NATO in Contemporary Times: Purpose, Relevance, Future 3030687309, 9783030687304

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NATO in Contemporary Times Purpose, Relevance, Future John Michael Weaver

NATO in Contemporary Times “A penetrating and deeply insightful look into the world’s most powerful alliance and its component organizations. The SWOT analysis methodology provides the reader a well-balanced assessment of the alliance’s current state as well as its prospects moving into the future.” —Greg Zellmer, Colonel, US Army (retired)

John Michael Weaver

NATO in Contemporary Times Purpose, Relevance, Future

John Michael Weaver Intelligence Analysis, School of Arts, Communication, and Global Studies York College of Pennsylvania York, PA, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-68730-4 ISBN 978-3-030-68731-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Melisa Hasan This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Part I 1

NATO—A Brief History, and Discussion on the Methodology

Part II 2

3

(Relevance): Political Structure

NATO Political Headquarters, Brussels Belgium

Part III 3

(Purpose): Background

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(Relevance): Military Structure and Operations

Allied Command Operations/Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (ACO/SHAPE)

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4

Allied Joint Force Commands Brunssum, and Naples

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5

Allied Air Command

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Allied Land Command

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Allied Maritime Command

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E3A/D Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) Component

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NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA)

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v

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CONTENTS

NATO Communications & Information Systems Group (NCISG)

Part IV

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(Relevance): Military Training, Lessons, and Exercises

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Allied Command Transformation (ACT)

139

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Joint Warfare Centre (JWC)

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Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC)

165

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Joint Forces Training Centre (JFTC)

171

Part V 15

(Future): Wrap Up

Conclusion and the Way Forward

Index

183 197

About the Author

John Michael Weaver is an Associate Professor of Intelligence Analysis at York College of Pennsylvania (USA), a retired DOD civilian from the United States’ Intelligence Community, and has served as an officer in the US Army (retiring at the rank of lieutenant colonel). He has lived and worked on four continents and in 19 countries spending nearly eight years overseas (on behalf of the US government). His experience includes multiple combat deployments, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and disaster assistance support in both conventional and unconventional/non-traditional units. John has trained and certified multinational NATO reconnaissance teams based in The Netherlands, Germany, and Spain for worldwide deployment in full spectrum mission sets. He has also personally led several reconnaissance missions throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Asia (including multiple missions in Afghanistan). He has received formal training/certification in the following areas from the US Department of Defense: Survival/Evasion/Resistance/Escape (high risk), communications equipment & communications planning (FM radio, landline & satellite communications, encryption, and the use of cryptographic devices), digital camera use & digital photography courses, US Joint Forces Command joint intelligence course, US Special Operations Command counterintelligence awareness course (USSOCOM CI), US Joint Forces Command counterintelligence awareness training (USJFCOM CI), counterinsurgency course, joint antiterrorism course, defense against suicide

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bombing course, dynamics of international terrorism, homeland security and defense course, the joint special operations task force course (JSOTF), defensive driving course, vehicle emergency drills (battle drills), composite risk management, the airborne and air assault schools, and more. Additionally, he graduated from NATO’s Combined Joint Operations Center course in Oberammergau Germany, the Air Command and Staff College, and the Joint & Combined Warfighting School. John earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in business management from Towson University in 1990, graduated from Central Michigan University with a Master of Science in Administration degree in 1995, earned a Master of Operational Arts and Science degree from the US Air Force’s Air University in 2004, and graduated from the University of Baltimore with a Doctorate in Public Administration in 2013.

List of Tables

Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table

2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 7.1 8.1 9.1 10.1 11.1 12.1 13.1 14.1

NATO Headquarters SWOT ACO/SHAPE SWOT Operational Level Command SWOT Allied Air Command SWOT Allied Land Command SWOT Allied Maritime Command SWOT E3A/D SWOT NSPA SWOT NCISG SWOT ACT SWOT JWC SWOT JALLC SWOT JFTC SWOT

27 43 59 76 89 98 106 119 130 146 158 168 176

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PART I

(Purpose): Background

CHAPTER 1

NATO—A Brief History, and Discussion on the Methodology

Abstract NATO was established in 1949. Since its founding, the Alliance has grown to 30 nations on both sides of the Atlantic (as of March 2020). From its inception, it has served as a deterrent to the Soviet Union for most of its history and following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the organization has been involved in multiple operations the world over. This chapter explores precursors to NATO, the member nations (and when each joined), and the North Atlantic Treaty (articles) with a brief analysis of each. Keywords NATO · Treaty of Brussels · North Atlantic Treaty

1.1

Background

The Treaty of Versailles brought to fruition the League of Nations. After World War I came to completion, most of the world wanted a supranational organization to work together to help avoid the manifestation of war to a level akin to the one of the Great War. This did not happen, and in just over two decades the same major belligerent from WW I rose to power once again and launched an offensive against Poland bringing about the Second World War.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_1

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During World War II, the United States entered the conflict after the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. As a result, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers was created and the command was assigned to Dwight Eisenhower, a US Army officer, who led the allied forces to victory in 1945. The United States was seen as the major reason why the allies prevailed over the Axis Powers as was the case with Russia’s determination against Germany’s eastern flank. Moreover, in the aftermath of the devastation experienced on the European continent, the United States fared much better and emerged as a superpower. Another country re-emerged in the aftermath of WW II as a major player as well, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, otherwise referred to as Russia). Countries in Europe subsequently found themselves aligned into the democratic and communist camps (based mostly on agreed-upon arrangements with the victors of WWW II) with many nations in Eastern Europe finding alignment with the USSR ostensibly to serve as a barrier to help protect the Soviet Union from future conflict though most in Europe saw this as a potential threat to democracy and capitalism. Following the victories in Europe and Asia, the world looked to create a more viable and effective version of the League of Nations. This new organization became known as the United Nations (UN) and was born in 1945 (Weaver 2019). The core of this organization is the Security Council’s five permanent members. The nations that comprise the five countries of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are the major victors of World War II and include the likes of the People’s Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Weaver 2020a). That stated, three were staunch allies during WWII and promoted democratic values and included France, the United Kingdom, and the United States; one, though an ally in WWII subscribed to a communist ideology—the USSR, and one later would become communist—China. The power with the UNSC is underscored by its ability to pass and implement binding resolutions; more pointedly, the power with the permanent members resides in their veto power whereby only one of these five members can derail a proposed resolution (Weaver 2019). Because the USSR possessed the power to veto resolutions, many nations were fearful that the UN would be relegated to a failing organization akin to its predecessor, the League of Nations. The Treaty of Dunkirk was signed in 1947. France and the United Kingdom were fearful of a resurgence of German power and looked to formalize an Alliance to work together to protect against said threat

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(Johnston 2017, 40–42; Oxford, n.d.). Mark Trachtenberg (1998) went further by stating that this treaty was also inclusive of the Russian threat. In the following year, the Treaty of Brussels was ratified and added the BENELUX nations of Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg (Brussels Treaty 1948). It was the following year that NATO was established (What is NATO, n.d.).

1.2 NATO: Its Origin and List of Current Member Nations NATO was established in 1949 through the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in April of that year (History of NATO, n.d.). The Alliance had aspirations to avoid conflict by aligning countries (Johnston 2017, 131–133). Essentially, it was a sworn pact to stand against aggression created under the premise that “an attack against one would be an attack against all” (History of NATO, n.d.). At the helm, is the NATO Secretary General (SECGEN); the current incumbent is the former Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg (NATO SECGEN, n.d.). It serves to help prevent conflict and also to prepare for the realities of an imperfect world (Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014; Odgaard, 2014). Likewise, it needs to strive to create a coherent strategy (Dorff 2014). NATO will have to remain flexible and adaptive to remain relevant (Wijk 1997). Since its inception, the Alliance survived the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the disintegration of the USSR in December 1991, the end of the Warsaw Pact, peacekeeping operations in Europe, the 9/11 attacks, and other operations in more contemporary times the world over. What began as a political–military alliance comprised of 12 nations (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States) has burgeoned to 30 nations today when the Republic of North Macedonia joined in March 2020 (History of NATO, n.d.). The following are the member nations and the year in which they joined. Albania (2009) Belgium (1949) Bulgaria (2004) Canada (1949) Croatia (2009)

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Czech Republic (1999) Denmark (1949) Estonia (2004) France (1949) Germany (1955) Greece (1952) Hungary (1999) Iceland (1949) Italy (1949) Latvia (2004) Lithuania (2004) Luxembourg (1949) Montenegro (2017) Netherlands (1949) North Macedonia (2020) Norway (1949) Poland (1999) Portugal (1949) Romania (2004) Slovakia (2004) Slovenia (2004) Spain (1982) Turkey (1952) The United Kingdom (1949) The United States (1949)

1.3

North Atlantic Treaty (Articles)

The overarching legal document that provides NATO with its authorization is the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty provides greater specificity into the raison d’être of the organization. More pointedly, NATO (and by extension, its articles), provide authority for it to operate as a regional organization under the United Nations (Higgins et al. 2017). The treaty and a brief analysis of this are found in the annex at the end of this chapter.

1.4

Methodology

This study focused solely on secondary data. A lot of material exists on NATO, but this book focused on synthesizing information in the context of four variables explained below. This work analyzed data from the

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literature and official NATO sources. It also looked at the official doctrine of NATO and the United States as well as oral accounts (interviews and panel discussions) that have taken place in recent years. Moreover, it looked at the contemporary history of the Alliance focusing predominantly on the last 10 years, but in some instances, went back farther for context and clarification on NATO’s evolution. The book afforded consideration to major organizations within the Alliance to look at these as cases to better understand what is occurring. This book departs from traditional theories used to look at the Alliance intentionally taking a new approach to more aptly understand what is taking place. Moreover, what makes this work unique is that (1) it looks at NATO through the lens of a practitioner that spent nearly six years working in the Alliance in the first decade of the millennium, and (2) applies a particular model frequently used in the public policy and administration discipline to more structurally guide the understanding of what is occurring with NATO in contemporary times to help move away from subjectivity and bias. Bryson in highly regarded among practitioners through his analysis of public sector organizations (of which, NATO is, albeit one that is supranational). This book conducts an analysis of NATO through the use of a model (Bryson 2018, 144–148; Bryson and Edwards 2017) that looks at the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of an organization (S.W.O.T.). NATO turns to these to help as Johnston (2017) points out, to adapt its strategy to remain relevant going forward. More pointedly, Heuer and Pherson (2015, 308) underscore the value of this model. They write that it is a useful framework from which one can collect data and subsequently analyze the strategic planning to help make informed decisions (Heuer and Pherson 2015, 308). Ultimately, the study considers the Alliance through its purpose and relevance and will provide insight into the viability of NATO going forward into the future. Though there are more organizations that comprise NATO than those covered in this book, this author narrowed the scope of the study to these (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats). Why may one ask? As a practitioner, this author served as a leader and staff officer in NATO throughout Europe for nearly six years (section head, branch chief, executive officer, and director). During his time in NATO, he interacted directly with most of these organizations and saw the impact (good and bad) of these and accordingly, decided to focus attention only on these. More pointedly, he deployed to Afghanistan several times as part

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of the International Security Assistance Force, conducted numerous coordination visits to several NATO headquarters, participated in Alliance led exercises, to include Steadfast Jaguar, NATO’s first out of area exercise to Cape Verde, deployed to Pakistan as part of NATO Response Force 7 following the earthquake there, and he even served as the sole NATO liaison officer to the US Central Command in Tampa, Florida in 2008. He saw firsthand the importance of all of these with the exception of two (Joint Forces Training Centre, and Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre), which came into existence after he retired from service. There is also a brand new headquarters stood up in Norfolk in September 2020 excluded from this book because there is nothing as of yet to analyze its performance (Atlantic Command, Norfolk). 1.4.1

Internal Variables

The two internal variables controlled by organizations are strengths and weaknesses (Bryson 2018; Bryson and Edwards 2017). Strengths turn to what the organization has available to it, from which it can leverage in order to enhance its position and remain relevant (Bryson 2018; Bryson and Edwards 2017). Conversely, the weaknesses look at inherent flaws and challenges that could prevent the organization from realizing its full potential (Bryson 2018; Bryson and Edwards 2017). 1.4.2

Part 1.4.2 External Variables

Externally, this book considers two variables: opportunities and threats. Opportunities are areas that an organization can pursue in order to help improve the viability of its structure and could enhance its relevance and position (Bryson 2018; Bryson and Edwards 2017). Threats on the other hand are issues and factors that could harm the organization or reduce its effectiveness (Bryson 2018; Bryson and Edwards 2017). 1.4.3

Value Added

There is value added in conducting a S.W.O.T. analysis. It can generate information that is useful and can serve as the basis for further analysis (Heuer and Pherson 2015, 308). It can also look at matching an

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organization’s internal strengths and weaknesses to the external opportunities and threats confronting the organization (Heuer and Pherson 2015, 308). 1.4.4

Methodology Limitations

However, there are limitations to such an approach. This type of analysis looks at the variables without ascribing weights to them (Heuer and Pherson 2015, 309). Likewise, S.W.O.T. does not necessarily take into account all issues because the analysis only focuses on four variables: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. This was intentional to narrow the scope of the analysis looking at the Alliance through a limited lens to not convolute the understanding of what is taking place. There are other variables that one might consider for future analysis on NATO, and attention will be afforded to these others in the last chapter of the book. Likewise, though academics might be inclined to assign values or weights to variables (considering that the four variables should not be weighted the same), this study intentionally looked at each of the four S.W.O.T. variables as equal, again to avoid convoluting the analysis. Moreover, the study does not look at legal considerations of the Alliance, and by extension, its operations. Other studies could build on this one looking at conducting an analysis affording attention to international and national law considerations. Finally, as stated above, the book only looks at secondary data sources. Absent from this work is information derived from interviews, questionnaires, and personal observations actually conducted by this author (at the present time). When NATO’s leaders gathered in 2019 to celebrate its 70th anniversary, they did not want to just focus on past successes. The leaders desired to move forward with a unified vision and the rest of this book will look to the present relevance and future of the Alliance.

Annex “The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

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They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:” (NATO Treaty 1949). Article 1 “The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: Article 1 looks to the United Nations as the overarching organization and this paragraph serves to underscore the legitimacy of the UN (AJP-01 2017). Article 2 “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: This article underpins the relevancy of peaceful pursuits of resolution to problems and looks to seek conflict avoidance. Article 3 “In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: Article 3 explains that all nations must contribute their share to the Alliance vis-à-vis military forces and equipment and each should not fall short thereby shifting the burden to allow other member nations to compensate for that nation’s lack of pulling its fair share of responsibility.

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Article 4 “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: To the Alliance, this article explains essentially that all members are equal and that any one can surface issues if they perceive a threat. NATO strives to achieve consensus in decision making (Jakobsen 2014, 70). Article 5 “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” (NATO Treaty 1949). “Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: Article 5 is often seen as the most important of articles and specifies that an attack on one (no matter how great or small) will be treated as an attack on all. More to the point, it is based on the purpose and principles listed in the United Nations (UN) Charter and in turn, leads to the commitment of nations to unite efforts that should result in a comprehensive and collective defense (AJP-01 2017, 1.6). More pointedly, the authorization for the use of force could be supported by the UN to take forceful action to bring about the restoration of peace and security (Higgins et al. 2017). Article 6 “For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:” (NATO Treaty 1949). • “on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey

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or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;” (NATO Treaty 1949). • “on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: This article provides specific examples of what constitutes an attack and relevant locations. Article 7 “This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: Once again, this treaty and NATO’s existence are not designed to supersede the viability of the UN. Article 8 “Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: This article, in essence, looks at the term of conflict as something that occurs after the treaty is ratified. Article 9 “The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: Similar to, but to a lesser extent than Article 5, this one is significant to NATO itself because it allows the political headquarters to set up subcomponents.

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Article 10 “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: This provision clearly states that unanimity is a necessary precursor for NATO member state expansion. Article 11 “This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: Article 11 explains that nations are still autonomous and that the governments of member states have to vote to implement the treaty. Article 12 “After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: This article explains that the treaty would remain unaltered and in effect for 10 years, but at any point thereafter, can be reviewed and changed. Article 13 “After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been

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given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: This article explains the provision for member states that want to leave NATO and that they could not do so for the first 20 years after the stand-up of the Alliance. Article 14 “This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.” (NATO Treaty 1949). “1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.” (NATO Treaty 1949). 2. On January 16 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.” (NATO Treaty 1949). “3. The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.” (NATO Treaty 1949). Analysis: This article explains that the two official languages of NATO are English and French.

References AJP-01. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/905877/202 00728-doctrine_nato_allied_joint_doctrine_ajp_01.pdf. Accessed September 2, 2020. Brussels Treaty. 1948. Treaty of Brussels. https://www.britannica.com/event/ Brussels-Treaty-European-history-1948. Accessed June 11, 2020. Bryson, John M. 2018. Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 5th ed. New Jersey, United States: Wiley. Bryson, John M. and L. H. Edwards. 2017. Public-Sector Strategic Planning. In The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Business and Management. Oxford, England. Oxford University Press.

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Dorff, Robert H. 2014. US National Security Strategy and NATO. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. Palgrave Macmillan. New York, USA. Heuer Jr., Richard J., and Randolph H. Pherson. 2015. Structured Analytical Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, 2nd ed. Los Angeles, United States: CQ Press. Higgins, Rosalyn, Philippa Webb, Dapo Akande, Sandesh Sivakumaran, and James Sloan. 2017. Oppenheim’s International Law United Nations (vols. 1 & 2). UK: Oxford University Press. History of NATO. n.d. The History of NATO—Video Timeline. https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139621.htm. Accessed June 11, 2020. Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. 2014. The Indispensable Enabler: NATO’s Strategic Value in High-Intensity Operations Is Far Greater Than You Think. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Johnston, Seth A. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore, MA, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. Krüger-Klausen, Villiam and Liselotte Odgaard. 2014. Preparing for an Imperfect World: Strategy in Conflict Management Environments. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. NATO SECGEN. n.d. NATO Secretary General. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natolive/topics_50094.htm. Accessed June 15, 2020. NATO Treaty. 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. Accessed December 15, 2020. Odgaard, Liselotte. 2014. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Oxford. n.d. Treaty of Dunkirk. Oxford Reference. https://www.oxfordrefere nce.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095734992. Accessed June 11, 2020. Trachtenberg, Mark. 1998. The German Threat as a Pretext for Defence Against Russia. http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/ appendices/appendixII.html. Accessed June 11, 2020. Weaver, John M. 2019. United Nations Security Council Permanent Member Perspectives Implications for U.S. and Global Intelligence Professionals. New York, USA: Peter Lang Publishers. Weaver, John M. 2020a. Intelligence Dilemmas: Understanding the Complexity of the P5 Relationship (Chapter). In Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, ed. Tom Røseth and John Weaver. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. What is NATO. n.d. What Is NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/ index.html. Accessed on June 11, 2020. Wijk, Rob d. 1997. NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium. London: Brasseries.

PART II

(Relevance): Political Structure

CHAPTER 2

NATO Political Headquarters, Brussels Belgium

Abstract First and foremost, NATO is a political organization. Many people fail to realize this and contextually, it is important for readers to know this fact. After all, it is through the political structure and voting by member nations that provides NATO the authority to conduct operations. This chapter explores the national delegations, Nuclear Planning Group, North Atlantic Council, NATO structure, and NATO activities. It then conducts a deeper dive into the Brussels structure, how it obtains funding, political nuances of moving forward (albeit with a compromise), and presents the reader with challenges in actually getting approval for operations especially those not seen as being driven by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Keywords North Atlantic Council · Article 5 · NATO Crisis Management Process · High Level Group

Claire Ashcraft is an MPPA student at York College of Pennsylvania and was a contributing researcher to this chapter. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_2

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2.1

History

NATO looked to legitimize its purpose by unifying multiple nations as a regional security organization. More pointedly, it wanted to serve as an alliance to link military capabilities under a single unified leadership structure to better coordinate security responses to the perceived threat presented by the potential spread of communism. Though many nations had viable capabilities, under NATO the Alliance could better coordinate responses to threats and at least theoretically, might better synchronize the application of the instruments of power to rising challenges (thereby, at least theoretically again) to avoid duplicitous efforts and flank exposure that could have been exploited by an adversary (like the Soviet Union). What is more, is that NATO could help form linkages, help in burden sharing (to reduce costs borne by individual nations), and provide deterrence. There was a grand strategy. NATO [like other regional security organizations (RSOs) that included the likes of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)] looked to protect the eastern flank of generally democratic countries from the threat of communism. RSOs were linchpins to help prevent/contain communism. NATO’s political headquarters is located in Brussels, Belgium. It serves as both the administrative and political center of the Alliance (NATO 2018). It allows experts and representatives from all member states to consult on a regular basis formally and informally and to work with partner organizations and countries. It is the senior decision-making body in NATO with an international civilian and military staff that hosts around 6000 meetings annually (NATO 2018). This cooperation is a key part of NATO’s decision-making process. Before the NATO headquarters was moved to Brussels, Belgium, it was located in Paris, France. In February 1966, France decided to pull out NATO’s integrated military structure in part due to France’s challenges with communist espionage (Lasoen 2016). Charles de Gaulle, the French President at the time, also stated that all foreign military forces had to leave France (Blakemore 2018). It was decided in June of that year that the NATO military headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), would move to Brussels, Belgium (NATO, n.d.). There were two main reasons Brussels was chosen for the political headquarters. The first being that Belgium is a more centrally located

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country than the other NATO member states. The second reason was that Belgium had the space to comfortably house the headquarters (NATO, n.d.). It was ultimately decided that SHAPE would relocate to nearby Mons-Casteau, Belgium due to free government land that was available. While the matter of where the military headquarters would be located was settled, there was still a question about whether the political headquarters, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), would remain in Paris. An argument was made to move both SHAPE and the NAC to Belgium to keep them together due to past precedence. In 1952, NATO’s political headquarters was moved from London, United Kingdom, where the NAC was initially based in 1949, to Paris to be closer to NATO’s military headquarters (NATO 2018). The plan was then to move the NAC to the greater Brussels area. The political headquarters would be in a temporary location in Evere while the permanent location was being built in Heysel (NATO, n.d.).

2.2

Vision

NATO is both a political and a military Alliance that exists to guarantee the security and freedom of its members with both political and military means. Politically, NATO seeks to promote democratic values and empower member states to consult and collaborate on both security and defense-related issues to solve problems, build trust, and prevent conflict in the long run (What is NATO, n.d.). Militarily, NATO is committed to peacefully resolving disputes. If diplomacy fails, NATO has the military power to commence crisis management procedures. These can be carried out under a United Nations mandate or Article 5, which is the collective defense clause of NATO’s founding treaty. Military operations can be conducted alone or with other countries and international organizations (What is NATO, n.d.).

2.3

Mission

NATO is an Alliance of countries from North America and Europe that serves as a link between the two continents. This enables cooperation and consultation in the areas of defense and security, and it has the ability to conduct multinational crisis management operations (What is NATO, n.d.).

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2.3.1

North Atlantic Council (NAC)

NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the epicenter of the Alliance’s decision-making body (NAC, n.d.). It is also responsible for helping to create strategic guidance in an imperfect world (Dorff 2014). Accordingly, the NAC unites representatives of each Alliance nation to discuss policy or operational questions that require collective decisions, to foster a forum for full range consultation among members on all issues that affect their peace and security (NAC, n.d.). As a political organization, NATO develops policy to respond to changing conditions in the political–military domains under political guidance (AJP-01 2017, 1-1). Accordingly, policy is seen as prescriptive and can better assign or direct tasks and capabilities (AJP-01 2017, 1-1). Moreover, the Alliance’s strategic framework helps link national power to the political system of international actors (under NATO), to support collective interests (AJP-01 2017, 1-3). It often does so through the application of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic or D.I.M.E.) (AJP-01 2017, 1-3–1-4; Møller 2014; Nissen 2014, 159; Weaver 2018a; b; Weaver 2019; Weaver 2020a, b; Weaver and Johnson 2020). Under D.I.M.E., diplomatic efforts look at the engagement of political entities and how effective they are at brokering agreements and negotiating terms with other countries (AJP-01 2017, 1-3). The information instrument is paramount for the decision-maker to have the facts and data necessary to make timely decisions and the synchronization of messaging is critical for the Alliance’s legitimacy (AJP-01 2017, 1-3). The military instrument looks to the availability of armed forces of different nations (air, ground, sea, space, and Special Forces), to project power as necessary (AJP-01 2017, 1-4). Finally, the economic instrument turns to capital and trade to exercise monetary influence over state and non-state actors alike (AJP-01 2017, 1-4). It is the ultimate authority that heads a network of committees and its discussions and decisions cover a host of NATO activities and are often based on recommendations and reports developed by subordinate committees, at the NAC’s request (NAC, n.d.). Policies that are decided in the NAC represent the collective will of all member countries from within NATO because those decisions are made based on unanimity and common accord. Likewise, the Secretary General chairs the NAC; decisions taken by it have the same status and validity at whatever level it

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meets (NAC, n.d.). Most importantly, the NAC was the only body established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and remains the only one with the authority to set up subsidiary bodies (NAC, n.d.). 2.3.2

Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)

Many of the nations in NATO possess nuclear weapons (France, United Kingdom, and the United States). This group is charged with discussing a specified policy that gravitates around nuclear forces in a changing world and serves as the senior body on nukes for the Alliance; specific emphasis is on arms control and nuclear proliferation and has existed since 1966 (NPG, n.d.). Though all NATO members are de facto members of the NPG, France has opted not to participate. The senior component charged with nuclear issues is the NPG High Level Group (HLG) and it is chaired by the United States. The HLG tends to the issues of NATO’s nuclear policy, planning and force posture, as well as the security, safety, and the monitoring of the effectiveness of NATO’s nuclear deterrence (NPG, n.d.).

2.4

NATO Military Organization and Structure

NATO will always look for political solutions first. However, when NATO’s execution of political decisions has military implications, there are several key actors. This includes its Military Committee (Johnston 2017, 60–61). This is comprised of the Chiefs of Defense of NATO member countries. It also includes the International Military Staff, and NATO’s Military Committee’s executive body (What is NATO, n.d.). Finally, the military command structure is made up of Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Accordingly, NATO can turn to the military structure to influence political outcomes (Hudson 2009). It is important to note that NATO has very few permanent forces of its own (several of these will be covered in subsequent chapters). At such times when the NAC agrees to launch an operation, member nations voluntarily contribute military forces. These forces are then returned to their nations upon mission completion (What is NATO, n.d.).

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2.5

NATO Activities

The Alliance can be seen as a significant enabler (Jakobsen 2014). NATO is engaged in four basic activities. These include (1) decisions and consultations, (2) operations and missions, (3) developing partnerships, and (4) developing the means to respond to threats (What is NATO, n.d.). It is incumbent upon the political leaders to craft strategic narratives to come up with a shared meaning of politics to more aptly shape beliefs, perceptions, and behavior (Miskimmon et al. 2011). The first of these is decisions and consultation. What is important to understand is that a decision by NATO is taken by consensus. Moreover, daily, member nations consult with one another and take decisions on issues of security on a wide mix of issues (What is NATO, n.d.). NATO is involved in multiple missions and operations the world over. More pointedly, these include recent operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo (Shea 2014), air policing, humanitarian relief operations, pandemic support (COVID-19), its interest in securing the Mediterranean, and NATO’s support to the African Union (Operations and Missions, n.d.; What is NATO, n.d.). Accordingly, it leads as a contributor to peace and security on multiple continents. The Alliance is a crisis management organization with an ability to handle full spectrum operations (Johnston 2017, 139; Operations and Missions, n.d.). These have increased substantially since the 1990s (Operations and Missions, n.d.). NATO is engaged in building partnerships (What is NATO, n.d.). In addition to the 30 member nations, 40 others collaborate with the Alliance on a wide range of security and political issues and this has led to many non-NATO members contributing resources and troops to Alliance operations in many countries. Finally, NATO is involved in developing capabilities to respond to threats (What is NATO, n.d.). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War, it has turned to innovation and adapted to emerging conditions and subsequent threats. These include the likes of special operations, intelligence, cyber, and contingency contracting in recent years. Under the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP), NATO personnel staff and committees put together options for the NAC (AJP-01 2017, 3-5).

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Funding

NATO relies on financial contributions of each nation to build/maintain/operate its headquarters, to pay civilian salaries, fund NATO units, purchase and maintain vehicle fleets and communication equipment, and more (NATO Funding, n.d.). Accordingly, the funding is either indirect or direct. Indirect (otherwise referred to as national) contributions are the largest (NATO Funding, n.d.). These come by way of member nation volunteers who provide equipment or troops to a military operation and when it bears the costs of the decision to execute operations. Conversely, direct contributions are used to pay for the requirements of the Alliance that end up serving the interests of all 30 members (NATO Funding, n.d.). These are not the responsibility of any one nation; these costs are collective in nature using the principle of common funding. When turning to the common funding of requirements, all 30 members are encouraged to contribute according to an agreed costshare formula, based on a nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP); this accordingly represents a small percentage of GDP towards each member’s defense budget (NATO Funding, n.d.). At present, this is 2% and many nations are not living up to this expectation. More pointedly, common funding arrangements finance the Alliances principal budgets that include (1) the civil budget (NATO Headquarters running costs), (2) the military budget (those costs associated with its integrated command structure) and, (3) the NATO Security Investment Program (turning to military capabilities) (NATO Funding, n.d.). Finally, other projects fall under what is referred to as jointly funded, which means that the participating countries can subsequently identify a set of requirements, determine the priorities and the funding arrangements for those, but NATO will end up providing political and financial oversight (NATO Funding, n.d.). The North Atlantic Council oversees the funding process; this is managed by the Resource Policy and Planning Board, and it is implemented by the Budget Committee and the Investment Committee (NATO Funding, n.d.).

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2.7

Approval Process

As one can probably quickly ascertain, getting 30 nations to agree to something is often fraught with challenges. Unless an event is unequivocally seen as an Article 5 incident, not all nations have the will to support the variegated mix of events that might confront NATO. What often happens is tantamount to “horse trading” when nations look to see what they can possibly obtain from the Alliance for supporting different missions and operations. As stated earlier in this chapter, the Secretary General strives to obtain consensus from member states to proceed or not. Thereby, consensus decision-making is a key principle that has been accepted as the sole basis for decision-making in NATO since its inception in 1949 (Consensus, n.d.). In essence, what this means is that there is no voting at NATO on consensus decision-making. Consultations end up taking place until such time as a decision that is acceptable to all is reached. Sometimes NATO members end up agreeing to disagree on an issue. That stated, this negotiation process often is rapid since members consult each other on a regular basis and often know and understand what a nation’s position on a particular issue is in advance of the request for one to take a decision (Consensus, n.d.). The consensus decision-making process applies throughout NATO. Likewise, it is applicable to all committees (Consensus, n.d.). What ensues is that when NATO announces its decision, it is clearly an expression of the collective will of all members of the Alliance.

2.8

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 2.1 shows the representation of the S.W.O.T. analysis for NATO Headquarters. Refer to the following paragraphs for more information. NATO is a political organization and is one that is supranational in nature. Like the United Nations, it serves to bring nations together toward a common goal. More pointedly, the Alliance has had a unique purpose, especially during the Cold War, and in recent decades, has become transformative to adapt to emerging security concerns. NATO helps provide (1) a security guarantee to protect from external attacks, (2) it serves as a tool to foster both international peace and security by having the ability to execute conflict management and arms control, and finally (3) fostering a sense of community that strives to promote democracy, liberty, and the rule of law (Jakobsen 2014, 60).

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Strengths

Weaknesses

Encourages international peace and security Each member country represented

Few Permanent military forces Funding depends on member contributions

Opportunities

Threats

Collaboration with outside countries and organizations Increase diversity to add additional perspectives

Cyber attacks Maintaining relevance

The political aspects that the NATO diplomats bring is essential for the success of the Alliance; diplomacy itself is an instrument of power and one that is critical as a “soft” component to bring about influence in the world (Weaver 2018a; Weaver 2018b; Weaver 2020; Weaver and Pomeroy 2018; Weaver and Pomeroy 2019, 2020; Weaver and Johnson 2020). To be effective and to remain relevant, it must look to clearly articulate objectives to NATO commanders at all levels (Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014). The Alliance also helps enable nations like the United States to leverage others to minimize the burden of being the sole bearer of the problem while adding legitimacy to the mission (Jakobsen 2014, 5). What’s more, is that NATO can bring together a variegated mix of capabilities that single nations might lack (Jakobsen 2014, 60). Similar to the United Nations, it is frequently quite challenging to come to commonly acceptable terms due to the disparate mix of nations each with their own agendas to help maintain their relevancy and position on the global stage (Geoan˘a 2020). It is not easy to realize consensus and when looking at divides between individual nations, like the United States and France (cultural differences), Greece, and Turkey (a history of hostility), and divisions between larger members like the United States and the European Union, the United Kingdom and the European Union (over Brexit), and many NATO nations and Turkey (due to Turkey’s move towards a closer relationship with Russia), and one can quickly see how challenges abound for the political leaders of the Alliance. That stated, diversity is often a good thing. It brings in new experiences, leads to better problem-solving, and offers additional perspectives.

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Working in diverse environments also promotes creativity and opens up the dialogue to innovative ideas. Looking at problems through different cultural lenses can add value, might assist in conflict avoidance, and even lead to greater legitimacy especially if there is a move afoot to gravitate toward the direction of armed conflict or intervention. The addition of more members and the collaboration of countries in recent years and into the future will further increase NATO’s diversity, give NATO leaders more cultural lenses to look through, and help avoid groupthink. Because NATO is a political organization first and foremost, the civilians that serve as the head of this Alliance are probably going to be more inclined to look to diplomatic efforts to help avoid the employment of military forces. NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoan˘a (2020) underscored the importance of NATO’s political influence in a panel discussion when he underscored the necessity of NATO to expand its political influence while trying to limit formal expansion to leverage (1) that no other alliance has a greater sharing of values than NATO, that (2) NATO countries possess 50% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and that the Alliance holds over 50% of the world’s military power. This is important because NATO (the NATO Command Structure or NCS) has few permanent military forces itself and this is a weakness. NATO depends on member countries to contribute military forces, if and when needed. While NATO does maintain some military equipment, most equipment is contributed by member nations to support their military personnel (NATO Troop Contributions 2018). This can directly correlate into issue resolution for NATO as a whole and reduce the costs associated with member nation contributions of troops at the individual nation level. Another weakness is that NATO heavily relies on member contributions for funding, and it is not entirely balanced. Additionally, NATO provides political and financial oversight for any jointly funded projects among member nations. Some countries have to spend more in order to develop additional capabilities for which the Alliance asks (cyber, communications, stand-off weapons, etc.) (NATO Funding, n.d.). NATO also relies on the United States for some essential operations, such as ballistic missile defense, airborne electronic warfare, and air-to-air refueling. However, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany contribute more than 50 percent of the non-defense spending (NATO Funding, n.d.).

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That stated, each country will probably not see the solution that they would like brought to fruition that they would prefer. Consensus is rarely possible when multiple parties from diverse backgrounds are involved. Compromise will likely occur with each NATO member advocating for their preferred course of action, and the actual decision becoming “watered down” because not all nations will agree with individual member recommendations. The ability of NATO members to keep an open mind, work together, and compromise is vital for NATO’s success. NATO leaders will have to continue to adapt to a quickly changing world. Having strong allies outside of NATO aids in foreign policy negotiations and helps reduce the risk of military conflict and this is an opportunity. The member nations will have to ensure they can form agreements within NATO and with its partners. For NATO to remain relevant, especially in the context of its burgeoning 30 member states, Alliance members will have to put aside differences and look to a utilitarian approach to solving problems at the top for this supranational organization to remain relevant in the future. There are threats. When turning to cyber, issues regarding cyber network operations are burgeoning and becoming more problematic (Weaver and Johnson 2020). Cyberspace has been designated as its own military domain, separate from land, air, sea, and space (NATO 2020). The Deputy Secretary General stated that NATO agreed to create a Cyberspace Operations Center in the military command structure (NATO 2020); what is needed is a clear understanding of the effects that the NATO SECGEN wants to achieve so that it can be task organized accordingly. It has also been noted that some actors have been exploiting the COVID-19 crisis, and there has been an increase in malevolent cyber activity since it began (NATO 2020). NATO will have to explore its interpretation of whether or not cyber attacks constitute an Article 5 attack. Geoan˘a (2020), also underscored the challenges confronting the expansion of cyber to include artificial intelligence and quantum computing in the years ahead. Moreover, NATO will have to come to understand advanced persistent threats (APTs), the Internet of Things (IOT), the use of “deep fakes” and more when looking at the topic of cyber (Weaver and Johnson 2020). To achieve success will require partnerships and synchronization to remain relevant. More pointedly, NATO political leaders will have to work with military planners (Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014). The

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threats facing the Alliance members have drastically changed since it was founded. A military attack from a hostile actor is less likely to occur now than during the Cold War, but Russia still is a concern (Geoan˘a 2020). Other challenges are more in the realms of terrorism, and nuclear proliferation (Geoan˘a 2020). NATO leaders will have to form a clear vision and a formidable strategy to remain relevant to survive (Shea 2014, 41). Moving forward, NATO will have many challenges. More to the point, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has underscored three points. These include (1) remaining strong as an Alliance to remain formidable and keep its edge, (2) looking at how NATO can enhance its political influence even though there will be disagreement at times among NATO member nations, and (3) looking to how NATO becomes even more relevant globally without expanding its formal membership (Geoan˘a 2020). Direction and guidance must be clear. The Alliance must also come to terms with the political realities of what is truly possible and knowing what exceeds the political will of member countries. Once this is understood, NATO as a political entity, can move forward with identifying the ways, means, and ends necessary to achieve what the Alliance wants to accomplish. Finally, NATO should turn to its Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) to look at future threats to the Alliance and determine the best way forward to address these (ESCD, n.d.).

References AJP-01. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine. https://assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/905877/ 20200728-doctrine_nato_allied_joint_doctrine_ajp_01.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. Blakemore, Erin. 2018. When France Pulled the Plug on a Crucial Part of NATO. https://www.history.com/news/france-nato-withdrawal-charlesde-gaulle. Accessed on November 18, 2020. Consensus. n.d. Consensus Decision-Making at NATO. https://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm. Accessed on June 14, 2020. Dorff, Robert H. 2014. US National Security Strategy and NATO. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. ESCD. n.d. Emerging Security Challenges Division. https://esc.hq.nato.int/def ault.aspx. Accessed on January 8, 2021.

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Geoan˘a, Mircea. 2020. NATO 20/2020: 20 bold ideas to reimagine the Alliance after the 2020 US election (Panel Discussion). Atlantic Council Panel. December 11, 2020. Hudson, Kimberly A. 2009. Justice, Intervention and Force in International Relations: Reassessing Just War Theory for the 21st Century. London, UK: Routledge. Jakobsen, Peter V. 2014. The Indispensable Enabler: NATO’s Strategic Value in High-Intensity Operations Is Far Greater Than You Think. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Johnston, Seth A. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore Maryland, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. Krüger-Klausen, Villiam, and Liselotte Odgaard. 2014. Preparing for an Imperfect World: Strategy in Conflict Management Environments. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Lasoen, Kenneth. 2016. 185 Years of Belgian Security Service. Journal of Intelligence History 15 (2): 9–118. Miskimmon, Alister, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle. 2011. Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations. Michigan, USA: University of Michigan Press. Møller, Hans Henrik. 2014. Effects-Based Thinking in NATO, Utilizing All Instruments of Power While Planning for and Conducting Operations. Strategy. In NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. NAC. n.d. North Atlantic Council. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/top ics_49763.htm. Accessed on June 11, 2020. NATO. 2018. NATO Headquarters. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/top ics_49284.htm. Accessed on November 20, 2020. NATO. 2020. Deputy Secretary General at CYBERSEC: NATO is adapting to respond to cyber threats.https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_178338. htm. Accessed on November 17, 2020. NATO. n.d. Why Belgium? https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_ 147162.htm. Accessed on November 11, 2020. NATO Funding. n.d. Funding NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ topics_67655.htm. Accessed on June 14, 2020. NATO Troop Contributions. 2018. Troop Contributions. https://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natohq/topics_50316.htm. Accessed on November 24, 2020. NPG. n.d. Nuclear Planning Group. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ topics_50069.htm. Accessed on June 11, 2020.

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Operations and Missions. n.d. Operations and Missions. https://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm. Accessed on June 14, 2020. Shea, Jamie. 2014. NATO’s Future Strategy: Ready for the Threats of the Future or Refighting the Battles of the Past? In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Weaver, John M. 2018a. The 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States. Journal of Strategic Security. 11 (1): 62–71. Weaver, John M. 2018b. Dissecting the 2017 National Security Strategy: Implications for Senior Administrators (The Devil in the Details). Global Policy. 9 (2): 283–284. Weaver, John M. 2019. United Nations Security Council Permanent Member Perspectives Implications for U.S. and Global Intelligence Professionals. New York, USA: Peter Lang Publishers. Weaver, John M. 2020a. Intelligence Dilemmas: Understanding the Complexity of the P5 Relationship (Chapter). In Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, ed. Tom Røseth and John Weaver. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Weaver, John M. 2020b. National Security Issues Confronting the United States: An Overview (Chapter). In Contemporary Intelligence Analysis and National Security: A Critical American Perspective. New York, USA: Nova Science Publishers. Weaver, John M. Ed. with Jennifer Pomeroy, Ed. 2018. Intelligence Analysis: Unclassified Area and Point Estimates (and Other Intelligence Related Topics), 2nd edn. New York, USA: Nova Science Publishers. Weaver, John M. Ed. with Jennifer Y. Pomeroy, Ed. 2019. Global Intelligence Priorities (From the Perspective of the United States). Nova Science Publishers. Weaver, John M. Ed. with Jennifer Pomeroy, Ed. 2020. Contemporary Intelligence Analysis and National Security: A Critical American Perspective. Nova Science Publishers. Weaver, John M. with Benjamin Johnson. 2020. Cyber Security Challenges Confronting Canada and the United States. New York, USA: Peter Lang Publishers. What is NATO. n.d. What Is NATO. https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/ index.html. Accessed on June 11, 2020.

PART III

(Relevance): Military Structure and Operations

CHAPTER 3

Allied Command Operations/Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (ACO/SHAPE)

Abstract This is the most senior headquarters at the strategic level, and it traces its lineage to the Allied Powers of World War II. Here, political end states are translated into military objectives and milestones, and accordingly, military planners conduct high-level reviews to develop plans to put into execution its strategy. Likewise, SHAPE/ACO coordinates force generation conferences to convince nations to contribute to NATO Response Force standby operations, and looks to help garner support for NATO member nations (and others) to contribute forces to future operations like they have in recent times in Afghanistan and Kosovo. It is at this level that ACO will designate one of the operational level headquarters to oversee the day-to-day execution of operations. Through Allied Command Transformation (ACT), it looks to conduct exercises designed to help prepare the two operational commands: Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, and Allied Joint Force Command Naples to take over the standby mission for the NATO Response Force (NRF). Keywords Allied Command Operations · SHAPE · SACEUR · KFOR · Military Committee

Kyle Daugherty is an MPPA student at York College of Pennsylvania and was a contributing researcher to this chapter. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_3

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3.1

History of ACO

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe traces its lineage back to 1951 and was activated on April 2nd of that year in Rocquencourt, France (NATO ACO, n.d.). It was established as part of an initiative to create a NATO military force that was integrated and effective (NATO ACO, n.d.). Essentially, what resulted was that the legacy Cold War command structure was reduced from 78 headquarters to 20 with two senior military strategic commanders, one for the Atlantic, and one for Europe (NATO ACO, n.d.). This also led to three regional commanders with one coming under Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and two falling under SACEUR (NATO ACO, n.d.). During the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO’s military command structure focused on becoming leaner and more efficient (NATO ACO, n.d.). Allied Command Europe (ACE) then became Allied Command Operations (ACO). Supreme Allied Commander Europe and his staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), still residing in Mons, Belgium, were thereafter responsible for all NATO operations, including those previously undertaken by SACLANT (NATO ACO, n.d.). Simultaneously, the former Allied Command Atlantic became Allied Command Transformation (ACT), with a different mission set (NATO ACO, n.d.). Likewise, Combined Air Operations Centers dropped from 32 down to nine (NATO ACO, n.d.). Eight years later, NATO took a decision to conduct a far-reaching reform of the NATO Command Structure once again (NATO ACO, n.d.). This one gravitated to ensuring that NATO could confront the security challenges of the twenty-first century more effectively and efficiently. The command structure became more forward-oriented with a focus on flexibility, as well as a structure that was leaner and more affordable. The goal was to create a real and viable multinational command and control capability that was deployable at the operational level (NATO ACO, n.d.). The NATO defense ministers later approved the command structure in June 2011 and transitioned to its current format (referred to as Transition Day) on December 1, 2012 (NATO ACO, n.d.). What followed was the building on these achievements, whereby more reforms were implemented with the goal of further increasing the flexibility of ACO and to

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provide NATO with a deployable command and control (C2) capability at the operational level (JP 6-0 2015, vii) fostering rapid intervention; these were not previously available to the Alliance (NATO ACO, n.d.).

3.2

Overview

This is the level where a shift occurs from diplomacy to the military; if diplomacy is seen as “soft power” then the military is the “hard power” (Weaver 2018a, b, 2020a, b; Weaver and Pomeroy 2018, 2019, 2020; Weaver and Johnson 2020). Allied Command Operations (ACO) often referred to as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is one of the two most senior military headquarters in the Alliance and the one that is charged with planning and execution of operations for the Alliance (NATO ACO, n.d.). It oversees joint operations which are those that integrate air, land, sea, space, and Special Forces capabilities (Moran, 2019, 256). At the helm is the Supreme Headquarters Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); the current incumbent in this post is US Air Force General Tod Wolters (SACEUR, n.d.). ACO, and under the command of SACEUR, is responsible for the strategic level operations and exercises from the ACO Headquarters (NATO ACO, n.d.). That stated, political considerations at this level are extremely important and this is why the command has a political advisor or POLAD (Flockhart 2014, 95). Of equal importance, is the tying together of the three levels of strategic, operational, and tactical operations (Grongstadt and Lasoen 2020; AJP01 2017, 1-8–1-9; AJP-3.2 2016, 1-13–1-14). It comprises a number of permanent headquarters and is augmented by forces assigned to NATO vis-à-vis NATO member countries and is responsible for both standing and crisis operations which also include deployable operations. It looks to help synchronize its air, land, and maritime (and other) operations (AJP-3.2 2016; AJP-3.3 2016; AJP-3.3.3, 2014; AJP-3.3.5, 2013). More to the point, SHAPE as a strategic headquarters prepares, plans, conducts, and executes NATO military operations, missions, and supporting tasks to meet NATO’s strategic objectives (Dorff 2014; Shea 2014, 32). More pointedly, military planners will have to clearly understand the intent of NATO political leaders (Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014). Accordingly, at a strategic level and through the military, it contributes to aggression deterrence to help foster peace, security, and the territorial integrity preservation for the Alliance (NATO ACO, n.d.). SHAPE has a key role in formulating military strategy looking at the

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application of force to deal with threats as it supports political purposes (Gray and Johnson 2019, 392). SACEUR traditionally has been (and currently is) a United States general or flag officer. Interestingly, the SACEUR is dual-hatted as this person also commands the US European Command (a four-star geographical combatant command); it shares much of the geographical responsibilities as ACO (NATO ACO, n.d.). The SACEUR is responsible to the Military Committee (MC). This committee is the senior military authority from within NATO and falls under the overall political authority of both the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The MC is the primary source of military advice to the NAC and NPG (NATO ACO, n.d.).

3.3

Vision

“Allied Command Operations (ACO) will be a top-quality command responsible for the planning and execution of combined, joint, effectsbased operations” (SHAPE Vision and Mission, n.d.).

3.4

Mission

“To prepare for, plan and conduct military operations in order to meet Alliance political objectives” (SHAPE Vision and Mission, n.d.).

3.5

Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP)

Russia has been quite assertive in Eastern Europe in recent years (Weaver 2020b). Accordingly, NATO is concerned that it is seeing a resurgence in the Russian threat (Weaver 2019; Geoan˘a 2020). More pointedly, it annexed Crimea in 2014 and has been meddling in Ukrainian affairs since (Garnett and Baylis 2019, 83; Morgan 2019, 39). To hedge against this threat and to protect NATO member states, the Alliance has enhanced its presence in the eastern part of its European territory, with four multinational battlegroups postured in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. These battle groups, under the leadership of the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States, respectively, are combat-ready, multinational, and are demonstrating the resolve of the transatlantic Alliance (SHAPE eFP, n.d.). The presence of these battle groups makes clear to the Russian Federation that an attack on one NATO member will be considered an attack on

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the whole Alliance (SHAPE eFP, n.d.). These battle groups are the largest reinforcement of NATO’s collective defense in more than a generation (SHAPE eFP, n.d.; AJP-01 2017, 2-2). That stated, Russia conversely sees this as a threat and as a nation that has been attacked on numerous occasions, most likely sees this as provocative.

3.6

Operations and Missions

At present, ACO is involved in multiple missions throughout the world. These include the NATO mission in Kosovo (KFOR), Operation Althea, Iceland’s Peacetime Preparedness Needs, Operation Sea Guardian, the recent Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan, the NATO Patriot Mission in Turkey, and NATO Air Policing (Ops and Missions, n.d.). KFOR is the mission where NATO forces are deployed to the Balkans to help create and maintain a secure and safe environment, to foster freedom of movement for the country’s citizens, and the Euro-Atlantic facilitation of integration of the Western Balkans. At present, 28 countries provide approximately 4000 troops to support KFOR’s objectives (KFOR, n.d.). The next is Operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina. Though the European Union (EU) has the lead for this, NATO is responsible for providing reserves to support stability and security if conditions threaten peace and stability (Althea, n.d.). The operational headquarters is physically present at SHAPE (Althea, n.d.). Iceland’s Peacetime Preparedness Needs mission followed the withdrawal of US forces from the country in 2008. NATO has stepped in to provide airborne surveillance and interception capabilities to maintain NATO’s airspace integrity (Iceland, n.d.). What’s more is that allied aircraft, supporting ground crews, and fighter controllers, execute air policing activities (Iceland, n.d.). NATO still has a residual presence in Afghanistan but this is winding down. Accordingly, RSM is a non-combat mission that entails training, advising, and providing assistance to Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (RSM, n.d.). The intent is to help Afghanistan’s security forces build capacity to defend the country and to protect the Afghan citizens as NATO withdraws (RSM, n.d.). Turkey has been a long-time member of NATO and it strategically links Europe to the Middle East. To help maintain the integrity of NATO’s

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ground lines of communication in this key area, it provides theater high altitude air defense (THAAD) systems through the NATO Patriot Mission in Turkey (Patriot Mission, n.d.). SACEUR maintains the operational command of this mission where Allied Air Command has been delegated responsibility for the day-to-day security of the airspace over Turkey (Patriot Mission, n.d.). Russia and others provide challenges to security on the European continent especially when looking at aircraft and the three-dimensional battlespace. Accordingly, the NATO Air Policing mission is responsible for 24/7 policing (NATO Air Policing, n.d.). Likewise, NATO aircraft respond to intercept military and civilian aircraft that fail to follow international flight regulations especially as they encroach on allied airspace (NATO Air Policing, n.d.).

3.7

Support to Operations

NATO’s ACO goes beyond the conduct of operations and missions. It also has components that provide support to other nontraditional operations as well. These include the ACO Medical Directorate, NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs), NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC), and the NATO Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff (JEWCS) (Support to Operations, n.d.). Under the ACO Medical Directorate, this component looks to facilitate the promotion of excellence in healthcare and hopes to do so by providing multinational cooperation, medical leadership, disease preventive measures, all to mitigate the likelihood of morbidity and mortality (Med Dir, n.d.). The next area regarding NATO’s support to operations looks to the NFIUs. Russia has been more assertive in recent years (Weaver 2019, 2020a, b). To adapt to this challenge, NATO has eight NFIUs to help counter this threat (NFIU, n.d.). At present, these are located in Sofia (Bulgaria), Tallinn (Estonia), Riga (Latvia), Vilnius (Lithuania), Bydgoszcz (Poland), Bucharest (Romania), Bratislava (Slovakia), and Székesfehérvár (Hungary) (NFIU, n.d.). The presence of the NFIUs in these Eastern European countries sends a message to Russia about the viability of Article 5. Intelligence about threats around the world is of paramount concern for all countries and this includes supranational organizations like NATO. The NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) helps the Alliance

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synchronize intelligence on issues of concern to it (NIFC, n.d.); it should work with the ESCD to do so (ESCD, n.d.). It is led by military personnel, is sponsored by a US memorandum of understanding (MOU), and the NIFC is physically located in the United Kingdom. Likewise, even though it is located outside of the main continent of Europe, it remains under the operational command of SACEUR through ACO’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence (NIFC, n.d.). The JEWCS provides direct support to headquarters and commands under NATO through the development of electronic warfare (EW) doctrine, policy, experimentations, and concepts (JEWCS, n.d.). Moreover, not only does it look to provide expertise on how to react to hostile electromagnetic events, but the JEWCS also provides advice on contingency planning and force integration (JEWCS, n.d.).

3.8

Capabilities

Capabilities are what provide militaries with the ability to conduct missions and operations. They vary in nature and under ACO, there are several available to SACEUR to conduct a wide mix of missions and operations. These include the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence Battalion, the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) unit, NATO Standing Naval Forces, and the Strategic Airlift Capability. Stated another way, NATO can rally a wide mix of capabilities that many nations, especially smaller ones, lack (Jakobsen 2014, 60). The first of these is the AWACS. AWACS is an enabler that provides NATO with advance early airborne warning and is used as an over-thehorizon command and control (C2) capability (SHAPE AWACS, n.d.). The E-3A and E-3D Boeing 707 platforms provide reassurance to the Alliance as it monitors Russian air activity on the European continent, it monitors the crisis in Ukraine, and has supported counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) operations in the Middle East (SHAPE AWACS, n.d.). Though they are based in Geilenkirchen, Germany, these aircraft operate out of Greece, Italy, Turkey, and Norway (SHAPE AWACS, n.d.). More detail on the AWACS will be covered in a subsequent chapter. NATO’s Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence Battalion is a multinational high readiness force that provides the Alliance with a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) capability (NMCBRN, n.d.). Likewise, it is used to defend against weapons of

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mass destruction (WMD) and the main activities of the battalion gravitate around NBC reconnaissance capabilities, biological detection, identification of substances, and provides subject matter expertise to NATO commanders (NMCBRN, n.d.). AGS consists of an accouterment of advanced systems of air, ground, and other support capabilities providing the Alliance with situational awareness (AGS, n.d.). The missions focus on border control, maritime safety, ground troops, civilian population protection, counterterrorism, crisis management, as well as humanitarian assistance pertaining to natural disasters (AGS, n.d.; Johnston 2017, 139). The Standing Naval Forces fall under the control of NATO Allied Maritime Command (covered in a later chapter) which is responsible to support Allied Command Operations (SNF, n.d.). Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 and 2, and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups 1 and 2 make up the Standing Naval Forces (SNF, n.d.). This integrated and multinational force is continuously available to execute tasks ranging from NATO exercises to NATO missions (SNF, n.d.). NATO’s Strategic Airlift Capability provides the Alliance with an ability to move heavy equipment and troops (to include across theaters) rapidly to respond to worldwide threats. These heavy-lift capabilities include the operation of a fleet of C-17 aircraft and, at present, this is the only multinational capability on the planet (NSAC, n.d.).

3.9

NATO Response Force

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is akin to the rapid response force of most nations like the United States. It is seen as technologically advanced, comprising multinational forces consisting of air, land, maritime, and special operations forces components that can rapidly deploy (NRF, n.d.). The NRF provides collective defense for the Alliance as well as a rapid military response capability to a crisis (NRF, n.d.; AJP-01 2017, 2-2). Additionally, it can conduct peacekeeping, provide protection to critical infrastructure, as well as providing the Alliance with the ability to support disaster relief operations (NRF, n.d.). It is through the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) that SACEUR looks to prepare options to the NAC (AJP-01 2017, 3–5). Under the NCMP, NATO breaks events into three phases. Phase 1 looks for indicators and warnings of a pending crisis (AJP-01 2017, 25). Phase 2 turns to the assessments of a developing situation of the

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emerging crisis and assesses the implications for NATO. Finally, in Phase 3, SACEUR looks to recommend response options to help support the NAC in making decisions throughout the crisis (AJP-01 2017, 3–5). The NRF traces its history to 2002. The overall command of the NRF belongs to Supreme Allied Commander Europe however, NATO’s Joint Force Commands Brunssum, and Naples assume the operational command on a rotational basis (NRF, n.d.). The NRF consists of four parts. These include (1) a C2 element, (2) a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), (3) an initial follow-on force group, and (4) a Response Forces Pool (RFP) (NRF, n.d.).

3.10

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 3.1 provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (S.W.O.T.) of this organization. Details follow in the paragraphs below. There are strengths. Throughout the decades of NATO’s existence, the world has changed considerably. Over this time, however, NATO has shown its ability to respond to crises and assert its collective political and military intentions. More than ever, the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020–2021 shows that international cooperation is beneficial to all parties involved and can improve outcomes. During a July 2020 visit to Supreme Headquarters Allied Command Europe (SHAPE), Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoan˘a praised SHAPE’s ability to respond to the challenges posed by the pandemic while also preserving deterrence and defense abilities. From the onset of the pandemic up until July 2020, “NATO and Allied armed forces have played a key role, including with 350 flights airlifting hundreds of tons of critical supplies around the Table 3.1 ACO/SHAPE SWOT Strengths

Weaknesses

Ability to respond to crisis Strong connections with international actors

Lacking internal trust Lack of common future vision

Opportunities

Threats

Improve relations with United Nations and European Union Cement role as an international community leader

Russian aggression (Europe and elsewhere) Challenges to American military hegemony

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world, almost 100 field hospitals, and more than half a million of troops supporting the civilian response” (NATO Deputy Secretary General Visits Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 2020). Its military preparedness and logistics capabilities make NATO an ideal provider of assistance and stability during a global crisis, such as this pandemic. NATO, as well as SHAPE, continues to rely on international consensus building to achieve goals. It is clear that one of NATO’s and SHAPE’s strong attributes is its connections with actors on many levels in Alliance member states and other international organizations. These strong connections with various international actors allow for seamless operations and mission completion. Fittingly, Lord Paddy Ashdown, the former NATO high representative in Bosnia, cements this idea by stating “the best things that you can do are what you do with others” (Shea 2010, 29). The strong international presence of NATO allows it to respond to needs in a timely and cost-effective manner (Shea 2010, 27). Despite these great strides in international cooperation, weaknesses continue to beleaguer operational streamlining as well as clear organization goal setting. There remains a sense of distrust among Alliance members and individual participants within the organization. This is directly related to how “many Allies today feel about whether it [NATO] will meet their security needs and expectations” (Shea 2010, 20). If Alliance members are not confident in the organization itself, the organization could lose support and might not run optimally. Something that could help with this sense of distrust is a common vision by Alliance members for NATO’s role in the future. Nissen (2014, 169) explains that “it is hard but feasible and certainly necessary” for NATO to have a coherent strategic vision for itself. Additionally, consensus building in the NATO bureaucracy and with Alliance members must be accomplished (Nissen 2014, 169). If all NATO members can agree on a strategic way forward, the Alliance can more easily accomplish its organizational goal, which “according to SHAPEs directive on Strategic Communication, is that NATO is a ‘democratic, multinational alliance uniting across borders to guard, with courage and competence, against threats to our homes’” (Nissen 2014, 166). Though internal challenges remain, external relationships can provide some great benefits for NATO. A prime opportunity exists in strengthening the bonds between the European Union and NATO, as well as between the United Nations and NATO (Shea 2010, 29). Especially with regard to the EU, the overlapping of many member states as well

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as shared values and common security strategies reinforces the need for greater dialogue and cooperation and perhaps an analysis using S.W.O.T. could be useful. Indeed, having NATO and the EU rationalize “their respective military forces, headquarters, and command structures, and using their comparative advantages according to the nature of the intervention” would help to minimize the “squandering of scarce resources” (Shea 2010, 29). Operational efficiencies can be established and help strengthen the collective responses from both organizations. Strikingly, in the modern world “closer cooperation and greater role specialization is unavoidable if the alliance is to…carry on” (Jakobsen 2014, 71). In addition to strengthening its relationships in Europe and with the UN, NATO can take the opportunity to bring Alliance members into an ever-closer union. This is because “what distinguishes the alliance from others is not just longevity, or even the military balance, by the promise of a genuine community as outlined in the treaty’s preamble” (Kaplan 1988, 184). The fall of the Soviet Union and the enlargement of the European Union over the past three decades has led to greatly diminished barriers to trade, movement, and commerce on the European continent. If SHAPE and NATO are able to take advantage of this more collaborative and friendly environment, they will be more able to respond to crises and to resolve conflict. In a 2012 address to SHAPE staff, Admiral James Stavridis said NATO’s “future operations demand a comprehensive approach. They cannot be solved by military force…in the 21st century we will defend ourselves by connecting, by building bridges” (Møller 2014, 182). The greater integration in the international community will allow NATO to have a role moving forward and a clear mandate in an increasingly interconnected world. By far, the greatest threat to NATO on the European continent is a resurgent Russia. Russian aggression, especially in Eastern Europe threatens peace in Europe and harkens back to an age where NATO stood opposed to the Warsaw Pact. This is especially concerning with regard to oil pipelines and delivery to Western Europe. Russia holds the power to turn off these oil and gas pipelines during a conflict, so NATO must not only tread carefully, but also remain steadfast and in a united manner to oppose Russia (Shea 2010, 31). However, it will also be necessary to align NATO and SHAPE’s policy in a concerted way to oppose Russia. NATO should “agree on a common analysis of where Russia is today and the exact content of its strategic, foreign policy, and military objectives” (Shea 2010, 26). Shea (2010, 27) continues that “as long as every

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NATO member has a different national analysis of what Russia is and where it is going…forging a common NATO position will be difficult.” However, not making the effort to have a comprehensive shared analysis on Russia is not an option if NATO hopes to face the issue at hand and to properly repel Russia moving forward (Shea 2010, 27). That stated, though NATO has intelligence analysts, many are assigned by nations and rely on the shared intelligence of their national intelligence collection capabilities owned by those countries. This could stymie NATO’s ability since it has limited collection platforms, the most notable being the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) that will be covered in a subsequent chapter. An equally concerning threat to NATO and SHAPE is the challenge to American hegemony on a global stage. Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll Jr. offers the following: “It seems that the true reason that the United States is committed to NATO expansion is to maintain its dominant role in European Affairs and to hedge against the resurgence of an aggressive Russia. The United States has dominated NATO for many years. It has the strongest voice and the most weight in NATO and is unwilling to let it fade into history” (Carroll Jr. 1998, 171). That said, there have been attempts from the United States to extricate itself from the European continent (especially under President Trump), but this has been easier said than done. At present, European countries, and by extension, the European Union, lack the capabilities to deal with Russia alone (without US assistance). Suffice it to say, Russia is not the only threat and China, too, has emerged as a country of interest to NATO. The People’s Republic of China has invested much in recent years in its armed forces and currently possesses the second most powerful military in the world (Weaver and Johnson 2020). If the relative power and influence of the United States is waning, is too the power and influence held by NATO? Leadership must remain strong and focused on the Alliance if it is to continue its role as a deterrent to foreign aggression. This level of NATO can arguably be one of the most challenging because this headquarters is unique insofar as the leadership of the strategic level is run by a military officer and not a civilian. Though SHAPE/ACO is akin to a ministry of defense, most in western countries are headed by civilians and not military personnel. Here though, the tables are turned where a US four star leads the organization but there is a senior civilian advisor to help ensure that the interpretation of political guidance takes place. SHAPE/ACO has overseen numerous operations

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in recent years and several (like those in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Libya) have been quite complicated (Greitens 2019, 277). Most officers that reach the four-star level have been schooled in the instruments of power. These include the likes of diplomacy, information, military, and economics (D.I.M.E.) components (Møller 2014; Weaver 2018a, b). That said, being schooled in these and being able to execute the others (apart from the military) can be quite challenging since many might not have become fully immersed in these in tactical and operational settings. It is therefore, at this level of command, one sees the translation from political wishes to figuring out how to “make things work.” What is necessary is for SACEUR and his staff to understand what is often referred to as ways, means, and ends (Eikmeier 2007). The “ways” look broadly at how one would go about achieving something. More pointedly, it would look at such things as the applications of the instruments of power in a concerted way to achieve a desired effect. To do so, the “ways” look to paths in order to pursue specific avenues that might help one achieve the outcome. Conversely, “means” are the resources that SACEUR and his staff have at their disposal to pursue the “ways” or paths to help execute tasks at hand. These most likely look at such hardware as planes, ships, ground combat systems, space-based systems, special operations capabilities, and more to help move the Alliance in the right direction. The “ways” also look at the accouterment of military forces (their training and readiness) to employ systems in a way to achieve a desired effect. That stated, it is not a foregone conclusion that just because one has an abundance of viable and high-tech weapon systems that the result will be what the political entities of NATO want to achieve. Other “means” that SACEUR must consider would include such things as information and the legitimacy of NATO’s mission (and to mitigate the effectiveness of the adversary’s message), diplomatic initiatives like garnering the support of Alliance member states and perhaps to entice other nations outside of NATO to contribute forces and capabilities to the cause. SHAPE/ACO would also have to consider economic means like tariffs and sanctions implemented simultaneously by the United Nations and/or individual nation states to see what this means to the pursuit of military means. Finally, the “ends” look to effects or outcomes. In military parlance, one often refers to this as “effects-based operations.” Effects-based operations or EBO looks to the “ends” to work backward from what a

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commander hopes to achieve to figure out the “ways” and “means” to help one complete the journey (Batschelet 2002; Møller 2014, 176). To do so, one would need to seek out what is referred to as “centers of gravity” or COGs. COGs are those things deemed essential for an adversary to operate like command and control nodes, logistics hubs, fuel sources, and/or economic resources that could help the enemy sustain itself in a fight. What has become increasingly challenging in recent years is the value of life and the desire to limit collateral damage to non-combatants in order to maintain support from the hearts and minds of those in the impacted areas. In pursuing ways, means, and ends, SACEUR and his staff often see this as a delicate balancing act and one that is very difficult to achieve desired outcomes and effects. As NATO moves through the twenty-first century, it will more likely become even more challenging to get this right. It must also avoid “tactification” which looks at the effects of tactical level decisions that have adverse strategic impacts (Nielsen 2014, 141).

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in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. JEWCS. n.d. NATO Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff (JEWCS). https:// shape.nato.int/page1139304/nato-joint-electronic-warfare-core-staff-jewcs. aspx. Accessed on June 16, 2020. Johnston, Seth A. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore Maryland, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. JP 6-0. 2015. Joint Communications System. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp6_0ch1.pdf?ver=2019-10-15-172254-827. Accessed on August 13, 2020. Kaplan, L.S. 1988. NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance. Boston, USA: Twayne Publishers. KFOR. n.d. NATO Mission in Kosovo (KFOR). https://shape.nato.int/ongoin goperations/nato-mission-in-kosovo-kfor-. Accessed on June 16, 2020. Krüger-Klausen, Villiam, and Liselotte Odgaard. 2014. Preparing for an Imperfect World: Strategy in Conflict Management Environments in Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Med Dir. n.d.ACO Medical Directorate. https://shape.nato.int/page1139304/ aco-medical-directorate.aspx. Accessed on June 16, 2020. Møller, Hans Henrik. 2014. Effect-Based Thinking in NATO, Utilizing All Instruments of Power While Planning for and Conducting Operations. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. Palgrave Macmillan. New York, USA. Moran, Daniel. 2019. Geography and Strategy in Strategy in the Contemporary World, 6th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. NATO ACO. n.d. Allied Command Operations (ACO). https://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natolive/topics_52091.htm. Accessed on June 15, 2020. NATO Air Policing. n.d. NATO Air Policing. https://shape.nato.int/page14 2085426.aspx. Accessed on June 16, 2020. NATO Deputy Secretary General Visits Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. 2020, July 13. Retrieved from State News Service: https://link.gale. com/apps/doc/A629858005/BIC?u=ycp_main&sid=BIC&xid=0f79ca86 NFIU. n.d. NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs). https://shape.nato.int/ope rations/nato-force-integration-units. Accessed on June 16, 2020. Nielsen, Thomas Galasz. 2014. Time and the Question of Unintended Influences on Military Strategy in Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. NIFC. n.d. NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC). http://web.ifc.bices.org/ about.htm. Accessed on June 16, 2020.

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Nissen, T.E. 2014. Strategizing NATO’s Narratives. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World, ed. L. Odgaard, 157–171. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. NMCBRN. n.d. NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence Battalion. https://shape.nato.int/about/aco-capabilities2/ nato-multinational-chemical–biological–radiological-and-nuclear-defence-bat talion. Accessed on June 16, 2020. NRF. n.d. NATO Response Force. https://shape.nato.int/nato-response-for ce–very-high-readiness-joint-task-force. Accessed on June 16, 2020. NSAC. n.d. NATO Strategic Airlift Capability. https://www.sacprogram.org/ en/Pages/Heavy-Airlift-Wing.aspx. Accessed on June 16, 2020. Ops and Missions. n.d. Operations and Missions. https://shape.nato.int/ongoin goperations. Accessed on June 16, 2020. Patrick, Morgan. 2019. Liberalism and Liberal Internationalism in Contemporary Security Studies, 5th ed. Oxford UK: Oxford Press. Patriot Mission. n.d. NATO Patriot Mission in Turkey. https://shape.nato. int/ongoingoperations/nato-patriot-mission-in-turkey-. Accessed on June 16, 2020. RSM. n.d. Resolute Support Mission (RSM). https://shape.nato.int/ongoingop erations/resolute-support-mission-rsm. Accessed on June 16, 2020. SACEUR. n.d. Supreme Allied Commander Europe. https://shape.nato.int/ saceur. Accessed on June 15, 2020. SHAPE AWACS. n.d. NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). https://shape.nato.int/about/aco-capabilities2/nato-awacs. Accessed on June 16, 2020. SHAPE eFP. n.d. Enhanced Forward Presence. https://shape.nato.int/efp. Accessed on June 15, 2020. SHAPE Vision and Mission. n.d. SHAPE Vision and Mission. https://shape. nato.int/visionmission. Accessed on June 15, 2020. Shea, Jamie. 2014. NATO’s Future Strategy: Ready for the Threats of the Future or Refighting the Battles of the Past? In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. SNF. n.d. NATO Standing Naval Forces. https://shape.nato.int/about/aco-cap abilities2/nato-standing-naval-forces. Accessed on June 16, 2020. Support to Operations. n.d. Support to Operations. https://shape.nato.int/pag e1139304.aspx. Accessed on June 16, 2020. Weaver, John M. 2018a. The 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States. Journal of Strategic Security. 11 (1): 62–71. Weaver, John M. 2018b. Dissecting the 2017 National Security Strategy: Implications for Senior Administrators (The Devil in the Details). Global Policy. 9 (2): 283–284.

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Weaver, John M. 2019. United Nations Security Council Permanent Member Perspectives Implications for U.S. and Global Intelligence Professionals. Peter Lang Publishers. New York, USA. Weaver, John M. 2020a. Intelligence Dilemmas: Understanding the Complexity of the P5 Relationship (Chapter) in Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century. Edited by Tom Røseth and John Weaver. Palgrave Macmillan. New York, USA. Weaver, John M. 2020b. National Security Issues Confronting the United States: An Overview (Chapter) in Contemporary Intelligence Analysis and National Security: A Critical American Perspective. New York, USA: Nova Science Publishers. Weaver, John M. with Jennifer Pomeroy (eds.). 2018. Intelligence Analysis: Unclassified Area and Point Estimates (and Other Intelligence Related Topics), 2nd edn. New York, USA: Nova Science Publishers. Weaver, John M. with Jennifer Y. Pomeroy (eds.). 2019. Global Intelligence Priorities (From the Perspective of the United States). Nova Science Publishers. Weaver, John M. with Benjamin Johnson (eds.). 2020. Cyber Security Challenges Confronting Canada and the United States. Peter Lang Publishers. New York, USA. Weaver, John M. with Jennifer Pomeroy (eds.). 2020. Contemporary Intelligence Analysis and National Security: A Critical American Perspective. Nova Science Publishers.

CHAPTER 4

Allied Joint Force Commands Brunssum, and Naples

Abstract This Chapter focuses on an overview of the two operationallevel headquarters responsible for overseeing the conduct of operations. The two commands, Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (in The Netherlands), and Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Naples (in Italy) are akin to a US Combatant Command like the US European or Central Commands. In terms of current operations, these two are responsible for recent missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo, respectively. They also rotate between one another for the responsibilities for the standby readiness of NATO Response Force (NRF) operations, serving ready to respond to real-world exigencies as they surface. These include such operations as the NRF support to the Pakistan earthquake in 2005 and the Libyan air war in 2011. These commands oversee the air, land, and maritime components covered in later chapters. Keywords Joint task force headquarters · CJOC · Enhanced forward presence · ISAF

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4.1 Operational-level commands: Brunssum, and Naples (an overview) Joint operations are those that include ones that integrate forces from two or more branches of the military and integrate air, land, and sea capabilities to achieve desired effects (Moran 2019, 256). The operational level under NATO consists of two standing Joint Force Commands (JFCs): these include one in Brunssum, The Netherlands, and one is found in Naples, Italy (NATO ACO, n.d.). The two stand ready to plan, execute, and sustain NATO operations of varying sizes and scope. This level of headquarters needs to be able to manage a significant and major joint operation from either their static headquarters location or from a forwarddeployed headquarters when operating in a theater of operation. In the latter case, the deployed headquarters is considered to be a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and should be able to operate for a period of up to one year (NATO ACO, n.d.). This can be seen as a significant capability helping NATO serve as a significant enabler (Jakobsen 2014). While deployed, the Joint Force Command is only charged to run one operation at a time; it must also implement the grand strategy of the politicians and superior headquarters (Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014). That stated, those remaining elements that haven’t deployed can still provide support to other missions and operations assigned to it (NATO ACO, n.d.). When a JTFHQ is not deployed, the command can assist ACO in coordinating with other headquarters that are physically present in theater for matters that arise daily and assist with such preparation like training for subsequent rotations (NATO ACO, n.d.; AJP-01 2017, 4-1). These two commands at the operational level are also responsible for engaging with important partners and other regional organizations to more aptly support regional NATO Headquarters tasks and responsibilities, when directed by SACEUR (AJP-3 2019, 3-11). Moreover, the two underscore the reinforcement of cooperation among partners that are participating in NATO operations while also helping prepare partner countries for possible NATO membership (NATO ACO, n.d.). More pointedly, these levels of commands look to help synchronize air, land, and maritime operations in support of Alliance goals and objectives (AJP-3.2 2016; AJP-3.3 2016; AJP-3.3.3 2014; AJP-3.3.5 2013). Commands at this level, and while serving in a JTFHQ capacity, are brought to fruition in accordance with the complexity, scope, and other

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factors that require the contribution of two or more services (JP 3-33 2018, xi). Accordingly, it will help in the assignment of missions and allocation of efforts to different sectors or areas. Likewise, the composition, size, capabilities, and other attributes will vary contingent upon the operating environment in general, and more pointedly when looking at the threats, geography, and the threat’s nature (JP 3-33 2018, xi). There are benefits associated with JTFHQs. These help provide the commander with an efficient and flexible means to surge capabilities (JP 3-33 2018, xii). This in turn helps NATO in the execution of assigned missions by the NAC. What are some common functions of a JTFHQ? First, this organization will help synchronize, integrate, and provide direction to joint operations (JP 3-33 2018, I-5). Likewise, it must be well versed in the instruments of power (D.I.M.E.) to ensure that joint efforts are supporting the goals of the higher level NATO organizations (Møller 2014; Weaver 2018a, b; Weaver 2020a, b; Weaver and Pomeroy 2018, 2019, 2020; Weaver and Johnson 2020). The common list of functions include C2, information, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires (indirect and arial delivered weapons), protection, and sustainment (JP 3-33 2018, I-5). What is important to note is that these are not mutually exclusive and to be effective, must be done in an integrated and complementary way (JP 3-33 2018, I-5). Commanders at the JTFHQ have many responsibilities. These include, among others, the development of operations orders (OPORDs), operations plans (OPLANs), and concept plans (CONOPs) (JP 3-33 2018, II-9). Leaders at this level also need to ensure compliance with NATO standardization agreements (STANAGS), the application of risk management throughout the various phases of an operation, and to monitor the maneuver, communications, fires, public affairs, information operations, and the requisite support (JP 3-33 2018, II-9). It is also the commander’s responsibility to comport with the requirements levied by higher authority (JP 3-33 2018, III-1). Commanders at this level must understand the political nuances intertwined in operations which is why political advisors (POLADs) (Flockhart 2014, 95) are assigned to these headquarters. Operations in a joint environment are fluid. One of the commander’s most important responsibilities includes providing assessments of the operation and its progress (JP 3-33 2018, III-1). Accordingly, the JTFHQ should manage, integrate, and share information (JP 333 2018, III-1) with the joint force commander, SHAPE/ACO, and

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NATO Headquarters. Commanders at this level can harness capabilities from troop-contributing nations while conducting real-world operations (Jakobsen 2014, 60). The nerve center for the conduct of missions is run through a combined joint operations center (CJOC) (JP 3-33 2018, VII-14-15). The CJOC is integral in the flow of information to relevant staff and subordinate commanders to provide a common operational picture (COP) (JP 3-33 2018, VII-14). To adequately do so, it will centralize the tracking, handling, and recording of information for the command (JP 3-33 2018, VII-14). Likewise, it is the commander’s focal point for assessing, monitoring, directing, and planning.

4.2 Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum 4.2.1

Brief History

Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCB) is presently located in the Limburg province of The Netherlands in the city of Brunssum (JFCB History, n.d.). It is uniquely postured on the Dutch side of the border adjacent to the countries of Belgium and Germany. The headquarters was previously referred to as Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe or AFCENT. Originally, AFCENT was physically located in Fontainebleau, France from 1953 until 1967. After France withdrew from the military structure in 1966, a decision was taken to move the headquarters to Brunssum (JFCB History, n.d.). Conveniently, after the coal mines closed in the mid-1960s, the Dutch government offered the Hendrik Mine location in Brunssum to NATO for use as a headquarters (JFCB History, n.d.). In March 2000, AFCENT stood down and it was renamed Regional Headquarters Allied Force North Europe and was charged with operations that could take place in northern Europe. After the Prague Summit in 2002, and as NATO was modernizing, it moved away from purely regional focuses to provide the Alliance with greater flexibility and what ensued was the creation of Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCB History, n.d.). In 2012, the name changed to what it is today— Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCB History, n.d.).

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Missions

Mission: “The mission of Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum is to foster an open and active family of headquarters based on enduring relationships focusing on issues of common interest in order to enhance coordination, cooperation and situational awareness” (JFCB, n.d.). JFCB, as an operational-level headquarters, is responsible for the waning Resolute Support Mission (RSM), enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), NATO Response Force (NRF) operations, and regional focus (JFCB Missions, n.d.). Commands at this level must bridge the long-term impacts of strategy with the near-to-mid-term impacts of operational-level planning (Strachan 2011). This headquarters is the out-of-theater operational-level command for recent NATO operations taking place in Afghanistan (JFCB Missions, n.d.). It is no longer a designated combat mission and RSM has replaced the preceding International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation that had been run by NATO up until 2014. During ISAF’s tenure, the Alliance saw a ground force of 131,000 servicemen and women, 194,491 close air support missions, and the release of 33,417 munitions in Afghanistan (Jakobsen 2014, 65). ISAF has had challenges that have led to a near-term focus on conditions and the crowding out of governance (Kværnø 2011; Nielsen 2014, 142). Subsequently, RSM focused on Alliance missions in concert with the Afghan government gravitating on helping to set conditions for the effectiveness of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (JFCB Missions, n.d.). JFCB supports eFP operations in North-Eastern Europe (JFCB Missions, n.d.). Russia has become more bellicose in recent years and this has been seen as a threat to NATO (Jakobsen 2019, 294; Weaver 2019; Weaver 2020a, b). Accordingly, and as mentioned in the last chapter, Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum helps command the battlegroups deployed to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland demonstrating NATO’s commitment to the security of its member nations (NFIU, n.d.). The NRF is expeditionary in nature and helps the Alliance adapt and implement political commitments to enhance its capabilities (Johnston 2017, 169). This command also regularly assumes NRF responsibilities with an ability to respond to emergencies around the world (NRF, n.d.). Capabilities include disaster relief missions, collective defense response, and the protection of Alliance critical infrastructure (JFCB Missions,

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n.d.). NRF standby capabilities have risen each year from 20000 troops initially from member nations to around 40000 in the present day (JFCB Missions, n.d.). Finally, JFCB has a regional focus. This command frequently engages with many commands (within and outside of NATO), other non-member partner countries, non-government organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and other security-conscious stakeholders (JFCB Missions, n.d.).

4.3 Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Naples 4.3.1

Brief History

Originally, Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Naples was established as one of two NATO commands situated in the Mediterranean area and was named Allied Forces Southern Europe; the second was located on the island of Malta (Allied Forces Mediterranean) (JFCN History, n.d.). These two were responsible for naval operations in this area of responsibility (JFCN History, n.d.). Allied Southern Forces Europe was subsequently renamed Allied Forces South in 1967, then later named Allied Joint Force Command Naples in 2002, then finally Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Naples a decade later (JFCN History, n.d.). The command became extremely involved in NATO operations in the Balkans beginning in 1992. At the outset, it was instrumental in the Alliance’s seaborne enforcement of UN arms embargoes under the moniker “Maritime Monitor.” Under AFSOUTH, the command directed Operation Deny Flight and later peacekeeping operations inside the borders of Bosnia Herzegovina. It has also been extremely involved in operations taking place in Kosovo (Johnston 2017, 163; Ops and Missions, n.d.). 4.3.2

Missions

Mission: “The mission of Allied Joint Force Command Naples is to prepare for, plan, and conduct military operations in order to preserve the peace, security, and territorial integrity of Alliance member states throughout Supreme Allied Commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) and beyond” (JFCN, n.d.; JFCN History, n.d.).

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This command fosters the development, the conduct of exercises, and helps train partner headquarters and forces (JFCN Missions, n.d.). Moreover, it contributes to stabilization in Europe through the Partnership for Peace program, the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as other engagement & consultation with non-Alliance member nations (JFCN, n.d.). The command has an ability to stand-up either a combined joint task force (CJTF) or a deployable joint task force (DJTF) to support NRF missions on a rotational basis as designated by SACEUR (JFCN Missions, n.d.; Johnston 2017, 119; Johnston 2017, 148–150). Accordingly, JTFHQs are one of several options for commanding and controlling joint operations (JP 3-33 2018). Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Naples has an international staff from 22 NATO member countries (JFCN Missions, n.d.). The focus of the staff is to help the commander of JFCN deter aggression and to help the Alliance contribute to an effective defense of NATO territories to help preserve the peace (JFCN Missions, n.d.).

4.4

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 4.1 provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (S.W.O.T.) of these commands. Details follow in the paragraphs below. Throughout the operational level, things become simpler and more complex at the same time. In a globalized setting, rarely will events occurring in one area of operation not have an impact on other parts of the globe. Though there are two operational-level organizations in the NATO Command Structure, events happening in one commander’s area of operation can transcend that location and impact another commander’s area Table 4.1 Operational Level Command SWOT

Strengths

Weaknesses

Real-world experience (Afghanistan and Kosovo) NATO Exercises

Limited NATO NRF operations

Opportunities

Threats

Continue to work with ACT and, by extension, JWC

Russia Terrorism Cyber

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of responsibility. Because of globalization and the inextricable linkages of nations to one another, this is the case (Weaver 2016). This presents a unique set of challenges. The most important of these is for leaders across the spectrum of commands to have the ability to forecast secondary and tertiary effects of decision from within one area of operation to the impact it could have on other AORs. At present, NATO is still actively involved with operations in Kosovo and the winding down of the one in Afghanistan that have now spanned many years. It is likely that these will not go away completely anytime soon and the operational-level headquarters have much to do to help keep stability (in Kosovo) or prevent an erosion of peace that could backslide into instability (in the case of Afghanistan). When turning to operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the former falls under the purview of the Naples command while the latter is the responsibility of Brunssum. The real-world experience gained by the commands’ involvement in these can be seen as a clear strength as nothing can replace the intricacies associated with real-world operations. Commands at this level must strive to exercise outside of their comfort zone to “train as it would fight.” To replicate realism, NATO joint exercises should strive to stress the headquarters to operate in austere locations to better prepare it for unforeseen events. Recent rotations into Kosovo and Afghanistan have spoiled staff officers from these commands who frequently rotate into these deployed settings because of the relative plushness of these headquarters. If one had to deploy and simultaneously build up a headquarters while it was expected to command the operation in theater, then this adds a whole new level of complexity and challenges abound as it works to do so. These headquarters must be flexible and quickly deployable to keep NATO relevant (Odgaard 2014; Shea 2014). Exercises can help them remain flexible. There have been limited real-world NRF events that the Alliance has participated in and this is a weakness. Accordingly, it will have to rely on the exercise regimen of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) broadly, and the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) more specifically to help prepare for these contingency operations. As the aforementioned stated, the limited experience of the operational-level commands with NRF operations will have to work closely with ACT and JWC to prepare for an uncertain future and the threats that could emerge. The accouterment of skills required must

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look to full spectrum operations like humanitarian relief support, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and full-on combat operations. Likewise, there is a difference between static and deployed operations. Moreover, commands at this level are finding themselves involved in more traditional roles as the Alliance looks to counter threats from Russia in many former Eastern European nations. This role, too, will likely not abate in the foreseeable future. NATO forces are working hand-in-glove with one another in deployed missions to several former Warsaw Pact countries that are now NATO members. Both operational headquarters arguably are concerned with transnational terror organizations. Because those that partake in acts of terror often transcend national boundaries, leaders should look to cross-pollinate intelligence and share information for the good of the collective members (Røseth 2020). Not only has the United States experienced acts of terrorism, but one has seen this in Europe as well with regard to the Madrid train bombing (Wirtz 2019, 308; Trinkunas 2019, 400) in March 2004 and in the bus bombings in London in July 2005 (Johnston 2017, 168). What is more, is that the Islamic State showed adeptness in coordinated attacks in Europe and elsewhere especially in the 2015–2017 period. NATO broadly and the United States more specifically could have experienced fatigue from years of engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere that might have encumbered the Alliance from taking a more assertive role in the country of Syria to more aptly deal with the threat of the Islamic State. Though NATO has been involved in counterinsurgency operations, apart from its special operations professionals, has limited experience in counterterrorism and must continue to prepare for these threats. Interoperability will always be a challenge (AJP-6 2017, 1–22). As nations agree to provide forces for standby NATO Response Force operations, one must know that it is not a foregone conclusion that servicemen and women from different nations will be able to talk to one another, will understand each other’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), or even have the same level of military skills. Blue on blue (otherwise known as fratricide) events will always be a concern. Commanders at the operational level will have to flush out issues through the exercise regimen. That stated, there are threats and a primary one confronting interoperability is linked to cyber and the threats posed by those that would want to exploit these weaknesses. NATO will have to invest in efforts to protect

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its networks, communications systems, and employ TTPs to help protect against cyber threats.

References AJP-01. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine. https://assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/905877/ 20200728-doctrine_nato_allied_joint_doctrine_ajp_01.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3. 2019. Allied Joint Doctrine. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/gov ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/797323/doctrine_ nato_conduct_of_ops_ajp_3.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3.2. 2016. Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations. https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/624149/doctrine_nato_land_ops_ajp_3_2.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3.3. 2016. Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations. https://ass ets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/624137/doctrine_nato_air_space_ops_ajp_3_3.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3.3.3. 2014. Allied Joint Doctrine for Air-Maritime Operations. https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att achment_data/file/624130/doctrine_nato_air_mar_coord_ajp_3_3_3.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3.3.5. 2013. Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control. https://assets.pub lishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d ata/file/624144/doctrine_nato_airspace_control_ajp_3_3_5.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-6. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/upl oads/attachment_data/file/602827/doctrine_nato_cis_ajp_6.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. Flockhart, Trine. 2014. NATO and EU: A “Strategic Partnership” or a Practice of “Muddling Through”? in Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Jakobsen, Peter V. 2014. The Indispensable Enabler: NATO’s Strategic Value in High-Intensity Operations Is Far Greater Than You Think. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Jakobsen, Peter V. 2019. Coercive Diplomacy: Countering War-Threatening Crisis and Armed Conflicts. In Contemporary Security Studies, 5th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press.

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JFCB. n.d. Mission. https://jfcbs.nato.int/default. Accessed on June 17, 2020. JFCB History. n.d. Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum History. https://jfcbs. nato.int/page583594.aspx. Accessed on June 17, 2020. JFCB Missions. n.d. Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum Missions. https:// jfcbs.nato.int/page5815856.aspx. Accessed on June 17, 2020. JFCN. n.d. Allied Joint Force Command Naples. https://jfcnaples.nato.int/. Accessed on June 17, 2020. JFCN History. n.d. Allied Joint Force Command Naples History. https://jfcnap les.nato.int/page6322744.aspx. Accessed on June 17, 2020. JFCN Missions. n.d. Allied Joint Force Command Naples Missions. https://jfc naples.nato.int/page631257.aspx. Accessed on June 17, 2020. Johnston, Seth A. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore, MA, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. JP 3-33. 2018. Joint Task Force Headquarters. file:///C:/Users/weave/Desktop/JP%203-33.pdf. Accessed on July 31, 2020. Krüger-Klausen, Villiam, and Liselotte Odgaard. 2014. Preparing for an Imperfect World: Strategy in Conflict Management Environments. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Kværnø, Ole. 2011. Governance in Southern Afghanistan-Managerial and Strategic Challenges. Military Journal 140 (4): 339–343. Møller, Hans Henrik. 2014. Effects-Based Thinking in NATO, Utilizing All Instruments of Power While Planning for and Conducting Operations. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. Palgrave Macmillan. New York, USA. Moran, Daniel. 2019. Geography and Strategy in Strategy in the Contemporary World, 6th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. NATO ACO. n.d. Allied Command Operations (ACO). https://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natolive/topics_52091.htm. Accessed on June 15, 2020. NFIU. n.d. NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs). https://shape.nato.int/ope rations/nato-force-integration-units. Accessed on June 16, 2020. Nielsen, Thomas Galasz. 2014. Time and the Question of Unintended Influences on Military Strategy in Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. NRF. n.d. NATO Response Force. https://shape.nato.int/nato-response-for ce–very-high-readiness-joint-task-force. Accessed on June 16, 2020. Odgaard, Liselotte. 2014. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Ops and Missions. n.d. Operations and Missions. https://shape.nato.int/ongoin goperations. Accessed on June 16, 2020.

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Røseth, Tom. 2020. How to Classify Intelligence Relations: Partnership Types in the Intelligence Community (Chapter) in Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century. Edited by Tom Røseth and John Weaver. Palgrave Macmillan. New York, USA. Shea, Jamie. 2014. NATO’s Future Strategy: Ready for the Threats of the Future or Refighting the Battles of the Past. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Strachan, Hew. 2011. Strategy and Contingency. Oxford, UK: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Blackwell Publishing. Trinkunas, Harold. 2019. Transnational Crime. In Contemporary Security Studies, 5th ed. Oxford UK, Oxford Press. Weaver, John M. 2016. Friend or Foe (or Do We Really Know)? Intelligence Community Contemporary Challenges (Chapter). In Globalization: Economic, Political, and Social Issues. Weaver, John M. 2018a. The 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States. Journal of Strategic Security. 11 (1): 62–71. Weaver, John M. 2018b. Dissecting the 2017 National Security Strategy: Implications for Senior Administrators (The Devil in the Details). Global Policy. 9 (2): 283–284. Weaver, John M. 2019. United Nations Security Council Permanent Member Perspectives Implications for U.S. and Global Intelligence Professionals. New York, USA: Peter Lang Publishers. Weaver, John M. 2020a. Intelligence Dilemmas: Understanding the Complexity of the P5 Relationship (Chapter) in Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century. Edited by Tom Røseth and John Weaver. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Weaver, John M. 2020b. National Security Issues Confronting the United States: An Overview (Chapter). In Contemporary Intelligence Analysis and National Security: A Critical American Perspective. New York, USA: Nova Science Publishers. Weaver, John M. with Jennifer Pomeroy (eds.). 2018. Intelligence Analysis: Unclassified Area and Point Estimates (and Other Intelligence Related Topics) 2nd Edition. New York, USA: Nova Science Publishers. Weaver, John M. with Jennifer Y. Pomeroy (eds.). 2019. Global Intelligence Priorities (From the Perspective of the United States). Nova Science Publishers. Weaver, John M. (Editor) with Jennifer Pomeroy (eds.). 2020. Contemporary Intelligence Analysis and National Security: A Critical American Perspective. Nova Science Publishers.

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Weaver, John M. with Benjamin Johnson. 2020 Cyber Security Challenges Confronting Canada and the United States. Peter Lang Publishers. New York, USA. Wirtz, James J. 2019. Weapons of Mass Destruction. In Contemporary Security Studies, 5th ed. Oxford UK: Oxford Press.

CHAPTER 5

Allied Air Command

Abstract This component command is responsible for synchronizing air and space power allocated to NATO. Moreover, this chapter looks at how it runs Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs), the development of Air Tasking Orders, the execution of air sorties, as well as ballistic missile defense, and more. It will also cover NATO’s hedge against real-world threats from Russia and the Baltic air police mission that is ongoing.

5.1

Vision

The stated vision for the Allied Air Command (AAC) is a “ready, robust team trained, equipped and trusted to command and control Air and Space Power for the Alliance” (AAC Vision and Mission, n.d.).

5.2

Mission

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery (1887–1976) once said “If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and we lose it quickly” (JP 3-30, 2019,

Garrett Hunt is an MPPA student at York College of Pennsylvania and was a contributing researcher to this chapter. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_5

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II-1). This thought process still prevails today, as air supremacy is an integral part of any situation or conflict faced by the Alliance. The mission statement for the Allied Air Command is simply put to “deliver Air and Space Power for the Alliance” (AAC Vision and Mission, n.d.). This mission includes a wide variety of abilities, technologies, and capabilities that the Alliance possesses. Aside from typical fixed wing or rotary-wing aircraft, the AAC also possesses significant ballistic missile defense capabilities that are instrumental in the defense of NATO member countries on the European continent and Turkey (AAC Vision and Mission, n.d.).

5.3

History

Since 1974, NATO Airpower Headquarters has been located in Ramstein, Germany within the Ramstein Air Force Base (AAC About, n.d.). In both peacetime and conflict, it has been and remains responsible for the integrated and synchronized planning, exercising, and execution of missile defense operations in NATO’s European AOR (AAC About, n.d.). Over 500 NATO personnel from 25 of the 30 NATO member countries (military and civilian) are dedicated to the AAC vision and mission (AAC About, n.d.). The headquarters at Ramstein is the base of operation and oversees several main aspects of AAC’s mission, including the control of NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control force, and NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance Force. Additionally, Ramstein serves as the Operations Centre for Air Policing and Ballistic Missile Defense, and maintains the ability to command and control a Joint Air Force Component in the event of a crisis (AAC About, n.d.). The original staff was made up of personnel from Belgium, Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AAC About, n.d.). Originally, it was charged with providing central control and direction for Europe’s central region’s air forces vis-à-vis the Second Allied Tactical Force (Rheindahlen) and the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (Heidelberg) (AAC About, n.d.). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War, consolidation occurred and in 1993 AIRCENT (Air Central) was stood up. AIRCENT was able to absorb the functions of the Central Region Air Force Headquarters due to the decreasing number of Alliance aircraft in Europe following the de-escalation of tensions in the early 1990s (AAC About, n.d.). Moreover, a year later, AIRCENT’s AOR increased when it absorbed responsibility for the territories of Denmark and

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Northern Germany. AIRCENT’s mission was expanded in March of 1999 when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were welcomed into NATO. In 2000, AIRCENT became AIRNORTH (Air North) and added personnel from Spain, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Norway and the Czech Republic (AAC About, n.d.). In 2004 with an additional seven member nations added to NATO, AIRNORTH Headquarters staff was expanded to include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia. From 2004 to 2010 AIRNORTH was renamed Component Command-Air Headquarters Ramstein and since 2010 has been named Allied Air Command Ramstein (AAC About, n.d.).

5.4

Overview

Airplanes have served as a significant nexus from the mid-twentieth century going forward in modern warfare; they provide reach in striking targets which have served as the “glue that makes modern combined operations possible” (Moran 2019, 265). Airpower is quite expensive to maintain but is a key component of military power in contemporary times (Ferris 2019, 239). AAC is responsible for the three-dimensional battlespace in Europe (AAC About, n.d.; AJP-3.3, 2016). Accordingly, a primary function of the headquarters in Ramstein is to conduct ballistic missile defense, air policing, it provides operational control of the Alliance Ground Surveillance Force, and AWACS support as well (AAC About, n.d.). These can be seen as significant resources to help enable the Alliance (Jakobsen 2014). During a crisis, AAC can serve as host to a Joint Force Air Component to conduct C2 (AJP-3.3.5, 2013). To better enable C2 functions, AAC makes use of a joint communications system that is interoperable (JP 6-0, 2015, vii). Subordinated to Allied Air Command are two combined air operations centers (CAOCs) at Uedem Germany and Torrejón Spain; it also oversees a deployable air command and control center in Poggio Renatico, Italy (AAC About, n.d.). These CAOCs provide oversight of air and space assets for the Alliance and are akin to a CJTF, but ones that focus on the three-dimensional battlefield (Johnston 2017, 169). Likewise, the CAOCs are responsible for the planning, directing, tasking, coordinating, supervising, and supporting air operations in both times of peace and conflict; they prepare Air Tasking Orders (ATOs). Maintaining NATOs air policing mission is an integral part of the CAOCs’ day-to-day operations. During these operations, it is typical for the CAOCs to work jointly with Control and Reporting Centers, National

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Air Policing Centers, and Quick Reaction Alert air bases throughout their respective AOR (AAC About, n.d.). The CAOCs have the ability to scramble Quick Reaction Alert Interceptor aircraft in the event that there is an unclear or potentially dangerous situation, or to visually identify other aircraft (AAC About, n.d.). Air provides a unique capability to a commander and will often be considered first because it could help in seizing the initiative upon a potential foe (JP 3-30, 2019, ix). This component provides unique capabilities to the joint force commander (JP 3-33, 2018, III-4). Often, it is this air component that will have the authority over forces assigned or attached to it to perform air-centric operational level missions (JP 3-33, 2018, III-4). Accordingly, the control of the air can vary substantially from no control, through parity (equal capabilities), local air superiority, to air supremacy (JP 3-30, 2019, ix). Moreover, air operations are often conducted under centralized control and decentralized execution with the former helping deconflict the airspace to help mitigate fratricide and air collisions (JP 3-30, 2019, x).

5.5

Tasks

Planning is a primary function (JP 3-30, 2019, III-1). To do this adequately, the command must immerse itself in the missions and objectives of NATO Headquarters and higher level commanders (JP 3-30, 2019, III-1). After conducting a mission dissection, the AAC commander will also turn to concepts of operations, the commander’s estimate, and then develop courses of action (COAs) to evaluate, select, and employ one to bring about certain effects. More pointedly, it will look at where operations will occur, what the command hopes to achieve, and forecast how air can be used to affect an adversary or situation in a way that is favored by the Alliance (JP 3-30, 2019, III-1). The Joint Air Estimate helps in applying the act of reasoning to understanding the mission (JP 3-30, 2019, III-3). Moreover, this estimate attempts to consider all aspects of COAs by looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. The planning continues but is affected by time and the experience of the staff. This planning must also be collaborative in nature and done in conjunction with joint force level commands as well as the land and maritime components (JP 3-30, 2019, III-2). The analysis that ensues during this process helps guide the commander at selecting a

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COA from which the AAC will develop effects-based initiatives (Møller 2014; JP 3-30, 2019, III-3). As a result of conducting the Joint Air Estimate, the command hopes to bring to fruition a Joint Air Operations Plan that is approved by the JTFHQ to bring to bear capabilities to shape the operational environment. Because no plan is ever perfect, AAC members must attempt to anticipate changes, remain flexible, and adapt accordingly (JP 3-30, 2019, III-3). Adequate targeting is a paramount concern. It involves the process of determining, the act of selecting, and the subsequent prioritization of targets, and allocating air assets to deal with them; it makes use of the ATO to do so (JP 3-30, 2019, III-16). What is equally important is the act of deconflicting targets to help avoid duplication of effort while simultaneously integrating efforts with Allied Land Command and Allied Maritime Command. Finally, NATO must afford consideration to Anti Access/Aerial Denial (A2AD) operations. This is a required precursor for employing a defensive strategy to inhibit the enemy from exerting influence in the AOR (Koch, n.d.). 5.5.1

Part 5.5.1 Securing the Sky

First and foremost, AAC is responsible for securing the skies in Europe (AAC Skies, n.d.). What is more is that this command monitors 30000 air movements each day thus making its AOR one of the busiest airspaces on the planet (AAC Skies, n.d.). To keep the Alliance safe and secure, it maintains an air police mission 24 hours a day, seven days a week, all year. To more aptly accomplish this, AAC detects, decides, launches, intercepts, identifies, escorts, returns, and reports (AAC Skies, n.d.). 5.5.1.1 Detection Through detection, NATO radar will pick up aircraft of interest. If the aircraft fails to use its transponder and/or is not in radio contact with a civilian air traffic controller and/or has not filed a valid flight plan, then the report of this is sent to one of two NATO CAOCs (AAC Skies, n.d.). 5.5.1.2 Decision This next step involves a decision by the CAOC. The commander of the respective CAOC will make a decision on whether or not to deploy a

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quick reaction alert interceptor aircraft to identify (visually), the aircraft in question (AAC Skies, n.d.). 5.5.1.3 Launch The NATO assigned aircraft then launches from airbases. They often do so within minutes and head toward the identified aircraft and are guided by a control and reporting center (AAC Skies, n.d.). 5.5.1.4 Intercept Following the launch, the NATO aircraft move to intercept the questionable airframe. It does so with the intent of approaching from astern (rear) assuming a position on the port (left side) of the aircraft (AAC Skies, n.d.). 5.5.1.5 Identify Once the aircraft has been intercepted, the NATO team looks to identify the one in question (AAC Skies, n.d.). It does so by complying with the International Civil Aviation Organization rules. 5.5.1.6 Escort The escort process will be implemented if the NATO interceptor aircraft needs to guide the aircraft to a close by airfield or until it backs out of Alliance airspace (AAC About, n.d.). 5.5.1.7 Return The quick reaction alert interceptor aircraft will ultimately break away (AAC About, n.d.). It will do so by way of a shallow dive. 5.5.1.8 Report NATO keeps track of these engagements. Accordingly, the affected CAOC will monitor events and report to Allied Air Command about what transpired (AAC Skies, n.d.). 5.5.2

Protection of Territories, Populations, and Forces

Most countries are concerned about issues gravitating around chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive devices otherwise referred to as CBRNE. Moreover, these are considered weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and those that can be affixed to a ballistic missile are

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troublesome to the Alliance (Territories, Populations, and Forces, n.d.). Since 2010, NATO decided to pursue a ballistic missile defense capability to address long-term concerns emanating from WMD threats (Territories, Populations, and Forces, n.d.). The defense network consists of sensors, missile launchers, and C2 facilities (Territories, Populations, and Forces, n.d.). To be effective, it looks to synchronize and integrate them to help protect against said threats. Regional threats to the European mainland via WMDs and ballistic missiles are currently present and are predicted to continue. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) are a key part of the military strategy of countries like Russia, along with their short and long-range ballistic missile capabilities (Weaver 2020). The Alliance has interpreted these threats and invested significant capabilities into countering them. There are sites in various NATO member countries for the purpose of strengthening the ballistic missile defense capability of all member nations (AAC About, n.d.). These sites include a radar system in Kürecik, Turkey, an Aegis Ashore site in Romania, a missile launcher system at Deveselu Airbase in Romania, another Aegis Ashore site at Redzikowo military base in Poland, and four missile defense capable Aegis ships at the Spanish naval base in Rota (AAC About, n.d.). In addition to these permanent installations, several NATO countries also possess other means of air and missile defense, such as PATRIOT or SAMP/T sites as well as ship-based missile defense systems. At the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, Poland the Alliance announced the initial operational capability of NATO’s new Ballistic Missile Defense system (AAC About, n.d.). It was declared that this system has the ability to protect Alliance populations, territory, and forces across NATO’s southern border from potential ballistic missile attacks not originating from the Euro-Atlantic area. Allied Air Command is responsible for this system, and placed its tactical responsibility under a 24-hour watch team (AAC About, n.d.). 5.5.3

Crisis Response

NATO makes use of C2 capabilities to integrate, adapt, and remain flexible and responsive to high tempo operations (Crisis Response, n.d.; JP 6-0, 2015, vii). More pointedly, it is through airpower that NATO can make use of accurate Alliance coordination and the synchronization of its air plans (Crisis Response, n.d.). Subsequently, air C2 can therefore aptly

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apportion tasks and missions in a highly effective way (Crisis Response, n.d.). The structure that enables this is the Joint Force Air Component or JFAC (Crisis Response, n.d.). Thus, the JFAC is an integral organization that can be task-organized by the need to deal with exigent threats. JFACs help provide C2 to air operations (JP 3-30, 2019). The JFAC is flexible. Moreover, it can receive augmentation from Allied Air Command entities or even national level JFACs (Crisis Response, n.d.). Presently, the following NATO member nations have national JFACs: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Crisis Response, n.d.). Its full-time core team for air C2 is the Allied Air Command (Crisis Response, n.d.). Likewise, it provides subject matter experts (SMEs) with knowledge of a variegated mix of skills to bring to bear courses of action and possible solutions to an eclectic mix of threats (Crisis Response, n.d.). Normal functions and responsibilities that fall under the purview of the JFAC include such things as helping develop joint air operations plans (JAOPs), allocating and tasking joint air capabilities made available to it by contributing nations, recommending priorities, providing oversight during mission execution, serving as the airspace control authority (ACA) if designated to do so, performing air defense coordination (if designated to do so), and also if required, assisting with personnel recovery (for example, recovery of downed pilots) (JP 3-30, 2019, xi). 5.5.4

Part 5.5.4 Bringing Airpower to Full Effect

The ACC looks at various levels of war; these are strategic, operational, and tactical levels (Grongstad and Lasoen 2020; Rose 2020; AJP-01, 2017, 1-8–1-9; AJP-3.2, 2016, 1-13–1-14). The Allied Air Command brings airpower to its maximum capability (Full Effect, n.d.). This is essential to bring to fruition airpower to its full effect for proper planning, air taskings (and the preparation of air tasking orders), communication among NATO entities, to cover the effects at strategic, operational, and tactical levels (Full Effect, n.d.; AJP-3.2, 2016, 1-13–1-14). In modern operations, NATO hopes to achieve effects-based operations (looking at outcomes) rather than just pursuing simple tasks or goals which might not result in an outcome favorable to NATO.

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Contribution to International Stability

Though NATO has the ability to go to war and support Article 5 operations, it would rather see stability in Europe and North America (as well as elsewhere) (Article 5, n.d.). NATO prefers so because it believes the more stable the world, the more secure it will be (International Stability, n.d.). More to the point, air assets can be integral in providing a wide range of capabilities to support political security as it engages in civil-military cooperation the world over with such operations that gravitate around humanitarian relief and peacekeeping (International Stability, n.d.). 5.5.6

Baltic Air Policing

A key component of NATO’s security strategy is the defense of all member nations, regardless of what abilities certain nations are able to provide for themselves or the Alliance. In order to project the message of unity, solidarity, and resolve within the Alliance, all member countries must be provided with equal protection. This message of collective defense is important to both current allies, prospective members, and partner nations of NATO (Air Policing, n.d.). In 2004, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined the Alliance and it was assessed that these members did not have sufficient air capabilities to maintain the single standard of security within NATO airspace. In order to maintain this standard, the Alliance provides the Baltic States with the required technical, logistical, and mechanical capabilities to do so. Although, the host nations do provide some mission support through C2 infrastructure and personnel. When the three states joined in 2004, a NATO Air policing facility was stood up at Šiauliai Air Base in Lithuania (Air Policing, n.d.). Pilots and personnel of the Baltic Air Policing mission spend a significant amount of their time dealing with Russian Federation Air Force aircraft and activities (Air Policing, n.d.). Due to the location of Kaliningrad, which is situated to the direct south of the three Baltic States, NATO interceptors are regularly scrambled to identify Russian aircraft flying between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad. It is typical for these Russian aircraft to fly near or toward NATO airspace without using transponders, failing to file a flight plan, or not communicating with Air Traffic Control (Air Policing, n.d.). After the annexation of Crimea

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in 2014, tensions between NATO and Russia increased enough to validate the establishment of a second Air Policing station at Ämari Air Base in Estonia (Air Policing, n.d.). Both the bases at Šiauliai and Ämari are staffed by Alliance forces on four-month rotations, and receive their orders from the CAOC in Uedem Germany. 5.5.7

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 5.1 highlights the S.W.O.T. analysis for the AAC. Details on these follow. There are strengths. That stated, there is no arguing with the advantages that come with effective airpower and how it can exert influence on the three-dimensional battlefield. It can provide what one refers to as “standoff” where the one employing it minimizes the exposure of troops that are put in harm’s way. To be effective, a precursor must be for NATO to have air superiority whereby its combat aircraft can operate over an enemy’s territory without major threats. Though this could be the case against many nations in the world, countries like Russia and China possess extremely capable aircraft that could provide them with what is commonly referred to as air parity in military parlance. Moreover, tactical and strategic airlift capabilities are also paramount for the movement of combat equipment, troops, and logistical support. Table 5.1 Allied Air Command SWOT Strengths

Weaknesses

“Standoff” advantages minimize exposure of troops on the ground Access to national strategic and tactical airlift capabilities ISR platforms provides advantages for political and military leaders

Over reliance on air operations (Kosovo and Libya) Disparities of air capabilities between NATO member countries Internal budgetary limits on airlift capabilities

Opportunities

Threats

NATO possesses air superiority over most countries in the world and should continue to do so

Airspace deconfliction

Russia and China possess “air parity” in limited instances Increased foreign investment in stealth technologies (adversaries)

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These aircraft are also mission critical to performing medical evacuation and retrograde operations of damaged equipment unable to be repaired in a theater of operation. NATO has these capabilities, but they are extremely expensive and at a time when many nations are dealing with crises at home, it is capabilities like these that often go unfunded or at least see a reduction in their budgets. Airlift proved its viability for the first several years of NATO’s occupation in Afghanistan because of the fact the country is landlocked; ships could not deliver supplies directly to this country. What’s more are the eyes and ears that provide the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) information generated by air platforms (both manned and unmanned). ISR can provide great situational awareness that can help enable leaders (political and military) make sound and timely decisions at both the operational and strategic levels. There are weaknesses. The initial reports following the 78-day air war in Kosovo back in 1999 seemed quite promising; collectively 75% of the airstrikes were carried out by European nations (Shea 2014, 34). During Operation Allied Force, the Alliance’s operation involved 1000 aircraft, 38000 sorties, and saw the dropping of 23300 munitions (Jakobsen 2014, 63). The mission of the seven-month campaign was to dismantle the regime’s combat power (Flockhart 2014, 95). What appeared to be the case was that airpower alone could be brought to bear against a belligerent and could lead to victory without putting “boots on the ground.” This proved to be fraught with challenges as after-action reports showed that other factors were at play and the “surgical” strikes carried out at the behest of NATO were anything but. Underscoring the problem was amplified when a US B2 accidentally dropped a bomb on the Chinese embassy (Mahnkem 2019, 60). It showed that air operations and an overreliance on these can result in unrealistic expectations (Greitens 2019, 285). To better integrate airpower, the Alliance adopted the combined air operations center (COAC) concept (Johnston 2017, 168–169). This was done to streamline the coordination process. That stated, the integration of NATO air assets can be seen as a force multiplier (Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014). Over a decade later, NATO became over-reliant on airpower again; this was a weakness. In March of 2011, it helped orchestrate the air attack on Libya under Operation Unified Protector that eventually saw Muammar Gaddafi fall from power and the country quickly disintegrated into civil war (Laity 2014; Nissen 2014, 157; Jakobsen 2019, 289). Ostensibly,

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the operation occurred to “protect civilians at all costs under UN Security Council Resolution 1973” (Higgins et al. 2017). That stated, the United States pushed for this to promote regime change, to support rebels fighting against Gaddaffi, to send signals to other dictators, and to return favor to European partners who had supported the United States in Afghanistan; it was overconfident that this would be relatively easy to accomplish (Greitens 2019, 285). This operation lasted 223 days and involved 260 aircraft, over 26500 sorties, and the release of 7600 precision guided bombs (Flockhart 2014, 93; Jakobsen 2014, 67). Likewise, there have been disparities in air capabilities among NATO nations (Hallams 2010; Johnston 2017, 164). This is truer when expanding on air to include space, the reliance on space-based technology, and protecting satellites from anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon systems (and as the US stands up its new Space Force). The NATO Secretary General and the United States should press member countries to invest in next generation fighters, strategic airlift capabilities, and more. Moreover, as Bryman and Waxman (2000) espouse, “air power can help sustain domestic or coalition unity…but it cannot eliminate underlying political constraints.” A final weakness deals with internal budget shortfalls of NATO member countries. More pointedly, many Alliance nations are not investing in airlift capabilities (or if they have them, they are limited). There is an opportunity. For AAC to do its part, NATO member nations must continue to allocate resources to it. These include missionready fighters and bombers, trained aircrews, munitions, and interoperable communications systems that will enable the adequate flow of secure information from airframes to ground sensors to C2 nodes throughout the Alliance’s territory and forward-deployed locations (AJP-6, 2017, 1-22). It must remain nimble and adaptive (Odgaard 2014; Shea 2014). There are threats. Complicating matters is the issue of airspace deconfliction. Combined Air Operations Centers that have the responsibility for creating Air Tasking Orders to prevent problems at all airspace levels are quite challenging to conduct. Accordingly, NATO’s Allied Air Command has a tall order to do this not just effectively, but safely as well. Russia and China have very advanced air technology. At times, they could achieve air parity and this would limit the effectiveness of offensive Alliance air capabilities. Finally, many nations are investing in stealth technology with many NATO countries involved in the United States’ F35 project. However,

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China is investing in level 5 fighters as well and one has a stark resemblance to the F35 (and this is a significant threat). The key takeaway is that NATO countries broadly, and those Alliance countries laden with tech industries more specifically, will have to employ proper counterintelligence measures to better safeguard from those involved in intellectual property theft especially those industries focused on national security and defense-related capabilities.

References AAC About. n.d. Headquarters. https://ac.nato.int/about/headquarters. Accessed on June 23, 2020. AAC Skies. n.d. We Secure the Skies. https://ac.nato.int/missions/air-policing. Accessed on June 23, 2020. AAC Vision and Mission. n.d. Allied Air Command Vision and Mission. https:// ac.nato.int/missions. Accessed on June 23, 2020. Air Policing. n.d. Baltic Air Policing. https://ac.nato.int/missions/air-policing/ baltics. Accessed on November 20, 2020. AJP-3.2. 2016. Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations. https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/624149/doctrine_nato_land_ops_ajp_3_2.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3.3. 2016. Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations. https://ass ets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/624137/doctrine_nato_air_space_ops_ajp_3_3.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3.3.5. 2013. Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control. https://assets.pub lishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d ata/file/624144/doctrine_nato_airspace_control_ajp_3_3_5.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-6. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/upl oads/attachment_data/file/602827/doctrine_nato_cis_ajp_6.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. Article 5. n.d. NATO, and FPRI Primer. https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/ 07/nato-an-fpri-primer/#:~:text=The%20keystone%20of%20the%20NATO% 20treaty%20is%20Article,defense%20of%20Western%20Europe%20after%20a% 20Soviet%20attack. Accessed on July 20, 2020. Foreign Policy Research Institute. Pennsylvania, USA. Bryman, Daniel L., and Matthew Waxman. 2000. Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate. International Security 24 (4): 5–38.

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Crisis Response. n.d. We Respond to Crisis. https://ac.nato.int/missions/jfac. Accessed on June 23, 2020. Ferris, John. 2019. Conventional Power and Contemporary Warfare in Strategy in the Contemporary World, 6th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. Flockhart, Trine. 2014. NATO and EU: A “Strategic Partnership” or a Practice of “Muddling Through”? In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. 2019. Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations. In Strategy in the Contemporary World. Oxford, UK. Grongstad, Ingeborg and Kenneth Lasoen. 2020. The Nature of Requirements, Internal Roles and Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Chapter). In Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, ed. Tom Røseth and John Weaver. New York, USA. Higgins, Rosalyn, Philippa Webb, Dapo Akande, Sandesh Sivakumaran, and James Sloan. 2017. Oppenheim’s International Law United Nations (vols 1 and 2). UK: Oxford University Press. Hallams, Ellen. 2010. The United States and NATO since 9/11. New York: Routledge. International Stability. n.d. We Contribute to International Stability. https://ac. nato.int/missions/partnerships. Accessed on June 23, 2020. Jakobsen, Peter V. 2014. The Indispensable Enabler: NATO’s Strategic Value in High-Intensity Operations Is Far Greater Than You Think. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Jakobsen, Peter V. 2019. Coercive Diplomacy: Countering War-Threatening Crisis and Armed Conflicts in Contemporary Security Studies, 5th ed. Oxford UK: Oxford Press. Johnston, Seth A. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore, MA, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. JP 3-30. 2019. Joint Air Operations. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Docume nts/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf. Accessed on July 31, 2020. JP 3-33. 2018. Joint Task Force Headquarters. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_33.pdf. Accessed on July 31, 2020. JP 6-0. 2015. Joint Communications System. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp6_0ch1.pdf?ver=2019-10-15-172254-827. Accessed on August 13, 2020. Koch, Charles. n.d. What Is A2/AD and Why Does It Matter to the United States? https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/blog/what-is-a2ad-andwhy-does-it-matter-to-the-united-states/. Accessed on January 8, 2020. Krüger-Klausen, Villiam, and Liselotte Odgaard. 2014. Preparing for an Imperfect World: Strategy in Conflict Management Environments in Strategy.

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In NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Laity, Mark. 2014. NATO and Libya: The Dawn of European Security Management, a Warning or Business as Usual? In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Mahnkem, Thomas G. 2019. Strategic Theory. In Strategy in the Contemporary World. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Møller, Hans Henrik. 2014. Effects-Based Thinking in NATO, Utilizing All Instruments of Power While Planning for and Conducting Operations. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Moran, Daniel. 2019. Geography and Strategy in Strategy in the Contemporary World, 6th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. Nissen, Thomas Elkjer. 2014. Strategizing NATO’s Narratives. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Odgaard, Liselotte. 2014. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Rose, Matthew A. 2020. Commanding America’s Spies. In Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, ed. Tom Røseth and John Weaver. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Shea, Jamie. 2014. NATO’s Future Strategy: Ready for the Threats of the Future or Refighting the Battles of the Past. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. Palgrave Macmillan. New York, USA. Territories, Populations, and Forces. n.d. We Protect Territories, Populations, and Forces. https://ac.nato.int/missions/bmd. Accessed on June 23, 2020. Weaver, J.M., and Jennifer Pomeroy. 2020. Contemporary Intelligence Analysis and National Security: A Critical American Perspective. New York: Nova Science.

CHAPTER 6

Allied Land Command

Abstract Allied Land Command or LANDCOM is responsible for synchronizing ground power allocated to NATO. Moreover, it looks to the types of forces necessary for forced entry operations to the indefinite sustainment of full-spectrum operations. These events include being ready to execute the likes of humanitarian relief operations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and all the way up to traditional combat. What’s more is that it does not just focus on ground power (light infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, airborne, and air assault formations), but also looks at medical units (hospitals), engineers, signals support, and logistics (fuel, supply, ground transportation, and more). This chapter conducts a deeper dive into this component command. The focus will also draw attention to the NATO show-of-force exercises in Eastern Europe to hedge against Russia’s bellicose behavior in the region (Jakobsen 2019, 294). Keywords LANDCOM · High Readiness Force · Low Readiness Force · C4ISR

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_6

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6.1

History

Allied Land Command is presently located in Izmir Turkey and traces its lineage back to 1952 when NATO established the Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe (LANDSOUTHEAST) (LCC History, n.d.) It was originally led by a US general with both a Turkish and Greek general officer serving as deputies (LCC History, n.d.). The area of responsibility (AOR) encapsulated the Caucasus to the Greek western shore and implemented security measures for the AOR’s 35 million inhabitants (LCC History, n.d.). LANDSOUTHEAST underwent a structural change in 1977 under SACEUR, and in the next year, a Turkish four-star officer assumed command with a US two-star serving as his chief of staff (LCC History, n.d.). In 2002, the structure changed again, and the headquarters became an air component command (ACC) and this remained the case until a new structure was approved in 2010 and subsequently saw the ACC deactivation in 2013 and the implementation of the new LANDCOM in June of that year (LCC History, n.d.). After achieving full operational capability in 2014, the command assumed a myriad of responsibilities. It remains in existence as the sole LANDCOM for NATO and resides at Izmir Turkey.

6.2

Overview

LANDCOM is a theater-level structure capable of synchronizing and coordinating NATO and NATO partner nation forces (ground) by enabling the land domain of readiness, interoperability, standardization, and competency (LCC History, n.d.; JP 3-31 2019, III-12; AJP-6 2017, 1–22). To remain effective, on order, it can deploy headquarters elements to oversee the planning, coordination, and C2 capabilities to ground forces for NATO (LCC History, n.d.; JP 3-31 2019; JP 6-0 2015, vii). Often, it is this land component that will have the authority over forces assigned or attached to it to perform operational level missions (JP 3-33 2018, III-4). What is more, and due to the nature of landbased operations, this command could find itself involved with other government agencies, foreign non-NATO nations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (JP 3-31 2019, III-10). Ground forces that are required to secure territory and maintain control of the terrain can also seize key land and destroy targets (Moran

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2019, 256–257). Moreover, for operations looking to unseat an incumbent ruler, and bring to fruition a change in the regime will most likely require the use of land forces (Moran 2019, 257). Land component commands (like LANDCOM) look to integrate ground-based military organizations in a concerted effort to support an assigned mission (JP 3-31 2019, ix). Like the AAC, LANDCOM must coordinate operations with air and maritime operations; synchronization and integration of efforts is necessary to achieve desired outcomes and effects (JP 3-31 2019, ix.). The LANDCOM commander has to task organize based on the forces allocated to the mission from NATO members and other contributing nations. What is more is that LANDCOM will plan, coordinate, and employ ground-based units to support the joint force commander’s mission (JP 3-31 2019, xi). Other considerations that LANDCOM must embrace turn to interoperable communications with nation-provided ground-based units (JP 3-31 2019, III-12; AJP-6 2017, 1–22). Likewise, the successful integration of national forces should be at the forefront of consideration for this commander (JP 3-31 2019, III-12). Another important consideration must be afforded to rules of engagement (ROEs) (JP 3-31 2019, III-13). Understanding the legal constraints by which nations operate is a paramount concern for the LANDCOM commander to understand just what he/she can and cannot do. Like all levels in NATO, LANDCOM must be adept at planning. The range of operations can span the likes of security cooperation, military engagement, and deterrence all within the operating environment (OE) (JP 3-31 2019, IV-1). Moreover, it must be able to plan major operations and campaigns (ground-centric) under the NATO Response Force construct. Likewise, LANDCOM looks to synchronize both defensive and offensive operations (JP 3-31 2019, V-4–V-6; AJP-3.2 2016). 6.2.1

Missions

LANDCOM is a theater land component that synchronizes and coordinates NATO ground operations and remains as a deployable headquarters to more aptly perform its mission in theater, if and when required to do so (LCC Mission, n.d.). Its focus gravitates around readiness (ensuring that NATO has adequately trained forces to perform missions on littleto-no-notice), interoperability (overseeing a multinational force poised

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to fight together effectively in a synchronized fashion), with standardization [clearly understood tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) with communications systems that can speak to one another], and competency (to mitigate blue on blue incidents of fratricide) to achieve required outcomes and effects (LCC Mission, n.d.). This component also provides unique capabilities to the joint force commander focusing on ground systems (JP 3-33 2018, III-4). Accordingly, it prepares operations plans in concept format, helps prepare operations orders, all designed to achieve a unity of effort with regard to the joint force commander’s mission (JP 3-31 2019, xi; AJP-01 2017, 1–13). To do this adequately, the commander must understand the OE (JP 3-31 2019, vi). Likewise, the OE is an amalgam of circumstances, conditions, and influences that can affect the successful deployment of ground-based capabilities (JP 3-31 2019, xi). To do so properly, LANDCOM must look at friendly forces, known enemy capabilities and locations, and neutral populations and military formations.

6.3

Operations

NATO’s conduct of real-world missions focuses on its ability to conduct those operations effectively. Accordingly, LANDCOM must perform operations dealing with ground-based events. More pointedly, these include the Graduated Readiness Forces (Land), NATO Force Integration Units (Land), enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), and NATO Response Force (Land) operations (LCC Operations, n.d.). 6.3.1

Graduated Readiness Forces (Land)

As one can probably quickly discern, not all nations have the same level of military capabilities. Likewise, even within nations, services of a country’s armed forces are at varying levels of readiness capable of responding to real-world events with different response times. The same is the case for the ground forces of NATO. NATO has made the distinction looking at two subsets (GRF Land, n.d.). The first level of forces are determined to be High Readiness Forces (HRF) (GRF, n.d.). The second tier is the Low Readiness Forces (LRF) (GRF Land, n.d.). Combined, HRF and LRF are referred to a Graduated Readiness Forces or simply, GRF (GRF Land, n.d.).

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What distinguishes an HRF, is its ability to constitute and deploy quickly with immediate response capabilities from 0 to 30 days to support a NATO Response Force event (GRF Land, n.d.). To remain effective, these forces and capabilities are made available to NATO by member nations in requested numbers as needed (GRF Land, n.d.). Likewise, capabilities include logistics tails provided through the Joint Logistics Support Group or JLSG (GRF Land, n.d.). The JLSG is an integrator of logistics support on the two-dimensional battlefield to help prevent logistics jams along key ground lines of communication. Moreover, NATO’s Command Joint CBRN Defence Task Force provides chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense capabilities as part of the GRF package (GRF Land, n.d.). The GRFs include many capabilities located throughout Europe. These include the following: the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) Headquarters in Gloucester, United Kingdom; the Rapid Deployable German-Netherlands Corps in Munster, Germany; the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps, Italy Headquarters located in Solbiate Olona; the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps, Greece, in Thessaloniki, Greece; the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps in Valencia, Spain; the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps, Turkey in Istanbul; the Rapid Reaction Corps, France in Lille; the EUROCORPS Headquarters located in Strasbourg, France; the Multinational Corps HQ Northeast in Szczecin, Poland; the Multinational Division, Southeast in Bucharest, Romania; and the Multinational Division Northeast in Elblag, Poland (GRF Land, n.d.). 6.3.2

NATO Force Integration Units (Land)

The ground components of the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) consist of forces operating in the countries of Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia (NFIU2, n.d.). The ground components of the NFIUs have adapted to security challenges confronting the Alliance by the Russian Federation and were brought to fruition by a decision taken at the Wales Summit in 2014 to prod the Alliance in enhancing border security along its eastern flank (NFIU2, n.d.). The intent by deploying NATO ground forces to these Eastern European countries sends a stark notice to Russia underscoring the collective response defense of NATO’s countries in this region (NFIU2, n.d.). The purpose of these deployed units is to assist in coordinating plans and

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training for the readiness, interoperability, standardization, and competency of the LANDCOM mission (NFIU2, n.d.). Accordingly, the NFIUs serve as the critical link between NATO allies and national level forces (NFIU2, n.d.). They are staffed with 40 personnel (NFIU2, n.d.). Host nations provide 20 national staff and NATO allies provide the other 20 multinational staff on a rotational basis (NFIU2, n.d.). 6.3.3

Enhanced Forward Presence (Land)

NATO in recent years has enhanced its forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance (eFP, n.d.). This has included the likes of four multinational battalion level battlegroups in the nations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, all on a rotational basis (eFP, n.d.). These battlegroups are led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States (eFP, n.d.). The capabilities include robust, multinational, combat-ready units capable of forces demonstrating the strength of the NATO bond, clearly articulating that an attack on one member would be akin to an attack on all of NATO. As stated in an earlier chapter, this represents the most profound reinforcement of NATO’s collective defense in a generation (eFP, n.d.). Moreover, NATO is bringing to fruition a tailored forward presence in the southeast region of the Alliance’s territory with a land element gravitating around a multinational framework brigade, under Multinational Division Southeast in Romania and accordingly, coordinates training at a multinational level through the Combined Joint Enhanced Training Initiative (eFP, n.d.). Likewise, NATO is also looking at increasing its activity and presence throughout SACEUR’s AOR to more aptly address security issues with a 360-degree perspective for NATO (eFP, n.d.). 6.3.4

NATO Response Force (Land)

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is NATO’s answer to threats confronting the organization (NRF2, n.d.). It is a high ready multinational force that is technologically advanced comprising air, land, maritime, and Special Forces components (NRF2, n.d.). NATO can deploy it quickly to wherever it is needed.

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The NRF mission is to provide this rapid demonstration of force to serve as a deployable NATO military presence in support of an Article 5 or other crisis response operation; the land component provides the ground capability for the NRF (NFR2, n.d.). NATO first declared the NRF to be operational in 2003 (NRF2, n.d.). Likewise, a decision taken to employ it requires political consensus and decision, taken on a caseby-case basis by the North Atlantic Council (NRF2, n.d.; Johnston 2017 62). The NRF has three main elements. These include the following: (1) a military headquarters to exercise command and control, (2) a “ready-togo” Immediate Response Force which is comprised of a joint force of up to 13000 high readiness troops provided by allies, and (3) a response forces pool made up by approximately 15000 follow-on forces, that can supplement the Immediate Response Force whenever it is necessary (NRF2, n.d.). SACEUR has operational responsibility for deployed NATO forces. However, the operational command of the NRF alternates between NATO’s Joint Force Commands (NRF2, n.d.).

6.4

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 6.1 provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (S.W.O.T.) of this organization. Details follow in the paragraphs below. There is a key strength associated with this command. As was the case with the air campaign in Kosovo, it was followed by the introduction of ground forces to serve as peacekeepers. Compounded with this, Table 6.1 Allied Land Command SWOT

Strengths

Weaknesses

Forward deployed presence

Could have to deploy < 30 days Challenges with interoperability

Varied force readiness levels

Opportunities

Threats

Push for more enhancements

Russia Hybrid warfare in Ukraine

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one has seen other NATO interventions in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq with boots on the ground to keep the peace, train coalition military and security forces, and even to conduct combat operations. Having a troop presence in an area of operation sends a clear message about the seriousness and resolve of a nation (or nations) regarding a particular mission and this, too, is the case with NATO. There is a strength and weakness that is one and the same. NATO has multiple command structures and forces with varying degrees of readiness. The ones at the higher level could be called upon quickly (this is a strength), but it still might not be enough to strive for a 30-day window; those at the lower levels that are not able to deploy as quickly could be seen as a significant weakness given how once combat operations ensue (as one has seen in recent years), the initiative goes to those who can muster forces and capabilities very quickly. That stated, is that significant NATO battle groups are operating in many former Soviet countries in order to telegraph to Russia, the Alliance’s dissatisfaction with what it is doing in Ukraine (Morgan 2019, 39) and elsewhere. Thus far, this has been seen as a success. The Land Command provides leadership, direction, and guidance, and C2 over ground formations focusing on the two-dimensional battlefield. Because stability and security often need a physical presence with armed men and women to help keep the peace, ground operations will likely continue, if not grow, in the future. As was established in the preceding chapter (regarding air), there are limitations to what land power can do. There are weaknesses though. Because of the complexity of such operations as one has seen in recent years and the sheer numbers of troops often deployed in various settings, interoperability will be of paramount concern; this is imperative for the command to remain relevant (Odgaard 2014; Shea 2014). Also true, is the need for proper identification of friendly forces throughout the area of operation to mitigate blue on blue incidents. Training and the use of communications systems that transcend national standards are imperative for NATO’s Allied Land Commander to properly lead the force. There is an opportunity; NATO needs to invest in enhancements. Likewise, NATO as a whole, and nations more specifically, will have to invest in enhancements especially anti-jamming capabilities to allow for adequate C2 to take place. It should also invest in redundant systems to help maintain continuity among its C4ISR architecture to foster a better common operating picture (COP). This is easier said than done, but by codifying

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requirements in NATO standardization agreements (STANAGS) would be a good place to start. Finally, the adversary will learn from past successes and failures. Russia has shown its interest in emerging once again as a significant player on the world stage as one has seen in Syria, Crimea, and Ukraine. Likewise, in Ukraine, it has demonstrated how it can use hybrid warfare as a way to achieve gains. NATO will have to acknowledge this and incorporate this into ACT/JWC scenarios to better prepare NATO for the emergence of this type of threat.

References AJP-01. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine. https://assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/905877/ 20200728-doctrine_nato_allied_joint_doctrine_ajp_01.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3.2. 2016. Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations. https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/624149/doctrine_nato_land_ops_ajp_3_2.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-6. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/upl oads/attachment_data/file/602827/doctrine_nato_cis_ajp_6.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. eFP. n.d. NATO Enhanced Forward Presence. https://lc.nato.int/operations/ enhanced-forward-presence-efp. Accessed on July 20, 2020. GRF Land. n.d. Graduated Readiness Force (Land). https://lc.nato.int/operat ions/graduated-readiness-forces-land. Accessed on July 20, 2020. Jakobsen, Peter V. 2019. Coercive Diplomacy: Countering War Threatening Crisis and Armed Conflicts. In Contemporary Security Studies, 5th ed. Oxford UK: Oxford Press. Johnston, Seth A. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore MA, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. JP 3-31. 2019. Joint Land Operations. file:///C:/Users/weave/Desktop/JP%20331.pdf. Accessed on July 31, 2020. JP 3-33. 2018. Joint Task Force Headquarters. file:///C:/Users/weave/Desktop/JP%203-33.pdf. Accessed on July 31, 2020.

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JP 6-0. 2015. Joint Communications System. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp6_0ch1.pdf?ver=2019-10-15-172254-827. Accessed on August 13, 2020. LCC History. n.d. Land Component Command History. https://lc.nato.int/ about-us/history. Accessed on July 20, 2020. LCC Mission. n.d. Land Component Command Mission. https://lc.nato.int/ about-us/mission. Accessed on July 20, 2020. LCC Operations. n.d. LANCOM Operations. https://lc.nato.int/operations. Accessed on July 20, 2020. Moran, Daniel. 2019. Geography and Strategy. In Strategy in the Contemporary World, 6th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. Morgan, Patrick. 2019. Liberalism and Liberal Internationalism. In Contemporary Security Studies, 5th ed. Oxford UK: Oxford Press. NFIU2. n.d. NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs). https://lc.nato.int/ope rations/current-operations. Accessed on July 20, 2020. NRF2. n.d. NATO Response Force (Land). https://lc.nato.int/operations/natoresponse-force. Accessed on July 20, 2020. Odgaard, Liselotte. 2014. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Shea, Jamie. 2014. NATO’s Future Strategy: Ready for the Threats of the Future or Refighting the Battles of the Past. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 7

Allied Maritime Command

Abstract This component command, Maritime Command (or simply MARCOM), is responsible for synchronizing sea power dedicated to NATO and NRF exercises and operations. More pointedly, this chapter looks at such issues as the breadth and depth of NATO maritime missions, the availability and use of command and control vessels, and will also provide an understanding of its application in such real-world operations like the NATO counterpiracy mission off the Horn of Africa in recent years. Keywords MARCOM · Standing NATO Maritime Group · Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group

7.1

History

MARCOM was officially launched on the 1st of December 2012 (MCC History, n.d.). It was implemented at the behest of the NATO heads of state to bring about a leaner and more effective maritime command structure (MCC History, n.d.). MARCOM is physically located at the Northwood Headquarters in the United Kingdom; its lineage dates back to 1953 (MCC History, n.d.). Prior to 2012, there were two maritime command headquarters, but © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_7

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as a result of reorganization in 2010, the sole MARCOM headquarters remains at Northwood (MCC History, n.d.). Other historical accounts show the prominence of Northwood’s location. Other maritime functions that have resided there included the NATO Chanel Command in 1966 and the Flag Officer Submarines in 1978 (MCC History, n.d.).

7.2

Overview

This section looks to build upon what was covered in MARCOM’s history section. When turning to the topic of naval power, this subset of the military is very expensive to establish (Ferris 2019, 239). Moreover, to maintain naval power is extremely costly (Ferris 2019, 239). The Alliance has many standardization agreements (STANAGS) that govern naval operations (JP 3-33 2018, II-16–II-17). This component provides unique capabilities to the joint force commander with the emphasis placed on maritime systems (JP 3-33 2018, III-4). Often, it is this maritime component that will have the authority over forces assigned or attached to it to perform operational level missions (JP 3-33 2018, III-4). Why are maritime operations important? The control of the seas is critical for the free flow of shipping, and maintaining unimpeded sea lines of communication; likewise, maritime operations can focus on embargo enforcement, blockades, and interception operations (JP 3-32 2018, ix). Moreover, these sea-based operations can help in the location, classification, tracking, and targeting of surface-based vessels, submarines, and aircraft flying over the water (JP 3-32 2018, ix). What’s more is that MARCOM can provide the joint force commander with options pertaining to maneuver along the littorals and could assist in the conduct of over-the-shore forcible entry operations (JP 3-32 2018, ix). NATO even participated in the counterpiracy mission off the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden in recent years (Johnston 2017, 174; Nissen 2014, 157). What’s more, this commander can provide integrated C2 (with communications) over maritime forces (JP 3-32 2018, ix; JP 6-0, 2015, vii). Likewise, a maritime command can be instrumental in the conduct of missions in both denied and degraded environments (JP 3-32 2018, ix). The DJTF headquarters has even used a naval vessel as a C2 platform during Exercise Steadfast Jaguar in 2006.

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Functions essential to this command include five broad areas. Operational access provides the joint force commander with the flexibility to project military forces in areas of operation that are accessible by water (JP 3-32 2018, x). Secondly, show of force and deterrence are often effective at altering the behavior of potential belligerents (JP 3-32 2018, x). Moreover, control of the seas is paramount for the successful implementation and accomplishment of maritime missions (JP 3-32 2018, x). Power projection will also help underscore and bring to fruition deterrence activities and objectives (JP 3-32 2018, x). Finally, maritime security operations, or MSOs, help set the conditions for greater security and protection of sovereignty in the seas (JP 3-32 2018, x). What is more is that the joint force commander can make use of MARCOM for the unity of effort, the command’s focus, and can also bring about the synchronization of efforts (JP 3-32, xi; AJP-01 2017, 1– 13; AJP-3.2 2016, 1–15; AJP-3.3.3 2014). MARCOM can do so through its “forward deploy, flexible, sea-based force” (JP 3-32 2018, xi). MARCOM serves as the subject matter expert for all things maritime. Accordingly, it helps ensure a concerted effort in planning naval operations in support of the joint force commander’s mission and objectives (JP 3-32 2018, xiii). It helps do so through the preparation for multiple (often simultaneous) missions that are prioritized, and deconflicted while also acknowledging the limitations of naval capabilities (JP 3-32 2018, xiii). MARCOM also considers the ROEs employed by NATO and other troop contributing nations when looking to put into play nationally owned maritime assets. 7.2.1

MARCOM Overview

MARCOM is NATO’s single point command and subject matter expert for all things related to maritime issues (MCC Overview, n.d.). It is through Maritime component commands that seaborne C2 is achieved (JP 3-32 2018). Accordingly, it is a multinational workplace staffed by more than 300 civilians and military personnel alike from 22 NATO member countries (MCC Overview, n.d.). The Maritime Command is responsible for conducting real-world naval operations and exercises at the behest of SACEUR (MCC Overview, n.d.). This has included the counterpiracy mission off the Horn of Africa and support to the NATO Response Force concept (Flockhart 2014, 85; Nissen 2014, 157).

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7.3 7.3.1

Missions MARCOM Mission

A majority of the world’s population is located along coasts with access to major bodies of water; accordingly, most of the people on the planet are within range of missiles and aircraft that can be carried by naval vessels (Moran 2019, 260). This section affords consideration to MARCOM’s support to maritime missions (MCC Mission, n.d.). It focuses attention on real-world events as well as the maritime groups that make up the command. Simply stated, MARCOM has a core mission (MCC Mission, n.d.). “Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) is the central command of all NATO maritime forces and the MARCOM Commander is the primary maritime advisor to the Alliance” (MCC Mission, n.d.). It must strive to remain relevant and dedicated to evolving as threats change (Odgaard 2014; Shea 2014). 7.3.2

Operation Sea Guardian

Up until 2016, NATO had implemented Operation Active Endeavor, a counterterrorism mission in the Mediterranean Sea (Sea Guardian, n.d.). Following the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO transformed this mission to Operation Sea Guardian (Sea Guardian, n.d.). This is a non-Article 5 operation centering on maritime security issues with the express intent of working with Mediterranean partners to foster situational awareness, while simultaneously striving to deter and counter acts of terrorism (Sea Guardian, n.d.). The operation focuses attention on several tasks. These include the likes of (1) supporting maritime situational awareness, (2) maintaining freedom of navigation, (3) counterterrorism that is maritime related, (4) conducting interdiction missions, (5) countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), (6) enhancing capacity building among partner nations, and (7) finally protecting critical infrastructure (Sea Guardian, n.d.). 7.3.3

Maritime Groups

SACEUR has several standing naval forces who respond to his operations (Maritime Groups, n.d.). They consist of Standing NATO Maritime

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Groups 1 and 2, and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups 1 and 2 (Maritime Groups, n.d.). 7.3.3.1 Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) This group serves as a maritime immediate reaction force. Accordingly, it consists of four to six destroyers and frigates and the role of this group is to provide NATO with an operational level capability to deal with naval threats. It was brought to fruition in January of 2005 and as of June 2020, consists of ships from Norway and Canada (SNMG1, n.d.). 7.3.3.2 Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 is akin to SNMG1. As of June 2020, it consists of ships from both Greece and Germany (SNMG2, n.d.). 7.3.3.3

Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCG1) This group is responsible for clearing sea lines of communication and removing jettisoned ordnance that could otherwise impede naval operations and has the ability to move freely about the seas. As of June 2020, it consists of naval forces from Germany (SNMCG1, n.d.). 7.3.3.4

Standing NATO Mine Countermeasure Group 2 (SNMCG2) Like SNMCG1, it has the same counter ordinance mission. As of June 2020, it consists of forces from Greece (SNMCG2, n.d.).

7.4

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 7.1 provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (S.W.O.T.) of this organization. Details follow in the paragraphs below. Most countries of the world find at least part of their borders located on a body of water. Moreover, over 70% of the planet’s surface is covered in water. As a result, maritime capabilities are useful in moving equipment and supplies at a much less expensive rate (albeit much slower) than airplanes can. Also, for security purposes, maritime forces are often necessary to prevent activities like the movement of people and goods illegally into one’s country. The Alliance is lucky to have many countries with formidable navies that serve as a key strength from which NATO can draw.

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Table 7.1 Allied Maritime Command SWOT Strengths

Weaknesses

Robust navies of many NATO member countries

Limited C2 bandwidth aboard vessels Expensive to maintain blue water capabilities

Flexibility

Opportunities

Threats

Invest in more maritime capabilities

Blue water navies of Russia and China Vast waterways to smuggle terrorists and others engaged in illicit behavior Pirates Strait vulnerability Hypersonic weapons

Many countries in NATO have a more robust maritime capability (like Canada, Norway, Germany, Greece, the United Kingdom, and the United States). These are referred to as blue water navies and often include very expensive hardware to protect the weapons’ capabilities and include such things as aircraft carriers and submarines. As is the case with strategic and tactical airlift capabilities, these are often seen as very expensive and ones that nations turn to when looking to cut budgets to save money. Maritime capabilities have some weaknesses. One is C2 bandwidth and the reliance on satellite communications. NATO will have to grapple with this and encourage its member nations to invest in redundant communications systems to protect against anti-satellite jamming capabilities used by countries like Russia and China. Likewise, most countries, therefore, opt to invest in a littoral capability because they lack the financial resources to fund significant naval capabilities. Nations often adhere to the 12 nautical mile notion whereby they see their legal borders expanding out into the water off the shore out to this distance. To patrol these areas is not as expensive as having more robust naval deliverable systems that can operate well beyond this distance; this is often referred to as having a brown water navy. This can be seen as a weakness for countries that lack a true blue water naval capability. There is an opportunity. For NATO to maximize its flexible response capability, it will have to encourage its member countries to continue to

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invest in their navies especially the more developed ones. Though this will be expensive, maritime investment will be necessary for the Alliance to remain relevant moving forward through the twenty-first century. There are threats. That stated, both Russia and China have and continue to invest in blue water capabilities. In order for NATO to remain relevant in the twenty-first century, it must continue to invest in these capabilities. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, water consumes much of the earth’s space. Accordingly, it is impossible for NATO to be everywhere at all times; because of this, it will be difficult for the Alliance to patrol all areas from where threats can emerge. Piracy has been a challenge in recent years (Moran 2019, 262). Likewise, there are rising concerns about the world’s maritime straits (like the Strait of Gibralter) and their vulnerability to closure by terror organizations (Moran 2019, 262). Illegal activity (like drug smuggling and human trafficking) are also concerns. There is one more threat. This includes the likes of hypersonic weapons. NATO will have to look to guard against threats to key choke points (especially those where commerce is concerned) and will have to encourage member countries to invest in counter hypersonic weapons to help mitigate their vulnerability from this type of weapon system (especially as Russia and China look to test these).

References AJP-01. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine. https://assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/905877/ 20200728-doctrine_nato_allied_joint_doctrine_ajp_01.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3.2. 2016. Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations. https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/624149/doctrine_nato_land_ops_ajp_3_2.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3.3.3. 2014. Allied Joint Doctrine for Air-Maritime Operations. https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att achment_data/file/624130/doctrine_nato_air_mar_coord_ajp_3_3_3.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. Ferris, John. 2019. Conventional Power and Contemporary Warfare. In Strategy in the Contemporary World, 6th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press.

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Flockhart, Trine. 2014. NATO and EU: A “Strategic Partnership” or a Practice of “Muddling Through”? In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Johnston, Seth A. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore MA, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. JP 3-32. 2018. Joint Maritime Operations. file:///C:/Users/weave/Desktop/JP%203-32.pdf. Accessed on July 31, 2020. JP 3-33. 2018. Joint Task Force Headquarters. file:///C:/Users/weave/Desktop/JP%203-33.pdf. Accessed on July 31, 2020. JP 6-0. 2015. Joint Communications System. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp6_0ch1.pdf?ver=2019-10-15-172254-827. Accessed on August 13, 2020. Maritime Groups. n.d. Maritime Groups. https://mc.nato.int/missions/NATOstanding-naval-forces. Accessed on July 20, 2020. MCC History. n.d. History of MARCOM. https://mc.nato.int/about-marcom/ history. Accessed on July 20, 2020. MCC Mission. n.d. Maritime Command Mission. https://mc.nato.int/default. Accessed on July 20, 2020. MCC Overview. n.d. Maritime Command Overview. https://mc.nato.int/aboutmarcom/life-at-hq-marcom. Accessed on July 20, 2020. Moran, Daniel. 2019. Geography and Stategy. In Strategy in the Contemporary World, 6th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. Nissen, Thomas Elkjer. 2014. Strategizing NATO’s Narratives in Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Odgaard, Liselotte. 2014. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Sea Guardian. n.d. Operation Sea Guardian. https://mc.nato.int/missions/ope ration-sea-guardian. Accessed on July 20, 2020. Shea, Jamie. 2014. NATO’s Future Strategy: Ready for the Threats of the Future or Refighting the Battles of the Past. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. Palgrave Macmillan. New York, USA. SNMCG1. n.d. Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1. https://mc. nato.int/snmcmg1. Accessed on July 21, 2020. SNMCG2. n.d. Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2. https://mc. nato.int/snmcmg2. Accessed on July 21, 2020. SNMG1. n.d. Standing NATO Maritime Group 1. https://mc.nato.int/snmg1. Accessed on July 21, 2020. SNMG2. n.d. Standing NATO Maritime Group 2. https://mc.nato.int/snmg2. Accessed on July 21, 2020.

CHAPTER 8

E3A/D Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) Component

William Yommer is an MPPA student at York College of Pennsylvania and was a contributing researcher to this chapter.

Abstract This AWACs unit exists in Geilenkirchen Germany and provides intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to NATO. It is integral in identifying threats both in the air and on the ground. It does so in the immediate proximity of NATO member nations and formations, as well as providing over-the-horizon ISR support to the Alliance. It has been used repeatedly in real-world operations that include support to the United States immediately following the 9/11 attacks, in the air war in Libya, and other events. This chapter provides readers with an overview of this component. Keywords AWACS · S-400 · E3A

8.1

History

The AWACS component holds a unique position in NATO’s history. It is the first multinational flying unit that was established by NATO (E3A Structure, n.d.). Development of both the E3A and E3D components began in 1978 when NATO members wanted to add an Airborne Early © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_8

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Warning (AEW) system to their airspace defenses. This was a particular concern when considering that the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union was at its peak. It signaled NATO’s largest procurement project of that time. Full deployment took years to accomplish, with the E3A component not becoming operational until 1988 and the E3D in 1992 (Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, n.d.). However, the nascent establishment of AEW capability was still marked as significant in the 1970s and 1980s (Johnston 2017, 124). This is especially true as the new E3A and E3D systems provided valuable military assistance in early stages of development, before full deployment was even reached. The E3A specifically, launched its first major action during the prelude to the Gulf Crisis in 1990–1991 as part of Operation Anchor Guard. The aircraft were used to increase surveillance on Iraqi forces and help maintain defense of Turkey from threat of attack (Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, n.d.). The early 1990s also saw the E3A component monitor Mediterranean air space as part of Operation Agile Genie in 1992. The deployment had been a result of an air embargo placed by the United Nations on Libya. It did so in order to cajole the Libyan government to hand over suspects of a terrorist bombing that occurred in 1988 (Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, n.d.). Later, in 2016 the AWACS E3A component also helped enforce the arms embargo placed on the Libyan government and NATO continued to monitor its airspace. These planes previously were integral in the air war over Libya (Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014; Jakobsen 2014) until the fall of the dictatorship setup by Muammar Gaddafi. Additionally, the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1992 saw both the E3A and E3D deployed on their longest mission to date. From 1992 to 2004 both components were responsible for supporting peacekeeping forces and aircraft entering and leaving Balkan territories (Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, n.d.) Another major event for NATO’s AWACS came in 2001 in the aftermath of the devastating 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States. The United States’ government formally requested NATO AWACS support to take some pressure off their own forces. It was the only time in history that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was invoked, calling on fellow NATO members for aid (Johnston, 201, 165). NATO AWACS provided direct support to the United States shortly thereafter (Johnston 2017, 166). Following this, NATO AWACS also expanded its missions to support counterterrorism operations in the Mediterranean and was later

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engaged in Operation Afghan Assist. This latter operation saw NATO E3A component aircraft support ISAF in Afghanistan by supplying information to protect friendly forces (Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, n.d.). This operation was also notable due to it being the first time NATO AWACS were supporting an operation while stationed in a country not part of NATO (Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, n.d.).

8.2

Overview

This unit consists of three wings. More pointedly, these include operations, logistics, and base support (E3A Structure, n.d.). Additionally, its aircraft operate out of forward operating bases and one forward operating location (E3A Structure, n.d.). Each wing is commanded by a colonel. The E3A workforce consists of roughly 1400 personnel (E3A Structure, n.d.). 8.2.1

Command Mission

The overall mission of this organization is to monitor NATO airspace. More pointedly, its precise mission is defined as having the ability to, “deliver ready, responsive, Airborne Early Warning, Battlefield Management and Command and Control capability to operational commanders in support of NAC-approved taskings” (E3A Mission, n.d.).

8.3

Operations

As stated earlier in this book, NATO has been and remains engaged in a wide array of missions around the world; these include such areas as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis and consequence management, disaster response, supporting peacemaking, as well as, humanitarian assistance (E3A Operations, n.d.). The role of this organization is to cover full-spectrum air battle management, and this includes the likes of air-to-air and air-to-ground control, air policing, air surveillance, force marshalling, combat search and rescue operations, as well as threat broadcast missions (E3A Operations, n.d.).

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8.3.1

Current Operations

8.3.1.1

Support to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) First and foremost, NATO AWACS are engaged in the fight against the Islamic State (Current Operations, n.d.). It has remained so since October 2016 and has used this ISR platform to provide coalition forces with situational awareness. These airplanes are used to coordinate coalition air strikes and to provide C2 (with interoperable communications systems) to friendly aircraft operating in Iraq and Syria (Current Operations, n.d.; JP 6-0 2015, vii). 8.3.1.2 Support to Operation Sea Guardian This operation commenced in October 2016 and was NATO’s AWACS support to this counterterrorism mission (Current Operations, n.d.). As stated in the MARCOM chapter, NATO transitioned from Operation Active Endeavor to Sea Guardian encapsulating a broader maritime mission (Current Operations, n.d.). Accordingly, AWACS aircraft provide a three-dimensional perspective of ISR capabilities to maritime forces operating on the sea (Current Operations, n.d.). Other tasks include support to maritime missions stated in Chapter 7. More pointedly, AWACS (E3As and E3Ds) provide what is referred to as a “Recognized Maritime Picture” (RMP) linked with its built-in C2 capabilities to provide an Automatic Identification System (AIS) to enhance RMP in determining friend or foe on the surface below (Current Operations, n.d.). 8.3.1.3 Assurance Methods Mission This mission dates back to 2014 as approved by the NAC in direct response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its meddling in the affairs of Ukraine (Current Operations, n.d.; Jakobsen 2019; Morgan 2019, 39). Moreover, NATO AWACS orbit Poland and Romania to conduct air surveillance in the eastern part of NATO’s territory (Current Operations, n.d.). Orbits over time have expanded to include the Baltics and Turkey (Current Operations, n.d.).

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8.3.1.4 NRF Support Like other elements of NATO, this command remains ready to support NRF missions (Current Operations, n.d.). The AWACS would be a center of gravity assisting NATO in ISR collection, providing situational awareness, and C2 support to future NATO contingency operations. 8.3.2

Fleet

NATO operates a fleet of both E3A aircraft (14 total) and E3D aircraft (six total) (Fleet, n.d.). Both are based on the Boeing 707 platform and usually operate at an altitude of 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) above ground and can monitor more than 400 kilometers of battlespace (Fleet, n.d.). The most distinguishing features differentiating the two aircraft are the larger engine design, refueling probe, and pods located at the wingtips of the E3D platform (Fleet, n.d.). These provide the Alliance with a significant enabler (Jakobsen 2014). 8.3.3

Crew

The crew of the AWACS includes an accoutrement of experts (Crew, n.d.). Likewise, it encapsulates a team consisting of two pilots, one flight engineer, a mission crew usually consisting of one tactical director, one flight allocator, two weapons controllers, one surveillance controller, three surveillance operators, one passive controller, one communications technician, one radar technician, and one system technician (the mission crew can be task organized as required) (Crew, n.d.).

8.4

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 8.1 provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (S.W.O.T.) of this organization. Details follow in the paragraphs below. The primary strength of the NATO AWACS force is that it is far ahead of any of its rivals in terms of resources, technology, and equipment. NATO has the money and power to perform modernization efforts and refits that ensure each AWACS is operating with the latest upgrades that the private industry has to offer. The last major upgrade for NATO AWACS occurred in 2018 and NATO has already begun sponsoring competition between developers and various industries for development

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Table 8.1 E3A/D SWOT

Strengths

Weaknesses

NATO member resources

Small number of aircraft for growing responsibilities Obsolescence projected in 2035

Advance technology and equipment Strong industrial relations Opportunities

Threats

Pursuit of new missions to maintain relevance

Russian air defenses and aggression in Eastern Europe

of the next generation of AWACS platform (NATO 2020a). The strong ties that NATO has to private industries can also be seen as a major strength as they have no issue in fulfilling large orders or contracts with large companies such as Boeing (NATO 2019). Leading industrial experts and designers are also at NATO’s disposal, constituting the best and brightest of dozens of nations. However, AWACS is not without some weaknesses. The primary weakness of NATO’s AWACS Component is the relatively small size of its force in opposition to its growing global responsibilities. NATO only has 20 AWACS aircraft that it can call upon for duty compared to the United States and Russia which have nearly twice that number (U.S. Air Force 2015). The AWACS are incredibly expensive and difficult to manufacture; in the event of a major loss, NATO would have a hard time replacing destroyed/damaged units. In the last 20 years alone, NATO has had to deploy its forces to action in the Middle East during the Syrian civil war to help rebel forces, and in support of the Alliance’s mission in Afghanistan. Furthermore, as terrorist groups continue to expand globally, NATO will have to stretch its AWACS forces thin over the coming decades. This is further complicated by the fact that Russia is also expanding its own AWACS platforms (Military Watch Magazine 2019). While the number of AWACS platforms that NATO possess already have proven sufficient for all operations thus far, a larger force will be necessary in the future. This is especially true as the threats of terrorism continue to grow in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia. In addition, another minor weakness is that the entire fleet status is projected to be obsolete by the year 2035; the Boeing 707 platform is

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no longer produced (NATO 2020b). However, this is of little concern as NATO is already working on the next phase of their AWACS platform development and should have a new design system worked out and manufactured before the 2035 deadline. The first opportunity for NATO AWACS is the acquisition of new mission sets. Specifically, these include missions related to counterterrorism that fall outside of the traditional sphere of NATO territory. Although, the original purpose of NATO AWACS was to serve as a monitoring and early warning defense system against the Soviet Union. The rise of global terrorism and its impacts on NATO members has opened new roles for AWACS to fulfill. This can be seen in the aftermath of 9/11 when NATO AWACS contributed its personnel and components to help the United States in protecting its homeland against further attacks from terrorist groups by monitoring the east coast for hostile activity (Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, n.d.). NATO AWACS also later assisted with the counterterrorist activities in Afghanistan, despite it being completely outside of the platforms’ operating area (Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, n.d.). Furthermore, AWACS has become a strong policing tool for the international community. For example, NATO AWACS were the systems that monitored the Libyan government to make sure it was following the arms embargo placed upon it (Airborne Early Warning and Control Force, n.d.). The second opportunity that the NATO AWACS has is the support it can provide to the enlargement of NATO members to include countries within Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the support the AWACS can provide to forewarn of Russian action. Specifically, the incorporation of Ukraine and Georgia as future NATO countries, both of which are moving toward achieving a Membership Action Plan, could be the beneficiaries of significant strategic advantage that can be provided by the AWACS capability (Brookings Institution and Pifer 2019). It would allow for deployment of AWACS deeper into territory formerly influenced by Russia and could considerably expand NATO’s awareness of and reactions to the movement of Russian forces. In the case of Georgia, it would also allow for another safe area of deployment into the Middle East, including Afghanistan, outside of Turkey. A stronger NATO presence in Georgia would also mean that Russia would be forced to stretch its defensive lines further south, taking some pressure off of Eastern Europe. The only major threat faced by NATO AWACS is in the defensive capabilities of Russia as it is the only current adversary that has the

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means by which to match and counter the AWACS. Russia leverages the most of its A-50 and A-50U ISR platforms to fulfill its needs. The A-50 is a holdover from the Soviet Union, originally deployed in 1984; the A-50U is a slightly more advanced model that was developed in the mid2010s; both of these platforms are slightly inferior to the aircraft used by the AWACS component of NATO (Military Watch Magazine 2019). However, Russia is still progressing in its designs for AWACS platforms. The newest AWACS platform that is being deployed by Russia as of 2020 is the A-100. It is considered to be as advanced as the NATO E-3 AWACS models currently in operation, if not better (Military Watch Magazine 2019). Although, it is unlikely Russia will be able to manufacture A-100s in mass, it is still a strong indication that Russia is advancing its AWACS program rapidly in order to match NATO. Additionally, Russia has several weapon systems that are capable of destroying or at least severely reducing the effectiveness of NATO AWACS. The Russian Federation did not only inherit a similar Soviet Union AWACS capability but also a formidable air defense capability in the form of the S-400 systems. All of which Russia has refined and improved on over time in order to counter the advances of NATO AWACS. The Russian S-400 air defense system for example is able to fire hypersonic missiles at any altitude within a 400k radius, which stand a reasonable chance of destroying AWACS craft at any altitude (Military Watch Magazine 2019). These missile defense systems have been strategically placed throughout the Russian border so as to afford its airspace a decent level of protection against enemy AWACS, at least on the Eastern European border. This also does not take into account the Russian air force fighter craft such as the MiG-31 which is also very capable of intercepting and taking down the AWACS platform. ISR is critical to helping form a common operational picture with regard to what is occurring and providing near real-time situational awareness to leaders. This, too, is the case with NATO. Accordingly, the E3A/D platforms employed by the Alliance provide it with a unique capability. In current times, the AWACS are providing western European members with intelligence on Russian air formations operating in the airspace throughout Europe (and sometimes as they intrude into NATO territory). Likewise, this ISR capability has been deployed to the United States in support of defensive measures immediately following the 9/11 attacks and have been used in out-of-area operations throughout the

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Middle East (like the air campaign against Libya back in 2011) (Jakobsen 2019, 289). As NATO progresses through the twenty-first century, and as countries like Russia and China invest in their militaries (to include advanced jet fighters), this platform becomes even more relevant and important as existential threats continue to burgeon. The AWACS as an overthe-horizon intelligence system can provide early warning of imminent threats. Moreover, it can assist Allied Air Command in its role of deconflicting the three-dimensional battlespace if/when the Alliance finds itself in a conflict. After all, air can be seen as a significant force multiplier (Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014). This versatile aircraft is not limited to tracking air targets. It can also provide a picture as to what is unfolding on the ground or on the seas. It is because of this that Allied Land Command and Allied Maritime Command could directly benefit from the intelligence provided by the AWACS as well. The AWACS system is a flexible and capable air surveillance system that integrates the function to control air battle management (AJP-3.3 2016, 2–13). Accordingly, it helps provide situational awareness with timely, reliable, and accurate information during all weather conditions and with regard to all altitude air activity beyond what ground-based radar systems can provide (AJP-3.3 2016, 2–13). The controllers onboard provide defensive and offensive control and battle management (air) capability (AJP-3.3 2016, 2–13). The AWACS will serve as a significant contribution to the Alliance for the foreseeable future, but at some point NATO will have to invest in next-generation technology.

References Airborne Early Warning and Control Force. n.d. History. NATO AWACS E-3A History. https://awacs.nato.int/organisation/hq-naewcf/history#:~:text= The%20NATO%20Airborne%20Early%20Warning,status%20on%201%20July% 201992. Accessed on November 18, 2020. Airborne Early Warning and Control Force. n.d. Past Operations. NATO AWACS E-3A Past Operations. https://awacs.nato.int/operations/past-ope rations. Accessed on November 18, 2020. AJP-3.3. 2016. Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations. https://ass ets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/624137/doctrine_nato_air_space_ops_ajp_3_3.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020.

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Brookings Institution, and S. Pifer. 2019, June 6. NATO’s Ukraine Challenge. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/ 06/natos-ukraine-challenge/. Accessed on November 18, 2020. Crew. n.d. The Crew. https://awacs.nato.int/operations/mission-crew. Accessed on July 21, 2020. Current Operations. n.d. Current Operations. https://awacs.nato.int/operat ions/current-operations. Accessed on July 21, 2020. E3A Mission. n.d. Airborne Early Warning and Control Force Mission. https:// awacs.nato.int/. Accessed on July 21, 2020. E3A Operations. n.d. Operations. https://awacs.nato.int/operations. Accessed on July 21, 2020. E3A Structure. n.d. E3A Component. https://awacs.nato.int/page5835237. aspx. Accessed on July 21, 2020. Fleet. n.d. AWACS Fleet. https://awacs.nato.int/organisation/awacs-fleet. Accessed on July 21, 2020. Jakobsen, Peter V. 2014. The Indispensable Enabler: NATO’s Strategic Value in High-Intensity Operations Is Far Greater Than You Think. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Jakobsen, Peter V. 2019. Coercive Diplomacy: Countering War-Threatening Crisis and Armed Conflicts in Contemporary Security Studies (5th Edition). Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. Johnston, Seth A. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore Maryland, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. JP 6-0. 2015. Joint Communications System. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp6_0ch1.pdf?ver=2019-10-15-172254-827. Accessed on August 13, 2020. Krüger-Klausen, Villiam, and Liselotte Odgaard. 2014. Preparing for an Imperfect World: Strategy in Conflict Management Environments in Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Military Watch Magazine. 2019, October 16. Russia Plans to Challenge the Supremacy of America’s E-3 Sentry with New A-50U and A-100 AWACS Platforms. https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-plans-to-challe nge-the-supremacy-of-america-s-e-3-sentry-with-new-a-50u-and-a-100-awacsplatforms. Accessed on November 18, 2020. Military Watch Magazine [JW1]. 2019, September 21. Russia’s Answer to American AWACS Superiority: A-100 Jets and Hypersonic ‘AWACS Killer’ Missiles. https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-s-answer-toamerican-awacs-superiority-a-100-jets-and-hypersonic-awacs-killer-missiles. Accessed on November 18, 2020.

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Morgan, Patrick. 2019. Liberalism and Liberal Internationalism in Contemporary Security Studies (5th Edition). Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. NATO. 2019. Secretary General Marks $1 Billion Contract to Modernise NATO’s Fleet of AWACS Aircraft. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ news_171307.htm. Accessed on November 18, 2020. NATO. 2020a. AWACS: NATO’s ‘Eyes in the Sky’. NATO—Topic: AWACS AWACS: NATO’s ‘Eyes in the Sky’. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ topics_48904.htm. Accessed on November 18, 2020. NATO. 2020b. Industry Experts Contribute to NATO’s Future Surveillance Capabilities. NATO News. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_1 74078.htm?selectedLocale=en. Accessed on November 18, 2020. U.S. Air Force. 2015. E-3 Sentry (AWACS). E-3 Sentry (AWACS) > U.S. Air Force > Fact Sheet Display. https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/ Display/Article/104504/e-3-sentry-awacs/#:~:text=There%20are%2031% 20aircraft%20in,E%2D3A’s%20and%20support%20equipment. Accessed on November 18, 2020.

CHAPTER 9

NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA)

Abstract NSPA is physically located in Capellen Luxembourg and provides logistics support to NATO. This agency helps contract for bulk fuel, manages routine and scheduled maintenance on NATO common weapon systems, and provides support to NATO exercises and operations. Its support ranges from that at its static location in Europe to hands-on support in recent forward-deployed locations like Afghanistan, Kosovo, and NATO exercise locations. Keywords NSPA · Central European Pipeline System · Heavy Airlift Wing · Logistics

9.1

History

NSPA traces its lineage back to 1958 (NSPA History, n.d.). The organization was originally called the NATO Maintenance Supply Services Agency (NMSSA) and was headquartered out of Paris France (NSPA History, n.d.). In 1961, the NAC modified the name and revised the charter. It then became the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) (NSPA History, n.d.). A decade later, NAMSA moved from France to Luxembourg where it resides today (NSPA, n.d.). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_9

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As a result of a series of NATO reforms, in 2012 the organization was renamed as the NATO Support and Procurement Agency. Accordingly, it absorbed not only the functions of NAMSA, but also those of the Central Europe Pipeline Management Agency, and the NATO Airlift Management Agency as well (NSPA History, n.d.).

9.2

Mission and Vision

9.2.1

Mission Statement

The NATO Support and Procurement Agency has a unique mission in support of the Alliance’s objectives. More to the point, “the mission of the NATO Support and Procurement Organisation is to provide responsive, effective and cost-efficient acquisition, including armaments procurement; logistics; operational and systems support and services to the Allies, NATO Military Authorities and partner nations, individually and collectively, in time of peace, crisis and war, in order to maximize the ability and flexibility of their armed forces, contingents, and other relevant organisations, within the guidance provided by the North Atlantic Council, to execute their core missions” (NSPA, n.d.). 9.2.2

Vision Statement

NSPA is looking to adapt to challenging conditions around the globe. Accordingly, “NSPA’s vision is to be NATO’s premier procurement, logistics and services provider team, delivering an integrated network of capabilities for NATO, and its Nations and Partners” (NSPA, n.d.).

9.3

Overview

NSPA is fully engaged in both joint logistics and contract support operations which involves all aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, and outsourcing to include contingency contracting (JP 4-0 2019; JP 4-10 2019). NSPA is what is referred to as a customer-funded agency; it operates on a “no profit - no loss” basis. Moreover, NSPA serves as the executive body for the NATO Support and Procurement Organization (NSPO), of which all 30 NATO nations are members. The countries that are represented in the NSPO Agency Supervisory Board (ASB) direct and control the NSPA’s activities. At present time, this agency employs

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approximately 1100 staff and is headquartered in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Capellen), with four operational centers in Luxembourg, France, Hungary, and Italy (NSPA, n.d.). What’s more is that NSPA brings together in a single organization the logistics and procurement support activities of NATO, thereby providing integrated multinational support solutions to the Alliance’s stakeholders. On April 1, 2015, the NAC-approved changes to the NATO Support Organisation Charter with the implementation of the NATO Support and Procurement Organization, where the NATO Support and Procurement Agency acts as NSPO’s executive body. These changes demonstrate the expanded capabilities of NSPA, its scope and the inclusion of major, multinational weapon system acquisition for NATO’s expanded capability set (NSPA, n.d.). NSPA is a logistics enabler. As such, it is integral in the sustainment function (static and deployed) vis-à-vis logistical support, the synchronization of efforts, to help enable freedom of action when and wherever needed (JP 4-10 2019, ix). Accordingly, efforts gravitate around logistics enablers; these include the likes of unity of effort, asset visibility, and quick & precise response (JP 4-0 2019, x; AJP-01 2017, 1–13). There are five logistics areas that NSPA should consider to support Alliance efforts. These include warfighting readiness, global integrations, competition in operations short of combat, innovation, and the strengthening of relations (within the Alliance and through other troopcontributing nations) (JP 4-0 2019, x). This agency has a key responsibility to the Alliance for integrating logistics. Moreover, it must be part of the planning process to better enable success that would lead to mission accomplishment. To do so, would help in not just the planning, but the synchronization of efforts, the execution of support, all while periodically assessing success and adapting accordingly (JP 4-0 2019, x). A key challenge will be to out-of-area deployed operations (JP 4-0 2019, II–1). The deployment and subsequent distribution of support is critical in the context of the “global dispersion of threats, compounded with the necessity to rapidly deploy” (JP 4-0 2019, II–1). A dichotomy also exists whereby considerations should be afforded to reducing the logistics footprint wherever possible to enable greater flexibility especially when looking at fluid offensive operations; this in turn will help provide the joint force commander with more options to conduct operations at the time and place of his/her choosing (JP 4-0 2019, II–1).

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Contracting out of services has become more popular in recent years (JP 4-0 2019, II–10). By turning to in-country or in-theater sources of supplies and services, can ultimately provide better and more responsive support and could free up strategic lift capabilities (air and sea) to dedicate limited space to moving combat equipment (JP 4-0 201, II–10). That stated, contract support must be integrated early in the planning process, it must be coordinated, and the provision synchronized so as to not impede air, land, or sea lines of communication to better allow for combat power to move freely about the area of operation (JP 4-0 2019, II–10). That stated, NSPA, as it contracts out for supplies and services, must properly vet vendors to ensure they truly have the capability to deliver on agreed-upon terms. 9.3.1

Logistics Operations

The NSPA’s Logistics Operations does not just deliver traditional inservice logistics support for various NATO weapon systems, but it also provides logistics services in a wider context, and this includes support to NATO and the nations as an integrator of logistics as part of a multinational initiative in direct support of deployed NATO forces (AJP-3 2019, ix; AJP-4 2018). NSPA’s Logistics Operations enables cooperative logistics services to a variegated mix of customers that include not just NATO nations, but other NATO bodies as well by underpinning three basic principles: consolidation, centralization, and competition (Support to Operations, n.d.). 9.3.1.1 Consolidation The consolidation of logistics requirements encapsulates two or more customers. The consolidation of requirements can enable economies of scale where larger quantities can be ordered, resulting in lower, per unit prices (Support to Operations, n.d.). 9.3.1.2 Centralization Through the placing of requirements with Logistics Operations, its customers realize the added advantage of dealing with a single entity instead of having to work with multiple suppliers and service providers (Support to Operations, n.d.).

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9.3.1.3 Competition By employing international competitive bidding, this process helps ensure that NATO customers obtain high quality goods and services at the lowest prices (Support to Operations, n.d.). The NSPA’s Logistics Operations’ nine program offices are meeting the needs of customers by providing support to them through different support partnerships that have been established and through other legal frameworks (Support to Operations, n.d.). Approximately 750 engineers, logisticians, and technicians are seen as a de facto extension of national capabilities and multinational logistics experts are consistently moving forward to ensure that customers are in receipt of the support needed to sustain force readiness (Support to Operations, n.d.). 9.3.2

Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) Program

9.3.2.1 Mission NATO’s Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) Program is responsible for managing the financing, operation, and maintenance of a fully integrated, cross-border pipeline (fuel) and the requisite storage system in direct support of NATO’s operational military requirements; this occurs during peacetime, crisis and conflicts, and is inclusive of expeditionary operations (Central European Pipeline, n.d.). The CEPS Program Board serves as the governing body for the CEPS Program; it consists of representatives from the CEPS member nations (Central European Pipeline, n.d.). 9.3.2.2 The Six Member Nations “The CEPS Programme member nations are Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, and the United States. The member nations with CEPS assets within their territory are called the host nations and comprise the following: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and The Netherlands” (Central European Pipeline, n.d.). 9.3.3

NATO Airlift Management (NAM) Program

The NATO Airlift Management Program Office is one that serves as an integral part of the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA); it has the responsibility to execute acquisition and sustainment at the

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behest of the member countries of the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) (NAMP, n.d.). Accordingly, it manages all life-cycle activities gravitating around the Boeing Globemaster III large transport aircraft (NAMP, n.d.). Likewise, this mission execution falls under the SAC’s operational arm, the multinational military unit, as well as the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) (NAMP, n.d.). The NAM Program is split in two divisions. The first is the Weapon Systems Management division, and it is responsible for life-cycle management of the actual C-17 weapon system and other aeronautical products (NAMP, n.d.). The Wing Support Management division, the second division, is responsible for providing direct support to the HAW as well as the life-cycle management of SAC infrastructure (NAMP, n.d.). 9.3.4

NSPA Support Units

All activities and functions of the NSPA operation are underpinned by those that work in these support offices; they plan, monitor, and control many of the support activities of this agency (NSPO, n.d.). These include but are not limited to the organization’s strategic planning, its resource planning, the personnel management of agency personnel, quality management, the agency’s communications and information systems, its physical infrastructure, NSPA security, and the safety and general administration of NSPA (NSPA, n.d.). These units sustain and refine on a continuous basis; their contribution to NSPA’s activities help ensure efficient and effective support, with a particular emphasis on the strategic and imaginative use of information technology (IT) in support of the programs, partnerships as well as the human resources functions, and the subsequent tailoring of manpower and personnel services with a focus on the operational environment, to help bring to fruition a streamlined structure (NSPA, n.d.). The express intent of the support offices aims to reduce support costs to customers with a renewed focus on developing close cooperation between support units that will leverage greater advantages (NSPA, n.d.).

9.4

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 9.1 provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (S.W.O.T.) of this organization. Details follow in the paragraphs below.

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Table 9.1 NSPA SWOT Strengths

Weaknesses

Logistics integration/enabler experience Economies of scale contracts Experience in exercises and real word operations Pipeline

Pipeline Vendors that don’t deliver

Opportunities

Threats

Expand offerings to supranational organizations (UN / EU)

High-intensity conflict risk

Logistics support underpins almost all of life’s activities. This is particularly true when looking at running large organizations, sustaining operations, and supporting military missions. This also directly applies to all that NATO is involved in around the world whether at static headquarters locations or in deployed settings. Logistics can be seen as a significant enabler allowing NATO flexibility to carry out numerous missions (Jakobsen 2014). Most NATO member nations have logistical units to support their own militaries. They are capable of feeding their forces, providing troops with potable water and uniforms, arming individuals and weapon systems, providing engineering material, medical supplies, perform maintenance functions, and transportation. Because of the varied mix of things needed to sustain organizations and military formations, the intricacies of such can be quite daunting and challenging. Often, when multiple formations of troops of different nations show up on the same battlespace to join forces, there can be duplication of effort. There are strengths associated with NSPA. Because of this, an organization like NSPA can help deconflict the logistics sustainment of various activities and can integrate logistics capabilities. This author saw this firsthand during deployments to Afghanistan when NSPA would handle the contracts for running various dining facilities as well as executing bulk fuel support to NATO operations. Moreover, what makes logistics support even more difficult are the limited access points and throughput routes that countries would need to bring in the support to their formations. This can quickly subsume the capacities of ports and airfields, as well as strain road networks leading to log jams rendering forces ineffective.

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A secondary benefit and strength to having a single logistics entity is that it could help save money because instead of multiple nations bidding on limited supplies and services thereby inflating the cost of those because of high demand, NSPA could achieve economies of scale contracts at reduced costs saving Alliance members money over time. NSPA is a fee for service provider (AJP-4 2018, 2–8). This in turn means it is a “customer funded” agency that serves as a conveyance to contractors who often provide the support for ACO operations at all levels. NSPA has a plethora of real-world experience supporting operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. This agency has stepped up and filled the void in taking on the complex tasks of ensuring that major NATO headquarters in forward-deployed locations had the requisite food, water, petroleum, construction, and maintenance support where and when needed. Finally, coat-tailing off of the economies of scale strength, is the Central European Pipeline System. NATO, and by extension NSPA, has a penchant for petroleum support for European cross-border support and storage from which NATO member nations in Europe can draw. That stated, the CEPS could be seen as a center of gravity on the part of an adversary. Protecting it is quite difficult and this could be seen as a significant weakness. Reliable vendor support could be problematic. Though NSPA goes to great lengths to ensure the reliability of vendors before awarding contracts, there is still a possibility that corruption could set in and what could ensue would be failure to deliver on supplies and services by a vendor. This author saw this specifically in Afghanistan, where subcontractors would siphon off fuel out of delivery trucks and would replace the contents with ballast tanks so that when fuel was gaged at delivery sites, the trucks appeared to have the correct quantity of fuel. Moreover, while in Afghanistan, the United States was skeptical of the vendors used by NSPA and reverted to its own contracts vis-à-vis the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) in order to support its own forces. As a result, and because of demand, contract costs went up. There could be challenges though. Because this is a civilian organization and as a result of there being a need to have people on the ground in hot spots, the cost to entice people to perform these duties could go up. That stated, this author saw NSPA civilians deployed in other forward locations like Cape Verde who performed quite well.

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NSPA has a key opportunity. Unlike other supranational organisation, NATO has shown how NSPA as a logistics integrator has been successful at synchronizing logistics support to operations short of full-on combat. Accordingly, if it has excess capacity, it could look to offer services at a cost-plus level especially as organizations like the United Nations and European Union might find themselves engaged in humanitarian relief or peacekeeping operations. There is one weakness. NATO has not been engaged in a high-intensity conflict. It is one thing to find vendor support in events short of combat, it is another ballgame altogether when major combat is taking place. NSPA, like NATO, has adapted over its history. It has changed significantly in recent years. This agency should constantly look to seek self improvement as it strives to remain relevant moving forward through the twenty-first century as it has in the first two decades of this century.

References AJP-01. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine. https://assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/905877/ 20200728-doctrine_nato_allied_joint_doctrine_ajp_01.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3. 2019. Allied Joint Doctrine. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/gov ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/797323/doctrine_ nato_conduct_of_ops_ajp_3.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-4. 2018. Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics. https://assets.publishing.ser vice.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 907825/doctrine_nato_logistics_ajp_4.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. Central European Pipeline. n.d. Central European Pipeline System. https:// www.nspa.nato.int/about/ceps. Accessed on September 18, 2020. Jakobsen, Peter V. 2014. The Indispensable Enabler: NATO’s Strategic Value in High-Intensity Operations Is Far Greater Than You Think. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. JP 4-0. 2019. Joint Logistics. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doc trine/pubs/jp4_0ch1.pdf?ver=2020-07-20-083800-823. Accessed on August 13, 2020. JP 4-10. 2019. Operational Contract Support. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/ 36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp4_10.pdf?ver=2019-04-12-133833-707. Accessed on August 13, 2020. NAMP. n.d. NATO Airlift Management Programme. https://nspa.nato.int/ about/namp. Accessed on September 18, 2020.

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NSPA. n.d. NATO Support and Procurement Agency. https://nspa.nato.int/ about/nspa. Accessed on September 18, 2020. NSPA History. n.d. NSPA History. https://nspa.nato.int/about/history. Accessed on September 18, 2020. NSPO. n.d. NATO Support and Procurement Organization. https://nspa.nato. int/about/nspo. Accessed on September 18, 2020. Support to Operations. n.d. Support to Operations. (n.d.). https://nspa.nato. int/about/support-to-operations. Accessed on September 18, 2020.

CHAPTER 10

NATO Communications & Information Systems Group (NCISG)

Danielle Gemperline is an MPPA student at York College of Pennsylvania and was a contributing researcher to this chapter.

Abstract NATO has three dedicated signal battalions. These units have headquarters located in Wesel, Germany (1st NATO Signal Battalion); Grazzanise, Italy (2nd NATO Signal Battalion); and Bydgoszcz, Poland (3rd NATO Signal Battalion). Under the command of the NATO Communications and Information Systems Group (NCISG), these units provide NATO with a communication capability that encompasses computer information systems (CIS) support to deployable headquarters along with cellular, satellite, and voice systems. These signal battalions have the ability to provide deployable headquarters with both unclassified and secret communication capability allowing forces to speak and transmit data to other formations globally. This chapter provides granularity into what these organizations can do. Keywords NCISG · Signal battalion · CIS

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_10

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10.1

NATO Communications & Information Systems Group (NCISG) Overview

The reliable, secure, and synchronized flow of information is paramount for all organizations (JP 6-0 2015; AJP-6 2017). Communications specifically underpins Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems (Ferris 2019). Likewise, properly integrated and protected communication equipment offers leaders advantages in sharing information, establishing situational awareness, and performing C2 for NATO operations (AJP-6 2017, 1– 1; JP 6-0 2015, vii; Shea 2014, 39). These capabilities should help foster success in static NATO operations, deployed missions, as well as allowing NATO organizations to communicate with systems provided by nations in support of NATO operations and NATO-led coalition operations (AJP-6 2017, 1–18). This, in turn, helps with the conduct of decentralized operations by ensuring that reliable, effective, and secure communications systems enable commanders throughout the Alliance to distribute information (AJP-3 2019; JP 3-31 2019, III–13). Moreover, NCIS participates in the Steadfast Cobalt exercises which are designed to test interoperability of C2 systems and NATO’s preparedness to effectively communicate. Headquartered in Mons, Belgium, the NCISG assists in providing these services (NCISG, n.d.). 10.1.1

NCISG Mission

The NCISG seeks “…to provide in theatre CIS services in support of Alliance operations, missions, and exercises, to train and maintain operational readiness of Deployable CIS Modules (DCM), to expand secure end-to-end CIS for mission-specific NATO C2 for deployed headquarters, and to act as the coordinating authority for CIS services in coordination with NATO Communications Information Agency” (NCISG Mission and Vision, n.d.; AJP-01 2017, 5-2–5-5; AJP-3 2019, 1–36; JP 6-0 2015, vii).

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NCISG History

NCISG traces its lineage to the NATO CIS Support Agency (NCSA) (NCISG History, n.d.). Fulfilling many of the same duties as today’s NCISG, the NCSA provided essential CIS support to the Alliance (NCSA Home, n.d.; NCSA Topics, n.d.). In 2012, the NCSA split into two separate organizations–the NCISG and the NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Agency (NCISG History, n.d.). As the NCISG assumed its current role, the NCI Agency focused on the development, acquisition, and maintenance of the CIS resources administered by the NCISG (NCISG History, n.d.). Although they now exist as separate entities, the NCISG and the NCI Agency still collaborate when providing support to the Alliance (NCISG History, n.d.). NCISG Headquarters dates to July 1, 2012 (NCISG History, n.d.). The organization’s Headquarters provides command over the three assigned NATO signal battalions (NCISG History, n.d.). Overseeing this endeavor, the NCISG commander also serves as the Director of Cyberspace for SACEUR (NCISG History, n.d.). Major General Wolfgang E. Renner of Germany has served in this dual position since 2018 (NCISG News 2018). 10.1.3

1st NATO Signal Battalion (1NSB)

Located in Wesel, Germany, the 1st NATO Signal Battalion (1NSB) provides the command over and the training for six deployable CIS modules, operates one command post for NATO DCIS for operations and/or exercises, and performs maintenance on CIS systems (1NSB, n.d.). Likewise, 1NSB has the responsibility for the CIS budget as well as for the execution of local static networks on the Alliance’s behalf (1NSB, n.d.). 10.1.4

2nd NATO Signal Battalion (2NSB)

Situated in Grazzanise, Italy, one will find the 2nd NATO Signal Battalion (2NSB) (2NSB, n.d.). This battalion provides CIS services and facilities to all deployed NATO headquarters (2NSB, n.d.). Moreover, 2NSB manages the connectivity of CIS and “sets up transmission media by establishing, operating, and maintaining two independent command and control and technical control centers (C2TCC) and all available DCIS

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equipment” (2NSB, n.d.). Likewise, this signal unit aspires to administer deployed local area networks (LANs) while providing support and required maintenance services to the field (2NSB, n.d.). In this role, 2NSB provides new deployable communications equipment in support of both exercises and operations in NATO’s AOR (2NSB, n.d.). 10.1.5

3rd NATO Signal Battalion (3NSB)

Activated in January 2020, NATO’s 3rd Signal Battalion (3NSB) is the newest component of NCISG. Located in Bydgoszcz, Poland, this unit provides flexible yet robust and reliable communications at the strategic level to all NATO deployed headquarters (3NSB, n.d.). This role allows NATO commanders to exercise proper C2 over assigned forces during both Article 5 and non-Article 5 exercises and operations (3NSB, n.d.).

10.2 Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Broadly stated, communications and information systems (CIS) collectively include voice and data systems (AJP-6 2017, 1–1). More specifically, communications systems focus on the transmission of pertinent details, whereas, information systems process the material (AJP-6 2017, 1-2– 1-3; JP 6-0 2015, viii; AC/322-D(2016)0017 2016, 19). Through these activities, CIS handle the exchange or imparting of information through speech, writing, or another medium (AJP-6 2017, 1–1). Additionally, these systems account for information management, a process that involves outlining the appropriate protocol for the distribution of vital messages as well as dictating the responsibilities of the various people involved in communications (AJP-6 2017, 1–2). A key part of information management involves information exchange requirements (IERs). These focus on both the source and destination of the information flow among parties (AJP-6 2017, 1–3). IERs do not remain static between missions; therefore, NATO’s CIS architecture must retain a flexible yet standardized nature in order to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of information flow (AJP-6 2017, 1–3; Suzic and Yi 2008, 33–34). In the past, there have been numerous organizations who have independently contributed to the Alliance’s CIS architecture but have caused a considerable number of discrepancies that have hampered the systematic

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capacity to address rapidly changing situations (AC/322-D(2016)0017 2016, 6). Responding to this challenge, NATO introduced the Consultation, Command, and Control (C3) Taxonomy. The C3 classification system provides codified terminology and a vast array of predetermined guidelines that ensure consistency throughout NATO’s CIS (AC/322D(2016)0017 2016, 6–7; AJP-6 2017, 1–3, 1-5–1-6, and 1-17–1-21). Along with the C3 Taxonomy, NATO’s CIS infrastructure utilizes two primary domains, known as the NATO and mission domains. The former allows NATO member nations to access the full network (AJP-6 2017, 1– 20). On the other hand, the Alliance often establishes the latter domain for a specific mission or operation (AJP-6 2017, 1–20). NATO troopcontributing nations in addition to partner countries participating in the mission/operation can access mission domains (AJP-6 2017, 1–20). 10.2.1

Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI)

To ensure the successful employment of CIS, leaders at all levels must integrate and pass information both vertically and horizontally using secure means whenever possible (AJP-6 2017, 1–2). Moreover, CIS leaders should consistently strive to guarantee that these systems remain capable, interoperable, agile, scalable, resilient, service-oriented, autonomous, timely, readily available, and secure (AJP-6 2017, 1-7–1-10; Shea 2014, 36). Instituting these qualities, NATO officials should abide by the principles of Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI). Rationalization, the first component of RSI, deals with a range of activities aimed at improving the organization’s competence (JP-316 2013, 1-8–1-9). Altogether, rationalization increases member nations’ ability to collaborate within a diverse network. When adhering to the principle of rationalization, NATO members focus on measures such as adjusting their priorities, providing support to allies, and consolidating relevant systems (JP-316 2013, 1-8–1-9). This process ultimately enhances military capability as it pertains to various components including weaponry and resources (JP-316 2013, 1-8–1-9). Moreover, standardization constitutes a second valuable principle that guides NATO’s communications strategy. This process involves members’ efforts to ensure consistent and stable guidelines for multinational operations (AJP-01 2017, 1–2; JP 6-0 2015, 3–12). Known as STANAGS,

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standardization agreements contribute to both the Alliance’s endurance as well as its capacity to succeed (AJP-01 2017, 1–2). As the final component of RSI, interoperability remains crucial to the development and utilization of CIS. A complex topic, interoperability can be defined as: The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve allied technical, operational, and strategic objectives. (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2019, A-2; AJP-01 2017, 1–4)

Even though the maintenance of interoperable systems remains crucial to an inherently multinational coalition such as NATO, a variety of factors can hamper the Alliance’s adherence to this principle (AJP-01 2017, 1–2; AJP-6 2017, 1–22, 1–27). Situations, when these obstacles arise, may involve cultural and/or linguistic differences (a grasp of NATO’s two official languages), incompatible technology and equipment, a narrow time frame, unequal access to information, contrasting organizational structures, and interpersonal conflict among leadership (AJP-6 2017, 1-22–1-27; JP 6-0 2015, 3–11; Burton 2015, 15–16; JP-316 2013, 1–11). 10.2.2

Role of CIS

Involved throughout NATO’s activities, communications significantly impact the Alliance’s cohesion and ability to promote common objectives [AJP-01 2017, 1–3; DSG (2010)0528 2010, 1–3 and 23]. Therefore, CIS serve as an integral component of NATO’s infrastructure due to their ability to disseminate vital information. Commanders utilize this material to establish situational awareness, to compose intelligence, and to process numerous forms of data (AJP-6 2017, 1-1–1-2; JP 6-0 2015, viii). As a result, leaders can effectively develop appropriate decisions, formulate plans to implement the decision, and analyze the mission’s effectiveness (JP 6-0 2015, viii). Without these important tasks, NATO’s actions might incur disastrous consequences such as failed missions and otherwise preventable casualties. Specifically referring to joint operations, CIS support involves several factors. The first looks at ensuring both effective and adequate CIS support to foster C2 of assigned forces (AJP-6 2017, 2–6). It also involves the synchronization and publication of plans, associated annexes, and

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operating instructions to support requisite missions (AJP-6 2017, 2–6). Moreover, NCISG exercises managerial functions over CIS support along with reviewing and coordinating plans among subordinates (AJP-6 2017, 2–6). As CIS have continuously enriched the Alliance’s efforts, the transfer of information has repeatedly served as a vital component of various missions. For example, because adequate communications open channels for negotiation and deliberation, this dialogue has endowed NATO with the ability to innovate and to remain flexible (Johnston 2017, 13; Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014, 6–7). Thus, CIS has served as vital components of numerous NATO land operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo along with the Alliance’s naval operations (NCSA Topics, n.d.). The concept of international law further details the importance of CIS. This set of standard rules and principles adopted by the global community apply to NATO due to the Alliance’s status as an international legal personality (Güntelberg 2014, 109; Nauta 2017, 18–19 and 86–107). While not every scholar agrees with this assertion, the international legal system has determined that this Alliance merits various rights and can be held accountable for legal violations due to this attribute (Nauta 2017, 99–106). As a result of NATO’s international legal responsibility, CIS maintain an especially pertinent significance. Should the organization’s inner dialogue fail to communicate a consistent, legally defensible strategy, individuals might elect to execute decisions in violation of international law. This hypothetical situation would not only diminish NATO’s credibility, but might also result in sanctions that would impede the Alliance’s ability to achieve its objectives. Therefore, dialogue initiated through an effective CIS infrastructure guards the organization against this disastrous scenario.

10.3

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

The following section presents an assessment of the NCISG’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (S.W.O.T.). Table 10.1 provides the highlights of the S.W.O.T. analysis. Communication is critical for large organizations such as NATO. Whether it involves data or voice systems, the ability to correspond with one another remains imperative for success. Five touchstones exist that serve as precursors to successful communications. These include adequate

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Table 10.1 NCISG SWOT

Strengths

Weaknesses

Training courses Preparedness exercises

Digital forensics Lack of experience

Opportunities

Threats

Technical solutions

Vulnerability of CIS Uncertainty of cyber threats

Training opportunities

policy, culture, economics and resources, governance, technology and infrastructure (JP 6-0 2015, xv). Additionally, interoperable communications must underpin everything NATO does in order to ensure success (JP 6-0 2015, vii). This means that NATO’s CIS infrastructure must facilitate a trustworthy, agile, and shared flow of information (JP 6-0 2015, viii). Through the aforementioned qualities, these systems serve as the bedrock for C2 execution through aiding the Alliance in collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information throughout the organization’s hierarchy (JP 6-0 2015, vii–viii). Accordingly, command and control helps better enable joint force components to function with greater efficiency and effectiveness across great distances (JP 6-0 2015, viii). NCISG, and by extension the signal battalions, provide essential services that enhance the Alliance’s effectiveness (JP 6-0 2015, ix). These include voice services (assured and unassured), video up-linking, messenger services and multi chat, C2 services, intelligence management, web-based access to Alliance members to mission services, all while helping provide a common operational picture (COP) (JP 6-0 2015, ix). Through these services, NCISG and the NATO signal battalions are key components to enabling NATO to deconflict issues, foster planning, pass orders, and aid in its messaging. Accordingly, robust and varied systems will be necessary for this to continue. Reliable networks like the NATO Unclassified and NATO Secret systems will help underpin the effective flow of digital information whether going outside the organization (unclassified) or the passing of sensitive plans and missions (secret). Voice systems are also necessary. These can include civilian telephones, secure telephone units (STUs), frequency modulating (FM) radios, and satellite systems like the Iridium satellite phone (unclassified) and the Falcon III (secret) systems.

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To help bring success to fruition, information quality is also important. Accuracy should always remain at the forefront and ensure that solid and reliable information is passed to decision makers (JP 6-0 2015, 1–3). Relevance is also important; the information that is transmitted (voice or data) should be mission related (JP 6-0 2015, 1–3). Timeliness and usability of information are also required insofar as one is able to get information to decision makers on time and in a format that can be consumed by them (JP 6-0 2015, 1–3). Information should also subscribe to brevity and must be complete; it must be shrouded with security (JP 6-0 2015, 1–3). Security is a paramount concern, as the Alliance must securely safeguard mission-critical information that could be deemed classified. To accomplish this vital task, information assurance (IA) can help. Accordingly, IA is the defense and protection of information and information systems and does so by helping ensure their availability, confidentiality, and integrity (AJP-6 2017, 1–12). The desired end state is a CIS system that leads to better and more effective command and control from within NATO (AJP-6 2017, 1–16). As part of the IA process, the Alliance has established numerous guidelines to assist individuals in maintaining the secure nature of pertinent documents. These security guidelines include a detailed system of classification levels based on who receives access authorization as well as the severity of any potential security breaches [C-M(2002)49-COR12 2002, 7; United States Authority for NATO Affairs 2007, 13–19]. These detailed instructions further promote security by standardizing how information must be handled, copied, disseminated, and destroyed depending on its classification (United States Authority for NATO Affairs 2007, 16–19). Should classified information fall into the wrong hands, documentation also specifies proper channels for reporting these compromises so that security breaches can be assessed and dealt with in a timely, and efficient manner (United States Authority for NATO Affairs 2007, 20). There are strengths associated with this organization. The NCISG currently demonstrates considerable strengths related to its capacity for adaptation and inter-agency review. For instance, the organization conducts training sessions designed to reflect on past operations while enhancing participants’ skills and knowledge (NCISG News 2020a). In February 2020, the NCISG offered one of these training courses known as the NCISG Lessons Learned Point of Contact (NCISG News 2020a). This program incorporated informative examples based on real NATO

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missions, and it ultimately received positive feedback from the participants (NCISG News 2020a). The NCISG also demonstrates its strengths when conducting a yearly exercise known as Steadfast Cobalt, which tests the interoperability and preparedness of NATO in the event of a major crisis (NCISG News 2020c). As a result, the Alliance guarantees that it can deploy its assets in a timely manner as soon as an emergency arises (NCISG News 2020c). Even though planning and preparation for Steadfast Cobalt typically commences a year in advance, the COVID-19 pandemic prevented the original 2020 itinerary from proceeding as planned (NCISG News 2020b, c). Acknowledging that the Alliance could afford to neither cancel nor indefinitely postpone Steadfast Cobalt, officials demonstrated the organization’s strength and flexibility when formulating a new plan. In accordance with public health guidelines, leaders arranged for this process to proceed virtually (NCISG News 2020b, c). Ultimately, in the fall of 2020, the Alliance successfully initiated Steadfast Cobalt, involving the participation of more than 1100 individuals (NCISG News 2020b, c). Weaknesses related to the Alliance’s relatively new role in the cyber domain present a challenging dilemma for the NCISG. Although cybersecurity concerns originated shortly after the Internet’s inception, the post-Cold War explosion of network accessibility has resulted in higher rates of illegal activity within cyberspace (Cavelty 2008, 1–2 and 9; DeTardo-Bora and Bora 2015, 158; Jasper and Wirtz 2017, 158). Over the years, the plethora of new devices with Internet capabilities has further exacerbated this trend (JP 6-0 2015, xv; DeTardo-Bora and Bora 2015, 170–171). Since an increasingly large number of actors could sabotage NATO’s objectives through attacking its CIS infrastructure, NATO has formally addressed cyber security as a major concern since 2002 (Burton 2015, 297–300). Although the member nations have formally focused on cyber security for nearly two decades, NATO and similar organizations possess inherent weaknesses that increase the difficulty of maintaining secure networks (Burton 2015, 305). For example, forensic technology often experiences issues when identifying the perpetrator(s) of an attack (Burton 2015, 302–303; DeTardo-Bora and Bora 2015, 120). The unconventional, borderless nature of cyber conflicts reveals another weakness because it constitutes new territory upon which the Alliance has not conventionally operated (Burton 2015, 302; Cavelty 2008, 138). This lack of experience

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might hinder the organization’s ability to respond to rapidly emerging threats. Altogether, these weaknesses indicate that the NCISG will need to adapt and continuously improve its cyber security capabilities since the threat of a disastrous cyber attack will continue for the foreseeable future. Heading into a new decade, the NCISG can capitalize on important opportunities that will enhance its capabilities. For instance, large technological corporations operate from headquarters located in NATO member nations such as Germany and the United States. Therefore, the NCISG should seek partnerships with these organizations that can provide valuable technical solutions to current weaknesses within the Alliance’s CIS infrastructure. In addition, the NCISG can improve its effectiveness through opportunities offered from other NATO facilities. As of present, the Allied Command Transformation (see Chapter 11), the Joint Warfare Centre (see Chapter 12), and the Joint Forces Training Centre (see Chapter 14) provide numerous training programs for NATO personnel. Therefore, the NCISG can further develop its workforce in order to ensure that all individuals possess the skills and knowledge necessary to provide reliable and trustworthy CIS services to the Alliance. It is incumbent upon NCISG to mitigate existing threats. Many threats emanate due to high-profile information protection failures. As a result, officials involved with NATO’s CIS must employ actions to safeguard information and to deter malicious insider activity (JP 6-0 2015, xv). Likewise, those involved in intelligence functions should provide threat assessments to more aptly protect the NATO CIS infrastructure (JP 6-0 2015, xvi). More specifically, the NCISG must do more to continuously address cyber security threats as NATO increases its focus on cyber and information warfare (Cavelty 2019). As mentioned previously, cyber security presents a vulnerable aspect of NATO’s CIS infrastructure. Because a cyber attack could decimate technological services critical to daily life and the economy, a hostile force could utilize cyberspace to inflict severe damage on the Alliance as an organization or on any member nation (Cavelty 2008, 138; DeTardo-Bora and Bora 2015, 158 and 161–162). While the true extent of this digital threat remains uncertain, the NCISG must still focus on preventing these potentially devastating attacks due to their pressing nature (Cavelty 2008, 3–5 and 138–139). Thus, the Alliance must continue its focus on cyber security, which will ultimately

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improve interoperability and assist in preparing continuity of operations plans (COOP) in the wake of a cyber attack (AJP-6 2017, 2–6). Finally, electronic warfare (EW) is an issue. As this author experienced in the 1980s when he served as a combat signaler, countries like Russia have (and continue to invest in) EW jamming capabilities. They do so because they realize that if they can inhibit effective C2 operations that this could cripple or at least hinder NATO from operating at optimal levels. NCISG must help protect against EW threats.

References 1NSB. n.d. 1st NATO Signal Battalion. https://ncisg.nato.int/about-us/1nsb. Accessed on July 21, 2020. 2NSB. n.d. 2nd NATO Signal Battalion. https://ncisg.nato.int/about-us/ 2-nsb. Accessed on July 21, 2020. 3NSB. n.d. 3rd NATO Signal Battalion. https://ncisg.nato.int/about-us/3-nsb. Accessed on July 21, 2020. AC/322-D(2016)0017. 2016. C3 Taxonomy Baseline 2.0. https://www.nato. int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_08/20180801_180801-ac322d_2016_0017-c3t.pdf. Accessed on September 22, 2020. AJP-01. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine. https://assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/905877/ 20200728-doctrine_nato_allied_joint_doctrine_ajp_01.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-3. 2019. Allied Joint Doctrine. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/gov ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/797323/doctrine_ nato_conduct_of_ops_ajp_3.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. AJP-6. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/upl oads/attachment_data/file/602827/doctrine_nato_cis_ajp_6.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. Burton, Joe. 2015. NATO’s Cyber Defence: Strategic Challenges and Institutional Adaptation. Defence Studies 15 (4): 297–318. http://dx.doi.org/10. 1080/14702436.2015.1108108. Accessed on September 21, 2020. Cavelty, Myriam Dunn. 2008. Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age. London, UK: Routledge. Cavelty, Myriam Dunn. 2019. Cyber-Security. In Contemporary Security Studies (5th Edition), ed. Collins, Alan. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2019. Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Activities. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Doc

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uments/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%202700.01G.pdf?ver=. Accessed on September 21, 2020. C-M(2002)49-COR12. 2002. Security Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. https://www.valisluureamet.ee/nsa/file/rvo_reg/NATO/Encl_G_CM(2002)49-COR12.pdf. Accessed on September 21, 2020. DeTardo-Bora, Kimberly A., and Dhruba J. Bora. 2015. Cybercrimes: An Overview of Contemporary Challenges and Impending Threats. In Digital Forensics: Threatscape and Best Practices, ed. DeSammons, John. Burlington, MA: Syngress. DSG(2010)0528. 2010. Military Concept for NATO Strategic Communications. https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-STRATCOM-Concept.pdf. Accessed on September 21, 2020. Ferris, John. 2019. Conventional Power and Contemporary Warfare. In Strategy in the Contemporary World (6th Edition), ed. John Baylis, James Wirtz, and Colin Gray. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. Güntelberg, Heidi. 2014. International Law and the Role of Legitimacy. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World, ed. Liselotte Odgaard. New York, USA: Palgrave-Macmillan. Jasper, Scott, and James Wirtz. 2017. Cyber Security. In The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk and Intelligence, ed. Robert Dover, Huw Dylan, and Michael S. Goodman. New York, USA: Palgrave-Macmillan. Johnston, Seth A. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore, Maryland, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. JP-316. 2013. Multinational Operations. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Doc uments/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_16.pdf. Accessed on September 21, 2020. JP 3-31. 2019. Joint Land Operations. https://www.google.com/url?q=https:// www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_31.pdf&sa= D&ust=1602781865515000&usg=AFQjCNFbKlM7cBt1chHqr_mT8bxC p6ucYQ. Accessed on July 31, 2020. JP 6-0. 2015. Joint Communications System. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp6_0ch1.pdf?ver=2019-10-15-172254-827. Accessed on August 13, 2020. Krüger-Klausen, Villiam, and Liselotte Odgaard. 2014. Introduction. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World, ed. Liselotte Odgaard. New York, USA: Palgrave-Macmillan. Nauta, David. 2017. The International Responsibility of NATO and its Personnel During Military Operations. Leiden, Belgium: Brill-Nijhoff. NCISG. n.d. NATO Communications & Information Systems Group. https:// ncisg.nato.int/default. Accessed on July 21, 2020.

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NCISG History. n.d. NATO Communications & Information Systems Group History. https://ncisg.nato.int/about-ncisg/history. Accessed on July 21, 2020. NCISG Mission and Vision. n.d. Vision and Mission. https://ncisg.nato.int/ about-ncisg/vision-and-mission. Accessed on July 21, 2020. NCISG News. 2018. Major General Renner Assumes Command of NCISG. https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2018/major-general-renner-assumescommand-of-ncisg. Accessed on October 8, 2020. NCISG News. 2020a. Lessons Learned Point of Contact Course 4 February 2020. https://ncisg.nato.int/news/2020/lessons-learned-point-ofcontact-course-04-february-2020. Accessed on October 9, 2020. NCISG News. 2020b. NATO Exercise Steadfast Cobalt Proceeds in New Format. https://ncisg.nato.int/news/2020/nato-exercise-steadfast-cob alt-proceeds-in-new-format.aspx. Accessed on October 8, 2020. NCISG News. 2020c. Exercise Steadfast Cobalt 2020. https://ncisg.nato.int/ news/2020/exercise-steadfast-cobalt-2020. Accessed on October 8, 2020. NCSA Home. n.d. The NATO Communications and Information Systems Agency. https://web.archive.org/web/20120314103329/http://www.ncsa. nato.int/index.html. Accessed on October 13, 2020. NCSA Topics. n.d. NCSA: Keeping NATO Connected. https://web.archive. org/web/20120128121933/http://www.ncsa.nato.int/topics/keeping_n ato_connected.html. Accessed on October 13, 2020. Shea, Jamie. 2014. NATO’s Future Strategy: Ready for the Threats of the Future or Refighting the Battles of the Past? In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World, ed. Liselotte Odgaard. New York, USA: Palgrave-Macmillan. Suzic, Robert, and Choong-ho Yi. 2008. Information Exchange Requirements (IER) and Information Exchange Models (IEM). http://ceur-ws.org/Vol340/paper03.pdf. Accessed on September 22, 2020. United States Security Authority for NATO Affairs. 2007. Instruction 1–07: Implementation of NATO Security Requirements. https://www.cdse.edu/mul timedia/shorts/nato/data/USSAN1-07NATO.pdf. Accessed on September 21, 2020.

PART IV

(Relevance): Military Training, Lessons, and Exercises

CHAPTER 11

Allied Command Transformation (ACT)

Abstract This headquarters is akin to SHAPE/ACO and is considered a co-equal to it. Located in Norfolk Virginia (USA), it helps the Alliance run major military exercises and education programs the world over to help create standards across NATO member nations. Though nations have their own exercise and training programs, this does not necessarily translate to interoperability among Alliance member nations. ACT looks to stress the forces during significant and realistic exercises to help prepare NRF standby nations with realistic full-spectrum events to help forces work out kinks to ensure interoperability (especially with communications systems) before assuming standby status. Moreover, it also prepares headquarters rotating into contemporary operations like those in Kosovo and Afghanistan. It also captures lessons learned and runs a major training center. Keywords ACT · Transformation · Capabilities

11.1

History

NATO’s transformation began in earnest after 9/11 (Johnston 2017, 169); this is why, in part, that ACT was established. The attacks resulted in almost 3000 people losing their lives raising the stakes regarding © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_11

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conflict that saw the United States invade Afghanistan to overthrow al Qaeda and the Taliban (Mahnken 2019, 65); NATO would play a significant role in the military action. As a large organization, it must afford consideration to interoperability (Shea 2014, 38). Although change was implemented following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s with a significant flattening of the command and control layers, the operational control for the Alliance shifted to the European continent (Johnston 2017, 169). Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation was activated in June 2003; at this time, it was envisioned for this to be NATO’s instrument of change, to lead the continuous improvement of NATO capabilities to uphold the Alliance’s global security interests (ACT History, n.d.). Prior to 2002, NATO’s two Supreme Commands were Allied Command Europe, established in 1951, and Allied Command Atlantic created the following year (Who We Are, n.d.). Both commands saw streamlining occur at the end of the Cold War reducing the NATO Command Structure from 78 headquarters at its height down to 20 headquarters. In 2002, the NAC took a decision to reorganize the NATO Command Structure to make it more efficient and leaner (Who We Are, n.d.). Moreover, NATO thinking fundamentally shifted; emphasis was placed on functionality rather than geography. Allied Command Europe became Allied Command Operations, and was subsequently responsible for all current Alliance missions, including maritime operations (Who We Are, n.d.). Allied Command Atlantic adapted to become Allied Command Transformation, responsible for preparing NATO to conduct future operations (Who We Are, n.d.). Accordingly, ACT resides in the United States and is situated on Naval Support Activity, Norfolk, VA, which happens to have the largest concentration of fleet headquarters, communication, and administrative facilities outside of Washington D.C. (ACT History, n.d.). The area is home to over 6000 personnel and these include major tenant commands, Joint Staff Hampton Roads, the United States’ Fleet Forces Command, Naval Submarine Forces, the United States’ Marine Corps Forces Command Atlantic, the Naval Surfaces Forces, as well as the Joint Forces Staff College (ACT History, n.d.). From ACT’s inception in 2003, the command has demonstrated the importance placed by NATO member countries on the transformation and development roles as continuous and essential drivers for the Alliance to remain relevant and viable; the drivers of change will help ensure that

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NATO remains poised to deal with full-spectrum operations that may arise in the future (Who We Are, n.d.).

11.2

Overview

Allied Command Transformation had a purpose—it would serve as the Alliance’s nexus focusing on expeditionary capabilities (Johnston 2017, 169). ACT is organized around four principal functions (Who We Are, n.d.). These include: (1) strategic thinking, (2) developing of capabilities, (3) education, training, and exercise, and (4) cooperation and engagement (Who We Are, n.d.). These four functions are reflected in the ACT structure which is headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia (Who We Are, n.d.). There are three subordinate entities and one can find these in Norway (the Joint Warfare Centre), Poland (the Joint Force Training Centre), and finally in Portugal (Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre) (Who We Are, n.d.). ACT also has a representative at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, a representative at the Pentagon, and an Allied Command Transformation Staff Element that is stationed at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (Who We Are, n.d.). NATO has other education and training facilities as well as nationally run entities (which are not endemic to the NATO Command Structure) that also coordinate with ACT (Who We Are, n.d.). These entities include (1) the NATO Defence College in Italy, (2) the NATO School in Germany, (3) the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre in Greece, in addition to (4) nationally run Centres of Excellence (Who We Are, n.d.).

11.3

Vision

ACT has a vision looking to the future. Specifically, “from its inception in 2003, Allied Command Transformation demonstrated the importance placed by NATO Nations on the roles of transformation and development as continuous and essential drivers for change—drivers of change that will ensure the relevance of the Alliance in a rapidly evolving and complex global security environment” (ACT Vision and Mission, n.d.).

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11.4

Mission

Like, ACO, Allied Command Transformation has a unique mission. More pointedly, the mission is “to contribute to preserving the peace, security, and territorial integrity of Alliance member states by leading the warfare development of military structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines. The mission must enable NATO to meet its level of ambition and core missions” (ACT Vision and Mission, n.d.).

11.5

Structure

This section affords consideration to the actual headquarters of ACT. More specifically, it looks at the five directorates that comprise this headquarters. 11.5.1

Capability Development Directorate

This directorate is the largest of ACT and encapsulates a wide mix of warfare development functions (Who We Are, n.d.). More pointedly, this directorate facilitates all aspects of helping to develop new capabilities for NATO (Who We Are, n.d.). The development of capabilities begins with an understanding of the trends in the security environment (Who We Are, n.d.). Once the trends are understood, the Capability Development Directorate goes to work on identifying the requirements that are necessary to meet the Alliance’s level of ambition (Who We Are, n.d.). The directorate subsequently develops requirements throughout the production phase and well into implementation, testing, and delivery of a given capability (Who We Are, n.d.). This process gravitates around NATO’s unique command structure capabilities (Who We Are, n.d.). This directorate is a major contributor to the NATO Defence Planning Process, which happens to be the primary nexus for identifying NATO’s minimum capabilities requirements, the apportionment of these capabilities, as well as assessing the progress of nations (Who We Are, n.d.). The goal of the directorate is to work to improve interoperability, C2, deployment, and sustainment capabilities (Who We Are, n.d.). To better accomplish the wide array of tasks linked with developing cutting-edge Alliance capabilities, this directorate collaborates with the science and technology community, as well as industry, to infuse innovative ideas and transformative principles thereby fostering the developmental process (Who We Are, n.d.). What’s more is that this directorate

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brings to fruition a transformative network in order to provide a hub within NATO and among member nations to further promote continuous innovation of NATO forces, structures, and processes (Who We Are, n.d.). The Capability Development Directorate is made up of three divisions. These include the likes of (1) Command and Control, Deployability and Sustainability, (2) Capability Engineering and Innovation, and (3) Defence Planning (Who We Are, n.d.). 11.5.2

Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate

Strategy is what one needs for an imperfect world (Dorff 2014). The Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate provides support to Allied Command Transformation to help it formalize military advice to better shape future military strategy, political guidance, as well as other policy documents that directly support NATO’s strategic objectives (Who We Are, n.d.). This directorate has the responsibility for drafting NATO’s Strategic Foresight Analysis and the Framework for Future Alliance Operations, in addition to other military concepts that could help foster and shape future strategies, political guidance, NATO’s relations with partner nations, as well as other international organizations (Dorff 2014; Who We Are, n.d.). The amalgam of this work helps foster NATO preparation for future threats and challenges, and helps it seize the initiative on emerging opportunities to better shape future events (Who We Are, n.d.). Other activities include rewriting policy documents, partnerships, and academic outreach (Who We Are, n.d.). 11.5.3

Resources and Management Directorate

To better meet the demands of a transformational organization, the Resources and Management Directorate is organized to support Allied Command Transformation (Who We Are, n.d.) This includes Human Resource Management, Protocol, Strategy Management, NATO Security Investment in addition to Base Support, and the Allied Command Transformation Office of Security (Who We Are, n.d.). Though the Office of the Financial Controller, Budget, and Finance resides outside of Resources and Management, the integration of the holistic resource

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allocation is effectively collaborated through strong processes and lines of communication (Who We Are, n.d.). 11.5.3.1 Human Resource Management The Human Resource Management Branch has the responsibility for planning and coordinating the developmental activities for over 1000 military and civilian staff personnel (Who We Are, n.d.). Likewise, this branch also provides administrative support to dependents of the staff (Who We Are, n.d.). 11.5.3.2 Protocol The Protocol Branch manages all functions for very important people (VIPs) assigned to and/or visiting the headquarters (Who We Are, n.d.). More pointedly, the branch ensures that all details are attended to in order to prevent perceptions of disrespect at a high-level political/military organization (Who We Are, n.d.). Visits from heads of state, ministers, secretaries of state, and politicians are not uncommon as are high-level dignitaries that participate in distinguished visitor days (Who We Are, n.d.). This team has coordinated over 1400 visits in recent years and overseen over 400 high-level conferences (Who We Are, n.d.). 11.5.3.3 Strategy Management This branch serves as the nexus for bringing to fruition ACT’s vision, its goals, and strategic objectives. What is more is that the Strategy Management Branch is responsible for developing procedures, policies, and tools to help ensure clarity throughout the command (Who We Are, n.d.). To more aptly do this, it monitors and measures the performance of the command while simultaneously integrating capabilities and resources all while adhering to fiscal constraints (Who We Are, n.d.). 11.5.3.4 NATO Security Investment The NATO Security Investment Branch is the one that manages the capital investment program for ACT (Who We Are, n.d.). More pointedly, it is the branch that ends up funding the facilities, ACT systems, and other equipment required by commanders at the strategic level to help ensure mission success (Who We Are, n.d.). It does this by looking at capability packages. Since 2005 and moving through 2016, this branch has developed and invested almost 10 billion Euros in defending the Alliance

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(Who We Are, n.d.). At present, it manages 161 capability packages and 2700 projects at varying developmental stages (Who We Are, n.d.). Some prominent outcomes of these investments include NATO Deployable Assets, Ballistic Missile Defence, Reassurance Measures, Alliance Ground Surveillance, NATO Command Facilities, Air Basing and Bulk Fuel, and Communications Systems (Who We Are, n.d.). 11.5.4

Joint Force Development Directorate

There are a wide number of means that are necessary to achieve a concerted effort as envisioned in NATO’s founding treaty (Who We Are, n.d.). One of the focal ways to achieve a united team is through the education, training, exercises, and evaluation processes (Who We Are, n.d.). The Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation Program helps ensure that NATO achieves and maintains a very high state of readiness, a force that is interoperable, and one that is capable across the current and emerging full mission spectrum (Who We Are, n.d.; AJP6 2017, 1–22). This helps serve as the cornerstone of NATO’s credible defence, deterrence, and assurance efforts (Who We Are, n.d.). Collectively, the education, training, exercises, and evaluation processes serve as a means to further enhance and enable NATO interaction with an eclectic mix of partners, and serves as an instrument to validate proposed transformational activities, thus enabling NATO to maintain the requisite capabilities now and into well into the future, and functions as a mechanism helping to create strategic communication at the political, strategic, and operational levels (Who We Are, n.d.). 11.5.5

Military Partnerships Directorate

This directorate and its Staff Element Norfolk have the responsibility for the development of Bi-Strategic Command Military Partnerships policy, direction, guidance, and advice (Who We Are, n.d.). The work of this directorate is conducted in close coordination with the divisions located in Mons, Belgium (Who We Are, n.d.). Staff Element Norfolk has the responsibility for partnership planning, programming, and the coordination of other partnership activities (Who We Are, n.d.). In 2016, approximately 2000 individual partners were able to participate in various NATO training and education events (Who We Are, n.d.). Moreover, the Staff Element Norfolk advises and supports partners on capabilities

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development and requirements for all aspects of transformation, and these include the likes of individual training and education (Who We Are, n.d.). Over the last decades, the partnerships have burgeoned and matured within the Alliance (Who We Are, n.d.). The concept of fostering and projecting stability will help guide future work throughout the partnership community (Who We Are, n.d.). This directorate will remain as an influential key enabler for NATO’s projection of its stability effort (Who We Are, n.d.).

11.6

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 11.1 provides an overview Bryson’s (2018) strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (S.W.O.T.) model and how it is applied to this organization. Details follow in the paragraphs below. As this research has shown, there are many strengths associated with the various NATO organization covered in this book; ACT likewise has a key component not already addressed. First and foremost, it focuses on capability development. There is an axiomatic expression that states, “that you go to war with the military you have, not the one you want.” That stated, ACT dedicates time and energy to integrate state-of-the-art capabilities, new equipment, and emerging TTPs into its raison d’être. It is because of this, that NATO headquarters at the operational level and the militaries of many NATO member countries might be able to take advantage of the latest accoutrement of capabilities that are available during the exercise regimen and prior to them assuming NRF standby status. Table 11.1 ACT SWOT

Strengths

Weaknesses

Capability improvements

Location outside of Europe

Location inside the United States Opportunities

Threats

Academic outreach Leverage US knowledge

Shrinking budgets Prediction of future of warfare difficult

Improve innovation when looking at its future

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Another strength is its location inside the United States. Arguably, the United States has the most technologically advanced military in the world and its location on a major Defense Department installation affords it potential access to this equipment, these capabilities, and TTPs. Conversely, because this headquarters is located outside of the European continent, could also be seen as a weakness. Separated by several time zones, puts ACT at a disadvantage when looking to quickly supervise its subordinates which are located throughout Europe. ACT has many opportunities. The first of which is academic outreach. Often, university researchers are the ones coming up with new capabilities and several of these have military applications. Because ACT affords consideration to the academic community, it could leverage the latest technology that is many times overlooked by members of the military community. Likewise, because of its location inside the continental United States, it could leverage US knowledge of military TTPs by observing US military exercises throughout this country. ACT could then integrate these into the training through events ran by both JWC and JFTC covered in later chapters. Another opportunity is its focus on constant innovation when looking at the future. Oftentimes, nations’ militaries look to the future to fight as they have in the past. ACT can therefore help the operational components focus on the future rather than the past. There are some threats. The first of these is the possibility of shrinking budgets. As many nations are dealing with the aftermath of the COVID19 pandemic, many NATO member countries are experiencing economic hardships that could translate into cuts to military investment and future capabilities. A final threat is that it is impossible to predict the future. Though ACT can look to trends exercised by potential foes with regard to hybrid warfare, asymmetric TTPs, and cyber, it is not a foregone conclusion that what ACT looks to integrate into future training and exercises will result in the next crisis emerging exactly as rehearsed. The NCS and NFS elements should rather look to ACT to challenge them to think critically to more aptly adapt to changes that will emerge during future full-spectrum operations. As was mentioned earlier, rotations into Kosovo and Afghanistan have spoiled staff officers from the operational-level commands because of the vast amenities one finds at the physical headquarters in Kosovo

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and Afghanistan. If one had to deploy and simultaneously stand up a headquarters through NSPA or NCISG capability packages while it was expected to command the operation in theater, then this adds a whole new level of complexity and challenges abound as it works to do so. These headquarters must be flexible and quickly deployable to keep NATO relevant (Odgaard 2014; Shea 2014). ACT will be a key command to help in this process.

References ACT History. n.d. ACT Newcomers Information. https://www.act.nato.int/new comers. Accessed on July 22, 2020. ACT Vision and Mission. n.d. Welcome to NATO. https://www.act.nato.int/# main-home-search. Accessed on July 22, 2020. AJP-6. 2017. Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/upl oads/attachment_data/file/602827/doctrine_nato_cis_ajp_6.pdf. Accessed on September 2, 2020. Bryson, John M. 2018. Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 5th ed. New Jersey, United States: Wiley. Dorff, Robert H. 2014. US National Security Strategy and NATO. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Johnston, Seth A. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore Maryland, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. Mahnken, Thomas G. 2019. Strategic Theory in Strategy in the Contemporary World, 6th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. Odgaard, Liselotte. 2014. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Shea, Jamie. 2014. NATO’s Future Strategy: Ready for the Threats of the Future or Refighting the Battles of the Past? In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Who We Are. n.d. Who We Are. https://www.act.nato.int/who-we-are. Accessed on July 22, 2020.

CHAPTER 12

Joint Warfare Centre (JWC)

Abstract This chapter looks at the JWC and how it prepares for major NATO exercises, and the way that it assesses military formations as they go through a rigorous exercise in preparation for assuming NRF status. Likewise, it looks at conducting battle staff training in the lead up to the major exercise and hosts a series of planning sessions moving toward those events. Keywords JWC · Exercise · NRF

12.1

History

The Joint Warfare Centre’s history dates to 2003 (JWC History, n.d.). It was brought into existence in Jåttå, Stavanger, Norway under the NATO Command Structure from within ACT (JWC History, n.d.). Accordingly, JWC was associated directly with two of NATO’s five transformational processes: (1) training and education and (2) concept development at the

Hans Clouser is an MPPA student at York College of Pennsylvania and was a contributing researcher to this chapter. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_12

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joint and combined levels, assessment and doctrine, and experimentation (JWC History, n.d.). The Joint Warfare Centre is the third NATO iteration of the headquarters in Stavanger (JWC History, n.d.). According to JWC History (n.d.), the Headquarters North occupied the same location from 1994– 2000 and was replaced by the Joint Headquarters North, which operated out of Stavanger until it was replaced by the JWC in 2003. The JWC represents the heart of NATO’s operational training (JWC History, n.d.). The Joint Warfare Centre plays an essential role in creating organizational value for NATO and its member states. For example, Belkin (2019, 13) notes that NATO provides its members with “an unrivaled platform for constructing and operating international military coalitions.” While NATO is primarily a political organization, it also represents an opportunity to strengthen the Alliance through the militaries of its members working and learning together. The execution of this training falls on the JWC. Multinational training exercises developed by the Joint Warfare Centre allows for these relationships to develop, which in turn leads to NATO strengthening both itself as an organization, as well as its member states as individual actors (Belkin 2019, 6). Belkin (2020, 2) describes how NATO turns to deterrence through increased readiness. The JWC also plays an important role in this, as the operational training provided by the Joint Warfare Centre is essential to developing a well prepared and adaptable coalition. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept recommendations (2010, 10) spoke on the process of “participating in a comprehensive approach to complex problems.” The Joint Warfare Centre holds an essential position in this, as its training must be comprehensive enough to prepare its participants for the unique scenarios presented in a modern world. As one can see from these examples, the JWC creates value through coalition building, deterring conflict by increasing the readiness of troops from member states, and comprehensive training. These characteristics have been and continue to be essential to the history of the Joint Warfare Centre and the operations it conducts. The first operation conducted by the Joint Warfare Centre took place less than a year after its launch (JWC History, n.d.). For six days in February 2004, 130 NATO staff members from 11 countries participated in the first exercise in the history of the JWC (JWC History, n.d.). This demonstrates that from the beginning, the Joint Warfare Centre has been committed to coalition building at an operational level.

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The JWC stepped up in 2004 to play a large role in the NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq (JWC History, n.d.). The Joint Warfare Centre Chief of Staff at the time, Major General James Short, traveled to the Middle Eastern country to identify the present and future training challenges for Iraqi Security Forces (JWC, n.d.). This resulted in training within this country for the Iraqi Security Forces. When the operation was selected to be integrated into a NATO facility, the JWC was selected (JWC History, n.d.). In November 2004, 19 Iraqi Security Force officers participated in training at the Joint Warfare Centre facility; this was the first time in its history that NATO had provided out-of-country training for Iraq’s Security Forces (JWC History, n.d.). This accomplishment was noted in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept recommendations (2010, 7) for using elite training and coalition building to strengthen NATO, its member states, and their regional partner in Iraq’s Security Forces, contributing to NATO’s history of success. This exercise was another essential step in establishing the value of the Joint Warfare Centre as an organization capable of executing training at the same pace as actual operations and was critical in securing NATO’s increased investment in the JWC throughout subsequent years. After approximately three years, the Joint Warfare Centre reached Full Operational Capability in 2006 (JWC History, n.d.). According to JWC History (n.d.), this achievement was accentuated when Norway and the JWC jointly signed the Memorandum of Agreement on June 21, 2006. This agreement documented the support that Norway would provide as a host nation for the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC History, n.d.). This agreement is essential for the operability of the JWC and its signing demonstrated the strong commitment of Norway to both the JWC and NATO as a whole (JWC History, n.d.). Additionally, the funding for the JWC’s state-of-the-art training facility had been authorized by NATO on April 25, 2006 (JWC History, n.d.). This facility provided the JWC a cutting-edge facility capable of using it for training, experimentation, and conferencing to provide NATO members with comprehensive training to execute exercises (JWC, n.d.). In addition to these groundbreaking agreements, 2006 also saw the JWC host the ACT seminar, a major undertaking that was highlighted by the presence of the NATO Secretary General, the ambassadors of the North Atlantic Council, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, as well as numerous other top civilian leaders and military commanders throughout the Alliance, in order to assess the current

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operational environment that NATO was working in at the time (JWC History, n.d.). JWC History (n.d.) states that a Norwegian private contractor, via the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization (NDLO) has been providing information technology support and expertise for the JWC training facility since 2009. In the years that followed, the Joint Warfare Centre would go on to train approximately 30000 personnel, both from member states and regional partners and allies, as well as directing numerous training exercises designed to simulate scenarios the personnel may encounter on a real battlefield (JWC History, n.d.). For example, Operation Unified Protector, conducted by NATO in 2011, was preceded by a JWC exercise that mirrored the actual operation, in order to better prepare participating personnel (JWC History, n.d.). Additionally, the JWC has partnered with United States Joint and Coalition Warfighting in recent years to provide complex and vital training for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) , which operated in Afghanistan (JWC History, n.d.). JWC History (n.d.) describes these training exercises as pre-deployment, which prepared the soldiers for the actual tour they were about to participate in. These instances again exemplify the consistency of the Joint Warfare Centre in providing coalition building and all-encompassing training in order to increase the readiness of troops and personnel from both NATO and its partners across the globe. Recent years have also seen the Joint Warfare Centre diversify its training portfolio. The JWC is constantly looking to adapt its training to ensure it is able to simulate actual events accurately and provide the training necessary for participating personnel to succeed (NATO 2020, 2010, 40). This has led to increasingly comprehensive training simulations and scenarios. For example, the JWC developed NATO’s Skolkan scenario, which incorporates challenges in cyber, space, and missile defence into training (JWC History, n.d.). This is vital to ensuring the preparedness of the Alliances’ staff as these challenges are emerging as threats (Belkin 2019, 17). JWC History (n.d.) describes the development of NATO’s first-ever large-scale virtual network in recent years. The Joint Warfare Centre has also developed and implemented a variety of modern NATO concepts, including NATO’s Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive and NATO’s Smart Defence and Connected Forces Initiative. The Joint Warfare Centre also aided in the creation of the Comprehensive Approach, which looks at the evolution and multifaceted nature of modern warfare and how to succeed in that operational

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environment (JWC History, n.d.). The JWC now also possesses NATO’s most advanced IT platform and its products are referenced extensively by actors looking to examine and/or succeed in modern warfare (JWC History, n.d.). Most recently, the JWC has successfully conducted two training operations since 2018 (Exercises 2019). Trident Jupiter 2019–1 was executed in ten different locations throughout Europe, concluding on November 14, 2019 (Trident Jupiter 2019). Trident Jackal (2019a) was designed to evaluate and confirm the certification of NATO Response Force 2020, with the exercise being completed successfully (Trident Jupiter 2019). The second successful exercise conducted by the JWC took place over the course of nine days jointly in Menorca, Spain, and the actual Joint Warfare Centre in Norway (Trident Jackal 2019a, b). According to Trident Jackal (2019a), the exercise was designed to test NATO’s Rapid Deployable Corps—Spain (NRDC-ESP) and involved a land-heavy joint operation involving maritime, air, and Special Forces components. The JWC’s most recent exercise, Trident Jupiter 19–20 was cancelled as a result of the global pandemic (Exercises 2019). These most recent exercises once again capture the thematic elements that have been present throughout the history of the Joint Warfare Centre: next-level, comprehensive training, providing readiness to personnel that results in deterrence, and coalition building. By examining the history of the JWC, it is safe to say that when the JWC is able to safely begin conducting exercises again, it will do so under the umbrella of these characteristics and the success that has propelled the Joint Warfare Centre to its present level.

12.2

Vision

When key leaders from NATO gathered to celebrate NATO’s 70th anniversary in 2019, it was not just to celebrate its past successes (Belkin 2019). NATO also wanted to present a unified vision for the future (Belkin 2019, 1). Within the confines of this vision, the JWC has its own: “to deliver collective training and the development of warfare at both the operational and strategic levels” (JWC Vision, n.d.). It aspires to be NATO’s trusted advisor capable of bridging both operations and transformation to underpin the Alliance’s readiness and future capabilities (JWC Vision, n.d.). To achieve this, it wants to attract and develop the most

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capable staff (permanently assigned and augmentees) based on their reputation for excellence predicated upon a culture of professionalism (JWC Vision, n.d.). The Joint Warfare Centre plays an essential role in providing collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security, through the lens of providing NATO staff with the best training possible (JWCNATO 2020). Underscoring the JWC’s vision to support the Alliance by increasing readiness and future capabilities, the Joint Warfare Centre works to do this through the exercises they conduct (JWC 2018). The JWC strives to achieve realism in order to better prepare the NATO forces they are training (JWC Vision, n.d.). As a result of this, the Joint Warfare Centre strives to create authentic exercises that mirror both the actors and conditions operations will be conducted in, if and when the need arises (JWCNATO 2020). The scope of the exercises looks to prepare participants for threats they may encounter in any and all domains, to include the use of information warfare (Cavelty 2019), in conflict, including cyberspace (JWCNATO 2020). As mentioned above, the JWC also aspires to be a trusted and transformational advisor to NATO. According to a 2020 video on the Joint Warfare Centre’s official YouTube page, the JWC looks to accomplish this portion of its vision through rigorous studying, sincere mentorship, continuous learning and innovation, concise publication, and, above all, adaptability to better serve NATO. JWCNATO (2020) states that the Joint Warfare Centre accomplishes this through its culture. The JWC represents a place where professionalism and curiosity are intertwined, and where innovation and communication are encouraged (JWCNATO 2020). This mix is essential, as it encourages collaboration and critical thinking while holding its staff to rigorous standards. It seems apparent that the JWC is manned by intelligent and hardworking professionals that work together to help enable NATO to more aptly achieve its goals as a primarily political organization with military components. In terms of being a transformational advisor, the JWC looks to position itself to succeed by looking toward the future. Per JWCNATO (2020), the Joint Warfare Centre aims to out-last, out-think, and out-excel expectations, in order to ensure the enduring success of the Alliance. The Centre strives to strengthen the cohesion of the Alliance, use action to ensure learning, and lead the way in warfare advancement in all conditions and environments (JWCNATO 2020). The Joint Warfare Centre is also unique based on the fact that it engages with every NATO command

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and force structure headquarters, in order to provide each with training, warfare advancement, and operational readiness (JWCNATO 2020). Ultimately, the Joint Warfare Centre is executing its vision to deliver collective training and development of warfare at both the operational and strategic levels and this will aid in guiding the overall strategy of NATO and strengthen the Alliance and its members (Odgaard 2014, 12).

12.3

Mission

The Joint Warfare Centre operates under the Allied Command Transformation, whose stated mission is to “contribute to preserving the peace, security and territorial integrity of Alliance member states by leading the warfare development of military structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines” (Who We Are, n.d.). In order to accomplish this, the Allied Command Transformation operates under these four principles: (1) strategic thinking (2) development of capabilities (3) education, training, and exercises, and (4) cooperation and engagement (Who We Are, n.d.). NATO’s overarching mission of self defense is partially reliant on trends and occurrences outside of the borders of Alliance members (NATO 2020, 2010, 7). The Joint Warfare Centre is essential in ensuring the preparedness of NATO members and allies for operating in these environments by using strategic thinking to engage in development, education, and training, which in turn leads to cooperation. Under this umbrella, the Joint Warfare Centre is responsible for providing NATO with a training focal point for full-spectrum missions at the joint level (JWC Mission, n.d.). Moreover, it is a cross-functional activity charged with delivering quality joint operational-level command post exercises (CPXs) (JWC Mission, n.d.). In addition, the JWC provides computer assisted simulations (CAX) and media simulations, allowing for more in-depth and all-encompassing training simulations and scenarios (JWC 2018). This support encapsulates both the NATO Command and the NATO Force Structures (JWC Mission, n.d.). The United States Army NATO (2018) describes the JWC’s role as one that ensures not only proper levels of training in these scenarios, but also fosters interoperability between various NATO forces, as well as allies of NATO. To more aptly perform its mission, JWC plans, prepares, and executes both static and deployed joint operational-level training in support of NATO’s readiness (JWC Mission, n.d.). Accordingly, it helps in fostering concept development and validation of doctrine for the Alliance while also looking to integrate experimentation into exercises (JWC Mission,

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n.d.). For example, according to United States Army NATO (2018), the JWC is responsible for using exercises to certify the NATO Response Force (NRF). This is an especially important task, as the NRF is vital to the Alliance’s deterrence and collaborative defense capabilities (Belkin 2019, 10). Furthermore, the Joint Warfare Centre develops and maintains NATO’s synthetic training exercises, which is an essential part of the concept development and doctrine validation process mentioned previously in this chapter (JWC 2018). The JWC adds to this process by “contributing fully to NATO’s lessons processes and ensuring transformational outputs are integrated into collective training events,” and by “supporting adherence to Joint Operational Warfare doctrine and standards” (JWC Mission, n.d.). This highlights the JWC’s commitment to training and capability development. JWC also contributes to not only developing but strengthening relations along with the integration of national training and command organizations, governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in addition to assisting regional security partners and organizations (JWC Mission, n.d.). This has been a hallmark of the Joint Warfare Centre that dates back to 2004, when the JWC provided training for Iraqi Defense Force personnel (JWC History, n.d.). In house, the Joint Warfare Centre certifies NRF forces and also supports the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) during the planning, execution, and analysis stages of an exercise (JWC 2018). All of this is indicative of an overarching commitment to cooperation. To bring exercises to fruition, the JWC helps create, develop, and maintain fictitious scenarios while anticipating likely events that NATO will see in the near future (JWC Mission, n.d.). It also looks to integrate transformational activities to help make the Alliance more capable (JWC Mission, n.d.). Derksen (n.d.) describes the operating environment as one that is constantly changing and provides a “360-degree scope.” Derksen (n.d.) goes on to describe the situation as one where NATO doesn’t have the luxury to focus on one problem at one specific time. Instead, NATO must be ready to take on a variety of missions at any given time (Derksen, n.d.). The Joint Warfare Centre is paramount in ensuring this level of adaptability as it applies critical thinking that is feasible (Wolff 2014, 11). In order to do this, the JWC uses a number of subject matter experts (SMEs) to develop realistic documentation and scenarios that can be implemented into training conducted at or by the JWC (Derksen, n.d.). The Joint Warfare Centre also uses teams of experts to simulate

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the amount of information and intelligence that would be available to the trainees if a certain scenario comes to pass in the real world (Derksen, n.d.). After these are created, scenario managers communicate the information to other members and branches of JWC’s exercise branches before it is able to be implemented into an exercise (Derksen, n.d.). Essentially, the JWC is preparing NATO for an uncertain world where any number of things can happen at any time (Wolff 2014, 1). These exercises are vital to the development, training, and cooperation that drives the Joint Warfare Centre.

12.4

Overview

The Joint Warfare Centre (per the guidance of the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation) has the responsibility for serving as NATO’s training focal point regarding full-spectrum joint operationallevel warfare (Who We Are, n.d.). The Centre has two primary outputs; these include the likes of exercises and support to NATO’s joint warfare development. The two outputs comport with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s requirements to help ensure NATO forces are versatile and well trained to execute any type of warfare mission to readily respond to present and future challenges (Who We Are, n.d.). NATO must pursue interoperability among systems (Shea 2014, 38); JWC helps ensure this. Moreover, JWC is the Alliance’s main provider of computer-assisted CPXs to NATO, primarily gravitating around the Trident series of exercises (Who We Are, n.d.). What’s more is that JWC is the nexus for transformation, directly linked to Supreme Allied Commander Transformation’s vision, goals, and strategic objectives (Who We Are, n.d.). The Centre is the sole proponent for the Alliance that creates and develops operational-level synthetic training settings and scenarios (Who We Are, n.d.). Two examples depicting the magnitude of JWC’s responsibility include one Joint Warfare Centre training scenario that occurred during Trident Juncture 2015, which was NATO’s then largest exercise focusing on non-Article 5, “out-of-area” threats (Who We Are, n.d.). A second scenario looked to underscore NATO’s increased level of ambition, thus reflecting NATO’s future focus on operational preparedness in the context of complex, networked, and hybrid threats; these, therefore, called for a wide spectrum of training (Who We Are, n.d.). JWC, in recent

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years, has implemented training scenarios that were subsequently modified into different variations to better support both NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure exercises (Who We Are, n.d.). Presently, JWC is staffed by a team of over 250 officers, enlisted, civilians, and contractors from 17 different nations (JWC Structure, n.d.). It has the capability to plan and deliver up to four complex operationallevel exercises each year (Who We Are, n.d.). The Joint Warfare Centre has trained almost 64000 personnel since it opened its doors in 2003 and continues to push the envelope for providing cutting-edge training to the Alliance and its partners (Who We Are, n.d.). The JWC is one of NATO’s most unique organizations and has transformed itself into an agile organization that is able to meet the training needs of NATO (JWC Structure, n.d.). Additionally, the JWC as a facility has one of the most advanced IT platforms in the Alliance and possesses a training capacity to serve 1200 personnel (Who We Are, n.d.). By combining continuous innovation and world-class training, the Joint Warfare Centre is equipped to improve the interoperability and readiness of NATO’s military forces (Who We Are, n.d.). Overall, the Joint Warfare Centre leverages its stateof-the-art facility, technology, and training into the execution of one of the most essential missions in the Alliance thus making NATO better through incredible preparedness.

12.5

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 12.1 provides an overview of Byrson’s (2018) strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (S.W.O.T.) model application to this organization. Details follow in the paragraphs below. Table 12.1 JWC SWOT Strengths

Weaknesses

Advance technology Comprehensive, efficient, and time-sensitive training

Potential susceptibility to groupthink

Opportunities

Threats

Learning from training allies

Impossible to predict the future (and what warfare will look like) Increasing complexity of the nature of warfare (cyber, hybrid, etc.)

Close proximity with expert outsiders/constructive feedback

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According to Johnston (2017, 139), NATO is a crisis management organization with the ability to handle full-spectrum operations. Throughout this continuum, the JWC is an essential component of ensuring that NATO’s military forces are equipped for any scenario they may encounter. The strengths of the Joint Warfare Centre rest in the fact that the JWC possesses advanced technology, comprehensive training techniques, and the capability to execute a variety of multilevel exercises in a relatively short period of time. JWC has strengths. As previously mentioned, the Joint Warfare Centre is in possession of one of the most advanced IT platforms in the entire Alliance (Who We Are, n.d.). In addition, the JWC was designed to provide exercise participants with realistic and challenging scenarios leveraging technology (Hutson, n.d.). With the increasing likelihood that technology will continue to play a role on the real-life battlefield, the JWC is able to use its own technology to better ensure the preparedness of NATO personnel. Furthermore, the Joint Warfare Centre uses experimentation, in addition to the creation of new ideas and maturation of pre-existing ones to work to implement its cutting-edge technology into its operability (Hutson, n.d.). The JWC is also able to provide the comprehensive training essential to ensure NATO’s relevance moving into the future. Likewise, the JWC is able to ensure this level of training through a variety of means. For example, the Joint Warfare Centre continues to develop its cyber and space capabilities to ensure that it is able to prepare the Alliance for not just the present operational environment, but also for potential future environments (Hutson, n.d.). Additionally, the JWC has the capability to execute as many as four operational-level exercises in a year, demonstrating its ability to consistently provide trainees with necessary training and certification (Who We Are, n.d.). According to Millet (2019) the Joint Warfare Centre is on the forefront of transformational training and warfare development, a position it must maintain in order for NATO to remain prepared. While its technological and training capabilities and capacities ensure the Joint Warfare Centre’s effectiveness, like any entity that conducts analysis, the JWC must look to avoid groupthink, a potential weakness. As described throughout the chapter, the training scenarios and their subsequent effectiveness rely on the performance indicators and analysis conducted by the JWC (Millet 2019). These exercises are essential to the warfare development that the JWC uses to drive its value. Millet (2019)

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writes about warfare development as “the synthesis of operational-level analysis, lessons identified through observation and coaching of exercises, doctrinal and technological developments, and capability integration and experimentation in all domains to ensure the Alliance remains relevant in current and future operational environments.” It is essential that the Joint Warfare Centre continues to avoid reaching the same conclusions with its analysis (when circling back to NATO doctrine and STANAGS) and performance indicators, especially when considering the importance of said training to NATO and, to a lesser extent, its allies. The effectiveness of the Joint Warfare Centre rests in its goal of continued transformational training and analysis, something that it cannot accomplish without being capable of critiquing itself and those performing the exercises it prepares. Thankfully, one can deduce that this has not been a problem, based on the JWCs track record of excellence, in terms of all-encompassing and transformational training and analysis. However, like any organization, it is important to examine not only the internal strengths and weaknesses of the Joint Warfare Centre, but also external opportunities and threats. There is an abundance of opportunities for the JWC to take advantage of outside of the Alliance, and the Centre has typically been astute at taking advantage of these. One example of this is the Joint Warfare Centre providing training not only for the Alliance, but also for its allies. As far back as 2004 when the JWC provided training for Iraqi Security Forces, the Joint Warfare Centre had interacted with partners that are in different regions of the world than the majority of NATO members (JWC History, n.d.). The advantages of this arrangement are twofold: (1) the JWC is able to interact with actors that may have different worldviews, in addition to (2) having encountered different challenges and scenarios than Alliance members. By learning how allies and their enemies think and interact, the Joint Warfare Centre is able to strengthen its ability to construct more accurate and comprehensive exercises for participating personnel. The Joint Warfare Centre also takes advantage of and can continue to do so of the expertise of outsiders. According to Hutson (n.d.), the JWC collaborates with nations, industries, and experts external to the Alliance to ensure they are providing the most realistic and contemporary scenarios for personnel participating in exercises. This collaboration ensures that the JWC is able to accomplish its goal of comprehensive training by preventing the aforementioned groupthink. In addition, by taking advantage of outsiders’ unbiased perspectives, the Joint Warfare Centre is better able to evaluate its performance and make changes where

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necessary. This intimate collaboration with outsiders is key in ensuring the future success of the JWC. The most important external threat to the Joint Warfare Centre is the increasing unpredictability of the operating environment. Hutson (n.d.) states that NATO operates in an environment of constant change that forces it to constantly adapt. This is an inhibitor to JWC specifically and NATO more broadly because if one cannot draw adequate conclusions about what the operating environment will be, then it is hard to provide useful training for those that may encounter it in the near future. A major proponent of this threat is the concept of hybrid warfare. In a JWC publication, Terrados (2019) prescribed the following characteristics to hybrid warfare, “coordinated and synchronized, deliberately target democratic states’ and institutions’ economic vulnerabilities, use a wide range of means, exploit the thresholds of detection and attribution as well as the difficulties in understanding the border between war and peace, and aim to influence different forms of decision-making at the local (regional), state or institutional level.” As one can imagine, emerging complex scenarios represent an acute challenge for the Joint Warfare Centre. These characteristics are often implemented at the strategic level, which in turn results in unforeseen consequences at the operational level (Terrados 2019). Hutson (n.d.) underscores the complexity of these scenarios, noting that proliferation, terrorism, and deep-rooted ethnic conflicts are not only hard to predict, but also difficult to introduce to training in a meaningful and constructive manner. In the face of this complex and unpredictable environment, the JWC has so far been resilient and has continued to prepare NATO personnel for new environments by providing overarching and thorough training. However, it is undeniable that the evolution of warfare and the relationship that states and actors have with this phenomena continues to increase in complexity and challenges the Joint Warfare Centre to keep pushing forward in its investment in both training, but perhaps even more importantly, the research that is needed to aid in realistic training. What is more, is for JWC to work closely with the NIFC under ACO to look at trends and the possibility of what these mean for adaptation of the enemy to alter their TTPs and strategies moving forward. The backbone of the JWC lies in its ability to provide the best training possible for the Alliance and its allies. This author experienced JWC’s abilities when he served as the real-life support commander during exercise Steadfast Jaguar, NATO’s first out-of-area NRF preparation exercise in

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Cape Verde in 2006. The Joint Warfare Centre also possesses a significant technological platform it can use to its advantage, as well as the ability to interact with outside experts and allies to further their understanding of the ever-changing external environment and their own internal evaluation and creation processes. It is important that the JWC continue to strive to avoid groupthink. The JWC must also continue to invest in research and development because of the threat presented by the complex and unpredictable global operating environment that NATO continues to work in. Based on this analysis, it is clear that the Joint Warfare Centre represents a significant asset for NATO, and projects to continue this trajectory in the future, assuming the continuance of its adaptability that it has shown throughout its existence is continued.

References Belkin, P. 2019. Assessing NATO’s Value. Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45652. Accessed on November 30, 2020. Belkin, P. 2020. NATO: Key Issues Following the 2019 Leaders’ Meetings. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://crsreports.congress. gov/product/pdf/R/R46066. Cavelty, Myriam. 2019. Cyber-Security in Contemporary Security Studies, 5th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. Derksen, M. n.d. 360° Scope Scenario Design and Development in JWC. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). https://www.jwc.nato.int/newsroom/warfare-develo pment-focus/360-scope-scenario-design-and-development-jwc. Accessed on November 30, 2020. Exercises. 2019. Exercises. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/49285.htm. Accessed on November 30, 2020. Hutson, P. n.d. Transformational Activities at the JWC. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). Retrieved from https://www.jwc.nato.int/newsroom/war fare-development-focus/transformational-activities-jwc. Johnston, S. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore, MD, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. JWC. 2018. Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). United States Army NATO. https:// www.usanato.army.mil/About-Us/Articles/Article/1513301/joint-warfarecentre-jwc/. Accessed on November 30, 2020. JWC History. n.d. JWC History. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). Retrieved from https://www.jwc.nato.int/organization/history. Accessed on September 11, 2020.

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JWC Mission. n.d. JWC Mission. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). Retrieved from https://www.jwc.nato.int/organization/mission. Accessed on September 11, 2020. JWCNATO. 2020. Together! We Make NATO Better! The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l9_iHYBgKco. JWC Structure. n.d. JWC Structure. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). Retrieved from https://www.jwc.nato.int/organization/structure. JWC Vision. n.d. Joint Warfare Centre Vision 2025. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). Retrieved from https://www.jwc.nato.int/organization/ vision. Accessed on September 11, 2020. Millet, J. 2019. Warfare Development: Relevance, Risks, and Making It Real. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). https://www.jwc.nato.int/images/sto ries/_news_items_/2019/three-swords/WarfareDevelopment_RelevanceRis ksMakingitReal2.pdf. Accessed on November 30, 2020. NATO 2020. 2010. NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. NATO Public Diplomacy Division. https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/ expertsreport.pdf. Accessed on November 30, 2020. Odgaard, Liselotte. 2014. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. https://ebookcentral.proquest. com/lib/ycp/reader.action?docID=1686008&query=odgaard#. Accessed on November 30, 2020. Shea, Jamie. 2014. NATO’s Future Strategy: Ready for the Threats of the Future or Refighting the Battles of the Past? In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Terrados, J. 2019. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). https://www.jwc. nato.int/images/stories/threeswords/HybridWar_Dec2019.pdf. Accessed on November 30, 2020. Trident Jackal. 2019a. Exercise Report: Trident Jackal 2019. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). https://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/threeswords/TRI DENTJACKAL2018_MAG.pdf. Accessed on November 30, 2020. Trident Jackal. 2019b. TRIDENT JACKAL 2019 Concludes. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). Retrieved from https://www.jwc.nato.int/articles/ TRIDENT-JACKAL-2019-Concludes. Trident Jupiter. 2019. Exercise Report: TRIDENT JUPITER 2019–1. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). https://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/thr eeswords/TridentJupiter2019.pdf. Accessed on November 30, 2020. Who We Are. n.d. Who We Are. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). Retrieved from https://www.act.nato.int/who-we-are. Accessed on July 22, 2020. Wolff, S. 2014. Training NATO for an Uncertain Future. McKinsey & Company. https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Pub lic%20and%20Social%20Sector/Our%20Insights/Training%20NATO%20for% 20an%20uncertain%20future%20An%20interview%20with%20Major%20G eneral%20Erhard%20Buhler/Training_NATO_for_an_uncertain_future.pdf. Accessed on November 30, 2020.

CHAPTER 13

Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC)

Abstract The JALLC is responsible for serving as a repository of information stemming from the conduct of operations and exercises. Accordingly, it looks to capture lessons learned to dive into what went well, what did not, and how things can be improved upon in the future. This chapter looks at the history of this organization and how it disseminates the knowledge derived from NATO exercises and operations. Keywords JALLC · Lessons · Analysis

13.1

History

JALLC was established in 2002 (JALLC History, n.d.). More to the point, it was stood up in Lisbon Portugal and is the Alliance’s lead agency for the conduct of analysis of NATO operations (as well as experiments and training), and is responsible for the collection and subsequent distribution of lessons learned (JALLC History, n.d.). It originated from the Permanent Maritime Analysis Team who looked at compiling lessons learned from NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia (JALLC History, n.d.).

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13.2

Mission

The JALLC mission focuses on the conduct of joint analysis of “operations, training, exercises, and experiments” that are based on the joint analysis of NATO generated requirements from its strategic commands (Mission, Roles and Tasks, n.d.). It does this to help transform and modernize NATO (Mission, Roles and Tasks, n.d.). The role of the JALLC is to provide analysis support to events in which ACT is involved (Mission, Roles and Tasks, n.d.). Once data is compiled, the organization looks to provide the findings to the Alliance (Mission, Roles and Tasks, n.d.). To help enable JALLC in pursuit of its mission, it looks to execute different tasks. These include the likes of the following. First, it conducts analysis of both known and emerging requirements. Secondly, it looks to support NATO exercises by connecting and sharing information/knowledge to the ACT community. Next, it lends support to working groups, conferences and other seminars, and other related events (like the NATO Lessons Learned Conference). Finally, through NATO’s training and experimentation, the JALLC helps prepare and conduct three staff officer courses each year in Sweden.

13.3

Overview

The Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre serves as NATO’s premier center for conducting joint analysis of not just training and exercises, but also looks at operations and experiments, predicated on requirements identified through NATO Military Authorities and the international civilian and military staff at NATO Headquarters (Who We Are, n.d.). Moreover, the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre facilitates the exchange of lessons learned in order to reinforce the constant modernization and transformation of NATO’s capabilities and forces (Who We Are, n.d.). Additionally, it analyzes the support to NATO training, exercises, operations, and experimentation, and it also maintains the NATO Lessons Learned Portal, which serves as a tool to foster the lessons learned process (Who We Are, n.d.). This, in turn, provides training into what was discovered during those events (Who We Are, n.d.). It does so through the Centre’s advisory and training team, in conjunction with various NATO commands, allies to NATO, Alliance partners, and other entities

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to support the discovery of what went well and what did not (Who We Are, n.d.). Since its inception in 2002, the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre has conducted more than 200 joint analysis projects supporting a variegated mix of customers from all across NATO; this has resulted in the generation of a plethora of reports that contain actionable recommendations at both the operational and strategic levels (Who We Are, n.d.). There are several examples over the last two decades and these include: (1) Future International Security Assistance Force Command & Control Structure (2004), (2) Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR: Lessons for the Alliance (2012), (3) Protection of Civilians—How International Security Assistance Force Reduced Civilian Casualties (2015), and more (Who We Are, n.d.). Its accomplishments go farther. Its joint analysis products include the production and maintenance of NATO’s Joint Analysis Handbook, which provide tools, principles, procedures, and techniques to conduct analysis of complicated problems all while supporting the lessons learned processes, and it also includes the NATO Lessons Learned Portal, that allows the NATO Lessons Learned community to more aptly share about what it has learned (Who We Are, n.d.). NATO training, exercises, and experimentation activities provide great venues for the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre. Its analysts gather observations, to acquire survey information as well as the conduct of interviews, most of which directly lead to the shaping of Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre’s future joint analysis projects (Who We Are, n.d.). 13.3.1

Joint Analysis

Under joint analysis, JALLC looks to thoroughly understand what is taking place to look for areas of improvement (Joint Analysis, n.d.). It does this to help provide NATO with an assessment of day to day operations (Joint Analysis, n.d.). Moreover, it considers capabilities and helps advise NATO on what it might want to pursue in changes to TTPs and technology going forward (Joint Analysis, n.d.). Next, it looks at the idea of concept development, again turning to technology to see how the Alliance can achieve greater success going forward (Joint Analysis, n.d.). Finally, it understands the utility of training and accordingly, JALLC will look to help develop training requirements for the JWC (Joint Analysis, n.d.).

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13.3.2

Lessons Learned

NATO has a portal that provides access to key lessons learned (The NATO Lessons Learned Portal, n.d.). This database is a repository of information related to what NATO has learned over time. It transcends information from ACT and also includes data points from SHAPE/ACO (The NATO Lessons Learned Portal, n.d.). More pointedly, it is accessible on the NATO Secret network using SharePoint technology (The NATO Lessons Learned Portal, n.d.).

13.4

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 13.1 looks at the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that Bryson (2018) underscores. This table looks at these through the lens of JALLC. Several strengths come to the surface when looking to historical accounts. Accordingly, JALLC can provide a wealth of information from across both major strategic commands when it looks to see what has gone well, and through the identification of events that have not to help the Alliance replicate success while avoiding past pitfalls. Moreover, through an introspective look, NATO can apply critical thinking to missions and operations to help bridge the two strategic commands looking for common themes and issues. JALLC can help apply critical thinking to more adeptly overcome issues with groupthink raised in the preceding chapter. Likewise, the JALLC can synthesize the learning from other allies as was raised in the last chapter. It can also assist others in the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure to better bolster the effectiveness of the Alliance by sharing information. Moreover, Table 13.1 JALLC SWOT

Strengths

Weaknesses

Analysis of requirements Critical thinking Sharing of information

Network protection Past events will repeat in the future Not everyone will read

Opportunities

Threats

Push more to ACO/NATO HQ

China / Russia interested in NATO vulnerabilities Cyber attacks

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it can even help the policymakers at NATO Headquarters when they look to enhance the diplomatic initiatives of the Alliance. There are weaknesses through. The first looks at network vulnerability and assumption that the enemy wants to know NATO’s weaknesses in TTPs and capabilities. The adversaries therefore would like to acquire this intelligence. The second is falling for the false assumption that events of the future will automatically look like those of the past and must constantly guard against these. It is fair to assume that potential antagonists to NATO will learn from their past mistakes and will evolve their TTPs to become more potent and effective in the future. Another weakness is that just because NATO has conducted analyses on past exercises and operations that staff officers and commanders will actually read these. It is probably safe to assume that NATO has collected a vast array of data and generated numerous reports on a multitude of events and it is highly unlikely that key leaders and staff officers will actually seek out lessons learned or will even know where to find said reports even if they actively seek them out. JALLC has an opportunity to help showcase its value. As members look to gather data on current and future exercise and operations, it will be incumbent upon JALLC staff to educate NATO members on what they are doing, why they are doing so, and the value in what it does. This will better assist JALLC in marketing its viability. When turning to threats, especially when looking at the nation states of Russia and China and their capabilities, NATO has concerns. Moreover, as established in Chapter 2, and when looking at cyber as a new domain and one that is challenging all nations, the threat becomes clear (Weaver with Pomeroy 2020). This is especially true of Alliance members and NATO has even used information warfare as early as 1999 (Cavelty 2019, 418). NATO will have to explore its interpretation of whether or not cyber attacks constitute an Article 5 attack. JALLC will have to look to past exercises and operations to see how and when cyber has been used and what should be done going forward to mitigate from these threats.

References Bryson, John M. 2018. Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 5th ed. NJ, USA: Wiley.

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Cavelty, Myriam. 2019. Cyber-Security in Contemporary Security Studies, 5th ed. Oxford UK: Oxford Press. JALLC History. n.d. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre. https://www.jallc.nato.int/organization/history.asp. Accessed on November 23, 2020. Joint Analysis. n.d. Joint Analysis. https://www.jallc.nato.int/activities/jointanal ysis.asp. Accessed on November 23, 2020. Mission, Roles, and Tasks. n.d. Mission, Roles and Tasks. https://www.jallc.nato. int/organization/mission_role_tasks.asp. Accessed on November 23, 2020. The NATO Lessons Learned Portal. n.d. The NATO Lessons Learned Portal. https://www.jallc.nato.int/products/nllp.asp. Accessed on November 23, 2020. Weaver, John M. with Jennifer Pomeroy (eds.). 2020. Contemporary Intelligence Analysis and National Security: A Critical American Perspective. New York, USA: Nova Science Publishers. Who We Are. n.d. Who We Are. https://www.act.nato.int/who-we-are. Accessed on July 22, 2020.

CHAPTER 14

Joint Forces Training Centre (JFTC)

Abstract Located in Poland, this center is instrumental in the conduct of pre-deployment training at the joint level, it provides support to current operations, helps identify emerging requirements, and also offers a venue for experimentation, testing, and interoperability. This chapter looks at the Joint Forces Training Center in more detail. Keywords JFTC · Training · NRF

14.1

History

The Joint Forces Training Centre (JFTC) was officially established in 2004 in Bydgoszcz, Poland where it quickly assumed a major role under the Allied Command Transformation’s training network (Who We Are, n.d.). However, JFTC was not fully operational immediately following its inception and therefore a memorandum of agreement was signed in 2005 which set the legal framework necessary for JFTC to be a fully functional

Zachary Claghorn is an MPPA student at York College of Pennsylvania and was a contributing researcher to this chapter. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_14

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entity (NATO 2005). Furthermore, 2005 also saw the first supporting actions from JFTC training teams in exercises that were conducted in Spain, Portugal, Germany, and Norway (Hirschmann 2019). Despite this, JFTC’s facility was significantly lagging. The staff had some offices at the Polish Army military complex, but for larger events they had to rely on external infrastructure such as the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany (Zacharias 2019). As a result, five years after its inception it began occupying its present facility with a CIS infrastructure that is able to handle large scale, joint force command-level exercises for the Alliance (Who We Are, n.d.). Over time, JFTC’s capabilities would increase due to the arrival of more experienced personnel, and a better equipped facility (Koztowski 2019).

14.2

Mission

JFTC is responsible for planning, preparing, and executing static and distributed joint and combined training events in support of Alliance warfighting readiness (What We Do, n.d.). NATO must ensure that systems of member nations are compatible and able to interact with those members from within the Alliance (Shea 2014). What is more, is that the center is committed to the development of warfare through conceptual development and the implementation of NATO doctrine while it looks to coordinate experimental integration into the process (What We Do, n.d.). Likewise, it is committed to ensuring interoperability to enhance effectiveness among NATO nations (What We Do, n.d.). Accordingly, it contributes to the strengthening and development of relationships while integrating national training and command elements (What We Do, n.d.).

14.3

Overview

The JFTC is constantly changing in order to meet the current and future requirements of NATO focused on training (Who We Are, n.d.). At present, it consists of 170 military and civilian personnel from 19 member nations (Who We Are, n.d.). It remains a key player in NATO’s transformation efforts and is a critical component of its training capability (Who We Are, n.d.). It helps NATO commanders test strategy (Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014). The structure of the command consists of a command group and three staff divisions that are functionally aligned (Who We Are, n.d.). These

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include the Training Division, the Plans and Development Division, as well as the Headquarters Support Division (Who We Are, n.d.). It is linked to the NATO Communications and Information Systems Group (Who We Are, n.d.). The Command Group provides leadership and direction for JFTC (Who We Are, n.d.). Under the commander’s leadership, the center provides joint and combined training, in both static and distributed environments as well as training at single and multiple echelons in support of full-spectrum operations (Who We Are, n.d.). Moreover, it helps in the development of doctrine, and with the integration of innovative concepts (Who We Are, n.d.). The JFTC’s first division looks to ensure that the center has the ability to deliver joint and combined training. Under the Training Division, JFTC helps in the mentoring of units to more aptly carry out the missions of the Alliance in current operations and those of the future that could look to implement the NRF (Who We Are, n.d.). The Plans and Development Division is the long-term repository of information (analysis and lessons learned) and is responsible for both programming and scheduling warfare development events and exercises (Who We Are, n.d.). Accordingly, it helps support ACT in engagement with regard to these types of events and exercises. Finally, JFTC’s last division ensures that the center has the infrastructure, resources, and property management to support static and distributed events (Who We Are, n.d.). The Headquarters Support Division provides real-life support to allow the center to function. Moreover, the JFTC conducted its first training event for NATO forces in the year following inception (Who We Are, n.d.). The event was a Mission Rehearsal Training/Mission Rehearsal Exercise for the South Eastern European Brigade that later served as the Kabul Multinational Brigade IX (Who We Are, n.d.). It continues to develop to meet NATO training needs in the present day (Who We Are, n.d.). Over the last decade and a half, training intensity at JFTC grew by holding single positions in exercise control events, serving in lead roles in the International Security Assistance Force Regional Command rehearsal and readiness exercises, and by engaging in more activities in general (Who We Are, n.d.). For example, throughout 2008 alone, JFTC carried out three visits to the ISAF Regional Command South Headquarters in Kandahar, in Southern Afghanistan, and conducted two exercises— one in Kingston, Canada, the other one in Grafenwöhr, Germany for

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staff rotating into Kandahar (Hirschmann 2019). Additionally, between 2006 and 2014, during 28 training events, more than 8300 trainees were successfully prepared for their deployment to ISAF (Zacharias 2019). Moreover, the center improved and took on a larger role supporting NATO Response Force exercises. It also conducted key leader training events for two of the six regional commands in Afghanistan (Who We Are, n.d.). It is through the provision of C2 elements (with interoperable communications) that it also played a key role in Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) courses for the International Security Assistance Force at the Joint Multinational Readiness Centre in Hohenfels, Germany (Who We Are, n.d.; JP 6–0, 2015, vii). Additionally, OMLTs closely partnered with, trained, and advised the newly created army units of the free Afghan government (Zacharias 2019). Then in 2013, after years of Afghanistan-oriented exercises, JFTC moved into NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS) exercises beginning with Loyal Bonus 2013 which resulted in a completely new exercise setup that had to be designed and implemented (Koztowski 2019). What’s more is that JFTC has also led the exercise planning course directly supporting the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (Who We Are, n.d.). While JFTC has increased efforts in training for NATO’s current operations and pre-deployment training, the Joint Force Training Centre has continuously developed and grown its role in defending the Alliance and projecting stability (Who We Are, n.d.). JFTC has subsequently opened its doors for new venues and these include various courses and NATO-wide conferences (Who We Are, n.d.). In fact, the first NCS/NFS exercise with JFTC in the role of Officer Directing Exercise was Trident Joust 2016 (Koztowski 2019). The focus of this exercise was to maintain NATO Response Force levels of proficiency and demonstrate the capability to plan and conduct operations within the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force concept (Koztowski 2019). Moreover, it was the first time that JFTC established a scenario team for the entire length of the planning process (Koztowski 2019). This series of exercises would go on to further develop the abilities of JFTC. For example, while Trident Joust 2017 was still underway, the same team at JFTC started preparations for Brilliant Joust 2018 (Koztowski 2019). Simultaneously conducting two planning processes by the same team had

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a positive impact and helped JFTC build up confidence in its capabilities (Koztowski 2019). In 2016, the center led the first-ever NATO-Georgia exercise and maintained a mentoring partnership in preparation for the next exercise in 2019 (Who We Are, n.d.). This event was a combination of a computer-assisted and a command post exercise used to educate and train the Georgian Armed Forces and to exercise a Georgian-led multinational brigade headquarters in planning and conducting a crisis response operation (Hirschmann 2019). Commanders and their training audience have a say in setting the training objectives. However, when it comes to implementation of training objectives, the exercise planners have the ultimate control by being the ones who create the exercise objective scenarios and incidents which are demanding and realistic enough to create operational dilemmas for commanders throughout the entire process (Hirschmann 2019). While the Alliance’s training and innovation efforts increase, Joint Force Training Centre is burgeoning along with these (Who We Are, n.d.). As a result, in 2017, JFTC “opened a training area for NATO headquarters elements to deploy and train as they would fight in expeditionary conditions. This, along with office expansions, increased the total training and control areas” (Who We Are, n.d.). Moreover, in 2018 the two NATO strategic commanders entrusted JFTC with the conduct of the Steadfast Pyramid and Steadfast Pinnacle exercises (Hirschmann 2019). The purpose of these events was to further develop the skills of commanders and senior staff to lead planning and conduct operations through the use of the NATO decision-making process (Hirschmann 2019). It is also important to note that JFTC’s output has been steadily increasing in the last five years from below four thousand to six and a half thousand individuals in 2019 who were trained and assisted in exercises, training events, conferences, and workshops (Hirschmann 2019). Additionally, JFTC grew from 113 to 170 personnel which means that it has experienced the largest amount of staff growth when compared to its sister organizations (Hirschmann 2019). As NATO moves into the future, JFTC continues to orient on NATO Command Structure exercises (What We Do, n.d.). It does so by helping enable the operational-level headquarters under ACO/SHAPE (What We Do, n.d.). To execute its support to warfare development, the center leverages modern information technology in its transformative role (What We Do,

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n.d.). It conducts and hosts sophisticated experiments and tests to flush out new ways of doing things. More pointedly, JFTC serves as the home for NATO’s annual Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise (CWIX); 1500 people participate in the event annually and hail from 40 NATO and partner nations (Who We Are, n.d.).

14.4

Practitioner’s Perspective and Analysis

Table 14.1 refers to what Bryson (2018) refers to as the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (S.W.O.T); these specifically apply to JFTC. Details follow in the paragraphs below. There are several strengths associated with JFTC. The first is in its ability to support current operations. In recent years, it has capitalized on the legacy experience derived from training up staff to take over rotations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan (Transformation, n.d.). Capitalizing on this real-world experience has allowed the JFTC to become more relevant as it continues to train up key leaders and essential staff to assume responsibility for significant, real-world operations at the behest of NATO. Since ISAF morphed into the Resolute Support Mission, JFTC has remained at the forefront of the effort and serves as the repository of key and essential information to more aptly prepare future deploying personnel with the institutional knowledge required to run the mission. It has done so to preserve the long-term integrity of the mission (Transformation, n.d.; RSM, n.d.). Table 14.1 JFTC SWOT Strengths

Weaknesses

Support to current operations

Lack of full-spectrum environments (no jungle/no desert) Computer simulations does not equate to realism

Key venue for training headquarters Ability to train even during a pandemic Leverage technology Opportunities

Threats

Learn from strengths/weaknesses of both NCS and NFS

The United States has competing venues in Europe (Germany) and in the United States

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Accordingly, it is committed to remaining as the key venue oriented on NATO Force Structure and NATO Command Structure exercises (Transformation, n.d.). Moreover, the center serves as the nexus to foster realistic exercises for the Alliance and national level headquarters to include the likes of the operational-level headquarters covered earlier in this book (Transformation, n.d.). Likewise, it helps provide integration and training to exercise control; the element responsible for injecting realistic scenarios into the exercise regimen. JFTC showcased success during Loyal Leda 2020. This exercise represented the largest distributed command post exercise of 2020 comprising forces from 21 nations spanning two continents (Europe and North America) and took place in November 2020 (Loyal Leda, n.d.). It proved that amid a global pandemic (COVID-19) that NATO could carry on with a major exercise. Other exercises took place during the pandemic. In October 2020, JFTC prepared future members of the Alliance’s mission to Iraq for their upcoming out-of-area operation (NMI, n.d.). JFTC can leverage modern technology and cross the ACO/ACT boundaries by working closely with NCISG. Accordingly, it makes use of state-of-the-art IT platforms to test and experiment new TTPs to help advance NATO capabilities (Transformation, n.d.). As already mentioned, the CWIX event is a great venue to help in the transformative process that NATO seeks (Transformation, n.d.). Conversely, there are weaknesses. First and foremost, the training center is endemic to Europe and lacks a full accoutrement of venues that one might experience on the modern battlefield. For example, if NATO were to deploy to a desert or jungle environment, the Alliance’s headquarters would have challenges with regard to sand and heat and the problems these can bring to bear on equipment in the desert, as well as the humidity and triple canopy foliage found the jungle that can reduce the effectiveness on communications equipment broadly, and satellite uplinks (the lack thereof) from limits to line-of-sight inhibited by dense vegetation more specifically. The good news is that most Article 5 operations would not involve NATO fighting in these types of environments. However, as the Alliance looks to participate in out-of-area operations, it will have to prepare to operate in them. Computer simulations cannot often replicate the sounds and smells of what one could confront on the modern battlefield. It is one thing to go through scenarios, and there is value added from the “inoculation” one

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could experience through participating in exercises, but to replicate the stress of life and death decisions often cannot be seen until one gets to experience these first-hand. There are opportunities made available to JFTC. As it looks to integrate efforts into both the NATO Command and Force Structures, it can also learn from the strengths and weaknesses of each and accordingly, and build better scenarios to help one another as it looks to the future. There is an axiomatic expression in military parlance that one is always looking to fight the last war. By learning (and not just teaching), JFTC could serve as an integrator of knowledge to build upon experiences learned from the conduct of exercises. JFTC, because it is a subordinate of ACT, can leverage knowledge and experience from its sister organizations: JWC and the Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre. JFTC can look to pull from what has worked well with the other two organizations and integrate these into the exercise location in Poland. There is one primary threat. Many nations have an exercise regimen that is quite good and realistic. The United States (and by extension many other NATO countries) has many training centers and the most prominent ones are located in the Mojave Desert, at Fort Polk Louisiana, and two in Germany. NATO will be in competition with these and to remain relevant, NATO will constantly have to apply critical thinking to its scenario building to ensure that it is able to compete effectively with national training facilities. Perhaps NATO could reach out to other nations to consolidate training venues under NATO and take the lead to help avoid duplication of effort and to enhance interoperability among Alliance members.

References Bryson, John M. 2018. Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 5th ed. NJ, United States: Wiley. Hirschmann, Leonhard. 2019. The Joint Force Training Centre-For 15 Years an Instrument to Meet the Challenges of NATO’s Security Environment. https://www.jftc.nato.int/images/media/Magazine/issue12/ index.html?page=6. Accessed on November 27, 2020. Koztowski, Piotr. 2019. BACK TO THE ROOTS NATO Command Structure (NCS)/NATO Force Structure (NFS) Exercises Gain Momentum in JFTC.

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https://www.jftc.nato.int/images/media/Magazine/issue12/index.html?pag e=18. Accessed on November 27, 2020. Krüger-Klausen, Villiam and Liselotte Odgaard. 2014. Preparing for an Imperfect World: Strategy in Conflict Management Environments. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Loyal Leda. n.d. Loyal Leda 2020, NATO’s Biggest 2020 Distributed Exercise Ends. https://www.jftc.nato.int/articles/loyal-leda-2020-ends. Accessed on November 23, 2020. NATO. 2005. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation Holds Official Signing Ceremonies for NEW CENTRE of Excellence and Joint Forces Training Centre. https://www.nato.int/ims/news/2005/n050412e.htm. Accessed on November 25, 2020. NMI. n.d. Future NATO Mission Iraq Members Ready for Deployment. https://www.jftc.nato.int/articles/future-nmi-members-ready-deploy ment. Accessed on November 23, 2020. Resolute Support Mission. n.d. Resolute Support Training Event—Virtual Execution. https://www.jftc.nato.int/articles/resolute-support-trainingevent-virtual-execution. Accessed on November 23, 2020. Shea, Jamie. 2014. NATO’s Future Strategy: Ready for the Threats of the Future or Refighting the Battles of the Past? In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Transformation. n.d. Welcome to NATO! Joint Force Training Centre Transformation Through Training. https://jftc.nato.int/. Accessed on November 23, 2020. What We Do. n.d. What We Do. https://www.jftc.nato.int/organization/whatwe-do. Accessed on September 28, 2020. Who We Are. n.d. Who We Are. https://www.act.nato.int/who-we-are. Accessed on July 22, 2020. Zacharias, Lars. 2019. Pre-deployment Training at JFTC for Current NATO Operations. https://www.jftc.nato.int/images/media/Magazine/iss ue12/index.html?page=12. Accessed on November 27, 2020.

PART V

(Future): Wrap Up

CHAPTER 15

Conclusion and the Way Forward

Abstract This chapter looks to provide a synopsis of what the book covered and provides recommendations that NATO might consider for its future. Keywords Strengths · Weaknesses · Opportunities · Threats

15.1

S.W.O.T. Analysis

Chapter 1 saw discussion on Bryson’s (2018) S.W.O.T. analysis. More pointedly, the author looked at the internal components of strengths and weaknesses as well as affording consideration to outside influences, those being opportunities and threats, and looking at the amalgam of data derived from previous chapters. 15.1.1

Strengths

The Alliance has many strengths available to it. Economically, and organizationally, NATO member countries straddle many supranational organizations and treaties. When turning to the United Nations, three of the member countries make up a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations (UNSC); these include France, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1_15

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the United Kingdom, and the United States. As permanent members of the UNSC, each can help advocate for sanctions and has veto power to help NATO where needed. Moreover, several of the NATO countries make up the G7 which are some of the wealthiest developed countries in the world. More pointedly, six of the seven are Alliance members and include the likes of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. Power resides in the status of the G7 possessing over half of the world’s wealth. The European Union is also a significant influencer. Though the United Kingdom has pulled out and by virtue of Canada’s, Iceland’s, and the United States’ presence being outside of Europe, all Alliance members that exist on the continent with the exception of Norway and Turkey enjoy membership in both organizations. The EU-NATO relationship can still be one that serves in a complementary capacity (politically and with regard to legitimacy) and can serve to help NATO with common interests shared by both organizations, but one needs to understand that this does not necessarily lead to synergy since both generally share the same capabilities. Collectively, Alliance members bridge multiple organizations and treaties. This, in turn, affords NATO significant clout and influence in the world. There are other strengths. The military might of many NATO countries provide it with significant hardware to be used if and when needed. NATO has robust combat power that covers multiple domains (air, land, sea, cyber, space, and Special Forces) that could allow it to project power and influence virtually anywhere on the planet if it has the political will to do so. NATO in recent decades has moved beyond its traditional battlespace in Europe and has seen the Alliance participate in multiple operations around the world to include the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Accordingly, it has shown a proclivity to adapt, though admittedly with growing pains, to demonstrate relevance as it moves forward into the twenty-first century. The embracement of technology is another strength. NATO through ACT and by extension through JWC and JFTC look to integrate and infuse innovation into NATO’s exercises and this has led to advancements in C4ISR throughout the operational commands as well. Going back as far as 2006, when this author served as a NATO commander in Cape Verde, he saw how technology could assist his senior commander who

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participated in the Steadfast Jaguar exercise, while still affording him the C4ISR architecture to run simultaneous operations in ISAF, the Baltic Air Police mission, as well as the counterpiracy mission off the Horn of Africa. Moreover, NATO is well invested in CIS, and other communications systems that allow it to foster voice and data transference throughout commands anywhere on the globe. NCISG, and its signals battalions, have helped bring these capabilities to fruition. Again, in 2006 when this author participated in Steadfast Jaguar, his deployment as part of NATO Response Force 7 to Pakistan in 2005, and multiple ISAF deployments, he saw first hand the adeptness of NATO’s ability to quickly and seamlessly set up a CIS architecture that allowed for communications to exist throughout the planet. Integrated logistics can be seen as another strength. NSPA has leaned forward over the last two decades providing support to numerous NATO exercises and operations to include out-of-area events like the NRF 7 mission to Pakistan in 2005, Steadfast Jaguar in 2006, and the ISAF support mission from 2006 moving forward. By having an agency help deconflict and prioritize efforts can lead to a reduction in duplication of effort and strains along ground lines of communication. This in turn could help lead to better traffic flow on the movement of equipment, supplies, fuel, and maintenance support teams within a theater of operation. There are strengths in numbers. Because of the unity of 30 countries through NATO, this in and of itself sends a clear message to other nations as to the strength and relevancy of the Alliance. It is also because of Article 5 that any nation wishing to confront a NATO member would think twice about doing so kinetically because of the military power that could be brought to bear against the culprit. Moreover, traditional past enemies like Denmark and Norway, the United Kingdom/France and Germany, and Greece and Turkey are less likely to see the rise of hostilities because of their membership in NATO. That stated, actors could try to exert influence against the Alliance by conducting events that might fall just under the Article 5 threshold thereby undermining its legitimacy as a supranational organization, or through an attempt to make NATO appear weak. Legitimacy is a key strength. NATO’s existence for decades is a testament to the enduring contribution to peace on the planet. It is a well-respected organization and one that many other countries want

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to be associated with as has been seen in such missions as one has witnessed in Kosovo and Afghanistan. However, legitimacy is ephemeral if counter messaging by potential antagonists present messaging through social media and print/televised news sources that could undermine the Alliance (even if those messages/news prove to be fake). NATO has many strengths. It would be wise for the political leadership of the Alliance to understand these and capitalize on them while subordinate commanders under ACT and ACO look to implement strategies and operations to help bring to fruition success in its missions. Likewise, NATO leaders have a wealth of real-world experience and knowledge. 15.1.2

Weaknesses

Money is oftentimes equated with power. That said, many NATO member nations are still not adhering to the 2% of GDP spending on defense. Though NATO has significant combat power available to it collectively, many individual nations are often relying on others to do the heavy lifting when it comes to defense investment. This is a problem that might not go away anytime soon because money spent on defense will often lead to decrements in spending on a country’s domestic programs which can be more popular with the citizens of one’s country. Unfortunately, countries like the United States will have to carry the burden for the Alliance while leaders of wealthier NATO countries meeting or exceeding the 2% should continuously push other NATO members spending less to spend more on collective defense. Diversity and membership can be a hindering factor. Because of the variegated membership of Alliance countries, achieving consensus (especially at the political level) will be fraught with challenges. NATO Headquarters specifically, and other NATO organizations (especially those covered throughout this book) more broadly will most likely have a watered-down approach to implementing policy decisions that resulted from compromise to get all countries to agree to “yes” to pursue NATO goals and objectives. That stated, if the alternative were for a country to pursue a unilateral decision on its own, it could become consumed by significant cost than if it pursued a multilateral approach through NATO and in the process, cost sharing among NATO countries, to help achieve good albeit at a level less than what it might otherwise want. Technology is a double-edged sword. Though a strength, Russia and other countries (like China) are investing in anti-satellite (ASAT)

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technology. NATO’s CIS and C4ISR platforms are heavily reliant on technology, satellites, the Internet, and more to ensure continuity and constant communication. Accordingly, it will have to invest in defenses in layers and to build in redundancy to ensure that it can communicate effectively if (or when) an adversary looks at employing jamming, computer network attacks, and/or decides to take out the global positioning system satellites. Secondary and tertiary effects could prevent Alliance weapons from communicating with radar systems and/or other weapon systems. With regard to C4ISR, NATO lacks its own intelligence collection capabilities. Though it has intelligence professionals working in all of its organizations, NATO as a whole, relies on satellite imagery, signals collection, human intelligence reports, and more provided by Alliance member nations. It is not a foregone conclusion that Alliance members will be forthcoming with information especially if the owner of the intelligence feels that a NATO member might “leak” the sources and methods used to acquire the information in the first place thereby tipping off to potential belligerents how NATO came to acquire the intelligence (and subsequently tie off the access in the future). Though expensive, NATO might want to consider investing in more C4ISR above and beyond its AWACS platforms. Reliance on commercial logistics systems could be a problem in highly kinetic operations. Though this author has experienced the advantages of contracted solutions in Cape Verde, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and throughout Europe, in a “hot war” it might be difficult to convince civilians to put their lives in harm’s way in order to run logistics support for NATO. It is therefore necessary for NATO to invest in the parallel structure of the Joint Logistics Support Group under Allied Land Command to serve as the lead integrator of logistics support with national military contributions to help ensure continuity of operations. NATO has weaknesses as one would expect is the case with large multinational organizations. The key is to identify these and attempt to implement threat mitigation strategies if not eliminate them outright, to do what it can to mollify them. 15.1.3

Opportunities

One of NATO’s strengths is its legitimacy, and it should use this to foment relations with non-NATO member countries. The more that

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NATO works with partners from around the world, the greater the likelihood that NATO will be able to exert influence into the political and military activities of other countries. As one sees with the sharing of costs among NATO members, if the Alliance is open to other countries providing troops and capabilities to its operations, the less the costs that will be directly borne by NATO writ large. NATO’s legitimacy can be furthered by association with other supranational organizations like the United Nations and the European Union. US Ambassador Doug Lute (2020) even went farther when he recently stated that a NATO/EU alliance should be seen as natural and likely. The greater the pool of international organizations and by extension, their support, the more likely that NATO will be successful at garnering greater support from other nations that transcend the Alliance. Space is a double-edged sword. Moreover, the United States is transitioning to a dedicated space force. NATO, will have to do more to stay relevant regarding this domain. It will have to invest in hardened technology and redundancy to ensure continuity of operations through C4ISR systems. NATO has opportunities but these are limited. One must appreciate that the more nations that get involved, the less likely it will be that the solution to problems will be a perfect one. 15.1.4

Threats

Outside the Alliance, many threats exist. The most pressing of these, and one that is existential, is Russia. In recent years, the malevolent actor has asserted itself on the continent through its annexing of Crimea and its forays into the affairs of Ukraine through the use of paramilitary operations, hybrid warfare, and cyber attacks. Several former Warsaw Pact countries are wary of Russia’s actions. As a result, NATO should continue to invest in its eight NFIUs. These will be critical to help integrate NATO ground capabilities to better hedge against Russia’s bellicose activities. Moreover, for the foreseeable future, NATO will need to keep its four battle groups forwardly postured. By maintaining an enduring military presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland sends a clear message about NATO’s commitment to its member nations especially those in close proximity to Russia.

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NATO will have to keep up its air policing mission. As Russia continues to test NATO with overflights of its territory, the AWACs and Allied Air Command will have a tall order to quickly identify and intercept Russian aircraft. The NATO Response Force should also participate in exercises with scenarios looking at threats emanating from Russia. ACT, and by extension JWC, will have to prepare the upcoming JTFHQ and other subordinate units to remain ready for all types of attacks (conventional and asymmetric) from Russia. Terrorism is still an issue (Geoan˘a 2020). As one has seen in recent years, it is not just the United States that has been the recipient of terror attacks. Spain saw bombings in March of 2004 as did the United Kingdom in July 2005. Just a few years ago, the Islamic State was responsible for a series of coordinated attacks in Paris, France and Brussels, Belgium; even Germany was not immune. NATO countries must be poised to deal with such attacks and invest in anti-terrorism force protection measures to protect critical infrastructure, government agencies, and military centers of gravity. The other side of the coin regarding space, is the threat posed by China and others (Geoan˘a 2020). As countries like China are investing in space-based weapons and as others are looking at anti-satellite technology, space will become increasingly important. NATO will have to invest in technology to ensure redundancy especially regarding global positioning technology and communications systems that rely on satellites. Finally, cyber threats are ubiquitous (Geoan˘a 2020). Both state and non-state actors turn to the asymmetric advantages realized through Computer Network Attacks (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) to look for vulnerabilities (Weaver and Johnson 2020). NATO should probably revisit both Articles 5 and 6 to determine if and when cyber is used against an Alliance member, whether or not it wants to broaden the definition of what constitutes an attack. There is no shortage of threats. NATO has a tall order to keep an eye on what could occur, should constantly consider what challenges can arise, and prepare to address these head on with its investing in C4ISR, logistics support, combat power, diplomatic initiatives, and more.

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15.2

Conclusion

No plan survives first contact with the enemy was espoused by Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke in the late 1800s. This too is true of organizations. As Johnston (2017) stated in his book on NATO’s adaptability, the Alliance of today is considerably different from the one established in 1949. It has proven to be a resilient organization and has undergone adaptation multiple times throughout its history to remain a relevant supranational organization (Johnston 2017, 3). Moreover, NATO has made changes over time, looked to position itself differently longitudinally, and has gone through several iterative transformations to its structure and capabilities especially in the post-Cold War environment (Odgaard 2014). The world of today is a pernicious one; it is one that will require an intrepid organization (comprised of political and military components) to deal with arising exigencies. The political and military components often see one another as inextricably linked as they work together to solve problems (Davidson 2004). The Alliance will need to understand that present security threats will continue and to hedge against such aggression as one has seen in Russia recently (Stoltenberg 2020; Geoan˘a 2020). NATO must turn to the future and look for the emergence of new threats to remain relevant in the decades to come (Jakobsen 2019; Odgaard 2014; Shea 2014). Stoltenberg (2020) recently stated that NATO would look to efforts to strengthen the Alliance rather than “reinventing it” in what he has dubbed “NATO 2030.” NATO civilian leaders will have to clearly articulate expectations to NATO commanders (Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014). This will be a precursor to avoid profligate behavior in times of fiscal constraint, and to avoid challenges gravitating around making adjustments, the pursuit of efficiencies, and enhancing coordination as it develops future strategies (Krüger-Klausen and Odgaard 2014). It must work with the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division and NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre to get things right. The NATO Secretary General had cautioned against nations applying a unilateral approach to solve global problems (like COVID-19) and sees that collective action, collaboration, and partnerships are what is needed (Stoltenberg 2020). He underscored this when he stated, “…challenges that we face over the next decade are greater than any of us can tackle

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alone” (Stoltenberg 2020). Moreover, Shea (2014) looks to the importance of maintaining links to major international bodies like the United Nations, the European Union, and the African Union (Shea 2014). Continued investment in the armed forces of NATO nations is needed (Stoltenberg 2020). Though spending on militaries has increased in the last five years, more is required. After the COVID-19 pandemic is over and once NATO member nations emerge from recession, leaders of member countries must afford attention to increasing their contributions to the Alliance, especially those below the 2% of GDP threshold. What is more, is that political disagreements have emerged among Alliance members over issues pertaining to trade, Russia, China, and the Middle East (Stoltenberg 2020). These fissures might weaken the fabric that has kept NATO intact for 70-plus years. Though countries like China are outside of the Alliance’s area of operation, a rise in the PRC’s influence is something that NATO will have to monitor and for which it must prepare; NATO voiced its concerns at a conference in London in 2019 (Stoltenberg 2020; Geoan˘a 2020). NATO will have to work closer with like-minded countries outside of its traditional sphere of influence like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea (Stoltenberg 2020). It must continue to strive to be what Jakobsen (2014, 59) refers to as a “force multiplier” rather than a “force-subtractor” where the Alliance is seen as beneficial rather than a liability. NATO has had a storied past, and one replete with examples of its ability to adapt to changing times and conditions (Johnston 2017, 163). NATO has overseen numerous operations in recent years and several (like those in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Libya) have been quite complicated (Greitens 2019, 277). Though the ability to quickly adapt might not be its forte, when confronted with crisis, the Alliance has learned and repeatedly risen to the occasion. Notable examples in recent memory include the likes of the air campaign in Kosovo (Jakobsen 2019, 291), NATO’s contribution to the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, the intervention in the civil war in Libya in 2011 (Jakobsen 2019, 289), and in more recent years, NATO’s contribution in leadership of forwarddeployed military units in Eastern Europe following Russia’s aggressive behavior in Ukraine (Johnston 2017, 163; Morgan 2019, 39). These have been less than perfect though.

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That stated, NATO has gone through growing pains. Notable examples include NATO’s shortcomings with the air campaign in Kosovo (Jakobsen, 2019, 291) as well as the disjointed nature of operations that have occurred under NATO’s umbrella in Afghanistan in the early years (Johnston 2017). To help avoid issues, NATO civilian leaders must clearly articulate expectations to NATO commanders. Conversely, though NATO operations in Afghanistan haven’t produced the results nations wanted (and many service men and women from NATO troop-contributing nations have been wounded and killed), it did demonstrate to the world that the Alliance could adapt under challenging conditions (Johnston 2017, 173). This represented the first time that NATO became embroiled in ground combat operations and showed how it could integrate air, logistics (NSPA), and communications (NCISG) into a difficult environment. What is more, is due to the perceived legitimacy of the mission and the organization, upwards of 48 countries participated in this NATO operation (Johnston 2017). Experts have identified disparities in air capabilities among NATO nations (Hallams 2010; Johnston 2017, 164). The NATO Secretary General and the United States should press member countries to invest in next-generation fighters, strategic airlift capabilities, fuel tanker support, and more. NATO needs to adapt to remain relevant; North American member nations should remain committed or risk the possibility of the European Union taking a more assertive role (Duffield 1992). NATO must remain flexible and adaptive to stay relevant (Wijk 1997). Moreover, it must look at affording consideration to all member nations’ needs. If not, one could see the Alliance falter or disband like what happened with CENTO and SEATO. There are benefits being in an Alliance. These include the cost sharing/burden sharing among nations and as one saw with Afghanistan that allowed the United States to leverage other capabilities from NATO member countries (and others outside the Alliance) to conduct security assistance operations in Afghanistan (Johnston 2017, 171). The Cold War ended 30 years ago and for over two decades, NATO has been involved in operations in Kosovo and almost as long as that in Afghanistan. In more recent years, one has seen a resurgence of military flex from Russia on the European continent, and China has signaled its desire to assume a more prominent role on the world stage (through diplomatic means, in expanding its economy, and through its investment

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in its military). The Alliance will have many challenges going forward (espionage, subversion, covert influence, hybrid warfare, and more), but should look to remain flexible and adaptive as it moves through the twenty-first century (Geoan˘a 2020). What is more is that the strategy and implementation of it by the military components nests nicely with the policy established by the political staff of NATO Headquarters (Johnston 2017, 180). Likewise, military strategy must support political objectives (Gray and Johnson 2019). This is because of the interdependent relationship between the NAC and the senior commanders of ACO and ACT. NATO should not become complacent and accept the status quo. NATO in the past, was inspired by, and has in turn served as a beacon of inspiration for political decisions throughout generations of American and European politicians. It can in the future as well if it remains flexible. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (2015) eloquently stated, “Our Alliance must also adapt to the long term.”

15.3

Way Forward

Though this work focused solely on secondary data, future research might want to use primary data collection to enhance what this research found. This study focused mostly on a five-year temporal period (2016– 2021), and used the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (S.W.O.T.) model (Bryson and Edwards 2017; Bryson 2018). Likewise, though S.W.O.T. was used as an analytical technique, other models could be used as well, like the York Intelligence Red Team Model-Modified (Weaver 2019). Other research might consider looking at other variables. KrügerKlausen and Odgaard (2014, 19) considered five variables when they looked at NATO (time, position, legitimacy, implementation, and capabilities) (Nissen 2014, 163–165). The first looks at time available to meet objectives. Next, position turns to what an organization can do to bring to fruition what one wants to realize through the strategic planning process. Legitimacy, gravitates around the perspectives that others (nation states and supranational organizations) have with regard to what one is doing. The implementation structure affords consideration to both domestic and international measures that are available to bring about the change. Finally, capabilities refer to the resources available to make change and put into practice what the organization wants to achieve.

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NATO could expand in the future. If it decides to do so, it should consider unintended consequences like the strengthening of Russian resolve moving forward (Ortman and Whittaker 2019, 321). Likewise, as pointed out earlier, NATO also helps enable nations like the United States to leverage others to minimize the burden of being the sole bearer of the problem while adding legitimacy to the mission (Jakobsen 2014). As also underscored in an earlier chapter, NATO should continue to pursue (1) a security guarantee to protect from external attacks, (2) to serve as a tool to foster both international peace and security by having the ability to execute conflict management and arms control, and finally (3) fostering a sense of community that strives to promote democracy, liberty, and the rule of law (Jakobsen 2014, 60). By virtue of the United States’ position in the Alliance and as the contributor that provides the most in terms of resources, it can share the burden with its European partners to support high-intensity conflict for concerns not centered solely on US interests (Jakobsen 2014, 61). There will be challenges when issues arise that fall under the threshold of an Article 5 mission; NATO looks to achieve consensus and this becomes increasingly complicated the larger the organization becomes (Jakobsen 2014, 70). This author posits that under the premise of conflict management, that NATO is an attractive option for high-intensity conflict when looking at achieving legitimacy of purpose (Laity 2014, 102) if it comes to this especially when consensus is achieved and in turning to the mix of capabilities that the Alliance can leverage from troop-contributing nations (through the interoperability of command and control systems). NATO will have to move away from profligate behavior. It should look to press nations to avoid duplication of effort while asking countries to pursue functional levels of expertise from which the Alliance can draw. Likewise, to remain relevant, the Alliance will have to avoid “tactificication” where developments at the tactical level will unintentionally impede strategy execution obviating the achievement of effects pursued by NATO (Nielsen 2014, 141). The Alliance will have to avoid past mistakes. This includes the lack of a comprehensive approach failing to integrate civilian efforts into military planning in Afghanistan (Nielsen 2014, 148; Odgaard and Nielsen 2014; Thruelsen 2011). Likewise, it will have to continue to make use of the NCMP (as covered in Chapters 2 and 3). To do so, NATO must pursue achievable objectives while also clearly understanding the end state (Nielsen 2014, 149). Success will be contingent on selecting the correct ways, means, and ends (Nissen 2014, 162).

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References Bryson, John M. 2018. Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 5th ed. NJ, United States: Wiley. Bryson, John M., and L. H. Edwards. 2017. Public-Sector Strategic Planning. In The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Business and Management. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Davidson, Janine. 2004. Giving Peacekeeping a Chance: The Modern Military’s Struggle Over Peace Operations. Small Wars and Insurgencies 15 (2): 168– 184. Duffield, John S. 1992. International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels. Internationals Organization 46 (4): 819– 855. Geoan˘a, Mircea. (2020, December 11). NATO 20/2020: 20 Bold Ideas to Reimagine the Alliance After the 2020 US Election (Panel Discussion). Atlantic Council Panel. Gray, Colin S., and Jeannie L. Johnson. 2019. The Practice of Strategy Strategy in the Contemporary World. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. 2019. Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations in Strategy in the Contemporary World, 6th ed. Oxford UK: Oxford Press. Hallams, Ellen. 2010. The United States and NATO Since 9/11. New York: Routledge. Heuer, Jr., Richard J., and Randolph H. Pherson. 2015. Structured Analytical Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, 2nd ed. Los Angeles, USA: CQ Press. Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. 2014. The Indispensable Enabler: NATO’s Strategic Value in High-Intensity Operations Is Far Greater Than You Think. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Jakobsen, Peter V. 2019. Coercive Diplomacy: Countering War-Threatening Crisis and Armed Conflicts. In Contemporary Security Studies, 5th ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford Press. Johnston, Seth A. 2017. How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950. Baltimore, MD, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. Krüger-Klausen, Villiam, and Liselotte Odgaard. 2014. Preparing for an Imperfect World: Strategy in Conflict Management Environments. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Laity, Mark. 2014. NATO and Libya: The Dawn of European Security Management, a Warning, or Business as Usual? In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Lute, Doug. 2020. NATO 20/2020: 20 Bold Ideas to Reimagine the Alliance After the 2020 US Election (Panel Discussion). Atlantic Council Panel, December 11. Nielsen. 2014. Time and the Question of Unintended Influences on Military Strategy in Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Nissen, Thomas. 2014. Strategizing NATO’s Narratives in Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Odgaard, Liselotte. 2014. Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Odgaard, Liselotte, and Thomas G. Nielsen. 2014. China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang. Journal of Contemporary China 23 (87): 535– 555. Ortman, Stefanie, and Nick Whittaker. 2019. Geopolitics and Grand Strategy in Strategy in the Contemporary World. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Shea, Jamie. 2014. NATO’s Future Strategy: Ready for the Threats of the Future or Refighting the Battles of the Past. In Strategy in NATO: Preparing for an Imperfect World. New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Stoltengerg, Jens. 2015. Remarks by the Secretary General of NATO at the 60th Anniversary of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Norway: Stavanger. Stoltenberg, Jens. 2020. NATO Secretary General Unveils His Vision for the Alliance’s Future. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlant icist/nato-secretary-general-unveils-his-vision-for-the-alliances-future/#:~: text=His%20NATO%202030%20project%20will,systematically%E2%80%9D% 20and%20harness%20the%20bloc’s. Accessed on September 23, 2020. Thruelsen, Dahl. 2011. Fighting an Insurgency Without Unity. https://milhis kom.dk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Thruelsen-COIN-MilHisKom-7mar-2011.pdf. Accessed on October 19, 2020. Weaver, John M. 2019. United Nations Security Council Permanent Member Perspectives Implications for U.S. and Global Intelligence Professionals. New York, USA: Peter Lang Publishers. Weaver, John M. with Benjamin Johnson. 2020. Cyber Security Challenges Confronting Canada and the United States. New York, USA: Peter Lang Publishers. Wijk, Rob d. 1997. NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium. London: Brasseries.

Index

A Afghanistan, 7, 24, 35, 39, 53, 57, 60, 61, 77, 90, 106, 107, 113, 119, 120, 129, 139, 140, 147, 148, 152, 173, 174, 176, 186, 187, 191, 192, 194 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), 57 African Union, 24, 191 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 41, 46, 69, 101–109, 187, 189 Airspace control authority (ACA), 74 Air Tasking Orders (ATOs), 67, 69, 74, 78 Albania, 5 Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), 41, 42, 68, 69, 145 Allied Air Command (AAC), 40, 67–74, 78, 109, 189 Allied Command Operations (ACO), 23, 35–42, 140, 186, 193 Allied Command Transformation (ACT), 23, 35, 36, 60, 133,

139–144, 146–148, 151, 155, 166, 168, 171, 173, 178, 184, 186, 189, 193 Allied Land Command, 71, 83–86, 88, 90, 109, 187 Allied Maritime Command, 42, 71, 93–96, 109 Area of Responsibility (AOR), 58, 60, 68, 70, 71, 84, 88, 126 Article 5, 11, 12, 14, 19, 21, 26, 29, 40, 75, 89, 96, 102, 126, 169, 177, 185, 194 Asia, 4, 184

B Balkans, 39, 58 Belgium, 5, 13, 20, 21, 36, 56, 68, 117, 124, 145, 189 BENELUX, 5 Brexit, 27 Bulgaria, 5, 40, 87

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 J. M. Weaver, NATO in Contemporary Times, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68731-1

197

198

INDEX

C Canada, 5, 13, 38, 68, 88, 97, 173, 184 Cape Verde, 8, 120, 162, 184, 187 CBRN Defence Task Force, 87 Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) Program, 117, 120 Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) Programme, 117 China, 4, 76, 78, 79, 98, 99, 109, 169, 189, 191, 192 Cold War, 5, 24, 26, 30, 36, 68, 102, 132, 140, 190, 192 Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs), 36, 67, 69–72, 76, 78 Combined joint operations center (CJOC), 56 Command and control (C2), 36, 37, 41, 43, 48, 55, 67–69, 73–75, 78, 84, 89, 90, 93–95, 98, 103, 104, 124–126, 128, 130, 131, 134, 140, 142, 143, 174, 194 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), 90, 124, 184, 187–189 Common operational picture (COP), 56, 90, 108, 130 Communications and Information Systems (CIS), 118, 124–133, 172, 185, 187 Contracting, 116 COVID-19, 24, 29, 43, 132, 147, 177, 191 Crimea, 38, 75, 91, 104, 188 Croatia, 5 Cyber, 24, 28, 29, 61, 132, 133, 147, 152, 159, 168, 169, 188, 189 Czech Republic, 6, 69 D Denmark, 6, 68, 185

Deputy Secretary General, 28, 29, 43 Diplomatic, information, military, and economic (D.I.M.E.), 22, 47, 55

E Electronic warfare (EW), 28, 41, 134 Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), 38, 57, 86, 88 Estonia, 6, 38, 40, 57, 69, 75, 76, 87, 88, 188 Europe, 4, 7, 11, 12, 21, 36, 38, 39, 41, 45, 56, 58, 59, 61, 68, 69, 71, 75, 83, 87, 107, 108, 113, 120, 147, 153, 176, 177, 184, 187, 191 European Union (EU), 27, 39, 43–46, 121, 184, 188, 191, 192

F France, 4–6, 13, 20, 23, 27, 28, 74, 115, 117, 183–185, 189

G Germany, 4, 6, 28, 38, 41, 56, 68, 69, 74, 76, 87, 88, 97, 98, 101, 117, 123, 125, 133, 141, 172–174, 176, 178, 184, 185, 189 Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF), 86 Greece, 6, 27, 41, 87, 97, 98, 141, 185 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 25, 28 Gulf of Aden, 94

H Hard power, 37

INDEX

Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCB), 53, 56–58 Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Naples (JFCN), 53, 58, 59 Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW), 118 High Level Group (HLG), 23 High Readiness Forces (HRF), 86, 87 Horn of Africa, 93–95, 185 Hungary, 6, 69, 87, 115

I Iceland, 5, 6, 39, 184 Instruments of power, 47, 55 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 77, 101, 104, 105, 108 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 8, 57, 103, 152, 174, 176, 185, 191 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 41 Italy, 5, 6, 41, 69, 74, 115, 125, 184

J Joint air operations plans (JAOPs), 71, 74 Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), 8, 141, 165–167, 178 Joint Forces Training Centre (JFTC), 8, 171 Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG), 87, 187 Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), 54, 55, 59, 71, 189 Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), 60, 141, 147, 149–162, 178, 184, 189

199

K KFOR, 39 Kosovo, 24, 35, 47, 53, 58, 60, 77, 89, 113, 120, 129, 139, 147, 186, 191, 192

L LANDCOM. See Allied Land Command Latvia, 6, 38, 40, 57, 69, 75, 87, 88, 188 Libya, 47, 76, 77, 101, 102, 109, 191 Lithuania, 6, 38, 40, 57, 69, 75, 87, 88, 188 Logistics, 44, 48, 83, 87, 103, 113–117, 119–121, 185, 187, 189, 192 Low Readiness Forces (LRF), 86 Luxembourg, 5, 6, 13, 113, 115

M MARCOM. See Allied Maritime Command Maritime Monitor, 58 Maritime security operations (MSOs), 95 Mediterranean Dialogue, 59 Military Committee (MC), 23, 38 Montenegro, 6

N NATO Air Policing, 39, 40, 75 NATO Communications & Information Systems Group (NCISG), 123–125, 129–133, 148, 177, 185, 192 NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP), 24, 42, 194 NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs), 40, 86–88, 188

200

INDEX

NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC), 40, 41, 161, 190 NATO Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff (JEWCS), 40, 41 NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence Battalion, 41 NATO Response Force (NRF), 8, 35, 42, 43, 53, 57, 61, 85–89, 93, 95, 146, 149, 153, 156, 161, 174, 185, 189 NATO Secretary General (SECGEN), 5, 29, 30, 78, 151, 190, 192, 193 NATO Signal Battalion (NSB), 123, 125, 126, 130 NATO standardization agreements (STANAGS), 55, 91, 94, 127, 160 NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), 113–121, 148, 185, 192 Netherlands, 5, 6, 13, 53, 54, 56, 68, 87, 117 North Atlantic Council (NAC), 14, 19, 21, 22, 25, 38, 89, 114, 151 North Atlantic Treaty, 3, 5, 6, 14, 19, 23 North Macedonia, 5, 6 Norway, 5, 6, 41, 69, 97, 98, 141, 149, 151, 153, 172, 184, 185 Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), 41, 42 Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), 19, 23, 38

O Operation Sea Guardian, 39, 96, 104 Operation Unified Protector, 77, 152, 167

P Poland, 3, 6, 38, 40, 57, 69, 73, 87, 88, 104, 123, 126, 141, 171, 178, 188 Political advisors (POLADs), 37, 55 Portugal, 5, 6, 141, 165, 172

R Resolute Support Mission (RSM), 39, 57, 176 Romania, 6, 40, 73, 87, 88, 104 Rules of engagement (ROEs), 85, 95 Russia, 4, 27, 30, 39, 40, 45, 46, 57, 61, 67, 73, 75, 76, 78, 87, 90, 91, 98, 99, 106–109, 169, 186, 188–192

S S-400 (air defense system), 108 Slovakia, 6, 40, 69, 87 Slovenia, 6 Soft power, 37 Spain, 6, 69, 74, 87, 153, 172, 189 Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG), 42, 97 Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group (SNMCG), 42, 97 Standing Naval Forces (SNF), 41, 42, 96 Steadfast Cobalt, 124, 132 Supply, maintenance, transportation, 114 Supreme Headquarters Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 37, 38, 40–43, 47, 48, 54, 59, 89, 95, 96, 125, 156 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 20, 21, 35–37, 39, 43–46, 141

INDEX

T Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), 61, 62, 86, 146, 147, 161, 167, 169, 177 Terrorism, 30, 61, 96, 106, 107, 161, 189 Theater high altitude air defense (THAAD), 40 Treaty of Brussels, 5 Turkey, 6, 11, 14, 27, 39–41, 68, 73, 74, 84, 87, 102, 104, 107, 184, 185 U Ukraine, 41, 90, 91, 104, 107, 188, 191 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 3, 4

201

United Nations (UN), 4, 12, 21, 26, 27, 43, 44, 47, 102, 121, 183, 188, 191 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 4, 183, 184 United States, 4–7, 13, 23, 27, 28, 38, 42, 46, 61, 68, 74, 78, 88, 101, 102, 106–108, 117, 133, 140, 147, 152, 178, 184, 186, 188, 189, 192, 194 US Central Command, 8, 53

W Warsaw Pact, 5, 45, 61, 188 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 42, 72, 73, 96