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N ative Resistance and the P ax Colonial in N ew Spain
N a tive R esistance and the P ax Colonial in N ew Spain
EDITED BY SUSAN SCHROEDER
University o f Nebraska Press Lincoln and London
Chapter 3 includes material originally published in Kevin Gosner, Soldiers of the Virgin: TheMoral Economy ofa ColonialMaya Rebellion (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1992), reprinted here with permission. © 1998 by the University o f Nebraska Press All rights reserved M anufactured in the U nited States o f America © The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements o f American N ational Standard for Inform ation Sciences— Permanence o f Paper for Printed Library M aterials, a n s i Z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-inPublication Data Native resistance and the Pax Colonial in New Spain / edited by Susan Schroeder. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8032-4266-2 (cl : alk. paper). — ISBN 0-8032-9249-x (pbk. : alk. paper) i. Indians of Mexico—Government relations. 2. Indians of Mexico—Wars. 3. Mexico—History—Spanish colony, 1540—1810. I. Schroeder, Susan. F1219.3.G6N37 1998 972'.02-D C 2i 97-35833 CIP
Contents
List o f Maps
vii
Acknowledgments
ix
Introduction SUSAN SCHROEDER
XÍ
i First-Generation Rebellions in SeventeenthCentury Nueva Vizcaya SUSAN M. DEEDS
I
2 Differential Response to Colonial Control among the Mixtees and Zapotees o f Oaxaca RONALD SPORES
30
3 Religion and Rebellion in Colonial Chiapas KEVIN GOSNER 47 4 Culture, Community, and “Rebellion” in the Yucatec Maya Uprising of 1761 ROBERT W. PATCH 67 5 The Indian Insurgents o f Mezçala Island on the Lake Chapala Front, 1812—1816 CHRISTON I. ARCHER 84 6 Some Thoughts on the Pax Colonial, Colonial Violence, and Perceptions o f Both MURDO J. MACLEOD
129
vi • C O N TEN TS
Notes 143 Bibliography 169 Contributors 189 Index 191
Maps
i Regions and Cities o f New Spain xii 2 Areas o f Indian Rebellion in SeventeenthCentury Nueva Vizcaya 2 3 The Colonial Mixtee and Zapotee Heartland 4 Chiapas, Early Eighteenth Century 48 5 Political-Ecclesiastical Districts (partidos) in Eighteenth-Century Yucatan 68 6 Laguna de Chapala, 1810-21 86
32
Acknowledgments
Somewhat long in the making, this book began in March 1988 when former University o f Nebraska Press acquisitions editor Patricia A. Knapp asked me to consider editing an anthology on native resistance. H er invitation an ticipated a panel on the same subject that I chaired the following summer— actually 467 years almost to the day from when Aztec resistance to Spanish domination ended, symbolically at least, with Quauhtemoc’s surrender to Hernando Cortés. O f course, Indian societies in New Spain knew well the complex nature o f resistance, as becomes all the more evident in this vol ume. Susan Deeds and Kevin Gosner, both contributors to this work, joined me as participants in San Francisco at that Pacific Coast Branch o f the American Historical Association session in August 1988. Additionally, Mi chael C. Meyer, for years an editor for the University o f Nebraska Press’s Latin American Studies Series, was supportive from the beginning and war rants special thanks for his ongoing interest in the project. This collection has taken many forms over the last decade, and I wish to gratefully acknowledge the present contributors for their staying power. I thank, especially, Eric Van Young and an anonymous reviewer for their in sightful comments upon reading the manuscript at an earlier stage. Re spectfully, we have addressed their suggestions while keeping to our pur pose. John Aubrey, Reference Librarian, Newberry Library, Chicago, was o f great assistance, as always. And the late Wanda Sala, History Department secretary at Loyola’s Water Tower Campus, warrants accolades for her word-processing skills, good nature, and forbearance as the book evolved over the years. My family— always interested, patient, and supportive, whether here or in California—I thank all o f you once again. And finally.
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dreading to think o f just how much paper has been expended as we prepared our seemingly endless drafts and wishing to return to Mexico in some fash ion even a minute portion o f all that I have gained, I will add another dozen trees to an ongoing tree-planting project there. Susan Schroeder
Introduction SUSAN SC H R O E D E R
We should exterminate them! - Public declaration in San Miguel de Allende, Mexico, January 1994, upon learning o f indigenous protestations in Chiapas It has been almost five hundred years since the Spaniards conquered the In dians o f ancient Mexico Tenochtitlan; yet modern Mexico’s nonnative pop ulations not uncommonly still feel threatened and angry whenever there is a manifestation by indigenous groups to make known their grievances.1Why this misplaced animosity toward Indians continues is hard to understand. The natives’ protests are usually localized and only mildly disruptive, taking the form o f encampments on the capital’s zócalo or along its thoroughfares; more recently, however, they were broadcast globally by the media and re ceived international attention even though the outbreak was centered in a distant southern state. Already as a panacea and doubtless as counterpoise to the quincentenary, the U nited Nations declared the year 1993 to be that o f indigenous peoples. In N orth America, the United States designated 1992 the year of the American Indian, while Mexico’s Constitution was amended to officially place the country’s fifty-six extant indigenous languages on a parity with Spanish— an im portant initiative toward recognizing its ten million native inhabitants.2 Yet when Chiapas’s Mayas took up arms to pro test their wretched living conditions and the dismal prospects for the future that they anticipated because o f the N orth American Free Trade Agree ment, not all Mexican citizens were sympathetic.3 Nonnatives’ qualms are rooted in the colonial era, when Spaniards wor ried constantly about Indian uprisings and particularly about the vulnera-
/. Regions and Cities ofNew Spain
INTRODUCTION • Xlll
bility o f Mexico City, which, unlike contemporary European cities, was w ithout fortifications and standard means of defense.4 Eric Van Young traces this attitude back even farther, though, to “Augustinian elitism” and the tendency “to blame the victims for their victimization and miserable condition .”5 Indeed, after conquest the lot of most Indians, at least in politi cal and economic terms, changed drastically for the worse. Social and cul tural transformations were less dramatic. The irony is that in most regions, and contrary to English and French dealings with natives in other parts o f N orth America, the Spaniards were dependent on the Indians’ labor and tribute, and they were quick to adapt native institutions to their purpose, es pecially when there were economic benefits to be had. M ost indigenous groups acquiesced as long as it seemed advantageous in some way or an other for their communities, for the imposed colonial system still served to maintain the integrity o f many traditions. This is not to say that New Spain’s Indians did not fight back. From their earliest encounters with Europeans, age-old traditions o f resistance were manifested in their many forms. It should be kept in mind as well that even the Tlaxcalans, the Spaniards’ fore m ost allies, fought hard against Cortes and his men, throwing in with them only after accepting the dual realities o f the Spaniards’ military superiority and the potential personal advantages that would accrue if they were in league against the Aztecs. It took generations for the Spaniards to subdue Mexico’s native popula tions, and even then protests against Spanish exactions were not at all un com m on in the centuries that followed conquest.6 M ost often the uprisings were local and put down immediately. Then violence countered violence when the offenders were flogged, jailed, enslaved, sent into exile, or, on oc casion, executed or made into lasting examples for everyone to see by the cutting off o f their hands as a means o f preventing progression to major re volts and regional insurrection .7 The character, frequency, and ubiquity o f Spanish retaliatory measures against native resistance are only recently re ceiving the attention that they warrant. Yet then and now the colonial era has typically been thought o f as a peace ful time. To understand such a generalized perception in the face o f appar ent endemic violence is to appreciate the complexities o f cultural adjust ments and accommodation between two very distinct societies over an extensive period of time. It was not military might that enforced the peace but instead systems o f quotidian arrangements that worked more or less for both parties most o f the time. The Pax Colonial was perceived by the Spaniards as the product and priv-
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ilege o f conquest. It was an artificial construct that served to justify crown and church policies. Indeed, over the course o f three hundred years there was no concerted wave across New Spain on the part o f the Indians to oust the Spaniards. Moreover, other than an occasional presidio on the northern frontier, there were no Spanish garrisons strategically positioned to ensure crown hegemony. In fact, an idyllic pastorale was a not infrequent theme o f colonial landscape paintings. The other extreme is perhaps that o f the ste reotypical, above-reproach colonial overlord who ravaged anyone and ev erything in his dominion. The Indians, o f course, were a critical part o f any scenario. The images are credible and serve at least as partial context for studying patterns o f native resistance and episodes o f rebellion. O f even greater importance, however, is consideration o f cultural factors as they re late to resistance and other aspects o f Spanish-Indian relations. Cataloging instances o f ethnic uprising and large-scale rebellions in New Spain dramatizes this fictive peace; most useful, though, are analysis and comparison o f the particular situations when traditionally effective mecha nisms for dealing with the Spaniards failed and the dreaded rebellion re sulted. The chapters in this book represent original, empirical studies o f such occasions in New Spain. A complementary comparative analysis, how ever, is reserved for another, more comprehensive, undertaking. Definitions and descriptions o f both active and passive forms o f resis tance in many regions o f Latin America have been treated in several recent studies.8 Here, resistance is taken in its broadest sense in order to avoid ei ther too simplistic interpretations or artificially rigid categories, for just about any expression o f noncompliance on the part o f the Indians was con sidered untoward by the Spaniards. What may today appear as a fairly in nocuous activity (and probably not even “resistance”) was in the colonial period more likely an inchoate, then insidious, compounding reaction to pressure from the Spaniards. Recounted by the latter in their reports to of ficials about the Indians’ failures to comply were uncleanliness, laziness, thievery, drunkenness, failure to adhere to the sacraments, idolatry, fight ing, and flight, among a litany o f complaints about Indian behaviors. O f all, organized revolt was the most worrisome. All the while, many Spaniards prospered in the face o f increasing hardships for the natives. But not all o f New Spain’s Indian groups took up arms in rebellion; those who did appar ently suffered a cultural disequilibrium that could not be set right. And sometimes the violence was profound—the product o f generations and even centuries o f ideological, social, economic, and political accommoda tions to Spanish colonialism that finally no longer served.
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Prehispanic Precedentsfo r Resistance in E arly M exico In spite o f its protean qualities, Indian resistance was not unique to Spanish subordination. Often, peace, even in the prehispanic era, was litde more than the by-product o f a hard-fought, enforced Pax, quite like that o f the Romans, the Aztecs, or the Spaniards.9 Preservation o f the integrity o f each indigenous polity, by whatever means, was an overarching concern for most native populations, whatever the region or group size. Traditional sover eignty was prized and zealously defended. For central Mexico, Nahuatl an nals abound w ith accounts o f aggression, conflict, and resistance.10 M ore over, dating at least from the middle years o f the fourteenth century, one well-known form o f cultural resistance was institutionalized by means o f rit ual xochiyaoyotl (flower wars), thereby establishing an early pattern for successful confrontation, subordination, accommodation—and cultural persistence.11 Scheduled and choreographed, troops o f warriors, including both pipiltin (noblemen) and macehualtin (commoners) from imperialistic and inde pendent altepetl (ethnic states), met for military maneuvers and combat and sometimes for the taking o f captives for sacrifice.12 The xochiyaoyotl were grandiose displays o f superiority for new and prospective subordinate groups, and they were repeated from time to time for the same effect. Knowledge and anticipation o f xochiyaoyotl permitted independent poli ties to consolidate and ready themselves.13 Thus, over the course o f 150 years, even with subjugation, many essentials of the indigenous corporation re mained intact, and it continued to function much as before. Writing in the 1620s, Nahua historian Chimalpahin noted ruefully that for his ancestors the golden age o f the Chalca ended in 1464 after years o f xochiyaoyotl, with con quest by the Mexica.14 In truth, although royal lineages were interrupted and the Mexica overlords appointed local rulers, in most other ways the Chalca ethnic state continued to flourish—for centuries afterward .15 (It is w orth noting that Chimalpahin registered no such complaint about con quest by the Spaniards; for him, the best o f times were already in the past.) 16 Additionally, some native ethnic states thwarted Aztec domination alto gether and enjoyed their autonomy in spite o f provocations.17 Generally, numerous forms o f resistance to imperial Aztec hegemony were probably already in place and operating at various levels when H er nando Cortés and his men arrived at Veracruz. However, the formalized rules and battlegrounds for “flowery combat” were not practicable for the Spaniards. As might be expected, the Indians had a full range o f alternatives to bring into play as they dealt with the colonists over the years. Many are
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considered in the following chapters: for example, resistance in the form o f indigenous-Christian organizations and rituals, revitalization and millenarian movements, litigation, token missionization, outright revolt, or a combination o f one or several—to conserve the community and familiar ways o f doing things. Prophetically, in speaking o f resistance and describing the Chalca xochiyaoyotl in 1376, Chimalpahin reported that only commoners died.18Centuries later, in 1956 and reflecting on the Mexican Revolution and violence in general, another Mexican Indian, Elias (Scarface) Caso in Na ranja, Michoacan, echoed, “The generals live and the soldiers die.”19 The plea o f the Chiapas Mayas resounds at the close o f the millennium.
Colonialism and P atterns ofResistance in N ew Spain Spanish methods for negotiating with newly encountered sedentary popu lations were perfected on the islands and then brought to the mainland.20 Typically, there was a relatively favorable and mutual sizing up by both par ties, some gift: giving, and then the local indigenous leader was taken cap tive. Booty was brought as ransom, although the ruler was seldom set free. A bloody uprising followed, resulting in harsh reprisal by Spanish authori ties, subjugation, and the beginning o f a prolonged series o f adjustments and readjustments between the conquerors and the natives. In Mexico City these interactions were particularly intense, as a colonial municipality was constructed on the ruins o f the ancient capital with the labor and produce o f the survivors o f its former inhabitants. Life was harsh for most Indians, al though a few managed to curry the favor o f Spanish officials and priests, thereby enjoying considerable prestige and benefits. Often serving as inter mediaries between the Spaniards and their own indigenous groups, such in dividuals existed and distinguished themselves wherever Spaniards were liv ing among or needed the services o f Indians. And when an outbreak o f rebellion occurred, such a person or someone emulating the role frequendy assumed a leadership position. On occasion, however, the intermediaries themselves were provocateurs o f excessive hardship and were then the tar gets o f the rebels, for they abused their positions to an extreme among their subjects. In the capital tensions were always high, and there were rules and barriers to keep Indians at a safe distance from the Spaniards. Litde reported are the mundane goings-on in the city. Receiving lasting notice, however, are the two urban riots in the seventeenth century (essentially the only urban up heavals during the entire colonial period). The first, reportedly a protest
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against high food prices in 1624, has been little studied, although the Indians certainly were involved in the attack on the viceroy’s palace. The riot o f 1692 is more thoroughly documented, and the natives’ violent reaction to Span ish practices was a critical factor at this time as well. In both cases, however, the uprisings are believed to have essentially sought redress for local, imme diate hardships; they were apparently w ithout a particular plan or leader; and they were not based on any great desire to overthrow the colonial re gime.21The result: officials responded with the usual colonial band-aid: pal liative measures to obscure the grievance and keep it from festering, but no real substantive treatment or permanent change for the benefit o f the native population. Nevertheless, the gestures were sufficient to prevent gener alized insurrection. In addition, it should be kept in mind that centralregion Indians had numerous other channels to exploit as they resisted the colonials—their immediate status and fileros (privileges); the Indian court; religious advocates, organizations, and practices; educational opportuni ties; and indigenous governmental institutions.22 Outside the capital, native populations were thinner and more mobile. M ost often contact was later, and formerly successful Spanish formulas for negotiating tribute and labor arrangements with Indians proved inappro priate. Moreover, Spanish exploration and conquest did not radiate out of Mexico City and into the northern and southern frontiers in Armageddon fashion but rather depended upon existing opportunities for financial gain, whether it was to be realized in mineral or human resources.23 M ost areas and native peoples in New Spain were known by the mid—sixteenth century, but effective colonization depended upon individual initiative and royal au thorization. Even then Spanish ingenuity in the face o f Indian intractability was frustrated repeatedly. O n the northern frontier native resistance to Spanish intrusions was so formidable that at one point, in 1542, the viceroy personally led forces into combat.24 Diplomacy, rewards, presidios, missions, even model Indians as colonizers eventually served to pacify local groups long enough to permit Spaniards entrée into a region. But once settled there were no guarantees o f enduring peace. As more outsiders penetrated the territory and as demands on the Indians increased, there were inevitably more violent confronta tions.25 In other areas, such as the south-central valley, where Spanish activ ities were not as disruptive, native peoples continued to live where and as they had for centuries. Their peace was one already established by both war fare and alliance. During the colonial era the Indians most typically resorted to the colonial legal system when there were conflicts. On the southern reaches o f New Spain and in Yucatan the situation differed once again. In
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these regions there were numerous settled Indian populations and Span iards certainly colonized the area, but the paucity o f mineral sources and plantation crops failed to produce substantial wealth. The tribute and labor o f the local native groups were surely the most precious commodities, but seldom could they satisfy the demand.26 We do not have the luxury o f firsthand native-language accounts about what transpired between Indians and Spaniards in most o f these regions; therefore, for want o f anything at all, we must resort to the Spanish perspec tive as recorded by local political and religious authorities and the official re sponses to those petitions. This is not to say that New Spain’s Indians were w ithout agency. James Lockhart, in his monumental treatise on colonial Nahuas, finds abundant evidence o f indigenous presence and continuity through initiatives o f cultural selectivity.27 Even with the imposition o f a new religion and government there were carryovers from earlier times and a paralleling o f institutions and operations.28 Conservatism was such that even native languages experienced little significant change for at least one hundred years.29 When necessary or especially useful, however, certain Spanish items and methods were adopted quickly. M ost conspicuous are the constant com plaints about indigenous litigiousness, for the Indians used the courts just as the Spaniards did.30 Lockhart states, “By the late eighteenth century, almost nothing o f the entire indigenous ensemble was left untouched, yet at the same time almost everything went back in some form or another to a pre conquest precedent.”31 W ith time and when possible, whether legal or not, the horse, metal tools, and weapons also became part o f native culture. These items were particularly effective in thwarting subjugation by Spanish settlers on the northern borderlands. As indigenous horsemanship was per fected, especially by groups like the Comanches and the Apaches, whose feats o f marksmanship and equestrianism terrified everyone, paradoxically a reverse intimidation ensued. European occupation was delayed or thwarted altogether, at least until the Indians and their horses were brought in tow.
Ethnohistory an d Selected Studies o f Resistance in N ew Spain By design, the essays in this collection treat resistance and rebellion in New Spain alone. Although it is tempting to seek comparisons with like instances by indigenous peoples in other parts o f the Americas, Europe, or Asia, the abundance o f heretofore untapped archival materials, new data and fresh in-
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terpretations o f what is known, an appreciation o f the texts themselves, and a genuine effort to consider the indigenous perspective in spite o f the bias in the sources afford the opportunity to contain the studies.32 Moreover, these essays are indigenous specific, for the intent o f each is to consider the ethnic population on its own terms along with the relevant factors relating to resis tance and rebellion. W ith this purpose and data reserve, neither the all-en compassing theoretical formulations, the terminology (subaltern, peasants, masses), or the urban-rural dichotomy approach standard for many recent studies has much application here. M ost Indians were peasants and obvi ously land was im portant, but “territory,” with all its cultural baggage, was usually more at issue. Additionally, for the last twenty years there has been a definite tendency in the considerable scholarship on both Indians and Span iards to work toward a more eclectic approach to our studies o f native cul ture by incorporating the methodologies o f ethnography, archaeology, oral history, art history, philology, and quantification with traditional approaches. W ith such a store, knowledge o f the variety, complexity, and richness o f New Spain’s indigenous cultures is enough o f a challenge, at least for present purposes. The essays span the middle to last years of the colonial period and follow a temporal and geographical coincidence, from the Xixime outbreak in 1610 in New Spain’s northwestern expanse to the south-central Oaxaca valley, then south to Chiapas and Yucatan, and back north, concluding with the valiant defense by the Indians o f Mezcala Island o f their Lake Chapala stronghold, which was caught up in the throes o f the independence move ment. W ith such ethnic and regional diversity, we are faced with the realiza tion that neither sweeping generalizations nor the most erudite theories about what provokes native resistance and rebellion are adequate to encom pass an almost infinite array o f variations and contradictions.33 N or can we postulate precisely any or all Indian groups’ motives, methodologies, or outcomes. Rather, it seems that heterodoxy best characterizes most episodes o f re bellion in these studies. For example, not one exactly follows Anthony Wal lace’s classic, complex definition o f revitalization.34 Yet there is evidence on the part o f several groups o f serious attempts at nativism but with an obvi ous overlay o f Catholic dogma and practice. Perhaps New Spain’s Indians were indeed influenced by the Franciscans’ millenarian “euphoria” o f the sixteenth century and adopted at least some o f the ideology for their own re ligious and social movements later on.35 This would explain, in part, the number and variety o f prophets of hope and the particularities of each one o f their programs for reform.36 And even though continuity o f indigenous
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tradition is the prevailing leitm otif and evidently the primary goal for all groups studied, it is important to emphasize that over time the costs o f re sisting were great—noble lineages were in many cases terminated, political leaders lost their authority, territory and sovereignty were abrogated, and om nipotent deities were abandoned, to say nothing o f profound demo graphic and economic losses. Nevertheless, the cultural protoplasm that gave shape and meaning to territory, corporatism, and world-view and withstood the “flower wars” o f ancient times and the “conquests” o f the present was still largely intact in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Charles Gibson speaks for the resis tance and survival o f many colonial Indian populations when he describes the archetype Tlaxcalans: “whatever other advantages the Tlaxcalans pos sessed for Cortes, there can be no doubt that their long resistance against the Mexican empire effectively prepared them for the position they were to oc cupy in conquest times.”37 How else to explain the Tlaxcalans as the first col onized group in New Spain and then as the model colonizers among alien Indians all over New Spain? Native populations in northern New Spain had knowledge of Spaniards by virtue o f their diseases, metal tools and weapons, and livestock long before having to confront any o f them face-to-face.38 Additionally, the changes in the social environment were compounded by increasing restive ness following news o f actual Spanish incursions, like the atrocities commit ted by Ñuño de Guzmán on his slaving expeditions in the 1530s, the Mixtón War in the 1540s, and the Chichimeca War o f the 1550s—1600.39 Hostilities in creased across the region; however, there were no further major, organized Indian uprisings until the seventeenth century. But then it was no zephyr wafting across the frontier but torrents of prolonged, often concerted and devastating retaliatory movements against the intruders. Susan Deeds, in “First-Generation Rebellions in Seventeenth-Century Nueva Vizcaya,” examines the early revolts by Xixime, Tepehuan, and Tarahumara populations in Nueva Vizcaya, a subject and region that have re ceived little attention until now. Over the course o f the seventeenth century all three groups were tentatively brought under the influence o f governmen tal and religious authorities, and all tried at some point to rid themselves o f the Spaniards but not necessarily o f everything Spanish. Traditionally eth nocentric and often engaged in intertribal warfare, they nevertheless did not hesitate to form alliances to overcome a common enemy. Basing her analysis on Jesuit reports and judicial proceedings, including Indian testimonies, Deeds explores what distinguished first-generation re volts by these tribes from later rebellions. Often the latter were the product
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o f socioeconomic attrition resulting from centuries o f exploitation. In the earlier period the tribes’ relatively recent yet very disruptive contacts with Spaniards were combined with vivid recollections o f a not too distant for mer way o f life. The disruptions o f first contact were soon made worse by the horrors w rought by Spanish diseases, Jesuit congregations o f scattered populations into missions, the rigors o f Christianity, and a different sort o f work ethnic. These were cause enough for native leaders, many already dis placed, to rally forces to prevent further disintegration o f their traditions and communities. O f particular interest, and a recurring theme, is that in spite o f their rather brief association with the Spaniards, each group made use o f Christian and royal symbols to regain some form of local autonomy. In Oaxaca native resistance was expressed in almost as many ways as there were to do so in all New Spain. Yet Ronald Spores, in “Differential Re sponse to Colonial Control among the Mixtees and Zapotees o f Oaxaca,” identifies characteristics unique to the region. Following the violent first en counters and occasional retaliatory measures. Spores finds little evidence o f endemic caste- or class-based animosity or warfare between Indians and Spaniards. Rather, when conflict occurred it was a particular native group’s response to a local administrator’s outrageous demands for labor and trib ute. Types and extremes o f resistance depended on the intensity o f Spanish occupation and activity. Moreover, Spores shows that intertribal conflicts (in many instances, a condition from the prehispanic era) were both com mon and frequent, and most significantly, Spanish institutions were inevita bly the basis for conflict resolution. Indian groups all over Oaxaca opti mized Spanish systems, especially during periods o f community crisis, to reestablish local identity and harmony, at least for a time. Farther south, in Chiapas, the conjunction o f Maya cosmology with Spanish Catholicism furnished ready devices for most native populations to develop safeguard mechanisms to ensure the integrity o f surviving tradi tions. Yet here, as elsewhere, passive resistance could not resolve the bur dens o f colonialism indefinitely. In “Religion and Rebellion in Colonial Chiapas,” Kevin Gosner’s graphic portrayal o f events leading to violent in surrection by Tzeltal Mayas brings to light a situation of despair prototypically nativistic yet manifestly imbued with Christian ritualistic para phernalia. Gosner probes for colonial causes precipitating the crisis while giving full consideration to immediate social and cultural factors intrinsic to Maya practices that resulted in the breakdown o f the movement. Appreciating the limitations o f standard Europe- (and elsewhere) based theoretical formulations about politicoeconomic systems for explaining patterns o f native resistance in the Americas, Robert Patch, in “Culture,
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Community, and ‘Rebellion’ in the Yucatec Maya Uprising o f 1761,” finds ev idence enough o f cultural factors as key determinants contributing to the Jacinto Canek rebellion in Yucatan. After two centuries o f colonialism, the realities (and disparities) o f Spanish-Maya cultural heterogeneity were ex emplified in indigenous Christian syncretism and in a European-styled po litical structure that operated in Maya ways. In fact, the Mayas o f Yucatan enjoyed considerable cultural persistence, through their knowledge o f Spanish, ancient American, and colonial histories, which they understood to be cyclical and cause for revitalization. In particular, Patch analyzes both the colonial context and the “mentalité” o f those who took part in the Maya cultural revanche to explain the preeminence o f Spanish Catholic symbol ism and practice in what essentially was very much a nativistic endeavor. Christon Archer, in “The Indian Insurgents o f Mezcala Island on the Lake Chapala Front, 1812-1816,” presents yet another configuration o f native resistance—one that obfuscates Mexican historiography about political ide alism as the basis for indigenous participation in the battles for indepen dence. H e details a war within a war in the region o f Nueva Galicia, where Tarascans, Nahuas, and other local populations combined forces against the royalist cause. Fortifying themselves on the Mezcala Island garrison in Lake Chapala, the Indians were able to hold off the Spaniards for years, most often using litde more than an ancient war complex o f stones, bows, arrows, and supply canoes. The story is reminiscent of similar efforts three hundred years before, when superior Spanish technology ultimately pre vailed and brought about the surrender o f the Aztecs’ island capital, Mexico Tenochtitlan. But the Mezcala Indians’ hold was more lasting, their advantage en hanced with symbolic irony when they captured and beached on their own shore the launch Fernando en su Trono (named specially and in honor o f the Spanish king’s restoration to power), which was custom-built, munitioned, and manned by the royalists expressly for the destruction o f the natives on the island. Detailed and evocative, and in a sense classic military history, Ar cher’s essay further looks for and finds evidence to support traditional Na tive American world-views as justification enough for all-out insurrection against the Spaniards. H ow to understand so much violence in a region otherwise described as peaceful? M urdo MacLeod goes beyond specific analyses o f native resis tance and episodes o f revolt to situate the realities o f three centuries o f vio lence in New Spain in a facade o f “colonial peace.” In “Some Thoughts on the Pax Colonial, Colonial Violence, and Perceptions o f Both,” MacLeod challenges researchers to set politics aside and consider instead the social.
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economic, and cultural contexts for and outcomes o f native resistance in more general terms. In spite o f an impressive array o f official legislative and judicial practices, the crown could not adequately police or keep in check a wide range o f abuses within the colonies. Hence, violence was pervasive; nor was it the province o f any one institution, group, or gender.40 The ubiquity o f vio lence across New Spain’s societies is therefore good reason to consider root causes as we try to interpret even indigenous resistance. In a sense, it seems, and following Albert Camus in speaking o f another sort o f plague, violence was for the colony its own “never ending defeat.”41
N ative Resistance
C H A PTER
1
First-Generation Rebellions in Seventeenth-Century Nueva Vizcaya SUSAN M . DEEDS
The seventeenth-century northern frontier o f New Spain experienced suc ceeding waves o f indigenous revolt, beginning with the Acaxees in 1601 and ending w ith the Tarahumara uprisings o f the 1690s. In between fell two re bellions that most threatened the Spanish presence on the frontier: the Tepehuan rebellion o f 1616-20 and the Pueblo rebellion o f 1680, which drove the Spaniards out o f New Mexico for twelve years. The Nueva Vizcayan rebellions have not been studied in depth by historians in spite o f scholarly fascination during the past decade with the topic o f colonial revolts.1The interest in Latin American rebellions stemmed from a variety of trends, including increased attention to ethnohistory and the borrowing of anthro pological theory and method to study the history o f subjugated ethnic groups; attempts to combine cultural and economic factors to explain the degree to which subject groups are incorporated by dominant societies; and the tendency to emphasize cultural survival and a self-consciously active role assumed by subject peoples. In these directions, Latin Americanists have tended to be followers o f dominant trends in European and South Asian historiography.2 Rebellion studies also provide fertile ground for testing postmodern critiques o f social-science theories. Face-to-face with dominant ideologies now in crisis, historians seem to be drawn more by the prospect o f highlighting the nuances and unique complexities o f individual texts and events than by the potential for ordering diversity in overarching explana tions.3 Territorially widespread rebellions o f linguistically unified indigenous peoples were not a prom inent feature o f central Mexico’s colonial land-
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F IR S T -G E N E R A T IO N R E B E L L IO N S IN NUEVA VIZCAYA • 3
scape. In a seeming paradox, they occurred more frequently in compara tively politically decentralized areas at the fringes o f New Spain. Nonethe less, it would be misleading to suggest that there is a category o f “mission revolts” w ith uniform characteristics.4 Uprisings such as the Pueblo rebel lion o f 1680 and the Yaqui rebellion o f 1740, which occurred after at least a century o f Spanish occupation, arose out o f a more complex mix o f variables than the “first-generation” rebellions in northern mission areas.5This article will consider several first-generation revolts, uprisings that took place within a generation or two o f Spanish setdement in Nueva Vizcaya: those o f the Xiximes in 1610; the Tepehuanes in 1616; and the Tarahumaras at midcen tury and in the 1690s. Were these first-wave rebellions uniform in their char acteristics? H ow did the timing of these revolts distinguish them from later revolts in terms o f both Spanish presence and demands and indigenous reli gious and socioeconomic structures? H ow do the revolts fit within a range o f local indigenous responses to Spanish intrusion?6 The last rebellions o f the Tarahumaras will be examined in more depth, using the detailed interrogations o f Indian prisoners that survive in the doc umentary record.7 For the historian of oral societies these records are partic ularly enticing because they promise to form a rare documentary stage from which indigenous voices can be projected. The judicial and extrajudicial processes employed in investigating rebellions produced detailed inter rogatories and other documents that allow us to actually hear the Tarahu maras5own testimony. O r do they? The Indians’ story often passes through two or more filters. Can we edit out the possible distortions o f the translator and the scribe? And what do we know about the unwritten rules that guided the interrogation—the agenda o f the judges, whose powers were unlim ited? N ot only must one know the intruder in order to interpret the native, but one must also consider the degree o f subjectivity embodied in the pro cess o f ethnographic description itself.8 In general, the sources for recon structing Tarahumara history are richer because Tarahumara peoples have survived in significant numbers to this day. Nonetheless, much more ar chaeological research is necessary to correa for ethnographic upstreaming in the case o f the Tarahumaras and Tepehuanes and to corroborate the colo nial Spanish sources in the case o f the Xiximes. Each o f these groups inhabited either the mountain canyons o f the Sierra Madre Occidental or the valleys and hills o f the central plateau between D u rango and Chihuahua (see map 2). The entmda of Francisco de Ibarra into this area in the 1550s was followed in the latter part o f the century by silver discoveries and Spanish settlement at Santa Bárbara, Guanacevf, and Indé (1560s and 1570s) as well as Topia and San Andrés (1580s). Sierra Madre In-
4 * SUSAN M . D EED S
dian groups shared certain common features: the cultivation o f com, beans, squash, chilies, and cotton adjacent to dispersed, small villages and settlements o f smaller numbers o f contiguous households {rancherías) ; frequent warfare with associated ritual cannibalism; polytheism and worship o f idols; the presence o f shamans or ritual specialists (hechiceros); and a decen tralized political structure that relied on the leadership o f elders in peace time and on war leaders to deal with outsiders. Although there is some evi dence that these groups may have had a more complex, hierarchical political structure in the early sixteenth century, by the time o f effective Spanish set tlement none o f them was reported to have a tribal leader.9 However, some caciques may have had jurisdiction over more than one ranchería or settlement. The nature o f the jurisdiction o f these authority figures, whether po litical or military, is not clear, but early-seventeenth-century Jesuit reports imply political disaggregation and describe intratribal warfare. Yet some In dian polities had decidedly urban features: for example, the fortified houses and plazas o f the Xiximes.10 Although a few Franciscan missions were established in northwestern Durango, until the 1590s the main Spanish presence was secular: civilians and a few soldiers associated with silver mining and its supporting activ ities.11 Labor for the mines came from imported black slaves, Indian slaves captured in warfare, and paid workers, including Indians from the south, mestizos, and mulattoes. Encomiendas of local Indians, especially Acaxees from the area around Topia and Conchos from southeastern Chihuahua, also provided labor when sufficient Spanish force was present to coerce it. The more systematic congregation o f Indians into villages by Jesuits after 1590 furthered the development of encomienda and repartimiento (forced la bor draft:).12 Forced labor was not the only gift o f the Spaniards; epidemics o f smallpox and measles had begun to take their toll in the sixteenth century and disease episodes occurred at five- to eight-year intervals into the seven teenth, producing high mortality rates. Jesuit reports during the 1590s mention a variety o f indigenous responses to such catastrophic change, including abandonment o f and even burying alive the sick. Child sacrifice may also have been practiced as a trade-off to restore health to dying adults.13 Armed resistance was another option. The Acaxees were the first o f the Sierra Madre groups to choose it, in 1601. By 1604 this attempt—which was characterized by messianic leadership and promises o f millennial redemption—had been brutally repressed by Spaniards, resulting in the death and resettlement o f thousands o f Acaxees.14
F IR S T -G E N E R A T IO N R E B E L L IO N S IN NUEVA VIZCAYA • 5
X ixim e R ebellion ofióio D uring the first decade o f the seventeenth century, Jesuits and civil authori ties also attempted to congregate the Xiximes, the Acaxees’ traditional ene mies and neighbors to the south. According to the Jesuits, the Xiximes were the most bellicose o f all Nueva Vizcayan Indians, and Jesuits’ descriptions invariably included a detailed account o f the Xiximes’ practice o f cannibal ism.15 Before going off to battle, the Xiximes would leave a young virgin fasting in a cave. Returning warriors would bring her the severed head o f one o f their victims, presenting it as her husband. She would hold the head in her hands, whispering endearments, and then, along with other women, dance w ith this and other heads to the beat o f drums. This ritual was fol lowed by a great fiesta in which flesh from the bodies of victims was con sumed in a stew o f corn and beans; thus the Xiximes absorbed the bravery o f their enemies. Bones from the bodies were kept as a way of trapping die souls o f their enemies, apparently to prevent these spirits from doing them harm. If the warriors were not victorious, it was said that the young woman had not fasted or was not a virgin, and she was banished. Despite the Xiximes’ cannibalism, Spaniards considered them to be more civilized than surrounding Indians because some o f their settlements resembled villages, with fortified stone houses and plazas. To Spaniards, urban living was a key ingredient o f civilization. Civilized or not, the Xiximes were not receptive to Spanish overtures. Al though in the last few years o f the first decade o f the seventeenth century they refrained from attacking the newly established Acaxee missions that bordered their territory to the north, by 1610 they were prepared to forcibly resist Spanish intrusion, having stockpiled stores o f arrows in stone forti fications. Promising immortality to warriors, shamans tried to lure both Acaxees and Tepehuanes to join them. When the Acaxees did not comply, Xixime rebels began to attack their settlements, taking advantage o f the weakened condition o f these neighbors who had succumbed by the thou sands to the smallpox epidemic o f 1606—7. The disease had also spread into Xixime territory and fueled shamans’ allegations that association with Span iards would bring death. Jesuit churches were construed as temples o f dis ease (Nahuatl: cocoliztli, “epidemic” disease), and true immortality could re sult only if Xiximes destroyed them.16 Governor Urdiñola first responded to Acaxee pleas for aid by trying dip lomatic measures. Nonetheless, after an emissary returned from Xixime country reporting that the Xiximes had rejected a Spanish offer o f peace.
6 • SUSAN M . D EED S
adding that they liked the taste o f Spanish flesh, Urdiñola waited for the summer rains to subside and then entered the rugged Xixime homeland on foot with two hundred armed Spaniards and eleven hundred Indian allies. Although Jesuit reports of Xixime ritual cannibalism in warfare contain plausible elements, Xiximes probably deliberately manipulated Spanish fears and revulsion over this practice in hopes o f scaring them off. The accounts o f the Xixime rebellion are not explicit about the nature o f its leadership, but they do mention warrior caciques and even a reyezuelo (litde king), revered as a god, who provided messianic leadership and had at least wartime juris diction over many settlements. By October, Urdiñola’s scorched-earth tac tics and relentless pursuit resulted in the surrender of principal insurgent leaders, ten of whom were hanged. Other rebels were sold into slavery. Upon finding nearly two thousand skulls and untold numbers o f bones in Xixime rancherías, Spanish soldiers continued to burn fields and houses, and they helped the Jesuits (bearing gifts o f tools, seed, and livestock) con gregate Xiximes from sixty-five settlements in five new missions. Silver was discovered at San José de Basis, and Spanish miners took advantage o f the forcibly imposed peace to exploit it.17
Tepehuan R ebellion ofi6i6 Compared to the Acaxee uprising (1601—4), Xixime resistance had erupted within fewer years o f effective contact with Spaniards but had been more easily contained. The next rebellion, that o f the Tepehuanes, occurred after two generations o f contact with Spaniards and within a generation o f con gregation in missions by Jesuits. It attracted support from other Indian groups, including Acaxee and Xixime apostates and some Tarahumara gen tiles (non-Christians), and posed the most serious challenge to Nueva Vizcayan Spanish settlements, the oldest o f which had been extant for barely a half-century. The Jesuits began work in 1596 among the Tepehuanes, some o f whom had already established regular contact with Spanish miners and hacendados by trading com for cloth and tools, and less frequendy through their labor. M ost early sources report that the Tepehuanes were not easily lured by Spanish gifts to work in mines, but there are indications that some Tepehua nes were assigned in encomienda.18 In 1597, although a number o f Tepehua nes had been baptized, none were yet living in Jesuit missions. Those who had accepted baptism probably did so as an additional protection against disease. Father Gerónimo Figueroa noted in 1596 that the Tepehuanes
F IR S T -G E N E R A T IO N R E B E L L IO N S IN NUEVA VIZCAYA • 7
greatly feared comets, which they believed to be omens o f great sickness and death. They planted milpas at the mission sites o f Santiago Papasquiaro and Santa Catalina de Tepehuanes (where other Indians were paid to dig irriga tion ditches and begin construction o f churches), but they resisted building their houses there and were especially reluctant to enter the churches, which they called houses o f the dead because Spaniards were buried beneath them .19 Still, the fathers were encouraged by the Tepehuanes’ intelligence (young people were quick to memorize the catechism) and their honesty. By 1610 the first two Tepehuan missions plus a third at Zape were inhab ited by Indians who had been given seeds, tools, clothing, and livestock by a civilian population eager to attract their services.20 These three sites were conveniently located near Spanish mines and haciendas. Farther north, Te pehuanes from the Sierra de Ocotlan had sought baptism in late 1607, just at the time that the smallpox epidemic claimed many victims.21 Persistently, the Jesuits sought to eliminate idolatry, ceremonial drinking, and polygyny. Since all o f these practices were linked to subsistence activities and kinship reciprocity systems, the priests threatened not only the spiritual but also the social and economic bases o f Tepehuan society. Traditional means o f placat ing gods, assuring good harvests, and organizing labor were forbidden. The fathers achieved some success despite their daily battles with Indian sha mans who claimed immortality when told they would go to hell if they refused to convert. At least some Tepehuanes believed that the Jesuits pos sessed stronger spiritual medicine than their own shamans. It has been argued that Nueva Vizcayan Indians at first accepted, even in vited, Jesuits, who were perceived as having the power to help them recon stitute their former polities.22 Certainly their world had been turned upside down by disease but also by the disruption o f previous relations with sur rounding groups. N ot only had the Tepehuanes taken Acaxee and Tarahumara women in warfare, but the Jesuits believed that a tributary relationship had existed in which Acaxees had provided corn, beans, and squash to the Tepehuanes.23 Furthermore, there were new Indian groups to contend with. Tlaxcalan Indians from central Mexico formed small nuclei in the Te pehuan missions, intended to teach agricultural techniques and Christian practices by example. In this climate o f flux some Indians conformed, even overcoming their fear o f confession, but many others took advantage o f whatever protections and gifts the missions offered w ithout abandoning their small stone idols and ritual dances performed away from the missions. Given such dislocation and uncertainty, it must have made sense to hedge one’s bets, to maintain a balancing act that could garner as much protection as possible w ithout inviting retribution from any o f several supernaturals.
8 • SUSAN M . D EED S
Even though some Jesuits, like Juan Font, remained optimistic in spite o f the slow progress o f conversion, others noted unrest and increased pilfering o f livestock and called for the establishment o f a presidio.24 Their fears were not unfounded. In late 1616 the Tepehuan rebellion erupted with the violent deaths o f as many as three hundred Spaniards and threatened to envelop all of northern New Spain.25 Although we cannot es timate contact populations with any certainty, the Tepehuan population was probably double that of the Acaxees and Xiximes combined. As had been the case with the Acaxees and Xiximes, messianic leadership and millenarianism provided ideological underpinning for the rebellion.26 This is hardly surprising, given the cataclysmic changes brought by Euro peans. Millenarianism characterized postconquest clandestine religious re sistance as well as revolt in other areas o f the Spanish colonial empire where religious authorities responded by carrying out vigorous anti-idolatry cam paigns. For example, the Andean Taqui Onqoy movement o f the 1560s pre dicted a millenarian upheaval that would wipe out all traces o f the Spanish past.27 N ot all future utopias would obliterate everything Spanish or Chris tian, however. Yucatecan Mayas predicted a coming cycle o f prosperity in which Christian cosmology had a place.28 The degree to which Christian symbols were incorporated into millennial thought, in either first-genera tion or later resistance, varied widely.29 In 1615 an Indian shaman called Quautlatas and “bishop,” some said from New Mexico, had begun preaching among the Tepehuanes around Du rango. H e carried an icon that he called the Son o f God and that resembled Jesus on the cross. He also had two letters said to be from God the Father, which exhorted the Indians to rise up against the Spaniards, who had stolen their lands and enslaved them. Priests were not to be spared; in fact the In dians should immediately cease to attend Mass or partake o f any sacraments that only strengthened the fathers. In order to quell the fears of the faint hearted the shaman promised that any Indian warrior killed in batde would be resurrected after seven days and even be made young again. A victory would also restore their lands and produce abundant fields and cattle. No Spanish reinforcements would come because their ships would be sunk. He added a warning: if the Indians failed to take up arms, God the Father (also called the Sun God) would exact retribution through plagues or famine or by opening the earth to swallow them up.30 According to the Jesuits, Quautlatas also appointed disciples to spread the word, giving them letters (cartas) and idols. Talking idols began to ap pear, calling for the worship o f ancient gods. N ot surprisingly, the Jesuit fa thers attributed this agitation to demons, who took many forms.31 They
F IR S T -G E N E R A T IO N R E B E L L IO N S IN NUEVA VIZCAYA • 9
drew on counterreformation reconstructions o f medieval concepts regard ing the devil’s role in championing sin.32 W hat is difficult to unravel is the extent to which their versions o f demonic inspiration for rebellion coincide w ith Tepehuan messianism and millenarian belief. Eventually, missionary condemnations elicited a response from civil authorities. One o f the “dev il’s” disciples, don Melchor o f Santiago Papasquiaro, was arrested for idola try and publicly flogged. Nonetheless, despite reports o f the stockpiling of arrows, Spanish authorities did not yet appreciate the gravity of the threat.33 D on Melchor, apparently a person o f status, continued to agitate, as did others, carrying their message to Acaxees, Xiximes, Tarahumaras, Conchos, Laguneros, and other surrounding indigenous groups. Tepehuan shamans claimed that the rebellion would spread from Zacatecas to New Mexico and that mestizos and mulattoes would join them. Subsequent reports o f the re bellion note the participation of blacks, probably slaves who had been brought by first settlers.34 Both the efforts at organization and the comment about Spanish ships suggest that the Tepehuanes had a relatively sophisti cated awareness o f their new geopolitical situation. Information on preparations for the rebellion is scanty, but organiza tional ability and wide-ranging communication are evident. Insurgents were divided among six different captains, or war leaders, who set 21 No vember 1616 as the date for a coordinated attack on many Spanish settle ments, including Durango.35 The twenty-first of November was significant because the Feast o f the Presentation o f the Virgin Mary would be held that day in the mission o f San Ignacio de Zape, and many Spaniards and Jesuits would attend. Nonetheless, the rebellion began prematurely when on 16 November Tepehuanes led by Gogojito attacked a mule train carrying Spanish goods to Topia. W ithin the next few days the rebels laid siege to the missions o f Santiago Papasquiaro, Santa Catalina, and Zape; the real (mining town) o f Guanacevi; and surrounding haciendas (among them, Atotonilco, Guatimape, and La Sauceda) and ranchos. More than two hundred Spaniards, including eight Jesuits, one Franciscan, and one Dominican, were killed w ith arrows, clubs, spears, and axes within the first few days o f the revolt. D uring their sieges, rebels mocked priests with Latin phrases and then sub jected them to great humiliations before slaying them and often mutilating their bodies. As they laid waste to the missions, Indians celebrated by flog ging statues o f the Virgin Mary, using crucifixes and crosses as targets, uri nating on the H ost, and holding mock processions in which Indian women dressed as the Virgin. Here the use and abuse o f Christian elements demon strates not only a rejection o f these elements but also a certain ambivalence about their power and how it could be undermined. Churches were burned
IO • SUSAN M . D EED S
and their ornaments, vestments, and other religious objects desecrated. Of ten horses were killed, while cattle, mules, tools, and weapons were taken by the Indians. Some black and mulatta women were taken prisoner. Killing and sacking were followed by feasting, drinking o f communion wine, and dancing.36 Word o f the rebellion reached Durango by 18 November, and Governor Gaspar de Alvear y Salazar summoned Tepehuan leaders from villages sur rounding Durango. Distrusting their claims to know nothing o f the rebel lion, he ordered seventy o f them hanged. Durango was attacked on 22 N o vember, but the rebels were driven back. Still, the Spaniards had been caught unprepared, and their initial response was weak. Only in late Decem ber was Alvear able to lead a column o f Spanish militia and Indian allies (mainly Conchos) from Durango to aid those surviving Spaniards who had managed to hold off the Indians at Guanacevi and La Sauceda. Between De cember 1616 and February 1617 the governor engaged small rebel forces on several occasions. Some warriors were killed and a few were taken captive. The majority o f prisoners were women and children. Spanish forces also dis covered caches o f corn and other supplies stored in caves. A more decisive turn occurred in February, when a principal Tepehuan leader, Gogojito, was captured and executed in Guarisamey. He had taken refuge in Xixime territory and had attracted allies among that recently sub dued group as well as among Acaxees. Using material gifts and in some cases the promise o f political authority in conquered pueblos, the Spaniards con vinced many Xixime and Acaxee allies to turn on the Tepehuanes. Indians were promised a specified number o f items for each Tepehuan head.37 If the Tepehuanes had been using force to expand their territory prior to the ar rival o f the Spanish, their neighbors were probably pleased to see Tepehuan authority undermined. In succeeding forays, a number o f other rebel lead ers were captured and executed in the mountains between Guarisamey and Santiago Papasquiaro. Nonetheless, the rebellion was not suppressed for several more years, as the remaining rebels retreated to mountainous areas, difficult o f access, from which they conducted occasional raids. For a time they continued to attract support among Acaxees, Xiximes, Conchos, and Tarahumaras, who were impressed by the Tepehuanes’ early successes and the weak Spanish re sponse. Furthermore, Tepehuan leaders took advantage o f the appearance o f such supernatural omens as earthquakes, comets, and unusual storms to demonstrate divine favor for their cause. The Indian governor o f Teguciapa defected to the rebels, warning that Acaxees who did not follow him would fall victim to epidemic or be swallowed up in snow-filled mountain crevices.
F IR S T -G E N E R A T IO N R E B E L L IO N S IN NUEVA VIZCAYA • D
O n the other hand, his god promised them a long life, abundant food, and the freedom to engage in ritual drinking. Even in the pueblos that remained loyal to the Spaniards, Jesuits saw spies everywhere and doubted that the In dians, because o f ignorance and fear, could resist rebel pressures. Reinforce ments eventually came from Sinaloa and Mexico City (almost a year after the rebellion began), and rebel fighters, increasingly cut off from food supplies and unused to prolonged warfare, were slowly ferreted out o f their hiding places.38 Principal leaders were hanged and other captives tortured and sold into slavery. As Spanish returns diminished in guerrilla warfare, they increasingly of fered amnesty to Indians who would make peace. In 1619 the governor per suaded Tepehuan and Tarahumara rebels to lay down their arms. Tepehuanes led by a cacique named Tucumudagui had persuaded some Concho fugitives from Franciscan missions and Tarahumaras in the San Pablo Valley to join them in prolonging the rebellion. Tucumudagui alleged that “a sin gle naked, unarmed Tepehuan could easily turn back ten armed Spaniards.” After Governor Alvear inadvertently captured the cacique’s wife and daugh ter, he was able to win the trust o f the Tarahumaras with gifts o f cloth and to negotiate an amnesty with Tucumudagui and his sons. The old cacique, known for his military prowess, reportedly commanded eight hundred Tepehuanes and Tarahumaras armed not only with native weapons but also w ith captured Spanish arquebuses. From the San Pablo Valley Governor Al vear marched south to Zape, where Tepehuan caciques had agreed to meet for relocation to new settlements in 1620.39 In 1622 Governor Mateo de Vesga was still congregating Indians in villages, using cloth, tools, and cattle to entice them.40 Some Tepehuanes eluded this resettlement by migrating to Tarahumara areas not yet penetrated by the mining economy. The Tepehuan rebellion had cost the crown more than a million pesos in direct aid and loss o f revenue from a ravaged mining economy. As many as three hundred Spaniards and more than a thousand Indians lost their lives. Once again the Spaniards, civil and religious alike, blamed the devil. Span ish solidarity stands in contract to the eventual collapse o f rebel alliances. In dian accounts o f the revolt, known to us only through Jesuit eyes and the testimony o f other non-Indians, identify the actions o f priests and Spanish miners and landowners as causal factors.41The Jesuits and their rites o f bap tism were clearly linked to death from disease. They had no monopoly on this power, o f course, and Tepehuanes convinced many Acaxees in 1617 that their Sim God had brought the recent epidemic o f peste y sarampión (pesti lence and measles) to those converts who refused to join the rebellion. If uncertainty prevailed over which religious authorities would win in this
n
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arena, Spanish priests were more vulnerable to attack for their outright pro hibitions o f proven, familiar rituals and kinship patterns. Although the evi dence is only suggestive, most fomenters and leaders o f the rebellion seem to have been former shamans and warriors who had lost their avenues o f prestige in a new political structure controlled by the Jesuits.42 If elders had earlier sought the help o f these outsiders, they had not expected the degree o f displacement that befell them. N or had the Jesuits been very effective in protecting their charges from labor service and other acquisitive demands o f an already established Spanish community, that other source of their discontent. A tenuous peace, wrought by juxtaposing violent Spanish retribution in executions and forced labor against gender bribes o f goods, prevailed through the 1630s and into the 1640s, when raiding by desert Indians to the east became an unceasing aggravation. Furthermore, the northern advance o f the Jesuit mission frontier into Tarahumara territory did not bode well for the future.43 A more detailed account of Tarahumara first-generation re sponses follows, drawing on a richer base of ethnographic documents.
Tarahum ara Rebellions o f the 1690s In the colonial period Tarahumaras inhabited the western and eastern can yons o f the Sierra Madre Occidental o f western Chihuahua and the rolling grasslands farther east and south. The most inaccessible canyons and slopes on the western side have served as a region o f refuge, attracting the Tarahu maras in a gradual migratory process since the beginning of the seventeenth century. The rugged terrain o f pine forests and precipitous canyons (as much as a mile deep) rather grudgingly accommodates subsistence farming and livestock raising at high altitudes and in canyon bottoms. The nature o f the terrain also discourages large population concentrations, helping to ex plain why small clusters o f Tarahumaras have lived there in dispersed rancherías since at least the seventeenth century. One observer put it this way: “the settlements in all this territory are so scattered that there are scarcely two huts anywhere that aren’t separated by more than a league.”44 The geo graphic isolation and relative lack o f readily exploitable and marketable nat ural resources afforded some protection from Spanish penetration. The initial lack o f interest on the part o f Spanish settlers primarily inter ested in silver was countered by Jesuits looking to expand their mission fields. Early in the seventeenth century the Jesuits persuaded a few Tarahu maras living in the plains east o f the Sierra Madre to come south to their Te-
F IR S T -G E N E R A T IO N R E B E L L IO N S IN NUEVA VIZCAYA • 13
pehuan missions despite the traditional enmity between the two groups. Some o f these eastern Tarahumaras also went to work in the silver mines es tablished at Parral after 1630 and exchanged their com and other agricultural products for Spanish clothing and tools.45 In 1639 the Jesuits began to found the first missions inside Tarahumara country along the Río Conchos. Be cause these missions were not far from the agricultural estates that supplied the mines, their inhabitants became vulnerable to Spanish labor demands.46 W hy did these Tarahumaras choose to live in missions? Contemporary Je suit accounts cite the lure o f protection from their Tepehuan enemy.47They were also interested in access to Spanish goods. Apparently, however, they exchanged one problem for another. Congre gación (concentration o f numerous indigenous sociopolitical units into sin gle clusters) made them readily available to supply labor, not voluntarily as many had elected earlier but in repartimiento. Escalating demands for min ing and agricultural labor in Parral and the Valle de San Bartolomé in the 1640s provoked what would become a characteristic response by the Tarahu maras, that o f flight (and see Ronald Spores’s discussion in chapter 2).48 In 1648 Tarahumara Indians, mainly unconverted gentiles but also some runa way apostates, led an attack on Spanish settlements and the westernmost mission.49 W ithin a few months they were defeated by Governor Diego Guajardo Fajardo, who decided to consolidate the victory by establishing a Spanish town. Villa de Aguilar, in the heart o f Tarahumara country to the northwest. The Jesuits founded Papigochi mission nearby. These new intru sions precipitated the rebellions of 1650 and 1652, in which two missionaries lost their lives. Although the Spaniards, with the aid of loyal auxiliaries from the Tarahumara Baja missions and other Indian groups, suppressed the re bellions, these revolts succeeded in discouraging settlement for the time be ing and drove the frontier back to the area just west o f Parral.50 N ot until twenty years later did the Jesuits move into the interior o f Tara humara country, only after some difficulty in securing official approval. Be tween 1674 and 1678 the order established six missions in the new Tarahu mara Alta province. By 1683 there was a total o f nine. Still, the fathers o f the Tarahumara Alta could not easily convince their neophytes to settle in vil lages. In a long report to their superior in Mexico City, Fathers José Tardá and Tomás de Guadalajara discussed the “demonic” challenges they faced, echoing many o f the concerns voiced by their predecessors to the south.51 The report reveals not only their frustrations but also a variety o f methods o f passive resistance employed by the Indians. Several practices were particularly troublesome to the priests. Foremost among them were the drinking parties (tesgiiinadas) in which Indians con-
14 * SUSAN M. D EED S
sumed alcohol fermented from com or agave.52 The missionaries catego rized these as mere borracheras (debauches), w ithout understanding the im portant social processes they represented in bringing together small groups o f isolated individuals to cooperate in work projects and to transact busi ness. The concept o f reciprocity was an integral part o f tesgüinadas hosted by a family needing help in some task. Since tesgüinadas also accompanied many kinds of ritual activity and probably involved some type o f reciprocity with cosmic power, the Jesuits were particularly anxious to end these sym bolic displays of the devil’s power. Even more abhorrent than drunkenness were the sexual promiscuity and violence that tesgüinadas encouraged among people whom the Spaniards nearly always characterized as peaceful. The missionaries attempted to substitute liturgical festivals for native ritual celebrations, and they hosted large fiestas, sometimes feeding over a thou sand people at once.53 Another “invention o f devils” was the tlatole or consulta, a reference to the public speeches or sermons o f principales (distinguished elders) that in structed people in the proper conduct o f life. These speeches, which could encompass moral or political rhetoric, also served as the public forum for discussing the merits o f conversion to Christianity. Those who were op posed (categorized as hechiceros by the fathers) argued that baptism would result in death and that conversion would cause milpas to become sterile.54 They also associated the ringing o f church bells with plagues. The mission aries countered that death would be visited upon those who were not bap tized. The persuasiveness o f these arguments must have depended in part on local configurations of gentile and Christian deaths. For other doubters, a visit to Parral or to a Spanish mine or farm often cemented the association between hard labor and conversion. Jesuit fathers Tardá and Guadalajara quoted elderly Indians who declared they could not become Christians be cause they were old and had no energy left. Resistance in the 1670s and 1680s was largely passive. The Tarahumaras took what benefits they could see as compatible with their lives and tried to ignore other accouterments o f Spanish civilization, much as the Tepehuanes had done earlier.55 The hoes, axes, knives, plows, cloth (even sheep to make their own wool), livestock manure, and new food sources, especially meat, were accepted eagerly and considerably changed their material culture. Ta rahumaras would go to the mission to celebrate fiestas and transact business, but most refused to build houses in the village and store their grain there. The fact that many farmed widely scattered plots (due to the scarcity of ar able land and to a bilateral inheritance system) discouraged congregation. More than in the case o f the Tepehuanes, the local environment was an espe-
F IR S T -G E N E R A T IO N R E B E L L IO N S IN N U EV A VIZCAYA • 15
dally conspicuous modifier o f the Spanish blueprint. The acceptance o f ma terial goods and the small concessions o f public compliance with ritual as pects o f the mission program were matched by withdrawal, evasion, deceit, dissimulation, feigned ignorance, and slander. Ranchería Indians would give the Jesuits permission to enter but would be absent when they arrived or would ask them to come back later. Many stubbornly refused to engage the missionaries in dialogue; others simply stated they wanted to go to hell. O ften they would not attend Mass or accede to Jesuit requests for firewood and other necessities. Taking a slightly more aggressive tack, some insulted the Jesuits behind their backs or in asides such as the one reported by Fa thers Tardá and Guadalajara: “¿Adonde vienes, padre Cornudo?” [Where are you going, Father Cuckold?]. And finally, a few resorted to violence, throw ing rocks and on one occasion wounding a priest with an arrow.56 I f discipline and a chain o f authority were important components o f a mission, Tarahumara political organization proved inordinately vexing to Spanish “civilizers” because it represented the most atomized o f all the cases considered in this chapter. Although the Jesuits named a hierarchy o f village officials to replace the loose decentralized government by elders, the fathers complained that “the governors and principals, who are usually the most ladino in buying and selling in the name o f the others, are more like brokers than governors or captains. In most cases, they simply make suggestions, and everyone does what he wants. Thus it is not enough to reduce the prin cipales, but rather each individual in particular... . When the governor or ders them to undertake any task, only love, not fear or punishment, will make them do it.”57 The foot-dragging o f adults increased the missionaries’ resolve to win the hearts and minds o f children, an already time-honored conversion tactic. They concentrated their efforts on catechizing this group in long sessions during which children boarded at the church. Since Tarahumara parents tended to be permissive with their children, it is difficult to assess how the missionaries’ bestowal of status on children may have disrupted traditional familial patterns.58 At the very least, the transmission by elders o f advice about good conduct in the customary public sermons was challenged in a similar repetitious format employed by catechists.59 The Tarahumara strategy o f ignoring those aspects o f the Spanish pro gram that they found incompatible worked relatively well at first, but silver strikes in the Tarahumara country (Coyachi in 1683 and Cusihuiriachi in 1687) made passive resistance more difficult as hundreds o f Spanish miners and other entrepreneurs flooded the region. The labor needs of the new mines made the Tarahumaras and Conchos to the north prime targets for la-
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bor brokers, who pressed them into service in the mines and in cutting wood for charcoal even though royal officials cautioned against the reparti miento o f neophytes and the unconverted. Spanish livestock became a se rious threat to Indian milpas in the areas closest to mines. Indians in the new Chinipas mission adjacent to the Tarahumaras complained that the Jesuits had entered their lands in order to turn them over to the Spaniards.60 Where the resettlement program o f the missionaries was successful, it was inevitably accompanied by epidemic disease, and continued high m or tality reinforced the Tarahumaras5 negative perceptions o f outsiders.61 Death practices at the time o f contact indicate that Tarahumaras feared the dead; they abandoned the houses where people died.62 Today they believe that the dead pressure the living to join them, and death rituals are crucial for obviating that threat.63 W ith mortality rates as high as 30 percent since the first Spanish entradas a half-century earlier, the Tarahumaras must have been bothered by the disruption o f reassuring ritual activity.64 Jesuits, on the other hand, could take comfort in recording the baptisms o f dying in fants and adults. Their work had purpose, even if the Indians would not grasp the basic Christian concepts o f repentance, salvation, and eternal damnation.65 Turning to the less abstract, missionaries stepped up the pressure on In dians to conform at least to basic Spanish norms o f urban living, monog amy, and industry. They were deeply preoccupied with carving out some semblance o f order among “disorderly peoples.55The disorder that the Je suits disparagingly termed “love of liberty” was epitomized in isolated dwellings, sexual license, and disinterest in work that had no desired tangi ble return. The dissent o f specialists trying to preserve indigenous rituals earned the punishments reserved for witches: public whippings, condemna tion to hard labor, and less frequently, death.66 Even backsliding converts could be publicly shamed, an experience that was particularly humiliating for Tarahumaras, who avoided confrontation and seldom raised their voices to one another.67 They had little defense against denigration and scorn. Some did find solace in the utopian aspects o f millenarian thought. Tardá and Guadalajara recalled the old woman who declared that if all the Span iards were killed, the Tarahumaras would have plenty o f food: “even the pines would bear squash and com.”68 In his history o f the Tarahumara rebel lions Father Joseph Neumann, missionary at Sisoguichi, attributed the out break in 1690 to the machinations o f a messianic leader who promised that any Tarahumaras who were killed by Spaniards would be resurrected in three days.69 Although Father Neumann’s assertion is not corroborated by the interrogations o f Indian participants in the rebellion that began in 1690,
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it certainly has a resonance w ith the aspects o f religious syncretism in pre vious Nueva Vizcayan first-generation revolts.70 The rebellion began in late March. Tarahumara Indians from the north western mission visita (visiting station w ithout a resident missionary) of Naguerachi led an attack on the mission headquarters at Yepómera, where they killed the Jesuit missionary, Diego O rtiz de Foronda, along with two other Spaniards.71 According to much o f the Indian testimony, the revolt had been planned for several years.72W hat seems more likely is that conspir atorial talks had taken place intermittently for some time but no specific date or plan had been formulated. Although the grievances that motivated the larger rebellion were varied, the attack on Yepómera had an immediate cata lyst. Father O rtiz had hired some Conchos (whose territory bordered the Tarahumaras’ on the north) to make bricks for building an irrigation dam, promising to pay them with one or two heads o f catde. They claimed that when they completed the work he reneged and paid them nothing. After consulting among themselves, they simply resolved to take two o f his mules. Several Tarahumaras sent by Father Ortiz in pursuit apprehended the Con cho men and several women. The missionary sent the men to be punished by Spanish officials in Cusihuiriachi and kept the women at the mission. One o f the Conchos escaped and made his way to Naguerachi, where resentment against the priest was strong. Father O rtiz had been insistent that these In dians settle in the village and contribute labor to the mission. He had met with violent resistance before when several Indians pelted him with rocks, leaving his face scratched and bloody.73 Living in the rugged terrain of the northwestern comer o f Tarahumara territory, the Indians o f Naguerachi had a good deal o f concourse with neighboring Conchos, Pimas, and Jovas. This area o f the headwaters o f the Yaqui River seemed to attract recalcitrant Indians trying to avoid Spanish encroachments from both the Sonoran and Chihuahuan sides. Various bands o f Conchos had rebelled a number of times in the seventeenth cen tury; eventually, many had settled near the presidio o f San Francisco de Conchos just northeast o f Parral and served as auxiliary troops.74 The Con chos around Casas Grandes and Namiquipa were not as compliant. Some had intermarried with the Tarahumaras and Pimas o f the surrounding area. (In fact, there seems to have been a marked incidence of Tarahumara-Pima intermixing among the participants o f both rebellions.) The Conchos were particularly unhappy with the excessive labor repartimientos organized in their pueblos for the mines o f Cusihuiriachi, and in late March they had killed their own governor, who was notorious for cooperating with the Spaniards in organizing the labor drafts.75 Conchos living in Naguerachi
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encouraged the Tarahumaras to avenge Father Ortiz’s insult to their breth ren. Certain Tarahumaras needed little urging. Among them was Bernardo, a former official in Yepómera whom the missionary had flogged for failing to attend Mass, and his son, who had also been flogged and had his head shaved publicly.76 When the rebels reached Yepómera, about half o f its in habitants (widely dispersed along the river valley) supported them in killing the priest and burning the church. According to one witness, the women o f the village entreated the rebels to spare the Jesuit’s life.77Mercy, a quality as sociated with women, was not prized by warriors, who perceived it as cow ardice. Later several Tarahumara rebels reportedly taunted compatriots who refused to join them, “asking them if the Spaniards were their husbands.”78 The rebellion spread in May and June, and more than a dozen churches were burned. Many o f the rebel leaders were principales who had been re moved from office by the Jesuits or punished for a variety of infractions, in cluding witchcraft, cohabitation with women not their wives, drunkenness, and insubordination. One was the grandson o f Tepóraca, a leader o f the 1648 rebellion. M ost o f the missionaries fled in time to save their lives. Only Fa ther Manuel Sánchez o f Tutuaca was killed in an ambush in May. After first dispatching Spanish troops and native auxiliaries under Juan Fernández de la Fuente and Juan Fernández de Retana, présidial captains o f Casas Grandes and San Francisco de Conchos, respectively, Gov. Juan Isidro de Pardiñas took the field himself in May.79The fighting followed previous pat terns established by the Tarahumaras, who attacked targets undefended by the Spanish and then retreated to nearly impenetrable rocky summits to await Spanish sieges. Spanish soldiers and militiamen, who never numbered more than a few hundred, were heavily reinforced by Indian allies (primarily Concho and lower Tarahumara in this case).80 They rarely engaged a large force of rebels directly but were forced to wage a war o f attrition against small pockets of rebels protected by their inhospitable environment. In this w ar o f attrition the Spaniards realized the efficacy o f cutting o ff the Indians’ means o f subsistence by destroying milpas and burning h u ts . 81 In addition, th ro u g h o u t June and July the governor offered pardons to all b u t the instigators o f the rebellion if they w ould return to the m issions . 82 A t first various groups o f Tarahum aras feigned acceptance o f these peace initiatives in order to buy tim e o r supplies to continue their resistance. By late July the scarcity o f food had introduced dissension am ong the rebels, and m ore be gan to advocate surrender . 83 Before N ovem ber m ost o f them had genuinely surrendered, although a handful o f their leaders rem ained at large. A fter several m onths o f fruitless pursuit, the Spaniards offered rewards for th eir heads. All were apprehended except for M alagara and B ernardo from Ye-
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pómera, who managed to hide out long enough to participate in the next re volt.84 In the most bizarre case, Nicolás el Tuerto was killed by his own sons w ith the aid o f their mother.85 The inquiries that accompanied and followed the revolt were directed by Governor Pardiñas. They reveal a rift between the civil and religious author ities, who tended to blame each other for the uprising. Having realized that the governor was attributing much o f the blame to the missionaries5harsh tactics and exploitation o f Indian labor, the Jesuits secretly sent Father Neu mann to Mexico City to meet with the viceroy. Neumann tried to convince the viceroy that the problem lay more with the demands of the growing Spanish population in the area and the lack o f adequate military reinforce m ent for implementing the mission program among a particularly stubborn group o f natives. The charges and countercharges were especially vitupera tive.86 Governor Pardiñas and other officials alleged that the Jesuits ex ploited Indian labor to enrich themselves, sold corn and flour to Spaniards at a profit, and helped provoke the rebellion through onerous labor de mands in Yepomera and Cocomorachi. He also suggested that the loyalty o f non-Spanish Jesuits was suspect and that they might be negotiating with French “pirates,” known to be in Texas. The Jesuits responded that they re munerated Indians for labor not associated with indigenous subsistence; supplied grain, livestock, and clothing to the Indians; and sold grain at lower than the regional market prices. They alleged that Pardiñas himself and his cronies benefited the most from labor drafts and that they allowed repartimiento Indians (especially Conchos) to suffer appalling conditions. The Jesuits charged that the governor not only had not been aggressive in pursuing the rebels but, even worse, had undermined Jesuit authority in the missions by his public accusations. From the documents it seems clear that Indians made little distinction between invasive agents, although for the Tarahumaras o f the western re gion the intercourse with secular Spaniards was much less frequent. Their Concho co-conspirators expressed more specific animosity toward the cruel treatm ent imposed by their employers in Cusihuiriachi.87 But the Tarahumara testimony reveals that they wanted all Spaniards out o f the region. Fa ther Neumann argued that most Tarahumaras did not want to kill their priests. This is corroborated by the account o f one Indian woman, a servant in a Spanish home, who was taken prisoner by the rebels, and reported that the rebels intended to kill all Spanish laypersons and to send the Jesuits na ked to preach in their own territories.88 O ther testimony did not distinguish between religious and lay Spaniards. In general, the measures taken by Pardiñas to repress the rebellion were
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mild. To be sure, the main agitators were executed and their heads placed on pikes in the mission villages. Others who refused to surrender retreated far ther into the barrancas (ravines). Civil authorities and Jesuits decided to proceed slowly in reconstructing the missions, and they abandoned the out posts at Naguerachi and Tutuaca.89 The Jesuits continued to report rumors o f conspiracies and unrest.90 Yet when Captain Retana, now tided Indian Protector o f the Tarahumaras, undertook his annual inspection in late 1692 and early 1693, he reported the situation to be relatively stable although many Indians were not in residence in the missions. Some were working in Cusihuiriachi; others had retreated to their rancherías. One reason for the calm was that two epidemics, first smallpox and then measles, raged through the missions claiming many lives.91 Retana admonished the Indians to build houses and bring their com to the missions. Whenever they could be appre hended, fugitive Indians were flogged.92 A new governor, Gabriel del Castillo, arrived in March of 1693. From the beginning he sent repeated complaints to the viceroy and the crown con cerning the lack of military and financial resources necessary to secure the peace in Nueva Vizcaya.93 His concerns were echoed in the reports o f Jo seph Francisco Marin, who had taken the residencia (review o f office) o f Governor Pardiñas and had also been charged with inspecting the presidios. Despite recommendations, présidial strength remained the same, and In dian problems escalated.94 Rumors o f continuing unrest among the Tarahumara took a back seat to the depredations o f Tobosos and other nomadic In dians to the north and east. D rought in the first few years o f the decade had contributed to a regional subsistence crisis, ParraTs silver mines were in a state o f decline, and haci enda owners were experiencing severe shortages o f labor, due to both In dian unrest and further native population decline. A 1695 epidemic o f small pox was followed immediately by another one o f measles, with devastating results.95 The government responded to crisis on an ad hoc basis, taking little note o f the impending signs o f renewed revolt in the Tarahumara country. In January of 1697 Father Neumann finally convinced the governor to send Retana (now a general) and Fernández de Fuente to investigate re ports that the Tarahumaras o f the northwestern mission comer were stock piling com and poisoned arrows in the sierra.96 Catching the conspirators before they were ready to launch their revolt, planned for after the summer harvest, Retana heard their testimony in March and April.97 Governor Cas tillo had granted him the power to punish major offenders with the death penalty, noting that until that time clemency had served only to fan the fires
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o f revolt.98 The cradle o f conspiracy once again was Naguerachi, which had been abandoned by the missionaries after 1690. In April one o f the leaders o f the previous rebellion, Malagara, was apprehended and sentenced to death along with fifty others deemed to be instigators o f the revolt. About the same number were sent into exile near the presidio of San Francisco de Conchos. Others, deemed to be followers, were flogged. Those prisoners receiving death sentences were shot and their heads placed on pikes as a reminder.99 The lesson did not have the desired effect. From May through August, the rebellion spread. As in the previous rebellion, Spanish troops could do little damage to Indians who had retreated to their nearly impenetrable rocky peaks, but they did inflict extensive damage on the com and beans ready for harvest in August and September. The Spaniards’ mobility from the headquarters at Papigochi was also restricted since they suspected the loyalty o f the Indians o f this central mission and could not leave it un protected. This left other individual missions w ithout much protection and eventually eight o f them were destroyed (in most cases with complicity from their inhabitants), although all o f the Jesuits escaped unharmed.100 In October, having been instructed by the viceroy who was receiving critical civilian reports from Nueva Vizcaya about the conduct of the war, veteran missionary Tomás de Guadalajara undertook a peace mission.101 Rebel followers were promised amnesty if they would return to the mis sions. Although in several instances Indians pretended to accept the offer, it was overwhelmingly rejected. Retana resumed aggressive pursuit o f the rebels, many o f whom were now suffering from scarcity o f food and water. Only in January o f 1698 could the Spaniards claim to have suppressed the re volt, after a year o f warfare. M ost of the leaders still remained at large and were not captured until later in the year.102 In June the Tarahumaras who had been exiled to San Francisco de Conchos presidio, where they were given milpas and provisions, fled with the intention o f returning to their homeland. M ost were apprehended, and seventeen o f the men received the death sentence from the governor.103 The measures implemented through out the revolt, harsh in comparison with the previous uprising, provoked an investigation of both the governor and General Retana. The residencia judge for Governor Castillo gathered testimony in this regard. Castillo died before the judicial procedure was completed. In the end the residencia ab solved both o f any wrongdoing in the Tarahumara war, attributing the blame to the Indians’ malevolence.104 A comparison o f the documents submitted to the crown in the two rebel lions is instructive. Indian testimonies during the course o f the 1697 rebel lion tended to be more brief and perfunctory than those taken by Governor
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Pardiñas in 1690; R etana also used to rtu re to extract confessions in some cases. These characteristics indicate th at the judicial process in 1697 was m ore m anipulated and th at testim onies were edited. They also suggest a new, harder line tow ard Tarahum ara revolts. Pardiöas, on th e other hand, seem ed to consult m ore frequently w ith n o t only his officers (as R etana did later) b u t also civilians. W hat is especially notew orthy is th a t the 1690 in ter rogatories always asked for the motives o f the rebels. The governor usually asked direcdy w hether the Indians had been m istreated by Spaniards. In no case did they ever respond in the affirmative to the direct question. Yet in som e testim ony taken by m ilitary officers away from field headquarters, In dians did cite m istreatm ent at the hands o f Spaniards as the cause. The interrogatories o f the 1697 rebellion are n o t so uniform in regard to the question o f causation. T hroughout m ost o f the rebellion, R etana never explicitly asked witnesses to state motives for the rebellion. H e did ask them w hat they were doing outside o f their pueblos, b u t this gave them the o p portunity to respond w ith a w ide variety o f excuses related to food gather ing. Furtherm ore, nearly all claimed either to have fled the missions because they heard th at R etana was com ing to punish them o r to have been forced, under th reat o f death, to take up the rebel cause. Occasionally prisoners vol unteered th at they rebelled to expel all the Spaniards and th at they intended to wage a w ar o f exterm ination against them . They recounted w hat one o f the leaders, Posilegui, a m ulatto from N aguerachi, had counseled them : “Leave the missions because the fathers’ teachings are w rong .” 105 Posilegui claim ed to have a better father advising him in the sierra and prom ised th at the rebels w ould receive aid from other m ulattoes and from Frenchm en ( franceses) w ho w ould com e from tie rra ca lien te (the G ulf coast). This may be evidence o f fairly sophisticated geopolitical know ledge, o r the Spaniards m ay have been p u ttin g w ords into the rebels’ m ouths. C aptain R etana had been sent to the R io G rande in 1688-89 to investigate reports th at the French were trading w ith Indians in Texas, and Spanish authorities w orried about these intrusions . 106
In 1698, when Retana was answering early charges that what had begun as a minor incident had been transformed into a major rebellion by his harsh tactics, he did begin to ask captured rebels for their motives. Uniformly (again suggesting editing) they responded that they wanted freedom (note the use o f a word that was anathema to the Spanish concept o f civilization) from the supervision o f the missionaries so that they could continue to en joy borracheras and many women (occasionally a number, ranging from two to four, was specified).107This emphasis on the burdens o f the mission program cannot be construed as an attack on the Jesuits, with whom Retana
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got on very well and who testified on his behalf during the residencia pro ceedings. None o f the 1697 proceedings reveals animosity or even disagree ment between soldiers and missionaries. In contrast, there w ere m ore divisions w ithin Tarahum ara society in both rebellions. This is n o t surprising given their historical lack o f political unity. A lthough the m idcentury Tarahum ara rebellions had been fought alm ost exclusively by non-C hristians reacting to civil intrusions in their territory, th e 1690s rebellions attracted both gentiles and apostates, together constitu tin g probably n o t m ore than half o f the entire population. This was very dif ferent from th e Tepehuan rebellion, w hich initially drew universal support am ong Tepehuanes. In the 1697 Tarahum ara revolt a com m on profile char acterizes m any o f the rebels w ho were interrogated. They had lived transi to ry lives, m oving from one place to another. They seemed to reflect a high degree o f m arital exogamy. R itual dances th at featured Spanish scalps and traditional drinking parties characterized their preparations for battle, indi cating retention o f precontact beliefs. R itual specialists w ho did n o t partici pate in the fighting accom panied rebel contingents. Rebel leaders seemed to have earned respect from their followers for their fighting prowess. M any rebel leaders were related by kinship, and a num ber o f them reported having relatives w ho had been abused o r punished by Spaniards, b o th civilians and m issionaries. Avenging kin deaths had always been an im portant aspect o f indigenous raiding and warfare. O n the other hand, m any converts re m ained loyal to the m issionaries and even a few gentiles aided the Spanish cause. T he latter were accused by the rebels o f being cowardly and effemi nate. In th e final analysis, the Tarahum ara rebellions were m uch less disrup tive o f Spanish econom ic activities than the Tepehuan had been. Exam ination o f these three seventeenth-century N ueva Vizcayan revolts re veals a num ber o f shared features. The basic com m on characteristic was th at they occurred w ithin a generation o r tw o o f the first serious dem ographic invasions by Spaniards and were responses to the cataclysm o f labor de m ands, population decline, congregaciones, and psychological pressures th a t ensued. T he tim ing itself distinguished the early revolts in term s o f the form s and intensity o f Spanish intrusion; indigenous strategies for coping; and th e extent to w hich Indians affected by resettlem ent and religious con version were reinforced by natives n o t yet as influenced by colonial rule. F irst-generation rebellions were interm ediate tactics th at fell betw een the m ost im m ediate reactions to conquest (both passive and hostile) and later responses to the im positions o f w ell-entrenched colonial rule, m anifested ei th er th ro u g h resistant accom m odation o r o u trig h t rebellion.
24 * SUSAN M . D EED S
A lthough Spanish dem ands on indigenous peoples w ere continuous th ro u g h o u t the colonial period, only in the early period o f contact did they am ount to cataclysm in the coincidence o f catastrophic population decline and violent disruption o f existing social netw orks and ritual activities deem ed essential for sustaining life. L ater rebellions were n o t so m uch des perate attem pts to m aintain equilibrium in a w orld turned com pletely u p side dow n as they were efforts to repair damages to a m oral econom y th a t evolved over tim e in a colonial context and th at could n o t invoke a concrete vision o f the past so clearly autochthonous as th at o f first-generation rebels. In each first-generation rebellion there were leaders and participants w ho had experienced firsthand the transition from preconquest to colonial con ditions. T heir first goal was to reinstate fam iliar precontact ritual activities th a t aim ed to restore spiritual and m aterial balance and especially to alleviate the sickness th a t was burying them . H ig h m ortality is, o f course, a great dis solver o f organizational structure. I f Indians inhibited in their capacity to rebel often accepted m issionary overtures in the m idst o f epidem ics, the continuing high rates o f decline turned the tables by sealing the association betw een conversion, baptism , and death. Indians came to connect m ission aries and churches, especially the ringing o f church bells, w ith death, and in each case o f first-generation revolt, leaders deliberately m anipulated these associations, exhorting their followers to throw off the Spanish yoke. This is n o t to im ply th a t the rebel leaders, even th ough unanim ous in th eir resolve to expel all Spaniards, intended to com pletely reestablish a pre vious age. W ithout rejecting some aspects o f Spanish m aterial culture and technology, such as livestock and m etal tools, w hich brought significant and perm anent alterations to their diet, dress, and residential patterns, rebels could attem pt to rem ove the prim ary obstacles to the restoration o f precon quest ritual and social practices. Since destruction and re-creation o f uni verses was a feature o f native cosmology, m illenarianism offered a path to re dem ption through revitalization o f certain cultural practices . 108 This revitalizing strain o f millenarianism was com plem ented by a u to pian vision in w hich deserts w ould yield in abundance and no Spaniards w ould circum scribe native “freedoms.” M illenarianism was certainly n o t unique to first-generation revolts, b u t the conjuncture o f a utopian rationale for revolt and the ability to tap preconquest organizational strategies for w ar w as . 109 B oth form er religious and w ar leaders participated actively in th e rebellions, furnishing the prim ary ideological im pulses from autochtho nous world-views and sociopolitical organization. Those individuals w ho had been principales, the leaders and respected el ders, provided political and m ilitary strategies. A lthough they had suffered a
F IR S T -G E N E R A T IO N R E B E L L IO N S IN NUEVA VIZCAYA •
2$
loss o f pow er under the new regim e, they could still sum m on up m ilitary force. T o be sure, Jesuits, know ingly o r unknow ingly, frequently appointed preconquest headm en to village offices in the Spanish-im posed system. B ut m any o f them could n o t reconcile the contradictions o f their bridge role and fell in to disfavor. The Tarahum ara rebellions provide the best evidence to link rebel leaders w ith Indians rem oved by the Jesuits from positions o f au thority. These m en had been deprived o f the key elem ents o f their culture th a t bestow ed prestige: supernatural powers and prowess in warfare. The rank and file m ay have been less concerned initially about the displacem ent o f native sham ans w ho had n o t been pow erful enough to resist either devas tatin g disease episodes o r Spanish invasion. B ut Spanish “civilization” im posed new burdens on everyone, n o t just the leaders. R esettlem ent (m ission congregaciones) and labor service (slavery, encom ienda, and repartim iento) elim inated the frequent warfare th at had previously provided avenues for the acquisition o f prestige and resources. In this regard the Tepehuanes m ay have felt they had the m ost to gain by rebelling since they had com e to con tro l th e m ost fertile areas o f the Sierra M adre’s central plateau and suc cessfully conducted raids on their Acaxee and Tarahum ara neighbors, per haps even exacting som e form o f trib u te in the first case. A bstract C hristian concepts o f m ercy and loving one’s enemy, tau g h t by the m issionaries, were perceived as akin to cowardice. Such qualities were associated w ith w om en and subservience. F urtherm ore, preconquest ritual specialists appeared as messiahs and de liverers and provided m illenarian and religious rationales for revolt. Invok ing form er gods and idols, they blended aspects o f native religion w ith a few sym bols o f C hristian religious authority. G od the Father, G od the Son, bishops, priests, rituals, sacram ents, and even icons such as crosses were som etim es borrow ed to em pow er the rebel cause. The letters from G od th at Q uautlatas allegedly carried are another case and w ould seem to su p p o rt the theory th a t Indians perceived European literacy as magical pow er . 110 T he extent o f borrow ing varied, w ith Tarahum aras less likely to invoke C hristian sym bols. B orrow ings by groups accustom ed to a polytheistic, cyclical u n i verse w ere n o t really in conflict w ith the goal o f obliterating the Spanish presence and could be used to enhance pow er. Sim ilar appropriations by o th er indigenous revitalization m ovem ents have been explained in psycho analytic term s, w ith the idea th at people w ho suffer severe repression (sub ordination) are susceptible to incorporating some o f th e characteristics o f th eir oppressors .111 A nother explanation considers the need o f subordinated people to either destroy o r appropriate for themselves th eir rulers’ symbols o f authority .112
26 • SUSAN M . DEED S
T he m ocking o f Catholic ritual th at characterized the sacking o f churches was one way o f underm ining it. A nother was to desecrate o r destroy reli gious objects such as bells and crosses. A ppropriation o f resources th rough looting and feasting provided other avenues for destroying the Spaniards’ pow er. A lthough some livestock were carried away by rebels, a significant percentage was slaughtered and left to rot, dem onstrating th at it was m oré im portant to ravage the oppressors’ resources than to profit from them . D espite disagreem ent over the degree o f social stratification in these soci eties at the tim e o f conquest, the evidence leans tow ard the existence o f egal itarianism in kin-ordered polities o r at least suggests societies grounded in reciprocity. Reciprocal relationships were knocked off-center w hen the Spaniards interposed a hierarchical assortm ent o f local officials and Jesuits insisted on m onogam ous relationships, the boarding o f children away from hom e, and the prohibition o f rituals associated w ith subsistence. A lthough gifts w ere used initially to attract Indians, these declined as Indians’ labor obligations increased. In first-generation revolts, precontact extended kinship and cerem onial ties were still intact despite high m ortality. They were a factor in prom oting solidarity am ong rebels and facilitating com m unication betw een gentiles and Christians. Indigenous stress on the im portance o f avenging the death o f a relative encouraged the prolongation o f rebel activities. W here political atom ization was greater, as in the case o f the Tarahum aras, it was harder to m aintain solidarity and discipline, b u t even their rebellions dem onstrated a w ide-ranging com m unications netw ork, w ith ample bridges between the converted and nonconverted. The Tepehuan case exhibits the m ost coordi nated planning. The m ost expansionist o f these groups in the preconquest period, the Tepehuanes succeeded in attracting the largest single rebel forces, som etim es several thousand strong. It is difficult to know w hether Spanish contact may have accelerated a process o f tribalization in the case o f the Tepehuanes . 113 Tepehuanes were also the m ost successful in m obilizing resources, accum ulating storehouses o f w eapons and com . W here rebels were n o t able to do this, especially w hen Spaniards burned their fields be fore harvest, rebellions tended to be shorter. In general, Indian subsistence patterns in agriculture and hu n tin g and gathering did n o t lend themselves to the stockpiling o f resources and dis couraged prolonged conflicts. A lthough barren, rocky precipices w ere ready-m ade fortresses against Spanish attack, they afforded very little con solation for the hungry. Participants in first-generation revolts, familiar w ith previous patterns o f warfare, were n o t prepared to deal w ith an enem y w ho could oudast them . Ironically, am ong peoples characterized by scattered
F IR S T -G E N E R A T IO N R E B E L L IO N S IN N U EV A VIZCAYA • 27
settlem ent patterns and disaggregated social structures, rebellions th at sought to o ust Spaniards and m issionaries also ow ed their tem porary soli darity in p art to th a t very m ission program ’s im position o f social coherence o n th eir disaggregation. T urning from factors specific to Indian social and religious organization, w h at o th er characteristics apply to these revolts? W hich invasive agents w ere perceived as m ost exploitive in first-generation revolts? In all o f these cases, b o th religious and lay Spaniards were identified by rebels as culprits and all w ere targeted for expulsion from Indian territory. The fact th a t m ore priests died in the Tepehuan rebellion does n o t necessarily p o in t to greater hostility tow ard them in th at case than in others. W hen com pared to the to tal num ber o f Spaniards killed by the Tepehuanes, the ratio is n o t signifi cantly different than th a t o f the Tarahum ara rebellion. In fact, the Tarahu m aras m ay have had m ore hostility tow ard the Jesuits because they repre sented the first significant Spanish presence in their territories. Tarahum aras stated on m ore than one occasion th at the Jesuits were no m ore than ad vance agents o f o th er Spaniards w ho came to take their labor and lands. In contrast, the o th er tw o native groups initially saw the Jesuits as buffers be tw een them selves and a civilian population th at had already begun to exploit them . In the final analysis, Indians understood very well th at the “civilizing” m ission o f the Spaniards was n o t in their interest, no m atter w ho carried it o u t. A lthough Jesuits often called on Spanish officials to carry o u t punish m ents and often set themselves up as protectors by intervening to have p u n ishm ents reduced, they also inflicted corporal punishm ent themselves. Such coercive authority figures did n o t inspire reverence am ong Indians accus tom ed to less-violent means o f ensuring prescribed behavior; the o p pressors w ould have to be elim inated before lost w orlds could be recon stituted. In first-generation revolts, Indians could use the argum ent th a t they should rebel w hile the Spanish presence was small enough th a t it could be obliterated. In o th er w ords, the odds seemed m ore conducive to victory w hen th e non-Indian population was still relatively small. T his was n o t m uch o f a factor in Indian rebellions th a t occurred after m any m ore years o f Spanish settlem ent; the latter som etim es took place w hen Indians perceived a breakdow n in the Spanish state. O nly in the case o f the Tarahum ara rebel lions is there evidence th at Indians may have believed th a t dissension am ong Spaniards m ade the latter m ore vulnerable. This was also the only case in w hich the m issionaries and civil authorities so publicly attacked one another and in w hich th e devil was n o t the prim ary scapegoat. In addition, in 1690 th e rebels w ere aware th at Pueblos had apparently been successful in th eir
28 • SUSAN M . D EED S
attem pt to rid their lands o f Spaniards. In the earlier revolts, both native geopolitical understanding and Spanish interregional ties were m ore lim ited. We need to know m ore about the role o f m ixed-bloods in Indian resis tance m ovem ents. M arginal, fugitive m estizos and m ulattoes were present early in northern Mexican colonial society .114 T he ability o f Spaniards to exploit previous Indian enm ities and enlist In dian allies was another im portant factor affecting the outcom e o f first-wave revolts. The Acaxees supported the Spaniards in the Xixime revolt. A t first the Tepehuanes attracted such broad support from old enemies and m ain tained such internal cohesion th a t their rebellion had the m ost potential for obliterating the Spanish presence in N ueva Vizcaya, b u t by 1617 Spaniards were able to erode th a t support through a com bination o f force and gifts. In the rebellions o f the 1690s Tarahum aras were m ore divided am ong them selves. In all the rebellions. Conchos (whose role in N ueva Vizcaya was sim ilar to th at o f the Tlaxcaians in N ew Spain) served as Spanish auxiliaries as well as rebels. The Spanish policy o f recruiting native soldiers was always m ost significant in the early period o f contact, w hen Spanish num bers were relatively small. 115 Internecine warfare was certainly n o t elim inated by Span ish colonialism ; as so often happened w hen European states expanded, in digenous warfare was transform ed to serve the intruders 5 interests. Im m ediate Spanish responses to the individual rebellions varied. U rdiñola’s cam paign against the Xiximes represented the m ost expeditious re sponse. W hen governors responded less decisively, as in the 1690 cases, the rebellions persisted, enduring until harsher tactics were em ployed. In all cases sum m ary executions and display o f bodies served as w arnings; in the last rebellion these practices became even m ore frequent. Jesuits w ere unani m ous in supporting this hard-line policy. D uring the early-seventeenthcentury rebellions, w hen Indian slavery was still w idespread in the n o rth , those leaders spared execution were enslaved. Perhaps harsh retaliation was n o t a unique feature o f first-generation revolts, b u t Spaniards felt even greater urgency to have their superior m ight recognized w hen there were so few o f them . Therefore, in each case considerable gift giving was com bined w ith threats o f future reprisals and increased attention to reducing Indians to fewer villages in order to subordinate the rem aining rebels. This policy was largely successful after 1620 w ith the first tw o groups and after 1700 w ith the Tarahum aras in elim inating the th reat o f rebellion. In addition, Indian gov ernors and other officials increasingly served to dispense disciplinary mea sures directly and to im pose the obligations dem anded by Spaniards. We have identified certain characteristics, shared in slightly varying de-
F IR S T -G E N E R A T IO N R E B E L L IO N S IN NUEVA VIZCAYA • 29
grees, th a t w ere com m on to these first-generation revolts and th at distin guished them from later, less frequent rebellions. T here were also som e dif ferences am ong th e first-generation rebellions. The Tepehuan rebellion stands o u t as the only serious threat to the m ining econom y o f N ueva Vizcaya. T he Tarahum ara rebellions were m ore m arginal to Spanish eco nom ic interests, b u t they to o k place in a tim e o f w idespread subsistence and dem ographic crisis th at affected m any parts o f N ew Spain. A lthough they w ere carried o u t w ithin tw o decades o f effective Spanish contact, they oc curred at a m ore m ature stage in the evolution o f the entire Spanish colony. T hey w ere also significant in the way th at they defined subsequent accom m odation patterns am ong Tarahum aras. A lthough the Xiximes, and m any Tepehuanes, w ere eventually absorbed by the non-Indian population, a sub stantially greater num ber o f Tarahum aras eluded colonial assim ilation .116 W hen th eir attem pts to retain control o f their ancestral lands failed, m any Tarahum aras retreated farther in to the m ountain canyons. T heir m igration patterns suggest th a t these m ovem ents were undertaken by particular ran cherías as a w hole rather than by disgruntled individuals. D oes this suggest th a t there was greater cohesion w ithin som e Tarahum ara population clus ters than others? I f so, w hat factors generated unanim ity about the desir ability o r necessity o f isolation? H ow are we to explain w hy som e Tarahu m aras avoided acculturation and others did not? Perhaps the tendency to pose the question o f cultural survival in term s o f w hether it represents greater cultural resilience o r weaker external forces does n o t allow us to give sufficient consideration to ecological factors in this case. To the degree th at th e Tarahum aras, and to a lesser extent the Tepehuanes, have been able to avail them selves o f the option o f flight to rugged, relatively inaccessible hab itats, p o o r in subsistence resources b u t especially in resources coveted by outsiders, they have been able to preserve a separate ethnic identity. O ver tim e, they have reinforced the physical barriers by delineating m oral bound aries to distinguish themselves from outsiders. F irst-generation rebellions— desperate, m illenarian attem pts to recon cile th e cataclysmic traum a o f conquest and subordination— proved the fu tility o f trying to obliterate the colonial yoke. F or m ost indigenous peoples o f N ueva Vizcaya, cultural endurance came to depend m ore on everyday in genuity than o n flight o r rebellion . 117 Yet resistance itself, regardless o f form , inevitably served as a source o f cultural transform ation . 118
CH A PTER
2
Differential Response to Colonial Control among the M ixtees and Zapotees ofOaxaca RONALD SPORES
W hen faced with conquest and subjugation by Europeans, Native Ameri cans responded in different ways. Some gave up with little or no resistance, even willingly. Others initially countered force with force and later capitu lated. Others continued resistance until recent times, preserving at least some elements o f their traditional culture or allowing change, but at least on their own terms. Eventually all were absorbed into the mainstream o f Euro pean society or marginalized between tradition and the dominant culture. Despite their wishes, none could resist the inexorable pressures—and at tractions—o f European technology, social institutions, and religion. O f all the areas of N orth America conquered by the Spaniards, none was more ethnically diverse than Oaxaca, and predictably perhaps, responses in Oaxaca to conflict, conquest, and subjugation were equally varied. Al though episodes o f violent confrontation occurred, never was there exten sively organized, prolonged, or effective resistance to European domina tion. This chapter focuses upon the periods and processes o f early resistance and consolidation and the developments during the seventeenth century, with special reference to Mixtees, Zapotees, Mijes, Chatinos, Chontales, and other native groups o f Oaxaca. Following their successes in the central valleys o f Mexico between 1519 and 1521, the Spaniards turned their attention to other areas o f Mesoamerica. Expeditions moved west and northwest to Michoacan, Jalisco, and up the Pacific coast, east to Puebla, Veracruz, and the Gulf coast, and south and southeast to Guerrero, southern Puebla, Oaxaca, Tehuantepec, Yucatan, Honduras, Guatemala, and Central America. In 1522—23 they moved into
D IF F E R E N T IA L R E SPO N SE TO C O N T R O L IN OAXACA • JI
Oaxaca (see map 3) in an effort to conquer an area so attractive that it be came the primary fixture in Hernando Cortés’s vast estate.
E arly Resistance O w ing to the sense o f relief am ong natives at the overthrow o f the CulhuaM exica Em pire, som e skilled diplom acy by C ortés and his associates, and th e persistent blind luck th at followed the Spaniards in their Am erican ven tu re, little resistance was encountered in the M ixteca Alta o r the M azatecaC uicateca o f no rth ern Oaxaca o r in the three central valleys o f Oaxaca. P rin cipal pockets o f opposition were Tututepec on the Pacific coastal plain, the Zapotee Sierra, and Tehuantepec. R esistance in the Tututepec region, although initially fierce, was short lived and rather quickly contained by the Spaniards under Pedro de Al varado. Shortly after the relatively easy victory by the colonists, the native lord o f T ututepec, C oaxintecuhtli, his son, Ixtac Q uiautzin (later baptized Pedro de A lvarado), and the people o f Tututepec revolted . 1 ‘T h e Indians o f T ututepec, having received considerable aggravation from the Spaniards, rebelled against th e m .. . . Pedro de Alvarado, w ith new forces, m oved against them , and although several encounters were fought and some Span iards died, the area was pacified. The natives, insufficient to successfully p u r sue hostilities, surrendered, awaiting a better opportunity that never came.” 2 T ututepec was sacked, w ith thousands o f pesos in gold and other goods be ing carted o ff by a succession o f encom enderos (recipients o f the right to na tive trib u te and labor) w ho included Alvarado, C ortés, G onzalo de Salazar, T ristán de A rellano, and others. The ruling cacique was executed o r sim ply died in com bat w ith the Spaniards, and the people were generally brutalized and exploited. T he Spaniards, im pressed by the size, reputation, and probable w ealth o f the M ixtee T ututepec cacicazgo em pire (sociopolitical institution under the authority o f a local native ruler, o r cacique), established a E uropean villa (royally chartered m unicipality w ith lesser privileges than a ciu d a d , o r city) at T ututepec. Realizing the difficulties and drawbacks inherent in th eir choice, including an unfavorable tropical climate and environm ent, a sm aller native population than anticipated, and a lack o f m ineral resources, the Spaniards abandoned the villa and reestablished themselves in the m ore favorable environs o f A ntequera . 3 A fter this tim e, except for one o r tw o highly localized tu m u lto s (violent disturbances), litde in the way o f orga-
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D IF F E R E N T IA L R E SPO N SE TO C O N T R O L IN OAXACA • 33
nized resistance developed in and around Tututepec or, for th a t m atter, on th e entire Pacific coast from G uerrero to Tehuantepec during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indians were far m ore likely to quarrel am ong them selves over boundaries, cacicazgos, resources, o r a subject com m u nity’s desire to break away from the control o f its cabecera (head tow n) than they w ere to openly o r violently resist Spanish dom ination. Form idable resistance was also directed tow ard the Spaniards as they at tem pted to m ove to the northeast o f the central valleys, into the Sierra Z apoteca and o n to th e G ulf coast, and east and southeast into the region o f th e C hontales and on to Tehuantepec. The M ijes o f the sierra, som etim es in alliance w ith Zapotees and Zoques, were a difficult foe. They fiercely re sisted the Spaniards n o t only during the initial encounter and conquest o f 1522—23 b u t th ro u g h o u t m ost o f the first century o f the colony’s existence. Frequently they em erged victorious in skirmishes w ith colonial troops as th e Spaniards labored to bring the sierra under control and to m ove in the direction o f the R io A lvarado and Coatzacoalcos .4 As the Spaniards sought to conquer the Tehuantepec area in 1523, they were forced to fight the Mijes and th eir allies, and as A ntonio Gay has stated, the Spaniards “never em erged victorious over the M ijes .” 5
E arly Consolidation T he docum entation on the early years o f the colonial reduction o f the prov ince o f Oaxaca is quite sparse. T here was an apparent lack o f notable resis tance d u rin g the first o r second decade o f colonization. The chroniclers o f the period, C ortés, A ntonio de H errera y Tordesillas, Francisco López de G om ara, fray Juan de Torquem ada, and Francisco de Burgoa, make little reference to any E uropean-Indian conflict in this region. W ith the exception o f th e M ijeria o f the Sierra Zapoteca, the Spaniards appear to have carried o u t the early phases o f consolidation o f the area w ith little overt opposition from the natives. C h a tin o s a n d M ix te e s
I t was d u rin g the 1540s th a t sm oldering dissatisfaction surfaced in the form o f open dem onstration. Som e form o f uprising, presum ably occasioned by excessive trib u te and labor dem ands, occurred in the southeastern M ixteca and am ong the C hatinos o f the Juquila area, apparently in 1545—46.6 Al th o u g h virtually nothing is know n o f these disturbances, they greatly con cerned the Spaniards. It is reported th at V iceroy don A ntonio de M endoza
34 * RON ALD SPORES
asked fray G onzalo Lucero to intervene and use his considerable influence to neutralize the insurrección and pacify the natives; apparently he did. The C en tral Valley
Shortly after the sporadic occurrences in the Mixtec-Chatino domain, the scene shifts to the Valley o f Oaxaca.7 Certain Indians in the valley were spreading the good news o f the appearance o f a new god among them. Leaders o f the group carried the message that the natives should rise up against the Spaniards and drive them from the region. Responding to this revelation, several pueblos arose en masse, organized themselves into mili tary squadrons, and marched on Antequera with the intention o f destroying the city, evicting the Spaniards from Antequera, and chasing them out o f the valley. At the time o f the intended attack on Antequera, during the summer months o f 1547, five Dominican priests under the direction of the vicario (vicar), fray Bernardo Albuquerque, resided in the city. By chance, four ad ditional friars were passing through Antequera on their way from Gua temala to Mexico City. One o f the latter group, fray Tomás de la Torre, orga nized the clergymen, sending them into the Indians’ communities to “pacify and disarm them.” The friars were faced with the challenge o f mediating be tween the natives and the Spaniards and breaking up the two armies that had been formed, “that of the Indians that attacked, and that o f the Span iards for their own defense.”8 A ttem pting to reach the natives directly, tw o D om inicans rode on horse back into the countryside. They ventured into shouting distance o f each com m unity and called to the residents to restore order. Two indigenous leaders {señoresp rin cip a les) w ho were acquaintances o f the friars, noting th at th e clergymen were unarm ed, p u t dow n their arms and approached the m e diators in order to speak w ithout raising their voices. A ccording to Gay, T h e p rie sts a d vised th em o fth e g r e a t erro r th ey h a d m ade in ta k in g up arm s a g a in st th e S pan iards , th a t in th e en d th ey w ou ld be fo rced to su rren d er a n d to be sold as slaves, m a k in g a fa rce o f th e ir m otives a n d objectives a n d ren derin g ju tile a ll o f th e death s a n d in ju ries, a n d th a t [th e revela tio n ] o fth e a p pea ra n ce o f a n ew g o d , w hich w as sa id to h ave been enclosed in a chest w hich w ou ld be opened in th e p la z a o f A n te q u e ra [b rin g in g ] d e fe a t a n d d e a th to th e S pan iards, w as a n in ven tio n o f th e tellers . . . . (CW ho fig h ts jin ' th a t w hich is n o t un derstood, a n d who places h is life in d a n g er fo r th a t w hich he has n o t seen? H ow could th is happen by sim ply open in g a chest?” T h ey p ro m -
D IF F E R E N T IA L R E SPO N SE TO C O N T R O L IN OAXACA • 35
ised, m oreovery in th e n am e o f th e k in g , to p a rd o n a ll who w ou ld la y dow n a rm s .9
The two p rin cip a les showed signs o f being persuaded o f the futility of their cause by the priests, but the pair requested that two young Spaniards be dispatched as representatives o f their group to discuss the m atter with the natives and to convince the other caciques o f the valley to retreat from their ob jectives. When the two Spanish representatives arrived among the natives, however, the natives killed them “w ithout listening to a single word.”10The two caciques, having given their word to return the young Spaniards un harmed, became highly indignant at hearing o f their deaths, withdrew their armies, and returned to their villages, resolving to terminate the struggle. The withdrawal o f the caciques and their supporters left the remainder o f the insurrectionist army badly depleted, and judging themselves insufficient to defeat the Spaniards, they dispersed. This ended a war that would have had disastrous consequences for both sides. Tiquiapan Zapotees
Although the movement that culminated in the deaths o f the two young Spaniards lost its momentum, elsewhere, especially in the high sierra re gions, others chafed and strained under the yoke o f colonial exploitation and abuse. In 1548 the Indians of Tiquiapan, a mining community in the mountains east o f Ocotlan, arose under the leadership of a local cacique named don Sebastián.11Although few facts are available concerning this up rising, it is quite likely that the difficulties arose from heavy demands for na tive labor for the silver mines in the region and from related abuses. It is known that Viceroy Mendoza considered the matter to be a serious threat to the stability o f the region and dispatched Capt. Tristán de Luna y Arellano w ith a supporting force to investigate and put down the disorder. Both the viceroy and Luna y Arellano must have been aware o f the probable conse quences o f a direct attack on the Indians, with the possible loss through death or injury o f these indispensable components of the labor force. Luna y Arellano directed efforts not so much at massive repression of the natives but at dealing with the leadership provided by the local nobility. The move ment apparendy involved at least some bloodshed and cruelty but was quelled, and the principal leader, don Sebastián, was imprisoned. Available documentation as well as the accounts o f Burgoa, Andrés Cavo, and Gay indicate the occurrence from the mid-i540s through the 1590s o f numerous localized uprisings o f the type seen in Tiquiapan.12 It is clear that these were localized events having to do with local problems. Although
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th e vast m ajority o f these episodes were concerned w ith intracom m unity disputes, intercom m unity conflict over lands, and quite frequently, natives attem pting to free prisoners, the emphasis o f the present study is on a m i nority o f such cases, those involving confrontations betw een Indians and Spaniards. C en tral Oaxaca an d the S ierra Zapoteca
In 1550 an insurrección involving several communities occurred in central Oaxaca, apparently primarily in the Sierra Zapoteca. The causes seem to have been varied abuses committed, or permitted, by Spanish officials. The perception o f abuse and generalized “misery” had become widespread by midcentury : “As a consequence, the old caciques told o f the old gods and the protection that they believed they received from them, especially from Quetzalcoatl, who, although having departed long ago, promised to reap pear and to liberate the nation from its enemies.”13 T he caciques exhorted the youth o f the region to take up arm s, announc ing th a t the “divino caudillo” (divine boss o r headm an) had arrived and th at the natives “w ould be liberated from the slavery which they suffered .” 14 A gain recognizing the potential danger o f the situation. Viceroy M endoza sent troops to deal w ith the m ovem ent before it became m ore violent and w idespread.
In an apparently related matter, in about 1550 there was notable native un rest in and around the Spanish villa o f San Ildefonso Villa Alta. The situa tion was serious enough that reinforcements had to be summoned from An tequera. Although various factors are likely to have created and perpetuated the explosive situation in the region, contemporary Spaniards as well as such later commentators as Burgoa and Gay emphasized the activities o f the local corregidor (Spanish official in charge of a district), Francisco de Sevilla, as the proximate cause o f the difficulties. Although the circumstances are hazy, this “revolución” by the natives may have been part o f the “Quetzalcoad movement” referred to above. It is also quite possible that it was related to an even more general nativistic movement that began in the Valley o f Mex ico and subsequently was disseminated by “factors fleeing to Oaxaca and Te huantepec to escape the punishment that faced them.”15 In April o f 1551Spaniards residing in San Ildefonso, alarmed by the explo sive situation in the region, sent a representative to the viceroy to tell of the danger and complain o f the bellicosity, rebelliousness, and untamed nature o f the Indians who, it was said, had rebelled in each ofthe twenty-four years since the villa had been established.16They indicated that, had aid not been sent from Antequera in 1550, the villa’s twenty Spaniards and their families
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w ould have perished. T he Spanish requested authority to build a fortress to p ro tect th eir w om en and children from attack and to equip them w ith fifty arquebuses and fifty crossbows for their defense. They asked th at they be al low ed to appoint an alcalde m ayor (head m agistrate) from San Ildefonso it self, hoping th a t an official w ho understood the local situation w ould be m ore effective in responding to the needs o f the Spaniards and dealing w ith the natives. T he Spaniards also com plained th at the Indians had refused to w ork because they had been denied food and pay for their w ork, b u t the Spaniards believed that the m atter could be rectified w ith the appointm ent o f a new alcalde m ayor. T he Indians, they stated, should be obligated to w ork for the Spaniards, for w ith o u t their labor and support the Spaniards could n o t live in the region, and they w ould have to abandon the villa and move to A ntequera. H ow ever, none o f these requests was granted by the viceroy. The M ixteca In the M ixteca during the 1530s the response to m istreatm ent by the Span iards was to flee rather than fight. In 1535, confronted by exorbitant tribute assessm ents and excessive labor dem ands by the encom endero Francisco Solis, the population o f Tam azulapan, led by their cacique, don H ernando, abandoned the com m unity and w ent in to hiding in the high, distant m oun tain s . 17 Later, follow ing a change o f encom enderos, the natives returned to find th eir lands occupied by settlers from the neighboring com m unities o f C oixtlahuaca and Tequecistepec. Tam azulapan and its cacique bro u g h t suit in 1546, b u t the decision, as approved by the Audiencia in M exico, was in fa vor o f th e tow ns Coixtlahuaca and Tequecistepec. T he Tam azulapan case, w hich began w ith a dem onstration o f native resistance “by flight” from Spanish dom ination, evolved into a conflict am ong three native com m unities and th eir caciques, a conflict th at was re solved th ro u g h the newly introduced legal system and n o t through violent confrontation. This is only one o f hundreds o f such native-native d istur bances th a t to o k place in the M ixteca over the three centuries o f Spanish colonization. M aria R om ero Frizzi has accurately perceived the situation in the M ix teca, especially as concerns native labor: “Thus, under the w eight o f all the obstacles, o f bureaucratic sluggishness, o f the linkage between the alcaldes mayores and the members o f the Audiencia, the Mixtees responded to the in tensification o f rep a rtim ien to s [m ost often, labor drafts] principally th ro u g h lawsuits. T heir com plaints w ere n o t against the Spanish system as such. To the contrary, they utilized it in search o f justice. O n very few occasions did they resort to violence in attem pting to change their situation .” 18
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Equally pertinent w ith respect to the focus, direction, and duration o f conflict in the M ixteca is R om ero Frizzi’s observation th at “A lborotos and tu m u ltos occurred in the sixteenth century, b u t consistently these were lim ited to one pueblo, o f short duration and seldom directed tow ard alcaldes may ores o r their lieutenants. M ore frequently, they were against their m ore di rect interm ediaries, their ow n indigenous authorities .” 19 The M ijes
The Mijes, the third largest o f Oaxaca’s ethnic-linguistic groups, dominated the area o f the Sierra Zapoteca to the east and southeast of the Villa Alta area, a place “some thirty leagues across.”20 At the time o f Spanish conquest the Mijes had been involved in long-standing conflict with neighboring Zapotees. “At the time that the Spaniards arrived with the Marqués [H er nando Cortés], blood flowed freely and there were many violent deaths re sulting from these discords. . . . The excessive power and courage o f the Mijes caused the frightened Zapotees to value the Spanish community, and to win them over as allies for their defense, and having recourse to their pro tection against the invasions o f those brutal bandoleros [thieves], from the highest mountains and ridges known in this kingdom o f New Spain, people that struggle with wild beasts, living among them w ithout fear o f sinister li ons, tigers, bears, and snakes.”21 It was largely the bellicosity o f the Mijes and their ongoing conflict with the Zapotees that prompted the Spaniards to establish a presidio settlement at Villa Alta in 1527. The community, composed o f about thirty Spaniards and a group o f “very loyal Mexican Indians” situated in the barrio o f Analco, entered into a complex relationship with local Sierra Zapotees.22 On the one hand, they attempted to exploit the Zapotees for labor and tribute, while on the other hand, they allied with them against the hostilities o f the Mijes. Through their combined efforts the Spaniards, Zapotees, and Mixtees were able to hold out against the Mijes, but this did not prevent the Spaniards from continued exploitation o f the Zapotees for their labor and resources. The ever troublesome Mijes rebelled in 1570 and rampaged through the Sierra Zapoteca, burning and looting Zapotee communities and threaten ing to annihilate the Spaniards in Villa Alta. Once again, Spaniards allied with Indians against Indians. Through the efforts o f a combined force o f Villa Alta and Antequera Spaniards, some two thousand Mixtees from Cuilapa, and the Mexican Indians residing in Analco, the rebellion was con tained and the Mije faction dispersed.23 U nfortunately, litde else is know n o f either the specific causes o f the M ije
D IF F E R E N T IA L R E SPO N SE TO C O N T R O L IN OAXACA • 39
uprising or the nature o f the organization involved in bringing together nu merous apparently independent and scattered communities and fielding an apparently effective fighting force—employing bows and arrows and slings and lances against the arquebuses, crossbows, and cannon o f their oppo nents. It can be inferred quite reasonably, however, that the natives were re sisting the demands and probable abuses o f lower-level Spanish authorities, while harboring their traditional animosity toward the Sierra Zapotees. There was virtually no Spanish population resident in the area, and pre sumably the Mijes agreed that any inclinations on the part o f the Spaniards to setde in the area should be discouraged. Following their defeat, reprimand, and punishment in 1570, the Mijes “remained peaceful and corrected until today [1680],. . . remaining friendly and reconciled.”24They had tested the Spaniards and their allies, and finding them formidable, the Mijes elected to retreat to the remoteness o f their mountain villages rather than risk inevitable destruction. There they re mained throughout the colonial period, and it is there that they may be found today.
The Seventeenth C entury In the early seventeenth century indigenous populations had declined dras tically from mid-sixteenth-century levels. Disease had taken a huge toll on the natives o f Oaxaca, reducing the total number o f Indians by at least 80 percent. Despite sharp declines in population, labor and tribute demands by Spaniards remained high. As the native communities began to recover be tween 1640 and 1660, Spanish encomenderos and crown officials demanded that evaders o f labor and other duties be apprehended and assessments be met. Recounts o f tributaries were initiated to ensure that natives were fully assessed, and efforts were made to include elderly, infirm, subadults, mes tizos, and blacks as well as traditionally eligible married, single, and wid owed Indians. Natives, pressed by demands they could not meet, claimed that the as sessments were excessive and that deceased and absent tributaries had not been removed from the registries. This made it necessary for the survivors to make up all deficits. Community governors and other indigenous officials were arrested for alleged irregularities. Where it was finally obvious that populations actually had been significantly reduced, Spaniards agitated to have inéligibles (mestizos, etc.) placed on the registries.25 This led to native
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resistance in several regions o f the province in 1661—62. The most notable oc currences were in Villa Alta, the Mijeria, Nejapa, Ixtepec, Ozolotepec, and Tehuantepec and along the Huatulco-Chontales coast. Tehuantepec, Nejapa, and V illa A lta O n 22 May 1660 a large and well-armed mob attacked and killed the alcalde mayor of Tehuantepec, Juan de Avellán, a Spanish assistant, and a black slave. The mob then dragged the corpses o f the slain victims through the streets and threw them onto the main plaza. When Dominican priests tried to intervene, the mob turned its anger against them and drove them back into the church. The rebellion was brought on by long-smoldering resent ment and was a violent reaction to the blatant greed o f the local alcalde mayor, who had oppressed the natives of the region with grossly exagger ated taxes, fees, and contributions. The immediate trigger had been the ar rest and imprisonment o f an indigenous official from Mixtequilla. The Te huantepec rebellion also spread to San Mateo Capulalpa, Nejapa, and Villa Alta, although with far less dramatic results. Natives stoned and harassed Spanish officials, in one case severely beating a tribute collector and leaving him for dead. They also refused to pay the tribute, but no additional deaths were noted.26 On 28 May 1660 governors, alcaldes, and principales o f fifteen Chontal communities in the Nejapa region appealed to the bishop o f Oaxaca to in tercede on their behalf to protect them from the excesses and aggravation that had been inflicted upon them by the then-deceased alcalde mayor o f Te huantepec, his lieutenants, and his assistants.27 They asked for relief from excessive demands and from underpayment for goods and services man dated by the alcalde mayor. They had been forced to pay exorbitant prices for merchandise monopolized by the alcalde mayor, and they complained that all o f their labor, and the fruits o f their labor, went to satisfy the greedy Spaniards. Further, if they did not pay or attempted to go to the capital to complain o f mistreatment, they were attacked, whipped, jailed, and other wise molested. As a result o f these demands, abuses, and threats, hundreds abandoned their homes and villages and fled into the hills. Again, the option exercised was to flee rather than openly resist. The bishop, taking advantage o f privileged access to the colonial pohtical-administrative system, for warded the natives’ complaints, together with highly supportive endorse ments and a petition for protective intervention, to the viceroy in Mexico. The seriousness o f the situation in Tehuantepec and in a dozen other communities in Oaxaca prompted the viceroy to send an oidor (judge) o f the royal Audiencia, don Juan Francisco Montemayor y Cuenca, to investigate
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both the violent uprising in Tehuantepec and a host o f problems concerning tribute assessment and collection. The oidor arrived in Oaxaca in March o f 1661. “Having conducted certain investigations,” he found that “the cause o f the [Tehuantepec] motín [insurrection] had been the excessive demands o f the said alcalde mayor, don Juan de Avellan, in the repartimientos levied against the Indians and the dealings and commercial activities conducted by the alcaldes mayores.”28 But Montemayor y Cuenca also sat in judgment o f the leaders o f the violent mob that had taken the life of Juan de Avellán. Two Indians were condemned to death, eight were banished to hard labor in the mines for six or more years, one other was lashed and banished, and three were lashed and condemned to serve four years on “la lancha” in Veracruz. An Indian woman who stirred up the community by inciting the people against the corregidor and who committed other crimes was condemned to whipping, six years in the obrajes (weaving factories) in Puebla, and banish ment. The native governors of the towns were also ordered to strictly “obey their superiors and to see to guarding the peace and tranquility o f their pueblos.”29 Violent demonstrations also occurred in Villa Alta. Following his inves tigation and a hearing, O idor Montemayor y Cuenca condemned two prin cipales to whipping and banishment and four years o f hard labor in the mines. Two other Indians were whipped and banished for shorter terms.
Huamelula andHuatulco D uring the oidor’s investigation in 1662 it was reported that the natives o f Huamelula and Huatulco had complained o f imprisonment o f thç.gober nador and an alcalde o f Huamelula by the Spanish alcalde mayor. The Span ish official threatened to garrotte the prisoners for failure to enforce tribute requirements. The incident caused panic among the natives, who sought to abandon the community and flee to the wild countryside. Only the inter vention o f the bishop o f Oaxaca and one fray Laureano de Lemos, seeking to avoid a repeat o f the situation that had occurred in Tehuantepec, saved the lives o f the prisoners and convinced the natives to return to their humble houses. The clergymen believed that their intervention was necessary to pre vent continued exploitation o f the natives of Huamelula and Huatulco by the alcalde mayor, to prevent the flight o f the natives, and to avoid violence o f the type that had occurred in Tehuantepec. There were bitter complaints by the bishop o f Oaxaca and others that the oidor had overstepped his authority and moved in a high-handed, arbitrary, and self-serving manner, not only with respect to the Tehuantepec affair but also w ith his investigation and judgment o f the tribute problems in more
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than a dozen other communities in the province. The bishop complained that the Indians had suffered from the excesses of the alcalde mayor o f Te huantepec but that they were “now suffering more from the excesses o f the oidor who came to punish Indians.”30 The bishop, in complaining o f official excesses, was also implying that the Indians may have been justified in their actions. Clearly he sympathized with the natives, and he endeavored to present their side. This matter, and much o f what native resistance in Oaxaca was about in colonial times, is poi gnantly compressed in the final statement o f cacique Fausan, the leader o f the insurrection, as he stood on the gallows awaiting execution: “My brothers, I do not die as a traitor to the King our lord, nor for disobedience, nor for inciting riot, but because o f the repartimientos.”31 Indians dominated landholding in all areas of Oaxaca throughout the colo nial period.32There is abundant confirmation that Indians held at least twothirds o f the arable lands o f the central valleys o f Oaxaca, seven-eighths o f the lands o f the Mixteca, and at least three-fourths o f the Sierra Zapoteca. A possible exception to this prevalent pattern o f land control may have existed in the Isthmus o f Tehuantepec. Painstaking studies by Judith Zeitlin and Lolita Gutiérrez Brockington reveal that the Spaniards, Cortés and his heir being most prominent among them, made unusually heavy demands on the lands and the labor o f the natives o f Tehuantepec.33 Zeitlin has found, for example, that between 1556 and 1634 titles to some 208 livestock or agri cultural sitios (plots o f land) were awarded to petitioners in the area. The Spanish presence was more obvious in Tehuantepec than in any other area o f Oaxaca outside o f Antequera and the central valleys. In spite o f this nota ble exploitation and the excesses and obvious abuses inflicted by the Span iards, it is quite remarkable that there is little indication o f resistance, orga nized or sporadic, in the area until the mid-seventeenth century. When conflicts arose between Indians and Spaniards, those problems re sulted far more frequently from administrative, commercial, or social abuses than from land or boundary disputes. The interests o f Spanish merchants and officials, primarily alcaldes mayores, loomed far larger than efforts to seize and control lands, waters, and revenue-producing localities (salt works, mines, fisheries, timber reserves). It was individual Spaniards attempting to take advantage o f their politically and economically superior status, their middleman roles, and their superior access to liquid capital who occa sionally provoked conflict with the Indians. Indian resistance in colonial Oaxaca was sporadic and was a response to the interm ittent excesses o f the Spanish. The primary indication o f any gen-
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eralized sense o f “relative deprivation” was manifested in the apparent nativistic movements that were beginning to take shape in the central valleys and in the neighboring Sierra Zapoteca around 1550. Rather than being vio lently suppressed by the Spaniards, however, these movements seem to have been doomed to failure by virtue o f a lack o f general popular support, lead ership, and organization as well as the effective intervention o f the Domini can clergy. Yet it is significant that wide-scale “revitalistic” movements seemed to come to an end in Oaxaca after the 1550s. Why should that be the case? First, during the late 1540s and into the 1550s the so-called New Laws of the co lonial government were beginning to be implemented. Increasing legisla tive and administrative liberalization led to improved relations among In dians and Spaniards, and there were increasing efforts on the part o f the crown and the Spanish clergy to protect the natives from physical, social, and economic abuse and to maintain the Indian pueblos as self-sufficient, in tegrated sociopolitical entities. Missionary clergymen became more effec tive as agents o f directed culture change, introducing the advantages o f Eu ropean technology and protecting the Indians against the greed and avarice o f Spanish officials, settlers, and merchants. The wounds of cultural and ideological upheaval following the conquest were healing, and the natives had become convinced o f the feasibility o f Spanish Catholicism and a colo nial way o f life. Second, the introduction o f Spanish legal and administrative systems provided avenues that extended beyond the individual communities for dealing with political and economic matters. These institutions were estab lished to resolve trouble situations, ameliorate conflict, and define and as sign property. And large numbers o f Indians were quick to take advantage o f these new institutions for meeting colonial judicial and political goals. Third, Spanish administrators and clergy soon realized that it was advan tageous to work through traditional political channels with existing govern ing bodies and in collaboration with local caciques and principales. Natives were also brought more fully into the economic network that extended from their villages to the general region, to the province of Oaxaca, to the rest o f Spanish America, to Europe, and even to Asia. In the Mixteca and in several other areas in Oaxaca the development o f the silk and cochineal industries also brought new prosperity to many localities. These factors served to lessen the general dissatisfaction, or deprivation, that accompanied the pe riod o f early contact and conquest. In general, it can be said that Spanish domination, particularly after 1550, was rather easily accepted. Levels o f acceptance, however, varied from re-
4 4 * RON ALD SPORES
gion to region. The places o f greatest resistance were the central valley o f Oaxaca, especially in the years immediately after the conquest; the Zapotee Sierra, particularly Villa Alta and the surrounding area; the Mijeria; Te huantepec; Nejapa; and the Chontales region. Resistance and violent con flict were most pronounced in these areas. The proximate cause o f violence in all o f the mentioned areas was excessive tribute and labor demands and abuse by Spanish officials. There was no widespread resistance in the Mixteca, the Pacific coastal lowlands, the Cañada-Cuicateca-Paploapan area, or the Oaxaca-Puebla borderlands. After the 1550s there was little resistance, and certainly little organized resistance, in the central valleys o f Oaxaca: Tlacolula, Etla, or Ocotlan-Ejutla-Miahuatlan. The natives had a choice be tween “fight” or “flight”: “Pressures within a community or excessive de mands by colonial authorities often forced Indians to choose between flight and active resistance, and many chose to abandon their homes. Residents o f even the largest and most affluent towns demonstrated great mobility when faced with involuntary service in the mines or a tyrannical native leader.”34 The Mixteca was quickly conquered and hispanized in the sixteenth cen tury. The Spanish instituted an effective multilevel system of government, and with little resistance, the Dominicans converted the Indians, built mas sive religious structures in their midst, and introduced Spanish civilization. Although Mixtees rather readily embraced Catholicism, European technol ogy, and the Spanish colonial political and economic systems, they did not give up their language, and they retained much o f their traditional world view and culture. Moreover, the Mixtees did not become homogenized into a pan-colonial peasant culture but, because of culture, geography, and spe cial forms o f adaptation, emerged as distinctive from the Zapotees, Mijes, Cuicatecs, Zoques, Chontales, Mazatecs, and Chinantecs.35 Mixtee communities were left standing, and their identities were further validated as legal titles delineated territories and assigned rights through subsequent adjudication by Spanish courts. Whether those claims were ver ified or moderated, the existence of the system of litigation and the building of in-group morale reinforced the identity o f the community as distinct from other such communities. The courts furnished a stage for the acting out o f a highly symbolic drama of community identity formation and rein forcement that went far beyond the often quite minimal economic values o f disputed lands, boundaries, and resources. The multilevel system o f govern ment reinforced the identity and autonomy o f the community while simul taneously linking individual communities into the ascending system o f co lonial government. Within thirty years after the Spaniards arrived, an “intercommunity conflict ethos” had arisen from the competition for lands
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and resources held “since time immemorial” or as granted by the colonial government, by population pressure, by livestock herding and grazing in fringements, by tribute demands that were community focused, and by other economic exactions.36 Fierce local identities and protectionism, and in some cases expansion ism, led to intercommunity conflict originally centering around boundary disputes. These conflicts were “managed,” but never finally resolved, by the colonial political-judicial system and thus persisted for decades or, in more than a few instances, for centuries. Communities in conflict took their prob lems to the colonial government for resolution. Paradoxically, governmen tal institutions structured intercommunity conflict, emphasized it, provided a forum for its full, dramatic expression, and reemphasized community selfidentity and a cognitive context for opposition o f one community to an other and for conducting, as well as managing, conflict. Thus the legacy o f the colonial period from the mid-sixteenth century forward was intrare gional fragmentation into dozens o f ethnic components : the Indian pueb los. This fragmentation precluded, even militated against, the emergence o f a Mixtee “ethnic identity” or a class-structured conflict between Indians and Spaniards. Broad-scale resistance simply did not materialize in the Mixteca during colonial times. Never was there any kind o f a “national movement” or a revitalistic expression. There were no caste or class wars. Indians in the central valleys, in the Villa Alta area, and in Tehuantepec had been more persistently exposed to the lifestyle and material culture o f the Spaniards and saw themselves as “disadvantaged.” Villa Alta and Nejapa were villas, and they, along with Antequera, the province’s only city, and Te huantepec, had relatively large, visible, and demanding Spanish popula tions. Contact between Spaniards and Indians was more direct and perva sive. In the Mixteca, however, there were fewer Spaniards; there was less persisting daily contact between Indians and Spaniards; and there was less mining and ranching. Repartimiento was far less a factor in the Mixteca than it was in the central valleys, the sierra, and Tehuantepec. The level o f ex ploitation by encomenderos and alcaldes mayor, and labor exploitation in general was far lower in the Mixteca than in those regions. Societal conflict throughout the colonial period involved vertical, rather than horizontal, cleavages in Oaxacan rural society. Disputes were far more frequent between Indian communities (usually over lands or scarce re sources), between caciques and communities, or between two or more caci ques than between Indians and Spaniards. Spanish landholdings were small relative to lands controlled by natives throughout the colonial period, and disputes between Spaniards and Indians were almost always channeled into
46 • RONALD SPORES
and resolved—or at least managed—by the formal administrative-judicial system. At no time during the colonial period were Indians dispossessed o f their lands on even a moderate scale or deprived o f their communities and access to basic resources. Colonial Indian communities competed with other Indian communities with respect to territory, boundaries, resources, and political separation and autonomy, just as they have to the present day. It would be futile to search for any kind of class conflict or “caste war” dur ing colonial times. Although some o f the ingredients may have been pres ent, the coalescence of those elements into broad social movements extend ing beyond specific localities simply did not occur. In their confrontation with the Spaniards, Indians had five alternatives o f resistance: openly resist by force o f arms or through threat o f violence (Tututepec, 1522; Valley o f Oaxaca, 1540s; Villa Alta and Mijeria, 1520s, 1540s— 1550s, and 1660; Tehuantepec-Chontales, 1660); passively resist by withholding labor services or tribute (Tiquiapan, 1548; Sierra Zapoteca-Villa Alta, 1540s—1550s; Tehuantepec, 1660); abandon communities and flee into remote areas (Tamazulapan of the Mixteca, 1535; Chontales-Huamelula, 1660); resort to the courts, administrators, clergymen, or parapolitical insti tutions (all areas from the 1530s to 1700 and beyond) ; or acquiesce and accept control and exploitation (most communities o f Oaxaca for most of the colonial period). Native resistance to Spanish colonial domination clearly did occur in Oaxaca between 1522 and 1700. Overwhelmingly, however, dominant re sponses to abuse, exploitation, dissatisfaction, and deprivation were to re sort to the administrative-judicial system for rectification or to yield to colo nial control. Only rarely, and under the most trying circumstances, did natives turn to violent confrontation, massive passive resistance, or revitalistic movements as mechanisms for redressing grievances or resolving con flict.
CHAPTER 3
Religion and Rebellion in Colonial Chiapas KEVIN G O SN ER
Early in the eighteenth century a series of purported miracles created great excitement among the native peoples o f Chiapas.1 In the first case, in 1708, large crowds o f tzotziles in Zinacantan and from nearby Chamula gathered to hear a mestizo preacher. H e was said to have, hidden in a tree, a statue o f the H oly M other that emitted rays o f light. A Dominican curate, fray Joseph Monroy, went to investigate the matter and later described what he found: I came upon agreat crowd ofIndian men and womenfrom the two pueblos. I asked them where this man was, and they told me he had now left the tree and moved to another paraje [subdivision o fan Indian town] nearby. Pro ceeding a short distance, I discovered a man covered in a blanket, leaning against an oak, hisface hidden. I asked him who he was. He did not respond until I asked a third time, “I am a poor sinner, who is not allowed to love God . . » I went to examine the tree, a hollow oak, whose cavity had been covered with a table. On the table Ifound a pestañuela for food receivedfrom the hands o fthe Indians. On this table I found an indentation in which had been placed a wooden image o fSt. Joseph. W ithin the tree, I found a small notebook ofverses that appeared to be concerned with penitence and love o f God. Fixed to the tree was a cross with verses written on paper addressed to the same concerns? M onroy gave the m an over to the custody o f the Franciscans in C iudad R eal, w ho im prisoned him . H e was freed tw o years later and returned to Zinacantan to resum e his unorthodox m inistry. A rural chapel was built to house his im age o f the V irgin, and the curious and the pious came again
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