New Eastern European Migration to Australia: From Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine to Sydney and beyond 3031070941, 9783031070945

Citation preview

New Eastern European Migration to Australia From Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine to Sydney and beyond Olga Oleinikova

New Eastern European Migration to Australia

Olga Oleinikova

New Eastern European Migration to Australia From Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine to Sydney and beyond

Olga Oleinikova University of Technology Sydney Ultimo, NSW, Australia

ISBN 978-3-031-07094-5    ISBN 978-3-031-07095-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07095-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my parents who gave me a start To my grandparents who continue to be an inspiration To my family who allowed me to question things To Kira, Richard and Kirill

Acknowledgements

Over the years, many individuals and institutions have contributed to and supported the research and writing of this book. In Australia I would like to thank the most wonderful Ukrainians, Hungarians and Czechs who generously contributed their time and life stories to this book. I made some great new friends through this research. My Sydney colleagues and friends too numerous to name have provided hospitality, affection and intellectual guidance. In Ukraine, I would like to thank my family and friends, my parents, Ira Oleinikova and Andrew Oleinikov, and grandparents, Alevtyna and Boris Oleinikovs and Volodymyr Kaidash, who are my continued support and source of energy and inspiration. Finally, I want to thank my husband, Kyrylo Medvediev, who is my best intellectual partner and the person who is always on my side morally supporting all my ventures. Bearing and raising children has given me a new perspective on this controversial world we live in. I hope Kira and Richard will forgive their mother for remaining glued to a laptop for nearly two years and not infrequently declining to go outside and play.

vii

Contents

1 Migration  from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers and Research Gap  1 1.1 Why Eastern European Migration to Australia?   1 1.2 Historical Overview and Migration Waves   5 1.3 Conceptual Model and Methodology   8 References 39 2 New  Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies and Migrant Profiles 51 2.1 Emigration Dynamics from Ukraine to Australia: Structural Contexts  53 2.2 Who Are They: Three Profiles of Post-­Independence Ukrainian Migrants to Australia  59 2.3 Conclusion  75 References 76 3 Czech  Migrants Making a Home in Australia 79 3.1 Emigration from Czech Republic Between 2000–2021: Economic and Political Contexts  80 3.2 Migration to Australia: Reasons & Motivations  90 3.3 Class Belonging and Dead-end/Bricolage Careers  93 References 99 ix

x Contents

4 The  New Hungarians on The Move103 4.1 Hungarians in Australia: Short Historical Overview 104 4.2 Emigration from Hungary During 2000–2021: Structural Contexts 106 4.3 Why Australia? Reasons & Motivations 117 4.4 One Story of Migration 123 4.5 Conclusion 126 References127 5 New  Directions for East Europeans and Migration Studies133 5.1 Profiling Migration from Ukraine, Hungary and Czech Republic134 5.2 New Patterns of East European Migration to Australia 142 5.3 Limitations 144 References146 I ndex147

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Ukrainian citizens granted refugee status in Australia and asylum applications submitted by Ukrainian citizens 2014–2021. (Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Data extracted: 15 December 2021, https://www. unhcr.org/refugee-­statistics/) 58 Fig. 4.1 Monthly Wages, $USD, 2016. (Source: ILOSTAT, WorldBank)120 Fig. 4.2 Dominant streams of modern Hungarian migration to Australia120

xi

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Ukrainian citizens granted refugee status in Australia and asylum applications submitted by Ukrainian citizens 1999–200955 Table 5.1 Three Profiles: Migrants from Ukraine, Hungary, Czech Republic to Australia 2000–2021 135

xiii

1 Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers and Research Gap

1.1 Why Eastern European Migration to Australia? With the rapid acceleration of Eastern European migration to Australia since the 2000s (particularly from three East European countries— Ukraine, Hungary and the Czech Republic) and the overall shift in the global political economy, there is now the emergence of new Eastern Europeans on the move. These new Eastern European migrants and diasporas are pioneers in the establishment of multiple homes in new geographical locations of Asia-Pacific region, the development of new (global and hybrid) East European identities and the creation of new (political, economic and social) inspirations through their mobile lives. This modern wave of Eastern European migration to Australia follows the increasing economic and political crises engulfing Eastern European democratic regimes (Rodrik & Wacziarg, 2005; Zielonka, 2014; Keane, 2009; Koinova, 2009; Birch, 2017). In the last 15 years there has been a particularly dramatic increase in arrivals to Australia from Ukraine (by 97.6%), the Czech Republic (by 132.4%) and Hungary (by 180.2%)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Oleinikova, New Eastern European Migration to Australia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07095-2_1

1

2 

O. Oleinikova

(SBS Census Explorer, 2016). Immigrants from Eastern Europe, mostly young or early middle-aged people, personify individuals who make not only a physical transition between countries (very distant from each other, even on a planetary scale) but also a transition between cultural backgrounds, including quite different systems of government and bureaucracy, different economic cultures and cultures of gender and interpersonal relations. Despite these striking developments and statistics, there has been very little research into East European migration to Australia. Research into migration to Australia from East Europe (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia) is very limited. There are fragmented studies in the form of isolated articles and book chapters about Polish migrants and diaspora in Australia (Kinowska & Pakulski, 2018; Forrest & Kusek, 2016; Johnston, 2012; Pendakur & Bevelander, 2021; Romanowski, 2021); the linguistic integration of Russian migrants in Australia (Ryazantsev, 2014; Team et  al., 2007); Hungarians in Australia (Andits, 2010; Cutcher, 2015; Petra, 2020; Petra, 2022); lived experiences of Czech and Slovak migrants in Australia (Adamec et al., 2022) and Ukrainians in Australia (Oleinikova, 2020a; Oleinikova, 2017; Oleinikova, 2019; Serbin, 2006). There is a critical lack of comparative studies and systemic analysis about the reasons behind modern East European arrivals to Australia, who come from the most active donor countries (Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary), as well as their migration outcomes in terms of employment, identity and class. Recent immigrants from Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary, countries that had socio-political systems based on principles and values often diametrically opposed to those of Australia, are of research interest and require an interdisciplinary research agenda at the intersection of economic theory, public policy (with a practical application in the form of immigration policy), sociology and psychology. If we think about the mainstream literature on international migration in the Asia-Pacific, it mainly explores numerous aspects of cross-country mobility within one classic paradigm, scrutinising migration separately across the stages before, during and after migration, or in generalist structural terms: labour migration in the global context of capitalist development, colonial expansion and imperialism (Castles & Miller, 2009;

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

3

Castles, 2010; Massey et al., 1988; O’Reilly, 2012); migration as a ‘substantial contribution’ to Australia’s workforce (Arunachalam & Healy, 2009; Hugo, 2004; Florida, 2005; Kuptsch & Pang, 2006); skilled temporary migration turning into permanent (Khoo et al., 2008); shifts in Australian immigration policy (Castles et  al., 2013; Boucher, 2013; Markus et al., 2009; Hugo, 2006a, 2006b; Arunachalam & Healy, 2009; Hawthorne, 2005) and the skilled migration agenda (Birrell & Healy, 2003); academic mobility as ‘brain mobility’ (Kenway & Fahey, 2009; Williams, 2006); and the role of family and social networks in skilled migration (Vertovec, 2002; Gill & Bialski, 2011; Kennedy, 2004; Scott, 2007; Castles, 2010). None of this literature, however, takes into account migrants’ life strategies, which provides critical insights into both the individual motivations for and structural frames/contexts of migration, as well as migration pathway from before- to after-migration periods. Such a transformative experience can be traumatic, but it can also be rewarding for an individual who ultimately undergoes a transition from a passive ‘survival’ life strategy to a creative and fulfilling life strategy of achievement. These issues were covered in the author’s previous works on Ukrainian migration to Australia (e.g., Oleinikova, 2020a; Oleinikova, 2017; Oleinikova, 2020b), but since then, the body of research in this area has practically not been replenished with new studies. During 2012–2016, I conducted the first systematic study of the modern wave of Ukrainian migration to Australia (Oleinikova, 2020a) and analysed how their lives are shaped by structural factors (e.g. crisis in Ukraine, Australian migration system) and individual agency (e.g. personal values, needs, aims) before, during and after migration. The study resulted in a monograph presenting a detailed analysis of survival and achievement life strategies of Ukrainian migrants to Australia (Oleinikova, 2020a). The main purpose of this book is to advance that research on broader sample and new material, with the research focus not only on Ukraine but also on the Czech Republic and Hungary as countries with similar histories of regime transition and similar emigration dynamics. This book is the first comparative account and systemic analysis of the new forms and paths of Eastern European migration to Australia since the 2000s.

4 

O. Oleinikova

The two main research questions that drive the analysis presented in this book are: (1) why Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migrants come to Australia (why now?) and (2) what their migration outcomes are. By addressing these two core questions, this book provides updated trends of contemporary migration movements of the Ukrainians, Hungarians and Czechs, who are the fastest growing migrant groups of Eastern Europeans in Australia. With chapters highlighting the diversities and complexities of these new waves of Eastern European migration to Australia, this book offers novel insights into reasons and migration outcomes to enrich our understanding of East European mobility in the twenty-first century. The mix-method empirical research that was undertaken—113 real-­ world engaging stories of migration from Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary to Australia, including the combination of qualitative interpretation and secondary statistical data analysis, and the author’s own life experience as a migrant—was guided by the life strategy approach to understanding reasons and outcomes of migration (explained in the last subsection of this chapter). Within this framework, migration is understood to be a tool used to help an individual achieve their goals and cope with the economic, political and social changes in Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary caused by long-lasting post-socialist transitions and the associated political and economic turbulences in the period between 2000 and 2021. The life strategy framework helps to conceptualise migration decision-making and understand the reasons behind migration given set of structural and individual frames. Subsequently, with this book I seek to fill the gap in the literature and identify the mechanisms through which the concepts of life strategy, regime transition and migration can generate a depth insight into the following issues: the relevance of the experience of migration to individual actor’s lives after migration; the migration rationales that are relevant for migrants from different countries; and the structural and agency factors that facilitate the implementation of modern migration from Eastern European countries to Australia.

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

5

1.2 Historical Overview and Migration Waves The detailed overview of the history of immigration to Australia in eighteenth to twentieth centuries is beyond the scope of this book. This subject is comprehensively described elsewhere, for example, in Sherington (1990) or Jupp (2002). The evolution of Australian immigration policy can be concisely summarised by the table of contents in Sherington (1990), which reads as follows: “Britain’s Overseas Penal Colony; The Formation Of Colonial Society; Victorian Britain Overseas; An Imperial Dominion; A Multi-cultural Society”. If more or less stable influx of migrants to Australia from outside England was outlined only in the second half of the twentieth century, as the policy of multiculturalism developed, there are some records of early isolated cases of voluntary or forced immigration from Eastern European countries. For example, Isaac Friedman, a Hungarian-Jewish merchant who arrived in Australia in 1833 with his wife and child, was the first recorded emigrant from Hungary (Osvát & Osvát, 2010; Kovacs, 2005), while Mark Blucher was the first recorded Czech national who settled permanently in Australia (Mark Blucher was deported to Australian jail in 1830 for stealing some lace and ultimately settled in Sydney—Cigler, 1983). Such examples, however, were sporadic. The insignificance of the influx of migrants from Eastern Europe during the colonial and imperial dominion period is illustrated by the data on immigration from Hungary: between 1883 and 1910, only 88 people of Hungarian descent boarded Australia (Osvát & Osvát, 2010). The noticeable arrivals of migrants from Eastern Europe into Australia are dated back to the existence of the Soviet Union (1922–1991) and the spread of its control over the socialist camp countries, such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic after World War II. The immigration to Australia from Eastern Europe in that period in many cases was impeded to the degree of being impossible. In the Soviet era, “more than ever, East European officials linked emigration to the West to slavery, exploitation, and moral ruin” (Zahra, 2016, p. 403). During this period, however, windows of emigration opportunity rarely opened, as was the case in the first few years after World War II, when thousands of

6 

O. Oleinikova

displaced persons from Eastern Europe arrived in Australia. Another case took place in 1956 when the Soviets suppressed a nationalist revolt in Hungary, and around 14,000 Hungarians fled to Australia. A similar exodus took place in Czechoslovakia in 1968, when the Soviet army invaded Prague to crush the ‘Prague Spring’, and more than five and a half thousand Czech refugees came to Australia with diplomatic support from the Australian Government (Sherington, 1990, pp.  217–218). Despite the political and logistical challenges for emigration from Eastern European countries, the Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics shows that Eastern Europeans comprised 37% of all arrivals to Australia since 1947, making them the most numerous immigrant group of non-British descent. In the first two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991–2001), Australia has become a relatively popular destination for permanent emigrants from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine, but not to the same extent as the United States and Canada (Strielkowski, 2012). It should be emphasised that Australia has traditionally been a target for permanent migration, while Czechs and Hungarians most often looked for temporary work in closer places, mainly in Western Europe. Ukraine at that time didn’t have visa-free travel arrangements with Western European countries but preferred to go for labour migration to Poland and Russia. The 2000s onwards saw a new wave of migration from Eastern Europe to Australia. The absolute majority (80.9%) of Hungary-born people in Australia arrived in that country before 2007 (for comparison, 61.8% of the total overseas-born population arrived in Australia before 2007). A further 7.2% of Hungary-born people arrived in Australia between 2007 and 2011 and 8.3% of Hungarians joined the Australian community between 2012 and 2016 (Department of Home Affairs, 2018c). The Czech Australian diaspora is somewhat younger in comparison with the Hungarian one. Thus, only 72.1% of natives of the Czech Republic arrived in Australia before 2007, which is almost ten p.p. lower than the corresponding figure for Hungary. Accordingly, more Czech natives came to Australia relatively recently: 9.3% of Hungarians

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

7

immigrated between 2007 and 2011 and 15.1% between 2012 and 2016 (Department of Home Affairs, 2018b). The waves of the arrival of Ukrainian immigrants in Australia were quite similar to those of Czech. In general, however, Ukrainians arrived in greater numbers in the long run, but not as much as Hungarians (the numbers are provided below). Prior to 2007, 73.6% of Ukrainian natives arrived in Australia. Thereafter, 10.2% of Ukrainians arrived in Australia between 2007 and 2011 and 12.9% between 2012 and 2016 (Department of Home Affairs, 2018a). A distinctive feature of the Ukrainian arrivals from 2003 onwards is the quality of migrants—the first time in the history of Ukrainian migration to Australia, the numbers of skilled migrants from Ukraine outnumbered the arrivals through family reunion and humanitarian streams (Oleinikova, 2020a). This gives an indication of the changing quality of migrants from Ukraine to Australia that are bringing new skills, knowledge and new perspectives to Australia. Among the three nations of particular interest to this book (Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian), the Hungarian diaspora in Australia is the largest. According to the latest census in 2016, 73,614 Australians have identified their Hungarian descent. For comparison, there were 46,186 responses towards Ukrainian ancestry, and only 24,475 census participants indicated their Czech origin (Department of Home Affairs, 2018a; Department of Home Affairs, 2018b). Geopolitically, the Australian Government reaffirmed its support of multiculturalism agenda in 1999, with National Multicultural Advisory Council (NMAC) claiming “optimistic about Australia’s future as a culturally diverse society and confident that Australian multiculturalism will continue to be a defining feature of our evolving national identity and contribute substantial benefits to all Australians” (Jupp, 2002, p.  95). Also, since the beginning of the 2000s, statistics show stable growth in Australia’s demand for highly skilled migrants, with the number of those who immigrated on a Skill Visa almost tripled: from 447,000  in 2000–2001 to 1,286,000 thousand in 2015–2016. The increase in immigration to Australia in 2000–2001 can also be connected to The 2000 Sydney Olympics. Djajić (2005) points out that during the preparations for the Sydney Olympics in 2000, the demand for labour, including low-­ skilled labour, increased sharply, which in a certain way served as a

8 

O. Oleinikova

prerequisite for the increase in illegal migration. Oleinikova (2020a, p. 144) also considers this matter, referencing some Ukrainian migrants who described the 2000 Sydney Olympics as one of those “favourable times […] which saw loosened immigration restrictions”, when the usual pattern of illegal migration was to come to Australia on a tourist visa, ostensibly to support the national sports team, and then stay. The 2008 global financial crisis is also considered to be a factor contributing to emigration, especially of highly skilled workers, who, in the face of rising unemployment and a worsening economic situation, are looking for better prospects abroad. In March 2000, due to the global outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia closed its borders to the entry of tourists and temporary migrants (including students and skilled workers). As of mid-2021, migration restrictions are still in place, and the influx of temporary and permanent migrants to Australia is virtually non-existent. Many temporary residents, including those on short-term visas, who were in Australia at the time of the onset of the COVID-19-related restrictions, remained in Australia. Border closures affect not only the dynamics of migration in Australia but also the economic, social and psychological status of migrants. A large number of migrant workers and international students in Australia faced potential destitution with loss of work due to economic slowdown and no access to a social safety net (Shakespeare-Finch et al., 2020). The Australian government has yet to find a new balance of restrictive and supportive immigration policies to offset the distortionary impact of coronavirus on immigration policy. The impact of the COVID-19 on the migrants from Eastern European countries to Australia remains completely unexplored.

1.3 Conceptual Model and Methodology To understand the reasons and migration outcomes behind modern (2000s–onwards) arrivals of Ukrainians, Czechs and Hungarians to Australia, this book applies life strategy research framework that allows for investigation of one’s life before and after migration.

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

9

Central to the life strategy conceptual framework are the following key ideas: life strategy, regime transition and migration. Life strategy is understood as a set of micro factors (individual values, aims, migration decision-­ making, agency); regime transition and associated political, economic and social unrest—as a context that shapes the migration decision and impacts the actual act of migration (migration streams and pathways)— and migration—as a tool used to assist in the implementation of one’s life strategy. This section discusses the key ideas and concepts that build up the original life strategy research framework and provides new conceptual and methodological tools for social scientists who want to study the life strategies of mobile social actors.

Life Strategy The definition of life strategy in this book is based on the definition suggested by Reznik and Smirnov (2002): they suggest a life strategy is a dynamic, self-adjusting system of socio-cultural presentations of individuals about their own lives, which orients their behaviour across a protracted period of life. Being a dynamic phenomenon, life strategies are analysed in this book across two dimensions, the temporal and the spatial. These two suggested dimensions form the frames of the life strategy conceptual framework developed for this book. The temporal layer is used to investigate how migration decision-making and reasoning is being made in the time before the actual act of migration in the period between 2000 and 2021. The spatial layer of analysis of the life strategies was used to conduct analysis of the migration outcomes, getting insight into the lives of migrants before migration: in Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and after migration: in Australia. In considering the spatial dimensions of migration, I draw on the conceptual difference between space and place that has been developed in recent debates in geography. When defining place, I rely on the definition that has been applied by several authors (Massey, 1994; Agnew, 1987; Martin, 2003), who conceptualise place as a socially constructed reality that is constituted through individuals and their interactions with

10 

O. Oleinikova

physical space, locals and environments. I leave aside the disciplines that have concentrated on only one dimension of place such as gender studies that mainly stress the construction of masculine spaces (Saar & Palang, 2009), which see places mainly as socially produced (Hubbard et  al., 2004). The spatial layer of life strategy conceptual framework relates to the unity of geographical space and the meanings attached to socially constructed places. In applying this understanding, I follow the logic of Entrikin (1991), who suggested the concept of the “betweenness of places” which brings together the individualistic meanings attached to place and the objective “naturalistic qualities of place” (geography). As such, I have used the notion of space as a meeting point of the subjective (socially constructed meanings migrants attach to place) and objective space (the actual physical reality of a geographic place). There are significant differences in the way ‘life strategy’ is conceptualised in the Western (Western European and North American) and Eastern European (Ukrainian, Polish, Russian) scholarship. The significant divergences in life strategy approaches between these two dissimilar academies are determined by historical, geographical, socio-economic and political differences, as well as different traditions of social research. In the Western tradition, the notion of a life strategy refers to the integrity of the life-­ world of individuals, their aspirations for the future and the ability to change their own lives in accordance with the social challenges and demands of the present and the future. In sociology, life strategies are usually related to the pursuing of conscious, rationally chosen, long-term planned goals (Crow, 1989, p. 2). As Morgan (1989, p. 26) noted, one of the main merits of studying life strategies is its capacity to assist in the analysis of “the complex dance between agency and structure”. If life strategies are developed in conditions of severe constraints, their study can reveal how social structures can influence agents’ actions as well as how social agents attempt to overcome structurally set limitations (Crow, 1989, p. 19). However, it should be noted that today the concept of individual life strategy is still an under-theorised phenomenon and lacks a clear and concise definition and research methodology. This concept is especially vague when it comes to the role that social structures play in life strategy formation and enactment during the transitional and crisis

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

11

stages of political, social and economic transformation in the post-­ communist countries of Eastern Europe and related migrations.

Western Perspectives In the Western tradition (North America and Western Europe) the notion of a life strategy refers to the most complex and integral manifestation of a person’s life. It expresses the integrity of the life-world of individuals, their aspirations for the future and the ability to change their own lives in accordance with the social challenges and demands of the present and the future. In sociology, life strategies are usually related to the pursuing of conscious, rationally chosen, long-term planned goals (Crow, 1989, p. 2). As Morgan (1989, p. 26) noted, one of the main merits of studying life strategies is its capacity to assist in the analysis of “the complex dance between agency and structure”. If life strategies are developed in conditions of severe constraints, their study can reveal how social structures can influence agents’ actions as well as how social agents attempt to overcome structurally set limitations (Crow, 1989, p. 19). The concept of life strategy in Western traditions was initially articulated within the studies of life trajectory and social change. The history of life strategy studies can be traced back to the research activities of the Chicago school of sociology in the early twentieth century. Inspired by a study of Thomas and Znaniecki (1958), these researchers began to use life records to study social change and the life trajectories of individuals (Elder, 1985, p. 24). This study for many years was a ‘benchmark’, which successfully combined the analysis and synthesis of empirical data, as well as providing a single, logically consistent theory of human behaviour based on social actions analysed through concepts such as ‘social values’ and ‘social attitudes’. In addition, Thomas and Znaniecki (1958) based their work on a study of autobiographies and personal documents from which they built a scale of social types. Although the term ‘life strategy’ is not used in their work, their analysis underpins the exploration of life strategies within the context of adaptation and migration. This work can be considered as the foundation on which much of the subsequent research on individual life strategies in the West is based.

12 

O. Oleinikova

Before analysing the concept of life strategy within Western sociological traditions, it is important to briefly mention that the Western psychological perspective on life strategy also has a long and varied tradition that has significantly contributed to the way we conceptualise life strategy today. Of particular value is the research of classical psychological thought, such as Berne (1964), Maslow (1967), Allport (1960), Fromm (1968) and Jung (1967), who produced extensive and varied material that could be applied in the integrated and complex study of life strategies from a sociological angle. Their ideas have been further developed in the writings of scholars such as Berger and Luckmann (1966), Garfinkel (1967), Goffman (1959; 1974) and Schutz (1967). These studies examined social attitudes, the phenomenological concepts of subjectivity and intersubjectivity of individual behaviour (‘life-world’), the concept of strategic action and interaction, as well as applied methods of investigation of personal life activities (ethnomethodology, etc.). Hence, the concept of life strategy as a tool for undertaking analysis is complex, especially given its origins in psychological scholarship and its relatively recent transfer to sociological research. The debate on the use of the term ‘life strategy’ in Western sociological thought from the late 1980s to the early 1990s has been useful in explicating some of the meanings associated with this term. These meanings have informed my conceptual research framework. The debate falls into four general areas. The first area is the idea that the concept of life strategy originated in a military context for the purpose of strategic thinking, including implications to hierarchy and military imperialism (Shaw, 1990). Its use spread into a variety of social settings and led to the ‘civilianisation of military language’ (Shaw, 1990, cited in Edward & Ribbens, 1991). Shaw criticised Crow’s (1989, p. 2) idea that strategies are usually related to conscious behaviour and rationally chosen, long-term planned goals. He also critiqued the idea that the concept of life strategy derives from game theory or more generally rational-­choice theory (Elster, 1983, 1986). Instead, Shaw (1990, p. 465) stressed the implications of the term’s military origins and its “connotations for sociology” in terms of the development of methodological tools and theories to better describe the relationship of ‘strategy’ to ‘planning’ in the strategic thinking of social actors. The debate on the military

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

13

origins of the concept of life strategy has influenced further studies of life strategies and promoted the adoption of strategic analysis in the discipline of sociology. Drawing on these debates, the most important lesson for this study is the theorisation of migrants’ life strategies as a part of the whole complex system of social relations and processes, taking into account micro and macro structural constraints. The second debate focused on the interdependence of humans, with special attention given to the role of the family as the primary arena for synchronising an individual’s life, that is, seeing life strategies in relation to family member’s lives and within a set of social constraints. This debate around life strategy unfolded in the examination of individual lives in relation to wider social constraints in families and households (Morgan, 1989). Morgan’s use of the term ‘life strategy’ in the analysis of families and households derives from historical studies by Anderson (1980) about the history of the Western family. He also draws on Bourdieu’s (1976) work on marriage strategies aimed at reproducing and safeguarding patrimonies, Levine’s (1977) theories about ‘fertility strategies’ and Hareven’s (1982) discussions of ‘family working strategies’. All these scholars recognise the presence of structural constraints faced by family members, as they actively respond to these constraints as social agents. Particularly interesting for my current study of migrants’ life strategies is the focus of these researchers on the preference for “the household or collective decisions over individual choices” (Morgan, 1989, p. 25) (also described by Hareven (1982) in relation to ‘family working strategies’). In my analysis chapters, I focus on the tension between individual and collective decision-making. The fact that many of these works focus on “the complex dance between structure and agency” (Morgan, 1989, p. 26) makes them incredibly relevant for the analysis of strategic behaviour of migrants from post-Soviet Ukraine since the 1990s. My intention to apply the concept of life strategy to migrants’ lives and mobility is motivated by the concerns raised by Morgan (1989) (and also discussed by Edwards and Ribbens (1991)) in relation to strategic decision-making in the lives of women. The approaches of these theorists analyse the individual’s sense of agency while at the same time retaining a sense of the contextual constraints that frame their actions. This discussion of structural constraints and social

14 

O. Oleinikova

action led me to consider the role of resources, which are an important part of migrants’ life strategy formation and enactment. As Morgan (1989, p. 27) argues, “without resources there can be no strategy”. The third debate that took place in the Western tradition that is important in this study is defining and understanding life strategies in relation to culture (Swidler, 1986). This alternative approach defines life strategy as a “tool kit of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems” (Swidler, 1986, p. 273). This relationship between culture and life strategy is not a relationship of dependence. Swidler (1986, p. 273) explains that culture’s significance lies not in defining the outcomes of actions, but in “provid[ing] components that are used to construct strategies of action”. In the frame of this study, culture is a powerful element that shapes and reproduces life strategies of Ukrainian migrants in Australia. The last area, and debate, that engaged the concept of life strategy was scholarship that analysed the role of the emotional or unconscious level in addition to the rational, conscious level of life strategy formation. Western scholars tend to ignore the power of unconscious elements in life strategy formation and implementation. Unconscious elements play an important role in a social actor’s own understanding and interpretation of social reality. Several scholars who indirectly recognise the unconscious (emotional) component in life strategies—namely, Anderson (1980), Lacey (1977), Crow (1989) and Watson (1990)—describe the unconscious elements of life strategy in the sense of ‘subconscious strategies’. Certainly, there is a type of life strategy that is purely based on instrumental rationality. However, I would argue that the assumptions of rational-­ choice theories underestimate the role of non-instrumental values in driving actions. When looking into unconscious elements of individual life strategies, such as coping mechanisms, scholars still risk patronising social actors by analysing unconscious elements of strategic action through the lens of externally imposed contexts and objectives which the individuals themselves would not recognise (Crow, 1989; Watson, 1990). It raises questions about what is or is not rational, and whether individual strategies can be analysed based on the presumption that the researcher has a superior judgement about the meanings and intentions behind individual

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

15

actions. Edwards and Ribbens (1991) emphasised the importance of using the concept of life strategy to understand individual lives in conjunction “with the reasons for their choices of the particular language” (Edwards and Ribbens, 1991) with which they describe their actions. This makes visible the part played by individual interpretations in creating larger social processes such as social change or migration. The question of rationality raised by Crow (1989) influenced the perspective used in my study. Moving away from a solely rationalistic framework, I analyse micro components of life strategies by examining emotions, class and national identity as key elements of non-strategic spheres of behaviour. The notion of strategy in Western perspectives attributes some sense of dignity and control over individual lives, which are often governed by conflicting intentions and myriad possibilities for engaging with social and cultural contexts. In this study, for example, this relates to the requirements of Australian migration policy, migrants’ desire to escape or disassociate themselves from structural constraints in the Ukraine and the norms of behaviour required of them by Ukrainian society.

East European Perspective The concept of life strategy was brought to Soviet sociology in the 1960s. It became a particularly popular field of study in the post-Soviet period, because it was a model that could explain the social factors that were important in the crisis. It was especially useful in relation to changes in social values that took place during the post-Soviet transition stage of development. It was also seen as a useful tool for assessing the population’s reaction to the ongoing transition. In order to get a better understanding of the processes taking place, post-Soviet East European social scientists began to undertake analyses of the social influences shaping individual lives. Their attention was focused on the problem of understanding how people’s orientations, lifestyles, cultural lives and ideas of self-realisation shaped individual life trajectories. The study of life strategy emerged in a range of fields of Ukrainian and Russian scholarship in the 1990s. A key field of enquiry was the nature and characteristics of life strategies (Abulkhanova-Slavskaya,

16 

O. Oleinikova

2001; Reznik, 1995; Reznik & Reznik, 1996; Vasilyieva and Demchenko, 2002; Smirnov, 2002; Zlobina, 2003; Bevzenko, 2008; Belyaeva, 2001). Another area of life strategy studies explored the factors influencing the formation and implementation of life strategies (Naumova, 1995; Fedorova, 2008; Zlobina & Tykhonovych, 2001). Also, Ukrainian and Russian scholars investigated the typologies of life strategies in post-­ Soviet societies in transition (Zaslavskaya, 1999; Babenko, 2004; Zlobina & Tykhonovych, 2001; Reznik & Reznik, 1996). The first important work in the field of East European life strategy studies is the work of Abulkhanova-Slavskaya (2001), which is fundamental to understanding the theoretical concept of life strategy as it is used today. She approaches the concept of life strategy by assessing the social and psychological maturity of individual personalities, which, she argues, manifests itself in the ability of an individual to combine their status, age, capabilities and personal aspirations with the claims and requirements of society. The ability to make the connection between these variables constitutes what the author defines as an individual life strategy. More precisely, the author considers a life strategy to reflect the ability of individuals to interweave their identity with their living conditions. In a broader sense, Abulkhanova-Slavskaya (2001) argues that life strategy is concerned more with a long-term projection than with the numerous short-term tactics of everyday life. A strategy of life is a “principle, realised in different life conditions and circumstances, and a person’s ability to compound his/her individuality with his/her living conditions, for his/her reproduction and development” (2001, p. 245). In a narrow sense, it is the development of certain life solutions to overcome life’s contradictions. Another important work by Reznik and Reznik (1996), the prominent scholars in the field of life strategy studies, suggests a slightly different interpretation to Abulkhanova-Slavskaya’s (2001) conceptualisation of life strategy. Reznik and Reznik’s (1996) concept of life strategy informs the life strategy research framework used in this study. According to these scholars, individual life strategy can be seen as “symbolically mediated and ideal formation, which is realised in human behavior, its priorities and guidelines” (Reznik & Reznik, 1996, p.  101). At the same time, Reznik in his later work (Reznik and Smirnov, 2002) presents a

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

17

system-­dynamic approach to life strategies, arguing that a life strategy is a “dynamic system of long-term orientation of the individual, including a change (formation) in accordance with a specific plan and given terms of socio-cultural development” (p. 99). The key idea here is the dynamic life strategy component of change. Reznik and Smirnov’s (2002) approach extends Abulkhanova-Slavskaya’s (2001) perspective. Though Abulkhanova-Slavskaya (2001), Reznik and Reznik (1996) and Reznik and Smirnov (2002) made strides in developing this theory, the main limitation of the post-Soviet East European tradition in defining life strategy was the lack of logical precision and clarity. It was understood either as a system of perspective aspirations and individual orientations or, even more narrowly, as a system of aims, plans and values. This meant that the East European conceptual formulations of life strategy could not account for how external factors mediate the achievement of a certain goal. This explains the present misunderstanding and confusion regarding the relationship between individual goals in a life strategy and the means of achieving them. Some authors give priority to goals, while others place importance on the resources, rules or standards of separate actions. Thus, Golovakha (2000) prefers to use the concept of ‘life prospects’ instead of life strategy, justifying this change in terminology by arguing that his concept is less reductionist and better captures the scope of the life strategy. Life prospects, Golovakha (2000, pp. 226–227) argues, “should be regarded as a complete and complex picture of the future contradictory relationship between programmed and anticipated events, with which the individual connects the social value [of an action] and an individual sense of his life”. I argue that the most theoretically substantiated point of view is that of Reznik and Smirnov (2002, pp. 67–70), who in their work relate not only aims and values to the structuring components of life strategy, but also other components of the activity that orient and guide the behaviour of the individual in a particular social space and time. To put it simply, they take into account structural or external elements as being important in shaping life strategies. Therefore, central to this study is Reznik and Smirnov’s (2002) concept of life strategy, in which the life strategy is conceptualised as a dynamic, self-adjusting system of socio-cultural presentations of

18 

O. Oleinikova

individuals about their own lives, which orient behaviour during the protracted period of life determined by the socio-cultural conditions and environment (social institutions and social structures). Their ideas are especially useful when exploring migration as a key event and turning point in life strategy implementation and re-evaluation. It is particularly useful when considering the lives of those individuals who have elected to migrate as the central means of enacting their life strategies and associated goals of employment, education or marriage. Reznik and Smirnov’s approach to life strategy extends Abulkhanova-Slavskaya’s ideas about the power of life conditions over individual lives. Their approach takes into account, on the one hand, subjective elements—the unique, inimitable, situationally contingent and personalised aspects of life—and on the other hand, objective and structural elements, including normative frameworks and cultural standards. This discussion makes clear the importance of mapping the structuring components that make up life strategies. In the life strategy scholarship, there is no shared opinion regarding the key structuring elements that shape life strategies. Abulkhanova-Slavskaya (2001) and Legostaeva (2011) argue that life strategy is made up of three components: (1) a value component (as an expression of spiritual-material value orientations), (2) a purpose of life component (as a way to achieve and retain a desired position in life) and (3) a meaning of life component (a generalised reflection of needs). Reznik (1995), whose ideas inform this study, argued that individual life strategy as a complex of motivated activities includes in its structure the following components: (1) life goals, (2) the meaning of life, (3) values and norms and, finally, (4) an image of the future (“dreams”). The idea that life strategy is built up through values, goals and needs gained support from another life strategy scholar, Golovakha. According to Golovakha (2000, p. 267), “values, life goals and motivated activity plans form the core of life strategy”. Additionally Levada’s (2000) concept of ‘human material’ (which I explain below) supports the idea that when analysing life strategies we cannot omit agency, in his sense the supremacy of structures over agency. Levada (2000) was a scholar who took up Abulkhanova-Slavskaya’s (2001) model to further explore the impact of post-Soviet social transition processes on citizens. Levada was driven not

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

19

only by an interest in the influence of social institutions or the actions of elite groups on other social actors, but also an interest in the qualities of social actors, which he called ‘human material’ (Levada, 2000, p.  8). Levada’s (2000, p.  8) concept of human material is important for this study when we look at the impact of structural factors on the formation of life strategies. On the one hand, my participants form an aggregated group that feels the impact and destructive dimensions of transition in the Ukraine and ‘absorbs’ or adapts to them. On the other, it is a collective of individual people whose life worlds are disrupted by regime transition and its impacts on the wider social fabric of Ukrainian society. From this point of view, social transitions are observed as structural factors that not only affect aggregated groups but also individuals as they experience changes in the system of personality and society, which forms their life strategies. In particular, transitions impact their individual agency. A life strategy is always the result of the social experiences of individuals, existing not in isolation from each other, but in the same social and cultural milieus (structural social and cultural space).

Typologies of Life Strategies Life strategies vary by types. Though Reznik and Reznik (1996), Abulkhanova-Slavskaya (2001) and Reznik and Smirnov (2002) were important in the development of aspects of the Eastern European life strategy field, other scholars were key in the development of typologies of life strategies. Modern scholars in the post-Soviet East European academy are actively using (in modified and supplemented ways) the classification developed by Reznik and Reznik (1996). The most conspicuous life strategy typologies—those developed by Zaslavskaya (1999), Zlobina and Tykhonovych (2001) and Babenko (2004)—applied Reznik and Reznik’s ideas to the context of post-Soviet actors’ responses to the transition. These four life strategy typologies are based on research into life strategies among individuals inside crisis societies in the post-Soviet period. I address Reznik and Reznik’s (1996) typology first, as it is considered the mother typology for the other three typologies. Reznik and Reznik suggest that there are three main types that unite the range of life

20 

O. Oleinikova

strategies available to individuals: (1) the welfare strategy, (2) success strategy and (3) self-realisation strategy. According to these scholars, the ‘welfare strategy’ is one of the most common types of life strategy and is characterised by the following features: receptive (‘acquisition’) activity and reference-group (correlative) consumption, prevalence of the attitude for acquiring (rather than creating) welfare, the desire for material comfort and maximum life security, the dominance of the image of a stable and peaceful life. The ‘success strategy’ is seen as a fairly common and appealing type of life strategy, characterised by such features as achievement-­driven activity and active life position, transformational activities and a focus on high performance, the ability to live and work in conditions of uncertainty and risk, originality and diversity in the selection and implementation of cultural lifestyles, a steady focus on external recognition and approval by others. The ‘self-realisation strategy’ is the third type of life strategy. Reznik and Reznik (1996, pp. 78–84) and later Smirnov (2002, pp.  35–36) describe it as characterised by a conscious and practical setting of the individual to creative change and transformation of his/her own life, for the purpose of self-improvement and self-development. The differences between the types of life strategies clearly separate the life positions that individuals adopt throughout their lives and in relation to other individuals. The impact of structures and institutions on the formation of life strategies emerges as an important element in the typology of life strategies that is used in this particular study. Thus, some elements of the typology suggested by Zaslavskaya (2001) are useful. Building on her theory of post-Soviet transition, Zaslavskaya (2001) defines four classes of life strategies: (1) achievement, (2) adaptation, (3) regression and (4) destruction. In adaptation strategies, the author addresses the notion of survival, which underlies the ‘survival life strategy’ type employed in this study. The survival life strategy type in this study appears as “a commitment to social survival, maintaining the same or at least a minimum acceptable social status. Such commitment is an important function to increase the adaptability of an individual to the difficult conditions of a changing world” (Zaslavskaya, 2001, p. 15). Zaslavskaya’s typology adds a structural dimension to the typology of Reznik and

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

21

Reznik, who focus to a greater extent on individual and personal features of life strategy types. The life strategy typology applied in this study consists of two types of life strategies, which appear as the opposites of one another. I argue that in this case study, Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migrants’ life strategies are not productively explained by the tripartite typology that Reznik and Reznik propose, nor the four types of life strategies that Zaslavskaya identifies in her studies of Russian society. Instead, the dichotomy of life strategy types used in this study was informed by the developments of the Ukrainian scholars Zlobina and Tykhonovych (2001). In the late 1990s, they built a categorical dichotomy of life strategies, proposing a survival strategy as the opposite to the strategy of life creation and construction. They argue that these types of life strategies are based on the level of adaptation to post-Soviet transition: from voluntary, “successful and positive” adaptation to “forced” adaptation to social change (2001, pp. 85–86). I draw on their theoretical developments to define the survival and achievement life strategy types used in this study, which are described later in this section. Babenko (2004), a Ukrainian sociologist who studies social practices, life strategies and the mechanisms of post-communist societal transformations, supports the ideas of Reznik and Reznik (1996) and Zlobina and Tykhonovych (2001). She proposes that the level of adaptation to transition is the strongest indicator of the real social situation and direction of social development of a society in transition. Babenko has distinguished four life strategy types: (1) achievement strategy, (2) adaptation strategy, (3) exclusion strategy and (4) survival strategy. Babenko’s division is based on the following criteria, which determine the strategy content: (1) the way social status is reproduced (advanced, simple and truncated) and, therefore, the decline or increase of life chances and opportunities; (2) the degree and quality of adaptation to changing conditions of social reality (successful, uncertain (unstable), failed (inability or refusal to adapt)); (3) the degree to which new opportunities are taken up in conditions of rapid change within post-Soviet transformation processes (Babenko, 2004). Such typology frames are the elements that fill these strategies with content and inform results.

22 

O. Oleinikova

Babenko’s typology, as well as Zlobina and Tykhonovych’s, was developed as an explanatory model relevant for those Ukrainians who stayed in Ukraine and experienced the post-Soviet transition period. Given this study investigates Ukrainians, Czechs and Hungarians who utilised international migration to enact their life strategies, the exclusion and adaptation strategies are not applicable to the investigation of migrants’ life strategies. Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migrants did exclude themselves from socio-economic life in their sending states to the extent that they were forced to adapt to changes and chose to leave Ukraine. In this book I use a two-fold typology of life strategy, consisting of the survival and achievement life strategy types, which provides a space to explore the combination of factors and contexts that impacted migration decision-making and in turn shaped the migration outcomes. These different combinations of push and pull factors for migration and the migration outcomes in terms of employment outcomes, social identity and social class correspond to the two main types of life strategies: achievement and survival strategies. The first type—the achievement life strategy—in the context of migration is presented as a life strategy type directed towards achievement, self-realisation, the use of new possibilities (extensive goals) and the extended recreation of social and economic status (Babenko, 2004). The main pre-condition of the achievement strategy is the motivational activity (‘achievement’) counted on public recognition (Reznik & Reznik, 1996). The second type—the survival life strategy—is a life strategy type directed towards limited recreation at the level of physical survival, which also entails a decline in social and economic status, self-restraint and a decline of life chances (Reznik & Reznik, 1996). Individuals engaged in a survival life strategy aim to achieve the maximum available and possible goals, which recreates self-limitation (Reznik & Reznik, 1996). According to Reznik and Reznik (1996), within the survival life strategy individuals set themselves the most accessible aims and thus provide for their own or collective (e.g. family) survival needs.

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

23

Agency and Structure Another important idea that informs the life strategy research framework emerges from the literature on the role of agency and structure in life strategy formation and implementation. Taking as its central standpoint the differentiation between the content and context dimensions that shape lives and life strategies of migrants across sending and receiving spaces, the life strategy approach has two scopes: agency/content and structure/context. These two scopes are referred to as the ‘individual content of migration’ and the ‘structural context of migration’. Such a research framework relies on the mutual determination between structure and agency. The interplay between structure and agency is viewed as key to understanding the life strategies of modern East European migration to Australia. The emphasis of this framework is not purely on agency or structure, but rather at the integrated level. The integrated level is shaped by the interrelation between micro individual dimensions (aims, values, needs and sense of agency) and macro dimensions (the structural context) in the formation of different life strategies and migration trajectories. The kind of aims, needs, values, sense of agency and the process of migration decision-making that Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migrants possess largely depends on the direction of the post-Soviet regime transition and migration policy regulations. I understand structure to be the field where agency is being enacted. This field is represented by economic structures, government politics, national and international events and policy that regulates migration. This is the field in which participants build their life strategies and made their choices to migrate. Though the concept of life strategy is constantly ignored by mainstream international migration (exceptions include Geisen, 2013; Volodko, 2007; Mrozowicki, 2011), a life strategy approach helps researchers “gai[n] new insights on migrants as social actors” operating within social structures (Geisen, 2013, p. 1). In this book the structure is conceptualised as macro or context factors. These factors are observable in the ‘external’ logic of the conceptual framework through the analysis

24 

O. Oleinikova

of the events and life situations of individuals before they utilise international migration as a tool to realise the micro components of their life strategy (aims, needs, values, agency). By events I mean the actual and organised (regulated and institutional) action carried out at the macro level and creating a context in which the decision to migrate was made. These events include political, economic or social events in Ukraine, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the period of 2000–2021 and migration policy regulations in Australia that impact on the behaviour of individuals at the micro level and create a specific life situation in which Ukrainians, Czechs and Hungarians conceive of their migration trajectories.

Regime Transition The concept of regime transition shapes this book’s analysis of the context in which the Ukrainians, Czechs and Hungarians made their decisions to migrate and where their lives (individual values, aims, needs, agency) were formed. While the regime transition paradigm is relevant for Ukraine, one may argue that the regime transitions in the Czech Republic and Hungary have already completed, and the modern wave of migration is caused by other political and economic problems linked to the challenges of the post-transition state of their societies (Carothers, 2002). For example, Lavigne (2000) indicated EU-accession as symbolic threshold for the end of transition. The Czech Republic and Hungary joined European Union in 2004. Other approaches to measurement of the completion of transition relates to GDP threshold (Radosevic, 2022) or integration into global economy (Gillman, 2021). Given the variety of perspective and no agreement among scholars about the end of transition, in this book I approach the Czech Republic and Hungary also as transition states with transition economies and societies (Rojec, 2019; Radosevic, 2022). Ukraine in this case sits behind Hungary and the Czech Republic on the transition journey, haven’t joined EU yet and lagging other Eastern European economies in GDP.

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

25

Similar to Radosevic (2022) this book approaches the post-socialist transformation in Eastern European countries as an open-ended process whose outcomes is seen as an evolutionary process of misalignment of different levels and parts of innovation systems. It is important to briefly reflect on the origins of transition scholarship and its usefulness in understanding post-socialist regime transitions and modern life in Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Transition research starts in the early 1950–1960s in the West, at a time “when democratic forms of government were the exception rather than the rule” (Wucherpfennig & Deutsh, 2009, p. 1). Lipset (1959), an early theorist in the field, introduced what he called the ‘requisites of democracy’. By doing so, he contributed the first formative input and laid out the transition research agenda for generations to come. He established the first theoretical link between the level of development of a given country and its probability of being democratic. Under ‘requisites of democracy’, Lipset (1959) described the foundations for successful democratic consolidation, which he saw as variables that create conditions favourable for democratisation and economic development—such as urbanisation, wealth and education. Concerned with structural and societal conditions conducive to democracy, especially in socio-economic terms, Lipset (1959) outlined a structure-centred framework that analysed transitions in terms of economic development and legitimacy. He argued that these two key structural characteristics were necessary to sustain democratic political systems (he used the examples of European and English-speaking nations and Latin American nations). Lipset’s (1959) idea that economic modernisation leads to democracy was further developed by Rostow (1960), who theorised that the path from economic modernisation to democracy is linear and inevitable. Rostow (1960) was later criticised by Moore Jr. (1966), who formulated a historical analysis and critique in which structural transformations caused by socio-economic development (industrialisation) were not necessarily conducive to democracy. Contrary to the modernisation approaches of the 1950s–1960s that were concerned with structural transitions, at the beginning of the 1980s Western research on transition was driven by the agency-centred perspective propagated specifically in the writings of O’Donnell and Schmitter

26 

O. Oleinikova

(1986). The retrospective analysis of transition research undertaken by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) helped scholars to understand that the incorporation of concepts such as human agency—in addition to structural factors—bore more fruit. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) discuss the factors influencing the success or failure of transitions revolved around the ruling elite as the driving force in initiating shifts at all levels. They believed that any type of transition is possible if the relevant elite groups (ruling and opposition) could agree on common ways of implementing democracy (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). The earlier socio-economic conditions (Lipset, 1959; Lerner, 1958; Rostow, 1960; Moore Jr., 1966) were understood as being irrelevant for transition research (Merkel, 2010). In Eastern Europe at that time (1980s), no similar research was being done as few scholars could even conceive of a possible future shift from communism to democracy that would actually necessitate research on regime transition. Any work on Eastern Europe was done in the West. Interestingly though, around the same time as the end of the USSR, the Western agency perspective faced challenges in the form of a wave of “structuralism and the wave of pessimism” towards democracy (Merkel, 2010, p. 19). The main focus of Western theoretical explanations of transition shifted from agency back to structure-centred transition theories and Eastern European scholars were part of this rethink. Merkel argued that scholars such as O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) overestimated the power of political elites. The belief that democracy can be promoted, supported or even imposed from the outside began to dominate (Merkel, 2010, p.  436). Agency perspectives in the form of action theory were claimed to have shown themselves to be deficient in the analysis of political and socio-economic system transformations that overwhelmed post-­ communist East Europe (Oleinikova, 2019). The works of Merkel (2004, 2010), Carothers (2002), Ottaway (2003), Levitsky and Way (2002), and Nathan (2003) are indicative of the shift in focus of transition research from an actor-centred perspective to a structuralist perspective. These works also highlight the shifts in the perception of ordinary citizens of the democratic changes in new post-socialist democracies from optimistic attitudes in the early 1990s to more pessimistic attitudes that have been increasingly common since the 2000s.

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

27

Therefore, in the first years after the dissolution of Soviet Union and communism’s collapse, most studies of state transition to markets and democracy, which tended to emerge from the West, were rather formal and structural, as more and more Western scholars identified post-­ communist Eastern Europe as the natural laboratory for testing their transition theories. The authors of the new wave of Western theories explaining transition (Edward et al., 2002; McFaul et al., 2004) tried to take into account some of the features of the post-Soviet countries, for example, they sought explanations for the development of modernity in the history of particular countries. These scholars emphasised the negative role of the Soviet legacy as a factor that not only inhibits processes of liberal democratisation but makes it impossible to even apply the general theoretical concepts of democratisation to the post-communist region. Their assessment of the current state of affairs in post-socialist countries was pessimistic, although they did not neglect the possibility of a gradual change towards democratisation. This led to significant debate, especially in the political and social sciences, about the relative value of these Western studies for providing an explanation of post-socialist regime transition towards democracy. Much of the contestation hinged upon how much one needed to know about national and local culture and history to produce a good explanatory framework. The first scholarly works on transition in the post-socialist East European scholarship appeared relatively recently, after 1990, when there finally appeared a real need to understand the consequences of reforms and transitions from the inside. The first research on transition in post-­ communist countries was determined by the dominant structural paradigm, which was drawn from existing research in the Western tradition. The post-Soviet social science in the late 1980s and early 1990s favoured the authority of Western theories and applied them, almost without adaptation, to explanations of the post-socialist social reality. These theories included path dependence theory (Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000; Collier & Collier, 1991), the third wave of democratisation theory (Huntington, 1991) and political mobilisation theory. Furthermore, theories of modernisation were revived to explain democratic transition in post-socialist countries. This involved dominant

28 

O. Oleinikova

discourses such as ‘catching up’ with processes of modernisation and westernisation, the need for development, overcoming dependency and reforming the state. In searching for their own approach, the post-­socialist scholars started to apply and develop early ideas about the path from economic modernisation to democracy and empirically test the relation between democracy and economic development. In this approach the argument was that underdeveloped post-socialist states, in terms of democracy and market economy, are subject to social transitions only through structural modernisation effects. Post-socialist structuralist scholars argued that a positive feature of modernisation theory was the emphasis on, and concrete analysis of, a wide range of modernisation processes that took place immediately after the collapse of Soviet rule: urbanisation, industrialisation, rationalisation, secularisation, marketisation of the economy, democratisation policy, the progress of education and other cultural processes. In other words, it suggested a framework for the interconnected study of all major aspects of social development that took place in post-Soviet countries. An important step in the development and application of modernisation theory in the post-socialist countries was undertaken by well-known scientists and sociologists in Hungary (Andorka & Spéder, 1994), Poland (Adamski, 1998; Domansky, 1990), the Czech Republic (Keller & Westerholm, 2007; Machonin, 1997) and Germany (Zapf et al., 2002; Zapf, 1998). These scholars, applying modernisation theory to the post-socialist context, ended up criticising it for its failure to reflect the multidimensionality of the transition process and for its limited explanation of structural and cultural factors in the development of post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Their criticism even extended to the updated and renewed versions of the ‘catching-up’ and ‘reflexive’ modernisation theories proposed by Beck et al. (1994; Keller, 2002). Therefore, the more research was done using modernisation theories to understand social change in post-socialist countries, the more problems they encountered and the more concerns post-socialist scholars had. These critiques of modernisation theories and their applicability to the post-socialist transition context, were based on the argument that they did not sufficiently explain the nature of the structural shifts that were taking place in post-socialist space “simply because the historical vector of

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

29

these changes was not objectively set up, not preconditioned” (Yadov, 1999, p. 14). Ukrainian and Russian scholars (Naumova, 1995; Zlobina, 2003) argue that given the limits of the structural transition paradigm of the 1990s for understanding what is happening in post-Soviet societies, and in Ukraine in particular, there is a need for a different approach with more of a focus on agency that would explain the structural shifts that are related to changes on the level of agency (micro-level). Naumova explains that a new theory should be able to widen our understanding of societies in transition to include deeper, spontaneous shifts in social and individual consciousness that find expression primarily in the transformation of the value system and in the formation of new, individual life strategies (Naumova, 1995, p. 7). Subsequently, by the beginning of the new century in the post-socialist countries, scholars had begun to create theories related to the cultural and historical originality of post-socialist people to explain the unique historical development of the political tradition, national mentality and cultural heritage (Titarenko, 2008). At the start of the 2000s post-Soviet scholars made significant advances in empirical descriptions and conceptualisations of post-communist transitions (Oleinikova, 2013). These scholars suggest that the most theoretically pertinent way to approach the interrelation between the components of transformation processes in the post-­ socialist space is to focus on (1) targeted reforms of basic institutions and (2) semi-natural changes in the social structure and change in agency (Zaslavskaya & Yadov, 2008; Kutsenko, 2004; Golovakha & Panina, 2006). However, it should be noted that studies of the interrelation of these combinations of structure and agency are still relatively rare. The addition of agency to the structuralist model of transition gave birth to the conceptual unity of ‘agency-structure’ that has become the main theoretical model in post-Soviet transition research from the mid-­2000s onwards. The combined agency-structure approach was primarily used to understand transition through the study of agents of social change. Borrowing the agency-structure approach from post-socialist explanations of transitions in Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary, I apply this approach to understand the modern migrations from such societies in transition.

30 

O. Oleinikova

Migration Another important concept that serves as a basis for the research framework is migration. The analysis approaches migration as it is associated with post-socialist regime transitions and the associated political, economic and social challenges in Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary and the lives of those who left the country as a part of that transition. The category of ‘migrants’ is a category used to describe the group of actors whose lives are examined. As the book aims to analyse individual lives before and after migration to understand reasons and outcomes of migration, one of the most distinguishing and useful concepts for these tasks is the integration of migration decision-making with migrants’ outcomes (e.g. the employment outcomes, identity and social class shifts) that have been treated separately in the mainstream literature. There is a few relevant studies of migration that have taken place in the context of rapid social change and pre- and post-migration stages (Genov & Savvidis, 2011; Genov, 2008; Kutsenko, 2007). Genov and Savvidis (2011) explored recent spontaneous trans-boundary migration of the two migrant cohorts from Armenia and Georgia into Russian Federation. The study is based on the event monitoring and qualitative data, 65 expert interviews and 1600 interviews with migrant, at all stages of the migration cycle (before, during and after migration). Similar to my research project, Genov and Savvidis (2011) deal with a variety of political, economic and cultural issues that challenged South Caucasian republics and Moscow after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Genov (2008) presents the results of the international research project Comparing Societal Integration of Ethnic Minorities (InterEthno), conducted by number of scholars in Ukraine, Russian Federation, Moldova, Bulgaria and Germany. Genov (2008) includes the study of the present-day ethnic relations in terms of the progressing assimilation of ethnic minorities in the post-independence Ukraine (Kutsenko, 2007). One relevant attempt to link structuration and practice theories to increase our understanding of migration is the study by Faist (2000). Faist’s (2000) main focus is on the ‘meso link’ that bridges micro- and macro-level theories. However, it does not really consider the extent to

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

31

which these theories are compatible in terms of their fundamental building blocks. Another study of migration and identity in Hong Kong by Findlay and Li (1999) explores the international migration as a process that is shaped both by international migration legislation (macro-­ structure) and by potential migrants making decisions related to their interpretations of their identities (micro-structure). Morawska’s (2001) study of Polish migration to Western Europe conceptualises migration as a structuration process, emphasising the agency of social actors to innovate and reinterpret the rules of the game. The existence of so few studies demonstrates how uncommon it is still to use the concepts structure and agency to study migration. The migration literature to date has a limited engagement with both theories despite their fundamental importance. It is worth again mentioning here the perceptible lack of specialised research on Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migration to Australia.

Employment Outcomes Migrants are commonly found to experience significant economic disadvantage and barriers of entry into the job market relative to the native population. There is a number of studies exploring the demographic and human capital attributes affecting migrant socio-economic assimilation (Cangiano, 2014). Most of the studies investigate the socio-demographic background of a migrant (gender, education, age, marital status, country of birth), duration of stay and language skills to explain employment outcomes and migrants’ general participation on the labour market of the host society (Bernardi et  al., 2011; Kogan, 2011; Reyneri & Fullin, 2011). There is a range of interesting and relevant studies around the role of structural (institutional) factors, such as immigration and integration policies, underpinning migrant poorer outcomes in European labour markets (Büchel & Frick, 2005; Kogan, 2007; Jean et al., 2011). To understand and explain the employment outcomes of migrants from Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary in Australia, this book uses Mrozowicki’s (2011) concepts of careers from studying workers in Poland. Inspired by Chicago school concepts, Mrozowicki integrated objective and subjective aspects of careers, describing structural changes

32 

O. Oleinikova

in the sphere of work and the subjective experiences of workers. In this study, the migrants’ employment after migration and mobility/immobility between jobs after migration will be classified under structural (objective) changes. The subjective changes will include the reshaping of identities and the transformation of biographies. Mrozowicki (2011) argues that “unprotected exposure to market mechanisms, when combined with the lack of significant resources leads to dead-end or patchwork careers” (p. 165). The two types of careers described by Mrozowicki as ‘dead-end’ and ‘patchwork’ are a useful tool to explain the variable employment patterns of skilled and low-skilled migrants in Australia (Oleinikova, 2020a). Mrozowicki is not the only scholar to have used the term ‘dead-end’ careers. Indeed, many DEJ (Dead-End Job) theories define occupations as ‘dead-end’ if they generally lack career opportunities in terms of wage increments and promotion chances (Bihagen & Ohls, 2007). Based on their empirical study of working women in Sweden, Bihagen and Ohls (2007) suggest that ‘dead-end’ jobs are characterised by low-level acquisition of specific human capital associated with an easily measured output and a lack of future rewards in terms of additional pay with time spent in the job and few possibilities of promotions. The defining feature of dead-­ end careers is the absence of occupational upward mobility—in some cases there is downward movement. These are jobs for which the worker does not need an education or any specific knowledge to do the work successfully. Dead-end careers are described by Thomas (1989) as those where the worker is “stuck … in organizational structures that do not yield to their (real or fantastic) desires of self-expression” (in Mrozowicki, 2011, p. 359). Another type of employment pattern used as a concept in this book is described by Mrozowicki as ‘patchwork career’. Patchwork career is typically marked by a multi-track employment history without any clear design or plan. A patchwork job pattern consists of many unintentional moves interwoven with periods of unemployment and desperate job-­ seeking (Mrozowicki, 2011). According to Mrozowicki, an anchor career is an “intentionally shaped single-track pattern, based on lasting employment in a particular work organization in a particular field” (2011, p. 160). Typical for anchoring

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

33

career pattern is the “intentionally protected continuity of action context” (Mrozowicki, 2011, p. 161). This means that when a worker gets a new job, it is in the same occupational area for relatively the same rewards. Mrozowicki (2011) suggests that maintaining an anchor career may demand a reduction in a career position or even an economic reduction for the sake of guaranteeing employment. The final career type by Mrozowicki used in this study is bricolage career. Bricolage career is slightly different from anchor career in that it is more oriented towards family goals, which demand high flexibility and job mobility, and excludes the emphasis on workplace continuity. As a multi-track occupational choice, the bricolage career involves a high level of responsiveness to institutional and structural challenges in the new environment.

Social Identities: National Identity and Class The social identity approach stems from social psychology of the 1970s, as a theory of intergroup relations (Tajfel, 1974). It explains how and when social groups, understood in terms of ethnicity, nationality or an organisational affiliation, become psychologically real and how intergroup belief structures predict the intergroup behaviours of different social groups. During the 1980s–1990s, the social identity approach continued to explore the implications of social identity in myriad contexts, including the life strategy context. As suggested by East European (Ukrainian and Russian) life strategy scholars, the life strategy choice is determined by the social identities of actors (Naumova, 1995; Reznik & Reznik, 1996). In a broad sense, the life and life strategy is determined by a variety of social phenomenon ranging from the socio-economic condition of society, the level of development of its culture, the method of production and system of property relations, the level and quality of life, particular social class membership and the influence of traditions, ideals and values of the dominant group in a given historical moment. Exploring shifts in national and class identities after migration is important in analysing the nature of the new life East Europeans are building in Australia within the migration context. National and class

34 

O. Oleinikova

identities are used as an indicator of integration success in society (Zlobina & Tykhonovych, 2001). However, it is crucial to stress that the definition and content of these forms of social identity are also dependent on their practical expression through behaviour. An identity is sustainable only to the extent that it can be expressed in practice (Klein et al., 2007) through the forms such as physical action and the manipulation of physical appearance (including displays, symbols, signs) and the verbal expression of representations and attitudes viewed as normative (e.g. stereotypes and prejudice). Identity performance in this study means the purposeful expression (or suppression) of behaviours relevant to those norms conventionally associated with a social identity. It is important to stress that identity performance pertains specifically to social identities. The key to performance is the concept of self-presentation (Baumeister, 1982; Jones & Pittman, 1982; Leary & Kowalsky, 1990; Schlenker & Weigold, 1992). In this study I examine the social identities of migrants through their self-representation, focusing in particular on the way they talk about themselves and which groups they identify as important to their lives in Australia. I am concerned with those cases where the performance of achievement and survival life strategies is governed by the different national and class identities of migrants. Class as the second component of social identity that is used in this study to examine the life strategies of achievement and survival is complex. When considering national identity in relation to life strategy of migrants before migration it is the same, but it becomes important when they arrive in the destination country (in our case Australia). However, it is more complex for class. Reznik and Reznik (1996, p. 12) argue that the “carriers of different life strategies are representatives of different social classes”. The social base of the life strategy of achievement is the class of professionals and scientific and cultural intelligentsia, who are entrepreneurs, managers, writers, artists and politicians. According to Reznik and Reznik (1996), the survival life strategy is typical of marginalised groups and those engaged primarily in manual labour (the blue-collar class). Therefore, there is a link between social class and life strategy. This link informs the distinction between the cohorts of ‘survival migrants’— implementing survival strategies—and ‘achievement migrants’—implementing achievement life strategies.

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

35

Mixed Methodology Two-fold methodological case study is at the heart of the research design. The case study approach drew on two methods of collecting data about the context (structure) and content (agency) of Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migrants to Australia. It used the combination of secondary data analysis and qualitative empirical fieldwork, which comprised semi-­ structured interviews and the observation of participants. The structure/agency conceptual dichotomy maps onto the two methods used. By bringing together these two different methods, this book presents a comprehensive analysis of the three cohorts of Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migrants to Australia. The first part of the research was driven by the main task to understand the structure/context of the modern East European migration in relation to the formation and background in which the new Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migrations are taking place. It includes the economic situation, political situation, demographic situation and trends in the dynamics of modern emigration (since 2000s onwards) from Ukraine, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The shifts in Australia migration policy since the 2000s are also analysed as one of the structural preconditions for the formation of the two different types of life strategies of Ukrainian migrants in Australia. The contexts of these migrations in the period between 2000 and 2021 are captured in a variety of ways through the analysis of secondary data sources. This helped to form an understanding of the backgrounds of these three groups. Secondary data collection and its review and analysis involved collecting and analysing a vast array of information. Secondary data is literally demarcated as ‘second-­ hand’ data. The secondary data is the information that was gathered by someone else (e.g. researchers, institutions, government departments, NGOs, etc.) or for some other purpose than the one currently being considered (Cnossen, 1997). As “it is always wise to begin any research activity with a review of the secondary data” (Novak, 1996), the method of secondary data collection was applied before the interviews were collected and analysed. Resources gathered for the secondary data analysis included:

36 

O. Oleinikova

• Aggregated statistical data: State Statistic Service of Ukraine; Czech Statistical Office (CZSO), Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Department of Home Affairs, Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). • Research publications/secondary data analytics/media: articles in peer-­ reviewed journals, scholarly books, encyclopaedias, media sources (newspapers, online media portals). • Government/parliamentary materials: reports of migration reforms in Australia; Ukraine, Czech and Hungary Parliamentary Committee reports; official records of parliamentary debates; treaties and other international agreements. • Reports of international organisations: International Organization for Migration (IOM); World Bank; United Nations; UNHCR—The UN Refugee Agency; Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS); Centre of Sociological Research (CSR); and so on. Data from the Extended Migration Profile (2011) funded by the European Union’s Thematic Programme, and data from the Migration Profile of Ukraine (2013) prepared by Ukrainian and international experts within the framework of the EU-funded ILO project “Effective Governance of Labour Migration and its Skills Dimensions”, was also used. • Survey data: European Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS); European Quality of Life Surveys (EQLS); European Company Surveys (ECS); Ukrainian nation-wide annual survey polls (with a sampling of about 1800 respondents aged over 18) conducted by the Institute of Sociology in Ukraine since 1992, titled “Ukrainian Society: Survey of Social Change”. The comparative case study had to rely on the range of materials, statistics and information on Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migration to Australia and Australian migration policy since the 2000s. The process of finding information on Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migration to Australia and trends related to it was complicated by the fact that there is relatively little empirical and statistical material on the issue, and absolutely no empirical studies on the current waves of Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migration to Australia since 2000s. Therefore, to complement the collection of various migration reports, which provided only a small amount of data and statistics on Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

37

arrivals in Australia, raw statistical information was also extracted from the Australian Department of Home Affairs and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). The second part of the research aimed at getting insights into the practical life situations of Ukrainian, Hungarian and Czech migrants first hand. To ensure the study was as current and comprehensive as possible and gathered the most up-to-date information on each of the case studies, it relied on qualitative interview fieldwork (Hage, 2005). Qualitative research has been described as having the focus on the meanings and interpretations of the social world’s of participants and provides rich and meaningful data about their experiences (Liamputtong, 2009). It differs from quantitative methodological approaches in the following ways. Qualitative methods are much less structured than quantitative (Sandelowski, 2000), they provide understanding of the underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations, rather than uncover measurable data to expose facts and patterns in the research. As Asselin (2003) remarked, qualitative research uses particular approaches such as interviews to gain a better understanding of the participant’s perspective. The individual migration reasons and outcomes of modern East European migration were captured through 113 interviews collected with Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migrants in Australia: 64 interviews—with Ukrainian migrants, 27 interviews—with Czech Migrants, 22 interviews—with migrants from Hungary. The interviews revealed the agency elements of migrants’ lives before migration, during the actual act of migration (migration streams and visa status resolution) and after migration. All participants were recruited through purposive and snowballing sampling methods. The most challenging part of the empirical fieldwork was to find and recruit the participants for the interviews. The target interview group, Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migrants who came to Australia between 2000 and 2021, turned out to be a cohort that was difficult to access. The representatives this modern Eastern European migration wave (since 2000) appeared to be passive in community life and were hard to reach during community gatherings, celebration events and at church. A snowball sampling technique made it possible to reach these hidden populations (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002, p.  152). As a

38 

O. Oleinikova

typical and widely used practice in similar studies of migration and life strategies, it is important to note that the snowballing technique can result in relatively homogeneous sample of respondents. I also used social media networks to find participants. Facebook and WhatsApp groups of Ukrainians, Czechs and Hungarians were another handy resource for advertising the research and putting a call for participants. Keeping the risk of homogeneity of the sample in mind and considering the scope of the study and the number of respondents, the interpretative analysis of data presented in following chapters does not attempt to generalise the findings to all the East European migrants to Australia. In other words, the results cannot be regarded as exhaustive. Migration situations are mobile and dynamic, and further research is needed on East European migrants and their life strategies in Australia. Furthermore, given the fact that snowballing may produce an homogeneous sample, this technique may have had an impact on sharpening the differences between the two cohorts of participants, in the sense that each cohort was internally similar and therefore seemed more different in comparison. The prerequisite for the selection of respondents was the homogeneity of the range of their social characteristics. It allowed to group study participants who met specific criteria and provided a better understanding of the respondents. The main features of the homogeneity of the respondents were age, year of immigration and the status of being the main applicant for emigration to Australia (if coming with other family members). All respondents were aged over 18. The interviews were conducted in various settings: face-to-face (in coffee shops and parks) and online. All participants were very open and willing to share their stories to assist in the research. The interviews lasted for 1½–2  hours on average. Field notes were made from the audio-­ recordings of the interviews, and all the interviews were transcribed. Confidentiality of the data was ensured by removing all the identifying details of the participants at the stage of transcription. All respondents were assigned pseudonyms to maintain their confidentiality. A semi-structured interview was used because it was less inhibiting than a formal and strictly formatted interview and more open to the natural way in which participants tended to express their experiences. This type of interview is based on a semi-structured conversation designed

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

39

from the outset to encourage participants to narrate their story and to be reflexive, to animate and revitalise memories and experiences (Denscombe, 2007). An interview script was developed, consisting of a set of questions (Cohen et al., 2007; Patton, 2002), which provided a starting point to guide the interaction. The interview questions were based on the research aims and served as a framework for thematic analysis of the transcribed interview texts. Both prospective and retrospective approaches were used to guide the conversation and capture respondents’ reflections on the past and their visions for the future. During their interviews, participants kept positioning themselves in different contexts that were organised spatially and temporally. Spatially, narratives were coded into three main themes that helped to follow the process of migration. These two main spatial themes were “In Ukraine/ Czech Republic/Hungary” and “In Australia”. Temporal thematic content reflects the way migrants share and make meaning out of the flow of their life history across time. They position themselves in time and talk about their lives “before migration”, “during the actual act of migration” (meaning the time between getting the temporary visa and receiving the permanent residency status) and “after migration”, whether it was about positive or negative events.

References Abulkhanova-Slavskaya, K. A. (2001). Strategiya zhizni [Life strategy]. Publishing House Mysl. Adamec, J., Gatwiri, K., & Renouf, J. (2022). Lived experiences of Slovak and Czech immigrants to Australia. Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 13(3). Adamski, W. (1998). The legacy of state socialism as a challenge to system transformation. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). Agnew, J. A. (1987). Place and politics: The geographical mediation of state and society. Allen & Unwin. Anderson, M. (1980). Approaches to the history of the Western family 1500–1914. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Andits, P. (2010). The politics of hope and disappointment: Ambivalence in the post-1989 homeland-related discourses among Hungarians in Australia. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(6), 989–1008.

40 

O. Oleinikova

Andorka, R., & Spéder, Z. (1994). A magyar társadalom szerkezete, 1994 [The structure of Hungarian society, 1994]. In S.  Kurtan, P.  Sándor, & L.  Vass (Eds.), Magyarország politikai Évkönyve (1995). DKMPA. Arunachalam, D., & Healy, E. (2009). Australia’s skilled migration programme and skilled migration between Australia and Japan. In J.  Corbett, A.  Daly, H.  Matsushige, & D.  Taylor (Eds.), Laggards and leaders in labour market reform (pp. 180–204). Routledge. Asselin, M. (2003). Insider research: Issues to consider when doing qualitative research in your own setting. Journal for Nurses in Staff Development, 19(2), 99–103. Babenko, S.  S. (2004). Sotsyalnyi mechanism post-sovetskoy transformatsyi: deyatelnostno-strukturnyi podhod [Social mechanism of post-Soviet transformation: Agency-structure approach]. In O. D. Kutsenko & S. S. Babenko (Eds.), Postkomunystycheskye transformatsiyi: vektori, napravleniya, soderzhaniye [Post-communists transformation: Vectors, directions, content] (pp. 251–274). Karazin Kharkiv National University Publisher. Baumeister, R.  F. (1982). A self-presentational view of social phenomena. Psychological Bulletin, 91, 3–26. Beck, U., Giddens, A., & Lash, S. (1994). Reflexive modernization: Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order. Stanford University Press. Belyaeva, L. A. (2001). Strategii vyzhivaniya, adaptacii, preuspevaniya [Strategies of survival, adaptation, prosperity]. Socis, 6, 44–53. Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. Bernardi, F., Garrido, L., & Miyar, M. (2011). The recent fast upsurge of immigrants in Spain and their employment patterns and occupational attainment. International Migration, 49(1), 148–187. Bevzenko, L. (2008). Stili Zhyzni Perehodnogo Obschestva [Lifestyles in society in transition]. Kiev: Institute of Sociology UNAS. Bihagen, E., & Ohls, M. (2007). Are women over-represented in dead-end jobs? A Swedish study using empirically derived measures of dead-end jobs. Social Indicators Research, 84(2), 159–177. Birch, K. (2017). A research agenda for neoliberalism. Edward Elgar. Birrell, B., & Healy, E. (2003). Migration and the housing affordability crisis. People and Place, 11(3), 43–56. Boucher, A. (2013). Bureaucratic control and policy change: A comparative venue shopping approach to skilled immigration policies in Australia and Canada. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 15(4), 349–367.

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

41

Bourdie, P. (1976). Marriage Strategies as Strategies of Social Reproduction. In E.Forster and P.M. Ranum (Eds.), Family and society. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Büchel, F., & Frick, J.  R. (2005). Immigrants’ economic performance across Europe—does immigration policy matter? Population Research and Policy Review, 24(2), 175–212. Cangiano, A. (2014). Migration policies and migrant employment outcomes. Comparative Migration Studies, 2(4), 417–443. Carothers, T. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 5–21. Castles, S. (2010). Understanding global migration: A social transformation perspective. Journal of Ethic and Migration Studies, 36, 1565–1586. Castles, S., Hugo, G., & Vasta, E. (2013). Rethinking migration and diversity in Australia: Introduction. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 34(2), 115–121. Castles, S., & Miller, M. J. (2009). Age of migration: International population movements in the modern world. Palgrave Macmillan. Cigler, M. J. (1983). The Czechs in Australia. AE Press. Cnossen, C. (1997). Secondary research: Learning paper 7. The Robert Gordon University. Cohen, L., Manion, L., & Morrison, K. (2007). Research methods in education. Routledge. Collier, R. B., & Collier, D. (1991). Shaping the political arena: Critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America. Princeton University Press. Crow, G. (1989). The use of the concept of “strategy” in recent sociological literature. Sociology, 23, 1–24. Cutcher, A.  J. (2015). Hungary Hungarians; Australia Hungarians. In Displacement, identity and belonging (pp. 45–58). Sense Publishers. Denscombe, M. (2007). The good research guide: For small-scale social research. Open University Press. Department of Home Affairs. (2018a). Ukraine-born community information summary. Australian Government. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/mca/ files/2016-­cis-­ukraine.PDF Department of Home Affairs. (2018b). Czech-born community information summary. Australian Government. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/mca/ files/2016-­cis-­czech-­republic.PDF Department of Home Affairs. (2018c). Hungary-born community information summary. Australian Government. https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/mca/ files/2016-­cis-­hungary.PDF

42 

O. Oleinikova

Djajić, S. (2005). Illegal immigration trends, policies and economic effects. Routledge. Domansky, H. (1990). Major social transformations and social mobility: The case of the transition to and from communism in Eastern Europe. Social Science Information, 38(3), 463–491. Edward, D., Mansfield, F., & Snyder, A. (2002). Democratic transitions, institutional strength, and war. International Organization, 56(2), 297–337. Edwards, R., & Ribbens, J. (1991). Meanderings around strategy: A research note on strategic discourse in the lives of women. Sociology, 25(3), 477–489. Elder, G. H. Jr. (1985). Life course dynamics: Trajectories and transitions. Cornell University Press Ithaca. Elster, J. (1983). Sour grapes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Elster, J. (1986). Rational choice. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Entrikin, J. N. (1991). The betweenness of place: Towards a geography of modernity. Johns Hopkins University Press. Faist, T. (2000). The volume and dynamics of international migration and transnational social spaces. Clarendon Press. Findlay, A.  M., & Li, F.  L. N. (1999). Methodological issues in researching migration. The Professional Geographer, 51(1), 50–59. Florida, R. (2005). The flight of the creative class: The new global competition for talent. Harper Collins Business. Forrest, J., & Kusek, W. (2016). Human capital and the structural integration of polish immigrants in Australia in the first, second and third generations. Australian Geographer, 47(2), 233–248. https://doi.org/10.1080/0004918 2.2016.1148103 Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Geisen, T. (2013). The complexity of migration: Life-strategies of migrant family members and families. Themis conference 2013. International Migration Institute. http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/events/themis-­2013/presentations/ geisen.pdf Genov, N. (Ed.). (2008). Interethnic integration in five European societies. Krämer. Genov, N., & Savvidis, T. (2011). Transboundary migration in the post-Soviet space. Peter Lang. Gill, N., & Bialski, P. (2011). New friends in new places: Network formation during the migration process among Poles in UK. Geoforum, 42(2), 241–249. Gillman, M. (2021). Macroeconomic trends among Visegrad countries, EU Balkans, and the US, 1991–2021. Central European Business Review, 10(2).

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

43

Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. University of Edinburgh Social Sciences Research Centre. Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. London: Harper and Row. Golovakha, G.  I. (2000). Zhiznennaya perspektiva i zennostnie orientacii lichnosti [Life prospects and values of the individual]. Psychology of Personality in the Works of Domestic Psychologists, 212–267. Golovakha, V. I., & Panina, N. V. (2006). Osnovnye etapy I tendencii transformacii ukrainskogo obschestva: ot perestroiki do orangevoi revolutsii [Main stages and trends in the transformation of Ukrainian society: From restructuring to the Orange Revolution]. Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing, 3, 32–51. Gubrium, J. F., & Holstein, J. A. (2002). Handbook of interview research: Context & method. Sage. Hage, G. (2005). A not so multi-sited ethnography of a not so imagined community. Anthropological Theory, 5(4), 463–475. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1463499605059232 Hareven, T. K. (1982). Family time and industrial time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hawthorne, L. (2005). “Picking Winners”: The recent transformation of Australia’s skilled migration policy. International Migration Review, 39(3), 663–696. Hubbard, P., Kitchin, R., & Valentine, G. (2004). Key thinkers on space and place. Sage. Hugo, G. (2000). Migration and women’s empowerment. In H.  Presser & G.  Sen (Eds.), Women’s empowerment and demographic processes: Moving beyond Cairo (pp. 287–317). Oxford University Press. Hugo, G. (2004). Future immigration policy development in Australia and New Zealand. New Zealand Population Review, 30(1–2), 23–42. Hugo, G. (2006a). Australian experience in skilled migration. In C. Kuptsch & E. F. Pang (Eds.), Competing for global talent (pp. 107–154). International Institute for Labour Studies. Hugo, G. (2006b). Globalization and changes in Australian international migration. Journal of Population Research, 23(2), 107–134. Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy’s third wave. The Journal of Democracy, 2(2), 12–34. Jean, S., Causa, O., Jiménez, M., & Wanner, I. (2011). Migration and labour market outcomes in OECD countries. OECD Journal: Economic Studies, 2010(1), 1–34.

44 

O. Oleinikova

Johnston, R. (2012). The Assimilation Myth: A study of second generation Polish immigrants in Western Australia (Vol. 14). Springer Science & Business Media. Jones, E. E., & Pittman, T. S. (1982). Toward a general theory of strategic self-­ presentation. Psychological Perspectives on the Self, 1, 231–262. Jupp, J. (2002). From white Australia to Woomera: The story of Australian immigration. Cambridge University Press. Keane, J. (2009). The life and death of democracy. Simon and Schuster. Keller, A., & Westerholm, P.  J. (2007). Benchmarking a transition economy capital market. Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal, 1(3), 49–60. Keller, J. (2002). Modernizacia—gumanizacia obshchestva ili korozia bytia? Kriticheskie zametki o teorii modernizacii [Modernization—Humanization of society or corrosion of existence? Critical notes on the theory of modernization]. Sociological Research, 7(219), 48–53. Kennedy, P. (2004). Making global society: Friendship networks among transnational professional in the building industry. Global Networks, 4(2), 157–179. Kenway, J., & Fahey, J. (2009). Academic mobility and hospitality: The good host and the good guest. European Educational Research Journal, 8(4), 555–559. Khoo, S.  E., Hugo, G., & McDonald, P. (2008). Which skilled temporary migrants become permanent residents and why? International Migration Review, 42(1), 193–226. Kinowska, Z., & Pakulski, J. (2018). Polish migrants and organizations in Australia. Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 10(2), 33–45. Klein, O., Spears, R., & Reich, S. (2007). Social identity performance: Extending the strategic side of SIDE. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11(1), 1–18. Kogan, I. (2007). Working through barriers: Host country institutions and immigrant labour market performance in Europe. Springer. Kogan, I. (2011). New immigrants, old disadvantage patterns? Labour market integration of recent immigrants into Germany. International Migration, 49(1), 91–117. Koinova, M. (2009). Diasporas and democratization in the post-communist world. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 42(1), 41–64. Kovacs, M. (2005). Hungarians in Australia. In A. Fenyvesi (Ed.), Hungarian language contact outside Hungary: Studies on Hungarian as a minority language (pp. 351–370). John Benjamins Publishing. Kuptsch, C., & Pang, E.  F. (2006). Competing for global talent. International Institute for Labour Studies.

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

45

Kutsenko, O. (2007). Monitoring of events in the Interethnic Intas Project. Abteilung Soziologie, Helt, 57, 16–23. Kutsenko, O. D. (2004). Fazi i puti sistemnyh transformacii: podobia i razlichia v byvshyh stranah gosudarstvennogo socializma [Phases and pathways of systemic transformations: Similarities and differences in former socialists states]. In O.  D. Kutsenko & S.  S. Babenko (Eds.), Postkomunystycheskye transformatsiyi: vektori, napravleniya, soderzhaniye [Post-communists transformation: Vectors, directions, content] (pp. 251–274). V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University Publisher. Lacey, C. (1977). The socialization of teachers. London: Metheun. Lavigne, M. (2000). Ten years of transition: A review article. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 33(4), 475–483. Legostaeva, N.I. (2011). Zhiznennye strategii sovremennoy rossiyskoy molodezhi [Life Strategies of Modern Russian Youth]. In Bugrov, D.V. (Ed.), Proceedings of the Conference on Modernization of Russia: the responsibility of youth (pp. 452– 456). Yekaterinburg, Russia: UrFu. Leary, M. R., & Kowalsky, R. M. (1990). Impression management: A literature review and two-component model. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 34–47. Lerner, D. (1958). The passing of traditional society. Free Press. Levada, U. (2000). Ot mnenui k ponimaniu. Sociologicheskie ocherki 1993-2000 [From opinions to understanding: sociological reviews 1991-2000]. Moscow: Moscow School of Political Research. Levine, D. (1977). Family formation in an age of nascent capitalism. New York: Academic Press. Levitsky, S., & Way, L.  A. (2002). The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 51–65. Liamputtong, P. (2009). Qualitative research methods. Oxford University Press. Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. The American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69–105. Machonin, P. (1997). Social transformation and modernization: On building theory of societal changes in the post-communist European countries (Vol. 3). Mahoney, J. (2000). Path dependence in historical sociology. Theory and Society, 29, 507–548. Markus, A. B., Jupp, J., & McDonald, P. (2009). Australia’s immigration revolution. Allen and Unwin. Martin, D. G. (2003). “Place-Framing” as place-making: Constituting a neighborhood for organizing and activism. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 93(3), 730–750.

46 

O. Oleinikova

Massey, D. (1994). Space, place and gender. Polity Press. Massey, D.  S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, J. E. (1998). Worlds in motion: Understanding international migration at the end of the millennium. Oxford University Press. McFaul, M., Petrov, N., & Ryabov, A. (2004). Between dictatorship and democracy. Russian post-communist political reform. Carnegie Endowment for International peace. Merkel, W. (2004). Embedded and defective democracies. In A. Croissant & W.  Merkel (Eds.), Consolidated or defective democracy? Problems of regime change. Taylor & Francis. Merkel, W. (2010). Systemtransformation. Eine Einfuhrung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Moore, B., Jr. (1966). Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Beacon Press. Morawska, E. (2001). Structuring migration: The case of Polish income-seeking travelers to the West. Theory and Society, 30(1), 47–80. Morgan, D.  H. J. (1989). Strategies and sociologists: A comment on Crow. Sociology, 23(1), 25–29. Mrozowicki, A. (2011). Coping with social change: Life strategies of workers in Poland’s new capitalism. Leuven University Press. Nathan, A. J. (2003). Authoritarian resilience. Journal of Democracy, 14(1), 6–17. Naumova, N.  R. (1995). Zhyznennaya strategya cheloveka v perehodnom obschestve [Individual life strategy in a transitional society]. Journal of Sociology, 1, 2–12. Novak, T.  P. (1996). Secondary data analysis lecture notes: Marketing Research (Vanderbilt University). www2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.edu/marketing. research.spring O’Donnell, G., & Schmitter, P. C. (1986). Transitions from authoritarian rule: Prospects for democracy. Johns Hopkins University Press. O’Reilly, K. (2012). International migration and social theory. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Oleinikova, O. (2013). Beyond two decades of social transition in Ukraine: The underestimated power of agency in transition research. Australian and New Zealand. Journal of European Studies, 5(2), 45–60. Oleinikova, O. (2017). Moving out of “their places”: 1991–2016 migration of Ukrainians to Australia. In A.  Pikulicka-Wilczewska & A.  Uehling (Eds.), Migration and the Ukraine crisis: A two-country perspective. E-International Relations. https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/handle/10453/121587

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

47

Oleinikova, O. (2019). Democratic transition research: From Western to post-­ Soviet East European scholarship. East/West: Journal of Ukranian Studies, 6(1), 147–167. Oleinikova, O. (2020a). Life strategies of migrants from crisis regimes: Achiever or survivor? Springer International Publishing. Oleinikova, O. (2020b). Migration for achievement: The life strategies of skilled IT migrants from Ukraine in Australia. Central and Eastern European Migration Review, 9(2), 53–70. https://www.ceeol.com/search/ article-­detail?id=926377 Osvát, K., & Osvát, S. (2010). Hungarians under the Southern Cross. The present of Australian Hungarianness in a nutshell. (in Hungarian). Regio 21. http://www.epa.hu/00000/00036/00078/pdf/Regio_2010_02_113-­128.pdf Ottaway, M. (2003). Promoting democracy after conflict: The difficult choices. International Studies Perspectives, 4(3), 314–322. Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods. Sage. Pendakur, R., & Bevelander, P. (2021). Polish immigrants and their children in Canada and Sweden, employment status and income patterns. Comparative Migration Studies, 9(1), 1–23. Petra, A. (2020). ‘Not anymore, not yet’: Australian–Hungarians rediscover the ‘old-new’ Hungary. The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 31(2), 257–269. Petra, A. (2022). Nostalgia as double-edged sword: Australian-Hungarians reclaim lost belonging in post-socialist Hungary. Identities, 29(3), 339–356. Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. American Political Science Review, 94(2), 251–267. Radosevic, S. (2022). Techno-economic transformation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union–A neo-Schumpeterian perspective. Research Policy, 51(1), 104–397. Reyneri, E., & Fullin, G. (2011). Labour market penalties of new immigrants in new and old receiving West European countries. International Migration, 49(1), 31–57. Reznik, T.  E., & Reznik, Y.  M. (1996). Zhyznennoe oryentyrovanye lychnosti: analiz i konulstyrovanye [Individual life orientation: Analysis and advice] (pp. 110–119). Sociological Research. Reznik, Y. M. (1995). Social dimension of a life world (introduction to sociology of life). Foreign Languages Publishing. Reznik, Y.  M., & Smirnov, E.  A. (2002). Zhyznennue strategyi lychnosty [Life strategies of a person (experience of complex analysis)]. Moscow: Institute of Human Sciences, Independent Institute of Civil Society.

48 

O. Oleinikova

Rodrik, D., & Wacziarg, R. (2005). Do democratic transitions produce bad economic outcomes? American Economic Review, 95(2), 50–55. Rojec, M. (2019). Facilitating transition by internationalization: Outward direct investment from Central European economies in transition. Routledge. Romanowski, P. (2021). Family language policy in the Polish diaspora: A focus on Australia. Routledge. Rostow, W. W. (1960). The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto. Cambridge University Press. Ryazantsev, S.  V. (2014). The lingual integration of migrants in Russia: Declarations and realities. Life Science Journal, 11(8), 139–143. Saar, M., & Palang, H. (2009). The dimensions of place meanings. Living Reviews in Landscape Research, 3, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.12942/lrlr-­2009-­3 SBS Census Explorer. (2016). Census https://www.sbs.com.au/news/creative/ census-explorer/xtjxeqygs (accessed 28 November 2021). Sandelowski, M. (2000). Focus on research methods-whatever happened to qualitative description? Research in Nursing and Health, 23(4), 334–340. https://doi.org/10.1002/1098-­2 40x(200008)23:4 3.0.co;2-­g Schlenker, B. R., & Weigold, M. F. (1992). Interpersonal processes involving impression regulation and management. Annual Review of Psychology, 43, 133–168. Schütz, A. (1967). Phenomenology of the social world. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Scott, S. (2007). The community morphology of skilled migration: The changing role of voluntary and community organizations (VCOs) in the grounding of British migrants in Paris (France). Geoforum, 38(4), 655–676. Serbin, S. (2006). Ukrainians in Australia. Ukrainian Studies, 2, 304–313. Shakespeare-Finch, J., Bowen-Salter, H., Cashin, M., Badawi, A., Wells, R., Rosenbaum, S., & Steel, Z. (2020). COVID-19: An Australian perspective. Journal of Loss and Trauma, 25(8), 662–672. Shaw, M. (1990). Strategy and social process: Military context and sociological analysis. Sociology, 24(3), 465–470. Sherington, G. (1990). Australia’s immigrants 1788–1988. Allen & Unwin. Smirnov, E.A. (2002). Life strategies of civil servants. Civil Service, 4, 33–39. Strielkowski, W. (2012). Migration in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Charles University Publishing House. Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review, 51(2), 273–286.

1  Migration from Eastern Europe to Australia: History, Numbers… 

49

Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. Social Science Information, 13, 65–93. Team, V., Markovic, M., & Manderson, L. (2007). Family caregivers: Russian-­ speaking Australian women’s access to welfare support. Health & Social Care in the Community, 15(5), 397–406. Thomas, R. J. (1989). 17 Blue-collar careers: meaning. Handbook of career theory. Thomas, W. I., & Znaniecki, F. (1958). The Polish Peasant in Europe and America Volumes I and II. New York: Dover Publications. Titarenko, L. (2008). Post-Soviet transformation of democracy: Western and domestic interpretations. Philosophy and Social Science: Scientific Journal, 1, 21–27. Vasilyeva, O.S, & Demchenko, E.A. (2002). Izuchenie osnovnyh kharakteristik zhyznennue strategyi lychnosty [The study of the basic characteristics of life strategy]. Questions of Human Psychology, 2, 74–85. Vertovec, S. (2002). Transnational network and skilled labour migration. Transnational Communities Working Paper WPTC-02-02. Oxford. Volodko, V. (2007). The choice of migration country and life trajectories of Ukrainian labour migrants (Regional aspect). The Herald of Odessa National University. Issue “Sociology. Politology”, 679–686. Watson, W. (1990). Strategy, rationality and inference: The possibility of symbolic performances. Sociology, 24(3), 485–498. Williams, A. M. (2006). Lost in translation? International migration, learning and knowledge. Progress in Human Geography, 30(5), 588–607. Wucherpfennig, J., & Deutsh, F. (2009). Modernization and democracy: Theory and evidence revisited. Living Reviews in Democracy, 1, 1–9. Yadov, V. A. (1999). Rosia kak transformirushcheesia obschestvo (rezume mnogoletnei diskusii sociologov) [Russia as a society in transition (summary of sociological discussions)]. Society and Economy, 10(11), 65–72. Zahra, T. (2016). The great departure: Mass migration from Eastern Europe and the making of the free world. WW Norton & Company. Zapf, W. (1998). Teоriya modernizacii i razlichie putei obschestvennogo razvitia [Modernization theory and differences in paths of social development]. Socis, 8, 14–26. Zapf, W., Khabik, R., Bulman, T., & Delei, Y. (2002). Germaniya: transfromaziya cherez obedinenie [Germany: Transformation through consolidation]. Socis, 5, 19–37.

50 

O. Oleinikova

Zaslavskaya, I.  T. (1999). Transformation process in Russia: Socio-structural aspect. In I. T. Zaslavskaya & Z. I. Kalugina (Eds.), Social trajectory of the reforming Russia: Research of Novosibirsk School of Economics and Sociology. Siberian Enterprise. Zaslavskaya, I. T., & Yadov, V. A. (2008). Report on the opening of III Russian Sociological Congress. http://polit.ru/article/2008/10/29/soctransformations/ Zaslavskaya, T.  I. (2001). Sotciostrukturnye aspekt transfromacii rosiiskogo obschestva [Socio-strcuctural aspect of the transformation of Russian society]. Sociological Researches, 8, 3–16. Zielonka, J. (2014). Is the EU doomed? John Wiley & Sons. Zlobina, O. (2003). Osobystisna skladova suspilnyh zmin: sociologichnyi kontekst [Agency component of the societal changes: Sociological context]. Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing, 3, 32–45. Zlobina, O., & Tykhonovych, V. (2001). Societal crisis and life strategies of ­individual. Stylos.

2 New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies and Migrant Profiles

This chapter presents analysis of Ukrainian migration to Australia, focusing on the bifurcation of migrants into two opposing life strategies of survival and achievement. Utilising the life strategy conceptual framework, the chapter discusses core reasons behind Ukrainian arrivals to Australia and their migration outcomes, shaped by structural and agency factors. Ukraine, like many other Central and Eastern European (CEE) nations in the twentieth century, went through several sharp turns and endured many tragic twists. This chapter will look into two important historical turning points in the context of the migration of Ukrainians to Australia. The first is the collapse of Soviet rule in August 1991 and the resulting massive emigration to Australia. The second is the 2014 EuroMaidan protests and the associated intensification of migration caused by political unrest, economic downgrade and the war in eastern Ukraine. These events touched every Ukrainian family deeply and will produce ripple effects for decades to come, both for those who migrated and for those who stayed at home. Ukrainian immigration to Australia has a long history. The first ethnic Ukrainians from western Ukraine are known to have settled in Australia as early as 1860. Then World War I and the Russian Civil War led to the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Oleinikova, New Eastern European Migration to Australia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07095-2_2

51

52 

O. Oleinikova

first massive instance of political emigration, which strengthened existing Ukrainian communities in Australia by infusing them with members from political, scientific, and cultural backgrounds. During the second wave of political emigrants from 1945 to the 1950s, the Ukrainian diaspora in Australia also reasonably increased. The 1990s saw a ‘third wave of Ukrainian immigration to Australia’. Today, more than 35,000 people of Ukrainian origin live in Australia, half of whom were born in Ukraine. Given the dramatic swelling of the Ukrainian community in Australia in the early 1990s and the complete change in Ukrainian migration patterns from 2004 onwards, understanding the contexts of recent migration flows to Australia is critical. This chapter emphasises the structural variables that shape Ukrainian migration, particularly the events in Ukraine and the shifts in Australian migration policy in the period between 1991 and 2021. Depending on the combination of structural and individual factors, the profile of Ukrainian migrants varies across three periods of migration: (1) 1991–2003, (2) 2004–2013 and (3) 2014–2021 (Oleinikova, 2020). The profile of 1991–2003 arrivals, hereafter called ‘transition migrants’, is characterised by survival life trajectories and dominated by the arrival of blue-collar working-class migrants through humanitarian and family reunion migration streams; during 2004–2013 the character of Ukrainian migration changed towards the arrival of skilled professionals from the white-collar working-class families through the skilled migration stream and marriage, and this cohort is addressed as ‘dividend migrants’. During 2014–2021 the profile of Ukrainian migrants in Australia has experienced another shift back towards the dominance of survival aims and mechanisms and these arrivals through the humanitarian and skilled migration stream and are referred to as ‘post-dream migrants’, a reference to the situation where dreams for Ukraine’s democratic and economically sustainable future are being destroyed by a reality that pushes its citizens to migrate. Ukrainian migration into Australia since the 1990s is an understudied phenomenon and this chapter seeks to redress this. The analysis is based on a research project that explored Ukrainian migration to Australia between 1991 and 2021 by focusing on the bifurcation of migrant life strategies into achievement and survival that were formed before, realised during and then recreated after the actual act of migration. The study

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

53

used a twofold methodology. It began with the collection and assessment of secondary data on both Australian migration policy and Ukrainian migration from 1991 onwards. Later, qualitative fieldwork was conducted in New South Wales, Australia, between October 2012 and May 2013, which involved 51 semi-structured interviews with Ukrainians. A further 13 interviews with Ukrainians who arrived in Australia after 2014 (the EuroMaidan protests) were conducted in February 2021. Hence, this chapter relies on a total of 64 interviews. Participants originated from different Ukrainian regions: 21 were from eastern Ukraine, 27 were from western Ukraine, another 16 were from central Ukraine and eight came from southern Ukraine. Of the participants, 42 were men and 22 were women. Regarding their social origins, 29 of the interviewees were born into white-collar working-class families and 33 interviewees into blue-­ collar working-class families, while the remaining two interviewees originated from the class of cultural and scientific intelligentsia. Most of the interviewed Ukrainian migrants received permanent residence in Australia through the skilled migration stream (34 participants), family reunion (21 participants) and humanitarian (refugee) streams (nine participants). Two participants arrived on sport talent visas. Most of the migrants (51 out of 64) had university degrees. Their average age was 31 years. 44 participants were married both with and without children and three were divorced. At the time of the interview, 20 participants were single.

2.1 Emigration Dynamics from Ukraine to Australia: Structural Contexts The empirical qualitative fieldwork garnered rich data that was then used to investigate the differences in migrants’ profiles across three spaces/ dimensions: (1) before migration (while in Ukraine); (2) during migration (the actual act of migration); and (3) after migration (while in Australia), as well as across three time periods: (1) 1991–2003; (2) 2004–2013; and (3) 2014–2021. From the 64 life stories of Ukrainians in Australia, the study found three waves of post-independence Ukrainian migration to Australia that correspond to three migration profiles, which

54 

O. Oleinikova

varied depending on a combination of structural factors and individual factors (values, aims, needs, sense of agency and decision-making). Let’s first sketch out the structural context and scrutinise the structural power of emigration dynamics in shaping the flow, character, and the profiles of ‘transition migrants’ (1991–2003), ‘dividend migrants’ (2004–2013) and ‘post-dream migrants’ (2014–2021) in Australia.

1991–2003 Migration Context The analysis of emigration dynamics during 1991–2003 are a direct reflection of Ukraine’s period of instability and the negative conditions of the country’s economic, political and demographic situation during the first 12 years of independence. The country faced a deep economic crisis, price hikes of basic consumer goods and transport, the commercialisation of education and the elimination of social benefits such as a guaranteed job, free health care and state housing. While these factors made migration more difficult, the economic difficulties forced people to look for opportunities to survive, which included migration. Hence, the huge difference in living standards between post-Soviet Ukraine and the countries of the West significantly impacted the level of Ukrainian migration to the West for permanent residency. Between 1991 and 2003, many countries experienced an influx of Ukrainian immigrants. According to official statistics, between 1991 and 2004, 2,537,400 individuals left Ukraine; 1,897,500 moved to other post-Soviet states while 639,900 moved to other, mainly Western, states. Based on the interviews, the choice of migrating in Australia was always associated with the following: (1) family ties, (2) successful migration stories of friends and (3) earlier biographical circumstances. The first five years of independence saw the most intensive flow of Ukrainians to Australia. Later, the flow of immigration decreased slightly, with 11% arriving between 2001 and 2006, and 9.6% arriving during 2007–2011 (DIAC, 2013). Between 1991 and 2003, a total of 3519 Ukrainians arrived in Australia with permanent residency status, which corresponds to 59% of the total number of post-independence Ukrainian permanent arrivals (DIAC, 2014).

55

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

Since the 1990s, key changes in Australia’s migration policies have shaped the character of Ukrainian migration to Australia. These changes are key to understanding migration profiles as they determined the pathways of Ukrainians to Australia. From 1970 to 1996, the Australian Government had made it increasingly difficult for unskilled migrants to migrate to Australia outside of humanitarian and family reunion programmes (Larsen, 2013). It encouraged family migration because it saw family migrants as bonding agents for the next migration wave, thereby assisting their cultural and economic integration (Larsen, 2013). Only after 1996 were the first reforms to family migration introduced, resulting in a shift in favour of skilled migration, which was perceived to have earning potential (Boucher, 2013; Hawthorne, 2005; Markus et  al., 2009). Therefore, at the beginning of the 1990s, Australia’s migration policy created a number of barriers for Ukrainian migration. Given the migration policy, the majority of Ukrainians in the 1990s arrived as family and humanitarian (refugee) migrants. The UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database shows this clearly (see Table 2.1). As the situation of the mid 2000s changed, so did Australia’s migration policy and in turn the migration trajectories of Ukrainians.

2004–2013 Migration Context During this period, many Ukrainian citizens tried to find a legal opportunity to leave their country under any pretext—either for work and/or for permanent residence. Against the background of Yushchenko’s Table 2.1  Ukrainian citizens granted refugee status in Australia and asylum applications submitted by Ukrainian citizens 1999–2009 Population type 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Refugees Asylum seekers

13 88

20 203

27 259

40 125

44 9

40 0

34 4

30 6

55 2

55 0

52 3

Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Data extracted: 15 December 2021, https:// www.unhcr.org/refugee-­statistics/download/?url=8ZHSgh

56 

O. Oleinikova

historical myth-making and demagoguery about patriotism, more and more ordinary citizens lost any hope for a bright future in Ukraine and began looking for a better life abroad. The main destinations for Ukrainian labour migrants remained the same. In 2009 they were, firstly, Russia (48.1%) and then European Union countries (41.2%)—mainly Italy (13.4%), the Czech Republic (12.8%), Poland (7.4%), Spain (3.9%) and Portugal (3.0%) (State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2009, p. 33). However, between 2010 and 2013, migration research and statistics revealed a shift in the migration choices of Ukrainians towards Asia. Due to its geographical distance and lack of easy way for Ukrainians to access the country, Australia was still not among the popular destinations. And, since 2004, there have been changes in the number and character of Ukrainian arrivals to Australia. The main feature of Ukrainian migration to Australia during this period was the change in the quality of migrants since 2004. In 2004, for the first time in the history of Ukrainian migration to Australia, the number of Ukrainians who arrived in Australia through the skilled migration stream with permanent status outnumbered humanitarian and family migrants (Oleinikova, 2020). Out of the 2470 permanent arrivals between 2004 and 2013, a total of 1312 migrants came through the skilled stream while only 1005 came through the family stream (DIAC, 2014)2 (2 As per the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) Settlement Database (SDB) data (extracted on 30/04/2014), the total number of Ukraine-born arrivals granted a permanent visa in Australia between 1 January 2004–1 January 2013 was 2 470 people, out of which 1312 were skilled migrants, 1005—family, 6—humanitarian and 147 unknown). Between 1 January 2004 and 1 January 2014, only six Ukrainian migrants were granted a permanent visa through the humanitarian migration stream (DIAC, 2014). This shift towards skilled arrivals from Ukraine was triggered by the change in the government’s migration policy. In 2008 the Rudd Labor Government announced plans to increase the numbers of skilled migrants to Australia by 30% compared to the previous year, and this trend continues (Boucher, 2013; Markus et al., 2009). This growing demand for highly skilled migrants attracted IT professionals and engineers from Ukraine. Hence, Australia’s migration policies have evolved from

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

57

focusing on attracting migrants for the purposes of increasing Australia’s population to attracting migrants as temporary and permanent (skilled) workers in order to meet the needs of the economy.

2014–2021 Migration Context Since the outbreak of mass protests against the Yanukovych regime in November 2013, Ukraine has been wracked by political and social unrest and violent conflict, especially with the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the outbreak of war in Eastern Ukraine. As of 2020, more than 21,085 people are wounded, 14,000 killed, and an estimated 2 million forcibly displaced. This includes 1.3 million internally displaced people and around 700,000 refugees. The 72-year-old Yanukovych was Ukraine’s president from 2010 until he was ousted in February 2014 following widespread protests over his decision to reject the country’s agreement to align itself more closely with the European Union, with an eye towards future membership in the bloc, and instead pursue a Russian financial bailout package and tighter ties to Moscow. Many Ukrainians and many international civil society groups had also criticised Yanukovych for running a corrupt administration, including charges that he embezzled funds from the government. (Yanukovych has denied he misappropriated government money.) He favoured a small group of wealthy Ukrainian business tycoons, including his own son Oleksandr Yanukovych, and members of his extended family. He also amassed a large personal fortune. In the years leading to the EuroMaidan protests, political instability and pervasive corruption inspired not only a movement for democratisation and greater ties with the European Union, but also the ambition to migrate among a significant portion of the population. The post-­ EuroMaidan events have affected all Ukrainian migration flows, which can be broken down into three main categories: (1) forced internal migration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) by the war in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (2) international migration of asylum seekers, driven by political motives, as well as the desire to avoid military conscription; and (3) continuous emigration of skilled and professional Ukrainians, along

58 

O. Oleinikova

with educational migration driven by mix of political and economic motives. During 2014 and 2021, there was a significant increase in the number of applications for refugee status submitted by Ukrainians to the EU countries, the US, Canada and Australia. In 2014, Ukrainians submitted 14,000 applications for refugee status, compared to 1120  in 2013 (Jaroszewicz, 2015, p. 1). See Fig. 2.1 below. Given the increase in the number of asylum seekers from Ukrainian citizens in Australia between 2014 and 2021 (DIAC, 2021), the country has become more restrictive about the arrivals of Ukrainians who apply for temporary tourist, study and business visas. All the participants interviewed, who arrived in Australia during 2014 and 2021, mentioned that they know from their own experience and heard from their friends and relatives about instances where temporary visas for Ukrainians were refused. There are no open statistics to confirm the increase in the number of refusals from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC). Among the interviewed males, one of the main reasons for

Fig. 2.1  Ukrainian citizens granted refugee status in Australia and asylum applications submitted by Ukrainian citizens 2014–2021. (Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Data extracted: 15 December 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/ refugee-­statistics/)

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

59

seeking asylum abroad was to avoid army conscription. As the conflict in the east escalated, the Ukrainian government reinstated a general draft with the power to conscript men between the ages of 20 and 27. As a result, many young men used diverse channels of migration to avoid conscription. This included employment, study, training programmes, internships and other available opportunities. It was in these different structural contexts and circumstances that Ukrainians made their decisions and plans to move to Australia during 1991 and 2021. And these contexts have shaped the different migration profiles of Ukrainian migrants in Australia.

2.2 Who Are They: Three Profiles of Post-­Independence Ukrainian Migrants to Australia The main finding of the 64 life stories of Ukrainians in Australia is that there are three waves of post-independence Ukrainian migration to Australia that correspond to three migration profiles with different set of reasons for migration and corresponding migration outcomes: ‘transition migrants’, ‘dividend migrants’ and ‘post-dream migrants’. These profiles vary depending on a combination of structural factors and individual factors (values, aims, needs, sense of agency and decision-making). These three profiles reflect the two opposing life strategies pursued by Ukrainians: one—dynamic, risk-taking and future-oriented ‘achievement strategies’ (or ‘creation strategies’), which are open to mobility; and the other—conservative, risk-minimising and survival-oriented ‘survival strategies’ and ‘strategies of adaptation’ that are less conducive to any type of change.

‘Transition Migrants’ Analysis of the aims, values, agency along with the emotional, occupational, and class characteristics of the ‘transition migrants’ migrants who arrived in Australia during 1991–2003, as well as considering their professional, identity and emotional shifts after migration, suggests that they

60 

O. Oleinikova

created a set of personal and social characteristics which reflected a survival life strategy. The survival life strategy—is a life strategy type directed towards limited re-creation at the level of physical survival, which also entails a decline in social and economic status, self-restraint and a decline of life chances (Babenko, 2004; Reznik & Reznik, 1995). (See more in Chap. 1). Drawing on the interview data, their survival-oriented, risk-­minimising trajectory is mainly characterised by: (1) the aim to escape poverty and starvation and regain job status; (2) material values, values of traditionalism, family well-being, comfort and conformity; (3) the need for security (order and stability, living in a safe environment, avoiding threats), environmental needs (a healthy environment) and social needs (integrity of social and individual values); and (4) weak agency and behavioural passivity (meaning operation within the most accessible and safe opportunities, and not actively transforming their lives by extending their opportunities). These characteristics were found to be shaped in Ukraine before departure, and they are what defines and reinforces the survival life trajectory of ‘transition migrants’ in the post-migration stages. The analysis of the motivations and aims for migration typical for ‘transition migrants’ shows that their choices are dominated by migration push factors. In the interviews, ‘transition migrants’ spoke about economic crisis and political turbulence as a push factor for their migration, and framed their emigration to Australia as being “more forced than voluntary”. The main migration push factors found in their life stories were: (1) unemployment; (2) lack of occupational work; (3) low wages and arrears and (4) the suppression of entrepreneurial activity. Kostyantyn’s narrative is an emblematic example. Kostyantyn, an engineer by training from a family of professionals (his mother was an academic and his father an architect), left Ukraine in his late 30s. As a result of the shift in the country’s economic priorities after the collapse of the USSR, from a planned economy (with a focus on the defence industry) to a market economy, many engineers and representatives of scientific and cultural intelligentsia lost their jobs. Kostyantyn was not an exception. Kostyantyn remembers strong disappointment with the State and the devaluation of his skills and work, when his defence industry research became irrelevant:

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

61

At that time I worked in systems services for scientific equipment. In the late 80s–early 90s, basically all scientific research was conducted under the roof of the defence industry. Therefore, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, of course, there was no such research and no defence industry. I lost my job. My skills and work as a specialist in this area was no longer needed. This economic situation prompted me to search for ways to leave.

This interview extract shows that Kostyantyn’s unsatisfactory economic situation was caused by sudden unemployment when he was unable to earn enough money to simply feed his family. The loss of his ability to earn a living was accompanied by the loss of social status that went with his profession. Kostyantyn says that his professional skills were no longer needed. Overall, ‘transition migrants’ built their survival life strategy based on the values of material wealth, traditionalism, family well-being and (non-) conformity. This set of values is drawn from the personal stories of migrants. Colic-Peisker’s (2009) study of Croatian migrants found that he two different migrant cohorts (those who migrated during 1950s–1960s and those—during 1980s–1990s) differentiate by different sets of values. I apply this conclusion and hypothesise that the cohort of ‘survival migrants’ brought up in socialist times of collective mentality and affected by the material insecurity of Ukraine’s economically and politically turbulent 1990s, are likely to develop material values that they associate with a sense of security and stability. The narratives show that values were visibly linked to identity and emotions. In particular, the values of ‘transition migrants’ were shaped by emotional trauma that emerged due to participants not being able to accept the systemic changes after the collapse of the USSR. Their identities also underwent a transformation from Soviet identity to Ukrainian identity affixed a stamp of traditionalism and conformity. Talking about migration as “an ongoing emotional journey” (Ryan, 2008, p. 301), the majority of ‘transition migrant’ interviewees emphasised the role of psychological discomfort and the depression that was induced by the social and economic conditions arising from post-Soviet unrest before migration that threaded through their post-migration life.

62 

O. Oleinikova

The majority of ‘transition migrants’ showed disappointment, guilt, nostalgic depression and homesickness caused by their separation from home and those they left behind. Most of the stories expressed partial satisfaction with migration and demonstrated precarity, emotional insecurity and opportunism. These emotions were a deterrent to the success of their integration into and adaptation to Australia. The ‘transition migrants’ cohort mostly used the family reunion and humanitarian migration streams to assist their entry into Australia. The blue-collar workers and suppressed entrepreneurs formed a particular group of humanitarian ‘transition migrants’ composed of regular and irregular short-term arrivals who tended to obtain their permanent residency in Australia by claiming asylum. This cohort was identified as using ‘conspiracy’ and ‘manoeuvering’ tactics to enable their entry into the country and attempts to gain permanent residency. Oleh’s use of words such as “no opportunities”, “practically impossible”, “hopeless”, and “had no other way”, signposts the lack of a simple and transparent gateway for Ukrainians who wanted to move to Australia in the 1990s. In the 1990s, the number of Ukrainians coming to Australia on working visas was relatively small (Boiko, 2001). Oleh, who used the idea of a “fake purpose”, gave more detail: At that time I had no opportunities to come to Australia and stay permanently apart from travelling here as a tourist or for some other fake purpose. If you didn’t have relatives or you weren’t a high-skilled professional, it was practically impossible to migrate to Australia. I even tried to find a job in construction through Ukrainian acquaintances in Australia. It was hopeless. I had no other way but to come as a tourist and then claim asylum onshore.

Oleh’s story is not a rare one. Oleh’s and other interviewed migrants’ effective tactics were found to grow out of explicit social networks. Such networks were crucial for this group as they assisted them in managing the different types of precarity associated with a lack of life and work predictability and security, which affected their financial or psychological welfare. Several participants said they did not even know that it was possible to seek asylum abroad at that time:

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

63

We didn’t even know about that. While in Ukraine nobody advised me or told me that it was possible to come to the US or Australia and to tell people that you had been thrashed, your human rights were violated and you wanted to seek asylum. We were told that we could leave only as specialists, or as a Jew to reunite with the Jewish community.

This is how Oleh, who came from a small town in Western Ukraine and had a college education, explained his awareness of the humanitarian migration stream. Oleh explained that in the early 2000s, in most cases only scholars, Jews and highly qualified specialists emigrated from Ukraine. He belonged to neither the first nor the second group. However, he was discriminated against on political grounds and harassed by the police whom he described as “bandits”. He had resigned himself to “observing the regression and lawlessness”. He didn’t know that he could escape his situation by claiming asylum. As a result, he came to Australia on the suggestion of his boxing trainer, who had been a trainer for the Ukrainian Olympic team and who had friends in Australia. The family reunion migration stream was, for ‘transition migrants’, the second most popular way of entering Australia. Here, the economic rationale, in the form of a plan to escape poverty and unemployment in Ukraine, was the main driving force behind the participants’ choice of family reunion. A connection to family and dependency on the resources that the family provided was found in many cases to encourage dependency on the Australian welfare system in the post-migration stage. It also tended to create a type of comfort zone that favoured the continuation of survival life patterns after migration. The choice of migration and the destination for these migrants (e.g. Leonid, Viktor, Oleksandra, Vasylyna) was limited by the location of their family. As Leonid, the 49  year-old painter, said about coming to Australia on a family reunion visa as the last relative remaining in Ukraine: If I had a choice, I would choose to go to America. But my parents were in Australia. I simply had no possibility of coming to Australia independently. I had no skills, no university degree, and no savings. It turned out that the easiest option for me was to come to Australia through family migration and start a new life.

64 

O. Oleinikova

Leonid’s narrative shows that he clearly realised that migration for him was not a matter of choice, but a matter of very limited possibilities and opportunities to use the Australian migration system to his advantage. He used the words “no possibility”, “no skills”, “no university degree”, “no savings” to express what made him take the “easiest” way of leaving Ukraine by joining his parents in Australia. Similar to Ukrainian arrivals through the humanitarian stream, getting a family reunion visa did not require skills, knowledge of English or an education; Leonid simply had to have a relative who was an Australian citizen/permanent resident and have some solid and convincing motivation to reunite with his family. For Leonid, the family migration stream was the easiest and most guaranteed option for him to get out of Ukraine. In sharing his life story Leonid said his main aim for getting a family reunion visa was economic survival: “I had wanted to leave Ukraine for more than 10  years. I just couldn’t survive the economic need, which I suffered from all the time”. Influenced by employment insecurity and “structural disempowerment” (Mrozowicki, 2011), a typical occupational experience for the ‘transition migrants’ was an occupational downgrade alongside an economic upgrade. Using Mrozowicki’s (2011) terminology of “dead-end careers”, the employment experiences of the majority of ‘transition migrants’ proved to be shaped by employment in non-professional jobs (dead-end careers) which were associated with the absence of occupational mobility in the new, changed environment. Thus, the survival life trajectory of the ‘transition migrants’ was reflected in their experience of a sharp downgrade of professional and social status after migration. Having had single-track linear careers in the Ukraine, some highly skilled ‘survival migrants’ (Yulia and Tetyana) fell into dead-end careers in Australia and thus they experienced a sharp downturn in their professional and social status. This occupational downgrade originated in “the unacceptability of the new rules of the game” (Tetyana) and is also the result of a conscious or unconscious failure to take up opportunities of gaining new and suitable skills to get a better job, or at least the same skilled job as they held in Ukraine. For example, Yulia said:

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

65

I couldn’t find my way into the same qualified job in Australia; I gave up one day” and Tetyana said: “It took time to figure out how to act and what the rules are in the Australian labour market, but it didn’t help.

This cohort demonstrated a low level of English proficiency and a strong national identification with Ukraine, which created barriers for successful social adaptation and integration into Australian society. The ‘transition migrants’ mentioned that the need to communicate, especially when a minority of the ‘transition migrants’ spoke English, caused gravity among survival Ukrainian migrants to settle in the Ukrainian community suburbs, which slowed down their social integration process. Nadiya had no English skills when she arrived and remembered that she always “felt a desperate need to speak in Ukrainian and keep in contact with the Motherland through communication”. As the most powerful and important motivation to work, material orientation facilitated their need for economic adaptation to life in Australia. ‘Transition migrants’ tended to start their employment in the first available job, typically a manual job in construction, painting or teaching Ukrainian at the Ukrainian language schools. Material values were also found to guide their behaviours and consumption practices. Being born into blue-collar working-class families and in majority having a secondary education, the ‘transition migrants’ do not attach much importance to professional growth and self-development. However, all of them mentioned that back in Ukraine they would never have believed that they would have had to wake up at 4 am in the morning and work as hard as they did in the construction industry, with only short breaks for holidays. The classic daily schedule of a ‘transition migrant’ employed in the construction sector, is illustrated by Vasyl: “Early start, usually about 4 am; work until sunset, usually five or six o’clock in the evening when the outdoor construction work can be done; arrive home around six; dinner and sleep”. Furthermore, the future plans of ‘transition migrants’ tend to be retrospectively oriented towards their past life in Ukraine. The stories of migrants who came to Australia for survival give grounds to assert the “migration myth” that “all Eastern Europeans only dream about getting to live their whole lives in the West” (Tolstokorova, 2009). Majority of ‘transition migrants’ expressed the wish to return to Ukraine when they

66 

O. Oleinikova

retire. One could argue that it might be age-related and typical when with age one becomes more aware of one’s roots and wants to return to beloved familiar places in the Motherland. However, the narratives showed that it is not only romantic attitudes and warm feelings towards Ukraine, but also a practical approach. For example, Oleh, who was born into a blue-collar working-class family and had come to Australia as a tourist and received refugee status, is employed in the construction sector as a painter: “At present I have been realising my potential to the full! I am sure Ukraine will be my home when I retire and become an old man”. His retirement return plans are not just an emotional decision, but the aim of his strategic trajectory planned many years in advance. Later in his narrative, Oleh said, “I am serious about my plans; I have a plan for how much I need to earn before I retire and move to Ukraine”. His attitudes, as he said, are “serious” and he has a “plan” for making it happen; thus, they cannot simply be explained by emotional linkage and nostalgia for the Motherland. The “objective Australian reality” as Ivan said, is what makes migrants, “choose to go back to Ukraine one day”. By “objective Australian reality”, Ivan means “unaffordable prices for housing” and “hard jobs in construction”. Two interviewees (Oleh and Taras) explained that their financial situation would never allow them to buy an apartment or house in Australia. These Ukrainian migrants do not accept mortgages as an option (or as an opportunity.) Within the Ukrainian mentality, all Ukrainians aim to possess their own houses. Taras said, “Renting for my whole life and ageing in somebody else’s property is miserable”. This finding from the narratives is supported by statistics. Ukrainian-speaking households were owned outright (62.4% compared to the nation’s 32.1%), 19.8% compared to the nation’s 34.9% were owned with a mortgage (SBS Census Explorer, 2012). Three interviewees (Oleh, Ivan and Leonid) said that they invest their money in property in Ukraine. Oleh explained his thoughts regarding mortgage and investment in Ukraine in the following way: I don’t know how to earn enough to buy property in Sydney. A flat, which I am now renting, costs $700,000. I don’t believe that I will be able to pay it out in 20 years, even if I earn big money. Maybe, I will manage to pay for it within 15 years, but I don’t want to have such a burden on my mind. If

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

67

I came here as a 25 year-old with my family, then I would take a mortgage. But instead of toiling for 20 years to pay the mortgage, I’d rather buy three flats in Kyiv—which I already did; it also brings some profit.

Ivan and Leonid stated that they prefer to invest in Ukraine, than in Australia. They buy real estate in Ukraine for investment purposes and, as Ivan said “with the intention to return to loved places of origin and live for myself”.

‘Dividend Migrants’ On the contrary, the ‘dividend migrants’ who arrived in Australia from 2004 to 2013 approach their migration as a kind of ‘investment’. Their narratives show that their choice of Australia as a destination was informed and driven by calculated advantages—‘socio-economic dividends’ from migration. By socio-economic dividends, we mean the surplus value of the migration experience in the form of individual intangible ‘savings’— that is, social, ethical, cultural, aesthetic, educational and civic capital. Interestingly, the dividends, as discussed by participants, were profession-­specific and determined by the nature of work primarily in the area of information technologies. Marko, Panas, Tamara, Mykola and Maksym accumulated specific working experience as IT system administrators, QA testers, programmers and IT business analysts. Apart from the better incomes, varied jobs and opportunities for professional development, participants also experienced the following ‘dividends’ after migration: (1) non-material and cultural dividends, (2) health and lifestyle dividends and (3) gender equality dividends. It is worth mentioning that these ‘dividends’ are envisioned by a number of respondents in this cohort in an idealised way. The narratives they construct present the subjective estimations of the informants of the benefits from migration. This narrative optimism should be taken into account when assessing the informants’ satisfaction with their migration decision. Unlike ‘transition migrants’, ‘dividend migrants’ are motivated by Australian pull factors. Economic push factors are not the primary ones for these migrants—they all come from the class of professionals or

68 

O. Oleinikova

scientific and cultural intelligentsia, and said they felt economically secure back in Ukraine and only went abroad seeking, to use one interviewee’s words, an “upgrade in life”. Here, an ‘upgrade’ means professional growth and self-realisation, better money and an improvement in the quality of life, with interesting work with social mobility. The life trajectory of this cohort is defined as achievement life strategy. Based on the interviews, the achievement life trajectory of ‘dividend migrants’ is characterised by the following: (1) large-scale and long-term aims for professional success and self-realisation, oriented to opening new opportunities (extensive goals) and the extended recreation of social and economic status; (2) socially oriented needs for professional and cultural success and individually oriented needs for creative self-expression and professional self-realisation; (3) instrumental values, aimed at achieving the aims, accompanied by a set of non-material values, such as the prospects and opportunities for self-realisation and a favourable environment for developing their own initiative, freedom and independence. Compared to the ‘transition migrants’, financial welfare for dividend migrants is secondary and is a minor value. For example, Marko, high skilled IT migrant, said with a smile, “I came to Australia to satisfy my need to gain more skills and experience to become successful professionally, to get respect in society and become rich culturally and materially”. The need for professional recognition and professionally stimulating environment was articulated in the story of Borys, who worked in logistics. He said he worked in a big international company on a good salary, before moving to Australia. His need for professional recognition was not met in Ukraine, “I felt I needed more professional recognition and promotion”. Both participants emphasised the fact that the structure of Ukrainian institutions suppressed all emerging initiatives that were not bringing any dividends for the institution, and undervalued skilled people. Bohdan, university lecturer, said that he “left Ukraine because I saw no perspectives for being myself in the profession that I was qualified for”. Majority in this cohort expressed sorrow and pain about the fate of Ukrainian science. Andriy, who arrived in Australia in 2004 on a temporary student visa to conduct doctoral research in physics and stayed permanently to continue his successful academic career, explains:

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

69

I find Ukraine rather unstimulating for those willing to devote their lives to science and self-realise themselves in research and teaching. Science was, in my eyes, being destroyed. The development of science has never been set by the State as a priority. The whole system became rotten. Therefore, I sought an opportunity to depart and work elsewhere more fruitfully.

Andriy used the words “unstimulating”, “destroyed”, “rotten”, “inoperative”, “no development” to express his vision of the academic environment in Ukraine and the lack of opportunities to realise himself as professional. Therefore, similar to Bohdan, he applied for permanent residency to remain in Australia after his temporary student visa expired. Such groups of creative and professional individuals significantly contributed to the Australian ‘brain-gain’ during 2004–2013. ‘Dividend migrants’ demonstrate strong agency. It is expressed through their active life position and the internal capacity to take responsibility for themselves instead of relying on external circumstances. Youth (the average of the cohort was 30) also played a role in their active life position and determined their focus on high performance and the ability to live and work in conditions of uncertainty and risk. ‘Dividend migrants’ value originality, access to a variety of choices of cultural styles and ways to implement them. The cohort is dominated by the young IT-skilled migrants from Ukraine who chose to be globally engaged through migration, and used this strategy to achieve better pay, professional development and future alternative employment opportunities. ‘Dividend migrants’ arrived in Australia through the skilled and family migration streams. Both streams reflect how this cohort was affected by the lack of opportunities for development and professional self-­realisation in Ukraine. Skilled migration during the 2003–2014 period was found to be mostly male and structurally framed by IT market growth both in Australia and in Ukraine, as well as the international exposure of Ukrainian professionals, linked to global orders, services and corporations, to parts of the IT industry outside their country. Drawing on the stories of the Ukrainian IT-skilled migrants the following factors, found in the narratives of all participants, are key to their experiences in the skilled migration stream: (1) the growing competition among IT professionals in Ukraine resulting from the rapid growth of the

70 

O. Oleinikova

IT market since 2003; (2) a desire to be developing, innovating, and growing as employees and professionals; (3) a desire to change from being outsourced labour (available cheaply to developed countries) into well-­ paid professionals who manage IT projects from the heart of an IT hub; (4) being a well-paid cohort in Ukraine, the awareness that they can earn more in Australia; and (5) the stable growth of the Australian IT market, employment shortages in the IT Australian industry and the easy conditions for their skilled immigration. Marko, Fedir and Maksym all mentioned this as the reason they applied for permanent residence in Australia through the skilled migration stream. For example, Marko said: Since Ukraine became well-known for skilled IT professionals, the competition in the Ukrainian ICT industry has started to grow. I think it happened somewhere around 2003 when the outsourcing orders flooded Ukraine. I took another degree at that time to develop more skills, but then I realised it was better to migrate.

Similar to Marko, Maksym also noted the competition from an ever-­ increasing group of new IT specialists as a result of the expansion of the IT market in Ukraine. However, he also noted that along with a national glut of IT workers there was an “increase in the global value of the Ukrainian IT talent pool”. Participants said that before migrating they were aware that their IT skills had global resonance, thus the national glut was not a problem for them, but rather a factor that shaped their decision to leave Ukraine. Another popular migration stream among Ukrainian ‘dividend migrants’ is marriage migration. Marriage migration in the cohort of the ‘dividend migrants’ is characterised by the involvement of highly educated (Master degree and PhD), middle-aged (in their 30s–40s) women in highly skilled professions such as law, banking and research. The narratives of the marriage migrants reflected, firstly, that these participants had high educational levels. All six respondents hold university degrees. Anastasiya, Oksana, Svitlana, Daryna and Alla have Masters degrees, and Ruslana holds a PhD. This is an unusually high standard for this type of migration (Tolstokorova, 2012) and provides insight into the

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

71

character of marriage migration from Ukraine to Australia. Education in Ukraine has become equally available and encouraged, so more and more women have qualifications that enable them to obtain well-paid professional work. Second, the occupational composition of the interviewed marriage migrants also speaks to the fact that such migration has a rather elite character—Oksana was a medical researcher, Alla a professional artist, Anastasiya a librarian, Ruslana was a lawyer, Svitlana a chief accountant, and Daryna a fashion designer. Therefore, it means that the women had good and highly skilled jobs in Ukraine. Despite the elite character of the participants’ marriage migration, this cohort expressed their suffering from being stereotyped as ‘mail-order brides’. When talking about their experiences of arriving in Australia through the family reunion stream, the six marriage migrants all said that they had been stereotyped as ‘mail-order brides’. The idea of the ‘mail-­ order brides’ derives from popular and academic discourses since the early 1980s around international marriage (Villapando, 1989), which appealed to two contrary images: “either vulnerable victims of mail operated international trades, or manipulative opportunists who marry solely for economic security” (Glodava & Onizuka, 1994; Sciachitano, 2000 in Kim, 2010, p. 10). These two images are typically represented in terms of sexualised women from specific nationalities. Such an intersection of sexuality and nationality shaped the juncture at which the interviewed marriage migrants from Ukraine found themselves. The interviewed women did not find the allusion flattering. Alla said that it presumed she “looked for a better life by listing herself in catalogues and been selected by a man for marriage”. Similarly, Anastasiya and Daryna said they felt that being stereotyped as ‘mail-order brides’ suggested they held low positions or were of low status in their home country and that they did work that earned them less respect and low wages. Anastasiya said: Some of the Australians, friends of my husband, had several times talked of my marriage as an arrangement motivated by horrible life conditions in Ukraine, low-paid job and my opportunism. It always deeply offends me, as I am a highly-educated woman with my own plans for life and aspirations. I would never have come to Australia if not for John.

72 

O. Oleinikova

Anastasiya’s story and the stories of the other women show a struggle with gender stereotyping and negativism in Australia towards them because of the stream of migration they used and the image of the ‘mail-­ order bride’ as an opportunist desiring economic security and lacking personal identity and any of her own aspirations, culture and plans. All the interviewed ‘dividend migrants’ have successfully adapted and integrated into Australian society both socially and professionally. In terms of their skills and education, the ‘dividend migrants’ are strongly associated with good labour market outcomes, with upgrade of their social and economic status. As a group, they tended to be employed after migration in occupations for which they were qualified. Two types of careers found among ‘dividend migrants’, are described by Mrozowicki (2011)—anchor and bricolage. A career is described as ‘anchoring’ when participants, while still in Ukraine, have already established and guaranteed their employment in the same company in Australia, and is only achieved by Anatolyi and Panas. The case of Anatolyi is a perfect example of the anchor career pattern. Anatolyi, who trained as a specialist in applied mathematics, moved to Kiev from his small town in the L—area (Eastern Ukraine), attracted by the higher incomes and professional development. After being employed for a couple of years as a programmer in one of the international insurance companies in Kiev, he applied for emigration to Australia. He explained that he experienced a smooth career transition into the Australian labour market: I had a very cool boss in Kiev. He wrote a letter to Australia—“good dude flies to you, do you want him?” They said: “Yes!” That’s how I found my job in Australia. The job found me. I didn’t have to work as a cleaner or a loader. I arrived and continued to work for the same company, organised in the way I am used to. I got an excellent salary—$120,000 per year. For me everything stayed the same, safe and stable.

In some sense, anchoring is similar to, as Anatolyi said later in his narrative, “life-long employment typical of State socialism”. Drawing on this comparison with the State socialism of Soviet times, Anatolyi refers to the security and stability of his occupational trajectory. In his case, anchoring

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

73

played a securing function and guaranteed income in the first days after arrival, which as he pointed out, “sped up my successful integration”. When determining the process of the formation and consolidation of a life strategy one of the fundamental categories is that of time (Abulkhanova-Slavskaya, 2001; Golovakha & Panina, 2006; Naumova, 1995; Reznik & Reznik, 1996). The narratives of ‘dividend migrants’ demonstrate that their life strategies of achievement involve planning and strategy that are both directed at the present and the future. When talking about their present life arrangements, Zoryana, Marko and Ruslana refer to their aims, needs and values as changing and suggest they are aiming to reconsider and adjust them in the future. Marko said, “My life is dynamic, I never stand still. I always plan for the future and re-evaluate my goals, needs and priorities on the go”. Marko noted that he “always plans for the future”, which fits with the argument by Reznik and Reznik (1996) that the “strategic orientation” (planning) of an individual extends to future life events and largely determines the nature and content of the achievement life strategy. The fact that ‘achievement migrants’ narratives showed that they tend to write a list of desirable goals elucidates that their lives are planned and driven by an orientation towards the long-term future and sometimes even unrealistic goals. Borys said: Before coming to Australia I had a small word file with a list of my aims. This file contained ten aims, the first five of which seemed unrealistic to me. I set a salary limit, which was ten times bigger than I earned. Then I forgot about this file. I discovered it only after three years in Australia, and four of my points were achieved. I ticked them off as achieved and set new ones for long-term future. The main thing here is that I have achieved these four aims even though they appeared so unrealistic to me at the beginning. I did not even tell anyone about them, because people just laughed at me at that time.

In relation to their identity, it was found that majority of ‘dividend migrants’ demonstrate an Australian and/or cosmopolitan national identification, high levels of English and complete satisfaction with migration, with future plans to succeed in terms of professional self-realisation,

74 

O. Oleinikova

career growth and personal development. Given their capacity to successfully maintain their social status after migration, they are the group of migrants who are positively contributing to Australian society in terms of social cohesion, innovation and economic production.

‘Post-Dream Migrants’ For ‘post-dream migrants’, the most recent cohort to arrive in Australia during 2014–2021, survival life trajectories dominate. However, a combination of achievement and survival life patterns is also common. The values, needs and aims that were found in the 13 stories of the ‘post-­ dream migrants’ were very much similar to that of ‘transition migrants’, where material values dominate and family welfare and security, financial freedom and independence come first. The popularity of security needs, along with the needs for self-realisation and self-expression, are explained by the fact that before migration, the interviewees supported the 2014 EuroMaidan protests and were investing emotionally and financially in Ukraine’s democratic future. The economic decline and political turbulence, associated with military actions in the Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, have impacted the activation of survival mode in people’s lives in Ukraine. Significantly, this cohort is dominated by people under the age of 29 from the white-collar social class. Due to the absence of the promised reforms and visible changes in Ukraine as well as the growing risk of full-scale Russian invasion (beyond just Crimea and Donbass), they experienced fear, disappointment and the loss of hope for future changes, as well as felt the first wave of economic scrutiny on national and individual level. Ultimately, the reality of their faded dreams and harsh reality of the approaching war pushed them to migrate. This reactionary behavioural response, spontaneous choice of migration and short-term aims drive the lives of the interviewed ‘post-dream migrants’. All participants in this cohort mentioned that their decision to migrate was reactionary and quick, rather than strategic. ‘Conspiracy’ and ‘manoeuvering’ tactics to turn their Australian temporary visas (study and business) into permanent ones actualised for the majority of the

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

75

interviewed ‘post-dream migrants’. Their emotional sphere is threaded with precarity, emotional insecurity, opportunism and concerns about the future of Ukraine, as well as their future in Australia. Despite the negative attitudes and emotions associated with the events in Ukraine, all the ‘post-dream migrants’ express satisfaction with their choice to migrate. They enjoy their new life in Australia and do not plan to return to Ukraine. ‘Post-dream migrants’ have cosmopolitan identities as well as a rediscovered Ukrainian identification. Social networks played the most important role in their integration. In Australia, their acquaintances and first jobs often came through relatives or friends. ‘Post-dream migrants’ tend to settle with or near Ukrainian friends and Ukrainian neighbourhoods in Sydney. The involvement in primary groups is also high, as with the ‘transition migrants’. The effect that all the interviewees experienced is a rather slower integration into Australian society compared to the fast and successful integration of the ‘dividend migrants’. Moderate and high levels of English language proficiency dominate and play an important role in the first years of the ‘post-dream migrant’s’ settlement in Australia.

2.3 Conclusion The Ukrainian community in Australia is a mixed group. Based on 64 interviews with Ukrainians in Australia, the three profiles of Ukrainian migrants were identified and described as ‘transition migrants’, ‘dividend migrants’ and ‘post-dream migrants’. These three profiles vary depending on the combination of individual values, aims, needs, agencies and the structural factors at the time of the migrant’s departure from Ukraine. A key point is the discovery that Ukrainian migration to Australia has changed since 2004 in terms of the reasons for migration and migration outcomes. In 2004, for the first time in the overall history of Ukrainian migration to Australia, the number of skilled arrivals outnumbered those who arrived using the family reunion and humanitarian stream, pre-­ dominantly low-skilled migrants. Subsequently, we can say that the narratives of ‘dividend migrants’ form a collective story of well-integrated members of Australian society, active agents of social and economic life

76 

O. Oleinikova

who took advantage of the new opportunities that emerged. The reproduction of their life strategy of achievement after migration was informed by successful adaptation and social and professional integration, an Australian and/or cosmopolitan national identity, a high level of English proficiency, complete satisfaction with migration and future plans to succeed in terms of professional self-realisation, career growth and personal development. Given their capacity to successfully maintain their social and economic status after migration, the group positively contributes to Australian society in terms of social cohesion, innovation and economic production and they can be considered a ‘brain-gain’ for Australia. The 2014 post-EuroMaidan events and Russian annexation of Crimea and military actions in the Eastern Ukraine also impacted the life trajectories of Ukrainians, whose motives for migration into Australia underwent another shift, this time towards survival: economic, political and physical. As a result, the number of asylum seeker applications from Ukrainians increased in the period between 2014 and 2021 compared to the previous ten years. However, it should be noted that the skilled migration stream from Ukraine to Australia also remains strong in the period in terms of numbers and successful integration of this new members into Australian society. Hence, the changed structural context of Ukraine in 2014–2021 has again reshaped the profile of Ukrainian migrants and their migration pathways in the last decade. However, given the small scope of the study and the number of respondents, the data should not be regarded as exhaustive or definitive. Migration situations are mobile and dynamic, and further research is needed on post-independence Ukrainian migrants, their profiles and adaptation to the structure of contemporary Australian society. In any further studies, it would seem appropriate to widen the research to include migrant family members (spouses, children and other relatives).

References Abulkhanova-Slavskaya, K. A. (2001). Strategiya zhizni [Life strategy]. Publishing House Mysl. Babenko, S.  S. (2004). Sotsyalnyi mechanism post-sovetskoy transformatsyi: deyatelnostno-strukturnyi podhod [Social mechanism of post-Soviet trans-

2  New Ukrainian Migrants to Australia: Life Strategies… 

77

formation: Agency – structure approach]. In O. D. Kutsenko & S. S. Babenko (Eds.), Postkomunystycheskye transformatsiyi: vektori, napravleniya, soderzhaniye (pp. 251–274). V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University Publisher. Boiko, I. (2001). Ukrainska diaspora Avstralii iak subjekt polityky [Ukrainian Diaspora in Australia as a political subject] (unpublished doctoral thesis), Odessa National Academy of Law, Ukraine. Boucher, A. (2013). Bureaucratic control and policy change: A comparative venue shopping approach to skilled immigration policies in Australia and Canada. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 15(4), 349–367. Colic-Peisker, V. (2009). Visibility, settlement success and life satisfaction in three refugee communities in Australia. Ethnicities, 9(2), 175–199. Golovakha, V. I., & Panina, N. V. (2006). Osnovnye etapy I tendencii transformacii ukrainskogo obschestva: ot perestroiki do orangevoi revolutsii [Main stages and trends in the transformation of Ukrainian society: From restructuring to the Orange Revolution]. Sociology: Theory, Methods, Marketing, 3, 32–51. Glodava, M., & Onizuka, R. (1994). Mail-Order Brides: Women for Sale. Fort Collins, Colorado: Alaken. Hawthorne, L. (2005). “Picking Winners”: The recent transformation of Australia’s skilled migration policy. International Migration Review, 39(3), 663–696. Jaroszewicz, M. (2015). The migration of Ukrainians in times of crisis. Warsaw, Centre for Eastern Studies. (2016-10-10). Kim, M. (2010). Gender and international marriage migration. Sociology compass, 4(9), 718–731. Larsen, G. (2013). Family migration to Australia. Research Paper Series (2013–2014). Canberra: Australia. http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/ download/library/prspub/2931915/upload_binary/2931915.pdf;fileType= application/pdf Markus, A. B., Jupp, J., & McDonald, P. (2009). Australia’s immigration revolution. Allen and Unwin. Mrozowicki, A. (2011). Coping with social change: Life strategies of workers in Poland’s new capitalism. Leuven University Press. Naumova, N.  R. (1995). Zhyznennaya strategya cheloveka v perehodnom obschestve [Individual life strategy in a transitional society]. Journal of Sociology, 1, 2–12.

78 

O. Oleinikova

Oleinikova, O. (2020). Life strategies of migrants from crisis regimes. Springer International Publishing. Reznik, T.  E., & Reznik, Y.  M. (1995). Zhyznennue strategyi lychnosty [Individual life strategies]. Socis. Sociological Research, 12, 100–105. Reznik, T.  E., & Reznik, Y.  M. (1996). Zhyznennoe oryentyrovanye lychnosti: analiz i konulstyrovanye [Individual life orientation: Analysis and advice] (pp. 110–119). Sociological Research. Ryan, L. (2008). Navigating the emotional terrain of Families “Here” and “There”: Women, migration and the management of emotions. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 29(3), 299–313. SBS Census Explorer. (2012). Ukrainian: Tenant type. Retrieved from http:// www.sbs.com.au/censusexplorer/ Sciachitano, M. (2000). “MOBS” on the Net: Critiquing the Gaze of the “Cyber” Bride Industry. Race, Gender & Class, 57–69. State Statistics Service of Ukraine. (2009). Foreign labour migration of Ukraine’s population. Ukrainian Center for Social Reforms, Open Ukraine. The Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC). (2013). Community information summary: Ukraine-born. Canberra: Australia. (00893) www. immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics/comm-­summ/summary.html The Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC). (2021). Reduction of certain student visa assessment levels. https://www.immi.gov.au/students/ reduction-­student-­visa-­assessment-­level.htm The Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC). (2014). Settlement Database (SDB). Canberra: Australia. Retrieved April 30, 2014, from http:// www.immi.gov.au/living-­i n-­a ustralia/delivering-­a ssistance/settlement reporting-­facility/index.htm Tolstokorova, A. (2009). The Woman and Sixpence: Gendered impact of remittances on social sustainability of Ukrainian transnational households. Analytical, 09, 74–97. Villapando, V. (1989). The business of selling mail-order brides. Making waves: An anthology of writings by and about Asian American women, 318–326.

3 Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia

This chapter presents analysis of Czech migration to Australia, with the focus on reasons behind migration and the employment outcomes. The analysis relies on 27 semi-structured interviews with Czech migrants who have moved to Australia since 2000. Building on the existing research on Central and Eastern European migration and the analysis of structural factors behind migration, it explores the new ways Czech migrants choose to migrate, reasons and motivations for choosing Australia as destination country and factors that influence their employment outcomes in the host societies. Particular emphasis in this chapter is on the notion of ‘dead-end’ and ‘bricolage’ careers and the sense of ‘belonging’ within the context of settling in the host country, both physically and mentally. Aspects of the individual’s migration situation and class belonging characteristics were also found to structure migrants’ lives in Australia and the process of regaining ‘control’ over their migration trajectory in cases when the decision to migrate was not made independently. The chapter concludes with a discussion around the future and the creation of new (political, economic and social) inspirations of Czech migrants through their mobile lives.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Oleinikova, New Eastern European Migration to Australia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07095-2_3

79

80 

O. Oleinikova

3.1 Emigration from Czech Republic Between 2000–2021: Economic and Political Contexts The two most significant emigration periods in the Czech Republic’s (otherwise known as Czechia) history were after World War II and after the Ukraine’s Chernobyl disaster in 1986. However, Janska and Drbohlav (2001) note that most of the Czech citizens who became expatriates during these two disasters returned home after. As Czechoslovakia and the USSR signed a document ensuring fair repatriation for citizens displaced during the war, many Czech citizens returned home and resettled (Drbohlav, 2012). In 1989, three and a half years after the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine, the Soviet press informed the public that the radioactive threat beyond the 30 km zone around Chernobyl was much worse than the official version that was released in 1986 when the disaster happened. As a result, many of the Czech diaspora in Ukraine and Belarus returned to the Czech Republic under a resettlement order created by the Czech government. 1812 Czechians returned home during this time (Janska & Drbohlav, 2001). With Czechia’s accession to the EU in 2004, some Czech citizens migrated to other countries in the EU and other parts of the Western world. By 2012, there were an estimated 2.5 million Czech citizens in the global diaspora (Janurová, 2018). Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, the Czech Republic has not been a significant emigration country (Okolski, 2012). The (general) stability of the government, development of democracy and good living standards for Czech’s has led to most Czech citizens remaining in their country for good. Czech Republic is a nation that prides itself on its cultural hybridity: Czech citizens have a Westernised mentality due to their positioning in central Europe, which meets their Slavic traditional roots. As such, the Czech citizen is capable of living both sides of their culture in one place—the Czech Republic. Their geographic proximity to other EU nations, such as Germany and Slovakia for example, has also facilitated a situation where many Czechians can live in the Czech Republic and commute to work in another nation not far away. This working situation became even more appealing after EU accession in 2004, although

3  Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia 

81

several Czech citizens did migrate to other nations permanently during this time, particularly the United Kingdom (Uherek, 2004). The Czech language is intelligible in Slovakia and there is a strong focus on learning English at school. Therefore, language skills also provided citizens with greater mobility. As of 2006, there were over 100,000 members of the Czech diaspora living in Great Britain (Janurová, 2018) and the UK remained one of the most popular migration destinations for Czech citizens until the Brexit withdrawal in 2020. In 2007, Czechia joined 26 other European nations and signed the Schengen Agreement, mapping out the geographical area of their nations and abolishing their internal borders. This allowed for free and unrestricted movement of people in harmony with common rules for controlling external borders and fighting criminality by strengthening the common judicial system and police cooperation (Pařízková, 2011). As such, migration data from 2007 onwards is unspecific as so many people were moving in and out of the Czech Republic and other nations in this zone. However, by the end of the decade, Czech emigration to EU nations appears to be one of the lowest in the ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Pařízková, 2011). Between 2010 and 2021 the main migration destinations for Czech citizens during this period were the United States (1.6 million by 2016); Canada (100–400,000 by 2018); the United Kingdom (100,000 by 2017); Germany (50,000 by 2018); and Austria (50,000 by 2018) (Czech Statistical Office, 2018). The most common reasons for Czech citizens to migrate to another nation are study abroad opportunities and economic motivators such as a lucrative job opportunity. Ionescu (2015) describes these motivators as causes for the ‘brain drain’ that affected many former-­ Soviet states during this period. Ionescu argues that tertiary educated citizens of nations including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia are more tempted to migrate to another nation as compared to their secondary-educated counterparts, also noting that those who live in large cities are more likely to migrate than those who live in rural settings (Ionescu, 2015). However, the ‘brain drain’ effect in Czechia is significantly smaller than that of other nations in this area of Europe due to the stable economic and political environment in the Czech Republic. In general, the Czech people prefer temporary mobility targeted to build

82 

O. Oleinikova

social skills, language skills or economic capital. This exposure and development of social and financial capital provides increased social mobility once they return to the Czech Republic. Therefore, most of those citizens who chose to emigrate are young and educated and have intent to return to Czechia after their time living abroad. On the immigration side, the Czech Republic is one of the most popular immigration nations in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe due to potential economic opportunities, central location and its Western cultural leaning (Kureková, 2013). In 1993, only 1% of the population were immigrants and by 2017, the number was 5% which is a modest estimate when one takes into consideration the mobility provided by the Schengen agreement (Boneva et al., 2018). The three main migrant communities in the Czech Republic are from Ukraine, Slovakia and Vietnam. Migrants in Czech Republic make up a ‘secondary labour market’ of low paid, unskilled workers mainly. The jobs marketed towards immigrants tend to be labour intensive and difficult and are jobs that Czech citizens are reluctant to undertake themselves (Boneva et al., 1997). In the years following the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015, anti-immigrant sentiment has become popular in the Czech Republic, with Prime Minister Babis setting the tone. He has been vocal about his disagreement with the EU quota system for refugee intake, a similar belief to some of his neighbours such as Poland and Hungary, although Czechia does accept refugees. The 2020 Covid-19 pandemic has led to a dramatic reduction in migration to and from Czechia as lockdowns took effect on the nation throughout the year (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2020).

Economic Context 2000–2021 The economy of the Czech Republic is amongst the most stable and prosperous economies in Central Europe. The Czech economy is a complex export economy, and their currency is the Czech Crown or Koruna (CZK). Following the end of Soviet rule, the Czech Republic joined NATO in 1999, and the European Union in 2004 and it is also a member of the OECD. As a result, the Czech Republic follows many EU fiscal guidelines and enjoys a profitable relationship with other countries that

3  Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia 

83

are a part of the European Union and other Western nation states (Doležalová, 2018). As of June 2019, the Czech Republic has the lowest unemployment rate in the EU at 1.9% and an extremely low poverty rate. Their major exports include machinery, information software, metallurgy and agricultural goods such as barley and hops. The country broke off from the Soviet Union in 1989, and split further from Slovakia in what is referred to as the ‘Velvet Divorce/ Revolution’ for the non-violent way these splits unfolded (Holy, 1996). Popular demonstrations against the one-party government of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia included students and older dissidents. Immediately after the Velvet Revolution, the Czech economy underwent what economists call a ‘Big Bang’ which is a form of economic shock therapy in which the entire economy is being reformed, causing instability. By 1995, the Czech Koruna stabilised following an expansive series of fiscal policy changes and it was made fully convertible to other currencies for business (Europa, 2016). The policy changes made steps towards westernisation and privatisation and at the end of 1996, Czechia was considered the best economy in the former Soviet Union. However, in May 1997, simmering banking problems were coming to the surface. Poor management, corruption, and a lack of transparency in Czechia’s banking institutions led to the closure of many of the country’s banks; the loss of citizens’ savings and stakes in public enterprise (introduced via a voucher system in the early 1990s) and drastic austerity measures being introduced. The country fell into a recession with GDP growth dropping to −0.4% in 1997 and −0.5% in 1998 and large-scale unemployment affected citizens (OECD, 2005). Czechia entered 2000 on the back of the largest domestic economic crisis in modern history. In response, the government created a restructuring agency whose purpose was to mend Czechia’s broken economy. Their aims were to comply with EU legislative standards (to facilitate a future EU bid), restructure public and (where possible) private enterprise and privatise banks and industry. The agency managed to reach their goals and the economy was on a slow mend. GDP growth increased in the years of the early 2000s with minor fluctuations. GDP growth was 4.0% in 2000 and by 2003, it was 3.6% (Simon, 2015). In 2003, Czechia also ran a referendum to join the EU and in 2004, Czechia officially joined the EU (OECD, 2005). This move opened new markets for Czech

84 

O. Oleinikova

exports, and increased trade with important trading partners such as Germany. Around this time, interest rates dropped for Czech citizens and mortgages and credit cards became more accessible for more citizens. Inflation was under control and the economy kept growing until 2009. The economic growth during this period was due to a combination of both EU membership and the fruition of many policies written by the government during the recession in the late 1990s. Major telecommunication company Cesky Telcom became privatised during this period, and fruitful new export relationships were fostered with neighbouring nations (Deloitte, 2019). The global financial crisis (GFC) hit Czech Republic in mid-2007. The global financial crisis (GFC) refers to the period of extreme stress in global financial markets and banking systems between mid-2007 and early 2009. Czechia was affected by GFC and sent into a recession with GDP growth shrinking −4.7% by 2009 (OECD, 2010). However, Czech Republic was not as affected as other parts of the Eurozone during this time. Almost all of the household debt (99 per cent) was in Czech Koruna, not Euros or American Dollars, shielding Czech citizens from the worst of the crisis. Also, Czechia had learnt from its previous recession and installed measures that created a stable and strong banking sector that was less fallible to the behaviours of external markets (OECD, 2010). The EU debt crisis did influence the Czech economy however, mostly through a decline in trade with major partners such as Germany, Slovakia and Australia who suffered more in the wake of the GFC. Foreign investment in the nation also declined in the wake of the GFC. The decade ended with proposed cuts of government spending which triggered massive protests in Prague from citizens who relied on welfare in its various manifestations. The opposition, the left-leaning Social Democratic party, was voted into a senate majority during the 2010 midterm elections however, and they blocked the proposed austerity measures. By the end of 2010, GDP growth was at 2.4%, signalling that the country had survived the recession. In the first half of 2011 there was promising financial growth, but by the end of the year, growth had stalled due to decreased foreign investment. To combat this, the government proposed a raise in value-­added-­ tax (VAT) from 20–21% in 2012. Small enterprises suffered from this

3  Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia 

85

slight raise, as did the machinery and automotive industries who were still in need of foreign investments to flourish. The country fell into a mild recession again by the end of 2012, with GDP growth falling to −0.8%. To end the recession, the Czech national bank implemented the controversial measure of deflating the value of the Czech Koruna to tempt foreign investment and make trade more attractive (OECD, 2014). This worked and the economy was out of recession but recorded no growth of GDP by the end of 2013. By 2014, the Czech economy had remained weak for any other OECD country, but a slow, export-led recovery was manifesting with modest wage growth and a GDP growth of 2.3% by the end of the year. The latter half of this decade tells a very different economic story. Starting in 2015, the Czech Republic had an exceptionally strong period of growth and stability. A combination of the absorption of expired EU funds and low commodity prices made 2015 a strong economic year for Czechia, as were changes to innovation policies, market regulations and the effectiveness of the public sector improved (Ključnikov et al., 2018). By August of 2015, GDP growth was at 5.4%, making Czechia the fastest growing economy in Europe. Unemployment dropped to 5.05%, the lowest in eight years and the poverty rate was low. By 2016, the Czech Republic had the second-­lowest poverty rate in the EU, second only to Denmark (Cocco, 2016). 2016 saw a 2.5% increase in GDP, 2017 saw a 5.2% increase and there was a slight drop in 2018 to 3.2% as there was some political instability concerning Prime Minister Andrej Babis and his private financial ventures. By 2019, GDP dropped further as Babis refused to resign and his corruption scandal weakened Czechia’s ties with the EU through criminal charges being proposed by the EU. After six years of consecutive growth, GDP growth fell by −5.6% in 2020 due to the COVID-19 crisis. Czechia experienced two strong waves of the virus in 2020, which triggered states of emergency, lockdowns and restrictions on businesses. Private consumption decreased, international trade decreased, and tourism revenue was wiped out. The government introduced broad emergency fiscal measures to support the economy during this time. These measures included job retention schemes, benefit payments, deferral of rent and childcare support packages. This spending, plus a strong reliance on external demand saw the Czech Republic fall

86 

O. Oleinikova

into a recession. There were 30,298 Covid-related deaths in 2020 (Ritchie et al., 2020).

Political Context: 2000–2021 The Czech Republic is a parliamentary representative democracy. The head of state is the president, whose powers include appointing the prime minister, appointing judges, giving amnesty to criminals, veto rights for proposed new laws and a host of ceremonial duties. The current president (as of 2021) is Milos Zeman. He previously served as the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic from 1998 to 2002. As leader of the Czech Social Democratic Party during the 1990s, he is credited with the revival of the party into one of the country’s major political forces. The parliament of Czechia is made up of two segments: the senate and the chamber of deputies. The senate reviews laws that are passed by the chamber of deputies and senators are elected for six-year terms. As the senate is designed to be a safeguard to Czech democracy, there are senate elections every two years with one-third of the senate up for election per election on a rotating basis. This ensures that the senate is more rigid and fixed, and (ideally) immune to populist political trends put forward by the chamber of deputies. The chamber of deputies proposes laws, and the leader of the party that wins this election is (usually) appointed Prime Minister. As Czechia has a multidimensional party system, coalitions are often formed in the chamber of deputies and it is the Prime Minister’s job to work with the different parties to form a coalition and therefore, create a majority government to lead. Czechia entered the 2000s with Vaclav Havel as president. He was first elected in 1993 and was instrumental in forming the first government of the free Czech Republic. Vaclav Klaus was appointed Prime Minister and was a part of the centre-right Civil Democratic Party (ODS). The pair led the country to NATO acceptance in 1999 but in the same year, mass protests erupted in Prague. The demonstrators demanded the resignation of both men, asserting that the country needed decisive social, moral and political change that would prepare the Czech Republic for EU ascension. The protesters also had concerns about the treatment of the Romani

3  Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia 

87

population in the country, who were maligned and discriminated against. Neither man resigned at the time, but Havel finished his presidential term in 2003 and Klaus (a long-time political rival and colleague) was elected as his successor. Klaus was vocal about his Euro scepticism, believing that following EU guidelines would adversely reduce the sovereignty of the Czech Republic. In 2003, there was a referendum concerning Czechia’s joining of the EU, and 77 per cent of citizens voted in favour of it (Johnson, 2006). In 2004, Czechia joined the EU and the economy began to flourish after a lengthy recession in the late 1990s. In 2008, Klaus was re-elected with a small margin of success and was charged with forming a new government, which was difficult as the chamber of deputies was riddled with infighting between representatives from different parties. In 2009, Klaus represented the Czech Republic as the EU president on a revolving basis. This was controversial as Klaus was the major figure blocking the unanimous signing of the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty is a document that would form the basis of the EU constitution, and the other 26 EU countries had already signed by late 2009. Klaus conceded, and signed for the Czech Republic in November 2009, stating that the Czech constitution was not threatened by the Lisbon Treaty after a domestic court handed back those findings. Meanwhile, the centre-right government collapsed after Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek was given a parliamentary vote of no confidence. He was replaced with the non-partisan Jan Fischer as interim prime minister who served one year in the role. In July 2010, Klaus appointed Peter Necas of the Civic Democratic Party to the role of prime minister and Necas formed a coalition with other centre-right parties TOP09 and VV (Havlík & Voda, 2016). Czechia entered the 2010s with Necas as prime minister and Klaus as president, proving political stability. However, in 2011 a string of corruption scandals and leadership struggles once again plagued the chamber of deputies. The GFC and Euro crisis saw Czech Republic enter a recession for the first time in a decade. To combat the effect of this, Necas attempted to pass severe austerity measures targeting social welfare and tax reforms. While the chamber of deputies was mostly fiscally conservative, the senate was composed of left-leaning senators who were opposed to the cuts targeted at social welfare. Therefore, Necas was unable to pass the

88 

O. Oleinikova

measures through the senate and the country would have to find other ways of overcoming the recession. In 2012, a major amendment was written into the Czech constitution which would make the presidential election based on the popular vote, meaning that future presidents would be chosen directly by the people. Also in 2012, one of the coalition parties, VV (otherwise known as Public Affairs), dissolved, leaving Necas without a majority government and scrambling to find another party to sustain his coalition. VV rebranded itself as Lidem and Lidem joined the coalition, securing Necas’s prime ministership, his approval ratings at the time however are the lowest in his career (Havlík & Voda, 2016). In January of 2013, the first president elected by popular vote was sworn into office. His name was Kasel Schawrzenberg with a voter turnout of 60 per cent. In June 2013, Prime Minister Necas was embroiled in his worst political scandal yet. Necas was nicknamed ‘Mr Clean’ for his staunch anti-corruption stance; however, it was revealed that he had been accused of bribery and misuse of government intelligence for personal reasons. The related staff members were charged for their actions and Necas stepped down. Jiri Rusnok replaced him as interim prime minister. In March 2013, Czechia voted in their new president and Milos Zeman became president. By late 2013, Czech citizens were disillusioned with politics after all the leadership changes and perpetual infighting in the chamber of deputies (Hájek, 2018). This disillusionment was felt as the October 2013 senate elections were met with low turnout and no majority favourite emerged. The Social Democrats won this election with a hairline result (20.5 per cent of votes) followed by the newly formed Action for Alienated Citizens (ANO), headed by Andrej Babis, with 19 per cent of votes. Infighting within the Social Democrats ensued, as they were unhappy with how few citizens voted for them. They then needed to form a coalition, so they formed an unlikely coalition with ANO and the Christian Democrats, whose interests often contradicted the Social Democrats. Bohuslav Sobotka was appointed as the prime minister of this new coalition and he remained prime minister until 2017. ANO was elected in December of 2017 with 29 per cent of the vote and 78/200 seats in the senate. Zeman asked the leader of ANO, Andrej Babis, to be the prime minister and form a government in the chamber of deputies. Babis accepted the job and came close to forming a majority

3  Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia 

89

government, but the Civic Democratic Party refused to create a coalition with ANO. Therefore, Babis started off his prime ministership in charge of only a minority government. These kinds of political problems have plagued Babis through the duration of his prime ministership, continuing until present day. Babis has been compared to Donald Trump and Viktor Orban in that he was an independently wealthy businessman who became interested in politics and ran using a populist and nationalist platform. Corruption allegations also followed Babis during his time in office. The biggest corruption scandal that Babis has faced has been titled ‘The Storks Nest Affair’ in Czech media. This scandal concerns allegations of fraud and a conflict-of-interest as Babis used funds provided by the EU. Babis was an investor in a luxury resort in central Bohemia called the ‘Storks Nest’. An investigation by the EU found that Babis knowingly changed the status of the resort to a ‘small businesses’ to qualify for EU funds, two million euros in total, to build and maintain the resort. Although Babis put this asset into a trust (to comply with Czech laws), he still exercised a level of control over the company leading to a conflict of interest. The EU investigation recommended that the Czech government press criminal charges; however, no charges have been filed to date. When the Czech people first heard about this scandal in 2018, mass demonstrations took place in Prague as they called for Babis’s resignation. 250,000 people gathered in Prague again after the EU findings were published in 2019, this protest aligning with the 30th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution. Politics in Czech Republic is currently dominated by the Covid-19 crisis. The government introduced lockdowns and welfare packages for its citizens who were out of work, which were received favourably by the people. Babis and his ANO party won the greatest number of votes in the 2020 election with 29.6 per cent of the vote and established a minority government, this time with the support of the Social Democrats. General elections are set to take place again in October 2021. In these political and economic circumstances, Czechians made their decision to migrate to Australia. Going beyond the structural context described above, in the next section we are looking into the personal (agency) dimension of their migrations, examining typical motivations and reasons for coming to Australia.

90 

O. Oleinikova

3.2 Migration to Australia: Reasons & Motivations According to 2016 census figures, around 24,500 Australians identify as having Czech ancestry, mostly in Melbourne and Sydney (Hall, 2016). Most Czech immigrants to Australia came after World War II and 1968–1969. The 2016 Australian National Census data reports that most Czech speakers arrived in Australia in 1969, representing 0.2% of immigration that year (among other people who completed the 2016 Census). In the ten years between 2005 and 2015, the number of arrivals increased from 105 to 244, representing a 132.4% change between 2005 and 2015. During the same period, the total number of people arriving in Australia rose from 139,888 to 255,222, a 121.3% change (Hall, 2016). This section centres on discussion of the main reasons and motivation for the Czechian arrivals into Australia between 2000 and 2021, that were mentioned and discussed by 27 Czechians in their interviews conducted in the mid-2021. 11 participants were on permanent resident visas or already became Australian citizens; and 16 participants were on temporary visas mostly student and working holiday visas. The average age of the interviewees was 33 and 21 out of 27 participants worked in the restaurant and catering industry (mostly in Czech-run or Czech-­ administered restaurants and pubs) and cleaning industry. Two of them worked in the media production and journalism space; one was a photographer, one was a marketing professional and two worked in the art sphere. The most common migration reasons for the interviewed Czech migrants who came to Australia between 2000 and 2021 are for study, for love, for new life experiences and driven by economic motivators such as better job opportunities. For the majority of the interviewed Czechians, high salaries and stable working conditions were not the main motivation. The desire for self-realisation, more flexible working schedule, living closer to nature and more free time outside work in Australia was mentioned as important in their migration-decision making process by 16 out of 27 interviewees. Also, there was a group of interviewees who followed their loved ones in their decision to move to Australia.

3  Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia 

91

A typical story among the collected 27 life stories is of a person from a middle- to upper-class family who came on a student visa and wanted to study and travel, to see the world and get new knowledge, and then decided to stay permanently. In response to the question, “How did you end up living in Australia?” the most common responses were: “I like adventure and I like English and I thought it would be nice to go to Australia to improve my English and learn new skills. So I just went” (Benni, 33 y.o., journalist); “I came here as a student to learn English and loved the country and people, then stayed permanently. Now Australia is my second home” (Boris, 29 y.o, restaurant administrator) “I came not for money, but for lifestyle” (Karina, 26 y.o. University student)

Economic motives came secondary for almost all interviewees (23 out of 27). It can be explained by the strong economic situation in the Czech republic since and the accessibility of both skilled and low-skilled job opportunities in other EU states to which Czechians have visa free and easy access. Thus, those who choose Australia for their country of temporary or permanent migration are driven by other factors. Commonly, in migration literature, “migration choice depends on the wealth difference between the country of origin and the host country” (Vergalli, 2006, p. 2). This is mainly because “people migrate in order to increase their welfare” (Khwaja, 2002). Economic theories of migration obviously stress the role of economic factors in migration decision-making. However, the decision to migrate appears to be not simply a rational choice based on economic conditions and aims to improve one’s welfare. It is a process that is strongly linked to emotions and two other types of factors that emerged from the narratives of Czech migrants related to (1) family and (2) earlier biographical circumstances. There is a group of interviewees that came to Australia motivated by family-related matters: (1) by family member who wanted, planned and mitigated to Australia or (2) following the romantic relationship with a person who lived and worked in Australia (not specifically Australian

92 

O. Oleinikova

citizen or permanent resident). Also earlier biographical circumstances played a significant role, that includes: (1) ethnic ties with Australia; (2) communication and social networks and (3) previous tourist visits to Australia. Together these factors made Australia more attractive in comparison to other destination countries. In the first instance, ethnic ties with the country and the presence of relatives in Australia played the main role. Participants, whose biographies included such experience, might mention that they did not know the language, or did not relate to the culture, but that they used their ‘blood’ connection to help them decide to migrate and settle in the country. Interview data showed that along with ethnic ties with relatives in Australia, the communication and social networks played an important role in making the decision to migrate. Migration scholarship stresses the importance of community networks in the migrant’s choice of destination (Bauer et al., 2002; Bauer & Zimmermann, 1997; Coniglio, 2003; Winters et al., 2001). The reliance on social networks that were established long before migration was founded through participants’ earlier travels, family visits and especially former migration experiences in EU countries. It is worth mentioning that one fourth of the participants had had experience working in the EU and UK. While working in the EU and UK, participants built their network to look for further opportunities in other countries with better life opportunities and incomes. As Benni said: Australia is called a lucky country, because most people don’t have problems with money. They have quite reasonable and fair incomes and they have a lot of sun as well. So the country is really nice and really welcoming. And people also say it is a very rewarding country, so if you work hard you can have a nice life.

Furthermore, social contacts gained through previous visits to Australia by participants helped, for example Adela, to “get emotionally connected to the country” and perceive it “as more accessible and a less distant country in terms of geographical and time distance”. In addition to non-economic reasons, there are other things that stimulate Czech migration to Australia, especially when we compare it to migration from Ukraine. For example, the availability of e-visitor visas

3  Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia 

93

(or visa subclass 651) that involves a simple online application process that travellers can complete in a few minutes. It is important to mention that E-visitor visas are not available to Ukrainians, which creates more barriers for arrivals from Ukraine. Similarly, Czech citizens can enjoy easy access to Australia through the Working Holiday Maker (WHM) programme (visa subclass 462) that allows them to work and travel in Australia, while this programme is not available to Ukrainian nationals. An easier access to a broad spectrum of Visas to come Australia stimulates bigger arrivals from Czech Republic, compared to Ukraine.

3.3 Class Belonging and Dead-end/ Bricolage Careers In terms of social class belonging, the group of Czech migrants in Australia is a diverse group, compared to Hungarian migrants where arrivals from blue-collar working class families dominate, and Ukraine dominated by white-collar working class. Out of 27 interviewees, 19 were from middle-­ class and upper-class families, originally from big Czech cities or small cities near Prague. 8 interviewees were coming from blue-collar working-­ class families. There are also many high-profile Czech scientists in Australia as well as many Czech artists. For example, one artist of Czech origin created the prime minister’s sculpture. So Czechs in Australia are pretty diverse. Frida (31 y.o., marketing manager).

Interesting common trend in migration pathways of the interviewed Czechia’s from middle and upper social classes is a temporary downgrade in their occupational trajectories. Most of the interviewees had to work in low-skilled jobs first (as cleaners, waitresses) while building up their access to better high-skilled job opportunities that match or superseded their qualifications gained back home in Czech Republic. At the time of the interview, the majority got stuck in their survival life strategy mode and were still in the process of building up their career profiles and searching for better job opportunities to regain their occupational status.

94 

O. Oleinikova

According to 2016 Australian National Census data suggests that more Czech speakers worked as Sales Assistants (General) than other occupations. Nationally, 5.0% of people worked as Sales Assistants (General). This was followed by Waiters (3.1%), which was 1.0% for all of Australia. I was expecting that it will be really easy to get a job here. I mean … [due to] what I did before [in] reception or in communication and marketing or something like that… but I found out that here it’s actually more about the visa thing. You can get easily a part-time job as a cleaner or nanny but my aspirations are a little bit higher due to my hard work before. (Katarina, 26 y.o., university student)

The two types of careers described by Mrozowicki (2011) as ‘dead-end’ and ‘bricolage’, are a useful tool to explain the variable occupational patterns of Czech immigrants to Australia. Mrozowicki’s (2011) concepts from studying workers in Poland are used in addition to the narrative analysis of the interviews to help map the career pathways of migrants. He argues that “unprotected exposure to market mechanisms, when combined with the lack of significant resources leads to dead-end or patchwork careers” (Mrozowicki, 2011, p. 165). Having had single-track linear careers in the Czech Republic, some of the high-skilled migrants who were interviewed fell into dead-end careers in Australia and thus experienced a sharp downturn in their professional and social status. This occupational downgrade originated in “the unacceptability of the new rules of the game” (Erika, 35 y.o. ) and is also the result of a conscious or unconscious failure to take up opportunities of gaining new and suitable skills to get a better job, or at least the same skilled job as they held in Czech Republic.

Erika’s Story of Dead-End Career The visualisation for the dead-end career pattern is the story of Erika, a 35 y.o. classic flute musician. Erika originates from an artistic family of Prague intelligentsia. Her relatives include a sculptor, painters, musicians and Catholic priests. She

3  Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia 

95

has been playing the flute since she was eight; according to her own expression, she has been making music “all her life”. Erika has a professional musical education from the Prague Conservatory, as well as numerous experience of performing in concert halls. Erika did not plan to migrate to Australia, her first trip to Sydney (2015–2017) happened quite spontaneously. Firstly, after a year in China, Erika felt an intense interest in how things are with the art of music in other countries far from Europe. Secondly, at that time, she had a Czech partner, who wanted to see Australia, and thus, the interests of Erika and her partner at that time coincided, and they went to Sydney. Erika’s first 2 years in Australia (2015–2017) were the worst years of her creative musical career. Despite her rich background in classical music, she could not find a place in any orchestra, although she sent out lots of letters and made lots of contacts. Erika described the reasons for her failure to find a place as a performer in the orchestra as follows: There are a lot of people who are Australians and who just like sitting on their spot and they are never gonna leave and there is a massive queue behind them waiting for the spot and I am in the fifth hundredth position.

Desperate to find a paid job in the orchestra, Erika tried to find an unpaid job (just to do what she loved—playing in the orchestra), but she could not do that either. From the words of Erika: There are a few orchestras around Sydney who sent me an email saying: you know you are overqualified, we don’t need you. So I felt desperate: I’m not asking for money, I just want to play!

Desperate to find a job as a musician, Erika worked as a cleaner during the long period of her first 2 years in Australia. In the end, disillusioned with her Australian experience and parting with her Czech boyfriend, Erika returned to the Czech Republic in 2017. During her first two  years in Australia Erika met an Australian (by profession—a pilot of a military helicopter), with whom she continued to communicate when she returned to the Czech Republic. Their communication developed well, and they decided to meet in a neutral

96 

O. Oleinikova

territory (Thailand), after which they started dating, realising that they fit together. In 2018, Erika’s new Australian partner invited her to his place. Not being completely sure of the strength of their relationship at its rather early stage, Erika did not want to depend on her partner, so she came to Australia on a Student visa (she enrolled in management courses at one of the Australian universities). Between attending university lectures, teaching the flute (the number of Erika’s music students was steadily increasing) and very rare concerts, three years passed, and on Easter in 2021, Erika’s partner proposed to her. Erika currently lives in Sydney and she is quite successful in teaching music. She has many students, and the lessons bring a decent income. However, she still suffers from a lack of sufficient concert practice, a situation that is exacerbated by the COVID-­ related restrictions Erika is nurturing creative musical projects, of which she has many—she still plans to conquer the inhospitable world of Australian classical music, but now from a better position of an Australian woman. After six years, Erika reflects on the harsh two years of her first visit to Australia: I was kind of hoping to be doing [in Australia] exactly the same as I was doing my whole life, as I’ve been playing the flute for twenty-four years. Now… My expectations are much lower.

Erika’s story demonstrated the dead-end career pathway, when a highly qualified creative specialist who due to unfavourable circumstances was forced to adhere not to a life strategy of achievement, but, paradoxically, to a strategy of survival. A possible reason for this was that she came to Australia spontaneously, without bothering to first find a job, and perhaps not realising the fact that it is often much more difficult for a highskilled and highly qualified specialist to find a job, rather than for a labourer with a low-skilled qualifications.

3  Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia 

97

Adela’s Story of Bricolage Career Other common pattern found in stories of the 27 interviewed Czech migrants is a ‘bricolage’ career. As a multi-track occupational choice, the bricolage careers involve a high level of responsiveness to institutional and structural challenges in the new environment (Mrozowicki, 2011). In the bricolage scenario migrants aim to match their strengths, weaknesses, values and preferred lifestyle with the requirements and advantages of a range of different occupations in their sphere of expertise and in terms of the availability of resources. Bricolage is the dominant logic among the stories of participants who came to Australia for professional and social advancement. Based on the level of education and skills of this cohort of migrants revealed through interview data and observation, it would seem that skilled and family migrants (through family reunion or marriage) tended to upgrade when they found work in Australia. The broad bricolage occupational patterns developed by Mrozowicki (2011) can be more carefully divided into two further categories—the entrepreneurial and the educational. Educational patterns would be more typical among the interviewed Czechians, when they gain new skills at university level, with the aim of becoming well-paid Australian professionals. In order to do this, they discontinued their professional careers in Czech Republic for study purposes and chose to migrate to the place that offered the best study programmes in their desired occupations. The study courses were for a period of one to two years. The story of Adela, a journalist in her mid-thirties, is a vivid example of a bricolage career pattern. Adela comes from the Czech city of Pilsen. She grew up, according to her definition, in a happy family, consisting of a father, mother and two daughters. Her father had his own small business in the IT sphere, and her mother was engaged in work with people (she specialised in HR management). Adela also has a sister who is into horses’ business, she looks after horses and trains them, she also has her own horse. The social class of Adela’s family back in the Czech Republic can be defined as a middle or upper-middle class.

98 

O. Oleinikova

Adela practised yoga and worked as a journalist in the Czech Republic, before arriving in the UK in the late 2000s to earn her Master’s Degree in Multiplatform Media within the Erasmus Exchange Program. While studying in the UK, Adela met a boyfriend with whom she later had an on-and-off relationship for many years and he eventually became the reason for her migration to Australia. Before migrating to Australia, Adela travelled quite a lot: in addition to various European countries, she also visited several Asian countries and worked in Africa for extended periods of time. She worked in Ghana and Sierra Leone as part of humanitarian missions for more than two years. After working in Africa, Adela returned to the Czech Republic, where she received an offer to work as a journalist for a leading Prague newspaper. In the last six months before her departure to Australia which happened in November 2015, Adela lived in Prague and worked for a local newspaper, while renting a shared apartment with several girls—as Erika noted, her main goal at that time was to save money for future travels. In 2015, her former partner invited Adela to join him in Australia, where he worked as a programmer at the time. Adela came first on a student visa—she went to college, where she studied yoga. Adela was frustrated by the failures in her job search and the Australian society in general. She described it in the following words: The first impressions I got it’s like I’m in a glass box. All the things are there but I can’t get to them. The jobs are there but I can’t get out of it [of the glass box]… Everything is here, close like hand-[reach], but you can’t get it.

Adela was especially saddened by the fact that despite all her training in journalism and international experience as a journalist, she could not find a job as a journalist in Australia: [I am] a journalist, and English is not my first language, so maybe it was a little bit naive for me, but I was applying for [journalist] work…you know, I wanted to use my skills and my experience from working in Ghana Sierra Leone and in other countries.

3  Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia 

99

In 2018, Adela left Australia for Africa, where she worked as a journalist and helped the humanitarian mission. However, in 2019 she returned to Australia to marry her Australian boyfriend. In her 2nd visit to Australia, Adela received permanent residency on a partner visa. As Adela notes, she did not experience any difficulties in the visa application process. The process of preparing documents for a student visa in 2015 was easy, and her ex-partner helped her prepare documents for a partner visa in 2018. Soon after she found a full-time job at the Czech branch of SBS radio, she also performed translations and other skilled work that is in line with her educational level. Adela mentions that now she feels a lot of warmth towards Australia and already identifies herself as Australian, although she does not forget about her Czech roots. She notes that now she understands the rules of Australian football, and she and her friends are cheering for ‘their’ teams in the Australian Football League. Adela has successfully integrated into Australian society and expresses her happiness about her employment and her life in general.

References Bauer, T., & Zimmermann, K. F. (1997). Network migration of ethnic Germans. International Migration Review, 1(1), 143–149. Bauer, T.  G., Epstein, G.  S., & Gang I.  N. (2002, August). Herd effects or migration networks? The location choice of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. IZA Discussion Paper, N. 551. https://docs.iza.org/dp551.pdf Boneva, B., Frieze, I. H., Ferligoj, A., Jarošová, E., Pauknerová, D., & Orgocka, A. (1997). East-West European migration and the role of motivation in emigration desires. Migracijske i etničke teme, 13(4), 335–361. Boneva, L., Cloyne, J., Weale, M., & Wieladek, T. (2018). The effect of unconventional monetary policy on inflation expectations: evidence from firms in the United Kingdom. 45th issue (September 2016) of the International Journal of Central Banking. Cocco, F. (2016, October 20). Israel and the US have the highest poverty rates in the developed world. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/ eacb2221-­86f3-­3be6-­b3a9-­075f0415367f

100 

O. Oleinikova

Coniglio, N. D. (2003, December). Migropolis: Migration networks and formation of ethnic clusters in cities. SNF Working Paper, 46/03. https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1012.69&rep=r ep1&type=pdf Czech Statistical Office. (2018). Foreigners: Number of foreigners. https://www. czso.cz/csu/cizinci/1-­ciz_pocet_cizincu Deloitte. (2019, January 7). Czech economy in 2019: Further slowdown and a shortage of workforce [Press release]. https://www2.deloitte.com/cz/en/pages/ press/articles/cze-­tz-­ceska-­ekonomika-­v-­roce-­2019-­zpomalovani-­rustu-­a-­ nedostatek-­zamestnancu.html Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2020). Czech Republic country brief. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/czech-­republic/czech-­republic-­country-­brief Doležalová, A. (2018). A history of Czech economic thought (1st ed.). Routledge. Drbohlav, D. (2012). Patterns of immigration in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. European Immigrations: Trends, Structures and Policy Implication, 179–209. Drbohlav, D., Lachmanová-Medová, L., Čermák, Z., Janská, E., Čermáková, D., & Dzúrová, D. (2009, May). The Czech Republic: On its way from emigration to immigration country. (IDEA Working papers, 11). https://is.muni.cz/ el/1423/jaro2004/SOC732/um/Drbohlav_et.al._2009._The_Czech_ Republic.On_its_way_from_emigration_to_immigration_country.pdf Europa. (2016). European structural and investment funds: Country factsheet  – Czech Republic. [Fact sheet]. http://ec.europa.eu/ Hájek, L. (2018). Dimensions of politics in the Czech Republic. Politologický časopis-Czech Journal of Political Science, 25(2), 131–151. Hall, F. (2016). Australia by the numbers: Putting ‘Us’ into Australia: Module 8 [Online course]. SBS Cultural Competence Program. https://www.sbs.com. au/sites/sbs.com.au.home/files/sbs_learn_study_guide_cultural_competence_programs_m8_australia_by_the_numbers_atom_study_guide.pdf Havlík, V., & Voda, P. (2016). The rise of new political parties and re-alignment of party politics in the Czech Republic. Acta Politologica, 8(2), 119–144. Holy, L. (1996). The little Czech and The Great Czech Nation: National identity and the post-communist transformation of society. Cambridge University Press. Ionescu, L. (2015). Emigration from Eastern Europe with a focus on brain drain. Journal of Social and Economic Statistics, 4(2), 54–74. Janská, E., & Drbohlav, D. (2001). Re-emigration and integration of Volhynian and” Chernobyl” Czechs in the Czechs in the Czech Republic. Acta Universitatis Carolinae: Geographica, 36(1), 123–131.

3  Czech Migrants Making a Home in Australia 

101

Janurová, K. (2018). The unbearable lightness of moving: Czech migrants making a home (or not) in the UK. Sociologický časopis/ Czech Sociological Review, 54(3), 315–342. Johnson, J. (2006). Two-track diffusion and central bank embeddedness: The politics of Euro adoption in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Review of International Political Economy, 13(3), 361–386. https://doi. org/10.1080/09692290600769245 Khwaja, Y. (2002). Should I stay or should I go? Migration under uncertainty: A real option approach. Economics and Finance Working Papers, Brunel University, pp. 2–10. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/902 Ključnikov, A., Krajčík, V., & Vincúrová, Z. (2018). International sharing economy: The case of Airbnb in The Czech Republic. Economics & Sociology, 11(2), 126–137. https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-­789X.2018/11-­2/9 Kureková, L. (2013). Welfare systems as emigration factor: Evidence from the new accession states. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(4), 721–739. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12020 Mrozowicki, A. (2011). Coping with social change: Life strategies of workers in Poland’s new capitalism. Leuven University Press. OECD. (2005). Education policy analysis 2004. OECD Publishing. https://doi. org/10.1787/epa-­2004-­en OECD iLibrary. (2010, April 6). OECD economic surveys: Czech Republic 2010. https://www.oecd-­i library.org/economics/oecd-­e conomic-­s urveys­czech-­republic-­2010_eco_surveys-­cze-­2010-­en OECD iLibrary. (2014, March 18). OECD economic surveys: Czech Republic 2014. https://www.oecd-­ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-­economic-­surveys­czech-­republic-­2014_eco_surveys-­cze-­2014-­en Okólski, M. (2012). European immigrations: Trends, structures and policy implications. Amsterdam University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9789048517275 Pařízková, A. (2011). Czech migrants in the European migration space. Migration and Ethnic Themes (Migracijske i etničke teme), 2, 177–197. https:// hrcak.srce.hr/file/110508 Ritchie, H., Mathieu, E., Rodés-Guirao, L., Appel, A., Giattino, C., Ortiz-­ Ospina, E., Hasell, J., Macdonald, B., Beltekian, D., & Roser, M. (2020). Coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus Simon, Z. (2015, August 14). Czechs power EU’s fastest GDP growth as Romania, Hungary stumble. Bloomberg Business. https://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2015-­08-­14/czechs-­power-­eu-­s-­fastest-­gdp-­growth-­as-­romania­hungary-­stumble

102 

O. Oleinikova

Uherek, Z. (2004). Use of social science research on migration policy in the Czech Republic. International Social Science Journal, 56(179), 101–113. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-­8701.2004.00478.x Vergalli, S. (2006, October). Entry and exit strategies in migration dynamics (working paper). Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12068/files/wp060123.pdf Winters, P., de Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E. (2001). Family and community networks in Mexico-U.S. migration. The Journal of Human Resources, 36(1), 159–184.

4 The New Hungarians on The Move

This chapter discusses the new trends in modern migration from Hungary to Australia. Utilising the life strategy conceptual framework, the chapter discusses core reasons behind Hungarian arrivals to Australia and their migration outcomes, shaped by structural and agency factors. It starts with recounting the history of the Hungarian Diaspora in Australia. The chapter’s analysis centres on the arrivals of many ethnic Hungarians in the past two decades, following the 2000s, showing a 180.2% increase in the overall Hungarian-speaking arrivals to Australia. It analyses the 2000–2021 immigrations, moving from a discussion of structural context of Hungarian migration to the investigation of the reasons behind modern migration, broader personal experiences around the identity, class and employment outcomes. Although there are only ~18,000 people of Hungarian ancestry living in Australia, Hungarian immigration is an important chapter of Australia’s immigration experience. Hungarian diaspora have played an important role in the history of the Eastern Europeans in Australia.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Oleinikova, New Eastern European Migration to Australia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07095-2_4

103

104 

O. Oleinikova

4.1 Hungarians in Australia: Short Historical Overview Research into Hungarian migration to Australia is very limited. There are fragmented studies in the form of isolated articles and book chapters on the following topics: (1) historical accounts of Hungarians arrivals to Australia (Urmenyhazi, 2015); (2) social and linguistic characteristics of migrants’ language adaptation (Fenyvesi, 2005; Karidakis & Arunachalam, 2016; Kovács, 2005; Hatoss, 2018); (3) Hungarian diaspora and Hungary-Australia relations (Gazsó et  al., 2019; Andits, 2010); (4) Hungary’s cultural diplomacy (Kantek et al., 2021); Hungarian identity and belonging (Kantek et al., 2019; Palotai et al., 2019). One of the reasons for limited research into the topic is the minority status of Hungarians in Australia. The latest Census in 2016 recorded 17,896 Hungary-born people in Australia. Australia was never the mainstream migration destination for Hungarian migrants. Thus, the data is quite limited and numbers are not big in comparison with say Chinese or Indian migration to Australia. The origins of the Hungarian community can be traced to four distinct refugee-migrant waves, each resulting from political and social upheavals in Hungary (Urmenyhazi, 2015). The first wave of Hungarian arrivals in Australia followed the 1848–1849 Hungarian war of independence against the Austrian Empire. The loss of that war and the impact of continued repression by the Austrian rulers resulted in the arrival of political refugees seeking freedom and opportunities in a promising new country, the colonies of Australia. Back in Europe, Hungarians experienced Austrian despotism until 1867, when a political compromise was reached with the declaration of Austro-­ Hungarian dual monarchy, which accorded the kingdom of Hungary equal status through national sovereignty, equal rights for its citizens and development parallel with Austria in every field. The first wave of Hungarian migrants numbered no more than a hundred, and comprised ex-army officers, soldiers and resistance fighters, some of them landed gentry, with a sprinkling of adventurers among them. What attracted many of them were “the Victorian gold fields, well-known in Europe, and

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

105

they joined the rush to try their luck as prospectors” (Urmenyhazi, 2015, p.  1). The second wave of Hungarian migration took place in the mid-­1930s from Hitler’s Germany, where gradual oppression of German Jews spread to Hungarian and other European Jews. Fleeing Nazi Germany’s legalised discrimination, persecution and threats to their safety, many Hungarian Jews chose Australia as destination country. Until the outbreak of World War II, Australia was a safe haven and accepted some 6475 new settlers (Urmenyhazi, 2015). The third wave of Hungarian immigration was directly attributable to World War II and its consequences. As in most parts of Europe, the war had caused immense devastation, economic collapse and impoverishment. In Central and Eastern Europe, totalitarian communist regimes came to power, introducing ruthless and inhumane policies (Sedelmeier, 2014). The following growth of the Hungarian community in Australia came out of several waves of forced migration throughout the decades of Hungary’s communist dictatorship (Kantek et al., 2019). Australia’s geographical distance paired with structural constraints described in more detail in the following section meant that up until 1989, “engagements with Hungary were infrequent and difficult” (Kantek et al., 2021, p. 2). In 2000 Hungarian migration saw an increase in arrivals. If we look at the data about Hungarian-speakers in Australia, in the ten years between 2005 and 2015, the number of arrivals increased from 126 to 353, representing a 180.2% increase between 2005 and 2015. During the same period, the total number of people arriving in Australia rose from 139,888 to 255,222, a 121.3% change (SBS Census Explorer, 2016). Currently, in Australia, New South Wales has the largest Hungarian-born population (6420) followed by Victoria (4984), Queensland (3432) and South Australia (1274) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). The main questions that arise from the data showing an increase in Hungarian arrivals since the 2000s are: who are those Hungarians who choose to migrate to Australia from modern Hungary? Why do they come (what structural and agency factors shape their migration decision making)? How do they come and what are their plans? In this chapter I aim to address some of these questions. Focusing on modern arrivals from Hungary to Australia between 2000 and 2021, in chapter I am to find answers to the questions above. The following section starts from

106 

O. Oleinikova

exploring the political and economic contexts for migrations, followed by the section exploring the individual motives (agency level) for this type of migration.

4.2 Emigration from Hungary During 2000–2021: Structural Contexts 2000–2021 Migration Dynamics The most significant spike in Hungarian emigration to date was after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Among those emigrating during this time were, in part, non-Hungarian citizens who had arrived in Hungary in previous years and were able to return home (Huseby-Darvas, 2004). Emigration decreased significantly during the 1990’s as the country started to rebuild and undergo major social and economic projects that would benefit citizens. In the early 2000’s, with Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004, emigration increased again as EU nations opened their borders to Hungarian citizens. Emigration numbers increased in 2008 as the country fell into recession and citizens searched for work elsewhere. Emigration (and immigration) became popular topics in political and public discourse in the final decade of the 2000’s as trends emerged indicating that university-­educated Hungarians were leaving Hungary en masse. France, Sweden, England and Austria are all ahead of Hungary in terms of emigration rates. However, these countries also have a healthy flow of immigration into their country to balance out higher emigration rates. The migration dynamics in Hungary has been significantly shaped by policies and reforms introduced by Viktor Orban, a Hungarian politician who has served as prime minister of Hungary since 2010, previously holding the office from 1998 to 2002 (Andits, 2008). He was the first post-Cold War head of government in eastern and central Europe who had not been a member of a Soviet-era communist regime. Orban received a law degree from the University of Budapest in 1987. The following year he gained a fellowship appointment at a central and eastern European research group sponsored by the Soros Foundation, a

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

107

pro-democracy organisation created by the financier George Soros. Orban also became a founding member of the anticommunist Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz). In 1989 he received a scholarship from the Soros Foundation to study political philosophy at the University of Oxford. That June Orban gained wide recognition when he gave a speech at the reburial of former premier Imre Nagy, leader of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, in which he called for free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. All Soviet forces did indeed withdraw by mid-1991. However, his second and third terms in the office are characterised by democratic-roll back and populist politics (for more details see the section ‘Political Context: 2000–2021’ below). During Viktor Orban’s second term as Prime Minister of Hungary, he implemented wide-reaching immigration reform which has dwindled the number of immigrants moving to Hungary to an unsustainable level (Aghm, 2013). As a result, there is concern around population loss exacerbated by an ageing population in Hungary today (Siska-Szilasi et al., 2017, p. 363). The emigration data from 2000–2007 is very modest, with 3000 or 4000 people a year leaving Hungary (Gödri et al., 2014). There was a small increase in 2004 when Hungary joined the EU as the labour markets in other EU countries slowly opened to Hungarians. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden opened their borders first, in 2004; others such as Spain, Italy and the Netherlands opened their borders in 2006 and in 2007 Germany and Austria welcomed Hungarians (Gödri et al., 2014). Germany and Austria would become the most popular countries of emigration for Hungarians in the years to come. The emigration of the Hungarian labour force began in 2007 as a result of austerity measures being implemented by the Gyurscany government, but emigration numbers were lower than that of most EU nations (Siska-Szilasi et al., 2017). In the wake of the 2007 GFC and resulting Hungarian recession, unemployment in Hungary started to rise and the labour force demands of other EU nations was appealing to many Hungarian citizens. 9500 Hungarians emigrated that year, and the number of emigrations per year has been steadily growing since then (Gellén, 2010). Outward migration during this period (and since) has been particularly high amongst doctors and other healthcare professionals, engineers, technical workers and

108 

O. Oleinikova

students (Siska-Szilasi et al., 2017). Between 2006 and 2010, Hungary lost around 780 medical doctors per year via emigration (Balázs, 2012). In the years between 2010 and 2019, one million Hungarians emigrated from Hungary (Kolba, 2019a). In the early years of the 2010’s Hungarians moved to EU nations at an increasing frequency. According to Eurostat, 15,100 Hungarians moved abroad in 2011, 22,800 in 2012 and 36,691  in 2013 (Eurostat, 2013). The three major countries for Hungarian emigration during this period, and since, are Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom which together welcome 70–76% of Hungarians seeking to work overseas (Siska-Szilasi et al., 2017). Germany registered 40,000 Hungarians and 54,400 in 2012 and Austria registered one and a half times the number of Hungarian immigrants in 2012 than 2010 (Gödri et al., 2014). Hars’s 2011 study suggests that the Hungarians who moved to Germany for work tended to settle permanently, whereas Austria and the U.K. were destinations characterised by circular labour force migration (Hárs, 2016). By 2012, almost 20% of the adult population was planning to move abroad for a period which is a significant shift from the 5–6% in the 1990s and 2000s (Gödri et al., 2014). As mentioned previously, the main demographic of those Hungarians who chose to emigrate during this period were skilled, educated workers. The emigration potential was also higher than average among the younger age groups including students, and those who had graduated already with a secondary or tertiary level of education. Hidasi’s, 2011 study indicates that the emigration intention of Hungarians is mostly determined by economic factors, however for younger people the opportunity to study and work abroad, especially in EU countries, is particularly appealing (Hidasi, 2011). In 2013, 33% of students in Hungary had plans to relocate to another nation and in 2015, that had risen to 37% (Szabó, 2015). Increased language skills and education opportunities are factors that have contributed to this shift. This was exacerbated in 2019 with the closure of the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest, a major tertiary institution, at the behest of Prime Minister Orban. Students at CEU and others protested this closure in 2019 as they viewed it as anti-democratic and anti-intellectual move by an increasingly restrictive government. Data from this period also indicates that people living in rural areas of Hungary had fewer

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

109

intentions to emigrate than those living in cities, overlapping with data about student migration, as most tertiary institutions are in Hungarian cities (Toomey, 2018). Siska-Azilasi et  al. also suggest that the role of attachment to place, family, tradition and local social networks are relevant when considering the intentions of rural people to emigrate (SiskaSzilasi et al., 2017, 363). During this decade there was also an increase in women emigrating. The rising employment and education of women in Hungary, as well as a ‘Westernisation’ of attitudes regarding traditional roles has resulted in increased mobility for Hungarian women. The staunch anti-immigration, anti-refugee policies of the Orban administration continued and worsened as the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic hit Hungary. Orban arrested 13 Syrian students in the early months of the pandemic for not ‘cooperating with authorities’ while Hungary was in a state of emergency over the pandemic, and they intend to deport them. The government has since blamed migrants for bringing coronavirus to Hungary since the first cases were detected among Iranian students who were studying at Hungarian universities. Various studies (Siska-Szilasi et  al., 2017; Gödri et  al., 2014; Hárs, 2016) warn of an unsustainable immigration rate today as Hungarian emigration continues to gradually increase and immigration rates remain steady under Orban (Inotai, 2020). This pattern has created a shortage of the labour force, especially skilled labour such as those in the medical and engineering industries as skilled labour continues to move out of the country.

Economic Context: 2000–2021 Hungary has a high-income, export-oriented market economy that is one of the most complex in the world. They joined OECD (Organization for Economy Cooperation and Development) in 1996 and the EU (European Union) in 2004, which has facilitated the country’s export-oriented economic policy of the past two decades. Hungary’s major industries include automotive, pharmaceutical, information technology and food processing and their major trade partners are EU nations such as Germany and Austria. Hungary’s productive capacity is currently 80% privately owned with 39.1% taxation which aids in funding their welfare economy

110 

O. Oleinikova

(International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2021). Their currency, the florint (HUF) is entirely convertible for business, which also aided their economic prosperity during this period. By 2000, the Hungarian banking system had almost completely privatised, with their national stock exchange, the Budapest Stock Exchange opening in 1990 (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2009). 1990’s post- Soviet economic policy set the stage for the economic events of 2000–2010. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Hungary became a democratic nation and they drafted a new constitution in 1989. This constitution remained titled communist Act No. XX 1949 but affected the entire constitutional system of Hungary (European Commission, 2015). Hungary is regarded as having a smooth transition from communism to democracy in comparison to other countries in the Eastern Bloc such as Yugoslavia and Romania (Ackland et al., 1997). Collective cultural memory about the 1956 cultural revolution against soviet dictatorship was at the forefront of the minds of Hungarian citizens during re-centralisation. Therefore, unlike other former Soviet Union’s nations, Hungary did not require any financial aid from other European countries to incentivise it into democratising. Jenei (2011) views the re-­centralisation as a process where stabilisation and a steady development path characterised Hungary’s economic situation until 2002. Afterwards, Jenei argues, the development path turned towards marketisation and later to state minimisation and that lasted until the end of the decade and the rise of the Fidesz political party (Jenei, 2011). In the early 2000’s, Hungary was benefiting from the harsh austerity measures put in place in the 1990’s. They had built infrastructure, improved roadways and improved the telephone system, leading to an increase in foreign capital and the arrival of major international companies to Hungary’s shores. Competitive domestic companies also emerged and flourished during this period. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, political conditions had largely stabilised, and the Hungarian economy had become one of the most competitive in East Europe. This is not to suggest that the Hungarian economy was flourishing. In 2002, new austerity measures were installed under the supervision of the IMF, who Hungary went to for structural guidance and financial assistance to reduce government debt that had accumulated during the

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

111

re-centralisation period. By 2004, Hungary was in the middle of an economic climate categorised as a period of Europeanization (OECD iLibrary, 2021) as Hungary successfully joined the European Union in 2004, which facilitated free trade and migration with other EU nations. As Hungary eased towards marketisation, pensions for Hungarian citizens during this time were made 50% public and 50% private through social security. GDP growth remained mostly steady with some slight fluctuations in the years between 2000–2005, starting with 4.5% GDP growth rate in 2000 and concluding with a 4.2% GDP growth rate in 2005. In 2006, a political scandal involving socialist coalition Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany occurred as he promised Hungarians ‘reform without austerity’ during his re-election campaign only to unveil a range of austerity measures in April of 2006 designed to reduce the budget deficit to 3% by 2008. As a result, Hungarian economic growth slowed significantly and dropped to 0.2% growth in 2007 (IMF, 2021). By 2008, Hungary had built their economy around the trade deals the EU facilitated, leading to a reliance on other EU nations that would end catastrophically for Hungary during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). In 2008, the Hungarian state budget collapsed, and Hungary had to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the EU and The World Bank for a large loan of $26 Billion USD (IMF, 2009). By October of 2008, Hungarian public debt became impossible to sell on the international financial market, so the country had to enter into a loan agreement with the IMF to avoid insolvency. The GFC is noted to have affected Hungary more than other EU countries due to Hungary’s patchy economic history post-independence and the reliance on export trading to the GDP. By 2009, the GDP growth rate decreased to an −6.7%, the lowest growth rate since Hungary left the Soviet Union (IMF, 2009). Minister for Economics Gordon Bajnai takes over as Prime Minister and announces a programme of public spending cuts, tax rises and public wage freezes. Hungary fell into a recession that was perpetuated by declining exports, reduced domestic spending and fixed-asset accumulation by the populace. There were job losses and the wage growth decreased but inflation remained stable.

112 

O. Oleinikova

By 2010, Hungary had an amount of debt that the EU deemed excessive which resulted in the imposition of sanctions until 2013 (IMF, 2019). During this time, Hungary’s economy was stalled, the GDP moved into modest or negative growth and the unemployment rate climbed. The major defining political and economic development of this period was the election of Viktor Orban and his far-right, conservative Fidesz-­ Hungarian Civic Alliance. He was first elected in 2010 and he has since won elections in 2018 with his party, Fidesz, winning in every senate election held since 2010. This political stability has allowed Orban to make drastic changes to Hungarian economic policy, aided by the drafting of a new constitution in 2010 which was made law in 2011. The goal of Hungarian fiscal policy in the early 2010’s was to get the country out of recession, increase privatisation and slowly increase governmental intervention in Hungarian financial institutions. To do this, Orban nationalised $13 billion of private pension assets for the national debt, and he introduced moderate austerity measures to reduce welfare spending and introduce a new set of crisis taxes on banking and selected industries (VigvÁri, 2010). Increased governmental intervention into the finance and judiciary sectors of Hungary proposed by Fidesz and vocally supported by Orban had economic implications as the UN and IFC threatened to halt ongoing financial and economic support for the country. By 2012, all three major rating agencies cut the country’s credit rating to ‘junk status’ (BBC News, 2018). The EU in particular began legal proceedings to stop Orban’s proposal of increased government control of the Hungarian National Bank, but they also opposed the proposed changes to the retirement age of judges and data protection outlined in the new constitution. Orban conceded and promised to alleviate their concerns as none of their EU’s objections affected his new constitution. This political tension between Hungary and its major creditors, in addition to a scandal involving the president, led the country into a short-­ lived recession in 2012, when GDP growth dropped to −1.4% (VigvÁri, 2010). By 2014, Hungary’s economy was much improved due to the continuation of moderate austerity measures proposed by Orban in 2011 and continuing aid packages. Fidesz also used its parliamentary supermajority

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

113

to intervene in the energy market by ordering utility companies to reduce the charges for households which was a popular economic policy that contributed to the re-election of Fidesz in April 2014. Orban’s concession to the EU in their lawsuit was also good for the Hungarian economy as trade relations with EU nations only strengthened to the point where Hungary saw fair GDP growth in 2014 of 4.2%, rising to an amount typical of pre-GFC Hungary (European Commission, 2015). 2015–2019 Hungarian economic events are defined by Orban’s increasing nationalism which saw him damage relationships with many of the EU nations Hungary is dependent on for trade. The turn to self-­ sufficiency endorsed by Fidesz meant that Hungarian small and medium enterprises were incentivised and by the end of the decade, Hungary was almost self-sufficient in its agricultural needs due to a flourishing industry. From 2015 the government supported EU fund transfers along with moderately successful central bank loans to aid in economic revitalisation. These factors all fuelled the fair GDP growth which remained between 3.5% (2014) and 5.4% (2018) in the years between 2015 and 2019 (OECD, 2019). In a 2019 report by the OECD, they advised that the Hungarian economy was rising strongly, with record-low unemployment rates (3.71%) and good wage growth, but the government needed to address the ageing population and related costs. The report also made suggestions to mitigate the possibility of an overheated economy through the diversification of the labour market (OECD, 2019). The Covid-19 pandemic that encompassed the world had a dramatic effect on the Hungarian economy in 2020, and GDP growth fell to −5.0% landing Hungary in another recession. An annual injection of EU structural and Next Generation COVID recovery funds equivalent to around 3.5% of GDP in total from 2021 will support growth if invested well. Orban used this crisis to pass a vote granting him the ability to rule by decree under a state of emergency. As of December 2020, 4977 deaths had been attributed to Covid-19 (World Health Organisation, 2019). In 2022 Hungary’s government has made a number of concessions to the European Commission in a protracted stand-off over rule of law and transparency failings, as it seeks to unlock about €15bn worth of pandemic recovery funds amid a crisis in the country’s financial markets. The

114 

O. Oleinikova

resulting funding gap of around €7bn worth of grants and about €8bn in cut-rate loans has exacerbated a crisis driven by inflation and energy prices.

Political Context: 2000–2021 Hungary’s current system of government is that of a parliamentary representative democratic republic. The Prime Minister is the head of the government and the President, despite being largely symbolic, nominates the Prime Minister and they can hire and fire parliamentary members. The president is also the commander-in-chief of the military. Hungary entered the twenty-first century under the leadership of Viktor Orban, who was elected in 1998 as a part of a centre-right coalition including Hungarian Democratic Form (MDF) and the Independent Smallholder’s Party (FKGP) who won 42% of the vote that year. In 1999, Hungary joined NATO alongside former Eastern bloc countries Poland and Czech Republic. By the year 2000, Orban and his government implemented wide-sweeping policy reforms that included major restructuring or ministries; the creation of a super-ministry for the economy; and the strengthening of the duties of the Prime Ministerial office (Metz & Oross, 2020). Orban’s mission was to continue the privatisation work of his predecessors and strengthen the economy. His economic policy was dedicated to cutting taxes and social insurance contributions while reducing inflation and unemployment while undergoing major education reform such as making tertiary education free for all citizens. During this time, tensions surged between the centre-right coalition and the socialist-left opposition on major social issues including welfare funding, and Orban’s hesitance to provide diasporic Hungarians citizenship rights (Gorondi, 2007). This period of conflict between the left and right would start the trend of division that lasts until present day with the fissures between the two sides growing ever deeper (Meyer-Sahling, 2006). In March 2001, there were a slew of allegations and prosecutions against major figures in the coalition, including many from FKGP. These scandals led to the de facto disbandment of Orban’s coalition. The 2002 election saw the largest turnout of citizens since independence with three-quarters of eligible voters voting. The Socialist-Free

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

115

Democratic coalition were elected back into power and the new Prime Minister, Peter Medgyessy, was in power until 2004. Medgyessy was a popular prime minister in the first years of his term, as he announced a 100-day plan to provide a 50% wage increase to public employees and a HUF 19,000 ($65 USD) allowance to pensioners on a single occasion. He passed another 100-day welfare programme a year later and was favoured as a result. These two welfare programmes cost the state budget HUF 817 billion (around $2.5 billion USD). Medgyessy’s defining act as Prime Minister was his spearheading of Hungary’s European Union bid. He held a referendum in 2003 that asked the Hungarian population if they wanted to join the EU and the results were overwhelmingly positive, supported by individuals and industry alike. Hungary joined the EU in 2004 and in the same year, Medgyessy resigned after losing the support of his party. The then sports-minister Ferenc Gyurcsany was chosen to fulfil the role of Prime Minister after Medgyessy’s resignation. Under Gyurcsany, the socialist-free democratic coalition won re-election in 2006, becoming the first political party to win two consecutive terms since re-­centralisation. In these years the coalition liberalised trade, deregulated most prices, introduced an expansive privatisation policy and founded the Budapest Stock Exchange. In September of 2006, Gyurscany had a major political scandal when he gave a closed-door speech to the Hungarian Socialist Party in which he stated that ‘we [the government] did not do anything right for two years—we lied morning, noon and night’ (Reuters Staff, 2009). The leaking of this speech led to mass protests in Budapest stirred in part by Orban and the opposition. Gyurscany and the leftist coalition were called to resign but he refused to do so, extending the demonstrations, which became violent. In 2008, the leftist coalition suffered dramatic losses in local municipal elections and 80% of the population were in favour of a Fidesz-proposed bill that overturned the government’s decision to charge for doctor and hospital visits, and tertiary education. In March 2009, Gyurscany resigned. He was replaced by then economics minister, Gordon Bajnai. In 2010 a coalition including Fidesz and a smaller party called the Christian Democratic People’s party were elected in a landslide victory, putting Viktor Orban back in power. They won more than two-thirds of

116 

O. Oleinikova

the parliamentary seats which meant that Orban had a big enough majority to draft a new constitution. The new constitution he drafted (and then passed in 2011) had a focus on conservative social values, nationalism and a controversial electoral reform which would reduce the number of seats in Parliament from 386 to 199 (Metz & Oross, 2020). In 2011, the government came under global scrutiny for its new, very conservative constitution (for its sexism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and homophobia) as well as the changes to the judicial system which would give Fidesz more power over the courts. Orban also attempted to pass controversial media law and internet freedom bills which would have given the government significant control over both. By 2012, thousands of Hungarians took to the streets to protest the new constitution. This outrage is also felt by the EU, who threaten to suspend aid payments to the country if Orban did not make amendments to the constitution. He conceded to the EU, specifically addressing their concerns about undemocratic government intervention into Hungary’s financial and judiciary systems and internet freedom. In 2014, Fidesz won a second sweeping victory in parliamentary elections despite controversies around social justice and constitutional issues. They won 133 of the 199 parliamentary seats. In 2014, Orban also criticised the EU’s sanctions on Russia for their part in the Ukraine crisis, leaning further into the Eurosceptic and nationalist rhetoric that has defined his time in office. In 2015, Fidesz’s harsh anti-immigrant stance was cemented. During the Syrian refugee crisis, Orban refused refuge to asylum seekers, contradicting quotas Hungary agreed to when joining the EU. Orban’s hard-­ line migration policies included construction of a barbed wire fence the length of Hungary’s border with Serbia as refugees travelled there after getting to Turkey or Greece by boat. In addition to the wall, he passes a law that allows refugees to be arrested if they are caught attempting to cross any border into Hungary. This anti-immigrant, anti-refugee stance is applauded domestically, when a 2015 referendum overwhelmingly backs its rejection of EU plans to relocate minors. This result put further pressure on Hungary’s already-strained relationship to the EU and the EU threatened to suspend Hungary from the EU as they grappled with Orban’s anti-immigrant rhetoric and his plans to shut down the liberal Central European University in Budapest.

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

117

The plan to shut down the university coincides with new laws introduced in 2017 that required non-governmental organisations to register as foreign organisations if they receive funding from international sources. This law was seen as an attempt to silence organisations that are independent (and critical) of the government, including enterprises of the American-Hungarian billionaire George Soros, who Orban often criticised for his investments in Hungarian independent media (Sipos, 2013). In 2018, Orban passed a controversial bill that would allow employers to ask employees to work up to 400 hours of overtime a year with delayed payment for those hours of up to three years. The bill, colloquially known as the ‘slave law’ led to mass protests in Budapest outside of Parliament. Despite the well-attended demonstrations, Fidesz and Orban were once again elected in the May 2019 election. The fierce nationalist and anti-­ immigrant rhetoric espoused by Orban was once again favoured by Hungarian citizens who voted for him, securing over 50% of the total vote. In October of 2019, however, Fidesz experienced their first significant loss as a leftist opposition member was elected to the office of Budapest mayor. In response to the 2020 global pandemic, Orban enacted a ‘state of emergency’ which gave his government the ability to rule by decree. He ended the state of emergency in July of 2020, but his government amended a law that allowed them to rule by decree without parliamentary approval (Amaro, 2020) in future. At present, Orban is often criticised by Western and other EU countries for a government rife with corruption scandals, far-right beliefs (such as his fierce anti-LGBT stance) and fascist tendencies. In 2022 Hungarian parliamentary elections, Orban’s party, which has been in power since 2010, has once again won a two-thirds majority. The broad opposition alliance behind opposition candidate Péter Márki-Zay was unable to achieve a breakthrough.

4.3 Why Australia? Reasons & Motivations Following the discussion of the structural context in which Hungarians made their decisions to migrate, here I explore the individual (agency) context of their migration experiences in Australia between 2000 and

118 

O. Oleinikova

2021.The analysis draws on 22 semi-structured interviews conducted in May-July 2020 with Hungarians on permanent and temporary visas residing in NSW.  Majority of the participants were coming from the Hungarian rural areas from working-class families in which 8 out of 22 had a university degree (BA & MA level). Through the lens of people’s memory of their lives before migration and their recollections of the period when they decided to migrate, it was found that the combination of the sets of motivations to (1) to escape economic hardship (2) build a future in an “economic prosperous Western country” (Beta, Zak, Francis, Tamara); and (3) enjoy sunny weather, warm Australian climate; all shaped in Hungary before departure is what defines and reinforces the most frequently mentioned decisions to migrate to Australia. All 22 participants demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the political, social and economic situation in Hungary as one of the key reasons behind considering leaving Hungary. Dissatisfaction with not just their own lives but with the internal situation in the country. 14 out of 22 respondents mentioned low living standards and unsatisfactory quality of socio-economic transformations as being behind their dissatisfaction. However, it seems that no less important is the huge gap between the inflated expectations of the Hungarian membership in EU since 2004 that didn’t go as successful as it was planned and the actual reality. The interviewed Hungarians voiced their hopes for EU membership that will help them expand their economic capabilities, increase their wages, improve the quality and availability of public services, and some of these expectations did come true. Lots of the EU and USA aid-money were poured into infrastructure and yes we have great roads in Hungary, but not much else has changed. (Sarka, 35 y.o.)

At the same time, the sharp recession of 2009, consequent job losses, GDP decrease and lack of new economic opportunities along with conservative government policies over-weighted all the minor positive shifts associated with EU membership. The fact that the expectations of the majority of the interviewed Hungarians were related to external actions (government, president, local

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

119

authorities, international structures and / or leading countries), and not to the desire to take active action on their own, explains some underestimation of their own incomes and social statuses. However, it should be noted that almost all interviewed Hungarians were generally much more satisfied with their own lives rather than the situation in the country as a whole. It is clear that assessments of one’s own life are influenced by personal experience, and the average Hungarian forms the idea of the situation in their country from their experiences and the media, which mostly provides negative information. The low subjective assessments of their own and society’s existence ultimately led to their desire for a change. The respondents, representing the active, mobile and competitive group of Hungarian population associated the possibility of radical change with external migration, specifically for permanent residence or for work or study in Australia. Majority of the respondents mentioned they were motivated for migration to Australia by (1) the hope of better living conditions (economic, political and climate) (15 out of 22 respondents), (2) the lack of decent jobs in Hungary (16 out of 22), (3) the desire to ensure a better future for children (10 out of 22 mentioned it’s in their interviews) and the desire to get a better education (6 out of 22). The economic motive of striving for decent wages dominates the stories of the interviewed Hungarians in Australia. The average salary in Hungary is the lowest among the Visegrád Group countries (V4, or European Quartet, made up of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic). However, it is a bit higher than in other Eastern European states (Fig. 4.1). Since 2009 the emigration attitudes (for permanent or temporary relocation) are becoming a must-have in Hungary, and migration to Australia is seen by the interviewed Hungarians as a social elevator that can help quickly break out of economic struggle, get a ‘pass’ to a society with a high standard and quality of life. Therefore, although the biggest share of Hungarians explained their desire to come to Australia by the inability to earn a decent income and unstable political climate in Hungary, in reality the motivation is much more difficult. The modern migrations of Hungarians to Australia can be divided into 3 dominant streams (Fig. 4.2).

120 

O. Oleinikova

Fig. 4.1  Monthly Wages, $USD, 2016. (Source: ILOSTAT, WorldBank)

Fig. 4.2  Dominant streams of modern Hungarian migration to Australia

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

121

First stream—departure for good or permanent migration to Australia. Such aspirations, often hidden from the start, had those interviewed migrants who went abroad for the declared temporary purposes of work or study, but remained in the country permanently through skilled migration stream or family stream. This type of migration is obviously irreversible and means direct losses for Hungary: the total population and the total supply of labour are reduced; resources spent on vocational training of migrants are lost. Family relationships do not suffer from this type of migration. Mostly migrants who leave with such intentions, or immediately go to the new country with their families or take their loved ones under the family reunion programme. 11 out of 22 interviewed migrants were permanent residents/citizens of Australia at the moment of the interview. 8 of them were employed in the low-skilled job—cleaning and sales occupations; 3 worked in high skilled jobs in IT and communications. Second stream—is the brain drain, that is, the outflow from Hungary of highly qualified scientists, educators, doctors, actors, and so on. For the most part, these temporary migrations transformed into emigration for permanent residency and caused obvious irreversible losses to the Hungarian economy (science, education, medicine, industry, etc.), but contributed to the positive progress and new developments in Australian society. 4 out of 22 interviewed migrants were high skilled Hungarians originating from the Hungarian middle and upper social classes. Participants from this group talked about the change and re-­orientation of migration outflows from Hungary in the last 5 years associated with the new policies of the Orban’s conservative government, lack of reforms and most importantly with the changed situation on the labour markets that were the traditional recipients of Hungarian labour migrants (Austria, Germany and UK). Many lower-paid and lower-skilled occupations in the UK and Germany saw falls in employment during 2016 and 2021. This trend is evident in several elementary occupations such as “elementary cleaning occupations” and “elementary sales occupations”, where employment in the UK fell by 36.0% and 33.5% respectively, with “elementary cleaning occupations” seeing the largest absolute fall of 265,000 (Portes, 2022). In comparison, many higher-paid and higher-skilled occupations in the UK saw an increase in employment in the same period.

122 

O. Oleinikova

Employment in “IT and telecommunications professionals” and “business, research and administrative professionals” increased 42.1% and 30.1% respectively (UK Office of National Statistics, 2022). For those high skilled Hungarians who are the minority among the interviewed participants, the following combination of factors is motivational for migration to Australia- more opportunities for self-realisation in Australia, better economy and better future for their kids. Majority of the interviewed migrants were low-skilled Hungarians who were significantly affected by the labour market changes in the UK, Austria and Germany, that pushed them to choose Australia as the next destination. “I lived and worked in Austria before coming to Australia. New country— new opportunity and a new job”, mentioned Lucia. Fred, a cleaner in his 40s, mentioned: I worked in the cleaning sector in the UK for 5 years, but the situation changed in 2016 and I had to leave. I decided to go to Australia instead, as my English was good and got used to living in an English-speaking country.

Third stream—temporary migration for education. Migration for education is becoming increasingly popular among modern Hungarians (Oláh et al., 2017). Australia has become one of the major global destinations of students from South nations (Abella, 2005; Tremblay, 2005), with 4% accounting for students originating from Southern and Eastern Europe. Migration for higher and secondary vocational education institutions usually means further employment of young Hungarians in Australia with all the negative economic and demographic consequences for Hungary and positive consequences for the Australian economy. This is facilitated by the Australian post-graduate visa programme, specifically the Temporary Graduate Visa (Subclass 485)—a temporary visa for international students who have recently graduated with skills and qualifications that are relevant to specific occupations Australia needs. This time of the visa that is usually between 2 and 4 years is usually used to find a job in Australia. 8 out of 22 interviewed migrants were on temporary student visas at the time of the interview. Most of them reported doing BA degrees at Australian universities and TAFEs. When asked if they plan

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

123

to return to Hungary, all participants voiced their plans to stay in Australia or travel to another country. To summarise, the commonly expressed motivation for migration from Hungary to Australia between 2000 and 2021 is the economic motive, the hope of receiving a better economic returns and higher wages than in Europe. However, economic factors always operate in a certain mental environment, in particular they are realised in a particular level of migratory mobility. In general, the migration mobility of Hungarians is lower in contrast to, for example, the Ukrainians, Czechs and other Eastern European countries (Libanova, 2019). Therefore, the improved structural constraints in modern Hungary across economic and political spheres (discussed in section above) in combination with improved labour market situations in their traditional European recipient markets (Austria, Germany and UK) can potentially decrease the outflow of Hungarians to Australia in the next 10 years. However, as Europe is going through its own crises, this situation is doubtful and Hungarians will continue to choose Australia over other destinations.

4.4 One Story of Migration We moved from Hungary to the UK for a better economy, and we moved to Australia for an even better economy than in the UK. (Beta & Franz, working class Hungarians in Australia)

At the time of the interview, Beta was 40 years old, her partner Franz was 43 years old. They have been living in Australia since 2017, having arrived first on a tourist visa, and then received a student visa. Beta entered the Early Childhood Education Bachelor’s programme at one of Australia’s universities, and her partner is currently on the same visa as a dependent person working as a cabinet joiner. Beta and Franz both come from blue-collar working-class families. Beta comes from a small village with a total population of 2000 people in the agro-industrial zone of Hungary, and Franz comes from a small town of 15,000–20,000 people. Franz’s father worked as a painter-decorator all his life, and his mother worked as a saleswoman in a store, and after the

124 

O. Oleinikova

store closed and she lost her job, she began selling used things from a folding table. Beta’s mother worked at a dairy processing plant, her father was employed in the agricultural sector. “In small [Hungarian] towns, there are no such job opportunities as in big cities”, said Beta. She recalls that in Hungary she worked in the field of logistics, and the names of exotic countries excited her imagination. This was an important part of her motivation to migrate outside Hungary. The migration path to Australia ran through the UK. They migrated to the UK in 2007–2009 and met first on the British Isles, having never known each other in Hungary. Franz says that until the age of 27 he could not imagine his life outside Hungary, but when he turned 29, events in his home country and the lack of any clear job prospects pushed him to emigration. In his small town, he finished School of Woodworking. The lack of prospects in his home country Franz linked primarily to his physical stay in Hungary and lack of economic opportunities, and not with other factors. As Hage (2005, p. 478) points out, an immigration decision is almost always constructed around the concept and vision of the future, and the perception of the home country as one with ‘no future’ motivates people to immigrate, ‘looking for a better future’ abroad. Franz, reflecting on his ‘English’’ life before migrating to Australia, notes that he has worked in a wide variety of fields. The first few years he worked as a helper in a restaurant, then, with the assistance of his Hungarian friend, he got a job as a clerk in the office, where he did all kinds of simple work such as copying documents. He also worked as a driver and barista; regarding the latter, Franz says that it was very useful in terms of developing his language skills. Beta also tried herself in various fields, mainly performing low-skilled work in the UK. Shortly before migrating to Australia, the couple launched their small business project: an online shop for Hungarian wines. However, after England began the process of leaving the European Union, they began to fear that after the UK left the tariff-free zone with the EU, their business would have no prospects and this strengthened their decision to migrate to Australia. In addition, Australia attracted them with its nature, lots of sunny days, and seascapes, which they liked to look at in the pictures. Sunny Australia was in particular contrast to England, as Beta recalls:

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

125

I went to the beach for the first time in the UK and the main colour was grey. I mean, the colour of the water, and the sky, and everything was grey. It was disappointing.

Finally, an important factor in deciding to migrate to Australia was the economic one. Beta and Franz, complementing one another, mentioned that in their life path they constantly went to improve in terms of choosing a country of residence: We moved from Hungary to the UK for a better economy, and we moved to Australia for an even better economy than in the UK.

In Australia, Franz put to good use his professional speciality from Hungary—cabinet joiner—which he had never put into practice before. As he comments on this: A new country—is a new opportunity. I have a good enough English to understand what they want from me in a job. Why don’t I do what I learned back in Hungary many years ago? So I decided to get into this. I’ve been a cabinet maker joiner for the last three and a half years and I work in a mid-sized family business company. We do exhibitions … and in 2020 we won the Award of the Northern Beaches Business. (Proudly concludes Franz)

While Franz is working as a cabinet’s joiner, Beta is completing her four-year bachelor course, which the couple hopes to use as a pathway to their permanent stay in Australia. Franz says that in life, he values the balance between work and rest and a calm environment the most—in particular, he wants to move from Sydney to a smaller town. Beta points out that her values have changed over time: in her youth, she prioritised her career (“that’s why I have no children”, she adds sadly), and now she sees her main calling in helping and giving joy to others. When asked about connections with the Hungarian community in Australia, Franz replied that they are aware of the groups of Hungarians on social networks, and they also know various Hungarian clubs. He adds: “We have lots of Hungarian friends [in Australia]. To be honest, I think even more than back in the UK”.

126 

O. Oleinikova

Beta and Franz are openly happy that they are currently in Australia and are determined to take all the necessary steps to obtain permanent residency. However, along the way, there are difficulties that they talk about: [We thought that getting a] permanent residential visa would be an easier process. We didn’t expect this many bumps on the road. You know, it’s much harder than we previously expected. And you have to pay for everything, pretty much. It’s very expensive, even more than in the UK. But because of your better wages, you can manage it.

The plans for the future of this Hungarian couple are to obtain a permanent residence in Australia, buy a house in a small quiet town and live a happy family life in Australia.

4.5 Conclusion The case of Hungarian migration to Australia with its diverse migrant groups and accelerated arrivals in the last two decades, teaches us to empirically and theoretically think about migration from Eastern Europe through an interplay of structural and agency factors. The dynamics of Hungarian immigration in Australia have been shaped by the changing dynamics of globalisation, the state, the changes in migration policy and the traditional labour markets for Hungarians, as well as Australian labour market needs and society as a whole. The turbulent political and economic contexts in Hungary since 2000s have pushed the emigration wave into a different direction, with new destination countries for Hungarian emigration and new reasons behind the departure. Hungary’s economic struggle through the financial and economic crisis in 2009 (when the economy shrunk by 7%), reliance of Western aid packages and conservative policies of Orban government, combined with a change of the labour demand in the traditional migrant destinations for Hungarians (UK, Germany and Austria) has created this new Hungarians on the move who choose to come to Australia since 2000s.

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

127

The qualitative research study records that the economic motive of striving for decent wages dominates the stories of the interviewed Hungarians in Australia. Majority of the respondents mentioned they were motivated for migration to Australia by (1) the hope of better living conditions (economic, political and climate) (15 out of 22 respondents), (2) the lack of decent jobs in Hungary (16 out of 22), (3) the desire to ensure a better future for children (10 out of 22 mentioned it’s in their interviews) and the desire to get a better education (6 out of 22). In terms of profiles of the new Hungarians in Australia, it’s worth mentioning that a typical story among my interviewed participants was the story of a low-­ skilled Hungarian who was employed in various low-skilled jobs in Hungary and very often in UK or Germany or Austria before coming to Australia, who first come on temporary visas to Australia to study at university or to do a language course and then try to find the way to stay permanently. The stories of high skilled migrants from Hungary are also noticeable, but less frequent compared to low-skilled arrivals. More research—both quantitative and qualitative—needs to be done to understand this dynamics deeply. However, we can definitely conclude that the economic hardship in Hungary in combination with changing labour markets and crisis in Eastern Europe as well as Western Europe has its impact on the migration choices of modern Hungarians. The reserved projection is that migration to Australia will continue to be an attractive route for Hungarians, as an alternative to shrinking economic opportunities in Europe.

References Abella, R. (2005). The effects of small K-8 centers compared to large 6–8 schools on student performance. Middle School Journal, 37(1), 29–35. Ackland, R., Braithwaite, J., Foley, M., Garner, T. I., Grootaert, C., Milanovic, B., & Ying, Y. (1997). Poverty and targeting of social assistance in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, appendix 2. World Bank. Ághm, A. (2013). Bumpy road of the Hungarian administrative reforms: From political over-centralization to public policy failures. Politika i Uprava, 13(4), 1115–1136. https://hrcak.srce.hr/130523

128 

O. Oleinikova

Amaro, S. (2020, March 31). Hungary’s nationalist leader Viktor Orban is ruling by decree indefinitely amid coronavirus. CNBC. https://www.cnbc. com/2020/03/31/coronavirus-­in-­hungary-­viktor-­orban-­r ules-­by-­decree-­ indefinitely.html Andits, P. (2008). Possible homecomings. Australian-Hungarians’ attempts of reintegration in Hungary. In E.  Nowicka & H.  Firouzbakhch (Eds.), Homecoming: An anthropology of return migrations (pp.  235–250). Zakład Wydawniczy »NOMOS«. Andits, P. (2010). The politics of hope and disappointment: Ambivalence in the post-1989 homeland-related discourses among Hungarians in Australia. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(6), 989–1008. https://doi. org/10.1080/13691831003643397 Balázs, B. (2012). Local food system development in Hungary. The International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 19(3), 403–421. https://doi. org/10.1080/09654313.2015.1096325 BBC News. (2018, March 5). Hungary profile timeline. BBC News. https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe-­17383522 European Commission. (2015). Commission staff working document: Country report Hungary 2015 including an in-depth review on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. Retrieved June 26, 2021, from https://ec. europa.eu/info/business-­e conomy-­e uro/economic-­a nd-­f iscal-­p olicy-­ coordination/eu-­economic-­governance-­monitoring-­prevention-­correction/ european-­semester_en; https://eur-­lex.europa.eu/legal-­content/EN/TXT/?u ri=CELEX%3A52015SC0036R%2801%29 Eurostat. (2013). Eurostat regional yearbook 2013: Population. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-­statistical-­ books/-­/ks-­ha-­13-­001-­02 Fenyvesi, A. (Ed.). (2005). Hungarian language contact outside Hungary: Studies on Hungarian as a minority language. John Benjamins Publishing. Gazsó, D., Jarjabka, Á., Palotai, J., & Wilhelm, Z. (2019). Diaspora communities and diaspora policies—The Hungarian case. Population Geography, 41(1), 23–34. Gellén, M. (2010). The story of a decade of centralisation in Hungary. Framing the current public. Environment, 24(2), 67–74. Gödri, I., Soltész, B., & Bodacz-Nacy, B. (2014). Immigration or emigration country? Migration trends and their socio-economic background in Hungary: A longer-term historical perspective (Working Papers on Population, Family and

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

129

Welfare No. 19). Hungarian Demographic Research Institute. https://www. econstor.eu/handle/10419/226462 Gorondi, P. (2007, February 27). Hungary’s Prime Minister expects political tension but no riots on 15 March commemorations. Taiwan News. https:// www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/397512 Hage, G. (2005). A not so multi-sited ethnography of a not so imagined community. Anthropological Theory, 5(4), 463–475. Hárs, Á. (2016). The experiences of a new emigrant country: Emerging migration from Hungary. In M.  Kahanec & K.  F. Zimmermann (Eds.), Labor migration, EU enlargement, and the great recession (pp. 271–295). Springer. Hatoss, A. (2018). Agency and ideology in language maintenance: Hungarian immigrants’ narratives on assimilationist post-war Australia. International Journal of Multilingualism, 17(4), 411–429. https://doi.org/10.108 0/14790718.2018.1504950 Hidasi, J. (2011). Migráció és mobilitás [Migration and mobility]. In L. Nyusztay (Ed.), Tanulmányok a nemzetközi migráció köréből (pp.  44–56). Perfekt Gazdasági Tanácsadó. Huseby-Darvas, É. (2004). Extra hungariam non Est Vita? The relationships between Hungarian immigrants and their homeland. In F.  Markowitz & A. H. Stefansson (Eds.), Homecomings: Unsettling paths of return (pp. 76–90). Lexington Books. Inotai, E. (2020, March 19). Pandemic hit Hungary harps on about migrant crisis. Balkan Insight. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/19/pandemic-­hit­hungary-­harps-­on-­about-­migrant-­crisis/ International Monetary Fund. (2009). Hungary: First review under the stand-­ by-­ arrangement and request for modification of performance criteria— Informational annex. IMF eLIBRARY. https://www.elibrary.imf.org/ configurable/content/journals$002f002$002f2009$002f105$002farticle-­ A002-­en.xml?t:ac=journals%24002f002%24002f2009%24002f105%2400 2farticle-­A002-­en.xml International Monetary Fund. (2019). Hungary. Retrieved June 26, 2021, from https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-­database/2021/October/ select-­s ubjects?c=914,913,963,918,960,967,921,943,962,964,968, 922,942,186,926 International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2021). How does the repo market behave under stress? Evidence from the Covid-19 crisis. International Monetary Fund. Jenei, G. (2011). The opening of the Hungarian border for the East German refugees in 1989: A public-policy analysis of a key decision. Halduskultuur,

130 

O. Oleinikova

12(2), 113–125. http://halduskultuur.eu/journal/index.php/HKAC/article/view/65 Kantek, J., Veljanova, I., & Onnudottir, H. (2019). Local engagements, transcultural belonging: The lived experiences of second-generation Hungarian Australian adults through the formation of a simultaneous self. Journal of Identity and Migration Studies, 13(2), 79–96. http://www.e-­migration.ro/ j i m s / Vo l 1 3 _ No 2 _ 2 0 1 9 / J I M S _ Vo l 1 3 _ No 2 _ 2 0 1 9 _ p p _ 7 9 _ 9 6 _ KANTEK.pdf Kantek, J., Veljanova, I., & Onnudottir, H. (2021). Constructing Hungarian ‘good-will ambassadors’: The collaborative soft power efforts of Hungary’s Balassi Institute and the Hungarian community in Australia. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 27(7), 920–935. https://doi.org/10.1080/1028663 2.2020.1858068 Karidakis, M., & Arunachalam, D. (2016). Shift in the use of migrant community languages in Australia. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 37(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/01434632019 2.2015.1023808 Kolba, G. (2019a, May 2). What is the reason for the rapid emigration in Hungary? Daily News Hungary. https://dailynewshungary.com/ what-­is-­the-­reason-­of-­the-­rapid-­emigration-­in-­hungary/ Kovács, M. (2005). Hungarians in Australia. In A. Fenyvesi (Ed.), Hungarian language contact outside Hungary: Studies on Hungarian as a minority language (pp. 351–370). John Benjamins Publishing. Libanova, E. (2019). Labour migration from Ukraine: Key features, drivers and impact. Economics and Sociology, 12(1), 313–328. https://doi. org/10.14254/2071-­789X.2019/12-­1/19 Metz, R., & Oross, D. (2020). Strong personalities’ impact on Hungarian party politics: Viktor Orbán and Gábor Vona. In S. Gherghina (Ed.), Party leaders in Eastern Europe: Personality, behavior and consequences (pp.  145–170). Palgrave Macmillan. Meyer-Sahling, J. (2006). The institutionalization of political discretion in post-­ communist civil service systems: The case of Hungary. Public Administration, 84(3), 693–716. OECD iLibrary. (2021). International migration outlook 2020: Hungary. https:// www.oecd-­i library.org/sites/2c9eaf3f-­e n/index.html?itemId=/content/ component/2c9eaf3f-­en Oláh, J., Halasi, G., Szakály, Z., & Popp, J. (2017). The impact of international migration on the labor market—A case study from Hungary. Amfiteatru

4  The New Hungarians on The Move 

131

Economic, 19(46), 790–805. https://ideas.repec.org/a/aes/amfeco/ v46y2017i19p790.html Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2019). OECD skills outlook 2019: Thriving in a digital world. Paris, France: OECD. Palotai, J., Wetzl, V., & Jarjabka, A. (2019). Identity preservation and Hungarian language education in diaspora communities. Hungarian Cultural Studies. e-Journal of the American Hungarian Educators Association, 12. https://doi. org/10.5195/ahea.2019.353 Portes, J. (2022). Immigration and the UK economy after Brexit. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 38(1), 82–96. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grab045 Reuters Staff. (2009, March 27). SCENARIOS-What next as Hungary seeks new prime minister? Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/idUSLQ97333420090326 SBS Census Explorer. (2016). Ukrainian: Tenant type. Retrieved February 10, 2022, from www.sbs.com.au/censusexplorer/ Sedelmeier, U. (2014). Anchoring democracy from above? The European Union and democratic backsliding in Hungary and Romania after accession. Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(1), 105–121. https://doi.org/10.1111/ jcms.12082 Sipos, B. (2013). Bias, partisanship, journalistic norms and ethical problems in the contemporary Hungarian political media. Central European Journal of Communication, 6(10), 89–104. Siska-Szilasi, B., Kóródi, T., & Vadnai, P. (2017). Measuring and interpreting emigration intentions of Hungarians. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin, 65(4), 361–368. https://doi.org/10.15201/hungeobull.65.4.5 Szabó, A. (2015). Az egyetemisták és főiskolások Magyarországon [University and college students in Hungary]. Belvedere Meridionale. https://doi. org/10.14232/belvbook.2015.58516 Toomey, M. (2018). History, nationalism and democracy: Myth and narrative in Viktor Orbán’s ‘illiberal Hungary’. New Perspectives: Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations, 26(1), 87–108. Tremblay, K. (2005). Academic mobility and immigration. Journal of Studies in International Education, 9(3), 196–228. UK Office of National Statistics. (2022). Statistical bulletin Labour market overview, UK: January 2022. https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/uklabourmarket/january2022

132 

O. Oleinikova

Urmenyhazi, A. (2015). Hungarian immigration in Australia. Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University. http://adb.anu.edu.au/essay/13/text31510 VigvÁri, A. (2010). Is the conflict container full? Problems of fiscal sustainability at the local government level in Hungary. Acta Oeconomica, 60(1), 49–77. World Health Organisation. (2019). Hungary situation. Retrieved June 21, 2021, from https://covid19.who.int/region/euro/country/hu

5 New Directions for East Europeans and Migration Studies

This book offers unique insights into the two core research questions: (1) why Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migrants come to Australia (why now?) and (2) what their migration outcomes are. One of the core findings discussed in this book is that modern East European migration to Australia has significantly changed over the years following the collapse of the Soviet regime. The Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian migration wave to Australia between 2000–2021 itself has undergone shifts and changes in its character linked to the turbulent political, economic and social regime transitions inside Europe. Contextual, structural and individual differences played a role in shaping the different life strategies adopted by the migrants, which created and shaped the different migration experiences. These experiences fall into different categories of survival and achievement implying differences in the rationale behind migration, decision making process, the actual act of migration and the success/failure of integration in the recipient society after migration. The book captured the complexity of each participant’s migration story and their experiences of the regime transitions and crises while in Ukraine, Hungary or Czech Republic and during their migration, which arose because of the interplay of individual factors. It was also due to a set of Ukraine/Hungary/Czech Republic and Australia-specific structural macro-factors that emerged from the economic, political and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Oleinikova, New Eastern European Migration to Australia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07095-2_5

133

134 

O. Oleinikova

demographic constraints in East Europe, as well as the shifts in Australia’s migration policy from the 1990s onwards. In making sense of these varying contexts in the establishment of multiple homes in new geographical locations of Asia-Pacific region and the creation of new (political, economic and social) inspirations through their mobile lives, migrant pathways and the way participants enacted them were far from static, being instead dynamic in the spatial and temporal sense. Their survival and achievement life strategies shifted and changed as individual circumstances and environments evolved, and the length of stay in Australia increased. Importantly, it was found that migrants over time have become more integrated and contributed more to Australian social and economic life, while at the same time becoming less active in their primary communities—in Ukrainian, Czech and Hungarian communities. In the light of the research findings, the cohort of Ukrainian and Czech migrants whose stories were dominated by the achievement life strategies were found to be more successful migrants in terms of their employment outcomes, integration and professional and social self-­ realisation in Australia compared to arrivals from Hungary. On the other hand, in each migrant group there were arrivals who implemented survival life strategies and are in need of assistance and support from the Australian Government to help them better integrate and contribute to Australian society.

5.1 Profiling Migration from Ukraine, Hungary and Czech Republic The empirical fieldwork revealed rich qualitative data that was used to investigate the motivation and migration outcomes of migrants from three different East European countries. The main argument of this book is that there is an accelerated migration from the three East European countries to Australia with most of the arrivals happening between 2000 and 2021 and the profiles of these arrivals share various similarities as well as demonstrate drastic differences. The comparison between the arrivals from Ukraine, Czech Republic and Hungary between 2000 and 2021 are presented in the Table 5.1 below.

Structural Context

Makers to work and holiday.

streams.

family reunion and humanitarian

2007 Schengen Agreement that

populist and nationalist Orban government with anti-­migration,

2 Revolutions of 2004 and 2013, followed by war in Eastern Ukraine

extend their stay in Australia by

working holiday visa holders can

labour—IT, engineers and others.

(continued)

a 2nd and 3rd working holiday visas.

holiday visas.

recession and a reduction in

temporary migration. Since 2005 the

another 1 or 2 years by applying for

by applying for a 2nd and 3rd working

sportsmen, tourists; the onset of

increase in demand for high-skilled

stay in Australia by another 1 or 2 years

illegal migrants—overstaying

In Australia: Rapid growth of

capital of Czechs.

build up the economic and social

Strong economic growth that helped

migration targets, at the same time

holiday visa holders can extend their

migration. Since 2005, the working

In Australia: Rapid growth of temporary

Olympic Games—gateway for

In Australia: the 2000s Sydney

change, anomie and stagnation.

allowed free movement in Europe;

focus on English language at schools;

emigration from Hungary, 2015–2019

corruption, poverty and nepotism.

anti-refugee laws, crack on democracy.

crisis 2000, EU accession in 2004,

unemployment rise; in 2010 massive

economy and unemployment,

In Australia, economic decline, lack of

Soviet Union, the largest economic

2008 GFC economic crisis and

Union, industrial decline, shadow

In Czech Republic: the collapse of the

study English; (2) Working Holiday

work and holiday.

arrivals through skilled migration

In Hungary: the collapse of Soviet Union,

(1) Students coming to Australia to

English; (2) Working Holiday Makers to

Ukrainian arrivals to Australia, the outnumbered the arrivals through

Two most popular migration streams:

Students coming to Australia to study

Between 2011 and 2016

Czech-­born people in Australia

Two most popular migration streams: (1)

2011

~25,000

Czech Republic

the 1st time in the history of

Skilled Migration Stream. In 2004 for

2019

Hungary-­born people in Australia

Ukraine-­born people in Australia

Hungary ~20,000

~35,000

Ukraine

Background for Migration In Ukraine: the collapse of Soviet

Migration Stream

Australia

Highest arrivals to

Diaspora Size in Australia

Table 5.1  Three Profiles: Migrants from Ukraine, Hungary, Czech Republic to Australia 2000–2021

Agency Context

Class Belonging

Trajectories

Survival / Achievement

Decision to Migration

Migration

Rationale Behind

Table 5.1 (continued)

biographical circumstances.

and economic status.

white-collar working class.

families dominated.

class of intelligentsia.

and white-collar working class and

Diverse group with both blue-collar

economic status. Arrivals from blue-collar working-class

first 3 years with upgrade of social

3 years with upgrade of social and

and economic status. Diverse group, dominated by

trajectory to achievement after the

trajectory to achievement after the first

leading to the upgrade of social

Combination of both, with clear

emotions.

a process strongly linked to

deprived of the emotional component.

for migration.

Combination of both, with clear

improve one’s welfare. For Czechs it’s

rationality and reflexivity, but not

Dominated by stories of achievement

economic conditions and aims to

made decisions associated with

methodologically produced plans

Not simply a rational choice based on

has signs of rationality and

Mixture of methodological and hastily

effect’). Reactionary rather than strategic, but

factors (1) family links and (2) earlier

job opportunity (causing ‘brain drain

‘brain drain effect’).

to emotions and two other types of

economic motivators such as a lucrative

opportunities in Australia (causing

participants came secondary, linked

motivations among the interviewed

outside work in Australia. Economic

closer to nature and more free time

flexible working schedule, living

Australia—for self-realisation, more

abroad opportunities, or due to

The most common reasons: for study

English in Australia.

  (3)  Affordable opportunities to study

  (2)  Low-paid jobs in Hungary

in Hungary;

benefits they got when moving to

Strong Pull factors associated with

Combination of Push and Pull factors:   (1)  Lack of employment opportunities

Czech Republic

Hungary

better paid jobs and self-realisation

The most common reason is for

dividends in Australia.

  (3)  Health, lifestyle and cultural

entrepreneurial activity in Ukraine

  (2)  The suppression of

  (1)  Low-paid jobs in Ukraine;

Combination of Push and Pull factors:

Ukraine

Future Plans

English Proficiency

Settlement

Employment Outcomes

industry. Bricolage careers are the

professional networks.

with secondary groups.

involvement with secondary

(3) To circulate between Czech

field of expertise (upgrade from low-skilled jobs)

(2)

To start their own business.

estate to return for retirement.

too: investment in Ukrainian real

There were some retrospective plans

(3)

current occupations;

experiences to get promotions in

To go overseas for professional

Republic and Australia.

(2) To travel and see the rest of the world;

To get a permanent job in the

To have Australia as the 2nd

To stay in Australia permanently.

(1)

(2)

(1) To stay in Australia;

Prospective orientation of plans:

improve upon it later on.

English skills when they arrive and

levels are common. Most have basic

(1)

Prospective orientation of plans:

they arrive.

home;

Prospective orientation of plans:

they arrive.

Low level of English Proficiency when

Intermediate and Upper Intermediate

suburbs to build up social and

for better integration and involvement

suburbs for better integration and

Low level of English Proficiency when

Australian society. Mostly in wealthy

groups, settlement in wealthier suburbs

groups, settlement in wealthier

groups.

help faster integration into

involvement with primary

involvement with primary

Independent of primary groups that

Mixed: compact settlement and

Mixed: compact settlement and

cleaning sector.

sectors: IT, engineering, as well as

found in interviews. Dominant

dominant occupational trajectory.

restaurants and pubs), media

hospitality and cleaning industry.

dead-end careers with low-skilled professional competencies were

in Czech-run or Czech-administered

competencies. Dominant sectors are

bricolage and anchor careers. Also,

Hospitality & catering industry (mostly

low-skilled jobs. Low skill professional

Dead-end and patchwork careers in

professional competencies with

Mixed: but dominated by high

138 

O. Oleinikova

A number of interesting conclusions are drawn regarding the allocation of migrants into these characteristics. Firstly, the content and focus of migrants’ life strategies on the one hand depended on the personal set of micro-components of the life strategy as well as structural factors associated with their social background, and on the other hand, on the structural economic and social conditions of a migrant’s life before and after migration. For the Ukrainian migrants arriving after 2000, analysis of their employment outcomes and class characteristics as well as professional, settlement and future planning suggested they created a set of personal and social characteristics which reflected the dominant strategy of achievement. Their life strategy was found to be made up of a combination of the following sets of migration push and pull factors: on one hand, low-paid jobs in Ukraine and the suppression of entrepreneurial activity in Ukraine, on the other—health, lifestyle and cultural dividends from moving to Australia. The most common reason is for better paid jobs and self-realisation opportunities in Australia. The analysed group of Ukrainians was a diverse group, dominated by white-collar high-skilled working-class arrivals, who come to Australia through a skilled migration stream with permanent visas. It was found that in 2004, for the first time in the history of Ukrainian arrivals to Australia, the arrivals through skilled migration stream outnumbered the arrivals through family reunion (including marriage migrants) and humanitarian streams (Oleinokova, 2020). The cohort of Ukrainians demonstrated a low level of English proficiency and a strong national identification with Ukraine at the time of arrival. As the most powerful and important motivation to work, material orientation facilitated their quick economic adaptation to life in Australia. For the Hungarian arrivals to Australia, the power of circumstances was found to be stronger than the power of their choice to migrate. Their arrivals are also dominated by the combination of push and pull factors of migration. Among push factors participants mentioned (1) lack of employment opportunities in Hungary; (2) low-paid jobs in Hungary and (3) affordable opportunities to study English in Australia. The most common reasons for coming to Australia were the economic motivators such as a lucrative job opportunity and affordable study opportunities to

5  New Directions for East Europeans and Migration Studies 

139

learn the English language. Two most popular migration streams: (1) students coming to Australia to study English and (2) working holiday makers to work and holiday. The demographic composition of the interviewed Hungarians is dominated by blue-collar working-class arrivals. This cohort tended to start their employment in the first available job, typically a manual job in the cleaning or hospitality industry through their Hungarian connections. Material values guided their behaviours and consumption practices. Being born into blue-collar working-class families and having secondary education, the majority of the interviewed Hungarians do not attach much importance to professional growth and self-development. They considered that they needed jobs to bring in an income. Influenced by occupational insecurity and “structural disempowerment” (Mrozowicki, 2011), a typical occupational experience found in the stories of Hungarians was an occupational downgrade alongside an economic upgrade. Using Mrozowicki’s (2011) terminology of “dead-end careers”, the occupational experiences of the majority of the interviewed Hungarians proved to be shaped by structurally forced employment in non-professional jobs (dead-end careers) which was associated with the absence of occupational mobility in the new, changed environment. The Hungarians who were skilled migrants and originated from white-collar working-class families and cultural and scientific intelligentsia (who were minority among the interviewed migrants) was reflected in their experience of a sharp downgrade of professional and social status after migration. It was found that the most recent increase and the biggest influx in Czech arrivals were of students coming to Australia to study English and to find work. Many of them are deciding to stay by gaining permanent residency. If we investigate numbers, in the year ended in June 2020, there were 314 Czechian working holiday makers and 1737 Czechian student enrolments in Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2020). In comparison, there were 422 Hungarian student enrolments in 2019 and 195 Ukrainian student enrolments in Australia in 2018 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2020). These figures indicate that educational mobility will be the highest from Czech Republic to Australia, compared to one from Hungary and Ukraine, which in turn is pre-conditioned by better economic and social capital in

140 

O. Oleinikova

possession of Czech migrants. It should be noted that Czech student demographics is not homogeneous. The majority of the student visa arrivals is not limited to fresh from school students enrolling at Australian universities for BA & MA degrees, but is formed by a much older demographic group of professionals in their late 20s to early 30s who come to Australia on a student visas to learn English language at three types of tertiary institutions: Universities, TAFE institutes, private colleges. A distinctive characteristic shaping Czech arrivals was the rationale behind most of the interviewed participants dominated by strong migration pull factors associated with benefits they got when moving to Australia—for self-realisation, more flexible working schedule, living closer to nature and more free time outside work in Australia. Out of all the three analysed countries including Ukraine and Hungary, Czech Republic demonstrated the least strong push factors that made people choose to leave their home country. Economic motivations among the interviewed participants came secondary, linked to emotions and two other types of factors (1) family links and (2) earlier biographical circumstances. Their decision to migrate was found to be not simply a rational choice based on economic conditions and aims to improve one’s welfare, for Czechs it’s a process strongly linked to emotions and non-economic reasons. This can be explained by the better economic and more stable political situation in Czech Republic during 2000–2021 compared to economic, social and political turbulence in Hungary and Ukraine. In terms of profiles of the new Czechians in Australia, it’s worth mentioning that a typical story among the interviewed participants was the story of a skilled migrant from mid- to upper social class family who was welltravelled, has seen the world and made the choice to come to Australia more based on spiritual values than material, where economic motivations came secondary, guided by spirit of adventure, thirst for gaining new skills and expansion of opportunities and upward social mobility. Most of the stories reflect the pathways of dead-end and bricolage careers, where participants had to consciously downgrade professionally by working jobs not according to their qualifications, later to regain their social and economic status by getting the job in their sphere of expertise typically within a 2 years’ time frame since arrival into Australia.

5  New Directions for East Europeans and Migration Studies 

141

Czech migrants’ narratives reveal the combination of both achievement and survival trajectories, with a clear trajectory to achievement after the first 3 years with upgrade of social and economic status. Hospitality, catering and media—are the top sectors among the interviewed Czechs, performing bricolage careers as their dominant occupational trajectory. They valued the opportunity to apply their knowledge and skills in their professional field and had a strong sense of agency focused on improving Australia and the people around them. Another distinctive feature of Czech arrivals is their good English skills, most participants reported the Intermediate and Upper Intermediate levels, with the majority having basic English skills at the moment of arrival to Australia, which they work on to improve later on. Finally, I would note that the participants constructed continuous causalities about their changing life circumstances as they faced an array of new challenges in Australia. They simultaneously had to deal with the realities of life in Ukraine, Hungary and Czech Republic which reached them through contacts with friends and relatives who had stayed in their home countries. The research has shown that migration situations and life pathways are dynamic and tend to change as the result of changes in social circumstances for each individual person as well as structural factors in the sending and receiving country. In any further studies, it would seem appropriate to widen the field of analysis by interviewing larger numbers of Ukrainians, Czechs and Hungarians about their experiences and about how they coped with challenges in the receiving and sending countries. This would enable the further testing and verification of the life strategy research framework used in this book and extend knowledge of the formation of different life strategies before migration and the transformations of these strategies after migration. Further, studies could be widened by the time period to include the latest developments of 2022 (specifically war in Ukraine and caused turbulence in Eastern Europe).

142 

O. Oleinikova

5.2 New Patterns of East European Migration to Australia Based on qualitative interview data, complemented by secondary data analysis, it was found that since the 2000s, the migration outflows from Ukraine, Czech and Hungary have changed not just by the scale and character, but by the speed and direction. It was caused by a combination of external macro events and the internal sending country’s affairs and politics. For Ukraine, the adoption of such an economic model that heavily relies on cheap labour and its low wages as the main competitive advantage of Ukraine on the world economic scene has significantly impacted the motivations of Ukrainians to leave Ukraine for temporary labour or permanently. At the same time the demand for Ukrainian workforce and skill sets has changed, along with the shift in the employment terms and conditions in Europe and globally. One of the core reasons behind emigration from Ukraine is the higher level of economic and social development of EU countries, USA, Canada and Australia. In 2004, the countries of the Visegrad group (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia) joined the EU, which, similar to Ukraine, in 1990–1992 refused the monopoly leadership of communist party and made the leap from central to market economy. In spite of having a significant economic, social and labour resource, Ukraine failed to implement successful reforms to make use of it. In 2020, the GDP per capita in Visegrad Group countries (Poland—$15656.18 USD; Hungary—$15899.14 USD; Czech Republic—$22762.19 USD; Slovakia—$19156.88 USD) exceeded Ukraine’s GDP by 5 times (Ukraine—$3726.92 USD) (Libanova, 2020). The global competitive index is 1.2 times lower in Ukraine (Poland—68.89; Hungary—65.08; Czech Republic—70.85; Slovakia—66.77) (Libanova, 2020). These numbers show the position of Ukraine in the region and imply the lack of decent economic and social capital for potential migrants to implement the life strategies of social and economic upgrade, rather than travel overseas for mostly economic reasons to earn their living. However, it is worth mentioning that there is a shift observed among the class composition of migrants from Ukraine to Australia, from the

5  New Directions for East Europeans and Migration Studies 

143

dominance of blue-collar low-skilled arrivals to the arrival of predominantly white-collar high-skilled Ukrainians to Australia since the mid-2000s. For Hungary, the turbulent political and economic contexts since the 2000s have pushed the emigration wave into a different direction, with new destination countries for Hungarian emigration and new reasons behind the departure. The most popular migration destinations for Hungarians before the mid-2000s were the UK, Germany and Austria. However, Hungary’s economic struggle through the financial and economic crisis in 2009 (when the economy shrunk by 7%), reliance of Western aid packages and conservative policies of Orban government, combined with a change of the labour demand in the traditional migrant destinations for Hungarians has created this new Hungarians on the move who choose to come to Australia since 2000s. While the dynamics of Ukrainian and Hungarian arrivals to Australia have more things in common, the migration from Czech Republic presents a different story. The main difference is in the nature of Czech immigration. Given the higher economic and social development in Czechia compared to Hungary and Ukraine, for Czechs the arrivals into Australia are mostly driven by non-economic factors. They are not in the immediate need to improve their financial wellbeing, instead they are happy to invest their economic capital to gain better opportunities to upgrade their careers and self-realise their aspirations. Czechs have more economic and social capital in their possession to perform different pathways and integration scenarios. For Czech migrants one of the most popular migration streams is through education, when they invest money in the Australian educational sector to gain English language diplomas or university degrees. The number of Czech students compared to the number of students from Ukraine and Hungary supports this claim. Their migration decision is determined by the power of choice rather than the power of circumstances. It is important to mention that if we compare the arrivals to Australia of East Europeans prior to the 2000s to those that are subject of this book (arrivals between 2000 and 2021), it can be concluded that the narratives of the new East Europeans in Australia form a story of well-integrated members of Australian society and active agents of social and economic

144 

O. Oleinikova

life. Given their capacity to successfully maintain their social and economic status after migration, along with their positive contributions to Australian society in terms of social cohesion, innovation and economic production, this group can be considered a ‘brain-gain’ for Australia. Thus, migration from East Europe is becoming less risky for the host state, in our case Australia. The evolution in the migration pathways from survival to achievement, imply that the new East European migration to Australia is becoming less ‘risky’ for Australia in terms of a growth in illegal migration and tourist-visa overstaying. Modern Ukrainians, Hungarians and Czechs no longer need to be opportunists, but instead create legal opportunities for themselves and contribute to the development of Australian society with their skills and experience. The risk of irregular East European migration into Australia was found to be low, which means that East Europeans should be seen as a ‘gain’ for the Australian labour market and cultural diversity. Based on the collected narratives we see how modern East European arrivals have evolved from the short-term arrivals of blue-collar low-skilled workers, who tried to permanently stay in Australia by using regular and irregular ways, into the arrival of well-educated high-skilled professionals who created a brain-gain in Australia. The overall shift in the global political economy, which affected migration patterns, were found to fundamentally change the ways individuals earned their living, planned their future and considered social and economic investments in terms of dividends. In the light of this finding, it can be suggested that there is a positive trend in the growing value of East European migrants in Australia.

5.3 Limitations The main limitation of this study is the timeframe for data collection, which only investigated the arrival of migrants into Australia up until 2021 (before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022). The war in Ukraine has significantly impacted the dynamics and directions of the outmigration flows from Ukraine. Along with this would come changes to the life strategies of migrants from Ukraine. Thus, the conclusions provided above about Ukrainian arrivals may not precisely account for

5  New Directions for East Europeans and Migration Studies 

145

the experiences of arrivals since 2022. Further, considering the scope of the study and the number of respondents, the data should not be regarded as exhaustive or definitive. Reflecting on the possible research limitations coming from my Ukrainian background and my insider research status, I would conclude that there were more benefits than drawbacks. As a qualitative researcher, I was not separate from the study, even though I had limited contact with my participants. I suggest, my Ukrainian background has helped me in the research process, and I believe was essential to it. It helped in recruitment and in understanding and talking to those participants whose English was not excellent. This was especially important in terms of the discussion of personal topics and being able to understand the participants when they went into the detail of their lives. The stories of participants were immediate and real to me; their individual voices were not lost in a pool of numbers and unfamiliar words. As a sociologist I have developed the habit of always engaging in selfreflection and analysing my conclusions with the aim to avoid bias, I continued to do so in this research project where I was working with my own national community. Furthermore, my insider status can be counted as relative when talking to participants from Czech and Hungarian migrants, as well as to migrants from blue-collar working class or suppressed entrepreneurs and the class of cultural and scientific intelligentsia. My social class affiliation was different to the majority of the participants and therefore, their lives where unfamiliar, which makes me an outsider in relation to their life experiences. Furthermore, my gender and age meant that some of the experiences of older and male participants were unfamiliar, which I reflected on again to avoid bias. However, I acknowledge that any qualitative researcher cannot retreat to a distant or objective ‘researcher’ role. Just as our personality affects the analysis, so, the analysis affects our personality. Finally, I would note that the participants constructed continuous causalities within their changing life circumstances as they faced an array of new challenges in the receiving country and simultaneously dealt with the realities of the sending country through contacts with friends and relatives who stayed in Ukraine, Czech Republic and Hungary. Research has shown that migration situations are dynamic and tend to change as a

146 

O. Oleinikova

result of changes in social circumstances for each individual person as well as structural factors in the sending and receiving country. In any further studies, it would seem appropriate to widen the field of analysis by interviewing larger numbers and include other groups of Eastern European migrants to Australia.

References Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2020). Country profiles: https:// www.dfat.gov.au/geo/czech-­republic/czech-­republic-­country-­brief; https:// www.dfat.gov.au/geo/hungary/hungary-­country-­brief; https://www.dfat.gov. au/geo/ukraine/Pages/ukraine-­country-­brief Libanova, E. (2020). Labour migration from Ukraine: key features, drivers and impact. Economics and Sociology, 12(1), 313–328. Mrozowicki, A. (2011). Coping with social change: Life strategies of workers in Poland’s new capitalism. Leuven University Press. Oleinikova, O. (2020). Life strategies of migrants from crisis regimes: Achiever or survivor? Springer International Publishing.

Index

A

Agency, 3, 4, 9–11, 13, 18, 19, 23–24, 26, 29, 31, 35, 37, 51, 54, 59, 60, 69, 75, 83, 89, 103, 105, 106, 112, 117, 126, 141 Australia, 1–39, 51–76, 79–99, 103–106, 117–127, 133–144, 146 B

Blue-collar working class, 52, 53, 65, 66, 93, 123, 139, 145 C

Career anchor, 32, 33, 72 bricolage, 33, 72, 79, 93–99, 140, 141

dead-end, 32, 64, 79, 93–99, 139, 140 patchwork, 32, 94 Class Belonging, 79, 93–99 Context economic, 80–89, 106, 109–114, 126, 143 individual, 133 migration, 3, 9, 11, 22, 23, 33, 35, 51, 52, 54–59, 106–109, 117 political, 80–89, 106, 107, 114–117, 126, 143 structural, 3, 23, 35, 53–59, 76, 89, 103, 106–109, 117, 133 Czech Republic, 1–6, 9, 24, 25, 28–31, 35, 56, 80–89, 91, 93–95, 97, 98, 114, 119, 133–143, 145

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 O. Oleinikova, New Eastern European Migration to Australia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07095-2

147

148 Index

shifts, 59, 134 of survival, 3, 20–22, 34, 51, 52, 59–61, 93, 96, 134

D

Democracy, 25–28, 80, 86, 110 E

Eastern Europe, 1–39, 122, 126, 127, 141 Eastern European diasporas, 1, 103 migrants, 1, 4, 5, 8, 146 migration, 1–39, 79, 126 F

Family migration stream, 64, 69 H

Humanitarian migration stream, 56, 62, 63 Hungary, 1–6, 9, 24, 25, 28–31, 35, 37, 81, 82, 103–116, 118, 119, 121–127, 133–143, 145 I

Integration, 2, 24, 30, 31, 34, 55, 62, 65, 73, 75, 76, 133, 134, 143 L

Labour market outcomes, 72 Life strategy of achievement, 3, 17, 20–22, 34, 51, 52, 59, 68, 73, 76, 96, 134, 138 research framework, 8, 9, 16, 23, 141

M

Middle-class, 93 Migrants dividend, 52, 54, 59, 67–75 post-dream, 52, 54, 59, 74–75 transition, 52, 54, 59–68, 74, 75 Migration to Australia, 1–4, 7, 23, 31, 36, 51–53, 55, 56, 59, 75, 79, 90–93, 98, 104, 119–122, 126, 127, 133, 142–144 for education, 122, 143 outcome, 2, 4, 8, 9, 22, 51, 59, 75, 103, 133, 134 pathways, 3, 76, 93, 144 policy, 15, 23, 24, 35, 36, 52, 53, 55, 56, 116, 126, 134 stream, 9, 37, 52, 53, 56, 62–64, 69, 70, 76, 121, 138, 139, 143 waves, 5–8, 37, 55, 133 for work, 6, 60, 119, 121 R

Refugee status, 55, 58, 66 stream, 53 Regime crisis, 133 transition, 3, 4, 9, 19, 23–30, 133 Research design, 35 limitations, 145 methodology, 10 mix-method, 4

 Index 

149

S

U

Skilled migration stream, 52, 53, 56, 70, 76, 121, 138 Social class mobility, 68, 82, 140 identity, 22, 33–34 networks, 3, 62, 75, 92, 109, 125 status, 20, 21, 61, 64, 74, 94, 119, 139 Structure, 10, 11, 13, 18, 20, 23–24, 29, 31–33, 35, 68, 76, 79, 119

Ukraine, 1–4, 6, 7, 9, 13, 15, 19, 22, 24, 25, 29–31, 35, 36, 51–61, 63–72, 74–76, 80, 82, 92, 93, 116, 133–145 Upper-class, 93 W

White-collar working class, 52, 53, 93, 139