical Protestantism, i.e. as a side effect of global Americanisation, while the latter makes sense in the case of global Islam (ibid.: 24). In the case of progressive Orthodox theology referred to here, it seems that both explanatory models are relevant. On the one hand, the revival of Orthodox ecumenical theology can be seen as a wish to become part of a worldwide culture of a ‘return of religion’, where religious worldviews and arguments are valid and global and detached from a specific cultural environment. Thus, global convergence and the rise of religious worldviews enhance the development of a specific understanding of Christianity. On the other hand, it is exactly this perspective of Christianity as ecumenical that makes it a-cultural and therefore, according to the theologians, applicable across cultural boundaries within and beyond national borders. Thus, it is the inherent cross-cultural (‘neither Jew nor Gentile [Greek] …’, Galatians 3:28) nature of Christianity that makes its spreading worldwide possible. It is, however, questionable whether this movement is successful; certainly, not on a scale comparable to Evangelic Protestantism or Global Islam. So far, the Greek progressive theological turn, despite its ecumenical arguments, is rather locally rooted as a protest against the local national Church and a local ethnically defined theology. It can be seen as an attempt of some Greek theologians to redefine their identity by approaching a European or western framework in an effort to escape what they see as an ethnocentric and provincial identity. Kalaitzidis has also helped to introduce the Greek public to works by Protestant theologians, for example History and Eschatology by Rudolf Bultmann (Kalaitzidis 2008c). Another related point where Kalaitzidis’ new theological proposal challenges the Orthodox ‘tradition’ is the question of change in the traditional forms of Orthodox liturgy and clerics, i.e. modernisation of language, rituals and dress codes (Kalaitzidis 2003c). In 2008, the Volos Academy hosted a Protestant female priest and scholar, and a monk from an Orthodox monastery in the USA who has made changes to liturgical practices. The Academy also hosted the Arab Metropolitan of Byblos and Botrys, who conducted in Arabic the Sunday liturgy in the metropolis of Volos. In January 2012, the Academy organised a one-day conference on the issue of liturgical language, an event which was also

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attended by critics who tried to obstruct the meeting by loudly protesting against any changes in the language of the liturgy. Ecumenism, Cosmopolitanism and the Theology of Multiculturalism Kalaitzidis (2005a: 49–51) has recognised the historical role of religion and of the Greek Orthodox Church as a guardian of Greek language and culture during the Ottoman Empire and in Greek nation-building in the nineteenth century. However, he goes on to argue that contemporary Greece is a well-established nation state which does not need the symbolic (and political) support of religion. In Kalaitzidis’ terms, the Greek nation state is solid enough to exist without the support mechanism of religion.33 He argues that Christianity represents globalism, a term used by Anastasios (2005), which bypasses the nation state but at the same time also acts as a local anchor that helps overcome the homogenisation of persons inherent to the construction of uniform national identities. Obviously, Kalaitzidis’ approach is theological, and it makes sense only if one accepts religion as the expression of an absolute truth that can be dissociated from the ‘territorially and historically bound social order’ in eschatological terms. As we saw above, Kalaitzidis regards eschatology as a central notion in Christianity and it is from this perspective that he concludes that the Church 33  Interestingly, Kalaitzidis’ argumentation here echoes an essay by the Greek novelist and intellectual of the 1930s generation, Georgios Theotokas (1905-1966). In 1966, shortly before his death, Theotokas’ essay ‘The Church and the Nation’ was published in the theological journal Sýnoro, founded by Christos Yannaras. Like Kalaitzidis, Theotokas recognised that the Church in the Ottoman period became ‘from historical necessity, the only ark of national life, the protector of the Greek people in the long, dark period of suffering’ (Theotokas 1996: 1167). Using arguments similar to those of Kalaitzidis today he continued: ‘But History changed its track and the Church’s five-century-long traditional mission no longer makes sense within the Greek State. (…) A Church that for five hundred years gave itself to national historical causes (…) today, having lost that mission, does not know where it stands, what it should aim at from now on, and through which means. The answers, however, to those questions are to be found (where else?) in the New Testament, which we must, however, re-read with a clear mind and with honesty towards ourselves and others. There, we will realise the new mission of our Church, which is besides its age-old mission: to be a source of high spiritual life, freedom and panhuman love, brotherhood and peace, a rejection of hate, evil and injustice, and a supporter of the suffering mankind on its troubled course. Outside this spirit, I am afraid that anything called “Helleno-Christian civilisation” is mere cunning’. Here, the leading intellectual of the ‘generation of the 1930s’ forwards the same arguments as the theologian Kalaitzidis regarding the Church’s universal and non-national mission. Obviously, Theotokas’ text may in part refer to the political climate in Greece which, within months of the publication of the essay, brought the military junta to power under the slogan of ‘Greece of Christian Greeks’. Still, the similarities of arguments with Kalaitzidis’ texts written 40 years later are striking.

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does not need the historical grounding of the nation as a support mechanism (2003b: 366). Furthermore, he regards the concept of identity as crucial for the new understanding of Christianity: Identity does not refer to the things that separate us and make us different, to personal or collective characteristics like national, cultural or religiousconfessional features. (Kalaitzidis 2005b: 162)

And The term identity changes radically in content and function: it no longer describes – as in the case of tribe and nation – a procedure or a reality of separation and division, but a course of transition towards unity, a struggle of overcoming differences and any kind of segmentation. Identity in the theological language, especially when we refer to the mystery of divine Eucharist, starts from difference and differentiation to achieve unity; it does not refer to special characteristics, but to universality and ecumenicity. (Kalaitzidis 2007b)

One of the goals of the conference ‘Ecclesiology and Nationalism in a Postmodern Era’, held at the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos, was the adoption of ‘an ecumenical ecclesiastical discourse’: The adoption of an ecumenical ecclesiastical discourse, free from the continuous references to the nation […], is not just a plea for genuineness, authenticity and faithfulness to the Orthodox tradition; it is also an absolutely indispensable and urgent prerequisite for the Church […] in order to enter the century in which we currently live and to avoid finding an easy and safe refuge in the past. (Academy for Theological Studies 2012)34

Kalaitzidis’ emphasis on the ecumenical outlook of the Church is also characteristic of another theologian, Stavros Yangazoglou (2006), who makes associations with certain versions of secular cosmopolitanism, but also with socialist or humanist ideals.35 Cosmopolitanism is a contested concept with a philosophical definition  This quotation is almost identical with the one by Kalaitzidis (2005a: 51). This illustrates the convergence between the publications of Kalaitzidis and the work of the Academy. 35  In a roundtable on the role of religion in the public sphere Kalaitzidis referred to religion as a substitute for or a supplement to socialism and humanism (Kalaitzidis 2012a). He referred to Richard Falk, professor of international law at Princeton University and author of Religion and Humane Global Governance (2001), who has claimed that ‘religion may cover the moral and political vacuum that emerged in the arena of ideas and public politics with the vanishing of socialism as a defender and supporter of the poor and generally the victims of economic “development”’ (Falk 2004, cited in Kalaitzidis 2012a). 34

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as well as a political or ideological dimension. With his repeated reference to the biblical quotation: ‘There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus’ (Galatians 3:28), Kalaitzidis uses more or less the same argument as the philosopher Martha Nussbaum in advancing the ideals of a post-national humanity. Nussbaum (2002: 31) writes: ‘A Greek male [Diogenes] refuses the invitation to define himself by lineage, city, social class, […], even sex. He insists on defining himself in terms of a characteristic that he shares with all other human beings, male and female, Greek and non-Greek, slave and free’ (emphasis added). She continues: ‘The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any nation. Recognising this, we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or even gender […] to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings’ (ibid.: 37, emphasis added). Through the biblical quotation, Kalaitzidis speaks from the point of view of ecumenical Christianity, while Nussbaum, through the quotation from the Stoic philosopher, speaks from a ‘long tradition of cosmopolitan political thought in the western tradition’ (ibid.: 31). Also the sociologist Ulrich Beck has noted the similarities between universalist religions and cosmopolitanism, in particular expressed in the wish to overcome differences: […] if there can be no such a thing as a pure cosmopolitanism, then the one truth common to all religions must be the cosmopolitan truth based on the recognition of the otherness of other religions, inclusive of their truths. To formulate this slightly differently: the relations of cosmopolitan truths to one another call for a cosmopolitanism of the religions and that is based, not on immutable truths, handed down to mankind, but ultimately on rules, treaties, procedures (human rights, the rule of law, etc.) that have been agreed by people among themselves. (Beck 2010: 194; cited in Speck 2012: 165)

The aims to overcome nationalistic exclusiveness in both cosmopolitan/humanistic and eschatological Christian universalism are similar, but what separates the two universalisms is that Christian universalism presupposes that human beings take part ‘in the event of the Church’ which ‘supersedes any kind of physical attachment (blood, race, language, social class etc.)’ (Kalaitzidis 2005a: 54). Therefore, Kalaitzidis rejects cosmopolitanism: ‘We are not called to choose between a wrong (στρεβλός) religious nationalism and an unrealistic internationalism, between the withdrawal (αναδίπλωση), the exclusiveness of nationalism and the “poorness of daydreaming” that internationalism represents, to remember the words of Berdyaev; by relying on the tradition of the Church we shall search for answers to the urgent problem that the church community is facing’ (2003b: 340). Therefore, despite its dialogic outlook, Kalaitzidis’ progressive theological proposal is confined to transforming only a specific part of humanity, namely those who choose to believe in Christ and participate in the Church.

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In a conference paper entitled ‘Nationalism and Worship of the Forefathers: Two Obstacles to the Re-Evangelisation of the Contemporary Greek’, Kalaitzidis claims that by becoming a national entity the Church has forgotten its ecumenical mission: ‘The worship of Christ and the transgression of all sorts of dis-unity and division were replaced by the worship of the nation and the sanctification of various national egotisms’ (Kalaitzidis 2005a: 68). He argues that such national and religious ‘egotism’ prevents the Church from facing one of the main challenges of late modernity, the multicultural society which has been a new reality in Greece since the 1990s, when the country became a country of immigration rather than emigration after receiving a large number of immigrants. Therefore, according to Kalaitzidis and other progressive theologians, the Church must develop a ‘theology of multiculturalism’: ‘The Church must get used to the circumstances and rules of contemporary open multicultural, multi-faith societies, realising that it is no longer the exclusive or privileged interlocutor of authority or society, but one interlocutor among many others’ (Kalaitzidis 2009b: 113–14). Vasilios Thermos, a priest and psychotherapist, has also addressed the difficulties of the Greek Church in embracing cultural and ethnic pluralism: When a bishop addresses the people calling them “blessed and chosen” it is not quite clear whether he includes the Albanian workers who in the past few years have become baptised and integrated into the only chosen people that can possibly exist: the Church. (Thermos 2001: 74, emphasis in original)

This quotation challenges the official Church’s ethnocentric discourse which reached its peak during Christodoulos’ leadership (1998–2008) when immigration to Greece increased dramatically and nationalism was aptly used by Church hierarchs and in particular by Christodoulos in his populist discourse and strategy. Progressive theologians attempted in the same period to address socio-cultural problems, such as racism and xenophobia, from a religious perspective. Within this framework, several theologians, including Stavros Yangazoglou, have proposed a ‘theology of otherness’ or ‘theology of diversity’: Orthodox theology ought to make a creative turn towards our multicultural world, taking into consideration its problems and reflections. A new approach to current social cultural realities is needed, through the theology of diversity, which does not, however, have anything in common with syncretism. It is indeed necessary for Orthodoxy to go beyond modernity and accept the pluralism and diversity of others so that it does not underestimate, reconcile or abandon Orthodox selfconsciousness and diversity. (Yangazoglou 2011: 478)

Yangazoglou emphasises that the acceptance of diversity is well founded in the Christian sources and does not mean compromising the Christian truth of the Orthodox Church (since it shares nothing ‘in common with syncretism’); all that is needed is a new interpretative approach:

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Certain elements of a theology of multiculturalism, such as mutual respect, acceptance and peaceful coexistence with any religious or other difference, can be found throughout the Bible and other sacred texts. Clearly, a different mentality and orientation is required to interpret them. A different interpretative approach can enlighten vital aspects of the theology of diversity. (ibid.)

Yangazoglou sees diversity as an opportunity for Christian theology to enter into dialogue and to ‘find once again its true ecumenism and tolerance’ (ibid.). He thus points to fundamentalism and intolerance as the real dangers of religious life and warns against an exclusive perception of religious truth. The above-mentioned proposals for a theology of diversity, otherness and multiculturalism illustrate how these progressive theologians envisage Christianity as playing a decisive role in the ‘post-national’ era. Modernity, with its homogenising and secularising nationalist forces marginalised religion, but these theologians – using an eschatological perspective – view religion in late modernity as a ‘new’ cohesive force that transcends cultural divisions. Challenges The new theological discourse advocated by Kalaitzidis and the Volos Academy has managed to set a new agenda by questioning and rejecting the conservative strands of the Church and, thus, positioning itself as progressive. It proposes something new and who is not thirsty for something new in today’s Greece? Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the Academy and Kalaitzidis himself keep a rather low public profile in Greece. Until now, he has been conscious to avoid addressing himself to a specifically Greek audience and has opted instead for cultivating an international dimension in his work. When looking at the new theological discourse through the lenses of Roy’s analytical prism and the thesis of de-territorialisation of religion in late modernity it seems plausible that there will be a Greek audience that can embrace the ideas about a religious identity that is detached from Greek cultural identity. It is unclear how the current socio-economic crisis may affect people’s ways of believing. Suffering and disappointment with Greek politicians could foster a willingness to abandon Orthodoxy’s strong cultural ties (ethnocentrism) in favour of an ecumenical way of believing, but it could also reinforce the need to hold on to well-known cultural patterns. Looking towards Europe in cultural, political and religious terms, is also an ambivalent affair in Greece after the three Memoranda (2010–2012) forcing very strict economic measures on Greek society within the context of financial austerity. However, with neighbouring Turkey increasing its political and economic influence in the region and emphasising Islamic values under Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan there seem to be enough motivations for Greece to remain close to Europe. Another challenge to the development of a new theological or religious paradigm in Greece is the intellectualism of this new discourse since Kalaitzidis’

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progressive and academic profile makes it difficult to communicate his message to a broader Greek audience, especially one that is focused on the challenges of living under very difficult socio-economic conditions. According to empirical findings by Grace Davie (2007: 144, cited in Speck 2012: 168) ‘the most dynamic and popular forms of “resurgent” religion appear to be those emphasising sensation, feeling, emotion’ (Speck 2012: 168) and here, the intellectualised and theologically grounded visions of Kalaitzidis and others, cannot compete. In comparison, the Neo-Orthodox movement, even if it was also strongly rooted in intellectual elites, could more easily find a captive audience among ordinary Greeks because it lends itself to populist rhetoric; it used a well-known national past and Greek aestheticism as a main point of reference which could be communicated effectively through popular art, for example through Greek popular music. The new theological proposals on the cultural and ideological bonds between nation and religion, and on Orthodoxy’s responses to the contexts of European modernity and globalisation that have been discussed in this chapter were developed in the late 1990s, long before the economic crisis broke out in 2008. The Church of Greece went through a change of leadership in early 2008 which radically changed the public discourse of the head of the Church, from a populist, ethnocentric and highly politicised discourse, to a moderate discourse on the spiritual values of the Church. The economic crisis has certainly been an important factor in strengthening the new focus of the Church’s discourse since the crisis and the poverty have given the Church a new concrete mission: to offer charity instead of a sense of identity. Progressive theologians and clerics have of course not remained silent on the new role of the Church so the following section refers briefly to how these progressive actors have estimated the new social situation. The New Theology and the Current Economic Crisis In a speech on the public role of the Church, Kalaitzidis recognises the attempts by the institutional Church to alleviate material poverty as a result of the economic crisis. However, he is critical of the lack of any transformative discourse and critical attitude towards current societal structures, thus suggesting that the Church has assumed a passive role by merely responding to the effects of the crisis, rather than also adopting a more critical stance to social injustice: Within this unprecedented crisis the Church has shown praiseworthy readiness in the philanthropic field, in the field of social welfare and solidarity. […] indeed the impressive intervention of the Church during the economic crisis, having, however, primarily the form of occasional philanthropy. Once again, a more critical attitude towards the problem seems to be missing from the Church’s discourse, an attitude that following the example of the Church Fathers would target the root and not the surface of the problem, the structure and not just the symptoms that create poverty and social injustice. (Kalaitzidis 2012a)

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Kalaitzidis continues his critique of certain attitudes within the institution of the Church that have prompted citizens to violent reactions against politicians and provoked a rhetoric of fear on the supposed extinction of Orthodoxy in the face of European (economic) ‘occupation’ by the Troika: We have thus reached the paradoxical point that, when the self-proclaimed atheist veteran leader of the Left, Leonidas Kyrkos, spoke of dialogue and reconciliation and the avoidance of violence by all means, the voices of prelates and official Church documents addressed to the Greek public praised the “use of yoghurt and tomatoes” and any kind of physical assault, and called for resistance to the occupation of the country by the Troika, fearing that basically “our creditors and overlords will soon attack our spiritual and cultural specificity that is associated with Orthodoxy!”. (ibid.)

The above excerpt illustrates two paradoxical divisions: on the one hand, the Church’s discourse, which appears reactionary (using a discourse of fear), extreme (encouraging violent attacks) and uncivilised (supporting the throwing of yoghurt and tomatoes to politicians); on the other hand, a true Christian discourse exemplified in the attitude of an atheist left-wing politician. This is yet another example of how Kalaitzidis’ new theology is very much based on socialist ideals. This attitude is not foreign within the established Church, since Archbishop Ieronymos stated in one of his first newspaper interviews after his election: ‘The Leftists are More Faithful that the Rightists’ (Papoutsaki 2008). Apparently, however, the Church’s and the Archbishop’s ‘preference’ for ‘leftists’ has not been mirrored in a left or radical type of response to the economic crisis. As we will see in Chapter 4, the Church of Greece has focused extensively on charity work, in particular the distribution of meals, extended to all citizens in need regardless of ethnic and religious affiliation, thus apparently embracing the new multicultural composition of Greek society and leaving behind the ethnocentric rhetoric from the Christodoulos era. However, there are voices, including that of Kalaitzidis, as in the above-mentioned speech, that have criticised the Church of Greece for merely consoling through charity and calling for repentance instead of providing a deeper civilisation critique (against capitalism) and proposing an alternative social ethos based for example on the teachings of the Greek Church Fathers, such as St. Basil and Gregory Palamas (Makris and Bekridakis 2013: 125–7). Based on fieldwork in two charity meal distribution centres run by local priests, Makris and Bekridakis (ibid.: 129) conclude that charity meals are viewed positively because they feed people, but also negatively because they give a false impression of the Church as ‘actually doing something’, since feeding people is a superficial act that has no transformational capacity. Makris and Bekridakis quote progressive priests who criticise the Church of cultivating a version of Christianity that is ‘ossified, traditionalist, pietistic and heavily nationalistic’ (ibid.: 128), i.e. much like the critique by Kalaitzidis and other progressive theologians.

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Conclusion This chapter has introduced the key elements of a recent theological trend in Greece that proposes different ways of understanding Orthodoxy in relation to the history and present of the Greek nation. The chapter has presented three central components and goals of this new theology, namely, (1) the critique of religious nationalism and the close bonds between Orthodoxy and the modern Greek nation; (2) the integration of the Orthodox Church into a wider Christian community through ecumenical dialogue and the reintegration of Greece and Greek theology into a contemporary European framework; (3) the development of a theology of multiculturalism that makes it possible from an Orthodox theological point of view to embrace the Other without losing one’s own religious identity. Against the backdrop of previous ethnocentric, exclusivist and traditionalist religious discourses, the new theological proposals expressed by Kalaitzidis appear more progressive, moderate and rational. One could say that this new theology offers an alternative orientation situated between the neo-nationalist uses of Greek Orthodox identity (Lavdas and Papadakis 2003) and the secular intellectual rejection of the positive contribution of religion in Greek society. Kalaitzidis’ position safeguards religion as having a strong say in late modern society, but adapts its use and relevance to the contemporary living conditions of fluid boundaries and pluralism. The remaining four chapters of the book focus on religion in public education, as a representative case study and battleground for ideological discussions and arguments on the role of religion in Greek national identity and public life. Chapter 4 provides an introduction of the Orthodox legacy in the history of Greek education, and Chapters 5 to 7 are based on empirical research data.

Chapter 4

The Orthodox Legacy and Education There is a poor and tormented country – no names mentioned – so beautiful though, one realizes from the following story: At the time when God gave out land to mankind some people were absent. They were having fun or they didn’t care. When the giving out was done, however, they were left without land and they went to complain to God. […] They justified themselves asking for excuse, they begged and cried until God took pity on them and said to them: “I have kept a small lot for myself, for my old age. From this I will cut a piece for you to make it your homeland”. Pantelis Kaliotsos, Το οικοπεδάκι του Θεού [God’s Small Lot] (In: Η Σφεντόνα του Δαβίδ [David’s Sling], Patákis 2001. Reproduced in Katsarou et al. (2006)).

The above excerpt from a school grammar exercise book exemplifies, in a charming way, the perception of Greece as a country with a special relationship with God. The excerpt is intended as a grammatical exercise and forms a point of departure for a writing exercise in geography for younger children. The text is accompanied by a hand-drawn map of Greece with symbols such as the Greek national flag, the Acropolis and a church on Mount Athos illustrating the words that ‘certainly God has chosen these mountains to build his hut since we can see some monasteries in the woods’. The suggested exercises do not encourage discussion on the text’s idea of the Greek people as ‘having fun or being careless’, nor as being especially favoured by God, which is thereby represented as a naturalised national selfunderstanding.1 As we have seen in Chapter 3, the idea of Greeks (i.e. Greek Orthodox) as God’s chosen people is a perception that is ardently opposed in 1  Cultivating a self-understanding that favours the idea of a people chosen by God in a school context may lead to a defeatist social behaviour, working as an excuse for some people to not take decisive action because God will come to rescue them in the end. The leading article in The Athens Review of Books, No. 31 (2012), refers to several public statements by politicians where God and Virgin Mary are invoked as guarantors of Greece’s way out of the economic crisis. Prime Minister Antonis Samaras has also on several occasions invoked the help of supra-natural powers: On Pentecost 2012 he said that ‘the Holy Spirit will give us love, faith and will to fight. We are all together and we will succeed’ (http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/4726925/?iid=2, accessed 12 June 2013). During the celebration of the Epiphany in 2013, he said ‘with God’s strength we will manage’ (http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=491675 accessed 12 June 2013). For an analysis of the relationship between religion and politics in contemporary Greece, see Dragonas (2013). For a detailed analysis of the subtle ways in which the current Archbishop of Athens and all Greece, Ieronymos II, negotiates influence and privileges for the Church in relation to Greek politicians, see also Papastathis (2012) especially pp. 214–18.

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contemporary progressive theology. According to this theology, no specific country or nationality can be particularly chosen by God. However, the idea of Greeks as God’s chosen people and the creation of the Greek nation state thanks to the Orthodox Church, as God’s representative, is at the core of the national master narrative, thus a narrative that permeates education. In this chapter, we will take a closer look at the symbolic relationship between Orthodoxy and education. Following a short historical introduction and a presentation of the legal framework of religion in education and the position of the Church today, I will provide an overview of the public debates over the teaching of religion that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. The chapter ends with a discussion of two sides of the debate regarding religion and education: a traditionalist one, according to which Orthodoxy is the foundation for Greek education, and one with a more open-minded approach attempting to set a new agenda for the values that should guide education, among them Orthodox religious values. The debate on the nature of religious education in Greece follows the same cultural and theological concerns that were presented in Chapter 3 on the progressive theology and is, therefore, closely related to perceptions of the importance of Christianity in Greek culture and Greece’s relationship with the so-called European tradition and the country’s integration into a European present. In Chapter 6, I present proposals for new ways of teaching religion in a multi-religious society; these are based largely on discussions about Europe’s Christian heritage and Greece’s European heritage. Historical Background In the Ottoman Empire, the Orthodox Church, under the leadership of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, had a certain administrative authority over the Greek Orthodox Christians who comprised multiethnic and linguistically diverse groups (including Greek-, Slav- and Albanian-speaking populations). When nationalist independence movements began to succeed in their aspirations to create territorially and linguistically or ethnically defined nation states, some members of the Church hierarchy followed suit and national Churches were founded in opposition to the multiethnic and multilingual composition of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire. Since people in the Ottoman Empire had primarily defined themselves vis-à-vis the authorities in religious terms it became necessary for this linguistic and cultural nationalisation project to include religion as an essential identity marker. In so far as the national project proved successful, it also became necessary for the Church hierarchs to adjust its religious and multiethnic (ecumenical) agenda: by developing a nationalist agenda in order to stay close to and retain a certain administrative power over their flock through the institutionalisation of the Church under the Greek state. The collective myth of the ‘secret schools’ (Κρυφό Σχολειό) was part of this new agenda. The ‘secret schools’ were supposedly run

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by the Orthodox Church under Ottoman rule, where clerics, supposedly illegally, taught Christian subjects how to read and write Greek, thus keeping the language and ancient Greek legacy alive. The idea of secret schools run by the Church was spread by the Greek Church itself in the latter part of the nineteenth century in an attempt to promote the positive and decisive role of religion in the continuation of the Greek nation (Katsikas and Therianos 2007: 20). The debate about whether such schools actually existed intensified in the 1990s, with nationalists and Church representatives claiming that education was suppressed by the Ottoman authorities and that secret schools really did exist despite historical evidence that proper Greek schools operated legally under Ottoman rule. The myth has been contested by historians since the first half of the twentieth century, but the first systematic study and critique of the myth was not published until the late 1990s (Angelou 1997). Regardless of the actual nature of the relationship between the Orthodox Church and education, and even if the Church was a factor helping to preserve the Greek language, the fact remains that the Church has been attributed a hugely positive contribution to education during the Greek nation-building process. This helped future Greek citizens reconcile nation and religion, thus not having to make a choice between the new national identity marker and the old religious one. In this sense, being educated as a national citizen was not necessarily in conflict with one’s self-understanding as a member of the Christian Orthodox Church. The strong links between Church and education are effectively reproduced every year on 25 March at the commemoration of the anniversary of the War of Independence in pre-schools and primary schools. Schoolchildren re-enact the drama of the Greek uprising, including a scene with pupils studying secretly around a candle, and recite a poem about how children attended school in the night and the Church lit up the darkness of Ottoman rule.2 The close relationship between education and religion is further reproduced on a daily basis through the morning prayer in all schools and the blessing ceremony of schools and schoolchildren by the local priest at the beginning of every school year.3 Another initiative sealing the close 2  The sixth grade history book represents the secret school as a myth, providing evidence that official Greek schools did in fact exist under Ottoman rule (In Modern Times, Aktypis et al. 2009: 55–9). In contrast, the school celebrations of the War of Independence, and in particular the theatre play that takes place during these celebrations, attempts to ‘confirm’ the myth. It is the latter, with its bodily experience, that arguably influences the children’s historical consciousness more effectively than a single page from their history book that tries to dispel the same myth. 3  For six years, from 2000 to 2007, the 132nd primary school in Athens implemented intercultural teaching practices (Protonotariou and Haravitsidis 2007), including a replacement of the school’s Orthodox morning prayer with a poem written by the Greek (Marxist) poet Yannis Ritsos (1909–1990). This initiative was stopped in 2007, deemed illegal by the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, the school principal was prosecuted for this initiative and for having arranged classes in the mother tongue of immigrant schoolchildren (from diverse ethnic, linguistic and/or religious origins) who represented approximately 70 per cent of the total number of schoolchildren in that particular school (http://www.tovima.

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ties between religion and education was the establishment in 1842 of three of the most influential Church fathers as patron saints of the Greek education system (Gazi 2004). This commemoration is celebrated on 30 January, which is a school holiday, along with speeches on the educational importance of the Church Fathers. In linguistic, ethnic and to some extent religious terms, the early modern Greek state in the middle of the nineteenth century was highly diverse because it included different linguistic groups such as Greeks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Vlachs and others. This diversity was managed through a centralised state and educational system, and a nationalising programme in which the Orthodox Church, as well as the ancient Greek legacy, came to play central roles. It is only recently, in the early twenty-first century and after increasing immigration, that Greece has become once again a multicultural, multi-faith society after almost two hundred years of efforts towards the homogenisation of the Greek nation state.4 In this context, the religion class is an interesting case study into ways of dealing with religious and cultural diversity in a society with both a historical and imagined homogeneity. The Legal Framework Since the foundation of the Greek state, religion has been taught in a catechist manner5 based on the assumption that the majority of the population is Greek Orthodox.6 According to article 3 of the 1975 Greek Constitution, the prevailing religion in Greece is the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ (Hellenic Parliament 2010). Article 16, paragraph 2 states the obligation of the Greek state to provide education with the purpose of, among other things, developing a Greek national and religious consciousness. Therefore, the Constitution is often forwarded in arguments claiming that the Greek state is obliged to provide a faith-based religious education according to the Eastern Orthodox creed. However, article 16 does not advocate the use of a specific religion or religious creed in developing such a consciousness. Thus, article 16 can also be interpreted as expressing gr/society/article/?aid=273340 and http://www.132grava.net/132grava/?q=node/3, both accessed 14 June 2013). 4  The citizens that did not conform to a national homogenous body during the first hundred years were confined within specific geographic areas (Thrace, Dodecanese and others) or disappeared in 1923 as agreed in the international Treaty of Lausanne with the Greek/Christian–Turkish/Muslim population exchange, and in 1943 with the Nazi extermination of Greek Jews. 5  Yangazoglou (2005) provides a thorough historical overview of the changes in the content and pedagogical models of religious education in Greek schools. 6  Until the early 1990s, the overwhelming majority (97 per cent) of the Greek population were members of the Greek Orthodox Church. The remaining 3 per cent were primarily Protestant, Catholic and Muslim minorities.

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the State’s obligation to merely provide schoolchildren with an education that develops their religious awareness within any religious framework. Note that the Constitution was written in 1975, when Greece was relatively homogeneous, did not pay any special attention to its historical religious minorities,7 and immigration into the country was limited. This can perhaps explain why the religious education of children according to article 16 has been typically interpreted as a religious education according to predominantly Orthodox values; values that are stated in the Constitution’s preamble and in article 3, where the prevailing religion is specified as the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. Today, however, approximately 10 per cent of the population are immigrants, many of which belong to other Christian denominations or non-Christian religious communities.8 According to the current law on education (Act 1566/85) the class entitled ‘Orthodox Christian Instruction’ is mandatory for all schoolchildren throughout primary and secondary education.9 The 1991 national curriculum (ΦΕΚ 133&4/9/1991) states that: The purpose of the Orthodox Christian instruction (religious topics) in primary education is to provide the children basic features of the Orthodox Christian teachings, tradition and life, to contribute to the development of their religious consciousness and to assist the strengthening of their relationship with God as Creator and Father. (cited in Karamouzis 2007: 92)

The 2003 national curriculum (ΦΕΚ 303/13-3-2003) included the intention of ‘approaching our own religious beliefs and traditions as well as those of others with respect and without prejudices, stereotypes and fanaticism’ (ibid.: 94). The goals of the curriculum, however, did not correspond to the content of the class where only 4 out of 161 hours of teaching were dedicated to other Christian denominations or religious traditions and only in the last year of primary school (ibid.). According to some critics, the mandatory nature of religious education within a specific creed collides with the right to religious freedom stated in article 13, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitution. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the discussion concerning the mandatory nature of the religion class raises questions of citizenship.  The religious rights of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace was (and still is) regulated by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, when the Muslims of Western Thrace were exempted from the population exchange of the 400,000 Muslims from Greece to Turkey and the 1,200,000 Christians from Turkey to Greece. The Muslim community in Western Thrace is responsible for the religious education of Muslim schoolchildren and a purely faith-based class is allowed (Baltsiotis and Tsitselikis 2001). 8  There are no reliable statistics on the religious beliefs and affiliation of immigrants in Greece (Mediterranean Migration Observatory 2004). 9  Even if the official designation of the class is ‘Orthodox Christian instruction’ it is referred to as ‘the class of religious topics’ [Το μάθημα των Θρησκευτικών] or simply ‘religious topics’ [τα θρησκευτικά]. 7

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One such question is whether religious education should be a requirement for all enrolled schoolchildren and future citizens or only for those addressed in the Greek Constitution as ‘Greeks’ of the ‘prevailing religion’ (Christian Orthodox). Should the religion class continue to develop the pupils’ religious (i.e. Christian Orthodox) awareness, or should it help promote an interreligious and intercultural understanding among future Greek citizens? This is also a political question, but since the Church of Greece, which in administrative terms is under the authority of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, is entitled to be heard in issues of public education related to religion, it has often proven very successful in influencing the policy of the Ministry.10 Therefore, the next section will provide a short analysis of the Church’s position vis-à-vis the culturally diverse composition of Greek society and religious education in school. The Position of the Church of Greece In the summer of 2009, the Church ran a publicity spot in the televised screens of the Athens metro showing Archbishop Ieronymos and other clerics distributing food to immigrants. According to the spot, the Church’s intention was not to proselytise,11 but to provide humanitarian aid to people regardless of their ethnic and religious background. Since 2008, this image of the Church has often been projected in the media. As mentioned in the Introduction to this book, the current Archbishop has a completely different profile to his predecessor and seems determined on bringing about a change in the image and discourse of the Church, which, under the leadership of his predecessor Christodoulos (1998–2008), had strong ethnocentric and xenophobic characteristics (Molokotos-Liederman 2007a). There are indications that Ieronymos will recognise the growing cultural and religious diversity of Greek society and thus avoid addressing the flock of the Church as

10  In 2007, following pressure from the Church and from the theologians’ union, PETH, the conservative ‘Pan-Hellenic Union of Theologians’, the Ministry withdrew a history textbook because it did not adequately attribute an unequivocally positive role of the Church in its account of the history of the Greek nation. The pedagogical advisor Stavros Yangazoglou estimates that religious education in Greece can only change with the consent of the Church, thus drawing attention to the considerable influence the Church exerts over public education (personal interview, May 2008). The Church does not formally have the right to veto government decisions, but only to be heard as any other NGO or civil society organisation. Yet, the Church’s position in society is still so strong that most politicians avoid direct confrontations and disagreements with the Church including on educational issues. 11  According to article 13, paragraph 2 of the Greek Constitution, any form of proselytising is prohibited.

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ethnic Greeks or Greek citizens who are presumably Orthodox Christians (written interview, 2008).12 The growing diversity in the ethnic and religious composition of the Greek population has challenged the Church’s position on religious education claiming that religion must be a mandatory school subject to be transmitted to all future citizens. In autumn 2008, the advisor for religious education at the Pedagogical Institute13 expressed confidence in the willingness of the recently elected Church prelate to support a change in the religion class, towards a mandatory but nonconfessional class for all schoolchildren.14 However, in February 2009 Archbishop Ieronymos publicly expressed his wish for religious education to remain both faith-based and mandatory for Christian Orthodox pupils (Ieronymos 2009), thereby exempting schoolchildren from other religions or pupils who do not belong to any religion. The Archbishop also expressed anxiety over possible plans for the Greek public school system to distance itself from the Church and its truths (Karamitrou and Konstantinidou 2009). In an official letter from the Holy Synod to the Ministry of Education, he also pleaded for appointing theologians, rather than primary school teachers, to teach the religion class in primary school and increasing the weekly number of hours dedicated to religious education (Holy Synod 2009). Furthermore, his statements on education seem to suggest that he understands true learning (paideía) as an education close to ‘the Church and its truths’, against all other education as ‘dry instruction’ (Makedonía 2009). It seems that when it comes to religious education, the Archbishop has shown himself less willing to take into practical consideration the cultural and religious diversity of schoolchildren. Thus, despite the hopes of some progressive theologians that Archbishop Ieronymos, contrary to his predecessor, would bring about a less conservative and ethnocentric attitude in the Church, he has openly supported the most conservative attitude of the theologians’ union, ‘Pan-Hellenic Union of Theologians’ (Ieronymos 2009; Tsatsis 2009) and failed to address various progressive proposals to change the confessional character of the religion class. The Church’s intervention and influence on both the content and teaching methods of religious education and the interaction and power relations between the various stakeholders involved in the process (including the Ministry, Pedagogical  It may still be too early to judge the long-term impact of the Archbishop’s leadership in 2008, but early estimations based on a comparative discourse analysis of the rhetoric of the two prelates suggests that Ieronymos is continuing the ideological line of his predecessor, under the cover of a less populist attitude (Papastathis 2009). 13  See footnote 13 in the Introduction to this book on the change of name from the Pedagogical Institute (PI) to the Institute of Educational Policy in 2012. The new institute has the same responsibilities vis-à-vis development of curricula and textbooks, and the principal advisor on religious education issues, Stavros Yangazoglou, also has the same position. Therefore, and to avoid confusion, I will refer to the institute with its old name, even in references and when referring to the period after 2012. 14  Interview with Stavros Yangazoglou, October 2008. 12

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Institute, Church, unions and NGOs) are issues that need specific attention; this falls outside the scope of this book which deals more particularly with independent and progressive theological initiatives directed towards a redefinition of national and religious identity. Public Debates on Religious Education, 1981–2008 Public debates on religious education in the Greek public school began in the late 1970s and 1980s when Greece started recovering from years of authoritarian regime and internal political conflicts. In 1974, the Greek Communist party became legal for the first time and the Church had to renegotiate a new contract with the State after its alliance with the far right during the dictatorship. During this period, proposals on the content and teaching of religious education came from the revived monastic movement (Agio Oros 1990) rather than from the institutional Church. The revival of monasticism and the so-called Neo-Orthodox movement (Makrides 1998) prompted a new image of the relationship between Orthodox and Greek identity based on an outspoken anti-westernism and ethnocentrism (Kalaitzidis 2008b). During the 1980s, there were attempts to relieve religious education from its pietistic and conservative spirit and to introduce instead a religion class based on the Orthodox experience (βίωμα), but always in concordance with Greek national identity as opposed to (Western) European identity. Theologians, Church hierarchs and religious intellectuals expressed their views on the survival of Greek national identity through the means of religious education. In contrast, legal experts and leftist secular intellectuals pointed to the problem of religious freedom. An important debate took place in the mid-1990s and in part was prompted by the State Council (Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας) decision on the right of pupils to be exempted from the religion class (ΣτΕ 3356/1995). This decision was the result of European standards based on the Human Rights Charter and article 18 regarding the right on the freedom of religion.15 In 1981, Greece had its first socialist government, which introduced educational reforms and launched a public debate on the removal of religious education from the national curriculum. Since then, the teaching of religion in the Greek public school has been a hot topic of public debate. The intensity of the debate is evident in the headlines of newspaper articles from the past three decades,16 including the following examples: ‘Religious Education in the Dock’ (Kyriakátiki Eleftherotypía, 24 January 1982);

15 16

 https://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/  Research based on a collection of 43 articles (four from the 1980s, 21 from the 1990s

and 18 from the 2000s) from eight large Greek newspapers collected by a religion teacher.

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‘Our National Survival and Religious Education’ (Kyriakátiki Eleftherotypía, 19 March 1995); ‘Is it Time to Change the Way we Teach Religion?’ (Eleftherotypía, 26 May 1997); ‘Religious Education Lights Fires’ (Ta Néa, 28 May 1998); ‘A New Coup against Orthodoxy. Religious Education will be Abolished from Schools’ (Adésmeftos Týpos, 30 May 2000); ‘A New Blow – […] the Catechist Way of Teaching Religion in Schools’ (Ta Néa, 12 November 2002); and ‘The Fight over Religious Education’ (same title in Ta Néa, 30 November 2002 and To Víma, 8 December 2002).

These headlines suggest that religious education is in danger of being abolished or at least diluted, thus confirming the intensity of this highly contested issue in Greece. Arguments over religious education have involved various institutions and stakeholders with different agendas, including the State and the Church. While the Greek state aims for compliance with European standards of religious freedom, the Greek Church wishes to retain its influence through the transmission of its message to the future Greek citizens in public education. In this debate, legal experts have supported the State, while theologians and clerics have sided with the Church. From the mid-1990s until his death in 2008, the Metropolitan and Archbishop Christodoulos was a frequent participant in such debates pleading for a purely Christian Orthodox religious education. During a speech at a theological conference on 3 September 1999, he criticised the weakening of the religious message of the religion class; he asked, ‘Is this really religious education? Or is it a class in the way the Europeanisers, those who have been called euro-greedy, dreamed of?’ (Eleftherotypía, 4 September 1999). The accusation of Europeanisation is often used by traditionalists and exemplifies a classic debate in Greece on whether Greece belongs to the West, to Europe, or whether it should try to preserve an authentic Greek culture that has not been alienated by European or western culture. This dilemma is at the core of what could be called Greece’s identity crisis. Greece is the only European country with a large Orthodox Church that did not fall under communist rule. This ‘isolation’ from other Orthodox countries, the active role of western powers, especially from the USA, in preventing the communist party from taking any form of power in Greece and the historical but traumatic relationship with Western Europe (see for example Kitromilides 1998) have all contributed to a deep and almost chronic identity crisis in Greece. This has probably been further accentuated by

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the economic crisis, the role of EU in the bailout of the Greek economy and the question of what EU membership entails in a moment of economic crisis. Since the focus of the book is on key figures and groups in the debate on religious education and on their opposition to traditionalist arguments, I will illustrate the differences between traditionalist and more progressive voices in the discussions. The following sections in this chapter will, therefore, provide examples of the different ways of interpreting and publicly promoting the role of religion in education in the debate. The Traditionalist Agenda In order to be able to speak about new trends and new agendas, as we do in this book, we first need to look at what are considered ‘old’ or ‘outdated’ agendas for religion in education. New discourses on the teaching of religion in public education are opposed to others that are projected as reactionary, fundamentalist and conservative. Often the ‘old-fashioned’ way of teaching is said to be marked by obscurantism (for example Yangazoglou 2006: 3) so the adherents of such teaching methods are often called obscurantists.17 So what are these conservative discourses? Selected works of Konstantinos Cholevas, an independent intellectual and columnist, will be examined here as representative examples of conservative discourses on religious education. Cholevas had a close relationship with the Church under Archbishop Christodoulos (1998–2008) serving as Editor-in-Chief of two important church periodicals, the theological quarterly Θεολογία [Theology] and the monthly bulletin Εκκλησία [Church], both published by the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece.18 In 2007, Cholevas published a collection of short essays on education in a short book under the title Greek Orthodox Education in the Twenty-First Century.19 17  The Greek word for ‘obscurantism’ is σκοταδισμός, and it is used by progressive as well as conservative and even fundamentalist religious groups, to accuse each other of either backwardness, as in the case of progressive groups, or heresy in the case of fundamentalist groups. A surprising example can be found at http://egolpio.wordpress.com/2011/12/17/ psixis_dromoi/ (accessed 19 April 2013), where a new periodical, Psychís Drómi [Psyche’s Ways], combining theological and psychological/psychiatric/psychotherapeutic approaches to human life, is equated with ‘obscurantism’ by a traditionalist blogger. 18  After the passing of Christodoulos, the new Archbishop Ieronymos appointed the progressive theologian and pedagogical advisor Stavros Yangazoglou as new Editor-inChief of Θεολογία. 19  The Greek title of the book is H Ελληνοορθόδοξη Παιδεία στον Εικοστό Πρώτο Αιώνα. It is important to note that the term ‘Helleno-Orthodox’, which is difficult to translate into English, is used instead of the shorter term ‘Orthodox’. It exemplifies that this author pays much attention to the close relationship between the Orthodox tradition and national identity. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the merging of a religious and a national identity dates back to the mid-nineteenth century as an ideological device to bridge the gap between a

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The cover image of the book is a famous painting called The First Letters, painted by the well-known Greek romantic artist Nikolaos Gyzis (1842–1901). The painting shows a young girl reading from a booklet under the guidance of an old man dressed in a monk’s cloak and hat. Gyzis is known in Greece for several paintings depicting the life of Greek Orthodox people during the Ottoman period. His painting Secret School from 1886 has become a symbol of the way Greek priests and monks supposedly kept Greek Orthodox schools alive but in secrecy during the Ottoman period. The Church funded Gyzis’ art studies in Munich, so he may have been more than willing to contribute to the creation of the myth which gave the Church an additional crucial role in Greek nation-building.20 On page 114 in Cholevas’ book another painting from the same period (by the lesser known artist Kostas Adamos) depicts a scene from what is apparently a lesson in a secret school. It shows a priest surrounded by four attentive young men while, in the background, one sees the blue and white Greek flag on a staff with a cross on the top. Both paintings give the impression of a warm and safe environment – in Gyzis’ painting the monk-teacher holds a coffee cup while kindly supervising the girl’s reading. The students in Adamos’ painting look happy and eager to learn from the elderly monk, and there is an atmosphere of harmony and kindness – there are no signs of an old-time ‘dark school’ with the imposition of severe punishments; there is certainly no resemblance to the current teaching conditions of up to 30 (undedicated) pupils in small classrooms in shabby school buildings, which is the reality of many Greek schools today. These paintings lend the book an air from ‘the good old times’ when students were attentive and education was a pleasure for teachers and students alike. To add to the book’s framing according to old traditional values, the title page and the headings of each chapter are written in a font resembling old church letters. Cholevas’ writing in the book avoids the use of the extreme or anti-globalisation rhetoric that can be seen in many fanatic ‘Helleno-Orthodox’ blogs on education (such as http://thriskeftika.blogspot.com/). However, in most of Cholevas’ writing there is a warning against the dangers of an ‘equalising or levelling globalisation’ (Cholevas 2007: 16). The author’s understanding of a ‘Helleno-Orthodox education’ is one that shapes young minds with ‘morality, humanism, democratic responsibility and respect for God, the Fatherland and its cultural heritage’ Helleno-centric western perception of the Greek nation and a locally rooted Greek Orthodox religious identification among the majority of Greek people. Helleno-Orthodoxy was also part of the twentieth-century Greek fascist ideologies, thus the slogan ‘Fatherland, religion, family’ was used during the authoritarian rule of Ioannis Metaxas (1936–1940), while the slogan of the dictatorship (1967–1974) was ‘Greece of Greek Christians’. The late Archbishop Christodoulos coined the slogan ‘Greece spells Orthodoxy’ (Papastathis 2012). Konstantinos Cholevas’ ‘Helleno-Christian’ ideology is not surprising since he was close to Christodoulos. 20  We should not forget that most members of the clergy of the Patriarchate of Constantinople were against the establishment of national churches corresponding to of the newly created nation states (Matalas 2003).

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(ibid.: 10). The author argues that an education based on ‘Greek Orthodox values’ and ‘solid patriotism’ is the best way to benefit from ‘globalisation and avoid its negative effects’, which include ‘materialism and disrespect for the national and cultural identity of every people/community’ (ibid.). In a text entitled ‘Young People, Saint Kosmas and Multiculturalism’ (ibid.: 33–8) young people or pupils are referred to as ελληνόπουλα [young Greeks] with no mention of the increasingly heterogeneous composition of the student body in today’s Greek schools, where, in some cases, the percentage of schoolchildren without Greek ancestry can surpass 50 per cent. However, Cholevas does mention the young Greeks of the diaspora, admiring them for keeping their Greek identity alive even from afar. The entire ideology of Cholevas’ book is that of a greater Greece (including Cyprus) with values that are said to be ecumenical (ibid.: 123–5), but which presuppose an education according to a specific national, cultural and religious tradition, founded on Greek Orthodox values: ‘Greece has the possibility of becoming an international centre for the learning, research and transmission of the ecumenical values of Greek Orthodox education’ (ibid.: 125). This ideological interpretation of ecumenism has cultural, rather than religious, roots and can be traced back to the ‘invention of modern Greekness’ by the intellectual and artistic circles of the 1930s and the cultural Neo-Orthodox paradigm of Yannaras as described in Chapter 2. The anthology Ελληνορθόδοξη Πορεία [The Greek Orthodox Trajectory], edited by Cholevas (2008), is based on similar ideas. Its cover shows an angel holding a globe in each hand; the globe on the right depicts the Greek flag and the globe on the left hand depicts the Byzantine flag with the double-headed eagle. The angel floats in the air over a group of six Greek Church Fathers and Byzantine emperors. This 584-page book is sponsored by the Greek supermarket chain Doúkas and is distributed for free. Cholevas writes in the introduction that the book ‘presents the Greek Orthodox proposal against the challenges of our time, namely a united (?) Europe, globalisation, multiculturalism, a crisis of institutions and values’ (Cholevas 2008, question mark in original). The book is dedicated to young people and their teachers in order to remind them of the diachronic and time-honoured values that our much afflicted People has kept upright through the centuries. We shall teach them that Orthodoxy and Hellenism are powers that are unbreakably connected and that only they can give a future to our past. All we need is to stay away from extremes: ethnophyletism and national arrogance, on the one hand, and defeatism, manic love of the foreign and national inferiority, on the other. Let our path towards the future be Orthodox and Greek. Hence, de facto optimistic and Ecumenical! (ibid.)

Cholevas is an interesting case because he belongs to a younger generation, as do the progressive theologians. He also frames his conservative and ethno-religious stance in a seemingly moderate and ecumenical discourse. His attempt to propose a Helleno-centric ecumenism that is neither nationalistic nor entirely international

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resembles Yannaras’ nostalgic visions of a ‘Hellenism with a universal range’, ‘an ecumenical Hellenism’ (Yannaras 2011). Cholevas participates in public debates through publications like the above and through press articles, some of which are posted on various internet blogs. One such blog is thriskeftiká, whose main aim is ‘the struggle for the preservation of the mandatory and Orthodox Christian character of religious education’.21 It is the leading blog representing a traditionalist, conservative attitude to religious education and the blogger, Ioannis Tatsis, is a theologian and religion teacher who represents an anti-ecumenical stance of Orthodox theology. The blogger deplores that ‘only few theologians are willing to fight for the preservation of the mandatory and Orthodox Christian character of religious education’; he also regrets that some people, ‘like tame sheep, follow pseudo-artsy fellow theologians […] who work for the transformation of religious education into syncretistic religious studies, thus abandoning its hagiographic and patristic content’.22 There are many other conservative intellectuals with views that are similar to those of Cholevas, which are typical among conservative intellectuals. One example is the linguist, dictionary editor and former rector of the University of Athens, Georgios Babiniotis.23 He is actively involved in public debate and has a considerable public influence among Greek elites. In his collection of essays Χριστιανική και Eλληνική Πνευματικότητα [Christian and Greek Spirituality] (2007) he argues for the critical importance of Orthodoxy in the foundations of Greek identity.24 New Approaches to Religion in Education The above examples indicate that the perceived ‘threat of globalisation’ has activated a defensive discourse and struggle of national survival to keep ‘old values’ unchanged. Progressive theologians also speak about the ‘consequences of globalisation’ as a threat, but they propose different means to deal with its associated risks. Instead of suggesting the preservation of or return to traditional values, they  http://thriskeftika.blogspot.com/ (accessed 22 February 2012).  Ibid. 23  In March 2012 Georgios Babiniotis was appointed Minister of Education, 21 22

Lifelong Learning and Religious Affairs under Lucas Papademos’ temporary technocratic government (November 2011–May 2012). 24  Babiniotis is also a proponent of Greece’s belonging to an eastern rather than a western cultural framework (in Greek traditionally called ‘καθ’ημάς Ανατολή’ [the East that is ours]). This is indicative in his recent suggestion as chairman of the Hellenic Culture Foundation that due to the economic crisis in Greece, the Foundation’s representation in Berlin (its last in Western Europe) should be shut down in favour of strengthening other representations in Tirana, Alexandria, Sofia and other Balkan and Middle East locations. For further details on this issue, see Kourtovik (2012).

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suggest a change of attitude, particular in theology. Stavros Yangazoglou (2006: 13) describes globalisation as ‘cultural and religious plurality in the contemporary world’ and refers to its dangers in terms of two extreme phenomena: religious fundamentalism and religious fading (αποχρωματισμός). He continues: Christian theology is called upon to engage in creative dialogue with the cultural and religious plurality of the contemporary world. It must rediscover its true ecumenism and tolerance in order to surpass intolerance and fanaticism. (ibid.)

Yangazoglou’s views are representative of the progressive religious voices examined in this book that consider themselves as the moderate voices between ‘fundamentalists’ or traditionalists, and ‘secularists’ or religiously neutral.25 Although Orthodox ecumenical values are at the core of the arguments put forward by the progressive strand of religion teachers, they refer to the teachings of Christ as a pan-human proposal and avoid any references to a specific cultural tradition, i.e. the Greek tradition. The educational researcher Evie Zambeta concludes in her book Σχολείο και Θρησκεία [School and Religion] that ‘the whole culture of the Greek school is equated with Orthodoxy’ (2003: 118). She further states that ‘the element which is basically promoted by the Greek education system is that Greek national identity is indissolubly connected with Orthodoxy, thus for someone to be Greek they have to be Christian Orthodox’ (ibid.: 119). The last sentence brings to mind similar statements from the book edited by Konstantinos Cholevas (2008); it is, therefore, an accurate description of a dominant perception of the relationship between religious and national identity in Greek education. Zambeta insists that schoolchildren in Greece are taught that 25  I have not made any reference to the ‘secular’ voices in the debate because it would imply adding a lot more material without substantially enriching the argument of the progressive theologians for a ‘non-traditional’ approach to religious education. One example of a secular progressive voice is the author and university professor Georgis Yatromanolakis, who had the following comment on the exemption of pupils from the religion class (which will be covered extensively in Chapter 7): ‘The religion class is another characteristic example of a fearful, unreliable and inefficient culture and education. The religion class shows very characteristically what really interests us: ritualism and visions of greatness. A supposedly “pure” fatherland, a supposedly “pure” religion. Religious education and more particularly the related debate is a clear example of our education policy: we pursue the ostensible; we are satisfied with the unreal. We think that we have an invaluable core which we should not lose sight. Do we? The religion class has in reality been abolished. But we don’t see it. On the contrary we keep insisting. We demand declarations and repentance from our children while we, the serious, the devout Christians, the high-principled citizens remain unrepentant’ (Yatromanolakis 2008). This comment obviously makes the same criticism, from a secular point of view, as do the progressive theologians from a theological point of view. Yatromanolakis, as a public intellectual, is in a position to criticise the state of affairs, while the theologians, employed in the education sector and related institutions are in positions where they can actually change the state of affairs.

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‘Greek culture is interwoven with the Orthodox Christian religion and that Greek history is interwoven with the history of the Orthodox Church’ (Zambeta 2003). However, as she importantly adds, this message is not communicated only through the religion class: ‘It is [also] communicated through all the classes and school events, from the blessing at the beginning of the year, the daily morning prayer, school holidays, daily practices and the entire school culture’ (ibid.). Even if this image is predominant in the Greek education system, as illustrated in the discourse of conservative participants in the debate and substantiated through scholarly research, there are alternative positions and proposals for a different role of religion in education. Such alternative approaches to the role of religion in education are illustrated in an edited volume on the state of affairs in Greek education today. Order + Disorder: Young People Cry Out is the title of an edited book that was published in autumn 2011.26 The title in Greek is a play on words, since τάξη [taxi] means both order and classroom and the word αταξία [ataxia] means disorder but also mischief. The book, edited by Marios Koukounaras-Liagis, a researcher in pedagogy and a theologically trained religion teacher,27 brings together a collection of essays by intellectuals, clerics, artists and other public figures, who address the frustration of young people in Greece, especially problems in education. In December 2008, if not earlier, it became obvious that young people in Greece felt a need to cry out.28 Aside from protesting against the authorities’ aggressive handling of young people,29 massive protests, which also included parents, schoolteachers and other adults, were directed against politicians for their lack of investment in the education and future employment of the young generations. Public education in Greece is inadequate so young people need to pay for tutoring to pass their final examinations for admission into university. Young people and their families typically have to work very hard and spend a great deal of money in private tutoring in order to achieve good results in exams to enter higher education institutions. Youth unemployment is extremely high (60 per cent in 2013) and wages are low. This forms the general societal context for the book about ‘the young crying out’. However, the book deals more specifically with the issue of education (paideía).

26 27

 Τάξη + Αταξία. Οι Νέοι Φωνάζουν (Koukounaras-Liagis 2011).  In September 2012 Koukounaras-Liagis was appointed lecturer at the Faculty of

Theology, University of Athens. 28  In early December 2008, a 15-year-old boy was killed by a police officer. Protests over this unjust killing turned into mass demonstrations that lasted several weeks and caused severe material damage. The extent of the demonstrations, their geographic spread to almost every Greek city and their persistence for weeks testify that these reactions did not only stem from frustration over an unjust killing, but from strong latent dissatisfaction with social, political and economic conditions in Greek society, including an inefficient education system. 29  The area of Athens, Exarchia, where the boy was killed has been infamous for frequent conflicts between groups of anarchists and the police over several decades.

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The front cover of the book is a collage against a bright red background. The first part of the book title, Τάξη (Order), is set in type, while the second part, Αταξία (Disorder), is in handwritten letters. The upper part of the cover shows a blackboard full of mathematical formulas; in the lower left corner of the cover there is a photo of a young girl sitting alone, legs crossed, on a simple folding chair. The photo is blurred and she is looking away from the centre of the book, perhaps paying attention to something we cannot see; below her is an empty, almost sterile floor. The contrast with the front cover of Cholevas’ (2007) book is striking. Here there is no guidance by a devoted adult, no warmth and no personal expression of feeling. The subtitle of the book, The Young Cry Out, is in contrast to the front cover’s emptiness and total lack of involvement, suggesting perhaps a feeling of apathy. Before each of the 19 essays in the book, there is a quotation from a young person describing his or her daily life, anxiety about the future and frustration over the society the young have inherited from the adults. Therefore, the layout of the book and the voices it represents make it a very contemporary and topical publication, in contrast to Cholevas’ publications, which all refer to an idealised past. Even if the overall appearance of the book is very different from Cholevas’ publications, the issues they address are similar. In Order + Disorder the focus of many of the contributions in the book is the need for education to become once again a humanistic endeavour. According to the authors, in this current time of spiritual crisis, a religious, namely Orthodox point of departure is suitable for attaining such a turn in education. As a contributing author, the Metropolitan of Demetrias Ignatios (2011: 167), believes that the school is a space where sooner or later the search for a new humanism will begin, a humanism which is ‘broader, more honest and truly unprejudiced’. He suggests that ‘Orthodox anthropology, based not on fleshless theories but on the incarnated w(W)ord and logic action, can map out routes of hope’. The book suggests perceiving education as paideía, an ‘education [that] does not consist of a mere transmission of information, but the moulding of the personality of the pupil through his/her relationship with the teacher’, as Philotheos Faros (2011: 315), who is also a cleric puts it. What all these essays share in common is the belief in or search for a new model for education, and for more spiritual and human conditions in society. They criticise modernity for its alienating aspects and see young people as its victims, but also as a source of hope for the future. Therefore, the editor concludes his introduction in this way: If we recognise the meaning of life as the satisfaction of existential needs and the achievement of authenticity, then we understand the meaning of what young people are searching for. What is order and what is disorder today? Let us have the young speak and cry out. (Koukounaras-Liagis 2011: 25)

This book is just one example of the many voices arguing for the strengthening of a religious and spiritual worldview in contemporary society. A common

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characteristic in these contributions is the belief that a theological or religious dimension in education will work as a counterweight to the problems of modernity. Conclusion This chapter has illustrated how Greek nation-building created close bonds between education and religion. Forming such tight bonds has been in the interest of both the Church and the State. Successfully persuading the Orthodox population that they were not only Orthodox but also Greek, the newly created Greek state ‘inherited’ a faithful flock from the Church. The Church, once identified with the national project, was able to increase its popularity through national popular myths (including the ‘secret school’) and the celebration of both religious and secular holidays (including the celebration of the Greek Church Fathers as patron saints of Greek education). In modern times, education and in particular the religion class has become a cultural battlefield for various debates over the church–nation relationship. According to the Greek Constitution, the purpose of Greek education is to develop the pupils’ ‘religious consciousness’. As illustrated in the section on the legal framework, article 16 in the Constitution does not specify whether the religious consciousness to be developed must correspond exclusively to the stated prevailing religion. Therefore, the vagueness of the constitutional article regarding religious education leaves room for many stakeholders to interpret and use it according to their specific agendas for religious education. Apart from the Constitution, the Church plays a crucial role in the question of religion in public education. Under the leadership of Christodoulos (1998–2008) it was obvious that religious education, as a confessional class, was supposed to function as a guardian of the Greek Orthodox tradition against the risks of alienation from the West. The current Archbishop Ieronymos has appeared more open towards dialogue and has toned down the rhetoric of Orthodox education as an issue of national identity, yet the official attitude of the Church remains in favour of a faith-based Orthodox class at the heart of public education. Beyond the role of the Church, the debate on religious education has also been influenced by political initiatives for safeguarding religious freedom and personal privacy. In the media, the debate since the 1980s has revolved around the impression that the continuity of religious education class is under threat. Two contemporary views and types of publications dealing with the role of religion in Greek public school were identified in this chapter. The first used a traditionalist agenda envisioning Orthodoxy as the essence of Greek culture and a return to ‘the good old days’ through a revival of Orthodox values in education. The other took contemporary Greek society as a key point of reference advocating that Orthodox theology and Orthodox values are compatible with a contemporary outlook which can contribute to society as it really is today and not as it should be or as it, supposedly, was in ‘the good old days’.

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Chapter 5

Teaching Religion in the Greek School In this and the following two chapters, public education is considered a social arena where the new above-mentioned theological ideas are put into practice. While Chapter 3 dealt with the ideological spaces of progressive theoretical and academic discussions, this chapter looks at how these new ideas can be communicated to larger segments of the population and transmitted to future citizens through the means of education. The cultural project of defining ‘Greekness’ (Ellinikótita) in the literary milieus of the 1930s and the Neo-Orthodox movement in the 1980s and 1990s, as mentioned earlier, helped cultivate the idea of the Greek Orthodox tradition, as a central identity marker of the Greek population. This idea has been transmitted, in part through public education, to Greek society as a whole, so that, today, it can be said that the Orthodox cultural heritage is the main point of reference in defining what it means to be Greek.1 Public education is generally recognised as an important area for reproducing, adapting or changing collective perceptions of cultural heritage and national identity. The importance of education for the progressive theologians, who propose a new relationship between religious and national identity, is illustrated by the fact that most of the participants in the debate on renewing the role of Orthodoxy in Greece have published articles or participated in seminars about religion in education. This can be partly explained by the fact that the majority of the candidates from the theological faculties in Greece are appointed as teachers in secondary school and therefore have a specific interest in education, but there are also participants in the debate who are not theologians (for example Zoumboulakis 2006). The formative power of education in Greece should not be overestimated, however. Several of the religion teachers that I interviewed said that the Greek school system has been given such low priority by the State that the ability of schools to make a difference has been severely weakened. One teacher said: Everything that happens in school is so superficial. Neither the children nor the teachers take anything seriously. The pupils are almost never given a failing mark; the teachers simply don’t check the students’ academic performance. […] We have a state that is completely disintegrated. […] There is a general contempt for school. We actually do not teach a whole (45-minute) class, only 25 or 20 minutes. The pupils don’t care (that is, in lower secondary school). I had to 1  See also Carras (2004: 320–24) for a concise overview of Orthodoxy as a key element in Greek identity, including references to some statistical figures showing its prevalence, in a certain historical moment, among the population.

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This interviewee has had a unique experience since he taught in a ‘secondchance’ secondary school, i.e. a school for pupils who have dropped out from the mainstream school system, usually because of severe cognitive and behavioural problems. However, this teacher also had experience of the public school system from his own children so the picture he painted of the conditions in the Greek school system are not unlike what I have heard from other teachers, especially from those who teach in less privileged areas. The following indicative quotation from a young man from the island of Kerkyra (Corfu), which is not known as a particularly socially disadvantaged part of Greece, also emphasises the profound structural problems in Greek society, including its educational system: Now that time has passed, I wonder what the school has offered me; not even knowledge. I remember almost nothing! It taught me, perhaps, that I have to study to get a job – something that does not seem to be confirmed in real life – and of course that I should be proud of being Greek. I don’t know whether I am; proud I mean… (Theofanis from Kerkyra, 22 years old, cited in Koukounaras-Liagis 2011: 48)

What this young man remembers from his school education is the importance of being proud of being Greek, which relates to the national master narrative on the role of Orthodoxy in shaping Greek national identity. The quotation certainly confirms the religion teacher’s impression mentioned above of the Greek school as inadequate. Several other teachers and intellectual figures I interviewed have pointed to the much stronger formative power of the media, which seem to shape the values and worldviews of young people today. Yet others still believe that the school is ‘a system that irrevocably will determine their thought, behaviour, development, actions and fantasy, the way they will be able or unable to think of themselves and the world’ (Ioannidis 2011: 173). This statement, by a popular musician, was published in the above-mentioned contributed volume Order + Disorder. Note that this assessment was made by a person outside the school system, who can, therefore, keep alive an idealistic image of the school as an important formative factor in the lives of a country’s citizens. Despite the divergent and sometimes utterly pessimistic views on the Greek school system, the intense debates on education in general and on certain classes in particular (including the religion or the history class,2 or the fate of the teaching 2  In 2006/2007 a public dispute on a new history textbook broke out, much like the intense protests of 2000/2001 against the removal of religious affiliation from Greek ID cards. As with the issue of ID cards, the Church fiercely condemned the book, and

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of ancient Greek), indicate that many people still rely on the public school system as a means either to provide young people with the tools needed to navigate in late modern, globalised and mediatised societies, or to create proud national citizens aware of the value of their culture and history. In this context, the study of religion in education seems relevant when we examine the new religious agendas at play in Greek society today. Taking the perspective of the teachers of religion, this chapter uses research material collected between 2008 and 2009 including interviews with theologically trained religion teachers and participant observation of training seminars for religion teachers. The fieldwork highlights the issue of change in religious education from the point of view of the teachers and illustrates the complexities associated with modernising the teaching of religion in education. Teaching Religion: Challenges and Opportunities During 2008 and 2009, I carried out approximately 20 interviews with theologically trained religion teachers in secondary school.3 One of the criteria used for selecting the interviewees was their interest in progressive theological agendas and the renewal of religious education. Therefore, since the people I interviewed were progressive theologians and teachers deeply devoted to their careers, my observations are not necessarily representative of Greek religion teachers as a whole. The general picture emerging from these interviews is that the daily work of teachers, and not only of religion teachers, is very hard because it is difficult to capture the interest of the pupils. However, the interviews also reveal two different and often contradictory versions of how theologians experience their position in schools. For pupils and teachers alike, theologians can be the least respected teachers at school; but they can also be the teachers most favoured by their pupils and most highly valued by their colleagues teaching other subjects. It all depends on the types of relationships that the teacher is able to build in class and his or her role in the life of the school. This is obviously true for teachers in all subjects but, as teachers of religion, the theologians I interviewed pointed out the specific disadvantages they face in schools. a nationalist web magazine (www.antibaro.gr) launched a campaign and petition for the withdrawal of the book, which finally succeeded in September 2007. The number of signatures was not particularly high, and even if 11,650 (according to the magazine) were collected, the number is not comparable to the three million against the removal of religious affiliation from ID cards that the Church then claimed to have collected (MolokotosLiederman 2003). The history book controversy has been discussed at great lengths in Greek media but the issue has not been covered in English language scholarly literature. Halikiopoulou (2011: 115–18) provides a brief description of the case, while Liakos (2008/2009) provides a more detailed analysis. 3  See appendix A for a detailed list of interviews.

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Several theologians feel that their colleagues who teach different subjects do not respect them. According to the theologians, the majority of those in Greece who declare that they are Greek Orthodox do so because of a certain cultural identification with the Orthodox tradition and not out of a personal conviction or a true spiritual or personal quest for meaning. Therefore, few people attend church regularly and when they do so it is on national holidays like Easter and Christmas. Theologians have a different, more devout approach to the Orthodox tradition and are viewed as different; some feel a distance between themselves and their teacher colleagues. The negative image of theologians in school may also be reinforced by stereotypes of religious people originating in the 1950s and 1960s, when many theologians in schools belonged to the pious Christian organisations that were referred to in Chapter 2. In general, since the late 1970s, partly because of the close involvement of the Church with the dictatorship (1967–1974), one’s close relationship with religion has typically been viewed as a conservative feature,4 which does not fit the general image that the secondary school teachers I interviewed have of themselves. Furthermore, theologians say they may be looked down upon by their colleagues because obtaining a theological degree is considered a relatively easy undertaking, not only because of the supposedly easy university exams one needs to pass, but also because theological faculties tend to admit students with low grades in their high school exams. Yet, the theologians I interviewed believe it takes a lot more than an academic degree to be a good theologian in school. They must be open-minded and engaged actively in school life. From this point of view, theologians are often considered ‘one of the most highly esteemed colleagues’, as one teacher told me. Therefore, depending on their own attitude and willingness to contribute to the life of the school, theologians can be seen as either marginal teachers or important and inspiring colleagues. A similar situation can be observed in terms of how pupils view the religion class and their religion teachers. One religion teacher, working in a school located on an island, noted that pupils in smaller communities, in islands or rural areas, are much more familiar with church life and naturally come into contact with the local priest. However, according to all the theologians I interviewed, the vast majority of the children in secondary school have absolutely no relationship with the Church. This is particularly true in urban schools. Since the majority of the Greek population lives in cities,5 most children, according to the theologians I interviewed, do not  However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, several progressive intellectuals and artists approached Orthodoxy during the 1980s, thus, partly associating Orthodoxy with a progressive worldview. From the early 1990s, however, the Orthodox Church again became associated with conservatism under the leadership of Archbishop Christodoulos and through its engagement in the nationalistic campaigns against the removal of religious affiliation from citizens’ ID cards and the creation of a new state with the name Macedonia, and in general against western and European influence in Greece. 5  According to the World Bank 2012 statistics, 62 per cent of the Greek population live in urban areas (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?page=6 4

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go to church frequently, they do not care about going to church and they know hardly anything about the liturgy or the icons. Therefore, schoolchildren see both the religion class and the religion teacher as something foreign or irrelevant to their lives. This means that the negative attitudes towards the religion class or the religion teacher can lead to a bad teacher–pupil relationship, but it can also lead to a positive one if the theologian succeeds in relating with the pupils as they are or engages them by capturing their attention and making the class interesting. Religion teachers in fact have an implicit freedom and opportunity to teach according to their own agenda instead of rushing to finish the textbook in time, especially if they see that pupils give low priority to the religion class, because the religion class does not count towards school grades or the diploma and is not part of the qualifying examinations for entering university religion. Many of the religion teachers I interviewed do not strictly follow the textbooks, especially in lower secondary school, but instead use the class to discuss social and psychological issues with the children: ‘Τα παιδιά έχουν ανάγκη από συζήτηση’ [The children have the need to talk].6 This characteristic statement by a religion teacher illustrates a recurring theme in the interviews, namely that pupils need someone to discuss their difficulties and the challenges they face, someone who listens to them carefully and who can relate with their situation. Even the religion teachers who thought the new textbooks from 2006 were very useful teaching materials seemed to give highest priority to their role as conversation partners with the children. More than seeing themselves as merely transmitting specific knowledge on the Orthodox faith and tradition to the children, they expressed a genuine wish to make a difference in their lives by just being there to listen to them. The key issue for these passionate teachers is to approach and meet the children on their own terms, to start a dialogue from which the children can gain insight into moral issues based on a Christian value system. The teachers describe the children’s lives as hectic and overly scheduled, spending very little time with their parents who are too busy working. Therefore, some religion teachers I interviewed described their work as fulfilling an important societal task by offering pupils an alternative space to their usual hectic life, which is typically dominated by television or computers and absent parents. Even though the overall standpoint of the theologians I interviewed was that the religion class provides pupils a time for reflection, thus adding a humanistic dimension to education, others use a more traditional approach and are critical of the role of a religion teacher as a ‘school psychologist’. Many religion teachers see their mission as one of cultivating the pupils’ religious awareness so that they can eventually embrace all the positive features of faith, more particularly Christian faith. This is clearly expressed by a religion teacher in an article in the short-lived religious/theological magazine Vimóthyro: accessed 25 September 2013). 6  Interview, female religion teacher, May 2008.

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With the correct structuring of topics, the amelioration of textbooks, further essential training of theologians and the assistance of the Church, and without distrust and fanaticism from both sides, religious education will help the pupils to discover what has nested unadulterated in their soul. (Syros 2010: 187).

He further attempts to present the religion class as a lesson aiming to cultivate not exclusively a Christian religious awareness, but a more general religious awareness: For [the pupils] to see that through religious rituals the believer aims to spiritually lift not only himself but also the whole world. For them to know […] their [own] religion as well as the religion of others with whom they live, and to discover that there is one more common feature that characterises us as [human] beings (ibid.).

In addition to the view of religion teachers as attentive listeners or de facto student counsellors, teaching religion in school can also be a way of guiding pupils towards a personal existential and religious quest. A teacher, a former atheist leftist who became involved in the Neo-Orthodox movement and subsequently made a personal turn towards the Orthodox faith, thought that by cultivating the idea of an intellectual and spiritual quest among the pupils, they would eventually come closer to Christ.7 In his view, the purpose of teaching religion in school is to open the possibility for children to believe in Christ and the best way to understand and believe in Christ is to understand and know oneself. By discussing issues that are close to the pupils’ daily life, such as relationships between the sexes, social behaviour or the risks of smoking, it is possible to instil a way of thinking that, in his opinion, would bring pupils closer to Christ. He therefore emphasised the importance of an existential inner quest over the mere knowledge of facts about religion. He compared the mission of the religion teachers to that of psychoanalysts, who, in order to work in that capacity, must have gone through psychoanalysis themselves. Thus, religion teachers should have experienced an inner spiritual quest in their own personal life. This teacher also noted that teaching this way was not problematic even in classrooms with pupils from different religious backgrounds, including Islam, because Muslim pupils showed the same degree of religious indifference as the Orthodox Christian pupils. Although he emphasised the importance of not insulting any religious tradition, he did not try to conceal the fact that he was teaching in the name of Christ and that in his view Christ in the Islamic tradition has nothing to do with the idea of a personal existential quest that is at the core of the Orthodox Christian tradition. His approach to teaching mirrored his view of the Church today as an institution, which he thought had become a ‘cultural fossil’, living in the past without facing the current realities of Greek society. 7

 Interview, male teacher, November 2009.

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In this context and beyond the different views on the role of the religion class and religion teachers, the role of the Church as an institution remains an important support mechanism for the enhancement of religious education. The role of the Church is visible in the many meetings, seminars and lectures for theologians teaching in secondary school, which are usually organised after some form of cooperation with the local Church administration and often take place in facilities provided by the Church.8 Religion teachers are educated Orthodox Christian theologians the overwhelming majority of whom have a personal relationship with the Orthodox Church and faith and, thus, consider it their mission to transmit to the pupils the positive aspects of the Orthodox Church and the value of religion in general. For example, I quote the following statement by the educational director of Central Macedonia, Georgios D. Karastasios, during a seminar on religious education: I confirm to you once again that the regional educational directorate of Central Macedonia will support any initiative contributing to the strengthening of religious education and to the consolidation of good collaborative relations between school and Church.9

The above description of the Greek church–state relationship in the context of education is typical of the ‘Greek model’ where, as described in Chapter 4, there is no church–state separation. Teacher Training Seminars Teacher training seminars, where teachers can exchange experiences with their colleagues, are a useful space for continuous learning about the teaching of religion and its challenges. I attended as an observer two teacher-training seminars, one organised by the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos (spring 2008) and one offered by the Inter-Orthodox Centre of the Church of Greece (autumn 2009). The objectives of both seminars were to provide religion teachers with modern teaching methods and insight into how the religion class should face the challenges of multicultural society in the European context. The seminars represent two different types of training. The seminar in Volos was taught by four trainers in four intensive all day weekend sessions, while the seminar at the Inter-Orthodox Centre consisted of a series of lectures by different educators scheduled across ten afternoon sessions.

8  Academic seminars on religious education are often organised in cooperation with local church authorities or take place in buildings belonging to the Church. 9  Official website of the Regional Directorate for Primary and Secondary Education in Central Macedonia (http://kmaked.pde.sch.gr/post_12022009.php accessed 26 April 2013).

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Academy for Theological Studies, Spring 2008 Between March and May 2008 the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos organised the first of several annual training seminars for theologically trained secondary school teachers. The seminar was taught by four experienced theologians and secondary school religion teachers, three of whom had co-authored textbooks for the religion class.10 The title of the seminar was ‘Meeting the Needs and Challenges of Religious Education Today: Improving Our Pedagogical Methods’. According to the Academy, there were many more applications than the maximum of 21 places they were able to offer. The teachers who participated in the seminar said that their theological academic training from University did not prepare them for the pedagogical task of teaching. In this context, these openminded seminars, dealing with new teaching methods in religious education, were an entirely new concept and a welcomed initiative. The training seminars covered several themes, including the biblical dimension of the religion class, the concept of a one and essential truth, the need for new and interactive teaching methods, the use of theological texts and the relationship with God. At the opening of the seminar, the Bishop of Volos expressed his pleasure in seeing such a large number of participants. As he said, there is a widespread interest among theologians in bringing religious education up to date. He also noted that the Church has great expectations from the religion class, which is needed now more than ever, because of the rapid changes in people’s lives. He therefore prompted theologians to act not only as teachers, but also as confessors whom the children can trust. He encouraged religion teachers to not ‘take children for granted’ and to show them ‘that there is hope; there is something else; that everything is not what it looks like on the surface’.11 In his view, the religion class is a means to show children the way of the Church so that ‘one day, if they search for the truth, they will find an answer to their existential problems’. Therefore, for the Bishop the religion class evidently constitutes a space for evangelising schoolchildren. The four trainers seemed to share this view of the religion class, at least in the context of this seminar. However, they contested the old-fashioned teaching methods, where teachers were teaching only one version of ‘the truth’. The seminar introduced a more interpretative approach to teaching, one that seeks to actively involve the pupils through the use of alternative and creative learning methods, such as theatrical plays, drawing and collages. The trainers emphasised that religious education has a biblical character. The purpose of the class is to illustrate that the Bible, as ‘a text of witness, calls upon us from a very distant past’ and that the reading of its texts can ‘open the future’. They also noted that the Bible illustrates human feelings, such as anger, love and envy, and argued that it can teach pupils that the essence of human life has not changed throughout history and  Grizopoulou et al (1998).  This and all following quotes in this section stem from my field notes of 22

10 11

March 2008 and 10 May 2008.

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that this is a constant reference point illustrating the fact that there is ‘one truth’. The recurrent theme of the seminar was ‘truth’ and the pupils’ relationship with theological truths and God. Thus, despite the fact that the seminar was considered by the participating theologians as very progressive in the Greek context, it was confessional in the sense that there was only one truth, that of Christianity as it is revealed in the Bible. Teachers participating in the seminar mentioned that there are schools where half of the pupils in the class are not of Greek origin and a teacher criticised not only the confessional but also the catechising nature of the religion class. However, this question was not further discussed in the seminar and what could be called ‘innovative’ aspects of the seminar seemed to be focused mostly on new teaching methods and on the introduction of interactive learning processes, not on making any fundamental changes in the overall approach to religion as a subject matter. The use of authoritative texts in religious education was questioned at the seminar. Instead of teaching pupils that there is only one authoritative theological text (by a Church Father) that interprets the Bible, the predominant view was that there can be several interpretations so that children can learn to be themselves interpreters; in the expression of a trainer: ‘just like a bee gathering honey from several flowers we gather information from various interpretations’. In discussing the authority of theological teaching texts, even the Bible was said to be a text that does not in itself represent the truth because the truth is only that of a transcendent God. Yet, the trainers suggested that pupils should be taught how to bring the Bible into their lives and be able to interpret it on their own, both inside and outside school, because it ‘gives answers to many questions’. Although they said that they do not require pupils to have faith, they still argued that: ‘We [the religion teachers] must make the Gospel a true life lesson’. Beyond the importance of the Bible, the trainers emphasised that it is necessary to teach children not only how vital it is to know the Bible, but also how important it is to live by the Bible, to experience it. The religion class was indicatively referred to as ‘a life lesson’ (μάθημα ζωής) by one of the trainers. The pupils should, therefore, learn that to be a Christian does not simply mean to abide by the rules (not to steal or kill and so on); it is about relationships, notably a special relationship with God that is mirrored through the individual’s relationship with ‘the Other’. Therefore, the religion class should teach pupils that ‘the group is everything and a “lone individual” is a tragic existence’. The participating teachers in the seminar pointed out that the pupils in their classes are not familiar with the Bible and have many prejudices about it. For example, many pupils do not want to learn about the Old Testament because they have been told that ‘it is the story of the Jews’. This reveals a latent anti-Semitism in Greece, which the trainers at the seminar contested; according to their argument, the religion class teaches about Christianity and the Old Testament is relevant only because it is a part of the story of Christianity. The trainers of the seminar suggested that the crisis of the Greek education system is part of a global phenomenon; they referred to two recent French books

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about the crisis of contemporary education, one of them by Régis Debray, a French atheist leftist intellectual, who claims that the teaching of religion is a prerequisite for understanding one’s own culture as well as that of others. Other theologians have used his book as an argument in the debate about the relevance of religious education (Kalaitzidis 2004). Given that Greek leftist intellectuals and politicians usually are strong opponents of the religion class in Greek schools, Debray’s position, representing European leftist intellectual elites, is a solid argument supporting the teaching of religion. However, it is important to note that Debray supports the teaching of religion in relation to a cultural and historical understanding of contemporary society, while the secular intellectuals that are critical to the religion class criticise more specifically the confessional and catechist nature of the class, not the teaching about religion per se. The topic of the last session of the seminar in May 2008 was cross-curricular teaching and pedagogical methods. The general impression among the teachers was that cross-thematic teaching, which was introduced to the Greek school system in 2003 as part of a new national curriculum called DEPPS-APS,12 is almost absent in Greek teaching practices. The teachers considered it very difficult to implement such new and progressive methods of teaching in a school system that functions according to ‘the old system’ of teaching which is based on rigid demarcation lines between school subjects. A teacher said that everyone in the Greek school system – pupils, teachers and parents – expects the continuation of a system of teaching that is well-known and established and that no one would be willing to venture into new and untested teaching methods. Three years after this first seminar I spoke to one of the trainers about the new and very progressive national curriculum, introduced in 2011, that prescribes exclusively the use of new teaching methods. She considered it much too ambitious given the Greek school context, and agreed that the ideas and ideals in the curriculum are good but compared the situation to ‘asking me at my old age to learn to dance ballet – it is impossible’.13 In conclusion, the training seminars in Volos revealed that there are theologians in the Greek school who are willing to apply new teaching methods and who want a modernisation of the Greek education system. Although they have adopted a more progressive mindset, they do not seem to question the purpose of the religion class as a means of transmitting a Christian religious worldview to the pupils. Therefore, what was progressive in this seminar was, not the idea of adopting a secular approach to teaching religion in school, but adopting a less dogmatic, less teacher-focused method aiming at the pupils’ own discovery of the truths and values of the Christian faith. Another progressive aspect was also the importance given to the Bible as a common ecumenical Christian heritage, thus weakening the 12  On the webpage of the Pedagogical Institute, then in charge of developing national curricula, DEPPS-APS refers to a ‘cross-thematic curriculum framework’ (http://www.pischools.gr/programs/depps/index_eng.php accessed 19 June 2013). 13  Informal interview, 27 May 2012.

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focus on Greek Church Fathers and Greek Orthodoxy as a religion distinct from the other Christian denominations.14 Inter-Orthodox Centre of the Church of Greece, Autumn 2009 Between November and December 2009 the Inter-Orthodox Centre of the Church of Greece organised a series of seminars for teachers of religion.15 The Inter-Orthodox Centre is directly under the authority of the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, with the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece as its president. The purpose of the Centre is to work towards dialogue and closer relationships between the Church of Greece and other Orthodox and Christian Churches, but also with other religious traditions, including Judaism, Islam and Buddhism. Because it is an institution under the leadership of the Church, it is expected to be a more conservative and established organisation compared to the Academy in Volos, which is under the Metropolis of Demetrias and known for expressing a progressive theological agenda. This conservatism was apparent in the attitude of the participants in the Athens seminar, where many religion teachers expressed traditionalist views on religious education and on the importance of Orthodoxy in Greece. One participant, who had also attended the seminars in Volos, told me that this was to be expected. The teachers participating in a seminar at the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos are by definition open to progressive thoughts because it is well known that the Academy stands for a progressive theology. In contrast, the teachers participating in the seminars organised at the Inter-Orthodox Centre would be expected to have more traditionalist views because the Centre is under the leadership of the Church of Greece. One would, however, not find teachers expressing extremely conservative views because they would be opposed to any type of inter-faith and ecumenical dialogue by the institutional Church and would not attend a seminar arranged by the Inter-Orthodox Centre.16 The lecture seminars asserted the role of the Church in religious education. Above all, they revealed the existing tensions between traditional and progressive attitudes towards the question of making the religion class less confessional which are highlighted below. In his opening speech to the seminar, the principal  It should be noted that I did not participate in two out of the four seminars, one of which dealt particularly with the Orthodox artistic and cultural heritage, such as icons, architecture and music. 15  To my knowledge most seminars on the teaching of religion in public education are addressed to theologically trained secondary school teachers, but this seminar was also open to primary school teachers. Primary school teachers teach all subjects, including religion, apart from English, computer and physical education classes. 16  Extreme Orthodox conservatives clashed with Archbishop Christodoulos, despite the fact he was in favour of cultivating a traditional role of Orthodoxy in Greek society, when in 2001 he welcomed Pope John Paul in Athens and in 2006 he visited Pope Benedict in Rome, thus showing a willingness for reconciliation between the Churches. 14

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pedagogical advisor Stavros Yangazoglou said that ‘religious education is at a crossroads’ and emphasised that the Church, under the leadership of Archbishop Ieronymos, ‘intends to cooperate with the education sector’.17 Angelos Valianatos, a school advisor in Athens, pointed out that ‘the Church is a hospitable space of freedom; here we are interested in religious education and everything can be discussed in the Church’. From the outset, this seminar clearly indicated that the Orthodox Church, as an institution and a faith community, constitutes the overall framework of religious education in the Greek school. The threat of eliminating the religion class or changing the content of religious education usually acts as a firm determination to cling to the traditional values and practices of the past. This tendency was illustrated in Chapter 4 with reference to Konstantinos Cholevas’ book Greek Orthodox Education in the Twentieth Century and the traditionalist blog thriskeftiká (thriskeftika.blogspot.com). This was also visible in the seminar at the Inter-Orthodox Centre. For example, the strategy of openness and dialogue proclaimed by Stavros Yangazoglou, the advisor of the Pedagogical Institute, in his opening speech prompted defensive reactions by some participants in the seminar at the Inter-Orthodox Centre. Yangazoglou further stated that religious education is held down by two weights from the past [which it should be relieved of]: one is the catechist legacy from the pietistic organisations and the other is the equation of Greek national with Orthodox religious identity […] The future class is a class of openness and dialogue where the pupils learn about other religions too.

Some teachers at the seminar were very sceptical towards this model because they feared that, by learning about other religions, ‘everything will get mixed up in the child’s mind’. One teacher feared the pupils’ loss of identity in encountering something foreign; she claimed that it is of crucial importance to know one’s own fixed place: the patristic tradition that the pupils should get to know before they become acquainted with any other religious tradition. Otherwise, she claimed, schools will run the risk of creating confused children. She thus pleaded that at least in primary school, pupils should not learn about other religions, arguing in favour of a monocultural perception of identity along the principle that ‘schoolchildren have to learn their mother tongue first before learning other languages’. Yangazoglou tried to alleviate this fear with the reassurance that ‘I am not saying that they should become what they learn about (i.e. the other religions)’ and ‘one does not stop existing because one opens up towards the Other’. A conflict developed between two views: on the one hand, the teachers who disputed the idea of teaching other religions, asking ‘what has come over us that we have to point it out to them [i.e. the existence of different religions]?’, and, on the other hand, 17  This and all following quotes in this section stem from my field notes of 14 November 2009.

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the advisor of the Pedagogical Institute, who emphasised the necessity of teaching children ‘that he who is different does exist’ emphasising that ‘in Orthodoxy there is a possibility of developing an open identity’ because ‘we have not been an imperialist religion’. Trying to bridge the gap between progressive and sceptical attitudes, Yangazoglou used an image of the confessional class as a table where only the Orthodox can eat while the foreigners have to sit outside hungry. His vision of the class is that all schoolchildren should be able to sit at the same table and learn about religion together, regardless of their cultural or religious background. In trying to persuade the sceptical teachers that the public school cannot continue to teach Orthodoxy in a confessional way, Yangazoglou also referred to a bishop who had declared that, since the Church has lost the young generation, it has to look outwards, to go meet children in school.18 According to Yangazoglou, this attitude is wrong because catechism can only be taught by the Church itself: ‘catechising is a very serious matter that cannot be carried out in school. A pupil’s faith is not a school subject that can be graded; only knowledge and critical sense can be graded’. An elderly teacher complained that ‘many teachers today do not even make the sign of the cross during the morning prayer, and the pupils’ parents do not go to church on Sunday mornings because they sleep in’, and then asked: ‘so how are the pupils going to have a religious experience when the adults around them don’t experience it themselves?’ Again, the traditionalist teachers expressed hope in religious education as the last stronghold before a total decay of modern society. There were several religiously devout teachers in the seminar who obviously felt their religious identity threatened by the new ways of teaching religion; they felt especially threatened by specific groups in society, such as atheists and ‘Europeanisers’, but also by the Ministry of Education and the Pedagogical Institute. One teacher put it like this: ‘it is as if there is a group of wise scientists and politicians who want to tell the ignorant villagers how things are supposed to be’. Another argued that he thought the religion class should concentrate on teaching Orthodoxy and that the religious education lesson should not cover other religions since other classes (not mentioning which) could deal with the multicultural aspects of society. The advisor of the Pedagogical Institute responded that he was often misunderstood and that until now a genuine discussion about the future of the religious education class had been impossible because of the deep divisions between different camps that rigidly oppose each other. This comment made two female teachers express their support for teaching other religions: one argued that schoolchildren are already used to meeting classmates from immigrant and different religious backgrounds in primary school; the other suggested that it

18  Indirectly this is what Metropolitan Ignatios had implied in his opening speech at the seminar in Volos referred to above. However, the bishop Yangazoglou referred to in the seminar had expressed himself much more directly.

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would be much easier to teach other religions in secondary school if pupils have already been acquainted with the topic in primary school. Conclusion Based on field research, this chapter has attempted to draw a picture of how theologically trained religion teachers in contemporary Greece conceive of the subject matter they teach and the general conditions of the Greek school system. From the teacher interviews, it is obvious that they teach under difficult conditions due to a school system that is in need of modernisation, both in technological and pedagogical terms. In such difficult circumstances, religion teachers find that they have an important role to play in supporting schoolchildren (as school counsellors) or in helping them find a religious dimension in their lives and open themselves to the Christian message (as spiritual guides). The chapter also offered an account of two training seminars for religion teachers. Although the seminars illustrated various approaches to the religion class, they also revealed the challenges created by the introduction of new progressive teaching methods. The seminars clearly showed that both traditional and progressive religion teachers and educators want to be able to communicate an Orthodox Christian message through the religion class, but the means they choose to do this are very different. One can speak of two teaching strategies or approaches to cope with religious education and Orthodox Christianity in particular. The traditional teachers fear plurality and want to keep religious education free from anything foreign. They are open to new teaching methods as long as the Christian foundation of the religion is kept intact. The progressive teachers, in particular trainers and advisors, believe that the Christian message will become more resilient by embracing plurality and including what is considered foreign; they see this as the only way to safeguard the religion class as a relevant subject in contemporary education.

Chapter 6

The Religion Class: Between a National, European and Multicultural Awareness Participants in the public debate on religious education in Greece include academics from theological schools and secondary school teachers (theologians), as well as other Greek intellectual figures (such as philologists, sociologists and historians), members of the Church hierarchy and politicians. In this chapter, I focus my analysis of the debate on contributions from theologians and other intellectuals. I will begin with a short discussion on the diversity of the debate itself. Diversity in the Debate During my research in 2008 and 2009, I did not come across any seminars, organised debates or other public events that involved the participation of other religious groups, such as minority religions, or atheists. Thus, as argued by Sakellariou (2009), there seem to be mechanisms within Greek society and public debates that render the religious ‘Other’ invisible. Although certain participants in the debates indicated that religious pluralism also comprises religious indifference and atheism, there have been no suggestions for teaching agnosticism or atheism as legitimate subjects in a new religion class. The focus on the challenge of religious diversity in the teaching of religion in public education could therefore be interpreted as a way to somehow put aside a possible growing atheism and religious indifference in Greek society. Recognising the indifference of most pupils towards religion would further strengthen arguments that religious consciousness does not need to be taught as a subject in its own right, thus, suggesting the abolition of the religion class which, of course, is not in the interest of theologians from both a professional and an ideological perspective. In the same vein, there is no proposal that explicitly considers the possibility of teaching a psychology or sociology of religion class as a means of understanding the way social and economic structures shape society, including its religious institutions. The largely elitist and intellectual debates that have taken place seem to lack any consideration for the societal dimension of religious education. The largely theological view of religious education in Greece, no matter how traditional or progressive it is, perhaps relates to the fact that theologians have a special interest in maintaining the theological character of religious education in public schools. For the past four decades, the theological faculties of Athens and Thessaloniki have produced large numbers of theologians whose main occupational mission is teaching religion in

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secondary education. Hence, we cannot overlook the professional interests lying behind the claims for a religion class based on a theological approach. That said, there can be no doubt that most of the new proposals for a renewed religion class over the past 13 years are serious proposals that have taken into consideration European and international developments in religious education; they are also based on the idea that an open-minded knowledge of religion is a prerequisite to navigating in contemporary societies. In terms of research studies and data on religious education in Greece, it is worth noting that there is no research data on public receptions of the current and proposed models of the religion class. Furthermore, there is no research data on immigrants’ attitudes to the religion class and the lack of immigrant or other religious minority voices in the debate further indicate the inward orientation of Greek definitions of religious and educational values. As such, the debate on religious education seems to be more related to century-old discussions on the identity of modern Greece and the country’s relationship to Western European modernisation than to current debates about contemporary religious and cultural diversity. Although the arguments for the various perspectives on religious education are framed as part of a European discussion on the challenges of religious diversity and multiculturalism, the religious diversity that is being debated in Greece is first and foremost about the internal diversity of Greekness and the different ways of being a Greek citizen. The presence of the religious ‘Other’ seems to some extent to have acted as a pretext for re-examining the religious and cultural foundations of Greek (Orthodox) identity. This explains the superficial position of the religious ‘Other’ in the debate.1 When analysing the debate on religious education one may ask how immigrants and religious minorities can benefit from the suggested improvements to the religion class, especially given their social and economic marginalisation in Greek society. Therefore, although attempts towards a more inclusive education can have a positive effect on minorities,2 an improved religion class is unlikely to make a difference in their social or economic position in Greek society. Cultivating a more tolerant attitude towards cultural difference a renewed religion class will perhaps help creating a less xenophobic climate in Greek society, thus indirectly improving the social position of minorities. Native Greek schoolchildren can perhaps benefit from a more inclusive religion class, since it can provide them with tools to navigate in an increasingly plural and changing world and since the current religious education is much too focused on the past to provide future Greek citizens with a useful understanding of their present: 1  This is, however, not the case in the interviews with religion teachers who have firsthand experience of the highly pluralistic composition of pupils in schools. 2  A recent example is the 132nd primary school in Athens, where inclusive pedagogical strategies from 2000–2007 created increased social integration of immigrant children and their parents (Protonotariou and Haravitsidis 2007). The implementation of the new strategies was, however, stopped by the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, because according to the Ministry they were not in accordance with Greek school regulations.

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The attempt to save collective memory through homogenised religious instruction, whose gaze is continuously turned towards the past, cancels all attempts to reach an understanding of the present in its real dimensions precisely because its hermeneutical frame is inflexible, providing only one version of reality as absolute and prevailing. (Karamouzis 2007: 90)

The proposals for a religion class that takes into account the challenges of religious pluralism and of Greece’s integration into the European framework are proposals of a non-confessional religion class. These proposals are discussed below. Three Perspectives in the Religion Class Debate Based on my analysis of the different voices in the debate on the religion class, as they have manifested themselves in journal articles and other public contributions, I have developed a thematic typology of three prevailing perspectives.3 These perspectives or approaches are practical proposals for the further development of the curriculum of the religion class. As we saw in Chapter 4, the mission of the religion class has been typically the safeguarding of Greek culture, thus developing a national (Greek) awareness and/or a religious (Greek Orthodox) awareness. Although this perspective is often referred to in the debate as the traditional confessional or the catechist version of the religion class, certain relatively progressive views will be presented in the first part of the following section. Apart from the traditional perspective, I have chosen to focus on two more progressive perspectives proposing a religion class that is based either on Greece’s role in the development of the European cultural and Christian heritage (‘European awareness’ perspective) or on interfaith and intercultural dialogue and reflexivity (‘intercultural awareness’ perspective). The National/Religious Awareness Perspective The foundations of Greek culture rest on a national master narrative of a culture under constant threat (Dragonas 1997: 80–94). Since the homogenisation of a very diverse population was one of the core foundations of nineteenth-century Greek nation-building, diversity is perceived as a threat to Greek culture. In this context, there is a latent theme of a threatening Turkification and Europeanisation.4 The national/religious awareness perspective is based on three arguments: ‘cultural  The analysis presented in this chapter is based on a collection of published articles from newspapers and theological or educational journals and published papers from seminars and workshops organised by theologians between 2001 and 2010. 4  During the late 1980s and 1990s, there was a widespread belief that Greece and ‘authentic Greek culture’ was in danger of decay, for example the book Finis Graeciae by Christos Yannaras (1987). Greek culture was perceived under ‘threat’ after its integration 3

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memory’, Hellenism as a defensive and assimilation strategy, and the concept of Helleno-Christianity. The idea of cultural memory is very prevalent in the current discourse on religious education and refers to the idea of religion as memory, as suggested by the title of a book by Daniele Hervieu-Léger (La religion pour mémoire).5 A representative illustration of this theme is the view of a religion teacher I interviewed who attributed the persistence of the traditional confessional religion class to the parents’ wish for their children to learn about Orthodoxy as part of Greek history. According to the teacher, the adult generations in Greece still wish to pay tribute to the Orthodox Church as a way of showing gratitude for its role as guardian of the Greek language and identity under Ottoman rule and during the war of independence. Another argument is that because parents do not spend enough time with their children, it is even more important for the school to provide pupils with ‘steady values’ by teaching them the religious tradition of older generations. In this sense, traditional religious education expresses nostalgia for the ‘good old days’, when adults supposedly had more time and the family unit was still intact.6 This discourse was illustrated in Chapter 4 through the views of Cholevas and the blog thriskeftiká (thriskeftika.blogspot.com). Another argument for preserving a Greek-centred perspective in religious education is that it is a great way to Hellenise non-Greek and non-Orthodox pupils, as part of a general assimilation strategy towards immigration and foreign influences. According to this perspective, immigrants living in Greece will become philhellenes, just as foreigners have always done since Isocrates (436–338 BC), saying that ‘men are called Hellenes because they have shared our common education rather than share our common ethnic origin’. Dimitris Natsios, a primary school teacher and author of several articles, who put forward this universalist understanding of Greek culture, also applies the cultural threat discourse when he says that Greek children should be reminded that they belong to a ‘lonely and brotherless’ nation. He declares that the Slavs, Arabs and Franks7 amount to millions of people, and so his argumentation develops into a narrative of Greeks as a chosen people of God: into the European Economic Community (1981), by the increasing influx of western tourists and from military conflict with neighbouring Turkey. 5  Hervieu-Léger (2000) attributes great importance to the aspect of collective memory in religious traditions. She has used the term ‘chain of memory’ to explain how religions can play a role in modern secular societies. In Greece, religion comes to serve the national myth that reproduces a collective national identity. Molokotos-Liederman (2004: 493) underlines the crucial role played of national education, generation after generation, in the service of reproducing an ethno-religious synthesis. 6  Interview, male religion teacher, May 2008. 7  In Greece, Western European people are often referred to as ‘Franks’, a remnant of the Crusades led by Franks and the conquest of parts of what are now Greek territory by Franks in the thirteenth century.

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Lonely and few in numbers, without brothers or relatives in other peoples, we cannot count on the honest help of anyone, we will not find support from any others but the Church fathers who for centuries with their sacrifices have passed on from one generation to the next the faith that salves us in the Church. […] If we lose this faith we lose everything since our national raison d’être disappears. (Natsios 2009)

The above-mentioned argument of Hellenism as an assimilating mechanism is coupled with religion, hence the concept of Helleno-Christianity, as already explained in Chapter 3. It became the raison d’être of the Greek nation and is, thus, grounded in its relationship with the Church and the Orthodox faith that have been safeguarded by the Greek Church fathers. The idea of understanding the Greek people’s special relationship with God was illustrated in Chapter 4 through an excerpt from a language exercise book. Other cultural and historical influences on the foundation of the Greek nation are ignored in this way and only an exclusive Christian Orthodox perspective of the past is thought to represent and reproduce the national community. The above example of Greek isolation is extreme in a sense, but it is widely reproduced in non-academic circles. The idea of Hellenism as an assimilating mechanism can be found in an open letter to Aris Spiliotopoulos, the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs (2007–2009), signed by a group of university professors (University Professors Initiative Group 2009). The professors were from the faculties of law, education, philology, polytechnics and dentistry, but most of them signed as Emeritus Professors. In their letter, they argued that religion must remain a mandatory class in school because knowing one’s own culture is a prerequisite to getting acquainted with other cultures. Again, the culturally and religiously diverse composition of the pupils is put aside: It is only by knowing our country’s specific character that you may be able to understand foreign religious and cultural traditions and compare them to our own. Knowledge of the Orthodox Christian heritage is not in opposition to the requirements of pluralism, polyphony and multiculturalism; in fact these are precisely its foundations. Therefore, its [the confessional religion class] mandatory nature does not revoke, but it rather seals respect towards different beliefs. All the more so because Greek space has always been open to foreign stimuli and throughout its historical course it has experienced a long coexistence with other races and religions. […] The crucial words of Odysséas Elýtis refer to this ecumenical wealth and Orthodox heritage: “It is the only way in which we can once again become Greek Europeans; by contributing and not by borrowing… With respect for the achievements of others, but also with awareness of the wealth that streams incessantly from a hidden source within us”. (University Professors Initiative Group 2009)

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Although these examples seem unprejudiced and open towards what is foreign, they nevertheless still seem to adopt an ethnocentric approach to education. In both cases, there is a discourse of fear and betrayal from within the nation. What is foreign is not invoked as a threat itself, as much as Greek compatriots who are at risk of betraying the distinct foundation of the nation, namely its Orthodox Christian heritage. These voices in the debate – supported by influential figures such as George Babiniotis (2007: 105–111), the former rector of the University of Athens and Minister of Education (March 2012–May 2012), and Father Georgios Metallinos (2009), the former dean of the Faculty of Theology in Athens – do not seem to take into account the increasing cultural and religious diversity of pupils in Greek schools today. Their attempts to preserve and reinvoke the past order of things reveal not only a view of a diversity that threatens this established norm, but also a conviction that diversity can be ignored or overcome by insisting on the preservation of a homogeneous and exclusive version of cultural and religious identity in Greece. Apparently, the proponents of a confessional Orthodox Christian religion class wish to preserve the national Greek cultural heritage rather than develop the pupils’ general religious consciousness, which is the stated aim of the Greek Constitution. There are, however, relatively progressive voices that are not in favour of a religion class that develops national/religious awareness. Instead, they propose a religion class as a way to develop the pupils’ religious consciousness through the mission of the Church, i.e. a confessional class. For example, Petros Vasiliadis (2010), Professor of Theology at the University of Thessaloniki, believes that ‘[r]eligious education through the religion class can – and certainly must – serve the mission and service [diakonía] of the Church since those who teach it, notably theologians, are the prophetic theological voice [of the Church]’ (emphasis in original, no pages). Vasiliadis presupposes that a theologian teacher is also an Orthodox believer (‘by extrapolation’) so the issue of religious education is not a question of a catechist versus a knowledge-based teaching of religion, but one about the method with which the teacher ‘ought to present his witness to the contemporary multicultural society’. Despite Vasiliadis’ claim that the religion class must serve the mission of the Church, he believes that pupils from other denominations and religions can be present in the class because they ‘should not be mistaken for objects of Christian mission, but seen as participants in a dialogue aiming at cooperatively founding (…) the Kingdom of God in the world’ (ibid., emphasis in original). Certainly, this perception of both the pupils and the religion class work is based on the view that every human being has or belongs to a religion or in some way is receptive to religion. Therefore, Vasiliadis’ views represent a perspective of the religion class as a class that aims towards the development of religious awareness rather than national awareness.

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The European Awareness Perspective The European awareness perspective is based on the need for modernisation of both the Greek educational system and the religion class, which are at the core of the debate on religious education. The proponents of the European awareness perspective claim that a confessional or ethnocentric religious education should be modernised and changed to a ‘legitimate and updated’ religion class in a ‘Greek school as part of a united Europe’ (Grizopoulou 2002: 62). Grizopoulou, a theologian and author of religion textbooks, takes this argument further by insisting that the aim of teaching religion ‘is to enrich the subject matter of our [religion] class and to converge creatively with Europe, without removing our specificity’ (ibid.: 66). This European focus in the debate over religious education is part of a century-long debate about the extent of Greece’s belonging to in a (Western) European cultural framework imagined as modern, secular and progressive. As Zoumboulakis (2006) sardonically remarks regarding the religion class: The abolition of the class is the first thing mentioned by most people, e.g. journalists, various intellectuals, professors, parents or pupils, all full of joy that, in this synoptic way, they are given a chance to prove their progressive mindset, their modern and innovative spirit, the freshness of their mind. (Zoumboulakis 2006: 234)

According to Zoumboulakis, the author of several essays, editor of a classic literary journal and director of the Greek Bible Society, the religion class issue relates to doubts over its general education value. He claims that a European school that does not teach about Christianity is unthinkable among those who believe that education is much more than merely teaching skills and a space for positive enculturation (ibid.). He, therefore, advocates a religion class based on the Old and New Testaments recognised as holy texts by the three monotheistic religions, texts that have been crucial in shaping the European cultural heritage. In his view, the focus of the religion class could be expanded from the Eastern and Greek Orthodox tradition to a general Christian and European tradition. Zoumboulakis also argues that the value of essential cultural texts, such as the Bible and the works of Classical Greece, are much needed today in order to counter-balance the ongoing emphasis on the market value of technical skills at the expense of an education based on the spiritual and cultural values of Europe (ibid.). Thus, Zoumboulakis’ proposal, known as ‘the religion class as a biblical class’, seems to be driven by a wish to integrate Greek education into a larger European tradition. Similarly, Konstantinos Delikonstantis, professor in theology at the University of Athens, believes that in the framework of a European dimension of education, ‘religious education should become an important mission as the leading class on European identity and culture’ (2005: 50). In his work, Kalaitzidis advocates the separation of the Church from public education according to the theological principle of separating the ‘the kingdom of

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Caesar from the kingdom of God’ (2005b: 158–60). He further argues that because of the ongoing pace of modernisation and globalisation, and Greece’s integration in the broad European context, such separation is even more important. He claims that ‘Greece is no longer an Orthodox country; it is a meta-Orthodox, metaChristian [country]’ (Kalaitzidis 2005b: 161) and consequently the catechist work of the Church does not belong in public school (Kalaitzidis 2009b). In his view, the current religion class consists of a confessional-catechist class and is therefore ‘a remnant of a different era’ giving the impression that Greece is an un-modern country that does not belong to the spirit of European integration: The existence of the religion class in primary and secondary education, with its character of an exclusively Orthodox catechistic confessional class, constitutes a remnant of another era and […] a paradigm that is foreign to the preconditions of Orthodox culture and ecclesiastical catechism. Simultaneously, a class of this type seems to constitute a foreign body and a howling discord in the educational programme of the contemporary democratic European school. (Kalaitzidis 2001b: 39)

In the above quotation Kalaitzidis seems to also make a theological argument for changing the character of the religion class, namely that in its current form it is not in accordance with ‘the preconditions of Orthodox culture’, which he considers to be openness and tolerance towards the Other. Developing an argument that combines a concern for a European outlook for Greece (in Greek education) and a concern for an authentic (not foreign) Orthodox culture, he attempts to overcome a discourse that views the Orthodox Christian religion class as a safeguard against the threaten of Europeanisation or westernisation to Orthodox culture and Greek national identity, as it is presented by traditionalist as Cholevas (2007). The modernisation and Europeanisation of the religion class is, according to Kalaitzidis, in harmony with the Orthodox principle church–state separation. The Church, therefore, should undertake its own catechist work, so that the State can fulfil its educational mission. Kalaitzidis (2001b) further argues that the model of religious education he proposes ‘refers to multiculturalism and post-modernity, where any kind of Orthodox “historical privileges” of supremacy are no longer sustainable’ (Kalaitzidis 2001b: 45). Despite the reference to ‘multiculturalism’, Kalaitzidis, just like Zoumboulakis, believes that the greatest challenge for the religion class in Greece is Greece’s position and role in the European context, rather than the multicultural composition of Greek society. The proposal for a renewed religion class with a European perspective, thus, rests firmly on the necessity of teaching about the religious and cultural foundations of Europe as a whole, rather than focusing only on the Greek religious and cultural tradition. Despite his clearly European focus, Kalaitzidis’ proposal for a mandatory cultural class on religion is still based on the ‘cultural contribution of theology and Orthodoxy’ and its ‘unifying and legitimate elements’ in a European perspective:

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[Orthodoxy] has contributed to shaping Greek and European cultural identity, that is, the cultural wealth that we teach in school. In our view, this is the only way to justify the inclusion of the religion class as mandatory in the curricula of the secular school. (Kalaitzidis 2005b: 158).

Therefore, a European awareness perspective does not necessarily imply that the religion class will have as its core topic the religious traditions of Europe, but that the teaching of the Eastern Orthodox tradition (by Orthodox theologians) will take place in a European framework. Despite his European focus and proposal for religious education as a class about culture, Kalaitzidis still seems to insist on the centrality of Christian Orthodox religious values: The argument […] is that the pupils should become familiar with the Orthodox tradition but also acquainted with the world of other religions. In this difficult work, the incorporation of intercultural elements and the reminder of the ecumenical spirit of Orthodoxy may work very positively in this respect. (ibid.: 185)

In addition to the idea of an ‘ecumenical Orthodoxy’, Kalaitzidis advocates for the incorporation of ‘intercultural elements’ in the religion class. This suggests that his overall religious education proposal, known as ‘The religion class as a cultural class’ (2005b) also fits the intercultural awareness perspective, but his point of departure, grounded in the spirit of a specific religion (Orthodoxy), and his prioritisation of the European context suggest that it seems to be less directed towards a truly intercultural awareness perspective and more founded on a European awareness perspective. The Intercultural Awareness Perspective The multicultural, intercultural or interfaith perspective covers such a variety of proposals that the term ‘perspective’ may seem a misnomer. The proponents of these proposals seem to share in common two key features: embracing the theme of otherness and rejecting the religion-nation link. They embrace the theme of otherness [ετερότητα] as an inherent feature of contemporary plural societies and subsequently question the idea of a special relationship between a specific religion and single national identity. Certain proposals within the intercultural awareness perspective take as a point of departure a Christian (Orthodox) interpretation of otherness, that is, a theological approach focused on Christ as the representation of otherness (in the Bible Christ is referred to as a foreigner or a guest) encouraging Christians to welcome and see the Other as ‘the image of God’. Other such proposals are similar to the values of cosmopolitanism (Nussbaum 2002) since they share in common the ideas of individual responsibility towards a global community of citizens:

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The religion class according to an intercultural awareness perspective is not meant to be confessional, even if the arguments in favour of the class are often based on Christian Orthodox theology. The idea of a ‘theology of otherness’, founded on the Bible and the Church Fathers, is based on the idea of ‘mutual respect, recognition and peaceful coexistence with religious or any other type of otherness’ (Yangazoglou 2005: 135). The proposals of the intercultural awareness perspective seem to have two interrelated agendas, one ideological and one practical. Its proponents are focused on the idea of a religion class that teaches a true and socially useful understanding of ‘an Orthodox approach’ in a multicultural society. They also argue that the religion class must remain mandatory as long as it does not constitute a violation of the pupils’ right to religious freedom, thereby ensuring its relevance in modern society and the continued employment of theologians as teachers of religious education. Stavros Yangazoglou, the principal advisor of the Pedagogical Institute, has been fighting for the ‘survival’ of religious education, arguing that the religion class should remain mandatory and be taught only by theologians. He maintains that it is important for the religion class to change in order to avoid the risk of marginalisation by new cross-thematic teaching methods8 and especially (secular) intercultural education (ibid.: 136). Yangazoglou pleads for a non-confessional, but mandatory and integrated religion class, which is nevertheless still grounded in an Orthodox theological framework and taught by Orthodox theologians. His vision is that the theology of multiculturalism should not only generally inspire religious education but permeate it so that the class becomes a pioneer within intercultural education, thus a testament to the truth and quality of human life and the world. (Yangazoglou 2005: 136).

Yangazoglou further claims that the religion class should illustrate the ecumenical elements of Orthodoxy and not its various ethnophyletisms (ibid.: 137).9 8  The cross-thematic curricula framework, DEPPS-APS, introduced in 2003 (see also Chapter 5) implies cooperation across school subjects and a possible blurring of clear subject demarcations. This blurring adds to theologians’ fears of becoming obsolete in the school system if religion can be taught in the framework of other subjects such as history or geography. 9  The term ‘ethnophyletism’ was introduced by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1872 to condemn the establishment of an ethnically defined Bulgarian Exarchate. Today the term is used to distinguish nationally based Orthodox Christianity from its ecumenical version

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Therefore, Orthodox theology in the religion class is to be presented as a Christian contribution to ‘the development of globality’10 (a global culture) that is respectful of difference and diversity: Orthodox theology in particular, which has a different tradition in its historical trajectory and is not burdened by a “more or less imperialist record in the history of mission” as is the case of the Christian West, can cooperate creatively and turn towards a globality that respects difference and otherness. […] The ideas of exclusiveness and God’s chosen people that have slipped into the local autocephalous churches used to identify their hypostasis with a nation or a state, cannot express the truth and catholicity of the Church. (Yangazoglou 2006: 13; emphasis in original)

The political and professional motivations of Stavros Yangazoglou are, as we have seen, obvious since, as an official stakeholder of religious education vis-à-vis the Minister of Education, he must justify and defend his own and his colleagues’ legitimate right to teach the religion class. Therefore, he has articulated a number of arguments for retaining the theological foundation of religious education into a mandatory religion class for pupils of all religious and secular affiliations. Furthermore, Yangazoglou, as the principle advisor of the Pedagogical Institute, has been in charge of developing the new curricula that were introduced in 2011. These new curricula will be analysed in their own right in Chapter 7. The argument of a ‘theology of otherness’ (Yangazoglou 2006) or a ‘theology of multiculturalism’ (Yangazoglou 2005: 135) claims that Orthodox theology is essentially an inclusive theology which embraces the Other, regardless whether he is atheist, agnostic, indifferent or belonging to different religious traditions. This argument approaches religious diversity from a specific (Orthodox Christian) theological framework so it cannot be described as a religiously neutral approach. I also distinguish the work of another theologian, Koukounaras-Liagis (2009) who has developed an approach to religious education that raises the pupils’ awareness of cultural and religious diversity without invoking a specific moral or religious (theological) code for coping with such diversity. His hypothesis is that the religion class in Greece can contribute to intercultural communication by focusing on interfaith encounters through the interactive learning processes of represented by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul or more broadly by the Christian ecumenical movement. 10  The Archbishop of Tirana, Durrës and All Albania Anastasios (2005), who also uses the term ‘globality’, is a proponent of what he calls the creative opportunities that lie in Orthodoxy’s spirit of dialogue to other religions and to the processes of globalisation. It is characteristic that such a voice comes from a church hierarch under the Ecumenical Patriarch’s authority. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of bishops from the Church of Greece use predominantly negative terms to refer to globalisation, as did the Archbishop of Greece, Christodoulos (1998–2008).

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theatre pedagogy. It is remarkable that Koukounaras-Liagis, who has worked as a theologically trained secondary school teacher, does not include any Orthodox theological aspects in his approach since he seems to be willing to give up the privileged status of Orthodoxy in the Greek education system. This approach, thus, appears as the most radical among those made by other theologians in the Greek context. On the one hand, his approach aims to sensitise young citizens to religious phenomena thus developing the pupils’ religious awareness which is a constitutional requirement of public education in Greece. Yet, at the same time, because his approach is focused on being aware of the pupils’ cultural background, it is better characterised as an intercultural awareness perspective since the aim is not to develop the pupils’ personal or collective religious awareness but to enhance their ability to deal with diversity and otherness in diverse societies: Cross-cultural religious education is not an interfaith education because it cultivates cross-cultural perspectives and not one religion or the dialogue between religions; thus its objective is the type of culture that is created by the religions and not the faith in them. Therefore, [the class] provides knowledge about a religion (including the dogma and worship practices) and encourage active learning from it. [The class] is associated with the experience of pupils regardless of their faith in one religion or in no religion. It does not presuppose faith and it does not place any such personal issues at the centre, it only deals with phenomena that derive from faith. (Koukounaras-Liagis 2010)

We also note the proposals by the sociologist of religion Polykarpos Karamouzis, and the theologian and religion teacher Spyridoula Athanasopoulou-Kypriou. The former advocates an ‘interfaith education’ (2007) and his contribution consists of an interpretation of the religion class that seems to have moved beyond the usual religious/theological, national or European-centred perspectives: The interfaith instruction […] undertakes a dialogue between religions as well as with non-religious philosophical traditions… Interfaith dialogue […] develops gradually in all the developmental stages of the child – cognitive, intellectual and psychosomatic – having the confidence in the concept of difference and in the encounter with it, based on the pluralist character of knowledge, without being confined exclusively to religious perspectives. […] The school does not adopt beforehand a specific religious perspective; it attempts to understand religious views through the presence of a pluralism of ideas. (Karamouzis 2007: 62–3)

Karamouzis further suggests that the aim of a comparative teaching of religions be the development of ‘a universal ethic’ (ibid.: 128–42) and he underlines his ‘cosmopolitan’ approach to the religion class with a citation from philosopher Martha Nussbaum that claims an education that cultivates critical thought, a plural conception of the world and its peoples, and, finally, strengthens the ability of sympathy (ibid.: 143). Karamouzis concludes that ‘the school today is perhaps the

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only institution that can guarantee a substantial reinterpretation of religions based on respect for human rights’ (ibid.: 64).11 Karamouzis’ assessment is similar to the view of Athanasopoulou-Kypriou, who suggests that the religion class must ‘be developed on the normative basis of human rights and democratic principles’ (Athanasopoulou-Kypriou 2006: 1002). Athanasopoulou-Kypriou further states that religious education can only be legitimate when it ‘encourages the civic virtues that are necessary in a contemporary, plural society’. She underlines that public dialogue is the foremost civic virtue and, therefore, religious education should aim to develop the pupils’ ability to take active part in public dialogue and to teach them to express their own claims in a clear secular language and to listen to the views of other individuals and groups. However, she concludes that the religion class, in order to be legitimate, must be taught in separate classes: For pupils belonging to a religion there will be a compulsory separate class of religious education with a theological character and with elements of religious studies and philosophy. The same accounts for the atheists and those who are indifferent to religion who will be provided a religious studies and philosophy class with elements of theological thought. The religious education will be controlled by the state authorities which will guarantee the respect of human rights and help develop the civic virtues. […] Theology will be responsible for the reflexive processes of the religious pupils, while philosophy will be responsible for the reflexivity of those who are non-religious. (ibid.: 1001).

According to Athanasopoulou-Kypriou’s more philosophical perspective, this is necessary in order to ensure the respect of religious freedom since religious pupils have the right to religious education from within their own faith just as non-religious pupils have the right to education of religion from a neutral perspective. However, the separation of pupils according to religious belief is problematic because in an attempt to respect the right to ‘one’s own’ religious education, the pupils’ right to religious freedom may be violated because their participation in a religious or non-religious (philosophical) class will be automatically dictated by the parents’ wish. It is also questionable how truly intercultural or interfaith-based a religious education can be if the pupils are separated into several classes according to their (family’s) religious belonging. Furthermore, if the pupils are separated how can they learn to engage in public dialogue? This proposal illustrates quite clearly the challenges of respecting individual religious freedom while at the same time maintaining a certain degree of social cohesion.

 The proposal of Karamouzis deserves a more detailed presentation and analysis, however, since he does not present himself as a theologian (he has a BA in theology), but rather as a sociologist of religion his contribution lies outside this chapter’s focus on new proposals for the religion class from a theological point of view. 11

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Conclusion This chapter presented three perspectives in the debate on religious education. The national awareness perspective corresponds to the traditionalist view of the role of Orthodoxy in education as presented in Chapter 4. According to this view, Orthodoxy and the religion class are the guardians of the Greek national identity, but can also become vehicles for integration of foreigners by assimilating them into the Greek nation and turning them into philhellenes. The European awareness perspective supposedly puts aside the religious consciousness of the pupils in favour of focusing on religion as a cultural legacy in Greece and in Europe. Finally, the proponents of the intercultural awareness perspective advocate a religion class based on cultural and religious diversity that is used as a platform for the purpose of teaching pupils how to navigate in culturally diverse societies. Even if this class is envisioned as non-confessional, many of the proponents of this perspective argue that the religion class should be taught from the point of view of an ‘open Orthodox theology’ by theologically trained teachers. In this context, many contemporary theologians have used progressive academic concepts, such as ‘fluid and multiple identities’ and ‘construction of otherness’, in an attempt to demonstrate how these ‘modern’ concepts are fully compatible with the Christian faith. However, their approaches are still grounded on an exclusively religious and Christian tradition. The aim of contemporary theologians advocating the European and intercultural perspectives is to distance religious education from the national identity paradigm. Their goals seem to be in accordance with social scientists who have also criticised the national identity paradigm for its exclusiveness and its allusions to a nineteenth-century romantic perception of national identity (Frangoudaki and Dragonas 1997). Although the aim of progressive theologians and secular social scientists may be similar, their underlying motives are very different. Secular social scientists advocate a public education system emancipated from the aggressive and romantic nationalism of nineteenth-century ideals of national purity and exclusiveness. They also advocate a secular public education on European standards of inclusive education inspired by human rights without any exclusive reference to a specific religious faith. The origins of their proposal can be found in their vision of a cosmopolitan Greek state based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination (Karamouzis 2007: 64). Some progressive theologians similarly advocate a public education without any firm national grounding, but from the perspective of the Christian principle of equality in God. Even though their proposals for a renewal of the religion class in Greece are progressive, their point of view remains deeply theological and their proposals are based on the assumption of teaching religion from a religious and not a secular point of view. Such an approach is based on theological arguments for equality and acceptance of the Other that underlie the universality of the Christian paradigm. Arguments grounded on Christianity are legitimate in the Greek context since the Eastern Orthodoxy is instated in the preamble to the Greek Constitution as the prevailing religion of the Greek Republic. This renders the discussion about a religiously

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neutral education very complex because even progressive and open-minded proposals in Greece can still claim to have the specific religious foundation of the ‘prevailing religion’. In the next chapter aspects of this very complex issue will be illustrated with reference to recent institutional development since 2008, the development and foundation of a new theological association in 2009 and 2010 and the development and implementation of new supposedly non-confessional religion class programmes of study since 2011.

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Chapter 7

A New Era in Religious Education? This chapter presents a series of recent institutional developments in the field of religious education that have further pushed progressive theologians to discuss the religion class and initiate changes. The chapter deals more particularly with the creation in May 2010 of a new association of theologians named ‘ΚΑΙΡΟΣ – Πανελλήνιος θεολογικός σύνδεσμος για την αναβάθμιση της θρησκευτικής εκπαίδευσης’ [KAIROS – Greek Theological Association for the Improvement of Religious Education].1 The last part of the chapter discusses changes in the religion class and textbooks as part of the development and implementation of a new national curriculum which was named Programme of Study (PS); it was issued in September 2011 but will apparently not be fully implemented until the 2014–2015 school year. The Mobilisation of Progressive Religion Teachers As mentioned in Chapter 4, the debate on religious education was reactivated in 1995 following the State Council’s decision to grant pupils the right to be exempted from religious education. In 1997, a new law that included the religion class in the national exams for university admission provoked a heated public debate that once again questioned the nature and relevance of teaching religion in a secular education system.2 The general insecurity regarding the future of the class prompted religion teachers to form discussion groups where they could develop new ideas for strengthening the class and securing their professional career and employment. One such group, which was the result of a private initiative in 1997, met on a monthly basis in Athens over a period of three years (Antonopoulos and Papadopoulos 2006). Similar groups were created in Thessaly and in Northern Greece. The work of these groups resulted in three successive conferences on  Kairós means ‘time’ in Greek, but the word has biblical connotations meaning that the ‘time has come’ (for God to act). According to Mark 1:15, ‘and he said, the time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is near’[καὶ λέγων ὅτι πεπλήρωται ὁ καιρὸς καὶ ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ]. By choosing this name, the theologians of the Association signal that their purpose is ‘a new reality’, as in the Revelation. 2  Underlining the confessional nature of the religion class, the voices advocating that religion should not be an exam subject claimed that religion is an issue of personal conviction and therefore should not be graded. Two years later, religion was removed from the national university entrance exams. 1

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the future of religious education in Greece held in spring 1999 (Volos, Thessaly), autumn 1999 (Veroia, Northern Greece) and spring 2000 (Athens). The declared aim of the third conference was to find ‘a common way in today’s climate of contestation and rejection’, but also to show that theologically trained religion teachers ‘do not reject dialogue, they actually seek it, so that […] differences can be recognised and, whenever possible, eased’ (Antonopoulos and Papadopoulos, 2006: 14). The three successive conferences, the publication of their proceedings3 and the creation of local groups of teachers, who were willing to openly discuss the future of the religion class, were the first steps towards the creation of a new association and a general mobilisation of progressive and critical voices in the field of theologically based religious education for the development of a new programme of study and new teaching methods for the religion class. Institutional Developments in the Field of Religious Education In 2008, the debate on religious education re-emerged after the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, in an attempt to comply with the recommendations by the EU, the Council of Europe and the Greek Ombudsman, sent out three successive circulars to public schools stating that any pupil wishing to be exempted from the religion class could do so without having to provide a reason. Up until 2008, pupils wishing to be exempted from the religion class had to state that they did not belong to the Orthodox faith and that according to the principle of freedom of conscience, they did not wish to take the class; in the case of minors, the parents’ signed consent was required. This requirement, however, forced citizens to reveal their religious affiliation (i.e. not belonging to the Orthodox faith) and could, therefore, be in contradiction with privacy and personal data protection. Religious and nationalist milieus in Greece reacted to the first two circulars by pointing out the risk of losing young generations that ‘don’t care about the Orthodox heritage’ and therefore would ask to be exempted even if they were members of the Church. As a result, the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs issued a third circular according to which ‘non-Orthodox pupils, i.e. pupils from other denominations or religions, who according to the circular 104071/Γ2/4.8.2008 are exempted from the religion class for reasons of freedom conscience, must attend a different course in lieu of the religion class’.4 Thus, according to the first circulars no reason needed to be stated for exemption from the religion class whereas, the third circular indirectly confirmed that only non-Orthodox pupils should be exempted. Owing to the lack of clarity in the circulars, the issue has not yet been resolved and the case is handled locally on a case-by-case basis; headmasters can thus accept or reject exemption requests from pupils and their parents. According to the Pedagogical Institute and the religion teachers I interviewed, only a few pupils have asked 3 4

 Kalaitzidis (ed.) 1999, and Antonopoulos and Papadopoulos (eds.) 2006.  Circular ΥπΕΠΘ Φ12/977/109744/Γ1/26-8-2008.

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to be exempted from the religion class during the first and second year after the circulars were issued. However, the religion teachers feared that the number of pupils requesting exemptions just so they can attend one class less will grow; especially in upper secondary school, where they are under a lot of pressure from university entrance exams. Theologians are not the only stakeholders involved in clarifying the consequences of the circulars. The Atheist Union of Greece has asked for assurances from the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs that any pupil, regardless of their religious background or affiliation and at any time (not only at the beginning of the school year), can be exempted from the religion class. Their request seems to question especially the third circular, which guarantees the right of non-Orthodox pupils to be exempted from the religion class, but it remains unclear whether Orthodox pupils are also entitled to this exemption. Furthermore, the third circular, as mentioned above, may be in contradiction with privacy and the protection of personal data, namely that citizens should never be required to declare their religious affiliation to any institutional authorities.5 Progressive theologians and the Pedagogical Institute, which is in charge of developing the national curriculum, seem to have identified a solution that could satisfy both human rights advocates and religion teachers. As we have seen in the preliminary proposals, referred to in Chapter 6, they suggest a compulsory religion class with no confessional orientation. In the last section of this chapter, we shall examine the results of the efforts to develop a non-confessional curriculum for the religion class. The circulars of July 2008 on the exemption of pupils from the religion class prompted the creation of several new Internet blogs by theologians and the organisation of many seminars upon the initiative of the Church and educational authorities, on the future of the teaching of religion in public education. One such blog is the ultra-conservative nationalistic blog thriskeftiká (thriskeftika.blogspot. com), which has accused the government of undermining the religion class and thereby the Greek nation. We find in its discourse several conspiracy theories about a ‘Jewish-led New Order’ whose aim is the ‘end of nations and religions (under the cover of the so-called multicultural society)’ (Thriskeftika 2009a).6 The blogger criticises other theologians for supporting this ‘New Order’ and proclaims: ‘We will not let it happen. We will fight with all our strength for the truth of Christ to be taught in Greek schools as it has been passed to us from the Holy Fathers’ (Thriskeftika 2009b).7 Finally, the blogger regrets that other theologians and the Volos Academy contribute to the ‘de-Orthodoxisation’ of religious education (ibid.). This blog is a representative example of very conservative and 5  This was the main argument for the removal of religious affiliation from citizens’ ID cards in 2000–2001. 6  http://thriskeftika.blogspot.dk/2009/04/blog-post_30.html (accessed 28 April 2013). 7  http://thriskeftika.blogspot.dk/2009/05/blog-post_186.html (accessed 28 April 2013).

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nationalistic public views on the religion class. It attacks the Ministry of Education for cooperating with progressive theologians, especially those who are associated with the theological teachers’ association KAIROS that was founded in 2010. In the following section we shall see how this Association was created, what it stands for and in what ways its proposals have been incorporated in the recent religious education curriculum issued in September 2011 under Anna Diamantopoulou, the former Social Democratic (PASOK) Minister of Education. ‘The Reply of the 44’ The issues raised by the above-mentioned 2008 circulars (July 2008–August 2008) effectively questioned the raison d’être of the religion class because they opened up the possibility of exemption for large groups of pupils. The Union of Theologians (PETH)8 reacted as expected by demanding that the religion class remain both compulsory and confessional in the name of the Christian Orthodox faith. At the end of May 2009, 44 theologically trained secondary school teachers addressed to the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece an open letter entitled ‘The “Religion Class”: A Requirement for Education [paideía] and Not a Union Issue’9 (Apántisi 2009); it was simultaneously published on several blogs on education and Orthodox theology. The letter was written as a reaction to a letter that was sent by the Standing Holy Synod of the Church of Greece to the Minister of Education in March 2009. The letter referred to the many unemployed university graduates from schools of theology, whose primary field of employment is in public education as religion teachers; it stated the Church’s firm position that religious education should be confessional and compulsory for all Christian pupils and that theologians should be employed in primary education and, finally, that the teaching hours of the religion class should be increased. In their letter, the 44 theologians accused the Holy Synod of expressing the positions of PETH, of becoming its mouthpiece and of disregarding the fact that not all theologians teaching religion agree with the views of the Union. The uncertainty as to whether the Church was speaking for itself or for PETH made the teachers who demanded a reform of the religion class feel a sense of betrayal by the Church. The letter of May 2009 was the first step in the mobilisation of progressive theologians who wanted to challenge the monopoly of PETH and its conservative views on religious education. A year later, this mobilisation led to the formation of KAIROS, a new association created as an alternative to the established union of theologians.

8 9

 Πανελλήνια Ένωση Θεολόγων (ΠΕΘ) [Panhellenic Union of Theologians (PETH)].  ‘Τά Θρησκευτικά ως αίτημα παιδείας καί όχι συντεχνίας’ (http://www.antibaro.gr/

article/454 accessed 14 January 2014).

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KAIROS: A New Association for the Improvement of Religious Education In the autumn of 2009, a network of approximately one hundred theologically trained secondary school teachers took the initiative to form an association whose declared aim is to work towards a pluralistic and compulsory, non-confessional, yet theologically grounded, religion class. These theologians propose the modernisation of religious education by replacing its confessional-catechistic foundations with a religious studies perspective, thus making it accessible to all pupils regardless of their religious or non-religious affiliation. The teachers behind the initiative chose the highly symbolic title Καιρός [time]10 with its biblical connotations of a crucial time for action. The theologians who suggested the title explained that the developments in religious education, and more particularly the identification of the opinions of PETH with those of the Church as illustrated by the Holy Synod letter in March 2009, was what made them decide that now was the time for action. They argued that with this symbolic title they wanted to express the crucial importance of time and give the Association a more aesthetic and poetic outlook, rather than use an acronym (such as ΠΕΘ/PETH). Another reason for the Association’s name was that it should have a very specific purpose, namely the improvement of religious education, thus not to be confused with a general (labour) union of theologians.11 By choosing the word ‘improvement’ in the descriptive title of the association (‘Greek Theological Association for the Improvement of Religious Education’) the initiative is very much in line with the proposed bill for a school reform, ‘Νέο Σχολείο: Πρώτα ο Μαθητής’ [New School: Focus on the Pupil], that was presented in March 2010 by the then Minister of Education, Anna Diamantopoulou; the keyword in this bill was ‘αναβάθμιση’ [improvement/upgrading] (Ministry of Education 2010). The radically new element in this reform was replacing the onetextbook system with subject portfolios and granting more autonomy to teachers in their teaching practices. The last sections of this chapter present and analyse the outcome of the reform and its implications for the teaching of religion. In one of the founding meetings of the Association that I attended there was a great deal of discussion over a draft text for the declaration of principles among the approximately 35 future members of the Association. A key issue was whether the declaration should include a specific reference to Orthodox theology, in other words how pronounced should the positive contribution of Orthodox theology be in the Association’s principles. Two main arguments emerged in the discussions, showing two different views among the members, one more progressive and one more traditional:  ‘ΚΑΙΡΟΣ – Πανελλήνιος θεολογικός σύνδεσμος για την αναβάθμιση της θρησκευτικής εκπαίδευσης’ [KAIROS – Greek Theological Association for the Improvement of Religious Education] (www.kairosnet.gr accessed 19 June 2012). 11  This and all the following references in this section are from my field notes from the founding meeting, 14 November 2009. 10

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According to the more progressive group of theologians, the aim of the new Association should be to gain as many members as possible so that it can be recognised as a representative association of theologians and thus be able to achieve its goals as an alternative organisation to PETH.12 Therefore, the declaration of principles should avoid direct reference to Orthodox theology because the Association should contribute something truly new and attract people who do not like PETH’s ‘theological’ language. A religious education supervisor believed that if the Association referred to Orthodoxy in its declaration of principles, it would deter some progressive religion teachers from becoming members. Another member asked how the new Association can expect to offer something really new if the proposed framework for the renewal and improvement of the religion class is still grounded in Orthodox theology. The second view was expressed by participants who wanted to include Orthodoxy in the declaration of principles, as the prevailing tradition in Greece and as a focal point of public education. There were two arguments for insisting on the Orthodox foundation of the Association. One argument came from religion teachers who believed that the Association should not advocate a religiously neutral class because this is neither feasible nor desirable. Obviously, proponents of this argument regarded Orthodoxy as such an important element of Greek society that its salience should also be mirrored in the focus of the religion class: ‘There is a fear of all that is Orthodox, but we do live in Greece where this tradition exists’. A further argument was that Greece should uphold its cultural specificity and not succumb to a European model: ‘Some people will say that we’re just copying what we are told from Europe’. The counter-argument from the more progressive voices at the meeting was that, since the purpose of the modernisation of the class is to include all pupils, it must necessarily be religiously neutral and thus avoid favouring a religious faith over another. The second argument from those wanting a reference to Orthodoxy in the declaration of principles was that since the new Association needed to obtain the support of the Church it must include a reference to Orthodoxy.13 This relatively more traditional strand of theologians among the  One participant noted that PETH has 3,500 members and that it gains its high degree of political influence from high membership. However, it was also noted that the Union is not exclusively for theologians teaching in secondary education since, among its members, there are also persons who simply hold a degree in theology but who work in other professions. 13  This attitude mirrors the statements expressed by teachers and education advisors during my interviews on the question of the Church’s support as a prerequisite to changing the religion class. The first interviews in this study were conducted in the first few months following the enthronement of the new and apparently moderate Church leader, Archbishop Ieronymos. The change in Church leadership gave hope to many progressive theologians that the Church would approve the modernisation of the religion class. This hope may also explain why the Archbishop’s conservative statements and the Holy Synod’s support of PETH caused a great deal of disappointment among the reformists, thus pushing them to establish a new association. 12

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Association emphasised that, even with an Orthodox theological underpinning, KAIROS will continue to be innovative because it will represent an ‘open theology’ in contrast to the ‘closed theology’ of PETH. To summarise the different views within the KAIROS Association, whereas participants in favour of not adding any reference to Orthodoxy in the declaration of principles asked: ‘Why are we so afraid of omitting it?’, those in favour of including an Orthodox reference asked: ‘Why are we so afraid of mentioning words like Orthodoxy and Christianity?’. The two different positions among these progressive theologians illustrate how the question of identity continues to play such an important role, not only in distinguishing between a religious identity and a cultural or national identity, but also in defining what a religious identity is and what role it should play in the public sphere and public education in particular. Religious Neutrality from a Theological Perspective? The discussions between the teachers at the founding meeting of the KAIROS Association took place on at least two levels. On a more personal level, the discussions related to the teachers’ personal relationship with religion so the teachers were divided in two groups: a large group affirming quite openly that Orthodox Christianity is the foundation of their personal value system and thereby a part of their teaching practice; and a smaller group that refused to express their personal beliefs in the public sphere and in their professional life through teaching. The other level of discussion was essentially the political context of the issue of religious education. The teachers were also divided into two groups: one opted for no reference to Orthodoxy, arguing that this would give the Association an ‘alternative’ and progressive image, attract more members and, therefore, make it more effective in achieving its political goals – also because a religiously neutral approach would satisfy the Ministry’s need to comply with European recommendations on safeguarding the principle of religious freedom. The other group made the case that including a reference to Orthodoxy as a necessary ‘identity marker’ in the Association’s principles would ensure the support of the institutional Church, which was thought necessary for proceeding with the vision of changing the religion class. The blurred picture emerging from these discussions illustrates the difficulties of renewing religious education within a theological framework. One could ask why there is so much insistence on preserving the theological dimension of the religion class, and there are several answers to this question. One clear answer, which was also pointed out in the meeting, is that the theologically trained religion teachers will lose their jobs if the religion class is either abolished or integrated into the history class, or even transformed into a religious studies class taught by sociologists or other professionals. Therefore, the struggle is to a large extent a union issue about ensuring employment for the theologians similar to PETH’s attempt, with the support of the Church, to demand teaching positions for theologians in primary education and more teaching hours in secondary education.

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However, beyond the issues of employment, there is a strong ideological dimension and internal division, since the progressive theologians are not in agreement with PETH’s conservative traditionalist stance. The progressive theologians’ passionate dedication to the cause, many of them spending their spare time in meetings and discussion groups, indicates that their struggle is rather ideologically motivated. They believe that with an ‘open theology’ they can contribute positively to society through the education of young people. This conviction has a prominent place in the Association’s final Declaration of Principles: 3. We believe that an upgraded religion class can indeed function as the foundation for the deepening and enrichment of democracy: by encouraging the elimination of prejudices and stereotypes, by fostering responsibility and inspiring love for fellow men and the Creation. (KAIROS 2010)

Similar to the contributions in the edited volume Τάξη + αταξία [Order + disorder] (Koukounaras-Liagis 2011) referred to in Chapter 4, the theologians of KAIROS indicate their belief that the goals of education must be more than simply achieving knowledge and skills. According to this position, education, and religious education in particular, should go beyond teaching about religion, it should cultivate a specific attitude to society, thus in a sense providing civic education. The dialogue and respect for otherness are key elements in the religion class proposed by these progressive theologians as expressed in the Association’s declaration of principles: Religious education can and must help so that students have the opportunity, the knowledge, foundation and open-mindedness for an unprejudiced and constructive dialogue, which makes room for acceptance and respect of religious otherness, without betraying or relativising their own – religious or non-religious – identity. (KAIROS 2010)

It is worth noting that the issue of ‘non-religious identity’ was also discussed during the founding meeting. The debates on religious education often raised a key issue, namely that a confessional religious education class violates the pupils’ right to religious freedom and ignores pupils who do not belong to a specific religious community. However, the final declaration of principles states that the Association advocates a theological dimension in religion education: The sensitive area of education needs a theology of “open horizons” that is “dialectic with the Other and honest with oneself”. A theology that studies the history of religious phenomena, the sources of the Orthodox tradition and our culture’s intellectual heritage; a theology that differentiates without dividing. (ibid.)

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Not only is the theology ‘of open horizons’seen as an important educational principle, but also as a necessary interpretation of ‘the freedom of human conscience’: A theology, which not only allows the freedom of human conscience, but also sees it as a “sacred centre” of the human existence and a pillar for the foundation of our society. (ibid.)

These statements signal that the Association supports a religion class that is taught from an Orthodox theological point of view with the Greek Orthodox tradition in a central position. The progressive dimension of the Association consists in avoiding a nationalistic rhetoric and promoting an ‘open theology’. Nevertheless, because the arguments are drawn from a specific theological point of view, the Association has not solved the problem of providing a neutral class for all pupils. The primary goal of the Association is to keep the religion class mandatory for all pupils but, evidently, for it still to be taught by Orthodox theologians: For this reason, we advocate that the religion class remain mandatory for all students, regardless of religious or non-religious origin and identity because knowledge is what gives meaning to freedom. (ibid.)

Thus, in the Association’s final declaration of principles, the less progressive voices prevailed in the end, focusing on an ‘open theology’ approach with a specific reference to the Orthodox tradition. This is the aim of the progressive theologically trained religion teachers who formed the new Association and it is also what has been attempted in the new programme of study for the religion class which will be discussed in the last sections of this chapter. Reactions to the Creation of the Association In light of the alternative, more progressive (i.e. less confessional) proposals expressed during the founding meeting of the Association, the final declaration of principles does not seem all that progressive. Nevertheless, the traditionalist and conservative critics outside the so-called progressive milieu of KAIROS reacted as might be expected in highly derogatory terms. The Orthodox nationalist blog thriskeftiká (http://thriskeftika.blogspot.com/) made the following comment on the progressive theologians and their creation of KAIROS: The multiculturalist Euro-theologians have organised themselves in order to achieve their goal of de-Orthodoxisation of religious education. After the unacceptable text of “the 44 theologians” (May 2009), which was condemned by a large number of theologians and by PETH, now they are proceeding to form a new theological association called “KAIROS [time] for the improvement of religious education”. (…) The well-known group of artsy theologians (including professors from the university schools of theology, school supervisors, religion textbook

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authors) now attempts to obtain broader acceptance within theological circles and promote the ideas for an “open” theology of otherness and multiculturalism, from primary school to the faculties of theology. (Thriskeftika 2010a )14

The issue, discussed so intensely among the theologians of KAIROS, of whether or not to include a reference to Orthodox theology did not seem to make any difference to the conservative and traditionalist theologians, including the blogger from thriskeftiká. According to the blogger, the creation of the new association, by what he claims to be a minority of theologians, is something close to the start of an ideological war: We will fight for Orthodox, Christian, patristic and evangelic religious education which will endow the Light of Christ and will not bend to the demands of the New Age. We owe this, first of all, to the children, the pupils of our schools. They demand from us a word of truth and of life, a patristic word, a redeeming word of Christ. We cannot give them instead tasteless artsy theories because that’s what a small group of Euro-theologians want. Those who now form the association KAIROS must know that school teachers, we who teach religion every day in the classrooms, we are not going to follow them on the disastrous path they have chosen, nor will we allow them to drag theologians into unlawful “agreements” and “collaborations” with the people at the Ministry of Education who have planned and promoted the deOrthodoxisation and devaluation of religious education. (Thriskeftika 2010b)15

The crucial issue here is the supposed de-Orthodoxisation of religious education, even if the declaration of principles of KAIROS clearly states the Orthodox foundations of its vision for an improved religious education. As it appears, this ideological war is also played out at the church–state level, where the blogger suggests that the theologians of KAIROS are working together with the Ministry of Education that is also accused of undermining religious education by complying with European standards. The accusation that the new Association is in collusion with the Ministry of Education relates to the close cooperation between the theologian Stavros Yangazoglou, principal advisor of religious education at the Pedagogical Institute, and members of KAIROS, some of whom have written textbooks for the religion class, have close relations with the Institute and, thus, indirectly with the Ministry.

 http://thriskeftika.blogspot.com/2010/01/blog-post_488.html (accessed 28 April 2013). 15  http://thriskeftika.blogspot.com/2010/02/blog-post_2117.html (accessed 28 April 2013). The title is a play on words, with the prefix ‘bad’ added to the slightly changed name of the new association to form the word for ‘storm’ or ‘foul weather’. 14

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According to the thriskeftiká blog (thriskeftika.blogspot.com), the issue is all the more worrying because the Bishop of Demetrias (Volos), a representative of the Church who is supposed to be on the side of the traditionalists and the guardians of the nation, has supported the progressive initiatives for the modernisation of religious education, including KAIROS. Even if the Bishop has no formal link with KAIROS, the blogger still accuses him of ‘promoting the de-Orthodoxisation of the religion class’: The association KAIROS does not represent anything but a very small group of artsy theologians. The question now is, what is the stance of the Hierarchs on the doings of the bishop of Demetrias and his Euro-theologians? Will they let him promote the de-Orthodoxisation of religious education? The Church ought to leave aside the TIME-serving16 games. If it is really interested in the religious education of pupils in Greece, it should only work with PETH that represents all school theologians as a whole. (Thriskeftika 2010c)17

The Church is, therefore, called upon to only cooperate with PETH, which is obviously threatened by KAIROS since the latter seems to be obtaining support not only from the Ministry of Education but also from some members of the Church hierarchy, including the Bishop of Demetrias. In the conservative newspaper Ορθόδοξος Τύπος [Orthodox Press] the same blogger published a comment insinuating that the progressive theologians have plans to deceive the hierarchs of the Church Synod into getting them to support their proposals: The Euro-theologians have put into practice their plan of deceiving the Hierarchs of the Synod with the aim of getting their agreement for the de-Orthodoxisation of religious education and its transformation into a religious studies class. (Tatsis 2009)18

Synthesising the views of the two different ideological ‘camps’ in the debates over religious education, both the progressive and the conservative theologians claim that they want to preserve the religion class and rescue its true Orthodox spirit. However, they want to achieve this in very different ways. The conservative theologians invoke a tradition which is Orthodox and patristic and certainly not European (they derogatively accuse progressive theologians of being ‘Euro-theologians’), providing schoolchildren with ‘a word of truth’. In contrast, the progressive theologians, for

 In Greek: ΚΑΙΡΟσκοπικά. This is a play on the word κερδοσκοπικά (speculative/ profiteering) by replacing κέρδος (profit) with the association’s name καιρός meaning ‘time’. 17  http://thriskeftika.blogspot.com/2010/04/blog-post_7069.html (accessed 28 April 2013). 18  http://thriskeftika.blogspot.dk/2009/05/blog-post_8357.html (accessed 28 April 2013). 16

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their part, also invoke an Orthodox tradition, but one that is open to dialogue and plurality in a wider ecumenical spirit and European context. The National Curriculum and Corresponding Textbooks for the Religion Class This section presents recent changes in national curriculum and textbooks for the religion class. The first part refers to how the religion–nation link is illustrated in the textbooks in use until today. The second part examines the views of the principal advisor on religious education issues at the Pedagogical Institute, who has been in charge of modernising the curricula and developing the new programme of study for the religion class. Finally, the last part of the section looks at the new national curriculum for the religion class which was implemented through three pilot programmes involving 188 schools in 2011–2012, 2012–2013 and 2013–2014 (Koukounaras-Liagis forthcoming). The Current Textbooks and the Religion–Nation Link In her study School and Religion Evie Zambeta concludes that ‘the whole culture of the Greek school is identified through Orthodoxy’ (2003: 118) and that ‘the element which is basically put forward in the Greek education system is that Greek national identity is unquestionably connected with Orthodoxy’ (ibid.: 119). Examples of references to the close bonds between national and religious identity can be found in primary school textbooks: third grade, unit 18 (Zouras et al. 2006: 58–9) refers to the Greek War of Independence and the relationship between the national holiday celebrating the Greek uprising and the religious holiday of the Annunciation; fifth grade, unit 2.7 (Kornarakis et al. 2009: 44–6) refers to Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire as Greek national martyrs who resisted the oppressors, thus ‘creating the wrong impression with the pupil, that Orthodoxy was forbidden during the period of the Ottoman Empire’ (Zambeta 2003: 137); sixth grade, unit 27 (Goulas et al. 2006: 87–9) refers to the importance of the synthesis of Orthodoxy and Hellenism for the development of modern Greek identity and the importance of ‘the authentic Greek Orthodox tradition’ for the Greeks of the diaspora. In the same textbook, we also find the following quotation: ‘During the Turkish domination what counted was always the Orthodox faith. This made the Greeks determined and assured. A Greek was not only someone who simply spoke the Greek language, but also an Orthodox believer. Greek people identified their misfortune and resurrection with the Orthodox religion and culture’ (p. 87). From these examples, we can clearly see the promotion of the ethno-religious dimension. Zambeta (2003: 135–41) has analysed references to Orthodoxy as part of the national myth in religion textbooks of upper secondary school and in history and language textbooks where ‘Orthodoxy is identified with the national self’ (ibid.: 140). It should be noted, though, that it is not so much in the current

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national curriculum of the religion class and the corresponding textbooks that the connection between the Greek nation and the Orthodox Church is highlighted as in other classes, including history, language and the social and cultural events and practices of school activities, such as the celebrations of national and religious holidays, as already described in Chapter 4. The curriculum of the religion class, which has been taught since 2003, hardly mentions a national dimension or mission of religious education. When national identity is discussed, it is in relation to teaching the pupils that ‘all children, as creations of God, are brothers regardless of their colour, race or nationality’ (DEPPS-APS 2003). By presenting religion as a natural and integrated part of life, the textbooks seem to teach Orthodox Christianity as if all the pupils were Orthodox Christians, but there are few references to an explicit national context. If direct references to explicit national identity are fairly rare, so are the references to other religions and other Christian denominations. In the seven religion textbooks, from third to sixth grade of primary school and from first to third grade of lower secondary school, only two books discuss other denominations and religions. In these two textbooks, which are used in the last year of primary and lower secondary school respectively, the themes on other denominations and religions are in the last chapters. Religion teachers, as well as teachers of other subjects, draw attention to the fact that Greek textbooks are packed with material and it is usually impossible to cover the units of the entire book within a school year, thus the last chapters are often omitted from the teaching material. This means that pupils in Greece can go through the nine-year compulsory education without learning anything – or very little – about other religions. Yet, the textbooks bear the general name Τα Θρησκευτικά [Religious Topics].19 This does not correspond to the actual content of the religion curriculum and textbooks, thus giving pupils the impression that Orthodoxy is the only recognised religion in Greek society, a view that collides with their daily experience of increasing religious diversity due to immigrant groups from other faith communities and religious change in the indigenous Greek population as a consequence of secularisation and changing identities in late modernity. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the religion curriculum (DEPPS-APS 2003) and the textbooks in primary school and in lower secondary school set the stage for a catechist/confessional way of teaching Orthodox Christianity. Modernising the National Curriculum on Religion Stavros Yangazoglou, the principal advisor on religious education issues at the Pedagogical Institute, has argued that since 1989 the teaching of religion has changed for the better: ‘Abstract moralism gave way to a theological approach and  Officially, since the 1985 Education Act, the title of the religion class is ‘Orthodox Christian Education’. However, in the documents and web pages of the Ministry of Education and the Pedagogical Institute the religion class is referred to as ‘Class of Religious Topics’ [Μάθημα Θρησκευτικών] or ‘Religious Topics’ [Τα θρησκευτικά]. 19

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dialogue with the problems of contemporary man’ (2005: 129). According to his assessment, the national curriculum of 2003 has modernised the religion class and brought it closer to a contemporary social and historical context. Being himself a moderniser, Yangazoglou concludes that the religion class has moved away from what he calls religious moralism without losing its mission of spreading the Christian message: The curricula (of 2003) call attention to the fact that Christianity offers a coherence and quality of life in the modern world, an understanding of the cultural, ethnic and religious diversity of contemporary society and a supranational and ecumenical character of the Christian message; this leads to the recognition that an inter-Christian and interfaith dialogue is needed. (ibid.)

As we can see from the above and the following quotation, Yangazoglou is not in favour of a religiously neutral class. Quite the contrary, he argues for the relevant contribution of Christian theology in today’s education: This is the era when the unifying power of the nation state is in decline, while other unifying bonds, such as language, culture, religion, are emerging. […] Within such framework it seems that the ghost of religious fundamentalism, but also of religious decline, will play a crucial role in future multicultural societies. […] In this new world of religious pluralism, Christian theology is called upon to engage in a creative dialogue with the cultural and religious diversity of the contemporary world. It ought to rediscover its true ecumenism and tolerance in order to overcome intolerance and fanaticism. (ibid.: 135)

The difference from earlier, nationally grounded arguments on the contribution of religion is that Yangazoglou presents it as a universal contribution that is not limited to a national community but directed towards all of humanity across the globe, as well as in the context of the cultural diversity of Greek society. As such, the proposal for changing the religion class attempts to place Greece in a global context, but at the same time it is highly evangelising. In an article entitled ‘Religious Education and Diversity: Towards an Alternative Approach to Religious Education’ Yangazoglou argues that the new programme of study, implemented in pilot schools since 2011 and planned for general implementation starting with the 2014–2015 school year, includes the contributions of Christianity towards cohesion in the modern world but also towards quality of life; […], emphasising the interracial, international and ecumenical nature of the Christian message. (Yangazoglou 2010: 174)

He further states that

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[t]he religion class relates to a modern stage in theological discourse or in the teachings of the Church and does not constitute catechism in the ecclesiastical or theological sense of the word. (ibid.: 176)

It is unclear what Yangazoglou means by ‘a modern stage in theological discourse and in the teachings of the Church’ and how these ‘teachings will distance themselves from a catechist or confessional approach or be taught ‘in respect of any religious and cultural polyphony and otherness’ (ibid.: 177). Yet, his argument for a method of teaching that is not dogmatic further confuses the matter, since it is clear that in the end his goal is to teach a religion class in the spirit of the Christian church, but in a non-dogmatic way: ‘dogmatic pervasion does not correspond to the existential interpretation and understanding of the dogma, that is, the faith, life and worship of the Church’ (ibid.). Therefore, the key issue is not whether the Christian message should be communicated through the religion class, but how this is can be done in a way that corresponds to a specific interpretation of the Christian faith. The New National Curriculum In March 2010, Anna Diamantopoulou, the then Minister of Education, presented a draft bill entitled ‘New School: Focus on the Pupil’. The bill included the development of new national Programme of Study (PS), which was tested through two pilot programmes in 2011–2012 and 2012–2013, and is currently going through yet another pilot programme in the school year 2013–2014. In this section, I will examine the new programme of study for the religion class and compare it to the existing curriculum in view of assessing to what extent the ideals of the progressive theologians discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 have been incorporated in the new programme of study. The programme of study for primary and lower secondary school issued in 2011 provides a short historical overview of religious education since the foundation of the Greek state. It affirms that the 2003–2006 curriculum had already ensured that the religion class distanced itself from its catechistic character and that it is a religion class which is, certainly, focused on the Orthodox tradition, but in a style that is clearly knowledge-based, educational and pedagogical. (Ministry of Education and Pedagogical Institute 2011a: 9)20

The three terms, ‘knowledge-based, educational and pedagogical’, were probably chosen to avoid any criticism that the class was too theological. However, after examining the religious education textbooks (written between 2003 and 2006) 20  The author of this introductory text is not specified but there is reason to believe that it is Stavros Yangazoglou in his capacity of principal advisor. Also, these excerpts are similar to other texts by this author.

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that were used from third to sixth grade in primary school, the claim that the class between 2003 and 2006 was no longer catechistic is highly questionable. According to the 2003 guidelines of the religion class curriculum,21 one of the main purposes of the class was to contribute to ‘the appreciation of Christianity as an element in the improvement of people’s lives’. The detailed objectives of each grade and thematic unit included the following: The pupils know that God loves man and the world; he accompanies and blesses life. The pupils understand that the world is a miraculous creation of God, a creation that people enjoy and for which they are grateful to God. The pupils know that God is a loving Father who takes care of all his creatures. (Curriculum, Third Grade, http://www.pi-schools.gr/programmes/depps/)

Although there is no explicit Christian reference in the textbook titles and chapter headings, the front cover images are deeply religious, depicting exclusively Christian motifs and including headings such as ‘God in Our Lives’22 and ‘Searching for the Truth in Our Lives’.23 Also, certain chapter headings convey explicitly religious messages: ‘God is with Us’ and ‘Praying Is Communication with God’. Therefore, the purpose of these textbooks and the entire religion class is to teach pupils how to live and practice according to the Orthodox Christian faith. More specifically, the fifth grade textbook was entitled Christians in the Struggle of Life (Kornarakis et al. 2009), and according to the curriculum objectives: The pupils are able to justify why the struggle of a Christian person in any aspect of life, thus also in school, presupposes the observance of rules, gives meaning to life and is therefore worthwhile for us to participate in. The pupils are able to explain why the hope, optimism and courage of a Christian person are vital elements for meeting difficulties and for a path of continuous struggle. The pupils know that a meeting with Christ may radically change the way of life of an alienated man, all he needs is to have an open heart and to repent. (Curriculum, Fifth grade, http://www.pi-schools.gr/programmes/depps/)

The above-mentioned objectives essentially constitute an attempt to make the pupils feel that they are part of a religious community of good Christians. Teaching  http://www.pi-schools.gr/programmes/depps/.  Zouras et al. 2006. 23  Goulas et al. 2006. 21 22

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pupils that ‘the world is a creation of God’, ‘the struggle of a Christian person […] gives meaning to life’ and ‘a meeting with Christ may radically change the way of life of an alienated man’ seem more close to catechism than to a class that is ‘knowledge-based, educational and pedagogical’. In the new Programme of Study, the purpose of the religion class is supposed to develop the pupils’ ‘religious literacy’: Religious education is called upon to provide “religious literacy” […] Besides, the main goal of cultural acclimatisation, which is part of religious literacy, is not only directed towards the Greek or Orthodox pupils, but to all [schoolchildren] regardless of their national origin or religious and confessional identity. (Ministry of Education and Pedagogical Institute 2011a: 14)

In the excerpt above, the goal of ensuring ‘religious literacy’ includes ‘cultural acclimatisation’. This point is obviously raised to guarantee that the class is nonconfessional. However, on the following page this issue is addressed once again but more specifically: the true objective of the new Programme of Study seems to be the marginalisation of a specific type of theology, which is considered deviant and extreme, while at the same time safeguarding the ‘positive manifestation’ of theology as contribution to education: This concise concept [religious literacy] – which embraces creative dialogue with modernity, pluralism, multiculturalism and difference – together with the underpinning of the Christian witness in school education in a higher spiritual and theological level, safeguard Theology against any deviances and extremism of the past on one hand, and ensure and give prominence to its positive manifestation and decisive contribution to the education of the pupils, on the other. (ibid.: 15; capitalisation in original)

Using the concept of ‘religious literacy’ the new Programme of Study attempts to satisfy the ideals of a secular national education system that is in compliance with European standards of inclusive education, while at the same time avoiding any compromising on the value of Orthodox theology . The new approach of embracing ‘a creative dialogue with modernity, pluralism, multiculturalism and difference’ seems to be achieved to with the introduction of a greater focus on other religions, especially ‘the large Christian traditions that we encounter in Europe’: The present proposal is a religion class that preserves its current cognitive and pedagogical nature, but opens itself towards the Christian traditions of Europe and the other religions. With the components of this class we shape a curriculum that starts from and has as its focal point on the religious tradition of the country, the tradition of the Orthodox Christian Church, as this has become incarnated in its life and imprinted in its cultural manifestations. It is useful for every pupil, regardless of his/her religious specificity, to know the religious tradition

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The focal point of the class remains the local Orthodox tradition, but two further ‘series are added introducing the pupils to other religions, first the Christian denominations and then the other monotheistic religions’ (ibid.). Because teaching other religions is a cornerstone in the debate on the religion class, the new programme of study insists on the continued importance of Orthodox theology, which is considered relevant to the Greek school context, but also a means to ‘go beyond modernity’: Of course, we cannot possibly have a Greek school where the discourse of Orthodox theology and tradition is not central. Through the religion class this discourse is called to go beyond modernity and to embrace pluralism and difference in such a way that it simultaneously does not devalue, or relativise or even depart from its self-consciousness. Elements of a theological understanding of multiculturalism, such as mutual respect, acceptance and peaceful coexistence with a religious or any kind of Other, are scattered through the Bible, the patristic heritage but also in the texts of modern and contemporary thinkers. […] Besides, Orthodox theology by its nature does not disregard the religious Other but engages in dialogue with them; without this meaning of course, it betrays itself. (ibid.: 16)

With such fine crafted argumentation, Orthodox theology is made to appear as a perfectly suited method to meet the challenges of multiculturalism in Greek school and in Greek society. The above excerpt illustrates how progressive theology, representing the foundation of the new Programme of Study, seems to balance on a thin line: on the one hand, it is presented as well suited to deal with cultural diversity, and, on the other, it is viewed as retaining an undisputable core allegiance to Orthodoxy. The Programme of Study, thus, suggests that Orthodox theology can be open to the Other, while still retaining its authenticity. As these examples illustrate, the new Programme of Study emerges as a text that tries to persuade the reader of its ideological underpinnings; this becomes even clearer in the accompanying Teacher’s Guide. The Teacher’s Guide to the new Programme of Study (Ministry of Education and Pedagogical Institute 2011b) is a thorough, well-written guide that should be helpful to many theologically trained teachers. Yet the size of the book (277 pages) is probably an initial disadvantage since not all teachers will be ready to revise their usual teaching methods or able to spend so much time reading the Guide, which could end up being an obstacle to implementing new teaching practices.

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The Guide discusses how theologically trained religion teachers should view their own role as teachers. It recognises that the role of the teacher is set by educational framework standards and that the pupils’ attitudes towards the teacher also play a crucial role in the teaching process. However, what the text considers most important is that teachers themselves have to become critically aware of the specific theological character of their teaching. According to the Guide, if the teacher responds to this call for self-examination in a problematic way ‘this will have consequences for his [sic] work and usually lead to problematic didactic approaches and stereotypical behaviour’ (ibid.: 270). The call for self-examination is supplemented by a list of what the new programme of study regards as problematic teaching approaches which include: The ritualistic insistence on “tradition”; a dead-end and aggressive focus on what separates Christian denominations; excessive dealing with religious paradoxes and para-religious phenomena; a polarisation between the so-called “secular” and religious disposition; the identification of the concepts Hellenism and Christianity; various subjectivities regarding the aims of modernisation; the dilemma of whether theology is a science; the devaluation of approaches by the “secular” sciences; the simplistic discussion on whether the religion class is primarily “knowledge” or “experience”. (ibid.)

Through this excerpt the ideal teaching approach seems to be one that is neither too devout nor too secular, and in particular not nationalist, i.e. not equating Hellenism with Christianity. The teachers should not be old-fashioned or folkloric (paying too much attention to rituals) and should not attack other Christian denominations or be too preoccupied with new religious phenomena. They should also avoid sensitive issues, such as the distinction between what is secular and what is religious, and whether the religion class should be knowledge-based or experience-based. In other words, the religion teacher ought to keep a low profile and appear sensible. The text goes on to state that the above-mentioned approaches, in their extreme, can lead to a class that is too much influenced by the teacher’s personal theological convictions; this entails a risk, namely that the general aims of the class are not followed and that the teacher will end up disregarding the official curriculum and textbooks. The Guide acknowledges, though, that such undesirable teaching approaches are not only due to the teacher’s problematic response to his/her theological identity, but also to the teacher-centred tradition of the Greek school system. The new Programme of Study attempts to change a teaching practice that has usually been based on the transfer of knowledge from teacher to pupil and the examination of the pupil’s satisfactory memorising of the subject: ‘The new Programme of Study aims at the creative liberation of the theologically trained teacher with a fruitful strengthening of his pedagogical role’ (ibid.: 271). According to the Guide, the old curriculum was focused only on the content of the class and not on methodology. Even if its intention (DEPPS-APS 2003) was to introduce

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new pedagogical methodologies, these were only implemented in the development of new textbooks so they never practically reached the teachers themselves.24 The Teacher’s Guide states that the new Programme of Study ‘proposes a new way for the didactic practice which is more up-to-date, creative, cooperative and efficient’ (Ministry of Education and Pedagogical Institute 2011b: 271). What is a novel concept in the proposed didactic practices of the new Programme of Study is that it ‘encourages initiatives from the teachers on both the teachinglearning process and the choice of suitable didactic means and material’ (ibid.). Looking at the suggested teaching materials for each teaching unit (Ministry of Education and Pedagogical Institute 2011a: 29–34, 38–44, 49–57) it is obvious that instead of referring to a chapter in the corresponding textbook for the specific religion class, the teachers are offered several options, either from textbooks for other classes, or from supplementary online material, articles, and so on. The principal advisor on religious education at the Pedagogical Institute has confirmed that there will no longer be a single reference book for each class; however, in the first implementation phase and until the preparation of new supplementary teaching material, corresponding to the new programme of study, pupils will receive the existing textbooks from 2006. Nevertheless, the new Programme of Study encourages a teaching approach that is much less textbook-focused. The Advisor adds that according to the new Programme of Study ‘the didactic work will happen in the classroom with many more activities’.25 The Guide includes a table listing some of the differences between the old and new teaching methods and approaches: Instead of ‘familiarising the pupils with the religious phenomenon by providing sufficient information’ the teachers will ‘encourage the pupils to examine and critically approach the various dimensions of religiosity’. Instead of ‘giving priority to the teaching of religious messages (convictions, ideas, values)’ the teacher will focus on ‘the existential, historical, social and cultural dimensions of religion’.

 According to page 27 in the Teacher’s Guide, the lack of full implementation of the new teaching methods that were proposed in DEPPS-APS 2003 was partly due to the insufficient in-service training for teachers. The teachers who attended the seminars in which I participated complained that they felt left behind by the State and that their theological training from the university was never sufficient for them to undertake their teaching responsibilities from a pedagogical point of view. The lack of sufficient teacher training for the pilot implementation of the new programme of study has also been a strong point of criticism (Papasotiropoulos 2012). 25  Email communication, 28 February 2012. 24

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Instead of ‘inviting the pupils to assimilate the commands of the official religious tradition’, the teacher will ‘facilitate the pupils in understanding their own values and those of others to form personal opinions’.26

Aside from changes in didactic practices, the new Programme of Study attempts to take into account the current social and cultural conditions in Greece and in the rest of the world by promoting inter-culturalism and respect for otherness. Alongside the above-mentioned demands on the teacher, the Guide ensures that the new religion class is suitable to all pupils, regardless of their religious or non-religious affiliation;27 yet, it is ‘by no means contradictory to a Christian vision of faith and education’ (Ministry of Education and Pedagogical Institute 2011a: 27–8). Religious education is, therefore, expected to play a role in the pupils’ ability to responsibly and creatively deal with ‘pluralism’ and engage in dialogue with ‘the Other’. The Guide also argues that, with the new Programme of Study, the educational aims stated in article 16 of the Greek Constitution regarding the development of the pupils’ ‘religious consciousness’ can be achieved ‘through pedagogical means but without religious or ecclesiastic criteria’ (ibid.: 273). Reactions to the New Programme of Study Several theologians who are actively engaged in the work of KAIROS are members of the board of experts at the Pedagogical Institute, which is responsible for the implementation and evaluation of the new Programme of Study. In a statement of February 2013, the Association expressed full support to its members who had participated in the development of the new Programme of Study and its subsequent pilot implementation. According to the same statement, the Association had been reluctant to express its position publicly because it wanted to give time for the evaluation of the pilot programme implementation. Overall, however, the Association positioned itself positively to the new Programme of Study because, as in its declaration of principles, the Orthodox faith remains the focal point of the new religion curriculum, which proposes the teaching of a religion class for all school children regardless of their religious positioning, yet at the same time the class is not discoloured

26  Table 8.1, ‘Schematic juxtaposition of the basic teacher functions in the old and the new didactic approach’ (Ministry of Education and Pedagogical Institute 2011b: 274). 27  The new programme of study is developed to address all pupils; however, the class is still optional in the sense that anyone can be exempted according to the above-mentioned Ministry circulars issued in July 2008–August 2008. It remains to be seen whether the Ministry will confirm the compulsory nature of the class when the new curricula will be implemented in all schools all over Greece in September 2014 following the three-year pilot programme.

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because it takes as its point of departure the acquaintance and understanding of the Orthodox Christian faith and life.28

The statement also includes certain points of criticism that are not directed so much towards the content of the Programme of Study, but to the contexts in which it is to be implemented. In particular, the declaration highlights the issue that according to the new Programme of Study the teachers are required to teach new topics, especially about other religions, without having received adequate training. This lack of training may, according to the Association’s statement, lead to the failure of the practical implementation of the Programme. Teaching without the use of one textbook, which has been the practice throughout the history of Greek education, is also seen as a possible insurmountable challenge, especially if teachers are not provided with sufficient professional training. In May 2012, a member of KAIROS offered an assessment of the first pilot project for the implementation of the new Programme of Study (Papasotiropoulos 2012). He welcomed the content of the Programme of Study for implementing modern international teaching methods, but concluded by referring to its hasty, chaotic and unorganised development and pilot implementation due to insufficient preparation and teacher training. He also referred to technical problems not only related to the use of multiple teaching materials, but also because of the challenges of organising teaching hours and transitioning to the new Programme of Study which will apparently create gaps in the pupils’ learning process: pupils who have been taught according to the old curriculum will simply not be adequately prepared to follow the new teaching methods if they are implemented in the middle of their schooling. Evaluations from members of KAIROS (for example Koukounaras-Liagis 2012) are in general positive with regard to the content of the new Programme of Study. However, Koukounaras-Liagis (ibid.) fears that if this sort of criticism leads to the withdrawal of the new Programme of Study, the religion class may be abolished or turned into an optional class according to different religious communities because the Greek state will not be able to defend a confessional class in a multicultural society. The latter scenario entails the separation of pupils into faith groups and atheists/agnostics and will thus threaten the social coherence of public school. Although he underlines his Christian ethos as a reason to remain hopeful for finding a solution, contrary to his conservative critics, he believes that the new religion class remains much too focused on Christianity to be able to provide a suitable religion class for everyone: ‘The new Programme of Study […] remains Christian and does not leave much room, if the theologian [teacher] hold to its content only, to become a class for all without exception’ (ibid.). Even though Koukounaras-Liagis represents, as shown in Chapter 6, an exception, since most of the arguments made by other progressive theologians suggest that the religion class can be respectful of non-Orthodox/non-Christian  http://e-theologia.blogspot.gr/2013/02/blog-post_4192.html (accessed 21 July 2013).

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pupils using an open-minded Orthodox Christian theology, the proposed way of teaching takes as its basis a specific religious worldview which is still not compatible with a religiously neutral secular school. In the end, the proposed way of teaching continues the use of a specific religious worldview, an Orthodox outlook which is not compatible with a religiously neutral and secular school. The key issue is that as those who teach religion are theologians, it is not possible to ensure an objective or neutral approach to religion. It is thus questionable whether the religion class can become a non-confessional class if it is still taught by graduates of the theological faculties, who by nature cannot maintain a neutral perspective, at least not in the way they have been educated in these theology schools until now.29 As long as the Ministry of Education employs theologians as secondary school teachers, the religion class conundrum will not be solved. In Greece, a neutral approach is referred to as a religious studies class (thriskeiología), and no theologian supports this teaching approach in public since it would mean that other types of teachers, such as sociologists and historians, would be able to teach the class, thereby threatening the job security of theologians. However, the theologians, who are obviously afraid of losing their jobs (and rightly so), are still in a strong position due to the strong influence of the Church on matters related to Greek education policy. Even though Archbishop Ieronymos appears less keen to engage in an open conflict with the State, the Church enjoys enough popularity to mobilise large parts of the population to exert severe pressure on political decisions that affect its social and cultural role in society. Therefore, and in light of the deep economic and cultural crisis in Greece, it seems unlikely in the foreseeable future that the religion class will be abolished or taught by educators other than theologians. If the religion class were to be abolished or not taught by Orthodox Christian theologians the Church would be threatened and it would do everything possible to prevent this. In periods of crisis and harsh times, when the Church takes on a role of providing national consolation, especially to the most vulnerable, no government would be strong enough to survive a direct confrontation with the Church as the Simitis government did in 2000–2001 at a prosperous time just before Greece joined the eurozone. Conclusion This chapter traced recent institutional developments in the evolution of the religion class in Greece. Various stakeholders have been trying to promote their own agenda in order to satisfy internal or external pressures. Thus, the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs has been trying since the mid-1990s to comply with European regulations on the right of religious freedom by issuing laws and 29  It is, of course, a crucial question whether objectivity or neutrality is feasible or even desirable, but this normative discussion would take this chapter far beyond its scope of examining recent changes in religious education in Greece.

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circulars for the exemption of pupils from the confessional religion class. The Ministry has been balancing between attempts to satisfy the interests of secular human rights advocates and the theological and nationalist interests of the Church. Under a climate of fear that was created around the fate of the religion class, theologically trained religion teachers have organised various initiatives to ensure the survival of a theologically grounded religious education, among them the foundation in 2010 of a new Association of theologically trained religion teachers. The modernisation visions of the new Association were partly reflected in the new Programmes of Study that were developed under the supervision of the pedagogical advisor Stavros Yangazoglou in the context of the school reform initiated by Minister of Education, Anna Diamantopoulou, in the PASOK government 2009–2011. The chapter illustrated the catechist character of the religion textbooks in use since 2006, and examined the teaching goals of the new Programme of Study, which implies the use of a teaching portfolio for each class instead of a single textbook. However, the new Programme of Study still sets out guidelines for a religion class focused primarily on Orthodox Christianity and Christianity taught from an Orthodox theological perspective and is, therefore, not as innovative as some progressive theologians had wished for. This chapter referred to critical assessments of the new programme from progressive stakeholders. However, the main obstacle to the implementation of the programme that emerged was the lack of practical coordination and the scarcity of technological and other critical resources, including training of school-teachers. The religion class according to the new programme of study could be a step in the right direction of modernising religious education in Greece, but the economic crisis may not allow the full implementation of these new initiatives.

Conclusions As indicated in the introduction, the research for this book has covered two interrelated spaces of theological thought: the initiatives for a theological revival by the Academy for Theological Studies in Volos and the mobilisation of theologically trained religion teachers towards a renewal of the religion class. These spaces share in common an ecumenical approach to Orthodox theology and a rethinking of the close bonds between Orthodox Christianity and the Greek national ideology. This duality has determined the structure of the book. Chapters 2 and 3 have examined the bonds between nation and religion and the possibility of untying them within contemporary Greek Orthodox thought. Chapters 4 to 7 have dealt extensively with the role of religion in Greek national education, notably recent attempts to leave behind the traditional role of religion as the guardian of the nation and adapt religious education according to the increasing diversity of Greek society and the modern teaching methods of reflexive and critical thinking. From National Religion to Pure Religion: Theoretical Considerations From the outset of the book, I have suggested that there are common features between the global tendencies towards the deculturation and denationalisation of religion and new trends in contemporary Greek Orthodox theology. Chapter 1 set the stage by providing a snapshot of the Greek historical context since the 1970s, characterised by increasing prosperity but also by political polarisation, antiwestern attitudes and growing immigration. It also introduced more general global trends in the changing relationship between national and religious identities in the late modern era. I suggested that developments since the end of the twentieth century have to some extent weakened the persuasive power of national communities and thereby made space for renewed identifications within religious communities that consider themselves increasingly independent from nation states. From a theoretical point of view, the book has attempted to demonstrate that religious culture is in flux and that processes of transformation have a global reach but also a local expression, even in a country like Greece, where the religious culture has been particularly conservative and tradition-bound. The new theological tendencies illustrated in this book may represent attempts at a denationalisation of (Greek) Orthodox Christianity, but they do not exemplify a deculturation of religion in the sense suggested by Roy (2010). The tendencies rather show how religious actors shift their focus from a national framework to a cultural framework defined by transnational global structures in late modernity. The book illustrated

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the inner logic of successive cultural and religious currents related to the history of modern Greece as a nation constructed along the ideational borders between ‘The East’ and ‘The West’, between eastern and western Christianity. It also interpreted the recent trends in Greek theology through the lens of Olivier Roy’s thesis of ‘religion without culture’ in the age of globalisation. Using a variety of cases, the global trend exemplified by Roy (2010) may work as an explanatory model for the developments observed in Greek theology today. The spatial and temporal cultural integration of Orthodoxy in Greek society cannot be disputed and the religious tendencies that can be observed in Greece today are not ‘fanatical and extreme versions of religious purification’ like the tendencies described by Roy. Yet, in a sense, the contemporary theological current does illustrate a global phenomenon of claims to an ‘uncultured religion’. Claims of purity and authenticity are expressed indirectly as assertions aiming to cleanse a religious tradition from elements that are perceived as foreign. In the case of progressive Greek theologians, nationalism and ethno-religiosity are seen as foreign to an authentic Christian tradition going back to the first Christian communities. Against the insecurity and constant flux of identities in the living conditions of late modernity, ‘religious purism’ should be interpreted not only as a local reaction to the phenomenon of cultural and nationalised religion, as is the case with Orthodoxy in Greece, but also as a broader global phenomenon where religion is reinstated as the absolute truth, the firm core identity, unaffected by any culturally defined belonging. Orthodoxy and Greek Culture: Between East and West Chapter 2 offered a brief introduction on the role of religion and Orthodox theology in the course of modern Greek history and demonstrated how the Orthodox Christian heritage and religious identity have been constituent features of Greek culture and national identity. The chapter showed, first, how Christian religious tradition has been identified with Greek national identity and a specific people and territory and, second, how interpretations of the religious tradition have created a constant fluctuation between a local eastern (Byzantine) Christian tradition and a universal western and/or Ecumenical Christian tradition. Chapter 3 introduced the key elements of a recent progressive theological revival in Greece that proposes alternative ways of understanding Orthodoxy in relation to the past and present of the Greek nation. There are three central aspects of this new and progressive theology: 1) the critique of religious nationalism, which asserts strong bonds between Orthodoxy and the modern Greek nation; 2) the integration of the Orthodox Church into the wider Christian community through ecumenical dialogue and the reintegration of Greece and Greek theology into a contemporary European framework; and 3) the development of a theology of multiculturalism that makes it possible, from an Orthodox theological point of view, to embrace the Other without losing one’s own religious identity. Against the backdrop of previous ethnocentric, exclusivist and traditionalist religious

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discourses, the new progressive theological proposals in Greece seem to develop an alternative position that is situated between the neo-nationalist uses of Greek Orthodox identity and the secular intellectual rejection of religion’s positive contribution in Greek society. Progressive theologians view religion as having a strong say in late modern society, but adapt its use to the contemporary living conditions of fluid boundaries and pluralism. The emergence of new tendencies in Greek theology since the late 1990s has also highlighted a feature in modern Greek cultural history, namely a dynamic movement of national and religious ideologies defined between a search for the authentic, pure national identity – rooted, among other elements, in the eastern religious tradition – and a search for a pure Christian religious identity partly inspired by western theologies and religious patterns. The new call for an Orthodox religious framework that promotes religion for its own sake resembles the pietism of the extra-ecclesiastical organisations in the 1940s and 1950s. The approach, the worldview and the context are different, but the message about finding and cultivating the essence of religion, with its perceived authentic, pure and true message, is similar. In the literary ‘generation of the 1930s’, the theological revival of the 1960s and the Neo-Orthodox current of the 1980s we see a similar way of interpreting Greekness and Orthodoxy as two sides of the same coin. During these periods, Greek culture and Orthodoxy were understood as unique cultural and religious traditions that, on the one hand, were exclusive and particular to the geographic area of (modern) Greece, but, on the other hand, also represented a universal alternative to western (capitalist) culture. According to the ‘generation of the 1930s’, which was not a religious but an artistic movement, Orthodoxy was seen as just one element of that unique Greek culture. In the 1960s and 1980s, Orthodoxy was seen as the constituent feature of Greekness, and the end result was the development of a ‘cultural religion’. Likewise, some common features can be distinguished between the religious organisations in the 1940s and 1950s and the progressive theological current of today. In both periods, Orthodox Christianity was receptive to influence from the West, and in both periods, there was a renewed interest in the Bible. In the case of the religious organisations, this influence came from Protestant movements, i.e. from America and from Protestant missionaries, while today the theological current is opening up Orthodox theology towards other Christian denominations based on arguments relating to the challenges of modernisation and globalisation. In both periods, the religious message is central and culture is marginalised so these periods are characterised by ‘religious purism’.1  Regarding the historical dynamics of national cultural religion versus religious purity, it is worth noting that it is the present generation of theologians, and in particular Pantelis Kalaitzidis (2008b: 223–45, 257–71), who have interpreted the past literary and theological generations as harmful to the ‘true’ character of Orthodoxy. Therefore it could be said that it is the current generation’s use and interpretation of the past that 1

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New Voices in Greek Orthodox Thought: Reforming Religious Education The last four chapters of the book focused on religion in public education as a representative battleground for ideological arguments on the role of religion in Greek national identity and public life. Chapter 4 provided an introduction to the role of the Orthodox legacy in the history of Greek education and illustrated how Greek nation-building created a close bond between education and religion. Forming such tight bonds was in the interest of both the newly created Greek church and the state. Successfully persuading the Orthodox population that they were not only Orthodox but also Greek, the newly created Greek state ‘inherited’ a faithful flock from the Church. The Church, once identified with the national project, was able to increase its popularity through myths like the ‘secret school’ and the celebration of both religious and secular holidays. However, Chapter 4 also highlighted how the religion class has become a cultural battlefield for debating various understandings of the church–nation relationship. The vagueness of the Greek Constitution regarding religious education leaves room for many stakeholders to interpret and use it according to their own vision of religious education. The role of the Church is also a crucial factor in the question of religion in public education. Religious education, as a confessional class, was supposed to function as a guardian of the Greek Orthodox tradition against the risk of alienation from the West. Beyond the role of the Church, the debate on religious education has also been influenced by political initiatives aimed at safeguarding religious freedom and individual privacy. Since the 1980s, the debate has revolved around the view that the continuity of the religious education class is under threat. The chapter concluded with an illustration of two types of contemporary publications dealing with the role of religion in Greek public school. The first used a traditionalist agenda that considers Orthodoxy as the essence of Greek culture and envisions a return to ‘the good old days’ through a revival of Orthodox values in education. The other focuses on contemporary society, in order to advocate that Orthodox theology and Orthodox values are compatible with a contemporary social outlook that can contribute to society as it really is today, and not as it was, supposedly, in ‘the good old days’. Based on field research, Chapter 5 painted a picture of what it means to work as a theologically trained religion teacher in contemporary Greece and teach under difficult conditions due to a school system in need of modernisation in technological and pedagogical terms. The chapter also offered an account of training seminars for religion teachers, which illustrated various approaches to has highlighted these patterns in Greek cultural history. Of course, the significance of the notions of purity and mixture for the concept or invention of ‘Greekness’ has been addressed before (Stewart 1994; Tsoukalas 2002), and undoubtedly they are an intrinsic part of Greek cultural history. However, in this case, we have seen how religious actors may set the agenda for a discussion on the ‘nature’ of religion – hence their decision to focus on the alienation between religion and (national) culture.

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the religion class used by the teachers and also revealed the challenges created by the introduction of new progressive teaching methods. Both progressive and traditional religion teachers and educators want to be able to communicate the message of Orthodox Christianity through the religion class, but the means they choose to do this are very different. Two strategies of religious education have been identified: traditional religion teachers fear plurality and want to keep religious education free from anything foreign, while progressive religion teachers believe that by embracing plurality and including what is considered foreign the Christian message will become more resilient; they see this as the only way to safeguard the religion class as a relevant subject in contemporary education. Chapter 6 presented three perspectives on the debate on religious education. The ‘national awareness’ perspective corresponds to the traditionalist view of the role of Orthodoxy in education as presented in Chapter 4. According to this view, Orthodoxy and the religion class are seen as guardians of the Greek national identity. The ‘European awareness’ perspective puts aside the religious consciousness of the pupils in favour of introducing the cultural legacy of religion in Greece and its European surroundings. Finally, the ‘intercultural awareness’ perspective advocates a religion class that takes cultural and religious diversity as a springboard for teaching pupils how to navigate in culturally diverse societies. Many proponents of this perspective argue that even if this class is nonconfessional it should be taught from the point of view of an ‘open Orthodox theology’ by theologically trained teachers. In this context, many contemporary theologians have used progressive academic concepts, such as ‘fluid and multiple identities’ and ‘construction of otherness’, in an attempt to demonstrate how these ‘modern’ concepts are fully compatible with the Christian faith and the message of its holy texts. Finally, Chapter 7 traced recent institutional developments in the religion class in Greece. Since the mid-1990s the Ministry of Education has tried to comply with European regulations on the right of religious freedom. It has also tried to find a balance between satisfying the interests of secular human rights advocates and the theological and nationalist interests of the Church, for example by the issuing in 2008 of three successive circulars regarding exemption for the religion class. The tightening of regulations on religious freedom by the Greek state and the EU, and the intensification of conservative forces in theological milieus and the Church, the various initiatives prompted the creation of a new organisation, the KAIROS Association. Its proclaimed aim was to advocate a reformed religion class that is compatible with the educational needs of a late modern and multicultural Greece. Several of the Association’s promoters have been involved in developing new programmes of study for the religion class in the context of the School Reform of 2010. An analysis of the new Programme of Study showed that the intention of the Association to advocate an open-minded yet theologically founded religion has been mirrored in the programme. The programme may, however, prove too ambitious to be fully implemented in school practice for several reasons, the most important of which is the lack of economic backing and teachers’ training. The

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School Reform presupposes a paradigmatic shift in the way subjects are taught from a teacher-based transfer of knowledge to a pupil-centred culture of learning. This may prove an insurmountable challenge in today’s Greek school. The Uncertain Future of a Non-Confessional Religion Class in Greece Throughout my research, I observed a tendency among theologians to deplore the fact that they are not highly respected in Greek society; this situation apparently makes it even more difficult for progressive theologians, who are a minority within a low-esteemed minority. However, the choice of progressive theologians to identify themselves as a minority may also be an explicit decision referring to a specific perception of Christian identity as embodied by the first Christians, i.e. the authentic, original Christians who were a persecuted minority. Thus, the minority status of progressive theologians is both a social fact and part of leading a life while bearing ‘the cross of Christ’. Nevertheless, progressive theologians do not passively deplore their lack of social recognition and influence; on the contrary, they remain agonistic proponents of their visions for societal change by raising a rational and intellectual type of awareness of the potential of ‘a Christian way of life’. It is obvious that the passionate debates on the nature of the religion class in Greek public school have, to a large extent, been triggered by two factors: first, the increasing presence of religious minorities which have challenged Greece’s constitutional assertion of a prevailing religion, and second, by the growing pressure of European policies towards the pro-active recognition of religious diversity.2 Behind this debate lie fundamental values and beliefs about the religious and cultural composition of Greece both as a nation and a state. In the context of this debate, I would tend to conclude that the perceived consequences of religious diversity have more to do with ideological views and perceptions of Greece as an ‘imagined community’ and as a nation state than with the actual status of the demographic religious diversity in Greek society. This is an interesting observation, since it suggests that the experience of religious diversity becomes a pretext for national self-reflection. So far, representatives of other religious communities, teachers of other professions or proclaimed secular or atheist groups in Greek society have not joined the discussions. Thus, the debate consists of a polarised dispute between conservative traditionalist and/or ethnocentric theologians on the one hand, and progressive but at the same time purist theologians on the other. Many of the proposals have emphasised that, by broadening its intellectual horizon, religious education should embrace all Christian denominations in order to integrate Greece and its specific Orthodox Christian tradition into an ecumenical Christian and European tradition. This ecumenical – or European – outlook relates to the rupture between progressive theological circles and previous generations of 2  Especially as represented by the Council of Europe, but to some extent also by the EU institutions.

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anti-western Greek theology (for example Kalaitzidis 2008b, 2007a). Therefore, on the one hand, some of the more progressive reactions to the challenges of multiculturalism and religious diversity in Greece have produced views advocating a religious (Christian) universalism rather than religious particularism. On the other hand, other more traditionalist reactions have strengthened the particularistic conceptions of Orthodoxy as specifically Greek and unique. Thus, my analysis of the debate on the religion class suggests that the presence of religious diversity in Greek society has led to both a diversification of views among Greek Orthodox theologians and to a unification process in so far as the ecumenical aspects of Greek Orthodoxy are concerned. By way of conclusion, I will refer to three possible scenarios for religious education in Greece. According to the first scenario, the Church of Greece and the Greek state will recognise the new association KAIROS as a credible serious and influential agent of change. This will open the way for the Ministry of Education to take initiatives towards a modernisation of the religion class by further incorporating a European and cultural approach as has been implemented to some extent in the new curriculum. It is likely, at this point in time, that the Ministry will continue to support a solution where theologians continue to teach religion because so many of them (approximately 4,500) are employed in the Greek public education sector. In all probability, any Education Minister will try to avoid a scenario of thousands of unemployed theologians who, through the Union of Theologians, will see the Church’s support.3 Therefore, it is expected that the Ministry of Education will turn to more urgent educational reforms.4 Given the severe economic crisis, the possibility of abolishing the religion class or turning it into a religious studies class taught by sociologists or other teachers (i.e. not 3  Considering the Troika’s demands (the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the European Central Bank), as part of Greece’s economic rescue package, for job and budget cuts in the public sector resulting in the dismissal of more than 2,500 public TV and radio workers in June 2013 and the dismissal of 2,500 teachers from technical high schools in July 2013, the scenario of dismissing a large number of teachers or other public employees does not seem that unlikely any more. The decision to shut down the public broadcasting company and the (temporary) dismissal of public employees proved to be a wrong move since it almost brought down the government because of the symbolic value of public broadcasting. The Church has an even stronger symbolic value and a more powerful economic and political influence over the population, so dismissing the theologians seems unlikely in the short term. What is certain, though, is that the Greek Ministry of Education will have to make further cuts in the near future, which will undoubtedly influence the reform and future development of religious education. 4  The priorities of Anna Diamantopoulou (the then Minister of Education under the Socialist government between 2009 and 2011) lay elsewhere, as suggested by her comment on the decision of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the removal of religious symbols in Italian schools: ‘I don’t think the Greek educational system is suffering first and foremost from questions like this’ (press interview with the political leadership of the Ministry of Education, 12 November 2009).

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theologians) is unlikely. Thus, the first scenario corresponds to the programme of study issued in 2011, which is a compromise between satisfying the requirements for the respect of freedom of religion and employing theologians in the public education sector. According to the second scenario, pupils who are exempted from an optional religion class will be offered an alternative class in ethics or philosophy. This is an expensive solution because the Greek state will need to employ new teachers for teaching this type of classes. The theologians and the Church will be very much against this option because an alternative class will directly compete with the existing type of religion class. According to the third scenario, the new programme of study will be abandoned if the difficulties of its implementation in all schools starting with the 2014–2015 school year prove to be insurmountable for technical reasons and due to the fierce criticism from traditionalist theologians and from the institutional Church. This means that the situation will remain unchanged and that the religion class will remain a confessional and ethnocentric class, but pupils will have the option to request an exemption. However, the number of pupils making such exemption requests may grow significantly in which case schools will have to arrange other activities for them. Given the economic crisis, the political dimensions of religious education and the political responses to religious diversity in Greece seem to be in a deadlock.5 However, as the chapters in this book have shown, it is an issue that has attracted the attention of many groups and produced a rich debate and several proposals for a religion class that correspond to the late modern living conditions. The question is whether, in the harsh times of economic crisis, conservative and ethnocentric proposals will gain more support from lay people and politicians, who will use the religion class as a platform from which to strengthen national cohesion and thereby hinder or slow down its modernisation. Even if the progressive theologians have succeeded in implementing many of their proposals in the new curriculum, in the end politicians may decide, for economic as well as ideological reasons, not to proceed with the challenging task of reforming a centralised and inefficient school system. The decentralisation of the education system requires thorough in-service training to provide teachers with the necessary skills of teaching and examining pupils in entirely new ways. Such a project may be considered insurmountable  That the New Democracy governments (2004–2009) and the Ministers of Education did not make a serious investment was partly highlighted by the youth protests in December 2008. Due to the economic crisis, the PASOK government (2009–2011), with Anna Diamantopoulou as Minister of Education, did not fully implement the projected reforms in the educational system. Although the new programme of study was issued in 2011, the Greek economy is close to a breaking point and there are no economic means to train teachers who can implement the new teaching programme or to update the textbooks. In 2011, even the old textbooks were out of print because the organisation responsible for the national publication of textbooks did not have an adequate supply of paper for printing the books. 5

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in light of the social and economic crisis, so the Ministry may be forced to keep up the centralised system of one class, one textbook. The consequences of this on religious education will be that the religion class will continue to focus on teaching about one religion, namely Orthodoxy, thus postponing the progressive theologians’ vision of a religion class that ‘embraces a creative dialogue with modernity, pluralism, multiculturalism and difference’ (Ministry of Education and Pedagogical Institute 2011a: 15) in a European framework. A Progressive Theological Agenda Contemporary theological discourse in Greece is itself a product of post-national and constructivist, reflexive discourses, and Greek Orthodox theologians themselves advocate an ‘authentic’ religious identity which enters into dialogue with contemporary society. The progressive theologians who suggest changes to the self-understanding of the Greek Church do so out of necessity. They believe that if the Church does not shift its focus ‘from the nation to the Gospel’ it will lose its ‘authentic’ mission, which according to Kalaitzidis, can best be carried out in a multicultural environment: the Church […] will rediscover its most authentic form of mission […], since Christianity was born and grew in the particular “multicultural” environment of the Roman Ecumene, while Orthodoxy itself at its peak (e.g. Byzantium) was always ecumenical (and multiethnic/multicultural) and not ethnocentric. (2009: 114)

Thus, proposals for change and innovation are presented as demands for a return to an original and ‘authentic’ purpose of religion, thereby rejecting all deviations from this origin (including the nationalisation of the Church) as disturbing innovations. What we can conclude is that, even though contemporary Greek theologians appear and perceive themselves as progressive agents of change, their underlying ideological argument for change is the fulfilment of an authentic and original Christian tradition. Thus, this renovating project can be considered at one and the same time an expression of adapting religious innovation and purist religious innovation (Willert and Molokotos-Liederman 2012: 10). The arguments put forward by progressive theologians in the debate are influenced by the social constructivist paradigm and an understanding of national identities as socially constructed or imagined communities. This understanding opens the way towards a global or an ecumenical type of religious metaphysical conception going beyond ethnic and national borders. What seems to have changed in the current debate, compared to earlier debates, is that the universalist conceptions of religion seem to join a global movement that embraces Christian ecumenism and religious diversity. The main point is that the dominant voices in this debate

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are not simply rational voices, but voices that combine a rational and pluralistic understanding of society together with a deeply religious (Christian) worldview. The Greek case of religious ‘renewal’ illustrates how the core values and ‘eternal’ truths of religion are proposed as alternatives to the constant state of flux and multiple ever-changing identities in late modernity. ‘Authentic’ religious values are presented as universal moral values ‘untouched’ by fanaticism, especially by nationalism. Thus, engaging in progressive theology becomes a viable alternative for intellectuals and religious ecumenists who emerge as rational, tolerant and progressive. They aim to distance themselves from nationalist discourse and from religious nationalists who are viewed as irrational, intolerant and reactionary. The progressive theologians draw attention to the fatal error of religion becoming an ally of nationalism. Nationalism was (once) about finding (or inventing) the authentic, true, pure spirit of the national community. For secular as well as religious intellectual elites, nationalism has now become a factor contaminating a purely cosmopolitan or ecumenical community. In the emerging paradigm of ecumenical theology, Greekness, as a cultural experience, is deemed irrelevant and even damaging to the Greek Orthodox religious tradition. This theological paradigm rejects the anti-westernism of previous generations and pursues an ecumenical dialogue with western Christian denominations. There is a renewed focus on Bible studies, which illustrates the wish to join other European traditions for which the Bible is a common point of reference. Progressive theologians put forward religion, and specifically Orthodox Christianity, as an answer to the social and existential problems of late modernity. Instead of using nationalistic ‘misguided’ ways of practising religion, progressive theologians propose a ‘true’ Orthodox Christianity, which leads to a community that is larger than the national community. The new progressive theology proposes a Christian humanism and urges the institutional Church to play an active role in recognising the multicultural reality of today rather than praising Greece’s past glory and homogeneity. In making a theological proposal for the modernisation of Orthodoxy the progressive theologians draw on contemporary contested topics and discourses, including ‘humanism’, ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘globalisation’, ‘European unification’, ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘diversity/otherness’. This proposal is a claim for a religious modernisation that draws on the identity discourses of the post-nationalist global era, and through its intellectual and reflexive perception of religious identity it attempts to adapt a religious worldview to life in contemporary multicultural societies. The new theological paradigm of a pure ‘denationalised’ religiosity is future-oriented (i.e. eschatological), and, therefore, appropriate to adapt and to face the challenges of a globalised world. The strength of the new theology appears to be its openness and willingness to integrate the Greek Orthodox Church into a contemporary globalised world. Whether this new paradigm will succeed in influencing larger parts of the Greek Orthodox community towards a transformation of values and outlook will depend on many factors. Greece’s position on the international political

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and economic scene is not irrelevant, since it will affect the population’s selfunderstanding. The pressures of the socio-economic crisis in Greece may lead to a further strengthening of nationalistic and defensive positions. In addition, the position of the institutional Church and its leadership will have a crucial effect on the possibilities for a new paradigm to settle. Throughout the current crisis, the Church has attempted to find a balance between its traditional role as guardian of national virtues, for example by defending the Greek Orthodox character of the religion class, and its new role as a provider of charity to people in need regardless of their national and religious affiliation. To end on an optimistic note, these challenges may prepare the Church for a much-needed modernisation that, according to Antonis Liakos (2005), can have a modernising effect on Greek society as a whole. The very harsh living realities in Greece have given rise to much intolerance and ethno-chauvinism, but movements of solidarity are equally strong. Such a period of deep transition may prove to be a fertile ground for a new open-minded theology to flourish, slowly but steadily. In any case, there can be no doubt that the devoted progressive theologians in Greece will keep fighting, identifying as they do with the early Christian communities who survived by facing and overcoming all sorts of hardship.

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Appendix: Interviews and Participant Observations Interviews Asproulis, Nikos. Religion teacher and Volos Academy associate, Athens, 14 May 2008, 10 July 2009. Ieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, Athens, 27 October 2008. Ignatios, Metropolitan of Demetrias, 22 March 2009. Kalaitzidis, Pantelis. Volos Academy Director, Volos, 12 February 2008 (telephone), 21 March 2008, 9 May 2008, 9 July 2009 (telephone). Karamouzis, Polykarpos. Assistant Professor of Sociology of Religion, University of the Aegean, Evoia, 12 July 2009. Kasselouri, Eleni. Religion teacher and Volos Academy associate, Thessaloniki, 19 May 2008. Koukounaras-Liagis, Marios. Education researcher, religion teacher and lecturer, University of Athens, Athens, 13 May 2008, 27 October 2008. Koukoura, Dimitra. Professor of Theology, University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, 19 May 2008. Lappas, Dimitrios. Professor of Theology, University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, 19 May 2008. Lipovatz, Thanos. Professor of Political Psychology, Panteion University, Athens, 23 October 2008. Mavrokostidis, Grigoris. Religion teacher and member of KAIROS, Thessaloniki, 19 November 2009. Mitropoulou, Vassiliki. Assistant Professor of Theology, University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, 19 May 2008. Papaderos, Alexandros. Academy of Crete Director, Chania, Crete, 23 November 2009. Papageorgiou, Niki. Assistant Professor of Theology, University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, 19 May 2008. Papathanasiou, Thanasis. Chief Editor of Sýnaxis, Athens, 26 March 2008, 13 November 2009. Perselis, Emmanouil. Professor of Theology, University of Athens, Athens, 23 October 2008. Petrou, Ioannis. Professor of Theology, University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, 19 May 2008. Thermos, Vasilios. Clergyman and psychiatrist, Athens, 16 May 2008.

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Vallianatos, Angelos. Regional pedagogical supervisor for the religion class, Athens, 18 March 2008. Vasilopoulos, Christos. Professor of Theology, University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, 19 May 2008. Velitzanides, Manolis. Publisher of Índiktos, Athens, 2 July 2008. Vlantis, Georgios. Theologian and Academy of Crete associate, Chania, Crete, 23 November 2009. Yangazoglou, Stavros. Pedagogical advisor, Pedagogical Institute, Athens, 16 May 2008, 29 October 2008, 9 July 2009. Zoumboulakis, Stavros. Chief Editor of Néa Estía, Athens, 2 July 2008. Anonymous Interviews Primary school teacher, female, Athens, 18 March 2008. Religion teacher, male, Athens, 7 May 2008. Four pedagogical trainers for the religion class, Volos, 10 May 2008. Religion teacher, male, Volos, 11 May 2008. Religion teacher, male, Athens, 14 May 2008. Religion teacher, female, Volos, 17 May 2008. Religion teacher, female, Volos, 17 May 2008. Primary school teacher, male, Thessaloniki, 19 May 2008. Religion teacher, male, Athens, 21 October 2008. Religion teacher, male, Athens, 21 October 2008. Two religion teachers, male and female, Patras, 25 October 2008. Researcher/religion teacher, male, Patras, 25 October 2008. Priest/religion teacher, Patras, 25 October 2008. Religion teacher, female, Athens, 8 July 2009. Religion teacher, male, Athens, 9 July 2009. Religion teacher, male, Athens, 16 November 2009. Religion teacher, male, Thessaloniki, 19 November 2009. Priest/primary school teacher, Thessaloniki, 20 November 2009. Philologist, male, Chania, Crete, 23 November 2009. Participant Observations Seminar for theologically trained secondary school teachers, Volos, 22 March 2008. Seminar for theologically trained secondary school teachers, Volos, 10 May 2008. Meeting of theologians to establish KAIROS, Athens, 14 November 2009. Training seminar for religion teachers at the Inter-Orthodox Centre of the Church of Greece, Penteli, Athens, 21 November 2009.

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Index

1930s, generation of 47, 48, 51, 157 1940s and 1950s 9, 49, 157 1960s theological revival 31, 47, 59, 60, 68, 69, 104, 157

awareness perspective, intercultural 123–7, 128, 159 awareness perspective, national/religious 117–20, 128, 159

Academy for Theological Studies, Volos 2, 4, 16, 42, 53, 55–9, 61, 74, 76, 155 and teacher training 107, 108–11 see also Kalaitzidis, Pantelis acclimatisation, cultural 147 Adamos, Kostas 93 ‘adapting innovation’ 30, 33 Agouridis, Savvas 68 Albania 22, 23 anamneses see commemorative practice Anastasios, Archbishop of Tirana 5, 75, 125n10 Anastassiadis, Anastassios 28 Anderson, Benedict 33 Annunciation, day of 42 anthropology 30 anti-Semitism 109 argumentation analysis 15 Ártos Zois, Greek Bible society 61, 67 Atatürk, Kemal 23, 46 Athanasopoulou-Kypriou, Spyridoula 61, 126, 127 atheism 110, 113, 115, 127 Atheist Union of Greece 133 Athens, Metropolis of 42 Athos, monastic community see Mount Athos ‘authentic’ tradition 28–9 authenticity, religious 8–10, 28–9, 62, 63, 163, 164 autocephaly 28–9, 36n13, 39, 40–1, 43, 52, 72, 125 awareness perspective, European 121–3, 128, 159

Babiniotis, Georgios 95, 120 Balkan wars 23, 46 Bartholomew, Patriarch 4, 70 Beck, Ulrich 14, 32n10, 77 belief, personal, see faith Bible, role of 49, 60, 67–9, 108–9, 110–11, 121, 164 blogs 95, 112, 118, 133, 139–41 Buddhism 111 Bulgaria 22, 23 Bultmann, Rudolf 74 Byzantium 45, 46, 47, 50, 52, 63, 68, 156 canonisation 39, 42–3 capitalism 26, 32, 157 catechist way of teaching 86, 109–10, 112, 113, 117, 122, 145–7 and textbooks 143, 146, 154 Catholicism 21, 34, 39, 41, 49, 70, 111n16, 148 charity 81, 88, 165 choice, personal 72–5 Cholevas, Konstantinos 92–4, 96, 112, 118, 122 Christodoulos, Archbishop 6–7 conservatism 92, 104n4, 111n16 as leader of Orthodox church 7, 54, 56–7, 58n14, 70, 78, 99, 104n and modernisation 58n14, 70 nationalism 2, 9, 35, 51, 52 ethnocentrism 54, 56–7, 70, 78, 88 and religious education 11, 91, 99 Chrysostom, John 43

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Chrysostomos, Archbishop 72 Chrysostomos, Bishop of Smyrna 39 church attendance 12n18, 104–5, 113 Church Fathers 26, 43, 49–50, 81, 86, 94, 99, 101, 119, 124 Church of Greece autocephaly 28–9, 36n13, 39, 40–1, 43, 52, 72, 125 modernisation of 13–14, 27–30, 59–61, 74–5, 80 and Christodoulos 58n14, 70 and religious education 122, 135–42, 143–4 nationalisation of 28, 39, 40–1, 84, 163 denationalisation 25, 37, 155–6, 164 civil partnerships 60 clerical dress 29–30, 74 commemorative practice 42–3 communism 24, 26, 91 Communist party (Greek) 90 communities, national 1, 21, 61, 63, 119, 144, 155, 164 confessionalism in religious education 109, 110, 111–12, 113, 117, 119–22, 143, 145, 158, 162 non-confessional curriculum 133, 153 consciousness, religious 86, 87, 99, 115, 120, 151 conservatism 104, 111, 136n13, 139, 155 Christodoulos, Archbishop 92, 104n4, 111n16 Constantinople, Patriarchate of 40–1, 57n13, 84, 93n20 constructivism 31, 163 consumerism 32, 34 corruption 4, 7, 22 cosmopolitanism 14, 75–9 Council of Europe 132, 160n2 counselling 105, 106, 108, 114 see also confessionalism in religious education coup, military 46 Crete 46 cross-curricular teaching 110, 124 Crusades 41n3 ‘cultural acclimatisation’ 147

cultural change 1, 21 cultural memory 66, 67, 117–18 cultural purity 43–6, 48, 51, 52 culture, Greek 2–3, 63n24, 69 and religion 14, 35–6, 64–5, 71–2, 73, 85, 101, 156–7 cross-culture 6, 71, 74, 151, 156 deculturation 34, 155, 156 and religious education 119–20, 122, 151 curriculum, national 87, 90, 125, 133, 142–53, 161–2 cross-curricular teaching 110, 124 Programme of Study (PS) 131, 145, 147–53, 154, 159–60, 162 Darwin, Charles 26 Davie, Grace 31, 80 deaconesses 29 Debray, Régis 110 deconstructionism 25, 31 deculturation 34, 155, 156 Delikonstantis, Konstantinos 121 Demetrias, Bishop of 141 see also Ignatios, Metropolitan of Demetrias Demetrias, Metropolis of 55, 58, 59, 111 democracy 127 Denmark 27 ‘de-particularisation’ 33 DEPPS-APS 110, 124n8, 143, 150 deterritorialisation 14 devotion, religious 48, 49 Diamantopoulou, Anna 56, 135, 145, 154, 161n4, 162n5 discourse analysis 31, 89n12 discrimination 12–13, 29, 36n12, 60, 77, 128 diversity 117 ethnic 12–13, 78, 94, 120 religious diversity 160 and religious education 89, 106, 115–16, 120, 125–6, 143–4, 147–8, 159, 163 see also multiculturalism; Otherness; pluralism DNA 44 dogmatism 145

Index ecclesiology 30 economy, Greek 13n20, 22, 24, 46, 70, 79, 80–1, 83n1, 92, 165 and religious education 13n20, 153, 154, 161, 162–3 Ecumenical Patriarchate 6n9, 41, 43, 70 ecumenism 5, 14, 24, 52, 56, 155 and Orthodox Church 6, 61, 62, 72, 74, 75–9, 156, 163 and religious education 94–5, 96, 111, 143, 144 education, interfaith 123–7, 144, 152–3 Education, Ministry of 10, 11 education, primary, see schools, primary education, public 10–13, 24, 27, 83–99, 102–3, see also religious education; schools education, secondary, see schools, secondary education, secular 43, 147 Ellinikótita 48 Ellinismós, see Hellenism Elytis, Odysseas 48, 119 employment issues 97, 137, 153, 161–2 Enlightenment 15, 26, 40, 72 eschatology 54, 62, 64, 65, 75–6, 164 essentialism 36, 64 ethnicity 12–13, 63n23, 74, 77, 78, 86, 89, 94 ethnocentrism 24, 69–70, 79, 80, 90, 120, 121, 156, 160, 162 Archbishop Christodoulos 54, 56–7, 70, 78, 88 ethnophyletism 36, 64, 94, 124–5 Eucharist 35, 42 Eurobarometer survey 5n7 European Community (EC) 22 European Court of Human Rights 60n20, 161n4 European Social Survey 11n18 European Union (EU) 50, 51, 58n14, 92 and national identity 7, 8, 68–9 and religious education 153, 159 and religious identity 28, 160 Europeanisation 7, 12–13, 91, 117, 121–3, 128, 136, 140, 147 Evangelicalism, Protestant 34 evangelisation 9, 108, 144

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exclusiveness 52, 64, 77, 125, 128 Faculty of Theology, University of Athens 26 faith 34, 35, 51, 67, 69, 73–4, 105–7, 113, 126, 137 Fallmerayer, Jakob Philipp 44–5 Faros, Philotheos 98 fascism 43, 93n19 feminism 32 Fokas, Effie 5 folklore 45, 48, 51, 73 Fordham university 59 foreign affairs, Greek 22 France 23 freedom 39, see also religious freedom fundamentalism 32, 34–5, 49 and Greek Orthodoxy 15, 36–7 Kalaitzidis, Pantelis 65–6, 70–1 and religious education 96, 144 and Yangazoglou 79, 96, 144 gender issues 29, 60, 77 ‘generation of the 1930s’ 47, 48, 51, 157 Germanos, Bishop of Patras 39 globalisation 14, 21, 24–5, 33–4, 155–6 anti-globalisation 70–1, 93–4 and religious education 93–4, 95–6, 122 globalism 75 globality 125 Golden Dawn party 44n7 Goulandri-Horn, Anna D. 1, 46n8 Great Britain 23 Great Idea 46, 63n24 Greece, ancient 44, 45, 46, 63, 85 Greece, history of, see history of Greece Greek Civil War 48 Greek Constitution 86–7, 99, 120, 128, 151, 158 Greek Orthodox Education in the TwentyFirst Century, edited by Cholevas 92–3, 112 ‘Greekness’, see Hellenism Gregorian calendar 72 Gregory the Theologian 43 Gregory V, Patriarch 39n1, 42–3 Grizopoulou, Olga 121, 124 Gyzis, Nikolaos 93

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Hart, Laurie K. 26 Hellenic Culture Foundation 95n24 Hellenism 1, 12, 45–52, 60, 62–3, 101, 119, 149, 157, 164 and Cholevas 92n19, 94–5 and Kalaitzidis 54, 68–9 and religious education 118–19, 142, 149 and Yannaras 8, 53, see also identity, national; nationalism heresy 72–3 Hervieu-Léger, Danièle 42, 66–7, 118 Herzfeld, Michael 29 Hieronymus, Archbishop of Athens 70, see also Ieronymos II, Archbishop history, idealised 98 history of Greece 22–6, 46–8 and religion 42, 63, 66, 75, 80, 84–6, 90, 142–3, 164 as a school subject 10, 118, 143 holidays, national 6, 42, 43, 99, 104, 142, 158 Holy Synod, Church of Greece 11, 60, 111, 134 homogeneity 5, 6, 23–4, 43, 86–7, 117, 120, 164 homosexuality 60 human rights 8, 9, 63n23, 127, 128, 133, 154, 159 Human Rights Charter 90 humanism 72, 76–7, 98, 105–6, 164 humanitarian aid 88 identity, cultural 25, 73–4, 122–3 and Kalaitzidis 76–7, 122–3 identity, national 1–2, 7–8, 44–5 and European Union (EU) 7, 8, 68–9 and religious education 27, 96–7, 101–3, 149 and Greek Constitution 86–7, 158 and religious diversity 118, 159 and religious identity 90–2, 112–13, 128, 137 textbooks 11, 142–3 and religious identity 12–13, 24–6, 33–7, 50–1, 118–19, 155–6, 157, 163–4

and Kalaitzidis 62–4, 69–70 see also Hellenism; nationalism identity, non-religious 138–9 identity, religious 4, 5–6, 35 as chosen people 78, 83n1, 84, 118–19, 125 and European Union (EU) 28, 160 and identity, national 12–13, 24–6, 33–7, 50–1, 118–19, 155–6, 157, 163–4 and Kalaitzidis 62–4, 69–70 and religious education 27, 96–7, 101–3, 149 and Greek Constitution 86–7, 158 and national identity 90–2, 112–13, 128, 137 and religious diversity 118, 159 textbooks 11, 142–3 identity, supranational 24–5, 63 identity, transnational 21 identity cards 7, 28, 57, 104n4, 133n5 Ieronymos II, Archbishop 2, 7, 60, 81, 88–9, 99, 108, 112, 136n13, 153 Ignatios, Metropolitan of Demetrias 57, 58n16, 98, 113n18 immigration 5, 9, 23–4, 34, 35, 46, 47, 78, 155 and religious education 86, 87, 116, 118, 128, 143 inclusivism 32–3, 116, 125, 128, 147 independence, Greek 39, 40, 42, 85, 142 Índiktos, publisher 4, 58 individualisation of religion 14, 26, 34, 35, 74 innovation, religious 14–15, 27, 28, 29–30, 33, 51, 55, 72, 163 and religious education 109, 129, 137, 154 Institute of Educational Policy, see Pedagogical Institute (later Institute of Educational Policy) integration, social 116n2, 118, 128 interfaith education 117, 123–7, 144, 152–3 Internet 33 Inter-Orthodox Centre, Church of Greece 16, 107, 111–14 Ioannidis, Alkinoos 102

Index Irineos, Bishop of Kisamos and Selinon 57n13 Islam 34, 79, 87n7, 106, 111, 148 Istina, journal 59 Jameson, Frederic 29 Jesus Christ 66, 123 John Paul, Pope 70, 111n16 journals, theological 2, 4, 53, 57, 59, 61, 68 Sýnaxis, journal 4, 16, 55–6, 57n12 Judaism 34, 111, 133, 148 Kaïris, Theophilos 72 KAIROS (Greek Theological Association for the Improvement of Religious Education) 55–6, 131, 134, 135–42, 151, 152, 154, 159, 161 Kalaitzidis, Pantelis 17–18, 53–4, 60–74, 75, 80, 81 and Academy for Theological Studies, Volos 56, 57, 58, 59 and ecumenism 77–8, 163 and fundamentalism 65–6, 70–1 and identity 54, 62–4, 68–70, 76–7, 122–3 and religious education 83, 121–3 Karamouzis, Polykarpos 117, 126–7 Klironomiá, periodical 68 Kontoglou, Fotis 47n10 Koukounaras-Liagis, Marios 97, 98, 126, 152 language 33, 44, 48, 74–5, 84, 85, 86, 118 Lausanne Treaty 23, 46, 47n9, 86n4, 87n7 leadership, church 2, 35, 51, 80, 84, 165 and Christodoulos 7, 54, 56–7, 58n14, 70, 78, 99, 104n and Ieronymos 88–9, 99, 112, 136n13 Liakos, Antonis 28, 165 lifestyle 23, 144 literature, Greek 3, 4, 47–8 liturgy 74–5 Lynch, Cecilia 10, 32–3, 36 Macedonia, Republic of 7, 22, 23, 104n4, 107 Maïstros, publisher 4

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Makrides, Vasilios and MolokotosLiederman, Lina 5, 12, 42 Makris, Gerasimos and Bekridakis, Dimitris 81 martyrs, national 42–3 Marxism 13n19, 48 Matalas, Paraskevas 40, 41 Matthopoulos, Father Eusebius 49n13 media, global 25 media, power of 102 media coverage 60–1, 90–1, 95 Memoranda (2010–2012) 79 memory, cultural 66, 67, 117–18 Metallinos, Georgios 120 metaphysics 47, 50–1, 63, 64, 71, 163 Metaxas, Ioannis 43 Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs 88, 116n2, 132–3, 134, 140, 153–4, 159, 161, 162n5, see also Diamantopoulou, Anna Mission, charity 7 missionary work 41, 120 modernisation of the Orthodox Church 13–14, 27–30, 59–61, 74–5, 80 and Christodoulos 58n14, 70 and religious education 122, 135–42, 143–4 modernity 46, 47–8, 69–75, 98–9 late 30–3, 67, 78, 79, 81, 155, 157, 162, 164 post-modernity 65–6, 148 monarchy 49 monasticism 47n10, 49–50, 65n26, 90 Mount Athos 5, 6n9, 7, 83 multiculturalism 24, 32, 75–9, 94, 156, 161, 164 and religious education 113, 115–29, 139, 144, 147–8, 163 see also diversity; Otherness; pluralism music 23, 80 Mussolini, Benito 43 national communities 1, 21, 61, 63, 119, 144, 155, 164 nationalisation of Orthodox Church 28, 39, 40–1, 84, 163 denationalisation 25, 37, 155–6, 164 nationalism 24, 37–52, 61–7, 69–70, 164

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and Kalaitzidis 54–5, 77–8 neo-nationalist 82, 157 post-national 13, 77, 79, 163, 164 and religious education 83–6, 102–3, 128, 149 see also Hellenism; identity, national nation-building 46–7, 85, 93, 99, 117, 158 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 9 Natsios, Dimitris 118 Nazis 86n4 Néa Efthíni, journal 53, 61 Neo-Orthodoxy 8, 10, 49–51, 55, 68, 80, 90, 157 and religious education 94, 101, 106 neutrality, religious 137–9, 144, 153 New Democracy 22, 162n5 ‘New School: Focus on the Pupil’, bill 135, 145 Nissiotis, Nikos 68 Nussbaum, Martha 77, 126 obscurantism 92 Order + Disorder: Young People Cry Out (Koukounaras-Liagis, Marios) 97–8, 102, 138 Orthodox Academy of Crete (OAC) 57n13 Orthodox churches 21 Orthodox Greek Church, see Church of Greece Orthodoxy, Greek 21–37, 39–42, 50–1, 71 de-Orthodoxisation 133–4, 139, 140, 141 Neo-Orthodoxy 8, 10, 49–51, 55, 68, 80, 90, 157 and religious education 94, 101, 106 and religious education 137, 140 values 94, 147–8 Otherness 8–10, 32, 72, 78, 156 and religious education 12, 115, 116, 122, 123, 125, 138–9, 148, 151 ‘construction of otherness’ 128, 159 ‘theology of otherness’ 10, 18, 78, 124, 125, 140 see also diversity; multiculturalism; pluralism

Otto, King 39, 72n29 Ottoman Empire 11, 39, 40–1, 46, 60, 84, 93, 118, 142 paganism 35–6, 45, 64–5 Palamas, Kostis 45 Pan-Hellenic Union of Theologians (PETH) 11, 55, 88n10, 89, 134, 135, 136–7, 138, 139, 141 Papandreou, Andreas 22 Paparrigopoulos, Konstantinos 45, 46, 63 Papathanasiou, Thanasis 55, 56n10 particularisation, religious 1, 32–3, 64, 161 PASOK government 22, 28, 57, 154 paternalism 61 patristic theology 47, 50, 59–60, 67–8, 112, 140, 141, 148 Pedagogical Institute (later Institute of Educational Policy) 10, 16, 89, 125, 132–3, 142, 151 Pentecostalism 34, 35 ΠEΘ, see Pan-Hellenic Union of Theologians (PETH) philosophy 26, 67, 127, 162 pluralism 6, 9, 32–3, 81 cultural 23, 24, 78, 96 ethnic 12–13, 78 and religious education 114, 116, 147–8, 151, 159 post-colonialism 10, 32 post-modernity 65–6, 148 post-structuralism 25, 31 pre-modernity 65 printing, invention of 33 privacy, personal 99, 132, 133, 158 Programme of Study (PS) 131, 145, 147–53, 154, 159–60, 162 Protestantism 21, 34, 39, 41, 49, 67, 72–5, 148 psychology 105, 115 ‘purist innovation’ 29 purity, cultural 43–6, 48, 51, 52 purity, religious 21–37, 71–2, 156, 157 ‘Radical Orthodoxy’ movement 71 Rebetika, music 23 ‘religion without culture’ 6, 71, 156

Index religiosity 4, 12n18, 49, 52, 73, 124, 150, 164 religious discrimination 12–13 religious diversity 160 and religious education 89, 106, 115–16, 120, 125–6, 143–4, 147–8, 159, 163 religious education 10–11, 16–17, 83–99, 101–14, 115–29, 135–54 and culture, Greek 119–20, 122, 151 and economy, Greek 13n20, 153, 154, 161, 162–3 and ecumenism 94–5, 96, 111, 143, 144 and European Union (EU) 153, 159 exemption from 89, 90, 96n25, 127, 131, 152, 162 Ministry of Education circulars 132–3, 134, 151n27, 154, 159 and fundamentalism 96, 144 and globalisation 93–4, 95–6, 122 and Greek State 91, 99 and identity 27, 90–2, 96–7, 101–3, 112–13, 128, 137, 149, 158, 159 and Greek Constitution 86–7, 158 and religious diversity 118, 159 textbooks 11, 142–3 and immigration 86, 87, 116, 118, 128, 143 and innovation, religious 109, 129, 137, 154 interfaith education 117, 123–7, 144, 152–3 and KAIROS 55–6, 131, 134, 135–42, 151, 152, 154, 159, 161 mandatory 87, 89, 95, 119, 122–3, 125, 139 and nationalism/Hellenism 83–6, 102–3, 118–19, 128, 142, 149 and Orthodox Church 88n10, 137, 140 and modernisation of 94, 101, 106, 122, 135–42, 143–4 and Otherness 12, 115, 116, 122, 123, 125, 138–9, 148, 151 ‘construction of otherness’ 128, 159 and multiculturalism 113, 115–29, 139, 144, 147–8, 163

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and pluralism 114, 116, 147–8, 151, 159 and religious diversity 89, 106, 115–16, 120, 125–6, 143–4, 147–8, 159, 163 and progressive thought 95–9, 108–14, 120, 128–9, 131–54, 158–63 and teachers 131–2, 134, 135, 139, 154, 159, 160–2 see also Kalaitzidis, Pantelis; Yangazoglou, Stavros reform 68, 158–60 religion class 115–29, 131–4, 152–4, 158, 160–3 and traditionalism 92–5, 99, 108, 112, 116–17, 122, 133–4, 158–9, 160–1 and KAIROS 135–7, 138, 139–42, 152–3 and national curriculum 145–7, 154, 162 teachers 111, 113, 114 see also catechist way of teaching; confessionalism in religious education and traditionalists 92–5, 99, 108, 112, 116–17, 122, 133–4, 158–9, 160–1 and KAIROS 135–7, 138, 139–42, 152–3 and national curriculum 145–7, 154, 162 teachers 111, 113, 114 see also Cholevas, Konstantinos; Christodoulos, Archbishop see also curriculum, national; schools; teachers; teaching methods religious freedom 63n23, 90–2, 99, 124, 127, 137, 138–9, 158, 162 religious literacy 147 religious neutrality 137–9, 144, 153 religious purity 21–37, 71–2, 156, 157 repentance 73 Repousi, Maria 11 respect 104, 124, 138–9, 151 Ritsos, Yannis 48, 85n3 ritual 74, 149 Romanian Institute for Inter-Religious Dialogue 59 Roudometof, Victor 12

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Roy, Olivier 6, 14, 33–7, 64, 66, 71, 74, 79, 155–6 Safran, William 24–5 St. Basil the Great 43, 81 saints, patron 43, 99 Sakellariou, Alexandros 115 salvation, personal 35 Samaras, Antonis 83n1 same sex partnerships 60n20 School Reform (2010) 11n15, 135, 154, 159–60 schools primary 85, 89, 112, 114, 116n2 and national curriculum 87, 145–7 teachers 16, 89, 111n15, 134, 137 textbooks 142–3, 145–7 rural 104 secondary 87, 101–2, 114, 133 teachers 16, 26–7, 56, 101, 103–7, 115–16, 135, 137, 153 textbooks 11, 16, 105, 142–3 urban 104 schools, acts of worship 85–6, 97 Second Coming 66 ‘secret schools’ 56, 84–5, 93, 99, 158 secularity 5, 9, 11, 12–13, 14, 24–5, 42, 54, 96, 110 de-secularisation 21, 31 post-secularisation 31, 32 Seferis, Georgios 48 Simitis, Costas 28, 153 Smyrna 23, 46 social activism 25 social class 77 social mobility 27 social welfare 25, 80–1, 88, 165 socialism 76, 110 sociology 115 solidarity 32, 67, 72, 80–1 Solidarity, charity 7 Sotir brotherhood 49 Spiliotopoulos, Aris 119 spiritual values 80, 98, 105–6, 151, 164 State Council 90–2 Stathopoulou, Theoni 11n18 stereotyping 104 Stewart, Charles 45

subjectivity 31 Sýnaxis, journal 4, 16, 55–6, 57n12 syncretism 10, 45, 78, 95 synthesis 45–6, 48, 50, 59 Tatsis, Ioannis 95 teacher training 16, 107–14, 134, 150n24, 152, 154, 158–9, 162 teacher-pupil relationships 103–6 teachers counselling role 105, 106, 108, 114 employment issues 137, 153, 161–2 KAIROS 55–6, 131, 134, 135–42, 151, 152, 154, 159, 161 of primary schools 16, 89, 111n15, 134, 137 progressives 131–2, 134, 135, 139, 154, 159, 160–2 of secondary schools 16, 26–7, 56, 101, 103–7, 115–16, 135, 137, 153 theologically trained 104, 115–16, 124, 128, 148–9, 153, 154, 155, 158–9 traditionalists 111, 113, 114 teaching methods 108, 109, 110, 114, 135, 148, 150–1, 160 catechist way of teaching 86, 109–10, 112, 113, 117, 122, 145–7 and textbooks 143, 146, 154 confessionalism in 109, 110, 111–12, 113, 117, 119–22, 143, 145, 158, 162 non-confessional curriculum 133, 153 textbooks 10–11, 39, 109, 135, 145–7, 149–51, 154, 162n5, 163 and catechist way of teaching 143, 146, 154 history 88n10, 102n2 and identity 11, 142–3 primary 142–3, 145–7 secondary 11, 16, 105, 142–3 theologians, as teachers 89, 104, 124, 128, 149, 154, 155, 158–9 secondary 101, 115–16, 135, 153 theologians, progressive 27, 56, 104n4 ‘44 theologians’ 134, 139

Index and religious education 95–9, 131–54, 159, 160–2 theology 26–7, 137 Theós & Thriskeia, journal 57n12 Theotokas, Georgios 48, 75n33 Thermos, Vasilios 53, 78 Thessaloniki, Bishop of 60 thought, progressive 55–61, 157, 164 and religious education 95–9, 108–14, 120, 128–9, 131–54, 158–63 and teachers 131–2, 134, 135, 139, 154, 159, 160–2 thriskeftiká, blog 95, 112, 118, 133, 139–41 Thriskeiologia Ierá/Vévila, journal 57n12 To Vima, newspaper 53 tourism 23 traditionalism 2–3, 118–20, 155, 156–7 authenticity, religious 8–10, 28–9, 62, 63, 163, 164 fundamentalism 65–6, 96 and religious education 92–5, 99, 108, 112, 116–17, 122, 133–4, 158–9, 160–1 and KAIROS 135–7, 138, 139–42, 152–3 and national curriculum 145–7, 154, 162 teachers 111, 113, 114 see also catechist way of teaching; confessionalism in religious education ‘traditionocracy’ 62 Troika 81, 161n3 Turkey 22, 23–4, 46, 79, 117, 142 Twentieth Century 46–51 ‘uncultured religion’ 156 ‘unintentional innovation’ 30 Union of Theologians 161 universalism 21, 76, 77, 161, 163 university admission 131, 133

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University Professors Initiative Group 119 unrest, social 97 USA 9, 91 Valianatos, Angelos 112 Vamvounaki, Maro 4 Vasiliadis, Petros 120 Venizelos, Eleftherios 46 Virgin Mary, holiday of 43 Volos 2n3 Volos, Metropolis of, see Demetrias, Metropolis of War of Independence 42, 85, 142 Ware, Kallistos 30 westernisation 8, 9, 41, 52, 68–9, 91, 113, 155–6 anti-Westernism 49–51, 70–1, 72, 90, 99, 104n4, 155 Willert, Trine S. and MolokotosLiederman, Lina 29 women 29, 49, 58 World Council of Churches (WCC) 5 World War I 46 World War II 48 xenophobia 78, 88, 116, 120 Yangazoglou, Stavros 4, 56n10, 69, 76, 78–9, 92n18 and fundamentalism 79, 96, 144 and religious education 88n10, 96, 112, 113, 124–6, 140, 143–5, 154 Yannaras, Christos 8, 9, 35, 50–1, 53, 54n1, 60–1, 72, 94, 95 Yatromanolakis, Georgis 96n25 Ypsilantis, General Alexander 39 Yugoslavia 9, 23 Zambelios, Spyridion 45, 51 Zambeta, Evie 96–7, 142 Zizioulas, Ioannis 4, 69 Zoi brotherhood 49, 72 Zoumboulakis, Stavros 61, 67, 121