Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan: A Study of Post-War Trends 0837171067, 9780837171067

Citation preview

N A T IO N A L IS M AND T H E R IG H T W IN G IN JA P A N : A S T U D Y O F P O S T -W A R T R E N D S

The Royal Institute of International Affairs is an un­ official and non-political body, founded in 1920 to encourage and facilitate the scientific study of inter­ national questions. The Institute, as such, is pre­ cluded by the terms of its Royal Charter from express­ ing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs. Any opinions expressed in this publication are not, therefore, those of the Institute.

Nationalism and the Right Wing A study of post-war trends

Dr. I. I. MORRIS With an Introduction by P rofessor M aruyama M asao

Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs O X F O R D U N IV E R S IT Y PR E S S LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO

i960

Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.C.4 GLASGOW BOMBAY

NEW YORK

TORONTO

MELBOURNE

W ELLINGTON

CALCUTTA

MADRAS

KARACHI

KUALA LUM PUR

CAPETOWN

IBADAN

NAIR OB I

ACC RA

© Royal Institute of International Affairs i960

P R IN T E D IN GR EA T B R IT A IN

ONUIP

TO ARNOLD TOYNBEE T H I S B O O K IS R E S P E C T F U L L Y D E D IC A T E D

PREFACE The common denominator of nationalism is a sense of group loyalty felt by people towards the nation to which they happen to belong. This sense of loyalty can take numerous forms depending on the his­ torical context. In some cases it will emerge as loyalty towards cer­ tain crucial national interests, notably, achievement of indepen­ dence, protection from foreign danger, or the need to expand or to safeguard overseas interests; national unity and military strength will then be the paramount considerations. Nationalism may also take the form of loyalty to national myths, symbols, cultural heri­ tages or ways of life that are regarded as making the nation unique and (in general) superior ; the focus will then be on preserving or re­ storing traditional aspects of the nation’s life. Various types of nationalist sentiment can coexist or, alternatively, one manifestation (for example, the desire to achieve freedom from foreign rule) can have overriding importance. In every case the essential aim is the assertion of the nation’s identity; the means, however, will vary depending on whether principal emphasis is given mainly to military, economic, cultural or ideological strength. Sometimes nationalism will be a diffuse, latent force manifesting it­ self mainly as pride in the nation’s cultural traditions and folkways, or as a vague nostalgia for a past epoch when the nation’s fortunes seem to have been happier ; in other circumstances it may emerge as a dynamic force spurring the nation-group to immense effort and sacrifice. Nationalism can serve to reinforce numerous different approach­ es, ideologies, and policies. Under certain conditions it can be com­ bined with democracy, liberalism, or moderate socialism; elsewhere it may become the most effective tool of aggressive militarism, re­ action, Fascism or Communism. It may be a popular movement springing up from below and allied to a desire felt by certain groups for improved conditions and greater rights; alternatively, it can be used by a ruling clique to create unity among the people in support of a policy of military expansion. The vast range and potentialities of nationalism must always be kept in mind, and one purpose of this Study will be to examine how nationalist sentiment in a given conn-

Preface vm try can change from one period to another, and how during the same period it can express itself in totally different ways in different countries. Nationalism is essentially an emotional force and can readily lend itself in periods of crisis to the hysterical manifestations of ultra­ nationalism; at such times its irrational characteristics may lead the nation to adopt policies that are harmful, not only to other countries, but to itself. In underdeveloped and late-developing countries, where the roots of democracy and civil rights are usually still feeble, nationalism is especially susceptible under such circumstances to exploitation by the political extremes. The present study will be focused on the right-wing manifestations of nationalism in Japan. It would be extremely misleading, however, to examine right-wing nationalism apart from the general political context in which it operates and considerable attention will be given in the following chapters to the left-wing forms of nationalism, as well as to non­ political expressions of this sentiment. The chapter on Japanese students, for example, will deal largely with the influence of leftist nationalism and analyse the reasons why the right wing seems to have had so little success in this important quarter. It has also ap­ peared necessary to give rather more background material on politi­ cal and social conditions than would be required in the case of a country that was more familiar to the average English-speaking reader. Such subjects as the development of state nationalism in the Meiji Period, the student movement in pre-war Japan, and the boss-follower system in Japanese society will therefore be discussed in some detail. The terms ‘left* and ‘right* are, of course, arbitrary and their con­ tent varies from time to time and from country to country. In the case of Japan, the word uyoku (‘right wing*) has a fairly concrete significance and a further aim of the present study is to present this aspect of Japanese politics for the benefit of Western readers. Several books in English (notably Mr. G. R. Storry*s The Double Patriots, London, 1957) have examined the pre-war development of the ex­ treme right wing ; so far, however, little has been written on its post­ war manifestations or, indeed, on post-war nationalism in general. A considerable number of rightist societies and personalities will appear in the following pages. The societies examined are, of course, only a minute proportion of the hundreds that have emerged in the

Preface

ix

post-war period. In most cases they have been chosen for discussion because they represent certain general aspects or trends. Now, as before the war, the societies are constantly changing their names, their composition, and their strength, and specific details concern­ ing each individual group are far less important than their over-all tendencies. It does, however, seem advisable to balance theoretical interpretation with a reasonable amount of concrete factual material. To avoid weighing down the text with detailed facts, these are as far as possible relegated to the notes. The biographical notes on pp. 440-52 also contain factual information on the pre-war back­ ground of many of the rightist personalities who became active after 1951. For purposes of reference, material contained in these notes (as well as in the appendices) are all listed in the Index. The names of societies and other Japanese words are indexed in both their romanized forms and in their English translations. Although this makes the Index bulky, it is hoped that it will result in com­ pensating advantages for most readers. In a specialized study of this type, the subject under discussion inevitably looms large and there is always the danger that it may ap­ pear to have a disproportionately great importance in the general picture. Every effort will be made to avoid over-emphasizing the present significance of right-wing nationalism and of the organized right wing. The aim will be to present them in proper perspective as one part of the constantly developing pattern of contemporary politics. At the same time it is the opinion of the present writer that our justifiable concern in the West with the dangers presented to the democratic cause by the extreme left may at times lead us to concen­ trate our concern overwhelmingly on Communist movements and thus to underrate the potential threat that may come from the oppo­ site extreme—a threat that may in many cases be at least as real, even if less disastrous for the Western cause. One aim of the present study is to help correct this possible imbalance. The West cannot afford to be complacent about the chances of a swing to either extreme in any of the countries that belong to the democratic camp. One of the difficulties in writing about the contemporary scene is that one’s material is soon apt to seem out of date. The present book concentrates on the twelve-year period from 1945 to 1957, but cer­ tain subsequent points, such as the results of the 1958 Lower House elections, have been incorporated. It is the writer’s hope that the

X

Preface

general conclusions drawn from his study of the material will retain some relevance after the material itself has ceased to be topical. In closing these prefatory remarks, I must express my apprecia­ tion to the Royal Institute of International Affairs for their encour­ agement, advice, and material assistance, without which this book would not have been written; I must point out, however, that the views expressed in it are entirely my own. I am also greatly in­ debted to the help and advice of numerous Japanese and foreign authorities on the subject. Most of their names appear in the ap­ propriate notes, but I must particularly mention Professors Oka Yoshitake and Maruyama Masao of Tokyo University; they have read each chapter as it was written and have made many valuable suggestions that have been incorporated in the final version. Despite their close reading of the book they are, of course, not responsible for any inaccuracy in content, illogicality in views, or infelicity in pre­ sentation. I am extremely grateful to Professor Maruyama who, in addition to suggesting certain revisions, has provided a valuable in­ troduction on the pre-war background. My thanks are also due to Professor R. P. Dore of the University of British Columbia, Mr. ökubo Genji of the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, Mr. Richard Storry of St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Professor B. R. Peam of the Foreign Office Research Department, Professor W. G. Beasley of the University of London, and others who have kindly read and commented on individual chapters, as well as to Mr. Hagiwara, Mr. Misawa, and others of the National Diet Library, Tokyo, who have helped to check my facts, and to Miss Hermia Oliver of Chatham House for her numerous valuable suggestions and for her thorough editing of the manuscript. Finally, I should like to take this oppor­ tunity to express my thanks to the various leaders and members of nationalist groups who have been good enough to answer my ques­ tions and to present their views to me while I was preparing ma­ terial for this study. Should any of them see this book, I hope that, even though they may not always agree with my analysis, they will consider my presentation fair and objective. Tokyo, May i g§8

CONTENTS PREFACE

vii

NOTE ON JAPANESE NAMES

XV

ABBREVIATIONS INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR MARUYAMA MASAO I. THE OCCUPATION ATTACK ON ORGANIZED NATIONALISM Ideological Measures Political Measures Economic Measures New Constitution II.

JAPANESE NATIONALISM UNDER FIRE AND THE DISPERSION OF ULTRA-NATIONALIST GROUPS Official Reactions to Defeat Popular Reactions to Defeat Ultra-Nationalist Incidents Effects of Defeat on Nationalist Sentiment Effects of Defeat on Ultra-Nationalist Elements Dispersion of Ultra-Nationalist Elements into Rural Areas The Peerless Poetry Association, &c. Conclusions

III. THE ANTI-COMMUNIST REVIVAL AND THE NEW RIGHTWING GROUPS Post-War Rise of the Extreme Left; Nationalism and Com­ munism in Japan General Characteristics of the New Right-Wing Organiza­ tions The People’s New Life Movement Japan Revolutionary Chrysanthemum Flag Comrades' Asso­ ciation Japan Anti-Communist League New and Powerful Masses Party Great Conciliation Party Minor Anti-Communist Groups Conclusions IV. THE ‘REVERSE COURSE’ AND THE EVOLUTION OF POST­ WAR NATIONALISM ‘Reverse Course' Evolution of Post-War Nationalism Special Characteristics of Post-War Nationalism Conclusions

xvi xvii

i i 7

13 16

22 22

24 24 29 40 44

S6

57

59 59 65

73 77

90

92 94 97 100

105 105 120

132 158

xii

Contents

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

THE REVIVAL OF NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS ON TRADI­ TIONAL LINES The ‘Reverse Course* and the Re-emergence of Traditional Nationalist Movements Points in Common and Points of Disagreement New Life Japan People’s League and Myriad Weapons Society Harmony Party The Anti-Bolshevik Corps and the Great Japan Production Party Constitution Justice Cultivation Association and the Japan National Polity Institution Great Japan Patriots’ Party Chrysanthemum Flag Association National Territory Defence Research Association and Fatherland Defence Comrades’Association Conclusions

160 160 164 172 174 181 185 187 192 198 200

RIGHT-WING NATIONALISM AND THE MILITARY Rehabilitation of Professional Military Men Political Significance of Military Elements in the Post-War Period Conclusions

206 208

NATIONALIST TRENDS IN THE STUDENT MOVEMENT Political Developments in the Student Movement General Aspects of the Post-War Student Movement Conclusions

269 270 291 310

TOUGH-MINDED AND STRONG-ARMED YOUTH GROUPS Patriotic Youth Groups in the Post-War Period Japan Sound Youth Association National Martyrs Youth Corps National Protection Corps and National Protection Youth Corps Significance of Patriotic Youth Groups

312 312 323 325

CAN RIGHT-WING NATIONALIST GROUPS UNITE? The Need for Unification Post-War Efforts at Unification Weaknesses in the Unification Movement Conclusions

350 350 353 368 379

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS : DEMOCRACY, NATIONALISM, AND THE POLITICAL EXTREMES Democracy and ‘Democracy’ Nationalism and its Political Implications Nationalism and the Political Extremes Weaknesses of the Extreme Right Potentialities of the Extreme Right Implications for the Western Democracies Conclusions

382 383 392 397 402 406 421 424

243 265

338 345

Contents

xiii

The ‘Amuletic’ Use of Words in Japanese Ultra-Nationalist Organizations Named in the Purge Order of January 1946 ill. Main Dom estic‘Incidents’, 1931-40 IV. Chart Showing Relationships between Some Pre-War and Post-War Nationalist Organizations v. Political Attitudes in Japan

427

APPENDICES I. I I.

427

429 430 436 437

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

440

BIBLIOGRAPHY

453

INDEX

459

N O T E ON JA PA N ESE NAM ES Names appearing in this study are given in the usual Japanese order, that is with the surname first. To facilitate reference, the word for ‘Japan* when appearing at the beginning of the name of an organization, or in combinations such as ‘Great Japan’ and ‘All-Japan*, is always given as Nihon although the pronunciation Nippon is frequently used. There is no significant distinction between the two readings, though in certain con­ texts the second has a slightly more masculine, martial, and nationalistic ring.

A B B R EV IA TIO N S Fujiwara, ‘Nationalism* :

Fujiwara Hirotatsu, ‘Nationalism and the Ultraright Wing’, Annals of the

American Academy of Political and Social Science, Nov. 1956. Fujiwara, ‘Nihon Nashion­ arizumu* :

Fujiwara Hirotatsu, ‘Nihon Nashionarizumu no Sengo Keitai—Nihon Kakumei Kikuhata Döshikai no Baai’, in Nihon Jimbun Kagaku Kai, ed., Shakaiteki Kinchö no Kenkyü. Tokyo,

JCP Keibi Keisatsu :

Japanese Communist Party. Keibi Keisatsu Kenkyü Kai, ed., Uyoku Undo. Rev. ed. Tokyo, 1955. Kinoshita Hanji, 'Purge' Policy and After. Conference Paper, 12th Institute of Pacific Relations Conference, Kyoto,

1953-

Kinoshita, Purge Policy :

1954-

Maruyama Masao, ‘Nihon Fuashizumu no Shisö to Undo*, in his Gendai Seiji no Shisö to Ködö. Tokyo, 1956-7. Maruyama Masao, ‘Minshushugi no Maruyama, ‘Minshushugi’ : Na ni okeru Fuashizumu’, Sekaiy no. 94, Oct. 1953, p. 37. Maruyama, ‘Nashionarizumu’ : Maruyama Masao, ‘Nihon ni okeru Nashionarizumu’, in his Gendai Seiji no Shisö to Ködö. Tokyo, 1956-7. Maruyama, Nationalism : Maruyama Masao, Nationalism in PostWar Japan. Conference Paper, n th Institute of Pacific Relations Confer­ ence, Lucknow, 1950. NDF National Defence Forces. SCAP, Political Reorientation: Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Political Reorientation of Japan, Sep­ tember 1945 to September 1948. Wash­ ington, USGPO, 1949. Shakaiteki Kinchö: Nihon Jimbun Kagaku Kai, ed., Shakaiteki Kinchö no Kenkyü. Tokyo, Maruyama, ‘Fuashizumu’:

1953-

Introduction by Professor Maruyama Masao, Tokyo University (translated by 1. 1. Morris) My aim in these introductory notes is to provide a brief survey of the position and role occupied by the ‘right-wing* movement with­ in the political and social structure of pre-war Japan and thus to set the stage for an examination of the post-war period, with which Dr. Morris’s study is mainly concerned. Since the terms ‘left* and ‘right* are essentially only relative ex­ pressions, it is no easy matter to determine what is ‘right wing* in any concrete set of political conditions. This was particularly true in the case of pre-war Japan, when numerous circumstances made it difficult to identify the driving force behind right-wing nationalism. The common misunderstanding about the role of the Amur River Association (Kokuryü Kai) is a case in point. Largely because of the emotive connotations of the mistranslation ‘Black Dragon Society*, the name of this group was from an early stage better known abroad than in Japan itself, and there was a widespread belief in the West that the Amur River Association was some sort of omnipotent secret society which was in a position freely to manipulate Japanese poli­ tics from behind the scenes. Misconceptions of this type do not result so much from any tendency of Western observers to over­ simplify the situation in our country as from the fact that the politi­ cal dynamics of pre-war Japan often seemed too peculiar and involved to admit of logical analysis. Since the subject of right-wing nationalism is so complex, we should perhaps begin by setting forth some of the common char­ acteristics that this political force manifests in the various countries where it has arisen. Inter alia we can distinguish the following ideo­ logies or tendencies: (i) precedence of loyalty to the nation over every other form of loyalty; (2) hostility towards any extension of democratic rights and towards international socialism ; (3) support of militarism and opposition to pacifist movements ; (4) glorification of a national ‘mission* ; (5) appeal to protect national traditions and B

xviii Introduction culture from sinister outside influences; (6) emphasis on duties as opposed to rights, on order as opposed to freedom; (7) stress on the individual's family and birthplace as the fundamental bonds of social cohesion; (8) tendency towards the authoritarian regimenta­ tion of all human relationships; (9) integration of the national spirit in support of orthodox ideas ; (10) tendency to be especially vigilant and suspicious in regard to intellectuals and members of the free professions, on the grounds that they are apt to become the dis­ seminators of ‘subversive thoughts'. Assuming that this is a reasonably accurate characterization of right-wing nationalism, let us apply it to the state of Japan from the beginning of the Meiji Period until the end of the Second World War. Whom may we regard as having been right wing during this period? If we overlook an extremely small number of heretics, the answer is—everybody. The assertions and tendencies that we have set forth in characterizing right-wing nationalism prevailed, or were at least latent, within the various parties, factions, and organizations of Japan, including the political, business, and educational worlds, and they were supported with particular enthusiasm by the leaders of these groups. The so-called ultra-nationalist or right-wing socie­ ties and their movement merely expressed the all-pervasive ideo­ logy of right-wing nationalism in a more blatant form. There is nothing surprising about this almost universal accept­ ance in Japan of the underlying tenets of right-wing nationalism. For when we examine these tenets one by one, we find that they are all closely related to the official education of chukun aikoku (‘loyalty to the Emperor and love of country*) which the power élite of Im­ perial Japan had systematically imposed on the people since the Meiji Period. In certain cases right-wing nationalist beliefs were from the outset part of the Government's programme of indoctrina­ tion; in other cases they were naturally derived from the official ideology. The extraordinarily widespread nature of right-wing nationalism in pre-war Japan was an underlying factor that determined both the strength and the weakness of the so-called right-wing movement. Let us first examine the advantages that accrued to the organized right wing from the conditions that have been outlined. When the increase in international and domestic tension in the 1930*s provided

Introduction xix the rightist forces with their golden opportunity, there was hardly any need for them to exert themselves in familiarizing the people with their ideology. The main nationalist doctrines were already widely disseminated among the public. All that the rightists had to do in order to awaken those people who had lapsed into dreams of ‘individualistic pleasure' and ‘socialistic utopias' and to bring them back to their patriotic senses was to ring an alarm-bell. When they raised the Imperial standard of ‘national polity' (kokutai), none of the parties and circles in Japan, with the exception of a handful of anarchists and Communists, had any legitimate grounds for offer­ ing frontal resistance. In the face of rightist attacks Japanese Chris­ tians, liberals, and democrats always had to begin by vindicating themselves, that is, by pleading that their own thoughts and deeds were in no way opposed to the ‘national polity'. Their arguments, accordingly, always tended to be passive. It is these conditions that explain developments like the Minobe Incident, which swept over Japan like a typhoon in 1935. For several decades Professor Minobe Tatsukichi had freely ex­ pounded his ‘organ theory', namely, that the Emperor exercised his sovereign powers only as the highest organ of the state. He had set forth this theory not only in his lectures at Tokyo Imperial Uni­ versity but in numerous books, some of which had long been regard­ ed as indispensable for candidates taking the higher civil service ex­ aminations. Yet once he had been exposed to the concerted attack of the rightists, Professor Minobe's books were instantly banned and he himself, together with men like Kanamori Tokujiro, the Presi­ dent of the Legislative Bureau, who were regarded as belonging to the same faction, found themselves being fiercely abused as ‘rebels' or ‘academic bandits' and had to resign their public posts. During this time almost all academic and journalistic circles remained silent ; furthermore, despite the fact that these victims of rightist onslaught had close connexions with the upper levels of the political, bureau­ cratic, and business worlds, hardly a single person, even among their friends, dared to come out in their support. Professor Minobe's theories were based squarely on constitutionalism ; yet it was none other than the president of the majority party, the Seiyükaiy who took the lead in laying a bill of censure before the Diet. The prevalence o f‘national polity' ideology in pre-war Japan did not, however, always play into the hands of the rightists. In many

xx Introduction ways it was their greatest drawback. On the one hand, the fact that the ‘national polity* was widely recognized as an essential aspect of the ‘Imperial flag* prevented the right-wing societies from mono­ polizing it ideologically. On the other hand, the original conception of‘national polity* provided two important limitations to the practi­ cal activities of the rightists. In the first place ‘national polity’ was not simply an ideology of Emperor-worship; it also had an organi­ zational aspect, that is to say, the so-called Emperor system, accord­ ing to which all national agencies were agencies of the Emperor and the authority of every single official received its sacred validity from the Throne. It was, therefore, perfectly possible for any given struc­ ture of government to be legitimatized in the name of ‘national polity*. Thus from the outset there was an important contradiction in­ herent in the conception of a political movement from below aimed primarily at protecting the ‘national polity*. It was inevitable that at a certain stage in their campaign for national reconstruction the rightist forces should be confronted with a dilemma—the dilemma of whether to accord unqualified respect to the principle of the Em­ peror system (as outlined above), abandon their direct defiance of the governmental structure and, at the best, content themselves with the role of ‘encouraging* the upper strata of the régime ; or whether, alternatively, to give themselves over entirely to being autonomous mass movements and thus risk the danger of becoming identified with the radicals of the left. The tragedy of Kita Ikki and the young officers of the 26 February (1936) Incident1 expresses this dilemma symbolically. The majority of the right-wing movement in pre-war Japan, of course, adopted the first of the two alternatives. The radicalism of the rightist societies was confronted with a second practical limitation because of another traditional aspect of Japan’s ‘national polity*. In general, the prerequisite for the develop­ ment of any political ideology is the existence of some concrete op­ ponent or enemy. Any movement inspired by such an ideology has the significant task of defining its own particular position within the total context of existing political situations. The concept of‘national polity* in Japan, however, was from the earliest times closely bound up with the mythological notion of a ‘harmonious community* which, being something absolute and indefinite, was regarded as 1 See below, App. I ll, pp. 434-5.

Introduction xxi transcending every form of political antagonism. The Japanese nation was viewed as the corporate structure of the family or of the village community writ large and, conversely, the family and the community were viewed as the ‘national polity* writ small. From the point of view of the nationalists, this mythology had the beneficial result of making it easy in the periods of crisis for the people to iden­ tify themselves emotionally with the nation. At the same time, how­ ever, it had a less favourable effect: by making the ‘national polity* non-political, the Japanese mythology of a ‘harmonious com­ munity* tended to frustrate all the plans of the radical right wing to carry out a thorough Gleichschaltung on the model of Nazi Germany. Herein lies the secret of why Japanese wartime reorganization, which started out with such verve under the name of the ‘new order*, should, in so far as domestic regimentation was concerned, have ended up as some vague principle of catholicity, exemplified by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, in which almost every exist­ ing force and group in Japan was included. In view of all this, it is only natural that from an early stage the right-wing movement should have developed a parasitic quality in its relationship with the power élites. Such a relationship is not, of course, peculiar to Japan. In most countries where mass rightist movements have arisen, these movements have had sponsors and sympathizers in the top echelons of the national structure and of the business world. In the case of our own country, however, the balance of power between the civilian rightist groups and those forces within the governmental mechanism who most authentically represented the principles of aggressive right-wing nationalism was remarkably inclined towards the latter. On the whole it would be no exaggera­ tion to say that the rightist groups were mere subcontracting agents of the ‘Imperial Way* elements within the ruling structure. This will become clear if we examine the practical relationship between the professional rightists and the pre-war ruling groups. The civilian right-wing societies had two main sources of financial support—the secret service funds of the army and the contributions made by certain important politicians and by various business leaders. What were the motives for making these contributions? In the first place, it was regarded by the donors as a necessary evil aim­ ed at safeguarding their position; secondly, rightist organizations could be used to gather valuable information. Despite their scruples,

xxii Introduction then, government and business leaders continued periodically to provide the rightist groups with funds, just as if they were doling out pocket-money to some dependant. There was a third significant motive for subsidizing the civilian rightists. Power élites in Japan were traditionally marked by extreme factionalism. Inasmuch as the transactions and struggles between the various factions could not be allowed to appear in the form of open struggles for power, they were bound to assume an increas­ ingly conspiratorial aspect. Organized rightist elements could be utilized very profitably in the constant intrigues between the fac­ tions. A large number of the civilian right-wing societies accordingly attached themselves to one conservative faction or another. Need­ less to say, it was no small advantage to them that the ruling élites should have recognized this new raison d'être for patriotic societies. Precisely the same conditions, however, contributed to one of the further great weaknesses of the right-wing movement in our coun­ try : since the various societies were so frequently attached to oppos­ ing factions within the ruling structure, it was remarkably difficult for them to achieve anything in the way of solidarity or unification. The history of the Japanese right-wing movement consists of end­ less disputes and schisms. On the whole, these did not result from any fundamental doctrinal differences, but revolved about personal relationship of the boss-follower (oyabun-kobun) type. The essenti­ ally parasitic role of the rightist societies made it impossible for them to form a united front or to become the leaders of an effective popu­ lar movement. Since the right-wing groups depended largely on support obtain­ ed from the ruling élitesythe withdrawal of such support was bound to have a serious effect. This is precisely what began to happen in the latter half of the 1930*3. As the threat from the left wing dis­ appeared and as the constant expansion of the war on the Chinese continent necessitated an increasing mobilization of men and materials, the ruling circles in Japan no longer had either the neces­ sity or the scope for supporting the civilian right wing. Thus, ironi­ cally enough, it was when Japan embarked on the Pacific War and when her internal structure became most highly regimented that the right-wing movement found itself in worse straits than ever be­ fore. It is worth remembering that in General Töjö’s ‘patriotic elections* (yokusan senkyo) of 1942 not a few veterans of the right-

xxiii wing movement, like Akao Bin and Nakano Seigö, had their names removed from the list of recommended candidates. The civilian right wing no longer had any useful function so far as the ruling élite was concerned. Introduction

Our emphasis on the parasitic aspect of the right wing in pre-war Japan must not obscure the strain of radicalism that has appeared repeatedly in the nationalist movement since the early decades of the Meiji Period. What, then, are the main social causes that gave rise to the strongly anti-Government elements among the nationalists and by what route did these elements advance? We must approach the problem from two sides—from that of the social setting and from that of the actors themselves. First, let us examine one of the objec­ tive conditions. The precipitous development of Japan after the Meiji Restoration was accomplished by governmental enforcement of capital accumulation and by a highly selective policy of financial investment. As a result, there developed from an early stage a re­ markable unbalance within the country between the urban centres and the provinces, between industry and agriculture, between the large cities and the towns, between highly capitalized industries and small enterprises, as well as an immense discrepancy in levels of technique, culture, and living standards between them. In particu­ lar, the farming villages found themselves left out of Japan’s ‘miraculous dash towards modernization* and, since they were given virtually no assistance in compensating for the lag, they soon became the reservoir of a huge industrial labour force. One effect of all this was to reinforce the resentment of farmers, petty entre­ preneurs, small shopkeepers, &c. towards the officials of the central Government, the great zaibatsu, and city life in general—that is, to­ wards the agents of ‘progress’. Since this traditional reaction had no regular or positive method for expressing itself, it had to remain pent up and to await the opportunity for illogical and intermittent explosion. The actors who first became the spokesmen for this resentment were the group known as söshi (literally ‘heroic knights’, actually ‘political hirelings or thugs’). The early söshi were as a rule unem­ ployed ex-samurai who had been deprived of their stipends by the Restoration and who had failed to adapt themselves to the new con­ ditions of the Meiji Period. The Dark Ocean Society (Genyö Sha)>

xxiv Introduction the prototype of the right-wing nationalist societies, started out pre­ cisely as a gathering of ex-samurai who were disaffected to the Meiji Government. Now Meiji rule proved itself to be remarkably adept in statecraft. While, on the one hand, it effectively suppressed any movement that attempted to democratize the structure, it did not hesitate, on the other, to demolish the various traditional barriers—barriers of birth, family, and inherited status—that the Japanese ancien régime had placed in the way of social advancement by means of superior edu­ cational qualifications. Little time was lost in putting into effect various measures that made it possible to absorb gifted students into the oligarchy, regardless of their family or their financial position. The particular type of social mobility that resulted from this policy became an important factor in the structural stability of modern Japan. At the same time, however, it had the effect of producing a conspicuous contrast in every town and village of the provinces be­ tween the ‘bright young men*, who had succeeded in passing the severe examinations and in graduating from one of the Imperial universities or from a military school and who were thus free to make their way up the rungs of the social ladder, and the untalented ‘dunces’, who had stumbled on the obstacle-race of worldly ad­ vancement or who had given up from the outset. Most members of this second group accepted their fates and im­ mersed themselves in the stagnant routine of local life. There was a minority, however, which was not content to let things take their course and to subsist as the Emperor’s obedient and passive sub­ jects. Sometimes a man of this type would set himself up for the Cavalliere rusticano of his community; sometimes he would seek out momentous adventures on the Asian continent and follow the path of the soldier of fortune (tairiku rönin). In either case, the rebellious spirit of such men encouraged them to become a type of outlaw. These elements came to constitute the second matrix of the modern nationalist movement in Japan. Here the reaction against central authority and bureaucracy overlapped with the deeply-rooted com­ plex of the ‘dunce’ towards the ‘bright young man* and served, once again, to give a radical inclination to the right-wing nationalist movement. The third type of actor in the vanguard of the right-wing move­ ment was the so-called young officer. He belonged to a class that

xxv under normal circumstances could confidently have looked forward to occupying a place among the élites of the future. In the conditions that prevailed in the early part of the Showa Period, however, the young officers, too, had a number of reasons for harbouring resent­ ment against the established order. In the first place, most of them came from farming villages, which had been especially affected by the world panic of 1929. Besides, they were usually in the position of being section or company commanders and accordingly had numer­ ous opportunities for daily contact with n.c.o.’s and soldiers. They could not help learning about the appalling conditions suffered by the families of the men under their command, and inevitably they were moved to indignation by the wretched state in which a large part of the population, especially in rural areas, was obliged to live. Secondly, the steady implementation of a disarmament policy by a series of party Cabinets cast a shadow over the future of these young officers; furthermore, since they were military men, this policy made them exceedingly anxious about national defence. Finally, there existed in military circles the same type of resentment towards men of high rank that we have noticed in the case of civilians. The ordinary low-ranking officers were by tradition resentful of the ‘farthing men',1who set themselves up for military geniuses and who succeeded in occupying all the privileged positions. In the case of many of the more fastidious young officers this resentment com­ bined with a profound scorn for the position-seeking ambitions of their superiors and made them extremely critical of the military staffs. Why, then, should the radicalism of these young officers have taken a specifically rightist direction? The main reason is that they happened to be military men. If they had been educated at ordinary colleges or universities the chances are that in the existing political atmosphere they would have turned to left-wing radicalism. The fourth and last type of actor to lead the right-wing movement was the intellectual. It should be emphasized that the intellectuals and university students who participated in the pre-war rightist movement were from the outset extremely few compared to those associated with the left and that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, they were converts from socialism or Communism. These Introduction

1 tempösen—derogatory term applied to graduates of the Military Staff College, who monopolized the posts on the General Staff.

xxvi Introduction converts had, of course, discarded the Weltanschauung that they had derived from their Marxist training. When entering the rightist camp, however, they did bring with them intact the inflammatory and the strategic aspects of the left-wing concept of ‘revolution*. With this aggressive approach, it is only natural that the intellectuals should have represented a further radical tendency within the nationalist movement. The intellectual converts to the right-wing movement were con­ stantly suspected both by their fellow nationalists and by the au­ thorities on the grounds that their apostasy might be no more than a camouflage. As a result they were obliged to outdo themselves in their support for the ‘national polity* ideology. Filled, as so many of these intellectuals were, with spiritual uneasiness and anxiety, they became more and more fanatic in their attacks against ‘disloyal ele­ ments*, such as the liberals and the pro-Anglo-Saxon faction. To what extent were these converts from the left-wing camp able to make use of their earlier experience as mass organizers? Apart from a few special cases, like the Co-operative Society activities in China, the right-wing movement provided them with very little such opportunity. For, as we have seen, right-wing nationalism was from the outset confronted with certain fixed limitations that pre­ vented it from developing as an organized mass movement. It is clear, then, that there were numerous latent conditions in pre-war Japan that could cause radicalism to ferment within the right-wing movement. These conditions, however, never combined to subjugate the parasitic aspect of this movement or to exert a dominant influence on the development of nationalism in our coun­ try. At the most, the radical elements in the right wing served to give a shock to the ruling élites and thus to expedite the trend towards absolutism from above. Once the rightist radicals had frenetically ‘made clean the way*, it was the high functionaries who came driving along in their carriages—their faces composed, their bodies clad in full dress, their chests festooned with decorations. In examining the causes that encouraged the abrupt turn to the right of the political climate in pre-war Japan we must not, of course, underestimate domestic factors, both political and economic. Yet a far more decisive determinant was the international situation, not­ ably the sudden rise of Fascist-Nazi strength in Europe and the

xxvii temporary success of the power politics so brazenly carried out by Hitler and others. It seems to me that this fact also has an important bearing on post­ war studies concerning Japan’s future prospects. Sidney Gulick, a student of Meiji Period Japan, has cited ‘sensitivity to environment’ as being one of our country’s national characteristics. Gulick’s theory has considerable relevance to pre-war developments. Modern Japan, which since the Meiji Restoration has always had a sense of tension and emergency when confronted with the steady advance of the European powers in Asia, and which, earnestly following in the footsteps of the ‘advanced nations* of the West, progressed along the path of ‘a wealthy nation and a strong army* (Jukoku kyöhei), de­ veloped an unusual sensitivity to changes in the climate of inter­ national politics. At present, even more than before the war, internal political pro­ cesses are fundamentally influenced by the impact of international developments. This is true in every country, but particularly in Japan. Under these conditions, if by any chance the ‘advanced nations* which subjugated Japanese ultra-nationalism and which taught us the real value of democracy and respect for the sovereignty of other countries should, by concentrating exclusively on the Com­ munist threat, come to pursue a policy that indirectly impeded the strengthening of democratic forces in Japan and that encouraged the re-emergence of pre-war patterns, what might be the effect on our country? It is not hard to visualize a situation in which the ex­ treme rightist elements, who have still not managed to recover from the effects of Japan’s defeat in 1945, and the pre-war nationalist politicians who, for all their democratic façade, continue to embrace the old spirit of Japanese imperialism, will slowly rise from their seats, their faces fixed in a mirthless grin, and, turning to the be­ wildered populace, will whisper into their ears ‘Look at this now! We’re all the same in the end, aren’t we? Except that our country is more advanced—we got there first! There’s no reason that we Japanese should regret our past. The only trouble is that we didn’t go about things cleverly enough last time.’ Introduction

I. The Occupation Attack on Organized Nationalism Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irre­ sponsible militarism is driven from the world.1

Thus it was declared at Potsdam in July 1945, and one month later the two ultimate objectives of Occupation policy were stipu­ lated: (a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world, (b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic selfgovernment but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely ex­ pressed will of the people.2

In working for these objectives, the Occupation carried out a com­ plex of policies that directly or indirectly attacked ultra-nationalist elements and ideals in Japan on almost every level. These policies may be reviewed under three headings—ideological, political, and economic. Ideological Measures Among the earliest and most important measures undertaken by the Occupation were those that served directly to undermine the ideological props of Japanese ultra-nationalism. The educational 1 Potsdam Declaration, paras. 5-6 (quoted in SCAP, Political Reorientation, ii. 413)-

3 United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (quoted in ibid. p. 423).

2

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

system was the first object of attack. Only one month after the Sur­ render, the Occupation issued an order prohibiting the teaching of all militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in schools and requir­ ing the authorities to remove all teachers and textbooks associated with such ideology ‘in order*, as the directive stated, ‘to eliminate from the educational system of Japan those militaristic and ultranationalistic influences which in the past have contributed to the defeat, war guilt, suffering, privation, and present deplorable state of the Japanese people*.1A subsequent order specifically prohibited all courses in morals (shüshin), Japanese history, and geography, for which textbooks had been published by the Ministry of Education.2 The next major Occupation offensive on the ideological front was taken on 15 December 1945. On this date a directive was issued whose specific aim was to abolish government support of state Shinto (Kokka Shinto), but which in fact was a direct attack on ultra-nationalist ideology in general. Among the stated aims in 1 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan (Tokyo, 1950), ii. 224. 8 AG 000.8 of 31 Dec. 1945, quoted in ibid. p. 219. The educational purge was announced on 30 October 1945, on the fifty-fifth anniversary of the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education. The long-hallowed Imperial Rescript, which had itself been deliberately exploited by the Government over a period of years as a symbol of nationalism, was one of the early objects of attack. The reading of the Rescript in schools, which had become a type of quasi-religious ritual, was officially prohibited in October 1946. In June 1948 the Rescript itself was re­ scinded after the Diet had legalized a new Basic Law of Education, thereby ‘eliminating thoroughly the error of an education that would put our state and nation at the center of the universe. . .* (SCAP, Political Reorientation, ii. 585). The Board of Education Law, passed on 15 July 1948, was aimed primarily at decentralizing the educational system and preventing it from once more becoming a tool in the hands of the central Government. For this purpose a Board of Educa­ tion was established ‘to execute educational administration based upon the equit­ able popular will and befitting actual local conditions, with the realization that education should be conducted without submitting to undue control and should be responsible to the entire people’ (ibid. p. 1207). In 1947 the Occupation itself began to develop a series of special education programmes for presentation in the press, publications, radio, &c. and to be used in schools and elsewhere. These programmes were designed to explain to the people in simple terms the concrete meaning of the various Occupation reforms, especially those relating to civil liberties and political relationships. Following the promulgation of the Constitution in November 1946, a series of educational posters was circulated setting forth the meaning of such concepts as equality of the sexes, popular government, freedom of religion, and workers’ rights (ibid, i. 392-8). These posters, designed primarily for children, served as graphic attacks on a number of well-established nationalist symbols, such as the Shinto torii (Shrine gateways) and Imperial supremacy. So far as the 1945 education orders were concerned, since their immediate enforcement would have meant bringing all school activity to a virtual standstill, it was some months before they were actually put into practice (SCAP, Education in the New Japan (Tokyo, 1948), i. 138).

3 disestablishing the state religion was ‘to prevent a recurrence of the perversion of Shinto theory and beliefs into militaristic and ultranationalistic propaganda designed to delude the Japanese people and lead them into wars of aggression*. The directive in question was, in fact, not limited to state Shinto, but extended to the ‘propa­ gation and dissemination of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in . . . the doctrines, practices, rites, ceremonies, and ob­ servances of any other religion, faith, sect, creed, or philosophy.. According to the very sweeping terms of this disestablishment order, no government official or agency was to participate in the spread of Shinto teachings or in the support of the Shinto establish­ ment, no public funds were to go to Shinto institutions, no Shinto doctrines were to be taught at schools, and school trips to Shinto shrines were prohibited.2The Government was forbidden to circu­ late such famous nationalist commentaries as Kokutai no Hongi (‘The Fundamental Principles of the National Structure*) and Shimmin no Michi (‘The Way of the Subject*).8 The directive also attacked certain nationalistic symbols. It prohibited the official use of ‘terms whose connotation in Japanese is inextricably connected with State Shinto, militarism, and ultra-nationalism*. Among these it specified Hakkö Ichiu (‘The Eight Corners of the World under One Roof*) and Dai Töa Sensö (‘Greater East Asia War*). Kamidana (the traditional god-shelves) were prohibited in all public buildings and ordered to be removed immediately.4Finally the directive care­ fully spelled out the meaning of the ubiquitous term ‘militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology*. This was stated to include : The Occupation Attack on Organized Nationalism

1 SCAPIN 448 of 15 Dec. 1945. a A later order (SCAPIN 1318 of 6 Nov. 1946) specifically prohibited neigh­ bourhood associations (chönaikai, burakukai, tonarigumi) from collecting funds for the support of Shinto shrines and festivals, and from distributing Shinto amulets and charms. The Kigensetsu holiday (11 Feb.), the anniversary of the Emperor Jimmu’s supposed accession to the throne in 660 b . c . and the red-letter day of the national­ ist calendar, was formally outlawed on 20 July 1948, in the Law Relating to the People’s Feast Days (Kokumin no Shukujitsu ni Kansuru Höritsu) {Documents concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, p. 179). 3Kokutai no Hongi, first issued by the Japanese Government in 1937, can be considered the bible of official state nationalism, much as Kita Ikki’s Nihon Kaizö Höan Taikö (‘A General Outline of Measures for the Reconstruction of Japan’) became the bible of revolutionary National-Socialism before the war. For a translation and commentary on Kokutai no Hongi see R. K. Hall, ed., Kokutai no Hongi: Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan, trs. J. O. Gauntlett (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1949). 4 The pre-Surrender Government had encouraged all Japanese subjects to instal kamidana and Shinto talismans in their houses as a token of loyalty.

4

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

(i) The doctrine that the Emperor of Japan is superior to the heads of other states, because of ancestry, descent or special origin, (ii) The doc­ trine that the people of Japan are superior to the people of other lands be­ cause of ancestry, descent, or special origin, (iii) The doctrine that the islands of Japan are superior to other lands because of divine or special origin, (iv) Any other doctrine which tends to delude the Japanese people into embarking upon wars of aggression or to glorify the use of force as an instrument for the settlement of disputes with other peoples. The term was thus defined to encompass virtually the entire set of notions on which the supposed uniqueness of Japan’s kokutai (na­ tional polity) had rested.1 About a fortnight after the issue of this directive, the Occupation followed up its attack on the ideological foundations of ultranationalism by requiring the Emperor himself to issue a New Year’s statement denying that he was divine. Even before this General MacArthur had made it abundantly clear to the Japanese nation that whatever the final decision might be about the future of the Imperial institution, there was, so far at least as the Occupation was con­ cerned, to be no question of preserving the Emperor’s sacrosanctity. On 27 September it was arranged that the Emperor should call on the Supreme Commander at his Tokyo headquarters at the American Embassy building. This in itself was, of course, a totally unprecedented step. The General further made it clear that he would neither go out to receive the Emperor on his arrival, nor see him off when he left. It was also reported (whether reliably or not) that the Emperor was kept waiting some considerable time before being received by the General. The really shattering effect, how­ ever, was produced by the publication on the following morning in the Japanese newspapers of a photograph showing General MacArthur in open-necked combat uniform towering above the Em­ peror in his morning-coat.2 It would be hard to overestimate the psychological impact, especially on the older generation of Japanese, of what could only appear to be a deliberate snub. Thenceforth, 1 Kokutai, usually translated by the phrase ‘national polity* (but given in Hall, Kokutai no Hongi, as ‘national entity*), is one of the many vague ‘amuletic’ words so often used in a nationalistic context in Japan. For a discussion of kokutai and other such words see below, App. I, pp. 427-8. 2 It will be recalled that in pre-war days, when the Emperor had issued forth from the Palace, the police had strictly forbidden people to use the upper-story windows of houses on the Imperial route, in order to avoid any possibility of sub­ jects ‘looking down* on the Emperor.

The Occupation A ttack on Organized Nationalism 5 as Professor Maruyama has said, it would be unthinkable to restore the Emperor’s former charismatic authority over the nation.1 The first New Year of the Occupation period was the occasion for the Emperor’s historic ‘non-divinity’ Rescript. In his statement the Emperor began with a sort of sop to tradition and continuity by re­ affirming the five clauses of the Emperor Meiji’s charter oath. He then expressed his deep sympathy with the sufferings of the people and arrived at the gist of the Rescript. We stand by the people and we wish always to share with them in their moments of joys and sorrows. The ties between us and our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world.2 As Dr. D. C. Holtom has pointed out, however, the claim that the bond between the Emperor and the people was based simply on mu­ tual trust and affection involved a ‘tremendous idealization of his­ tory’.3 It appears to have been the deliberate policy of the conserva­ tive leaders at the time to minimize the significance of this and the various other fundamental changes in the national polity that ine­ luctably resulted from Surrender.4Despite these efforts, the fact re­ mains that by renouncing his divinity the Emperor with one stroke removed the main ideological prop of traditional Japanese national­ ism, which had for so long depended on the principle that the state’s authority rested on a superhuman basis.6 Having been deprived of most of his theoretical power and also of a large part of his material wealth, the Emperor was encouraged to model himself in his behaviour on Western constitutional monarchs, 1 Maruyama, Nationalism, p. n . * SCAP, Political Reorientation, i. 470. 3 D. C. Holtom, Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism (Chicago University Press, 1947), p. 177. 4 Maruyama Masao, ‘Nihon no Shisö*, in Iwanami Shoten, ed., Gendai Nihon no Shisö, vol. xi (Tokyo, 1957), pp. 25-26 and passim. 5 ‘For two thousand years the ultimate authority by which government had imposed its will on the nation had rested on sanctions that transcended the right of subjects to criticize or to resist. The Japanese state had been not merely a secular entity. It had been a sacred church as well, and, like other churches, it was founded on the arrogation that in the last analysis the validity of its decisions was superhuman or supernatural. The state had claimed the authority to impose unquestionable obligation. It could not do this without trying to establish the fiction that over it hovered a special source of final truth. For the Japanese system of things, this existed in the person of the emperor, in whom resided an inherited sacredness which made his will irresistible* (Holtom, Modern Japan, pp. 176-7; italics are those of the present writer). C

6 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan though in view of the limitation of his financial means, the model was bound to be closer to the Swedish than to the British monarch.1For this purpose he was advised to undertake official tours to various parts of the country, which were later sometimes referred to rather facetiously as foraging expeditions. The ‘humanizing* process was rapid and before long the Emperor had received such a disrespect­ ful sobriquet as‘Mr. Ä so?* from his alleged habit of saying ‘Oh, I see* whenever he was addressed.2 All this underlined in homely terms the official renunciation of divinity. An interesting development in this early period was the deliber­ ate effort to build up the position of the Crown Prince. Until October 1947, when it was officially announced that the Emperor would not be arraigned as a war criminal, the future status of Em­ peror Hirohito himself was uncertain and one body of opinion advocated his abdication in favour of Crown Prince Akihito. It was at this time that Japanese newspapers and magazines began to play up the activities of the Crown Prince and to present him as a ‘human* and popular figure. This continued long after the Emperor’s own future status had become assured and was particularly conspicuous at the time of the Crown Prince’s visit to London for the coronation of Queen Elizabeth. Because of his youth, the Crown Prince could not possibly be associated with either Japan’s militarism or with her defeat. He was therefore ideally suited, as Professor Maruyama points out, for the role of a non-political nationalist symbol.3 The change in the Emperor’s status was indeed a landmark in the history of Japanese political thought. Dr. Holtom goes so far as to say that ‘throughout their long history no greater change than this had ever come to the Japanese people*.4The question remains, how­ ever, whether the change, great as it was, will prove to have been ir­ revocable. The renunciation of divinity in the Emperor’s statement seems categorical enough ; but so, indeed, does the renunciation of war potential in Article IX of the new Constitution, and Japanese experts have already found ambiguities and variant interpretations galore. It would be a mistake to underestimate the ability of future 1 On 20 November 1945 the Imperial assets (calculated at about ¥6,000 million at values prevailing in March 1946) were frozen and made subject to property and other taxes. Thereafter a major portion of these assets became part of the national property (Kinoshita, Purge Policy, p. 3). a Minami Hiroshi, ‘Tennösei no Shinri-teki Jiban’, Shisö, no. 336, 1952, p. 56. * Maruyama, ‘Minshushugi’, p. 37. 4 Holtom, Modem Japan, p. 176.

The Occupation A ttack on Organized Nationalism 7 authorities either to overlook the intention of the famous New Year’s Rescript or, if necessary, to interpret it in some way which would en­ able them at least partially to restore the Emperor to his role as the ‘special source of final truth*. Nor must one overlook the resilience of the Japanese Imperial institution, which in its long history has endured so many vicissitudes. It may well be that in the end the un­ interrupted retention of the institution itself—the respect for the principle of continuity on which its prestige so largely depends— will prove to have been more important than all the buffets that were visited on it during the early months of the Occupation.1

Political Measures Turning now to the main Occupation measures that contributed to the political undermining of ultra-nationalist elements, the first of these was the order demobilizing the Japanese armed forces.2 By disbanding the ‘invincible* Imperial Army and the entire structure that surrounded it, the Occupation eliminated not only the strongest driving force of centralized Japanese nationalism, but also the power on which many elements of the civilian extreme right had depended for their practical support. Henceforth, if they were to survive, they would be obliged to look in other directions—to powerful business groups, to conservative politicians, or even to mass support. It is true, of course, that in pre-Surrender days many of the leading nationalists, such as Ishiwara Kanji, Hashimoto Kingorö, and Nakano Seigö, had frequently been at loggerheads with the country’s military leaders, especially with General Töjö himself. Indeed, it was the military themselves who were instrumental in suppressing one important wing of the pre-war ultra-nationalist movement, namely the National-Socialist wing inspired by men like Takabatake Motoyuki and Kita Ikki. Not unnaturally, there was a con­ siderable amount of pent-up antagonism towards the military on the part of the civilian rightists, who often felt that they had been ex­ ploited by the militarists during the latter’s rise to power in the 1930’s, only to be cavalierly cast aside when they were no longer 1 Professor Kinoshita makes the point in rather more emphatic terms : ‘The purge system, an important means to democratize and demilitarize Japan, dealt a near fatal blow, for a time at least, to leaders in various circles. But the effect of the blow was temporary since the Emperor system, nucleus of old militaristic Japan, was allowed to remain in force* (Purge Policy, p. 40). * SCAPIN 137 of 14 Oct. 1945.

8 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan needed, much like the unfortunate hound in the Japanese proverb, ‘After the cunning hare has been killed, it is the turn of the swift hound to be boiled.* This general feeling of resentment emerges in the writings of many of the pre-war nationalists, such as ökawa Shömei,1 Inoue Nisshö,2 Kodama Yoshio,3and Tsukui Tatsuo.4 It also appeared rather dramatically during the War Crimes trials when Mr. Okawa slapped his fellow-defendant, General Töjö, on his bald pate in the court-room. This petulant act no doubt resulted partly from ökawa*s pathological condition at the time, but it also revealed a strong sense of hostility to militarists like Töjö, who, in the view of most civilian ultra-nationalists, were largely responsible for the existing ruin. For all this, the fact remains that by and large the civilian extreme right wing had owed its position to the prestige and practical re­ sources of the military, in relation to whom it had constituted what Professor Oka Yoshitake calls an ‘auxiliary force*. With the com­ plete removal of the military from political power, the ultra­ nationalists were condemned to exist in a sort of precarious vacuum. The most direct Occupation attack on the extreme right was the purge from public office of ultra-nationalist elements, the dissolu­ tion of all ultra-nationalist organizations, and in more extreme cases the arrest, trial, and conviction as ‘war criminals* of people con­ sidered responsible for furthering Japan’s ultra-nationalist policies.5 This ‘great purge* constitutes, according to Professor Kinoshita, ‘the nucleus of democratization* of the Japanese Government; we shall, however, have reason to question later whether it was as effective as might have been expected.6 Shortly after the arrival in Japan of Allied forces, General Töjö and other war-criminal suspects were arrested.7 On 4 October a 1 See below, p. 448. * See below, p. 442. 3 See below, pp. 443-4. 4 See below, p. 451. For examples of rightist resentment regarding the military see below, p. 257 n. 1. 3 The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the Supreme Commander (3 Nov. 1945) directed him to arrest and hold as suspected war criminals the following inter alia: ‘(2) All commissioned officers of the Gendarmerie (Kempei), and all officers of the Army and Navy who have been important exponents of militant nationalism and aggression. (3) All key members of ultra-nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies.. .* (SCÄP, Political Reorientation, ii. 432). • Kinoshita, Purge Policy, p. 4. 7 The order for the arrest of General Töjö and most of the other major suspects was issued on 11 September. Subsequent orders were issued on 17 November and i December. The final order (for the arrest of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu) was on 28 April 1946.

9 comprehensive order was issued for the removal of officials, from the Minister of Home Affairs downwards, connected with the political police, including the kempeitai and the entire network of ‘thought police*.1 According to this order, all secret police organs and all departments concerned with the control of thought and speech were forthwith abolished. All political prisoners, including many Communists who had lain in durance for fifteen years or more, were immediately released and by a subsequent order restored to full political rights.2 The entire complex of laws and regulations which had grown up during the past decades with the aim of cur­ tailing political and civil liberties was abrogated. This included the Peace Preservation Law {Chian Iji Ho) of 1925, the Protection and Surveillance Law for Thought Offence (Shisö Han Hogo Kansatsu Ho) of 1936, and all censorship laws. The Ministry of Home Affairs was abolished and the police system drastically reorganized with the aim of precluding the re-emergence of a police state. The first of the major purge orders was issued on 4 January 1946, in accordance with the terms of the Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive.3 The order was specifically concerned with abolishing ultra-nationalist groups: Aimed at freeing all political parties from the influence of reactionary elements and at releasing government officials from fear of attack by secret, terroristic societies, the first directive orders the Japanese Gov­ ernment to abolish all ultra-nationalistic, terroristic and militaristic groups and so to control all other political associations and organizations that never again will they be able to impose their will on the Japanese people.4 Accordingly the directive ordered the abolition of all groups whose purposes ‘or the effect of whose activity* fell into one of seven cate­ gories: (a) Resistance or opposition to the Occupation Forces or to orders issued by the Japanese Government in response to directives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or; The Occupation A ttack on Organized Nationalism

1 SCAPIN 93 of 4 Oct. 1945 (SCAP, Political Reorientation, ii. 463-5). 2 SCAPIN 458 of 19 Dec. 1945. 3 Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, Pt. I, paras. 5b and 5g, quoted in SCAP, Political Reorientation, ii. 431. The 4 January directives were timed to meet the April 1946 elections with the aim of screening all successful candidates before the Diet met in June to pass on the new Constitution and to enact other im­ portant Occupation laws (ibid. i. 9). 4 Ibid. ii. 489.

io

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

(b) Support or justification of aggressive Japanese military action abroad, or; (c) Arrogation by Japan of leadership of other Asiatic, Indonesian or Malayan peoples, or; (d) Exclusion of foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or the exercise of their professions, or; (ie) Opposition to a free cultural or intellectual exchange between Japan and foreign countries, or; (/) Affording military or quasi-military training, or providing benefits, greater than similar civilian benefits, or special representation for persons formerly members of the Army or Navy, or perpetuation of militarist or a martial spirit in Japan, or; (g) Alteration of policy by assassination or other terroristic programs, or encouragement or justification of a tradition favoring such methods.1 Twenty-seven ultra-nationalist organizations were specifically named as coming within the purviews of the directive, and it was specified that this list was not exhaustive.12By December 1951 a total of 233 right-wing organizations had been dissolved in compliance with this order, beginning with the Great Japan Renovation As­ sociation (Dai Nihon Isshin Kai) in February 1946, and ending with the Shöji terrorist group in December 1951.3 An equally comprehensive order for the ‘removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel from public office* was issued on the same day.4 In an accompanying press release, the aim of these two orders was described as being ‘to strike the shackles from the efforts of the Japanese people to rise toward freedom and democracy and effec­ tively to remove from the world scene one more rotten spot wherein the germs of war might breed*.5 It had originally been hoped, ac­ cording to the release, that ‘Japan itself would clean its own stable*. But the inertia, if not the active opposition within the government itself blocked all attempts. Centuries of feudal submission and the complete, untrammelled and irresponsible freedom of the executive proved 1 SCAP, Political Reorientation, ii. 479. * See below, App. II, p. 429. 3 129 groups were dissolved in 1946-7. The first post-war rightist group to be dissolved was the New and Powerful Masses Party (Shinei Taishü Tö) in Decem­ ber 1947. The pace slowed down considerably thereafter, 36 groups being dis­ solved in 1948, 18 in 1949, 29 in 1950, and 9 in 1951. Kinoshita (Purge Policy, pp. 21-22) gives a monthly total for the number of groups dissolved during this five-year period. 4 SCAPIN 550 of 4 Jan. 1946 (SCAP, Political Reorientation, ii. 482-8). 6 Ibid. p. 489.

i1 obstacles too great to be overcome by the people themselves. General MacArthur has, however, resolved the difficulty in direct and forthright fashion. The rather euphemistic phrase ‘undesirable personnel* was de­ fined as consisting of again seven categories of people : A. War criminal suspects unless released or acquitted. B. Career military and naval personnel, special police and officials of the War Ministries. C. Influential members of ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies, including people who had made substantial voluntary contributions to such societies. D. Persons influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusan Kai), the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society ( Yokusan Seiji Kai), and the Political Association of Great Japan (Dai Nihon Seiji Kai). E. Officers of financial and development organizations involved between 1937 and 1945 in Japanese expansions. F. Governors of occupied territories. G. Additional militarists and ultra-nationalists, including people who had attacked opponents of the militaristic régime, played an active part in the programme of aggression or shown themselves by speech, writing or action to be active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression. Anyone deemed by the special screening committees to fall into one or more of these categories was forthwith obliged to relinquish any public position that he might hold, or debarred from being elected or appointed to such a position. Some ten months after the order was issued, a total of 7,769 incumbents of public office had been screened and of these 894 purged. The largest number of ‘purgees’ (394) were officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs; next in order were members of the House of Peers (172).1 The first phase of the purge was relatively modest in its scope. The second phase, which began exactly one year later with the is­ suance of three Imperial Ordinances and one Cabinet Ordinance, was of a much more sweeping nature.2It was timed to coincide with the general elections of 1947, when for the first time people were to The Occupation A ttack on Organized Nationalism

1 H. S. Quigley and J. E. Turner, The New Japan (Minneapolis, 1956), p. 102. * SCAP, Political Reorientation, ii. 501- 49 . Imperial Ordinances Nos. 1-3 of 1947 and Cabinet and Ministry of Home Affaire Ordinance No. 1 of 1947.

12

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

vote for their local chief executives as well as for Diet members ; as a result of its application some 7,000 people were removed or barred from important office, mainly in local government.1 Whereas the first phase had been mainly limited to members of the ministries and to politicians, the second phase included not only all first-grade civil servants and Diet members, but officials in large numbers of business companies, banks, newspapers, and broadcasting com­ panies, the word ‘public* being interpreted in the broadest possible sense. The ordinances also applied to relatives within the third de­ gree of the purged officials. It is estimated that the potential number of people subject to purge under the new ordinances was about i million.12 The end was not yet, however, for a third and final phase of the purge began late in 1947. This purge applied to important positions in business enterprises and in mass media of public information; as a result about 800 more men were removed from key posts.3 Despite the immense sweep of the purge, it will be seen that only a relatively small number of people were in fact removed from public office. The numbers who were barred were, of course, vastly greater. A total of almost 50,000 ultra-nationalists were purged as being ‘un­ desirable personnel* belonging to Categories C or G (p. 11 above).4* These included virtually every single pre-Surrender ultra-national­ ist of note and almost every prominent member of extreme rightwing groups.6In this aspect of the purge at least, there was little in­ clination towards leniency. Although the great purge constituted by far the most direct attack on extreme right-wing elements, it is doubtful whether in the long run it was the most important so far as the eradication of ultra1 SCAP, Political Reorientation, i. 9. 2 Quigley and Turner, The New Japan, p. 104. On 1 April 1947, however, a SCAP order abolished all federations of neighbourhood associations (chönaikai and burakukai) on the grounds that they were ‘instruments of ultranationalism and obsolete social ideals’, and this in effect enormously reduced the number of people subject to the purge (ibid. pp. 104, 388). 3 SCAP, Political Reorientation, i. 9. 4 Kinoshita, Purge Policy, p. 21. 5 Among prominent civilian nationalists purged were Inoue Nisshö, Töyama Hidezô, Tachibana Kôsaburô, Homma Kenichirö, Kageyama Masaharu, Terada Inejiro, Mikami Taku, Miura Giichi, Konuma Tadashi, Suzuki Zenichi, and Akao Bin; among the theorists, Tsukui Tatsuo, Yasuoka Masaatsu, and Tanaka Sawaji. ökawa Shümei, Hashimoto Kingorô, Kodama Yoshio, Kuhara Fusanosuke, Kawakami Toshiji, Gôko Kiyoshi, Gotô Fumio, and others were in addition arrested as war-criminal suspects (Nagamatsu Asazô, Ikite iru Uyoku (Tokyo, 1 9 5 4 ), P- 233).

13 nationalism was concerned. It is true that all known ultra-national­ ists were for a number of years barred from holding public office of any kind and also from joining in groups to promote their ideologies. Yet in fact their places were often taken by less well-known people holding much the same views, but careful not to express them in public. Especially in the case of the economic purge, the removal from office was often more nominal than real, for the pre-Surrender directors frequently continued to exercise their power, though be­ hind the scenes.1 It should further be remembered that only a small proportion of civilian ultra-nationalists had ever in fact held public positions of any importance ; in this respect at least, most of the ‘pro­ fessional right-wingers* had little to lose. So far as the ultra-nation­ alist organizations are concerned, the shattering impact of defeat and the material and psychological conditions in the early post-war years would undoubtedly have led in most cases to their rapid de­ cline and virtual disbandment, even in the absence of any compel­ ling legislation.2 Far more important were the indirect Occupation measures—those that served to attack the ideological and material foundations on which extreme right-wing elements had been able to build their strength. The Occupation A ttack on Organized Nationalism

Economic Measures Of the long-term economic measures, the most significant were those aimed at a decentralization of economic power and at improv­ ing the system of land tenure. The purpose of dissolving the zaibatsu business combines was not only to remove one of the main forces that had increasingly collaborated with the military in furthering 1 In this context it is also important to remember that the Japanese bureau­ cracy was on the whole remarkably successful in weathering the Occupation storm. Except for its top rungs, the bureaucracy withstood the blows of the purge better than any other group that could be held responsible for the implementation of ultra-nationalist policies ; it consequently succeeded in maintaining a consider­ able measure of continuity. Professor Kinoshita attributes this partly to the Allied policy of indirect rule and partly to the Japanese bureaucracy’s traditional adaptability to changing political situations (Purge Policy, pp. 19-20, 26-27; see below, pp. 116-17). * Professor D. M. Brown has provided an interesting sidelight on the actual operation of the order dissolving ultra-nationalist organizations: ‘The work of ferreting out evasions of the dissolution directive was mainly the responsibility of the G-2 Section, and that section, it will be remembered, was unenthusiastic about the whole program. As early as 1948, if not earlier, there were reports that some of the ultranationalist societies were helping G-2 investigators to gain in­ formation about the activities of Communist organizations’ (Nationalism in Japan (Berkeley, Calif. 1955), p. 248).

14 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Japan’s ultra-nationalist policies, but to make possible the develop­ ment of a relatively free economic system, which in turn would en­ courage the growth of political democracy in accordance with AngloAmerican ideals.1 The first of these objectives, which was in fact one aspect of the purge, was set forth in the Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive: You will prohibit the retention in or selection for positions of important responsibility or influence in industry, finance, commerce, or agriculture of all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression . . . and of any who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends. (In the absence of evidence, satis­ factory to you, to the contrary, you will assume that any persons who have held key positions of high responsibility since 1937, in industry, finance, commerce or agriculture have been active exponents of mili­ tant nationalism and aggression.)2 The Initial Post-Surrender Policy defined the second objective: Policies shall be favored which permit a wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade. . . To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander. . . to favor a pro­ gram for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan’s trade and in­ dustry.3 Following on the heels of the demobilization of the armed forces, the dissolution of Japan’s powerful economic groups removed a second important nucleus of material power to which extreme nationalist elements had looked for support. Here again it will be re­ called that the ultra-rightists had by no means seen eye to eye with the groups in question. Indeed extreme nationalists, especially those of the Reformist and National-Socialist right wing, had for years been the most outspoken and vitriolic critics of Japanese monopoly capitalism, to the extent of carrying out murderous at­ tacks on zaibatsu representatives like Baron Dan.4The fact remains 1 This highly ambitious programme was started two months after the Surrender with the issuance of SCAPIN 244 (6 Nov. 1945) for the Dissolution of Holding Companies. It was pursued during almost the entire Occupation period, though with steadily decreasing enthusiasm as the focus of policy changed from reform to stabilization. Relevant documents are SCAPIN 1079 (23 July 1946), SCAPIN 1741 (3 Jub 1 9 4 7 )» and SCAPIN 1868 (1 March 1948). 2 Pt. 11A, paras. 23-24 of Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive (SCAP, Political Reorientation, ii. 435). 3 U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, Pt. IV, para. 2 (ibid. p. 425). 4 Baron Dan Takuma, the chief director of the Mitsui zaibatsu group, was

The Occupation A ttack on Organized Nationalism

15

that with the deepening of Japan’s involvement on the continent and particularly after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the financial cliques, increasingly enmeshed in the implementation of the coun­ try’s extremist policies, had willy-nilly become one of the main material props of centralized dynamic nationalism. To this extent their disappearance as an organized force heightened the sense of vacuum in which extreme right-wing groups found themselves after the war. The economic basis of the traditional Emperor system was further undermined by the land reform. This programme was initiated one month after the first order for the dissolution of the zaibatsuf its aim being to ‘remove economic obstacles to the revival and strengthen­ ing of democratic tendencies, establish respect for the dignity of man, and destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the Japanese farmer to centuries of feudal oppression’.*1Among the ills which it was designed to remedy were the intense overcrowding of land, the unfavourable conditions of tenancy, farm indebtedness combined with high rates on farm loans, and government disregard for farm interests. Ever since Tokugawa days, successive Japanese Governments had paid lip-service to the principle that agricultural interests should be paramount to those of trade and industry, but in practice these interests had been increasingly disregarded and the tenant farmer in particular had been obliged to shoulder a dispro­ portionately heavy burden. This had been one of the main subjects of ultra-nationalistic propaganda before the war and had been es­ pecially effective in army circles, where the more idealistic young officers had been moved to indignation by the depressed conditions in Japanese villages, which provided so many of their recruits. In­ deed, one entire wing of the extreme right-wing movement had been devoted primarily to redressing the national balance in favour of agriculture. There is a certain irony, therefore, in the fact that it should have been the Occupation which carried out a reform aimed partly at revising government policies which ‘discriminate against agriculture in favor of industry and trade*.2 General MacArthur in one of his many sanguine pronouncements termed the land reform as ‘possibly the most successful in history’. assassinated in March 1932 by a nationalist youth belonging to Inoue Nisshö’s Blood Pledge Corps (Ketsumei Dan). See App. I ll, p. 432 below. 1 SCAPIN 411 of 9 Dec. 1945. 2 Para. 2(d) of SCAPIN 411.

16 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Yet the real success of such a reform can be measured only in the light of its lasting effects, which even now it is too early to judge. Whatever its ultimate outcome, however, the reform did serve to attack extreme nationalist elements in two important ways. First, by reducing the economic power of large land-holders, the reform im­ paired, at least temporarily, the influence of one important group to which these elements had traditionally looked for both moral and material support. Secondly, by alleviating some of the more pressing ills from which small farmers had suffered, it made it less likely that the latter would turn to ultra-nationalist societies or to the army for a solution to their difficulties. Almost one-half of the Japanese popu­ lation is still engaged in agriculture and rural communities remain overwhelmingly conservative despite all the post-war changes. Whether or not these twin effects of the land reform are likely to remain in force is therefore extremely important in assessing the future prospects of ultra-nationalism. New Constitution The Occupation attacks against the bases of established rightwing nationalism were brought to a focus in the drafting and enact­ ment of the 1947 Constitution. This Constitution can, in a sense, be regarded as the epitome of all the ideological, political, and economic reforms that were carried out during the early post-war years with the aim of undermining the traditional structure and of providing the foundations of a modern democratic society in Japan. It is of the utmost significance that the principal domestic issue on which rightwing nationalist elements, as well as important segments of the con­ servatives, should have agreed since 1952 has, in fact, been the re­ vision of the 1947 Constitution. A brief study of this Constitution and of its symbolic role in post-war Japan is, therefore, most ger­ mane to the theme of this study. From the earliest months of the Occupation the Supreme Com­ mander had made it clear to the Government that he was in favour of a prompt revision of the Meiji Constitution, in order to ‘give to the Japanese people a goal at which to shoot, as well as a solid foun­ dation on which to build* and to make sure that ‘a reactionary cabin­ et, privy council or Emperor would not, overnight, wipe out all the gains that might be achieved*.1At first it was sincerely hoped that the 1 SCAP, Political Reorientation, i. 90.

17 necessary revisions would be undertaken by the Japanese them­ selves, with mere advice and encouragement from the Occupation. As the official SCAP report explained, this was based on General MacArthur’s ‘firm belief that that which was imposed by authority or superior military force not only bore the taint of oppression but would be the antithesis of true democracy as well*.1 In the event it was precisely by such imposition, albeit deliber­ ately concealed, that the new Constitution came into being. By the beginning of 1946 it had become clear that the type of constitutional draft which the Japanese Government would be prepared to recom­ mend, though embodying many of the political and social changes demanded by the Occupation, would not involve any alteration in the traditional basis of the Emperor system. Apart from a single ex­ ception, the government committee in charge of constitutional re­ vision decided to make no changes in the fundamental provisions of the Meiji Constitution that defined the Emperor’s role. The only alteration on which they could agree was that instead of being ‘sacred and inviolable*, the Emperor should become ‘supreme and inviolable*.1 2The locus of sovereignty was to remain as before : ‘The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty. . .*3 In explaining why the Emperor’s sovereign power should be preserved, the committee adduced what might strike the Western reader as something of a non sequitur : ‘Consider­ ing the fact that Japan has been reigned over by a line of Emperors unbroken from the very beginning of our national history, there is no room for doubt but that an overwhelming majority of our people are strongly desirous of retaining the system.*4 At this stage, the Occupation was faced with the painful dilemma of either accepting a Japanese draft Constitution in which the legal basis of the Emperor system remained intact, or by one means or The Occupation A ttack on Organized Nationalism

1 Ibid. p. 91. 2 This change was clearly designed to conform with the Emperor’s recent de­ nial of his divinity. It is worth noting that even liberal scholars like Professor Minobe did not in most cases feel that it was the Meiji Constitution itself which had been at fault, but rather the abuse of this Constitution by later accretions such as the prerogative of supreme command (tösuiken). They all agreed that these later points should be clarified, but on the whole they were not inclined to recom­ mend any real alteration in the original definitions of sovereignty or of the Em­ peror’s status as given in the Meiji Constitution. 8 Quigley and Turner, The New Japan, p. 417. 4 General Explanation of the Constitutional Revision Drafted by the Govern­ ment (SCAP, Political Reorientation, ii. 619).

18 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan another of imposing its own draft and taking the consequent risks. The latter course was adopted in February 1946, although a valiant effort was made to foster the myth that the document rather hastily written by the Government Section of SCAP, and then with no less haste translated into Japanese, was in fact an indigenous Consti­ tution, conceived, drafted, and recommended to the Diet by the Japanese Government itself.1 The new Constitution, passed by the Diet in October 1946, and proclaimed to be in effect six months later, represented, as Pro­ fessor Maruyama has said, a general formalization of the funda­ mental reforms carried out by the Occupation.2The many-pronged attacks on the bases of ultra-nationalism were now given added weight and supposed permanency by being associated with the fundamental law of the land. Most important of all was Article I. In a single sentence, the Emperor’s denial of his divinity was given legal confirmation and the entire basis of the traditional kokutai was officially demolished: ‘The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.*3 It was the principle of Imperial supremacy that in the course of Japan’s history had been used by one group after another to gain and 1 According to Professor Kamikawa Hikomatsu, a leading authority on inter­ national law, the Government Section of SCAP completed their draft of the new Constitution in the record time of nine days (between 4 and 13 February 1946) (Asahi Evening News, 15 Feb. 1958). Their haste was evidently impelled by Gen­ eral MacArthur*s determination to forestall any complicating action by the Far Eastern Commission in Washington (H. E. Wildes, Typhoon Over Tokyo (New York, 1954), pp. 44-45). Professor Kamikawa, in his evidence before a sub-com­ mittee of the Constitution Study Council on 13 February 1958, stressed that the Occupation authorities applied considerable pressure on the Japanese Govern­ ment to accept the draft promptly. He refers to a threat made to the Vice Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsumoto Shunichi, that the United States could not guarantee the position of the Emperor if Japan refused to accept the draft. In the event the draft, which was submitted to the Japanese Government, was accepted on 22 February (1946). Any careful study of the Japanese text of the new Constitution reveals quite clearly that the document must originally have been written in English. During the Occupation period, however, until the abolition of the censorship system in October 1948, any open suggestion in the press or else­ where that the Constitution, or indeed any of the main Occupation measures en­ acted by the Japanese Government, might be essentially of foreign inspiration was rigorously suppressed, and even after the end of official censorship the Allied Headquarters’ directives remained in force, exerting heavy psychological pres­ sure on newspaper editors (‘Japanese Press Under Allied Occupation’, The Japanese Press, yearbook of the Japan Newspaper Publishers* and Editors* As­ sociation, 1957). 2 Maruyama, Nationalism, p. 7. 3 Quoted in Quigley and Turner, The New Japan, p. 407.

The Occupation A ttack on Organized Nationalism 19 hold absolute authority; each group in turn as it wielded its power had claimed to be acting on the Emperor’s behalf and to be expres­ sing his irresistible will. It is of the utmost significance, therefore, that the categorical denial of this traditional principle was the one aspect of the new Constitution at which the Japanese experts had utterly balked. In the light of this revolutionary change, the other political and social innovations embodied in the liberal Constitution, including the naming of the Diet as the highest organ of state power, the principle that the Cabinet should be collectively responsible to the Diet, and the definition of people’s fundamental rights, how­ ever unpalatable they might be to the more conservative members of the Government, were accepted without too much difficulty. Article XXIV stated that *. . . With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.’1 This and the other human-rights clauses were the basis of a thoroughgoing revision of existing legislation, which did much to alter the social patterns that had fostered extreme rightwing elements. The revised Civil Code did much to undermine the traditional family system by eliminating the prerogatives of the head of the house (kachö) and, indeed, by virtually abolishing the house system, with all its inherent inequalities, as a legal institution. It may be that of all the multifarious reforms embodied in the Con­ stitution and in the subsequent laws based on it, those relating to individual human rights will, with certain exceptions, prove to be of the most sturdy durability. Apart from Article I, the clause which from the beginning attract­ ed the most attention and evoked the most violent support and op­ position is undoubtedly Article IX, the inclusion of which none were to regret more bitterly than its authors themselves : Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.2 1 Ibid. p. 409.

* Ibid. p. 408.

20

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

Almost every key word of this clause (‘war*, ‘threat or use of force1, ‘international disputes*, ‘land, sea, and air forces*, ‘war po­ tential*, ‘right of belligerency*) has been repeatedly defined and re­ defined during the past ten years and the elasticity of at least some of the definitions can be judged by the fact that in 1957, although Article IX was still part of the nation’s fundamental law, Japan’s ground forces alone numbered over 170,000 men. In early 1947, however, such developments were hard to foresee and, so far as ultra-nationalist elements were concerned, the enactment of Article IX, following on the total loss of Japan’s overseas possessions, the demobilization of her armed forces, and the outlawing of her war in­ dustries, seemed at the time to blast any lingering hopes of a revival of the type of successful militarism on which they had, in fact, if not in theory, so largely depended for their support in earlier days. In a sense the 1947 Constitution can be viewed as representing the entire range of Occupation policy that was aimed at extirpating those elements in Japan which might prevent her from developing into a peaceful and democratic nation. To the extent that the basic principles of this Constitution continue to be preserved and respect­ ed, it will be possible to judge that the Occupation succeeded in its aim. Perhaps the greatest obstacle lies in the fact that the Occupa­ tion ideals, as embodied in the Constitution, came neither as a result of widespread popular demand from below, nor even primarily from Japan itself. Just as the Meiji Constitution had been granted by the Emperor ‘to point out to what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform*, so the 1947 Constitu­ tion was in effect handed down to the Government, and through them to the people, by a superior authority. The democratic revolution carried out by the Occupation came not only by directive from above, but also as a foreign product from outside. Many of its ideals, it is true, corresponded to those of an important segment of the Japanese people and might in the course of time have been achieved without foreign encouragement. In the event, however, it was through foreign incentive and foreign power that they were put into effect and few Japanese were deceived by the myth that it was their Government and not the Occupation who were initiating the reforms. Thus in March 1956 the Minister of Education, Mr. Kiyose Ichiro, could declare in the Diet that

The Occupation A ttack on Organized Nationalism 21 Constitution Day (3 May) was ‘not a day of glory, but of national humiliation’.1 While most of the Occupation reforms remain, and may well con­ tinue to remain, on the statute books, a far more important question for Japan’s future is whether the democratic ideals which they em­ body can become an integral part of the nation’s symbolism, instead of foreign imports linked in people’s minds with defeat and Occu­ pation. As Professor Maruyama has written, . .. democracy in this country has not yet infiltrated into the daily lives of the people, although it has accomplished the outward legal and institu­ tional changes in the Japanese state structure. In other words, democracy is still an imported product and has not yet developed to the stage where it has become a positive symbol to regulate the Japanese way of life, com­ pletely displacing the old nationalism.2 Unless democracy does in fact progress from being a fashionable foreign-style slogan with a certain emotional appeal into becoming a positive symbol with concrete referential significance, the attack on the bases of ultra-nationalism carried out in the first phase of the Occupation may, instead of being a step towards an indigenous democratic revolution, turn out to have been but one more episode in the pendulum swing, so often witnessed in Japanese history, in which a period of rapid importation of outside ideas and institutions is followed by a strong nationalist reaction. 1 This was a rather remarkable statement for a Cabinet Minister to make before the national legislature and there was considerable sentiment among the Socialists in favour of disciplining Mr. Kiyose. In the event, however, no action was taken. • Maruyama, Nationalism, p. 14.

D

II. Japanese Nationalism under Fire and the Dispersion of Ultra-Nationalist Groups

Official Reactions to Defeat Turning our focus now from the Occupation’s many-pronged offensive against the citadels of ultra-nationalism to the early re­ actions of nationalist elements themselves, we are struck at first by how readily the Government and most groups associated with Japan’s nationalist policies accepted the realities of the unprece­ dented situation brought about by surrender. One of the main rea­ sons for this was undoubtedly the fact that the Emperor himself, still endowed with the full force of his theoretically supreme authority, had, in his broadcast to the people, called on them to accept the Pots­ dam terms and to ‘endure the unendurable and suffer what is unsufferable* so that the ‘tradition of the Yamato race, which will surely rise [may] be preserved and the wishes of His Imperial Majesty be fulfilled’.1 The Emperor’s broadcast was an unprecedented event and the ‘jewel-voice’ (gyokuon), as it was called, was heard by virtu­ ally every person in the country, other than infants and the deaf. The exact meaning of his words was not always fully understood by the people, but it was clear to even the most bemused listener that the hostilities which were now to end had not turned out exactly as planned. The Emperor specifically gave warning against the type of upheaval that the arrival of foreign troops might so easily have pro­ voked, especially on the part of extreme nationalist elements : 1 Quoted in Japan Year Book, 1949-1952, App., p. 14, The words ‘to endure the unendurable* (shinobuhekarazu wo shinobu) had a significantly traditional ring, for they had been used fifty years before by the Emperor Meiji in reference to the three-power intervention aimed at reducing Japan’s spoils following the SinoJapanese War. According to the record of Kido Köichi, the Lord Privy Seal, the Emperor himself referred in 1945 to the earlier use of the phrase: ‘Needless to say I cannot bear the sight of our loyal troops being disarmed, or those responsible for the war being punished, especially since they were unswerving in their devo­ tion and unalloyed in their loyalty to me. But I think that now is the time to bear the unbearable. Recalling the Emperor Meiji’s feeling when he was confronted with the Triple Intervention, I repress my tears and approve the draft plan’ (International Military Tribunal for the Far East, transcript, pp. 31178-9: affidavit of Kido Köichi).

Japanese Nationalism under Fire 23 Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Im­ perial State, We are always with ye, Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity. Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strife which may create confusion, lead ye astray and cause ye to lose the confidence of the world.1

It was the Emperor also who in terms of ringing praise had instruct­ ed the troops to lay down their arms.2 Once the Emperor had spoken, the burden of official propaganda was reversed overnight. Hitherto the people had been exhorted to fight, if need be to the last man, to defend the fatherland; now they were admonished to accept ‘the present difficulty* and to co-operate with the conquerors. It was made clear, however, that the goal re­ mained the same, namely to preserve the immutable kokutai. Sur­ render was in no wise to alter the nation’s fundamental structure.3 In his address to the Diet on 5 September, the Prime Minister (Prince Higashikuni) explained: ‘The termination of the war has been brought about through the merciful benevolence of the Em­ peror.*4 For the time being at least, traditional nationalist aims would have to be pursued by peaceful means. In his Surrender broadcast the Emperor had stated: ‘Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness of its sacred land.. .*5Following the broadcast, a Cabinet proclamation emphasized the continuity of national ideals : The people must be concerned now with the defense of the national structure... The government. .. will fight all hardships and always con­ form with the Imperial Will, absolutely to recover the national prestige and answer the will of our ancestors.6 Similarly the Prime Minister, in calling for peaceful co-operation with 1Japan Year Book, p. 14. a .. we believe that the loyalty and achievements of you officers and men of the imperial forces will for all time be the quintessence of our nation* (Quigley and Turner, The New Japan, p. 80). 8 Preservation of the Emperor’s sovereignty had been the sole condition on which the Japanese Government had insisted in their original acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration (10 August) and, though in the end even this had to be dropped, Japan’s leaders remained unanimous in their determination that if any­ thing was to be saved from the wreckage it must be the continuity of the Imperial institution and of the national polity which it embodied (Togo Shigenori, The Cause of Japan (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1956), pp. 309 ff.). See also p. 17 above. 4 Yomiuri Höcht, 6 Sept. 1945. 6Japan Year Book, p. 14. • Quoted in Brown, Nationalism in Japan, p. 240.

24 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan the Occupation, referred repeatedly to the preservation of thekokutai : When the whole Empire unites as one and advances overcoming the present difficulty in perfect order and unity, in full observance of the Imperial Wishes, the whole world will be surprised at the greatness of Japan's polityytranscending victory and defeat. It is at this time of difficulty and adverse fortune that the true value of our polity will be revealed.1 Popular Reactions to Defeat If Japan’s nationalistic leaders were thus prepared to take in their stride the painful fact of defeat, the general public was, on the whole, even more ready to accept the end of a war that had brought in­ creasing misery for the overwhelming majority of the population. More enlightened individuals had for years been aware that a Japan­ ese victory was out of the question and even those people most succeptible to government propaganda had, as American bombers relentlessly razed one city after another to the ground, begun to sus­ pect that the war had (in the Emperor’s words) ‘developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage*.1 2 For a large part of the Japanese people, defeat came as a merciful relief—a relief not only from material privations, the scourges of bombardment, and the despair of fighting against hopeless odds, but from the tyranny of their own despotic militarism. In the minds of many civilians the Occupation was not simply an alien force patiently to be endured in obedience to the Imperial command, but, in the broadest sense of the term, an ‘army of liberation*. Ultra-Nationalist Incidents In this general context the scattered ultra-nationalist incidents that followed Japan’s decision to surrender seem picayune indeed.3 1 Quoted in ibid. Italics are the present writer’s. These statements were all made during the month following the Emperor’s broadcast when, as Professor Quigley has pointed out, the attitude of highly-placed Japanese towards the con­ querors was more reliably expressed than later when Occupation controls came into effect (Quigley and Turner, The New Japan, p. 79). 2Japan Year Book, App., p. 13. This classic understatement was the result of reconciling some of the divergent views expressed during the Cabinet meeting on 14 August, at which the Imperial Rescript of Surrender was drafted. The original draft had read ‘the war itself became worse day by day’. This seemingly innocu­ ous statement of fact, however, was considered objectionable by some of the more jingoistic members. See ‘How Japan Surrendered’ by Shimomura Kainan (head of the Information Board at the time of the Surrender), Asahi Evening Netvs, 15 Aug. 1957. * Keibi Keisatsu gives a description of the main incidents on pp. 114-18.

25 One of the more interesting of these incidents was the attempt on 14 August by a group of young officers of the Imperial Guards Division to seize the recording of the Emperor’s surrender broad­ cast. Realizing (quite correctly) the traumatic effect that this broad­ cast was likely to have on the Japanese people, they faked army orders enabling them to prevent any cars from leaving the Imperial Palace with the offending record: despite their efforts, however, it reached the broadcasting studio in time. Another group of the Guards Division organized an anti-Surrender coup d’etat on 15 August, but was foiled. The leader committed suicide and the others were arrested by the kempeitai (gendarmerie), whose harsh attentions had in the past days been abruptly turned from the sup­ pression of anti-war elements to that of anti-surrender elements. On the same day another group from the Guards Division broke into the broadcasting studio in a final effort to forestall the Imperial broadcast; balked in their efforts, they committed mass suicide in front of the Imperial Palace. Also on 15 August a small group of soldiers under a Captain Sasaki joined various rightist student or­ ganizations in a so-called National Divine Wind Unit (Kokumin Shimpü Tai) to carry out attacks on the residences of the Prime Minister and the President of the Privy Council, whom they held responsible for Japan’s calamity. This plan also proved abortive. Following the official surrender, certain military units circulated pamphlets to the effect that the Imperial Rescript was a forgery and organized further attacks on the residences of high government officials. In other cases the more irreconcilable ultra-nationalist ele­ ments admitted that the Imperial Surrender order might be genu­ ine, but stated that it was impossible for them to respect any Em­ peror who could have issued such an order. To command the coun­ try to surrender was, they claimed, not worthy of a Japanese Em­ peror. For such men, loyalty under the existing circumstances para­ doxically required that they be disloyal. Thus ö i Atsushi, a strong adherent of the Defend-the-Divine-Land faction of officers (Shinshü-böeiha)t could state: True loyalty in the widest sense lies in defending the fundamental principles of our national polity that have been established ever since the time of our Imperial Ancestors, even if this means that we must tempor­ arily violate the intentions of Emperor Hirohito.1 Japanese Nationalism under Fire

1 Quoted in Shüsen Shiroku, compiled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

26 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan This odd flexibility of the Emperor system in the minds of some of its most ardent supporters was also seen during the time of the February (1936) Incident. On this occasion some of the officer in­ surgents had declared that the Emperor’s original order command­ ing them to disband, even if it was genuine, ran counter to the proper way of Imperial rule (KödÖ)> having been inspired by the corrupt elements at Court (kunsoku no kan)}and that it need therefore not be respected. Of the numerous schemes improvised during the immediate postSurrender period, one of the more quixotic was to resist the Occupa­ tion from the Imperial Headquarters installation that had been set up some months earlier in a mountainous region of Nagano Pre­ fecture ; this, too, ended unsuccessfully and in a spate of suicides. In all these cases the plans were hastily drawn up and poorly conceived ; but the more important reason for their failure was that it proved impossible to obtain the slightest support from the higher echelons of the army, let alone from the general public.1 Many of Japan’s high-ranking officers, it is true, opposed the Emperor’s decision and would have preferred to greet the Occupa­ tion with a scorched earth, bamboo spears, and ‘death in the battle of the hundred million’ (ichioku gyokusai). Once the decision had been irrevocably handed down, however, they felt bound to submit. A few of these men saw in suicide the only honourable solution to the agonizing dilemma of having to choose between the twin principles that had until then inspired their thoughts and actions—the prin­ ciple of ‘unquestioning compliance with the Emperor’s wishes’ (shöshö-hikkin) and that of ‘defending the Divine Land’ (Shinshüböei). On the night of 14 August the Minister of War, General Anami Korechika, committed seppuku (harakiri) in his house, leav­ ing behind him a note in which he stated that by his death he sought to ‘atone for his great sin’.*12 Similarly, on the following morning p. 752. The use of the name ‘Hirohito’ for the Emperor Shöwa was itself a fairly blatant mark of disrespect. 1 The Minister of War, General Anami, for example, flatly refused to counten­ ance the plans for a coup d’état to be carried out by a group of younger officers on the night of the war’s ending (Togo, The Cause of Japan, p. 304). Similarly General Mori Takeo, commander of the Imperial Guards Division, to which most of the insurgents belonged, refused to sanction the anti-Surrender uprising planned by some of his younger officers and as a result was fatally shot by one of his own officers. 2 Concerning General Anami’s suicide, Admiral Nomura Kichisaburö com­ mented: ‘As a member of the Cabinet he knew the real situation, but as head of

Japanese Nationalism under Fire

27

Vice-Admiral önishi, who as Naval Vice-Chief of Staff had been the main originator of the kamikaze (suicide-plane) attacks, com­ mitted seppukuy uttering as his final words: **1 have suffered in su­ preme agony these past few days. It is the command of His Imperial Majesty. [Yet] how can I tell the people at this stage to surrender?... I have no way of apologizing to the people and to the Emperor.*1 Many other high-ranking officers, including General Sugiyama Gen, one of the dominating figures in the Japanese army during the past decade, also committed suicide at the Surrender; General Tan­ aka Seiichi, Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Defence Com­ mand, who had been asked to join the young rebel officers in their plan to prevent the broadcast of the Imperial Rescript of Surrender, but who had refused, killed himself some days after the Surrender, having first assured himself that General MacArthur’s landing in Japan would, as the Emperor wished, take place without incident. General Honjö Shigeru, commander of the Kwantung Army at the time of the Manchurian Incident, killed himself in September upon being designated as a war criminal ; in his final note he stated : I . . . feel utterly overawed for having led the Empire to today’s un­ precedented state of near ruin. I can only atone for my sin by dying ten thousand deaths. . . In leaving the world bearing full responsibility, I hereby pray from the depths of my heart for the health and longevity of the Emperor, for the protection of our national constitution, and for the restoration of the Empire.2 General Töjö Hideki’s attempt to cheat the gallows by taking his own life was thwarted.3 the Army he knew that there was a strong feeling in the Army for continuing the war. Therefore he was in a dilemma, and after signing . . . he killed himself. He was in a very difficult position, being both a member of the Cabinet and head of the Army, and it was said that he acted truly like a gentleman’ (quoted by Y. C. Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Calif., 1957), p. 211). 1 Recorded by Kodama Yoshio, who was himself present in the room when the Admiral committed seppuku (I Was Defeated (Tokyo, 1951), p. 172). * International Military Tribunal for the Far East, transcript, p. 19246. * Tögö, The Cause of Japan, p. 123. General Töjö was convicted as a war criminal by the International Military Tribunal and was hanged on 23 December 1948. In April 1958 it was announced by a group of the defence lawyers that the ashes of General Töjö and of six other major war criminals had been secretly re­ trieved from the U.S. Army crematory and kept in a Buddhist temple. (It had thus been possible to frustrate the Occupation plans to keep the disposal place of the ashes a secret in order to prevent their burial places becoming national shrines.) At the same time plans were announced to build a memorial to the executed war leaders later in the year. Among prominent civilian leaders who committed suicide in this period was

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan 28 Apart from these incidents involving the armed forces, a number of civilian right-wing groups demonstrated the strength of their convictions by committing mass suicide. Two days before the Sur­ render broadcast, twelve members of the rather inappropriatelynamed Bright Sunshine Association (Meirö Kai) under their leader, Hibi Waichi, committed suicide in the Imperial Palace Plaza. Among them was one young woman; she alone sought death by poison rather than the sword. At one o’clock on the morning of 24 August fourteen members of the Great East Institute (Daitöjuku) issued forth from their Tokyo headquarters and proceeded on foot to the Yoyogi Parade Grounds.1 After bowing to the Imperial Palace, each man in turn committed ceremonial seppuku, beginning with their leader, Kageyama Shöhei. They left behind them various patriotic poems and a farewell vow declaring : ‘For all eternity will we protect the Imperial Palace.’*12The Great East Institute was revived after the Occupation under Kageyama’s son and as might be expected, the spectacular suicide of ‘the fourteen patriots’ has become for the Society a heroic legend, fre­ quently compared with the great feudal epic that ended in the death of the Forty-Seven Ronin.3 Rather ironically, the site of the mass seppuku happens to be within the compounds of the United States Washington Heights military base. The new leaders of the group are, however, making efforts to recover the area in order to build a commemorative shrine. A week after the Surrender, a group of youths belonging to the Revere-the-Emperor-and-Expel-the-Barbarian Comrades*Associa­ tion (Sonjö Döshikai) under the leadership of Iijima Yoshio, planned to assassinate the Prime Minister, his Cabinet, and various other political and financial leaders. They started by attacking the resithe former Prime Minister, Prince Konoe Fumimaro. Since the Surrender his status had been extremely uncertain. He himself claimed that he was sponsored by SCAP and as late as 11 October 1945 he was appointed to revise the Constitu­ tion. On 6 December, however, he was listed for arrest as a suspected war crimin­ al. He was allowed ten days to prepare himself for prison; on the final day (16 Dec.) he took his life by poison. 1 The Great East Institute was founded in 1939 as one of the many offshoots of the Amur River Association (Kokuryü Kai). (See App. IV below.) 3 Keibi Keisatsu, p. 117 and Nagamatsu, Ikiteiru Uyoku (Tokyo, 1954), p. 231. 3 See below, pp. 56-57. The sixth edition of the Records of the Fourteen Patriots was published in 1956 by the Great East Institute. Almost every issue of the Institute’s monthly organ has references to the heroes and poems extolling their final deed. The Sept.-Oct. 1956 issue of Fuji has a detailed description by Mimura Yukio of events leading to the suicides.

29 dence of the Minister of Home Affairs, but their plans went awry. They then proceeded to Atagoyama in Shiba, locked themselves in a building at the top of the hill and, having established temporary con­ tact with anti-surrender elements at Atsugi air base, planned a final stand. The advance Occupation forces were due to arrive in two days and the authorities were desperately anxious to avoid any incidents such as the Emperor had given warning against in his broadcast. A cordon of police was thrown round the hill and various efforts made to persuade the fanatic youths to disband. When the police finally entered the building, however, it was to find that the ten young men with three of their wives had blown themselves up with hand-gre­ nades, in order, as they had explained in a final note, ‘to atone for our sins in disobeying the Imperial Rescript*.1 Apart from these more striking incidents, the immediate postSurrender days witnessed various sporadic attacks on the Govern­ ment by ultra-nationalist societies, as well as numerous individual and group suicides throughout the country.2 On the whole, how­ ever, extreme nationalist elements both in the army and among civilians submitted with extraordinary pliancy to the Government’s orders, and, instead of resisting the Occupation, strove to salvage what they could from the wreckage. As Professor Maruyama has pointed out, . . . it is ironical to note that the vast majority of the officers of the armed services and their supporters, the rightist group leaders, who had boasted of ‘dying for the cause of the nation*, holding that ‘life should be regarded [as] lighter than a feather, if given for the sake of the Emperor*, etc., facing the greatest disgrace wrought upon their traditional symbol, should not have chosen the way of death.3 Japanese Nationalism under Fire

Effects of Defeat on Nationalist Sentiment The ultra-nationalist movement now entered what Professor 1 A vivid description of the incident is given in I Was Defeated (Tokyo, 1951) by Kodama Yoshio, who acted as an intermediaiy between the youths and the police in an effort to avoid bloodshed. Commenting on the leader of the group Kodama writes: ‘Iijima was a thorough patriot, but not a militarist. He continu­ ally advocated that unless the militarists were overthrown, true Emperor politics would never be materialized. From the beginning to end, he refused to submit to authoritarian force. His outlook might have been narrow, but I felt that in purity of heart he far outstripped me’ (pp. 174-8). a For instance, a right-wing group in Shimane Prefecture, acting on orders from its parent body, the Sonjö Döshikai in Tokyo, staged an abortive attack on the prefectural office (Keibi Keisatsu, p. 118). * Maruyama, Nationalism, p. 8. (Italics in original.)

30 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Fujiwara calls its period of ‘utter depression*.1 During this time nationalism, which had for so long been the dominant force in Japan, failed to express itself either as an organized movement or as a popu­ lar feeling, and in its absence the extreme right-wing political groups were relegated to a sort of limbo. The effects on nationalism of specific Occupation policies have already been considered. The impact of defeat, however, weakened Japanese nationalism in other important ways as well.2In the first place, the very fact of losing the war served as an almost fatal attack on a whole network of nationalist ideals, especially those relating to the notion of Japan’s mission in the world. Since the Meiji era, nationalist ideals had been fostered and maintained through the propaganda of the Imperial Way {Ködö), namely, that Japan had a special mission for overseas ex­ pansion. Now in defeat right-wing groups might condemn the bureaucrats, the zaibatsu, the politicians, or the military for having brought destruction on the Empire; but in most people’s minds, Japan’s fourteen-year-old war effort had become so inextricably in­ volved with nationalist ideals themselves that unconditional defeat could only result in their questioning the very validity of these ideals. The war appeared to have been an unmitigated mistake—indeed the greatest mistake in Japan’s history—and it was hard to single out any single group as the scapegoat. Rather, the whole edifice of nationalist ideology itself must needs be called into question ; for war and defeat appeared to have come as a natural result of imple­ menting this ideology. In the light of unconditional surrender, the entire set of expansionist slogans that had been drummed into people’s ears for so many years—‘the eight corners of the world under one roof* (Hakkö Ichiu), ‘Japan the leading power of East Asia* (Töa no meishu Nihon), ‘the National Polity that stands fore­ most among all nations* (Bankoku ni kantaru Kokutai), ‘a hundred million hearts beating like one* {ichioku isshin),z ‘spreading the 1 According to Professor Fujiwara, this period lasted from August 1945 (Surrender) until February 1947 (General MacArthur’s banning of the General Strike) (Fujiwara, ‘Nationalism’, pp. 76-84). 2 For the following discussion I am particularly indebted to Professor Maruyama’s analysis, specifically in ‘Nihon ni okeru Nashionarizumu’ and 'Chôkokkashugi no Ronri to Shinri’ in his Gendai Seiji no Shisö to Ködö (Tokyo, 1956-7) and Nationalism, pp. 13-17. 3 This famous maxim, enunciated by General Araki at a time when the popula­ tion of Japan proper was less than 75 million, was designed to include Korea, Manchuria, and the other areas of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was used as a poster slogan during the China Incident and the characters were significantly printed over the drawing of a distended ant.

31 Great Cause throughout the world* (Taigi zoo sekai n ishiku)—stood starkly revealed as false and, what was perhaps rather more damag­ ing, as risible. Nor did the purely ‘domestic* slogans escape this onslaught on the edifice of nationalist ideology. ‘Loyalty to the Emperor and patriot­ ism* Çchükun-aikoku), ‘a wealthy nation and a strong soldiery* (fukoku kyöhei), ‘the Army as the Nation*s flower* (guntai wa kuni no seika), ‘indestructibility of the Divine Land* (Shinshü-fumetsu), ‘the Imperial line unbroken for ages eternal* (bansei-ikkei), ‘coeval with heaven and earth* (Tenjö-mukyü), ‘loyalty towards the Emperor coincident with filial piety* (Chuko itchi)1—they all belonged to the same discredited pattern and to the same emotional context. Also the main symbolic nationalistic activities, such as waving the Rising Sun flag, singing the Kimiga Yo anthem, and visiting the Meiji and Ise shrines, temporarily lost their value among the people.2 As Professor Maruyama has pointed out, the effect of defeat was bound to be particularly overpowering in the case of Japan. This was partly because post-Meiji Japanese nationalism had for its main prop a belief in the country’s politico-military superiority, as op­ posed, for example, to China whose ideal of Chunghua (Central Em­ pire) was based on a supposed cultural superiority and was therefore far less shaken by political collapse or military defeat.3 Even more important was the integral quality of Japan’s kokutai ideal as it had developed since the Meiji Period. While certain countries might focus their national mission on some single aspect—industry, political organization, religion or art, for instance—Japanese leaders had sought to combine in her kokutai the ‘spiritual* civilization of the East with the ‘technical, material* civilization of the West.4 To the extent that the Japanese nationalist ideal had been all-inclusive Japanese Nationalism under Fire

1 Chükö itchi was the famous slogan of the bakumatsu loyalist, Yoshida Shöin. It must be understood in contrast with the fundamental Confucian outlook, according to which filial piety preceded loyalty to the sovereign. In China it was, of course, the duty of the subjects to overthrow the wicked ruler who had lost the mandate of Heaven. No such right was ever recognized in Japan, where loyalty to the ruler coincided with filial piety as the ultimate virtue. 8 Until 1949 the Occupation forbade the hoisting of the Hi no Maru, but even after the ban was lifted (SCAPIN 1956 of 6 Jan. 1949), 43 per cent, of people questioned in a poll answered that they did not raise a flag on national holidays (Maruyama, Nationalism, p. 11). 8 Ibid. p. 12. 4 Professor Maruyama, in discussing the feeling of national mission, refers to R. Michels’s distinction between Integralmissionsbegriff and Teilmissionsbegriff. According to Professor Maruyama, post-Meiji Japan is a classical example of a country which concentrated on the former (‘Nashionarizumu’, p. 23).

32 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan and absolute, the spiritual vacuum resulting from its destruction tended to be complete. Pre-Surrender propagandists had frequently used the image ‘flawless like a golden chalice* (kinö-muketsu) in des­ cribing the Japanese national polity and great emphasis was laid on the supposed fact that the soil of the divine land (Shinshü no ryödo) had never suffered the pollution of an invader’s foot.1 It was pre­ cisely this type of thinking that made the effects of defeat on tra­ ditional nationalist ideology so shattering. Defeat also brought in its wake an economic crisis of the first magnitude. In the months following Surrender, industrial produc­ tion came to a virtual standstill and the Japanese people were faced not only with a continuance of the privations to which they had been subjected for so many years, but with the additional scourges of mass unemployment, rampant inflation, and black market. Among those hardest hit were former officers and soldiers who now returned by the tens of thousands to their shattered homes without either jobs or pensions. As on the continent of Europe people depending on fixed salaries or savings suffered the brunt of the steadily worsening inflation. A large part of the population of Japan’s cities was living from hand to mouth and barely managing to keep above the subsistence level. Under such circumstances it is hardly surprising that even those people who had hitherto supported Japan’s nationalistic aims should now turn their attention wholeheartedly to the problem of making a livelihood. It was this period of economic dislocation that witnessed the phenomenal growth of the labour movement and also of the Socialist and Communist parties.2Aspirations for a better material life began to take the place of the traditional nationalist ideals which seemed to have brought the country to its present nadir. After years of sacrificing their material well-being for what had proved to be a chimera, demands for a decent living and reasonable security be­ came paramount. It was clear, however, that Japan’s problems could not be solved simply by a redistribution of the nation’s in­ adequate economic resources. The presence of well-fed, sanguine 1 The kinö-muketsu image occurs in the nationalist song popular at the time of the China Incident: 'It is the form of towering Mount Fuji which is the pride of our flawlcss-like-a-golden-chalice, unshakeable Nippon’ (quoted by F. J. Daniels, ‘Mr. Tfsjurumi-Syunsuke on the “Amuletic” Use of Words’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 18 (1956), p. 521). * See below, pp. 59 ff.

33 Occupation forces had vividly underscored the discrepancy be­ tween Japanese and Western economic standards. It was realized by even the least perceptive Japanese that for all her spiritual ideals and sacrifices, their nation had been defeated by the cold fact of econo­ mic and technical inferiority. Faced now with overwhelming evi­ dence of the sheer physical strength of the Allied nations, it seemed almost absurd that Japan should have aspired to defeat them in war, and any notions of a national revanche in the future were unthink­ able. The most that the economically shattered and overpopulated islands could hope for was by diligent efforts at technological ad­ vancement over a period of years to lessen the gap between their living standards and those of the more favoured nations. And so once again the pendulum had swung: a period of complacent, in­ ward-looking nationalism was to be followed by a deliberate effort to absorb new knowledge from technically more advanced countries outside. Japan’s administrators and executives, thoroughly imbued with the principle that each man must serve the state through his own occupation (shokuiki hökö), now turned their energies to co-operat­ ing with the Occupation in order to Westernize the country both economically and politically. In a status society like that of Japan, with its emphasis on conforming with the existing social order, whatever it may be, and its almost complete lack of any ‘open door* of political initiative, the bureaucracy had little difficulty now in adopting an almost diametrically opposite set of slogans from that held hitherto—slogans based on the ideal of Westernism instead of that of Japanism. Henceforth they would do their best to carry out the new policy of importation, so long as this was ordered from above as being necessary for the state. This time, however, due to the policy of the Occupation and to the temporary collapse of the kokutai structure, there was to be no ques­ tion of a strictly selective importation. Japan’s leaders could not, as they had done some seventy years before, pursue a policy of borrow­ ing suitable Western techniques while by and large rejecting West­ ern ideology. Though technology was still the most spectacular as­ pect of the West’s apparent superiority, the popular prestige of the Anglo-American democratic ideal, which seemed in practice to have worked so well in its countries of origin, was very high in the early post-war period and a large part of the people was ready to Japanese Nationalism under Fire

34 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan believe the Occupation when it told them that Japan’s failure was not simply the result of the country’s economic poverty and technical backwardness, but of‘feudalism’, militarism, and ultra-nationalism. The relative ease with which Japan’s leaders, including some of those who until the Surrender had been most rabidly nationalistic in their pronouncements, were now able to adopt the new democratic slogans can also be understood in terms of verbal usage. In his dis­ cussion of the ‘amuletic’ use of words in Japan Mr. Tsurumi ex­ plains that as phrases like ‘the eight corners of the world under one roof’ (Hakkö Ichiu) lost their value with Japan’s defeat, their place was often taken by up-to-date imported ‘amulets’ from the West, such as ‘democracy* (irninshu), ‘freedom* (jiyû), ‘people’s rights* (jinken), and ‘peace’ {heiwa) which, like their predecessors, were in effect used as ‘charms against ill luck’.1 He further points out that these new words were often used most enthusiastically by the very people who during the war had bandied about the official nationalist slogans: . . . when one sees that the same commentators sang the praise of minsyu, ziyuu, and heiwa as before and throughout the war had seemed to wel­ come aggressive action, one is inclined to conclude that the reason for their having no qualms about the change-over as between one period and the other may well lie in their having pondered on the amuletic nature of these words and thus come to realize that a change in the words could take place without any change in content.2 So far as the mass of the Japanese people was concerned, demo­ cracy, though often (as Japanese conservatives never tire of pointing out) misconstrued as a synonym for licence, now became the most popular slogan of the day, especially among the urban youth. It is true that democratic slogans were no novelty in Japan ; but they had for so long been officially eschewed that they now enjoyed all the charm of the unfamiliar. At the same time as demokurashï and its fashionable concomitants, there flooded into Japan a host of less exalted foreign-style commodities of a type that the militarist authorities had hitherto frowned on, if not outright condemned— dance-halls, strip-tease shows, music-halls, jazz, popular Americanstyle songs, French-style chansons, and chewing-gum, to name but a 1 F. J. Daniels, ‘Mr. T[s]urumi-Syunsuke on the “Amuletic” Use of Words’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 18,1956, p. 525. See also App. I, p. 427 below. * Ibid. p. 525.

Japanese Nationalism under Fire

35

few.1 Throughout Japanese cities bars and cafés sprang up bearing such exotic names as ‘Joe’s Hideout* and ‘C’est Si Bon*. All this, too, was no real novelty in Japan; the relatively liberal phase of the 1920’s, for instance, had seen the emancipated moga and mobo (‘modern girl’ and ‘modern boy’), who clearly owed much of their inspiration to the Western furappä and her appurtenances. But the post-war fad for Western, and supposedly Western, forms of this kind has, on the whole, been far more widespread; this was partly because the reaction was more violent than before, partly because the conservative forces that would normally oppose them were them­ selves demoralized and on the defensive, and partly because these forms often derived a certain prestige from being associated with the life enjoyed by the successful American forces in Japan. Though democracy in its true sense largely failed to pass into the lives of the people, superficial, foreign-style symbols became, and indeed re­ main, an important part of urban life. The connexion between post-war economic dislocation and the weakening of nationalist ideals is underscored by the fact that in rural districts, where the ruinous effects of war were so much less evident and where, indeed, the war-time and post-war food short­ ages and inflation resulted in substantial advantages, there was very much less tendency for foreign influences to impinge on traditional nationalism. A final reason for the weakening of nationalist sentiment in the post-war period is to be found in the conduct of the Occupation it­ self, apart from its specific policies. The Occupation did not, as it might so easily have done, serve to stimulate feelings of national or racial humiliation, on which nationalist elements could then have capitalized. Allied authorities went to particular pains to avoid any incidents in which the occupying forces might offend the national sensibilities of the Japanese, for instance by showing disrespect to Shinto shrines.2In view of the bitterness of the war itself, it is indeed 1 Western-style dancing, for instance, had been prohibited during the war in the name of moral purification, and efforts had been made to divert popular interest from baseball to national sports such as jüdö and kendo. As examples of doctrinaire humourlessness, one may recall that the Government had ordered the substitution of Japanese words for the normal American baseball terms and in cer­ tain cases had even advocated that, instead of the standard word matchi for‘match’, people should say kaichü toridashi hitsukegi (‘pocket-extraction kindling-wood’). 1 The Provost Marshal’s Office even prohibited Allied personnel from attend­ ing the kabuki theatre, for fear that they would add to the already congested con­ ditions and thus cause resentment among the Japanese spectators.

36 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan remarkable how successful they were in accomplishing this aim. Pre-Surrender propaganda had warned the Japanese population of the atrocities that they must expect should the Allies occupy the country; this was partly because the militarists honestly expected the Western soldiery to behave in the same manner as their own had occasionally seen fit to do, but chiefly because they thought thus to encourage the will to resist. It was with some surprise, then, and considerable relief that the Japanese people saw the American and Commonwealth troops offering not rape, loot, and the sword, but chocolate, chewing-gum, and cigarettes. When it came to extirpating those elements that they held re­ sponsible for the war, the Occupation authorities were stern, some­ times even harsh ; but they were rarely vindictive. On the whole, the Occupation in its early phase took the side of the underdog—the indigent tenant-farmer, the unorganized factory worker, and the woman whose political and legal rights had been curtailed by the traditional family system. While the Occupation had as its primary objective to ensure that Japan would never again become a menace to the peace and security of the world, only the most cynical observer would question the existence, especially in the early stages, of an important element of idealism. Japan was viewed not simply as an ex-enemy or a potential menace, but as a country whose people had suffered greatly through the fault of their rulers and of the political system which had been imposed on them. This non-vindictive, idealistic quality of the Occupation was understood and appreciated, even if grudgingly, by an important part of the Japanese people and undoubtedly did much to forestall the type of nationalism that military conquests have so often fostered in the past. A further important advantage was that in Japan occupation did not, as in the case of Germany, involve a partition of the country into zones; in this way it avoided becoming in people’s minds a check to territorial integrity and national pride. Perhaps the most telling evidence of the Occupation’s success in this direction is that despite all the fanatically anti-Western elements existing in Japan at the time of surrender, the Occupation forces during their almost seven years in the country did not suffer a single fatal casualty as a result of deliberate Japanese action. While nationalism underwent an almost total eclipse both as a movement and as an organized popular feeling, it must not be

Japanese Nationalism under Fire 37 thought that it ceased to exist, even in the early post-war period. As Professor Maruyama has pointed out, Japanese nationalism, unlike that in Europe, was originally built up from local or provincial senti­ ments and depended on traditional morality and loyalty to local patriarchs. The political oligarchy which ruled Japan since the Meiji Restoration succeeded to an important extent, by means of state edu­ cation closely allied with political indoctrination and thought-con­ trol, in mobilizing this traditional morality in order to create a con­ sciousness of national unity and loyalty to the central Government. In these efforts, they were consciously influenced by the Western concept of a nation state. In view of the virulently anti-Western as­ pect that it later assumed, it is interesting to recall that the most conspicuous symbols of modern Japanese nationalism, including the official designation of a national anthem, a national flag, and a national holiday (all of which were to become so important a part of nationalist-militarist indoctrination and mystique), were introduc­ ed during the early decades of Meiji under Western inspiration.1 Despite all the efforts of the Meiji leaders to mobilize nationalist sentiment into a modern, dynamic force, despite even the national victories against China and Russia in 1895 and 1905, nationalism as a popular movement never acquired the type of strong autonomy that it had, for instance, in France in the early nineteenth century or in China in the present century; instead, it remained tied to feudal and paternalistic traditions and consistently reflected a primitive attachment to primary groups. The Meiji educators insisted that loyalty to the sovereign should precede, not only filial piety, but love of the country itself, and this remarkable reversal of European, as well as Chinese, patterns reveals the strongly paternalistic quality of Japanese nationalism, in which the principle of the authoritarian family system was applied on a national scale. From the very beginning the oligarchs were at pains to suppress 1 The Kimi-ga-Yo was officially established as the national anthem in 1891. In 1870 an English bandmaster to the Japanese Imperial Army suggested that Japan should have a national anthem and he himself rose to the occasion by composing the music. This music was used until 1881, when the poem was set to its present tune. The Rising Sun flag has a far older history, but it did not officially become the national standard until 1870. The Kigensetsu holiday, although it is supposed to commemorate the accession of Emperor Jimmu more than 2,600 years ago, was not in fact instituted until 1873. As Mr. Kuroda Kazuo pointed out, ‘The Japanese Government at that time was eager to build a modem nation like the Western countries. The idea was “let us have a national holiday because the Westerners have it” ' (Japan Times, 8 Feb. 1958). E

38 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan all revolutionary and democratic elements in the nationalist move­ ment and to concentrate on its chauvinistic and expansionistic aspects ; in this they were, of course, assisted by the growth in na­ tional pride following the country’s success in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. Nationalism, which in Europe had be­ come associated with successful demands by the middle classes for increased political power and human rights, and in China with anti­ imperialism and social revolution, was in Japan deliberately canal­ ized by the Government into building up the country’s unity and strength for the purpose of military expansion and utterly failed to develop into a strong, independent sentiment of the people.1 This is certainly not to suggest that nationalism in Japan was de­ void of anti-governmental or revolutionary aspects. On the contrary, one strain of the modern nationalist movement was characterized by the most virulent opposition to the existing order. In the Meiji Period, for instance, powerful nationalist leaders like Saigö Takamori were among the Government’s most violent critics ; and former samurai radicals like ö i Kentarö combined extreme nationalism with active sympathy for the peasants* conditions and with a pro­ gramme of quasi-socialism, in implementing which they were pre­ pared to risk terrorism and direct action against the Government ; in a more recent period radical nationalism was represented by the young agrarian-military extremists of the early 1930’s, who de­ manded, on the one hand, the resolute fulfilment of the national mission abroad and, on the other, an end to the inequities of 1 In comparing the development of modem nationalism in China and Japan Professor Oka Yoshitake emphasizes the effect on the Chinese people of the fact of physical foreign domination. This gave rise to a widespread feeling of humiliation and nationalist resentment, which was directed specifically against the West and the results of which are still very evident. The Japanese people on the other hand, who never came under foreign domination until 1945, had very little direct ex­ perience with foreigners of the type that would stimulate nationalist resentment. Even the unequal treaties affected relatively few Japanese people and lasted for a relatively short period of time. During the half-century following 1895 Japan’s position in Asia became that of an ‘Imperialist exploiter’, rather than of a sub­ jugated and exploited country; Japan consequently remained psychologically isolated from the rest of Asia (a situation that has persisted with modifications in the post-war period). To an important extent the fear of foreign nations and resentment at foreigners had to be instilled into the Japanese people from above by education and propaganda. Modem Japanese nationalism was accordingly never free from a certain unrealistic, artificial quality. Asian nationalism in coun­ tries like India that came under direct foreign control has in most respects de­ veloped according to the Chinese, rather than the Japanese, pattern. In every case popular resentment arising from the direct experience of national subjugation has been an important factor.

39 bourgeois capitalism at home. In every case, however, these efforts at combining nationalism with violent opposition to the ruling élite or with radical social programmes ended in defeat at the hands of the established forces—either violently as in the case of Saigö Takamori in 1877 or of the ‘young officers* in 1936, or, more usually, by a pro­ gressive loss of political influence. Nationalists in Japan have only succeeded in exercising power by compromising and allying them­ selves with authority; they have never risen to high position by representing popular aspiration for greater economic or political rights. In practice, then, the ruling forces of the country succeeded to a large extent, especially after the success of the Sino-Japanese War, in mobilizing nationalism for their own use and in directing it into chauvinist, instead of reformist or revolutionary, channels. With surrender and the complete breakdown of the symbols of military imperialism, Japanese nationalism was released from the central force that had until then controlled it and was automatically dispersed into its original sources, namely the family, the villages, and small local groups.1 This process, which Professor Maruyama has well described as the ‘demobilization* of Japanese nationalism, involved on the one hand a replacement of discredited chauvinist symbolism by older, non-political symbols, associated, for instance, with local festivals, Shinto celebrations, and traditional art forms.2 On the other hand centralized loyalty to the Emperor tended to make way for loyalties to bosses (54-

4 akushitsu Chöseitjin (Keibi Keisatsu, p. 147). 6 Figures given in Köan Chösa Chö, Shuyö Uyoku Kankei Dantai-Hyö.

The New Right-W ing Groups 97 Minor Anti-Communist Groups A few of the minor extremist groups may now be briefly mention­ ed as examples of the scores that sprang up in the post-war period in an effort to exploit popular anti-Communist feeling. Many of these groups were of a criminal or semi-criminal variety, their political and social slogans being mere camouflage to disguise their real objectives. Few of them entertained for long any hope of ac­ quiring a mass following and accordingly they could permit them­ selves the luxury of a more fanatic approach than relatively respect­ able groups like the Chrysanthemum Flag Association could afford. The Japan Goblin Party (Nihon Tengu To) was, despite its whimsical name, a group of roughs from the Ginza and Shimbashi districts of Tokyo. Its aims, however, were couched in a typical form of Robin Hood idealism : On behalf of the liberty and happiness of the lower-class working masses, we do not fear boldly to shed our blood. We are resolute in our stand against the self-vaunting bureaucrats and all the established political parties and are ready to adopt even illegal methods in our struggle. Then in a sudden access of common sense they added: ‘We expect that in due course our group will be banned.*1 The Japan Goblin Party was set up by Tada Sankichi in Decem­ ber 1945, with its headquarters on die Ginza. It was organized on the classical oyahun-kobun pattern and among its prominent mem­ bers were district bosses (kaoyaku) and gambling operators (bakuchiuchi). At first it tried to justify its name as a party by indulging in such political activity as plastering public places with anti-Com­ munist posters. None of this proved to be very remunerative, how­ ever, and before long the Japan Goblin Party descended to more congenial occupations such as robbing a post office, stealing stores of Occupation cigarettes, intimidation, fraud, and mayhem. As a result the party’s original prediction was fulfilled: in August 1948 the group was banned and its leaders purged.2 The general policy of the new groups was, as we have seen, one of shimbei-hanso (pro-America, anti-Russia). Though most of the post-war nationalists were no doubt sincere in their opposition to Communism, their pro-Americanism, following on their previous 1 Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, p. 140.

* Ibid. pp.140-2.

98 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan hysterical anti-Westernism, was certainly inspired to a large extent by arrant opportunism. The new right-wing groups realized, es­ pecially during the active period of the purge, that their existence was already sufficiently precarious without their risking the added charges of being anti-American or opposed to the Occupation. Accordingly few of them were rash enough to invite instant dis­ bandment and purge by setting themselves up against the Allies in deed or word. A notable exception, as we have seen, was the New Life Headquarters. Even bolder in its defiance of the Occupation was the Love and Esteem Mutual Benefaction League (Keiai Dqjun Remmei), established in Tokyo in July 1946 by Katsuda Kenichi.1 This group had an unusual history, for it was originally organized in Peking in August 1945, as the North China Japanese Residents* Democratic Party (Zai-Kahoku Nihon Minshu Tö). The party had some 1,300 members and received considerable support from the Nationalist Government before it was repatriated to Japan. Its aims were to establish a coalition with the Chinese Nationalists on the basis of Sun Yat-sen*s san min chu i (three people’s principles) and to carry out a common fight against Communism and for the security and welfare of the Far East. The Love and Esteem Mutual Benefaction League had 280 mem­ bers with a hard core of about 60. It made little effort to truckle to the times and its slogans had a decidedly archaic flavour: (1) we respect the Emperor and love mankind ; (2) we follow the Emperor’s command and do not defy his justice ; (3) human sincerity is our way and human harmony our strength.2In addition, much emphasis was put on the formation of an East Asian anti-Communist league in­ cluding Nationalist China and Korea, but with Japan, in solid pre­ war tradition, playing the leading part. To quote from the League’s manifesto: *. . . it goes without saying that Communist influence must be driven out of our country. But it is also our urgent duty to join hands with the [Chinese] Nationalist forces in order to expel the Communist Army entirely from China.’3 Were it not for the atmosphere of unreality and verbal intoxication in which many of the smaller extremist groups exist, it would be hard to believe that the following plan for an anti-Communist league could have been seriously announced less than two years after Japan’s total defeat: 1 Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, pp. 142-7.

* Ibid. p. 144.

8 Ibid.

The New Right-W ing Groups 99 We 8haU form a federation in which the Japanese nation, utterly cen­ tred on the Emperor, will act as leader of China and Korea. Since olden times we Japanese have been the outstanding people of the Far East in politics, economics and culture and accordingly it seems only natural that in relation to such countries as China and Korea we should occupy the role of leader.1 So far as practical activities were concerned, the League trained Japanese volunteers for service with the Nationalists, with the ob­ jective of making ‘manpower and technical contributions to the anti-Communist camp based on Formosa’.2 In order to expedite these efforts, the League rather unsuccessfully tried to obtain the assistance of men like ex-Lieut.-General Nemoto, who were also interested in recruiting Japanese personnel for service with the Nationalists.3 When it came to actually transporting volunteers to Formosa, the League ran squarely into conflict with Occupation regulations. This, however, did not daunt the leaders, in whose minds, one feels, laws were simply made to be broken : ‘If our activi­ ties go against Occupation policy and violate Japanese laws and regulations, we shall be punished according to these laws. But this is nothing to fear and will certainly not serve to deflect us from the aims on which we have determined from the outset.*4 This rather cavalier attitude to the Occupation did not go unheeded and in February 1947 the League was outlawed. There is evidence, how­ ever, that its activities continued clandestinely well into 1948, though with no practical results.6 Finally, the Japan Leaping-Carp Comrades* Association (Nihon Koitö Döshikai) may be cited as typical of local post-war youth groups with strong militarist leanings.® The Association was organ­ ized on 5 May 1946, with headquarters in a village of Kumamoto Prefecture (Kyüshû), a traditional centre of militarist sentiment. The leader was a young man called Shiozuka Seiya; he and several of the more active members had been wartime students at the Tokyo Officers* Preparatory School, their studies having been rudely broken off by the Occupation. Their aim was to provide an oppor­ tunity for the publication and exchange of views among ‘young men 1 Ibid. p. 146. * Ibid. p. 145. 8 See below, pp. 227-9. 4 Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, p. 146. 5 Ibid. p. 144. • Ibid. pp. 148-9. The image of a carp leaping indomitably up a waterfall is a traditional Japanese symbol of courage and determination in the face of heavy odds ; it is especially associated with the Tango no Sekku (Boys’ Festival) on 5 May, this, incidentally, being the date on which the group was founded.

ioo Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan throughout the nation who bum with desire to reconstruct the Fatherland*.1 The Association published a patriotic newspaper which circulated in almost every prefecture of Japan and this at­ tracted the attention of many young zealots. It also caught the less sympathetic eye of the Occupation and the group was dissolved in March 1947, on the grounds that it was aimed at the ‘perpetuation of militarism and the militarist spirit*.2 Conclusions Of the scores of anti-Communist groups that arose after the war the vast majority, as we have seen, succumbed sooner or later to the Occupation ban. This, of course, constituted the most direct and immediate setback for the organized anti-Communist movement. Far more significant in the long run, however, was the fact that even groups such as the Chrysanthemum Flag Association and the Great Conciliation Party which managed to survive the purge failed utterly in their efforts to win mass support. Although they were often able to establish branches throughout the country, to hold national rallies, and to evolve ambitious frameworks suitable for mass or­ ganizations, their actual membership at all times remained small— and, in the light of their pretensions, ludicrously so. As in the case of similar pre-war bodies, their effective strength tended to be limited to small local groups of zealots, often so inebriated with their own heady ideals and slogans that they were unable to make any objec­ tive appraisal of the society in which they were functioning. On occasion they might succeed in recruiting a few hundred members 1 Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, p. 148. a Ibid. p. 149. Among other post-war ultra-rightist groups arising in the early Occupation period, Professor Kinoshita discusses the following: 1. Kagetsu Youth and Adult Comrades’ Association (Kagetsu Seisönen Döshikai): a Tokyo gang of racketeers using anti-Communist and Imperial slogans; founded in April 1946 as an affiliate of the Japan Anti-Communist League and banned in November 1948. 2. New Japan Youth Party (Shin Nihon Seinen Tö): local anti-Communist youth group in Fukuoka aimed at the violent suppression of the JCP; banned in June 1950. 3. Japan Emperor Party (Nihon Sumer a To) : founded in March 1946 with head­ quarters in Wakayama City (western Japan) and widely scattered branches; it combined chauvinist slogans with virulent anti-Communism and was banned at an early stage. 4. New Japan Justice Party (Shin Nihon Gi Tö): Tokyo anti-Communist organization founded in February 1946; despite its name and highly idealistic slogans, it was an oyabun-kobun group of a criminal-fringe variety, dealing in intimidation, assault, theft, &c. It was banned in August 1950 after being im­ plicated in a dozen incidents of violence.

The New Right- Wing Groups

i oi and sympathizers, but the latter usually remained inactive. Despite the many similarities in conditions between pre-1933 Germany and post-war Japan, there was at no time any indication that the antiCommunist nationalist groups that sprang up in the Occupation Period might themselves lead to a genuine mass movement such as the Fascist and Nazi parties were able to stimulate in Europe. The fact that the Japanese neo-Fascist groups were utterly divided among themselves on grounds of personality, objectives, and methods was one important reason for their failure to provide effective leadership of a mass movement. Yet even this disunity might have been surmounted had there been any sign that the new groups were succeeding in capturing popular fancy.1 This they could never do ; for despite all their efforts to couch their messages in up-to-date fashionable terms, despite all their talk of peace, democracy, anti-feudalism, popular rights, and even socialism, the groups retained a hopelessly anachronistic flavour. Though their names, their leaders, and many of their slogans might be of post­ war vintage, the organizations were associated in most people’s mind with the atmosphere that had led Japan to war, defeat, and her present ruin. So far as winning mass support in the early post-war period was concerned, this was a crippling disadvantage and one, of course, from which the Fascisti and the National-Socialists had not suffered in the days of their rise to power. In their attempt to gain mass following many of the post-war organizations attempted, as we have seen, to exploit popular pre­ judices against Koreans and other minorities. These prejudices, however, were based on the supposed anti-social proclivities of the minorities, rather than on any resentment at their undue economic power or treacherous tendencies and it was quite impossible to whip up popular anti-Korean feeling into anything corresponding to German anti-Semitism. The one issue that might potentially have led to mass support for the new ultra-nationalist groups was that of anti-Communism. By playing on widespread fears of a Com­ munist revolution and especially on popular resentment against Communist labour tactics, which appeared to threaten people’s already precarious living standards, organizations like the Chry­ santhemum Flag Association might, despite their rather antiquarian 1 The connexion between right-wing unity and popular support is discussed in Ch. IX below. I

102 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan flavour, have succeeded in building up at least a limited mass follow­ ing, notably among small shopkeepers and other members of the lower middle class who felt that their position was being undermined by aggressive trade union tactics and who feared that under a Com­ munist régime they would inevitably be assimilated with the work­ ing class socially as well as economically. In this field, however, the Occupation itself, by reversing its original friendly attitude towards the left wing, succeeded effectively, though not deliberately, in stealing the thunder of the new rightist groups. The Yoshida Gov­ ernment, too, as it came to pursue a tough anti-Communist policy and to restrict disruptive trade union activities, made it increasingly difficult for the extreme right wing to convince the public that their groups represented the most effective defence against the JCP. Such of these groups as succeeded in surviving the purge began once again, despite all their ambitions to organize themselves as mass movements from below, to revert to the familiar role of being an auxiliary force in relation to the driving anti-leftist force now repre­ sented by the Occupation and the Japanese Government.1 Thus a group like the Chrysanthemum Flag Association co-operated with the authorities on a local, unofficial level in obtaining information about the Communists active in their area; others like the Japan Anti-Communist League acted as strike-breakers for employers; and in certain cases, as we have seen, ultra-nationalist societies were even reported to have helped the Occupation in gaining material about Communist organizations.2 On the whole, however, the ruling forces in the country felt quite capable of dealing themselves with the extreme left wing, at least for the time being, and showed little inclination to call on the aid of the militant nationalists, which, they clearly saw, would be both un­ necessary and troublesome. Thus the new anti-Communist societies failed not only to build up effective mass following, but to find any alternative for the practical support which the military and the zaibatsu had so often given similar groups in pre-war days. As a result they were without exception plagued with a constant shortage of working funds. This in turn provoked even the more idealistically inclined groups into illegal or semi-illegal activities, which further reduced their chances of gaining popular prestige. It is true that honourable poverty and 1 See below, pp. 191 ff.

1 See above, p. 13 n. 2.

The New Right- Wing Groups

103 total disregard for money have traditionally been important ideals for Japanese ultra-nationalists. Yet, however willing some of the leaders might be to substitute ideological pabulum for more mun­ dane fare, the fact remains that in Japan, as in any other country, it is impossible to run a political organization effectively without a fairly well assured source of income.1 Lacking this, the post-war anti-Communist bodies were constantly beset by budgetary diffi­ culties and for financial reasons obliged to curtail propaganda activities which might otherwise have helped them build up mem­ bership. The many-sided failure of the organized anti-Communist move­ ment in the early post-war period would tend to confirm the view that in Japan, which in her history has never experienced a real middle-class revolution, in which important changes have, in the last analysis, always been imposed from above, and in which nationalists themselves have risen to power by joining, rather than by overthrowing, the ruling forces, ultra-nationalist elements are still severely handicapped in any efforts that they may exert to win the degree of mass support necessary to seize power from below.2 The authoritarian structure of the Japanese state has, it is true, been greatly modified since 1945 and this might be expected to give mass movements a greater chance of success. In the post-war period, however, most of the nationalist causes likely to win mass support were espoused by the left wing, leaving the ultra-rightists with few effective slogans other than anti-Communism to drum up popular enthusiasm—and this last slogan, as we have seen, was by no means their monopoly. It would be unwise to use the analogy of pre-war developments to rule out the possibility that some form of neo-Fascist mass move­ ment may succeed in the future. But for the various reasons that have been suggested, it would appear likely that such success as ultra-nationalists may for the present hope to achieve will continue to depend (as in pre-war days) on whether or not they are able to ally themselves effectively with the existing ruling forces in the country. 1 Professor Fujiwara’s investigations reveal that most of the Chrysanthemum Flag committee members were incurring personal economic loss as a result of their association with the group (‘Nihon Nashionarizumu’, pp. 300-1). On the whole, the poverty of the nationalist groups was in direct proportion to their ideal­ ism ; the readier they were to indulge in violence and criminality, the more solvent they became. 1 Ibid. p. 327.

104 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Many of the groups in question seem to have recognized this, for in the subsequent period, as we shall see, they began to abandon their pseudo-modern slogans and their attempts at mass organization, and to concentrate instead on building up the traditional type of fanatical nationalistic élites and on developing close relations with people in the Government and elsewhere who already commanded political or economic power.

IV. The ‘Reverse Course’ and the Evolution of Post-War Nationalism ‘Reverse Course* The term ‘reverse course* (gyaku-kosu or gyakkösu) did not come into current use until after 1950 and normally refers to the efforts of Japanese ruling groups to turn back the clock and restore traditional patterns in the country’s political, economic, and social life. This counter-reformation, however, started well before 1950 and, by a strange twist of history, it was the Occupation, rather than the Japanese Government, that set it in motion. Opinions differ as to exactly when Occupation policy began to change its course and go into reverse. Some Japanese authorities give i February 1947, the date on which General MacArthur ban­ ned the general strike and began to restrict trade union activity, which the Occupation had hitherto been at such pains to encourage. Another date that is sometimes taken to mark the symbolic turningpoint is October 1947, when it was officially announced that the Emperor would not be prosecuted as a war criminal. A recent American report suggests that the shift in policy may have begun much earlier.1According to this report, the change took place with ‘some speed’ towards the end of 1946, in other words, hardly more than a year after the beginning of the Occupation, and had behind it a double compulsion: (1) to reduce the economic burden of Japan on the United States, (2) to utilize the geographic position and the manpower and industrial potential of Japan as elements in the general policy of checking the Soviet Union. As the report points out, American policy-makers agreed ‘that the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States had reduced the importance of the effort to change Japanese society, and that it was of greater sig­ nificance to rebuild Japan as a useful base for American power and 1 W. Reitzel and others, United States Foreign Policy, 1945-55 (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1956), p. 171.

io6 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan to reduce the strain on American resources*.1 Henceforth, Japan was no longer to be regarded as a potential menace, but as an ally in the cold war, in fact as the very linchpin of American Far Eastern strategy. In discussing the change in American policy Professor Kinoshita refers to the existence in Washington of two main factions with strongly opposing views on Japan, especially with regard to the Em­ peror system. One faction (the ‘Japan Crowd*) led, according to Professor Kinoshita, by ex-Ambassador Grew and State Depart­ ment Counsellor Dooman, was strongly in favour of retaining the Emperor system; the other faction, which included Mr. Owen Lattimore, insisted on a thorough-going reform of the Japanese state and was even in favour of condemning the Emperor to exile.1 2 Although at the outset American policy tended to favour the latter faction and to support a vigorous programme of reform in Japan, the course of events, in particular the intensification of the cold war, swung the balance in the other direction. In a sense paralleling these two factions in Washington, there existed two main schools of thought within the Occupation itself. These, according to Professor Kinoshita, were the conservatives, centred in the G-2 Section of SCAP, and the ‘New-Deal Demo­ crats*, centred in the Government Section. Here again, the reform­ ist faction was paramount in the early part of the Occupation period, but lost place to the conservative group in the second phase.3 It would, of course, be a mistake to attach leading importance to the role of these factions or ‘lobbies* in determining the evo­ lution of Allied conduct towards Japan. Nevertheless the exis­ tence, especially in American circles, of a group that strongly favoured the preservation of conservative patterns in Japan was undoubtedly instrumental in encouraging the swing in Occupation policy. Although fundamental American objectives in Japan may have 1 Ibid. p. 173. Italics are those of the present writer. 2 According to Professor Kinoshita, the Emperor himself was at one stage de­ termined to abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince and to seek refuge in Kyoto; Prince Konoe, firmly dedicated to the retention of the Emperor system, is also said to have seriously considered the abdication of the Emperor and even had the Ninna-ji Temple in the suburbs of Kyoto inspected as an abode for the Emperor after his retirement (Purge Policy, p. 25 n. 2). 3 Kinoshita, ‘Kyüshihaisö no Kaitai to Fukkatsu’, in Nihon Seiji Gakkai, cd., Sengo Nihon no Seiji Katei (Tokyo, 1953), pp. 69-75.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

107

begun to shift less than eighteen months after the Surrender, it was in fact not until 1948 that the focus of the Occupation changed openly from reform to stabilization, from making Japan safe for democracy to building her up as a potential ally and to encouraging the conservative forces and processes considered suitable for this end. The speech given in January 1948 by the United States Secre­ tary of the Army, Mr. Kenneth Royall, in many ways adumbrated the entire new course of the Occupation. In this speech, Mr. Royall said that the changes in the world political situation made it neces­ sary to re-examine policy towards Japan. In the first place, if Japan was to become a dam to stop the tide of totalitarianism in Asia, the original policy of complete demilitarization was unrealis­ tic. Secondly, continued economic decentralization—that is, the break-up of the zaihatsu—would make it more difficult for Japan to stand on her own feet. Finally, Mr. Royall pointed out that many of Japan’s former military and economic leaders were in fact the men who could contribute most to the country’s economic recovery.1 The steady intensification of the cold war, and in particular the Communist victory in China, encouraged the new policy of re­ habilitation in Japan ; and the outbreak of war in Korea added a new urgency to the objective of building Japan up as a partner in the antiCommunist camp. The original Occupation policies that had served both directly and indirectly to attack ultra-nationalist elements and ideals now made way increasingly for a programme of strengthening Japan for the struggle against Communism. For American policy­ makers in Washington and Tokyo the Communist danger had come to outweigh all others, and if in fighting this danger it should prove necessary to encourage elements in Japan which had previously been suppressed as militarist or ‘feudalistic’, that must be regarded as an unfortunate necessity, a casualty, as it were, of the cold war. The Occupation attack on Japanese nationalism did not, it is true, come to an abrupt halt. As late as July 1948, for instance, National Foundation Day, a pre-Surrender focus of nationalist expression, was outlawed at the behest of SCAP, and the purge of nationalist elements continued until the very end of 1951.2 By 1948, however, the main criterion for determining Occupation policy had radically 1 W. MacMahon Ball, Japan; Enemy or Ally (London, 1948), pp. 151-2. 2 See above, p. 10 n. 3.

io8 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan altered and the brunt of the attack was thenceforth directed in a new direction.1 In the economic field, the new policy of rehabilitation was re­ flected first of all in America's decision not to demand war repara­ tion for herself and to persuade the Allies to keep their claims to a minimum. More significant for the revival of pre-war leadership in Japan was the new policy with regard to so-called ‘trust-busting', which had been so popular among liberal elements in the Occupa­ tion. For some time there had been strong opposition on the part of certain groups in the United States to the policy of economic reform with its ‘socialistic' overtones, and conservative circles in Japan had been especially insistent that the policy was in fact ham­ pering recovery. In 1949 General MacArthur announced, with characteristic euphemism, that the programme was ‘completed', and the Japanese Government was ‘authorized' to revise the AntiMonopoly Law which had been given them by the Occupation some three years earlier with such fanfare. The way was now clear for the open regrouping of the old zaibatsu combines and for their return to political influence. In the same year the Dodge programme of economic stabilization came into force. Though its implementation had a salutary effect in checking the rampant inflation that was plaguing the Japanese economy, it did not avoid some of the more unfortunate aspects of deflation, including bankruptcy, non-pay­ ment of wages, and dismissal of workers among medium and smaller enterprises, which in turn added to stresses on the labour front. It was precisely in the field of labour that the new approach of the Occupation was now most conspicuously revealed. General Mac­ Arthur's banning of the general strike in February 1947 had, as Professor Oka points out, been generally regarded as an ad hoc mea­ sure, necessitated by the particular conditions existing at the time.2 It was not until 1948 that the full implications of his move became clear. In banning the nation-wide strike organized in March of that year by the National Communications Workers' Union, MajorGeneral W. F. Marquât, chief of SCAP's Economic and Scientific 1 It was in 1948 that the Government’s Special Investigation Bureau (Tokushinkyoku), which until then had concentrated on the investigation of extreme rightist and militarist elements, and which had played an important part in the early phases of the purge policy, shifted its emphasis to the investigation of the extreme left. * Oka Yoshitake, Outside Pressures on Government in Post War Japan (Tokyo, IPR , 1954)» PP- 6- 8,

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

109 Section, stated that the union’s action ran counter to the spirit of General MaqArthur’s earlier ban and added that any series of syste­ matic or related work stoppages by employees in any industry or industrial group would be regarded as conflicting with the February (1947) strike ban. In a subsequent letter to the Prime Minister, Mr. Ashida, General MacArthur wrote that ‘No person holding a posi­ tion by appointment or employment in the public service of Japan or in any instrumentality thereof should resort to strike or engage in delaying or other dispute tactics which tend to impair the efficiency of governmental operations.’1As a result of this letter the coalition Cabinet in July 1948 promulgated Administrative Ordinance No. 201. This important measure, apart from other restrictive provisions, deprived public servants, who represented over one-third of organ­ ized labour, of their right of collective bargaining and their right to strike.12 Extreme left-wing influence in the trade union movement was the origin of these and other similar measures ; but the new American policy of strengthening Japan’s economy by deflation and wage con­ trol played an increasing part. It is interesting to recall that SCAP itself was by no means unanimous in approving the shift in labour policy. The action to ban collective bargaining by government ser­ vants, for instance, was based on views held by the Government Section, in opposition to those of the Labour Division, and as a re­ sult the head of the Labour Division, Mr. James Killen, and several of his associates resigned ; later Mr. Killen stated that the repressive SCAP measures, far from weakening Communism, would tend rather to drive Japanese workers into its arms; and it might appear that his prophecy was to some extent borne out by the results of the 1949 general elections.3 The reversal of Occupation policy also extended to the political field and was here revealed most strikingly in the new attitude to the purge. In February 1949 the Japanese Government was ‘author­ ized’ to reopen the Purge Appeals Committee, in order to reinstate, as the directive rather remorsefully put it, ‘for gross injustice done 1 Quoted in ibid. p. 8. * In December 1948 employees of the National Railways and various govern­ ment monopolies were removed from the category of ‘public servants’ ; they were nevertheless deprived of the right to strike or engage in other acts of dispute. This was a crucial point in the 1957 strike action by the National Railway employees. 3 Miriam Farley, Aspects ofJapan's Labor Problems (New York, 1950), pp. 191-2.

i io Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan or error committed*.1 Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War about 10,000 people were released from purge restrictions and in the next eighteen months a total of some 201,000 were ‘depurged*.1 2One of the more symbolic steps came in early 1952 when General MacArthur*s successor, General Ridgway, restored to full political rights the members of General Töjö’s wartime Cabinet. It was these measures that made it feasible for the pre-Surrender nationalist and ultra-nationalist leaders to emerge from limbo into the political arena. By 1952, however, a new purge was well under way. This was the so-called ‘red purge*, which began, on General MacArthur*s direc­ tion, at about the same time as the depurge. It was aimed primarily at Communists who had managed to infiltrate themselves into the civil service, trade unions, newspapers, universities, and elsewhere, but in many cases it extended in practice to non-Communists of left-wing persuasion known to be opposed to the Government or the management. Under the Organization Control Ordinance (April 1949) left-wing groups were forced to register with the competent authorities and subjected to official control. The basis of this, in­ terestingly enough, was that they were stated to belong to Category C of the original purge directive, which had referred to ‘ultranationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic societies*.3 By initiating the purge of the left wing on the same basis as that of the extreme right, the shift in Occupation policy was made to appear rather less fundamental. Over 11,000 civil servants were dismissed in 1949 and 1950 under the new ordinance, and about the same number from other walks of life, notably among the ranks of school-teachers. The pre-war practice of police raids on newspaper offices was revived ; 1 The first Purge Appeals Committee was set up by the Government on 3 March 1947 (Imperial Ordinance No. 66), but was closed on 10 May 1948. Appeals continued thereafter, but the full-scale depurge did not start until the committee was reopened on 8 February 1949. 2 By 28 April 1952 (when the Peace Treaty came into effect) only 8,711 people had not been released from purge restrictions. Of these, the largest numbers were career military personnel (5,482), especially ex-members of the kempeitai (3»°39)- Of people purged as belonging to Category C (influential members of ultra-nationalistic societies), 2,860 had been cleared and 521 had not been rein­ stated; in the case of Category D (influential members of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, &c.), 34,325 had been cleared and only 71 remained sub­ ject to restrictions; in Category G (additional militarists and ultra-nationalists), the corresponding figures were 46,068 and 208. Kinoshita, Purge Policy, pp. 32-35, gives detailed charts of the depurge programme. 3 See above, p. 11.

The Evolution o f Post-W ar Nationalism

Ill

radio offices were also purged. Occupation officers toured universi­ ties in 1950 to recommend the dismissal of pro-Communist pro­ fessors—and it is interesting to recall that it was partly because of having indulged before the war in this very activity that the former Prime Minister, Mr. Hatoyama, was purged in the early part of the Occupation. The JCP itself was not outlawed, but various measures were enforced against it piecemeal and, much as in the United States, the legal position of its members became increasingly pre­ carious. Just before the Korean War General MacArthur ‘recom­ mended* that the Government purge the twenty-four members of the Central Committee of the JCP, who thereupon went under­ ground. In his directive of 6 June to the Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, General MacArthur stated that there was a strong simi­ larity between the methods and threats of the pre-war militarists and those of the post-war Communists, thus again indicating that the change in Occupation policy was not as fundamental as it might seem, and that the objective of fostering Japanese democracy re­ mained unaltered : Their [the JCP] coercive methods bear striking parallel to those by which the militaristic leaders of the past deceived and misled the Japan­ ese people, and their aims, if achieved, would surely lead to an even worse disaster. To permit this incitation to lawlessness to continue unchecked, however embryonic it may at present appear, would be to risk ultimate suppression of Japan’s democratic institutions in indirect negation of the purpose and intent of Allied policy pronouncements, forfeiture of her chance for political independence, and destruction of the Japanese race.1 Shortly afterwards, the editors of the Akahata were purged and a later order suspended publication of the paper itself. During the same period the Occupation authorities instituted a thorough purge of left-wing elements in such bodies as the Shinjuku Ward of Tokyo and the Töhö Film Company; in August the Attorney-General’s office ordered the disbandment of the left-wing National Liaison Council of Trade Unions (Zenrören) and purged twelve of its officers. In theory, the official attacks on the extreme left were, no doubt, consistent with the original objectives of the Occupation ; in practice, however, they seemed to represent a diametrical change in 1 Quoted by Oka, Outside Pressures on Government, p. 16. That the failure to check the spread of the JCP might mean the destruction of the Japanese race was a challenging theory, which unfortunately was never elucidated.

112 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan direction and were so regarded by most Japanese both of the left and of the right. The third of the three major Occupation reforms (democratiza­ tion, decentralization, demilitarization) was openly abandoned with the outbreak of war in Korea. The policy of demilitarization, which had been so energetically pursued both by exhortation to the people and by practical measures, now began to change to one of rearma­ ment for Japan. In July 1950 General MacArthur ‘authorized’ the Government to form the so-called National Police Reserve of 75,000 men. This was to be the embryo of the new Japanese army and thereafter Anglo-American policy became one of encouraging a rather reluctant Japan to build up her own forces so that she could provide as much as possible for her own defence. Of the approxi­ mately 120,000 career military personnel released from purge re­ strictions, many officers and n.c.o.’s began to enlist in the new de­ fence forces. Thus from 1948 the Occupation in practice reversed its policy in one important field after another. Finally, in May 1951, General Ridgway authorized the Japanese Government to review and, if necessary, revise all Occupation-sponsored legislation. The circle was almost complete and, in case any doubts remained in the minds of Japanese observers that what had once been black was now white, these were effectively dispelled by Vice-President Nixon when on his visit to Japan he admitted that America had been mistaken in insisting on the ‘no war’ clause in the Constitution.1 Japanese reactions to this reversal tended to be a combination of bewilderment, cynicism, and relief. The conservative forces, hitherto on the defensive, now once more came into their own and began to co-operate wholeheartedly with both the spirit and the letter of the new Occupation policy, the only notable exception be­ ing in the field of rearmament. The gap between American policy­ makers and Japanese conservative circles narrowed steadily from 1948 and the return to Japan of political independence on the com­ ing into force of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in April 1952 made remarkably little difference so far as the main line of Japanese policy was concerned. For in the case of Japan, unlike that of Germany, the 1 For a long time, even after the end of official censorship in October 1948, the Occupation had sharply opposed any open mention in the press or elsewhere of the fact that policy had altered (cf. p. 18 n. 1 above).

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

113 Allied objective had been to enforce policy, in both its reformist and its stabilizing phases, through the existing administrative machinery. And undoubtedly the most important fact in Japanese post-war politics is that the reins of power have remained consistently in con­ servative hands, throughout the Occupation and after. Even in the Katayama Government (May 1947 to March 1948), though the Prime Minister was a Socialist, the majority of the Cabinet mem­ bers and of the Diet were conservative, and the latter were able to block any attempt at a genuine socialist policy. Especially important for the consolidation of conservative power in Japan was the over­ whelming victory of Mr. Yoshida’s Democratic-Liberal Party in the 1949 general elections, following popular disillusionment over the middle-of-the-road policy, attempted by the preceding Katayama and Ashida Cabinets, and also over the Shöwa Denkö scandal, in which the Ashida Government had been involved.1 Mr. Yoshida, notwithstanding his firm opposition to the pre-Surrender militarists was in most respects, it will hardly be denied, a staunch conserva­ tive, whose attitude to a large part of the post-war reforms was one of acquiescence rather than of enthusiasm. From 1945 until the fall of his fourth Government in December 1954 he held power for all but thirteen months and the influence that he exerted on the evolu­ tion of post-war political patterns would be hard to overestimate. Mr. Yoshida was Prime Minister continuously from 1948 until the end of 1954, during the crucial period in which Occupation policy reversed its course and came more and more to coincide with that of the Japanese conservatives themselves, the period in which Japan re-emerged into the world as a politically independent nation firmly committed to the Western camp. In view of the overwhelmingly conservative patterns of political power in Japan, it is hardly sur­ prising that the ‘reverse course’, initiated by the Occupation and carried out in collaboration with Japanese ruling circles, should have been vigorously pursued after the country regained its inde­ pendence and, indeed, that it should have continued until the pre­ sent day. 1 General MacArthur’s statement at the time of this election suggests that the objective of reform was certainly no longer paramount: ‘The people of the free world everywhere can take satisfaction in this enthusiastic and orderly Japanese election, which at this critical moment in Asiatic history, has given a clear and decisive mandate for the conservative philosophy of government* (quoted by Quigley and Turner, The New Japan, p. 97 ; italics those of the present writer).

114 Nationalism and the Bight Wing in Japan From the outset Japanese conservatives had been quick to recog­ nize and respond to the new direction of Occupation policy. They now found themselves in the fortunate position of being able, in direct or indirect compliance with SCAP directives, to implement measures which, in the existing climate of public opinion, they would have hesitated to sponsor on their own initiative for fear of being branded as feudalistic, reactionary, or undemocratic. An important part of these measures involved restricting the power of organized labour and restoring that of industrial-financial groupings. By undoing in one field after another the policies that it had at first pursued with such vigour, the Occupation often encour­ aged the regrouping of the very power-patterns that it had originally tried to destroy. Professor Oka refers, for instance, to the fact that General MacArthur’s letter forbidding dispute tactics by govern­ ment employees led directly to a series of anti-labour measures on the part of the Japanese authorities, including the enactment by various prefectures of ‘public security preservation ordinances*.1 Similarly, the Occupation-sponsored Dodge Plan provided the oc­ casion for the enactment by the third Yoshida Cabinet of the Table of Personnel Organization Law in May 1949. As a consequence of this law, the Cabinet embarked on a personnel reduction programme affecting some 174,000 people in government service, the chief victims being members of the National Government and Public Workers’ Union (Zenkan Ko), which had played a leading part in the post-war labour movement. Private enterprise also took advan­ tage of the Dodge Plan to carry out personnel retrenchment, aimed especially at Communist and other left-wing employees. In the field of the ‘red purge* the SCAP policy, as reflected in the suppression of Akahata (1950), led to similar action on the part of private Japan­ ese employers. Communists and their supporters were, for example, dismissed from the staffs of five leading daily newspapers and also from the Japan Broadcasting Company. This purge of employees, which was carried out with the encouragement of SCAP but in­ creasingly on the initiative of the employers, was extended to the electric-power industry, from which some 2,000 Communists and their sympathizers were dismissed. In the months that followed, similar purges were carried out in other private concerns and also in government agencies, public corporations, local autonomous bodies, 1 Oka, Outside Pressures on Government, pp. 9, 14.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

115 and institutions of learning.1 The result of this was that in large segments of Japanese employment, both public and private, it be­ came impossible for people of known leftist leanings to obtain or keep jobs. So far as the political purge was concerned, the fact that its implementation had rested virtually in the hands of conservative bureaucrats and politicians ensured that the depurge of those who had formerly been designated as ultra-nationalists would be carried out with no less vigour than the new purge of Communist and other left-wing elements. One important effect of the depurge was to permit the open return to power of pre-war leaders in financial and business circles.1 2 Of the many important figures in the business world who were cleared from purge restrictions following 1949 and who returned to positions of influence, one may mention Mr. Mukai Tadaharu of the Mitsui zaibatsu, who became Mr. Yoshida’s economic adviser, fund raiser, and Finance Minister; Mr. Katö Takeo of the Mit­ subishi group, who also became one of Mr. Yoshida’s economic ad­ visers; Mr. Shöriki Matsutarö,3 former President of the Yomiuri newspaper and a director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Associa­ tion; and Mr. Göko Kiyoshi4an important figure in the Mitsubishi zaibatsu and also a director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Associa­ tion, who became Chairman of the Defence Production Com­ mittee of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanreh). This open re-emergence to power of pre-Surrender financial leaders, in conjunction with the revision of the anti-monopoly laws and with the new policy of restricting trade union activities, pro­ duced in the period following 1948 a steady shift in the relative strength of labour and capital in favour of the latter. In the early days of the Occupation the Government had, as we have seen, been obliged to enforce anti-zaibatsu legislation and to permit the un­ restricted development of the labour movement, however unpalat­ able all this may have been to its more conservative members ; now 1 Ibid. p. 16. Most of the ‘red purge’ was carried out by the Government or by the employers on oral instructions from SCAP. In most cases the Occupation authorities informed the Japanese employers of left-wing suspects recom­ mended for purge, but would not give official written instructions for the in­ dividual purges. The suppression of Akahata was a notable exception. 2 Of those purged as belonging to Category E of ‘undesirable personnel’ (officers of financial or development organizations, p. 11 above), all but six had been reinstated by the end of the Occupation. 3 See below, p. 449. 4 See below, pp. 440-1.

116 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan with the reverse in policy it became possible to curb the ‘excesses* of labour and at the same time to reconsolidate the traditionally close relationship of mutual interdependence that had existed between the Government and monopoly capitalism since the early decades of Meiji. Not only were the great industrial combines largely able to recoup themselves from their immediate post-war losses, but be­ cause of the disappearance from the scene (at least temporarily) of the military and certain other foci of conservative strength, they were able to fill the power-vacuum and to exert even greater political influence than they had before the war. The influence of groups like the Federation of Economic Organizations and the Japan Federa­ tion of Employers* Associations (Nikkeiren) became and has re­ mained one of the determining forces in Japanese conservative politics. By their ability to give or withhold the political funds on which the conservative parties so largely depend, especially at elec­ tion time, business interests came to exercise an unprecedented degree of control over the Government, and to play a major part in forming political decisions. The other great bastion of conservative strength in post-war Japan, the bureaucracy, had, as we have seen, been remarkably suc­ cessful in weathering the Occupation storm, the policy of indirect rule having to a large extent been responsible for their retention of power. In order to carry out their programmes the Americans had, though often reluctantly, used the existing bureaucratic apparatus, which had been one of the mainstays of Japan’s traditional régime. The bureaucracy, faced with the necessity of implementing liberal reforms of which it more often than not disapproved, tended in many cases to combine outer compliance with inner resistance.1 By their esprit de corps and their close personal links with Occupation officials they succeeded to a large extent in weathering the purge, which interrupted the careers of so many of their rivals in the ranks of the military or of pre-Surrender politicians. Most of the new political leaders of Japan, including Mr. Shidehara, Mr. Ashida, Mr. Yoshida, and Mr. Shigemitsu, were former government officials 1 The attitude of officials to the different Occupation reforms was very varied. In the case of demilitarization and land reform, for instance, there was little opposition on the part of the bureaucracy. In other important fields, however, such as administrative decentralization, civil service and educational reform, there was considerable resistance, though it could rarely be expressed openly. It is chiefly these reforms that the conservatives sought to undo in the post-1951 period.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

117 rather than professional politicians, and the conservative parties came more and more to depend on them. An increasing number of ex-officials was elected to the Diet, or recruited for party office and high administrative posts ; the overwhelming majority of these men were conservative, and their position in post-war Japanese politics is widely considered to be paramount. With the conservatives firmly in the saddle, ‘reverse course* legislation continued after the resumption of independence on almost every front. Police, education, and local government were all to some extent re-centralized. Anti-monopoly laws were further emasculated. Political activity by school and university teachers was banned. The right to strike was circumscribed in further large segments of employment, and much of the Occupation-sponsored legislation aimed at protecting the rights of labour was revised. A Subversive Activities Prevention Bill, which in left-wing circles was widely compared to the draconian pre-war Peace Preservation Law, was passed a few months after the restoration of sovereignty. On the other hand the conservatives did not have everything their own way. The various anti-conservative forces in the country that had been galvanized into life during the early reformist phase of the Occupation were vocal, organized, and often successful in their opposition to efforts at turning back the clock. In particular the trade union movement continued to exert its considerable political influence against the Government’s ‘reverse course* policy, acting either directly or through its influence on the Socialist Party—an influence which, incidentally, may be considered analogous to that exerted by groups like the Keidanren on the conservative parties. It is of the greatest significance that much of the opposition to the ‘reverse course* programme has taken the form of support for the 1947 Constitution, which, it is claimed, the Government has fre­ quently violated or planned to violate in pursuing its retrograde policies. This was the case, for instance, when the Subversive Activities Prevention Bill was being legislated in July 1952, at the time of the law to curb strike action in the electric industry and the coal mines (August 1953), at the time when legislation was being passed to prevent political activity by school-teachers (June 1954), and also in 1954 when the conservatives, on the initiative of Mr. Ogata Taketora, unsuccessfully attempted to establish a govern­ ment-controlled news agency on pre-Surrender lines. Charges that K

118 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan the conservatives were infringing the Constitution have been most vociferous in the case of Communist, Socialist, and labour attacks on the Government’s efforts to promote limited rearmament. Al­ though in June 1954 the Government succeeded in passing the SelfDefence Forces Bill, setting up a Defence Agency and providing the legal basis for armed forces to defend the country against direct as well as indirect aggression, the build-up of armed forces adequate for Japan’s defence has from the outset been hampered both practi­ cally and psychologically by the Opposition’s appeals to Clause 2 of Article IX.1On the whole the conservative elements in the country have certainly not been averse to considerably increased rearma­ ment within the limits of Japan’s economic capacity. Not only do they themselves feel this to be essential to protect Japan from the Communist danger, both external and internal, but the Government has been constantly pressed by the Americans to provide the forces necessary for Japan’s own defence and for Western security plans in the Far East. Popular opposition on political, economic, and emotional grounds has, however, continued to be widespread and vocal, and the conservatives have not been sufficiently strong to ignore such opposition. Leaving aside the moot question of whether or not the present extent of Japanese rearmament is compatible with the provisions of Article IX, it is generally recognized that any con­ siderable increase in the strength of the armed forces, such as is advocated by the Americans and considered necessary by many influential Japanese, would necessitate some form of conscription, which in turn would require constitutional revision. Such revision would be even more necessary if Japan is to be legally permitted to dispatch troops overseas, either as part of United States security plans in the Far East, or for independent purposes. The need for constitutional revision was voiced with increasing emphasis by conservatives, both within and outside the Govern­ ment, ever since Japan regained her independence, and this indeed became the main long-term issue dividing the conservative elements 1 . land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be main­ tained*. In view of the almost religious fervour with which the Communists have, for reasons of their own, chosen to defend Art. IX of the Constitution, it is inter­ esting to recall that in 1946, when the draft Constitution was being deliberated in the Diet, the strongest critic of the clauses renouncing resort to force and war was none other than the Communist leader, Mr. Nozaka, who insisted that 'war for self-defence may be said to be a right war’ (Quigley and Turner, The Nezu Japan, p. 137).

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

119

in the country from the non-conservatives.1 In June 1956 Mr. Hatoyama, the Prime Minister, finally succeeded in having the Diet pass the Constitution Research Council Law, a much-cherished measure of his which was to be the first step towards a thorough revision of the new Constitution; and efforts to prepare the way for such revision were resumed with added vigour under Mr. Kishi*s premiership through the Constitution Research Council, which held its first meeting in August 1957. The impetus for these efforts lies only partly in the feeling that Japanese rearmament must be placed on a sounder constitutional basis. In a wider sense the conservative belief in constitutional re­ vision can be considered an ideological concomitant of the various practical steps that have been considered earlier to restore tradition­ al patterns in Japan. The aims of the revisionists, though they vary in detail, all point in the same general direction—backwards. The Hirose Plan incorporates the main objectives openly advanced by conservatives since Japan regained her independence.2 According to this plan, the status of the Emperor would be raised and instead of being ‘symbol of the state and of the unity of the people*, he would be given the character of sovereign as ‘chief of the Japanese state, representing the Japanese nation*.3 While such a change would probably not result directly in any practical increase in the actual powers of the Emperor or of people acting in his name, it would clearly involve a symbolic step back to the pre-war pattern, and as such it is most resolutely opposed by the Socialists and their sympathizers. Regarding the fundamental rights of the people, the Hirose Plan involves a certain change in emphasis from the new Constitution, as indicated, for instance, in the ruling that the people would have the ‘duty to obey the regulations of the law under certain conditions*. Official support for the traditional family sys­ tem is a further objective of most of the revisionists; the Hirose Plan, for instance, defines the home as a group of persons living to1 The Socialists in the Diet have been adamant in their refusal to participate in preliminary discussions with the Liberal-Democrats concerning the possibility of even limited revision, and have refused to occupy the io seats reserved for them on the 50-man Constitution Research Council. The Socialist Party has instead set up a special committee to protect the Constitution, and is acting in conjunction with the People’s Federation for the Preservation of the Constitution. * Plan announced in April 1957 by Mr. Hirose Hisatada of the Upper House Ryokufükai (Party) (Asahi Shimbun, 2 May 1957). * Cf. the corresponding provision of the Meiji Constitution : ‘the Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty..

120 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan gether on a basis of marriage or blood relationship, which the state would have the obligation to protect. Concerning rearmament, the plan would allow the state to hold ‘war potential* for waging a ‘de­ fensive war*. Few of these changes, it is true, are very startling from a practical standpoint; and on the whole, the concrete amendments proposed by conservative revisionists are more moderate than one might expect from their sweeping denunciations of the ‘foreign* Constitution. In many cases it would seem that the fact of revision, with its symbolic connotations, is more important for them than the actual content of the amendments. For the conservatives to Secure revision of the Constitution, the Government must obtain a two-thirds majority in the Diet and a majority of popular votes at a special referendum. The conserva­ tives are still far from commanding the necessary parliamentary strength and a poll in 1957 indicated that only 28 per cent, of the people were in favour of rewriting the Constitution.1 Evolution of Post-War Nationalism The anti-revisionist forces in the country have from the outset militated against attacks on the 1947 Constitution and against all 1 The figure of 28 per cent, is given in the results of the public-opinion poll conducted by the Cabinet Secretariat Council in September 1957. It represents a 4 per cent, rise in support since the previous survey conducted 6 months earlier. Similarly, those opposed to revision dropped from 24 to 19 per cent. Of those advocating revision, 13 per cent, said that it was necessary to legalize rearmament, while 12 per cent, said that the Constitution must be rewritten since it had been forced on Japan by the United States. The biggest single reason (14 per cent.) for opposing revision was that it would lead to heavy rearmament. For the purpose of these public opinion tests, which were carried out by the Government to find out the trend of feeling on constitutional revision, 20,000 men and women were polled in widely separated parts of the country {Japan Times, 23 Apr. and 28 Sept. 1957). It is noteworthy that in many cases opinions on this crucial question of con­ stitutional revision cut across party affiliations. In the September 1957 poll, for instance, we find that among declared supporters of the conservative party onethird opposed revision and one-quarter answered D K ; conversely, one-fifth of the Socialist supporters favoured revision and one-sixth answered DK. Conserva­ tive opposition to revision can mainly be explained by the fact that many of the people who vote conservative have over a period of ten years come to feel that the 1947 Constitution guarantees their improved patterns of consumption and enjoy­ ment and that even a small change in the status quo, as symbolized by this Con­ stitution, may bring about the collapse of the entire post-war democratic struc­ ture under which they have benefited. Such feelings would be especially strong among the younger generation and among women. Here we have one of several cases in which conservative feeling is at odds with the official conservative pro­ gramme. In the July 1956 Upper House elections the Socialists and other anti-revision­ ists secured over one-third of the seats and it was therefore impossible for the Government to submit a successful motion for revision until 1959.

The Evolution o f Post- W ar Nationalism

121

other aspects of the ‘reverse course* as representing efforts on the part of the conservatives to undo the post-war democratic reforms and to restore, at least partially, the status quo ante helium in par­ ticular they have opposed large-scale rearmament, on the grounds that, far from protecting Japan, it will bring her into the forefront of any future war. Democracy, freedom, people’s rights, anti-militar­ ism, anti-feudalism, however feeble their roots may be, remain nevertheless potent counters in the country at large, especially among the younger generation, and in the main it is the anti-con­ servative forces that can most effectively exploit them. What sentiments, then, have the conservatives been able to use in their efforts to win and consolidate popular support? On the whole it may be said that the conservative appeal has been to a type of latent nostalgia for the security of traditional ways and, in general, to post-war Japanese nationalism, of which this nostalgia is, as we shall see, an important ingredient. A typical example of continuing conservative efforts to exploit these sentiments has been their sponsorship of a bill to revive National Foundation Day, a holiday which would tend to have nostalgic connotations for all except the younger generation, and which also is a symbol of a certain type of national pride.2Again, in attempting to secure the people’s support 1 The outside observer is bound to be struck by the extreme sensitivity of anti­ conservative elements in Japan regarding anything that smacks vaguely of an effort to revive pre-war patterns, even when such efforts would appear to be of a quite innocuous or non-political nature. For instance, the decision in 1957 of the Ministry of Education to institute a national system to rate the efficiency of school­ teachers was violently attacked by the Japan Teachers’ Union on the grounds that it resembled tactics used by the pre-Surrender thought police and would eventu­ ally result in restricting freedom of thought among teachers. The teachers an­ nounced that they would fight the measure to the end and staged large-scale demonstrations and strikes. In most cases, this form of sensitivity is not simply the result of left-wing propaganda ; genuine fear that the conservatives will, if given the chance, again indulge in the pre-war type of repression is an important factor. a The bill passed the Lower House of the Diet in May 1957. It is interesting to note that even its conservative proponents did not claim that the date, 11 Feb­ ruary, had any historical validity. The organized movement to revive the Kigensetsu holiday started in 1953 and has been one of the most popular symbolic causes among right-wing nationalists. Each year on 11 February the National Foundation Day Celebration Association (Kigensetsu Höshuku Kai), headed by Mr. Kimura Tokutaro, the former Director-General of the National Defence Agency, has staged parades, festivals, and rallies calling for a revival of the holi­ day. By recently giving their official support to this movement the conservatives have to a certain degree taken the wind out of the sails of the professional patriots. The proposal to revive National Foundation Day appears to be gaining increased popular support and this in itself can no doubt be viewed as a manifestation of the growth of a nostalgic form of nationalism. A poll taken by the Cultural Research Institute of the Japan Broadcasting Company in January 1954 gives 85-5 per

122 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan for revision of the Constitution, it is primarily to nationalist feeling that the conservatives have directed their appeal. The popular argu­ ments for revision rest not so much on the need to provide a solid legal foundation for Japanese rearmament or to ‘clarify’ the status of the Emperor, but on the contention that the 1947 Constitution is a foreign-written and foreign-imposed document, whose retention as the basic law of the land implies a form of national humiliation.1 Similarly, much of the ‘reverse course* legislation that conserva­ tive Governments have sponsored in the years following indepen­ dence has been justified on the grounds that it involves revising laws imposed by a foreign power and hence basically unsuited to Japan. As early as 1952 Mr. Yoshida, for all his strongly pro-American proclivities, announced that one of the immediate tasks of the nation was ‘to rectify the mistakes of the Occupation*, and in the following years the phrase ‘correcting the excesses of the Occupation* (senryö seisaku no yukisugi wo zesei suru) became a veritable cliché in con­ servative circles. Thus increasingly conservative Japanese Governments have sought to utilize nationalist sentiment in order at least partially to restore the traditional patterns that were disrupted in the early Occupation period. In this they have been aided by the fact that, mainly owing to world conditions, American policy towards Japan changed so soon after the end of the war and before many of the cent, of the people as being in favour of reviving the holiday and 6 per cent, opposed. A similar poll taken in February of the following year resulted in 87*4 per cent, and 4 •5 per cent, respectively (Fuji, Nov. 1957). On the other hand most well-known scholars, notably historians and archaeologists, are opposed to the revival of the Kigensetsu holiday. Among them is the Emperor’s brother, Prince Mikasa, who in an open letter written in January 1958 at the time of the annual clamour for restoring the holiday stated that the revival would seriously impair the systematic study of Japan’s ancient chronicles (Japan Times, 3 Feb. 1958). For this he was vitriolically attacked by right-wing extremists and special police guards had to be assigned to protect his person. Several historians have also emphasized that by sponsoring the revival of Kigensetsu the conservatives are attempting to exploit nostalgic sentiments among older people. According to Dr. Wakamori Taro, ‘those who allegedly support the plan are composed of the older generation which has a deep nostalgia for the “good old days” . Such a sentiment should not be utilized for political purposes.’ Another historian, Professor Haga Köshirö, writes that the memory of the Kigensetsu holiday ‘stirs old people to long for the good old days. There is every indication that such a feeling is being utilized as a political tool’ (Asahi Evening News, 8 Feb. 1958). The Socialist Party has taken a particularly strong stand against the proposed revival of Kigensetsu, on the grounds that it cannot be dissociated from militaristic imperialism and that the conservative efforts at restoring the holiday represent a reactionary attempt to resuscitate nationalism of the pre-war type (Japan Times, 8 Feb. 1958). 1 e.g. Mr. Kiyose’s remark quoted above, pp. 20-21.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

123 democratic reforms had a chance to take root. Much as the reformist elements in the country might, after their initial enthusiasm had turned into disillusionment, condemn the Occupation as a reaction­ ary force and the conservative political leaders as puppets in the hands of the Americans, these elements were in most cases only able to slow down, not to block, the new trend. In the years following 1948 it became clear that a large part of the reforms instituted in Japan under foreign pressure lacked solid domestic props ; when the nature of the foreign pressure changed, such reforms were bound to atrophy or to be undone. Popular as the liberal-democratic ideals and changes had been in the immediate post-war period, they had on the whole never become sufficiently imbedded in the minds and lives of the people to replace traditional nationalist sentiments. The latter, having for a time disappeared from the surface, began to reemerge at about the time of the Korean War. From then on, there was a steady increase in nationalist feelings among the people. While the conservative leaders of the country have done much to encour­ age, and in certain cases to mobilize, these feelings as part of the ‘re­ verse course* trend, they certainly did not provide the motives for the reappearance of popular nationalism. What, then, were the main motivating factors? In the first place, there was a perfectly natural and spontaneous reaction to the initial post-war fascination for all foreign commodities, whether of a material or an ideological nature. The predilection for novelty—in particular foreign-style novelty—has emerged so often and with such force in the course of Japanese history as to justify our viewing it as a national trait.1But no less characteristic are the periods of re­ action, following those of wholesale importation, when the more conservative elements in the country have been able to reassert themselves and to uphold the value of time-honoured Japanese ways in politics, social organization, art, and daily living habits, as against new-fangled foreign fashions. Such a period started during the latter half of the Occupation, and by and large it may be said that it con­ tinues today. This form of conservative nationalism stressed the 1 Even in the Heian Period, a millennium ago, the word imamekashi (up to date, new-fangled) was a term of the highest praise. ‘The Japanese of all classes and at all times seem to have had a strong taste for novelty, from the Nara period when they adopted most ardently the T ’ang fashions, through the Heian period when the last word of praise was imameku, “to have a modem air” ’ (Sansom, Japan, P- 346 ).

124 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan need to reintroduce typically Japanese patterns that had been dis­ rupted immediately after the war, and it was especially marked in rural and provincial districts. These are the areas where people have tended to view with a certain distaste the Westernization of urban life, which in some ways they have felt to be connected with the ‘unpatriotic’ attitude of unionized workers, the ‘egoism* of the younger generation and, in fact, with the entire distasteful pattern of violating the established order of things. It is here, also, that the traditional family system, with its respect for status and hierarchic authority, has undergone least change, and that conservative Governments have continued to base their main institutional strength. One of the effects of this reaction that is bound to strike foreign residents, especially those who were in Japan also during the Occu­ pation period, is a limited growth of anti-foreign feeling during recent years. To some extent, this is a by-product of the left-wing political campaign against the West in general and the Americans in particular. The mild xenophobia that has manifested itself in some quarters since about 1953 is not, however, limited to left-wing antiAmericanism. It is, for instance, not particularly left-wing papers that so frequently give prominence (out of all proportion to their im­ portance) to misdemeanours and crimes committed by foreigners in Japan; nor are the reports that lists of ‘delinquent aliens* (furyö gaijin) are being prepared by the Ministry of Justice with a view to deportation the result of anti-American propaganda; nor, finally, are the numerous bars, cafés, and dance-halls that rigidly exclude foreign customers usually owned or patronized by people of pro­ nounced left-wing sympathy. These and similar phenomena can only be fully understood as part of a general nationalist reaction to the early post-war phase of infatuation with all things foreign, and of adulation for foreigners. To exclude an English visitor from enter­ ing a bar (even, as so often happens, a very Westernized bar) is one way of asserting national pride and of proving to oneself and others that the days of open-eyed enthusiasm for foreigners are past. Anti-foreign feeling, then, is part of the general swing of the pendulum.1 1 The extent of this anti-foreign feeling must not be exaggerated, as has been done by some observers (e.g. as reported in the Asahi Evening Netcs of 7 Feb. 1958). On the other hand it cannot be entirely discounted, although few Japanese would openly admit its existence. Proprietors of bars and other establishments

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

125

No less important, however, in stimulating the revival of nation­ alist feeling in Japan have been world conditions, in particular the intensification of the conflict between the Western and the Com­ munist camps. As Professor Kinoshita points out, the Americans and the Russians have each in their own way acted to encourage Japanese nationalism.*1 The Americans, by stressing the Com­ munist menace to Japan, have contributed to right-wing nationalist elements with their traditional anti-Communist and anti-Russian proclivities. Especially after the outbreak of the Korean War the Occupation, by stressing the urgency of fighting leftist subversion at home and of rearming the nation to meet the threat of Communist aggression from abroad, greatly strengthened the conservative nationalist forces within the Government and the country at large. Furthermore the fact that the Western powers attached such ob­ vious importance to building up Japan as an ally in the anti-Communist camp was a potent salve to lacerated nationalist feelings. Once again Japan counted in the scheme of things. While even the most ardent nationalist could no longer think of Japan as one of the top-ranking powers, and while hopes of independent military action were dim indeed, the country was clearly becoming a crucial ele­ ment in the Far Eastern balance of power, and this at least was something on which nationalist sentiment might build. The left-wing forces both within and outside Japan have been no less instrumental in stirring up and exploiting nationalist sentiment in the country. Although, as we have seen, the Occupation avoided to a remarkable extent stimulating feelings of national or racial humiliation in Japan, the simple fact that the country lay under open foreign control for almost seven years could not but arouse a certain measure of nationalist resentment and, as the years progressed, ex­ asperation.2 Since the Occupation was by and large an American affair, and since after 1947 the extreme left wing throughout the that exclude foreigners frequently justify their action on the grounds of language difficulties or by saying that foreigners do not understand the Japanese way of computing bills. These, as a rule, are excuses, not reasons ; the establishments that turn away foreigners do not usually make any exception for Japanese-speaking foreigners, and most foreigners who visit Japanese bars and other places of entertainment are prepared to be heavily charged for the privilege. 1 Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, pp. 152-3. 1 According to Professor Brown, the American troops used for Occupation duty in the later years were on the whole less disciplined and much rougher in their treatment of the Japanese than the wartime veterans who had been in the country during the immediate post-war years (Nationalism in Japan, p. 274).

126 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan world had come to regard the United States as their principal ad­ versary, it is natural that the Communists, Socialists, and their allies should have made the fullest use of this brand of nationalist feeling. In particular, with the shift after 1947 in Occupation policy to­ wards the labour movement, the Communists and their sympathiz­ ers began to appeal to nationalist sentiment among the workers with the slogan of a ‘democratic national front*. In pre-war years restric­ tions on the labour movement had normally been carried out as part of the nationalist effort to build up the country’s strength by sub­ merging ‘selfish* demands and concentrating on the glory of Greater Japan. In the present context, however, it became possible for the left wing to associate resistance to the Government’s anti-labour policy with an assertion of national pride and independence. At first, as Professor Maruyama points out, the Communists did not em­ phasize the anti-American aspect in their slogans and demonstra­ tions, but as time passed and the confrontation between left and right grew intense, this aspect became more specific.1This in turn stiffened the attitude of the Occupation towards labour, and led to a vicious circle in which the increasingly anti-American attitude of the Communist-influenced labour groups made GHQ still more hostile and severe in its treatment of disruptive left-wing elements in the trade union movement. This culminated in the explosive inci­ dents during the 30 May (Memorial Day) 1950 labour demonstra­ tion on the Imperial Palace Plaza, when various Communist-inspir­ ed groups rallied in commemoration of their fight against the pre­ war Peace Preservation Law. On this occasion some of the partici­ pating labourers and students attacked American military person­ nel. This clash, which led directly to General MacArthur’s purging the JCP Central Committee members, was by far the most con­ spicuous example of the political exploitation of nationalist feeling since the Surrender. That it should have come from the left rather than from the traditional right-wing exponents of Japanese nation­ alism confirms that the latter is a force which can be harnessed by organized groups whatever their political complexion may be.2 1 Maruyama, Nationalism, p. 17. 2 For a further illustration of this crucial point concerning Japanese nationalism we may refer to Professor Dore’s analysis of speeches made by candidates of different parties during the 1935 general elections. A study of the frequency per candidate of the use of certain key words indicates that those with a nationalist flavour are on the whole used more frequently by left-wing than by conservative candidates. (Figures given are percentages.) [Cont. on p. 127

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

127

Apart from the Communists* exploitation of post-war national­ ism to stir up anti-Americanism in Japan, the widespread confusion and cynicism that followed the evident reversal of Occupation policy served itself to stimulate a type of nationalist sentiment. Many of the ideals that the Americans had so piously proclaimed in the early period appeared to be abandoned in later years for reasons of expediency, and this inevitably led to a certain disillusionment over the ways of the West, especially among those Japanese who had enthusiastically responded to the initial liberal aspect of the Oc­ cupation. In the matter of rearmament, for instance, the Americans spent a vast amount of time and effort teaching the Japanese about the iniquity and ultimate folly of arms and militarism; then after 1950 they switched to chiding them for ‘dragging their feet* in re­ arming for the common defence against Communism. In certain cases this led to a bitter disenchantment with the United States and resentment that Japan should continue to be dependent on a country that was clearly using her for purely selfish ends in manipu­ lating the balance of power; in other cases people came to feel that, for all the fine words in the Constitution and for all the fond hopes of Japan’s becoming a ‘Switzerland of the Far East*, national arma­ ments still constituted the ultimate sanction in the world as it existed and that if Japan was to survive, she must not depend on the promises or ideals mouthed by foreign powers but on her own national strength. Thus the intensification of the cold war served directly and in­ directly to stimulate dormant nationalist feelings both on the right and on the left. The polarization of Japanese politics, as reflected in the results of the 1949 general elections, is to some extent a reflection of this trend. In these elections many people who had previously voted for middle parties, the Democrats and the Socialists, swung their support, either to the staunch conservatism of Mr. Yoshida, who would, they felt, take a strong stand, in co-operation with the United States, in protecting the nation against leftist subversion at ‘Japan’: Liberals 2*6, Democrats 2*5, Right-wing Socalists 2-8, Left-wing Socialists 3*8, Communists 4*9. ‘Independence’: 0-9, 1*4, i * i , 1*3, 3*7. ‘Race’ (minzoku): 0*3, 0^3, 0-2, 0*2, 1• 1. ‘Fatherland’ (sokoku) provides an exception, though even in this case the Com­ munists use the word as frequently as the conservatives: Liberals o- 5, Democrats o •2, Right-wing Socialists o •2, Left-wing Socialists, o •2, Communists o •4 (R. P. Dore, ‘Japanese Election Candidates in 1955*, Pacific Affairs, June 1956, p. 175).

128 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan home and Communist aggression from abroad, or to the Com­ munists, who, by their resolute opposition to American domination, posed as the true repositories of Japanese nationalism. The Korean War intensified the confrontation between the left and the right in Japan. Again both sides directed their appeal to nationalist sentiment. The conservatives could point to near-by Communist aggression and give warning that the same fate might easily befall Japan if she did not look to her defences, curb unpatrio­ tic leftist activities at home, and restore the national virtues that had been vitiated during the past years. The left wing, for their part, claimed that the country was being used by the Americans as a base for their military operations, in flagrant violation of the people’s wishes, and that, were it not for the vigilance of the ‘progressive* forces, the Japanese might well be forced into the war—and that, not for their own advantage, but in the humiliating role of colonial mercenaries. The coming into force of the Peace Treaty in April 1952 did not alter the left-wing line of appeal to nationalist sentiment. According to the Opposition, Japan’s newly-gained independence had been hopelessly emasculated, both on the domestic front because of the Administrative Agreement, which permitted the indefinite station­ ing of foreign troops in the country and even a limited revival of extraterritorial privileges, and in the foreign field, where Japan was firmly tied to American policy, having, for instance, been obliged against her best interests to recognize the Formosan Government instead of Peking. Typical of the left-wing appeals to Japanese nationalism after the San Francisco Peace Treaty was the following statement in the JCP organ, Zenei (‘Vanguard’): ‘We 80,000,000 Japanese do not want to become slaves of a foreign country. Our national land has been covered by a network of military bases. Our industries and lives have been destroyed. And our national pride has been completely trampled on. . ,n Left-wing nationalism of this type was further encouraged by Stalin’s New Year message to the Japanese people (1952), in which he wished them success in winning ‘complete independence*.2 1 Quoted by Brown, Nationalism in Japan, pp. 262-3. 2 This pious hope concerning ‘real’ Japanese independence is voiced periodic­ ally by Russian leaders. For instance, in an interview with a Japanese newspaper editor in June 1957, just prior to Prime Minister Kishi’s visit to America, Mr. Khrushchev said : ‘But Mr. Kishi is not going to negotiate as an equal at all. The

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

129 It was only three days after the official restoration of Japanese in­ dependence that the Communists and their sympathizers (including large numbers of students) organized violent attacks on American lives and property. This was the most tumultuous May Day demon­ stration since the Surrender. Although no fatal casualties occurred on this occasion, the violence of the outbreak disappointed many observers who had hoped that Japan’s official resumption of inde­ pendence would serve to mitigate anti-Western sentiment. In the following years the left wing pursued their efforts to arouse antiAmerican nationalism by numerous campaigns directed against the United States military bases in Japan. Among the series of anti­ base ‘incidents’ which they have continued to utilize until the pre­ sent day have been the Asama-yama Base demonstrations (1953), the Mount Fuji Base demonstrations (1955), Uchinada firing-range (1952-7), the Sunakawa air-base demonstrations (1952-8), and the Girard Incident (1957). The Socialists in their attacks on the Government have made the fullest possible use of nationalist resentment at the continued pre­ sence of foreign bases in the country. Thus in a resolution issued prior to Mr. Kishi’s visit to Washington as Prime Minister (June 1957) they referred to the existence of over 500 American military bases in Japan, comprising a total area of some 3 million acres, and to further American efforts to expand these bases. ‘As a result’, they said, ‘our independence is curtailed and our peace and security menaced.*1According to the resolution, all this was due to the fact that Japan had signed a ‘series of unequal treaties’, namely the United States-Japan Security Treaty, the Administrative Agree­ ment, and the M.S.A. Agreement. The solution for the Socialist nationalists is simple : The U.S.-Japan Security Pact must be rescinded and in the place of such military alliances as this and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, there ought to be a new nonaggression, collective security, peace system in the Far East. Thus, we demand that Prime Minister Kishi conclude with the U.S. authorities a rescission of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty*1 relationship between Japan and the United States is not that of equals. But the people of Japan will endeavour to acquire real, not a false, sovereignty. We hope that Japan will gain true sovereignty as soon as possible.. .' (Asahi Evening News, 11 July 1957). Music to the ears of the Japanese left wing, which, on the whole, remained impervious to the lessons of the Hungarian revolt. Q u o te d by Murata Kiyoaki, ‘A People's Rally', Japan Times, 15 June 1957.

130 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan . . . [and] promptly restore relations with the People’s Government of China from a self-reliant position. This form of anti-Americanism had been particularly embarrass­ ing for Japan’s conservative leaders, who have found themselves caught between their belief in the necessity of a strong alliance with the United States and the realization that in pursuing this alliance they risk allowing their opponents to assume the role, which they covet for themselves, of being the principal champions of Japanese nationalism. It is interesting that in more recent cases the Govern­ ment has appeared willing to risk a certain tension in relation with the United States, rather than allow the left wing to direct the nationalist protest. In the Girard Incident, for instance, the con­ servatives succeeded to a certain extent in stealing the thunder of the left by themselves taking the lead in protesting against alleged American efforts to violate Japanese sovereignty.1 The effects on Japanese nationalism of increasing world tension were by no means limited to a concentration of sentiment into antiCommunism on the one side and anti-Americanism on the other. No less significant was the desire felt by a growing number of Japanese that their country should be tied to neither of the two power-blocs, but should instead pursue an independent course dictated purely by national interests. Sometimes, notably in the cases of non-Communist intellectuals and of Socialists, this has in­ volved the belief that Japan should work for world peace by refusing to be associated with either side in the cold war and should join the third group of countries, at present informally led by India, which seek to form a bridge between East and West. Following the Ban­ dung Conference this type of ‘third force* thinking stressed that Japan must belong in spirit, as well as in theory, to the Asian1 The Girard Incident involved the deliberate shooting by an American soldier (William S. Girard) of a Japanese woman at Sömagahara firing-range on 30 Janu­ ary 1957. The killing created a nationalist furore in Japan, and the Socialists and Communists lost no time in taking advantage of this to drum up anti-American feeling. The failure of the American authorities to hand the soldier over promptly to the Japanese authorities for trial added further to the feeling of national affront. The Japanese authorities, who hitherto had been careful to avoid stimulating bitter feelings in cases of this kind, on this occasion gave warning that the inci­ dent might ‘worsen Japan-United States relations considerably’, and a Foreign Ministry official voiced ‘great concern* over the repercussions on Japanese national opinion. The protest against hydrogen-bomb experiments also revealed a considerable element of anti-Western nationalism. Here again the conservative Government, by taking a fairly strong stand in protesting against the tests, pre­ vented the left wing from monopolizing the issue for their own ends.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

131

African group of countries and that this would be possible only by reducing the military and other ties with America, ties which have tended to isolate the Japanese politically, economically, and psycho­ logically from most of the other Asian peoples. Interestingly enough in the context of nationalism the suggestion is often implied that if Japan were to join the ‘third force* group, she would, because of her superior economic organization and standard of living, in due course win the position of leadership from India. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, the neutralist position of the advocates of a ‘third force*, whose main suspicion was now directed at alleged American attempts to embroil Japan in the fighting, often made them indistinguishable from the extreme left wing. Again, especially after Bandung, the concerted efforts of this group to encourage immediate restoration of relations with Com­ munist China in direct opposition to United States policy have laid them open to suspicion in American circles. The Communists have, of course, made full use of any group that would tend to weaken Japan’s ties with the Western powers and to increase those with the Communist mainland. Nevertheless it would be an extreme over­ simplification to identify ‘third force* sentiment in Japan with ‘fellow-travelling*. It is a form of post-war nationalist sentiment which under other circumstances could just as well have emerged under a left-wing Government and in opposition to a pro-Russian policy. Another form of neutralism—and one that can hardly be con­ fused with any expression of lingering pro-Communist feelings— was that voiced by men like ex-Colonel Tsuji,1 who insisted that Japan must hold utterly aloof from both America and Russia. Ac­ cording to a secret address given by Tsuji as early as March 1951, Japanese intelligence reports showed that the United States was likely to lose in the forthcoming war with Russia (the outbreak of the Third World War being, for this follower of Lieut.-General Ishiwara, merely a matter of time); Japan should therefore become strong and neutral, so that she could avoid being engulfed in the holocaust which otherwise would totally destroy her. Although Tsuji has insisted that Japan must become independent of the United States, he expects the Americans to equip large-scale Japan­ ese forces before withdrawing their own troops. His particular 1 See below, pp. 450-1.

132 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan brand of neutralism is combined with insistence on the need for total rearmament, and it is this which has cut him off from the main stream of the post-war Ishiwara movement, especially as expressed in the anti-rearmament stand of the Harmony Party.1 That exColonel Tsuji's belief in a strong, neutral Japan found a popular response in the post-Occupation period, may be judged from the heavy majority by which he was elected to the Diet in October 1952, and by his success in subsequent elections. One important aspect of Tsuji's outlook that is common to his form of nationalism is a stress on the need for co-operation between all Asian peoples. This again belongs to the tradition of Ishiwara's East Asia League ideals and involves the feeling that Japan's destiny lies neither with Russia nor with America, who merely wish to exploit Japan in their respective ways, but with the other coun­ tries of the Asian continent. The cry ‘Asian must not fight Asian' has, significantly enough, been equally popular with the extreme right and the extreme left, especially after the outbreak of the Kor­ ean War. Concerning relations with China, the pan-Asianists tend to feel that despite the existence of a Communist regime on the mainland, full Sino-Japanese understanding and co-operation would be possible if only the two countries were left alone by nonAsian foreigners. In a most interesting way the strongly antiAmerican nationalism of the Japanese left wing and the traditional anti-Russian nationalism of the extreme right tend to find common ground in this feeling that the countries of Asia must achieve com­ plete independence from the West and work together for their own national interests. That Japan would become the main partner in any pan-Asian alliance is implied, though usually not stated, by right-wing advocates of neutralism, and in this way they are able to appeal to traditional nationalist sentiment in a way that is impossible for people of the extreme left, who inevitably look to Communist China for leadership. Special Characteristics of Post-War Nationalism Having suggested the general context in which Japanese nation­ alism re-emerged during the ‘reverse course' period, and especially the effects of international tension in stimulating various forms of nationalist feeling, we may now examine some of the special 1 See below, pp. 179-80.

133 characteristics of this new nationalism as it has developed until the present time.1One of the main features that distinguish it from preSurrender nationalism is, to use Professor Maruyama’s term, that it has been primarily for home consumption rather than for export. In view of Japan’s international situation in the post-war period, the expansive or proselytizing form of nationalist aspiration, which had culminated in the ‘eight corners of the world under one roof’ philosophy of the militarists and their allies, had become patently unrealistic. As we have seen, even the more traditionally-inclined exponents of a national mission tended to play down their hopes for Japanese leadership of any future pan-Asian union. On the whole extreme nationalists concentrated on the prior need for returning to traditional ways of life at home before there could be any possibility of ‘spreading the Great Cause throughout the world*. So far as the conservative leaders were concerned this inward­ looking type of ‘home consumption* nationalism was far preferable to one which laid emphasis on Japan’s position in the world, in that it was less likely to develop into popular opposition to the country’s subordinate role in the alliance with America. Post-war nationalism from the Government’s point of view has been a two-edged weapon —beneficial in that it could be used to encourage the restoration of traditional conservative patterns, dangerous in that it was so apt to lead to attacks on the American alliance. Conservative policy since the war has been based consistently on maintaining strong ties with the United States. This policy, as we have seen, has involved the danger of inviting nationalist attacks on the Government, from both the left and the right, for being subservient to a foreign country— attacks of the type, indeed, which led to Mr. Yoshida’s eventual fall from power in 1954. In almost every way anti-Western nationalism has been the preserve of the Government’s enemies. There has been one notable way, however, in which the Government has found use for this sentiment, namely, in its ‘reverse course’ attacks on the ‘excesses of the Occupation’. By associating the various measures, including enactment of the 1947 Constitution, with foreign domina­ tion, the Government has, as we have seen, harnessed nationalist sentiment in its efforts to turn back the clock. So far as underlying The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

1 For the following discussion I am especially indebted to the analysis of Pro­ fessor Maruyama, as contained in his various writings, especially in his Gendai Seiji no Shisö to Ködö (Tokyo, 1956-7). L

134 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan ideals were concerned, nationalism, so long as it was of the ‘home consumption’ variety and could be separated from uncontrolled opposition to the American alliance, was on the whole a far more satisfactory guiding force to put before the people than liberalism, which for Japanese conservatives even today tends to connote, in Professor Yanaga’s words, ‘something uncontrolled, undisciplined, licentious, and even uncivilized’.1 The development of ‘home consumption’ nationalism involved a steady increase in the interests and activities that have been men­ tioned earlier in discussing the ‘demobilization’ of the nationalist movement.2 As the novelty of foreign importations wore off, local pride in traditional Japanese mores made steady headway. In addi­ tion, there was a revival of many of the main symbolic nationalist activities. The Rising Sun Flag was proudly waved on every pos­ sible occasion; the national anthem, as well as patriotic songs and military marches, were once more popular; and people again began to flock to the Shinto shrines. In pre-war days Shinto could be regarded as a sacred form of nationalism, and even today popular interest in Shintoism may often act as a barometer for a certain form of nationalist feeling in the country. Attendance at Shinto shrines has increased steadily since Japan’s recovery of independence. Family and group visits to shrines are, it is true, a popular form of holiday outing in Japan and often have no religious, let alone nationalist, significance. Yet the outstanding popularity in recent years of those shrines that are tra­ ditionally associated with the expression of nationalist feeling, such as the Grand Shrine at Isé, the Meiji and Yasukuni Shrines3 in 1 Yanaga, Japanese People and Politics, p. 35. 2 See above, p. 31. * The Yasukuni Shrine is unique in the world, having been regarded, since its foundation in 1869, not as another tomb of the unknown soldier, but as the central gathering-point for the deified spirits of all those who have died for the ‘peace of the land’ (yasu-kuni), that is for the Imperial cause. A visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, therefore, represents for many people a real reunion with their departed kin, and for this purpose large-scale tours to Tokyo are frequently organized by the pre­ fectures. Because of the Shrine’s militarist associations, the Occupation was especially severe in suppressing it. The war museums on the grounds were emp­ tied and the tanks and obsolete canons destroyed with acetylene torch. An interest­ ing sidelight is that when the Shrine superintendents were ordered to deface the bronze relief pictures on the octagonal bases of the pair of mammoth Shrine lanterns, they skilfully covered them with cement; eleven years later (1957) when the cement coverings were removed, sixteen pictures showing popular Japan­ ese war heroes emerged intact. In the lean years of 1946 and 1947 the number of daily visitors fell to a few dozen and the total cash offerings often amounted to no more than a handful of pennies. Later the Occupation relented in its attitude

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism 135 Tokyo, the Kashiwara Shrine near Nara, and the Atsuta Shrine in Mié Prefecture, cannot simply be dismissed as a result of improved economic conditions; it is undoubtedly to some extent an expres­ sion of a renascent ‘home consumption’ form of nationalism and of growing mood of vague nostalgia for pre-war patterns.1 Devotion to the Emperor symbol is a similar indication of ‘home consumption’ nationalism, and here again the post-independence period has witnessed a steady rise in enthusiasm, though very differ­ ent, be it added, from the awestruck attitude of pre-war days.*12 Every year on the occasion of the Emperor’s birthday and at New Year people have thronged in increasing numbers to the grounds of the Imperial Palace to pay their respects, and when the Emperor makes his appearances on the balcony many a damp eye may be seen in the crowd, especially among the more elderly onlookers.3 Typical of the symbolic way in which conservative politicians have encouraged these expressions of ‘home consumption* national­ ism has been their revival of the pre-war habit of personally travel­ ling to the Grand Shrine at Isé to report to the Gods on all significant developments in the country.4 In their speeches conservative to the Shrine and since 1948 it has been visited by over a million people. In October 1948 the Emperor revived the habit of paying personal visits to Yasukuni Jinja (which had been suspended in November 1945). On these occasions he lays a twig of sacred tree before the altar and prays for the everlasting peace of all his subjects there enshrined who have died violent deaths in his name. One of the main difficulties in recent years has been that of enshrining the 2 million war dead from the Pacific War. Each enshrinement costs about ¥100 (2s.) and despite the steady increase in attendance, the Shrine’s finances have so far not been suffici­ ently sound to permit this expense. In 1953, in response to the growing impatience of many war-bereaved families at not being able to visit their deceased kin at the Shnne, an Association of Yasukuni Shrine Worshippers was formed to ex­ pedite the task of enshrinement (Murata Kiyoaki in the Japan Times, 23 Apr. 1957). ^ 1 Mr. Okawa Shümei, for example, pointed to the growing attendance at Meiji, Isé, and other shrines as an indication that national pride was springing up spontaneously among the people, despite all the efforts of politicians and cynical intellectuals to denigrate Japan’s traditions (‘Seiji no Fuhai to Nihon Kakumei* (The Corruption of Politics and the Japanese Revolution), Nihon Shühö, Apr. 1953. PP- 3- 12)* 1 Post-war public-opinion surveys indicate a steady rise in support for the Emperor. The poll taken by the Cabinet Secretariat Council in September 1957 (p. 120 n. 1) found 87 per cent, to be in favour of retaining the Emperor (as com­ pared with 81 per cent, half a year earlier) ; 32 per cent, said that he should remain a ‘symbol of the state*, while 19 per cent, said that he should be given administra­ tive power (Japan Times, 28 Sept. 1957). * In New Year 1954 17 people were crushed to death and many more injured in the stampede at the Palace. 4 The habit was restored in September 1951, when Mr. Masuda Kaneshichi, Chief Secretary of the Liberal Party, acting on behalf of the Prime Minister, Mr.

136 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan political leaders have frequently stressed the importance of restoring nationalist symbols. Thus in 1953, during the periodic dedication of the new shrine at Isé, Mr. Tsutsumi Yasujirö, the former Speaker of the Lower House, stated that the Constitution should be amended to permit the return of the Grand Shrine to its former importance. Again, as we have seen, the conservatives have sponsored a bill to re­ vive the pre-war Kigensetsu holiday with all its nationalist associa­ tions. In this pre-modern, inward-looking type of nationalism, the Emperor system ceased to imply any idea of a ‘national mission* in the world, that is, of military aggrandizement, and tended, rather, to become a matter of respect for authority and of general social conformity at home. As such, it could be used to oppose the various post-war manifestations of ‘egoism* or ‘decadence*, especially among younger people and unionized workers, which so distressed the more traditionally-minded Japanese. In this connexion it is in­ teresting to note that one type of question now asked by many organizations when selecting prospective employees involves their opinions on the Emperor and the Emperor system.*1 For a Japanese candidate to declare that he is opposed to the Emperor system would mean for most employers that he is a non-conformist and a potential trouble-maker, and would, indeed, be as cogent a recommendation for employment as for a young man in the United States to say that he disliked the ‘American way of life*. Not only have post-war nationalist symbols been largely of a ‘home consumption*, rather than an export, variety, but they have tended to be of a non-political nature, relating to characteristically Japanese local customs, traditional family patterns, established art forms, and other aspects of everyday life that have little direct posiYoshida, reported the conclusion of the Peace Treaty before the Grand Shrine at Isé. Questioned by reporters, Mr. Masuda stated that in this ceremony Mr. Yoshida was acting as an individual, rather than as a Prime Minister. Similarly in June 1952, when the Emperor himself visited the Grand Shrine to report to the Gods on the independence of Japan, the Imperial Household Agency explained the visit as a personal act and not that of a sovereign. (The Emperor’s previous visit to the Grand Shrine had been in November 1945, when he reported the end of hostilities.) 1 Another standard question is whether the candidate ever belonged to the National Association of Students’ Self-Government Associations (Zengakureti), the huge left-wing student organization. The numerical decline of the Zengakurcn after about 1952 may to a considerable extent be attributed to the student’s fear that if he joins it, he may have trouble later in obtaining satisfactory employment. See Ch. VII below.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

137 tive connexion with politics. It must not be concluded, however, that these symbols have no political effect. For even ‘non-political’ expressions of nationalism, innocuous or even admirable as they be in themselves, can often act as significant checks to the democrati­ zation of Japanese life. In the first place they can combine to awaken a nostalgia for pre-war patterns, both social and political. As memor­ ies of the war and its dismal aftermath grow dim, there is a natural harking back to the ‘good old days*. The power of nostalgia to stimu­ late a certain form of nationalist sentiment operates largely, as one would expect, among people of middle age and above. The recordbreaking success of the recent film Emperor Meiji and the Great Russo-Japanese War provides an interesting example and may be worth discussing in some detail as being indicative of one important trend in post-war nationalism. This film, produced in 1957 by the Shin-Töhö Company, the most nationalistically inclined of the wellknown cinema companies, consists of a series of emotive episodes about the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) which were officially adopted in the pre-war ethics textbooks and hence not too strictly circumscribed by the need for historical accuracy. An audiencesurvey conducted by the Institute of Social Psychology significantly reveals that, despite the warlike subject of the film, its main emo­ tional appeal lay not in its depiction of Japan’s military successes overseas, but in its nostalgic reminder of the days when the tra­ ditional virtues permeated the social structure at home. The Em­ peror Meiji himself, who appears in many of the scenes, portrayed by a popular actor (something, incidentally, that would have been inconceivable in pre-war days),1is cast in the role, not of a conquer­ ing hero, but of a benevolent father-figure, painfully concerned with the troubles of his civilian subjects and with the suffering of his troops. Even General Nogi appears less as a steely warrior than as a sincere and kindly leader with whom the audience can feel full human sympathy when he loses his two sons on the battlefield.2 1 Even in 1954 when the same company produced Nihon Yahurezu (‘Japan Is Not Defeated’), portraying the attempted Palace coup on the eve of Surrender (see above, p. 25), Imperial Conference scenes had an empty throne; in the se­ quence which dealt with the Emperor’s famous broadcast the film showed the microphone but no speaker. Evidently the code is that one may depict a deceased Emperor, but not one who is still alive, however noble his role may be. a General Nogi, hero of the Russo-Japanese War, who committed seppuku in 1911 as an act of loyalty at the death of the Emperor Meiji. His wife killed herself at the same time. The act was much applauded at the time by ultra-nationalists like Toyama Mitsuru.

138 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan To the question, ‘What was your motive for coming to see this film?1 the most common answer from subjects of middle age and over was, T longed to see the story of a war in which the whole nation devoted itself to a single cause.* The picture of the Emperor as given in the film corresponded to that fondly held by most of these people. About 75 per cent, of people in the middle-age group and above (as compared with only 50 per cent, of those below 30 years old) replied that the Emperor’s personality and way of living as shown in the film was exactly what they had imagined. It is clear from the various answers that the older members of the audience were almost all moved by nostalgia for the ‘good old days*, regardless of whether or not they themselves had actually grown up in the Meiji atmosphere. As Mr. Minami writes, . . . those spectators who are above the middle-age bracket were pre­ sumably able to submerge themselves in the world of the old sense and understanding in which they grew up. Among them some perhaps re­ called their childhood experiences, lectures about war heroes given by grammar school teachers, the games they played at their homes, and similar experiences.1

The parts of the film that stirred most of the people interviewed were not (as would almost certainly have been the case in pre-war days) the victorious battle-scenes, but those that depicted the vir­ tues of the old family system and its extension into the national realm by the portrayal of the Emperor himself as a father symbol. Again, what chiefly moved them in the leaders was not bravery, mental brilliance, or superior faculty of judgement, but the simple consider­ ate attitude that they showed to their followers—a quality more associated, as Mr. Minami points out, with the kindly master of a household than with the leader of a great world power. The age differential emerges once more in the general reactions to the film. Those who had no particular feeling about the film or did not like it constituted about one-quarter of the audience and were most com­ mon among people between 18 and 30 years old ; on the other hand, almost all the women over 31 and 90 per cent, of the men over 41 replied that they were ‘deeply moved*.2Some of the most interesting 1 Results discussed by Mr. Minami Hiroshi of the Institute of Social Psycho­ logy (Asahi Evening News, 30 May 1957). 2 It is noteworthy that the audiences usually clapped enthusiastically after the showings of the film, something which is most unusual in Japan. Lachrymal re­ actions were almost universal among the older members of the audience.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

139

results were contained in answers to the question ‘Why would you like other people to see this picture?’ Many of the younger people re­ plied that it would help others to understand the horrors of war. Among people of middle age and over, however, the predominant reason was to the effect ‘I want others—selfish young people—to see this picture so that they will know the beautiful state of affairs in which the people united their efforts by casting aside personal interests*. In reactions such as these, a clear connexion emerges be­ tween nostalgia for pre-war ‘non-political* patterns on the one hand, and intolerance for the ‘egoism* associated with post-war foreignstyle liberalism and democracy on the other. With the revival of non­ political symbols, especially those relating to the old family system, much of the pre-war pattern that was discredited in the immediate post-Surrender period, including traditional political behaviour, begins to assume a new charm, and many of the reforms instigated by the Occupation appear as unnecessary and uncongenial innova­ tions. In many cases also the revival or preservation of pre-war prac­ tices, however non-political they may be on the surface, can have a very important effect on the life of the people. For example, as Pro­ fessor Maruyama points out, the highly-organized system of col­ lecting contributions for local festivals tends to strengthen the position of the local bosses (,kaoyaku), who play a great part on these occasions;1 again, the traditional veneration for one’s ancestor is more than a purely religious manifestation, for it helps to re­ establish the pre-war authority of the main branch (honke) within a large family and of the head of the household (kachö) within a single unit; even the propagation of such a pleasant form of feminine art as flower arrangement can, in this general context, contribute to the feeling that women should devote any leisure they may have to the acquisition of traditional skills rather than to asserting their 1 Similarly, in urban areas the town-block associations (chönaikai) have been revived, and representatives regularly visit households to solicit funds for local Shinto festivals, crime prevention, youth activities, and the like. In pre-Surrender days these town-block associations, which have their origins in the gomngumi (fivefamily neighbourhood unit) of the Tokugawa Period, had a role roughly analo­ gous to that of the ‘blocks’ in Nazi Germany and they were used by the Govern­ ment to help mobilize and control the civilian population in pursuit of the national mission. They were abolished by the Occupation as ‘instruments of ultra-nationalism and obsolete social ideals’ (p. 12 n. 2 above). The post-war associations are unofficial bodies ; in most cases they have a strongly traditional, conservative flavour.

140 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan economic, social, or political rights.1 A farther example would be the growing interest in traditional forms of fighting such as kendo and jüdö. Kendo (Japanese fencing), for example, was banned in the early part of the Occupation as being a manifestation of militarism. It was revived, however, at about the time of the Korean War and in the following years the police organized numerous youth associa­ tions (seinenkai) where young men were trained in such arts as kendo. More recently, the Ministry of Education officials revived kendo in middle schools.2All this had the laudable aims of combating delinquency among young people (seishönen hanzai yobo) and of improving their physique and mental alertness. Nevertheless a revived interest in a traditional form like kendo could well inspire many young men with an uncritical respect for the heroic samurai tradition and its various political associations. No one would, of course, suggest that there is anything inherently sinister in a country’s revival of interest in its cultural traditions ; far from it. The fact remains that in the historical conditions which we are examining there is often a very thin line of demarcation be­ tween this form of revival and a desire to restore earlier social and political patterns. As Professor Maruyama writes, Political dynamics has taught us time after time that it is precisely at the moment when everyday behaviour patterns of this type have accumu­ lated—patterns which at first sight have no connexion at all with politics —that they may suddenly be converted into powerful political energy. To determine at exacdy what point they will emerge on the political horizon is a matter of the greatest delicacy.3

Non-political manifestations of nationalism have a further sig­ nificance in that they may in certain cases acquire strong political features. The development of the new post-war religious groups provides a good example. Originally these new sects had no specific political content. Many of them, however, including the Establishment-of-Righteousness Rebirth Association (Risshö Kösei Kai) and the Value-Creating Academy (Söka Gakkai\ were inspired by the Nichiren form of Buddhism and revealed the type of nationalist fervour that is traditionally associated with this sect and that can so easily spill over into the political field. Such a political tendency can 1 Maruyama, ‘Minshushugi*, p. 37. 2 Hessell Tiltman, ‘The Trend Back to the Past’, Asahi Evening Netvs, 3 Dec. Ï 957 8 ‘Nashionarizumu’, p. 27.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

141 be clearly seen in the case of the most important of these new post­ war religions, namely the Value-Creating Academy. This group came into being in its present form in 1949. In 1952 the Academy had some 70,000 adherents, and by 1954 this number had risen to about i \ million, divided among 640,000 households and organized into 32 branches. Its strength was concentrated to a large extent in Hokkaido and Osaka, and much of its support came from workers, especially coal miners. The group’s militant methods of proselytiz­ ing also belong to the Nichiren tradition and partly explain its im­ pressive growth in membership. Although the Value-Creating Academy remains primarily a religious group, affiliated with the Nichiren Shöshü Sect, there is no doubt that it has an important political potential. The political sig­ nificance of the new sect was widely recognized for the first time after the 1955-6 elections, when the Academy achieved consider­ able success: 52 out of 53 of its candidates were successful in the 1955 local elections, and 3 out of 6 in the 1956 Upper House elec­ tions. The group has been very active in the labour field. It is strong­ ly anti-leftist in tone and categorically opposed to strike action of any kind; it insists that the only solution for social and economic difficulties is to embrace the true faith, to repeat the Nichiren in­ vocation of the Lotus Sutra, and to devote oneself wholeheartedly to one’s allotted work. The Value-Creating Academy has, in fact, been the first religious sect to represent a threat to the organized la­ bour movement. It was clearly the growing strength of this group that inspired the statement of the Japan Federation of Coal Miners’ Unions in 1957 that ‘Unless some action is taken against the new re­ ligions they will increasingly disrupt the unity of the workers. . .’.1 New religious sects like the Value-Creating Academy should cer­ tainly not be viewed in the same category as political nationalist societies. Yet, though their aims may be primarily religious, many of them do in fact represent a form of anti-leftist nationalism that could exert a very important influence, especially in a period of economic crisis. In certain other cases, religious groups assumed a political com­ plexion from the outset. By far the greatest number of these was associated in one way or another with the Nichiren Sect and in most cases their politics were of a distinctly reactionary nature. The Japan 1 ‘Japan’s New Church Militant’, Japan Quarterly, Oct.-Dec. 1957, pp. 413- 19.

142 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan People’s Party {Nihon Jimmin To), for example, was organized in 1946 in Sendai by Mr. Tadano Naosaburö as a gathering of fervent Nichiren believers. Its political objectives included the restoration of authority to the Emperor and the realization of a ‘control system* {tösei seido). The group participated actively in election campaigns and in 1953 succeeded in electing Mr. Tadano to the Lower House as a representative of the party. Thereafter headquarters were moved to Tokyo; seventeen branches were established with a total membership of about 200. Another important aspect of the revival of ‘non-political* nation­ alism, and one that operates especially in rural and provincial areas, is that it tends to turn people’s attention away from politics into per­ sonal, family, and local spheres. By making people a-political in their interests, it paradoxically, as Professor Maruyama says, has a capital effect on the country’s politics, which tend to become more and more the preserve of local bosses and professional politicians.1 In this respect it clearly acts as a check to democratic development. The idea that the people should actively participate in the govern­ ment of their country and that sovereignty ultimately rests with them has feeble roots in Japan. As Professor Yanaga writes, . . . politics to an average Japanese citizen is still quite remote, for it is ‘something that takes place somewhere [else]*. . . . So far, only a small percentage of the voters has managed to tie together their everyday life and politics in a real and meaningful manner, to appreciate fully the stake they have in politics. . . . Political obligations are as yet only hazily realized.2

One of the principal aims during the early part of the Occupation was to eliminate this sense of distance which the people felt in view­ ing their country’s politics. The shift in American policy and the ‘reverse course*, however, started far too early for these efforts to have any definite effect. During the Occupation period itself, de­ spite the existence of a democratically elected Government, it was clear that all major decisions were being made by authorities over whom this Government, let alone the voters, had virtually no con­ trol. In the post-Occupation years the traditional attitude of distance from political power became once more solidified among the people, particularly in non-urban areas. This, as has been suggested, was due partly to the development of nationalism in non-political 1‘Minshushugi’, p. 37. 2Japanese People and Politics, p. 18.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

i 43 directions, to the fact, that is, that nationalist sentiment, instead of focusing people’s attention on the political life of their country, tended instead to turn their interest into parochial directions. The feeling of distance, which leads inevitably to political apathy and ignorance, has combined with an increasing sense of cynicism and disgust, as one well-publicized scandal has followed hard on the heels of another ever since the early part of the Occupation. The belief that many of the country’s politicians, and not a few of her officials, are to a greater or lesser extent besmirched with corruption has taken deep root in the nation at large. This is the belief on which ultra-nationalist elements were able to capitalize with such consequence in the 1930’s. It is still one of their main lines of ap­ peal in attacking the status quo. In the post-war period this general cynicism about politics, so similar in many ways to that which pre­ vails in a country like France, has had the important effect of pre­ venting feelings of national pride from being directed towards the centres of political power and of concentrating interest instead on local spheres of activity. The sense of distance which separates the mass of the population from the locus where the nation’s main political decisions are being made is one aspect of the great gap in Japan, to which Professor Maruyama refers, between the apex (chöten) and the base (teihen).1 According to Professor Maruyama the apex, which includes the Diet, the Cabinet system, and all the forms of parliamentary demo­ cracy, tends to be international in its orientation. It is here that Western influence operates most freely and in particular that AngloAmerican political thought has had the greatest effect. It is here again, in post-war years, that Japan’s association with the ‘freeworld alliance’ is most strongly felt, and that direct contacts with foreigners take place on terms of equality.2 The base, on the other hand, is essentially nationalist and still tends to be steeped in 1 ‘Minshushugi’, pp. 43 ff. * This ‘international’ aspect of the apex must be viewed with certain reserva­ tions. Conservative enthusiasm for the ‘free world’ alliance, for instance, does not in most cases spring from any devout adherence to the ideals of the Western democracies, but from an appraisal of Japan’s post-war position in the world and of the concrete advantages that are likely to accrue from close ties with the United States. Professed friendship for the West does not necessarily preclude pronounced nationalist sentiment or a nostalgia for traditional ways. In most cases the latter are reserved for home consumption, while the former is for export. The fact remains that, compared with the base, the apex is far more subject to Western influence and more susceptible to changes in the outside world.

144 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Japanese tradition. Here the kaoyaku system and local loyalties tend to take the place of Western parliamentarianism, and here the democratic reforms of the Occupation are most readily dismissed as imported ‘excesses* having little or no relevance to national tradi­ tions or needs. At the base interest in foreign affairs, which the Government stimulated in earlier days as part of its effort to harness nationalism in the cause of military expansion, has largely been dis­ sipated and the focus of concern is, in the fullest sense of the word, provincial.1 The gap which exists in Japan between the apex and the base emerges in a comparison of local and national election results. As a rule village, town, and city assemblies, all of which represent the base (in our present use of the term), are overwhelmingly conserva­ tive, compared with the composition of the national Diet, which since the war has been at least one-third Socialist-Communist. Furthermore it is almost impossible to predict the results of national elections on the strength of local elections. In countries like England, France, and Italy local elections usually provide a reasonable indica­ tion of how people will vote in choosing their national representa­ tives. But in Japan the idea that the national parliament is essentially an extension of local bodies has not taken hold and local results tend to differ widely from national results, even though the elections may have taken place within six months of each other. Local representa­ tives belong, as a rule, to the traditional kaoyaku system and are chosen for their influence in the community and for the support which it is hoped that they will give the voter in his day-to-day activities. Diet members, however, tend to be regarded by the ordin­ ary provincial voter as inadequate representatives of local interests, distracted by concern with national policies which the voter does not share and corrupted by urban luxury which the voter morally condemns. Voting patterns will, therefore, differ widely in the two types of election.2 1 This fact is clearly recognized by Japan’s conservative politicians—men who before the war would have larded their speeches with reference to Japan’s crisis, need for Lebensraum, national mission, &c. Professor Dore’s analysis of election speeches in 1955 (p. 126 n. 2 above) indicates how small a proportion of space was devoted to foreign policy. As will be seen, the attention given to foreign policy was significantly greater among the left-wing candidates, especially those of the JCP: Liberals 8 per cent., Democrats 9 per cent., Right-Wing Socialists 10 per cent., Left-Wing Socialists 14 per cent., JCP 31 per cent. 2 Maruyama, ‘Minshushugi’, p. 45. It is worth noting that the voting percen­ tage in local elections is considerably higher than that in national elections, despite all the fanfare attending the latter (Yan&ga, Japanese People and Politics, p. 281).

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

145 One aspect of the apex-base dichotomy has become especially pronounced in the post-war period. Since 1945, despite all the im­ provements in travel services, it has been only an infinitesimally small percentage of the Japanese population that has had the re­ motest possibility of leaving their home islands for even a short period. In this physical sense Japan has actually become more iso­ lated now than she was before the war, when large numbers of Japanese of all classes travelled to various parts of Asia in either a civilian or a military capacity. The possibility of going overseas is now largely limited (apart from such special groups as emigrants and merchant seamen) to Cabinet Ministers, high-ranking govern­ ment officials, Diet members, important business men, and a hand­ ful of scholars, students, and delegates to international conferences ; and their usual destinations, instead of such relatively accessible areas as China, Manchuria, Korea, the Philippines, and Formosa, have become California, New York, London, Paris, and Rome—a sort of ‘grand tour* which each member of the apex aspires to take at least once in his career, preferably at government or company expense, but which the vast majority of people cannot even remotely envisage for themselves. In a sense the situation is now closer to that which existed in the early decades of Meiji, when foreign travel was the prerogative of members of the élite and of a few students who were carefully chosen by the Government and who were usually dispatched to the ‘advanced* countries of the West. The post-war situation is, of course, the result of economic and political conditions rather than of any deliberate policy on the part of the Japanese Government. This, however, will not make it any the less likely in the long run to increase those insular aspects of the country that are already established by geographic, linguistic, and other factors, and thus to make the people still more susceptible to an inward-looking form of nationalism. Already it has tended to emphasize the gulf that separates the great mass of the Japanese people, whose interests become ever more provincial and centred on particular in-groups, from the apex with its relatively broad outlook and international orientation. This dualism in Japan, this great gap between the outward-look­ ing apex and the traditional-bound base, is, as Professor Maruyama points out, inherent in the development of Japanese nationalism and constitutes one of its main weaknesses.1 In the speed and uneven1 ‘Nashionarizumu’, pp. 16-17 and passim.

146 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan ness with which the Meiji policy of ‘a wealthy country and a strong army’ was carried out lay the seeds of future distortions that have persisted to this day. The sense of urgency that impelled the Meiji leaders, as well as their own strong conservatism deriving in part from an overwhelmingly samurai background, led them, as we have seen, to stress only the material aspects of Westernization, notably those that would strengthen the country in its dealings with the out­ side world, and to overlook or suppress the elements that might in­ volve increasing demands by the people to participate actively in the process of Government. A modern form of independent, popular nationalism, which would have tended to bridge the gap between the apex and the base, was never allowed to develop ; instead popular nationalist feelings were canalized on foreign scapegoats (beginning with Korea) and a pre-modern nationalism, compounded of tra­ ditional local loyalties, paternalistic sentiment, and quasi-religious national myths, was imposed from above and used to stimulate chauvinism for the purpose of advancing Japan’s position in the world. Even at the height of total mobilization during the Pacific War, as Professor Maruyama remarks, this local or sectional aspect of Japanese nationalism served in many surprising ways to weaken the war effort; and the failure of nationalism to develop as a strong, popular movement from below also explains the ease with which, after defeat, most Japanese could abruptly abandon their ‘national mission’, which had for so long been bruited throughout the world, and sink back into self-centred, a-political provincialism.1 The peculiar dichotomy in Japan between the apex and the base furthermore makes it possible for the country’s politics to develop in a strongly authoritarian, anti-democratic, or even Fascist direc­ tion, while retaining intact the entire formal structure of parlia­ mentary democracy. This indeed is what happened during the ultra-nationalist era in the 1930’s and during the entire period of wartime totalitarianism, when the Diet continued to function with­ out interruption. In this way the situation in Japan differs entirely from that in a country like France, where nationalism has developed as a popular movement from below, where, however unpopular the existing Government and national politics may be, they are not viewed by the people as something completely apart, and where the establishment of thoroughgoing authoritarian rule would almost 1 Ibid. pp. 20-21.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

147 inevitably involve a collapse or complete alteration of the parlia­ mentary system itself. One of the most interesting aspects of post-war Japanese national­ ism is the fragmentation, or as Professor Maruyama calls it, the ‘chopping up* (ikomagiri) of national symbolism.1 The pre-war nationalist ideal, as propagated by the Government, the military, and the professional patriots, rife though it was with false assump­ tions, inconsistencies, illogicalities, and sheer hocus-pocus, re­ vealed none the less a certain emotional unity. In slogans like Chükö itchi (‘Loyalty towards the Emperor, piety towards one’s father’), loyalty to the Emperor, or to those who spoke in his name, was in­ culcated on the people as a natural extension on a national plane of the piety that was traditionally due to the head of the household (kachö) in the microcosmic hierarchy of the family system. In much the same way the ideal of ‘spreading the Great Cause throughout the world* (Taigi wo sekai ni shiku) was presented as a natural expansion beyond the frontiers of Japan of the kokutai ideal that obtained with­ in the country. This emotional unity of pre-Surrender authority symbols and of the entire national ideal made it possible, despite the consistently provincial basis of Japanese nationalism, for the coun­ try’s leaders to instil into the people a strong sense of national mis­ sion. At the same time it was, as we have seen, this very integrity of Imperial-expansionist symbolism that made the ideological effects of defeat so overwhelming. The national ideal, like the nation itself, had been pictured as ‘flawless like a golden chalice*, and, if one may be permitted to extend this significant image, it can be said that Japan’s total defeat meant the shattering of this chalice into in­ numerable pieces. The pieces remain to be sure, and can still com­ mand an emotional appeal, especially among people of middle age and over, yet they utterly lack this former cohesion and the strength that this cohesion gave them. This fragmentation serves to explain, among other things, the interesting phenomenon that one so often comes across in post-war Japan of ‘mixed symbols’, that is of typically national symbols ap­ pearing in incongruous juxtaposition with symbols of an utterly foreign nature. Now that the tokens of nationalism no longer belong to a well-defined integral pattern, the Japanese seem able to accept, sometimes even to enjoy, the ideal of combining them with, as it 1 'Minshushugi', pp. 38 ff.

148 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan were, their emotional opposites. By way of example, Professor Maruyama refers to the fact that the members of the National De­ fence Force, ‘the kernel of the new Japanese army*, sport an attire virtually identical with that of American G.I.’s. In the ideological realm he mentions the Diet member who, after an impassioned plea for the revival of the traditional family system, added that this must in no way be allowed to conflict with respect for the individual or for the equality of the sexes.1 The same incongruity is found at the ‘base* as at the ‘apex*. Thus a poll taken among a group of Westernstyle jazz singers revealed an unusually high degree of support for the Emperor system. Again, a band of labourers demonstrating their feelings of solidarity with the workers of the world during the 1957 May Day parade was reported to have ended the day’s proceedings by furling their red flag and repairing en masse to the cinema to enjoy the highly nationalistic film The Emperor Meiji and the Great RussoJapanese War.2 Incongruity of symbols is perhaps most striking in the field of customs and art forms, when a characteristically national form is juxtaposed with something blatantly foreign. Professor Maruyama cites the example of strip-tease kabuki, a form of entertainment that would no doubt have much the same appeal as the presentation in 1957 of the ancient Nö drama, Hagoromo, in the nude, or as the rendition on television of the ‘Samisen Blues’. In 1957 people flocked to see the performance in a Tokyo music hall of the epic of the Forty-Seven Ronin in the form of a burlesque, in which the climactic revenge secured by the heroes after all their travails takes the rather sordid form of a monetary donation by the villain. The present writer recently saw the performance in a country village of a traditional-type O-Bon (Festival of the Dead) danced to the music of the Latin American cha-cha. In 1958 the priests of the venerated 1 This is a typical case of what might also be called ‘double-protection amulets’, that is, the balancing of a traditional amulet with one of post-war provenance (see p. 34 above). The two may be logically incompatible, but given the amuletic use of words favoured by Japanese politicians and others, this is far from being a disadvantage. By using the two types of amulet in close juxtaposition the speaker or writer is, as it were, giving himself double protection from outside dangers. Thus an orator may call for the rapid build-up of Japan’s defence forces in order to secure national independence and in the next breath insist on full respect for the democratic Constitution; few of his hearers will be aware of any particular inconsistency. In the case of nationalist groups, for instance, the Harmony Party advocates an authoritarian ‘control system’ but specifies that it must be ‘demo­ cratic’. * See above, pp. 137-9.

The Evolution o f Post-W ar Nationalism 149 Kan da Myöjin Shrine gave an exotic touch to their annual festival by having a popular ‘rockabilly* (rock-and-roll cum hillbilly) singer perform his gyrations to the blaring music of the Western Caravan band in the hallowed precincts of the hall that was normally used for sacred Shinto music and dance. The Gunkan March of the Im­ perial Navy, which in the past was always played at times of military victory, was adapted as a fox-trot and became a popular tune for dancing in Western-style night-clubs. Even so august a symbol as National Foundation Day was in 1957 given an incongruous fillip by the announcement of a competition to select a ‘Miss Kigensetsu’ I This general form of incongruity is, to be sure, nothing new in Japanese history. Indeed, the rapid introduction of Western ways during the Meiji Period resulted in a number of odd mixtures of which the literature of the period provides innumerable examples. In Meiji days, however, imports of foreign commodities were in most cases justified as efforts to strengthen the Empire, and were part of the policy variously described as ‘the harmony of Eastern and West­ ern civilization* (tözai bumtnei no chöwa) and ‘Oriental virtue, Occi­ dental arts* (töyö dötoku seiyö geijutsu). The indiscriminate import of things Western in the post-war period, however, bore little such justification, and the ‘mixed symbols* that resulted have differed both in frequency and in range from these earlier manifestations of cultural syncretism. They are an effect not simply of over-rapid im­ portation but of the fragmentation of nationalist symbolism itself. The ideological vacuum that resulted from the break-up of the kokutai ideal is one of the most important aspects of post-war Japan, and the revival of a predominantly inward-looking, non-political, provincial, and fragmented form of nationalism has done little to­ wards filling it. No new sense of national mission has emerged to take the place of that which since the Meiji Restoration played so important a part in sustaining the Japanese people. Even the hope, so often voiced in the early days of the Occupation, that Japan might become a ‘Switzerland of the Far East*, dedicated to the ways of peace and art, proved with the intensification of the cold war to have been merely one more chimera. The early post-war successes of the extreme left, though mainly a result of economic dislocation, result­ ed to some extent from an effort to fill the vacuum left by defeat. For many people Communism was able to provide a new and integral ideal sufficiently inspiring to take the place of the shattered kokutai. M

150 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan The post-war proliferation of new religious sects, which has already been discussed as a manifestation of non-political nationalism, can also be explained as an effort to fill the ideological vacuum and to satisfy the psychological need for release. Interestingly enough, the full extent of the vacuum did not really emerge until after Japan had regained her independence. The Occupation, by using its authority to impose a set of policies on the country, provided a certain continuity to the tradition of imparting a sense of direction from above by order and exhortation. Power to shape the nation’s destiny and implicit Imperial sanction to do so rested from 1945 to 1951 with the Allied Headquarters, as they had in earlier days with a succession of noble and military families, with the Tokugawa shogunate, the Meiji oligarchy, and finally the mili­ tarists. The people, for their part, were cast in the familiar, and to many of them, congenial, role of diligently carrying out what they were ordered by superior authority to do for the good of the nation, even though this ‘good’ was in many cases diametrically opposite to that which had been inculcated on them before. In other words a certain sense of direction remained, even though the direction itself was completely altered. With the relaxation and finally the complete removal of Occupa­ tion control, however, this foreign-imposed sense of national mis­ sion ceased to operate and nothing was there to take its place. Japan, as Professor Maruyama says, now appeared to many of her people to be a nation lacking in a raison d'être.1 Looking at their newlyindependent country in the clear light of day—small, deficient in investment capital, and lacking almost every natural resource except human population, dependent for her economic survival on finding markets in a world of fierce competition and rigid trade barriers, dis­ trusted, even disliked, by many of her Asian neighbours, faced with the overwhelming might of Communist power on the near-by con­ tinent, and unable to defend her territory without assistance from a country 6,000 miles away—even the most sanguine Japanese were hard put to find grounds for national ebullience. The hope that Japan might redeem her past lapses and regain a respected place for herself in the family of nations was, of course, quite widely held and provided a focus for a moderate form of nationalist feeling since the early Occupation days. These hopes 1 ‘Nashionarizumu’, p. 24.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

151 were to some extent realized with the coming into force of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and later when in December 1956 the country was finally admitted to the United Nations and in October 1957 elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. The desire to regain independence and to acquire international respectability was in some ways analogous to the determination dur­ ing the early decades of Meiji to abrogate the unequal treaties and to be accepted as a modern nation. Yet it never exerted the same dyna­ mic force. The post-war wish to make up partly for what has been lost has so far failed to provide a focus for nationalist enthusiasm even vaguely approximating that of the pre-war sense of national mis­ sion. If the Occupation had continued very much longer than it did, it is possible that growing impatience and resentment about foreign control might have produced powerful nationalist reactions. In the event, however, such reactions never developed into any popular, vocal movement, except among extreme left-wing elements whose motives in attacking the Occupation were bound to be suspect. After achieving independence, the next ‘official’ national goal was admittance to the United Nations.1This ambition, laudable as it might be, was hardly designed to stir up great popular enthusiasm ; it was an objective that was bound to appeal to the ‘apex’ rather than to the ‘base’ and, despite the importance attached to its achievement in official and semi-official circles, it never showed signs of becoming a significant focus of nationalist feeling. Japan’s election to the Security Council was hailed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Kishi, as ‘a cause for national rejoicing* ; and indeed, by being endorsed by most of the Western countries and by ‘defeating’ Czechoslovakia in the contest for election, Japan had secured one of the only types of victory that seemed feasible for her in the post-war period ; but such national rejoicing as took place outside official circles was of a very subdued nature indeed. A further national raison d'être that the Government has (rather half-heartedly) tried to place before the people, especially since the 1 It is perhaps not without significance that one of the leading figures in the Japan United Nations Association (whose main objective was Japan’s adherence to the United Nations) should have been Mr. Amau Eiji. Mr. Amau was the author of the ‘Amau Statement* in 1934 when he was in the Foreign Ministry. According to this statement, Japan and China alone were responsible for main­ taining peace in the Far East and Japan would oppose efforts by any other coun­ tries to help China even in technical or financial ways. ‘Respectable* nationalism can manifest itself in divers and unexpected ways.

152 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan success in the United Nations, is that of becoming a ‘bridge between East and West* (seiyö to Ajiya wo musubu hashi). There is so far no sign that the other countries of the East feel any impelling need for this particular bridge; and even in American government circles, where the idea might be expected to have a certain appeal, the sup­ port seems to have been rather lukewarm. So far as Japan herself is concerned, the goal of being a ‘bridge* does not appear to have ex­ erted the slightest appeal among the mass of the people ; still less has it caught the imagination of students or intellectuals, among whom it tends to be dismissed as just one more political slogan having little practical content. The post-war sense of ideological vacuum that we have been ex­ amining was probably keenest among students and young people, whose energies were for the time being not so predominantly occu­ pied, as were those of their elders, with the problems of making a livelihood.1 The democratic ideal and its concomitants, which had been so popular in the early post-war period, especially among the youth, had, by the time that independence came, begun to lose much of their dynamic appeal; although a large part of the people con­ tinued to subscribe formally to democracy, it lacked on the whole the power to inspire the type of enthusiasm that might fill the vacuum. This was fundamentally, as we have seen, because democracy came to Japan in the post-war period not as part of a popular movement from below, but as a foreign-style commodity imposed by directive from above, together with all the other rules and regulations in­ volved in a military occupation. Apart from this the Occupation it­ self had, by its very nature, frequently been obliged to adopt meth­ ods which were the very reverse of democratic, and in its later phase it had often supported, or even initiated, trends in Japan which ap­ peared flagrantly to belie its earlier idealistic pretensions. Nor was the democratic ideal greatly served by the fact that so many of Japan*s politicians and conservative leaders—men who in earlier days had outspokenly opposed it as an aspect of decadent Western materialism, and who even now often continued to act in a contrary spirit—chose nevertheless to present themselves as firm believers in democracy, for what could only appear to be motives of blatant 1 As Professor Yanaga puts it, ‘It is a truism that a large proportion of the human race is obliged to work so hard in obtaining the necessities of life that little energy is left over for other purposes. The overwhelming majority of the Japanese people fall in this category* {Japanese People and Politics, p. 17).

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

153

opportunism. Disabused by the democratic ideal as it showed itself in practice, many young people, especially in university circles, turned to radical socialism or Communism, which, they were led to believe, would not only result in a better organization of life within the country, but would save Japan from her entanglements with the Western powers and their ‘imperialist war-mongering*. As we shall see, a fairly large part of the organized student movement in post­ war Japan, whether or not actually under Communist domination, has been inspired by this type of thinking. Another large part of the people, particularly in urban areas, turned in bored and cynical dis­ gust from politics of the left, right, and centre, to devote such leisure as it possessed to material or hedonistic goals, the enjoyment of which, fleeting though it might be, at least promised a certain degree of present pleasure. In the case of young people, the most conspicu­ ous manifestation of this trend was to be found in the gyrations of the so-called taiyözoku (‘members of the Sun Tribe*), a sort of ‘lost generation* who self-consciously and flamboyantly proclaimed their lack of faith in established Japanese traditions, in conventional morality, indeed in everything but the enjoyment of the passing moment.1 The high rate of juvenile delinquency during the post­ war years, though partly of economic origin, is also part of the ten­ dency that we have been considering.* 1 The name is taken from the title of a novel Taiyö no Kisetsu (‘Season of the Sun’) (1955) by a young writer, Ishihara Shintarö, in which are described the ex­ periences, sexual and otherwise, of a group of young people who, having thor­ oughly rejected all Japanese traditions, give themselves over to rather violent lives of physical enjoyment. The book itself and the many films that it inspired did much to encourage the type of activity which they described—a good case of life imitating ‘art*. At the height of the taiyözoku craze, there was a significant move by the Government to reintroduce a form of official censorship of films; according to Socialist critics and most of the press, the Government was in fact using the demoralizing effect of these films as a pretext to revive pre-war forms of restriction. Conspicuous though the taiyözoku have been in recent years (especi­ ally for newspaper readers), it must not be thought that they represent any large part of the younger generation in Japan (for one thing, they usually belong to well-to-do families) ; they are, however, an interesting symptom of the times. * The following figures are taken from the official Hanzai Tökei Sho Keishichö Year 1949

No. of cases 131,906 166,433 126,097 54,787 104,829 I2 I»753 . Although the juvenile-delinquency rate has decreased since 1951, it is still more than double that of pre-war years, a startling rise even when a population in­ crease of about 25 per cent, is taken into account. Year 1941 1943 1945 1947

No. of cases 52 ,7«>9 61,366

1951 1953 1955

154 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan In what way, then, have the conservative elements in the country tried to combat these various trends caused by the post-war sense of ideological vacuum? Among measures in the practical field have been the efforts, mainly thwarted until about 1957 be­ cause of strong Socialist opposition, to reintroduce some form of moral education in schools. The categorical prohibition of courses in morals (shüshin) was, as we have seen, one of the earliest steps taken by the Occupation ; it was the reform most regretted by many of the country’s conservative educators, who have inevitably blamed it for what they consider to be the subsequent degeneration of Japanese youth. For the past many years successive Ministers of Education have strongly urged a return to some form of official moral code to be taught in schools. In 1951 Dr. Amano Teiyu,1the Minister of Education in Mr. Yoshida’s third Cabinet, prepared a moral code to be used officially after the country regained its inde­ pendence. In an analysis of this draft code Professor R. P. Dore points out that though it differed in many important respects from the Imperial Rescript on Education (as, for instance, by giving pre­ cedence to clauses on the dignity of the individual personality over those on the family and the state), it nevertheless revealed a strongly traditional flavour, which, in this context, is probably more im­ portant than the actual wording.2 The state was still viewed as be­ ing a sort of ‘metaphysical entity* and the basic pattern of social 1 Dr. Amano is a Kantian philosopher and a professor emeritus of Kyoto University. His own views on patriotism were recently set forth in a newspaper article and may be worth quoting at some length as being typical of those widely held by Japanese conservatives. Patriotism, he insisted, must be unconnected with self-interest; nor must it depend on whether or not one’s country ‘deserves* to be loved. Rather, it is a form of natural blood-feeling: *. . . we Japanese have lived in these same Pacific islands, spoken a common language, respected a com­ mon reigning line, formed a single race of common blood by linking together the bloods of several tribes, and have gone through such major crises together as the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Second World War. . . . Because we were bom and brought up under this atmosphere and will die in Japan, we realize that the country is the parent and body of our existence ; we feel the heritage handed down by our ancestors in each drop of blood in our bodies and feel an echo of our ancestors in each stroke of the pulse.’ So far as socio-political behaviour is concerned, patriotism for men like Dr. Amano involves unquestion­ ing acceptance of the existing pattern: ‘If I may borrow an old saying, “Act in accordance with one’s station and desire nothing else” . Everyone has his respective position in life. To be faithful to this will not only improve oneself, but will also improve one’s country and the world. This, I believe, constitutes true love of one’s country* (‘Loving One’s Country’, Yomiuri Japan Nezvs, 25 Aug. 1957. Italics are the present writer’s). * R. P. Dore, ‘The Ethics of the New Japan’, Pacific Affairs, June 1952, pp. 147- 59 -

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

155

relationship was that of hierarchy rather than equality. In the event, the code was not adopted, owing to the powerful opposition of the Socialists and also of most of the national press. Subsequent minis­ ters and conservative leaders, notably Mr. Matsunaga To, Minister of Education in the Kishi Government, have made similar efforts to reintroduce moral education.1 Numerous sporadic attempts have also been made on a local level by school principals to bring into use textbooks on ethics in the pre-war style, but until now they have mostly been balked by the vigilance of the Socialists and the press. The issue of textbooks has been prominent during the past few years and is far from being settled. In 1947 the Fundamental Law of Education brought to an end the system, which had been started forty-four years earlier, whereby the Ministry of Education pre1 Typical of the conservative attitude to the problem were the views expressed in February 1953 by Mr. Okano Kiyohide, Minister of Education in the 4th Yoshida Cabinet. During a discussion in the Lower House on Government mea­ sures to correct the ‘post-war laxity in morals’, he declared that ‘young people nowadays insist only on their rights, and shirk their responsibilities’. The Minister added that Emperor Meiji's Rescript on Education was objectionable only in its ‘feudalistic wording* and not in its contents. Mr. Okano’s address was also notable as being the first post-war occasion on which the theory of Japanese racial superiority was officially voiced by a high government official and also on which the Pacific War was referred to as the Greater East Asia War (Dai Töa Sensö). To quote Mr. Okano, ‘I believe the Japanese to be an outstanding race with few peers in the world. . . I do not intend to discuss whether the Great East Asia War was right or wrong, but the fact that Japan fought the whole world for four years is ample evidence of our racial excellence’ (Int. News Service, 10 Feb. Ï 953 ). In July 1957 it was reported that the Ministry of Education had completed a draft outline of a new school curriculum, incorporating a course that resembled the pre-war Shûshin. Revision of the educational system on modified pre-war lines was heartily supported by the Minister of Education in the 2nd Kishi Cabinet, Mr. Matsunaga Tô. Enumerating what he considered to be essential for future Japanese education, he declared: 'Above all shushin [moral] education. And then history to show the footsteps of our forebears... It is necessary to ham­ mer morality, national spirit, and, to put it more clearly, patriotism, into the heads of our younger generations’ (Japan Times, 20 July 1957). In a later pressconference Mr. Matsunaga denounced the Occupation policies on education as having been aimed at ‘the weakening of the Japanese race’ and again insisted on the need for re-introducing an independent course on Morals to promote patrio­ tic sentiment among young people (Mainichi Shimbun, 5 Aug. 1957). In August (1957) it was announced that moral education would start in primary and junior high schools as an independent part of the curriculum in April 1958. In reply to widespread criticism, the Ministry of Education pointed out (November 1957) that the new system of moral education would be completely different from the pre-war ethics course and in particular that it would not be based entirely on traditional Confucianism, but would have a much freer approach. This, how­ ever, did not serve to diminish the opposition of the Japan Teachers’ Union and of most anti-conservative circles.

156 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan pared the textbooks to be used throughout Japanese schools.1These textbooks played a very important part in the Government’s pro­ gramme of inculcating nationalist sentiment upon the people; the various revisions that took place since 1903 almost invariably had the effect of strengthening the nationalistic content of the books. As a result of the Occupation-sponsored Fundamental Law, textbooks were after 1947 produced privately and were ordered directly by the schools, subject to their having been certified by an impartial board of educators. According to conservative critics of the reform, this led on the one hand to a general lowering of standards as commercial motives became paramount and as publishers began to exert in­ fluence to have their own books accepted by the schools; far worse, the left-wing proclivities of the Japan Teachers’ Union (Nikkyöso)2 came to be reflected in the actual content of many of the post-war textbooks. The textbook issue was enthusiastically espoused by the conservative party and in 1955 the Democratic (government) Party issued a fiery booklet, entitled The Problem of Deplorable Textbooks ( Ureubeki Kyökasho no Mondai)t which caused a considerable stir in educational circles. The writers of this pamphlet linked the Japan Teachers’ Union with the JCP and charged that its leaders had taken advantage of the post-war system to introduce misleading and pre­ judiced textbooks, which were poisoning the innocent minds of young people with unpatriotic and Marxist notions. To take one example, the history textbook Bright Society (Akarui Shakai) is excoriated for praising China at the expense of Japan. Various passages are cited which refer to Japanese offerings of tri­ bute to China in ancient days, to the relatively advanced state of Chinese civilization, and to Japanese imitations of Chinese things; all this, according to the pamphlet, reveals an unhealthy attitude of adulation for a foreign country and a lack of respect for one’s own fatherland. The book is further attacked for quoting third-century Chinese sources concerning the state of Japan, for referring to the 1 Marius B. Jansen, ‘Education, Values and Politics in Japan’, Foreign Affairs, July 1957, pp. 666-78. I am indebted to this article for much of the present material on the textbook issue. 9 The Japan Teachers’ Union was organized in June 1947 and acquired a membership of over half a million. From the outset it has been under strong Communist influence and has been prominent in many of the left-wing cam­ paigns against the Government. It exerts considerable influence on the teachers, especially in state schools, and indirectly on the students. Its wings were partly clipped by the passing in 1954 of legislation outlawing political activity among teachers.

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism 157 early Japanese Emperors as being the heads of a ruling clan, and for saying that the Chinese did not act in a hostile way towards Japan at the time of the Mongol invasions. The writers of the pamphlet are particularly incensed at the second half of the book, in which modern Japan is pictured as having acted as an aggressor since the time of the Sino-Japanese War. ‘This textbook*, says the pamphlet, ‘treats its subject in just the same way as would the Japan Com­ munist Party.*1And it concludes, ‘Can we really call this a Japanese textbook?’ The best way to meet the threat posed by ‘unpatriotic* textbooks of this type was to revise the certification system in such a way that the Ministry of Education would have far greater control over the issuance of all written material for schools. A conservative bill to this effect was defeated in 1956, owing to strong opposition on the part of the Socialists and of most of the teachers themselves. Thereafter the Government appears to have attempted to accomplish by adminis­ trative means what it could not achieve by legislation. The Ministry of Education made certain changes in the composition of the com­ mittee that was charged with certifying textbooks, and control be­ came very much stricter. ‘Opinion F* (which was the name given to the views of the Ministry itself on the respective textbooks) was stated far more forcefully than before and resulted in the banning of several books. Among those banned in this so-called ‘F purge’ were several history books and a particularly popular work entitled Japanese Society {Nihon no Shakai), which was rejected by ‘Opinion F* for being too partial to the new Constitution, ‘unbalanced* in its treatment of human rights, and too ‘gloomy* in its depiction of the Second World War. The conservatives have thus, as Dr. Jansen points out, begun to challenge the virtual monopoly that intellec­ tuals have since the end of the war exercised over materials of in­ struction. The influence of a theoretical type of Marxism has, as we have seen, been especially strong in intellectual circles and has un­ doubtedly served in many cases to vitiate the objectivity of these materials. Whether a return to some form of state control of text­ books and the substitution of a traditional nationalist influence for that of Marxism would result in increased objectivity is, of course, open to question. The cardinal importance of the education system in forming 1 Nihon Minshu Tö, Ureubeki Kyökasho no Mondai (Tokyo, 1955), p. 20.

158

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

popular attitudes has been recognized in Japanese ruling circles since the early decades of Meiji, and the conservatives are clearly de­ termined to reassert themselves in this field and to reverse the vari­ ous tendencies that they consider to have been undesirable. In tak­ ing specific practical measures, however, they are faced with strong and well-organized opposition from the left-wing forces in the country and from a large part of the intellectuals and teachers them­ selves, who are especially sensitive concerning anything that smacks of a regression to thought control. Few issues have produced more heated exchanges in the post-war Diet than the successful efforts of the conservatives in 1955 to revise the Education Board Law so as to substitute a system of nomination for that of popular election. When we turn from practical measures to the ideological realm, we see that the Government’s appeal has been mainly to a latent sense of nostalgia for pre-war days and to a form of inward-looking, non-political nationalism. These are hardly sentiments that would tend to inspire the people of Japan, in particular the youth, with any strong sense of mission. Conclusions Nationalism, as it has evolved in the latter part of the post-war period, is not a dynamic unity, capable of spurring men to great efforts, let alone self-sacrifice, but arises mainly from a diffused sense of conservatism deeply rooted among people of the middle generation and over, especially in provincial and rural areas, where established social patterns have undergone the least change. Now a diffuse and latent form of nationalism is the normal state of affairs in most countries. In England or France, for example, nationalism as a rule subsists diffusely below the surface, but can become a dynamic force when external circumstances provide a focus. Japan was peculiar, though by no means unique, in that certain powerful motives (such as territorial ambitions in Asia, determination to be on equal terms with the Western powers, and resentment at racial discrimination as reflected, for example, in the United States exclusion policies) provided a more or less permanent focus for what may be described as ‘chronic nationalism*. These motives were pointed up and exploited by the ruling élites in their pursuance of expansionist policies. No such impelling objectives have so far developed in the post-

The Evolution o f Post- War Nationalism

159

war period to provide a sense of national mission, and nationalism has reverted to what is frequently described as a ‘pre-modern* form. The prevalence of this diffuse type of nationalism has no doubt helped the Government in its efforts to restore at least part of the traditional structure. It is, moreover, possible that in an emergency the country’s leaders could once more, by various forms of indoc­ trination and repression, mobilize scattered nationalist feelings into a strong political force. But, as Professor Maruyama writes in dis­ cussing the loss of a feeling of national raison d'être, ‘Whatever form future nationalism may take, unless it succeeds in inspiring some fresh sense of mission having a power of attraction. .. matching that associated with nationalism in pre-war Imperial Japan, it cannot be expected to develop as an independent force.*1 1 ‘Nashionarizumu*, p. 24.

V. The Revival of Nationalist Movements on Traditional Lines In examining the course of post-war nationalism in Japan, we should make a clear distinction between the development of nationalistfeel­ ing in the country and that of organized national movements. In the same way it is important to distinguish between what Professor Fujiwara terms ‘rightist éléments*, in which he includes men of strong conservative conviction, members of the conservative party, bureaucrats, former professional military personnel, industrialists and landowners, and ‘right-wing organizations’, which he defines (not without a certain bluntness) as ‘merely the gathering of socially unreliable, reckless people, with some stragglers from the intel­ lectual class’.1 The trends so far considered have involved the revival of a form of nationalist feeling (as a reaction to the post-war collapse and to inter­ national conditions), and the efforts of rightist elements to encourage this nationalism and to utilize it both in combating Communism and in carrying out a ‘reverse course’ policy of partially restoring pre­ war patterns at home. The re-emergence of right-wing organizations in the latter part of the Occupation period, and especially after the restoration of independence, belongs to the development of national­ ist movements. It is in itself not central to the evolution of post-war nationalist feeling, but should rather be viewed as one sign of the general swing of the pendulum in Japan. In other words this reemergence has so far been more important as a symptom of political trends than for any actual influence that it has exerted on them. The ‘Reverse Course’ and the Re-emergence of Traditional Nationalist Movements As we have seen, the pre-war ultra-nationalist groups that man­ aged to survive the Occupation typhoon were obliged to adapt them­ selves to the inclement environment by either dispersing into rural 1 ‘Nationalism’, p. 84.

161 areas, or completely changing their programmes, or both. The post­ war anti-Communist groups had, in their turn, met the new con­ ditions by adopting quasi-modern slogans and attempting to win popular support, in which efforts, as we have noted, they were sig­ nally unsuccessful. The right-wing organizations that developed later in the general context of the ‘reverse course*, however, were on the whole not burdened with any desire to appear modern, or with any particular ambition to become mass parties; instead they were content to evolve on largely traditional lines as patriotic cliques, which in fact, if not in theory, looked for their support to established conservative elements in the country, rather than to the mass of the people. So far as the relationship is concerned between the development of nationalist feeling and the ‘reverse course* trend on the one hand, and the re-emergence of traditional nationalist movements on the other, this has so far been entirely one-sided. The post-war rightwing organizations have not had the slightest effect in determining the evolution of nationalist sentiment or in inspiring the ‘reverse course* policy, much as they might approve of these tendencies. The rightist organizations, on the other hand, were themselves over­ whelmingly influenced by the national trends that we have been con­ sidering. In the first place, the Occupation’s depurge policy made it pos­ sible for a large part of the pre-Surrender professional rightists once again to engage openly in politics. On 6 August 1951, as part of the reverse policy of the Occupation, now accelerated by outbreak of war in Korea, a total of 2,457 m^n, hitherto purged for their mili­ tary or ultra-nationalist associations, was released from all restric­ tions, and of these a significant number thenceforth contributed its services to resuscitated right-wing movements.1 It is worth noting, however, that despite the extent of the depurge, it was not complete, and that at the time of the Peace Treaty Conference many of the most prominent ultra-rightist personalities continued to have their activities seriously curtailed by the purge.2 Even after the official resumption of independence in April 1952, the Occupation-inspired Organization Control Ordinance, though primarily directed The Revival o f Nationalist Movements

1 Keibi Keisatsu, pp. 153-4. 8 Among these were Okawa Shümei, Inoue Nisshö, Tanaka Seigen, Shindö Kazuma, and Hozuma Goichi (Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyokti, pp. 155-6).

162 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan against the extreme left, tended for some time to inhibit the blatant reappearance of traditional right-wing groups under pre-war leadership.1 So far as the Government was concerned the Com­ munists remained, as in pre-war days, the Public Enemy Number One; at the same time, however, the conservatives were, on the whole, not inclined to view with sympathy the re-emergence of those professional nationalists who in earlier days had so often com­ bined with the militarists to make life uncomfortable for them. The country’s leaders, as we have seen, felt quite capable of dealing with the left wing without any help from the hands of militant pre-war patriots and they made it clear that they would apply the full sanc­ tion of the law in controlling the latter should they become ob­ streperous.2 As a result most of the re-emergent rightist groups, 1 The Ordinance (Dantai Tô Kiseirei) ceased to be effective in April 1952 with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, on the grounds that it was simply an administrative regulation imposed by the Occupation. The main result was seriously to weaken the Government’s legal sanction against the JCP. At the same time it greatly lessened the threat of dissolution that had hitherto hung over rightist organizations. 2 See p. 102 above. Both the Public Security Investigation Agency (Kôart Chösa Chö), established in July 1952 as a successor to the Special Investigation Bureau ( Tokushin Kyoku), and the Police Guard Division (Keibi Bu) of the Police Agency (Keisatsu Chö), established in June 1954, though more concerned with left-wing illegality, also maintained departments to investigate the background of post-war rightist groups and their possible violations of the law. The PS IA is an investigating body set up as an extra-ministerial board to enforce the Sub­ versive Activities Prevention Law ; its Second Section is concerned with rightist activities. The Agency is supposed to maintain close liaison with the Police Guard Division, which, in addition to investigation, has the powers of arrest, seizure, and raid. Uyoku Undo (‘Right-Wing Movements’), the extremely useful book compiled by the Police Agency Research Association {Keibi Keisatsu Kenkyûkai) which has been used extensively in obtaining material for the present study, was first published in November 1952 and the most recent edition appeared in February 1955. As an appendix this book lists the main laws applicable to criminal activity on the part of rightist organizations. All these, of course, apply equally to left-wing illegality : 1. Subversive Activities Prevention Law (July 19s 2); 2. Radio Law (May 1950, revised July 1952); 3. Criminal Code, Section II on Complicity, Section 26 on Homicide (Apr. 1909, revised Oct. 1947 and Aug. 1953). 4. Penalties for violent acts (Apr. 1926). 5. Gunpowder Law (May 1950, revised Aug. 1953). 6. Law for the Control of Firearms and Swords (Nov. 1950, revised Aug. 1953)7. Penalties to control the use of explosives (Dec. 1884, revised Mar. 1908 and Apr. 1918). 8. Articles concerning the crime of duelling (Dec. 1889). 9. Special criminal law accompanying the Administrative Agreement (May 1 9 5 2 ). 10. Public Security Regulations (i.e. regulations enacted by local public entities under the terms of Art. XCIV of the Constitution. In July 1948, Osaka City

163 though fully of traditional vintage, made some attempt at remodel­ ling their organizations so as not to appear too brashly avant-guerre in their composition and philosophy. Many of the more notorious ultra-nationalist figures, like ökawa Shümei and I noue Nisshö, whose overt participation would have been more of a liability than an asset in acquiring support, were allowed to linger on for a time in relative obscurity. In particular the groups in question emphasized their devotion to legality as a means of achieving their aims. Apart from the direct effects of the depurge in permitting former ultras to resume open political activity, the various aspects of the ‘reverse course* policy almost all combined to produce a more favourable climate for their operations. The mass release from purge restrictions of former militarists, for example, and the concurrent build-up of new Japanese armed forces suggested the possible reemergence to at least some of their pre-war authority of the group to whose power most of the civilian rightists had largely owed such influence as they had enjoyed during their palmier days. The particular way in which post-war nationalist sentiment de­ veloped in the country at large also had a major effect on the revival of pre-war right-wing organizations. Notably, the fact that national­ ism tended to be concentrated so largely on traditional, ‘home con­ sumption*, and non-political symbols led the re-emergent rightists to stress the restoration of strictly Japanese virtues—respect for the family system and personal devotion to the Emperor—rather than, as in pre-war years, the need for a fundamental reform at home in order more effectively to pursue the national mission abroad. In many ways the organized rightists, though so hopelessly out of tune with the times, were, during the post-war period here considered, reasonably sensitive to the form that Japanese nationalism was tak­ ing in the country, and on the whole they were careful to respond to it. The Revival o f Nationalist Movements

enacted a restrictive regulation concerning parades and demonstrations ; the constitutionality of the regulation is still to be determined by the Supreme Court). The only legal sanction against the dissemination of inflammatory ultra-national­ ist views (as opposed to overt activity) is contained in the section of (i) above which provides for penalties in cases of incitement to infringe the law in question. With this single limitation, which has hitherto not been enforced, ultra-nationalist elements have been completely free since April 1952 to organize and to spread their doctrines. The Government has in practice made no attempt to undermine the legal basis of their existence, as it did in the case of the JCP (p. 111 above). Rightist brushes with the law have so far almost invariably resulted from their efforts to raise funds by illegal methods, such as blackmail, extortion, and robbery.

164

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

Points in Common and Points of Disagreement Before examining a few of the individual organizations, it may be useful to view in outline the general approaches which these groups had in common and also the main points of ideological difference. In the first place, the re-emergent rightists, however much they might diverge on other points, would invariably begin and end by stressing the crisis with which Japan was faced on the political, economic, and international levels—crisis to which, needless to say, they alone could provide a solution. Post-war Japan has her full share of critical problems, to be sure ; yet the constant harping on this theme by the old-guard rightists is to a large extent a reflection of their habits of pre-war days, when the words kiki, hijöji, ittan kankyü, kikyü somböy and kokunan (all indicating various degrees of national emergency) reverberated forebodingly throughout their writings and speeches. To meet this crisis it was essential, according to the re-emergent groups, to restore a sense of national pride among the people, and for this purpose, to revive traditional national virtues. This involved on the one hand a strengthening of the family system, and on the other a ‘restoration* of the Emperor. In the latter context the stirring term Shöwa Ishin (‘Showa Restoration*), so popular among ultranationalists in the 1930*3, came once more to be used commonly by traditional rightists, with the meaning that if Japan was to surmount her crisis, power must be restored to the present Emperor, as it had been some eighty years earlier to the Emperor Meiji. The rightwing organizations that we are considering tended, in the most com­ plete sense of the word, to be reactionary, and restoration of power to the Emperor was to be one aspect, albeit the most important, of a general return to earlier patterns, including a full-scale revival of traditional customs, institutions, principles, and relationships. For the Emperor to ‘enjoy his own again* a revision of the 1947 Constitution, in which he had been relegated to the role of mere symbol, was clearly essential. Accordingly the old-guard rightists were unanimous in demanding that this foreign-inspired document cease to be the basic law of the land and that either the Meiji Con­ stitution or a new indigenous Constitution be substituted. As part of the restoration movement there was to be a complete reform of the country’s leadership and in particular an overthrow of the corrupt political organization, which polluted the national struc-

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements 165 ture. Politicians and political parties of the left, right, and centre were excoriated not only for their alleged proclivity to corruption but for the far more fundamental sin of ‘egoism*, that is of putting sec­ tional or class interests above those of the nation itself. The attacks and demands for political reform were, however, rarely as violent or sweeping as in pre-war days; for, as we shall see, the post-war rightist leaders, in the absence of the military from the political scene, tended in practice to co-operate with existing conservative forces rather than to seek to overthrow these forces by means of ‘incidents* or coups d’etat. Although the burden of the ultra-rightist opposition was directed at the abuses of the democratic system, there was almost always the implication that democracy itself was at fault, being essentially a foreign system, unsuited to the peculiar characteristics of Japan. Loyal compliance to the disinterested, patriotic decisions of ex­ perienced men was instinctively regarded as a superior method for the conduct of affairs than following the wishes of the confused and untutored majority. Most of the re-emergent groups were under the leadership of pre-war diehards, in whose opinionated minds opposi­ tion to Western ideology was far too deeply embedded to permit them the type of lip-service to fashionable liberal ideals that we have noticed in the case of some of the younger leaders of post-war antiCommunist bodies. Again, these groups by the very nature of their organization ran counter to any possible democratic aspirations on the part of the members. Almost invariably they were oyabun-kobun élites, closely bound together by ties of personal loyalty to a leader who exercised more or less autocratic power over all policies and activities. The spiritual dislocation of the people, and especially of the youth, was one of the main themes that the groups held in common. This, they averred, could not be corrected by the inculcation of any foreign creed but only by the revival of time-tested Japanese values. Thus Mr. Tachibana Kösaburö, in a conversation with the present writer, lamented the emptiness and decadence of present-day young people, who wasted their time in pachinko and sumäto-böru (‘smart ball*) parlours,1 instead of cultivating the national virtues; a re­ newal of respect and love for the Emperor must return to fill the 1 Types of pin-ball machines whose popularity in post-war Japan is regularly cited by those of conservative bent in lamenting the decadence of the younger generation. N

166 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan vacuum, and it was for this reason that Mr. Tachibana himself was devoting years of work to a many-tomed book about the Emperor Jimmu; until young people were once more imbued with unselfish, patriotic feelings there could be no possible hope for the revival of the country. The demands for political reform were usually accompanied by plans for improving the economic system. Sometimes, as in the case of Tachibana Kösaburö or of the groups inspired by Ishiwara Kanji’s ideas, these were aimed at de-urbanization and agricultural autonomy; in other cases they involved various degrees of state planning. Almost all the schemes had in common the rather chi­ merical goal of achieving complete economic independence for Japan by building up an economy based on the national good rather than on the benefit of any particular class in the community. ‘Ego­ ism* was, as usual, viewed as the root of all evil ; capitalism, Com­ munism, and the organized labour movement were all opposed on the grounds that they sought to advance the interests of specific groups rather than the general good of the nation. So far as capital­ ism was concerned, however, opposition to the economic status quo never approached in bitterness and violence that which had been ex­ pressed in pre-war days by members of the Reformist Right Wing (kakushin uyoku); nor was there any enthusiasm for the type of national-socialism that had been preached by Kita Ikki and his fol­ lowers. For one thing, most of the old-guard rightists were now far too preoccupied with the need for restoring the traditional patterns that had been disrupted as the aftermath of defeat to give much of their energy to plans for economic reform. Furthermore, with the eclipse of the military, right-wing leaders recognized that the locus of established power had largely moved to the country’s powerful capitalist groups ; if, as seemed inevitable, they were to continue in their traditional role of being an ‘auxiliary force’, it was to these quarters that they would have to look for much of their future sup­ port. Small and medium business men, notably shopkeepers, had since before the war often provided support for nationalist move­ ments and, as we shall find, many of the revived groups directed a special appeal in this direction. As in past times, the woes of this group were attributed largely to the encroachments of the zaihatsu and the iniquities of the existing system of monopoly capitalism. Yet, however ‘egoistic* and unpatriotic this system might appear in

167 their eyes, the extreme rightists were on the whole obliged to temper their attacks on it. No similar compunctions existed in the case of their attacks on the labour movement or on the JCP, and the right-wing groups were able to unleash the full fury of their invective against the minority which, as they claimed, was for its own selfish interests bringing ruin on the Japanese people. It is true that the re-emergent rightists differed fairly widely in the scope of their anti-Communism. Some of them, while bitterly opposed to ‘Stalinism*, were prepared to recognize certain merits in ‘Marxism* and ‘Leninism* ; others felt that Japan might learn some useful lessons from the Chinese form of Communism;1 still others advocated some sort of a truce with the JCP until such time as Japan had achieved complete independence.2 On the whole, however, Communism was viewed as being dia­ metrically opposed to all that was best in the Japanese tradition and it remained the most important single target for attacks by the rightist leaders who re-emerged on the scene following their de­ purge. Apart from their own no doubt sincere opposition to Com­ munism, these attacks gave them an objective in common with the established conservative forces in the country, with whom they must co-operate if they were to achieve any of their pre-war in­ fluence. As for organized labour groups, notably Sôhyô, these they regarded as being themselves under overwhelmingly Communist influence and, besides, as being fundamentally unpatriotic, since they were directed towards the interests of a single class. In opposing strike action by word and by deed the right-wing organizations were again in the congenial, and often profitable, position of working on the side of the Establishment. Regarding Japan’s position in the world, the old-guard national­ ists gave priority to the achievements of ‘complete independence*. Almost all of them had opposed the San Francisco Peace Treaty— The Revival o f Nationalist Movements

1 e.g. Tsukui Tatsuo (see below, p. 451), the well-known National-Socialist theoretician, who, on his return from a journey to Communist China in the sum­ mer of 1955, wrote a book (Uyoku Kaigan, ‘The Right-Wing Shore’) describing in glowing terms the progress made in China under Communism. For this he was violently attacked as a renegade by many of his less flexible sympathizers. A similar sensation was caused in rightist ranks by the sympathetic reaction to Communist China of ex-Lieut.-General Endö Saburö (a former member of the extremist young-officers’ group, the Cherry-Blossom Association, and later head of the Aircraft Production Bureau), who visited Peking in 1956 as head of a delegation of former military officers. * Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, p. 154.

168 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan and done so for the same general reasons as were advanced by the extreme left, namely that it had strings attached and that, because of the concomitant Security Treaty and Administrative Agreement, it granted only the form or illusion of independence, without the full reality. Demands for thorough revision of the pacts with the United States on a basis of ‘equality* were common to the programmes of most of the rightist organizations, and in certain cases, as we have noted, it was even suggested that the struggle against Communism should be suspended until real independence had been achieved. In order to win independence from the West, it was generally felt by the societies in question that Japan must work together with the other Asian peoples, in particular with those of non-Communist countries. ‘Asia for the Asians* was an especially popular slogan among the groups that belonged to the Töa Remmei tradition. The pan-Asian brand of neutralism advocated by men like Tsuji Masanobu has already been examined in some detail, and here it may simply be said that this general approach to Japan’s foreign policy is shared by much of the right-wing movement. On the other hand, though the national Lebensraum was more cramped than ever, there was virtually no harking back to the blatant expansionist am­ bitions of pre-war days. Even the most obscurantist of the chau­ vinists seemed to be aware, however reluctantly, that in the context of post-war Japanese nationalism such slogans as ‘Japan the leading power of East Asia* {Töa no meishu Nihon) had little practical rele­ vance. The achievement of independence through Asian solidarity had taken the place of ‘spreading the Great Cause throughout the world*. The constant harping on the need for ‘complete independence’ led the old-guard rightists into a contradiction regarding their atti­ tude to the United States, a contradiction similar to that which had served to divide the early post-war anti-Communist groups.1While the rightist organizations were unanimous in attacking the Yoshida Government for its allegedly subservient attitude to Washington, they differed widely among themselves as to the need for allowing American bases in Japan to protect the country against the Com­ munist danger, and also as to the proper degree of American par­ ticipation in Japan’s defence programme. As Professor Kinoshita points out, the attitude towards the United States on the part of the 1 See above, pp. 75-76.

169 old-guard rightists was as often as not determined by how they had fared under the Occupation.1 Since most of them had, in fact, de­ spite their frequent overtures and protestations of common purpose, been given rather short shrift by the Occupation authorities, and especially since they belonged to groups which before the Surrender had been thoroughly steeped in anti-Western feeling, it would seem that the natural inclination of these men would be to match their anti-Soviet sentiment with an equally strong anti-Americanism. The realities of the post-war situation, however, were such that if the right-wing organizations espoused open anti-Americanism they were automatically condemning themselves to isolation from both sides and hopelessly reducing any chances that they might have of receiving support from the established conservative forces in the country, for whom the American alliance was, however regrettably, an overriding national necessity.2Besides, they themselves were the last to minimize the Communist danger, and were on the whole pre­ pared to admit that without American aid Japan would be hard put The Revival o f Nationalist Movements

1 Nihon no Uyoku, p. 154. a This particular drawback of anti-Americanism failed, of course, to apply in the case of the ‘lunatic fringe* nationalists, who as a rule had little intention (or possibility) of co-operating with anyone outside their own ranks. Higo Torn, for example, the young leader of the National-Socialist Workers’ Party (KokkaShakaishugi Rödö Tô), who proudly described himself as ‘a Neo-Nazi’, stood on a platform of out-and-out anti-Americanism. At the time of the 1952 Lower House elections, when he managed to poll 286 votes, he spelled out the details of his ‘Anti-American Struggle Policy’. These included steps which could have been borrowed directly from the JCP programme during its most obstreperous phase: (1) Overthrow the present Quisling (traitor) Government by means of a violent revolution and drive all American influence from the country I (2) All those who go against the people’s wishes must be tried by People’s Courts and condemned to execution in the name of the people. (3) Let us attack the treacherous Quisling rogues in their houses and on the streets ! (4) Let us pull down the American flag wherever it may be and revile it 1(5) Let us embark on anti-American movements in the vicinity of all American bases 1Higo’s xenophobia was not limited to antiAmericanism. Great Britain was also singled out for abuse and in 1953 (at the time of the arrest of two British sailors in Kobe for assaulting a taxi-driver) his followers were instructed to desecrate the Union Jack (unpleasant details may be found in Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, p. 200) and to send it to Buckingham Palace. Fortunately for its own survival, Higo’s group tended to restrict itself to verbal and printed invective; occasionally, however, they would resort to such un­ attractive means of showing their feelings as to break into the American Embassy in Tokyo and relieve themselves on the floor; in February 1958, in commemora­ tion of the 26 February Incident, the Corps made some vague threats against the life of the American Ambassador. The leader himself stood regularly for election and with equal regularity lost his deposit. In 1953 he received some 400 votes in Tokyo (Lower House elections) ; his following, however, appears to have declined, for in the 1956 Upper House elections, when he stood as a representative of the Anti-American Guerrilla Unit (Hambei Yûgeki Tai), he emerged with a total that was small even by the standards of ultra-nationalist groups—o votes.

170 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan to build up adequate defences. One general feeling, therefore, tend­ ed to be that expressed by ex-Colonel Tsuji, namely that the United States should equip large-scale Japanese forces and then promptly withdraw all her own troops from bases in Japan and Okinawa. In the meantime, much as the old-guard rightists might retain private feelings of suspicion or resentment towards America and the West in general, they tended in their speeches and writings to give over­ whelming priority to attacks on Communism and the Soviet Union. The policy of shimbei-hanso (pro-America, anti-Russia) was, to be sure, not a particularly congenial one for men of strong nationalist bent and on the whole the shimbei part of it involved no more than a reluctant admission that in Japan’s present enfeebled condition the American alliance must be accepted as the lesser of two evils. As the Chrysanthemum Flag Association expressed the dilemma, ‘If we sit back, we fall prey to Communist invasion ; if we stand up, we be­ come the catspaw of [American] imperialism.*1 Of the alternatives, most right-wing groups preferred that of the American alliance, unequal though it was bound to be in practice ; the stress, however, was always on the ultimate objective of complete independence. This attitude, it may be added, differs little in kind from that held since 1952 by most conservative elements in the country. A further point of ideological friction among the re-emergent rightist organizations was the rearmament question. Here again the fact that Japanese rearmament was from its beginnings in 1950 so closely associated with American policy led several people who would normally have been its supporters to view it with indifference or distaste. In the minds of many of the old-guard nationalists, re­ armament should be carried out in a thoroughly Japanese way (even though foreign assistance might be necessary at first) and should be directed exclusively to the advancement of Japanese national inter­ ests. For these people the ‘mixed symbolism* of Japanese soldiers dressed in the uniforms of American G.I.’s, as well as the knowledge that all defence plans were drawn up in the closest consultation with Washington, were nothing short of odious and, especially in the early days of the Self-Defence Force, tended to turn them against the entire idea of an American-inspired rearmament.2 1 Quoted by Fujiwara, ‘Nihon Nashionarizumu*, p. 328. 8 A form of emotional resentment against the Self-Defence Forces and their foreign connexions still crops up occasionally in rightist groups. For example, in June 1957 the Asia Youth Corps (Ajiya Seinentai), one of the minor ultra-

171 The anti-rearmament inclination of the New Life Movement has already been examined in an earlier chapter.1 Most such groups, which objected to rearmament primarily on the grounds that it was under foreign direction, came to modify their stand as the American influence on the defence forces became less conspicuous. Such was not the case, however, among men whose main objections were moral or religious, and since 1952 the nationalist groups most con­ sistently opposed to the build-up of defence forces have been those who belong ideologically to the Ishiwara Kanji tradition, notably the Harmony Party.2 The strong opposition to rearmament within the Ishiwara groups resulted, as we shall And, in a complete split in the movement, culminating in 1953 when Tsuji Masanobu broke away from the East Asia League Comrades**Association to form the pro-rearmament Self-Defence League (Jiei Dômei). Apart from the strong stand of the Harmony Party and related groups, it may be said that right-wing organizations have in recent years come overwhelmingly to accept the desirability of large-scale rearmament despite its connexion with America. Also, as we shall see, many of the new rightist organizations that came into being at about the time of the Korean War had as their primary objective the acceleration of rearmament. All this does not point to any increased sympathy with American objectives on the part of Japanese nation­ alists. On the contrary, it springs from the belief that a powerfully rearmed Japan will be in a far better position, not only to fight the enemies on the left, but also to resist American ‘interference*. The Revival o f Nationalist Movements

nationalist youth organizations, made a move to have the doll of Okichi-san (traditionally, but incorrectly, reputed to have been the mistress of the first American Consul-General, Mr. Townsend Harris) removed from the offices of the Defence Board building in Tokyo, where it had until then been ensconced as a decoration. According to members of the Youth Corps, the doll's presence symbolized the fact that the Defence Agency was a ‘mistress of the United States’ and bespoke ‘Japan’s subservience to American military might*. Perhaps the most significant part of the incident is that, as a result of these protests, the Director-General of the Defence Agency, Mr. Kodaki Akira, actually ordered the decoration to be removed from the building (Asahi Shimbun, 28 June 1957). 1 See above, p. 76. * It is noteworthy that many of Ishiwara’s followers should have participated in the Second World Pacifist Conference held in 1954 at the Nichiren temple, Nihonzan Myöhöji. At this Conference they unsuccessfully introduced a motion urging ‘the United Nations to take the initiative in organizing an international meeting in which religious workers, thinkers, scholars and politicians may assemble to seek a way of thought and faith really acceptable to all mankind’. A far cry indeed from the out-and-out chauvinism of young pre-war nationalists (Nichirenkyöt Apr. 1957).

172 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Of the many hundreds of right-wing organizations that emerged as part of the revived nationalist movement, only a few of the more significant groups will be mentioned here. For the sake of conveni­ ence, they can be divided into: (a) organizations that descended directly from pre-Surrender groups, having been resuscitated after the depurge of their leaders, (£) post-war bodies that developed on traditional lines. New Life Japan People's League and Myriad Weapons Society Typical of the re-emergent groups belonging to the so-called ‘pure right wing* (junsui uyoku) was the New Life Japan People’s League (Shinsei Nihon Kokumin Dömei). This was organized in Tokyo in May 1951, under Homma Kenichirö1 following his de­ purge, and was in the direct tradition of his pre-war Purple Moun­ tain Institute (Shizan Juku). Homma had for some time been plan­ ning the unification of all right-wing organizations under the slogans of national independence, pan-Asianism, and anti-Communism; the New Life League became the largest gathering of depurged rightists and included several prominent ex-officers as well as a number of noted terrorists.12 The pan-Asian proclivities of the group were mainly reflected in efforts to co-operate with the Chiang Kai-shek régime in Formosa. Numerous ex-officers were dispatched clandestinely to Formosa, reportedly under the leadership of former Lieut.-General Nemoto, 1 See below, p. 441. 2 Among the leading members were : Suzuki Zenichi of the pre-war Great Japan Production Party, who was active in the 1933 Heaven-Sent Soldiers’ Unit Incident; Kuno Kazuo, also of the Great Japan Production Party; Nakamura Takeshi (b.1912) of the former Loyalists* Sincerity Group and a prominent figure in the post-war nationalist movement; Sagoya Torueo (b.1910) of the pre-war Patriots’ Society and assassin of Prime Minister Hamaguchi (1930). Ex-officers included ex-General M azaki Jinzaburö (d.1956), former Inspector-General of Military Education and one of the main figures in the Imperial Way Faction (Ködö Ha) ; former Rear-Admiral M azaki Katsuji, brother of the preceding, who was placed on the inactive list before the war for his part in the 26 February (1936) Incident, and who after the war headed the militarist Hokushin Kai and was elected to the Diet; former Lieut.-General Nemoto Hiroshi, an extreme militarist, whose name was linked in 1949 with that of Kodama Yoshio in con­ nexion with the raising of funds for procuring weapons and recruiting Japanese personnel for service with the Chinese Nationalists, and w'ho in 1954 headed the All-Japan Ex-Servicemen’s Association (Zen-Nihon Zaigö Gunjin K ai).The group also had contact with such Chinese leaders as General Ho Ying-chin and Han Yun-chieh (former Finance Minister in the Manchukuo Government). It was further connected w'ith certain religious bodies of the Nichiren Sect, such as the Justice Army (Seigi Gun) of Tanabe Nittoku. (ökubo notes.)

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements 173 and abortive efforts were made to recruit Japanese soldiers for ser­ vice with the Chinese Nationalists. As in the case of so many of the groups having connexion with Nationalist China, the League’s finances were said to be helped by smuggling activities.1The aims of the New Life League throw an interesting light on the nature of right-wing pan-Asianism : by helping to land Nationalist forces on the mainland and by participating in Chiang Kai-shek’s struggle to regain power, they planned to establish strong ties between China and Japan which would eventually free the nations of East Asia from both American and Russian influence ; in other words, ‘Asia for the Asians* was the goal, rather than co-operation with the Western democracies. So far as domestic policy was concerned, the League aimed to fight Communism by organizing patriotic students and young exofficers. The martial atmosphere of the group is reflected in the bal­ listic symbolism of the manifesto, which states: ‘Under the banner of the Rising Sun we shall muster a great people’s league which will make the whole nation into a single cannon-ball’.2 The platform of the League was typical of the re-emergent traditional groups and included the following points: (1) complete peace and indepen­ dence, (2) spiritual revolution and the strengthening of a people’s spirit, (3) new political leadership for the people and the foundation of a youth party, (4) development of economic autonomy, (5) es­ tablishment of a people’s defence organization.3 ‘Ours is a reform movement’, reads the manifesto, ‘which aims at strengthening of the internal structure of Japan, faced as it is with imminent crisis; for this aim, we must crush those time-serving, corrupt, un­ patriotic, and destructive forces which at present hold sway in our country.’4 The various references to forming a ‘people’s movement’ were largely decorative; the League belonged squarely to the pre-war elitist tradition and membership was exiguous. Like most such élite groups its existence depended largely on the personality and centri­ petal influence of a single leader, and with the death of Homma Kenichirö in 1955 the League and its various cognate organizations automatically dissolved.6 1 e.g. p. 46 n. 3 above. 2 Keibi Keisatsu, p. 155. 3 Ibid. pp. 154-5. 4 Ibid. 6 Among the cognate organizations were the Myriad Weapons Society ( Yachihoko Sha), the Group Association (Musubt Kai), and the Purple Mountain Institute, the last of which had been revived in Tsuchiura in 1953. All these were

174 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Among these groups a few words should be said about the Myriad Weapons Society ( Yachihoko Sha)t an organization of ultra­ nationalist pamphleteers and fighters, which also descended from Homma Kenichirö’s Purple Mountain Institute, and whose name again revealed its pugilistic bent. This was organized on the classical pattern of elitist terrorist organizations, a good part of its members having taken part in the various pre-war ‘incidents*.1 The Society was founded during the Occupation Period under Nakamura Takeshi (Takehiko) (b.1912), who had made a name for himself in pre-war extremist circles as a member of the Loyalists* Sincerity Group and as a participant in the Heaven-Sent Soldiers* Unit Incident.*2Nakamura was the type of younger rabid nationalist who would have no truck with the democratic slogans that were fashionable in almost all circles during the post-war days. His organization and the fanatically nationalist paper which it published, the Myriad Weapons News ( Yachihoko Tsushin)t were run on a clan­ destine basis. This was especially necessary since, in addition to de­ manding an integral return to the Emperor system, Nakamura was violently anti-American in his views. In the Myriad Weapons News, for instance, he likened the Americans to savages and the War Crimes trials to a cannibalistic rite.3 In order to oust the Americans from Japan Nakamura was even prepared for co-operation with the JCP which he referred to as the ‘People’s Communist Party* (Minzoku Kyösan Tô).4 He was also opposed to any form of rearmament in which the Americans might be involved. Following the dissolu­ tion of the Myriad Weapons Society after Homma’s death, Naka­ mura played an important part in the right-wing unification move­ ment, and later became Chief Secretary of the National Salvation People’s General Federation (Kyükoku Kokumin Sörengö). Harmony Party The influence of former Lieut.-General Ishiwara Kanji on post­ war nationalist movements has already been examined at some length. Though his East Asia League Comrades* Association was, under the leadership of Homma and his associates, and descended from his pre­ war Purple Mountain League. 1 Keibi Keisatsu, p. 165. a See below, App. I ll, p. 433. 3 Quoted in Nagamatsu, Ikite iru Uyoku, p. 276. 4 YükanYomiuri, 10 July 1953. The significance of such possible co-operation between the extreme left and extreme right is discussed below, p. 179.

175 as we have seen, dissolved by the Occupation in 1946, the Töa Remmei movement itself continued on an unorganized basis and in 1949, following Ishiwara’s death, the younger, majority elements in the movement combined to form the Harmony Association. With the mass depurge two years later, this led to the Harmony Party (Kyôwa Tô), which was founded in Yamagata Prefecture on 15 August 1951, the second anniversary of General Ishiwara’s death and the sixth anniversary of Surrender. Ishiwara’s close associate, Kimura Takeo, was the leading figure in organizing the new party, which incor­ porated many of the other groups in the Töa Remmei tradition, such as the National Party and the Flowers-of-Glory Association, and which was supported by still others, like Fujimura Nobuo’s Na­ tional Food Production Increase Comrades* Association and Takeda Kunitarö’s Nichiren Sect Comrades’ Association. The name of the Harmony Association was taken directly from that of the organization founded by Ishiwara Kanji in Manchuria before the war and many of its supporters were men who had come under Ishiwara’s strong idealistic influence during their years on the continent. The significance of the word ‘harmony* was spelled out in one of the early manifestos of the group : ( 1) the basis of our worldoutlook is harmony between the peoples ; (2) our movement is not a class party, but comprises every class, and so aims at the ultimate harmony of all the people in the nation ; (3) these objectives are based on the actual harmony that obtains between the members of our own group.1 It need hardly be added that such constant references to national harmony, concord, or unity are themselves one of the stan­ dard marks of groups with totalitarian inclinations. About 500 members gathered for the inaugural ceremony, which was held close by Ishiwara’s tomb overlooking the Japan Sea, and a statement was issued calling for a nation-wide rally of former sup­ porters of the East Asia League movement. As a beginning it was planned to enlist 30,000 out of the reported 100,000 members of the original East Asia League Society. These ambitions, however, were not to be too easily realized. By the end of 1951 the party had a maxi­ mum of 2,000 members, almost all of them from the Töhoku area. The years did not improve the situation. Despite a fairly successful electioneering campaign in 1953, membership in fact tended to fall, partly as a result of the various splits over the rearmament question, The Revival o f Nationalist Movements

1 Keibi Keisatsu, p. 159.

176 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan and in 1955 it was officially estimated at 529, distributed among 28 branches. A more recent estimate (January 1957) placed member­ ship at about 800. The founding leaders of the Harmony Party, apart from Kimura, were Takeda Kunitarô, concurrently head of the Nichiren Sect Comrades’ Association, and Cho Nyoung Chyu of the Korean Mission; Wada Tsuyoshi, formerly Lieut.-General in the Manchukuo Army, also played an important role in the early history of the party.1 The interest of the Harmony Party lies not in its organization but in its rather unusual approach to many of Japan’s domestic and foreign problems, which, as we shall find, sets it apart from most other post-war nationalist groups. The essential outlook of the party is expressed in the inaugural statement. This curiously eclectic blend of Emperor-philosophy and Marxism is sufficiently import­ ant to be worth quoting at some length: We who burn with the ideal of peace and the resolve to save our nation do hereby with firm intent establish the Harmony Party and raise our voices in the first cry for a new life. Our party is not based on the so-called capitalist system, nor on Communism, but isformed with the Emperor as the centre. By means of a people’s organization bound together by a lofty world-outlook, we aim to realize a truly democratic system of 'control'. In particular, we look to an economic system based on the three principles of state enterprise, union enterprise and private enterprise, which will enable each element in the nation to develop its own special virtues, and which will co-ordinate and make full use of all the capacities of our people. By the planned dispersion of our [urban] population and of our industries into rural villages throughout the country, and by creating an ideal society based on a complete harmony between nature and science and on the incorporation of industry with agriculture (nökö ittai)t we shall resolutely carry out a great national reconstruction, which will com­ pletely alter the appearance of our land. Our ideal society would mean the perfect realization of the lofty ideals of Marx, who would have eliminated every form of exploitation by making full use of the means of 1 Other personalities connected with the Harmony Party were Nakayama Yü, öb a Nobuo (the official representative), Sugiura Haruo, Ushijima Tatsukuma, Kamata Asakichi ; all of these were known as ‘rightist independents’. The Com­ munist renegade, öyama Iwao, was one of the main advisers, and it was he who gave the opening address at the first party convention in September 1951. Little is known about the financial support of the party, except that, as usual, it is in­ adequate and that the group has, since its inception, been hampered by lack of funds. The prominent business man Ayukawa Gisuke is believed to have made some financial contribution, (ökubo notes.)

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements 177 productive power, thus securing a rich cultural life for all the nation.1 As will be seen, this rather grandiloquent manifesto consists largely of a restatement of Ishiwara*s own socio-economic theories, notably his belief in a ‘control* system, urban dispersion, and the ‘in­ corporation* of industry with agriculture. The specific slogans of the party also derive mostly from Ishiwara*s thinking, though some of them are simply the stock-in-trade of traditional nationalist move­ ments, and one of them, indeed, could be the heading of a leader in an English daily: (1) Let us concentrate the political power of the people and focus it directly on the Emperor, thus securing the inde­ pendence of our Fatherland! (2) Put politics in the hands of the people ! Down with plutocratic and bureaucratic politics, which are merely taking the place of [pre-war] militarist politics!2 (3) Let us crush the revolutionary violence of the Communists, who falsely rally people under the banners of peace and racial independence. (4) Let us establish a public-service force of 3 million men for build­ ing up our national territory and defending our homeland.3 (5) Without self-sufficiency in food, there can be no national indepen­ dence. Let us lose no time, then, in determining a system of selfsufficiency in food for our hundred million people. (6) Let us reso­ lutely carry out a reform of the agricultural system, collectivizing all arable land and establishing co-operative, mechanized agriculture. (7) Let us respect the rights of the workers, opening every form of business management to the public and having the representatives of workers* unions participate in management. (8) Let us reduce the ranks of public servants at one stroke to a fifth of the present num­ ber, and set the people free ! (9) The only way to prevent a Third World War is to consolidate a great union of the Asian peoples.4 The sense of crisis which we have seen to play such an important part in the psychology of nationalist groups is represented for the Harmony Party by General Ishiwara*s vision of a Final War. With the introduction of nuclear weapons into warfare the catastrophic quality of the conflict now seemed even greater than when Ishiwara had originally predicted it in 1940. To avoid the cataclysm, the 1 Quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 157. Italics are the present writer’s. * An interesting reflexion of Ishiwara’s long-standing feud with the militarists (p. 46 n. 4 above). * Köekigun, given here as ‘public service force’, might be loosely translated as ‘militia’, though the normal word for the latter is mimpei. 4 Keibi Keisatsu, p. 160.

178 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan leaders of the party insisted that it was essential to follow Ishiwara’s theories, especially as expressed in his ‘Theory of the Showa Res­ toration* (Shöwa Ishin Ron) and ‘General Principles for the Found­ ing of a New Japan* (Shin Nihon Kensetsu Taiko); these works ac­ cordingly assumed a canonical value for the members and excerpts from them were regularly printed in the organs of the Harmony Party and related groups. At home the Constitution must be revised so as to establish the political authority of the Emperor. This would lead to a ‘control* system (tôsei shugi) which, as we have seen, Ishiwara considered to be essential for the future development of Japan. The focus of the movement’s domestic policy lay in restoring the balance between agriculture and industry by means of urban dispersion and building up the depressed rural areas, especially in the Töhoku (north­ eastern) and Hokuriku (north-central) districts. As the platform of the Harmony Party stated, ‘The rural population must be awakened to its own strength as the motive force of the revolution ; for unless we build up the rural villages, Japan itself can never be built up.*1 The ultimate goal here was the achievement of economic selfsufficiency, notably in the production of food, without which Japan would always be beholden on foreign countries for her existence and could never regain self-respect. For all these goals, a ‘control* method was essential. The rather bitter pill of totalitarianism was, to be sure, coated with the sugaring of democracy (demokurachikku na tösei-shugi), but how the two systems were to be reconciled was never clearly explained. In foreign policy the accent of the Harmony Party was on inde­ pendence rather than anti-Communism. The sine qua non for world peace was a union of the Asian peoples on a basis of complete equality, as advocated by General Ishiwara. Significantly a Korean was, as we have noted, among the founding members of the party, and from the beginning efforts were made to obtain Chinese and Korean supporters. Great stress was placed on breaking free from the entanglements with the United States and the group exhibited a definitely anti-American bias, no doubt resulting partly from the rather cavalier treatment accorded their hero during the Occupa­ tion. Japan must assume a strong, autonomous position in world affairs and be free to negotiate freely with both sides in the cold war, 1 Ibid. p. 159.

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements 179 in particular with other Asian nations, not excluding Communist China. In this connexion it is worth noting that some of the mem­ bers, mindful no doubt of the ‘lofty ideals of Marx’ as mentioned in their manifesto, advocated the participation of their group in the Communist-inspired Peace Conference in Vienna (1954). In the fight for peace, they said, not even the Communists must be re­ jected as allies. This again pointed to the interesting possibility of a working rapprochement between the right-wing nationalist move­ ments and Communism. The similarity in practical approach be­ tween these two schools in post-war Japan has struck many ob­ servers, and it has been pointed out that Japanese politics are not to be represented by a straight line, with the JCP at one end and the right-wing nationalist movement at the other, but rather by an al­ most complete circle in which the two extremities are much closer to each other than to the more moderate groups in between. Or, as the right-wing theoretician Mr. Tsukui Tatsuo has put it, ‘The right and the left are only separated by a paper’s width.’1 Yet, however true all this may be in theory, the nationalist organizations which we are considering have developed on largely traditional lines and there is little evidence of any tendency towards practical co-operation with the left wing, even though the desirability of such co-operation is occasionally mentioned.2 One major issue on which the Harmony Party took the same general stand as the extreme left, though for fundamentally differ­ ent reasons, was opposition to the way in which rearmament was being carried out. Of all the rightist groups in post-war Japan the Harmony Party was the most consistent and outspoken in its anti­ rearmament position. This resulted partly from their feeling that the National Defence Force was being built up at American behest and mainly in the service of American strategy. A further objection was on economic grounds, namely that Japan could not afford to carry out large-scale modem rearmament and at the same time 1 Cited in Nihon Shühö, p. 10. Dr. H. J. Eysenck’s study (The Psychology of Politics, London, 1954) on the similarity in personality traits between English Fascists and Communists may have some relevance to the problem of the ex­ tremes in Japanese politics. Although there has been no detailed experimental analysis on these particular lines in Japan, the studies of Professor Fujiwara and others (as well as the present writer’s personal observations) would tend to suggest that Dr. Eysenck’s analysis of political attitudes may well be applicable to Japan in many respects, as is shown in Appendix V, pp. 437-9 below. * e.g. p. 174 above.

i8o Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan build up her self-sufficiency. According to Ishiwara, should the Final War break out, Japan’s only hope of not being crushed lay in avoiding alignment with either side, while at the same time being self-sufficient in food. On this issue, as on so many others, the Harmony Party found itself in diametrical opposition to the Yoshida Government. In March 1952 300 representatives of the party called on the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Hirokawa, to demand that in­ creased food production be given overwhelming priority over re­ armament. In place of conventional armed forces, the Harmony Party ad­ vocated the formation of a ‘public-service force* (.Köekigun), a type of combined labour battalion and militia ; this would be composed of 3 million young men and women, who would be responsible for building up and defending the national territory. This ‘public ser­ vice force* would be a completely indigenous organization, receiving no help or ‘advice* from the United States. Since it would be en­ gaged in work on the land as well as on defence, its total effect would be to strengthen the economy. As for recruiting, this would pre­ sumably be solved by the ‘control* system. The underlying objection of the Harmony Party to rearmament, however, was ideological and derived from the religious convictions of Ishiwara and his followers, in whose minds only a spiritual awakening could save Japan and the world from Armageddon.1This attitude, which even emerged in such Gandhi-like slogans as ‘vic­ tory without weapons*, was by no means common to all Ishiwara’s former supporters. In particular it was opposed by the older, minority members, led by ex-Colonel Tsuji Masanobu, who in July 1952 broke off from the main body to organize a revived East Asia League Comrades* Association. The Association’s stand can be summed up by saying that, apart from the rearmament issue, it was essentially the same as that of the Harmony Party, namely antiAmerican, opposed to the Yoshida Government, in favour of ‘Asia for the Asians* and the restoration of the Emperor’s prerogatives at home. So far as the crucial rearmament question was concerned, its position was based on Tsuji’s belief in a strong military force largely financed and equipped by the United States, combined with a policy of neutrality. Within a year of its regrouping, however, Tsuji’s relations with most of the other leading members of the 1 See pp. 52-54 above.

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements 181 Association had become strained, due mainly to his rather extreme attitude on various matters, such as the need for building up a mili­ tant right-wing group to combat expected Communist terrorism in Japan. A movement was started to remove Tsuji from the Associa­ tion and at the same time to reunite into a grand federation all in­ dividuals and organizations, including the Harmony Party, which sympathized with the fundamental ideals of Ishiwara Kanji. Tsuji, however, anticipated this step by announcing his own withdrawal from the Association and promptly organizing the Self-Defence League in August 1953. The Association thereafter continued its efforts to join forces with the Harmony Party, but these have so far been bedevilled because of the basic difference of opinion on re­ armament.1 Meanwhile the Harmony Party, despite its small membership and its essentially local nature, remains one of the most significant organizations in the post-war nationalist movement. Although it has developed on largely traditional lines, the party, be­ cause of its stand on foreign affairs, rearmament, and agriculture, has a potential appeal, particularly for rural youth, which most of the revived pre-war groups lack.

The Anti-Bolshevik Corps and the Great Japan Production Party Of the revived groups that belong to the main stream of the pre­ war nationalist movement, among the most conspicuous have been the Anti-Bolshevik Corps (Sekka Böshi Dan) and its successor, the Great Japan Production Party (Dai Nihon Seisan To). The former, which was founded in Kyoto in May 1952, descended directly from the pre-Surrender Great Japan Renovation Society (1942) and Uchida Ryöhei's Great Japan Production Party (1931), which in turn derived from the Amur River Association (1901) and from the common ancestor of all these groups, the Dark Ocean Society (Genyö Sha) (1881).2 The head of the Anti-Bolshevik Corps was the violent anti1 The revived East Asia League Comrades’ Association continued to exist independently from both the Harmony Party and the Self-Defence League. In 1956 it was reported to have about 3,000 members ; it was thus rather larger than any of the other groups belonging to the Ishiwara tradition. Its leader was exLieut.-General Wada Kei, who since his days in the Manchurian Army, had been a strong supporter of Ishiwara (Asahi Nenkan, 1956). * The Anti-Bolshevik Corps should not be confused with the group of the same name which was founded in 1922 under Yonemura Kaichirö as one of the many ultra-rightist organizations that sprang up after the First World War as a re­ action to the spread of left-wing and liberal ideology. O

182 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Communist Kawakami Toshiji, who before the war had held im­ portant positions in both the Production Party and the Renovation Society, and who had been imprisoned during the Occupation for his role in the Amur River Association.1Another of the leaders was Suzuki Zenichi, a prominent participant in the Heaven-Sent Sol­ diers' Unit Incident (1933) and chief of the Youth Faction of the pre-war Production Party. The Corps also had the potent support of Yoshida Masuzö, the dean of the rightist movement in western Japan (Kansai), who in pre-war days had headed the Osaka branch of the Amur River Association, as well as being a leading figure in the Production Party and the Renovation Society. These old-school nationalists had all promptly succumbed to the purge, and it was not until the end of the Occupation that they reemerged on the political scene. Their years of eclipse had clearly not done much to modernize their views, as can be judged from the manifesto of the Anti-Bolshevik Corps, which smacks more of the early Taisho Period than of the year 1952: ‘Stand forth, all ye samurai who love the Fatherland, ye who make the pride of the people your own pride and, like us, burn with anguish for the nation’s future! The time of crisis is at hand. Join us in the holy struggle against Bolshevism !’12The slogans which accompanied this stirring appeal were hardly more up-to-date : ( 1) We love and esteem the Imperial House. (2) We dearly love our Fatherland. (3) We shall protect the liberty and rights of the people. (4) We shall protect our Japanese Fatherland by working for the complete destruction of all Bolshevik influences.3 All this was taken wholesale from the tenets of the Amur River Association. As will readily be judged, the Corps made little effort to gain a mass following, but developed on traditional pre-war lines as an élite group. Activities were largely centred in the Kansai area, where the Corps engaged in anti-union propaganda and demon­ strations. At the time of the drawn-out dispute in the Omi Silk 1 Kawakami came from Kumamoto in Kyüshü, one of the main provenances of Japanese ultra-nationalists. His great-grandfather, Kawakami Gensai, was a w'ellknown patriot (shishi) of the Restoration Period, who, for his proclivity to putting to the sword those who opposed the Revere-the-Emperor-Expel-the-Barbarian policy, had earned the nickname ‘man-slashing Gensai’. Toshiji had profited from his ancestor’s edifying example by indulging before the war in various violent attacks on ‘unpatriotic’ individuals, for which he was imprisoned (Nagamatsu, lkite iru Uyoku, p. 268). 2 Quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 162. * Ibid. p. 161.

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements 183 Industry Company (1954-5) it issued a stern warning to both sides to correct their ‘selfish* policies. To ensure that moral pressure could, if occasion arose, be matched with more forcible persuasion, a Kawakami Hall was set up in the Kyoto headquarters where mem­ bers might studyjüdö, karate, and similar pugilistic arts. In 1953 the Corps staged a violent attack on the welcoming committee that was to greet the veteran labour leader öyama Ikuo on his arrival in Kyoto. These efforts did not go unnoticed by anti-union business men and the financial position of the Corps was reported to be comparatively favourable, due mainly to support from Kansai industrialists.1 In 1954 the group decided to resume its original pre-war name and the Great Japan Production Party was officially inaugurated in Osaka under the leadership of Kawakami Toshiji. Suzuki Zenichi was put in charge of the Central Japan (Chüo) branch and Sekine Kishirö of the Eastern (Kantö) branch,2 while the old stalwart, Yoshida Masuzö, who had in 1953 started the publication in Osaka of the extreme right-wing paper, The New Japan Defence Journal (Böei Shinnihon Shimbun), continued to give his influential support. The slogans of the new party had a slightly wider scope than those of the Anti-Bolshevik Corps, though none was of remarkable origin­ ality: (1) Complete independence for Japan; (2) autonomous union of the Asian peoples; (3) absolute world peace; (4) enactment of an indigenous Constitution; (5) strengthening of the defence forces; (6) immediate end of interference by Russia and America in our in­ ternal affairs ; (7) annihilation of the JCP ; (8) protection of small and medium industries. In comparing this programme with that of the pre-war Produc­ tion Party, one is immediately struck by the inward-looking nature of the former. While the pre-war party called for the development of a strong foreign policy based upon the Greater Japan concept, in­ dependence and reform for Manchuria and Mongolia, the guidance and development of China and the reconstruction of a new Asia, its successor merely makes a vague appeal for the ‘autonomous union of the Asian peoples*.3 A further notable area of difference lies in the respective attitudes to the existing economic system. The 1932 1 Nagamatsu, I kite iru Uyoku, p. 269. a Sekine Kishirö (b.1905) was arrested in 1956, together with Sagoya Tomeo, on charges of extortion. 3 Slogans of pre-war Great Japan Production Party outlined in Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement, p. 361 n.

184 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan programme of the Production Party demanded a basic revision or abolition of the ‘ruinous capitalist economic system*, the state con­ trol of finance and industries, social legislation, relief for the working classes, and the reduction of taxes ; in 1954, however, such attacks on the capitalist system had, for reasons suggested earlier, been virtu­ ally abandoned. Nor was there any echo of the pre-war demands for the destruction of ‘plutocratic political power and of the pluto­ cratic parties—the Seiyü Kai and the Minsei 7 o*. The main points that carried over from pre-war days, apart from fanatic respect for the Emperor and the Emperor system, were contained in the 1932 slogans calling for the increase of national-defence efforts, the ex­ clusion of ‘aggressive Western powers*, the promotion of family ethics, and the end of ‘class egoism*. The post-war emphasis, in other words, was on ‘home consumption* nationalism and on return to tradition. The revived Production Party, like its predecessor, concentrated on building up strength in the Osaka area, although it had fortythree sub-branches in various parts of the country. Estimated membership rose from about 600 in 1954 to between 2,000 and 2,500 at the end of 1956. Kamoda Tokuichi, who stood in the 1955 Lower House elections (Kyoto district) as a representative of the combined Great Japan Production Party and Anti-Bolshevik Corps, received about 6,000 votes but was not elected. Again it would appear that Kansai business interests provided more effective support than the general public, and funds do not seem to have been a major difficulty for the group. Among the party’s more con­ spicuous activities were a violent attack on the Communist leader Mr. Shiga Yoshio during an election speech in Kyoto (1954) and a threatening call on Mr. Yoshida, the Prime Minister, at his official residence prior to his world tour in 1954;1 in 1956 the party sent a delegation to the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Köno, and reportedly 1 The nationalist opposition to Mr. Yoshida which, as we have seen, came from both the left and the right, reached a climax just before his departure from Japan in the autumn of 1954. Right-wing groups gave warning that Mr. Yoshida, by visiting Washington, would further compromise Japan's independence, and at this juncture the Great Japan Production Party declared, in foreboding pre-war style, ‘If Mr. Yoshida does not abandon his trip abroad, we are prepared.’ He did not and they were : on 21 September 1954 Maruyama Toshiyuki, head of the Kobe branch of the party, called on Mr. Yoshida in Tokyo. He was armed with a dagger and used threatening language to dissuade the Prime Minister from his im­ pending trip. The visitor was, however, arrested before he was able to supplement his verbal demands with action. This was one of several abortive attempts by

185 obtained a pledge that he would not cede to the Russians during the forthcoming negotiations. The Revival o f Nationalist Movements

Constitution Justice Cultivation Association and the Japan National Polity Institution The Constitution Justice Cultivation Association (Rikken Yösei Kai) has already been mentioned as one of the pre-war groups that braved the inclement conditions of the immediate post-war period to re-emerge only a few months after Surrender.*1 The Association was originally founded in 1923 by the Buddhist patriot Tanaka Chigaku (d.1938). It was revived in March 1946 under his son, Tanaka Sawaji (1887-1955), who had been in charge of the group since 1929, in collaboration with Dr. Satomi Kishio. The focus was on establishing Emperor politics (Tennö seiji). As opposed to most of the ultra-nationalist leaders, who always spoke of restoring power to the Emperor, Tanaka admitted that the Japanese Emperor had in fact never ruled, real authority having always been in the hands of regents, military dictators, Privy Councillors, and the like. Only by giving power to the Emperor in fact as well as theory could there be a real national revival.2These views were hardly designed to appeal to the Occupation in its early stages and it was not long before Tan­ aka Sawaji found himself on the purge list. His Association, though not actually dissolved, languished until the depurge in 1951. In November of that year a meeting was held in Tokyo of about 100 former members of the Association in commemoration of the thir­ teenth anniversary of the founders death. The principal slogans adopted were: (1) Power must be centred with the Emperor. (2) Down with the Communist Party ! (3) Destroy the Constitution ! In view of the name of the Association, this last slogan may seem a trifle incongruous ; it should be remembered, however, that Rikken (Constitutional) referred to the Meiji Constitution, in which the Emperor was ‘the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty*. The principal objective remained the reconstruction of Japan in terms of the ‘Emperor spirit*. Like most of the revived pre-war groups, the Constitution Justice Cultivation Association had, despite right-wing fanatics on Mr. Yoshida’s life (Nagamatsu, Ikite iru Uyoku, pp. n , 24Ï-2). 1 See above, p. 43. * Keibi Keisatsu, p. 164.

186 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan the cataclysm of total war and defeat, learned nothing and for­ gotten nothing. This, indeed, was a source of no little pride, as may be judged from the following boast in the group-organ, JusticeCultivation Review ( YöseiJihÖ) : ‘We alone of all the political groups in this land of Japan have in the post-war period held consistently to our pre-war attitude. Firm as steel, we have changed neither the name, nor the principles, nor again the slogans of our Association.*1 The statement is perhaps rather more revealing than its authors in­ tended. Plans for recruiting members and raising funds were, as ever, on the ambitious side. The initial campaign was aimed at obtaining i million members and io million yen. There is no evidence about the achievement of the latter objective, but by 1957 membership had only barely reached the 4,000 mark. Headquarters were in Tokyo and a total of some 150 branches existed throughout the country. Fifteen candidates contested seats in the 1953 elections, but without the slightest success. Since Tanaka’s death in 1955, leadership of the Association has been uncertain. A cognate group was the Japan National Polity Institution (Nihon Kokutai Gakkai), originally founded in 1936 by the right-wing theoretician Professor Satomi Kishio, who was a younger brother of Tanaka Sawaji. The aim of the Institution was to undertake a ‘scientific* study of the various traditions on which the national polity was based, in order to endow that polity with the new strength that it needed to face the modern world. The group was quiescent during most of the Occupation period, but was reactivated in 1951 with an announcement of objectives by Professor Satomi: Our movement is aimed at enlightening the entire nation by making the people keenly aware of the need to use the sovereign power of Japan to effect a complete revision of the American-manufactured Constitution, which acts as an obstacle to our independence, and to enact a new Con­ stitution.2 The innovations of the Occupation period were given short shrift : We undertake the thoroughgoing criticism and annihilation of all those destructive, revolutionary thoughts that serve to undermine our national polity, the [Shinto] deities of Heaven and Earth, the Emperor, the history of our nation and the family virtues.3 1 Quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 165. 2 Ibid. p. 166. 8 Ibid. See also p. 52 above for Dr. Satomi’s views on the Emperor.

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements 187 All ‘unscientific* interpretations of the national polity, whether from the left or the right, were to be exposed and attacked. By its constant use of outmoded phraseology (its very name being a case in point), the Japan National Polity Institution showed itself to be even more out of touch with the present-day atmosphere than most of the revived rightist organizations. Professor Satomi, with his uncompromisingly reactionary stand, has played a rather inde­ pendent role in the post-war nationalist movement. In 1955 his organization had twenty-three branches, with headquarters in Tokyo. Membership was estimated at about 350; most of these were men of the older generation, thoroughly steeped in traditional nationalism.

Great Japan Patriots' Party The Great Japan Patriots* Party (Dai Nihon Aikoku To) will be mentioned as the final example of nationalist groups descending directly from pre-war organizations. It also provides a good instance of the one-man parties (ichinin-ittö-teki na mono) that proliferate in the nationalist movement; for although membership is not entirely restricted to Mr. Akao Bin, the group, for all its grandiloquent name, consists in effect of this single gentleman and a handful of zealous followers.1 The Great Japan Patriots* Party, like its predecessor, the Japan Anti-Communist League, is in the direct tradition of the pre-war National Founding Association and the Great Japan Imperial Way Association.2 It was organized in Tokyo in October 1951, following Mr. Akao*s release from purge restrictions. His domestic objectives included the aims common to most of the revived nationalist move­ ments, such as constitutional revision, harmony between the Em­ peror and his subjects (Kummin itchi), thoroughgoing opposition to the JCP, and the encouragement of small and medium business enterprises. The party was strongly in favour of rearmament and in late 1952 Mr. Akao founded an additional group, the League for the Acceleration of Rearmament (Saigumhi Sokushin Remmei), which was supported by the former Prime Minister, Mr. Ashida Hitoshi, and by the conservative educator, Professor Kitaoka Juitsu.3 Mr. 1 Thirty in all, according to Köan Chösa Chö, Shuyö Uyoku Dantai no Shugi Köry ö, but judging from the size of recent demonstrations organized by the group, it would appear that membership by 1957 was closer to 300. * See above, p. 68. 8 Shükan Asahi, 8 Jan. 1953.

188 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Akao’s foreign policy was an intense form of shimbei-hanso (proAmerica, anti-Russia). In particular, he took a much stronger proAmerican stand than most of his fellow nationalists. The post-war switch to pro-Americanism on the part of so many Japanese ultra­ nationalists has frequently in the course of this study been attributed to sheer opportunism. Mr. Akao’s position, however, reveals a cer­ tain consistency, for in pre-war days too his main fury was always directed against Russia, and his attitude towards Great Britain and the United States was relatively moderate. Despite its exiguous numbers, the Great Japan Patriots’ Party has been one of the most conspicuous groups in the revived national­ ist movement. On almost every possible occasion it has made its name and its view known to the public by holding demonstrations, issuing pamphlets, and the like. Its vigilance has been especially directed towards Japan’s foreign relations and it would seem that in recent years a statesman rarely leaves or arrives in Japan without Mr. Akao Bin and his stalwarts being present at the airport to voice their approval or opposition as the case may be. As early as December 1951, on Mr. Dulles’s visit to Japan, Mr. Akao shook hands with him at Haneda Airport, while party members jubilantly waved ban­ ners with the legend, ‘Welcome Dulles! Promote rearmament!’ Some five years later, when the Prime Minister, Mr. Hatoyama, returned from Moscow after signing the joint declaration with the Soviet Union, Mr. Akao and members of his party were on hand at Tokyo International Airport to ‘greet* him with flags draped in black to signify their view on the agreement.1A few weeks later Mr. Akao and his indefatigable followers stationed themselves in the spectators* gallery of the Lower House during the debate on ratifi­ cation. At what he judged to be the correct psychological moment, Mr. Akao began to shout his opposition to the ratification of the Japanese-Soviet pacts and to scatter anti-Soviet handbills on the floor below. His followers in the gallery immediately joined in, roaring nationalist slogans and stamping on the floor, until they were overpowered by the House guards and dragged off to the police station. Some months later they were again at the airport, this time, 1 Before Mr. Hatoyama’s departure twenty-five members of the group, headed by Akao Bin, had staged a sit-down strike in front of the Prime Minister’s residence to protest against the forthcoming talks and to demand his immediate resignation. On this occasion twenty policemen were at hand to protect the Prime Minister from possible violence.

i 89 however, to voice their support for the then Prime Minister, Mr. Kishi, on his departure for the United States (June 1957).1 Four young members of Mr. Akao’s party were in the process of scatter­ ing handbills appealing to Mr. Kishi to adopt an absolutely proAmerican and anti-Communist policy when they were arrested by the police.12*9 The party’s demonstrations were often aimed at counterbalan­ cing those being conducted by left-wing elements. For instance, when the United States Ambassador, Mr. MacArthur, arrived in Japan in February 1957, about 100 anti-American student demon­ strators from the Zengakuren were at the airport with banners bear­ ing such devices as ‘Don’t make Okinawa an eternal A- and HBomb Base’ and with the kindly greeting of ‘Go home, Americans !* They were matched, however, by 120 members of the Great Japan Patriots’ Party, who screamed welcome to the Ambassador and dis­ tributed leaflets calling on the United States to crush the Commun­ ists in Japan. Another typical example of such confrontation occur­ red in May 1957, during the student rallies outside the British Em­ bassy in Tokyo in protest against the hydrogen-bomb tests. On this occasion the numbers were not so well matched: some 15,000 Zengakuren students, carrying slogans with such scholarly labels as ‘To Hell with Macmillan !*‘Englishmen, why aren’t you ashamed of yourselves?’, and (more succinctly) ‘British fools !’, were met outside the Embassy gates by about 300 of Mr. Akao’s followers, waving huge flags denouncing the Zengakuren as ‘Fifth columnists of the Soviet Union’ and calling for a halt in the ‘Soviet-inspired campaign for ban on bomb testing’. The police managed to avert a head-on collision between the two camps—a collision which, one feels, might well have had an effect on the numerical strength of the Great Japan Patriots’ Party that it could ill afford. As a result of his efforts on this occasion, Mr. Akao was arrested and held in custody for a few days. The Revival o f Nationalist Movements

1 It is interesting to note that Mr. Kishi was the first post-war Prime Minister to have received any measure of public support from the extreme nationalists. Both Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Hatoyama were the targets of bitter attacks from the professional patriots, the latter mainly because of his role in the Russo-Japanese negotiations (1955-6). Mr. Kishi’s popularity among extremist circles was not, however, universal. In particular, he was viewed askance by the groups descending from the original Töa Remmei, who recalled the antagonism between him and General Ishiwara Kanji. 9 It is illegal to distribute handbills at Haneda Airport.

190

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

When no foreign-policy issues were at hand, the Great Japan Patriots’ Party turned its wrath against corrupt politicians and ‘un­ patriotic’ trade unionists. In May 1954, for example, members scat­ tered leaflets in the Diet saying ‘Down with the scandal-ridden Yoshida Cabinet ! Purge the corrupt conservative parties !’ After re­ lease from prison the same members attempted to force their way into Mr. Yoshida’s residence to present him with the identical mes­ sage, but were again arrested. More recently, on May Day 1957, twenty members led by Akao Bin, after staging their own ‘Anti-Red May Day’ Rally, marched to the Söhyö headquarters with Rising Sun flags and banners. On arrival they forced their way into the building, shouted ‘Traitor !’ (and worse) at the various union leaders present, and offered them violence; the day’s affray ended at the usual destination, the police station. The group also made its views known by posting slogans in public places. Most of the right-wing nationalist bills that festoon Tokyo’s walls and telegraph poles are those of the Great Japan Patriots’ Party. Early slogans (1951) were ‘Aid for Chiang Kai-shek!*, ‘Down with the Communists!’, and ‘Enforce discipline for the Yoshida Cabinet!’ Later messages with which Mr. Akao saw fit to enlighten the populace were ‘Stop this Christmas business !*(posted, among other places, opposite the Tokyo Chapel Centre, in protest against the increasing observance of this foreign holiday on a largely secular and commercial basis), ‘The Socialist Party is the enemy of the people!*, ‘The Socialist Party is merely a second Communist Party hiding its claws’, ‘Down with strikes!* and (in English) ‘Wel­ come to McArther [r*7r] !’ A rash of posters that appeared in Tokyo at the end of 1957 bore what might seem to be a rather unnecessary admonition: ‘Stop facing both banks of the river, Prime Minister Kishi! Adopt a thoroughgoing pro-American anti-Soviet Policy!*1 Mr. Akao’s strong pro-American and anti-Communist stand has also been translated into efforts to foster relations with Chiang Kaishek and the Nationalist Government. In 1954 he participated in the second Asian Anti-Communist Conference in Formosa, and he has further planned the formation of an Asian anti-Communist agency and an All-Asian Anti-Communist Youth League.2 These 1 There is a pun here on Mr. Kishi’s name, which literally means ‘bank’ or ‘shore*. a Nagamatsu, Ikite iru Uyoku, p. 265.

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements 191 schemes have, however, been thwarted by the perennial lack of funds. In 1953, 1955, and 1956 Mr. Akao’s group participated in the election campaigns, but the results were not encouraging.1Mr. Akao also helped to organize the All-Japan Council of Patriotic Societies (Zen-Nihon Aikokusha Dantai Kyögikai), one of the earlier efforts in the ultra-rightist unification campaign. He has, however, had little success in bringing other groups into his orbit. On the whole the Great Japan Patriots* Party has remained outside the main stream of post-war nationalist organizations, and it has not participated in the National Salvation (Kyûkoku) unification movement. It may be imagined, however, that the members and the party leader are quite busy enough with their many demonstrations, posters, and visits to Tokyo International Airport.

Turning now to the right-wing organizations that developed on traditional lines but without any direct connexion with pre-Surrender bodies, these may be divided into two main types. First, there were organizations which had originally sprung up in the early post-war period as anti-Communist groups with ambitions at win­ ning mass followings. Most such organizations had, as we have seen, succumbed at a fairly early stage to the Occupation ban ; others, fail­ ing wholly to build up any popular following, had gradually fallen into decline or split into insignificant sub-groups. The Korean War and its repercussions, however, with their strongly stimulating effect on the anti-Communist movement in Japan, had served to reawaken many of the dormant right-wing organizations. Yet the objective conditions in which these groups were henceforth to function had changed considerably from the earlier period. For one thing they were obliged to compete with the pre-war leaders who were now reemerging as a result of the depurge. Furthermore the general ideo­ logical atmosphere in Japan had, as we have seen, changed consider­ ably since about 1949. Under these circumstances they in effect abandoned their earlier efforts at becoming mass parties from below, and instead reorganized themselves on traditional élitist lines. 1 Akao Bin received 13,029 votes in the 1953 Lower House elections. Unlike most of the right-wing nationalist candidates, Akao had lost a certain amount of support by the time of the 1955 elections, when he received 12,327 votes. Running for the Upper House in 1956 (from Tokyo local district), he received 30,915 votes. In each case he stood as a candidate of the Great Japan Patriots’ Party. In 1958 he received 10,765 votes.

192 Nationalism, and the Right Wing in Japan The second type of group to be considered is that which came into existence for the first time during the depurge period. Although these groups had no specific pre-war lineage, many of their leading figures were, as we shall note, well established in the traditional nationalist movement. Chrysanthemum Flag Association Considerable notice has already been given in an earlier chapter to the Chrysanthemum Flag Association as an example of the numer­ ous nationalist societies which sprang up during the early Occupa­ tion period under post-war leadership, and which combined tra­ ditional anti-Communism with up-to-date ‘democratic* slogans in an effort to win some degree of mass support. Its later evolution will now be discussed in order to suggest how such groups, having failed utterly in their efforts at becoming people’s movements from below, tended to develop on traditional, élitist lines, looking for their sup­ port mainly to established conservative forces in the country. In May 1950 the Chrysanthemum Flag Association split, as we have seen, into two completely separate groups, the Fukushima Faction under Fukushima Seishi, the former army private and the original founder of the Association, and the Shimazu Faction under Shimazu Sadayasu, the rather more intellectually-inclined leader who had joined the movement in 1949. As is usual in such cases, each side blamed the other for the rupture. On the whole it would appear that the real cause was personal antagonism between the two leaders, in particular Shimazu’s resentment at the autocratic ways of Fukushima, whom he no doubt considered his mental inferior, and Fukushima’s resentment at Shimazu for encroaching on his own position of leadership and even trying to wrest his movement from him. Following the split, the Shimazu Faction set up its head­ quarters in Shimonoseki, while Fukushima remained in Kumamoto (Kyüshü). Both factions tried to expand their influence to eastern Japan. The Shimazu Faction organized an East Japan Regional Committee in Tokyo, which exerted a certain influence on students at Meiji University, one of the centres of the anti-Communist student movement, and Fukushima established a Central Commit­ tee for the Tokyo region in Tachikawa.1 On the whole, however, neither faction has had much success in its efforts to become a 1ökubo notes.

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements 193 national movement, and such influence as they have remains con­ centrated in localities of south-western Honshu and Kyüshü, es­ pecially in the mining areas. So far as membership and funds were concerned, the Shimazu Faction took the lead after the split; by 1955 the discrepancy between the two was considerable, Shimazu having over 2,000 followers in 44 branches, compared with Fukushima’s 500 followers in 16 branches.1 The slogans of the two factions all derive from the so-called philosophy of ‘Kikuhata-ism*. A comparison between the two will reveal a difference in stress, those of the Fukushima Faction being of a rather more primitive character ; in point of grandiloquent fuz­ ziness, however, there is not much to choose between them. Fukushima Faction : (1) Cherish and protect the Emperor system. (2) Restore the independent sovereignty of the Japanese nation. (3) Down with the reactionary Communist Party! (4) Establish an eternally neutral Japan. (5) Work for a classless society by means of a peaceful, noble revolutionary movement. (6) Work for world peace by means of ‘impartial* revolutionary activity, that is, ‘Kikuhataism*. Shimazu Faction : (1) Carry out a Revolution of Love leading to the construction of a noble society. (2) Establish a Third Philo­ sophy on a ‘reciprocal* world outlook.12 (3) Stabilize the people’s livelihood by carrying out a planned economy. (4) Secure permanent peace based on the promotion of liberal, democratic ideology. (5) Abolish all ideas of racial superiority by means of cultural inter­ change between different countries. (6) Work for emancipation from colonialism by securing a coalition between the Asian peoples.3*8 Of the two factions Fukushima’s gave far greater stress to Em­ peror-worship and anti-Communism. Fukushima, too, was much more ready to abandon the idea that the Association should become a broadly-based popular movement. Earlier, as we have seen, he had 1 In 1952 the combined strength of the two factions was about 2,000; there has therefore been a modest growth in membership. * This particular objective derives from the thinking of Shimazu’s pre-war intellectual mentor, Nakano Seigö. The Third Philosophy (Daisan Tetsugaku) is defined by Shimazu as ‘a fundamental philosophy for future social progress based on a reciprocal mastery of the rules of historical development underlying the long history of evolution from primitive society to the present’ (quoted in Köan Chösa Chö, Shuyö Uyoku Dantai no Shugi Köryö, p. 52). The quotation unfortunately throws little light on the meaning of the term, but it does serve to illustrate the mental cloudiness prevailing among extremist intellectuals of this type. 8 Ibid, and Fujiwara, ‘Nihon Nashionarizumu*.

194

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

referred to his group as *a genuine party for the masses’,1but by 1952 he was singing a rather different tune: ‘The Chrysanthemum Flag is a private institute (juku). This institute is my own household. If you want to know about the Chrysanthemum Flag, all you need do is to meet me.’2 Compared with Fukushima’s attitude to the nature and purpose of the Association, Shimazu’s was decidedly complex. In the first place, he was anxious to stress that his group was not simply a re­ actionary, anti-Communist society, as its name and activities might imply. In a spate of auto-criticism following the split he admitted that the Association had erred in giving people the impression that it was an out-and-out anti-Communist body. While it was essential to carry on the fight against Communist subversion, the real goals of the group were far wider in scope; in particular, it was essential to fight the iniquities of the capitalist system, difficult as this might be under the Occupation.3 Concerning the name of the Association, with its rather obscurantist ring, Shimazu wrote : During the early period of chaos following Japan’s defeat, it was essential, first of all, if we were to address ourselves to reactionary patriotic youth, to win them over unconditionally to our side. Once these youths had been absorbed, we could proceed with that most essential of tasks for the rebuilding of defeated Japan, namely, the infusion into their minds of the breath of a new period. For this purpose [of recruitment], the name of our group was especially appropriate.4 Shimazu’s attitude to the JCP was, in fact, ambivalent. As he wrote in November 1950, ‘We loathe the ideological sin of these red elements, but we do not hate them as people.’6The repressive antiCommunist policy of the Occupation and the Yoshida Government was fiercely attacked, not only for having driven the JCP under­ ground and thus having increased its menace, but on a human basis : ‘The Communists may have invited this repression on themselves, but the fact remains that they too are human beings and deserve the protection of the Japanese Constitution.’6 This is an interesting point of view for an extreme right-wing nationalist. In part it de­ rived from the knowledge that by adopting a tough anti-leftist policy the country’s conservative leaders were taking the wind out 1 p. 84 above. 2 Quoted by Fujiwara, ‘Nihon Nashionarizumu', p. 311. 3 Keibi Keisatsu, pp. 168-9. 4 Ibid. p. 169. Italics are those of the present writer. 6 Fujiwara, 'Nihon Nashionarizumu', p. 308. 6 Ibid.

195 of the sails of the rightist organizations, for whom militant antiCommunism had for so long been the stock-in-trade. With the Government itself fighting Communism at every turn, it was diffi­ cult for these organizations to pose as the principal champions de­ fending the people against Bolshevik onslaughts. Men like Shimazu no doubt realized that as a result of the Government’s anti-Communist policy right-wing nationalist organizations, if they were to function at all, would once more be relegated to the role of an auxili­ ary force. Here was a notable exception to the general rule, suggested earlier, that the official ‘reverse course* policy played into the hands of the nationalist movement. In addition to all this Shimazu may have seen, as Professor Fujiwara remarks, that the government axe which was now being wielded on the extreme left might all too readily be turned against the extreme right.1 In contrast to Fukushima, Shimazu spoke of himself as being a ‘progressive’ thinker who viewed Japan’s future realistically. Japan­ ese nationalism could, he insisted, only find expression in terms of the ‘universal principle of Asianism’, and coalition between the Asian peoples was, as we have noticed, one of his slogans. The gener­ al attitude of his followers to Japan’s position in the world and to international affairs is suggested by the results of a poll conducted by Professor Fujiwara in November 1952, among 148 members of the Shimazu Faction.2The following are some of the questions and answers: (1) Q. Can Japan regain her position as a first-class world power? A. Yes 99 per cent. No o per cent. DK 1 per cent. (2) Q. Do you support Egypt and Iran [in their fight for nationalization]? A . Yes 92 per cent. No 8 per cent. (3) Q. Do you consider that Ameri­ can policy towards Japan is well intentioned? A. Yes 33 per cent. No 63 per cent. DK 4 per cent. (4) Q. Do you think that the peoples were really on the side of Japan before the war? A. Yes 88 per cent. No 12 per cent. And, most clear-cut of all (5) Q. Which country has acted worse in Asia, Japan or England? A . Japan o per cent. England 100 per cent. In reviewing the answers to these and other questions, Professor Fujiwara writes, ‘. .. traditional ultra-national­ ist thinking is swirling about in their minds, mixed with concern for the other countries of Asia and tending towards vague ambitions for reform and independence’.3 The Revival o f Nationalist Movements

1 Ibid. * Ibid. pp. 317-18. 8 Ibid. p. 318. Other questions which elicited a fairly clear-cut response were:

196 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan So far as Japan’s economic future was concerned, Shimazu called, as we have seen, for a planned economy to stabilize the people’s live­ lihood. ‘Our real foe now’, he wrote, ‘is not Communism, but monopoly comprador capitalism.*1 Here again he differed from Fukushima, for whom the JCP remained the only significant enemy. Yet, as Professor Fujiwara points out, much as Shimazu and his followers might in theory oppose the capitalist system and advo­ cate a planned, ‘noble* society, the realities of the situation were such that they normally found themselves in violent opposition to the re­ formist parties and on the side of the most conservative capitalist elements in the country. Despite their aspirations for socialistic reform [he writes] the Associa­ tion, because of its fanatic opposition to the Communist Party, its dis­ illusionment with the existing Socialist Party and its determination to maintain its own strict isolation, in the end relegated itself to the stag­ nation of ultra-conservatism.*12 For all Shimazu’s realization of the hopeless limits inherent in any nationalist society which disregarded the popular hopes for social and economic reform and instead restricted itself largely to sterile anti-Communism and reactionary Emperor-worship,3 the force of circumstances was such that after about 1951 his group developed in practice on traditional elitist lines and virtually abandoned its earlier efforts to expect widespread appeal by coupling its traditionalist flavour with demands for socialistic reform. Fujiwara attributes this partly to the hopeless gap between the relatively pro­ gressive leadership of the Shimazu Faction and the rank and file,4 Q. Do you consider that classes exist in present-day society? A. Yes 81 per cent. No 16 per cent. DK 3 per cent. Q. Is the change from a free economy to a planned economy inevitable? A. Yes 96 per cent. No o per cent. DK 4 per cent. 1 Fujiwara, ‘Nihon Nashionarizumu’, p. 311. ‘Monopoly comprador capitalism’ ((dokusen-teki baiben-shihon) is, of course, a favourite catchword of the JCP.

2

I b id *

3 As Professor Fujiwara points out, the ultimate ineffectiveness of nationalist groups that are lacking in popular background and organizations had been im­ pressed on Shimazu by his pre-war teacher, Nakano Seigö (ibid. p. 311 ). 4 The difference in outlook between the leadership of the Shimazu Faction and the rank and file emerges from the results of the ethnic-distance tests conducted by Professor Fujiwara in August 1951 (p. 71 n. 1 above). Shimazu's belief in the need of unified Asian nationalism on the basis of equality had clearly not pene­ trated to the general membership, whose answers tend to reflect a standard shimbi’i-hatiso with little sense of kinship for the other Asian peoples. Whereas India and China are viewed with the least sense of ethnic distance by the leaders, the rank and file feel closest to America and England. Similarly Burma and T hai­ land occupy the same position for the leaders as France and Germany do for the

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements 197 partly to its complete isolation from other groups of both the left and right, and partly to psychological factors. It may be suggested, however, that one of the underlying determinants was the general way in which nationalist sentiment evolved in Japan following the early post-war period. In summary, then, the main trends since about the time of the Korean War in the Shimazu, as well as in the Fukushima, Factions of the Chrysanthemum Flag Association have been, on the one hand the effectual abandonment of efforts at mass organization, which, from the experience of the past five years, seemed too costly in relation to actual results, and on the other the search for influen­ tial people in conservative business, political, and bureaucratic circles on whom they might rely. While building up close-knit organizations on an oyabun-kobun pattern, in which Fukushima and Shimazu respectively enjoyed the röran-style freedom of action and group obedience traditional for ultra-nationalist leaders, the two factions continued, each in its own local area of influence, to engage in anti-union, anti-Communist, and anti-Socialist activities of the type that have already been illustrated. Control remained firmly in the hands of post-war leaders and there was hardly any effort at co-operation with other nationalist bodies, either of the post-war members. The following table suggests the results of tests taken among (a) 122 members of the Shimazu Faction, (b) the managing staff of the group, (c) the Central Committee. Countries are given, as usual, in order of increasing estrange­ ment. It will be noted that the people from whom the greatest sense of distance is felt are in every case the Negroes, Australians, Russians, and Koreans. (c) Central Committee (6) Managing Staff India India America China China England Thailand Germany India Burma Burma France Germany Thailand Germany Indo-China Indo-China Thailand Indonesia Indonesia Italy France France Burma America America Indonesia England England China Italy Italy Philippines Philippines Philippines Australia Negroes Negroes Negroes Australia Australia Korea Russia Russia Russia Korea Korea (Fujiwara, ‘Nihon Nashionarizumu*, pp. 314-15.) It is worth noting that the results of Professor Izumi’s test on race relations taken among members of the Tokyo lower middle class (p. 70 n. 3 above) correspond most closely to those in (a) above. P

198

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

anti-Communist school or of the revived rightist movements. National Territory Defence Research Association and Fatherland Defence Comrades' Association Two final groups, one centred in Tokyo, the other in Osaka, will be examined in this chapter as examples of the numerous nationalist societies that were formed following the depurge without any direct connexion with specific pre-war bodies. Both owed their initial in­ spiration to the challenge of the Korean War and both included among their leaders prominent rightist elements as well as profes­ sional nationalists. The National Territory Defence Research Association (Kokudo Böei Kenkyükai) was founded in Tokyo in December 1950 by the well-known Communist renegade, öyama Iwao.1 The primary ob­ jective of the group was to promote national defence against Com­ munism. In particular, öyama aimed ‘to profit from the lesson of the Korean Incident and to counter the Soviet strategy of promoting a defeatist peace movement*.2 For this purpose, he published a monthly bulletin, the National-Territory Defence (Kokudo Böei), and issued a series of pamphlets in which he attacked inter alia the Peace Problems Symposium (Heizoa Mondai Damuakai) and its lead­ ing academic members, such as Professors Abe Nösei and Maruyama Masao. Because of his own left-wing background, öyama was especially interested in promoting his views on rearmament among labour elements and was active in the anti-Communist Democrati­ zation League (Mindö) movement in the National Railways and elsewhere. As the name of öyama*s group suggests, large membership was not one of its objectives. A review of the leading members reveals an interesting cross-section of nationalist elements, including business men, Diet members, and editors, as well as a handful of professional rightists.3This, of course, fits in with the general tendency of rightist 1 See below, pp. 448-9. 2 Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, p. 166. 3 Members included Etö Natsuo, a former follower of ökawa Shümei and a former Diet member, who headed the Kyüshü branch of the Association; Yoshitake Keiichi, Liberal member of the Upper House and former Minister of Labour; Nakasone Yasuhiro, Democratic Party member of the Upper House; Sugiwara Köta, Liberal Party member of the Upper House and formerly of the Foreign Office; Fujimura Nobuo, head of the National Food-Production Increase Comrades’ Association; Hirota Yöji, President of the Tokyo Trading Co.; Ezaki Masumi, Liberal Party member of the Lower House; Suetsugu Ichiro, head of the Japan Sound Youth Association; Tamai Yükichit Labour-Farmer member

199 organizations to ally themselves wherever possible with existing conservative power rather than to seek mass support. It is significant however, that despite the many respectable conservative names on its committee, öyama’s group also had close connexions with an out-and-out ultra-nationalist society like the Japan Sound Youth Association (Nihon Kensei Kai)> whose president, Suetsugu Ichiro, was one of öyama’s strong supporters. The Fatherland Defence Comrades’ Association (Sokoku Böei Döshikai), usually known by the abbreviated name of The People’s Defence (Mimbö), was organized in Osaka in August 1951, with the same general objectives as öyama’s group. The chairman was Kizaki Tameyuki1 and the president, ex-Admiral Nomura Kichisaburö,*12 former Foreign Minister and Ambassador to Washington at the time of the Pearl Harbour attack, who since 1951 had been one of the leading advocates of Japanese rearmament. The Association rep­ resented a coalition of various anti-Communist bodies in western Japan, and financial support was forthcoming from several Osaka business leaders, including at one time Matsushita Könosuke, the head of the Matsushita Electrical Company.3The People’s Defence which Professor Kinoshita has described as the strongest advocate of rearmament among all the post-war nationalist organizations, publishes a paper, the Mimbö Shimbun, and also organizes nation­ wide lectures and instruction courses on defence and rearmament.4* In June 1952 an affiliated student organization was set up under the name of the New Japan Student League (Shin Nihon Gakusei Dömei). This League consisted of students from sixteen universities in the Kansai area (western Japan), its main aim being to foster an understanding for the need of rearmament. A membership of 150,000 is claimed for the League, but the figure is undoubtedly ex­ aggerated.6 Although Mimbö itself appears to have recruited con­ siderably greater numbers than öyama’s similar group in Tokyo, the leaders were again less interested in building up a large membership The Revival of Nationalist Movements

of the Upper House; Horiki Kenzö of the Upper House; and Komura Sakahiko, formerly of the Ministry of Home Affairs Thought Police. 1 Kizaki was one of the principal organizers of the anti-Communist movement centering in Osaka (Keibi Keisatsu, p. 170). * See below, p. 447. 8 L. H. Battistini, The Postwar Student Struggle in Japan (Tokyo, 1956), p. 132. 4 The Association itself objected to Kinoshita’s description (Shisö, Dec. 1955, p. 17). * Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, pp. 132-3.

200 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan than in obtaining support from influential conservative circles, which would help them to broadcast their views on the Communist peril and the need for large-scale rearmament. As in the case of Oyama’s group, leadership of Mimbö consisted of a mixture of rightist elements and professional nationalists.1 Conclusions In the preceding pages the re-emergence of right-wing organiza­ tions on traditional lines has been discussed as but one aspect—and by no means the most important—of the general revival of nation­ alism in Japan in the context of the ‘reverse course* policy that was initiated under the Occupation and enthusiastically pursued by es­ tablished rightist elements in Japan. The re-emergent groups, as we have seen, almost invariably received their impetus from the ‘crisis* with which Japan was faced and in particular from the challenge of international conditions following the outbreak of the Korean War. As in pre-war days, the internal and external menace of the extreme left played a large part in their motivation. They tended to differ, however, from their pre-war counterparts in laying their main stress on the restoration of traditional patterns rather than on the need for socio-economic reform or the pursuit of a national mission abroad. Here, and in other respects too, they were responding, as we have seen, to the general trend which nationalist sentiment was taking among the people at large. The numerical strength of the re-emergent rightist organiza­ tions is (as we have noted in the case of almost each of the groups discussed) extremely hard to assess. Nor, in view of their virtual abandonment of any ambitions of becoming mass parties, is it par­ ticularly important in judging the extent of their success. As will be recalled, the pre-war rightist societies owed none of their influence to large membership. The actual number of organizations in existence appears, if any­ thing, to have been rather larger in post-war days than before the war. Professor Kinoshita lists 350 right-wing groups for the pre-war period.2 Of these some 210 were dissolved during the Occupation Period. With the re-emergence of rightist movements during the 1 Details in Nagamatsu, Ikite iru Uyoku, p. 277, and Keibi Keisatsu, p. 170. * Nihon no Uyoku, pp. 160-1. The police listed 741 nationalist associations in 1936, but a great number of these was small and obscure (Storry, Double Patriots, p. 26).

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements 201 latter part of the Occupation, the total number of groups in 1951, including both old and new, was given as 540. Many of these were, however, as Kinoshita says, merely the branches of parent groups and a more accurate figure for distinct groups would be 265. These were scattered throughout the country, the greatest concentrations being in eastern Japan and Kyüshü.1 Numbers increased gradually after 1951. In 1953 750 organiza­ tions were listed. In 1956 a survey by the Police Agency listed ap­ proximately 1,000 with an aggregate membership of about 100,000. Of this number, more than 600 were marked as ‘dangerous* and about 30 were under special surveillance. As Professor Kinoshita points out, most of the existing organizations belong to the category of ‘one-man parties* (ichinin-ittö-teki na mono), that is, groups con­ sisting of a single leader and a fairly small number of personal fol­ lowers. If such ‘one man* groups are removed from the total, we are left with about 90 proper organizations ; of these, 50 are of pre-war vintage and 40 belong to the post-war school.2 Concerning the total membership figure, the Police Agency estimate would, as Professor Kinoshita says, appear to be on the generous side.3The researches of the present writer would tend to indicate that if active sympathizers are included, the extreme rightist groups may have altogether be­ tween 80,000 and 90,000 followers in the country at large.4 This compares with registered JCP membership of about 60,000, in addition to about 40,000 members secretly affiliated. In the 1953 1 The following break-down is given: Kantö 73, Kyüshü 62, ChügokuShikoku 50, Kinki (Osaka-Kyoto area) 26, Hokkaido 23, Töhoku 20, Chübu (central districts) 18 (Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku). * Professor Borton quotes a report according to which in January 1956 there were 53 ‘old* and 42 ‘new’ rightist organizations with membership of 15,000 and 52,000 respectively (Council on Foreign Relations, Japan between East and West, p. 38 ). 3 Kinoshita Hanji in the Oriental Economist, Dec. 1956, p. 602. According to Professor Kinoshita, the figure of 100,000 is based on the fact that the extreme rightist candidate, Mikami Taku, garnered some 90,000 votes in the 1953 Upper House elections. Kinoshita believes that the post-war strength of the ultranationalists tends to be greatly overestimated, especially by foreigners, e.g. ‘Despite the overevaluation made of the ultra-nationalists of Japan by all for­ eigners, including GHQ, SCAP, it has turned out that the rightist elements are but isolated islets in the sea of the Japanese public’ (p. 605). It is not only for­ eigners, however, who give generous estimates concerning the post-war strength of the organized right wing. For example Mr. S. Nagamatsu, a Japanese authority on the subject, states that in 1954 there were about 3,000 right-wing organizations (including one-man groups) and about half a million members (Ikite iru Uyoku, P. 7 )4 If members of ex-servicemen’s leagues with rightist inclinations are included, however, the number would be increased to about five times this amount.

202 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Lower and Upper House elections extreme right-wing candidates collected a combined total of about 1,520,000 votes (of which about 580.000 were in the Lower House elections) and seven were elected ; the Communists received a total of about 1,250,000 votes (of which about 650,000 were in the Lower House elections) and one was elected. The 1955 Lower House elections resulted in a fair gain for the extreme right and a very slight gain for the Communists. About 860.000 votes were cast for men of strong rightist tendency and ten were elected, all as candidates of the Democratic Party; the Com­ munists received some 730,000 votes and two were elected. In the 1956 Upper House elections right-wing nationalist candidates pol­ led about 300,000 votes and one was elected ; the Communists re­ ceived about i ,750,000 votes and two were elected. The 1958 Lower House elections did not result in any substantial change in support for extreme rightist candidates. They again received a total of some 860.000 votes (about 2 •3 per cent, of the popular vote) and nine were elected, all as official candidates of the Liberal-Democratic Party. Three of the successful rightist candidates, however, were more closely connected with the organized right-wing movement than any one who had been elected to the Lower House since the war. The Communists received a little over 1 million votes (about 2 •6 per cent, of the popular vote) and one was elected. In comparing these results, it must be remembered that most of the right-wing nationalist organizations, having to a large extent abandoned their efforts at becoming mass parties, attached relative­ ly little importance to elections, whereas for the JCP they were of the greatest moment ; it would be a serious mistake to deduce from them any firm conclusions concerning the relative strength of the two extremes in Japanese politics.1 Far more important are the nature 1 The figures are perfectly satisfactory in the case of JCP candidates, but veiy much less so where rightist candidates are concerned. The lack of common basis and cohesion among the rightists makes it extremely difficult to determine which candidates can be properly classed under this heading. While all Communist candidates belong to and are selected by the Communist Party, most of the more important ultra-rightists are attached to no specific nationalist organization, but either belong to one of the conservative parties (Liberal, Progressive, Democratic, Liberal-Democratic, &c.) or stand as independents. Whereas a vote for a Com­ munist candidate is almost invariably a vote for the JCP and for Communism, a vote for a rightist (except of the most extreme and blatant variety) may well be in support of the Prime Minister, Yoshida or Kishi, rather than of any extreme rightwing group or cause. Again, although ex-Gcneral L'gaki Kazushige (1868-1956) was usually included among the nationalist candidates, the fact is that he was one of the moderates in the Imperial Army who was most opposed by the militarists

The Revival o f Nationalist Movements

203

and organization of the respective groups. In the first place, as opposed to the comparative organizational unity of the Communist Party, the right-wing nationalist movement is, we have seen, split into countless groups and sub-groups. Most of these are, despite all recent efforts at unification, constitutionally unable to act together for a common purpose.1Not only do they tend to be organized on an oyabun-kobun basis, with loyalty to individual leaders rather than to any common principles, but frequently they differ diametrically in their character and their aims. It would be hard, for instance, to imagine more divergent groups in all Japan than Takeda Kunitarö’s agricultural community of high-minded religious pacifists, the Nichiren Sect Comrades* Association in Yamagata Prefecture, and Tomatsu Keigi’s band of anti-Communist strike-breaking toughs, the Great Conciliation Party—not to mention the numerous crimin­ al-fringe groups ; yet all these are normally included under the head­ ing of right-wing organizations (uyoku dantai). Although in most ways the extreme right is even today more at­ tuned to the nature of Japanese nationalism and to Japanese tradi­ tions in general than is the left, it suffers, as we have observed, from most of the weaknesses that it exhibited in pre-war days and from many others as well. Its tendency to split into isolated local groups, having limited spheres of influence (nawabari) and cut off, not only from the general public, but even from other like-thinking elements, remains as strong as ever. Its stand on encouraging rearmament and on suppressing the extreme left lost much of its force when the con­ servative Government itself took the lead on these issues. In its ap­ peal to national pride, the extreme right remains severely handi­ capped by its apparently contradictory attitude to the United States and to the American presence in Japan and Okinawa; in this and who could certainly not have been considered an ultra-nationalist in the pre­ war context. It may be contended that a large number of the people who voted for him in 1953 (when he received 513,863 votes in the Upper House elections, the largest number of any candidate in the nation) were nationalists of militarist persuasion, or again that what was ‘moderate* in 1931 may, with the change in political environment, have become ‘nationalistic* in 1953. The fact remains that it is virtually impossible to establish a consistent criterion to determine which candidates should be classified as right-wing nationalists. This difficulty applies in the cases of many of the most important candidates, such as ex-Admiral Nomura and ex-Admiral Hoshina, with the result that the election figures given for extreme rightist candidates must be viewed with the gravest reservations. 1 The right-wing unification movement and its consequences will be examined in Ch. IX below.

204 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan important realm it is the extreme left that has been most effective in exploiting nationalist sentiment. Despite the significant revival of a type of diffused nationalist sentiment in the country since the early post-war days, the extreme rightist organizations continue to suffer from their anachronistic flavour, their seeming aloofness from the everyday economic concerns of the people, and the fact that they are still associated for many with the unpleasant memories of militarism and defeat; nor, on the whole, have they succeeded in finding slogans that might win them the following among students that the extreme left has achieved. The ‘reverse course* has, as we have seen, played into the hands of rightist organizations by rehabilitating many of those power ele­ ments in the country to which they had traditionally looked for sup­ port, and also by providing a more congenial ideological atmosphere for them in which to function. Yet despite all the efforts of rightist groups to develop close relations with established political parties, conservative leaders, and regrouped zaibatsu combines, the latter were, except in certain specific instances that we have noted, not prepared to encourage the growth of groups that in pre-war days had brought them far more trouble than benefit.1 It should also be remembered that, for their part, many of the rightist leaders, especi­ ally those of the older generation, were by nature far too crabbed or fanatic to be capable of any effective working compromise with con­ servative elements, of whom they more often than not strongly dis­ approved in principle ; relatively few of the established nationalists were endowed with the flexibility that has permitted men like exColonel Tsuji, Kodama Yoshio, and Kimura Takeo to join or co­ operate with the government party. In the absence of adequate dependable support either from the public or from entrenched conservative elements, the right-wing societies were almost constantly plagued with a shortage of funds and all the consequent difficulties that have already been con­ sidered. A general assessment of the rightist movement will be left for the concluding chapter. In the meantime it may be said in summary that so far as the post-war period is concerned, the organized right-wing movement has until now had virtually no effect on shaping the 1 The relationship of civilian rightists with the military will be examined in the following chapter.

205 course of things in Japan ; its importance lies in the fact that its par­ ticular development is symptomatic of general nationalist trends in the country, and notably in its potentialities, should outside circum­ stances permit, for once again becoming a significant auxiliary force in shaping Japan’s future in an anti-democratic direction. The Revival o f Nationalist Movements

VI. Right-Wing Nationalism and the Military

It would be beyond the scope of this book to enter into any syste­ matic study of the course of post-war disarmament and rearmament in Japan. Instead, attention will be focused on such trends as may point to a revival of military ideals and power and specifically to the increase of political influence on the part of military elements. Inas­ much as Japan is still categorically debarred by her Constitution from possessing ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war poten­ tial*, since such forces as do exist are legally and effectively under civilian control and since the prevalent climate of opinion in the country still undoubtedly inclines towards pacifism rather than militarism, such an examination might at first sight appear otiose. As will appear, however, there is evidence that pre-Surrender mili­ tarist elements, far from having disappeared from the scene, have in certain cases reorganized themselves and are, despite their uncon­ genial position under the Constitution, and despite the general in­ difference or hostility of the public, actively participating in the sphere of politics. It would, of course, be a serious mistake to regard former career military personnel as being necessarily nationalistic, right wing, or even militarist. Many of the younger ex-officers have, in fact, been not only outspokenly anti-militarist, but even opposed to large-scale rearmament ; and most of the organizations of military men that have grown up since 1951 have, at least in their early stages, strongly de­ nied that they were right wing or indeed that they had any particular political objectives. One of the main reasons for the tendency to ex­ aggerate the strength of the organized post-war nationalist move­ ments lies precisely in the automatic inclusion of ex-military organi­ zations, with their enormous memberships, into the ranks of right­ ists. The fact remains, as we shall see, that, despite their disclaimers of political interests, many of the former military men and of the

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary 207 organizations to which they belong have entered the realm of poli­ tics, and that in these cases their objectives have tended to be of a right-wing or reactionary character. It will be especially significant for the purpose of this study to examine to what extent these military elements have come to co-operate either with established conserva­ tive forces in the country or with right-wing organizations with whom they may have certain objectives in common. An examination of the societies in which military men are to be found side by side with right-wing civilian nationalists, for example, or with repre­ sentatives of the regrouped business combines will be most germane to the subject of the present study. Similarly, it will be important to see whether any ex-military men with strongly right-wing national­ ist leanings have succeeded in building up a political following in the country, and, if so, whether they are acting independently or in co-operation with the ruling conservative party. Further relevant questions will be to what extent military men are accepting the principle of civilian supremacy in the new defence forces, and in what ways, if any, they are attempting to recover their pre-war position. Before we embark on a factual study of the post-war record a few salient points should be mentioned so that the subject may be viewed in proper perspective. First, the dominant tone in the country is still overwhelmingly anti-military, and on the whole it may be said that military forces are accepted by the public as a necessary evil, rather than as a cause for patriotic pride or as a means of fulfilling national ambitions. Secondly, the officers of the existing civilian-controlled Self-Defence Forces are in most cases of a very different type from those who led the Imperial forces. No one who held a rank higher than colonel or equivalent at the end of the last war has been eligible for a commission in the new forces; of those who held ranks of colonel or below, relatively few have in fact been selected for the ground forces, and then only after a careful scrutiny of their records to ensure that there was no suspicion of ultra-nationalist or extrem­ ist leanings in their records.1Thirdly, the ex-militarists themselves, although their position has, as we shall see, greatly improved since 1 Since the original examinations of officer candidates for the new forces wTere carried out under the close supervision of the Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, who was and remains one of the staunchest anti-militarist conservatives in Japan, it is unlikely that any significant number of extreme militarists managed to enter the forces.

2o 8

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

the years immediately following the debacle, have failed in all their attempts to influence the Japanese Government in its defence plans : they have not had the slightest effect on the actual evolution of the Self-Defence Forces, which have developed quietly and almost without deviation along the lines laid down by the American Mili­ tary Assistance Group towards the target of a very modest degree of rearmament. The former leaders of the Imperial forces are by now for the most part elderly and disgruntled men, out of touch with the modern atmosphere and unable to exert any influence upon the policies of the Japanese Government. It is these men, as we shall observe, who have been most active in organizing most of the exservice leagues that have appeared in recent years, and it is they, too, who are responsible for most of the militaristic statements that appear in the press and elsewhere. Despite their vocality and despite the frequency with which they will appear in the present discussion, the fact is that they play a very small part in the general scheme of things in present-day Japan. None of this is to deny the possibility that under certain circumstances rampant militarism could once more appear in Japan. But in examining the present situation and future prospects it is well to keep the above reservations in mind and not to attach disproportionate importance to various manifestations that will inevitably loom large in the present chapter. Rehabilitation of Professional Military Men The Japanese military, having risen to a position of defacto hege­ mony at the end of the Heian Period in the twelfth century, extended and consolidated their political power over a period of some 700 years; the Restoration and the partial Westernization of Japanese political forms brought about the collapse of the structure that the military had built up to perpetuate their privileged position, and once more they were obliged to engage in a struggle for political power with civilian leaders. The modem history of the Japanese military is one of marked vicissitudes. Just as in the wider scene we have recognized a swing of the pendulum between phases of whole­ sale importation and those of strong nationalist reaction, so we may see that the influence of the military in modern Japanese society has waxed and waned depending on outer circumstances. In the years following the First World War, for example, their prestige and in­ fluence underwent an eclipse, only to rise to new heights in the

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary 209 decade of the 1930’s. The five years after 1945 marked the absolute nadir. Having for the first time in recorded Japanese history suffered both defeat and the successful occupation of their home islands by foreign troops, the military were shorn overnight of all the power and prestige that they had hitherto enjoyed. The mechanical sanc­ tions imposed by the Occupation—complete demobilization, pro­ hibition of war industries, purge of career military personnel from public life,1the arrest and conviction of many of their leading figures as war criminals, and, finally, the permanent outlawing of armed forces by the Constitution—were hardly more disastrous than the emotional catastrophe that defeat spelled for the military. For they had gambled everything on victory—the welfare, liberties, and lives of the people, the economy of the nation, the prestige of Japan in Asia and in the world, the territorial integrity of their home islands, and, not least, their own hegemony as a class—and they had utterly lost. Nor could they, like some of their more aristocratic German colleagues, blame everything on upstart politicians ; for was it not one of their own leaders who, with the willing co-operation of the other principal officers in the army and navy, had wielded over­ whelming power in the country from the beginning of the war until the time when its outcome was no longer in doubt? Faced with the ineffable humiliation of defeat, many of Japan’s highest officers, men like General Anami, Vice-Admiral önishi, and General Sugiyama, saw in suicide the only honourable action that remained for them. We have also noticed the exploits of various young hot-heads in the army who refused to accept the Emperor’s order for surrender and who too usually ended by committing sui­ cide. These, however, were isolated exceptions. Most of the country’s scores of thousands of career military men now returned to what was left of their homes. The majority were faced with appalling econo­ mic problems, which often made the material conditions of those being held in prison as war-crimes suspects seem favourable by comparison. A large number had lost all their worldly possessions as a result of the bombings ; such savings as they might have had were usually wiped out by the inflation ; many were ill or wounded and unable either to work or to afford the medical care that they 1 Of the 210,287 people purged from public office over one-half (122,235) were career military men.

2io Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan needed; jobs were hard to find and men who had been outside the civilian economy for a large part of their lives were at a particular disadvantage, especially since the general public now tended to re­ gard these erstwhile heroes and martinets with little enthusiasm. The Government itself was in no position, economically or politi­ cally, to provide even the minimum benefits that these men required nor was it able to give adequate help to the destitute families of those who had been killed or who were still being held prisoner. In case there were any hopes that official help might be forthcoming, these were quashed in February 1946, when the Government announced that all benefits to ex-servicemen would be stopped.1 Under these circumstances even many of the high officers in the Imperial Army and Navy, men who for the past ten years or more had ruled the roost, now sank to unskilled or menial labour. Professor Kinoshita cites the case of ex-General ö i Shigetomo, former commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces to Siberia, who had to obtain a job as a watchman in a Tokyo warehouse, where he eventually died of starvation without attracting any particular attention.2 Confronted as most of the ex-military were with the stark neces­ sity of economic survival, it is not surprising that few of them had any inclination to complicate their task by infringing the strict ban on political activity. In the early part of the Occupation some officers tried to keep the spirit of military comradeship alive through un­ official associations of former classmates from the Imperial Military Academy. These were usually aimed at the exchange of personal in­ formation and mutual assistance. In a few cases there were reports that groups were in possession of arms, presumably cached in the hopes of a revolt against the Occupation forces. In the event, how­ ever, there was not the slightest attempt at armed resistance. Faced with the economic rigours of the post-war period, with the unfav­ ourable social and psychological environment, and with the vigi­ lance of the Occupation itself, most of these informal ex-officer groups either disbanded, or subsided into complete inactivity in the hopes of better days to come.3 1 Keibi Keisatsu, p. 206. 2 Nihon no Uyoku, p. 52. 8 Among the groups that survived throughout the Occupation, though re­ maining almost entirely inactive, were the Reserve Officers’ Association ( Yoshi Kai), the Double Eight Association (Hachi Hachi Kai)t the Artillery Com­ rades’ Association of Kaga and Echizen Prefectures (Kaetsu Kai) and, most im­ portant because of its subsequent resuscitation, the War Comrades’ Association (Senyü Kai).

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

211

The year 1950 marked the end of the doldrums for military ele­ ments in Japan. By this time the ‘reverse course*, as reflected in the policies of both the Occupation and the Government itself, had pro­ duced a climate that permitted, indeed encouraged, some of the military to engage once more in organized activity. General MacArthur’s New Year’s message adumbrated the new approach. In this speech the Supreme Commander, who in past years had ful­ minated so violently against the iniquities of the military, dwelt on the deteriorating world situation and invited Japan to prepare to de­ fend herself from danger from abroad. Five months later war had broken out in Korea; in July the Yoshida Government, at the instance of SCAP, started recruiting for a National Police Re­ serve, the euphemistic designation for what was to become the new armed forces;1 and in the following February Mr. Dulles urgently requested the Japanese Government to undertake re­ armament. The acceleration of the ‘reverse course’ following the outbreak of war in Korea was to the advantage of military elements in almost every way. Most directly, of course, the new policy on rearmament changed them almost overnight from being a largely superfluous and rather pathetic remnant of an earlier epoch into becoming a potentially significant element in society; for it was clear from the outset that it would be impossible for Japan to build up effective armed forces without the co-operation of her pre-Surrender army and navy officers.2Now that rearmament had, in fact if not in name, become a cornerstone of conservative policy, the Government, which hitherto had by and large treated the military with cavalier indiffer1 The original strength of the NPR (Keisatsu Yobitai) was fixed at 75,100 men. In 1952 it was increased to 110,000 and in October renamed as the National Security Force (Hoan Tai). In 1954 the name was changed to the National Defence Force (Jiei Tai). Japanese defence forces were reconstituted about five years after they had been outlawed by the Occupation. In West Germany over ten years had elapsed when the first military unit was brought together for train­ ing in January 1956. On the other hand there was very much less difficulty in passing a conscription law in Germany than in Japan: general conscription for a service period of twelve months was approved by the West German Parliament in July 1956. The West German Government was, of course, not faced with the constitutional difficulty that existed in Japan. * The original American policy was to exclude former professional officers from the leadership and training of the new forces. Leadership was kept in civilian hands and training was carried out according to American methods and under the direction of American officers. The need, however, for large numbers of leaders with technical military qualifications soon began to outweigh other considerations.

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan 212 ence, would be obliged to show them some respect.1 In a wider sense, the ‘reverse course* tended to produce a political and ideo­ logical atmosphere in the country that was more congenial to tra­ ditional military elements, for whom, on the whole, the iconoclastic liberalism of the early post-war period had been sheer anathema. In particular they were bound to welcome the revival of nationalist sentiment among the people, albeit this was of an inward-looking, non-political, and fragmented nature. The greatest practical benefit that accrued to the military at this time was the mass depurge in October 1951 of former army and navy officers. By the time that the Peace Treaty came into effect in April 1952, all but about 5,000 career military personnel had been released from purge restrictions.2Those depurged officers who had held ranks up to colonel in the Imperial Army were recruited for the new forces, and, despite some initial reluctance which will be ex­ amined later, they began to join in increasing numbers. In addition about one-half of the ranks had been soldiers in the former army. The depurge also led to the formation of numerous new local groups of ex-officers and to the revival of others that had languished during the lean years. Now that their position was legitimate, these scattered provincial bodies began to think in terms of uniting on a national basis, which would enable them more effectively to voice their economic, and possibly also their political, demands ; in par­ ticular it was felt that the time had come to revive a nation-wide inter-service organization, which, by sheer force of numbers, would be bound to carry weight in the country. Welcome as this prospect 1 From the time of the Korean War, and especially after the restoration of national independence, the conservative parties in Japan were all agreed on the need for building up defence forces, but Mr. Yoshida’s Liberal Party was sufficiently aware of the general opposition to rearmament in the country to avoid using the actual word until well after the 1953 elections. Even in 1957, although the majority of the people was in favour of maintaining defence forces, there was still a marked tendency to shy away from the word ‘rearmament* (see below, p. 252 n. 1). The conservative party is, of course, well aware of these popular feelings and although its leaders frequently refer to the ‘inescapable duty of national defence’, they tend on the whole to avoid mentioning the more concrete and uncomfortable aspects of rearmament itself. The main pressure to take practical steps seems in many cases to have come from the Americans rather than from the Japanese conservatives, who, though aware that the slogan ‘Defend the homeland* may have a popular nationalist appeal, keenly realize that the material aspects of rearmament are considerably less attractive to most voters. 2 A total of 122,235 was purged; of these 116,753 had been reinstated by April 1952. Of those not depurged by then, the majority (3,039) were former members of the kempeitai (gendarmerie) (Kinoshita Hanji, ‘Echoes of Militar­ ism in Japan’, Pacific Affairs, Sept. 1953, p. 246).

Right- Wing Nationalism and the M ilitary 213 might be, however, its realization was hampered for some years by the existence of numerous splits among the military. Sectionalism was rampant in the armed forces before the war and some of these splits carried over from earlier days ; others are of post­ war provenance and derive largely from the special conditions in which Japan’s new defence forces came into being. Among the tra­ ditional divisions is the antagonism between the army and the navy. One might have expected that, having in name at least been deprived of both these services, Japanese officers would have joined forces to secure their full legal restoration before indulging in traditional rivalries. In fact, however, since the very founding in 1950 of the Na­ tional Police Reserve and the Coastal Safety Force, it was clear that the antagonism had not disappeared; and the navy’s virulent oppo­ sition to ex-Colonel Hattori’s plan for the integration of the armed forces shows that it continues.1 One of the more important factors that have tended to prevent unity among the pre-war professional military is the opposition, to which Professor Kinoshita refers, between the younger and older elements ; of these, the former were more democratic in outlook, or at least more in tune with the post-war atmosphere, while the latter still tended to support traditional military ways and to look for a partial restoration of the status quo ante helium. This is an interesting reversal of the pre-war situation, in which aggressive militarist ideals tended to be most strongly represented by the younger officers, rather than by their conservative elders. The difference in approach towards their own post-war role is reflected in the fact that on the whole the members of the older officers* classmate associations were in favour of engaging in political activities, whereas the younger ele­ ments usually wished the associations to retain their original char­ acter of social clubs or welfare groups.12*5 1 The so-called H atton Plan would have made Japan the first country to have a single armed establishment under one commander. One of its main purposes, according to its author, was to end the debilitating inter-service rivalry. Former navy officers were intransigent in opposing the scheme. Thus one former navy commander was quoted as saying, ‘The scheme is extremely dangerous. We were always dominated by the Army even under the old system. If the armed forces were unified under former Army fellows, what will happen?’ Partly as a result of his abortive plan, former navy personnel vigorously opposed exColonel Hattori’s appointment as Councillor in charge of defence planning on the Defence Council (Murata Kiyoaki, ‘Old Wine for a New Bottle’, Japan Times, 31 July 1956). 5 Kinoshita, in Pacific Affairs, Sept. 1953, p. 245. Q

214 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan A further source of disunity resulted from varying attitudes to Japan’s foreign policy, specifically with regard to the American alliance. This, as we have seen, has been one of the crucial points that have tended to split the civilian nationalists; in the case of the military it has been a central issue during the post-war period. The type of armed neutralism advocated by men like ex-Colonel Tsuji has already been examined in some detail ; it is not surprising that his nationalist views should have found considerable favour among former professional military men, as well as among some sections of the public, who inevitably resented Japan’s overwhelming depend­ ence on America in military affairs. Of all the factors that served to divide the military, none was more important at first than their attitude to the actual way in which the Government was carrying out rearmament. In the early days the overwhelming majority of former professional military men—some 90 per cent., according to Professor Kinoshita—was opposed to the concept of the National Police Reserve, which they tended to re­ gard with acerbity as being a body of mercenaries established mainly for the benefit of a foreign power, and as anything but a source of national pride or power. Although approximately the same percent­ age was in favour of rearmament as such, about one-half of them re­ fused to accept any programme that entailed exclusive reliance on the United States. The 10 per cent, or so that supported the Nation­ al Police Reserve consisted mostly, according to Professor Kino­ shita, of former officers who had actually joined its ranks, and these men tended to be regarded with suspicion, if not scorn, by many of their fellow officers.1In most cases the early policy of the ex-officer associations was to boycott the National Police Reserve and to see that it was relegated to the role that its actual name denoted. Ina few instances, ex-officers implied that they would be willing to co­ operate with the new forces as soon as certain preliminary conditions were met. In September 1951, for example, a band of thirty-six former army captains (members of the Fifty-fifth Class of the Mili­ tary Academy) met at the Honganji Temple in Tokyo and listed four significant demands, which may be quoted as representing the more extreme type of military aspirations at this period : ( 1) the immediate and unconditional depurge of military men, (2) the release of all ‘war criminals’, (3) the rehabilitation of the Yasukuni Shrine, (4) govern1 Kinoshita, in Pacific Affairs, Sept. 1953, p. 246.

Right- Wing Nationalism and the M ilitary

215 ment grants and pensions for wounded men and their families. The officers declared that if these demands were met, they would ‘place our lives at the service of the country’, that is to say, they would give their services to the new armed forces.1 In the event, none of these demands was fully met. Nevertheless the general attitude of the military began to change towards the end of 1951 after the mass depurge of former military men and the re­ moval of most restrictions on their admission to the new forces. In October of that year a group of 400 depurged officers entered the military school and many were subsequently sent to the United States for further training. Unofficial military leaders like exColonel Tsuji, who had hitherto tended to look askance at the Police Reserve, began to adopt a more moderate attitude. Thereafter, former professional officers joined the defence forces in increasing numbers. Yet, although the original hostility of the professional military was dissipated, many of the more conservative members continued to view the new forces with some suspicion, partly be­ cause of the ‘amateur’ civilian leadership and partly because of the heavy dependence on the United States. The factors that tended to divide the ex-military during the early period of rearmament have been examined in some detail, since there are signs that in many cases they continue to exert an important in­ fluence and since they often reveal significant parallels with the splits inside the civilian right-wing movements. Although the various schisms effectively prevented the revival for the time being of any nation-wide service organization, local bodies of former army officers succeeded in late 1951 and early 1952 in forming four large national societies.2 Membership in these respective groups was mainly based on former rank held in the Imperial Army and on class membership in the pre-war Military Academy. In view of the 1 Quoted by Robert Guillain in ‘The Resurgence of Military Elements in Japan’, Pacific Affairs, Sept. 1952, p. 212 n. a The four societies were: (1) the Saturday Association (Doyö Kai), consisting of career officers of the 20th-25th classes at the Military Academy, who had been corps commanders (i.e. mostly generals and major-generals) and above; (2) the Wednesday Informal-Discussion Association (Suiyö Kondankai), with ex-officers of the 20th~33rd classes, who had been division commanders or major-generals; (3) the First Wednesday Association (Issui Kai), with members of the 34th-39th classes, who had mostly been colonels; (4) the Classmates’ Informal Discussion Association (Dösö Kondankai), with members of the 40th58th classes, including men up to the lank of lieut.-colonel and others (59th6 1st classes) who had still been students at the time of Surrender (Kinoshita, in Pacific Affairs, Sept. 1953, pp. 240-1).

2i6 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan dissimilar attitudes held by the different age-groups of ex-officers, it is not surprising that these four societies should have developed on markedly individual lines. The First Wednesday Association (Issui Kai), for example, which consisted of men like ex-Colonel Tsuji who had embarked on their military careers during the uncongenial period of disarmament following the First World War, was the most active and also the most militaristically-inclined of these groups. Many of its members, as Professor Kinoshita indicates, were men who had .become more and more disgruntled over the relatively liberal society and politics of the 1920*8 and who had subsequently advocated policies leading to the Manchurian Incident, the China War, the Tripartite Pact, and eventually the Pacific War.1 Some of them had participated in the February (1936) Incident, though most had been in sympathy with the Control Faction. In either case, these men would inevitably note the parallel between existing conditions in Japan and those that had prevailed two decades before, and it is not surprising that many of them should have hankered after the nationalist-militarist type of solution that had been applied in the earlier period. Members of the young ex-officer group, the Class­ mates* Informal Discussion Association (Dösö Kondankai), on the other hand, tended to be of individualistic rather than nationalistic bent, and to look askance at the narrow, traditionalist views held by their elders, whom they regarded as being at least partly responsible for the war and the defeat.2 In the event, with the further develop­ ment of the ‘reverse course* and the rehabilitation of traditional ele­ ments in Japan, it was on the whole the more conservative of the exmilitary who came to exert preponderant influence in the various service organizations that sprang up in the following years. The movement for unification was given new impetus by the official resumption of independence, and in September 1952 the four class-groups mentioned above effectively joined forces to form the Companions* Association (Kaikö Kai).3About 100 representa­ tives assembled at the Yasukuni Shrine and inaugurated the first national inter-class organization of ex-officers in the post-war period. The preparatory committee, under the chairmanship of exLieut.-General Numata Takazö, who had formerly been Chief of 1 Kinoshita, in Pacific Affairs, Sept. 1953, p. 247. *Ibid. 8 Named after the Companions’ Society {Kaikö Sha), the former army club, which had been dissolved by the Occupation.

Right- Wing Nationalism and the M ilitary

217

Staff of the Southern Expeditionary Forces, included a number of prominent ex-generals.1 Headquarters were established in Tokyo and branches in almost every prefecture. One of the first questions to confront the group was to what ex­ tent its objectives should be political. In view of the numerous cleavages of opinion that we have noticed, it is not surprising that a common political platform should have been rejected in favour of a non-political slogan, namely, ‘Fraternity and Mutual Aid* {Shimhoku Gojo). The Association’s stand was summarized by the chair­ man at the inaugural meeting: ‘Our new Society should constantly occupy a moderate, middle position rather than an extreme one. In particular, we must guard against attempts from outside to influ­ ence or exploit our organization.’2 ‘Attempts from outside’ clearly referred to possible efforts to use the strength of the Association’s influence for political ends. The question of whether the Association should engage in politics continued to be debated, however, especially after Tsuji Masanobu and a few other professional military men had been suc­ cessfully elected to the Diet. Arguments on both sides were set forth in the group-organ, The Companion (Kaikö).3 In the event, the Association has consistently avoided becoming a political group and it still retains on the whole its original character as a federation of classmates’ societies, having companionship and mutual welfare for its main objectives. This, of course, is not to say that many of its members may not hold strong views on different political questions. The equivalent group for former officers of the Imperial Navy is the Navy Friendship Association (Suikö Kai)> which was also found­ ed in 1952 as an amalgamation of various local classmates’societies.4 1 These included ex-Lieut.-General Hanaya Tadashi and Inada Masazumi (head of the 26th Air Force division in New Guinea) and Major-General Matsumura Shüitsu, formerly of the Cherry-Blossom Association. Ex-General Shimomura Sadamu, the former Minister of War and a prominent member of the Control Faction, later became a leading figure in this, as well as in other post war military associations. * Quoted by Kinoshita, in Pacific Affairs, Sept. 1953, p. 248. 3 The original organ of the Companions’ Association was the Ichigaya Monthly (Ichigaya being the site of the former military academy). Its editor was Satö Katsurö, a fanatical follower of Tsuji Masanobu, and many of the more moderate members of the group feared that the latter’s extreme views might become influential. In November 1952 the paper came under a new editor and its name was changed to the present one of The Companion. Thereafter Tsuji’s influence became less apparent (ibid.). 4 Named after the Navy Friendship Society (Suikö Sha), which had been founded in 1876 and dissolved by the Occupation.

2 i8 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan The association was inaugurated in September at the former navy museum in Yoyogi; the president was ex-Admiral Yamanashi Katsunoshin (formerly president of the Peers* School) and the vicepresidents were ex-Vice-Admiral Sakonji Masazö (former Minister of Industry) and ex-Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo, who has played a prominent role in the post-war rearmament movement.1As Pro­ fessor Kinoshita points out, most of the important members had belonged to the moderate Naval Administration Faction, which in pre-war days had opposed the extremist Fleet Faction.2 So far as participation in politics was concerned, the Navy Friendship Association took the same general stand as its army equivalent and, despite the active political careers of leaders like ex-Admiral Nomura, it has continued to concentrate its group activities on mutual aid among members and the provision of relief to needy families of former naval officers. Although these two important associations have, on the whole, consistently refrained from political activity, and have avoided affiliating themselves with any political objectives, most of the ex­ military groups that developed during the ‘reverse course* period have shown an increasingly political orientation. It is these that are of particular interest for the present study. The main political issue that has inspired them is, as would be expected, that of rearmament. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, scores upon scores of groups sprang up with the primary aim of promoting national de­ fence and with various cognate aims, such as constitutional revision. Examples of predominantly civilian groups of this nature have been discussed in the previous chapter; a few of the groupings with mainly military composition will now be examined. Many of these were organized on a fairly informal basis under the leadership of some central personality. Of such military coteries the best known was probably the Hattori Agency (Hattori Kikan), which was formed under ex-Colonel Hattori Takushirö. Colonel Hattori (b.1910) had headed the Strategic Section of the General 1 See below, p. 447. Other leading figures were ex-Admiral Sawamoto Yorio, ex-Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru (who, as Chief of the Operations Division of the Imperial Navy General Staff, had been one of the more outspoken advocates of war with the United States), and ex-Rear-Admirals Kojima Hideo and Tominaga Shözö. 2These two pre-war factions, the Gumei Ha and the Kant ai Ha, corresponded roughly to the Army’s Tösei Ha and Ködö Ha respectively, although the rivalry between them was never as intense as that between the army groups.

Right- Wing Nationalism and the M ilitary

219 Staff at the time of the outbreak of the Pacific War and had later served as one of General Töjö*s secretaries. To have held such posts as these was not as a rule very advantageous during the early postSurrender period; but Hattori fared better than most of his col­ leagues and was attached first to the Demobilization Bureau and, after 1948, to the Repatriation Bureau.1In this official capacity, he became an important point of contact between the Occupation authorities—in particular Major-General Willoughby, the chief of Intelligence (G-2) under SCAP—and former Japanese professional officers. Because of their detailed knowledge of military affairs and their access to records, he and his colleagues could provide the Occupation authorities with valuable assistance in carrying out the staggering tasks that confronted them in the early post-Surrender period ; at the same time, they were by virtue of their official position able to consolidate a small nucleus of like-minded military men with­ in the surrounding morass of disintegration. In the course of time this nucleus came to be known as the Hattori Agency. Most of its leading members had worked in the Demobilization Bureau in close association with Colonel Hattori. The Agency consisted of a central clique of about a dozen ex-officers, mostly colonels and lieutenantcolonels, and of some 300 members in provincial areas.12Their prin­ cipal objectives were, on the one hand, to collect and disseminate in­ formation on national defence (the slogan of the group being ‘Free­ dom, Independence, Self-Defence*) and, on the other, themselves 1 The Occupation authorities had realized that the essential tasks of de­ mobilization and repatriation could not be efficiently executed without the co­ operation of at least a handful of Japanese ex-officers who normally would have been barred by purge restrictions from taking part in any official work. Accord­ ing to an executive decree, ‘A person who cannot be replaced by others may be appointed to public office by the authority of the Prime Minister.’ This enabled a group of former officers, mostly colonels of the General Staff and the Ministry of War, to obtain public positions despite the purge. Another group of former Staff officers was attached to the Historical Records Section of G HQ to help the American authorities in compiling material. A lively and critical account of this enterprise is contained in Wildes, Typhoon Over Tokyo, in ch. xxviii entitled ‘Trumpets Bray’. 2 The central group included the following: ex-Colonel Nishiura Susumu, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Ministry of War during the Pacific War and later General Töjö’s secretary; ex-Colonel Imoto Kumao, member of the Strategic Section, Office of the General Staff, and later General Töjö’s secretary ; ex-Colonel Horiba Kazuo, Deputy Chief of Staff of the 5th Army Air Force at the time of Surrender; ex-Lieut.-Colonel Mizuno Shögö, member of the Strategic Section, Office of the General Staff. Most of the group had been associated with the Control Faction and many of its members, as will be seen, had been especially close to General Töjö.

220 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan to provide the core of a new army. Hattori and his associates repre­ sented the main fields of expert military knowledge, and besides were in a position to monopolize the records of the demobilized army, including the muster-roll. In general terms, they envisaged a large, autonomous army, to be organized about a framework of qualified ex-officers (i.e. themselves), and to consist of some 15-20 divisions in peace-time and 50 divisions in times of crisis or war. These plans were, of course, totally at variance with the modest, civilian-controlled defence programme advocated by the Yoshida Government, and were firmly rejected by the Prime Minister and the various civilian officials responsible for rearmament. Largely as a result of this, the Hattori Agency turned bitterly against the Government’s rearmament plans, most of all against the civiliandominated National Police Reserve ; so much so, indeed, that when in the autumn of 1951 the Government began to recruit ex-officers into the new forces, the group sent a circular to a number of possible candidates urging them to refuse to co-operate with the ex-bureaucrats of the Ministry of Home Affairs now in charge of the National Police Reserve, who, they asserted, lacked all the necessary martial virtues and qualifications.1Ex-Colonel Hatton’s hostility to Japan’s civilian-dominated defence forces became slightly less virulent dur­ ing the course of the following years as an increasing number of the professional officers who had volunteered their services came to attain important positions. He continued, however, to be strongly critical of the defence forces because of their non-professional leadership, their slack discipline, and their dependence on America. The Hattori Agency continued to function until 1953, when it was dissolved following its implication in the so-called Kaji Affair.1 2 1 ökubo notes. 2 The Kaji Affair became a cause célèbre in Japanese left-wing circles. In November 1951 Kaji Wataru, a leftist critic and novelist, who during the war had worked with the Anti-Militarist League in Chungking, was allegedly arrested by the American military authorities and held incommunicado by Central Intelligence Agency agents in Japan. He was not released until a year later, following appeals by his wife to the authorities. During this year he was alleg­ edly subjected to severe ill-treatment, including electric torture. The United States Embassy later announced that Mr. Kaji had been detained at his own request, and it was widely suggested that he had been a spy working either for the Communists or, possibly, for both sides simultaneously. The case aroused particular indignation, as it was considered that Kaji’s detention by the Ameri­ can authorities in Japan later than April 1952 was a violation of Japan’s sover­ eignty. The Hattori Agency was allegedly implicated in the Kaji Affair for having provided the American authorities with relevant information, and it was sub-

Right- Wing Nationalism and the M ilitary

22 1

Its work was pursued to some extent, however, by the Historical Research Institute (Shijitsu Kenkyüjo), which was founded by exColonel Hattori in May 1952 to ‘study and publish the history of the Greater East Asia War*.1Hattori was also closely associated with the Watanabe Economic Research Institute,*12 a group of highranking ex-officers headed by Dr. Watanabe Tetsuzö,3a vocal antiCommunist and advocate of heavy rearmament and constitutional revision. This Institute had indirect connexions with the Yoshida Government and in 1951 submitted a rearmament programme call­ ing for an army of fifteen divisions totalling a quarter of a million men. It published a monthly military magazine entitled Defence and Economy (Böei to Keizai) and also maintained its own Constitution Revision Research Committee. Following the creation of the Defence Council in 1954, exColonel Hattori was strongly favoured for the important post of Councillor in charge of defence planning, but his appointment was effectively blocked as a result on the one hand of the navy’s opposi­ tion to his plan for merging the three services, and on the other of the suspicion among civilian officials in the Defence Agency that he was basically opposed to the principle of civilian supremacy. His unusually close associations with the Americans during the Occupa­ tion period may also have militated against his appointment. Des­ pite this setback, Hattori remains influential in right-wing military circles. He continues to advocate a rapid build-up of an effective army under professional leadership and the immediate withdrawal of all American forces, so that the Japanese may proudly undertake to defend their own country from the Communist menace. Accord­ ing to ex-Colonel Hattori, it is the inescapable fate of mankind to engage in successive wars ; although the nature of wars may change, sequently dissolved. Also allegedly involved was the so-called Canon Agency (under the direction of an American colonel, J. Y. Canon), which, it was claimed in left-wing circles, was engaged in anti-Communist espionage in collaboration with certain Japanese civilians and former military men. 1 The history, the first of its kind, has been published in serial form in The Companion (p. 217 n. 3 above) and comprises four volumes. Drawing on hither­ to secret records of the army and on hidden operational orders of Imperial Head­ quarters, it deals largely with top-level war decisions and Japanese strategy. 3 Among the officers connected with Dr. Watanabe’s Institute were ex-ViceAdmiral Hoshina Zenshirö, formerly in command of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry ; ex-Vice Admiral Fukudome Shigeru ; ex-Lieutenant-General Inada Masazumi; and ex-Colonel Imoto Kumao. The group was also backed by the ubiquitous ex-Admiral Nomura, (ökubo notes.) 3 See below, p. 452.

222 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan wars themselves will continue so long as there are human beings left to fight them. Now the Japanese people, instead of indulging in ‘collective repentance* over the last war (which in any case was none of their fault, since it was forced on them by Anglo-American machinations), should be urgently preparing for the next bout of hostilities, or they will find themselves in even a worse plight than before. The Third World War has, in fact, already started; but the Western powers, by concentrating on the build-up of material mili­ tary strength, are giving an immense advantage to the Communists, who are aware of the capital importance of the ‘internal battle-front* (naihu-sensen). If the Western powers should lose in the ideological war against the Communists, then they may be forced to embark on the atomic holocaust of the Fourth World War. So far as Japan herself is concerned, it will be impossible until the last American forces have left for a true patriotism and love of one’s native blood (chi no ai) to arise among the people and inspire them to concentrate on the fight against subversive, that is, leftist, elements on the home front. For the mere accumulation of weapons, however up to date and lethal, will not avail against the Communists unless it is backed by ‘spiritual* strength. The left-wing forces in Japan, with immense financial help from abroad, have ever since the end of the Greater East Asia War been striving to subvert the country by fomenting class struggles and labour disputes and by undermining the nation­ al spirit through unpatriotic education and propaganda. These ubiquitous forces, of which the Communists themselves merely form the most conspicuous element, must be crushed if Japan is to survive. As a first step the 1947 Constitution, which is steadily poisoning the Japanese people by having put all the emphasis on their rights rather than on their duties, must be revised. ‘Will no one*, writes ex-Colonel Hattori in reference to constitutional re­ vision, ‘step forth to take the lead? If no one does emerge, the people themselves must create a political figure for the task. They must at all costs produce a man who will save Japan.*1 One of ex-Colonel Hattori’s most influential supporters has been 1 These views are contained (i) in an address given by ex-Colonel Hattori at the 119th Regular Meeting of the Peerless Poetry Association in June 1957 and reported in the August 1957 issue of the Fuji magazine under the heading ‘Fundamental Problems of Defending the Fatherland’; (2) in an address given during a study course sponsored by the Great East Institute in August 1957 and reported in the October 1957 issue of Fuji under the heading ‘A New Theory of National Defence’. The quoted passage is from p. 23 of (2).

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

223

ex-Colonel Tsuji Masanobu. Tsuji was not, however, a member of the Hattori Agency and his approach to post-war defence problems has differed widely from that of Hattori. During the Occupation period Tsuji tended to avoid SCAP, and consequently he did not in­ cur the type of suspicion that was directed towards Hattori because of his close association with certain American officers. Until his in­ dictment in 1951 on the charge of violating the purge decree, Tsuji was active in various organizations of nationalistic ex-officers, not­ ably in a group of staff officers of the former Kwantung Army under the unofficial leadership of ex-Major-General Imai Takeo, formerly of the Cherry-Blossom Association.1Following the end of the purge restrictions Tsuji plunged himself once more into open political activities, centred on organizations of former officers and service­ men. In 1953, as we have seen, he broke away from the main stream of the East Asia League, whose pacifist inclinations had become increasingly unpalatable to him, and organized the Self-Defence League. This group, which claimed to belong to the direct tradition of Ishiwara Kanji, was based on Tsuji’s twin policies of self-defence and neutrality (jieichüritsu-ron), and was incidentally designed to give moral and physical support to Japan’s growing armed forces. Its strength came mostly from provincial areas, especially from Ishikawa and Nagano Prefectures. In 1955 it was estimated to have some 2,500 members, distributed among thirty-four local branches.2 Tsuji’s support in the country at large was, however, very much greater than these figures would suggest; for the Self-Defence League represented only one aspect of his multifarious political 1 This group, which evidently aimed at controlling the new Japanese army, represented a sort of militarist 'lunatic fringe*. It was categorically opposed to the new civilian-dominated defence forces, and planned for massive rearmament to be carried out as soon as the Peace Treaty came into effect. Its programme is reported to have included the following points: (i) personnel of the National Police Reserve will not be admitted into the new army, (2) if the United States does not recognize the plan, no War Academy graduates will co-operate in the Government’s rearmament schemes, (3) weapons for the new army will be demanded from the United States, and, if they are refused, Japan should apply for similar aid to the Soviet Union, (4) the country should be placed under martial law until the rearmament project is completed and the Commander-inChief of the new forces will assume control of economy, administration, justice, &c. (ökubo notes). In examining the forceful and dogmatic attitude of this group, it should be remembered that in pre-Surrender days the Kwantung Army had often acted as though it were a more or less autonomous authority, and also that, when the war ended, many of its officers considered that they had in fact not been defeated. 1 According to a report issued by the Law Section, Political Department of the research division of the Nat. Diet Library, 31 Jan. 1957.

224 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan activities. Unlike Hattori, Tsuji did not aim to build up a small military élite to supply leadership for the new army. Instead he worked at consolidating support throughout the country and at spreading his ideas among the people ; at the same time he maintain­ ed relations with close followers in different parts of Japan and, though he did not form any official ‘Tsuji Agency*, he aimed at fos­ tering a spirit of unity among his supporters. Tsuji*s main backing came not from Tokyo but from the hinterland of Töhoku and Kyu­ shu. It is hard to estimate the actual number of his followers, but, judging from the results of the 1953, 1955, and 1958 Lower House elections, in which he was elected with about 50,000, 84,000, and 46,000 votes respectively, his appeals to the public have not fallen on deaf ears. Tsuji*s refractory attitude during the Occupation un­ doubtedly served him well in the following period, and, by advocat­ ing a goal of armed neutrality, he was able to appeal to two powerful sentiments in post-1951 Japan, namely, neutralism and nationalism. Apart from this popular support, Tsuji is known to have had wide connexions in political and government circles, especially after he himself joined the conservative party. He was also strongly backed by such established nationalist figures as Kuhara Fusanosuke and Satomi Kishio. An outspoken and ambitious individualist like Tsuji was bound to be subjected to considerable attack. In left-wing circles he was widely denounced as an ultra-militarist and neo-Fascist. Some of Tsuji*s severest critics were, however, to be found among army circles themselves. Many of the older officers resented him for his high-handed ways, his arrogation of military genius, his brazen attacks on former superiors, and his showmanship ; no doubt some of them secretly envied him his popular success. Their feelings could be summed up in the phrase *samurai general*, which was fre­ quently applied to him, ‘samurai*here being used in its least flatter­ ing sense.1On the other hand Tsuji enjoyed a certain support among younger military men, and could also claim a number of fanatic devotees.12 In this he was helped by the prestige that still widely 1 i.e. with the implication of ‘ruffian’, ‘swashbuckler’, &c. 2 The most devoted of these was Satö Katsurö, who had been one of the leaders of the so-called Officers’ School Incident in November 1934 (see below, p. 434). In the post-war period Satö was a vigorous advocate of Emperorism and was active in organizing support for Tsuji among young ex-officers (i.e. of the 40th~48th classes) (Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, p. 179).

225 attached to him from his close association with Ishiwara Kanji, who had been an idol for many of Japan’s younger officers. Tsuji’s original hostility to the new forces had, as we have seen, lessened towards the end of 1951 and thereafter a number of his fol­ lowers had enlisted. Like most former military men of strong nationalist persuasion, however, Tsuji continued to view these forces askance, for the same reasons that we have seen in the case of Hattori and others. Though willing to accept the present defence organization as being better than nothing, he considered that real independence would be impossible until Japan was able to mobilize a large, self-reliant army led by professional officers and free from the ‘interference’ of civilian bureaucrats. A number of ‘research’ groups was also formed during this period. These mostly consisted of former military men, politicians, and a sprinkling of professional nationalists. One of the more prominent has been the Continental Problems Research Institute (Tairiku Mondai Kenkyûjo)t under the leadership of ex-Lieut.-General Doi Akio, a specialist on Russian affairs.1The Institute, while advocating the usual policies of constitutional revision and increased rearma­ ment, gives special emphasis to research on Soviet and Chinese military matters and on questions relating to the Third World War, whose outbreak they regarded as probable. Ex-General Doi edits a review entitled Continental Problems ( Tairiku Mondai), which con­ centrates largely on China. The original supporters of the group represent an interesting cross-section. They include : former Prime Minister Ashida, Mr. Satö Naotake (Minister of Foreign Affairs in General Hayashi’s 1937 Cabinet and now a member of the Upper House and president of the United Nations Association of Japan), the late Mr. Ogata Taketora (Chief Secretary in the Yoshida Cabin­ et), the important business leader Mr. Göko Kiyoshi, ex-Admiral Nomura, ex-General Okamura Yasuji,2 ex-General Shimomura Sadamu, ex-Rear-Admiral Tomioka Sadatoshi;3 also the patriotic philosopher, Mr. Yasuoka Masaatsu, and the Communist renegade, Mr. Nabeyama Sadachika. Groupings such as this suggest the ease with which conservative elements in Japan, both civilian and mili­ tary, can join forces and co-operate with people of the extreme right wing at least for limited nationalist objectives. Another private military group was the Dawn Association Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

1 See below, p. 440.

* See below, pp. 447-8.

3 See below, p. 450.

226 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan (Akebono Kai)}which was devoted primarily to the publication of an extreme right-wing and militarist magazine, Dazon. Among its sup­ porters were former career officers, business men, and civilian ultra­ nationalists, many of whom had been involved in the ‘incidents* of the i930*s.1 The group was one of those named in left-wing circles as having received support from the so-called ‘Murphy Fund*.2 Of societies with combined military and civilian leadership that arose during the period following the Peace Treaty, one of the most prominent was the War Comrades* Association (Senyû Kai)t which was organized in Osaka in August 1952 by the civilian ultra-rightist Yoshida Masuzö, as a successor to his League for Promoting the Revival of Pensions (Onkyü Fukkatsu Sokushin Remmei). Men like Yoshida Masuzö foresaw that by building up a following among ex­ military men they would have a far better chance of obtaining heavy numerical support than by concentrating on civilians. This belief was justified by the events : while the Great Japan Production Party, the well-known civilian nationalist group revived under the guid­ ance of Yoshida Masuzö, could only muster some 2,500 members, the War Comrades* Association built up a membership of about 14,000. The president of the Association was Yoshida Masuzö, and the vice-presidents were former military men, including ViceAdmiral Tamura Hide and Major-General Endö Shunzan. The original objectives of the Association were largely of a non-political nature, including the immediate release of war criminals, repatria­ tion of war prisoners, and pensions for wounded ex-servicemen and their families ; the slogans included such pacific aims as ‘to work for the avoidance of the Third World War, to offer our services for the defence of Japan, and thus to contribute to the peace of the peoples of the world*.3 In 1954, however, with the advance of ‘reverse course* tendencies, the slogans were significantly revised and the emphasis was now put on traditional right-wing nationalist objec­ tives. In the new programme the Association pledged itself to work inter alia for : (1) the ideal of a national polity (kokutai) based on the 1 Contributors to Dawn included ex-Lieut.-Generals Tanaka Shinichi and Endö Saburö and the ultra-nationalist writer, Matsumoto Tokumei (Kinoshita, Purge Policy, p. 38). 2 This was a fund allegedly set up by the L'nited States Embassy in Tokyo during the time of Ambassador Murphy to assist Japanese anti-Communist and rearmament groups. The author has discovered no evidence to suggest that such a fund actually existed except in the minds of anti-American propagandists. 8 Quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 214.

Right- Wing Nationalism and the M ilitary

227 Emperor’s sovereignty; (2) the carrying out of national administra­ tion by means of Japanism (Nihon-shugi), which would lead to the construction of a new Japan; (3) the complete freedom and inde­ pendence of the Japanese people and the strengthening of sound national thought. In an interesting comparison between the 1952 and 1954 programmes Professor Kinoshita points out that in 1954 the Emperor was mentioned for the first time, ‘Japanism’ was sub­ stituted for ‘new Japanism’, all references to ‘peace’ were deleted, and a new article was substituted on the need for ‘Asianism’ based on coexistence and co-prosperity (kyöson-kyöei) ; an article calling for ‘the suppression of Communism and its activities’ was, however, left unaltered.1Whether or not it may have been the original inten­ tion of its founders, the fact is that the War Comrades’ Association, having recruited members as a non-political group devoted largely to welfare activities for the benefit of ex-servicemen, had some two years after its founding changed the emphasis of its slogans to such political issues as rearmament, anti-Communism, and the restora­ tion of traditional nationalist patterns. Although the Association has not been very conspicuous, its activities having been mainly con­ centrated in the Osaka area, it has undoubtedly had an important effect in bringing together former military men and in inspiring them with certain common political ideals. In 1953 the group par­ ticipated in the national right-wing unification movement. One of the more blatant efforts made by former military men in contravention of the Occupation ban on political activity was that of the group which supported Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Government in Formosa and which tried to raise funds to procure weapons and recruit men for service with the Chinese Nationalists ; the group also arranged for high-ranking Japanese officers to serve as military advisers in Taipeh. This, as we have seen, was a popular cause among certain civilian rightist groups, including the Love and Esteem Mutual Benefaction League and Homma Kenichirö’s New Life League, and was also championed by some of the younger nationalists like Kodama Yoshio and Mikami Taku. Among former 1 Kinoshita, ‘Sengo Uyoku Undo no Hembö* (The Transfiguration of the Post-War Right-Wing Movement), Shisö, Dec. 1955. Other slogans were: (1) to revise or abolish institutions that do not accord with the national polity and the State, (2) to work for a new Constitution, infused with the spirit of history and tradition, (3) to eliminate internal strife in Japan and to establish industrial relations on a basis of morality, so that management and labour can be united as one, (4) to revise the present educational system on the basis of Japanism.

228 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan high-ranking officers who devoted themselves to raising military support for the Formosa régime the most conspicuous was exLieut.-General Nemoto Hiroshi,1who had been one of the extreme militarists before the war and who had taken an active part in the October (1931) Incident;2 others who participated in these efforts were ex-General Okamura Yasuji and ex-Major-Generals Tomita Chokuko and Imai Takeo.8 The pro-Chiang group of officers fre­ quently co-operated with like-minded civilian nationalists. Though their labours turned out on the whole to be abortive so far as effective aid to Chiang was concerned, they did succeed within Japan in pro­ ducing the type of ad hoc collaboration between military and civilian nationalists that was so common in pre-war politics. The motives that inspired the pro-Chiang group were varied. Some of the officers were undoubtedly sincere admirers of the Generalissimo himself. More important, however, was the goal of establishing a strong antiCommunist alliance in East Asia : by helping the Nationalists to re­ gain power on the mainland, Japan might recoup herself from her earlier losses and come once again to exercise strong influence under the banner of pan-Asianism. Japan’s military moves on the contin­ ent before the war had consistently been justified as being partly aimed at protecting Asia from Communist encroachments; the same justification could be used with no less effect now that the Communists had, partly as a result of Japan’s defeat, so greatly ex­ tended their power in the Far East. Another consideration was that the Occupation authorities might, because of their known sympa­ thies for Chiang and their violent antipathy to the Chinese Com­ munists, wink at the violation of the purge ordinance by Japanese officers who were effectively aiding the Formosa regime. This was 1 See below, p. 446. * See below, App. I ll, pp. 431-2. 3 Okubo notes. According to a report published in the Mainichi newspaper (26 Sept. 1957), eighteen former high-ranking Japanese officers were still serving as military advisers in Taipeh as of September 1957. In 1949, according to the report, about twenty officers were personally invited by President Chiang Kaishek (himself a graduate of the Japanese military academy) to build up the Nationalist military forces through re-education and retraining. The officers were selected by ex-General Okamura Yasuji and were under the leadership of ex-Major-General Tomita Chokuko, who has been with President Chiang since 1949. They were smuggled out of Japan in violation of the immigration regula­ tions, allegedly after talks had been held on the subject between Occupation authorities and Colonel Chen Chao-kai (present military attaché to the [Nation­ alist] Chinese Embassy in Tokyo). There is now said to be considerable senti­ ment in Formosa in favour of the group’s return to Japan, since it no longer seems to have any useful function.

229 connected with the belief, still held by many of the Japanese ex­ military, that, since United States policy was to build up Japan as the great anti-Communist bastion in the Far East, one of Japan's first military tasks would be to help restore Nationalist rule on the Chinese mainland. In the event, hopes that the Occupation might actively connive in these pro-Chiang activities do not appear to have been realized. As, with the passage of the years, the chances of a Nationalist reconquest of China appeared increasingly remote, the efforts of former Japanese officers to provide material support for Chiang Kai-shek became more and more desultory. The proChiang group in Japan had never managed to acquire even a semb­ lance of popular backing, and in particular it had been discredited by the frequent disclosures of smuggling activities by some of its civilian participants. During the Korean War there were reports of efforts by certain officers, such as ex-Lieut.-General Wachi Takaji, formerly ViceChief of Staff of the Southern Army, to recruit Japanese volunteers for service with the United Nations forces in South Korea,1 but these activities proved to be even less successful than those of the Formosa group ; for, as we have seen, most right-wing nationalists, who might otherwise have supported Japanese participation in an anti-Communist war, were vigorously opposed to the role of colonial mercenaries which they feared would be assigned to the Japanese should they fight on the side of the Americans under the existing conditions of semi-independence. The various organized activities of former professional officers that have been examined in the preceding pages led the way to their resumption of open and legal political activity after April 1952, and notably to their striking success in the general elections of April 1953—success that would have been quite unthinkable a few years earlier, even in the absence of purge restrictions. Former military leaders, who in the years immediately following defeat had been bereft of all prestige among the population at large, and had even as­ sumed the role of the scapegoat on whom Japan's catastrophe could be blamed, had by 1952, in the context of the ‘reverse course', often come to appear as the trustworthy repositories of the solid national virtues. To have held the rank of general in the Imperial Army or of admiral in the Imperial Navy was ceasing to be a stigma, except in Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

1 e.g. Yükan Yomiuri, io July 1953.

R

230 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan the eyes of left-wing voters, and often it was a distinct political ad­ vantage. Former officers who now began to participate in election campaigns wisely avoided even a semblance of the pre-war type of jingoistic rodomontade, which would inevitably have alienated the great mass of the voters. Instead they concentrated on the need for restoring traditional national virtues, pride in one’s country, and respect for established social patterns; their unexpected success in April 1953 and in subsequent elections can largely be attributed to their effective appeal to what has been denoted as ‘home consump­ tion’ nationalism and to the special form of nostalgia that has been identified as one of its aspects. It is not, of course, suggested that these candidates were at heart unrepentant chauvinists who were for the time being disguising their bellicose ambitions under an innocu­ ous veneer. Indeed, it should be remarked that the most successful of all the ex-officer candidates were men like ex-General Ugaki and ex-Admiral Nomura who had been noted as moderates in pre-war days. Such men were, despite their advanced age, far more in tune with the post-war type of nationalism than were the radical fire­ brands who had been so conspicuous in an earlier period. Far from preaching a demoded chauvinism, many of the ex­ military candidates went out of their way to lard their speeches with up-to-date slogans about democracy and people’s rights. Former Vice-Admiral Hoshina, for example, declared himself to be in fav­ our of ‘World Peace in Democracy and Freedom’, a combination of up-to-date amulet-words that could hardly be bettered by the most extreme left-wing candidate. Another reason for the success of the former military in the 1953 elections and thereafter was the growing influence of the various exservicemen’s associations that have been examined in earlier pages. These associations usually had branches throughout the country and often extended their organizations to the remotest rural areas. They were ideally suited for garnering votes at election time, es­ pecially from ex-servicemen and their families. The first of the former military to achieve prominent success in a post-war election was ex-Colonel Tsuji himself, who was elected to the Lower House in October 1952. Tsuji was subsequently re­ elected in 1953, 1955, and the 1958 elections. As we have seen, his special popularity derived partly from his wide associations through­ out the country, partly from his connexions with ex-General

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

231

Ishiwara’s East Asia League movement, and partly from his very successful appeal to a neutralist brand of nationalism. Inspired by Tsuji's success, the magazine The Companion (organ of the army exofficers* Companions* Association), despite its usual reluctance to enter the political arena, in January 1953 urged ex-military men throughout the country to stand for office. Several were accordingly nominated in April 1953 and, as we have seen, the success that they achieved in this election came as a surprise to many observers. ExGeneral Ugaki Kazushige, former Minister of War and GovernorGeneral of Korea, was elected to the Upper House with 513,863 votes, the largest number received by any candidate in the entire election; ex-Colonel Tsuji was elected to the Lower House with 50,090 votes. In a by-election in 1954 ex-Admiral Nomura was elected to the Upper House with 254,123 votes. In 1955 ex-Colonel Tsuji, ex-Vice-Admiral Hoshina Zenshirö,1 and ex-Rear-Admiral Mazaki Katsuji were elected to the Lower House with 83,696, 75,461, and 46,989 votes respectively. In 1956 former MajorGeneral Matsumura Shuitsu, a member of the pre-war militarist Cherry-Blossom Association and head of the post-war League for the Protection of Pensions for Former Military Men, was elected to the Upper House with 325,397 votes. Many other ex-military candi­ dates, such as ex-General Hashimoto Kingorö in 1956, received con­ siderable support from the voters but failed to secure election. Concerning party affiliation, in 1953 both ex-General Ugaki and exColonel Tsuji ran as independents, but in subsequent elections most of the successful ex-military candidates stood as members of the conservative party and thus tended indirectly to become more closely associated with the Government. It would be unwise to ex­ aggerate the success that former officers have achieved in these elec­ tions; yet the fact that they have managed to garner so many votes since 1952 would tend to suggest that the strong feeling which existed in the early post-war period against military men as such has begun to subside, and that in many cases these men can effectively represent the particular form of nationalist feeling that prevails among the voters.2 1 See below, pp. 441-2. 1 It is to be noted that the successful ex-military candidates (apart from those running for the Upper House from the national constituency) all represent pre­ dominantly rural prefectures (Ishikawa, Miyagi, Saga, &c.). The same applies to successful civilian right-wing nationalists. Successful left-wing candidates are, of course, in most cases elected from predominantly urban areas.

232 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan The post-war trend, then, has been for former military men, who immediately after the defeat had been widely rejected as a super­ fluous, and possibly even a dangerous, element in Japanese society, gradually to be accepted as individuals into the political life of the country. They, for their part, came to collaborate more and more with the established conservative centres of power and in particular with the implementation of the Government’s rearmament plans. This last trend was accelerated after the passing of the Self-Defence Forces Bill in June 1954 and the expansion of the National Safety Force into the present Self-Defence Forces (Jiei Tai). There had, it is true, ever since the Yoshida Government first started during the Occupation to think in terms of rearmament, been a group of highranking ex-officers—men like ex-General Shimomura Sadamu, exLieut.-Generals Tatsumi Eiichi and Kawabe Torashirô, and exRear-Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio—who had acted as unofficial ad­ visers to the Government on matters of defence. On the whole, how­ ever, former military men had, for reasons that have been examined, looked askance at the Government’s embryonic rearmament schemes. Their hostility, as we have seen, began to lessen towards the end of 1951 ; the trend towards increasing acceptance of govern­ ment-directed, American-supported rearmament continued, and after the establishment of the Self-Defence Forces in 1954 it be­ came the exception, instead of the rule, for former professional officers to hold aloof. This is not to say that they ceased to be highly critical of the way in which rearmament was being carried out; but on the whole they were now willing to participate in, or at least co-operate with, the new forces, in the hope that these would in due course be improved along the lines that they felt to be neces­ sary. What, then, is the nature of these forces? According to the legisla­ tion passed in 1954, their aim is to ‘maintain the independence and peace of the country and preserve the security of the nation’. They are divided into three separate ‘Headquarters’, Ground, Maritime, and Air, each under a Chief of Staff. At the end of 1956 the ground force was reported to have some 160,000 officers and men, 12,000 civilians, and 247 aircraft; the maritime force about 23,000 officers and men, 1,300 civilians, a total tonnage of about 92,000, and 127 aircraft; the air force about 14,000 officers and men, 1,900 civilians,

233 and a total of about 550 aircraft, of which 163 were combat craft.1 These forces all come under a Joint Staff Council, which in turn is under the Defence Agency headed by a civilian Director-General, who is a member of the Cabinet and, as such, responsible to the Diet. Thus whereas under the pre-Surrender Constitution the ‘pre­ rogative of high command1was with the Emperor, the supreme con­ trol over the new defence forces is vested with the Prime Minister, who has the power to appoint and dismiss the Director-General of the Defence Agency. Many professional military men, Defence Agency officials, and conservative leaders, notably two former Prime Ministers, Mr. Hatoyama and Mr. Ashida, emphasized the need for an additional body to exercise general supervision over rearmament and defence policies. In 1954 and in 1955 the Yoshida and Hatoyama Cabinets respectively laid bills before the Diet which provided for the estab­ lishment of a Defence Council. The measure was vigorously op­ posed by the socialists and other left-wing elements in the country, who feared that the proposed Council was the thin end of the wedge for vitiating the principle of civilian supremacy in the defence forces. In addition, the Progressive and the Liberal parties were at odds on the question of whether ordinary (non-Cabinet) citizens should be members of the Council. In 1955 the bill was shelved, to­ gether with the related bill for establishing a Constitution Research Council ; the Director-General of the Defence Agency, Mr. Sugihara Arata, assumed responsibility for this setback and resigned. The measure was reintroduced the next year ; this time, as a result of the merger of the two conservative parties, it was successful : in July 1946 a bill was finally passed setting up a Defence Council as the nation’s top defence-planning organ.2 Having had the satisfaction of seeing this legislation passed, Mr. Hatoyama, the Prime Minister, did not appear to be in any great hurry to have the Council start its Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

1 Figures provided by the former Director-General of the National Defence Agency, Mr. Funada Naka, in Seiji-dayori 7, pp. 11-14. * Membership in the Council included the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance, Director-General of the Defence Agency, and Head of the Economic Planning Board. The Council’s duties were defined as discussing and deciding the following: (1) formulation of a basic plan for national defence, (2) adjustment of defence plans with related industries, (3) activation of national defence, (4) all other matters that the Prime Minister considers necessary from the standpoint of defence.

234 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan work: the inaugural meeting was repeatedly postponed and in fact did not take place until just before Mr. Hatoyama’s resignation in December 1956. The Defence Council is endowed by law with considerable authority and the question of whether its centre of gravity will be civilian or military is a most important one. This issue arose at an early stage when ex-Colonel Hattori was recommended by Mr. Hatoyama, ex-Colonel Tsuji, and others for the key post of Coun­ cillor in charge of defence plans; his appointment was, as we have seen, strongly opposed on the grounds that it might compromise the principle of civilian supremacy. The extent to which former pro­ fessional military men succeed in penetrating the Defence Council will in the years to come be one significant guide to the extent of their political influence. The issue of constitutional revision is, as we have seen, intimately connected with that of rearmament and the evolution of the Con­ stitution Research Council has paralleled that of the Defence Coun­ cil: both these bodies were unanimously opposed by the left-wing and ‘progressive* elements in the country and both were finally ap­ proved by the Diet in 1956 following the unification of the con­ servative parties. The Constitution Research Council has, however, been even more difficult to activate than the Defence Council, since membership in the former is far wider, including, as it does, people who are actually opposed to the principle of revising the Constitu­ tion and who have as a result flatly refused to participate in the Council’s work.1 In addition there is the ineluctable fact that, even if the Constitution Research Council should be able to agree on a plan for revision, the hurdles of obtaining a two-thirds majority in the Diet and a simple majority in a national referendum will still remain. Constitutional revision is probably the main nationalist issue in Japanese domestic politics and it is one on which conservatives, military men, and right-wing nationalists are in principle unani­ mously agreed. The basis of revisionism has already been examined in the section on the ‘reverse course*. Apart from general nationalist considerations, military men have many special reasons for wishing to see the Constitution altered. Although the present type of defence forces may, by some legalistic dexterity, be regarded as compatible 1 See above, p. 119 n. 1.

Right- Wing Nationalism and the M ilitary 235 with Article IX, any effort at conscription or at dispatching forces overseas (whether independently or in compliance with some United Nations resolution or some regional pact) would certainly involve stretching a point. In case there should be any doubt on the latter issue, the Upper House in 1954 overwhelmingly passed a reso­ lution prohibiting the dispatch of troops outside Japan. So far as conscription is concerned, it is generally felt that this will be neces­ sary in one form or another if Japan is to build up sizeable ground forces of high calibre.1A ballon d'essai was launched in 1955 by Mr. Sunada Shigemasa, the Director-General of the Defence Agency, when he announced a plan to introduce a short-term military train­ ing programme for university and secondary-school graduates, who would thus be compulsorily enrolled in the Defence Forces. There have also been reports of local authorities being ordered to compile lists of men in their districts who are of enlistment age. Such mea­ sures, however necessary they may seem to military men, are strongly attacked by the left wing and by most of the press : they are bound to prove abortive unless the Constitution is at least partially modified. The most important consideration is that of morale : so long as the Defence Forces retain their present aura of illegitimacy, it will be impossible to stimulate among their members the sense of pride, solidarity, and discipline which, according to Lieut.-General Sugiyama Shigeru, the Chief of Staff of the Ground Self-Defence Force, and others, is even more important than modern technology. Military leaders are well aware that the general attitude of the public to the forces still tends to be one of indifference, if not of actual re­ sentment, and keenly realize the effect that this is bound to have on those who have joined. Thus Lieut.-General Sugiyama is reported to have remarked (in 1957): I feel very sorry for the boys who have joined the Ground SelfDefence Forces and are looked upon by the people with a suspicious eye and even called ‘tax thieves* by some heartless people. I personally want to see the Constitution which bans military forces modified and the Defence Agency promoted to a Defence Ministry.2 Similarly a rear-admiral in the Maritime Self-Defence Force stated 1 A further advantage of military conscription for many of its advocates was that it would help to control the ‘excesses’ of present-day Japanese youth and to instil in them some of the traditional virtues. * Quoted in Asahi Everting News, 26 Aug. 1957.

236 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan that Japan’s defence forces could not achieve a truly military char­ acter so long as the Defence Agency retained its present status of illegitimacy under the Constitution. ‘Ours is not a military organi­ zation anyway’, he is quoted as saying. ‘The way it is run, it is ex­ actly like another government agency. In case of emergency, of course, these forces will be of no use at all.*1 Similarly ex-Admiral Hasegawa Kiyoshi, commander of the Navy Air Squadron at the time of the bombing of the U.S.S. Panay (1937), stressed that con­ stitutional revision was even more important than acquiring new destroyers and submarines : Under our Constitution it is impossible for the armed forces to have the proper military spirit. The men today are treated like civilians. They can’t act like soldiers and sailors. No one wants to die. But soldiers and sailors must die for their country in an emergency.2 Despite these and other doubts, professional officers have con­ tinued to join the new defence forces in increasing numbers. In 1954, shortly before the National Safety Agency gave place to the National Defence Agency, the proportion of former career officers in the ground forces was about 24*4 per cent., the highest percen­ tages being found among the ranks of major-generals, colonels, and lieutenant-colonels.3 In the Maritime Safety Force the proportion 1 Quoted in Japan Times, 31 July 1956. * Quoted in ibid., 10 Dec. 1957. 3 The following percentages for the proportion of former career officers were included in a report by the National Safety Agency to the Upper House in May 1954: National Safety Force (present Ground Self-Defence Force) Holding the rank of Lieut.-General in the N D F 11*5 „ Maj.-General 57* 1 ,, Colonel 65*9 „ Lieut.-Colonel 52-9 „M ajor 42*4 „C aptain 32-7 „ First Lieut. 15-6 „ Second Lieut. 35 o Maritime Safety Force (present Maritime Self-Defence Force) Holding the rank of Vice-Admiral 50-0 „ Rear-Admiral 63 •6 „C aptain 91*6 „Comm ander 82*3 ,, Lieut. -Commander 92 •2 „ First Lieut. 89*8 „L ieut. 81 *8 » » » „Ensign 51*3 Professional officers are thoroughly screened before being appointed to the new Self-Defence Forces and from the outset the policy has been to exclude general-grade officers. A number of officers who took a leading part in the pre­ paration and execution of the Pacific War have, however, joined the NDF.

237 of officers from the Imperial Navy was over 80 per cent. ; the officers of the new Air Force were, as one would expect, almost entirely pro­ fessionals. The percentage of former career officers in the ground forces has steadily increased since the formation of the National Defence Forces (NDF). Top control in the Ground Self-Defence Force and in the internal bureaux of the Defence Agency itself was at first allotted mainly to non-professional men, in accordance with the principle of civilian control. The great majority of these con­ sisted of ex-bureaucrats of the Ministry of Home Affairs, including many former police officials. This ‘amateur* leadership was not un­ naturally resented by the professional officers, almost all of whom had undergone combat experience on the continent or in the Pacific. After 1954 the professionals made steady inroads into the offices of the Defence Agency. Outside the Defence Agency itself ‘civilians in uniform* were also being replaced by career officers, and, with the appointment of Lieut.-General Sugiyama as the new Chief of Staff of the Ground Self-Defence Forces in August 1957, the three top service positions were for the first time all held by former officers of the Imperial Army and Navy.1 With the ever-increasing participation of professional military men in national politics and in the management of the new defence forces, the movement for forming an all-inclusive ex-servicemen’s organization gathered strength. Former officers were now far less divided among themselves on the question of co-operation with the Government’s defence plans and they were, as we have seen, firmly united on the need for constitutional revision, which had become the sine qua non of any effective military expansion. The situation now demanded a nation-wide ex-servicemen’s league, which would have a far broader basis both in membership and in objectives than the existing groups, and which could help to re-educate the public on the issues of rearmament and constitutional revision. By 1954 Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

Among these are Lieut.-General Sugiyama Shigeru (now Chief of Staff of the Ground Self-Defence Force), who was responsible for military organization and mobilization in the Imperial Army and who was subsequently prominent in the direction of the New Guinea campaign; General Sanagi Kowashi (now Chief of Staff of the Air Self-Defence Force), one of the organizers of the air attack on Pearl Harbour; and Vice-Admiral Yoshida Eizö (former Chief of Staff of the Maritime Self-Defence Force), who was outstanding among the younger offi­ cers in the Imperial Navy. 1 viz. Lieut.-General Sugiyama Shigeru (ground), Vice-Admiral Nagasawa Hiroshi (sea), General Sanagi Kowashi (air).

238 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Reservists* Associations (Zaigö Gunjinkai) had been established throughout Japan; of these the most active politically was the Tokyo Reservists* Association, which counted about 10,000 mem­ bers under the leadership of ex-General Nishio Chüzö, a former Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army and Vice-Chief of General Staff at the time of the China Incident, and of ex-General Okamura Yasuji. The first concrete step in the direction of forming a national servicemen’s group on the general lines of the powerful pre-Surrender Reservists* Association (Zaigö Gunjinkai)1was the organiza­ tion in May of that year of the inter-service Cherry and Star Club (Osei Kurabu) by a number of former generals and admirals.2 This group co-operated closely with the Tokyo Reservists* Association and in June 1956 they succeeded in forming the Federation of War Comrades* Associations (Senyû Dantai Rengökai)t known for short as the War Comrades* Federation (Senyüren).3 This was undoubt­ edly the most important military organization of its type since the war. The inaugural meeting of the Federation was held in Tokyo and began with a requiem service for those killed in the Pacific War.4 Some 2,000 representatives attended from forty-two (out of Japan’s forty-six) prefectures. Initial membership was stated to be 800,000 ; 1 The Reservists’ Association was originally founded in 1910 under Generals Terauchi and Tanaka Giichi. It was subsidized by the Government and organ­ ized by the Military and Navy Affairs Bureau. Membership was automatic for all ex-servicemen; even the smallest village in Japan had its local chapter and the Association was especially influential in rural areas. The standing member­ ship before the war was 3 million, and during the war it reached over twice that number. The Association accordingly provided an ideal organ whereby the country’s militarist leaders could influence the public. It did not take any active part in national politics until about 1930. Thereafter it became an important focus for political activity by nationalist agitators and it was instrumental in stirring up popular feeling on such issues as the need for strong action in Man­ churia and the opposition to Professor Minobe’s ‘organ theory’ of the Emperor ( 1935 )-

8 The Cherry and Star stand for the navy and army respectively. Prominent among the organizers were ex-General Okamura Yasuji, ex-Lieut.-General Numata Takazö, and ex-Vice-Admiral Fukudome Shigeru. 3 Not to be confused with Yoshida Masuzö’s War Comrades’ Association (Senyü Kai) (pp. 226—7 above). The question of civilian participation was de­ bated during the formation of the Senyüren and in the end it was decided that membership should be purely military. Yoshida Masuzö’s group, however, appears to have maintained close ties with the Federation; there have also been reports of efforts by other civilian-directed right-wing groups to penetrate the Federation. 4 In August 1955 the Federation held a memorial service at the Yasukuni Shrine for the ‘heroes who committed suicide at the time of the termination of the War’.

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

239

this included about 50,000 former professional officers, of whom about 1,000 were generals or admirals. Ex-General Ueda Kenkichi, formerly Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, was elected president and ex-General Okamura Yasuji became vice-president and chairman of the board of directors. The group was clearly de­ signed to occupy the role held in pre-Surrender days by the Reserv­ ists’ Association; according to General Okamura, it was hoped that the Federation would eventually embrace all former military per­ sonnel and would number close on 10 million.1 The Federation is especially significant from the point of view of the present study since, despite a few pious disclaimers, its ob­ jectives were from the outset largely of a political nature and in­ spired by the type of right-wing nationalism that has been examined in the previous chapter. This emerges clearly from a study of the Federation’s basic documents and from the statements of many of its leaders. The charter insists on the ‘spiritual* nature of the group— the word has a strongly pre-war ring—but makes it clear that this is by no means incompatible with political action : This Association is a spiritual organization and not a so-called political society. But we wish for the righteous growth and development of our Government through the firm existence of our Association and its activi­ ties based on the fundamental principles of our organization.12 The highest mission of the Federation is stated in its Rules to be ‘the reconstruction and defence of the fatherland’ and—a conces­ sion to post-war amulets—‘the realization of peace and the welfare of the world’.3 The dominant socio-political flavour of the group may be judged from the following typical passage in the Resolution : We expect to devote ourselves to the cause of maintaining internal peace and order, minimizing damage and relieving victims in the case of social disturbances or natural disasters. [We] inherit the beautiful cus­ toms handed down in our fatherland and, in the meantime, reject acts hampering the reconstruction of the country and disturbing the social order... .4 The leaders of the Federation had none of the scruples that still existed among some members of the Companions* Association 1 Quoted in Nippon Times, 6 July 1955. * Quoted in ibid. 8 Quoted by Professor Kinoshita in *A New Phase of Militarism in Japan’ (1956, unpublished). 4 Quoted in ibid.

240 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan about co-operating wholeheartedly with the Self-Defence Forces, though they were, it is true, quite ready to criticize the latter for their ‘amateur* leadership. At the same time they realized that one of the main functions of their vast and rapidly-expanding organization would be to spread ‘defence-mindedness* among the people by means of propaganda. A ‘spiritual movement to promote the national ideal of loving and protecting our own fatherland* was regarded as no less important than practical rearmament measures. The Federation naturally focused on the prime need for constitutional revision. The leaders were well aware that much of the popular opposition to re­ armament came from the young people and women of the country and they made it clear that they would especially direct their appeal to these quarters.1 The potential political influence of a vast organization like the War Comrades’ Federation, with its membership spread through every stratum of Japanese society and in every prefecture of the country, was evident from the outset, and the leaders made it clear that, despite the essentially ‘spiritual* nature of the group, they would not hesitate to use this influence, when necessary, to ‘re­ educate* the public and also to secure the election of suitable candi­ dates to the Diet. In November 1956 the Federation was reorgan­ ized under a new name, the Japan Native Friend League (Nihon Göyü Remmei). Ex-General Ueda was again chosen to head the group and most of the leading figures were the same as in the War Comrades* Federation. Initial membership was now stated to be about 1,100,000, that is almost 40 per cent, more than membership in 1955. The Federation had, from the outset, maintained close re­ lations with the defence forces and this was also the policy of the new League. Mr. Funada Naka, Director-General of the Defence Agency, attended the inaugural ceremony and said that his Agency would extend full co-operation to the new group. He also urged the members to lead and enlighten the public and to awaken them to the necessity of defence.2 Beginning in 1953 a number of local ex-servicemen’s leagues was organized for men who had retired from the post-war defence forces. The first of these was the Comrades* Association (Höyü Kai)t 1 . [we shall] publicize the spirit of this Federation widely among all groups of the people, particularly among the youth and women. . .* Standards of Action, Clause 8, quoted by Kinoshita in ibid. 2Japan Times, 23 Nov. 1956.

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary 241 which came into being in October 1953 under the presidency of the conservative politician and former Director-General of the National Defence Agency, Mr. Kimura Tokutarö. Its early membership was about 5,000 and branches were set up in sixteen prefectures; since then, it has expanded steadily as the number of ex-servicemen of post-war vintage has increased.1 In October 1957 a total of thirtyseven different groups had been organized in different parts of the country for former members of the post-war defence forces. Most of these groups aim to give moral and spiritual support to the NDF, and in particular to counteract indifferent and hostile attitudes on the part of the public. There is little evidence, however, that they plan to engage in any overt political activity ; their general approach, as would be expected from the relative youth of most of the mem­ bers, is very much less backward-looking than that of the associa­ tions of pre-Surrender ex-servicemen that have been described above. The period of accelerated military rehabilitation after 1952 also saw an increase in the number of private groups, aimed on the one hand at the encouragement of constitutional revision and rearma­ ment, and on the other at military and historical ‘research’. These groups all strongly supported the new armed forces (though severely criticizing their weaknesses) ; most of them emphasized the need for increasing a patriotic spirit among the people as a sine qua non for effective national defence. Their supporters usually included high-ranking career officers, conservative politicians and govern­ ment officials, representatives of the zaibatsu and other business groups, and a smattering of professional right-wing nationalists. The most prominent of these groups was the Japan Defence Society, organized in June 1953 under the sponsorship of the Defence Pro­ duction Committee of the Federation of Economic Organizations,2 1 In October 1957 a total of about 150,000 men had retired from the National Police Reserve, the National Security Force, and the NDF. * The Defence Production Committee (Böei Seisan Iinkai) had itself been established in January 1952 to advise the Keidanren (p. 115 above) on questions of defence and rearmament. Its chairman was Mr. Göko Kiyoshi of the Mitsubishi combine; former Vice-Admiral Hoshina was a prominent member. Among other things the Committee elaborated a detailed programme for Japanese re­ armament and submitted advice to the Government on long-term rearmament plans. The desire to promote increased defence production was, according to Professor Kinoshita, especially strong among business groups in the Kantö area, including Tokyo, and corresponded to the interest among Kansai (western Japan) business men in expanding trade with Communist China.

242 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan with the aims of increasing popular support for rearmament, study­ ing Communist activities and, in particular, fighting pacifism among Japanese youth. The leading military supporters were exAdmiral Nomura, ex-Vice-Admiral Hoshina, ex-Lieut.-General Kawabe T orashirö,1and ex-Lieut.-General Iimura Minoru ;12among conservative political figures were Mr. Ichimada Hisato (Governor of the Bank of Japan and subsequently Finance Minister), Mr. Kishi Nobusuke, and Mr. Abe Genki (Minister of Internal Affairs in the wartime Suzuki Cabinet); business leaders included Mr. Fujiyama Aiichirö (President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and subsequently Foreign Minister) and Mr. Göko Kiyoshi of the Mitsubishi group. It was understood that the association would re­ ceive considerable financial backing from the Federation of Econo­ mic Organizations and this naturally attracted to its ranks a number of professional rightists. Among right-wing intellectuals who joined the group were Mr. Akamatsu Katsumaro,3 the Communist rene­ gade, and Mr. Tsukui Tatsuo.4*In the event these expectations ap­ pear to have been disappointed, and the Society itself gradually lapsed into inactivity. This, however, is the type of grouping that can readily be reorganized under a new name as circumstances re­ quire.6 The Martial Virtues Association (Butoku Kai) is an example of the pre-war organizations of this type that now came back into exis­ tence. It was revived in March 1954, its main objective, as in earlier days, being to promote a healthy military spirit, especially among young people.6 The friend of Mr. Yoshida, the Prime Minister, 1 See below, p. 443. 2 See below, p. 442. 3 See below, p. 440. 4 See below, p. 451. Other right-wing nationalist supporters of the Japan Defence Society were Mr. Ogushi Toyoo (the ultra-rightist philosopher), Mr. Yasuoka Masaatsu, Mr. Saitö Tadashi (writer), Mr. Shindö Kazuma (the prominent right-wing civilian who had been a leading figure in the pre-war Dark Ocean Society and Amur River Association, and who was elected to the Lower House from Fukuoka in 1958), and Mr. Kinoshita Torn. 6 Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, p. 66. • The Martial Virtues Association was founded in Kyoto in 1895 with the aim of promoting the samurai spirit. Its headquarters were used for the practice of various traditional martial sports. Later, branches were established throughout the country and by 1912 the Association claimed over a million and a half members. It was under the leadership of prominent military men (Stony, Double Patriots, pp. 20-21). In his memoirs (published in 1957) Mr. Yoshida mentions that he appealed to General MacArthur not to dissolve the Martial Virtues Association, which, as he said, was simply a type of youth club. Mr. Yoshida pointed out that its dissolution would harm the chances of the Liberal Party at the forthcoming elections. General MacArthur, however, was adamant,

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary 243 ex-Major-General Machino Takema, was chosen as president; among the leading backers were ex-Lieut.-General Tanaka Shinichi, Mr. Yoshida, Mr. Ichimada Hisato, Mr. Ogata Taketora, Mr. Okazaki Katsuo (Foreign Minister under Mr. Yoshida), Mr. öno Bamboku (the prominent conservative politician) ; figures from the business world included Mr. Shöriki Matsutarö and Mr. Göko Kiyoshi; rightist nationalism was represented by Mr. Yasuoka Masaatsu and Mr. Sasagawa Ryöichi. Two other representative groups may be briefly mentioned. The National Defence Institution (Kokubö Gakkai) was established in May 1953, under the leadership of ex-Lieut.-Generals Tanaka Shinichi*1and Iimura Minoru and seventeen other former generals, who aimed at conducting military research and promoting rearma­ ment; the group publishes the National Defence Review (Kokubö Jihô), one of the numerous military magazines that have come into circulation since 1952. The Japan Fatherland League (Nihon Aikyö Remmei), composed chiefly of former generals and admirals, was formed in July 1953 under the leadership of ex-Admiral Nomura Naokuni, a former Minister of the Navy, with Göko Kiyoshi as ad­ viser. It had the usual aims of promoting rearmament, elevating national morals, and combating Communist influence. The League has established branches in various parts of the country and has con­ centrated on the organization of patriotic village youth. The period following 1952, then, was marked by the formation on the one hand of a mass ex-servicemen’s organization, led by former career officers and supported by the Government, which grew steadily in strength and which in 1956 passed the one-million mark ; on the other hand of numerous private groups, which though small in membership, represented a significant alliance of military and civilian elements who had in common the aim of restoring nationalist feeling among the people as a means of building up effective armed defence for Japan.

Political Significance of Military Elements in the Post-War Period Having traced the steady rehabilitation of military elements in on the grounds that butoku ('martial virtues') had a militarist ring. As a sort of quid pro quo, he agreed to postpone the enforcement of the rule that the zaibatsu trade names must be changed. Mr. Yoshida cites this as an example of the Supreme Commander’s sagacity (Kaisö Jünen, i. 98-99). 1 See below, p. 450.

244 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Japan since the nadir in 1945, we may now briefly examine their sig­ nificance in the context of post-war nationalism. To begin with, a few general observations may be drawn from the factual account given above. In the first place, there has been a tendency for military elements to participate more and more in the political life of the country. In the case of the numerous unofficial groups that developed in the post-war period we have seen that, although their original aims tended to be of a non-political nature, they became increasingly political as the ‘reverse course* continued. Even in a body of ex­ officer classmates like the Companions* Association, which from the outset emphasized the slogan ‘Fellowship and co-operation without any political colouring*, there was in fact increasing sentiment in favour of participating in elections and in national ‘re-education*. In the March 1953 issue of the magazine The Companion, for ex­ ample, we find the following contributions : The Companions* Association must, at the same time as observing a principle of unbiased leadership, lose no time in becoming a pure force (seijun no chikara) and in emerging into the field of political activity. And again: We must become an organ of enlightenment, to proclaim the great spirit of Restoration and to correct public opinion and national feeling, which have been distorted as a result of erroneous Occupation policy.1 The original objectives of most of the ex-officer groups were, as we have seen, closely related to the material welfare of their mem­ bers, and any political content was more or less incidental. Among these objectives were the securing of pensions and similar benefits, prompt repatriation, the depurge of military men, and the release of war criminals. Political activity during the Occupation period was sporadic. Thus we have noticed the abortive efforts of the form­ er officers favouring Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; again, in 1950, a group of ex-officers unsuccessfully tried to organize a cam­ paign to have ex-General Ugaki Kazushige nominated as chief dele­ gate to the Peace Conference.2 With the restoration of indepen­ dence, however, and the acceleration of ‘reverse course* trends, ex­ officer and other military groups assumed an increasingly political 1 Kaikö, no. 19, quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 204. 2 Maruyama, Nationalism, p. 10.

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary 245 character. This trend was encouraged by their unexpected success in national elections, by their achievement of nation-wide organiza­ tion and, most important, by the Government’s policy on rearma­ ment. Most of the small groups in which career military men joined forces with politicians, officials, business men, and professional nationalists were essentially political in their orientation; and the great national ex-servicemen’s league that developed after 1955 was also to an important extent political. All this emerges clearly both from the statements of the leaders and from the contents of the numerous military magazines that began to appear after 1952. Fre­ quently, it is true, these military elements disclaimed political in­ tent and insisted that their aims were of a purely spiritual nature; such protestations, however, were usually accompanied by appeals for the restoration of ‘Japanism’ and of the kokutait which were nothing if not political in their implications. The effective co-operation of former military men was, as we have seen, at first inhibited by the existence of numerous splits and rivalries, some of them carrying over from pre-war days. In par­ ticular they were divided in their attitude to the new defence forces and to the Government’s rearmament policy in general. After 1952, however, with the increasing participation of career men in these forces and in national politics, the tendency was towards increasing agreement on central issues. What, then, was the position of the former military men who were prominent and vocal in the various organized movements that we have been considering? While they differed in details and in em­ phasis, their general approach on most of the main questions was similar. In the first place, they were, as in pre-war days, agreed that Japan was confronted with a crisis of both a military and a spiritual nature.1 Furthermore it was usually stated or implied that former military men would play an essential role in helping the country meet this crisis. For example, the manifesto of the Tokyo Reservists’ War Comrades’ Association (Tokyo Zaigô Senyû Kai) gives the 1 According to ex-Colonel Hattori, even the word ‘crisis’ was totally inade­ quate to describe the appalling dangers with which Japan was faced: ‘I consider Japan’s aspect today to be truly alarming and terrible. We have had words like “emergency” (kiki) drummed into our ears until we are sick of hearing them. But things have now passed beyond that point. At this stage I do not want to utter such words as “ emergency” ; for I consider that conditions are far too grave for that’ (Hattori Takushirö, ‘A New Theory of National Defence’ (Shin-kokuböron)f Fuji, Oct. 1957, p. 14). S

246 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan following alarming diagnosis: ‘Was it not we fellow soldiers who were the very backbone of the people? While we war comrades have been sleeping, the Japanese have been a people without a back­ bone.*1 Japan’s main danger, it need hardly be said, came from Com­ munism. The country was shown to be threatened from the outside by the predatory ambitions of Soviet Russia and Communist China, and no less menacingly from within by leftist subversion. In the words of the manifesto just quoted, Japan was ‘on the eve of being turned into a second Korea*. Just as the military were the only force that could defend Japan from outside aggression, so they alone were capable of meeting the internal threat of Communism. In presenting the danger the strength of the JCP was often exaggerated beyond all measure. To quote ex-Lieut.-General Kunisaki,2 The internal strength of the Communists is now about 1,600,000 and already we hear reports of their preparing to establish a Communist régime in Japan. They are eagerly watching for their opportunity to take advantage of the Government’s unpreparedness to make a break-through. Judging from our experience years ago at the time of the Great Kantö Earthquake, when we undertook responsibility for preserving security under martial law, the only hope of stopping such an uprising lies in a union of ex-servicemen. The duty of ex-servicemen to unite in opposing elements who ‘dis­ turb the social order* was also, as we have seen, specified in the reso­ lution of the giant War Comrades* Federation.3 To resist the critical Communist menace, it was also essential to build up the NDF into proud and effective fighting services. The question of how to accomplish this was naturally a crucial one for most former military men. Many ex-officers directed their experi1 This association was founded in September 1952 under the presidency of the late Lieut.-General Andô Kisaburô, Minister of Home Affairs in the Tôjô Cabinet. Its manifesto is quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, pp. 215-17. 8 See below, p. 444. 8 The similarity between the pre-war and post-war utterances of military men concerning such matters as Japan's crisis and their role in meeting it are often striking. The following statement, for example, was made by Major-General Kita (ret.) of the Companions’ Association in 1936; mutatis mutandis, it is identical with the pronouncements being made by military men in 1956: ‘While I see world conditions deteriorate I cannot stand idle. We, the first and second reservists and officers on the retired list, must resist the permeation of dangerous thoughts. I propose that we devote the rest of our lives to awakening public sentiment, to perfecting education, and to substantiating national defence* (quoted by Storry, Double Patriots, p. 50 n. 2).

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary 247 ence, either in collaboration with the Government or through pri­ vate research groups, to the technological problems of modern re­ armament ; these matters are beyond the scope of the present study. At the same time it was generally recognized that the creation of efficient forces involved many questions of a socio-political nature and that these were often more difficult to solve than the purely technical difficulties. Foremost among these, as we have seen, was the need to revise the ‘no-war’ Constitution. So long as Article IX remained part of the basic law of the land, Japan’s forces would be bound to retain an unpleasant aura of illegitimacy; conscription, compulsory training, and the overseas dispatch of troops would all be impossible; and the Defence Forces would be less a genuine army, navy, and air force than an inflated riot squad incapable of any effective combat on the field of battle. Professional military men were also agreed that Japan’s forces must become ‘independent’. They differed widely as to how soon it would be possible to break away from the existing reliance on the United States, but this was almost invariably viewed as the goal. It was widely felt that, although Japan must for a long time continue to depend on America for technical and financial help, American forces themselves should be rapidly withdrawn from the homeland and that this move, far from weakening the country’s defences, would in fact spur the movement for large-scale rearmament. This was related to the crucial question of how closely Japan should co­ operate with American security arrangements in the Far East. Some military men, as we have seen, sympathized with ex-Colonel Tsuji’s objective of armed neutrality; the majority, however, appears to have felt that, for the time being at least, Japan’s best defence lay in the American alliance. The essential point on which they almost all agreed, however, was that the major decisions concerning the build­ up of Japan’s defence forces and the use of these forces must be made in Japan and must be based on Japan’s own interests. Another point of wide agreement was that professional men, whose careers had been devoted to military pursuits and who had mostly undergone years of hard combat experience, were more qualified, both technically and psychologically, to build up efficient armed forces than were the ex-bureaucrats of the Ministry of Home Affairs who at present held both the key posts in the Defence Agency and many of the important posts of command. Though few

248 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan would go so far as publicly to question the principle of civilian su­ premacy, which had become a shibboleth for acceptability in the post-war forces, it was widely considered that professional men should be given greater responsibility in what must, after all, be highly professional organizations. A basic revision of personnel policy in favour of career men was necessary, if only to improve the morale of these officers themselves, who in many cases were smouldering with discontent at the sight of inefficient ‘amateur* leadership. Even more important, it was necessary in order to im­ prove discipline and training, and to raise the NDF from the status of oversized police and coastal forces to that of an efficient army and navy capable of defending the country in a real emergency. Many professional officers, both in and outside the NDF, and not a few conservative civilians inevitably looked back with nostalgia at the rigorous training system and the esprit de corps that prevailed in the Imperial Army and Navy, and doubted whether effective mili­ tary forces could ever be built up without at least a partial return to pre-war methods. In certain cases local commanders with a hanker­ ing for past ways gave practical expression to their feelings ; such in­ cidents, when exposed, usually caused an uproar in the press and among left-wing circles. In January 1957, for instance, a com­ manding officer in Yamaguchi Prefecture ordered an emergency ‘defence mobilization* for the following day. The manner in which the mobilization was carried out smacked strongly of pre-war days. Among other things, the men were ordered to cut off locks of hair or finger-nails as ‘remembrances*; this was a typical pre-Surrender practice and encouraged the criticism by members of the unit that ‘modern and rational methods were not used*.1 The local com­ mander subsequently justified his orders as being aimed at improv­ ing the men’s training in view of ‘the impending international situation*. The most publicized incident involving the revival of pre-war training methods was the so-called Hiroshima Death March in February 1957, when two members of the Ground Self-Defence Force died as a result of a severe training exercise, for which they 1 During the war men used to leave locks of hair or finger-nails before going into battle, so that if they did not return these ‘remembrances' could be sent to their survivors. This also had a strong psychological effect on the men by making them aware of the decisive and heroic nature of their actions (Asahi Evening News, 4 Feb. 1957).

249 appear to have been inadequately prepared. The exercise consisted of an inter-regimental marching contest lasting some twenty-four hours. Public criticism arose not so much from the severity of the exercise itself as from reports that the men who subsequently died had been beaten on the head and lashed with bamboo sticks by officers as they staggered along half unconscious from fatigue. It was further reported that several other soldiers had been kicked and beaten by their platoon leaders and that men who were about to col­ lapse had been roped to those in front of them and pulled along. This criticism was not greatly abated by the accused officers, who were quoted as saying that they had merely ‘encouraged* the men with their bamboo canes, or by the official statement (a masterpiece of its kind) that Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

. . . the use of bamboo sticks and ropes was intended to promote the effectiveness of the march, but it is apparently due to lack of proper leadership on the part of the officers in command that their actions, aimed to encourage, were interpreted as ‘violence* by some of the unit members.1 The strongly pre-Surrender flavour of the incident was reinforced by the reported statement of the Chief of Staff of the Ground SelfDefence Force (an ex-official of the Ministry of Home Affairs who has since resigned his appointment) : T am deeply impressed with their [the deceased*s] spirit of “Give up only after you are dead**.*2 Also in the tradition of the defunct Imperial Army was the posthu­ mous promotion of the two men concerned and their citation as ex­ amples to be emulated by surviving comrades-in-arms. In examining this incident one should remember first of all that in pre-war days such misadventures would in all likelihood have passed virtually unnoticed by the general public. Beatings, kickings, and slappings by n.c.o.’s and officers were commonplace in the Im­ perial Army and rigorous training methods were taken for granted.3 In the post-war context, however, with the very constitutionality of the defence forces in question, with anti-militarist sentiment still pervading the public and vocal left-wing forces ready to exploit it 1Japan Times, 14 Feb. 1957. Detailed reports of this incident and some of its repercussions are contained in the Japanese press of 10-17 February. * Quoted by Mr. Murata Kiyoaki in Japan Times, 16 Feb. 1957. 3 Mr. Murata cites the instance of the Hakköda tragedy in 1902, when 208 men died as a result of a severe training exercise. Although it was a clear case of negligence on the part of the organizers, not a single officer was court-martialled as a result and only a few were even reprimanded (ibid.).

250 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan at every opportunity, incidents such as these were bound to have repercussions. An interesting comparison could be made of re­ actions in four different countries—Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States—to the deaths that occurred as a result of training exercises in their respective armies during the same general period. It would probably be found that the prevailing Japanese reactions were closest to those in Germany, namely fear that dis­ credited militarist methods were being revived in the armed forces and doubts whether it was in fact possible, in view of the country’s militarist traditions, to establish the army as a modern, democratic structure.1 One repercussion of the Hiroshima incident was to increase dis­ content among career officers in the NDF regarding non-profession­ al commanders. The divisional commander who had originally ordered the unfortunate exercise was an ex-civilian; he received far lighter punishment, however, than the career officers under his command who had carried out his orders. This naturally gave rise to the suspicion that a civilian-dominated Defence Agency was making scapegoats of professional officers who had dutifully obeyed the orders of their ‘amateur* superior. Repercussions on the soldiers of the NDF themselves are hard to determine; but it would be sur­ prising if the Hiroshima Death March and similar incidents have done much to stimulate recruitment or re-enlistment. Efforts to reintroduce traditional training methods have thus sometimes done more harm than good to the new Japanese forces, and most professional officers, however much they may feel the need to restore pre-war discipline, are aware that other things must come first. One of the most important points that is stressed by all former military men is the need to build up morale. This is essential not only for recruitment and re-enlistment but to ensure that the new forces will constitute an efficient fighting unit in time of emergency. Opinions differ widely concerning the present morale of the men in the armed forces, but it is generally conceded to be lower than in pre-Surrender days. Despite considerable unemployment, effective enlistment into the forces has been disappointing. In 1957, for ex­ ample, although the number of applicants was over three times that 1 An interesting account of German reactions to the drowning in June 1957 of fifteen soldiers of the Federal German Army is given in a special report from Bonn by Mr. K. W. Beer, ‘Drowning of Trainees Thom to German Army’, Asahi Evening News, 8 Aug. 1957.

Right- Wing Nationalism and the M ilitary

251 required, some 40 per cent, failed to appear at the examination centres, and of those who did appear and qualify, 30 per cent, later changed their minds and refused to join the colours. Re-enlistment rates have also been unsatisfactory and far too many men have tried to leave the services before the end of their period, or even (in some cases) after their very first taste of military discipline.1 Although the most important factors directly determining enlist­ ment and re-enlistment rates are economic conditions, especially the employment situation in the country, the attitude of the men them­ selves to the forces has a most important bearing on the matter. Genuine pride in the armed forces is essential for building up morale and discipline, and it is widely felt that it is in these areas that the new forces are especially weak. There are many reasons for this state of affairs and some of them should be examined here, because the proposed solutions are often of a political nature. In the first place, the doubtful position of the new forces under the Constitution and their overwhelming dependence on a foreign country are both fac­ tors that would tend to vitiate pride and enthusiasm among the members ; the attitude of military men on these two issues has al­ ready been discussed. A far more important factor is the breakdown of the pre-war ideological structure in which the armed forces were theoretically under the personal command of the Emperor. As Mr. Murata Kiyoaki has pointed out, this provided for the two basic require­ ments of discipline, obedience to command and willingness for selfsacrifice. A Japanese soldier or sailor in the Imperial forces was taught on the one hand that his superior’s command was to be re­ garded as the Emperor’s own, and on the other that to die for the Emperor was a supreme honour and one that would, in fact, qualify him to foregather with other heroes in the Yasukuni Shrine as a 1 The ratio of applicants to recruits needed was 4*5:1 in 1956; in September 1957 it had fallen to 2:1. According to the Defence Agency, the minimum num­ ber of applicants required for building an efficient force is accepted as being 3 • 5 times the requirement. The actual numbers of applicants have been as follows: I954~*5: 170,000; 1955-6: 202,000; 1956-7: 201,000; 1957-8 (anticipated): 144,000. Among reasons given by a Yomiuri Shimbun survey for this decrease in numbers of applicants are: (1) successive bumper rice crops, which brought relative prosperity to farming communities, previously the main source of volunteers ; (2) relatively favourable employment situation for students graduat­ ing from secondary schools; (3) bad impression created by the Hiroshima Death March ; (4) general unpopularity of the N D F ( Yomturi Japan News, 28 Aug. and 22 Sept. 1957 \ Japan Times, 8 Oct. 1957).

252 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan deified spirit. The extent to which these and similar doctrines were literally believed varied, of course, from man to man, but their cumulative effect was to help produce a discipline and morale that has rarely been matched in modern armed forces. The cohesive strength provided by the doctrine of personal Imperial command over the army and navy was, of course, one aspect of the entire kokutai ideology that was examined in a previous chapter ; similarly, the breakdown of the pre-war sense of military discipline was itself one aspect of the shattering of the ‘golden chalice’, that is, of the in­ tegral national ideal which had inspired not only members of the armed forces but a large part of the entire population. The post-war ideals of democracy and individualism have, as we have seen, failed to fill the vacuum so far as the general population is concerned, and they certainly do not appear to have provided a new basis for morale in the NDF. Professional military men are bound to look back with nostalgia at the pride and zeal of the pre-war forces and almost in­ variably they regard some form of moral re-education as essential if an effective sense of discipline is to be revived. Once this ‘spiritual’ improvement has taken place, the problems of numerical and tech­ nical growth will, it is felt, be far more readily solved. The armed forces do not, of course, exist in a vacuum, and most military men recognize that, if the essential feeling of pride is to be restored, there must be a change in the general attitude of the public. The popular feeling towards the defence forces has tended, as we have seen, to be one of indifference, bordering on suspicion and hostility. Memories of the unpleasant aspects of militarism are far from having dissipated and incidents like the Hiroshima Death March serve to revive them vividly. Election results after 1952 sug­ gest that military leaders have to a certain extent rehabilitated them­ selves in the public eye since the nadir of 1945; yet the emotional associations of the words ‘army’ and ‘navy* still tend to be far from pleasant. Most important are the economic objections to the armed forces, as summed up in the popular description of its members as ‘tax thieves* (zeikin dorobö). So far as the majority of the public is concerned, it would seem that limited defence forces are accepted as necessary evils so long as world conditions continue to be critical, but that even this qualified acceptance would be in question once conditions appeared to have improved.1 1 A public-opinion poll in September 1957 (see above, p. 120 n. 1) gives the

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

253

The re-education of the public in order to make people more ‘defence-minded* is, we have seen, one of the main objectives recog­ nized by the numerous unofficial military associations that have been organized since 1951. This is viewed as essential for improving the morale of the existing forces, for encouraging recruitment and re-enlistment, for securing increased budgetary support and, even­ tually, for revising the Constitution so as to put the armed forces on a new legal and psychological footing. The attitude of suspicion and disrespect that carries over from the immediate post-war period must be corrected and the vital role of the new armed forces recog­ nized. Thus General Sugiyama, Chief of Staff of the Ground SelfDefence Force, is quoted as saying that he would like to see his organization ‘trusted’ rather than ‘loved* by the people.1 Military men were especially indignant at the continued tendency to make them into a scapegoat for Japan’s disaster in the Pacific War. For ex­ ample, the League for Promoting the Revival of Pensions declared: ‘. .. the War was an all-out national war, in which all the people par­ ticipated equally with their entire strength. It is absolutely wrong to put all the blame on just one element [of the people].’2The strength of this feeling forcefully emerges from the following statement to the public made in July 1952 by the All-Japan Liaison Committee for the Revival of Pensions for Former Military Men (Kyûgunjin kankei Onkyû Fukkatsu Zenkoku Renraku-kai) : By discriminating in your treatment between [former] civilians and [former] military, regarding the latter as war criminals and placing all the blame for the war on their shoulders, you are producing a reaction of antagonism on the part of these highly sensitive ex-military men (kanjusei no kiwamete 5i naru kyûgunjin). If you let things continue like this, following results: 55 per cent, of the people questioned were worried about Japan’s security in the light of the existing world situation; of these 37 per cent, said that Japan should defend herself with her own forces, 27 per cent, called for a collective security system, 4 per cent, preferred to depend on United States forces. Another question indicated that 64 per cent, favoured the maintenance of a defence force, while 19 per cent were opposed. A third question indicated that 31 per cent, were in favour of rearmament (of whom 11 per cent, also believed that Japan should be armed with nuclear weapons) and 42 per cent, opposed; the 3 1 per cent, in favour represented a 3 per cent, increase since the previous regular survey in February 1957. The results of this poll would suggest that many of the people who support the maintenance of a defence force ( Jiei Tat) shy away when the word ‘rearmament’ (saigumbi), with its pre-war connotations, is introduced, and either express themselves as opposed or answer DK. 1 Sasagawa Masahiro in Asahi Evening News, 26 Aug. 1957. 2 Quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 201.

254 Nationalism, and the Right Wing in Japan it is quite possible that, should a time of real emergency arise for our nation, former military men, who would [normally] be the people to co­ operate in effectively restoring order, may on the contrary adopt a hostile stand.1 The re-education of the public did not simply involve the incul­ cation of a more sympathetic attitude to the armed forces. Far more fundamental was the need to restore traditional Japanese virtues, especially among the youth, who had never received a proper ‘moral* education, and who would form the backbone of the future army and navy. The Occupation Period was viewed as having had a pro­ foundly demoralizing effect on the Japanese people. Though the material ravages of defeat may have been repaired, the spiritual vacuum was as great as ever. This condition is powerfully described in the manifesto of the Tokyo Reservists* War Comrades* Associa­ tion (September 1952): . .. the people have lost all spiritual direction; they have lost all theforces that can control the individual—the Imperial House, Shintö, Buddhism and morality; until in the end they have given themselves over utterly to the unrestricted license of rampant egoism; they are forever fighting among each other; and their society, which was supposed to be free, has finally come to be marked by the most completely absence of freedom. Apart from this, young people have forgotten the respect for work ; they vainly pursue the enjoyment of the present day and think nothing of building for the morrow. In the presence of such behaviour, older people are filled with indignation in their hearts : yet they carry patience and tem­ porizing too far, and [instead of attacking the demoralization of young people] stifle their own consciences. The result of all this is that the Japan­ ese people are earning the scorn of thoughtful foreigners, who have come to regard us as mean-spirited and servile.2 Although the solutions to this depressing state of affairs were usually stated in ‘moral* or ‘spiritual* terms, they almost invariably had political implications that, in the strictest sense of the term, were reactionary. There was a strong nostalgia for the days when the Japanese people had been inspired by a sense of national mission, 1 Keibi Keisatsu, p. 207. One aspect of the growing campaign to rehabilitate professional military men was the move started in 1957 by the family of General Töjö Hideki and others to enshrine executed wrar criminals at the Yasukuni Shrine on the grounds that they had died for the Emperor (Tökyö Shimbun, 12 Dec. 1957. See also p. 27 n. 3 above). * Ibid. p. 215. (Italics are the present writer’s.)

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary 255 for the days when proud and powerful armed forces, acting in the name of the Emperor, had enjoyed the support of a patriotic popu­ lace. (The fact that the situation had, in fact, never been quite as rosy as this, even during the period of military hegemony, did no­ thing to lessen the desire to return to the ‘good old days’.) The methods that were advocated for restoring health to the body politic were generally of a peaceful and gradual nature : violence and coup d’état were implicitly rejected in favour of re-education and legal political activity. Thus the manifesto of the Tokyo Reservists* War Comrades’Association after its alarming description of presentday decadence, continues : ‘We rigidly adhere to the best methods of gradual advance under the laws of our nation and the rules of social morality ; using these methods, we shall advance year after year until in the end we attain our lofty ideals.’1The dominant political mood among the military was closer to that of the established pre-war leaders than to the radical approach of the ‘young officers*. Although the inflammatory phrase ‘Showa Restoration’ was occasionally heard, it was always made clear that the restoration must be carried out by peaceful, gradual means. The existing system of parliamentary democracy was, in itself, rarely attacked, though its abuses were severely criticized. Most military men, however, made it clear that the moral re-education, which was the sine qua non for any real solution to Japan’s crisis, must be based on traditional national virtues rather than on im­ ported ideals such as democracy, liberalism, and individualism; the latter were in most cases regarded as being incompatible with the true Japanese spirit, and blind acceptance of them in the early post­ war years was often suggested as being responsible for many of Japan’s present ills. To quote Lieut.-General Kunisaki of the Com­ panions’ Association,

Concerning the nature of the organization that we are planning, it is not a so-called right-wing group (iwayuru uyoku), but, to put it briefly, a concentration of forces based on Japanism (Nihon-shugi). Japanism is essentially grounded on the family system, as opposed to individualism, which is the ideal of democracy. The principle of family formation con­ sists of harmonizing and incorporating various elements, according to the sentiment of love, which derives originally from human instinct; at the same time, it establishes an order of natural harmony, which is based on an 1 Ibid. p. 216.

256 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan attitude of humility and respect by the younger towards the elder, by the lower towards him who is above—an order that is in accordance with the very flow of life itself. The reason that we intend to offer ourselves to the movement for forming ex-servicemen’s organizations is in fact that we look for the establishment of people’s groups based on this sentiment of love and imbued with national morality.1 Statements of this type could be quoted by the gross if space per­ mitted ; when stripped of their verbiage they all suggest that military men, though they may variously be reactionary or radical in their approach, pacific or violent in their methods, are as unlikely now as they were before the war to ally themselves with liberal, democratic, or egalitarian aspirations. The respect for order and hierarchy which underlies so much of their thought is no doubt more in accord with Japanese ways than are these Western-style ideals; yet it continues to make it unlikely that military men, at least those of the traditional type, can by themselves ever effectively become the leaders of popu­ lar movements in Japan.2 This was one of their main political weaknesses in pre-war days. Then, as we have seen, militarist elements frequently reinforced their political position by co-operation with professional national­ ists, using the latter as a type of ‘auxiliary force* in their efforts to acquire and retain power. The relationship between the military and the civilian rightists appears in most cases to have been one of con­ venience rather than of real sympathy. To what extent, then, has a working partnership been built up during the post-war period? So far as their approach to Japan’s main problems are concerned, former military men and leaders of the revived right-wing organiza­ tions are remarkably close. This can perhaps be judged from the numerous quotations cited in the respective chapters of this study. When it comes to attacking the ‘unpatriotic attitude* of trade unions, or the ‘egoism* of post-war youth, most professional military men and civilian rightists speak with one voice. They see eye to eye on such matters as the existence of a crisis in Japan and the need to sup­ press Communism and to control the left-wing movement in gener­ al ; they further agree on building up strong and autonomous armed 1 Ibid. p. 202. (Italics are in the original.) 2 ‘Mass movements, whether of the right or of the left, will never be [led] by the military. Organized masses will not move on orders coming from above and couched in such terms as “This is our command” * (Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, p. 178).

257 forces, revising the ‘foreign* Constitution and, at least partly, re­ storing the Emperor*s prerogatives. As we have seen in the previous chapter, all the right-wing organizations in post-war Japan include the promotion of rearmament as one of their principal objectives ; the only important exceptions, oddly enough, are to be found among groups (like the Harmony Party) descending from Lieut.-General Ishiwara and his East Asia League, which was originally composed for the most part of military men. Not only do military elements and professional nationalists tend to agree in their diagnosis of Japan*s besetting ills and in the general line of treatment proposed, but it would appear that they could in many practical ways complement each other in carrying out their policies. The military are more in need than ever of an ‘auxiliary force* to assist them in fulfilling their objectives, particularly in re­ educating the public concerning the necessity both of defending the homeland and of restoring traditional virtues. The civilian rightwing organizations, for their part, have, as we have seen, been greatly handicapped by their failure to obtain adequate support from established forces in the country and would in many cases stand to gain immensely from restoring a working relationship with the military, who from all appearances were likely to increase in in­ fluence as the years passed; apart from this, many civilian ultranationalists realized that by courting the support of ex-servicemen they had a chance to build up membership, in which their organiza­ tions had always been so deficient. Hampering such co-operation, however, was a considerable legacy of mutual distrust and antagon­ ism : civilian ultra-rightists, as we have observed, often considered that they had been exploited by the military during the latter’s rise to power, only to be discarded in the subsequent period;1 the Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

1e.g. ôkawa Shùmei: ‘It was the time-serving practical [tr. i.e. un-idealistic] military who picked our purses and used us for their own selfish ends. . . These practical men used the youth [tr. the young officers of the February incident] to achieve distinction for themselves. . . And to keep it all secret, they then killed ten or more of these young men.’ Similarly, Inoue Nisshö explains that army officers persuaded him to take action in the Blood Pledge Corps Incident, but that after it was completed, ‘the military (gumbatsu) reaped all the advantage for themselves’ (Nihon Shühö, cited, p. 12). Again Kodama Yoshio repeatedly refers in his autobiography to the army’s ‘ruthless exploitation’ of patriotic civilian rightists in order to gain political power for themselves, e.g. : ‘These youths had no way of knowing that the military leaders would eventually skilfully exploit the fervor of young officers for the purpose of grabbing political power. How­ ever, when Zensuke Shibukawa, who participated in the February Incident, was being dragged to his place of execution, he shouted one wild last cry: “Oh

258 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan military, on the other hand, tended to regard the professional civilian nationalists as crack-brained fanatics, wordy visionaries, or oppor­ tunistic upstarts, who were often even less suited than they were themselves for appealing to the civilian public. Both sides undoubt­ edly preferred co-operation with the successfully established con­ servative forces, that is, with the leaders of the conservative party, high officials, and influential business interests. Despite these and other reservations, however, ex-military and civilian nationalists have, as we have seen, succeeded in working to­ gether in several of the major rightist organizations that have come into being since 1952. In many cases they have enlisted the support of the conservative leaders. The future of such collaboration may have an important bearing on political trends in Japan. Military and civilian nationalists—equally impelled by a feeling of crisis and national humiliation, by a disgust with the inefficiency and cor­ ruption of party politics and by a determination to restore power to the Emperor and to revive traditional virtues among a demoralized people—did in fact manage to join forces in Japan’s not too distant past. With the more or less active support of civilian conservatives like Mori Kaku, Baron Hiranuma, and Marquis Kido, who backed them mainly as a bulwark against ‘excessive liberalism’ and leftist subversion, they succeeded in increasing their effective power over a period of years, in crushing all left-wing elements in the country, in neutralizing opposition among the more moderate conservative groups, and finally in subverting the political status quo and estab­ lishing militarist hegemony.*1Yet we must hesitate to draw too close an analogy between the present situation and that which existed people of Japan! Don’t trust the Imperial Army!” This was one last desperate attempt to point out the fact that the military leaders were frantically trying to gain political power under the pretext of domestic reform . . . we nationalists and the people in general only first came to realize this some ten [sic] years later, when the Tojo Régime appeared on the scene’ (/ Was Defeated, p. 50; see also pp. 29, 90). 1 One may distinguish the following four groups in the pre-war nationalistmilitarist power pattern : (1) the civilian ultra-conservative leaders who were pre­ pared in the final analysis to back the military against the more moderate ele­ ments in the country (Mori, Hiranuma, Kido, &c.); (2) the military leaders, es­ pecially those of the Control Faction (Koiso, Umezu, Töjö, &c.); (3) their in­ creasingly powerful subordinates (Tanaka Shinichi, Iwakuro, Tsuji, &c.); (4) the civilian ultra-nationalists whose main targets of attack were the left-wing and liberal forces in the country (Tachibana, Inoue, Okawa, &c.). Although each group had its own particular motives and ambitions, it was in effect the actions of the first and last groups during the 1930’s that served in different ways to bring the middle groups to power.

259 some three decades ago. There are, in particular, several important factors in the post-war period that would tend to frustrate any efforts by the military to gain effective political power, either alone or in collaboration with nationalist organizations. In the first place, there is the principle of civilian control, firmly embodied in post-war Japanese legislation. The idea that the rule of law must always take precedence over the rule of men still has shal­ low roots in Japan, it is true. Yet, in so far as legal provisions can offer lasting safeguards, a recovery by the military of their pre-war political power would seem remote. Article XI of the Meiji Con­ stitution had assigned supreme command of the army and navy to the Emperor; and the Imperial Rescript of 1882 to soldiers and sailors announced that . . . all military power is now in Our own hands. Various details of ad­ ministration may be placed in the hands of Our subjects under certain circumstances, but general control shall in no case be left to any subject but shall be kept forever in Our own hands.. -1 As a result of the nature of Imperial power in Japan, however, the question soon arose as to whether the command ‘prerogative* would in fact be exercised by the country’s military leaders or by the civilian Government. In the event, the military succeeded in steadily building up a privileged position for themselves in the political structure : by establishing various principles and customs (such as the separation of command prerogative from ordinary mili­ tary administration, the principle that military leaders should have ‘direct access* to the Emperor, and the regulation, first secured by Marshal Yamagata as early as 1900, that the Ministers of War and of the Navy must be generals and admirals on the active list),2 they Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

1 Quoted by Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 4. * This last rule was revised in 1913 to allow generals and admirals on the First and Second Reserves to serve as Ministers of War and of the Navy respectively. It was, however, reimposed after the February (1936) Incident, at the behest of the Control Faction of the Army, and thereafter the Chiefs of Staff once more had the power in practice to give orders to the service ministers. No single provision was as instrumental as this in giving the military a controlling voice in pre-war Japanese politics and foreign affairs; for, among other things, it enabled them (by the implied threat of resignation from the Cabinet and refusal to appoint a successor) to exercise a permanent power of veto over the civilian Government. It was, however, only one among several effective arrangements. Thus in 1878 the General Staff Office, which had until then been under the Minister of War, was set up directly under the Emperor. This ensured that the function of military command (as opposed to that of administration) would be free from the risk of civilian interference. The so-called right of direct access

2Ôo Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan eventually made themselves a virtually sovereign state within the state. The army and navy acquired the status of autonomous organizations that could treat with the central Government on a basis of equality. Not only did they have the last word in all military and naval matters, but, as these matters came to play an increasing­ ly important role in the country, their authority was extended to foreign policy and other crucial spheres, and the ‘prerogative of high command* came to have ever wider implications. The logical conclusion of this was the virtual eclipse of civilian authority and the establishment of effective military control over the Govern­ ment, leading directly to the disaster of the Pacific War. The ques­ tion as to who should in fact exercise the power assigned to the Emperor under Article XI had been finally resolved by about 1935; and in 1941 the Minister of the Navy could openly inform the Diet, ‘The Prime Minister cannot participate in the preroga­ tives of the supreme command in any way.**1 The 1947 Constitution was unable to specify the locus of military authority or the legal status of the military, for the simple reason that the maintenance of military force was itself categorically out­ lawed. Military elements, which had held sway during so large a part of Japanese history, had now legally ceased to exist as a power in the country. The Constitution did, however, state (in Art. LXVI) that all Cabinet members must be ‘civilians*. This last provision, illogical as it may have been at the time, has served to ensure that the Director-General of the present Defence Agency, who by law is a Cabinet Minister, must ipso facto be a civilian. He, in turn, is ap­ pointed by the Prime Minister, in whose hands supreme command over the new armed forces is thus indirectly vested. The military are in this way precluded by statute from exercising the influence over Cabinet formation that contributed so greatly to their pre-war political power. Laws, however, can be amended and constitutions revised (or ignored). To depend on Japan’s present legal structure for a con­ tinuance of civilian control may be to lean on a reed.2The same may (iaku jösö) was implicitly recognized in Art. VII of the Imperial Ordinance on Cabinet Organization (1889). This permitted the Ministers of War and of the Navy to circumvent the Cabinet, and hence all civilian authority, by reporting directly to the Emperor on military matters (ibid. pp. 22, 23, 25). 1 Quoted by Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination (London, 1943), p. 144. 8 Professor Maruyama emphasizes the absence in Japan of any traditional

261 be said of public opinion in Japan. Popular feelings, as we have seen, still tend to be strongly anti-militarist, especially where young people and women are concerned, and most people would no doubt be outraged by any open efforts to attack the principle of civilian control. Public opinion in Japan, however, is subject to violent fluctuations. The prevailing sentiment in the 1920’s was anti­ militarist; yet this not only proved to be utterly ineffective in stem­ ming the militarist tide but was itself largely reversed in response to changing world conditions and to indoctrination. A far more reliable guarantee is to be found in the attitude of various influential groups in the country. The left-wing forces, in­ cluding the labour movement, are, as we have seen, keenly critical of any efforts to restore the influence of the military and take the lead in attacking all symptoms of renascent militarism. The fact, how­ ever, that these forces are mostly opposed to the entire principle of rearmament as such tends to weaken the specific effectiveness of their support of civilian supremacy. Less vocal, but probably more significant, in opposing the recrudescence of military influence are the established conservative elements in the country—influential members of the Liberal-Democratic Party, high officials, business leaders, and others—many of whom suffered directly or indirectly from pre-war militarism, and most of whom consider that they and the country would gain nothing, and might lose everything, if the military were once more in a position to go on the rampage. These are the men who hold effective political power in Japan, and, al­ though they are mostly in favour of considerably increased defence forces and of constitutional revision, it can be expected that they will oppose any efforts by the military to take over control of these forces and thus potentially challenge their power. Finally there are the hundreds of high-ranking civilians and ex-civilians in the offices of the Defence Agency and in posts of command. These men, Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

values representing civilian as opposed to military authority. In this connexion it is most significant that until recently the Japanese language contained no word accurately corresponding to ‘civilian’. The current term bummin (which appears in the 1947 Constitution) came into normal use only after the Pacific War. The common pre-war term, bunkan, referred to civil officials of the Imperial Govern­ ment, and not to civilians as such. The principle of civilian control (bummin yüetsusei) is legally enshrined in the new Constitution and has, in fact, become one of the more important post-war amulets in governmental and legal circles. Nevertheless, it is not a traditional or familiar idea in the country at large; it retains a foreign (specifically, an American) flavour and, though it has legal force, its social roots remain extremely weak. T

2Ô2 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan whether or not they are in uniform, have a vested interest in the principle of civilian supremacy and are in a fairly good position to re­ sist the encroachments of military professionals. Their successful resistance to ex-Colonel Hattori’s appointment to the Defence Council is a case in point.1In addition, not a few of the professional military themselves are fully conscious of the need for civilian con­ trol at the top of the armed forces. Despite all this opposition, former officers of the Imperial forces have, as we have seen, made steady inroads into the leadership of the NDF. Most conspicuously, the three Chiefs of Staff are now all pro­ fessional military men with their roots in the pre-war forces ; in this connexion it is worth recalling that in pre-war days the army Chief of Staff in most cases exercised more effective power than did the Minister of War himself.2Though professional military men, except for outspoken critics like ex-Colonels Hattori and Tsuji, rarely in­ dulge in open attacks on the principle of civilian supremacy, they have frequently made clear their resentment at ‘amateurish* control and their belief that, if the NDF is to become a real fighting body, instead of an enlarged police force, it must be directed by men with professional wartime experience and must be free from the constant ‘interference* of civilian officials. It would appear, however, that their policy is one of gradually extending their control rather than of arousing outside opinion by any frontal attack on the existing principle. A second significant development in post-war Japan that would tend to remove one of the sources of pre-war militarism is the im­ provement in the position of the farmer, mainly as a result of the Occupation-inspired land reform. The impact of agrarian distress and discontent on the younger officers of the Imperial Army was, as we have seen, one of the important causes of their radical opposi­ tion to the political and economic status quo and of their conviction that disinterested, patriotic officers had a duty to improve conditions 1 See above, p. 221. * The dominant position of the Chiefs of Staff, having been adumbrated in the administrative reorganization of 1878 (p. 259 n. 2 above), was finally ensured by the custom, established in about 1924, that the new Minister of War must be chosen at the time of Cabinet formation by agreement among the three chiefs of the army, viz. the outgoing Minister of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Inspector-General of Military Training. As the Chief of Staff had the power of appointing the Inspector-General, he automatically carried a majority in deciding on the next War Minister (Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy).

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary 263 in the country. The great majority of the ranks also came from poor rural areas and could easily be stirred to resentment at the economic system which appeared to have kept them and their families in thrall and at the ‘corrupt politicians* who had done so little to alleviate their lot. The radical strain in the Imperial Army was after 1936 sub­ jugated by more conservative military elements. There is no doubt, however, that the radical movement in the army, which gained much of its inspiration from the depressed condition of the countryside, had a major influence on the rise of the military to political power, and that a good deal of the emotional and practical support for the army came from rural areas. Despite the greatly improved agrarian situation in the post-war period, the new defence forces do in fact obtain most of their re­ cruits from among the younger sons of farmers. There is, however, no sign of any radical movement being inspired within the defence forces by the prevalence of relatively unfavourable conditions in rural areas as opposed to cities. The former professional officers who have been active in post-war military movements have, as we have noticed, been mostly men of strong conservative bent. The most important factors in post-war Japan that would tend to decrease the chances of a militarist revival are those of a more im­ ponderable nature, involved in what has been described as the ‘shattering of the golden chalice*, that is, the breakdown of the in­ tegral pre-war symbolism. The general effect of this breakdown on military morale and on the public attitude to the armed forces has already been discussed. The ‘inward-looking’ type of nationalism that has developed in Japan is clearly not one that would lend itself to the pre-war manifestations of militarism. In particular the dis­ credit of all the expansionist symbols and the loss of the pre-war sense of national mission would make it exceedingly difficult for the military to rise to their former power, even in the absence of legal impediments. It may be argued that in a period of real crisis diffuse nationalist sentiments could be reintegrated, the kokutai ideal res­ tored, and the people once more indoctrinated with a strong sense of national mission. The fact remains that it is hard for militarist ele­ ments to succeed politically unless they can convince people that they have a chance of achieving military success. This fact was well recognized by the pre-war armed forces, for whom the phrase ‘pres­ tige of the armed forces* (gun no ishin) was of cardinal importance.

264 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan The militarists’ rise to hegemony in pre-war days was not only the result of adroit political manoeuvring at home and of exploiting the fears and hopes of the people ; at least as significant was the fact of past victories on the battlefield and the probability of future vic­ tories. It would be far beyond the scope of this discussion to examine the motives that inspired the pre-war policy of the military on the continent ; but there is no doubt that the need to achieve victories on the battlefield in order to reinforce their political position at home was prominent among these. The ‘prestige of the armed forces’, having been built up to its greatest heights during the first part of the Pacific War, was utterly shattered in 1945. The sense of pride and dependence with which people had regarded the armed forces was crushed and followed by one of scorn and disillusionment. The need to restore the ‘prestige of the armed forces’ has, as we have seen, been widely recognized by military men in the post-war period. Yet the possibility of doing so by the most effective method of all, namely, independent victory on the battlefield, seems rather remote. Faced with the ever-growing colossus of Communist power on the continent Japan’s military men, even when the present rearmament plans have been car­ ried out, will be hard put to convince people of the probability of success in the field.1There is, it is true, a chance that they might be able to promise military success in co-operation with the forces of some stronger country, presumably in a joint struggle against the Communist powers. This, however, would undoubtedly lead to the Third World War, whose unforeseeable catastrophes would no doubt make the question of whether or not Japan was under militarist rule a rather minor one—even for the Japanese 1 The military strength of Japan and her neighbours in 1957 was approximately as follows : Ground (men) Sea (vessels) Air(craft) Japan 160,000 384 (incl. 2 destroyers, 979 i submarine) S. Korea 600,000 170 6 patrol boats Formosa 500,000 13 patrol boats 500 Philippines 55,ooo 30 mosquito boats 1,326 N. Korea 700,000 25 mosquito boats 500 Comm. China 3,000,000 350 (incl. 2 light cruis­ 3»ooo ers, 15 submarines) Soviet Far East Forces 500,000 700 (incl. 4-6 cruisers, 4,500 50 destroyers) Source: Yomiuri Japan News, 30 Sept. 1957; figures for the Philippines given by Funada in Seiji-dayori, 7. As will be seen (p. 266), present rearmament plans will hardly correct the imbalance.

265 people themselves. Short of such cataclysmic developments, it is hard to foresee a situation in which the Japanese military will be able to recoup their prestige and rise to political power by the timetested method of promising victory overseas. There remains the possibility of rising to power by promising victory on the home front, that is, subjugation of the Communists and other disruptive elements. Ex-Colonel Hattori’s views on the prime importance of the ‘internal battle-front* (naibu-sensen) have already been set forth, and we have seen that many military men consider the suppression of leftist subversion at home to be one of the main tasks both of the ex-servicemen’s leagues and of the defence forces themselves. Barring a situation, however, in which leftist ele­ ments in Japan actually threaten to overthrow the status quo, it seems unlikely that an implied assurance by the military of securing ‘vic­ tory* on the home front can ever be an adequate substitute for heady promises of victory abroad. The Imperial Army, with its unbroken record of success and its seemingly endless possibilities of following up this success in the power vacuum of East Asia, could command an emotional appeal that would appear difficult for future forces whose main aims would be the negative ones of suppressing subversive movements at home and of co-operating with the United States to prevent further Communist advances abroad. Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary

Conclusions Though the military have risen from the ashes of defeat rather more rapidly than might have been expected in 1945, we must not overestimate their present importance in the scheme of things. There is always a danger in a study of this type, which perforce con­ centrates on the more positive manifestations of a certain group, of producing an exaggerated impression of that group’s significance. Again, the military men whose opinions have been quoted in these pages have, by the nature of things, tended to be of the more vocal, reactionary type; their views on the whole are representative of right-wing militarists rather than of the military as such. On the other hand these men cannot simply be dismissed as crankish diehards or unrepentant Colonel Blimps ; for, as we have seen, it is often they who have taken the lead in organizing ex-servicemen’s leagues and military ‘research* groups, and who have been most active in political activities since^i952.

266 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan So far as the development of right-wing nationalism is concerned, the importance of military elements, like that of present-day nationalist organizations, lies in their potentialities rather than in any actual political influence that they may now be exerting. The existing power of the Japanese military is, it need hardly be said, ex­ tremely small ; and there are, as we have seen, several new factors in the post-war situation that would tend to impede their recovery of political strength. At the same time the history of the Japanese mili­ tary would warn one against any assumption that their present state of subservience to civilian authority is necessarily a permanent one, or that their relative lack of support among the population at large will necessarily continue. The further growth of the armed forces themselves would, for one thing, tend to increase their prestige ; and the continued with­ drawal of American forces from Japan would have a similar effect. The leaders of a sizeable, self-reliant army and navy are more likely to be accorded respect than those of swollen police and coastal forces unable to defend the home islands without foreign assistance. American ground forces are, in fact, being rapidly withdrawn from Japan, and Japanese forces are steadily assuming responsibility for the defence of the country. By i960, according to present plans, all American ground troops will have been removed ; at that time Japan will have an army of 180,000 men, a navy with a total tonnage of 125,000 (including 24 destroyers and 180 patrol planes), and an air force with some 1,300 planes (including 770 combat craft).1 These, it is true, are not impressive figures when we observe the strength of some of Japan’s neighbours. Yet it should be remembered that even an army of this size would not be greatly inferior in manpower to Japan’s standing army before her invasion of Manchuria in 19312 and, far more important, that there is an immense potentiality for rapidly increasing this manpower once the essential political de­ cisions have been made. In a world of hydrogen bombs, inter-continental ballistic mis­ siles, and other weapons of mass annihilation, it is true that the mere addition of conventional infantry divisions, destroyers, or fighter planes to a country’s forces is unlikely to make it into a 1 Funada, in Seiji-dayori, 7. * Rekkoku no Rikugun (‘The Armies of the Great Powers’), issued by the War Ministry in 1931, gives the total manpower of Japan's army as being 220,000. The Imperial Navy in 1931 numbered a little under 80,000 men.

Right-W ing Nationalism and the M ilitary 267 formidable martial power.1 On the other hand given a favourable political climate it is not entirely impossible that Japan, with the co-operation of her principal ally, may in due course produce, or at least be in a position to utilize, such new weapons. Even should this happen, the feasibility of independent military action by Japanese forces would appear remote; but, so far as restoring the prestige of the armed forces, and thus of the military, is concerned, a combined build-up of scientific strength and of manpower might well have an important effect. In examining the political potentialities of the military, the exservicemen’s leagues that have been organized since 1952 are un­ doubtedly important. The potential political influence of an organi­ zation like the Japan Native Friend League, having a present mem­ bership of over i million men (and aspiring to a membership of 10 million) and led by professional officers with strong right-wing lean­ ings, is not to be underestimated. We have already noticed that, de­ spite their disavowals, these groups have definite political objectives and also that they have contributed to the unexpected electoral suc­ cesses of many former military men.2At a time of internal crisis—if, 1 This feeling came to the fore after Russia’s launching of the Sputnik in October 1957. Several Socialist members of the Diet questioned ministers as to whether this invention did not imply such immense changes in the nature of warfare as to make the conventional forces that Japan was so laboriously building up quite pointless, e.g. Okada Söji (Socialist): ‘The advent of missiles has com­ pletely changed the military situation. The Self-Defense Forces have been rendered virtually valueless. The Government had better abandon its fruitless attempt to build them up’ (quoted by Kazuo Kuroda, Japan Times, 9 Nov. 1957). Köno Mitsu (Socialist): ‘In this age of ICBM’s and earth satellites, the SelfDefence Forces do not serve any purpose other than giving us a false sense of security’ (Yomiuri Japan Nezus, 25 Nov. 1957). The Socialist assumption was that the Japanese forces would not themselves possess guided missiles and simi­ lar weapons; this assumption, of course, was one that the Government was hardly in a position to question in view of the existing legal status of the Defence Forces. a The reviving political power of ex-servicemen’s groups was revealed in January 1958 in their successful lobbying for a sharp rise in the rate of pensions for ex-servicemen and their families. Large-scale rallies and parades were held in Tokyo and elsewhere at the time of the 1958 budget debate (Japanese press of 11 Jan. 1958). Petitions for an increase in the servicemen’s pensions were writ­ ten in blood and submitted to the Prime Minister. Among the important lobbies active in this campaign were the League for the Protection of Pensions for Former Military Men (under ex-Major-General Matsumura Shüitsu), the Japan Wounded Servicemen’s Association (under ex-Admiral Nomura Kichisaburö), and the Japan Association of Bereaved Families (under Mr. Takahashi Ryütarö, the former Minister of Commerce and Industry). The organized ex-servicemen’s vote is becoming an extremely important factor in elections and, by sponsoring the Servicemen’s Pension Bill in 1958, the conservatives were clearly determined to assure themselves of this vote in the forthcoming elections.

268 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan for instance, falling living standards provoked the labour movement into really disruptive action—they might well come to play an im­ portant role, as their charter provides, in maintaining ‘internal peace and order* ; or again, they might in time of crisis co-operate with civilian ultra-rightist groups in support of a strong right-wing nationalist Government that promised to restore the national vir­ tues, to abolish corruption in politics, and to rid the country of sub­ versive elements. This, however, is to enter the realm of crystal-gazing, which is beyond both the intentions and the abilities of the present writer. What can be said in conclusion is, first, that in a country with Japan’s traditions it would be a mistake to place too much reliance on formal statutory limitations to the revival of military power in politics; the very existence of the present armed forces of some 160,000 men bespeaks the flexibility with which even a Constitution can be interpreted when it seems to interfere with the realities of the state’s needs. Secondly, the many profound differences that we have observed between pre-war and post-war circumstances must not lead us glibly to rule out the possibility of a militarist recrudescence in the future; the military have held sway in Japan under widely varying conditions and it is by no means impossible that, in case of real internal crisis, they may once again become a dynamic political force even in the absence of the integral ideal of a national mission that was so important for them in pre-war days. Ridding the coun­ try of internal enemies may be a less inspiring banner than that of ‘spreading the Great Cause throughout the world’; but in many ways it is more in accord with the direction that right-wing national­ ism appears to be taking in post-war Japan.

VII. Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

In examining the various weaknesses that had beset ‘patriotic’ groups in Japan, the General Conference for the Restoration Move­ ment, meeting at Osaka in September 1953, emphasized three prin­ cipal points. These were, first, their lack of popular appeal (taishüsei), secondly, their failure to attract youth and, thirdly, their inability to build up a united front that might match the monolithic strength of the Communist Party. It is with the second of these points that this and the following chapter are mainly concerned. The urgent necessity of attracting youth to the nationalist cause, whether of the Communist or of the traditional right-wing variety, has been consistently stressed by supporters of the respective move­ ments. Thus the Osaka Conference declared ‘It is with the youth of Japan that we can accomplish the Showa Restoration.’1 And the ultra-nationalist youth leader, Mr. Kodama Yoshio, writing of a period some ten years earlier, said : ‘Through this general election [1942], I learned the true desires and aspirations of the youth of Japan and that the motive power and the will for the creation of an ideal Japan lay in the pure idealism of the youth of the country.’2We have also observed the importance that conservative leaders and military men have attached to the re-education of youth, especially since 1952, and the great heat that has been engendered by such is­ sues as the réintroduction of moral education (shüshin), the revision of textbooks, and the re-centralization of the educational system. What, then, has been the reaction of young Japanese people to the appeals that have been addressed to them from various political quarters, and to what form of post-war nationalism, if any, have they responded? The problem of attitudes among youth (taking this term to cover roughly the ages between 17 and 30) is, of course, very com­ plex and easily lends itself to glib generalizations. There have been numerous opinion surveys during the post-war years directed to 1 Keibi Keisatsu, p. 197.

21 Was Defeated, p. 108.

270 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan different segments of Japanese youth. The samples have, however, usually been far too small for reliability and in many cases the choice of questions does not appear to have been entirely judicious.1 It would appear that the results of these opinion polls must be regard­ ed with even more reservations than are usually necessary. Perhaps their most valuable function is of a negative nature, namely, to modify certain prevalent generalizations about Japanese youth, such as that they are predominantly radical in their views. Instead of attempting any systematic survey of the attitudes of Japanese youth, the two following chapters will focus on two speci­ fic aspects that are relevant to the general subject of the present study: first, nationalist trends in the student movement and, secondly, the rise, especially since 1952, of tough-minded, strongarmed youth groups having political ideals or pretensions. In both chapters a mainly factual account will be followed by general com­ ments. To a certain extent the subjects of the two chapters overlap : a society like the Japan Sound Youth Association, for instance, be­ longs both to the right-wing student movement and to the toughminded youth groups. The student movement in Japan, however, has sufficiently distinct characteristics to be treated as a separate subject; and in the case of most post-war youth groups it is quite possible to determine whether or not the student element is pre­ dominant. Political Developments in the Student Movement The right-wing student movement, as indeed right-wing nation­ alism in general, can be profitably examined only by reference to political movements of the extreme left. For right-wing sentiment 1 For example, Mr. F. Vos’s investigation in 1951 (the results of which are reported in J. Stoetzel’s Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword, London, 1955) consisted in choosing 100 questionnaires at random from those completed by 130 subjects selected from different layers of society in Tokyo. As the author points out himself the results, interesting as they may be, are representative neither of Tokyo youth as a whole nor of any specific category of them. Again, one of the questions in the 1951-2 investigation carried out in Kyoto and Sap­ poro (also as part of the Unesco-sponsored study of post-war Japanese youth) was as follows : ‘Democracy is often defined in the words of Abraham Lincoln as government of the people, by the people, and for the people. If you were forced to do so, to which of the two conceptions would you personally give greater emphasis, “by the people” or “ for the people” ?* Considerable importance was attached by the writer to the fact that the great majority of the young people questioned replied ‘for the people’; but anyone acquainted with Japanese youth and the Japanese language cannot help wondering what percentage of the young people really understood the significance of the question in the first place.

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement 271 among students has, as we shall see, developed to a large extent as a direct reaction to the overwhelming influence of the left. This form of reaction occurred also in the pre-war period, and though we must always be careful about drawing conclusions from analogies of this type, a brief account of developments before the war is necessary for an understanding of more recent trends. The end of the First World War is usually regarded as marking the beginning of the student movement in Japan, as well as of the modern labour and social movements.1 These movements were born of the economic and social dislocation that followed the war, and owed much of their ideological inspiration to the success of the Russian revolution and to the feeling that the inequities of the capi­ talist system were susceptible of remedy by organized action from below. From the outset Marxist Communism was the dominant force in Japanese student movement.12 In most cases, however, it was the more idealistic and humanitarian aspects that held the greatest appeal for left-wing students and professors. As in the post-war period, Tokyo Imperial University and Waseda University were the centres of the early political groupings.3 In 1918 an influential body known as the Association of New Men (Shinjin Kai) was established in the Law Department of Tokyo Imperial University under the sponsorship of Professor Yoshino Sakuzö, Mr. Akamatsu Katsumaro, and other left-wing intellectuals. This association, which may be regarded as the pioneer of modern student groups in Japan, com­ prised teachers, students, and graduates of the university. At the outset the main influences were of a ‘progressive*, Western nature. The emphasis of the slogans was not so much on the overthrow of the Government as on the gradual build-up of a socialist state, con­ solidation with the international socialist movement, and the per­ manent banning of war. Similar groups were organized in the other main universities and, after the establishment of the Communist 1 For the following discussion I am greatly indebted to information and analy­ sis contained in Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle. In addition, apart from sources mentioned below, the information contained in this chapter is derived from numerous conversations with students, teachers, and professors from various Japanese universities. * Ibid. p. 5. 3 As Mr. Battistini points out, the centres of left-wing student activity both before and after the war have been Tokyo, Waseda, and Kyoto Universities (ibid. p. 116).

272 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Party in 1922, their tendency became increasingly left wing. This led to the formation in 1924-5 of an amalgamated student leftist organization known as the Japan Student Social-Science League (Nihon Gakusei Shakai Kagaku Rengökai).1 In its early days, the League had about 1,600 members, representing forty-six universi­ ties. It soon became the centre of the student movement and, despite its relatively small membership, came in some ways to occupy a position analogous to that of the post-war Zengakuren2 As can be seen from its principal slogan, ‘the conquest of bourgeois education by Marxist ideology*, the League took no great pains to hide its Communist sympathies. This is not to say that the members them­ selves were necessarily Communists; most of them appear to have been inspired by a form of idealism, which included both socialist and pacifist sentiment, and in particular by a repug­ nance to the ‘contradictions* and cruelties of the existing social sys­ tem. There is little doubt, however, that it was not the students who provided the driving force but men who were either members of the party or sympathetic with its main objectives. Among the cam­ paigns conducted by the Student League in different parts of Japan were those against war, conscription, and government repression. The League also declared its solidarity with the working class of Japan and with the general social mass movement. In practice, how­ ever, there was little effort at opposing the Establishment by means of common action with the labour movement; left-wing intellec­ tuals and students, unlike their post-war counterparts, were almost entirely isolated from outside groups and from the general public. The beginning of the year 1925 may perhaps be considered the high point of the leftist movement among academic circles in Japan. It was in this same year that the reaction started. This reaction, it should be emphasized, did not come mainly from among the stu­ dents themselves, but from the strongly conservative elements who controlled the Government and from certain right-wing intellec­ tuals like Mr. Amano Tatsuo and Professor Uesugi Shinkichi.8 1 Storry, Double Patriots, p. 32 ; Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, pp. 6, 116. 3 It is worth noting the similarity in the names of the two groups. The pre­ war organization was usually known, for short, as Gakuren (The Student League). 3 As early as in 1913 Professor Uesugi had organized a group to combat liberal tendencies in Tokyo Imperial University (Storry, Double Patriots, P- 32).

273 Japanese conservatives, including political leaders, members of the academic profession, business men, the military, and others, had for some years been viewing with apprehension the growing radical tendencies among students and were determined to check what they regarded as disruptive tendencies. The fact that the main student movement was under strong Communist influence made the task of suppression easier, since it could be claimed with some justification that the Student League and similar bodies were being used by out­ side forces, whose interest lay, not in solving the students* everyday problems, but in overthrowing the existing form of government. The conservative reaction to left-wing tendencies in student circles took both a negative and a positive form. The first major re­ pressive measure was the passing of the draconian Peace Preserva­ tion Law (Chian Iji Ho) in March 1925, according to which the rights of free speech and assembly were severely curbed and the severest sanctions provided for violation. The following years were marked by mass arrests of Communists and of others suspected of subversive thoughts. These severities were not directed specifically at academic circles, but increasing numbers of radical students were arrested under the newpolicy. A form of mutual hostility, compound­ ed of suspicion on the one side and scorn on the other, had become almost traditional between police and students, and the latter, when taken into custody for illegal political activities, were in many cases accorded harsh treatment. In 1928 the repressive policy was turned directly to the educational field. In that year the Ministry of Educa­ tion instituted a purge throughout the country of teachers suspected of subversive thoughts, and in the years that followed numerous teachers and professors of liberal or non-conformist bent were re­ moved from their positions.1 The Japan Student Social-Science League became a special object of attack, and in 1929 the Govern­ ment ordered its dissolution. Such left-wing student activity as con­ tinued thereafter was on an illegal, clandestine basis and subject to rigorous persecution. The Government’s attack against students with radical tendencies was intensified after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. In 1931 about 1,000 students were disci­ plined for ‘dangerous thoughts* and the number increased in the Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

1 e.g. Professor Takikawa Yukitoki of Kyoto University, whose book on criminal law was regarded as an indirect attack on the Emperor system. He was dismissed from his position in 1933 by Mr. Hatoyama Ichiro, Minister of Education at the time (Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, pp. 8-9).

274 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan following year.1 The majority were merely expelled from their schools and universities. The less fortunate students, however, were consigned to prison; here they often languished for many years, to­ gether with adult ‘dangerous thinkers*, until they had undergone ‘conversion*. By about 1933 the left-wing student movement had for all intents and purposes been crushed. Having suppressed the ex­ treme left, the authorities extended the term ‘dangerous thoughts* to include liberalism, social democracy, pacifism and, in fact, almost any type of political non-conformity. Thereafter the few sporadic attempts at forming small socialist or liberal groups among students were almost invariably brought to light by the vigilance of university authorities and the police, and were crushed with ruthless efficiency. In the meantime, conservative leaders had been sponsoring the formation of ‘patriotic* student groups, both to combat the leftist organizations and to fill the vacuum left by the suppression of the latter. Countless such groups came into existence between the years 1925 and 1940. Despite official encouragement their member­ ship was rarely large; they were undoubtedly effective, however, in helping to silence dissident elements among the student population and to regiment the country’s youth for the national mission. One of the earliest ‘patriotic* student groups was the Rising Nation Com­ rades* Association (Kökoku Döshikai), formed in 1920 at Tokyo University by Professor Uesugi. Its membership and life-span were both exiguous, but it led to numerous other groups of a less ephe­ meral nature. Among these were the Military Affairs Research Group (Gunji Kenkyû Dan), set up in 1923 by Professor Aoyagi, partly as a reaction to the unpalatable Washington Treaties, and aimed at combating pacifism among students; in 1925 Professor Uesugi formed his Seven Lives Society (Shichishö Sha),2 largely to combat the influence of the left-wing Association of New Men. The i930*s, with their constant succession of foreign and domes­ tic ‘incidents*, produced a far more favourable climate of opinion for right-wing student groups of this type. The political sentiments of youth were increasingly directed into aggressive nationalist chan­ nels and the patriotic organizations became larger and more extreme '9 8 4 students were disciplined for ‘dangerous thoughts’ in 1931; in 1932, 1,170 were arrested in 305 police cases (ibid. p. 8). * A name with typically patriotic associations, being taken from the motto of the feudal hero, Kusunoki: 'If I but had seven lives to serve His Majesty and destroy His enemies!’ (ibid. p. 10).

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

275

in their attitudes. This is not to suggest that the students whole­ heartedly supported the nationalist policies of the time. But, be­ cause of the nature of public opinion in Japan and the effectiveness of the Government’s repression, such opposition as there was usually took the form of political indifference or apathy. After the Manchurian Incident the Government started a syste­ matic programme of thought-control in the schools and colleges. Every school and university was given special ‘funds for thought guidance’ (shisö-zendö-hi). Compulsory military training for stu­ dents (kyören) was intensified, special officers {haizoku-shökö) hav­ ing been assigned to the various schools and colleges for this pur­ pose. Young Japanese were first exposed to these officers at the age of 12 when they entered middle school. Especially after the out­ break of the China Incident, the haizoku-shökö began to have an influence on education that went far beyond their own particular sphere, and they were ever on the lookout for weak-kneed or ‘un­ reliable’ students. Their power was enhanced by the fact that nor­ mally no student, however brilliant he might be, could advance from one class to another unless he showed satisfactory results in military subjects and drill ; the officers held the further sanction of being able to recommend ‘unpatriotic’ students to the tender mercies of the kempei or of the civilian police.1Apart from military training, a Re­ search Institute for the National Spiritual Culture (Kokumin Seishin Bunka Kenkyüjo) was set up by the Ministry of Education to exercise thought-control in collaboration with the police.2 Prominent among the student groups that grew up in this atmo­ sphere was the violently anti-leftist Patriotic Student League (Aikoku Gakusei Remmei)t established in 1931 as a youth branch of the 1 The system of haizoku-shökö was started mainly as a form of unemploy­ ment relief for army and navy officers who had been retired from active service following the armament reduction carried out in 1924 under General Ugaki; its political significance increased during the 1930*3 and became especially pro­ nounced after the outbreak of the Pacific War. As time passed, these officers were chosen increasingly for their toughness rather than for any supposed didactic abilities, and it became customary to assign especially bigoted types to academic institutions, like Keiö University, that had a suspicious reputation for liberalism. On the whole, the haizoku-shökö were successful in their ideological indoctrination in the middle schools, but they encountered considerable opposi­ tion from among the higher school and university students, who tended to despise them as being semi-educated and narrow-minded martinets. University students often went to great lengths (and some risk) in avoiding attendance at the intensely dull lectures delivered by the haizoku-shökö. * Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, p. 8.

276 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan terrorist organization, the Patriots* Society. It claimed a member­ ship of 3,000 students from various universities, but the number is, as usual, probably exaggerated. Its slogan contained the traditional right-wing amulets: ‘To clarify the dignity of the national founda­ tions and to live up to the principles of loyalty and filial piety from birth to death without a moment of failure.*1 Apart from such offshoots of general ultra-nationalist societies there were several right-wing student groups of a more respectable nature, and these often received various forms of official support. The Japan Student Society (Nihon Gakusei Kyökai), originally founded in 1938 under a different name, was backed by navy men, officials of the Ministry of Education, and violent nationalists like Baron Kikuchi and Minoda Kyöki; it counted Prince Konoe among its distinguished advisers. It aimed at furthering ‘spiritual ex­ change’ among students and for this purpose embarked on a national ‘thought struggle*, involving bitter attacks on the principles of liberal education. The activities of this and similar groups were stimulated by the appointment of General Araki (the fanatic advo­ cate of militarist education and of the Imperial Way) as Minister of Education in Prince Konoe’s 1938 Cabinet. In 1940 the Japan Stu­ dent Society claimed 500 ‘militant elements* and 2,000 ‘sympa­ thizers*.2 In accordance with the new government policy of 1940-1 the youth organizations were all amalgamated into the Great Japan Youth Corps (Dai Nihon Seishönen Dan), and thereafter right-wing groups officially ceased to exist as separate entities. In August 1941 all students and teachers in Japan were regimented into the School Corps for Patriotic Service in Industry (Gakkö Sangyö Hökoku Tai) (more commonly known as Sampo) and obliged to spend an increas­ ing part of their time on compulsory labour (kinrö-höshi) in muni­ tions factories, shipyards, and elsewhere. The nationalist-militarist indoctrination of students was further intensified by the establish­ ment in 1942 of the Educational Drill Institute (Kyögaku Remeijo). During the Pacific War the age of conscription was progressively lowered, and by about 1943 most Japanese youths were too much absorbed in the armed struggle that their elders had prepared for them to give much attention to political activity of any type. Following the Surrender, Japanese students were once more free 1 Ibid. pp. 128-9.

1 Ibid.

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

277

to organize themselves into independent groups aimed at promoting both welfare and political objectives. In the early days of utter material dislocation, from which students suffered at least as much as any other segment of the population, the emphasis tended to be on the economic well-being of the members. Beginning in 1947, how­ ever, it was changed increasingly to political aims ; these, as we shall see, tended to be overwhelmingly of a reformist or radical nature. After a period of regional activity the student groups in the various universities moved towards a merger. This culminated in the formal inauguration in September 1948 of the All-Japan Union of Student Self-Governing Societies (Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sörengö), usually known as Zengakuren. Headquarters were established at Tokyo University, the traditional centre of student political ac­ tivity, and branches set up throughout the country; self-governing societies (jichikai) in different universities became affiliated in in­ creasing numbers with the new union. Zengakuren remains by far the most conspicuous organization in the history of the Japanese student movement. It would be beyond the scope of this study to enter into any detail concerning its organization, but a brief descrip­ tion of its development is necessary if the right-wing student move­ ment is to be seen in perspective. From the outset Zengakuren was, both directly and indirectly, under strong Communist influence. The degree of actual control exercised by the Communist Party is open to debate. Although the new organization had no official links with the JCP many of the key positions were held by Communist students, who were of course subject to orders from the party.1 In September 1949 Zengakuren was accepted as a member of the Communist-dominated Inter­ national Union of Students, and since that time it has maintained close ties with the international Communist movement. It was, therefore, susceptible to direct influence both from the domestic party and from the Cominform. The policies of the Zengakuren have from the beginning revealed its strong left-wing leanings. Although many of its slogans related to the actual economic welfare and practical concerns of students, a large number reveal by their wording the familiar imprint of left1 According to the anti-Communist writer Professor Kitaoka Juitsu, the JCP at one time had about ioo students on its payroll in the Zengakuren as ‘career workers’ (Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, pp. 32-33). U

278

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

wing politics. ‘Oppose war and Fascism*, ‘Defend the national cul­ ture*, ‘Unify and enlarge the student front*, ‘Defend peace and democracy* are all clearly of this nature. Most of the principal cam­ paigns conducted by the Zengakuren have also been those espoused by parties of the extreme left, and the JCP often made it clear that the Communists regarded the Zengakuren as part of their united front of mass organizations. Zengakuren has been active in opposing the various political manifestations of the ‘reverse course*, such as the Subversive Activities Prevention Bill, the recentralization of the police, the stricter governmental control of education, and the efforts to revise the 1947 Constitution. Student members co-operated forcefully with socialists, Söhyö, and the Communists in many of the left-wing nationalist campaigns, such as those for abolishing American bases, ‘racial emancipation*, and the recovery of Okinawa. Student demonstrators were frequently taken into custody by the police, and at least part of the traditional antipathy between the two seems to have persisted since earlier days.1 The political issue that has most stirred Japanese students since the war is undoubtedly that of opposing war preparations, especially atom and hydrogen bomb tests ; here, too, Zengakuren has closely co-operated in its campaigns and demonstrations with left-wing labour groups and political parties. The main student movement has been implacably opposed to Japanese rearmament, and especially to any attempts at reintroducing military training or conscription. It may be argued that the attitude of politically-minded students on these issues is perfectly natural and spontaneous and that it in no way needs to be ascribed to deliberate socialist or Communist in­ fluence ; in particular, it is said, the abhorrence that Japanese youth feels for nuclear war springs from their own true feelings and is not the effect of any pressure by outside political groups.2 The fact re­ mains that for most people in Japan, especially for the conservative majority, the aims, activities, and even the organization of Zenga­ kuren have become inextricably identified with those of left-wing political elements, especially the JCP. 1 For an account of some typical Zengakuren demonstrations see above, p. 189. “ Yet the fact that the number of students who demonstrated outside the Soviet Embassy against A-bomb tests was always infinitesimally small compared to those outside the British and American Embassies would suggest that, how­ ever sincere their feelings against war may be, left-wing political motives are not entirely absent when it comes to expressing these feelings.

279 Following its formation in 1948, Zengakuren increased rapidly in size and influence. By October 1949 it was able to claim an affiliation of 394 self-governing societies throughout Japan, representing a total membership of about 350,000 students. This proved to be the high-water mark.1Thereafter membership fell off rapidly, reaching a low point of about 80,000 in 1952. It rallied later, but never approached its earlier height: claimed membership in 1955 was 180,000 and in 1956 about 220,ooo.2There has been a marked ten­ dency since about the beginning of 1956 for Zengakuren to take a rather less fanatic, more realistic attitude to current political issues. This is part of the general lowering of the political temperature that will be discussed later. One aspect has been a steady weakening of the influence of the Communist Party Central Committee on Zengakuren leadership; Zengakuren was the first mass organization of the left to be attacked by the so-called Main Current Faction of the JCP, and since 1956 the leaders of Zengakuren (many of whom belonged to the International Faction of the JCP) have shown signs of becoming slightly more independent from the control of the Com­ munist Party headquarters. While many, if not most, of the leaders of the student movement remained Communist in their ideology, they were evidently becoming less susceptible to strict domination from the party itself. It was partly as a result of its more moderate stand that after 1956 Zengakuren began to regain some of the influ­ ence which it had lost among students and that it had increasing suc­ cess in mobilizing even non-political students for participation in such campaigns as that against the extension of the Sunakawa air base. It is no mere coincidence that the fluctuating fortunes of Zenga­ kuren should to some extent have paralleled those of the Communist Party itself, which, as we have seen, reached its apogee in the 1949 elections, declined precipitously after 1950, and began to rally slightly after 1954. One important reason that Zengakuren began to lose support was precisely that it had come to be identified, in the eyes of both the public and the authorities, with the JCP and the Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

1 Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle. 8 These claims would appear to be highly exaggerated. Present strength (1958) is probably in the neighbourhood of 160,000, and in any case less than half of what it was in 1949. In 1955 the Zengakuren organ paper admitted that only 20 per cent, of the universities were now affiliated with their organization, and also that many of the self-governing societies were balking at paying their dues (ibid, p. h i ) .

28o

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

latter’s new aggressive tactics. Already in 1949 the Government had compelled Zengakuren to register as a political organization and its attitude became one of increasing hostility; this attitude was fully reciprocated by students of left-wing inclinations, who now came to regard the Government as their implacable foe. This was part of the growing ‘confrontation* (tairitsu) between the various left-wing forces and the conservative Government to which Japanese writers so often refer. In 1950 it was rumoured that the Government was planning to dissolve the Zengakuren entirely, as part of the new antiCommunist drive that followed the outbreak of war in Korea. As a result many of the Zengakuren student activities went underground. The police raided Zengakuren offices in July and September ; docu­ ments and records were confiscated and several students arrested. Many conservatives in Japan were in favour of outright dissolution, on the grounds that Zengakuren was a highly subversive and cor­ rupting influence. In the event, however, more moderate counsel prevailed and the left-wing student movement was, for the time at least, spared the fate that it had undergone some three decades earlier. This did not end the ‘confrontation* between the students and the authorities, which has continued unabated, and which re­ cently emerged in repeated charges by the Zengakuren that the police have been using spies in various universities to obtain in­ formation and records regarding ‘progressive* student activity.1 The Government’s drive against left-wing influence among stu­ dents was strongly encouraged by the Occupation authorities, who in 1949 began to direct their new anti-Communist policy to the field of education. In July of that year, for example, Dr. Walter Eells, an adviser to the SCAP Education Division, gave a speech at a Japanese 1 This form of spying was admitted and defended by the authorities. In November 1957 the Socialists charged in the Lower House that police were en­ gaged in using student spies in Fukushima and other universities. This, accord­ ing to the Socialists, constituted ‘interference with legal organizational activity and violation of the freedom of learning’. The Minister of Justice, Mr. Karasawa Toshiki, defended the use of student spies as being necessary when ‘criminal offences’ committed in universities were being investigated. And the director of the Police Agency pointed out that although the spy in question was ‘familiar’ with the police, he was not being paid for his activities. During the same month, students in Yamagata University said that they had been asked by the local police to spy on the activities of other students and of leftist elements. One student, for instance, said that he was paid ¥500 (105.) by the police to give in­ formation concerning the leftist student paper. The police later justified this action on the grounds that the information was requested on a ‘friendly’ rather than an official basis (Japanese press of 12 and 30 Nov. 1957).

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement 281 university in which he referred to the purging of Communist pro­ fessors in the United States and recommended a similar course in Japan.1 In the following year a ‘red purge* was in fact carried out in Japanese universities. Communist student cells were outlawed by many of the universities, including Tokyo University, and some of the more radical student agitators expelled. In September Dr. Amano, the Minister of Education, announced a purge among uni­ versity professors of radical tendencies. This move was fiercely opposed by Zengakuren^ as well as by the Japan Teachers* Union (Nikkyöso) and similar bodies. A series of student strikes and demon­ strations was staged in protest. In the event, this policy, as well as the other aspects of the Occupation-directed educational purge, were carried out with considerable restraint, especially in com­ parison with the 1928 educational purge. By this time, however, the main student movement, which in earlier days had regarded the Occupation as an ‘army of emancipation*, was in open opposition, and since then, Zengakureris statements and activities have been marked by a vocally anti-American brand of nationalism. As the authorities, the press, and the general public all became in­ creasingly hostile to the left-wing student movement, the students themselves became less enthusiastic about belonging to self-govern­ ing societies that were affiliated with Zengakuren, and after 1950 a considerable number of these societies withdrew their affiliation. The organization was further weakened by internal splits and by repercussions of the fierce struggle within the JCP between the socalled International and Main Current Factions. The abrupt switch in the JCP line in 1950 at the behest of the Cominform had a par­ ticularly disillusioning effect on those students whose approach was of a mainly idealistic nature. Many members of Zengakuren now began to look with cynical boredom on the type of political activity that they had until then supported. In 1952 the left-wing student movement suffered two further blows that served to reduce Zengakuren membership to about onequarter of its original strength. The first was the exceedingly un1 Not surprisingly, Dr. Eells' strong anti-Communist stand earned him the dislike of many of the more left-wing students and teachers. His lectures at various universities were frequently interrupted by hecklers. In May 1950 he was prevented by hecklers in Töhoku University from completing a talk on academic freedom. Four of the students involved were disciplined and two were arrested on charges of obstructing an Occupation official in the discharge of his duties (Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, pp. 66, 68-69).

282 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan favourable reaction of the press and the public to the role of students in the May Day Incident. It is estimated that some 10,000 students were involved in the original demonstration. Zengakuren members carried banners of the International Union of Students and placards inscribed, ‘Down with the Yoshida Government!* and ‘Go Home, Yankees !n Many of them took part in the subsequent anti-American rioting and in the fracas with the police. One student was killed, large numbers were injured, and about 100 arrested. Many people who had until then tended to regard the left-wing movement with tolerance, as being largely a manifestation of youthful idealism and high spirits, were now convinced that it was the tool of political ex­ tremists and troublemakers. The conservatives themselves were now confirmed in their suspicions that Zengakuren was essentially a subversive political group working in close alliance with the Gov­ ernment’s enemies. The incident as a whole contributed to the up­ surge of anti-Communist feeling in the country and specifically to the passing of the Subversive Activities Prevention Bill two months later. Although the May Day Incident exercised a very demoralizing effect on the student movement, a far more damaging development was the decision taken later in the year by the Japan Federation of Employers* Associations (Nikkeiren) and similar bodies to exclude from their future employment all applicants known to have partici­ pated in left-wing student activities. University authorities were asked to issue special reports on which the applicant’s ‘social be­ haviour* in his student days would be indicated. Past membership in Zengakuren, needless to say, was not viewed as a good qualification for employment. Special tests and interviews were also carried out to determine the candidate’s political sentiments.2 This new policy, which was itself partly a reaction of the employers to the role of radical students in the May Day demonstrations, came at a time when graduates from universities were having increasing difficulty in finding suitable jobs. The result was to discourage many of the more moderate and non-political students from joining self-govern­ ing societies that were affiliated with Zengakuren, and it is generally considered that the sharp decrease in their membership can be directly attributed to the new employment policy. This policy would not, however, appear to have had much effect on the hard core 1 Ibid. p. 82.

2 See above, p. 136.

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

283

of confirmed radical students, and since then Zengakureny though smaller in membership and rather less violent in behaviour, has re­ mained strongly left-wing in its character. One further reaction to the growing unpopularity of the leftwing student movement was the formation in 1952 of a number of right-wing groups in the universities. Many of the right-wing organizations that arose during the Occupation, such as the National Salvation Youth League, the People’s New Life Movement, the Chrysanthemum Flag Association, and the Japan Reconstruction Youth Association, included many students among their numbers, but it was not until 1952 that any significant right-wing groups were formed within the universities themselves.1These new groups were inspired mainly by the nationalist form of anti-Communism that has been examined in an earlier chapter, and specifically by resent­ ment at the overweening power exerted over post-war students by ‘unpatriotic* left-wing groups like Zengakuren and its supporters in academic circles. It must be emphasized that the rightist student groups arose primarily as a reaction to Zengakuren, and that they can only be understood against the background of overwhelming leftist sentiment among politically-minded students. In addition, these new groups shared the main sentiments of the general right-wing organizations on such issues as rearmament and constitutional revision. A further motive that appears to have in­ spired many students to join them was precisely that which had in 1952 made others shy away from Zengakuren, namely the new employment policies governing university graduates. In some cases, the anti-Communist student groups were openly supported by em­ ployers as a counterbalance to the radical student movement; to have joined such groups might well stand some of the less brilliant students in good stead when it came to seeking a job in the swollen labour market. The new right-wing groups aimed at checking, if necessary by force, the strikes and rowdy demonstrations carried on by Zenga­ kuren, They often succeeded in recruiting some of the more muscu­ lar and pugilistic students to their ranks, but, as we shall see, their 1 A number of small groups was formed in the universities prior to 1952 in opposition to the radical influence of Zengakuren. In some cases they appear to have had outside support from right-wing or conservative elements (Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, pp. 131-2). Their political content, however, appears to have been slight and they are not strictly relevant to the present discussion.

284 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan membership remained so small in comparison with that of their leftwing counterparts that, so far as this aim was concerned, they could be of little more than nuisance value.1A further function that some of the groups arrogated to themselves was to expose and attack students and teachers of pronounced left-wing views. A typical case occurred in Meiji University in the autumn of 1957 and, though of little importance in itself, it may be outlined to illus­ trate the type of activities in which some of these groups are in­ volved.2 An anti-Communist student organization in Meiji Uni­ versity (Tokyo) published an article in its magazine in which it identified forty-five students of the university as either members of the Communist Party or ‘fellow-travellers* ; another article referred to the professor who was dean of students as a ‘self-styled Marxist*. The university authorities stated that these articles were libellous and as a result suspended the three leaders of the anti-Communist organization from the university. This produced a storm of protest by members of the group, who claimed that the authorities had for political reasons sided with leftist elements. In particular the group charged that the suspension had been timed to deprive them of leaders during the general meeting of university students that was to be held shortly. At this meeting the group in question had been plan­ ning to make a forceful demand (for the third year in succession) that the university’s self-governing society secede from Zengakuren. At the insistence of the rightist students the meeting was postponed for a fortnight. When the time came, however, the rightist group still objected to its being held, on the grounds that anti-Communist students were not properly represented and that their leaders were still under suspension. A band of tough right-wing students, mostly belonging to the athletic department and to the university baseball cheering squad, accordingly took matters into their own hands and squatted on the stairs of the auditorium to prevent the other students from attending the meeting.3 Despite these and other efforts, how1 Head-on collisions between right-wing student groups and affiliates of Zengakuren were avoided. Such chastisement as the right-wing students saw fit to inflict on their radical colleagues was usually of an individual nature; some­ times it involved the destruction of property belonging to left-wing students or to societies affiliated with Zengakuren. 3 Japanese press of 13 and 28 November 1957. 3 It is worth recalling that in pre-war days the so-called söshi and ingaidan (tough political hirelings or lobbyists traditionally employed by the conserva­ tive parties and frequently associated with extreme rightist groups) often had their first experience in raising their voices for a common cause when they

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

285

ever, the main student movement in Meiji University retained its affiliation with Zengakuren. It might appear at first sight that timeconsuming activities of this type must prevent Japanese students from making any great advances in their more scholarly pursuits ; as we shall see, however, it is in fact only a small minority that takes part in political or quasi-political doings of this sort. The right-wing student groups were in most cases supported by outside nationalist societies or by conservatives with violent antiCommunist beliefs, like Professor Kitaoka Juitsu, who saw in them a potential antidote to the prevailing degeneration of Japanese students; in many cases they formed part of larger nationalist organizations. Before we examine a few of the more important rightwing student groups that have been organized since 1952 it may be worth while to glance briefly at the general stand put forward by a representative figure in the right-wing student movement. Professor Kitaoka Juitsu of the Kokugakuin University has been active, es­ pecially since 1952, both in advocating the need for anti-Communist student groups and in helping to organize them. His views were cogently set forth in an article published in April 1953 and entitled ‘Win Back the Students from the Reds I’*1 Professor Kitaoka’s general stand, as expressed in this article, is shared by most advo­ cates of a right-wing student movement, although his mode of ex­ pression is perhaps rather more forceful than most. The professor begins by directing a powerful broadside against the supposed ideal­ ism of the Soviet Union and of the JCP. The latter, he states, is in fact neither an idealistic nor a progressive organization, but simply the catspaw of aggressive Soviet imperialism—an imperialism marked by constant crime and brutality. The true motive of the Japanese Communist leaders is personal ambition and lust for power; in its achievement they are quite prepared to betray their country and their fellow citizens. Although their numbers may be small, they exert immense influence, thanks to their close-knit organization. In particular they have concentrated on Japanese students and here their success has been remarkable. The drive to capture the minds of Japanese youth has been the work of only a served as cheer-leaders (öendanchö) on their school or college baseball teams. The Western origins of the game do not appear to have offended their nationalist scruples. 1 'Gakusei wo Aka kara Torimodose’, published in Nihon Shühô, 5 Apr. 1953, PP. 34- 38 .

286 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan few hundred JCP members and a few thousand fellow-travellers; yet, in the absence of any organized anti-Communist movement, these ‘fiends* (akuma) have had the field to themselves. How, then, have they succeeded in dazzling the Japanese students? In the first place, young people are confused by the supposed idealism of Com­ munism and do not realize that this is merely a cloak for predatory ambition and treachery. Secondly, Marxism has spread its tentacles into the academic profession. In particular, the economic depart­ ments of the national universities have been taken over entirely by Marxist professors, who preach socialism to the students from morn­ ing till night. Some of the ‘red-tinted* professors are mere oppor­ tunists who are hoping for rapid advancement when the Commun­ ists come to power; others are misguided theoreticians. In either case, by putting anti-capitalist ideas into the heads of the students they are leading them to violence and illegality. Thirdly, there is a minority of ambitious students who believe that to be associated with Zengakuren or similar groups will help them to advance rapidly in the world. Fourthly, the Occupation, by undermining true national­ ist feeling, had a profoundly demoralizing effect on Japanese youth. Finally, while Zengakuren is a well-organized group receiving both moral and financial support from the JCP and from other outside bodies, the ‘patriotic* students lack both leaders and money and re­ ceive no help whatsoever from the authorities. The situation, as Professor Kitaoka sees it, is a menacing one. It is not, however, hopeless. Three main steps are necessary if Japan­ ese youth, and indeed Japan itself, are to be saved from the alldevouring ambitions of the Communists. First, the JCP itself must be suppressed as a criminal conspiracy. The life of the country is at stake and the people cannot afford to be too magnanimous about either the Communists or their ‘intellectual* apologists. Even under existing laws, writes Professor Kitaoka, the Communists are liable to capital punishment on the grounds of conspiring with foreign countries.1 The proctors should, in fact, be constantly engaged in arresting Communists. The post-war police, which has been ren­ dered virtually impotent, must have its powers restored. All this may run counter to some of the new-fangled ideas about freedom. But freedom in Japan has gone too far. On this point Professor 1 Professor Kitaoka cites Art. lxxxi of the Criminal Code in support of this rather startling thesis (Nihon Shühö, p. 37).

287 Kitaoka’s views are common to most right-wing nationalists of the post-war period and may be worth quoting : Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

The Japanese people, perhaps because they are deficient in culture, perhaps because their life is so hard, are apt to misuse the freedom that they have been granted. When they are given the freedom to gamble, both adults and youths run amuck at bicycle-races and pachinko parlours; when the control of morals is relaxed, the harlots shamelessly parade the streets ; when censorship is abolished, the book-shops bury their counters with erotic magazines. It is doubtful whether such a people should in fact be granted too much freedom.1

Once the Communists have been suppressed, the main outside prop for the left-wing student movement will have been removed. As the next step, the professor announces, ‘Drive the Marxist pro­ fessors from the universities!* The outright Communists will, of course, have already been disposed of by the suppression of the JCP. It is, however, also necessary to remove from their present positions of influence those ‘red-tinted sympathizers* who are still living in an atmosphere of idealistic nineteenth-century Marxism and who expound their socialist ideals in the lecture halls and in the more intellectual magazines. As a third step, it is essential to build up a patriotic, anti-Communist student movement. For various reasons this can unfortu­ nately not be done by the students themselves : ‘Under present con­ ditions*, writes Professor Kitaoka, ‘it is unreasonable to expect that an anti-Communist movement aimed at correcting the errors of the Communist Party can arise merely from among the students, or that it can depend on the strength of the students.*2 The anti-Com­ munist students lack both the leadership and the financial support commanded by their opponents; the various student papers and also most of the main intellectual magazines in Japan have already come under left-wing domination and to launch rival publications is a very costly business ; finally, the university authorities themselves tend to view Marxist Communist propaganda with a certain sym­ pathy (so long as it does not lead to any actual violence by the stu­ dents), but invariably look askance at any anti-Communist activity as being ‘reactionary* or ‘right wing*. For all these reasons it is es­ sential that the Government itself gives clear and practical leadership to the anti-Communist movement among students : 1 Ibid. p. 36.

* Ibid. p. 38.

288

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan When we look squarely at actual conditions in our country [concludes Professor Kitaoka] we see that there is no body outside the Government that can carry out such an enterprise on a large scale. We must therefore hope that the Government will in fact assume the responsibility of guid­ ing students in the right direction.1

Despite the urgings of Professor Kitaoka and others, such mea­ sures as the Government has in fact taken to combat left-wing in­ fluences in the field of education have, apart from the rather modest ‘red purge* during the Occupation period, been mainly directed to schools rather than to universities, and have usually taken the form of efforts to reintroduce some kind of moral education.2 The antiCommunist student groups that have been organized in the uni­ versities have, as we shall see, received no official encouragement from the Government. The first important group of this type was the New Japan Student League, which was set up in June 1952 by the well-known anti-Communist organization, the Fatherland Defence Comrades* Association (Mimbo).* This League, as we have seen, consisted of students from sixteen universities in western Japan and claimed a membership of 150,000. The principal motive of its sponsors ap­ pears to have been to inculcate the need for national rearmament upon the minds of young people, who had until then been exposed only to the pacifist blandishments of the Japan Teachers* Union and of Zengakuren. The rearmament issue also played a leading part in the Student National Defence Society (Gakusei Kokubö Kyökai\ which was organized during the following November in Tokyo under the guidance of Professor Kitaoka Juitsu. The group, which claimed to be non-political and non-partisan, had as its principal aim ‘the pro­ motion of armaments, so that our country can remain an indepen­ dent nation in which the life, liberty and other rights of the people will be protected*.4For this purpose it was essential both to encour­ age research on rearmament and to stimulate defence-mindedness among students. As in the case of most right-wing student groups, the slogans of this society were, despite its essentially reactionary leadership, generously sprinkled with post-war amulets about 1Nihon Shühô, p. 38. 4 Keibi Keisatsu, p. 220.

2 See pp. 154-5 above.

2 pp. 199-200 above.

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

289

liberty and democracy ; for these were essential if young people were to be attracted in any considerable numbers. In the following year the Student National Defence Society, despite all its talk of students’ solidarity, fell apart as a result of in­ ternal dissension. A successor group, the Student League for the Protection of Liberty (Jiyü Yögo Gakusei Remmei)t was set up in February 1953, again under the guidance of Professor Kitaoka. In view of this gentleman’s strong views (quoted earlier) on the dangers of liberty, the name of the League need hardly be taken at its face value. Some of the more prominent right-wing student organizations were sponsored by the tough-minded youth groups that are to be ex­ amined in the following chapter. For example, the Pure Association for an All-Student Movement (Zen-Gakusei Undo Junsei Kai)> es­ tablished in Tokyo in February 1955, was an outer organization of the well-known group of fanatically nationalist young men, the National Martyrs Youth Corps.1 The aims of this student group were of a more ‘tough-minded’ variety than most, and the usual sugaring of post-war amulets was noticeably absent ; in this respect, the influence of the parent organization is clearly revealed. Among the aims were: (1) destruction of Communist power; (2) indepen­ dence and self-sufficiency; (3) establishment of self-defence forces to undertake the ‘holy responsibility of defending the Fatherland’; (4) prompt revision of the ‘MacArthur Constitution’ ; (5) the purge of all ‘red professors and students’, especially those connected with Zengakuren\ (6) rationalization of employment; (7) abolition of ‘comprador capital*; (8) deportation of refractory Koreans; (9) elimination of ‘degenerate music*.2As will be seen, only two of these aims can be considered to have any direct relevance to the practical welfare of the student members ; most of the remainder are the stockin-trade of the extreme right. The reference to ‘comprador capital* is significant, since this particular nationalist slogan is usually an earmark of the left wing. Indeed, as may have been noted, a number 1 The Association was originally formed in November 1953, under the name of the Association of Sympathizers for an All-Student Movement (Zen-Gakusei Undo Yüshi Kai). * Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, pp. 136-7. ‘Degenerate music’ refers mainly to Western jazz, whose popularity among the post-war young is regu­ larly decried by those of traditional nationalist bent.

290 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan of the above slogans suggest that the nationalism which inspired this group is not only anti-Communist but anti-foreign. In view of the rather extreme stand of the Pure Association, it is interesting that an impressive array of conservative leaders should have issued congratulatory messages on the occasion of the publica­ tion in September 1955 of the first issue of its organ magazine, The Student Movement (Gakusei Undo), Among these were the Governor of Tokyo, Mr. Yasui Seiichirö, and the prominent political leaders Mr. Satô Eisaku and Mr. Miki Bukichi; the messages of these dis­ tinguished gentlemen appeared next to that of the fanatic young leader of the parent organization, Mr. Toyoda Kazuo,1thus provid­ ing the type of conservative-ultra-nationalist juxtaposition that has been discussed in earlier chapters of this study. Membership figures are, as usual, hard to assess; in 1956 the Pure Association claimed a following of some 4,000 students in twenty-three universi­ ties in the Tokyo area, but this is no doubt a rather generous esti­ mate.2 The urgent need to unite the scattered anti-Communist student groups into a national organization strong enough to counterbalance the overwhelming influence of Zengakuren was constantly being stressed by right-wing leaders. The National Salvation People’s General Federation was especially exercised on this point, and in May 1954 they sponsored the formation of a National Salvation Student League (Kyükoku Gakusei Dömei), This was composed of anti-Communist students from various Tokyo universities and was conceived as the nucleus of a national movement.3 The results, however, appear to have been disappointing. A similar effort at organizing all rightist students was the formation in Tokyo in April 1956 of the Japan Student League {Nihon Gakusei Remmei), which, immediately after its inauguration, organized a pilgrimage to the nationalist shrine at Sengakuji erected to the memory of the FortySeven Ronin.4 Despite these and several similar efforts, the anti-Communist student movement has until now been marked by the same fissiparous and centrifugal tendencies which have plagued its adult counterparts and which, as has been suggested, tend to appear in 1 Postwar Student Struggle, p. 136. 2 Ibid. 3 Nagamatsu, Ikite iru Uyokuy p. 284. 4 Kinoshita, ‘Rightist Movements’, Oriental Economist, Dec. 1956, p. 604.

291 any movement whose main inspiration is of a negative nature. The aim of becoming a counterweight to Zengakuren has so far not been even remotely compassed, and it would appear that the right-wing student movement has, if anything, stirred Zengakuren and its allies to greater efforts in a determination to retain the position that they have secured among post-war students. Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

General Aspects of the Post-War Student Movement In examining political trends among Japanese students the ob­ server cannot but be struck by the many similarities between pre­ war and post-war developments. In both cases the unsettled years following a world war witnessed an upsurge in Japan of radical leftwing sentiment among students, as well as among labour. In 1924-5 Gakuren became the focus of the left-wing student movement ; after 1948 this role was occupied by Zengakuren. Both these groups ap­ pear to have been under strong Communist influence ; in both cases, however, the motivation of the rank and file was to an important ex­ tent idealistic, and genuine pacifist sentiment played an important part. The two groups reached the apogee of their strength about one year after their founding, in 1925 and 1949 respectively. Meanwhile the suspicions and fears of conservative elements in the country that the youth was being subverted by unpatriotic, radical forces led to a reaction. The police were mobilized to combat leftist extremism among students, and purges were carried out in the various univer­ sities. As a result the left-wing student movements rapidly lost strength. At the same time right-wing student groups were formed to oppose radical sentiment and to infuse the student body with a sense of national duty. In both cases, these groups received their main impetus from conservative and nationalist forces rather than from among the students themselves ; that is, they were deliberately inspired from the outside, rather than arising spontaneously within the universities. In both cases, again, despite a certain amount of in­ fluential support, these groups failed to form any powerful common front or to win wide support from among the students themselves. The above comparison between pre-war and post-war develop­ ments implies no prediction. Nor is the analogy by any means com­ plete. It is, indeed, precisely because of the striking similarities that the differences come to assume special significance. In the first place, radical student activities have been incomparably more frequent

292 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan and extreme since the war than in the early 1920*8. Most of these activities would have been quite unthinkable in the earlier period, when, despite the radical nature of their slogans and manifestos, left-wing students were still inhibited in their actions by a deepseated respect for constituted authority. The revolt against war and traditional social patterns was bound to be far more passionate and profound after 1945, when Japan had been atom-bombed and de­ feated, than after 1918, when the country had achieved victory (though of a rather spurious sort) in the war and when one of the chief motives for the left-wing upsurge was simply excitement over the recent success of the Soviet revolution.1The so-called Emperor Incident in 1951 exemplifies this change. In November of that year the Emperor visited Kyoto University during his tour of the Kansai (west Japan) district. This university contained a fairly strong radi­ cal element and, on the Emperor’s arrival, some students tried to hand him an open letter asking, among other things, if he would try to keep Japan out of a possible war and would oppose rearmament. About 1,000 students gathered at the entrance and some of them carried banners with such devices as ‘No More Deification of the Emperor!’, ‘Not Welcome!’, ‘No More Wars!’, and ‘No Rearma­ ment’. Large numbers of policemen were called, but there was no actual violence. The Emperor himself is said to have acknowledged the demonstrators by good-naturedly raising his hat to them. Although activities of this type gave rise to considerable antagon­ ism on the part of the general public and stimulated efforts to restrict the left-wing student movement,2 the very fact that they could occur suggests the profound effect that the weakening of the authori­ tarian structure had exerted on politically-minded students. A further capital difference between the pre-war and post-war student movements lies in the simple matter of numerical support. The pre-war Gakuren at its highest point probably never had more than 2,000 members; Zengakuren at its very nadir in 1952 had at least 80,000. 1 Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, p. 80. Professor Maruyama compares the gloomy, pessimistic radicalism of the pre-war leftist students, whose atti­ tude towards the Emperor system tended to be one of impotent hate and fear, with the light-hearted, positive radicalism of post-war students, who regard the Emperor system with a mixture of nonchalance and scorn. a The Emperor Incident, for example, was immediately followed by police raids on various universities, for the purpose of investigating left-wing activities (Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, p. 81).

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

293

As a result of general political conditions in the country (especi­ ally the powerful opposition by anti-Government forces), the con­ servative-nationalist reaction against the radical movement was very much more moderate and hesitant in the post-war years than in the i920*s. Much as the conservative leaders resented the iconoclastic turbulence of Zengakuren, and in particular the fact that left-wing elements in the universities so often acted in alliance with their political elements, the repression, when it came, was of a relatively mild nature. ‘Progressive’ circles, it is true, were quick to construe any governmental efforts at control as evidence of the most blatant reaction. Thus the Japan Council of Men of Culture (Nihon Bunkajin Kaigi) in its attack on the Subversive Activities Prevention Bill in 1952, could write, ‘The Bill. . . is worse than the Peace Preserva­ tion Law and it will surely destroy freedom of culture, speech, and study.*1An objective comparison of the two laws, however, suggests rather different conclusions : the Peace Preservation Law threatened violators, not only with life imprisonment and hard labour, but in case of attempt to ‘subvert the national polity* (kokutai no henka) with the gallows ; the severest sanction under the Subversive Activi­ ties Prevention Law, on the other hand, was four years in prison, and until now this law has been enforced with the greatest moderation. Again, when it came to dissolving the main left-wing student group, the pre-war Government was, as we have seen, quite prepared to crush Gakuren, whereas in 1951 the conservatives decided, despite strong persuasion to the contrary, to allow the far more menacing Zengakuren to continue its legal existence. A comparison of the way in which the ‘red purge* was carried out in the universities before and after the war would also indicate the restraint in the more recent conservative efforts at repression.2 It may be argued with some conviction that the post-war process has so far not reached maturity and that the full drive against the leftwing student movement is yet to be seen. The fact remains that due to the enormous growth of anti-conservative forces in post-war Japan, and to the partial collapse of authority symbols, any future 1 Quoted in ibid. p. 87. a For example, the professors purged after 1950 were usually Communists or overt Communist sympathizers. There was nothing to correspond to the pre­ war purge of liberal scholars like Professors Minobe and Takikawa. It is worth noting that the post-war ‘red purge* had far more effect in provincial univer­ sities, where traditional conservative forces retained their influence, than in centres like Tokyo and Kyoto. V

294 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Government attempting thorough-going repression will be faced with a far harder task than were its pre-war counterparts, who, as we have seen, were confronted with a relatively weak and isolated left-wing movement in the universities. It may at the same time be hazarded that in the absence of such strong action by the Govern­ ment, left-wing tendencies are likely to remain dominant for some time among politically active students. The right-wing student movement shows even less sign now than it did before the war that it can ever spontaneously develop into a powerful force in the uni­ versities. As we have seen, the leading advocate of this movement has himself stressed that without official support, accompanied by draconian suppression of the left, there is scant hope that Japan’s ‘patriotic* students will develop into an effective counterbalance to the prevailing radical influences. One general tendency which has been suggested by the above account is that post-war students have been far readier to organize themselves into groups with political interests and objectives than were their pre-war counterparts. Though political apathy (both of the traditional and of the modern varieties) prevails among the vast majority of individual students in Japan, post-war students are more inclined to political activity of a group nature, which during the 1920*3 was on the whole restricted to small cores of single-minded devotees. An examination of the reasons for this state of affairs will bring to light certain relevant aspects of the student movement, and in particular will explain why right-wing nationalism has until now had so little success in these quarters. In the first place, the post-war period has been marked by freedom of political action in general and by an immense widening of the legal sphere of the organized student movement. Before the Surrender, the only political activity in which a student could indulge without courting the severities of the police was of a conformist, right-wing nature; the nationalist student groups failed, as we have seen, to exert any widespread appeal and even they themselves ceased to exist after 1940. The post-war political movements among students were part of the general upsurge of free political activity that fol­ lowed the Surrender. Political feelings among students have been characterized by a trend towards polarization. Although the great majority remains largely indifferent to the political activities being carried out by

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

295

Zengakuren and other groups,1 the conspicuous minority of politically-conscious students has tended to go to extremes of the left and (in exceptional cases) of the right. Among the most important deter­ minants have been those of a socio-economic nature. The great majority of the student body during the early years of economic dis­ location following the war was faced with appalling economic con­ ditions, including malnutrition and disease, poor clothing and in­ adequate housing. Few were fortunate enough to be able to concen­ trate on their studies and the rampant inflation in 1946-7 made mat­ ters worse. In 1947 it was estimated that at least 83 per cent, of Japanese university students were obliged to have regular outside jobs in order both to secure their own livelihood and, in many cases, to help support their indigent families.2The numbers suffering from tuberculosis and other deficiency diseases increased at an alarming rate. Apart from the immediate effects of the war on the economic con­ ditions of the student population, the vast increase in opportunities for higher education brought about by the Occupation reforms has made the percentage of university students labouring under finan­ cial difficulties very much greater than before. Until about 1952 a 1 According to Professor Shiba Yoshie, on an average no more than 20 per cent, of university students participate in the activities of the self-governing societies (‘Sengo ni okeru Gakusei Undo*, in Shakaiteki Kinchö, p. 351). The investigations of the present writer would suggest that the average rate of (university) student participation in political activity of all types in 1957 was about one-quarter. It is also worth remarking that even among those who are active in left-wing student politics, the majority turns to political indifference or even to conservatism after graduating and obtaining jobs. This tendency is, of course, not peculiar to Japan, but the observer is perhaps more struck here than elsewhere by the marked change in political outlook that so often takes place when a politically-minded young man ceases to be a student and becomes an employee : in almost every case, reformist or ‘progressive’ views will give way to a cautious, moderate approach. As a rule, this is probably not so much a matter of hypocrisy as of adaptation to a new environment. * The following figures for the percentage of working students to the total student population were given by the Ministry of Education and quoted in Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, p. 149: Found Jt Year Sought Jobs 41 1947 83 1948 44*5 71 61 *6 1949 34*7 60 21*4 1950 23-7 I 9 SI 73*9 22'2 71*5 1952 48-6 1953 32*4 1954 1955

39*7 41-3

32

38

296 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan considerable majority could only make ends meet by finding parttime employment, or, as it is normally called, arubaito (Arbeit) ; and even after the spectacular improvement in economic conditions in 1954-5 a substantial number could only continue their studies by these means. Nor was such work easy to find. In 1957, for instance, the main employment agency for students* part-time jobs was re­ ceiving an average of 700 applications a day, but could only offer jobs to 250. Although the students all hoped for ‘clean* or clerical jobs, most of them were fortunate if they could find work as com­ mon day-labourers. In order to earn enough to live and study the majority was obliged to work eight or more hours a day for the most meagre rewards at such unscholarly occupations as sandwich-man, delivery-boy, or night-watchman.1 All this frequently interfered with their university studies, and inevitably inspired many young men with a sense of humiliation and resentment against the existing economic system. A far more serious concern for most students was that of finding suitable jobs after graduation from university. The particular age distribution of the Japanese population has made the question of employment increasingly acute and university graduates, with their greater expectations, have been among the main sufferers. It is esti­ mated that only half of the approximately 140,000 students who are graduating each year from the innumerable Japanese universities is able to find jobs befitting their education and ambitions.2This situa­ tion is, of course, directly dependent on the country’s general economic situation, but even under the relatively favourable con­ ditions that prevailed in 1957 (when the national prosperity was 1 The average payment for jobs listed by the Student Welfare Relief Associa­ tion (Gakuto Engo K ai) was about ¥325 (6j. 6d.) a day. These ranged from ¥250 (55.) for a waiter to about ¥600 (12J.) for a night-watchman ( YomiuriJapart Netcs, 25 Nov. 1957). 2 Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, pp. 141-2. A survey of the period 1952-4 by the Statistical Research Society showed that 23 per cent, of university graduates (excluding those from medical and educational departments) had been unable to find any jobs whatsoever ( Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 Apr. 1958). 1957 was a relatively good year for employment, yet 13 per cent, of the students graduating in October were unable to find any work whatsoever: about 180,000 university graduates were thus forced, at least temporarily, to join the ranks of the unem­ ployed. A further significant factor is that in Japan employment is still to a con­ siderable extent determined by the personal connexions that the applicant or his family may have with the employing concern. Students from poor families, how­ ever excellent their academic records may be, are therefore at a disadvantage when it comes to obtaining jobs. Such students are naturally more susceptible to the blandishments of extreme political groupings.

297 popularly described as ‘the best since the days of Emperor Jimmu*), the state of affairs was such that Japan’s universities were with some reason dubbed ‘unemployment factories’ (shitsugyö-köjö). In Japan, as in Germany after the First World War, one effect of economic anxiety and dissatisfaction was to make students politi­ cally conscious and, in particular, susceptible to appeals from ex­ tremes. It was precisely this form of dissatisfaction with the econo­ mic status quo that had in pre-war days driven many young Japanese to the extreme right. Mr. Kodama’s remarks concerning his own ex­ perience are worth quoting ; for, mutatis mutandis and making allow­ ance for a rather forceful manner of expression, they describe the feelings that have inspired many post-war students into political activity of the opposite extreme: Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

So great were the sufferings of the people that any full-blooded youth, unless he were an impotent lunatic or a moron, could not but be driven by the tense atmosphere of the times to either the right or the left. There was no middle path for the youths of the period,. . . No person can possibly understand the degree of degradation and irrationalities of Japanese society of the times, unless he lived in that period as a member of the down-trodden weak and the ‘have-nots*. For a person such as I, always oppressed and trampled upon, the injustices of society were felt with par­ ticular bitterness and the only way of combating the wrongs of society was to join others to take direct action against the hateful privileged class responsible for the current evils of society. Perhaps the ideology of resorting to force and direct action was a grave mistake on our part, but even if this way of thinking may have been a mistake, it does not auto­ matically clear the privileged and ruling class of all guilt. Basically, society itself was at fault in compelling us to embrace the thoughts we did. In essence, be it Communism, nationalism or even militarism, these are all the directproducts of an irrational and unjust society.1 In the early post-war period, with traditional nationalist ideals and their right-wing exponents thoroughly discredited, especially among the youth of the country, the political reaction to economic grievances was, when it came, bound to take the form of a left-wing protest. For it was the left that could best offer a ‘scientific* explana­ tion of the economic crisis with which students were faced and that also claimed to have the correct solution. Again, an important ele­ ment among teachers and professors, and indeed among Japanese I Was Defeated, p. 42. Italics are those of the present writer.

298 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan intellectual circles in general, was of strong left-wing or Marxist per­ suasion, and its attitude inevitably influenced the students. It is also to be noted that the academic profession in Japan is, by tradition, ill paid and that the economic conditions of the students and the teach­ ers were thus in many ways parallel.1 The first major issue in which politics was prominently intro­ duced into the student movement was, significantly, one that di­ rectly concerned their economic predicament. This was the decision of the Government in February 1948 to increase tuition fees in state universities by about 300 per cent.2The proposed increase was dis­ astrous for a large number of the students, who were already sorely 1 Another essentially economic motive for the popularity of political groupings among post-war students is that they fill the need for social activity. This motive is often overlooked, but it has undoubtedly had an important effect in recruiting politically apathetic students to the ranks of Zengakuren-afhliated societies. A îarge number of Japanese university students is unable to afford ordinary social diversions of even the simplest nature. Cinemas, dances, and similar entertain­ ments that are not infrequently enjoyed by their English and American counter­ parts are out of their economic range. A well-organized group like Zengakuren is often able to fill the gap for such students. Membership in Zengakuren gives them an opportunity to attend lively meetings and discussion groups, and also of participating in demonstrations in front of the American Embassy and else­ where, which, though they may result in an occasional scuffle with the police or even arrest, serve to break the monotony of their esurient lives, and also to give them a comfortable in-group feeling. A further attraction of Zengakuren (which was emphasized to the present writer by an anti-Communist youth leader) is that the students who join have considerable opportunity of meeting members of the opposite sex. This particular advantage would not apply in the case of rightwing groups, whose membership is, as a rule, almost entirely masculine. The success of the group-singing movement (utagoe undo), which became especially popular after 1954, is also partly to be explained by this need for social activity on the part of economically disfavoured students. The group-singing movement was, from the beginning, strongly backed by the JCP, who recognized in it an excellent way of bringing their influence to bear on student, labour, and other elements. A few of the songs used in the group-singing have a strong political flavour, being anti-America, pro-Communist China, and sympathetic to the Communist peace campaign. Most of them, however, are non-political and of a much higher standard than the usual type of popular song heard on the wireless. Zengakuren members participate enthusiastically, though often discordantly, in student singing activities of this type. The immense success of the group­ singing movement has inspired the Ministry of Education itself to enter the field with its own songs and its own groups. In 1955 ¥1 million (£1,008) was set aside for the purpose, and millions of copies of the Ministry’s songs were issued to local boards of education to be distributed free to students. A similar counter­ movement was sponsored by the Kokusai Bunka Kökan Kyökai (International Society for Cultural Exchange), which is backed by prominent business circles (Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, pp. 108-9). It is significant that even in 6uch a field as this, the conservative efforts should have come as a reaction to those of the left wing. * Political aims had appeared in student activities since about May 1946, but it was not until 1947 that they came to play a prominent part and that Com­ munist influence became conspicuous.

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

299

beset by economic difficulties. It appeared to many of them that the Government had been largely indifferent to their plight and that, when eventually it did take action, it was only to make things worse. The campaign to oppose the increase was enthusiastically led by Kokugakuren, the main parent organization of Zengakuren, and took the form of direct opposition to the Government. This form of political confrontation became characteristic of the major student movement thereafter, and it may be said that almost all the major student campaigns carried out by Zengakuren since its foundation in 1948 have, either overtly or implicitly, been directed against the con­ servative authorities. Yet although the post-war student movement became increasingly political, and although the causes that it es­ poused were in most cases the common ground of Japanese leftwing politics, often having no direct connexion whatsoever with the students* own welfare, economic factors continued to play a major part in inspiring and consolidating the rank-and-file membership. In all this such right-wing elements as existed among the students were until about 1952 obliged to adopt a defensive or negative atti­ tude. However much they might decry the unpatriotic proclivities of Zengakuren and its allies, the anti-Communist groups could never hope to win over any appreciable number of students unless they could offer some alleviation of their various economic difficulties, such as was promised by the rival forces. The hardship of the post­ war student’s life has in almost every case played into the hands of the left wing. In 1952, however, there arose a factor that served the interests of the right. This was the decision of certain business groups to exclude known radical students from employment. The decision, as we have seen, resulted not only in a decline in the follow­ ing of Zengakuren but in the development of various anti-Communist student groups, often directly sponsored by the employers, membership in which might serve as a mark of respectability and a recommendation for employment. These so-called ‘job-hunting groups* (shüshoku-undö dantai) had played an important part in the right-wing movement before the war, and after 1952 they sprang up again in various universities throughout the country. On the whole they have probably played a greater part in encouraging the antiCommunist student movement than any other single factor.1Thus 1 Kinoshita (Nihon no Uyoku, p. 191) describes a few such groups. Their im­ portance is also stressed by Nakazawa Shinichirö in his article 'T he Rise of the

300 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan it would appear from an examination of pre-war and post-war de­ velopments that economic motives can lead students to varying forms of political action, and that such action is likely to be inspired by one extreme or the other rather than by belief in a moderate form of liberal democracy. It is not only economic factors, however, that have determined the increase in political consciousness among post-war students. The deep-lying sentiment against war has had an important effect in turning the interests of students from their normal academic and social pursuits to the outside political sphere. This sentiment is by no means the monopoly of youth, but during the post-war period it has in fact been expressed with particular vehemence by university students. The waste and futility of war had especially been impress­ ed on young people by the cataclysm of 1945 and by all the miseries that the war and its aftermath had entailed for them and their fami­ lies. In many cases war appeared to have been the final outcome of the misguided ideals of their elders, the reductio ad absurdum, as it were, of the entire pre-war pattern, which was now so completely discredited. Anti-war feeling, however, was not merely a matter of bitterness over the past catastrophes. With the development of the cold war and the division of the world into two power-camps, each truculently preparing for the next holocaust, Japanese youth was faced with the unpalatable prospect of once more being regimented, conscripted, and obliged to make every sacrifice to build up armaments. Such liberties and privileges as they had acquired after 1945 appeared to be in danger of rescission in the name of national defence. Apart from fearing the practical effects that war or even rumours of war would have on their own lives, the more idealistic youths were moved with indignation and horror at the implications, in universal human terms, of a future war fought with weapons even more lethal than those used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This genuine and deeprooted aversion for war is confirmed by every public-opinion poll that has been carried out among post-war youth and will emerge in a conversation with almost any young Japanese person.*1 Right Wing as Seen by the Law-Enforcing Authorities’ (Shühö, p. 41). It is interesting to note that similar anti-Communist groups have recently sprung up in certain West German universities at the encouragement of the employers. 1 According to the experience of the present writer, this applies even to young people of extreme right-wing persuasion. The following results were obtained

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

301

Just as the economic concerns of students could be exploited for political motives, so the existence of these strong anti-war feelings could serve to win them over to any political group that, for one rea­ son or another, strongly advocated peace. The preservation of world peace was prominent among Zengakureris slogans ever since its foundation in 1948 and was undoubtedly one of the most powerful attractions for students who joined its ranks. The issue became in­ creasingly important as the years passed and as the prospect of a future world conflagration became more menacing. In 1950 Zengakuren launched a campaign to obtain 1 million signatures for the Stockholm Peace Appeal. In the same year the Anti-War Student League {Hansen Gakusei Dömei) was organized to promote the anti­ war movement among both school and university students. From the beginning this League appears to have been under the strongest left-wing influence, though again the pacifist feelings of most of its members were no doubt free from any ulterior political motives. Among the numerous campaigns that the Anti-War League has conducted in collaboration with Zengakuren and similar groups have been those against the testing of nuclear weapons, the depurge of war criminals, the invitation to Japan of American professors, re­ armament, the Self-Defence Forces, and any form of conscription or military training. The campaign against conscription became es­ pecially active in 1953 when there were rumours that the Govern­ ment was considering its introduction.1 The vocal role of Zengakuren, the Japan Teachers* Union, and fro m a U n e s c o s u r v ey carried o u t in 1951-2 (rep o rted in S to e tz e l, Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword). A total o f 231 stu d e n ts b e tw e e n th e ages o f 15 a n d 29 rep lied to th es e q u e s tio n s tak en from th e A llp o r t-G ille s p ie q u e s tio n ­ naire. T h e stu d e n ts w e re d iv id e d as fo llo w s : m e n s tu d e n ts in K y o to (K M ), w o m e n stu d e n ts in K y o to (K W ), m e n a n d w o m e n stu d e n ts in S a p p o ro (ca p ita l o f H o k k a id o ) (S ). T h e r esu lts are e x p r essed in p erce n ta g es, an d th e th ree m o s t c o m m o n rep lies are g iv e n : Q. W h a t are th e tw o w o r st th in g s th a t c o u ld c o n c e iv a b ly h a p p e n to y o u d u rin g y o u r lifetim e?

KM

A.

Q.

KW

S

18 W ar 39 55 Illn e ss 24 14 23 D e a th in fa m ily 0 24 34 "What are th e tw o w o r st th in g s th at are lik ely to h a p p en to y o u in y o u r

lifetime? W ar

KM

KW

S

57

45

35

Illness 12 15 Death in family 2 25 1 Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, p. 77.

12 18

302 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan similar bodies in the students* peace movement has tended to ob­ scure the fact that strong anti-war feelings are by no means restricted to left-wing students. Many of the student delegates who attended the First Japan Student Peace Conference in November 1952, for instance, represented groups that were not associated with Zengakuren or other left-wing bodies; similarly the 1,600 delegates of the All-Japan Student Peace Conference in May 1954 included dele­ gates from the YMCA, Unesco, and religious groups. Yet the fact remains that, however widespread these anti-war feelings may be among Japanese youth, it has in most cases been left-wing organiza­ tions with political objectives, like Zengakuren, the Japan Demo­ cratic Youth Corps, the Anti-War Student League, and the Ocean Association, that have taken the lead when it has come to giving these feelings practical expression. This probably remains the greatest single idealistic appeal for such youth organizations. It is, further­ more, an appeal that right-wing student groups are unable to use. Although the latter may see fit to include an occasional anti-war amulet in their manifestos, their general ideological stand, and in particular their strong support of rearmament, make it impossible for them to appeal to the anti-war sentiment among students.1This powerful issue, in so far as it is used to win the political affiliation of students, has become, and is likely for some time to remain, the monopoly of the left.2 The particular aversion for rearmament and war that is common 1 Right-wing student groups in almost every case favour some form of con­ scription and the build-up of the Defence Forces into a genuine army. Here, as elsewhere, their stand would seem to be utterly at variance with the sentiment of most Japanese youth. Thus the Unesco survey (quoted above) gives the fol­ lowing results : Q. Do you favour military service for men? KM s KW 6 Yes 5 14 No 84 94 89 0 DK 2 2 An investigation conducted in 1956 by Professor Fujiwara and others included a question concerning attitudes to the Defence Forces. (The results of this in­ vestigation were based on answers by 1,771 youths in different parts of the country between the ages of 20 and 35.) By far the largest proportion replied that the Defence Forces should only be used for assisting people in cases of natural calamities (see p. 309 n. 1 below). For details concerning Professor Fujiwara’s investigation see Tosho Shimbun, 1 Jan. 1957. 2 To a rather lesser extent, this represents one of the main weaknesses of rightwing organizations as a whole when it comes to courting popular support. It is only a very exceptional group, like Takeda Kunitarö’s Nichiren Sect Comrades’ Association (p. 203 above) that can in any way hope to appeal to the anti-war sentiment which still prevails in the country as a whole,

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

303

to most Japanese youth is partly, as we have seen, a reaction to the defeat of 1945. The realization of Japan’s military inferiority to the West was among the least important of these reactions. So far as the psychological impact of defeat was concerned, no element of the population would appear to have been so deeply affected as the youth of the country. For them the sudden collapse of the integral national ideal with which they had been indoctrinated since child­ hood, and the discrediting of all the national symbolism that had accompanied this ideal, would appear in many cases to have had an almost traumatic effect. The ‘shattering of the golden chalice’ tend­ ed, for one thing, to destroy their faith in the older generation. In­ evitably Japanese youth blamed their elders, not only for the econo­ mic agony into which the country had been plunged by defeat but for the ideological vacuum and the mental disequilibrium that pre­ vailed after August 1945. This breakdown of respect for the older generation was accompanied by a widespread reaction among youth against principles of control and authority, and also by a general loss of faith in the entire complex of national traditions that had been ex­ ploited by Japan’s rulers in the disastrous crusade to ‘spread the Great Cause throughout the World’. On the one hand the Govern­ ment, and indeed authority of all kind, came to be instinctively mis­ trusted and despised. For was it not in the name of constituted authority that they had been condemned to so many years of futile sacrifice? The entire authoritarian structure, from the Emperor down to the father of the family, from the Prime Minister down to the local policeman, came to be associated with the travails of the past decade; and this reaction undoubtedly underlies the relative lack of respect shown by post-war youth towards their elders, as well as iconoclastic outbursts like the Emperor Incident. On the other hand anything that smacked even vaguely of right-wing nationalism, militarism, or pride in tradition became anathema. For was it not under the influence of these motives that their elders had brought the country to its present pass? The revulsion against the authority of the older generation varied both in strength and in profundity, and was, of course, most pro­ nounced among the generation which was at school at the time of the Surrender and which was accordingly most affected by the rapid and complete reindoctrination of the early post-war years. Yet there are few members of the younger generation in post-war Japan that have

304 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan not been affected by it in one way or another. In some cases it has had the effect of causing young people to turn away in disgust from the social and political doings of their elders and to give themselves over to some form of bored scepticism or to rampant hedonism. In such cases the moral admonitions of the older generation were likely to fall on deaf ears; appeals to ‘duty*, ‘respect*, ‘obligation*, and the traditional Confucian virtues often provoked either indifference or scorn. In the general absence of any religious inhibitions, the way was then open for them to indulge in such forms of licence as their economic status might allow. The increase in juvenile delinquency and the activities of the Sun Tribe were, as we have seen, among the more conspicuous manifestations; and it is, significantly, on the need to combat such symptoms that the conservatives have to a large extent based their demands for a réintroduction of moral education.1 On the other hand the reaction against constituted authority could take the form of strong political consciousness. In such cases young people were inspired by the conviction that, having already once in their lifetimes been disastrously misled by the older genera­ tion, they were now responsible to themselves for ensuring that their traditionally-minded elders did not repeat their follies and make havoc of their hopes for the future. Shiba Yoshie has written, One point that we must recognize as a salient characteristic among post-war Japanese youth and students is a group feeling, which may even be interpreted as a form of class consciousness. This is based on the belief that it was they, the students, who more than any other group had been deceived by the country’s leaders—by those leaders who during the war carried out a policy of absolutist, militaristic control and who, in the end, failed; that it was they, too, who sustained the severest and most lasting wounds as a result of militarist violence, and who underwent the most wretched ordeals. Accordingly, these students are convinced that their own future destiny must at all costs be assured by action springing from among themselves.2 The desire for self-assertion against their elders undoubtedly had an important effect on the political colouring of the post-war student movement. From the beginning, as we have seen, student politics took the form of confrontation with the conservative Government, and the numerous campaigns that have been conducted by the main student movement, from the struggle against the increase in tuition 1 See above, p. 154.

• In Shakaiteki Kinchö, p. 352.

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

305

fees in 1948 to the demonstrations against American policy in Okinawa in 1957, may all be viewed partly as a rebellion against con­ stituted authority. The widespread mistrust of youth for authority in general and for the Government in particular was fired by the efforts of the conser­ vatives to correct the ‘excesses’ of the Occupation and to restore cer­ tain pre-war patterns. The virulent opposition of the student move­ ment to the ‘reverse course’ policy in education and in other fields was part of the general left-wing attack on the Government; but it would be a great over-simplification to dismiss this opposition as be­ ing merely the result of socialist or Communist propaganda. For, in view of the pre-war background that has been examined, politicallyminded university students were bound to be especially resentful of any conservative efforts that savoured even remotely of restoring authoritarian control. As in the case of their anti-war feelings, it would appear that outside left-wing forces exploited and gave direc­ tion to the students’ opposition to the ‘reverse course* rather than that they actually inspired this opposition. The fact that the official counter-reformation seemed to have been greatly abetted, if not actually instigated, by the United States was largely responsible for the rise of anti-American feeling among students. The American Occupation, which had originally been hailed as a liberating force, now appeared to most politically-minded students as the main ally of domestic reaction. This, in turn, served to stimulate nationalist and even xenophobic feelings among many students, feelings that were dramatically displayed during the Memorial Day and May Day riots. The nationalism against which Japanese youth had so virulently reacted in 1945 was, of course, the official brand that had been inculcated upon them since their early childhood by parents, teachers, and other representatives of au­ thority; the revulsion against this form of nationalism was, there­ fore, part of their general stand against tradition. But the main form of nationalism that arose in Japanese universities in the later part of the Occupation was implacably opposed to the traditional centres of conservative power and had as one of its main objects of attack the external force on which those centres seemed to depend, namely the United States of Aunerica. The effect of outside propaganda in stir­ ring up anti-American feelings among students cannot be dismissed, but one of the fundamental motives for these feelings would appear

3o6 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan to have been the genuine belief that the conservative efforts to re­ store the hated pre-war patterns, notably rearmament and conscrip­ tion, were made inevitable by the American alliance. Opposition to this alliance and to its various domestic implications, such as American bases, rearmament, and constitutional revision, has accordingly been the main political aspect of the post-war student movement. The intensification of the cold war served, as we have seen, to stimulate nationalist feelings on the right as well as on the left. Yet so far as the great majority of politically-minded students was con­ cerned the anti-Communist form of nationalism could have little appeal. Nationalism, for most students, was now represented by op­ position to the conservative leaders and to their policy of consigning Japan to a state of semi-independence or ‘semi-colonialism* vis-à-vis the United States.1These facts have often perplexed observers, who compare the immense benefits that post-war Japan has been granted by America with the very cavalier treatment that she has received from Russia. One explanation for the existing state of affairs will have emerged from the above discussion: namely that the antiAmerican form of nationalism represented a challenge to the forces of constituted authority, whereas anti-Communism had all the emo­ tional disadvantages for youth of official conservative approval; again, it was the Americans, not the Russians or the Chinese Com­ munists, who appeared to be instigating the conservatives in their efforts to promote rearmament, conscription, and the other con­ comitant ‘reverse course* policies that were so odious to Japanese students. So far as political parties were concerned, it was of course those of the left, notably the Socialist Party, that represented the type of na­ tionalism which appealed to most students.2 This form of national­ ism was on the one hand opposed to the overwhelmingly proAmerican orientation of Japan’s foreign policy; at the same time it 1 The investigation of Professor Fujiwara and others (p. 302 n. 1 above) elicited the following answers to the question ‘What is the actual state of United States-Japanese relations?' Percentage (a) semi-independent (b) in a state of dependency (r) quasi-colonial (d) completely independent 5 *i 92 (e) D K 2 See below, p. 308 n. 1.

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

307

involved the belief that Japan must become part of Asia, in feeling as well as in geography, and that this would be impossible so long as she pursued an official attitude that critics described as looking up to the United States and down on the Asian continent. A vague ‘third force1type of thinking had a considerable appeal, as we have seen, for Japanese intellectuals and students ; this, too, was to some extent an aspect of anti-American nationalism, and, again, it was the social­ ists and their sympathizers who gave it expression.1 Thus the left wing was able to appeal in numerous different ways to the fears, re­ sentments, and aspirations of politically-conscious youth. The con­ servative party, by its nature, had little chance of exercising such appeal ; for it represented the very forces against which this youth had since 1945 been in rebellion. Still less could the nationalist groups of the extreme right, with their calls for a return to tradition and restoration of authoritarian control, find much common ground with the ideals of post-war youth. Although predominantly left-wing ideals would appear for a number of reasons to have become well entrenched among politi­ cally-minded students, we must not, of course, regard this as being necessarily a permanent state of affairs. Just as the immediate post­ war infatuation for American commodities, both of an idealistic and of a more materialistic nature, was followed by a period of wide­ spread disillusionment, resentment, and anti-Americanism, so the fascination with left-wing slogans and movements, though it no doubt has more solid roots among students than did the earlier fashion, could well be followed by a measure of disenchantment. In­ deed, we have observed signs that this has in fact been happening since 1952, when the strength of Zengakuren began to decline. One of the reasons for this decline was, as we have seen, a growing dis­ illusionment about Communist behaviour both within and outside Japan. The revelations concerning some of Stalin’s egregious activi­ ties inevitably diminished the appeal of the extreme left for the more idealistically inclined students ; and the slaughter in Hungary would suggest to them that there were other forms of imperialism than that 1 The issue of political corruption was also one that the opposition party was able to exploit, even though in many cases it was tarred with the same brush. Conservative corruption aroused particular indignation among Japanese youth, both before and after the war. Referring to the situation in the late 1920*3, Mr. Kodama writes: ‘It was, indeed, nothing else but these corrupt politics which drove youths to the left* (/ Was Defeated, p. 22).

308 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan usually castigated by Zengakuren. A further factor that has miti­ gated radical tendencies among students has been the improvement in economic conditions since 1955. Again the new ‘home consump­ tion* form of nostalgic nationalism that was analysed in an earlier chapter, although it would be less likely to appeal to youth than to other elements of the population, has undoubtedly had some effect in stimulating a limited respect among students for certain tradi­ tional Japanese values and, to this extent, in making them less sus­ ceptible to iconoclastic appeals from the extreme left. A final factor that should be mentioned is that the students entering universities after about 1952 were on the whole too young to have had any direct experience of the nationalist-militarist period, and were accordingly less conscious of any need to rebel against ‘feudalism* or traditional morality. Having been brought up entirely in a period when free­ dom and democracy were respectable and officially accepted ideals, they tended to take these ideas for granted and to adopt a rather less truculent attitude to the established centres of authority. Although there has for some years been a trend, among all except the most dedicated adherents, to move away from the extreme leftist position, this has not in most cases played into the hands of the ex­ treme right. There has been a general lowering in the political tem­ perature rather than any swing from one extreme to the other. In at­ titudes to foreign relations this has been reflected in a more neutral stand as between Russia and America. In domestic politics it takes the form of a more moderate left-wing position.1 Right-wing na­ tionalists, despite their numerous efforts since 1952 to organize an anti-Communist movement among students, have, as we have seen, had even less success here than among the general population. Their 1 A poll taken in November 1957 among 1,741 students of Tokyo University indicates a notable fall in support for the extreme left ; this was, in fact, the first time since the war that less than 10 per cent, of the students at this particular university had named the JCP as their preferred party. The majority still sup­ ported the socialists ; at the same time, there was a slight increase in support for the conservatives : Percentage Men Women io-6 Liberal-Democratic Party 4*6 Socialist Party 50-1 592 40 JCP 59 o-o Others 1*3 DK 32 ‘5 303 i •i No reply 00 (Results given in Shükan Asahi, 5 Jan. 1958, pp. 48-56.)

309 failure has frequently been blamed on lack of funds, publication organs, organizational experience, and leadership. But this is to overlook their fundamental weakness: namely that the right-wing groups, because of their very nature, have been unable to exert an effective appeal on any of the principal issues that since the war have made Japanese students politically conscious and active. The de­ mand for an improvement in economic conditions, the hatred of war and of anything that suggested preparations for a future war, the dis­ trust of established conservative authority and the opposition to any efforts at restoring traditional authoritarian patterns, the resentment over Japan’s dependence on the United States—all these, as we have seen, were the issues that inspired students to political activity and all of them were either contrary or irrelevant to the main demands of the right-wing nationalists.1 The single issue on which the latter had any possibility of exerting an appeal was the purely negative one, namely opposition to Com­ munist depredations and to the role of Zengakuren. Despite the strong influence of left-wing causes among students the fact remains that the great majority was not in sympathy with the Communists,2 Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

1 A few of the results taken at random from Professor Fujiwara's survey (p. 302 n. i above) may suggest how far the general attitude of youth is from that of the traditional right-wing nationalists. It should be observed that this survey covers youth in general (ages from 20 to 35) and that if the test had been con­ ducted among university students only, the results would certainly have been even less sympathetic to right-wing attitudes. Q. To love Japan is to love zvhat? The main replies were ‘the people’ (44-8 per cent.) and ‘the nature’ (26-8 per cent.). Only 5-4 per cent, and 4*5 per cent, answered ‘the traditions’ and ‘the Emperor* respectively. Q. What should be the status of the Emperor? 49-6 per cent, favoured a continuation of the present ‘symbolic’ status; only 6 •7 per cent, believed that he should be restored to his pre-war position. Q. Do you approve of constitutional revision? No 45 9 per cent. Yes 29 o per cent. Q. What should be the role of the Self-Defence Forces? The largest number (48-3 per cent.) said that they should only be used for assistance in case of natural calamities. A mere 4*5 per cent, replied that they should be made like the pre-war forces. Q. Do you think that the recent re-emergence to influence of pre-war and wartime leaders is a good thing? 8 0 per cent, replied that it was a good thing; 47 5 per cent, that it was a bad thing; 8 •2 per cent, that it could not be helped. 2 Even in an institution with such strong left-wing traditions as Tokyo Uni­ versity, we have seen that in 1957 only about 4-0 per cent, supported the Com­ munist Party. Among youth in general, the JCP is undoubtedly the least popular party. This is evidenced, inter aliat by the findings of Professor Fujiwara and others in 1956: [Cont. on p. 310 W

3 io Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan and that a large number resented the overweening attitude of Zengakuren in the universities and its exploitation of youthful idealism for political purposes. In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, this opposition took the form of non-participation in the student movement or of political apathy, rather than of joining conservative anti-Zengakuren groups. For, as a rule, the attitudes that these groups held on such questions as rearmament and constitutional re­ vision were unpalatable to students in general, and not only to the adherents of Zengakuren. The type of anti-Communism preached by the right-wing groups had too many reactionary, pre-war con­ notations to be acceptable to any but a very small minority of stu­ dents. As a result, such recruits as these groups did win to their ranks were often more attracted by the possible material benefits than by any desire to join a right-wing anti-Communist crusade. In the minds of most moderate students, it might be said, the right-wing youth groups were anti-Communist for the wrong motives and with the wrong objectives.

Conclusions In comparing the left-wing and the right-wing student move­ ments we have seen that the former virtually had a clear field until 1952, and that, even thereafter, such issues as inspired students to political activity were in most cases of a kind that would incline them to the left rather than to the right. Both movements appealed to re­ nascent nationalist sentiment, though in very different ways ; both were concerned more with politics than with the everyday welfare of their members ; and both were closely connected with outside groups. Zengakuren became part of the general left-wing opposition, and carried on many of its campaigns in conjunction with the Social­ ists, the Communists, the Japan Teachers’ Union, and the General Council of Labour Unions ; as a member of the International Stu­ dent Federation it was also subject to Communist influence from outside Japan. As we have seen, the fortunes of Zengakuren, at least until about 1956, have to a remarkable extent varied with those of the Q. Which political party do you dislike most? A. The Communist Party (58*4 per cent.), the Liberal-Democratic Party (12*1 per cent.), the Socialist Party (2*2 per cent.). The anti-Communist res­ ponse varied from 49 •7 per cent, among the younger group to 68-5 per cent, among those in the older age-group.

Nationalist Trends in the Student Movement

311

JCP itself. The right-wing student groups, for their part, were sup­ ported by outside conservative elements or actually formed part of general right-wing societies. Their disunity is similar to that which characterizes the outside rightist movement, and can be contrasted with the relatively well-knit organization of Zengakuren. Though both movements depend to a large extent on their outside connexions, the ideas and feelings that inspire allegiance to Zenga­ kuren have so far sprung more spontaneously from among the stu­ dents themselves than have those which attracted them to the right. This is one of the reasons why in the post-war period the left-wing student movement has been a significant force in Japanese politics, whereas the efforts of its opponents have, on the whole, been nuga­ tory. If the right-wing student movement is to exert any effective in­ fluence, it will undoubtedly require considerably more outside sup­ port than it has hitherto received ; in particular, as one of the prin­ cipal mentors of this movement has emphasized, it will require official support from the conservative Government, as well as a fairly thorough-going repression of its left-wing rivals. The future of both wings of the student movement depends, in the last analysis, on economic and political conditions in the country as a whole. Zengakuren will no doubt continue to flourish to the same general extent as its left-wing political allies ; the future of the rightwing student movement will parallel that of the general rightist movement. Yet on the whole it would appear that, while the left wing has an inherent strength resulting from the spontaneous appeal that it exerts among large numbers of students, the right wing still has no more than a potential importance and its future will largely depend on such support as it may receive from the outside.1 1 Cf. ‘The various right-wing student groups are weak in organization, funds, and background, and they also lack anything in the way of clear guiding prin­ ciples. Their future will be determined by the fortunes of general rightist power. Yet we must not overlook the possibility that they may again come to occupy their former important role as the so-called “intellectual hotbeds” of the rightist movement, and as right-wing action groups’ (Keibi Keisatsu, p. 218).

VIII. Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

Patriotic Youth Groups in the Post-War Period In examining the reaction of Japanese youth to the chaos of defeat and its aftermath we have noticed that it frequently took the form of a forceful rejection of traditional values and of respect for authority. In some cases this involved a recourse to the brash hedonism of the so-called Sun Tribe, or to the various types of juvenile criminality practised by the hooligan groups (gurentai) and others ; among stu­ dents one frequent reaction was to plunge into the left-wing political movement. There were other instances, however—relatively rare but none the less significant—in which young people reacted to the economic and ideological dislocation of the post-war years by a pas­ sionate reassertion of traditional loyalties and by virulent opposition to anything that appeared to challenge these loyalties. Such youths formed the rank-and-file membership of the numerous organiza­ tions which sprang up in various parts of Japan since 1946, and which may be described as the ‘tough-minded and strong-armed youth groups’.1 These are organizations, composed predominantly of young men under twenty-five, having traditional patriotic slo­ gans, a truculent or aggressive attitude to various outside groups, and a marked inclination for violence. Such organizations clearly overlap in many respects with those that have appeared in earlier parts of this study. For one thing, young people were predominant among the rank and file of many of the post-war rightist organizations that we have examined.12 In the case of the present groups, however, the common youth of the mem­ bers is one of the main bases for cohesion, even though the leaders 1 ‘Tough-mindcdness’ and an inclination to use forcible means have been posited as general characteristics of right-wing nationalists (see App. V, p. 437 below). The present groups would appear to manifest these tendencies in a more extreme form; they would, therefore, be located higher with respect to the T-factor, though not necessarily more to the right with respect to the R-factor. 2 See p. 67 above.

313 and advisers are usually older men. Again, a readiness to indulge in threats or violence has been found to characterize much of the or­ ganized right wing, notably the numerous anti-Communist groups formed during the Occupation period. Here, however, it is an out­ standing feature of the groups in question. This is not to say that these groups openly advocate violent methods in dealing with their enemies, or even that their principal activities are of a violent na­ ture; but their general approach is such that violence is never very far from the surface. This violence takes numerous forms, and, al­ though it is normally justified by the groups in question on the tra­ ditional grounds that the motives are ‘pure* or ‘sincere’, the fact is that in many cases it merges with outright criminality of a most sor­ did nature, including blackmail, extortion, assault, ‘protection’, and forcible collection of loans. Here, then, we have the seamy side of the right-wing movement. This is also, as we shall see, its most con­ spicuous side ; for the members of these groups, with their penchant for strong-arm methods, have regularly attracted the attention of the law and of the press. The present organizations differ from the right-wing student groups in that the general educational level of their members is much lower. Although in some cases they have sponsored the formation of anti-Communist groups within the universities, very few of the members of the parent groups themselves have any university edu­ cation, and, if anything, the tendency would be to regard ‘book learning’ with a certain suspicion. Their emphasis is overwhelming­ ly on action rather than on theory, and the scope of their activities is very much wider than that of the corresponding student groups. Their approach, as we shall see, is strongly emotional. The various ultra-nationalist ideas and shibboleths are accepted uncritically; the attacks on their enemies—socialists, trade unionists, Koreans, and others—are equally emotional in their nature. The need to escape the loneliness of the surrounding confusion and disintegration by belonging to some in-group that can provide powerful, ready-made ideals and values would appear to be an attraction for many of the members. A further attraction is that these groups can offer a cer­ tain release from social tension by offering their members concrete objects of aggression. In attacking Communists and trade unionists they are able to satisfy the youthful need for self-assertion, in much the same way that is possible for Zengakuren members in their Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

314 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan attacks on the various centres of constituted authority. A virulent type of nationalist xenophobia also serves to release pent-up feelings of aggression; in this case, the favourite object of attack for these groups (corresponding to the Americans for left-wing students) was the Korean minority in Japan. In examining the motives of the tough-minded, strong-armed youth groups, the simple desire for pecuniary gain must not be over­ looked. Although a form of sincere idealism undoubtedly inspires many of the members, Dr. Johnson’s definition of patriotism is fre­ quently applicable to the groups in question. Indeed, one of the main difficulties in examining them is to determine which are moti­ vated by genuine nationalist idealism and which are, in fact, the ‘last refuge of scoundrels’. In the case of the former, questionable methods may be adopted in order to raise funds in pursuit of the nationalist crusade ; for the latter, however, patriotism is no more than a veneer to disguise rascality. The difficulty is increased by the fact that in some cases these two types of motivation can be found side by side within the same organization. Membership of the Japan Sound Youth Association, for instance, ran the whole gamut from traditional right-wing theoreticians through so-called ‘men of chi­ valrous spirit’ (kyökaku) down to outright racketeers (tekiya),1and, 1 The problem of terminology is a hard one when it comes to describing the various figures in criminal and criminal-fringe groups. Though the rate of criminality is no higher than average in Japan, few countries can boast so rich a vocabulary to describe the nuances of status and function in the criminal hier­ archy. There are numerous terms that convey definite shades of meaning to the Japanese, but for which there are no specific English equivalents. Many of these terms came into use in the Edo Period and have strong historical connotations. Shis hi, kyökaku, yakuza, söshi, gorotsuki, and tekiya are among the numerous such words that admit of no simple translation. The literal translation of kyökaku (‘chivalrous man*) must not, for example, lead us to endow these gentlemen with any excess of moral virtue. The kyökaku are, in fact, petty labour bosses, having their roots in feudal traditions and directly exercising a tough control over groups of unskilled workers. Despite their claims that they repre­ sented an old tradition of helping the weak and opposing the strong, the kyökaku co-operated with the police during the Taishö Period in strike-breaking and similar activities, and many of them became local leaders of the militantly anti­ unionist Great Japan National Essence Association (Dai Nihon Kokusui Kai) after the First World War. Similarly, the men who boast the name ‘heroic knights’ (söshi) are, in fact, political bullies or myrmidons who, since early Meiji days, were employed by government officials and politicians to act as body­ guards, to ‘influence’ voters and, when necessary, to offer violence to members of the opposition. The söshi were frequently associated with right-wing societies such as the Kokuryü Kai. The tekiya have since the war probably become the most powerful of all the underworld elements. They, too, have their origins in the feudal period, and are organized on traditional oyabun-kobun lines. Their special field of operations has

315 not surprisingly, the various elements often regarded each other ask­ ance. It is even possible that the different motives might exist within the same person : a young hooligan, for instance, who joined a patrio­ tic youth group might well delude himself into believing that his true purpose was to promote national ideals rather than to indulge his taste for fisticuffs or to line his pockets by dubious methods. With­ out venturing into the realm of psychology, we can simply note that the groups in question should not (as is often done) be glibly dis­ missed as mere bands of unprincipled ruffians. The tough patriotic youth groups, like most ultra-nationalist societies, were organized on the traditional oyabun-kobun basis. In the ‘pledge** of the National Protection Corps, for instance, we find: This Corps is modelled on the National Polity as expressed in the words, ‘One Lord, ten thousand subjects* (ikkun bammin). All the mem­ bers are organized under the Corps leader and have taken a pledge that binds them together in the relationship of parent and child, of elder brother and younger brother.1 The common attitude of unquestioning loyalty to the leader is re­ vealed in ‘Seven Prayers on the Fifth Anniversary of the Corps*, published by the National Martyrs Youth Corps : Our Corps leader is the very Corps itself, he is our anthem, he is our flag. Only when every member of our Corps throughout the land is attached to our leader, communes with him, loves him, will it be possible for our numbers to increase by geometrical progression—tenfold, a hundredfold, a thousandfold.2 In order to understand the form and atmosphere of ultra-nation­ alist groups, and in particular those of the patriotic youth groups, it is essential to take into account the strong emotional bond provided by the oyabun-kobun nexus.3In the absence of this cohesive factor, it Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

been the management, financing, and ‘protection’ of street-stalls, but their scope has been steadily expanded in recent times, and the general American term ‘racketeer’ is probably the best equivalent. For a detailed discussion of the history and actual conditions of the tekiya and similar elements see Iwai Köyü, Böryoku (Tokyo, 1957), pp. 22-34 and passim. 1 Köan Chösa Chö, Skuyö Uyoku Dantai no Shugi Köryö, p. 15. * Fuji yo Okore (‘Look Down in Anger, Mount Fuji !’), publication of the National Martyrs Youth Corps, 1957, p. 78. # A strong oyabun-kobun nexus is not peculiar to the present youth groups and will already have been noticed in the case of many of the early post-war antiCommunist societies (Ch. III). It plays a particularly important part, however,

316 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan is probable that these groups would succumb even more often than they actually do to the numerous weaknesses, centrifugal influences, and legal sanctions that beset them. It would be far beyond the scope of this study to enter into any thorough discussion of the oyabun-kobun system and its complex ramifications, but a few words may be said by way of introduction to our survey of certain post­ war youth groups. In its widest sense, the oyabun-kobun (boss-follower) system is a form of social organization that has existed in almost every part of the world and that is still important in many, if not in most, coun­ tries.1There is little doubt, however, that it is especially conspicuous in Japan, and it is one of the first things to strike the Western ob­ server. One reason is that in Japan the system retains its primitive and feudal characteristics to an unusual degree. In more extreme cases this is revealed by the continuance of such ancient practices as initiation by blood pledges and the so-called oyako sakazuki (bossfollower pledging-cup).*123*In general, the oyabun-kobun system is modelled on the patriarchal type of relationship characteristic of an­ cient communities, this relationship being reinforced by feudal tra­ ditions of a lord-vassal bond. The system is based on a strict ethical code, according to which the oyabun is responsible for protecting his various kobun and for assuring their livelihood, while they in return owe him absolute loyalty and blind obedience.8 In practice it would in the strong-armed youth groups and a brief general discussion of the system is accordingly included in this chapter. 1 On the subject of the oyabun-kobun system, Professor John Pelzel writes: ‘The differences among cultures . . . are very important, but the device itself seems to be pan-human, and to some degree important everywhere, so that I find it impossible to judge it—in and of itself—evil’ (quoted by A. B. Cole, Japanese Society and Politics (Boston, Mass., 1956), pp. 122-3). Certainly no value judge­ ments concerning the oyabun-kobun system are implied in the present discussion. a The oyako-sakazuki ceremony is still practised, for instance, among certain groups of gamblers, miners, and street-stall racketeers (Iwai, in Shakaiteki Kincho). The blood pledge was, of course, a conspicuous aspect of Inoue Nisshö’s pre-war terrorist group, the Blood Pledge Corps. For details concerning the blood-brotherhood ceremony, &c., see Iwai, Böryoku, pp. 43-60. 3 During the oyako-sakazuki pledging ceremony the kobun makes an oath of lifelong loyalty, but the oyabun promises nothing whatsoever in return. Among traditional oaths that are administered during the ceremony, Mr. Iwai quotes the following: ‘Having once drunk from this cup, you will offer your loyalty to our family (ikka) and filial piety to our father {oyabun). You will be prepared to sacrifice your life for our father, even if it means that you must allow your own wife and children to starve.’ ‘You have blood parents of your own, but you must resolve henceforth to devote your whole life to this new calling. Your own parents are important, but once you have entered this new family, you will devote everything to your calling. Above all, you must think of your new father

317 on the whole appear that the sense of loyalty felt by the kohun for their supposed benefactor is a rather stronger force than the sense of obligation or duty felt by the oyabun for his followers.1 The tradi­ tional Confucian precepts concerning loyalty to one’s parents also play an important part, since the groups are based on a family-type nexus. This important characteristic of a fictitious blood relation­ ship is revealed in the nomenclature : oyabun can be translated as ‘he who stands in the relationship of parent’ and kobun as ‘he who stands in the relationship of child’; a similar family-type relationship pro­ duces a strict hierarchy among the various kobun, with the anibun (elder brothers) ranking above the otötobun (younger brothers). References to these family relationships will have been noticed in the pledge of the Defence of the Fatherland Corps.*12 Another salient characteristic of the Japanese form of the bossfollower system lies in the fact that it extends to almost every walk of life. It is, one might say, the rule rather than the exception so far as social relationships in Japan are concerned, and to give a list of the areas in which the system applies in one way or another would be to mention almost every significant field of social activity in the coun­ try.3 It is natural, however, that this vertical system of relationships should retain far more of its force in some of these fields than in Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

(oyabun) as your eternal parent and must be prepared to go through fire and water and sacrifice yourself on his behalf’ (Böryoku, p. 45). 1 Iwai, in Shakaiteki Kinchö, p. 93, also Böryoku, pp. 54-55. * For a description of the strict family system that prevails in certain oyabunkobun groups see Böryoku, pp. 37-56. 3 The following are merely a few scattered examples of the fields in which the oyabun-kobun system operates in one form or another: gambling syndicates, black-market rings, ‘protection* gangs, dance-halls, prostitution; street-stalls; local politics ; right-wing nationalist associations ; coal mines, the building trade, dock workers, casual labour; landlord-tenant relationship in agriculture, forestry, &c. ; professional groups, including medical practitioners and lawyers, also certain college and university faculties; traditional artists; new religious cults; government departments and the military services. Obviously the system varies considerably depending on the field to which it is applied. But in every case it is characterized by the strongly personal nature of the nexus and by the powerful feelings of loyalty, obligation, &c. that bind the followers (juniors) to the leader (superior). This is not to suggest that the cash nexus is lacking—far from it. But the fact remains that the oyabun-kobun relationship, whether it be a group (gumi) engaged in managing local municipal politics or a troupe of Japanese-style dancers or even the bond between a landlord and one of his tenants, possesses a power of cohesion which derives from traditional moral tenets and deeplyingrained patterns of social behaviour, and which cannot be attributed ex­ clusively to motives of pecuniary advantage. The entire Japanese system of employment, in particular the reluctance of employers to dismiss redundant employees, may partly be explained by the prevalence of these incongruous traditional motives within a modem capitalist structure.

318 Nationalism and the Right Wing inJapan others. Among the areas in which it has continued to exert a par­ ticular influence since the war are those of local politics, unskilled labour, and urban gangs, and it is with such groups that the follow­ ing discussion is mainly concerned. In both rural and urban areas political bosses have been among the most conspicuous and influential types of oyabun in the modern period. Almost invariably their political inclinations have been of a conservative or right-wing nature, rather than liberal or leftist. In most cases, they have connexions with the national conservative parties and they are often on close terms with one or more prominent conservative politicians, for whom they can perform valuable ser­ vices such as garnering votes at election time, and from whom in re­ turn they may receive material favours, which may occasionally filter down to the humble kobun. In this respect their role is not un­ like that of political bosses in certain cities of the United States, al­ though the ties that bind them and their followers together are usu­ ally of a rather different order. In some cases the political oyabun are elected to the Diet and, with the backing of their loyal clique of fol­ lowers (habatsu), succeed in securing positions of major importance within the ruling conservative party, thus contributing to the ram­ pant factionalism that besets Japanese politics. Conservative or right-wing tendencies are not limited to political bosses but are also characteristic of oyabun in the field of labour and in the criminal or semi-criminal world. So far as labour bosses are concerned, it is hardly surprising that they should view with a cer­ tain suspicion the socialist and trade union principles that represent a frontal attack on the traditional patriarchal system of coolie labour. In some cases, notably in the coal mines, where they were so well en­ trenched, oyabun have been able to meet the threat of trade union­ ism by actually taking over the unions and becoming union leaders, just as in the United States resourceful labour racketeers were often able to obtain influential positions in local unions. This, needless to say, would not diminish their opposition to the trade union move­ ment itself or to reformist principles in general. That the bosses of gambling syndicates, black-market rings, redlight districts, and the like should in general have pronounced con­ servative or reactionary attitudes might at first sight appear anoma­ lous. There are, however, numerous explanations. In the first place,

319 there is often a very tenuous line of demarcation between the politi­ cal oyabun and those who manage the lucrative criminal-fringe groups. Many of the scandals that besmirch conservative politics in Japan derive precisely from this.1Far more important is the fact that oyabun, whatever may be the particular area in which they are oper­ ating—the management of dock workers, the ‘protection* of streetstalls, or the control of village politics—depend for their position on the preservation of traditional social patterns and realize that the en­ tire basis of their authority is threatened by the left-wing attacks on fixed status. The boss of a gang of hoodlums (gurentai), for example, may on occasion find himself in conflict with the forces of law and order; this, however, will not prevent him from being a passionate supporter of the traditional hierarchy or even of a return to the Em­ peror system. For his own position within his group, or, in the case of a local politician, within his community, depends for its contin­ uity on the preservation of traditional social patterns. Professor Fujiwara cites the case of a post-war oyabun-kobun gang of gamblers (1bakuchiuchi) which regularly closed its illicit meetings with a rous­ ing cry of ‘Long live the Emperor!’2 The oyabun will, for the same reasons, tend to be strongly opposed to any force that strives to alter the existing order, in particular to that group which threatens to de­ stroy it entirely, namely, the Communist Party. Certain oyabun, belonging to a class that included building con­ tractors, master carpenters, small landowners, and others, played a capital role in pre-war days in stimulating patriotic feelings and a sense of national mission among the general population. According to Professor Maruyama this was the social stratum that most ar­ dently supported the policy of regimentation at home and of aggres­ sion abroad.3 It was they who became the heads of village councils, neighbourhood groups, and reservists* associations, and it was largely through them that the Government was able to mobilize the masses. Their intermediary role was analogous to that of the n.c.o.’s in the Imperial Army. While the motive power for national policy came from the military leaders and certain high conservative officials Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

1 This point emerges forcefully in a recent study of Japanese political cor­ ruption and its history, Hori Makoto, Oshoku (Tokyo, 1957). * ‘Tennö Heika banzai!’ (Fujiwara, ‘Nihon Nashionarizumu’, pp. 116-17). * M a ru y a m a, ‘N ih o n F u a sh iz u m u ’, p p . 58- 66, d eals w ith th e role o f th e ‘q u a si­ in te llig e n ts ia ’ as th e m a in so cia l e x p o n e n ts o f F a scism in p re-w a r Japan.

320 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan the social basis was located in this powerful stratum that Professor Maruyama describes as the ‘quasi-intelligentsia’{gijiinterigenshiya).1 Maruyama also points out that it was largely from among this group that the leaders of Fascist and rightist organizations were recruited. It is significant that since early Meiji days right-wing societies had often played an important role in such traditional fields of oyahun enterprise as the organization of dock workers and miners. The Occupation authorities recognized the oyabun-kobun system as being basically inimical to the form of modern democracy that they wished to encourage in Japan. It is possible, however, that they underestimated the scope and the strength of the system; in any event, their efforts to eradicate oyabun-kobun relationships from politics and other fields were certainly among the less successful of the Occupation policies. Indeed, oyabun groupings, far from suffer­ ing any eclipse during the early post-war period, came to flourish more than ever. In the economic field the chaos of the first five post­ war years, with massive unemployment in the cities, a rampant black market, and a boom in the construction of buildings, provided a per­ fect environment for traditional oyabun enterprises. Oyabun-kobun relationships also frequently served as a substitute for the partially disrupted family system, the oyabun himself being ideally suited by tradition for acting as a father-figure. Again, the great increase since the war in the financial requirements of politicians has made the role of the political boss more important than ever.2 1 Maruyama describes the ‘quasi-intelligentsia' as including small factory owners, owners of mills, building contractors, retail-shop owners, master car­ penters, small landowners, primary school teachers, low-grade officials and priests. Within the general pattem of society, this class belongs at the same time to the ruled and to the rulers: ‘From the point of view of the Japanese political and social mechanism as a whole, these persons plainly belong to the class of the ruled. Their living standard is not very high, and their mode of living hardly differs from their subordinates. Nevertheless, they are indisputable rulers, lord­ ing it over their microcosmos with absolute authority. . . Accordingly, the most stubborn opposers to all progressive tendencies, for instance the attempt of the masses to organize themselves in order to gain social and political voice, are found among their group' (ibid. p. 6 1). It is clear that this ‘quasi-intelligentsia*, as described by Professor Maruyama, overlaps at many important points with the oyabun class that we have been examining. Both are the unquestioned rulers in their limited jurisdictions and exert an influence over their followers that goes far beyond their official or overt role. Both tend to be ardent supporters of the social status quo and of authoritarian principles; and both strongly oppose any efforts to alter established patriarchal traditions. * Concerning the political influence of oyabun, SCAP reported in 1947: ‘. . . the Oyabun-Kobun system has extended today into the upper level of political parties, supplying funds to the parties and receiving funds from the

321 The ‘tough-minded* youth groups that sprang up in the post-war period belong, then, to this well-established tradition of boss-fol­ lower societies and were held together by the strong cement of patriarchal loyalty feelings. The leaders were frequently men who had their roots in pre-Surrender ultra-nationalist politics. The head of the Patriotic Youth Committee, for instance, was the son of the great nationalist oyabunt Toyama Mitsuru, and the Defence of the Fatherland Corps was directed by such well-known pre-war figures as Inoue Nisshö and Sagoya Tomeo. The rank-and-file members were inexperienced young men who had grown up during the cha­ otic years of war and defeat. By joining these organizations they received a certain amount of material and moral security, including the comfort of belonging to a family-type unit more powerful than that into which they had been born. In return, they offered their loyalty to the leaders : in most cases they were prepared to act vio­ lently on his orders and even, if necessary, to risk imprisonment. The relative stress given to fund-raising on the one hand and to the pursuit of political ideals on the other varied from group to group. At one extreme were criminal-fringe groups, organized on a quasipatriarchal basis and disguised by nationalist slogans ; at the other were genuine patriotic youth societies that were prepared on occa­ sion to offer violence to political enemies in pursuit of their ideals ; in most cases, of course, the two types overlapped. As in almost all oyabun-kobun groups, the political ideals of these youth societies were reactionary and anti-Communist. The slogans and campaigns were largely of a negative order. A comparison of the programmes of the principal youth groups reveals that the main points that they shared were not positive objectives but certain com­ mon objects of attack. Foremost among these were the Communists and their ‘unpatriotic* allies, the latter term being taken in the wid­ est possible sense. The strong anti-Soviet sentiment shared by these youth groups was not in most cases correlated with any very friendly feelings towards the United States. The Occupation policy of under­ mining traditional ideals and nationalist elements was regularly de­ nounced. Though the American alliance was generally accepted as an unfortunate necessity, the unequal aspects of this alliance were Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

parties. . . . It is said that the various Government Ministries have their own Oyabuns* (memo by G.H.Q., 25 Sept. 1947, quoted by Cole, Japanese Society, p. 121).

322 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan bitterly resented, and on such nationalist issues as the future of Okinawa their attitude was often indistinguishable from that of their left-wing adversaries.1 The next group singled out for attack was the Koreans and other ‘third country* minorities, who, as we have seen, had become a standard scapegoat in rightist circles.2 Denunciation of political corruption was another common theme, and this was frequently ex­ tended to outright rejection of the principles of parliamentary demo­ cracy. The inequities of the existing economic system were also at­ tacked. This, however, was delicate ground, since anti-capitalism could so easily lead young minds to sympathy with the left, and it was frequently emphasized that left-wing doctrines offered no real solution for the prevalent evils. When it came to proposing alterna­ tive solutions, however, a certain vagueness invariably entered the argument. Thus in a recent publication of the National Martyrs Youth Corps, we find a heated attack on the existing state of econo­ mic inequality in which ‘large groups of a people lie suffering in the underground passages of Ueno Station, while others indulge in gluttony and idiotic extravagance*.3 To abolish this great gap be­ tween the poor and the rich ‘universal benevolence* (döjin-shugi) was required, and this must be applied not only to economics, but to morals, literature, and ‘the revolution* itself.4 Unfortunately the concrete details of this admirable panacea are left to the reader’s imagination. So far as positive objectives were concerned, most of the youth groups were agreed on a vague desire for some form of Imperial res­ toration, and especially on the need to reindoctrinate young people with pride in their Emperor. In addition they looked to a resurgence of Japan in Asia, which, though it would not necessarily involve any territorial expansion, would permit the country to regain some of its pre-war prestige and to avoid insults at the hands of countries like South Korea. Finally, all the groups were agreed on the need for re­ armament and constitutional revision. It must be emphasized, how­ ever, that these positive aims invariably took second place to the at­ tacks on existing sources of national danger. Having noted the background and certain general characteristics of the ultra-rightist youth groups, we may now examine three 1 e.g. Fujiyo Okore, pp. 74-75. * See pp. 69-71 above. 3 Fuji yo Okore, p. 10. 4 Ibid. p. 11.

Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

323

organizations of the type that have grown up during the post-war period and that still remain active. The first of these is the Japan Sound Youth Association, which, though it overlaps with the rightwing student movement, is primarily a youth group. The two most conspicuous organizations to be studied are the National Martyrs Youth Corps and the National Protection Corps. Numerous similar organizations sprang up during the Occupation, either inde­ pendently or as branches of the anti-Communist groups that were described in Chapter III ; in most cases they were dissolved by the authorities as soon as their ultra-nationalist proclivities became known. Scores of others were formed during the period of national­ ist revival after 1952, but as a rule their penchant for violence and illegality made their lives short and troubled. The two main groups to be discussed below had their fair share of rascality and violence ; it would appear, however, that patriotic and idealistic motives play­ ed a somewhat larger part in their actuation than they did for most of the minor groups. Although they, too, suffered from constant brushes with the law, they had sufficient cohesiveness to withstand the repeated arrest of many of their members and even of their leaders. Japan Sound Youth Association The Nihon Kensei Kai has its origins in an organization that was founded in March 1946 to help Japanese students who had been re­ patriated from Manchuria and who were in need of lodging and em­ ployment. The aims of the group were expanded to include the re­ lease of war criminals and numerous objectives of a political nature. In August 1948 the Association was inaugurated under its present name, with an original membership of about 650. Headquarters were set up in Tokyo and approximately twenty branches were organized. The Association is headed by Mr. Suetsugu Ichiro, who graduated from Waseda University shortly before the war, and who later became a follower of the nationalist politician, Mr. Nakano Seigö. In 1956 the group claimed a membership of about 10,000, but a more accurate figure would probably be half that number.1A fair 1 Nagamatsu, Ikite iru Uyoku, p. 271. Material concerning the Nihon Kensei Kai is to be found in ibid. pp. 269—71; Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, pp. 138-9; and Köan Chösa Chö, Shuyö Uyoku Dantai no Shugi Köry>ö, pp. 49—50. The name of the group is sometimes incorrectly translated as ‘Japan Reconstruction Youth Association'.

324 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan proportion consists of university students, and this clearly differen­ tiates the group from the others examined in this chapter. The ideal of the Association, as adumbrated in its name, is to restore Japan from the chaos of defeat by building up a morally healthy and patriotic youth. The platform contains five points: (1) We offer ourselves to the emancipation of those who are oppressed, and aspire after friendly co-operation and social justice. (2) We shall struggle for the purge of corrupt politics, for the reform of the ad­ ministration, and for the achievement of complete independence in our fatherland. (3) While enduring poverty, we shall strive to in­ crease the strength of our nation and to create an abundant economy, from which both monopolistic exploitation and class struggle will be banished. (4) We reject all forms of domestic and foreign violence, and pledge our complete loyalty to the ideals and safety of the fatherland. (5) Hand in hand with the other peoples of Asia, we shall strive to realize true world peace.1 These ideals seem unexceptionable enough ; but when we come to examine how they were reflected in the activities of the group, we find that the connexion is, as usual, rather tenuous. The ‘emancipa­ tion of those who are oppressed’, for example, mainly took the form of campaigns for the prompt release of war criminals. The Associa­ tion had two fairly successful publications ; in addition it distributed numerous circulars and leaflets, and engaged in signature-collecting campaigns. Anti-Communism was the main issue through the years and took numerous forms depending on the circumstances. After 1954, for instance, a campaign was organized to counter the Com­ munist group-singing movement by popularizing nationalist songs in which Japanese traditions and patriotism were extolled.2 The ticklish Okinawa question became increasingly important for the Association : its publications regularly demanded a prompt return of sovereignty and also spurred a movement to send Japanese na­ tional flags to Okinawans. Asian nationalism has, in fact, become a major issue for the Association, which has sent delegates to the Asian Students’ Conference and to similar meetings ; on such occa­ sions it would appear that opposition to Western ‘imperialism* even transcends the group’s antipathy to Communism. Great stress is given to the ‘spiritual training* of the members. As part of this effort 1 Quoted in Köan Chösa Chö, Shuyö Uyoku Dantai no Shugi Köryö. 2 See above, p. 298 n. 1.

325 patriotic youths from various parts of the country assembled each year at May Day outside the Imperial Palace, in order to ‘guard the Emperor*. Annual rallies are held, and in August 1957 a special ‘physical and spiritual training course* was organized by the Associa­ tion at Sendai to mark the twelfth anniversary of surrender. The Sound Youth Association, as we have seen, officially rejected all forms of violence. Protestations of peaceful intent by groups of this kind need not always be taken at their face value ; but the present Association has in fact avoided the more pugilistic manifestations of anti-Communism. The head of the Association, Mr. Suetsugu, has gone so far as to deny that his group is right wing.1The word uyoku (right wing) has, primarily because of its frequent connexion with violence, acquired a rather unpleasant connotation, even among out­ spoken ultra-nationalists, and leaders like Mr. Suetsugu are natur­ ally reluctant to have their organizations confused with the more notorious patriotic violence groups (böryokudari). Despite the dis­ claimer, there is no question but that the background, personalities, propaganda, and activities of the Japan Sound Youth Association place it squarely in the ranks of right-wing nationalist groups. Among outside organizations with which the Association main­ tains connexions is Mr. Oyama*s influential anti-Communist re­ armament group, the National Territory Defence Research Associa­ tion.2 Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

National Martyrs Youth Corps T htjunkoku Seinen Tai has probably been the most conspicuous of all the rightist groups in the period after 1952 and, although it may not be the most significant of these organizations, it is certainly the one with which Japanese and foreign observers are most famil­ iar. It is organized on traditional oyabun-kobun lines and represents all the outstanding features of the ‘tough-minded, strong-armed* youth groups. The Corps* parent group was the Committee of Volunteers for a Patriotic Youth Movement (Aikoku Seinen Yûshi Kai). The latter had been formed in June 1952 by Mr. Töyama Hidezö, the second son of the famous ultra-nationalist leader Töyama Mitsuru, and was one of the numerous rightist groups belonging to a pre-war tradi­ tion that sprang up after the Peace Treaty. Its origins may be found 1 Nagamatsu, I kite iru Uyoku, p. 269. X

* See above, pp. 198-9.

326 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan in the Association for Heavenly Action ( Tenkö Kai), a small student group founded by the young Toyama in the early ^ ß o ’s.1 The Patriotic Youth Committee showed promising beginnings but suffered a serious blow when its leader, Mr. Toyama, was killed in a car accident one month after the founding. Leadership then passed into the hands of Mr. Morita Masao, a man in his 40*s, who had been active in China before the war as a military agent. In the following months the Committee appears to have suffered from internal dis­ putes and from the usual financial difficulties that beset these groups. In September it organized a sit-down demonstration out­ side the Foreign Ministry, followed by an attack on a group of people who were applying for passports to visit Communist China. This resulted in a good deal of publicity for the young patriots; it did not, however, improve the practical situation of their committee, and in March of the following year it was temporarily disbanded. Thereafter, its tradition was carried on by the National Martyrs Youth Corps. This Corps had been officially founded in September 1952 as the ‘action group* of the committee. The main impetus for its organiza­ tion was the leftist May Day riots four months earlier and the con­ viction that the JCP*s para-military forces must be counterbalanced by a patriotic youth force. It was led by Mr. Toyoda Kazuo, who was a fairly recent recruit to the rightist movement, only 26 years old when the Corps was started. Mr. Toyoda had entered the Im­ perial Army at the age of 17 and after the war had joined Mr. Toyama Hidezö in his anti-Communist crusade. He appears to be a young man with strong convictions, pronounced ambitions, and an effec­ tive power of leadership. Much of his ire was directed against ‘de­ linquent third-country nationals’, especially Koreans. His indigna­ tion at these people was not limited to polemic, and Mr. Toyoda proudly bears the scar of a sword-cut on his face resulting from a fight in 1951 with ‘third-country nationals* in Yokohama. Despite his relatively short career in the right-wing movement, he is among its most enthusiastic and able leaders. Aspiring to follow in the footsteps of his great hero, Toyama Mitsuru, he devotes him­ self almost entirely to the work of the Corps, and has by now 1 It was the Tenkö Kai that gave refuge to Mr. Inoue Nisshö after the assas­ sination of Baron Dan and the Finance Minister, Mr. Inoue, in the Ketsumei Dan Incident (1932) (Storry, Double Patriots, p. 107 n.).

327 become the most prominent young nationalist leader in post-war Japan. The National Martyrs Youth Corps claims a steadily growing membership, which in 1958 has reached about 50,000.1The authori­ ties, however, consider that actual membership is between 2,000 and 3,000, and that only about 600 of them are really active.2A reason­ able estimate would be between 20,000 and 30,000.3A meeting held at Hibiya Hall, Tokyo, in November 1957 was attended by about 500 members in uniform, in addition to about 1,000 youths from the affiliated student organization. In June 1958 the Corps organized a meeting of 3,000 youths, including representatives of anti-Communist youth groups from South Korea, the Philippines, and other Asian countries. Some of the demonstrations held in Tokyo have been attended by well over 1,000 members, and so far as numerical strength is concerned, it would appear that the Corps has done better than most groups of its kind. Tokyo has remained the centre of acti­ vities. In addition there are some twenty branches in different parts of the country; of these the branch in Niigata (on the Japan Sea) appears to have built up the greatest strength, having evidently en­ joyed some co-operation from the civic authorities; the Corps is also strong in Töhoku and Kyüshü. According to the Corps leader, about ten new applications for membership are received each day; these are carefully examined and only the most suitable young men are accepted into the ranks.4 Promising members are sent from the various branches for training at the Tokyo headquarters and fre­ quently return to their localities as leaders. In certain cases members who for one reason or another have left the Corps form local, un­ official cells and continue the crusade wherever they may be. The average age of membership is between seventeen and twenty. Despite its active sponsorship of a fairly large affiliated student organization,6 the Corps itself has very few members with a uni­ versity education. The majority comes from working-class, farmer, Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

1 Fuji yo Okore. 3 Nagamatsu, I kite iru Uyokut p. 266; Köan Chösa Chô, Shuyô Uyoku kankei Dantai Hyö (Tokyo, 1955), p. 2. 3 This estimate was given to the present writer by an influential supporter of the Corps. Mr. Toyoda, however, informed the writer that official membership throughout the country was 50,000, of whom 10,000 were really active. 4 Asahi Shtmbun, 5 Nov. 1954. A thought test is conducted, and young men who are found to like jazz, mahjong, or romantic films are automatically ex­ cluded from membership; interest in baseball is also viewed askance. 6 See above, pp. 289-90.

328 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan and poorer middle-class families. Few would appear to be benefit­ ing greatly from existing socio-economic conditions in Japan, and economic discontent is undoubtedly one of their important motives in joining a ‘revolutionary* political movement of this kind. Of the members who were living in the Corps dormitory in Tokyo in 1954 many were still attending school; others had such jobs as grocers* assistants and delivery boys ; a small minority was selected for regu­ lar work at the Corps headquarters. The group publishes one of the more successful right-wing magazines, The Youth Movement (Seinen Undo). All fully-fledged members of the Corps sport dark-blue uniforms with an Imperial chrysanthemum crest. In-group feeling is strong, the members being bound together by their unquestioning loyalty to the leader, at whose command they must all be ready to give their lives for the patriotic cause. The feeling of cohesion is strengthened by the existence of supposed enemies on all sides and by the emo­ tional appeal contained, for instance, in the Corps anthem and the Corps motto, ‘The member’s aim is to sacrifice everything for his country*. The desire for a modicum of financial security is a further important factor. Although members receive no actual salary, they are usually given their uniforms free and are provided with food and even cigarettes ; as in most oyabun-kobun groupings, they can expect help at times of illness or other special need. The Corps also maintained a dormitory in Tokyo, where the leader, Mr. Toyoda, resided with his family, and where about forty members were invited to stay on a rotary basis.1A few weeks in the dormitory make a member feel that he belongs to an organized group of young fellow thinkers ; it also puts him under a certain obli­ gation to the Corps, since there is no fee for residence. The dormi­ tory life is spartan, but congenial. Members are strictly forbidden from partaking of the hedonistic pleasures associated with wine and women, a notice to this effect being prominently displayed in the jüdö hall, together with similar spartan admonitions. The day starts with a bugle call at 5 a.m. The young patriots then run round the garden in military formation and wearing nothing but a loin-cloth. This is followed by an hour or so of some traditional pugilistic exer1 Details obtained from Asahi Shimbun, 5 Nov. 1954, and from conversation with Mr. Toyoda. Since 1957 the Corps dormitory has been in a farm outside Tokyo, but the daily routine has not changed appreciably.

329 cise, such as sumo, kendo, orjüdö. Great emphasis is attached to body building and the members are all supposed to weigh at least 150 lb., a substantial amount by Japanese standards. Breakfast is at seven o’clock and afterwards the members disperse for the day, some going to work in the Corps headquarters, others to school, and others to their jobs, which, as we have seen, are usually of a fairly humble nature. When they return to the dormitory in the evening, they en­ gage in games of go or shögi (Japanese chess), sing traditional songs, or practise the Corps anthem. A roll-call is held in the garden and at seven o’clock the members partake of a frugal supper ; the order of ‘Retire !*is given at nine o’clock and all lights are turned out. As will be gathered, the National Martyrs Youth Corps is operat­ ed on comparatively ambitious lines, and finances are bound to pre­ sent a major problem. According to Mr. Toyoda, the group’s budget is between three and four million yen a month (£3,000-^4,000).1 Members are expected to contribute 30 yen monthly (about 6d.) ; committee members and sympathizers are asked to give 100 yen (25.). These contributions, even if they were fully paid up, would clearly not suffice to balance the budget, and substantial financial support must be forthcoming from other quarters. Some of the less savoury activities of which the group is accused would provide one source of income. This, however, is both risky and intermittent. There is no doubt that the Corps depends to an important extent on regular contributions from business men, politicians, and others, who are often invited to become ‘advisers’. Mr. Toyoda himself re­ fers to the director of a certain firm in Tokyo as being an adviser and a contributor.2 Not surprisingly, these individual donors usually prefer to conceal their identity from the public. The Corps is very conscious of the need to integrate its activities with those of the general nationalist movement. ‘We are not lone wolves’, points out a recent publication. ‘We must gradually bring together fellow-thinkers from every cove and hamlet in Japan, in­ cluding all those people who have no power to express their feelings. However much we are oppressed, we shall gather strength like an Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

1 From conversation with Mr. Toyoda. 1 According to Mr. Nagamatsu (Ikite iru Uyoku, p. 267), the net profit of the Beppu Sulphur Mines is regularly contributed to the Corps. The director of these mines would appear to be the gentleman to whom Mr. Toyoda refers when he says *. . .w e receive the income from the mountain that this man owns* (conversation with Mr. Toyoda).

330 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan avalanche. This is the way of racial spirit; this is the way of Japanism.*1The Corps is associated with Mr. Fukuda Soken’s anti-Communist unification movement, but in practice it appears, like most societies of its type, to have a fairly isolated existence. Among prom­ inent nationalist figures with whom Mr. Toyoda maintains contact, but who are not officially connected with the Corps, are Mr. Kodama Yoshio and Mr. Miura Giichi.2 Action plays a proportionately greater role than words for rightwing groups of the type that we are examining. The National Mar­ tyrs Youth Corps has, however, devoted particular effort to ex­ pounding its ideological stand, and it may be worth while examining the latter in some detail, since, despite the usual cloudiness and am­ biguity, it appears to represent the concerns and aspirations that occupy much of rightist youth in post-war Japan. The Corps has five main slogans; at least two of these, it will be noted, smack strongly of German National-Socialism: (i) We look for the estab­ lishment of a new, vigorous, youthful nation, based on a history and a morality that are peculiar to the Japanese people, with the Em­ peror as the central force. (2) Resisting all imperialistic pressure, we aspire to set up without delay an order of national independence and self-defence, and to take the lead in the fight for Asian emancipation and independence. (3) We are determined on the suppression of the treacherous Communist Party and of its fellow-travellers, and on the overthrow of the present ruling classes, whose policy makes Japan a hotbed of Communism, and who are the ruin of our nation ; we look to the establishment of a new order based on the people’s co­ prosperity (minzoku kyöei no shin-chitsujo). (4) Together with all oppressed people, we dedicate ourselves to a reform movement based on social justice and on love for our fellow countrymen; by joining hands with the young people of other Asian countries, we aspire to contribute to the peace of the world. (5) We aim to consoli­ date a group of comrades who, basing themselves on the pride and self-confidence of Japanese youth, are ready to work, to learn, and also to fight for the sake of their fatherland; thus shall we establish the way of youth, which will truly become a model for the entire people.8 1 Fuji yo Okore, p. 81. a See below, p.445. 3 The slogans are quoted from Fujiyo Okore (pp. 88-93), which was published in February 1957. They contain certain significant changes from the earlier set of slogans as given in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 10. Notably, the democratic amulets that

331 In examining the stand of the National Martyrs Youth Corps we find that, as usual, far more attention is given to naming the various existing evils than to describing concrete, positive solutions to the country’s difficulties. The Corps recognized multifarious enemies and was obliged to carry on a many-fronted battle. Foremost, of course, were the Communists : ‘Soviet Russia and the international Communist Party do not partake in the slightest of the true quality of Japan, nay, not even of that of the human race.’*1At the same time, however, the Corps must resolutely oppose both the ‘aggressive poisonous monopoly capitalists’ and the ‘no less shameful ruling classes of the post-war period’.2Japan’s domestic weakness and de­ moralization made it impossible for her to improve her international position. Ever since the war she had been buffeted and insulted by foreign countries, and even a rump state like South Korea was able to defy her with impunity. The United States contrived to under­ mine Japan’s national pride during the Occupation period, and de­ spite the official resumption of independence, Japan had remained a ‘small, weak, semi-colonial country.’3 (The use of the word ‘semi­ colonial* (hanshokuminchi-teki) suggests that left-wing propaganda has had an influence even in these quarters.) The spinelessness of Japan’s present rulers could be judged by the fact that they had made no sincere efforts to regain control over Okinawa, which the Americans continued to hold forcibly in violation of all their muchtrumpeted principles of democracy. History showed, however, that even defeated countries will, if pressed too hard, turn on the world and reassert themselves by force. Look Down in Anger, Mount Fuji! (a recent booklet published by the Corps) cites the case of Germany which, despite all its pacific resolutions after the First World War, turned some fifteen years later to fanatic nationalism and militarism. This was not because of any inherently bellicose quality in the Ger­ mans, but because the country, in order to provide a living for its people, was forced into aggression by international conditions. ‘Japan’s case’, says the booklet ominously, ‘is no different.’4 For Japan to extricate herself from her present morass the first Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

occasionally appeared in the earlier slogans have almost entirely disappeared. For instance, the anti-Communist slogan (no. 3 of the slogans) in its earlier form spoke of a ‘fight for liberty and independence’ ; in its present form it refers to a ‘new order based on the people’s co-prosperity’. 1 Fuji yo Okore, p. 90. 3 Ibid. p. 91. 3 Ibid. p. 80. 4 Ibid. p. 74.

332 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan essential was to regain national pride. One of the greatest crimes of the Occupation was to shake the faith of the Japanese people in their own traditions. Gradually, however, confidence in the country and in the Emperor was being restored among the people. This trend must be encouraged and accelerated. Other countries looked with envy at Japan’s unique imperial institution, and at the Japanese genius for carrying out reforms and even revolutions without over­ throwing their sovereign.1 The Japanese people must realize how fortunate they were to be blessed with such traditions, and must take full pride in their Emperor. In bringing about the national renaissance, the role of Japanese youth would be paramount: Just as our youth acquitted itself so magnificently at the end of the Tokugawa Period in the national rebuilding, so must we young people today carry out a new national rebuilding, with pride in our own whole­ hearted self-reliance and devoting our young blood and quick wits to the task.2 Youth could not carry out the revolution single-handed, but it was youth that must fire the first shot if any revolution was to succeed.3 In this respect it was significant that it should have been ‘we Japan­ ese youth who have first recovered a mighty self-confidence in our racial essence*.4 The Communists and their allies were striving to undermine this confidence, but they were doomed to failure. Though the young patriots of Japan might be poor and powerless now, the future was theirs.6 At home, then, there must be a national renovation or revolution. Abroad Japan must once more assert her position of leadership in the Far East: ‘Though Japan may have been defeated in the war, she remains the foremost nation of Asia.*8 It was thanks to Japan’s selfsacrifice in the Pacific War that the various countries of Asia were finally able to throw off the Western imperialist yoke ; and to this ex­ tent at least, the war might be considered to have been a success. Now it was Japan’s urgent duty to take the lead in guiding these newly-independent countries through the numerous perils that confronted them: ‘If we do not brace ourselves and take action, the people of Asia, who have secured their independence with such difficulty, will again be in danger of falling prey to aggression from 1 Fuji yo Okore, p. 27. 8 Ibid. p. 89. 4 Ibid. p. 29. 6 Ibid. pp. 40-41, 82.

3 Ibid. p. 80. 6 Ibid. p. 90.

Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

333

either of the two great forces in the world.*1 To save the Asian peoples from this fate was the smallest parting gift that Japan could give to her fallen soldiers.2Here again the role of youth would be of crucial importance: *We Japanese youth must hold out inflexibly. First, we must shoulder the responsibility for the revival and the reform of our fatherland. Secondly, we must join hands with the young people of Asia and help to raise them up.*3 As will be gathered from this summary, the statements of the National Martyrs Youth Corps are imbued with a strongly emo­ tional form of idealism. It would, indeed, appear that for groups of this type emotions, as a rule, precede ideals, theories, and even actions. The emotional atmosphere that inspires the National Mar­ tyrs emerges vividly from the Corps anthem, and it may be worth while quoting a few of the verses in order to suggest the type of senti­ mental stimulus to which many young nationalists respond. (The reader should perhaps be warned that the frequent references to weeping are not in any way incompatible with the tough-minded nature of the group; tears in Japan are traditionally a mark of sin­ cerity, rather than of womanly weakness, and the most stout-hearted samurai would not scruple to weep in public under appropriate cir­ cumstances.) Though we are but simple and honest fellows,4 We love Japan... Oh, for our home villages by the distant hills and rivers! Oh, for the flower-like maidens of our land ! Because we are but simple and honest fellows, When we have graduated, We dream of journeying both East and West... Oh, let us weep bitter tears As we pray for our country! Aye, the hot blood bums in our breasts And we seethe with youthful rage ! At the batde-cry of ‘Rebuild the country!* We youthful patriots burst into tears. 1 Ibid. p. 92. 3 Ibid. p. 90. s Ibid. p. 92. 4 ‘Simple and honest fellows’ (guchoku no mono): tactless, uncalculating or even stupid honesty is a quality much prized by Japanists of the traditional school. The true patriot is too sincere to avoid unpleasantness by cloaking the truth; he must, indeed, ‘roar out’ the truth to the world, however disagreeable it may be.

334

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

Confusion reigns in the land! The red traitors are striving to devour us, While the money-mad plutocrats prance about. Is there no one to sustain our country? The foreigners are competing in the armaments race. Ah, our country is ruined and nothing is left but the hills and the rivers. Let us dedicate ourselves and bravely face the danger— Such is the way of the National Martyrs Youth Corps! Friends, let us not strive for worldly advancement, But instead consecrate our youth to the great struggle! We shall sleep in the fields and eat the grass of the hills, And shed the blood of our arms for the righteous cause. The politicians are besmeared with corruption, But let us remain pure ourselves! We young men shall leap forth from among the people And in the words that we roar out to the world will lie the truth ! Let us go forth a million strong, Offering violence to none, and disdaining To tread the path of injustice. Firm as iron are we— Young men of the National Martyrs Youth Corps!1 When we move from this elevated plane to the field of practical activities, the effect is apt to be that of descending from the sublime to the ridiculous or even to the sordid. By way of transition, as it were, a few words may first be said about the specific aims as they are envisaged by the Corps itself. The Main Points of Action, which are listed as follows, serve to throw light on the more concrete objectives of the group : 1. Expulsion of lawless North Koreans from the country. 2. Annihilation of Communist influence, and the establishment of self-defence power. 3. Rejection of unjust laws and unjust taxes. 4. Suppression of amusements and cultural activities that are 1 Quoted in Fuji yo Okore. The words of the anthem are by the poet, Mr. Kikuoka Kuri; the music is by Mr. Kaneko Mitsuo,

335 pernicious to the state, and promotion of a healthy people’s culture. 5. Chastisement of delinquent zaibatsu, political parties, and government officials. 6. Suppression of professors, students, and intellectuals who truckle to the thoughts and schemes of the Bolsheviks. 7. Rejection of comprador capitalism and support for people’s industries. 8. Correction of the class tendencies in labour unions. 9. Aid for war victims, bereaved families, and wounded service­ men. 10. Immediate repatriation of all detainees. 11. Immediate release of ‘war criminals’, who are imprisoned as a result of a legal fiction. 12. Stabilization of livelihood for the workers, the farmers, and the labouring masses. 13. Return of all the lost territories, which have been unreason­ ably and forcibly seized from Japan.1 Despite the tough, aggressive tone of many of these objectives, the Corps frequently stated that it was resolutely opposed to the use of violence in compassing its aims. ‘In no way can we be called the children of violence*, states a recent publication ; and it is even point­ ed out that, should the ultimate disaster occur and the Communists seize power in Japan, the Corps would adopt a Gandhian policy of passive resistance.123Notwithstanding these pacific ideals, the Corps had since its founding suffered constant persecution at the hands of the authorities. This had resulted largely from a misunderstanding of the Corps’ true aims—a misunderstanding encouraged by the ‘fabrications of the plutocratic bourgeois press’, which had describ­ ed the Corps with ‘such loathsome names as a gang of hooligans, ruffians, extortioners and terrorists’.8 Even the designation of the group as ‘right wing’ (uyoku) was a vicious misnomer.4 There had, however, been signs recently that even the police had begun to see Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

1 Quoted in Köan Chösa Chö, Shuyö Uyoku, pp. io - ii . 3 Fuji yo Okore, p. 39. Directly after the categorical rejection of violence, we find the following sentence, from which the title of the publication is taken: ‘Our only fear is that the time may come when our most sacred Mount Fuji will pour forth its anger from within its depths.’ Fuji is, of course, regarded as the sacred symbol of the Japanese nation. 3 Ibid. p. 77. At the same time the press is accused of being under socialistic influence. 4 Asahi Shimbun, 5 Nov. 1954.

336 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan through all this slander and to recognize the true intentions and mo­ tives of the Corps.1 Unfortunately the activities of the Corps all too often belie its pacific protestations.2 One of its first exploits was to participate in the attack on people applying for passports to visit Communist China. The Corps* anti-Korean proclivities emerged in frequent fights with Korean residents, sometimes on quite a large scale and with much shedding of patriotic blood. The Corps was particularly incensed at the fact that Koreans were engaged in smuggling the drug known as philopon, which was having a demoralizing effect on young Japanese people, and many of the early attacks on Koreans (including that in which Mr. Toyoda was wounded) were aimed at suppressing this traffic. Anti-Communist street meetings were organized, and these were not infrequently attended by street fights with left-wing elements. Large anti-leftist demonstrations were also staged on May Day; in May 1954, for instance, 1,000 members marched through the streets of Tokyo in protest against ‘unpatriotic elements*. In November 1954 the largest right-wing demonstration since the war was successfully carried out by the Corps in the heart of Tokyo. In the same year the Corps attracted attention by scatter­ ing anti-socialist handbills over Tokyo from a helicopter. The Corps is active at election time in supporting patriotic candidates and in ex­ posing the socialists as ‘Communists in disguise* ; in the 1958 gener­ al elections many streets in Tokyo were festooned with the Corps* anti-socialist posters and some Corps members (including Mr. Toyoda) were arrested for violation of the election law. In addition the group was frequently reported to be engaged in anti-union activity, notably in breaking picket-lines during strikes ; this, how­ ever, was categorically denied by the Corps itself. Charges that the Corps was indulging in such traditional rightist methods of fund­ raising as loan-recovery, ‘protection*, intimidation, and forcible ex­ tortion, were even more indignantly rejected; it was pointed out by Mr. Toyoda that these charges often resulted from the actions of people who had posed as Corps members, but who were in fact common crooks.8 1Fuji yo Okore, p. 77. This was written in 1957 after the mass raids and arrests carried out by the police against the Corps. a For examples of the Corps’ less admirable activities see Yükan Yomiuri, 10 July 1953; Shakai Taimusu, 29 Sept. 1953; Yomturi Shimbun, 22 Oct. 1953; Yükan Asahi, 8 Feb. 1954. 3 Asahi Shimbun, 5 Nov. 1954.

337 Despite all its protestations of pure motives and peaceful methods the Corps was among the chief objects of the police round-up of strong-armed groups that began in 1954. In the course of the 1954 raids the police arrested a total of 10,000 members of criminal or criminal-fringe gurentai (hooligan) groups, of which a considerable number were youths with nationalistic right-wing beliefs or preten­ sions.1 Several members of the Corps were arrested in February 1954 on charges of having inflicted severe bodily injury on trade union demonstrators.12 In December 1954 150 armed police raided the headquarters and dormitory of the National Martyrs Youth Corps. Three of the leaders, including Mr. Toyoda, were arrested on charges of assault, intimidation, and carrying out illegal investi­ gations, and for a time the Corps went underground.3*8The unfavour­ able publicity that attended these and similar arrests, as well as the practical inconvenience involved, appears since 1954 to have moved the Corps to concentrate attention on its pacific aspirations. Many of the more turbulent young members were sent on a rotation basis (about fifty at a time) to the self-sustaining farm that the Corps now operates outside Tokyo. Members from different parts of the coun­ try also come to this farm for periods of training. Here their pro­ pensity for violence and street fighting is sublimated into the man­ agement of pigs and similar bucolic pursuits. The young men are at Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

1 People arrested in 1954 belonged to the following groups: gambling groups 2,544, racketeers (tekiya) 1,750, gangs of hooligans and delinquents (gurentai) 10,962, blackmail newspaper operators (gorotsuki shimbun) 183, company racketeers (kaisha goro) 468, others 18,512; total arrests: 34,419. Total arrests in 1956 had risen to 78,582. The main charges were: inflicting bodily injury (33,572), intimidation (11,692), and assault (10,890). The above figures are quoted from official police records given in Iwai, Böryoku, pp. 5, 7. Unfortun­ ately it has been impossible to find any reliable statistics concerning what per­ centage of the above suspects belonged to groups with right-wing slogans. The strong-armed youth groups discussed in the present chapter correspond largely to the gurentai, although the latter term is no longer necessarily restricted to young people. In 1956 1,335 members of gurentai groups were arrested in Tokyo. Of these 85 per cent, were between the ages of 15 and 20. The leaders, however, were in most cases considerably older (ibid. p. 10). * Uniformed members of the Corps attacked the unionists, who were striking outside a certain company in Tokyo, and inflicted severe sword-wounds on three of them. In this case, there were reports that the Corps had acted in collusion with the company concerned, presumably for a financial consideration ( Yükan Asahi, 8 Feb. 1954). 8 The specific offence that led to the arrests was that the Corps had enticed a certain company director, Mr. Ohira, to its headquarters, accused him of not paying a debt, demanded money from him, and inflicted a beating that required a fortnight’s hospitalization ; similar patriotic treatment was visited on two other business men ( Yoniiuri Shimbun, 16 Dec. 1954).

338 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan the same time given patriotic indoctrination, trained in traditional military arts, and taught about the importance of agricultural selfsufficiency. The operation of this farm appears to have been one of the Corps* more successful ventures to date. National Protection Corps and National Protection Youth Corps Though a pre-war atmosphere strongly pervades the right-wing nationalist groups that we have been considering, most of them have made at least a minimal concession to the developments that occur­ red in Japan after 1945, both in the composition of their leadership and in the wording of their slogans. The National Protection Corps (Gokokudan), however, was organized as a classical pre-war type of ultra-rightist group, and seemed quite impervious to the post-war changes. So far as leadership was concerned, it belonged on the one hand to the sanguinary tradition of the Blood Pledge Corps. Most of the top figures, as we shall see, were directly involved in one or an­ other of the pre-war ‘incidents’, and two of them had demonstrated their patriotism in the early 1930*5 by assassinating prominent political figures. The name of the group itself is apparently taken from the National Protection Hall (Gokoku Do), where the Blood Pledge Corps had its origins in the early 1930*5. At the same time the National Protection Corps descended from the pre-war tradi­ tion of strong-armed anti-labour and anti-Bolshevik groups, based on a firm oyabun-kobun basis, and notably exemplified by the Great Japan National Essence Association.1 The leading members of the 1 The Great Japan National Essence Association (Dai Nihon Kokusui Kai) was founded in 1919 with the encouragement of Mr. Tokonami, the Minister of Home Affairs in the Hara Cabinet, and with the strong backing of Mr. Toyama Mitsuru. It was organized on oyabun-kobim lines as a reaction to the growing influence of labour unions. Its most active members were builders’ foremen and labour contractors (the so-called kyökaku discussed on p. 314 n. 1 above) and its principal aim was to mobilize ‘patriotic’ elements in order to preserve in­ dustrial discipline. At one time the Association claimed to have a million members, but 60,000 is probably closer to the actual number. The Kokusui Kai represents one important strand in the pre-war rightist movement, and it introduced an unprecedented degree of violence into that movement. Its real objectives were of a far more restricted nature than those of most of the later ultra-nationalist groups. As Mr. Storry writes, 'It represented a straightforward, militant reaction on the part of large employers and politicians to the menace of “dangerous thoughts” , particularly in industry. Here was no fresh or dynamic interpretation of nationalism, but only the stale ideas of an old-fashioned paternalism, sup­ ported by the rowdy methods of the kyökaku ’ (Double Patriots, p. 29). Despite strong official support from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the police, and some high-ranking military, the National Essence Association never fulfilled its early promise and it soon split into two opposing groups. Its most notable activities

339 Corps therefore represented an interesting combination of repre­ sentatives of the so-called pure right-wing (junsei uyoku), ‘patriotic* labour bosses (kyökaku)t and racketeers (itekiya). Even by right-wing standards the group was singularly unwilling to truckle to the spirit of the age. Its heterogeneous leadership had little in common except fierce opposition to the existing state of affairs. Many of them, it would seem, had learned nothing and forgotten nothing since their heyday of assassination in the early 1930*5 ; rowdiness and terrorism were accordingly never far from the surface. The Corps was inaugurated in Tokyo on the Emperor’s birthday (29 April) in 1954. The leader was the ultra-nationalist Nichiren priest, Mr. Inoue Nisshö (b.1886), the organizer of the pre-war Blood Pledge Corps. Mr. Inoue’s uncompromising and fanatic ap­ proach, as well as his admitted proclivity to terrorism and assassina­ tion, had tended to exclude him from the more moderate type of nationalist societies that arose after 1952. The organization of the National Protection Corps was his post-war comeback. By this time, however, Mr. Inoue was almost in his 70*s and the main burden of operating the new group fell on younger men. Among these were Mr. Sagoya Tomeo (b.1910),1 who had distinguished himself in 1930 by firing the shot that killed the Prime Minister, Mr. Hamaguchi ; the Secretary was Mr. Konuma Tadashi (b.1911), a member of the Blood Pledge Corps, who had assassinated the Finance Minis­ ter, Mr. Inoue, in 1932; the head of the Special Duty Division was the former navy lieutenant, Mr. Mikami Taku, who had been in­ volved in the 15 May (1932) Incident.*12 Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

were frequent efforts at strike-breaking and a pitched battle in Nara Prefecture against a large organization of Eta outcasts. In the post-war period the main personality associated with the group was the late Mr. Umezu Kambei, director of the pre-war Kantö National Essence Association. It appears that in February 1952 he was given some official encouragement to form a new anti-Communist labour group in the general tradition of the National Essence Association; according to Mr. Nagamatsu (Ikite iru Uyoku, pp. 258-60), this was the real genesis of the National Protection Corps, although in the event no official sup­ port was forthcoming. 1 See below, p. 449. 2 Mr. Mikami, who was elected to the Upper House in 1953 with a heavy majority, resigned his position in the Corps in the following year, but continued to give his support (ibid.). Other leaders of the National Protection Corps were Mr. Furuuchi Eiji, second in command of the Blood Pledge Corps, who was scheduled to kill Mr. Ikeda Seihin (director of the Mitsui Bank) in 1932 according to Inoue’s ‘one man, one killing’ plan; also Mr. Kojima Gennö and Mr. Matsugi Yoshikatsu, both members of the Blood Pledge Corps and of numerous other ultra-nationalist societies.

340 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Belonging as it did to a pre-war tradition of extreme nationalist cliques, the Corps had little interest in exerting mass appeal or in building up substantial numerical support. The leaders aimed at consolidating a small group of single-minded, loyal patriots. Mem­ bership appears to have been between 200 and 300 at the most, with the centre of activities on Tokyo and with six national branches. About thirty kohun members were normally on duty at the head­ quarters, together with one or more of the leaders. Applicants were scrutinized with the greatest care and often rejected. Most of the members were young men in their 20’s belonging to the type of youth that has been discussed earlier in this chapter. The oyabunkobun nexus appears to have been unusually strong. In the autumn of 1954 the Corps sponsored a subsidiary student organization known as the National Protection Youth Corps (Gokoku Seinen Tai) to combat prevalent left-wing tendencies in uni­ versities. The early membership was small and appears to have been largely concentrated in Chüö University, Tokyo.1 The members were trained in kendo and other pugilistic arts, which were no doubt considered to be more useful than polemic in convincing leftist stu­ dents of the error of their ways. Later the youth corps broke off from the parent group and became an independent organization. Mem­ bership was expanded to include non-students ; thereafter violence came to play an increasing part in the group’s activities, and mem­ bers were frequently arrested on charges of assault and battery, ex­ tortion, intimidation, illegal possession of arms, and armed robbery; the young patriots were also charged with two rather unpleasant cases of having inflicted torture on their victims and with one case of murdering a recalcitrant customer in a bar.2In June 1957 the police charged that ‘the National Protection Youth Corps, which purports to be a patriotic rightist organization, is a vicious gang of hoodlums reeking crime and violence in the name of patriotism*.3 The leaders of the National Protection Corps were, as may be judged, men of action rather than of words, and theorizing played 1 Battistini, Postwar Student Struggle, p. 137. 2 Details may be found in Iwai, Böryoku, p. 133. 3Asahi Evening News, 11 June 1957. In January 1958 the deputy commander of the Gokoku Seinen Tai was arrested on suspicion of having intimidated Mrs. Inumata Koo, the wife of a Socialist member of the Diet; Mr. Inumata had made some unpalatable remarks in the Diet about the Prime Minister, Mr. Kishi, concerning alleged gifts of money and of a gold-buckled belt to the Corps in question (Iwai, Böryoku, p. 137).

Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups 341 an ever less important part for them than for most groups of this type. Their platform was steeped in the traditional and obscurantist pre-war spirit, and could have been drafted just as well in 1932 as in 1954: (1) This Corps has been founded by a group of samurai who have all suffered at the present sight of our peerless national polity (sekai muhi no kokutai) being destroyed for egoistic motives and for supposed benefits at home and abroad. This polity, which is un­ paralleled in the world, is nothing other than the spirit of Japan (Nihon seishin), which represents the only way for the creation and the development of mankind. In order to protect the national polity, we have taken counsel together and have compacted this league.1 (2) This Corps is the epitome of the national polity of Japan ; in order to carry out a thorough-going reform of the national system, organi­ zation, and structure, based on the spirit of Japan, we shall use every sort of method and device. (3) This Corps, basing itself on the spirit of Japan, aims to strengthen the resolution of those who are deter­ mined to fight both physically and spiritually for the protection of our fatherland ; we shall struggle for racial independence, for a purge within our country, and for a reform of the national structure; we offer ourselves to the task of liberating the masses who are being tyrannized by the overweening despotism of influential people, of plutocracy and of violence. Thus shall we deal with the emergency that confronts our fatherland.2 The Corps clearly envisages itself not as the nucleus of a popular movement but as a well-knit band of patriotic storm-troopers who are prepared to fight for the ‘liberation of the masses*. This fight has taken numerous forms, but, until now at least, the Corps has made no attempt at actually assassinating any of the country’s leaders. Such illegal actions as the group has perpetrated appear to have been motivated by the perennial need for funds rather than by any deter­ mination to purge the country of noxious elements. The members of the National Protection Corps were dressed in military caps and khaki uniforms with blue arm-bands. Their num­ bers were insufficient for any effective mass demonstrations, but they frequently toured Tokyo in lorries distributing verbal and writ­ ten propaganda. At the time of the great brawls in the Diet in 1954 1 The word used for ‘compacting this league’ (ketsumei) has the same pro­ nunciation as that for ‘blood brotherhood’. 8 Quoted in Köan Chösa Chö, Shuyö Uyoku Dantai no Shugi Köryö, pp. 14-15. Y

342 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan members of the Corps personally visited those responsible and warned them against any repetition of their unseemly behaviour.1 More recently members of the youth corps have been visiting publishers and others whom they accused of disseminating un­ patriotic material. Such visits belong to a well-established pre-war tradition according to which strong-armed patriots would demand payment by way of apology from publishers who had committed such peccadillos as making typographical errors in the names of im­ perial personages.2In 1957 a successful book concerning some of the less attractive doings of the Japanese military police in China was re­ moved from circulation following a visit to the publisher by mem­ bers of the National Protection Youth Corps. A book dealing with the rape of Chinese women by Japanese troops in China was simi­ larly put out of circulation on the ‘advice* of the Corps. A cinema company which was producing a film about the Crown Prince was visited by young members and charged with commercializing the Imperial family; in this case the company issued a letter of apology. In most of these and similar instances the newspapers suggested that apology to the young patriots had taken a more concrete form than that of words. The police invariably investigated the cases on sus­ picion of intimidation or extortion, but as a rule the supposed vic­ tims appear to have been too frightened to give any concrete in­ formation.8Not surprisingly, the suggestion that these visits to pub­ lishers might be inspired by mercenary motives was categorically denied by the Corps : ‘We will continue to give warnings in the fu­ ture whenever necessity arises. But one thing we must make clear is that we never received any money from those publishers.’4 Again we are confronted with the problem of funds, and again it would appear that the chief contributors have wished to remain anonymous.6 When questioned in 1957 about who supported the 1 Details in Nagamatsu, Ikite iru Uyoku, pp. 260-1. 1 Murata Kiyoaki, *A Reign of Terror—Police Probe Alleged Extortion of Publishers, Film Firms by Rightists', Japan Times, 8 June 1957. 8 This is the view of the police officer in charge of the investigations, as re­ ported by Mr. Murata, ibid. 4 Ibid. In certain cases the patriotic warnings took a rude form. In 1956, for example, members of the rather inappropriately named Righteous Men’s Party (Gijin Tö), one of the smaller strong-armed nationalist groups, attacked a his­ torical writer for having written something that appeared insulting to the Im­ perial family; he was slashed in the head with a dagger and badly wounded. Members of the Righteous Men’s Party were later arrested en masse for engaging in widespread theft and intimidation (Asahi Shimbun, 11 Nov. 1957). 6 Newspaper and magazine articles and books on the post-war right-wing

343 Corps, Mr. Sagoya is reported to have replied : ‘Some business inter­ ests, including a few taxi companies. There are also a number of politicians who give us both financial and moral support. But by agreement I can’t disclose their names.’*1 One of the more original methods of fund-raising used by the Corps was to arrange a lecture tour by Mr. Inoue and Mr. Sagoya. In return for a 1,000 yen (£1) admission charge (500 yen in country districts), these two gentlemen described the sanguinary coups that they had organized in the 1930’s. Despite the rather unusual nature of these talks, the tour does not appear to have been a great financial success. In the absence both of popular support and of backing by some influential element corresponding to the pre-war military, the Na­ tional Protection Corps could not afford to be too squeamish about its methods for raising funds. Accordingly it became one of the main targets during the police round-up of strong-arm groups that began in 1954. A number of the leading members was arrested in October 1954 ; in 195 5 Mr. Sagoya and others were imprisoned for blackmail. Early in 1956 the police staged a further raid on the Corps head­ quarters, as a result of which almost all the remaining leaders, in­ cluding Mr. Inoue himself, were arrested on charges of terrorism, blackmail, kidnapping, and on the even less endearing suspicion of having extorted funds from an orphanage and a sanatorium.2 Shortly thereafter all the important leaders of the Corps, except Mr. Inoue, were in custody; at this stage, Mr. Inoue saw fit to resign his position and Mr. Sagoya succeeded him as Corps leader. The exposure of the various misdeeds committed by the National Protection Corps and similar patriotic groups caused considerable indignation among the general public. One result was to convince the more respectable right-wing organizations, notably those con­ nected with the National Salvation unification movement, that they could no longer afford to be associated with the blatant strongTough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

organizations frequently mention names of financial contributors, usually fairly prominent business men. These reports, however, often appear to be in the nature of rumour or surmise. Particularly in the case of the strong-armed groups, the donors are usually careful to conceal their identity. There is little definite information on this subject, and it has seemed best to exclude names of supposed financial supporters from this chapter. 1 Murata, in Japan Times, 8 June 1957. * Asahi Shimbun, 11 June 1957. For further details concerning the activities of the National Protection Corps see Iwai, Böryoku, pp. 133 ff.

344 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan armed groups. Many of the more moderate nationalists had from the beginning looked askance at the Corps because of its close con­ nexions with outright kyökaku and tekiya. With the mass arrests their hand was strengthened: when in May 1955 the Corps applied to rejoin the unification movement (from which it had seceded in 1954), it was refused admission. The repeated visitations of the police were a serious blow to the National Protection Corps. Prison life itself was no such shattering experience for the leaders, many of whom had spent a considerable time in custody during the 1930*8, and who (much like the Com­ munists) viewed occasional incarceration as the inevitable fate of those who were dedicated to the true cause. It was difficult, how­ ever, for the Corps to continue its activities when almost all the lead­ ing members were held by the police, and when the Corps itself had been so thoroughly discredited in the public eye. In early 1956 it was widely thought that the Corps had, for all intents and purposes, been dissolved. This, however, was perhaps to underestimate both the force of the oyabun-kobun nexus and the resilience and adaptability of nationalist groups in general. In March of that year the Corps made public a draft of its new platform. This revealed a surprisingly moderate stand and rigorously denied any intentions of violence. Among other things, the new platform supported the JapaneseSoviet negotiations, and opposed an unqualified pro-American antiSoviet (shimbei-hanso) policy. Coming from the most extreme of all the important post-war rightist groups, this represented a definite swing to the left, and, as such, was widely criticized by other na­ tionalist groups. Whether this new departure has in any way helped to rehabilitate the group, and whether it has been accompanied by any real change in activities, is extremely doubtful.1 It does, how­ ever, provide an interesting example of the ideological flexibility that these organizations possess, despite the seemingly doctrinaire nature of their stand. 1 It may be noteworthy that Mr. Sagoya was again arrested in September 1956 on charges of having extorted large sums of money from various Tokyo firms as a contribution for a fund for the reconstruction of the right wing (Mainichi Shimbun, 2 Oct. 1956). Professor Kinoshita points out that the member who drafted Gokokudan’s new moderate programme was obliged to resign from the group as a result of widespread criticism within the rightist movement and that in 1957 the tone of the Corps’ pronouncements began to revert to its earlier fanaticism (‘Uyoku Undo no Tenshin Keitai’, in Oka Yoshitake, ed., Gendai Nihon no Seiji Katei, Tokyo, 1958).

Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups 345 Significance of Patriotic Youth Groups The tough-minded, strong-armed youth groups have, as we have seen, been by far the most conspicuous right-wing organizations in the post-war period. This does not mean that they are politically the most significant representatives of the right wing—the Harmony Party and the Chrysanthemum Flag Comrades* Association, for ex­ ample, would seem to have considerably more political weight—but that their activities have been of a type that have repeatedly caught the notice of the newspapers and thereby of the vast newspaper­ reading public of Japan. In particular the National Martyrs Youth Corps and the National Protection Corps have become names with which almost every reader in the country is familiar. These two groups have been especially notorious since the autumn of 1954, when they became a target of numerous police raids. Unfortunately for the groups in question, and indeed for the en­ tire right-wing movement, the aspect of their activities to which the public*s attention was mainly called was not their fight against leftwing subversion or their crusade for the preservation of national traditions, but what appeared to be certain rather sordid efforts at filling their coffers. In pre-war days, too, it had been the violent and illegal doings of the double patriots that had attracted most notice. But the exploits of the 1930*8, however brutal and sanguinary, had as a rule not been motivated primarily by any desire for pecuniary profit. This cannot be said for many of the post-war activities of the strong-arm patriots. In a country where ‘sincerity* of motive still plays so important a part in judging people’s actions this is a crucial difference. In the early post-war period, as we have seen, right-wing national­ ist elements were extremely unpopular among the Japanese public, mainly because they constituted one very blatant aspect of the entire pattern that had been discredited by defeat. With the development of ‘reverse course* trends and with the limited revival of nationalist feeling, this particular cause for hostility was bound to diminish ; we have, in fact, seen from election results after 1952 that right-wing and even pre-war military elements have once more begun to com­ mand a certain amount of popular support. What has since the Oc­ cupation served to an important extent to discredit rightist groups and to prevent them from gaining in strength has been their associa­ tion in the public mind with mercenary illegality. For this the well-

346

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

publicized activities of the strong-armed youth groups are largely responsible. The frequent arrests that took place after 1954 were regularly reported under such headlines as ‘Police round up gang of racketeers and ultra-nationalists* or ‘Right-wing group of gangsters indicted on charges of assault*. As a result a large part of the Japanese public—by no means only people of left-wing persuasion—inevit­ ably come to regard rightist groups {uyoku dantai) as being merely one part of the extensive criminal world. Genuinely idealistic as­ sociations accordingly tended to be lumped together with notorious strong-armed youth groups under the general heading of ‘gangs of ruffians* (böryokudan). The relatively respectable nationalist socie­ ties are, as we have noticed, well aware of this danger, and have in many cases dissociated themselves from the more notorious group­ ings (the ‘spurious right wing*, ese-uyoku, as they call them), or have tried to make the latter mend their ways.1 The identification of uyoku (right wing) with violence has, however, become well en­ grained in the public mind and seems to give the word an unsavoury connotation which will be hard to remove. We need not be too sur­ prised, therefore, when extremist groups like the National Martyrs Youth Corps and the Sound Youth Association indignantly deny that they belong to the right wing. Although it has been the strong-arm groups that have attracted the overwhelming attention of the police, the press, and the general public,2it would, of course, be a gross over-simplification to dismiss the entire right-wing movement in post-war Japan as being merely a congeries of criminal or semi-criminal elements masquerading under a patriotic front. To do so would, indeed, be hopelessly to underestimate the importance and potential influence of right-wing nationalist elements, which, as we have seen in the course of this study, are sometimes marked by honest idealism and a strong, if odd, sense of political direction. Even the tough-minded, strong-armed youth groups, despite their propensity for violence, and despite the fact that at certain points they undoubtedly overlap with the 1 In the ‘Memorandum Analysing Internal Conditions* (Kokunai Jösei Bunseki Oboegaki), issued in May 1955 by the National Salvation People’s General Federation, the strong-armed rightist groups are described as follows: ‘groups of people who advance similar arguments to our own, but whose real actions show them to be spurious imitations’ (quoted in Iwai, Böryoku, P- 135)-

2 The attention of the law-enforcement agencies is focused almost entirely on the criminal and criminal-fringe groups. See above, p. 162 n. 2.

Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups 347 criminal fringe, often reveal a form of idealism and a seriously held political creed. The political importance of these groups at the moment is, to be sure, negligible. The youth groups have had even less success than other nationalist movements in winning popular support. Their association with violence and the frequent indictment of their mem­ bers on charges of raising funds by sordid methods have earned them the scorn of a large part of the public, including many people who might otherwise have sympathized with their youthful patriot­ ism. In particular they have failed to attract to their ranks, or even to influence, any significant segment of post-war youth. With their strong reactionary stand and their mouthing of pre-war slogans that contain not the slightest freshness, charm, or even meaning for most young Japanese people today, these groups show no sign of being able to counterbalance the attraction exerted by their enemies on the left. They are, it would seem, hopelessly out of touch with the gener­ al mood and aspirations of present-day youth ; and the obscurantist form of nationalism that they propound is unlikely to win them any great support among young people in the foreseeable future. Apart from this, they are on the whole even more isolated than other right-wing groups from the centres of power in the country. It is true that they occasionally receive support from business inter­ ests and also maintain certain connexions with political oyabun. But in most cases the attentions that these groups receive from the authorities have, as we have seen, been of a far less encouraging na­ ture. Most of all they suffer from the absence of any dynamic power in the country, corresponding to the young-officer movement in the pre-war period, to which they can look for moral or material sup­ port. In studying these youth groups one is constantly struck by the feeling that, despite all the publicity that they attract, they exist politically in a virtual vacuum. When all this has been said, the fact remains that the toughminded, strong-armed youth groups represent a significant political potential. Numbers and popular support were never of great im­ portance for groups of this type in pre-war days, and it would not appear that their post-war counterparts, despite occasional refer­ ences to the need for increased membership, are genuinely con­ cerned with forming any mass following. Now, as before the war, the oyahun-kohun structure of these groups produces an exclusive,

348 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan isolated quality that militates against any large membership.1 It was small, closely-knit groups of fanatic youths, disgusted with the ex­ cessive Westernization of the country, with the corruption of parlia­ mentary politics, and with the harsh injustices of the existing econo­ mic system which, with virtually no support from the public, spear­ headed the various successful and abortive incidents of the early i930*s, and which thus helped to create a political atmosphere that led to an official policy of ultra-nationalism. A list2of the patriots of the Blood Pledge Corps who were scheduled to carry out the politi­ cal assassinations of 1932 is perhaps most striking for the youth of the participants : Intended Victim Intended Assassin (and his age) General director of the operation: Mr. Inoue Nisshö (46) Mr. Takura (25) Baron Wakatsuki (Prime Minister, 1931) Mr. Tanaka (24) Mr. Inukai (Prime Minister, 1931-2) Mr. Kukida (23) Baron Shidehara (Foreign Minister) Mr. Konuma (21) Mr. Inoue (Finance Minister) Mr. Tanaka (24) Mr. Tokonami (Minister of Railways) Mr. Ikebukuro (25) Prince Saionji (elder statesman) Prince Tokugawa (President of the House of Mr. Suda (25) Peers) Count Makino (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) Mr. Yotsumoto (25) Mr. Ikeda (director of the Mitsui Bank) Mr. Furuuchi (32) Mr. Hishinuma (22) Baron Dan (director of the Mitsui Co.) If the nationalist movement in post-war Japan consisted entirely of gatherings of old diehards, muttering outworn slogans and va­ guely groping for some past state of affairs that never really existed, we might well be justified in dismissing it as some interesting, but unimportant, political curiosity. In fact, however, it has succeeded in recruiting to its ranks numbers of devoted and single-minded youths who are filled with much the same indignation at the evils which they recognize on all sides as were their precursors some 1 As Mr. Iwai points out, the typical oyabun-kobun group in the underworld has fifty or less members. Even a very active group like the Far East Gang (Kyokutö Gumi) has less than 200 members. In case of emergency, the groups can usually call on strong numerical support from affiliated bodies scattered in various districts, but for normal purposes too large membership merely tends to make the groups unwieldy. In most cases this applies also to oyabun-kobun groups of the patriotic variety (Iwai, Böryoku, pp. 40-41). ‘ Nagamatsu, /kite iru Uyoku, pp. 125-6. Ajnong the pre-war Corps members mentioned here, the following were prominent in the post-war National Pro­ tection Corps: Mr. Inoue, Mr. Konuma, Mr. Furuuchi.

349 twenty-five years ago. As in pre-war days, the burden of these young men’s mission is a negative one, namely to purge the country of all the leftist and other corrupting forces that are preventing its re­ covery. The general post-war break-up of the integral national ideal would not appear to lessen the determination of the young patriots, who now, as before, conceive their mission largely in terms of ‘puri­ fying* the country, rather than of constructing some new political system. Their aim, as we have seen, is the ‘salvation* or ‘protection* of the fatherland rather than its leadership. The absence of any dy­ namic force in the country, such as the pre-war young officers, to whom they can attach themselves is, to be sure, a handicap ; but it is worth remembering that the attitude of the military to the youth groups was rather ambiguous at the best of times, and that the main nationalist incidents within Japan prior to February 1936 were in fact carried out almost entirely by the civilians. The post-war youth groups have in most cases officially rejected violence as a means of achieving their goals. We have observed, how­ ever, that disclaimers of violence have not as a rule precluded its practice. Until now the latter has been directed largely to securing funds. It is by no means inconceivable, however, that in case of real political or economic crisis in Japan, members of the patriotic youth groups may once more use their strong arms to help rid the country of its supposed enemies. Should this happen, the results will be different, but may well be as far-reaching as those that followed the assassinations of the early 1930*8. Tough-Minded and Strong-Armed Youth Groups

IX. Can Right-Wing Nationalist Groups Unite? The Need for Unification Of the numerous differences that distinguish the development of right-wing nationalist movements in Europe and in Japan, the most striking are that, whereas in countries like Italy and Germany a single united party under the inspiration of some strong leader was able to win political power with the help of popular, mass support, in Japan the nationalist organizations were never able to present a common front or to win any significant backing from the people, and were in the end ignominiously suppressed by the very nationalist-militarist Government that they had unwittingly helped to bring to power. In Germany, for instance, Hitler, starting from the most modest position, succeeded over a period of some ten years in uniting ex­ treme nationalist elements from the entire country into a single organization, which won increasing support from the population, and which already in 1930 had by legal, parliamentary means be­ come the biggest party in the Reichstag. The Japanese nationalist groups, on the other hand, failed entirely to inspire any real mass movement; nor could they ever obtain any significant number of votes in elections. Until they were finally dissolved by General Töjö on the eve of the Pacific War, they continued for the most part as small, rather isolated cliques, indulging in much heady propa­ ganda and a good deal of violence, and precariously dependent for their support on those elements in the army or elsewhere that were willing to use them temporarily as an auxiliary force to mobilize the people for the national mission. In terms of their lofty pretensions the pre-war ‘double patriots’ remained absurdly weak. Though they succeeded by their words and deeds in helping to produce conditions that led to the final collapse of parliamentary democracy and to the rise of militarist totalitarianism, they never remotely attained the strength necessary to compass their ambitions for carrying out a Showa Restoration. In a period of economic crisis and international

Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite? 351 tension like that of the 1930% fanatic nationalist propaganda, politi­ cal assassination, and threats of coup d’état could all serve effectively to undermine democratic institutions, whose roots in Japan were so shallow, and at the same time to encourage a truculent foreign policy and military aggression; but in order to win power and to accom­ plish anything in the way of a genuine revolution it was essential that the nationalist groups should present a united political front, which might attract at least a measure of popular backing. The need for such unification was clearly recognized by many of the pre-war nationalists, and numerous attempts were made after 1931 to bring together at least some of the hundreds of scattered right-wing societies. These efforts were stimulated by the increased prestige and self-confidence that accrued to the militant right-wing in Japan from the Manchurian Incident. The first and most con­ spicuous of the right-wing unification movements was the Nikkyö (All-Japan Patriots’ Joint Struggle Association), which was formed in 1931 as a loose confederation of Dr. ökawa Shümei’s Activist Society (Köchi Sha), Mr. Toyama Mitsuru’s groups, including the Amur River Association, and numerous smaller bodies.1The man­ aging director of the confederation was the nationalist theoretician, Mr. Tsukui Tatsuo, and the guiding spirit was Dr. ökawa Shümei. Their immediate aim appears to have been to organize a united right-wing front to carry out the coup d’état which was being plan­ ned at the time and which later became known as the March Inci­ dent. Their slogans, accordingly, had a distinctly revolutionary ring: Imperial ownership of all property, establishment of the Em­ peror system, destruction of capitalism, achievement of revolution under the Imperial flag.2 Shortly after its formation the various organizations participating in Nikkyö marched through the streets of Tokyo carrying their respective party banners. According to Mr. Kodama Yoshio, who participated in the movement as a member of one of the constituent rightist societies (the Radical Patriotic Workers’ League), this was the first demonstration of its kind to be carried out by nationalists.3 Great stress was put on the mass nature of the new movement. Prominent among the slogans were ‘Carry out the Imperial flag revolution through the enormous might of the 1 The full name was Zen-Nihon Aikokusha Kyödö Tösö Kyögikai (Storry, Double Patriots, pp. 72-73). 8 Ibid. 3 Kodama, I WasDefeated, pp. 26-29.

352 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan patriotic masses!* and ‘Down with the privileged classes!*1 Mr. Kodama quotes one of the many inspiring songs that were sung dur­ ing the parade: Daily we submit to hypocrisy and lies, While national honour lingering dies. Arise ye! Oh Patriots, arise! Onward we march, defying death! Come prison bars! Come gory death!2 The authorities were quick to take alarm at the radical nature of the new movement. As Mr. Kodama writes, ‘Hand in hand with the change in the target of our attacks from Communism to the ruling class, the vigilance of the police authorities towards our groups became as strict as that maintained over the leftists.*3 Mr. Ko­ dama himself was arrested for distributing Nikkyö handbills in the Imperial Diet, and served one of his numerous terms in police custody. It was not repression by the authorities that balked Nikkyö's aim of winning mass support for a united right-wing front. The im­ mediate setback was the failure of the March Incident.4The under­ lying difficulty, however, was the perennial one of personal disagree­ ments between the nationalist leaders themselves. It was this factor that mainly accounted for the collapse of the successive efforts at unification that took place during the following years. Although at first it looked as though the right-wing movement might possibly develop into a unified national force backed by popular support,6the leaders were in the event never able to reconcile their ideological and personal differences long enough to present a common front; nor did any single leader arise with a sufficiently strong personality to bring the scattered groups together and to lead the people in a com­ mon nationalist crusade. In the event, the individual leaders clung 1 Kodama, I Was Defeated, pp. 26-29. * Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 See below, pp. 430-1. Mr. Storry suggests that one motive for the formation of Nikkyö was the feeling of Toyama Mitsuru and others who were not directly in­ volved in the preparations for the 1931 coup d’état that it would be prudent to be united with ökawa and Tsukui, since these men would become extremely in­ fluential if their plans for a Showa Restoration succeeded (Double Patriots, p. 73). With the failure of the March coup, of course, such motives disappeared, and this was probably the direct reason for the subsequent inanition of Nikkyö. 6 A Japanese Foreign Ministry paper in 1935 advanced this possibility: ‘The Right-wing movement, which once appeared to be a heroic [i.e. élite] movement, changed its aspect and gradually became a national movement having its main support in the public’ (Uyoku Undô no Gensei, quoted in ibid. p. 73).

353 jealously to their positions within their respective groups, and the various attempts at unification were never more than temporary amalgamations, some of which lasted only for a few weeks.1 Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

Post-War Efforts at Unification In the post-war period, with right-wing nationalist groups de­ prived of their main traditional centres of support and hopelessly out of tune with the prevailing mood of the country, the need to pool their material and ideological resources was more imperative than ever. The Occupation policy, however, and in particular the purge regulations, made any practical attempt at unification impossible, and served over a period of some six years to aggravate the scat­ tered, isolated characteristic of rightist societies in Japan. The first overt attempt at unification came towards the end of the Occupation and was organized by Mr. Fukuda Soken, the editor of the AntiCommunist News (Bökyö Shimbun)2 In November 1951 this news1 Examples of such short-lived efforts at unification are the Aikoku Undo Itchi Kyögikai (1933) and the Nigatsu K ai (1936). The latter was named after the February Incident, but collapsed almost immediately for lack of army support (ibid. pp. 147-8, 201). One of the more lasting unification efforts was the Great Japan Production Party, which was founded in June 1931 under the influence of Mr. Uchida Ryöhei. The Osaka branch of the Amur River Association was the nucleus of the Production Party, and, although headquarters were moved to Tokyo later in that year, the nationalist and labour groups adhering to the party came largely from western Japan. The Production Party declined as a political force after the failure of the Heaven-Sent Soldiers’ Unit Incident in 1933, but even thereafter it had a fairly large membership (ibid. p. 144). It is only in a rather narrow sense, however, that this group can be considered to be part of the right-wing nationalist unification movement. The Production Party con­ sisted to a large extent of Kansai elements belonging to the old traditions of the Amur River Association, and it did little to emulate Nikkyö in trying to bring together nationalist groups of varying complexions from different parts of the country. As Mr. Storry points out, ‘in essence the Seisanto was a modernised version of the old Kokuryükaï (ibid. p. 74). The Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusan Kai), which was founded in October 1940 under the direction of Prince Konoe to take the place of the recently disbanded political parties, can certainly not be included among the right-wing unification efforts. In the beginning there were signs that it might develop in the direction of a mass National-Socialist totalitarian party on the European model, but in April 1941 the Yokusan Kai reverted to its original form of being an officially inspired and officially supported association of in­ fluential men, representing almost every aspect of society. It was formed from the top, instead of from below, and was almost entirely lacking in mass appeal. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association became increasingly bureaucratic and conservative, and ultra-nationalists like Akao Bin were among its most vocal critics (ibid. pp. 279-82). ■The Bökyö Shimbun is the pioneer of post-war anti-Communist newspapers. It was first published in November 1948, and from the outset took a fanatic stand against all varieties of left-wing thinking (not only Communism). It is

354 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan paper sponsored a meeting in Tokyo of 150 representatives of right­ ist and anti-Communist societies. Those attending included Mr. Tsukui Tatsuo (a leading figure in the pre-war unification move­ ment), Mr. Homma Kenichirö, Mr. Sagoya Tomeo, and other wellknown right-wing personalities. Resolutions were passed calling for a united nationalist front and for a co-ordinated anti-Communist movement; among the more specific objectives were the revival of National Foundation Day, the repeal of the educational reforms, the immediate release of war criminals, the scrapping of the ‘for­ eign* Constitution, the establishment of a thought police (shisô Keisatsu)ythe purge of foreign influences from the Japanese langu­ age, and the closing of allpachinko parlours.1This meeting was the first of a series of semi-annual Patriots* Friendship Rallies (Aikokusha Konshinkai), which have continued until the present day. These rallies are organized by the Anti-Communist News Society (Bökyö Shimbun Sha). The latter, which is itself usually listed as one of the post-war right-wing organizations, has a peculiarly small membership even by the standards of such groups: in 1955 it was officially stated to have six branches and nine members.*12Although many of the original supporters have drifted away (some of them, like Mr. Tsukui, to become the target of scathing attacks by the Society itself), the Patriots* Friendship Rallies appear to have been fairly successful and well attended.3 So far as unifying rightist groups into a popular movement is concerned, however, Mr. Fukuda*s efforts have borne little fruit. His general stand has been too uncompromisingly reactionary to build up any wide common front; by his resolute opposition to anything that smacks of ‘pro­ gressive* thinking or socialism he has made it impossible to win mass support. For in Japan, as in Europe, mass support will never be forthcoming unless the leaders in question make at least a pretence of being concerned with the improvement of the people’s daily interesting to note that Mr. Fukuda’s original ventures in the field of journalism were of a rather different nature: according to Professor Kinoshita, he was an editor in the early 1920’s of the left-wing paper March Forzvard! (Susume) (Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, p. 194). The switch from extreme left to extreme right is, as we have seen, a commonplace event in Japan. 1 Köan Chösa Chö, Shuyö Uyoku Dantai no Shugi Köryö, pp. 56-60. 2 Ibid. A National Diet Library report published in 1957 gives 132 members. 3 Among the participating groups have been Mr. Akao Bin’s Great Japan Patriot’s Party, the National Party, the Chrysanthemum Flag Comrades’ Association; the National Martyrs Youth Corps, the Great Japan Production Party, and the Great East Institute have also maintained friendly connexions.

355 economic conditions ; sheer reaction, however inspiringly presented, is never sufficient. The Anti-Communist News Society was obdur­ ately opposed to any form of socialist reform and insisted that Japan must be reconstructed solely according to the philosophy of the Imperial Way (ködö-shugi). The preamble to the Society’s slogans sets the entire tone: ‘We look to the establishment of the Japanese national polity, based on an Imperial line unbroken for ages eternal and on harmony between the Sovereign and his subjects, and we shall enunciate this polity both at home and abroad.’1 Such ringing phrases might still produce some form of conditioned reflex among diehard nationalists of the old school, but in 1951 they had lost their power to inspire any large section of the population. Something more up to date and concrete than this was needed to wean the mass of the population from political apathy or from the appeals of the left. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Fukuda’s group should in sub­ sequent years have abandoned any real ambition for becoming the nucleus of a united right-wing popular movement. The Patriots’ Friendship Rallies have not led to the formation of any effective common front, but have simply provided an opportunity for certain types of reactionary nationalists to exchange their obscurantist views. A far more hopeful effort at unification was that which started in 1952 immediately after Japan’s resumption of independence, and which culminated two years later in the formation of the National Salvation People’s General Federation. In April 1952, the month in which Japan became independent, a group of some twenty pre-war nationalist leaders, who for the past seven years had languished in the doldrums of the purge, formed a small society which was to be the spring-board for their rather belated return to political activity. This was the East Wind Association ( Tôfü K a i\ and among the par­ ticipants were such luminaries as Inoue Nisshö, ökawa Shümei, Tsukui Tatsuo, and Akao Bin. Most of these men had been active in the various pre-war efforts at unification, and they no doubt realized that the need to present some sort of united front was even greater now than before, if they were to rehabilitate themselves in the uncongenial atmosphere of post-war Japan. During the following months they made contact with right-wing leaders in different parts of the country, and in March 1953 a meeting was held in Tokyo on the occasion of the funeral ceremonies for the noted pre-war Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

1 Köan Chösa Chö, Shuyô Uyoku Dantai no Shugi Köryö, p. 56.

356 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan terrorist, Mr. MaedaTorao.1 Some 200 prominent nationalists at­ tended these ceremonies and it was decided to press forward with the movement for a nation-wide unification of nationalist groups, in obedience to the dying wishes of Mr. Maeda.2Among those present was the navy ex-lieutenant Mr. Mikami Taku, who had taken a prominent part in the 15 May (1932) Incident. He chose this occa­ sion to announce his intention of running as a candidate in the forth­ coming Upper House elections. This marked the beginning of a concerted effort by right-wing nationalist leaders to help Mr. Mikami in his campaign. Although he was not elected, he received about 89,000 votes, an unprecedentedly large number for a post-war candidate who was best known for his earlier ultra-nationalist as­ sociations. The unexpected success of Mr. Mikami and of some other right-wing nationalist candidates in the 1953 elections did much to spur efforts for the unification movement. If the multi­ farious rightist societies could only submerge their dissensions and present the people with a common nationalist platform, it looked as though they might enjoy even greater success in subsequent elec­ tions and eventually become a significant force in the political pat­ tern. The first of a series of regional right-wing unification rallies was held in June 1953, shortly after the elections. The place chosen for the meeting was Mito, a small town north-east of Tokyo, which is well known for its traditional nationalist associations.3 This is not without significance, since almost all the 180 representatives at the conference (the so-called National Salvation Consultative Confer­ ence) belonged to traditional pre-war nationalist groups from the 1 See below, p. 445. 2 Keibi Keisatsu, p. 179. Funeral and memorial services for prominent rightwing personalities, like Mr. Maeda Torao, Mr. Uchida Ryöhei, and Toyama Mitsuru, have provided some of the best occasions in the post-war period for reunions of rightists representing different nationalist societies. The numbers attending such services have increased steadily. Over 3,000 people were present at the funeral rites for Dr. Okawa Shûmei in February 1958. 3 In the middle of the seventeenth century Tokugawa Mitsukuni founded a famous school of nationalist historians in Mito. They concentrated their studies on national literature, religion, &c. and did much to pave the way intellectually for the Imperial restoration two centuries later. Among recent nationalist figures who have centred their operations in Mito were Mr. Inoue Nisshö, whose temple near Mito was the planning headquarters for the Blood Pledge Corps conspiracy, and Mr. Tachibana Kösaburö, whose Institute for Local Patriotism and other co-operative communities have all been located in Mito, and who planned the 15 May coup there. The only other town in Japan with equally strong nationalist associations is Fukuoka in Kyüshü (p. 78 n. 2 above).

357 Kantö (East Japan) area;1there was hardly a single prominent rep­ resentative of the post-war right wing. The Mito conference paved the way for further regional conferences in different parts of the country, with the aim of co-ordinating scattered right-wing group­ ings into a single nationalist movement. One month later about 250 representatives participated in a unification rally in Tokyo ; this was followed by a meeting in Osaka in September, attended by 150 rep­ resentatives of nationalist groups from western Japan.2 During the course of the following year similar regional rallies were held at Fukuoka, Nagoya, Yokohama, Okayama, and elsewhere. Wellknown nationalist personalities from Tokyo usually attended these local meetings and impressed the representatives with the urgent need to form a united front. Bombastic resolutions and grandilo­ quent manifestos, all liberally sprinkled with traditional nationalist amulets, were issued in great quantity. A single example will suffice: The meeting that we open today in this city of Osaka . . . signifies that we are lighting an epoch-making fire—the sacred fire of a nation-wide co-operative structure, cutting across all lines and unprecedented in the history of patriotic movements.. . . We vow to dedicate ourselves to the hope which we have cherished all these years—the hope that we may realize a Shöwa Restoration. All ye in every part of this land whose hearts burn fiercely with love for your country and who look with anguish on her present plight, step forth and join in this historic and sacred task ! It is our most earnest hope that we may strengthen our united battlefront and push forward, joined firmly hand in hand, along the great road of victory, with colours flying and drums beating.3 Apart from such heady fare, which was supplemented by much sing­ ing of patriotic songs and much bowing in the direction of the Imperial Palace and the Grand Shrines at Isé, the conferences Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

1 Among the prominent nationalists attending the Mito conference were Tachibana Kösaburö, Ökawa Shûmei, Inoue Nisshö, Homma Kenichirö, Amano Tatsuo, Kageyama Masaharu, Mikami Taku, Konuma Tadashi, Sagoya Tomeo, and Furuuchi Eiji. As will be seen, these include most of the surviving 'big names* (kao) from the 1930’s and an important number of those who had directed the various terrorist incidents. * It was at the Osaka meeting (the All-Kansai Patriots’ Battle-Line Confer­ ence) that detailed plans were drawn up for the formation of a National Salva­ tion Movement (Kyûkoku Undo), which later became known as the National Salvation People’s General Federation. The well-known rightist leader from western Japan Mr. Yoshida Masuzö took a prominent part in the Osaka con­ ference. a Quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 198. Z

358 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan provided a good opportunity for useful personal contact between local nationalist leaders and helped to give the participants the feel­ ing that they were no mere voices in the wilderness but members of a potentially important political movement. These local activities led to the formation in May 1954 of the National Salvation People’s General Federation (Kyukoku Kokumin Sörengö), the most important post-war effort at unification. This Federation is a loose amalgamation of various nationalist societies throughout Japan.1Although its aim is to provide a unified front for all ‘patriotic* groupings in the country, it is in fact composed almost entirely of societies that have their roots in the pre-war period, and even many of these, as we shall see, have seceded. Headquarters were established in Tokyo, and membership in 1957 was about 4,ooo.2 The official head of Sörengö was Mr. ömori Sögen, who had also acted as chairman of the Mito conference ; he was not one of the very well-known figures in the right-wing movement but, given the factional nature of Japanese politics, this no doubt made him more acceptable than some prominent leader of a specific group with his own established following. The Secretary-General was Mr. Naka­ mura Takeshi, a participant in the pre-war Divine Soldiers* Unit Incident. The annual budget was about 5 million yen (about £5,000); funds were obtained from individual contributors and from membership dues, which were fixed at the rather substantial amount of 1,000 yen (£1) monthly.3 The group publishes a maga­ zine, The National Salvation Movement (Kyükoku Undo), three times a month. The main aim of the Sörengö was to find sufficient common ground for the scattered patriotic groups to form a united nationalist movement. Since 1952 these groups had been engaging in open and energetic activities ; yet it was clear to all but the most bemused ad­ herents that their influence in the general political scheme was al­ most nil. As in pre-war days there were three main ways by which they could assert themselves : one was to resort to direct action by means of assassination, coups, and other forms of terrorism; the 1 Among the groups originally associated with the Sörengö unification move­ ment were Mr. Tomatsu Keigi’s Great Conciliation Party, Mr. Yoshida Masuzö’s War Comrades’ Association, the National Essence Mass Party, the National Protection Corps, the Great Japan Production Party, the Great East Institute, the Anti-Bolshevik Corps, and the National Martyrs Youth Corps. 2 Nat. Diet Library (31 Jan. 1957). 3 For details see Nagamatsu, Ikite tru Uyoku, pp. 239-44.

359 second was to ally themselves with individuals or groups who held, or who were likely to obtain, positions of power in the state ; the third method was to build up popular support in the country at large and thus to achieve influence through the legitimate means of parlia­ mentary democracy. It was the third of these courses that the pro­ moters of Sörengö officially espoused. In this they were, as we have seen, inspired by the fair success of their efforts in the 1953 election campaign. If a really effective union of nationalist societies could be formed, their influence in subsequent elections might become very considerable. This was, officially at least, viewed as a better method of effecting the desired changes, such as constitutional revision, than the pre-war type of terrorism. The possibility of having recourse to the latter, however, never seems to have been entirely absent from the minds of the Sörengö leaders, and emerges rather ingenuously in such statements as the following: ‘So long as we are not contem­ plating a coup d’etat, there is no other way for us to get rid of the slave-constitution (dorei-kempo) than by this political movement of ours.’1 One of the principal motives for unification, then, was the realiza­ tion that, unless the nationalist groups were able to present a com­ mon front, they had no chance at all of winning any significant sup­ port from the people. This point was stressed during almost all the conferences and rallies that preceded the formation of Sörengö. The Second National Salvation Consultative Conference, for example, which was held in Tokyo in July 1953, put the case as follows : Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

Our aim is to mobilize a popular political force—a pure force aimed at independence and reform. In order to prepare the way for this, we must carry out ideological and organizational unification by means of liaison between our various groups and movements, by holding conferences and by promoting common action; and we must push forward towards a union of all our subordinate organizations. We must base our movement firmly among the masses and the peasantry, and we must consolidate a practical nation-wide structure, having its nucleus in the youth of the country.2 Similarly, at the Osaka Conference two months later, a statement on future tactics began by saying: ‘What our patriotic groups have lacked hitherto has been a mass characteristic and a social 1 Quoted in ibid. p. 11.

2 Quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 178.

360 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan characteristic. From now on, we must never neglect these two as­ pects in carrying out our movement.’1 The other great post-war motive for unification was the aspiration to counterbalance, and in the end to overwhelm, the powerful leftwing elements in the country. Although in 1953 the left wing was far from being a unified force, the two Socialist parties, the giant Söhyö labour federation, and other massive organizations like Zengakuren could in fact frequently pool their strength and thus exert immense political influence. When common issues were involved, such as anti-war demonstrations, the demand for a return of Okinawa, or election campaigns, they were often able to act in concert with the Communist Party, despite the numerous differences that separated them. This form of working co-operation was clearly something that the right-wing nationalist groups must emulate if they were ever to win any mass popular support. Apart from this, there were signs in 1953 that the two Socialist parties would eventually be reconsolidated and would thus greatly enhance the strength of the left wing. In 1953, too, the Communists were beginning to realize that their independent strong-arm tactics had done them far more harm than good, and thereafter the JCP once again began to broaden its base by pursuing a more moderate policy and by working for a popu­ lar front of ‘progressive* forces. All these were potent reasons for the rightist groups to submerge their traditional differences and to pre­ sent the people with a common front. When it came to assessing their chances of winning popular sup­ port, the sponsors of the unification movement, while admitting that for the moment the left-wing forces were far better organized and far more vocal, insisted that the overwhelming majority of the Japan­ ese people was in fact sympathetic with the type of ideals advanced by the National Salvation movement, and that once the patriotic groups were able to present a united front, they would win immense popular support in the country.2 The need to come closer to the people was constantly being stressed by speakers at the unification rallies. The essential aim of Sörengö (although this ambition was not necessarily shared by all the participants) was to be the nucleus of a mass political party that would eventually become a major power in the country. Once such a party had developed, Sörengö itself would 1 Quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 197. 2 Nagamatsu, I kite iru Uyoku, p. 240.

361 automatically dissolve.1 The electoral successes of nationalist can­ didates in 1953 and 1954 were an important factor in convincing the leaders of the unification movement that their ambition of securing popular backing was by no means quixotic. To develop as a united, popular movement, it was essential to win support from the youth of the country. In the words of two of the distinguished leaders, ‘It is the adherence of young people that will guarantee the autonomy of the unification movement*.1 2 When it came to influencing post-war youth, however, the right-wing lead­ ers were faced with certain ineluctable difficulties. These have al­ ready been examined in an earlier chapter, and can here be sum­ marized by saying that almost all the main issues which inspired young people to political interest or activity in the post-war period were of a type that would attract them to the left, and that as a rule the form of nationalism advanced by the right wing produced an attitude of indifference, if not actual repugnance. The leaders of the National Salvation movement were in many cases sufficiently aware of the prevalent climate of opinion to avoid some of the more blatantly reactionary appeals traditionally associat­ ed with nationalist organizations. As we have seen, they eschewed the use of violence associated with pre-war nationalism, and they also did their best to avoid the unpopular label of uyoku (‘right wing*);3 instead they emphasized such slogans as ‘independence*, ‘reform*, and ‘creation of a new political force’, which might have some appeal for post-war youth. All too often, however, these efforts at appearing up to date were vitiated by irrepressible old diehards like Mr. Tachibana Kösaburö who, blithely disregarding the ‘new look* of the post-war right wing, would make such pronouncements as ‘The Emperor as the central force, immutable for all ages—such is the common prayer that unites us, such is our fundamental thought*.4 A comparison of the many prolix manifestos, resolutions, and Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

1 Ibid.

* Mr. Tachibana Kösaburö and Mr. Homma Kenichirö, quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 184. 3 Nagamatsu, Ikite iru Uyoku, p. 11. The ‘Analysis of Domestic Conditions’ (Kokunai Jösei Bunseki) issued by Sörengö at the time of its 1955 congress, contains the following statement : ‘People call us “ right wing” , but we ourselves are not proud of this name (isagiyoshi to sezu) and aim to divest ourselves of right-wing tendencies.. .* (quoted by Kinoshita, in Gendai Nihon no Seiji Katei, p. 310). 4 Quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 178.

362 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan programmes issued during the successive unification rallies, and of those published by the National Salvation movement since its foundation in 1954, reveal not a few inconsistencies and differences in emphasis. Certain common themes, however, do emerge and, although the movement has (so far at least) failed to fulfil its aim of creating a solid nationalist front, these themes are worth reviewing briefly, since they represent the common denominator of thinking among the right-wing nationalists who have participated in the only important post-war effort at unification. As usual, a great deal of space is devoted to bewailing the existing state of affairs. Such la­ ments need not be detailed here, since they have already appeared in earlier chapters of this book. Suffice it to say that Japan’s present conditions were viewed as almost unmitigatedly bad, and that a major crisis was regarded as imminent unless these conditions were improved. The changes produced by the Occupation had served to corrupt the very essence of the country. For the first time in her his­ tory Japan was no longer a proud and independent nation. The fun­ damental aim, therefore, must be ‘to work for a true people’s inde­ pendence based on the maintenance of our national polity, and thus to restore our nation to its ancient form {Nihon korai no sugata)'.1 The ‘ancient form* did not, of course, refer to the status quo ante bellumybut to that antique Arcadia (whose image hovers in the mind of every patriotic nationalist in Japan) when sovereign and subjects lived together in perfect harmony in a prosperous land, and when ‘loyalty towards the Emperor, coincident with filial piety* took the place of present-day ‘egoism*. The first step towards national salvation must be the resolute sup­ pression of the Communist Party and its allies; in certain cases the socialists were specifically included among the latter. The next es­ sential was to scrap the existing ‘MacArthur Constitution* and to return either to the Meiji Constitution or to some new independent constitution, ‘written in our own words and with our own grammar* and based on Japanese history, traditions, and feelings.2This would pave the way for restoring the Emperor to his rightful position as ‘the pillar of the people’.3It would also lead to a policy of heavy rearma­ ment. Such rearmament, however, was not regarded as a means of 1 Quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 183. * Ibid. p. 195 and Nagamatsu, Ikite iru Uyoku, p. 241. 8 ‘The Emperor is not a national symbol ; he is an historical personality and the pillar of the people* (quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 183).

363 making Japan a stronger partner in the American anti-Communist alliance, but as a necessary condition for her complete indepen­ dence. Furthermore, to have any effect at all, rearmament must be accompanied by a reawakening of defence-mindedness and patriot­ ism among the people, particularly among the youth : ‘Rearmament itself is not enough ; unless there is a genuine resurgence of the spirit of old Japan ( Yamato-damashii) among the people, there can be no defence, no bulwark for our country.’1 One purpose of the unifica­ tion movement was precisely to compass such a reawakening, as the following rather startling statement points out: Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

The reason for Japan’s defeat [in 1945] was not that the war itself was wrong. It was the lack of sufficient patriotism among the people (kokumin no aikokushin nofujüburi) that produced this result, and henceforth Japan must march steadfastly into the future supported by a united front of her patriots.2 So far as foreign policy was concerned, ‘independence’ was again the watchword, and this frequently led to the type of right-wing neutralism that we have already examined : ‘We must reject Ameri­ ca’s colonialist policy towards Japan and secure the true indepen­ dence of the people by taking a stand midway between America and Russia’.3 Asian solidarity was a related theme, and the National Salvation movement pledged itself to work for the ‘emancipation and independence of the Asian peoples*.4 A thorough-going economic reform must be carried out in order to stabilize the people’s livelihood and to make Japan less dependent on the vicissitudes of foreign trade. Considerable stress was given to attaining self-sufficiency in food, especially rice, and here the in­ fluence of agrarian nationalists like Mr. Tachibana was clearly felt. The peasants and the working masses were to be the base of the uni­ fication movement. These were the classes that were being exploited under the existing system and it was they who would chiefly benefit from the economic revolution that was envisaged. To make all these changes possible, however, would require more than a series of scattered economic and social measures ; what was needed was a complete reform of the nation’s political structure. This reform was the Showa Restoration, which would bring about a new political force in the country, based on harmony and patriotism 1 Ibid. p. 195.

2 Ibid. p. 184.

3 Ibid.

4 Nut. Diet Library,

364 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan in place of exploitation and egoism. All corrupt elements in the political, bureaucratic, and economic spheres must be ruthlessly purged in what was described as a ‘national house-cleaning’,1 and the Emperor must be restored to his full powers. At this stage, there would be no further need for political parties, which were in any case incompatible with the true spirit of Japan.2The principal objectives of the National Salvation unification movement did not, it will be seen, differ greatly from those of the Showa Restoration movement in the 1930’s, and the following statement of purpose issued in 1953 could just as well have been written by the leaders of Nikkyö some twenty years earlier: Basing ourselves on the history and traditions of the Japanese people, and confronted as we are by various pressing issues at home and abroad, we aim to consolidate a people’s political force that will carry out a thorough reform of thought, politics, culture, national defence and every other aspect of the country’s life.3

The words, indeed, were much the same ; but the possibility of matching them with action was of a very different order. Having officially eschewed all violent methods, the leaders of the unification movement were obliged to concentrate on the slow, laborious, and— for people whose early political careers had so often consisted of heroic plots and daring coups—rather boring tasks of building up an effective organization and of attracting popular support. Once the Sörengö had finally been organized in 1954, some of the impetus seemed to go out of the unification movement. At this point it was important to find live political issues that might bring the constitu­ ent nationalist societies into working partnership with Sörengö rather than mere formal adherence. As usual in the case of post-war nationalist groups, the organized activities of Sörengö were almost absurdly trivial in the light of its grandiose programme. Attacks on the Communists, and on the left in general, provided perennial grounds for concerted action by right-wing nationalist groups, and few opportunities were lost for staging joint anti-leftist demonstra­ tions by the various groups affiliated with Sörengö. The campaign in favour of a revival of the National Foundation Day holiday also pro­ vided regular opportunities for joint meetings, demonstrations, and parades. 1 Kcibi Iveisatsu, p. 196.

2 Ibid. p. 195.

3

Ibid. p. 178.

Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite? 365 A more stirring issue at the time when Sörengö was founded was the nationalist campaign against the Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, and his Government, which, as we have seen, was carried out with no less gusto by the extreme right than by the left. In May 1954, for instance, Sörengö organized a mock trial of Mr. Yoshida in the Yotsuya Park in Tokyo. Nationalists from numerous different organizations attended, and the park bristled with banners carrying such slogans as ‘Down with the Yoshida Cabinet!*, ‘Down with corrupt politics!*, and ‘Out with the traitors!* Despite the stormy weather, a considerable number of spectators attended the ‘trial*. Among those officiating were several prominent participants in the pre-war nationalist incidents. Mr. Inoue Nisshö (whose view of courts of law in the past had usually been from the dock rather than the bench) was the judge, while Mr. Kojima Gennö acted as presi­ dent of the court ; and one cannot help seeing a certain bathos in a situation like this in which men who in their prime had attacked cor­ rupt politics with swords should be doing so by the rather ludicrous method of a mock trial. The ‘public prosecutor* denounced Mr. Yoshida*s alleged misrule (notably his tolerance of governmental corruption and his compromising of Japan’s independence) in the most scathing terms, and demanded the death penalty. After due deliberation, however, Mr. Inoue Nisshö (evidently rendered mild­ er by the weight of years) handed down the reduced sentence of banishment. This gave rise to vocal dissatisfaction among many members of the audience who felt that the sentence was too lenient.1 As Mr. Nagamatsu points out, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the ‘trial’ was, in fact, this rather fierce reaction of the onlookers.2 For it indicated that, if the right-wing societies should ever abandon their present pacific tactics and resort to the more traditional meth­ ods of carrying out their ‘national house-cleaning*, they would not be without sympathizers. In this connexion it is worth recalling that a number of rather inefficient assassination attempts were made by rightists against Mr. Yoshida during the following months,3 and that one of them was in fact perpetrated by a young man who had attended a nationalist unification rally in Osaka and who had there been inspired with patriotic fury against the Yoshida Govern­ ment.4 1For details see Nagamatsu, lkite iru Uyoku, p. 244. 2 Ibid. 3 See above, p. 184 n. 1. 4 Nagamatsu, lkite iruUyoku, p. 11.

366 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan By far the most conspicuous issue that was used by Sôrengô to promote common right-wing action was opposition to the SovietJapanese negotiations in 1955-6. This reached its climax in the autumn of 1956 at the time of the visit of the Prime Minister, Mr. Hatoyama, to Moscow. The Anti-Communist News Society (the earlier of the two principal post-war unification movements) also organized joint protests against the talks which, it was generally be­ lieved, would turn out to Japan’s disadvantage. Everything possible was attempted in order to prevent Mr. Hatoyama’s departure, in­ cluding a sit-down strike outside his residence. Having failed in all these efforts, the rightists evidently felt that more drastic action was required. In November Sörengö and other groups sponsored a large right-wing rally in Hibiya Park to oppose ratification of the joint Japanese-Soviet declaration. Following the rally, over 200 demon­ strators paraded through the streets of Tokyo to the Soviet Fisheries Mission (the present Soviet Embassy). On arrival they broke open the main gate, stormed into the compound, and stoned the mission building, in order to underline their demands that the members of the mission ‘go home*. When the police tried to stop them from ap­ proaching the main building they were pulled away and denounced as Communists. A few of the policemen were injured and some of the demonstrators, including Mr. Tomatsu (leader of the Sörengöaffiliated Great Conciliation Party), were arrested. This was by far the most violent anti-Soviet demonstration since the end of the war and it caused considerable indignation in the press and among the public.1 The right-wing leaders who were involved no doubt realized that the storming of the Soviet Mission was not entirely compatible with their new peaceful policy. Mr. Tomatsu attempted to justify the attack as ‘an explosion of the pent-up anger of the Japanese people against the Soviet Union* and as ‘a natural expression of the honest feelings of the Japanese people*.2 The fact was, however, that the participants were members not of the general public but of various right-wing organizations, many of them associated with the Sörengö and the Anti-Communist News Society. Why should the organizers 1 e.g. Asahi Shimbun: \ . . Such barbaric acts produce only adverse effects. . . The rightist groups are past redemption if they continue to ape vicious gangsters. They should fight with words. Every time they use brute force, they will be dis­ liked and despised by the public. . .* (14 Nov. 1956). 2 Mainichi Shimbun, 14 Nov. 1956,

367 of these groups have risked further alienating the public by resorting to rowdy action of this type? One reason pointed out by many news­ papers was the simple desire for publicity. As the Asahi Shimbun commented, . . . most of these demonstrations are to ‘sell their names’. If they make a lot of noise, their names and pictures appear in the newspapers and they gain a certain distinction in the eyes of their fellow rightists. The pub­ licity can be used for obtaining contributions.1 A further motive appears to have been a tactical one, namely the aim of the Sörengö leaders to use the Soviet-Japanese negotiations as a common issue to strengthen their existing federation and to bring more right-wing groups into the unification movement. In this way it corresponded mutatis mutandis to the Manchurian issue in 1931, which helped to bring certain rightist groups together into a tem­ porary coalition. Anti-Soviet sentiment was an effective rallying point for right-wing nationalists. Whereas rightists differed fairly widely in their attitudes to the United States or even to Communist China, opposition to the Soviet Union was a traditional feeling shared by almost all of them. Here also was an issue on which they could strongly oppose the Hatoyama Government from a nationalist standpoint, and also one that might possibly win them popular sup­ port. By resorting to violence, however, they forfeited their chance of winning approval from the general public in what might other­ wise have been a profitable issue. The much-publicized attack on the Soviet Mission was undoubtedly a mistake for Sörengö and the other participating groups, because it resulted in resentment from the public and suspicion from the authorities. Yet it was a very un­ derstandable mistake for men who on the whole are of the ‘toughminded* variety, who have spent their early political lives planning and participating in ‘incidents’—for men, in short, who find actions more congenial than words and violent outbursts of patriotic wrath better than the tedious work of political organization. Despite the unfavourable reactions to the stoning of the Soviet Mission, mem­ bers of the two unification movements continued thereafter to par­ ticipate in anti-Soviet demonstrations, such as those that were regu­ larly held on the anniversary of the Russian attack against Japan in August 1945.2 These were usually attended by scuffles with the Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

1 Asahi Shimbun, 14 Nov. 1956. 2 See, for example, the Japanese press of 10 Aug. 1957, in which one of these

368 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan police and a few arrests ; so far, none of them has approached in vio­ lence the attack on the Soviet Mission in 1956. Weaknesses in the Unification Movement In assessing the post-war unification efforts, it should first be said that the very fact of different nationalist leaders having been able to meet, talk, and draw up common programmes is something of an achievement. The various rallies, conferences, and lecture meetings were important in themselves, apart from what they led to, because they enabled rightist personalities, who since 1945 or even before had often been isolated from each other, to exchange views on all the momentous developments in Japan and to plan a course of action to ‘save the country* in the future. They also helped to dredge up well-known figures like Dr. ökawa Shumei, Mr. Inoue Nisshö, and Mr. Tachibana Kösaburö, who had been vegetating in inactivity during the long years of the purge, and who had experi­ enced difficulty in making a political come-back even after their de­ purge. Particularly valuable were some of the regional unification meetings, such as those in Kansai (western Japan) and Kyüshü. In Osaka, for instance, eighteen of the more important nationalist societies in Kansai agreed on a common set of slogans and a common programme of action ; they have been able to co-operate quite suc­ cessfully thereafter on a local basis, and appear to be well provided with funds.*1All in all it may be said that the unification movement has served to convince many nationalist leaders that their differences of opinion are less important than their points of agreement ; also it has resulted in considerably more practical co-operation between them than was possible before 1953. So far as achieving its real objective was concerned, however, the post-war efforts at unification must be reckoned as a failure. In the first place, it has only been a small minority of the nationalist socie­ ties that has become affiliated with either Sörengö or the Anti-Com­ munist News Society. The numerous groups that belong to the East Asia League tradition, for instance, have remained outside the unifi­ cation movement, and it is worth noting that they too, despite their demonstrations is described. On this occasion about seventy ultra-nationalists clashed with the police in front of the Soviet Mission. The editor of the AntiCommunist Nezcs was arrested for trying to break through the police cordon. 1 Nagamatsu, Ikite iru Uyoku, p. 269. Concerning the success of the unification movement in Kyüshü, see Keibi Keisatsu, p. 192.

Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

369

common descent from Ishiwara Kanji, have been unable to achieve any effective unity.1 Secondly, even among those groups that were originally associated with the National Salvation movement, many of the more important ones seceded even before Sörengö was offici­ ally formed in 1954.2 Thirdly, even those right-wing nationalist leaders who were conscious of the need for unification and who made efforts to build up a common front were unable to act together. Thus we find the absurd situation in which the leaders of one ‘unification* movement are at loggerheads with the leaders of another. Indeed, some of the most virulent attacks against Sörengö have emanated from the Anti-Communist Newst which has described ökawa Shumei, Tsukui Tatsuo, and others as ‘false patriots* (ese-aikokushugisha).z One of the principal aims of unification, as we have seen, was to win popular support. In this the post-war efforts have been utterly unsuccessful. The Anti-Communist News Society has from the be­ ginning taken too uncompromising a stand to attract any but the most dedicated diehards. Even Sörengö, with its rather more realis­ tic approach, has shown no signs whatsoever of being able to develop into a popular movement. So far as conspicuous activities are con­ cerned, these, as we have seen, have been of a type that in the present Japanese context would tend to alienate, rather than to attract, the public. Their attack on the Soviet Mission, for instance, belied their protestations of peaceful intent and confirmed general suspicions that a movement led by people with such violent pasts was unlikely to eschew violence for very long. The leaders of Sörengö were for the most part fanatic men of action rather than practical organizers. Despite the rather promising beginnings of the National Salvation unification movement, Sörengö itself was never able to produce any working unity, even among the relatively few groups that were as­ sociated with it. The organization has, in fact, become a loose, topheavy amalgamation of various rather disparate societies, none of which was willing to sacrifice any of its own freedom of action. Power of exercising discipline over the constituent groups was vir­ tually nil, and more recently it would appear that Sörengö itself is 1 See above, pp. 180-1. Unification efforts by post-war groups like the Chrysanthemum Flag Association were equally abortive (pp. 89-90 above). * Among those that seceded were the Great Japan Production Party, the Great East Institute, and the National Protection Corps. * Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku, p. 185.

370 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan developing as just one more of the innumerable nationalist organi­ zations that constitute the extreme right wing in Japan.1 By and large, then, it may be said that the rightist efforts, which started in 1952, to build up an effective common front have so far been abor­ tive. Many of the reasons for this failure of the unification movement are implicit in the above account of post-war developments. These reasons throw considerable light on the fundamental nature of the right-wing nationalist movement in Japan, and also suggest the direction in which this movement is likely to develop hereafter. In 1954 the head of the Sörengö, Mr. ömori, referred to possible efforts by the Government to impede the amalgamation of nationalist groups: Recent changes in the direction of the Second Section of the Public Security Investigation Agency suggest that the authorities are tightening their control over the activities of right-wing groups.2In particular, they are trying to introduce the demon of mutual suspicion among us com­ rades, to instigate disruptive tendencies to prevent our union, and to weaken or even block the concentration of power that we are achieving. Inasmuch as they are exerting their evil influence in this way and con­ fronting us with malignant schemes reminiscent of the former Special Secret Police, we must all exert the greatest care not to fall victim to their plots.3 These warnings would appear to result more from a type of persecu­ tion mania than from any realistic appraisal of government policy. There seems to be no evidence that the authorities have ever adopt­ ed disruptive tactics against the unification movement of the type that Mr. ömori describes. Indeed, there was no need for them to do so. For in almost every instance this movement bore the seeds of its own failure within it. Effective unification was inhibited, in the first place, by the fact that Japan’s right-wing nationalists continued to be split in their 1 ‘Due to the secession of various constituent groups, the National Salvation People’s Federation was unable to fulfil its aim of forming a united right-wing front, and instead the central core of the Federation developed as just another independent rightist group’ (Nat. Diet Library). The secession of constituent groups is just one of the reasons for Sörengö*s failure to build up a united front. It is an effect, rather than a cause, of the weaknesses of the right-wing movement in Japan. * Concerning the Second Section, see p. 162 n. 2 above. * Quoted by Nagamatsu, Ikite tru Uyoku, pp. 241-4.

Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

371

fundamental approach to political questions. The main split, which has been apparent in the right-wing movement ever since the end of the First World War, was that between those who believe in ‘pure Japanism’ (junsei Nihonshugi) and Emperorism (Ködö-shugi) on the one hand, and in some type of revolutionary reform and national socialism (kokka-shakaishugi) on the other. It was this divergence that led to the break between the extreme nationalist, Professor Uesugi, and the socialist writer, Mr. Takabatake, in 1919, and to the dissolution of their society (the Keirin Gakumei) ; this also was the ideological basis for the dispute between Dr. ökawa Shümei and Mr. Kita Ikki, which began in 1927, and which did so much to di­ vide the nationalist movement in subsequent years.1Writing about the break between Uesugi and Takabatake, Mr. Storry says The disagreement between the two men exemplified a split that was to run right through the nationalist movement before the Pacific War. On the one side were those, like Uesugi, who preached Nippon-shugi (‘Japanism’), a fundamentally nostalgic, conservative mystique. On the other were the radical nationalists, such as Takabatake, the advocates of revolutionary reconstruction, of national socialism.2 Put in elementary terms, this is essentially the split between re­ actionary traditionalism and modem Fascism. The two schools of thought and feeling could find common ground in an extreme, ‘tough-minded’ form of nationalism, in fanatic opposition to the left wing, and in a deep hostility towards parliamentary democracy and liberal ideals; but they were unable to coexist indefinitely. In 1 As usual in Japanese politics, strong personal factors were also involved in the Ökawa-Kita controversy; the effect, however, was to bring to the surface the latent discrepancy between men like Ökawa, who belonged to the reactionary Genyösha-Kokuryükai tradition, and revolutionaries like Kita, who aimed at thorough-going socialist reform. The personal nature of his rupture with Kita is stressed by Dr. ökawa in a posthumous essay entitled ‘I Remember Kita Ikki’ (Kita Ikki kun wo Omou), Fuji, Feb. 1958, pp. 8-22. 2 Storry, Double Patriots, p. 33. Japanese writers frequently use the terms kannen-uyoku (ideological right wing) and soshiki uyoku (organizational right wing) to describe the pure Japanist and the national-socialist schools respectively. The dichotomy was by no means clear-cut ; in pre-war days it was further com­ plicated by a profound split between men like Gondö Seikyô, who believed in some form of decentralized agrarian society, and men like Kita Ikki, who en­ visaged a highly centralized, industrial state. In the post-war period the agrarian strain has been represented both by men of the old school, like Tachibana Kösaburö, and by certain new leaders, like Takeda Kunitarö, who belong to the Ishiwara Kanji tradition. The urban-anti-urban split does not, however, appear to have been a very important factor in blocking right-wing nationalist unity in the post-war period. Both elements were represented, for instance, in the Sörengö and there has been no evidence of conflict between them.

372 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan both Germany and Italy the socialist strain in the respective nation­ alist movements was strong enough to dominate the blatantly re­ actionary, anti-labour strain. This was essential for the early success of these movements. In Germany, for instance, it was the popular, reformist aspects of the National-Socialist German Workers* Party that enabled Hitler in a period of economic crisis to obtain sufficient mass support to win the 1930 elections and thus eventually to edge himself into complete power; mere anti-Communism, references to the ‘Versailles Diktat*, and calls for a return to Teutonic traditions could never have given the Nazis the overwhelming popular backing that they required.1 In Japan, on the other hand, the traditionalist and the radical elements split at a fairly early stage and were, in the last analysis, unable to make common cause against the status quo. The socialist, reformist elements in the right-wing movement, who in the early 1930*8 tried to exert influence through the extremist young-officer group (Imperial Way Faction), effectively lost their chance of achieving, power with the suppression of the February (1936) revolt by the conservative authorities; and thereafter, al­ though the radical elements were never entirely submerged, the principal strain in the right-wing movement was traditionalist, re­ actionary, and by its nature wholly unsuited for winning mass sup­ port. It is not, of course, suggested that if the two main wings of the pre-war nationalist movement in Japan had succeeded in uniting their forces they would thereby have been able to capture power ; yet there is little doubt that such a union would have immensely in­ creased their political effectiveness. This conflict between the ‘pure Japanists* and the nationalsocialists has persisted during the post-war period in a rather diluted form, as will already have been observed in the course of the present study. In the case of the unification groups, for example, the AntiCommunist News Society represented an extreme militant form of 1 Once Hitler had assumed power, however, he did not lose much time in sup­ pressing the more revolutionary elements in the party. The radical advocates of a ‘second revolution* (whose role in the German nationalist movement may be regarded as vaguely analogous to that of men like Kita Ikki in Japan) were effectively crushed with the assassination of Ernst Rohm and other S.A. leaders in 1934. Radical socialism had served its turn in helping to win power for the Nazis. Once this power had been secured, all potential unrest and radicalism were firmly suppressed. In Germany the dichotomy within the Nazi Party between those who were primarily socialists and those who were primarily nationalists had never been allowed to disrupt the unity of the movement; in Japan, however, it kept the movement hopelessly divided.

373 ‘pure Japanism'. The Sörengö leaders on the other hand were aware of the need, if they were to win any real popular backing, to include attacks on social and economic inequality in their statements and socialist reform in their programme. One of the main weaknesses of the National Salvation movement, however, was that the constitu­ ent groups were by no means unified on this question of traditional nationalism versus national-socialism. On the whole the older, more conservative strain has predominated. As a result Sörengö's refer­ ences to socialist reform have tended to be in the nature of mere lipservice and have failed to produce any popular following. All too often, as we have seen, they were belied by the brazenly reactionary statements of some of the leaders. The fundamental split concerning objectives has been paralleled by one concerning methods. Here the main divergence is between those who envisage nationalism as an élite movement consisting of groups of heroic patriots who give their unswerving loyalty to the leader and who will use whatever methods he may consider neces­ sary to save the country from her peril, and those who see it as a popu­ lar movement, having its base in the masses, and steadily gaining power by legal, parliamentary means. The former approach stresses the importance of big names (kao), that is of dedicated patriots who have spent their lives in the nationalist crusade and who are able to inspire their followers with the same idealistic fanaticism; the latter is concerned with building up an effective organization that is cap­ able of appealing to various important elements of the population, including its youth. This divergence in approach does not neces­ sarily coincide with the Japanism-socialism dichotomy that was dis­ cussed earlier, but it is clear that the reactionary type of Japanese nationalist would in almost every case espouse the elitist, antiparliamentary stand. The main leaders of the National Salvation movement, despite all their talk of building up mass support for a united nationalist front, were themselves closer both by background and by temperament to the élitist approach. Although they were theoretically committed to building up a political party that would gain power by acquiring popular support throughout the country, many of the leaders of the National Salvation group were too steeped in the pre-war nationalist traditions of conspiracy and direct action to be suited for the more humdrum forms of political activity, or to have had any practical experience in organizing popular movements. Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

AA

374 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan It is true that Sörengö officially, and no doubt sincerely, rejected ter­ rorist violence as a means of achieving its ends and that after 1955 considerable efforts were made by the leaders to dissociate them­ selves from the more rowdy and disreputable elements in the right wing.1Yet, as we have already observed, it would seem unlikely that men who had been trained in a school of political violence could ever completely divorce themselves from it psychologically, or that people who had spent a good part of their lives decrying democratic institutions should turn into sincere parliamentarians. By force of historical association, if nothing else, the calls for a Showa Restora­ tion almost inevitably carried a latent connotation of violence. Thus in a broadcast in May 1954 Mr. Mikami Taku, an active participant in the 15 May ( 1932) Incident and one of the early supporters of the post-war unification movement, declared as follows: Terror may be bad, violence may be mad. But the vilest thing of all (ichiban akushitsu na no wa) is to deceive the people. When we look at those urchins who call themselves Diet members (chimpira-daigishi), and when we see them carrying on in their bars and assignation-houses,2 it is small wonder that social conditions in Japan have been reduced to their present pass. To rescue us from our existing plight, there is only one way—the Shôwa Restoration. This may sound reactionary to some, but as it is what the people all desperately desire, it must be realized.3 And Mr. Inoue Nisshö, the most conspicuous figurehead in the Na­ tional Salvation movement, ended his autobiography (published in 1953 under the dramatic title One Man, One Killing (Hitori Issatsu)) with the following words: The time for strength (chikara nojidat) has come. In terms of Shintö, this is a time not for the jewel and the mirror, but for the sword... Now Japan is free from the Occupation and I, too, have had my liberty restored. Now things will begin to happen ! I am fully conscious of my own nature 1 See above, p. 346 n. 1. The need to cut themselves off from the rowdy ele­ ments of the right wing was especially stressed during Sörengö's 1955 congress, when it was pointed out that the unification movement must have no truck with ‘rightist groups that are scorned or feared by the public’ (quoted by Kinoshita in Gendai Nihon no Seiji Katei, p. 310). 2 Assignation-houses (machiai) are places traditionally used by a certain type of Japanese politician for behind-the-scenes political dealings. ‘Machiai politics’, as they are commonly called, have a strong connotation of shadiness and cor­ ruption. They are regularly attacked in the press and elsewhere as one of the causes for the lack of improvement in Japanese political life; the tradition, how­ ever, continues unimpaired. 3 Broadcast delivered on 13 May 1954, on Bunka Hösö (quoted by Nagamatsu, pp. 248-9).

Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite? 375 as a child of revolution (kakumeiji). When I observe conditions in Japan and in the world, I feel confident that there is still a final service for me to perform.1 An underlying penchant for direct action, and impatience with the slow parliamentary methods of registering one’s political views inevitably led right-wing leaders to become associated with such violent outbursts as the attack on the Soviet Mission in 1956. Rowdy action, in its turn, tended to alienate the public and to decrease the chances of obtaining any widely-based support among the people. It also widened the gap between those within the movement who in­ sisted on peaceful, legal means and those who were prepared to rep­ resent the ‘pent-up anger of the Japanese people* in more robustious ways. The above divergences in approach are to a certain extent associa­ ted with the rivalry that has developed within the right-wing move­ ment between old leaders and young leaders, pre-war groups and post-war groups.12 This rivalry is a microcosm of that which exists in general Japanese politics and which emerged with particular force following the depurge. It is clear that on the whole the post­ war type of nationalist leader would be more in touch with existing conditions and feelings in the country than the old diehards, on whom the changes produced by the war and the Occupation had usually made little, if any, impression. Once the pre-war nationalists were cleared from purge restrictions, however, they were in most cases not prepared to leave the direction of the movement in the hands of their juniors, whom they suspected both because of their lack of experience and because of their occasional new-fangled ideas. After 1952 they lost little time in trying to reassert their leadership.3 We have already noted the significance of the fact that the National Salvation movement should have held its inaugural rally in a town with such strong traditional associations as Mito. Thereafter, al­ though the unification movement aimed at incorporating all patrio­ tic groups, both pre-war and post-war, it was in fact the old, con­ servative elements that held most of the positions of leadership in 1 Inoue Nisshö, Hitori Issatsu (Tokyo, 1953), p. 397 2 Professor Kinoshita considers that this conflict between pre-war and post­ war elements was the principal cause for the lack of cohesion in the post-war rightist movement, and that the main objective of the National Salvation move­ ment was to solve it (Gendai Nihon no Seiji Katei, p. 306). 3 See above, p. 68.

376 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan both the local and the national organizations, and it was they who set the tone. This had the effect on the one hand of alienating post­ war nationalist groups from Sörengö and thus of impeding the for­ mation of a common front. An even more damaging effect was to give a reactionary, pre-war flavour to the entire unification move­ ment and to lessen the appeal that it might otherwise have had among certain elements of the population. In particular it made it impossible to secure any support among the youth. The National Salvation Student League, sponsored in various Tokyo universities in 1954, was, as we have seen, one of Sörengö's less successful moves.1 Stress was constantly being given to the importance of winning over the youth of the country; yet, quite apart from their institutional weakness, groups like Sörengö could hardly compete with Zengakuren in appealing to the type of post-war nationalism that was cap­ able of inspiring young people. Moreover it was made very clear that leadership was to remain in the hands of the old guard. Thus during the Mito rally the following reassuring statement was issued : We must awaken the young people and form a firm union of [patriotic youth.] It is, however, we elders (chörö taru warewaré) who must grasp the leadership of this movement [to restore] the national polity, it is we who must arouse public opinion and who must evolve a positive pro­ gramme for raising funds.2 Apart from these fundamental differences in approach, unifica­ tion efforts were frustrated by disagreements on specific issues. These have already been discussed in an earlier chapter,3and it will here be sufficient to recall that on such pressing issues as the future of American bases in Japan, the nature of the American alliance, policy towards Communist China, and the need for rearmament right-wing nationalist groups often took diametrically opposite stands. The issues on which they agreed were, as we have seen, in almost every case of a negative nature. It was in certain targets for attack that the various rightist societies could best find grounds for ad hoc co-operation—attacks on the Communists, the trade unions, Soviet Russia, the ‘MacArthur Constitution*, and the entire fabric of post-war innovations that it represented. But what they com­ pletely lacked, and what was essential for effective unification, was a positive image of future Japanese society, such as the Communists 1 See above, p. 290. 8 Quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, p. 183. 3 See above, pp. 154-7.

Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

377

possessed, despite all their ideological contortions. Before the war, too, it had in the main been negative issues that had produced such working cohesion as had obtained among the nationalists. Neverthe­ less there had existed an integral national ideal which, nebulous though it was, had been strong enough to inspire a good part of the population and to provide a focus for the activities of the extreme nationalists. Until they are able to fabricate a national ideal of cor­ responding strength, that is to say a new kokutai or a sense of nation­ al mission, Japanese nationalists would appear to have even less chance than they did before the war of forming a real common front. A further factor that has undoubtedly impeded unification efforts is the extremely wide nature of the Japanese conservative parties. The Liberal-Democratic Party and its post-war predecessors have been sufficiently catholic in their nature to include almost every degree of right-wing nationalism. The conservative party in Japan was vague enough in its stand to be able to absorb anything from an old-fashioned liberal with strongly pro-Western sympathies to a xenophobic nationalist or an extreme militarist. The result of this was that many right-wing nationalists who might otherwise have worked closely with the National Salvation movement or similar groups found it more expedient to join the conservative party, which afforded them an infinitely better chance of being elected. As we have seen, the extreme right-wing candidates who were elected to the Lower House in 1955 all stood as members of the Democratic Party. Ever since 1953, indeed, the trend has been for extreme nationalists, like ex-Colonel Tsuji and Mr. Kodama Yoshio, to join their fortunes with those of the conservative party. Had the latter been of a less all-embracing nature, it is quite possible that rightwing personalities of this type might have put their weight behind the formation of a unified nationalist party, which could then have achieved some of the electoral objectives originally envisaged by the leaders of the National Salvation movement. Significant as all these factors were, the greatest impediment to right-wing unification has unquestionably been the personal factor, specifically the fact that in almost every case personal loyalties pre­ ceded devotion to a common ideal. The oyabun-kobun characteris­ tics of right-wing groups has already been examined in a previous section.1This strongly personal bond is, as we have seen, common 1 See above, pp. 316-20.

378 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan to most types of social groupings in Japan. In political life it is found within the Socialist Party and even among the Communists; it is, however, bound to be especially conspicuous in groups, like the right-wing societies, in which traditional factors predominate. In studying the pre-war history of the nationalist movement one is constantly struck by the independent manner in which various likeminded right-wing leaders operated even at the periods of their greatest crisis. As a rule it was only for very short periods and for very specific purposes that they were able to work together. For the most part the nationalist societies were isolated cliques consisting of a relatively strong leader and a number of loyal followers. This personal quality of rightist groups has not been materially modified since the war, and it continues to exert a profound effect on the development of the right-wing movement. The personal nature of the loyalties is, of course, a source of considerable strength for the individual groups ; it is mainly this which gives them such cohesion as they have, and which, as we have seen, often enabled them to sur­ vive the catastrophe of defeat in a way that was unthinkable for the Nazi and Fascist parties. On the other hand it is perhaps the princi­ pal source of weakness for the movement as a whole. For one thing it emphasizes the heroic, elitist nature of nationalist organizations, which, as we have observed, prevents them from developing as a popular movement. In the second place, the fact of owing loyalty to the respective leader rather than to the common ideals of the move­ ment as a whole prevents the emergence of any single nationalist leader strong enough to unify the various scattered groups. The in­ dividual leaders, however much lip-service they may pay to the principle of unification, are not in practice prepared to abrogate their positions of authority within their microcosms, and they can count on their respective followers to support them in this determination to preserve power. Thirdly, the personal nature of right-wing groupings vastly increases the chances that such unity as may be achieved will shortly be disrupted by fission. Personal differences between two or more leaders concerning questions of authority within the group or even concerning completely non-political mat­ ters will easily lead to a complete rupture of the group itself. The pre-war history of right-wing societies was marked by such splits, and similar fissiparous tendencies have continued in the post-war period. The personal, autonomous nature of the rightist groups is

Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

379

emphasized by the fact that each leader has his own independent, and often secret, sources of operating income. In order to survive, each group must be self-sufficient in funds and this inevitably leads to rivalries between the less successful groups and those that have attained a certain degree of financial security. There is, of course, nothing even vaguely corresponding to the organized budgetary system that plays so important a part in maintaining the unity of the JCP. All these inherent weaknesses were to bedevil the main post-war effort at unification. Although the National Salvation movement succeeded, as we have seen, in bringing about an amalgamation of many of the more influential nationalist societies, many of the con­ stituent groups had already seceded by the time that Sörengö came into being, and of those that remained none was willing to give up its autonomy in order to make common cause under a single strong leader. Each group maintained its separate identity, with its respec­ tive leader and his loyal group of followers, and each remained financially self-sufficient. Although the members might all agree on certain common slogans, their primary loyalty was directed towards their own leader. Conclusions The failure of the pre-war rightist groups to submerge their per­ sonal and ideological differences and to form a united front effec­ tively precluded their gaining power as an independent, popular movement, and ensured that such influence as they could secure would be either by means of direct terrorist action or by allying themselves with the dynamic nationalist forces in the country rep­ resented by the military and their conservative allies. In the post­ war period the need for such unification was even greater than before. In the first place, there was no longer any corresponding dynamic force to which the rightist groups could attach themselves. Pre-war ultra-nationalists had continually struggled among each other; yet in many cases they had been able to co-operate with the military and the conservative leaders on a bilateral basis and had thus avoided condemning themselves to a complete political vacu­ um. In the post-war context such an arrangement was, of course, in­ finitely harder to achieve, and the need to unite their own scattered forces was correspondingly greater. Apart from this the growth in

380 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan the post-war period of powerful left-wing forces, which had the power to attract to their ranks most radical and reformist elements in the country, and which were able to act in unison on many im­ portant political issues, made it more important than ever for the rightist groups to consolidate a counterbalancing weight. In effect, however, the right-wing efforts at unification were, if anything, even less successful after the war than before. For one thing they lacked the prestige and self-confidence which had been provided by such events as the Manchurian Incident and which had encouraged pre-war groups to unite. Far more important was the absence of a new positive image of future Japanese society, and the fact that the rightists were for the most part hopelessly out of touch with the common aspirations of the people. It is true that only a few years have passed since the organization of the first major post-war unification movement and that it is too early to make any final assessments. Also it is sometimes suggested that the development of a major national or international crisis, es­ pecially one that could be attributed to Communist deviltry, might spur a union of extreme nationalist groups. It would, however, ap­ pear that the main causes for the failure of nationalist groups to form a united front are of a fundamental nature, which have applied in both pre-war and post-war days, and which are unlikely to dis­ appear until there is a profound change (of which at present there is no sign) within the right-wing movement and even in Japanese politics as a whole. So far as crises are concerned, the pre-war period had its full share of these, yet they did little to inspire any solid union of the multifarious rightist societies. If, as would appear likely, right-wing nationalist groups are as un­ successful in the future as they have been in the past in consolidat­ ing their forces into a single party under a powerful leader, their chances of being able to develop into an autonomous popular move­ ment, on the lines of the Fascisti in Italy and of the Nazis in Ger­ many, must be regarded as rather remote. This is the conclusion that we have already reached by a different route in an earlier section of the present study.1As we have seen, however, the development of a mass movement by means of a united nationalist front is certainly not the only method by which extreme rightist elements can achieve influence—even decisive influence—in Japan; and it would be as 1 See above, Ch. III.

Can Right-W ing Nationalist Groups Unite?

381

great a mistake now as it would have been in pre-war days to ima­ gine that because the extreme nationalists are divided among them­ selves and have little popular support, they are ipso facto politically negligible. However atomized the right-wing movement may con­ tinue to be, however little backing it may receive from the general population, cadres of dedicated right-wing nationalist fanatics re­ tain an important potential both for direct action and for serving as an auxiliary force in any future crusade against the left.

X. Summary and Conclusions: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Political Extremes

Military defeat, official surrender, and seven years of Occupation confronted established Japanese forces and ideals with challenges as great, and in many ways even greater, than those that had faced the country some eight decades earlier at the time of the breakdown of the Tokugawa régime. Total defeat is bound to have the most profound effects on a modern nation state, in which virtually the entire population is identified with the war effort. For a number of reasons it was particu­ larly overpowering in the case of Japan, where the myth of politicomilitary superiority had been so carefully fostered. Surrender brought about the shattering of the ‘golden chalice*, that is, of the integral national ideal, comprising the structure of the absolute Emperor system and the vague but influential conception of a unique ‘national polity*, which the country’s leaders had instilled into themselves and into the people since the early decades of the Meiji Period. The Occupation, with its initial aims of rebuilding Japanese society on modern, democratic lines, dealt severe powerful blows to certain powerful elements in the country, notably the mili­ tary, the zaibatsUy and the landlord class. By a series of ideological, political, and economic measures, it undermined much of the struc­ ture on which Japanese ultra-nationalism and militarism had been based ; and by laying the stress on individual human rights, instead of on loyalty and obligations, it helped to weaken traditional social patterns, as manifested in the family system and elsewhere. The dislocation of the old order was accompanied by the streng­ thening of certain forces and ideals that had been incompatible with state nationalism. The individual’s desire for material improvement in his everyday life replaced the earlier goals of national aggrandize­ ment, and many of the new forces that arose after 1945 were aimed primarily at securing such improvement. Among these the most im­ portant was undoubtedly the trade union movement, which now

383 achieved unprecedented influence, both economically and politic­ ally. The Socialist Party also became a potent factor in the country and for a brief period was even able to break the conservatives* age­ long monopoly of governmental power ; although the Socialists have never even briefly achieved the status of a majority party, they have been extremely effective in organizing opposition to the conserva­ tive Establishment and in preventing a wholesale scrapping of post­ war reforms. No less significant has been the growing power of an independent public opinion. The Meiji leaders had been quick to realize the immense importance of using education and propaganda to mobilize public opinion in support of the official national goals. With the breakdown of the national mission in 1945, however, and with the development of a comparatively free society, supported by equal rights for women, freedom of speech and assembly, academic freedom, and other democratic liberties, public opinion was no longer a tool to be used by the Government on behalf of conformity at home and aggression abroad but an independent force (backed by a powerful free press and other media of mass communication) which not infrequently emerged in effective opposition to official policy. Summary and Conclusions

Democracy and‘Democracy* The discrediting of the Emperor system and the early post-war prestige of the Western democracies helped to bring a different set of ideals and slogans into currency, especially among younger people. In most cases these slogans were diametrically opposed to pre-Surrender doctrines; though none of them was entirely new to Japan, they had on the whole been effectively suppressed during the militarist period. Democracy, freedom, individualism, people’s rights, anti-militarism, anti-feudalism—these were the new count­ ers to replace ‘the eight corners of the world under one roof*, *a hundred million hearts beating like one*, ‘loyalty towards the Em­ peror coincident with filial piety*, and the other slogans of state nationalism. In many cases the new ideals were clearly understood and seri­ ously held ; more often, however, they were merely fashionable new amulets to replace those that had been invalidated by defeat. Of all these post-war catchwords, ‘democracy* gained the widest follow­ ing, though perhaps the least understanding. It was espoused not

384

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

only by liberal and socialist elements, but also by thorough-going conservatives, many of whom had during the nationalist period dis­ missed it as being foreign or decadent ; so great indeed was the amuletic charm of ‘democracy* in the early post-war period that the word was even bandied about by leaders of the extreme right wing, who had formerly been its greatest detractors. The essential aim of the Occupation reforms was the democrati­ zation of Japan. If the Occupation had in fact succeeded, during the brief period in which reformist goals were paramount, in providing a strong and lasting basis for democratic ideals and institutions, even General Willoughby’s description of it as ‘the greatest achieve­ ment of its kind since Napoleonic days* might seem to err on the side of modesty. All too soon, however, it became evident that despite the continued popularity of liberal-democratic slogans and despite the preservation of many of the important post-war reforms demo­ cracy itself still had extremely feeble roots in the country. Defeat and Occupation had weakened traditional patterns but, contrary to the fond belief of many of the SCAP authorities, they had not eradi­ cated these patterns or effectively precluded their revival. The Japan of August 1945 appeared to some extent to be a tabula rasa both physically and ideologically; and for a time the country was undoubtedly in an extremely receptive state so far as outside in­ fluences were concerned. It might have seemed that with the dis­ crediting of militarist-nationalist ideals and the demolition of the semi-totalitarian structure there would be no serious difficulty in guiding Japan back to the liberal-democratic course that had been so rudely interrupted in the 1930*3. The Japanese had possessed independent parliamentary institutions longer than any other Asians, and the Occupation did not have to start from scratch in its efforts to create a democratic structure. In Japan, however, as in Germany, the pre-war failure of democracy had been the result not primarily of adventitious circumstances, such as a conspiracy by militarist or Fascist elements or a lack of support from other demo­ cratic countries, but of certain fundamental social and economic factors that had combined under particular historical conditions to make the country poor material for democracy, and unsuited for withstanding the strain of severe crisis. Among the operative factors in the case of Japan had been the immense speed of industrialization in the Meiji Period, which had made it difficult for democratic ideals

385 and institutions to evolve naturally, as in the West, under the aegis of a strong, independent middle class. Nationalism had been by far the strongest force, and the main inspiration for this nationalism had come not from a rising bourgeoisie but from military and agrarian elements, who were largely hostile to democratic ideals. The fusion between democracy and nationalism, which played so important a part in the modern history of Western Europe, never occurred in Japan. Again Japan’s late emergence on the world scene and her material weakness in relation to the Western powers resulted in con­ ditions that promoted the influence of military elements and that placed the emphasis on national strength rather than on social re­ form and democratic rights. Notably, Japan was from the outset faced with the problem of preserving her national security from real and imagined outside dangers ; also it was essential to build up mili­ tary strength if the country was to assert that special position on the continent (especially in Korea and Manchuria) which seemed essen­ tial for the development of her economy. No less important were certain traditional and cultural aspects of Japan, many of them deriving from Tokugawa Confucianism, that were essentially alien to the liberal-democratic approach. Those included the overwhelming stress on group loyalty rather than in­ dividual dignity, on conformist ‘harmony’ and orthodoxy rather than free choice and on fixed status rather than personal merit. Many of these fundamental factors were bound to persist in the post­ war period, and they continued to impede deep-rooted (as opposed to institutional) democratization. This brings us to a further important weakness of the post-war reforms, which resulted from the very manner in which they were achieved. The democratic rights acquired during the Occupation were not won in a political struggle by the people themselves, but were an exotic commodity imposed by directive from above. No class or group in Japan could pride itself on having finally secured these rights as a consequence of thought and travail such as had led to parliamentary power, civil liberties, enlarged franchise, and labour rights in the West. Here again we find a certain similarity with earlier patterns. The human rights contained in the Meiji Con­ stitution, for instance, had been munificently granted from above by the Sovereign (or, more exactly, by the oligarchy that acted in his name) and, lacking firm roots among the people, could easily be Summary and Conclusions

386 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan whittled away in time of crisis. The post-war reforms came not only from above but from outside. To this extent it was even more diffi­ cult for them to become an integral part of the nation’s symbolism ; for many people, especially of the older generation, the post-war democratic reforms, including civil liberties, remained foreign im­ ports closely linked with defeat and Occupation. This particular factor was, of course, an ineluctable result of im­ posing democracy by directive or (as one writer has put it) of forcing the people to be free; it is doubtful whether any amount of sagacity on the part of the Occupation could have precluded this identifica­ tion between democratic reforms and foreign influence. Other weak­ ening factors, however, were the results of deliberate Occupation policies. One of these was to use the existing governmental struc­ ture and to have the democratic reforms implemented by a con­ servative bureaucracy, which was often out of sympathy with the underlying spirit of these reforms. Among the most interesting as­ pects of the Meiji Restoration was the considerable degree of con­ tinuity in the social composition of the ruling class, despite the dras­ tic change of direction in the country’s policy. This was undoubtedly an important reason why social reform in the Meiji Period and after­ wards always lagged so far behind political and economic changes. In studying the Occupation, too, we are struck by the fact that, not­ withstanding the purge and the disappearance of the military from politics, there was a remarkable amount of continuity between the pre-Surrender and post-Surrender administrations. The greatest concern of Japanese leaders at the end of the war had been to preserve as much ideological and practical continuity as pos­ sible. From this point of view the decision of the Allies to respect the continuity of the Imperial institution was of the greatest symbolic importance. In the practical sphere, while power to determine the main lines of policy was temporarily assumed by a foreign Shögun, the actual implementation of the new policy was to a large extent in the hands of a Japanese bureaucracy which had its roots in the past and whose traditions were far removed from those of Western demo­ cracy. This use of existing conservative forces was a wise policy from many points of view, but it undoubtedly impeded the implementa­ tion of a thorough-going democratic reform of the country. Even more important was the early change in the main purpose and direction of Occupation policy. For reasons that lay largely out-

Summary and Conclusions

387

side Japan herself, the switch in emphasis from reform to stabiliza­ tion, from democratization to anti-Communism, started long before most of the Occupation-sponsored reforms had any chance of taking real root. The initial impetus for the counter-reformation came from the outside and was certainly not inspired by any desire to undo much-trumpeted democratic reforms; Japanese conservatives, however, lost no time in responding to the new ‘reverse course* trends, which were on the whole far more in accord with their own sentiments than had been the earlier efforts at democratization. This was accelerated by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. After the resumption of independence in 1952 it developed into a con­ certed effort by Japan’s ruling classes to correct the ‘excesses of the Occupation* ; the result was a limited retreat to the past, which still continues. Thus, paradoxically, the Occupation had set in motion a tendency that was to vitiate many of its own efforts at turning Japan into a modern democracy. The ease and speed with which much of the ‘reverse course* policy could be carried out bespoke the extent to which the post-war democratic reforms, having been instituted in Japan under foreign pressure, lacked solid domestic props. Left-wing and liberal forces in the country have been zealous in their efforts to resist the reverse trends ; on the whole, however, they have not been strong enough to halt the process, though they have certainly slowed it down. The entire structure of post-war ideological, political, and economic re­ form was, in a sense, symbolized by the 1947 Constitution; it is, therefore, of the greatest significance that the principal long-term goal of the conservatives should be the revision of this Constitution, which they tend to regard as a ‘foreign* document, and that, con­ versely, defence of the Constitution should be the main rallyingpoint of the anti-conservatives. The issue of constitutional revision is far more important for this symbolic implication than for any specific articles, such as the ‘no-war* clause or the definition of the Emperor’s status, that may require alteration. One aspect of the weak basis of democracy in Japan is to be found in the widespread persistence of pre-modern conditions and tra­ ditions. This is especially conspicuous in provincial and rural areas, but it is by no means restricted to them. In almost every case social change has lagged hopelessly behind institutional reform. In rural areas, where agriculture remains typically Asian in its minute-scale

388 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan farming (the average farmer owning less than 2\ acres), social pat­ terns have to a remarkable extent withstood the land reform. Here, as in the provinces, communal loyalties still tend to precede national interest, while kinship and social custom, buttressed by the deeplyentrenched system, retain a stronger hold than democratic rights and the rule of law. Often the spirit of the post-war reforms seems hardly to have seeped through at all and in many cases it is rejected as alien to the Japanese tradition. In a country where almost half of the entire population is still engaged in agricultural enterprise these pre-modern aspects of rural life, though largely non-political in themselves, are bound to have a vital effect on national politics. The continuing influence of local bosses (kaoyaku) and the overwhelm­ ing electoral successes of a very conservative party are among the consequences. This persistence of pre-modern conditions is also found in the field of industry, where labour relations often remain predominantly patriarchal and where the employment system frequently reveals aspects that are more appropriate to a feudal structure than to modern capitalism. The weakness of the economic basis for demo­ cracy is underlined by the lack of opportunity for advancement, es­ pecially in the lower rungs of the industrial world. The peculiar pre­ war structure of Japanese capitalism (which, again, was fundamen­ tally the result of over-rapid industrialization) has persisted in the post-war period because of overpopulation and other factors, and has become more conspicuous with the regrouping of the great busi­ ness concerns. Now, as before, we find a situation in which the pro­ ductive forces of different historical ages exist side by side. On the one hand are large-scale, well-capitalized modern enterprises ; on the other small, often precarious, household concerns with vastly in­ ferior conditions of employment, which account for over 50 per cent, of the country’s non-agricultural employees. This dichotomy had a vital effect in preventing the growth of a deep-rooted demo­ cratic movement before the war and has undoubtedly continued to impede a genuine modernization of the country. In both rural and urban areas the prevalence of vertical oyabun-kobun relationships, with all their pre-modern implications, also continues to inhibit the development of democratic feeling. The far-reaching influence of these loyalty relationships does much to explain the slow develop­ ment of political maturity among the people.

Summary and Conclusions 389 Political power in Japan, though far more widely spread than before the war, remains largely in the hands of an extremely con­ servative Establishment. This ruling group, whose influence has steadily increased since the resumption of independence, owes much of its strength to the prevalence of pre-modern conditions and tra­ ditions that we have noticed. For this reason, and also because of its composition, the interests of the ruling group are at many points contrary to those of modern democracy. The main élites that con­ stitute the post-war Establishment are the higher ranks of business executives, who are well organized in associations of industry and commerce, the high-ranking bureaucracy, and the leaders of the conservative party. As compared with the pluralism of the pre-war ruling elements, the post-war period has been marked by relative unity between these élites, one reason being the considerable degree of interchange between the world of officialdom and that of politics. The intimate relationship of mutual interdependence between business and government, which was established in the early de­ cades of Meiji, has been reinforced by the disappearance of the mili­ tary from the political power pattern. The political influence of Japan’s main business leaders is perhaps greater than at any time in the country’s history and there is little doubt that this group con­ stitutes the principal post-war élite. The purge policy of the early Occupation period dealt a tempor­ ary blow to many of the important business leaders, conservative politicians, and officials. Even during the seven lean years, how­ ever, these elements were remarkably successful in upholding the principle of continuity. The reins of real power remained consis­ tently in conservative hands and it is well known that purged leaders were often able to maintain their influence on business and politics during the Occupation by means of personal connexions and in­ structions. With the depurge many of the pre-Surrender leaders re­ turned to their former positions of authority and, especially since 1951, they have become firmly entrenched and increasingly power­ ful. The early post-war policy of the conservative leaders was on the one hand to co-operate with the Occupation in restoring the coun­ try from its shattered material condition. This, of course, was a poli­ cy that almost any ruling group would have pursued under the cir­ cumstances. The specifically conservative nature of their attitudes, BB

390 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan on the other hand, was revealed in the stress that they laid on the principle of continuity and in their efforts to keep to a minimum the reforms of which they did not approve. Later, with the change in Occupation policy, they co-operated enthusiastically with the ‘red purge* and with most other aspects of the ‘reverse course* ; with the advent of independence they were in a position to legislate against many of the more unpalatable reforms, notably in the fields of edu­ cation, labour, zaibatsuy and police. This was accompanied by a counter-offensive against the left wing and against the more militant elements of the labour movement, which were denounced, on tra­ ditional lines, for their class consciousness, ‘egoism*, and lack of patriotism. In Japan, as has frequently been pointed out, the men in power and the socio-political attitudes that they hold have always been more important than the particular set of slogans or ideals that they voice, or than the formal structure through which they operate. Verbal adherence to democracy and the exercise of power through democratic institutions must not, therefore, be confused with any genuine sympathy with the democratic approach. This, of course, is not to suggest that Japan’s leaders are necessarily inimical to the real content of democracy. It would, however, appear that in many cases the post-war conservative élites are, by their background, their per­ sonality, and their group interests, largely out of tune with the mo­ dern democratic spirit, and that so far as socio-political attitudes are concerned these élites have often not changed greatly since before the war. This cannot fail to have an important effect in a country where the basis for democracy is already so insecure. The future of parliamentary democracy can only be assured when the groups that hold political power are firmly dedicated not only to the outer in­ stitutional forms of that system but to the fundamental values on which it is based. Owing to the various unfavourable factors that we have examined, democracy has so far been largely limited to the outward legal and institutional structure ; it has not become a great unifying belief or a principle to influence the daily lives of most people. For a large part of the population it remains a foreign-style slogan, one of the numerous superficial commodities that became fashionable during the early post-war period. Among the younger generation, which tended to be most enthusiastic about these commodities, demokur-

Summary and Conclusions 391 ashi (with its implications of emancipation from conventional re­ strictions) still retains considerable charm; among older people, however, especially in rural and provincial areas, it is often viewed with suspicion as being un-Japanese and vaguely ‘egoistic*. For most of the conservative Establishment ‘democracy* remains an official doctrine with the full force of orthodoxy; its more unpalat­ able contents, however, can be rejected as the ‘excesses of demo­ cracy* or as ‘unsuited to the Japanese form of democracy*. In almost every case the word and its concomitants serve as amulets, confer­ ring protection or respectability on their users, rather than as posi­ tive symbols with concrete referential content. For this reason demo­ cratic slogans were freely used to gain support by people or groups that were wholly out of sympathy with the real implications of democracy. Among these were extreme conservative politicians, former professional military leaders, Communists, and ultranationalists. The traditions of syncretism, verbal vagueness, and amuletic usage all contributed to this devaluation of ‘democracy*. The failure of democracy to become (in Professor Maruyama*s words) ‘a positive symbol to regulate the Japanese way of life* has had numerous important consequences. One of these has been to preserve the traditional sense of distance which separates the mass of the people from the centres of political power, and which is one aspect of die great gap in Japan between the ‘base* and the ‘apex*. National politics, instead of being regarded as the responsibility of each individual citizen, are seen as something remote and technical that ‘takes place somewhere else*. This attitude, which is especially pronounced in non-urban areas, leads inevitably to political apathy and ignorance, the greatest enemies of modern democracy. The sense of distance from political power was connected with a decreas­ ing respect for parliamentary institutions. Blatant corruption, scan­ dals, Diet brawls, factional bickerings—indeed ‘politics* in the worst sense of the word—combined to lower the prestige of the party­ parliamentary system, which had only existed in Japan for some seventy years and which had never achieved any great popular respect at the best of times. The various weaknesses in the operation of the parliamentary system were prominently exposed by the press and were vigorously attacked by the extreme groups on both sides. Before the war political corruption and scandal had done much to undermine popular confidence in the parliamentary system; this

392 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan issue had been exploited over a long period by the militarists and the civilian ultra-nationalists; although it did not in itself account for the breakdown of parliamentary democracy, it certainly facilitated the gradual assumption of power by non-parliamentary, extremist elements. In the post-war period the main effect so far has not been to turn people to one extreme or the other, but rather to dampen the real enthusiasm for parliamentary institutions that many citizens had felt after the war. The net result has been to increase political apathy and the sense of distance, and thus to retard the growth of political maturity. The possible consequences of this in a period of crisis will be examined later in the present chapter. A further result of the continued weakness of the liberal-demo­ cratic ideal is that it has been unable to fill the ideological vacuum which resulted from the break-up of the integral kokutai conception. Though democratic institutions have legal validity, the ideal of democracy itself does not have sufficient power to take the place of the sense of national mission that sustained the people after the early decades of Meiji and that was lost at the end of the war. The only phenomenon that has any possibility of even partly filling the gap in the foreseeable future is an older force, which has been paramount in modern Japanese history and which now exercises a major in­ fluence in almost every other part of Asia, namely nationalism. The type of nationalism that arose in post-war Japan, however, differed profoundly from that which had inspired the pre-war sense of na­ tional mission, and it was also very different from the nationalism that operated in the former colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia. Nationalism and its Political Implications Japanese nationalism has numerous historical characteristics which continue to differentiate it from that in most other countries. It was originally built up from provincial sentiments and depended on traditional local loyalties, paternalistic feelings, and quasi­ religious national myths. The Meiji oligarchy succeeded by means of state education and propaganda in mobilizing this pre-modem form of nationalism to break down feudal barriers and to create a sense of national unity, loyalty to the central Government, and en­ thusiasm for a national mission of aggrandizement. With the col­ lapse of the national mission nationalism was released from the

393 central force that had directed it and was automatically dispersed into its original sources, namely the family, the villages, and small local groups. Although it underwent an eclipse both as a movement and as an organized popular feeling, and although for a time West­ ern-style democratic slogans had a vast appeal in many quarters, nationalism itself did not disappear, but was, rather, ‘demobilized*. During the latter part of the Occupation nationalism began to appear once again on the surface, rather to the surprise of some ob­ servers who had imagined that it had been effectively replaced by democracy as the dominant force. Two factors were mainly respon­ sible for the revival of nationalist feeling. In the first place, there was a reaction of the type that has so frequently occurred in Japanese history, in which a period of wholesale importation is followed by a partial rejection of foreign commodities and a reassertion of timehonoured Japanese ways. This swing of the pendulum manifests itself in numerous ways and includes, for instance, a revival of in­ terest in indigenous art forms, a certain disenchantment with for­ eigners, and a stress, especially in provincial areas, on the need for strengthening traditional social patterns and for reviving patriotism among young people. It clearly fits in with one of the fundamental elements of nationalism, namely the emphasis on a unique way of life and on characteristic national symbols. A further important factor in reviving nationalist feeling has been the force of external circumstances, specifically the intensification of the cold war. In Japan, as in other countries, a diffuse or latent form of nationalism will normally emerge as a dynamic social force when the nation is confronted with real or imagined danger from the outside. Pre-war Japanese leaders, by constantly stressing foreign threats and international crisis, had kept the country in a state of ‘chronic nationalism*. Having finally succumbed to the crisis which she herself had been so instrumental in producing, Japan emerged into the post-war period with the hope of being a ‘Switzerland of the Far East* in a world of lasting peace. This blissful dream was sup­ ported by the Occupation’s early policy of demilitarization and by the ‘no-war’ clause in the Constitution. For some time Japan was largely insulated from the disagreeable realities of the world situa­ tion. The halcyon period came to an end, however, when the focus of the Occupation turned from democratization and demilitarization to a policy of countering disruptive leftist forces within Japan and of Summary and Conclusions

394 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan pressing the country to rearm in order to meet the danger of Com­ munist aggression from abroad. The new Occupation policy, with its stress on the Soviet threat, served to stimulate conservative and right-wing nationalist forces in Japan. At the same time the intensification of the cold war helped to foster the left-wing form of nationalism, as manifested mainly in the growth of a virulent anti-Americanism. The Korean War exa­ cerbated the sense of national danger and heightened both forms of nationalism. The effect of world tension, however, was not simply to polarize nationalist sentiment into anti-Communism on the one hand and anti-Americanism on the other. An equally significant nationalist reaction was to be found in the development of a form of neutralist ‘third force* feeling, according to which Japan should re­ fuse to be drawn into either of the two major power-blocs (which merely intended to use her for their own ends), but should instead pursue an independent course dictated by purely national interests. Neutralism, far from weakening the country, represented for many Japanese the only way in which it might again assume a position of major importance in Asian and world affairs and become a leader of the uncommitted nations. This general form of thinking was to be found both on the left and on the right. Many socialists, especially after the Bandung Conference, declared that in order to play a sig­ nificant role among the Asian-African nations Japan must break her strong dependent ties with America ; at the same time men of strong rightist persuasion like ex-Colonel Tsuji insisted that Japan must become strong and neutral, so as to protect herself in the forthcom­ ing Russo-American war, and so as to exert greater influence in Asia. The anti-American nationalism of the left wing and the antiRussian nationalism of the right find common ground in a form of pan-Asianism, according to which the countries of Asia must achieve complete independence from the West and work together for their own national interests. Although world tension played an important part in stimulating nationalist sentiment, and although most of the vocal nationalists of both the left and the right were greatly concerned with the inter­ national crisis, the principal focus of the new nationalism was not on asserting Japan’s position in the world. Especially when compared with the pre-1945 form of expansive nationalism, the post-war feel­ ing is predominantly an inward-looking nationalism for home con-

Summary and Conclusions

395

sumption. Though stronger and more widespread than in the early post-war period, it retains diffuse, provincial characteristics which clearly differentiate it from the sentiment that before 1945 was able to inspire the people with a dynamic sense of national mission. Nos­ talgia for the good old days plays an important part in this pre­ modern form of nationalism, which is to a large extent concerned with the preservation or restoration of traditional institutions and principles (notably, respect for established authority and belief in social conformity) rather than with the assertion of national strength on the world scene. Compared with the emotional unity of pre-war nationalism, the post-war manifestations are fragmented and scat­ tered; this is revealed in the atomization of nationalist symbolism that is such a prominent aspect of the ‘shattering of the golden chalice*. Despite its comparative weakness, nationalism remains the most important emotional force in the country, and there are many signs that it will become more pronounced during the coming years. There is, of course, nothing incompatible between nationalism per se and the strengthening of democratic institutions and beliefs, but in the case of Japan there have in the past been numerous obstacles that have prevented nationalism from being directed into democrat­ ic channels. Among these was the fact that modern nationalism was given its main direction by military and agrarian elements, who were fundamentally hostile to the liberal-democratic approach ; as a result the major nationalist symbols were of a primitive or reaction­ ary nature, wholly alien to social modernization. Largely because of the late-developing quality of Japanese capitalism, the rising middleclass business groups co-operated closely with the ruling oligarchy and, to all intents and purposes, espoused the organic concept of the state and the official form of Meiji nationalism, instead of trying (as in the West) to combine nationalist sentiment with an insistence on liberal and democratic rights. Again modem Japanese nationalism was from its outset closely associated with a sense of imminent danger from foreign sources. This helped to emphasize its fanatic and irrational aspects and to make it inimical to the spirit of liberal democracy. The early military successes of modem Japan, notably the victory over Russia in 1905, further helped the ruling oligarchy to mobilize nationalism and to direct it into chauvinist, instead of modem reformist, channels. In sum, the state nationalism that held

396 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan sway with varying degrees of strength until 1945 was in almost every respect incompatible with the evolution of a modern form of demo­ cracy. It is still too early to predict whether the type of nationalism that is developing in the post-war period will be directed into a demo­ cratic pattern rather than into the pre-war mould. Many of the earlier obstacles have, at least temporarily, disappeared. Post-war nationalism does not, for instance, receive any of its main inspira­ tion from Japanese military elements ; again, total defeat has made it infinitely harder for any Government to direct national sentiment away from domestic concerns towards goals of military expansion. On the other hand the post-war inward-looking form of nationalism, with its strong nostalgic motivation and its emphasis on the restora­ tion of traditional ways, is not likely to combine with any enthusiasm for modern democratic ideals. From the standpoint of the main form of post-war nationalist feeling, democracy and its concomitants have a ‘foreign* aspect that renders them irrelevant to Japan’s real needs and, under certain circumstances, positively harmful. It is, of course, possible that with the passing of time (and especially with the emergence to influence of a generation that has been brought up entirely in a period when democracy has official sanction) liberal and democratic symbols will become thoroughly naturalized. In the meantime, although Japanese nationalism and democracy are no longer as incompatible as in the pre-war period, it would not appear that they are developing as complementary or mutually-supporting forces. What, then, are the political implications of this revival of a diffuse type of inward-looking nationalism? In the first place, it has un­ doubtedly been of some help to the ruling conservative elements in combating leftist attacks on the established order and in carrying out a ‘reverse course* policy of partially restoring traditional patterns. By associating many of the post-war reformist measures, including the enactment of the 1947 Constitution, with foreign domination, the Government has often been able to harness nationalist senti­ ment in its efforts to turn back the clock. Reforms that ran counter to conservative philosophy could effectively be condemned as ‘ex­ cesses of the Occupation*, fundamentally unsuited to Japan’s national traditions. Again, for most conservatives, nationalism— that is, a strong sense of group loyalty and a pride in traditional ways

Summary and Conclusions

397

—was a far more satisfactory force to fill the post-war spiritual vacuum than democracy and liberalism, which, though useful as amulets, retained disturbing connotations of ‘egoism*, license, and disrespect for the established order. Nationalism had its own dan­ gers, in that it could so easily be turned into opposition to the Ameri­ can alliance, on which conservative economic and foreign policy was based. For this reason the inward-looking form of nationalism, with its stress on loyalty, conformity, and other traditional virtues, was far more satisfactory than an expansive nationalism which, by laying emphasis on Japan’s position in the world, might readily develop into popular indignation at Japan’s subordinate position in the alli­ ance. The nationalist measures supported by the Government were, therefore, largely of a ‘home consumption’ variety and many of them, such as the bill to restore National Foundation Day, were symbolic and nostalgic in nature. The diffuse post-war type of nationalism has been of use to the conservatives in partly filling the gap left by the destruction of the kokutai ideal, and in helping to reassert time-honoured traditions and allegiances. This form of nationalism, with its nostalgic and pre-modern aspects, has the greatest appeal for people of middle age and over, especially in provincial and rural areas. With the réintro­ duction of moral education in schools, however, the conservatives may succeed in imbuing the younger generation with a certain amount of traditional nationalist sentiment and in counteracting the iconoclastic, left-wing tendencies among youth that were so pro­ nounced in the early post-war years. Nationalism and the Political Extremes Although nationalism continues now, as before the war, to be of service to the ruling conservative elements, it is a force that can be especially exploited by the political extremes. The extreme left and the extreme right are both characterized by strong nationalistic atti­ tudes and by a determination to pursue nationalist objectives by forceful, or even violent, means. Thus the most virulent attacks that were directed at the Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, for his alleged policy of subservience to foreign countries came equally from the extreme left and the extreme right. Again, both extremes had in common a form of anti-Western, pan-Asian nationalism. The stress that has been given in the present study to the right-

398 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan wing manifestations of nationalism is certainly not intended to sug­ gest that this force is a monopoly of one political extreme. Ever since 1950 the JCP has officially viewed ‘American imperialism* as a greater enemy than the ‘reactionary Government* at home, and we have seen numerous examples of the left-wing exploitation of post­ war nationalism to stir up anti-American feeling. These efforts have been directed with particular effect at the universities, and national­ ism for most politically active students is, in fact, represented by opposition to the conservative leaders and to their policy of consign­ ing Japan to a state of ‘semi-colonialism* in relation to America. The official writings and pronouncements of Communist leaders are al­ most invariably larded with nationalist references such as ‘the soil of our ancestors*, ‘our two-thousand-year-old history*, ‘love of our country*, ‘pride in our people*. The Communists are well aware of the latent power of nationalism in Japan and realize that attacks on the inequities of the capitalist system and on the remnants of ‘feu­ dalism* are unlikely to win them any significant increase in popular following unless they are supported by effective appeals to national­ ist sentiment. In particular they are obliged to convince people that Japan’s economic and other ills are, directly or indirectly, the result of compromising national independence by a policy of subservience to the United States. Thus their propaganda stresses that America is preventing a resumption of trade between Japan and her natural trading partner, China, while at the same time erecting barriers against Japanese imports into the United States. The Americans are also accused of forcing Japan to rearm, not in order to protect Japanese national interests, but simply so that the country may serve as a cog in the American ‘imperialist* alliance ; so far from protecting Japan, this policy is (according to the extreme left) putting an im­ possible burden on the economy, isolating her from the rest of Asia, and increasing the danger of national extinction in any future nuclear war. Further perennial nationalist issues exploited by the left wing are those of American bases in Japan and of Okinawan sovereignty. Although post-war nationalism has played into the hands of the extreme left in many ways, having in particular helped it to win sup­ port among certain sections of organized labour and of the student movement, the main force of Japanese nationalism is not favourable to the Communists. For the large majority of the Japanese people

Sum m ary and Conclusions

399

Communists and the Communist Party remain symbols of an es­ sentially unpatriotic approach. This was one of the main weak­ nesses of the extreme left in the pre-war period, when nationalism was the most lethal weapon of anti-leftist forces. Although during the post-war years the Communist Party has been able to exploit nationalist sentiment in some quarters, it is clear that in Japan the extreme left has not even remotely been able to achieve what it did in China, namely identification with the nationalist aspirations of a large part of the population. One fundamental reason for this difference is a historical one. Whereas in China nationalism became associated at a fairly early stage with anti-imperialism and with aspirations for a social revolu­ tion from below, which were later given their strongest support by the Communists, in Japan nationalism was mobilized from above and directed away from reformist or revolutionary channels into those of national unity and military expansion, which were irrele­ vant to the main ideals of the left. Instead of being able to use nation­ alism, as the Communists did in China, the Japanese extreme left was from its very beginnings obliged to resist it. Although the situa­ tion has vastly changed since the collapse of state nationalism in 1945, the fact remains that there is no strong link in Japan between nationalist sentiment and left-wing revolutionary reformism, and that for most people Communism and nationalism are instinctively felt to be incompatible. This incompatibility was reinforced by certain specific develop­ ments in the post-war period. Among these were the virulent Com­ munist attacks on the Emperor, which were bound to conflict with one important strain of nationalist sentiment, and their instigation of strikes and other disruptive tactics, which made people feel that the Communists were more concerned with their own power than with the general weal. By far the most important factor that has pre­ vented the JCP from identifying itself with nationalism in the minds of most people has been its close link with one of Japan’s traditional enemies. This was emphasized in 1950 when, at the behest of the Cominform, the JCP abandoned its ‘lovable’ policy and adopted illegal, violent tactics in utter disregard of popular feeling. The tra­ ditional suspicion and fear of Russia, resentment at the breach of the non-aggression treaty in 1945, and the numerous points of friction in post-war Russo-Japanese relations were bound to turn most

400 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Japanese against a group, like the JCP, which appeared to be closely connected with the Soviet Union. In almost every respect it would seem that now, as before the war, the extreme right is more attuned to Japanese nationalism than the extreme left. While an unpatriotic aura hangs over the Communists, the rightists are the representatives par excellence of Japanese patriotism. The conservatives are subject to nationalist attack for their close ties with the West, and the extreme left is suspiciously linked in people’s minds with Russia and Communist China ; the ex­ treme rightists, on the other hand, though most of them may re­ luctantly recognize the need for temporary ties with America, are wedded to no foreign country and to no foreign interests. Again, while both democracy and Communism have a strongly foreign flavour, right-wing nationalism, with its call for a return to a com­ pletely indigenous Emperor system and to time-honoured national traditions, is Japanese through and through. Furthermore the organized rightists have been reasonably sensi­ tive to the particular form that nationalism has taken in the post-war period. They have, for instance, avoided talk of rebuilding Japan into a great military power in order to secure a dominant position in Asia and have, instead, concentrated on the need to restore tra­ ditional Japanese virtues, including respect for the family system and devotion to the Emperor. Their general reactionary approach has fitted in at almost every point with the nostalgic, inward-looking type of nationalism that replaced the dynamic, expansive sentiment of pre-war days. It goes without saying that the appeals of the ex­ treme left, with their stress on revolution and the disruption of tra­ ditional ways, were either irrelevant to these aspects of post-war nationalism or actually incompatible with them. The growth of right-wing organizations in the latter part of the Occupation period, and especially after the restoration of indepen­ dence, was one aspect of the limited revival of nationalism in the country and was facilitated by the general ‘reverse course* trends. Although they are divided on many specific issues, these organiza­ tions all direct their appeal predominantly to nationalist sentiment, and in most cases to the particular form of nationalism that has de­ veloped in the post-war period. They invariably stress the need to restore national pride and to revive the old Japanese virtues ; this in­ volves a strengthening of the family system and a ‘restoration* of the

Summary and Conclusions

401

Emperor, accompanied by a full-scale return to traditional customs, institutions, principles, and relationships that made Japan powerful in the past. The ‘foreign’ Constitution must be revised and the vari­ ous debilitating Occupation reforms corrected. The political struc­ ture must be thoroughly overhauled in such a way that patriotism and devotion to national interests will take the place of personal am­ bition and corruption. Most of the groups are also agreed on the need for reforming the economic system so that it will contribute to the strength of the whole nation rather than to that of any particular element ; class struggle, which is essentially based on ‘egoism*, must be eliminated and national interests must always come first. The Communist Party and the left wing in general are attacked for being diametrically opposed to all that is best in the national tradition, and especially for being the catspaws of Japan’s foreign enemies. So far as foreign policy is concerned, Japan must work towards complete independence. Until she becomes economically and militarily auto­ nomous it may be necessary to retain fairly close ties with America, but these must be kept strictly on a basis of equality. The habit of subservience to the United States, which was implanted during the Occupation, must be eradicated. Although military expansion is no longer feasible, a strong, independent Japan is likely to attain a posi­ tion of great, if not preponderant, influence in the Far East, and can help the other Asian nations to consolidate the independence from the West that they partially achieved as a result of Japan’s sacrifices in the Pacific War. For many of the rightist organizations this form of pan-Asianism does not preclude a marked hostility towards cer­ tain Asians themselves, specifically, the Korean and Chinese minori­ ties in Japan, who are viewed with suspicion and scorn, and who sometimes occupy the role of national scapegoat held by the Jews in some other parts of the world. This general approach of the rightist organizations is clearly directed to nationalist sentiment at every point. The actual and potential strength of the rightist movement derives to a large extent from this sentiment. Total membership of the organizations them­ selves approaches that of the JCP—about 100,000. Popular support for extreme right-wing personalities, as revealed in post-1952 elec­ tions, has increased steadily; yet, like that for the Communists, it remains an exceedingly small percentage of the total (about 2 per cent, in 1955 and 2-3 per cent, in 1958). Although the organized

402 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan right wing is in many ways attuned to existing nationalist sentiment in Japan, it suffers from numerous fundamental weaknesses which prevent it from fully exploiting its present strength and which con­ tinue to impede it from expanding its influence. These weaknesses have been thoroughly examined in preceding chapters and here it will only be necessary to review a few of the more important points. Weaknesses of the Extreme Right In the first place, we have noticed the predominantly negative as­ pect of the rightist groups. Their focus is invariably on attacking existing evils rather than on proposing concrete solutions. The con­ structive programmes that they have been able to present are, as a rule, hopelessly vague and confused. The rightists have failed to create any positive image of the future, such as the Communists possess and such as they themselves could evoke before the war by ‘the eight corners of the world under one roof and the entire battery of nationalist slogans. This negative aspect not only made it difficult to inspire popular support but inhibited practical co-operation among the groups themselves, whose common action was as a rule limited to sporadic and ineffective attacks against Communists, trade unionists, the Soviet Mission, and similar targets. A second important weakness of the right-wing organizations was their strongly reactionary aspect. The stress that these groups gave to the restoration of traditional patterns might win them support among certain older and more conservative elements in the popula­ tion, especially in non-urban areas, and it was fully in accord with the nostalgic aspect of post-war nationalism. It served, however, to keep them out of touch with one important element of modern national feeling, namely the people’s aspiration for an improved material life. On this point again they suffered in comparison with the leftwing forces, which for all intents and purposes were able to mono­ polize reformist sentiment. By focusing their attention on issues like the restoration of the Emperor’s powers rather than on the need for socio-economic reform, the rightists particularly alienated them­ selves from elements, such as organized labour, the student move­ ment, and the intelligentsia, that tended to be keenly concerned with correcting the inequities of the existing system. The socialist strain, which had been so important in the pre-war rightist movement, be­ came very feeble in the post-war period and direct attacks on the

Summary and Conclusions 403 capitalist system were far less frequent and less virulent. As a result of the Occupation and the post-war flood of Westernization on the one hand, and of the disappearance of radical military elements on the other, right-wing nationalists were bound to emphasize the preservation of national traditions rather than reform or revolu­ tion. The reactionary, obscurantist aspect of the rightists became even more pronounced after 1951, when many of them began to abandon the quasi-democratic slogans and the relatively up-to-date, popular approach that they had espoused during the Occupation period. There is little doubt that under present circumstances this makes it extremely difficult for them to win any significant degree of popular support, and quite impossible to exert real influence on Japanese youth, whose main aspirations are in nearly every case irrelevant or contrary to the demands of right-wing nationalism. A third fundamental weakness derives from the strongly personal nature of the groups themselves, which in most cases are small cliques formed on an oyabun-kobun basis, with loyalty to the leader as the principal motive of cohesion. Their disparate and scattered character in terms of organization and doctrine stands in contrast to the relatively monolithic nature of the Nazi and Fascist parties in Europe and of the Communist Party in Japan. This was un­ doubtedly an important factor in their survival capacity; Japan’s scattered ultra-nationalist societies were often able to come through defeat and to re-emerge, in a way that was unthinkable for a united, well-organized group like the Nazis. On the other hand the fact that the right-wing movement consists of some 1,000 separate organiza­ tions, with widely-diverging approaches and highly personal bases of loyalty, has prevented it from forming a united right-wing na­ tionalist front. Despite various efforts to submerge their personal and doctrinal differences, the rightists on the whole remain split into isolated local groups, having limited spheres of influence and cut off not only from the general public but also from other likethinking elements. As in all movements whose inspiration is mainly negative and personal, centrifugal and fissiparous tendencies con­ stantly threaten new ruptures. In the absence of effective unification, it has so far been impossible for them to win any significant popular support or to counterbalance the relatively unified left-wing forces in the country. The main causes for the failure of the unification

404 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan efforts are of a fundamental nature and, unless the rightist organiza­ tions in Japan radically alter their character, there seems to be little chance that they will succeed in forming a unified movement. These various aspects of the rightist organizations contributed directly and indirectly to the fourth weakness, that is their inability to win popular support and to develop as a modern mass movement from below. While the disunited nature of the rightist groups, their anachronistic flavour, and their failure to create positive goals were all important factors, an underlying reason was the difficulty of creating any successful mass movement (of the left or the right) in a country, like Japan, where important changes have always been im­ posed from above and where authoritarian patterns are still so strong. Some of the new rightist groups that sprang up during the Occupation were determined to break with the pre-war élitist tra­ dition that had prevented nationalist organizations from achieving power by means of popular support. In the event, however, these groups completely failed to win any substantial backing from the public. Those that managed to survive the Occupation began to de­ velop along traditional lines, and the pre-war groups that re-emerged after 1951 were, despite occasional talk of building up mass support, too steeped in the old élitist approach to be even remotely capable of organizing popular movements. In pre-war days, too, the rightists had failed to create any effective mass movement. There had, however, existed powerful elements in the country to whom they had been able to attach themselves as an auxiliary force and through whom they had been able to exert con­ siderable influence on the course of events. This brings us to a fifth great weakness of the post-war rightist movement, namely the ab­ sence of any particular element in the population or of any centre of power with which it could ally itself. There has so far been nothing in the post-war period to correspond with the military, in particular the ‘young officers*, who had supplied so much of the dynamic for the ultra-nationalist trends of the 1930*8. The Occupation-spon­ sored land reform, by alleviating the most pressing grievances of the agrarian population, had to a large extent removed a further tra­ ditional source of support for right-wing nationalist groups. The middle class (of small industrialists, shop owners, contractors, lowgrade officials, and others), which had provided much of the practi­ cal support in pre-war days, was little inclined in a period of relative

Summary and Conclusions 405 economic prosperity to back extremist groups, which were still un­ pleasantly associated with memories of crisis and defeat ; the LiberalDemocratic Party and its predecessors were wide enough in their composition to reflect the main economic and political demands of the most conservative elements of the middle class, and also seemed quite capable, at least for the time being, of dealing with any leftwing threats to the existing order. Finally, the conservative Estab­ lishment itself, including leaders of the conservative party and of the regrouped business combines, while they were in most cases more in tune with the objectives of the extreme right than with those of the left, were, with few exceptions, not prepared to encourage the growth of groups that in pre-war days had brought them far more trouble than benefit. Although there has been some co-operation with the anti-Communist groups on a local level, and although several extreme rightist personalities have preserved or formed close relations with conservative leaders, top-level official policy has been hostile to most of the organizations themselves, and there is no reason to believe that the influence of extreme rightists has had any significant effect on shaping conservative policy. In the absence both of popular backing and of specific elements to whom they can look for support, the rightist societies have, despite ‘reverse course’ trends and despite the revival of nationalist senti­ ment, been condemned to a sort of political vacuum. The groups themselves do not differ essentially from their pre-war counterparts, the personalities and the themes being often indistinguishable from those of the late 1920*8 and the 1930*8. The great difference lies in the change of political environment. Right-wing weaknesses that in pre-war days could be at least partly surmounted, because of the general temper of the times and because of the support received from certain specific elements, have since the war combined to render the groups politically ineffective. Lacking any dependable source of funds, many of them have resorted to illegality and even violence— not for idealistic motives, as in earlier days, but merely to fill their coffers. These criminal-fringe groups have, as a rule, received the greatest publicity and have done much to lower the already shaky prestige of the organized right wing. A further result of existing in a virtual vacuum is that the accom­ plishments of the right-wing organizations have in most cases been ludicrously out of proportion with the grandiose schemes set forth cc

4o6 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan in their programmes and manifestos. In the light of their preten­ sions and ideals, the practical activities of the groups in the post-war period have in most cases been either trivial or sordid. In fine, the revival of the organized right wing has until now been merely a symptom of certain general trends. It is one by-product—and certainly not the most important—of a resurgence of right-wing nationalist sentiment in the context of a ‘reverse course*. The right­ ist societies have profited from these trends, both practically and ideologically, but they themselves have had virtually no effect on them. So far as present political influence is concerned, they remain negligible. Potentialities of the Extreme Right On the other hand the organized right wing has certain important potentialities. The rightist groups are small and disunited, yet they are no less numerous than before the war. In view of the nature and methods of the Japanese right wing, it would be as great a mistake now as it would have been in the i930*s to dismiss them simply be­ cause of their small membership. Again it should be remembered that the rightist movement does not (as is sometimes suggested) consist mainly of obfuscated old diehards, mumbling the incanta­ tions of some outworn form of patriotism and feebly harking back to the past. The leaders, it is true, tend to belong to the older genera­ tion of nationalists, but the rank-and-file members of the more im­ portant groups are often young, energetic men, filled with enthusi­ asm, indignation, and a sincere idealism. What, then, are the potentialities of these groups? It is not the aim of this study to make any detailed predictions. The imponderables are too varied and complex and, the longer one observes Japanese politics, the more one hesitates to forecast any given development. A few possible trends may, however, be tentatively suggested, with the caveat that in this section objective analysis will frequently be alloyed with the writer’s personal impressions. In the first place, it would appear that so long as the country suc­ ceeds in preserving its present system of democratic politics, based on parliamentary supremacy, freedom of opposition, and respect for civil rights, the extreme right wing has little chance of increasing its influence. Most of the weakening factors mentioned above will con­ tinue to prevent these groups from winning any significant support

Summary and Conclusions 407 from the public. Furthermore, it is probable that under the existing system conservative leaders will for some time be able to carry out their essential aims, including a steady pursuit of present ‘reverse course* policies, without reverting to authoritarian extremes and without any help from ultra-rightist elements. They will continue to benefit from the existence of a diffuse, inward-looking form of nationalist sentiment but are unlikely to make any effort at mobiliz­ ing this sentiment in support of an official policy of ultra-nationalism on pre-war lines. The rightists will continue to clamour for a return to tradition, re-education of the youth, revision of the Con­ stitution, restoration of the Emperor’s prestige, and suppression of the left, and occasionally they will find that their objectives are being carried out for them by the conservatives; in the present type of political environment, however, their actual power to influence policy will remain negligible. They may, it is true, be able on occa­ sion to co-operate with the conservatives on a personal or local level, but this will not suffice under present circumstances to invigorate the rightist movement itself. Lacking any established centre of power or any specific element of the population to which they can look for substantial support, the rightist organizations are likely to continue in their present state of vacuum, though sporadic rowdy­ ism or even political assassination may temporarily bring them into the limelight. Numerous factors combine to make it likely that, barring severe international or economic crisis, the present system will be preserv­ ed in its essentials for the foreseeable future. One factor, of course, is the general law of political inertia which in itself supports any sys­ tem in existence so long as that system does not become powerless to prevent such disasters as successful foreign invasion or a drastic fall in living standards. Numerous powerful elements have a vested interest in the preservation of liberal politics, and no significant group openly opposes the principle of democracy. Financial and in­ dustrial leaders, for instance, though their approach may often be alien to the true spirit of democracy, have almost every reason to favour a continuation of the present system, which provides them with a position of major power; under normal circumstances they are likely to oppose any swing to state nationalism, which would in­ evitably involve interference and regimentation by the state. Con­ servative political leaders, who in most cases also suffered a loss of

4o8 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan power as a result of militarism and ultra-nationalism, have every reason to retain the present party-parliamentary system, thanks to which they have so far enjoyed almost uninterrupted control. An indefinite continuation of this control is, of course, not assured. If the present system of free political activity is maintained it ap­ pears likely that the socialists will continue to make modest, though uneven, gains in future elections and that eventually they will reach the point of threatening to assume governmental power. It is some­ times suggested that under such circumstances the conservative Establishment might feel that its position was being radically en­ dangered : the political leaders might consequently resort to strong­ handed, undemocratic methods, possibly with the co-operation of extreme rightist elements, in order to avert the dangers of a socialist régime, and business leaders might shift their support from the ex­ isting parliamentary system to some authoritarian form of control which might alone seem capable of preserving their interests from left-wing encroachments. In the estimation of the present writer, however, this is highly improbable, mainly because the socialists, if they are to increase their voting strength sufficiently to win a majority of seats in the Diet, will drastically have to modify their stand. Organized labour cannot produce enough votes for the social­ ists to come to power as a class party, and any Socialist Party that is able to obtain a majority will have had to broaden and moderate its stand to such an extent that its formation of a Government will probably not represent any fundamental threat to the conservative forces. The longer the system continues, the greater will become the various vested interests in it. It will not be long, for example, before virtually all the Diet members owe their political careers entirely to the present party system, and this will certainly discourage any efforts by politicians to weaken it. A further preservative factor is that the generation which is now growing up will have known no other political system and that conservative sentiment itself will then favour the retention of democratic institutions. Barring severe crisis, the passing of time is likely to be accompanied by a gradual streng­ thening of democratic roots and a development of political maturity among the people. A well-informed and vocal public opinion can, in time, come to act as a powerful deterrent to undemocratic politics and to a recrudescence of extremism. The centrein Japanese politics,

409 which still remains substantially weak, will develop into a positive force that can give a much-needed stability to democratic institu­ tions. Under these general conditions parliamentary politics will slowly be improved along the lines of a genuine two-party system, in which both parties are entirely agreed on the fundamental prin­ ciples of democracy. This will result over a period of years in in­ creased popular respect for the Diet as the highest organ of state power. We may also look for a gradual strengthening of a respon­ sible labour movement which, as in certain Western countries, can become one of the main bulwarks to protect democratic institutions against the political extremes. Political and economic conflicts of interest will gradually come to be resolved by orderly, democratic methods, and in the course of time the evolution in Japan of a ‘mass society* is likely to reduce class antagonisms and to mitigate the confrontation, which has produced so much tension in post-war politics. Finally, liberal-democratic ideals will steadily penetrate non-urban areas and become the guiding force in local, as well as national, politics. This rather sanguine picture of the future is based on two main premisses. The first is that Japan will not be confronted with a threat from the outside which seems seriously to threaten her na­ tional security and which the Government appears incapable of meeting under the existing system of free parliamentary politics. In view of Japan’s international position, in particular her abandon­ ment of pre-war territorial ambitions (which had involved such an extension of the ‘national security* conception) and her close ties with the United States, it seems most unlikely that any threat of this kind will develop in the foreseeable future. There is, of course, the possibility of direct aggressive action against Japan by one of the Communist powers. Given Japan’s role in the Western alliance, however, this would without doubt lead to a third World War ; and it is certainly beyond the scope of this study to examine the political changes that might occur in Japan in such a drastic eventuality. The second premiss is, unfortunately, far less secure. The pre­ servation of the present democratic structure depends to an impor­ tant extent on the success of the economy. In case of severe and pro­ longed economic crisis, there is a considerable chance that Japan will swing to one non-democratic extreme or the other. The crucial importance of economic factors in undermining an insecure demoSummary and Conclusions

4io Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan cratic structure and in promoting political extremes is, of course, not limited to Japan. It was, for example, the 1923 inflation in Ger­ many that provided the conditions of economic and psychological instability in which the Nazi movement achieved its first successes and in which the Communists too were able to win a substantial in­ crease in their following. With the improvement of conditions after 1924 the two extremes suffered a temporary decline. The subsequent resurgence of the Nazi and Communist parties coincided with the years of the economic depression after 1929 ; unemployment and in­ security helped to strengthen both extremes and disastrously to weaken the Weimar Republic. In Japan, too, the world economic slump, whose effects were especially pronounced in the already de­ pressed rural areas, had a fatal effect on the liberal-democratic struc­ ture and was one of the immediate causes for the rising influence of right-wing extremism and militarism. Since the Meiji Period Japan’s economic well-being has been more dependent than that of most industrial nations on world price fluctuations and on general conditions of trade. From the outset in­ dustry was to a large extent subservient to the demands of inter­ national trade, and goods were manufactured primarily for the ex­ port market. In the post-war period, with the loss of her overseas investments and territory, including her special markets and sources of food and raw materials, and with the development of exceedingly close ties with the American economy, Japan’s dependence on the conditions of world trade has become even greater. This is under­ lined by the fact that Japan is now obliged to import 20 per cent, of her food requirements and over 80 per cent, of the raw materials that are most important for her industry. External factors, such as a de­ cline in world trade or an increase in tariffs, can at any time upset the precarious balance between exports and imports. The relative economic prosperity that Japan has enjoyed since the prostration of the early post-war years has resulted to a considerable extent from adventitious circumstances (such as the Korean War and favourable conditions of world trade) rather than from any in­ herent strength in the national economy. For the next decade at least Japan’s economic well-being will continue to be of a precarious nature. The underlying facts are well known. In terms of population per arable acre, Japan has the densest population in the world and, so far as can be determined, the greatest of any major country in

Summary and Conclusions

411

history. Although the birth-rate is now lower than in any other in­ dustrial nation, the death-rate began to drop well before urbaniza­ tion and birth-control could exert any significant effect on the rate of reproduction, with the result that for some time the population will continue to increase by almost 1 million a year. No amount of urbanization, birth-control, or emigration will prevent the popula­ tion from soon being twice that of Great Britain and two and a half times that of France. This population (which, it may be noted, has already passed the supposed ‘explosion point* of 90 million, and which is bound to reach almost 110 million before it starts to decline) is packed into a country two-thirds the size of metropolitan France —a country of which only about 16 per cent, is arable, of which some two-thirds is mountain and forest, and which, in addition, is hope­ lessly deficient in most raw materials. Even more important from a political point of view is the particu­ lar age structure of the population and the enormous increase in the number of people in the productive age-group, for whom jobs must be found. This, of course, is a potential source of strength ; at the same time, however, it puts enormous demands on the economy. With the rural population having long since reached a saturation point so far as employment on the farms is concerned, it is now necessary to create new non-agricultural jobs for some 800,000 people every year. It is estimated that until 1965 this will require an annual growth in the economy of about 6 per cent. Economic growth has been impressive in the post-war years, but to achieve the postu­ lated rate of growth in the future will require very favourable export conditions indeed. As a result of the 1957 policy of economic re­ trenchment and of the business recession in the United States, the rate of growth appears to have slowed down considerably and the Economic Deliberation Committee predicted a rate of only 3 per cent, in 1958. There will no doubt be constant fluctuations in the years to come, but the important thing to remember is that the Japanese economy cannot afford to stand still, let alone to recede. In the absence of a consistent and substantial rate of economic growth during the coming decade, unemployment figures are bound to in­ crease drastically. Seriously underemployed people now probably number some 7 million out of a labour force of 43 million ; fully un­ employed are close on 1 million. An^ubstantial increase in the pool of surplus labour may have grave political effects.

412 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan A deep and prolonged economic crisis would bring the unem­ ployment and underemployment figures to a dangerous level; it would result in a fall in the standard of living, which for a consider­ able part of the population is still perilously low; it would cause serious distress to large segments of the people, including farmers, industrial workers, and small entrepreneurs. If the Government ap­ peared to be incapable of dealing with the crisis under the present system, that system would be gravely imperilled. Since liberalism and its concomitants have not yet developed sufficiently to replace the old values, critical conditions, marked by widespread anxiety, cynicism, and despair, would make the existing political structure extremely vulnerable to attack by nationalist agitators of the left and the right. The various influences that serve at present to secure moderation and stability in the nation’s politics would be enfeebled and the prestige of democratic institutions, whose roots are still so shallow, would be undermined among large sections of the popula­ tion. Such an internal weakening of the existing economic and political system would play directly into the hands of the two ex­ tremes and might well involve the renewed failure of democracy in Japan. Severe crisis presents a threat to the stability of liberaldemocratic institutions in any part of the world, but in view both of the many fundamental weaknesses that still characterize Japanese democracy, and of the immaturity of the centre in Japanese politics, it would take much less of a crisis to push Japan to one extreme or the other than would be required in the case of countries like the United States, Great Britain, Canada, or Sweden. As is frequently pointed out, the crucial period will be during the next decade, when the working population will be increasing with such breakneck speed. Thereafter, a gradual levelling off and ageing of the population, together with a strengthening of democratic be­ liefs and institutions, can be expected to reduce the threat. The population will, however, continue under normal circumstances to increase rapidly during the greater part of this century and it ap­ pears probable that Japan’s political system will for some time be very susceptible to dangers from economic factors which are not mainly dependent on the country itself but which come from the outside. As in the case of pre-1933 Germany, a severe and prolonged

Summary and Conclusions 413 economic crisis in Japan is likely to lead to a temporary strengthen­ ing of both extremes. Despite the profound differences in their ideologies, these two extremes are in many ways surprisingly close, being, as we have seen, situated at the extremities of an almost com­ plete circle rather than at the opposite ends of a straight line. Both extremes attract the same type of authoritarian personality and are characterized by a similar ‘tough-minded’ approach, involving fan­ aticism, irrationality, and a readiness for violence; the frequent shifts from one extreme to the other bespeak this psychological affinity. In their attacks on the political order, the extreme left and the extreme right both attempt to exploit nationalist sentiment, and both stress the need to make Japan strong and ‘independent*. Viru­ lent anti-foreign sentiment in Japan is largely concentrated in the extremes. Both extremes thrive on the same political climate : both stand to profit from a decline of liberal values and a weakening of democratic institutions. Though they may pay lip-service to ‘democracy’ and ‘people’s rights’, the type of régime that they both envisage is authoritarian and completely intolerant of political opposition. Although the two extremes have so much in common, they re­ main each other’s most mortal enemies and there appears to be little likelihood of their being able to co-operate with each other under any circumstances. This brings us to the crucial question of whether it is the extreme left or the extreme right that stands to profit more from a crisis of the type that we have envisaged. The Communists have certain clear advantages. They are infinitely better organized than the extreme rightist groups and are free from most of the prin­ cipal weaknesses that beset the latter. They are able to present a positive image of the future and one that supposedly involves a steady improvement of living standards and a permanent elimina­ tion of unemployment and of the other aspects of economic injustice that would be so conspicuous at a time of crisis. In addition the Communists are in a far better position than the rightists to exploit certain prevailing sentiments, such as those against war, nuclear weapons, and the remilitarization of Japan ; they are also better suit­ ed than the rightists for exploiting nationalist feelings on issues like American bases in Japan and the future of Okinawa. Again, while the right-wing organizations exist in a virtual vacuum, the

414 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan Communist Party has allies among certain elements of the Socialist Party, organized labour, the student movement, the teachers* union, and the intelligentsia. When all these factors have been taken into account, however, it remains the opinion of the present writer that, in the event of a break­ down of the existing democratic régime, Japan is more likely to swing to some form of extreme rightist politics than to Communism. This view is based on various pre-war and post-war factors analysed in the course of this study and on certain general observations. It is not, however, advanced with any dogmatic assurance and the reader, on evaluating the evidence, may well reach a contrary conclusion. The principal considerations that incline the writer to the view that a breakdown of the present system in Japan would in the final analysis benefit the extreme right rather than the Communists are as follows. First, nationalism remains the strongest underlying force in the country and in a period of crisis it is likely to become intensified ; for a variety of reasons discussed earlier in the present chapter, the extreme right is more closely attuned to Japanese nationalism than is the left. Secondly, the extreme rightists are far more in tune than the Communists with Japanese traditions in general. In almost every way they fit into the Japanese ‘atmosphere* better than the left. The right-wing societies that we have been examining do not derive simply from the 1930*3, but have their historical roots in the Edo and Meiji Periods. Tokugawa Confucianism, the theories of the Mito School, the agrarian xenophobia of the hakumatsu period, early Meiji nationalism and official Shintoism, to name only a few ex­ amples, all find their echoes in the post-war rightist groups. These groups can, accordingly, appeal to a desire for cultural security and continuity in a way that is impossible for the Communists, who, despite all their talk of respect for the nation’s cultural traditions, are widely regarded as ‘foreign* and iconoclastic. In view of the widespread persistence of pre-modern conditions and sentiments, this association of the rightists with traditional ways is an important source of potential strength. The traditionalist appeal of the extreme right is especially opera­ tive in provincial and rural areas. This brings us to a third considera­ tion, namely that farmers and other country-folk, with their strong traditionalism, their deeply-ingrained anti-urban sentiment, and their suspicion of foreign innovations, would in a period of crisis be

Summary and Conclusions

415

more susceptible to the ideas of a reform from the right than to the internationally slanted theories of the extreme left. As has often been pointed out, there is a close relationship between the agrarian primi­ tivism of the late Tokugawa Period and the modern ultra-nationalist movement, and many of the rightist organizations still reveal their strong agrarian roots. It is significant that the strength of the extreme left in rural and provincial areas should have remained negligible in the post-war period, and that these are the areas where extreme rightist candidates have had the greatest electoral success. The conservatism and stability that have characterized rural areas since the land reform would be seriously impaired in case of serious economic crisis. This would play into the hands of any extreme group that was able to attack the supposed sources of agrarian diffi­ culties and to promise a solution; but it appears likely that some form of right-wing radicalism, in which a return to the Emperor sys­ tem and Japanism was combined with economic reform, would have a better chance of exploiting economic discontent than Communism. This probable tendency of non-urban elements to swing right rather than left could be of great importance in a country with as large a rural population as Japan and where even most urban dwell­ ers are still only one generation removed from the land. A fourth factor that would tend to favour the extreme rightists is that in case of a critical weakening of the existing system the power­ ful conservative elements in the country would almost invariably back them in preference to the Communists. Under normal circum­ stances conservative politicians, bureaucrats, and business men can be expected to uphold the present form of government, but if it should ever come to a choice there is little doubt as to which of the two extremes would be the lesser evil for most of them. A severe economic crisis would almost certainly be accompanied by con­ siderable labour unrest and other forms of social tension, as well as by a rapid growth of ultra-leftist influence in the trade unions and elsewhere. If the Government seemed to be unable to deal with the crisis under the parliamentary system, many business leaders might see fit to give at least partial support to extreme right-wing groups and policies, which (like Nazism before 1933) might appear to be the best defence against the supreme disaster of Communism. It is also important to remember that whereas an unbridgeable chasm separ­ ates the ruling conservative party from the extreme left, many

4 i6 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan extreme right-wing personalities have close connexions with this party and that those rightists who have been elected to the Diet since 1953 have invariably stood as official candidates of the conservative party. The well-entrenched power of the conservatives would in­ evitably favour the extreme right rather than the extreme left. As­ suming that at the time of crisis government was still in the hands of the conservatives, it is they who would have control of the state machinery, including the police and the National Defence Forces. If things seemed to hang in the balance between the extreme left and the extreme right, this immensely powerful machinery would indubitably be used against the Communists. Thus the realities of present leadership in Japan would favour the extreme right. The realities of Japan’s position in the cold war world would also incline the country towards the right rather than to Communism, though this is rather more dubious ground. So long as international tension continues at its general post-war level and so long as the con­ servatives remain in power, it is likely that the United States will re­ tain considerable influence on Japan in both the military and the economic fields. It is, of course, the hope of America and of the West in general that Japan will preserve her present democratic structure. If, however, the country should swing to one extreme or the other, there is no doubt as to which would be the lesser disaster for the Western allies. The establishment of an extreme left-wing régime in Japan would represent an unmitigated catastrophe for the West and it is clear that the United States in particular would use all its con­ siderable influence in co-operating with the Japanese conservatives to prevent such a development. It is doubtful whether a swing to the extreme right, unfortunate as it might seem, would elicit any such reaction. The Communist countries would, of course, decry the growth of rightist power, but given their relatively small influence on Japan’s policy it is hard to see what they could do to prevent it, other than to pursue a policy of open interference which, in the pre­ sent pattern of alignments, would presumably lead to world war. It is clear, then, that there are many influential forces both inside and outside Japan which, while preferring a continuation of the existing system, would in the event of its breakdown favour the extreme right as against the left. On the other hand it may be argued that, despite the weak roots of democracy among the general popu­ lation, there are now too many effective anti-rightist forces in the

Summary and Conclusions

417

country to make a swing to the extreme right feasible. When these forces are examined one by one, however, their probable effective­ ness in preventing such a trend in time of crisis often seems slighter than one might at first have imagined. The extreme left itself is a very small minority and completely out of touch with the principal centres of power, including public opinion. In a period of crisis the danger that Communism would present to the state would in itself be the greatest spur to the rise of the extreme right. Socialist and moderate leftist sentiment, which would also be in­ tractably opposed to a recrudescence of right-wing power, finds much of its main support among industrial workers, students, and intellectuals. To what extent would these elements be effective in blocking the right wing? In the present stage of Japan’s industriali­ zation the interests of workers are far from being homogeneous. Japanese workers are split in countless ways—organized and un­ organized, permanent employees and day-labourers, those who work in large-scale modern enterprises and those who are employed in small family-type concerns, those who feel a loyalty to their own class interests and those whose primary loyalties are still of a pa­ ternalistic nature. It is doubtful whether even in a time of crisis these divisions would be overcome to the extent that the workers could present a common front against a rise of right-wing power. In the case of students and the younger generation in general, though a vague form of socialist sentiment is widely spread, it does not as a rule go very deep and frequently it begins to evaporate at the first contacts with the realities of post-scholastic life. Such senti­ ment would hardly be of much avail in withstanding a right-wing resurgence during a period of crisis. When we come to Japanese in­ tellectuals, it would seem that their real political influence remains extremely small. There is still a far greater gulf in Japan than in most Western countries between the intellectuals and the mass of the people. The views expressed in the main intellectual journals of opinion, for instance, rarely reflect prevailing political sentiment in the country. The intellectuals are predominantly left wing and ‘pro­ gressive’ ; the country is predominantly conservative. Among the many reasons for the persistence of this gulf is the strongly Western orientation of intellectuals since the Meiji Restoration and the diffi­ culty (partly for linguistic reasons) that intellectuals have in making

4i 8 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan their ideas intelligible to the mass of the people. Such opposition as the intellectuals voiced to the rise of pre-war ultra-nationalism and militarism was totally ineffective and, so long as the gulf remains, it is unlikely that their opposition to similar trends in the future will carry much more weight. Now, as before the war, a far more in­ fluential force in shaping public opinion consists of the so-called ‘quasi-intellectuals* (giji-interigenshiya). It is they, as we have seen, who provided much of the support for rightist movements before the war ; they remain politically conservative and bitterly inimical to the left. A final advantage of the extreme right in a country where the principle of continuity is so highly valued as in Japan is that their rise would in all probability not require any violent or abrupt change in the existing patterns of political power. While a swing to the extreme left would involve almost total disruption of the present order, a swing to the right could take place in such a way as to pre­ serve the institutional façade of the existing system and to assure continuity, in administration and elsewhere, between the period of party supremacy and that of authoritarian rule. This leads us to the question of how the extreme right would be likely to assert its influence in a period of crisis. We can distinguish three main possibilities. First, right-wing nationalism could develop as a mass movement (on the general lines of European Fascism or Nazism) which would gradually win the support of large sections of the population and which in a time of crisis would acquire sufficient popular strength to assume power by more or less legal means. Our study of the rightist movement in Japan has indicated that for a variety of fundamental reasons such a development is exceedingly unlikely; there is even less chance now than there was before the war that the rightist societies will significantly expand their popular support and become a driving political force that can actually take power. Secondly, the rightists could assert themselves by means of ter­ rorism and assassination. Almost all the post-war groups have re­ jected violence and coup d’état in favour of ‘re-education* and legal political activity. Such groups as have perpetrated violence have in most cases been motivated by pecuniary rather than political mo­ tives. On the other hand there has been a number of attacks or at­ tempted assassinations directed at labour leaders, Communists, and

419 even a Prime Minister. Disclaimers of illegal intent must certainly not be taken at their face value when they come from groups in which the tradition of direct action is still so strong and in which violence is always so close to the surface. Many of the figures who participated in the pre-war assassinations are active in the post-war societies and in a period of crisis such societies might well display their patriotic fervour by violent attacks on corrupt political leaders, labour organizers, and prominent left-wing personalities. In the ab­ sence of any strong supporting forces, it is unlikely that the rightists will be able to organize any putsch on such ambitious lines as the February (1936) Incident. The actual usurpation of political power through violent action by one or more of the groups remains highly improbable. Even in a period of crisis, the attacks are likely to be of a sporadic nature and in most cases abortive. Though such attacks would not in themselves enable the rightists to obtain power, they would, as in pre-war days, help to increase the prevailing tension and indirectly to hasten the collapse of the liberal-democratic structure. By far the most likely way in which the rightists could assert themselves is by assuming their traditional role as an auxiliary force in conjunction with some dynamic nationalist power in the country. The absence of such a power in the post-war period is, of course, the main reason for the present inanition of the right wing. At a time of crisis, however, in which the country appeared to be threatened by the extreme left, a dynamic nationalist power might well re-emerge. One possibility is that the military may once more become a driving political force. There is at present little sign that this will happen and numerous factors combine to make it unlikely that the military will regain their pre-war position. Nevertheless in a country where dur­ ing the course of the centuries the military have held power under so many different conditions, it would be unwise to rule out the possi­ bility that in a time of crisis they may again assert themselves on the political plane. We have noticed the increasing success of former military leaders in elections since 1952 and also the growing political orientation of the great ex-servicemen’s organizations. The ideals of most military men who have been active in post-war politics are in every respect congruent with right-wing nationalism of the ‘homeconsumption’ variety. In most cases they tacitly discount the possi­ bility of independent military ventures overseas. Instead, they stress the need to fill the existing spiritual vacuum with a new patriotism Summary and Conclusions

420

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan

and to re-educate the people with a respect for traditional national virtues; the emphasis is on loyalty and conformity to established social patterns, and as a rule there is little real sympathy with demo­ cratic or egalitarian aspirations; the great enemy is the left wing, which is regarded as threatening all that is most valuable in the national heritage. This similarity of approach has made it possible for ex-military and civilian rightists to co-operate in certain post-war nationalist organizations. Such collaboration was of the greatest importance before the war and could become important again under certain con­ ditions. In a period of crisis civilian ultra-nationalists might co­ operate with military men in support of a right-wing, nationalist Government that promised to restore the national virtues, to abolish corruption in politics, and to rid the country of subversive elements. The fact that the military will in all likelihood have little scope for success overseas does not preclude their becoming a driving force in crushing internal enemies; in such an eventuality the civilian right­ ists would have a valuable role to perform as an auxiliary force. A far more probable pattern of development, however, is that in a period of crisis, with a weakening of confidence in the democratic system and with a growing threat from the extreme left, the power­ ful conservative elements in the country, including political leaders, high-ranking bureaucrats, and business leaders, would attempt to mobilize the present scattered nationalist sentiments into a dynamic force and to direct this force into authoritarian rather than demo­ cratic channels. Such a ‘remobilization* would be aimed primarily at a domestic crusade against the left; at the same time it would be designed to meet real or imagined dangers from abroad by promot­ ing national unity. It would involve at least the partial restoration of pre-war totalitarian patterns and a partial suppression of funda­ mental democratic freedoms. If the process continued, this might lead to the creation of a police state, bolstered by thought control and based on a reconstituted Emperor system—a regime marked by oppression at home and suspicion, if not outright hostility, towards foreigners and foreign countries. Such developments would in all probability not require any vio­ lent overthrow of existing institutions, but as in pre-war days would involve the gradual, legal transformation of a liberal, democratic structure into a semi-totalitarian régime. Democratic amulets

421 would probably retain official sanction and the steady suppression of civil liberties and the consolidation of a garrison police state might well be justified as necessary to protect ‘democracy* from leftist sub­ version. It is likely that, as in the 1930*8, the formal structure of par­ liamentary democracy itself would be preserved. In a country where the dichotomy between the base and the apex remains as pronoun­ ced as in Japan and where democracy has such feeble roots it is quite possible for politics to develop in an authoritarian direction while the institutional façade of democracy remains intact. The danger is not that the parliamentary institutions themselves will disappear, but that effective power will be transferred from the legislature to an in­ creasingly authoritarian executive. In this general pattern the right wing would have an important auxiliary service to perform. The fact that on the whole the rightists have become far less radical and anti-capitalist in their stand would probably make it easier for them to co-operate with the conserva­ tives than it was in pre-war days. A number of the post-war nation­ alist organizations have combined politicians, business men, and professional rightists in their leadership and such groups would probably become more numerous and important under the con­ ditions that we are examining. The less respectable strong-arm groups could usefully co-operate with the police in breaking strikes and riots and in obtaining information about leftists and trade unionists. In case a full-fledged police state should come into being many of them could profitably be mobilized as anti-Communist shock troops. As the Government steadily came to adopt extreme undemocratic policies, prominent rightist personalities would be likely to gain positions of influence in the state, and many middleof-the-road conservative leaders would probably become increasing­ ly right wing in their orientation. Summary and Conclusions

Im plications fo r the W estern Democracies

What, then, would be the implications for the West of such a swing to the right in Japanese politics? Much, of course, would de­ pend on general international conditions at the time, but, assuming that there has been no fundamental change in the world situation, the following general observations may be ventured. In the first place, the establishment of a rightist régime, however extreme it might be in its anti-democratic policies, would clearly be DD

422 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan less damaging from the standpoint of the Western alliance than the victory of Communism in Japan. This point need hardly be labour­ ed. If Japan, with her immense population, her industrial capacity, and her strategic location, turned to Communism and made com­ mon cause with the great Communist land powers, the balance of power, not only in the Far East but in the world, would shift dis­ astrously against the West. For various reasons discussed in the course of this study, however, such a development seems very un­ likely, even in the event of severe economic crisis, unless the internal forces favouring Communism are backed by outside support from the Communist bloc, of a type that would almost certainly lead to a world conflagration. In other words it would appear that Com­ munism has little chance of winning power in Japan in the absence of a world war. At the present time Communist power represents the greatest world menace to the Western democracies and it is true that a rightwing nationalist régime in Japan would be strongly anti-Communist, at least in its domestic policy. These facts should not, however, lead the West to regard a swing to the extreme right in Japan with any complacency. For one thing, the failure of democracy in Japan would have a most damaging effect on the entire liberal-democratic cause in Asia. With China and certain other areas under the control of Communist dictatorships, with the parliamentary system in numerous countries of South East Asia having succumbed to mili­ tary dictatorship, and with Japan under an authoritarian right-wing Government, the future of democracy in the Far East would be far from bright. A return to authoritarian rule in Japan would seriously weaken the moral basis of the Western alliance. It may be suggested by the tough-minded observer that, unfortu­ nate as the failure of democracy in Japan might be, the only signifi­ cant consideration under the present circumstances is whether or not Japan will remain in the anti-Communist camp. It may even be argued that the establishment of a strong rightist régime, which could resolutely suppress left-wing opposition, would actually in­ crease Japan’s effectiveness in the struggle against world Com­ munism; Japan, after all, would not be the first non-democratic country to participate effectively in the Free World alliance. This seemingly hard-headed argument is based on one rather uncertain assumption, namely, that under a right-wing nationalist

423 Government Japan would remain in the Western camp and would continue to co-operate with the democratic powers. For several reasons it is unwise to assume that under such a Government Japan would in fact be a reliable ally. To begin with, virulent xenophobia and the various other irrational factors associated with extreme nationalism would come into play, and would tend to make the country’s foreign policy unstable and unpredictable. The incon­ stancy and opportunism of Japanese rightist elements will have been observed frequently in the course of the present study; this could have a very unsettling effect on foreign policy if the rightists rose to a position of influence. Until now the tendency among most rightists has been to accept the American alliance as a sort of necessary evil. The general rightwing policy of shimbei-hanso (pro-America, anti-Russia) should cer­ tainly not be confused with any real sympathy for the West, still less for the ideals on which the West bases its cause. A right-wing Government led by men of extreme nationalist conviction might well come to pursue policies of which the West would strongly dis­ approve. In view of Japan’s economic weakness and of the unified power of China and the Soviet Union, the danger of independent militarism is relatively small. Yet it is far from impossible that a heavily rearmed Japan might adopt a very truculent policy towards certain small pro-Western states like South Korea and the Philip­ pines; this could be a source of considerable embarrassment to the West. The flexibility of the extreme right in matters of foreign policy might also lead them to favour an alignment with Communist China, despite a strong anti-Communist policy at home. Closer understanding with Communist China is an important objective of several nationalist groups, right-wing theoreticians, and even con­ servative statesmen; under a rightist Government such an align­ ment would be likely to assume a pronounced anti-Western form. Pan-Asianism is a favourite theme with the organized right wing and this, again, could take the form of co-operating with other Asian countries to expel Western influence. Finally, we have notic­ ed the strong link that has developed in the post-war contact be­ tween the nationalist demands for ‘independence* and right-wing neutralism. The attitude of ‘a plague on both your houses’ has be­ come increasingly frequent among rightists in observing the conSummary and Conclusions

424 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan flict between the Soviet Union and the West. Under the inspiration of a certain type of nationalist leader, a right-wing Government might well begin to cut ties with the West in favour of a policy of neutralism in the cold war, combined with support for an antiWestern pan-Asian movement in which Japan would play a major part; such a course, it may be added, would probably receive considerable support from popular nationalist sentiment. With the dominance of Communist China, an anti-Western pan-Asian policy would probably be most damaging for Japan’s position in the world. Yet this would not necessarily prevent the Government from adopting it or other injudicious policies; for, as in the past, the ir­ rational aspects of extreme nationalism would probably lead Japan to follow a course that was entirely contrary to her own real interests. In sum, a swing to the extreme right in Japan would represent a danger to the West second only to the victory of Communism. There are numerous ways in which the West can help to reduce the chances of a swing to extremism in Japan. Anything that can be done to encourage mutual understanding, friendly co-operation, and cultural contact is valuable; for, in Japan as elsewhere, insu­ larity, a sense of isolation, and the resultant paranoia, persecution mania, and belief in uniqueness all combine to lead nationalism into dangerous channels. Far more important than any of this, however, is the preservation of Japan’s economic viability. Democracy in Japan is still too precarious to withstand a deep and protracted crisis, and it is precisely such a crisis that is likely to make politics swing to one extreme or the other. Since Japan’s economy is now more de­ pendent than ever on trade in the open world market, this is clearly a medium by which the West can help to steer the country’s politics along safe channels. Conclusions In this study attention has been focused on one particular aspect of Japanese politics and this has inevitably involved the danger of creating an unbalanced picture. Every effort has been made to avoid overemphasizing the present importance of extreme right-wing ele­ ments and to show that they are far from occupying a central posi­ tion in the political pattern. A particular effort has been made in this final chapter to examine these elements in the general context of Japanese society and politics rather than as independent phenomena.

425 Seen in this way, the re-emergence of a type of right-wing national­ ism is clearly not central to current politics; nevertheless it reveals greater symptomatic and potential significance than is usually recognized. A further possible source of misinterpretation arises from the fact that a virulent form of right-wing nationalism played so important a part in recent Japanese history. As a result, the observer is liable to look for historical parallels and familiar symptoms instead of objec­ tively analysing contemporary trends. In studying current develop­ ments, we must never forget that a symptom which had a certain significance or effect in one set of historical circumstances may have an entirely different significance or effect in another context. It would, for example, be foolish in the extreme to deduce from the premiss that political corruption was successfully exploited by right-wing elements before the war the conclusion that the present corrupt state of parliamentary politics augurs the breakdown of the democratic structure. Again, the fact that the period since 1952 has seen numerous developments that are reminiscent of pre-war days and also the return to influence of many political leaders who were important during the militarist period must not lead us to the con­ clusion that Japan is steadily reverting into an ultra-nationalist state. A hardly less insidious danger, however, is to assume that, because objective conditions differ widely from one period to another, the earlier pattern cannot possibly be repeated in any form ; or that, be­ cause certain conditions have arisen that were unthinkable in the earlier period, these will effectively prevent a recurrence of earlier developments. The fact, for example, that Japan has virtually no scope for independent military action and that even the professional patriots have as a rule abandoned dreams of expansion does not in itself preclude the emergence of a right-wing authoritarian régime having much in common with its pre-war counterpart. Equally, the preservation of many of the individual Occupation measures (for in­ stance, the land reform and equality of rights for women) is not sufficient to rule out the possibility of a breakdown of a democracy and a return to a semi-totalitarian structure. In examining contem­ porary developments it is essential to draw our conclusions from general conditions and trends seen in the light of the historical back­ ground rather than from individual phenomena, however impresSummary and Conclusions

426 Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan sive they may be. At the same time we must always be alive to the latent or collateral developments that accompany the main trends; in periods of great social tension the former may rapidly accumulate energy and emerge as the dominant force. While the reappearance of numerous pre-war signs in Japan does not in itself betoken any wholesale return to past political patterns, the preservation until now of many aspects of the post-war demo­ cratic reform, the considerable degree of real modernization, and the growth of a generation that has been raised in a relatively free atmosphere do not guarantee that under conditions of severe and prolonged crisis the country will not revert to more familiar authori­ tarian patterns, even though they may differ in many respects from those of the pre-war period. If modern history teaches us anything, it is that we cannot take democracy and its concomitants for granted in any part of the world, especially not in underdeveloped or latedeveloping countries where its roots are still shallow. Democracy in Japan is no hardy perennial, but a very fragile growth indeed. It would be most unwise both for the Japanese themselves and for us in the West to assume that it has already reached that point where it can withstand the challenge of real crisis.

A P P E N D IX I THE ‘AMULETIC’ USE OF WORDS IN JAPANESE Important material on the ‘amuletic’ use of words in Japanese is given in an article by Mr. F. J. Daniels entitled ‘Mr. T[s]urumi-Syunsuke on the “Amuletic” Use of Words: a Translation with Commentary*, published in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 18,1956, pp. 514-33. In his analysis of ‘amuletic words’ Mr. Tsurumi explains them as words used by a person ‘especially in order to safeguard his own social or political standpoint’ and having ‘tendencies and associations recognized as orthodox by those in power in the society in which he lives* (p. 519). As he says, ‘The group of words kokutai, nipponteki, and koodoo usually gave anyone who used them the same feeling of security as an amulet: “provided I have this about me, I shall be able to keep myself safe from the malevolent, to escape accidental misfortune” ’ (p. 522). Further examples of ‘amuletic’ words and phrases frequently used in a nationalistic context are given in Ch. II, pp. 30-31 above. The titles of most of the ultra-nationalist societies both before and after the war have consisted simply of a string of ‘amulet-words’. Since the latter are quite limited in number, it is not surprising that the name of one extremist group should often be barely distinguishable from that of another and that in certain cases the same name should be used for two or more en­ tirely different groups, e.g. Nihon Kokumin To, Japan National Party (p. 43 above) ; Kokumin To, National Party (p. 51 above) ; Nihon Dokuritsu Kokumin To, Japan Independence National Party (p. 46 above). The same confusion applies to the slogans of different ultra-nationalist societies, which again consist of the same amulet-words ‘bobbing up one after another*, as Mr. Tsurumi says, ‘almost like the members of an all-star cast*. Mr. Tsurumi shows how the objects of association of some thirty political and ideological bodies listed in the Bunka Dantai Nenkan for 1942 all contain amulet-words and that as a result they are sometimes completely indistinguishable from each other (Daniels, pp. 529-30). The lack of concrete referential content in these amuletic words is underlined by the fact that a single amulet could be used with totally different connotations depending on the historical circumstances. Thus during the International Military Tribunal proceedings Professor Uzawa could explain that the phrase hakkö ichiu (‘eight comers of the world under one roof’), whose connotations until then had been of the inost chauvinistic nature, was in fact an expression of belief in ‘universal

428 Appendix I brotherhood* (Maruyama, ‘Nihon no Shisö*, in Iwanami, Gendai Nihon no Shisö, vol. xi). Among the many significant ‘amuletic* words used in a nationalistic context is kokutai. In his Glossary, Mr. Daniels cites various definitions of these ‘amulet-words* as given in Japanese dictionaries dated 1925,1943, and 1949 respectively. ‘Amulet-words*, however, cannot be understood simply by reference to their dictionary meanings: it is essential to exam­ ine their ‘situational context*. In the case of kokutai^ this context is described by Mr. Tsurumi as follows: tendency represented!ousting of foreign ideologies, support of capitalist-bureaucratic government; advocating class/ older officers, aristocracy, older educationalists ; period/ 1933-4 onwards; course of events/ Minobe affair, &c. It was an essential tenet of faith among ultra-nationalists, and one much stressed in the canonic work on the subject, Kokutai no Hongi,1that Japan’s kokutai was unique and superior to that of any other country—if, indeed, other coun­ tries could even be said to have one. 1 See above, p. 3 n. 3.

A P P E N D IX I I ULTRA-NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS NAMED IN THE PURGE ORDER OF JANUARY 1946 1. Dai Nippon Isshin-Kai (Great Japan Renovation Society). 2. Dai Nippon Köa Remmei (Great Japan Rising Asia Alliance). 3. Dai Nippon Seisan Tö (Great Japan Production Party). 4. Dai Nippon Sekisei Kai (Great Japan True-Hearted Society). 5. Dai Töa Kyokai (Great East Asia Association). 6. Daitöjuku (Great Eastern Academy). 7. Genron Hökoku Kai (Literary Patriotic Society). 8. Genyö Sha (Dark Ocean Society). 9. Jikyoku Kaigi Kai (Current Affairs Discussion Society). 10. Kakumei Sö (The House of the Cry of the Crane). 11. Kenkoku Kai (National Foundation Society). 12. Kinkei Gakuin (Golden Pheasant Institute). 13. Kokuryü Kai (Black Dragon Society). 14. Kokusai Hankyö Remmei (Anti-Communist League). 15. Kokusai Seikei Gakkai (International Political-Economic Society). 16. Kokusui Taishü Tö (National Essence Mass Party). 17. Kokutai Yögo Rengö (National Polity Protection League). 18. Meirin Kai (Higher Ethics Society). 19. Mizuho Kurabu (Fresh Rice-Ears Club). 20. Sonjö Doshikai (Loyalist Comrades’ Society). 21. Taika Kai (Great Reform Society). 22. Tenkö Kai (Heavenly Action Society). 23. Töa Remmei (East Asia League). 24. Töhö Doshikai (Far East Comrades’ Association). 25. Töhö Kai (Eastern Association). 26. Yamato Musubi Honsha (Yamato Solidarity Headquarters). 27. Zen Nippon Seinen Kurabu (All-Japan Young Men’s Club). The above are listed in SCAP, Political Reorientation, pp. 480-1. A further list of about 100 affiliated organizations (together with their leaders) is given by Professor Kinoshita Hanji, Purge Policy, pp. 11-13. Appendix I of the Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance of 4 Jan­ uary 1947 lists 145 ultra-nationalistic organizations whose members are to be automatically purged (SCAP, Political Reorientation, pp. 511-13).

A P P E N D IX I I I MAIN DOMESTIC ‘INCIDENTS’, 1931-40 The word ‘incident* (jikeri) has an extremely wide range and is used to describe anything from the arrest of a smuggling ring (e.g. Kairetsu-go Incident) to a full-scale attempt at coup d’etat (e.g. February Incident). The cognate wordjihen> also officially translated as ‘incident*, served as a useful euphemism to describe the action initiated by the Imperial Army in Manchuria (1931) and in China (1937). Since many of the personalities who figure in the present study par­ ticipated in one or more of the domestic incidents in the 1930’s, and since these incidents tend to overlap in a rather confusing manner, brief factual outlines of the more important efforts may be useful for reference. Names of personalities who have been active in the post-war period are given in italics. The following account does not include isolated assassinations, such as that of the Prime Minister, Mr. Hamaguchi (who was fatally shot in 1930 by Sagoya Tomeo, a nationalist zealot), or of Major-General Nagata, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of War (who was murdered in 1935 by a fanatic lieutenant-colonel of the Imperial Way Faction); nor does it include the many abortive incidents concerning which little concrete evidence is available, such as the plot of Kodama Yoshio's Independence Youth Society and Toyama Hidezö's Association for Heavenly Action to kill Prime Minister Saitö and various ‘corrupt advisers to the Throne’ in the autumn of 1932. The Police Agency Re­ search Association describes a total of twenty-nine rightist ‘incidents* that occurred between 1930 and 1945 (Keibi Keisatsu, pp. 229-36). i. March Incident (Sangatsu Jiken) Date planned for 20 March 1931. General first major attempt by military and civilian ultra-nationalist Description elements to organize a coup d’etat at home in preparation for military action abroad (viz. the Manchurian Incident). Main 1. military—Col. Hashimoto Kingoro and other members Participants of the army’s Cherry-Blossom Association (Sakura Kai) provided the driving force, but the main support came from certain senior officers (e.g. Lt.-Gens. Tatekawa and Koiso, Maj.-Gen. Nagata).

Plans

Results Punitive Action

Appendix I I I 431 2. civilian—ökawa Shümei, Shimizu Gionosuke, Kita Ikki, Tsukui Tatsuo and his Mass Society (Taishü Sha); financial support provided by Marquis Tokugawa Yoshichika and others. to overthrow civilian rule by violence and to substitute a military government under Gen. Ugaki Kazushige, which would carry out the policies advocated by the CherryBlossom Association and its civilian supporters; the Tokyo garrison was to be mobilized and troops placed round the Diet building; the Diet was to be dissolved. plan abandoned because of opposition from certain high army circles, especially Gen. Ugaki himself. the matter was officially hushed up and no punitive action was taken.

2. October Incident (Jügatsu Jiken) or Imperial Flag Revolution (Kinki Kakumei) Date planned for October 1931. General attempt to carry out a Showa Restoration and to install a Description government that would pursue a tougher policy in Man­ churia; the plans were more concrete and violent than in the March Incident; few senior officers were involved. Main 1. military—Col. Hashimoto and other members of the Participants Cherry-Blossom Association, including Capt. Chö Isamu and Lt.-Col. Nemoto Hiroshi. 2. civilian—ökawa Shümei, Nishida Zei, Akamatsu Katsumaro. Plans (a) War Minister and Chiefs of Staff to be isolated and two regiments of the Guards Division to be called out to help the rebels; (b) the entire Cabinet to be assassinated by aerial bombard­ ment during a Cabinet meeting; (c) Metropolitan Police Board Hqs. to be occupied ; (d) Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and other advisers close to the Throne to be assassinated ; (é) a military government to be installed under Gen. Araki. Results the plans were exposed to the authorities and the army par­ ticipants were arrested on 17 October.

432 Punitive

Appendix I I I

mild ‘administrative punishment* given to a few of the army ringleaders; civilian participants not arrested; the army hushed up the incident.

3. Blood Pledge Corps Incident (Ketsumeidan Jiken) Date February-M arch 1932. General attempt by a fanatic agrarian radical society to remove the Description ruling clique, whom they considered to be responsible for agrarian suffering and national weakness. Main Inoue Nisshö and members of the Blood Pledge Corps, Participants including Konuma Tadashi, Hishinuma Gorö, Furuuchi Eiji. Plans to assassinate certain leaders of the political and business world; about twenty prospective victims were listed and each one was assigned to a specific member of the Corps for disposal. Results only two of the planned assassinations were carried out: Inoue Junnosuke (the Finance Minister) was murdered on 9 February, Baron Dan Takuma (director of the Mitsui Company) on 6 March; the leaders of the Corps were arrested and confessed before they could organize any further killings. Punitive Inoue Nisshö and other Corps members were sentenced to Action prison, but they were all released before their terms ended. 4. 7 5 May Incident (Goichigo Jiken) Date 15 May 1932. General attempted coup d’etat with the same general purpose as the Description Blood Pledge Corps Incident and carried out by the same type of agrarian fanatics with the help of certain young officers. Main 1. military—(a) group of young navy officers, including Participants Lt. Koga Kiyoshi and Lt. Mikami Taku; (b) group of army cadets. 2. civilian—(a) ökawa Shümei and his Jimmu Association (provided the main financial backing and also the general co-ordination), (b) Tachibana Kösaburö and twenty-three students from his Institute for Local Patriotism {Aikyö Juku), (c) Homma Kenichirö and Töyama Hidezö (active support).

Plans Results

Punitive Action

Appendix I I I 433 to assassinate political and business leaders, as well as the statesmen close to the Throne; it was hoped that the army would then take over and carry out the Showa Restoration. (1) Prime Minister Inukai assassinated by nine navy offi­ cers and army cadets under Lt. Koga; (2) Seiyü Kai head­ quarters and the Metropolitan Police headquarters at­ tacked; (3) power stations raided by Tachibana's Farmers* Death-Defying Corps (Nômin Kesshi Tai); (4) attempt made to blow up the Mitsubishi Bank. The coup collapsed owing mainly to lack of support from the army. Tachibana, ökawa, Homma, Mikami, &c. arrested and sentenced to prison; all were released by 1940 before their terms expired.

5. Heaven-Sent Soldiers' Unit Incident (Shimpeitai Jiken) Date planned for 11 July 1933. General a fairly large-scale attempt to carry out the objectives of Description the 15 May Incident by assassinating a number of leading figures. Main 1. military—Comm. Yamaguchi Saburö (a naval air officer Participants and brother of Inoue Nisshô). 2. civilian—(a) youth faction of the Great Japan Produc­ tion Party (Dai Nihon Seisan To) under Suzuki Zenichi, Kageyama Masaharu, (b) Amano Tatsuoy Maeda Toraot Nakamura Takeshi, (c) Naitö Hikokichi, head of the Matsuya Dept. Store (gave main financial support). Plans (ï) to storm the court building in which Inoue and other nationalists were being tried and to release them ;(2) Comm. Yamaguchi to bomb the Prime Minister’s residence while the Cabinet was in session and to kill the Prime Minister and all Cabinet members, including Gen. Araki; (3) several hundred members of the Production Party to par­ ade through the streets and create a diversion for (4) attacks on the residence of Count Makino and on the offices of the main political parties ; (5) the army to declare martial law and to carry out the Showa Restoration, installing either Prince Higashikuni or Prince Chichibu as Prime Minister. the police heard about the plot and arrested the con­ Results spirators in time.

434 Punitive Action

Appendix I I I

no details released for two years and the trial did not open for four years; in 1941 short terms were given to the con­ spirators with immediate remission of sentence.

6. Officers*School Incident (Shikan Gakköjiken) Date planned for 20 November 1934. General a military plot to assassinate the Prime Minister and other Description high officials by young members of the Imperial Way Faction. (a) Army captains and lieutenants attending a course at Main Participants Tokyo War College, (b) a group of cadets at the Military Academy, (c) General Mazaki Jinsaburö (aware of the plot even if he did not actually encourage it), assassination of government leaders. Plans Ministry of War heard about the plot and arrested the ring­ Results leaders in time. The incident was kept from the public until after the war. Punitive the ringleaders were suspended from active duty, but not Action court-martialled. 7. 26 February Incident (Niniroku Jiken) or Imperial Capital Rebellion (Teito Hanran). Date 26 February 1936. General the most ambitious domestic incident of the century; a Description major uprising by the Imperial Way Faction of the army to upset the hegemony of the Control Faction, to destroy the ruling cliques, and to effect a thorough reform of the na­ tional structure. Main 1. military—{a) 1,400 soldiers from the army’s ist Division Participants under the command of young officers of the Imperial Way Faction, (b) General Mazaki Jinsaburö and some other leaders of the Imperial Way Faction (sympathetic to the coup but not openly active), (c) certain officers of the Con­ trol Faction, like Col. Hashimoto and Lt.-Gen. Tatekawa (passive support), (d) Rear-Adm. Mazaki Katsuji. 2. civilian—(a) Kita Ikki, Nishida Zei, &c. (b) Ishihara Köichirö and Kuhara Fusanosuke (financial support). Plans (1) to overthrow the Cabinet by a military rising and to

Results

Punitive Action

Appendix I I I 435 assassinate all high officials, (2) to install a military govern­ ment under GeneralMazaki or Admiral Yamamoto. (1) Adm. Saitö Makoto (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and former Prime Minister), Takahashi Korekiyo (Finance Minister), General Watanabe Jötarö (Control Faction leader and Inspector General of Military Education) were killed in their homes; (2) Adm. Baron Suzuki Kantarö (Grand Chamberlain) was attacked and seriously wounded ; (3) Prime Minister Okada, Count Makino, Prince Saionji escaped; Okada’s brother-in-law killed by mistake; (4) following the assassinations and various action such as destroying the presses of the Asahi, the insurgents barri­ caded themselves in one part of the city; limited martial law was proclaimed and after three days the rebels sur­ rendered at the personal command of the Emperor. (1) thirteen army officers and four civilians (including Kita and Nishida) were rapidly tried and executed, (2) Gen. Mazaki Jinsaburö was acquitted by court martial and re­ leased, (3) Rear-Adm. Mazaki was placed on the inactive list.

8.5 July Incident (Shichigo Jikeri) or Imperial Subjects Sympathizers Uprising Incident (Kömin Yüshi Kekki Jikeri). Date planned for 5 July 1940. plot to carry out the objectives of the Heaven-Sent General Description Soldiers* Unitlncidentbyassassinatinggovemmentleaders and thus finally bringing about the Showa Restoration. Maeda Toraof Kageyama Masaharu and about thirty Main Participants members of the Great East Institute (DaitöJuku). Plans to assassinate Prime Minister Yonai and other political leaders and to set up a new government based on the principles of the Imperial Way. the conspirators were arrested shortly before their plans Results were to be executed. the incident was hushed up and the ringleaders given short Punitive sentences. Action

A P P E N D IX IV CHART SHOWING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SOME PRE­ WAR AND POST-WAR NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS Since nationalist societies in Japan tend to be organized on a strongly personal basis, with emphasis on the relationship between the leader and his followers (oyabun-kobun) or between the teacher and his disciples (,sensei-monka), we can in many cases reliably establish connexions be­ tween one society and its collateral or successor groups, even though their names and slogans may differ widely. The chart facing gives some such connexions and illustrates the continuity that frequently exists between pre-war and post-war rightist movements. For the Japanese names of the societies the reader is referred to the Index.

A P P E N D IX V POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN JAPAN Dr. H. J. Eysenck’s analysis of personality traits of English Fascists and Communists,1 based on experimental social studies in England, the United States, Sweden, Germany, and elsewhere, indicates that it is pos­ sible to regard all political attitudes as being determined by two main principles or factors, which are entirely independent of each other, and which can, therefore, be represented diagrammatically by two lines inter­ secting each other at right angles. These are the Radical-Conservative continuum (R-factor) and the Tough-minded-Tender-minded factor (T-factor) (the latter terms being those used by William James in the philosophical field). Eysenck regards the R-factor as a major dimension of social attitudes; the T-factor, on the other hand, is a projection on the field of social attitudes of certain fundamental personality traits. Accord­ ing to the findings of Eysenck and other investigators, Tough-mindedness is closely related to extroversion in general and to certain specific traits such as aggression, dominance, conformity, rigidity, authoritarian­ ism, intolerance, and narrow-mindedness. Detailed and independent experimental studies have all indicated that Fascists were a 'toughminded’ Conservative group, Communists a 'tough-minded* Radical group, and that conservatives and socialists were Conservative and Radical respectively on the R-factor and intermediate with respect to the T-factor. To give a single example, an aggression test carried out in England by T. Coulter among 43 Fascists, 43 Communists, and 86 ‘neutral* subjects gave the following results: mean score of neutral group with respect to overt aggression was 6 •6, of the Communists 6 •7, of the Fascists ii*8; for indirect aggression the respective results were 4*7, 9 *3, 8 *2.

If the general situation should prove to be applicable to Japan, one might expect to find the type of pattern shown overleaf (typical attitudes being given below the chart). 1H . J. E y se n c k , T h e P sy ch o lo g y o f P o litic s (L o n d o n , 1954).

Appendix V

43®

force revolutionary communism J.C.P. x

T O U G H -M IN D E D N E S S

fascism

extreme right-wing nationalist groups x moderate right-wing nationalist groups x Liberal-Democratic Party

left-wing socialists x Socialist Party x right-wing socialists x R A D IC A L ISM

C O N SERV A TISM

humanitarianism

religionism T E N D E R -M IN D E D N E S S

love (1) tough-minded radical quadrant: abolish remnants of ‘feudalism’, enforce workers’ rights, abolish American bases in Japan, &c. (2) tough-minded conservative quadrant: restore the Emperor’s pre­ rogatives and a strong kokutaiyexpel ‘delinquent’ Koreans, strong patriotic leaders to save the nation, &c. (3) tender-minded radical quadrant: work for democracy, human rights, pacifism, modify national sovereignty in favour of the United Nations, &c. (4) tender-minded conservative quadrant: restore a strong family sys­ tem and emphasize well-rooted traditions such as belief in Shin­ toism, love of the Emperor as a sacred father-figure, &c. Strong nationalist attitudes, whether of a left-wing or a right-wing variety, would mostly be found in the ‘tough-minded’ quadrants. In both cases these would involve a determination to pursue nationalist objectives by forceful means, e.g. ‘rid Japan of American bases and drive out American imperialism’ (backed by anti-base demonstrations) on the Radical side; ‘suppress the treacherous Communist Party, the catspaw of Soviet imperialism’ (backed by demonstrations outside the Soviet Embassy) on the Conservative side. Powerful attacks would be directed against the

Appendix V 439 Government for its ‘weak-kneed* attitude to foreign powers (America or Russia, as the case might be), for placing selfish personal ambitions above the good of the nation, for permitting corruption in high places, &c. (e.g. the numerous attacks on the Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, from both the extreme left and the extreme right). In both cases, too, the groups would tend to be organized on a strong authoritarian basis (e.g. pp. 84-85 above, where it is suggested that the organizational structure of the Japan Revolutionary Chrysanthemum Flag Comrades’ Association is a microcosm of that of the JCP). The various personality traits that are associated with tough-minded individuals (aggression, intolerance, &c.) would appear to be common to most members of the extreme rightist groups that are discussed in the present study, as well as to Japanese Communists; again the frequency with which Communists have switched to the extreme right would seem to suggest that the two extremes in Japan have more in common from the point of view of personality traits than is generally recognized. In the absence of sufficiently detailed and accurate experimental work, the above scheme must remain in the sphere of hypothesis. The con­ trolled empirical study of various groups in Japan with respect to the T-factor would be of considerable value for a deeper understanding of Japanese politics and might in particular throw light on the psychology of members of extreme rightist groups and of the JCP, which primafacie seem to have much in common.

B IO G R A PH IC A L N O TE S AKAMATSU KATSUMARO (1894-1955). Mr. Akamatsu was one of the early members of the Japan Communist Party and in 1924 was associated with Mr. Suzuki Mosaburö in the movement to dissolve the JCP (Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement, p. 328). He subsequently developed steadily in a right-wing direction. He became General Secretary of the rightist proletarian Social Demo­ cratic Party (Shakai Minshu To) and later was a prominent member of the Great Japan Production Party (Dai Nihon Seisan To). He was involved in the October Incident (see App. Ill, p. 431 above) and in later years was actively associated with Mr. Tsukui Tatsuo and others in numerous National-Socialist groups. In post-war years he was one of the more important right-wing writers. It is interesting to compare his career with that of his former comrade, Mr. Suzuki Mosaburö, who became the head of the post-war Socialist Party. AKAO BIN (b.1899): a lawyer, a professional political agitator (and formerly an anarchist) was one of the most vociferous anti-Communists in the pre-war ultra-rightist movement and was a leader inter alia of the Great Japan Imperial Way Association (Dai Nihon Ködö Kai). His main fury both before and after the war has been directed against Soviet Russia. After the war Mr. Akao founded a new Shinto sect in the Asakusa area of Tokyo. This was one of numerous such sects that sprang up in the early post-war days in response to the moral confusion of the times. Many of them were of a decidedly cranky, if not blatantly dishonest, nature; they not infrequently had close connexions with former ultra-nationalist elements. DOI AKIO, ex-Lt. Gen. (b.1896), is the author of Beiso-sen to Nihon (The Soviet-American War and Japan) which, as may be gathered, deals with Japan’s role in the forthcoming war. In 1957 Doi led a Japanese military group which visited China at the invitation of the Communist Government. Unlike former Gen. Endö Saburö (p. 167 n. i above), he was not greatly impressed by the Communists* pro­ testations of peaceful intent, and on his return he gave warning that China’s real aim was to Communize Japan. Mao Tse-tung, he added, had declined to give him any assurance to the contrary. GÖKO KIYOSHI (b.1882): a financier; important in a number of nationalistically-inclined post-war defence groups, including the National Defence Society (Kokubö Kyökai), the Japan Fatherland

Biographical Notes 441 League (Nihon Aikyö Remmei), the Martial Arts Association (Botoku Kat), Continental Problems Research Institute (Tairiku Mondai Kenkyûjo), Japan Defence Society {Nihon Böei Kyökai), Japan Arms Industry Association {Nihon Heiki Kögyö Kai), &c. HASHIMOTO KINGORÖ, Lt.-Col. (1890-1957), was the leader of the Cherry-Blossom Association {Sakura Kai), formed in 1930, which was the most famous of the young officers’ societies that sprang up in the early 1930’s. He took an active part in the abortive March and October (1931) Incidents (see App. Ill, pp. 430, 431 above) and was also privy to the February (1936) revolt. In 1936 he organized the Japan Youth Party {Nihon Seinen Tö). He was re­ sponsible for the shelling of H.M.S. Ladybird on the Yangtse in 1937, and in the following years exerted considerable influence on the events that led to war with the Western powers. Hashimoto was a militant xénophobe. ‘Britain, the United States, and France’, he once declared, ‘are the setting sun. The universe will only come to life with the bright sun of great Japan flashing in the sky. Watch me, Hashimoto, I am no man to sit still and talk.’ Belonging as he did to the radical faction of the extreme right, his relations with Gen. Töjö deteriorated steadily. In 1948 Hashimoto was sentenced to life imprisonment as a Class A war criminal ; he was released in 1955. He stood as an independent in the 1956 Upper House elections and re­ ceived almost 200,000 votes; he was, however, not elected. HOMMA KENICHIRÖ (1889-1955), who first became well known in the ultra-nationalist movement as the secretary of Toyama Mitsuru, played an important part in the 15 May Incident (see App. Ill, p. 432 above). He was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, but was liberated after four years. He was subsequently involved in nationalist anti-Western activity as leader of the Purple Mountain Institute {Shizan Juku) and of the related organization, the Loyal­ ists’ Sincerity Group {Kinnö Makoto Musubi). After his post-war depurge, Homma was one of the most active of the old-guard rightists, and took a major part in encouraging the right-wing unification movement following 1953. Though in favour of con­ stitutional revision, he was at first strongly opposed to rearmament, but later modified his views. Belonging as he did to the anti-zaibatsu tradition of the 15 May Incident, he also expressed himself against the reviving power of capitalist groups. HOSHINA ZENSHIRÖ, ex Vice-Adm. (b.1891), was former Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of the Navy. He is a close associate of ex-Adm. Nomura; member of the Defence Pro­ duction Committee of the Federation of Economic Organizations

442

Biographical Notes

(Keidanreri), Watanabe Economic Research Institute, and the Japan Defence Association (Nihon Böei Kyôkai). IIMURA MINORU, ex-Lt.-Gen., former director of the Total War­ fare Research Institute; joined the post-war defence forces and be­ came an instructor at the Defence Force Training Centre. INOUE NISSHÖ (b.1886): Nichiren priest of extreme rightist beliefs, who before turning to Buddhism had spent most of his life on the continent as a secret agent for the Japanese Army. On his return to Japan, he organized various extreme nationalist societies. The most important of these was the Blood Pledge Corps (Ketsumei Dari), a fanatic band of youths, centred near Mito, who were pledged to remove many of the country’s political leaders by assassination. Inoue’s group was responsible for the killing in 1932 of Finance Minister Inoue and of Baron Dan, the Mitsui director (see App. Ill, p. 432 above). As a result Inoue was sentenced to life imprisonment; he was released in 1940 on a general amnesty. He resumed political activity after 1952 and in collaboration with several members of his Blood Pledge Corps he founded the extremist National Protection Corps (Gokoku Dan), ISHIWARA KANJI, Lt.-Gen. (1889-1949). Although Ishiwara was one of the leading figures during the Manchurian Incident (he was Operations Officer of the Kwantung Army in 1931), he became in­ creasingly disillusioned in subsequent years with the army’s high­ handed behaviour on the continent. In 1937 Ishiwara was among the minority in the Control Faction of the army who vainly opposed the China War. Not only did he feel that this war would over-extend the country’s strength, but he insisted that Japan’s only hope of fortifying her position in the Far East lay in co-operating with the Chinese, and that any attempt at military suppression would be bound to fail. Ishiwara was strongly opposed to the Kwantung Army’s strict control of Manchukuo. His original plan was to set up an independent Government in Manchuria based on the principles of the Righteous Way (Ödö). This was to be the nucleus of the East Asia Federation which China and other Asian countries would join in due course of their own free will. Any attempt to coerce China by military means would not only frustrate this plan, but would, according to Ishiwara, result in Japan’s isolation from the very countries that should be her closest partners. For these reasons he and the members of his group were constantly at loggerheads with Gen. Töjö and the wartime Cabinet; for his part, Gen. Töjö, the Prime Minister, looked askance at Ishiwara because of his excessive ‘internationalism’ and idealism. There also appears to have been a

Biographical Notes 443 good deal of personal animosity between the two men since 1937, when Ishiwara served at Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army under Töjö, who was Chief of Staff (Nagamatsu, Ikite iru Uyoku, pp. 216-18, 236-8; Kinoshita, Nihon no Uyoku (Tokyo, 1953), pp. 120-31; Tsukui, Uyoku, pp. 248-59). For further material on Ishiwara Kanji, see Yamaguchi Shigeji, Higeki no Shögun—Ishi­ wara Kanji (‘Ishiwara Kanji, General of Tragedy’) (Tokyo, 1952), and Takagi Seigu, Töa no Chichi-Ishiwara Kanji (‘Ishiwara Kanji, Father of East Asia’) (Tokyo 1954). KAGEYAMA MASAHARU (b.1906) was active in the Heaven-Sent Soldiers* Unit Incident (see App. Ill, p. 433 above) as a member of the Great Japan Production Party and as a result was imprisoned for two and a half years. On his release he helped to found the Great East Institute (Daitö Juku). Kageyama has been one of the most active and forceful figures in the post-war ultra-nationalist move­ ment. He is an especially ardent advocate of a return to the Emperor system and has had little truck with the new-fangled ‘democratic’ slogans adopted by some of his fellow nationalists in an effort to curry popular favour. KAWABE TORASHIRÖ, ex-Lt.-Gen., member of the militarist Cherry-Blossom Association (SakuraKai), pre-war military attaché in Germany and later Assistant Inspector of Military Education; he was C.-in-C. of Japanese forces in Burma ; in 1945, he flew to Manila to make surrender arrangements with the U.S. forces. KODAMA YOSHIO (b.1911): nationalist leader active in many pre­ war societies since 1929 when he joined Dr. Uesugi’s National Founding Association (Kenkoku Kai). In 1932 he founded the Independence Youth Society (Dokuritsu Seinen Sha), which was reportedly involved in an abortive plot to kill the Prime Minister, Admiral Saitö. Kodama was arrested on numerous occasions for his obstreperous ultra-nationalist activities. Later, however, he was sent to China, where he was attached in a semi-official capacity to the Imperial Army Headquarters. He organized the Kodama Agency and amassed an immense fortune by his purchasing activities (allegedly by buying looted goods). At the end of the war he was appointed as an adviser to the Prime Minister, Prince Higashikuni, but shortly thereafter he was tried and sentenced as a Class A war criminal. He was in Sugamo Prison from 1945 to 1948. On his release he used his earlier contacts and his personal fortune to establish close relationships with various conservative leaders, including Miki Bukichi, Hatoyama Ichirö, Köno Ichiro, and Ogata Taketora. Kodama is considered to be extremely influential as an undercover

444

Biographical Notes

man in conservative and financial circles. At the same time he main­ tained links with former military men and rightists like ex-Col. Tsuji, ex-Lt.-Gen. Nemoto, Matsugi Yoshikatsu, and Akao Bin. Kodama’s autobiography (which appeared in 1949 in an English edition with the title I Was Defeated) provides a valuable record of the evolution of a professional Japanese nationalist. KUHARA FUSANOSUKE (b.1869), the politician and business leader, was chief secretary and later, president of the Seiyü Kai (one of the two main pre-war conservative parties, in some ways cor­ responding to the post-war Liberal Party). Following his depurge, Mr. Kuhara applied for membership in the Liberal Party, but was refused by Mr. Yoshida, who looked askance at his NationalSocialist ideas. Kuhara continues to display a lively interest in politics even at his present advanced age. In 1955 he was named chairman of the National Council for Restoring Relations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Republic, a group with pro­ nounced left-wing sympathies. (The fact that a man of Mr. Kuhara’s political colouring should be chairman of such a group illustrates a type of apparent paradox that may almost be called characteristic of Japanese politics.) In this capacity he visited Peking as a guest of the Communist Government. He also attempted to visit Moscow and later wrote a letter to the head of the Soviet Mission in Tokyo giving various cogent reasons why Russia should return the entire Kurile Islands to Japan. Kuhara’s connexions with the Soviet Union date back some thirty years and he is indeed one of the few, if any, living Japanese to have had an interview with Stalin. In 1927 he met Stalin in Moscow and proposed the creation of a ‘buffer state’ in a vast region comprising Manchuria and parts of China and Siberia. The state thus created was to remain perpetually unarmed under joint supervision of Russia, China, and Japan. According to Kuhara, Stalin was finally convinced of Japan’s peaceful intentions. Later, however, the plan was destroyed because of Japan’s actions in Manchuria (Japan Times, 2 Oct. 1956). Kuhara Fusanosuke, who has variously been described as an éminence grise and a Japanese Joseph Fouché, is interesting and important as the type of convinced nationalist having close connexions in both the finan­ cial and the political worlds and also concerned with international affairs. KUNISAKI NOBORU, Lt.-Gen. (b.1886), was Commander of the 7th Division of the Imperial Army; after the war, he was in charge of the Hokkaido branch of the Companions’ Association (Kaikö Kat), His views are quoted in Keibi Keisatsu, pp. 202-3.

Biographical Notes 445 MAEDA TORAO. Mr. Maeda first became well known for his part in the Heaven-Sent Soldiers1 Unit Incident (1933) (see App. Ill, p. 433 above) ; he was also prominent in an abortive terrorist conspiracy in 1940 to assassinate the Prime Minister and other leaders. MIURA GIICHI (b.1898) is an important figure in the business world and has had close connexions with rightist groups since well before the war. In pre-war days he supported such nationalist societies as the National Policy Society (Kokusaku Sha) and the Bright Sun­ shine Association (Meirö Kat). After the war he became an adviser to the Great East Institute, and backed the National Martyrs Youth Corps (Junkoku Seinen Tax) and similar groupings. He also main­ tained close connexions with the Liberal Party, the Mitsui group, &c. Men like Mr. Miura are clearly able to provide rightist move­ ments with the type of influential support that they so badly require ( Yomiuri Shimhun, 7 Feb. 1954; Kinoshita Nihon no Uyoku, pp. 116,156,187; Sanji Mainichi, 11 Apr. 1954). NABEYAMA SADACHIKA (b.1901) was in 1927 appointed as one of the new members of the JCP’s Central Executive Committee follow­ ing a major purge in the party leadership carried out from Moscow. Caught in one of the police drag-nets, he was kept in prison for five years together with other JCP leaders such as Sano Manabu, Tokuda Kyuichi, and Shiga Yoshio. In 1933 he recanted and was re­ leased. From then on he devoted himself wholeheartedly to ultra­ rightist activities. During the war he worked in North China as an agent of the military. After the Surrender he tried with characteristic opportunism to join the Socialist Party, but was refused. In col­ laboration with other Communist renegades such as Mizuno Shigeo and Minami Kiichi, he busied himself with collecting and disseminating information about the JCP, often of rather doubtful validity, for which he is said to have been paid amply by various in­ dustrialists who appreciated his experience in the labour movement. Nabeyama exerted considerable influence in the post-war organi­ zation and leadership of government and company labour unions and has been closely connected with the Democratization League (Minshuka Domex), one of the anti-Communist labour groups. In 1948 he helped to organize the Independence Youth League (Dokuritsu Seinen Domex), which sought the support of nationalistically-inclined young men in the National Railways Democratiza­ tion League, the Socialist Party, the Japan Farmers* Union(Nichino), See., with the aim of disuniting the labour camp. Nabeyama has also been associated since the war with Kodama Yoshio in his antiCommunist information activities and with the Hattori Agency

446

Biographical Notes

(Hatton Kikan) ; he was a counsellor to the Continental Problems Research Institute ( Tairiku Mondai Kenkyüjo). Despite his original rebuff, Nabeyama is reported later to have been accepted into the ranks of the Right-Wing Socialist Party (Uha Shakai To) in the capacity of adviser. It might appear incongruous that a man of such extreme rightwing tendencies as Nabeyama should have joined a post-war socialist party. The case is by no means unique, however, for many of the leaders of the Right-Wing Socialist Party were, as Mr. Ökubo points out, closely connected with men of extreme reaction­ ary tendencies. It should be recalled that before and during the war many of the people who later became prominent in the Right-Wing Socialist Party, far from resisting militarist domination, co-operated whole-heartedly with the country’s nationalist leaders by becoming either leaders of patriotic organizations or heads of town, village, and neighbourhood associations. As Professor Yanaga points out, the Social Mass Party (Shakai Taishü Tö) was in 1939 actually work­ ing for a merger with Nakano Seigö’s ultra-nationalistic Eastern Association, and it was the first of the political parties to respond to Prime Minister Konoe’s call in 1940 for disbandment and the merg­ ing of forces into a ‘new political structure’. During this period many socialists were, as Yanaga writes, ‘outdoing members of the con­ servative parties in enthusiastically supporting nationalistic policies* (Yanaga Chitoshi, Japanese People and Politics (New York, 1956), p. 233). A considerable number of Right-Wing Socialists were purged during the Occupation; following their release from purge restrictions many of them maintained their contacts with extremists like Nabeyama. This factor was one of the causes (though certainly not a major one) for the long-standing split in the Socialist Party. NEMOTO HIROSHI, ex-Lt. Gen., was closely associated with exLt.-Gen. Hashimoto Kingorö during the period of the militarists’ rise to hegemony. He was active in numerous nationalist societies, such as the Golden Pheasant Academy (Kinkei Gakuin) and the Imperial Flag Association (Kinki Kai), and was one of the leading figures in the militant faction of the extremist officers’ group, the Cherry-Blossom Association (Sakura Kai). In 1931 Lt.-Col. Nemoto was in charge of the China Section of the 2nd Division of General Staff Headquarters, and he was regarded in army circles as an expert on China. Because of his role in the abortive October Incident (see App. Ill, p. 431 above) he was transferred to the Kwantung Army. Both Nemoto and Hashimoto represented the extreme militarist element in the Control Faction of the army.

Biographical Notes 447 NOMURA KICHISABURÖ (b.1877) was Foreign Minister from 1939 to 1940; he was selected as Ambassador to the United States in December 1940 and held the post during the crucial months of the Washington negotiations, and at the time of the Pearl Harbour attack. He had no public office after his repatriation to Japan in 1942. In the post-war period he acted as unofficial naval adviser to the Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, but, according to Kinoshita (in Pacific Affairs, Sept. 1953, p. 5), his views proved to be too extreme. He was also on close terms with Mr. Hatoyama when he was Prime Minister. Nomura provided a focus of activities for former officers of the Imperial Navy and was also on fairly friendly terms with American naval authorities in Japan. After his depurge he became associated as president or adviser with almost all the major rearma­ ment organizations, including the Japan Defence Society (Nihon Böei Kyökai), the Navy Friendship Association (Suikö Kai), and the Continental Problems Research Institute (Tairiku Mondai Kenkyüjo). In 1954 he was elected to the Upper House from a local district, receiving over a quarter of a million votes. Nomura is at present the president of the Japan Victor (Gramophone) Com­ pany. OGATA TAKETORA (1888-1956) was Minister of State in the Yoshida Government and but for his untimely death in 1955 would almost certainly have become Prime Minister following Mr. Yoshida’s retirement. Before the war he was associated with the ultra-national­ ist leader Toyama Mitsuru; later he wrote a well-known and lauda­ tory book about Nakano Seigö; he was also on close terms with Lt.-Gen. Ishiwara Kanji. Among other post-war groups supported by Ogata were the West Japan National Construction League (Nishi Nihon Kensetsu Kokumin Remmei), the Continental Problems Research Institute (Tairiku Mondai Kenkyüjo), the Ogata Youth Unit (Ogata Seinen Tat), and the Martial Virtues Association (Butoku Kai). OKAMURA YASUJI, Col. (b.1884), was one of the army officers with whom the civilian ultra-nationalist leader, Ökawa Shùmei, formed close relations during the early years of the militarists’ ascendancy. He was involved in the early planning of the March Incident (see App. Ill, p. 430 above), but later changed his views on its advis­ ability. Okamura rose to the rank of general and in 1945 he was C.-in-C. of the Japanese Army in China. In the post-war period he was one of the strongest supporters of the Chiang Kai-shek Government. He played a prominent part in most of the regrouped ex-servicemen’s organizations, and in 1945 he was elected vice-

448

Biographical Notes

president and chairman of the War Comrades* Federation, the major grouping of its kind. ÖKAWA SHÜMEI, Dr., (1886-1957), a jurist, specialist in Oriental philosophy, and one of the most prominent civilians in the pre-war rightist movement. He maintained close connexions with high military and bureaucratic circles, as well as with professional nationalists. He founded numerous rightist societies, including the Society of Those Who Yet Remain (Yûson Shay 1921), Activist Society (Köchi Shat 1925), and Emperor Jimmu Association (Jimmu Kai, 1932). ökawa’s early association with the NationalSocialist leader Kita Ikki was disrupted mainly because of personal disagreements and ökawa himself became increasingly reactionary in his views. In the 1930*3 he was a prominent participant in several of the ‘incidents* (see App. III). As a result of his role in the 15 May (1932) Incident he was sentenced to fifteen years* imprisonment. He was released after only five years, and later headed the govern­ ment-sponsored Showa Foreign Language Institute. In 1945 Ökawa was arrested as a Class A war-criminal suspect, but he was declared insane and the case against him was dropped. After 1952 ökawa was regarded as the dean of the rightist movement in Eastern Japan, but he was not very active in any of the reconstituted societies. Before his death, he completed a translation of the Koran into Japanese. ÖYAMA IWAO (b.1906) (not to be confused with the Satsuma-clan genrö of the same name) first became known in pre-war left-wing circles for his part in the Shinjin Kaiya progressive students* group at Tokyo Imperial University. Later he became a Communist and gained fame by his translation of Lenin’s The Development of Capitalism in Russia and other Marxist works. After his apostasy, he swung to the opposite extreme in well-established fashion and became a research assistant in the Showa Research Association (Shöwa Kenkyü Kai\ the rightist group run by Goto Ryünosuke with the backing of Prince Konoe. He also put his knowledge of the labour movement to use by joining the Industrial Patriotic Associa­ tion (Sangyo Hokoku Kai). Following the war he performed further ideological gyrations and turned up in the Liberal Party as an un­ official adviser. The main object of his attack at this period was bureaucratic control and he set up a ‘Free Economy Research Association* to further his new-found ideals. Nothing came of this, however, and in 1950, with the outbreak of war in Korea, öyama switched his energies to the rearmament question and founded the National Territory Defence Research Association (Kokudo Böei

449 Kenkyükai). öyama remains one of the more prominent theoreti­ cians in the right-wing nationalist movement. SAGOYA TOMEO (b.1910) was a member of the Patriots* Society (Aikoku Shd) and it was he who in 1930 fired the shot that killed the Prime Minister, Mr. Hamaguchi. He has been extremely active in the post-war rightist movement, especially as deputy-head and later, head of the National Protection Corps (Gokoku Dan). SANO MANABU (1892-1953). The late Sano Manabu, a teacher at Waseda University, played an important part in the JCP since its foundation and after 1925 became one of the leading figures in the Japanese Communist movement. Arrested by the police, he re­ canted from his prison cell in 1932 and subsequently was active in the right-wing anti-Communist movement. After the war he con­ tinued to hold office at Waseda University. He organized a Vanguard Workers* League (Zenei KinröDömei), which proved to be a failure, and later the ultra-rightist Japan Institute of Politics and Economics (Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyüjö). He was also active in the West Japan National Construction League. Following his death his nephew, Sano Hiroshi, a graduate of Moscow University and also a Com­ munist renegade, succeeded him as head of the Japan Institute of Politics and Economics. SASAGAWA RYÖICHI was director of the pre-war National Defence Society (Kokubö Shd). Following his depurge, he became a director of the Martial Virtues Association (Butoku Kai). His resuscitated National Essence Mass Party (Kokusui Taishü Tö) belongs, despite its name, to the tradition of the one-man party (ichinin-itto), and its ‘mass* membership is estimated at about 70 ( Yomiuri Shimbunt 7 Feb. 1954; Köan Chösa Chö, Shuyö Uyoku kankei Dantai Hy6). SATOMI KISHIO (b.1897): known as one of the shrewder rightist theorists. His nationalist theories are expounded in his book Sandai no Shisö (‘Thoughts under Three Imperial Reigns*). He now heads the Japan National Polity Institution (Nihon Kokutai Gakkai). SHÖRIKI MATSUTARÖ (b.1885): President of the Yomiuri news­ paper and of the Nippon Television Network, Head of the Hokkaidö Development Board in the 3rd Hatoyama Cabinet, Chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission in the 2nd Kishi Cabinet, and Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency ; VicePresident of the Martial Virtues Association (Butoku Kai). TACHIBANA KÖSABURÖ (b.1893): prominent nationalist leader of the agrarian school. In 1930 he established the Institute for Local Patriotism (Aikyöjuku) in Mito and devoted himself to the educa­ tion of country youths along patriotic lines. Tachibana put special Biographical Notes

450

Biographical Notes

stress on agricultural self-sufficiency and on the need to reform the economy in order to save the depressed rural areas. His Institute played a prominent part in the 15 May (1932) Incident (see App. Ill, p. 432 above) and Tachibana was sentenced to life imprisonment; in 1940 he was released on general amnesty. TANAKA SAWAJI (b.1897), rightist theorist strongly influenced by the theology of Nichiren Buddhism and combining a belief in the Emperor as the supreme political institution with a tendency to­ wards state socialism. He continues to head the Constitution Justice Cultivation Association (Rikken Yösei Kai), which in 1955 was reported to have over 4,000 members and 167 branches (Köan Chösa Chö, Shuyö Uyoku Dantai no Shugi Köryö). TANAKA SHINICHI, ex-Lt.-Gen. (b. 1893), had (as a colonel) been one of the aggressive leaders of the Control Faction at the time of the China Incident; as Chief of Operations Division, General Staff (1940-2), he was one of the more ardent advocates of war with the United States (according to ex-Gen. Tanaka RyQkichi, former chief of the Military Service Bureau). (Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 47.) After the depurge he was active in several of the rearmament groups. TOMIOKA SADATOSHI, ex-Rear-Adm. (b.1897), was Director of the ist Bureau, Navy General Staff, and is said to have belonged to the ‘Australia first’ group in the navy staff headquarters, which was in favour of concentrating Japan’s attack in a southern direction. He has played an active part in the new defence forces. Since 1948 he has been director of the Historical Material Research Association (Shiryö Chösakai), one of the numerous post-war groups devoted to military research and incidentally to encouraging rearmament. TSUJI MASANOBU, ex-Col. (b.1903), former Chief of South Seas Section, Operations Division of the Imperial General Staff, first gained fame as a shrewd military strategist during the Pacific War, of which he is generally considered to have been one of the most ardent advocates. He was among the most dynamic of the younger officers in the army and no doubt contributed significantly to the initial Japanese military successes in South-East Asia, notably to the con­ quest of Singapore. Tsuji, formerly a member of the extremist young-officer group, the Cherry-Blossom Association (Sakura Kai), was a strong believer in the East Asia League theories of Ishiwara Kanji and was one of the General’s main followers. Listed by the British forces as a war criminal, Tsuji avoided arrest by disguising himself as a Buddhist monk and travelling about South-East Asia and China for three years after the Surrender. He only returned to

Biographical Notes 451 Japan after the end of the war crimes trials and then wrote a very successful book about his experiences on the continent. (This book has been translated into English with the title Underground Escape.) In 1951 he was arrested for violating the purge ordinance by making a political speech in which he expounded his neutralist theories. Following his depurge Tsuji was elected to the Diet by a heavy majority as an independent; later he joined the Government party and he remains a conspicuous member of the Lower House, having been returned in the 1955 and again in the 1958 elections. Tsuji is connected with most of the important post-war rightist associations advocating increased rearmament. In 1955 he visited Communist China and Russia; on his return he spoke favourably of accomplish­ ments in China, but was extremely critical of the régime in the Soviet Union. In 1956 he made a tour to Africa and Europe, in the course of which he met General Nasser, Marshal Tito, and other nationalist personalities. TSUKUI TATSUO (b.1901). Mr. Tsukui was a National-Socialist writer. In the 1920’s he headed the Radical Patriotic Workers* League (Kyüshin Aikoku Rödösha Remmei), a group of NationalSocialist followers of the famous socialist writer, Takabatake Motoyuki. In 1931 he was managing director of one of the many rightwing confederations formed in an attempt to unify the myriad nationalist societies. He was prominently involved in the March Incident (see App. Ill, p. 430 above). Later he joined Mr. Uchida Ryöhei’s Great Japan Production Party {Dai Nihon Seisan To)ybut was expelled because of his opposition to Mr. Suzuki Zenichi’s terrorist policies. Mr. Tsukui was associated in numerous groups with Mr. Toyama Mitsuru, Mr. Akamatsu Katsumaro, Mr. Ökawa Shümei, and other ultra-nationalist leaders. He has been prominent since the war in the right-wing unification movement and has also written several books (e.g. Uyoku Kaigan, see p. 167 n. 1 above) that provide an interesting insight into the thinking of an intelligent right-wing nationalist. YASUOKA MASAATSU (b.1898) was one of the most respected in­ tellectuals in the pre-war nationalist movement and his primary con­ cern was with ‘spiritual education* rather than political intrigue. He was associated for a short time with ökawa Shümei’s Society of Those Who Yet Remain ( Yüson Sha, 1921) and Activist Society (Köchi Shay 1925) and with Toyama Mitsuru in the Great Japan Sacrifice Association (Dai Nihon Junkoku Kaiy 1925); in 1926 he founded the Golden Pheasant Academy (Kinkel Gakuin)y an in­ fluential study group attended by both civilian and military men.

452

Biographical Notes

In 1932 he organized the Association for the Maintenance of the National Prestige (Kokui Km). Mr. Storry describes Yasuoka’s pre­ war role as that of a ‘bridge connecting elements of the higher bureaucracy with the leaders of the unofficial Right-wing move­ ment* {Double Patriotsyp. 49). In the post-war period Mr. Yasuoka has been active in various nationalist societies that combine civilian and ex-military elements. Although Mr. Yasuoka is frequently described as an ultra-nationalist and was, indeed, purged on this count, the fact is that his approach has been that of an independent scholar. He severed relations with most of the extreme rightists like ökawa at an early stage and in subsequent years he was frequently attacked by them. During the Töjö régime he often voiced his criticism of the Government’s extremist policies. WATANABE TETSUZÖ (b.1885) was a professor of economics at Tokyo Imperial University. During the war he was imprisoned for a time because of his defeatist views and for having advocated a move­ ment to end the war. He was elected to the post-war Diet as a Liberal, but failed in the 1949 elections. Partly because of his strong antiCommunist position, he was appointed to be president of the Töhö Film Company, and he was in fact instrumental in suppressing the radical labour elements there in 1948 and later (p. 81 n. 1 above).

B IB L IO G R A P H Y (Books marked * have been of particular value in preparing this study.) W orks

in

J apanese

BooksyPeriodicalsy&c. by Nationalists and Nationalist Societies Akamatsu Katsumaro. Nihon Shakai Undo Shi (History of the Social Movement in Japan). Tokyo, 1952. Amano Tatsuo. Kokutai Ködö Nyümon (A Guide to National Polity and the Imperial Way). Tokyo, 1939. Fuji (Peerless). Monthly publication of the Fuji Kadö Kai (Peerless Poetry Association). Tokyo. Hashimoto Tetsuma. Tenno to Hanran Shökö (The Emperor and the Rebel Officers). Tokyo, 1954. #Inoue Nisshö. Hitori Issatsu (One Man One Killing). Tokyo, 1953. Jinja Shimpösha (New Shinto Shrine Publication Society). Tennôy ShintöyKempö (The Emperor, Shinto, and the Constitution). Tokyo, 1954. Rev. ed. 1956. Junkoku Seinen Tai (National Martyrs Youth Corps). Fuji yo Okore (Look Down in Anger, Mount Fuji!). Tokyo, 1957. *Kageyama Masaharu. Saiken Ishin no Mon (The Gateway to Recon­ struction and Restoration). Tokyo, 1949. Nabeyama Sadachika. Watakushi wa Kyösan Tö wo Suteta (I Left the Communist Party). Tokyo, 1950. Ökawa Shümei. Anraku no Mon (The Gateway to Comfort). Tokyo, I95ISatomi Kishio. Sondai no Shisö (Thoughts under Three Imperial Reigns). Tokyo, 1950. Tachibana Kösaburö. Nösonjikyü Ron (The Theory of Self-Support for Farming Villages). Tokyo, 1952. ♦Tsukui Tatsuo. Uyoku (The Right Wing). Tokyo, 1952. ----- Watakushi no Shöwa-shi (My History of the Showa Period). Tokyo, 1958. Watö (Harmonious Prayer). Monthly publication of the Nichiren Kyö Döshikai (Nichiren Sect Comrades’ Association) (entitled Nichiren Kyö until Nov. 1957). Other Books Asahi Nenkan (Asahi Yearbook), 1956, 1957, 1958. Hori Makoto. Oshoku (Corruption). Tokyo, 1957. Inoue Kiyoshi. Tennö-sei (The Emperor System). Tokyo, 1953. FF

454 Bibliography Iwai Köyü. Böryoku (Violence). Tokyo, 1957. Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nihon Senryö oyobi Kanri Jüyö Bunsho SM (Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan). Vol. II. Tokyo, 1950. *-----Shüsen Shiroku (Records of the End of the War). Tokyo, 1952. *Kainö Michitaka. Böryoku—Nihon Shakai no Fuashizumu Kikö (Violence—the Fascist Structure of Japanese Society). Tokyo, 1950. *Keibi Keisatsu Kenkyü Kai (Police Agency Research Association), ed. Uyoku Undo (The Right-Wing Movement). Tokyo, 1952; rev. ed. 1955-

Kinoshita Hanji. Nihon Kokka-shugi Undo Shi (History of the Japanese Nationalist Movement). 2 vols. Tokyo, 1940; rev. ed. 1952. * ---Nihon no Uyoku (The Right Wing in Japan). Tokyo, 1953. Maruyama Masao. Gendai Seiji no Shisö to Ködö (Thought and Action in Current Politics). 2 vols. Tokyo, 1956-7. A collection of essays of which the following were of particular value for the purpose of this study : ‘Chökokka-shugi no Ronri to Shinri’ (Theory and Psychology of UltraNationalism) ‘Nihon Fuashizumu no Shisö to Undo* (The Ideology and Movement of Japanese Fascism) ‘Gunkoku Shihaisha no Seishin Keitai’ (The Mental Structure of the Rulers of a Militarist Nation) ‘Nihon ni okeru Nashionarizumu’ (Nationalism in Japan) ‘Fuashizumu no Sho-mondai* (Problems of Fascism) ‘Nashionarizumu, Gunkoku-shugi, Fuashizumu’ (Nationalism, Militarism, Fascism) ‘Seiji Kenryoku no Sho-mondai* (Problems of Political Power).

-----Nihon Seiji Shisö-shi Kenkyü (A Study of the History of Japanese Political Thought). 3rd ed. Tokyo, 1954. -----‘Nihon no Shisö* (Thought in Japan), in Iwanami Shoten, ed. Gendai Nihon no Shisö (Present Thought in Japan). Vol. xi. Tokyo, Ï957-

*Nagamatsu Asazö. Ikite iru Uyoku (The Living Right Wing). Tokyo, Ï954. *Nihon Jimbun Kagaku Kai (Japanese Association of Humane Sciences), ed. Shakaiteki Kinchö no Kenkyü (A Study of Social Tension). Tokyo, 1953. A collection of essays of which the following were of particular value for the purpose of this study: Fujiwara Hirotatsu, ‘Nihon Nashionarizumu no Sengo Keitai—Nihon Kakumei Kikuhata Döshikai no Baai’ (The Structure of Post-War Japan­ ese Nationalism as seen in the Japan Revolutionary Chrysanthemum Flag Comrades’ Association)

Bibliography

455

Iwai Köyü, ‘Hanshakaiteki Shüdan to Shakai Kinchô’ (Anti-Social Groups and Social Tension) Izumi Seiichi, ‘Tokyo Shöshimin no Iminzoku ni taisuru Taido* (Attitudes to Foreign Peoples among Tokyo Pettis Bourgeois) Shiba Yoshie, ‘Sengo ni okeru Gakusei Undö’ (The Student Movement in the Post-War Period).

♦Nihon Seiji Gakkai (Japanese Political Science Association), ed. Sengo Nihon no Seiji Katei (The Course of Post-War Japanese Politics). Tokyo, 1953. A collection of essays of which the following were of particular value for the purpose of this study: Oka Yoshitake, 'Gaiatsu to Hannö* (Outside Pressures and the Reaction) Tsuji Kiyoaki and Oka Yoshisato, ‘Sengo Taisei no Seisaku to Kikö’ (Policy and Organization of the Post-War Structure) Kinoshita Hanji, 'Kyûshihaisô no Kaitai to Fukkatsu’ (The Dissolution and Revival of the Former Ruling Classes) Kyögoku Junichi and Masumi Junnosuke, ‘Seiji Ishiki ni okeru Zenshin to Teitai’ (Progress and Stagnation in Political Consciousness).

Ogata Taketora. Ningen Nakano Seigô (Nakano Seigö the Man). Tokyo, 1951. Oka Yoshitake. Gendai Nihon no Seiji Katei (The Course of Present Japanese Politics). Tokyo, 1958. ----- Kindai Nihon no Keisei (The Formation of Modern Japan). Tokyo, 1947. ----- Yamagata Aritomo; Meiji Nihon no Shöchö (Yamagata Aritomo; Symbol of Meiji-Period Japan). Tokyo, 1958. Röyama Masamichi. Nihon ni okeru Kindai Seijigaku no Hattatsu (The Development of Modern Political Science in Japan). Tokyo, 1949. Shigemitsu Mamoru. Shöwa no Dôran (The Upheaval of the Showa Period). 2 vols. Tokyo, 1952. Tanaka Sögorö. Nihon Fuashizumu no Genryü: Kita Ikki no Shisö to Shögai. (The Source of Japanese Fascism: the Thought and Life of Kita Ikki). Tokyo, 1949. Yoshida Shigeru. Kaisö Jünen (Recollection of a Decade). Vol. i. Tokyo, 1957. Other Articles, Pamphlets, &c. Hayashi Shigeru and others. ‘Nihon Fuashizumu Kyödö Kenkyü’ (Collective Research on Japanese Fascism), Shisö, Aug. 1953Apr. 1954. Kinoshita Hanji. ‘Sengo Uyoku Undo no Hembö’ (The Transformation of the Post-War Right-Wing Movement), Shisö, no. 378, Dec. 1955-

456 Bibliography Köan Chösa Chö (Public Security Investigation Agency). Shuyö Uyoku Dantai no Shugi Köryö (General Principles of the Main Right-Wing Organizations). Tokyo, 1955. ----- Shuyö Uyoku kankei Dantai Hyö (Chart of Main Right-Wing Organizations). Tokyo, 1955. Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan (National Diet Library). Uyoku Dantai no Soshiki oyobi Dökö (Organization and Trend of Right-Wing Organizations). Tokyo, 1957. ----- Nashionarizumu ni kansuru Bunken Mokuroku (Bibliography of Material on Nationalism). Tokyo, 1955. Maruyama Masao, ‘Minshushugi no Na ni okeru Fuashizumu* (Fas­ cism under the Name of Democracy), Sekai, no. 94, Oct. 1953. Minami Hiroshi, ‘Tennö-sei no Shinriteki Jiban’ (The Psychological Base of the Emperor System), Shisö, no. 336, June 1952. Nihon Minshu Tö (Japan Democratic Party). Ureubeki Kyökasho no Mondai (The Problem of Deplorable Text-Books). Tokyo, 1955. Takakura Tern, ‘Tennö-sei no Mondai to Köshitsu* (Problems of the Emperor System and the Imperial Household), Chüo Köron, Aug. 1946. W orks

in

O th e r L anguages

Books Ball, W. Macmahon. Nationalism and Communism in East Asia. Mel­ bourne, 1952. Battistini, Lawrence H. The Postwar Student Struggle in Japan. Tokyo, 1956. Borton, Hugh. JaparCs Modern Century. New York, 1955. ♦Brown, Dehner M. Nationalism in Japan; an Introductory Historical Analysis. Berkeley, Calif., 1955. Byas, Hugh. Government by Assassination. London, 1943. Cole, Allan B. Japanese Society and Politics; the Impact of Social Stratification and Mobility on Politics. Boston, Mass., 1956. Colegrove, Kenneth. Militarism in Japan. Boston, Mass., 1936. Council on Foreign Relations, ed. Japan between East and West, by Hugh Borton and others. New York, 1957. Eysenck, H. J. The Psychology of Politics. London, 1954. Guillain, Robert. Le Peuple japonais et la guerre. Paris, 1947. Holtom, D. C. Modem Japan and Shinto Nationalism. Chicago, 1947. Ike Nobutaka. The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan. Balti­ more, 1950. Jansen, Marius B. The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen. Cambridge, Mass., 1954-

Bibliography 457 Japan, Ministry of Education. Kokutai no Hongi (Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan), trs. by J. O. Gauntlett, ed. by R. K. Hall. Cambridge, Mass., 1949. •Kodama Yoshio. I Was Defeated. Tokyo, 1951. Maxon, Y. C. Control of Japanese Foreign Policy; a Study of CivilMilitary Rivalry, 1930-1g45. Berkeley, Calif., 1957. Norman, E. H. Japan's Emergence as a Modem State, New York, 1940. Quigley, Harold S. and John E. Turner. The New Japan; Government and Politics. Minneapolis, 1956. Sansom, Sir George. Japan; a Short Cultural History. London, 1936. ----- The Western World andJapan. New York, 1950. •Scalapino, Robert A. Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan. Berkeley, Calif., 1953. Stoetzel, J. Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword. London, 1955. #Storry, Richard. The Double Patriots; a Study of Japanese Nationalism. London, 1957. •Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, Government Section. Political Reorientation ofJapan. 2 vols. Washington, 1948. ----- Education in the New Japan, 2 vols. Tokyo, 1948. Swearingen, Rodger and Paul Langer. Red Flag in Japan; International Communism in Action, igig-ig^i. Cambridge, Mass., 1952. Tsuji Masanobu. Underground Escape. Tokyo, 1952. Yanaga Chitoshi. Japanese People and Politics. New York, 1956.

Articles, &c. Daniels, F. J., ‘Mr. T[s]urumi-Syunsuke on the “Amuletic” Use of Words: a Translation with Commentary*, Bulletin of the School of Oriental & African Studies, vol. 18, 1956, pp. 514-33. Dore, R. P., ‘The Ethics of the New Japan*, Pacific Affairs, vol. 35, June 1952, pp. 147-59. ----- ‘Japanese Election Candidates in 1955*, Pacific Affairs, vol. 29, June 1956, pp. 174-80. Fujiwara Hirotatsu, ‘Nationalism and the Ultraright Wing*, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Nov. 1956. Guillain, Robert, ‘The Resurgence of Military Elements in Japan’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 25, Sept. 1952. Jansen, Marius B., ‘Ultranationalism in Japan’, Political Quarterly, vol. 27, June 1956, pp. 141-51. Kinoshita Hanji, ‘Echoes of Militarism in Japan’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 26, Sept. 1953. ----- 'Purge' Policy and After. Conference Paper, 12th Conference, I.P.R., Kyoto, 1954.

45$

Bibliography

----- ‘Rightist Movements*, Oriental Economist, Dec. 1956. Maruyama Masao, ‘The Ideology and Movement of Japanese Fascism’ (trans. of essay listed on p. 454 above), The Japan Annual of Law & Politics, 1952. ----- Nationalism in Post-War Japan. Conference Paper, n th Confer­ ence, I.P.R., Lucknow, 1950. Norman, E. H., ‘The Genyösha: a Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 17, Sept. 1944, pp. 261-84. Oka Yoshisato. Pattern of Power in Japanese Democracy. Conference Paper, 12th Conference, I.P.R., Kyoto, 1954. Oka Yoshitake. Outside Pressures on Government in Post-War Japan (trans. of essay listed on p. 455 above). Conference Paper, 12th Con­ ference, I.P.R., Kyoto, 1954.

IN D E X Note: Pages in italics refer to biographical notes on pp. 440-52. Abe Genki, 242 Abe Nösei, 198 A-bombs and H-bombs, 130 m 1, 189, 278, 300 Academy for Self-Government, see Jichi Gakkai Activist Society, see Kôchi Sha Administrative Agreement, 128 f., 168 Administrative Ordinance No. 201, 109 agriculture and rural areas, 44-45,166, 166, 177 f., 262-3, 387-8, 404, 414-

15

Aikoku Gakusei Remmei (Patriotic Student League), 275-6 Aikoku Seinen Yûshi K ai (Committee of Volunteers for a Patriotic Youth Movement), 325-6, App. IV Aikoku Sha (Patriots’ Society), 42, 172 n. 2, 276, 449 Aikokusha Konshinkai (Patriots* Friendship Rallies), 254 Aikoku Undo It chi Kyögikai (Council fora Union of Patriotic Movements), 353 n. i Atkyö Juku (Institute for Local Pat­ riotism), 44 f., 356 n. 3, 432, App. IV, 449-50 Ajiya Seinen Tai (Asia Youth Corps), 170 n. 2 Akahata (Red Flag), 82, 93, h i , 114, 115 n. i Akamatsu Katsumaro, 56 n. 2, 242, 27i*43L44o

Akao Bin, 440 ; disqualified from elec­ tion, xxiii; purged, 12 n. 5; Japan Anti-Communist League, 68; Na­ tional Founding Association, 68 n. 1 ; Great Japan Patriots* Party, 91, 187-92; election results, 191 n. 1; criticizes Imperial Rule Assistance Ass., 353 n. i ; participates in uni­ fication efforts, 355 Akebono (Dawn), 226 Akebono K ai (Dawn Association), 226 Akihito, see Crown Prince All-Japan Council of Patriotic Socie­ ties, see Zen-Nihon Aikoku Dantai Kyögikai All-Japan Ex-Servicemen’s Associa­ tion, see Zen-Nihon Zaigö Gurtjin Kai

All-Japan Liaison Committee for the Revival of Pensions for Former Military Men, see Kyûgunjin kankei Onkyû Fukkatsu Zenkoku Renräku-kai All-Japan Patriots* Joint Struggle As­ sociation, see Zen-Nihon Aikokusha Kyödö Tösö Kyögikai All-Japan Union of Student SelfGoverning Societies, see Zengakuren All-Japan Young Men’s Club, see ZenNihon Seinen Kurabu All-Kansai Patriots’ Battle-Line Con­ ference, see Zen-Kansai Aikoku Sensen Kyögikai Amano Tatsuo, 272, 357 n. 1, 433 Amano Teiyü, Dr., 154, 281 Amau Eiji, 151 n. 1 amuletic words : effect on political adaptability, 34, 42 n. 3; ‘double­ protection amulets’, 148 n. 1 ; use in election speeches, &c., 230, 239; ‘civilian control*, 260 n. 2; use by various groups, 239, 288-9; post­ war usage, 383, 391 ; amuletic use of words, 427-8 Amur River Association, see Kokuryü K ai Anami Korechika, Gen., 26, 209 Andö Kisaburö, ex-Lt.-Gen., 246 n. i Anti-American Guerrilla Unit, see Hambei Yügeki Tai anti-Americanism, see U.S.A. anti-base incidents, 129, 279 Anti-Bolshevik Corps, see Sekka Böshi Dan anti-Communism: post-war develop­ ment, Ch. 3 passim; expression by revived rightist groups, 167; ex­ pression by military and ex-military leaders, 246; student groups, 283; general attitude of students, 306; attitude of oyabun, &c., 319; youth groups, 321; Japan Sound Youth Association, 324; National Martyrs Youth Corps, 326, 330-1, 33^; National Salvation Movement, 362,

364

‘Anti-Communist News’, see Bökyö Shimbun Anti-Communist News Society, see Bökyö Shimbun Sha

460

Index

anti-foreign feeling, 124 anti-rearmament, see pacifism Anti-War Student League, see Hansen Gakusei Dômei Aoyagi Atsutane, Prof., 274 Araki Sadao, ex-Gen., 30 n. 3, 276, 43 L 433 Arbeit, 296 armed forces, see military Army, see military Artillery Comrades’ Association of Kaga and Echizen Prefectures, see Kaetsu K ai Asahara Kenzö, 56 n. 2 Asakusa Kôsei Ryô (Asakusa Rehabi­ litation Hostel), 94 Ashida Hitoshi, 109,116,187,225, 233 Asia Youth Corps, see Ajiya Seinen T'ai Asian Anti-Communist Conference, 190 Association for Heavenly Action, see Tenkö Kai Association for the Maintenance of the National Prestige, see Kokui Kai Association of New Men, see Shinjin K ai Association of Ronin, see Rönin K ai Atsumi Masaru, 68 n. 1 Ayukawa Gisuke, 76, 176 n. 1 Back-to-the-Earth Union, see Kino Kumiai bakuchiuchi (professional gamblers), 92, 97 » 319 bakumatsu (late Tokugawa Period), 83, 414 f. Black Dragon Society, see Kokuryû Kai Blood Pledge Corps, see Ketsumei Dan blood pledges, 316 n. 2 Böei Seisan Iinkai (Defence Produc­ tion Committee), 241 n. 2, 441 Böei Shinnihon Shimbun (New Japan Defence Journal), 183 Böei to Keizai (Defence and Economy), 221 Bökyö Shimbun (Anti-Communist News), 353, 367 n. 2 Bökyö Shimbun Sha (Anti-Communist News Society), 354-5, 3^6, 369» 37 * böryokudan (violence groups), 68, 69,

325, 346

‘boss system’, &c., see kaoyaku; oyabun Bright Sunshine Association, see Meirö Kai bureaucracy, 13 n. 1, 33, 116-17, 386 Butoku K ai (Martial Virtues Associa­ tion), 242-3, 441, 447, 449

Canon Agency, 220 n. 2 Cherry and Star Club, see Osei Kurabu Cherry-Blossom Association, see Sakura Kai Chiang Kai-shek, see Formosa China, 167, 423, 440 Cho Nyoung Chyu, 55, 176 chönaikai (town block associations), 3 n. 2, 12 n. 2, 139 n. 1 ‘Chrysanthemum Flag’, see Kikuhata Chrysanthemum Flag Association, see Nihon Kakumei Kikuhata Döshikai Chükö Itchi (Loyalty towards the Em­ peror coincident with filial piety),

31, 147

Chütva Tö (Neutralization Party), 94 Classmates’ Informal Discussion As­ sociation, see Dösö Kondan Kai coal-mining, see mining Committee of Volunteers for a Patrio­ tic Youth Movement, see Aikoku Seinen Yüshi K ai Communism and Communists, Ch. 3 passim; release from prison, 9; red purge, h i ; gains in 1949 elections, 128; fills an ideological vacuum, 149; similarity in outlook with ex­ treme right, 174, 179, 413; attitude of Chrysanthemum Flag Associa­ tion, 84-85, 194-5; results in elec­ tions, 201-2; influence on students, 277-411, 285-6, 307-8, 309; group­ singing movement, 298 n. 1 ; united front tactics, 360; nationalism and, 397-400; potentialities compared with extreme right, 413-16 Communist renegades, xxv-xxvi, 56 n. 2, 413, 439, 445» 448 f. ‘Companion, T he’, see Kaikö Companions’ Association, see Kaikö Kai Companions’ Society, see Kaikö Sha Comrades’ Association, see Höyü Kai Concord Association, see Kyöwa Kai Concord Party, see Kyöwa Tö conscription, 118, 211 n. 1, 235, 301 Constitution, 16-21, 18 n. 1, 112, 206, 260, 268, 387 Constitution Justice Cultivation As­ sociation, see Rikken Yösei Kai Constitutional revision : significance of revision efforts, 16, 387; conserva­ tive and socialist stands, 117-20; popular attitude, 120 n. 1, 309 n. 1 ; attitude of rightists, 164, 178, 185, 222, 362, 401 ; relation to rearma­ ment, &c., 234-6

461

Index 'Continental Problems’, see Tairiku Mondai Continental Problems Research Insti­ tute, see Tairiku Mondai Kenkyûjo Control Faction, see Tösei Ha corruption, 143, 307 n. 1, 319, 322, 374 n. 2, 425 Council for a Union of Patriotic Movements, see Aikoku Undo Itchi Kyögikai ‘crisis’, 164, 245 n. i, 362, 380, 393 Crown Prince, 6 Current Affairs Discussion Associa­ tion, see Jikyoku Kaigi K ai Dai Nihon Aikoku Tö (Great Japan Patriots’ Party), 91, 187-92, 354 n. 3» App. IV Dai Nihon Isskin K ai (Great Japan Renovation Society), 10, 46, 429, App. IV Dai Nihon Junkoku K ai (Great Japan Sacrificial Association), 451 Dai Nihon Kinnö Döshikai (Great Japan Loyalists Comrades’ Associa­ tion), 45 Dai Nihon Kôa Dômei (Great Japan Rising Asia League), 47 n. 1, 429 Dai Nihon Ködö K ai (Great Japan Im ­ perial Way Association), 68, 187, App. IV, 440 Dai Nihon Kokusui K ai (Great Japan National Essence Association), 314 n. i, 338 Dai Nihon Seiji K ai (Great Japan Political Association), 11 Dai Nikon Seisan Tö (Great Japan Production Party) : succeeded by Dai Nihon Isshin Kai, 46 n. 1; Suzuki Zenichi, 172 n. 2; Kuno Kazuo, 172 n. 2; development pro­ gramme, &c., 181-5; membership, 226; pre-war role of party, 353 n. 1, 433; participates in unification ef­ forts, 354 n. 3, 358 n. 1; secedes from National Salvation movement, 369 n. 2; purged, 429; continuity, App. IV ; Akamatsu Katsumaro, 440; Kageyama Masaharu, 443; Tsukui Tatsuo, 451 Dai Nihon Seishönen Dan (Great Japan Youth Corps), 276 Dai Nihon Sekisei K ai (Great Japan True-Hearted Society), 429 Dai Nihon Senyû Kai, see Senyû K ai Dai Töa Kyökai (Great East Asia As­ sociation), 429 Dai Töa Sensö (Great East Asia War), 3» 155 n. i

GG

Daitö Juku (Great East Institute): members commit mass suicide, 28 ; origins, 28 n. 1; co-operates with rural groups, 45; dissolved and re­ vived, 56-57, 443 ; sponsors ex-Col. Hattori, 222 n. 1 ; co-operates with unification efforts, 354 n. 3, 358 n. 1 ; secedes from National Salvation movement, 369 n. 2; purged, 429; 5 July Incident, 435; continuity, App. IV ; Miura Giichi, 445 Daiwa Shöji (Great Conciliation T rad­ ing Company), 96 Daiwa Tö (Great Conciliation Party), 71, 94-96, 203, 358 n. i, 366 Dan Takuma, Baron, 14, 348, 432 Dark Ocean Society, see Genyö Sha 'Dawn', see Akebono Dawn Association, see Akebono K ai Dawn Newspaper Society, see Yoake Shimbun Sha defence, see rearmament ‘Defence and Economy’, see Böei to Keizai Defence Council, 213 n. 1, 221, 233-4 Defence Production Committee, see Böei Seisan Iinkai democracy and ‘democracy’, 34, 165, 3 8 3 - 9 2 ,.

3 9 5 -6

Democratization League, see Minshuka Dômei depurge, 109-10, 115, 161-3, 212 n. 2, 213, 215, 389 Divine Land Farm, see Shinshü Nöjö Dodge Plan, 114 Doi Akio, ex-Lt.-Gen., 225, 440 Dokuritsu Seinen Dômei (Independ­ ence Youth League), 445 Dokuritsu Seinen Sha (Independence Youth Society), 430, 443 Dokuritsu Seinen Tö (Independence Youth Party), 45 Dösö Kondan K ai (Classmates’ In­ formal Discussion Association), 215 n. i, 216 Double Eight Association, see Hachi Hachi K ai Doyö K ai (Saturday Association), 215 n. i Dulles, John Foster, 188, 211 East Asia League, see Töa Remmei East Asia League Comrades' Associa­ tion, see Töa Remmei Döshikai East Asia League Society, see Töa Remmei Kyökai Eastern Association, see Töhö K ai East Wind Association, see Töfü Kai Eccentrics’ Association, see Kijin Kai

462

Index

education, 2, 154-8 Eells, Dr. Walter, 280-1 ‘Eight Comers of the World Under One Roof', see Hakkö Ichiu elections: 1949 elections, 127-8; Great Japan Production Party, 184; Great Japan Patriots* Party, 191 ; Akao Bin, 191 n. 1; participation of rightist elements, 201-2, 401 ; an­ alysis of results, 202 n. 1; Tsuji Masanobu, 224, 230-1; success of ex-military men, 229-32, 267, 441 ; importance of ex-servicemen’s vote, 267 n. 2 ; activities of rightist groups, 336; effect of electoral success, 361 Emperor and the Emperor system, xx ; Occupation policy, 4-6, 386; future status, 6-7, 119; constitu­ tional position, 17 ff. ; Surrender broadcast, 22-23, 25; post-war ad­ vocacy of Emperor system, 52, 5657 , 72- 73 , 142, 164-5, 176-7, 184, 185-6, 224 n. 2, 322, 361, 364; Communist attacks, 62-63, 399; Chrysanthemum Flag Association, 87-88, 89 ; decision not to prosecute, 62,105 ; opposing views in Washing­ ton, 106; abdication plans, 106 n. 2; popularity, 135; visits Isé, 135 n. 4; new significance, 136; attitude of students, 292 n. 1, 309 n. 1; Na­ tional Martyrs Youth Corps, 332 Emperor Incident, 292, 303 Emperor Meiji and the Great RussoJapanese War, 137-9, 148 Endö Saburô, ex-Lt.-Gen., 167 n. 1, 226 n. 1 Endö Shunzan, ex-Maj.-Gen., 226 Establishment-of-Righteousness Re­ birth Association, see Risshö Kösei K ai Eternity Club, see Mansei Kurabu Etö Natsuo, 198 n. 3 Ezaki Masumi, 198 n. 3 Far East Comrades’ Association, see Töhö Döshikai Fascism, see Nazism Fatherland Defence Comrades’ As­ sociation, see Sokoku Böei Döshi­ kai February Association, see Nigatsu Kai February 26 Incident (Ninirokujiken ) : dilemma of participants, xviii, 26; Kuhara Fusanosuke, 76; anniver­ sary commemorated, 169 n. 2; Mazaki Katsuji, 172 n. 2; Okawa Shûmei’s comment, 257 n. 1 ; Kodama Yoshio’s comment, 257

February 26 Incident : (contd.) n. i ; significance of suppression, 372 ; outline of incident, 434-5 Federation of Economic Organiza­ tions, see Keidanren Federation of War Comrades* As­ sociations, see Senyü Dantai Rengökai Final War, Theory of, see Saishûsenron First Wednesday Association, see Issui K ai Fleet Faction, see Kantai Ha Flowers-of-Glory Association, see Seiko K ai Formosa and the Chinese National­ ists: smuggling Japanese personnel, 46; help by rightist groups, 99, 1723, 190-1; recognition of Govern­ ment, 128 ; help by ex-military men, 227-9; Japanese officers in Taipeh, 228 n. 3 Forty-Seven Ronin, 28, 148, 290 Fresh Rice-Ears Club, see Mizuho Kurabo Fuji, 56-57, 222 n. i Fuji Kadö K ai (Peerless Poetry As­ sociation), 56-57, App. IV Fujimura Nobuo, 55, 175, 198 n. 3 Fujiyama Aiichirö, 242 Fukoku Kyöhei (A Wealthy Nation and a Strong Army), xxvii, 31, 146 Fukuda Soken, 330, 353-5 Fukudome Shigeru, ex-Vice-Adm., 218 n. i, 221 n. 2, 238 n. 2 Fukuoka, 78 n. 2 Fukushima Ha (Fukushima Faction), 79, 192-8 Fukushima Seishi, 72, 77-90, 192-8 Funada Naka (Chû), 233 n. 1, 240 ‘Fundamental Principles of the Na­ tional Polity’, see Kokutai no Hongi Fundamental T ruth Japan Society, see Gertri Nihon Sha Furuhashi and the Japanese swim­ ming-team, 40 n. i Furukawa Gisai, 90 Furukawa Yoshiya, 67 Furuuchi Eiji, 339 n. 1, 348, 357 n. 1,

432 Gakuren (Student League), 272-3, 291 ff. Gakusei Kokubö Kyökai (Student Na­ tional Defence Society), 288-9 Gakusei Undö (The Student Move­ ment), 290 gambling, see bakuchiuchi gendarmerie, see kempeitai

Index General Council of Labour Unions, see Söhyö ‘General Outline of Measures for the Reconstruction of Japan’, see Nihon Kaizö Höan Taikö ‘General Principles for the Founding of a New Japan’, see Shin Nihon Kensetsu Taikö general strike, 61, 78, 93, 105, 108-9 Genri Nihon Sha (Fundamental Truth Japan Society), 41 n. 3 Genron Hökoku K ai (Literary Patriotic Society), 429 Genyö Sha (Dark Ocean Society), xxiiixxiv, 242 n. 4, 429 Gijin Tö (Righteous M en’s Party), 342 n. 4 Girard Incident, 129 f. Goichigo Jiken, see May 15 Incident Göko Kiyoshi, 12 n. 5, 115, 225, 241 n. 2, 242 f., 440-1 Gokoku Dan (National Protection Corps), 315, 317 , 338- 44 , 345 , 358 n. i, 369 n. 2, App. IV, 442, 449 Gokoku Seinan Tai (National Protec­ tion Youth Corps), 340, App. IV Golden Pheasant Academy, see Kinkei Gakuin Gondö Seikyö, 44, 50, 371 n. 2 goningumi (five-family unit), 139 n. 1 gorotsuki (ruffians), 68, 92, 314 n. 1 Goto Fumio, 12 n. 5 Gôyûren, see Nihon Gôyû Remmei Great Conciliation Party, see Daiwa Tö Great Conciliation Trading Com­ pany, see Daiwa Shöji Great East Asia Association, see Dai Töa Kyökai Great East Institute, see Daitö Juku Great Japan Imperial Way Associa­ tion, see Dai Nihon Ködö Kai Great Japan Loyalists Comrades’ As­ sociation, see Dai Nihon Kinnö Döshikai Great Japan National Essence As­ sociation, see Dai Nihon Kokusui Kai Great Japan Patriots* Party, see Dai Nihon Aikoku Tö Great Japan Political Association, see Dai Nihon Seiji K ai Great Japan Production Party, see Dai Nihon Seisan Tö Great Japan Renovation Society, see Dai Nihon Isshin K ai Great Japan Rising Asia Alliance, see Dai Nihon Köa Remmei (and Dömei) Great Japan Sacrificial Association, see Dai Nihon Junkoku Kai

463

Great Japan True-Hearted Society, see Dai Nihon Sekisei K ai Great Japan Youth Corps, see Dai Nihon Seishönen Dan Great Reform Society, see Taika K ai Grew, Joseph, 106 Group Association, see Musubi K ai group-singing, see utagoe Gunji Kenkyû Dan (Military Affairs Research Group), 274 gun no ishin (prestige of the armed forces), 263-4 Gunsei Ha (Naval Administration Fac­ tion), 218 n. 2 gurentai (hooligan group), 312, 319, 337

gyaku-kösu, see ‘Reverse Course’ Gyöchi Sha, see Köchi Sha Hachi Hachi K ai (Double Eight As­ sociation), 210 n. i haizoku-shökö, 275 Hakkö Ichiu (The Eight Comers of the World Under One Roof), 3, 30, 34, 49, 133, 383, 402, 427-8 Hamaguchi Yükö, 172 n. 2, 339, 430, 449

Hambei Yugeki Tai (Anti-American Guerrilla Unit), 169 n. 2 Han Yun-chieh, 172 n. 2 Hanaya Tadashi, ex-Lt.-Gen., 217 n. 1 Hansen Gakusei Dömei (Anti-War Stu­ dent League), 301 harakiri, see seppuku Harmony Association, see Kyöwa K ai Harmony Party, see Kyöwa Tö Hasegawa Kiyoshi, ex-Adm., 236 Hasegawa Yukio, 56 Hashimoto Kingorö, 7, 12 n. 5, 79, 231, 430 f., 434 , 44* Hashimoto Tetsuma, 94 Hatoyama Ichiro: feud with Mr. Yoshida, 68; pre-war activities, h i , 273 n. i ; constitutional revision, 119; Soviet-Japanese negotiations, 188, 366; attacked by rightists, 188 n. i, 189 n. i, 366-7; Defence Council, 233-4 Hattori Kikan (Hattori Agency), 21823, 445 Hattori Takushirô, ex-Col., 213, 21823, 234, 245 n. i, 262, 265 head of the household, see kachö Heaven-Sent Soldiers’ Unit, see Shimpei Tai Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (Peace Prob­ lems Symposium), 198 Hibi Waichi, 28 Higashikuni Naruhiko, 23, 443

464

Index

Higher Ethics Society, see Meirin K ai Higo Tom , 169 n. 2 Himorogi Juku (Offerings to the Gods Institute), 56 hi no mam (Japanese national flag), 31, 37 , 134 Hiranuma Kiichirö, Baron, 68 n. 1,258 Hirohito, see Emperor Hirose Plan, 119-20 ‘Hiroshima Death March’, 248-50, 251 n. i, 252 Hirota Yöji, 198 n. 3 Historical Material Research Associa­ tion, see Shiryö Chösakai Historical Records Section (G.H.Q.), 219 n. i Historical Research Institute, see Shijitsu Kenkyüjo Hitler, Adolf, see Nazism Ho Ying-chin, Gen., 172 n. 2 Hoan Tat (National Security Force), 211 n. i Hokushin K ai, 172 n. 2 Homma Kenichirö, 12 n. 5, 172-4, 354 , 357 n. 1, 361, 432 , 441 Honjö Shigeru, Gen., 27 Honryö Shijirô, 43 Horiba Kazuo, ex-Col., 219 n. 2 Horiki Kenzö, 198 n. 3 Hoshina Zenshirö, ex-Adm., 202 n. 1, 221 n. 2, 230 f., 241 n. 2, 441-2 House of the Cry of the Crane, see Kakumei Sô ‘How to Raise Flower Bulbs’, see Kyûkon Saibai H.Ö Höyü K ai (Comrades’ Association), 24 ° - ï Hozuma Goichi, 161 n. 2 Ichigaya Monthly, 217 n. 3 Ichimada Hisato, 242 f. Iida Seisei, 46 n. 3 Iijima Yoshio, 28-29 Iimura Minoru, ex-Lt.-Gen., 242 f., 442 Ikeda Seihin, 339 n. 2 Imai Takeo, ex-Maj.-Gen., 223, 228 Imoto Kumao, ex-Col., 221 n. 2 Imperial Flag Association, see Kinki Kai Imperial Rescript on Education, 2 n. 2, 154, 155 n. i Imperial Rule Assistance Association, see Taisei Yokusan Kai Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, see Yokusan Seiji Kai Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Corps, see Yokusan Seinen Dan Imperial Way, see Ködö

Imperial Way Assistance Youth Lea­ gue, see Ködö Yokusan Seinen Remmei Imperial Way Faction, see Ködö Ha Inada Masazumi, ex-Lt.-Gen., 217 n. i, 221 n. 2 Independence Youth League, see Dokuritsu Seinen Dömei Independence Youth Party, see Do­ kuritsu Seinen Tö Independence Youth Society, see Dokuritsu Seinen Sha ingaidan (lobbyist), 284 n. 3 Inoue Junnosuke, 339, 348, 432 Inoue Nisshö, 442; resentment to­ wards military, 8, 257 n. 1 ; purged, 12 n. 5 ; Blood Pledge Corps, 14 n. 4, 326 n. i, 348, 356 n. 3; backs Mikami Taku, 45 ; Nichiren be­ liever, 53; converts Tanaka Seigen, 56; delayed depurge, 161 n. 2; lingers in obscurity, 163; pre-war role, 258 n. 1, 351-2, 432; National Protection Corps, 339-44; partici­ pates in unification efforts, 355, 357 n. i, 368; ‘judges’ Mr. Yoshida, 365 ; comments on his mission, 3745; Heaven-Sent Soldiers’ Unit In­ cident, 433 Institute for Local Patriotism, see Aikyö Juku International Political-Economic Aca­ demy (Kokusai Seikei Gakkai), 429 International Society for Cultural Ex­ change, see Kokusai Bunka Kökan Kyökai Inukai Tsuyoshi, 433 irredentism, 66, 95 Isé Danjingù (the Grand Shrines of Isé), 31, 57,. 134, 135- 6 , 357 Ishiwara Kanji, 442-3; antagonism towards Töjö, 7, 46 n. 4, 47; pre1945 activities, 46-47; post-war activities, 46-55; death, 48; influ­ ence, 74, 131 f., 166, 171, 174-5, 177 f., 180, 223, 257, 371 n. 2; antagonism towards Kishi Nobusuke, 189 n. 1 ; relations with Tsuji Masanobu, 224-5, 230-1 Jssui K ai (First Wednesday Associa­ tion), 215 n. i, 216 Iwakoshi Genichirö, 43 Japan Anti-Communist League, see Nihon Hankyö Remmei Japan Arms Industry Association, see Nihon Heiki Kögyö Kai Japan Association of Bereaved Fami­ lies, see Nihon Izoku Kai

Index Japan Communist Party (JCP), see Communism Japan Council of Men of Culture, see Nihon Bunkajin Kaigi Japan Defence Society, see Nihon Böei Kyökai Japan Emperor Party, see Nihon Sumera Tö Japan Fatherland League, see Nihon Aikyö Remmei Japan Federation of Employers’ As­ sociations, see Nikkeiren Japan Goblm Party, see Nihon Tengu Tö Japan Independence National Party, see Nihon Dokuritsu Kokumin Tö Japan Industrial Workers’ Union, see Nissanrö Kumt Japan Institute of Politics and Eco­ nomics, see Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyûjo Japan Labour Party, see Nihon Rödö Tö Japan League of Students, see Nihon Gakusei Remmei Japan Leaping-Carp Comrades’ As­ sociation, see Nihon Koitö Döshikai Japan National Polity Academy, see Nihon Kokutai Gakkai Japan National Party, see Nihon Kokumin Tö Japan Native Friend League, see Nihon Göyü Remmei Japan People’s Party, see Nihon Jim min Tö Japan Power Generating Company, see Nippatsu Japan Revolutionary Chrysanthemum Flag Comrades’ Association, see Nihon Kakumei Kikuhata Döshikai Japan Sound Youth Association, see Nihon Kensei K ai Japan Student League, see Nihon Gakusei Remmei Japanese student movement (post­ war), 276-3i i Japan Student Social-Science League, see Nihon Gakusei Shakai Kagaku Rengökai Japan Student Society, see Nihon Gakusei Kyökai Japan Teachers’ Union, see Nikkyöso Japan Village School, see Nihon Son Juku Japan Wounded Servicemen's As­ sociation, see Nihon Shöi Gunjin Kai Japanism, see Nihon-shugi Jichi Gakkai (Academy for SelfGovernment), 44

465

Jiei Dömei (Self-Defence League), 171, 223, App. IV Jiei Tai (Self-Defence Forces), 118, 170, Ch. 6 passimt 309 n. 1 Jikyoku Kaigi K ai (Current Affairs Discussion Society), 429 Jikyü Hiryö Fukyü K ai (Self-Suffi­ ciency Fertilizer Diffusion Associa­ tion), 55 Jimbö Nobuhiko, 77 Jimmu Tennö (Emperor Jimmu), 166 Jiyü, Yögo Gakusei Remmei (Student League for the Protection of Liber­ ty), 289 Junkoku Seinen Tai (National Mar­ tyrs Youth Corps), 289, 315, 322, 3 2 5 -3 8 , 345, 354 n. 3 , 3 5 8 n. 1, App. IV, 445 Justice Army, see Seigi Gun ‘Justice-Cultivation Review', see Yösei Jihö juvenile delinquency, 153 kachö (head of the household), 19, 139,

147

Kaetsu K ai (Artillery Comrades’ As­ sociation of Kaga and Echizen Pre­ fectures), 210 n. i Kagetsu Seisönen Döshikai (Kagetsu Youth and Adults Comrades' As­ sociation), 100 n. 2 Kageyama Masaharu (Masaji), 12 n. 5, 56, 357 n. i, 433, 435, 443 Kageyama Shöhei, 28 Kaikö (The Companion), 217,221 n. 1, 231, 244 Kaikö K ai (Companions' Association), 216-17, 244 Kaikö Sha (Companions’ Society), 216 n. 3 Kairetsu-go Incident, 46, 430 Kaizö Sha (Reform Society), 79 Kaji Affair, 220 Kaji Wataru, 220 n. 2 Kakumei Sö (House of the Cry of the Crane), 429 Kamata Asakichi, 176 n. 1 kamidana (god-shelves), 3 Kamoda Tokuichi, 184 Kanamori Tokujiro, xix Kantai Ha (Fleet Faction), 218 n. 2 kaoyaku (district boss), 97,139,144,388 Kasumigaura Farm, 45, App. IV Kataoka Shun, 47 n. 5 Katayama Tetsu, 112 Katö Takeo, 115 Katsuda Kenichi, 98 Kawabe Torashirö, ex-Lt.-Gen, 232, 242, 443

Index

466

Kawakami Gensai, 182 n. 1 Kawakami Toshiji, 12, n. 5, 182-3 Kawamura Takeo, 55 Kazama Jôkichi, 56 n. 2 Keenan, Joseph B., 62 Keiat Döjuti Remmei (Love and Es­ teem Mutual Benefaction League), 98-99, 227 Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations), 115 ff., 241 f. Keiö University, 275 n. 1 Keirin Gakumei (Statesmanship Lea­ gue), 371 Keisatsu Chö (Police Agency), 162 n. 2 Keisatsu Yobitai (National Police Re­ serve), 112, 211 kempeitai (gendarmerie), 9, 25, n o n. 2, 212 n. 2, 275 kendo (Japanese fencing), 140, 329, 340

Kenkoku K ai (National Founding As­ sociation), 68,187,429, App. IV, 443 Ketsumei Dan (Blood Pledge Corps): assassination of Baron Dan and Mr. Inoue, 14 n. 4, 326 n. 1, 442; Kojima Genno, 47 n. 5 ; Inoue Nisshö’s comment, 257 n. 1 ; role of the blood pledge, 316 n. 2 ; post-war echoes, 338 f. ; assassination plans, 348; youth of participants, 348; Mito, 356 n. 3; outline of incident, 432; relationship with post-war movement, App. IV Kigensetsu (National Foundation Day), 37, 37 n. i, 107, 121, 149, 354, 364, 397

Kigensetsu Höshuku Kai (National Foundation Day Celebration As­ sociation), 121 n. 2 Kijin Kai (Eccentrics’ Association), 43-44

Kikuchi Takeo, 276 Kikuhata (The Chrysanthemum Flag), 78, 80 Kikunami Katsumi, 92-93 Killen, James, 109 kimiga yo (Japanese national anthem), 31,

37 , 134

Kimura Takeo, 46 n. 4, 47, 175, 204 Kimura Tokutarö, 121 n. 2, 241 Kinkei Gakuin (Golden Pheasant Academy), 56, 429, 446 Kinki K ai (Imperial Flag Association), 446, 451-2 Kinnö Makoto Musubi K ai (Loyalists* Sincerity Group), 43, 47 n. 5, 172 n. 2, 174, App. IV, 441 K in o Kum iai (B ack-to-the-E arth Union), 45

Kinoshita Törn, 45, 74, 76 f., 242 n. 4 Kishi Nobusuke, 119,151,189,190,242 Kita Ikki: his dilemma, xx; influ­ ence, 3 n. 3; suppressed by the military, 7; Nichiren beliefs, 53; National-Socialism, 7, 166, 371, 372 n. i ; dispute with Okawa Shümei, 371 ; March Incident, 431 ; February Incident, 434-5 Kitaoka Juitsu, Prof., 187, 277 n. 1, 285-8, 289 Kiyose Ichiro, 20-21 Kizaki Tameyuki, 199 Köan Chösa Chö (Public Security In­ vestigation Agency), 162 n. 2, 370 Köchi Ken Zaigai Döhö Kikan Sokushin Remmei (Köchi Prefecture Overseas Compatriots’ Repatriation Promotion League), 91 n. 2 Köchi Sha (Activist Society), 351, App. IV, 448, 451 Kodama Kikan (Kodama Agency), 43, 443

Kodama Yoshio, 443-4; resentment towards military, 8, 257 n. 1 ; warcriminal suspect, 12 n. 5, 43; pre­ sent at önishi’s suicide, 27 n. 1 ; de­ scribes Atagoyama suicides, 29 n. 1 ; Nihon Kokumin Tö, 43; Formosa activities, 46, 172 n. 2, 227; co­ operates with conservatives, 204, 377 ; stress on youth, 269 ; discusses effects of social injustice, 297; on corruption, 307 n. 1 ; National Mar­ tyrs Youth Corps, 330 ; pre-war plot,

430

Ködö (Imperial Way), 26, 30, 435 Ködö Ha (Imperial Way Faction), 172 n. 2, 218 n. 2, 372, 430, 434 Ködö Yokusan Seinen Remmei (Im ­ perial Way Assistance Youth Lea­ gue), 45 Kojima Gennö, 47 n. 5, 339 n. 2, 365 Kojima Hideo, ex-Rear-Adm., 218 n. 1 Kokka-ShakaishugiRödö Tö ( NationalSocialist Workers’ Party), 169 n. 2 Kökoku Döshikai (Rising Nation Com­ rades’ Association), App. IV Kokubö Gakkai (National Defence Academy), 243 Kokubö Jfihö (National Defence Re­ view), 243 Kokubö Kyökai (National Defence Society), 440 Kokubö Sha (National Defence So­ ciety), App. IV, 449 Kokudo Böei Kenkyûkai (National T er­ ritory Defence Research Associa­ tion), 55 n. 2, 198-9, 325. 448-9

Index Kokui K ai

(A s so c ia tio n for th e M a in ­ te n a n ce o f th e N a tio n a l P re stig e ),

451

Kokwnin Seishin Bunka Kenkyùjo (Re­ search Institute for National Spirit­ ual Culture), 275 Kokumin Shimpü Tai (National Di­ vine Wind Unit), 25 Kokumin Tö (National Party), 51-52, 54, 175, 354 n. 3, App. IV Kokuryü K ai (A m u r R iv er A ss o c ia ­ tio n ), x v ii, 1 8 1, 2 4 2 n . 4 , 3 1 4 n . 1, 3 5 1 , 353 n . i , 4 2 9 , A p p . IV

Kokusai Bunka Kökan Kyökai (Inter­ national Society for Cultural Ex­ change), 298 n. i Kokusaku Sha (National Policy So­ ciety), 445 Kokusui Taishü Tö (National Essence Mass Party), 42, 358 n. 1, 429, App. IV, 449 , . • kokutai (national polity): implications for pre-war rightists, xix-xxi; Oc­ cupation attack on, 4, 18 ; definition, 4 n. i ; preservation despite defeat, 23-24; effect on attitude to defeat, 31-32, 252, 303, 382; imperialism and, 147; post-war advocacy, 186-7, 226, 245, 341, 355 ; possible restora­ tion, 263, 377; capital punishment and, 293 ; various definitions, 428 Kokutai no Hongi (The Fundamental Principles of the National Polity), 3 Kokutai Yögo Rengö (National Polity Protection League), 429 Komura Sakahiko, 198 n. 3 Köno Ichiro, 184-5, 443 Konoe Fumimaro, 27 n. 3, 46 n. 4, 106 n. 2, 276, 353 n. i, 446, 448 Konuma Tadashi, 12 n. 5, 339, 348, 357 n. i, 432 Korea, Koreans, and anti-Korean sentiment: Cho Nyoung Chu, 55, 176; anti-Korean sentiment among rightists, 69-71, 101, 196 n. 4, 314, 322, 401 ; popular attitudes to Koreans, 70 ns. 1-3, 101 ; Great Conciliation Party, 96 ; National Martyrs Youth Corps, 326, 331, 336 Kuhara Fusanosuke, 12 n. 5, 76, 224, 434 , 444 Kunisaki Noboru, ex-Lt.-Gen., 246, 255- 6 , 444 Kuno Kazuo, 172 n. 2 Kuroiwa Kaitaku Dan (Kuroiwa Re­ clamation Corps), 45 Kwantung Army, 223 kyökaku (men of chivalrous spirit), 314, 338 n. i, 339

467

Kyoto University, 271 n. 3, 292 Kyöwa K ai (Harmony Association), 48-49, 175, App. IV Kyöwa Tö (Harmony Party): absorbs the National Party, 54; absorbs the National Salvation Youth League, 77 ; Tsuji Masanobu, 132; ‘amuletic’ slogans, 148 n. 1 ; opposes re­ armament, 171, 257; development, programme, &c., 174-81; relation­ ship with pre-Surrender movement, App. IV Kyûgunjin kankei Onkyü Fukkatsu Zenkoku Renraku-kai (All-Japan Liaison Committee for the Revival of Pensions for Former Military Men), 253-4 Kyûgunjin Onkyü Yögo Remmei (Lea­ gue for the Protection of Pensions for Former Military Men), 231, 267 n. 2 Kyükoku Gakusei Dömei (National Salvation Student League), 290,

376

Kyükoku Kokumin Sörengö (National Salvation People’s General Federa­ tion), 174, 191, 346 n. i, Ch. 9 passim Kyükoku Seinen Remmei (N a tio n a l S a lv a tio n Y o u th

L ea g u e),

7 3 -7 5 ,

App. IV Kyükoku Undo (The National Salva­ tion Movement), 358 Kyükon Saibai Hö (How to Raise Flower Bulbs), 63 Kyüshin Aikoku Rödösha Remmei (Ra­ dical Patriotic Workers’ League), 351 , 451 labour and trade unions, 59-60, 108-9, 114, 126 land reform, 13-14 Lattimore, Owen, 106 League for the Acceleration of Re­ armament, see Saigumbi Sokushin Remmei League for Promoting the Revival of Pensions, see Onkyü Fukkatsu Soku­ shin Remmei League for the Protection of Pensions for Former Military Men, see Kyûgunjin Onkyü Yögo Remmei legal position of right-wing organiza­ tions, 162 n. 2 Literary Patriotic Society, see Genron Hökoku K ai Love and Esteem Mutual Benefac­ tion League, see Keiai Döjun Rem­ mei

468

Index

Loyalists’ Sincerity Group, see Kinnô Makoto Musubi Kai ‘Loyalty towards the Emperor coinci­ dent with filial piety’, see Chükö Itchi MacArthur, Ambassador, 189, 190 MacArthur, Douglas, Gen., see Oc­ cupation ‘machiai politics’, 374 n. 2 Machino Takema, ex-Maj.-Gen., 243 Maeda Torao, 356, 433» 435» 445 Maki Könen, 92-94 Manchukuo Harmony Association, see Manshükoku Kyöwa K ai Mansei Kurabu (Eternity Club), 56 Manshükoku Kyöwa K ai (Manchukuo Harmony Association), 46, 55, 175, App. IV Mappö no yo (the latter days of the Law), S3 March (1931) Incident, 351-2, 430-1 Marquât, Maj.-Gen. W. F., 108 Martial Arts Association, seeButoku Kai Maruyama Masao, 4, 198 Maruyama Toshiyuki, 184 n. 1 Masses Party, see Shinei Taishu Tö Matsugi Yoshikatsu, 339 n. 2 Matsumoto Tokumei, 226 n. 1 Matsumura Shüitsu, ex-Maj.-Gen., 217 n. i, 231, 267 n. 2 Matsunaga Tö, 155 Matsushita Könosuke, 199 May 15 (1932) Incident: Tachibana Kösaburö, 44; Yabuki Shögo, 45 n. 1; Mikami Taku, 45 f., 339; outline of incident, 432-3; ökawa Shümei, 448 May Day (1952) demonstration, 129, 282, 305, 326 Mazaki Jinsaburö, ex-Gen., 172 n. 2, 434-5

Mazaki Katsuji, ex-Rear-Adm., 172 n. 2, 231, 434-5 Meiji Constitution: Occupation atti­ tude, 16; conservative attitude, 17; comparison with 1947 Constitution, 20, 119 n. 3, 385; attitude of right­ ists, 164, 185, 362; provisions re military, 259 Meiji Jingü (Meiji Shrine), 31, 134 Meiji University, 192, 284-5 Meirin Km (Higher Ethics Society), 429 Meirö Kai (Bright Sunshine Associa­ tion), 28, 445 Memorial Day (1950) riots, 126, 305 Mikami Taku (Takashi): purged, 12 n. 5 ; post-war organizations, 45-46, 54 n. 2; Formosa activities, 46, 228; elections, 201 n. 3, 356; National

Mikami Taku (Takashi) : (contd.) Protection Corps, 339; participates in unification efforts, 356, 357 n. 1 ; comments on Showa Restoration, 374; May 15 Incident, 432-3 Mikasa, Prince, 121 n. 2 Miki Bukichi, 290, 443 military, militarism, militarists, &c., 7-8, Ch. 6 passim, 419-20 Military Affairs Research Group, see Gunji Kenkyü Dan Mimbö (People’s Defence), see Sokoku Böei Dôshikai Minami Kiichi, 445 Mindö (Democratization League), see Minshuka Dömei mining and mine-operators, 88-89,318 Minken Dôshikai (People’s Rights Comrades' Association), 43 Minobe Tatsukichi, Prof., xix, 17 n. 2, 41 n. 3, 238 n. i, 293 n. 2 Minoda Kyöki, 41, 276 Minshuka Dömei (Democratization League), 198, 445 Minzoku Shinsei Undö (People’s New Life Movement), 45 n. 1, 73-77, 9°» 171, App. IV Mitamura Shirö, 56 n. 2 Mitamura Takeo, 43 Mito, 356, 375 Mitsubishi, 115 Mitsui, 115 Miura Giichi, 12 n. 5, 330, 445 Miyato Takayuki, 42 Mizuhö Kurabu (Fresh Rice-Ears Club), 429 Mizuno Shigeo, 445 Mizuno Shögö, ex-Col., 219 n. 2 mobo and moga (‘modem boy’ and ‘modern girl’), 35 Mori Kaku, 258 Mori Takeo, Gen., 26 n. 1 Morita Masao, 326 Moro Seiki, 47 n. 5 Mukai Tadaharu, 115 ‘Murphy Fund’, 226 Musubi Kai (Group Association), 173 n. 5 Myriad Weapons Society, see Yachthoko Sha Nabeyama Sadachika, 56 n. 2, 90, 225, 445~6 Nagasawa Hiroshi, ex-Vice-Adm., 237 n. i Nakamura Takeshi, 172 n. 2, 174, 358, 433

Nakano Seigö, xxiii, 7, 43, 79, 193 n. 2, 196 n. 3, 323

469

Index Nakasone Yasuhiro, 198 n. 3 Nakayama Yü, 47 n. 5, 176 n. 1 national anthem, see kirnt ga yo National Communication Workers* Union, see Zen Teishin Jügyöin Kumiai National Defence Academy, see Kokubö Gakkai ‘National Defence Review*, see Kokuböjihö National Defence Society, see Kokubö Sha and Kokubö Kyökai National Divine Wind Unit, see Kokumin Shimpü Tai National Essence Mass Party, see Kokusui Taishü Tö National Food-Production Increase Comrades’ Association, see Zenkoku Shokuryö Zösan Döshikai National Foundation Day, see Kigensetsu National Foundation Day Celebration Association, see Kigensetsu Höshuku K ai National Founding Association, see Kenkoku Kai National Government and Public Workers’ Union, see Zenkoku Kinrösha Dömei National Liaison Council of Trade Unions, see Zemören National Martyrs Youth Corps, see Junkoku Seinen Tai National Party, see Kokumin Tô National Police Reserve, see Keisatsu Yobitai National Policy Society, see Kokusaku Sha 'national polity', see kokutai National Polity Protection League, see Kokutai Yögo Rengö National Protection Corps, see Gokoku Dan National Protection Youth Corps, see Gokoku Seinen Tai National Salvation Consultative Con­ ference, see Kyûkoku Undo National Salvation Movement, see Kyûkoku Undö 'National Salvation Movement, The', see Kyûkoku Undo National Salvation People's General Federation, see Kyûkoku Kokumin Sörengö National Salvation Student League, see Kyûkoku Gakusei Dömei National Salvation Youth League, see Kyûkoku Seinen Remmei National Security Force, see Hoan Tai

National-Socialist Workers' Party, see Kokka-Shakaishugi Rödö Tö National Territory Defence Research Association, see Kokudo Böei Kenkyükai Naval Administration Faction, see Gunsei Ha Navy Friendship Association, see Suikö K ai Navy Friendship Society, see Suikö Sha Nazism and Fascism: differences be­ tween Nazism and pre-war Japanese structure, xxi, 58, 350, 372; NaziFascist characteristics among Japan­ ese nationalists, 71, 330; differences between Nazi Party and post-war Japanese groups, 101, 380; econo­ mic determinants, 410, 412-13, 415 Nemoto Hiroshi, ex-Lt.-Gen., 446] Formosa activities, 46, 99, 173, 228; member of New Life Japan People’s League, 172 n. 2; October Incident,

431

neutralism, 130-2, 180, 214, 223-4, 23 L 247, 363, 394 , 423-4 Neutralization Party, see Chüwa Tö New and Powerful Masses Party, see Shinei Taishü Tö New Japan Construction Comrades’ Association, see Shin Nihon Kensetsu Döshikai New Japan Justice Party, see Shin Nihon Gi Tö New Japan Party, see Shin Nihon Tö New Japan Student League, see Shin Nihon Gakusei Dömei New Life Japan People's League, see Shinsei Nihon Kokumin Dömei New Youth Party, see Shin Seinen Tö Nichiren Buddhism, 48 n. 2, 53-54, 140-2 Nichiren K yö Döshikai (Nichiren Sect Comrades' Association), 55, 175, 203, 302 n. 2, App. IV Nigatsu K ai (February Association), 353 n. i

Nihon Aikyö Remmei (Japan Fatherland League), 243, 441 Nihon Böei Kyökai (Japan Defence Society), 77, 241, 441 f. Nihon Bunkajin Kaigi (Japan Council of Men of Culture), 293 Nihon Dokuritsu Kokumin Tö (Japan Independence National Party), 46, 54 n. 2 Nihon Gakusei Kyökai (Japan Student Society), 276 Nihon Gakusei Remmei (Japan Student League), 290

470

Index

Nihon Gakusei Shakai Kagaku Rengökai (Japan Student Social-Science League), see Gakuren Nihon Göyü Remmei (Japan NativeFriend League), 240, 267 Nihon Hankyö Remmei (Japan AntiCommunist League), 67-68, 69, 78, 90-91, 100 n. i, 187, App. IV Nihon Heiki Kögyö K ai (Japan Arms Industry Association), 441 Nihon Izoku K ai (Japan Association of Bereaved Families), 267 n. 2 Nihon Jimmin To (Japan People’s Party), 142 Nihon Kaizö Höan Taikö (General Outline of Measures for the Re­ construction of Japan), 3 n. 3, 48 Nihon Kakumei Kikuhata Dôshikai (Japan Revolutionary Chrysanthe­ mum Flag Comrades’ Association), 66, 69, 71, 72-73, 77-79, 103 n. i, 170, 192-8, 354 n. 3 Nihon Kensei K ai (Japan Sound Youth Association), 73 n. 2, 198 n. 3, 199, 270, 314-15, 323-5 Nihon Koitô Dôshikai (Japan LeapingCarp Comrades* Association), 99100 Nihon Kokumin Tö (Japan National Party), 43, 54 n. 2, App. IV Nihon Kokutai Gakkai (Japan Na­ tional Polity Academy), 186-7, 449 Nihon Rödö Tö (Japan Labour Party), 78, 87 Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyûjo (Japan Institute of Politics and Economics), 449

Nihon Shöi Gunjin K ai (Japan Wound­ ed Servicemen’s Association), 267 n. 2 Nihon-shugi (Japanism), 227, 255,

371 78

Nihon Sonjuku (Japan Village School), Nihon Sumera Tö (Japan Emperor Party), 100 n. 2 Nihon Tengu Tö (Japan Goblin Party), 97

Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Em­ ployers* Associations), 116, 282-3 Nikkyö, see Zen-Nihon Aikokusha Kyödö Tösö Kyögikai Nikkyöso (Japan Teachers’ Union), 155 n. i, 156, 281 Niniroku Jiken, see February 26 Inci­ dent Nippatsu (Japan Power Generating Company), 56 n. 2 Nishi Nihon Kensetsu Kokumin Rem-

Nishi Nihon Kensetsu Kokumin Rem­ mei: (contd.) mei (West Japan National Construc­ tion League), 447, 449 Nishio Chûzô, ex-Gen., 238 Nishiura Susumu, ex-Col., 219 n. 2 Nissanrö Kumi (Japan Industrial Wor­ kers’ Union), 96 Nixon, Richard, 112 Nogi Maresuke, Gen., 137 Nomura Kichisaburö, ex-Adm., 447; comments on Gen. Anami’s suicide, 26 n. 2; Fatherland Defence Com­ rades’ Association, 199; elected to Diet, 202 n. 1, 230 f. ; Navy Friend­ ship Association, 218; Watanabe Economic Research Institute, 221 n. 2 ; Continental Problems Re­ search Institute, 225 ; pre-war stand, 230; Japan Defence Society, 242; Japan Wounded Servicemen’s As­ sociation, 267 n. 2 Nomura Naokuni, ex-Adm., 243 North China Japanese Residents’ Democratic Party, see Zai-Kahoku Nihon Minshu Tö Nozaka Sanzö, 63, 118 n. 1 Numata Takazö, ex-Lt.-Gen., 216-17, 238 n. 2 ö b a Nobuo, 176 n. 1 Occupation, Ch. 1 passim, 35-36, 6061, 150-1, 152, 320, 383-7 Ocean Association, see Wadatsumi K ai October (1931) Incident, 228, 431-2, 440 Oda Masanobu, see Orita Masanobu Offerings to the Gods Institute, see Himorogi Juku Officers’ School Incident, see Shikan Gakkö Jiken Ogata Seinen Tai (Ogata Youth Unit), 447

Ogata Taketora, 43 n. 1, 77, 117, 225, 243 , 443 * 447 Ogushi Toyoo, 242 n. 4 ö i Atsushi, 25 ö i Kentaro, 38 ö i Shigetomo, Gen., 210 Okamura Yasuji, ex-Gen., 225, 228, 238 f., 447-8 Okano Kiyohide, 155 ökawa Shümei, 448; resentment to­ wards military, 8, 257 n. 1; war criminal suspect, 12 n. 5; comment on Shrine attendance, 135 n. 1; de­ layed depurge, 161 n. 2; lingers in obscurity, 163; pre-war role, 258

Index ökawa Shûmei: (contd.) n. !» 3 5 3 5 2 n. 4; participates in unification efforts, 355, 357 n. 1, 368; funeral, 356 n. 2; attacked as ‘false patriot’, 369; dispute with Kita Ikki, 371; March Incident, 430; October Incident, 431; May 15 Incident, 432-3 Okazaki Katsuo, 243 Okinawa, 305, 322, 324, 331, 398 öm i Silk Industry Company, 182-3 öm ori Sögen, 358, 370 Onishi Takijirö, Vice-Adm., 27, 209 Onkyü Fukkatsu Sokushin Remmei (League for Promoting the Revival of Pensions), 226, 253 ö n o Bamboku, 243 Organization Control Ordinance, n o , 161-2 Orita Masanobu, 73-77 Osei Kurabu (Cherry and Star Club), 238 oyabun-kobun (boss-follow er sys­ tem): in pre-war rightist societies, xxii ; in early post-war period, 39,92, 97, 100 n. 2, 320 ; in coal-mines, 88, 318; in revived rightist societies, 165, 197, 203, 315 n. 3; among street-stall racketeers, 314 n. 1; among patriotic youth groups, 31516, 340, 347-8 ; characteristics of the system, 316-20; organization, 348 n. i ; prevents rightist unification, 377-9» 403; significance, 388 Oyama Ikuo, 183 Oyama Iwao, 55 n. 2, 56 n. 2, 176 n. 1, 198-9, 44&-9 Ozuru Seinenbu (Ozuru Youth Branch), 67, 90-91 pachinko, 165, 287, 354 pacifism, anti-rearmament, &c., 54, 76, 171, 179-81, 260-1, 278, 300-3 Pan-Asianism : Tsuji, neutralism and, 132; advocacy by revived rightist societies, 168, 322, 401; Harmony Party, 178; Chrysanthemum Flag Association, 195-7; National Mar­ tyrs Youth Corps, 332-3 ; National Salvation movement, 363 ; common ground of the extremes, 394, 397; future possibilities, 423-4 Patriotic Student League, see Aikoku Gakusei Remmei Patriots’ Friendship Rallies, see Aikokusha Konshinkai Patriots’ Society, see Aikoku Sha Peace Preservation Law (Chian Iji Hö), 9, 126, 273, 293

471

Peace Problems Symposium, see Heizva Mondai Damoakai Peerless Poetry Association, see Fuji Kadö K ai People’s Defence, see Mimbö People’s New Life Movement, see Minzoku S hinsei Undö People’s Rights Comrades* Associa­ tion, see Minken Döshikai Police Agency, see Keisatsu Chö Potsdam Declaration, 1, 23 n. 3, 61, 86, 95 ‘prestige of the armed forces’, see gun no ishin ‘Problem of Deplorable Textbooks, The*, see Ureubeki Kyökasho no Mondai Public Security Investigation Agency, see Köan Chösa Chö Pure Association for an All-Student Movement, see Zen-Gakusei Undo Junsei K ai purge, 8-13, 107, 109-10, 209, 389, 429 Purple Mountain Institute, see Shizan Juku ‘quasi-intellectuals’, 319-20, 418 Radical Patriotic Workers’ League, see Kyûshin Aikoku Rödösha Rem­ mei rearmament and national defence : change in Occupation policy, 112; attitude of conservatives, 118; con­ stitutional revision and, 120; op­ position, 121; effect on civilian rightists, 163; conflicting attitudes of rightists, 170-1 ; Great Japan Patriots’ Party, 187; groups favour­ ing rearmament, 198-200, 288-9; post-war developments, Ch. 6 passim ; attitude of National Salva­ tion movement, 362—3 ‘Red Flag*, see Akahata ‘red purge’, 89, no -1 1 , 114-15, 273, 281, 288, 293 Reform Society, see Kaizö Sha Repatriation Bureau, 219 Research Institute for National Spirit­ ual Culture, see Kokumin Seishin Bunka Kenkyûjo Reserve Officers* Association, see Yoshi K ai Reservists’ Associations, see Zaigö Gunjinkai Revere-the-Emperor-and -Expel - the Barbarian Comrades’ Association, see Sonjö Döshikai

472

Index

‘Reverse Course’: definition, 105; de­ velopment, 105-20, 122; opposi­ tion, 120-1; effect on nationalist movements, 160-3, 200, 204, 400; New Life Japan People’s League, 172-3; effect on the military, 21112, 244-5; opposition of students, 305-6; effect on democratic de­ velopment, 386-7; continuation, 407 Rhee Syngman, and the Rhee Line, 70 f. Ridgway, Matthew, Gen., n o , 112 Righteous Men’s Party, see Gijin Tö Rtkken Yösei K ai (Constitution Jus­ tice Cultivation Association), 43, 185-6, App. IV Rising Nation Comrades' Association, see Kökoku Döshikai Rising Sun Flag, see hi no maru Risshö Kösei K ai (Establishment-ofRighteousness Rebirth Association), 140 rönin (disenfeoffed samurai), xxiv Rönin K ai (Association of Ronin), App. IV Royall, Kenneth, 107 rural areas, see agriculture Russia, see Soviet Union Sagoya Tomeo (Yoshiaki), 44g; co­ operates with Great Conciliation Party, 94; New Life Japan People’s League, 172 n. 2; National Protec­ tion Corps, 339-44; attends rightist unification meetings, 354, 357 n. 1; shoots the Prime Minister, 430 Saigö Takamori, 38-39 Saigumbi Sokushin Remmei (League for the Acceleration of Rearma­ ment), 187 Saishûsen-ron (Theory of the Final War), 49-50, 177-8 Saitö Masahisa, 94 Saitö Tadashi, 242 n. 4 Sakonji Masazô, ex-Vice-Adm., 218 Sakura Kai (Cherry-Blossom Associa­ tion): Endo Saburö, 167 n. 1; Matsumura Shüitsu, 217 n. 1 ; Imai Takeo, 223; March Incident, 4301; October Incident, 431; Hashi­ moto Kingorö, 441; Kawabe Torashirö, 443; Nemoto Hiroshi, 446; Tsuji Masanobu, 450 Sanagi Kowashi, Gen., 236 n. 3, 237 n. i San Francisco Peace Treaty, 75, 112, 128, 151, 167-8 Sankô Construction Company, 56

Sano Hiroshi, 449 Sano Manabu, 56 n. 2, 77, 44g Sasagawa Ryöichi, 42, 243, 44g Sasaki, Capt., 25 Satö Eisaku, 290 Satö Katsurö, 217 n. 3, 224 n. 2 Satö Naotake, 225, 290 Satomi Kishio, Dr., 43, 47 n. 5, 52, 185, 186-^7, 224, 449 Saturday Association, see Doyö Kai Sawamoto Yorio, ex-Adm., 218 n. 1 Seigi Gun (Justice Army), 172 n. 2 Seiko Kai (Flowers-of-Glory Associa­ tion), 55, 175, App. IV Seinen Undö (The Youth Movement),

328

Sekine Kishirö, 183 Sekka Böshi Dan (Anti-Bolshevik Corps), 181-4, 358 n. i, App. IV Self-Defence Forces, see Jiei Tai Self-Defence League, see Jiei Dömei Self-Sufficiency Fertilizer Diffusion Association, see Jikyü Hiryö Fukyû K ai Sensaisha Kösei K ai (War Victims Welfare Association), 92-93 Senyü K ai (War Comrades’ Associa­ tion), 210 n. 1, 226-7, 238 n. 3, 358 n. 1 Senyüren (War Comrades' Federa­ tion), 238-40, 246, 448 seppuku (harakiri), 26-29, 42, 43, 137 n. 2, 209 Seven Lives Society, see Shichishö Sha Shakai Minshu Tö (Social Democratic Party), 440 Shakai Tö (Socialist Party), 119 n. 1, 306, 308 n. 1, 383, 408, 440, 445-6 Shichishö Sha (Seven Lives Society), 274 Shiga Yoshio, 60, 184 Shijitsu Kenkyûjo (Historical Re­ search Institute), 221 Shikan Gakkö Jiken (Officers’ School Incident), 224 n. 2, 434 Shimazu Ha (Shimazu Faction), 79, 80 n. 2, 192-8 Shimazu Sadayasu, 72, 79-90, 192-8 shimbei-hanso (pro-America, anti-Rus­ sia), 66-67, 97-98, 170, 188, 190, 196 n. 4, 344, 423 Shimmin no Michi (The Way of the Subject), 3 Shimomura Sadamu, ex-Gen., 217 n. i, 225, 232 Shimpei Tai (Heaven-Sent Soldiers’ Unit): Moro Seiki, 47 n. 5; Suzuki Zenichi, 172 n. 2 ; Nakamura Takeshi, 174, 358; outline of inci-

473

Index Shimpei Tai: (contd.) dent, 433; Kageyama Masaharu, 443; Maeda Torao, 445 Shin Nihon Gakusei Dömei (New Japan Student League), 199, 288 Shin Nihon Gi Tö (New Japan Justice Party), 100 n. 2 Shin Nihon Kensetsu Döshikai (New Japan Construction Comrades* As­ sociation), 43 Shin Nihon Kensetsu Taikö (General Principles for the Founding of a New Japan), 178 Shin Nihon Tö (New Japan Party), 43 Shin Nihon Seinen Tö (New Japan Youth Party), 90 n. 3, 100 n. 2 Shin Töhö, see Töhö Film Company Shindö Kazuma, 161 n. 2, 242 n. 4 Shinei Taishü Tö (New and Powerful Masses Party), 10 n. 3, 68, 92-94 Shinjin K ai (Association of New Men), 271, 274, 448 Shinsei Nihon Kokumin Dömei (New Life Japan People’s League), 172-4, 227, App. IV Shinshü Nöjö (Divine Land Farm), 45 Shinto, 2-3, 35, 134-6, 440 Shiozuka Seiya, 99 Shiryö Chösakai (Historical Material Research Association), 450 Shizan Juku (Purple Mountain Insti­ tute), 172, 173 n. s, 174, App. IV, 441 Shöriki Matsutarö, 115, 243, 449 Shötva Ishin (Showa Restoration), 164, 255, 269, 350, 352 n. 4, 357, 363-4, 374 , 431 Shöwa Ishin Ron (Theory of the Showa Restoration), 178 sküshin (morals), 2, 154-5, 269, 397 Social Democratic Party, see Shakai Minshu Tö Socialist Party, see Shakai Tö Society of Those who Yet Remain, see Yûson Sha Söhyö (General Council of Labour Unions), 167, 190, 278, 360 Söka Gakkai (Value-Creating Aca­ demy), 140-1 Sokoku Böei Döshikai (Fatherland De­ fence Comrades* Association), 199200, 288 Sortjö Döshikai (Revere-the-Emperorand - Expel - the - Barbarian Com­ rades* Association), 28-29, 429 Sörengö, see Kyükoku Kokumin Sörengö söshi (political hireling), xxiii-xxiv, 284 n. 3, 314 n. i

Soviet Union and the Russians, 63, 64-65, 188, 366-8, 399-400 Söya M am , 40 n. 1 Special Investigation Bureau, see Tokushin Kyoku Stalin’s New Year message (1952), 128 Statesmanship League, see Keirin Gakumei Stockholm Peace Appeal, 301 Student League, see Gakuren Student League for the Protection of Liberty, see Jiyü Yögo Gakusei Remmei student movement, Ch. 6 passim ‘Student Movement, T he’, see Gakusei Undo Student National Defence Society, see Gakusei Kokubö Kyökai Subversive Activities Prevention Law (.Haböhö), 117, 162 n. 2, 278, 282, 293

Suetsugu Ichirö, 198 n. 3, 199, 323-5 Sugihara Arata, 233 Sugiura Haruo, 176 n. 1 Sugiwara Kôta, 198 n. 3 Sugiyama Gen, ex-Gen., 27, 209 Sugiyama Shigeru, Lt.-Gen., 235, 236 n. 3, 237 n. i, 253 Suikö Kai (Naval Friendship Associa­ tion), 217-18 Suikö Sha (Naval Friendship Society), 217 n. 4 Suiyö Kondankai (Wednesday In­ formal-Discussion Association), 215 n. 2 ‘Sun Tribe’, see taiyözoku Sunada Shigemasa, 235 Suzuki Mosaburö, 440 Suzuki Zenichi, 12 n. 5, 172 n. 2, 182, 433

‘Switzerland of the Far East*, 129, 149, 393

Table of Personnel Organization Law, 114 Tachibana Kösaburö, 449-50 \ purged, 12 n. 5; post-war activities, 44-45; criticizes modem youth, 165-6; stresses agricultural autonomy, 166, 363, 371 n. 2 ; pre-war role, 258 n. 1 ; Mito, 356 n. 3; participates in uni­ fication efforts, 357 n. 1, 368; on importance of youth, 361; on Em­ peror, 361 ; May 15 Incident, 432-3 Tada Sankichi, 97 Tadano Naosaburö, 142 Taika Kai (Great Reform Society), 429 Tairiku Mondai (Continental Prob­ lems), 225

Index

474

Tairiku Mondai Kenkyüjo (Continen­ tal Problems Research Institute), 225» 441» 446 f.

Taisei Yokusan K ai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association), xxi, 11,115, 353 n.

1

taiyözoku (‘Sun Tribe’), 153, 304, 312 Tajima Yoshiyuki, 56 n. 2 Takabatake Motoyiîki, 7, 371, 451 Takahashi Ryütarö, 267 n. 2 Takeda Kunitarö, 47 n. 5, 48 n. 2, 54 f., 83 n. 3, 175 f., 203, 371 n. 2 Takeshima Island, 70 Takikawa Yukitoki, 273 n. 1, 293 n. 2 Tamai Yükichi, 198 n. 3 Tamura Hide, Vice-Adm., 226 Tanabe Nittoku, 172 n. 2 Tanaka Chigaku, 185 Tanaka Hisashi, ex-Col., 77 Tanaka Keiji, ex-Col., 77 Tanaka Ryükichi, ex-Gen., 450 Tanaka Sawaji, 12 n. 5, 43, 185-6, 450 Tanaka Seigen, 56, 161 n. 2 Tanaka Seiichi, Gen., 27 Tanaka Shinichi, ex-Lt.-Gen., 226 n. 1, 243, 258 n. 1, 450 Tatsumi Eiichi, ex-Lt.-Gen., 232 tekiya (street-stall ‘racketeers’), 314, 339

Tenkö K ai (Association for Heavenly Action), 326, 429 f., App. IV Terada Inejirô, 12 n. 5 tera-koya (temple school), 54 textbooks, 155-7 ‘Theory of the Showa Restoration’, see Shôwa Ishin Ron ‘third-country nationals’, 69-71; see also Korea ‘third force*, 307, 394 Töa no meishu Nihon (Japan the lead­ ing power of East Asia), 30, 168 Töa Remmei (East Asia League): ori­ gins and objectives, 46 n. 4, 442; developments, 47 n. 1 ; post-war in­ fluence, 50, 168, 189 n. i, 257; off­ shoots, 74, 175, 223, 368-9; purged, 429

Töa Remmei Döshikai (East Asia League Comrades’ Association), 47, 171, 180, 181 n. i, App. IV Töa Remmei Kyökai (East Asia League Society), 46-47, App. IV Töfü Kai (East Wind Association), 355 Töhö and Shin Töhö Film Com­ panies, 81, h i , 137, 452 Töhö Döshikai (Far East Comrades’ Association), 429 Töhö K ai (Eastern Association), 43, 46 n. 4, 79, 429, 446

Töhoku, 47, 49, 55 , 175, 178, 327 Tôjô Hideki, xxii ; opposition of right­ ists, 7-8, 43, 46 n. 4, 441, 442-3; arrested, 8 n. 7; attempts suicide, 27 ; hanged, 27 n. 3 ; disposition of ashes, &c., 27 n. 3, 254 n. 1 ; war­ time role, 209; post-war activities of associates, 219; pre-war role, 258 n. i ; dissolves rightist groups, 350 Tokonami Takejiro, 338 n. 1 Tokorozawa Nöjö (Tokorozawa Farm), 45

Tokuda Kyüichi, 91 Tokugawa Mitsukuni, 356 n. 3 Tokushin Kyoku (Special Investigation Bureau), 108 n. 1, 162 n. 2 Tokyo (Imperial) University, 271, 272 n. 3, 277, 308 n. i, 309 n. 2 Tökyö Zaigö Gurtjin K ai (Tokyo Re­ servists’ Association), 238 Tökyö Zaigö Senyü Kai (Tokyo Re­ servists* War Comrades’ Associa­ tion), 245-6, 254-5 Tomatsu Keigi, 94-96, 203, 366 Tominaga Shôzô, ex-Rear-Adm., 218 n. i Tomioka Sadatoshi, ex-Rear-Adm., 225, 450 Tomita Chokuko, ex-Maj.-Gen., 228 tonari-gumi (neighbourhood associa­ tions), 3 n. 2 Tösei Ha (Control Faction), 52 n. 1, 216, 217 n. i, 218 n. 2, 219 n. 2, 258 n. i, 259 n. 2, 434, 442 town block associations, see chönaikai Töyama Hidezö, 12 n. 5, 325-6, 430, 432

Toyama Mitsuru, 68 n. 1, 88, 137 n. 2, 321, 325 f., 338 n. i, 351, 352 n. 4 Toyoda Kazuo, 290, 326-38 trade unions, see labour Tsuji Masanobu, ex-Col., 450-1 ; on World War III, 50, 131; follower of Ishiwara Kanji, 50, 230-1 ; sup­ ports New Life Movement, 77; on neutralism, 131-2, 168, 214, 247, 394; on defence, 170, 180; SelfDefence League, 171, 223; breaks with Harmony Party, 180-1; co­ operates with conservatives, 204, 377 ; attitude to Police Reserve, &c., 215; First Wednesday Association, 216; elected to Diet, 217, 224, 2301 ; influence on The Companion, 217 n. 3 ; political activities, 223-5 '*sup­ ports ex-Col. Hattori, 234; pre-war role, 258 n. 1 ; on civilian supre­ macy, 262

Index Tsukui Tatsuo, 451 ; resentment to­ wards military, 8; purged, 12 n. 5; book on Nakano Seigö, 43 n. 1 ; National Founding Association, 68 n. i ; comments on Communist China, 167 n. 1 ; comments on political extremes, 179; Japan De­ fence Society, 242; participates in unification efforts, 351, 355; at­ tacked as ‘false patriot’, 369; March Incident, 431 Tsutsumi Yasujirö, 136 Uchida Ryöhei, 181, 353 n. 1, 356 n. 2 Ueda Kenkichi, ex-Gen., 239 f. Uesugi Shinkichi, 68 n. 1, 272, 274,

371

Ugaki Kazushige, ex-Gen., 202 n. 1, 230 f., 244, 275 n. i, 431 Umezu Kambei, 338 n. 1 United Nations, 151-2 United Nations Association of Japan, 151 n. i, 225 Ureubeki Kyökasho no Mondai (The Problem of Deplorable Textbooks),

ÏS6

U.S.A. and attitudes towards America : divided attitudes of rightists, 7576, 97-98, 168-71 ; anti-American rightists, 98, 169 n. 2, 174, 178; effects of nationalism, 125-30, 394, 398; pro-American rightists, 188; divided attitudes of ex-military, 214, 247; anti-Americanism among students, 281-2, 305-7; anti-Ameri­ canism among rightist youth groups, 321-2 U.S.S.R., see Soviet Union Ushijima Tatsukuma, 176 n. 1 utagoe (group-singing), 298 n. 1, 324, 335

uyoku (right wing), 203, 325, 346, 361 Value-Creating Academy, see Söka Gakkai ‘Vanguard*, see Zenei Vanguard Workers’ League, see Zenei Kinrö Domex Vienna Peace Conference, 179 Wachi Takaji, ex-Lt.-Gen., 229 Wada Kei, ex-Lt.-Gen., 181 n. 1 Wada Kinji, 54 Wada Tsuyoshi, ex-Lt.-Gen., 176 Wadatsumi K ai (Ocean Association), 302 Wang Ching-wei, 46 n. 4 War Comrades’ Association, see Senyü K ai

475

War Comrades’ Federation, see Senyüten War crimes and war criminals, 8 n. 5, 12 n. 5, 27 n. 3, 48 n. 1, 324 War Victims Welfare Association, see Sensaisha Kösei Kai Waseda University, 271 Watanabe Kunio, 81 Watanabe Shözö, 74, 76 f. Watanabe Tetsuzö, 221, 452 ‘Way of the Subject, The*, see Shimmin no Michi ‘Wealthy Nation and a Strong Army’, see Fukoku Kyöhei Wednesday Informal-Discussion As­ sociation, see Suiyö Kondankai West Japan National Construction League, see Nishi Nihon Kensetsu Kokumin Rernmei Willoughby, Maj.-Gen., 219, 384 xenophobia, see anti-foreign feeling Yabuki Shögo, 45 Yachihoko Sha (Myriad Weapons Society), 173 n. 5, 174, App. IV Yamagata Aritomo, Marshal, 259 Yamamoto Hiroshi, 67 Yamamoto Yoshio, ex-Rear-Adm., 232 Yamanashi Katsunoshin,ex-Adm.,2i8 Yamato (old name for Japan), 94 n. 1 Yamato Musubi Honsha (Yamato Solidarity Headquarters), 429 Yasui Seiichirö, 290 Yasukuni Jinja (Yasukuni Shrine), 134, 214, 216, 238 n. 4, 251-2, 254 n. i Yasuoka Masaatsu, 12 n. 5, 56, 225, 242 n. 4, 243, 451—2 Yoake Shimbun Sha (Dawn News­ paper Society), 77 Yokusan Seiji K ai (Imperial Rule As­ sistance Political Society), 11 Yokusan Seinen Dan (Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Corps), 47 n. 5, 79 Yonemura Kaichirö, 181 n. 2 Yösei Jihö (Justice-Cultivation Re­ view), 186 Yoshi K ai (Reserve Officers’ Associa­ tion), 210 n. i Yoshida Eizö, Vice-Adm., 236 n. 3 Yoshida Masuzö, 182-3, 226, 238 n. 3, 357 n. 2 Yoshida Shigeru: conflict with Mr. Hatoyama, 68; opposed by right­ ists, 72, 168, 180, 184, 189 n. i, 190, 365; pursues anti-Communist policy, 102, 127-8; receives antiCommunist directive, 111 ; influ-

476

Index

Yoshida Shigeru: (contd.) ence on post-war politics, 113; bureaucratic background, 116 ; at­ tacked by left and right, 133, 184 n. 1» 365, 397, 439; sends deputy to Isé Grand Shrine, 135 n. 4; screens candidates for Self-Defence Force, 207 n. i ; organizes National Police Reserve, 211 ; avoids reference to re­ armament, 212 n. 1; rejects plans for large-scale rearmament, 220; supports the Martial Virtues As­ sociation, 242 n. 4, 243 Yoshida Shöin, 31 n. 1, 78 n. 3 Yoshimatsu Masakatsu, 42 Yoshino Sakuzö, Prof., 271 Yoshitake Keiichi, 198 n. 3 young officers, xxiv-xxv, 38-39, 347, 349 , 404 youth groups, Ch. 7 passim, Ch. 8 passimy 361 ‘Youth Movement, The*, see Seinen Undö Yüson Sha (Society of Those who Yet Remain), App. IV, 448, 451 Zai-Kahoku Nihon Minshu Tô (North China Japanese Residents' Demo­ cratic Party), 98 zaibatsu, xxiii, 13-15, 107 f., 115-16, 166-7, 389 Zaigö Gunjinkai (Reservists' Associa­ tions), 238 f. Zen-Gakusei Undö Junsei K ai (Pure Association for an All-Student Movement), 289-90

Zen-Kansai Aikoku Sensen Kyögikai (All-Kansai Patriots’ Battle-Line Conference), 357 Zen-Nihon Aikokusha Dantai Kyögikai (All-Japan Council of Patriotic Societies), 191 Zen-Nihon Aikokusha Kyödö Tösö Kyögikai (All-Japan Patriots’ Joint Struggle Association), 351-3, 364 Zen-Nihon Hankyö Remmeit see Nihon Hankyö Remmei Zen-Nihon Seinen Kurabu (All-Japan Young M en’s Club), 429 Zen-Nihon Zaigö Gunjin K ai (AllJapan Ex-Servicemen's Associa­ tion), 172 n. 2 Zenei (The Vanguard), 128 Zenei Kinrö Dömei (Vanguard Work­ ers’ League), 449 Zengakuren (All-Japan Union of Stu­ dent Self-Governing Societies), 136 n. i, 189, 272, 277-311, 313-14, 360, 376 Zenkan Kö (National Government and Public Workers' Union), 114 Zenkoku Kinrösha Dömei (National League of Working People), 42 Zenkoku Shokuryö Zösan Döshikai (National Food-Production Increase Comrades’ Association), 55, 175, 198 n. 3 Zenrören (National Liaison Council of Trade Unions), 111 Zen Teishinjügyöin Kumiai (National Communication Workers’ Union), 108

P R IN T E D AT T H E BRO A D W A TER PR E SS, W ELW Y N G A R D EN C IT Y , H E R T FO R D SH IR E