NATO and Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Foreign and Security Policy Perspectives 2020035976, 2020035977, 9780367492779, 9781003045434

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NATO and Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century

This book explores the evolution and future relevance of NATO from the perspective of the member-​states. Addressing the overarching question of the relevance of transatlantic relations in the 21st century, the volume has three core objectives. The first is to reinforce the view that international alliances serve not only an external-​ oriented goal, but also a domestic-​oriented aim, which is to control others’ behavior. The second is to show that tensions amongst NATO allies have become more acute and, therefore, more dangerous. The third is to discuss current transatlantic relations through the adoption of a “second image” perspective; that is, one that emphasizes the multiple vertical linkages that connect NATO to the politics and the policies of each ally. The chapters presented here are built on a dual approach: on the one hand, they look at the place the Alliance occupies in the domestic public debate and the strategic culture of specific member states; on the other hand, they analyze how each of these countries contributes to NATO’s operations and what interests and visions they share for the Alliance’s future. This book will be of much interest to students of NATO, international organizations, foreign policy, and security studies in general. Michele Testoni is Adjunct Professor of International Relations at IE University, Madrid, Spain.

Contemporary Security Studies Series Editors: James Gow and Rachel Kerr, King’s College London

This series focuses on new research across the spectrum of international peace and security, in an era where each year throws up multiple examples of conflicts that present new security challenges in the world around them. Cultures of Counterterrorism French and Italian Responses to Terrorism after 9/​11 Silvia D’Amto Russian Imperialism Revisited From Disengagement to Hegemony Domitilla Sagramoso Targeted Killings, Law and Counter-​Terrorism Effectiveness Does Fair Play Pay Off ? Ophir Falk Impact in International Affairs The Quest for World-​Leading Research James Gow and Henry Redwood Transitional Justice in Peacebuilding Actor-​Contingent and Malleable Justice Djeyhoun Ostowar NATO and Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century Foreign and Security Policy Perspectives Edited by Michele Testoni Reconciliation After War Historical Perspectives on Transitional Justice Edited by Rachel Kerr, Henry Redwood and James Gow For more information about this series, please visit:  www.routledge.com/​ Contemporary-​Security-​Studies/​book-​series/​CSS

NATO and Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century Foreign and Security Policy Perspectives Edited by Michele Testoni

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Michele Testoni; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Michele Testoni to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data Names: Testoni, Michele, 1976– editor. Title: NATO and transatlantic relations in the 21st century: foreign and security policy perspectives / Michele Testoni. Other titles: Foreign and security policy perspectives Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2021. | Series: Contemporary security studies | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020035976 (print) | LCCN 2020035977 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367492779 (hardback) | ISBN 9781003045434 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: North Atlantic Treaty Organization–History. | Europe, Western–Defenses–History–20th century. | World politics–1945–1989. | World politics–1989– | United States–Foreign relations–1945–1989. | United States–Foreign relations–1989– Classification: LCC D845.2 .N18 2021 (print) | LCC D845.2 (ebook) | DDC 355/.031091821–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020035976 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020035977 ISBN: 978-​0-​367-​49277-​9  (hbk) ISBN: 978-​1-​003-​04543-​4  (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Newgen Publishing UK

Contents

List of illustrations  Notes on contributors  List of abbreviations  Preface  Introduction 

vii viii x xii 1

MI C H E L E T E STO N I

1 The US role in NATO: past, present, and future 

18

JAC K T H OMP SO N

2 Canada and NATO: hopes and ambitions 

33

JAME S   MC K AY

3 The UK in NATO: London’s transatlantic bargain and the dilemmas of Brexit 

47

L I N DA S L APAKOVA A N D G I U SEPPE SPATA FO RA

4 Norway, NATO, and the Northern flank 

67

K ARST E N   F RII S

5 Denmark in NATO: from laggard to leader to loyal? 

85

P E T E R V I G G O JA KO BSEN

6 Toward a “partner in leadership”? Germany’s shifting role in NATO after the end of the Cold War 

104

F LORI AN   B ÖL LER

7 Poland’s role in NATO: toward a transatlantic bargain 2.0?  125 WOJ C I E C H MIC H N I K

vi Contents

8 The Baltic states in NATO: an evolving transatlantic bargain from newcomers to President Trump 

142

E OI N M.  MC NA MA R A A N D MA R I - L ​ I I S SU LG

9 Spain and NATO: punching below its weight? 

167

AL B E RT O BU EN O A N D MI C H ELE TESTO N I

10 Italy and NATO in the 21st century: still a formidable partnership? 

188

LU C A  RAT TI

11 Turkey and NATO: a fluctuating relationship 

207

VAL E RI A G I A N N OTTA

Index 

224

Illustrations

Figures 2.1 Canadian military personnel in Europe or on “Out-​of-​Area” NATO missions, 1949–​2019.  36 2.2 Canadian defense spending as a percentage of GDP, 1949–​2017. 37 2.3 Canadian defense spending as a percentage of overall federal government expenditure, 1949–​2017.  38 3.1 NATO defense expenditure, 2019.  55 6.1 Deployment votes in the German Bundestag (number of votes, mandated troop limits, agreement).  109 6.2 Average no-​votes on military deployments by German parties (in percentage, 1993–​2018).  112 6.3 Development of German defense expenditure.  115

Tables 3 .1 3.2 5.1 5.2

UK defense reviews and white papers after the Cold War.  50 Current UK contributors to NATO.  54 Continuous cuts in Danish defense spending and force structure. 94 The evolution of the Danish–​NATO relationship.  97

Contributors

Florian Böller is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Kaiserslautern, Germany. Alberto Bueno is PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, University of Granada, Spain. His research is funded by Spanish Ministry of Education (grant FPU) and project “DEHUSO” (University of Granada). He is member of the International Security Studies Group (GESI) and editor of the online journal Global Strategy. Karsten Friis is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Research Group on Security and Defense at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo. He has previously worked for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo as well as for the Norwegian Armed Forces in Oslo and in Kosovo. Valeria Giannotta is Assistant Professor at Türk Hava Kurumu Üniversitesi in Ankara, Turkey. Peter Viggo Jakobsen is Associate Professor in the Department of Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College and Professor (part time) at Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark. James R. McKay is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Economics at the Royal Military College of Canada. Eoin M.  McNamara is a PhD candidate at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia. His research focuses on security studies, in particular NATO transformation and Nordic-​Baltic security. Wojciech Michnik is Assistant Professor of International Relations and Security Studies at Jagiellonian University and Contributing Editor for New Eastern Europe. In 2019 he was NATO Eisenhower Research Fellow at NATO Defense College, Rome. Luca Ratti is Associate Professor in History of International Relations at the University of Rome III, Italy. Also, he teaches as Adjunct Professor at the

Notes on contributors  ix American University of Rome (AUR). In 2019 he was visiting scholar in European security at Carleton University, Canada. Linda Slapakova is Analyst at RAND Europe where she focuses on emerging security threats, counter-​terrorism, and defense strategy and capability development. She holds a Masters degree in International Relations from the University of Oxford. Giuseppe Spatafora is a DPhil (PhD) candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford, where he studies foreign intervention in civil wars. His research interest lies in the area of international security, conflict studies, and alliance theory. Mari-​Liis Sulg is a PhD candidate at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia. Her research focuses on small states foreign policy making in the post-​Cold War period, in particular Estonian foreign policy. Michele Testoni is Adjunct Professor of International Relations and Affiliated Faculty to the Transatlantic Relations Initiative at the School of Global and Public Affairs (SGPA), IE University, Madrid, Spain. Jack (John M.) Thompson is Senior Strategic Analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), the Netherlands, where he leads a range of projects in the fields of security and defense.

Abbreviations

BRI CARD CFSP CSDP DSACEUR EADRCC EDA EDC EDF EDI EEA EEAS EEC eFP EFTA ESDI ESDP EU ESA GDP GIUK GWOT HRF HR/​VP ISAF JEF KFOR MARCOM NATO NDS NRF NSCR

Belt and Road Initiative Coordinated Annual Review on Defense Common Foreign and Security Policy Common Security and Defense Policy Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe Euro-​Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre European Defense Agency European Defense Community European Defense Fund European Deterrence Initiative European Economic Area European External Action Service European Economic Community Enhanced Forward Presence European Free Trade Association European Security and Defense Identity European Security and Defense Policy European Union European Strategic Autonomy Gross Domestic Product Greenland–​Iceland–​UK Global War on Terror High Readiness Forces High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/​Vice-​President of the European Commission International Security Assistance Force Joint Expeditionary Forces Kosovo Force Maritime Allied Command North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Defense Strategy NATO Response Force National Security Capability Review

List of abbreviations  xi NSS NORAD OUP PESCO PfP PRT RAP SDSR SFOR TTIP UN USSR VJTF

National Security Strategy North American Aerospace Defense Command Operation Unified Protector Permanent Structured Cooperation Partnership for Peace Provincial Reconstruction Team Readiness Action Plan Strategic Defense and Security Review Stabilization Force Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership United Nations Soviet Union Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

Preface

I embarked on this book for two main reasons:  a scientific interest and a cultural–​political motivation. On the one hand, I have always been attracted by the complex interaction that exists between the external variables and the domestic factors shaping states’ foreign policy and, within this relationship, the phenomenon of international alliances –​NATO on top of it. A fascinating theme that constitutes the core of my scholarly investigation. This curiosity has been renovated by a recent host of unsettling events for the Euro-​Atlantic community: the social and political fallout of Europe’s financial and immigration crises; the renewed imperial ambitions of Russia and Turkey; the Brexit referendum; the election of Donald Trump as US President as well as the erratic and destabilizing policies of his administration; and the “brain death” statement made by French President, Emmanuel Macron, about NATO. Last but not least, the Covid-​19 pandemics and China’s “health silk road” propaganda machine. Inevitably, a question popped up into my mind: what is the future of such a strained transatlantic security architecture? I felt a sense of general dissatisfaction for the way in which most of the scientific literature has been trying to cope with these issues. I thought a study of NATO prioritizing the member states’ visions and actions would have made a greater deal of sense and, therefore, was needed. The second reason that induced me to work on this book was all those students, who over the years have attended, whether accidentally or deliberately, my courses on foreign policy analysis, geopolitics, or IR theories. Through their comments, the world seems to be changing faster than reality itself: the rise of a new Asian Orientalism (efficient and powerful, yet still fragile and shamelessly authoritarian) attracts new generations in an understandable but alarming way. A phenomenon accelerated by the palpable erosion of the sentiment of Atlanticism. Disaffection towards “the West” is mounting –​ and not without reason. But for someone grown up believing in the values and institutions of an “open society,” these novel circumstances are hard to digest. This book seeks to be a little grain of sand in maintaining alive, and hopefully improving: (1) the knowledge of values, policies, and institutions of a Euro-​ Atlantic sphere that, in spite of current crisis, is still the best of the worlds’ we live through; and (2) for those who have an interest in international relations,

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Preface  xiii the study of the foreign and security policies of Euro-​Atlantic states that, however declining they might be, remain primary actors in the 21st century. An initial version of several of the book’s chapters was presented in a panel session that I organized at the annual conference of the Transatlantic Studies Association (TSA) held in Lancaster, July 8–​10, 2019. Others were included later. I therefore owe a substantial debt of gratitude to all colleagues and friends who kindly accepted to partake in this journey: their “national visions” offer insightful theoretical perspectives and practical policy-​making ideas. The reader is given much food for thought. I would like to extend thanks to colleagues in the School of Global and Public Affairs, IE University, for providing both academic stimulation and supportive working environment. A  number of ideas and views included in this book come from the events and discussions organized through the “Transatlantic Relations Initiative” of the SGPA, a forum of crucial importance to develop high level transatlantic debates. Last but not least, my greatest intellectual debt is to Marco Cesa, who introduced me –​many years ago –​to the world of IR theories and, thanks to his relentless stimulus, down deep critiques, and invaluable feedback, has profoundly influenced my understanding of what alliances are and what they are for. Michele Testoni

Introduction Michele Testoni

Our Alliance has not lasted for seventy years out of a sense of nostalgia. Or of sentiment. NATO lasts because it is in the national interest of each and every one of our nations. NATO is the most successful Alliance in history because we have always been able to change as the world changes. And because, despite our differences, we are united in our commitment to each other. (Jens Stoltenberg)1

This book aims to address the overarching question of the relevance of transatlantic relations in the 21st century. No doubt, NATO continues to be the primary institution for ensuring peace and stability in Europe and North America. Nonetheless, its essence and utility remain under the endless scrutiny of scholars and policymakers. A  host of questions crowds a debate that is anything but in agreement. What explains the array of tensions and contradictions that characterizes the evolution of NATO in the post-​Cold War era? Has it over expanded with too many, and too lengthy, out-​of-​area operations? Was its eastward enlargement a strategic mistake? Or should it expand further and include other countries such as Georgia or Ukraine? Which is the main priority the Alliance should have in the future: returning to a policy of containment toward Russia or focusing on nontraditional security issues such as terrorism, cyber warfare, or climate change? Should it be used to engage with China? If so, to do what? Also: why does Germany, the second largest economy within NATO, not comply with the “2 percent rule” of defense spending? Is the EUSA project at odds with NATO? How are recent economic and social pressures on government budgets, such as financial and public debt crises, population ageing, or the Covid-​19 pandemic, shaping the member states’ ability and eagerness to uphold the effectiveness of the Alliance? Is the relative decline of the US-​led international order, a process prompted by high social inequalities, spreading illiberal and populist sentiments and parties, and the disruptive impact of new technologies, especially in the media sector, the greatest existential threat to NATO?

2  Michele Testoni This book has three broad objectives. The first is to reinforce the thesis, increasingly popular in the literature of international relations, that alliances are a more complex phenomenon than usually perceived: not simply a formal arrangement through which two or more states join forces, for a given period of time, in order to achieve a common goal, generally related to a third party. Rather, alliances are also an instrument to accomplish a more ambitious purpose: reducing the uncertainties generated by the international anarchy and establishing a more ordered and intelligible environment. Alliances represent a peculiar subset of political institutions: negotiating arenas forged by states with the aim to make others’ behavior –​both opponents and friends –​more predictable and, as a result, more easily to be controlled. Alliances are an explicit manifestation of given power relations that exist among a number of interdependent actors. In accordance with such an interpretation, the second ambition of the book is to provide evidence of the many idiosyncrasies that exist inside transatlantic relations. NATO has always been characterized by an inconstant, or even incongruous, evolution; but in the early 21st century rifts among member states have turned stronger and, as a result, more worrisome. Since its inception NATO has alternated phases of enthusiasm, with the allies demonstrating a palpable sense of unity and solidarity, and periods of standstill, ill-​concealed uneasiness, or, worse, open criticism toward the choices of one or more of their partners. Compared to other alliances, no matter their historical, geographical, or ideological circumstances, NATO is an exceptional case whose achievements can measured in terms of life span, strategic adjustment, democratic promotion, and successful management of intra-​allied competition. It has resisted the geopolitical earthquake triggered by the implosion of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, but also the shockwaves originating from the 2003 US-​led invasion of Iraq and the difficulties that the 2007–​2008 global financial crisis put on the defense budgets of all member states. NATO played a key role in the 2011 Libyan conflict and continues to act as Europe’s major defense and security organization, especially since Russia’s involvement in eastern Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Simultaneously, however, the course of transatlantic relations does not leave much room for triumphalism. The life of NATO is punctuated by a series of tensions that, in the most recent times, seem to have reached a degree of unprecedented intensity. In particular, the allies’ commitment toward collective defense looks increasingly less coherent and ever more fragmented, with NATO turning into a security organization à la carte in which the member states operate on a case-​by-​case basis.2 Nowadays, even the very rationale of transatlantic relations appears to be in question: with global affairs pivoting to Asia, and the social fabric of Western democracies under the disrupting pressure of illiberal and anti-​systemic forces, for many old NATO no longer appears to be the necessary instrument to tackle new issues. Lawrence Freedman’s famous question still echoes –​but now in a more sinister way:

Introduction  3 should we view the current set of trans-​Atlantic troubles as just another episode in a continuing story or are there deeper factors that will severely test the durability of the Alliance?3 The third purpose of this volume is to discuss the present circumstances as well as the future challenges of transatlantic security relations through the adoption of a “second image” approach; that is, one that stems from the viewpoint of the allies themselves. If the two previous points hold true –​alliances are negotiated strategic equilibria, and the lack of coherence among NATO members is increasing –​then it should be clear how important is to emphasize the multiple vertical linkages that connect the politics and the policies of NATO to the politics and the policies of each ally. All chapters, indeed, are built on a dual approach: on the one hand, they look at the place the Alliance occupies in the domestic public debate and the strategic culture of specific member states; on the other hand, they analyze how each of these countries contributes to NATO’s operations and what interests and visions they share for the Alliance’s future. Rather than using the conventional prospect of alliance politics, this book is primarily a study of the foreign and defense policies of a number of NATO countries. To simplify: if it is member states that make the Alliance work, then it is member states that one needs to analyze in order to explain the strengths and the weaknesses of the Alliance itself.

Making sense of NATO The literature of international relations has extensively dealt with NATO. The discussion, however, whether policy-​driven or theoretical-​oriented, has proceeded along quite predictable directions. On the one side, empirical studies are usually centered on peculiar events or specific issues:  summits, institutional innovations, strategic changes, military operations, or defense spending. This sort of analysis is commonly grounded on a short-​ term perspective, looks at the foreseeable geopolitical consequences of specific decisions, and offers limited value-​added interpretations. On the other side, academic scholars have largely followed the tracks of their respective schools of thought. This way, they have often developed ad hoc explanations. Realists have first trumpeted the Alliance’s collapse, deemed as the unavoidable consequence of the end of the Cold War; then justified its persistence and celebrated its transformations due to the “unipolar moment” of the United States; and lastly warned about the deepening incoherence of the transatlantic bond given the conflicting incentives on states behavior unleashed by the return of great power politics. Liberal institutionalists have underlined –​as recalled by the aforementioned quotation of current NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg –​that the Alliance’s greatest value rests on it organizational flexibility: given a unique capability to adjust to changing circumstances, NATO has cemented the allies’ interdependence, provided a valuable forum for multilateral decision-​making and crisis management, nurtured a sense of unity and

4  Michele Testoni solidarity, and acted as a strong pole of attraction for neighboring countries. Yet, what about the recent fractures? For constructivists, NATO is a puzzling paradox: if originally cherished as the tangible outcome of how a “community of values”4 can be created and consolidated by shared discourse and institutional practices, now shifting power relations and a mounting tide of anti-​global and neoauthoritarian nationalisms are undermining the significance of such practices and, as a result, the Alliance’s overall cohesion. The book aspires to expand and enrich the debate on NATO by concentrating on the most nuanced aspects of the transatlantic bond. Designed in accordance with the assumptions of those theories –​mainly, but not exclusively, neoclassical realism  –​sensitive to the many and constant linkages between the “domestic” and the “international,” the volume adopts a conceptual framework that conceives alliances as the formalized outcome of a calculated, yet dynamic, equilibrium between different states searching for different gains. As a matter of fact, alliances are an intimately political phenomenon as they combine aspects of cooperation with elements of conflict, in a constant and complex interplay. At first glance, all alliances share three basic features: they are “a cooperative enterprise,” have “a formal nature,” and aim “to guarantee the security of the parties involved, in particular their military security.”5 In terms of alliance formation, no matter what theory one agrees more with, whether “balance of power,”6 “balance of threat,”7 or “balance of interests,”8 it is clear that alliances perform as a transmission belt between a condition of systemic anarchy and states’ ceaseless competition for power. As famously argued by George Liska, it is “impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances; the two often merge in all but name.”9 But alliances can also be interpreted as the quintessential instrument through which states –​great or small powers alike –​aim to achieve a broader objective:  the establishment of some form of international order by either defending an existing status quo or creating and securing a new state of affairs. An agreement, however provisional it might be, that seeks to enforce a number of rules by adding a sense of “obligation,” “reciprocity,” and “reputation” to inter-​allied relations, especially vis-​à-​vis third parties.10 Alliances can be many things altogether: the vast amount of accords and deals signed by two or more states before or during a conflict in order to increase their own power against a common enemy; but also the equally abundant collection of pacts and covenants concluded at the end of the hostilities with the aspiration to set up a new form of international governance. There is an inescapable symbiotic relationship between alliances and international political processes. What emerges is that, besides a mainstream conception of alliances interested in their external dimension, theories of international relations are paying increasing attention to an alternative view, one in which the internal competition among the allies acquires central stage. The attitude of states to control partners, and not only opponents, has sparked off a new wave of interpretations, in which alliances are no longer exclusive “weapons of power” but also practical “tool of management” of a political, apparently amicable,

Introduction  5 relationship.11 Alliances, therefore, can be explained not only in terms of self-​ help, but also according to the purpose of their members to ensure the “conformity” of each of their partners.12 By adopting such an approach, the volume advances the idea that the core issue of NATO relates to the complex management of a relationship of cooperative competition.13 In other words, the capacity to minimize the consequences of an inescapable trade-​ off between the allies’ centrifugal interests and NATO’s powerful institutional inertia. If in the Cold War era, such tensions were tamed by the presence of a unifying common enemy, today’s changing global circumstances are amplifying the space for maneuver of each member state and, therefore, putting the endurance of the Alliance under greater and growing pressure.

NATO in historical perspective: All that glitters isn’t gold! How does the notion of alliances serving a multiple, sometimes even conflictual, set of objectives apply to NATO? The image of a transatlantic bargain looks the most appropriate. Initially formulated by Harlan Cleveland, former US Ambassador to NATO in the 1960s, it argues that the Alliance has to be understood as the end point of a set of strategic negotiations among its most relevant members whose aims were, and still are, directed not only at bolstering the signatories’ external defense, but also regulating their mutual relationships. In Cleveland’s own words: The glue that has held the allies more or less together is a large, complex and dynamic bargain –​partly an understanding among the Europeans, but mostly a deal between them and the United States of America.14 The central idea is that a comprehensive arrangement was agreed in the aftermath of World War II between the Western European countries, reduced to a secondary rank after 1945, and the United States, the new world superpower, with the latter being at the head of a new coalition of states wishing to reactivate global capitalism, democratize western societies, and establish a credible military shield to deter the Soviets. Under this light, the European Recovery Program –​the Marshall Plan –​of 1947 and the Washington Treaty of 1949 were essentially the two sides of the same coin: economic and military assistance in exchange for economic and military coordination. At the same time, a series of “subordinate bargains”15 between individual allies and the US added further significance to the overall deal: Britain pressured for an enduring US involvement as a way to maintain continuous military presence across its own empire; France sought a guarantee that it would not have to deal with post-​war Germany on its own; Italy and West Germany accepted substantial political and military constraints in return for full domestic sovereignty and international recognition; Greece and Turkey saw the Alliance as the only viable means to scale down their mutual rivalry; and after the end of

6  Michele Testoni the Cold War, former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe saw NATO membership as the way to get Westernized and defended from Russia. It is this prism of general and particular interests what defines the essence of transatlantic relations. As a matter of fact, NATO’s history appears punctuated by a constellation of episodes showing the cyclical nature of inter-​allied crises.16 It was the 1950s when the Alliance underwent its first internal crisis. As the Korean War broke out, an ambitious plan to buttress the Alliance’s military assets was launched. But in August 1954 France rejected the ratification of the EDC treaty:  humiliated by the defeat in Indochina, the weak Fourth Republic feared that a supranational body allowing a new German rearmament would put excessive limitations on its national sovereignty. A couple of years after, the 1956 Suez crisis shoved again the Alliance, especially Anglo-​ French relations:  while London understood that it had no other foreign policy choice than reactivating its special relationship with the US, Paris fortified a sentiment of Anglo-​American skepticism that burst, with great virulence, during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle.17 The two following decades provided fertile grounds for new tensions: the release of the Harmel Report in 1967 seemed to set the basis for a renewed bargain, yet a further wave of misunderstandings spread across the Atlantic. Several factors coincided. On the one side, the Vietnam War gave rise to strong anti-​American sentiments, while the switch of the US military doctrine from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response” led some of the allies questioning the real US commitment to European defense and, as in the case of France, even withdrawing from NATO’s military integrated structure. On the other side, the Nixon-​Kissinger administration showed a declining interest for Europe, as détente with the USSR, the opening to China, and the Arab oil shock became the main strategic goals for the United States –​a conviction reinforced by the already manifest unwillingness of the Europeans to increase their defense spending. Other events, such as the 1969 decision of Canada’s Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, to almost halve the number of forces stationing in Europe, or the 1974 Cyprus crisis, with revamped tensions between Greece and Turkey, contributed to feed a generalized sense of “transatlantic malaise.”18 In the early 1980s, the Euromissiles crisis set another low, with a new division between the Americans and the Europeans and, once more, among the Europeans themselves. But even the end of the Cold War was not void of disagreements:  several European leaders felt concerned about the prospect of a German reunification, an outcome they reluctantly accepted only due to the activism of then-​ US President, George Bush, and the assurances of then-​German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl.19 The post-​Cold War era has not brought about any significant changes. Moments of euphoria alternated with periods of strains. NATO has never been so proactive: it has launched four partnership programs, almost doubled its membership, embarked on peace-​enforcement and peacekeeping operations, from former Yugoslavia to Libya, and established a special relationship with

Introduction  7 the EU. In addition, it has set up training missions in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as border patrolling activities in Eastern and Southern Europe, maritime security operations in the Mediterranean, and anti-​piracy surveillance in the Horn of Africa. Last, it started to develop a missile defense system and, in the aftermath of the 2014 Russia’s annexation of Crimea, reinforced its traditional mission of conventional and nuclear deterrence (EDI). All these changes are contained in the “three essential core tasks” that NATO, according to its latest strategic concept, is expected to fulfill: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.20 At the same time, however, Americans and Europeans did not stop having different, if not opposing, views. It first began with the war in Bosnia:  as Britain, France, and Germany failed to agree on the creation an EU-​led mission, coupled with the manifest incapability of the UN peacekeeping operation to stop the hostilities, it was only when NATO entered the stage, given the energetic leadership of then-​US President, Bill Clinton, that peace was brokered.21 Similarly, when a few years later the Kosovo crisis broke out, and NATO delivered a massive air campaign, the allies continued to have, and publicly show, discrepancies on how to handle the conflict. Yet, the first big fracture of post-​bipolar transatlantic relations came about in the wake of September 11, 2001, when NATO switched quickly from being an asset of US foreign policy to a heavy burden, almost marginalized by its greatest shareholder. It was then-​US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, who boldly certified this new state of affairs: Now, what I  said is correct also. What I  said was that the mission determines the coalition. And the coalition must not be permitted to determine the mission.22 The ensuing wars in Afghanistan and, in particular, Iraq generated a new and deeper rift in transatlantic relations. A further wave of anti-​Americanism spread, but this time matched also by strong anti-​European feelings in the United States. As the George W. Bush administration felt “unbound,”23 neoconservative pundits circulated the idea of an inescapable cultural difference separating the Americans from the Europeans, the former coming “from Mars” and the latter “from Venus.”24 Clumsy definitions notwithstanding, it is patent that, in the first two decades of the new millennium, the amalgamation of specific interests and broader political visions among the allies has become an increasingly hard task. A difficulty that not even a figure like former US President Barack Obama, who enjoyed constant high approval rates in European public opinions, managed to reduce. Quite the opposite: the “pivot to Asia” of his administration meant a reduced strategic importance of European and Middle Eastern affairs for US foreign policy, while the recurrent criticisms to the EU economic austerity measures contributed to a further deterioration of an overall sense of coherence and unity within transatlantic relations. More recently, the rise of anti-​ establishment and

8  Michele Testoni anti-​globalization movements, based on a “populist” agenda fueling xenophobic and anti-​ modernist sentiments, is shaking the very foundations of post-​ 1945 liberal international order and, therefore, undermining the raison d’être of the Alliance itself. Indeed, no US President had ever said, as Donald Trump did it, that NATO is “obsolete”25 or raised doubts about the US commitment to the Article 5 collective defense clause.26 No Turkish leader had ever announced, as Recep Tayyip Erdogan did it, the purchase of Russian military technology.27 And no French President had ever argued, as Emmanuel Macron did it, that NATO is “becoming brain dead” because of the lack of American leadership.28

What future for NATO? Talking about NATO is not only studying a given organization, its decision-​ making procedures, or its members’ interests and tactics; it means, on a more general level, reasoning about the evolution of the whole of international relations, from both a quantitative and a qualitative perspective. NATO is the most important provider of defense and stability for almost 1 billion people, comprises the world’s two greatest economic actors –​the EU and the US –​consists of three nuclear powers –​France, the UK, and the US –​and accounts for 52 percent of global military spending.29 It is not plain rhetoric to say that what NATO does shapes the rest of the world. But in a world that is turning profoundly different from the one in which the Alliance was imagined and created, the prospects of transatlantic relations are far from being clear –​and positive. Unlike in the late 1940s, when the Atlantic Ocean was the core of global governance, the geopolitics of the early 21st century is witnessing an extensive power shift, with the Indo-​Pacific acquiring a stronger relevance. An area in which China  –​an authoritarian and high-​tech giant of 1.39 billion people30 –​is building a gigantic economic and infrastructural project, which it plans to extend throughout the Eurasian landmass. Put it differently, the world we face is one in which “the Pond” risks to be relegated to a condition of limited, if not peripheral, significance. But at the same time, as previously argued, NATO is facing multiple challenges “from within:” first and foremost, some member countries are backsliding from established democratic standards, with a new generation of demagogic leaders exploiting a noxious blend of chauvinism and illiberal populism.31 This does not only weaken the Alliance’s cohesion, but also goes to benefit of autocratic and revanchist powers like Putin’s Russia. It is clear is that the future of transatlantic relations depends on the successful capability of the allies to revitalize the original purposes of their pact. In the early 1950s, as brilliantly captured by the famous phrase of NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, they were “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” Today, in a relatively equal manner, they still consist in providing a solid institutional anchoring for the participation of the United States to European security, deterring aggressive third

Introduction  9 actors, and avoiding the reemergence of would-​be hegemonies in continental Europe. NATO must continue to remain the primary defense and security framework of, and for, the transatlantic community. No other institution can deliver what NATO has been able to deliver. The corrosion, or even the splitting, of the Alliance can be fatal: it would lead to the disengagement of the US and the creation of a “Carolingian” Europe,32 which however would be a weaker counterweight of the Western world toward an expansionary “Eastern hemisphere” of undemocratic nature. The implications of such a scenario look all but positive for NATO countries. The fundamental question, however, is about how the transatlantic bond can be actually rejuvenated. Much has been written in relation to the many challenges facing a 70-​year-​old Alliance.33 The book seeks to develop such a debate by emphasizing four main topics, which should set the foundations of a new and more effective transatlantic bargain. The first, inevitably, is about the revival of American leadership. The United States must rediscover what it means to be in charge of the world’s largest military alliance. It is a position that cannot be understood solely in terms of financial burden sharing, but entails also, if not mostly, a function of guidance and vision. If Washington wants to remain the world’s greatest power in the decades to come, it should continue to invest on NATO and go back to set the agenda of the organization in a constructive and inspiring way, no matter who sits in the White House. But in these years, the Trump administration has sent highly mixed messages: on the one hand, it has expanded, not cut, US military commitment abroad, Europe included;34 on the other hand, it has announced a unilateral reduction of troops stationing in Germany  –​a reprimand for Berlin’s low defense expenditure  –​some of which, though, may be relocated to Poland in order not to jeopardize the Alliance’s deterrence posture.35 In general terms, what is missing is a new grand strategy recognizing the value of NATO for US foreign policy. Its geopolitical location, its number of assets and infrastructures, its system of information sharing, and its collection of shared experiences  –​whether cooperative or conflictual  –​are a capital of extraordinary importance. The second point refers to the urgent need of European countries to provide a stronger and more efficient contribution to collective defense and, this way, become true and consistent security providers. But turning words into facts is never easy. For the moment, as decided in the NATO Wales Summit of 2014, the focus is largely on quantitative aspects. In spite a positive general trend, however, defense expenditure remains low: according to the most recent data, only nine countries respect the “2  percent rule” in relation to GDP, with the overall NATO median being at 1.67 percent.36 Yet, if size does matter, other criteria also are important and should be added to evaluate the allies’ actual contribution. This is the case of looking not just at how much, but at how, money is spent. One way could be giving more importance to the other criterion established by NATO, that is the minimum of 20 percent of defense spending devoted to equipment expenditure –​or it could also refer

10  Michele Testoni to research and development. Another measure was proposed by former German Defense Minister, and current President of the EU Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, about an “activity index” taking the costs of participation in foreign missions into also account.37 Similarly, Garrett Martin and Balazs Martonffy have suggested the introduction of a composite metric  –​ they call it “Alliance Contribution Rating,” something similar used by credit rating agencies  –​in order to assess the actual contribution member states to NATO’s core tasks.38 On an equal footing, another factor that should be considered is the overall level of coordination among European countries and how they pool resources within the general framework of the interoperability of forces. In this field, the EU-​led PESCO project seems to go in the virtuous direction of boosting European military capabilities. But whether this remains a realistic scenario, given the unfavorable socioeconomic prospects associated to the Covid-​19 pandemic, remains an open question. In any case, the strengthening of NATO–​EU relations is a goal of utmost importance. The third pillar of a renewed transatlantic bargain must rest on the allies’ necessity to reconcile their different areas of operation and come to grips with different, and diverse, sources of threat. It is a hard, yet fundamental task. If NATO is perceived as increasingly disjointed, it is because its three flanks are getting progressively disconnected from one another. With the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict and the US withdrawal from the 1987 INF Treaty, NATO–​Russia relations have reached a new and alarming low, bringing the Alliance’s Eastern flank back to a position of major geopolitical relevance and compelling NATO to renovate a credible deterrence posture.39 Nevertheless, Putin’s assertiveness includes also the Arctic region, where Russian economic interests, territorial claims, and military buildups are turning stronger. As a result, NATO needs to adapt quickly and smoothly to an equally important security concern.40 The defense of the High North, though, requires different military assets as well as a distinctive strategy,41 a condition that may fuel a new inter-​allied competition for resources and political consideration. But a rising consideration for both the Eastern and the Northern flanks goes at the expenses of the Mediterranean, which is returning to a situation of disarray characterized by a lack of strategic neglect vision and planning.42 In the post-​ Cold War era, and especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Southern flank surged to top priority as the Middle East and Northern Africa entered into a spiral of instability and violence. Yet the Ukrainian crisis, the bad coordination among the Europeans, and the selective disengagement of the US are once more decreasing the interest for NATO’s South, leaving more opportunities for uncoordinated unilateral moves, such as Turkey’s attempt to reestablish a neo-​Ottoman sphere of influence, even at the cost of clashing with other NATO allies.43 Ironically enough, however, the Mediterranean basin remains the region where traditional and nontraditional sources to states security abound and, therefore, must receive equally high attention. Transatlantic relations are likely to experience a dismal future,

Introduction  11 if the allies will prove unable to reconcile their three flanks and elaborate a common strategy to deal effectively with multiple security issues. Lastly, it is the growing influence of China on global affairs. Through the development of its flagship project of the BRI, China is creating a sphere of influence that is expected to extend over three Continents. Although the real effects such an ambitious project are still unclear, it is impossible to deny that Beijing is now a geopolitical competitor of primary importance; a fact that, as recognized in the NATO’s 2019 London Declaration, offers both opportunities and challenges that need to be carefully addressed by the Alliance as a whole.44 Yet, some implications can be already envisaged. On the one hand, China is investing in a range of business sectors –​i.e., transportation facilities, supply chains with ramifications in the defense sector, communication systems and digital networks –​with potential repercussions on the security and the well-​being of NATO allies. On the other hand, the rise of China is likely to have more direct “hard power” consequences, such as increasing military expenditure, hybrid warfare, or the securitization of new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, or big data. In addition, it may have further effects on the Alliance’s broader security perimeter, such as strengthening Russia’s pivot to Asia, putting stronger pressures on NATO’s partner countries through, for instance, the “17+1” framework, or intensifying a worldwide struggle for resources. But once again, if the world is turning more competitive, particularly through a rising confrontation between the US and China, the preservation of NATO is crucial. More simply, it should be seen as a goal of strategic common sense. In this direction goes the NATO 2030 initiative promoted by current Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg: launching a new process of inter-​allied adaptation aimed at making NATO stronger militarily and politically, and with a more global reach.45

Organization of the book This is another book on NATO, but done in a different way. It does not deal with the politics of the Alliance –​at least not in the strictest sense. Rather, it is a kaleidoscope that seeks to portray the many and different sides forming the transatlantic relationship. It is a journey through the foreign and security policy of 11 member states –​or, as in the Baltic case, a group of allies –​aiming to shed more, and hopefully better, light on the achievements, the unresolved issues, the emerging challenges, and the future prospects of NATO. All authors, indeed, share the view that looking at the behavior of single allied countries provides the policymaker, the researcher, and the uninformed reader with many lessons that, as it typically occurs, neither an IR view nor an Innenpolitik perspective can fully grasp. Each chapter explores and discusses, on a case-​by-​case basis, four subject matters: •

A history of the country’s transatlantic membership and, thus, both past and current issues.

12  Michele Testoni •

An analysis of the basic factors of the country’s strategic vision, such as its defense policy doctrine, its threat perception, and the role of societal actors in determining its commitment to NATO. • An examination of empirical policy issues, such as the evolution of the country’s defense expenditure and the type of “output” (e.g., troop deployment, sharing of bases and other types of military assets etc.) with which it contributes to the Alliance’s operations. • How the country views its involvement in NATO in the decades to come, and also in relation, for instance, to the EUSA project. The book begins, and it could not be otherwise, with the Alliance’s hegemonic power: the United States. In Chapter 1, Jack Thompson evaluates the role of Washington in NATO and, by doing so, suggests that one of Lord Ismay’s conditions for the Alliance’s success  –​keeping the Americans in  –​ remains, in fact, a core issue of present and future transatlantic relations. The Trump administration has brought the criticism toward a supposed free riding behavior of many allies to an unprecedented level. Yet, as the author argues, Trump does not look like a shooting star of US politics as he represents “an extreme symptom of a broader set of problems that are changing how many Americans think about the world.” Under this light, although the prospect of the US exiting NATO is unlikely, it necessary to start considering the perspective that the United States, regardless of who will be the next President, may become “a more inconsistent, less engaged, and less reliable partner.” The remaining cases are presented according to the three geopolitical flanks of the Alliance. Although this may appear as an oversimplifying division, nevertheless it offers the chance to classify allies with regard to one of their most relevant common features, which is their peculiar strategic environment. By doing so, it will be easier to assess and compare the connection between external and domestic factors that shaping their specific foreign and security policies. The Northern flank is the first. In Chapter 2, James McKay writes that Canada, due to obvious proximity reasons, is one of the countries that is most exposed to the negative consequences of a potential disengagement of the US from NATO and, above all, Trump’s bitter critiques toward the allies’ low defense spending. Given a decreased threat perception, a fact that began during the Cold War, Canada has significantly reduced its military budget, but not its vision of NATO being a valuable political instrument to raise Canada’s international sway and, at the same time, serve as a “counterweight” to the US superpower. But given today’s shockwaves to transatlantic cohesion, the Canadian position looks more uncomfortable and fragile. Chapter 3, written by Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora, discusses the British case, with particular attention to the effects brought about by the 2016 Brexit referendum. In the light of the United Kingdom leaving the EU, the idea of a “Global Britain” is expected to provide London with all but a neoisolationist foreign policy course. Therefore, the authors claim, the UK–​US special relations and British commitment in NATO are expected to be strongly revitalized. The two following chapters deal with

Introduction  13 the two Scandinavian allies:  Norway and Denmark. In Chapter  4, Karsten Friis describes how Russia’s annexation of Crimea and operations in the Donbass region have “profoundly changed” Norway’s traditional approach to Moscow, a foreign policy based on a delicate equilibrium of deterrence and reassurance. Contrary to other countries’ circumstances, this external alteration is leading Norway to strengthen its reliance on NATO and the United States and, therefore, to regard transatlantic relations of vital importance for its national security. The case of Denmark, illustrated in Chapter 5 by Peter Viggo Jakobsen, is a sort of middle-​ground between Canada and Norway. On the one hand, similarly to Oslo, the 2014 events have increased the awareness of Copenhagen that a renewed Russian aggressiveness poses a severe threat Danish interests, especially in the Arctic region. On the other hand, however, and similarly to Ottawa, Denmark is prioritizing low military spending over an increase of its defense budget and, therefore, the maintenance of a special relationship with the US. Danish transatlantic policy is “in flux” as it faces a strong dilemma between rivaling domestic and external priorities. The second cluster of NATO countries are those located on the Eastern flank. In Chapter  6, Florian Böller develops the case of Germany in accordance with the role theoretical approach. The author claims that neither an explanation based on the continuity of Berlin’s culture of restraint nor the claim of that Germany has finally embarked on a process of “normalization” grasp fully the significant changes in Germany’s foreign and security policy. Yet, the author argues that, far from being a reluctant power, since 2014 Berlin has adopted an increasing role of leadership within the Atlantic Alliance, for instance through a number of contributions in NATO military interventions. Chapter 7 is about Poland, a country that, as Wojciech Michnik maintains, has made Atlanticism, instead of Europeanism, the polar star of its foreign and security policy. But this choice, which deeply embedded in the Polish social and political fabric, does not come without a cost. The “NATO-​ centric interpretations” of Poland’s security environment have provided Warsaw with a safe shield against a resurgent Russia, but have also created a syndrome of entrapment with the United States, a fact that, given the anti-​ European orientation of the Trump administration, is reducing Poland’s space for maneuver and, this way, political leverage. A very similar situation is portrayed in Chapter 8, the only contribution of the book focusing on three states: the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The authors, Eoin McNamara and Mari-​Liis Sulg, claim that while in the first decade of their NATO membership (2004–​2014), the Baltic states provided a valuable participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, circumstances changed in the post-​2014 years with the three allies turning into security consumers. As for neighboring Poland, also for the Baltic states the US security guarantee has become a factor of paramount importance. Whether the Obama administration provided an unequivocal defense assurance, current US President Trump has sent mixed –​and, from a Baltic perspective, worrisome –​messages. Despite the Trump administration remains supportive of NATO’s deterrence posture, other events (e.g., the US military withdrawal from Syria;

14  Michele Testoni the threat of Turkey’s President Erdoğan to veto additional measures for NATO’s eFP; and Trump’s announcement to withdraw over 9,000 US troops from Germany) have highlighted to Baltic policymakers that future security cooperation involving the US, especially within NATO, might be an increasingly challenging task. The last group of member states is the one located in the Alliance’s Southern flank. In Chapter  9, Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni explore Spain’s ambivalent defense posture:  a middle-​range power with limited ambitions, but one of the most active players in NATO operations. They suggest that the image of Madrid punching below its weight is not entirely correct and deserves a more nuanced clarification. Spain lacks a direct security threat and, due to a host of historic and cultural reasons, has a scarce defense spending, which in the foreseeable future is unlikely to increase. Yet, in a way similar to Germany, its desire to be perceived as a loyal and reliable actor, with a strong stake in a working multilateral system, makes the Spanish contribution to NATO more valuable than initially perceived. Italy is the object of Chapter  10. According to Luca Ratti, Rome’s commitment to the Alliance derives from the country’s structural weaknesses and vulnerable strategic position, which were particularly evident during the Cold War, but it also reflects a genuine normative preference for multilateral security cooperation. Italy’s remains a loyal transatlantic ally, but in recent years economic stagnation and increasing popular discontent have significantly called into question both Atlanticism and Europeanism, the two traditional pillars of Italy’s foreign policy –​an evolution that is reinforced by the Covid-​19 pandemic and the powerful Chinese propaganda machine. Further, with the Mediterranean losing the strategic importance it gained in the 2000s, Italy risks entering a spiral of abandonment and, therefore, igniting a process of further erosion of its deep-​rooted transatlantic commitment. Chapter 11, the concluding one, deals with today’s most problematic NATO member:  Turkey. The author, Valeria Giannotta, claims that, despite today’s controversial circumstances, epitomized by Turkish military interventions in the Syrian civil war and the purchase of Russian S-​400 defense technology, Turkey-​NATO relations have always been fluctuating. External and domestic factors are considered. The former include the impact of a changing geopolitical landscape, in which Turkey is no longer a passive security consumer, but has turned into an increasingly proactive regional power. The latter focus on the transformation of Turkish politics and society, particularly the rise of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development party and its promotion of a new/​old Ottoman identity. The result is an increasing lack of confidence in both NATO’s and Turkey’s side. What the future holds remains an open question.

Notes 1 J. Stoltenberg. “NATO: good for Europe and good for America.” Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at United States Congress. Washington DC. April 3, 2019. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​opinions_​165210.htm.

Introduction  15 2 J.M. Godzimirski, N. Græger and K.M. Haugevik. “Towards NATO à la Carte? Assessing the alliance adaptation to new tasks and changing relationships.” NUPI Report. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010. www.nupi.no/​en/​ Publications/​CRIStin-​Pub/​Towards-​a-​NATO-​a-​la-​Carte-​Assessing-​the-​alliance-​ s-​adaptation-​to-​new-​tasks-​and-​changing-​relationships. 3 L. Freedman. “The Atlantic Crisis.” International Affairs 58, 3 (Summer 1982): 411. 4 K.W. Deutsch et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. 5 M. Cesa. Allies Yet Rivals: International Politics in 18th Century Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, 11. 6 H.J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf, 1948. 7 S.M. Walt. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. 8 R.L. Schweller. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security 19, 1, Summer 1994. 9 G. Liska. Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, 3. 10 G.H. Snyder. Alliance Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, 8–​9. 11 P.W. Schoeder. “Alliances, 1815–​ 1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, K. Knorr (ed.). Lawrence: Allen, 1976; and P.A. Weitsman. Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 12 M. Cesa, Allies Yet Rivals, 35. 13 A. Locatelli and M. Testoni. “Intra-​Allied Competition and Alliance Durability: the Case for Promoting a Division of Labour Among NATO Allies.” European Security 18, 3, September 2009. 14 H. Cleveland. NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 15 S.R. Sloan. NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005; Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama. New York: Continuum, 2010; Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016; 16 L.S. Kaplan. NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of An Alliance. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004; T.A. Sayle. Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2019. 17 D. Keohane. “NATO, the EU, and the Curse of Suez.” Strategic Europe, Carnegie Europe. October 14, 2016. https://​carnegieeurope.eu/​strategiceurope/​64859. 18 H.A. Kissinger. The White House Years. Boston: Little Brown, 1979. 19 K. Wiegrefe. “Germany’s Unlikely Diplomatic Triumph: An Inside Look at the Reunification Negotiations.” Spiegel International. September 29, 2010. www. spiegel.de/​international/​germany/​germany-​s-​unlikely-​diplomatic-​triumph-​an-​ inside-​look-​at-​the-​reunification-​negotiations-​a-​719848.html. 20 NATO. “Active Engagement, Modern Defense.” Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Lisbon, November 20, 2010. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​official_​texts_​68580.htm?. 21 S. Lucarelli. Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000.

16  Michele Testoni 22 “Secretary D.H. Rumsfeld Media Stakeout.” US Department of Defense. Washington DC, September 23, 2001. https://​archive.defense.gov/​Transcripts/​ Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1926. 23 I.H. Daalder and J.M. Lindsay. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Hoboken: Wiley, 2003. 24 R. Kagan. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Knopf, 2004. 25 A. Parker. “Donald Trump Says NATO is ‘Obsolete’, UN is ‘Political Game’.” The New York Times. April 2, 2016. www.nytimes.com/​politics/​first-​draft/​2016/​04/​ 02/​donald-​trump-​tells-​crowd-​hed-​be-​fine-​if-​nato-​broke-​up/​. 26 R. Gray. “Trump Declines to Affirm NATO’s Article 5.” The Atlantic. May 25, 2017. www.theatlantic.com/​international/​archive/​2017/​05/​trump-​declines-​to-​affirm-​ natos-​article-​5/​528129/​. 27 C. Gall and A. Higgins. “Turkey Signs Russian Missile Deal, Pivoting from NATO.” The New York Times. September 12, 2017. www.nytimes.com/​2017/​09/​ 12/​world/​europe/​turkey-​russia-​missile-​deal.html. 28 “Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming drain-​dead.”The Economist. November 7, 2019. www.economist.com/​europe/​2019/​11/​07/​emmanuel-​macron​warns-​europe-​nato-​is-​becoming-​brain-​dead. 29 “Global Military Spending Remains High at $ 1.7 Trillion.” SIPRI. May 2, 2018. www.sipri.org/​media/​press-​release/​2018/​global-​military-​spending-​remains-​high-​ 17-​trillion. 30 “Population, total –​China.” The World Bank. https://​data.worldbank.org/​indicator/​SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CN. 31 C.A. Wallander. “NATO’s Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance.” Foreign Affairs 97, 4, July/​August 2018. 32 Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, on receiving the Charlemagne Price. Aachen. May 10, 2018. www.elysee.fr/​emmanuel-​macron/​ 2018/​ 0 5/​ 1 0/​ s peech-​ by-​ m -​ e mmanuel-​ m acron- ​ p resident- ​ o f- ​ t he- ​ republic- ​ o n-​ receiving-​the-​charlemagne-​prize-​1.en. 33 D. Lute and N. Burns. NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Belfer Center, Harvard University. February 2019. 34 P.K. MacDonald and J.M. Parent. “Trump Didn’t Shrink U.S. Military Commitment Abroad –​He Expanded Them: The President’s False Promise of Retrenchment.” Foreign Affairs. December 3, 2019. www.foreignaffairs.com/​articles/​2019-​12-​03/​ trump-​didnt-​shrink-​us-​military-​commitments-​abroad-​he-​expanded-​them. 35 At the time the book goes to press, Trump’s decision to pull over 9,000 US troops from Germany has only been announced, but not yet implemented. M.R. Gordon and G. Lubold. “Trump to Pull Thousands of U.S. Troops From Germany.” The Wall Street Journal. June 5, 2020. www.wsj.com/​articles/​trump-​ directs- ​ u - ​ s - ​ t roop- ​ reduction- ​ i n- ​ g ermany- ​ 1 1591375651?mod=hp_​ l ead_​ p os3. C. Oprysko and L. Seligman. “Trump says he will ‘probably’ reassign troops from Germany to Poland.” Politico. June 24, 2020. /​www.politico.com/​news/​2020/​06/​24/​ trump-​reassign-​troops-​from-​germany-​to-​poland-​338461. 36 NATO. Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013–​2019). November 29, 2019. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​news_​171356.htm. 37 “Germany wants change to NATO two-​ percent budget goal.” The Local. March 17, 2017. www.thelocal.de/​20170317/​germany-​wants-​change-​to-​nato-​two-​ percent-​budget-​goal.

Introduction  17 38 G. Martin and B. Martonffy. “Abandon the 2 percent obsession: a new rating for pulling your weight in NATO.” War on the Rocks. May 19, 2017. https://​ warontherocks.com/​2017/​05/​abandon-​the-​2-​percent-​obsession-​a-​new-​rating-​for-​ pulling-​your-​weight-​in-​nato/​. 39 K. Friis (ed.). NATO and Collective Defense in 21st Century: An Assessment of the Warsaw Summit. London: Routledge, 2017. 40 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. “NATO needs to adapt to new security challenges in the High North.” November 18, 2018. www.nato-​pa.int/​news/​ nato-​needs-​adapt-​new-​security-​challenges-​high-​north. 41 R. Allport. “Fire and Ice: A New Maritime Strategy for NATO’s Northern Flank.” Human Security Centre. London. December 3, 2018. www.hscentre. org/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2018/​11/​Fire-​and-​Ice-​A-​New-​Maritime-​Strategy-​for-​ NATOs-​Northern-​Flank.pdf. 42 CSIA European Security Working Group. “Instability and Change in NATO’s Southern Flank.” International Security 3, 3, Winter 1978–​1979. 43 R. Gingeras. “Blue Homeland: the Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy.” War on the Rocks. June 2, 2020. https://​warontherocks.com/​2020/​06/​ blue-​homeland-​the-​heated-​politics-​behind-​turkeys-​new-​maritime-​strategy/​; D.M. Herszehorn, R. Momtaz, and J. Barigazzi. “Rough seas for NATO as Turkey clashes with allies.” Politico. June 24, 2020. www.politico.eu/​article/​rough-​seas-​ for-​nato-​as-​turkey-​clashes-​with-​allies/​. 44 NATO. “London Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.” London, December 4, 2019. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​official_​texts_​171584.htm. 45 NATO. “Secretary General launches NATO 2030 to make our strong Alliance even stronger.” June 8, 2020. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​news_​176193.htm.

1  The US role in NATO Past, present, and future Jack Thompson

Introduction In his April 12, 1949 message transmitting the North Atlantic Treaty to the US Senate, President Harry Truman wrote eloquently about the shared values and interests which had led the United States and its European allies to form NATO: We have joined together in the progressive development of free institutions, and we have shared our moral and material strength in the present task of rebuilding from the devastation of war … The security and welfare of each member of this community depend upon the security and welfare of all. None of us alone can achieve economic prosperity or military security. None of us alone can assure the continuance of freedom.1 For decades, Truman’s conception of the US role in NATO  –​wherein US membership and leadership was taken as a given  –​was an unquestioned cornerstone of US grand strategy. However, in recent years a number of factors have called this consensus into question. The most prominent example is US President Donald Trump’s ambivalence about NATO: he has interfered in the domestic politics of other member states, called the Alliance obsolete, and complained that its European members are taking advantage of the US by underpaying for defense and pursuing unfair trade policies. Yet, Trump is an extreme symptom of a broader set of problems that are changing how many Americans think about the world. Beyond US borders, the international system is moving toward multipolarity; the American “unipolar moment” has ended. The decline of the US relative to other major powers has contributed to increasing geopolitical competition. In response to the rise of China and the phenomenal economic growth in the region, the United States has been in the process of attempting to “pivot” to East Asia –​ and, to an extent, away from Europe and the Middle East. Against the backdrop of this evolving geostrategic landscape and a changing relationship with the US, Europe is pursuing a project of strategic autonomy (ESA). The meaning of this concept is contested, and some

The US role in NATO  19 countries are more enthusiastic about it than others, but the broader point is difficult to miss –​most Europeans want to develop a more independent and coherent security and defense policy.2 This need not damage the transatlantic relationship. In fact, at least a degree of strategic autonomy likely will be necessary for the long-​term health of the transatlantic relationship. However, for some European policymakers and analysts, the quest for ESA is not driven primarily by a desire to develop a better transatlantic relationship. Instead, they are seeking to protect European interests from a US that appears increasingly nationalistic and unreliable. Meanwhile, US policymakers question the willingness of its European partners to challenge China and Russia, both of which regularly transgress international law and western values. Instability on the southern (and, in Europe’s case, southeastern) borders has contributed to domestic political challenges in NATO member countries on both sides of the Atlantic. In particular, the rise of radical right-​wing populism and so-​called illiberal democracy has undermined the notion that the Alliance is based upon a shared set of values. In the case of the US, internal cultural, economic, and political problems directly threaten the country’s leadership in NATO. In recent years, a growing minority of Americans have expressed ambivalence about key aspects of international engagement, including participation in alliances. Partly, this reflects longstanding trends. Anti-​Europeanism, anti-​elitism, and unilateralism are powerful impulses in US political culture. Though they were mostly held in check during the Cold War, they have resurfaced, especially among downscale conservative whites. In part, this recrudescence has been catalyzed by inexorable changes in the US economy, such as growing inequality and the downsides of globalization, and cultural life, such as the backlash against multiculturalism and the country’s growing diversity. NATO cannot exist in its present form without the United States and an effective internationalist US foreign policy is impossible without a robust set of alliances. Each side needs the other. But as the international system and US political culture evolve, the country’s relationship with its European security partners is also changing. The focus of this chapter is the nature of that transformation. First, it recaps the history of US–​NATO ties, giving particular attention to the origin of long-​term challenges that have complicated the relationship and the role that NATO has played in pivotal national security challenges for the US. The second section examines the state of relations today. It takes stock of how NATO is perceived among the US public and policymakers. It evaluates the role NATO plays in US national security strategy, especially when it comes to how policymakers perceive the external security environment. It provides an overview of the US role in debates about defense spending and NATO’s budget. In the final section, the chapter discusses the most likely trajectory for relations between the United States and NATO. This includes sketching two potential scenarios. One is mostly positive and includes the US following geopolitical and domestic political logic –​a majority of the US public and most US policymakers support NATO –​to

20  Jack Thompson embrace a more equal and constructive relationship with its European allies, including their ambitions to develop ESA. The second potential outcome is a muddled future in which the US will become a more inconsistent, less engaged, and less reliable partner. As it spends more time and resources on China and East Asia, the United States will become more reluctant to take the leading role in security challenges in Europe and in Europe’s backyard. Depending on the political party of the US President, it will also periodically act in ways that undermine the rules-​based international order, which Europeans consider a vital interest. Though US withdrawal remains unlikely in this scenario, internal and external factors intensify differences, rather than assuaging them, sapping NATO’s effectiveness and pushing the US and Europe to address their security needs more often outside the parameters of the alliance. Whether this version of the US–​NATO relationship would be sustainable in the long run remains an open question.

The US and NATO in historical context When the United States signed and ratified the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, it broke a longstanding tradition. For the first time since the late 18th century, the US entered into a long-​term military alliance. Several factors drove this fundamental shift in strategy. In spite of the World War II alliance, policymakers and the public had come to perceive the USSR as an existential threat. To be sure, the Soviets laid in ruins after World War II  –​more than 20 million citizens died during the conflict and their industrial base was shattered –​so, there was no possibility that they could attack the US homeland. (This changed after the Soviets began to develop an atomic weapons program, beginning with their first successful nuclear test in August 1949.) However, the outlook in Western Europe after World War II was also bleak; the miserable conditions bolstered domestic communist parties, which Washington assumed would be at least indirectly supportive of Moscow’s policies. In addition, Eastern Europe had quickly oriented itself politically and economically toward Moscow, furthering weakening the trade outlook for Western Europe. In spite of Soviet economic weakness, they maintained a significant edge in conventional military forces in Europe. US policymakers worried that if the Soviets and their allies extended their sway over Western Europe (and Japan), they could prevent the emergence of a viable international economy and US exports would dramatically shrink. This would endanger the health of the US free market economy and political institutions. Hence, the decision to pursue a long-​term security alliance was not fueled by some lofty concern for upholding democracy and human rights overseas; it was motivated largely by national self-​interest. As Melvyn Leffler writes, US officials “were driven less by a desire to help others than by an ideological conviction that their own political economy of freedom would be jeopardized if a totalitarian foe became too powerful.”3

The US role in NATO  21 The future of Germany also played a role in US thinking. In order for Western Europe to be a viable industrial center, the zones of Germany occupied by the Britain, France, and the US after World War II would need to be revived economically. Furthermore, in order for Western Europe to contribute meaningfully to a transatlantic security alliance –​the Western Union, a military alliance between Belgium, Britain, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands was established in 1948  –​German troops would be needed. Yet, all sides were nervous about the prospect of a militarily and economically revived Germany so soon after the horrors of the war. Meanwhile West Germany, which was founded in May 1949, began to assert itself. It did not want to reunite with East Germany as a neutral country, it demanded an end to the practice of dismantling West German industry to pay for the war, and would soon begin to agitate for independent military forces that would contribute to a broader Western European security arrangement.4 In addition to concerns about a reinvigorated Germany, France and other countries were worried that the US would reject a central role in the postwar European security architecture. Though Washington was willing to make vague assurances about military support, Europeans wanted concrete commitments. Meanwhile, US policymakers were determined to force the Western Europeans to develop substantial military capabilities, partly to ensure that the burden of European defense did not fall only on US shoulders, and partly for domestic political reasons, as influential members of Congress remained leery of a long-​term security commitment.5 Though the US was in the process of transitioning to a firmly internationalist foreign policy, influential voices fought back. On the left, Henry Wallace, Franklin D.  Roosevelt’s second Vice President, warned that NATO would undermine the UN and prevent peaceful existence with the USSR. Among conservatives, the most prominent critic was Robert Taft, the Republican Senator from Ohio. Ever since 1945, Taft, a staunch nationalist, had offered the most compelling critique of the burgeoning internationalist orientation of US foreign policy. He had opposed creation of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and only reluctantly voted in favor of the European Recovery Program. He was skeptical about the North Atlantic Treaty from the outset. He worried that it would lead to long-​term entanglements in far-​off countries in which the US had no vital interests, that Article 5 of the treaty would give the President the power to engage in hostilities without the consent of Congress, that the Europeans would require substantial military aid, and that the pact would stoke Soviet perceptions that the West posed a threat.6 Taft’s anti-​treaty forces lost the fight. In July 1949, the Senate voted to ratify 83-​13. The treaty played a crucial role in forging a bipartisan consensus around a version of US internationalism that valued multilateralism and viewed European security as a vital national interest. To put it simply, joining NATO helped lock in a relatively constructive version of US internationalism. This was important, because a significant strain of unilateralist

22  Jack Thompson sentiment persisted among US policymakers and the public through the mid-​1950s. Even though Taft lost the short-​term fight over the future of US foreign policy, aspects of his worldview contributed to the emergence of a perspective that was more unilateralist, more concerned with East Asia  –​ especially China  –​and more responsive to populist impulses than was the mainstream bipartisan internationalism. Senator Joseph McCarthy served as an early leader in promoting what would eventually be recognizable as a form of conservative internationalism; he voted for the North Atlantic Treaty but was a leading voice in the “Asia First” campaigns of the 1950s.7 In spite of Taft’s lingering influence, vigorous participation in NATO remained a cornerstone of US national security strategy for the remainder of the Cold War. To be sure, there was always tension in the US–​NATO relationship. The status of West Germany was a constant source of friction. In the early years of NATO, US policymakers had to reconcile the necessity of creating a West German military with stubborn French resistance to rearming what had been, until recently, an existential threat. Later, the divided city of Berlin emerged as a focal point for US–​Soviet confrontation. Washington was skeptical of West Germany’s policy of Ostpolitik, including improving relations with the Soviet bloc and the establishment of diplomatic relations with East Germany. France was never comfortable with the predominant role of the US and partially disengaged from the Alliance in 1966 (and only fully rejoined in 2009). The Vietnam War angered both sides, as the US resented the lack of European support while the Europeans were horrified by the disastrous US intervention. In the 1980s, against the backdrop of a renewed Soviet–​US arms race, the stationing of US Pershing II nuclear missiles in Europe sparked massive protests and fueled anti-​Americanism. The connective threads to all of these disagreements was, in Washington, frustration that the Europeans were not doing enough to defend themselves and, in Europe, that the US was domineering –​though also occasionally neglectful –​ and that its aggressive behavior would drag them into a war with the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies.8 The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet threat, which had always overridden transatlantic tensions, raised crucial questions about the Alliance. Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, some European policymakers, with the French in the lead, began to discuss the possibility of European security cooperation that could operate independently of NATO –​ an initiative that eventually came to be known as the CSDP. US policymakers were skeptical that the Europeans would be able to create durable structures but, paradoxically, also viewed these supposedly unworkable ideas as a threat to the cohesion and effectiveness of the alliance.9 In return for acquiescing, at least in theory, to the existence of an ESDI, US policymakers extracted an agreement to develop closer relations with the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe. Washington viewed this as a way to encourage the emergence and consolidation of liberal democracy in the region, to bolster US power and influence throughout Europe, and to hedge against the resurgence of a Soviet

The US role in NATO  23 or Russian military threat. Eastern European countries strenuously lobbied for membership, bolstering the case for expansion.10 Though the Soviets had agreed in 1990 that the newly unified Germany could remain in NATO, the successor state, the Russian Federation, reacted angrily to subsequent rounds of expansion eastward. This fueled concern among many NATO members that expansion was needlessly provocative. Washington’s concern about its allies’ lack of military will and capability was reinforced by a series of military conflicts after 1990. Though some alliance members contributed forces to the successful Gulf War in 1990–​ 1991, they did so as part of a US-​led coalition that included many non-​ NATO members and which operated on the basis of UN resolutions. In contrast, NATO was a key player during the Bosnian and Kosovo wars, but this only served to exacerbate tensions in the transatlantic alliance. In both cases, though the conflicts took place in close proximity to NATO’s European members, the US was forced to act as the lead country, politically and militarily, in successful efforts to combat Serbian aggression. The US resented the Europeans’ inability to take responsibility for problems in their neighborhood and the Europeans criticized the reluctance of the Americans to commit ground forces.11 The divide widened following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. At first, the transatlantic bond appeared stronger than ever. NATO rallied in defense of the United States and, for the first time in its history, invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO forces fought as part of a US-​led coalition to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003 split the Alliance. A number of NATO members questioned the George W.  Bush administration’s rationale for intervention and anti-​war protests erupted in many countries. In reaction, US officials dismissed concerns raised by countries such as France and Germany, with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld deriding them as “old Europe” and suggesting that recent additions to the alliance in Central and Eastern Europe would be more productive partners for the US.12 No one greeted the election of Barack Obama as US President in 2009 more enthusiastically than “old Europe.” In many respects, this optimism was justified, as the Obama administration pursued policies that aligned more closely with the multilateral and rules-​based approach preferred by most European members of NATO. However, like every previous administration, Obama and his advisors, frustrated by NATO member shortcomings in military operations in Afghanistan and Libya, criticized their European allies. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, warning of a “dim and dismal future,” suggested that the unwillingness of some NATO member countries to increase military spending could fatally undermine the alliance. As he argued: The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the US Congress  –​and in the American body politic writ large  –​ to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are

24  Jack Thompson apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.13

The role of the US in NATO today In spite of the longstanding tensions between the United States and its European partners in NATO, for most of its history the Alliance was held together by several crucial factors:  the perception of a common external threat, the Soviets; US acknowledgement of the inability of the Europeans to defend themselves without US support and the recognition that European security was a vital national interest; and a bipartisan consensus in US political culture about the need for an internationalist foreign policy that, at least in theory, was multilateral and contributed to the maintenance of a rules-​ based international order. Today, each of these elements has a least partially dissipated. The result is an alliance that is simultaneously still effective and in crisis. At the working and military level, the US remains a constructive and indispensable member of NATO. The US military remains the most powerful in the world and, at USD 649 billion, its military spending far outpaces that of any other country. At 3.4 percent of GDP, it is one of the few NATO members to clear the 2 percent threshold to which all have agreed. The US has led the way in crafting a response to NATO’s biggest challenge, Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine. The US has provided billions of funding for the EDI, which boosts investment in troop presence, training and exercises, infrastructure, prepositioned equipment, and building partner capacity. It heads one of four multinational battle groups as part of the 2016 eFP policy. In addition to its leadership of the multinational battle group in Poland, several thousand US troops are stationed there. Overall, about 65,000 US troops are located in Europe and Turkey and US forces continue to take the leading role in NATO exercises such as Operation Trident Juncture, in 2018, for which the US provided about half of the 40,000 troops.14 This constructive role for the US makes sense because NATO remains an essential part of its national security strategy. While the US, in keeping with key elements its post-​Cold War grand strategy, continues to pursue military predominance and the upholding of what is often referred to as the liberal international order of alliances, institutions, and norms developed in the years following World War II, it recognizes that the geostrategic landscape differs from that of the early 2000s. The 2018 NDS states that “Inter-​ state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in US national security,” while the 2017 NSS highlights the “growing political, economic, and military competitions we face around the world.” In this context, NATO and other alliances play a crucial role in maintaining US predominance and reinforcing US values, deterring great power and regional adversaries, and stabilizing key parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia. As the NDS argues “A strong and free Europe, bound by shared principles of

The US role in NATO  25 democracy, national sovereignty, and commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is vital to our security,”15 while the NSS calls NATO “one of our great advantages over our competitors.”16 In spite of such statements and the positive role it continues to play at the working and military level, at the political and strategic level the US is currently a suboptimal NATO member. To a large extent, this can be attributed to Trump. Though the President’s foreign policy worldview is simplistic and inconsistent, he has a few core convictions. He is ambivalent about democratic institutions and norms, resents leaders –​such as German Chancellor, Angela Merkel –​willing to defend them, has a preference for working with autocratic heads of state, is hostile to supranational organizations such as the EU, and, above all else, is convinced that key allies have taken advantage of the US but are under spending on defense and engaging in unfair trading practices. As a result, the President treats NATO in a manner unlike any of his predecessors. In contrast to the US public and a large majority of policymakers and national security experts, Trump has made it clear that he does not consider continued NATO membership to be a vital national interest. But rather than prioritizing US withdrawal –​he has discussed the possibility with advisors, but recognizes the high political cost such a decision would entail –​the President has sought to use his criticism to extract concessions from other NATO members on defense spending and trade. In addition, he has tried, in the face of opposition from the rest of the US national security establishment, to improve ties with Russia, at times at the expense of NATO allies.17 Yet, it would be misleading to characterize the current challenges facing the relationship as only a product of Trump’s tenure. Systemic disruptions have played a big part in necessitating a reevaluation of the role of the US in NATO. Many of these changes relate to the evolution of the international system and the position of the US within it. The speed and nature of China’s rise to major power status has stunned and dismayed many Americans and prompted US policymakers to focus more on East Asian, and correspondingly less on European, security concerns. Conventional wisdom in the 1990s and early 2000s held that rising economic prosperity would create a Chinese middle class and, in time, irresistible pressure for political reform. Instead, even as China has built what is, by some measures, already the world’s largest economy, the Chinese Communist Party has tightened its grip on power and has developed sophisticated tools for repressing dissent. The pivot to Asia, made famous during the Obama administration, actually began during the George W. Bush administration, which sought to engage with Beijing in order to persuade it to avoid a bid for regional hegemony. Now that China, under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, has made clear its goal of attaining regional predominance and the role of a global power, it has become the foremost geostrategic concern for US policymakers.18 More broadly, the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, the persistence of regional challengers such as Iran and North Korea, and continued instability in hotspots such as Syria have shifted US focus away from issues

26  Jack Thompson such as terrorism, development, and governance back toward what the 2018 NDS calls “interstate strategic competition” and what Walter Russell Mead describes as the “return of geopolitics.” Concomitantly, the US is in gradual decline relative to other countries, especially China. Though the US remains the foremost major power, the gap between US and Chinese capabilities continues to shrink and American ability to project power has decreased relative to its post-​Cold War peak. Though some analysts contend that these fundamental shifts in the geostrategic landscape make US leadership within the transatlantic context even more pressing, the overall trend has been toward, at a minimum, placing less priority on European security.19 In addition to structural trends abroad, significant changes in the domestic landscape are changing the nature of US international engagement, including the relationship with NATO. A  backlash among culturally conservative (and mainly white) Americans against multiculturalism and the nation’s growing diversity has led to a rise in anti-​immigrant and anti-​foreigner sentiment. Related to this trend is, among a large minority of mostly conservative Americans, a distaste for and distrust of the EU and other supranational institutions on the other side of the Atlantic.20 Cultural unease with Europe among a large minority of Americans is compounded by economic anxiety. Though the US economy has been growing since 2009, gains have been unevenly distributed. This is in keeping with a long-​term pattern of rising income inequality. This gap between the rich and poor, along with problems such as the negative effects of international trade –​especially but not only with China –​the opioid epidemic, and falling life expectancies has contributed to a sense of cultural–​economic crisis among many working class whites.21 These cultural and economic challenges have contributed to political radicalization among a large minority of voters. This can be seen across the political spectrum. Many on the left are suspicious of capitalism and young Americans are ambivalent about democratic governance. Meanwhile, on the right, there is a growing tendency toward authoritarian political values, which correlate with racism, prejudice, and nationalism. It does not help that polarization is at a historically high level. In the US system, which was not designed to accommodate ideologically homogenous political parties, this is a formula for gridlock, a problem which further alienates voters.22 The cultural, economic, and political dysfunction plaguing the United States do not bode well for the nation’s long-​term role in NATO. To be sure, support for NATO among policymakers and the public is strong; the Democratic and Republican party platforms in 2016 explicitly mention the importance of NATO membership (though both argue that other NATO members need to contribute more to the Alliance). However, many conservative voters prefer a more nationalist and unilateralist foreign policy. They view NATO negatively and think NATO does not do enough to solve global problems. (A smaller bloc of voters on the left favor significantly reducing military expenditures; some are ambivalent about or even hostile to NATO). Given the logic of US

The US role in NATO  27 politics, wherein the extreme factions of the two main political parties tend to wield disproportionate influence, it is possible for a politician who is less than committed to NATO to become President –​as was the case with Trump in 2016. The direction of the GOP is also troubling. Though Trump is an outlier even by Republican standards, the populist nationalism that he espouses likely represents the future for a party that is trending older, whiter, more rural, and more intolerant. This cohort is fertile ground for the type of foreign policy thinking –​unilateralist, suspicious of long-​term security partnerships, and ambivalent about international institutions –​that is least conducive to a productive relationship with NATO.23 US domestic struggles are not caused by the existence of instability in many of the countries in Latin America, but insecurity –​including narcotics and violence –​and large-​scale immigration flows crossing the southern border exacerbate these problems. NATO’s European members face many of the same challenges vis-​à-​vis their southern and southeastern borders, yet neither the US nor its European partners have developed effective responses. When it comes to the future of NATO, analysts need to pay as much attention to the threats emanating from the South of the Alliance as they do to those located to the East.24

The future of the US in NATO Unfortunately, the role that the US will likely play in NATO in the coming years is different than the one it should play. NATO should remain a cornerstone of US national security policy. One prominent feature of intensified geopolitical competition is an increasingly stark cleavage between liberal and illiberal states. As the US declines and grapples with the challenge of a series of autocratic foes, foremost among them China and Russia, it will need to make ever more intelligent use of its natural allies –​other liberal democracies, such as those that predominate in NATO. To be sure, NATO faces an internal challenge in member states such as Hungary, Poland, and Turkey that are experimenting with degrees of illiberality. However, NATO has long been and for the foreseeable future will remain a club for western democracies: the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty states that the signatories “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” There are also compelling domestic political reasons for the US to recommit to vigorous participation in, and leadership of, NATO. In spite of extreme elements in both major political parties, NATO remains popular among most policymakers and among the broader public. The reasons for this are twofold. Americans overwhelmingly believe that they are closely linked to NATO’s European members by history and culture. More concretely, the US accrues enormous net benefits in terms of security, power amplification, and

28  Jack Thompson political influence from its position in NATO –​a fact which is as apparent to the broader public as it is to national security experts.25 There is another, more abstract, but still vital reason that the US should maintain a vigorous role in NATO. Participation in the transatlantic alliance is often challenging. Membership in an organization with 29 other countries forces policymakers to negotiate, to make concessions, and to settle for less than ideal solutions. It necessitates that the US thinks less like a superpower and more like an ally. This is often frustrating for the world’s most powerful nation, but it is a vital exercise. One of the pernicious consequences of US might is a temptation to strive to achieve total security, to view a world where the US is the lone pole of power as a realistic and desirable state of affairs. This “unipolar fantasy,” as David Calleo calls it, perverts US internationalism and leads to dangerous and counterproductive undertakings, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Membership in alliances such as NATO acts as a countervailing force to such temptations. Furthermore, a US that is fully engaged and which engages in the tedious but essential horse-​trading that is the lifeblood of such alliances is also good for other NATO members, which have a tendency to want the United States to dominate but then to criticize the results. Sten Rynning notes that NATO works best when it functions as a concert of member states, one that is a “compromise between the strategic cultures of the United States, Canada, and Europe.”26 NATO’s European members are finally embracing this lesson and have embarked on a long-​term process designed to develop more robust and independent military and security capacities. Though there are multiple conceptions of what ESA will entail, most envision a process that allows Europe to make a more substantial contribution to transatlantic security cooperation. Though the US traditionally has been wary of European initiatives operating outside the framework of NATO –​and the Trump administration has sought to undermine it –​an increasing number of US policymakers have accepted that ESA is in the interest of the United States. It will eventually permit Europeans to assume more of the burden for security challenges in their neighborhood, freeing Washington to focus on more distant problems, such as China. As long as ESA follows this cooperative trajectory, it should play an important role in the development of a more equal –​and therefore more sustainable –​ transatlantic relationship.27 Regrettably, this version of the US–​NATO relationship may be too optimistic. Though it is unlikely to withdraw from NATO, the US will probably become a less dependable member, one that oscillates between phases of constructive engagement and periods in which it is more ambivalent about the relationship and less willing to engage in the consultations and compromises without which the alliance cannot function. The cultural, economic, and political problems afflicting the US are unlikely to be resolved any time soon. This means that longstanding habits in US political culture –​unilateralism, suspicion of international engagement, and (especially conservative) populism  –​will continue to play an important role in US foreign policy. These

The US role in NATO  29 tendencies will not predominate unabated; rather, they will crest and recede depending on the circumstances. Crucially, because the US President has so much potential freedom for action in national security matters, anytime the GOP controls the White House, there will be an increased danger of a more contentious approach to NATO. Diverging interests may also split the US and the rest of NATO. Even if it is successful, it will take years before ESA begins to bear fruit. In the meantime, the United States will continue to resent Europeans’ inability to fully contribute to joint security challenges. In addition, there are some who view ESA not as a cooperative mechanism, but primarily as a means to enable Europe to act independently of the US. Many of these policymakers and analysts still desire close collaboration with the US, but fear that that the US, with its focus on Asia and –​at least during the Trump era –​hostility to the European project, is no longer a reliable partner.28 Though Europeans are awakening to the implications of intensifying geopolitical competition, there are significant inter-​ European differences about how to react. Meanwhile, the US tends to take a more hawkish view of the international landscape. China is a case in point. Though Europe is attempting to develop an appropriately complex policy  –​mixing trade and cooperation where possible, but remaining cognizant of the problematic nature of the Chinese regime –​Beijing is pursuing a patient and intelligent divide and conquer approach. It is using programs such as the 17+1 format and the BRI to make economic inroads that can later be used to wield political influence. It does not help that the Trump administration is clumsily pushing the Europeans to choose sides in US–​China strategic competition. Washington and its European partners have begun to discuss NATO’s role in managing relations with China, but there is as yet no consensus as to the role the Alliance should play.29 Russia is another instance in which the lack of a common European policy frustrates Washington. Some countries view Russia as Europe’s foremost security challenge while others seek a more pragmatic relationship, in part because of unease about US intentions. With the notable exception of Trump, there is a bipartisan US consensus on the need for maintaining economic sanctions on Russia and providing support to countries, such as Ukraine, that perceive Moscow as a threat. Meanwhile, Rome has called for lifting the sanctions and Paris, though not yet willing to lift the sanctions, has made it clear that it would like to reorient NATO’s threat perception away from Moscow. These differences will not necessarily cause lasting damage, but close coordination will be required to prevent a breach, especially because Russia is adept at identifying and exploiting the fault lines in transatlantic security debates.30 In the final analysis, NATO and the United States need each other. There is much that binds the two and both sides will benefit from maintaining a close and constructive relationship. Yet, internal and external forces are depleting the will and ability of Washington and Brussels to take the necessary steps to

30  Jack Thompson ensure that the alliance remains viable. Every effort should be made to reverse this worrying trend –​the future safety and security of the transatlantic region depends on it.

Notes 1 H.S. Truman. Harry S. Truman, 1949: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1949. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1964, 206–​207. 2 S. Dennison. “Give the people what they want: Popular demand for a strong European foreign policy.” European Council on Foreign Relations, September 10, 2019. www.ecfr.eu/​publications/​summary/​popular_​demand_​for_​strong_​european_​foreign_​policy_​what_​people_​want. 3 M.P. Leffler. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992, 1–​24. 4 J.L. Harper. American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 278–​301. 5 L.S. Kaplan. The United States and NATO: the Formative Years. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984, 65–​92. 6 L.S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO, 30–​48; see also: J.T. Patterson. Mr. Republican: a Biography of Robert A. Taft. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972, 291–​295, 392, 435–​440. 7 J. Mao. Asia First: China and the Making of Modern American Conservatism, Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 2015; J. Thompson. “Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy: McCarthyism as a Cautionary Tale.” Center for Security Studies, CSS Policy Perspectives 4/​10, December 2016. 8 L.S. Kaplan. NATO and the United States: the Enduring Alliance. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988; T.A. Sayle. Enduring Alliance: a History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019. 9 J. Thompson. “European Strategic Autonomy and the US.” Center for Security Studies, CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 248, September 2019. 10 T.A. Sayle, Enduring Alliance, 232–​240. 11 L.S. Kaplan. NATO Divided, NATO United: the Evolution of an Alliance. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004, 109–​131. 12 US Department of Defense. “Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs at the Foreign Press Center.” January 22, 2003. https://​archive.defense.gov/​Transcripts/​Transcript. aspx?TranscriptID=1330. 13 T. Shanker. “Defense Secretary Warns NATO of ‘Dim’ Future.” New York Times, June 10, 2011. www.nytimes.com/​2011/​06/​11/​world/​europe/​11gates.html. 14 M. Zapfe. “ ‘Hybrid’ threats and NATO’s Forward Presence.” Center for Security Studies, CSS Policy Perspectives vol. 4/​7, September 2016; M. Friedl. “US Joins NATO’s Trident Juncture Exercise.” US Department of Defense, October 18, 2018; A. Mehta. “European Defense Fund Takes a 10 Percent Cut in New Budget.” Defense News, March 12, 2019; A. Fleurant, P.D. Wezeman, S.T. Wezeman, N. Tian, and A. Kuimova. “Trends in World Military Expenditure 2018.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2019; J. Adamowski. “US, Polish presidents sign pact to boost American military presence in Poland.” Defense News, September 24, 2019.

The US role in NATO  31 15 US Department of Defense. “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States.” 16 “National Security Strategy of the United States,” December 2017. 17 J.E. Barnes and H. Cooper. “Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. from NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia.” New York Times, January 14, 2019. www. nytimes.com/​2019/​01/​14/​us/​politics/​nato-​president-​trump.html. 18 N. Silove. “The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia.” International Security 40 (Spring 2016): 45–​88; White House. “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China.” October 4, 2018; D. Sevastopulo, “Why Trump’s America is Rethinking Engagement with China.” Financial Times, January 15, 2019. www.ft.com/​content/​f882b7c2-​1339-​11e9-​a581-​4ff78404524e. 19 W.R. Mead. “The Return of Geopolitics.” Foreign Affairs 93 (May/​June 2014): 69–​ 79; C. Layne. “The US–​ Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana.” International Affairs 94, 1 (January 2018): 89–​111; H. Binnendijk. A Transatlantic Pivot to Asia: Towards New Trilateral Partnership. Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2014. 20 M. Abrajano and Z. Hajnal. White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015; T. Bromund. “A New Approach to Europe: U.S. Interests, Nationalist Movements, and the European Union.” The Heritage Foundation, December 4, 2018; S. Maitra. “Why The United States And European Union Are Destined To Collide.” The Federalist, May 23, 2019; C. Brockway and C. Doherty. “Growing Share of Republicans say U.S. Risks Losing its Identity if it is too Open to Foreigners.” Pew Research Center, July 17, 2019. 21 D.H. Autor, D. Dorn, and G.H. Hanson. “The China Shock: Learning from Labor Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 21906, January 2016; J. Gest. The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016; P.H. Lindert and J.G. Williamson. Unequal Gains: American Growth and Inequality since 1700. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016; L. Bernstein. “U.S. life expectancy Declines Again, a Dismal Trend Not Seen Since World War I.” The Washington Post, November 29, 2018. www.washingtonpost. com/ ​ g dpr- ​ c onsent/​ ? next_​ u rl=https%3a%2f%2fwww.washingtonpost. com%2fnational%2fhealth- ​ s cience%2fus- ​ l ife-​ expectancy-​ d eclines-​ again-​ a -​ dismal-​trend-​not-​seen-​since-​world-​war-​i%2f2018%2f11%2f28%2fae58bc8c-​f28c-​ 11e8-​bc79-​68604ed88993_​story.html. 22 C. Andris et al. “The Rise of Partisanship and SuperCooperators in the U.S. House of Representatives.” PLOS One, April 21, 2015; R.S. Foa and Y. Mounk. “The Democratic Disconnect.” Journal of Democracy 27, July 2016, 5–​17; C. Weber, C. Federico and S. Feldman. “How Authoritarianism is Shaping American Politics (and it’s Not Just about Trump).” The Washington Post, May 10, 2017. www.washingtonpost.com/ ​ g dpr- ​ c onsent/ ​ ? next_​ u rl=https%3a%2f%2fwww. washingtonpost.com%2fnews%2fmonkey-​ cage%2fwp%2f2017%2f05%2f10% 2fhow-​authoritarianism-​is-​shaping-​american-​politics-​and-​its-​not-​just-​about-​ trump%2f; F. Newport. “Democrats More Positive about Socialism than Capitalism.” Gallup, August 13, 2018. 23 J. Thompson. “American Affairs and US Foreign Policy.” CSS Policy Perspectives 5, 3, June 2017; M. Fagan. “NATO is Seen Favorably in Many Member Countries,

32  Jack Thompson but Almost Half of Americans Say it Does Too Little.” Pew Research Center, July  9, 2018; D. Smeltz, I. Daalder, K. Friedhoff, C. Kafura, and B. Helm. “Rejecting Retreat: Americans Support US Engagement in Global Affairs.” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, September 6, 2019; J. Stepman. “National Conservatives Set Out to Define Future of Politics on Right.” The Daily Signal, July 28, 2019; Y. Levin. “Fumbling for Clarity, At Last.” National Review, November 13, 2019. 24 S. Rynning. “NATO’s Futures: the Atlantic Alliance between Power and Purpose.” NATO Defense College Research Paper 2 (March 2019): 16–​17. 25 S.G. Brooks and W.C. Wohlforth. America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016; J. Poushter and A. Castillo. “Americans and Germans Disagree on the State of Bilateral Relations, but Largely Align on Key International Issues.” Pew Research Center, March 2019. 26 D. Calleo. Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Rynning, “NATO’s Futures,” 16. 27 J. Howorth. “European Strategic Autonomy: Why It’s Not About Europe Going it Alone.” Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2019; Thompson, “European Strategic Autonomy and the US.” 28 N. Tocci. “Navigating Complexity: The EU’s Rationale in the 21st Century.” Istituto Affari Internazionali, January 6, 2019; “Emmanuel Macron in his own words.” The Economist, November 7, 2019. www.economist.com/​europe/​2019/​11/​ 07/​emmanuel-​macron-​in-​his-​own-​words-​english. 29 T. Fallon. “The EU, the South China Sea, and China’s Successful Wedge Strategy.” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, October 13, 2016; European Union and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, and the Council.” March 12, 2019; N. Barkin. “The US Is Losing Europe in Its Battle With China.” The Atlantic, June 4, 2019; “London Declaration,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 4, 2019. 30 S. de Jong. “Confuse, Divide and Rule –​How Russia Drives Europe Apart.” Institute for European Studies, Policy Brief No. 2 (March 2016); “Joint news conference with Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte,” President of Russia, July 4, 2019; “Joint press point with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of France Emmanuel Macron,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 28, 2019.

2  Canada and NATO Hopes and ambitions James McKay

Introduction Canada’s approach to NATO over the past 70 years is puzzling. On the one hand, Canada has been perceived by other member states as a laggard in terms of defense spending and its commitments to NATO operations have tended to be modest. It has been accused, if one were to use stronger language, of being a rider, be it “free,” “easy,” or otherwise.1 On the other hand, it was a founding member that championed NATO as a political and economic community as opposed to a mere collective defense organization. It has also been a participant in every NATO operation since the Alliance’s creation.2 The most appropriate way to describe this is that Canada’s ambitions with regard to the Alliance exceed its capabilities. This begs a broader question: what explains the Janus-​faced approach, a combination of institutional ambition, a relative lack of capability (with some notable exceptions), and varying shades of “ridership,” best? In other words, why have Canada’s contributions varied over time? A decade ago, Haglund and Onea argued persuasively that neoclassical realism explains the variance in Canadian foreign policy behavior well.3 This paper will explore the logic behind the variance and, in so doing, show why neoclassical realism would offer a convincing explanation for Canada’s behavior toward the Alliance over time. This will be accomplished through a brief summary of the theory before exploring four broad themes. These are: • • • •

The variances in Canada’s commitments to the Alliance, measured in military personnel and expenditures. Canada’s perceptions of threats over time. The quest for a “counterweight” to the United States, Canada’s closest  ally. How membership in NATO connects to Canadian foreign and security policy goals.

Neoclassical realism This international relations theory is relatively simple. Founded on a critique of structural realism, where the cause and effect relationship between the

34  James McKay structures of the international system purports to explain state behavior, neoclassical realists seek to account for the variances in state behavior that occur in spite of structural realist predictions to the contrary. Neoclassical realists argue that the variances are evidence of a series of intervening variables at the domestic level. It is through these variables that states perceive the external environment (aka strategic situation), make decisions and implement policies. The perception of the situation, decision-​making, and implementation of policies, are all broadly affected by four things, namely: (1) leader images, (2) strategic culture, (3) state–​society relations, and (4) domestic institutions.4 Each one of these will be explained in turn. The concept of leader images pertains to perception. It is effectively about the ideas and beliefs held within a state’s foreign policy executive, i.e., the head of state/​government, the minister or secretary for foreign affairs, and the ministries and departments that influence policy formulation and implementation.5 For the sake of brevity, this will not be addressed in depth. Strategic culture, as a concept, is somewhat contested. Putting the debates aside, there is much more literature pertaining specifically to Canada on this subject. Bloomfield and Nossal offered a simple definition of the concept in their comparison of Australian and Canadian strategic cultures, namely “the habits of ideas, attitudes, and norms toward strategic issues, and patterns of strategic behavior.”6 Where this differs is that it is focused on the link between the ideational and what state behavior can be observed. Historians and political scientists alike have offered their observations of such patterns. Leuprecht and Sokolsky offered the idea that Canada was less a “free rider” than it was an “easy rider” that opportunistically bandwagoned deliberately.7 This was the product, they argued, of a contradiction in its strategic culture between the belief that an expeditionary orientation (largely but not exclusively Atlanticist in nature) afforded a degree of international influence and the national predilection to be expedient.8 Maloney argued that Canada preferred to engage in “forward security,” i.e., at a distance from North America, with others.9 This draws on the assumption that Canada was a “peaceable kingdom,” which came into doubt with the growth of Soviet bomber capabilities in the mid-​1950s.10 Yet, this would explain why successive governments of Canada would want to support international peace and security in that era. He also argued that Canadian national interests over time remained consistent, namely a unified Canada, the maintenance of political freedom, championing the rule of law in international matters, and economic prosperity.11 Bloomfield and Nossal asserted that the pattern since at least 1949 includes the close relationship with the US, membership in NATO, and internationalism.12 Massie offered that there were three competing imperatives, namely “continental soft-​ bandwagoning,” “defensive internationalism,” and “soft-​balancing Atlanticism.”13 The idea of competition appears elsewhere; McDonough offered up continentalism and independence as competing subcultures to explain Canada’s “goldilocks zone” that combined

Canada and NATO  35 “continental soft-​ bandwagoning” and “independent soft-​ balancing.”14 In addition, one of the other observable patterns is the idea of limiting one’s military liability to what is necessary, which helps explain the commitment side of the puzzle.15 One of the more prevalent ideas linked to strategic culture is that as a middle power sharing the North American continent with the US, Canada has tended to seek a “counterweight” in Western Europe.16 This idea’s origins lay in Brebner’s “North Atlantic Triangle” consisting of Canada, the US, and the United Kingdom (UK), where the latter was the “counterweight” to the US. The idea predated NATO, but as the UK wrestled with the long-​ term effects of two World Wars, the idea suggests that Western Europe (through NATO) replaced it.17 This idea is seductive in a Canadian context, as Haglund noted, it allows Canadian policymakers to be transatlantic while not necessarily threatening national unity, the latter being far from insignificant. State–​society relations could be characterized relatively simply. It is the character of interactions between civil society and government.18 In other words, how does the government interact with civil society? Given that the latter represents all of the potential groups citizens can form and seek to influence policy, how the federal government allocates funds provides good evidence to show how the government of Canada balanced demands from the international and domestic political spheres. Domestic institutions, in the case of the Canadian perspective of NATO, is the least important of the intervening variables. Three points, however, remain important. In the division of powers between the federal and provincial levels, defense is a purely federal matter.19 Defense policy is in the hands of the executive branch of government, but every Canadian party, when in opposition, argues that parliamentary debates should occur before Canadian forces are committed. There is no statutory justification for this argument, but most believe it to be necessary. Finally, defense matters have become a political battleground in the absence of a discernible threat. When one exists, the government of Canada has shown that the willingness to reallocate resources to deal with it. The Department of National Defense is the largest federal department and given that it engages in activities that are uncomfortable for segments of the Canadian population, opposition parties cannot resist using defense issues as a means to criticize the party in power in periods of reduced threats. Neoclassical realism’s strength comes from its acknowledgment that states (in the government sense) need to balance the demands emanating from the international environment and from within the country. Decisions, according to this theory, are made as a result of what the domestic body politic will accept as a solution to the problems posed by the environment. This theory provides a cogent explanation for the variances in Canada’s contributions to NATO.

36  James McKay

Variances in Canada’s commitments to the Alliance Canada’s commitments to NATO were greatest at the outset of the 70 years and declined as the years progressed to a rough equilibrium. Measuring the scale of commitment through the number of military personnel and government of Canada spending on defense reveals this pattern quickly. Three datasets are used to support this claim. Figure 2.1 provides a rough measure of Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel stationed in Europe, deployed to Europe, or deployed on NATO missions outside Europe. What is most important about this is that it shows a connection between contributions and the security concerns of the day. The data show that from the Korean War to the start of détente, Canada’s contribution to NATO was much larger than later decades. While the number of Canadian military personnel fell abruptly with the closure of “Canadian Forces Europe” in 1992, it contributed forces to UN-​led and then NATO-​led operations in the former Yugoslavia. As that

Stationed

NATO Operations in Europe

NATO Operations outside of Europe

Europe (non-NATO)

14000

10500

7000

3500

0 2019 2017 2015 2013 2011 2009 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 1997 1995 1993 1991 1989 1987 1985 1983 1981 1979 1977 1975 1973 1971 1969 1967 1965 1963 1961 1959 1957 1955 1953 1951 1949

Figure 2.1 Canadian military personnel in Europe or on “Out-​ of-​ Area” NATO missions, 1949–​2019. Note:  See also B.  Frandsen. “The Rise and Fall of Canada’s Cold War Air Force, 1948–​1968.” Ph.D. Thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 2015: 113–​159; Correspondence from S. Maloney, June 2, 2019; and R. Stouffer. Swords, Clunks and Widowmakers: The Tumultuous Life of the RCAF’s Original 1st Canadian Air Division. Trenton: Canadian Forces Air Warfare Centre, 2015. Source: CAF Department of Heritage and History, “Past Operations Database,” www. canada.ca/​en/​department-​national-​defence/​services/​military-​history/​history-​heritage/​ past-​operations.html.

Canada and NATO  37 conflict faded away, Canada contributed significantly to ISAF, both before and after NATO’s assumption of command. From 2001 to 2014, however, the Canadian government perceived Europe as a relative zone of peace, which accounts for the lower level of forces in Europe. Figure 2.2 shows defense spending relative to GDP over time. Canadian defense spending peaked in 1953, at the height of the early Cold War and Canada’s larger contribution of forces in NATO, but since that time, defense spending has declined. Since the end of the Cold War, it has not gone above the 2  percent level. Much of the Canadian experience has been about how to contribute with quality when quantity has not been a viable option. This explains Sokolsky and Leuprecht’s characterization of Canadian behavior as “easy riding.”20 This begs the question of why quantity-​based approaches became unviable. The last dataset provides an explanation associated with that question. Figure  2.3 shows the percentage of defense spending relative to total federal government expenditures over time. This is a measure of state–​society relations and preferences. What this shows is the relative decline of importance of defense as a priority for successive Canadian governments. What accounts for this is the increasing demand on the part of the Canadian public for programs and services to address issues of concern as well as the desire to do so without significant increases in taxation. Thus from 1969 onwards, Canadian military contributions to NATO have been constrained by government choices in terms of resource allocation. This helps explain the decline in spending and why Canadian contributions may appear modest. Domestic matters were a greater concern to Canadian voters than those associated with foreign and defense policy in the absence of a significant threat.

8.0%

6.0%

4.0%

2.0%

0.0% 1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 2017

Figure 2.2 Canadian defense spending as a percentage of GDP, 1949–​2017. Source:  SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, www.sipri.org/​databases/​milex.

38  James McKay

50.0%

37.5%

25.0%

12.5%

0.0%

1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 2017

Figure 2.3 Canadian defense spending as a percentage of overall federal government expenditure, 1949–​2017. Source: L. Di Matteo, A Federal Fiscal History: Canada, 1867–​2017. Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2017, 87–​89.

Canada’s view of threats At the outset of the Cold War, Canada saw NATO as a solution to four problems. The first was the preservation of democracy in Europe. Having just invested a large amount of the nation’s blood and treasure in defeating the Axis powers, Canada was leery of letting another authoritarian regime threaten Western Europe. The second was that the Alliance offered a potential “counterweight” to its much larger neighbor without risking the exacerbation of questions of national unity. Third, Canada saw NATO less like a collective defense organization as more of a multinational forum of western liberal democracies to deal with collective action problems.21 Article 2 of the Washington Treaty is popularly known as the “Canada clause.” What it revealed was the Canadian view that NATO was a political organization in addition to being a collective defense organization.22 The article was watered down, but it took some time for Canadian politicians, such as Lester B. Pearson, to realize that there was little interest in expanding the Alliance’s purpose beyond collective defense.23 Canada has been and remains one of the countries that favor the à la carte approach to collective security.24 This, of course, begs the question of why the Canadian government was so enthusiastic about a collective defense organization that offered less than Canada has hoped. Jockel and Sokolsky argued that, at the outset, NATO was extremely useful to Canada as it offered a proverbial “seat at the table,” the promise of keeping defense costs low, finding a new counterweight to the US if the UK was no longer able to do so, and with little to no domestic criticism.25 Finally, a multilateral alliance offered the prospect that Canada would be internationally influential. NATO membership is also a reflection of an Atlanticist orientation on the part of Canada. While it could be argued that this has weakened over the years,

Canada and NATO  39 this is a comment on a relative trend. Even today, two-​thirds of Canadians live in its eastern provinces as opposed to the Canadian west.26 While the US is Canada’s largest trading partner, Europe remains one of Canada’s primary trading partners. In spatial terms, Europe remains important to Canada. The degree of threat posed by the USSR can be explained this way. Canada emerged from the World War II much like its American ally –​more or less unscathed. The Soviets were seen to pose a threat to liberal democratic states of Western Europe that were rebuilding from the trauma of the war. Canada and the US, by comparison, were more able to should a greater weight of the burden of alliance contributions. As a result of the increased perception of a Soviet-​led communist threat, the government opted to spend heavily on defense and to postpone much of the programs unrelated to defense until the situation stabilized. CAF grew from roughly 35,000 people in 1947 to 104,000 in 1953, and defense was the largest single line item in the annual federal budget until 1964.27 In the main, Canadians accepted these costs as the price of peace. The government (and, by inference, Canadians) made a valuable contribution to the Alliance at a time when a number of other States were making contributions in Korea (along with Canada), recovering from the World War II and/​or dealing with decolonization. The nuclear era put the lie to the old Canadian notion that the country represented a “fireproof house.”28 Soviet bombers, and eventually missiles, could reach North America via the Arctic, and, as such, contributing to the collective defense of Europe was a means of indirectly defending Canada. As NATO’s Western European members recovered and shouldered an increasing share of the defense burden, Canada was able to reduce the scale of its commitments, somewhat reassured that there would be some form of warning to allow rearmament if necessary and that it was not alone in any collective defense endeavor. While the government of Canada expected that as Europeans recovered from the World War II, their share of the burden would increase. What the government did not expect was that Canada’s voice might decrease as a result. This desire to reduce commitments was due to both domestic and international factors. Canadians came to be less willing to make sacrifices domestically as the Cold War settled into something resembling stability. This, from a Canadian perspective, lasted from the start of détente to the end of the Cold War, where forces rotated in and out of “Canadian Forces Europe,” “Standing Naval Forces Atlantic,” and Cyprus. What this meant was that spending on domestic issues increased over the 1960s and 1970s to the detriment of defense spending and an increasing federal debt. There was a seductive logic to this trend. As a middle power in a collective defense organization largely comprised of other middle powers, Canada expected, reasonably, that it would have a voice or exercise a degree of influence within the member states of that organization. This is much more difficult in smaller arrangements with much larger powers, i.e., in bilateral arrangements with only the US, unless the arrangements are crafted

40  James McKay deliberately to avoid and/​or mitigate issues associated with power asymmetry. While Canada seldom expects to lead, successive governments have feared a loss of international influence. When such losses are perceived, it can lead to a loss of interest on the government of Canada’s part in the Alliance. By way of example, in the late 1960s, Canadian public opinion became increasingly skeptical of the Alliance, as trade within North America deepened, and the UK’s efforts to join the EEC suggested the ties within the Commonwealth were loosening.29 At the same time, as European powers strengthened, the Canadian contribution seemed less valuable. The Prime Minister opted to diversify Canada’s approach to foreign and defense policy with the “Third Option,” which sought to expand relations with states other than the allies. This created some angst within a number of allies and led to pressure on Ottawa to deepen its commitments. It did so in the late 1970s, but the situation changed a decade later. The end of the Cold War meant the Soviet threat effectively evaporated. The Canadian public expected to extract a “peace dividend,” meaning a reduction in defense spending, but they also wanted to ensure that Canada made contributions to international peace and security. The threat to Canadian interests changed in this period from a singular monolithic threat that necessitated forward basing to fears that Canada, by virtue of withdrawing its forces from Europe, would lose influence. A number of crises and conflicts, including the former Yugoslavia, saw to it that Canada would continue to make contributions, albeit smaller than during the Cold War. There was a second threat to Canadian interests, the perpetual fear of a loss of economic prosperity. Given that the Canadian and US economies are intertwined, this has meant Ottawa has been sensitive to Washington and when the American economy appears weaker, Canada seeks to hedge against economic weakness by seeking free trade agreements with other countries. During the crisis of September 11, 2001, Canada supported its American ally immediately, all the while fearing that increased security measures in the US would cause a “thickening” of the border that would slow down trade in North America. It made contributions to the GWOT, and soon joined the US in its efforts in Afghanistan. After the initial efforts, it took a pause and then made contributions to the ISAF but demurred on the invasion of Iraq. Afghanistan came to be the primary activity of the CAF in the decade, and Canadians have a lasting memory of the approximately 160 soldiers that fell there. Europe came to be seen in Canadian circles as a relative zone of peace, and as a result, NATO ought to focus its efforts on out-​of-​area missions pertaining to collective security. This also reinforced the enthusiasm for à la carte collective security endeavors.30 This would allow Canada to address its concerns about influence and prosperity. Yet more recent events, such as the Russian seizure of Crimea and NATO’s assurance measures, have brought NATO back to its original purpose of being a collective defense organization. From 2014 on, CAF elements deployed to Europe to reassure eastern allies. A year later, working with some allies in a

Canada and NATO  41 non-​NATO training mission, the deployments increased to include Ukraine. Most recently, Canada took on a lead nation role in Latvia. While none of these commitments are as numerous as their forerunners, they do represent a signal to reassure allies and partners that Canada is not going to abandon them. They are also evidence of “soft-​balancing Atlanticism.”31 This begs the question of what is being done about “continental bandwagoning.”32 The answer to that appears in the 2017 White Paper on defense, which increased Canadian defense spending by altering accounting practices to match those used by a number of NATO member states, i.e., the inclusion of spending on paramilitary forces and some human resource costs, which were not previously reported for NATO purposes. The effect of this was to put Canada in median of NATO member states for spending in 2017, with the promise of spending more as time progressed.33 This, of course, assumes the Canadian public is willing to pay those costs, and the evidence from the 2019 election campaign suggests the Canadian electorate is less interested in questions of foreign and defense policy matters than they are about questions pertaining to economic prosperity, climate change, and health care. Like many of its predecessors, the new government has to contend with competing demands for resources. It would be wrong to present Canadian threat perceptions as a completely coherent and consistent body of thought. A longstanding perception is the possibility of “help,” coming in the form of an ally that opts to take on Canada’s share of the burden whether Ottawa likes it or not. Nils Ørvik coined the phrase “defense against help,” or commitments undertaken to sufficiently mollify concerned allies back into a grudging inaction.34 This concept of “defense against help” emerged around the same time as another, the “capability-​commitment gap,” and the two represent variations on a theme. The long-​term reduction of defense spending was not matched by a reduction of commitments, which led to a perceived gap in Canadian defense circles. Sorenson summarized the situation well at the end of the Cold War by stating that: The multitude of missions for Canadian forces in Germany seems to compare with the larger Canadian military problem –​there are too many missions and not enough forces or resources to perform all of them effectively.35 R.B. Byers distilled the central problem of Canada’s defense issues in the era into the succinct phrase of the “capability–​commitment gap” to identify the mismatch between the ends being sought and the means provided.36 The overall implication is that the Canadian level of commitment relates directly to the perceived level of threat relative to the Alliance’s capabilities. When the threat was greater and the Alliance was less capable, Canadians responded. Since that time, the threat diminished, the Alliance’s capabilities increased, and Canadians sought to focus on domestic matters.

42  James McKay

The quest for a “counterweight” NATO affords the ability for Ottawa to be transatlantic without having to deal with questions of national unity or concerns that Canada has become subordinate to the United States. Prior to the World War II, the “counterweight” was the UK due to Canada’s heritage as a British dominion and trade links associated with the British Empire. In the early Cold War, NATO came to be seen as the new counterweight to the US if the UK was no longer able to do so, and this transition came with little to no domestic criticism.37 What followed in the next 70 years was a deepening of Canada–​US defense cooperation in North America, an initial substantial commitment to the Alliance that declined over time, and a counterweight in an alliance that included much of Western Europe. It may seem odd or even paradoxical that Canada has sought to maintain a counterweight to its closest ally. The US looms large in the Canadian political imagination. In addition to being Canada’s largest trading partner, the US is an ally in a binational military agreement and a series of bilateral military agreements, as well as having similar but not identical cultures. Geography, over time, triumphed over politics. The salience of this idea of a counterweight varied over time. The elder Trudeau’s “Third Option,” itself a partial reaction to the idea that the Alliance was not all that effective as a counterweight in the 1960s, was not as warmly received by some allies as Ottawa would have liked. By the mid-​ 1970s, the Canadian government discovered that the rest of NATO did not share its optimistic view of détente. The argument has been made that the Trudeau government discovered that the counterweight failed to operate the way Ottawa assumed. The EEC expanded to the detriment of old imperial ties but without new trade links to Canada, and European allies grew concerned that the Canadian military contribution had become mere symbolism.38 By 1975, the government shifted away from the “Third Option,” and sought to at least partially rearm its forces in Europe with new tanks purchased from West Germany and with fighter aircraft purchased from the US.39 In 1984 Trudeau’s successor, Brian Mulroney, expended greater efforts in deepening the relationship with the US. What this meant can be summarized as the counterweight required credible Canadian commitments to Europe to actually function; and in such cases, the counterweight worked against Canada’s attempts at expediency.

Connection of foreign and defense policy goals Membership in NATO serves to connect a number of Canada’s foreign and defense policy goals. The lack of a direct threat to Canada has reinforced the expeditionary aspect of Canadian strategic culture and led to the pursuit of other policy goals such prosperity, the maintenance of influence and the promotion of values.

Canada and NATO  43 Canadians tend to conceive of NATO as something where Canada helps its allies and not necessarily the reverse. This is due in part to the lingering sense that Canada is “a fireproof house” and has the great fortune of being an American ally in the defense of North America.40 The last international conflict experienced in eastern North America was approximately 150 ago and predates Canada’s existence. What this does is lead successive governments to pursue relatively consistent policy goals despite their claims to the contrary. Chief amongst these policy goals is the maintenance and enhancement, if possible, of Canada’s economic prosperity. Over the past 70  years, this has meant trade within North America and an increasing interdependence with the United States. As was mentioned earlier, this has had two effects. Ottawa has sought to avoid or mitigate situations that could lead to a reduction of continental trade. Thus, it can be argued that Ottawa is sensitive to Washington’s concerns and policies. Ottawa tends to adopt the strategy of hedging against the effects of economic downturns in North America through the pursuit of free trade agreements with third parties. This, too, has been a form of mitigation but this has been one of the reasons NATO remains important to Canada. Yet, it would be wrong to characterize Canada’s goals as wholly driven by economics. Absent a multilateral collective defense organization like NATO, Canada would remain an American ally, but it would be forever cast as the junior partner of the US. Membership in NATO allows it to take on leadership roles that it might not be able to do in bilateral arrangements. The US has been a magnanimous ally over the years in ensuring roles for Canadian military leaders in binational structures like NORAD, but it has not been so obliged. NATO affords, as Sokolsky pointed out, “a seat at the table.”41 What this has meant is that Canada has enjoyed a sense of being able to influence its fellow NATO members despite modest contributions. Being part of NATO also allows Canada to work with countries with similar political philosophies and systems –​liberal democracies that support the rule of law. Canada supported the idea of expanding NATO in part as it meant increasing the number of democracies. It also supported NATO’s efforts to behave more like a collective security organization for similar reasons; spreading values shared by Canada has been an interest to successive governments.

Conclusion The variances in Canada’s commitments are explained well through the combination of threat perception (a view of the international environment) and domestic political demands. As a result, neoclassical realism affords a powerful explanation of Canada’s behavior toward NATO. The Canadian approach to NATO has been largely successful, but this may not hold in the near future. The Trump administration has increased the degree of pressure on those member states that have yet to meet the pledge made at the Wales

44  James McKay Summit in 2014 over the past years. It can be argued that this has increased the number of member states that meet the pledge.42 The challenge is that this creates a form of zero-​sum game with the Canadian federal budget. At the risk of a simplistic “guns versus butter” argument, if the government wishes to resolve the matter to preserve its level of influence, it then must engage in one of the following to be capable of meeting the pledge made in 2014: (1) an increase in deficit spending when they created the domestic political expectation that they would decrease the deficit; (2) an increase in taxes at the federal level; and/​or (3) it reallocates funding previously allocated to domestic matters. These are all far from insignificant and none of these would occur without voters reacting negatively. While history has shown that Canadians will act in times where the threat is significant, the actions of the Russian Federation do not appear to match the degree of threat posed by the USSR in the 1950s. Thus the Canadian approach going forward, in many ways, is contingent on American politics and its potential effects on the Alliance. The Trump administration has shown a deeper interest in resolving the issue of burden sharing in the Alliance, and due to comments about the possibility that the US might not honor Article 5 commitments for those that have yet to meet the pledge, there is some uncertainty about the American level of commitment. There are two possibilities. The Trump administration either represents an anomaly or it is signaling a broader trend in American foreign and defense policy. If it is the former, then there is a time limit to the pressure applied on the country and it will return to the norm of occasional polite comments from visiting official and ambassadors about Washington’s desire for Ottawa to spend more on defense. If it is the latter, then Canada faces a much more significant challenge.

Notes 1 J. Massie and S. Vucetic. “Canadian Strategic Culture from Confederation to Trump.” January 2018 revisions. https://​osf.io/​preprints/​socarxiv/​2ewxg/​download/​. 2 Massie and Vucetic, 8. 3 D. Haglund and T. Onea. “Sympathy for the Devil: Myths of Neoclassical Realism in Canadian Foreign Policy.” Canadian Foreign Policy, 2008: 53–​66. 4 N. Ripsman, J. Taliaferro, and S. Lobell. Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 59. 5 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, 61–​62. 6 A. Bloomfield and K. Nossal. “Towards and Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada.” Contemporary Security Policy, 28, 2 (August 2007): 288. 7 C. Leuprecht and J. Sokolsky. “Defence Policy ‘Walmart Style’: Canadian Lessons in ‘Not-​So-​Grand’ Grand Strategy,” in Going to War?: Trends in Military Interventions, eds. C. Breede and S. Von Hlatky, 195. Kingston: McGill-​Queen’s University Press, 2016. 8 Ibid., 196–​198.

Canada and NATO  45 9 Maloney, 8. See also: A. Moens. “NATO and the EU: Canada’s Security Interests in Europe and Beyond,” in Canada’s National Security in the Post-​9/​11 World, ed. D. McDonough, 141. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012. 10 R. Bothwell. Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World 1945–​1984. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007, 116. 11 S.M. Maloney. “Canadian values and national security policy: who decides?” Policy Options, 6–​7, December 1, 2001. https://​policyoptions.irpp.org/​magazines/​ university-​tenure/​canadian-​values-​and-​national-​security-​policy-​who-​decides/​. See also R. Bothwell. Alliance and Illusion, 237–​259; A.G. Sens. “Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a Changing Alliance.” International Journal 50, 4 (Autumn 1995): 697–​698. 12 Bloomfield and Nossal, 299. 13 J. Massie. “Making sense of Canada’s ‘irrational’ international security policy.” International Journal 64, 3 (Summer 2009): 627. 14 D. McDonough. “Getting It Just Right: Strategic Culture, Cybernetics, and Canada’s Goldilocks Grand Strategy.” Comparative Strategy, 32, 3 (2013): 227–​228, 230–​233, 236. 15 D. Haglund and S. Roussel. “Is the Democratic Alliance a Ticket to (Free) Ride? Canada’s ‘Imperial Commitments’, from the Interwar Period to the Present.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 5, 1 (2007): 5–​6. 16 R.J. Sutherland. “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation.” International Journal (Summer 1962): 207. See also: P. Dobell. “Europe: Canada’s last chance.” International Journal, (March 1972): 113–​114. 17 Bothwell, 7, 39, 57; D. Haglund. “The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: (Geo) Political Metaphor and the Logic of Canadian Foreign Policy.” The American Review of Canadian Studies, Summer 1999: 212–​213 and 223–​225. 18 Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, 70–​71. 19 Section VI, Canadian Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982, https://​laws-​lois.justice. gc.ca/​eng/​const/​page-​4.html#h-​17. 20 See note 7 above. 21 Leuprecht and Sokolsky, in Breede and Von Hlatky (eds.), 207. 22 Bothwell, 65–​71, and Sens, 696–​697. See also: D. Morton. “Defending the indefensible: some historical perspectives on Canadian defence 1867–​1987.” International Journal, XLII (Autumn 1987): 636; J. Massie. “United West, divided Canada? Transatlantic (dis)unity and Canada’s Atlanticist strategic culture.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 8, 2 (June 2010): 121. 23 J. Jockel and J. Sokolsky. “Canada and NATO.” International Journal, June 2009: 321. See also R. Haycock and M. Hennessy. “The Road from Innocence: Canada and the Cold War, 1945 to 1963,” in The Canadian Way of War: Serving National Interest, ed. B. Horn. Toronto: Dundurn, 2006, 241. 24 See note 2 above. 25 Jockel and Sokolsky, 316–​317. 26 Data sourced from “Population estimates quarterly,” Statistics Canada, www.150. statcan.gc.ca/​t1/​tbl1/​en/​tv.action?pid=1710000901. 27 Bothwell, 93–​95. 28 “We live in a fireproof house” were part of Canadian Senator Raoul Dandurand’s remarks to the fifth assembly of the League of Nations in 1924. See A. Chapnick. “On Protocols and Fireproof Houses: The Re-​ emergence of Canadian Exceptionalism.” International Journal, Summer 2006: 713–​723.

46  James McKay 29 Bothwell, 286. 30 See note 2 above. 31 Massie, “Making sense of Canada’s ‘irrational’ international security policy,” 627. 32 Ibid. 33 “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010–​2017),” PR/​CP (2017) 111, www. nato.int/​nato_​static_​fl2014/​assets/​pdf/​pdf_​2017_​06/​20170629_​170629-​pr2017-​ 111-​en.pdf. See also: Government of Canada, Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017, http://​dgpaapp. forces.gc.ca/​en/​canada-​defence-​policy/​docs/​canada-​defence-​policy-​report.pdf, 46. 34 For a thoughtful commentary on the concept, see: P. Lagassé. “Nils Ørvik’s ‘defence against help’.” International Journal, Spring 2010: 463–​474. For the original, see: N. Ørvik. “Defence against help: A strategy for small states?,” Survival, 15, 5 (1973): 228–​231. 35 D. Sorenson. “Canadian Military Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in Canada and NATO: Uncertain Past, Uneasy Future, eds. M. McMillan and D. Sorenson, 70. Waterloo: University of Waterloo Press, 1990. 36 R.B. Byers. “Canada’s Challenges.” Adelphi Paper No. 214, London: IISS, 1986, 3. See also: D. McDonough. “Grand Strategy, Culture and Strategic Choice: A Review.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 13, 4 (Summer 2011): 9. 37 Jockel and Sokolsky, 316–​317. 38 Jockel and Sokolsky, 326. See also: D. Barry and D. Bratt. “Defense Against Help: Explaining Canada-​U.S. Security Relations.” American Review of Canadian Studies, 2008: 74–​75. 39 Bothwell, 382–​383. 40 Chapnick, “On protocols and fireproof houses,” 713–​723. 41 J. Sokolsky. “A Seat at the Table: Canada and Its Allies.” Armed Forces & Society, 16, 1 (1989): 11–​35. 42 NATO. Wales Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Cardiff, September 5, 2014. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​official_​texts_​112964.htm.

3  The UK in NATO London’s transatlantic bargain and the dilemmas of Brexit Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora

Introduction In December 2019, NATO allies gathered in London to mark the 70th anniversary of the Alliance. Britain’s offer to host the event in their capital not only symbolized a return to the origins of the Atlantic Alliance,1 but also served to underline the country’s enduring support for NATO. Historically, the United Kingdom (UK) has proven to be among the most NATO-​ enthusiastic European member countries. Yet, the 2016 Brexit referendum on leaving the EU casts a looming shadow on Britain’s commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. While leaving the EU does not directly impact the UK’s membership in NATO, the decision of June 2016 nonetheless shook the foundations of Britain’s geopolitical role, and consequently its position within the Alliance. In conjunction with the outspoken criticisms of NATO raised by the leaders of key allies, including the US and France, Brexit raises fundamental questions about “the future strength, cohesion, and very credibility of NATO.”2 Since the referendum, successive British governments have reassured the allies that the UK’s commitment to NATO, in context of a “Transatlanticist” view of European defense and security, will not wind down. The “Global Britain” outlook, the foreign policy leitmotif of Theresa May’s and Boris Johnson’s cabinets, indicates that the country will not withdraw from the international stage, but instead will seek to enhance its perceived role on the global stage through various venues of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. NATO engagement will represent a core element of this new orientation of UK foreign and security policy. As this chapter posits, this is driven primarily by two necessities:  firstly, ensuring a continued US commitment to Europe’s defense so that UK’s resources can be sufficiently emancipated from European commitments; and secondly, safeguarding a “special relationship” with Washington, hence keeping a uniquely influential role vis-​à-​vis the Western hegemon. As we argue, this perception of the transatlantic bargain has been a central factor in the formulation of UK’s security and defense policy throughout the Cold War and post-​Cold War periods, and it will likely be even more strongly embedded in the UK’s post-​Brexit strategic calculus.

48  Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora As most analyses on contemporary British security and defense policy acknowledge, Brexit does interrogate whether the UK will maintain its existing commitments to NATO, particularly in terms of regional defense and deterrence postures.3 A more global outlook indeed seems to indicate a trajectory away from the increasingly institutionalized and integrated EU–​ NATO frameworks. Additionally, enduring budgetary concerns could shrink Britain’s defense posture and undercut its interest and ability to contribute to global security. However, as we argue, these concerns are offset by a continued political and material commitment to the Alliance, beginning with Cameron’s Warsaw Summit declaration two weeks after the referendum and upheld by the May and Johnson governments. In fact, the pressures and uncertainties produced by Brexit are likely to reinforce the UK’s emphasis on the transatlantic bargain and its efforts to strengthen the special relationship as a basis for its NATO engagement. The study of the UK’s role in NATO’s post-​Cold War transformation as well as its future NATO policy should be contextualized in the evolution of the British declination of the transatlantic bargain. As the Introduction to this volume suggests, the Atlantic Alliance is the result of a summative agreement between the US and European allies to organize Europe’s defense and security architecture, as well as several individual national bargains which informed each member’s interest in joining NATO.4 The first section of this chapter will sketch the foundations of the bargain from the British point of view and its evolution since the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the second section draws out the extent and nature of the UK’s current commitments to NATO. The final section discusses the factors affecting the UK’s role, interest, and position within NATO in the present and the foreseeable future, ranging from its perspective of emerging security threats to the domestic foundations of British defense policy, emphasizing the effects of Brexit on the contemporary British view of, and contribution to, the Alliance.

The British version of the transatlantic bargain The UK was the keenest among Europeans to embed Washington in Europe’s postwar security order, and its early foreign policy choices heavily influenced the original design of the Alliance. The breakdown of British rule in Palestine and India in 1946–​1947, the dire financial conditions the HM Treasury versed in since the end of Land-​Lease, and the predominantly inward-​looking attitude of the Attlee government indicated that Britain could not guarantee the security of both Europe and its Empire. British diplomacy was decisive, first, in gathering American support for the Treaty of Brussels, and then in permanently tying the US to Europe through the Washington Treaty. When Lord Ismay stated that the purpose of the Alliance was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down,” his words resonated with the British foreign policy establishment.5

The UK in NATO  49 In addition to the cumulative transatlantic bargain, the UK too envisioned its own version of the bargain, tailored to its own interests and values, in two constitutive considerations. First, the UK wanted US participation in European defense to provide an effective deterrent to Soviet expansionism, so that some British military assets would be available to maintain its position as a global power.6 US commitment in fact allowed Britain to maintain an extra-​European orientation, toward the largest of the “three circles” that Churchill theorized as the keystones of British foreign policy: first, the colonial holdings, later reenvisioned as the Commonwealth; second, Europe; and third, the US and the Anglo-​American “special relationship.”7 This “strongest of partnerships” became more deeply embedded after the Suez crisis of 1956. While France drew from this experience the conclusion that the US could not be trusted, the Macmillan government developed the concept of Anglo-​American interdependence and the “ ‘hug them close’ mantra” that characterizes British policy toward the US to the present.8 If such special bond were maintained, London could enhance its global role by exerting more influence in Washington than any other partner in the world.9 While the transatlantic bargain, including the UK’s version of it, has in its essence remained substantially unaltered, its implementation has been a continuous source of friction.10 During the Cold War, the UK’s initial refusal and subsequent stalling of the European integration process exacerbated Washington’s dismay at the inability of Europeans to organize themselves. The “special relationship” was also shaken by episodes such as the British refusal to commit militarily to the Vietnam War, divisions over the Yom Kippur War, and the shock over US invasion of Grenada as a member of the Commonwealth.11 Yet, it was with the end of the Cold War that pressure for renegotiation of the “special relationship” mounted. As the demise of the Soviet threat threw the very existence of the Atlantic Alliance into question, the two aforementioned pillars of British security posture risked disappearing, threatening a major upset of British security. Hence, at the end of the Cold War, two necessities emerged that British policymakers from both Conservative and Labor governments had to jostle with. First, the risk of NATO’s demise loomed larger than ever. If the Alliance were to come to an end, and the US withdrew its commitment to Europe, Britain would have to take up most of the burden for Europe’s security. This scenario would likely entail giving up its perceived status as a global power. Additionally, the UK political establishment aimed at cashing in the “peace dividend” to redirect resources elsewhere. Hence, the UK policy establishment made the case for the continued relevance of NATO, which entailed endorsing the transformation of the Alliance as well as of Britain’s defense postures. Its various new defense and security doctrines, summarized in Table 3.1, display these concerns. While each review is the product of various strategic visions, we can identify some recurring threads tracing back to the adaptation of NATO and the transatlantic bargain. One such theme is the adaptation of armed forces

50  Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora Table 3.1 UK defense reviews and white papers after the Cold War Year

Title

Key message

1990

“Options for Change” Review “Front Line First” Defense Cost Study Strategic Defence Review (SDR)

Revise force structure to reduce defense costs while maintaining capabilities for action. Adopt an expeditionary approach to warfare.

1994 1998 2003/​ 2004 2010

2015

“Delivering Security in a Changing World” White Paper Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and National Security Strategy (NSS) SDSR/​NSSa

2018

National Security Capability Review (NSCR)

2020

SDSR/​NSSb

Enhance for readiness for international deployment in crisis response, including through the new Joint Rapid Reaction Force. Update defense planning to emphasize the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Reduce defense budget, develop a risk-​based approach to security, in the absence of immediate threats. Restructure armed forces over ten-​year period with defense forces “international by design.” Enhance commitment to new (JEF) and existing (NATO) multinational structures, and develop Future Force posture (2015–​2025) in light of a resurgence of State-​based threats, cyber, terrorism, and threats to international liberal order. Establish Fusion Doctrine as a new national security doctrine integrating security, economic and influence capabilities, and enhance strategic efficiency and business modernization (Modernizing Defence Program). Announced topics: change MOD procurement models; enhancement of UK’s cyber-​security capabilities and replacement of EU schemes; tackling serious and organized crime.

Source: Compiled by the authors.c Notes a  The first Cameron government introduced the practice of issuing a new SDSR/​ NSS at the start of every new five-​year parliamentary cycle. See P.  Porter. “Between Theory and Practice:  Britain and the Use of Force’, in NATO’s European Allies, eds. J.H. Matlary and M. Petersson. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. b At the time the book goes to press, the publication of the SDSR has been postponed due to the onset of the Covid-​19 pandemic. c  S. Croft and A.  Dorman. Britain and Defence 1945–​ 2000:  A Policy Re-​ Evaluation. Oxford: Routledge, 2001; M. Codner. “Fighting for Peace, 1991–​2001’, in Wars in Peace: British Military Operations Since 1991, 32. London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Books, 2014. https://​ r usi.org/​ p ublication/​ r usi-​ b ooks/​ wars-​ p eace- ​ b ritish- ​ m ilitary- ​ o perations- ​ 1 991; P.  Cornish and A.  Dorman. “Complex Security and Strategic Latency:  The UK Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015.” International Affairs 91, 2 (2015):  351–​ 370; UK Government. National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, NSS/​SDSR 2015. https://​assets.publishing.service. gov.uk/​government/​uploads/​system/​uploads/​attachment_​data/​file/​478933/​52309_​Cm_​9161_​ NSS_​SD_​Review_​web_​only.pdf; D. Sabbagh. “Johnson Unveils Major Review of Foreign and Defence Policy.” The Guardian. February 25, 2020. www.theguardian.com/​politics/​2020/​feb/​25/​ johnson-​unveils-​major-​review-​of-​foreign-​and-​defence-​policy.

The UK in NATO  51 to a new set of threats, moving away from traditional deterrence postures to a slimmer, integrated, multitask expeditionary force, and integrating of military and nonmilitary means, such as most recently through the “Fusion Doctrine.”12 The changing force posture has also been in line with further integration of UK armed forces within NATO, given the assumption that the Alliance will only endure through adaptation. A second recurring thread is therefore the enhanced role of multilateralism, and strengthening NATO’s institutional structure while developing alternative but complementary fora of European and subregional security cooperation. The 2015 SDSR, for instance, introduced “defense engagement” with allies as a core military task for the first time, ensuring that partnerships would become “central to all that we do.”13 Additionally, British reviews emphasize a cost-​effective use of defense forces, while maintaining the 2 percent defense spending target and a defense policy “international by design.”14 A second necessity that British governments faced in the post-​Cold War period was, and still is, to maintain the US–​UK special relationship. As assumed, if the partnership were to wind down, the UK would lose its influence within Washington, together with wider geopolitical influence as well as its ability to “mediate” between the US and Europe.15 The Yugoslav Wars seriously questioned the UK and other European armies’ ability to effectively respond to crises in the European neighborhood and wage high-​end, short wars.16 The “Dayton humiliation” revealed that London’s ability to influence Washington, taken for granted by most commentators, depended on what force the British could bring to bear in support of the Americans in a crisis.17 In fact, the Bosnian crisis generated doubt in the UK’s ability to generate sufficient force in support of US-​led out-​of-​area operations, potentially undermining London’s influence in Washington. At first, the Blair government’s effort to reinvigorate the special relationship took the form of ideological repositioning. On April 22, 1999, in a speech to the Chicago Council on World Affairs, the Prime Minister announced the “Blair Doctrine” of humanitarian interventionism. High-​ end operations would be carried out to foment democratization and prevent human rights abuses. In these new wars, Blair argued, the UK would prove an equal partner of the US.18 The Kosovo crisis presented the UK with a chance to vindicate the Dayton humiliation, with British forces leading NATO’s KFOR operation and committing 28,000 ground troops.19 The following year, the success of Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone seemed to prove that the Blair Doctrine could indeed provide the basis for a new British role in the world, with a rebalancing of the UK–​US relationship.20 The ideological affinity between British and American administrations pushed Blair to back US President Bush’s expeditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, in the latter case counter to the preferences of other European capitals, notably Paris and Berlin. In the context of the Iraq split, London showed a preference for maintaining the “special relationship” over advancing the European defense project, despite the latter experiencing a new momentum since the St. Malo Declaration in 1998.21

52  Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora Afghanistan and Iraq ultimately showcased the limitations and shortsightedness of the UK defense and security narrative of the late 1990s. The 2011 Chilton Report revealed a poor grasp of the design and execution of strategy at the very highest levels of civil service.22 UK troops found themselves overstretched and bogged down in two theatres for over a decade. Belief in the effectiveness of “early in, early out” campaigns generated a misbelief that military success could achieve broader political objectives. Operation Herrick, for example, assumed a counterinsurgency mandate, but it lacked the means and the resources necessary for such a type of operations.23 At the same time in which the Chilton Report revealed the flaws of the Iraqi campaign and the 2010 SDSR suggested strategic retrenchment, the Libyan crisis of 2011 prompted the UK into another military adventure. With Cameron’s aspirations to demonstrate leadership among the European forces to the US, Britain and France rushed to command Operation Unified Protector, with weaker military means than in previous years due to budget cuts, and without a clear political strategy. The post-​intervention state of affairs was little less chaotic than in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, and was worsened by the immediate withdrawal of NATO forces after enforcement of the no-​fly zone seized.24 Despite British aspirations to demonstrate strength and resolve, to American leaders the intervention in Libya showcased “the result of years of underinvestment in defense by even our closest allies,” further weakening the special relationship.25 Given these setbacks, the remaining way in which Britain could reconcile reducing defense spending while improving Britain’s position in the transatlantic bargain was by highlighting its indispensable role as a bridge between the US and Europe. The NATO Summit of 2014, hosted in Wales in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, represented a new opportunity for showcasing this role. Britain agreed to uphold the 2 percent of GDP investment pledge, and took up new responsibilities in the context of NATO’s eFP with new defense cooperation initiatives discussed further below.26 Furthermore, the Cameron government reclaimed some of the cuts promised in the 2010 SDSR, announcing the retentions of the two new Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers.27 In follow-​up to the Wales Summit, the Cameron government issued a new SDSR/​NSS in 2015. The fundamental goals replicated those of the 2010 SDSR, with emphasis on interoperability and participation in collective multinational operations.28 However, in contrast to the 2010 fixation on budget cuts and reduction in overseas security commitments, the 2015 SDSR highlighted a rapidly changing security landscape with a new threat of Russian revisionism posing a direct threat to the UK, as demonstrated by the poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018. The Salisbury attacks put a further strain on bilateral relations between the UK and Russia with particular resonance in view of prior cases of Russian aggression on British soil, such as the murder of former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko in London in

The UK in NATO  53 2006.29 That there were “no major defense challenges to the UK in the immediate short term” was less and less credible, rendering defense cuts advocated for in the 2010 SDSR untenable.30 The narrowly decided referendum to leave the EU generated major uncertainty about Britain’s role in the world and the regional institutional architecture. NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, which took place two weeks after the referendum, was the first forum in which the UK would showcase post-​Brexit diplomacy. Then Prime Minister David Cameron attended the Summit with a key mission to reassure Allies of Britain’s commitment to transatlantic security:  “While Britain may be leaving the European Union, we are not withdrawing from the world, nor are we turning our back on Europe or on European security.”31 To exhibit the UK’s continuing commitment to NATO, Britain’s defense spending and force contribution pledges made at the 2014 Wales Summit were significantly expanded. Theresa May and Boris Johnson followed suit, reiterating Britain’s commitment to NATO in spite of Brexit both at 2018 Brussels and 2019 London Summits, and in strategic documents such as the 2018 NSCR and the announced 2020 SDSR. In short, in the post-​Cold War period London never questioned the centrality of NATO and of the special relationship. The development of the UK’s defense posture shows an enduring commitment to the Alliance, even as the “peace dividend” and the financial crisis put a strain on defense budgets, and operational inadequacies undermined Britain’s perceived worth as a partner on the field. To a certain extent, this consistency results from path dependency: the transatlantic partnership and the special relationship have become deeply embedded in UK foreign, security and defense policy to such an extent that no alternatives are explored or seriously considered. This is why, in the aftermath of the referendum, British policymakers rushed to reassure NATO allies, and to a certain extent, themselves, that the UK was not scaling back its commitments to the Alliance and to the world. The next section will explore how this fundamental feature of UK security policy translates into the current British commitments to the Alliance.

Enhanced capabilities and continued commitment: the UK in NATO today The 2015 SDSR and the follow-​up NSCR set the tone for the UK’s current force structure and contributions to NATO, by emphasizing the immediacy of threats rather than a risk-​based approach.32 In line with the British transatlantic bargain’s embedded focus on multilateral security and defense cooperation, it gave a central role to partnerships and alliances, especially NATO. Table 3.2 summarizes the current extent of British commitments in NATO. In addition, the 2015 SDSR introduced “defense engagement” as a core military task for the first time, ensuring that partnerships would become “central to all that we do.”33

54  Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora Table 3.2 Current UK contributors to NATO Issue

Examples of contributions

Defense spending

Meeting thresholds of 2 percent of GDP dedicated to defense spending and of 20 percent of it invested in defense innovation Maintaining British role as DSACEUR and hosting MARCOM based in Northwood Providing a nuclear-​at-​sea deterrent through Operation Relentless Leading the JEF, supporting the RAP, and EFP as a VJTF framework nation

Command structure Nuclear deterrence Defense and deterrence postures

Source: Compiled by the authors.

To maintain defense commitments vis-​à-​vis NATO, this engagement takes place through three primary avenues: 1 Provision of personnel to NATO standing commands and force structures. 2 Capabilities and personnel to support NATO-​led operations and exercises. 3 Commitment of troops and equipment to HRF, such as the VJTF, the NATO Maritime HRF, and the NRF.34 The UK’s ability to ensure these commitments inevitably concerns the question of defense spending and burden sharing. Despite the curbing of defense spending, the UK has maintained the Alliance’s second largest defense budget, the largest among NATO’s European allies and the fifth largest armed forces, providing an estimated 12–​14 percent of all NATO capability.35 And, as Figure 3.1 shows, the UK remains one of the few member states (nine as of 2019) meeting both the 2 percent pledge on defense spending and the requirement of investing at least 20 percent of defense expenditure on equipment. The UK’s continued engagement in NATO has been enabled through a relatively high standing in the Alliance’s command structure. The country hosts two NATO Headquarters  –​the Allied Maritime Command and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps  –​as well as the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre and Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff. The UK also holds the post of DSACEUR who, under the Berlin-​ Plus arrangement, commands EU operations within the CSDP framework using NATO headquarters.36 As one of three nuclear powers in the Alliance, the UK plays a central role in maintaining NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture. Operation Relentless, representing “the longest sustained military operation ever undertaken by the UK,” preserves a continuous at-​sea submarine nuclear deterrent since 1969.37 Often cited as the “foremost among the UK capabilities valued by the US,” the nuclear deterrent is also a key factor for the UK–​US special

Equipment expenditure as % of defence expenditure

The UK in NATO  55 % 65 NATO guideline 2%

Median 1.67%

60

BGR

55 50

LUX

45

SVK

40

TUR

35 NOR

30 25

ESP

20

HUN NLD ITA

FRA

DNK DEU ALB PRT

15

CZE

CAN

BEL

10

SVN

5

LTU ROU

USA Median 21.53%

LVA/POL GBR

NATO guideline 20%

EST MNE

GRC

HRV

0 0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5 2.0 2.5 Defence expenditure as % of GDP

3.0

3.5

4.0 %

Figure 3.1 NATO defense expenditure, 2019. Source: NATO Defense expenditure of NATO countries (2013–​2019). November 29, 2019. www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_171356.htm, 2.

relationship.38 However, the status of the UK’s contributions to the nuclear deterrent are highly uncertain in the face of a possible Brexit-​induced second Scottish independence referendum, with potentially substantial constraints to the UK’s access to key facilities such as HMNB Faslane and RNAD Coulport.39 Demonstrating leadership in the maritime domain, enabled through continued investment in maritime capabilities, has been a key aspect of UK’s transatlantic engagement. Apart from hosting the MARCOM, the British Navy conventionally holds the corresponding maritime commander post, retaining operational command of NATO’s Standing Naval Forces and maritime operations.40 Additional commitments in this domain include the British lead of the biannual Joint Warrior multinational naval exercise, contributions to the Standing NATO Maritime Group, and support of NATO efforts in patrolling the North Atlantic and countering a growing presence and revisionism of the Russian Navy in that area.41 Recent efforts to advance the development and adoption of uncrewed and autonomous capabilities, including in the maritime domains, signal the UK’s potential to lead at the forefront of similar NATO defense innovation initiatives. Turning toward the UK’s priorities for NATO, in line with the Alliance-​ wide shift to countering the Russian threat, the UK has actively participated

56  Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora in adapting defense and deterrence strategies for the Eastern flank. Notably, British forces have “taken a leading role” in the RAP and the VJTF configurations forming the core of NATO’s eFP.42 In cooperation with Estonia, the UK currently acts as one of the framework nations for eFP battle groups.43 The 2014 Wales Summit also endorsed the UK-​led JEF, which incorporates troops from seven contributing nations embedded under British command.44 Though not as such integrated into the NATO architecture, JEF has direct relevance of NATO through its work toward strengthening interoperability and improving defense engagement, as well as providing an option for the use of JEF’s operational capacity for NATO formations and “sub-​ Article-​5” operations.45 The JEF puts on display several aspects of UK’s contemporary NATO policy: firstly, it serves as a reassurance tool vis-​à-​vis smaller Allies. Its multinational nature as a UK-​led contingency force for short-​notice operations allows “for smaller states that can no longer sustain even modest crisis management operations for more than a few days, rapid access to allied consultations and reinforcements is of the utmost importance.”46 Secondly, a particular emphasis placed on the Northern Group coalition within the JEF demonstrates a continued interest of Nordic and Baltic states in increasing military cooperation with British forces, as well as the strategic importance attached to the region from the UK’s perspective.47 While the emphasis on interoperability and engagement can be interpreted as mitigating the reduction in defense budgets, multinational cooperation in expeditionary operations in the JEF framework is seen not as necessary, but desirable. The initiation of JEF therefore also aimed at maintaining existing relationships with like-​ minded partners.48 Fourthly, with JEF designed to “meet the [UK’s] NATO obligations,”49 the force undeniably seeks to demonstrate the UK’s ability to meet such obligations and provide leadership in European defense and security affairs to the US, which has been increasingly critical of the scope of Europe’s contributions to its own defense. This is in line with the UK’s post-​2014 aim to de facto “lead by example” in meeting the standards of burden-​sharing, in contrast to the post-​2010 SDSR focus on reducing defense spending. In the context of the Obama and Trump Administrations’ vocal criticism of Allies not meeting the agreed standards, this has become a signal of “the willingness on the part of London to recognize that the United States will no longer accept the status quo when it comes to Europe’s continued reluctance to invest in defense.”50 The extent and nature of the UK’s commitments to NATO, in terms of defense spending, contributions to the permanent command structure, as well as participation in operations and other initiatives, reflect the key aspects of UK foreign and security policy identified in the historical overview. Firstly, certain aspects of Britain’s NATO participation such as the nuclear deterrent and intelligence sharing are upheld in part due to their key role in the context of the special relationship. Secondly, fostering bilateral and multilateral

The UK in NATO  57 partnerships, such as those with the UK’s northern allies, and spearheading regional initiatives such as the JEF, are accentuated, partly to demonstrate the continued leading role London plays in NATO’s adaptation, and partly to counterbalance the effects of Brexit. Continued participation in the NATO adaptation process, including reinforced defense and deterrence postures to address emerging threats, also speak to the emphasis on adaptation and interoperability in the UK’s security and strategic reviews. The following section examines the potential effects of Brexit on this continuity, showing that these trends are likely to be reinforced in the context of the UK’s post-​Brexit NATO policy.

Beyond the EU: prospects for the post-​Brexit UK role in NATO Prior to the 2016 referendum, NATO Secretary General expressed skepticism about the effects of a potential Brexit on preventing the fragmentation of cooperation in an unstable security environment.51 Subsequent reactions from Stoltenberg were aimed at minimizing such impact, stressing that the UK’s position in NATO would not change. Theresa May and Boris Johnson’s subsequent efforts to “get Brexit done” while safeguarding the UK’s position in NATO seem to have been successful thus far, with the aforementioned decision to host the upcoming NATO Summit in London speaking to the strength of the British position.52 Nevertheless, while institutionally speaking Britain’s position in NATO has not changed, Brexit is both directly and indirectly significant for the extent and structure of the UK’s defense engagement, for its role in and contributions to the Alliance, and for its national version of the transatlantic bargain. Cameron’s Warsaw speech set the tone for efforts to mitigate the Brexiteer anti-​institutionalist and isolationist image. Theresa May’s Conservative government encapsulated this message by introducing the “Global Britain” framework. Global Britain undeniably aims leverage several distinct aspects of British foreign and security policy, including historically constructed global military and diplomatic expertise and relations with local partners which the UK utilizes to project power and influence globally.53 At the same time, London faces numerous challenges in setting a new foreign policy orientation. Persistent rhetorical references to Global Britain have first and foremost been said to lack specificity of a genuine foreign and security policy direction, risking the perception of the concept as style over substance and a “superficial branding exercise.”54 The foreign policy turn also stands in a somewhat paradoxical contrast to the anti-​globalism underpinning Brexit, predicting intense scrutiny from the public as to the compatibility of global engagement with preserving British sovereignty and national interest. The EU withdrawal process as such is also said to consume a vast majority of Foreign Office resources, putting the realization of “Global Britain” further in question.55 It is these and other factors that lead some experts to conclude that “the UK will need to balance its desire to use Brexit as an opportunity to deepen

58  Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora its influence as a global power with its continuing interest in the security and stability in Europe.”56 In attempting to strike such a balance between global and regional interests and commitments, the UK is likely to attempt to benefit from various assets including an “internationalist political culture, continuing high levels of resource commitment, and [a]‌permanent seat on the UNSC.”57 The reorientation of foreign and security policy under “Global Britain” also builds on the historically strong support from the UK for the US vision of NATO as an essentially “expeditionary alliance capable of delivering security where needed.”58 Despite recent UK contributions made to regional defense and deterrence posturing on the Eastern flank, Eastern European allies can be expected to feel the need of an assured continued British engagement in the region.59 New discourse such as “Global Britain” has the potential of signaling that “small nations might look to internationalize any dispute in order to obtain Britain’s, and, by extension, America’s backing.”60 For now, the British military characterizes Eastern Europe as one of key strategic areas for Allied security and therefore British interests,61 and with continuing participation of British forces in various NATO structures and exercises in the region the impact of a globalized security and defense outlook post-​Brexit may be more limited. It is however possible to say that in contrast to the pre-​2014 era, the UK is more likely to characterize regional threats as genuinely salient to its security and national interest, with Russian revisionism demonstrating direct impact on British soil and the changing nature of space with new anti-​access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities, as well as the cyber, artificial intelligence, and other information technologies redefining the meaning of spatial distance in security and defense policy.62 In terms of capabilities, existing research points to the limited short-​term impact of Brexit on conventional military capabilities with a potential detrimental effect in the medium-​to-​long-​term due to the financial and economic costs of Brexit affecting defense spending. As with other aspects of the process though, the precise impact of Brexit on the defense budget and military capabilities is uncertain, with some experts noting that “strong performance might result in increased spend on defense and a bolstering of Britain’s military assets in line with post-​Brexit levels of ambition.”63 Brexit may therefore counterintuitively accelerate the growing trend in recent years toward “a more visible contribution by UK defense to the wider ‘prosperity agenda’ and global influence.”64 The clearest potential impact of Brexit on UK’s position in the NATO command structure is the loss of Britain’s traditional hold of the DSACEUR post. As the UK will no longer participate in the CSDP or other EU structures, the question remains to what extent a British commander could carry out the responsibilities of the DSACEUR post. Given the seniority of the DSACEUR, various commentary points to the fact that the issue represents “a clear message that the UK’s influence within NATO cannot be entirely ring-​fenced from the consequences of Brexit.”65 At the same time,

The UK in NATO  59 the possibility of creating a second DSACEUR position or exchanging the current post with the role of Chief of Staff has indicated that the substantive impact for UK’s standing in NATO is likely to be relatively limited.66 The appointment of General Tim Radford as DSACEUR in April 2020 signals that, so far, the status quo holds, but the future remains uncertain.67 In line with the post-​2010 trend, the exit from the EU is overall likely to increase British appetite for transatlantic security cooperation and increasing participation in NATO structures and initiatives. The continued skepticism concerning Brexit’s effect on defense capabilities and the UK’s standing in NATO is likely to strengthen the UK’s efforts to keep the US engaged in European security affairs to mitigate said challenges. As mentioned previously, the Brexit vote has also made initiatives such as JEF seem even more important to both Britain and its allies and partners. An increased future investment in JEF-​like formats seems likely as it would represent tangible proof of Britain’s continued engagement with European multilateralism.68 JEF is particularly well-​suited to fit NATO’s new emphasis on defending the Northern flank, with a view to the Arctic which is one of the areas of geopolitical competition mentioned in the 2019 Summit declaration. In making and fostering contributions to transatlantic security such as JEF, the UK seeks to benefit from a number of factors that have characterized its foreign and security policy apparatus, including a historically global and transatlantic outlook which allows it to transcend divisions between allies advocating for a stronger eastern-​or southern-​ flank commitments, and robust military and diplomatic expertise which gives the UK valuable insight into a wide array of policy and strategic issue areas.69 In light of Brexit it is, however, not a question of capability as much as a question of commitment for the future of UK’s defense engagement. As such, initiatives such as JEF are perceived as counterbalancing the potential negative effects of Brexit on the UK’s participation in transatlantic security and defense. While JEF is an example of this in a multilateral setting, it also speaks to the UK’s appetite for strengthening bilateral engagements with established partners which share the UK’s worldview and strategic outlook. As much as JEF demonstrates a strategic reset from engagements akin to Afghanistan or Iraq toward short expeditionary operations, it is uncertain to what extent the UK would be able to participate in crisis management in support of the US. Even prior to the 2016 referendum, public opinion has been increasingly negative toward participation in operations similar to those in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Libya, and has demonstrated a “public fatigue over wars of choice” making Britain’s participation in such operations in the future more uncertain.70 Though this is not the case with the current Conservative government, the opposition Labor party has previously signaled that any participation in military operations without a UNSC mandate would be blocked. This ties into enduring criticisms of the extent and quality of British contributions to US operations which have put a strain on the UK–​US “special relationship.” Initiatives such as JEF and new pledges to nearly double

60  Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora British troop contributions to the NATO’s training mission in Afghanistan in light of pre-​Brussels summit pressures from the US to improve burden sharing across the Alliance can be partially seen as seeking to counteract these criticisms.71 While the special relationship might suffer with Britain’s departure from the EU reducing its perceived value in the eyes of the US as a friendly voice in the EU policy-​and decision-​making circles, the UK is likely to keep seeking alignment with the US on key strategic issues. Attempting such alignment serves in addition to leveraging instruments such as intelligence sharing and issue contracts for US defense equipment for strengthening the US’ commitment to the special relationship, which the US has regarded in increasingly functionalist terms. As the historical overview showed, the special relationship is built not least on alignment between American and British worldviews, which was strengthened by the recent mutual praise between President Trump and PM Boris Johnson. A possible exception to this may be Russia. The UK has previously made attempts to position itself as an interlocutor between Russia and the West, particularly the US, rather than relying on multinational frameworks such as the EU.72 During the Wales Summit, which pitted Eastern European allies eager to secure maximum possible commitments and countries such as Germany and France who were generally skeptical about making them, the UK served essentially as a consensus builder. As mentioned previously, however, Russian revisionism has increasingly posed direct strategic challenges to British interests, through repeated attempts at violations of British airspace by the Russian military, as well as increased Russian submarine activity in the Atlantic, the Black Sea, and the Northeast.73 With the preservation of the international liberal order among the key elements of British strategic thinking,74 and Russia’s apparent status as a threat to that very order, the likelihood of substantial improvement in UK–​Russia relations remains relatively scarce. In contrast to this, the Trump Administration’s Russia policy continues to be defined by an amalgam of condemnatory statements and sanctions over actions in Ukraine and beyond,75 tensions born out of Russia’s intervention in the 2016 election, and conciliatory rhetoric from President Trump.76 The resulting ambiguity presents a clear contrast between the US and UK views on Russia which is unlikely to be resolved during a Trump Administration. The rise of China has recently made foray into the special relationship. London and Washington have taken a radically different approach to Beijing in the economic arena in recent years, the latter engaging in a trade war whereas the former keeps wooing Chinese investment and in 2015 became the first major Western economy to agree to join the Chinese-​led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. On NATO’s relationship with China, however, the UK and US see eye to eye: they both emphasize the risk posed by China’s encroachment via the BRI in NATO’s immediate neighborhood, have clashed with Beijing over the 2020 National Security Law curtailing Hong Kong’s autonomy,77 and have pushed for the inclusion, in the London Declaration, of

The UK in NATO  61 an acknowledgment of the “opportunities and challenges” posed by China’s increasing global role.78 Given its (mainly economic) interest in not alienating China, on the one hand, and the concerns that Beijing’s increasing interest in Europe’s markets and infrastructure, on the other, Britain could well play its traditional role of bridge between European allies, who are more willing to dialogue with China, while keeping a firm position on certain issues, and the more assertive United States. Overall, the US–​UK “special relationship” is set to remain a cornerstone of British foreign and security policy. A near consensus exists that Britain’s emphasis on bilateral relations with the US is only likely to strengthen following the UK’s departure from the EU, and proponents of Brexit frequently cite the event as an opportunity to strengthen Anglo-​ American cooperation not least in the security realm.79 This is not least due to path dependency. As mentioned in the chapter’s first section Section 1, the fear of isolation as well as reliance on the US in matters of defense and security have had a profound influence on the “British way of war” and strategic thinking.80 In this light, US leadership in NATO is fundamental to the UK’s role within the Alliance as well as its stance on the future of European defense cooperation and EU–​NATO relations.81 Similarly, the US is likely to perceive British support as central, particularly in the context of debates on defense spending and burden sharing.

Conclusion: NATO will be more essential to London The December 2019 electoral victory of the Conservative party has ensured the delivery of Brexit under Boris Johnson’s direction. The nature of Britain’s post-​Brexit relationship with the EU, however, is yet to be determined, both in the economic and security arenas. The 2020 coronavirus pandemic has stalled preparation for the new SDSR, which is now expected for publication in late 2020. The Review should provide some clarification as to how Britain will define its foreign and security policy, its approach to Europe, NATO, and the US, in the post-​Brexit world.82 Much of the discussion in this context will likely depend on two factors: additional budget cuts which might include a more structural overhaul of Ministry of Defense spending and procurement models, and the UK’s evaluation of US foreign policy following the outcome of the 2020 elections, which will impact London’s pursuit of an ever-​stronger US–​UK relationship. Even amidst this uncertainty, however, this chapter suggests some ways in which Britain will continue to approach NATO, based on the long-​term trends in British security and defense policy and London’s version of the transatlantic bargain. Shortly after the 2016 referendum, John Bew argued that in order to transform Brexit into an opportunity, the UK had to be aware of the perils of a “Global Britain” strategy.83 Within this context, in many ways the UK’s contemporary outlook in NATO is fundamentally paradoxical. On the one hand, Brexit has the potential of curtailing the ability of the UK to commit

62  Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora resources and capabilities to NATO. On the other, in light of its withdrawal from the EU and perhaps precisely because of Brexit-​induced constraints on capability development, the UK is likely to enhance the emphasis on retaining Britain’s status within NATO and influence amongst key allies, through multilateral as well as bilateral initiatives.84 As we argue, this emphasis may require striking a balance in the trade-​off between such global activism and making effective contributions to regional security. In doing so, the UK will seek to leverage its “special relationship” with the US, on the basis of two key considerations:  firstly, a perceived necessity to maintain sufficient US involvement in European defense and security in order to free up UK resources for non-​regional engagements; and secondly, an imperative for the UK to ensure continued influence vis-​à-​vis Washington. Unlike its highly ambiguous status in European affairs, there is little doubt that the UK retains a solid position in NATO and transatlantic relations. The post-​Cold War evolution of UK defense posture indicates a continued commitment to the Alliance, and despite the Brexiteer anti-​globalist and anti-​ institutionalist turn in public discourse, London will strife to enhance that status in the near future. This ambition is not likely to be realized without substantial obstacles. In the aftermath of Brexit, UK’s view of and role in NATO may be defined by a number of trade-​offs. The potentially detrimental effect of Brexit on defense spending and military capability may clash with aspirations to enhance the UK’s status in the Alliance through additional commitments, as result of the reputational damage imposed by Brexit. In light of its departure from EU structures, the UK may seek to leverage alternative bilateral as well as multilateral avenues to reinforce its role in the European security architecture, particularly entrenched partnerships and alliances, in addressing existing and emerging security threats in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. The formulation of new foreign policy ambitions in the context of “Global Britain” also has the potential of clashing with these efforts to maintain a strong regional presence in the European security architecture including through NATO-​led defense and deterrence initiatives. In the post-​Afghanistan strategic environment, the need for Allied contributions and participation is likely to remain heavily focused on regional deterrence and forward defense posturing. In sum, the UK’s commitment to NATO in the aftermaths of Brexit is likely to remain strong in the foreseeable future, not least due to the deep embeddedness of NATO and transatlantic cooperation in British strategic culture. Britain’s historically demonstrated enthusiasm for transatlantic solutions, emerging out of the special role that NATO has played in the UK’s foreign and security policy since the World War II, is not likely to suffer. To curb any fears of post-​Brexit isolationism, London has demonstrated its willingness to commit to NATO initiatives, rhetorically as well as materially. As mentioned in the Introduction, the choice of London as the venue for the 2019 Summit served to reinforce this message: even in the paradoxical age of Brexit, the UK remains one of the strongest advocates of the Alliance.

The UK in NATO  63

Notes 1 J. Stoltenberg. “Secretary General: As the World Changes, NATO Will Continue to Change.” Speech at the London NATO Summit, London, December 4, 2019. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​news_​171581.htm. 2 J. Lindley-​French. “One Alliance –​The Future Tasks of the Adapted Alliance.” GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative, 2017, 34. 3 A. Glencross and D. McCourt. “Living Up to a New Role in The World: The Challenges of ‘Global Britain’.” Orbis 62, 4 (2019): 585. 4 S.R. Sloan. NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002; Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama. New York: Continuum, 2010; Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016. 5 G. Lundestad. “American-​European Cooperation and Conflict: Past, Present, and Future,” in No End to Alliance. The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present and Future, 245. New York: Springer, 2016. 6 Sloan, Permanent Alliance, 5. 7 D. Sanders and D.P. Houghton. Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy Since 1945. London: MacMillan International Higher Education, 2016, 2. 8 D. Mash. “The US, BREXIT, and Transatlantic Relations.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 16, 3 (2018): 273. 9 P. Riddell. Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the ‘Special Relationship’. London: Politico’s Publishing Ltd., 2003. 10 Sloan, Permanent Alliance, 5. 11 Mash, “The US, BREXIT, and Transatlantic Relations,” 274. 12 This is exemplified by the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF), tasked with rapid deployment worldwide at short notice. 13 T. Heier. “Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force: A Force of Friends?” in The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, And Partnerships, eds. R. Johnson and J. Matlary. New York: Palgrave, 2019, 190; NSS/​SDSR 2015. 14 L.L. Saxi. “British and German Initiatives for Defence Cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept.” Defence Studies 1, 2 (2017): 173. 15 R. Singh. “Friends without Benefits: The Special Relationship after Brexit.” The American Interest, September 13, 2019. www.the-​american-​interest.com/​2019/​09/​ 13/​friends-​without-​benefits-​the-​special-​relationship-​after-​brexit/​. 16 J.I. Walsh. “Policy Failure and Policy Change: British Security Policy After the Cold War.” Comparative Political Studies 39, 4 (2006): 490. 17 J. Lindley-​French. “UK Military Operations,” in The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces, eds. H. Meijer and M. Wyssin, 6. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 18 Codner, “Fighting for Peace,” 41. 19 Lindley-​French, “UK Military Operations,” 8. 20 Cordner, “Fighting for Peace,” 47. 21 C. Hill. The Future of British Foreign Policy: Security and Diplomacy in a World After Brexit. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019, 87. 22 Independent Iraq Inquiry Report Group, The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, National Archives, 2016. https://​webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/​20171123123237/​www. iraqinquiry.org.uk/​; A. M. Dorman. “The United Kingdom,” in eds. Meijer and Wyssin, The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces, 4–​5.

64  Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora 23 J. Gaskarth. “Defence and Foreign Policy,” in British Foreign Policy: Crises, Conflicts, and Future Challenges, eds. O. Daddow and J. Gaskarth, 67. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013. 24 Cornish and Dorman, “Complex Security and Strategic Latency.” 25 R.M. Gates. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. New York: Vintage Books 2015, 522. 26 Saxi, “British and German Initiatives for Defence Cooperation,” 172. 27 NATO. “Wales Summit Declaration.” NATO Documents, 2014. www.nato.int/​ cps/​ic/​natohq/​official_​texts_​112964.htm; S. Young. “The United Kingdom’s 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review –​Economic, Procurement and Brexit Implications.” 11th Defence and Security Economics Workshop, Ottawa, Canada (November 3–​4, 2016), 5. 28 UK Government. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review NSS/​SDSR 2010, 49. https://​assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/​government/​uploads/​system/​uploads/​attachment_​data/​file/​62482/​strategic-​ defence-​security-​review.pdf. 29 M. Chalmers. “UK Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit.” Royal United Services Institute Briefing Paper, January 2017. 30 Gaskarth, “Defence and Foreign Policy,” 69. 31 D. Cameron. “NATO Summit, Warsaw: PM’s Press Conference.” Speech at the Warsaw NATO Summit, July 9, 2016. www.gov.uk/​government/​speeches/​ nato-​summit-​warsaw-​pms-​press-​conference-​9-​july-​2016. 32 At the time the book goes to press, the 2020 SDSR has not yet been released, so this section is based on the latest available Review. 33 Heier, “Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force,” 190; SDSR 2015. 34 J. Black, A. Hall, K. Cox, M. Kepe, and E. Silfversten. Defence and Security after Brexit: Understanding the Possible Implications of the UK’s Decision to Leave the EU. Santa Monica, CA, and Cambridge, UK: RAND Corporation, 2017. 35 R. Johnson. “UK Defence Policy: The ‘New Canada’ and ‘International by Design’,” in The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, And Partnerships, eds. R. Johnson and J. Matlary, 189–​ 214. New York: Palgrave P. Szymański. “The consequences of Brexit for the UK’s security policy and NATO’s eastern flank.” OSW Center for Eastern European Studies Commentary. April 3, 2019. www.osw.waw.pl/​en/​publikacje/​osw-​commentary/​ 2019-​04-​03/​consequences-​brexit-​uks-​security-​policy-​and-​natos-​eastern. 36 Black et al., Defence and Security after Brexit; Lindley-​French, “One Alliance,” 63. 37 NATO. “NATO Secretary General Marks 50 Years of UK Submarine Nuclear Deterrent.” Speech by Secretary General. May 21, 2019. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​ natohq/​news_​166172.htm. 38 House of Commons Defence Committee. “Indispensable Allies: US, NATO and UK Defence Relations.” Eighth Report of Session 2017–​19. UK Parliament, 2018, 20. https://​publications.parliament.uk/​pa/​cm201719/​cmselect/​cmdfence/​387/​387.pdf. 39 Black et al., Defence and Security after Brexit, 13–​14. 40 UK Government, National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS 2014), 26. www.gov.uk/​government/​publications/​national-​strategy-​for-​maritime-​security. 41 NATO. “Key NATO and Allied Exercises in 2019, Factsheet (February 2019).” Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2019. www.nato.int/​nato_​static_​ fl2014/​assets/​pdf/​pdf_​2019_​02/​1902-​factsheet_​exercises_​en.pdf.

The UK in NATO  65 42 G. Williamson. “UK Steps Up Commitment to a Modernised NATO.” Speech by Defence Secretary, February 15, 2018. www.gov.uk/​government/​news/​uk-​steps-​up​commitment-​to-​a-​modernised-​nato. 43 NATO. “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, Factsheet (December 2018).” Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2018. www.nato.int/​nato_​static_​fl 2014/​assets/​pdf/​pdf_​2018_​12/​20181205_​1812-​factsheet_​efp_​en.pdf. 44 The JEF was first elaborated in 2012, one year after the questionable Libyan intervention, and in light of declining defense budgets since the financial crisis. It has since increased membership to nine countries, now comprising Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. 45 L.L. Saxi. “British and German Initiatives for Defence Cooperation,” in Military Cooperation Around Framework Nations: A European Solution to the Problem of Limited Defence Capabilities, eds. E.H. Frisell and E. Sjökvist. FOI, Sweden: Northern European and Transatlantic Security Project (FORI-​R-​4672-​SE), 2019. 46 Heier, “Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force,” 200. 47 Szymanski, “The Consequences of Brexit,” 2. 48 Saxi, “British and German Initiatives for Defence Cooperation.” 49 Cited in Frisell and Sjökvist, Military Cooperation Around Framework Nations. 50 A. Michta. “The US-​UK Special Relationship and the ‘Principled Realism’ of the Trump Administration,” in The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit: Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, And Partnerships, eds. R. Johnson and J. Matlary, 60. New York: Palgrave, 2019. 51 B. Surk. “NATO chief on Brexit: ‘We Don’t Need More Instability’ in Europe,” Politico, June 6, 2016, www.politico.eu/​article/​nato-​chief-​on-​brexit-​we-​dont-​need-​ more-​instability-​in-​europe-​uk-​eu-​counter-​terrorism/​. 52 B. Johnson. “PM Statement at NATO Meeting,” Speech at London NATO Summit, December 4, 2019, www.gov.uk/​government/​speeches/​pm-​statement-​ at-​nato-​meeting-​4-​december-​2019. 53 Johnson, “UK Defence Policy,” 37. 54 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. “Global Britain,” Sixth Report of Session 2017–​ 2019, 2018, https://​publications.parliament.uk/​pa/​cm201719/​ cmselect/​cmfaff/​780/​780.pdf. 55 Glencross and McCourt, “Living Up to a New Role in The World,” 597. 56 Chalmers, “UK Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit,” 2. 57 Ibid., 7. 58 A. Michta and P.S. Hilde. The Future of NATO: Regional Defense and Global Security. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2014. 59 Szymanski, “The Consequences of Brexit.” 60 Johnson, “UK Defence Policy,” 39. 61 D. Nicholls and L. Wood. “British Airborne Forces Join NATO Allies in Show of Force to Russia,” The Telegraph, June 21, 2019, www.telegraph.co.uk/​news/​2019/​ 06/​21/​british-​airborne-​forces-​join-​nato-​allies-​show-​force-​russia/​. 62 Johnson, “UK Defence Policy,” 40. 63 Black et al., Defence and Security after Brexit, 61. 64 Ibid., 62. 65 Chalmers, “UK Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit,” 6. 66 Ibid., 6. 67 NATO. “Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe: General Tim Radford.” https://​shape.nato.int/​deputy-​supreme-​allied-​commander-​europe-​dsaceur.

66  Linda Slapakova and Giuseppe Spatafora 68 Hill, The Future of British Foreign Policy, 89. 69 L. Risso. “Time to Act: The UK in NATO,” The RUSI Journal, 160, 5, 2015, 30–​ 34; J. Devanny. “UK National Security Decision-​Making in Context: The Ukraine Crisis and NATO’s Warsaw Summit Meeting,” Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2017. 70 Glencross and McCourt, “Living Up to a New Role in The World,” 587. 71 P. Crerar. “Number of UK Troops in Afghanistan to Rise ahead of NATO Summit.” The Guardian. July 10, 2018. www.theguardian.com/​uk-​news/​2018/​jul/​ 10/​number-​of-​uk-​troops-​in-​afghanistan-​to-​rise-​ahead-​of-​nato-​summit. 72 Chalmers, “UK Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit.” 73 E. MacAskill. “RAF Fighters Intercept Two Russian Bombers Near UK Airspace.” The Guardian. January 15, 2018. www.theguardian.com/​world/​2018/​ jan/​15/​raf-​fighters-​intercept-​two-​russian-​bombers-​near-​uk-​airspace. 74 Johnson, “UK Defence Policy,” 36. 75 A. Polyakova and F. Letsas. “On the record: The U.S. administration’s actions on Russia,” Brookings Institutions, June 3, 2019, www.brookings.edu/​blog/​order-​ from-​chaos/​2018/​09/​25/​on-​the-​record-​the-​u-​s-​administrations-​actions-​on-​russia/​. 76 M. Russell. “US-​Russia Relations: A Point of No Return?,” European Parliament Research Service, October 2018, www.europarl.europa.eu/​RegData/​etudes/​BRIE/​ 2018/​628230/​EPRS_​BRI(2018)628230_​EN.pdf. 77 M. Landler. “Boris Johnson’s ‘Global Britain’: Inspired Vision or Wishful Thinking?” The New York Times. July 3, 2020. www.nytimes.com/​2020/​07/​03/​ world/​europe/​johnson-​brexit-​hong-​kong.html. 78 NATO. “The London Declaration,” London NATO Summit, December 4, 2019, www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​official_​texts_​171584.htm. 79 T. Shaffer. “Hard Brexit on Defence: How the UK Can Lead Europe in Global Security,” Journal of Intelligence History 16, 2, 2018. 80 Johnson, “UK Defence Policy,” 35–​37. 81 Ibid., 38. 82 A. Chuter. “UK Hits Pause on Defense Review Due to Coronavirus,” Defense News. April 15, 2020. www.defensenews.com/​global/​europe/​2020/​04/​15/​uk-​hits-​ pause-​on-​defense-​review-​due-​to-​coronavirus/​. 83 J. Beu and G. Elefteriu. “Making Sense of British Foreign Policy after Brexit: Some Early Thoughts,” Policy Exchange, July 2016, www.policyexchange.org.uk/​ wp-​content/​uploads/​2016/​09/​british-​foreign-​policy-​after-​brexit-​policy-​exchange-​ briefing-​july-​2016.pdf. 84 Gen. Sir D. Richards. “Speech by General Sir David Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff,” Speech at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London, December 17, 2012, UK Government, www.gov.uk/​government/​speeches/​chief-​of-​ the-​defence-​staff-​general-​sir-​david-​richards-​speech-​to-​the-​royal-​united-​services-​ institute-​rusi-​17-​december-​2012.

4  Norway, NATO, and the Northern flank Karsten Friis1

Introduction On October 25, 2019 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited the small town of Kirkenes in far northeastern Norway to mark the 75th anniversary of the Soviet liberation of the eastern part of Finnmark county in 1944. “Norway and Russia have a common past and a pragmatic future,” Lavrov stated in an op-​ed published on the occasion of that visit. But he also criticized Norway for holding “very aggressive NATO exercises … close to the Russian border.”2 Needless to say, Russian–​Norwegian relations are, and have been, mixed. The combination of pragmatic neighborly relations, trade, cultural exchanges, and intermarriages, as well as occasionally tense military relations, has not always been easy to navigate. Norway was a signatory to the North Atlantic Pact (also known as  the Washington Treaty) that established NATO in 1949. At the outset of the World War II, Norway had sought to remain neutral, as it had been in the World War I, but found itself occupied by Nazi forces from April 1940 until May 1945. This experience led the government to change its approach to international security after the war: a small state like Norway needed allies for protection. Since then, support for continued NATO membership has remained generally strong. This chapter discusses Norwegian perspectives on NATO, and security and defense policy today, some 70 years later. Norway’s relations with Russia, a big neighbor with a huge military force very close to the common border, is an essential part of this picture. But also bilateral relations with the United States have remained important, not least given Norway’s geopolitical location close to the Russian Northern Fleet. The chapter begins with a short background discussion about the historical relations between Norway and Russia, and the Norwegian security and defense posture that has resulted in since the World War II. It then discusses Norway’s relations to NATO, popular support for the Alliance today, and Norway progress concerning the 2 percent target at the Wales summit in 2014. Lastly, having discussed how Norway relates to the various new European and EU initiatives in the defense sector, it concludes that Norway’s traditionally balanced approach to Russia, between deterrence

68  Karsten Friis and reassurance, is proving increasingly difficult  –​not least since the relatively small size of its armed forces makes the country more reliant upon allies. New defense plans may improve the situation, but these will take time to implement. Further, given Norway’s proximity to Russia and the Russian Northern Fleet, both NATO and the US are regarded as far more important for Norwegian security than the various EU or European initiatives –​even though Norway participates in many of these.

Background: Norway and Russia Historical memory plays an important role in Norwegian relations with Russia. Prior to the 1917 Russian Revolution, there were significant trade and people-​to-​people contacts between Norwegian and Russian settlements across the border in the north. Much of this was reduced with the establishment of the USSR, but it did not end. In stark contrast to, for instance, the case of Poland, Norway has never experienced war with Russia. Quite the contrary: the Red Army moved into eastern part of the northern county of Finnmark in October 1944, forcing the Nazi forces out. Soviet troops moved about 80 km into Norway before stalling, and withdrew about a year later, in September 1945. This was a relatively unique move on the part of Moscow, as most other fronts became the frontiers of the new Cold War and part of the Soviet sphere of interest. The historical memory of Russian liberation has remained strong in Norway, particularly in its northernmost regions. This unique history with Russia still feeds into the Norwegian security public debate today, where local attitudes in Finnmark do not always match the national view. For example, on the occasion of the above-​mentioned 75th anniversary, Ragnhild Vassvik, head of the Finnmark County Council, stated: “The time for sanctions has passed and they should be abolished now. The situation has changed both in Russia and in other parts of the world with respect to our allies.”3 This stands in stark contrast to official Norwegian policy, which is fully aligned with NATO and the EU sanctions as regards Russia. Norway has, in fact, always sought to pursue a balanced approach to Russia. Before joining NATO in 1949, and in response to a formal enquiry from the USSR, Norway announced its “basing policy”: no permanent allied bases in Norway in peacetime.4 With this unilateral declaration, Norway demonstrated a certain understanding of Soviet concerns about western militarization of the Northern flank, and tried to retain some room for political maneuvering space between the two superpowers. Despite instances of Soviet pressure, it was the Norwegian government that defined more precisely what its basing policy meant in practice throughout the Cold War. The end of the Cold War represented a new beginning for Russian–​ Norwegian bilateral relations. From the Norwegian side, considerable funding and political prestige were invested in building good relations with Russia on all levels: residents in the northern counties were granted special permits to

Norway, NATO, and the Northern flank  69 cross the border, trade increased, environmental clean-​up of nuclear waste was sponsored, there were cultural exchanges, fisheries management cooperation improved, and military cooperation increased. Several High North strategies were implemented. The political peak came with a diplomatic breakthrough in 2010: the settlement of the 40-​year border dispute in the Barents Sea. This proved the existence of shared interests, political goodwill, and pragmatism on both sides. That said, Norway never stopped its surveillance of and intelligence collection on Russia in the North. Then came the Russian annexation of Crimea and warfare in eastern Ukraine. On February 26, 2015 Norwegian Defense Minister, Ine Eriksen Søreide, stated on CNN: We are faced with a different Russia. I want to warn against the fact that some people see this as something that is going to pass. The situation has changed. And it has changed profoundly. […] there is no going back to some sort of normality or some sort of back to normal business. Because that normality does not exist.5 This representation of Russia as “profoundly changed” has become established Norwegian policy, reiterated in government statements and documents. For instance, the 2017 government White Paper on foreign and security policy argues that: Russia’s desire to be the dominant power in what Moscow regards as its sphere of influence conflicts with international principles relating to the right of countries to determine their own foreign policy and choose their own alliances.6 Norway joined the EU sanctions regime and suspended all bilateral military cooperation with Russia in 2014. However, bilateral cooperation on fisheries management, on search and rescue and on incidents at sea has continued, and the direct hotline between the Norwegian Joint Operational Headquarters and the Russian Northern Fleet remains open. Norway has also repeatedly stated that it does not consider Russia to be a military threat today.7 From a military perspective, however, the fact that the Russian Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula is stationed so close to Norway (about 150 km) is a geopolitical challenge. The Kola strategic submarines, armed with ballistic nuclear missiles, are a cornerstone of Russian defense planning, representing its strategic deterrence and second-​ strike capability. The Russian military presence and build-​up in the north are not directed specifically against Norway –​they just happen to be located very close to the Norwegian border. Should a crisis erupt between the West and Russia, it would most likely also have consequences in the north, even if not initiated there. Such “horizontal escalation” is what Norwegian defense planners fear the most: that Norway would be pulled into a conflict due to events in other parts of the world. In

70  Karsten Friis such a situation, the Northern Fleet might be used, for instance, to attack allied sea lines of communications across the Atlantic, which would be crucial in the event of war. The most-​debated scenario is that Russia, in an attempt to protect its nuclear assets in the High North, would establish “bastion defense”  –​a denial zone stretching from the GIUK Gap over to Kola.8 Denying NATO access north of the GIUK line would allow Russia to protect its strategic submarines –​but Norway would end up basically “behind enemy lines.” At the very least, Norwegian air and sea maneuvers would be severely hampered. Military planners also regard a partial extension of land defense into northern Norway as likely in such a scenario –​as with the deployment of mobile air defense systems in northern Norway as part of an offensive defense of the Kola bases. Russian denial efforts in the North Sea would then make it difficult for the allies to provide reinforcements to Norway. Recently, Russian military training and activity have increased in the north. In August 2019, Russia began its largest naval exercise since the Cold War, Ocean Shield. Some 50 warships and 20 supply ships from the Northern and Baltic fleets participated, as well as 58 aircraft, and about 10,000 personnel. Ocean Shield took place primarily in the Baltic Sea and along the Norwegian coast up to the Arctic.9 The purpose, it seems, was to exercise “sea denial:” the “bastion defense.” A  few months later, in October 2019, some eight to ten submarines of the Russian Northern Fleet left port and sailed into the Norwegian Sea, also this the largest Russian submarine operation since the Cold War. Further, Russia has deployed various missile systems close to the Norwegian border; it has conducted GPS-​jamming that interfered with civilian aviation in Norway, has held several snap exercises and flown simulated attack profiles on Norwegian targets. Even if some of this activity can be regarded as normal for a military force like the Northern Fleet, other actions give cause for Norwegian concern. They call for some kind of response –​but what is appropriate, and how much? Today, the balancing act between deterrence and reassurance is again at the heart of Norwegian security and defense debates. How much deterrence is sufficient, how much could prove escalatory, what reassurance measures can and should be taken? These are among the difficult questions discussed in the context of Norway’s gradually more potent and forward-​leaning military neighbor.

Norwegian security and defense priorities Norwegian security and defense priorities today reflect this perspective on Russia. In the above-​mentioned White Paper, the policy is summarized as follows: We must maintain and strengthen our transatlantic ties and NATO, strengthen our own defence capabilities and manage our relations with

Norway, NATO, and the Northern flank  71 Russia wisely. We must also develop closer security policy cooperation with European countries and institutions. And we must do more to alleviate the situation in Europe’s unstable southern neighbourhood. All these efforts combined will make our security policy more robust. In this way, we will be better equipped to deal with unforeseen events.10 In this White Paper, the government highlights three main “courses of action as crucial for safeguarding Norwegian security in these times of change:”11 maintaining and building on the well-​established principles of Norwegian security policy, strengthening the European and Nordic dimension in Norwegian security policy, and intensifying Norway’s efforts in Europe’s unstable southern neighborhood. Implied in the first course of action are “maintaining our close transatlantic ties,” “supporting NATO adaptation with a view to strengthening the Alliance’s collective defense,” and “strengthening Norway’s defense capabilities and facilitating a greater Allied presence and more frequent Allied exercises in the north.”12 These are clear guidelines for the priorities of the government today, reflected in concrete policies in recent few years, as we shall see below. Also, the second action point is relevant in this context, as it relates, inter alia, to “developing closer security policy cooperation with selected European allies,” “helping to enhance European civilian and military crisis management capacity,” and “promoting closer cooperation between NATO and the EU.”13 In short, current Norwegian security and defense policy reflects renewed concerns about developments in Russia, and the desire to enhance NATO and US engagement in the north, while also strengthening European security cooperation.

The evolution of Norway’s defense doctrine The “basing policy” has become a pillar of Norwegian defense policy, and part of what was termed the combined “deterrence and reassurance” strategy in the Cold War.14 This strategy sought to balance deterrence with reassurances that Norwegian territory would not be used to launch an attack against strategically important Soviet military installations on the Kola Peninsula. However, to compensate for the absence of allied bases, Norway encouraged significant allied training and exercises in Norway. These were held primarily in Troms county on the northwestern coast, and, to a lesser extent, in Finnmark county, which borders on Russia. Finnmark county is large and sprawling  –​at 48,618 km larger than the whole of Denmark, or Wales and Northern Ireland combined. By keeping its main military activities in Troms, Norway was in practice offering the USSR significant warning time should it suspect a Western attack. During the Cold War, the Norwegian armed forces in peacetime consisted of about 30–​40,000 personnel, including conscripts; an additional 350,000 reservists could be mobilized to take up arms in case of war. For a population

72  Karsten Friis that then numbered about four million people, this was significant. In 1992, Norway had one division and 13 brigades, 12 submarines, 5 frigates, 30 Missile Torpedo Boats, and 30–​40 other vessels, about 30 coastal fortresses, 61 F-​16 and 20 F-​5 fighter jets, and over 200 Leopard and Patton tanks.15 Norway also developed its “total defense” concept, whereby some 200,000 civilians could be mobilized to support the military from the civil society. Large parts of the civilian infrastructure and resources were to be transferred to military use in case of war. For instance, any bus, truck, tractor or car with four-​wheel drive was registered as an asset for the Army. In total, about 20–​30 percent of the population would be involved in defending the country.16 However, in the years after the Cold War, it gradually became apparent that this defense structure was not financially sustainable. The equipment was also aging, and far less effective than it appeared on paper.17 The armed forces were in dire need of reform. The post-​Cold War reform of the Norwegian armed forces was a slow and painful process –​a main challenge being that the government and parliament repeatedly passed decisions regarding the structure and size of the armed forces, but failed to follow up with sufficient funding. This made reform difficult to implement, and the chief of defense was unable to deliver as expected. Furthermore, the slogan of the 1990s and 2000s, that NATO would have be “out of area or out of business,” forced Norway to provide resources for international operations. There were heated debates over the role of the armed forces in this new security environment, and a slow and difficult reorientation toward deployment abroad in international crisis management. As a net recipient of allied help during the Cold War, the Norwegian military apparatus was unprepared for NATO’s growing demands to contribute internationally.18 Previous international deployment had been limited to UN peacekeeping operations –​which usually represented a negative career step for officers, not a positive one. Nevertheless, Norway managed to contribute troops to Bosnia-​ Herzegovina and later on a full infantry battalion to Kosovo. The challenges related to the transition from a Cold War defensive military role to the post-​ Cold War peace-​enforcement requirements are illustrated by the Norwegian air force’s experience in the 1999 NATO air campaign over Kosovo. At the time, Norway’s F16s were capable of conducting only defensive air-​to-​air operations, which was their planned role in a territorial defense of Norway. This meant that they could not contribute in air-​to-​ground operations over Kosovo, and were therefore largely irrelevant for the allied effort.19 The lesson was learned, and a few years later Norwegian F-​16s were capable of air-​to-​ ground operations and in both Afghanistan and Libya. The Norwegian army also took command of a PRT in the Faryab region in Afghanistan, remaining there until 2012.20 The Norwegian Navy has also participated in several NATO operations –​as in the Mediterranean, and off the coast of Somalia. A well-​recognized key asset that Norway has provided to NATO, from the Balkans to Afghanistan and the Middle East, are the Special Forces. They were among the first to move into Kosovo; they arrived

Norway, NATO, and the Northern flank  73 in Afghanistan early and remain there today in a training capacity in NATO’s Resolute Support mission. The Special Operations Advisory Team support and train Crisis Response Unit 222 of the Afghan Special Police.21 Today, as collective defense and the protection of national sovereignty are again the main priorities, the focus has returned to the capacities of Norway’s armed forces in Norway. Fifteen years of downsizing have taken a toll. Today’s Norwegian army is down to one brigade, which, with three maneuver battalions, does not meet NATO requirements for a full brigade. However, with the exception of the aging fleet of Leopard 2 A4 tanks, all support systems and units have been modernized  –​mechanized infantry, artillery, intelligence, communications etc. The navy has four frigates, and is replacing its four submarines with three new ones. The air force is in the process of replacing its F-​16s with a fleet of 52 F-​35s.22 On the whole, then, Norway’s armed forces are small but quite potent. They have a broad range of tools available, but not much durability, making it challenging to meet expectations nationally as well as internationally. Norway is arguably more reliant upon NATO today than during the Cold War, and its armed forces would not be able to fight a protracted war with Russia without allied assistance. This is particularly apparent in the land domain, where large territories and a small force would make it difficult to retain control in case of war. But also the maritime domain is challenging, as Norway’s territorial waters are seven times larger than its land territory. Obviously, four frigates and some coastal corvettes hardly can be expected to maintain full control at sea.

NATO’s role in Norway Norway is clearly reliant on NATO. However, in view of its basing policy, Norway has not asked NATO for arrangements similar to the eFP in the Baltic states and Poland, or the “Tailored Forward Presence” in the Black Sea region. Norway continues to declare itself as being “NATO in the North” –​ the eyes and ears of the Alliance in peacetime. In case of war, however, that can obviously not apply. What NATO brings to Norway is extended deterrence. As stated in Norway’s current long-​term plan for defense, the role of the armed forces is to “secure credible deterrence with a basis in NATO’s collective defense.”23 Further, the foundation for Norwegian security is NATO. A modern defense which is part of a strong and credible alliance has a deterring effect and reduces the likelihood of ending up in a situation where the security of Norway or its allies is challenged and must be defended by military force.24 According to the Chief of Defense, “credible deterrence is secured through an active alliance policy which is predictable, long-​term and conflict-​preventive.

74  Karsten Friis NATO is the core of Norway’s ability to provide credible deterrence.”25 Similarly, the above-​mentioned 2017 foreign policy White Paper states: The Norwegian armed forces must be able to carry out assignments within Norway as needed, contribute to credible deterrence, and help maintain Norway’s role and expertise in the Arctic. At the same time, Norway must have close ties to key allies. Allied presence in the North strengthens NATO’s credibility, and regular exercises must be carried out based on defense plans.26 NATO is undoubtedly a cornerstone of Norwegian security policy. In practice, Norway seeks security through NATO in two ways: by actively contributing to NATO, and by encouraging allied exercises and training in Norway. Even during the period of international crisis management in the 1990s and early 2000s, critics argued that Norway’s primary aim in contributing was not to support counterterrorism and peace in Afghanistan and the Balkans. Rather, they held, the objective was of national character: by contributing to NATO, Norway could expect NATO’s support in return if needed. Or, put in another way, if Norway had chosen not to contribute to international operations over these years, it would have lost much political goodwill and prestige, not least vis-​à-​vis the US, and that would have affected Norwegian security. Nor was that line of reasoning limited to Norway: many other European states that participated in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya had limited interest in actual achievements on the ground. Participation as such was seen as more important.27 This focus on the Norwegian or European homeland, even in the “int-​ops years,” was evident already in 2008, when Norway presented a nonpaper in NATO, Strengthening NATO  –​raising its profile and ensuring its relevance. Here it was argued that the Alliance should pay more attention to its own territory and periphery. That was not exactly the primary focus of NATO at that time, and the nonpaper initiative did not accomplish much. However, it shows that Norway remained focused on collective defense and regional security when many others did not.28 Irritatingly to Norway, NATO seemed basically to have forgotten the High North. Therefore, Norway welcomed NATO’s “return” to collective defense after the Russian warfare in Ukraine from 2014. The RAP has been supported; likewise, the designing of new Graduated Response Plans, the reinvigoration of the NATO Response Force, the eFP, the Framework Nation Concept, and all the other new NATO initiatives. In particular, Norway has championed a reform of the NATO Command Structure to make it more functional for conducting collective defense tasks. In addition, Norway has pushed for an improved maritime posture, including the transatlantic maritime sea lines of communication. The 2018 decision by the NATO Defense Ministers to establish a new NATO command for the Atlantic in the US State of Virginia was celebrated as a victory in Norway.

Norway, NATO, and the Northern flank  75 A second way of securing NATO engagement in Norway is to make sure that the Allies have first-​hand knowledge and awareness of the situation in the North. Norway does this partly though massive intelligence collection concerning the Russian Northern Fleet, and partly through hosting allied exercises. For the former, Norway has two sophisticated intelligence collection ships operating 24/​7 in the North. In addition, it has several radars and sonar and listening installations for signal intelligence, as well as the P3 Orion (soon to be replaced by P8 Poseidon) planes and other assets. Updated information on the development of Russian weapons systems in the High North is of high value to all NATO, as most weapons systems are used in other Russian military districts as well. Allied exercises and training have always been important for Norway. They are considered a precondition for its basing policy, and also for the credibility of NATO’s defense plans. To be credible, allied reinforcements in case of crisis must be trained. Extreme climate conditions present a range of special challenges for equipment and personnel. Without awareness and proven ability to operate under such circumstances, NATO commitments may become hollow. Therefore, Norway regularly hosts its allies, bilaterally and through NATO exercises, although exercises are less frequent than on the eastern flank bordering Russia. In 2018, Norway hosted NATO’s high-​visibility Trident Juncture exercise, which involved some 50,000 troops from 31 nations, including non-​NATO members Finland and Sweden. In total, 250 aircraft, 65 vessels, and over 10,000 vehicles participated. The aim was to exercise collective defense in Norway, including the logistics involved in receiving Alliance reinforcements of such scale. On the other hand, the exercise was held in southern and central Norway, at significant distance from the Russian border, apparently in an effort to signal restraint to Moscow. The exercise exposed many NATO participants to the realities of the harsh Norwegian environment, allowing them to gain valuable operational experience. Importantly for Norway, it also signaled NATO resolve and commitment to collective defense of its northern flank. Another important exercise is Arctic Challenge, conducted biannually in cooperation with the Swedish and Finnish air forces. It builds on the weekly cross-​border training between fighter jets from Luleå in Sweden, Rovaniemi in Finland, and Bodø in Norway. Arctic Challenge is among Europe’s largest air exercises, involving some 100 planes and 1,000 personnel from several NATO countries. In practice, however, Norway, like many other smaller NATO states, relies on the commitment of the US for support in case of war. Today, no other allies have the military strength to contribute significantly to the reinforcement of Norway. Norway has therefore actively engaged with the US, through NATO and bilaterally, in order to secure its continued security commitment. The most concrete bilateral military tie here is arguably the US prepositioning of military equipment in central Norway, the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program–​Norway (MCPP–​N). Eight storage facilities contain

76  Karsten Friis trucks, armored vehicles, tanks, munitions, and various support materiel.29 The equipment, which has been used in Iraq and elsewhere over the years, is now stored in caves, kept fit and maintained, ready for use on short notice. In 2017, some 350 US marines began training rotations at the Værnes military airfield in central Norway. From 2018, another 350 US marines were deployed to Bardufoss military airfield in Troms county (Far North, but still about 450 km from the Russian border). These permanent but rotational troops have strong symbolic value, signaling the US commitment to the defense of Norway. They also serve a certain tripwire function, as the likelihood of US involvement in case of aggression against Norway increases. The presence of US marines has triggered some debate in Norway, as to whether their semi-​permanent presence constitutes a break with Norwegian basing policy. In particular, as we shall see below, the political left has expressed concern that this move serves to increase tensions in the region while also bringing Norway uncomfortably close to the security policies of the US.

NATO: popular perceptions and political support NATO enjoys broad support in Norway. In a poll conducted in 2019, 80 percent of the respondents agreed that NATO membership contributes to the security of Norway30 –​the highest score since these polls were first conducted 15 years ago. Norway’s two largest political parties –​the Labour Party and the Conservatives –​have a long tradition of agreeing on national security policy. They have recognized the importance of predictability and “steady course” in these matters for a small state such as Norway. Both parties have been strong supporters of NATO and have usually voted in favor of the government’s four-​year long-​term plans for the defense sector, irrespective of being in opposition or in government. Also, the other smaller parties in the center and to the right have been steadily supportive of NATO. It is only the two leftist parties, the Socialist Left (SV) and Red (Rødt), that oppose Norwegian NATO membership. As stated in the SV program: SV is against Norwegian membership in NATO. NATO is based upon the usage of nuclear weapons. NATO is not only a defense alliance but is also conducting warfare against other countries. As long as Norway is a part of NATO, SV will work against further enlargement of the Alliance. SV favors replacing NATO membership with a Nordic defense pact.31 Furthermore, the same SV platform argues that: The NATO alliance is dominated by the foreign-​policy interests of the USA and serves as a tool for promoting Western economic and foreign policy interests, more than as a constellation to prevent war. Authoritarian countries are part of the NATO cooperation. Norway must seek a form of security cooperation based on the Nordic region, and establish security

Norway, NATO, and the Northern flank  77 guarantees with likeminded neighboring countries. SV is of the opinion that Norway should leave NATO.32 Similarly, the far-​left Red Party states that it seeks to:  “Withdraw Norway from NATO and work for a Nordic defense alliance with Sweden, Denmark. Finland and Iceland. Work toward the closure of NATO.”33 Further, “Rødt wants the UN to be the primary pillar of Norwegian foreign policy, not the alliance relation to the US and NATO.”34 Elsewhere, it states: “NATO membership ties us to the aggressive imperialist power of the US through weapons development and international military operations […] To be part of NATO is to gamble with Norwegian security.”35 However, these are relatively marginal voices in the Norwegian public discourse. Combined, these parties have generally had support from about 5–​ 8  percent of the electorate, but in recent years this has increased to about 12–​13 percent. However, it cannot be the issue of NATO that has triggered this increase. A  considerable share of the members of these leftist parties support NATO, despite the official party programs: 56 percent of respondents supporting the Red Party, and 62% of those supporting the Socialist Left Party, see NATO as contributing to Norwegian security.36 That said, there have been recent debates over the Norwegian defense posture, triggered in particular by the semi-​permanent presence of the US marines. It is argued that their “rotational status” is merely window dressing for a permanent base, and therefore in violation of Norway’s basing policy.37 This criticism has emerged not only from the above-​ mentioned leftist parties, but also from the agrarian-​oriented Centre Party and even some in the Labour Party. Unsurprisingly, the Russian embassy in Norway has echoed this, adding that this “makes Norway less predictable, may increase tension, incite an arms race and lead to destabilization of the situation in northern Europe.”38 Critics have argued that, even though Moscow should not be allowed to dictate Norwegian defense policies, it is nonetheless wise to take Russian concerns seriously. The Russian worldview may be very different from ours, they note, but for the sake of stability and in order to decrease tensions in the North, Norway and NATO should be more restrained and cautious in their defense policies.39 Deterrence should be balanced with diplomacy and reassurance, as too much emphasis on the former may lead to a security dilemma and an arms race. The main counterargument of the government and others favoring the US marines presence is that these 700 troops are too few and too lightly equipped to pose any military threat to Russia.40 They are also located quite far from the Russian border. In addition, they note, extensive allied exercise and training in Norway have been integral elements in the basing policy, as compensation for the absence of permanent bases. Given the relatively small size of the Norwegian Army, the US Marines also provide valuable manpower (similar to a small infantry battalion) to the Norwegian Brigade. Again, public opinion is

78  Karsten Friis supportive: 50 percent of those surveyed in a 2018 poll said they were positive to the US marines presence in Norway; 36 percent were negative.41 Another concern is that Norway, due to the severe downsizing of its defense forces after the Cold War, has become more dependent on NATO and the US than before.42 Both the leftist parties, inherently skeptical to the US, and more rightist national-​conservative voices want to strengthen the national defense to become less reliant on American “war mongering” or strategic priorities. This view has also gained some support from military experts, who fear that if Norway is incapable of being NATO’s “eyes and ears” in the North, other members of the Alliance will increase their surveillance and patrolling there. That, they hold, will give Russia more reason for concern than if Norwegian planes and vessels conduct such operations. This debate was triggered by the deployment of up to five US P-​8 Poseidon Maritime Surveillance Aircraft at Andøya airfield in Nordland county in 2018 and 2019.43 This is also used in arguing why it is urgent to strengthen the army. The Labour Party (currently in opposition) has become increasingly critical of what it sees as the government’s neglect of the army. In particular, Labour stresses the urgency of purchasing new battle-​tanks and strengthening the manpower of the army. Increased US marines presence in the north cannot be a “compensation for the absence of Norwegian troops,” it is argued.44 Lastly, the presidency of Donald Trump has caused concerns about how reliable the US security guarantee would be when push comes to shove. The need for “hedging” and building stronger European security links has been a recurrent element in recent debates, also from senior Labour Party officials.45 However, the lack of a European alternative has made this debate somewhat symbolic, and the continued US engagement in Europe also under Trump has now eased some initial concerns. In Norway, nuclear weapons are the most contentious NATO issue. Although Norway did not sign the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017, in a 2019 poll, about 79 percent of respondents stated that they supported the ban, and 85 percent said Norway should sign it even if it would be the first NATO country to do so.46 This view has support also deep within the traditionally NATO–​loyal Labour Party:  10 out of 15 regional boards voted in favor of Norway signing the Treaty in 2019, amidst warnings from the central leadership of the party. Even NATO’s current Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, former Norwegian Prime Minster and Labour Party leader, engaged in this debate and expressed concerns about such a policy. He argued that the aim should be mutual arms reductions –​not unilateral ones, which would only create uncertainty.47 In the end, the proposal to sign the UN Treaty was voted down at the April 2019 Labour Party congress. But there is little doubt that many Norwegians see nuclear weapons as an uncomfortable dimension in the NATO strategic concept.

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The Norwegian defense budget and the “2 percent” requirement The Norwegian defense budget has increased significantly in the last few years. The defense budget for 2020 is NOK 61 billion (around EUR 6.1 billion), as against some NOK 42 billion (EUR 4.2 billion) in 2014.48 That said, the defense budget equals only about 1.8 percent of Norwegian GDP. The Wales Summit agreement of “aiming to move toward” spending a minimum of 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024 is supported by the government, but initially the Prime Minster put primary emphasis on the “aiming to move toward” part of the formulation. However, as NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has stressed: Norway’s extraordinarily high GDP should make it easier, not harder, to reach the 2 percent target.49 The current long-​term plan envisages a total increase in defense spending of about NOK 165 billion (around EUR 16.2 billion) over a 20-​year period, but the new long-​term plan in the pipeline is likely to increase the defense budget further. In 2019, the Chief of Defense recommended a steady increase in defense spending, to reach 2 percent by around 2028. That would entail an increase in the defense budget of NOK 25 bn (EUR 2.47 billion) until 2028, but it is uncertain if politicians are prepared to spend that much, even though Norway was spending more than 2 percent of its GDP on defense as recently as the 1990s. This appears harder to achieve today. With an aging population and a gradual diminution in the revenues from the petroleum industry, Norway has been tending to prioritize welfare over warfare. For Norwegian politicians, preserving the current level of social security is a higher priority today than defense. Moreover, investments in welfare and growth payoff in terms of results –​and hence votes –​in a way that defense does not. Nonetheless, polls show popular support for increased defense budget. In a poll conducted in 2017, 55  percent of those surveyed agreed that Norway should reach the 2  percent target.50 Similarly, when asked if today’s defense budget was too small, 49 percent answered affirmatively in 2017, and 42 percent in 2019.51 Several political parties have also included the 2 percent target in their political programs. In short, therefore, the defense budget is likely to continue to increase, but the 2 percent target may be at least a decade away –​if indeed it is ever reached.

Norway’s attitude toward EU’s CSDP Norway’s relations with the EU are regulated through the EEA Agreement, which provides the EFTA countries with access to the single market. Norway is also a signatory to the Schengen Agreement and numerous other EU arrangements. As the only non-​EU (or “third”) country, Norway is part of the EDA and has contributed troops and personnel to several CSDP missions. The government has also repeatedly stated support for a tighter European security and defense policy. Typically, Norway aligns itself with EU’s CFSP

80  Karsten Friis and EEAS statements and declarations when it can. Moreover, Norway was the only non-​EU country to participate in the Preparatory Action Defense Research (PADR), the initial phase of the EDF.52 However, it seems that Norwegian engagement is as much driven by economic concerns and the desire to rationalize the European defense industry, as by any wish to enhance EU capacities in security. Norway has expressed a strong interest in the EDF and has been lobbying to join it on a permanent basis as of 2021  –​importantly, in both in the research (DR) and industrial development phases (EDIDP). The wish to participate in the EDF stems from the added value expected for the Norwegian defense industry and defense research community. Today, about one-​third of Norwegian exports of defense-​related products go to the EU. Thus, a major concern for Norway has been the prospective loss of market shares, should it not get access. With a fairly significant defense industry, Norway is concerned about being excluded from these new EU initiatives, which have primarily been limited to EU members. The exact conditions for third-​country participation in these programs remain to be decided, but several EU countries seem to be taking a tough stance toward the UK because of Brexit. Norway, as well as the US and others, may have suffered “collateral damage” from that.53 Therefore, Norway has been seeking to utilize its special relationship with the EU through the EEA Agreement to safeguard continued access to the European defense market. Furthermore, although supportive of an enhanced EU security role, Norway also warns against any potential duplication or overlap with NATO. This is a view which has been championed within the EU especially by the UK, but with Brexit, these voices have become weaker. It is still EU policy to avoid duplication, as Germany keeps stressing. Nevertheless, France, as the decidedly strongest military power in the EU after Brexit, may have a somewhat different perspective. President Emanuel Macron’s infamous interview in The Economist, where he declared NATO to be “brain dead,” is illustrative.54 Macron’s aim for Europe is to “regain military sovereignty” and “strategic autonomy.” Norway seems less than enthusiastic about phrases such as “strategic autonomy,” or a European Security and Defense Union as championed be German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas.55 As a nonmember, Norway keeps a finger on the EU pulse –​and contributes when that is deemed profitable or in line with national priorities –​but is naturally not in the driving seat of any of the initiatives. From a Norwegian perspective, anything that undermines NATO, and particularly the US commitment to defend Europe, is worrisome. A division of labor between NATO and the EU, where the former emphasizes collective defense and the latter regional security, is the preferred solution  –​in other words, something along the lines of the current arrangement.

Norway, NATO, and the Northern flank  81

Conclusions The geopolitical location of Norway, next to Russia’s largest concentration of armed forces, is a defining factor for its security policy. Even if bilateral relations with Russia are relatively good, the military build-​up of Russia’s Northern Fleet, its exercises and new weapons systems, do represent a challenge. Norway, as a small state with limited national forces, must rely on NATO for its security and deterrence. Norwegian popular support for NATO is now higher than in a long time, and even voters on the far left appear predominantly supportive. Nonetheless, striking the right balance between deterrence and reassurance in a new era remains an ongoing topic of debate in Norway. In particular, critics claim that the semi-​presence of the US marines is Norway has a negative security effect, whereas the government argues the opposite: that they enhance national security and serve as a tripwire defense. Public opinion seems to be on the government side here. Nonetheless, there are in Norway strong traditions of a softer approach to Russia as well, not least in the northernmost regions. History plays a part –​but there is also a genuine desire to combine hard defense policies with dialogue, diplomacy, and alternative channels of communications. Also in military circles, there is broad recognition that a certain degree of restraint is wise, given the strategic importance of the Russian Northern Fleet. Too much NATO activity too close to Russia would be likely to sharpen tensions. Norway prides itself on being “NATO in the North,” but its undeniably thin military structure makes this claim rather hollow. New long-​term defense plans may improve the situation, but implementation will take many years. While the Norwegian armed forces are gradually being strengthened, NATO engagement in the north, even if restrained, remains crucial. In practice, this primarily implies US troops, planes, and vessels. Norway is not dreaming of any European strategic autonomy, because Europe is unlikely to be able to respond alone to a resurgent Russia at any time in the near future. Instead, Norway favors specific initiatives that can contribute to security and stability in Europe, particularly as regards the northern flank. And at this stage, NATO and the US are considered indispensable for such a task.

Notes 1 The author wishes to thank Ståle Ulriksen, Maren Garberg Bredesen, Paal Sigurd Hilde, Ole Martin Stormoen, and Susan Høivik for comments and corrections in both content and style. Several of the sources of this chapters are in Norwegian, and the quotations are translated by the author. 2 S. Lavrov. “Russland og Norge: felles fortid og pragmatisk fremtid.” Aftenposten. October 25, 2019. www.aftenposten.no/​meninger/​debatt/​i/​QoK65R/​ russland-​og-​norge-​felles-​fortid-​og-​pragmatisk-​fremtid-​sergey-​lavrov.

82  Karsten Friis 3 A. Staalesen. “Norway’s commemoration of Soviet war liberation came with a touch of anti-​western sentiment.” The Barents Observer. October 31, 2019. https://​ thebarentsobserver.com/​en/​life-​and-​public/​2019/​10/​norways-​commemoration-​ soviet-​war-​liberation-​came-​touch-​anti-​western. 4 K. Skogrand. Norsk forsvarshistorie 1940–​1970: Alliert i krig og fred. Oslo: Eide forlag, 2004, 161. 5 M. Krever. “Norway: ‘We are faced with a different Russia’.” CNN. February 26, 2015. https://​edition.cnn.com/​2015/​02/​25/​world/​amanpour-​norway-​ine-​eriksen-​ soreide/​index.html. 6 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Setting the course for Norwegian foreign and security policy. Meld. St. 36 (2016–​2017) Report to the Storting (White Paper), 2017, 15. 7 Forsvarsdepartementet. Kampkraft og bærekraft. Langtidsplan for forsvarssektoren. Prop. 151 S (2015–​2016), 2016, 29. 8 Forsvarsdepartementet. Ekspertgruppen for Forsvaret av Norge: Et felles løft, 2015, 52. 9 T. Nilsen. “Russian navy to hold live-​fire exercise off Northern Norway.” The Barents Observer. August 6, 2019. https://​thebarentsobserver.com/​en/​security/​ 2019/ ​ 0 8/ ​ r ussian- ​ n avy- ​ a nnounces- ​ c omprehensive-​ exercise-​ n orthern-​ n orway; “Bekymret over russisk storøvelse.” Forsvaret. August 14, 2019. https://​forsvaret. no/​aktuelt/​russisk-​stor%C3%B8velse; “Ocean Shield exercise lasted one week longer than expected.” TASS. August 19, 2019. https://​tass.com/​defense/​1074004. 10 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, 15. 11 Ibid, 6. 12 Ibid., 6–​7. 13 Ibid. 14 J.J. Hols. “Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv.” Internasjonal politikk, 24, 5 (1966): 463–​490. 15 Forsvarsdepartementet, Forsvarskommisjonen av 1990, NOU 1992, 12. 16 O. Bogen and M. Håkenstad. Balansegang: Forsvarets omstilling etter den kalde krigen. Oslo: Dreyer, 2015, 32. 17 S. Diesen. Fornyelse eller forvitring? Forsvaret mot 2020. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2011, 21. 18 S.V. Rottem. “The ambivalent ally: Norway in the new NATO.” Contemporary Security Policy, 28, 3 (2007): 619–​37; S. Ulriksen. Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: militærmakt eller folkeforsvar? Oslo: Pax, 2002; Bogen and Håkenstad, 2015; K. Egeberg. Fredsnasjonen Norge. Oslo: Kagge Forlag, 2017; N. Græger. Norsk forsvarspolitikk: Territorialforsvar og internasjonal innsats 1990–​ 2015. Oslo: Spartacus, 2017. 19 H.O. Sandnes. “Ryktene om luftmaktens allmakt er nok noe overdrevet.” in Luftmaktstenkningens ‘enfant terrible’: Festskrift til Nils E. Naastad på 60-​ årsdagen, eds. Ø. Espenes and O.J. Maaø, 73–​82. Trondheim: Tapir Akademisk Forlag, 2012. 20 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan 2001–​2014. Official Norwegian Reports NOU 2016, 8. www.regjeringen.no/​contentassets/​09faceca099c4b8bac85ca8495e12d2d/​en-​gb/​ pdfs/​nou201620160008000engpdfs.pdf. 21 “Afghanistan,” Forsvaret.no. https://​forsvaret.no/​fakta/​aktivitet/​internasjonale-​ operasjoner/​Afghanistan. 22 Four of which will remain in the US for training purposes.

Norway, NATO, and the Northern flank  83 23 Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016, 22. 24 Ibid., 5. 25 Forsvaret, 2018, Årsrapport 2017, 10, https://​forsvaret.no/​fakta_​/​Forsvaret Documents/​Forsvarets_​aarsrapport_​2017.pdf. 26 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017, 29. 27 Egeberg, 2017 (n. 16 above). 28 P.S. Hilde and H.F. Widerberg. “Norway and NATO: The art of balancing,” in Common or Divided Security? German and Norwegian Perspectives on Euro-​ Atlantic Security, R.M. Allers, C. Masala and R. Tamnes eds., 199–​215. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014; H.F. Widerberg. “Rallying for reassurance: a study of North Atlantic Treaty Organization diplomacy.” European Security 24, 2 (2015): 183–​202. 29 United States Marine Corps Headquarters. Prepositioning Programs Handbook, 3rd ed., 2015, www.iandl.marines.mil/​Portals/​85/​Docs/​Division%20LP%20Documents/ ​PrepositioningProgramsHandbook_​3dEdition_​2015.pdf. 30 Folk og Forsvar. Meningsmålinger om Forsvaret og internasjonalt samarbeid. 2019, www.folkogforsvar.no/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2019/​10/​Meningsm%C3%A5linger-​ om-​Forsvaret-​og-​internasjonalt-​samarbeid-​august-​2019-​3-​1.pdf. 31 SVs arbeidsprogram 2017–​2021, www.sv.no/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2013/​12/​170816_​ Arbeidsprogram-​2017–​2021.pdf. 32 SVs prinsipprogram 2019–​2023, www.sv.no/​prinsipprogram/​. 33 Rødts arbeidsprogram 2017–​2023, https://​rødt.no/​arbeidsprogram. 34 Ibid. 35 Røds prinsipprogram 2019, https://​rødt.no/​prinsipprogram. 36 Folk og Forsvar, 2019. 37 N. Berglund. “Government open to more US troops.” News in English. June 12, 2018. www.newsinenglish.no/​2018/​06/​12/​government-​open-​to-​more-​us-​troops/​. 38 H. Eilertsen. “Russia’s Embassy in Norway: –​Gravely Concerned.” The High North News. June 15, 2018. www.highnorthnews.com/​en/​russias-​embassy​norway-​gravely-​concerned. 39 J. Wilhelmsen and K. Gjerde. “Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 9 (2018): 382–​407; J. Wilhelmsen and K. Gjerde. “Hva er en klok NATO-​politikk overfor Russland?” Aftenposten. June 21, 2018. www.aftenposten.no/​meninger/​debatt/​i/​oRGkvK/​hva-​ er-​en-​klok-​nato-​politikk-​overfor-​russland-​julie-​wilhelmsen-​og-​kristian-​lundby-​ gjerde; J. Børresen. “Økt militær aktivitet i nordområdene øker risikoen for kriser og konflikt.” Dagbladet. December 11, 2018. www.dagbladet.no/​kultur/​okt-​ militaer-​aktivitet-​i-​nordomradene-​oker-​risikoen-​for-​kriser-​og-​konflikt/​70550527. 40 H. Elvenes. “USA sikkerhetsgaranti er avgjørende for Norges sikkerhet.” Nordlys –​Nordnorsk debatt. June 11, 2018. https://​nordnorskdebatt.no/​article/​usa-​ sikkerhetsgaranti-​avgjorende; H. Elvenes. “Mer alliert øving –​en takk til ‘Onkel Sam’.” Nordlys –​Nordnorsk debatt. June 19, 2018. https://​nordnorskdebatt.no/​article/​mer-​alliert-​oving-​en-​takk-​0. 41 “Halve befolkningen støtter flere amerikanske soldater i Norge.” Nye Troms. July 25, 2018. https://​nye-​troms.no/​halve-​befolkningen-​stotter-​flere-​amerikanske-​ soldater-​i-​norge/​19.9154. 42 S. Prestegård and M. Melgård, “–​Vekker for norske politikere.” Dagsavisen. January 20, 2017. www.dagsavisen.no/​nyheter/​innenriks/​vekker-​for-​norske-​ politikere-​1.915135; O. Nygård. “Jo mere vi er sammen –​med Onkel Sam.”

84  Karsten Friis Nordlys –​Nordnorsk debatt. June 12, 2018. https://​nordnorskdebatt.no/​article/​ jo-​mere-​vi-​sammen-​onkel-​sam. 43 E. Mowinckel Petterson. “–​Skal allierte nasjoner drive MPA-​virksomhet for Norge?” Vesterålen Online. June 7, 2018. www.vol.no/​nyheter/​andoy/​2018/​06/​07/​–​-​ Skal-​allierte-​nasjoner-​drive-​MPA-​virksomhet-​for-​Norge-​16871179.ece; J. Aune. “Forsvaret: Derfor er amerikanske overvåkningsfly i Nord-​Norge.” Vesterålen Online. August 7, 2019. www.ht.no/​nyheter/​2019/​08/​07/​Forsvaret-​Derfor-​er-​ amerikanske-​overv%C3%A5kningsfly-​i-​Nord-​Norge-​19647494.ece. 44 “Takknemlig for Norges ja til flere styrker.” Aldrimer.no. June 14, 2018. www. aldrimer.no/​takknemlig-​for-​norges-​ja-​til-​flere-​styrker/​. 45 S. Tallaksen. “Søker alternativer til USA.” Klassekampen. June 15, 2017. www. klassekampen.no/​article/​20170615/​ARTICLE/​170619978. 46 “Massiv støtte til atomvåpenforbud i befolkningen.” Norsk Folkehjelp. April 3, 2019. www.folkehjelp.no/​Nyheter/​Nyhetsarkiv/​2019/​Massiv-​stoette-​til-​ atomvaapenforbud-​i-​befolkningen. 47 G. Stavrum. “NATO-​ sjef Stoltenberg advarer mot atomvåpenforbud fra Arbeiderpartiet.’ Nattavisen Nyheter. April 5, 2019. www.nettavisen.no/​nyheter/​ nato-​ s jef-​ s toltenberg-​ a dvarer-​ m ot-​ atomvapenforbud- ​ f ra- ​ a rbeiderpartiet/​ 3423652339.html. 48 Part of this increase is due to new standards for measuring defence expenditures in NATO, which allowed Norway to add about NOK 5bn to the defence budget in 2019. The 2014 figure is not adjusted for inflation. 49 T. Støbakk. “Jens legger press på Norge –​avfeier Ernas forsvarsunnskyldning: Vekst er ingen ulempe, sier NATOs generalsekretær.” Dagbladet. February 5, 2018. www.dagbladet.no/​ n yheter/​ j ens-​ l egger-​ p ress-​ p a-​ n orge–​ avfeier-​ e rnas-​ forsvarsunnskyldning/​69409867. 50 A.B. Johnsen and S.S. Skiphamn. “Klar melding fra velgerne: Norge må opp på NATOs prosentmål.” VG. March 10, 2017. www.vg.no/​nyheter/​innenriks/​i/​ G7eOm/​klar-​melding-​fra-​velgerne-​norge-​maa-​opp-​paa-​natos-​prosentmaal. 51 Folk og Forsvar. Meningsmålinger om Forsvaret og internasjonalt samarbeid. www. folkogforsvar.no/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2019/​10/​Meningsm%C3%A5linger-​om-​ Forsvaret-​og-​internasjonalt-​samarbeid-​august-​2019-​3-​1.pdf. 52 “Norge deltar i EUs forsvarsforskning.” Pressemelding. February 18, 2019. www. regjeringen.no/​no/​dep/​fd/​id380/​. 53 G. Chazan and M. Peel. “US warns against European joint military project.” Financial Times. May 14, 2019. www.ft.com/​content/​ad16ce08-​763b-​11e9-​bbad-​ 7c18c0ea0201. 54 “Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-​ dead.” The Economist. November 7, 2019. www.economist.com/​europe/​2019/​11/​07/​emmanuel-​ macron-​warns-​europe-​nato-​is-​becoming-​brain-​dead. 55 “Germany’s Maas unveils vision for post-​Atlantic Europe.” Euractive.com. June 14, 2018. www.euractiv.com/​section/​defence-​policy/​news/​germanys-​maas-​unveils-​ vision-​for-​post-​atlantic-​europe/​; “Germany’s Foreign Minister calls for ‘A Real European Security and Defense Union’.” Atlantic Council. June 15, 2018. www. atlanticcouncil.org/​blogs/​natosource/​germany-​s-​foreign-​minister-​calls-​for-​a-​real-​ european-​security-​and-​defense-​union/​.

5  Denmark in NATO From laggard to leader to loyal? Peter Viggo Jakobsen1

Introduction If this chapter had been written 10 or 20 years ago, it would have read like a classic Hans Christian Andersen fairy tale. It would have been the story of Denmark transforming itself from an ugly NATO duckling fearful of entrapment to a beautiful blue swan renowned and respected within the Alliance for playing leading roles in NATO expansion, out-​of-​area operations, and in the formulation of its comprehensive approach to conflict management.2 But today, in the aftermath of the Alliance’s 70th birthday, this leadership position is crumbling due to Denmark’s unwillingness to spend 2 percent of its GDP on defense and due to capability problems resulting from 30 years of defense cutbacks. It looks increasingly unlikely that Danish decision-​makers will succeed in retaining Denmark’s status as a core member of the Alliance with a special relationship with the United States without spending significantly more on defense. This chapter will demonstrate how the Danish NATO membership has gone through three distinct phases: the Cold War period characterized by fear of entrapment and a long list of national caveats; a second phase starting in the mid-​1990s characterized by leadership and a special relationship with the US; and the contemporary one, initiated by Russia’s use of force in Ukraine, in which Denmark is fighting a losing battle to preserve its leadership position with a special relationship with the US on the cheap. The analysis has three parts. Part one presents the analytical framework that will structure the empirical analysis of Denmark’s evolving relationship with NATO in part two. Part three summarizes the main findings and assesses their implications for the future Denmark–​NATO relationship.

Making sense of Denmark’s NATO policy Three explanatory drivers stand out as the most potent in the existing literature on Denmark and NATO: 1 The need to maintain the American security guarantee without undesirable entrapment.

86  Peter Viggo Jakobsen 2 The attempt to obtain it on the cheap. 3 A post-​Cold War desire to establish and maintain high status in the alliance and a special relationship with the US. Denmark joined the Alliance in 1949 to obtain protection from the rising Soviet threat. The German occupation 1940–​1945 had convinced Danish decision-​makers that neutrality could not keep Denmark safe from the USSR, but they feared that the alliance membership would entrap the country in a future war between the USSR and the United States. Glenn Snyder has usefully conceptualized this alliance dilemma as a balance between abandonment and entrapment. On the one hand, a state needs to invest enough in an alliance to avoid abandonment by the other members in the event of an attack. On the other, it must avoid entrapment in conflicts involving other alliance members that it has no national interest in.3 Striking the right balance between entrapment and abandonment has been the principal factor shaping Danish NATO policy since 1949.4 A close second has been the strong desire to obtain the American security guarantee on the cheap.5 Denmark has never spent the money on defense that the US and NATO have demanded, nor has Denmark ever met the force requirements emanating from NATO’s biannual capability reviews in full. This second driver is in accordance with the free-​riding thesis emphasized in the alliance literature. The free-​riding thesis does not expect states to invest more in alliances than their national interests warrant.6 In the Danish case, this has translated into not spending more on defense than absolutely necessary to keep the US engaged in the Alliance. The third and final policy driver emerged in the post-​Cold War era:  the desire to maintain a newly won status as a “core member” of the Alliance with a special relationship with the United States. Denmark established this status by making disproportionate high-​risk force contributions to NATO-​ and US-​led operations from 1990 onwards with very few caveats. Danish decisionmakers exploited the opportunity created by NATO’s involvement in out-​of-​area operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan to establish Denmark as a top-​force contributor (measured per capita). They became addicted to the status and access that this new position generated in NATO and in Washington, and maintaining this position has become an objective in its own right in Denmark’s NATO policy since the second half of the 1990s. This driver draws on insights from the literature on status-​seeking, which expects states to do things that a rational choice perspective would regard as counterintuitive or irrational in order to protect or enhance their status within an alliance or other groupings.7 In the analysis that follows, I  use interaction among these three drivers to explain the evolution of Denmark’s NATO policy since 1949. Domestic party politics will not studied as a separate driver for the simple reason that Danish foreign and security policy has been characterized by an unusually

Denmark in NATO  87 high degree of political agreement since 1945.8 The principal exception to this rule is the so-​called footnote period in the 1980s, where a majority in parliament forced the government to insert footnotes in NATO communiqués opposing the Alliance’s nuclear policies. Other than that, broad majorities in Parliament have supported Danish NATO policy, which is why Denmark is analyzed as a unitary actor.

Cold War laggard 1949–​1989: national caveats galore Denmark joined NATO with considerable reluctance. The experience with the German occupation during World War II meant that neutrality was not considered an option in the face of the rising Soviet threat. The need for outside assistance to deter Soviet aggression was generally accepted, but there was considerable concern that alignment with the US would entrap Denmark in a future war between the two great powers. The Danish preference was therefore a smaller defense pact with Sweden and Norway in the hope that this would be sufficient to deter Soviet aggression and keep Denmark and the Nordic region out of war. Julius Bomholt, chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee in Parliament, illustrated this line of thinking with his argument that membership of the Atlantic Pact would ensure immediate entrapment in a war, whereas a Scandinavian alliance would give Denmark a 10 percent chance of avoiding it.9 When disagreements between Sweden and Norway caused the negotiations concerning the Scandinavian Defense Union to break down in February 1949, joining NATO became Denmark’s only option. The US was aware of the Danish fear of entrapment and did its outmost to ease it. During a meeting in mid-​March 1949, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, explained the Danish Foreign Minister, Gustav Rasmussen, that NATO would be a defensive alliance based on the principle of deterrence, the purpose of which is to avoid war. He also pointed out that Article 5 in the Washington Treaty, NATO’s founding document, would not entail an automatic obligation for Denmark to go to war in the event of an attack upon another alliance member. He used the example that the US would not expect Denmark to go to war if Alaska came under attack, but that Denmark could “take other appropriate measures.” Finally, Acheson reassured Rasmussen that the US would not seek military bases in Denmark.10 This crucial meeting between the two foreign ministers just before Denmark decided to join the Alliance nicely captures the dynamics characterizing the Danish–​ NATO relationship during the Cold War: to avoid abandonment Denmark wanted American protection against the Soviet threat for lack of a better alternative, but it sought to keep its defense spending, its obligations, and the risk of entrapment to a minimum. To avoid abandonment, Denmark integrated its military forces into the Alliance’s command structures joining NATO’s Europe Command in 1951 and the integrated command for the Baltic Approaches in 1961. The

88  Peter Viggo Jakobsen rearmament of West Germany improved the balance of power in the Danish-​ Baltic region vis-​à-​vis the Warsaw Pact, and intimate military cooperation with West German forces significantly reduced the Danish fear of abandonment, which had been considerable until then.11 In addition, Denmark signed a bilateral agreement with the US giving the Americans unrestricted access to bases in Greenland. The Danish government also accepted US deployment of nuclear weapons in Greenland between 1957 and 1965, an acceptance that was kept secret until 1995.12 Finally, the Danish acquisition of 58 F-​16s in 1975 was also strongly motivated by the desire to meet American demands for burden-​sharing and reduce the risk of abandonment.13 Denmark balanced these steps to avoid abandonment with a series of caveats aimed at reducing the risk of entrapment. Along with Italy, Denmark was the only NATO member refusing to offer any military contribution to the Korean War, opting to send a hospital ship with Red Cross staff instead.14 From 1952 onwards, Denmark kept the island of Bornholm in the Baltic Sea off limits to non-​Baltic NATO forces and refrained from participating in NATO exercises east of Bornholm to avoid provoking the USSR. This restriction followed from a promise made to Moscow in 1946 to obtain a withdrawal of the Soviet troops that took control of the island in the final days of World War II.15 In 1953, Denmark refused an American request for air force bases in Jutland, and in 1957 Denmark said no to the deployment of nuclear weapons on Danish soil in peacetime. The decision to say no to air bases was facilitated by a Norwegian no to such a request the year before, and Denmark and Norway joined forces in refusing the peacetime deployment on nuclear weapons on their soil.16 This policy was maintained throughout the Cold War, and Denmark, again inspired by Norway, said no to NATO requests for the prepositioning of heavy equipment in 1982.17 The Danish opposition to NATO’s deployment of intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe in the 1980s also stemmed from fear of entrapment. Its proponents argued that NATO had sufficient nuclear missiles in Europe to deter a Soviet attack, and that deployment of additional missiles served to fuel a nuclear arms race increasing the risk of war.18 Its domestic setting was a parliamentarian situation without precedent in which a minority government let a majority impose NATO policy upon it without stepping down and calling an election, which would have been the normal procedure.19 The majority in this way forced the government to insert 22 footnotes in official NATO communiqués between 1982 and 1986 distancing Denmark from the missile deployment.20 In sum, the military integration in NATO command structures and the willingness to give the Americans carte blanche in Greenland indicate a fear of abandonment. Similarly, the many caveats and the opposition to NATO’s nuclear policy in the 1980s indicate a considerable fear of entrapment. After the rearmament of Germany, which improved the balance of power in the Baltic region significantly, the fear of entrapment became stronger than the fear of abandonment.

Denmark in NATO  89 The second policy driver, the strong determination to obtain the American security guarantee on the cheap, also indicates that the fear of entrapment was greater than the fear of abandonment. A  strong fear of abandonment would have induced Denmark to meet NATO’s capability and spending targets; but this never happened. For most of the Cold War, Denmark spent a lower percentage of its GDP on defense than all other members, except Canada, Iceland (which does not have any armed forces), and Luxembourg.21 The Danish unwillingness to meet NATO’s capability and spending targets resulted in a constant tug of war with NATO defense planners and the US. On a number of occasions, American representatives directly threatened to abandon Denmark unless spending increased. In 1980, US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown told his Danish counterpart Poul Søgaard in a letter that he would find it “extremely difficult to justify to Congress and the American public commitments to reinforce Denmark” in an emergency unless Danish defense spending increased.22 Such pressure usually worked, but only to a degree. Ringsmose finds that strong US pressure preceded all increases in Danish defense spending in the 1949–​1989 period. Absent such pressure, spending usually declined.23 However, not even threats of abandonment could persuade Danish decision-​makers to increase defense spending to the level desired by the US. This suggests that Danish decision-​makers feared entrapment more; or that they perceived the American threats of abandonment as empty. Our third policy-​driver, Denmark’s status in the Alliance, did not carry much weight during the Cold War. Denmark spent most of the Cold War in relatively bad standing in the US and in the Alliance more generally. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff characterized Denmark as “the weakest member in morale” in a memorandum to the US Secretary of Defense in 1953,24 and Norwegian officials regarded Denmark’s low spending and military preparedness as a problem in the 1950s.25 In 1980, the poor state of Denmark’s armed forces and its low military spending induced the Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Simonet to coin the term “Denmarkisation” to describe a country wanting NATO protection without being willing to pay for it.26 The term was used widely in the 1980s and the perception of Denmark as a free rider was further compounded by its footnote policy. This policy was heavily criticized by US, the NATO Secretary General, the UK, and other alliance members.27 A representative example is the statement by US Deputy Defense Secretary William Taft made in 1988: [Denmark has] a very unenviable reputation in the area of burden sharing … the burden of maintaining the defense capabilities needed to deter aggression against Denmark is carried less and less by Danes and more by her allies. There is no reason why this should be the case.28 Danish decision-​makers rejected accusations that they were free riding, and they were very creative in their efforts to justify why Denmark did carry its

90  Peter Viggo Jakobsen fair share of the collective defense burden. In the 1950s, Danish governments argued that increased defense spending would undermine public support for NATO and strengthen support for the Danish communist party. They also invoked the bases made available to the US in Greenland, the need to show restraint to prevent Russia from increasing its pressure on Finland and Sweden, the costs related to the Home Guard, which did not count in the NATO calculation of defense spending and, from the 1970s on, the considerable sums spent on Danish development assistance.29 It did not worry Danish decision-​makers too much that their arguments carried little weight with the other Alliance members; keeping defense spending low was more important than status. The overriding priority was to achieve protection on the cheap and avoid entrapment. This even held true during the footnote period, when US and allied criticism culminated and direct threats of abandonment became frequent. In view of Defense Minister Hans Engell (1982–​1987): We got through the Cold War by the skin of our teeth. It was not pretty but we were never in danger of being thrown out of NATO. The American bases in Greenland … were too important for the United States for that.30

NATO leader 1990–​2014: damn entrapment, full speed ahead The collapse of the USSR fundamentally changed the interaction and the relative importance of the three drivers shaping Denmark’s NATO policy. The Danish fear of abandonment increased, the fear of entrapment disappeared and status-​seeking emerged as a policy objective in its own right. The only constant was the determination to obtain NATO’s security guarantee on the cheap. The fear of entrapment in a war with Russia and the fear of entrapment in out-​of-​area conflicts disappeared completely. As the Cold War ended, Denmark became a leading proponent of Baltic independence and pushed hard to get the Baltic countries admitted into the Alliance in the first round of NATO enlargement in 1999. While this failed, persistent Danish lobbying helped pave the way for Baltic membership in the second round of enlargement in 2004. The strong Danish support for the Baltic states not only upset Russia, but also key NATO allies, such as Italy, France, Germany, and the US, who wanted to go slower in order not to provoke Russia.31 Denmark also lifted the self-​imposed restrictions related to military activities in the Baltic Sea.32 It is hardly surprising that Danish decision-​ makers stopped worrying about entrapment in a military conflict with Russia once the perceived military threat disappeared. However, it is surprising that the Danish fear of entrapment in out-​of-​area conflicts also evaporated. Unlike most other NATO members, who sought to reduce this form of entrapment by imposing a variety of national caveats on their participation in NATO and US-​led out-​ of-​area operations, Denmark adopted a plug-​and-​play policy making their contributions available to the US and the Alliance with very few caveats.33

Denmark in NATO  91 The newfound Danish willingness to risk entrapment in out-​ of-​ area conflicts can only be explained by taking the increased fear of abandonment and the determination to improve Denmark’s status in NATO and the US into account. The end of the Cold War increased the Danish fear of American abandonment for two reasons. First, Europe lost much of its strategic significance for the US. Second, the rapid drawdown of the American forces in Europe in (280,000 in 1989; 100,000 in 1994; 58,000 in 1998) made abandonment seem far more likely than at any time since the early 1950s.34 This made NATO survival a Danish priority. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs report, outlining the principles guiding Danish foreign and security policy in the new era, thus characterized NATO as “the irreplaceable guarantor of Denmark’s territorial integrity” and “the central defense organization in Europe.” NATO remained essential because it “prevented renationalization of defense policies” and “kept the United States engaged in the security of Europe.”35 The increased fear of US abandonment goes a long way toward explaining why Denmark transformed its armed forces in accordance with US and NATO preferences and became a top-​contributor (measured per capita) to US-​and NATO-​led out-​of-​area operations. In the 1993–​1994 Defense Agreement, Denmark made units from all three branches as well as the Special Forces available for NATO’s new reaction forces.36 Denmark prioritized these expeditionary capabilities in its force structure and created a new international 4,500-​strong army brigade. The ambition was to create the capacity to deploy and sustain 1,500 army personnel abroad on a continuous basis. Although this target was never achieved, the international brigade enabled Denmark to become a top contributor measured per capita to NATO’s operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the course of the 1990s. When the US in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks put pressure on its NATO allies to provide more combat capable forces for out-​of-​area missions, Denmark scrapped its remaining territorial defense structures. As Defense Minister Søren Gade told NATO in 2005: Today Denmark has deployed more than 1,000 troops to international operations in primarily Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. That should be compared to the size of the Danish population –​which is just above 5 million. So already today, we carry a fair share of the burden … But we intend to do more! … By transforming our armed forces, we will be able to double our capacity to participate in international operations from 1,000 to 2,000 troops.37 With its 2005–​2009 Defense Agreement Denmark signaled an ambition to go beyond the so-​called usability targets set at the NATO summit in Prague in 2004. The usability targets held that 40 percent of the land forces should be deployable; and 8 percent deployed abroad at any given time. Denmark aimed for 60  percent deployability and a continuous international deployment of 10 percent.38

92  Peter Viggo Jakobsen The Danish disregard for entrapment in out-​of-​area conflicts in the post-​ Cold War era is remarkable. Denmark supported NATO’s involvement in out-​ of-​area operations from the start. It made ships available for NATO’s naval embargo against Yugoslavia (1992–​1996), and the Danish army provided battalions for all NATO operations launched in former Yugoslavia from 1995 onwards. The Royal Danish Air Force joined the fray in 1999 when Danish F-​16s conducted bombing missions as part of the NATO air campaign over Kosovo. After 9/​11, Denmark increased its support for NATO and US-​led operations contributing to the NATO operations in Afghanistan (2003-​), Iraq (2004-​), Kosovo (1999-​), and Libya (2011), and the US-​led coalitions of the willing overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq (2003–​2007) and defeating the Islamic State in Iraq/​Syria (2014–​). This complete disregard for entrapment in out-​of-​area operations cannot be explained solely by fear of abandonment. The fear of NATO and US abandonment was markedly higher in Norway than in Denmark, but this did not induce the government in Oslo to give the same priority to out-​ of-​ area operations (see the Norway chapter in this volume). The strong Danish involvement in out-​of-​area operations also stemmed from a desire to repair the free rider reputation that Denmark had acquired in NATO and Washington in the 1980s. Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-​ Jensen (1982–​1993), Minister of Defense Hans Hækkerup (1993–​2000), and Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2001–​2009) were all determined to improve the Danish standing in the Alliance and Washington, and they used force contributions to US-​led coalitions and UN and NATO operations as their principal instrument to do so. The involvement in out-​of-​area operations was a continuation of the traditional Danish support for UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, but it went beyond it by supporting operations mandated to use force beyond self-​defense. The move toward peace enforcement and war fighting started in 1990 with the dispatch of a warship to enforce the UN embargo against Iraq in the Persian Gulf. A crucial next step was the pioneering decision to deploy main battle tanks to the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia in 1993. Denmark was the first nation ever to make tanks available to the UN, and they successfully defeated attacking Bosnian Serb forces in an engagement on April 29, 1994. The skirmish made international headlines and gave Denmark’s standing among its NATO allies a major boost. The new Danish NATO policy was highly appreciated by the Alliance, and Denmark was increasingly praised as “role model” by the US and other NATO members with respect to force contributions,39 force transformation,40 and the comprehensive approach to conflict management operations.41 US President Bill Clinton’s visit to Copenhagen in 1997 marked the beginning of a “special relationship” between Denmark and the United States –​at least in the eyes of Danish decision-​makers.42 Danish Prime Ministers became regular visitors to the White House and all serving US Presidents visited Denmark in the 1997–​2016 period.43 Danish decision-​makers became addicted to praise

Denmark in NATO  93 and privileged access to US decision-​makers, and force contributions took center stage in their efforts to uphold the new status as a core member of the Alliance with a special relationship with the US.44 This newfound craving for status explains why Denmark made combat contributions without caveats its trademark in the post-​2001 era. Denmark was one of only five US allies contributing to the attack on Iraq in 2003; one of only six NATO members deploying combat troops to southern Afghanistan in 2006; one of only eight NATO members dropping bombs over Libya in 2011; the only nation together with France supporting the US threat of air strikes against the Syrian regime in 2013; one of only six NATO members dropping bombs over Iraq in 2014–​2015 and over Iraq/​Syria in 2016;58 and one of a handful of NATO members allowing their Special Forces to operate inside Syria in 2017. Denmark suffered more fatalities measured per capita than any other troop contributor to NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan, Danish F-​ 16s dropped 11 percent (821) of the smart munitions dropped during NATO’s air campaign against Libya, and they were second only to the United States dropping 102 smart munitions in the initial US-​led Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. In 2014–​2015, Danish F-​16s dropped more smart munitions (503) than the British and French aircraft operating over Iraq.45 The determination to keep defense spending to a minimum supported the post-​ Cold War transformation of the Danish NATO policy. Danish policymakers lost no time reaping the peace dividend when the Cold War ended. Denmark cut defense spending in proportion of GDP continuously between 1992 and 2017 (see Table 5.1). As was the case during the Cold War, Denmark ignored demands from NATO and the US for increased defense spending.46 However, the continued unwillingness to spend on defense did not affect Denmark’s status adversely, because the other NATO members reduced spending as well, and because Denmark transformed its armed forces in accordance with US and NATO demands and made disproportionate high-​ risk force contributions to NATO and US-​led operations. In sum, Denmark’s journey from laggard to leader in NATO resulted from the disappearance of the fear of entrapment vis-​à-​vis Russia and out-​of-​area conflicts, increased fear of American abandonment and a desire to improve Denmark’s status in Washington, which over time became an important policy driver in its own right. Denmark still sought to obtain the American security guarantee in NATO on the cheap, and managed to meet the new American and NATO demands for increased involvement in out-​of-​area conflicts while cutting defense spending by engaging in radical force transformation.

NATO loyalist? 2014–​today: leadership status under pressure All good things end. In 2014, the Russian use of force in the Ukraine put increased defense spending at the top on the Alliance agenda. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO member states committed to work toward spending 2  percent of GDP on defense by 2024, and since taking office in 2017, US

94  Peter Viggo Jakobsen Table 5.1 Continuous cuts in Danish defense spending and force structure 1990 Defense budget 16,143 (million DKK) Defense budget 2 percent in proportion of GDP Active troops Total: 31,700 -​of which Army: 19,400 (of which 9,900 conscripts) Navy: 5,400 (900 of which conscripts) Air: 6,900 (700 of which conscripts)

2017 24,961 1.16 percent Total: 16,100 -​of which Army: 8,200 Navy: 2,000 Air: 2,700 Joint: 3,200 (conscripts no longer listed due to very low numbers)

Sources:  Military Balance 2018 (IISS London, 2018):  96; NATO, Information on Defense Expenditures. www.nato.int/​cps/​ic/​natohq/​topics_​49198.htm.

President Trump has repeatedly threatened to abandon allies unwilling to meet this spending target. Trump’s threats of abandonment did not have much policy-​impact in Denmark. Part of the reason has to do with the fact that the Trump administration has increased America’s military commitment to NATO in terms of both funds and personnel since 2017.47 However, the principal reason for the lack of concern was the perception that Russia did not constitute a military threat. Since Danish decision-​makers perceived the risk of war between NATO and Russia as remote, there was no immediate need to worry about either abandonment or entrapment. The annual threat assessments prepared by the Danish Defense Intelligence Service since 2014 characterize Russia a “major security policy challenge,” but a conventional military attack on NATO member states is considered “highly unlikely.”48 This threat assessment also made Danish decision-​makers unwilling to increase defense spending to the level demanded by NATO and the US. They continued to cut defense spending until 2017, and the 2018–​2023 Defense Agreement of January 2018 adopted a minimalist interpretation of the 2 percent spending pledge. It met the NATO requirement to invest 20 percent of the defense budget on new equipment as well as NATO requests for an army brigade, air defense missiles, and anti-​submarine capabilities. But it only increased Danish defense spending to 1.3  percent of GDP by 2024.49 The announcement of the agreement was accompanied by a series of factsheets and a Youtube video intended to drive home the message that 1.3 percent was sufficient and fair, because Denmark’s defense spending measured per capita was in top-​five of the Alliance, and because Denmark got more military output in terms of equipment and force contributions out of its defense spending than

Denmark in NATO  95 most other allies.50 The Danish Ministry of Defense even paid an American think tank 65,000 dollars to write a short nine-​page issue brief praising the Danish defense effort and its strong support for the US and NATO. In violation of American law, the report initially failed to mention that it was paid for by the Danish Ministry of Defense. It also failed to mention that Denmark spent far less than 2 percent of GDP on defense.51 The Danish Strategic Communications campaign failed. The US subjected the Danish government to a barrage of criticism to push it to increase spending further. Denmark was among the ten NATO countries receiving a letter from President Trump prior to the NATO Summit in July 2018 demanding that they meet their obligation to spend 2  percent on defense.52 At the summit, Trump’s verbal abuse of allies spending less than 2  percent shocked and enraged the Danish Minister of Defense Hjort Frederiksen53 and Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen. Rasmussen retorted during the meeting that Trump was unfair, because Denmark had lost the highest number of soldiers in Afghanistan per capita.54 Yet, the US pressure continued unabated. US officials demanded a credible plan increasing Danish defense spending to 2 percent by 2024. Failure to produce such a plan by January 2019, they warned, would have serious consequences for Denmark’s standing in NATO and its bilateral relationship with the US.55 In January 2019, one year into 2018–​2023 agreement, Danish decision-​ makers yielded to the pressure.56 Spending increased to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2024. Most of the 0.2 percent increase resulted from the inclusion of existing expenses that had hitherto not been included in the defense budget such as pensions that other NATO members, including the US, also counted in their defense budgets. Yet, the revised budget also included 1.5 billion DDK worth of new money.57 The chosen spending level illustrates the traditional Danish determination to obtain American protection on the cheap. Yet, it is noteworthy that status-​ seeking now determines the definition of cheap. Preserving Denmark’s status as a “core member” of the Alliance was explicitly stated as an objective of the 2018–​2023 Defense Agreement, and it has been part and parcel of the official Danish NATO narrative throughout the 2014–​2019 period.58 That the desire for status preservation determined the initial 1.3 percent spending level is clear from Defense Minister Hjort Frederiksen’s explanation that it was chosen to put Denmark on a par with Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. He added that it “would begin to hurt if they [Germany, the Netherland and Norway] ran away from us.”59 In February 2019, Hjort Frederiksen justified the decision to increase spending to 1.5 percent with the argument that these countries had signaled a willingness to increase their spending: “the countries that we have compared ourselves with have moved and then it is natural that we move as well.”60 The 1.5  percent spending level is unlikely to preserve Denmark’s post-​ Cold War leadership status in the eyes of NATO defense planners and most importantly, the US. NATO defense planners have criticized the state of the

96  Peter Viggo Jakobsen Danish armed forces in the biannual capability reviews since 2014. The 2018 review concluded: a sustained increase in funding and continuing political will is required well out into the medium term. If this extra effort is not forthcoming, then other Allies will potentially need to carry a part of Denmark’s share of the Alliance burden, particularly in the case of large-​scale, high-​end operations against a peer adversary.61 The American pressure has also continued. In the run-​up to the December 2019 London Summit, US representatives told Danish decision-​makers to prepare a credible plan for increasing defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2024, suggesting that they buy more F-​35s and increase surveillance in the Arctic.62 In response, the Danish government increased its force contributions to NATO, committed a warship to a French-​led US-​desired naval operation in the Strait of Hormuz and earmarked 1.5 billion DKK to improve surveillance and anti-​submarine warfare capacities in the Arctic.63 Defense spending stayed at 1.5  percent of GDP, however. Denmark escaped public criticism from President Trump at the Summit, but the message from his administration has been clear and consistent:  Denmark must continue to make force contributions and spend 2  percent of GDP to carry its fair share of the defense burden. The Danish unwillingness to meet this spending target will most likely result in the loss of leadership status and the special relationship with the US. Status as a NATO loyalist is probably the most that Danish decision-​makers can hope for in the current environment.

Conclusion This article explains the evolution of Danish NATO policy in the 70-​year period between 1949 and 2019 by means of three explanatory factors:  (1) the need to maintain the American security guarantee without entrapment, (2) the desire to obtain the security guarantee on the cheap, and (3) a post-​ Cold War desire to establish and maintain high status the alliance and a special relationship with the US. Table 5.2 sums up the findings. It shows that Denmark entered the Alliance reluctantly to obtain protection from a perceived Soviet threat fearing that NATO membership might entrap it in the war it sought to avoid. Fear of abandonment induced Denmark to integrate itself in NATO’s command structures and to give the US carte blanche to do whatever it wanted in Greenland. As a result, Denmark turned a blind eye when the US deployed nuclear weapons there in 1957. At the same time, fear of entrapment led Denmark to keep a low profile in the alliance and introduce a series of caveats aimed at reducing tension with the USSR. Denmark refused to make a military contribution to the Korean War, said no to NATO troops and nuclear weapons on Danish soil in peacetime and imposed restrictions on military activities in the Baltic

Denmark in NATO 97 Table 5.2 The evolution of the Danish–​NATO relationship Laggard 1949–​1989

Leader 1990–​2014

Defense As low as possible –​ As low as possible –​ spending increases result of heavy declining spending NATO/​US pressure throughout this period

National caveats

-​No NATO troops on Bornholm (1952) -​No Danish participation in naval exercises east of Bornholm (1952) -​No foreign troops on Danish soil in peace time (1953) and no nuclear weapons (1957) -​No prepositioning of heavy equipment on Danish soil in peacetime (1978) Opposition to NATO nuclear policy –​ footnotes in NATO communiqués (1980s) NATO/​US -​No to any form of support military contribution out of to the Korean War area (1950–​1951) -​Contribution of a civilian hospital ship with Red Cross staff to the Korean War (1951–​1953) Core goal -​US protection on the cheap without provoking the Soviet Union

NATO status

-​DK perceived by NATO force planners and many members, including the US, as a free-​rider not carrying its fair share of the defense burden

-​NONE: the bans on foreign troops, nuclear weapons and prepositioning lost their relevance, and the NATO restrictions related to Bornholm were officially lifted (2000)

-​Top per capita force contributor to NATO operations and US-​ led coalitions of the willing (COWs) -​Highest per capita losses in ISAF

Loyalist? 2014–​ As low as possible –​ increases result of heavy NATO/​US pressure -​Two percent GDP spending demand unfair and unnecessary

-​Top per capita force contributor to NATO operations and US-​led COWs

-​US protection on the -​US protection cheap with NATO core on the cheap member status and a with NATO special relationship core member with the US status and a special relationship with the US -​DK praised by the other -​DK perceived members and the US as by NATO force a role model punching planners and above its weight the US as a -​DK regarded as a leader member not with respect to Baltic carrying its fair NATO membership, share of the force transformation, defense burden the Comprehensive Approach and force contributions

98  Peter Viggo Jakobsen Sea. The Danish use of caveats culminated in the 1980s, when Denmark inserted footnotes in official NATO communiqués criticizing the deployment of new intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe. The footnote policy and the unwillingness to meet the Alliance’s capability and spending targets earned Denmark the reputation as a free-​rider in the 1980s. Maintaining a good standing in the Alliance and in Washington was not a priority among Danish decision-​makers during the Cold War. This changed in the post-​Cold War era. The Danish fear of entrapment disappeared together with the perceived military threat to Danish security. All restraints and caveats went the way of the USSR as Denmark took the lead in pushing for Baltic independence and early admission to the NATO alliance, transforming its armed forces to out-​of-​area operations, enhancing civil–​ military integration in conflict management operations (the comprehensive approach) and making combat contributions to NATO-​and US-​led out-​of-​ area operations. Increased fear of abandonment provides part of explanation of the newfound willingness to lead and exceed NATO and US demands, but only status-​seeking can explain why Denmark was willing to make the largest force contributions (measured per capita) to NATO-​and US-​led out-​ of-​area operations and suffer the highest number of fatalities (measured per capita) in Afghanistan. These contributions boosted Denmark’s standing in Washington and maintaining it became a policy objective in its own right. The only constant in Denmark’s NATO policy in the post-​Cold War era was its determination to keep defense spending to a minimum. Denmark cut its defense spending throughout this period and engaged in radical force transformation to generate its considerable force contributions to NATO-​and US-​ led operations. The new era ushered in by the Russian use of force in Ukraine pulled the rug from under Denmark’s leadership status by putting increased defense spending on top of NATO’s agenda. The Trump administration made NATO’s 2  percent of GDP defense spending target the sine qua non for states wanting high membership status and a special relationship with the US. In the Danish perspective, nothing fundamental changed in terms of the abandonment–​entrapment dilemma. President Trump’s threats of abandonment were not regarded as credible, and entrapment was not seen as a danger either, because Russia was not perceived as a direct military threat to the Alliance. However, the new situation made it impossible for Denmark to maintain its special relationship with Washington without increasing defense spending. It took heavy and sustained American pressure to coerce Danish decisionmakers to increase their defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2024. Danish attempts to convince Washington that this spending level and large (per capita) force contributions are fair and sufficient to retain its high status and a special relationship with the United States have thus far failed. In December 2019, Danish Defense Minister Trine Bramsen ruled out spending 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2030, because the current threat environment did not warrant such a large increase in defense spending.64 This

Denmark in NATO  99 suggests that Danish NATO policy in the foreseeable future will be shaped by the need for American protection (fear of abandonment) and the determination to obtain it by spending as little on defense as possible. During the Cold War, Denmark prioritized low spending over status in NATO and Washington. This appears to be the case again. Since 2014, Denmark has lost the leadership status that it acquired in the post-​Cold War era. Danish decision-​makers insist that Denmark deserves “core membership” status and a special relationship with the US because of disproportionate per capita force contributions to NATO and US-​led operations, but the US seems highly unlikely to grant such status and privileged access to Denmark, unless its spending comes much closer to the two percent target. The Danish status and role in the Alliance is therefore in flux. Denmark is more active and enjoys a better standing than was the case during the Cold War, but it no longer as active and as respected by the other members and the US as was the case in the post-​Cold War era. Its future role and status seems most likely to end up somewhere in between the laggard-​leadership positions that the Cold War and post-​Cold War eras gave rise to. Status as a loyal member is probably what Denmark can aspire to given its unwillingness to meet NATO’s capability and spending targets.

Notes 1 I would like to thank Ian Bowers, Troels Burchall Henningsen, Mikkel Storm Jensen, Jan Werner Mathiasen, Jens Ringsmose, Annemarie Peen Roth, and Sten Rynning for useful comments, which significantly improved the coherence of my argument. 2 S.A. Christensen, “The Danish Experience: Denmark in NATO, 1949–​1999,” in E. Reiter and H. Gärtner (eds.) Small States and Alliances, Heidelberg: Physica, 2001, 89–​100; N. Petersen, “The Dilemmas of Alliances: Denmark’s Fifty Years with NATO,” in G. Schmidt (ed.) A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001, 275–​293; P. Villaume, “Denmark and NATO through 50 Years,” in B. Heurlin and H. Mouritzen, (eds.) Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1999, Copenhagen: DIIS, 1999, 30–​61. 3 G.H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, 4, 1984, 461–​495; Alliance Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. 4 S.A. Christensen, “The Danish Experience: Denmark in NATO, 1949–​1999,” 2001; N. Petersen, “Abandonment vs. Entrapment: Denmark and Military Integration in Europe 1948–​1951,” Cooperation and Conflict 21, 3, 1986, 169–​ 186; “The Dilemmas of Alliances: Denmark’s Fifty Years with NATO,” 2001; “Footnoting’ as a political instrument: Denmark’s NATO policy in the 1980s,” Journal of Cold War History 12, 2, 2012, 295–​317; P. Villaume, “Denmark and NATO through 50 Years,” 1999. 5 J. Ringsmose, “Paying for Protection: Denmark’s Military Expenditure during the Cold War,” Cooperation and Conflict, 44, 1, 2009, 73–​ 97; J. Ringsmose and C.Brøndum, Frihedens pris: så lav som mulig. NATO, Danmark og forsvarsbudgetterne, Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2018.

100  Peter Viggo Jakobsen 6 M. Olson Jr. and R. Zeckhauser, “An economic theory of alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 48, 3, 1966, 266–​279. 7 For analyses applying a status perspective on Danish NATO and security policy see: P.V. Jakobsen, “The Danish Libya Campaign: Out in Front in Pursuit of Pride, Praise, and Position,” in D. Henriksen and A.K. Larssen (eds.) Political Rationale and International Consequences of the War in Libya, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 192–​208; P.V. Jakobsen, J. Ringsmose and H. Lunde Saxi, “Prestige-​seeking small states: Danish and Norwegian military contributions to US-​led operations,” European Journal of International Security 3, 2, 2018, 256–​ 277; G. Schaub and A.K. Jakobsson), “Denmark in Nato: Paying For Protection, Bleeding For Prestige,” War on the Rocks, 2018. Online. Available: https://​ warontherocks.com/​2018/​07/​denmark-​in-​nato-​paying-​for-​protection-​bleeding-​ for-​prestige/​ (accessed December 22, 2019). 8 P.V. Jakobsen, “Policy-​ fællesskaber, standard-​og krisestyringsprocedurer: det oversete institutionelle grundlag for den brede opbakning til Danmarks aktivistiske udenrigspolitik,” Politica 51, 2, 2019, 139–​167. 9 N. Petersen, “Abandonment vs. Entrapment: Denmark and Military Integration in Europe 1948–​1951,” 1986, 172. 10 Ibid., 173. 11 N. Petersen, “The Dilemmas of Alliances: Denmark’s Fifty Years with NATO,” 2001. 12 N. Petersen, Nikolaj (1998), “The H. C. Hansen Paper and Nuclear Weapons in Greenland,” Scandinavian Journal of History, 23, 1–​2, 1998, 21–​44. 13 J. Ringsmose, Århundredets våbenhandel (København: Dansk Institut for Militære Studier, 2008. 14 K. Midtgaard, “National security and the choice of international humanitarian aid: Denmark and the Korean War, 1950–​53 A small state in a military context with a civilian orientation,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, 2, 2011, 148–​173. 15 DIIS Vol. 1, Danmark under den kolde krig Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945–​ 1991 Bind 1 1945–​1962, København: DIIS, 2005, 232. 16 DIIS Vol. 1, 2005: 289; R. Tamnes, “The Strategic Importance of the High North during the Cold War,” in G. Schmidt (ed.) A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001, 257–​274. 17 N. Petersen, “The Dilemmas of Alliances: Denmark’s Fifty Years with NATO,” 2001, 285. 18 P. Villaume, “Denmark and NATO through 50 Years,” 1999, 44–​45. 19 I. Faurby, “Danish Alliance Policy 1967–​1993: From Quiet Adaptation via Loud Disagreement to Cautious Involvement,” in C. Due-​Nielsen and N. Petersen (eds.) Adaptation & Activism: The Foreign Policy of Denmark 1967–​1993, Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 1995, 68. 20 DIIS Vol. 3, Danmark under den kolde krig Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945–​ 1991 Bind 3 1979-​1991, København: DIIS, 2005, 233. 21 J. Ringsmose, Danmarks NATO-​omdømme, København: Dansk Institut for Militære Studier, 2007, 24. 22 C. Thune, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1980, Copenhagen: Samfundsvidenskabeligt Forlag, 1981, 261–​265. 23 J. Ringsmose, 2006. 24 P. Villaume, Allieret med forbehold. Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949–​1961, København: Eirene, 1995, 650.

Denmark in NATO  101 25 M. Petersson and H. Lunde Saxi, ”Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–​ 2009,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, 6, 2012, 6. 26 E. Bjøl, “Nordic Security,” The Adelphi Papers, 23, 181. London: IISS, 1983; J. Vinocur, “Danes May Ease Stand Against More Arms Spending,” New York Times, 20 January: A12, 1981. 27 DIIS Vol. 3, 2005, 581–​584; 593–​594; B. Jensen, Ulve, får og vogtere, Vol. 2, København: Gyldendal, 2014. 28 Jane’s Defense Weekly, “Denmark ‘Indifferent’ to NATO Defense, Says Taft,” July 30, 1988. 29 J. Ringsmose, Danmarks NATO-​omdømme, 2007: 27–​28. 30 Quoted in M. Pihl, M. Seidelin and M. Bonde Broberg (2014) “I løvens gab,” Jyllands-​Posten, February 8, 2014. 31 K.T. Christensen, “Den danske baltikumpolitik 1988–​1991,” unpublished MA dissertation, Roskilde University: Department of History, 2017; L.M. Pedersen, “Når småstaten fører stormagtspolitik. Dansk baltikumpolitik fra Murens fald i 1989 til EU-​topmødet i København i 2002,” KONTUR 9, 2004, 50–​60. 32 K.T. Christensen, 2017, 48–​51, 54, 66; S. Olesen, “Fra frontstat til frontløber,” unpublished MA dissertation, Roskilde University: Department of History, 2010, 48, 52, 58–​67; Ritzau, “Den kolde krig afsluttet på Bornholm,” Berlingske, November 30, 2000. 33 D.P. Auerswald and S.M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting together, fighting alone, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014, 17, 20, 161–​168. 34 H. Zimmermann, “The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment America’s Troop Presence in Europe during the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 11, 1, 2009, 4. 35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Principper og perspektiver i dansk udenrigspolitik –​ Dansk udenrigspolitik på vej mod år 2000 (København, 1993, 53–​54). 36 Ministry of Defence, Aftale om forsvarets ordning 1993-​199 4 af 13 NOV 1992, København, 1992, 2. 37 S. Gade, The Danish Response to the Transformation Challenge, Speech at the NATO Secretary General’s Annual Conference Transforming NATO –​A Political and Military Challenge, Brussels, April 14, 2005. Online. Available: https://​fmn. dk/​gamlesites/​Ministeren/​Taler%20og%20artikler/​Documents/​2005/​Danish_​ Response_​Transformation_​Challenge.pdf (accessed December 22, 2019). 38 J. Ringsmose and S. Rynning (2008), “The Impeccable Ally? Denmark, NATO, and the Uncertain Future of Top Tier Membership,” in N. Hvidt and H. Mouritzen (eds.) Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2008, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008, 60. 39 P.V. Jakobsen and J. Ringsmose, “Size and reputation –​why the USA has valued its ‘special relationships’ with Denmark and the UK differently since 9/​ 11,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 13, 2, 2015, 135; P.V. Jakobsen, J. Ringsmose and H. Lunde Saxi, 2018, 264–​269. 40 J. Ringsmose and S. Rynning, 2008, 60. 41 P.V. Jakobsen, “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress,” DIIS Report, 15, Copenhagen: DIIS, 2008. 42 P.V. Jakobsen and J. Ringsmose, 2015. 43 F.A. Petersen, “USA,” in R. Mariager (ed.) Danmark og verden efter den Kolde Krig, Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2015, 191–​211.

102  Peter Viggo Jakobsen 44 P.V. Jakobsen and J. Ringsmose, 2015; P.V. Jakobsen, J. Ringsmose and H. Lunde Saxi, 2018. 45 P.V. Jakobsen, J. Ringsmose and H. Lunde Saxi, 2018: 266–​267. 46 P.V. Jakobsen and S. Rynning, “Denmark: happy to fight, will travel,” International Affairs 95, 4, 2019, 877–​895. 47 D. Welna, “Under Trump, NATO Nations Get More U.S. Troops And Military Spending,” NPR.org, December 3, 2019. Online. Available: www.npr.org/​2019/​ 12/​03/​784444270/​under-​trump-​nato-​nations-​get-​more-​u-​s-​troops-​and-​military-​ spending. 48 DDIS (2019) The DDIS Intelligence Risk Assessment 2019, Copenhagen, 2019, 18. 49 Ministry of Defense, Defense Agreement 2018–​2023, Copenhagen, 2018: 2–​4. 50 Ministry of Defence, Denmark in NATO, Copenhagen, 2019a. Online. Available: https://​fmn.dk/​eng/​allabout/​Pages/​denmark-​in-​nato.aspx (accessed December 22, 2019). 51 M. Nordenman, Magnus (2019) The US-​Danish Defense and Security Relationship: Keeping Up in a Changing World, Washington DC: The Atlantic Council, 2019. 52 A.K. Krogh, “Dokumentation: Her er Trumps brev til Løkke,” July 4, 2018. Online. Available: www.altinget.dk/​artikel/​dokumentation-​her-​er-​trumps-​brev-​til-​ loekke (accessed December 22, 2019). 53 K. Klarskov and J. Svendsen, “Det virker, som om Putin og Kim Jong-​un er bedre venner,” Politiken, October 7, 2018. 54 K. Mouritzen, “Lars Løkke i direkte konfrontation med Trump,” Berlingske, July 13, 2018. 55 Author’s off-​the-​record conversations with officials from the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs as well as Prime Minister’s Office during the autumn of 2018. 56 M. Sonne, “Claus Hjort Frederiksen: Vi har været under et vist pres fra amerikansk side i den her beslutning,” Information, February 18, 2019. 57 Ministry of Defence, Supplemental Agreement for the Danish Defence 2018–​ 2023, January 29, 2019. Online. Available: https://​fmn.dk/​temaer/​forsvarsforlig/​ Documents/ ​ d anish- ​ d efence- ​ agreement- ​ 2 018-​ 2 023-​ S UPPLEMENTAL.pdf (accessed December 22, 2019). 58 K.T. Dahl, “Det er nødvendigt at investere i Danmarks sikkerhed,” Dansk Folkeparti.dk 2 February 2, 2018. Online. Available: https://​danskfolkeparti.dk/​ noedvendigt-​investere-​danmarks-​sikkerhed/​ (accessed December 22, 2019); C.H. Frederiksen, “Danish defence in the midst of Change,” in K. Fischer and H. Mouritzen, (eds.) Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2019, Copenhagen: DIIS, 2019, 32–​45; Ministry of Defence, The Danish Government presents a comprehensive security policy package, September 6, 2019. Online. Available: https://​fmn.dk/​eng/​ news/​Pages/​The-​Danish-​Government-​presents-​a-​comprehensive-​security-​policy-​ package.aspx (accessed December 22, 2019); K. Klarskov and J. Svendsen, 2018. 59 Cited in K. Klarskov and J. Svendsen, 2018. 60 M. Sonne, 2019. 61 NATO Defense Planning Capability Review 2017/​2018 Denmark Overview, C-​M (20186) 0025 (DE-​OVERVIEW, 2018), June 5, 2018, para. 22. 62 J. Kongstad and M.B. Broberg, “Trumps udsending i Danmark: Det virker som om, at vi tigger jer om at forsvare jer selv,” Jyllands-​Posten, November 24, 2019; C. Sands, “Hvorfor skal USA investere mere i Danmarks sikkerhed, end I selv gør?,” Information, October 22, 2019.

Denmark in NATO  103 63 D. Buch, “Mette F. holdt møde med Trump –​ekstra fly til NATO og ingen snak om køb af Grønland,” TV2.dk, December 4, 2019. Online. Available: https://​nyheder. tv2.dk/​politik/​2019-​12-​04-​mette-​f-​holdt-​moede-​med-​trump-​ekstra-​fly-​til-​nato-​ og-​ingen-​snak-​om-​koeb-​af (accessed December 22, 2019); Ministry of Defense, Danmark parat til at tage lederskab for NATO’s træningsmission i Irak, November 26, 2019. Online. Available: https://​fmn.dk/​nyheder/​Pages/​Danmark-​parat-​til-​at-​ tage-​lederskab-​for-​NATOs-​traeningsmission-​i-​Irak.aspx (accessed December 22, 2019); Ritzau, “Dansk bidrag til fransk-​ledet flådemission i Hormuz-​strædet,” Bornholms Tidende, December 6, 2019. 64 J. Sahlholdt, “Trine Bramsen: Vi når ikke to procent de næste ti år,” Altinget. dk December 19, 2019. Online. Available: www.altinget.dk/​forsvar/​artikel/​trine-​ bramsen-​vi-​naar-​ikke-​to-​procent-​de-​naeste-​10-​aar (accessed December 22, 2019).

6  Toward a “partner in leadership”? Germany’s shifting role in NATO after the end of the Cold War Florian Böller

Introduction After the end of the Cold War, Germany was often described as a reluctant power.1 Despite the early predictions of realists,2 Germany largely refrained from power politics, did not acquire nuclear weapons, and remained skeptical toward military interventions. This special course –​the German Sonderweg –​ was usually explained with reference to a deep-​rooted collective identity, its lessons from the experience of World War II, and its responsibility for the Holocaust.3 Within NATO, Germany’s reluctance in world affairs was met with ambivalence. In particular, the Alliance’s traditional lead nation, the United States, expected that potent economic and military powers in Europe should share the burden of security and defense cooperation after the end of the Cold War. Germany was an increasing target of these expectations for a fairer burden-​ sharing arrangement.4 In addition, East European NATO members also expected that Germany should contribute its share to the defense of NATO’s boarder, especially after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. In this chapter, I argue that the description of Germany as a reluctant power oversimplifies the significant changes in German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War that transformed its role within the transatlantic alliance. For instance, only within ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany accepted to participate in military operation outside the area of NATO. However, tensions regarding the burden-​sharing arrangement remained and led to an increased pressure on Germany’s foreign policy elite, for example, in the wake of the 2011 Libya intervention, when the German government did not support its NATO allies. The 2014 Ukraine crisis then catalyzed the internal role contestation and facilitated an adaptation of Germany’s foreign policy role. Growing defense budgets and more responsibility in NATO’s deterrence policies are evidence of a shift in Germany’s national role conception. At the same time, domestic constraints, in particular a growing partisan contestation of security and defense policies, continue to limit Germany’s ability to fully adopt a leadership role.

Toward a “partner in leadership”?  105 The shifting pattern of Germany’s role within the context of its primary international security institution, NATO, presents a puzzle for traditional approaches to the study of German foreign policy. I  contend that a linear explanation of continuity (the German Sonderweg-​thesis), which highlights the relevance of traditional norms and a “culture of reticence,” fails to grasp the significant changes of Germany’s foreign and security policy. At the same time, Berlin has rejected a path of “normalization,” as some analysts argued employing a neorealist perspective.5 Instead, I  offer a differentiated picture by investigating Germany’s role in NATO along two key indicators:  first, Germany’s contribution to military interventions after the end of the Cold War; and, second, military expenditures in light of burden-​sharing debates among allies and within Germany. The next section introduces a theoretical perspective at the intersection of constructivism and liberal international relations theory. More specifically, I  use a role theoretical approach to grasp external expectations from key allies within NATO as well as the limiting factor of domestic politics. In the empirical section, I employ this role theoretical lens to make sense of Germany’s shifting foreign policy within NATO along the two indicators of military deployments and military expenditures. In methodological terms, the empirical part is structured by the insights of role theory and examines domestic discourses, in particular within the German Bundestag. Here, I also make use of an original dataset on parliamentary votes on military missions.6

Theoretical perspectives on Germany’s role in NATO Germany’s foreign policy posture presents a puzzle for traditional approaches to the study of International Relations (IR). On the one hand, neorealists suggested that Germany’s increased power position in the wake of unification would lead to a “normalization” of Berlin’s foreign policy.7 Germany would use its economic resources to foster its military capabilities and seek more autonomy. Some observers indeed argue that Germany’s role within the EU resembles a hegemonic position, in which Germany pursues its interests assertively.8 While this argument might apply to the realm of economic policies, such as the decision to continue the Northstream II pipeline, it fails to explain the steadfast integration of Germany inside NATO. As I  will show in more detail below, up until 2014 German governments favored to realize a peace dividend and the defense budget remained on a declining trajectory. Furthermore, German security policy remained firmly embedded inside the Western alliance and Berlin repeatedly refused to participate in robust military interventions. Troop deployments outside the multilateral framework of NATO or the EU are still regarded as a taboo by the German public as well as the foreign policy elite. Similarly, the proposal that Germany should acquire nuclear weapons as a reaction to the

106  Florian Böller perceived diminished reliability of the US nuclear umbrella remained at the fringes of the discourse and did not gain traction among mainstream political parties.9 Liberal theory presents a valid alternative to neorealism. Here, domestic preferences and institutions matter most in shaping the foreign policy choice of states.10 Seen from this perspective, German governments represented the skeptical foreign policy attitudes of voters and refrained from renewed power politics. As public opinion polls show, key elements of Berlin’s foreign policy after the end of the Cold War are in line with a majority of German society. NATO membership continues to be popular,11 the hesitance to deploy the Bundeswehr outside NATO’s borders is reflected in opinion polls and the German public did not favor increases in military expenditures.12 However, a pure “bottom-​up” perspective to explain Germany’s foreign policy entails several blind spots. First, Germany’s participation in out-​of-​area NATO missions started already in 1992. At that time, a majority among the public largely opposed an active international role of Germany.13 Furthermore, Germany contributed to the Afghanistan intervention since 2002 despite skeptical public opinion and increasing opposition toward the mission.14 Germany’s foreign policy in the wake of the 2014 Ukraine crisis seems at odds with a domestic politics explanation, too. Berlin supported the sanctions regime against Russia and joined its NATO allies in bolstering the Eastern flank of NATO. It did so despite its close economic ties to Russia, and despite the German public favoring an end to the sanctions.15 In view of the blind spots of both neorealist and liberal accounts, I propose an alternative theoretical approach. I argue that role theory, which is rooted in social constructivism, offers a more accurate explanation for Germany’s foreign policy within the Western alliance. This approach helps understand how Germany’s role and its strategic vision in NATO changed in view of both external pressures articulated by other members of the alliance and domestic incentives and restrictions. Role theory as an alternative explanation Role theory argues that societal actors, which are influenced by domestic norms and expectations from outside, constitute the foreign policy role of states.16 Internally, members of the society share specific values that define a corridor of acceptable foreign policy choices. The domestic side thereby forms the “ego part” of a role. The ego part of national roles goes beyond mere self-​description. Rather, it draws from domestic norm reservoirs, such as collective identities, past experiences, and societal norms, to define an appropriate function of the state within a specific group.17 Societal actors such as voters, parties, and Parliaments influence the make-​ up of national role conceptions. In that regard, role theory shares the basic insights of liberal IR theory, which underscores the impact of domestic politics

Toward a “partner in leadership”?  107 on foreign policy.18 Parliaments constitute a key “transmission belt”19 for societal preferences. Members of the Parliament also form distinct ideological groups based on partisan goals and interests. At the same time, international events, crises, and norms affect elite discourses within the Parliament, for example, in the case of debates prior to NATO summits or within specialized foreign affairs and defense committees. It is therefore plausible to assume that external expectations influence the foreign policy role of states and that international pressures have an impact on the government as well as on members of the Parliament. In role theoretical terms, these external expectations form the “alter-​part” of a national role conception. In particular, within highly developed and institutionalized groups, such as the transatlantic “security community,”20 allies cultivate a sense of community and of common values. These external norm reservoirs influence how states perceive their responsibility as a member of the community. In a process of role-​taking, states incorporate the expectations of others in their self-​ perception.21 The transatlantic security community presents an institution, which already incorporates specific values  –​for example, the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. Both the institutional provisions and the actions of other members of the community define a set of behavioral expectations toward the role bearer. For example, in case of an Article 5-​scenario, the behavioral expectation is already outlined in the treaty. In addition, an attacked member State will communicate what other allies should do in order to help its partner.22 Stability and change within the transatlantic security community According to a role-​theoretical perspective, Germany underwent a process of social learning and role change after the devastating defeat of World War II. The destruction of the country and a collective guilt for the Holocaust led to the firm belief that Germany must become a reliable partner within the community of Western nations.23 To further the political integration of Europe, maintain a democratic order, and keep strong ties to the US embodied the central norms of the West German Republic:  “never again Auschwitz” and “never alone” were the basic principles of Bonn’s foreign policy, which constituted the ego part of Germany’s role.24 The Western alliance, with NATO at its core, provided the institutional network, in which the Federal Republic could begin to restore its sovereignty and be a member of a group rather than an outsider.25 West Germany’s accession to NATO in 1955, thus reflected core values of the postwar society and the political leaders understood the membership as an essential part of the country’s new identity. Since West German governments accepted the integration into the Western security community as part of their identity, expectations articulated by other members of the group were influential in shaping the alter-​part of the role.

108  Florian Böller Expectations articulated by the Western allies were also necessary conditions, which the Federal Republic had to meet in order to be accepted as a member of the transatlantic security community.26 The stability of national role conceptions depends on compatible external expectations and domestic ideas about the country’s adequate role within its core reference group.27 While Germany’s role conception was rather stable between 1945 and 1990, internal contestation and policy disputes may cause role conceptions to shift. Change can thereby result from both constitutive parts of the role. First, domestic contestation can lead to shifting role conceptions.28 For example, if new parties emerge or elections trigger a significant policy change. Hence, the retention of a specific role is not a constant feature of the community’s order, but needs reevaluation and support from the reservoir of domestic role production. In case of change, the emerging role conception can become incompatible with existing role conceptions of other allies producing inter-​role conflicts within an alliance. Second, external sources may trigger role change. There are several variants of this form of role change.29 One is connected to the previous consideration of internal changes within the domestic role construction. If the ego part of a role changes, the new role conception also produces a distinct set of expectations toward other members of the community. In this process of “alter casting,”30 actors may seek to push, limit or prescribe certain role elements of others in a social relationship. If the articulated expectation is met by a compatible ego part, the role can adopt to new expectations. If, however, the ego part of the role and the external expectation are incompatible, an intrarole conflict emerges.31 This intrarole conflict then triggers domestic debates which either result in the rejection of the new expectation or their adoption. Intrarole conflicts are therefore an important source for foreign policy role change. Ego as well as alter-​parts of national role conceptions thus need to be considered to grasp the shifting pattern of Germany’s role within NATO.

Germany’s role in NATO after the end of the Cold War In the following section, I evaluate two key indicators of Germany’s foreign policy within NATO:  first, whether and how Germany contributes to military out-​of-​area operations and NATO’s defense posture. Second, I  analyze the trajectory of Germany’s defense budget. Following the theoretical lens outlined above, my assumption is that both external expectations and domestic politics shape the positioning of Germany within NATO. Contribution to military missions The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR transformed the transatlantic alliance. Despite the prediction of neorealism, NATO survived

Toward a “partner in leadership”?  109 without its ideological and geopolitical counterpart and renewed its raison d’être by enlarging its functional scope from collective defense to include collective security. US President George H.W. Bush had already alter-​casted Germany as a “partner in leadership”32 in 1989, but faced with instability, civil wars, and humanitarian crises in Europe and worldwide, the expectation to contribute to the collective good of allied security increased considerably for the reunited Germany.33 Before the end of the Cold War, military deployments by German armed forces outside the borders of NATO were considered both as a societal taboo and as unconstitutional. Slowly and after years of debates within the conservative–​ liberal coalition, before the German Constitutional Court, and within the public discourse, a new role conception became prevalent, according to which out-​of-​area missions would be acceptable, if they were conducted within a collective security framework (NATO, UN, and EU) and approved by the Parliament.34 As Figure 6.1 shows, troop contributions to multilateral military operations increased significantly within the first ten years after reunification. While the Kohl government’s deployment policy was still restrained by concerns over the constitutional legitimacy of out-​of-​area missions, the Red-​Green government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) decided to participate in the Kosovo War in 1999, which marked Germany’s first combat mission after World War II. The Kosovo mission, together with the Afghanistan operation since 2001, made up the majority of German troop deployments. The

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Figure 6.1 Deployment votes in the German Bundestag (number of votes, mandated troop limits, agreement). Source: Analysis based on Bundestag records and F. Ostermann et al. “Voting on the Use of Armed Force.” Notes: Table tracks the deployment limits for each mission and year (averaged for government terms). Actual deployment numbers may vary. Number of deployment votes in brackets.

110  Florian Böller declining average annual troop limit during Merkel’s second cabinet (since 2009) can be explained by the gradual drawdown of the missions in Kosovo, Bosnia, as well as in Lebanon. Growing international expectations and Germany’s out-​of-​area debate Role theory suggests that growing expectations by key allies may trigger an intrarole conflict, if new expectations collide with domestic traditions. In fact, throughout the 1990s, the German public remained skeptical toward participation in military missions outside NATO’s borders.35 At the same time, Chancellor Helmuth Kohl (CDU) was attentive to growing international expectations that resulted from Germany’s economic power in Europe and warned already in 1991 against “resignation and flight from responsibility.”36 In the Chancellor’s speech, the US served as the “significant other” for Germany’s alter-​perception. Kohl highlighted Washington’s central role as a security guarantor during the Cold War and then explained that Germany would now need to assume more responsibility: “That’s the way our partners see it. They expect from a reunited Germany that it will live up to its new role.”37 Accordingly, Kohl’s government sought to implement a more active role within the Alliance and expand Germany’s traditional limits regarding military interventions.38 Although the CDU under Kohl’s leadership acknowledged the increased expectations by the US and other NATO allies, the question of out-​of-​area deployments remained contested within society. Between 1991 and 1999, an intrarole conflict emerged due to the incompatibility of alter-​expectations and ego-​perception. Pacifist orientations had a long tradition, in particular within Germany’s left, which protested, for example, against the rearmament in the 1950s, and against NATO’s dual track decision in the 1980s.39 The controversy within the Green Party prior to the decision to participate in the Kosovo intervention in 1999 demonstrates how fragile this new role conception was. The fact that Joschka Fischer, then foreign minister and junior coalition partner of the Red-​Green government, could win the inner-​ party debate with his credo of “Auschwitz:  never again” was influenced by external expectations within the transatlantic security community. During a tumultuous party convention in May 1999, Fischer sought to convince his pacifist party base that Germany (and the Green Party) needed to acknowledge its responsibility. Fisher hereby connected the alter-​part of external expectations with Germany’s traditional civilian power identity.40 When the German Parliament debated the Kosovo intervention in 1998, then-​Secretary of Defense Volker Rühe held: It is no exaggeration if I  say that our allies closely follow the decision of the 13th Bundestag. All our NATO allies –​also the three prospective members Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic –​their governments and parliaments have unambiguously stated their support for the

Toward a “partner in leadership”?  111 envisioned air campaign of NATO. Everybody expects a clear vote by the German Bundestag.41 The Parliament approved Germany’s first combat mission after World War II on February 25, 1999 with a bipartisan majority of 556 yes-​to 42 no-​votes. Compared to the previously dominant “culture of antimilitarism,”42 this decision can be viewed as a significant foreign policy change enabled by an intra-​ role conflict after reunification. The domestic politics of military interventions Despite the acceptance of out-​of-​area missions in principle, decisions to contribute to military interventions remained controversial and regularly provoked bitter partisan debates. In that regard, Germany continued to show more hesitance toward military instruments and resisted to become a “traditional” power.43 Despite recurring calls by allies, most notably by the United States, to assume more international responsibility, German governments repeatedly risked serious disputes with NATO allies by avoiding to answer these calls. My argument is that these tensions followed from an intrarole conflict where self-​images (ego part) and external expectations (alter part) diverge. To understand the ego part of Germany’s role conception, it is necessary to consider the domestic politics of Berlin’s foreign policy including its institutional and partisan dimensions. Regarding the institutional context, the German Parliament’s strong war powers require separate votes for every new deployment and parliamentary mandates are usually extended on a yearly basis.44 Deployment voting records can thus serve as an indicator for both the number of separate missions and the political contestation of military intervention policies (see Figure  6.1). It is noteworthy that despite the declining trend of deployed troops during the Merkel governments (since 2005), the Parliament in fact mandated more missions than during Schröder’s chancellorship. The average agreement index45 for each cabinet since 1991 (see Figure 6.1) shows a varying degree of opposition toward military interventions. During the Schröder governments, the number of no-​ votes against deployments reached a low point (leading to a high agreement value). After 2005, support for military deployments declined again. In general, the government-​opposition dualism of Germany’s parliamentary system is the main driver for Bundestag roll calls. At the same time, support for military missions is also shaped by ideological differences.46 Christian-​democrats (CDU) and liberals (FDP) are supportive of deployment decisions, even if they form the opposition (see Figure 6.2). This factor contributed to the relatively high agreement during the Red-​Green Schröder coalition. Here, the no-​votes came primarily from the left-​wing PDS party in the Bundestag. Moreover, ideological support for military missions is “U-​shaped.” Both left-​and right-​wing parties regularly oppose out-​of-​area missions. With the right-​wing AfD party in the Bundestag

112  Florian Böller 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

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Figure 6.2 Average no-​votes on military deployments by German parties (in percentage, 1993–​2018). Source: Own depiction based on data by F. Ostermann et al., “Voting on the Use of Armed Force.” Note: Radical left (PDS/Linke ) and radical right (AfD) have not been part of a government coalition.

since 2017, the number of no-​votes for military missions therefore increased (see Figure 6.1). The institutional and partisan dimensions form the domestic “transmission belt”47 for societal interests. In turn, they shape the national role conception of Germany. The effect within the policy field of military interventions is threefold. First, governments cannot freely decide to deploy troops abroad, but face parliamentary scrutiny. The Schröder government’s Afghanistan decision in 2001 is a prime example in that regard. In the weeks prior to the decision, dozens of critical voices within the SPD and Green Party groups threatened to oppose the deployment. With four no-​votes from the Green party, the deployment was approved by 336 to 326 votes –​the smallest margin of approval for any military deployment in Germany.48 The internal opposition from members of the Green Party and left-​wing Social Democrats underscores that Germany’s culture of reluctance was still partly alive and the shifted role conception after the out-​of-​area debate was not without contestation. Second, although so far the Bundestag never vetoed a governmental request for troop deployment, parliamentary war powers arguably contribute to Germany’s hesitance to deploy more troops and loosen national caveats. The case in point here is NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan. After hostilities increased in the Southern regions of Afghanistan in 2008, following offensive operations by the US, Canada, and the UK, NATO allies sharply criticized Germany’s restrictive operational rules. Yet, the Merkel government rejected a more robust mission, which would have required the Bundestag’s approval.

Toward a “partner in leadership”?  113 Third, politicians also consider electoral incentives regarding military interventions. To secure his reelection, Chancellor Schröder mobilized voters by highlighting his opposition against US plans to invade Iraq, which resulted in a major disruption of US–​German relations.49 The importance of domestic politics was also evident in 2011, when Germany refused to support the intervention in Libya. Germany first abstained from voting together with its Western allies in the UN Security Council and thus aligned itself with Moscow and Beijing. Then, the CDU/​FDP coalition also refused to support the NATO-​led intervention against the Gaddafi regime in Libya.50 Foreign minister Westerwelle (FDP) sought legitimize his decision by highlighting the domestic self-​perception of Germany as a civilian power: “I see myself in the tradition of reticence toward military deployments.”51 Commentators however suspect that the FDP tried to capitalize on the war-​skeptical German public prior to the important state elections in Baden-​Württemberg.52 In sum, both the Iraq and Libya decisions provoked transatlantic conflicts and both were driven by domestic consideration. Alter-​casting in the wake of the Ukraine crisis It was not before the Ukraine crisis that Germany’s foreign policy role shifted again. Role theory suggests that foreign policy change might be triggered by external events if they also affect the perception of ego and alter-​conceptions. In particular, for Poland and the Baltic states, the conflict proved their long-​ held suspicion toward Russia’s aggressive foreign policy and was seen as a threat to their own security. Within the Alliance, these members therefore demanded to bolster NATO’s Eastern flank and improve the Alliance’s capabilities for collective defense.53 During the Ukraine crisis, Eastern European members clearly articulated their expectations toward the US but also toward Germany. For example on April 25, 2014, then-​Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland called for Germany’s solidarity.54 In a similar vein, Latvia’s Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma held “that Germany is a strategic partner in question of security and beyond.”55 Eastern European member states thus alter-​casted Germany into an adapted role in which Berlin was expected to assume more responsibility. These shifting expectations were perceived within the German foreign policy discourse. The debate in the German Parliament after the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014 clearly shows that the Ukraine crisis led to a changed perception. Accordingly, Germany needed to show solidarity toward its Eastern allies. The measures approved at the Wales Summit would send a “visible signal of our solidarity toward our Baltic and Eastern allies,” as Chancellor Merkel argued in the Bundestag.56 Members of the governing coalition, such as Thomas Oppermann (SPD), acknowledged that “others have assumed responsibility for the security of Germany.” Today, Oppermann, concluded, “would be the time to assume responsibility as well.”57 The Merkel government and the governing parties in the Bundestag, thus clearly demarked

114  Florian Böller Russia’s annexation of Crimea as a breach of international law, which a self-​ described “civilian power” could not ignore.58 At NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, Germany offered a substantial military contribution to the Alliance’s new RAP, which included increased air policing, naval patrols, military exercises, and the bolstering of NRF. Germany agreed, for example, to serve as one of the rotational lead nations of the new VJTF.59 Following the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Germany also vowed to lead a multinational battle group in Lithuania as part of the Alliance’s eFP. Military measures were accompanied by diplomatic efforts within the Normandy format. Furthermore, Germany voted to uphold the sanctions regime against Russia, despite its relatively close business ties and economic interests.60 In view of both ego and alter-​parts of Germany’s role, reassuring Eastern European member States that the security community is ready to defend the borders of its allies could draw on a consensual understanding of Germany’s national role conception. Hence, the Ukraine crisis catalyzed a learning process among Germany’s foreign policy elite, which contributed to a significant role shift of Berlin’s foreign policy.61 Defense expenditure After the end of the Cold War, Germany defense budget declined from well over USD 63.3 billion to an all-​time low of USD 39.6 billion in 2006. Since 1991, Germany spent less than 2  percent of its GDP for defense purposes and was thus able to realize a significant peace dividend (see Figure  6.3). During that period, the German Bundeswehr was transformed from a large conscript army tasked with territorial defense to a more flexible force focusing on out-​of-​area missions. In 2011, conscription was abolished and in 2018, the Bundeswehr entailed 179.791 active duty-​members, compared to the 495,875 soldiers army in 1983.62 It is also noteworthy that the increasing participation of the German armed forces in peacekeeping missions did not shift the declining trajectory of Germany’s military expenditures between 1990 and 2006. NATO’s burden sharing debate NATO’s 2 percent defense spending goal was first mentioned in the Ministerial Guidance of the Defense Planning Committee in 2006 and German government officials repeatedly pledged to meet this threshold even before the goal was officially adopted with the Wales Summit Declaration in 2014.63 However, Germany failed to spend 2  percent of its GDP for military purposes ever since. At the same time, considering absolute numbers, the defense budget steadily increased since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in February 2014. In 2014, Germany spent USD 39.9 billion for its defense budget. Four years later, the budget allocated 46.2 billion to the military –​an increase of more

Toward a “partner in leadership”?  115 70000

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Figure 6.3 Development of German defense expenditure. Source: Based on data by SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database. See www.sipri.org/​ databases/​milex.

than 15  percent.64 For 2019, the government announced plans for an additional increase of the defense budget of 12.2 percent compared to 2018.65 To understand why Germany fails to abide to NATO’s 2 percent goal, it is necessary to consider both the context of long-​term external expectation as well as domestic politics. Internationally, NATO’s burden-​sharing controversy gained salience in the wake of Barack Obama’s election in 2008. This argument seems counterintuitive, as the 44th US President’s multilateral foreign policy doctrine promised to be more receptive toward European interests. His plan to end the war in Iraq and ban the use of enhanced interrogation techniques were praised by European public and elites. In that regard, the Obama Administration shifted the US role and produced a commensurate role constellation vis-​à-​vis its European allies.66 Although Obama’s multilateralism seemed more compatible to Germany’s traditional ego-​perception of a “civilian power,” a new intrarole conflict emerged. Obama’s understanding of multilateralism entailed the expectation that Europe would need to bring more to the table as well, in particular regarding the ongoing military intervention in Afghanistan. Already as a candidate in front of an excited crowd in Berlin in 2008, Obama argued that “(i)n this new century, Americans and Europeans will be required to do more  –​not less.”67 Hence, Obama understood multilateral cooperation not only as a value in itself, but also as a means to reduce the burden on America’s society after the failed adventure in Iraq.

116  Florian Böller Yet, Obama’s call to arms was ignored  –​at least in Berlin. Neither did Germany commit more troops to Afghanistan, nor did it lift its strict national caveats, which prevented an effective role of Germany’s military contribution within the ISAF mission.68 The burden-​sharing controversy reached a new climax, when Germany refused to participate in the Libya intervention in 2011. According to Koschut, NATO allies felt betrayed by Germany’s opposition and the heated debates in the NATO council signaled the German government the gravity of allied disappointment.69 In the wake of the Libya decision, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates bluntly criticized that European partners “are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”70 Gates’ criticism drew on frustrations on the American side that Europeans were unable to conduct a limited air campaign without US support.71 Without directly criticizing Germany, the issue of fair burden-​sharing within the Alliance remained salient and Germany was accused of free riding the Alliance. Domestic debates on defense expenditures after the Ukraine crisis Yet, the declining trajectory of Germany’s defense budget was not reversed until the Ukraine crisis increased the awareness for the need of traditional territorial defense at NATO’s Eastern flank. As outlined above, the Merkel government perceived the crisis as a serious threat to transatlantic security. Communicated within NATO, Eastern allies increased their expectations toward Germany and demanded a clear commitment to collective defense, which would also mean to commit the necessary material resources. However, domestic politics also limit the extent to which the government is able to implement a new foreign policy role. If Germany wanted to meet NATO’s 2  percent goal, it would need to spend around USD 90 billion compared to 46 billion in 2018.72 Despite a supportive public opinion in general, left-​ leaning voters remain skeptical toward spending more on defense.73 These partisan attitudes are clearly represented within the Bundestag and within the coalition government. The budget debates within the Merkel government in the years following the Ukraine crisis document the frictions between the Chancellor’s CDU and its Social Democratic coalition partner. During the 2017 general election campaign, disagreement between the coalition partners surfaced in the wake of Trump’s inauguration as US President in January and continued to shape the electoral campaign. President Trump repeatedly demanded that NATO partners must pay their “fair share” in defense expenditure. Germany was a recurring target of Trump’s public outrage over a perceived European “free-​riding” on US security provisions.74 These demands have not only been dismissed by Social Democratic members of the German government (alongside other left wing parties), but also spilled over into a domestic debate on foreign policy priorities.75 This partisan dispute

Toward a “partner in leadership”?  117 can be traced in public statements during the campaign, in party manifestos, as well as within the governing coalition’s internal politics. Then foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) was first to publicly criticize Trump’s demands and NATO’s goal to spend at least 2 percent of the GDP for defense. Gabriel argued in a speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2017 that “crises prevention, reconstruction, and economic cooperation” would be more effective than “any military spending.”76 In contrast, government members of the CDU and CSU affirmed the 2 percent goal and argued that German armed forces needed to be reinforced. In the ensuing months of the election campaign, the issue became more and more salient, with politicians of CDU and SPD exchanging spats.77 The partisan contestation on foreign policy priorities is also documented in party manifestos prior to the 2017 elections. Most clearly, the Linke advocates reducing military expenditures and investing in development assistance.78 The Green Party also favors to increase foreign aid instead of the defense budget.79 Despite the statements by Sigmar Gabriel, the SPD’s manifesto is less pronounced and even acknowledges the need to increase the defense budget. Yet, it is evident that the party proposes to focus on civilian instruments of foreign policy and the program includes the rejection of the 2 percent goal as well.80 The only commitment to NATO’s defense spending goal is offered by CDU/​CSU.81 The liberal party also favors to increase defense and foreign aid spending and proposes to invest 3 percent of the GDP for “international security.”82 Social Democrats not only campaigned for a change in foreign policy priorities and framed their manifestos accordingly, but also put their disagreement with their senior coalition partner on record. On June 28, 2017, SPD cabinet members disapproved the defense department’s budget for the fiscal year 2018. Thomas Oppermann, head of SPD’s group in parliament, criticized an “imbalance of expenditures for defense versus development.”83 The partisan disputes apparently went beyond different preferences regarding budgetary items. They offered distinct foreign and security policy priorities. While left-​wing parties aimed at nonmilitary instruments of foreign policy along Germany’s traditional “civilian power” approach, the CDU/​ CSU regarded an increase in military expenditures as a necessity in view of current security crises.84 The analysis of Germany’s 2 percent debate, thus suggests that the Ukraine crisis stopped the declining trajectory of the defense budget. Yet, at least during the current term of the Bundestag, a parliamentary majority to implement NATO’s spending goal remains unrealistic due to the continued partisan contestation in this policy field.

Conclusion In this chapter, I traced the changing patterns of Germany’s foreign policy role within NATO. I argued, on the one hand, that Germany’s role is shaped

118  Florian Böller by external expectations articulated by NATO allies. Here, the US played a key role as the leading power ever since Germany’s accession to NATO in 1955. The US role as the “significant other” of Germany, that is, its primary reference point in terms of security, has shifted dramatically in the last two decades. The resulting shifts have also transformed Germany’s understanding of responsibility and leadership within the alliance. On the other hand, domestic politics provide limits and incentives, which cannot be ignored by foreign policy decision-​makers. From a role-​theoretical perspective, these tensions between ego (domestic) and alter-​part of national role conceptions help understand how and to what extent Germany’s role was transformed after unification. Two periods of significant transformation could be detected. First, after the Cold War, Germany’s role shifted from a principled reluctance to the acceptance of out-​of-​area missions. German leaders perceived clear signals that allies would expect Germany to assume more international responsibility. Second, the election of Barack Obama generated a paradox situation. While his multilateral foreign policy was compatible to Germany’s role conception, Obama’s “nation-​building at home” approach was accompanied by increased expectations toward the European allies. At that time, the external push to adapt its foreign policy role was still rejected by an incommensurate ego part driven by domestic politics. The Ukraine crisis then facilitated a shift in the perception of external expectations and enabled a window of opportunity for role adaptation. Germany hence increased its defense posture and sought to signal its commitment to NATO’s revived core task of collective defense. External expectations articulated by the US, but also by other allies, inform the domestic debate on Germany’s adequate place among its peers. The processes also suggest that linear narratives, such as Germany’s continued Sonderweg (special course) or its complete “normalization” fail to explain the shifting patterns of Germany’s role. While the analysis presented in this chapter focused on the longer-​term trends of Germany’s role in NATO after unification, the role theoretical argument can also be applied to the most recent developments within the alliance, in particular in view of the changing role of the US under Trump. Trump’s ambivalent stance toward NATO and European allies produced insecurity and his foreign policy doctrine of “America First” as well as the President’s interactionist worldview directly contradict NATO’s basic principles of solidarity, multilateralism, common values, and political consultation.85 It is important to note that Trump’s NATO policy not only entailed divisive rhetoric and symbolic gestures, but also changes which affect NATO’s deterrence policy. In June 2020, the President Trump announced plans to withdraw one-​ third of its 34,500 troops deployed to Germany. This measure was perceived as a retaliation for Germany’s failure to increase its defense expenditure.86 For Germany, Trump’s disruptive NATO policies entail two implications. First, although the US clearly remains a “significant other” within the security community, divergent worldviews and values create incentives for

Toward a “partner in leadership”?  119 decision-​makers to legitimize policies that explicitly oppose Trump. This applies, for example, to arguments of Social Democrats regarding defense spending in NATO: the 2 percent goal is rejected because it is portrayed as “Trump’s idea.” Second, without the stabilizing effect of the US as a lead nation bound by common values and firmly committed to NATO, external pressures to assume more responsibility independent of the US increase. Accordingly, Chancellor Merkel stated already in May 2017 that Europeans need “to take their fate into their own hands.”87 In responding to French President Emanuel Macron’s call for European leadership, the Chancellor acknowledged that European integration in the realm of security would be “existentially necessary” and the “task of the future.”88 The 2019 Treaty of Aachen between Germany and France as well as the decision to establish the project of PESCO as part of the EU’s security and defense policy integration can be regarded as concrete steps following the declining authority of the US within the Alliance.89 At the same time, Germany continued to highlight the importance of NATO as a transatlantic bridge and the German government rejected President Macron’s verdict of NATO as a “brain-​dead” alliance.90 Merkel’s statement instead marks the willingness to withstand the current disruptive forces within the transatlantic security community: “NATO is and will remain the cornerstone of our security.”91

Notes 1 F.-​J. Meiers. “Germany: The Reluctant Power.” Survival 37, 3 (1995): 82; P. Keller. “Germany in NATO: The Status Quo Ally.” Survival 54, 3 (2012): 107; H.W. Maull. “German Foreign Policy, Post-​Kosovo: Still a ‘Civilian Power’?,” German Politics 9, 2 (2000): 17. 2 J.J. Mearsheimer. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War.” International Security 15, 1, 1990. 3 J.S. Duffield. “Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism.” International Organization 53, 4, 1999. 4 E. Hallams and B. Schreer. “Towards a ‘Post-​American’ Alliance? NATO Burden-​ Sharing After Libya.” International Affairs 88, 2 (2012): 315. 5 R. Baumann and G. Hellmann. “Germany and the Use of Military Force: ‘Total War’, the ‘Culture of Restraint’, and the Quest for Normality.” German Politics 10, 1, 2001. 6 F. Ostermann, F. Böller, F.J. Christiansen, F. Coticchia, D. Fonck, A. Herranz-​ Surrallés, J. Kaarbo, K. Kucmas, R.B. Pedersen, T. Raunio, Y. Reykers, M. Smetana, V. Vignoli, and W. Wagner. “Voting on the Use of Armed Force: Challenges of Data Indexing, Classification, and the Value of a Comparative Agenda,” in Methods in Defence Studies: A Pluridisciplinary Handbook, D. Deschaux-​Dutard (ed.). London and New York: Routledge, 2020 (in Print). 7 Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future”; Baumann and Hellmann, “Germany and the Use of Military Force.” 8 S. Bulmer. “Germany and the Eurozone Crisis: Between Hegemony and Domestic Politics.” West European Politics 36, 6, 2014.

120  Florian Böller 9 G. Hellmann, C. Masala, F. Sauer and R. Wolf. “Deutschland braucht keine Atomwaffen.” Spiegel Online. December 11, 2016. www.spiegel.de/​politik/​ deutschland/​gastbeitrag-​deutschland-​braucht-​keine-​atomwaffen-​a-​1125247.html. 10 A. Moravcsik. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.” International Organization 51, 4 (1997): 518. 11 For example, according to a 2019 public opinion poll, 54 percent of respondents support Germany’s membership in NATO. However, this represents a significant decline from 68 percent of support in 2017. See, YouGov. Support for NATO Falls in Key European Nations. April 3, 2019. https://​yougov.co.uk/​topics/​international/​ articles-​reports/​2019/​04/​03/​support-​nato-​falls-​key-​european-​nations. 12 P. Lagassé and P.A. Mello. “The unintended consequences of parliamentary involvement: Elite collusion and Afghanistan deployments in Canada and Germany.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, 1 (2018): 149; M. Steinbrecher, H. Biehl, and T. Graf. Sicherheits-​und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsbild in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ergebnisse und Analysen der Bevölkerungsbefragung 2018. Potsdam: Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr. 13 Z. Juhász. “German Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the Early 1990s,” in Public Opinion and the International Use of Force, P. Everts and P. Isernia eds. London and New York: Routledge, 2001, 69. 14 See Lagassé and Mello, “The unintended consequences of parliamentary involvement,” 149. 15 T. Forsberg. “From Ostpolitik to ‘Frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy towards Russia. International Affairs 92, 1 (2016): 41. 16 S. Harnisch. “Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts,” in Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses, S. Harnisch, C. Frank and H.W. Maull (eds.). London and New York: Routledge, 2011. 17 M. Breuning. “Role Theory Research in International Relations: State of the Art and Blind Spots,” in Role Theory in International Relations. S. Harnisch, C. Frank and H.W. Maull (eds.). New York: Routledge, 20. 18 C. Cantir and J. Kaarbo. “Unpacking Ego in Role Theory: Vertical and Horizontal Role Contestation and Foreign Policy,” in Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations, C. Cantir and J. Kaarbo (eds.). London and New York: Routledge. 19 A. Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 518. 20 K.W. Deutsch et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organizations in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. 21 Harnisch, “Role Theory,” 11. 22 S. Koschut. Normative Change and Security Community Disintegration: Undoing Peace. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016. 23 K. Longhurst. Germany and the Use of Force. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004; Maull, “German Foreign Policy, Post-​Kosovo.” 24 Duffield, “Political Culture and State Behavior,” 780–​783. 25 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 47. 26 A. Hyde-​Price. Germany & European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000, 138–​139.

Toward a “partner in leadership”?  121 27 K. Oppermann. “Between a Rock and a Hard Place? Navigating Domestic and International Expectations on German Foreign Policy.” German Politics 28, 3, 2018. 28 Cantir and Kaarbo, “Unpacking Ego in Role Theory.” 29 C.G. Thies. “Role Theory and Foreign Policy,” in The International Studies Encyclopedia Online, R.A. Denemark and R. Marlin-​ Bennett eds. www. oxfordreference.com/​ abstract/​ 1 0.1093/​ a cref/​ 9 780191842665.001.0001/ ​ a cref-​ 9780191842665-​e-​0333?rskey=lTF7we&result=1. 30 G. Friedrichs and S. Harnisch. “Alliances Rebalanced? The Social Meaning of the U.S. Pivot and Allies’ Responses in Northeast Asia.” Korean Journal of International Studies 15, 1, 2017. 31 H. Tewes. “Between Deepening and Widening: Role Conflict in Germany’s Enlargement Policy.” West European Politics 21, 2, 1998. 32 G.H.W. Bush. Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany. May 31, 1989. https://​bush41library.tamu.edu/​archives/​public-​papers/​476. 33 Hyde-​Pryce, Germany & European Order, 144. 34 S. Harnisch. Internationale Politik und Verfassung: Die Domestizierung der deutschen Sicherheits-​und Europapolitik. Baden-​Baden: Nomos, 2006. 35 Juhász, “German Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the Early 1990s,” 69. 36 Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 12/​5, Stenographischer Bericht, 5. Sitzung, 67. January 30, 1991. http://​dipbt.bundestag.de/​doc/​btp/​12/​12005.pdf. 37 Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 12/​5, 69. 38 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force,  59–​60. 39 T.U. Berger. Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. 40 J. Fischer. Rede Joschka Fischers auf dem Außerordentlichen Parteitag in Bielefeld, 13.5.99. May 13, 1999. https://​wolfgang-​naeser-​marburg.lima-​city.de/​htm/​kos-​fisc. htm. 41 Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 13/​248, Stenographischer Bericht, 248. Sitzung. October 16, 1998. Online. Available: http://​dipbt.bundestag.de/​doc/​btp/​13/​13248.pdf. 42 Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism. 43 H.W. Maull. “Reflective, Hegemonic, Geo-​economic, Civilian …? The Puzzle of German Power.” German Politics 27, 4 (2018): 2–​3. 44 W. Wagner. “The Bundestag as a Champion of Parliamentary Control of Military Missions.” S+F Security + Peace 35, 2, 2017. 45 The agreement index is a formula developed by Hix et al., which can be used to measure the degree of consensus within a legislature (the agreement index equals 1 if all members of the parliament vote together. A value of 0 denotes an equal distribution between all voting options). S. Hix, A. Noury and G. Roland. “Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979–​2001.” British Journal of Political Science 35, 2, 2005. 46 F. Ostermann et al. “Voting on the Use of Armed Force.” 47 Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 528. 48 W. Wagner, “The Bundestag as a Champion of Parliamentary Control of Military Missions.” 49 T. Forsberg. “German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-​Americanism, Pacifism or Emancipation?,” Security Dialogue 36, 2 (2005): 219.

122  Florian Böller 50 S. Koschut. “Emotional (Security) Communities: The Significance of Emotion Norms in Inter-​allied Conflict Management.” Review of International Studies 40, 3, 2014. 51 Auswärtiges Amt. Regierungserklärung von Bundesaußenminister Guido Westerwelle zu den aktuellen Entwicklungen in Libyen. March 3, 2011. https://​archiv. bundesregierung.de/​archiv-​de/​regierungserklaerung-​von-​bundesaussenminister-​ guido-​westerwelle-​zu-​den-​aktuellen-​entwicklungen-​in-​libyen-​mitschrift–​1122354. 52 See for a critical analysis of the vote-​ seeking argument M. Hansel and K. Oppermann, “Counterfactual reasoning in foreign policy analysis: the case of German nonparticipation in the Libya intervention of 2011.” Foreign Policy Analysis 12, 2, 2016. 53 F. Böller. “ ‘Guardian of the International Order’? NATO’s Contested Identity, the Discourses of Secretaries General, and the Ukraine Crisis.” East European Politics 34, 2, 2018. 54 Bundesregierung. Pressestatements von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem polnischen Ministerpräsidenten Tusk am 25. April 2014. April 25, 2014. www.bundesregierung. de/​Content/​DE/​Mitschrift/​Pressekonferenzen/​2014/​04/​2014-​04-​25-​merkel-​tusk. html. 55 Bundesregierung. Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und der lettischen Ministerpräsidentin Straujuma am 18. August. August 18, 2014. www.bundesregierung. de/​Content/​DE/​Mitschrift/​Pressekonferenzen/​2014/​08/​2014-​08-​18-​pk-​lettland.html. 56 Bundestag. Plenarprotokoll 18/​50, Stenographischer Bericht, 50. Sitzung. September 10, 2014. http://​dip21.bundestag.de/​dip21/​btp/​18/​18050.pdf. 57 Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 18/​50, 4565. 58 P. Daehnhardt. “German Foreign Policy, the Ukraine Crisis and the Euro-​Atlantic Order: Assessing the Dynamics of Change.” German Politics, 27, 4, 2018. 59 C. Major. “Die Strategische Anpassung der NATO.” SWP-​Aktuell 20. February 2015. www.swp-​berlin.org/​fileadmin/​contents/​products/​aktuell/​2015A20_​mjr.pdf. 60 Daehnhardt, “German Foreign Policy, the Ukraine Crisis and the Euro-​Atlantic Order,”  10–​11. 61 L. Aggestam and A. Hyde-​Price. “Learning to Lead? Germany and the Leadership Paradox in EU Foreign Policy.” German Politics, Online First, 2019, https://​doi. org/​10.1080/​09644008.2019.1601177. 62 Bundestag. Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten, Drucksache 19/​ 7200, 29.1.2019. January 29, 2019. https://​dip21.bundestag.de/​dip21/​btd/​19/​072/​ 1907200.pdf. 63 K.-​H. Kamp. “Myths Surrounding the Two Percent Debate –​on NATO defence spending.” Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik. Security Policy Working Paper 9/​2019. www.baks.bund.de/​sites/​baks010/​files/​working_​paper_​2019_​9.pdf. 64 SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database; see Figure 6.3. 65 BMVg (Bundesministerium für Verteidigung). Einzelplan 14/​2019 im Vergleich zum Haushalt 2018. 2019. www.bmvg.de/​resource/​blob/​30132/​5a6709e731e4e10c57717 a6ac9f6c9e6/​vergleich-​verteidigungshaushalt-​2019-​zu-​2018-​data.pdf. 66 S. Harnisch, G. Friedrichs, C.G. Thies. “Theorizing Transatlantic Crisis Resilience,” in The Politics of Resilience and Transatlantic Order: Enduring Crisis? London: Routledge, 2019. 67 B. Obama. “Speech in Berlin.” CNN. June 24, 2008. http://​edition.cnn.com/​2008/​ POLITICS/​07/​24/​obama.words/​index.html.

Toward a “partner in leadership”?  123 68 S. Bierling. Vormacht Wider Willen: Deutsche Außenpolitik von der Wiedervereinigung bis zur Gegenwart. München: CH Beck, 2014, 160. 69 Koschut, “Emotional (Security) Communities,” 550. 70 R. Gates. The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO). June 10, 2011. https://​archive.defense.gov/​Speeches/​Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1581. 71 Hallams and Schreer, “Towards a ‘Post-​American’ Alliance,” 323. 72 SIPRI 2018; OECD, Gross Domestic Product. https://​data.oecd.org/​gdp/​gross-​ domestic-​product-​gdp.htm. 73 Before 2015, a broad majority of the public supported to maintain the defense budget and only a small minority favored an increase. According to polling data for 2015 to 2018, a majority favors to expend the budget. At the same time, partisan preferences play an important role in shaping spending preferences. M. Steinbrecher et al., Sicherheits-​und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsbild, 142–​143. 74 D.J. Trump. “…vast sums of money.” Twitter. March 18, 2017. https://​twitter. com/​realdonaldtrump/​status/​843090516283723776?lang=de; see also: F. Faiola. “ ‘The Germans Are Bad, Very Bad’: Trump’s Alleged Slight Generates Confusion, Backlash.” Washington Post. May 26, 2017. www.washingtonpost. com/ ​ world/ ​ t rumps- ​ a lleged- ​ s light- ​ a gainst- ​ g ermans- ​ g enerates- ​ c onfusion-​ backlash/​2017/​05/​26/​0325255a-​4219-​11e7-​b29f-​f40ffced2ddb_​story.html?utm_​ term=.6db971f59fd0. 75 Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU), member of the Bundestag’s International Relations Committee, even requested a report whether Germany was allowed to enter nuclear weapons sharing agreements within Europe. The Bundetag’s research service’s report refers explicitly to Trump’s foreign policy as a cause for growing concerns among European allies. This illustrates the impact of US demands on German foreign policy discourse. See Bundestag. Völkerrechtliche Verpflichtungen Deutschlands beim Umgang mit Kernwaffen. May 23, 2017. www.bundestag.de/​ resource/​blob/​513080/​c9a903735d5ea334181c2f946d2cf8a2/​wd-​2-​013-​17-​pdf-​ data.pdf. 76 S. Gabriel. Rede von Außenminister Sigmar Gabriel auf der 53. Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz. February 18, 2017. www.auswaertiges-​amt.de/​de/​newsroom/​ 170218-​rede-​bm-​gabriel-​muesiko/​287944. 77 J. Delcker. “Merkel: Germany Stands by NATO Spending Pledge Despite SPD Doubts.” Politico. November 5, 2017. www.politico.eu/​article/​merkel-​germany-​ stands-​by-​nato-​spending-​pledge-​despite-​spd-​doubts; H. Monath. “Gabriel warnt vor ‘blindem Gehorsam’ gegenüber den USA.” Tagesspiegel. February 22, 2017. www.tagesspiegel.de/​politik/​streit-​um-​ruestungsausgaben-​gabriel-​warnt-​vor-​ blindem-​gehorsam-​gegenueber-​den-​usa/​19429910.html. 78 Die Linke. Sozial. Gerecht. Frieden. Für Alle. Die Zukunft, für die wir kämpfen! Langfassung des Wahlprogramms zur Bundestagswahl 2017, 95. www.die-​linke.de/​ fileadmin/​download/​wahlen2017/​wahlprogramm2017/​die_​linke_​wahlprogramm_​ 2017.pdf. 79 Bündnis 90/​Die Grünen. Zukunft wird aus Mut gemacht. Bundestagswahlprogramm 2017, 87 ff. www.gruene.de/​fileadmin/​user_​upload/​Dokumente/​BUENDNIS_​90_​ DIE_​GRUENEN_​Bundestagswahlprogramm_​2017_​barrierefrei.pdf. 80 SPD. Es ist Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit: Zukunft sichern, Europa stärken. Das Regierungsprogramm 2017 bis 2021, 105. www.spd.de/​fileadmin/​Dokumente/​ Regierungsprogramm/​SPD_​Regierungsprogramm_​BTW_​2017_​A5_​RZ_​WEB. pdf.

124  Florian Böller 81 CDU/​CSU. Für ein Deutschland, in dem wir gut und gerne leben. Regierungsprogramm 2017–​202, 66. www.cdu.de/​system/​tdf/​media/​dokumente/​170703regierungs programm2017.pdf ?file=1. 82 FDP. Denken wir neu. Das Programm der Freien Demokraten zur Bundestagswahl 2017, 5. www.fdp.de/​sites/​default/​files/​uploads/​2017/​08/​07/​20170807-​wahlprogramm-​wp-​ 2017-​v16.pdf. 83 Cited in Badische Zeitung, Große Koalition praktisch am Ende. June 30, 2017. www. badische-​zeitung.de/​nachrichten/​deutschland/​grosse-​koalition-​praktisch-​am-​ende. 84 CDU/C ​ SU. Weckruf für Europa. Facetten einer europäischen Verteidigungsunion. June 21, 2017. www.cducsu.de/​themen/​aussen-​europa-​und-​verteidigung/​weckruf-​fuer-​ europa. 85 R. Wolf. “Donald Trump’s Status-​Driven Foreign Policy.” Survival 59, 5, 2017; F. Böller. “A Breakdown of Trust: Trump, Europe and the Transatlantic Security Community,” in Mobilization, Representation, and Responsiveness in the American Democracy, M.T. Oswald (ed.), 301–​319. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. 86 “Trump approves plan to withdraw 9,500 US troops from Germany.” BBC News. July 1, 2020. www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​us-​canada-​53248177. 87 Cited in RP Online, USA kein verlässlicher Partner mehr. May 29, 2017. https://​ rp-​online.de/​politik/​ausland/​so-​reagieren-​us-​medien-​auf-​merkels-​bierzeltrede_​ aid-​19395693. 88 Bundesregierung. Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel anlässlich der Verleihung des Karlspreises am 10. Mai in Aachen. May 10, 2018. www.bundesregierung. de/​breg-​de/​aktuelles/​rede-​von-​bundeskanzlerin-​angela-​merkel-​anlaesslich-​der-​ verleihung-​des-​karlspreises-​am-​10-​mai-​in-​aachen-​1008452. 89 A. Dossi. “PESCO Armament Cooperation, Prospects and Fault Lines.” CSS Analyses in Security Policy, March 2019. https://​css.ethz.ch/​content/​dam/​ethz/​ special-​interest/​gess/​cis/​center-​for-​securities-​studies/​pdfs/​CSSAnalyse241-​EN.pdf. 90 S. Erlanger. “Merkel and Macron Publicly Clash Over NATO.” New York Times. November 23, 2019. www.nytimes.com/​2019/​11/​23/​world/​europe/​nato-​france-​ germany.html. 91 Bundesregierung. Angela Merkel Receives NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. Online. November 7, 2019. www.bundeskanzlerin.de/​bkin-​en/​news/​ mrkel-​empfaengt-​stoltenberg-​1690044.

7  Poland’s role in NATO Toward a transatlantic bargain 2.0? Wojciech Michnik

Introduction For Poland, which joined NATO in 1999, the past two decades have been a period of enhanced stability and defense capacity-​building measures. Polish policymakers embraced both NATO’s global and regional role. Warsaw has deployed its military as part of NATO’s out of area operations from Kosovo to Afghanistan, while at the same time it modernized its armed forces and steadily worked to annually spend the agreed 2  percent of Poland’s GDP on defense. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014 signaled a threshold for NATO’s “new-​old” role as the Alliance started to move back toward its original responsibilities of territorial defense and deterrence as results of NATO’s Newport and Warsaw Summits clearly indicated. The debate about reinforcement of the Eastern flank ceased to be merely theoretical. This chapter aims to explore the question of Poland’s role in the Alliance and its contribution to NATO’s security. From a Polish perspective, NATO’s commitment and reassurance in Central and Eastern Europe has been essential for the stability and regional security. Conversely, Poland’s role in NATO over the past 20 years has proven to be mostly positive both for the development of the Alliance and for the defense and security of NATO’s Eastern flank. Yet, as this chapter argues, NATO is in need of reinventing itself in the new security environment and in need of redefining the “transatlantic bargain” that would match the changed reality of intra-​alliance dynamics and external security concerns. From this perspective, the chapter assesses Poland’s role in NATO and addresses the question about Warsaw’s ability to play a considerable part in a process of the transatlantic bargain renewal.1 The term “transatlantic bargain” was originally coined by former US Ambassador to NATO Harlan Cleveland and in essence refers to the United States’ “pledging continued involvement in European security arrangements in return for a European commitment to organize itself both for external defense and internal stability.”2 Throughout the history of the Alliance, the bargain had to be revised several times and in a way has become a symbol of constant evolution of NATO, its goals and crucial debates on both sides of

126  Wojciech Michnik the Atlantic. The bargain’s dynamic nature was grasped by telling remarks of the former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson: The U.S. suffers from a sort of schizophrenia. On one hand, the Americans say ‘You Europeans have got to carry more of the burden’ and when the Europeans say, ‘ok, we will carry more of the burden,’ the Americans say, ‘Well, wait a minute, are you trying to tell us to go home?”3 Yet, given the current state of Euro-​Atlantic affairs including post-​Brexit Europe; resurgent Russia, raging global pandemic and Trump’s isolationist administration, a case can be made for a new transatlantic bargain. For Poland, one of the most pro-​Atlanticist states within the Alliance, the need for a reinterpretation of a transatlantic bargain has become a part of Warsaw’s own balancing act. After all, the Polish road to NATO was perceived in Poland predominantly as a route that led through Washington rather than through Berlin, Paris, or Brussels. And even though it proved to have been successful, as with all strategic choices, betting predominantly on the US came with a cost. As Warsaw in its security policies placed the United States and NATO as primary actors in the realm of security and defense, it left little room for intra-​European and non-​NATO cooperation in this field. What was understandable in the Polish strategic thinking in the 1990s (namely poor historical experiences with European allies in 20th century) resulted in the US and NATO-​centric interpretations of security environment. Later, at the beginning of the 21st century, this tendency came to be known as Americanization of Polish foreign policy.4 Consequently, Poland’s strategic culture of the last two decades has been much more affected by the US worldview and position rather than European. For Poland, it often resulted in being at odds with its major European allies –​i.e., Iraq War, Missile Defense system, purchases of US military equipment, secret CIA detention cite, European strategic autonomy etc.5 This chapter focuses on Poland’s evolving role in NATO over the course of the past two decades (1999–​2020). First, it provides a short historical overview of Poland’s accession into NATO and Warsaw’s main challenges in the first years after the enlargement. Particularly, it assesses how Polish historical experiences and security challenges shaped perception of Poland’s position in the Alliance. The second part deals with current Polish–​NATO relations, pointing to the 2014 Russia’s aggression on Ukraine as a critical juncture for repairing the Alliance cohesion and sense of urgency. It is argued that even six years after the war in Ukraine began, NATO–​Russia relations remain damaged beyond easy ad hoc diplomatic fixes. How to deal with resurgent Russia that has become a threat to NATO, still resonates as a focal question in Poland’s debate about its contemporary role in NATO. Finally, third section offers a discussion about future role of Poland in NATO, based on current challenges that the Alliance faces. It examines possible alternatives for NATO, given its present focus on defense and deterrence while most of the member

Poland’s role in NATO  127 states have found themselves in the midst of emergencies that require nonmilitary answers such as migration, terrorism, or the Covid-​19 pandemic. Finally it assesses a potential role Poland might play in a process of renegotiating the transatlantic bargain.

Entering the club –​Poland in NATO in historical context When NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner during his visit to Poland in March of 1992 confirmed that “NATO’s door is open,” his declaration signaled changes within NATO thinking about enlargement, that eventually led to Poland’s accession to the Alliance seven years later.6 Yet, despite the early diplomatic statements, the accession process proved to be lengthy and filled with political hurdles. Some of the difficulties needed to be resolved on the Polish side such as adjustments in civil–​military relations; democratic norms and procedures; and a transformation of the Polish armed forces toward NATO’s standards. It is also worth noting that in the 1990s, there were many policymakers and academics openly opposing Central European states to join the Alliance, including John Lewis Gaddis, Michael Mandelbaum, John Mearsheimer, or Kenneth Waltz.7 Even George F. Kennan, one of the most prominent US diplomats of the Cold War period, famously had called the enlargement of NATO into Central Europe “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-​cold-​war era.”8 Overall, their concerns were put aside as both the United States and other NATO member states decided that enlargement would bring more good than harm to European stability and security and hence for the Alliance itself.9 In the words of former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright the Alliance would do for Europe’s east what NATO has already helped to do for Europe’s west:  steadily and systematically, we will continue erasing  –​without replacing –​the line drawn in Europe by Stalin’s bloody boot.10 Regardless whether sheer interests or correcting historical injustices explained it, the Eastward enlargement became reality in 1999. In his March 12, 1999 speech in Independence, Missouri, marking Poland’s entrance to NATO structures, Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronislaw Geremek spoke about importance of this moment for the country he represented: This is a great day for Poland, as well as for millions of Poles scattered all over the World. Poland forever returns where she has always belonged –​ to the free World. Poland is no longer alone in the defence of her freedom. We are in NATO “for your freedom and ours.11 Indeed, accession to NATO became the single-​ most important event in Poland’s security realm since the end of the Cold War. It symbolized a fulfillment of nearly a decade-​long effort of Polish political and military elites

128  Wojciech Michnik as well as indicated that the changes in strategic environment that started in Europe in 1989 could result in more secure and stable Poland. Moreover, Poland joined NATO one decade since the beginning of the Polish political and economic transformation from a socialist and authoritarian state into a liberal democracy. The 1999 enlargement of NATO that also included Czech Republic and Hungary, marked a historical threshold for both NATO alliance and newly joined member states. It also came at the heyday of Western dominance in world affairs and just days before NATO led military operation over Kosovo. From Warsaw’s perspective, ability to finally become NATO member constituted the greatest achievement since 1989, as it guaranteed a physical security of Polish territory under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. In other words, by joining NATO, Poland improved its regional security, a necessary condition for further political and economic development, including road to the membership in the EU. Simultaneously, Polish accession to NATO marked a beginning of the long learning process of the reliable and responsible membership in the most successful alliance in modern history. This membership has been based on common interests, values, military cooperation, and burden-​ sharing in the realm of transatlantic defense and security. Thus, entering NATO was only an initial step on a road to rebuilding Poland’s position and status within Western security framework. As far as geostrategic location was concerned, Warsaw’s strategic challenges in 1999 and beyond turn out to be more not less ambitious, as newly accepted NATO member, Poland became also the Alliance’s European eastward flank (bordering Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine from the east).12 For NATO as a whole, bringing newcomers in 1999 meant testing the Alliance ability to project security and stability beyond the Cold War borders. In this regard, Poland became one of few cases for subsequent further enlargement eastward in 2004 and 2009. If for Poland, as Robert Kupiecki aptly writes, “the political sense of efforts in the first post-​Cold War decade focused on gaining a place in NATO as a credible defensive alliance,”13 then in the following decade, Warsaw’s efforts concentrated on becoming a full-​fledged member of the Alliance shifting from a security consumer to a security provider. Yet, the international context in which Poland entered the Alliance, started to change rapidly and it influenced NATO’s strategic well-​being and Poland’s role within it.14 The first test for Warsaw came quickly when on March 24, 1999 NATO launched military operation Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War. Even though, Poland was just a newly admitted NATO member and was not able to fully contribute to the NATO operations, it provided a strong political support toward the military actions of other NATO states and deployed a 140-​soldier unit to assist in the Alliance’s humanitarian operation in Albania in April of 1999.15 The first decade of 21st century seemed to have been formative for Poland’s position in NATO. Polish role evolved from a junior member to a fully compatible, reliant, and equal partner within the Alliance. This transformation of Poland’s role in NATO took place in a very turbulent times for the

Poland’s role in NATO  129 transatlantic security and NATO itself: Poland entered NATO in the midst of Kosovo war, only to witness strategic evolution from post-​September 11, 2001 NATO’s decision to join the GWOT, through the participation in Afghan war; through the Russian–​Georgian war of 2008; and NATO’s military campaign over Libya, to the political clash with Russia over Ukraine. As mentioned above, a membership in NATO has allowed Poland to enjoy security guarantees extended to each NATO member state in a case of a foreign military attack (the Article 5 clause). This security rationale has become the prism through which Poland has viewed its role in NATO and vice-​versa, defining NATO’s usefulness to Poland. After the Prague Summit of 2002 and the NATO decision to “go global,” it was clear that the Alliance was drifting even further toward out-​of-​area posture, while it was also evident that for some states like Poland, Norway, or the Baltic states, security concerns were predominantly regional as all of them shared at least one of their borders with an unpredictable neighbor. These concerns were later reinforced by the Russia–​Georgia War of 2008 and ultimately by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent aggression on eastern Ukraine. Yet, in the post-​9/​11 world, NATO’s priorities shifted and Afghanistan became a battlefield for confronting enemies of the Alliance at their own territory. Poland took an active part in the ISAF mission contributing over 2,000 troops to the multinational contingent. As NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan –​ which initially looked like a mission based mainly on peacekeeping, reconstruction, and assistance –​turned virtually into a counterinsurgency campaign against the resurgent Taliban, the Alliance found itself in the rift. Not all of NATO’s European allies were ready to provide military support needed for such operations. The Afghan mission brought back the discussion quite typical for transatlantic security about the burden-​sharing, bandwagoning, free-​riding, and providing allies with necessary assistance. It has been the first large NATO military operation (ISAF) in which Poland contributed substantial number of military troops (2,600 at its peak). To some extent, NATO’s mission in Afghanistan proved that Poland could be a reliable ally both for NATO and the United States.16 Still Polish decision-​makers and generals were caught in the middle of the Euro-​Atlantic spat about the character and scope of non-​US NATO involvement in Afghanistan. The focal point of this argument was highlighted by the EU think tank: The Americans criticize the Europeans for being too unforthcoming and the Europeans feel that their contribution is neither understood nor appreciated. Moreover, strategic divergences on what should be done and how are slowly emerging, reinforced by the unsatisfactory results of the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and their staggering human and economic costs. At the same time that American forces have been rapidly leaving Europe, American strategic priorities are increasingly focused on non-​European territories.17

130  Wojciech Michnik No one was more vocal about the challenges that NATO came across in Afghanistan than then-​US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. In his speech from June 2011, he explicitly warned that NATO is turning into a two-​tiered alliance polarized between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership –​be they security guarantees or headquarters billets –​but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.18 It is worth underlining that Poland, which lost 43 soldiers in Afghanistan and additionally paid a hefty price in resources and equipment, demonstrated that its role within NATO was evolving from the security consumer to the security provider.19 Overall, the Afghan mission has shown again the differences between NATO’s allies in military potential, capabilities, and political will to use their troops in operations in distant territories. Poland has not been exception in this case as its engagement in military mission in Afghanistan has displayed both strengths and weaknesses of its political and military role. Polish participation in Afghan war led to the modernization and strategic transformation of Polish military forces. When it entered the conflict in 2002, Polish army was still oversized, all-​volunteer, and technologically lagging behind in comparison to its older NATO allies. After more than 12  years of Afghan mission (and also war in Iraq), Polish forces were in the midst of quality and technologically oriented transformation. Fully professional army replaced the all-​volunteer military. Furthermore, as a result of reforms, trainings, and warfare experience, Polish Special Forces have become one of the leading NATO special operations units. For Poland, the end of the military mission in the Hindu Kush also meant that the NATO internal debate about “out of area” missions versus Article 5 commitments could be resumed. With the unstable situation on its Eastern flank, a tilt toward a focus on regional defense rather than interventions outside NATO borders was a scenario that the Polish side welcomed. And even though both wars in which Poland deployed its forces –​Iraq and Afghanistan –​ were limited in scope, they both left a lasting mark on transatlantic relations (i.e., NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan, and the intra-​transatlantic rift over the Iraq War).20

The role of Poland in NATO today Paradoxically for Poland’s position within the Alliance, out of area operations undertaken by NATO in the 1990s and 2000s created opportunities for Warsaw to showcase its political and military support in joint combat efforts. Yet, simultaneously, NATO’s departure from traditional collective defense tasks toward crisis management missions was not a welcome course of action among Polish policymakers, as it was clear that, from a security–​interests

Poland’s role in NATO  131 perspective, deterrence and defense against potential threats (coming from the East) constituted a much greater concern. Kupiecki has summarized this growing concern: The priority of collective defence in Allied efforts was additionally undermined by the pressure of ongoing crisis contexts that required looking for effective solutions and adapting the Alliance’s civil and military capacities to them at the cost of traditional missions. This led some experts to prematurely claim that NATO would transform from a defensive alliance into a collective security organisation or even an international regime.21 It took Russia’s attack on Ukraine in 2014, that made NATO reinforce traditional defense and deterrence as priorities again. Moscow’s action marked a watershed moment not only the Alliance as a whole, but also for its eastern members. Until 2014, in fact, there was no consensus among member states about Russia’s aggressive behavior and its resurgent policies. Yet, Moscow annexation of Crimea and subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine changed this situation. It shocked many within the Alliance. As a result, this crisis brought the Alliance back to refocus on defense and security of Europe, making it a pivotal moment for NATO, a unique “U-​turn” in its evolution.22 For Poland and other preoccupied states in the region, such as the three Baltic states and Romania, war in Ukraine was a bitter validation of fears and concerns about nature of the Kremlin regime. In Poland that suffered in the past from belligerent Russian policies, Kremlin’s aggressive actions in Ukraine and provocations aimed at NATO’s member states raised legitimate question whether Russian policy of 2014 heralded the return of an era when ethnic claims backed by sheer military force trumped international law. From Warsaw’s vantage point, it was rather evident that Russian disregard for Ukrainian territorial integrity was a serious blow for the statehood and the society of Ukraine itself and as a result made Poland and its neighborhood less secure. But overall, Russian actions challenged transatlantic security and de facto sent a message to the West that Russia was no longer going to respect the rules of the game established by the Euro-​Atlantic security architecture after the end of the Cold War.23 More importantly, Russia did not limit itself to attacking non-​NATO states as in the case of Georgia (2008) or Ukraine (2014), but also was undertaking aggressive provocations and signaling campaigns against NATO member states. For instance, in August 2008, Russian high-​ranking military official Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn warned that if Warsaw agreed to host US rockets as part of the missile defense shield, “Poland is exposing itself to a strike  –​100%.” Also, he added that Russia’s security doctrine allowed

132  Wojciech Michnik it to use nuclear weapons against an active ally of a nuclear power such as America.24 Next year, Russia and Belarus revived its Zapad (the Russian word for “West”) military exercise, during which Russia simulated nuclear attacks on Poland and an amphibious landing after a NATO-​led attack on Belarus.25 As Mark Galeotti pointed out, the Kremlin has indicated that it would use nuclear-​capable Iskander-​M (SS-​26) missiles in its Kaliningrad Oblast (the Russian enclave bordering Poland and Lithuania) to gain a political rather than military upper hand over the West as periodically, the ‘Iskander card’ was played whenever Moscow wanted to alarm the northern Europeans. Although the missile is primarily used for conventional precision strikes –​as demonstrated in Georgia and Syria –​ the fact that it is nuclear-​capable inevitably attracts particular attention from the public and politicians.26 Given the above threats from Moscow, Polish authorities were quite instrumental within NATO framework about a need to build a united front against Russian bullying behavior. As a matter of fact, Russian aggressive signaling was not limited to Poland itself. In 2014, the year when Russia attacked Ukraine and annexed Crimea, there were some 11 instances of serious incidents provoked by military forces of the Russian Federation: 4 separate cases of the harassment of the US and Swedish reconnaissance planes in international airspace; 2 cases of Russian aircraft close over flights over US and Canadian ships in the Black Sea; Russian aircraft violating Swedish airspace; a mock attack on the Danish island of Bornholm; the practicing of cruise missile attacks against the US mainland; detention of a Lithuanian fishing in the Barents Sea; and a substantial growth of Russian aviation activity along NATO borders.27 Moscow’s occupation of Ukrainian territory along with aggressive posturing against NATO states, made allies to design a clear response. This response was officially delivered during NATO Summits in Newport and Warsaw. For Poland’s role in NATO, the Warsaw Summit of July 2016 constituted both a symbolic and a practical step toward unity and solidarity of the Alliance. In that occasion, transatlantic allies agreed on firm defensive measures that would counterbalance the Russian Federation’s actions on NATO’s eastern periphery. Some of the key decisions of the Summit included: strengthening the Alliance’s military presence in the east, with four battalions in Poland (US-​ led), Estonia (British-​led), Latvia (Canadian-​led), and Lithuania (German-​ led) on a rotational basis (in place in 2017); developing a tailored forward presence in the southeastern part of NATO; declaring the Initial Operational Capability of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense; and, by committing to strengthen their own cyber defenses, the member states recognized cyberspace as a new operational domain.28 In the aftermath of the Warsaw Summit, Polish authorities have intensified their efforts to bring permanent US military

Poland’s role in NATO  133 presence to Poland. They even proposed to name a potential base after president Trump and offered to contribute USD 2 billion toward establishing a US military base in Poland.29 It can be argued that Poland’s reliance on both NATO and the US bore immediate fruits in the midst of Russia’s war against Ukraine. In 2014, NATO enhanced its Baltic Air Policing Mission and NATO AWACS planes were deployed over Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states. Additionally, NATO took more substantial steps toward defense and reassurance of its members on the Eastern flank, when in 2016 NATO decided to deploy four allied multinational battalions on a rotational basis in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The United States also undertook unilateral actions to deter potential aggressive behavior of Russia toward Central and Eastern European states. In 2014, the Obama administration created the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) that aimed to reassure the US allies and to increase American military presence in Europe. Later in 2016, the ERI was rebranded into EDI to reflect the evolution of the mission from reassuring allies to deterring Russia.30 As NATO’s main focus shifted back to defend its members’ territories, Poland and the Baltic states –​geopolitically based on the Eastern flank –​found themselves in the center of the Alliance attention. In addition to NATO’s immediate responses to Russia’s behavior in Central and Eastern Europe, there has been a return to the transatlantic security debate about a role of traditionally understood defense (and deterrence) in current NATO’s strategy. In a sense, Russia provided the Alliance with a new boost of energy. And it did not happen for the first time in the history of NATO. According to one of NATO officials’ remark dating to 1976, “as has been the case in the past when NATO has been in the doldrums, Moscow does us the great service of waking us up.”31 It was no secret that Poland has been advocating for years for a more traditional NATO defensive role. And since 2014, Poland has been on the front line of NATO’s efforts to deter Russia, it came as little surprise that Warsaw has been playing a significant part in efforts to enhance NATO’s conventional defense. Overall, after more than two decades, Poland’s evolving role in NATO mostly proven to be beneficiary for both the Alliance and Poland itself. Polish list of gains is a long one and includes among many: transformation from the former Warsaw Pact military toward a modern Western fighting force that gradually has contributed to NATO’s military strength and operational readiness; a constant defense and security guarantee of the most successful alliance in history; and participation in an interdependent network of 30 allied states that mostly share similar interests and values. For NATO, Poland’s record seems also mostly positive:  Warsaw swiftly went into transformation mode to create military that meets NATO standards with regards to training, equipment, and interoperability; Poland has contributed to most of the Alliance military out-​of-​area operations (with one important exception of Libya in 2011) and additionally reached NATO-​agreed guideline of military

134  Wojciech Michnik spending of 2 percent of the GDP (2.02 percent in 2018 and 2.01 percent in 2019);32 Warsaw has taken up a role of regional leader, that included close cooperation with other NATO member states in Central and Eastern Europe; and lastly, contrary to some of the NATO enlargement critics, Poland, has proven to contribute to European, and therefore the Alliance, security. The above picture however, should also be taken with a grain of salt. What Poland has accomplished through nearly three decades in the realm of security policy, could be jeopardized by recent domestic developments and policies that put in question Poland’s commitment to the rule of law and democratic transition. Consequently, as a wave of populist decisions (including the crisis surrounding Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal) has been steadily implemented by the government of Law and Justice party (in power since 2015), there have been growing concerns over Poland’s record as a successful liberal democracy.33 Finally, the dominant perspective in Poland about the role of the United States in Europe and in NATO seems to be quite different than in majority of Western European states. Such a different approach has mostly been informed by a historical experience of Polish foreign policy that dates back to the early 1990s. In fact, it could be argued that an early debate about NATO enlargement and steadily increased US support to bring Poland and other Central and Eastern European states into the Alliance, had affected greatly Polish political establishment’s views on transatlantic security, Poland’s role within NATO and bilateral relations with other members of the Alliance. What Poland’s western allies might sometimes overlook, is so called “founding myth” of Polish–​American relations, that deeply affected Poland’s behavior and role in NATO. The Clinton administration’s policy of engagement and enlargement materialized for Warsaw in a form of American support of democratization and stabilization of Central and Eastern European region. Poland’s potential membership in NATO fell under such an agenda. The US support for NATO open door policy, as Olaf Osica writes, followed by NATO’s enlargement to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, marked the birth of a new myth of the founding of Polish-​ American relations, the essence of which was the conviction that a special bond between Poland and the USA was created, which revolutionized the paradigm of European security.34 According to this myth, Poland supposed to have become a new partner for the United States in Europe and to have played “an independent role between Germany and Russia, creating therefore a new pillar of transatlantic relations.”35 It takes only one look into current Polish foreign policy, including its (sometimes) one-​sided pro-​US stance; skepticism toward pan-​European security and defense projects; and bilateralization of NATO, to understand that this myth has barely faded away.

Poland’s role in NATO  135

The future of Poland in NATO In 2020, as the Covid-​19 pandemic stroke NATO member states and the rest of the world, the Alliance has faced somehow unexpected crisis that will likely leave a lasting mark on its ability to thrive and sustain its economic prosperity. So far, the biggest blow might come to the economies of allied states that would affect future military budgets. Yet, since the direct impact of the pandemic on NATO as defense and security institution is still unknown, the section about the Alliance’s future concentrates on threats and challenges already recognized before a crisis caused by the Covid-​19.36 Poland’s future role in NATO will mostly depend on three factors: (1) NATO’s overall ability to adapt to new security environment; (2) its capacity to regain cohesion in the midst of eroding international order; and, (3) Poland’s readiness to play more significant role in redefining a new transatlantic bargain. First, even though NATO’s history is in fact a history of strategic and institutional adaptation, current external and internal dynamics raise more questions than answers. Given a growing disinterest of democratic societies in politics and foreign affairs;37 rise of populism and crisis of leadership and democratic institutions among NATO allies (from Hungary, Poland, Turkey to the US), it may be difficult to undertake a serious debate about future of NATO among all of its 30 members. In addition, it might be impossible to adapt to new security threats if NATO does not state vigilant. The recent example indicates a need for improvement in this regard. Up until 2014, transatlantic allies had seemed to neglect state-​based threats, whether coming from strong, weak, or fragile states (as the fallout from Arab Uprising, including Libya, has shown) great power politics and revisionist powers. The clearest example of such negligence was the Alliance’s surprise over aggressive policies of Russia on European fringes in Georgia and in Ukraine. As a result, Russia –​a state paradoxically by far weaker militarily and economically than NATO allies, has been able to mark its influence on three flanks. Consequently, within 270 degrees of the NATO’s scope, the Arctic, the North Atlantic, North Africa, Syria, and Turkey “all appear to have been fallen under Russian influence with the result, ironically, that it is the turn of NATO’s European continental members to feel encircled, the very claim that Russia has so often made about the Alliance.”38 And even though not all Kremlin’s actions are equally threatening to NATO, they have shown ability of Russia to destabilize the Alliance’s neighborhood, whether it is in Ukraine, Georgia, Syria, or the Arctic. Of course, NATO is not only about containing Russia any more, as the nature of threats that the Alliance is facing, has broadened significantly. That is why it is even more important for the Alliance future to excel in area that NATO has so far been good at for more than 70  years:  dealing with great powers through defense and deterrence of NATO member states. In terms of keeping deterrence and traditional military defense at the helm of NATO strategy, an argument is rather well-​known: great powers have never entirely disappeared from the potential “threat horizon.” As Colin S. Gray assessed

136  Wojciech Michnik in 2009, Russia and China, though by no means total rivals or adversaries for NATO, would “each in its unique way, for familiar reasons, (…) contribute more to the problems column than to the solutions file, for NATO.”39 Even though, containing potential adversaries and enemies is a complex undertaking in itself. NATO has had successful record of keeping its members safe against attack from the state actors. Contrarily, that cannot be said about dealing with instability caused by nonstate actors and threats that has recently been affecting the southern flank of the Alliance. It provides also a partial answer why NATO addressed Russian aggressive behavior relatively well. Because it has been trained to do so, “NATO just happens to be better at countering an assertive great power than at state-​building and fighting terrorism.”40 Second, NATO’s capacity to regain cohesion in the midst of eroding international order would require from member states a fundamental decision: either to scale back NATO’s portfolio to mostly military based threats (while sharing responsibility in addressing nonmilitary challenges with other security actors such as the EU, the UN, or the African Union) or be ready to pay economic and structural costs to broaden NATO’s strategic functions and consequently risking the Alliance overextension. The history of NATO has shown that addressing nonmilitary challenges requires more nuanced and more unified efforts from the NATO member states. In current security environment, a need to address nontraditional threats is daunting but increasingly harder to transform it into one coherent allied strategy. Therefore, if societies of NATO members accept that NATO is solely military alliance that cannot be deployed to all sorts of threats in the world, perhaps this would safeguard a cohesion of NATO. Yet, considering current political will and NATO’s military capabilities this would entail revamping political and military strategy so that they incorporate 21st century elements of defense and deterrence (i.e., cyber component; special operations, and disinformation campaigns used by adversaries; space capabilities etc.). This approach should not be limited only to the Eastern flank and containing Russia in Eastern Europe or in the High North. As NATO is continuing its adaptation to a “complex and volatile security situation” member states “will have to acknowledge that the debate has to go beyond the question of military presence in Eastern Europe, and that in a modern understanding deterrence is the cumulative effect of many different measures.”41 Addressing this problem should be a priority of the next NATO’s Strategic Concept. Third, Poland does not have political power to become a sole broker of a new transatlantic bargain. By remaining unfaltering ally of the US, especially in the realm of military cooperation, it alienated some of the European NATO member states, that argued that Poland should have been relying on NATO as a whole, instead of bringing more security assurances from American partner. According to some critics, Polish government decision to bring via bilateral agreement the US troops to Poland might have been viewed in Brussels as ungrateful:

Poland’s role in NATO  137 Poland, the biggest Central European country with a strong military tradition, should be the sword and shield of NATO in the defense of northeastern Europe. Yet offering to pay for extra U.S. protection suggests that Warsaw regards NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP)  –​rotating multinational frontline units in Poland and the Baltic States to ensure that any Russian incursion would immediately encounter allied forces –​ as inadequate.42 Polish authorities would challenge this assertion, arguing that by bringing additional US forces to its territory, it actually fulfills its membership responsibility of “effective self-​help and mutual aid” under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Certainly, in this context, the latest decision of the Trump administration to withdraw 9,500 US soldiers from Germany complicates intra-​NATO dynamics and chances for a new transatlantic bargain. Regardless these debates, Warsaw should be ready to be able to tilt the bargain toward favorable direction. With the United States concentrating its strategic interests on the great power rivalry, identifying China as the most dangerous competitor, NATO European allies face a choice between staying on the sidelines while rivalry between Washington and Beijing intensifies, or embracing limited engagement along the US. By doing too much, the Alliance is risking delivering too little (with diffusion of resources and focus) and consequently breaking into subgroups of member states that address threats they deem most urgent ones. After all, NATO has been –​in words of Ambassador Cleveland –​“an organized controversy about who is going to do how much.”43 Yet, here might be a role for Poland should such an occasion occur. Since there is an ambition among some European NATO members to support greater European Union’s security and defense agency, the division of labor between NATO and other institutions could become necessary. This could move intra-​NATO debate forward, according to some scholars, and address a question of the Alliance cohesion: “Overall Alliance cohesion could benefit from the open acknowledgement of allies’ diverging threat priorities, and an agreement to allow for a division of labor among them.”44 From the Alliance standpoint, all kind of increases in European military spending and assuming security responsibilities would be welcomed. For a strongly pro-​US Warsaw, it would probably be acceptable with one exception:  in a situation when European member states start to consider some form of collective defense guarantees. “This is very much a long shot, but it would undoubtedly strike at the heart of NATO’s mission and call for a more fundamental re-​adjustment of its tasks.”45 After all, NATO’s strength is in how it deters its rivals. In other words, the success of NATO is actually measured in “attacks that have not happened.” As long as Article 5 is in place –​and there is a mutual understanding among both NATO members and adversaries that allies will come to defend each other, should the need be –​NATO proves its value and utility as a defense pact.46 The loss of such a mutual understanding would not be a development Poland would wish to find itself or NATO dealing with.

138  Wojciech Michnik

Notes 1 The transatlantic bargain can be defined as a rule that has underpinned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since its founding in 1949 and “framed the relationship between the United States and its European allies” and can be characterize as a “balancing act between a U.S. commitment to European security in return for a position of U.S. leadership and dominance of NATO, and the expectation that Europeans would accelerate efforts to provide for their own defense.” Quoted in E. Hallams. A Transatlantic Bargain for the 21st Century: The United States, Europe, and the Transatlantic Alliance. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2013, ix. 2 M. Rühle. Re-​examining the Transatlantic Bargain. “NATO Review.” December 01, 2002. www.nato.int/​docu/​review/​articles/​2002/​12/​01/​re-​examining-​the-​transatlantic-​ bargain/​ index.html 3 “The Ageing Alliance.” The Economist. October, 21, 1999. www.economist.com/​ special-​report/​1999/​10/​21/​the-​ageing-​alliance 4 R. Kuzniar, Polityka i Sila. Studia strategiczne –​zarys problematyki. Warszawa: Scholar, 2005, 343. 5 For a more detailed explanation of Polish–​US security relations see: A. Lanoszka, “Poland in a time of geopolitical flux,” Contemporary Politics (2020): 1–​17. 6 Ministry of National Defense. Poland in NATO –​20 years. www.gov.pl/​web/​ national-​defence/​poland-​in-​nato-​20-​years. 7 On debate about NATO enlargement, see: J.L. Gaddis. “History, Grand Strategy, and NATO Enlargement.” Survival 40, 1 (1998): 145–​151; J.M. Goldgeier. “NATO Expansion: Anatomy of a Decision.” Washington Quarterly 21, 1 (1998): 83–​ 102; J.J. Mearsheimer. “Why the Ukrainian Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” Foreign Affairs 93, 5 (2014): 77–​89; K.N. Waltz. “NATO Expansion: A Realist’s View.” Contemporary Security Policy 21, 2 (2000): 23–​38; A. Lanoszka. “Thank Goodness for NATO Enlargement.” International Politics 57, 2020, 451–470. 8 J. M. Goldgeier. Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999, 1. 9 The recent article addressed aptly myths and concerns of NATO enlargement critics: “NATO enlargement has been a net positive for European security. It has provided a useful hedge against Russian revisionism, which even critics of NATO enlargement have acknowledged is possible. Enlargement is not responsible for Russia’s current authoritarianism or its foreign relations, and mutually beneficial cooperation between the USA and Russia has still been possible with NATO enlargement. Finally, NATO enlargement has not brought insurmountable deterrence challenges. In fact, it has helped to solidify the security of the alliance’s most vulnerable members by creating additional sources of risk of Russia should it be tempted to undertake aggressive activities against them.” See A. Lanoszka, “Thank Goodness for NATO Enlargement,” International Politics, vol. 57 (2020): 451–​470. 10 J. Perlez. “Expanding Alliance: the Overview; Poland, Hungary and the Czechs Join NATO.” The New York Times. March 13, 1999. www.nytimes.com/​1999/​03/​ 13/​world/​expanding-​alliance-​the-​overview-​poland-​hungary-​and-​the-​czechs-​join-​ nato.html. 11 Address by Bronislaw Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Independence, Missouri. March 12, 1999. www.nato.int/​docu/​speech/​ 1999/​s990312d.htm.

Poland’s role in NATO  139 12 For Poland, the geopolitical changes of the 1989–​1991 brought the new strategic environment and resulted in new challenges. They stemmed from the direct and indirect consequences of the end of the Cold War, such as the unification of Germany and the break-​up of the Soviet empire. “Not only Poland needed to confront the reality of neighboring newly formed states (Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Russian Federation and later Czech Republic and Slovakia) but also of choosing the right geostrategic path that would strengthen Polish security and independence. But even though the brand new international order was emerging, some elementary problems that resulted from Poland’s geopolitical position, remain unchanged: mainly, how to secure country’s borders; its physical security and how to minimize the threat of external attack.” Quoted in W. Michnik, “Poland’s Role in NATO and The Transformation of The Transatlantic Security” in 15 Years Of Polish Membership in NATO: Experiences and Future Challenges, M. Matyasik (ed.), 112. Kontekst: Krakow, 2015. 13 R. Kupiecki. Poland and NATO after the Cold War. Warsaw: PISM/​MSZ, 2019, 125–​126. 14 The “new NATO” that emerged after the end of the Cold War evolved in key areas, from a “different strategic concept, structure, different practices, and different functions” than the Alliance during the West-​ East divide.” Quoted in G.M. Thornton. “The Paradox of the Transatlantic Security Project.” International Politics 45, 3 (2008): 387. 15 P.E. Gallis. Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force. Washington, DC: Congress Research Service, Report for Congress, November 1999, 18. 16 Poland has been among very few states that actually did not set any caveats (operational limitations placed on ISAF forces by governments of the countries that sent troops) on its forces during the Afghan mission. 17 S. Biscop et al. What do Europeans want from NATO?, European Union Institute for Security Studies Report No. 8, November 2010, 16. http://​eaab.be/​adminzone/​ img/​ReportWhatdoEuropeanswantfromNATO.pdf. 18 Quoted in S. von Hlatky and A. Wenger (eds.) The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015, 2. 19 W. Michnik. “From Security Consumer to Security Provider –​15 Years of Poland in NATO.” New Eastern Europe 2 (XI) (April–​June 2014): 81. 20 This era of limited wars has “overturned the traditional division of responsibility between politicians and military leaders many of whom seem to be challenged in meeting two intellectual challenges at once.” Quoted in P. Roberts, NATO vs Russia at 70. Royal United Service Institute, Commentary. November 6, 2019. https://​rusi.org/​commentary/​nato-​vs-​russia-​70 21 Kupiecki, Poland and NATO after the Cold War, 128. 22 R.R Moore and D.V. Coletta. NATO’s Return to Europe: Engaging Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017, 3. 23 W. Michnik, “Poland and Transatlantic Security after the Russian-​Ukrainian Conflict: A Paradigm Shift?” Poland in Transatlantic Relations after 1989: Miracle Fair, M. Zachara (ed.), 163. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2017. 24 I. Traynor, L. Harding, H. Womack. “Moscow warns it could strike Poland over US missile shield.” The Guardian. August 16, 2008. www.theguardian.com/​world/​ 2008/​aug/​15/​russia.poland.nuclear.missiles.threat.

140  Wojciech Michnik 25 M. Petersson. NATO and the Crisis in the International Order: The Atlantic Alliance and Its Enemies. London: Routledge, 2019, 11. 26 M. Galeotti. Russian Political War: Moving Beyond the Hybrid. London: Routledge, 2019, 71–​72. 27 Petersson, NATO and the Crisis in the International Order, 11. 28 “Landmark NATO Summit in Warsaw draws to a close.” June 9, 2016. www.nato. int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​news_​133980.htm. 29 “Poland wants a fort with Donald Trump’s name on it,” The Economist. January 12, 2019, www.economist.com/​europe/​2019/​01/​12/​poland-​wants-​a-​fort-​with-​donald-​ trumps-​name-​on-​it. 30 The EDI is comprised of five main functions (components): 1. increased presence, 2. exercises and training, 3. enhanced prepositioning, 4. improved infrastructure, and 5. building partner capacity. The funding for the EDI in 2015 was $ 985 million, in 2017, $ 3.4 billion, in 2018, 4.8 billion, in 2019 $ 6.5 billion and the Department of Defense (DoD) request for 2020 $ 5.9 billion. Figures in Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, European Defense Initiative, Fiscal Year 2020. March 2019. https://​comptroller.defense.gov/​Portals/​45/​Documents/​defbudget/​ fy2020/​fy2020_​EDI_​JBook.pdf. 31 T.A. Sayle, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order, Cornell University Press, 2019, 246. 32 NATO. Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2012–​2019). June 25, 2019. www.nato.int/ ​ n ato_ ​ s tatic_ ​ f l2014/ ​ a ssets/​ p df/​ p df_​ 2 019_​ 0 6/​ 2 0190625_​ PR2019-​069-​EN.pdf. 33 For an explanation of recent domestic dynamics in Poland, see M. Figlerowicz. “Poland’s Right Won the Day, But Not the Future.” Foreign Affairs. October 25, 2019. www.foreignaffairs.com/​articles/​poland/​2019-​10-​25/​polands-​right-​won-​day-​ not-​future; Y. Mounk. “Democracy in Poland Is in Mortal Danger.” The Atlantic. October 9, 2019. www.theatlantic.com/​ideas/​archive/​2019/​10/​poland-​could-​lose-​ its-​democracy/​599590/​. 34 O. Osica. “O Stosunkach Polsko-​Amerykanskich.” Nowa Europa” 1, 8 (2009): 136. 35 Ibid., 137. 36 For a recent perspective, an impact of Covid-​19 on transatlantic relations, see K. Donfried, W. Ischinger, “The Pandemic and the Toll of Transatlantic Discord,” Foreign Affairs. April 18, 2020. www.foreignaffairs.com/​articles/​united-​states/​ 2020-​04-​18/​pandemic-​and-​toll-​transatlantic-​discord. 37 T. Nichols. “How America Lost Faith in Expertise. And Why That’s a Giant Problem.” Foreign Affairs. March/​ April 2017. www.foreignaffairs.com/​articles/​ united-​states/​2017-​02-​13/​how-​america-​lost-​faith-​expertise. Even though Nichols’ article focuses on trends in the United States, given populist resurgence in many European countries (United Kingdom, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic etc.), the argument about decreased informed interest in foreign policy can be applied to most of the European NATO allies as well. 38 Roberts, NATO vs Russia at 70, 2019. 39 C.S. Gray. “Presentation to the ‘Multiple Futures’ Conference.” NATO’s Allied Command Transformation. Brussels. May 8, 2009. www.act.nato.int/​images/​ stories/​events/​2009/​mfp/​mfp_​surprise_​prediction.pdf. 40 K. Friis. NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century: An Assessment of the Warsaw Summit. Routledge, 2017, 57.

Poland’s role in NATO  141 41 K. Friis (ed.) NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century: An Assessment of the Warsaw Summit. London: Routledge, 2017, 24. Deterrence works mostly against the states. “Unlike states, non-​state actors cannot be deterred” writes Christopher Coker reminding us that after 9/​11 “we were forced to think seriously about pre-​emptive strikes, for non-​state actors may be more dangerous than states, and rogue regimes may be more dangerous still.” See: C. Coker. War in the Age of Risk. Cambridge: Polity, 2009, 132. 42 P. Taylor, “Polandʼs Short-​Sighted Military Dependence on the United States,” Carnegie Europe, February 12, 2019. https://​carnegieeurope.eu/​strategiceurope/​ 78338. 43 Quoted in: T. Valasek, “A New Transatlantic Security Bargain,” Carnegie Europe, May 23, 2017, https://​carnegieeurope.eu/​2017/​05/​23/​new-​transatlantic-​ security-​bargain-​pub-​70050. 44 L. Béraud-​Sudreau and B. Giegerich. “NATO Defence Spending and European Threat Perceptions.” Survival August-​September 2018: 70. 45 F. Pothier. “Five challenges that NATO must overcome to stay relevant.” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). April 4, 2019. www.iiss.org/​ blogs/​analysis/​2019/​04/​five-​challenges-​for-​nato. 46 A potential return of NATO to the most basic task of collective defense, focused on defending Europe and deterring potential adversaries, falls into the realist arguments of scholars who also claim the United States should come back to its role of an offshore balancer. See J.J. Mearsheimer and S.M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing, A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy.” Foreign Affairs. July/​ August 2016. www.foreignaffairs.com/​articles/​united-​states/​2016-​06-​13/​case-​ offshore-​balancing.

8  The Baltic states in NATO An evolving transatlantic bargain from newcomers to President Trump Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-​Liis Sulg

Introduction This chapter examines the evolving perspectives of the Baltic states –​Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania –​toward the transatlantic security bargain from their entry to NATO in 2004, until the current political turbulence leading from Donald Trump’s rise to the US presidency. As small states with limited military capacity in a challenging region, the Baltic states have occasionally been labeled as “net security consumers” in NATO.1 The first section of this chapter argues that this assessment is sometimes inaccurate when the first decade of Baltic NATO membership is taken into account. Each state carved out a valuable “niche” area for security provision to valuably contribute to NATO’s collective stabilization priorities in Afghanistan from the early 2000s until 2014. Wider strategic reverberations from the Ukraine crisis soon eclipsed events in Afghanistan after 2014 and the Baltic states have benefited significantly from the refocusing of NATO’s transatlantic bargain “back to basics” for collective defense. As Russia illegally annexed Crimea from Ukraine, US President Barack Obama promptly spearheaded NATO’s assurance measures for Eastern allies. These measures were developed in phases, extending from NATO’s Wales and Warsaw Summits in 2014 and 2016, respectively. The political earthquake caused by Trump’s rise to office as US President in 2017 has hailed some stark challenges for a continuing transatlantic bargain that relies on Washington as NATO’s main political and military leader. Nevertheless, despite unpredictable policy actions elsewhere, this chapter argues that the Trump administration has remained reliable in support of NATO’s eFP designed to reinforce the Alliance’s deterrence for the Baltic states and Poland. The argument still remains tentative as doubts on NATO linger on both sides of the Atlantic. Much media attention has been focused on how Trump’s election might alter US–​European relations. Commentary has centered on the continuing viability of a transatlantic security bargain where Washington continues to act as the main security guarantor in the Euro-​Atlantic area in exchange for “fairer” NATO burden-​sharing from European allies. While Trump has been making headlines, the transatlantic consequences pertaining to the recent monumental political change in Europe

The Baltic states in NATO  143 centered on the populist far-​right has received less scrutiny. This risks additional diplomatic acrimony within NATO. Since restoring independence in 1991, the Baltic states have been devoted supporters of the US strategic leadership that NATO institutionalizes in Europe. This chapter argues that it has therefore been a recent surprise that comments have come from one of Estonia’s governing parties, the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE), to advocate that an enhanced focus be dedicated to Estonia’s independent defense capacity while also casting doubt on NATO being able to effectively react in the country’s defense. While not (yet) shared within the wider Baltic political mainstream, such comments would previously have been unthinkable and are contrary to the long-​held Baltic strategic insistence to “never again” be isolated without strong allies.2 While recent transatlantic setbacks centered on the US and Europe hold serious risk potential to damage the Alliance’s political cohesion, the military durability advanced through NATO’s eFP to safeguard deterrence for the Baltic states has thus far remained effective despite political turbulence. This chapter nevertheless finishes with the argument that past performance might still not always be a consistent indicator of future success in this area: Trump’s military withdrawal from Syria in 2019  –​an abandonment of the Kurdish-​led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) –​the threat of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to veto additional measures for NATO’s eFP in late 2019; and Trump’s decision, announced in June 2020, to drawdown 9,500 troops from Germany have all highlighted to Baltic policymakers that strengthening security cooperation involving the US and within NATO might be an ever more challenging task.

The NATO proving ground in Afghanistan The security assurances received under the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5 following NATO accession in 2004 have been unanimously welcomed in the Baltic states. Accession also brought a challenging new responsibility to contribute to NATO’s common objectives as a “multipurpose” alliance.3 When ISAF in Afghanistan became a full NATO mission in 2004, the Baltic states had to develop proficiency in a number of capability niches within this mission’s division-​of-​labor. The myriad of specialization options included:  combat; improvised explosive device (IED) removal; military capacity-​building; and a variety of reconstruction tasks linked to humanitarian aid, engineering, agricultural development etc. While weighing up these options, each Baltic state retained a focus on events at home, reasoning that a display of solidarity with NATO allies in Afghanistan would strengthen their transatlantic link and thus also their territorial defense. NATO’s leading allies –​foremost the US and to a lesser extent the UK –​framed the value variations for the multitude of contributions required under NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to security provision. As NATO newcomers, the Baltic effort to prove themselves as capable allies and to accumulate diplomatic capital would greatly hinge

144  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg on performance. Proficient performance in NATO burden-​sharing held the potential to either increase or risk reputational standing within the alliance. With Washington expressing premium demand for greater NATO burden-​ sharing in the casualty-​intensive combat operations in the Afghan South, Estonia deployed approximately 150 combat-​ready troops without caveats to engage in Afghanistan’s violently unstable Helmand Province on a rotational basis from 2006, while many established NATO allies shied away. In terms of reputational consequences, this strategy’s principal political risk would have arisen if Estonia’s armed forces demonstrated themselves as inferior compared to the more experienced US, UK, and Danish forces that they fought alongside. This a risk that was worth taking seriously at the outset, however, this faded away as the Helmand campaign progressed. Estonia demonstrated itself as a highly competent niche contributor to a crucial combat area within NATO’s mission. This has been acknowledged by many directly involved. The gains in terms of both military development experience and political capital within NATO have been discussed by Estonian policymakers themselves. Then Minister for Defense, Urmas Reinsalu, addressed Estonian units assembled in Afghanistan in 2013 with the praise that: Thanks to your contribution to our relations with allies, our international ties, credibility and visibility are greater than ever before. Everyone knows how good Estonian soldiers are in battle.4 This was not a gain made without considerable human sacrifice; Estonia’s military deployment in Afghanistan resulted in nine soldier fatalities, this has been among NATO’s highest fatality rates in per capita terms.5 The UK was a leading NATO ally in Helmand. The sentiments expressed by then UK ambassador to Estonia, Christopher Holtby, indicate that the Estonian Defense Force’s (EDF) strong performance in Afghanistan would also facilitate positive repercussions for Estonia as a NATO ally beyond ISAF. Holtby wrote in 2014 that: “Fundamentally, the UK military wants to work closely in the future with Estonian forces because we know they are capable and effective. This has been proved in Afghanistan.”6 Latvia’s two principal contributions to ISAF came through its lead role in coordinating the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) via the Port of Riga and its efforts in defense capacity-​building with the Afghan National Army (ANA) through NATO’s Operational Mentorship and Liaison Team (OMLT). For the former, while the commercial contracts for US cargoes through the NDN were awarded by Washington, the cargoes for other NATO allies were organized under the “Latvian Lead Nation Concept,” a strength of which being that, under Latvia’s coordination, contracts facilitating cargo pooling and shared transit space between different allies were implemented. This has led to greater efficiency in terms of financial cost and the frequency of delivery.7 The NDN was developed as a more stable transit route for ISAF in preference to riskier supply-​chains through Pakistan. With the NDN, an

The Baltic states in NATO  145 important logistical asset for ISAF, these efforts stand as an important contribution from Latvia to NATO burden-​sharing. A series of deployments tasked for defense capacity-​building stand as Latvia’s main military contributions to ISAF. From late 2008, this included Riga’s allocation of 175 Latvian military personnel to the relatively stable Kunar and Nurestan Provinces in eastern Afghanistan. These units were deployed to train and mentor military counterparts from the ANA. As a major US military initiative seeking to fully stabilize Afghanistan, President Obama announced a “troop surge” for Afghanistan in 2009. This aimed to add 30,000–​35,000 US troops to the approximately 65,000 troops that Washington had already stationed in the country at that time.8 With this “surge” ultimately proving unsuccessful as a means to fully eliminate the Taliban insurgency, a drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan began in 2012. As America’s in-​theatre military presence was being reduced to be replaced by an approach instead advocating greater mentorship for the beleaguered Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Latvia contributed 140 personnel to the Scandinavian-​ led Nordic Transition Support Unit (NTSU) in 2012. The NTSU was a consortium designed to facilitate an orderly logistical withdrawal for Nordic contributors supporting ISAF as well as to implement any remaining Security Sector Reform (SSR) mentorship for the ANSF.9 SSR has been a task of considerable importance for NATO as, once ISAF troop numbers were significantly reduced after 2014; the ANSF quickly acquired increased responsibility for enforcing public order.10 The presence of NATO members willing to provide SSR in Afghanistan was essential for ISAF’s stabilization efforts. However, some indications within NATO have also portrayed providers of SSR as in abundant supply, while soldiers available and combat-​ready for counterinsurgency have been scarce. Speaking in 2014, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, Jamie Shea, put it that defense capacity-​building is “something everyone wants to do.”11 By contrast, the scarcity of allies willing to unconditionally engage in the heavy combat deployments that NATO crucially required to defeat the Taliban insurgency has been regularly criticized by the US in particular. Hence, while a valid contribution to ISAF, Latvia’s SSR undertakings in Afghanistan are unlikely to have gained the same recognition among NATO’s leading allies compared to Estonia’s deployment of combat troops for NATO’s Helmand campaign. The roots of Lithuania’s main NATO burden-​sharing tasks for ISAF are to be found in Washington’s mounting commitments within both the Iraqi and Afghan conflict areas by 2004. The US was encouraging its allies to assist by undertaking a larger share of the security burden. With the idea of a joint Baltic-​led PRT for Afghanistan originally mooted, an agreement on this could not be found. Lithuania then signaled that it could lead a PRT alone and Vilnius was ultimately assigned to Afghanistan’s comparatively stable, yet remote, Ghor province. Considering the visibility of those leading PRTs within the ISAF fold, undertaking this type of project was first envisaged

146  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg by Lithuanian policymakers as an excellent vehicle for the accumulation of political capital within NATO. These preliminary aesthetics appealed, but leading a PRT turned out to be an arduous labor and resource intensive task that stretched Vilnius’ persistence to its limits. Lithuania was the only ally from NATO’s second post-​Cold War enlargement in 2004 to lead a PRT in Afghanistan. Holding little or no previously attained expertise for how to coordinate such a strenuous and complex project, it quickly became clear that Lithuania’s acceptance of this responsibility was an overambitious undertaking. Early ambition displayed at the outset in 2005 was, by 2009, replaced by disillusion. Some Lithuanian defense officials even lamented their government’s original decision to lead a PRT as never credibly considering the competence actually required to accomplish the reconstruction task as involved, rather the decision to lead the PRT in Ghor was taken on superficial grounds designed to politically “score points” within NATO.12 As Lithuania’s confidence in its own PRT leadership had rapidly eroded by 2009, it appeared as if its original decision might end in a counterproductive outcome for its NATO status. To avoid the negative reputational consequences extending from an embarrassing PRT demotion, Lithuania’s efforts in Ghor faced three main challenges. First, with the Global Financial Crisis sharply affecting Lithuania’s economy after 2007, there was a risk of domestic pressure requesting the government to further reduce its resource allocation to the PRT in Ghor. However, as Asta Maskaliūnaitė has argued, this risk was reduced by consensus among both the opposition and the government in support of PRT leadership retention.13 Second, within NATO, Vilnius faced pressure through the risk of other allies perceiving its performance as substandard and thus a liability rather than an asset. Finally, a further risk materialized through vocal local Afghan criticism of Lithuania’s performance. Political pressure was exerted on Vilnius as two separate Governors of Ghor, in 2007 and 2009 respectively, stated their dissatisfaction with the Lithuanian-​led PRT, before predicting that the transfer of reconstruction duties in Ghor to better resourced NATO allies was inevitable.14 While the latter partially occurred as the PRT progressed, with the majority of Ghor’s civilian relief projects taken on by the US and Japan, the Lithuanian government nevertheless persevered to continue leading the PRT until its nominal termination in 2013. Coordinating a PRT caused much affliction for Vilnius, however, from a NATO-​wide vantage point, all ISAF burden-​sharing tasks of high demand have proven a challenge for the allies involved. A NATO ally struggling with a strenuous stabilization task in Afghanistan was not unusual. Abandoning PRT leadership was a political risk of sharply negative consequence. Thus, persevering to the PRT’s nominal completion was important for Lithuania’s political status in NATO. Bridging the collective ISAF experience of the Baltic states, comments from US Vice President Joseph Biden, as the Baltic Presidents met with President Obama in 2013, frame the positive US perception of Baltic burden-​sharing in Afghanistan succinctly. Referencing a diverse range of achievements under

The Baltic states in NATO  147 ISAF, Biden outlined that, as well as proving themselves as proficient security producers, the Baltic states had also positively changed their diplomatic discourse with Washington from one once centered on what the US could do to alleviate the Baltic security situation, to a transatlantic partnership focused on how the Baltic states and Washington can cooperate to assist in resolving broader global security challenges.15 With US recognition forthcoming, Baltic adaptation to NATO’s expeditionary demands in Afghanistan at least partially facilitated the discard of the “net security consumer” label. The logic that participating in an expeditionary operation can in turn benefit territorial defense might be paradoxical, but Baltic efforts in contributing to NATO’s principal stabilization objectives during the ISAF era strengthened their transatlantic link, and thus politically reinforced support for Baltic territorial defense among NATO’s leading allies.

Baltic NATO policy and the Ukraine crisis With the Obama’s administration’s major troop surge in Afghanistan fading by 2012, there was much conversation in Baltic capitals on NATO’s future direction once ISAF would begin downsizing after 2014. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the anxious sentiments that this promptly caused among many of NATO’s Eastern allies ensured that the alliance would not have to wait long to renew its purpose. Since joining NATO in 2004, the Baltic states have been advocates for a NATO return “back to basics,” emphasizing an increased focus on collective defense in Europe. Together with Poland and Norway –​NATO allies sharing a location in close proximity to Russia’s border  –​the Baltic states campaigned to ensure that collective defense retained an elaborate emphasis in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept.16 The Baltic states have been consistent in expressing skepticism towards a view occasionally held by some Western allies that Russia could eventually become a reliable strategic partner for NATO, and therefore a partner for stable cooperative security. After NATO accession, Baltic skepticism was initially intensified by Moscow’s disproportionate military aggression displayed during the Russia–​Georgia War in 2008. Developments in Ukraine after 2014 have been worryingly perceived from Baltic capitals as an escalated continuation of the Russian aggression that first tangibly unveiled itself in Georgia in 2008. The general outlook within NATO has not always been as stringent. A “reset” aiming to foster improved cooperation between the US and Russia was a prominent early foreign policy initiative for the Obama administration as it entered office in 2009. Washington was seeking to reengage Moscow as an important partner and thus reduce the risks of future military instability in Europe’s east. Partnership rather than provocation was Obama’s message. Baltic capitals perceived this “reset” initiative as naive from the outset. The emphasis that the US and some European NATO allies placed on attempts to retain Russia as a partner meant that, during their early years as NATO

148  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg members, the Baltic states found it difficult to achieve NATO consensus for a defense plan for the Alliance’s Eastern flank.17 However, the Russia–​Georgia War in 2008 proved to be a watershed in this area. The first NATO defense plan involving the Baltic states, named Eagle Guardian, was soon created thereafter.18 These developments leading up to 2014 represented a considerable evolution in the transatlantic bargain as it was perceived from Baltic capitals. US-​led policies such as the “reset” with Russia were being pursued alongside NATO strategies that reinforced vigilance for Baltic defense. The internal alliance discussions that ultimately produced NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept were a response to a quickly transforming security environment where the alliance was required to adapt its multipurpose functions. Rather than the broader multipurpose NATO that each actually entered in 2004, it is sometimes argued that the Baltic states have held a sentimental and impossible preference to instead accede to the NATO of the 1949, an alliance dominated by its main focus to fiercely deter any threat from its eastern adversary.19 However, working with likeminded allies, the Baltic states were still successful in revitalizing an enhanced consciousness of NATO’s collective defense within a 2010 Strategic Concept that developed NATO’s raison d’être as a multipurpose alliance. This was precisely redefined as a commitment to three main strategic objectives:  collective defense; crisis management; and cooperative security.20 Criticism has sometimes emerged to caricature the Baltic states as simply “one-​issue” allies that can be problematic for NATO’s multipurpose compromise.21 These claims are rudimentary in their oversimplification. When the transatlantic bargain was focused on stabilization in Afghanistan, the Baltic states remained reliable in their commitment to contribute to NATO’s collective action priorities, even if events in Central Asia did not directly affect their territorial security situation. As ISAF in Afghanistan dominated the early years of Baltic NATO membership, public opinion in each state sometimes questioned military involvement overseas. In 2010, Lithuanian President, Dalia Grybauskaitė, perhaps best captured the Baltic rationale for providing this solidarity; she referred to NATO as an “insurance policy” for her country. Grybauskaitė’s remark came with the qualification that “this does not mean that you will get sick, but it is good to have it [the NATO security guarantee].”22 Baltic unease that Russian aggression would eventually reemerge in Europe has remained since NATO accession in 2004. This has sometimes been contrary to the Russia perspective of other NATO allies. The Baltic “insurance policy” of NATO’s collective defense and deterrence was promptly called in after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Baltic capitals have observed the turmoil in Ukraine with profound concern. This has progressed from the tumultuous Maidan demonstrations in late 2013; to Crimea’s illegal annexation in 2014; to the Russian-​supported proxy war waged in Eastern Ukraine since 2014. The Baltic states have been both active and vocal on the need to convert this concern into tangible policies limiting vulnerabilities along NATO’s Eastern flank. Highlighting this focus will remain a crucial Baltic security policy

The Baltic states in NATO  149 objective into the foreseeable future. The Baltic states possess limited independent defense resources and their ability to deter any Russian aggression will greatly depend on NATO support. Baltic diplomacy aiming to improve NATO’s collective defense has not been undertaken without some risk. On aggregate, NATO has cautiously sought to minimize tensions in relations with Russia. This has involved an important and delicate balance. The continual strengthening of eFP has involving an emphasis on NATO’s West–​East military mobilization capacity while also attempting to avoid a perilous security dilemma with Russia and then risk a dangerous military build-​up in Eastern Europe.23 The Baltic states remain important actors within this delicate strategic landscape. Russia’s information operations have repeatedly aimed to discredit the Baltic states as “troublemakers” and hyperbolic threat inflators. This message has not been taken seriously within NATO. However, if not delivered with care, some aspects of Baltic communication to other NATO allies can still be ineffective. Dovilė Jakniūnaitė has described Lithuania’s foreign policy as, at times, “audible and loud,” but also “negative and narrow” as Russia forms its dominant focus.24 This can sometimes backfire as Western partners, particularly US policymakers, can skeptically envisage overexaggerated diplomatic claims. By contrast, Estonia’s immediate post-​ 2014 diplomacy has been praised for successfully “threading the needle” where Western partners are well briefed on the main strategic issues, while also assured that Tallinn does not wish to escalate NATO–​Russia tensions.25 Nevertheless, despite these nuances, Russia’s military aggression displayed in Georgia in 2008; Ukraine since 2014; and Syria since 2015 has enabled Baltic security concerns to be broadly perceived as credible and requiring unanimous NATO solidarity. As stated by Estonian defense analyst, Sven Sakkov, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have been a hidden “favor” for NATO, as the Alliance has been given a clear reference point to guide its reemphasis on collective defense.26

Baltic defense and NATO’s strategic priorities With the limits of Russian aggression uncertain, NATO reacted promptly in April 2014 aftermath of the Ukraine crisis. The US, supported by the UK, led the initial series of assurance measures for NATO’s Eastern allies that were perceived as potentially vulnerable. US military units were rotated for joint-​ training exercises in the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission was initially increased from 4 to 16 allied fighter jets. Air bases at Ämari in Estonia and Malbork in Poland were used in addition to this mission’s original basing arrangements at Šiauliai in Lithuania. As this “new normal” has stabilized, the air policing mission’s frequency has since been reduced to eight NATO aircraft. These deterrence measures were fully finalized when the RAP was formalized at NATO’s Wales Summit in September 2014.

150  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg RAP also sought to increase the size of the NRF that maintains some military units at a higher level of readiness.27 The utility of the NRF’s 5,000-​ strong spearhead force, the VJTF has been debated by Baltic policymakers. Deployable within 58–​ 72 hours, NATO Secretary-​ General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has referred to the VJTF as a defense instrument that will “travel light, but strike hard if needed.”28 However, some Baltic politicians have also expressed skepticism about the VJTF. Most prominently, then Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves argued in 2015 that the VJTF is a “great idea but it probably is, in terms of the realities, just too late.”29 Ilves based this on the logic that an encroaching enemy would restrict access to Baltic territory before NATO reinforcements would have the opportunity to arrive.30 Reflecting on the same issue Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose argue that it is unlikely that NATO can “provide for in-​place deterrence” with the current posture centered on the NRF and military mobilization. A  move towards “in-​ place deterrence” would require a significant increase in the number of NATO’s forward deployed forces.31 With further concerns expressed in the lead-​up to NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, a report from an Estonian think-​tank report outlined proposals to “close” this Baltic defense gap.32 It elaborated that NATO’s RAP up until 2016 was unable to fully defend against a potential Russian anti-​access/​area denial (A2/​AD) strategy.33 The report recommended that NATO station additional forces in the Baltic states and Poland and that the Alliance evolve its posture for the Eastern flank to progress from assurance to a more scaled-​up form of deterrence.34 The question of where the limit for scaled-​up military deterrence for the Baltic states might be is an important discussion within NATO. Since 2014, NATO has designed its defense measures within the 1997 NATO–​Russia Founding Act. Agreed when a NATO–​Russia partnership developing without serious bilateral conflict was foreseen, the Founding Act rules out the “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” in Europe.35 At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO sought to balance adherence to the Founding Act with requests from some allies to better safeguard its Eastern flank with a stronger military presence. The eFP was formalized, this outlined that, at a minimum, a brigade-​sized multinational battle group would be stationed in each of the Baltic states and in Poland.36 The multinational battle groups stationed in the Baltic states comprise just over 1,000 NATO troops. Each battle group is led by a different Framework Nation:  the UK in Estonia; Canada in Latvia; and Germany in Lithuania. The largest eFP battle group is led by the US and is stationed in Poland; it is planned that this battle group will reach 4,000 troops in 2020.37 Each battle group operates on a persistent but rotational basis. From a legal perspective, eFP deployments are technically not permanent. In practical terms, there is still only a marginal difference between permanent stationing and persistent rotation. Baltic policymakers have therefore been pragmatically satisfied with eFP’s development. Those that perceive remaining flaws in eFP can insist that, even though troop numbers have been increased, the NATO presence still remains

The Baltic states in NATO  151 too skeletal to realistically defend against a Russian military encroachment. However, reinforced through NATO’s Article 5 guarantee, eFP has significantly raised the stakes for any military engagement that Moscow might wish to contemplate. The eFP has strengthened the function of “trip-​wire” deterrence.38 Lasting historical animosity between the Baltic states and Russia has its origins in the 1939 Molotov–​Ribbentrop Pact and the events of World War II. Baltic memory is dominated by the narrative that each suffered isolation and were left to perish without security assistance from the main Western powers. While a relatively light military presence, NATO’s eFP removes the fear of isolation. Should Russia militarily encroach on Baltic territory, its soldiers will also find themselves exchanging fire with counterparts from the US, the UK, France, Germany, and a host of other NATO allies in addition to the Baltic militaries. Moscow will thus be running the immense risk of triggering a major international conflict. The punishments for doing so are likely to be severe.39 Beyond deterrence per se, eFP holds a further subtle benefit for participating allies: its multinational operational structure enables NATO militaries to tighten practical cooperation pertaining to interoperability and force integration.

Donald Trump and transatlantic turbulence Comparing Denmark’s and Estonia’s Atlanticism over recent decades, Anders Wivel and Matthew Crandall argue that Estonia has increased its status both in US diplomacy and within NATO by striving to be a “model-​ally.”40 As a “super-​Atlanticist,” until 2016, Estonia consistently adopted a foreign policy defined by unwavering support for the US-​led world order.41 This included support for two American-​led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has been Tallinn’s attempt to cultivate a “special relationship” with the world’s only superpower. Owing to its success up to and including the Obama administration, Estonia’s approach has also influenced the foreign policy direction of its Baltic neighbors. Central to Tallinn’s “super-​Atlanticism” has been to meet its principal NATO commitments, be this through contributions to international missions or adhering to the Alliance’s 2 percent of GDP defense spending pledge. Estonia’s policymakers have been cautious, believing that “free-​riding” is never ultimately for free. “Free-​riding” NATO allies have long been perceived from Tallinn as gravely risking abandonment, dispensed with either by the US or NATO’s other framework powers. Estonia was the first among the Baltic three to achieve the 2  percent defense spending target in 2012.42 Over the course of Obama’s US presidency, Latvia and Lithuania remained lackluster performers under the same metric. While Riga and Vilnius were warning other NATO allies of the risk of Russian aggression, this diplomacy was not matched by heightened financial investment in their own defense. Latvian and Lithuanian defense spending patterns began to swiftly change once Donald Trump took office as US President in 2017. The financial burden-​sharing performance of America’s

152  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg allies was a central foreign policy theme during Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. Delivered in the cavalier language of a blunt businessman rather than a cautious diplomat, when asked during the campaign in August 2016 whether he would honor the US commitment to NATO’s Article 5, should Baltic security be threatened, Trump expressed the answer: “Have they [the Baltic states] fulfilled their obligations to us? If they fulfill their obligations to us, the answer is yes.”43 With this “obligations” reference, Trump was likely alluding to NATO’s 2 percent of GDP defense spending commitment. This vague, uncertain, and conditional answer expressed instead of a definite reaffirmation of support for NATO’s Article 5 was created unease in Baltic capitals. In contrast, visiting Estonia just two years earlier in 2014, President Obama had explicitly emphasized US support for Baltic defense as he stressed that “the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London.”44 As a further reversal, Trump was the Republican Party’s presidential candidate. When the Republican Party previously held the US presidency between 2000 and 2008, the firm support of President George W.  Bush was crucial in finally facilitating the Baltic states’ NATO accession. The Baltic states’ successful post-​ communist transitions to liberal democracy and market economics closely complimented the worldview that Bush advanced. This was celebrated soon after NATO’s 2002 Prague Summit that agreed Baltic accession, with Bush stressing in a speech in Vilnius that a troubled past underlined that the Baltic states “know the value of human freedom” and that anyone who “would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America.”45 Receiving support from prominent political figures within the wider Republican Party, this liberal values-​based understanding of the transatlantic bargain has dominated Baltic security discourse since the restoration of independence in 1991 and until Trump’s arrival to power. Therefore, to some surprise in Baltic capitals, accompanying Trump’s political rise have been segments closely connected to Republican politics that have publically questioned America’s continuing commitment to Baltic defense. For example, interviewed at the 2016 Republican National Convention, former Speaker of the House of Representatives and Trump supporter, Newt Gingrich, described Estonia as “in the suburbs of St. Petersburg” and that he was “not sure” that he “would risk a nuclear war” for an ally in this location.46 As Trump became the Republican Party’s presidential nominee, a series of ideologically varying US think-​tanks broadly on the political right began to compete to influence Trump’s policy program. Among these, analysts from the libertarian CATO Institute  –​a prominent think-​tank that favors minimalist levels of US foreign policy engagement  –​were prominent to cast further doubt on continuing US support for Baltic security. In the weeks immediately following Russia’s illegal Crimean annexation, CATO’s Justin Logon questioned whether Estonia was “worth a war2 while envisaging heightened conflict with Russia as a significant risk were Washington

The Baltic states in NATO  153 to spearhead an elaborate military deterrence presence for NATO’s eastern members.”47 Likewise, CATO’s Ted Galen Carpenter has claimed that, despite their alarmist diplomacy, the Baltic states do not actually take their own security seriously enough. Writing in late 2014, Carpenter perceives actions with defense spending as louder than simple diplomatic words. While Latvia’s and Lithuania’s defense spending at this time lagged behind NATO’s recommended 2  percent of GDP, this was a requirement that Estonia was already conforming to. Nevertheless, according to Carpenter, if Baltic security was as dangerously imperiled as each state communicates, their governments would surely be willing to spend a figure on defense well in excess of 2 percent of GDP.48 It can be inferred from this argument that Baltic governments are either overexaggerating the Russian threat or, if not, are instead content to free ride on NATO security assurances reinforced by Washington. While serving to remind Baltic policymakers that continuing political support from the broader US foreign policy establishment should not be accepted as a formality, these arguments still do not capture the full context of the Baltic states as NATO allies. Even if currently requiring enhanced NATO defense provisions, since 2004, the Baltic states have not always been “net consumers” of security within the alliance. As well as significant contributions to stabilization in Afghanistan, efforts to “produce” security have come through Estonia’s leadership in shaping NATO’s cyber security agenda; Latvia’s dedication to an improved understanding of NATO strategic communications; and Lithuania’s initiative to develop NATO’s role in enhanced energy security. A  NATO-​accredited Centre of Excellence (COE) on each theme has been established in the corresponding Baltic state. In seeking to exert influence at the outset of Trump’s presidency, the CATO Institute may have sought to guide US foreign policy in a more isolationist direction. However, considered within a global context, and while constant unpredictability has been a major pattern, Trump’s foreign policy has not embraced isolationism. The US President has undergone a series of puzzling reversals in his thinking on NATO. Trump was heavily critical of NATO when he first burst into onto the political scene in 2016. This position moderated for a time. However, his initial skepticism has since intermittently returned. Reports surfaced in late 2019 that Trump was considering withdrawing the US from NATO.49 Trump’s unpredictable NATO policy continues to cause unease in Baltic capitals. Nevertheless, concerning NATO’s eFP specifically, the Trump administration can be credited with at least incrementally strengthening the deterrence posture template introduced by the preceding Obama administration. This aligns with the argument that the actual shape of Trump’s wider foreign policy does not display too many consistent signs of US retrenchment.50 For the Baltic states and Poland, under Trump, Washington has continued to lead in facilitating eFP development linked to NATO’s joint military exercises; the improvement of infrastructure to enhance NATO’s military mobilization fluency; and with plans to preposition military equipment.

154  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg From an operational military perspective, US policy on eFP has remained quietly consistent throughout the Trump era. As a positive indication of NATO’s durability, Washington’s coordination of eFP has been reinforced by the mission’s later development as an initiative that is truly multinational. NATO’s European powers:  the UK, France, and Germany all contribute along with many smaller allies. Despite “business as usual” on the military front, Trump’s NATO policy is politically confused, and as a possible response to this, in late 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron made the disparaging comment that NATO was “brain dead” due to a perceived leadership void within the Alliance.51 While the accuracy of this comment is debatable, it certainly contrasts sharply with the military leadership and cooperation that NATO members have displayed to operationally develop the eFP deterrence posture.

Political change and new doubts The political earthquake started by Trump’s election as US president in November 2016 has continued to attract many headlines worldwide. However, while receiving understandably less attention by comparison, some significant domestic political change has also affected Baltic societies over recent years. As a result, some nuanced change in the Baltic outlook towards the transatlantic bargain has surprisingly emerged. As the Baltic state that has perhaps held the highest Atlanticist profile since 2004, Estonia has become a further focal-​point in the rise of the far-​right across Europe. Holding no mandates in Estonia’s Riigikogu before 2015, that year’s national elections saw the far-​ right EKRE gain 7 mandates out of 101 in Parliament, this significantly increased to 19 mandates at the 2019 national election. EKRE has proceeded to become an outspoken coalition partner in a three-​party Estonian government since 2019. Compared to the consistent cross-​party consensus that has expressed strong approval for NATO in Estonia for the past two decades, this hardened nationalist shift has contributed to a slightly more varied Estonian discourse on the transatlantic bargain. With NATO membership a primary symbol of Western integration, Estonia’s official discourse on the Alliance had, until recently, consistently emphasized a shared commitment to liberal values as a crucial basis for solidarity within the Alliance. Under this Estonian rationale, this value-​system is what differentiated NATO members from the authoritarianism of Russia under Vladimir Putin.52 However, Tõnis Saarts has interpreted recent political change in Estonia as at least a partial “revolt against the West.”53 With social transformation in some Western societies favoring enhanced liberalization to embrace multiculturalism, gender equality, and legalized same-​sex marriage, Saarts argues that many East European societies within the EU and NATO are not yet willing to accept this social change themselves.54 This is a source of political fragmentation within the EU; however, its harm to the transatlantic security bargain as the Baltic states perceive it,

The Baltic states in NATO  155 has thus far been limited. Even if pragmatically shorn of liberal ideology or taking up a more conservative political philosophy, many of Eastern Europe’s nationalist elites perceive the Trump administration as an ally that is likely to accommodate their security concerns. In EKRE’s 2019 campaign discourse, this was illustrated by an audacious claim made by the party’s aspirant for the Ministry of Defense portfolio, Leo Kunnas. If awarded this office, Kunnas promised that he would seek to secure “billions” in additional funding from Washington for Estonia’s national defense.55 Kunnas’ statement is a further indication of EKRE’s outlook to seek improved bilateral security cooperation between Estonian and the US. This aspiration has sometimes been accompanied with criticism for some other European NATO allies on a range of political issues, particularly immigration policy. This outlook represents a deviation from Estonia’s long-​held understanding of the transatlantic bargain that has perceived relations with Washington as vitally important, but has still simultaneously emphasized consistent support for NATO’s continued strength through collective action. This approach also risks unnecessary political friction with implications for military security. As NATO has evolved RAP to eFP, US military rotations have been based in Poland, with European allies and Canada contributing to the multinational battle groups in the Baltic states. European allies also dominate the rotations that allow NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission to function. Estonia is a recipient of security produced in a multinational context, thus some contributing European allies might react with disappointment if they perceive EKRE’s wider political criticism to be directed at them. Of the three parties that formed Estonia’s government after the 2019 election, two –​EKRE and Isamaa –​respectively, display either strong nationalist and moderate nationalist credentials. Such political viewpoints tend to advocate the further strengthening of Estonia’s “total defense” system. Many in Estonian politics admire the “total defense” system that has been synonymous with neighboring Finland.56 In general terms, “total defense” can be understood as territorial defense system that attempts a full “mobilization of national resources.”57 A military’s professional core sources reinforcement from conscript and reserve components. “Total defense” extends to a readiness to exert prolonged guerrilla warfare in its aim to repel any enemy incursion.58 This system has been an important resource for Finland, causing acute problems for the encroaching Soviet military during the 1939–​1940 Winter War, and thereafter assisting to deter Moscow as Finland guarded its territorial integrity during the Cold War. In the contemporary context, one might argue that “total defense” is more appropriate for a non-​NATO partner like Finland rather than for Estonia as an ally fully integrated in NATO’s collective defense approach. In the years surrounding Estonia’s NATO accession in 2004, the task of balancing the country’s limited resources for “total defense” while simultaneously being able to support NATO’s collective defense was a major policy dilemma.59 Sometimes in contrast to its Baltic neighbors, during the 1990s, Estonia was reluctant to take much of the

156  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg general advice provided by EU and NATO officials advocating that member states decommission conscription-​focused defense models and adopt the development of specialized professional forces to better support broader collective defense and multinational crisis management efforts.60 While still contributing professional units to NATO’s expeditionary operations, a series of Estonian governments have insisted that conscription be retained.61 As Russia’s military aggression has returned, this insistence has paid dividends as Estonia’s expected wartime mobilization for territorial defense is currently outlined at 60,000 personnel.62 Any contradiction between Estonia’s “total defense” approach and NATO’s collective defense has been eased by military exercises such as Siil and Spring Storm that have taken place since 2014. These exercises have integrated the EDF’s professional, reserve, and conscript elements with NATO’s multinational forces stationed in Estonia as part of the eFP mission. Significant divergence exists in the Baltic approaches to the issue of conscription and the broader reserve mobilization that this can generate for territorial defense. Estonia has maintained conscription since the early 1990s; Lithuania abolished conscription in 2008 only to reintroduce it again in 2015; and Latvia abolished conscription in 2006 and does not as yet plan to reintroduce it. Much military opinion both in the Baltic states and, more recently, within NATO tends to perceive the strengthening of conscription-​ led “total defense” as a major part of the solution for the region’s current defense predicament. The commander of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, Lt. Gen. Valdemaras Rupšys, has remarked that the suspension of conscription between 2006 and 2015 currently puts Lithuania’s defense at a disadvantage: “We lost some capabilities, skills to train young citizens. The connection between the armed forces and civilian society weakened.”63 Having convinced most within NATO that the “total defense” and collective defense models could be synchronized effectively, recent statements from EKRE Chairman Mart Helme have regressively cast unnecessary confusion around current Estonia’s engagement strategy in NATO. As Estonia’s Minister of the Interior, in 2018, Helme argued that once Estonia improves its own independent defense capability, it will be in a better position to ignore the advice of its allies.64 Curious from the perspective of cross-​party support for shared security within NATO that has previously been emphasized by Estonia’s governing elite, Helme added that “A state that hangs all its defense-​ related hopes on allies is also a toy in their allies’ hands.”65 Referring to political challenges largely beyond NATO’s remit, Helme elaborated on this with the controversial claim that conservative governments in Hungary and Poland are in a stronger position to refuse EU refugee quotas because both are less dependent on NATO’s European allies for defense assistance.66 As the legacy of the 2015 migration crisis lingers to cause tensions in Estonian politics, Helme’s discourse is contrary to Estonia’s long-​held perception of the transatlantic bargain as a partnership essential to ensure that the country is “never again alone” to fend for its security by itself without allies.

The Baltic states in NATO  157 Helme’s habit for curious statements continued into 2019, in response to Macron’s comments on NATO being “brain dead,” he elaborated that a “Plan B” for regional collective defense beyond NATO “was being prepared” in cooperation with Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania.67 This caused bewilderment and surprise in Helsinki, Finland’s Ministry of Defense responded with a statement outlining that it was unaware of any such plan.68 Helme later claimed that his comments were “misinterpreted,” nevertheless the mea culpa that his ministry issued was far from a ringing approval of NATO’s current health, containing the line that an “independent people and state [Estonia] must also be capable of defending themselves in a situation in which international security guarantees for some reason don’t function.”69 While surprising, Helme’s comments need to be clarified with the assertion that, in the aggregate policy of the Estonian government elected in 2019, Tallinn’s long-​ held position of unwavering support for NATO has not officially changed. Leading figures from EKRE’s coalition partners in government, Prime Minister Jüri Ratas (Centre Party) and Minister of Foreign Affairs Urmas Reinsalu (Isamaa) have both been explicit to communicate that the state’s foreign and security policies have not been altered.70 Nevertheless, as well as creating unnecessary controversy in Estonia’s relations with Finland, EKRE is a party that command significant support among the Estonian electorate and therefore its leadership’s doubts on NATO’s continuing durability cannot be fully ignored as likely to hold foreign policy implications. By comparison, the impact of domestic political change on foreign policy discourse in Latvia and Lithuania has not been as profound. The different political parties forming recent governments in Riga and Vilnius have upheld a political consensus approving of NATO. Both have nevertheless perceived recent inconsistencies in the Estonian government’s NATO discourses with concern. While each have a different security policy emphasis, external partners tend to perceive the Baltic three as one homogenous strategic constellation. Were inconsistencies in the current Estonian government’s discourse to create friction with some NATO members, concern might increase among Latvian and Lithuanian policymakers that their countries could be mistakenly associated with the same controversy.71 At the level of the Baltic Presidents –​symbolically significant for foreign policy leadership in all three states –​the prioritized emphasis on transatlantic relations dominant during the 1990s and 2000s has been more modest over recent years. The 1990s and 2000s were partially defined by Baltic Presidents of distinct North American émigré backgrounds including: Estonia’s Toomas Hendrik Ilves (2006–​2016); Latvia’s Vaira Vīķe-​Freiberga (1999–​2007); and Lithuania’s Valdas Adamkus (1998–​2003, 2004–​2009). Estonia’s President Lennart Meri (1992–​2001) and Lithuania’s President Dalia Grybauskaitė (2009–​2019) were of non-​émigré backgrounds, but still noteworthy as leaders prioritizing Atlanticism in Baltic foreign policy. To be sure, those that have succeeded these presidents over recent years have certainly not led contrary to a transatlantic focus, but have instead prioritized other issues often in

158  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg domestic policy areas. During Estonia’s 2016 presidential campaign, some quarters expressed a preference for a President that would prioritize domestic matters and foreign policy slightly less.72 Nevertheless, Kersti Kaljulaid, the candidate that eventually emerged victorious in Estonia’s 2016 Presidential Election, has since balanced a message of unity for an increasingly fractured domestic political landscape while also undertaking important foreign policy initiatives. Most prominently, Kaljulaid extended an invitation to her Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to meet during a visit to mark the completion of renovation works at the Embassy of Estonia in Moscow in April 2019.73 This was the highest-​level meeting of the Estonian and Russian leaderships since the tensions created by Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Some commentators may have initially considered this meeting as an attempt to rebalance Estonia’s foreign policy in a more pragmatic direction at a time of increased international turbulence and thus a change from Tallinn’s ardently held transatlantic focus. However, the complexity of Estonia’s relations with Russia is such that a clearly defined strategy like this is hard to confirm. On the Kaljulaid-​Putin meeting, Kadri Liik has remarked that, for Estonia, this event was like “climbing Everest” and that “It was like something major in its own right, that we [Estonia] are communicating with Putin.”74 It remains to be seen whether the meeting will be a means to any foreign policy end, rather than just an end in itself. The meeting did however create the unintended consequence of frustration in other Baltic capitals. Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Linas Linkevičius, has been critical of Baltic attempts seeking to manage relations with Russia in a bilateral manner, perceiving this as putting Moscow at an advantage. On the Kaljulaid-​Putin meeting, Linkevičius remarked that: It’s always more effective when we coordinate things and act in a more united way … There will always be attempts to divide us and test the unity of European countries or the Baltic countries.75 Linkevičius’ remark could also have included the Baltic fear of a Russian strategy that aims to exacerbate any transatlantic divide in NATO between the US and its European allies. Surrounding the 2016 US presidential election, the suspicion that Trump and Putin could forge a partnership on realpolitik principles, thus marginalizing the security interests of NATO’s Eastern allies never materialized.76 While Trump held a controversial summit with Putin in Helsinki in July 2018, the Baltic Presidents have also had access to the Trump White House, having a summit with the US President in April 2018, a meeting at which Trump declared that “nobody has been tougher on Russia than me” but that he still wanted good relations between the US and Russia.77 Continued access to key security officials in the Trump administration as well as Washington’s continuing operational military support for NATO’s eFP serve as points of assurance indicating that the transatlantic bargain that underpins Baltic security will remain durable.

The Baltic states in NATO  159 While these are positive points for Baltic security, negative reverberations from recent international events have again heightened Baltic concerns on NATO’s current health. Trump’s October 2019 decision to withdraw US military units from Northern Syria brought some unease in Baltic capitals. The US military presence in Syria had acted as a safeguard preventing direct confrontation between the Turkish military and SDF. The SDF have been led by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), and considering long-​ held US policy stressing protection for Kurdish populations, many perceived Trump’s action as a cruel act of abandonment.78 It must be clarified that Washington’s traditional support for various Kurdish groups has developed through arrangements far less robust than NATO as a treaty-​based military alliance. Nevertheless, Trump’s swift final decision to majorly deviate from a once consistently held US policy position risks creating further doubt on the President’s willingness to deliver US security assistance elsewhere if this is required. Sakkov has argued that events in Syria are likely to create “morally questionable choices” in Estonia’s foreign policy. On one hand, Tallinn has a responsibility to display solidarity with the US and Turkey as its NATO allies. On the other hand, Baltic populations are likely to have sympathy for the suffering of Kurdish civilians and others exposed to an escalated military conflict.79 As an additional acrimonious episode in NATO’s current alliance politics, Baltic security concerns were heightened as Turkey’s President Erdoğan brought one of such moral dilemma to the surface on the eve of NATO’s 70th Anniversary Summit in London in December 2019. Erdoğan “threatened to veto” improved NATO defense measures for the Baltic states and Poland unless the alliance “endorsed his assessment that Syrian Kurdish fighters on Turkey’s borders were terrorists.”80 Both senior US policymakers and French President Macron disagreed with Erdoğan’s assessment.81 A series of negotiations at the London meeting ultimately produced a fragile outcome resulting in Turkey not obstructing any improvements for NATO’s Eastern flank defense plan. With the Covid-​19 pandemic distracting attention away from European defense matters for much of 2020, Baltic policymakers were dealt a shock in July 2020 when Trump announced that the US would withdraw 9,500 of its troops based in Germany. Trump’s motivation for this decision centers on a suspicion that Berlin continues to “free-​ride” in NATO.82 Unease for the Baltic states has nevertheless been lessened by discussions that the US will instead seek to resettle some US troops withdrawn from Germany in Poland. It is yet unclear whether such an alteration will improve NATO deterrence along its Eastern flank, but this partly assuages Baltic fears that the US might again be minimizing its military focus on Europe. Despite this, Baltic policymakers have continued to observe many recent abrupt decisions and foreign policy controversies involving Trump and other NATO leaders with concern. If this remains as the “new normal,” finding consensus within NATO on matters vital to improve the Baltic security situation might not be as straightforward to achieve into the future as was the case in times past.

160  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg

Conclusion In examining the Baltic states’ perspective on the evolving transatlantic bargain that acts as a strategic bridge between the US and its European allies, this chapter has presented two main arguments. First, the operational military link that safeguards Baltic security through NATO’s eFP has continued to develop along a consistent track, this despite the political turbulence that has stemmed from Trump taking office as US president in 2017. Second, while NATO’s operational continuity has alleviated some Baltic concern; the vital political layer that anchors NATO’s transatlantic bargain has still suffered some severe damage during Trump’s first presidential term. Should transatlantic political acrimony continue, this will eventually seep through to undermine NATO’s military durability. With some political discourses emerging from Estonia’s EKRE the most striking example, recent transatlantic discord even risks eroding some Baltic support for NATO. This would once have looked remote as the Baltic states entered NATO in 2004. The Baltic states understood the transatlantic bargain as stressing the obligation to produce security and not just consume the benefits that NATO membership provided. By contributing to ISAF for over a decade, the Baltic three put this understanding into action, taking on a range of stabilization tasks. These contributions were a Baltic effort to reduce the imbalance in expeditionary security provision that the transatlantic bargain sometimes suffers from, prompting Washington to loudly ask for more from its European allies. Baltic capitals were therefore disappointed and concerned when, during the 2016 US presidential election campaign, Trump, followed by some supporters in the Republican Party, spontaneously began to hint that a return of US solidarity for the Baltic security, should this be required, might not be a certain prospect. Nevertheless, once entering office, NATO’s eFP has been one of the few areas less exposed to Trump’s otherwise inconsistent and unpredictable US foreign policy. In addition to events in the US, and with Estonia as an important focal-​point, recent political change in Europe has often compounded the current uncertainty that surrounds NATO’s durability. As a reaction to Trump’s absent and inconsistent leadership, French President Macron made the astounding claim that NATO is now “brain dead.” This comment reverberated throughout the Euro-​Atlantic area. Prompting many responses, it was the trigger for a curious set of statements made by Estonia’s Minister for the Interior, Mart Helme, where he indicated that his country was developing a “plan B,” should NATO’s security assurances “fail to function.” These comments were dismissed by other parties in Estonia’s government, but this was not an episode that helped to strengthen public trust in NATO’s ability to ensure security at challenging time for its eastern allies. Even beyond Washington’s military security provision, this unfolding of events demonstrates the immense political importance of US leadership in NATO. With Trump’s leadership unclear, uncertainty from this has in turn festered European perceptions that are detrimental for

The Baltic states in NATO  161 alliance cohesion. In a similar vein to Helme, should this political uncertainty prevail, a further set of European politicians might be encouraged to downplay NATO’s collective action ethos in favor of a narrower discussion on alternative bilateral defense arrangements. This would be a further setback for NATO’s strategic utility. The rise of populist far-​right parties such as EKRE connects to wider problems that currently affect the European side of the transatlantic bargain. Beginning with the European immigration crisis in 2015, there have been acrimonious disagreements often following and East–​West divide within the EU. Lingering acrimony from this has gradually seeped into collective defense discourse and is thus a further risk for NATO’s cohesion. Some of NATO’s Eastern governments have resented criticism received from Western counterparts over their handling of immigration issues. While Western European governments have significantly contributed to improve military security along NATO’s Eastern flank, some have been critical of their Eastern counterparts’ refusal to accept greater responsibility for burden-​sharing with EU refugee quotas. The Baltic states are likely to pragmatically undertake what has been agreed in this area, but the risk of a populist and nationalist backlash still remains. The problematic linkage some politicians have started to perceive between solidarity in collective defense and that in the management of immigration could create further complications for the Baltic states in NATO. As demonstrated by President Erdoğan’s December 2019 announcement during the build-​up to NATO’s 70th Anniversary Summit, it cannot be ruled out that populist politics from Turkey or another NATO government will threaten the obstruction of policy measures should it be dissatisfied with NATO or EU policy elsewhere. This stands as a risk both for NATO’s collective action ethos and the Alliance’s support for the Baltic states’ security. Therefore, while the transatlantic bargain continues to deliver on the operational military functions that safeguard Baltic security, this vital agreement is now also shrouded in political uncertainty that has dangerous potential to undermine NATO’s lasting durability.

Notes 1 K. Dudzińska. “The Security Policy of the Baltic States Vis-​à-​Vis Russia.” The Polish Institute of International Affairs Bulletin 83, 2014, 1. www.files.ethz.ch/​isn/​ 180933/​Bulletin%20PISM%20no%2083%20(678),%2012%20June%202014.pdf. 2 A. Kasekamp and E.M. McNamara. “From the Cold War’s End to the Ukraine Crisis: NATO’s Enduring Value for Estonia’s Security Policy,” in Peacebuilding at Home: NATO and Its “New” Member States After Crimea, A.H. Kammel and B. Zyla (eds.), 43. Baden-​Baden: Nomos, 2018. 3 A. Forster and W. Wallace. “What is NATO For?” Survival 43, 4 (2001): 111. 4 Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Defence. “Reinsalu: Next 12 Months in Afghanistan are Critical.” June 28, 2013. www.kaitseministeerium.ee//​en/​news/​ reinsalu-​next-​12-​months-​afghanistan-​are-​critical. 5 Statistics available from the website: http://​icasualties.org/​.

162  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg 6 C. Holtby. “UK-​Estonian Defence Cooperation in NATO.” Estonian World. April 1, 2014. http://​estonianworld.com/​security/​uk-​estonian-​defence-​cooperation-​nato/​. 7 M. Andžāns. “The Northern Distribution Network and its Implications for Latvia,” in Northern Distribution Network: Redefining Partnerships in NATO and Beyond, A. Sprūds and D. Potjomkina (eds.), 23–​24. Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2013. 8 E. MacAskill. “Obama Takes Final Gamble with Afghanistan Troops Surge.” The Guardian. December 1, 2009. www.theguardian.com/​world/​2009/​nov/​30/​ obama-​troops-​afghanistan. 9 G. O’Dwyer. “Latvia Joins Nordic Military Initiative in Afghanistan.” Atlantic Council NATO Source. September 17, 2012. https://​atlanticcouncil.org/​blogs/​ natosource/​latvia-​joins-​nordic-​military-​initiative-​in-​afghanistan/​. 10 Figures on Latvia’s personnel contributions for Kunar and Nurestan Provinces cited from Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Participation in International Operations.” January 8, 2015. www.mfa.gov.lv/​en/​policy/​security-​ policy/​directions-​of-​security-​policy/​participation-​in-​international-​operations. 11 J. Shea. Plenary Lecture: Emerging Security Challenges –​A NATO Perspective. 13th Annual Conference of the Transatlantic Studies Association, University of Ghent, Belgium, July 8, 2014. 12 E. Račius. “Trials and Tribulations of the Lithuanian Participation in the NATO ISAF Mission,” in Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction, N. Hynek and P. Marton (eds.), 286. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011. 13 A. Maskaliūnaitė. “Learning to Think Big: The Lithuanian Experience of the ISAF.” Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 2 (2014): 46. 14 R. Kuokštytė. “Lithuania’s Participation in the Reconstruction Process of Afghanistan: A Case of a Small State’s Engagement in the International Arena.” Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 4, 1, 226. 15 J. Biden. “On Baltic-​ U.S. Presidents’ Meeting: Meeting of Valued Friends.” Latvia.eu. August 30, 2013. www.latvia.eu/​news/​joe-​biden-​baltic-​us-​presidents-​ meeting-​meeting-​valued-​friends. 16 H. Forsland Widerberg. “Rallying for Reassurance: A Study of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Diplomacy.” European Security 24, 2 (2015): 183–​202. 17 T. Rostoks and N. Vanaga. “Deterring Russia in the Baltic Sea Region: Latvia’s Defence Developments in Regional Context.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Analysis, 2017, 18. http://​library.fes.de/​pdf-​files/​bueros/​baltikum/​13702.pdf. 18 I. Traynor. “WikiLeaks Cables Reveal Secret NATO Plans to Defend Baltics from Russia.” The Guardian. December 6, 2010. www.theguardian.com/​world/​2010/​dec/​ 06/​wikileaks-​cables-​nato-​russia-​baltics. 19 K. Paulauskas. “Yesterday Came Suddenly. The Brave New Security Agenda of the Baltic States,” in Global and Regional Security Challenges: A Baltic Outlook, H. Tiirmaa-​Klaar and T. Marques (eds.), 17. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2006. 20 NATO. “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon 19–​20 November 2010.” November 19, 2010. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​topics_​82705. htm. 21 M. Mälksoo. “From Existential Politics Towards Normal Politics? The Baltic States in the Enlarged Europe.” Security Dialogue 37, 3 (2006): 282–​283.

The Baltic states in NATO  163 22 D. Grybauskaitė cited in N. Adomaitis. “Lithuania awaits NATO ‘Insurance Plan’ on Russia.” Reuters. March 11, 2010. https://​in.reuters.com/​article/​idINIndia-​ 46841820100311. 23 E.M. McNamara. “Securing the Nordic-​ Baltic Region.” The NATO Review. March 17, 2016. www.nato.int/​docu/​review/​articles/​2016/​03/​17/​securing-​the-​ nordic-​baltic-​region/​index.html. 24 D. Jakniūnaitė. “Lithuanian Foreign Policy: Loud, But Narrow and Negative.” Delfi. January 6, 2015. http://​en.delfi.lt/​opinion/​opinion-​lithuanian-​ foreign-​policy-​loud-​but-​narrow-​and-​negative.d?id=66824988. 25 A. Hanna. “How a Tiny Baltic Nation Became a Top Destination for US Officials.” Politico. July 29, 2017. www.politico.eu/​article/​estonia-​americahow-​a-​tiny-​baltic-​ nation-​became-​a-​top-​destination-​for-​us-​officials/​amp/​. 26 S. Sakkov. “Rock ‘n’ Roll and Heavy Metal. The Wales Summit and Estonia.” Diplomaatia. November 4, 2014. https://​icds.ee/​rock-​n-​roll-​and-​heavy-​metal-​the-​ wales-​summit-​and-​estonia/​. 27 NATO. “Wales Summit Declaration.” September 5, 2014. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​ natohq/​official_​texts_​112964.htm. 28 A.F. Rasmussen. “Pre-​Summit Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at Residence Palace, Brussels.” NATO Press Release. September 1, 2014. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​opinions_​112238.htm?selected Locale=en. 29 T.H. Ilves cited in D. Blair. “Sitting Near a Nuclear Tripwire, Estonia’s President Urges NATO to Send Troops to Defend His Country.” The Telegraph. April 11, 2015. www.telegraph.co.uk/​news/​worldnews/​europe/​estonia/​11530064/​Sitting-​near-​a-​ nuclear-​tripwire-​Estonias-​president-​urges-​Nato-​to-​send-​troops-​to-​defend-​hiscountry.html. 30 Ilves cited in Blair, ‘Sitting Near a Nuclear Tripwire.’ 31 S. Rynning and J. Ringsmose. “Can NATO’s New Very High Readiness Joint Task Force Deter?” NUPI Policy Brief 15 (2006): 2. www.nupi.no/​en/​Publications/​ CRIStin-​Pub/​Can-​NATO-​s-​new-​Very-​High-​Readiness-​Joint-​Task-​force-​deter. 32 W. Clark, J. Luik, E. Ramms, and R. Shirreff. Closing NATO’s Baltic Gap. Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security, 2016. https://​icds.ee/​wp-​content/​ uploads/​2015/​ICDS_​Report-​Closing_​NATO_​s_​Baltic_​Gap.pdf. 33 Clark, et al., Closing NATO’s Baltic Gap. 34 Clark et al., Closing NATO’s Baltic Gap. 35 NATO. “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France.” May 27, 1997. www. nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​official_​texts_​25468.htm. 36 NATO. “Warsaw Summit Communiqué by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–​9 July.” July 9, 2016. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​official_​texts_​133169.htm. 37 J.H. Svan. “Troops Living Deployment-​Style in Poland as US Military Ramps Up Presence in Region.” Stars and Stripes. August 29, 2019. www.stripes.com/​news/​ troops-​living-​deployment-​style-​in-​poland-​as-​us-​military-​ramps-​up-​presence-​in-​ region-​1.596399. 38 “Trip-​Wire Deterrence.” The Economist. July 2, 2016. www.economist.com/​news/​ europe/​21701515-​ageing-​alliance-​hopes-​russia-​will-​get-​message-​it-​serious-​trip-​ wire-​deterrence.

164  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg 39 J. Ringsmose. “NATO’s Response Force Reloaded: How Much Support, To Counter Which Threats?” Europe’s World. February 3, 2015. www.friendsofeurope. org/ ​ i nsights/ ​ n atos- ​ response- ​ force- ​ reloaded- ​ h ow- ​ much- ​ s upport- ​ t o- ​ c ounter-​ which-​threats/​. 40 A. Wivel and M. Crandall. “Punching Above Their Weight, But Why? Explaining Denmark and Estonia in the Transatlantic Relationship.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 17, 3, 392–​419. 41 Wivel and Crandall, “Punching Above Their Weight,” 392–​419. 42 Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Defence. “Defence Budget.” September 25, 2015. www.kmin.ee/​en/​objectives-​activities/​defence-​budget. 43 D.E. Sanger and M. Haberman. “Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey’s Coup Attempt and The World.” The New York Times. July 21, 2016. www.nytimes. com/​2016/​07/​22/​us/​politics/​donald-​trump-​foreign-​policy-​interview.html. 44 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia,” Press Release. September 3, 2014. https://​ obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/​the-​press-​office/​2014/​09/​03/​remarks-​president-​ obama-​people-​estonia. 45 G.W. Bush. “Remarks to the Citizens of Vilnius, Lithuania.” US Department of State. November 23, 2002. https://​2001–​2009.state.gov/​p/​eur/​rls/​rm/​2002/​15452. htm. 46 R. Flores. “Newt Gingrich: NATO Countries ‘Ought to Worry’ About US Commitment.” CBS News. July 21, 2016. www.cbsnews.com/​news/​newt-​gingrich-​ trump-​would-​reconsider-​his-​obligation-​to-​nato/​. 47 J. Logan. “Is Estonia Worth a War?” CATO Institute Commentary. April 10, 2014. www.cato.org/​publications/​commentary/​estonia-​worth-​war. 48 T.G. Carpenter. “The Baltic States Are Not Serious About Defending Themselves.” Newsweek. December 19, 2014. www.newsweek.com/​baltic-​statesare-​not-​serious-​about-​defending-​themselves-​293493. 49 J.E. Barnes and H. Cooper. “Trump Discussed Pulling US From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia.” The New York Times. January 14, 2019. www.nytimes.com/​2019/​01/​14/​us/​politics/​nato-​president-​trump.html. 50 P. Harris. “Why Trump Won’t Retrench: The Militarist Redoubt in American Foreign Policy.” Political Science Quarterly 133, 4 (2018): 611–​640. 51 “Emmanuel Macron Warns Europe: NATO is Becoming Brain-​ Dead.” The Economist. November 7, 2019. www.economist.com/​europe/​2019/​11/​07/​emmanuel-​ macron-​warns-​europe-​nato-​is-​becoming-​brain-​dead. 52 M. Mälksoo. “Decentring the West From Within: Estonian Discourses on Russian Democracy,” in Decentring the West: The Idea of Democracy And The Struggle for Hegemony, V. Morozov (ed.), 157–​174. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013. 53 T. Saarts. “Eesti mäss Lääne vastu’ [‘Estonia’s Revolt Against the West’].” SIRP. September 20, 2019. https://​sirp.ee/​s1-​artiklid/​c9-​sotsiaalia/​eesti-​mass-​laane-​ vastu/​. 54 Saarts, “Eesti mäss Lääne vastu.” 55 U. Ploom. “Väitlusselts valimisstuudiost: Leo Kunnase esinemisest välispoliitika teemadel jäi kõige nõrgem mulje [Debating Society from the Election Studio: Leo Kunnas’ Speech on Foreign Policy Makes the Weakest Impression].” Postimees. February 21, 2019. https://​arvamus.postimees.ee/​6528379/​vaitlusselts-​ valimisstuudiost- ​ l eo- ​ k unnase- ​ e sinemisest- ​ valispoliitika-​ t eemadel-​ j ai-​ koige-​ norgem-​mulje.

The Baltic states in NATO  165 56 M. Kolga. “New Challenges to the Estonian Defence System After Accession to the Alliance,” in Global and Regional Security Challenges: A Baltic Outlook, H. Tiirmaa-​Klaar and T. Marques (eds.), 43–​46. Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2006. 57 K.H. Kaldas. “The Evolution of Estonian Security Options During the 1990s.” Athena Papers 4 (2005): 26. 58 Kaldas, “The Evolution of Estonian Security Options,” 26. 59 Kolga, “New Challenges to the Estonian Defence System,” 43–​46. 60 A. Dier. “To Draft or Not to Draft? Conscription Reform in the EU.” CSS Analysis in Security Policy. ETH Zurich 75 (2010): 1–​2. https://​ethz.ch/​content/​dam/​ethz/​ special-​interest/​gess/​cis/​center-​for-​securities-​studies/​pdfs/​CSS-​Analyses-​75.pdf. 61 A. Kasekamp. “Are the Baltic States Next? Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,” in Strategic Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region: Russia, Deterrence, and Reassurance, Ann-​Sofie Dahl (ed.), 67. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018. 62 Republic of Estonia. “Defence Forces.” February 12, 2020. https://​mil.ee/​en/​ defence-​forces/​. 63 E. Kaldoja. “Commander of the Lithuanian Armed Forces: Abolition of Compulsory Military Service Big Mistake.” Postimees. January 30, 2020. https://​news.postimees.ee/​6885375/​commander-​of-​the-​lithuanian-​armed-​forces-​ abolition-​of-​compulsory-​military-​service-​big-​mistake. 64 A. Vahtla. “Helme: With Enough Defence Capability, Estonia Can Ignore Allies’ Advice.” ERR News. October 31, 2018. https://​news.err.ee/​873385/​helme-​ with-​enough-​defence-​capability-​estonia-​can-​ignore-​allies-​advice. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 H. Wright. “Helme: Government is Preparing a Plan B in Case NATO Fails.” ERR News. November 19, 2019. https://​news.err.ee/​1004705/​helme-​ government-​is-​preparing-​a-​plan-​b-​in-​case-​nato-​fails. 68 H. Wright. “Finnish Ministry of Defence Denies Involvement in Helme’s Plan B for NATO.” ERR News. November 20, 2019. https://​news.err.ee/​1004745/​ finnish-​ministry-​of-​defence-​denies-​involvement-​in-​helme-​s-​plan-​b-​for-​nato. 69 A. Whyte. “Helme: I was Misinterpreted About NATO.” ERR News. November 20, 2019. https://​news.err.ee/​1004962/​helme-​i-​was-​misinterpreted-​about-​nato. 70 H. Wright. “Reinsalu: Case Closed on Helme’s NATO Plan B Comments.” ERR News. November 20, 2019. https://​news.err.ee/​1005037/​reinsalu-​case​closed-​on-​helme-​s-​nato-​plan-​b-​comments. 71 Thanks to Lukas Pukelis for insights on this point. 72 A. Sarapik. “Allar Jõks Confirms Intention to Run for President in the Riigikogu.” ERR News. August 8, 2016. https://​news.err.ee/​118728/​allar-​joks-​confirms​intention-​to-​run-​for-​president-​in-​the-​riigikogu. 73 A. Whyte. “President Kaljulaid Proposes Meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.” ERR News. April 2, 2019. https://​news.err.ee/​926130/​president-​kaljulaid-​ proposes-​meeting-​with-​russian-​president-​vladimir-​putin. 74 A. Vahtla. “Expert: Putin Meeting Was Viewed in Estonia Like Conquering of Everest.” ERR News. January 31, 2020. https://​news.err.ee/​1030212/​expert-​putin-​ meeting-​was-​viewed-​in-​estonia-​like-​conquering-​of-​everest. 75 S. Walker. “Estonia’s President Plays Down Criticism over Putin Meeting.” The Guardian. May 14, 2019. www.theguardian.com/​world/​2019/​may/​14/​estonia-​ president-​plays-​down-​criticism-​putin-​meeting.

166  Eoin M. McNamara and Mari-Liis Sulg 76 E.M. McNamara. “Between Trump’s America and Putin’s Russia: Nordic-​Baltic Security Relations Amid Transatlantic Drift.” Irish Studies in International Affairs 28 (2017): 73–​98. 77 M. Talev. “Trump Says He’s Tough on Russia but Still Wants Good Relationship with Putin.” Bloomberg. April 3, 2018. www.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2018-​ 04-​03/​trump-​says-​no-​one-​is-​tougher-​on-​russia-​but-​he-​wants-​relationship. 78 M. Specia. “Winners and Losers in Trump’s Troop Withdrawal from Syria.” The New York Times. October 15, 2019. www.nytimes.com/​2019/​10/​15/​world/​ middleeast/​trump-​syria-​troop-​withdrawal.html. 79 H. Wright. “Sakkov: Estonia Faces Morally Questionable Choices over Turkey’s Attack.” ERR News. October 10, 2019. https://​news.err.ee/​990403/​ sakkov-​estonia-​faces-​morally-​questionable-​choices-​over-​turkey-​s-​attack. 80 P. Wintour. “Macron Clashes with Both Erdoğan and Trump at NATO Summit.” The Guardian. December 4, 2019. www.theguardian.com/​world/​2019/​dec/​03/​ macron-​clashes-​with-​erdogan-​over-​anti-​isis-​kurdish-​fighters. 81 Wintour, “Macron Clashes With Both Erdoğan and Trump.” 82 “Trump approves plan to withdraw 9,500 US troops from Germany.” BBC News. July 1, 2020. www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​us-​canada-​53248177.

9  Spain and NATO Punching below its weight? Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni

Introduction The relationship between Spain and NATO appears, at first glance, as a success story with no, or very few, incidents. For most of the Cold War era, due to the fascist regime of Francisco Franco, the Alliance’s gates remained closed to Spain. It was only after the dictator’s death that the accession process was set in motion. On May 30, 1982 Spain became the 16th member of NATO, the last country to sign the North Atlantic Treaty when the East–​West confrontation was still in place. In the following years, especially after the end of the Cold War era, Spain has constantly increased its level of commitment becoming one of the most active members of the Alliance. Nonetheless, the evolution of Spain’s NATO membership deserves greater scrutiny due to a number of contradictions and still unresolved issues. Three in particular. First, the country’s accession process did not prove straightforward due to a stiff domestic opposition coming largely from left-​wing parties, but also the ambivalent attitude of some of post-​Francoist leaders, first of all Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez (1976–​1981).1 In the aftermath of its victory in the general elections of October 1982, the Socialist party (PSOE) made a pragmatic U-​turn with the new Prime Minister, Felipe González, starting a “reflection period” over Spain’s participation in the Alliance. It ended with a compromise:  in 1984, the Parliament passed a “Decalogue on peace and security policy” (Decálogo de paz y seguridad) in which the government agreed on the country remaining inside NATO, but depending upon an explicit set of caveats, among which the nonincorporation of Spain in the Alliance’s military integrated structure and the prohibition to station nuclear weapons on its soil.2 Second, as Francisco Villar argued, although Spain entered NATO and the EEC in the 1980s, its “external transition” ended fully in the 1990s when Madrid adopted a more proactive role in the three macroareas of its foreign policy:  the European institutions, the Ibero-​American region, and transatlantic security.3 As the post-​Cold War world started to unfold, NATO shifted its focus from collective defense to collective security and crisis management. This allowed Spain to reverse one of the requirements of the 1984 Decalogue and, effective from 1999, integrate itself in the Alliance’s military

168  Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni structure. Third, the country’s defense budget is below the standards agreed by NATO:  Spain is the seventh largest economy and the eight largest military spender within the Alliance, but it is the second-​lowest contributor in terms of the 2 percent rule –​better only than Luxembourg –​with a defense expenditure between 2013 and 2019 fluctuating around 0.90  percent of its GDP.4 A behavior that has led to a substantial cooling of Spain–​US bilateral relations. This chapter aims to provide an overview of the state of the art of Spain–​NATO relations and, as a result, respond to two interconnected questions: is Spain punching below its weight within transatlantic security relations? And, what are the prospects of Spain’s role within the Alliance? The chapter divides in three parts. The first one explores Spain’s ambivalent posture: a middle-​range power with limited ambitions and scarce defense expenditure, yet one of the most active players in NATO operations. The second section explores an interesting, yet still undervalued, scholarly debate about Spain’s visions of NATO and, accordingly, traces the historical evolution of the country’s relationship with the transatlantic collective defense system. The third part of the chapter deals with the future of Spain–​NATO relations, which do not seem to foresee any radical shift. Three challenges, however, are likely to play crucial relevance: (1) the evolution of Spain–​US relations; (2) the capability of Spain to revitalize the Alliance’s attention toward the Southern flank; and (3) the degree of sensibility of Spanish politics and society for the outer world and, thus, the country’s future international role. The concluding section suggests that the image of Spain punching below its weight is not entirely correct, but deserves a more nuanced clarification. Indeed, the country could “do more”; yet it is also true that such a negative statement does not take into account neither the real “output” of Spanish contribution to transatlantic collective defense and security operations nor that this outlook seems consistent with both the country’s strategic culture and the population’s desire to maintain a low profile in foreign affairs. If Spain aims to increase its assertiveness, it should also assume greater costs and responsibilities, something that for the time being appears as an unrealistic option.

The ambivalent nature of Spain’s defense and security policy Spain is a typical example of a middle-​range power. If one looks at the most basic quantitative criteria to rank a country’s power position –​e.g., size, demography, economic growth, wealth per capita etc. –​Spain fits pretty well in the group of intermediate states. Nevertheless, when it comes to national security, this image is offset by the perception that Spain’s defense posture is characterized by a low profile, inertia, and limited ambitions. Spain appears as a “lamb” punching below its weight. According to Randall Schweller’s theory of balance of interests,

Spain and NATO  169 Lambs are countries that will pay only low costs to defend or extend their values. In a world of predators and prey, these states are prey. Lambs are weak states in that they possess relatively few capabilities, or suffer from poor state-​society relations for a variety of reasons.5 Lambs are satiated countries interested in the maintenance of existing material and normative circumstances, and logically inclined to bandwagon with stronger status quo powers. Motivated by a sentiment of “self-​abnegation,” they are usually risk-​adverse.6 Their foreign policy is largely defined by the pursuing of “milieu goals” such as international legal principles or rules whose objective is to make the country’s environment more stable and secure, and, thus, avert dangerous transformations of their neighborhood.7 Two features are at the origins of this pacifist and legalistic attitude of Spanish defense policy. First, a peripheral geographical location that since the early 19th century, with the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the spread of the industrial revolution, has left the country on the margins of international relations. This remoteness has not only led to a condition of economic and social backwardness  –​a fact reinforced by the complete loss of the empire in 1898, a true national shock –​but also generated a perception of the country lacking a direct and existential threat. Spain stayed neutral in all three global conflicts of the 20th century; with Morocco being the major source of tensions and insecurity, the country has developed a limited sense of urgency for national defense and, as a result, a scarce interest for global politics. Second, the necessity to establish a discontinuity with the past, namely Franco’s long dictatorship and his military deal with the United States, has triggered a process of denationalization of its national interest. The new democratic Spain’s foreign policy priority was clear: anchoring a backward country, and its outdated military, to the club of modern nations and, thus, achieving recognition and legitimation.8 But while entering the EEC, a purely civilian institution, faced virtually no opposition, joining NATO turned to be harder than expected.9 Hesitations and resistances materialized, and only a radical change in attitude of PSOE rendered Spain’s transatlantic membership an irreversible choice. Isolationist sentiments no longer exist, yet the memory of Franco’s regime still affects the country’s view of its own role in the world. The crucial factor, indeed, is the country’s strategic culture, which can be defined as defensive and reactive, one “very similar to Germany’s.”10 Spain associates its national security to the attainment of the milieu goal of a strong and united Western community, a strategy of multilateral engagement aimed at displaying commitment and loyalty toward its allies. Today’s Spain wants to be perceived as a mature and trustworthy actor, fully incorporated in the international community, and willing to assume responsibilities equivalent to its status. A policy of institutional integration that is consistent with the tendency of a medium power to bandwagon with its strongest partners. And, it is not by chance that Spain considers NATO and the EU as “complementary.”11

170  Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni The appointment of former Foreign Minister, Javier Solana, as NATO Secretary General (1995–​1999) and then first High Representative of the EU’s CFSP (1999–​2009) was the paramount recognition of Spain’s staunch multilateral, and transatlantic, engagement. The Spanish approach, however, rests upon a high degree of ambiguity. On the one hand, in the post-​Cold War decades the country has developed a strong activism, which is reflected, for instance, in its participation in the out-​of-​area operations conducted by the two Euro-​Atlantic organizations. As for NATO, Spanish armed forces have been present in practically all missions:  Bosnia–​ Herzegovina (SFOR), Kosovo (KFOR), Afghanistan (ISAF and Resolute Support), Libya (OUP), and the naval operations in the Horn of Africa and the Mediterranean. In addition, Spanish soldiers are deployed in Turkey (along with anti-​aircraft Patriot missiles), Latvia (with over 300 troops, tanks and mechanized vehicles in the eFP multinational battalion led by Canada), and Iraq (about 70 troops serving in the training and strengthening of Iraqi security forces). More, Spain hosts several NATO’s military infrastructures: the air bases of Morón (Seville) and Torrejón de Ardoz (Madrid); the naval base of Rota (Cádiz), which is part since 2011 of NATO’s missile defense system, hosting four Aegis-​equipped US destroyer ships and over 4,000 US military personnel; and the base of Bétera (Valencia), which is the headquarter of NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Spain and, in 2016, of the first VJTF. And in terms of cooperative security, Spain was one of the greatest supporters of the Mediterranean Dialogue partnership program.12 As for the EU, the situation looks even brighter: Indeed, in the operational field Spain is already punching above its weight as it is a top-​ranking contributor to CSDP missions and operations. Spain is the only country that has participated in all EU missions/​operations and one of the countries that contributes the most troops (30%), commanding a dozen missions over the last decade.13 As a leading advocate of the EU integration process, Madrid has adamantly supported all efforts aimed at widening and deepening European defense projects, such as CARD, EDA, EDF, and PESCO. In this regard, it is also worth mentioning that two of four HR/​VPs of the EU are, so far, Spanish: Javier Solana (1999–​2009), who was the drafter of the first “European Security Strategy” adopted by the European Council in December 2003; and Josep Borrell (2019–​present), whose positions in favor of the EU to develop an “appetite for power” are well-​known.14 The famous sentence coined in 1910 by Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset  –​Spain is the problem, Europe is the solution –​still echoes. This attitude to act like a responsible stakeholder is also visible in all documents that every Spanish government has issued in relation to the country’s defense policy. If one looks at the most relevant ones –​the National Security Strategies (ESN) of 2011, 2013, and 2017  –​the axes of Spain’s

Spain and NATO  171 security posture remain largely unchanged. The country is recognized to possess a number of vital interests associated to the strengthening and promotion of values such as democratic rule of law, plural and open society, economic progress, and territorial and linguistic diversity. Simultaneously, these principles serve as the foundation for the fulfillment of five “general objectives,”15 which are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Developing the comprehensive crisis management model. Promoting a culture of National Security. Favoring the good use of global common spaces. Enhancing the security dimension in technological development. Strengthening the international projection of Spain.

In the description of these objectives, NATO is mentioned twice, and always in conjuncture with the EU:  both institutions, the 2017 ESN argues, must reinforce their coordination, but also adapt in order to provide a more efficient response to a growing and diverse number of “common threats and challenges.”16 Equally important are the provisions of the National Defense Law of 2005 which modifies and modernizes the country’s defense system and military organization. The legislation emphasizes three main points: the defensive character of Spain’s defense policy (artt. 2 and 15); the power of the Parliament to authorize Spain’s participation in international military operations (artt. 4.2 and 17); and, that such missions must take place within a multilateral framework –​whether the EU, NATO, or the UN (art. 19).17 A position reaffirmed by the National Defense Directive of June 2020.18 Nonetheless, this approach of multilateral dedication is offset by “the absence of general guidelines for national defense and security, limited planning, and inadequate political vision.”19 Spanish defense policy can be compared to Don Quixote, the famous character invented by Miguel de Cervantes in the early 17th century. As Manuel Muñiz puts it, Don Quixote was a fictional Spanish knight known for his commitment to the defense of causes in which he rarely had a direct stake. That noble and tragic ability to get into harm’s way for a purpose ‘higher’ than protecting one’s own interests seems to have survived the four centuries that separate Don Quixote and Spain’s current defense policy.20 Therefore, as Muñiz explains, (w)hat has been missing in Spain is an overarching strategy that justifies this commitment. … As valid as this goal may be (…), Spain shows a lack of clarity and strategic guidance. As with the fictional character of Don Quixote, Spanish policy (…) displays both loyalty and commitment, in an attitude that is both honorable and extremely risky.21

172  Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni The 2017 ESN is a constructive attempt to reduce such vagueness, but still without articulating its ends, ways, and means. In fact, the ESN is more an attempt to build consensus among stakeholders (mainly ministries and public administrations from a “whole-​of-​government” approach) rather than the output of strategic thinking. First, it emphasizes the importance of recognizing Spain’s “singular geostrategic position” as the country possesses a “European, Mediterranean, and Atlantic identity.” As a matter of fact, this “natural opening to distinct places requests [Spain to develop] a specific and dynamic strategic vision.”22 Likewise, as power relations are shifting toward East and Southeast Asia, the document portrays the image of “a country with a global vocation”; in particular, it advances the idea that, due its “Atlantic character,” Spain should considers itself as a “maritime power as well as an actor with a legacy and global interests that go beyond its natural borders.”23 Yet, the provisions included in all ESNs seem unable to shape the public arena as they stay confined in the domain of military bureaucracies and scholarly discussions. Spain’s defense policymaking is characterized by a domestic-​ oriented attitude of political elites,24 while the public opinion remains largely uniformed about the country’s defense policy, displaying cognitive mechanisms that are profoundly shaped by internal social cleavages.25 The lack of an organic conception of the national interest as well as the partisanship and negligible relevance of national security issues, NATO included, are confirmed by looking at the party platforms of last general elections. If foreign policy holds a secondary place, with an agenda dominated by “civilian” issues,26 defense policy is relegated to an even more subordinate position, with the two biggest parties –​the conservative People’s party (PP) more explicitly than PSOE –​calling for a quite unspecified greater role of Spain in the Alliance. Two recent surveys reveal the ambiguities and the unawareness of the Spaniards with regard to NATO. In February 2020, Pew revealed that only 49 percent of the population expressed a favorable view of the Alliance vis-​à-​ vis 42 percent of unfavorable, ranking as one of the least favorable and, simultaneously, one of the most unfavorable among NATO countries.27 This is consistent with the 2018 Barometer of the Elcano Royal Institute, a Madrid-​ based think tank, showing that about a half of the interviewed (a median score of 5.4, with 10 being the highest) believes in the utility of NATO. However, these data are contrasted by the high number of people in support of Spain’s continued NATO membership, 75 percent, a substantial increase if compared to the 43 percent of 1993.28 In sum, Spain’s defense policy is characterized by a great deal of ambivalence: a middle-​range power eager to assume a high degree of responsibilities, especially in military terms, whether deployment of troops or infrastructural assets, but feeling almost no need to increase its military spending and, above all, to develop a clear notion of its own national interest. In accordance with Schweller’s ethological metaphor, Spain is a good example of a “lamb” adopting an unambiguous, yet peculiar, strategy of bandwagoning:  a

Spain and NATO  173 trustworthy security provider, but on the cheap. Lacking a mature defense culture, and with its political elite unable to embark on a truly bipartisan approach on security issues, Spain’s defense policy continues to develop mainly through a path of institutional inertia.

Spanish visions of NATO: There’s an American in the soup! The Spanish strategic debate does not enjoy the robustness of other Western communities. This weakness helps understand the negligible place that defense and security occupy in the national decision-​making process as well as the passive attitude of both policymakers and the public opinion in thinking about Spain’s goals within NATO. Spain’s original sin looks threefold. First, the Spanish public sphere remains characterized by the “absence of great debates” in relation to foreign policy.29 At the same time, the scholarly community has proved unable –​at least in the first 40 years of Spanish democracy  –​to prioritize strategic and military policy and defense issues, despite the steady growth of IR studies.30 Second, participation in the Alliance has never been intended as the fulfillment of a given geopolitical design, but a simple objective in itself, whose aim was to internationalize Spanish politics through multilateral integration. And third, Spain’s idea of the “transatlantic bargain”31 with the United States rests upon a bilateral relationship that, as the following section will argue, has noticeably cooled down. As a result, the Spanish strategic debate has been largely shaped by political positions with no, or limited, proactive strategic thinking, while the country’s foreign policy agenda has been often affected by domestic issues. A  historical overview allows tracing this process and understanding these essential features of the Spanish visions of NATO. Spain’s integration into the Western security sphere began in the 1950s, thanks to the relations with the US. The Cold War order and the precarious international place of Spain led to the rapprochement. On the one hand, the US government had an interest in join a staunch anti-​Communist state located in a privileged geostrategic position: a logistical and operational rearguard against the USSR and a Mediterranean vital point given the Strait of Gibraltar chokepoint. On the other hand, Franco’s dictatorship, internationally isolated and economically impoverished, was eager to coalesce with the world’s capitalist superpower with the double purpose of breaking worldwide political ostracism and, internally, legitimizing his authoritarian regime. In accordance with these premises, the bilateral cooperation was initiated by the signing of the Pact of Madrid of 1953.32 As Francoism lacked a real defense policy,33 the American military and economic aid boosted the modernization of the armed forces (equipment, structure, doctrine etc.), especially the air force and the navy.34 On the political level, it also meant the entry of Spain in the Western world and the beginning of its –​still unofficial, though –​relationship with NATO.

174  Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni Nevertheless, it was only after the death of Francisco Franco in 1975 that Spain’s accession process began. Openly supported by the Washington,35 NATO was “the instrument to anchor Spain–​ US bilateral relations and bestow the country’s new elites a full international legitimation.”36 The elites of the “transition,” former King Juan Carlos in particular, aspired to put an end to the country’s long-​rooted isolationism and, therefore, saw Spain’s membership in Western regional institutions –​NATO and the EEC –​as an essential requirement for its full modernization. At the onset of Spanish democracy, whether Spain had to adhere or not to the Atlantic Alliance became the most important discussion in foreign and defense affairs. The first Prime Minister of the democratic period, centrist Adolfo Suárez, held an ambiguous position. Given the priority held by democratic reform and the divisive nature of transatlantic security relations among the different political parties, Suárez remained aloof and avoided to accelerate the accession process.37 To the contrary, the left-​wing political forces defended an option closer to neutralism, not only due to a Cold War-​related ideological cleavage, but also because the prejudice against the US and its ties with Franco’s regime. Thus, the foreseeable victory of PSOE in the 1982 general elections induced Suárez’s successor, Leopoldo Calvo-​ Sotelo, to ask to join the organization. Simultaneously, another factor came into play: the attempted coup d’état of 1981 made clear that NATO membership would be the necessary means of solving the so-​ called “military problem”  –​the recurrent intervention of the military in Spain’s domestic politics. The decision was supported by the Chairman of the Board of Joint Chiefs of Staff38 and approved by all NATO and EEC members, but harshly criticized by the opposition.39 In 1982, Spain became a new member of NATO. Previous relations with the US were key in order to facilitate this process, since the cooperation had already been channeled through NATO.40 Geopolitics had anchored the country to the Western sphere, so that the Cold War balance of power remained unaltered.41 The new socialist government did not change this state of affairs, although a referendum was called to legitimize this position: while PSOE defended the membership, the main opposition party (the conservative People’s Alliance), until then pro-​NATO, promoted abstention. This “surrealistic referendum,”42 triggered by political tactics and short-​term pragmatism, led to a debate mainly on national politics.43 The defense and military issues were sidelined, as Antonio Marquina, one of the first Spanish scholars specializing in strategic studies, criticized: The strategic debate […] hardly if addressed, the Soviet threat was not discussed, focusing the discussion on marginal issues of domestic politics, the consequences of European integration and fear of the consequences of Spain’s withdrawal from NATO.44 From that moment on, Spain began to pave an unknown path, involved for the first time in its history in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.

Spain and NATO  175 Furthermore, a new agreement on defense cooperation with the US was signed and Spanish troops participated in the Gulf War. The 1990s began with this Copernican revolution and were characterized by military deployments abroad, particularly relevant the Yugoslav Wars. Together with this more ambitious involvement in NATO and UN operations, as well as a closer engagement with the US, Spain strongly supported efforts to boost the Western European Union and develop NATO’s ESDI. The Spanish position understood the demand for a European defense pillar as a substantial contribution to the transatlantic relation. Also, the new collective security and crisis management framework fitted the Spanish assumptions and strategic culture. There was broad consensus among scholars about the positive outcomes of these endeavors in foreign policy terms. The country wanted to demonstrate that it was a reliable ally looking forward to contributing to international security employing modernized (and democratic) armed forces. For this reason, there was no debate on military and defense policy, and consequently any in-​depth analysis about the strategic interest of these operations. Despite the lack of policy relevant research, experts did agree to point out the importance of the Southern flank for Spain,45 especially at a time when NATO was thinking about its enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. With the end of the Cold War, Spain was among the countries calling for a greater deal of attention to Europe’s southern neighborhood. This paved the way to an array of initiatives, especially the launch of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994 and the EU’s Barcelona Process in 1995, which were enthusiastically underpinned by the Spanish government. This “call to action” toward this particular flank, also in military terms, remains a cornerstone of Spain’s foreign policy.46 However, this increased international ambition did not correspond to a similar effort in defense budget. On the contrary, during the 1990s Spain significantly reduced its military spending, not only as a result of the so-​called peace dividends, but also as a consequence of a deliberate political choice.47 Along with a reduced defense budget and the strengthening of the Southern flank, a third issue came to the fore: the need to complete Spain’s integration into NATO’s military structure.48 That anomalous situation, which implied obvious strategic costs,49 came to an end in 1999 with the conservative Prime Minister José María Aznar already in charge. This new period was characterized, on the one hand, by an attempt to energize and globalize the defense policy.50 Thus, the first Defense White Paper51 was published, which made a clear promotion of European defense, but subordinated to the reinforcement of the transatlantic partnership. On the other hand, and in accordance with this strategic decision, the foreign policy shifted toward the US as main international ally. There are three factors that explain this turn. Firstly, September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks shocked the entire world and turned over the strategic scenario. Terrorism became the top security problem for the George W. Bush administration. And so, it had been for decades for the Spanish government because of the actions perpetrated by

176  Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni the Basque terrorist group, ETA. The Aznar government perceived a closer understanding of the problem coming from the other side of the ocean, whereas the European governments seemed to keep a more reluctant position, judging it as an internal problem. Secondly, the presence of a core of neoconservative advisers inside the government, who together with Aznar himself adapted the foreign and defense policy to this view of international relations.52 These circumstances reinforced the Spanish decision to contribute to the international intervention in Afghanistan and the subsequent ISAF mission, which enjoyed broad political and social support –​something that totally evaporated with the Iraq War. A third factor triggered this controversial alignment:  the Perejil Island crisis of July 2002 with Morocco. Then nonanswer given by the European colleagues contrasted with the critical mediation settled by the US, which convinced the Spanish government of the truthfulness of this renewed alliance. The strategic value of this tiny island and its meaning for national security,53 as well as the worrisome about the instability in Northern Africa and the Middle East, where Spain has “non-​shared threats” (the official way to underline the situation of Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish enclaves in Morocco that are not covered by the umbrella of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty) caused this turn from Europeanism to Atlanticism.54 Neither the EU was a trustworthy actor, unable to deploy quick reaction forces, even less to build a truly European defense pillar; nor was NATO, incapable to respond adequately to the Spanish geopolitical interest, to the blurry threat of nonstate actor insurgences emerging in the Southern flank. Becoming a strong ally of the US “unipolar” hegemon was perceived as the best way to protect Spain and, as a result, contribute to NATO and collective security.55 This way, it becomes easier to realize the controversial nature of the Iraq War as it brought the Spanish domestic debate to deviate from assessing a specific policy of the Aznar government to questioning the whole of Spain’s relations with the United States and, by extension, NATO itself. The change of government following the jihadist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004 and the abrupt exit strategy conducted in Iraq blemished even further the relationship between Spain and the US. In the attempt to compensate, the socialist government increased the numbers of troops in Afghanistan and engaged with the reconstruction of the country, for instance by taking the responsibility over the PRT of the Badghis province. This was a clear example of how the transatlantic connection and the bilateral relationship with the US are intertwined and are understood as part of the same foreign policy perspective. Precisely, in response to the challenges posed by the Afghan conflict, the Spanish government and the entire security and defense community fully embraced the need to promote a “comprehensive approach” in favor of the nation-​building efforts.56 In recent years, the Spanish armed forces have been deployed across many countries and military missions, as enumerated in the previous section. However, there has also not been a strategic debate within the strategic

Spain and NATO  177 community about the opportunities or disadvantages that these missions could entail for the national security. In a way, there has been a return to the scheme of the 1990s: Spain wants to demonstrate that it is a reliable ally with a high degree of commitment toward the international organizations of which it forms part. Harmed by a restricted military budget, Spain prefers valuing this commitment in qualitative outcomes, so transformed into variety of missions participated. Nonetheless, the economic–​effectiveness gap is still a “hot topic” in political and scholarly agenda.57 This revival is completed by the reemergence of the dilemma between European defense vis-​à-​vis NATO. As a new attempt of boosting the EU security and defense pillar was in 2016, there is certainly an agreement on the relevance of pushing this policy forward. It is seen as the best way to tackle the open challenges of the Southern flank. It is assumed that the EU will be more sensitive to this question than a NATO much more focused on the Eastern flank. Despite this judgment, both organizations are not incompatible; on the contrary, Spain considers that a proper European defense can better contribute to a stronger NATO and healthier transatlantic relations. In this sense, Spanish public opinion would accept a greater expenditure in defense only if it is done through the European way, but not as part of the NATO “2 percent” deal. The idea that this goal is just of US interest is broadly extended. Certainly, the Spain–​NATO relations are shaped by the American relationship, which is a longstanding characteristic of Spanish defense policy. The strategic purpose of these commitments and burden-​sharing compromise remain unclear beyond the willingness of being a reliable ally in the international scenario, contributing to milieu goals. In effect, institutional inertia seems to be the most outstanding feature of the decision-​making process. Keeping it this way, the window of opportunity for a more relevant strategic debate will continue closed.

Spain and NATO: future challenges Although early 21st century international relations are witnessing fast and deep changes, the prospects of Spain–​NATO relations are likely to experience a high degree of continuity. Spanish foreign policy is strongly multilateral and, despite a preference for the EU, its transatlantic membership is unquestioned and the bilateral relationship with the US remains crucial in terms of defense policy. But, as said, given a host of cultural, geographical, and political factors, Spain faces no direct threat and, therefore, “continues to perceive a sense of limited strategic urgency.”58 In spite of cyclical crises, largely related to immigration and territorial claims, relations with North African countries remain stable and cooperative. The issue of Gibraltar has been “Europeanized” in the Brexit deal. Russia is distant59 and accounts for only 4.2 percent of Spain’s crude oil imports.60 And, US pressures notwithstanding, China is turning into an important trading partner, especially in the critical ICT sector.61

178  Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni In the future, however, a stronger and more direct engagement of Spain in NATO seems to depend on the development of three crucial aspects: (1) the evolution of Spain–​US bilateral relations; (2) the capability of Spain to restore the importance of the Southern flank in the Alliance’s agenda; and, (3) the “internationalization” of Spanish politics and society, and, hence, the rise of a more mature debate about the country’s foreign and defense policy. The evolution of Spain–​US relations From Madrid, American–​Hispanic relations can be summarized through a “yes, but” approach. This strategy of “soft bandwagoning” remains one of the pillars of its foreign and security policy.62 But this “vital” bond has turned into a “controversial relationship.”63 Security and economic issues dominate the agenda. As mentioned, the decision of the socialist Prime Minister, José Luis Zapatero, to withdraw unilaterally the Spanish contingent from Iraq brought about a substantial deterioration in bilateral relations, which have not improved since then. Spain’s nonrecognition policy of Kosovo, partly due to internal territorial tensions with the Basque country and Catalonia,64 and its languishing military budgets are further matters of divergence. If former US President, Barack Obama, personified the cooling of American interests as he visited the country only at the very end of his mandate, current US President, Donald Trump, has used no self-​restraint in claiming that Spain is a free-​rider and should increase its defense spending.65 Similarly, economic relations look flaccid. Even before Trump’s decisions to scratch the TTIP and impose tariffs on European and Spanish produces, especially olive oil, the two countries enjoyed limited trade exchanges, with the US being Spain’s 6th export destination (4.8 percent of its overall exports) and 5th import origin (4.5 percent of its overall imports).66 A host of facts that reinforces the asymmetric and ambiguous condition of Spain–​ US bilateral relations which, according to Juan Tovar, remain cordial, but with little US interest to make them more visible.67 In this context, Spain’s activism in NATO is easier to be appreciated: defense spending alone, Madrid argues, is an insufficient criterion to evaluate the real contribution of each member state to the Alliance.68 This is due to, at least, three essential reasons. First, Spain does not comply with the 2 percent rule, yet it respects the other guideline approved in the 2014 Wales Summit as it devotes over 20  percent of its defense spending to equipment expenditure.69 Second, the 2 percent rule calculates only a country’s budgetary input, but omits its concrete output such as, for instance, all costs associated to troops contribution in out-​of-​area operations or the hosting of interallied infrastructures on one’s territory. And, in this respect, Spain is not a selfish security consumer, but a generous security provider. Third, the accomplishment of a predetermined defense expenditure sounds unrealistic. In times of strong fiscal constraints and other social challenges that many allies face  –​ including the emergency provoked by the Covid-​19 pandemic, with Spain

Spain and NATO  179 being the first NATO member to request assistance from EADRCC  –​an increase in military budgets may turn into a boomerang risking to damage the credibility of NATO itself.70 Spain’s transatlantic bargain goes exactly in this direction: compensating what the US considers as a liability with different types of assets. And, with the reiterated intention of the current Spanish government not to reach the 2 percent of defense spending, the US has asked –​ and should obtain –​to deploy two more destroyers and 600 personnel at Rota naval base.71 Spain and the Southern flank Geographical proximity, political relevance, and economic and social connections make North Africa “a strategic priority” for Spain’s foreign and defense policy.72 Tensions in the Arab Gulf, the unresolved Israel–​Palestinian conflict, the many structural fragilities of Arab societies, and the outburst of Islamic-​based terrorism brought the “Southern flank” to enjoy center stage. Yet, NATO’s Med policy remains largely a fiasco. As Antonio Marquina argues, three issues have proven the Alliance’s approach to be incoherent and ineffective.73 First, due to the complex challenges arising from the region, ranging from traditional to nontraditional security threats, and the manifest asymmetries within the Mediterranean basin, NATO has displayed a lack of conceptual consistency, which has turned into policy inertia and unmet expectations. Except for broad statements in support of political stability and economic reform, the allies have not clarified how they want to project values and interests as well as the kind of political order they wish to implement in the region. Second, the ambitious notion of “cooperative security” displayed by the Alliance’s strategic documents has constantly clashed with the allies’ different, if not diverging, strategic priorities, which keep fluctuating between diplomatic cooperation and military missions, multilateral or unilateral interventions, and an agenda-​setting process based on predetermined foreign policy priorities. Third, NATO’s Med partners are characterized by a strong fragmentation, different backgrounds, and heterogeneous security policies. This composite array of features turns very hard to be addressed in a comprehensive way. A way in which Spain–​NATO relations can be further stimulated is the capability of Spain to restore the importance of the Southern flank and, hopefully, improve the Alliance’s response in the region. However, alongside the persistence of the aforementioned reasons, other factors seem to make this scenario more complicated: • • •

The disengagement of the US from the Mediterranean. The unclear “social division of labor” between NATO and the EU, a course potentially reinforced by the ESA. The absence, inside both NATO and the EU, of a Mediterranean bloc of countries, especially between France, Italy, and Spain.

180  Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni • •

The controversial policies of Turkey. The return of Russia as active Mediterranean player and the still unclear consequences of China’s BRI on the geopolitics of the Southern flank.

A more “international” Spain? A general rule in the literature of political science is the existence of a positive relationship between a country’s external activism and the degree of interest the population of such country develops for the outer world. In this regard, Spain is showing mixed results. In the 1980s and 1990s, a general consensus existed between PP and PSOE, with foreign policy commonly referred as “the State policy” (Política de Estado).74 But since the 2004 elections, in the aftermath of the Aznar government’s decision to support the US-​led invasion of Iraq, foreign policy alternatives have begun to polarize, losing the original pragmatism.75 As previously said, this has made the public debate on Spain’s international role become more domestic-​oriented and, as a result, more parochial and inconsistent. A fact reinforced by the presence inside Spain of strong political and territorial cleavages. But if Madrid wants to punch (a bit more) above its weight, the change has to start domestically. Playing with an image common to Spanish politics, Miguel Otero argues there are in fact “two Spains”: a small, yet increasingly influential, Spain with more international-​oriented, particularly European, interests; and a larger Spain, which maintains more narrow-​minded and volatile attitudes. In order to improve its international position –​i.e., not only its institutional representation and decision-​making power, but especially its capability to set the agenda and shape the public debate –​the country as a whole shall embark on a thorough reflection on what constitutes its national interest as well the identification of a national strategy toward the “international” that, in order to be effective, must rest upon a greater cohesion of purpose between political, economic, and societal actors. A new social contract aimed at getting those “two Spains” closer. Only if Spanish politics and society become more international, the country’s international role would increase.76

Conclusions The “long history” of Spain–​NATO relations has been characterized by the constraints and caveats of Spanish foreign policy. Isolationist in nature yet supported by the US during Franco’s dictatorship, Spain’s integration process into NATO during the transition to democracy was basically a debate on domestic policy, which has certain edges still undefined. For instance, the kind of relationship with the American great power opened a discussion never satisfactorily concluded; a one often impacted by the type of crisis ahead. At the same time, the willingness for a strong and trustworthy European defense pillar has suffered from tensions because of the (apparent) dilemma between Europeanism vs. Atlanticism. Last, since the onset of post-​Cold War era,

Spain and NATO  181 Spain felt itself as a “newcomer” looking forward to demonstrating its reliability as Western ally. These different political dynamics have provoked several longstanding consequences. Firstly, Spain–​ NATO relations are understood in the face of Spain–​ US linkage, whose outputs maintain a delicate balance. Stormy moments between the countries could prompt Spain to increase its commitment in NATO as a means of exit the stalemate; or conversely, to look at the European colleagues as counterbalance. Furthermore, this sometimes-​ controversial alliance has shaped arguments and visions toward the transatlantic relationship. The best example of that is the burden-​sharing dispute and the subsequent NATO 2 percent compromise, often misunderstood as a compromise just in American interest. Secondly, the decision-​making process is marked by a sharp institutional inertia. Spain accepts diligently to take part in the military operations agreed by the Atlantic Alliance or the EU. The Iberian state is one of the most important contributors in terms of missions participated, although the degree of military implication could be quite diverse:  restricted “rules of engagement” (if it accepts being involved in combat operations) and limited military contingent (partially due to the bounded power projection). As mentioned, the pursuit of a milieu goals agenda helps to influence that political position; the committed multilateral option and the lack of strategic guidance drive this response to allies’ specific requests. However, there is confusion between ends and ways (multilateralism as an end itself), and the political-​strategic chain is not adequately greased. Political motives, rather than strategic rational thinking, usually define the degree of involvement. This eager commitment in so many operations is also motivated, at least partially, by the low defense spending. There is a continuous decrease of economic efforts since the 1990s and the past crisis (from 2008 on) has exacerbated this trend. Worth mentioning is also the financing gap that constrains the Ministry of Defense’s budget.77 Unfortunately, this critical situation has been created, not only without completing the Spanish military transformation, but also compromising future modernization requirements. Since then, Spain compensates these shortages with qualitative value; that is, more missions, although it puts a strain on operational readiness. Fourthly, Spanish public opinion shows little interest in international issues and in general rejects the deployment of armed forces abroad, except for traditional peacekeeping operations. In this sense, it could be added that Spanish society backs up more easily an UN or EU civilian framework than NATO “classical” military operations. This position is largely shared with the political elites; or to put it another way, it is extensively stimulated by these political elites, which are reluctant to employ military means in foreign affairs and so, to use the military force in international relations. In addition to that, the scholarly community has not enriched the strategic debate, in part because of its reduced extension (IR and political science studies do not enjoy a large tradition in Spanish academia), in part because of its reactive debates

182  Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni on policy decision-​making. Nevertheless, it is worthy to point out that the policy system has kept itself certainly away from any influence by epistemic communities or other type of expert communities. In sum, this strategic culture jeopardizes the alignment in combat operations, as well as explains the Spanish option in recent years for Security Sector Reform or peacebuilding operations. That said, it could be concluded that the idea of Spain acting as a free rider, or punching below its weight, is not entirely correct. Taking into consideration its strategic culture and the performance of its foreign policy, Spain contributes actively to transatlantic collective defense and security operations. Analyzing outputs and outcomes, Spain deserves a more nuanced assessment. Yet, it is also fair to state that Spain could do more in accordance to its status of middle-​range power. Regarding its power position, it is complicated to justify, for example, such a low level of defense spending or the absence of a clear strategic rationale. While this path seemed more justifiable in the past, when the country’s goal was limited to a display of utility and reliability, this has appeared as an inadequate tool to navigate the turmoil of today’s great power competition, hybrid threats, and accelerated geopolitical changes. Spain has decided to prioritize qualitative over quantitative criteria in order to value its contribution to collective security. An in-​ depth understanding of these drivers induces to think that this situation is not going to change favorably any time soon. At present, political leaders and public opinion agree on the necessity of a stronger European security and defense policy:  at worst, as a European pillar of the transatlantic relation; at best, as embryo of some kind of future European army; in any case, as a counterbalance of a US foreign policy that has inevitably shifted toward East Asia, specifically China. On the other hand, security and military experts defend the imperative of rethinking NATO’s purpose and strategy:  even though the organization remains the most important asset for Spanish defense, the Alliance’s difficulties in facing the challenges coming from the Southern flank are evident. In sum, Spain does not entirely look like a country punching below its weight: it is an active and loyal member on NATO, whose attitude is shared by Spain’s biggest parties. Yet, a number of elements unveil a less hopefulness scenario: (1) the “pivot to Asia” of the United States; (2) the complexity of articulating any coherent response to the threats coming from the Southern flank (the main frontier for Spain), a difficulty reinforced by the renewed strategic relevance of both Eastern Europe and the High North; and (3) the maintenance of low expenditure on defense (where the Covid-​19 crisis threatens to shrink the budget even more) couple with a persistent lack of interest of Spanish politics and society for international-​related issues. For these reasons, expecting Spain to bear greater costs and responsibilities does not seem a realistic option in the near future.

Spain and NATO  183

Notes 1 F.J. Rodrigo Luelmo. “The Accession of Spain to NATO.” CVCE.EU, 2016. www.cvce.eu/​obj/​the_​accession_​of_​spain_​to_​nato-​en-​831ba342-​0a7c-​4ead-​b35f-​ 80fd52b01de9.html. 2 The government also called a referendum to legitimize the Decalogue:  held on March 12, 1986, the government’s plan was endorsed by 56.85 percent of the voters. 3 F. Villar. La Transición exterior de España. Del aislamiento a la influencia (1976–​ 1996). Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2016. 4 NATO. Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013–​2019). November 29, 2019. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​news_​171356.htm. 5 R.L. Schweller. “Bandwagoning for Profit:  Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security 19, 1 (Summer 1994): 101–​102. 6 Ibid., 100. 7 A. Wolfers. Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962, 73–​74. 8 See:  A. Marquina. España en la política de seguridad occidental, 1936–​ 1986. Madrid: Ediciones Ejército, 1986; C. del Arenal. “Democracia y política exterior: el largo camino hacia el cambio,” en España a debate. I. La política, J. Vidal-​Beneyto (ed.), 45–​65. Madrid: Tecnos, 1991; K. Maxwell (ed.), SpanishForeign and Defense Policy. Westview Press, 1991; C.  del Arenal, “La posición exterior de España’, en Transición política y consolidación democrática, España (1975–​1986), R.  del Aguila y R. Cotarelo (eds.), 389–​428. Madrid: CIS, 1992; R. Gillespie, F. Rodrigo, J.  Story (eds.). Democratic Spain:  Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World. London and New York: Routledge, 1995. 9 See: H.P. Klepak. Spain–​NATO or Neutrality?. Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University, 1980; E. Barbé. España y la OTAN. La problemática europea en materia de seguridad. Barcelona: Laia, 1981; F.G. Gil and J.S. Tulchin (eds.). Spain’s Entry Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988. 10 Interview with Dr.  F.  Arteaga, Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid, June 27, 2019. 11 Interview with Dr. F. Arteaga, Madrid, June 27, 2019. 12 Spanish Ministry of Defense. 70 Years of Collective Defence. June 3, 2019. https://​ ejercito.defensa.gob.es/​en/​reportajes/​2019/​82_​aniversario_​otan.html. 13 F. Arteaga. “PeSCo: The Spanish Perspective.” Ares 27. September 2018, 5. www. iris-​france.org/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2018/​09/​ARES-​27.pdf. 14 P. Bock. “EU must develop ‘appetite for power’ says foreign policy chief Josep Borrell.” Euronews. February 17, 2020. www.euronews.com/​2020/​02/​16/​ eu-​must-​develop-​appetite-​for-​power-​says-​foreign-​policy-​chief-​josep-​borrell. 15 Gobierno de España. Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional 2017. December 1, 2017, 83–​88. www.dsn.gob.es/​sites/​dsn/​files/​Estrategia_​de_​Seguridad_​Nacional_​ ESN%20Final.pdf. 16 Ibid., 87. 17 Ley Orgánica 5/​ 2005 de Defensa Nacional. November 17, 2005. www.boe.es/​ buscar/​pdf/​2005/​BOE-​A-​2005-​18933-​consolidado.pdf. 18 Gobierno de España. Directiva de Defensa Nacional 2020. June 20, 2020. www. defensa.gob.es/​Galerias/​defensadocs/​directiva-​defensa-​nacional-​2020.pdf 19 Interview with Dr. F. Arteaga, Madrid, June 27, 2019.

184  Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni 20 M. Muñiz. “Spain: The Don Quixote of European Defense’, National Visions of EU Defence Policy: Common Denominators and Misunderstandings, F. Santopinto and M. Price (eds.), 90–​91. Brussels: CEPS, 2013. 21 Ibid., 89. 22 Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional, 24. 23 Ibid.,  40–​41. 24 P. Espada. “Opinión pública y propuestas sobre Defensa en las campañas electorales españolas.” Revista de Pensamiento Estratégico y Seguridad CISDE 2, 1 (2017): 43–​64. 25 “Defensa quiere convencer a la opinión pública de que España está en peligro.” El Confidencial. June 16, 2018. www.elconfidencialdigital.com/​articulo/​defensa/​ defensa-​convencer-​opinion-​publica-​espana/​20180615135841112899.html. See also:  Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. La Defensa nacional y las Fuerzas Armadas (XII), 3188. September 13, 2017. www.cis.es/​cis/​opencm/​ES/​1_​encuestas/​ estudios/​ver.jsp?estudio=14363. 26 A. Agudo. “La política exterior que prometen los principales partidos.” El País. April 3, 2019. https://​elpais.com/​elpais/​2019/​04/​02/​planeta_​futuro/​1554221057_​ 993648.html. 27 M. Fagan and J. Pousher. “NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States.” Pew Research Center. February 9, 2020. www.pewresearch.org/​global/​2020/​02/​09/​nato-​ seen-​favorably-​across-​member-​states/​. 28 Elcano Royal Institute. Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano. Madrid, December 2018, 41–​43. www.realinstitutoelcano.org/​wps/​wcm/​connect/​8504de38-​4426-​4b65-​ 8c72-​ca2b3a9d50db/​40BRIE_​Informe_​Diciembre2018.pdf ?MOD=AJPERES& CACHEID=8504de38-​4426-​4b65-​8c72-​ca2b3a9d50db. 29 Interview with Dr. F. Arteaga, Madrid, June 27, 2019. See also: J. Jordán. “Una aproximación a la agenda institucional de la Comisión de Defensa del Congreso de los Diputados español, 2004–​2016.” Revista UNISCI, 44 (2017): 163–​183. 30 A. Bueno. “La evolución de los estudios estratégicos en la comunidad académica española: análisis de su agenda de investigación (1978–​2018).” Revista Española de Ciencia Política 51 (2019): 177–​203. 31 S.R. Sloan. Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016. 32 Signed on September 23, 1953 by Francisco Franco and US President Dwight Eisenhower, the pact was part of the regime’s effort to break the post-​1945 diplomatic isolation imposed on Spain due its relationship with the Axis powers. With the pact, the US provided Spain with economic and military assistance in exchange for the right to build and use four military bases on Spanish territory. 33 A. Viñas. “La política franquista de seguridad y defensa.” Historia Contemporánea 30 (2005): 81. 34 C. García Encina. “La adecuación de las Fuerzas Armadas españolas a la seguridad occidental en la década de 1960.” Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional 3, 2 (2017): 45–​59. 35 C.T. Powell. El amigo americano. España y Estados Unidos de la dictadura a la democracia. Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, 2014. 36 Interview with Dr. F. Arteaga, Madrid, June 27, 2019. 37 F. Rodrigo. “La inserción de España en la política de seguridad occidental,” in Las relaciones exterior de la España democrática, R. Gillespie, F. Rodrigo and J. Story (eds.) Madrid: Alianza, 1996.

Spain and NATO  185 38 F. de Salas López. “El proceso de integración de España en la OTAN.” Revista de Estudios Internacionales 3, 1 (1982): 137–​172. 39 F. Aldecoa. “Las constantes de la política exterior española.” Política y Sociedad 2 (1989): 61–​78. However, neoconservative scholars have criticized the truly existence of such a consensus. See: GEES. “El mito del consenso.” Strategic Studies Group. August 11, 2003. www.gees.org/​articulos/​el-​mito-​del-​consenso. 40 F. Puell de la Villa. “La incorporación de España a las organizaciones defensivas occidentales.” La Albolafia:  Revista de Humanidades y Cultura 14 (2018): 107–​133. 41 W.L. Heiber. “The Sixteenth Nation: Spain’s Role in NATO.” National Defence University. Monograph Series, 83-​1, 1983; B. Wojna. “Spain’s and Poland’s Road to NATO: the problem of continuity and change in the foreign policy of a democratizing state.” European Review of History 15, 5 (2008): 533–​547. 42 A. Gooch. “A surrealistic referendum:  Spain and NATO.” Government and Opposition 21, 3 (1986): 300–​316. 43 D.A. Ruiz Palmer. “Spain’s Security Policy and Army in the 1990s.” Parameters 20, 2 (1990): 90–​98. 44 A. Marquina. “La evolución de la política de seguridad española (1982–​1992),” in La política exterior española en el siglo XX, R. Calduch (ed.). Madrid: Ciencias Sociales, 1994. 45 E. Barbé. “La región mediterránea. La aportación española en materia de seguridad.” CIDOB 2 (1984):  5–​16; “La región mediterránea. El flanco sur de la OTAN.” CIDOB 3 (1984):  5–​16; A.  Marquina. El flanco sur de la OTAN. Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1993. 46 J.L. García Hernando. La proyección mediterránea de la Alianza Atlántica: España y Marruecos, una encrucijada de intereses en la frontera sur de la OTAN y de la UE (de 1981 a nuestros días). Valladolid: University of Valladolid, 2014; R. Barras. La potenciación del ‘flanco sur’ de la OTAN como elemento cohesionador de la Alianza Atlántica. Equilibrio de fuerzas en el seno de la OTAN: el papel de España. PhD dissertation. Madrid: UNED, 2016; A. Marquina. “NATO’s Southern Flank and the threat of disruption.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 17, 2 (2019): 223–​237. 47 R. Bardají and I.  Cosidó. “España y su defensa. 1994:  el aumento de la vulnerabilidad.” INCIPE. Junio 1994. www.incipe.org/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2014/​ 10/​Informe-​INCIPE-​1994.pdf 48 C. Coates. “Spanish Defence policy: Eurocorps and NATO reform.” Mediterranean Politics 5, 2 (2000): 170–​189. 49 F. Portero. “La política de seguridad española.” Cuenta y Razón 38, 1998. Although de facto there was participation in the military structure, not belonging officially was an obstacle especially for the integration and modernization of the Army; interview with Dr. Florentino Portero, Madrid, November 28, 2019. 50 C. Navajas. “La política de defensa del gobierno de Aznar (1996–​2004).” in Los desafíos de las Fuerzas Armadas en el siglo XXI, C. de Cueto Nogueras (ed.), 131–​ 136. Granada: Comares, 2008. 51 Spanish Ministry of Defense, Defense White Paper, 2000. 52 M. Iglesias Cavicchioli. Aznar y los ‘neocons’. El impacto del neoconservadurismo en la política exterior de España. Barcelona: Huygens, 2017. 53 R. Bardají. “El valor estratégico de la Isla de Perejil.” Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano 17/​ 2002. July 12, 2002. http://​biblioteca.ribei.org/​66/​1/​El_​valor_​ estrat%C3%A9gico_​de_​la_​Isla_​del_​Perejil_​-​_​Elcano.pdf.

186  Alberto Bueno and Michele Testoni 54 A. Niño. “50 años de relaciones entre España y Estados Unidos.” Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea 25 (2003): 9–​33. 55 R. Bardají. “La virtud de la hegemonía americana.” Cuadernos de Pensamiento Político 1 (2003): 161–​174. 56 I. Pareja Rodríguez and G. Colom Piella. “El Enfoque Integral (Comprehensive Approach) a la gestión de crisis internacionales.” Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano 115/​2008. September 25, 2008. http://​biblioteca.ribei.org/​1414/​1/​ARI-​115-​2008-​ E.pdf; See also: G. Colom. “La evolución del Enfoque Integral de la OTAN en la gestión de crisis.” Revista CIDOB 97–​98 (2012): 287–​304. 57 A. Cuenca García. “La defensa y los presupuestos generales.” Agenda Pública. May 26, 2017. http://​agendapublica.elpais.com/​la-​defensa-​los-​presupuestos-​ generales-​del-​estado/​; C.  Méndez Martínez et  al. “Bases para un consenso en política de defensa en España. El nivel de gasto.” Documento de Trabajo Opex 88/​ 2017, Fundación Alterantivas, 2017. www.fundacionalternativas.org/​public/​ storage/​opex_​documentos_​archivos/​a490a8e03e6d641db19fd76ae256a1c5.pdf; A. Fonfría. “Proyecciones del gasto en defensa 2040.” Documento de Investigación 03/​2018, IEEE. Mayo 2017. www.ieee.es/​Galerias/​fichero/​docs_​investig/​2018/​ DIEEEINV03-​2018_​Proyecciones_​Gasto_​Defensa2040_​AntonioFonfria.pdf. 58 Interview with Dr. F. Arteaga, Madrid, June 27, 2019. 59 Nonetheless, there are suspicions of disinformation operations run by Russia during the 2017 Catalan independence referendum. See:  J. Jordán. “Rusia y el secesionismo catalán. Una campaña estratégica en la ‘zona gris’ del conflicto.” Agenda Pública. November 11, 2017. http://​agendapublica.elpais.com/​rusia-​ secesionismo-​ c atalan-​ u na-​ c ampana-​ e strategica-​ l a-​ z ona-​ g ris-​ d el-​ c onflicto/​; D. Alandete. “ ‘Guerra mundial en internet.’ Cómo la desinformación agravó la crisis de la independencia catalana,” in #Desinformación. Poder y manipulación en la era digital, M. R. Torres Soriano (ed.), 43–​56. Granada: Comares, 2019. 60 The Observatory of Economic Complexity –​Spain. https://​oec.world/​en/​visualize/​ tree_​map/​hs92/​import/​esp/​show/​52709/​2017/​. 61 M. Esteban and M.  Otero-​Iglesias. “Washington’s War on Huawei Is Causing Angst in Madrid.” Foreign Policy. January 20, 2020. https://​foreignpolicy.com/​ 2020/​01/​20/​spain-​china-​usa-​washingtons-​war-​on-​huawei-​is-​causing-​angst-​in-​ madrid/​. 62 D. Garcia Cantalapiedra. “Spanish foreign policy, the United States and soft bandwagoning.” in Contemporary Spanish Foreign Policy, D. Garcia Cantalapiedra and R. Pacheco (eds.), 82–​105. London and New York: Routledge, 2014. 63 J. Tovar. “España y Estados Unidos: un análisis contemporáneo de una relación controvertida.” Comillas Journal of International Relations 16 (2019): 87–​101. 64 F. Wesslau. “Spain’s Kosovo-​Catalonia conundrum.” European Council on Foreign Relations. November 24, 2017. www.ecfr.eu/​article/​commentary_​spains_​kosovo_​ catalonia_​conundrum_​7240. 65 M. González. “Trump urges Spanish PM to increases defense spending.” El País. July 3, 2018. https://​english.elpais.com/​elpais/​2018/​07/​03/​inenglish/​1530603349_​ 167070.html. 66 The Observatory of Economic Complexity –​Spain. https://​oec.world/​en/​visualize/​ tree_​map/​hs92/​import/​esp/​show/​52709/​2017/​. 67 J. Tovar. “Spain-​US relations and the transatlantic partnership.”ARI 98/​2018. August 13, 2018. www.realinstitutoelcano.org/​wps/​portal/​rielcano_​en/​contenido?WCM_​ GLOBAL_​ C ONTEXT=/ ​ e lcano/ ​ e lcano_ ​ i n/​ z onas_​ i n/​ s panishforeignpolicy/​ ari98-​2018-​tovar-​spain-​us-​relations-​and-​transatlantic-​relationship.

Spain and NATO  187 68 J. Jordán. “El 2%, criterio insuficiente para valorar la contribución de España a la OTAN.” Agenda Pública. March 18, 2019. http://​agendapublica.elpais.com/​el-​2-​ criterio-​insuficiente-​para-​valorar-​la-​contribucion-​de-​espana-​a-​la-​otan/​. 69 NATO. Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013–​2019). 70 G. Colom. “A New Debt Burden for Spain’s Defence Planning.” RUSI Journal. December 18, 2019. https://​rusi.org/​publication/​rusi-​journal/​new-​debt-​burden​spain%E2%80%99s-​defence-​planning. 71 M. González. “EEUU quiere desplegar dos destructores y 600 marinos más en la base de Rota.” El País. December 18, 2019. https://​elpais.com/​politica/​2019/​12/​17/​ actualidad/​1576608957_​537130.amp.html?_​_​twitter_​impression=true. 72 ESN 2017, 46, 73 A. Marquina, “NATO’s Southern Flank and the threat of disruption,” 2019. 74 C. del Arenal. “Consenso y disenso en la política exterior de España.” Documento de Trabajo n.  25/​ 2008, June 2, 2008. www.realinstitutoelcano.org/​wps/​wcm/​ connect/ ​ 1 5c494004f019704a004e43170baead1/​D T25-​ 2 008_​ A renal_​ p olitica_​ exterior_​consenso.pdf ?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=15c494004f019704a004e 43170baead1. 75 R. Gillespie. “Spanish Foreign Policy:  Party Alternatives or the Pursuit of Consensus.” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 9, 1, (2007): 29–​45. 76 M. Otero-​Iglesias. “Dos Españas (y no son la azul y la roja).” Cinco Días. April 25, 2019. https://​cincodias.elpais.com/​cincodias/​2019/​04/​24/​midinero/​1556120559_​468 213.html. 77 G. Collom, “A New Debt Burden for Spain’s Defence Planning,” 2019.

10  Italy and NATO in the 21st century Still a formidable partnership? Luca Ratti

Introduction This chapter evaluates the Atlantic Alliance’s significance for Italian foreign and security policy and Italy’s role in transatlantic security in the 21st century. While NATO membership has shaped Italy’s security policy since the Cold War, the main focus of this chapter is Italy’s current perception of, and role within, the Alliance. Since the North Atlantic Treaty’s signing in April 1949 Italy has displayed a consistent and unswerving commitment to transatlantic cooperation. Together with support for European integration, this commitment has been the lodestar of Italy’s international trajectory. The chapter argues that, on the one hand, Italy’s commitment to the Alliance derives from the country’s structural weaknesses and vulnerable strategic position. On the other hand, it reflects a normative commitment to multilateral cooperation. Both dynamics are unlikely to change in the 21st century, continuing to make Italy a loyal NATO ally. Although in recent years, economic stagnation and increasing popular discontent have called into question support for European integration, Rome’s commitment to NATO has remained rock solid. Rather, the prospect of US disengagement from Europe has rekindled fears of marginalization and exclusion. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first introductory section provides a summary Italy’s role in the Alliance during the Cold War and in the early post-​Cold War period. The second section focuses on Italy’s role in NATO in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and during the GWOT. The third section evaluates the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on Italy’s role within the Alliance. The fourth section discusses Italy’s perceptions of NATO’s policy toward Russia. The fifth section debates the Trump administration’s impact on Italy’s current and prospective role within the Alliance. The conclusion provides a reappraisal of Italian perceptions of, and attitudes to, the Alliance in the 21st century.

Italy and NATO during the Cold War Italy’s commitment to NATO finds its roots in the country’s excruciating defeat during the World War II. Italy’s inability to take care alone of its security

Italy and NATO in the 21st century  189 prompted those at the helm of the young republic to strive for a bilateral alliance with the United States.1 After the emergence of East–​West tension, US protection was perceived as an insurance policy and, together with participation in European integration, as a necessary step toward Italy’s moral and material rehabilitation. Nonetheless, the prospect of a unilateral US guarantee evaporated quickly, making participation in the Western Alliance the country’s main priority. Italy’s inclusion into NATO was achieved, however, only after intense diplomatic lobbying and was the masterpiece of Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi and Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza who, with the crucial assistance of Ambassador Alberto Tarchiani in Washington, were able to overcome the reservations of the US Democratic administration as well as the UK and Canada, which opposed Italy’s membership on the grounds that it was not an Atlantic country and could become a liability for the allies. As late as February 28, 1949, President Truman had stated “it would be wiser not to have Italy one of the original signers and possibly not in the Pact at all.”2 Equally important were the government’s efforts to overrule the domestic opposition of the left wing of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) as well as the Socialist (PSI) and Communist (PCI) parties, which advocated Italy’s neutrality in the emerging structure of the Cold War. During the 1950s and 1960s, NATO membership helped stabilize the domestic political climate and contributed to a revision of the harsh clauses of the 1947 Peace Treaty and to the country’s admission to the UN in 1955.3 For most of the Cold War, NATO membership also remained the main reference point for Italy’s security policy: no military requirements, other than those that were part of its operational planning, and no scenarios of bilateral crisis outside the East–​West context were taken into consideration by the Italian authorities. Whilst preserving Italy’s security, participation in the Alliance also had the effect of lifting Italy’s governments from the responsibility of drafting a military policy. Italian decisionmakers delegated to the Alliance the preparation, deployment, and use of Italian armed forces. The expression “external delegation” summarizes Italy’s relationship with the Alliance during the Cold War: defense policy goals were stripped down to a bare minimum and implemented through NATO. Nonetheless, even in the heydays of the Cold War Rome never considered the Alliance as a mere military pact but also as a vehicle of moral rehabilitation. De Gasperi once famously described it as a “formidable moral and material element.”4 For this reason, Italian governments consistently endeavored to bolster NATO’s political role. After the advent of détente in East–​West relations, Italy’s Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino played a key role in the drafting of the 1957 Report of the Committee of Three on Non-​ Military Collaboration, more usually known as the Three Wise Men’s report on nonmilitary cooperation and internal solidarity, cohesion, and unity. In the early 1960s Manlio Brosio, in the post of NATO’s Secretary General, ushered in a review of the Alliance which, while preserving transatlantic unity, also explored new avenues of dialogue with the Soviet bloc, resulting in the approval in December 1967 of the Harmel Report.5

190  Luca Ratti After the advent of East–​ West détente also the opposition parties acknowledged NATO’s relevance for Italian security: by the early 1960s the Italian socialists, and after the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, also a new generation of communist leaders accepted Italy’s participation in the Alliance, openly distancing themselves from the Soviet leadership. In a press interview shortly before the national elections of June 1976, the then-​PCI Secretary Enrico Berlinguer unequivocally stated that he felt more secure within NATO, rather than in the Warsaw Pact.6 In the late 1970s, as East–​West tension increased following the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) crisis and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, Rome’s commitment to NATO remained firm. In the early 1980s, after having been excluded from the 1979 Western Summit in Guadalupe, the government led by the socialist Bettino Craxi accepted the deployment of 112 Cruise missiles on Italian soil. However, Italian decisionmakers also continued to strive for East–​West dialogue and endeavored to promote better relations with the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. On some occasions, Italy’s search for a more autonomous conduct led to frictions with the US, such as during the Palestinian hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro in October 1985 and the US bombing of Libya in the following year. These divergences revealed undercurrents between Rome and Washington, but did not undermine Italy’s overall support for the Alliance. On the contrary, by the end of the 1980s, the prospect of the Soviet bloc’s impending crisis and of the unification of the two German states rapidly rekindled fears of marginalization and isolation, highlighting NATO’s persisting relevance for Italian security.7

Italy and NATO after the Cold War Whereas during the Cold War the prospect of a nuclear or conventional conflict along the East–​West border had been Italy’s main security concern, after 1991 Italian decisionmakers were confronted by the challenges of a rapidly transforming security environment. The emergence of a new arc of crisis, that stretched from the west coast of North Africa to the Middle East and encompassed the Balkans, replaced the threat of nuclear attack or of conventional warfare, presenting Rome with the unpleasant prospect of “entrapment” in neighboring local crises, which may develop into conflicts and cause large and uncontrollable inflows of migrants. The Italian peninsula represents, in fact, the closest and most porous, and hence the favorite, point of access to Europe.8 Hybrid and fragmented threats –​e.g., uncontrolled mass migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational organized crime, political and religious terrorism, maritime piracy, and energy security –​came high on the Italian agenda. At the same time, the disintegration of the static certainties of bipolarity, undermining the relatively comfortable position that Italy enjoyed during the Cold War, prompted an intense debate on the country’s international collocation and demands for a complex reassessment of the national interest.9 Some political forces now advocated closer West

Italy and NATO in the 21st century  191 European defense cooperation, fearing the prospect of a gradual US disengagement from Europe, while others favored a strengthening of the CSCE as an alternative institutional framework and a forum of dialogue with the Russian Federation. This debate remained, however, largely rhetorical and symbolic and had no tangible impact on Italy’s transatlantic commitment. While there are a number of reasons, which explain Italy’s support for the Alliance after the Cold War, four are certainly more pertinent. Firstly, Italy’s exposure to the volatility and uncertainties of the post-​Cold War system, which made it imperative not to loosen ties with the US. Secondly, a widespread belief that, as enshrined in article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO is more than a defensive military alliance: it is a community among liberal–​democratic states, which share a communitarian, liberal–​democratic identity, based upon a common set of norms, values, and practices. Thirdly, NATO remained the main vector for the modernization of the Italian armed forces, and for keeping them interoperable and technologically up-​to-​date with those of more militarily advanced allies. Fourthly, also after the end of the Cold War membership of the Alliance continued to act a means of winning allied prestige and recognition and of retaining a say in the key decisions that shape the international system. As a result, in the early 1990s Italy firmly placed itself among those countries willing to revitalize the Alliance for the contingencies of the post-​Cold War world. In 1991, Rome fully endorsed the adoption of a New Strategic Concept, which envisioned the prospect of “out-​of-​area” engagements in peacekeeping and crisis management operations. The possibility of NATO’s intervention to manage conflicts in unstable areas close to Italy’s borders, such as the Balkans and North Africa, was aimed at dealing with the fragmented contingencies of the post-​ Cold War world, while preventing the risk of “entrapment” in neighboring crises.10 Loyalty to NATO also reflected fears about an emerging Franco-​German axis in Europe, which might condemn Italy to the rank of a secondary power and exclude Rome from the debate on the reform of the UN Security Council.11 In other words, also after the end of the East–​West division Italian decisionmakers perceived the Alliance as a guarantee that Italy would continue to sit at the table when decisions in as crucial a field as European security were made. In 1991, Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti made this preference clear by issuing, together with his British counterpart John Major, a declaration that restated the Alliance’s enduring importance for European security in response to a Franco-​German request for a larger West European role. Furthermore, in order to prove its relevance for the US, Italy quickly embraced the role of geostrategic carrier in the Mediterranean, contributing robustly to NATO’s first “out-​of-​area” operations. This alacrity rapidly improved the country’s credentials and prestige, reversing a cliché that long portrayed it as a “security consumer” –​or NATO’s Bulgaria –​and earning Rome prestige and the recognition as a “security provider.” It also proved that, although the geostrategic priorities of Italian defense policy were more

192  Luca Ratti narrowly defined than those of larger European powers, its external operational ambitions remained relatively robust and were perceived by Italian decisionmakers as a tool to increase the country’s influence in transatlantic power hierarchies.12 In other words, Italy’s staunch commitment to the Alliance continued to provide Rome with Washington’s appreciation, securing preferential treatment in military basing, the prestige of being a respected ally, and greater attention to Italian strategic preferences.13 The fact that between 1971 and 2012, the post of NATO’s deputy Secretary General was held uninterruptedly by an Italian diplomat was a poignant example of the prestige Italy has derived from its loyalty to the Alliance. Throughout the 1990s both center-​right and center-​left forces firmly viewed the Alliance both as a much stronger guarantor of territorial integrity than the Italian armed forces would ever be able to provide alone and as an indispensable asset in the stabilization of regions close to Italy’s borders. NATO was also perceived as providing a much more effective and reliable multilateral security framework than the revived Western European Union. As Nuti has cogently noted, Rome clearly showed “an inclination to take a slightly more Atlanticist posture.”14 Nonetheless, support for the Alliance was not perceived as alternative to closer European defense cooperation, but as part of a broader multilateral strategy and in close cooperation with other international organizations, such as the EU and the UN. Hence, in the Italian view, the Alliance’s operations should not have occurred unilaterally but through the legitimization from the UN. Within this context, Italy was also particularly supportive of NATO’s endeavors to nurture dialogue both with former Soviet bloc states, including the Russian Federation, and with the countries of North Africa and the Arab world through the opening of the PfP in 1993 and of the NATO–​ Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994. However, during the 1990s, also as a result of its volatile domestic situation and transition from the First to the Second Republic, Italy was unable to fully capitalize from its staunch transatlantic commitment. While Italian decisionmakers welcomed NATO’s involvement in former Yugoslavia, Rome did not contribute to any of the high-​profile political solutions that were taken to end the Bosnian conflict. By contrast, until 1996 Italy was excluded from the “Contact Group” on former Yugoslavia. In the second half of the 1990s, although providing an important contribution to NATO’s IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia, Rome played a secondary role in the political decisions that shaped the Alliance. In 1997, its requests to include Slovenia and Romania in the first wave of NATO’s eastern enlargement were discarded by the US, which opted to open the Alliance’s doors only to three central European candidates, namely Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. While the inability to assert its views did not weaken Italy’s commitment to NATO, it certainly rekindled Rome’s interest in closer European defense cooperation also to avoid the risk of an excessive dependency from, and complacency, with US political and military leadership. NATO’s involvement in the Balkan–​Mediterranean region was thus seen as complementary and not

Italy and NATO in the 21st century  193 alternative to a more vigorous EU presence.15 Nonetheless, also as a result of the slow transition from CFSP to ESDP, Italian decisionmakers continued to ascribe NATO a pivotal role and a mainly ancillary function to the EU. Following the Anglo-​French St. Malo declaration in 1998, Rome therefore thoroughly supported the 2002  “Berlin Plus” agreement, which reaffirmed the complementary relationship between transatlantic and European defense, allowing the Union to borrow NATO’s capabilities and resources in order to carry out crisis management and peacekeeping operations. As argued by Croci, in Italy’s viewpoint, European defense was not meant in fact “to supersede NATO but to increase Europe’s range of available options at least when it comes to dealing with crises in its neighbourhood.”16 Italy’s bipartisan and outright support for the Alliance was confirmed in 1999, when the center-​left government participated in the air strikes against Yugoslavia in the context of operation Allied Force, despite strong opposition from some of its coalition partners and Italy’s close economic ties with Serbia. Rome contributed with more than 50 combat aircraft, clocking a total 2,903 mission flight hours, although Italian planes were not allowed to bomb Serb cities.17 Furthermore, Italy was also the only NATO country participating in the campaign that kept its Belgrade embassy open, while then Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini openly criticized the Alliance when civilians were killed during operations.18 Italy’s participation to operation Allied Force was emblematic of Rome’s staunch bipartisan commitment to NATO and willingness to shoulder the costs of transatlantic security. At the same time, although occurring without a formal UN Security Council endorsement and against the outright opposition of the Russian Federation and China, it was an additional demonstration of Italy’s willingness to engage in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in its closer neighborhood. Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, Italy was among the major ten financial contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, during the late 1990s Italy had averaged more than 20 missions annually, which went up to 30 in 1999 and remained at that level for the entire following decade, a period in which the Italian armed forces deployed an average of 8,700 troops in peacekeeping and crises management operations annually.19

Italy and NATO in the War on Terror At the beginning of the new millennium, the Bush administration’s proclamation of the GWOT added an element of complexity to Italy’s relationship with the Alliance, presenting Italian decisionmakers with a novel and potentially disrupting scenario. Italy was now required to contribute to peacekeeping and crisis management operations that were conducted far away from its closer regional interests and which could potentially have a negative impact on Rome’s relations with the Arab world. Nonetheless, Italy’s conduct confirmed the solidity of its transatlantic vocation. On September 12, 2001, the then center-​right government welcomed the invocation of the North

194  Luca Ratti Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5 mutual defense clause. Although Italy did not participate to Operation Enduring Freedom, it subsequently backed the Alliance’s involvement in Afghanistan at the head of the ISAF. Italian troops were first deployed in the context of the UN lead operation in 2002 and, after NATO formally assumed the command of the operation in 2003, Rome provided one of the largest contributions to ISAF, rapidly becoming one of the mission’s bedrock nations.20 In 2005, Italy was assigned the lead of the Regional Command West as one of six regional commands into which the mission was divided. Italy’s commitment to the Alliance remained rock solid also during the run-​up to the 2003 US military invasion of Iraq. The fracture between Washington and some of its European allies, such as France and Germany, provided then Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi with the opportunity to strengthen bilateral bonds with the US. Together with seven other European leaders, in January 2003 Berlusconi signed a letter supporting the US campaign to disarm Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction and calling for the UN Security Council to “face up” to its responsibilities.21 Nonetheless, Rome also continued to strive for a diplomatic solution, committing troops on the ground only after Washington had officially declared the termination of military operations in Iraq. Although Berlusconi came under harsh criticism from the opposition, the government’s stance during the build-​up to the intervention was consistent with Rome’s commitment to the alliance with the US as well as with its vision of a broader political role for NATO. While providing diplomatic support to Washington, the center-​right government pressed hard for a political solution. Within this context, Rome also advocated the deepening of dialogue with the countries of the region and in 2004 strongly supported the creation of NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) with the aim of promoting cooperation between the Alliance and the Gulf countries, particularly in the fight against transnational terrorism and maritime piracy. As a result of his staunch support for the Alliance, in March 2006 Berlusconi was given the distinct honor of addressing a joint section of the US Congress.22 Shortly afterwards, the Italian government announced that it would begin withdrawing troops from Iraq but took great care not to imitate Spain’s withdrawal, which had been completed within a mere six weeks in the aftermath of the 2004 Madrid train station bombing. On the contrary, Rome closely coordinated the Italian withdrawal, which took more than a year to complete, with the US.23 Italy’s participation in the “War on Terror,” however, certainly did not reflect a passive acceptance of Washington’s unilateral lead. On the contrary, Rome continued to portray its Afghan and Iraqi deployments as part of a broader commitment to multilateral security cooperation. After 2006, Italy actively participated in the NATO training mission in Iraq, contributing to the training of Iraqi officers and instructors from the Iraqi Federal Police. Moreover, Rome’s efforts also involved humanitarian, social, and cultural initiatives as well as a specific contribution toward the protection of cultural heritage. In Afghanistan Italy remained Head of Regional Command West,

Italy and NATO in the 21st century  195 which was headquartered in Herat, until 2014. Italy was the only European member of the Alliance, together with Germany, to maintain throughout the entire mission significant military and political responsibilities. Furthermore, as for NATO’s Balkan operations during the 1990s and despite deepening criticism from the far left, this deployment relied upon the bipartisan support of center-​right and center-​left forces. Furthermore, Rome also continued to reconcile its commitment to the Alliance with the development of European capabilities. In the aftermath of the Israeli–​Hezbollah conflict of 2006, Italy played alongside France a leading role in the pacification of the situation in Lebanon but stopped short of casting its cooperation with Paris as alternative to the Atlantic Alliance.24 This contribution was an asset in successfully obtaining a nonpermanent seat on the 2007–​2008 UN Security Council, as well as in the wider diplomatic dispute over the Council’s composition. In late 2009, in response to US demands for an increase in European contributions to ISAF, Rome made a further commitment of an additional 1,000 troops, bringing the Italian contingent in Afghanistan to over 4,000. Italian decisionmakers continued to resist, however, demands to involve Italian militaries in major combat operations in the south and continued to strive for a political solution to the war. Italy’s armed forces also provided one of the largest contributions after the US to the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. Overall, Italy lost 53 soldiers in Afghanistan between January 2002 and August 2014, making its participation to ISAF the costliest in terms of casualties since the World War II. While other NATO members, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and Poland, unilaterally announced in 2010 their decision to withdraw troops, only following president Obama’s announcement of a phased American withdrawal, the Italian government communicated the intention to begin removing troops from Afghanistan. Furthermore, after ISAF’s termination at the end of 2014, Italy contributed as one of the four NATO framework nations, alongside the US, Germany, and Turkey, to the Resolute Support mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan Security Forces. However, also Rome’s considerable engagements in NATO’s operations did not always result in an increase of its standing in transatlantic power hierarchies: in 2011, the combined air operation center in Poggio Renatico, responsible for Italy’s air defenses, the Balkans, and operations in Libya, was relocated to Spain, while at the end of 2012 Rome relinquished its long-​held post of NATO’s deputy secretary-​general, as Claudio Bisogniero was replaced by former US ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow.

The impact of the 2008 economic crisis and the rise of populist narratives The 2008 economic crisis, constraining the country’s available resources, further impacted upon Italy’s international ambitions and role in the Alliance. After a decade of sluggish growth, the crisis dealt a major blow to the Italian economy, raising the prospect of a sovereign debt crisis. Italy suffered

196  Luca Ratti a double-​dip recession between 2008 and 2014, experiencing only a moderate recovery between 2015 and 2017. This was then followed by another slump in 2018. Economic difficulties resulted in a growth in unemployment, GDP’s contraction, and rising public debt, leading to widespread government spending on interest rates. The resulting climate of economic and political uncertainty influenced domestic and foreign perceptions of Italy’s international role. For the first time since the end of World War II, some political forces, particularly the populist Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Northern League, began to question Italy’s multilateral commitments.25 More specifically, the M5S expressed criticism of both NATO and the EU while the League, although remaining supportive of the Alliance, embraced a virulent Eurosceptic discourse.26 At the same time, the interest of the wider public and the electorate now focused on domestic issues, such as the deteriorating economic situation, growing unemployment, inequality, the impact of migration, and the demographic crisis at the expenses of foreign policy. The adoption of drastic financial austerity measures made it more difficult to justify investments in the defense sector, raising the prospect of marginalization and loss of influence within the Alliance. Both center-​right and center-​left coalitions were unable to increase defense spending, which fell from almost 1.3 percent of GDP in 2011 to less than 1.1 percent in 2015, and hovered around 1.2 percent in 2018 and 2019 well below the 2 percent benchmark set in the 2014 Wales Summit.27 In a December 2019 poll, 56 percent of the interviewees identified the economic crisis as the major challenge for the country, with immigration featuring as a distant second, and foreign policy attracting only very minor interest.28 Nonetheless, while the growing sense of insecurity and discontent fuelled Eurosceptic feelings, they did not equally affect Italy’s perceptions of the Alliance. On the contrary, support for NATO remained overwhelmingly strong among decisionmakers and the public alike. In 2014, Italy was at the forefront of the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria with Italian armed forces contributing four Tornado combat aircraft, two unmanned Predator aircraft, a tanker for air-​to-​air refuel, and 280 trainers and military advisors, to the international coalition led by the US.29 Also, the formation of a new government between the populist M5S and the Northern League in June 2018 did not impact upon Rome’s relationship with Washington. The new government led by academic and jurist Giuseppe Conte appointed a figure from the establishment and former EU official Enzo Moavero Milanesi as Foreign Minister, while Italy’s President Sergio Mattarella had a stabilizing influence on foreign policy, craftily nurturing relations with allies and partner countries. The frictions that developed between the executive and the European institutions further strengthened for Rome the importance of a close relationship with the US. Currently, Italy remains among the top contributors of the Global Coalition against Daesh, carrying out intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, air-​to-​air refueling, and personnel transportation activities, as well as playing a proactive role in the delivery of humanitarian aid and

Italy and NATO in the 21st century  197 in the capacity building of Iraqi military in Baghdad and Kurdish security forces  –​the Peshmerga  –​in the autonomous Kurdistan region. However, the economic crisis also led Rome to whittle back its external projection in a period of growing economic uncertainty. In 2015, Italy published its new “White Paper for International Security and Defense,” which de facto replaced two landmark documents dating back to 1985 and 2002, providing new strategic guidance. While restating a willingness to play an active role on the international stage, the new document unequivocally states that Italy will primarily worry about its immediate neighborhood, portraying the enlarged “Euro-​Mediterranean” region as its primary geostrategic focus. This region was, however, conceived in broad terms, covering the EU, the Balkans, the Maghreb, the Middle East, and the Black Sea. The White Paper, which aims to reform the Ministry of Defense in order to increase its effectiveness as well as its efficiency and rationalization, places the EU and NATO on an equal footing in terms of Italy’s contribution to international security. It defines NATO’s role primarily in defensive and deterrence terms, making it also clear that Rome sees no contradiction between its firm commitment to the Alliance and its support for deeper European cooperation.30

Italy and the Southern flank The White Paper also confirmed Italy’s concerns about the Alliance’s Southern flank, which presents Rome with the biggest security threat since the Balkan wars of the 1990s. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Italy’s governments supported all the initiatives taken by the Alliance toward the region, such as the establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994 and of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) in 2004. Currently, Libya remains Italy’s most pressing concern in light of its potential threat to the region’s stability as well as to Italy’s social fabric and democratic values. Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, Rome consistently sought reconciliation with Tripoli.31 Italian efforts culminated in the signing of the 2008 Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation. Italy endeavored to pay USD 5 billion as a compensation for its former colonial occupation, wherein Gaddafi pledged to combat illegal migration and boost investments in Italian companies.32 The explosion of the Arab Springs and of the Libyan revolution in 2011, however, significantly complicated matters, facing Rome –​whose approach toward the Middle East and North Africa countries had long been based upon dialogue –​with two dilemmas: first, whether or not to intervene in a crisis, which carried uncertain consequences for Italy’s interests; second, whether or not to support a transition, which might end up in an Islamist autocracy or in Libya’s political disintegration.33 The lack of a coherent European response and divergences with France further complicated matters. In March 2011, Rome adhered to the “coalition of the willing” that implemented a no-​fly zone over Libya. However, it soon threatened to reconsider the use of its bases and create a national command,

198  Luca Ratti unless operations passed under the NATO umbrella.34 The war disrupted the flow of energy, leading ENI to shut its “Green-​stream” gas pipeline, which connects Libya to Italy, and increase imports of Russian gas by 60 percent.35 It also led to an increase in the migratory flow with large numbers of migrants being smuggled across the Mediterranean.36 The center-​right government’s insistence on a NATO command presented a number of similarities with that of the center-​left during the 1999 Kosovo. Prime Minister Berlusconi argued that Italian planes would target specific military sites in order to protect civilians, while Foreign Minister Franco Frattini pressed early on for a political solution and a suspension of hostilities.37 President Giorgio Napolitano, whose institutional position was not constrained by party affiliations, invoked Italy’s commitment to alliance solidarity.38 Libya’s following descent into chaos and the ensuing civil war further increased Rome’s apprehensions. According to the Italian viewpoint, in 2011 the West’s intervention occurred outside of a long-​term strategic perspective: the Obama administration abandoned Libya once NATO air operations were accomplished, while political transition was not followed by a robust plan of stabilization and reconstruction capable of securing the country’s democratization as well as economic and social development. US disengagement and the paralysis of the CSDP, together with the chronic weaknesses of Italy’s governments, further aggravated the situation, although the establishment in 2017 of the Italian led Strategic Direction-​South Hub, based in the Allied Joint Force Command of Naples, was a partial success for Rome. The Hub, which was strongly supported by Italy, operates on multilayered dimensions and is becoming the focal point from which the Alliance operates toward the Southern flank, contributing to defensive capacity-​ building initiatives in favor of partner countries. Nonetheless, in Italy’s view it constitutes only a first step toward a more structured approach to security along the Alliance’s Southern flank. Furthermore, despite deepening tension between different warring factions, the Trump administration’s reluctance to commit forces on the ground has prevented NATO from reclaiming a pivotal role in Libya. However, in Italy’s view it remains particularly important not only to increase NATO’s presence in the area but also to promote cooperation with other regional organizations, such as the UN, the EU, and the African Union, and some of the countries of the regions, such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Tunisia. Nonetheless, Italy’s strategy has been hardly effective. Rome has privileged the UN-​led diplomatic process that sought to repair ties between the Tripoli-​based Government of National Accord (GNA) and general Khalifa Haftar, head of the Libyan National Army based in eastern Libya. However, the weakness of successive governments limited their operational ability. The Palermo Conference in 2018 was supposed to return Italy to the core of the peace process. During a visit to Washington three months earlier, Prime Minister Conte had obtained Trump’s endorsement to establish an Italian “control room,” as the Italian leader defined it, that would make

Italy and NATO in the 21st century  199 Italy the US primary interlocutor for “Mediterranean challenges,” such as terrorism and, particularly, the Libyan crisis.39 However, since that visit, Italy has lost ground to other actors, while the increasing activism of Turkey and Russia has pushed Rome to the sidelines. Italy’s weakness was reflected in its muted reaction to Haftar’s bombing of Misrata in July 2019 –​where the Italian armed forces maintain a military hospital –​and closure of the oil flow. Haftar remains strongly critical of the Italian presence on the ground and accuses Italy of violating Libyan sovereignty. For Rome, Libya presents an important opportunity to increase its influence in the Alliance, reshape NATO’s partnership system, and strengthen EU–​NATO cooperation. However, in December 2019 its exclusion from the meeting between the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Turkey, that took place ahead of the NATO London summit, crudely exposed the risk of marginalization. Furthermore, while Prime Minister Conte endeavored to convince Trump about the need to promote a broader political solution, Libya did not feature in the declaration issued by the Alliance at the end of the summit, largely confirming the administration’s reluctance to ramp US engagement in Libya. Turkey’s increasing support for the GNA and the Alliance’s lukewarm response to requests to provide support for the EU’s naval operation Irini, that in March 2020 was tasked by the European Council with implementing the arms embargo and is currently headquartered in Rome, were an additional proof of Rome’s inability to shape NATO’s policy toward its former colony, leading the Italian government to pursue bilateral dialogue with both Paris and Ankara in the search for a lasting ceasefire and a durable a political solution.

Italy and the return of Russia The political elite’s chronic inability to envisage durable solutions to the country’s low economic growth not undermine support for the Alliance but certainly impacted upon Rome’s perceptions of Russia’s policies. While most Italians never held negative views toward Russia, after the 2008 financial crisis, some political forces, particularly the M5S and the Northern League, started to look with favor at Moscow. The Kremlin undoubtedly cultivated relationships with both parties, which portrayed Russia as a strong and proactive country able to protect its national interests and insulate itself from the negative effects of globalization. The radicalization of the public debate, particularly during the migration crisis of 2015–​2016, further contributed to augment pro-​Russian feelings in Italy. Leaders of the League publicly fawned over Putin, praising the Kremlin as a bastion of sovereignty, identity, and cultural conservatism. According to a 2018 polling, Italians had greater confidence in Putin to do the right thing in world affairs than Trump. Moscow endeavored to take advantage of Italy’s public discontent: of all foreign media operating in Italy, Sputnik was the second-​most influential, following the Italian version of The Huffington Post, while private enterprises, such as the

200  Luca Ratti Lombardy–​Russia Cultural Association, have lauded the Kremlin’s role as the defender of identity, tradition, and sovereignty.40 Nonetheless, Italy’s pro-​Russian leanings have deeper material and emotional roots. During the first part of the 20th century and until the fascist regime’s participation in the Nazi invasion of Russia in 1941, both the Tsarist Empire and the USSR were important partners –​Italy had been among the first countries to recognize de jure the USSR –​while during the Cold War, the presence of a strong communist party contributed to tone down the harshness of the East–​ West division.41 Bilateral economic cooperation was promptly reestablished during détente period. Italy became the largest importer of Soviet oil outside of the Communist bloc, while in 1965 the Italian car company Fiat agreed to build a factory in the USSR that remains Russia’s largest auto production facility. A  gas deal followed in 1969, further consolidating ties, making Italy a major supplier of industrial equipment and one of the USSR’s top trading partners in Western Europe well into the 1980s. These agreements and the presence of a still strong communist party prompted Rome to advocate the Kremlin’s inclusion in discussions about European security at the Cold War’s end. During the 1990s, both center-​right and center-​left governments argued that NATO should take Russia’s interests into account, as it designed its enlargement to the countries of central and south-​eastern Europe. Following Moscow’s inclusion in the Alliance’s PfP in 1994, Italy called for a broad political agreement between NATO and Russia. At the Alliance’s 1997 Madrid Summit, Rome was not at the forefront of efforts to incorporate Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, supporting instead the candidacies of Slovenia and Romania, the inclusion of which was perceived as less as a provocation for the Kremlin. Italy’s efforts to promote a long-​term engagement between the Alliance and Moscow intensified in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Then Prime Minister Berlusconi, a personal friend of Vladimir Putin, claimed a leading role in the organization of the 2002 Pratica di Mare Summit that led to the creation of the NATO-​Russia Council. The summit became the most visible manifestation of Rome’s endeavors to promote a durable arrangement between the Alliance and Russia. The resulting “Pratica di Mare spirit” had a big impact on bilateral economic relations. Most of the Italian political forces shared a genuine belief that the Alliance shall not marginalize Russia and Putin once boasted that he was the only person who could get along with both Berlusconi and his political antithesis, Romano Prodi. Italy’s strong dependence on Russian energy was certainly one of the factors behind Rome’s endeavors to broker an accommodation with Moscow. At the 2002 Prague summit, as the Alliance extended invitations to seven applicant countries, Rome expressed doubts about the inclusion of the Baltic states, while in 2008, together with France and Germany, Italy resisted the awarding of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine. Together with other NATO’s member states, such as France, Germany, and Hungary, Italy also took a benevolent stance toward Moscow during the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, trying to revive the work of the

Italy and NATO in the 21st century  201 NATO–​Russia Council and attempting to mediate between Washington and Moscow, especially as far as US plans to deploy components of a missile defense system in eastern and southeastern Europe were concerned. Bilateral ties remained strong in the following years, especially in the energy market, as proved by the involvement of Italy’s main hydrocarbon company ENI in numerous joint ventures with Gazprom, Rosneft, and other Russian partners, including the agreement for the construction of the “South Stream” gas pipeline. Cooperation, however, extended also to other economic sectors, including tourism and banking. All these factors made different Italian executives particularly wary of Russia’s interests and sensitivities. Although in 2014, Rome hurried to condemn Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, immediately adhering to Western sanctions, most of Italy’s political forces did not perceive Russia’s conduct as a vital threat to Euro-​Atlantic security. Some even claimed that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was legitimate.42 The following deterioration in relations between NATO and Russia presented Italy with a dilemma between solidarity with allies, such as the Baltic states and Poland, that felt threatened by Russia’s conduct and Moscow, causing a degree of concern in Washington. However, despite some initial hesitation, Rome fully supported allied endeavors to contain Russia, despite Moscow’s opposition to NATO’s deployments along its borders. In 2020, Italian troops fully participate in the NATO’s eFP in Latvia, providing 150 soldiers drawn from the 1st Bersaglieri Regiment, plus the 4th Armored Regiment and other army units in the Canadian led battle group. Nonetheless, Italy also continues to strive for a normalization in relations with Moscow. Persisting tension between the Alliance and Russia remains a major source of Italian concern. When the Trump administration announced US withdrawal from the INF Treaty, fears resurfaced that Italy could become once again the potential battle ground of a nuclear standoff between the US and Russia. New missile deployments would most likely be hosted by the military bases of Aviano and Ghedi in the north of the country. Finally, a willingness not to antagonize Moscow has continued to shape Italy’s position on the Alliance’s eastern enlargement, leading Rome to downplay the prospects of Ukrainian and Georgian membership and privilege instead the Balkan candidates, particularly Croatia and Albania, and subsequently Montenegro and North Macedonia.43

Italy and the Trump administration Italy’s commitment to the Alliance is a reflection of the depth of its bilateral bond with the United States. The strength of this relationship was not affected by the alternation between democrats and republicans in the White House and center-​left or center-​right coalitions in Rome. To an extent, political alternations in Rome influenced bilateral relations. Whereas center-​left forces sought inspiration in the Democratic presidencies, the center-​right tended to look with favor at Republican administrations. However, bilateral ties remained robust also at time of conflicting domestic orientations.

202  Luca Ratti When disagreements or undercurrents emerged, for example, during NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 or over deteriorating relations with Russia, they were normally dealt with effectively and promptly papered over. Italy–​US relations also continued to benefit from the close collaboration in the defense industry. The early 2000s experienced the intensification in collaboration on international procurement programs, as in the case of the F-​ 35. Italy became the second largest contributing partner to the Joint Strike Fighter after the UK, committing to order 131 planes by 2018. Nonetheless, Rome’s participation in the F-​35 rapidly became a hotly contested issue in the domestic political debate:  while neither center-​left nor center-​right governments questioned it, the far-​left and the M5S were openly critical of the planned purchase and argued that the money could be better spent on welfare or to boost the economy.44 In 2012, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee and then Defense Minister Di Paola began reviewing the program as part of Prime Minister Mario Monti’s austerity plan to shore up public accounts, announcing that Rome would curtail its order to 90 fighter-​ jets from the original 131.45 Nonetheless, Italy was not among the main targets of President Trump’s rants against some of the US European allies. Equally, as transatlantic tension over trade and defense expenditures deepened, Italian decisionmakers duly avoided the open criticism of the administration that was expressed at times by France and Germany. Rather, Italy endeavored to present itself as a privileged interlocutor of the administration, particularly as far as developments on the Alliance’s Southern flank are concerned. However, this diplomatic activism has not been matched by an adequate increase in capabilities. On the contrary, Italy’s military expenditures have continued to decrease steadily. Currently, Rome remains far away from meeting the 2 percent target. The results of the 2018 election and the formation of new government between the M5S and the League further complicated matters. On a number of issues, including China’s BRI, Venezuela’s internal situation, withdrawal from Afghanistan, and ties with Russia, the executive embraced positions that diverged from those of the US. The signing of a memorandum of understanding with China in March 2019 and the prospective Italian use of 5G wireless network developed by giant Huawei caused particular apprehension in Washington. Beijing’s acquisition of the Genoa port contributed to increase American concerns. Furthermore, in March 2018 Rome suspended payments for the 11 F-​35 jets that have already been delivered and 9 others it ordered, causing consternation in the US government.46 Nonetheless, at least for the time being, also these frictions appear to have been bridged. As a result of US pressures, Italian decisionmakers expressed a willingness to halt the deal with China, if it might jeopardize national security, while at the 2019 London Summit, Italy supported the concept of resilience and critical infrastructures. Travelling to Washington in June 2019, then Interior Minister and Northern League’s leader Matteo Salvini proclaimed: “at a time when European Union institutions are fragile and changing significantly, Italy

Italy and NATO in the 21st century  203 wants to be the first, most solid, valid, credible and coherent partner for the United States.”40 The government’s collapse in 2019 and the formation of a new coalition, including the progressive Democratic Party (PD), brought the relationship back to more familiar tracks. Furthermore, in the current strategic scenario, serious friction with the US would present Rome with significant problems, undermining Italy’s defenses and exposing the country to the risk of marginalization. In March 2020, the Trump administration’s promise to send USD 100 million worth of surgical and medical aid to Italy to face the Covid-​19 emergency was, in light of the hesitations of some Italy’s European partners, an additional demonstration of the strength of bilateral bonds. Italy’s future relationship with the US will certainly be influenced by the overall evolution of transatlantic relations. Within this context, the UK’s departure from the EU and the tension between the current administration and some of Washington’s European partners, particularly France and Germany, provide Rome with opportunities, but also risks. On the surface, a fracture between the US and the Franco-​German pair might allow Italy to claim a role to the east and south of the Alliance, where Rome aspires to mediate between Washington and Moscow. Nonetheless, the prospect of American disengagement from Europe also raises significant concerns in Italy, while an uncertain domestic scenario and the impact of Covid-​19 on the country’s troubled finances are likely to constrain Rome’s ability to play a more significant transatlantic role.

Conclusions More than three decades since the crumbling of the Soviet bloc, Rome’s robust support for the Alliance is a reflection of the strong bilateral bonds between Italy and the US, as well as of the Italian political and military elite’s awareness that Italy cannot afford to remain isolated on the international stage. In the 21st century, NATO continues to act as an indispensable insurance policy for the country’s security. An increasingly volatile international scenario and the lack of effective institutional alternatives further strengthen the Alliance’s importance for Italian security. Although the protracted impact of the financial crisis partially eroded public support for European integration, even populist political forces, such as the M5S and the Northern League, have been reluctant to question Italy’s relationship with the US and NATO’s relevance for Italian security. In the current strategic scenario, Rome’s concerns are focused on an arc of crisis stretching from the Mediterranean toward the Near East and which might weld with instability in the Gulf, the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Afghanistan. Persisting economic problems, the uncertain trajectory of the EU’s CSDP, fears of being marginalized by France and Germany, the growing assertiveness of other powers in the Mediterranean, and more recently the nefarious Covid-​19 outbreak make far too evident for Italy the centrality of the Alliance and of its bilateral bond with the US. The Alliance remains the only multilateral security provider capable of securing Rome a

204  Luca Ratti seat at the table when decisions in as crucial a field as European security are taken, effectively engaging in crisis management and peacekeeping operations in Italy’s Balkan and North African neighbourhood, and keeping in check the ambitions of other regional and world powers alike. In the 21st century, NATO’s ongoing relevance and credibility for Italy will continue to depend on its ability to perform these three “core tasks.”

Notes 1 P. Pastorelli, “L’adesione dell’Italia al Patto Atlantico,” Storia Contemporanea, vol. 14, no.  6, 1983, pp.  1015–​103. See also A.  Varsori, L’Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992 (Bari, 1998); of the same author see also, La Cenerentola d’Europa. L’Italia e l’integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 2010). 2 Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 4, Western Europe (Washington, DC:  Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 125. 3 Massimo de Leonardis, “L’Italia nell’Alleanza atlantica. La storiografia e i temi chiave,” Rivista Italiana di Storia Internazionale, Vol. 1, no. 2, 2018, pp.235–​264. 4 See Enrico La Loggia’s statement at the Celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance Rome, 11 May 2009, available at www.senato.it/​application/​ xmanager/​projects/​senato/​file/​sixty_​years_​nato.pdf. 5 M. G. Brosio, Diari NATO (1964–​1972), (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011). 6 L. Fasanaro, “Neither in One Bloc, Nor in the Other:  Berlinguer’s Vision of the End of the Cold War,” in F. Bozo, M.P. Rey, N. Piers Ludlow and B. Rother (eds), Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–​1990 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2012), p. 168. 7 L. Nuti, “Italy, German Unification and the End of the Cold War,” in F. Bozo, M.P. Rey, P. N. Ludlow, and L. Nuti (eds), Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 191–​203. 8 O. Croci, “Italian Security Policy after the Cold War,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies, Vol. 8, no. 2, 2003, p. 268. 9 E. Brighi, “Europe, the USA and the ‘Policy of the Pendulum’: The Importance of Foreign Policy Paradigms in the Foreign Policy of Italy (1989–​2005),” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 2, no. 2, 2007, p. 110. 10 C. Hill and F. Andreatta, “Struggling to Change: the Italian State and the New Order,” in Robin Niblett and William Wallace, (eds.), Rethinking European Order: West European Responses 1989–​1997 (London, Palgrave, 2001). 11 P. Fulci, “Italy and the Reform of the UN Security Council,” International Spectator, Vol. 34, no. 2, April 1999, pp. 7–​16. 12 O. Croci (2003), p. 269. See also F. Attinà, La scelta del multilateralismo. L’Italia e le operazioni di pace (Milano, Giuffrè, 2009)  and P.  Ignazi, G.  Giacomello, F. Coticchia, Italian Military Operations Abroad: Just Don’t Call It War (London and New York: Palgrave/​Macmillan, 2012). 13 T.S. Mowle and D.H. Sacko, “Global NATO:  Bandwagoning in a Unipolar World,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 28, No. 3, December 2007, p. 613. 14 L. Nuti, “The richest and farthest master is always best:  U.S.–​Italian relations in historical perspective,” in David Andrews (ed.), The Atlantic Alliance under

Italy and NATO in the 21st century  205 stress:  U.S.–​European relations after Iraq (Cambridge:  CUP, 2005), p.  177. Of the same author, see also L. Nuti, “The Role of the US in Italy’s foreign policy,” International Spectator, Vol. 38, no. 1, January 2003, p. 91. 15 R. Alcaro, V.  Briani, E.  Greco, M.  Nones, S.  Silvestri, La NATO e la Difesa Europea: Sviluppi Recenti, Scenari e Ruolo dell’Italia, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2009, www.iai.it/​pdf/​Oss_​Polinternazionale/​Sicurezza_​europea.pdf. See also the speech given by President Napolitano at the NATO Defence College in Rome on 20 May 2011. www.quirinale.it/​elementi/​Continua.aspx?tipo=Discorso&key=2196. 16 Croci (2003), p. 274. 17 A. Marrone, P.  Tessari and C.  De Simone, “Italian Interests and NATO:  From Missions to Trenches?,” Documenti IAI, November 2014, p. 24. 18 R. Balfour, R.  Menotti, and G.  Micieli de Biase, “Italy’s Crisis Diplomacy in Kosovo, March-​June 1999,” International Spectator, Vol. 34 no.  3, July–​Sept. 1999, pp. 67–​80. 19 Marrone, Tessari, De Simone (2014), p. 19. 20 G.. Scognamiglio and E.  Vattani (eds), Italia in Afghanistan, available at www. esteri.it/​mae/​approfondimenti/​afghanistan.pdf. 21 See J.M. Aznar et al., “United We Stand,” Wall Street Journal, 30 January 2003. 22 In February 2011 in a letter to the daily Corriere della Sera, former U.S. ambassador to Rome Ronald P. Spogli publicly praised Berlusconi’s conduct. R. P. Spogli, “Grati all’Italia, miglior alleato degli USA,” Il Corriere della Sera, February 25, 2011. 23 O. Croci, “The Second Prodi Government and Italian Foreign Policy: New and Improved or the Same Wrapped up Differently?,” Modern Italy, Vol. 13, no.  3, 2008, p. 295. 24 A. Caffarena, “Italy and International Politics: The Israeli-​Lebanese War and an Effective Multilateralism,” in J.L. Briquet and A. Mastropaolo (eds.), The Center-​ Left’s Poisoned Victory (Berghahn, New York 2007), pp. 154–​170. 25 M. Tarchi, “Recalcitrant Allies:  The Conflicting Foreign Policy Agenda of the Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord,” in Christina Schori Liang (ed.), Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007), pp. 187–​208. 26 C. Monteleone, Italy in Uncertain Times:  Europeanizing Foreign Policy in the Declining Process of the American Hegemony (Lanahm: Lexigton, 2019), p. 8. 27 NATO’s estimates can be consulted at www.nato.int/​nato_​static_​fl2014/​assets/​pdf/​ pdf_​2019_​11/​20191129_​pr-​2019-​123-​en.pdf. 28 The results of the poll are available at https://​formiche.net/​2019/​12/​politica-​2019-​ ispi-​ipsos/​. 29 Marrone, Tessari, De Simone (2014), p.31. 30 The 2015 White Paper can be downloaded at www.difesa.it/​Primo_​Piano/​ Documents/​2015/​07_​Luglio/​White%20book.pdf. 31 Allegedly Craxi sent Qaddafi a message one or two before the bombing, tipping off the Libyan leader and possibly saving his life. See V. Nigro, “Andreotti e il ministro libico confermano:  Craxi avverti’ Gheddafi del bombardamento USA,” La Repubblica 30 October 2008. See also Massimo Bucarelli e Luca Micheletta (eds), Andreotti, Gheddafi, e le relazioni italo-​libiche (Roma: Edizioni Studium, 2018). 32 N. Ronzitti, “The Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation in the Mediterranean?,” Bulletin of Italian Politics, Vol. 1, no. 1, 2009, pp. 125–​133.

206  Luca Ratti 33 Marrone, Tessari, De Simone (2014), p. 3. 34 Italy contributed to NATO’s operation “Unified Protector” seven air bases, four Tornado bombers, four F-​16 fighters, four AV8-​B plus planes; the light aircraft carrier Garibaldi, the frigate Euro, the frigate Borsini, and the ship Etna to provide logistic support. www.difesa.it/​Operazioni_​Militari/​Operazioni_​internazionali_​ in_​corso/​Libia-​odisseaalba/​Pagine/​Contributonazionale.aspx. 35 R. Donadio, “Italian Energy Company Suspends Gas Pipeline to Libya,” The New York Times, 22 February 2011. 36 The war in Libya carried a cost of142 million Euros for the first semester of 2011. See Corriere della Sera, 7 and 27 July 2011. 37 See the statements by Frattini on 22 June and 5 July. www.esteri.it/​MAE/​EN/​ Sala_​ S tampa/​ A rchivioNotizie/​ Approfondimenti/​ 2 011/​ 0 7/​ 2 0110705_​ Focus LibiaFrattiniMassari.htm; www.esteri.it/​MAE/​EN/​Sala_​Stampa/​ArchivioNotizie/ Approfondimenti/​2011/​06/​20110622_​FocusLibia_​AppelloUmanitario.htm. 38 Il Sole 24 Ore, 25 April 2011; see also Napolitano’s statement of 22 March 2011. www.esteri.gov.it/​MAE/​EN/​Sala_​Stampa/​ArchivioNotizie/​Approfondimenti/​ 2011/​03/​20110322_​FocusLibiaNapolitano.htm?LANG=EN. 39 M. Giampaolo, “How Italy was marginalised in Libya,” European Council on Foreign Relations Commentary, available at www.ecfr.eu/​article/​commentary_​ how_​italy_​was_​marginalised_​in_​libya. 40 S. Urra and S. Hunter, “How Russian networks worked to boost the far right in Italy” El Pais, 1 March 2018, available at https://​english.elpais.com/​elpais/​2018/​03/​ 01/​inenglish/​1519922107_​909331.html. 41 Francesco Randazzo, Italian–​Soviet Relations from 1943–​1946: From Moscow to Rome (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2019), p.2. 42 F. Capurso, “Salvini:  L’annessione russa della Crimea è legittima. Per l’Africa serve un piano Marshall,” La Stampa, 20 luglio, 2018. 43 F. Coticchia, J.  W. Davidson, Italian Foreign Policy during Matteo Renzi’s Government: A Domestically Focused Outsider and the World (Lanham: Lexigton, 2019), p. 74. 44 A. Marrone e P. Tessari, “Il dibattito italiano sulle questioni di difesa: questa sera si recita a soggetto?,” Documenti IAI 2013, pp.8–​10 available at www.iai.it/​sites/​ default/​files/​iai1305.pdf. 45 A. Marrone, “Italy and the F-​35: Rationales and costs,” International Journal, Vol. 68, no. 1, (Winter 2012–​13), pp. 31–​48. 46 P. Mastrolilli, “Italy suspends F-​35 orders, owes US 500 million euros,” La Stampa 12 March 2019, available at www.lastampa.it/​esteri/​la-​stampa-​in-​english/​2019/​03/​ 12/​news/​italy-​suspends-​f-​35-​orders-​owes-​us-​500-​million-​euros-​1.33687119.

11  Turkey and NATO A fluctuating relationship Valeria Giannotta

Turkey joined NATO in 1952 as part of the first enlargement of the organization, and the relationship has lasted until the present day despite some difficulties. Although both sides are committed to the alliance and gain mutual benefits from it, the relationship has been fluctuating. Indeed, Turkey’s membership was perceived as something that might make a positive contribution to the country’s economic, military, and political development. On the other hand, with the second largest army within the organization, Turkey has been a vital ally, providing NATO a connection to the East and the South. The first disappointment and let-​down occurred in relation to the Cyprus issue, and NATO’s attitude is still vividly remembered in Turkey as it created an anti-​NATO and anti-​American feeling in the country. With the consolidating power of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development party (AKP) and Turkey’s proactive engagement in the region, some new frictions have arisen. Turkey’s own internal transformation affected its own security priorities, while the lack of confidence in NATO has been further aggravated. Crisis after crisis –​the most recent decision to purchase the S-​400 missile defense system from Russia seems to be the most critical turning point in the contention between Ankara and its Western allies. While Turkey has internally turned into a peculiar Presidential system and consolidated its partnership with Russia as outcome of the fragmentation of Syria, the main question is whether Turkey is drifting away from its commitment to NATO and Western values. By analyzing the crucial steps of the Alliance over time, with a special focus on the past 20 years of AKP politics, this chapter argues that Turkey’s cooperation with its allies is mainly a result of its changing security concerns related to the new balance of power in the region and to Syria spill-​over effects.

The Cold War period Turkey joined the Transatlantic Organization in 1952, as the first enlargement process occurred. It was the Cold War period, when the international system was bipolar and pivoted on the principle of deterrence and containment of threats. Along with the Kemalist doctrine, based on the assumption that “Turks has no other friends rather than the Turks” and “Peace at home,

208  Valeria Giannotta peace in the World,” Turkey had pursued an isolationism doctrine. Instead, in face of the Soviets’ attempt to expand their influence over the straits and some eastern Anatolian provinces such as Kars and Ardahan, Ankara’s strategic priority was to ensure its own security. The USSR was perceived as a direct threat; therefore, the Turkish membership of the emergent transatlantic security community was as a defensive step, also aiming at establishing an international order based on democratic governance and free market economies.1 Thus, thanks to its geopolitical location and its great military capacity, as the second biggest army within the Alliance, along with the deterrence strategy, Turkey was a strategic partner in preventing the Russians from penetrating the Middle East region.2 On the other hand, the engagement in NATO would represent an historic milestone for Turkey’s domestic political process as an established state mainly oriented toward Europe and the West. In other words, during the Cold War a dogmatic neutral strategy was no longer an effective option for Turkey, which in terms of collective defense and internal political order would benefit from becoming a member of the Alliance. As Turkey was the extreme defense bulwark against the Soviets, the United States decided to place Jupiter missiles right at the border with the USSR. However, the newly fresh cooperation was not always a thornless rose garden, and Turkey’s 1974 intervention in Cyprus created huge disappointment among the Allies.3 Indeed, along with the so-​called Operation Atilla, the US nuclear vehicles were removed from Turkey as a sort of sanction. In retaliation against the US embargo, Ankara did not allow their return until some further negotiations produced a new agreement regulating US access to military bases in Turkey. This attitude was led by the protection of Turkish national interests related to the defense of the Turkish community and to prevent enosis (union) of Cyprus. The operation, which lasted approximately a month (from July 20 to August 16, 1974), was the outcome of escalating tensions between Greece and Cyprus, on one side, and Turkey, on the other. When in 1963 communal fighting broke out in the island, Turkey asked for the support of the US, which was reluctant to get involved in what was perceived as a local issue between Greece and Turkey, although they were members of the same alliance.4 It was in that time that Ankara decided for the first time to take action, but was deterred by US President Lyndon Johnson, who sent a letter to his counterpart advising against the use of military force. The letter stated: military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies … [and that] … your Government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your

Turkey and NATO  209 government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.5 However, the appeasement did not last long. After the 1967 coup d’etat in Greece, Cyprus experienced some spillover as the situation degenerated to the extent that Turkey intervened with military action. From a systemic point of view, this unilateral initiative pushed Turkey to expand its relations to the countries of Eastern Europe by leveraging its political potential. Bulent Ecevit, who replaced Ismet Inönü as leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in May 1972, was the architect of a more assertive foreign policy designed to serve Turkey’s national interests.6 The danger of a Soviet annexation of Turkish territories was getting softer. In the aftermath of the Cyprus invasion, the US Congress, partly under pressure from the Greek–​American lobby and partly because of American domestic politics, imposed an embargo on Turkey –​this was partially lifted in late 1975 and fully revoked in summer 1978. At the same time, Turkey retaliated as the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel made the Cabinet issue a decision on July 25, 1975. Accordingly, all 21 US bases and facilities in Turkey were closed, with the İncirlik Air Base, the largest and the most strategic one, being available only to NATO. The reopening of US military bases was possible only after the military coup of September 12, 1980. The events of the 1970s certainly created the first scratch in Turkey–​NATO relations. Until that point, Turkey had been a loyal partner in the containment policy. However, while deterrence against the USSR remained, Cyprus became a vital issue for the direct interests of Turkey, which had to take unilateral action.7 Until the present day, Cyprus has been a dividing issue within the international community, which not only hampers Turkey and its relations with Europe, but it has also contributed to the spread of wide anti-​American feelings inside the country and an increase in nationalist pride.

Conservatism and domestic factors From this point onwards, the Turkish attitude toward NATO began to change and this became more visible after the end of the Cold War. To better understand the new dynamics, two factors must be considered:  the changes that occurred domestically and the new interpretation of international security. Indeed, it was with the end of the Cold War that Turkish politics faced the consequences of the still undefined new world order as domestically a new wave of instability and democratic attempts were experienced. All of this caused a shift in the electoral preferences of Turkish people toward emerging parties aiming at representing the interests of the periphery and pivoting on the revival of religion and conservatism. By combining Islamic, liberal, and

210  Valeria Giannotta nationalist values, political conservatism was a direct outcome of the difficulties experienced by the masses over time along with the traditionally imposed Westernization process. Firstly, conservatism emerged as a cultural and populist movement of the public opposition and then it stood on the political scene in its religious version.8 This was extremely visible after the 1995 elections, when Necmettin Erbakan became the first Islamist leader in the history of the modern Turkish Republic. The assumptions of his doctrine were formulated as Milli Görüş (National Vision), the frame for a morality not imported by the West aiming at defending culture, social justice, and education. Politically, the National Vision promoted domestic and foreign policies rejecting Turkey’s Western orientation and its request for EU membership. Accordingly, it pursued the idea of a “Greater Turkey” based on a foreign policy independent from the West.9 In this perspective, traditionalism and Islamism acquired a new strength in Turkey, which registered a new electoral realignment in favor of the Turkish–​Islamic synthesis. Indeed, after the collapse of the USSR and the socialist ideology, while Turkey averted the danger of its main external enemy, the foundations of the bipolar international relations were removed and a new network of interconnections and opportunities was created. Domestically, moreover, Turkey faced the problem of Kurdish separatism led by the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK), which over time gained great support from some regional neighbors in their attempt to destabilize Turkey. However, with the fall of socialism as ideology, in Turkey political Islam began to attract the support of a large number of Kurds, by emphasizing religious and anti-​republican symbols and values as a viable alternative for a stronger social solidarity.10 Actually, some part of the Turkish society was already frustrated by the Kemalist rule and it perceived the new liberal and economic order as devoid of justice and morality. Therefore, the demand for the restoration of morality was strenuous. Put in another way, the mass seemed to prefer a more traditional and religious type of society, which would promote family values, respect for blood ties, religious, and territorial solidarity. In these terms, by emphasizing adherence to religious values and the respect of traditions aimed at adapting old concepts and practices to the new global dynamics by appealing to a sort of cultural nostalgia for that golden age represented by Islamic, Turkish, and Ottoman customs.11 The advent of globalization, the Balkans civil wars and the ever growing unrest in the Middle East, combined with the redefinition of European borders, coincided with a rapid social mobilization in Turkey. As matter of fact, those assumptions are, necessary in order to understand the emergence and big success of Erdoğan’s AKP and the current stance of Turkey in the international arena.

A new definition of security All the above-​mentioned domestic elements had a natural impact on Turkey’s definition of security to the extent that use of hard and soft power increased and played an important role in Ankara’s strategic choices. With the end of

Turkey and NATO  211 the Soviet threat, the interests uniting Ankara and Washington cooled down and this became suddenly clear in March 2003, when the Turkish Parliament refused to support the US-​led invasion of Iraq, proving that domestic interest, public opinion, good neighborly relations, and regional stability were a diktat superior to anything else.12 A  foreign policy built on a univocal domestic policy and centered on a single western axis was one of the main critics by the AKP conservative government. As former Foreign and Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, wrote in his book Strategic Depth: A univocal and rigid approach, devoid of a vision open to any alternative, of precise strategic determinations and of tactical flexibility, certainly cannot promptly perceive the changes on the international scene, either it can reap the advantages that can raise Turkey to the rank of regional and international power (…). This multifaceted nature requires us to broaden the range of options. Static approaches have condemned Turkey to passivity, especially in the regional context. (…) In the new international situation, determined by the overcoming of the parameters of the Cold War, Turkey finds itself having to interpret its geopolitical role. First of all, this role should be considered in overcoming the strategy of maintaining the status quo. In a time when global and local balances are changing very dynamically, using geopolitics to maintain the status quo is suicidal. The geopolitical role gains weight when it becomes an incisive tool of a strategy that enhances it internationally. (…) The geopolitical position should no longer serve only to protect national borders, but to transform local influence into global and gradually increase international openness. The prior condition to evolve from the mere protection of national borders to the exercise of continental and global influence consists in investing our geopolitical position in the international dynamic of economic, political and security relations.13 As the first aim was to combine Turkey’s historical and cultural identity with new strategic factors, it was upon these assumptions that it started to play a multidimensional international role. In other words, the new formulation of foreign policy show that Turkey’s ambitions were beyond the inclination of isolationist foreign policies. Since the emergence of AKP what has occurred was a general repositioning of Ankara in the regional and global context to the detriment of Turkey’s foreign policy interpretation as merely anchored to the West. The turning point raising awareness on the new international course of events was the 1991 Gulf crisis and the political development in the Balkans and Caucasus. In this frame, the alliance with NATO and US was reaffirmed as both interests converge in the promotion of democratic, secular, and Western-​oriented regimes and fight against terrorism. Hence, Turkey was the suitable actor to stabilize the Black Sea region, control the access to the Mediterranean, balance the Russian presence in the Caucasus, offer

212  Valeria Giannotta an antidote against Islamic fundamentalism, and serve as a Middle Eastern anchor to NATO. Nevertheless, the new Turkish military strategy, along with NATO’s new strategic concept adopted in Rome in 1991, emphasized four objectives: deterrence, forward defense, military contribution to crisis management and intervention in crises, and collective defiance/​security.14 Thanks to its diplomatic outreach, army, and experience of the development of new strategies against security threats coming from the east and the south, Turkey’s membership in the Alliance was, indeed, still a vital element for the whole NATO-​framed security community. In this time, NATO marked its shift from collective defense to collective security and Turkey fitted the role of regional frontline as functional ally for out-​of-​area operations.15 After September 11, 2001, unfortunate events and the consequent NATO intervention in Afghanistan under the scope of out-​of-​area collective security mission, Turkey confirmed its stance by contributing to no combat actions such as the peace-​building operation along ISAF, where more than one time it took the lead. Since 2003, ISAF has been a significant mission for NATO and the Turkish army has provided its support from the very beginning. Turkey assumed the leadership of both ISAF Command and Kabul Regional Command twice until November 2010. Furthermore, since the later established NATO Afghanistan Training Mission (NTM-​A), it played an important role in empowering the Afghan Security Forces, and made personnel contributions to the NTM-​A Headquarters and to Afghan Military Education Institutions along a continue contribution of troops, capabilities, training, and educational support. By the same logic, Ankara was on stage on several other missions as member of KFOR, and the European EUFOR Althea.16 Unfortunately, in that time, NATO also started to show its first signs of stress and lack of cohesion, as it was evident during the American invasion of Iraq. While Turkey was going through an internal political transformation, the transatlantic alliance experienced a crisis leading to a refusal of some European members to deploy the Allied Mobile Force in Turkey as preventive measures before the war. Since on the eve of the US incursion into Iraq, NATO requested the deployment of AWACS aircraft, Patriot missile batteries, and equipment to Turkey as a precaution against possible retaliation actions, France, Germany, and Belgium declared their opposition by marking not only a big rift within the Alliance, but also a fear of abandonment in the Turkish political sentiment. To some extent, Turkey was in the eye of the storm:  from the American perspective, Turkey was the ally who denied its support to Operation Iraqi Freedom, while Europe marginalized Ankara just focusing on the role of the big European powers and the US. Given Turkey’s internal and external conditions, the Iraqi war opened the way to a crisis of trust between Ankara and Washington as natural outcome of the existing clash related to their different approaches to security.17 In other terms, the American policies in the Greater Middle East have been greeted with some skepticism by its Turkish counterpart, who has preferred a policy

Turkey and NATO  213 of internal transformation with the declared intention to emerge as regional leader.18

From security consumer to security provider This fluctuating relation escalated in 2007 when Turkey asked some support against the PKK threats from Northern Iraq. In that time, the violence in the fight between the Turkish armed force and PKK reached its peak and the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a resolution allowing the military incursion in North Iraq aiming at eradicating the threats and at containing the problem. This decision played a detrimental role for the alliance with the West as for the first time, some concerns related to Ankara’s hard power in the region sparked.19 The perception of Turkey shifted dramatically as many doubts on being an asset for NATO rather than a liability arose from both sides. It was evident that Turkey turned to be more a security provider than a consumer for NATO, referring also to the structure of its army which had switched into a brigade-​based from regiment division-​based for improving mobility and streamlined command and control.20 In terms of the number of troops committed to NATO, Turkey is indeed the second biggest army after the US. Still, the size and its commitment is not directly proportionate to its weight within the alliance. Despite the vivid feeling of abandonment, Ankara invested much in keeping its links functional as it acted as a pivot in the frame of the PfP in establishing friendly connections with Black Sea and Central Asia countries.21 In the transatlantic relations, however, a new phase emerged, leading Turkey to leave its functional-​ally position and to assume the role of strategic partner, relying also on its use of soft power in dealing with regional issues. At the core of the new relations lays the fact that Turkey was an indispensable partner in the Middle East, as the agreement to deploy the missile defense system under the scope of the European Phased Approach (EPAA) against direct threats shows. Anyhow, Ankara’s confidence in the Atlantic alliance began to crumble and its frustration with the West exacerbated as the EU enlargement process included some former Warsaw Pact countries as well as Cyprus while Turkey was excluded.22 It was this resentment –​along with the above-​mentioned social and political dynamics  –​that stresses the relevance of a Eurasian foreign policy. In fact, the strategic divergence between AKP government and the Bush administration was wide, but after Barack Obama’s election a window of opportunity to improve the quality of the transatlantic relations was recorded.23 Finally, the strategic partnership was conceived for the resolution of some crucial nodes of international politics such as the management of the situation in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan; the containment of Islamic terrorism; energy security; the relationship with Russia and the situation in the Caucasus.24 A  greater involvement of Ankara in the definition of a western common political agenda was elaborated in 2006 “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue” and reaffirmed during the visit to Turkey of then-​US

214  Valeria Giannotta Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in March 2009. In that occasion, she said that: We share a commitment to democracy, a secular constitution, respect for religious freedom, faith in a free market and a sense of global responsibility (…) Although Turkey has extraordinary capabilities that enable it to play a key role in the Middle East, Caucasus and the Balkans, it will never be able to resolve these complicated conflicts on its own. Turkey’s unique characteristics are among the factors that make it capable of playing an important and constructive role in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans. However, Turkey’s activities and efforts alone are not enough to bring these conflicts to resolution. We need to connect Turkish energy to the capabilities of the US and the European Union. (…) This synergy should improve the overall effectiveness of the Euro-​Atlantic community.25 The Turkish side had welcomed these words and they were perceived as a new starting point in the transatlantic relations. Moreover, with reference to the stability of the Middle East region, the hope was clearly expressed in seeing Turkey engaged in the front line of the negotiations between Israel and Palestine and in working together to normalize the situation in Iraq. More intense cooperation between the United States, Turkey, Iraq and all neighboring states would be needed to lay the foundations for a new dialogue that reconciles the differences and increases common security: Iraq, Turkey and the United States they face the common threat of terrorism, which includes Al-​Qaeda and the PKK. There is no excuse for anyone who terrorizes any nation. As President and ally of NATO, I guarantee that Turkey will have our support against the terrorist activities of the PKK. These efforts will be reinforced by the ongoing effort to build cooperative ties between Turkey, the Iraqi government and the Kurdish leaders of Iraq, and by the continued effort to promote education and opportunities for the Kurds of Turkey (…).These efforts will be reinforced by the ongoing effort to build cooperative ties between Turkey, the Iraqi government and the Kurdish leaders of Iraq, and by the continued effort to promote education and opportunities for the Kurds of Turkey (…).26 Although the two allies were united by very specific strategic objectives, the Turkish transatlantic relations did not just reach a point of relaxation. On the contrary, they have started to go through new turbulent moments, reaching the lowest peaks in recent history. The indicators are many. The thorniest issues concern the Turkish–​Israeli ties, Iran, and the relations with the Middle Eastern neighbors during and after the Arab springs. Actually, the relations with Tel Aviv have been the testing ground for the stability of the ties between Ankara and Washington, but still the situation seem destined to cast some

Turkey and NATO  215 more shadows.27 Coming to Iran, by siding with Tehran within the framework of the bilateral mediation with Brazil in 2010 about the nuclear issue, Turkey fomented the suspects of changing axis in its international policy. The approach to the Iranian nuclear issue underlined profound differences between Turkey and the Western allies about the implementation of sanctions. At this regard, Turkey had caused a serious break in the Atlantic alliance to the extent that it found itself further isolated within the international community.28 However, along the draft of 2010 NATO new Strategic Concept centered on vital issues such as nuclear policy; partnerships; transformation and future of its structures –​some crucial knots emerged. Indeed, while the Arab awakening arose Turkey as a model for the Middle East, the West first acknowledged Ankara’s political importance as valuable partner and democratizing actor for the area. Then, as the situation deteriorated, it surrendered to the unpredictable geostrategic realities of the region. Due to the circumstances and to the emerging regional security vacuum, in Lisbon Ankara subscribed the new strategic concept. Definitely, among the other things, the Syrian turmoil pushed Turkey to make a choice of camp and to remark the importance on NATO in Ankara’s security calculation. Although the transformation of the Atlantic Alliance was included in the foreign agenda of AKP government, Turkey’s relations with the West have been further tested by the tension over the approval regarding the installation of defense missile shields on Turkey’s territory.29 That was a project proposed firstly by the Bush administration and later Obama took it up with the aim at containing threats coming from the Gulf. The Turkish interest proved to be vivid to the extent that the government decided to host also an X-​Band radar site as part of NATO’s ballistic missile defense in the south-​east of Turkey in order to protect its own and the allies’ security.30 This signed another turning point in the regional dynamic and in the relations with the neighbors since Iran and Russia openly expressed their opposition to the placement of the missiles in Turkey claiming that they would increase tension in the surroundings.

Recent developments and Syrian issue Recent history shows that the relations between Turkey and other NATO allies are hectic. Indeed, by looking in retrospect, past periods were certainly more positive as the situation gradually deteriorated due to the cooling of Ankara’s democratic zeal and divergent priorities in the Middle East, especially in the Syrian conflict. Anyhow, the recession in Ankara’s transatlantic approach is directly related to the crisis occurred with the US. Actually, profound disagreements emerged in 2016. In one hand, Turkey was not pleased by the US alliance with the Syrian Kurds and its frustration was further deepener over the void request for the extradition of Fetullah Gülen, the imam residing in Pennsylvania and accused by Ankara to be the architect of July 15, 2016, failed coup. Precisely, the unfortunate events of July 2016 were a sort of watershed for Turkey’s internal politics and the relations with its partners

216  Valeria Giannotta as they affected dramatically the society and the perception about Turkey’s key allies. The fact that in that night the putchist planes took off from İncirlik Air Base, which is used by US and some other NATO members, that some of the putschists were from the ranks of NATO officers, further reinforced Turkey’s belief that the US was had prior knowledge of the coup attempt and this perception was endorsed by the delayed American condemnation of the coup attempt.31 Nevertheless, another main dividing issue refers to the American support granted to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), considered by Turkey as the PKK’s Syrian wing. The Kurdish ambitions along the Turkish–​Syrian border, indeed, are like a direct threat to Turkish national unity. In this frame, Ankara has repeatedly urged Washington to cease any kind of support in order to counter the Kurdish ambition to create an autonomous enclave and avoid spillovers in Turkey. On the American side, instead, harsh criticism arose over Turkey’s authoritarian tendencies. Shortly, Turkey was no longer perceived as a “model” for the Middle East. Thus, relations remained affected by profound structural defects. Definitely, this did not help to overcome the widespread and longstanding anti-​American sentiment in Turkey. Specularly, considerable political distrust has grown among Washington’s political elites toward the Turkish leadership as reflected in Obama’s remarks, which defined Erdoğan as “a failure and an authoritarian.”32 Moreover, institutional resentment has also developed in the defense and security apparatus for disagreements on how to stop the flow of foreign fighters heading to the territories controlled by the Islamic State (ISIS) and how to fight it not only with air operations but also by land. Along the advance of ISIS and the consequent launch of NATO air raids in Syria, Turkey has been the destination of a large number of Kurdish refugees fleeing the city of Kobane, where the advance of the Caliphate threatened the local community. Despite the vague tones, Ankara supported the anti-​ISIS coalition, although it showed a clearer interest in supporting the ground operations of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).33 In the spirit of preventive actions to contain threats, in August 2016 the military operation Euphrates Shield was launched in support of the FSA with the aim of “cleaning up” and “securing” from the threats around 2,000 km border area around Jarabulus.34 At this point, Turkey definitely sealed its transformation from “consumer” to “security provider” by turning its soft power into military involvement in both Syria and Iraq. It follows that both Turkey and the US started to doubt about the mutual credibility as reliable partners, to the extent that over time both sides have tested their limits by investing in relations with other actors in order to protect their own interests.35 While the US, as main Turkey’s NATO partner, engaged the Syrian Kurds in the fight against the Islamic State, by posing a direct threat to Ankara, Turkey followed a rapprochement with Russia, aggravating the confidence crisis already existing within NATO and deepening its own abandonment feeling. Both Barack Obama and Donald Trump had promised that their collaboration with the YPG would end and all weapons would be immediately

Turkey and NATO  217 withdrawn. (…) The Americans have not kept their promises; we expect concrete steps, not just words […]. Washington should immediately stop collaborating with terrorists; we want them to honor their words.36 By using these words, the Turkish policymakers have repeatedly shown their disagreement with the American strategic choices. In open confrontation to Washington, in January 2018 a second joint military intervention with the FSA was promoted aimed at defeating the YPG in the Syrian canton of Afrin. Announced as a useful action to “get rid of terror nests in Syria,” the so-​ called Olive Branch operation was also a source of national pride for Turkey. Indeed, by securing the border, Erdoğan announce to give an “Ottoman slap” to anyone attempting to question Turkey’s tenure.37 Domestically, the political rhetoric turned to be more national oriented and by pivoting on a sort of renewed Islamic-​nationalist synthesis Erdoğan was able to carry the country toward a full presidential system.38 As a corollary of this new political inclination, much more self-​referential also at international level, Ankara signed a defense agreement with Moscow. The agreement allowed Turkey to purchase the Russian S-​400 defense system, whose delivery started in July 2019. As expected, the deal marked a deep watershed in the transatlantic relations to the extent that the debate on a possible exit of Turkey from the alliance emerged from many sides. After the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the S-​400 delivery to Turkey has been the most critical point in the relations with the West. The S-​400 surface-​to-​air missile system, known among NATO member as SA-​ 21 Growler, represent the last stage of development of the S-​300 technology, introduced during the Cold War by the USSR to retaliate the use of Patriot US missile batteries. Indeed, the core of tension between Turkey, the US, and NATO is strictly tied to the F-​35 issue as beforehand Ankara had decided to take part in the Lockheed Martin F-​35 program and to purchase 100 aircrafts by investing almost USD 9 billion.39 Since for Washington the F-​35 endowment is not compatible to the S-​400 installation, the US warned Turkey that any defense cooperation with Russia would compromise the F-​35s delivery. The main concern is that the S-​400 defense system may be used by Russian technicians such as a Trojan horse to have access to sensitive information on F-​35 radar deterrence. Therefore, the American reaction was not long in coming. Although President Trump has alleged responsibility for the Turkish decision on the former Obama administration, which had refused Ankara’s request to purchase Patriot missiles, in July 2019 Turkey was excluded from the F-​35 program.40 Furthermore, the US Congress even announced its intention to evaluate the use of Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the 2017 anti-​terrorism law aimed at imposing sanctions against anyone making agreements with the Russian defense industry. The tear in the transatlantic relations has been serious since almost all NATO allies agree on the idea that the installation of the S-​400 system is incompatible with the purchase of the F-​35s. In other words, the Turkish–​Russian cooperation was perceived as a contradiction of the principles uniting the

218  Valeria Giannotta whole Atlantic organization.41 The longstanding Turkey–​NATO membership, thus, was subjected to a fierce criticism, overall by those European countries considering Russia a growing threat. Moreover, a legitimate concern over Moscow’s strategy to divide and weaken NATO by using the partnership with Turkey spread in the West.

Old partner, new problems Nowadays, Turkey proves to be committed to balance its position as an ally of the US, NATO member, and at the same time as a promoter of the Astana group with Russia and Iran. Nevertheless, Turkey is the only NATO member whose national integrity is directly threatened as it is exposed to the violence from its 911-​km border with Syria. In face of the American withdrawal from Syria at the end of 2019, the hypothesis of the creation of a buffer zone has started to take shape and also to be endorsed by Washington, despite the thorny issue of the Kurdish militias. By marking a sort of strategic continuity with the former transborder military operations  –​namely Euphrates Shield (2016) and Olive Branch (2018)  –​on October 9, 2019, the Turkish armed forces, supporting the Syrian National Army (SNA), raided again into Syria. Unlike the other times, Turkey got criticized by the international community for acting in violation of international law. Regarded as a sudden invasion, the EU immediately condemned Turkey for its unilateral action, adding that “Turkish military action risks prolonging instability in north-​east Syria, providing fertile ground for the rebirth of Daesh.”42 Some American harsh warnings followed. Indeed, US President Trump did not lose time to inform Ankara that he would “completely destroy and erase” the country’s economy if Turkey took “off limits” actions, as a tweet dated October 7, 2019, clearly stated.43 The tweets were followed by a telephone conversation and a letter sent to the Turkish President Erdoğan, suggesting to “not be stupid” and to avoid any military action.44 The launch of Peace Spring Operation was the response. Despite the international criticism, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg acknowledged in several occasions the critical position of Turkey as forefront of crisis and its legitimate security concern about Syria: Turkey has suffered horrendous terrorist attacks and it hosts millions of Syrian refugees [recommending] to act with restraints and ensure that any action it may take in northern Syria is proportionate and measured.45 During his visit to Istanbul on October 11, 2019, Stoltenberg reiterated the importance of Turkey as “strong member of the Alliance” praising the deep relations built over decades. Underlining once again that Turkey is at the forefront of a very volatile region, he added that No other ally has suffered more terrorist attacks. No other ally is more exposed to the instability, violence and turmoil from the Middle East.

Turkey and NATO  219 And no other NATO ally hosts so many refugees as Turkey does, many of them from Syria [and that] over the years, NATO has invested more than 5 billion dollars in military facilities in Turkey, including important infrastructure such as naval bases and radar sites. All of this clearly demonstrates NATO’s strong commitment to Turkey’s security.46 Furthermore, by entangling the dividing issue of the S-​400 system, Stoltenberg expressed concerns about the impact of Turkey’s decision. While it is for Turkey to decide which system to purchase, there are real issues related to the lack of interoperability with NATO systems and the potential risk for allied aircrafts.47 In front of such a crisis and lack of consent to the Turkish operation, this was the formal stance of the Alliance while for Ankara it was a further opportunity to prove its diplomatic flexibility. After escalating tones and constant confrontations with Washington, the ground was ready to find a mediation. Indeed, the visit to Turkey of US Vice President Pence and the Secretary of State Pompeo had the positive outcome to produce a joint statement regarding actions coordination; ceasefire and control of the safe zone in Syria.48 However, it was not all. A few days after the Turkish–​American deal, Turkey signed a new agreement with Russia on the control of the safe zone and on the establishment of a common mechanism ensuring the end of hostilities.49 Although this multirhythmic diplomacy was not new in the Turkish agenda, a new spiral of tension sparked in the West and among the Atlantic allies as the French President Macron declared NATO affected by “brain death.”50 The main reference of such statement was on the NATO’s failure to respond to the Turkish offensive in Syria, by highlighting some criticism toward American dominant position within the Alliance. It was in this spirit on December 3 and 4, 2019, in London took place the celebration for NATO’s 70th anniversary. Many issues were on the table as many were the dividing points, but the most critical one was the Turkish dossier. The main and most recent reason of tension between Ankara and the allies obviously concerned the Peace Spring Operation. However, while the European states have once again shown their inability to act collectively, proposing an embargo on the sale of arms that was substantially void, Washington also reacted decisively. In terms of armaments, the controversial Turkish decision to purchase the S-​400 air defense system from Russia and the start of negotiations for the procurement of the Russian Su-​35 jet was equally relevant. Added to this, there was the tactical-​military cooperation with Russia on Syria that, by marking a reversal in the conflict in favor of the Assad regime, raised doubts about a stricter alignment of Ankara with Moscow.51 Indeed, although the Turkish attempt to act as a strategic partner for both the West and Russia was evident, it was worrying for many. Definitely, this zigzag strategy contributed to cast a shadow of suspicion on Ankara’s reliability within NATO. A lack of

220  Valeria Giannotta credibility was somehow confirmed also by the attitude of Turkey in the cosmetic opposition to the Graduated Response Plan proposed within NATO to increase the security of the Baltic states.52 In addition, the more recent controversy over the drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean did not play in favor of Turkey, thickening further the discontent. Conversely, on the other side, Ankara’s request to recognize the YPG as a terrorist organization by the alliance did not produce any concrete result. Indeed, although in the third point of the final declaration of the London Summit were listed the threats to the security of the alliance such as Russia and terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations,” this was acknowledged just as a partial recognition of Turkey’s strategic priorities.53 Despite the cracks, all those elements prove the importance of Turkey as strategic partner for NATO. Therefore, a break-​up is just not a convenient option for either side or a realistic eventuality. NATO plays a central role in the security of Turkey, by making significant contributions for Turkey to be integrated in the Euro-​Atlantic community as Turkey adopted the common values the allies share. However, along the changes in the international system it became evident that Turkey’s security preferences are not relegated just to the diktat of the Alliance as Ankara emerged as a regional player. However, in the foreseeable future Turkey may see NATO as a useful multilateral tool in the region. This was evident in Turkey’s insistence on putting NATO in control of the Libyan intervention. While in official terms Turkey was initially reluctant to support any intervention in Libya, once France and the UK, with US support, started to launch an aerial campaign using NATO assets, Turkey decided to lobby for bringing the whole operation under the control of NATO. Then, Turkey became an active participant of the Operation Unified Protector.54 Therefore, there was room to think that, for the future, Turkey and NATO would reestablish a solid bond of trust. Nowadays, their relations between stands mainly on convenience. Indeed, for Ankara leaving NATO for Russia is not an option due to the different interests in relevant theaters such as the Black Sea. On the other hand, it is essential for NATO to start an internal debate aiming at transforming itself in a global organization, by overcoming particular interests and internal divisions. Currently, while there are some urgent external challenges –​such as the expansion of Russia and China –​some problems are occurring within the Alliance too. The US itself has established defensive deals with regimes far from the spirit of NATO and moreover has undermined relations with Iran, while it undertook the unilateral decision to move the Israeli capital to Jerusalem in spite of dozens of international resolutions. Added to this, the political crisis of EU and the serious discrepancies among the western allies do not help overcome these challenges. Not surprisingly, from a regional perspective, Turkey entangles all these problems, jeopardizing further its credibility. It is clear that in front of common challenges it is more appropriate than ever both for Turkey and for the Alliance to work together in order to rebuild a mutual trust and understanding. The anti-​American and anti-​NATO sentiment is dramatically

Turkey and NATO  221 increasing in Turkey, as a recent survey shows. According to PEW Research Center survey, Turkey ranks as the most pessimistic among the member states. Indeed, Turks are particularly unfavorable toward the alliance: roughly half or more express a negative opinion while just 21 percent of them have a positive opinion of NATO.55 Revitalizing relations, then, seems to be an obligatory step and it does not require only a balanced diplomatic rhetoric, but also an intergovernmental effort and constructive dialogue among civil societies.

Notes 1 D.J.K. “Greece, Turkey and NATO.” The World Today 8, 4 (1952): 162–​169. 2 G. Aybet. “The Evolution of NATO’s Three Phases and Turkey’s Transatlantic Relationship.” Perceptions 17, 1 (2012): 19–​36. 3 V. Saigha. “NATO and Turkey:  Where is the Partnership Headed.” REPATS, Brasília/​Brazil, special Issue, 2 (2019): 239. 4 J. Sakkas and N. Zhukova. “The Soviet Union, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem, 1967–​1974.” Les cahiers Irice 1, 10 (2013): 123. 5 J. Miller. Foreign Relations of the United States:  Cyprus, Greece & Turkey. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2000, 108–​109. 6 B. Ecevit. Diş Politica. Ankara: Ajans Turk, 1976. 7 M. Erdem. “US President L.B. Johnson’s Letter of 1964 and Its Impact on Turkish Public Opinion.” Uluslararası Sosyal Aratırmalar Dergisi –​Journal of International Social Research 7, 33, (2014): 309. 8 A. Çarkoğlu and E.  Kalaycioğlu. The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 10. 9 B. Toprak. “The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey,” in State, Democracy and the Military, M. Heper and A. Evin (eds.), 119–​136. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988. 10 B. Toprak. Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey. Istanbul: TESEV, 2007. 11 Y. Atasoy. Turkey, Islamists and Democracy. Transition and Globalization in a Muslim State. London and New York: Tauris, 2005. 12 Ü. Cizre. “The Justice and Development Party and the military. Recreating the past after reforming it?,” in Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey. The Making of the Justice and Development Party, Ü. Cizre, 135. London and New York: Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, 2008. 13 A. Davutoğlu. Statejik Derinlik. Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 2001, 143–​149. 14 A.L. Karaosmanoğlu, and M.  Kibaroğlu. “Defense reform in Turkey,” in Post-​ Cold War Defense Reform:  Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States, I. Gyarmati and T. Winkler (eds.), 140. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002. 15 T. Oğuzlu. “Turkey and NATO.” Adam Akademi 3, 1 (2013): 1–​10. 16 G. Aybet. “The Evolution of NATO’s Three Phases and Turkey’s Transatlantic Relationship.” 17 M. Perris. “Allergic Partners:  Can US–​Turkish Relations be Saved?,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 4, 1 (2005): 49–​58. 18 Z. Öniş and Y. Şuhnaz. “Between Europeanization and Euro-​Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era,” Turkish Studies 10, 1 (2009): 7–​24. 19 M. Kibaroğlu and T. Oğuzlu. “Turkey and Unites States in the twenty-​first century: friends or foes?” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 20, 4 (2008): 381.

222  Valeria Giannotta 20 G. Aybet. “The Evolution of NATO’s Three Phases and Turkey’s Transatlantic Relationship.” 21 S. Güvenç and S. Özel. “NATO and Turkey in the post-​Cold War world: between abandonment and entrapment.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 12, 4 (2012): 533–​553. 22 G. Tol and Ö. Taşpinar. “Turkey’s Russian Roulette,” in The Mena Region:  A Great Power Competition, A. Varvelli and K. Mezran (eds.), 112. Milan: Ispi and Atlantic Council, 2019. 23 F. Türkmen. “Turkish-​American Relations:  A Challenging Transition.” Turkish Studies 10, 1 (2009): 115. 24 K. Kirişçi. “US-​Turkish Relations: New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership,” in Turkey in World Politics:  An Emerging Multiregional Power, B.  Rubin and K. Kirişçi (eds.), 132–​137. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. 25 Y. Schleifer. “Turkey:  Hillary Clinton Presses ‘reset’ button with key ally.” Eurasianet. March 10, 2009. https://​eurasianet.org/​turkey-​hillary-​clinton-​presses-​ reset-​button-​with-​key-​us-​ally. 26 I. Lasser. “The Visit and After:  Changing Style and Substance in U.S.-​Turkish Relations.” On Turkey, GMF. 2009. 27 W. Hale. “Turkey and the Middle East in the New Era.” Insight Turkey 11, 3 (2009): 143–​159. 28 V. Gönül. “Turkey-​ NATO Relations and NATO’s New Strategic Concept.” Turkish Policy 9, 1 (2010): 20–​21. 29 T. Oğuzlu. “Turkey and NATO.” Adam Akademi 3, 1 (2013): 1–​10. 30 S. Egeli and S.  Güvenç. “Missile Defense System of NATO and Turkey.” OrtadoĞuAnaliz, 2012, 19–​30. 31 A. Aydintaşbaş and K. Kirişi. “The United States and Turkey Friends, Enemies, or Only Interests.” Brookings, Turkey Project Policy Paper, Number 12, 2017. 32 J. Goldberg. “The Obama Doctrine.” The Atlantic. April 2016 issue. www. theatlantic.com/​magazine/​archive/​2016/​04/​the-​obama-​doctrine/​471525/​ 33 V. Giannotta. Erdoğan e il suo partito. AKP tra riformismo e conservatorismo. Rome: Castelvecchi, 2018, 76–​77. 34 M. Yeşiltaş, M. Seren, and N. Özçelik. Operation Euphrates Shield. Implementation and Lesson Learned. Ankara: SETA Publication, 2017. 35 A. Aydintaşbaş and K. Kirişi, “The United States and Turkey Friends, Enemies, or Only Interests,” 2017. 36 Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlűt Çavusoğlu. See:  Anadolu Agency. “US’ YPG army plan ‘irreversibly’ harms ties with Turkey: FM Çavusoğlu.” Hürriyet Daily News. January 17, 2018. www.hurriyetdailynews.com/​us-​plan-​to-​set-​ up-​border-​guard-​force-​irreversibly-​harms-​us-​turkey-​ties-​fm-​cavusoglu-​125850. 37 Turkish President Erdoğan, commenting on the American stance in Syria and the support granted to YPG, during a parliamentary session in February 2018 said “Those who say they would respond if targeted, they have never tasted an  Ottoman slap.” www.hurriyetdailynews.com/​opinion/​sedat-​ergin/​erdogans-​ handshake-​and-​ottoman-​slap-​doctrine-​127697. 38 V. Giannotta. Erdoğan e il sup partito, 2018, 101–​103. 39 J. Zanotti and C. Thomas. “Turkey: Background, U.S. Relations, and Sanctions in Brief.” Congressional Research Service, November 8, 2019. 40 M. Yegin. “Turkey between NATO and Russia: The Failed Balance Turkey’s S-​400 Purchase and Implications for Turkish Relations with NATO.” SWP Comment, 3 (2019): 1–​4.

Turkey and NATO  223 41 J. Zanotti and C. Thomas. “Turkey: Background, U.S. Relations, and Sanctions in Brief,” 2019. 42 Statement of EU High Representative on the recent developments in Syria: www. consilium.europa.eu/​e n/​p ress/​p ress-​releases/​2 019/​1 0/​0 9/​d eclaration-​by-​t he-​ high-​representative-​o n-​b ehalf-​o f-​t he-​e u-​o n-​recent-​d evelopments-​i n-​n orth-​ east-​syria/​. 43 On October 7, 2019 Trump’s tweet reads: “as I strongly affirmed previously, and only to reiterate it, if Turkey does something that I, in my great and unmatched wisdom, consider off limits, I will destroy and totally erase economy of Turkey (I’ve done it before!). Turkey, Europe and the rest of them must be careful …” 44 Donald Trump’s bizarre, threatening letter to Erdoğan: “Don’t be a fool.” www. theguardian.com/​us-​news/​2019/​oct/​16/​trump-​letter-​erdogan-​turkey-​invasion. 45 www.aa.com.tr/​en/​middle-​east/​turkey-​has-​legitimate-​security-​concerns-​nato-​ chief/​1607547. 46 Joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​ natohq/​opinions_​169574.htm?selectedLocale=en. 47 Joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​ natohq/​opinions_​169574.htm?selectedLocale=en. 48 Joint Turkish-US Statement on Northeast Syria, Presidency of the Republic of  Turkey, www.tccb.gov.tr/​en/​speeches-​statements/​558/​111164/​joint-​turkish-​us-​ statement-​on-​northeast-​syria. 49 Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and Russian Federation. October 22, 2019. www.tccb.gov.tr/​en/​news/​542/​112260/​-​turkey-​and-​russia-​will​not-​allow-​any-​separatist-​agenda-​on-​syrian-​territory. 50 “Emmanuel Macron warns Europe:  NATO is becoming brain-​ dead.” The Economist. November 7, 2019. www.economist.com/​europe/​2019/​11/​07/​emmanuel-​ macron-​warns-​europe-​nato-​is-​becoming-​brain-​dead. 51 D. Zandee. “70  years of NATO:  the Alliance in troubled waters.” Militaire Spectator 188, 4, 2019. 52 R. Emmott. “Exclusive:  Turkey holds up NATO military plans over Syria dispute  –​ sources.” Reuters. November 26, 2019. www.reuters.com/​article/​us-​nato-​ summit-​turkey-​exclusive/​exclusive-​turkey-​holds-​up-​nato-​military-​plans-​over-​ syria-​dispute-​sources-​idUSKBN1Y01W0. 53 NATO. “London Declaration.” Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council. London. December 3–​4, 2019. www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​official_​texts_​171584.htm. 54 G. Aybet. “The Evolution of NATO’s Three Phases and Turkey’s Transatlantic Relationship.” 55 M. Fagan and J. Pousher. “NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States.” Pew Reasearch Center. February 9, 2020. www.pewresearch.org/​global/​2020/​02/​09/​ nato-​seen-​favorably-​across-​member-​states/​.

Index

Note: Page numbers in italics refer to figure, those in bold refer to tables. Acheson, Dean 87 Adamkas, Valdas 157 Afghanistan conflict (2003-​present) 7, 143–​7, 213–​14; Baltic states 143–​7; Denmark 92, 144; Estonia 144; Germany 106, 112; Italy 194–​5; Norway 72; Poland 130; Spain 170; UK 52; USA-​led forces 23 Albright, Madeleine 127 Alliance Contribution Rating 10 Allied Force (1999) 128; Italy 193 America see US (United States) Andreotti, Giulio 191 Arab Spings 197 Arctic Challenge exercise 75 “Asia First” campaigns 22 Australia 34 Aznar, José Maria 175 Baltic Air Policing Mission 133, 149 Baltic states 142–​66; Afghanistan conflict (2003-​present) 147–​9; conscription 156; Covid-​19 pandemic 159; defense and 149–​51; independence of 90; Italy and 201; military force 150–​1; one-​issue allies as 148; political change 154–​9; Russia, fear of 158; transatlantic bargain 154, 160; Trump and 151–​4; see also Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania Barcelona Process (1995) 175 Basque terrorism 176, 178 Berlinguer, Enrico 190 Berlin Plus agreement (2002) 193 Berlusconi, Silvio 198, 200 Bew, John 61–​2 Biden, Joseph 146–​7

Bisogniero, Claudio 195 Blair, Tony 51 Bomnolt, Julius 87 Bosnian war (1992–​1995) 7, 23; Spain 170 Bramsen, Trine 98–​9 Brexit 47, 61’ Norway, attitudes of 80; role in NATO 57–​61; UK World role 53 Brosio, Manlio 189 Brown, Harold 89 Bulgaria 149 burden sharing debate in NATO 114–​16 Bush, George H. W. 109 Bush, George W. 7, 23, 25, 51, 152, 175, 213 Byers, R. B. 41 CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act) 217 Calleo, David 28 Calvo-​Sotelo, Leopoldo  174 Cameron, David 52–​3 Canada 33–​46; Atlanticist orientation 38–​9; commitment variations 36–​7; defense budget 37, 37, 38; defense policy 35, 42–​3; foreign policy 42–​3; military force 36, 36; national interests 34–​5; neoclassical realism 33–​5; spending reductions 39–​40; state–​ society relations 35; strategic culture 34; threats, view of 38–​41; USSR, views on 39; US, subordination to 42 “Canada clause” 38 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) 36 Carpenter, Ted Galen 153

Index  225 Catalonia 178 CATO Institute 152–​3 China: economic growth 8, 25–​6; European relations 29; global influence, growth of 11; Italy, relations with 202; rise of 18, 60–​1; US, relationship with 19, 137 Cleveland, Harlan 5, 125 Clinton, Bill 7, 92 Clinton, Hilary 214 Cold War: Denmark and 96, 98; end of 22–​3; Italy and 188–​90; Norway and 71–​2 Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) 22, 79–​80 Conference on Secuity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, 1975) 190 constructive role, US 24–​5 Conte, Giuseppe 196, 198–​9 counterweight, Canada & Europe 35, 38, 42 Covid-​19 pandemic 1; Baltic states 159; Italy 203; Poland 135 Spain 178–​9; Crandell, Matthew 151 Craxi, Bettino 190 Crimean annexation (2014) 2; Baltic states 147; Canada 40–​1; Norway 69; Poland 131; USA-​led response 24 CSCE (Conference on Secuity and Cooperation in Europe, 1975) 190 CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy) 22, 79–​80 Cyprus, Turkey and 207, 208–​9 Davutoğlu, Ahmet 211 Defence Agreement (1993–​94, Denmark) 91 de Gaulle, Charles 6 Demirel, Süleyman 209 democracy preservation 38 Denmark 85–​103; Cold War 87–​90, 96, 98; defense pacts 87; military budget 86, 89, 93, 94, 94–​6; military conflicts 90–​1; military force 87–​8, 91; NATO leadership 90–​3; neutrality of 86; nuclear missile refusal 88; relationship with NATO 97; Strategic Communications campaign 95; US base refusal 88; US special relationship 86; USSR threat 86 Denmarkisation 89–​90 Department of National Defense (Canada) 35

Dini, Lamberto 193 DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) 58–​9 Eagle Guardian 148 Eastern Europe: UK alliances 57; USSR orientation 20 Ecevit, Bulent 209 economic cooperation, Russia–​Italy 200 EDF (Estonian Defense Force) 144 EDF (European Defense Fund) 80 EDI (European Defence Initiative) 133 eFP (Enhanced Forward Presence) 154 Ellemann-​Jensen, Uffe  92 EPAA (European Phased Approach) 213 Erbakan, Necmettin 210 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 143, 159, 161, 207, 217 ERI (European Reassurance Initiative) 133 ESDI (European Security and Defense Identity) 22 Estonia: elections 2015 154; elections 2019 155; Finland, relations with 155–​6; interna; politics 143; military budget 151–​2; military force 156–​7; Russia relationship 149, 152, 158; security plan B 160; US air bases 149; US relationship 151 Estonian Defense Force (EDF) 144 EU see European Union (EU) Euphrates Shield (2016) 216–​17, 218 Europe: China, relations with 29; military budget 28; military force 28; Russia, relations with 29; USA cultural attitudes 26 European Defence Initiative (EDI) 133 European Phased Approach (EPAA) 213 European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) 133 European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) 22 European Union (EU): Italy, cooperation with 192; NATO vs. in Spain 169; Norway, joining of 69; Norway, relationship with 80; political fragmentation 154–​5 extended deterrence 73 extra-​European orientation, UK 49 Finland: Estonia, relations with 155–​6; military force 157 Fischer, Joschka 110

226 Index France: Germany relations 5; nuclear power 8 Franco, Francisco 167 Franco–​German axis  191 Frattini, Franco 198 Frederiksen, Hjort 95 Freedman, Lawrence 2–​3 Free Syrian Army (FSA) 216 future of NATO 8–​11 Gabriel, Sigmar 117 Gaddis, John Lewis 127 Gade, Søren 91 Galeotti, Mark 132 de Gasperi, Alcide 189 Gates, Robert 23–​4, 116, 130 Geremek, Bronislaw 127 Germany 104–​24; foreign policy 105, 117; France relations 5; future concerns 21; military budget 105–​6, 114–​15, 115; military contribution to NATO 104; military interventions 108–​10, 109, 111–​13; NATO burden sharing debate 114–​16; out-​of-​area debate 110–​11; political party conflicts 110–​11, 112, 116–​17; post-​WWII 21; role in NATO 105–​17; Ukraine crisis 113–​14; see also West Germany “Global Britain” framework 57, 61–​2 Global Coalition against Daesh 196–​7 Global War on Terror (GWOT) 40, 129 González, Felipe 167 Graduated Response Plan 74 Gray, Colin, S. 135 Great Britain see UK (United Kingdom) Greece 5–​6 Gringrich, Newt 152 Grybauskaitè, Dalia 148, 157 Gülen, Fetullah 215–​16 Gulf War (1990–​1991) 23, 211 GWOT (Global War on Terror) 40, 129 Hækkerup, Hans 92 Helme, Mart 156, 160 Herbert Report (1967) 189 Holtby, Christopher 144 Hong Kong 60–​1 Hungary 27, 110, 128, 135, 200 ICI (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) 194 Ilves, Toomas Hendrik 150, 157 INF Treaty (1987) 10 Inönü, Ismet 209

internationalism, Spain 181–​2 international order, establishment of 4–​5 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 129, 212; Canada 40; Germany 112; Italy 194 Iran 25, 213–​14 Iraq conflict (2004-​present) 7, 213–​14; Denmark 92, 93; Italy 196;  UK 52 ISAF see International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Islamic State (ISIS) 216 Israel–​Hezbollah conflict (2006) 195 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) 194 Italy 188–​206; China, relations with 202; Cold War 188–​90; Covid-​19 pandemic 203; domestic politics 189; economic crisis of 2008 195–​7; European access 190; military budget 196; military force 191; multilateral commitments 196; post-​Cold War 190–​3; post-​ WWII 5; Russia and 199–​201; Southern flank 197–​9, 202; Trump and 201–​3; War On Terror 193–​5 Jakniūnaitè, Dovilè 149 JEF (Joint Expeditionary Force) 56, 58 Jinping, Xi 25 Johnson, Boris 47, 57, 60, 61 Johnson, Lyndon 208–​9 John Warrior exercise 55 Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) 56, 58 Kaljulaid, Kersti 158 Kennan, George F. 127 KFOR (Kosovo Force) 51 Kissinger, Henry 6 Kohl, Helmuth 110 Kola Peninula, Russian Norwegian fleet 69–​70 Korean War (1950–​1953) 6, 88 Kosovo conflict (1999-​present) 92, 109–​10, 170 Kosovo Force (KFOR) 51 Kosovo war (1998–​1999) 23, 72 Kunnas, Leo 155 Kupiecki, Robert 128 Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) 159 Kurds 215–​16; separatism 210 Latin America 27 Latvia: Canadian involvement 41; conscription 156; domestic politics

Index  227 157; military budget 151–​2, 153; military force 144–​5 Lavrov, Sergey 67 Leffler, Melvyn 20 Libyan conflict (2011) 2, 6–​7, 197; Denmark 92, 93; Germany non-​ involvement 104; Italy 198–​9; Norway 72; Poland 129; Spain 170 Liik, Kadri 158 Linkevičius, Linas 158 Lithuania 145–​6; conscription 156; domestic politics 157; military budget 151–​2, 153; US relationship 152 Litvinenko, Alexander 52–​3 Logon, Justin 152–​3 London Declaration (2019) 11 London summit (2019) 199 Macmillan, Harold 49 Macron, Emmanuel 80, 160, 219 Madrid Summit (1997) 200 Major, John 191 Mandelbaum, Michael 127 MAP (Membership Action Plan, 2008) 200–​1 Marine Corps Prepositioning Program–​ Norway (MCPP–​N)  75–​6 Maritime Allied Command (MARCOM) 55 Marquina, Antonio 174, 179–​80 Marshall Plan (1947) 5 Martin, Garrett 10 Martino, Gaetano 189 Martonffy, Balazs 10 Mattarella, Sergio 196 May, Theresa 47, 57 McCarthy, Joseph 22 MCPP-​N (Marine Corps Prepositioning Program–​Norway)  75–​6 Mead, Walter Russell 26 Mearsheimer, John 127 media, Italy and 199–​200 Mediterranean area: Italy in 191–​2; Strait of Gibralter 173; Turkey, access via 211–​12; see also Southern flank of Europe Mediterranean Dialogue (1994) 175 Membership Action Plan (MAP, 2008) 200–​1 Meri, Lennart 157 Merkel, Angela 25, 113 Middle East region, Turkey and 214

military budget: Denmark 86, 89, 93, 94, 94–​6; Estonia 151–​2; Germany 105–​6, 114–​15, 115; Italy 196; Latvia 151–​2, 153; Lithuania 151–​2, 153; Poland 125; Spain 168, 175, 178; UK 48, 54, 56–​7 military capability of NATO: European contribution to 9–​10; USA worries over 23 military conflicts: Denmark 90–​1; Germany 108–​10, 109, 111–​13 military exercises: Norway 74, 75; Spain 170, 176–​7 military force: Baltic states 150–​1; Canada 36, 36; Denmark 87–​8, 91; Estonia 156–​7; Europe 28; Finland 157; Italy 191; Latvia 144–​5; Norway 73; UK 57; US 24, 75–​6 Milli Görüs (National Vision) 210 Moavero Milanesi, Enzo 196 Monti, Mario 202 Morocco 176 Mulroney, Brian 42 Muñiz, Manuel 171–​2 Napolitano, Giorgio 198 National Defense Law (2005, Spain) 171 National Defense Strategy (NDS, 2018) 24 National Security Capability Review (NSCR) 50 National Security Strategy (NSS, 2017) 24–​5, 50, 52–​3, 170, 172 NATO 2030 initiative 11 NATO-​Afghanistan Training Mission (NTM-​A)  212 NATO defense expenditure 55 NATO Response Force (NRF) 150 NATO–​Russia Founding Act (1997) 150 NDN (Northern Distribution Network), Latvia 144 NDS (National Defense Strategy, 2018) 24 neoclassical realism, Canada 33–​5 New Strategic Concept (Italy, 1991) 191 9/​11 attacks 10; Canada, effects on 40; divide in USA 23; Italy, effects on 200; Spain, effects on 175; Turkey, effects on 212 Nixon, Richard 6 Nogovitsyn, Anatoly 131–​2 NORAD 43

228 Index Nordic Transition Support Unit (NTSU) 145 Northern Distribution Network (NDN), Latvia 144 North Korea 25 Norway 67–​84; Cold War and 71–​2; defense budget 78, 79; defense doctrine evolution 71–​3; defense posture of 77–​8; Denmark defense pact 87; dependence on NATO 78; EU, joining of 69; EU, relationship with 79–​80; military force 73; NATO, perceptions & support 76–​8; NATO role 73–​6; nuclear weapons, attitudes to 78; political opposition to 76–​7; post-​Cold War 68; Russia; relations with 67–​70; Second World War 68; security & defence priorities 70–​1; US, relations with 67, 77–​8 NRF (NATO Response Force) 150 NSCR (National Security Capability Review) 50 NSS (National Security Strategy, 2017) 24–​5, 50, 52–​3, 170, 172 NTM-​A (NATO-​Afghanistan Training Mission) 212 NTSU (Nordic Transition Support Unit) 145 Obama, Barack 7, 115–​16, 133, 142, 178, 213; Afghanistan 145; Baltic states 146–​7; European response to 23 Ocean Shield (2019) 70 Olive Branch (2018) 217, 218 OMLT (Operational Mentorship and Liaision Team) 144 Operation Atilla 208 Operation Enduring Freedom 194 Operation Herrick 52 Operation Iraqi Freedom 212–​13 Operation Odyssey Dawn 93 Operation Palliser 51 Operation Relentless 54–​5 Operation Trident Juncture 24 Operation Unified Protector 52 Oppermann, Thomas 113, 117 Ortega y Gasset, José 170 Ørvik, Nils 41 Osica, Olaf 134 Ostpolitik policy 22 Otero, Miguel 180

Pact of Madrid (1953) 173 PADR (Preparatory Action Defense Research) 80 Palermo Conference (2018) 198–​9 Peace Spring Operation 218, 219–​20 Pearson, Lester B. 38 Pence, Mike 219 Perejil Island crisis (2002) 176 Poland 125–​41; historial context 127–​30; internal problems 27; Italy and 201; military budget 125; NATO, future in 135–​7; NATO membership opposition 127; NATO, present-​day role 130–​4; physical security 128; regional leader as 134; Russia, attitude to 132; US air bases 149; US military exercises 149; US, relationship with 126, 134, 136 Politica de Estado 180 Pompeo, Mike 219 Prague Summit (2002) 129, 152 Preparatory Action Defense Research (PADR) 80 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 72–​3 Putin, Vladimir 8, 154, 200 RAP (Readiness Action Plan) 74, 150 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 92, 150 Rasmussen, Gustav 87 Rasmussen, Lars Løkke 95 Ratas, Jüri 157 Readiness Action Plan (RAP) 74, 150 Red (Rødt, Norway) 76–​7 Reinslau, Urmas 144, 157 Report of the Committee of Three on Non-​Military Collaboration (Three Wise Men’s report, 1957) 189 Resolute Support mission 73 Ringsmose, Jens 150 role theory 106–​7 Romania 149 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 21 Rühe, Volker 110–​11 Rumsfeld, Donald 7, 23 Rupšys, Valdemaras 156; Russia: Baltic states, fear of 158; bastion defence 70; Estonia, relations with 149, 152, 158; Europe, relations with 29; Northern Fleet 69–​70; Norway, relations with 67–​70; threat counternance 55–​6; Turkey, agreement with 219; Turkey, threat to 208, 209; UK, relations with

Index  229 60; USA, challenge by 19; see also USSR Russia–​Georgia War (2008) 129, 131, 135, 147 Rynning, Sten 28, 150

Straujuma, Laimdota 113 Suárez, Adolfo 174 Suez crisis (1956) 6 Sweden–​Denmark defense pact 87 Syria 25; Italy 196; Turkey 215–​18

Saarts, Tõnis 154 Salvini, Matteo 202–​3 Schengen Agreement (1985) 79–​80 Schröder, Gerhard 109, 113 Scweller, Randall 168–​9 SDR (Strategic Defense Review) 50 SDSR (Strategic Defense and Security Review, 2015) 50, 51, 52–​3 Second World War: aftermath of 5; Norway 68 SFOR (Stabilization Force, Italy) 192 Sforza, Carlo 189 Shea, Jamie 145 Simonet, Henri 89 Snyder, Glenn 86 Socialist left (SV, Norway) 76–​7 Søgaard, Poul 89 Solana, Javier 170 Søreide, Ine Erisksen 69 Southern flank of Europe: Italy 197–​9, 202; Spain 175, 177, 179–​80; see also Mediterranean area “South Stream” gas pipeline 201 Spain 167–​87; Covid-​19 pandemic 178–​9; defense policy 168–​73; Europeanism vs. Atlanticism 180; foreign policy 173; internationalism 180; middle-​range power as 168, 182; military budget 168, 175, 178; military exercises 170, 176–​7; NATO, ambiguity with 167, 172; NATO, joining of 167; NATO membership 174; NATO vs. EEC 169; public opinion in internationalism 181–​2; security policy 168–​73; Southern flank of Europe 175, 177, 179–​80; strategic culture as 169–​70; terrorism 175–​6; US relations 173–​7, 178–​9, 181 Stabilization Force (SFOR, Italy) 192 St. Malo Declaration (1998) 51, 193 Stoltenberg, Jens 1, 3–​4, 11, 218–​19 Strait of Gibraltar 173, 177 Strategic Concept (2010) 148, 215 Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR, 2015) 50, 51, 52–​3 Strategic Defense Review (SDR) 50 Strategic Direction-​South Hub 198

Taft, Robert 21–​2 Tarchiani, Alberto 189 Three Wise Men’s report (Report of the Committee of Three on Non-​Military Collaboration, 1957) 189 transatlantic bargain 125; Baltic states 154, 160; Spain 173; UK and 48–​53 transatlantic relations 2, 4, 9 Treaty of Brussels (1948) 48 Trident Juncture exercise (2018) 75 Trudeau, Pierre 6, 42 Truman, Harry 18, 189 Trump, Donald 27, 60, 116–​17, 158; Baltic states and 151–​4; foreign policy 25; Italy, attitudes to 201–​3; leadership style 160; NATO obsolesence 8, 18, 25, 78, 94, 98; NATO, undermining of 28; tariffs on European produce 178; Turkey and 217, 218 Turkey 207–​23; Cold War 207–​9; conservatism 209–​10; Cyprus and 207, 208–​9; domestic factors 209–​10; foreign policy 211; internal problems 27; isolationist doctrine 208; Kurdish separatism 210; Mediterranean access 211–​12; military strategy 212; NATO, attitudes to 5–​6; populist politics 161; Russia, agreement with 219; Russia as threat 208, 209; security definitions 210–​13; security provider as 213–​15; strategic importance of 220–​1; Syrian issue 215–​18; US, relationship with 213–​15, 217–​21 Tusk, Donald 113 UK (United Kingdom) 47–​66; Brexit see Brexit; Cold War 49; defense reviews 50; Eastern Europe alliances 57; extra-​European orientation 49; military budget 48, 54, 56–​7; military force 57; negative public opinion 59; nuclear power 8; post-​Brexit role 57–​61; present day commitment 53–​7, 54; Russia, relationship with 60; transatlantic bargain and 48–​53; US “special relationship” 47, 51, 59–​60

230 Index Ukrainian conflict (2014-​present) 2, 10, 135, 148–​9; Baltic states 142; Denmark 93–​4, 98; Germany 106, 113–​14; Poland 131; USA-​led response 24 unipolar movement, USA 18 UN (United Nations), Italy and 192 United Kingdom see UK (United Kingdom) United States see US (United States) US (United States) 18–​32; Baltic state military exercises 149; China, relationship with 137; constructive role 24–​5; Denmark special relationship 86; domestic landscape 26; Estonia relationship 151; European cultural unease 26; historical contexts 20–​4; military force 24, 75–​6; NATO, future in 27–​30; NATO, leadership of 9; NATO leadersip challenges 19; NATO, present role 24–​7; Norway, relations with 67, 77–​8; nuclear power 8; Poland, relationship with 126, 134, 136; post-​Second World War 5; Spain relations 173–​7, 178–​9, 181; suboptimal membership of NATO 25; Turkey, relationship with 213–​15; UK “special relationship” 47, 51, 59–​60; worldview of 126 USSR: Canada 39; dissolution of 108–​9; ending of 2; Italy and 200; see also Russia

Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) 56, 150 Vietnam War (1955–​1975) 22 Vīķe-​Freiberga, Vaira  157 Villar, Francisco 167 VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) 56, 150 von der Leyden, Ursula 10

Vassik, Ragnhild 68 Vershbow, Alexander 195

Zapad 132 Zapatero, José Luis 178

Wales Summit (2014) 9, 114, 178 Wallace, Henry 21 Waltz, Kenneth 127 War On Terror, Italy 193–​5 Warsaw Pact, ending of 2 Warsaw Summit (2016) 132–​3, 150 Washington Treaty (1949) 5, 87 Welsh Summit (2014) 52 West–​East military mobilization 149 Western union 21 West Germany 21; NATO, accession to 107; Ostpolitik policy 22; post-​Second World War 5; status of 22; see also Germany Wivel, Anders 151 World War II see Second World War Wörner, Manfred 127 Yugoslavia conflict (1992–​96): Denmark 92; Italy 192; Poland 128;  UK 51 Yugoslavia peace mission (1992) 6–​7; Canada 36–​7, 40