Neo-Marxist Theories of Development 0709916418

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Chapter l

INTRODUCTION Peter Limqueco and Bruce McFarlane

the decade 1972-1982, Journal of Contemporary Asia promoted a number of research p r o j e c t s , d i s c u s s i o n s a n d debates about ways of' a n a l y s i s "underdevelopment" in Asia, Africa a n d L a t i n America. Not b e i n g convinced ( i n t h e l i g h t of` t h e Cambridge c r i t i q u e o f the methods and c a p i t a l theory of orthodox economists) t h a t the "investment-choice" theories of U . N . I . D . O . , A.K. Sen and Little-Mirlees explained problems o f underdevelopment, we gave space to other schools of thought. These included followers o f Sraflf'a and the Cambridge school and "neo-tflarxists", followers of Paul A. Baran's theses about the development of underdevelopment. Unlike other journals (e.g. Monthly R e v i e w ) , J . C . A . s u b j e c t e d t h e l a t t e r school t o serious and heavy c r i t i c i s m n o t a b l y t h e ideas promoted by Samir Amir, A Gunder Frank and I . W a l l e r s t e i n . In the following collection of' essays we have brought together pieces which have c r i t i c i z e d the major works of these a u t h o r s , a series of` c r i t i q u e s which a r e sceptical of'

Over

-

-

t h e claims of' the neo-Marxist writers to have established new and

useful

paradigms

and

important

policy

conclusions.

I

suggest that the reader- who goes carefully i n t o the critiques will not find them to be wholly negative and d e s t r u c t i v e , b u t t o b e f`ull of' suggestions for a better a l t e r n a t i v e in the study of underdevelopment. The collection includes major survey articles by Fitzgerald, Leys and Browett which the reader should peruse f`or' h i m s e l f , instead of` g e t t i n g a "survey of` a survey" h e r e . They a r e followed by d e t a i l e d c r i t i c i s m o f

i n d i v i d u a l writers of the school c o n s t i t u t i n g "dependency theorists". It is only proper in t h i s introduction t o bring out more sharply some of' t h e ideological issues involved. Samir Amin himself has produced a number of key ideological t e x t s . His Monthly Review a r t i c l e of` February, 1980 condemns western workers and t r a d e unions as accomplices of monopoly c a p i t a l and enemies of` t h e " t r u e " working class on a g l o b a l scale the peasants. His book 1 "The Law of Value and Historical

-

l.

Materialism is not too s t r o n g on t h e f a c t s . l What i t includes as major items are an attack on the Piero Sraffa School a t Cambridge (who have done more than anyone, Amin included,

to

h i t h e r t o imposing r e j e c t i o n of a l l Marxist research carried o u t w i t h i n Eastern Europe the Hungarian Academy of Science Publication b y Tokei, on t h e Asiatic Mode of P r o d u c t i o n , being described as a p l o y , a Trojan Horse, with which t o batter neo-Maoist groups i n Europe. This casual treatment of` a l t e r n a t i v e schools of economic thought comes out c l e a r l y i n A m i n ' s books a n d , q u i t e properly it is something touched on by t h r e e authors in this volume: Mkandawire, Smith, and Leaver. Ii; a l s o u n d e r l i n e s the need to treat with care the claims of` the dependency school t o be more "Marxist" than European a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h e s . Perhaps chapter four by Mkandawire is best described a s a d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h the p o l i t i c a l economy of' S. Amin. He draws a t t e n t i o n to Amir's h a b i t o f c i t i n g himself a n d other "world systems" supporters, ignoring insights from non-Third World w r i t e r s . I t a l i a n , Polish a n d British w r i t e r s are dismissed as i n h e r e n t l y unable t o analyse economic relations between European a n d Asian s t a t e s . I n the case of' M. K a l e c k i , an a u t h o r who did much theoretical and practical work on problems of underdevelopments, t h e evaluation is one t h a t simply could not have been carried out by anyone with t h e s l i g h t e s t knowledge o f what the Cambridge School has

edifice of

done

in

down

tumbling

bring

the

neo-classical economics) and a

.integrating

Mkandawire

process of t r e a t e d in countries, Europe. It

the

out

points

of

work

that

at

-

Sraffa

the

Kalecki3.

and

level,

practical

the

Eastern Europe cannot be the same way as t h a t in Asian and Latin American nor can i t be seen as t h e same as that in Western i-s d i f f i c u l t t o s e e , t h e n , how Amin and Frank can c a p i t a l accumulation in

t r e a t Eastern Europe as par t o f t h e "metropolis" area o f t h e world as they do i n t h e i r "geographical" approach to d e f i n i n g the w o r l d ' s

to

"workers" a n d

follow t h a t

more

than

s.

Amir's

dismissal of

would seem

Eastern Europe

bureaucratized

misses a l l

capitalism, issues, as does F r a n k ' s dismissal of Countries moving towards Capitalism U The c r i t i c i s m o f

It

"proto-eapitalists".

China

Amin by Mkandawire

and

and

as

no

the

real Vietnam as

Smith also gets

to t h e heart of t h e method used by Amir i n a series o f works I n s t e a d of` using the Marxian, S r a f f i a n or Emmanuel theories of` "unequal change" t o explain how trade e x p l o i t a t i o n between two economies arises because o f unequal labour productivities (as

done

by

V.V.

Dandekar')5,

Amir

prefers t o

chatter about

Sraffa and copy out the l a t ; t e r ' s equations without ever using them

(as

in

his

The

Law

of`

Value

and

Historical

Materialism. Sometimes h e vulgarizes Emmanuel ' s idea that; unequal exchange arises between c o u n t r i e s because of u n e q u a l compositions o f c a p i t a l s between diflfler-ent i n d u s t r i e s and departments by assuming subsistence-wages in the periphery 2

countries. Amin's chosen example is a special case in which "unequal exchange" a r i s e s because t h e labour' in the high productivity country receives a s h a r e o f t h e surplus v a l u e , so that not only the c a p i t a l i s t s , b u t also t h e labourers of' the high p r o d u c t i v i t y country p a r t i c i p a t e a n d p r o f i t b y t h e process of "exploitation" implied i n t h e t r a n s f e r o f s u r p l u s value from t h e low productivity c o u n t r y . That i s , t o prove his own version of` a "labour aristocracy" thesis, Amir seizes on a par t of' a Sraflfla model where workers share in s u r p l u s . More elaborate use o f the Sraffian "schemes", however, also provides other cases i n which only t h e c a p i t a l i s t s in the higher productivity country can p a r t i c i p a t e i n s u r p l u s , in any such e x p l o i t a t i o n , depending on i n i t i a l assumpticns.6. This is by no means t o deny that Third World countries f`aee serious problems posed by the policies and production f l u c t u a t i o n s o f the West. But a decline i n western output would not be taken u p by t h e Third World under t o d a y ' s conditions o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i v i s i o n of` l a b o u r . Rather the foreign exchange earnings of Third World countries would f a l l s h a r p l y via a reverse-multiplier e f f e c t . ' The a c t u a l problem now is the f a l l i n the volume o f world t r a d e and the r i z e of a new protectionism s i n c e 1970, a process t h r e a t e n i n g f u t u r e markets for the o u t p u t o f Third World countries. Quantitative restrictions on imports cluster in p a r t i c u l a r areas and a r e now tailored t o t h e needs of` p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i e s as communicated to governments by industry lobbies. Textiles, clothing, steel, synthetic fibres and transport equipment each have a trade policy of their own. Export subsidies in relation t o gross domestic product were, i n 1979, higher everywhere except i n the U . S . A . , than t h e y were i n 1970 7 .Such trends w i l l be most d i f f i c u l t t o reverse u n t i l they a r e , western markets will be p a r t l y closed to Third Worlders for a long t i m e . This point has, o f course, been raised a t UNCTAD, and lies behind t h e demand for a New International Economic O r d e r . But i t is not necessary to be a T h i r d World economist or embrace a "world systems" analysis to support such

-

demands.

Keynes

suppor°ted8

international

action

to

s t a b i l i z e the t r a d e of Third World countries; Balogh has for many years exposed t h e d e v a s t a t i n g impact on Third World countries of' the development o f synthetics in the West and the braindrain which followed on political independence.9 Rather

as

Sheila Smith h a s

pointed

out

in

chapter

six,

and

elsewherelo, the political attitudes which stem from the Amir-Frank-Wallerstein s t y l e o f world-systems analysis earl o n l y hinder progress because i t precludes, b y a s s e r t i o n , theoretically and politically important work a t the l e v e l of` national economies. As Leaver puts i t in chapter f i v e , Amir reaches the l i m i t o f any e n t e n t e cordials, between Marxian theory and dependency theory when forced to draw p o l i t i c a l conclusions about Kampuchea, rigid autarchic policies is

Iran

shown

and

by

Angola.

Leaver t o

Support for be deeply

3

embedded

-

in

periphery Armin's discussion of` centre r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f world economic s u r p l u s , and international t r a d e . Andre Gunder Frank has been w r i t i n g about the chain o f control from metropolis countries to cities in colonial countries to rural areas. He has been p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e in favour of autarchic political movement and appears o f t e n a t conferences d e a l i n g w i t h the broad issues raised by a "new

relations,

international economic order". The distinguishing f e a t u r e o f F r a n k ' s a n a l y s i s , as

Leaver

points out , was the claim t h a t some areas of the globe ( p a r t i c u l a r l y Latin Ameriea) were capitalist f r o m thelbth C e n t u r y , a claim based on h i s conception of' capitalism as t h a t social system which produces surplus p r o d u c t and appropriates i t t o owners as a result of' commodity production for the market. This one-sided use of "economic s u r p l u s " , p o t e n t i a l l y a most u s e f u l way o f establishing the specifics d i f f e r e n t i a e o f social systems, v i t i a t e s F r a n k ' s r e s u l t s . It also raises doubts as to the tendency o f h i s followers to discuss h i s work as a product of a Marxian box of' tools as Leaver points out in chapter seven. Does Frank know h i s economic h i s t o r y ? Those brought u p on Werner Sombart's account o f the development of' World Capitalism or even on a popular work l i k e Leo Huberman's M a n ' s Worldly Goods w i l l f i n d i t hard t o recognise the development of capitalism on a global scale from Frank and E-Jallerstein's version. A detailed case against Frank is presented in this volume by Jairus Banaji's article, especially in a criticism of' F r a n k ' s l a t e r works (notably World Accumulation 1978) Frank a t least here goes back into the early development of` capitalism, some 300 years ago. Banaji is not impressed b y the use t o which t h i s economic history is p u t . Like other contributors Leaver and Mkandawire, Banaji highlights the political results of Frank ' s whole project which i s t o s h i f t the focus from the struggle of' a l l workers against a l l types of` capital to one in which t h e initiative is taken by groups outside the Asian

-

.

and Latin American working class. The study of' four Asian states by Clive Hamilton takes u p point made earlier b y Leys concerning t h e desirability of' using class-formation and class-struggle to investigate such countries a prism which dependency theory precludes. Petras follows on with the same emphasis as Leys, i f in a wider context. This leads Hamilton to the kind of` argument many would l i k e t o see as a positive alternative to the dependency perspective. It implies that the internationalization of capital investment causing a transition from merchant-dominated capitalism t o i n d u s t r i a l capitalism is the process that is occurring i n A.S.E.A.N. and some other Asian, Latin American and African c o u n t r i e s . It

the

-

implies t h a t t h e development of' t h e

main force II

*

of change.

productive f o r c e s is

the

It involves drawing attention not to

"de-development" b u t to t h e r a p i d growth of the share of i n d u s t r y in national income and f a l l in t h e share of' agriculture. Economic development is p r e c i s e l y about t h i s structural change in the f i r s t phase of' accelerated economic growth. Moreover, the degree of "foreign control" requires empirical investigation and not an assumption o f complete dominance. Foreign ownership of' industrial assets has been declining in A.S.E.A.N. since the days of` classical colonialism. In 1980 the level of this ownership in total

industrial assets within A.S.E.A.N. amounted to 30-35% o f the t o t a l . This is well below estimates for foreign control over Australian i n d u s t r y , and few claim that Australia is de-developing. It is also increasingly clear t h a t foreign capitalists prefer joint-venture projects, a technique pioneered by the Japanese for their investments in Asian industries. In relation a g r i c u l t u r e , I t h e r e is occurring a change i n , the form of' capitalist domination now that we have f u l l blooded c a p i t a l i 5 penetration 1 - 1i c u l t u r e , monetization of the r u r a l economy and control of marketing by agribusiness (who often pr mnmul Iii\1lr_ local ownership of` plantations) Such I development within a g r i c u l t u r e has not

m

.

.

u

been handled well by dependency t h e o r y , ' I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i oruin growth productive forces i n labour A.S.E.A.N. i s bringing d i f f e r e n t forms l)f` control --. power i n d i f f e r e n t spheres o result t h i s , as Hamilton i n d i c a t e s , is that t h e S of t h e working class in national income may be held dowry I decline. Side by side with t h e growth of` productive forces can go "immizerisation" in the s p h e r e of income d i s t r i b u t i o n . Control over the l a b our force i s exercised by f o r c e , by the s e t t i n g up of company unions or by state control over workers ' organizations. It also involves the techniques needed by capitalist industry a t a higher' level of` i t s development: piece work, b o n u s e s , q u o t a s , which reduce t h e s o c i a l costs ( h e a l t h , family b i l l s ) t o the employer.

In

A clear implication from Harnilton's work is the need to look closely at; what has been happening t o the Asian working class: new work-control methods, work discipline, and management systems need as much study as "cheap labour". Such a study should be directed to firms in three categories: light industry ( t e x t i l e s , electronics, plastics, r u b b e r ) ; intermediate (assembly work) and heavy industry (machinery, construction e t c . ) Each group should be studied according to whether t h e r e is worker organization a t the work place. Agricultural social relations s t i l l need close study a minor t e s t that could then be done, is to look a t the complaint of` Amir that Western socialists press only the interests of t h e industrial workers a t the expense of the great majority of the labouring poor.

-

5.

An additional p o i n t , brought out in reading Hamilton on industrialization a f t e r researching dependency theory on autarchy, is the need to use structural models of` production t o work o u t a strategy for more mature countries which is less dependent on imported materials and more productive of' backward and forward linkages with other domestic industries.

Such

a

model

has

been

sketched

by

A.

Lowell

and developed i n a p r a c t i c a l way b y Sachs a n d L a s k i , l 2 w h i l e Clive Thomas worked out a strategy which does not imply autarchy, but enables small economies to escape the immiserizing pattern of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i n primary products for exports.l3 The core of` t h e s t r a t e g y t h a t Thomas proposed was the development of` a "basic materials" s e c t o r , one t h a t i s capable o f producing goods such as t e x t i l e s , iron and s t e e l , paper, l e a t h e r , f u e l , plastics and i n d u s t r i a l chemicals which enter i n t o t h e means of` producing a l l other goods. This underlines a point made by Sheila Smith in another context: national control is not t h e same t h i n g as a u t a r c h y ; the development of the productive forces might develop under r e l a t i v e l y autarchic c o n d i t i o n s , depending on t h e s i t u a t i o n ; national self'-sufficiency can also t u r n i n t o national s e l f - i n s u f f i c i e n c y . The historical periodisation and discussion of a world c a p i t a l i s t system i n chapter* 12, by James Petras, is very d i f f e r e n t from Gunder-Frank ' s dash i n t o economic h i s t o r y i n World Accumulation. Petras is closer to Res rick and Hymer. He looks a t various stages in the growing web of power between c o u n t r i e s based on capital investment and divides this aspect of` t h e economic history of such countries into primitive accumulation (1500-1800) , e a r l y monopoly capitalism

(1800-19U5) and late capitalism.lU While there is exploitation o f the "periphery" countries o f the Third World, t h i s is n o t linked (as i n Amir) t o the idea of a giant sucking machine t a k i n g out surplus from neo-colony to western metropolis. Rather the process o f "exploitation" has i t s own d i f f e r e n t phases w i t h d i f f e r e n t processes a t w o r k . The phases as seen b y Petras include p i r a t e colonialism,

"extractive"

kinds

of

colonialism

and

"dependent

neo-colonisalism". But this is q u i t e different from the implication of t h e analysis of' Frank, Wallerstein and Amir that the world economy has been c a p i t a l i s t for centuries.15 P e t r a s ' p o i n t is

t h a t t h e problem of' t h e "external impact" on

Third World

countries i n t h i s c e n t u r y is not one of absolute stagnation but of' the conditions under' which the process of' capital accumulation takes place and i t s impact on the class structure problems o f the process of s u r p l u s extraction, the economic r o l e of' t h e S t a t e , t h e allocation of` the work force. The further impact on class structure would appear to involve issues of the changeover from small proprietors to wage labourers or from rural workers to urban workers, OP

-

landlords to merchants or merchants to industrialists. 6.

Surely t h i s i s t h e r i g h t focus of attention of p o l i t i c a l economy rather than a Frank-Amin emphasis on "blocking" o f the growth of' productive forces as a r e s u l t of` external ties. This does not preclude a discussion ( a s Petras demonstrates) of capital accumulation as an uneven, contradictory and e x p l o i t a t i v e process. Nor does i t mean that s h i f t s in economic activity i n "peripheral" ex-eolonial countries and relations w i t h the metropolis country a r e not linked to changes in class alignments and c l a s s power. But the causation is l i k e l y to be the opposite to t h a t proclaimed by dependency theory: t h e displacement o f the m e t r o p o l i s from agro-mineral sectors is the r e s u l t of t h e rise to influence of national social forces and represents a significant increase in national control over t h e process of capital accumulation as compared with the classical colonialist period. The issue of changing internal class relations as a result of` changes i n the pace and structure of capital accumulation s u r e l y must be a t t h e centre of a t t e n t i o n in discussing Third World development. Kautsky in The Agrarian Question (English summary in Economy and Society, Vol. 5 , No. l ) underlined changing class relations in t h e agrarian sector and the diverse ways in which capital and t h e State have used rural producers as a way of securing subsistence and s u r p l u s . Monopsony, regulations and force have been used to get trading p r o f i t s and foreign exchange. A wage relation exists side-by-side with various forms of household and cottage production. Accordingly, i t is essential t o analyse r e l a t i o n s h i p s between crop producers a n d c a p i t a l ( a s well as the State) in varying concrete conditions. Banaji in particular, takes u p t h e issue of Frank's conceptual confusion concerning difference forms of the capital-labour relationship. The parcellization o f land is an issue t o be incorporated into t h i s kind of emphasis, in view of t h e claims by A.K. Sen and M. Lipton t h a t , given a negative correlation between s i z e of` land h o l d i n g and r e a l agricultural product per' man h o u r ,

the majority of Third World countries can benefit from going peasant-family agriculture. Although such over to conclusions are in doubt ( i f chemical rather than organic f e r t i l i z e r is a p p l i e d , small farms lose t h e i r productivity

-

advantage) , the process of parcellization is very i m p o r t a n t Marx ( i n the 18th Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte) h a d assumed a trend towards concentration of land which has not occurred in peripheral c o u n t r i e s , as Kautsky n o t e d . H . Bernstein ("Notes on Capital and Peasantry") suggested in Review of` African Polital Economy, No. 10, that " t h e r e is no single and essential "peasantry" nor any such homogenization of` peasants a t the level o f p o l i t i c s and ideology." Whether merchant c a p i t a l became a central fact in the "development of underdevelopment" as argued i n Geoffrey Kay ' s Development and Underdevelopment is also a n important issue.

7

This suggestion implies t h a t accumulation has largely been carried on by merchant capital on the basis of' p e t t y commodity production. Res rick has described this as one of "two roads to c a p i t a l i s m " b u t i t seems closer* to India than to (say) modern-day Singapore where wage labourers and c a p i t a l i s t s meet i n t h e process of c a p i t a l i s t production and accumulation. Merchant c a p i t a l , by c o n t r a s t , is a s i t u a t i o n where "the c i r c u i t s of' t h e independent producer and merchant capitalist intersect only in the market" (Kay, D - 7 0 ) . But did i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l , when i t made i t s s t r o n g appearance in the post 19145 phase of the development o f the world market, use merchant c a p i t a l . as i t s a g e n t ? Does not industrial capital inhibit the accumulation of' merchant capital? Does i t not demand a new pattern of trade away from a trade in l u x u r y i t e m s , textiles and c r a f t s to a constant supply of imported raw materials? The method o f extracting s u r p l u s also changes with the rise of i n d u s t r i a l capital from unequal exchange, price manipulation and market rigging t o i n d u s t r i a l profits from the use of wage-labour in the

-

labour process. Such changes in class relations as a r e s u l t of` changes i n the accumulation process seem t o r e q u i r e close a n a l y s i s . Petras suggests f r u i t f u l ways of providing t h i s . CONCLUSIONS

The f i r s t conclusion to draw from the above collection is t h a t the "dependency" paradigm must now be transcended. I t s development required l i t t l e knowledge of economics, p o l i t i c a l economy or q u a n t i t a t i v e research methods. Worse, i t l e d , as Sheila Smith shows, to an assertion that "periphery economies" have no room for man oeuvre, an assertion which was based on no analysis of' c a p i t a l accumulation or internal movements in income d i s t r i b u t i o n and the s t r u c t u r e of production. It led t o the idea of` a radical and complete break with the world system by individual C o u n t r i e s , without the

qualifications,

Dependence

noted

by

economist

Transformation.

and

It

Clive

led

Thomas

to

the

in

his

loose

methodology of treating the "centre" a n d "periphery" a s undifferentiated blocs, although the c h a p t e r on mining rent in Amir's Law of Value and Historical Materialism sees some rent accruing t o the peripheral s t a t e s and middle classes (and hence allows the p o s s i b i l i t y o f some local accumulation of

capital).

is a modification of the thesis o f World Scale which shows Amir can accommodate somewhat tO new r e a l i t i e s . A second conclusion that we draw from a survey of' t h e debate is the need to look closely a t the origin and role of economic surplus within each of ( a ) poor and ( b ) rich countries, while reeognising t h a t such a concept cannot by itself provide a basis for s a t i s f a c t o r i l y probing the s p e c i f i c i t y o f the structure of the capitalist mode of

Accumulation

8

This

on

a

production in

each case.

D i f f e r e n t forms

of

penetration by

overseas corporations of the social system occurred, and these have to be traced o u t , incorporating also t h e mediating role of` the post-coplonial s t a t e . We n e e d , as w e l l , a way o f showing how and why a country moves from one "mode of` production" t o a n o t h e r . Here i t i s necessary t h a t a n a l y s i s avoids t h e twin errors o f ( a ) concentrating only on external influences ( l i k e the demands o f t h e world capitalist market or ( b ) operating with a closed system. Most important, we need to explain why one mode of production is dominant i n a

country a t a particular time rather than another. Another

key

weakness

of

theory and

dependency

of'

Frank

and Amin's copnstant t a r g e t t i n g o f the "centre" a s t h e cause of` all exploitation is their inability to explain "South-South"

Asian

contradictions,

as

Sheila

Smith

points

out.

multinationals e x p l o i t i n g Asian workers d o not

appear i n the centre-periphery or "North versus South" models. So when i t became clear that t h e Sri Lanka Free Trade Zone was rapidly becoming an appendage of` Asian m u l t i n a t i o n a l s , this kind of exploitation went unanalyzed, underlining the importance of looking a t capital qua capital, and a t worker-capital relationships in every country, instead o f the "broad sweep" s o favoured by t h e s t y l e of' Ecole Nor-male Supérieure, in which "money smells" and some capitals are wickeder than others. Perhaps this is another way o f saying t h a t t h e new Trans-Atlantic alliances of` W a l l e r s t e i n ' s "Binghamton School" (Fernand Braudel Centre for the Study of` Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations) w i t h Gunder Frank and Amin in Europe, or of elements in Monthly Review ( U . S . A . ) with t h e University of Bielefeld (Germany)1° have become sects groups of` people who demonstrate t h a t they are unusually remote from r e a l i t y and have developed the language and methodology o f the claque. Rejecting trade unions, the western labour movement, western socialist and communist

-

parties,

socialist

defining

the

good

the

and

bad

bloc

of

that Amir ends and the workers

up

experiences

it

is

no

peasantry

as

workers,

countries,

wonder*

of'

the

as

capitalists.l7 All of` this surely is has r u n , as exposed in this It could, I suppose, debate between "dependency former is not a coherent

rooted in the way their analysis book. be argued that there is no real theory" and "Marxism" because the theory and the latter' is open to widely d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . This is a view that has been taken by Aidan Foster Carter and E . Mavros i n the U . K . , and would contradict the views expressed here by Fitzgerald, Leys and Gulalp. It seems to me to be sociological hairsplitting. Amir, Frank and Wallerstein made i t q u i t e clear a t the U . N . I . T . A . R . Conference in New Delhi in 1980 t h a t they do see their work as a theory, and t h a t t h e y make predictions from i t ' that capitalism will continue to 9,

exploit the Third World u n t i l capitalist imperialism is abolished; t h a t revolution will end t h e centre-periphery spiderweb o f centuries ( a view disputed i n t h i s book b y John Browett).

While i t is t r u e t h a t "Marxism" is a d i f f u s e body of` ideas, sush c r i t i c s o f dependency as H . Bernstein, and John Taylor ( a s well as t h e a u t h o r s i n t h i s book l i k e Sheila Smith a n d T . Mkandawire) have used rigorous techniques o f analysis clearly linked to Marx's political theory and political economy. At least there should be agreement now that neither a separate "mode of` production" analysis for every individual country or par t of` a country, nor a view that "the whole system must be studied as a system" seem adequate in the light of experience. There is more to t h e story o f economic development of` particular nations than that of' participation in the r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n of' world economic s u r p l u s . On the other hand, n o country i s untouched by international trade a n d investment. Perhaps what the sum of t h e contributions to t h i s volume suggests t o us is t h e need t o approach the problem in t h i s way: t h a t t h e same social system because of "innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial relations, external historical circumstances [ w i l l show] i n f i n i t e variations and gradations in appearance, which can b e ascertained only by analysis of' the e m p i r i c a l l y given circumstances". 18 Third

World

ex-colonies

like

Indonesia,

India

and

Argentina have shown themselves just as capable of territ.orial expansionism and exploitation o f peoples as the U.K. , Germany and t h e former imperialist powers of` Europe. Unfortunately, this seems likely to be lost on t h e guilt-ridden western scholars and the mindless anti-westernism of' some Third Worlders who c o n t i n u e t o a "dependency perspective"

uphold

A debate among concerned Politieal economists about the perspectives of` Baran, Frank, Amir and Wallerstein can be useful. The dependency school has had a large volume o f work

on the market for some years, and it is time to take stock of it.

One t h i n g though, needs to be avoided: t h e reduction of

a l l the experiences of wars of liberation and socialist economic development to zero, as i f C a p i t a l i s t sueeess were t h e only r e a l i t y . On t h i s crucial point surely Frank would be in agreement with t h e i r l e f t c r i t i c s .

Amin and

NOTES 1.

On Australia a country which pioneered the 8 hour'

day and women's suffrage as well as having°a most militant trade union movement, all Amir could say was: "Why is Australia a world of` absolute silence?" S. Amir "In praise o f socialism" Monthly Review, Sept. l 9 7 U , p . lu.

10.

on DeveloPinlg Economies, Kalecki , Essays 2. M. London, 1975. 3. Joan Robinson, "Who is a Marxist?", in Joan Robinson, G.C. Harcourt,

Collected Economic Papers, V o l . 5 , p p . 252-3, "The Sr'aflflian C o n t r i b u t i o n " , i n Bradley and

Howard ( e d s ) , Classical and Marxian Political Economy. LL. A. Gunder-Frank, "Long Live Trans ideological E n t e r p r i s e " , Review, V o l . l , N o . l , Summer 1977, p p . 91-lM0. 5. V.M. Dandekar, "Unequal Exchange' Imperialism of' T r a d e " , Economic and P o l i t i c a l Weekly, Bombay, 5 t h January, 1980. p p - 27-326. Dandekar, o c . C i t . , pp32-33. 7. Jan T u m l i r , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic Order: Can t h e Trend Be Reversed?" The World _Eeonomy, March, 1982, p . 30. 8. J . M . Keynes, "The International Control o f Raw Materials" republished in the Journal of International Economies, Vol. U. Balogh | The T. 9. His more recent e f f o r t is Economics of Poverty, i 9 7 u . Theory 10. Sheila Smith, "The Ideas o f Samir' Amir: or Tautology", Journal of Development Studies, V o l . 17, October, 1980, p . 1 9 . II. Adolph Lowe, The Path of E_conomic Growth , Cambridge, 1976. 12. I . Sachs a n d K. Laski, "Industrial Development Strategy", in U.N. Industrialisation and Productivity Bulletin, 1971. Thomas I Dependence and Transformation, 13Clive N.Y., 197u. lil. See S. Res rick and S. Hymen, "The Crisis and Drama o f the Global Partnership" International Journal (Canada) Vol. XXV, 1970, p p . 186-18915. S. Amir, The Law o f Value and Historical Materialism. 16. Both produced mor-e Pol Pot and pro-autarchy pieces than contemporaries regarded as reasonable on the evidence.

la»

S. Amin, "The Class Structure of' the Contemporary

Imperialist System", Monthly

18.

Review , J a n u a r y 1980.

K. Marx, Capital, V o l . 3 , Moscow, 1962, e d . p . 7 T 2 .

II.

Chapter" 2 SOCIOLOGIES OF DEVELOPMENT

Frank T . Fitzgerald

Since the post-World War I I years when "development" became a focus o f concern within Western social s c i e n c e , t h e concept itself and t h e perspectives in which i t has been couched have undergone a series of` dramatic changes. As post-war imperialism faced movements for national independence or socialist transformation in the so-ealled Third World, modernization theoryl was formulated to serve as an ideological cover and framework o f policy orientation for continued c a p i t a l i s t expansion, geared t o keeping a n d f u r t h e r incorporating Third World areas within t h e c a p i t a l i s t o r b i t . Dependency theory? arose i n the l a t e f i f t i e s and the sixties as a n extensive c r i t i q u e of' the modernization paradigm, which turned many of' t h e l a t t e r ' s central concepts on t h e i r heads' development became the development of underdevelopment. Diffusion became the mechanism of dependency or imperialism. Recently, dependency theory has attained a new intellectual stature and perhaps its theoretical apogee i n t h e form o f world systems a n a l y s i s . 3 At the same t i m e , t h e c r i t i c s of the dependency/world systems school have become more vocal and more incisive. World systems analysis has been a t t a c k e d f o r a l l e g e d l y c o n f u s i n g

the

capitalist

world system with

the capitalist mode of

production* a n d , from a very diflflerent a n g l e , f o r ignoring or mystifying classical Marxist class analysis.5 Development sociology, as should b e clear from t h e above, has been r i c h i n p o l i t i c a l d e b a t e , empirical disagreement, and theoretical innovation. There is n o one sociology of development, but several competing sociologies. To wind through this labyrinth of controversy and clarify the major issues in dispute is the purpose o f this paper. I

Modernization

theory conceptualizes development as movement continuum of historical change upon which all national societies can be placed according to indices such as

along

12.

a

GNP, per' capita income, acceptance of "modern" values, social differentiation, political integration, e t c . This continuum is meant; to describe a universal path o f societal e v o l u t i o n , supposedly already followed by the modern, developed nations, eventually to be travelled b y the traditional, underdeveloped ones. The end points o f t h i s continuum have t h e methodological status of ideal types. The concept of' modernity or developed is fashioned by a b s t r a c t i n g a t t r i b u t e s from the social s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e advanced c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , especially those a t t r i b u t e s which supposedly typify the social s t r u c t u r e of` t h e "lead n a t i o n " , 5 t h e United S t a t e s . As Gabriel Almond b a l d l y p u t i t : "The model o f the m o d e r n . . . c a n only be derived from the most careful empirical and formal analysis...oI" modern Western polities."7 Modernization theory thus takes q u i t e seriously a n d , by ripping i t from i t s textual and historical context, reduces to absurdity M a r x ' s famous statement that "The country that is more developed i n d u s t r i a l l y onl shows to the less developed, the image of

and

i t s own future". BY At the other end of' t h e modernization continuum s i t s t h e ideal type of t r a d i t i o n a l i t y or' underdevelopment. Unlike t h e concept of m o d e r n i t y , t h e ideal type o f traditionality is not comprised o f attributes abstracted from a single "social or area of t h e g l o b e . The reason for- this is While there i s an i d e n t i f i a b l e lead nation which shows to a l l others what modernity means, traditionality is supposedly a s t a t e t h a t has been shared by a l l societies. As Bert Hoselitz formulated i t : "If there a r e 'developed' and 'advanced' countries i n the present, they must have a t some time been 'underdeveloped'."9 Many questions and criticisms have been directed a t the adequacy of these ideal typical end points of the modernization continuum. F i r s t , i t has been asked whether the ideal types of modernity and traditionality t r u l y capture the essential features of t h e social s t r u c t u r e s from which t h e y h a v e been a b s t r a c t e d . Those, f o r e x a m p l e , who frame system" simple.

their

analysis

in

terms

of

the

Parsonian

pattern

variables lO open themselves to the q u e s t i o n of` whether achievement or- universalism are so all-pervasive and ascription oz* particular-ism SO e n t i r e l y absent in t h e most modern nations, and vice versa i n the most traditional areas.ll One can also question the methodological sense of` constructing a concept of` t r a d i t i o n a l i t y out of the wide diversity of' social formations which preceded Western capitalism: the Inca and Chinese and Mogul Empires, the trading states of Africa, Feudal Europe, innumerable isolated subsistence economies, etc.12 The f a c t , however, that these types of' questions could have been raised, a t least in part, by a leading proponent of the modernization appr-oachl3 attests to t h e f`aet t h a t , while t e l l i n g , such criticisms stay well within the modernization paradigm. For 13-

such criticisms question t h e empirical adequacy o f the p a r t i c u l a r i d e a l type concepts constructed b y p a r t i c u l a r modernization theorists, b u t they d o n o t , as s t a t e d , question t h e notion of universal end p o i n t s a n d a universal p a t h o f social evolution along a continuum. Conceivably, with b e t t e r empirical investigation and Formal a n a l y s i s , more empirically adequate ideal types could be formulated; that i s , i f we were to s t a y within t h e modernization p e r s p e c t i v e . When i t diagnoses t h e condition of' t h e contemporary Third World,

modernization

theory

sees

underdevelopment,

which

it

conceptualizes as development manqué. Contemporary Third World countries a r e "backward", "late-star tens" which lack t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f developed m o d e r n i t y . Development will r e s u l t from the " d i f f u s i o n " of` these a t t r i b u t e s f r o m t h e developed West. " D i f f u s i o n " in this schema serves as a code word f o r c a p i t a l i s t expansion i n i t s economic, political, cultural guises. The modernization t h e o r i s t s have i d e n t i f i e d several levels a t which d i f f u s i o n can a n d should t a k e place: l) The individual/psychological level where "modern"

values

and

skills

-

achievement

orientation,

"empathy",

democratic values and p o l i t i c a l par t i c i p a t i o n , political obedience a r e seen as necessary f o r development. 2) The i n s t i t u t i o n a l and organizational levels where markets, division of lab o u r , bureaucratic r a t i o n a l i t y , modern state structures, political par t i e s , etc. a r e seen as p r e r e q u i s i t e s or necessary concomitants o f development. technological and financial levels where The 3) know-how, advanced t e c h n o l o g y , c a p i t a l , e t c . a r e b r o u g h t to

-

the Third World.

This multi-level notion of d i f f u s i o n has constituted another entry point for the critics o f modernization. Petras and LaPorte,lU for example, have convincingly shown t h a t "political bargaining systems" such a s a r e characteristic of' the advanced c a p i t a l i s t nations are s i n g u l a r l y unsuited for i n s t i t u t i n g the massive structural changes necessary for "development" i n t h e Third W o r l d . Andre Gunder Frank,15 Baran and Sweezy,l6 et.al., have demonstrated that

capitalist aid and investment serve to siphon out rather pump s u r p l u s i n t o t h e Third World. When modernization theorists examine at close hand, they see societies

Third

than

World nations

split asunder in t r a d i t i o n a l and modern sectors commanded by corresponding elites. T r a d i t i o n a l s u b s i s t e n c e economies a n d political

systems and modern commercial economies and political systems coexist i n r e l a t i v e isolation within t h e same s o c i e t y . Modernization theorists locate the major obstacles to development within t h e traditional sector and postulate t h a t t h e major political c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n Third World societies take place between sectors.l7 I t has been pointed out18 t h a t such an analysis ignores t h e myriad of` ways i n which t h e so-called t r a d i t i o n a l and modern sectors interrelate: 114.

l) The extent to which "modern" urban commercial and " t r a d i t i o n a l " agro~mineral interests a r e integrated within the same social c i r c l e s , f a m i l i e s , or even t h e same person. extent which he "modern" sector b e n e f i t s from structure ermined, a t l e a s t in p a r t , by of y m f u t o in:\ll " agriculture L e v e n t mf-. which "moderns" u t i l i z e " t r a d i t i o n a l " methods ensure labour s c i p l i n e , political quiescence,

um

l

etc. M) The extent to which "modern" imper t - s u b s t i t u t i o n industrialization r e l i e s on t h e earnings o f the " t r a d i t i o n a l " agro-mineral export s e c t o r . This systematic inter-relatedness o f t h e so-called sectors h e l p s in explain lm, no decisive c o n f l i c t s i n t h e Third World mum developed ,,,.etween landed and urban proper t i e d groups. Contrary to t h e claims of` modernization theory, conflicts 'E n the Third World have been between the exploited classes sond integrated dominant classes w i t h the IL consume "modern" values wherewithal and goods a n d with an interest in maintaining "traditional" social relations to ensure their social p o s i t i o n . Modernization t h e o r y ' s reliance on ideal types which f a i l to grasp t h e essence of the situations from which they a r e a b s t r a c t e d , i t s obfuscation of` the a c t u a l relationships between Third World and developed capitalist countries by means of t h e d e c e p t i v e concept o f diffusion, i t s p e n c h a n t f o r sectoral rather than class a n a l y s i s , a l l d e r i v e , in the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , from its master- conception of a universal path o f societal evolution. This master' conception focuses on the nation as i t s primary u n i t o f analysis and thereby ignores the international context which is so crucial t o any understanding of` historical development and c u r r e n t r e a l i t i e s i n the Third World. For several centuries now, the Third World has been par t of' a s t r u c t u r e d whole, a world political-economy. As a consequence, i t has experienced d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n s o f class f`or-mation, economic d e v e l o p m e n t , a n d m u c h e l s e t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h i t s path o f evolution from that followed by the now developed c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . There is no universal path of evolution a t the national l e v e l . Modernization theory f a l l s with t h e f a l l of' t h i s , i t s master conception. It i s to t h e dependency t h e o r i s t s that we must look for a c l e a r conception o f d i f f e r e n t i a l p a t t e r n s o f national evolution and their s t r u c t u r e d interrelatedness at the world l e v e l . II Dependency

theory,

while

having

its

structuralism of t h e ECLA eoonomists,20 and forcefully as an extended c r i t i q u e perspective. In t h e f i r s t instance, t h e undertook a series of empirical

roots

in

the

arose most d i r e c t l y o f the modernization dependency theorists investigations and

15.

theoretical reformulations which attacked t h e notion o f "diffusion". The strategy here was to t u r n the concept of diffusion on i t s head by renaming it "mechanisms of dependency or' imperialism" and by showing that its effects upon the Third World were essentially the opposite of' what modernization theory supposed. Instead, these mechanisms resulted i n : l) Metropolitan appropriation o f economic s u r p l u s from Third World producers through ( a ) super-exploitation of Third terms of t r a d e imposed by World lab our, (b) unequal transfer p r i c i n g by monopolistic market structures, (c) multinational corporations, ( d ) domination of m e t r o p o l i t a n financial i n s t i t u t i o n s which d i c t a t e the terms o f borrowing and repayment, ( e ) metropolitan expansion financed by Third World savings, e t c . 2) Metropolitan preemption of the requisites of production by means of ( a ) the take-over and control of Third World raw materials, (b) the plunder of Third World labour-power as in the slave trade, e t c . 3) Metropolitan destruction of' Third World industries such as ( a ) Indian t e x t i l e s , ( b ) Mexican o i l , (co) Vietnamese rice e t c . II) Metropolitan preemption o f Third World markets through ( a ) tied loans, ( b ) MNC take-over of' local markets,

etc. 5)

Metropolitan subordination o f

Third World

production

structures by means of ( a ) t h e imposition of an international division o f

labour within which Third World economies became and dependent on metropolitan demand f`or their dynamism, ( b ) MNC take-over* of` Third World industries created by local e f f o r t s a t import-substitution, e t c . 6) Creation of social s i t u a t i o n s and class formations which do not replicate those of the metropolis (even in i t s historical past) and which do not p r o j e c t a p a t h of social evolution similar to that described by metropolitan countries; e . g . (a) t h e maintenance of` landholding a n d

outward-directed

mercantile

imperial

classes,

domination,

military

(b)

regimes,

etc.

which

mediate

the marginalization or at least

limitation of' a Third World national bourgeoisie through "par ticipation" and mechanisms l through 5 above, ( c ) t h e metropolitan " b i a s " toward capital-intensive technology which limits the s i z e of' a n d s t r a t i f i e s the proletariat and which an increasingly large urban creates the conditions for sub-proletariat, e t c . The role o f explicating and formalizing t h e i m p l i c i t model behind the above inversion of the "dif'flusion" concept was taken u p most i n f l u e n t i a l l y b y Andr-e Gunder F r a n k , 2 l who argued t h a t i t is false t o suppose that development proceeds through the same stages in each country. were never' Contemporary developed capitalist countries underdeveloped as is t h e Third World t o d a y , b u t rather were undeveloped. Underdevelopment, instead of being caused by 16.

the peculiar socio-economic structures of Third World c o u n t r i e s , is t h e historical product of the relations which have obtained between underdeveloped s a t e l l i t e s and developed metropoles. In s h o r t , development and underdevelopment are two sides of` the same c o i n , two poles of the same process metropolitan c a p i t a l i s t development on a world scale creates the "development of` underdevelopment" in the Third world. The major mechanism of this "development of underdevelopment" is the drainage of economic s u r p l u s from t h e s a t e l l i t e s . When Frank examined Third World countries a t close hand, h e envisioned the Chain o f metropolitan/satellite r e l a t i o n s , existing on the international l e v e l , replicated within each country. Rejecting the dualist thesis o f modernization theory a n d , by the way, o f the dogmatic Marxists who see a stagnant f`uedal sector in t h e Third World a s h o l d i n g back a dynamic c a p i t a l i s t o n e , and who await and support bourgeois classes and revolution against these feudal elements22 Frank argues that a l l of Latin America is c a p i t a l i s t because it is involved in the world-wide chain of metropolitan/satellite surplus appropriation. In fact, according t o Frank, Latin America's most backward areas ( e . g . , Northeastern B r a z i l ) were p r e c i s e l y those areas which had once been most s t r o n g l y linked t o the metropolis. I n s t i t u t i o n s such as plantations and haciendas, regardless of t h e i r internal appearance, have s i n c e the Conquest been c a p i t a l i s t forms of` production linked to the metropolitan market. The result o f t h i s incorporation of` a l l Latin America into the world capitalist system with its chain of m e t r o p o l i t a n / s a t e l l i t e s u r p l u s drain was underdevelopment, economic stagnation. Economic development, according to Frank, was experienced in Latin America only in those times when t h e metropolitan linkages were weakened the Spanish depression of the l7th century, the Napoleonic Wars, the Depression of` the l 9 3 0 ' s a n d the two World Wars of the 20th century and i t came to an end precisely as t h e m e t r o p o l e s recovered from these disruptions and recemented their links

-

-

-

-

-

to the Third World. Frank's model was indeed a powerful advance over modernization theory, but it suffered from peculiar weaknesses of i t s own. First o f a l l , dependency theory has usually suffered from a c e r t a i n ahistorical character. Change w i t h i n t h e Third World tends to be viewed as an outcome o f i t s undifferentiated dependent s t a t u s . As Colin Leys put i t , dependency theory " . concentrates on what happens to the underdeveloped countries at hand of imperialism and colonialism, rather than on the total historical process involved, including the various forms of struggle against imperialism and colonialism which grow o u t of` the conditions of underdevelopment."23 Social classes, s t a t e s , politics appear in the perspective as derivatives o f

..

economic

forces

and

mechanisms.

Classes,

class

projects, 1'7-

class

struggles

appear

neither

as

the

prime

movers

of

historical change nor- the prime movers of historical change nor' the prime foci of analytic attention in most versions of dependency theory. Secondly, i n much o f t h e dependency l i t e r a t u r e , the meaning of "development " and , therefore, of "underdevelopment" is u n c l e a r . Given that i t is f r e q u e n t l y argued that "development" occurs i n the Third World when metropolitan/satellite linkages are weakened, does is

an

a t t r i b u t e of' capitalist development i n the metropoles, i s

"development"

the

debate

about

path?

If

imply the

Since

autarchy?

Third

World's

'development'

ability

to

replicate

this

s o , what kind o f 'socialism'? F i n a l l y , on the assumptions o f dependency theory, how can the various so-called 'economic m i r a c l e s ' o f t h e Third World b e explained? This failure of` dependency theory to c l a r i f y the many issues surrounding t h e question of ' d e v e l o p m e n t ' pinpoints a key weakness of` the perspective. Dependency t h e o r y advanced beyond the myths of modernization; y e t , we can see in retrospect, i t d i d not fully escape t h e i m p r i n t o f these myths. In the work of` Baran and in that o f Frank, ' d i f f u s i o n leading to modernization' was inverted t o read 'dependency leading t o

underdevelopment',

but

the

u n d e r l y i n g problematic

theory escaped u n s c a t h e d . The put forth b y modernization focus of analysis was economic growth as measured b y GNP, per capita income, e t c . , a l l of' which measurements disguised the underlying class basis of t h e phenomena. Modernization theorists argued that ' d i f f u s i o n ' brought growth, dependency theorists argued that dependence brought stagnation. Within the dependency paradigm a reaction eventually came in the form of' Fernando Cardoso's argument that ' i n specific situations i t is possible to expect development and dependency' .2ll From another angle, Bill Warren argued that imperialism itself' was creating the conditions for r a p i d ,

sustained development i n the Third W o r l d . 2 5 while t h e s e newer formulations severed the f a c i l e u n i t y of' dependence and stagnation, they unfold lunately r e p l a c e d i t , especially i n

Warren's hands, with an equally facile unity of' dependence and growth. Both the stagnationist and growth versions of dependency theory ignore the necessarily contradictory nature of' capitalist development a t the national and international levels. Growth and stagnation would b e better conceptualized as phases of` the c a p i t a l i s t c y c l e , which embody class struggles and class projects. With growth or stagnation, the critical question should be "What class project or a l l i a n c e of` class projects stands a t i t s base?" In s h o r t , "Who benefits?" But to ask t h i s requires a focus on classes, which, as we have already s e e n , has largely been l a c k i n g from the dependency l i t e r a t u r e . Dependency theory received i t s second wind with the theoretical boost given i t by Arghiri Emmanuel ' s theory of

18.

exehange.26 In essence, Emmanuel argued that m o b i l i t y on the world level creates world v a l u e s , while labourimmobility creates national wage rates. D i f f e r e n t i a l wage r a t e s , low in the Third World, high i n the " F i r s t " , render higher r a t e s o f e x p l o i t a t i o n i n t h e Third World. The surplus from this finds its way through international trade a t world prices into the pockets of the " F i r s t World" p r o l e t a r i a t , which since the labour struggles which began in the 1870's has been able to c a p t u r e a greater portion of world surplus in the form of wages. Emmanuel ' s economic reasoning and his political conclusions have been well-disputed both from without t h e unequal exchange perspective2'7 and from within that p e r s p e c t i v e , 2 8 so we need n o t dwell on them h e r e . What i s important t o n o t e for what follows is the extent to which this schema displaces relations of` exploitation between classes in a national arena and inserts a t t h e center of` i t s analysis t h e problematic o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f world surplus unequal capital

as

national

between

"Class

units.

struggle"

is

transmogrified i n t o s t r u g g l e over the distribution of` world s u r p l u s among national u n i t s , i n t o an e f f o r t to capture a

greater, or a t l e a s t not a diminishing,

proportion of world surplus within o n e ' s national boundaries. This problematic has been taken up by Immanuel Waller-stein who has combined i t with many of` t h e standard arguments of dependency theory t o form a new s y n t h e s i s , world systems a n a l y s i s . Following Frank, Wallerstein has argued that the expansion of` Europe s t a r ting in the 16th century signalled the end o f pre-capitalist modes of' production in those areas of` the Third World incorporated within t h e world capitalist market. Talk o f dualism o r feudalism i n the Third World is consequently mystifying. We cannot speak of stages of national development, but only o f stages of' t h e world system. The modern world system is unitary in that i t is synonymous w i t h t h e capitalist mode of p r o d u c t i o n , yet disparate in that i t . is divided i n t o tiers core,

semi-periphery,

and

periphery

-

-

which

play functionally s p e c i f i c roles w i t h i n t h e system as a whole.29 The primary advance made by world systems analysis over earlier versions of the dependency perspective is in i t s breadth of' a n a l y s i s . World systems analysis places a new emphasis on the multilateral relations of the system as a whole (analogous t o Emmanuel's "world values") , rather than on t h e u n i l a t e r a l relations of metropolis and s a t e l l i t e characteristic of dependency theory. Thus core-core and periphery-periphery relations become as central t o the analysis as do core-periphery ones.30 Unfold l u n a t e l y , t h i s new breadth moves us no closer to historically concrete class analysis than did earlier formulations

perspective

of

all

dependency

events,

theory.

processes,

In

the

world

group-identities,

system

class 19.

and s t a t e p r o j e c t s are explained by reference to the system as a w h o l e . As Petras p u t i t , t h e key to understanding world systems analysis is i t s direction of generalization: Specific events within the world system explained i n terms of` t h e demands o f t h e

a r e t o be system as a whole. Actors ar-e acting not for their- immediate concrete i n t e r e s t s but because t h e system dictates that they a c t . 3 l

Actions become reflexes of' system imperatives, especially of t h e need for equilibrium in the distribution of' world s u r p l u s amongst the states of the system. At t h e same t i m e , class cleavages and p o l i t i c a l struggles and alliances within states become in Wallerstein's words " e f f o r t s to a l t e r or preserve a position w i t h i n the world economy",32 that i s , to capture a n undiminished or increased portion o f t h e world surplus within s t a t e boundaries. As a r e s u l t , t h e world systems perspective is riddled w i t h "explanations" such as t h i s ' Welfare s t a t e ideology came about in t h e core s t a t e s a t t h e end o f t h e 19th century as a r e s u l t of t h e need o f the world system ( i . e . , o f the core bourgeoisie) t o redistribute s u r p l u s t o the core proletariat t o enable i t t o buy more a g r i c u l t u r a l and l i g h t manufactured goods, which were then g l u t t i n g t h e world rnarket.33 In such a view, class struggle becomes secondary, if truly important a t all, while the core bourgeoisie takes on t h e a t t r i b u t e s of an omniscient and omnipotent planning apparatus. Most c r i t i q u e s of the world systems perspective have focussed

on

its

understanding

of`

the

transition

from

feudalism to capitalism i n Western Europe.3L* Here, since as Wallerstein has many times s t a t e d , his purpose in delving i n t o the historical past i s to i l l u m i n a t e the shape of` the present, I would l i k e t o focus on a c r i t i c a l current issue' the question of' t h e transition from c a p i t a l i s m t o s o c i a l i s m . I will try to show t h a t t h i s question cannot be c l a r i f i e d by

an analysis that focuses solely on the distribution of' world surplus.

We saw above t h a t for Wallerstein the modern world system is

characterized

by

a

single

mode

of

militant monism not o n l y extends backwards feudalism but also forward According to Wallerstein:

to

the

production.

rise

There a r e today no s o c i a l i s t systems in

This

to the demise of of

socialism.

t h e war-ld economy

any more than there are feudal systems because there is only one world-system. It is a world-economy and i t is by d e f i n i t i o n capitalist i n form. Socialism involves the creation of a new kind o f world system.35

20.

Whether or not transition36, it

t h i s implies a "big-bang" t h e o r y o f the c e r t a i n l y makes i t d i f f i c u l t to situate socialist s t a t e s within the contemporary w o r l d . Looking a t t h e t r a n s i t i o n to socialism solely f r o m the perspective of' the distribution of world s u r p l u s , Wallerstein argues that socialist revolutions have been attempts to r i s e or maintain a position within t h e world system. Once i n power socialist governments, even i f they n a t i o n a l i z e a l l domestic e n t e r p r i s e , must a c t in conformity with t h e "mode of operation of t h e c a p i t a l i s t market system".3'7 Involvement in t h e world capitalist market, a t whatever level a n d in

whatever fashion, constrains socialist governments to behave as collective c a p i t a l i s t s . Without using the terminology, Wallerstein is a consistent advocate of' t h e s t a t e capitalism

thesis.38

World systems analysis , again , focuses on the distribution of world s u r p l u s through s t a t e power. It correctly assumes t h a t , because a t any one t i m e , say a p a r t i c u l a r y e a r , t h e amount o f s u r p l u s produced on the world scale is f i x e d , d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h i s surplus is a zero-sum game. But i t moves from t h i s t r u e , but t r i v i a l , proposition to the notion t h a t national "development", which here means upward mobility through the tiers of t h e world system, necessarily involves capturing greater amounts of` t h e world surplus. And since the overall amount is fixed, "development", be i t c a p i t a l i s t or socialist, involves upward mobility .at the expense of other national u n i t s , particularly those o f the p e r i p h e r y . What i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y passed over here is t h a t , while world surplus is a t any one time a f i x e d amount, over time i t expands because of` increased labour p r o d u c t i v i t y . A concrete examination . of` socialist "development" shows that i t has taken place p r i m a r i l y through increasing labour productivity and greater use of` internal resources, both of` which have required internal class transformations. Once this is realized, the concept o f a "world surplus" becomes a misleading abstraction. For' t h e s i n g l e concept amalgamates two very different quantities' 1) a capitalist world s u r p l u s , the l i o n ' s share of` which is siphoned i n t o the c o f f e r s of` the core bourgeoisie, and 2 ) a socialist s u r p l u s which originates from increased labour productivity within particular socialist states and . is largely retained for domestic u t i l i z a t i o n in those s t a t e s by means of' collectivist control over the national economy. The class project of' socialist revolution has been creation of' bonds of social solidarity, increase of' internally generated s u r p l u s and retention o f that surplus f o r domestic use or for a i d i n g other socialist s t a t e s ( i n t e r n a t i o n a l social s o l i d a r i t y ) , not "development" a t the expense of t h e perip hery. 39 By ignoring t h e peculiarities of' the class project a t the base of' socialist revolutions and transitions and the f'act t h a t these conflicts a r e not over 21.

the distribution of world s u r p l u s but over- the conditions under- which t h i s s u r p l u s i s produced and For whom, world systems t h e o r y becomes a variant of bourgeois convergence theory. The technological level of states w i t h i n t h e world economy determine the operating principles o f the regimes: The Soviet Union and China become increasingly l i k e t h e U . S . , Cuba l i k e Puerto R i c o , a n d s o o n . The c l a s s basis of` a r e g i m e ' s a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l i t s economy and to replace individual competitiveness with c o l l e c t i v e m o b i l i t y through social s o l i d a r i t y is ignored by world systems a n a l y s i s , as is the class basis of` a r e g i m e ' s mode of' insertion into the world m a r k e t . I n s h o r t , classes appear i n world systems analysis as the o b j e c t s , not the s u b j e c t s , of h i s t o r y . III

The tendency o f the dependency/world systems school t o stray from widely acknowledged standards o f Marxist a n a l y s i s its focus on d i s t r i b u t i o n a t the expense o f p r o d u c t i o n , i t s tendency to ignore or mystify class struggle has understandably led t o e f f o r t s to "return to Marx". These have taken a t l e a s t two very d i f f e r e n t forms, which need to be c a r e f u l l y distinguished. One such e f f o r t has taken the form o f what we might c a l l

-

-

"modes o f production" a n a l y s i s . Deriving i t s i n s p i r a t i o n and conceptual tools from Althusserian structuralism a n d i t s attendant school o f Marxist anthropology,L*0 it has found i t s way i n t o English-language s t u d i e s largely through the work o f Ernesto L a c l a u . L l While t h e l i t e r a t u r e o f t h i s approach is diverse and one sometimes feels t h a t i t s advocates share a common terminology r a t h e r t h a n a common t h e o r y , the terms themselves and the d e f i n i t i o n s t y p i c a l l y given to them do tend to imply certain theoretical directions

rather than o t h e r s . Against t h e monism of' dependency/world the

modes

social

This

of'

production

formations

claim

is

approach

encompass

argues

several

partially based

systems that

modes

of

on definitional

Third

theory, World

production.

criteria:

a

mode o f production i s , according t o t h i s a p p r o a c h , d e f i n e d by i t s "relations o f p r o d u c t i o n " , i . e . , the d i r e c t relation between the immediate producer of' the surplus and i t s immediate a p p r o p r i a t o r . Involvement in market r e l a t i o n s is i r r e l e v a n t to t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f a mode o f p r o d u c t i o n . And couplet, serf-lord, slave-slavemaster, free l a b o u r e r - c a p i t a l i s t d e f i n e s a s e p a r a t e mode. Thus while t h e

each

modes o f production approach acknowledges the e x i s t e n c e of' a capitalist world system k n i t together by market r e l a t i o n s , i t recognizes a c a p i t a l i s t mode o f production only where lab our is " f r e e " , Prima f a c i e , t h i s perspective appears t o constitute a t least a partial return to the sectoral analysis of` modernization theory. The c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e , however , is 22.

t h a t , u n l i k e d u a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , t h e emphasis here is on interrelatedness of modes of production. It is argued that the c a p i t a l i s t , or in some versions f e u d a l , expansion of the West in t h e 16th c e n t u r y , encountered pre-capitalist modes o f production in the Thas. World which n o t or could not t o t a l l y transform OI obliterate,= .--. er which it simultaneously conserved a destroyed. . It roved by draining these pre-capitalist modes H labour-power and raw materials. At t h e same time I conserved these modes as arenas for the production of means of agricultural subsistence in order to k e e p the labour-power and raw materials so extracted cheap. In the jargon o f t h i s school , capitalism both dominates and "articulates" with pre-capitalist modes of production i n the Third World. A major d i f f e r e n c e between this school and world systems analysis is in i t s focus of analysis and direction of generalization. As we have seen t h e world systems approach would explain everything by reference to the systemimperatives of` the whole. Compared to this the modes of production a p p r o a c h , a t je ?"""' variants . with important e x c e p t i o n s , Samir attempts conjoin both approaches i s i n g l e framework) signal considerable narrowing oft a n a l y t i c focus. in scheme: "The character ul development social formations must be understood i n terms basic contradictions ' i n t e r n a l ' t o these f`ormations." Thus to the primacy o f the "external" relations focussed on b y world systems analysis, the modes of production approach counterposes the primacy of "internal" relations. What frequently underlies t h i s change of` focus is t h e i m p l i c i t notion (explicit in the work of Rey) t h a t c a p i t a l i s t development i n the core countries is homologous t o t h a t in the peripheral countries. I n other w o r l d s , i t postulates that the sequences of t h e transition from feudalism to capitalism in """"' 1est will be replicated in the Third

the

i*"3"

El

he-:¢

,1.

ul'-

" -

Worlds ;I. become immediately ' I

frequently school. E

lnalysis in

volumes I

and

I I I of` Capital

.p plicable to the Third World, and are

so quoted

and applied in

the

literature of` this

implicit 11 i a l o f combined and uneven development sometimes comes perilously close to the universal stages of national development postulated by modernization t h e o r y . How are we to explain with t h i s approach the fact t h a t c a p i t a l i s t expansion into t h e Third World occasionally engendered i t s own "historical antecedents"? As Foster-carter put i t :

...the problematic of articulation must envisage a capitalism which not only conserves...[pr=e-capitalist modes of pr~oduction]...but even or on occasion in defiance of diachronic actively creates them.u3

-

-

23.

how are we to explain West Indian s l a v e r y , s e t t l e r regimes, e t c . These, i t seems, a r e only explicable as capitalist i n s t i t u t i o n s , created by expansive capital for i t s own purposes. The modes of' production approach narrows the focus of i t s analysis i n another r e g a r d . By i d e n t i f y i n g a mode o f production s o l e l y on the basis o f , again narrowly d e f i n e d , "relations of' p r o d u c t i o n " , i t s t r i p s the eoneept o f mode of production down to i t s barest bones and displaces from the centre of attention the much wider complex o f relations of c l a s s , s t a t e , inter-state which d e f i n e the dynamic of' Third World social formations. The outlines o f a very d i f f e r e n t "return to Marx" can be seen in t h e recent work of Colin Leys and James Petras.ll*l4 The focus of analysis h e r e i s not world system imperatives or articulated. modes of production, but classes as the prime movers o f h i s t o r y . Petras has done the most to systematize t h i s a p p r o a c h , s o we w i l l focus on his perspective h e r e . Petras argues along with t h e world systems approach and against the modes of' production theorists that capitalism, defined by the creation o f s u r p l u s v a l u e , can have d i f f e r e n t relations of production. Typical of t h e Third World, i n this view, has been labour s c a r c i t y and the availability of a l t e r n a t i v e economic a c t i v i t y , which has required coercive relations o f p r o d u c t i o n f o r c a p i t a l expansion. But Petras dissents from the "external" relations of' world systems analysis and the "internal" relations of modes of production a n a l y s i s . The salient feature of Third World societies is precisely t h e manner in which external and internal "class s t r u c t u r e s cross one another and the various combinations of' class symbiosis and interloek".*5 C a p i t a l i s t expansion on t h e world s c a l e has engendered t h e other w o r d s ,

In

reserve systems in

existence of

collaborative s t r a t a in the Third World which both orient production outwardly and e x p l o i t i n t e r n a l l y . Decolonization gave these strata access to the instrumentality o f t h e indigenous s t a t e and the choice o f development s t r a t e g i e s based on d i f f e r e n t internal

several

and external class alliances. F i r s t , there is the "neocolonial" strategy wherein the national regime p a r t i c i p a t e s with the core bourgeoisie in exploiting the indigenous lab our force. Secondly, the national regime may undertake a "national developmental" strategy based on exploitation of` t h e indigenous labour force a n d t h e l i m i t a t i o n or elimination o f t h e share going to imperial firms. ~Thir'd, the regime may a l l y w i t h the indigenous labour force, nationalize foreign and even indigenous e n t e r p r i s e , r e d i s t r i b u t e income, and generally undertake a "national populist" strategy as against core c a p i t a l . Although we cannot go into i t h e r e , Petras has much to say about t h e inter-relations amongst these strategies and the

role

of'

the

imperial

state

in

regimes and undermining the others. 211

.

snoring

u p neo-colonial

What is i m p o r t a n t to notice is the new emphasis t h a t is put on classes as the agents o f h i s t o r y . The focus i s not on development, i . e . , growth, versus stagnation. Accumulation occurs, b u t in a cyclical fashion and on the basis of concrete class p r o j e c t s . Nor i s the focus on world system imperatives. The world market, a f t e r a l l , is the r e s u l t of class activity extended beyond national borders. The relations o f the world economy a r e not the result of` impersonal market f o r c e s , b u t o f the economic and p o l i t i c a l interplay of' class forces across national boundaries and within n a t i o n s . Nor, f i n a l l y , i s the focus on i n t e r n a l modes o f production and t h e i r at t i c u l a t i o n . The wider interplay of class and s t a t e a t the national and i n t e r n a t i o n a l levels is brought i n t o f u l l view. In t h e work of' Petras and Leys, the key q u e s t i o n t h a t has tended t o get lost i n a l l other sociologies o f development clearly s u r f a c e s : development for

whom? NOTES l. For' t y p i c a l examples of` modernization theory, see Walt w. Ros tow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960) ; Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, e d s . , The Politics o f Developing Areas ( P r i n c e t o n : Princeton University P r e s s , 1960) ; David A p t e r , The Politics U n i v e r s i t y of' Chicago P r e s s , of` Modernization (Chicago~ 1965); etc. 2. For typical examples of` dependency t h e o r y , see Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review P r e s s , 1957) ; Andre Gunder F r a n k , Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin American (New York: Monthly Review Press, 196 7) ; Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence", i n Readings in US Imperialism, K.T. Fann and Donald C . Hodges, e d s . , (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971); e t c . 3. For t y p i c a l examples of' world systems t h e o r y , see Immanuel

Waller-stein,

The

Modern

World

System

(New

York:

Academic Press, 19714) ; and his "Rise and Demise of the World Capitalist System", Comparative_ Studies in Society and History, 16, l97M; e t c . II. This criticism has been made by adherents of modes of' production theory. See Ernesto L a c l a u , "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America", New Left Review, No. 6 7 ; John G . Taylor, From Modernization to Modes o f Production (Londo n° Macmillan, 1 9 7 9 ) ; e t c . 5. For this c r i t i c i s m , see James Petras, Critical _Perspectives on _Imperialism and Social Class_ in the Third World (New York' Monthly Review Press, 1978) ; Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975) ; a n d his "Underdevelopment and Dependency' Critical Notes", Journal o f Contemporary Asia, Vol. '7:l, 19771 e t c .

25-

6. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-building a n d Citizenship (New York: Wiley, l 9 6 M ) . 7. Cited by Donal Cruise O ' B r i e n , "Modernization, O r d e r , and t h e Erosion o f a Democratic I d e a l : American Political Science 1960-'70", Journal of` Development Studies, 8 . 1972, p . 353. 8. Karl Marx, Capital (Chicago: Charles K e r r , 1 9 0 5 ) , V o l . I , p . 13-

9.

Ber t

Hoselitz,

ed.,

The

developed Areas (Chicago: University o f

Progress

of`

Under-

Chicago Press, 1952) ,

p. v . 10.

See, e.g., Seymour Martin Lips e t , "Values, Education, and Entrepreneurship", in Elites i n Latin America, Lipset a n d Aldo Solari, e d s . (New `York: Oxford University Press, 1967). II. For a good example of t h i s type o f c r i t i c i s m , see Andre Gunder Frank, "Sociology of` Development and Underdevelopment of` Sociology", in Dependence and Underdevelopment, James Cockcroft, A.G. Frank, and Dale Johnson, e d s . (Garden C i t y : Doublebay, 1 9 7 2 ) . 12. For other approaches to the understanding of "traditional" social formations, see Karl Marx, P r e c a p i t a l i s t Economic Formations (New York: International P u b l i s h e r s , 1965) ; Samir Amin, Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1 9 7 6 ) , Chap. 1 . 13 Reinhard Bendix , "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered", i n his Embattled Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, . 1 9 7 0 ) . lil. James Petras and Robert LaPorte, Cultivating Revolution (New York: Random Press, 1971) 15. Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America: Development or Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969) 16. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1 9 6 8 ) . 17. The notion o f "dual economy", taken u p by the whole o f t h e modernization school, was given consistency by

.

.

.

w.A.

Lewis,

"Economic Development with

Unlimited Supplies of

Labour" in his Theory of' Economic Growth (New York' Harper Torchbooks, 1970)

.

The dualist thesis and t h e p o l i t i c a l l i n e has i t s analogue in the classical debate over' imperialism. Joseph Schumpeter, "The Sociology of` Imperialisms" i n h i s Imperialism a n d Social Classes (New York: World Publishing, 1955) , argued that German imperialism resulted from a complex of "atavistic" a t t i t u d e s l e f t over from the feudal past a n d carried into the present by feudal elements which retained political hegemony. Schumpeter's p o l i t i c a l thrust was to appeal to the German bourgeoisie ( t h e "modernizers") to throw o f f their feudal rulers (the "traditiorlalists") and to develop a "pure" , for' him non-imperialist, capitalism.

that flows from i t

26.

18. James P e t r a s , Politics and Social Structure in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1 9 7 0 ) : Irving Leonard Markovitz, Power and Class in Africa (Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice H a l l , 1 9 7 7 ) . 19For an i n t e r e s t i n g historical ease s t u d y which illustrates t h i s p o i n t , see Frederick Pike, "Aspects of` Class Relations i n Chile, 1850-l960", i n Latin America: Reform or Revolution, James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds. (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1 9 6 8 ) . 20. On t h i s background, see P h i l i p O'Brien, "A C r i t i q u e o f Latin American Theories of Dependency", and David Booth, "Andre Gunder Frank: An Introduction and an Appreciation", both in Beyond t h e Sociology o f Development, I v a r Oxaal, Tony B a r n e t t , and David Booth, e d s . (London: Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1 9 7 5 ) . 21. See, e s p . , his Capitalism and Underdevelopment, op.cit. 22. For an informative account of t h i s schema and i t s ups and downs in recent years, see Jacques Lévesque, L'URSS et l a Revolution Cuba i r e (Montreal: Presses d e L ' U n v e r s i t é d e Montréal, n . d . ) . 23. Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, o p . c i t . , p . 20. 211. Fernando Cardoso, "Dependency and Development in Latin America", New Left Review, No. 7H. 25. Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization", New Leflt Review, No. 7 3 . Warren's theoretical ineptitude, d e c e p t i v e use of` s t a t i s t i c s , e t c . have been well criticized b y Philip McMichael, James Petras, and Robert Rhodes, "Industrialization in the Third World", in P e t r a s , Critical Perspectives, o p . c i t . 26. Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange (New York: Monthly Review P r e s s , 1 9 7 2 ) . 27. See Charles Bettleheim's remarks contained in Emmanuel's book; Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1975), Chap. I I ; Michael Kidron, Capitalism and Theory (London' P l u t o Press, 1 9 7 u ) , Chap. 5 . 28. Saris Amir, Imperialism and Unequal Development (New York' Monthly Review Press, 1 9 7 7 ) , P a r t Iv. 29. Wallerstein, The Modern_ orld System, o p . c i t . ; and his "Rise and Future Demise", o p . c i t . 30. For t h i s , see Samir Amir, Accumulation on a World Scale (New York: Monthly Review Press, l 9 7 U ) » Petras, Critical Perspectives, o p . c i t . 1 D- 333132. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Present State of` the Debate on World Inequality", i n his edited volume World Inequality (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1975) , p . 16. 33Wallerstein, "Rise and Demise", o p . c i _ t . , pp. M10-ll. 311. See, e . g . , Verl F . Hunt, "The Rise of' Feudalism in Eastern Europe", Science and Society, Spring 1978; Robert

_

Brenner,

"The

Review,

No.

Origins

1014;

of

Alex

Capitalist

Dupuy

and

Development",

Paul

New Leflt

Fitzgerald,

"A

.

27

System Contribution to the Critique of the World Perspective", The Insurgent Sociologist, Spring 1977. 35. Waller s t e i n , "Rise and Demise", o p . c i t . , p . U1536. For t h i s view, s e e Ira Get-stein, "Theories o f t h e World Economy and Imperialism" and

W a l l e r s t e i n ' s d e n i a l , "How

Do We Know Class Struggle When We S e e - I t ? " , Insurgent Sociologist, Spring 1977.

both

in

The

W a l l e r s t e i n , "Rise a n d Demise", o p . c i t . , p . u13. For t h e s t a t e c a p i t a l i s t thesis, see Tony C l i f f , Capitalism in Russia (London° P l u t o P r e s s , 19714) ; f`or

3T.

38. State

cogent

criticisms o f

this

see

thesis,

Ernest

Mandel,

The

Mystifications ofl__state Capitalism (London: Prinkipo Press, 1970) and his The Inconsistencies o f S t a t e Capitalism (London: Pioneer Press, 1 9 6 9 ) . 39. On t h e nature of this class p r o j e c t , see James Petras, "Aspects of Class Formation i n the P e r i p h e r y " , in his Critical Perspectives, op.cit.,; John Gurley, "Maoist Economic Development", i n his C h i n a ' s Economy and t h e Maoist Strategy (New Y o r k ' Monthly Review P r e s s , l 9 T 6 ) ; Clive Y. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation (New York: Monthly Review Pr-ess, 19711) ; for' a case s t u d y which begins to a n a l y z e

some of

the obstacles t o t h e easy implementation o f this project, see Frank T . Fitzgerald, "A C r i t i q u e o f the 'Sovietization of C u b a ' , Thesis", Science and Society, Spring

1978. MO. Esp. t h e work o f Georges D u p r e , P i e r r e - P h i l i p p e Rey, a n d Claude Meillassoux, for a discussion of' which, see John Clammer, "Economic Anthropology and t h e Sociology of' Development",

in

Beyond,

Oxaal,

et.al.,

op.cit.,

Aidan

Foster-Carter, "The Modes o f Production Controversy", New Left Review, No. 107Ml. Laclau, "Feudalism a n d Capitalism", o p . c i t . 112. Richard Harris, "Marxism and the Agrarian Question i n Latin America", L a t i n American Perspectives, Fall

1978, p . 16. 43.

Foster-Carter, "Modes",

1414.

Leys,

Critical perspectives, op.cit. UE.

28

.

o p . c i t . , p . 67.

Underdevelopment i n

I b i d . , p . 6M.

Kenya,

o p . c i t . ; Petr-as,

Chapter

3

_

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY:

CRITICAL

NOTES

Colin Leys

. . . t h i s concept [dependence] f a i l s t o grasp t h e real n a t u r e of' the process o f underdevelopment. The immediate explanation for this is the theoretical framework employed...eclectic combination of' orthodox economic theory and revolutionary phraseology... (Geoffrey Kay, Development and_ Underdevelopment' A Marxist Analysis, p . 103)It

is

becoming c l e a r t h a t "underdevelopment" a n d "dependency" 'ho longer- serviceable and must now be transcended. The evidence for t h i s i s ( a ) theoretical r e p e t i t i o n and stagnation in the literature on underdevelopment and dependency theory (UDT): ( b ) t h e existence o f fundamental problems of' analysis which UDT cannot solve, or even formulate, and c e n t r a l problems o f development s t r a t e g y which a r e linked with t h e s e , and about which UDT is e i t h e r silent or ambiguous; ( c ) an evident lack of practical impact in favour o f the popular forces i n the struggles in t h i r d world countries, b u t on the c o n t r a r y , a marked tendency for the theory is

-

underdevelopment/dependency

"perspective"

allied to present article is an attempt

developmentalists

to

international

be

co-opted

capital.

by

The

to c l a r i f y all t h i s , with the

h e l p of` several recent sympathetic s t u d i e s o f

t h e genesis of'

UDT and i t s v a r i a n t s , and to suggest what needs to be done about i t . UDT AND ITS PROBLEMS By "under-development and dependency t h e o r y " I mean the following general theses' a. The social, economic and political conditions prevailing throughout today's "third world" ("less developed countries" in UN assuage) are not due to the persistence o f an "original" (undeveloped or' "untouched") s t a t e of` a f f a i r s , but a r e the results o f

process

in

which

the

"first

t h e same war-ld-historical

world"

("developed

market

29-

b

economies") became "developed"; the development of' the latter involved a closely associated course of development f o r t h e f o r m e r , a process o f subordinate development or underdevelopment. The prime mover in t h i s combined process was c a p i t a l seeking p r o f i t s , i . e . seeking opportunities t o accumulate c a p i t a l ; s p e c i f i c a l l y , c a p i t a l i s t merchants, capitalist bankers , capitalist insurers , etc , and finally c a p i t a l i s t manufacturers. Their a c t i v i t i e s involved a c c u m u l a t i n g c a p i t a l where t h i s could be done c h e a p l y , and i n v e s t i n g i t where t h e return to investment was h i g h e s t , and this gave r i s e to a process o f s u r p l u s removal from some parts o f the world to o t h e r s , p e r p e t u a t i n g and r i g i d i f y i n g i n new ways the low levels o f p r o d u c t i v i t y in t h e areas from which the s u r p l u s was t a k e n ; and a l s o a s t r u c t u r i n g o f these economies so as t o subordinate them systematically t o the s t r u c t u r e s of t h e economies where c a p i t a l was being accumulated. This expressed i t s e l f in the "external orientation" of t h e subordinate economies (export of primary commodities, import of a l l manufactures) ; in monoculture; in dependent industrialisation (dependent on external forces demand, strategic division o f l a b o u r , technology, e t c . for i t s dynamics and s t r u c t u r a t i o n ) .

.

C

-

-

d

Secondary

f.

The

term

the

consequences

process

of

this

served

to

local i n i t i a t i v e s t o pursue an pathe . g . t h e low incomes o f the m a j o r i t y d u e to t h e creation o f s u r p l u s labour and marginalisation imply a generally small domestic market; highly unequal income d i s t r i b u t i o n implies a narrow import-oriented consumer demand; e t c . The corresponding emergence and formation of social classes a t t h e c a p i t a l i s t periphery w i t h interests in common with the bourgeoisie of` t h e metropoles made possible the development of colonial neo-colonial and semi-colonial s t a t e s r e p r e s e n t i n g successive types o f such a l l i a n c e s .

reproduce

e.

structural

and

constantly block autonomous development

"underdevelopment"

refers

to

these

self-perpetuating processes , these self-reproducing s t r u c t u r e s , and to t h e i r r e s u l t s . The term "dependency" i s sometimes used t o r e f e r to e x a c t l y t h e same things, and sometimes more specifically to refer to the non-autonomous nature o f the laws or tendencies governing change in t h e social formations of t h e p e r i p h e r y . In s p i t e of disagreements between the users of the two terms their differences seem less important extensive points of general agreement.1

than

their

Of course this s o r t o f o u t l i n e misses part o f the strength of UDT, which is to have stimulated t h e e m p i r i c a l study of institutional and structural mechanisms of' under-development such as multinational c o r p o r a t i o n s , income distribution, fiscal and taxation policies , capital 30 .

expenditure and aid programmes, e t c . But I think i t s main t h r u s t is roughly as sketched above. And in the context of` the e a r l y 1960s when UDT emerged as a m i l i t a n t c r i t i q u e of the ruling ideas of developmental ism, its thrust was unquestionably a progressive one. O'Br-ien's comment that "the international economy is l i k e l y to prove a more seminal starting point for understanding development and underdevelopment t h a n , e . g . , traditional and modern s o c i e t y , stages o f growth, achievement motivation, or even M y r d a l ' s "causally i n t e r - r e l a t e d conditions of' a social system" i s an

understatement which reminds us of' some of' the intellectual deserts from which UDT rescued u s , along with "integration", " n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g " , " p o l i t i c a l development", "modernisation" and much e l s e . These were arid formulations because they s t a r t e d o u t from t h e premise (mo re or less i n a r t i c u l a t e ) that underdevelopment was a "primal" or "original" condition and proceeded to ignore the historical and "transitive" relationships between development and underdevelopment, and hence the whole phenomenon o f imperialism. They nearly a l l

ignored the existence of social classes, and treated the s t a t e as an instrument of popular w i l l , or a t least o f t h e public interest as i n t e r p r e t e d by a minority on behalf of the public. They had in fact a highly ideological c h a r a c t e r , as we can now easily see in the light east by UDT. And some of` them embodied this i n the particularly s t u l t i f y i n g forms o f abstracted empiricism and "grand t h e o r y " . In fact all these features of bourgeois development theory have been made apparent by UDT. The question i s , however, whether UDT is free from a l l of them i t s e l f . As for UDT, then, i t is t r u e t h a t the charge that i t has tended towards theoretical repetition and stagnation is necessarily s u b j e c t i v e ; and i t is probably more accurate to say that UDT was eharacterised from the first by a proliferation of attempts to formulate characterisations, models and analyses of underdevelopment or dependency in general,2 it iS significant t h a t the few attempts a t systematic theorisation

-

f o r instance by Amir or

Szentes

-

have been by economists and have not really systematised the kind of` total perspective s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , ideological and economic implied in the more general formulations

-

-

through which UDT is c h i e f l y known. As I w i l l indicate below, t h i s r e f l e c t s the genesis of UDT as a criticism o f bourgeois development theory which, while radical in intention, r e a l l y remains within i t s problematic, s o that the systematisation of` UDT could only produce a revision of' bourgeois development t h e o r y , and an ultimately non radical one a t t h a t . The sense of` theoretical repetition and stagnation which the UDT l i t e r a t u r e eventually conveys (as O'Brien says, "was i t really necessary to write so many millions of words to establish j u s t this perspective'?") seems t o me t h e n , to be due to the necessity o f s t a y i n g a t the level of a general "perspective" i f the fundamental

31.

d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent in that perspective a r e not t o be immediately a p p a r e n t . 3 The s o r t of' d i f f i c u l t i e s involved include the following ( t h e l i s t is not in any o r d e r , let alone comprehensive) • a. The meaning o f "development" i n UDT i s o b s c u r e . Insofar a s i t implies a concept of` development i t is evidently that of the c a p i t a l i s t development experienced by the capitalist "metropoles". But if the study of underdevelopment

b

C

suggests

that

the

underdeveloped

countries now cannot follow a development path a t a l l similar to that of` t h e "metropoles", i t is a matter of great consequence i f t h e analysis of how they become and are kept underdeveloped does not i t s e l f disclose what "development" can or should mean for them, or how i t is to be accomplished. The f a c t is that this does not seem t o b e s o , and t h i s i s shown by the great variety of` practical-political positions arrived a t ( o f t e n somewhat independently of their theoretical f o r m u l a t i o n s ) by d i f f e r e n t UD theories, though UD theorists actually o f t e n adopt very vague practical-political p o s i t i o n s , i f a n y , and largely confine themselves to i n t e r p r e t i n g a n d explaining what has happened in the past. Exploitation. Much UDT is unclear- whether- the masses in the underdeveloped countries s u f f e r from exploitation or n o t , and i f s o , to what extent. Most o f t h e theorists i m p l y , a t l e a s t , that the masses o f the third world a r e exploited as well as oppressed, but do not make i t clear* how. The issue was posed i n the debate between Charles Bettelheim and Arghiri Emmanuel over Emmanuel ' s Unequal Exchange and is raised again in a s h a r p way by Kay even though his formulation is not perhaps a s clear as one would l i k e ("capitalism has created underdevelopment not simply because it has exploited the underdeveloped countries but because it has not exploited them enough").U Primitive concepts.

It

is

hard

to

deny

that

UDT i s

to

say t h e least very broad-gauged. The centre-periphery metaphor is seldom if' ever replaced by a concrete typology o f centres and p e r i p h e r i e s . The same is t r u e o f "dependence". I t is sometimes said ( e . g . by Cardoso) t h a t there a r e " d i f f e r e n t forms" of' dependence but unless these a r e i d e n t i f i e d and t h e differences theoretically explained, the question arises whether t h i s perspective is not a f a i r l y a r b i t r a r y way of s e n s i t i s i n g us to one set of relationships a t the cost o f anaesthetising us to others - i . e . sensitising us to only one dimension of a more complex interdependency.5 And i t is not r e a l l y a n accident t h a t these s i m p l i s t i c pairings, developed/underdeveloped, c e n t r e / p e r i p h e r y , dominant/dependent resemble those o f bourgeois development theory (traditional/ modern, r i c h / p o o r , advanced/backward, e t c . ) : t h e y a r e basically polemical inversions of them. But the r e s u l t

32.

d.

is a very serious weakness: t h e empirical meaning o f "underdeveloped" has t o be pretty slight if' i t must embrace India and Brazil as well as Haiti and Tanzania. I t is also clear t h a t P o r t u g a l , B r i t a i n , t h e USA and Japan ( n o t to mention the USSR) a r e "developed" i n different ways t h a t are seldom i f ever c l a r i f i e d in UDT, important though this i s . (Before l9'7ll, for example, i t was conventional wisdom for some UD theorists that a neo-colonial solution in Africa was "impossible" for Portugal because of' her own underdevelopment; i t is clear t h a t t h e concepts these words denote a r e f a r too weak for making the theoretical distinctions needed t o a n a l y s e t h e important p o l i t i c a l questions involved h e r e ) . "Economism" and "mechanicisrn". UDT tends to be economistic i n t h e sense t h a t social classes, t h e s t a t e , p o l i t i c s , ideology figure in i t very n o t i c e a b l y as derivatives of economic forces, and o f t e n get very l i t t l e attention a t a l l . Classes, for i n s t a n c e , tend t o appear as categories r e s u l t i n g from t h e s t r u c t u r a l evolution o f underdevelopment or dependent development; thus landlords are technically backward, domestic bourgeoisies are weak and comprador in outlook, wage-labour forces a r e small and highly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , e t c . Classes do n o t appear as t h e prime movers of` history in t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , and a corresponding theoretical eclecticism is apparent ( " e l i t e " is often used alongside "class", for i n s t a n c e ) . And UDT tends to be mechanical in the sense that processes tend t o be presented as resulting from a "logic" of mechanism, a system of vicious circles reinforcing each other ( e . g . low productivity means low real incomes which mean narrow markets which mean high levels of` protection f o r manufacturing which mean high cost production which means lower real incomes - e t c . etc.). This r e s u l t s i n accounts which appear curiously s t a t i c , "underdevelopment" can appear as inescapable (something countries are "locked into" as the "breakdown" of' c a p i t a l i s m appeared in t h e marxism of' t h e

-

Second International.

e.

Little attention

is

paid t o the

struggle against imperialism and t h e social and political consequences of underdevelopment; s t i l l less d o most UD theorists concentrate on t h i s s t r u g g l e as t h e key t o overcoming underdevelopment. A good example of the confusion and v u l n e r a b i l i t y of' UDT on something obviously central is the debate stimulated by Warren, as to whether "underdevelopment" precludes rapid and "independent" c a p i t a l i s t industrialisation a t the periphery, and if not, whether (as Cardoso implies) the "dependent c a p i t a l i s t industrialisation" through MNC branch plants is ultimately different from other kinds of c a p i t a l i s t industrialisation; i f n o t , are we not back with "late development" and "catching up"? Imperialism. On the whole this concept appears in UDT

33.

as an "extra", o f t e n with a qualifier' (such as "economic imperialism", "cultural i m p e r i a l i s m " , e t c . ) and often meaning no more than the mechanisms and institutions of' penetration and control employed by international capital in the t h i r d w o r l d . There is a certain ambivalence, to say the l e a s t , towards t h e Lenirxist conception of imperialism as a historical stage of' capitalism, an ambivalence which is I t h i n k primarily political and only secondarily theoretical; i . e . , i n the third world context the adoption of such a concept implies a break with the perspective o f reform which much UDT has not really made. But avoiding the concept means , f r e q u e n t l y , avoiding realities which are c e n t r a l to the situations with which UDT i s meant to deal. Units of analysis. Another area where the conceptual imprecision of UDT is unacceptable concerns t h e u n i t s of` analysis which should be central to it social formations, modes of` p r o d u c t i o n , world economy, e t c . The positive merits of UDT turn on i t s insistence on the importance of` trans-national or trans-state relationships i n explaining the course o f events in underdevelopment i n t h i r d world c o u n t r i e s . Yet concepts used to analyse these are often far from clear. For- instance Fr-ank's well-known characterisation of t h e whole Latin American economy as " c a p i t a l i s t " from the 16th century seems to preclude a systematic analysis of` t h e class forces there (over that time they can't a l l have been either c a p i t a l i s t s , eompradors or proletarians and a r e they y e t ? ) ; yet the problematic o f the "articulation" of d i f f e r e n t modes of production, which is implied by Laclau's equally well-known c r i t i q u e of Frank, presents i t s own d i f f i c u l t i e s . What causes underdevelopment? Curiously enough, i t is not clear that . UDT provides any explanation o f why more capital did not get invested and accumulated in the t h i r d world in the past, or' o f why i t should not now take advantage of cheap labour and soak up the v a s t pools of

only

f`.

-

-

g.

unemployed people in the third world today. This is connected, of course, with the failure to be clear' about t h e question of e x p l o i t a t i o n ; i t shows again how UDT offers only a general interpretation of` a current s i t u a t i o n , a system of` mechanisms broadly taken as " g i v e n " , rather than p u t t i n g forward a theory of` the "laws" governing t h e historical appearance and subsequent evolution of those mechanisms. The l i s t could be extended. Booth's remark t h a t F r a n k ' s formulations "sensitise us to certain features of economic change and a t the same time anaesthetise us to other features" can Fairly be a p p l i e d , i t seems, t o UDT generally. But the comment does not go far enough. The trouble with UDT is not that i t is a theory s t i l l a t a n e a r l y stage of development, a theory with various gaps needing to be filled

314.

u p and ambiguities to be resolved (as I myself' used to suppose) The real trouble is that concepts which primarily "sensitise" d o not belong t o a coherent theoretical system, based on a consistent political standpoint and a consistent method of analysis; they a r e ideological rather than s c i e n t i f i c . This is why UDT is "stalled", and why i t s real gains - t h e detailed analyses of the i n s t i t u t i o n s and structures of underdevelopment are being appropriated more by the ideologists of international capital than the workers and peasants of the third world.

.

-

UDT AS "MARXIFIED STRUCTURALISM"

In order to understand this better we must look again a t the origins of` UDT, taking advantage of the excellent recent studies by Foster-Carter, Girvan, O'Brien a n d Booth. 6 What these a l l confirm is that the main l i n e of' descent of UDT, almost wholly a New World Phenomenon, was a series of revisions of orthodox (bourgeois) economic analysis, beginning with t h e c r i t i q u e of international trade theory which was t h e s t a r ting-point of` the ECLA "school". This i n i t i a l revision explained the failure of Latin American and Caribbean economies t o develop b y i d e n t i f y i n g s t r u c t u r a l obstacles which would have to be overcome by appropriate policies to change t h e structures policies summed u p in the phrase "inward-oriented development", and meaning particularly, industrialisation through import substitution. This was followed by a further revision which explained the failure of` this strategy in terms of a new set of structural b a r r i e r s , often structures which were introduced i n t h e very

-

process o f inward-oriented industrialisation and tended to defeat the o b j e c t of the original restructuring policy ( e . g . the high import-content of' MNC branch plant i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ) ; or' s t r u c t u r a l obstacles a t another level, which were revealed in the course of the initial restructuring

e f f o r t ( e . g . h i g h l y u n e q u a l income s t r u c t u r e s , urban-rural imbalances, e t c . ) structures which in turn often seemed .1 aggravated by the new strategies. "Under-development" and "dependency" then emerged as concepts

,

=

embracing these newly apparent structures and mechanisms l h e same time, as the fresh "layers" of' s t r u c t u r a l obstacles were i d e n t i f i e d they came more and more , as part o f a long-term process involving Ml successive stages, each with i t s d i s t i n c t i v e institutional mechanisms reinforcing or- modifying economic and social structures, but always reproducing their fundamentally subordinate character , serving development elsewhere , minimising i t s benefits and maximising i t s costs locally. The main stream of UDT can thus b e seen as eventuating in radical structuralism i . e . as a structuralist analysis of' the obstacles to c a p i t a l i s t development in the third world in which progressively more and more of what were originally r

-

35-

as means to structural change international manufacturing companies, t h i r d world governments and t h e interests they mostly represent, e t c . - come to be seen as yet further s t r u c t u r e s which themselves need t o be changed. The central weakness of radical structuralism is obvious. Inverting Cleaver's dictum t h a t "if y o u ' r e part o f the solution you're part of the problem", radical s t r u c t u r a l i s m cannot escape the d i f f i c u l t y t h a t t h e solution always turns out to be part o f t h e problem. This is particularly clear in t h e case of Gunnar Myrdal, who is not a dependency or underdevelopment theorist b u t who c e r t a i n l y is a s t r u c t u r a l i s t and a social-democrat, and whose Challenge of World Poverty identifies as main causes of` poverty t h e very governments and international agencies t o whom h e a l s o appeals for solutions. In the case of the earlier writings of` Best, Girvan and their collaborators in the West I n d i e s , i t appears in t h e shape of a reform programme for an anti-imperialist government based on an alliance of` progressive local c a p i t a l i s t s w i t h the popular* masses - which was, i n f a c t , j u s t what the existing governments of the West Indies generally claimed t o b e . 7 Neither Myrdal nor t h e New World Economists appear' t o suggest how the problem is to become t h e solution; t h e i r utopianism is q u i t e c l e a r . But i n the case of UDT the c e n t r a l weakness is p a r t l y concealed, thanks to the convergence of` i t s main stream with _ Marxism, and especially neo-Marxism of another stream various k i n d s . In t h e case of Frank there was the influence of' Paul Baran, whose Political Economy of Growth appeared in 1957, and as Frank himself says, t h e influences of` t h e Cuban revolution. More generally there was t h e impact of` de-Stalinisation a n d polycentrism on t h e Latin American communist par t i e s , and t h e subsequent influence of Maoism added to t h e a l r e a d y complex pattern of Latin American Marxism, with i t s strong Trctskyist c u r r e n t s . But whatever the d i v e r s i t y of channels, t h e Marxist stream c e r t a i n l y mingled with t h a t o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m in t h e 1960s, t o the point where O'Brien, for instance, could refer to them as

seen

"different

traditions within the theory of dependency" 1 8

immediate effect of "mar°xifying" radical structuralism was to s h i f t the implied solution to the problem of underdevelopment from economic nationalism to socialism, and to shift the means from utopian recommendations of' radical structural reforms to revolutionary struggle. But t h i s was a n i l l u s i o n . It i s no less utopian t o appeal to "revolution" and "socialism" t o solve the problem a s radical structuralism formulates i t , than to t h e existing t h i r d world governments or the USAID since a .structuralist analysis d o e s n ' t disclose t h e potential class forces on which a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e can be based, or t h e contradictions which condition and a r e developed b y the struggle, or a strategy or organisational forms of s t r u g g l e , or a "socialist" solution , since a a fortiori The

-

36 .

Q

s o c i a l i s t solution must i t s e l f b e disclosed b y the i n t e r e s t s and capacities of the revolutionary forces and their strategy, which have not been i d e n t i f i e d a t a l l . In short the "marxification" o f radical s t r u c t u r a l i s m , or " l e f t " UDT, does not rescue radical structuralism from i t s dilemma, for t h e basic reason that i t has been b u i l t up through successive revisions o f bourgeois economics, and l i k e a Russian d o l l , the f i n a l outer layer has essentially the same shape as the innermost one. I t is an a n a l y s i s whose central concepts and problematic are ultimately s t i l l those o f bourgeois social science, especially bourgeois economics, in s p i t e o f the fact that i t uses words which denote the concepts of historical m a t e r i a l i s m ; i . e . i t understands t h e r e l a t i o n s o f production and exploitation in the t h i r d world i n a way which s t i l l idealises and mystifies them. The converse of` t h i s , o f course, is that the "marxism" o f the most marxist of UD theorists becomes u t o p i a n . This seems to me t h e main d i f f i c u l t y with F r a n k ' s p o l i t i c a l position, a t least as it emerges from his writings. Emphasising r e v o l u t i o n a r y class struggle for socialism as the only solution to underdevelopment, h e r e j e c t s dogmatic formulae for t h i s struggle and recognises t h e great variety of patterns and stages o f underdevelopment in t h e d i f f e r e n t countries of Latin America. But he does not himself o f f e r much i n the way o f a n a l y s i s which would make the reality and meaning of' this "solution" more apparent and concrete. The main t h r u s t of his work is a historical-structural analysis of surplus extraction and transfer, and structural subordination of' periphery economies through the mediation of subordinate (or "lurupen") bourgeoisies; not of' the structures of oppression and e x p l o i t a t i o n , i . e . the modes and relations of production, and the class struggles and class organisations developing within these. Kay's polemical comment cited a t t h e beginning of` this paper would be u n j u s t if' applied to Frank without q u a l i f i c a t i o n , b u t there would s t i l l be an element o f t r u t h i n i t . What is more, "marxist" or' " l e f t " UDT is not merely

utopian in its own way, but ultimately cannot escape being ideological. An example of t h i s is my own idea that some of' the limitations of UDT o f which I had become somewhat aware in my work on Kenya were "gaps" which could be "plugged" by grafting on a treatment of`I what was missing, e . g . an a n a l y s i s o f classes. The r e s u l t was d i s t i n c t l y l i f e l e s s , uninspired by any real concept of class struggle.9 In order' to arrive a t an analysis of' classes for the purpose of r e l a t i n g class s t r u g g l e to the problem o f development, I needed' t o break away from the problematic of structuralism i t s e l f . So long as I remained within i t , I remained a prisoner of i t s ideological ef'flects, i n c l u d i n g a concept o f social class which is ultimately residual and passive. More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , I would now say that I think UDT i t s e l f is same way really ahistorical, in the that bourgeois

3'7-

theory i s , and for' the same reason ( i . e . i t s the same). I t does have a time dimension, of course, which some versions o f bourgeois development theory conspicuously lacked. But t h i s is not the same thing as history. The mere extension o f t h e model t o allow for* change, or t o see t h e present as t h e end o f a chain of` events extending back i n t o the p a s t , is not t o make i t h i s t o r i c a l ; i . e . does not explain underdevelopment by reference to social

development

problematic is

forces which have been identified as a result of a coherent and consistent method for s i f t i n g o u t from t h e complex flow o f events the patterns that: allow us t o make sense o f i t , now and in the past. The stages familiar from UDT (such as mercantilism, l i b e r a l i s m , neo-mercantilism, e t c . ) a r e rather empirical periodisations w i t h a t most a good d e a l o f descriptive and heuristic value, not the product of a systematic a n a l y s i s of t h e i n t e r p l a y o f p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l as well as economic forces which resulted i n the geographical extension of t h e sway o f c a p i t a l , or o f t h e new s t r u g g l e s generated by t h i s process. Most of t h e points made above a r e made, i m p l i c i t l y where not explicitly, in Frank's "reply to c r i t i c s " , where h e also concept o f makes the illuminating observation t h a t t h e "dependence" can best be understood as the product of` a very specific historical period, v i z . t h e long post-war "boom" , or phase of rapid c a p i t a l accumulation;l0 i t r e f e r s , i n f`act, to that boom, seen from Latin America. The end o f that phase of the accumulation c y c l e , he remarks, s h i f t s a t t e n t i o n to its cyclical nature, and the concept of` "dependence" n e c e s s a r i l y gives way t o the concepts needed in order to understand not just one phase, but "the process of` c a p i t a l accumulation in the world with special reference t o the par t i c i p a t i o n of` A s i a , t h e Middle E a s t , A f r i c a a n d Latin America from 1500 to the present", a task h e has set for h i m s e l f and which h e says is also being undertaken in d i f f e r e n t ways by others such as Laclau, Hinkelammer t , Marini and Torres ( a n d we should presumably add Amin , Wallerstein and Anderson) ( I have reservations about this programme, to

-

-

.

be mentioned in a moment.) Meantime

ideological character of UDT i s best vulnerability to what Kay calls "conservative re-absorption" of' t h e kind r e p r e s e n t e d by the World Bank's recent adoption of` a "power t y - o r i e n t e d " a i d philosophy under Macnamara ' s Presidency , and the

demonstrated

the by

its

corresponding "reorientation" o f

bilateral

aid

doctrines

by

the USA and other countries. What t h i s comes down t o is the adoption of non-radieal structuralism. This s a y s , i n e f f e c t , t h a t not a l l solutions a r e part of` the problem: t h e World Bank i s n ' t , nor- a r e MNCS ( i f third world governments pool their

bargaining

knowhow

and

co-ordinate

their

collective

leverage) , nor are a l l third world governments, a t least not monolithically. On t h e other hand, radical s t r u c t u r a l change is ( a ) unlikely, and ( b ) usually turns out to be very 38.

whom is not usually made clear) and i t s outcomes, and ( c ) who are we ( i n the bourgeois democracies) to advocate such radical changes for' others ( e t c . e t c . ) , so l e t us pursue structural reform instead.ll This position is in my view simply the a expression of political programme of large-scale international capital and t h e states and international agencies which represent it. The assimilation of` structuralism is at best p a r t i a l in such perspectives, but even i f i t were more complete, i t would s t i l l be what i t i s , i . e . a form o f bourgeois ideology, whose character has been very adequately revealed by the critiques of Baran and Amin and t h e polemics of F r a n k . l 2 We must t h e r e f o r e go forward, n o t backward; not merely "beyond t h e sociology of development" ( t h e t i t l e of Oxaal, Barnett and Booth's book) but beyond the sociology of' underdevelopment in two ways: not merely into a d i f f e r e n t kind of t h e o r y , b u t i n t o a more c l e a r l y d e f i n e d relation between theory and p r a c t i c e . A genuinely h i s t o r i c a l theory will allow us t o analyse the process o f combined and uneven development of' capitalism on a world s c a l e , as i t has been experienced (or "participated i n " as Frank r i g h t l y puts i t ) in particular countries, and hence as i t presents i t s e l f to any one of them now, in t h e form o f a class struggle conducted in the framework of' a particular inherited s t r u c t u r e of productive r e l a t i o n s , forms of exploitation and exchange relationships, and a particular s t r u c t u r e of` relations of p o l i t i c a l a n d ideological domination, i n t e r n a l and external, e t c . A serious and systematic application of` historical materialism does not mean t h e application of' a ready-made formula taken from the texts o f Marx and Engels, or Lenin or Trotsky or Mao Tse-tung, but t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e method and conclusions to b e drawn from s u c h texts plus the practice out of which they emerged, and by which they have since been continually revised. And t h i s is why i t is not; merely a q u e s t i o n of' a different kind o f theory (i.e. different from UDT or

unpleasant (to u n p r e d i c t a b l e in

disguised

radical structuralism)

but also of' a more clearly

defined relation between theory and practice. The reason I am not too happy about Frank's conclusion t h a t UDT should give way t o the analysis of the process of capital accumulation from l500AD to the present is that i t seems even more l i a b l e than UDT t o be a n academic exercise i n the l i t e r a l sense of` t h e t e r m , a n d hence liable to b e s t i l l more vaguely related to p o l i t i c a l practice, and hence, finally, l i a b l e to t a k e on a n ideological character a l l over a g a i n . It is not that such an analysis is unnecessary; i t is very necessary. But what is involved is hardly less than a history o f the modern w o r l d ; and any such product conceived of primarily as a product o f scholarship ( l e t alone individual scholarship) o r "social science" ( t o use F r a n k ' s term ) rather than as a work of synthesising the experience of

39 -

the political practice of' particular classes on a world s c a l e , and hence proceeding b y a process o f provisional formulations based on t h e experience of` s p e c i f i c struggles, and so necessarily consisting of a p r o t r a c t e d and collective endeavour, seems to me likely to prove essentially ideological. Perhaps Frank himself should not b e interpreted too l i t e r a l l y when h e seems to propose the task in these terms, b u t without going i n t o d e t a i l over t h e examples we already have (such as W a l l e r s t e i n ' s a n d Anderson's w o r k ) . I think i t will be important t o envisage the development of' an historical context for f u t u r e theory b y way o f successive approximations, arising out of studies of historical situations specific enough for the s t u d y to be related i n a very e x p l i c i t way t o the contemporary class s t r u g g l e s w i t h i n them.l3 SOME THEORETICAL QUESTIONS

In conclusion, and in t h e context o f what I have j u s t argued , I wish to r-aise three theoretical issues from among the many which have t o be c o n f r o n t e d ' t h e q u e s t i o n of` e x p l o i t a t i o n , the question of modes of production and their "at-ticulation", and the question of t h e reasons for underdevelopment. a . Exploitation. UDT generally holds or implies t h a t the condition of' the people in underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s is the result of` e x p l o i t a t i o n , and this certainly appeals to "common sense" as one contemplates generally the record of` colonialism i n , say, Peru or the Congo. But Marxist economists such as Bettelheim and Kay r i g h t l y question "common sense". While t h e r e may be "super-exploitation" in the periphery, i . e . extraction of s u r p l u s value from workers through coercive sanctions in pre-capitalist modes of` production, or in the course of` primitive capital accumulation (forced labour, e t c . ) , t h e d i r e c t exploitation by c a p i t a l of' wage workers a t t h e periphery i s t y p i c a l l y l e s s than in the capitalist metropoles if' the level of

exploitation

is

the proportion

of the value of what the

workers produce t h a t is not paid to them i n wages. In the metropoles wage levels are much higher but p r o d u c t i v i t y is higher s t i l l , thanks t o the higher organic composition of capital. The problem o f the underdeveloped countries is then, Kay argues, that the workers are exploited without being exploited enough in t h e sense that they a r e subject

-

to severe downward pressure on wages, t o extract the maximum absolute surplus v a l u e , but do not benefit from t h e higher real wages that they could be paid if` c a p i t a l i s t s were Forced to try to increase relative s u r p l u s value by more investment leading t o higher productivity. In f a c t , Kay a r g u e s , t h e value of wages may be lower in the metropoles than a t the periphery, even though wages are much higher there i n terms of purchasing power; meaning t h a t the labour time necessary

u0.

to produce the goods t h e i r wages buy i s probably smaller' than the time taken to produce the r e l a t i v e l y few goods the third world workers can buy with their wages.1" Against t h i s Emmanuel argues that i t is a r t i f i c i a l to treat t h e metropoles and t h e periphery countries in isolation from each other i n t h i s wage.l5 I f a pair o f shoes can be produced anywhere in the world in ten minutes of labour-time, t h a t is the (world) value of` a pair of shoes and the proper measure o f the value of` real wages everywhere; the tendency of this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is to make t h e real wages o f third world workers seem much lower as a proportion of what they produce, and hence to make their level of exploitation higher. By adopting this general standpoint one can a l s o argue t h a t merely because s u f f i c i e n t capital has not been invested to make workers as productive as workers employed in similar work elsewhere, i t does not follow that they a r e less exploited. If c a p i t a l i s t s choose in certain areas not to extract t h e maximum s u r p l u s value from t h e workers t h a t is possible using t h e best available equipment and organisation, t h a t is because in those areas political, social and economic conditions permit them to pay such low wages as t o make the

additional investment unnecessary. This l i n e of argument h a s , i t seems t o me, considerable force, and corresponds to our "common-sense" feeling that low-paid workers in u n d e r - c a p i t a l i s e d operations a r e more exploited than higher paid workers in more e f f i c i e n t plants in the same l i n e of` business.

At a l l events, i t is not hard t o see that these arguments a l l have a rather abstract q u a l i t y and that what is a t issue is not so much a "correct" theorisation of' the locus and r e l a t i v e levels o f e x p l o i t a t i o n a s between f i r s t and third world countries a n d workers, as c e r t a i n practical-political implications that have been supposed to follow from one position rather than a n o t h e r . Thus Bettelheim, f o r instance, was really anxious to show that the exploitation of workers in France or t h e USA was the source of` t h e economic power' behind imperialism and hence of the oppression (and hence "superexploitation") of` workers in the third world; and to discourage the idea that t h i r d world workers had a common cause with the bourgeoisies and petty-bourgeoisies of` t h e i r own countries a g a i n s t both foreign capital and foreign workers (who were considered b y Emmanuel to b e s h a r i n g i n the exploitation of` third world workers through the operation of the

terms of t r a d e ) . Perhaps by now we

are

free

to

dislodge

the

discussion

from such an abstract and universal plane. Is i t really necessary to hold t h a t a l l workers in a l l underdeveloped countries are more or less exploited than a l l workers in a l l the metropolitan countries? Is i t not clear that the technical concept of' e x p l o i t a t i o n , formulated by Marx in the context

of

the

competitive

capitalism

of'

a

single

formation, cannot be stretched to cover unambiguously

social

all the

ul.

complex

relationships

between

workers

and

capitalists

and

workers and workers throughout a world capitalist economy? So, for instance, when a multinational corporation moves i t s television manufacturing operation from the USA t o Taiwan i t does so precisely to reduce the overall level of real wages it pays and so increase absolute s u r p l u s v a l u e . The Taiwanese workers a r e evidently more exploited than the US workers whom they replace, u s i n g identical equipment. They are also l i k e l y to have higher real incomes than Taiwanese workers in p l a n t s with much lower organic composition of' capital and who as a result produce less per hour o f labour Which of these two groups of` workers is considered more exploited depends both on r e l a t i v e real wages and r e l a t i v e productivity, b u t also on the position one takes on the

.

general theoretical issue discussed above.

Furthermore, both

are d i r e c t l y exploited i n a way t h a t t h e Taiwanese peasant producer selling his crop t o realise a s t i l l lower real income, is n o t . All t h r e e groups of workers a r e i n d i f f e r i n g ways victims of an international and national structure of social relations and p o l i t i c a l domination which condemns them t o (among other* t h i n g s ) a level o f real incomes which the development o f the forces of production on a world-wide basis has long since rendered unnecessary. The practical political implications of these theoretical distinctions are not unimportant, a f f e c t i n g workers' and peasants' s o l i d a r i t y , and the possibilities of` international class co-operation too; but they a r e only par t of the ensemble of' relations which also a f f e c t s o l i d a r i t y , consciousness, organisation, e t c . In short the general question about exploitation in t h e third world needs to be dissolved into a series of more particular questions about the forms, degrees a n d e f f e c t s of d i f f e r e n t kinds of exploitation in different national a n d international contexts, and the way these relate to forms, degrees and e f f e c t s of domination and oppression and the struggles waged against b o t h . units of analysis: modes of production and their' "articulation". As soon as we move beyond t h e broad perspective of UDT according t o which the condition of' the

b.

accepted as simply b e i n g , as a matter* of' f a c t , to the process of' capital accumulation a t the c e n t r e , two questions a r i s e : ( i ) how; and ( i i ) why. Frank did not r e a l l y propose an answer' to the second question (nordid Baran) Frank's answer to the f i r s t q u e s t i o n was that i n Latin America, i t was done b y means of changing forms of' monopoly through a hierarchy of cert res of surplus expropriation/appropriation (extraction and t r a n s f e r ) , the top of which lay in the c a p i t a l i s t metropoles; and t h a t the bottom of t h e hierarchy consisted of institutions established for this purpose, hence capitalist institutions, not feudal

"periphery" is

complementary

.

institutions

(the

enterprise") _16 112.

latifundium

The

was

conditions

"born

of

as

a

servitude

commercial

on

the

latifundium were o n l y "fuedal -seeming", for' the latifundium was not an institution "beyond the reach of' c a p i t a l i s t development". The practical implication of t h i s view seemed t o be t h a t the task o f the revolution was not one of` f`irst over throwing feudalism in

L a t i n America, and only then going was not a question of` t h e proletariat and peasantry a l l y i n g w i t h t h e national bourgeoisie against feudal landlords; o n the c o n t r a r y , the feudal-seeming landowners were really capitalist and both they and the so-called "national" bourgeoisie were playing and had always played a subordinate role in alliance with imperialism, so that the struggle of` the workers and peasants must be waged against a l l of` them, and must be a struggle to move from capitalism to socialism. Laclau in his well known c r i t i q u e points o u t t h a t ( a ) this eonceptualisation includes in "capitalism" all productive processes, and the social formations dominated by them, which a r e in a significant exchange relationship with capitalist social formations (so t h a t e . g . Russia in 1850 would presumably have to be described as "capitalist") ; ( b ) capital, in the form of` merchant c a p i t a l , was being accumulated long before capitalism i . e . social formations dominated by the capitalist mode of' production was established, in particular, long distance t r a d e and commodity markets existed long before cap1talism.17 The colonisation of Latin America was i n f a c t a feudal colonisation, the response of Iberian feudalism to a general feudal economic c r i s i s which could b e relieved (though not resolved) by extending t h e area of land under servile cultivation through overseas expansion. The latifundium was not a "feudal-seeming" but really a feudal institution. Subsequently, with the establishment of capitalism as a dominant mode of production in parts of Western Europe, there arose a world capitalist system, i . e . primarily a system of (unequal) exchange l i n k i n g social formations dominated by pre-capitalist modes of` p r o d u c t i o n , including those o f Latin America, t o those dominated by the capitalist mode of' production. The effect was t o consolidate the pre-capitalist modes of` production, not to destroy them (for reasons touched on below) This means t h a t the first revolutionary task in such situations is to over throw the pre-capitalist relations of production, and the corresponding superstructures. Specifically, i t means that in some parts of the world t h e revolution has t o accomplish some of the tasks historically under taken by the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Europe before the task o f b u i l d i n g socialism can be tackled liberating servile labour, democratising national and local institutions, abolishing a l l kinds of` privileges, taboos, destroying archaic forms of' ideological domination, e t c . I t follows that any c a l l for "socialist revolution" which ignores t h i s , and the s t r a t e g y , organisation, programme, alliances, etc. which i t implies, will be utopian. At any

on to over throw c a p i t a l i s m ; and hence i t

-

-

.

-

ug.

r a t e , Laclau argues, such v i t a l issues cannot even be posed in terms of t h e formulations used b y Frank. This has been endorsed i n various forms by writers such as Bettelheim and Rey who can be lumped together as theorists of t h e problematic o f the "articulation" o f d i f f e r e n t modes of p r o d u c t i o n . l 8 According t o t h i s view, the way i n which the capitalist mode o f production is "articulated" with precapitalist modes of production which continue t o exist in t h e era of capitalism constitutes, in R e y ' s terms, the "field of' contradictions" of t h e class struggles in the social formations where this articulation occurs (above a l l , in underdeveloped areas) This field je determined by c a p i t a l i s t ' s need to "conserve" the precapitalist modes of production a t the same time as i t "dissolves" them ( i . e . i t transforms them from modes of' production s u b j e c t to their own "laws of' motion" t o modes o f production whose motion is primarily determined by t h e laws operating in the c a p i t a l i s t

.

mode of p r o d u c t i o n , and hence a l s o progressively transforms the content, and eventually t h e form, o f their- relations of` production). Reacting against t h i s in turn Banaji has recently argued that writers o f t h i s school, including Laclau, reduce the meaning of "mode of production" to that o f "mode of' e x p l o i t a t i o n " , or "form o f the labour process", a "simple category" of' a n a l y s i s , like an ideal type, Formed by abstraction a few empirical features from a given situation. g On this basis a "feudal mode of production" is held to exist whenever labour is s e r f - l i k e , i . e . one slave plantation does not make a slave mode of production, nor yet t o q u i t e a number. What constitutes a slave mode of' production i n t h e historical sense is a much wider ensemble of relations, including class, state and ideological relations, which together a r e governed by determinate "laws of` motion" which a t the level o f any given enterprise ( i n this c a s e , a p l a n t a t i o n ) i s revealed i n t h e l o g i c of' i t s operations, the economic motivation o f i t s owners and managers (production f o r social consumption not for' p r o f i t ) ,

the

specific

rationality

of

its

production,

consumption,

savings and investment decisions, the degree of` exploitation of' i t s labour' force, e t c . On this basis the plantations of the West Indies were c a p i t a l i s t notwithstanding t h e r e a l i t y of the slavery on which they r e s t e d , 2 0 the twentieth century plantations established in Peru by large US and British firms using forms of' s e r v i l e labour a r e c a p i t a l i s t , not f e u d a l ; and the peasants of` Kenya who produce leaf f o r capitalist tea companies a t a closely controlled price are a

kind of' wage labourers, not participants in a "peasant mode of production". In other words, Banaji agrees with Laclau t h a t the Latin American latifundiurn was a feudal institution but disagrees with him i n thinking that t h e p e r s i s t e n c e of' i t s feudal form necessarily implies t h e continuance of' i t s feudal content once t h e "laws of' motion" of' feudalism, to

un.

which i t was once s u b j e c t , have been displaced by t h e "laws of motion" of the capitalist mode of' production, as increasingly occurred from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth. The political implication o f t h i s seems to be that t h e n a t u r e of t h e revolutionary task is d i f f e r e n t in cases where a pre-capitalist mode of' production has really survived, from those where i t s forms may have s u r v i v e d , a n d even become more "highly developed" (as Banaji considers happened in Europe to feudal production precisely when i t began to be subordinated t o capitalism) , but where i t s laws of motion have ceased to be a t a l l autonomous. These general formulations sometimes have a rather abstract and even scholastic q u a l i t y , but i t seems to me t h e y must be taken seriously. The a l t e r n a t i v e is only new forms of` utopianism. At the same time I think both Laclau and B a n a j i ' s presentation of` the matter s u f f e r s from a neglect of i t s p o l i t i c a l aspect, i . e . of class struggle a n d class

domination

(including

this aspect i s

state power)

.

This does not mean that

"given" and can be known independently of` t h e determination o f the mode(s) o f production, forms of labour process, e t c . ; but j u s t as Banaji thinks t h a t modes o f production cannot be determined merely be reference t o the mode of e x p l o i t a t i o n , b u t must be "living" ensembles of relationships with a definite "logic" and historical tendencies, so I d o not think they can be determined independently o f the determination o f the classes, forms of s t a t e , e t c . , which are based on them and which a l s o determine their development. (The same point was made in another context b y Bettelheim i n his debate with Sweezy.)2l I suspect in f`act t h a t t h e apparent abstractness (and some of the difficulty) of the problem o f deciding whether a pre-capitalist mode o f production s t i l l "exists" in a p a r t i c u l a r situation or j u s t how f`ar and i n what ways i t is i n t o a mere subordinate form o f the being transformed capitalist mode, disappears when i t is f i r m l y linked to the problem o f exploring t h e past and present course of' class formation and class s t r u g g l e s .

c . Why does capitalism "underdevelop" some countries? Laelau pointed o u t t h a t UDT really sidesteps this issue; Frank, in particular, sees a single contradiction between the bourgeoisie in the metropolis a n d the masses in t h e p e r i p h e r y from t h e sixteenth century t i l l today. But i f t h e i n i t i a l dependency was one within f e u d a l i s m , the reasons for i t cannot be i d e n t i c a l with those which e x p l a i n c a p i t a l i s t dependency. Laclau h o l d s t h a t t h e i n i t i a l feudal dependence turned on unequal exchange between Latin America a n d Europe, made possible by holding down price levels i n Latin America by an extremely ruthless use of servile forms of' l a b o u r , thereby "reducing the economic s u r p l u s of' the peripheral

countries and fixing their relations of production in an archaic mould o f extra-economic coercion, which retarded any

u5.

process o f social d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and diminished t h e size of' their internal markets".32 Subsequent capitalist under-development ( i . e . once the c a p i t a l i s t mode o f production had become dominant in Europe in t h e nineteenth century) was due to a different central cause, the decline i n the rate of p r o f i t caused by t h e increasing organic composition o f capital. The maintenance of pre-capitalist modes of production in the colonies and semi-colonies, he hypothesises, maintained the average r a t e o f profit by o f f e r i n g opp or tunities for high rates o f r e t u r n d u e 'Co the low organic composition of capital and the use of extra-economic coercion of lab our in those modes. This hypothesis refers to the competitive phase of` capitalism and e x p l a i n s capitalist underdevelopment in that stage o n l y . Kay, as I understand him, takes a d i f f e r e n t view. Labour at the periphery may have been ( a n d may s t i l l be ) s u b j e c t to extra-economic coercion and also may be paid a much lower real wage than the " f r e e labour" o f t h e metropoles b u t i t does not follow from t h i s that p r o f i t rates a r e h i g h e r ; this depends on t h e r e l a t i v e rates of surplus value and ratios o f constant to variable c a p i t a l a t the centre and a t the periphery. Part of what seems to be a t issue here is an empirical q u e s t i o n , which Laclau poses: d u r i n g the nineteenth century was t h e growth in t h e organic composition o f c a p i t a l in fact more r a p i d than the growth in the p r o d u c t i v i t y o f labour in t h e metropoles? I f i t was, the p r o f i t r a t e would have tended t o f a l l and the maintenance o f pre-capitalist modes of production a t the p e r i p h e r y would have tended to offset t h i s for t h e reasons Laclau suggests. I f i t was n o t , the r a t e of p r o f i t would have tended t o r i s e , not f a l l , a n d t h e only reason for capital to be invested in the periphery a t a l l would be to secure p a r t i c u l a r commodities needed for production in the metropolis (cotton, minerals, e t c . ) and cheap foodstuffs (reducing t h e value of t h e real wages paid i n the metropolis) Working on the l a t t e r a s s u m p t i o n , Kay suggests that the explanation of` c a p i t a l i s t under-development i s r e a l l y historical a n d s t r u c t u r a l , and is to be sought in the special characteristics of merchant c a p i t a l . Merchant c a p i t a l , h e argues, deriving i t s profits e n t i r e l y from unequal exchange and from maxi rising the flow of transactions, destroyed the p r e - e x i s t i n g social frameworks in the periphery (Kay e v i d e n t l y has Africa p a r t i c u l a r l y i n mind) ; and a c t u a l l y created conditions inimical to the investment of` industrial capital which, once i t gained supremacy over merchant c a p i t a l in the metropoles, sought q u i t e limited ends in the periphery (cheap raw materials and food supplies) using merchant capital as i t s a g e n t . Playing this role of a g e n t , merchant c a p i t a l was forced t o maintain the forms of` p r e - c a p i t a l i s t modes o f p r o d u c t i o n , a n d social r e l a t i o n s of production, in order to maxi rise t h e production of commodities for metropolitan markets, and maintain conditions for regular and reliable trading.23

.

up.

Although t h e r e seems to be some d i f f i c u l t y with both these views, they have t h e great merit or" b e i n g genuine t h e o r i e s , and I suspect t h a t i f they a r e understood as i . e . Latin theories applicable t o mor-e limited places America and Africa respectively and to s p e c i f i c phases of` metropolitan development they w i l l prove c a p a b l e of contributing to t h e s o r t of general theory that i s needed.

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-

-

CONCLUDING REMARKS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Consideration of these theoretical q u e s t i o n s serves t o suggest once more that a large part of' t h e d i f f i c u l t y of resolving many o f them is due to the same cause t h a t is u l t i m a t e l y responsible for the ideological nature of' UDT a particular form of political p r a c t i c e . In the itself case o f UDT that practice, i t is safe t o s a y , was primarily that of` planners in the s t a t e apparatuses (planning o f f i c e s ) of` third world countries, of t h e i r advisers and mediators

-

(with international c a p i t a l ) i n regional economic policy bureaux, such as ECLA, and of` the personnel of' the "aid and trade" network, from UNCTAD to the IBRD/IMF. The under-development and dependency "perspective" really expressed the "unhappy consciousness" of progressive i n t e l l e c t u a l s ( i n c l u d i n g academies) w i t h i n or close to t h i s set o f institutions, on or just over the d i v i d i n g l i n e between reluctant acceptance and impatient rejection o f t h e s t r u c t u r e , b u t not s t a r t i n g out from or conditioned by involvement in the e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t p r a c t i c e o f a radical working class or- peasant p a r t y . The ambiguities of UDT reflect the ambiguities of their position. The work of the c r i t i c s of UDT, on the other' hand, w h i l e i t may be much less ambiguous, does show a tendency to t h e o r e t i c i s m , abstractness and g e n e r a l i t y , r e f l e c t i n g perhaps the primarily academic practice of most of' those concerned. There i s , c e r t a i n l y , n o uniquely c e r t i f i e d connection between theory a n d the p o l i t i c a l practice o f the e x p l o i t e d and oppressed classes, and the problem of' making a n y such connection is aggravated by the d i f f i c u l t y , in many parts of' the third w o r l d , of` i d e n t i f y i n g effective current forms of popular politics, and establishing links with them. Nonetheless i t looks as i f i t will be very important to resolve t h i s question as a condition of' useful theoretical advance.

NOTES

1. C f . F . H . Cardoso, "Imperialism and Dependency i n Latin America" in Bonilla and Gilling ( e d s . ) , Structures of` Dependency, 1973, p p . 15-16. 2. See f o r instance, "A Dependency Bibliography" b y William C. Smith J r . , in Bonilla and Gilling, o p . e i t .

up.

3Philip J . 0'Brier1, "A Critique of' Latin American Theories of Dependency" i n L . Oxaal, T . Barnett and D. Booth ( e d s . ) , Beyond_the Sociology o f Development, 1975, p . 25. 14. C f . C . Bettelheim in Appendices I and I I I t o A. Emmanuel, Unequal_Exchange, 1972, p p . 300-07 a n d 352-55, and A. Emmanuel, i b i d . , Appendix I V , p p . 380-83; and G . Kay, Development and Underdevelopment' A Marxist Analysis, l9'75, p. 555. D . Booth, "Andre Gunder- Frank: An I n t r o d u c t i o n and an Appreciation", in Oxaal e t . a l . , o p . c i t . , p p . 75-76. 6. See notes 3 and 5 above; and A. Foster C a r t e r , "Neo-Marxist Approaches to Underdevelopment" in E . De Kadt and G. Williams ( e d s . ) , Sociology and Development, 1973, and N. Girvan, "The Development of Dependency Economics in the Caribbean and Latin America", Social and Economic Studies 2 2 / 1 , l973~ T. C f . Girvan, o p . c i t . , and L . Best, "A Model of Pure Plantation Economy", Social and Economic Studies 1 7 / 3 ,

1968. 8.

g_ co. 6

Loc.cit.

of.

,

Leys,

p . I I ; italics added. Underdevelopment in Kenya,

1975,

esp.

lo. "Dependence is Dead, Long Live Dependence a n d t h e Class Struggle: An Answer t o Critics", Latin American Perspectives 1/1, 1 9 ? u . II. A study of MacNarnara ' s speeches in the past five years shows that a remarkably large proportion o f the main theses of UDT have been incorporated in t h e m , though n a t u r a l l y in s k i l f u l l y deradicalised versions. For an official systematisation see the IBRD/IDS study, Redistribution w i t h Growth, 1975, which is c r i t i c i s e d , with replies by some o f the a u t h o r s , i n L e y s , "The Politics of` Redistribution With Growth", IDS Bulletin 7 / 2 , 1975. 12. C f . S. Amin, Unequal Development, 1976; a n d Frank, "Sociology of` Underdevelopment and Underdevelopment of' S o c i o l o g y " , in Latin America' Reform or Revolution. 13. I . Wallerstein, The Modern World System, 19711; P .

Anderson, Passages f'r'orn Antiquity to Feudalism, 1975, and Lineages of the Absolutist State, 1975. 1M.

Kay, o p . e i t . , p p . 50-5M and 115-16. Emmanuel, l o c . c i t . , pp. 382-83. 16. A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Under-development in Latin America, 1967. 17. E . Laclau, "Feudalism and C a p i t a l i s m in Latin America", New Left Review, 6 7 , 1971. 18. Cf`. C . Bettelheim i n Appendix I to Emmanuel, o p . c i t . , pp. 293-99; and P-P. Rey, Les Alliances des Classes,

15.

197319. J . B a n a j i , "Modes o f Production i n a Materialist Conception of History", Economy and Society, forthcoming. 20. An interpretation which seems to have the explicit endorsement of Marx: "The fact that we now not only

us.

call the plantation owners in America capitalists, but that they are capitalists, is based on their* existence as anomalies within a world market based on free lab our" (Grundrisse, p . 513). On the Bettelheim, 21. Cf. P. Sweezy and C. Transition to Socialism, 1971, pp. 15-17. 22. Laclau, o p . c i t . , p . 3 5 . 23. Kay, o p . c i t . , pp. 105-7.

up.

Chapter* 14

ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE P . Thandika Mkandawire

The publication by Monthly Review Press o f Samir Amir's major' work opens t o the Anglo-Saxon world a very important school in t h e s t u d y o f t h e problems o f underdevelopment. Sometimes r e f e r r e d t o as the "Dependency School", i t has had great impact on students of underdevelopment i n French and Spanish-speaking countries. This "school" i s , o f course, f a r from homogeneous since i t includes such d i v e r s e schools as " s t r u c t u r a l i s t s " , radical l i b e r a l s and Marxists. What a l l the members of` t h i s school have in common is an acute awareness of` the problems arising from the bifurcation of` the capitalist world i n t o "centre" and "periphery" economies and the impact of the relationship between these economies on the development and under-development of t h e l a t t e r . Samir A m i r , Director of` the United Nations African I n s t i t u t e for Development a n d Economic Planning i n Dakar, Senegal, is a Marxist. As a Marxist, he is seriously pre-occupied with the historical character of underdevelopment of backward countries. Of c o u r s e , this pre-occupation with the h i s t o r i c a l nature of' underdevelopment i s n o t t h e monopoly o f M a r x i s t s . Bourgeois h i s t o r i a n s such as Rostov a n d Kuznets, t o name only a few, have spent much e f f o r t to study the process of' development i n today's developed nations with t h e hope of discovering the laws of` development, or a set of conditions which, i f properly reproduced in the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , can b r i n g about those

processes

which

characterized

the

growth

of

the

nations. From these historical studies , certain "paradigms" have been constructed to d e p i c t the possible course of` transition of the underdeveloped countries. Generally missing in these h i s t o r i c a l studies is a history o f underdevelopment i t s e l f . I n f a c t , i n t h e more dogmatic formulation of' t h e bourgeois historical view, t h e underdeveloped countries a r e viewed as a " p r e - h i s t o r i c a l " in t h e sense t h a t they have as yet to enter the historically materially advanced

established path some history is

50 .

towards self'-sustained growth.

conceded

to

these

countries

Even where the profound

impact of their colonial experience and t h e i r domination by the metropolitan countries is treated as some u n f o r t u n a t e , a l b e i t necessary, t h i n g o f t h e past with no lasting impact

upon the present and future of these countries. For Marxists, t h i s perception of o f development and underdevelopment ahistorical. In particular, it consideration that historical time is f u t u r e societies w i l l not be a b l e traversed by other societies a t a words of Dos Santos'

"

All

t h e historical process is merely formal and fails to take into not Oni-linear and that t o r e p l i c a t e the paths previous time. In the

societies move towards new forms of s o c i e t y .

The

historical experience of` developed capitalist societies has been completely t r a n s c e n d e d ; t h e i r basic source of` private capital formation in foreign trade, the incorporation of vast masses of workers in industrial p r o d u c t i o n , their indigenous technological development, constitute options no longer open t o underdeveloped countries."

historical origins and context of contemporary then suggests t h a t new models of accumulation must be constructed to deal w i t h t h e new phenomenon of "dependent accumulation". Attempts by bourgeois economists to construct models for t h e s t u d y of development have generally started w i t h the elimination of t h i s historical problem. Strange as it may seem in face of' mounting The

backwardness

h i s t o r i c a l evidence, the most elegant models o f accumulation in underdeveloped countries ( t h e Arthur Lewis and Fei-Ranis models, for example) have assumed "closed" underdeveloped economies in which accumulation is autoeentric. Foreign trade and the exploitative relations with the metropolitan powers may l a t e r be introduced i n t o t h e models as a further complication of an otherwise autonomous accumulation process. Samir Amin takes the "openness" o f these backward economies as the crucial impetus to their present experiences and problems. He s t a r t s his s t u d y with the observation that the process of' underdevelopment has taken place within the global context of` c a p i t a l i s t a c c u m u l a t i o n and dependence f o r t h e periphery economies. It is precisely the absence of` autocentric expansion in t h e dependent economies t h a t has

characterized

their accumulation process. An economy experiencing autocentric accumulation must a t least have one sector to produce the means o f production (the capital goods s e c t o r ) and another one producing mass consumption goods t o feed the workers employed in both sectors. Marx, basing his theoretical abstraction on the historical experience of' England, developed the famous 'two department schema' for the study of capitalist accumulation in an essentially

auto-centric

structure.

Unfold l u n a t e l y ,

valid abstraction has been abused

this

historically

in forms of" "two-sector" 51 .

models

that have been put forward

as u s e f u l abstractions for Amir demonstrates lack t h e s t r u c t u r a l coherence t h a t was implied e a r l i e r in t h e Marxian two department schema and later' i n the "two sector models" of growth. The dominant linkages in these economies a r e those between an export sector and a "luxury goods" sector. In most cases, the c a p i t a l goods sector is t o t a l l y l a c k i n g and where i t e x i s t s , i t is linked e i t h e r t o the export sector or "luxury goods" sector and not to the mass consumption goods sector which was historically the case in the advanced countries. A recurring point in Amir's book is that the centre-periphery relationship implies dominance and , t h e r e f o r e , i n e q u a l i t y and d i s h a r m o n y . Today most economists would concede that colonial rule implied economic e x p l o i t a t i o n , although some ( l i k e Rostov) would justify colonialism as the necesary "shook" to "traditional societies". Generally, however, bourgeois economists consider e x p l o i t a t i o n as basically a political problem in the sense t h a t t h e removal of any extra economical means of domination b y , s a y , granting p o l i t i c a l independence, allows for t h e operation of t h e "law of` comparative advantage" in a way beneficial to a l l parties. Such a law guarantees equal exchange since a l l " f a c t o r s o f production" a r e rewarded according t o their marginal productivities and there is a general t e n d e n c y towards the e q u a l i z a t i o n of' factor prices that countervails any such disharmonious processes as uneven development. Amir challenges t h i s dogma with t h e "Theory of' Unequal Exchange" as developed by Emmanuel . 2 There a r e two versions o f the "Theory of` Unequal Exchange". one is the neo-Ricardian one based on the theoretical work of S r a f f a a n d the so-called Cambridge School and the other is the Marxian one. In t h e Sr'aflflian version, the main thrust o f the theory is t o challenge t h e neoclassical theory of production and dependent economies of today. convincingly that the dependent economies the

distribution.

has

destroyed

"reWwrds

to

More

the

the

specifically

basis

of

factors

the

of'

the

neo-Rieardian

critique

neoclassical claim that production" (or income

is purely a market phenomenon by showing that there is no such t h i n g as " c a p i t a l " which is q u a n t i f i a b l e without a knowledge of` prices ( a n d , therefore, income d i s t r i b u t i o n ) . We cannot, t h e r e f o r e , derive t h e s t r u c t u r e of' income distribution by knowing the 'marginal p r o d u c t i v i t y ' of factors whose q u a n t i t y cannot be obtained without prior knowledge of income distribution. The implication o f this thesis on international trade is only now beginning to be perceived b u t i t does pose a serious problem t o the believers of` theorems o f "comparative advantage" since i t brings back t h e p o l i t i c a l element i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f income between nations and classes. The Marxian theory o f "Unequal Exchange" used by Amir s t a r t s from the distinction between values and prices. Amir distribution)

52 .

observes t h a t a large number' of t h e export commodities o f t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s a r e produced with modern technology so

that

t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y o f labour' in t h e periphery and t h e for' these commodities. Although monopoly of` t h e equalization o f p r o f i t rates does capitalism. But t h e wages of' periphery lower than those of the c e n t r e , even for equal labour p r o d u c t i v i t i e s . Under such c o n d i t i o n s , t h e r a t e

centre is equalized is rampant, t h e law s t i l l operate under economies a r e much

of exploitation of lab our is much higher' in the periphery economies. The transformation o f values i n t o prices on the assumption t h a t t h e r a t e s of` p r o f i t a r e e q u a l i z e d , demands t h a t values be transferred from economies with higher rates of s u r p l u s ( e x p l o i t a t i o n ) t o those w i t h lower rates of surplus. This i s , of' course, the old "transformation problem" of Marx except that while in Marx t h e transfer of values was necessitated b y t h e differences i n the organic composition of capital a n d , t h e r e f o r e , d i f f e r e n t r a t e s of s u r p l u s given same wage r a t e s , i n the Amin version t h e differences in the r a t e of s u r p l u s a r e d u e to differences in the "organic composition o f labour" or' wage r a t e s . The theories of unequal exchange a r e s t i l l in an embryonic stage but they promise to shed l i g h t on the current world division of lab our and t h e resultant international s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . As a r e s u l t o f t h e dominance t h e non-equivalence of exchange .and the asymmetric international s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , there have emerged certain peculiar social formations in the periphery. While a s in both t h e c e n t r e a n d periphery c a p i t a l i s m is dominant i t has not achieved the e x c l u s i v i t y in the periphery t h a t i t immediately achieved in t h e centre by destroying pre-capitalist agriculture and industry and replacing these with purely c a p i t a l i s t forms of organization and production. Thus a t the periphery, capitalism remains dominant without being exclusive. It has destroyed p r e - c a p i t a l i s t h a n d i c r a f t and agriculture without replacing them with c a p i t a l i s t ones s o t h a t t h e social formations o f the peripheries consist o f modern c a p i t a l i s t s t r u c t u r e s and deformed pre-capitalist structures. This is not one more crude version of the structural asymmetry o f the peripheries t h a t goes under t h e term "dualism" s i n c e in Amin's version the deformed pre-capitalist s t r u c t u r e s were an intergral part of t h e process of t h e assimilation of` t h e underdeveloped countries into t h e world capitalist order. The modern capitalist part and the deformed precapitalist are constituent parts o f a Whole t h e dependent economy. Another important characteristic of t h e social formations t h a t emerge from this dependence is the predominance of agrarian and commercial c a p i t a l i s m in the national s e c t o r , industrial capitalism being in the foreign sector. Agricultural and commercial activities a r e a b o u t t h e only activities in which t h e national bourgeoisies has room to

-

stretch

its

puny

muscles

transnational giants.

without

being

gobbled

up

by

the

The weakness of' the local bourgeoisie

53-

vis-a-vis foreign c a p i t a l largely explains the tendency t o a peculiar form of development towards bureaucratic structures. The ideological expression of this type of 'statism' takes the form of certain par t i c u l a r i z e d

.

"socialisms" ( I s l a m i c s o c i a l i s m , A f r i c a n socialism e t c ) The hopes by the local bourgeois t o achieve autonomy b y increased state par ticipation in the economy never become more than just t h a t hopes. I n t h e f i r s t place i t i s never q u i t e clear whether i t is the s t a t e t h a t "nationalizes" foreign private capital or foreign p r i v a t e c a p i t a l t h a t " p r i v a t i z e s " the state. And i n t h e second place a s lo n g as s t a t e ownership does not lead to disengagement from the world capitalist system, the dependent economy simply continues to play the same vicious subordinate r o l e , only t h i s time under the guise of "state ownership". Given these s t r u c t u r a l and institutional d e v e l o p m e n t s , the periphery economy is faced with problems of transition t h a t were never experienced b y t o d a y ' s advanced nations i n the early stages of their development. The onslaught from without, by means of t r a d e , carried out by t h e c a p i t a l i s t mode of` .production upon the pre-capitalist modes of production, causes certain retrogression such as the ruin o f c r a f t s without t h e i r being replaced by l o c a l i n d u s t r i a l production. This has contributed to extreme sectoral inequalities in p r o d u c t i v i t y in the periphery a n d the system of' prices transmitted to i t from t h e centre has led t o forms of income distribution not conducive to the development o f a

-

balanced

industrial structure.

Furthermore, t h e r e i s a disarticulation o f t h e periphery economy due to the adjustment of` t h e orientation of production to t h e needs o f t h e c e n t r e which prevents t h e transmission of the benefits of` economic progress from the dynamic poles of` the economy to other sectors since large parts of economic a c t i v i t i e s are progressively "marginalised" in t h e course of dependent accumulation. C l e a r l y , i n such economies s t r u c t u r a l paradigms developed f o r t h e s t u d y o f centre economies have l i m i t e d a p p l i c a t i o n . Amir discusses a t length the truncated impact of' the Keynesian m u l t i p l i e r and accelerator as a result o f the s t r u c t u r a l incoherence o f p e r i p h e r y economies. In these economies, i t is not t h e traditional "leakages" such as hoarding and imports t h a t account f o r the r e s t r i c t e d i m p a c t . Rather i t is ( a ) t h e absence of' linkages in both consumption and production and (b)export of monopoly super p r o f i t s t h a t have t h e ef'flect of transferring t h e impact of` t h e multiplier and accelerator to the centre economies. Although Amir's discussion of t h e l i m i t s o f Keynesian analysis is well-taken, I believe h e u n n e c e s s a r i l y belabours the point about the inadequacy or inappropriateness o f t h e Keynesian policies in the s t u d y of periphery economies. Most conventional economists would agree. The Keynesian aggregative model, i n which m u l t i p l i e r

514.

income e f f e c t s of a single injection of purchasing power play so crucial a r o l e , conceives t h e underemployment e q u i l i b r i u m i n terms o f i d l e c a p a c i t y , i n v o l u n t a r y unemployment and a generally elastic supply curve o f output. It is now generally accepted t h a t i n underdeveloped countries there i s no involuntary unemployment a t least insofar as employment cannot b e stimulated s i m p l y b y a n increase i n e f f e c t i v e demand. Nor does observed excess capacity i n the periphery economies suggest a n elastic supply curve of output since there a r e s o many other bottlenecks other than inadequate demand that r e s t r i c t f u l l u t i l i z a t i o n o f capacity in the i n d u s t r i e s of the periphery. Indeed, about the only concept borrowed from Keynesian analysis that has been extensively used (and abused) has been t h e Harrod-Domar capital-output r a t i o , a concept that Amin correctly observes is easily derivable from Marxian a n a l y s i s . Amin's unduly long criticism of` Keynesian economics is extended to a c r i t i q u e o f Kaleeki which I found hard to swallow. Amin seems opposed t o a n y theories t h a t confine themselves to the realm of` prices a n d d o not introduce, analysis in terms of' value b u t I believe t h i s is a misunderstanding on the part o f Amir o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between values and prices in Marx. PriCe analysis is important

in

Marx.

Indeed,

the

whole

point

of

the

"transformation o f values and p r i c e s " was to show that the value system, the quantity system and t h e price system are an integral part of t h e capitalist system. The value analysis is a n instrument to lay bare the social relationships between men which a r e hidden behind the v e i l of e x c h a n g e . The quantity system shows the technolgoical properties of production while prices, because they a r e d i r e c t l y observed,

are used as the basis for decision-making a n d , therefore, have a practical meaning. Where perfect competition prevails, the relationship between these t h r e e is q u i t e straightforward. When monopoly a r i s e s , however, there a r e serious divergencies between these systems and a price analysis without a n y direct reference to values becomes

necessary.

The only fundamental relationship between value

and prices that remains is that a positive rate o f surplus in the value system is a necessary condition for a positive profit rate in the p r i c e system. The inequality in the rates of p r o f i t s (due t o monopoly) calls for a n e n t i r e l y different analysis o f

c a p i t a l i s t accumulation and

it

is

in

t h i s sense

work and that of Baran and Sweezy are an important contribution to Marxist economics. I t is strange that Amir who embraces Baran's and Sweezy ' s contribution

that

Kalecki's

fails to see the s i m i l a r i t y between their contribution and that of Kalecki. In any case, the most significant negative e f f e c t of the Keynesian system has not been so much the belief by economists in the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of i t s policy recommendations to the periphery economies as the adoption of i t s categories 55-

of` analysis (national income accounting systems) used in

the

empirical studies of underdevelopment. The Keynesian preoccupation with final demand obscures the actual process of the production of commodities by means of commodities and lab our' t h a t one derives from the Marxian and input-output systems. It is t h i s empirical application of Keynesian categories that vitiates the works of' such economic historians as Kuznets since in the Keynesian system t h e notion of t h e s t u d y of accumulation simply vanishes. A m i r ' s views on the socialist countries of' Eastern Europe raise some important questions. For Amin, these countries are no more than bureaucratized c a p i t a l i s m . This view prevents him from really integrating the economies of these countries in a s t u d y purported t o be a s t u d y of "accumulation on a world scale" although these countries together account for more than 30% of' world production. The laws of` accumulation in these countries d i f f e r significantly enough from those of' either the periphery or monopoly capitalism to warrant a separate treatment. I t would also b e interesting to know what Amir thinks is the r o l e o f these countries in attempts by the periphery countries to "disengage" from t h e world c a p i t a l i s t system. Surely, the presence of the socialist bloc has facilitated ( m i l i t a r i l y and economically) the disengagement of some of' t h e periphery countries from the world capitalist system. One need only mention Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea in this respect and i t would not be too farfetched to include China in this l i s t . It is sometimes said that economic assistance from the socialist countries has done nothing t o a l t e r the structures that reproduce dependence and underdevelopment b u t I believe t h i s is more a reflection on the dependent economies than on the exploitative intentions of` the s o c i a l i s t countries. No socialist country can force a dependent "sovereign" state to use a donated textile mill t o produce c l o t h i n g for' the masses. In f a c t , what we see in practice is that cloth produced i n "friendship" t e x t i l e mills is j u s t a s l i k e l y to b e e x p o r t e d as t h a t produced in foreign c a p i t a l i s t m i l l s .

-

There a r e times when socialist economic assistance turns out to b e no more than subsidy to capitalism particularly with t h e growing tolerance of` the West towards socialist aid in infrastructure. Amin's dismissal of` socialist accumulation leaves one with the impression that not only does h e have an extremely e l a s t i c view of' capitalist accumulation but that his call for "disengagement" i s rather utopian since it tends t o negate a l l attempts _to disengage (except perhaps the Chinese one) t h a t have so f a r been made.

NOTES

and

56.

1. the

T. Dos Santos "The Crisis o f Development Theory Problem of Dependence in Latin America", in H.

_

Bernstein, Underdevelopment and Development (Penguin, 1973).

2. A Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade, (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1972).

57,

Chapter* 5 SAMIR AMIN ON UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Richard

Leaver

with the end of yet another development decade drawing n e a r , a strange situation can be observed in the trends o f inquiry i n t o the dialectic o f development a n d u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t . A decade ago, t h i s academic f i e l d was t h e near-exelusive preserve of l e f t - l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s , and the Marxist i n p u t was c l e a r l y a secondary c u r r e n t ; today the reverse i s more nearly true. As i f this is not odd enough in i t s e l f , i t is equally peculiar t o witness the increasingly intense l e v e l o f debate amongst Marxists, a debate which seems t o have gathered momentum and fed o f f their increasing dominance of the field. The label o f Marxist i s no longer s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y ; everyone is liable to identify themselves as a Marxist, but o f a different sor t . Marxism has almost become the exemplar of pluralism. This increasing schism amongst self-proclaimed Marxists is partially t e s t i f i e d by the recent s h i f t in the arguments of Aidan Foster-Car t e r , who has enjoyed t h e s t a t u s o f a disseminator of knowledge within Marxist c i r c l e s . Over the last f i v e years Foster-Carter was intent upon delimiting t h e

parameters of` what he perceived as a distinctive 'neo-marxist paradigm' t h a t was invading development studies which stood

apart

from

both

classical

Marxism

and

the

.

liberal

sub-discipline of economic development 1 But more r e c e n t l y , even he has been forced by t h i s p l u r a l i s t tendency to throw u p his hands in despair a t the f u t i l i t y of h i s task

of

finding

a

common

denominator

for

such

a

paradigm.2

Other recent work by Marxists in related fields exhibits increasing concern over the possibility of a crisis in Marxist theory i t s e l f stemming from this division o f interest and opinion.3 Anyone familiar with the recent work of scholars such as Emmanuel, Kay, Warren and Frank cannot but be struck by the substantive points of` disagreement between them. The issues are complicated enough without even considering the exponential growth of the secondary literature witnessed in the recent books o f Nabudere, Saul, Arrighi and Caldwell.

58.

It seems particularly inappropriate t o current situation i n development studies as

describe t h i s constituting a paradigm s h i f t . This is not o n l y because o f t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f identifying a 'neo-marxist paradigm' , but also because there has been no major d e f e c t i o n of liberals towards a n y a l l i a n c e with Marxism. The dynamics of` development s t u d i e s is b e s t depicted as the waxing a n d waning o f two q u i t e independent traditions, each with i t s own debates and problems, and addressing each other in an eye-to-eye confrontation a t only a few nodal p o i n t s . The decline of liberal development studies has l i t t l e to d o with the embarrassing q u e s t i o n s asked of` i t b y radicals. R a t h e r , t h i s f a l l from grace is to be explained almost entirely in terms of' t h e p r a c t i c a l failures of the tradition. This has l e d to a certain amount of theoretical introspection and recantation and even some inoffensive alliances with radical phraseology b u t there has been l i t t l e s y s t e m a t i c attention paid t o t h e foundations of' l i b e r a l social sciences a s genus, OI' the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the discrete 'disciplines' c o n s t i t u t e d by t h a t tradition. The rejuvenation of' Marxist thought in development studies draws primarily from a number of' theoretical developments internal to the h i s t o r y of Marxism; its dynamism is not externally oriented. The most important of` these begin from t h e c r i t i q u e of t h e theory a n d p r a c t i c e o f Stalinism. This p r o j e c t , which has occupied a v a r i e t y of theorists ranging f r o m Mao to A l t h u s s e r , has succeeded i n e l i m i n a t i n g , as the vector r e s u l t a n t o f these d i f f e r e n t t h r u s t s , t h e s i m p l e evolutionary teleology which was passed The oflf` as historical materialism by the Soviet s t a t e . publication in 19614 of' Marx's Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations was a significant milestone in removing the maker's seal of approval from this 'automatic Marxism', although i t did l i t t l e t o direct t h e reconstruction of Marxism which remained as a problem.

-

-

The

form

in

which Marxism has been remade h a s

and

out

of

quite

developed

traditions. Even in 19611 , continental Marxism was marked both by the debate on unequal exchange, an d by the early work o f Godelier concerned unevenly

different

to of

t u r n h i s t o r i c a l materialism i n t o a l i v i n g method capable bringing together t h e d i s p a r a t e l i b e r a l ' d i s c i p l i n e s h Apart from occasional glimpses, neither o f these influences were f e l t in English-speaking circles for another decade. There the tendency of' the times was well captured in the t i t l e of' Oliver Cox's l96L1 book, Capitalism as a System. This book is h a r d l y a ' l o s t c l a s s i c ' , but i t s t i t l e does show the persistent epistemology. The l i n e of inheritance of' t h i s tendency can be traced back to the peculiar reading of Durkheim by Radcliflf'e-Brown t h a t inspired British Social Anthropology and which was very i n f l u e n t i a l in l e f t circles at t h e t i m e . Contemporary 'neo-marxism' is one s i t e o f this incipient debate between structural and structuralist

59-

methods.5 In this c o n t e x t , t h e translation i n t o English of` t h e four major* theoretical works of Saris Amir within the space of five years serves an important bridging function forEnglish-speaking Marxists concerned t o break out of the s t r u c t u r a l impasse. For' q u i t e apart from h i s stupendous r a t e of` o u t p u t , Amir has increasingly refined the structur-alist contribution to contemporary 'neo-marxism'. He also possesses a comprehensive knowledge of' conventional development economics, and i t was the c r i t i q u e of that field which

absorbed

a

disproportionately

large

share

of

his

Accumulation on a World Scale.7 His more recent Unequal Development,8 although r e p e t i t i v e a t times, i s concerned particularly with the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and dynamic properties of the social Imperialism and

formations

of

peripheral

capitalism.

Unequal Developments collection of' essays intended to complement

is an uneven t h e l a t t e r as a companion volume; i t s q u a l i t y i s primarily redeemed b y the f i n a l seventy page essay "The End o f a Debate", f i r s t written in French i n t h e e a r l y seventies and o c c a s i o n a l l y alluded t o in the footnotes of' the l i t e r a t u r e . This review w i l l look a t some o f the themes t h a t emerge from these works which seem p a r t i c u l a r l y significant to the direction of' "neo-marxism" in general, and forward a few tentative criticisms on t h e way forward.

MARX, "NEO-MARXISM" AND PERIODIZATION

One o f the paradoxes of t h e "neo-marxist" revival has been the rather' strained r e l a t i o n s h i p i t has established with Marx's own work. I t is well known that Marx's writings on the non-European world, although slight and often j o u r n a l i s t i c in s t y l e , were hardly complimentary; in f a c t , he is best remembered on t h i s question by the rather provocative throw-away lines and analogies which made such lively reading. We h a v e , f o r i n s t a n c e , h i s r a t h e r open disgust f o r the s t u l t i f y i n g e f f e c t s of village l i f e , his analogy between

the political consciousness of` peasants and a sack of' potatoes, and the apparent determinism whereby colonialism was seen a s a progressive force in destroying the stagnancy of the Asiatic mode of' production by introducing an external dynamism i n t o the growth of' the forces of production.l0 In a l l o f these arguments, Marx was q u i t e demonstrably following in the footsteps of" t h e established prejudices o f European scholarship on the non-west.ll Many "neo-marxists" have been forced t o

argue t h a t Marx was eurocentric i n

h i s thought

and t h a t t h e i r own work breaks with t h i s practice by providing an analysis of` imperialism from "the perspective of` the

periphery". Reconciliations with t h e s p i r i t of` marxism hinged on the weak argument t h a t Marx's oriental writings were not t o be taken t o o s e r i o u s l y .

have

It 60.

is

to

Amir's

credit

that

he

disposes

of'

this

ideological problem a n d restores t h e w r i t i n g s of Marx t o their proper p l a c e . He argues, in essence, t h a t t h e object of analysis of "neo~marxism" is s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of Marx. marx was concerned to a n a l y s e t h e laws of tendency within t h e " p u r e " c a p i t a l i s t mode o f p r o d u c t i o n , while the "neo-marxist" revival has a d i f f e r e n t task the

-

contemporary f o r m o f t h e c a p i t a l i s t world system and the manner in which t h i s system constrains I n other and involutes t h e development of' the periphery. investigation

of

the

world capitalist system cannot be reduced t o the mode of production. The system deals with relations between social formations which are not reducible to t h e s t a t u s of "economistic laws". The a n a l y s i s of t h i s system r e q u i r e s us t o return t o the "global plan of' historical materialism", Marx's u l t i m a t e l e g a c y , a n d t o implement t h a t plan i n i t s "true worldwide c o n t e x t " . For t h i s t a s k , Amir reaches out to Althusser a n d his followers for t h e appropriate concepts o f modes o f p r o d u c t i o n , social formation, t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of instances, e t c . 1 2 He also argues that Marx's works on t h e non-west must be s i t u a t e d a s products o f t h e i r epoch. This means more than t h e simple b u t t r u e observation t h a t Mar-x's sources on the non-west were r u d i m e n t a r y ; i t involves a comprehension of the periodization of' the c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m , of' the different functions assigned to the periphery in each of those periods , a n d o f the d i f f e r e n t consequences f o r the periphery which flowed o u t of' each p e r i o d . Amir reminds us that Marx lived i n the period of' competitive capitalism when colonialism referred either to t h e case o f the "white dominions" or t h e trading monopolies of the mercantilist period. One c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of` t h i s period was t h e favourable movement o f the terms o f trade t o the benefit of t h e periphery which r e f l e c t e d t h e r a p i d i t y o f technological progress a t t h e centre o f t h e system. Wage levels a t the centre were a t near-subsistence levels, a consequence o f the importation of consumption goods and cheap raw materials from the periphery. The d i s t i n c t i v e specialization in world t r a d e established in this period kept the rate o f p r o f i t a t the centre h i g h by keeping wages a t the c e n t r e low. A l l of these characteristics were to change w i t h the growth o f monopolies at the c e n t r e . The importance of L e n i n ' s theory o f imperialism to Amir words, the capitalist

_

can h a r d l y be

is

over-stressed.

so

In

a n age where L e n i n ' s

-

theory

many d i f f e r e n t things to d i f f e r e n t people and in p a r t i c u l a r , where the dominant tendency is t o s'tress L e n i n ' s legacy from Hobsonl3 Amin is content to return to fundamentals. Lenin is praised for realizing that the growth of' monopolies a t the centre and their extension went hand-in-hand with the formation of revisionist social democracy as the ideology of` the labour aristocracy. Equally important, monopolies made possible t h e rapid expansion of\ the export Of c a p i t a l . I t was the export of c a p i t a l which

-

61.

had t h e e f f e c t of r e c o n s t i t u t i n g the world c a p i t a l i s t system on a higher b a s i s ; t h u s i t marked o f f a new period i n the h i s t o r y of the system as a whole. Capital exports had the consequence o f making the costs o f production i n d i f f e r e n t social formations common knowledge. Earlier forms of expansionism and long-distance trade provided no benchmark for the comparison o f prices of production across national boundaries, and exploitation was founded only on the differential subjective valuation of the worth of commodities. But once capital from the c e n t r e , partaking in the generalized equalization o f p r o f i t r a t e s , was located in t h e periphery, exploitation of the periphery took the f o r m of unequal exchange because wage differentials between centre and periphery outstripped the respective productivity d i f f e r e n t i a l s . The e x p l o i t a t i o n o f the periphery became more systematic in form. The per iodization makes good s e n s e . But regardless of whether one agrees w i t h it or not, Amir should be congratulated for encouraging "neo-marxists" t o think about the d i f f e r e n t forms taken by the world c a p i t a l i s t system, and the different functions performed by the periphery a t d i f f e r e n t points in t i m e . The t r u t h of the matter is that structural "neo-marxists" have tended to see the world c a p i t a l i s t system in a highly aggregative manner; Frank, for instance, invited us to stress the continuities of t h e system as a whole over the particularities of any given situation.lL* This exaggerated sense o f permanence and constancy across time a n d space r e f l e c t s the time-honoured problem t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r a l method has had with systemic change a luxury that can n o longer be afforded i n an age when t h e extent of differentiation within t h e periphery is proceeding at a rapid r a t e and the system is in the throes o f reorganization. Phenomena such a s OPEC, t h e de-domiciling of c a p i t a l , the continuing political u n i t y o f t h e "Third World" and t h e onset of neo-mercantilist tendencies amongst OECD

-

states

can

hardly

begin

to

be

understood

using

such

undifferentiated concepts.

Amir's

interpretation

of

Lenin

will

also

prove

provocative. He is strongly opposed to the underconsumptionist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Lenin and t h e r a t h e r Stalinist conception o f "necessity" which accompanies i t .

The export of' capital is not pre-ordained; i t is as much a product of the class struggle and the r i s e of labour aristocracies as i t is of' economic "laws".l5 Amir always employs the idea of a "law" very f l e x i b l y . So, f o r instance, while he argues that t h e r e is an inherent c o n t r a d i c t i o n between t h e capacity to produce and the capacity to consume within the c a p i t a l i s t mode of production, t h a t contradiction never comes to fruition in a generalized crisis.l6 Luxemburg i s reproached f o r failing t o see t h e a c t i v e role played b y c r e d i t in expanded reproduction of' t h e c a p i t a l i s t mode. The "solutions" a r e dictated by the s t r u c t u r e of' the

62

.

class s t r u g g l e , and each of them displaces t h i s contradiction i n s p e c i f i c ways. But t h e "lonely moment o f the last instance" never- comes. Such interpretations should be welcomed. CHAHACTERIZING THE SYSTEM:

UNEQUAL EXCHANGE

For' Amir, the whole o f the liberal d i s i c i p l i n e o f development economics is "pre-Leninist" that i s , i t is erected upon t h e assumption t h a t t h e national economy takes precedence over the world economy, and that the latter' is merely a "spillover" of` the former. It might well b e added t h a t when as l i b e r a l social science breaks with t h i s image, both p o l i t i c a l and economic a n a l y s i s have tended to do i n reaction to OPEC and the MNC's, i t tends t o t h e opposite extreme of s t r e s s i n g the homogeneity of' the globe with "cobweb models" and talk of "interdependenee". "Neo-marxism" has always carved out a d i s t i n c t i v e niche f`or i t s e l f by accepting the primacy of the whole over the parts and by distinguishing between the centre and the periphery o f t h a t u n i t y . But whereas structural "neo-marxists" merely asserted this organic analogy, Amin tries very hard to pin down t h e kernel which makes i t a l i v i n g r e a l i t y . It is a clear' indication o f h i s structuralist p r o c l i v i t i e s that he turns to the concept of value to i d e n t i f y t h e basis of t h e system. Amin's position on this matter f i n d s i t s most mature expression in his above-mentioned essay "The End o f a Debate", where i t is elaborated in the context of his c r i t i q u e of Emmanuel and Bettelheim's contributions to the theory o f unequal exhchange. The crucial problem here concerns the scope a n d f u n c t i o n of t h e concept of value i n Marxist theory, and the manner in which calculations of value can be harmonized with historical materialism as a method. Amin finds little sustenance in the discoveries of neo-classical economies; t h e idea of` v a l u e present i n

-

classical

economics

becomes

totally

subjective

and

tautological under this influence, making comparisons across national boundaries meaningless and denying any systemic qualities to the international economy by adhering to the outdated Ricardian assumptions o f mobile labour* and immobile capital. Furthermore, neo-classicism begins from pre-given consumer preferences which necessarily exalt the use-value o f commodities and p o s i t a supra-human rationality of exchange which can in n o way be reconciled with the prevailing conditions of' production. The r e s u l t i s psychologism run wild; economics is transformed into "the ideology of' universal harmonies". The Emmanuel-Bettelheim debatel'7 on the other h a n d , is erected upon Ricardian theory and therefore avoids some if' not a l l of' these neo-classical p i t f a l l s . The theory of' unequal exchange advanced by Emmanuel inverts Ricardo's assumptions on the grounds that the conditions of mobile

63.

c a p i t a l and immobile labour* are more realistic in the present It can then be shown that exchanges between centre and periphery necessarily involve t h e systematic transfer of value for the low-wage levels could b e treated a s an

age.

"independent variable" in the system, determined by h i s t o r i c a l and moral elements within each national economy. For this, he has been compared with the Keynesian position.l3 Bettelheim refused t o accept t h a t wages could depend on the productivity of` labour; t h i s situated his critique back within the inescapable circuit of` interdependencies which enmesh marginalist formulations. For Amir, there is a s e r i o u s trade-oflf` involved in t h i s debate between historical materialism and a n o b j e c t i v e theory of' v a l u e , w i t h Marxist theory as the two-time l o s e r . Emmanuel's; "methodological pluralism" i n his treatment of wage determinations has the undesirable e f f e c t of' driving a wedge between production and exchange to the detriment of historical materialism, while Bettelheim's linkage of wage levels to national productivities makes i t d i f f i c u l t to conceive of' t h e reality of imperialism through an o b j e c t i v e theory o f value. This is a trade-oflf` h e seeks t o destroy. Emmanuel

is

praised

for

his

inversion

of

Ricardian

assumptions; Amir sees t h i s as establishing the correct abstract characterization of the imperialist system in the pre-eminence o f international (or w o r l d ) values.l9 This accurately captures the r e a l i t y t h a t commodity production in the i m p e r i a l i s t epoch is international rather than n a t i o n a l , that t h e capitalist mode of production is dominant a t both the c e n t r e and the p e r i p h e r y o f t h e system. And, a s we have already seen, he treats the question o f wage levels in the process of expanded reproduction as a resultant o f the specific form of the class s t r u g g l e , with dynamic equilibrium always possible.

The implications of t h i s very recent interpretation are quite fascinating. Firstly, the pre-eminence o f world values re-establishes exchange-value as

t h e dominant v a l u e form over-

From t h i s i t follows that the products entering international trade do not do so on the basis of'

use-value.

into

i r r e d u c i b l e use-values.

so,

for' instance, peripheral exports

such as tea

and coffee enter world trade not because they cannot b e grown elsewhere. Even i n cases like t h i s , substitutes exist for these "specific products"; t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y are produced in

the periphery and enter into world the dominant price structure of t h e a g e , these goods maximize t h e r a t e of` s u r p l u s v a l u e a t that point in time.20 To argue t h a t tea a n d coffee are traded because they can only be grown in the periphery is to admit that use-value predominates over exchange-value, which in t u r n is restatement of the theory of consumer sovereignty in a disguised form. Yet this is precisely w h a t Amin does a t times argue. In Unequal Development we are told t h a t :

trade indicates t h a t , under

et.

" . . . 75 per cent of" exports from the periphery came from modern enterprises with a very high productivity, and the rest mainly exotic agricultural products simply cannot be produced i n t h e advanced c o u n t r i e s . 2 1

-

-

This changed position requires clarification, for' i t s e f f e c t s would seem to be far-reaching. An important distinction set up by Amir in the l i g h t of these early arguments is that between primitive accumulation and expanded reproduction. He contends t h a t unequal exchange is a modern form o f p r i m i t i v e accumulation practiced by the centre against t h e periphery. He attempts t o show t h a t assuming equal productivities and 5:1 wage differential between

c e n t r e and

periphery,

t h e $26

b i l l i o n of' peripheral

exports ( i n 1966) coming from modern industries would cost $314 billion i f ' they were produced a t the c e n t r e . The ease is even more blatant when exports coming from "backward" sectors are investigated, f o r h e r e wage differentials v a s t l y o u t s t r i p productivity d i f f e r e n t i a l s . He calculates that the $9 billion c u r r e n t l y expended on such exports would swell to $23 billion i f they were produced a t the c e n t r e . So the overall picture i s t h a t t h e centre "saves" $22 billion through t h e operation of unequal exchange a saving which runs close to 20% of' t h e value of` t h e product i n the periphery. The "gains" to the centre are only 1.5% of` i t s p r o d u c t , but these accrue mainly to the MNC's who directly partake in unequal

-

exchange.22 The magnitude of such figures is already the s u b j e c t of' a heated debate.23 Yet what remains most important is the methodology used to derive them.2" Some real problems a r i s e when employing the equations of` the transformation

this way. For these equations, in assuming the of profit rates, are implicitly assuming a system of' competitive capitalism. This assumption cannot be made under monopoly conditions, as Amin admits. Monopolies appropriate a disproportionately l a r g e share o f t h e t o t a l par t o f s u r p l u s value through t h e i r political nexus with t h e state, so "draining" the surplus value distributed competitively amongst small producers. And this inflated share is i n t u r n distributed amongst individual monopolies in proportion to t h e i r political power. Now i t is totally unrealistic t o see world trade as c o m p e t i t i v e ; i t more problem

in

equalization

closely approximates

t r a d e between monopolies,

for

even t h e

exports originating from t h e peasant sector where competitive assumptions might apply are channelled through s t a t e trading monopolies on their way to world markets.

Unequal

exchange,

as calculated b y Amir, would seem t o be a rare case.

The

distribution of' surplus value between D C ' s and UDC's i n the act of international trade would seem to depend primarily on political power. Of course t h e DC's have had more of' t h i s , b u t as t o how we might q u a n t i f y t h e b e n e f i t s derived from i t

eludes me. 65.

these attempts a t measuring the extent of a r e fraught with hazards, his conceptual d i s t i n c t i o n between primitive accumulation and expanded reproduction is useful. It suggests that although the functions of the periphery for the centre may be p r o f i t a b l e , t h e y are not 'necessary' t o the sustenance o f t h e c e n t r e because they do not directly enter into expanded reproduction. This seems to accord with our present a g e , when serious thought can b e given t o the possibilities of substituting f o r such fundamental products as Middle Eastern o i l . His point that new "solutions" to the contradictions needs to be of' expanded reproduction can always be found heeded, and the class consequences o f these "solutions" thought o u t . And the s o r t s of debates which characterized radical circles in the Vietnam period25 need to be reformulated in the light o f these concepts. Although exploitation

-

-

PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM AND DECAY

In the social formations of` the centre, the dominant capitalist mode of production is expressed in the as ticulation o f t h e c a p i t a l goods and consumer goods sector. This mechanism o f expanded reproduction underwrites the a u t o c e n t r i c characteristics of c e n t r a l capitalism. According t o Amin, capitalism a t t h e centre tends t o become the exclusive as well as the dominant mode of p r o d u c t i o n ; i t dissolves a l l lesser modes i n t o their constituent parts and incorporates these elements into t h e process of expanded reproduction. Hence the social formations of` central capitalism converge around t h e model of the pure c a p i t a l i s t mode. Class divisions are s i m p l i f i e d to bourgeois and proletariat, despite the multiplication of secondary political and ideological s t r a t i f i c a t i o n s . 2 6 But although the capitalist mode of' production is s i m i l a r l y dominant a t the periphery, this dominance assumes a crucially different form. Although this dominant mode destroys t h e autonomy of precapitalist modes which it

encounters

there, Amid argues (following Bettelheim) that i t does not disintegrate these modes into their' basic components. Instead the contradictory effects of' dissolution/conservation come i n t o p l a y , with t h e r e s u l t that the tendency t o exclusivity of the c a p i t a l i s t mode a t the centre is never' realized. The linkage between c a p i t a l and consumer goods sectors which is a t the hear t of expanded reproduction in the central formations is never effected i n t h e periphery. Instead i t is the export sector which becomes t i e d to the t e r t i a r y sector and defines t h e basic tendencies of` the peripheral social f o r m a t i o n s , expressed in the "disar ticulation" of the economy.-27 SO while the pre-eminence o f world values expresses abstractly the unity of t h e system as a whole under the dominance of the capitalist mode o f production, this unity does not imply the 66 .

homogeneity of the parts. On the contrary, the stark contrast between centre and periphery is the Final disproof

of evolutionary theories o f "economic" development and "nation-building". The origins of these s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s may generally b e found in t h e manner in which the periphery was brought into the ambit of the world system. The most common method was through the mechanism o f t r a d e , accompanied by the application of` f o r c e . Trade gave to the peripheral economies their external orientation, and created a local class s t r u c t u r e compatible w i t h this outlook. The prime element o f t h i s class structure is t h e absence of any genuine national bourgeoisie; even contemporary policies of import-substitution express in a new form the extraversion of the peripheral economy. This absence is due to the manner i n which external trade broke u p the natural at ticulation of petty producers and agriculturalists in the pre-colonial e r a ; t r a d e l e d to t h e decimation ( e i t h e r through technological or p o l i t i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y ) o f petty commodity production i n order t h a t markets for- metropolitan products could b e secured. In the social formations of` central capitalism there was no directly comparable process to t h i s . There, the "freeing of the ser-fs" led to their absorption into the young manufacturing s e c t o r . But i n the periphery, former artisans were forced back on to t h e land o r harnessed as a lab our force for the extraction of` minerals in which the periphery may have enjoyed a natural advantage. The extraversion of' the economy was reinforcing t h e tendency towards a g r a r i a n crisis, a n d cementing t h e parameters o f a dependent class s t r u c t u r e a t the same time. As in the ease o f t h e social formations o f central capitalism, peripheral social formations do converge around a general model which i s nonetheless q u i t e d i s t i n c t from t h a t of the c e n t r e . This model has four main characteristics; the dominance of agrarian c a p i t a l in any t r u l y national class f o r m a t i o n , the complementary role f u l f i l l e d by local merchant capital to foreign i n t e r e s t s , t h e pronounced growth of bureaucracy which dominates "civil society" u p t o the l i m i t of s t a t e capitalism, and t h e r i s i n g levels of social inequality and active "proletarianization".28 But there are neither economic laws nor bourgeois class formations which challenge the dependent s t a t u s of t h e p e r i p h e r a l social formation or t h e r u l e s o f p r o f i t a b i l i t y which d a i l y reconfirm that dependence. Growth is spasmodic and confined i n i t s extent a succession of' "miracles" that lead nowhere in an economy t h a t is never internally i n t e g r a t e d . The foreign exchange constraint is ever-present as a bottleneck, while the s t a t e moves from one fiscal crisis to another as bureaucratic growth, s t a t e subsidies and personal emrnoluments eat i n t o i t s limited portion of t h e s u r p l u s . The forms of` dependence do v a r y , but the fact o f dependence is never challenged.

-

6'7-

-

The last characteristic o f peripheral social formations the r i s i n g levels of "proletarianization" is a contentious p o i n t , the s i t e o f one of` the most heated debates in "neo-marxist" work. The debate here is an old o n e , 2 9 r e s u r r e c t e d i n t h e contemporary period by L a c l a u ' s c r i t i q u e of Frank.30 Stripped t o i t s essentials, t h e debate r u n s as follows. For Marx, t h e p r o l e t a r i a t was defined by i t s "double f'reedom"; i.e. it is both freed from servile obligations and a b l e t o sell i t s labour power f r e e l y on the market, and it is free also in the sense of being unencumbered by possession of' the means o f production. A s t r i c t application of t h i s d e f i n i t i o n to the conditions of peripheral social formations reveals t h a t very l i t t l e lab our is free in both of' these senses and t h a t t h e p r o l e t a r i a t , so defined, probably amounts to n o more than 3-U% o f t h e workforce. One also sees some strange counter-intuitive phenomena a t work; for instance, a n archetypal ' c a p i t a l i s t v e n t u r e ' , s u c h as t h e Green Revolution in I n d i a , generated a n

-

increase i n t h e level of' semi-feudal "bonded" labour rather than f r e e l a b o u r . Hence t h e p r o l e t a r i a t i s defined b y reference to the immediate relation of' production i n t o which

-

it enters, the conclusion is inescapable that the proletariat is p o l i t i c a l l y insignificant in the periphery, and t h a t t h e present political task for socialist strategy does not consist o f t h e over-throw of' capitalism so much as i t s development. Frank's arguments on this point were that the apparently semi-feudal producer i n the periphery nonetheless produces for a world market a n d t h a t i t is t h e loss of autonomy which constitutes the essence o f the p r o l e t a r i a t . More recently, authors such as Wallerstein have redecorated these structural arguments without reformulating t h e terms of reference of the debate.31 Armin's c o n t r i b u t i o n flows o u t of' h i s a b s t r a c t characterization of' the system of world capitalism as a u n i t y marked b y the pre-eminence of' world v a l u e s , t h e dominance of` the c a p i t a l i s t mode o f production, and t h e all-pervasiveness of` unequal exchange. In other words, under the process of` the formation of the imperialist epoch, pre-capitalist modes of production have been

... .to

a simple form, a "shell" whose content; relation of the sale of labourpower...(producers at the periphery) are mostly proletarianized and sellers (although indirectly) of' their lab our powep".32 "-..reduced

has

become

a

.. .

So i t

i s " t h e separation of the producer from the means of' pr-oduction"33 which is a t the essence of` the process of' proletarianization. Th is may s a t i s f y some as an improvement on t h e status q u o insofar as Amir is clearly i r i n g to retain the

conclusions o f Frank w h i l e basing his analysis a t t h e productive r e l a t i o n s , but my preference would s t i l l

level o f

68.

lie with a more disaggregated mode of class i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Amir proposed t h a t we employ a "model of' decadence" to explain the transition of` t h e system as a whole in t h e direction of socialism. He argues that " ..when a system i s outgrown and superseded, t h i s

.

process

takes

place,

not

in

the

first

place,

starting

from the c e n t r e , but from i t s p e r i p h e r y . . . " 3 U Such

a model of

"decay from

the

p e r i p h e r y " a p p l i e s not

only

to t h e transition to socialism b u t also helps explain t h e b i r t h o f c a p i t a l i s m , as a peripheral, or' marginal, case of the more general t r i b u t a r y mode of' p r o d u c t i o n , which t h i s peripheral condition defined by the acute degradation o f the community to the point where i t loses dominium emir ens of t h e land. This specific "backwardness" of feudal Europe in relation to t h e Chinese and Arabian centre of civilization found expression in the absence of a strong and centralized a u t h o r i t y over t h e peasants. Commercial a c t i v i t y was more independent , t h e f l i g h t from localized tyranny was more likely to succeed, and hence the formation of` t h e elements of the capitalist mode of production was more easily effected. By contrast, at the "centres" of the t r i b u t a r y mode feudalization was seen by the peasants as a regression, and peasant revolts led to the restoration of` centralized s t a t e

control.35 These a r e interesting and novel thoughts that should be well received. But i n the present political climate, Amir's brief a n a l y s i s of` t h e strategy of t h e Cambodian r e v o l u t i o n is to a t t r a c t a disproportionate s h a r e of attention.36 He argues t h a t differentiation w i t h i n t h e Cambodian peasantry was marginal, a n d t h a t t h i s degree of' d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n has been exaggerated by sociologists unable to distinguish the e x t r a c t i o n - of' a surplus from the relations of' social domination. This relative lack of class formation set Cambodia apart from the more typical and "central" t r i b u t a r y made a s found i n both China and Vietnam. Imperialist forces were faced with a dilemma i n such situations, in that

sure

potential collaborators within the countryside are numerically and strategically weak. They could either expropriate peasant lands, turn them over t o white settlers, and proceed to exploit t h e peasants as a pool of labour or as specialized producers by t h e use of taxes and monopolistic control of peasant o u t p u t . But, Amir argues, t h e principal contradiction in such situations remains external to peasant society and symbolized i n the opposition between the town a n d the whole of the peasantry. Consequently the correct revolutionary s t r a t e g y does not follow t h e Chinese p a t t e r n o f "the r i c h peasant line" but seeks to u n i t e the peasants against the domination of t h e town and c a p i t a l . The ideological leadership o f t h e working class is essential to the success of t h i s strategy because i t converts the traditional peasant uprising i n t o a stage in the socialist 69-

transformation o f the world system. Such an alliance also weakens the enemy by d i v i d i n g i t , while preserving t h e real basis of` u n i t y amongst the peasantry. Amir concludes that this strategy and these conditions are r a t h e r typical of' A f r i c a , whereas the f u l l y developed t r i b u t a r y mode of` production is somewhat more confined to China and Egypt. Larger questions remain, however, about the p r o j e c t which Amir is engaged i n . He pushes the entente cordiale between Marxist concepts and dependency theory which is passed oflf` as "neo-marxism" t o i t s l i m i t . The systematic basis o f t h i s synthesis ultimately t e l l s against i t when faced with political analysis of` contemporary situations such as those in Cambodia and I r a n . For there we need concepts which can inform r e v o l u t i o n a r y strategy with more precise information than the generalized signal that the periphery is r i p e for r e v o l t . This may be t r u e although the unexpected s t a b i l i t y o f the ASEAN s t a t e s in the years a f t e r the Guam doctrine might lead to doubts but i t is c l e a r l y evident that we need b e t t e r indicators of' the quality of t h e revolutions which do not occur. And it may b e questioned whether' this "neo-marxist" approach can help in this task more s a t i s f a c t o r i l y than any well-informed p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s . Amin does disaggregate the "lumpen-concepts" of early structural "neo-marxism" t o a significant e x t e n t , and even attempts t h e introduction o f some s t r u c t u r a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s . But i t might s t i l l b e argued that the organicist radicalism which is b u i l t into t h e notion of' the world c a p i t a l i s t system makes these attempts insufficient to handle the ultimate problem o f s t r u c t u r a l thought the analysis o f the sources and directions of change.

-

-

-

NOTES l. Aidan Foster-car t e r , "Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment" i n E . d e Kadt and G. Williams ( e d s . ) Sociology and Development (London: T a v i s t o c k , l9714) , pp.67-105 (an earlier' version appeared in JCA,

V0l.3:l, 1973) and "From Rostow to Gunder- Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment", World Developmemt,M, l976,pp.l67-180. 2 . See the introductory remarks to his recent a r t i c l e "The Modes of Production Controversy", New L e f t Review, 107,1978,pp.uy-77. 3. For example t h e comments by Jean Copans and David Seddon i n t h e i r "Marxism and Anthropology: A Preliminary Survey" i n D. Seddon ( e d . ) R e l a t i o n s of` Production (London: Cass,l978),DD-M0-Ml II. See, for

instance, the recent paper by Richard Higgott which argues strongly that liberal theories of` modernisation have not disappeared so much as undergone a change in form; "From Modernisation Theory t o P u b l i c P o l i c y : Continuity a n d Change in t h e Political Science of` Political

70 .

Development", paper presented to the Ll9th ANZAAS Congress, Sociology section, Auckland, New Zealand, January 19795. Some pertinent reflections upon this reading can be found in David Goddard, "Limits of' British Anthropology" New

Left Review, 58, 1969. 6. For a good attempt to distinguish these methods, see Chapter

2

of

Miriam

Glucksmann,

Structural

Analysis

in

Contemporary Social Thought (London: Routledge and Kevan Paul, l97U). 7. Samir Amir, Accumulation on a World Scale, tr. B. Pearce (New York: Monthly Review press, 197M) two volumes. 8. Samir Amir, Unequal Development, tr. B. Pearce (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1976). 9- Samir Amir, Imperialism and Unequal Development

(Sussex: Harvester Press, 1977). 10. These arguments are economically assembled and plausibly argued by Shlome Avineri in the Introduction to his edited book, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969). II. A clear' demonstration of` this is provided by Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, lg7u), pp.u62-m72. 12. See Chapter 1 of Unequal Development.

13- Michael Barratt Brown has been the main propagator of Critique of Marxist Theories of Imperialism" in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism" (London: Longman, 1972). 114. See Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (Penguin, 1971), pp.36-38. 15. Imperialism and Unequal Development, p.l06. 16. Ibid, pp.205-208, 239-252. 17. See Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange, to. B. Pearce (London: New Left Books, 1972). 18. Michael Barratt Brown, The Economics of Imperialism (Penguin, l97M), pp.72,230~ Although this comparison is correct in political terms, it lis unfair- insofar- as Emmanuel does not accept the marginalist foundations upon which

this view; see his "A

Keynesian theory is based. 19. Imperialism and Unequal Development, pp.l86-l9l. 20. Imperialism and Unequal Development, pp.208-216. 21. Unequal Development, pp.lm7-lm8. 22. Accumulation on a World Scale, Vol.l, DD-57~'58 and Unequal Development, pp.lm3-lu8. 211. Some of these problems are discussed in my earlier review of Amin, "Accumulation on a World Scale", Arena, '42, 1976, pp.l00-116, especially p.1luff. There is the additional aproblem of deciding which terms remain constant in the transformation of` values into prices. Is total price total price of production? Or is the rate of surplus value = rate of profit? 25. E.g. the famous Magdoff-Miller debate. See Harry Magdoff, "The Logic of Imperialism" and S.M. Miller et.al.,

=

71.

"Does the U . S . Economy Require Imperialism?" both Policy, 1 ( 3 ) , 1970. 26. Unequal Development, pp.293-29M.

in

Social

27- For' a clear- statement of the centre-periphery contrast in this respect, see Samir' Amir, "Accumulation and Development:

A

Theoretical

Model",

Review

of`

African

Political Economy, 1 , 197M. 28. Unequal Development, pp.333-36M. 29- See the classical debate between Sweezy and Dobb, updated and reprinted in R. Hilton ( e d ) , The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London: New L e f t Books, 1 9 7 6 ) . 30. Ernesto Laclau "Feudalism and C a p i t a l i s m i n Latin America" i n Politics and Ideology i n Marxist Theory (London: New L e f t Books, 1 9 7 7 ) , pp.l'5--50. 31 Immanuel Wallerstein - "The Rise and Future Demise o f the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis" Comparative Studies and History, 197U, pD-387-u15. 32. Imperialism and Unequal Exchange, p . l 9 l . 33. Unequal Development, pp.lM,360-361. 3M. i b i d . p . l 0

-

35.

i b i d . pp.51-58.

3 6 . Imperialism

'72.

and

Unequal

Development,

pp.1LI7_152_

Chapter' 6 CLASS ANALYSIS VERSUS WORLD SYSTEMS' A1~4In's TYPOLOGY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

CRITIQUE

OF

SAMIR

Sheila Smith

INTRODUCTION Despite the

heterogeneity o f a n a l y t i c a l approaches which a r e included in t h e term "dependency theory" ( s e e Palma, 1978), i t is possible to d i s t i l some commonly held c o n t e n t i o n s ,

including the following' (i) t h e w o r l d system is such t h a t the development of' par t of' the system occurs a t t h e expense of' o t h e r parts. The mechanisms by which t h i s occurs i n c l u d e t r a d e a n d unequal exchange, t h e transfer of` s u r p l u s to central/metropolitan c o u n t r i e s by multinational corporations, and t h e transfer o f technology under r e s t r i c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s which prevent i t s diffusion i n underdeveloped countries (LDCs) and benefit i t s owners in developed c a p i t a l i s t countries (DCCs); underdevelopment is not simply non-development, (ii) b u t is a unique type of' socio-economic s t r u c t u r e brought about b y the integration o f LDCs i n t o t h e world c a p i t a l i s t s y s t e m ; (iii)

countries lack the capacity for autonomous, self-sustained growth, and can expand only as a r e s u l t o f the growth of DCCs. contentions can b e summarized by t h e following dependent

These quotation from Amir: "The accentuation of t h e features of' under-development i n proportion as ( s i c ) the economic growth of the periphery i n other words, the development of under-development necessarily results in the blocking of growth, in other words, t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y whatever the level of production per capita t h a t may be attained of` going over to autonomous and self-sustained growth, to development i n the true sense" (Amin, l97M, p . 3 9 3 ) . There are some excellent general c r i t i q u e s o f dependency t h e o r y , including Warren ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Leys (1977, 1978) a n d Palma

-

(1978).

I

will

-

-

attempt

to

summarize

these

-

criticisms

b r i e f l y , before presenting the main part o f this paper,

which 73-

is a more detailed c r i t i q u e o f t h e views o f Samir Amir. Warren argues t h a t dependency t h e o r y i s s t a t i c , i n the sense that dependency is g i v e n , thus "the centre periphery paradigm on which t h e e n t i r e theoretical s t r u c t u r e rests remains largely unexamined. The shifting geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n of world economic power ( i n favour' of t h e LDCS) is simply assumed t o u n f o l d under t h e control o f t h e c e n t r e " (1980, p . 1 6 3 ) . This means t h a t proponents of` dependency ignore the considerable bargaining power of LDC national States vis-a-vis multinationals. Imperialism is assumed t o be a "monolithic s t r u c t u r e " ; imperialism i s generally equated with the world market, thus "the possibility of any non-dependent c a p i t a l i s t Third World progress" is excluded by definition (1980, p.l6Ll). Finally, "dependency theory assumes' ( a ) t h a t there is a l a t e n t , suppressed historical a l t e r n a t i v e to the development that a c t u a l l y took place; ( b ) t h a t t h e failure o f t h i s alternative to materialize was the even if' mediated result primarily o f external imposition through i n t e r n a l social forces and not of` the_ choice o f the internal d i r e c t i n g groups; ( c ) t h a t t h e l a t e n t (suppressed) a l t e r n a t i v e would have been more autonomous and t h e r e f o r e would have achieved more rapid development" (pp.l66-7, emphasis in original) Warren goes on to illustrate his contention t h a t a l l t h e normal indicators of` 'dependency' point t o increasingly non-subordinate economic relations between poor and rich countries, as regards trade d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n , control of' foreign investment, s t r u c t u r a l change and balance of payments accounts. In response t o Warren's empirical evidence, proponents of dependency theory might counter with two arguments:

.. .

-

-

.

( a ) Warren is equating growth and development , which i s not legitimate. As shown i n the Amir q u o t a t i o n a b o v e , economic growth a t the periphery is compatible with the development of under-development. ( b ) Many o f the r a p i d l y growing LDCs a r e exceptions a n d t h e i r experience is not generalizable f o r the periphery as a

whole. Neither of these arguments is s u s t a i n a b l e . The f i r s t is sometimes based on a moralistic expectation that; capitalism ought t o b e n i c e . The existence or otherwise o f c a p i t a l i s t development needs t o be grounded on something stronger- than i t s niceness and nastiness. Alternatively the f i r s t argument is based on the view that c a p i t a l i s t growth a t the periphery is ' d i s t o r ' t e d ' , which implies some ' c o r r e c t ' , standard type of' c a p i t a l i s t

pp.lll-l5)

.

growth.

(For

more

details,

see

Smith,

1980,

The second argument is an illustration of t h e c i r c u l a r i t y of dependency theory a l l LDCs are dependent, except when they'r~e not. Furthermore, as Leys argues, Britain was an exceptional c a s e , a n d , summarising his views, he states that "The debate about dependency and 7*-|-

-

under-development has not shown either' t h a t capitalist development cannot occur' a t the p e r i p h e r y or t h a t i t is e v e n t u a l l y bound t o . What i t demonstrates i s , r a t h e r , the need t o s t u d y and theorise the conditions under which some peripheral countries have, and others have n o t , experienced significant measures o f growth" ( L e y s , l 9 7 8 , p . 2 M H ) . This brief' resume of some criticisms made of' dependency theory i n general is c l e a r l y inadequate t o dispose o f i t . I shall therefore proceed by attempting a more d e t a i l e d

-

discussion of' one theorist Samir Amin. This discussion is an extension of a previous a r t i c l e (Smith, $ 9 8 0 ) , which was based on t h r e e works: Accumulation on a World Scale ( 1 9 7 ' ) , Unequal Development (1976) and Imperialism and Unequal Development (1977) ; the present discussion includes two l a t e r works' The Law o f Value and Historical M a t e r i a l i s m ( 1 9 7 8 ) , and Class and Nation, Historically a n d i n the Current C r i s i s , (1980). The r e s t of" the

paper is

organised as

follows.

After a

summary of Amin's a n a l y s i s o f world capitalism, t h e c r i t i q u e of' Amin is i n t h r e e p a r t s : f i r s t , a discussion o f the ways i n which Amin a t t e m p t s t o immunize himself' from brief

criticisms;

secondly,

some

general

criticisms;

thirdly,

discussion o f t h e spurious nature of' Amin's claims ' s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y ' , and f i n a l l y , a discussion of p o l i t i c a l implications of A m i r ' s

a

to the

ideas.

SUMMARY OF AMIN'S ANALYSIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM

According to Amir, i t is necessary to analyse capitalism a t a world level in terms of two categories, c e n t r e and periphery. The basic d i f f e r e n c e between centre and periphery is that c a p i t a l i s t relations in the c e n t r e developed as a r e s u l t of internal processes, whereas c a p i t a l i s t relations i n the periphery were introduced from t h e o u t s i d e . Thus central economies a r e a u t o c e n t r i c : autocentric capitalist growth is c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y t h e balanced i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e sector producing mass consumer goods and the sector

producing capital goods.

In contrast,

peripheral economies

a r e "subject t o the logic of` accumulation in t h e centres that dominated them" ( l 9 8 0 , p . l 3 3 ) . The form of domination has changed

with

the

political

independence

of

peripheral

direct colonial rule to technological dependence, domination by multinational companies, e t c . , b u t t h i s has been associated w i t h a deepening, not a lessening, nations,

from

o f underdevelopment. I n peripheral economies, low wages, modern technology and hence high labour productivity provide t h e basis for unequal exchange and hence for super-exploitation: "all plans for a dependent development policy worked out i n constant prices lead to a blocking by a double d e f i c i t , i n the external balance a n d i n t h e p u b l i c f i n a n c e s ; a l l plans for such a

policy worked out ex post, a t current

prices ( r e l a t i v e prices 75 .

of imports and exports) lead t o t h i s same blocking o c c u r r i n g even sooner. There i s o n l y one explanation for t h i s , namely, t h a t the p r i c e structures are distorted (through the e f f e c t of combined c l a s s s t r u g g l e s on t h e world s c a l e ) so as to aggravate exploitation i n the periphery" (1978, p.63). Unequal e x p l o i t a t i o n and unequal exchange d i c t a t e i n e q u a l i t y i n t h e international division o f labour, and lead t o a ' d i s t o r t e d ' s t r u c t u r e of' demand a t the periphery, since the domestic market for mass consumer goods is restricted by t h e low level of wages, and since demand is dominated by 'parasitic classes' demand for luxury goods. This ' d i s t o r t e d ' s t r u c t u r e of demand has eflflects, b o t h on the s t r u c t u r e of domestic production and on the composition o f imports. P e r i p h e r a l economies a r e s u b j e c t to a 'vicious c i r c l e ' o f development: " i n order t o reproduce i t s own conditions of` e x i s t e n c e , t h e peripheral formation must s t i l l contain p r e c a p i t a l i s t modes of` p r o d u c t i o n or else produce n o n - c a p i t a l i s t modes w h i c h , b e i n g dominated, provide the c a p i t a l i s t mode with i t s cheap labour" (1977, p . 2 l 8 ) . Amir r u l e s o u t completely the p o s s i b i l i t y of` ' p r o p e r ' c a p i t a l i s t development a t the periphery: "in t h e imperialist p e r i o d . . . t h e door t o the establishment of' new c a p i t a l i s t centres is henceforth closed, while the era o f t h e stages o f the s o c i a l i s t revolution is opened (1980, p.lll1), and "complete, autonomous capitalism is impossible in the periphery. The s o c i a l i s t break is o b j e c t i v e l y necessary t h e r e " (1980, p . l 3 l ) . In order for the productive forces i n the periphery t o d e v e l o p t h e i m p e r i a l i s t system must be broken u p , since "the contemporary imperialist system is a system of" c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of` the s u r p l u s on the world s c a l e . . . c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the acceleration of accumulation and by the development of` the p r o d u c t i v e forces in t h e centre of the system, while in the periphery these l a t t e r are held back and d e f o r m e d " (1980, p . 2 5 2 ) .

There a r e four important drawn from Amir's a n a l y s i s ' l. Peripheral economies have

political

no

freedom

conclusions

of

to

be

man oeuvre in

relation to world capitalism. 2

3

u.

76 .

Only a radical and complete break with t h e w o r l d c a p i t a l i s t system will provide the conditions necessary for ' g e n u i n e ' d e v e l o p m e n t . The working class in countries of t h e centre benefits from the exploitation of' the periphery' this provides t h e objective explanation for the p r o - i m p e r i a l i s t political and ideological characteristic of' t h e workers' movement in t h e c e n t r e . The principal contradiction in the world is between t h e peoples of the periphery and imperialist c a p i t a l . Hence, "In the periphery, t h e s o c i a l i s t transition is not d i s t i n c t from national l i b e r a t i o n . It has become clear that the l a t t e r i s impossible under local bourgeois l e a d e r s h i p a n d thus becomes a democratic stage in the

per-ooess o f the uninterrupted revolution b y stages led by the peasant and worker masses" (1980, p . 2 5 2 ) . CRITIQUE OF SAMIR AMIN (A) A m i r ' s Self-Immunisation from C r i t i c i s m C r i t i c i z i n g Amir is d i f f i c u l t , and p o t e n t i a l l y h a z a r d o u s , forseveral reasons. First, A m i r ' s analysis is concerned with ' e s s e n c e s ' , thus a n y c r i t i q u e based upon a c t u a l events can be countered by accusations of s u p e r f i c i a l i t y and of' concern only with 'appearances'. Secondly, Amir proceeds by a mode of argument which I have described as "assertion plus t h r e a t " ( S m i t h , 1980, D . 1 3 ) . i . e . , a n assertion is followed by a

' t h r e a t ' or an i n s u l t a p p l i e d to anyone who might disagree. This mode of argument is o f t e n combined i n A m i r ' s work b y an attempt to proclaim himself the 'true' intellectual descendant of Marx, the 'Marxist of them a l l ' . One example is the Following: " I t is worth n o t i n g t h a t t h e concepts of` c e n t r e and periphery, basic t o my analysis, b u t r e j e c t e d by all pro-imperialist currents w i t h i n Marxism, were introduced by Lenin in d i r e c t relation t o his analysis of` t h e imperialist s y s t e m " (Amin, 1980, p . l 3 2 ) . A f u r t h e r example is: "West-centredness systematically distorts Marxism. Through dogmatic r i g i d i t y , it has virtually turned an instrument of` revolutionary action into an academic discipline. The debate over- unequal exchange has convinced me that insistence on t h e 'pre-eminence of` production over c i r c u l a t i o n ' is n o t h i n g b u t a n ideological excuse" ( I b i d , p.20'4)- ' Finally, "in the periphery the absolute pauperization o f the producers exploited by c a p i t a l has revealed itself in a l l i t s brutal r e a l i t y . But i t is t h e r e , p r e c i s e l y , t h a t t h e pro-imperalist tendency among Marxists pulls u p s h o r t , for i t is from that point onward that Marxism becomes subversive.. .The consequences t h a t follow from t h i s

-

contradiction c o n s t i t u t e t h e real problems which a r e o f no i n t e r e s t t o dogmatic professional Marxism o r , f`or that matter, to revisionist and crypto-revisionist labour

movements" (Amir, 1978, pp.3l1-35).

At the risk

of being

labelled a revisionist or* a pro-imperalist M a r x i s t , or* even not a proper Marxist a t a l l , I should l i k e to argue t h a t assertions plus threats or insults a r e not a n adequate s u b s t i t u t e for a serious c r i t i q u e of other persons' arguments. The f i n a l , and most unacceptable, reason f`or the d i f f i c u l t y o f c r i t i c i z i n g Amir, i s t h a t the pro-imperalist degeneration of' Marxism i n the centre is o b j e c t i v e l y given. This is most clearly argued i n Amir 1978, For example: "The o b j e c t i v e basis of the pro-imperalist tendency -among Marxists is c o n s t i t u t e d by the f a c t o f imperialism i t s e l f and i t s implication: the hegemony of the social democratic and revisionist ideologies among t h e working classes a t the centre of t h e system. On the theoretical p l a n e , this tendency f i n d s expression i n t h e tirelessly renewed s t r i v i n g to eliminate the question of' the collective, worldwide

77-

genesis of s u r p l u s value and i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n " (Amir, l 9 T 8 , p.ll6). "Of course the revolutionary credential o f the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , which a t the c e n t r e is i n the service of` capital, is here, in the periphery, in the camp o f revolution" (Ibid, p.l2U)This means that a correct analysis o f the w o r l d , or any par t o f i t , can o n l y be generated a t the p e r i p h e r y , and thus i n t e l l e c t u a l work in countries of t h e centre must be automatically dismissed: "As for the trends o f t h a t famous 'Western M a r x i s m ' . . . t h e y are all linked with trends in bourgeois, and therefore pre-Marxist philosophy. Consequently, even when they ask t h e right questions, they a r e incapable o f answering these questions because their s o c i e t y is not ready for the answers. Refusing to break with imperialism, t h e y can b e r e - a b s o r b e d , especially through psychologism i n one form or another (Freudo-Marxism, feminism, a n d s o o n ) " ( I b i d , p . l 2 5 ,

my emphasis). This f'orm of argument i s an extreme example of economic reductionism: by locating a person's class position, Amir is ' r e a d i n g o f f ' their' political and ideological s t a n c e , without even considering the content. A m i n ' s argument is also extremely dangerous, since i t is t e e t e r i n g on the brink of` racism, b y claiming a n intellectual privilege for h i s own ideas because t h e y a r e generated w i t h i n t h e p e r i p h e r y , and not because o f their' c o n t e n t , w h i l s t dismissing any c r i t i q u e from

the

centre

by

labellings

it

'pro-imperialist'.

The

status o f arguments is t h e r e f o r e pre-determined, r e s u l t i n g from t h e location of their owners in c e n t r e or p e r i p h e r y . Despite t h e predetermined s t a t u s of` my ideas, generated as t h e y a r e in a Western ivory tower, I wish t o argue t h a t a l l ideas and arguments should be examined on t h e i r m e r i t s , and not a c c o r d i n g t o the s t a t u s o f t h e i r o r i g i n a t o r ; and furthermore, t h a t t h e ideas cannot be ' r e a d those s t r u g g l e s .

p o l i t i c a l orientation o f struggles and o f f " from the geographical location of

( B ) Some General Criticisms

(1) Amir, along with many other 'proponents

of the dependency or- under underdevelopment school, regards the periphery on the one hand, and the centre on the other, as u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d blocs. There a r e many purposes, however, For which t h i s view is both u n h e l p f u l and misleading. Significant differences among less developed countries can t a k e p o l i t i c a l or economic forms, examples of the l a t t e r a r e differences between oil exporting economies , newly-industrialising c o u n t r i e s , countries w i t h a s i g n i f i c a n t

in'dustrial sector based upon the domestic market, exporters of non-oil primary commodities, e t c . I t cannot be seriously sustained t h a t a l l these groups of' economies Face a s i n g l e , monolithic s t r u c t u r e o f i m p e r i a l i s m , and t h a t none o f them h a v e any freedom o f man oeuvre i n r e l a t i o n t o imperialism. Examples of political d i f f e r e n c e s include differences between 78.

countries which are attempting to construct a socialist t r a n s i t i o n whilst remaining t o some degree involved with the 'international capitalist s y s t e m ' , either- through trade orforeign investment, such as Angola, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua; and on the other hand, countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Nigeria, Hong Kong, Ivory Coast, which remain f i r m l y within the c a p i t a l i s t political camp. To deny t h e significance o f these l a t t e r d i f f e r e n c e s involves denigrating the heroic struggles which took p l a c e , denying t h e important v i c t o r i e s o f p o l i t i c a l par ticipation o f the mass o f the population as well as the economic changes resulting from l i b e r a t i o n , a n d , further, involves an arrogant dismissal o f the economic strategies formulated in those countries for a transition to socialism. The l a t t e r is indeed an arrogance stemming from a presumed intellectual omniscience, g e n e r a t e d , n o t in the centre, but in the periphery. Amir regards empirical evidence which runs counter to his view as s u p e r f i c i a l . Yet h i s methodology is suspect: how are his assertions to be disproved? A m i r ' s methodology proceeds a s follows: there are two categories of' country, A and B; countries in A have characteristics X, Y a n d Z ; countries in B have characteristics 0 , P and Q . Countries' membership of A and B determines all important features of' those countries. If research uncovers the existence o f X, Y and/or z i n countries in B or O, P and/or 0 in countries i n A, t h i s research is either wrong, or s u p e r f i c i a l , or has failed to understand Marxism. This methodology is a r e c i p e for t a u t o l o g y , rather than a procedure for analysing the w o r l d . Some examples of' evidence which would b e dismissed b y Amir b y means o f t h i s procedure are as follows: the development of multinational companies based in less developed countries such as Brazil, I n d i a and South Korea. By June 1979, the cumulative total of foreign investment by South Korean companies has reached us$13u million, involving 367 projects. Around one-third of t h i s had occurred during the f i r s t 6 months o f 1979 (Lueddel-Neurath, 1980, p.5l); evidence of mass consumption of Brazilian produced manufactured goods in Brazil , rather than t h e i r consumption exclusively by 'parasitic classes' (Wells, 1977) ; and evidence of` t h e increased production of' c a p i t a l goods i n LDCs ( S c h i f f e r , 1981). The l a t t e r t h r e e examples a r e instances of` attempts to i n q u i r e i n t o t h e a c t u a l nature of' c a p i t a l i s t development in LDCs, and to t h a t extent a r e , however, dismissed by Amin as irrelevant before the answers have been discovered. This research i n t o t h e s p e c i f i c i t y o f p a r t i c u l a r economies is deemed unimportant by Amir.

( i i ) In presenting a criterion of c a p i t a l i s m in the centre as a 'standard' and capitalism in the periphery as a 'dis tor l i o n ' , Amir implies a strange assessment of` the process of` capitalist: development in the c e n t r e . He argues t h a t , because of domination by the centre, "the development

'790

o f under-development is neither regular nor' c u m u l a t i v e , in On contrast to the development of` capitalism a t the centre. is jerky and made u p of phases of' extremely the contrary, i t rapid growth, followed by sudden blockages" ( 1 9 7 6 , p . 2 8 9 ) .

If Amir's view o f 'standard capitalism' is one of' r e g u l a r , steady, even progress, then a l l capitalisms of t h e centre are 'dis tor r e d ' , and the yardstick by which peripheral capitalism is judged is an a b s t r a c t , utopian one.

( i i i ) Given A m i r ' s confidence o f t h e correctness of his view o f t h e world, i t is s u r p r i s i n g t o find major- inconsistencies in i t . In Accumulation on a World Scale, Amir argues that "so long as an under-developed country continues to be integrated i n the world market, i t remains helpless the possibilities of local accumulation a r e n i l " (l9'714, p . l 3 ) .

. ..

However, in The Law of Value and Historical Materialism, in a remarkably sensible c h a p t e r on Mining R e n t , Amin argues t h a t the formation of mining rent is conditioned by the emergence of a bourgeosie in the periphery t h a t mining r e n t is a r e s u l t of attempts by peripheral states to impose a real royalty for access to t h e i r resources, and that " t h e transfer from centre to periphery which this r e n t c o n s t i t u t e s should enable accelerated accumulation to take place in t h e periphery The necessary condition For t h i s accelerated accumulation is access t o t h e centre f o r the p e r i p h e r y ' s i n d u s t r i a l exports" (1978, p.7I4). T h u s , i t seems, t h e periphery has room for man oeuvre, t h e possibility of local accumulation in the periphery is not n i l . Yet Amir s t i l l wants i t both ways: "The bourgeoisie of' t h e periphery is ( t h u s ) a productive c l a s s , even though i t is dependent and p a r a s i t i c " (1978,

p.78). THE 'SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY'

OF AMIN'S ANALYSIS

One of argument

the central f e a t u r e s o f A m i r ' s analysis is the that the periphery is underdeveloped because of` s u p e r - e x p l o i t a t i o n , a n d t h a t the resulting super-surplus is transferred to the centre: "contrary to the bourgeois theory of' under-development, the periphery is not poor but impoverished, because i t is super'-exploited" (1980, p . l 6 3 ) . Several means a r e employed by Amir t o establish that t h i s super-exploitation is an o b j e c t i v e l y provable phenomenon: f`irst, A m i n ' s claim to be the t r u e heir of Marx means that his application of historical materialism t o the world capitalist system is the o n l y correct use of` Marx's method, and that anyone who disagrees has failed to understand Marx; secondly, to provide an acceptable scientific proof, Amir attempts to quantify this super--surplus. In order to i l l u s t r a t e the basis on which h i s claim r e s t s , I shall discuss t h e q u a n t i f i c a t i o n o f the super-surplus i n d e t a i l . Table l

p.l5l). 80.

is

reproduced from Class and

The f i r s t thing to note is

Nation

(Amir,

that no source

is

1980,

given

t h e numbers. The second remarkable feature is that t h e 77 million unemployed persons, constituting 6 percent of the w o r l d ' s population, receive no income. The arbitrariness of the division of persons and income i n t o classes hardly needs to b e s t a t e d . However, a f t e r d e f i n i n g t h e class c a t e g o r i e s ,

for-

Amin poses the following q u e s t i o n : "Is i t possible t o use a t a b l e of t h e equivalents, expressed in incomes, of" production within the capitalist system, t o analyse the contradictions within t h i s system and pinpoint the tendencies in t h e accumulation which t h e y control?" ( I b i d , p . l 5 6 ) . The answer he provides is in three p a r t s :

.. .

l.

a 'vulgar' economist' would regard the income o f each class as a measure o f i t s contribution t o production, since 'vulgar economists' are concerned only with 'appearances', i . e . prices.

2

a 'vulgar' Marxist' would proceed thus: for group A , t o t a l value produced is $2,220 billion, the value of' lab our power $1,0U0 billion, surplus value $1,080 billion, and hence the rate of` surplus value approximately 100 percent. For group B , total value produced is ~'B1l60 billion, surplus labour (income accruing to land proprietors) is $185 billion, thus the r a t e of' surplus value is 185/2'7'5, or 67 per cen.t. So although workers in

B are poorer than in A, they are less exploited. It should be noted that an extreme degree o f vulgarity would be needed in order for a Marxist t o equate prices and values in this way. Indeed, Amir r e j e c t s the reasoning o f his imaginary vulgar Marxist, on the grounds that the reasoning "derives from a systematic obfuscation o f the fact o f imperialism, expressing a bourgeois point of view within distorted Marxism, whether social democratic or revisionist" (Ibid, p . l 5 7 ) .

3

The

only

starting

correct

with

way

"a

of` i n t e r p r e t i n g

comparative

the

table

analysis

is

by

of`

working conditions which define the comparative productives and the rates of extraction of' surplus labour" (Ibid) Furthermore, the prices in the table a r e "distorted", due t o "different conditions of the class struggle and the extraction of' surplus labour" ( I b i d., p.l'59). So to

.

interpret

the

table

correctly,

one

should

reason

as

follows: "Suppose that the direct producers in the centre are exploited under' technical conditions which maximise the productivity of` their labour in each of` the branches o f production concerned: and take 100 a s an index of this productivity for each o f these branches. The return t o labour here is about $11,300 per worker and t h e value created

81.

about $8,700, t h e r a t e of' s u r p l u s value being about 100 per cent" (Ibid) Note t h a t Amir follows h i s imaginary vulgar Marxist here by d i r e c t l y e q u a t i n g prices and values in the centre. Not so in the periphery, however. In i n d u s t r y i n t h e periphery Amir assumes that the index of comparative productivity is 5 0 . Taking t h i s productivity difference i n t o a c c o u n t , " t h e v a l u e produced by 50 m i l l i o n workers ( i n industry in the periphery) at the average rate of

.

Table I World Income Distribution by Cl.ss (1975) (I)

(2)

Millions of Proud

Prrrrnlqe of

m

0) Avrngf Income Per Pron (S)

w Tol.l Income (Billion II' S)

(Sl Prrcenlqge 0'

141

A. Centres 35

3

4,300

150

6

4

3,000

5060

4

4,500

150 270

10

110

s

5.200

570

21

90 25

7 2 27

12,000

370

600 150 50 50

44 II 4 4

80 20

Pca.santry: Working class "inferior" category "superior category Prolelarianizcd pei bourgeoisie Middle and bourgeois layers Uncmploysd TOTAL of A B. Peripheries Peasantry: poor and exploited

middle owners and capitalists Working class Prolelarianizcd P¢UY bourgeoisie Middle and bourgeois layers

6

1,080

40

2,220

83

120 60

4 2

I 000 600

50 30

2 I

6

800

65

2

200 400

135

5

1.000

l 4 73

6.800

TOTAL of B

460

460

GRAND TOTAL

1,370

100

\ ,950

2,680

17 100

50

Urban employees

Discrepancies in pcrcemages resuh from rounding. Source: Amin, 1980. p.I5l

Amin's calculations for all sectors can be summarized in Table 2: Table 2

Industry Proletarianized Ptlly Bourgeois Agriculture

TDlll VnlIf

Froducd per Woflnrr I. Cf.lll

.l "EH¢di\¢

$8.100 $8,700 s4.300F

S220bn $2 I Obn s32obn

S2JObn

$750bn

S460bn

Index

Numbff of

(Cr.lr¢

Works in

IW)

50 30 10

TOTAL

P¢l'il\ltf!

50mn 80mn

750mn.

D

la Pcriplny

P'imll

A

1-2.3.

Told "App-.l\¢" \'.|- In F-ipllrn'

sI65 bn s 65bn

col. D = 1 0 0 x B x C col. E=tota1 value of output per sector from Table 1This figure is less than average income per worker in the centre because Amin assumes that "the contribution o f dead labour (eapital)" is zero in the periphery. The figure of S4.300 is the actual earnings of the workers in

agriculture in

the centre-

Source:

82.

Ez

c V.|-

_

Sector

I

A

Yrodunivin

Deduced from Ibid, pp. 159-161.

exploitation of t h e c e n t r e (100 percent) would be 0 . 5 X 50 x $8,700 or' $220 b i l l i o n . I f t h e value of t h e industrial production in t h e periphery given e m p i r i c a l l y , i . e . , i n going p r i c e s , is less than t h i s , i t i s because the r a t e of exploitation of the workers is much higher than in the centre ( t h e i r salaries a r e not even h a l f of those in the centre, b u t a r e seven times l e s s ) , a n d because t h e r e s u l t i n g e x t r a s u r p l u s lab our is not necessarily made u p for the volume of profits t h a t would presuppose a considerably higher rate than in the c e n t r e . As a r e s u l t , e f f e c t i v e prices dif'fler from prices of production" ( I b i d , p . l 6 0 , my emphasis). The purpose of` t h i s e x e r c i s e can now be revealed: the d i f f e r e n c e between the "apparent" o u t p u t o f the periphery of` $1-l60 b i l l i o n a n d t h e value o f output a t something called "elf:lective" prices of` $750 billion is almost $300 b i l l i o n ; this sum is transferred to the c e n t r e by means o f a ' d i s t o r t e d ' p r i c e s t r u c t u r e , where i t swells t h e income of' both workers and c a p i t a l i s t s . In case our c r e d u l i t y is being s t r e t c h e d a t t h i s p o i n t , Amir states that "This s t a t i s t i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n of` the nature o f t h e imperialist problem is not arbitrary. On t h e contrary, the basic s t a t i s t i c s and hypotheses are conservative a n d t e n d t o under-estimate the magnitude o f t h e s u r p l u s labour extracted on the periphery o f the system" ( I b i d , p . l 6 l ) .

To

establish

the

destination

of

this

mysterious

$300

b i l l i o n , Amin states t h a t : "The volume o f s u r p l u s labour extracted from t h e workers, employees and peasants of t h e periphery is obviously much too great for me t o believe t h a t i t is retained completely by t h e local exploiting classes in the form o f rent and p r o f i t . The local income o f these exploiting classes and Magubane (1976) in their delimitation of colonial and post-colonial modes of' production (see Harriss, 1 g 7 9 ) , There i s , however, l i t t l e support f o r such a viewpoint and indeed, Banaji (1975) has subsequently r e j e c t e d Alavi's formulation. In particular, it has been argued that dependency does not constitute a unique mode of production nor a particular phase of another mode of' production and hence there is no theoretical space in which to locate a new theory of dependent capitalism (Cueva, 1976: 1 5 ) . The f o u r t h , f i n a l and most predominant viewpoint proposes that , whilst the dependent nations exhibit a capitalist mode of' production, the a r ticulation of' t h i s c a p i t a l i s t mode of production with other modes o f production within the dependent social formation and with the world c a p i t a l i s t economy produces a distinctive and d i f f e r e n t dependent

-

..

-

189.

-

c a p i t a l i s t mode o f production (Roxborough, 1976: p 12 9) i . e . , capitalist development. This i s the approach taken by Cardoso (1973) and in the as ticulation of modes of production l i t e r a t u r e ( F o s t e r - C a r t e r , 1978; Taylor, 1 9 7 9 ) . I t finds i t s most detailed expression in t h e 'conservation-dissolution' arguments relating to the reciprocal inter-relationships between dominant c a p i t a l i s t and dominated pre-Capitalist modes of` production Three m a j o r , and inter-related, criticisms can b e raised against these l a t t e r approaches. F i r s t l y , the focus Of attention has remained almost e n t i r e l y upon structure and so insufficient consideration has been given to relations of exploitation between classes. Class formation, class domination and class s t r u g g l e are not an i n t r i n s i c par t of their a n a l y s e s . Secondly, a substantial par t o f the research effort devoted to theoretical and methodological issues is based upon the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe from t h e sixteenth century onwards (Frank, l 9 7 B ) . Whilst i t may be the case t h a t , i n order to transform the dependency perspectives, i t i s necessary t o undertake such a t a s k , i t remains to be demonstrated how such research e f f o r t will contribute to facilitating desired changes i n the existing social order of dependent peripheral nations p a r t i c u l a r l y since ( a ) their social s t r u c t u r e s , modes of production and internal contradictions are neither classically feudal nor capitalist and (b) models of' endogenous social change derived from the Western Europe experience are l i k e l y , on their own admission, to be inapplicable (ahistorical) to peripheral nations incorporated, in a dependent position, in the world capitalist system (Roxborough, 1979: p 19) Such a retreat into the past, and this is the t h i r d criticism, i s viewed as being symptomatic o f the f a i l u r e of these perspectives, as with those of the dependency paradigm, to formulate alternative prescriptions for social change. This i s surprising s i n c e i t would appear t h a t , for Mar-xists, there are a number of different attitudes that can

.

-

be taken towards the derivation, from their analyses, of alternative prescriptions for the achievement of progressive change in the world. Two viewpoints are i d e n t i f i e d here. On the one h a n d , it can be argued in a d e t e r m i n i s t i c , teleological manner, t h a t No social order ever' perishes before a l l t h e p r o d u c t i v e forces for- which there is room in i t have developed ; and new, higher* relations of" production never' appear' before the material conditions for their existence have matured in the womb of t h e old society i t s e l f . (Marx in Marx and Engels, 1969: 5ou)

It is f e l t t h a t this is both unsatisfactory and unconvincing: neither' is i t supported by the contemporary war-ld experience 190.

of revolutionary change. It is necessary to go beyond such a passive, almost Rostovian, view as t o t h e necessity and i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the evolution of' pre-conditions for social and economic change. On the other hand, i t can be a r g u e d that a Marxist perspective must involve much more that a return t o , and a re-reading o f , the 'sacred texts' in order to explain the past and present. It was, a f t e r a l l , Marx (Marx and Engels, 1969: p 15) who stated in the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach that "the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways: the p o i n t , however, is to change i t " . Such an endeavour must comprise more than a moralistic/radical-liberal/humanitarian concern for the oppressed o f t h e world. This will n o t , indeed cannot, produce revolutionary t h e o r y . Rather, many would a r g u e , the unity of theory and practice must be re-established ( s e e , for example, Book c h i n , l 9 T 8 ) . Folke (l9'72: p 17) has forcefully made the case t h a t ,

development of` revolutionary theory is itself dependent on revolutionary practice. It is crucially important to understand that theory cannot be developed f i r s t and then put into p r a c t i c e . The revolutionary practice must be a dialectical one between theory and practice. Revolutionary theory without revolutionary practice is not only useless, i t is inconceivable.

the

There a r e , however, a t least two dangers associated with this approach. First, i t is the height o f arrogance to argue, from the s a f e t y and comfort of' some pedestal i n t h e ivory towers of academia, for others to overthrow the established order whilst not demonstrating a willingness or an a b i l i t y to bear the costs associated w i t h t h e attempt to bring about such a change. This is not to suggest that 'First World' academies should leave their native shores in order t o ferment r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y i n f'ar--off' lands. The lessons of such interventionism a r e to be found not only

in the proselitising of Christian religions b u t also on the battlefields of' Spain. At least in this respect I agree with Lipton's (l9T7: p 329) comment that social scientists are not qualified to advise on revolutionary action and nor- do they have the right t o sacrifice human l i f e to their ignorance [as development assistance experts have done i n the past?]. Contra Debray (1967) , i n t h e national liberation struggles against colonialism, neo-colonialism and dependency there is no active role for a band of` missionaries or international brigades to play. Their 'assistance' may not o n l y be unwelcome but i t may also involve a cost to the indigenous peoples greater than ever wrought b y t h e development experts o f the multi or bi-lateral aid and assistance bureaucracies Change must, can o n l y , emanate d i r e c t l y from the people themselves. Thus i t can be suggested t h a t i f Marxists wish

. .

191

to be actively involved in praxis in order' t o bring about social change, to re-establish the u n i t y of theory and p r a c t i c e , then the focus of attention should b e upon the advanced capitalist nations (rather than t h e dependent peripheral nations) In this r e g a r d , though, i t will not be

.

s u f f i c i e n t merely to mimic the r h e t o r i c of` Lipton (l9'77: p 352) "Our duty is to attempt to make the policies of` our own countries more h e l p f u l to poor people in poor countries" but t o work with those forces actively seeking the over throw of` capitalism w i t h i n i t s hegemonic centres. Banaji (1980' p M88) , expressing similar sentiments writes that

-

-

If a revolutionary Marxist theory of world capitalism is to make any progress a t all in the 1980s, i t must s t a r t by r e j e c t i n g the entire framework of 'dependency theory' and s h i f t i n g its focus r a d i c a l l y to the working class and i t s real practice of self-emancipation from capital.

My concern with this a p p r o a c h , and this is the second that of the emergence of a new form of' vanguardism among theorists who may delude themselves into believing that class relations can be manipulated or transformed from above. One recalls the constraints upon freedom of action recognised by Marx (Marx and Engels, 1969: D 398 ) d a n g e r , is

Men make their' own h i s t o r y , but they do not make i t just as they please; they do not make i t under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under* circumstances d i r e c t l y encountered, given and transmitted from t h e past. Of` perhaps greater significance is the implicit assumption that strategies designed to achieve the self'-emancipation of workers can be derived and prescribed from theory or by theorists. The experience of Eastern Europe, i n which the intellectuals are on 'The Road to Class Power' as teleological redistributers and central planners (Konrad and S z e l e n y i , 1979) i n a r e l a t i v e l y autonomous socialist mode of'

production which s t i l l oppresses workers and which shows l i t t l e evidence of i t s supposed transitory status between capitalism and communism, should serve as a s u f f i c i e n t warning to all those who wish to espouse e l i t i s t 'views from above' It is along similar lines of` argument that theorists

.

like Fanon and Debray, writing in t h e aftermath o f t h e Cuban revolution and the Algerian independence movement, sought". the abandonment of' revolutionary theory conceived of as an analysis of the dynamics of the social structure which could serve as a guide for revolutionary action" (Roxborough, 1979: p 1314). .It appears to me, therefore, that the adoption of Marxist methods of social analysis necessitates ( a ) the end of the study o f development as a d i s t i n c t and separate area of' academic enquiry, (b) the engagement by 'First World'

..

192.

Marxists in praxis in advanced c a p i t a l i s t n a t i o n s , ( c ) a diminution i n the r e l a t i v e significance o f theory (or a t least the r e j e c t i o n of the notion t h a t theory can be imposed upon p r a c t i c e ) , and ( d ) following Blaut (l97L!: pp nu-1I5), the abandonment by academic development theorists of' t h e i r class-designated r o l e . I f s t r i c t l y adhered to this would tend to imply and call for a departure from t h e halls of academia something which is regarded as an unlikely outcome for self'-sacrifice is not p a r t i c u l a r l y a t t r a c t i v e for many, and neither is martyrdom necessarily guaranteed for those who desire i t . Yet, without a move towards the directions s t a t e d above, i t is d i f f i c u l t t o envisage how the Marxist project, on t h e basis of i t s own v a l u e c r i t e r i a , can offer a range of strategies for social change which can, in the present be put into a c t i o n . Thus, t h e inexorable conclusion from both the viewpoints considered is t h a t Marxism cannot, should n o t , prescribe change from t h e o r y . The alternatives remain as barbarism or socialism.

-

CONCLUSION

The critiques of the dif fusionist and dependency perspectives well established t h a t a further concentration of research eflf'ort i n this direction would not appear t o be able to contribute a l l that much. There is need to move away from abstract grand theorising to more empirically-based and lower-order t h e o r y . This is what the Re forruists are a t t e m p t i n g , a l b e i t i n a n ostrich-like manner, by 'dropping o u t ' and seeking refuge in their investigations of` 'current local area development problems' which a r e thought t o be amenable to solution within the constraints of` world capitalism. In contrast, Marxists appear to have retained a predilection for homothetic approaches and for the investigation of time periods other than the present emphases which, i f ' maintained as their central focus, will have a diminishing marginal u t i l i t y in t h e f u t u r e . Yet t h e move away from this towards praxis, overt activism and the establishment of dialectical relationships between theory a n d practice may also be questioned in an advanced capitalist world t h a t is inexorably, and rapidly i n some instances, moving away from the political l e f t . But i f resigning oneself to wait for' the inevitable in order to justify lack of' action is seen as u n a c c e p t a b l e , then the Marxist project must move beyond both 'technical solutions' t o 'development problems' and the notion that i t is their role to develop and expand upon theoretical knowledge which can then b e applied t o moves to achieve social change in the 'real world' The journey out of the dependency perspectives will not be as easy as the road in (which was part of the attractiveness of these perspectives in t h e f i r s t place) b u t one t h i n g is c e r t a i n , neither utopian socialist dreams nor t h e technical

are so

-

.

193-

competence

of'

development

experts

will,

by

themselves,

be

sufficient.

REFERENCES

Ala v i , H. 1972. "The State in Post-colonial Societies' Pakistan and Bangladesh." New Left Review, 714. Ala v i , H. 1975"India and t h e Colonial Mode of Production". in R. Miliband and J . Saville, e d s . , The Socialist Register 1975 London: Merlin Press. Amir, S . 1976. Unequal Development Hassocks, Sussex : Harvester Press. A r r i g h i , G. 1971. "The Relationship between t h e Colonial and t h e Class Structures: A Critique of A.G. Frank's Theory of the Development of Underdevelopment". Dakar: IDEP Banaji, J . 1972. "For a Theory of' Colonial Modes of Production". Economic and Political Weekly 7 (52 ) Banaji, J . 1975. "Comment on India and t h e Colonial Mode of Production". Economic and Political Weekly 19 (M9). Banaji, J . 1980. "Gunder Frank in Retreat". Journal of Contemporary Asia 9 , and this volume.

.

Baran,

P.A. and Sweezy, P.M. 1966.

Monopoly Capital New

York: Monthly Review Press. and Underdevelopment Bernstein, H. , ed. 1976. Development Harmondsworth: Penguin. B l a u t , J . H . 19714. "Commentaries on 'Values in Geography". pp. llll-M5 in A. But timer, Values in Geography Commission on College Geography Resource Paper No. 211. Washington, D . C . : Association of American Geographers. Book chin, M. 1978, "Beyond Neo-Marxism", Telos, 36. Brenner, R . 1977"The Orogins of' Capitlist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism". New Left Review 1014.

25-92 Brookfield, Interdependent H.C. 1975London: Methuen Browett, J.G. 1980. "Development, the

Paradigm and Geography".

Development

Dif fusionist

Progress in Human Geography u(1)

.

Browett, J . G . 1981. "Into the Cool d e Sac of' the Dependency Paradigm with A.G. Frank", Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology forthcoming Cardoso, F . H . 1973. "Associated-Dependent Development' Theoretical and Practical Implications. " Chapter 5 in A. Stepan, e d . , Authoritarian B r a z i l ' Origins, Policies and FUture, New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press. Chenery, H. et a l . 19711. Redistribution with Growth:

Policies

to

improve

Income

Distribution

in

Developing

Countries in the Context of' Economic Growth. London: Oxford University Press. Connell, J . 1971. "The Geography of Development". Area "Rural Development' Green, White, Red Connell, J . 1980. in J . Friedmann, E.L. Wheelwright and or5 Blue Revolutions?"

.

1911.

the Eighties, J. Connell, Development Strategies in The Monograph No. l . Sydney: Development Studies Colloquium, University of Sydney. Cueva, A. 1976. "A Summary of` Problems and Perspectives of Dependency Theory: Latin American Persectives 3: Revolution in the Hevol_ution ? Debray , R l96'7 Harmondsworth: Penguin. Theoretical Dore, R. "Underdevelopment in 1977 P e r s p e c t i v e . " Discussion Paper l09.Brighton: I n s t i t u t e of Development Studies, University o f Sussex.

.

.

Dunn, J . 1979. Western Political Theory in the Face of' the Future, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. E l i o t H u r s t , M.E. 1980. "Geography, Social Science and Society: Towards a De-Definition". Australian Geographical Studies 18 ( 1 ) : Emmanuel, A. 19711. "Myths of' Development versus Myths of' Underdevelopment". New Left Review 85 Folke, S. 1972. "Why a Radical Geography must be Marxist". Antipode II ( 2 ) Approaches to Foster-Car ter , A. 1973 "Neo-Marxist Development and Underdevelopment". Journal of Contemporary Asia 3 (1) Foster-Carter, A. 1978. Modes of' Production "The Controversy". New Left Review 107 New York: Monthly Frank, A.G. 1978. World Accumulation Review Press. Friedmann , J 1978 "Basic Needs , Agropolitan Development and Planning from Below, Comparative Urbanization Studies." Los Angeles: School of Architecture and Urban Planning, University o f California. Gouldner, A.W. 1973 "The New Class Pro j e s t , I I : A Frame of References, Theses, Conjectures, Arguments, and an Historical Perspective on the Role of Intellectuals and Intelligentsia in the International Class Contest o f the Modern Era". Theory and Society 6 Harriss, J . 1979"The Mode of' Per-oduction Controversy: Themes and Problems of t h e Debate". Discussion Paper' NO. 60 Norwich: Development Studies Centre, University of' East Anglia. Harver, D. 1972. "Revolutionary and Counter Revolutionary Theory in Geography and the Problem of` Ghetto Formation". Antipode II ( 2 ) : 1-12. Hayter, T . 1971 Aid as _Imperialism Harmondsworth:

.

.

_

Penguin.

=ul

International Labour O f f i c e . 1976. Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem Geneva- I . L . O Kay, G. 1975. Development and Underdevelopment:

Marxist Analysis. London: Macmillan. Konrad, G and Szelenyi, I . 1978. Die Injzelligenz auf dem Neg Zur Klassenznaeht, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, translated by A. Araro a n d R.E. Allen (1979) as The

Intellectuals

on

the

Road

to

Class

Power:

A

Sociological 195.

New Study o f the Role of the I n t e l l i g e n t s i a i n S o c i a l i s m . York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Laclau, E . 1971. "Feudalism and Capitalism i n Latin America." New Left Review 67 Economic for' Lefeber, L. l97Ll. "On the Paradigm Development". World Development 2 (1) Dependency: Leys, C. 1977. "Under-development and 7 (l) and C r i t i c a l Notes". Journal of Contemporary Asia t h i s volume. London : Why Poor' People Stay Poor' L i p t o n , M. 1977Temple Smith. McMichael , T. , Petras , J and Rhodes, R. l97M "Imperialism and t h e Contradictions of Development". New Left

.

.

Review 85 McGee, T . 1978. "Western Geography and the Third World". American Behavioural Scientist. 22 (1) Mabogunje, Third W o r l d " .

A . L . 1975. "Geography and t h e Problems o f the International social Science Journal 27:

287--302. Magubane, A. 1976. "The Evolution of Class Structure i n Africa". Chapter 7 in P.C.W. Gutkind and I Wallerstein, e d s . , The P o l i t i c a l Economy of Contemporary A f r i c a Beverly H i l l s : Sage. Marx K. and Engels, F. 1969. Selected Works volume 1. Moscow: Progress Publishers. Mercer, D. l9'77. "Conflict and Consensus in Human Geography". Monash Publications in Geography No. IT. Clayton, V i c t o r i a ' Department o f Geography, Monash University. Moore, B . 1977. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Harmondsworth: Penguin ( f i r s t published i n 1 9 6 6 ) . Mortimer, R. n . d . "Underdeveloprnent/Dependency Theory (UDT) : A short Selected and Annotated Bibliography", Mimeo Myer, J . 1975. "A Crown of Thorns* Cardoso and Counter-Revolution". Latin American Perspectives 2 P e t r a s , J . and Trachte, K. 1979. "Liberal, S t r u c t u r a l and Radical Approaches to Political Economy: An Assess, ent and an A l t e r n a t i v e . " Contemporary Crises. 3

Phillips,

A. 1977.

"The Concept of Development". Review

of African Political Economy 8 Roxborough,

I.

1976. "Dependency

Theory in

t h e Soeiology

of Development' Some Theoretical Problems." West African Journal o f Sociology and Political Science l ( 2 ) Roxborough, I. 1979. Theories of Underdevelopment London: Macmillan. Skocpol, T. 1977"Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical C r i t i q u e " . American journal of Sociology 82 ( 5 ) Slater, D. 1978. "Towards a Political Economy of' Urbanization i n Peripheral Capitalist S o c i e t i e s " . Problems of' Theory and Method with Illustrations f`r'om Latin America " . International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 2 ( 1 )

_

196-

Street en, P . 1977. "The Distinctive Features o f a Basie Needs Approach to Development." International Development Review 19 ( 3 ) Taylor, J . 19711. "Neo-Marxism and Underdevelopment - A Sociological Phantasy". Journal of Contemporary A s i a . M ( 1 ) . Taylor, J. 1979From Modernization to Modes of' Production. London: Macmillan. Country?" Versus Van Arkadie, B. 1977. "Town Development and Change 8 Villamil, J . J . 1 9 7 9 "Introduction." in J . J . Villamil, ed. Transnational Capitalism and National Developmen_t° New Perspectives of Dependence. Hassocks, Sussex' Harvester Press. Warren, w. 1973. "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialisation". New L e f t Review Bl Warren, W. 1979. "The Postwar Economic Experience of` the Third World", in Rothko Chapel Colloquium, Toward a New

,

Strategy for Development.

New York: Pergamon.

197-

Chapter 12

NEW

PERSPECTIVES ON IMPERIALISM

AND SOCIAL

CLASSES IN

THE

PERIPHERY

James F. Petras

INTRODUCTION

The issue neo-Marxists perspectives of' growth", problem was achieve

which conventional development t h e o r i s t s a n d l i k e Baran and Frank focused upon from d i f f e r e n t was the issue of growth "the p o l i t i c a l economy "capitalism and underdevelopment";l the central stagnation, the incapacity of capitalism to high growth rates in the colonial/semi-colonies/neo-colonies; the argument centered on the reasons for "economic stagnation" the m a j o r focus being external surplus extraction/appropriation/drainage, a v a r i e t y of mechanisms of external surplus appropriation were analyzed: trade relations, f i n a n c i a l and investment controls,

-

-

aid

policies,

etc.

Socialism

was

conceived

of

largely

in

terms of` i t s u t i l i t y as an instrument of' development- rapid growth and sustained economic expansion became the justification for socialism. This approach was significant in that it immediately engaged non-Marxist development economists, insofar as i t shared many of the same concerns notwithstanding the different political and ideological orientations that informed each discussion. This convergence of rec-Marxism and conventional development writings contained latent within i t a series o f problems that would surface and elude the l e f t in d u e time. With the rise of' formally independent regimes i n the Third World, efforts were made to avoid t h e extreme economic fluctuations r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e i r dependence on export sales and t h e ensuing p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y . E f f o r t s a t economic diversification occurred (in many cases directed by traditional-conservative regimes) : policies promoted various

types of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , in most cases externally financed and d i r e c t e d . Some of these e f f o r t s resulted in an increase in industrial output, though not necessarily of the productive forces - a substantial part of' t h i s "industry" is nothing more than assembly p l a n t s . 198.

As t h i s process of industrial expansion occurred in the Third World (varying i n intensity w i t h time a n d place) , bourgeois social s c i e n t i s t s , drawing on the "data" from the Third World, began to challenge t h e premises and conclusions of t h e neo-Marxists: growth rates in some o f t h e neo-colonies matched those o f revolutionary societies; e x t e r n a l l y induced and fragmentary industrialization led to exploitive b u t increasingly diversified class s t r u c t u r e s . Vague formulas, such as F r a n k ' s "development of' underdevelopment", anchored i n an historical analysis o f agro-mineral societies acquired an e l a s t i c i t y t h a t , while giving t h e appearance of' explaining new developments, merely added to the confusion: probing questions surfaced concerning t h e u t i l i t y o f discussing the new industrial enterprises and emerging p r o l e t a r i a t i n the Third World i n t h e context of' "underdevelopment". And i f t h e nexus of` the struggle was s h i f t i n g to class relations what did the notion of "development of` underdevelopment" have to do with the emerging class consciousness and class struggles which were increasingly not over' "development" b u t the conditions of imperial capitalist exploitation. The essential bankruptcy of` "developmental Marxism" was evidenced in the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of' labels: the emergence in the Third World o f a bourgeoisie became the "lumpen-bourgeoisie", t h e expansion of the productive forces became "lumpen-development".2 In a word, the incapacity to move further' within the stagnationist framework led t o a d hoc explanations and attempts to mystify through categories which carried derogatory connotations their analytical value was

-

nil.

Given the growing u n t e n a b i l i t y of t h i s a p p r o a c h , i t was inevitable that a reaction would set i n . Expansion of the Third World, not stagnation, was the distinguishing characteristic of the new school (Cardoso, Warren, Emmanuel) 3 National capitalism, independent i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , sub-imperialism, favoured neo-colony a l l

.

served t o describe Third World economies i n which growth was the crucial f e a t u r e . In this debate, both the stagnationists

and the expansionists shared a common narrow perspective in which the quantity o f u n i t s produced was the point of f`or organizing t h e i r a n a l y s i s . The e f f o r t s to anchor t h i s discussion in the class structure led to discursive exercises in which labels and prescriptions were s u b s t i t u t e d for h i s t o r i c a l analysis: comprador bourgeoisies and landlords and lumpen-bourgeoisie were ascribed responsibility for stagnation by the neo-Marxists; the c r i t i c s d i f f e r widely as to who is responsible for expansion: the "development" agencies range from the petty-bourgeois class to "development s t a t e s " , the m i l i t a r y , external powers or some combination of the above. Expansion on a world scale has been characteristic of our epoch though the process has not been as smooth as some commentators would have u s believe. In f a c t , recurring departure

-

-

199

.

-

"crises" recessions, depressions and f l u c t u a t i o n s , are indeed the very mechanisms through which the economic system has sought to recover i t s dynamic. II The problem then is not: one o f absolute s t a g n a t i o n but of examining the conditions under' which t h e process of' capital accumulation takes place and i t s impact on the class s t r u c t u r e . The issue in debate has been over' "underdevelopment" and the focus has been on which social system is more conducive to growth and "development" to overcome "underdevelopment". While of late some attention has been paid to income distribution and inequalitiest - the sources of` those inequalities, their' roots in social relations and s t a t e c o n t r o l , have been passed over. The issue of exploitation rooted in c a p i t a l i s t social relations or in bureaucratic collectivistic forms of' s t a t i s m , has hardly been analyzed; even less so have t h e class relations served as a point of` departure within which to locate the problem of c a p i t a l accumulation and expansion. The conditions under which accumulation takes place include: ( a ) the nature of' t h e State (and s t a t e policy) ; ( b ) class relations (process of s u r p l u s extraction, i n t e n s i t y of' e x p l o i t a t i o n , level of class s t r u g g l e , concentration of work force). The impact of` capital accumulation on class s t r u c t u r e includes: ( a ) class formation/conversion (small proprietors to p r o l e t a r i a n s or k u l a k s , rural proletarians to urban sub-proletarian , landlord to merchant , merchant to i n d u s t r i a l i s t , national indoor aerialist to branch plant manager of' a multi-national corporation these are just some examples of` the processes under t h i s r u b r i c ; ( b ) income

-

distribution (concentration, redistribution, reconeentration of` income) ; ( c ) social r e l a t i o n s ' labour market r e l a t i o n s ("f`ree" wage, trade union bargaining) , semi-coercive (market and political/social controls) , coercive (slave, debt peonage). Production expands, growth does patterns, largely as a function of ("demand") and internal conditions

occur in external

cyclical decisions (externally linked

classes, alienated state, repressed social movements). Accumulation is characterized by uneven development reflected in the particular product areas integrated t o the external world and sharp income inequalities derived from the external class linkages, control over s t a t e revenues, and coercive controls over working class and peasantry.6 Unlike dependency studies which centered on the growth of' productive forces and how the external t i e s "blocked" growth , the focus on conditions of' accumulation and i t s impact on class relations allows us to focus more c o n c r e t e l y on the nature of the state ultimately involved in both accumulation and class formation, as well as internal class relations as they emerge from, as well as shape capitalist development. its A discussion of imperialism which focuses on expansionary/stagnationist tendencies overlooks the essential 200.

character of it as capitalism's historical production

accumulation,

in

a

the international expression of mission to d e v e l o p t h e forces of` accordance with the logic of' capital process that i s , by i t s nature, uneven,

e x p l o i t a t i v e and c o n t r a d i c t o r y . Imperialism has passed through three distinct phases which reflect three different stages of capitalist development and which, in t u r n , correspond to three types of peripheral exploitation. During the early phase of capitalist development, a period that straddles both t h e period of' mercantilism and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , the periphery was subject to a type of' plunder that most closely resembles the operations o f p i r a t e s : the f o r c i b l e extraction of' goods and services through military a n d administrative controls, while the economic exchanges played a subordinate r o l e . The process of exchange was largely between the European

countries; Spain serving as a conduit

for

wealth

from the

colonies in exchange for f i n i s h e d goods from i t s n o r t h e r n European trading partners. The "piratical" form of' exploitation was modified over time with the growth of settler colonies and through these settlements trade relations began to emerge, u l t i m a t e l y establishing the form of' colonial trade relations which served as the basis of extractive colonialism. The importance of pirate colonialism is found in the fact t h a t i t occurs i n the early period of European capital accumulation a period during which the transfer o f resources from the periphery is decisive in stoking t h e engines of` t h e industrial revolution. Here i t is not a question of unequal exchange; but rather given the low level of` development of t h e productive forces in the West, i t s capacity t o "exchange" with the periphery being thus constrained, it commands through m i l i t a r y conquest the unilateral exaction of income. The earnings from slavery, gold, s i l v e r , t h e t r i b u t e exacted from the commerce and labour of` the periphery did not contribute to the it s i m p l y decimated "underdevelopment" of' the periphery

-

-

whole c i v i l i z a t i o n s and

p o p u l a t i o n s , especially

Latin America, while i t served to finance the

in Africa and expansion of'

manufacturers and technological innovation in the metropolis. The creation of an i n t e r n a l market in the metropolis was made possible by the lack o f market relations in the periphery: t h e purely extractive exploitative relation, allowed the metro pole to expand i n w a r d l y , with growing c i t i e s and internal markets which provided further impetus t o i n d u s t r i a l expansion.

The exhaustion of this type of colonialism was inherent i t s mode of' operation: t h e end of' easy exploitation of precious metals and of` substantial segments of the labour

in

force. More important, the growth of` industry required new forms of e x p l o i t a t i o n in t h e periphery. Beginning the l a t t e r half` o f the 19th c e n t u r y , commercial t i e s between colony and metropolis were modified by the growth of i n d u s t r i e s , whose 201 .

production exceeded the bounds o f the internal m a r k e t s , which increasingly sought new markets abroad as well as profitable outlets for surplus capital and raw materials t o f`uel the increasingly complex and voracious a p p e t i t e of' diversified industrial operations. The early infusions of wealth from the colonies d u r i n g the period o f pirate colonialism contributed to the export of surplus c a p i t a l in the period of e a r l y monopoly c a p i t a l , i n the form of' investment, which in The turn returned high rates of p r o f i t to the metro pole. outflow and inflow of capital from metropolis to periphery varied with time and place but in t h e process accumulation became world wide. In t h e l a t e r stages of' "early monopoly capitalism", the economic networks were extended to the interior of' the periphery: moving away from simple lab our' intensive extraction, imperial expansion during t h i s phase brought with it the latest technology, to increase p r o f i t a b i l i t y through higher productivity as well as to fulfil the growing demands of' large-scale e n t e r p r i s e s . Mineral extraction, especially those types most closely tied to the high growth areas of the imperial economies, became points of' conflict in the growing competition between imperial empires. If the surplus extracted from the periphery served to facilitate the growth o f industries within the metropolis and the creation of' an internal market i n i t i a l l y , in the second period o f c a p i t a l i s t development, the surplus was tied to industrial empires and served to accelerate world-wide expansion: i t contributed t o the growth of` the multi-national corporations and t h e creation of a world capitalist market. Intervening between the periods of early and late monopoly capitalism were a series of' world historic events: the eruption of' class/national/imperial struggles on a world-scale which delayed , modified and then accelerated the pattern of world capitalist exploitation. The world depression weakened the t i e s between centre and p e r i p h e r y , the i n t e r - i m p e r i a l i s t i c war- of the l9MOs d e p l e t e d t h e old empires and set in motion a whole series of` events culminating in the rise of` national revolts throughout the periphery. The socialist revolutions in Russia, China, Cuba f u r t h e r delimited the areas o f imperial operations. The demise of the old colonial empires, however, gave rise to a new form of' peripheral exploitation, i n i t i a l l y centered in the US and later amongst competing imperial poles (US-Europe-Japan) Both i n terms of t h e q u a n t i t y of capital flows, the dimensions of the organization, the ease with which capital mobility was evidenced (the continuous c i r c u l a r i t y of the flow of the capital in and out of countries) , the predominance of' investment and bank loans as well as the diversification of investment, late monopoly capitalism defined a new period of capital accumulation. The emergence of non-revolutionary national regimes in the ex-colonies led to collaboration with the metropoles; the

.

202.

needs of the metropolis for s t r a t e g i c raw materials and investments outlets as well as the constant search for' new revenues to sustain the national state in the dependent neo-colony led to the d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of economic activity within the periphery beyond administrative and economic enclaves to increasingly lock-in the entire network of local economies: commerce, banking, industry and services. The world-wide network and power of' imperial c a p i t a l resolved the latent (and overt) conflict with the newly emerging national s t a t e through a variety o f forms o f penetration- j o i n t partnership, management contracts, exploitation rights, royalty and licensing agreements, e t c . At one and the same time the extension of c a p i t a l i s t networks lends credence to the notion o f greater s t a b i l i t y to the e m p i r e , consolidation, and y e t a t the same t i m e , poses an immediate t h r e a t : by increasing the decision-making capacity within t h e periphery, by drawing i t closer to the webs of power and capital accumulation, it tends to allow it to observe the inner-workings of the system, laying t h e basis for new demands and redefinitions of' relationships between the periphery and metropolis.

Capital Accumulation Phase o f Capitalist Development 1.

primitive accumulation (1500-1880)

-

Phases o f Imperialism Type o f Peripheral Exploitation

a . pirate colonialism extraction from periphery of` surplus (gold, spices, slavery, trade, agro-products,) build up of basic industry, expansion o f manufacturing-technical innovation.

2

early monopoly

b . extractive colonialism

capitalism (1880-19u5)

export of surplus capital, capturing o f raw materials, search for- markets for excess production,

outflow

of

capital as well as inflow albeit proportions vary with time/place, process of accumulation became world-wide, extension of networks to interior of' country, expansion of' production/technology

focus

on

with

industrial-mineral 203.

and resources, surplus to mineral extraction tied industrial empires. a.

' l a t e ' monopoly

3

capitalism (19u6-1975)

"dependent neo-colonialism"

circular flow of' capital into out of countries, investments and bank loans predominate, diversification of` investment; imperial s t a t e and neo-colonial state create new opportunities for a c t i v i t y , markets for' goods; need for strategic raw materials and investment

and

outlets,

leads

to

diversification of' economic activity within periphery extension of a c t i v i t y beyond administrative and mineral centres, to increasingly look-in with e n t i r e network

of

local economies:

commerce

banking, industry, services; a variety of forms of' penetration: ownership, j o i n t - p a r t n e r s h i p , management contracts, exploitation r i g h t s , royalty and licensing agreements, commercialization and transport agreements, e t c .

THE OLD AND NEW CONTRADICTIONS

In the period prior to neo-colonial type of peripheral exploitation, the political and social f`or-ms of domination were largely extensions of metropolitan institutions. The exceptions

first open

were mostly

colonial-settler regimes who i n the tendencies as wedges to

instance developed autonomist up

political

space

and

commercial

opportunity;

the

existence of pre-imperial social formations and traditional political authorities (chieftancies, high easts functionaries) mostly served as surrogates of` imperial authority largely delegated to tribute collecting functions. The process of surplus extraction was therefore r e l a t i v e l y d i r e c t , the colonial o f f i c i a l inside was the foreign officer outside. The essential contradiction was between imperial capitalism extracting surplus value from colonized classes; the national s t r u g g l e was in large par t unmediated by internal class and political c o n f l i c t s . 2014.

In the neo-colonial phase, national independence and the formation of the national s t a t e led to the creation o f social s t r a t a between imperial c a p i t a l i s m and the l a b our f o r c e . Drawn from a variety of' sources including political movements, the u n i v e r s i t y , the a r m y , the civil service, e t c . , this social strata is drawn from the propertyless "intermediary" groups; rooted in t h e s t a t e bureaucracy i t has access to powers of` the s t a t e , i n c l u d i n g revenues and expenditir-es; t h e impulse to personal property ownership and affluence through derivative "ownership" via association with metropolitan enterprises or through d i r e c t o r s h i p s in s t a t e e n t e r p r i s e s created the basis for "negotiated c o n f l i c t " between i m p e r i a l / n a t i o n a l i s t social s t r a t a on t h e one hand and on the other hand by enlarging the scope of' class r e l a t i o n s h i p heightening tension within the periphery between these intermediary s t r a t a a n d the labour force. Imperial capital exploitation mediated by internal class forces creates and multiplies contradictions and disguises them. Imperial policy is oriented toward manipulating national "intermediaries" as a protective covering while on the other hand the dominant national s t r a t a struggle to increase their social preponderence viz a viz t h e i r own labour force. CLASS ALLIANCES AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN THE PERIPHERY.

A numberof strategies emerge for the national intermediaries dominant in the peripheral countries. But before discussing the principal options open t o the dominant national s t r a t a , i t is worthwhile to b r i e f l y survey three inter.-related issues: the social basis of' nationalist predominance over socialism during t h e independence struggle and subsequently in the post-independence period as well as the p o l i t i c a l , social a n d economic p o s s i b i l i t i e s opened by independence to nationalistic regimes. Nationalism emerged largely as a r e s u l t of the low degree o f s o c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n t h e colonies l e a d i n g t o t h e amalgamation of` various class and pre-class Forces. The existence of subsistence farmers and their general isolation from political l i f e contributed t o making the land question less pressing than the national question. As a r e s u l t , political organization was bourgeoisie, products of expansion. The predominance small s i z e of' the proletariat

confined t o the urban petty commercial and administrative of the petty bourgeoisie, the and i t s relative isolation from the peasantry created circumstances in which the tradition of class struggle was much weaker than nationalist p o l i t i c s . The large concentrations of` urban p e t t y - c a p i t a l i s t s and s t a t e employees over and against the industrial p r o l e t a r i a t set the tone and direction of independence p o l i t i c s . Nationalism sustained itself in the post-independence period in part because t h e slowness of industrial expansion did not favour the growth of social classes which might be 205

.

more

receptive to class p o l i t i c s . As a r e s u l t of the relatively weak position of` t h e i n d u s t r i a l p r o l e t a r i a t , the trade unions were in many cases absorbed in the s t a t e apparatus, further undermining t h e socialist o p t i o n . In addition to these organizational measures, t h e "national" state has ironically resorted to communal mystifications and regional loyalties to sustain i t s power, thus a t one and the same time d i s i n t e g r a t i n g the source of i t s legitimacy as well as undermining class divisions. Parallel to national disaggregation, t h e "nationalists" have followed a policy of` external integration grafting on to the police a n d m i l i t a r y apparatus the ideology and orientation o f the metropolis. These structural adaptations and policies have been reinforced by s p e c i f i c changes i n the mode of` political activity: demobilization of' the population and bureaucratization of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . "Legitimate" p o l i t i c a l action i s largely confined to competition over employment in the expanded s t a t e sector. While nationalism in power has not led to the demystification of oppresive class relations, control over t h e government has led to a number- o f economic "openings" or' possibilities: the national intermediaries can bargain over terms of` dependency, d i v e r s i f y the sources of dependency, increase revenues, create a framework for the development of internal markets through social expenditures investments, promote diversification of and (state) production, c r e a t e the basis f o r t h e expansion of the national bourgeoisie anchored in e i t h e r the s t a t e or private sector or both and t h e petty bourgeoisie (mainly public employees) , and open u p opp o r tunities f`or statist development policies. These possibilities a r e in large part contingent upon the type of international and national class alliances which a r e formed as well as the bargaining s t r e n g t h of the classes within the alliance The post independence national regime can choose among a t least three strategies or t y p e s of class alliances for capital accumulation. In t h e f i r s t instance it can join with imperial firms and regimes i n i n t e n s i f y i n g s u r p l u s extraction

-

-

-

from the labour' force through a variety of post-independence relationships outlined under- t h e rubric of "dependent neo-colonialism". strategy for the national regime involves surplus from the labour force and l i m i t i n g or

working

above-mentioned An alternative e x t r a c t i n g the e l i m i n a t i n g the

share going to the imperial firms, thus c o n c e n t r a t i n g i t in the hands of' s t a t e and/or private national entrepreneurs. This approach, which can be referred to as national developmental ism without redistribution, leads to concentration of income a t the top of the national class hierarchy. A t h i r d a l t e r n a t i v e is f o r t h e n a t i o n a l regime to a l l y i t s e l f with t h e labouring p o p u l a t i o n , extend the areas of national control (through nationalization) , reinvest the surplus of the national economy or promote a redistribution 206.

of income within the national class s t r u c t u r e . The type o f class alliance on which the national regime rests and the strategy for* capital accumulation directly a f f e c t s the distribution of income. C a p i t a l accumulation from above and outside (what can be called the "neo-colonial" model) results in an income structure that resembles an inverted pyramid with wealth and power concentrated i n the hands of foreign capital. The national bourgeois developmental approach which "capitalizes" on the foreign e l i t e and the national labour force concentrates income among the intermediary strata ( i n the form of the governing e l i t e

-

of' the periphery) , l e a d i n g t o income d i s t r i b u t i o n along the shape o f a diamond. The alliance between national intermediaries and th e

labour f o r c e , what can be referred to as a "national-popular" s t r a t e g y , leads to a broader based society i n which income i s more diversified , spreading downward and taking the shape of

a pyramid. Income Distribution and Class Alliance

\\

foreign capital

Neo colonial

national intermediaries (private/public bourgeoisie)

labour force

foreign n a t i o n a l intermediaries

National developmental

1

labour force

foreign capital national intermediaries

National popular

labour force

As

the

above

indicates,

the

struggle

against

imperial

domination is now mediated through a class s t r u c t u r e which i t s e l f contains c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , i . e . , is i t s e l f ' a source of exploitation. The pattern of e x p l o i t a t i v e relations varies from one development strategy to another. In the neo-colonial model the national bourgeoisie serves as a means of heightening imperial exploitation in order to extract a share of the surplus for i t s e l f ; examples of this regime

207

.

include Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, I r a n , Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam. Coercion, and a demobilized population, open access t o raw materials, tax and other "incentives" to foreign investors characterize policy. The forms of' joint exploitation vary g r e a t l y , expressing the differences in bargaining power between the national and imperial bourgeoisie. Under conditions of total foreign control of the economy the national bourgeoisie obtains tax revenue. Under conditions of partnership in which m a j o r i t y ownership and management prerogatives are in foreign hands, the national bourgeoisie obtains a minority share o f earnings plus tax revenues. Whatever t h e s p e c i f i c s , t h e foreign component is clearly dominant in internal as well as external relations.

In the development model, t h e bourgeoisie "dominates" foreign capital and exploits the national labour f o r c e . In this case, t h e national bourgeoisie serves as a means of "national capitalization" b u t a t the expense of the lab our force reconcentrating c a p i t a l in i t s own hands. This type of' é l i t e nationalism is d i f f i c u l t to i d e n t i f y as a "pure type" apart from t h e neo-colonial/populist models because the national bourgeoisie is generally numerically and socially in a weak position. The initiatives for t h i s form of c a p i t a l accumulation usually come from outside of' the bourgeois class and i t s par t i e s , usually from t h e m i l i t a r y . Only under dictatorial conditions can this narrow and weak strata resist the pressures from below and from the outside and then not usually for any duration of' time. Moreover, there is considerable overlap between national bourgeois developmental ism and the neo-eolonial a p p r o a c h , i n some cases and in other instances i t approximates the national popular approach. Some possible examples of this type of regime would include: Mexico, ( u n d e r Echevarria) , Venezuela (under P e r e z ) , Peru (under Velasco), Argentina ( t h e second Peron regime and the earlier Frondizi regime) The "developmental" model ostensibly gives t h e s t a t e t h e role of` maximizing national bourgeois i n t e r e s t s . In t h i s context i t has a

-

.

double

function,

"anti-imperialist" and disciplining the In practical terms, the national developmental state attempts to redefine the terms of dependency to favour national capitalist s t r a t a and contain labour demands. The forms for c a p i t a l i z i n g the national bourgeoisie include: labour force.

include the

increasing tax of' earnings ;

2.

extending ownership t o m a j o r i t y shares including management r i g h t s ; limiting foreign capital activities to the

3

208.

revenues to

1.

majority

external sector (commercialization) , fragmenting their operations (exploitation r i g h t s , management contracts) , limiting exploitations to specified time periods, limiting access to local capital,

u.

d i r e c t i n g foreign industry to export markets, e t c . selective nationalization: expropriation of particular enterprises by the state in many cases to provide cheap services to the private sector.

The developmental approach , however, while squeezing the foreign sector, also shares with the foreign sector' an interest in maximizing exploitation o f the labour force: maintaining production, labour discipline and popular demobilization. The success of this type of` "establishment nationalism" depends on the avoidance o f confrontations with foreign sectors and the lab our force. Threats from either side may cause the national bourgeoisie to seek alliances: with populists i f threatened by foreign interests or with imperial groups i f threatened by the l e f t . While the r i s e of' establishment nationalism may have been influenced i n i t i a l l y by radical nationalist pressures, the usual tendency has been for i t to dissolve in a series of external agreements which erode the original national developmental p r o j e c t . The national-populist alliance composed of bourgeoisie/petit-bourgeoisie , workers and/or peasants attempts to capitalize the economy on the basis of' nationalist measures directed a t foreign firms, state financing and s t i m u l a t i n g national-populist regimes include Argentina ( f i r s t Peron government, 1gL15-1g55) , Bolivia (MNR, 1953-1956), Brazil (under Goular t ) , Mexico ( u n d e r C a r d e n a s ) . The s t r i k i n g characteristic o f this type of' regime is the f r e q u e n c y with which they have appeared in the p e r i p h e r y , their short duration as "national-popular" regimes (usually they are over thrown or evolve into one o f t h e two other v a r i a n t s ) and t h e "special" c o n j e c t u r a l conditions which favour the formation of this alliance (windfall earnings accruing to Argentina during World War I I ) One of` the basic weaknesses of t h i s type of` regime as a vehicle for capital accumulation is found in i t s e f f o r t s t o eliminate foreign exploitation without developing adequate s u b s t i t u t e s : a f t e r t h e i n i t i a l redistributive measures and a f t e r the initial

.

euphoria over' the reduction of the foreign presence, the issue arises as to which of' the two national social classes will capitalize the economy: the national bourgeoisie or the workers/peasants. The national bourgeoisie without its external

sources

of

finances

must

seek

in

and

through

the

s t a t e means to promote t h e accumulation of' c a p i t a l , at; the expense of the working class. On the other hand, the workers' participation in the populist alliance i s not based on a change in the mode of` production but on increases in consumption: to restrict consumption is by d e f i n i t i o n to terminate the populist aspect of the alliance. The continuation of' populist measures beyond the i n i t i a l period of the extension of nationalization beyond the foreign sector to encompass national bourgeois strata alienates the bourgeoisie and leads to an alternative non-capitalist model

209

.

of c a p i t a l i s t accumulation. The i n i t i a l impetus to class formation, mainly externally directed capital accumulation based on simple surplus extraction, gave way to a more complex process where an internal ruling class with i t s own s t a t e apparatus emerged to "mediate" the process of exploitation and accumulation. Capital accumulation in t h e periphery has had a varied experience: the lest durable and expansive regimes have been t h e most

popular and n a t i o n a l i s t ; t h e least popular have been the most expansive and least national; and the regimes which have been national but not popular have eventually evolved i n t o one of the other two approaches. Recent historical experience suggests that among capitalist countries in the periphery the most e f f e c t i v e instrument o f capital accumulation and growth is p r e c i s e l y the least national and most exploitative model, the neo-colonial or "from above and outside" approach. The historical conditions, more specifically the political pre-conditions, f`or~ this growth have in fact been non-popular, externally oriented regimes largely r e s t i n g on a l l i a n c e s between m i l i t a r y e l i t e s and property classes whose incapacity to accumulate c a p i t a l leads them to r e l y on foreign capital. The imperial s t a t e plays a crucial role in changing the balance of forces favouring dominance by externally oriented developmental regime. The device has been the coup carried through by m i l i t a r y and civilian officials in large part socialized, trained and/or financed by agencies o f the s t a t e apparatus of the imperialist power dominant in its region. The property-based political-military regime functions to create conditions that permit externally induced industrial growth without danger of nationalization, wage demands, or autonomous trade unions.

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES SOCIAL REGIMES AND THE ROLE STATE.

OF THE

The intensification of` e x p l o i t a t i v e relations i n h e r e n t in t h e neo-colonial and national (bourgeois) developmentalist approach accelerates the growth of' economic inequality and social polarization. Where a modicum of' political freedom e x i s t s , the bourgeois' drive to accumulate capital gives rise To new social forces which provided the base for national-popular or socialist movements and regimes with t h e i r commitment to redefining class relations and thus providing t h e basis for a new development strategy based on r e d i s t r i b u t i v e reforms, a reversal of previous approaches. In this context of latent and overt class conflict within peripheral societies, imperialist relations are central in sustaining or destabilizing the two polar types o f social regime. When a neo-colonial regime is replaced by a national-popular government which makes serious inroads on foreign corporate capital ' s exploitative capacity, the

imperial response is 210.

to effectively collaborate with national

political and social forces and end the national popular regime. The new orientation is based in a restructured state apparatus, whose i n i t i a l function is to eliminate the obstacles to externally-based capital accumulation ("discipline labour " , denationalize firms , dexnobilize populace, e t c . ) . The crucial i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y in this process of' reversing regimes, reconcentrating income, and re-opening economic channels is the s t a t e . 7 The s t a t e i s the c r i t i c a l unit i n the process o f converting class alliances i n t o developmental strategies. The social and political nature of' the s t a t e in the periphery is best understood through i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to the imperial s t a t e whose role and a c t i v i t i e s in the formation of imperial networks, include shaping the s t a t e in the periphery. The imperial and the bourgeois state in the periphery can be studied from a t least two dimensions: l. the central role of the imperial state in c r e a t i n g conditions for neo-colonial capital-accumulation. 2. the role of the imperial s t a t e i n state formation in the periphery' a . state-building in the neo-colonial c o n t e x t . b . disaggregating the s t a t e in the context of national-popular or even national developmental regimes.

-

The focus on private investment t r a d e , the multi-national in the s t u d y of' imperialism is useful but not adequate. For' these economic activities and organizations operate within a universe which is not explainable by the behaviour and a c t i v i t y of` these u n i t s . To understand where, when, and how capital expanded into the periphery i n a period o f substantial political upheavals and class conflict one must look to the role of' t h e imperial s t a t e . Three moments in the movement o f capital are profoundly a f f e c t e d by imperial state a c t i v i t y : l. i n i t i a l entry corporation

2.

3.

expansion survival

At each point t h e imperial state plays a decisive role in creating the conditions for capital expansion and accumulation. In the i n i t i a l period the imperial ~state is heavily involved in a number of activities: l. "state-building", creating t h e formal machinery o f government t o secure the groundwork for effective exploitation; the creation of' an imperially sound army and police force is c r u c i a l . eliminating or containing internal dissidents. 2.3. minimizing external competition. creating the economic infrastructure through u. loans and "aid". While not always achieving maximum success , without these activities by the state i t is q u i t e doubtful that private 211.

e n t e r p r i s e , even on the s c a l e of` monopoly corporations, would have risked the financial resources and manpower' which led t o their becoming multi-national corporations. The i n i t i a l thrust of the s t a t e laid t h e basis for' long-term , large-scale movements of' capital The relationship between t h e imperial s t a t e and the multinational c o r p o r a t i o n , however, was not confined to this i n i t i a l e f f o r t but was continuous and comprehensive. The process of expansion and accumulation necessitated t h e elaboration of world-wide financial networks to finance a great diversity of` activities in a v a r i e t y of` locales; alongside state-building, the imperial state assumed the much more complex task of fashioning a world monetary system, financial agreements, development banks, credit agreements, e t e . , which provided

.

the

multi-nationals

accelerate

with

mobile capital

to

facilitate

and

accumulation o f capital a n d i n t e n s i f y the extraction of s u r p l u s . The decisions of corporate heads to extend their conglomerates was based on the financial networks organized and directed by the imperial s t a t e . Yet the extension o f imperial ties t o the new s t a t e s and the subsequent expansion of` imperial c a p i t a l i s m throughout the periphery led to the simultaneous transformation of the class structure and polarization of society. Small proprietors and subsistence farmers became rural labourers, share croppers or urban migrants ; urban masses were converted into day labourers or concentrated as unemployed/semi-employed slum dwellers. The neo-colonial state (product of` imperial state-building) , whose prime function was facilitating externally-induced capital accumulation isolated i t s e l f from a mass constituency. The petty bourgeoisie ( i n c l u d i n g m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s ) and other s o c i a l l y mobile or aspiring bourgeois classes, not having direct access either to imperial or state revenues became potential or actual detonators of a national-popular upheaval. It is out of t h i s context then t h a t t h e t h i r d function of the imperial s t a t e emerges, what might best be described as t h e "enforcer" r o l e : t h e use of' direct and

indirect

the

military

and

economic

pressure

to

ensure

the

survival of the multi-national corporation and t h e conditions necessary for accumulation and reproduction. This imperial state enforcer function has manifested itself' i n a great variety of' ways, from direct military intervention, financing of' mercenary troops to economic blockades and credit squeezes. Imperial s t a t e power has been u t i l i z e d against nationalist social movements out of power as well as governments in power. It has been used against populist as well as democratic socialist governments; against elected governments as well as non-elected governments. The critical issue for t h e imperial state is not the formal structure of' government but access to the internally generated surplus and the creation of class relations which facilitate access. The targets of imperial s t a t e intervention have been 212.

those regimes and movements who attempt to alter substantially the conditions for imperial capital accumulation, limit the access points which the imperial s t a t e possesses w i t h i n the p e r i p h e r y and c r e a t e conditions for national c a p i t a l accumulation. The isolation of` t h e neo-colonial s t a t e , the vulnerability of' the bourgeois developmental s t a t e and the porosity of' t h e national-popular regime provides a great number of opp or t u n i t i e s f`or imperial state a c t i v i t y ' to b u t t r e s s the former and t o "destabilize" the latter. THE IMPERIAL

STATE AS STATE-BUILDER

In i t s broadest terms, imperialism in t h e periphery h a s been involved f i r s t and foremost in t h e creation of' a new social o r d e r , one in which social relations are tied to the dynamic of` e x t e r n a l l y induced expansion and accumulation. The foremost problem for t h e imperial state is to prevent p o l i t i c a l decay or disintegration through the creation of' a durable political o r d e r , one in which social control over t h e lab our force permits the continuous f`low of` c a p i t a l and the reproduction of' e x p l o i t a t i v e social relations. At the operational l e v e l , a number of` imperial agencies, ranging from military missions to university advisory teams, have been involved in shaping the counterpart agencies, personnel recruitment programmes, as well as forging converging perspectives within t h e s t a t e bureaucracy as i t evolves. The technical s k i l l s , such as budgeting, planning and project elaboration a r e imparted w i t h i n a n ideological framework which reinforces external bonds. Imperial "state-building", however, does not merely involve piecemeal administrative "block-building" (imperial agency insertion in distinct administrative areas) , b u t t h e integration of' the commanding heights of the peripheral state into the overall politico-economic project of the imperial s t a t e through long-term development agreements i n c l u d i n g t r a d e , Financial and

technical

assistance.

directed toward as

"leadership

The

imperial

strategy is largely

influencing e l i t e s described euphemistically training".

The apex o f

the s t a t e

pyramid is

the central t a r g e t ; and within t h a t pyramid t h e Army and police have a c e n t r a l position. The astronomical sums of` m i l i t a r y "aid" during the post World War Two period into t h e periphery a r e , in large p a r t , eflflor is to create and later maiNtain the external allegiances of` peripheral s t a t e apparatuses. Independently o f social origins and within the context of technical preparations (professionalization) , the military and police are pivotal groups in imperial state-building in the periphery. Out of' these "f'oundations" of1v state-building a whole series o f other administrative programmes have emerged linked to t h e imperial p r o j e c t . Tentative and isolated instances of` parliamentary governments have been spawned,

neo-colonial though the 213.

boundaries within which social and ideological competition takes places a r e sharply l i m i t e d and transparent to those who a s p i r e to participate. The origins of the neo-colonial s t a t e a r e not always vested in élite transfers of' power ( f r o m colonial to national) Moreover, national p o l i t i c a l leaderships meshed in neo-colonial networks a r e not always lacking a certain legitimacy derived from their role in the "national struggle". Nevertheless the process we a r e discussing concerns the formation and orientation of institutions of' the post-independence national s t a t e , which does not preclude cohfllict in the period prior to national independence. In the process of imperial state-building can be sum , schematically considered in t h e following manner:

.

l.

securing ties w i t h the political leadership, including, a t a minimum, t h e heads o f t h e police and m i l i t a r y , but not necessarily limited to

these areas. extending influence to budgeting, economy, planning, public works administrative areas that directly aflflect specific economic opportunities for foreign enterprises, as well as general conditions for c a p i t a l accumulation. training programmes and technical missions to 3 promote e f f i c i e n c y and ties with middle levels of the bureaucracy and research institutes which can provide inexpensive sources of` information and effective implementation. creation o f new s t a t e power c e n t r e s , i n c l u d i n g u the development of special forces in the military, regional military alliances and economic authorities-international banking o f f i c i a l s with project supervisory powers. The whole point of imperial state-building is to provide a v a r i e t y of' access points t o shape policy p r i o r i t i e s and agendas in order t o avoid t h e use of' "external p r e s s u r e s " , to avoid having to act "from t h e outside". Within the periphery the alienated state articulates the interest of imperial capital by promoting growth on the basis of the exploitation of national classes. Only sustained and continuous inflows 2

of

-

capital

apparatuses durability.

and

and

elaborate

surveillance

political

provide

police/military

this

state

with

THE IMPERIAL STATE AS STATE DISAGGREGATOH Social polarities and p o l i t i c a l mobilization have f r e q u e n t l y accompanied the exploitative social relations characteristic o f ' imperial capital expansions. Equally important, the socially exclusive and economically c o n s t r i c t i n g e f f e c t s of' externally directed accumulation have set in opposition numerically and strategically important strata in the 2lLl.

The process of` imperial accumulation leads to of wealth and opens opp or tunities to petty bourgeois strata for national c a p i t a l i z a t i o n through control over the state and i t s revenues. The emergence o f national movemenns, and eventually governments, sets the stage for redefining relations with the imperial power. Yet in most instances c o n t r o l l i n g the government i s not identical with controlling the state: the c r i t i c a l means o f production, as well as important fractions of the Army/police/state bureaucracy, remain, a t least i n i t i a l l y , s t i l l tied to the metropolis and serve to countermand the orders of the national government. In this context, the imperial power may seek to renegotiate terms of dependency or disarticulate the national regime's development project through a variety o f measures, and agencies located outside or inside the national s t a t e . . The more decisively the national government challenges the process of external accumulation, t h e more l i k e l y e f f o r t s will be made by the imperial s t a t e to undermine the regime. Unlike the circumstance of' a neo-colonial regime where "nation-building" is the k e y , with a national regime the imperial s t a t e operates disaggregate the state: the rhetoric speaks t o destabilizing, not stabilizing society. 8 The "incomplete" transformation from a neo-colonial or national development regime to a national popular s t a t e provides several opportunities for reversing changes. The imperial s t a t e utilizes the financial networks and military-administrative apparatuses t h a t were elaborated earlier to promote imperial-capital accumulation in order to coerce the national-popular s t a t e . Financial and credit constraints lead to d i s a r ticulating the economy and alienating t h e national bourgeoisie. External links with t h e m i l i t a r y a r e reinforced in t h e process of' disintegrating the state. Alienated from t h e national-popular project o f the government, the pro-imperial segment of the military serves as the instrumentality for' overthrowing t h e government, reversing changes and r e c o n s t i t u t i n g a s t a t e t o promote periphery.

concentration

i m p e r i a l c a p i t a l accumulation.

State formation and disaggregation are then two crucial processes for imposing exploitative class relations located in imperially induced economic expansion. Without the intervention o f the imperial s t a t e , the neo-colonial state would be d i f f i c u l t t o s u s t a i n ; without the neo-colonial s t a t e the c o n f l i c t s generated by imperial-capital accumulation

would

become unmanageable. Without the "strong s t a t e " t h e polarization of' class forces would be skewed toward the l e f t ; and the alternative of' a petty bourgeois-led popular-national alliance would either l i m i t the capacity of imperial capital to extract s u r p l u s from the labour force or lead to a more profound transformation of s o c i e t y .

215.

BEYOND DEPENDENCY AND MODERNIZATIOn REVOLUTION IN THE PERIPHERY

CLASS

POLITICS

AND

Dependency theory describes the shifts in the locus o f external control within the periphery from agriculture to industry, from industry to technology, i n terms o f t h e logic of metropolitan needs: the formulation which speaks of "new" forms of dependency assumes that changes in economic activities in the periphery are always or usually the result of external impositions; in this sense the class configurations, alliances and conflicts which underlie each type of' peripheral relationship with the metropolis in discarded or in extreme cases is seen as also a product of high level manipulation from the "centre". Shifts in peripheral economic a c t i v i t y and r e l a t i o n s h i p s with the metropolis a r e in many cases products of rising new class forces taking power. The displacement of` the metropolis from agro-mineral sectors is in part the product of the rise to influence of national social forces (peasant movements, petty bourgeois or labour nationalists) and represents a significant increase in national control though not necessarily a lessening o f class e x p l o i t a t i o n , i . e . , surplus value may be appropriated by the national bourgeoisie or the bureaucratic s t a t e . Likewise, the growth of national control over industry cannot be viewed simply as a "new international division of labour between technologically advanced metropolitan industry and labour intensive peripheral i n d u s t r y " (though it could become t h a t ) b u t reflects the growth of power within the periphery of` social forces (national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie or working class) willing and capable of directing the industrialization process. The national appropriation o f surplus value from these industries can function to develop higher forms of industrialization including technologically sophisticated enterprises. The incomplete nature of industrialization i n the periphery should not obscure t h e nature of` t h e process of` change within the periphery: the emergence of new class

forces and alliances that further circumscribe

the areas of`

metropolitan dominance. For example, t h e emergence of a highly s t a t i s t , agrarian reform regime in Peru is a product of` the new class arrangements and reflects a new class configuration of` power which is redefining i t s relations with the metropolis , diversifying external dependence and constricting areas of imperial o p e r a t i o n . It is absurd to extrapolate continuing links with the metropolis from these struggles and define them as the "new strategy" of` imperialism; it is self defeating to describe the metropolis's loss of` concrete influence, resources, areas of` operation as being supplanted by some vague notion of` advantages from "future consolidation".9 By

not

examining

the

changes

in

class

relationships

within the periphery the dependency writers are a t 216.

a loss to

explain the changes in t h e nature and form of the external relationship as well as the possibilities for f u t u r e changes implicit in the process of internal struggle. Social revolution is not a product o f t h e under-developed areas of the periphery b u t more l i k e l y i n i t i a t e d in those areas most penetrated b y the metropolis, where c a p i t a l i s t social relations predominate and where productivity approximates that of' the metropolis. Likewise, the growth o f nationalism in t h e periphery i s not a product of dependence per se b u t the result of a growing capacity among the petty-bourgeoisie to manage and control the productive forces under metropolitan domination. It is within this gap between capacity and control that petty-bourgeois nationalism emerges. The key issue in centre/periphery r e l a t i o n s then is the growing social and p o l i t i c a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and autonomy of class forces within the metropolitan enclaves a n d t h e i r a b i l i t y to l i m i t t h e exploitative eapaeity o f t h e metropolis. The conflict is therefore not between u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d dependent countries against metropoles; much less is the anti-imperialist vanguard located in the "traditional" poverty-stricken h i n t e r l a n d . The development o f national and/or social revolutionary struggle in the periphery is less a product of` "under-development" and more a response to the conditions of imperial capital accumulation which in the case of t h e wage labourers is exploitative and in the case of t h e petty bourgeoisie is "exclusionary", i . e . , the imperial c a p i t a l i s t s displace t h e local bourgeoisie as the locus of'

accumulation. In t h i s w a y , we demystify the notion of dependence which, as i t has commonly been discussed, f'ails to take account of the d i f f e r e n t social formations within the periphery and the real sources of surplus appropriation located in the advanced sectors, i . e . , enclaves. The initial formulation of' the problem for the periphery is not "external dependency" but imperial exploitation located in the class structure of the periphery; and i t is within this class s t r u c t u r e and in the class struggles that ensue t h a t this problem must be examined

and eventually resolved. If the principal contradiction between the periphery and metropolis is located i n the technologically and economically advanced imperial enclave sectors of the periphery, the problematic is not "modernization" but socialization or nationalization, depending upon which class is hegemonic in the anti-imperialist struggle. It appears that in most of' the socialist revolutions the original impetus, o r g a n i z a t i o n , leadership and ideology of` the revolutionary struggle began precisely in the more "advanced" sectors of the peripheral economy: in Russia the Petrograd proletariat led by the

Bolshevik P a r t y ; in China in the coastal c i t i e s ; in Cuba in Havana. 10 In a l l cases, however, the success of the revolution which began in t h e advanced enclaves depended on joining efforts with t h e bulk of' the social forces(peasants) 217

.

located in the "backward" areas of t h e economy. II The process o f transformation i n the periphery combines two d i s t i n c t but inter-related experiences' the socialization o f production in the metropolitan enclaves and the modernization of the backward areas. Socialization of the economy is not based on the level o f productive Forces in t h e abstract (as Soviet ideologues, technocrats, managerialists, argue) , nor is it a creation o f individual w i l l , of transforming individuals' social consciences ( a s some of' the socialist voluntarists would have i t ) but of transforming social relations in the advanced sectors of the periphery and extending them outward t o t h e hinterland i n the process of the socialization of production. Modernization of the periphery under imperialism was essentially uneven and imposed through class relations of' domination. The introduction o f technology and organization was essentially a means of` heightening t h e level of' e x p l o i t a t i o n , increasing the absolute and relative rates of` extraction of' surplus value. This form of modernization from above and outside created the social r e l a t i o n s which led to the concentration, organization and p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of` t h e social forces which then became the source o f nationalist and

socialist movements. The l a t t e r grew, i n par t , as a response to the uneven and incomplete nature of` modernization b u t more importantly as a response to the exploitative and exclusionary nature o f the total social s i t u a t i o n . To continue to discuss the periphery as i f the principal issue continues to be one of "modernization" is to call For the continued and extended exploitative social relations that have already been established in the enclaves. The modernization problematic is an imperial project: i t proposes the introduction of new techniques and organizations to deepen and extend e x p l o i t a t i v e social relations from the enclave to the hinterland To enter into that problematic to redefine i t s methods is an e f f o r t a t reformist politics' to ameliorate the conditions of capitalist accumulation without affecting the essential

mechanisms. The sueeess of` any n a t i o n a l i s t or* socialist development e f f o r t depends not upon gaining control over the numerically important but backward hinterland but of' capturing the commanding heights of the economy oriented in the metropolitan enclaves the modern and productive firms in t h e dynamic sectors of

-

the economy: these are t h e e n t e r p r i s e s

that might serve as the principal source for financing national economic expansion. "Modernization theory" by locating the problematic in the hinterland, by focusing on t h e problems of economic backwardness in the periphery, by examining the peasant or poverty or food problem isolated from t h e periphery/metropolis, and the point o f departure for national development.

In 218.

summary,

the

greatest

source

of

imperial

surplus

extraction is found in the advanced sectors of the peripheral economy. The imperial based organization of' exploitation and the social relations of production have engendered antagonistic social classes the urban petty bourgeois nationalist a n d / o r the populist/soeialist urban p r o l e t a r i a t . The growth of' productive forces in the advanced sectors of' the periphery and their extension to the hinterland has increased the social weight of national forces i n the political and social arena, increasing their capacity to contest imperial accumulation. The consummation of a successful national transformation, however, depends on Forging links with the h i n t e r l a n d , a problematic not always envisioned in the initial national or socialist e f f o r t s . This is so i n some cases because of s t r u c t u r a l links (between in bourgeoisie and landlords) and others because of structural discontinuities (workers and peasants are located in different social formations) The central issue in the periphery then is not backwardness and t h e answer therefore i s d e f i n i t e l y not modernization. Nor is the central issue unequal exchange an important but derivative problematic. The central issue is imperial exploitative social relations and domination of the dynamic sectors of` t h e peripheral economy which l i m i t s modernization o f the hinterland and determines the terms of` exchange.

-

.

-

NOTES 1. Paul Baron, The P o l i t i c a l Economy o f Growth (New York' 1957) and Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: 1967) 2. Andre Gunder Frank, Lumpen-Bourgeoisie and Lumpen-Development (New York' 1972) 3. Fernando Cardoso, "Dependency and Development" New Left Review, No 7 4 » July-August 1972, Bill Warren, "MythS of Underdevelopment", New Left Review, No 81, P • 3-146 . Arghiri Emmanuel , "Curr»ent Myths o f Development", New Left

.

Review, No 85, pp. 61-82. II. M.C. Tavares and Jose S e r r a , "Beyond Stagnation: A Discussion on the Nature of recent developments in Brazil" in J. Petras ( e d . ) , Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution (New York: 1973). 5. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Stanf'ord° 1973) ; Jose Serra, "The Brazilian Economic Miracle" i n J . From Dependence t_o Revolution Petras ( e d . ) , Latin America: (New York: 1 9 7 3 ) . For an informative discussion on accumulation see 6.

Samir Amin, Accumulation on _a World Scale (New York: 197/4) 7. For an interesting discussion of` one agency of imperial see a r t i c l e Expor t-Impor t Bank the state in

219

.

September 1973, NACLA. 8. See James Petras and Morris Morley, U.S. Imperialism and the Over throw of Allende: (New York: 1975) 9. See Anibal Q u i j a n o , Nationalism and Imperialism in Peru (New Y o r k : 1973) 10. On Russia see L . T r o t s k y , History of the Russian Revolution (New York' 1961) ' on China, Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of` t h e Chinese Revolution ( C a l i f o r n i a : l 9 6 l ) ; Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution l9l5-l9Ll9 ( C a l i f o r n i a : 1971) ; and Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Lab our Movement 1919-1927 ( C a l i f o r n i a : 1968) , p p . 372-1112: on Cuba see Ramon L . Bonachea and Marta San Martin, The Cuban Insurrection 1952-1959 (New Jersey: 1 9 7 4 ) . II. In this sense we r e j e c t t h e thesis of` Barrington Moore, Eric Wolfe and others who speak of "peasant" revolutions and i d e n t i f y the process o f transformation in terms of` "modernization" of the underdeveloped areas. See Barrington Moore Social Origins o f Dictatorship a n d Democracy (Boston, 1966) ; E r i c Wolfe, Peasant Wars of' t h e Twentieth Century (New York: 1 9 6 9 ) .

.

220.