National Survival in Dependent Societies: Social Change in Canada and Poland 9780773573642

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THE CARLETON LIBRARY SERIES

A series of original works, new collections and reprints of source material relating to Canada, issued under the supervision of the Editorial Board,

Carleton Library Series, Carleton University Press Inc., Ottawa, Canada. General Editor

Michael Gnarowski Editorial Board

Bruce Cox (Anthropology) Irwin Gillespie (Economics) Naomi Griffiths (History) David B. Knight (Geography) Michael MacNeil (Law) Randy Newell (Political Science) Stephen Richer (Sociology)

Carleton University Press Ottawa, Canada

1990

OCarleton University Press Inc. 1990 ISBN 0-88629-126-7 (paperback) ISBN 0-88629-127-5 (casebound) Printed and bound in Canada Carleton Library Series 162

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: National survival in dependent societies (The Carleton Library ;CLS 162) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-88629-127-5 (bound) ISBN 0-88629-126-7 (pbk.) 1. Quebec (province)--Social conditions--1960- . 2. Quebec (Province)--Politics and government-1960- .3. Poland--Social conditions--1945- . 4. Poland--Politics and government--19455. Nationalism--Quebec province). 6. ~ationalism-Poland. I. Breton, Raymond, 1931- . 11. Series.

Distributed by Oxford University Press Canada, 70 Wynford Drive, Don Mills, Ontario, Canada. M3C 1J9 (416) 44 1-2941 Cover design: Y Graphic Design Acknowledgement Carleton University Press gratefully acknowledgesthe support extended to its publishing programme by the Canada Council and the Ontario Arts Council. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Social Science Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..

List of Contributors .................................................................................. vll Acknowledgements ................................................................................... ix I Introduction: Quebec, Canada, Poland and Comparative Studies in Sociology. The Editors. ................................................................ 1

PART ONE: CANADIAN AND POLISH SOCIOLOGY IN CONTEXT I1

Anglophone Canadian Sociology: Context and Evolution. HI Hiller .......................................................................................... 29 I11 Quebec and its Cultural Specificity,or the Construction of an Identity. M. Fournier ............................................................. 43 71 IV Polish Sociology and Problems of Nation Building. J. Szacki V The Polish Sociological Tradition. P. Sztompka ............................ 83

......

PART TWO: TRANSITION IN POLAND AND QUEBEC VI Ethnic Groups, Regions and Nationalism in the Formation of Canadian and Polish Society. R. Breton and W. Kwasniewicz .... 101 VII Social and National ConsciousnessTransfonnations in Dependent Societies. G. Houle, P. Lukasiewicz and A. Sicinski. 137 VIII The Process of Dependent Development in Industrialized Capitalist and Socialist Settings. G. Caldwell, A. Kaminski, W. Morawski, and A. Sales .......................................................... Ix A comparison of Social Mobility and Socio-economic Achievement in Quebec and in Poland. P. Bernard, J. Renaud, and M. Pohoski ........................................ X Unions and Industrial Conflict A The Sources of Industrial Conflicts in Post-War Poland. W. Pankov ................................................................................ B Crises and Change in the Union Movement in Quebec. J. D o h y .................................................................................. XI Transformations in Political Institutions. A Social transformation and Political Change in Quebec: Political Parties and the State. R. Pelletier ............................... B Structural Conditions for Political Change in Poland. W. Wesolowski ........................................................................ XII Conclusion. The Editors ................................................................ References. ...........................................................................................

177 217

261 283

297 323 353 373

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

H. HILLER, Department of Sociology, University of Calgary M. FOURNIER, Departement de Sociologie, Universite de Montreal

J. SZACKI, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw P. SZTOMPKA, Institute of Sociology, Jagellonian University, Krakow R. BRETON, Department of Sociology, University of Toronto W. KWASNIEWICZ,Institute of Sociology,Jagellonian University, Krakow

G. HOULE, Departement de Sociologie, Universite de Montdal P. LUKASIEWICZ, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences A. SICINSKI, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences

G. CALDWELL, Institut qu6bCcois de Recherche sur la Culture A. KAMINSKI, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw W. MORAWSKI, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw A. SALES, Departement de Sociologie, Universite de Montreal

P. BERNARD, Departement de Sociologie Universit6 de Montreal J. RENAUD, Departement de Sociologie, Universite de Montreal M. POHOSKI, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw W. PANKOV, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences J. DOFNY, Departement de Sociologie, Universite de Montreal

R. PELLETIER, Departement de Science politique, Universite Lava1 W. WESOLOWSKI, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

By the time this manuscript appears in print, and for reasons expanded upon in the introduction,the international exchange project that inspired it will have lasted more than ten years. Such a collaborative effort would have been impossible without the contributionsof several institutions, a support without which our individual efforts would have been insufficient. In this respect we wish to mention the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw which was the instigator of the original Polish-Canadian exchange, as well as the Institute of Sociologyin Krakow and the Department of Sociology of the University of Warsaw whose personnel contributed. On the Canadian side, grateful appreciation is due to the Social Science Research Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Canadian government and the Ministry of International Affairs of the Quebec government; we wish also to thank the University of Montreal which put its facilities at our disposal when the Canadian delegation received its Polish colleagues in Montreal. We also wish to thank Methuen Publications for permission to reproduce the paper by Rejean Pelletier. Above and beyond the necessary institutionalsupport, mention must be made of the interest and availability of numerous Polish and Canadian colleagues who, though not members of the exchange group, nonetheless contributed to and participated in the meetings and the stimulating lateevening conversations which inevitably followed.

INTRODUCTION

I CANADA, QUEBEC, POLAND AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY

The Editors

This book is about social change in two settings that are quite different in several aspects, yet exhibit important similarities: Poland and Canada, with a focus on one part of Canada,namely Quebec. It describes and compares some of the actual or attempted transformations that the two societies have experienced in recent decades and draws parallels between the forces that have been the motor of these processes. The value of comparative studies is generally accepted, even if the state of the art does not allow them to be systematic and conclusive. Establishing parallels between structures and processes in different social contexts can be quite instructive. But in carrying out this task, we have been confronted with two issues, one in planning the project and one after its completion. The first pertains to the question of why Poland and Canada and more specifically Quebec? It could perhaps be argued that the two societies and their geopolitical contexts are so different as to preclude any meaningful comparisons. This was probably the feeling of most participants at the beginning of the exchanges between the two countries. In fact, the initial impetus appears to have been primarily intellectual curiosity and the desire or need to communicate with sociologists working in a different type of ~ociety.~ The second concerns the rapidity of social change in contrast with the relatively slow pace that comparative social research can take, given the particular kinds of difficulties and eventfdness that it entails (as the second part of the introduction clearly shows). Is an analysis overtaken by events without value? As a narrative of events, social change is likely to make it soon out of date. But, in varying degree, this is probably the case for most social research. But narration was not the aim of the project, even though a narrative

National Survival in Dependent Societies

does emerge from the documentation included in the analyses. The general objective was to understand the two societies and the dynamic forces that shape their social structures and give direction to their evolution. To the extent that we have succeeded, the essays included in this volume are far from obsolete. They do not describe recent events, but they present documentation and analysis relevant to recent developments. Indeed, they identify elements of the culture and social structurethat underliethe recent changes which, it will be seen, were in many ways already under way when the studies were carried out. Both issues can be seen as opportunities rather than limitations for sociological analysis. The question of the difference between the two types of societies will be discussed in the followingpages. In the conclusion, the recent events and changes will be examined in relation to the analyses presented in this book. They indeed provide us with an interesting opportunity, that of examining the validity of the ideas and analysis presented against empirical events occurring after they were originally formulated and organized. If the two societies involved in this project were in fact totally different, the benefits of the exercise would tend to be limited. Such a comparative

project would be usehl to eliminate certain hypotheses: if similar behaviours were to be observed in totally different social systems, one could not refer to the structural features of that system to explain the behaviour in question. As a study in contrasts, it would also have a heuristic value: it could be a source of insight and of a new approach to the social structure of our respective societies. In spite of such advantages, the comparison of totally different societies would perhaps not be the wisest way to use limited research resources. But such is not the situation of Poland and Canada. The two countries and their socio-political and economic environments, while significantly different, also show important similarities. Some of the differences are quite striking: one society is a variant of the capitalistic type, the other of the socialistic; they are integrated in different ways in the world economy; they do not belong to the same political and military blocs; one is a liberal democracy, the other is not; one has a federal and the other a unitary form of government; in one, economic decisions are more decentralized than in the other; one leans in the direction of a market economy, the other of a planned one (at least at the time of the study); one is ethnically, linguistically and religiously heterogeneous, the other tends to be homogeneous in these regards; one is significantly more affluent than the other.

Introduction ... The similarities, on the other hand, are not negligible. One common element is the role played by national consciousness in the history and in the contemporaryexperience of both societies, despite industrialization. There is also an analogy in that, relativeto a number of other Western societies, Poland, Quebec and Canada have experienced, since World War 11,the consequences of an accelerated transition to an industrialized urban society. Furthermore, both societies have been particularly concerned, and plagued, with problems related to the development of a balanced industrial structure (given a highlydeveloped heavy industrial sector in Poland's case and an highly-developed tertiary sector in Canada's case) and with those of an agriculture insufficient to feed the society and free it from dependence on imports. Another major analogy can be drawn from the fact that both Poland and Canada are industrial societies. Also, in Quebec and Poland, the Roman Catholic Church has played a major role, along with family and kinship relations and the traditions of rural life. There is a further cultural analogy in the fact that both societies have traditionally been mobilized by the need to maintain and develop a national culture in the midst of cultural influences emanating from powerful external centres. Finally, both societies share the geopolitical fate of existing in the shadow of a super-power; and as Poland is Russia's shortest land route to Europe, Canada is America's shortest route to Russia, and vice versa. The essays in this volume explore some of the similarities and differences among various components of the two societies. To that end, they present informationabout the past evolutionand contemporarysituation of the two societies:historical documentationon events and circumstances;description of institutional features and ways of functioning; statistics pertaining to economic,political and social activity; data on the demographicconfiguration and its evolution; and indicators of cultural patterns. Comparative studies usually include such comparative materials, essential in this type of endeavour, and without which the hypotheses about and interpretations of various structural forces and social processes would not be very meaningful. Our intention, however, is to go beyond such descriptive materials. In fact, we see such materials as playing only an instrumental role in relation to a wider analytic approach-an approach shaped by the fact that we wish to understand the conditions and processes of social change in two different societies. We think that such a task-the comparative analysis of changeshould focus on the structural contradictions with which societies are struggling and on the context in which they exist. The identification and analysis

National Survival in Dependent Societies

of the deeply-rooted contradictions not only give meaning to the statistical data, chronicles of events, and other descriptive information, but provide a basis for an understanding of recent events in the two societies. Poland and Canada have been experiencing and are still struggling with such contradictions.Both societieshave been calling into question someof the fundamental features of the political and economicsystem. In many ways, the very character of these institutions, their underlying cultural and ideological premises, and the distribution of power within them have been and continue to be challenged. The structural contradictions are also important in the sense that they have tended to be global: their ramifications extend to most institutional sectors of the society. Hardly any segment of the population, any sphere of activity, or any institutional domain are left unaffected. In addition, the economic, social and political events and developments that have taken place and are still taking place within each society and in their environments have precipitated the manifestation of the contradictions embedded in the structure of each of the two social systems and in the features of their environmental relationships. Systemic contradictions can manifest themselves in different ways. First, there are usually tensions between social groups and classes, tensions that generate pressures for change. Those pressures, in turn, can bring about transformations of the institutional order usually through a more or less intense confiictualprocess. Contradictory interests and ideologies attempt to restructure and control the societal institutions and the occurrence and direction of change is largely a function of the power differential between the contending groups. There can also be divergences between existing institutional m g e ments and the changing aspirations of significant segments of the population: economic inefficiency, bureaucratic corruption and paralysis, political coercion or failure of representation can become increasingly felt by various segmentsof the population. Under appropriatecircumstances,this dissatisfaction can become organized and thus constitute a significant pressure for change. Finally, there can also be incompatibilitiesamong the normative system of various institutionalsectorsor between the officially celebrated values and the existing social reality. Religious values and norms can be in dishannony with those prevailing in politics or in business. Officially proclaimed values

Introduction ,.. of equality can be systematically violated by certain practices. Traditional values may no longer be appropriate in urban-industrial contexts. The various contradictions and accompanying socio-political tensions may or may not be resolved. They may remain latent for considerable periods of time. They may not surface at all, or only very slowly, giving rise to a struggle that would eventually result in the negotiation or importation of new institutional arrangements. Indeed, instead of being an occasion for social innovation,they can be a source of paralysis. Finally, systemic contradictions and socio-political tensions may be a powerfd impetus toward institutional innovation and transformation,but may, at the same time, be such as to prevent their successful implementation. The awareness of this last possibility seems to be the source of much anxiety in Poland and to some extent in Canada and Quebec. The study of social change can thus bear on several questions: a) the systemic contradictions or incompatibilities generating struggles between groups and pressures for change; b) the extent to which actual transformations are brought about; C) the factors contributing to or impeding the institutional accommodation of the contradictory forces; and d) the social impact of the attempts made to change certain features of the institutional system or of the attempts to prevent such changes. The predominant systemic contradictions and incompatibilities and the accompanying tensions or confrontations between groups and classes, or between more or less organized social movements and institutional authorities, can provide meaningful points of anchorage for comparative analysis. They can be such points in the sense that the multiplicity of demographic, ecological,technological,cultural,economic, geo-politicaland militarychanges can best be understood in relation to their role with regard to the fundamental contradictions with which the society is struggling and with regard to the ways in which it attempts to resolve them.

FOUR SHARED SETS OF CONTRADICTIONS As already indicated, the configuration of contradictions and tensions in the

National Survival in Dependent Societies

two societies under consideration reveals both similarities and differences. Some of these contradictionsand tensions involve quite different sets of social groups, classes, institutions and elites; some involve the same kinds of actors and institutional domains. Sometimes the fundamental issues are remarkably similar, in several instances, they are different. We wouldliketo indicatea few partly similar, partly different sets of contradictions or tensions that can serve as points of anchoragein the comparativeexamination of Poland and Quebec as part of Canada.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND TRADITIONALISM Both societies have had to face increasing contradictionsbetween a changing socio-technical and economic environment and a traditional society. At the socio-culturallevel, these contradictionsmanifested themselves in confrontation between different ways of life, socio-economicorganization, values and norms, and patterns of social integration. These involve the confrontation of the urban with the rural lifestyle; the industrial with the agricultural organization of work and residence. Theyinvolve differentfamily roles and relationships, different political relationships,different organizationof mutual aid and so on. The shift from a traditional to an urban industrial society also involved a shift in value and ideology systems. A confrontation occurred-and still underlies the debate over a number of issues-between a conservatism which idealizes the past and its presumed better way of life, and a rationalistic pragmatism which emphasizes economic and technological efficiency, "modernization" and the need to join what is seen to be the movement of history. It is a confrontation of two types of civilization. Also, in many ways, it is a confrontation between past- and future-oriented myths.

In addition, the technological and economic changes were largely introduced by external agents rather than being the result of indigenous processes of scientific, technical and economicdevelopment. Because of this, the new "modernizing" forces tended to be perceived as the cause of the disintegration and loss of what constitutedthe distinctivecharacteristics of the nation. Thus, technological and economic change not only preceded cultural change, but also appeared as something foreign which, on the negative side, was seen as a threat to be resisted and, in its positive facet, as a reality to be absorbed and digested.

At the socio-political level, the contradictions have been manifesting

Introduction ...

themselves in a number of struggles for institutional ascendancy. These involve the clergy and traditional economic elites on the one hand and contending classes of professionals, industrialists, and technocrats, on the other. As already indicated, there have also been tensions between indigenous and external interests. Because of the cross-cutting lines of opposition, the traditional elites have been in the contradictory position of being both defenders of the collective identity and culture and conservative forces resisting industrialization and urbanization. The contending elites have also been facing a serious dilemma: transformingthe social and institutional order without eroding the structural and cultural basis of the national society.

LEVELS OF INTEGRATION Both societies are also experiencing tensions between the societal and the supra-societal levels of integration Quebec, on the one hand, is part of Canada, a circumstance that is only one dimension of its integration in the larger North American continent while Poland, on the other, is part of the "socialist bloc." In both cases, an important feature of the larger integration is the fact that a major world power is involved. In such a context, contradictions may arisebetween the requirementsof the supra-societalintegration and those of an adequate economic, political and cultural development at the societal or sub-societal level. What makes these contradictory forces particularly frustrating is the fact that the integration in the larger system is at the same time a condition necessary for development and one that may hinder or distort it. Three manifestationsof these contradictionsare worth mentioning. One is the physical separation of the decision-makingunits from those concerned with production of goods or delivery of services. These latter are dispersed across geographic areas (localities, regions, or nations) while control over resources and their allocation tends to be centralized in locationsmore or less removed from these areas. Thus contradictions may be experienced between the requirements of the larger system and those of some of its components. Second, the wider continental integration can bring about and nurture contradictory interests within each society. Certain segments of the elite and their associated groups have a vested interest in the larger "continental" system, while others have their interests rooted in the institutional system of their own society (or one of its regions). Various political and economic conflicts are based on the divergent interests of those two sets of elites and groups. Thus, there can be conflictsbetween nationalists and anti-nationalists,

National Survival in Dependent Societies

between protectionists and the advocates of free trade; between "realists" and "idealists" (the realists being those who see themselves as taking into account the reality of the larger integration and its power configuration); between accommodationists and those who advocate confrontation. Third, the tensions between the societal and supra-societal levels of integration manifest themselves at the level of the collective identity. Indeed, those involved are confronted with the issue of who they are as an historical entity and especially of how they are to fit in the larger totality of relationships and institutions. This process entails confrontationbetween ideologies which define the degree and modalities of political, economic and cultural integration. It also triggers an investigationof the collective historical experience and indeed a selective rewriting of history, usually to suit the various visions of or preferences for the future. In Quebec, one finds an independentist and a federalist version of history. The contrasting perspectives on the past and the future in Poland have been described in the following way by Davies (1984: 200-1): The great divide in the Polish political debate has always

lain between the Romantic-Insurrectionary-Idealistcamp on one side, and the Positivist-Conciliatory-Realist Camp on the other. It cut right through the middle of all the other social and political groupingsin Poland...The typical Polish Romantics,for example, always claimed that they werejust as 'realistic' as their positivist opponents, only that they had a different conception of reality. The typical Positivist would always claim that he was no less in favour of Polish Independence than the Romantic, only that he differed on the ways and means of achieving it.

BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND INDIVIDUALS Both societies are also experiencing a contradiction as the requirements of an ever more bureaucratized social system conflict with the aspirations for individual autonomy and self- fulfillment of a population which is increasingly educated and affluent (or at least less poor than in the past). This is taking place in economic, political and other institutional spheres. Economic development brings the promise of a higher quality of life which may be in contradiction with the constraints and costs that technology and the bureaucratic organization of production entail. The fidl and creative participation of

Introduction ...

the population in the economy is both required for its effectivefunctioning and desired by various categories of economic actors. Yet, the presence of large corporate actors (e.g. large private and public corporations and an interventionist government in Quebec and large enterprises and planning state bureaucracy in Poland), may place considerablerestrictions on effectiveparticipation by individuals and small groups. There is thus a growing contradiction between certain culturally-defined and ideologically-celebratedideals on the onehand, and the realities of a bureaucratized social organizationon the other. There also appears to be a growing gap between politico-administrative s t n ~ c t uand ~ s civil society. The extensive and frequently determining role of state institutions in most spheres of social life can be accompanied by an increase in bureaucratic control and a decreased autonomy of individuals in the organization of their own lives and of their role in their communities and the society at large. As far as political participation is concerned, the contradiction between the professed ideals and existing institutional opportunities appears to exist in most liberal democracies, including Canada. In this realm, however, the contradiction is drastically more pronounced in Poland. Here, there is a structurally-baseddiscrepancybetween the promises of socialistideology and the possibilities of influencing the centres of power available to individuals and groups. In most domains of public policy, intermediary stmctures linking citizens and decision makers exist in Canada and Quebec. In Poland, except perhaps for the Catholic Church which has played a significant intermediary role, the links between state and society are weak, the state apparatus being somewhatdisconnected from the groups, interests and forces that make up the society. Intermediary structures are either weak, under the tutelage of the party, or absent depending on the policy domain. The links that exist are primarily for the "downward" exercise of political control.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT In both societies, tensions exist regarding control of the means of economic growth and over the distribution of benefits generated by economic activity. In Canada the conflict has been and continues to be between Anglophone and Francophone interests. However, this conflict intersects other lines of opposition: private versus public control of investment; federal versus provincial; and foreign (especially American) versus indigenous control. Capital accumulationas such is not an issue. Who controls it for what

National Survival in Dependent Societies

purposes constitutes the matter of contention. Conflicts have become especially apparentin debates over control of natural resources and of the revenues resulting from their exploitation. But the problem extends far beyond this particular area. One could argue that these tensions have always been present in Canada in general and Quebec in particular. However, they have become accentuatedin recent years with substantial increasesin resource exploitation, massive American investment in Canada, the multiplication of Crown corporations and other state economic agencies (provincial and federal), a limited but real shift of power toward the Western provinces, the growth of giant corporations, and the rise of economic nationalism in Quebec (transforming traditional cultural and political nationalism). In Poland, similar tensions exist but between somewhat different sets of actors. Perhaps the main conflict over control of the instruments of economic management exists between the party and state apparatus,on the one hand and the intelligentsia and the workers, on the other. It is a conflict between those whose authority is based on loyalty to the party and to political superiors and those whose claims to power are based on technical expertise (technological, economic, managerial). An important difference between the two countries should be noted. In Poland, the conflict is highly dichotomized between a centre of power and various quite powerless contending groups while, in Canada, it is multilateral with a perhaps less uneven distribution of power among the conflicting interests.

The concern of the book is twofold. On the one hand it deals primarily with the patterns of change in various social spheres and the forces underlying those patterns. The book is comparative in the sense that it uses comparative analysis as a heuristic device; that is, as a method of elucidating the problems under consideration.Our primary goal is not to compareCanada's Quebec and Poland, but rather to contribute to a better understanding of both by showing each society against the background of the other. The problems of Polish society are taken in this study as a frame of reference to discuss the problems of Quebec society, and vice versa. The book is also about the repercussions of actual and attempted social change in the last decades on sociological thinking and on the social role of sociologists in Poland and Canada. Indeed, to a considerable extent, the societal contradictions mentioned above and the various manifestations of social tensions and change have provided the themes of recent sociological thinking and analysis in both societies: the problems of transition from a rural to an urban, industrial society; the impact of increasing integration as a more

Introduction ...

or less dependent entity into a larger economic, political and military system; issues pertaining to power such as its social, regional and institutional concentration, the relations between economic and political power, the rise of the state bureaucratic class, and problems of participation especially as they affect socia1 categories that had previously occupied a more or less marginal position in the socio-politicalorder (e.g. women, ethnic and linguisticminorities). It is probably fair to say that, whatever its quality and usefulness, the work of sociologists in Poland and Canada has been concerned with some of the fundamental contradictions experienced by their respective societies. However, it is probably fair to say that sociologists in both countries have been unable to anticipate important social movements and transformations, their direction or evolution. Rather, sociologists have turned their attention to these phenomena once they had begun to manifest themselves. The emergence of state bureaucracies is a case in point. Sociologists do not seem to have anticipated this phenomenon and its consequences. This is perhaps because as a professional class they were too much involved in the very making of those bureaucracies. They have been involved either in designing the frameworks or models for the various units and agencies, or in providingjustification for the growth of the state and its services. Now that the problem is with us, however, sociologists are beginning to focus on the phenomenon. The same could be said with regard to other phenomena such as the Independentist movement, the Solidarity movement, the feminist movement, and the role of the church. (For instance, how much theoretical and empirical work is now being done on the role that this last institution is now shaping for itself in the two societies,perhaps to take us by surprisesome years down the road?) Before presenting the content of the book, the history of the exchange between Polish and Canadian sociologists will be sketched. This, we believe, is useful background informationfor an appreciationof this project. But, first, a note about the sub-title "Social Change in Canada and Poland" (with special reference to Quebec). Initially,editors, reviewers, and the publisher did not all agree on that sub-title. Some suggested that the sub-title selected was not appropriate as the volume dealtprimarily with Quebec and not Canada. Others argued that it was since Quebec is part of Canada; it is not a separate country even if it is a distinct society.Thus, Quebecbeing part of Canada, a comparison between Poland and Quebec was to a certain extent one between Poland and Canada. In the debate over this matter, some wondered whether the issue would have even come up had the papers focussed primarily on Ontario? One

National Survival in Dependent Societies

can easily entertaindoubts on that question! This debate is summarized not so much to justify the Canada option as to draw the attention of the reader to what constitutes a manifestation of the problems of Canadian identity.

HISTORY OF THE PROJECT On the basis of the considerations presented above, it seems not only justifiable but intellectually profitable to juxtapose Poland and Quebec and examine them in relation to each other. The decision to pursue this comparative endeavour did not, however, occur suddenly as the outcome of a meeting called to explore such a possibility, or of an exchange of correspondence between researchers in Poland and Canada. The idea of such a comparative project was not obvious at the outset of the exchanges. On the contrary, at the beginning of the venture most participants were certainly interested in an exchange of ideas,but would probably have considered the idea of a comparative project somewhat far-fetched and of dubious value. Projects can be deliberately planned. Frequently, however, they are set up because individuals or groups encounter certain opportunities and decide to take advantage of them. This is what happened in this case as the following will indicate. The project evolved progressively as a result of exchanges between the Polish and Canadian sociological communities, and of discussions reflecting the common and divergent interests of the participants of both countries. It was aprocessof trial and enor and of confrontationbetweenmore or less opposed views. In 1972, Professor Jan Szczepanski came to Carleton University in Ottawa as a visiting professor. The now deceased John Porter, author of the Canadian classic The VerticalMosaic,was at the time teaching at Carleton. In the mid-seventies Professor Porter visited the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology (IFIS) of the Polish Academy of Sciences where, given his interest in social stratification, he met and conversed with Wlodzirnierz Wesolowski. John Porter brought back an invitation from the Institute whereby Canada and Poland would initiate a sociological exchange. Porter asked the secretary of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association to circulate the invitation from the Polish Academy, inviting anyone interested in organizing the Canadian delegation to come forward. The first time this was done, in 1975, no one responded. However, in 1976, two Canadian sociologists came forward, Gary Caldwell and Bogdan Czamocki.The formerhad spent a month in Poland in 1963on a World University Services student exchange, whereas

Introduction ...

the latter was born in Poland and had left as a youth, after having survived the Warsaw uprising. It is interesting to note that all those involved with the initiation of the exchange, Szczepanski and Porter in the first instance, and CaldweIl and Czamocki in the second, had in fact previously been to Poland and Canada respectively. Had it not been for the interest of these individuals, the exchange would not likely have been initiated: an initial cross-cultural eqerience in the societies in question preceded the initiation of the exchange. Once it had been decided to take up the Polish invitation, a joint Canadian organizing committee comprising an official representation of the Associationcanadiennedes Sociologueset AnthropologuesdeLanguefran~aise (ACSALF) and the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association (CSAA) was put into place. This committee worked out with the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology (IFIS) an agreement which called for a reciprocal exchange: a delegation of Canadian sociologists would visit Poland in 1977 and a Polish delegation would reciprocate in 1978. In the course of the respective lO-day visits, the visiting delegation would present a series of sociological papers on its own society. Thus the initial phase of the exchange was conceived as a reciprocal exchange designed to allow for two conferences, one inPoland on Canadian society and one in Canada on Polish society. The 1978 meeting would constitute consummation of the project. In May of 1977, the first conference took place in Radziejowice. After an opening presentation by Szczepanski, 10 Canadians from six provinces deliveredpapers on Canadian societyand loPolish commentatorsresponded? Up to this point there was, it must be noted, no explicit comparative dimension to what was seen to be an exchange of sociological papers. Rut there appears to have been a latent expectation. The Polish sociologists responsible for the exchangeseemed to have more in mind than an internationalcontact and a visit to Canadian society. Indeed, at that time they were pursuing their FinlandPoland comparativeproject which they brought to completion and published in 1978.5 The situation with regard to that latent expectation was further confused by the heterogeneity of the papers presented by the Canadians (which was a reflection of the heterogeneityof their society) and by the factrather dramatic for outsiders but taken for granted by the Canadians-that many members of the Canadian delegation met each other for the first time in Poland. In that context, the meaning of a comparative project was far from obvious. Indeed, if one examinesthe list, eight out of 10of the Canadian papers had a part of Canada as their geographicalreference. Faced withpapers which

National Survival in Dependent Societies implicitly assumed an intra-society comparative perspective, it was indeed diflcult to envisage how one would proceed to an inter-society comparison.

The difficulty experienced in coming up with a productive framework for a second round of exchanges manifested itself in the plenary discussion held at the end of the first conference. Participants were unable to fix upon a d e f ~ ttheme e and contented themselves with two rather general suggestions: the Psychological and Cultural Consequences of Social Development and the Psychological, Structural and Cultural Aspects of Social Change. Indeed, these two suggestions proved to be of so little utility that they were never invoked again, except to make the point that they were insufficient and that a more focussed community of interests would have to be established among the researchers of the two countries. Faced with apportioning their scarce resources between the return exchange to Canada in 1978 and the International Sociological Association congress in Helsinki, the IF'IS decided to husband its resources in favour of a more extended participation in the Helsinki congress. In the meantime, certain members of the CSAAIACSALF Canadian organizing committee, impressed by the existence of certain analogies in the social histories of Poland and Quebec, put forward a proposition which they felt would overcome the problems experienced in 1977 with regard to the juxtaposition of Canadian and Polish societies as reference framework by substituting Quebec for Canada, at least insofar as a substantive comparison of societies was concerned. The reasons for this redefinition were put forward in a document submitted to the CSAA and the ACSALF by Gilles Houle on behalf of the Canadian organizing committee.6This document and its subsequent approval by the two Canadian sponsoring authorities represented a major re-orientation of the basis of the exchange. The documentbegan with the affirmationthat a productive international exchange requires first that those involved be able to bring common intellectual preoccupations to bear on the deliberations. Second, it required that discussions be focussed on a number of issues or problem areas. A more carefullydelimitedframeworkwas needed. Thiswould allow a better selection of themes and an appropriate selection of researchers. The first exchange did not take place under such conditions and consequentlydid not lead to the kind of relationships that would have facilitated the pooling of experience in a comparative enterprise. The conclusion reached by the Canadian committee was that a renewal

Introduction ...

of the exchange required a focus on one or a few regions of Canada presenting a relative homogeneity "du point de vue d'une thematique sociologique". Quebec was selected for this reason and also because of the analogy between the history and the contemporary social experience of Quebec and of Poland, an analogy which was felt would allow the definition of domains of common intellectual preoccupation and interest. The perceived analogies are those presented earlier in this introduction. Subsequent to the endorsement of this redefinition of the basis of the exchange by the two sponsoring sociological associations, the Canadian organizing committee wrote to its Polish counterpart and proposed the consummation of the original exchangeproject. Among the implications of all this was the fact that the Canadian participants for the 1979meetings would be selected on the basis of their familiarity with the corpus of sociological production on Quebec, which would necessitate renewal of most of the original Canadian delegation. As it happened, the sociologists at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology adopted the proposal submitted by the Canadian committee. The role of Professor Wesolowski, who has since left the editorial team, was determiningin this decision. The second conference,hosted by the Universite de Montreal, was held in Quebec in October 1979. Each of the 10 visiting Polish sociologistspresented apaper which was commented onby a Canadian, thus reciprocating the 1977 conference? Although the Canadian delegation included sociologists from other regions, the commentaries on the Polish papers were situated within a Poland-Quebec comparative perspective. Sessions and discussions at St-Hippolyte were quite successful. An important dimensionof this success was the rapport that grew between the two delegations. Both Poles and Canadians were conscious of a remarkable frankness in the discussions about their societies.This rapport was the product of several factors. First, the decision to focus the exchange seemed to yield positive results. Second, for several participants this was the second meeting. A third consideration was the growing consciousness of the geo-political parallel between the two societies: Poland and Quebec are both non-metropolitan nations living under the shadow of metropolitan powers. Hence a certain status equilibrium was possible that is not present in intellectual relations with ametmpolitan culture. In this regard, a structural detail that was not insignificant is the fact that in 1979, the Canadian and Polish delegations experienced a linguistic equilibrium which was not present in 1977: each delegation had a national language inaccessible to the other. The common

National Survival in Dependent Societies

language, English, was a second language for almost evelyone in both delegations (Kwasniewicz, 1981). To conclude, then, the climate was such that in a plenary session held in Montreal, a joint publication project based on a comparative perspective emerged and was articulated: the substantive societal comparisons would be Poland-Quebec and the comparison of sociologies would be Canada and Poland. In the course of the meeting a particular social phenomenon, that of late and accelerated transition to an urbanized and industrial society, was proposed as a focus that could facilitate comparative analysis. After the plenary in which some 30 persons participated, the executive of the Canadian and Polish delegations met to structure the context of the proposed joint publication as well as to fix on certain material aspects. The proposed chapter organization of a volume to be called "Social Structureand Social Change in Poland and Canada" was later revised in function of the availability of Canadian and Polish scholars. It was subsequently endorsed by both delegations, in 1980. It underwent even further changes in 1981 and 1982 for other reasons, among which were political developments in Canada and Poland, especially the latter. One of the arrangements agreed upon in Montreal in 1979was the need to hold a planning meeting of the executives of the two delegations in Warsaw in summer of 1980,which was done. At this meeting, Edmund Mokrzycki, a representative of the Polish SociologicalAssociation was associated with the Polish delegation. This was in response to the desire of the sponsoring Canadian sociological associations to have a direct relationship with their Polish counterpart. The Polish Sociological Association has since been suspended and subsequently reinstated. Prior to the 1980 Warsaw meeting, the executives of both delegations carried out preliminary discussions with sociologists who might be interested in the project and willing to work with a Polish or Canadian counterpart. The major task of the 1980 planning session was to establish a definite list of authors, and for the part dealing with the substantive comparison of Quebec and Polish societies, compatible chapter teams. All of this was in preparation for a working session in Poland in the fall of 1981 at which time the authors would meet to work together on their contributions. The 1981working sessiontook place in Grezejorzewicein mid-November. An initial plenary session was followed by three days of chapter-team working sessions and periodic reports to the plenary by individual authors or

Introduction

..

,

teams. At a final plenary session a joint editorial board (Caldwell, Houle, Breton, Wnuk-Lipinski and Moknycki) was struck and the editorial policy was discussed at some length. The operational plan was for chapter teams to continue their work by correspondence and finish their contributions by early 1982, thus permitting the editorial team to meet in Montreal in May 1982 to work on the fmal document. A major crisis was of course impending in Poland in November 1981, and the situation was very much on the minds of all those assembled at Gnejomwice. Indeed, in retrospect, the unfolding of the crisis and our vicarious participation in it via guests who came to Grzejorzewice,television, and the experiences of members of the Polish delegation had a major impact on the nature of the discussions. The impact that this had on the content of the book is not negligible. This was the case particularly in respect to the as yet very fragile conception of the object of the comparative exercise. The Polish crisis tended to focus attention on the political dimensions of Polish society.

On the moming of Friday, November 11,1981, we set off for Warsaw for a weekend of informal visits and socializing. We dispersed after the weekend and the dam broke in Poland less than a month later: martial law was declared on December 13, 1981. Subsequently, communication between Canada and Poland was interrupted and the editorial meeting in Montreal planned for May 1982 became problematic; in fact, the whole project was in jeopardy. On the Canadian side the immediate reaction was a concern for the welfare and liberty of the Polish colleagues. Canadians associated with the exchange met in Montreal in January and prepared a declaration to be submitted to the International Sociological Association, which was endorsed and forwarded to the ISA by the two Canadian associations. In this declaration, four demands concerningthe personal liberty of Polish intellectuals, liberty of expression and movement and the ability to travel abroad in the context of international academic exchanges were formulated and addressed to the Polish government. The Canadian participants also decided that every effort should be made to assure that the project would be pursued in the same spirit and with the participation of the same Polish sociologists. When this assurancebecame available from the Polish colleagues, both parties began working towards the realization of the editorial meeting in Montreal. Despite a Canadian government boycott of scientific exchanges with Poland and the Polish government's reluctance to allow travel abroad,

National Survival in Dependent Societies

funding and entry visas were obtained in Poland. On November 8 the Polish editors arrived in Montreal for a few weeks, and the following summer the Canadian editorial team went to Poland to complete the project. As a conclusion to this narrative, three features of the exchange should be emphasized. First, the importance of selecting an object of sociological analysis presenting a certain sociological homogeneity and allowing for the definition of domains of common intellectual preoccupation cannot be overemphasized, even if doing so makes us appear to be as belabouring the obvious. Second, the exchangeshad a certain "multiplier effect": A. Kaminski of the University of Warsaw was invited as a visiting professor to the University of British Columbia; B. Czamocki of Concordia University spent a year, in 1980-81, as a visiting professor at the University of Poznan; Paul Bernard of the Universite de Montreal spent three weeks in 1981on a research visit with Professor M. Pohoski at the University of Warsaw; finally A. Sicinski of the Polish Academy of Sciences established a relationship with the GAMMA* groupat the Universitede Montreal. Finally, it should be noted that the exchanges have been organized and camed out outside of governmental frameworks, although with public financial support. As already mentioned, the exchanges have been the result of initiatives by individuals and professional organizations. They did not involve formal agreements between governmentsor governmentalorganizations,althoughpublic supportwas essential and is gratefully acknowledged and, we suspect that the success of the exchanges can to some degree be attributed to a minimal interference by formal specificationsand theirbureaucraticrequirements. We are also grateful for that.

THE CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME The volume is organized in two parts, one pertaining to various aspects of Polish and Quebec societies, and the otherto features of the sociologiescarried out in these two contexts. Given the peculiarities of the project described above, it was felt that the book should begin with a presentation of the orientation of sociology in the two societies and of the institutional context in which it is practised. In other words, we begin with an overview of the kind of analysis that has been canied out on the changing socio-political and The chapters of the second part, economic circumstances in each s~ciety.~ considered as specific instances of such analyses, could be read in relation to this broader context.

Introduction ... The chapters by Sztompka and Hiller document in a fairly detailed fashion the main features and trends of the two sociologies. These are presented by phases which correspond with important moments in the evolution of the respective societies. The essays by Szacki and Foumier add to the documentationand analysis of the otheressays. Theirmain concern,however, is with the ways in which Polish and Quebec sociologieshave approached the formation and evolutionof the collectiveculture and collective consciousness or identity. Moreover, since the practice of sociology cannot be dissociated from these societal processes, they also examine the ways in which sociology and its practitionershave been involved in it and influenced by it. Szackipoints out that in Polish sociology, the nation has been treated as a phenomenon of social consciousness and culture. In relation to this, he has identified three problems of critical importance: the participation of the various components of the society in the nation formation process; the blumng of local and regional differences and attachments; and the relationship between the state and the national-cultural community. In his analysis of Quebec sociology,Foumier is also concerned with the ways in which the definitionof the collectiveidentity has been approached. He is particularly concerned, however, with the contribution of intellectuals and especially social scientists to the constructionof that identity. Since the end of the nineteenth century, the collectivity has been viewed successively and simultaneously as a (dominated) ethnic minority and as a nation. Cultural qualities and weaknesses have both been attributed to it. It has been invited to change as well as to maintain its specific characteristics (including, of course, its language). The author argues that these various contributions can be understood only in relation to the socio-politicalforces which have sometimes led the collectivity and its dominant classes toward an integration into the Canadian economic and political phase and at other times toward the pursuit of political autonomy.

Several dimensions of the social, economic and political structures and of the changes they have undergone are considered in the second part. The analysespresented spell out in greaterdetail severalof the contradictoryforces and processes mentioned above, although they may not be identified as such and their formulation or description may be different. The reader will be able to recognize their manifestations and consequencesas different aspects of the two societies are analyzed. Although the various papers constitute, as far as their content is concerned, an integrated whole, the format adopted for the presentation of the analyses varies from one to another. In some cases, the

National Survival in Dependent Societies

documentation and discussion of the two societies are woven together throughout the paper, in other instances, they are presented successively between an introduction and a conclusion;in two areas (industrial conflict and political institutions), they appear as two separate papers. This is the result of the fact that each team collaborated under different circumstances. In the first essay Breton and Kwasniewicz give an overview of the nation-building process in Poland, Canada and Quebec. Nation building is conceived as an institution building process. Because societal institutions are mechanisms for the allocation of material and symbolicresources, the process inevitably entails conflict over the means by which they are shaped. A comparison between Poland and Canada allows an examinationof institution building and control in situations where the main forces seem to be toward a coincidence of state and cultural nation with those where they appear to be toward some form of cultural pluralism within a political nation.

Houle, Lukasiewicz and Sicinski pursue this overall analysis in a more focussed way in the following chapter. They concentrate on the evolution of social values and ideologies in the two societies as these pertain to such institutional realities as nation, state, religion and church. It is also more focussed in that it is restricted to a comparison of Quebec society with Poland (as are the subsequent chapters). The next four essays deal with interrelated aspects of industrialization: development strategies, stratification and mobility, and industrial conflict. In the first of these, Caldwell, Kaminski, Morawski, and Sales use as their startingpoint the fact that in spite of their different degrees of industrialization and their specific features, development in Quebec and Poland was affected by the condition of dependency. Given this context, the objective of the chapteris to examine development strategiestakinginto accountthe specificity of each institutional system. Only in this way can their societal impact be understood. After the presentation of some historical background, the overall level of development of the two societies is identified. At the centre of the analysis of the institutional systems and of the strategies adopted is, of course, the political process, particularly the role of the state in the process of accumulationwhich follows different modalities in Quebec and in Poland. As a result, certain interests are created or reinforced while others are weakened or destroyed. This affects both the class structure and the prevailing life styles. In the next chapter, Bernard, Pohoski, and Renaud examinethe similari-

ties and differences between the two societies in the social mobility and income distribution of women and men. These are placed in the context of the

Introduction ...

transformation of the labour market and its shift from agriculture to the secondary and especially the tertiary sector. They are also analyzed in relation to the differences in political regimes and their economic development policies. The following two papers by Pankov and Dofny analyze industrial conflict in Poland and Quebec respectively. They deal with the complex interaction of different the economic and political spheres of activity. In order to understand the dynamics and significance of these conflicts, they locate them in the total system of power. Differences between the two societies are attributed to the differences in the structure of that total system. The last two papers deal different aspects of the structure of political power and, in particular, with the structural features pertaining to the relationship between state institutions and authorities and different segments of the society. They also deal with some of the existing political opposition and the related processes of change. In dealingwith political change, their approaches, which are quite different, reflect in part the evolution of the respective societies and their structural features. Pelletier analyzes the ways in which political parties have been agents of political change in Quebec and the opposition among parties as to the extent to which the state should be the central agent of change. Wesolowski examinesthe struggle over the introduction of structuralmechanisms through which various segments of the society could influencestateauthorities. He considersthe extent to which social forces are already mobilized and the conditions of further mobilization. He devotes considerable attention to the possibilities and limits of such transformations and the constraints to their implementation. An overview of the comparative analysis is presented in the conclusion s the analyses to recent changes in the two with an attempt to relate the ~ s u l tof societies.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

NOTES 1 2 3 4

5

6 7

The decision to focus the analysis on Quebec but as part of the larger Canadian environment is discussed later. This is apparent from the history of the project presented below. S.D.Clark (1975) argues quite convincingly that both English-and Frenchspeaking Canada underwent a "quiet revolution" in the 1960s and early 1970s. The Canadian contributors and their papers, in the order in which they were presented were: a) Ralph Matthews: Towards a Sociological Explanation of Regionalism with Special Reference to Atlantic Canada, b) Raymond Breton: Ethnic Differentiation in Canada. c) Gary Caldwell & Bogdan Czarnocki: Quebec in Comparison to Ontario 1950-1974: Progress in Question. d) Bogdan Czarnocki: A Methodological Preamble to the above paper. e) Patricia Marchak: Corporate and Non-Corporate Labour in Hinterland B.C. Gilles Houle: Life-History Experiential Approach to the Study of Sociof) logical Transformation in Post-1940 Quebec. Pierre-Jacques Hamel: Democracy and Co-operatives: Some Quebec g) Experiences. h) Harvey Rich: One Party Dominance in Alberta, Canada. i) Robert J. Bryrn: Explaining Regional Variations in Canadian Populist Movements. James N. McCrorie: Agriculture and Industrial Development in the Case j) of Western Canada. Allardt and Wesolowski (1978). Gilles Houle: "LesEchanges Canada-Pologne", Document de Travail, 1978. The papers presented were as follows: a) Michal Pohoski: Socio-EconomicAchievement in Poland in a Comparative Perspective. b) Wlodzimierz Wesolowski: StraMicationand Meritocratic Justice. c) Wladyslaw Adamski: Peasants and SocialistReconstructionof the Polish Countryside. d) Wlodzimierz Mirowski: Impact of Industrialization and Urbanization on Community Functioning in Poland. e) Piotr Sztompka: The Focus on Social Structure in Marxist Poland. Antoni Karninski: General Public Interest in the Theory of Planning, and f) Obstacles to Participation. g) Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski: Time Budget and Value Orientation. h) Wlodyslaw Kwasniewicz: From Folk Culture to Mass Culture. The Polish Case. Jolanta Kulpinska: Industry and Society in the Socialist System. i)

Introduction

Stefan Nowakowski: The Interaction Between a Town and Factory in a Socialist System. This last aspect, the absence of an examination of sociology in the societies compared had been regretted by Kohn (1980) in his review of the FinlandPoland study.

j) 8

...

PART ONE: CANADIAN AND POLISH SOCIOLOGY IN CONTEXT

I1 ANGLOPHONE CANADIAN SOCIOLOGY: CONTEXT AND EVOLUTION

Harry H. Hiller

Anyone surveying the condition of sociology in Canada would see it to be a well-established discipline and profession. Both language groups (French and English) have their own professional associations, each language group publishes two journals,' sociologists are employed in both the public and private sectors, and research is lively and relevant on a variety of topics sponsored by governments, foundations, and industry. Yet it was not always this way. In retrospect, it seems hard to believe that in 1950there were probably not more than a dozen sociologists in all of Canada. Now there are considerably more than 1,000--most of whom have PhD degrees and are universityemployed. Many more sociology graduates with master's degrees are employed in government and industry. All of this relatively rapid expansion has meant that sociology in Canada has experienced both euphoria and growing pains. At the outset it ought to be pointed out that Anglophone sociologists frequently speak of sociology in Canada as though the existence of two language groups meant no real division in the disciplinary enterprise in Canada. That is, Anglophone sociologiststend to speak of Canadiansociology as though Francophone sociologists were a subgroup of the larger whole. In reality, though, they know that the languagebarrier is a real banier to effective colleagueship and they are aware of the surge of Qut5Mcois sentiments in the last two decades. Thus, one of the great paradoxes of sociology in Canada is the pretense of sociologists to disciplinary unity (as suggested by the national association dominated by Anglophones known as the Canadian Sociologyand Anthropology Association); yet they are aware that Francophonesociologists

National Survival in Dependent Societies

have greater interests in their own language association and journals, as well as the issues of Quebec society.The result is that considerableambiguity exists in the appropriateness of Anglophone dispositions which refer to Canadian sociology as an entity in which a l l sociologists in Canada are a part. Thus, in the same manner that "Quebec sociology" refers primarily to Francophone sociologists in Quebec, the common reference to "Canadian sociology" largely denotes all other sociological activity in the discipline, most of which is Anglophone? Whatever commonality sociology may have, regardless of the location in which it is practised, it is quite clear from the illustration above that the contexts of language and polity have an impact on the discipline. Chapter 3 by Marcel Fournier demonstrateshow contextual factors in Quebec, which have shaped the character of Francophone sociology in Canada, have evolved and responded to changing contexts within the country. I will conclude with a discussion of some of the factors which currently affect how the discipline is molded and practised.

THE EVOLUTION OF ANGLOPHONE CANADIAN SOCIOLOGY The general developmentof sociologyas a disciplinewithin a national context can be theoretically related to four factors. First, since sociology is a comparatively young discipline (in contrast to history, for example), the structural traditions and rivalries within existing academic institutions can either retard or promote the emergence and development of sociology (Shils, 1970). In short, the power structure within long-established educational institutions determines the acceptance and placement of new disciplines. The second factor is called ideological congruence and refers to how the values and ideologies of the surroundingsociety affect what sociology is presumed to be and how it is practised (Friedrichs, 1970). For example, sociology will take a somewhat different shape and focus in a country where capitalist values predominate, as opposed to a country where socialist values are strong, The third factor affecting the growth of a discipline is interdisciplinary in scope. Who controls the intellectual means of production (i.e., new ideas and innovative theories) through publications and leadership positions determines the rise and fall of dominantperspectives in sociology (Mullins, 1973). The fourth factor is based on a dependency model (Hiller, 1980: 264) in which the centres of sociological dominance, prestige, and influence are located

Anglophone Canadian Sociology: Context and Evolution

outside the boundaries of a national social science community so that the sociological community where sociology is less developed is dominated by the more developed sociological community. As a national sociological community matures, it may seek to be more independent from foreign influence. National or political boundaries establish different social contexts in which these factors operate. All four of them have been significant in the development of sociology in Canada. They help explain why an autonomous sociology emerged relatively late in Canadian universities, why sociology took on a peculiarly US orientation when it did develop so rapidly, and why a reaction eventually set in that sought to produce a more indigenous sociology. The evolution of Anglophone Canadian sociology can be divided into four stages (Hiller, 1982): (1) European transference; (2) environmental adaptation;

(3) disciplinary differentiation and specialization; and (4) consolidation.

EUROPEAN TRANSFERENCE Before the First World War, Canadian universities were very much oriented towards European scholarship. In Anglophone universities, British traditions prevailed and most of the academic appointments were made from among those born in England or trained there (Berger, 1976: 10). This was a consequenceof the fact that Canadian universities were predominantly small, undergraduate institutions with no graduate programs of their own. However, the most significant consequence of this British influence was the conviction that sociology was best practised under the tutelage of other disciplines such as history, philosophy, or economics (Clark, 1976). It was this orientation which prevented sociology from being accepted as an autonomous discipline in Canadian universities for many years. As a result, society was analysed in more abstract terns or based on the European experience rather than being related to its Canadian context. The first sociologist (R. M. MacIvor) appointed to the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto in 1915came from Scotland and was perceived by his colleagues as primarily a British social philosopher. His successor, E. J. Urwick, also came from England and was viewed the same way. In general, during this era, little

National Survival in Dependent Societies

attempt was made to analyze or understand the developing Canadian society and old world theories were merely transplanted to Canadian soil.

ENVIRONMENTAL ADAPTATION The heightened social conscience that emerged between the two world wars was expressed in movements such as prohibition, women's suffrage, and by conditions such as urban poverty, unemployment, and immigration. Sociology emerged as practical social problems were acknowledged, and the desire for social refom was expressed. The Protestant social gospel movement (Morgan, 1969)which was strong in the United Statesspilled overinto Canada (Campbell, 1983). Also, as a response to the social urging of the Papal Encyclical, post-secondary religious educationalinstitutionsin Canada began to include sociology in their curriculum (Tomovic, 1975: 79). This type of sociology was usually taught by persons without training in sociology and was frequently directed towards the amelioration of social conditions (Allen, 1971: 8). At the two major universities in Montreal and Toronto, sociology was initially linked with theologically-inspired social work programs. At the University of Toronto, a Department of Social Service was establishedin 1914 and a similar program was created at McGill University in Montreal in 1918. The rudimentary sociology that was taught was of an applied nature. It is noteworthy to single out the Social Service Department at McGill because it was from this program that the first Department of Sociology was established in Canada.In 1922, Carl A. Dawson, a Canadian who had studied theology and sociology at the University of Chicago, became director of the Department of Social Service at McGill University. At his urging, the focus of the department was soon changed. It was renamed the Department of Sociology and modelled quite closely after the University of Chicago, from where further faculty appointments were also made. This was the only Department of Sociology at any university in Canada for the next 40 years. The surrounding milieu generated an interest in sociology first on an applied level, through public concern for social refom in such areas as agriculture (Card, 1975: 5) and social welfare (Magill, 1983: 10). But sociology also found expression as a part of a social science collectivity seeking to understand the nature of this rather young Canadian society. Primarily through the leadership of the political economist Harold Adam Innis, at the University of Toronto (Creighton, 1957), Anglophone social

Anglophone Canadian Sociology: Context and Evolution

scientists used the tools of history and economics to examinethe evolution and development of their society. Most critical were issues such as frontiers of settlement, Canada-US relations, and agrarian protest in Western Canada. In these endeavours, the British organizational and intellectual structures in Anglophone universities insisted that sociology be joined with the more established social sciences in an interdisciplinary mode. Throughout this period, then, sociology still essentially lacked an autonomous identity. Indeed, the rather small social science community of scholars found its unity in co-operative endeavours focussing on understanding what Canadian society was like and what the central issues were in understanding its contours. The Canadian Political Science Association was the organizational vehicle used to accomplish these goals and the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science was the published forum for the presentation of the research that was undertaken. The most important feature of this era was a strong resistance to US sociology (as practised in survey research and as organized in universities as a separate department). Sociology at McGill remained the sole exception. In fact, it took until 1956 for a sociology chapter of the Canadian Political Science Association to be organized there. But it was not only British biases against US sociology that thwarted its development in Canada; it was also a matter of fiscal necessity due to the existence of small faculties in relatively small academic institutions where specialization was impossible. It was precisely the rapid expansion of post-secondary educational institutions that provided the impetus for greater disciplinary specialization and thereby the full-blown emergence of sociology.

DISCIPLINARY DIFFERENTIATION AND SPECIALIZATION As the Second World War came to a close and industrial development began to attain some momentum, a university education became more and more desirable. Enrollment in post-secondary institutions initially doubled, and by 1960had tripled. Through the 1960s, enrollment increased annually by 12 to 15 percent (Hiller 1982: 21). During the same decade, graduate school enrollment increased sixfold. These dramatic increases were due not only to the effects of the postwar baby boom, but also to the needs of the economy for a more educated workforce. Clearly, what all of this growth meant was that the need for more faculty, and faculty expansion, in turn, produced unwieldy

National Survival in Dependent Societies

institutions unless departmentalizationoccurred. Consequently,Anglophone universities began to emulate the American model and departments of sociology were established in a l l Canadian universities in the 1960s. Three other events took place in the 1960s which indicated that a new day had dawned for Anglophone sociology in Canada. The Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association was created as a separate professional organizationin 1965,and the CanadianReview of Sociology and Anthropology was established in 1964. Funding for research was institutionalized through the refinanced Canada Council in 1965-66, which followed a disciplinary model in making decisions about research support (Hettich, 1969). Sociologists were now able to develop a more clear-cut professional identity in a distinct discipline. Increased enrollment and the rapid hiring of new faculty soon exhausted the small pool of personnel available to teach sociology within Canada (Scott, 1967). Graduate sociology programs in Canada were either small or nonexistent, meaning that Canadians seeking education in sociology usually obtained it outside the country. One estimate pointed out that 50 to 60 PhDs were needed annually through the 1960s in order to meet the instructional needs in sociology in Canadian universities (Von Zur Mehlen, 1972: 79). Consequently,large-scale faculty recruitment took place in the United States among US nationals, Canadians studying there, international students who had come to the United Statesto study sociology. During this era, sociologists practicing in Canada became a very diverse group in nationality, although US citizens outnumbered other foreigners.It was therefore no surprise that the influence of US sociology became very strong in Canadian universities. Not only was the interdisciplinarymodel of the previous era swept away but greater attention was paid to theories and methods emerging in the United States. Since sociology had developed much more rapidly in US universities than anywhere else in the world, US sociology had a similar impact on the discipline in othercountries (Oromaner, 1970). However, Canada's proximity to the United States facilitated a transfer and exchange of ideas and personnel that was much more significant. Only 40 per cent of a l l the sociologists in Canada in 1970 were Canadian citizens (Rotstein and Lax, 1974: 199). Thus, disciplinary differentiation meant the sorting out of sociology as an autonomous discipline from the other social sciences and the establishment of structures to sustain a disciplinary professional identity. It also meant a marked linguistic differentiation from Francophone sociologists, to a large

Anglophone Canadian Sociology: Context and Evolution extent a result of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec and the new wave of QuCMcois nationalism that swept the province in the 1960s. Linguistic diffexnces were also accentuated by differences in training programs and recruitment policies between Francophone and Anglophone sociologists (Curtis et al, 1970). In addition, an increase in the number of sociologists expanded the number of working groups and specializations within the country. A wide range of professional skill areas became represented- from deviance to phenomenology to demography-which made sociologythe very diverse and pluralistic enterprise that it is today in Canada. Parallel to the economic expansion and industrialization that took place in Canada during the post-war era (and which considerably transformed the nation), a more specialized social scientific community of scholars emerged in burgeoning academicinstitutions. But, fortunately for the maturation of the discipline, this random growth became much more controlled as governments reduced the large annualincreases in financial support which characterizedthe earlier part of this phase.

CONSOLIDATION The 1960s and early 1970s, then, were years of general undergraduate expansion which had a dynamic impact on the growth of the discipline. By the latter part of the 1970s,enrollment increases almost came to a halt. But as the economicrecession of the early 1980sbegan to make itself felt and layoffs and unemployment became commonplace, universities experienced new growth, but under far different conditions than the growth of the 1960s. In the earlier decade, governments willingly poured millions of dollars into university expansion to strengthen old programs and to initiate new programs. By 1980, inflation and the recession had severely cut into the government's ability to respond to educational needs. In sum, no new growth in sociology programs or number of personnel took place and, consequently, time could be given to the consolidation of the earlierexpansionand the strengtheningof the existing sociological enterprise. The best single indicator of this process of strengthening from within was the development of graduate programs in sociology in Canada, most notably at the PhD level. Only eight PhDs in sociology were awarded in 196970, but by 1974-75, 39 were awarded and, by 1975-76, an amazing 494 students were involved in doctoral programs in sociology at Canadian universities (Hiller 1982: 32). In graduate student seminars, a new quest began for

National Survival in Dependent Societies

a closerapplication of the disciplineto Canadian issues, debates, and analyses. Graduate students also became concerned about employment in a job market where sociologists were no longer in such high demand in educational institutions as they once were. The result was that Canadian sociologists, recruited and trained in Canada rather than elsewhere, began to ask new questions about the form and content of the discipline in Canada. Questions about foreign influence were generally part of the cultural milieu during this era. Whether it had to do with the economic influence of foreign multinational corporations or the foreign influence in academia,there was general cultural interest (or at least debate) about Canadianizing aspects of Canadian society that were too vulnerable and/or had already been overwhelmed by foreign (and particularly US) influences (Lurnsden, 1970). The early 1970s saw the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association embroiled in debates and motions over what action should be taken to reduce and/or totally eliminate the rec~uitrnentof non-Canadian sociologists for positions in Canada. Graduates from Canadian programs felt particularly vulnerable because their training in relatively young Canadian graduate schools made it difficult to compete with graduates from more established foreign graduate programs. Because of the political pressures exerted by these new graduates and their allies during this period, and supported by strengthened immigration regulations requiring the hiring of Canadians first, Canadian nationals have been given priority in any employment vacancies. Perhaps it ought to be pointed out that both the language barrier and the reluctance of Francophone Quebec universities to hire from outside Canada ensured that this aspect of Canadianizationwas not an issue among Francophone sociologists. While the first part of the Canadianization movement was primarily concerned with ending the flow of expatriate sociologists into the country, thereby providing opportunities for Canadians, the second part of the Anglophone movement sought to give substance to the quest for a Canadian sociology (Hiller, 1979). In other words, a Canadian sociology did not just mean any and all sociology practised in Canada, but the production of theoretical models or paradigms that were grounded in the Canadian experience or based on the unique character of Canadian society (Felt, 1975). As distinct from the type of sociology dominant in the United States in the 1960s-functionalist, quantitative, and micro-sociological-it was typically thought that Canadian sociology ought to be more critical, historical, and macro-sociological. In that way, it was thought that more would be understood

Anglop hone Canadian Sociology: Context and Evolution

about the structure and character of Canadian society. Some of these perspectives were presented in the early issues of the Canadian Journal of Sociology which began publication in 1975. And, to some extent, the identification of Francophone sociology with the evolution and development of Quebec society provided a model against which Anglophone sociologists measured their own response to nationalist goals. Much of this activity was a natural reaction to issues plaguing the nation as a whole at that time, as well as the sheer strength and influence of US sociology in Canada (Lamy, 1976). To some extent, a similar reaction took place in other countries as well, including Australia and New Zealand (Baldock and Lally, 1974: 285). Yet the question of whether a national sociology was even possible generated considerable debate and controversy that still pervades the Anglophone sociological community in Canada. In this most recent phase, considerable effort has been devoted to the production of Canadian materials such as textbooks to replace the imported texts from the United States or England. There is now a fairly good range of published material available on all aspects of Canadian society, from urbanization to stratification to ethnic relations. Consolidation has meant that the sociological community in Canada is no longerbent on rapid growth, but rather it can concentrateits energies on the establishment of working groups of researchers with similar interests and the generation of data and theories that will contribute to a deeper understanding of Canadian society. As the amount of data and experience has accumulated, Canadian sociologists have become more active in entering their research in international forums of sociologists, which suggests a further maturation of the sociological enterprise.

TRAITS AND TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY ANGLOPHONE CANADIAN SOCIOLOGY Perhaps the most dominant feature of contemporary Anglophone Canadian sociology is its orientation towards the larger concerns of Canadian society as a whole. Government research funding and publication subventions usually give priority to projects that illuminate important aspects of Canadian society. The federal government's Department of the Secretary of State, for example, provides funding for research and lectureships on ethnic relations because of the government's policy of multiculturalismwhich promotes ethnic identities.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

Ever since the appearance of the Symons Report3in 1975which proposed that Canadians needed more publications about their own society in order to become knowledgeable participants in the society, research priority has been given to topics that illuminate national and regional histories, structures, and movements. Trend studies on poverty, the role of multinational corporations, socialization of children, population shifts, and urbanization have provided topics for sociological research because of their relevance to national interest. Even studies in deviance and criminology are frequently sponsored by federal agencies because of their national importance, though researchers are usually given considerable independence in the formulation of their research problems. It is not so much that government constrainsthe researcher or the project but that, from among those seeking support for their independently conceive projects, the government has a mandate to give priority to those research projects which are in the national interest. Furthermore, through their own experiences with regional socio-economicdynamics, researchers themselves have selected research themes that are critically related to matters of national well-being. In short, Canadian sociologists,to a large extent, are drawn to their work by what is viewed as of critical importance to the society as a whole. A second feature of contemporary sociology in Anglophone Canada is its ambivalent relationship to US sociology. This ambivalenceis rooted in an intellectual and materialist dependency to foreign powers which Canadians have long felt (Rush et al, 1981). On the one hand, there is a tendency to want to be more independent from US sociology. For the strongest nationalists, US meetings and journals are to be avoided in preference for Canadian meetings and journals. On the other hand, the sheer geographic size of the country frequently makes it closer and less costly for a Canadian sociologist to attend a meeting in the United States than to travel great distances to a Canadian meeting. Other sociologists argue that it is their primary objective to present their research before the best researchers in that subdisciplinary field. For example, there is not a separate organizationfor family sociologists in Canada and many family sociologists in Canada may, if funds are limited, choose to attend a meeting of the National Council on Family Relations in the United States rather than a Canadian meeting with few family specialists present. Others argue that prior attention should be given to establishing strong links between family sociologists in Canada first. Thus, perhaps as a mirror of the larger concern of differentiation between Canadian and US societies, some tension does exist over precisely what the relationship between US and Canadian sociology ought to be.

Anglop hone Canadian Sociology: Context and Evolution

A third characteristic of Anglophone Canadian sociology is increased interest in the continuity of the sociological enterprise in Canada In recent years, Canadian sociologists have demonstrated increasing interest in rediscovering the work of early Canadian social scientists. The work of C.A. Dawson on the social side of the settlementprocess in the Canadian West, the impact of staple extraction in the work of Innis, the role of the rural and urban frontier as Canadian responses to primary resources and secondary industrial development in the research of S. D. Clark (Harrison 1982), the studies on unemployment undertaken by Leonard Marsh (Magill, 1980), the groundbreaking research on stratification and power elites in the award-winning book The Vertical Mosaic (1965) by John Porter (see the 1981 Special Issue of the Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology) in memory of John Porter -many of these studies are being read with great interest as evidence of how the sociological tradition in Canada has grown. Such historical reflection serves as a convenient reminder that sociology did not just arrive in Canada in the 1960s.This social science tradition also serves as the basis for the search for a more indigenous sociology. The fourth characteristic of Anglophone Canadian sociology is that it is indeed a very diverse enterprise. Not only is there a plurality of areas of Macro specialization but a wide variety of interpretive models are ~tilized.~ approaches to research vie with micro approaches; quantitative and qualitative preferences in methods frequently produce debate. Some sociologists view their role primarily as researchers generating data and conclusions but standing somewhat remote from their objects of study. Other sociologists feel that data should be used to accomplish goals of social change and that the sociologist should be critical and prophetic. Marxist conflict theory, symbolic interactionism,functionalism,and phenomenology each have their supporters as an interpretive framework for sociological data. Canada's hinterland/periphery position as a nation and the regional disparities within the country in many ways have fostered the rediscovery, reformulation, and current popularity of political economy as an interpretive model of sociological explanation (Whyte,1982: 24). As a country rich in resources needed by other industrial societies, it seems quite appropriate to bring models of economic organizational power to bear on a society that has relatively unstable hinterlands due to uncertain markets and centralized capitalist decision making. Consequently, world systems theory in the tradition of Wallerstein,the Frankfurtschoolin Germany, and Andre Gunder Frank in Latin America are currently popular reference points. Nevertheless, social

National Survival in Dependent Societies

psychological studies of attitudes and other micro-social processes are also prevalent and any simple attempt to characterize Canadian sociology must take into account the diversity that does exist. A more recent trend in Anglophone Canadian sociology is the move away from academic institutions and towards more applied settings. Certainly, master's degree graduates in sociology have for some time been employed in industry and government, thoughnot alwayswith the designation of sociologist^'. However, with the lack of new employment possibilities in educationalinstitutionsand the growthof greaterjobspecializationin industry, particularly in the field of socio-economic consulting to industry or government, sociologistswithPhDs arefindingincreasing opportunity for challenging employment outside academia. Many graduate programs, realizing that they are no longerprimarily training people for teaching, are incorporating applied courses, policy studies, and internships into their training programs. As employment opportunities for sociologists broaden, training programs are also changing as the potential roles for a sociologist are becoming more diverse than ever before. While the academically based-sociologist will always remain a large component of the sociological activity in Canada, the potential for the growth of sociological activity in more applied settings could produce significant changes in the discipline in the future.

CONCLUSION Universities in Canada are h d e d by governments which indirectly exercise some contml over the programs offered. Yet universities are autonomous to the extent that they have their own self-governingmechanisms. Government sponsorship of universities has had little direct effect on the evolution of sociology in Canada per se, for the discipline's major struggle has been with obtaining its own rightfbl place within existing university structures. It would be accurate to say that once the old interdisciplinary model of social science of the second phase had been swept away by a more American model of departmentalization in which sociology was an accepted independent partner among other social sciences, the discipline had obtained its own place within universities. Without this legitimation within academic institutions, it is doubtful whether sociology would have such a vital existence in Canada today. The largenumber of Anglophone sociologistswithin the country and the diversity of perspectives and specializations they represent almost ensure a

Anglophone Canadian Sociology: Context and Evolution

wide of range of ideological perspectives within the discipline. However, those engaging in macro-levelresearch aremorelikelyto be criticalof existing structures and practices within Canadian society. Such criticism, even when made publicly, is not without legitimation in Canadian society and may even be channelled through political parties in the political process. While there is increasing interest among Anglophone sociologists in direct participation in political activity, the role of the more detached scientist is also prevalent among many in sociology, for along with industrial specialization has come the role of the consultant. Sociologists based in academic institutions are frequently called upon by government or industry to engage in research as consultants, to providedata or reports that are useful to the contracting agency. Clearly, it is difficult to provide simple characterizations of contemporary Anglophone Canadian sociology. As a multi-faceted enterprise, the existence of diversity and debate about the nature and goals of sociologyas a discipline and profession indicates that Anglophone Canadian sociology is alive and well.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

NOTES 1 2

3

4

They areRecherchesociographiques,Sociologieet Soci6t&,Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, and Canadian Journal of Sociology. As acasein point, Grayson's (1980)English languagetextbook for introductory Canadian sociology studentsdiscussesthe dominant paradigms in Anglophone sociology and essentially ignores Francophone sociology. The Symons Report was commissioned and published by the Association of Universities and Colleges in Canada. Its chairman was Pn,fessor T.H.B. Symons and the report was entitled "To Know Ourselves: The Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies." Francophone sociologistMarcel Fournier (1985: 797) has argued that there is a surprising congruency in the debates and theoretical conflicts on this issue within the two sociological language p u p s in Canada.

111 QUEBEC AND ITS CULTURAL SPECIFICITY OR THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN IDENTITY

Marcel Fournier

The publication in 1982 of an article by Lise Bissonnette, an editorial writer for Le Devoir, reactivated the old debate on Quebec's cultural specificity or distinctiveness. Responding to a declaration made by Fernand Dumont, professor at Laval University and director of the Institut qu6Mcois de Recherche sur la Culture who maintained that the defence of a language only made sense in terms of the maintenance of a culture, the editorial writer took sarcasticpleasure in calling the eminentprofessor to order and assailed anyone who might dare to define Quebec's inexpressible cultural specificity, except of course forthe language question- all the rest could only be empty words! (Bissonnettte, 1982: 14) Today, as in the past, the social sciences and particularly sociology have a stake in this debate. It is difficult, if not impossible, for these disciplines to escape this problem, because they cannot define what constitutes their field without constructing an object, that is, without defining the society in which they practise. In Quebec, it was certainly not sociologists who invented the "Quebec Question"; however, both the political conditions and their own approachto object constructionhave induced them to become involved in this question and to produce studies partaking both in sociological analysis and political reflection, both of which have made important contributions to the formation of a national identity (Fournier & Houle, 1980: 21-45). These studies have, in fact, frequently provided cognitive categories which have helped the French-speaking collectivity in thinking out its identity. As early as the beginningof the century, Marcel Mauss had remarked on this contributionof the human and social sciencesin Europe. Speakingof work devoted to the study of national character, he stated "Le si5cle dernier a vu la

National Survival in Dependent Societies naissance d'un nouveau genre litteraire...Mais ceci n'est que la manifestation littdraired 'un fait: la formation conscientedes caract2resnationau" (Mauss, 1969: 603). To clarify this, we might say that recourse to the human and social sciences is even more indispensable in that it ensures a cognitive basis for political demands. But even if it shows certain similarities to inductive generalization (through identification of historical, geographical, cultural, and other characteristics), identity formation, be it ethnic, regional, national or other, remains an ideological construct whose conditions for fulfillment are sociopolitical. Just as a society only poses those problems which it can resolve, a collectivity (or a group) only projects the representationof itself- the identity -that it is capable of assuming. This representation of identity does not rest only on inherent characteristics, but is also, and more importantly, a fhction of the balance of power within which the group or collectivity exists, which determines the ease with which it may transform these traits into a collective identity (Bourdieu, 1980: 63-72). Within the framework of this paper, we will briefly review the representation that the human and social sciences, in particular sociology, have constructed of the French Canadian collectivity, from the end of the last century until the present. This necessarily rapid summary will pennit us to demonstrate that these disciplines are unable to undertake specific studies without defining this collectivity (and its relations with other collectivities). This approach obviously respects the norms inherent in the disciplines, and is influenced by their dominant research models, but it also touches upon the political struggles which often give the approach its real meaning. The interpretations proposed by the social sciences of the Quebec situation are,in fact, never independent from these struggles in which social scientists are led to participate as a consequence of their social position and relation to political power.

Along with the other social sciences, sociology appeared, as it did in Europe and the United States, at the end of the nineteenth century. Its appearancecoincideswith what is generally called the "entry into modernity." Of this entry into modernity, sociology was the witness, the analyst, and (occasionally) the critic. In Quebec, however, the birth of the discipline took place in a particular social and political context -the unification of the two

Quebec and its Cultural Specificity

...

Canadas and the creation in 1867 of the Confederation. If at that time two collectivities, French Canadian and North American Indian,' fell under the scrutiny of sociologists and ethnologists, one must not ascribe the reason for this only to the nature of these disciplines or the research models they used. The choiceof research subjectscould not be dissociatedfrom the transformation of these groups or collectivities into ethnic or minority groups. Confederation created a balance of power which led to instituting difference as a sociopolitical issue. Under the scrutiny of outsiders, ethnic particularity which normally inspired pride, began to be viewed either as a handicap or a museum artifact (folklore). After a brief stay in Paris where he met two of Le Play's disciples (the Abbe H ~ Mde Tourville and Edmond Demolins), U o n Gerin (1863-1951) undertook his first monographic surveys of rural French Canadian families. This son of an intellectual who earned his living in the federal public service was to have only one watchword: "Du positif, du positif! ." In this respect, he can be clearly distinguished from the social writers of his generation who found their doctrinal inspiration in social Catholicism, or who were content to be propagandists for the nationalist movement. Just as he refused to assimilate sociology into ethics, this public servant, who conducted surveys in the field during his leisure time and his holidays, remained distant from specifically political debates, except for the reform of the educational system and, in particular,of classicalsecondaryeducation (Mrin, 1937;Falardeau & Garigue, 1968). However, both his analytical approach and his findings had an undeniablepolitical impact. His work provided the French-speakingcollectivity with an image of itself which some would ignore and others reject. Uon Gerin's support for the theory of "particularism" -first advanced by his French masters De Tourville and Demolins -which maintained that economic, social and political progress was based on the education of the individual and on training for personal initiative (and therefore on the transition from the community-based family to the particularist family) did not fail to give rise to negative reactions. His position implied a harsh judgment of the French Canadian collectivity which was encouraged to recognize Anglo-Saxon superiority and to borrow some of its characteristics. Detractors retorted with: "Ne soyonspasjaloux de la sup6rioritedes autres races. Restons ce que nous sommes. Gardons la foi des ai'eux avec la foi en notre mission (religieuse et intellectuelle)." Certainly, Gerin reminded us that we must not reduce social issues to religious issues, but he was no less a defender of reform and progress. He would reaffirm his own positive judgments of his fellow

National Survival in Dependent Societies

citizens-their dedication and selfIessness, the spirit of mutual aid in the rural French Canadian family, the great value of French customs and religious traditions -while persisting in his severe criticism of the complexity of life in the industrial centres. But he was no less an advocate of the entry into modernity, an entry which demanded change in French Canadian attitudes and institutions, including the awakening of individual initiative, the formation of a business elite, etc. At least one of the fundamental elements of French Canadian culture -family organization and the type of socialization associated with it -appeared as a handicap. It was an obstacle to the survival of French Canada itself. At the beginning of the twentieth century, another Quebec intellectual looked at his society from a relativistic point of view. This was Marius B arbeau (1883-1969) who, as ethnologist for the Geological Commission of the Department of Mines in Ottawa and later for the National Museum, conducted ethnological and folkloric surveys of North American Indian and French Canadian populations,collecting songs, legends, tales and so forth. His intellectual contributions, like those of GCrin, were characterized by empiricism and distance from the social doctrine of the church. Noteworthy among his works are Indian Days in the CanadianRockies (1923) and The Downfall of Temlaham (1928) for which he received the Prix David (English section) from the Quebec government. He frequently gave public lectures to learned audiences, and wrote numerous newspaper articles based on his own research from primary sources. His public interventions were those of a popularizer as opposed to those of a political activist: as objects of amazement and marvel, traditional society and culture became less a motive for political action than artifacts destined for the museum or the learned joumal, to be appreciated by specialists and other cultured people. Patrimonial conservationis an ambiguous activity. For those specialists who carry it out, it involves a follclorizationof so-called traditional cultures. For others who are more nationalist-minded, it is a means of consolidating traditions and reaffirming values. Barbeau, who viewed Quebec from the perspective of Ottawa, found himself between these two positions. At times, before specialized or English-speaking audiences,he exhibited local production (tales, legends, etc.) as bits of exotica; at other times, in the joumal L'action nationale, he would come to the defence of "our traditions." Modernity had, however, gained ground. Tradition had become the object of discourse and attention by specialists on culture. Even when it was employed for the explicit promotion of values or of a whole set of real-life practices, le patrimoine became an object, even a commodity.

Quebec and its Cultural Spectpcity

...

A RACE, ITS TERRITORY, ITS SOUL

Sociology did exist at the Universit6 de Montr6al where since 1920 Edouard Montpetit had been head of the Ecole des sciences sociales, politiques et kconomiques, but its place as a discipline remained very marginal and its teaching closely associated with social philosophy. Not until the early 1940s e reorganized with the addition of a history and sociology when the ~ c o l was section, did a course explicitly identified as sociology appear. But this first sociology course had much less to do with sociological theory and research than with social work -it was a course on applied sociology which dealt with the problems of poverty and ways of solving them. The man in charge of the coursewas Arthur Saint-Pierre,an intellectual occupied to alarge extent at that time by dutiesrelating to the organization,teaching, and difhsion of the social doctrineof the church. His works (Questions et oeuvressocialeschez nous, etc.) appear to be the direct continuation of his responsibilities as secretary of the ~ c o l sociale e populaire. Sociology remained a discipline derivative of social ethics and generated scarcely any surveys at the time. A concern for social research appeared more strongly in other disciplines, for example in history, geography, and economics, and also in other institutions such as 1'~coledes hautes etudes commerciales. Conscious of the fact that "patriotism requires a perfect knowledge of one's country," themembers ofthe nationalist movements were often the first to conduct studies and to gather data on their society. This concern was felt, for instance, by the first decades of the century by the members of the Association catholique pour la jeunesse canadienne (ACJC). In 1912, this nationalist movement, which was active within the colleges, conducted a vast survey of all the schools of the province to acquaint itself with their functioning (attendance, cost of education, expenses brought about by change of school, the efficiency of teaching and its adaptation to the social milieu, teachers' salaries, and political interferencein the school). As was stated at the time, facts and figures were wanted, not empty words or diatribes (LeSemeur, 1912: 12)?Even if rhetoric did not completely disappear in nationalist circles, as forexample at thejournalL'Actionj?aqaise, run by the AbM LionelGroulx, we find all the same a concern for objectivity reflected in dossiers compiled on issues of the day and in the importance accorded to the development of the social sciences. "~tudionsles sciences sociales" became the catchword.' Until then, history had been the leading social science discipline.This should not surprise

National Survival in Dependent Societies us, for history not only made it possible, as the monumental work of Lionel Groulx testifies, to describe facts and events and to establish a chronology of these events, but also to develop a political perspective (or even a mission of "spiritualizing" America) and to consolidate a national conscience and pride (hero cult, etc.). The constructionof a national history was both an intellectual and a political exercise, which made possible the initial recognition and affirmation of the specificity or distinctiveness of a national history. This political intention was made explicit by the same AbM Groulx in one of his first works, published in 1919 under a pseudonym, in which he justified the title of his "roman ii these" in the following terms: J'ai intitulele volume: La naissance dune race ....Distincts, nous le sommes non seulement par le pays, par I'aNdgeance politique, par une histoire et des traditions qui nous sont propres, mais aussi par des caract2resphysiqueset moraux deli fix& et transmis avec la vie, d b le 17e si&cle.... Seule la dalite de notre persomalit6 nationale, la conscienceprofonde de notre entit6distincte pourront soutenir nos instincts de race. (Groulx, 1919) Such a nationalist commitment is also found in one of the first Quebec intellectuals to take an interest in demography. Of EmileMiller (1885-1922): it was said in L'Action fran~aisein 1922 that he loved geography out of love for science, but also out of patriotic fervour? Moreover, in his first book, Terres etpeuples du Canada (Miller, 1912) which was considered at the time as the centrepiece of his work, we find, in addition to a description of the geography of Canada, a study of the characteristicsof its populations (demography, physical appearance,language, religion, etc.). As a human geographer concerned with establishing a relationship between man and his natural environment, Miller attempted to determine some of the perceptible traits of the two main ethnic groups in Canada, which he designated as being the Franco-Canadians and the Anglo-Saxons. He offered the following characterizations of the Franco-Canadian,whom he called also "Neo-French" (N6ofran~ais)and "Laurentian" (Laurentien): the Franco-Canadian soul, blessed with three qualities essential to the existence of homogeneous people (unity of faith, common language, and convergence of aspirations); the Quebec dialect (parlure) with its outdated words, expressions of an archaic flavour, numerous Canadianisms, etc.); and physique (high forehead, aquiline nose, wide square shoulders, medium stature, remarkable superiority of structure and musculature, etc.) (Miller, 1912).

Quebec and its Cultural Specificity

...

Miller contained his ''patriotism" throughout his work except in the conclusion where he allowed himself to express his personal opinion on the subject of Canadian problems of the time; his hope was that: se dalise pour la Laurentie..."son cantonnement sur un vaste temtoire geographique autonome, ainsi ses vertus anciennes d'amenite, d'amour d'ordre, du beau et de la richesse, perpetuees dans des corps trempes d'endurance aux souffles vivifiants du nord, triompheront au rogne et utilitaire Anglo-saxon, car: un peuple est d'autant plus fort qu'il s'est heureusement assoupli a la nature de son milieu,1'alliance des institutionscivilesaux caracteres sociaux assure la stable existence d'une nation, et les cadres gbgraphiques sont le premier element constitutif des patries." (Miller,1922) The importance of geography was such that we find it in the program of e sciences sociales until the mid- 1950s,and it was often by means the ~ c o ldes At of its teaching that students were initiated to anthropology and s~ciology.~ that time, "Apprendre le pays" (Montpetit, 1922) constituted an element of the program of national action. The development of a national conscience is, in fact, never independent from identification with a geographical space, a temtory. Geography, like history, makes the construction of distinctive identity possible. In this light we can understand the impact that the publication of a series of works written by a French geographer, Raoul Blanchard, L'Est du Canadafrangais (1935) would have had in the mid- 1930s. Geography's contribution to the formation of identity was also expressed in the writings of another geographer of French origin, Piene Desfontaines, who became the head of the geography department of Laval University in 1948. It was he, in fact, who identified the "rang" as a specifically French Canadian system of populating rural areas @esfontaines, 1953).

The desire to h o w the country and to give it a name was also behind the developmentof the natural sciences and appears in the work of Marie-Victorin (1885-1944),who was both anintellectualand apolitical activist. A researcher and popularizer, scientist and poet, he put fonvard a national plan for the survival of French Canada. Not only was he a militant within the previously mentioned ACJC, notable for its nationalistic pronouncements, he also succeeded in completinga giganticwork, La Flore laurentienne (1935),which had an undeniable political thrust. Using the term "Laurentie", this work

National Survival in Dependent Societies

undertook a systematic identification of the natural characteristics of the tenitory occupied by French Canadians, and thus contributed to the national struggle? It was to economics, more than any other discipline, however, that nationalist circles resorted. Was it not frequently repeated that the national issue was first and foremost an economicissue? ~t the h o l e des hautes etudes commerciales, attention became focussed on the transformations brought on by the crisis of 1929. The need was recognized not only of training businessmen and accountants,but of putting more research,knowledge, and reflection into the social organization in Quebec. Esdras Minville (1896-1975) became associated with the ~ c o l as e a professor in 1924, becoming its director from 1938 to 1950 and also the founder of the school's journal L'Actualitb bconomique. He succeeded in linking an academic career to social action, organizing economic research while pursuing nationalist objectives. He worked to "assurer B notre groupement national l'autonomie economique indispensable B l'exercice heureux de ses liberth politiques et l'accomplissement de sa carri&re9'(Minville, 1944-45), while promoting Christian objectives as well. Of his effort to understand "the French Canadian national problem," the most eloquent manifestation was the publication between 1940 sur nonemilieu," which and 1945,under his editorship,of a seriescalledU~udes constitutedthe first systematicallyempirical research in economics(Wnville, 1942-1946). For Minville, a convert to nationalism since the first years of L'Action francaise, there was no doubt of French Canada's distinctiveness. He maintained, in the words of Abbe Groulx at the Royal Society of Canada, that: "il existe telles choses au Canada qu'une nationalit6canadienne-franqaise et m e province de Quebec, que ces deux entites politiques et nationales, existant de fait et de droits, ont des probl8mes angoissants..."(Groulx, 1944-45). Moreover, Minville drew a portrait of French Canada which was socio-cultural as well as economic. Even if it owed much to the "French genius," French Canadian culture appeared as being first of "Christian inspiration;" it was the culture of a "Christian nation," and therefore its main characteristics were spiritualistic (primacy of values relating to the mind and repugnance for all forms of materialism), personalistic (the cult of liberty and rejection of any form of subjection or of collectivism), community (predominance of the structure of the family,parish, occupation,etc.), and finally qualitative (search for a greater degree of "humanization") (Minville, 1979).

Quebec and its Cultural SpecrjLicity

...

During the 1930s and the 1940s, which some identify as a period of "nationality crisis", such forms of discourse on the nation were sufficiently widespread to make the compilation of a voluminous anthology possible, and in this way French Canada was provided with a history, a temtory, an economy, and a soul (or a culture) specific to it. The formation of such an identity, then, was linked, for some, to the defence of traditional values and to a conservatism which was called "clerical-nationalist," which in some of its variations pushed for a withdrawal into self and a return to the past (or to the land). The primary issue was obviouslylanguage, but only insofaras it was the expression of a culture and the vehicle of a civilization.' Anglo-Protestant utilitarianism and materialismwas opposedby the humanism and Catholicism of "immortal France." For a culture (traditional) perceived as an impediment to change or progress, some sought therefore to substitute a culture and a set of values which were seen as necessary for the survival of French Canada. And at the moment when the social sciences were making their entrance as an institution into society in the 1940s, this oppositionbetween traditionalists and modemists became apparent within the various disciplines. Specialists of different political orientations, academic backgrounds, and generations stood in opposition to one another. A LOOK FROM THE OUTSIDE: E.C. HUGHES AND THE LAVAL SCHOOL

The cultural uniqueness of French Canada gave rise to sufficient surprise and interest among American sociologists to encouragethem to carry out research in Quebec, mainly in rural areas. Their central concern was, according to Redfield's typology, the analysisof the transition of a still traditional or "folk" society to a modem or "urban" society. In presenting Horace Miner's book, St-Denis, a French-Canadian Parish (1939, p. xiii), Robert Redfield remarked that one important contribution of this excellent book was to pennit us to see in what ways the French Canadian peasant society resembled "primitive peoples." Refemng to such cultural factors as the weight of tradition, social consensus, strength of faith, and omnipresence of the family, he summed up by remarking that the habitants did have a culture,but that this traditional culture, whose essential traits were identifiable, was a culture which, through contact with modem industrial civilization, was in the process of transformation (Miner, 1971: 71-89).

National Survival in Dependent Societies

The research problem thus posed - analysis of the transition of a traditional or folk society to a modem society-was also the basis for various surveys conducted by Everett C. Hughes, another American sociologist who, after completing his studies at the University of Chicago, took up a university career at McGill University (Montreal) in 1922. AAer doing some work on the division of labour along ethnic lines, he produced an importantmonograph on Dnunmondville, a small Quebec town in the process of industrialization (Hughes, 1943). Hughes was fascinated by French Canadian survival, which he saw as a sort of heroic cultural miracle before which we should render homage (Hughes, 1938). For him, the question of French Canada was posed in terms of a discrepancy between economic transformation, that is, a "belated industrial revolution" controlled by foreign interests, on the one hand, and the institutions of French Canada including a mentality "oriented toward another and preceding economic condition," on the other. It seemed that the future of French Canadian culture depended on achieving an equilibrium between its proud traditions, and the various and more highly technical requirements of metropolitan and industrial life? We find brought together here the elements of a model of sociological research which would guide a new generation of researchers at Laval University, resulting in their developingthe thesis of "catching up" or modernization. Yet in the early 1940s the teaching of social sciences at the Universite de Montreal remained focussedonUgeneralculture" and was confinedto evening e sciences sociales lectures by a few eminent scholars. However, the ~ c o l des of Laval University gradually took on a more specialized and professional orientation. After 1938,under the direction of the Reverend Father GeorgesHenri Uvesque, a cleric, day courses, higher academic requirements, the hiring of career-oriented professors, establishment of departments, organization of research, and so on, were instituted. Sociology made its appearance as a university program at Laval University, first under foreign professors E.C. Hughes, Reverend Father Delos,lofor example, and then under Frenchspeaking Quebecers - Reverend Father Gonzalve Poulin, a Jesuit who quickly took a social-work orientation and Jean-Charles Falardeau (19141989). A student of Park and Burgess at the University of Chicago, the latter cameback to Quebec as disciple and "heir" to E.C. Hughes. One of Falardeau's responsibilities was to create a social research program for Quebec, which he wrote during one of his stays in Quebec City. It included, among other things, the study of the family and the parish, and of the basic problems of an urban community (Hughes, 1945).

Quebec and its Cultural Specificity

...

For Falardeau and his colleagues in the social sciences, the "tragedy" of French Canada was to be found not, as the nationalist intellectuals thought, on the level of constitutional relations between the provincial and federal governments, but on the level of the antinomy between urban American civilization and the religious and cultural identity of French Canada. In one of his first writings, Falardeau had tried to answer the question as to whether a French Canadian cultureexisted, on the basis of a theoretical discussionof the notions of culture and civilization. He identified what he called the "something different" of French Canada -its Catholic religion, French language, historical events, and so on. This analysis had evolved into a severe criticism of his fellow citizens and their faults -vassal and belated-youth complex, latent xenophobia, colonialism, intellectual pettiness, and tendency toward a sometimes intransigent insularity (Falardeau, 1941: 206). Throughout the 1940sand the 1950s, at a time when the social sciences were directly implicated in various political debates Jean-Charles Falardeau and his colleagues continued their critique of the French Canadian elite and its conservative ideology. Falardeau was particularly severe with the nationalist leaders who dreamed of a utopian "Laurentie" and wanted to keep Quebec isolated from the world by means of what he called a political, religious and linguistic "Wallof China" (Falardeau, 1960: 37). He recognized, of course, that French Canadians had certain particularities, such as being of French language and civilization and being Catholic by tradition and conviction. But contrary to the nationalist intellectuals, Falardeau gave great importance to another characteristic, that of being North American by birth, and formulated the "Question of French Canada" in different terns: he sought to reconcile the concern for collectiveprosperity with the spiritual requirementsof the culture and Christianity from which Quebec took its inspiration (Falardeau, 1954: 248).

This rejection of an ethnocentricnationalism in favour of modemity was echoed by the "new intellectuals" -social scientists,joumalists,etc. -who contributed to the journal Citt?libre or to the activitiesof the Institut canadien des affaires publiques. Advocates of liberty, democracy,and modemity, these intellectuals worked out a critique of traditional French Canadian society, its clerical-nationalist elite, and the ideology of conservation of the past. This ideological and political perspective became linked with the sociological research model of transition from traditional(fo1k) society to modem urban society. It became the basis of the perspective of "catching up" (rattrapage) which was to be transformed several years later into political policy by the

National Survival in Dependent Societies

Liberal Party of Quebec. "Catching up" was seen in terms of changes in attitudes and modemization of institutions which at the time appeared to be obstacles to the progress and economic survival of French Canada in a world of large companies and high technology. Summarized as an absence of enmpreneurship, the existing mentality seemed to relegate French Canadian business to the family-sized enterprise sector. Pmof of this was found in the study carried out on the French Canadian industrialist by the American sociologistNorman W. Taylor(1957), with the financial support of the Carnegie Corporation, as part of his doctoral work at Yale University. His results showed that the French Canadian mentality and culture constituted, in a number of their features (significance of family, individualism or spirit of independence, primacy of personal relations in the conduct of business, etc.) a factor that explained the position French Canadians occupied in the economic sphere." Like the earlier studies by E.C. Hughes on the ethnic division of labour and those which Hughes would inspire, that of Falardeau brought the "inferiority" of French Canadians to the fore, and provided a rationale for two movements which then took shape. The first, which took place at the level of the federal government, was a movement of ethnic contestation which led to a policy of bilingualism and biculturalism; the second was a vast movement for reform which took place in Quebec at the turn of the 1960s when the provincial Liberal Party came to power and which came to be known as the "Quiet Revolution." In both movements, the intention was the same - to make up for lost time in the administrationof men and things in Quebec. In no time, the Quebec collectivity rid itself -to use the expression of the painter Paul-Emile Borduas (Le Refus global, 1948)-of the "tuque et le goupillon" (the traditional woolen hat and the holy-water sprinkler), that is, of ethnocentric nationalism and conservative Catholicism. However, even if these two movements-ethnic nationalism and the modernism of the Quiet Revolution -sprang from the same intention and relied heavily on the contributions of social scientists, they were far from being totally reconcilable. Whereas one referred to the defence of an ethnic group and of its position in the Canadian political and economic sphere, the other led to the creation of a society with a desire to possess a strong state and modem institutions. Tom for a time between the two perspectives, the human and social sciences, and in particular sociology,gradually abandoned the first in favourof the second. Theirprimary field of interest was no longer French Canadians as an ethnic group (ethnic relations, etc.) but Quebec society as such, its infrastructure, social structure, education system, ideologies, and so forth.

Quebec and its Cultural Specificity

...

Until the mid-1960s, sociologists still spoke of French Canada as opposed to e le Canadafrancais(l958) Quebec. Philippe Garigue gave the title ~ t u d sur to a book which brought together several of his studies; a colloquium organized by thejournal Recherchessociographiqueswas held underthe theme "Situation de la recherche sur le Canada franqais" (1962); and a collective work published in Paris by the Centrecatholique des intellectuels fran~aiswas devoted to Canadafrancais, aujourd'hui et &main (1961). Fernand Dumont and Guy Rocher published an article entitled "Introduction une sociologie du Canada franqais" in a reader assembled by Yves Martin and Marcel Rioux which had, in the first English edition, the title French Canadian Society (1964);and the professional associationset up by sociologists, anthropologists and social psychologists in 1961 was named the Association canadienne des sociologues, anthropologues et psychologues sociaux de langue Eranqaise. However, even if the name remained the same, a change was in the making whereby the French Canadian collectivity was no longer considered as an ethnic group or as an ethnic minority, but as a society (easily identifiable in Quebec), or as a global society, a societyunto itself, to borrow an expression from Femand Dumont. French Canada or Quebec was now seen as a society with its own economic infrastructure, social structure (including classes), state, ideologies, etc., capable of becoming the object of sociological analysis. This conceptual transition was not arrived at without difficulties. In order to account for French Canada's specificity, which included being both a global society and a recognized minority within Canada, the sociologists Jacques Dofny and Marcel Rioux invented the rather ambiguous notion of "ethnic class." A few years later, the latter of these two wrote, in La question du Qukbec, that there was no longer any question of "French Canada,"or of bilingualism or biculturalism. What counted was the powers of the state and the organization of the collective life of Quebecers (Rioux, 1969: 151).

The movement for the autonomy or nationalization of sociology in Quebec - creation of French-language journals (Recherches sociographiques in 1960 and Sociologie et sociktks in 1969), establishment of associations, multiplication of teaching positions, etc. -coincided to a large extent with Quebecbecoming a specificobjectof study, and also with the development of neo-nationalism, in which a number of sociologists and other social

National Survival in Dependent Societies

scientists participated.This new nationalism, which was characterizedless by the defence of a culture than by the formulation of specifically political demands, manifested itself during the 1960sand 1970s. At the level of official political organization, the Rassemblement pour l'independance nationale @IN) came into being, and on the level of clandestineor terrorist movements, there was the Front de liMration du Quebec (FLQ), whose activities led, in 1970 to the "October Crisis," the military occupation of Quebec by the Canadian army by virtue of the War Measures Act. The issue of political independencewas an explicit part of all these movements. Theplan was to fuse the French Canadian "nation" with Quebec society by means of specifically political action. This was articulated forcefully by Paul Chamberland, a member of the editorial staff of the joumal, Parti Pris: "Nous utiliserons le terme Qukbec et Qukbecois, de pkference a ceux de Canada fran~aiset de canadiens fran~ais.Le parti pris langagier recouvre une transformation des dalites. QuCbec ne sera plus une 'province' mais un 'pays', le nom d'une totalite et non celui d'une partie honteuse d'un ensemble desorganise. Quebec constitue l'antithese ineluctible du Canada, du moins de ce qui a ed le Canada jusqu'h maintenant. I1 y aura recouvrement, coihcidence entre le territoire, la nation, la patrie et la culture." (Chamberland, 1964: 75) At a time when the framework of sociologicalresearch was changing,the politicization and radicalization of nationalism led to a very different formulation of Quebec's cultural specificity.12This specificity was seen much less as an essence (related to origins, etc.) than as a set of relationships which were characterized by dependency. We see this clearly in Parti Pris, the politicalintellectual journal quoted above. Parti Pris opened up three fronts simultaneously - secularism, nationalism, and socialism - and had an important ideological impact in the mid-1960s. Led by young intellectuals (literary people and philosophers at first, but soon taken over by social scientists), this joumal established the link between Quebec's cultural specificity and its state of dependency: the Quebecer was colonized,thatis, he was anUhreminoritaire qui ne se cornprend que par l'existence de son cordlat, l'&e majoritaire" (Chamkrland, 1964: 79). In the manner of Jacques Berque in his Damnks de la terre and Dt!possessionsdu monde, aportrait of the colonized Quebecerwas drawn. He was not only dispossessed (of his land, his wealth, in short, of the control of the economy), but also depersonalized. Regarding this

Quebec and its Cultural Specificity

...

depersonalization,editor Paul Chamberland isolated the following characteristics: 1) self-denigration (or national masochism), 2) the "Big Shot" complex (submission to the Crown and the church), 3) dogmatism in question of morals and conformism and gregariousness from the social point of view, and finally 4) the search for safety valves (taverns, cult of hockey, cursing, the frantic search for material comfort and gaudy luxury, the Saint-Jean Baptiste parades, the cult of legendary heroes, etc.). This portrait of the Quebecerwas obviously very gloomy and negative, but its only objective was to discover and analyse deficiencies in order to make the "birth of the new Quebec man" possible. The intention was not to defend a culture, but to create the basis for action (national liberation and revolution ) forthe renewal of aculture. Chamberland concluded by statingthatthenascent changes in the "Quebec man" constituted the ultimate and fundamental goal of the struggle for political and economic emancipation (Chamberland, 1964: 79). If there was one debate among those launched by Parti Pris which gave rise to numerous argumentsin intellectual circles, it was the languagequestion in Quebec, a language said to be different from the French language of France. This position provoked even more virulent reactions because the defence of the Quebec language (the adjective "qu6b6cienneWappeared) led certain authors to turn to the language of the people, the so-called "joual," in their writings. Linguists and socio-linguists pursued this debate and attempted, by resorting to various theories or empirical studies, to determine if the language spokenby the French-speakingpopulation of Quebec exhibited any specificity or distinctiveness. For the human and social sciences -undergoing rapid development at that time - the change in socio-political context at the end of the 1960s,manifested notably by the diffusion of the Marxist research model, developmentof community development/participationactivities, radicalization of political discourse, and so on, was expressed in a new preoccupation with understanding the working class l3 and ordinary people. Already during the 1950s, an end to unanimity (Rioux, 1955: 60) transpired in politics and ideology. Noting (often with regret) that structural transformations were accompanied by equally thoroughgoingcultural changes, it was easy to arrive

National Survival in Dependent Societies

at the conclusion in the mid-1960s that Quebec was indeed undergoing profound cultural change, or, in the words of Guy Rocher, a real cultural revolution (Rocher, 1973).l4 Just as one could not speak in terms of ideological unanimity, neither could one speak, on the cultural level, of homogeneity. One increasingly apparent instance of cultural diversity was that of social class. There could be no doubt of the reality of social classes and attempts were made to represent them so that they would be as consistent as possible with existing theory. There were discussions as to the existence of a Quebec French-speaking bourgeoisie, attempts to differentiate the petite bourgeoisie into different fractions (traditional, technocratic, etc.). One of the best expressions of this new sociological sensibility, which manifested itself principally among young researchers, was a vast survey (1969-1972) of five social environments(districts) in Montreal, carried out under the direction of Marcel Rioux and Robert Sevigny (Rioux et al, 1973). Reference made to alienation in this study showed similarities to the critique of everydaylife initiated by the contributors to the journal Parti Pris. At the same time another dimension to the perceived problem of alienation made its appearance. This was the creative dimension,that of being open to change, of putting forth a collective plan in order to break the vicious circleof structural alienationand of the alienatedindividual (Rioux et al, 1973: 16). Marcel Rioux participated in the publication in 1976 of another politicalintellectual joumal, Possibles, of which one of the main preoccupations was to throw light on "emancipatory practices," principally those practices associated with self-management. With the transformation of the nationalist movement into a political party, the Parti QuWcois, which came to power in the election of 1976, the image of the Quebec collectivity changed. Criticism of "qu&&itude" and of cultural alienation gave place to expressions of pride. Of course, anxiety was still present, and sorne armed with figures (demographic, economic, and other data) insisted on the "urgency of making a choice" (for autonomy). The essayist, Pierre Vadeboncoeur published his Le Gdnocide en douce (1976). However, Quebecerswere being looked at in a much less negative light. Some of the faults attributed to French Canadians became signs of superiority instead: for example, their sense of community. Historical backwardness was transformedinto an opportunityfor making history and affirmingthe originality of their culture in North America. After the victory of the Parti Qu6Mcois, there was, in the words of political scientist Daniel Latouche, a veritable

Quebec and its Cultural Specificity ...

"verbal delirium" and, to a certain extent, the manifestation of a (new) "messianism" (Latouche, 1979). Apart from setting up new legislation to protect the French language (Bill 101), the Parti QueWcois, under its leader Rent5 Uvesque, committed itself from the moment it came to power to the creation of a comprehensive cultural policy. To affirm or reaffirm the existence of a "specific and original cultural context" in Quebec, this government -composed to a large extent of academics-took pains to ensure the close collaboration of sociologists such as Fernand Dumont and Guy Rocher in working out a Quebec policy for cultural development (Quebec, 1978). Although the document recognized the cultural diversity of Quebec (minorities, classes, ages, etc.) as well as numerous cultural borrowings, it was, nevertheless, centered on the specificity of a "Quebec culture in the French tradition." Culture, in this context, was not reduced to objects or creative works, but was, in anthropological terms, a set of lifestyles. To the specificquestion as to whether a Quebec culture existed, the following answer was given with a reminder that the French-speakingpopulation is situated in a territory whose limits correspond to Quebec's political boundaries: "Ce qui, en premier lieu, s'impose, c'est le dessin d'une aire linguistique oh progresse une expression culturelle. Deuxieme constatation: il s'agit d'un fait de longue dude, inscrit dans l'histoire depuis des si8cles. Troisiemeobservation:cette situation se refl8te dans la conscience d' une identitd" (Quebec, 1978:46).15 But, except with respect to language and the heritage of the past, the nature of this cultural identity remained blurred: it referred vaguely to "something inside," a "mentality," even to a "soul" -in sum, to something inexpressible. This something was said to be made up of "quiet strength and resignation,pride and hesitation,joie de vivre and nostalgia, protest and hope, conservatism and audacity, the desire for peace and fierce resistance, a spirit of sedentariness and a sense of adventure, the most pragmatic realism and the most utopian dreams at one and the same time" (Quebec, 1978: 49). A certain number of positive forces were identified as being at work (capacity to assimilateborrowings and to resist and defend oneself, tenacious faith in their country and in themselves, an aptitude for continuity within change, and so on). Nevertheless, because of its history and geopolitical

National Survival in Dependent Societies

context, Quebec culture in the French tradition was found to be in dramatic straits. There were, therefore, two faces to Quebec culture: one clearly positive, and the other negative. Survival (which was now referred to in terms of cultural development) was therefore no longer possible by memory alone but depended, increasingly, on a plan or a challenge to be met. A few years earlier, Marcel Rioux, who had already produced several ethnographic studies on rural Quebec communities( ~ e l l e - ~ n sL' e fie , ~erte), tried to identify in a systematic way the cultural specificityof French-speaking Quebec, and the original characteristics of "homo-qu6Mcensis." From the very outset, he noted prudently that this French-speaking collectivity shared certain traits with other peoples - Frenchness, Americanness, and Canadianness -but that through its history it has succeeded in creating its "own individuality" and, furthermore, in affirming that identity. Each of the chapters in his work, Les Qudbkcois (1977). is devoted to describing the original characteristics of the "new Quebec man:" first, his language (or more precisely his languages-French and "joual" or dialect); the Catholicreligion (whose influence remained despite secularization of society); oral tradition (which found its continuation in song and humour); and a particular relationship to space or to the natural environment (the "rang" as model of land occupation, altemance of seasonal, hot and cold weather, which, in conjunction with living sideby side with an English-speakingpopulation,led to a dual personality); and relations with others (a certain xenophobia, distance in relation to the state and public administration,certain co-operative and egalitarian practices, for example). But in his analysis of a collective psychology, Rioux did not attempt to present a totally unified, coherent and positive image of French-speakingQuebecers whose situation of dependency (dispossession and alienation) and proximity to the United States (Americanization)not only provokes changes and variations, varying in magnitude according to social milieu and social class, but also creates ambiguities. Thus, even if for Rioux, the predominant character of Quebecers,is "dionysian," a number of the traits of this characterhave been repressed, giving way to an "apollonian influence" (the composure, orderliness and self-control of the English).

Moreover, because of the rapid historial change which Quebec had undergone in its transition from the parish to the electronic age, the Quebecer appears both as a folkloric character still tied to the land, and as an individual very well adapted to a new society in the process of being bom. This "human type" brought together the contrasting traits of "archaicism and futurism" and tolerated the existence side by side of "institutions and values belonging to

Quebec and its Cultural Specificity

...

different ages." The portrait Rioux outlined of the Quebecer of today is nevertheless a positive one. As an American speaking French, he not only possesses a cultural specificity,but he also sees himself as a Quebecer and has stopped thinking of himself as a member of a minority. The process of identification and of according positive value to this cultural specificity was accompanied throughout the 1970s by a rebirth of folklore: appearance of groups of folk singers (chansonniers), organizing of shows, publication of numerous works on national heritage, rediscovery of arts and crafts such as ceramics and weaving, development of a specifically QuCMcois architecture for single-family dwellings, the struggle to conserve historic buildings, and both the private and public restoration of old houses, and so forth.More than everbefore,everythingrevolved around "le patrirnoine." In sociology, this movement found expression in a reexamination of the history of the discipline and an effolt to understand its development and its contrib~tions.~~ But at a time when the representationof cultural specificity had taken on official expression and had become the objective of policy making (as seen, for instance, in the plan for a Museum of Man with a local emphasis, and the creation of the Institut quMcois de Recherche sur la Culture), a rejection of this tendency began to manifest itself sporadically, generally among young intellectuals. In art and literature, there was a re-invention of modernism, of post-modernism, and the reaffirmation of universality. In the social sciences, the spread of Marxism, or "structural Marxism" (Althusser,Poulantzas)-to be more precise - led for a time to a reconceptualization of the "Quebec Question." Some reduced Quebec to a region (within Canada); others saw the French-speaking Quebec collectivity as a "ethno-linguistic" group (Bourque, 1977 and Bourque and U g a d , 1978). And in far left-wing political milieux (Marxist-Leninist or Maoist) the Parti QuCMcois's "bourgeois" nationalism was criticized in accordance with what Nicole Laurin-Frenette has ironically called a "proletarianversion of federalistnational.ism"(Launn-Frenette,1978). Finally, the development of feminist and ecologicalmovements had the effect of relegating the national issue to one of secondary interest in the eyes of many.17 This was especially the case after the failure of the 1980 referendum in which the nationalist government failed to obtain a mandate for the negotiation of Sovereignty-Association. Various signs pointed to a tendency toward taking one's distance in relation to nationalist discourse going as far as a refusal to construct the Quebec reality solely around the categories of ethnicity or nation. The fascination aroused by new technologies such as

National Survival in Dependent Societies microcomputershas also had the effect of changing people's perspectives and rendering partially inoperative the nationalist view as it has been elaborated until now (Proulx and Vallii?re, 1982).

Through the prism of the human and social sciences, the French-speaking collectivity in Canada has appeared, successively and simultaneously, in different ways. The status of race, nation, ethnic group (minority), society (global), socialformation, region, and so on, have been attributed to it. The cultural specificity of this collectivity has been alternately perceived as a stigma or as an element of pride. It has been enlarged to include a whole set of collective representations(traditions, religion, etc.) and to express a "soul," sometimes reduced to a series of folkloric practices (furniture, dance, songs and legends, certain dishes, etc.). But the language has remained the most obvious sign of cultural difference.For some, however, this language can only be differentiated from the French of France by a few distinctive usages of words and expressions; for others, it has the status of a separate language and expresses a distinctive relationship to the world and a specific way of thinking and seeing. The variation of discourse on Quebec illustrates well that no cultural specificity exists in essence. It exists only insofar as it is affirmed and insofar as a set of selected cultural traits makes the constructionof a collective identity possible. To some extent, this process of identity construction constitutes an epistemological and theoretical issue for social scientists to debate among themselves using the framework of sociology, anthropology, linguistics, etc. But the use that is made of various analytical constructs always bears a direct relationship to political struggles.The approach which studies ethnic relations as a research problem can no more be separated in Canada, from the policy of bilingualism and biculturalism, than the postulation of Quebec as a nationstate can be separated from an independentist stance. A dominated collectivity is predisposed to h c t i o n in relation to its

difference, pushing it toward nationalism. For the French-speaking population of Quebec, this predisposition is even greater in that, not only certain cultural features-particularly language, and geopoliticallocation- but also its position of dependency (economic, etc.) differentiate it from and place it in opposition to English Canada. The social and political position of the Frenchspeaking collectivity is maintained in a constant state of fragility both by the economic structure and federal political organizationof Canada, an organiza-

Quebec and its Cultural Specifcity

...

tion which has resulted in Quebecers experiencing limited access to, or saturation of, some labour markets, marginalization of local enterprise, limitation of the field of action of the provincial government, and so forth. Moreover, all French-speaking Quebecers consider themselves to be "nationalists" - what distinguishes them is the manner in which this nationalism is expressed. The social mobilization which finds expression in nationalism and whose magnitude varies with socio-political conditions is never independent from "social mobility," that is, group or social class strategies for maintaining or bettering one's social position. The way that nationalism is expressed generally corresponds, for any one group or social class within a dominated collectivity or society, to the structure of capital, both economic and cultural, that it possesses. The propensity to "invest in nationality" is, within the middle and upper classes, even greater in that the capital at their disposal is mainly cultural (advanced academic training, general culture, language proficiency, both oral and written, and so forth) and only has value on the local market; or, as was the case for the traditional petite bourgeoisie in the 1930s and 1940s, the maintenance of a social position requires the conversion of economic capital into cultural capital (advanced education for children, etc.). For intellectuals or the producers of culture, nationalist fervour seemed to be self-evident, particularly since the 1960s. Because their cultural capital had value only on the "national" market, the defence of this market, and of an occupation as well, was inseparablefrom the defence of language and culture. In this way, neo-nationalism was rightly identified with the "new petite bourgeoisie" (teachers, technicians, middle management in the public and publicly-funded sectors, etc.). The majority of poets, singers, secondary school,college and university teachers demonstrated their nationalist convictions - sometimes very openly - and were early supporters of the Parti QuCMcois. Despite the general mobilization of intellectuals and producers of culture, the ways in which their nationalism was subsequently articulated depended on socio-political conditions or the position they occupied in the intellectual sphere. For example, the weaker or more dominated the position of a discipline or specialization was, the greater were the chances that its members would invest heavily in nationality.This was the case, between 1920 and 1940,for history, geography,economics, and also for the "little sciences" (natural), whose position, in comparison with law, medicine and philosophy, was low on the scale.

National Survival in Dependent Societies It was Lionel Groulx, abbot and historian from a family of farmers in the region of Vaudreuil, who denounced the French Canadian elite's "sofmess;" Esdras Minville, economist from the Gasp6 and son of a fanner-fisherman, who demonstrated the economic weakness of "our milieu;" and Franwis Albert Angers, economist at the Hautes etudes commerciales,who carried on, accusingthose like Louis Saint-Laurentprime Minister of Canada at the time) and Father Uvesque (head of the ~ c o l edes sciences sociales of Lava1 University) of being naiire. For the contemporaryperiod, one could construct a typology of social positions, distinguishing between a "professional" pole (more centered around the economic field) and a "cultural" pole (around the intellectual field and the education system) (Lamont, 1982). In comparison with the medical, physical and applied sciences, those in human and social sciences were alwaysmore nationalistic. However, both the enlargement of the field of action of the provincial state (in education, health and welfare, etc.) and the "nationalization" ofjobs accessibleto those who had advanced academictraining made the entirebody of intellectuals and academics more sensitiveto the national issue and led them to adhereto a more radical and specifically political nationalism.

Moreover, if certain groups - among them academic disciplines appeared divided on the Quebec question, it was as a consequence of their social position, the functions they performed (often in the service of big capital), and the structure of their capital (cultural and economic to an equal extent). These groups were attracted both by the economic pole and the intellectual pole and, in politics, tom between two extreme positions (federalism and independence-orientednationalism). Such was, it would seem, the situation of members of the liberal professions, particularly law. Very active on the political scene, the members of these professions (who often have considerable economic capital at their disposal) expressed their middle-ofthe-road position in the sphere of social relations by an ambivalence,or more exactly by formulating moderate or conciliatory positions, as for example Maurice Duplessis' autonomy stand, Daniel Johnson's "Equality or Independence," and Fran~oisAquin, Jacques-Yvan Morin and R e d Uvesque's "Sovereignty Association." In this light, we can better understand the discord which occurred at a newspaper such as Le Devoir, which held a position in the mass-media field equivalent to that held by the liberal professions in the social structure, and which, therefore, could only escape tensions and contradictionsby attempting

Quebec and its Cultural Specif city

...

to maintain a position of arbitrator which would allow it to criticizealternately all sides. Signs of this ambiguity manifested themselves in the rift within the editorial team and even in the path followed by one of the past chief-editors, Claude Ryan. In order to ensure the upset of the Liberal government led by Robert Bourassa, he gave his support to the Parti Qu6Mcois in 1976; a few years later, he left the newspaper in order to make a bid for the leadership of the same Liberal Party of Quebec. He won, going on to participate actively in the campaignto defeat the referendum, and subsequently,to become leader of the opposition in the National Assembly. Generally,the rejection of radical nationalism indicated a greater degree of proximity to the economic pole and big business (usually not controlled by French-speaking Quebecers). Thus in the "cultural industries" such as private radio and television, the popular press and commercial publishing houses, film, record and show business production companies, etc.and those institutions connected to the symbolicinterests of the economicallydominant classes (large art galleries, Mush des Beaux-arts, symphony orchestra, the universities or at least the higher administration and some of their faculties, etc.) "nationality" was hardly the moving force. This tendency can be seen in the case of La Presse, "the largest Frenchlanguage daily in America," and also of its past president,RogerLemelinwho, before taking on this position, had had great commercial success with his novels and a televised serial (LesPloufle). It was also generally true of a certain cultural bourgeoisie whose members not only had extensive cultural capital at their disposal, but also extensive economic capital. Even if there was hesitation between two theses, that of a CanadianNation (and multiculturalism) and that of TwoNations (within Canadian society), the political stand of this cultural bourgeoisie conformed to a large extent with the position of the bourgeoisie itself; its moving force was "Canadian unity." Obviously, the same was true for the members of the top federal public administration and for those who were in the administration of organizations such as Radio-Canada, the National Film Board, Air Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and so forth, especially when these organizations were within the economic sphere. The-Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, was a supreme example of the privileged minority who were able to profit from the combination of superior cultural capital (training in law, studies abroad, author and journal editor, travel, etc.) and inherited economic-capital in achieving

National Survival in Dependent Societies

political power on the Canadian scene. Characterized in the title of a recent biography by Richard Gwyn as the Prince (the book was published in English under the title The Northern Magus),Trudeau represents this combination of power, economic wealth and nobility (of mind). Alas, the "march toward independence" has not been irreversible, as some have claimed. Nationalism's advances and retreats, both in Canada and Quebec, have been to a large extent a function of changes in the structure of social relations. If at this point there exists a certain exhaustion, it is due to doubts which are subjective as much as they are structural. The effects of the economic crisis on business (reorganization of its activities and its relations with government), the state (return to "liberalism" and reduction of its sphere of intervention), and finally on the careers of groups and individuals are certainly alreadyperceptible, but they have not yet been translated into precise political positions resulting in what somecommentatorshave called a political vacuum.

Although one might consider that all the conditions necessary for natioKiismmfindingits second wind are already assembled, we are obliged to recognize that the signs of a widespread national mobilization are presently very feeble."National solidarity"has given way to a multitude of strategies for retreat, running the gamut from corporate withdrawalto personal escape (into spiritualism, etc.). Sociology has not escaped this movement - divided within itself, it has become more critical, more reflective.18

Quebec and its Cultural Specificity

...

NOTES 1

2

3 4

5

We will not deal here with this aspect as such. It should be remembered that by the end of the nineteenth century, the native populations of Canada were the object of ethnological studies, first by foreign researchers (Lewis H. Morgan, Franz Boas,E. Sapir,R. Radin, etc.) and later by Canadian researchers. In 1909, an anthropological division was created within the Geological Commission of the Department of Mines in Ottawa with the objective of bringing together "authentic data" on native populations of the country before it was too late. A few years later, in 1913,the Commission organized a first great expedition into the Arctic, which included geologists,geographers, biologists, and also anthropologists, among them M.D. Jenness of New Zealand and M.A. Beuchat of France. The resultsof the survey werediscussed at the Congr8sde Trois-RiviCresin June 1913andpublished in aparnphletentitled&& critique¬re xyst2me scolaire, Montreal, Bureau de 1' ACJC, 1913,188p. See in this regard the article "Mot d'ordre: Etude des Sciences sociales" in L'Action fran~aise,vol. I11 no.3, August 1922. The fact that Emile Miller is not well known in the human sciences today necessitates giving somebiographicaland bibliogxaphical details. He appears to be a dropout from the school system who was self-taught. He gave up his studies in pharmacy to travel in Europe and, on his return, registered at the ~ c o l e normale Jacques Cartier. He refused to become a teacher, however, preferring to take up employment at City Hall and later at the Bureau des archives de Montrd. His training in geography was acquired through his wide reading and his relationship with a professor at the ~ c o l enormale, the Abbe Adaard Desrosiers. In his leisure, Miller pursued his reading and his research and succeededin publishing severalworks: Terresetpeuplesdu Canada (1912),Pour qu'on aime la giographie (1920), Mon voyage autour du monde (1921), and finally Gkographie gddrale (1923). The knowledge he acquired in this discipline seems sufficiently great for him to be entrusted with a number of teaching responsibilities, first a series of lectures at the Monument National, a sort of popular university organized by the Societ6 Saint-Jean Baptiste de MontrM, and then courses at the Universit6 de Montrhl, at the Facult&des lettres and at the h o l e des sciences sociales. See abbe Adelard Desrosiers, "Un gt%graphe", L'Action fran~aise,vol. XIII, no. 5. November 1922,p. 300 and "EmileMiller" also in L'Action fran~aise,vol. VIII, no. 2, August 1922, p. 117. In studying the various traditional social institutions, Miller accorded great importance to the parish, which he considered the "Crhteur de traditions regionales, celluIe de la pens& latine, gardien vigilant de la vie catholique, secret de la rkistance la conquCte morale."

National Survival in Dependent Societies At the Universitede Montreal,it was Yves Tessier-Lavigne,graduateof law and of social sciences, who succeeded Emile Miller, At l'Universit6 Laval, the course in human geography was entrusted to Benoit Brouillette. It is interesting to note that the developmentof sociologybrought about a conflictbetween these two disciplines. See B Brouillette, "Comment faire une monographie gbgraphique?", Cahiers de la Facult6 des Sciences Sociales de 1' Universitk Laval, vol. 111, no. 4, 1944.

.

Brother Marie-Victorin nevertheless recognized the "artificial nature" of the Laurentian region. It did not constitute, in his eyes, a natural floral division of North America, At the very most, it was an enclave which included the most densely populated and accessible part of Quebec. Bastien, Hennas,Le bilinguisme au Canada,~ontreal, ~ditionsdeI'ACF, 1938. Written by a professor of philosophy,this little work is interesting for its analysis not only of the history of bilingualism in Canada,but also of its cultural and psychological effects. In this text Hughes manifested great sympathy for the common peasant people: homogeneous, rich in tradition, and firmly based in the solidarity of family and parish. During his stay, this cleric of French origin published a theoretical essay on the nation, Le problPme de civilisation. Lo nation (Montreal, ~ditionsde l'Arbre, 1944,2 tomes). His intention was to mark the place of the nation in a series of human groups (race, ethnic milieu, etc.) and to clarify the idea of national vocation. The importance that Delos accorded to this phenomenon was evidently determinedby international political conditions and the birth of totalitarian nationalism in Germany. Nevertheless, he devoted a few pages to the situation of French Canadians. The history of this group showed how a colonial group created a milieu for itself and grew into a nation. Among the factors contributing to this change, the most decisive seemed to him to be faithfulness to culture. An original culture was the essential guarantee of the survival and influence of this ethnic group. (Vol. 1, p. 142). See his article, "L'industriel canadien-fran~aiset son milieu", Recherches sociographiques,vol. 2, no 2, avril-juin 1961,pp. 123-150. This thesis has been the subject of numerous discussions, but it is only recently that it has received a systematic rebuttal in Sales (1978). We might speak of the "politicization" of the new nationalism in comparison with the nationalism of the 1930s which was apolitical. In the early 1970sthis interestled to increasedresearchon the labour movement, particularly trade unionism, to creation of research groups, and to establishment of research institutes (e.g. I'Institut de reche~heappliquk du travail).

Quebec and its Cultural Specificity

...

14 For a theoretical approach, see Fernand Dumont (1968). See also the ethnographic studies by Colette Moreux (1969 - 1982). 15 The emphasis is ours. 16 See the following journal issues: "La sociologie au Quebec" in Recherches Sociographiques, XV, 2-3,1974,374 p., and "Reflexions sur la sociologie" in Sociologie et Sociktbs, vol. XII, no. 2, October 1980,201p. 17 Two recent issues of Sociologie et sociktk have been devoted to "Femmes dans la sociologie" (XIII, 2, 1981) and " ~ c o l o ~sociale ie et mouvements sociaux" (XIII, 1, 1981). 18 On the cognitive plane, we can distinguish, in a very hypothetical way, three main trends in Quebec sociology which correspond in part with three periods in the history of this disciplinein Quebec: a sociology of tradition (and of transition to modernity); a sociology of communication (including pedagogy and social activism); and a sociology of knowledge (including ideology). The best examples of this last and contemporarytrend are recent works of Marcel Rioux (1978) and Fernand Dumont (198 1).

IV POLISH SOCIOLOGY AND PROBLEMS OF NATION BUILDING

Jerzy Szacki

The problem of nation has been one of the principal subjects of study in Polish sociology. In that respect, Polish sociology has been a continuation of Polish social thought which, from the eighteenth century on, concentrated, as did Polish letters in general, on the problem of nation. It approached this subject by taking up the issueof the relationshipbetween the individual and the nation, and between the nation and mankind. The first Polish sociologists were infinitely more concerned with this subject than were their predecessors and contemporaries in Western Europe. This concern played an important role in the sociological system of Ludwig Gumplowicz, for example, who viewed mankind from the perspective of the multinational monarchy of Austria-Hungary, not as a homogeneous whole but as a collection of conflicting groups, differing in origin and ethnic features. Characteristically, the concepts adopted by Polish sociologists were often used to articulate the traditional problems of nation. For instance, Boleslaw Limanowski, when popularizing Comte's ideas in Poland, joined them to his own thesis that "the nation conscious of its own distinctive features is the highest social organism so far produced by social evolution" (quoted in Kurczewska, 1979:53). The national question held a leading position in the works of the most prominent and influential Polish sociologistsin the twentieth century, namely Bystron, Czamowski, Malinowski, Znaniecki, Chalasinski, and Ossowski. The Marxist Ludwik Mrzywicki is the only exception, which is not to say that Polish Mancists were not interested in the problem; Je~zyJ. Wiatr has demonstrated quite the contrary (Wiatr, 1969). Most of the above-mentioned authors devoted special studies to the problem of nation building, and in some

National Survival in Depeniknt Societies

cases these studies stand out as being of central significance in their scholarly production. As examples we can cite two works which are most accessible to non-Polish readers: Stefan Czarnowski's Le Culte des hkros et ses conditions sociales (1919), which discusses the role of the worship of St. Patrick in the shaping of Irish national consciousness, and Florian Znaniecki's Modern Nationalities (1952), one of the best sociological analyses of the process of nation-building. Since then Polish sociologistshave paid comparativelyless attention to the problem of nation, but Chalasinski did continue his studies on the emergence of nations, and Wiatr, already a trained Marxist when the Second World War ended, published two ambitious books in the field. It would be wrong to say that Polish sociologistslost interest in the problem; if they wrote less about it this was due to the fact that the research techniques which came to be dominant were much less suitable for the study of nation than were the traditional sociological techniques. But the problem of nation was a constant theme. For instance, in his study of "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People," Stefan Nowak found that Poles identified with the nation more than with any other social group after the family. In this connection he wrote that "the social structure of Polish society, in the subjective vision of its members... would appear to be a 'federation' of primary groups unified in a national community" (Nowak, 1981: 51). An even better testimony to the topicality of the national question can be seen in the vast social movement that was born in Poland in the summer of 1980. Sooner or later, sociologists will have to take up the problem, as it constitutes an issue of primary importance.

First, a few general comments. "The nation" is a controversial issue, both in the social sciences and in cumnt social consciousness. Thevarious definitions of nation, whether assumed explicitly or implicitly, most often take into consideration such factors as political organization (in the form of a state), commonculture,language,territory,nationalconsciousness,commonhistorical fortunes and traditions, and specific psychological characteristics.Today, we much less frequently mention such factors as historical mission (assigned to every nation by many Romanticists), alleged community of blood (the "race" emphasized in chauvinistic doctrines), and religion. It seems doubtll that it would be possible to construct a concept of nation that would be theoretically satisfactory and acceptable to all. These difficulties are certainly due to struggles between different points of view and value systems'or ideologies. A

Polish Sociology and Problems of hration Building

no less serious and related problem is that of the immense variety of ways in which nations were created or have developed in various periods and parts of the globe. In some cases, political structures had a decisive influence (in the form of the state); in others, the culture played a leading role; in still others, ideology served to delineatethe distinctivecharacteristicsof a given community compared with neighbouringones. It is importantto distinguish between those countries in which the nation-building process took place within the h e work of a state and accordingly,where the concept of nation was strictly linked to the idea of a national state and citizenship, as opposed to those countries in which the process was not supported by state organization and where the idea of the nation was associatedprimarily with distinctive cultural characteristics. National consciousness is the only attribute common to all nations. It comes into being when the members of a given community, or at least the members of its leading groups or "national ideologists" (Znaniecki, 1952), have a sense of belonging to one and the same nation, or of having a common motherland. They must feel distinctive not only in some respects (language, customs, religion) but there also must be the sense of being totally different from others. Thus, national consciousness always has a political aspect: it has as its correlate a state that is proper to a given national group, or at least autonomy within a multi national state. The fact that there have been, and still are, nations without a state does not refute this principle. In such cases there are either aspirations to form a state or memories of the past in which such a state did exist National consciousness thus means the sense of group distinctiveness which has as its corollary a real or ideal state or amtorial organization. National consciousness is a product of a long process whose beginning is often hard to trace. At first, manifestations of national consciousness intermingle with manifestationsof earlier attitudes such as loyalty to a dynasty or to a ruler, status group, solidarity, or attachment to a state or a religion. National consciousnessis at first an attribute of comparativelyfew individuals and/or leading groups, often recruited exclusively from higher social strata. The masses for a long time remain indifferent to nationalism, even though they usually have a sense of being ethnically distinctive. Centuriesmay pass before national consciousness is shared by all the inhabitants of a country. In speaking about the shaping of modem nations we mean that process of ever-widening social circles coming together in a given national community, and the acceptance of a set of common values (moral ideals, traditions,

National Survival in Dependent Societies

cultural monuments, national heroes, the concept of national interest) associated with the motherland. This process occurred in Europe as a result of deepreaching economic, social, and political changes which were linked to the emergence of capitalism, and this is why some Marxists use the otherwise unfortunate term "bourgeois nations." The first of these changes was the development of the market. The decomposition of the natural economy drew together the previously isolated regions of the country: there was increased transportation and horizontal mobility, leading to the formation of new contacts and bonds, even among regions remote from one another. The second change took the form of a gradual elimination of status group privileges and dissolution of the barriers between these groups, a result of economicnecessity and deliberate reformist or even revolutionary tendencies. The third change was marked by the evolutionary or revolutionary transformation of the dynastic state into a state which represented the whole nation and claimed to be the voice of national interests-in such a state, former subjectsbecame citizens.The fourth change was the political activation of the masses, evidenced in their participation in anti-feudal revolutions and their growing role in post-revolutionary societies. The fifth change came as a result of increased literacy, education, and literary activity, leading to the gradual transformation of local folk culture into national culture, which was at least potentially accessible to every member of the nation. By these comments I do not intend to propose my own theory of nation. I wish merely to indicate which facts seem to me to be especially important. I am inclined to believe that these historical facts attracted the interest of Polish sociologists who were concerned with the national question.

Until recently, one of the striking features of Polish sociology was that it treated the nation as a phenomenon in the sphere of social consciousness and culture. Limanowski was apoor sociologist, but his thinking was typical of the Polish tradition. He wrote that "the nation is a psychological rather than physical organism...The nation has certain common feelings, thoughts, aspirations, and strivings" (Kurcrewska, 1979: 54). That point of view seems to have dominated in Poland. Stanislaw Ossowski treated as sterile all controversies over "the externalcharacteristicsthat arenecessary and satisfactoryfor a social group to be called a nation" and suggested that the concept of nation

Polish Sociology and Problems of Nation Building

should be treated as a correlateof national ideology-that "nation" should be defined in terms of "national ideology," and not vice versa (Ossowski, 1967: 241). His excellent studies on the problem with which we are concerned here e.g. Socjologiczna Analiza projecia ojczyzny (The Sociological Analysis of the Concept of Motherland) are as a rule studies in ideas and attitudes, and totally disregard the "external characteristics" of nation. For instance, the problem of the state is absent in his studies, if we disregard his statement that having a separate state is one of the prerequisites of national ideology (Ossowski, 1967: 227). Yet what might be termed the culturological approach is more often found amongPolishsociologiststhan the ideological approach: nationprimarily means a community of culture. This can be seen clearly in Bronislaw Malinowski (1947: 255) where he opposes, first, the tribe-nation and the tribestate, and second, the cultural and political principles of integration. He writes that "the tribe-nation is ...the prototype of what we define today as the nation, that is, a large groupunified by a common language, a common tradition, and a common culture." For Znaniecki, nation is synonymous with the "national culture society," and hence his book about the making of modem nationalities is in fact a study in the making of national cultures. Jozef Chalasinski (1968: 31) notes correctly that "Znaniecki's opinions on the nation meet on an essential point with those of Malinowski." It is worth adding that these sociologists did differ on other points. For instance, Malinowski was inclined to treat nationhood as the binding factor for all culture, and even claimed that "nationhood as we find it today, and within the region of Westem, mechanized civilization, is fundamentallythe same as nationhood at the levelof unpolished stone" (Malinowski, 1947: 273). Znaniecki emphasized social change, which leads national culture society away from tribal society. In particular, he emphasized the role of intellectuals as cultural leaders who spread supra-local national solidarity through propaganda and education. Znaniecki linked nationhood with a definitetype of culture-namely, literacy. Likewise, Chalasinskifocussed on the emergence of modem nations as communities of a particular kind, which in some parts of the world are only beginning to take shape. (He took, incidentally, a lively interest in the nation-building process in Africa.) While he sided with those who treated the nation as a cultural community,he stressed even more strongly than Znaniecki the significance of national consciousness and the formation in the social consciousness of the idea of nation, which he considered, along with socialism (i.e. class struggle), to be the principal force

National Survival in Dependent Societies

in the contemporary world. In his opinion, "national consciousness is a product of social mobility, both spatial and psychological" (Chalasinski, 1968: 33) -hence, his interest in the decomposition of traditional peasant culture as a condition of the birth of national consciousness. Personal documents, particularly memoirs, which were the kinds of sources he liked most to study, lent themselves well to the investigation of those processes. The point of view described above was quite natural to Poland. As Znaniecki (1952) wrote in his introduction to Modem Nationalities: The history of the Poles from the partition of Poland in 1795up to 1919not only seemed to disprove the doctrine that a common state is indispensable for social unity, but also suggested that the idea advanced by those social philosophers who considered a common national culture to be a more lasting and influential bond of social solidarity than common government, might prove to be scientifically valid theory. As a matter of fact, many Polish historians, ethnologists, and sociologists accepted it. They used the term 'nmd' to denote a socially solidary [sic] collectivity united by a common national culture. The term has no equivalent in English, although the word nationality approximates its meaning.

This view of nation as cultural community accounted for the primary importance in Polish sociology of the problem of diverse national groups and their participation in national culture. This was also a traditional problem in Polish social thought. In the nineteenth century, Polish social thinkers were tormented by the fact that the peasantry was indifferent to the nation and, on the whole, did not support the paUiotic undertakings of the gentry. Despite immense advances in the peasants' national consciousness, at the turn of the twentieth century the problem had not vanished in the least, because Polish national culture was often perceived as lordly, elitist, and alien to the masses. Its scope was viewed differently by cultural leaders than it was by members of those groups which were socially and economically handicapped. Many years later, Ossowski blamed the problem on "uninstructed members of ideological groups" (Ossowski, 1962: 61). This situation continued in Poland in the period between the two world wars. The number of those whom the ideologists classed as part of the Polish nation was certainly much greater than those who felt themselves to be full-fledged members. This explains why

Polish Sociology and Problems of Nation Building social thought and sociology in that period often referred to opposing social elements: the intelligentsia versus the masses, national culture versus folk culture, the national group versus the local group. References to this are to be found in many sociological studies, including those written after the Second World War. The work of Jozef Chalasinski is beyond all doubt the most characteristicexampleof this tendency. Before 1939,Chalasinskiwas stronglyinfluenced by radical peasant ideologies, and after 1945 he declared himself firmly in favour of a socialistrevolution, though not in favour of Marxism. His work is astonishingly consistent, beginning with the monumental Mlode pokolenie chlopow (The Younger Generation of Peasants), which in a sense was a continuation of The Polish Peasant in Europe and America by W.1 Thomas and F. Znaniecki, and ending with Mlode pokolenie wsi Polski Ludwej (The Younger Generation of Peasants in People's Poland). He was obsessed with what he termed "the great process of the peasant massesjoining the historical stream of the national culture" (Chalasinski, 1969: 345). His pre-war works describe Polish culture as split into two opposing parts: that of the propertied and upper classes, and that of the peasants. In 1967, in summing up his work on peasant memoirs, Chalasinski (1969) wrote: The present situation is marked by the fact that the peasant masses have become full-fledged members of the nation. This is reflected in their feelingat home in the national culture as a whole. It is akind of national self-knowledge which permeates the working classes and tells them that the nation is embodied in the masses and not in any single social stratum. His essayist style of writing makes many of his statements difficult to verify, yet it does seem that he took up one of the essential problems regarding the changes which took place in Poland after the Second World War, The problem has not ceased to attract the attention of Polish sociologists. This is demonstrated, for instance, by Z.T. Wierzbicki's paper (1978) "Rozwoj swiadomosci narodowej chlopow polskich" (The Development of National Consciousness Among Polish Peasants) which also proves that personal documents are still treated as valuable sources. Studies and discussions of the social role of the intelligentsia also seem to be closely related to the issue of nation building. The interpretation of the nation dominant in Polish sociologystressed the part played by the makers and

National Survival in Dependent Societies

camers of culture.This bias is evident inthe views of Znaniecki, who idealized the intelligentsia (and the intellectuals in particular) and assigned them a leading role in the nation-building process. Chalasinski (1968: 121), too, wrote that a nation is inconceivable without its intelligentsia. But at the same time he was the author of the muchpublicized (not to say notorious) pamphlet Spoleczna genealogia inteligencji polskiej (The Social Genealogy of the Polish Intelligentsia) in which he blamed that group for being elitist, attached to its lordliness and incapable of co-operatingwith the masses in their struggle for emancipation. Discussions on this subject are generally quite popular in Poland, but it would be difficult to find reliable studies showing the role of the intelligentsia in the shaping of the modem Polish nation.

Polish sociology has also studied another aspect of the problem of the peasant masses' joining the mainstream of national culture. I refer here to the blurring of local differences, the disappearance of regionalism. Before the Second World War,Poleswerenotonly stratified,but differentiatedterritorially. When speaking about changes in culture and cultural consciousness we must note two characteristic facts. First, there were parts of the country whose inhabitants, while ideologically linked to the Polish nation as a whole, felt distinct from the rest of the population. While feeling themselves to be Poles they identified with their region, which they considered theirmotherland in the narrower sense of the word and thought to be indisputably better than other, similar motherlands. Secondly, even shortly before the Second World War, there were areas in Poland whose inhabitants called themselves "the local people" (or "the people who live here"), without ascribing any nationality to themselves. Thus, forinstance,many inhabitantsof Silesiathoughtthemselves to be simply Silesians, and neither Poles nor Germans. As Ossowski (1967: 275) wrote, to such groups "the real bonds were those which linked together their people, in this case those from Silesia. And the nationality in which they were classed depended on the political forces which clashed somewhere above them and over which they had no influence."That feelingof group identity was usually due to clearly distinctive cultural features, distinct customs, dialect, and quite often religion. This phenomenon was most clearly obse~vablein the border areas of ethnically Polish territories, both in the west and in the east. Most information on this subject is, of course, to be found in the works of ethnographers, but sociologists did not overlook it either. It suffices to

Polish Sociology and Problems of Nation Building

mention earlier studies by J. Obrebski, Ossowski's Zagadnienia wiezi regionalnej i wiezinarodavej na Slasku Opolskim (Problemsof Regional and National Bonds in Opole Silesia), and among recent works, W. Pawluczuk's Swiatopoglad jednostki w warunkach rozpadu spolecznosci tradycyjnej (Individual World View in a Decomposing Traditional Community). Unfortunately, we do not have at our disposal sociological descriptions of all regional groups, and our knowledge of some of the (e.g. the Casubians) is embarrassingly scanty. On the other hand, we know a fair amount about the processes which diminished their distinctive features, although the available data have not always been i l l y exploited to describe the present-day Polish nation, Thereis, however, a commonopinion that in many respects, it is "anew nation." An important factor in its newness must, it seems, be seen in the decline of regionalism, certainly inevitable in view of mass migrations and rapid urbanization. Territories in the west and north, incorporated into Poland after the Second World War, have proved a veritable laboratory for the study of the gradual obliteration of differences among regional cultures. Those tenitones saw vast cultural contacts on an enormous scale among various groups-the autochthonouspopulations of these regions, those arriving from various parts of Poland as it had existed before 1939, a large group of repatriates from the Soviet Union, repatriates from several Western European countries, and nonPolish ethnic groups such as Germans, Ukrainians, Jews, and Greeks.Polish sociologists did avail themselves of that laboratory to a considerable extent They pointed out both the difficulties in mutual adaptation among the various groups and the remarkable progress of that process with the passing of time (Nowakowski, Dulczewski, Kwilecki, Burszta,Markiewicz,and others). This new community of postwar western Poland was "a new community with a richer culture, based on common elementscontributedby groups which found themselves neighbours" (Markiewicz, 1960: 108- 109).

We have so far referred to studies which treated nation in terms of a national cultural entity, because that point of view seemed to be dominant in Polish sociology. As I have said,Polish sociology did not differ in that respect from the other social sciences and the humanities as they developed in Poland, nor from Polish thought in general, in which the concept of state used to play a comparatively insignificant role. It must even be said that the concept of

National Survival in Dependent Societies

nation was often opposed to that of state. That opposition can be seen clearly in Polish historical thought and in the ideologies current in the period between the two world wars (H. Serejski and A. Wienbicki). The dominant opinion was most succinctly formulated by Stanislaw Grabski, an economist and o (TheState and the Nation) (1922): "In politician, in his book P a ~ i Narod Poland the State can neither create values nor contribute to the expansion of thenation; it is thenation which, by its own development, must create thevalue and the power of the State" (quoted in Wierzbicki, 1978: 37). I suspect that, in many countries the very existence of such a dilemma would appear strange. Between the world wars, efforts were often made to put the tribe-state before the tribe-nation (to use Malinowski's opposition), but these encountered much resistance. It is difficult to say how much of this was due to the force of tradition and how much the fear of a statist ideology unacceptable to both the right wing and the left wing (and it was towards the latter that most Polish sociologists inclined), nor is this important in the present context. It is worth nothing, however, that a considerable shift in that respect took place after the Second World War. The nation began increasingly to be associated with the state. The process was certainly made easier by the fact that Poland had become a mono-national state, without national minorities which before 1939 had played a considerable role. But two other factors seem more important. First, sufficient time had elapsed since the restoration of the Polish state after the First World War for people to get used to the idea of the state as something natural existing in the framework of the Polish nation. In that respect, there are some characteristic differences between the attitudes of the older and the younger generation. In my own studies, carried out in 1966,I was struck by the fact that more young people under 17than people over 60 closely linked the concepts of nation and state. Second, the younger generation of Poles, having to live in a radically statist system, could develop the illusion, reinforced by official propaganda, that the state was the source of all initiatives and all national life. If, for instance, the nation has a culture of its own, then this is so because the state finances that culture, protects it, takes care to secure its progress, and inspires cultural life. There seemed to be real chances that social consciousnesswould develop in that direction. It all collapsed in 1980, when the contrast between "we, the nation" and "they, the authoritiesof the state" was revived in an acute form. Unfortunately, Polish sociologists still have not had time to say more about those changes.

Polish Sociology and Problems of Nation Building

In Polish sociology of nation, the problem of the state was taken up seriously only once, by Jerzy J, Wiatr in Narod i panstwo, Socjologiczne problemy kwestii mrodowej (The Nation and the State, Sociological Problems of the National Issue) (1969). We find there a definitionof nation which takes into account the community of political institutions and also "a sense of the State as a fundamental element of group consciousness" (Wiatr, 1969: 139).The book is, however, concerned with the theory of the state in general, and not with changes in the Polish nation. The latter issue is discussed by the sameauthor in PoLrka-Nowy Narod (Poland-a New Nation) (1971), which is apparently much closer to the traditional approaches to the problem.

THE POLISH SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION

Piotr Sztompka

To some foreign observers, the phenomenon called Polish sociology may seem to be of relatively recent origins, dating back at most two or three decades. Nothing could be further from the truth. In Polish society,just as in any other, rudimentary, common sense self-reflection is as ancient as society itself. Also, as in most European societies, the Renaissance era in Poland brought a proliferation of social and political thought in a more systematic form. (The important treatise by Andlzej Frycz Modnewski, "On the Rectification of the Republic," written in 1551, is a fitting example.) This development reached its peak during the Enlightenment, in the works of Hugo Kollataj(1750-1812), and Stanislaw Staszic(1755-1826).Theseinvestigations focussed mainly on the issues of political, administrative, and educational reform, leaving social problems somewhat in the background. The clear distinction between the polity and the society was not yet perceived. Sociology,as a distinct body of thought dealing directly with the domain of society, first appeared in Poland more than 100 years ago, making it "one of the oldest national branches of our profession" (Wiatr, 1973: 3; Markiewicz, 1970: 5). Apart from being a source of pride for Polish sociologists, this fact has a more fundamentalsignificance.Namely, it implies a need to take this old and rich heritage into account in any attempt to understand the contemporary state of the discipline and the contemporary dilemmas of Polish sociology. As is well known, the continuity of ideas is much more salient in the social sciences than in the natural sciences, and old theoretical constructs are still very much alive. But this is perhaps even more so in societies, like Poland's, which are permeated with historical consciousness, somewhat obsessed with the past (for better or for worse), and as free from an unreflective "presentism" as from an over-optimistic, future-oriented achievement syndrome. Be that as it may, one cannot but agree with Wiatr that "historical

National Survival in Dependent Societies

continuity plays a special role in shaping the ethos of sociology in Poland, and is, therefore, an essential element of the intellectual environment in which we operate" (Wiatr, 1973: 1). Thus, the first characteristic of Polish sociology is its particularly strong link with its own past. But there is another, related characteristic, namely its particularly tight, intrinsic link with the course of Polish national history, which it reflects and aspires to influence. One may say that there is nothing peculiar here, since according to the well-established theorems of the sociology of howledge, this is the case with all social ideas. But, while accepting this general observation, it is reasonable to assert that the level of autonomy which social thought may acquire(and conversely,the degreeof its dependence on historical circumstances), may vary in concrete cases to a large and significant degree. In societies such as that of Poland, whose modem history is fraught with national calamities and national upheavals, wars, revolutions, revivals, and thorough socio-political transformations, sociology is firmly rooted in the vicissitudes of history -perhaps more so than in societies which have experienced calmer, smoother, and more harmonious development. One has to agree with Eileen N. Znaniecki's observations: "as has frequently been pointed out, the course of Poland's history is reflected in Polish trends of thought" (Znaniecki, 1945).The same point is made by J. Wiatr(1973: 2): "the most important changes [in sociological theories] have been brought about as a result of social transformationswhich had changed perceptions of historical reality." (See also Nowakowski, 1979: 35). Polish sociology's historical nature (with roots both in its own past and in the history of the society) is clearly reflected in certain general and consistent traits. Before we proceed to analytical discussion of these, a short chronological account is needed. THE HISTORY OF POLISH SOCIOLOGY: A BIRD'S EYE VIEW

In view of what has been said so far, Polish sociology can be divided into nine historical periods based on major landmarks in the political, economic, and social history of Poland: 1) up to the First World War: early sociology; 2) between the two world wars: the institutionalization of sociology; 3) early post-war years: the search for accommodation;

The Polish Sociological Tradition

Stalinist period, 1949 - 1956: the condemnation of sociology; liberalization, 1956 - 1966: the revival of sociology; conservativereaction, 1966- 1970:the battle against "revisionism"; pragmatic and technocratic dreams, 1970 - 1980: the era of "ex.perts"; 8) popular movement of refom and renewal, 1980 - 1981: the era of "new utopia"; 9) martial law of 1981 and after: the uncertain future of sociology. The periods become shorter and shorteras we approachthe present time. This may be due either to the progressive acceleration of change, both in the realm of political history and the corresponding domain of social thought, or it may simply result from a particular myopia of the observer, for whom his own times acquire greater subjective significance and seem more dense or loaded with importantevents. It is hard tojudge which is the case. Nevertheless, I shall review these periods in rough outline, attempting to convey their distinct flavour and character without pretending to give a complete or exhaustive historical account. 4) 5) 6) 7)

1

UP TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR: EARLY SOCIOLOGY

The nineteenth century was a dim epoch in Polish history. Poland ceased to exist as a sovereign state and was partitioned among three neighbouring powers. It was a long period of persistent struggle against foreign domination, and for the preservation of nationhood, national language, and continuity of cultural tradition. At the same time, it was a period of slow and belated transition firom feudal society to industrial, urban civilization. Needless to say, these were not conditions particularly conducive to the development of academic science, to say nothing of the social sciences. But despite the difficulties, the dominant European trends of social thought had found followers among Polish thinkers as early as the 1860s. The positivism of August Comte was studied and elaborated by F. Krupinski (1868), 2. Kaszewski (1869), and B. Limanowski (1875). The organicism and evolutionism of H. Spencer was reflected in the works of J. Supinski (1860) and E.. Majewski (1858-1922). The psychologism of Gabriel Tared and Gustav Le Bon influenced the ideas of E. Abramowski (1868-1918), 2.Balicki (18581916), and L. Petrazycki (1867-1931). L. Gumplowicz (1838-1909) carried on the study of social groups and intergrouprelations in the light of the conflict

National Survival in Dependent Societies

tradition and was the only Polish sociologistof the period to enterthe standard textbooks on the history of sociology, perhaps due to the fact that he was teaching abroad and writing in German. Last but not least, early acceptance of Marx's historical materialism came with S. Krusinski (1857-1886) and L. Krzywicki (1859-1941), who translated Das Capital into Polish and initiated their own original contributions along Marxist lines, along with K. KellesKrauz (1872-1906). These works were all, in some sense, secondary, and did not amount to muchmore thanvariationsonthe themes initiated by the masters of nineteenth century European sociology. It was too early in Polish sociology for any really original achievements,or for wider recognition by the academic community. 2.

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIOLOGY

After the First World War, Poland regained its political independence,but that did not mean immediate internal stability. On the contrary, the country was tom by conflicting political trends, and plagued by economic and social turmoil, ethnic hostilities, and international tensions. Various political and social movements became involved, along with the government, in an effort to overcomethese problems. The resulting intellectual ferment was accompanied by a growing demand for sociologists, and the restoration of normal academic life allowed them to enter the universities and research institutions. In 1919the first sociology chair was established for L. Petrazycki at the University of Warsaw. A year later, a second chair was established at the Universityof Poznan for F. Znaniecki. Krakow, the oldest and most traditional academic centre, followed several years later with the opening of a chair for sociology and cultural history at Jagiellonian University, under J.S. Byst and, later, K. Dobrowolski. At the same time, several research institutes were created, amongthem the Polish SociologicalInstitutein Poznan (F. Znaniecki), the Institute of Social Economics in Warsaw (L. Krzywicki), and the State Institute of Rural Culture (J. Chalasinski). The first sociologicaljournals also began to appear.

It was a period of great creative effort with significant accomplishments at the level of sociological theory and empirical investigation. Of the authors who began their careers in the earlier period, some were able only now to produce enduring creative contributions.

The Polish Sociological Tradition In the realm of theory, the Marxist school acquired considerable importance, with novel interpretations of historical materialism being made by L. Krzywicki. Humanistic, "meaningfd" sociology found a world-renowned exponentinF. Znaniecki (1882-1958).The positivistic sociologyof Durkheim influenced the work of S. Czarnowski (1879-1937). The social anthropologist B. Malinowski (1884-1942) laid the foundations for the long and important contribution of sociological functionalism. This mosaic of theoretical orientations has remained characteristicof Polish sociologyto the present day.

In the realm of empirical investigation, one should not forget the worldfamous studies of Polish emigrants to the United States, which were carried out by F.Znaniecki in collaboration with W.I.Thomas. These studies originated the research procedure of "human documents" which was to become a trademark for the research of numerous later sociologists (Sisyphus, 11,1982). Another example of research which greatly influenced the development of Polish sociology was the study of the young generation of peasants, on the basis of an extensivecollectionof their life stories,carried out by J. Chalasinski. Monographic studies of various aspects of popular culture and local communities were carried outby J.S. Bystrom,F. Bujak, K. Dobrowolski, J. Obrebski, S. Rychlinski, and numerous others. There is no doubt that in this period Polish sociologycame of age and acquired a high level of sophistication,comparable to the state of sociology in Western Europe and the United States. 3.

EARLY POST WAR YEARS: THE SEARCH FOR ACCOMMODATION

The Second World War inflicted tremendous losses on the community of Polish intellectuals. Only half of Poland's sociologists survived the Nazi extermination, and despite severely limited human resources the attempt to revive sociologybegan almost immediatelyafter the war. Sociologicaldepartments were established or re-established at the Universities of Lodz, Krakow, Poznan, and later Warsaw, Lublin, and elsewhere. The Polish Sociological Institute was moved to Lodz and em6kked on new projects. Sociological journals started to appear again after a long silence. Two factors must be taken into account when discussing the development of Polish sociology in the early postwar years. The first has to do with fundamental and revolutionary political, economic, and social transformations which occurred as the traditional, capitalist social order was replaced by a new socialist system. Numerous empirical studies attempted to come to

National Survival in Dependent Societies

terms with the quickly changing realities of this grand social experiment. For example, anumber of importantstudieswere undertaken on the mass migrations towards the western and northern territories (K. Dobrowolski, J. Chalasinski, P. Rybicki, S. Ossowski, T. Szczurkiewicz). Other projects dealt with the new cultural patterns and lifestyles of the working class (D. Dobrowolska, D. Markowska). Many similar problems required solutions, leading to a demand for sociological research and strong incentives for its further development. A second factor had an opposite, adverse effect. This had to do with the level of sociological theory. The pluralism and open confrontationof theoretical orientations, so typical of the earlier period, now became impossible, as Marxist theory acquired official, established orthodoxy and was treated as the ideological foundation of the new socialist order. In the theoretical and methodologicaldisputes between followers of the humanistic orientation and Marxist-oriented scholm,l as well as in debates inside the Marxist school between the open interpretation (S. Ossowski, J. Hochfeld) and the dogmatic one (A. Schaff), the adversaries obviously held unequal positions. Still, the fact that the discussion was going on was in itself salutary, and produced interesting contributions and reassessments with respect to Marxism as well as other theories.

4. STALINIST PERIOD, 1949-1956: THE CONDEMNATION OF SOCIOLOGY

With the growing rigidity of the political system, the onset of the Cold War, and the international isolation of the socialist countries, the most dogmatic tendencies came to dominate in ideology and science. The marketplace of ideas was replaced by the statemonopoly; there was institutionallysafeguarded hegemony of the most simplified and mechanistic (Marxwould have said "vulgar") versions of Marxism proposed by Stalin for purely tactical purposes and applied in purely instrumental fashion in support of the autocratic, bureaucratic regime. There could be no place for sociology in that closed, intellectual -or better, anti-intellectual -universe. Not surprisingly, sociology was soon condemned as a bourgeois science, said to reflect the false consciousness of the capitalist society. That stigma was applied both to theory and to research methodology. Consequently, sociology was banned from the universities and research institutions, and officially ceased to exist. But in fact it did persist. Depending on their personal proclivities, sociologists continued working under various

The Polish Sociological Tradition guises, either as historians of social thought, ethnographers,demographers,or Marxist philosophers. Particularlyin the field of theoretical or methodological investigation, they were able to keep the sociological tradition going. But, naturally, any serious empirical research was effectively hampered. 5. LIBERALIZATION, 195691966: THE REVIVAL OF SOCIOLOGY

The return to democratic forms of government and the attempts to institute a more liberal and independent"Polish road to socialism" came with the process of de-Stalinization and the ascent to power in Poland of Wladyslaw Gomulka. This change, occumng in the wake of the workers' rebellion against the old regime, brought about an explosionof Polish sociology. All formerly existing university departments and research institutes were reopened and new ones were created. The Polish Sociological Association was founded, affiliated with the International Sociological Association, and an important research centre, The Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, came into existence. Five sociologicaljournals began publication. Numerous books, some of them written during the Stalinist period, appeared in print, having waited for publication in a more liberal climate. (A good example is S. Ossowski's The C h s Structure in Social Consciousness.) Numerous Polish sociologists took up post-graduate studies in universities in the West, mostly in the United States. In the domain of theory it was a period of proud revival of all of the

orientations which had traditionally been present in Polish sociology. Thus, Marxism acquired two distinct forms. One, known as "open Marxism", took into account in undogmatic fashion all the recent developments within Marxism itself (including the rediscovered works of the young M a ,and the work of the neo-Marxists Gramsci, Lukacs, and Fromm) and put forward original interpretations of historical materialism. The most influential exponent of this open approach was J. Hochfeld. But there was also another brand of Marxism, at heart superficially eclectic, which tried to achieve the best of all possible worlds. It attempted to enrichMarxismwith haphazardly selected components from non-Marxist theoretical traditions, without any self-conscious criterion of relevance. This approach was best exemplified by the numerousvolumes of 2.Bauman. Outside Marxism, the humanist orientation was revived in the works of S. Ossowski, J. Szczepanski, T. Szczurkiewicz, A. Kloskoska, and P. Rybicki. Finally, the positivistic tendency reappeared in neo-behaviourist guise in the works of A. Maslewski, and in the much

National Survival in Dependent Societies advertised program of "socio-technique", or social engineering, advanced by A. Podgorecki. But theory, of whatever son, had little relationship to current practices of empirical research. Here, quite independent of theoretical orientation. inductive, fact- centred, survey research on representative samples (with all the impressive ornamentations of formalism, quasi- mathematization, and sophisticated statistics) seemed to reign almost exclusively. Predictably, it produced little more than extensive descriptive accounts, valuable per se, of various domains of social life. The most interesting data were gathered about industrializing regions (J. Szczepanski, W. Markiewicz, A. Matejko, K. Doktor, J. Malanowki, J. Kulpinska, A. Sarapata), rural communities (J. Chalasinski, B. Galeski, 2. Wierzbicvki), urban centres (P. Rybicki, S. Nowakowski, J. Ziolkowski), cultural patterns (A. Kloskowska, K. Zygulski, A. Sicinski, J. Danecki), class and stratification structure (W. Wesolowski, S. Widerszpil), attitudes and motivations (S. Nowak), and local political institutions (J. Wiatr). The need for synthesiswas widely felt but not satisfied, in spite of the high level of methodologicalconsciousnessamong Polish sociologists, with their strong tradition of local inquiries (in the so-called Lwow- Warsaw school) and extensive current methodological research (S. Nowak, K. Szaniawski, J. Lutynski, P. Sztompka). 6.

CONSERVATIVE REACTION, 1966-1970: THE BATTLE AGAINST REVISIONISM

The economic setbacks which led to the more conservative and rigid political tendencies at the end of the 1960swere soon reflected in renewed criticism of sociology. Sociologistswere accused of theoretical revisionism and empirical "quantomania", and the dogmatic, "official" interpretations of Marxism regained control,to the neglect of other theoretical trends. In the turmoil of the student unrest of 1968 and of the official anti-Semitic campaign urged by the Communist Party and the government,the sociologicalcommunity lost some members who, either by choice or compulsion, emigrated from the country. The atmosphere was ripe for major political reforms, but unfortunately the disorder only led to furtherpetrification of conservativetendencies, to deeper bureaucratization of the administrative apparatus, and to autocratization of government.

The Polish Sociological Tradition 7.

PRAGMATIC AND TECHNOCRATIC DREAMS, 1970-1980: THE ERA OF EXPERTS

Again Polish workers took history by the lapels and changed its course. In the wake of strikes, widespread unrest, and militant uprisings, the new government of Edward Giarek came to power, introducing an ambitious program of accelerated development incoprating the most popular catchwords of the earlier periods- including "the Polish road to socialism" and "socialism with a human face." Naturally, this vend permitted a relatively high degree of liberalism in science and ideology. The sociologists were again free to develop sociological theory along various lines. In additionto traditional areas of investigation,extensive studies began appearing on functionalism e.Sztompka, A. Paluch), conflict theory (J. Mucha), structuralistphenomenology, and symbolic interactionism. Within the Marxisttradition there were new and interestinginterpretationsof classical authors, proposed mainly by groups of scholars from Poman and Krakow. Meanwhile, serious efforts were made to produce a Manrist theory of the socialist society which confronted the realities of the modem era (J. Wiatr, W. Wesolowski, S. Widerszpil, W. Narojek J. Staniskis, J. Stnelecki). In the area of empirical research, the need for synthesis was acknowledged and led to large-scale, nation-wide, highly co-ordinated research projects which received considerablefunding from the state. Perhaps the most significant results were achieved in studies of social stratification, class structure, and social mobility (W. Wesolowski, S. Nowak, M. Pohoski, K. Slomczynski).

Sociologists were employed by the "enlightened" government to serve as experts and advisers on numerous committees and commissions, and some obtained high political positions themselves (J. Szczepanski,W. Wesolowski, W. Markiewicz). New departments of sociology and important research centres were created, a leading example being the Institute of Fundamental Problems of Marxism-Leninism. By the middle of the 1970s sociology was being taught at seven universities, research was going on in 25 institutes, and the Polish Sociological Association had almost 1,000 members. Giarek's policy of accelerated progress, based unfortunately on wishful thinking and foreign credit, failed dramatically at the end of the decade. However, during this period sociology enjoyed full legitimacy, prosperity, and significant achievement. W. Markiewicz' diagnosis, formulated in the

National Suwival in Dependent Societies

early 1970s remained valid throughout the decade: "Whatever we can say about the weaknesses of contemporary Polish sociology, it cannot be denied that it is one of the most dynamic and developing branches of Polish humanities" (Madriewicz, 1970: 17). Why sociologists were unable (and in some cases did not even try) to forestall and prevent the coming social, political, and economic breakdown is a separate and difficult question to answer. 8. POPULAR MOVEMENT OF REFORM AND RENEWAL, 1980-1981: THE ERA OF NEW UTOPIA

The massive and radical protest of the working class during the summer of 1980, followed by 18 months of convulsive attempts to introduce wideranging social,political, and economicreforms, brought about the redefinition of the "social roles of the men of knowledge." Experts, advisers, and members of the political establishment came under heavy fire for their apologetic attitude, complacent conformity, and failure to deliver strong warnings as the economic and political organism moved toward the abyss. Those opinion leaders who directly addressed the masses instead of the elites were hailed and strongly encouraged. Sometimes the opinion leader's role degenerated too easily into that of prophet of anew utopia. At the same time, some sociologists again assumed the role of experts and advisers, this time to the newly founded trade unions. Some sociologists shared the fate of other experts, becoming apologists,dogmaticin their loyaltyto the newly discoveredreference groups, one-sided, unrealistic, and blind to the adverse factors in the wider context of the socio-political situation. Predictably, the theoretical achievements of this period are not particularly impressive? In the main, sociologists involved themselves in political action, the mass media, rallies, meetings, and ideological campaigns. Instead of books they wrote columns,commentaries,and essays. At the same time, the economic crisis and resulting scarcity of funds led to a drastic reduction in empirical research. However, important empirical efforts were made to documentthe changing forms of social organizationand consciousness.These produced a large body of valuable descriptive materials awaiting future synthesis. These include documentation of strikes by J. Kulpinska, the extensive projects '%les 8 0 and "Poles 81" headed by W. Adamski, as well as a parallel effort by M. Marody and many others. In addition, some efforts were made to interpret on-going events in terns of Marxist and neo-Marxist theory, conflict theory, mass behaviour theory, and even the theory of games.

The Polish Sociological Tradition

9. MARTIAL LAW OF 1981 AND AFTER: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF SOCIOLOGY The imposition of martial law in 1981 had the effect of slowing down all academic activity for a time. But it would be patently false to claim, as some foreign observers have, that "all sociological publications are forbidden in P ~ l a n d ,and ' ~ that sociology has again been banned. This was simply not the case. No institutional changes in the organization of the discipline were introduced, apart from a short-lived suspension of the Polish Sociological Association. Sociologywas still taught at the same universities as before, and studied at the same research centres and institutes, by the same people. The priorities of the investigationshad naturally changed; this was due as much to complex economic factors and the need for relocation of research funds as it was to political and ideological reorientation. Limited resources inevitablyresult inmore intensive,selective,in-depth or qualitativestudies in place of massive, representative surveys. It also tends to encourage the secondary interpretation of previously collected data. After 1981,Polish sociologistsbegan preparing to meet these new research imperatives. A pause for reflection and stock-taking may finally do some good facilitating a long-awaited synthesis. But one thing seemed certain -Polish sociologywas too strong in its traditions and accomplishments not to continue to develop in the future. THE NATURE OF POLISH SOCIOLOGY: SOME ANALYTIC OBSERVATIONS

Having reviewed the situation Erom a chronological perspective, I will now approach the Polish sociological tradition from an analytical point of view, attempting to singleout some of its most characteristic traits. I propose to deal with three distinct aspects: the definition of the social role of a sociologist, the dominanttendenciesinempiricalresearch, and themajor trendsin sociological theory, Polish sociologistshave, from the beginning, been committed,rejecting the image of the value-free, detached and neutral scholar. The questions "sociology for what?" and "sociology for whom?" -questions of relevance and practical implications -have been consciously explored by all genera-

National Survival in Dependent Societies

tions of Polish sociologists. With rare exceptions,they have treated sociology not simply as ajob, but as a social sewice,motivated by patriotic, nationalistic, or socialist considerations. The link between sociology and movements of nationalliberation,socialemancipation,democraticreform, economicprogress, and the advancement of mass culture and civilization, is stronger in Poland than in many other countries. The reason for this must certainly be sought in the particularly complex meandering of modem Polish history. The first generation of Polish sociologists worked in a country without national independence,which was suffering the birth pangs of capitalism with particular severity. Polish sociologists could not help becoming preoccupied with the national question, married in some way or other with the social one. This admixture found its strongest expression in the socialist movement. Not surprisingly as Wiatr testifies, "the most important phenomenon in the early history of Polish sociology is the unity between sociology and socialist theory" (Wiatr, 1973: 3). A new generation of Polish sociologists inherited an independent, sovereign state, but, along with that, a whole m y of economic troubles, social injustices, inequalities and cleavages, ethnic hostilities, and political or ideological conflicts. They had no choice but to take sides, once again either allying themselves with the socialist movement or with the nationalist movement of reconstruction and recovery. The present generation of Polish sociologists lives in a country undergoing a long and extremelycomplex process of socialist transformation. It is a society in statu nascendi, going through the most fundamental planned reconstruction, accompanied by periodic outbursts of spontaneousand unpredictablemass behaviour, cyclicalbreakdown, and repeated crisis. The situation is such that nobody can stand aside, without committing himself either for or against. It is a social experiment on the grandest scale in which sociologists cannot but participate, contributing to its successes but also its failures, drawing benefits but also paying certain costs. In my view, these historical circumstances provide the main explanation for the committed, praxis-oriented attitude of Polish sociologists, as we have seen over the last century. But there are additional factors of a cultural or ideologicalnature which must be taken into account,too. One is the traditional creed of the Polish intelligentsia, a specific social stratum which sprang up in a form unknown to Western countries, usurping for itself the spiritual leadership of the nation and expressingthat leadershipin messianichopes and prophetic aspirations. Another factor is the significantly leftist and Marxist orientation of Polish intellectuals, who were strongly influenced by the well-

The Polish Sociological Tradition

known Marxist tenet that a scholar's ideological and practical commitment constitutes a fundamental epistemological and ethical assumption. Whatever the reasons, there seems no doubt that Polish sociology has always rejected the role image exemplified by the pure scholar enclosed in an ivory tower and engulfed in esoteric speculation. The majority of Polish sociologistshas always been involved in practical, committed efforts,through their research, public activities of various kinds, and occasionally, positions of direct power (Marchiewicz, 1970: 6).

Turning to the area of research, one encounters another typical trait of Polish sociology,namely its macro-sociological focus and preoccupationwith large-scale socialprocesses. The problems of micro-sociology (small groups, direct interaction, informal organization)as well as those of social psychology (attitudes, motivation, value orientation) are relatively neglected? Trend reports on the state of Polish sociology list the following central research topics for the period between the two world wars: a) the nation vs. the state; b) ethnic studies; c) rural sociology; d) urban sociology; and e) sociology of education (Znaniecki, 1945). The following topics are listed for the period after the Second World War: a) sociology of migration; b) sociology of work and industry; c) class, strata, occupation (changes in the social structure); d) social transformations in rural areas; e) social processes of urbanization; f) mass culture and mass media; and g) sociology of education (Markiewicz, 1970). W h y is there a bias in favour of a macro-sociological and dynamic perspective? One answer is obvious: it has to do with the demands and expectations impinging on the community of sociologists from the society, which are directly related to historical conditions and circumstances. The crucial problems of Polish sociology, for the last century, were always of a grand, macro-structural order. The existence and overall pattern of society, nation, state, and culture, were always at stake, and not merely their internal functioning. Before the First World War there was the problem of national integration, cultural continuity, and political sovereignty. Between the wars it was the problem of social reconstruction within the boundaries of a reestablished state. After the Second World War there have been the demands posed by the purposeful construction of the new socialist society. For better or for worse, an equilibrated, organized, harmonious, consensual, smoothly functioning social order has never been obtained, and Polish sociologists could never devote themselves entirely to the scrutiny of minor, orderly mechanisms of normal social life, to the neglect of grand schemes of social reconstruction, restructuring, and revolution.

National Survival in Dependent Societies An additional ideological factor is the predominance and "official"

status of Marxism in the postwar period. Marxist theory has a clear macrosociological and dynamic focus. Therefore, those who adopt (or pretend to adopt) a Marxist perspective in their research, as well as those who allocate funds and resources for research within a centrally planned academic policy, are more apt to select the issues dealing with macro-structures and social development, rather than the problems of micro-structures and social behaviour. As an aside, one may obselve that the enforcement of these official preferences has had some latent side effects. One is the apriori neglect of certain topics for fear that empirical results may disprove accepted ideological axioms. At first glance it is surprisingthat modem Polish sociologyis deficient in any thorough studies of working-class cultural and sociallife (Malanowski, 198 1). But if one remembers that the fundamental assumption of the political system is "the leading role of the working class," one sees why sociologists are hardly motivated to take up the research, which would presumably show areas of persistent deprivation, inequality, and frustration within the hegemonic class. For similarreasons, problems of social conflict, classes, pressure group, and alienation have also been avoided, at least prior to the major outbreaks of social unrest; afterwards, they were easily identified and discussed but solely in the ex post manner. Another side effect has been an escapist reaction by those sociologists who avoided all socially or politically relevant problems in favour of completely safe and innocuous analysis of research techniques and procedures. But this trend at least resulted in an abundance of sophisticated and original methodological inquiry -so one should not complain. Finally, with respectto the theoretical aspect, I must againemphasizethe persistent plurality of trends, orientations, and schools of thought. From the very beginning, there have always been at least three major theoretical orientations: positivistic, related to the heritage of Comte, Spencer and Durkheim; humanistic,drawing from Weber and Geman philosophy but also from social pragmatism; and Marxist, indebted to the creators as well as the disciples of historical materialism. Except during the relatively brief Stalinist period, no theory has ever acquired an exclusive, monopolisticposition. Even within the Marxist school, the attitude of open confrontation, discussion, and partial reconciliation with other theories has clearly predominated over a closed dogmatism and intellectual monopoly safeguarded by administrative means.

The Polish Sociological Tradition

This tendency expressed itself in numerous attempts to synthesize differenttheoreticaltraditions and to overcometheir seemingincompatibilities. As Wiatr put it: There was in the history of Polish sociologynot only this manifest element of pluralism, but even more, an effort to build bridges between different theoretical currents in sociology. A large part of the history of Polish sociology could be written in terms of initiatives and attempts to combine different theoretical perspectives...The young generation of Polish sociologists after the Second World War continued the same tradition: for most of them Marxism and other theoretical currents in sociology are not absolutely and hermetically opposed to each other, but rather compatible at least in some of their aspects? It is hard to grasp the precise reasons for the persistence of theoretical pluralism and the rejection of dogmatic tendencies in Polish sociology. Perhaps it has something to do with the long tradition of tolerance in a country which has never fought religious wars and does not know the concept of a heresy. Perhaps it is due to the cosmopolitan orientation of Polish science, including social science, which has been bound by multiple traditional ties with numerous countries - both East and West - and which has always defended itself against parochialism. Whatever the reasons, one must hope that these characteristics of Polish sociology will continue to survive in the future, as necessary prerequisites of further, creative development.

National Survival in Dependent Societies NOTES 1 2

3 4

5

S. Ossowski, J. Szczepanski, J. Hochfeld and A. Scaff were the main participants. Three most significantbooks by P. Rybicki, J. Szacki and A. Kloskowka were published in that period, but they were obviouslythe product of an earlierepoch, delayed only by the long publishing process. See Sociologie du Travail (Paris,1982: 245). Of coursewith several exceptions: F. Znaniecki, E. Abramowski,L. Pettazycki, and a whole group of scholars devoted to the socio-psychological or microsociological studies in contemporary sociology (J. Szmatha, M. Ziolkowski, E. Marody, P. Skeris, and others). As concrete examples,one may quote the attemptof A. Malewski (1957) to give positivistic interpretation of historical materialism, the effort of P. Sztompka (1979) to reveal common conceptual modelsof Marxism and functionalism,and the endeavour of A. Kloskowska (1981) to show the affinities of Marxism with the contemporary structural or semiotic interpretation of culture.

PART TWO

TRANSITION IN POLAND AND QUEBEC

VI ETHNIC GROUPS, REGIONS, AND NATIONALISM IN THE FORMATION OF CANADIAN AND POLISH SOCIETY

Raymond Breton and Wladyslaw Kwasniewicz

The aim of this essay is to present the most important socio-cultural features of the nation building process in Canada and in Poland. As is natural in such a case, the comparative approach has to be applied here. Therefore, the question raised by Mokrzycki (1981) as to the possibility of comparative research is most relevant and the answer which he suggested is just as simple as it is difficult to work out. He states that "any attempt at comparative study shouldbe a result of, rather than a first steptowards, thorough examinationand profound understandingof systems involved." He adds that "to the extent that comparative research is possible at all, it seems to be quite clear that in many cases it is not possible or, rather, that it does not make any sense, since it would result in comparing different types of phenomena on the assumptionthat they are of one type, and thus produce purely intellectual artifacts." The question then is whether it is possible to compare two types of phenomena as different as the Canadian and Polish nations without a previous intra-system characterization. Obviously, this book may be considered as a contribution to this kind of characterization. However, this did not relieve the authors of the duty of looking for such a level of comparison which would have, at the same time, an operational quality. It was not an easy task. The attempts to construct an adequate defmition of a nation were especially difficult. At the very beginning it appeared that even the meanings of the word "nation" in English, French, and Polish canbe quite different. This is indicated by the comparisonof the definitions of the word "nation" contained in various dictionaries. For instance, the Gage Canadian Dictionary (1983: 759) gives several definitions, two of which are as follows: 1) "A community of people occupying and possessing a defined territory and united under one govern-

National Survival in Dependent Societies

ment;" and 2) "people having the same descent and social and political history and usually sharing a common language." The American Heritage Dictionary (1982: 831)makes the same distinction between the idea of a people who share common customs, history, language, and collective consciousness and that of "an aggregationof people organized under asingle government." Le PetitRobert (1972: 1138)also provides a cultural and political definition of nation, among others. On the other hand, the definition of nation presented in the Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna (1966, vol. 111: 623) does not take into consideration the political aspects of a nation at all. It simply states that the nation is "a historically shaped, lasting community of people which arose on the basis of a common historical background, culture, language, territory, and economic life, manifest in the ethnic consciousness of its members." In Canada, the political and cultural views of nation are not only found in the dictionary; both are also found in the actual usage of the tern. In English Canada, its usage tends to correspond to the political meaning (although frequently with an underlying aspiration towards cultural unity), while in French Quebec, its usage is closer to the meaning assigned to the term in Poland (frequently with the underlying realization that the socio-cultural reality must be accommodated politically). Thus, the word "nation" may have a different meaning for an English-speaking Canadian, a French-speaking Canadian, and a Pole.

These and other differences in the meaning of the word "nation" in different languages are reflected in the well-known lack of agreement among sociologists about the definition of the theoretical category "nation." Wiatr (1969), who undertook a survey of the latter, distinguished several meanings of the word "nation" in sociology. The first definition treats the nation as a product of history. (Many Marxists hold such a theoretical position.) The second looks at the nation as a social phenomenon with certain material features, such as ethnic temtory. A third definition sees the nation as a political unit. One can find connotations of this type not only in such dictionaries as Webster's New Word Dictionary or Larousse pour tow, but also in sociological dictionaries and encyclopedias. For Theodorson and Theodorson (1970: 270), nation is "an autonomous,territorially delimited political grouping whose members have a loyalty to shared institutions that gives a sense of unity as a community. A nation need not have a common origin, language, religion, or race, although nationhood often is formed around a common history and other cultural similarities." The fourth concept proposes a definition in terms of cultural phenomena (Chalasinski, 1968; Ossowski, 1967;

Ethnic Groups, Regions, and Nationalism

...

Znaniecki, 1952). And finally, the fifth sociological approach to the concept of nation depends upon its analysis as a system of community beliefs and values. The most outstanding representative of this orientation was Max Weber, who stated that nation is that socialcommunity of common beliefs and values which naturally tends towards the formation of its own state. Using this background, Wiatr (1969: 204) presented his own definition of nation, an attempt to integrate the above definitions. According to him, a nation is a historically shaped, lasting community which arose on the basis of a common background, a common market economy, and common political institutions. The aspiration of forming one's own state usually accompanies national consciousness. In the presence of this variety of definitions, certain scholars have gone as far as to question the very possibility of establishing a universal definition of nation. For instance, Markiewicz(1960) argues that the variability of forms of the appearance of the nation in time and space results in the illusiveness and elasticity of the definition.

The various definitions point to a critical distinction between the nation as a cultural and as a political community. The concept of nation is applied to one or the other type depending on the author. Some definitions, such as the one proposed by Wiatr, include both components. Some have suggested that "nationality" be used to refer to the culturalcommunity without its own state, reserving the term "nation" for those that have acquired statehood. Whatever definition one adopts, a fundamental issue concerns the interaction between polity and culture. Related to the definitional issue, there is the question of the evolution of communities:political, utilitarian communitiesevolving into culturally cohesive ones on the one hand, and cultural communities acquiring state institutions on the other. One approach to these issues is to see nations as institutional systems, and therefore nation building as the processes through which institutions are shaped. Such processes, it should be noted, can pertain to the instrumental aspects of institutions or to their symbolic and cultural character. Institution building is not independent of the processes of class formation and of class conflicts, nor are these processes independent of the definition of boundaries and of the attempts by ethno-cultural, linguistic, and regional groups to establish cultural security or dominance. Institutional control and the conflict

National Survival in Dependent Societies

over such control will be key concepts in the analysis. The focus will be on control over the means of institution building, and of the definition of their cultural and linguistic character, over the distribution of benefits that accrue from their functioning, and over the mechanisms for the reproduction of the institutional structures. Such processes can take place in several domains: political, cultural, economic, religious, educational, and so on. Moreover, institution building and control can move from one realm to another, usually from the one that is fairly well-established. Expansion or development can thus move, for example, from the cultural/religious to the political, or vice versa. Because we are concerned with nation building, it is necessary to pay special attention to state institutions. When we speak about the state and its bureaucratic system, we mean either the institution of the state under which a given nation lives (for instance, Poland during the partition period), or a state generated by a nation as its own ethnic institution (Poland after the F i and Second World Wars). Inother words, the stateas an institution may be aproper instrument for analyzing the political conditions of a nation regardless of the mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic character of the inhabitants. By political institutions we refer to three types of political arrangements: typical state institutions, regardless of whether they were imposed by the invading powers or installed internally within the society; political parties, regardless of whether they operate openly or in conspiratorial fashion; and quasi-political institutions, which in the past filled the role of political forces. In this regard, the Catholic Church as a public institution in Poland and the Catholic Church and other churches during a certain period of Canadian history are good examples. It should be emphasized that the church played not only a religious role, but that it functioned as a political force as well, although in somewhat different ways in the two societies. With regard to educational institutions, one can also make a similar statement. And other institutions, for instance, some cultural or sport associations, have played not only their own specific role, but also a number of secondary and often hidden roles which foreign observers would not normally expect to find. Canadian and Polish societies may be compared to some extent in terms of their political and state institutions, despite their historical and cultural differences. Obviously,it is important to know what these differences depend upon. This is the reason to emphasize the need to apply a broad historical perspective whichmakes it possible to avoid formalizedahistoricalstatements

Ethnic Groups, Regions, and Nationalism

...

(Kwasniewicz, 1982). This means the use of conceptual categories of a relatively low level of generality. When we consider the specific properties of the Polish institutional system in the partition period, we can consider how social classes and regional groups on the one side, and the partitioning powers on the other, influence this system. In this light we conclude that the time period of our analysis has to be relatively broad and include a discussion of the Polish situation from at least the end of the eighteenth century up to the present day. An analysis of the Canadian situation poses the same historical requirement. It is indeed necessary to begin with the French settlement of the Canadian part of the North American continent. This raises the question of how detailed the descriptions of the nation building processes should be. It is understood that in this brief outline it is not possible to present anything but the most essential facts of the nation building processes as a sociologicalproblem. It is also not possible to review the whole, rich literature on this subject in each of the two countries. TWO CONTRASTING SITUATIONS: FROM DIVERSITY TO MONO-ETHNIC SOCIETY, AND FROM RELATIVELY LOW TO INCREASING HETEROGENEITY 1. POLAND

The analysis should start by the statement that modem Polish society is a product of a historical process in the course of whichit evolved from the multiethnic to the mono-ethnic composition. Polish society has always been a population distinguishable in CentralEast Europe by its demographic features. According to estimates made by historians who -as is natural -do not always agree, the Polish state, at the very beginning of its existence in the tenth century, counted about 750,000 people. At the beginning of the sixteenth century this number reached 7.5 million, and in 1772 (the date of the first partition of Poland) it had increased twofold. Because the third partition in 1795meant that the Polish state ceased to exist, historical-statistical works of the later period refer to the temtory which was perceived as ethnically Polish. In 1820, therefore, Poland was estimated

National Survival in Dependent Societies to contain about 10 million people. The population increased to 16 million in 1910,in spite of intensiveemigrations, especially at the turn of the nineteenth century. Poland, reborn in 1919 as a multi-ethnic state, counted 27.4 million people in 1921. In 1930the population was estimated at 35.4 million. Because of great population losses during the Second World War, and the shift of the stateterritory from the East to the West, the populationdropped to 23.9 million in 1946, then rose to almost 30 million in 1960and 35 million in 1978. Unlike the period between the wars, however, this population was overwhelmingly linked to the Polish nation; its character was almost mono-ethnic. However, as the inheritor of the biological and especially of the cultural heritage of the past, it is ethnically differentiated. What did this past consist of? The concept of ethnic diversity does not have an indiscriminate connotation. Poland provides a good example. It reveals various forms of this differentiation in particular epochs of development of the feudal and capitalistic society. In the period when the State of Polanie was created in Great Poland in the latter part of the ninth and in the tenth century, and ruled by the Piast dynasty, this diversity manifested itself first of all in culturaldifferences (but surely not linguistic ones) of Polish vibes who were gradually incorporated in this state from the areas of Lower and Upper Silesia, Little Poland, Mazovia, and Pomerania. Over the course of time, these tribes were to create an entity with specific ethnic features. However, there is no agreement among historians as to when this happened. Somehistorians assume that only at the turn of the eleventh century was such a community created, initially among the most enlightened part of the society connected with the prince's court, the magnates, the warriors, and the clergy of the Polish descent (Ihnatowicz, 1979: 210). The dynamics of this process were manifested by the development of the Polish literary language, beginning in the thirteenth century. In this respect, an important role was played by the Catholic Church. The senseof Polish community started to develop on a larger scale in the fourteenthcentury,when thelast repmentativesof the Piastdynasty,Wladyslaw I the Short and his son Casimir III the Great, created the foundations for Regnurn Poloniae. After that time, a sense of Polish nationality began to be formed among the knighthood, who were soon transformed into the nobility. (They never exceeded 10 percent of the total population of Poland.) The nobility started to identify with the Polish nation, excluding completely from

Ethnic Groups, Regions, and Nationalism ...

this concept both townspeople and peasantry. This situation lasted until the nineteenth century. In this sense we can say that the ethnic diversity of Polish society at the time of feudalism, on the one hand, consisted in the existence of extremely developed ethnocentricity in the Polish nobility, and on the other, in the ethnic indifference of the essential component of this society, the peasantry. As well, the townspeople as a class practically ceased to be counted in public life, having been displaced by the selfish economic policy of the nobility. The diversity of the ethnic composition of feudal Poland was deepened by the incorporation of foreign ethnic groups into Polish society as a result of the tenitorid development of Regnum Poloniae. Especially important in this regard was the ascentto the throne of the LithuanianGrand Duke Jagiello, who after baptism in 1386, adopted the name Wladyslaw. The union with Lithuania, at that time a vast state strengthenedformallyby the 1569interstateunion, not only caused the borders of the Polish state to shift northwards and eastward, but also resulted in the inclusion into the Polish state of ethnic groups who later on gave birth to the Ukrainian, White Russian, Lithuanian, and the Latvian polities. Simultaneously, another important process occurred which influenced the ethnic differentiation of the feudal Polish state. This was the influx of ethnically foreign elements, either colonists or specialists of various kinds, coming to Poland mainly from Western Europe. Gemam settled in the Polish territories from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries. In the nineteenth century, they settled mainly in the cities. Sincethe fourteenthcentury, owning to privileges extended (especially by King Casimir I11 the Great), Jews also settled willingly in Poland. In the fifteenth century they were estimated to number about 20,OO; by the latter part of the eighteenth century they counted about 750,000.A much less important role was played by immigration, in the age of feudalism, by the Flemish, Dutch, and Italian peoples. An extremelyinteresting group was the nomadic Wallachianpopulation

of shepherds who came to Poland along the curve of the Carpathiam in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. They mixed with the Polish element and moved graduallyto the Carpathianvalleys. This created a mountaineerculture centered in the Tatra Highlands. Finally, nomadic Gypsies had arrived in the early Middle Ages. In sum,the essential origin of the ethnic differentiation of Polish society in the age of feudalism was immigration. Its contribution to the culture of

National Survival in Dependent Societies

Polish society was highly varied. On the one hand, the Polonization of immigrants occurred, and on the other hand, they introduced into Polish culture anumberofnew values, bothmaterial and symbolic. This immigration was largely German, Italian and Wallachian. At the same time, the social and cultural isolation of the immigrants was maintained for many hundreds of years. A classic examplewas the Jewish population, which was linked with the Polish one in many ways, especially economic ones, but at the same time preserved its ethnic and denominational identity until the twentieth century. This picture of the ethnic diversity of Polish society in the age of feudalism should be complemented by one more significant remark. AU of the above-mentioned kinds of differentiation were intersected by still one more dimension, namely, regional differentiation. To be sure, in the course of development of feudalism, the former pre-feudal divisions into tribal territories were replaced by new ones. Among them the most significant was the division into the Kingdom of Poland (the temtories of the Polish state prior to union with Lithuania in 1569)and Lithuania (territories of the Lithuanian state prior to this union). Also important was the administrative division of the country into larger territorial units called voivodships. Some historians, such as Lepkowski (1967: lo), maintain that Poland in the age of the nobility "was a federation of regions, strongly isolated, each having a specific economic, demographic, linguistic, and cultural individuality, and weakly linked together as regards communication." This situation started to change gradually in the period of partitions, when the new approach to the regional affiliation of Poles found expression. Increasingly, Poles living in the Russian sector were perceived as different from Poles living in the Prussian or Austrian sectors ( Galicians). The rebirth of Poland in 1918did not eliminatethe vision of a Polish society differentiated according to these former sectors. Reminiscences of this vision endure in the national consciousnessof Poles up to the present, in spiteof the fact that Polish society acquired a trdy mono-ethnic character and mobility reached a high rate. This mono-ethnicism of Polish society is due to three factors, It first manifested itself during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the development of a new social quality, namely, the Polish nation with a developed social structure, striving for political independence. However, the new Polish state created in 1918 included, beside the Polish core, a number of national minorities. For lack of other statistical data, they were counted on the basis of

Ethnic Groups, Regions, and N a t i m l i s m

...

their declared mother tongue, but obviouslythis does not give a precise picture of ethnic diversity. As the findings of the 1931 census (Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, 1939: 23) reveal, of a total population of 3 1.9 million people about 10 million declared a non-Polish mother tongue. The most numerous were those who spoke Ukrainian or Ruthenian (4,441,000), Yiddish or Hebrew (2,732,600 although 3,113,900 claimed affiliation to the Judaic faith), Byelorussian (986,900), Gennan (741,OW), Russian (138,700), Lithuanian (78,400), and Czech (31,300). A further 878,600 persons declared other mother tongues, among them about 108,000Gypsies. Some 707,000persons declared that they spoke the language "of this place." This referred mainly to the population of Polesie, the marshy area on the eastern edge of the Poland of the day, where the local population lacked even the most elementary national identity, although culturally they identified with the Byelorussians or Ukrainians. Putting aside the question of the interrelations between the Polish population and the national minorities, includingthe problem of Polonization chiefly of the Ukrainian and Byelorussianminorities, after 1918 there was still no indication that Polish society would soon become mono-ethnic. The 1939 attack on Poland by the Third Reich constitutes the second factor affecting significantly the composition of Polish society, including its ethnic structure. The horror of the Gennan occupation overwhelmed all categories of society and all but wiped out one of its most significant ethnic components,the Polish Jews. A third factor in the transition to mono-ethnicism was the decision in 1945 of the Y a h Big Three to create the Polish Republic. Its shape corresponded to a large extent to the Polish ethnic temtory. The German population living on western territories (Silesia, Poznan district, Pomerania, and whole area of regained territories) was either already evacuated before the amval of the front in January 1945, or escaped with the withdrawing Nazi army, or finally, it was resettled to Germany after the end of the war (Kwilecki, 1963: 86). This last process was based on the Potsdam Treaty. In turn, on the basis

of the Polish-Soviet agreement, people belonging to the Ukrainian, Russian Byelorussian, and Lithuanian minorities, were resettled to the Soviet Union. In addition, about 120,000 Jewish people left Poland. Kwilecki (1963: 87) estimates that from 1944 to 1949, over three million people of non-Polish ethnic origin left Poland.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

It should be emphasized,then, that the process of developmentof Polish society as a mono-ethnic one is not the result of a spontaneous tendency of development,but the consequenceof historical events which occurredoutside the sphere of influences of Polish society. It is impossible to discuss here all the consequencesof mono-ethnicism for Polish society. But one is significant: a shift in the sphere of ethnic orientation and attitudes. "We Poles" now means the modem Polish society, "they" the ethnically foreign social groups living outside the spatial borders of society. Therefore, Poles are much less interested in the fact that among them live representatives of other ethnic groups. This is also revealed in the lack of a significant number of relevant sociological studies. The most recent investigationson this subject were carried out inPoland two decades ago. They revealed that of a total population of 29,776,000,there were in 1961-62 about 180,000 Ukrainians, 165,000 Byelorussians, 3 1,000 Jews, 21,000 Slovaks, 19,000Russians, 12,000 Gypsies, 10,000 Greeks and Macedonians (political immigrants from post-war Greece), 10,000 Lithuanians, and 3,000 Germans -altogether about 450,000 persons belonging to national minorities, or about 1.2 percent of the total population. The lack of more recent investigations in this field does not mean that there is a lack of monographic studies. The most interesting among them are the works of Sadowski (1968), Kwilecki (1974), and Wozniakowski (1982). 2.

CANADA

The ethno-cultural evolution of Canadian society has been quite different. Initially, the territory from which Canada has been cawed was occupied by a number of peoples who were distinct in language, culture, and social organization. Distinctions existed between broad cultural and linguistic families which also contained a variety of subgroups. Today, many of these distinctions continue to shape the social fabric of the native peoples. The appearance of the French as colonizers, that is, as people who undertook to establish a society of their own, brought about a radical change in the situation. This was the case even though the French population was small and remained small for a long time; it is estimated to have been around 60,000 at the time of the British conquest, 160years after the founding of the colony. What should be noted is the formation of a social structure parallel to the indigenoussocieties. In a sense, French immigration then was primarily an institutional rather than an individual phenomenon.

Ethnic Groups, Regions, and Nationalism

...

In 1760, British colonizers appeared on the scene after the military conquest.They undertook to establishtheir own society. It does not appear that the British conquerors intended to establish a society that would be parallel to the indigenous and French societies, but rather to transform the area into a British entity. However, avariety of circumstancesrequired accommodations with these existing societies. Hostility could be expectedfrom the French, who had been conquered, from the indigenous population, which was being displaced, and from the United States, which had ambitions of independence and expansion. Moreover, the growing French population remained larger than the British one up until the early part of the nineteenth century, and the French community retained strong social and ideological cohesion under a primarily clerical elite. The result was parallel social structures held together initially through an administrative apparatus and subsequently through a political and administrative framework.

To a significant degree, the shaping of Canadian society has occurred through successive sequences of conflict and accommodation, primarily between its British and French segments, but also between the latter and the indigenouspopulation. The native people were displacedto make room for the European settlers, who exploited the land and other natural resources. The native people were placed in administered dependencies with the result that their potential for social transformation and development was drastically curtailed. Another feature of the formation of the Canadian nation is that settlement by Europeans began at significantly different periods that spread over a few centuries in differentparts of the country.Not surprisingly,there were also important differences in the demographic weight of the different regions, differences that remain today. The central provinces of Quebec and Ontario represented a little over 7 1 percent of the population in 1901, and almost 62 percent in 1981. The Western provinces represented a little over 11 percent and the Atlantic provinces (not counting Newfoundland) almost 17percent in 1901,while the same areas constituted 29 and 9 percent respectively (Atlantic including Newfoundland) in 1981. Further incorporation of provinces into Confederation took place between 1867 and 1949, although nine of the 10 provinces were members by 1905. The sense of history does not have the depth in Canada that it has in Poland. However, what is perhaps of equal significanceis the fact that its depth varies considerably from one part of the country to the other. Although it is

National Survival in Dependent Societies difficultto assess its significance, this variation in the historical dimension of the Canadian consciousnessno doubt had, and continuesto have, an impact on the nation-formation process and on the accompanying tensions. There are also i m p o m t variations in language and ethnicity. By the time of Confederation in 1867, the population of Canada (which consisted then of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec and Ontario) was primarily of British and French origin (60.5 percent and 31.1 percent respectively in the census of 1871, out of a total population of 3,486,000). Besides that component, and the small proportionof native people (0.7 percent), 7.7 percent of the population consisted of people of other origins, three-quarters of whom were German. In the early part of this century, this fourth non-British non-French componentof the Canadian population began to grow,in absolute and relative terms. In 1971, it reached 25.3 percent of the population while the British had declined to 44.6 percent and the French to 28.7 percent. It also grew in diversity to include several western, eastern, and southern European groups, as well as groups from Asia, the West Indies, Africa, and Central and South America (whose numbers have increased significantly in the 1960s as immigration regulations became less restrictive). This fourth component of the population comprises a large number of ethnic origins. In 1971, only six included over 200,000 people and only one - the Germans - over one million. The situation was essentially the same in 1981. By and large, many of those groups came to Canada with the intention of becoming part of the existing society, its institutions, and its culture. Contrary to the earlier French and British, this flow of immigration was primarily individual rather than institutional. This, of course, does not mean that its impact on the evolution of the society was negligible; it means that it had a different character. Hence, contrary to Poland, Canada has had a history of increasing heterogeneity. Moreover, this heterogeneity has been increasing not only in terms of the number of groups but also in terms of the types of ethno-cultural groups and, consequently, of intergroup relationships. (Breton et al., 1980).

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NATION BUILDING PROCESSES AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 1. POLAND

The main actor of the modernPolish society is the nation. It was shaped during the nineteenth and the twentiethcenturies as the result of the influence of many factors, amongst which the developmentof capitalism in the Polish territories played a significantpart. This is the opinion of many Polishhistorians,not only those of a Marxist orientation (Chlebowczyk, 1975; Kieniewicz, 1968). Thus, the question arises: by means of what kind of indicators is it possible to study the Polish nation building process? As suggested earlier, it appears that we should look for these indicators among the public institutions which functioned on the Polish territories after 1795, and especially the state institutions. Here we immediately face the fundamental difference between the Canadian and the Polish situation. Although in Canada the state was created from above (first as a Dominion, in 1867, and then as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, in 1931),the Polish state was rebuilt from below, in response to pressures from an increasingly larger proportion of the population. The reconstruction of the Polish nation building process must, therefore, take into account this process of joining the movement for the creation of a separate Polish state by newer and newer social forces. In other words, the fight for the lost institution of the state became one of the main nation building factors in Polish society. The course of this process was very slow. One of the reasons was the specific social structure in Poland near the end of the age of feudalism. On the one extreme there was the narrow class of nobility dominating the whole of collective life; on the other extreme were the masses who were deprived of land, property, and adequate legal protection, and who in general did not identify with the Polish state as defined by the nobility. Consequently, the feudal peasants in Poland were not interested at all in helping the nobility to restore the state. Between these two classes there was a small class of townspeople (the burghers) as well as an incipient working class. In addition, in the early part of the nineteenth century, an intelligentsia was appearing in the cities, a social stratum that would later play a significant role in establishing the standards of national consciousness. Interest in regaining independence was revealed first of all by the nobility, who started to transform into a gentry during the nineteenth century.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

They were supported in their efforts by a part of the townspeople and by the intelligentsia. If we examine who participated in the fight for the liberation of Poland (1792,1794,1797-1803,1806-1814,1830-1831,1864-1865), we see that the contribution of the peasantry was quite insignificant; in fact, it was often forced to participate in this fight by farm owners. This situation was the result of many causes. The most importantwas the exploitation of the peasantry by the gentry and the fact that peasants lived in small, local communities, isolated from the broader market. The intellectual horizons of the peasantry were also very narrow, due to low geographical mobility and the lack of the more broadly developed system of common education. The lack of constructive programs of socio-economic reforms which would meet the needs of the peasant masses dissuaded them from participating in public affairs at the national level. Nevertheless, the peasantry also contributed to the fight against the invaders, although often in a spontaneous way, with no deeper political thought. By various means the invaders tried to split Polish society from the inside, strivingquite successfully,forexample, for the support of the magnates and the peasantry. The latter, however, staunchly defended its own cultural identity, and indirectly its ethnic identity. The fight against the Russianization and Germanization of the Polish people became, consequently, one of the fundamental processes running through Polish society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These remarks underline the importance of the lack of statehood in the nation building process of Polish society. Under the conditionsof the partition period there was almostno opportunityfor the Poles to developtheir own state institutions. Instead they tried to establish a quasi-political system in the form of predominantly underground, conspiratorial movements and activities. For all educated Poles, partition meant apoliticalsystem which was inimical to the Polish people and had to be overcome, with the partial exception of Galicia after 1867, when the Austro-Hungarian emperor granted to Galicia a form of autonomy. It is worth stressing that some of these attitudes towards the state have been retained by the Polish people to some extent, even up to the present day. The quasi-political system mentioned above manifested itself in various forms. It included both preparations for insurrection and conspiratorial teaching. The illegal political activity was sometimes developed by cultural institutions (folk choirs in Upper Silesia) and later, athletic institutions (the

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famous Sokol AUiance which functions in Polish community centres, in Western Europe, and in the United States). The fight against the economic constraints of the invadersgave birth to Polish economicorganizationsuniting producers, agents, and consumers. Towards the close of the nineteenth century, these organizations sometimes took the form of co-operatives. In all these effortsto strengthenthe Polish nation's ability to stand up to the invaders' oppression, the representatives of the intelligentsia played unusually important roles. Growing more and more numerous during the nineteenth century, the intelligentsia consisted not only of the d6class6 members of the gentry (Chalas-, 1958), but also of people of peasant or urban background who graduated from high schools and universities. Among the succeeding generations, the one which participated in the November Uprising (1830-31) and afterwards emigrated to Western Europe, had a special importance. The intellectuals who belonged to this generation -for example, Adam Mickiewicz, anational poet, or Joachim Lelewel, an outstanding historian -contributed greatly to the Polish national ideology-building process. At that time two basic ideological orientations came into being in response to the problem of national existence:the romantic orientation and the realistic one. They continue to compete even in the twentieth century.

Despite the increasing role of the intelligentsia in both preserving and developingthe national consciousnessof the Polish people, this socialstratum continued to be composed of relatively independent occupational categories involved in mental activities, such as of clerks, doctors, engineers, teachers, scientists, priests, writers, and musicians. In other words, the intelligentsia was not a social entity with a high degree of cohesion (Szczepanski, 1964).For this reason the Polish intelligentsia neither produced a common group consciousness, nor established a political representation of its own. The new look of the political life of the Polish society was the result of the workers' and peasants' parties created after the 1880s. Outside the Austrian sector they acted illegally, playing a significant part especially in the Russian sector. In the social democratic workers' movement, it was possible to observe the effects of the so-called delusions of Luxembourgism (an expression referring to Rosa Luxembourg's position that the fimdamental issue for a revolution was not the delusion of national independence but the liberation of the working class). Although such delusions were present, the urban proletariat outside the Russian sector preserved in its main mass the Polish cultural and national aspects and gave specific evidence of this in the future fight against the Nazis.

National Survival in Dependent Societies In the partition period, within the quasi-political system of the Polish society, a specificrole was played by the Catholic Church. Although the upper church hierarchy sometimes frowned upon the church joining the fight for national independence, the lower hierarchy, linked with the parishes, participated actively in various undertakings aimed at the preservation of the Polish spirit. They were especially active in ceremonies and manifestations which, under the veil of religion, provided for the believers experiences of a patriotic character. One must not forget that, in the Polish territories, the Polish language was obligatory for sermons,confessions, and singing in the Catholic Church. A number of nativePolishreligioustraditionswere also preserved, for instance, All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day. Such events often provided an occasion to pay secret tribute to national heroes.

It was not until the inter-war period that the conditions were created for the re-incorporationof the various parts of the formerlydivided Polish society into a single, socio-political entity. Among these conditions we should mention, first of all, the creation of the state-wide system of education with compulsory school attendance. Although such systems were founded by the invaders - excluding the Austrian sector after 1867 - they consisted of German or Russian schools activelyinterested in the fight against all manifestations of the Polish national thought. After 1918 a three-level educational system was created in Poland, which comprised elementary education (compulsory for youths aged sevento 15years), secondaryeducation (gymnasiums and lyceums) and academic education (universities, polytechnics, and other schools). This system worked for less than 20 years. However, it played a significantrole in the awakeningof Polish patriotism among youth, especially those of peasant origin. This was evident during the Geman occupation of 1939-1945,when the anti-German underground was joined by all categories of Polish society, including the peasantry. The system created an ideological vision of their place within the Polish nation as those who "feed and defend." During the years 1939-1945, Polish society was shaped as a national community. It was characterizednot only by common territory, language, and culture, but also by national consciousness.These features were strengthened after the Second World War, thanks to the restoration of the Polish state. In spite of such serious political shocks as the one of 1944-1945, and the temtorial shifts and population movements connected with it, further steps were made towards the strengthening of the national community. These were the establishing for the first time in Polish history of the nation-wide market, the development on a large scale of a common, free system of education, and

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the dissemination of many cultural values by means of the mass media and various cultural institutions. 2. CANADA

The analysis of the formationand evolutionof Canadian societymust consider the peculiarities, structural and cultural, of each of the main axes of cultural differentiation identified earlier. To begin with, more than one kind of nation and, consequently, nation building processes can be observed in Canadian society. Second, the presence of several native peoples and ethno-cultural groups with a variety of collective aspirations concerning their place in the societal framework has important implications for the nation building processes. This brief essay can only deal with a limited number of aspects of this phenomenon. The society building carried out by the British and French will first be considered. Two levels of institution building are involved: that internal to each of those communities, and that of the common framework within which they function. Next, we willlook at the ways in which the native peoples and the other ethno-cultural groups (immigrants and their descendants) were, or failed to be, incorporated into the social and institutional structuresthat have been and continue to be fonned and transformed at these two levels by the so-called founding peoples.

Ever since their initial settlement, the French and British collectivities have been busy constructing their own communities, each with a set of institutions with their own organizational structures, values and norms, and language. Historically, both communities have considered themselves as nations and as the bearers of a distinct cultural heritage. Accordingly, they have been deeply concerned with the maintenance, growth, and cultural integrity of the institutional systems. The two collectivities have not been equally situated with respect to the relevant economic, political, socio-cultural, and demographic resources that community building and growth require, or with respect to the institutionalized means to gain access and/or to generate such resources. Their method of community building is a function of several factors, including the circumstancesof their initialcontact, their relative size, their internal political, social, and economic organization, their cultural and political ideologies, and the direct and indirect support received from other groups and countries.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

The intention of the British metropolis and of the colonizerswas to build a British-type society in North America. Initially, the British Canadian community was largely geared to the interests of the British empire and integrated into the network of its mercantileinterests and later its financial and industrial capitalism. Thus, one of the main institution builders in that community has been the economic entrepreneur, who was extending the empire (Berger, 1970). The structuring of political institutions was also an important concern but they were also an extension of the institutions of the metropolis, albeit in different ways as conditions changed over the years. This orientation in shaping the community's institutions lasted for a long time: When the new federal union was taking form, the leading politicians of English Canada and its chief newspaper editors were predominantly British immigrants.. .Union, in fact, as responsible government before it, was achieved under strongly British auspices. Neither produced significant nationalist expressions in English Canada. The emphasis was on British models - on achieving the full glory of the cabinet -parliamentary system in the one case; on producing a monarchical, not a democratic, federalconstitutionin Canada, on the other. It may evenbe claimed that these basic Canadiannationalachievementsof self-government and union took the special shape they did because of the efficacy of a British metropolitan system which left the people of the hinterland basically in concord with the power at the centre and not inclined to react drastically against it (Careless, 1966: 278). Given this evolution, it is perhaps debatable whether or not the process of extending the metropolis economically, politically, and culturally can be referred to as nation building. This colonial foundation nevertheless had a significantimpact on the characterof the society that emerged from it, or rather that was built through it. A process of disengagement (from the network of ties with the British metropolis) began slowly, even as the other process of extension was still going on. This disengagementwas very progressive; it took place over a long period of time. Indeed, it is only in recent decades that English Canada's situation as an extension of Britain has become very tenuous, although it has not completely ceased. This disengagement is syrnbolized by events such as

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the defmition of Canadian citizenship (as opposed to the status of British subject) as late as 1947,the Supreme Court of Canada becoming the country's final court of appeal in 1949 (rather than the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London), the adoption of a Canadian flag in 1965 (over the Union Jack), the proclamation of 0 Canada in 1975 as the official Canadian anthem (rather than God Save the Queen), and the patriation of the Constitution in 1981. On the other hand, what symbolizes the continuing link with Britain is the fact that its Queen is still the Queen of Canada. Another nation building process closely related to the project of a British-type society was resistance to US expansionism, which was seriously felt around the middle of the nineteenth century. This threat was an important impetus towards the unification of Canada, first through the negotiation of a Confederationin 1867(Cook, 1963),and second through the settlement of the West and its inclusion in Confederation (The initial federal pact included four provinces; five others were included between 1870and 1905, and the tenth in 1949.) In other words, this phase had a proactive component, in the sense of the creation of a certain type of society politically and culturally that would serve the economic interests of Britain and of the domestic classes connected with those interests. It also had a reactive facet in the sense of protecting those interests against an expansionist neighbour. Although it is largely accurate to say that the settlement of the West was an integral part of the formation of the British Canadian community, some segments of the French community also had an interest in it and attempted to take part in the process. Only a segment of the clergy played a leading role in this project (we explain later that the clergy was the main institution builder in the French community). Its success, however, was limited. It lacked the resources and organization necessary to redirect towards Western Canada the 900,000people who migrated from Quebec to the United Statesbetween 1840 and 1930. (It should be noted that the Quebec population movement constituted'only about 32 percent of the total Canadian population movement towards the United States.) In particular, the clergy lacked support from the major segments of the clerical and political elite in Quebec who felt either threatened by the settlement project (i.e., depopulation of Quebec) and/or were simply not interested in community building beyond the borders of the Quebec territory (Lalonde, 1982). In connection with the issue of US expansion, the presence of annexationists in Canada should be noted as an important element in British

National Survival in Dependent Societies

Canadian society. The building of a British-type society (and the institutional formsthis entailed in the imperialcontext) was not without internal resistance. Segmentsof the merchant class saw that their interests would be better served by integration with the United States. Segmentsof the political elite shared this view: Refonn movementsthreatened to draw thepopulation more closely to the southemneighborand to weaken, if not destroy, the political ties of Empire or, after 1867, of nation....The attack upon political institutions implied a challenge to constituted authority, and the danger was great that a state of confusion would lead to the intervention of the southern neighbor. William Lyon Mackenzie and Louis Riel are obvious examples of refom leaders who, through advocating ideas only partly American in origin, found themselves leading movements which derived much of their support from across the border (Clark, 1962: 190). US expansionism and its supporters within Canada were strongly resisted for a long time. However, with the decline of the British empire and the enormous growth of the United States, integration into a continental network grew over the years - an integration that took an accelerated pace beginning with the Second World War. This is the case in the economic, cultural, and military spheres and, by ricochet at least, in the political sphere as well. So, even though Canada has several of the accoutrements of a sovereign state, it has moved from the British sphere to a significant incorporation into a US-controlled institutional system. Such an integration into the continental system is resisted by groups of English Canadian nationalists, just as being a part of the British empire was opposed by some groups at an earlier time. The evolution of Canadian society cannot be understood without a consideration of these opposing interests and their struggle to shape institutions and their policies. The French settlement before the British conquest was, in relation to its metropolis, in a situation similar to that of the British: it was linked to France as an instrument of its mercantile interests. It seems, however, that France's interest in it was limited and unenthusiastic. After the conquest, the ties with France were ruptured quite suddenly. The colony passed from the hands of one power to another, but with a drastically different status. This passage involved the severance of a network of institutional links; it also entailed establishing

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relations with mother institutional system, that of the conquering people. This task was difficult and conflict-ridden,since the desirable characteristics of the system were frequently defined quite differently by the two communities. In addition, because the British feared the conquered people's continuing loyalty to France, they attempted to discontinue all contacts with France, including those of a social and cultural nature. It is only later that linkages, primarily cultural, were progressively re-established with France. Recently, economic and political exchanges have also become part of the agenda in Quebec-France relationships. After the conquest, one of the important institution-builders in the French community was the clergy. The relative importance of the clergy was, in large part, the result of the departure or weakening of other Francophone elites (political,military, commercial). Also, the Quebec Act of 1774made the periodic payment of tithes to the church compulsory (Ossenberg, 1967: 211). Through this sort of taxation power the British administration gave to the church a means of capital accumulation -an essential ingredient in institution building. However, it is primarily in the nineteenth century, and especially in the second half of that century, that the church succeeded in establishing its position of social and institutional dominance. By 1840 it had obtained full legal recognition. An outcome of the 1837-38 rebellion was a weakening of the anticlerical segment of the elite. The seigniorial system, which for a long time had the support of the habitants was abolished in 1854. The Confederation of 1867 gave the provinces jurisdiction over education, public health, property, and civil law. This allocationof powers favoured the influenceof the church, sincethe areas involved were those in which the church was interested. Through institutions in those areas it achieved control over the social and ideological orientationof the society and much of its resources (Linteau, 1979: 232). By the end of the century, the clergy had overcome its principal ideological opponents and had either defeated or co-opted its competitors for institutional control. This ecclesiastical dominance over the socio-cultural and material resources of Quebec society lasted for a considerable period of time and permitted an enormous growth ofparticular institutionaldomains. Thus, in the areas of religion, education, health, and welfare, an impressive network of organizations and associations were built and a powerful normative structure was put in place.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

This nonnative system (that is, the values and nonns, and means to enforce them) was an important factor in the growth of the population another critical ingredient in institution building. Indeed, population provides the potential clientele and labour force for the functioning and growth of institutional systems. The attempts to establish an institutionalized political base has always been (and, of course, continues to be) an important component of community building among the French in Canada. This political power base has been perceived as critical in the community's relations with the Anglophone component of Canadian society. The clergy and its supporters may at times have been challengedby otherrequests of the elites,but by and large they were all nationalists committed to the persistence of French Canada and its institutional system. This, of course, does not mean that they did not differ on the means; they did. In fact, one of its central issues was whether the institutional system was to be maintained within the Canadian federal framework or as a separate independentpolitical entity.The relative political weight of the two points of view has varied considerably over the years. With time and the introductionof industrialcapitalism,the elites became increasingly differentiated in terms of interests, power bases and ideological orientations. This process, and the accompanying challenge to the existing institutional system, culminated in what has become known as the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. The revolution consisted in a shift in the traditional distribution of power: political institutions and their elites are now dominant, while thoseof the churchhavereceded, Themanagementof thevast system of organizationshas changed hands. Accordingly, the church bureaucracy has decreased while the state bureaucracy has increased. More important, however, is the fact that a new wave of institution building was launched in areas that had previously been left to Englishspeaking entrepreneurs. This involved the accumulation of capital from the exploitation of natural resources, the acquisition of control over sources of capital such as pension plans, and the use of tax revenues for capital investment through various government agencies. French-controlled private or semi-public (e.g., credit unions) financial institutions have also played a significant role in capital accumulation. This accumulationhas permitted various developments: building new entreprises, acquiringexisting ones controlledby non-Francophones, assisting the growth of those controlled by Francophones, and acquiring interests in English

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Canadian and American companies so as to be able to exert some control or influence over their investment and related policies. The legislation concerning the language of work is also in part a tool for the expansion of French control of, and presence in, these enterprises. The decline of the birth rate in recent decades has also had implications for institutional maintenance and growth. The collapse of the nonnative system maintained by the church required new means to assure the demographic basis of the institutional system. Channelling immigrants into the French institutional domain was adopted as one course of action for this purpose. But the language legislation pertaining to education and work is perhaps the most important instrument. As was to be expected, it was met with a negative reaction on the part of the English in Quebec, since it deprives their institutional system of a part of its potential clientele. Nation building has not taken place only at the level of the British and French communities, but also at the level of the society as a whole. The processes involved here have to do with the construction of overarching governance institutions and of structures of inter-group accommodation in various fields of activity. It has also involved the building of society-wide economic institutions and a limited set of cultural institutions. However, because of the segmented character of the society, this level of institution building has gone through particular kinds of processes and has taken particular forms. Foremost among these is the federal system of government. As Smiley (1970: 5) points out, "federal governments can be sustained only in societies whose people believe that their interests in respect to a number of important matters are specificto geographical divisions of the country rather than to the country as a whole." Thus, the English and French collectivities have been deeply interested in the overarchinginstitutions, not only because through them the character of the society is defined but also because of their possible impact on the vitality and cultural integrity of their own institutions and socio-cultural milieux. (This essay does not deal with all of the regional dimensions of Canadian society. These, however, are also significant, if only for the variations noted earlier. The political, economic, and military dimensions of the history of settlement adds further to their significance for the shaping of the overarching or "national" structures). Indeed, societal resources can be reached or produced through the overarching structures, whether these resources be political, economic, ideological, or cultural. As a result, the distribution of control

National Survival in Dependent Societies

over these institutions and the definition of their powers and areas of jurisdiction have been, and will continue to be, objects of tension and conflict. It is largely through such conflicts and the resulting accommodations that institution building has occurred at this overarching level. The Quebec Act of 1774, the 1791 Constitutional Act, the Union Act of 1840,the British North America Act of 1867,its subsequentmodification, and the patriation of the Constitution with an added Charter of Rights have all involved, in part at least, issues concerning the distribution of powers and the recognition of the two collectivities, their languages and cultures. Besides the structure of government,a number of policy questions have been objects of concern. These have had to do with the conditions deemed essential by each community for the maintenance and growth of their institutions and culture such as policies related, or perceived to be related, to population (immigration, language of education, family allowances), access to resources (taxationpower, pension funds, revenues from the exploitation of natural resources), cultural protection and development (education, communication, support for research activities), and economicand industrial policies (tariffs, regional development, resources for research and development). The competition between the two communities for control of the overarching institutions has been very unequal due to differences in population, wealth, technology, and external political and economic support. One result has been that, historically, the central government has been largely perceived by Anglo-Canadians as an instrument for building their own community throughoutthe Canadian temtory. In fact, as suggested earlier,the building of Canada and of English Canada was by and large perceived as the same thing by Anglo-Canadians. (The nation-forming act has been called the British North America Act - a label that certainly signifies something important about the intentions of the group that dominated the situation at that time.) For different reasons, this view of the central government was also shared by the French. Only a relatively small fraction of their elite and population appears to have been seriously interested in community building beyond the Quebec borders. And in Quebec, the church and provincial government were seen as the instruments of community building, partly out of choice, partly out of lack of choice. As a result of this unequal power and of these differences in aspirations, the central governmentbecame dominated by Anglo-Canadians. As groups in conflict, English and French Canadiansprobably exaggeratedtheir respective

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power and influence. In fact, it appears that generally, Ottawa did not think spontaneously of the French community's interests, nor did its policy orientationsdemonstratea proportionatepreoccupation with the development of that community. Such a situation has triggered different reactions at different times. Recently, it has been expressed in two ways. One is the Quebec independence movement, whose supporters argue that being part of the existing overarching framework puts severe restrictions on the potential for growth of the French Quebec community. They also argue that the inequalities mentioned earlier virtually preclude the negotiation of a satisfactory arrangement. For many supporters of independence,however, the symbolicaspects of sovereigntythe question of national honour and pride - appear to have as much, if not more, weight. In other words, they favour independence even though they do not anticipate much change in the situation of an independent Quebec, which will continue to have to operate in the political economy of the present continental and world system. The second reaction observed in both the French and English communities has been the advocacy of a transformation of the overarching institutions: in the composition of the civil service, in the status and use of the two languages, and in the redistribution of certain powers. Generally, the idea is to make the central government more responsiveto the interests of the French community than it has been in the past, and to make it more representative of the two communities in terms of personnel and symbols. Obviously, these two orientations are in opposition to each other. A power struggle is involved. The outcome will depend largely on the relative power of the opposing groups and on the strategies they employ. A parallel should perhaps be drawn between Canadian nationalists and continentalists on the one hand, and Quebec independentists and federalists on the other. Given the distribution of power among these groups and the support (or lack of it) that they receive from beyond their boundaries, one could hypothesize that just as continentalist interests seem to have the upper hand while the concerns of the nationalists are somewhat accommodated, the interests of federalists seem to dominate for the moment, even through significant gains have been made by the independentists. Another important componentof nation building in Canada, at the level of each of the two communities and of the overarching framework, has to do with the incorporation of the native communities and of the ethno-cultural

National Survival in Dependent Societies

groups consisting of immigrants and their descendants. In the case of the native peoples, it is difficultto refer to them as having been incorporated in the institutional system. By and large, they have been, and continue to be, in a situation of marginality; they are poorly integrated in the polity, economy, and social fabricof the society. Second, Indian bands are externally administered dependencies.They are managed by a federal government bureaucracy that, until recently, was staffed almost entirely by nonIndians. Third, they constitute a segment of the lower class in the Canadian social structure. Thus, in addition to their poverty, they play a marginal role in the economy and have little access to the means to improve their condition.

In addition, there are different categories of native peoples, whose

incorporation into the societal framework poses somewhat different problems. There are those who have a recognized status under Canadian law and a territorial base (reserves). On the otherhand, there are the non-status Indians and the Metis population. Finally, there are some native groups, the Dene in particular, who consider that they constitute a nation and should be recognized as such. This represents another nationalism with an ideological and sociopolitical dynamism of its own. Its incorporationin the overarchingframework and how it will be accommodated, if it ever is, by overarching institutions is uncertain and it is likely to go through a very complex process. The significant presence of a large number of ethno-cultural groups is the result of immigration.While the French relied primarily on a high birth rate to expand the demographic base of their community, the British relied primarily on immigration. British immigrantshave always been preferred, but their numbers have not always been sufficient. In particular, the settlement of the West required that the central authorities, in whose hands the control of immigration rested, search for immigrants elsewhere. Circumstances in various parts of the world also provided a large pool of potential immigrants. Large numbers of immigrants from a variety of cultural backgrounds, including Poles, came to Canada. They were instrumentsin the building of a Britishtype society, but the settler population frequently resented the immigrants, perceiving them as disrupting the British way of life. The immigrants were also instruments in the building of a capitalistic society and were frequently harshly exploited in the process. The newcomers were allowed to keep their culture in their private lives and in their communities. In the public sphere, however, they were expected to adopt the English language and ways of functioning.The attempts by some

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groups to establish bilingual schools were curtailed by provincial legislation that outlawed languages other than English in schools. This legislation was aimed at limiting community building on the part not only of the French but also of the other ethno-cultural groups. Thus, as far as these groups are concerned,nation building has consisted largely in using them to build a particular type of society and to absorb them as individuals into its fabric. By and large, this absorption has taken place: acculturation and the accompanying incorporation into the so-called mainstream institutions has been largely achieved by the third, if not the second, generation. This process has continued with new waves of immigrants and their descendants. It should be noted that the immigrants and their descendants have integrated themselves primarily in the Anglo-Canadian community. As indicated earlier, however, the French community in Quebec has recently become interested in increasing the rate of integration of members of these ethnocultural groups within its social boundaries. The operation of an absorptionprocess, however, does not mean that all have had an equal opportunity for participation in the various institutions of society. It means, rather, that things are moving in that direction and that the issues and conflicts that have arisen concern the removal of obstacles to equality of opportunity, and eventually to equality of results. The absorption that has taken place does not mean either that members of the ethno-cultural groups have necessarily internalized the purely instrumental role in the building of a society. Indeed, some see themselves as cofounders of certain parts of the country,eitherprovinces or parts of provinces. The claims of founder or co-founder status have recently been gaining importance in the politics of ethnicity in Canada. It does not mean, however, that these claims become translated into the demand for, or the formation of, parallel institutional structures. Third, despite absorption and acculturation, the immigrants have attempted to maintain some elements of their identity and culture. However, the institutional and social means through which a distinctive culture can survive, flourish, and be transmitted to succeedinggenerations, are very restricted and have become increasingly so with successive generations. Finally, the absorption process does not mean that the societal institutions do not have to face demands for various forms of recognition and

National Survival in Dependent Societies

assistance on the part of ethno-cultural groups. In fact, the 1960s and 1970s have witnessed the expression of demands for governmentintervention in this area. At the federal level, the response was the Multiculturalism policy of 1971. This policy has four components cultural maintenance,the elimination of barriers to full participation in Canadian society, interchange among cultural groups, and assistance to immigrants in the acquisition of one of Canada's official languages. The policy is stated in quite general terms. Various pmgrams have been initiated to implement this policy, such as grants for cultural activities, multiculturalism centres, assistance to the ethnic press, third language teaching aids, and research. The policy has been operationalized over a fairly narrow range of social and institutional activities. This may be partly due to the limitations imposed by the co-existence of a large number of ethnic minorities, to institutional inertia, and to opposition to any extensive development of multiculturalism. Whatever the reasons, the specification of ways in which societalinstitutions would be modified to make a significantplace for this pluralism has not yet been pushed very far. Nevertheless, the existence of a limited range of policies does signify an official recognition of cultural phenomena and represents a certain degree of support for it. SOME REMARKS ON NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN POLAND AND CANADA 1

POLAND

The problems of social consciousness in general, and of national consciousness in particular, are amongthe most difficulttheoreticalquestions.They also raise ideological controversies. Therefore, it is not possible in such a brief study to mention all of the most significant issues. Rather, we concentrate on two questions. The first one refers to the role of symbols in the contents of the national consciousness of Poles. Many historians maintain that in the process of crystallization of this consciousness in the nineteenth century, "the trend of unity of the defeated and the trend of belonging to this very nation" (Ihnatowicz et al., 1979: 555) were intermingled. A certain community of feeling and beliefs developed on this basis and was nourished by the contents of national consciousness, among which a particular place was occupied by symbols.

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They united the defeated by reminding them of the nation's martyrs in the fight against the oppressors. For example, Poland is represented as "Christ of nations" which allowed itself to be "crucified" for the sake of universal values of human dignity. As well, many Polish women from the gentry, after the failure of the January Insurrection (1863-1864), wore mourning garments for many years, not only for those killed or transported to Siberia, but also for the "buried" Poland. These symbols affirmed the pride of being a member of the Polish nation. It is no accident that Polish national heroes -not civilians led wars for national independence from 1794 to 1913. Nor is it any accident that the anthem, national colours, and state emblem were all created in the latter part of the eighteenth century and early part of the nineteenth century. Moreover, certain symbols of the fight against the Nazi invader were resurrected in the crisis after August 1980. The social rank of the creators of particular symbols depends on the symbols themselves. That is why the intellectuals, especially the writers, have gained major significance with regard to political life (Blonski, 1979). The second question refers to the modem social consciousnessof Poles. Nowak (1979) proves convincingly that within the system of values not only of the established but also of the new generation of Poles, the highest position is occupied by the family and by the nation: We see, then, that between the level of primary groups and the one of national community there is -from the point of view of the identification of people and their emotionalinvolvement-a kind of sociologicalemptiness. If we tried to draw a gigantic 'sociogram' based on human sense of group bonds and identification, then the social structure of our country would appear as a federation of primary groups, families and groups based on friendship,united in a national community, with very weak types of bonds between these two levels, Nowak concludes that the institutional structure of modem Polish society is a very weak group-building factor. The events that took place in Poland after August 1980 seem to support this thesis. However, is not the failure to perceive institutions as an important component of the system of values, and the lack of readiness to build social ties around them, the fatal heritage of 123 years of annexation and six years of Geman occupation?

National Survival in Dependent Societies 2.

CANADA

The question of national consciousnessis also very complex when considered in the Canadian context. As it was impossible to deal with all of the relevant nation building processes, it is also impossible to deal with all dimensions of national consciousness. Only a few will be discussed briefly. First, as indicated earlier, the Canadiannationhas been built h m above. Canadian nationalism is as much, if not more, instrumental utilitarian as it is expressive cultural (Zeller, 1982). Several key economic and political interests have been well served by the existence of national boundaries bumssed by substantial collective investments and a considerable dose of protectionism. The cultural componentof Canadian nationalism is comparativelyweak. Its content is vague and amorphous, a fact that allows people from various backgrounds to include themselvesunder it. It is perhaps quite meaningful to a number of Canadians, but for many it lacks substance. The critical elites in the promotion of this nationalism have been political and economic. The protectionism underlying Canadian policy in several areas has led some to argue that Canadian nationalism is heavily, if not primarily, antiAmerican. Even if this is the case it should not detract attention from the fact that as long as the instrumental role of the boundary is observed, Canadians allow themselves to borrow heavily from the culture of their southern neighbours and give them considerable freedom to pursue their interests on Canadian territory. Such borrowing and activities seem to preoccupy a fairly small segment of Canadian society. It should be noted in this connection that the initial instrumental character of Confederation still lives today. It does so through its provisions for the distribution of powers between levels of government and the various institutional arrangements that have flowed from them. Indeed, the powers assigned to the central governmenttend to be instrumental in nature: management of the economy, trade and commerce, international relations, and defence. On the other hand, those pertaining to cultural development and transmission, and to the fostering of loyalty, tend to be concentrated at the provincial level: schools and universities, and services involving direct contact with the public which are thus most directly visible to the public such as health and welfare. Of course, this is a matter of emphasis; it does not constitute an exclusive allocation of those types of powers. Perhaps Canadiannationalism would be most accuratelydescribed as an

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identity rather than a culture -an identity that can be felt quite strongly. One frequently observes in Canada members of ethno-cultural groups who are nearly completely acculturated yet retain a deeply felt sense of their ethnic identity. It perhaps could be argued that, in an analogous way, AngloCanadianshave been acculturatedinto a North American system of values and way of life while retaining a strong national identity and a sense of belonging to a distinctive community. Second, British Canadian nationalism has changed over the years. A significant factor in this change has been the presence of people of a variety of cultural backgrounds who, in the process of integrating themselves into the British Canadian community, have transformed it into an English-speaking community. The ethnic nationalism of British Canadians progressively gave way to a territorial nationalism; it shifted fiom a cultural to an identificational nationalism. Whether or not the absorption of people of various ethno-cultures into French Quebec society will have a similar impact on its nationalism is difficult to predict. If it does, this impact is likely to occur progressively over an extended period of time, as it did in the case of British Canadians. Similarly, the implications for Canadian nationalism of such an evolution, were it to take place, are virtually impossible to anticipate. Third, in contrast to Canadian nationalism, the post- conquest French Canadian nation was built from below. Its identity and cultural distinctiveness were nourished by a particular historical experience, a relative degree of isolation and by the threat that the growing Anglophone environment represented. The critical elites involved in this process were cultural: the clergy, educators, writers, journalists, artists, and members of the liberal professions. Politicians were also important, but not as a distinct class. The economic elites played avery secondary role. In recent decades, the clergy was replaced by the state and its functionaries,but the cultural elite remains the dominant force. In many ways, this elite uses the state apparatus and power to promote its vision of the French Quebec nation which, as a result, has taken an increasingly political and secular character.

h Correspondingto these changes in Quebec, the overall F ~ n c Canadian identity and group consciousness has become fragmented. In Quebec, there has been a shift to a Qu6Mcois identity. This fact, together with the growing importance of provincial governments,has led other French Canadians, such as Franco-Ontarians and Franco-Manitobans, to emphasize their provincial

National Survival in Dependent Societies identities (Juteau-Lee and Lapointe, 1979). In one instance, a new name was coined to denote the regional identity: Fransaskois (Francophones of Saskatchewan). This fragmentationis also illustrated by the absenceof a name for the non-QuebecFrench collectivity as a whole. A negative expression is used: the Francophones outside Quebec (les Francophones hors Qukbec). This evolution has a long background. The Quebec French have always been ambivalentabout the boundariesof the community they were attempting to build: was it restricted to Quebec or did it include the French throughout Canada? These two definitions of the community boundaries have been, and continue to be, in competition with each other. Today, it is part of the political conflict between independentists and federalists.

CONCLUSION The formation of the Polish and Canadian nations is in many ways a study in contrasts. In one case, the character of the population has moved from ethnocultural heterogeneity to a quasi-complete homogeneity, while the other has experienced a progressively increasingheterogeneity-one that included the co-existence of different nationalisms as well as other expressions of cultural diversity. In Poland the central nation building process concerned the fight for the lost institution of the state, a struggle sustained by pressure from the masses as well as various elites, and carried out by a quasi-political system and the church. This struggle involved a resistance against Russianization and Germanization. In a general way, this parallels the experience of French nationalism in Canada: a resistance against Anglicization, a central role played by the church, a struggle for state institutions and their progressive autonomy within a federal framework (institutions that provided their own basis for further nation building and autonomy efforts), and at different points in time, a search for independence.

The experience of English Canada and of Canada as a whole has been quite different. Nation building in these cases was largely initiated by elites who saw Canada as an extension and an integral part of the British empire. These elites were partly Canadian and partly external to the society in formation. These external forces were not resisted, except by relatively small groups; on the contrary, they were welcomed as an active element in the nation building process. Also, utilitarian interests and cultural expressions were

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involved in both societies. However, it appears that cultural forces have been central to the process in Poland, and in French Canada, while utilitarian forces were dominant in English Canada and in Canada as a whole. While the social structure of Poland would appear to be a federation of primary groups united in a national community, with very weak bonds between the two levels, that of Canada would seem to be a federation of primary groups united in linguistic and/or regional communities, with relatively weak bonds at the level of the national community.

In recent decades, the contrast has become less striking. It pertains to the types of societies and systems in which it is integrated, rather than to the relative importanceof extemal and internal forces or of utilitarian and cultural processes. The evolution of a socialist society integrated into a larger system of interests and in which external agents play an important role is, at a certain level, similar to that of a capitalist society, also integrated in a larger system of interests and in which extemal forces are quite significant. Perhaps the differences are increasingly found in the type of social systems and in the character of the relations with the other countries in their respective environments. We have adopted a view of the nation as an institutional system. This approach did not allow us to solve the definitional problem. It did, however, make it possible to analyse the relationships among some of the components identified in the various definitions of nation presented at the beginning of this essay, and in particular that between the cultural and the political. The institution building and control approach has helped to contrast two types of situations: 1) Those characterized by attempts on the parts of a cultural community, or a community of people with a common background and

group consciousness, to establish or gain control of its own state institutions. Such a control is sought so as to be better able to maintain the cultural community, to facilitatecollective expression, and to obtain compliance of its members. Gaining extension of the state is thus an extension of the social institutions already possessed by the community. In addition, if it has its own economic institutions, gaining control of the state also helps to consolidate or to expand them and to reinforce the position of its dominant classes. If the economic institutions are weak, state power is sought as an instrument for their development.

National Survival in Dependent Societies 2) Thosecharacterizedby attempts on the pan of a p or a community of citizens to build the conditions of national consciousness and cohesion This includes cultural values, a way of life, symbols, systems of communication, and opportunities for participation in common endeavors. These conditions are sought in order to establish or reinforce the legitimacy of the state institutions and its ability to obtain compliance from its members. What is involved are attempts by the state to complement its own with other social instihltions, in particular those of culture, socialization, and communication. A strong state power can also be used to strengthen the economic system -frequentlythe utilitarian motive underlying the formation of the state in the first place -and the position of the dominant classes. Our approach has also made it possible to consider some of the ways in which the unfolding and outcome of these processes are affected by the presence of people of different cultural backgrounds in the same sociopolitical space, and by the conflicts taking place among them for the control of the relevant institutions. This, in some ways, has been an application of the statement by Deutsch (1953: 78): In the age of nationalism, a nationality is a people pressing to

acquire a measure of effective control over the behaviour of its members. It is a people striving to equip itself with power, with some machinery of compulsion strong enough to make the enforcement of its commands sufficiently probable to aid in the spread of habits of voluntary compliance with them. As the interplay of compliance habits with enforcement probabilities, such power can be exercised through formal social or political organizations, through the administration of educational or economic institutions, or through the machinery of government. Whatever the instrumentsof power, they are used to strengthenand elaborate those social channels of communication, the preferences of behaviour, the political (and sometimes economic) alignments which, all together, make up the social fabric of the nationality. Thus, there is clearly a distinction between the different realms, especially the political and cultural. These may be associated in a mutually reinforcing way or they may undergo variety of tensions. There is a dynamic interaction among them. An examinationof the Polish and Canadian cases has

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permitted us to capture some aspects of this interaction at various stages in its evolution. This has been made possible not only by comparing the two societies but the different moments of their historical situations.

VII SOCIAL AND NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS TRANSFORMATIONS IN DEPENDENT SOCIETIES

Gilles Houle Piotr Lukasiewicz Andrej Sicinski

Since the Second World War, and especially in the last twenty years, considerablework by sociologistshas focussed on the process of change in the contemporary world, and particularly the ways in which these changes affect countries, regions, and local communities. Studies have been undertaken on the most diverse topics connected with changes: modernization,development, progress, etc., and have concerned themselves primarily with the most visible phenomena of social life, such as changes in living conditions (sometimes defmed as civilizational or civilizational-technologicaltransformations), and changes in social structure and everyday customs. As a rule, much less attention is paid to changes in values or ideologies which accompany modernization, development, or progress, and which may themselves help bring about such change. Need it be said that as a society changes, so do the value systems and world vision prevailing in that society? This occurs under conditions which often need to be clarified. Values are the basis of all conduct and behaviour, going so far as to determine the meaning which a society places on life. Thus, industrialization involves more than simply economic and social reorganization; it is both a political and cultural issue as it has repercussions on the lifestyles and ways of thinking in the societies it transforms. Although we have been very conscious of change in this essay, we must stress that we are equally interested in matters that remain the same. We are indeed concerned with persistence or continuity of certain phenomena in our respective, changing societies.

National Survival in Dependent Societies Returning to the central question of value change, the issue of dominant values as seen in both societies will be presented against the background of two basic entities: nation and state, and religion and church. This is not a random or arbitrary choice. The "specificity" of both Poland and Quebec expresses itself (among other things) in the importance accorded to these institutions, and these institutions in turn affect many areas of social, political, and economic life. It should be added that these two value systems (one based on identification with the nation, and the other religiously-based) are not independent and self-contained; on the contrary, they are very intimately associated with other social values. For this reason, our present approach embraces a wide range of the attitudes,beliefs and ideas, focussingon those social values which are peculiar to both. It is not difficult to perceive, if only hypothetically, what Poland and Quebec have in common: it is that which gives such profound meaning to the spheres of church and state. The larger environmentplays a determining role in both cases. Polish culture is sometimes defined as a "frontier culture," developing at the frontier between Eastern and Western Europe, and subject to the influences of both the Eastern church and Byzantine tradition, and the Western church centered in Rome. Furthermore, the Poles have for centuries lived between two powerful neighbours -Russia and Germany -both of which have tried, individuallyor in concert with others, to subjugatethe Polish nation. On the other hand, Quebec society, which is ethnically and linguistically distinct from the rest of North America, has traditionally been tied to Roman Catholic traditions within a predominantly Protestant milieu; this has had repercussions in the sphere of cultural and national identity. For these reasons, we have decided on the designation "dependent societies". It is not necessary to elaborate on the fact that, in the complex modem world, fully and completely independent societies are non-existent. Nevertheless, societies differ markedly in their degree of dependency. In stressing the problem of dependency, we are less interested in the objective dependency of a given nation or country, than in the subjective meaning and importance of the concepts of dependence and independence as they affect consciousness and collective behaviour in both Poland and Quebec.

NATION AND STATE Problems of national formation (and transformation) have been extensively discussed in another chapter (by R. Breton and W. Kwasniewicz). Here we

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wish to stress only that we are using the term nation to mean a body of people having a shared culture (expressed in language, a common history, shared symbols, religion, way of life, etc.) and who are aware of belonging to that body, perceived as a distinct socio-cultural entity. The nation, as understood here, need not be identified with a state (although the idea of a state usually plays an important role, as it has in both Poland and Quebec), or with a particular temtory (inhabited either by a state or a nation). We should add, however, that a "tenitory of our own" is of great importance, both to the particular nation involved and to those outside it. Often, symbolic value is attached to a given tenitory, usually referred to as a father or motherland. Stanislaw Ossowski made an important distinction between a "private" fatherland as "a place where one spent his/her life or its main part, or a period particularly important from the point of view of shaping lasting emotional bonds, i.e. particularly childhood." Whereas the relationship with the second, "ideological" fatherland is based on certain beliefs: a belief in one's membership in a collectivity, and a belief that this collectivity is connected with a given temtory. In this latter sense the fatherland means "a land of my nation" (S. Ossowski, 1967). 1. POLAND

The importance of the contradictionbetween nation and state was revealed in Poland towards the end of the eighteenth century when the Polish state was liquidated after having been partitioned among Russia (which occupied the greatest part), Prussia and Austria.The feeling of a common identity lived on, despite the objective fact of being incorporated into different state organisms, and led to a struggle to break the yoke of bondage and restore the independence of the Polish state. Among the three powers, there were different rules governing the annexation and integration of particular Polish provinces. Levels of civilization and political systems also differed. As a result, the three partitioned sectors developed different strategies for survival and national restorati0n.I-n nineteenth century Polish thought, the state was completely dissociated from the idea of nation, or opposed to it outright.This is not to say that the role of the state was entirely denied.Memories remained vivid of the powerful "Rzeczpospolita" (Respublica)of past centuries which had extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and included some 7.5 million inhabitants in all, and of its millenary history and struggle to regain its independence.Nevertheless,

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the experience of 120 years of foreign rule contributed to an attitude of opposition, or at least indifference to the institution of a state.Under such circumstances, particular importance was attached to various communities, such as the ethnic nation, rural village communities, and the family.The relative strength of those ties linked to "Gemeinschan", and the weakness of "Geselschaft", persisted through the whole of the nineteenth century and up to the period of the Second Republic established after the Second World War.Even in contemporary Poland this tendency has not withered away. Two major factors contributed to the survival of national identity in partitioned Poland: national culture (language, customs, symbols, art) and religion (Catholicism, in Orthodox and Protestant surnoundings).The importance of cultural identity manifested itself with particular strengthin emotional attitudes toward the Polish language, illustrating the unique position of nineteenth and twentieth century Polish literature in the national experience. Certain literary works became objects of national devotion; great poets and writers became national heroes. The belief in education was no less important, and was stimulated by a desire to support the emerging intelligentsia who, in the nineteenth century, were given the task of safeguardingnational traditions. Mass education, on the other hand, was also emphasized, and was seen as a means of developing national consciousness. Polish national experience in the last two centuries resulted in a system of social values different fmm those found in societies which have not been deprived of independence for long periods. Particular importance came to be attached to qualities which contributed to the cause of national survival: language, customs and habits, faith, self-sacrifice (including the willingness to give one's life). On the otherhand, less esteem was accorded to those values which contributed to the survival of the state, such as law enforcement, efficiency at work, respect for individual and institutional representatives of the state, etc. These differences in value systems have consistently resulted in misunderstandings, recriminations and reciprocal grievances between Poles and people of other societies. The Poles have for a long time "gotten on Europe's nerves." A striking example of the specificity of Polish values in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be seen in the tendency of Poles to view international politics in moral rather than pragmatic terms. A young Polish historian has recently commented that:

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Poles imtated Europeans because they had too many complications in them ....A young European, if he h a p p e d to belong to an appropriate social class, found in the contemporary world quite auspicious conditions for his self-Millment ....A young Pole stood before the same opportunities, but he had to answer for himself a couple of additional and basic questions which revolved around one issue: how much of his one and unique life he should sacrifice to the fatherland? (Tomasz Lubienski). While Western Europe had completed the transition to a capitalistic economy and political system, Poland still remained an agricultural country with a traditional social structure. Given the slow pace of urbanization and industrial development, rural elements still predominated. By the middle of the nineteenth century, 80percent of the population of "Congress" Poland (the Russian zone) were employed in the agricultural sector. Despite the abolition of personal serfdom and the equality of all citizens under the law, elements of the feudal system endured in rural social relations. Neighbouring inhabitants of squire cottages and peasant farm houses remained far apart in social status: 'Squire cottages' created, however, somethingmuch more important and durablethan a doctrine: a collection of consecrated values, a catalogue of Polish virtues, h m which a native literature and ideologicalcamps of various shades would deriveduring the entire period of bondage. A bucolic country life was a centralvalueof this system: a deep conviction that country air had natural attributes of conserving both physical and moral health, mildness and simplicity of customs, respect for parents, love of God and motherland.. . The estate was something more than a farm: it was a hearth, a gentry nest, and outpost of Polish being and faith. (Jexzy Jedlicki). The peasant's sense of national identity was less developed, however. Essentially emotional, his traditional attachment to the soil was not based on patriotic attitudes. The peasant was more aware of "being here" than being Polish; his fatherland was more private than ideological. In the literature which appeared following the uprising of 1863, the peasants' indifference to the national question was condemned, although their tenacity in defending their country was glorified.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

Only after the enfranchisements enacted in the nineteenth century did the peasants take possession of the soilthey cultivated. It then became obvious that cultivation in general did not interest them so much as cultivation of one's own piece of land. The durability of this value, which has survived into the second half of the twentieth century, suggests one reason why postwar attempts at collectivization have never succeeded in the Polish countryside. The manifold temtorial changesundergoneby the Polish statehave also brought forth new ethnic relations. As a result of territorial expansion and contraction, there has been some mixing between the Poles and neighbouring nationalities. This is true especially at the so-called "Kresy" (borderland) extending along the eastern border, but also in Upper Silesia and Pomerania. However, viewed in terms of the entire Polish state, native Poles have always formed a significant majority. At the onset of the period between the two world wars, of 27 million citizens, 69 percent were Polish, 14 percent Ukrainian, and 8 percent Jewish. This probably explains why no slogan advocating demographic expansion of Polish nationality has ever been proposed by those nationalist groups concerned with solving the "national question." The impact of political and temtorial changes on internal ethnic relations has beenmuch strongerthan the impactof the birth rate amongthevariousnationalitieslivingin Poland. Despite its strict and consistent ban (even to this day) against birth control, the Polish Catholic Church has never encouraged the worship of procreation.

Nonetheless, the phenomenon of emigrationhas had some demographic influence. Before 1830, the population of "Congress" Poland amounted to four million. Political emigration was closely tied to sudden political changes, of which there were plenty in the last 200 years. Emigration "in search of bread," stemming largely from the overpopulated countryside, intensified at the end of the nineteenth century, affecting many more people than political emigration. In the period preceding the First World War, over four million Poles left partitioned Poland; (three million settled in the United States, fortyfive thousand in Canada). The 20 years of independence between the wars was a period of adjustment, during which various segments of Polish society learned (sometimes through acute conflicts) to live together in their own state. It was also a time of construction of modem institutions and new, primarily political, elites. But this process had no opportunityto reach maturity in the short lived Second Republic.

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The Second World War and its consequences

It is hard to overestimatethe significance of the war in shaping Polish attitudes towards the nation and the state. As is commonly known, the Poles' refusal to accept the limitation of their State sovereignty was a direct cause of the outbreak of the War in September 1939. (This is why the French sarcastically labelled it "the war for Gdansk" - a port city which had been a bone of contention with the Germans.) During the subsequent Nazi occupation, the Polish underground state functioned quite effectively, all things considered, under the direction of the government-inexile (based in London), having at its disposition a well-developed system of basic governmental agencies with the army playing a major role. The war years thus both strengthened national identity and helped build consciousness of the state. After the war, the contradiction between nation and state was once again intensified. On diminished temtory there emerged a new state, which was not adirect continuation of the prewar government,but rather a dramatic reorganization enacted by the Communist Party with the support of the Soviet Union. This state relied heavily on ideology which it attempted to impose through force (sometimes resorting to terror) on the whole society, especially during the Stalinist period. The fact that all the power was wielded by a minority party, under the leadership of successive teams (led by Bierut, Gomulka, and Gierek), could not fail to produce an explosion of popular discontent. This experience did nothing to abolish the nation-state contradiction, even though the authorities managed on some occasions to win public acceptance for certain policies and programs. The opposition of state and nation loomed very large against the background of the crisis of August 1980. In that conflict, the authorities declared their role as representing the state interest (i.e. public good) while the Solidarity movementpresented itself as the spokesmanof national aspirations (which, among other things, called for reform of the state). Imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981, only reiterated the importance of the nation-state dichotomy in modem Poland. Three years after that event, predictions as to the future of that ongoing opposition have as much relevance as a fairy tale.

National Survival in Dependent Societies Two conflicting ideologies regarding the national question

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, two tendencies have vied with each other in shaping Polish independence struggles, and strategies for solving the national problcrn and particularly the problem of relations between nation and state. The competing philosophies have been characterized as "romantic" on the one hand, and "positivist"onthe other.The first set of ideas was formulated by nineteenth century Polish poets, the greatest of whom, Adam Mickiewicz (1798- 1855) had written: ". .. reach outward far beyond the sight / Crush what mere human reason cannot harm!" ("Ode to Youth") (translated by J.G. Noyes and M.B.Peacock). Elsewhere, Mickiewicz voiced what may be seen as the basic principle of Polish romantic nationalism: "Size your force up to your dreams / not dreams to your force" (our own translation). Polish positivism (sometimes callcd "positivism Warsaw") was in clear opposition to romantic thinking. Although based on philosophical positivism, it was mainly an intellectual and social movement linking those ideas to notions of political realism and organic work. One of the fathers of Polish positivism, Aleksander Swietochowski, wrote, in 1882: Don't let us hope for anything after political upheavals, wars, treaties, the volatile favors of foreign powers; but let us trust only our own vitality. Occupy all vacant positions, squeeze into all clefts, strike roots everywhere, in any possible breeding ground. To kneel at the grave and weep or to defend it against its being tumbled by a hyena -yes, it can be as good as any outpouring of despair but not as a token of energy. Put around that grave the cradles of new life; draw beams and they will radiate ever wider circles of influence; broadcast our own civilization;-that is the programme of action- reasonable and effective, and all the more so since the State into which we have been incorporated (i.e. Russia) opens to us so many outlets. Polish romanticism advocates a kind of absolutism which views reality in terms of all or nothing solutions, and encourages momentary acts of heroism. On the other hand, Polish positivism advocates: pragmatism, maximization of gains and minimization of losses in a given situation as well as lasting, systematic effort.

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The clearest manifestation of the romantic tendency can be seen in a series of insurrections and military actions, beginning with the insurrection in 1794, led by Tadeusz Kosciuszko, then the November Insurrection of 1830, the January Insurrection of 1863, the creation of a Polish m y (called "Legiony") at the beginning of the First World War, a series of uprisings in different parts of the country during and just after the war aimed at joining certain territories to the Second Republic, and finally the Warsaw Uprising of August 1 to October 2, 1944. On the other hand, efforts directed toward development of the economy and educational improvements in the Russian sector, the fight against Germanization ("Kulturkampf"), the creation of co-operative banking, national farna, etc., in the Prussian zone, as well as attempts to play a political role within the Austro- Hungarian empire, were all more or less positivistic in character. In fact, one could employ these terns in characterizing even contemporary events in Poland -e.g. linking the Solidarity movement with the romantic tradition. 2.

QUEBEC

The national issue in Quebec and the nationalist movement as we know it today have a relatively short history. However, in order to understand the strange destiny which awaited it we must return to the very origins of the French colony in America. At the time of the British conquest in 1760,this society (if such it could be called then) numbered hardly more than 60,000people. Two centurieslater,

the population had reached six million, an increase brought about through the birth rate alone, which was a feat rarely equalled in history. This so-called "revenge of the cradle" was an attempt to impose through numbers what politics and economicshad denied. Though it had never been achieved under the French regime, such population growth would undoubtedly have contributed to the success of the colony. Under the French regime, the national issue had never raised its head except in a negative sense: there was a preoccupation that autonomy from the metropolis might stand in the way of developmentwhich was centred mainly on the fir trade and imports. These activities were organized to furnish as much capital as possible to the metropolis, and there could be no question of compromising this. French immigration alone was insufficient to populate and developthe society of New France, and France's failure in this regard was brought to a conclusion in 1760. The marks of this failure can still be seen

National Survival in Dependent Societies

today. Social hegemony fell into the hands of the church, which even at that early date cherished a dream it subsequently realized, that of establishing a Catholic society established on rural foundations and which would endure through its connection to soil and tradition. The threat represented by the American Revolution, as well as the political climate in Europe and England at the end of the eighteenth century, explain why, under British rule, Quebec was allowed to retain its language, religion, and code of civil law. The emergence of a mainly professional bourgeoisie (doctors, lawyers, etc.) made possible the development of a republican ideology in Quebec in the early nineteenth century. There was a desire to imitate the new American republic, and some advocated annexation to the United States. The failureof the 1837rebellionled to an inquiry and the Durham report. Lord Durham's inquiry into the political crisis of the time resulted in, among others, the recommendation that measures be taken to assure the assimilation of the French-speaking population. His report helped create the conditions necessary for the emergence of a national consciousness in the French population.

F.X.Gameau, author of the first history of Quebec (1840),was pessimistic in his assessmentof the future of this small nation, which heviewed in terms of limited aspiration appropriate to a small nation: "Que les C a ~ d i e n ssoient fiddles ct eux-mgmes; qu'ils soient sages et pershkrants, qu'ils ne se laissent point skduire par le b r i l h t des nouveautis sociales et politiques. C'est aux grandr peuples d faire l'kpreuve de nouvelles tMories....Pour nous, une partie de notreforce vient de nos traditions; ne now en kbignons (pas) et ne les changeons que graduellement" (F.Dumont. 1969:

148).

The French Canadian nation was to be rural and Catholic. Having returned to the land after the Conquest, this new society was forced to reorganize itself in relation to new political conditions. The new "Middle Ages" (M. Rioux, 1971) which ensued, were built around the church. Neither the abolition of the seigneurial system in 1854,nor the advent of Confederation in 1867 would forestall the consolidation of theocratic hegemony. Notable was the church's creation of a System of classical colleges from which would come a professionalbourgeoisie, and more particularly, a political class

Social and National Consciousness

...

composed of liberals and nationalists who became, the manifestation par excellence of the contradictory aspirations of a peasantry struggling with its destiny. It was only with the coming of industrialization that this social structure began to change. Two levels of government, one federal and one provincial, took their place at the head of society according to a division of powers set down by the Constitution of 1867. Operating in the tradition of the British parliamentary system, i.e., on principles of economicand political liberalism, this balance of power persisted until the Quiet Revolution of the early 1960s. The Canadian and Quebec states, however real they might have been in their functioning, remained, however, somewhat abstract As Quebec's first sociologist remarked in 1885: "Les habitants montrent dans la gestion des affaires municipales et scolaires une parcimonie excessive, d courte vue. Quant aux @sires provinciales et fkdkrales, elles leur kchappent." w o n Gtrin, 1968: 126). Some 75 years later, at a time when Quebec was in ebullition, Vincent Lemieux (1971) made the same observation: political parties were, first and foremost, family affairs, and their raison d'Ctre was to be found in the desire for continuity. Politics in Quebec, traditionally, was determined by kinship, for the simple reason that family ties remained the real, essential centre of life; the same was true for the economy. The new Middle Ages were rural and continued uninterrupted until the Second World War, which marked the beginning of their decline. The Quebec state had to act in accordance with this, and a convincing illustrationof this is the policies of internal colonization which were defended up to the end of the nineteenth century, and then again during the crisis of the 1930s. Paradoxically, these policies were carried out through state intervention, a role which many had hoped the state would assume in relation to so many other issues such as education and industrialization, but which it was not to do until after the 1960s. Thus, since the second half of the nineteenth century the develop ment of an agricultural economy was stimulated by hiring agronomists and establishing schools of agriculture. This endeavour was promoted jointly by the church and the state. This nationalism was indeed economic as well, but we must qualify this statement immediately by saying that the economy and the economic ideas of the time were those of a society rising up again from its ashes. The economy was essentially agricultural, and agriculturalism became a doctrine of mythical proportions. A Quebecer had no choice but to be a

National Survival in Dependent Societies

fanner, a condition seen as basic to his development and eternal happiness. It was also the cause of his poverty, and here some attemptswere made to comct the problem and, incidentally, also to stem heavy emigration to the United States. Agriculture became the battleground in the struggle for the national survival of French Canadian, for with it went the survival of the family and those traditions which evolved from living on the land. If it has been said that Quebec nationalism at the time was apolitical (A. Belanger: 1974), the same might have been said of economics. This was obviously not the case though it suggests a situation in which polities and economics were in fact of a very different nature. The French Canadian nation saw itself locked in a strugglefor temporal and spiritual salvationin the face of the combined threat of American materialism and Anglo-Saxon capitalism, both of which were Protestant in spirit. The mission of propagating French Catholic civilization in North America was applied to the nation itself, which was seen as having a spiritual vocation. The values of faith, language, culture, family, and land became systematized to form one national id en tit^.^ From this perspective, it is hardly necessary to note that the coming of the industrial world -while it brought an urgently needed remedy for the poverty of rural Quebec -was nevertheless a national catastrophe, worsened by the fact that it was an essentially foreign phenomenon. The national economy had been community based, and was designed in the image of the family. The nation itself was seen as a large family in which egalitarianism was a social value, enforced by complementary behaviour patterns. To dispense with this economy meant dispensing with a particular type of family and society (Lemieux, 1971).Personal economicsuccess meant setting oneself up in a relationship of inequality, which would lead to the breakdown of those egalitarian family relationships. The only workable economic system was one based on national aspirations and the social values which developed out of these aspirations, in other words, the co-operatives, and later on, consumer co-operatives, housing co-operatives, and so on. These, it must be admitted, had a variable record of success. The most outstanding example was the credit and loan co-operatives - the Caisses populaires Desjardins -which played an important role at the outset of the Quiet Revolution. The co-operativeeconomy made it possible to wipe out usury in the rural areas. It became an enormous reserve of capital which did not transgress the

Social and National Consciousness

...

system of community values. Operating on the principle of one man, one vote, it provided the basis for a form of economic democracy whose raison d'Ctre was the promotion of the collective interest as opposed to money making. The "liberals", meanwhile, established banks. These banks and the credit and loan co-operatives were the origin of the first indigenouscapital reserves, which in turn, made possible an indigenous industrialization. The central role of the Second World War

However, the second wave of industrialization in Quebec after the Second World War modified this state of affairs. It was the beginning of a process of social change, the Quiet Revolution being, at the beginning of the 60s, its political expression. The massive population movements (urbanization process) associated with the mobilizationforincreasedproduction (industrialization process) during the war, the use of female labour and the vastly increased buying power which resulted from economic expansion, all contributed to the erosion of traditional, prewar values. Postwar industrialization and urbanization, along with the entry of women into the labour force, especially in factories, led to the development of a new middle class, and created the conditions for the new society which was now under construction. There was some opposition to the changes. Two economists, Father E. Bouvier, a Jesuit, and F.A. Angers, condemned the industrialization of the early 1940s,setting out to demonstrate "objectively" that the phenomenon of women working was contraryto nature. It is clear from their writing, however, that they understood perfectly well that industrialization would change the social roles not only of women but also of men, the family, the educational system, etc.. Industrial society was contrary to rural society and therefore to nature. The values and canons of the old society were destined to disappear in the course of this "quiet" revolution which was nonetheless decisive from the point of view of politics, culture, and eventually economics. And indeed, the once strongly-integrated,traditional value system did in fact give way to a new, less easily defined set of values, a product of the disintegration of the old society and the emergence of the new, not yet fullyarticulated social form. Politics, once abstract, now became very concrete in Quebec. Not only did the governmentintervenein all areas of political life; those social functions which the church had previously assumed were now taken over by the state.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

New ministries were created to govern areas such as culture, education, and welfare; state corporations were established, state-owned companies appeared, and nationalization became the order of the day. In contrast to past indifference, there was a swing to feverish activity and state management, in order to meet the challenges of a modem economic order which had become international. Without possessing the full powers of an independent state, but nevertheless acting as a relatively autonomous political jurisdiction within its structure of the Canadian confederation, the province came to be recognized by the Qu6Mcois as their own nation-state. Yet the province of Quebec is also part of the Canadian state and the acquisition by the former of some of the attributes of the later is not an evident step but rather the product of a whole history, and all political parties, both Canadian and Qu6Mcois, have had to subscribe to this as a sort of sociological necessity. The federal parties although here only the Liberal Party has succeeded -have done so because they have managed to express a part of Quebec's aspiration; but perhaps because, in the case of the Liberal Party, it has been led for nearly 20 years by leaders of Quebecorigin-liberals and nationals. The last act in this scenario, which took place in 1980, was the Quebec referendum, the purpose of which was to permit negotiation of increased sovereignty for Quebec. The Parti QuebCcois government lost the referendum: then the federal government under Trudeau repatriated the Canadian Constitution without the consent of Quebec. The consequence of this episode - which might be characterized as Quebec's "normalization" experience-was that Quebec became a province like all the other provinces. From a founding nation of Canada with the customary right of veto, Quebec society had become simply a province. Quebec will nevertheless have to sign the Constitution but the conditions under which it will do so are unknown. Its minimal requirementsdo not obtain a universal consensus in English-speaking Canada. The Meech Lake Accord (1987) was the first step in that direction as it was unanimously approved by the provincial first ministers. Events since then, however, have generated a lot of uncertainty and pessimism as to the eventual outcome. To summarize then, by the middle of the 1980s,Quebec had become an industrial, urban society. Its agriculture had evolved into agro-business. The extended family had given way to the nuclear; divorce, once socially forbidden, was now accepted and common; the birth rate had dropped below the level of replacement. Education and health had become the responsibility of the state. The education systemhad been reformed and democratized,universities

Social and National Consciousness ...

had undergone accelerated growth, health reform had been undertaken. Economic liberalism was now fashionable, and the traditional cooperatives had grown into huge, bureaucratic enterprises. Conservatism, the ideology of survival, had been replaced by the ideologyof rattrapage (catching up), or modernization Quebec, after the Quiet Revolution, was preoccupied with forging a new society, more in line with the modem world. Indeed, the history of Quebec over the last two centuries can be summed up in terms of a herculean effort to find an original solution to the problems of the nation, short of opting for an independent political state.Two conflicting ideologies with regard to the national question resulted in the conservatives and the liberals being at odds: on the one hand, the "survival" doctrine which held that "lesinstruments de son [la nation] destin sont la croix et la charrue" (Mgr Paquet, 19 15);and on the other hand, the ideology of rattrapage which stressed,with little successuntil 1960,the urgent necessity of modernizingthe decision-makingsystem and the industrial base if Quebec were to develop (E. Bouchette, 1906). The above discussion confims the role of the nation and the state in the development of both Polish and Quebec societies as well as in the fashioning of their dominant social values and ideologies. Furthermore, rather striking is the similarity of the historical condition of domination which determinedthat agriculture became not simply a way of life, but ameans of survival,and often a means of resistance to all forms of foreign intrusion. Agriculture was in both cases the rampart of the nation. Its conservative role as national guardian also explains why both countries soon fell behind, both in terns of agricultural development and overall economic progress. There is also an interesting parallel to be seen in the ideological duality characteristic of both societies: i.e. Polish romanticism vs. Polish positivism, and Qu6bCcois conservatism (survivance) vs. QukbCcois liberalism (rattrapage).There are certain points of comparison between, for instance, conservatism and romanticism, both of which are based upon an ideal view of what society could be rather than an account of its prevailing state of development. Conservatism, however, implies a connection with the present and/or the past, while romanticism emphasizes change and a movement toward the future. Both positivism and rattrapage stress the necessity of serious, intensive effort in pursuit of modernity. However, rattrapage is connected with notions of progress and competition, while positivism emphasizes stability and self- sufficiency.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

In the everlasting struggle against a state which is perceived as foreign, such ideologies are the political and social articulation of the contradictions a dominated society has to deal with, Such societies thus waver between the absolution of those values which are responsible for its survival, and those which would promote its development. This development, and the social change that comes with it, will inevitably be at the expense of tradition and a survival hitherto assured.

RELIGION AND THE CHURCH 1. POLAND

Since the earliest times, Christianity has had serious political consequences for Poland. The adoption of Western Christianity in 966 gave Polish rulers the right to compete with other already existing states for a place in the political fabric of Europe; it also brought a respite from attacks by German magnates who until then had invaded Polish lands under the pretext of fighting paganism. From the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, while Poland was partitioned into smallprincipalities, the church and Christianfaith helped bind together the separate provinces. Instrumental in this was the cult of certain Polish saints. In much later epochs, a similar role was played by the icons of the Black Madonna of Czestochowa and Our Lady of Ostra Brama in Wilno which also acted as integrative symbols. Despite a temporary weakening of its position as a result of the Reformation, the Roman Catholic Church in Poland always exerted a strong influence over affairs of state. This openly political role was given official confirmation after 1573(during the period when Polish kings were chosen by free election), with the custom of appointing the Primate of Poland as head of state for the time of interregnum. As a secular kingdom, Poland was also assigned a quasi-religious mission within the framework of European Christendom: protecting the Western world from Eastern paganism. The most expressive manifestation of this function was the decisive role played by the Polish m y (under King John I11 Sobieski) in beating back the Turks in the battle of Vienna in 1683. In 1861, there were 3269 Catholic priests and monks in "Congress" Poland, out of a total population of approximately five million. In the

nineteenth century Polish partition, the church was the only native institution to escape the general restrictions, although there was some repression of the

Social and Nationul Consciousness ,.. more radical elements of the clergy. In response to social expectations, the church became the protector of national identity, testifying by its very existence to the vitality of the subjugated nation. There were times when Polish was spoken only in church and at home, and mass gatherings for religious services often culminated in nationalist demonstrations. With the Prussian "Kulturkampf' and the policy in the Russian sector of granting privileges to those who turned Orthodox, keeping the Catholic faith grew to the status of a national duty. Particularly in the countryside, the "Polish- Catholic" equation became all the more meaningful. This explains why, in the Second Republic, the tendency to identify patriotism with attachment to the church was sometimes used as a weapon against ethnic and religious minorities.The social and moral authority of the church, dating from the era of partition, was used in support of nationalistic actions. During the Second World War the German occupation had particular significance in terns of this blending of national and religious issues in the Polish consciousness. Both the church hierarchy and the clergy were unambiguous in their stand against the invader and in support of the resistance movement. The clergy suffered heavy losses in this struggle. A Franciscan priest, Father Maksymilian Kolbe -recently canonized -came to symbolize both religious and national resistance by sacrificing his life to save that of a fellow prisoner in the death camp at Auschwitz. After the war, the church lost its privileged position and found itself on the defensive; the Communist Party had no intention of tolerating alternative centres of power and ideology. Nevertheless, by the 1980sthe church had not only survived, but also regained lost ground. This was due to three factors. First, Communist attempts to limit the church to a spiritualmissionwere doomed to fail in a country where the Catholic faith was so widespread. Second, as soon as it was threatened by Stalinism, the church once again became a symbol of national identity as it had in the nineteenth century. Its representatives accentuated the church's deep roots in national history and traditions while dissociating themselves from concrete ties with the existing state. At a time when relations between church and state were much improved over what they had been in the 1950s,the Primate ofPoland, Stefan Wyszynski, stated that "the nation.. .is a lastingphenomenonjust as the family from which the nation originates. There were moments when the state's voice was taken

National Survival in Dependent Societies

away, and only the Church of Jesus could speak in the name of the Polish Nation.. . When the state was unable to offer the country a helping hand, (the church) stood in for it, pe~onningits duties". Thus the church became the repository of national values a position which always found wide popular acceptance. Third, the church, with its general social followingand its intelligent and cautious policies, gained unchallenged moral authority as the only public organization independent of the government. Defending its own right to undisturbed development, the church fought at the same time for more freedom for the whole society. Accordingly participation in religious ceremonies served to demonstratenot only faith or devotion to God, but also national and political sentiments. After 1945,religious practice served for many Poles as the only way of takingpart in an authentic collectiveexperience.The church's permanent and, more or less open opposition to the authorities gave participation in it the character of political dissent. Consequently, ceremonial activities such as processions, pilgrimages, visits to holy icons and so on, came to the fore, sometimes acquiring significance at the expense of conscious religious experience. Such ostentatious religiosity (some would term it "folk" religion) is compatible with the popular roots of Polish Catholicism which emphasizes ritualism, a weak relationship between the religious life and its ethical and ideological content, and a conviction that religion is a matter of collective, not individual, experience. Despite extensive and profound social and political changes, Catholicism in the 1980s remained closed, not having undergone any significant transformations. The links between religious experience and accepted moral standards and behaviour were still rather weak. In everyday life this manifested itself, for example, in the sphere of sexual morality; the standard of chastity continued to be strongly accentuated in Polish Catholic teaching. In Poland more than 80 percent of the population declare themselves as believers. However, in view of the church's extensive influence,many people who are religiously indifferent or simply atheist, show their attachment to national or family traditions by occasionally taking part in church sewices. The election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla to the papal throne and his subsequent visit to Poland as Pope John Paul 11, opened a new chapter in reflections on the church's role in Poland. As a matter of fact, almost all of Polish society, united in national triumph, took part in these events.

Social and National Consciousness ...

The Solidarityera altered the position of the church. It was no longer the only authentic, independent major organization having its own territorial structure and communication system. During this period the church became a necessary mediator in conflicts between Solidarity and the authorities, thus assuming a strictly political function. After imposition of martial law and the dissolution of the trade unions, the church's representativesopenly advocated involvement in public affairs, which was a clear departure from their prcvious ambiguous stance on this issue. The Polish Church as a "Great Organization" The Polish church does not perform exclusively spiritual functions. On the earthly plane, it maintains a sizeable establishment. In the period between the two world wars, the church was present in all areas of public life, and cooperated closely with the state. With its well-developed networks of fraternities and associations administered by the hierarchy, its charity organizations, press and publications,and the concordat between the Holy See and the Polish state which assured the church a privileged position, it was among the most influential forces in the country. It is interesting to note that during this time the official Catholic political party (its name translates literally as "Labour Party") was rather weak. On the other hand, during the time of partition and after the Second World War, the church operated parallel to, or quite against, the state. Later, under Communist rule, many church institutions, such as charities from the prewar period, were taken over by the state. In addition, the church was deprived of influence in areas such as public education. However, in the wake of the serious social and political breakdowns of 1956, 1970, and 1980, the church gradually recovered its losses. As a result of the crisis of August, 1980, the church regained certain spheres of operation: access to mass media, increased number of titles and circulationfor its publications,wider possibilities for ministry in such places as hospitals and prisons, and permission to raise numerous ecclesiasticalbuildings. Religious teaching at primary and secondary levels was organized in every parish, and the church continued to have at its disposition the Catholic University of Lublin and numerous seminaries. The church was now neither poor nor silent! It took positions in public affairs and maintained extensive international relations. Its territorial structure embraces the whole area of the country, and this fact, along with its hierarchical structure, requires maintenance of a considerable bureaucratic apparatus. In

National Survival in Dependent Societies

1983, there were 21,643 Catholic priests and monks in Poland, out of a total population of thirty-six million. In theory, the church pursues no economic activity. However, in the

early 1980sit assumed the role of distributor of enormous amounts of foreign aid. In 1985,the church was planning to act as chief administratorof Western aid to individual Polish farmers. 2.

QUEBEC

The Roman Catholic Church is intimately tied to the history of Quebec, and constitutes a sort of backdrop. Its incessant struggle to build a French society in America has exceeded its original, missionary efforts, and this vocation survives even today. It contributed in the early days of the French colony in America, to the enlargement of the French empire through discovery of new territories as far west as the Rocky Mountains and as far south as Louisiana. In no way can the failure of the colony be attributed to the church. In fact, throughout this period, the church fought to provide a solid foundation for the colony by encouragingsettlementon the land, realizingthat an economybased primarily on the fur trade tragically compromised the colony's success. The church's failure can be explained to a large extent by the then policy of official Gallicanism, according to which the Church of France was unable to exceed the powers bestowed on it (control of the missions, pastoral activities, and education and welfare of the population). It carried out these functions in a colony whose territory was both immense, and enormously underpopulated. The conquestbrought with it a profound change. The church had to fight for the right to exist, since the transfer of authority from the French to the British presupposed the expectationthat the Church of England be established both in principle and in practice. The successive victories of the "Eglise Canadienne" came in exchange for loyalty to the British crown, obligation which various ecclesiastics were to defend at the time of the War of 1812 (between Canada and the United States). This division of loyalties constituted a formidable test for the new "British Subjects" of Quebec. Nevertheless, the Catholic Church was in fact recognized as an established church within this British colony. The situation was, however, to remain delicate for some time. The colony had first to recover from the Seven Years War (1756-1763), and it could call on no real outside assistance. The colony and its society were seriously shaken. The mother Church, in France, was in no better position,

Social and National Consciousness

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being on the eve of the French Revolution, the effects of which would be felt even in Canada. The new professional bourgeoisie, seizing the idea of Liberty, soon became aggressive in its demands. The church reacted with a campaign against liberalism, which it saw as an invitation to further catastrophe. It waged a war against the "Reds" (Liberals) and the "Instituts canadiens" (which, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, had been popular breeding places for the revolt) -even resorting to excommunication when necessary. However, the church at this time was in a position of relative weakness, having at its disposal only 323 priests for a population which had increased from 60,000 in 1760, to 500,000in 1840. Nevertheless, with the failure of the rebellion of 1837, liberalism suffered a major defeat, and the church's power and leadership were reinforced. The stage was set for the growth of a national church which would build the social edifice of French Canadian society. Education, which soon fell under its control, would become its main instrument. Laval University, established in 1852, was the first French University in America and the only one until 1922. It had a pontifical charter and was administered by the seminary at Quebec City. Control of primary educationwas ensured by the ComittcatholiquedeI'imtructionpublique,which was administered by a council of bishops. Secondary education was offered by classical colleges which were also controlled by the church. The characterof the teaching body also changed; while in the beginning it was largely composed of lay personnel (96 percent), by 1901that percentage had fallen to 57. As well, teacher training was in church hands, since: "toute la pddagogie catholique est centrke autour de i ~ ~ l iets dominke e par elle, c o m e toute la vie.. . C o m e interpr2te de la doctrine du Christ, elle ttablit les normes de I' tducation chrttienne, nun seulement enfonction de la destinke surnuturelle de I'enfant mais en fonction de sa destinte temporelle." (N. Voisine, 1971 :44). The multiplication of dioceses and parishes made it possible to extend and secure the church's mission, which was expanding on an unprecedented scale. By 1910, there were 1,465 priests for a population of more than two million. Recruitmentto the clergy was high, indicating a transformationwhich was in the nature of a religious awakening. In the classical colleges, which were becoming increasingly numerous, nearly half the graduates entered

National Survival in Dependent Societies

religious life (Voisine, 1971:45). The church in French Canada was on the brink of triumph. A national institution to the degree that to be French Canadian meant, first and foremost, to be a Catholic; the church's ultramontane ideology was the expression of a state of affairs which precluded political solutions. Nationalism and democracy still preoccupied the "Reds" or Liberals, who spoke of establishing a democratic nation-state. Under these historical conditions, this was an impossible solution. Hence, many simply gave up their dream, or went into exile. The church, meanwhile, was about to hlfil a dream of its own which dated back to the French regime: transforming Quebec into a rural society whose expanding population would live and work on the land, thus ensuring stability and cohesion. This social program was put into effect but its very success led to failure in the long run. Acting against the commercial classes, which it had traditionally antagonized, the church sought to eliminate them completely from the enormous enterprise it was undertaking: that of building Quebec society (A. Faucher, 1970). It succeeded so well at protecting the society (to the point of turning it inward on itself), that it almost brought about Quebec's downfall. In the church's plan, social cohesion was to depend on agriculture. Industrialization would, of course, be permitted, but only insofar as it manifested the same virtues as agriculture, and followed the same economic pattern. The church's opposition to capitalist economics was radical in this respect: L'industrie a une tendance nkcessaire vers le cosmopolitisme; l'agriculture au contraire est de sa nature essentiellement conservatrice.L'attachementd lapatrie, d ses institutionss' identr'jle pour I'agriculteur h I'attachement au sol auquel il estfixk par la propriktk.. ..L'agriculturefera concurrence dksirable cf I' industrie qui est et qui sera encore longtemps ktrangdre, ou plutdt elle donnera la vie, une valeur rbelle et durable, d I' industrie indig2ne et contenue dans de justes bornes.. . (Dumont, 1969: 154).

The Quebec Church as a State

The co-operative economy which developed after 1900provided more effective tools for social progress, and this transition was also initiated by the

Social and National Consciousness ... church. The society which was evolving now appeared extraordinarily coherent; built by the church, it would soon be indistinguishable from it. The prevailing ideology, emanating from the clergy, was distinctly clerical and reflected the interests of this now dominant class. Religion had taken on a political aspect, and functioned outside the politics of the state. It was the true centre of social life. Consequently,the state at that time could hardly be more than an impotent reflection of the church.

"Leprttre par cela seul qu' il estprttre, parce qu' il doit ttre plus que tout autre ktranger h l'ambition et h I'intkr&tpersonnel, est appelk h connaftrelesfaits et les kvdnements de la sociktk;parce qu'il a la mission de Dieu pour les juger et les apprkcier; parce qu'il est le gardien nk de la morale en tous lieux, en tout temps et que la morale est like nkcessairernent aux institutions sociales; parce qu' il a la missiond' insnuire, deprotkger lespeuplescomme les individus" (Dumont,1969: 155). This Christianity was of a medieval type, and its social plan of a corporatist nature. By the beginning of the 1940s, the church in Quebec numbered 25,000, clerics and members of the orders, who were engaged in "construction of the city" and radically opposed to all modernism. The church had now set up shop, and by comparison the state was a poor relation (N. Voisine). The church was even attempting to desecularize what was secular:

Comme cette sociktk est une chrktientt! de type mkdikval, l'&lise s' efforce donc de sacraliser le monde industriel et urbain, c'est-hdire les nouveaux rapports du capital et du travail et le genre de vie qui en dbcoule. L'idkologie que d e e d I' ~ g l i s ene permet pas une division du social et du religieux! (N. Voisine,1971: 66). Within this hierocratic regime, the church was in many ways similar to a totalitarian state; it was, however, a giant with feet of clay. Quebec was experiencing industrialization (in the form of injections of Anglo-American capital) and would soon begin developing into a pluralistic society. But at the same time the church had locked Quebec into a ideological prison in which, "L'on a I'impression que, impuissante h se reconnaitre h n s ses conditions mati?rielles &existence, une collectivitk s'est exilke dans un univers social parall8le, celui du souvenir, du rtve, de la spkculation" .(Dumont,1974: 1011).

National Survival in Dependent Societies The attempt to desecularize the secular would continue into the 1960s. Generally speaking, the church resisted industrialization and external influences. As early as the end of the nineteenth century, the church opposed the American-based International Unions. It spearheaded the formation of the ConfedQation des travailleurs catholiques du Canada (CTCC) in which the union chaplains had the right of veto. Another such organization the Jeunesse ouvri8re catholique (JOC) appeared shortly thereafter. The Asbestos Strike in 1949 (P.E. Trudeau, 1970), in which the local workers fought a large American company on issues more concerned with human dignity and working conditions than with higher wages, marked the breaking point in the ideology whereby church and state worked hand in hand, under the direction of the former. The conservative and authoritarian government, led by Maurice Duplessis, sided with the company against what it perceived to be a new opposition. As a result, not only students and intellectuals, but the church as well was won over to the cause of the workers, organizing support from around the province to sustain them over the long months of the dispute. Paradoxically, the victory of the workers marked the beginning of the end for the church. The secular power, in the form of the repressive state, now began to emerge as the real arbitrator of conflicts. The social relevance of evangelical ideology was now being questioned more and more. In order to develop, Quebec's economy had to be modernized, and its educational system brought up to date. People had been saying this for 50 years, and it was obvious that the church was not up to the job. Groups of intellectuals were formed around new, progressivejournals such as CitkLibre, Partipris, and the daily newspaper Le Devoir. The social sciences, which had ~ pre-occupied with using empirical begun to appear in the 1 9 4 0 ~became analysis to make an inventory and assessment of social problems. The elections of 1960 brought the defeat of the Union nationale party, which had been in power for more than 30 years. The Liberal Party, under the slogan "It's time for a change," was to usher in the era of the Quiet Revolution. After the 1960s the church remained in control of vast financial and human resources, but was now "out of wind." Surveys made in 1960 show an astonishing decline in religious practice. The church was soon to withdraw from various sectors which subsequently became the responsibility of the state, such as education, health, etc. All social agencies, such as associations and unions were secularized.Recruitmentof priests and the novices for orders declined dramatically, and there were desertions from the clergy, as well as a

Social and National Consciousness

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drop in church attendance abetted by the fact that non-attendance (once unthinkable, and the object of social ostracism) had suddenly become socially acceptable. (N. Laurin-Frenette, 1978: 120) The church entered aperiod of silence and withdrawal, and its voice was not heard again until the 1980s. This long period of retrenchment would provide an opportunity for the church to question its vocation and role in the world. A first step in this self-assessment was camed out by a commission of inquiry, the Commission d'ktude sur les lacs et l'~glise,which was headed by sociologist Femand Dumont. Political disillusionment and disappointment with modernism could explain the strong subsequent resurgence of progressive groups which had defined themselves as left-wing Christians! The church in Quebec has always played the role of spokesman for the society (F. Dumont, 1983). Needless to say, there have been periods in which it has lacked the capacity to influence overall cultural and political conditions. By the mid 1980s it was still too soon to determine whether Christian voices would begin speaking to a new vision of society.

Notwithstanding the similarities, there are a number of apparent differences in the behaviour of the two churches and in their structure which invite reflection. In a more religious society like Poland the church was more pressed to respond to spiritual needs, whereas in the more secular Quebec society the church took up more worldly concerns. Are the channels of communication between the churches and the population -direct in Poland and via institutional intermediaries in Quebec -different and why? Why is it that the major challenge of the Quebec church was to socialize the profane whereas the Polish Church found itself inextricably identified with something as profane as Polish nationalism? Is the role of an independent institution such as the church in Poland and Quebec different in a closed society and in an open society. No doubt differences in the nature of the dependency of these two dependent societies pertain here. In Poland, as in Quebec, the church was the incamation of society, becoming not only its historical, but also its social conscience. In both societies it contributed greatly to the social fabric, assuming various roles in substitution for other social actors which were missing. The church was the originatorof many social forms, institutions, and patterns of life; the family is a prime example of an institution which found its legitimacy in Roman Catholic canonical law.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

PECULIARITIES OF POLAND AND QUEBEC Certain values exist in both Poland and Quebec which are quite peculiar to each society. These are: the family as a social institution of particular importance; certain attitudes towards work, egalitarianism, historical consciousness and the sense of having a special role among nations. We will now proceed to explore each of the peculiarities as they manifest themselves in the two societies. 1. FAMILY

In terms of the individual's immediate milieu, the family- and-friend circle in Poland is seen as clearly distinct from the wider social environment. In surveys in which Poles are asked to list their principal life goals, "happy family life" (along with such values as "health", and "a peaceful life free from surprises") appeared high in the hierarchy of preferences. The conclusionhas been drawn that the society as a whole has experienced limited social aspirations, giving rise to the thesis of "small stabilization" with regard to Polish society, at least in the 1960s. In fact, the tendency to situate one's life aspirations within the circle of one's own lot, including family and friends, was to a certain degree, a compulsory choice as opportunities for public activity remained closed to large segments of society. The spurious, artificial character of public life, along with enforced conformityto rules which regulated all public activity and advancement to the exclusion of individual initiatives, created a tendency towards withdrawal into the sphere of privacy. The resulting sharp separation between the private and public spheres has had a bearing upon all social life in Poland. The attraction of the family group and of the home (which is a crucial element in Polish social reality) lies in giving the individual a shelter from pressures stemming from the centralized world of official institutions. However,Polish family life is not excluded or separated from public life; the private sphere has become a place in which, however imperfectly, the country's real public life is being regenerated. Family-and-friend channels help circulate information and create public opinion which, althoughthey have no chance for official manifestation, nevertheless can affect attitudes. For the younger generation, family upbringing and education supplement and comct the instruction received in state-controlled schools or through the mass media. This supplementary education also includes religion. Generally speaking, home and family can be viewed as the carriers of values which supportnational and cultural continuity.

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The family-and-friendgroup also functions importantly as a mutual-aid network. Chronic shortages encourage the establishment of informal networks of redistribution. The family-and-friend group forms a singular unit within this informal economicnetwork, manging its internal relations, in this case on a basis of mutuality in providing rare goods and services. Polish society has often undergone violent shocks and upheavals; hence the family-and-friendgroup tries to produce mechanisms for absorbing these shocks, adapting to new conditions, and resisting any direct threat to the individual or his immediate group. During the Nazi occupation, underground organizations were also established on the basis of bldod and friendship ties, and this common wartime experience produced an esprit de corps among membersof the resistancemovement whichlater intensifiedpersonal contacts in peacetime. Such group contacts help relieve tension and fear during moments of threat. We can thus justifiably say that such a group plays a defensive role, and constitutes a kind of protective coat for an individual. In Quebec's case, the family was at the root of society. Being socialized in it was tantamount to being socializedinto society and the destiny of society, the cohesion and integration of which was, as we have stated, remarkable. It was also a process of forgetting the immediate environment and the social contradictions which would finally topple traditional Quebec.

Quebec's traditional character can only be truly understood in terms of its polarity with the modem industrial world. In an agricultural setting, children learned farm work naturally, and the family unit, if necessary, could be entirely self- sufficient. In political life (for which the parish provided the most immediate framework), the father was the authority delegated by the priest. In intellectual life, the force of tradition, combined with church doctrine, provided explanations for all of life. The social effects of the advance of industrialization, which intensified radically after the Second World War, can be summarized as follows: from 1940 to 1960, the rural population dwindled dramatically and the extended family became the nuclear family; after 1960the family began to break down completely, as unmarried couples became exmmely common, and the birth rate experienced a dramatic decline, 55 percent in the 12-year period from 1960 to 1972. The whole complex of social relations was transformed at its very foundations. The criteria for social differentiation had become negative with regard to the family and tradition. Positive social values were implicit and

National Survival in Dependent Societies

problematic, yet clear: progress, money, the future. Depending on a person's age, acquired social position, and set of values, the family was still the centre of life for some, but was generally being abandoned for the workplace which would become the centre of social life. This shift of emphasis helped legitimize the transformation of social relations, thus providing a basis in consciousness for adaptation to a new, emerging class structure (R. Sevigny, 1979). 2. ETHICS OF WORK

One of the most serious social and economic problems of contemporary Poland is worker inefficiency and the low quality of work. Sociologists, economists, managers and politicians have provided various explanations for this situation. At times it is ascribed to enduring, centuries-old traits in the Polish national character. Sometimes the opposite is asserted and the whole blame is placed on the political and economic system. Here we will put forward the thesis that the situation is due to a combinationof both factors i.e., social values and organization of social and economic life. These factors combined prevent Poles from ever understandingconscientiousperformance. (Significantly, the feeling of the meaninglessness of any activity appears in other areas of public life which have nothing to do with work.) In Polish society, work is seldom accepted as a value unto itself. Neither the dominant traditions nor the socio-economic situation after the last war have encouraged such an attitude. Undoubtedly this is also due to a large extent to the fact that Catholicism never attached as much importance to work as did Protestantism. Looking back over the last forty years, we can note a characteristic absence of a social order of work. Other contributing factors include: 1) the system of state-controlled macro economic management which was based more upon orders than upon market mechanisms; 2) the fact that workers have no say in the running of their factories, and in the manner of utilization of the products of their labour; and 3) the tendency to confuse economic and political criteria in assessing worker efficiency, individual performance, etc. The lack of any social order of work no doubt was an impedimentto the developmentof a work ethic, as well as a respect for work as an autonomous value.

Neither the socio-economic system nor the country's traditions were much help in allowing work to be appreciated as instrumental to the achievement of certain goals, particularly those connected with individual and

Social and National Consciousness ...

collective survival. Since the eighteenth century, collective survival, survival of the society - as we have already pointed out - was identified with the survival of the nation, not the state. While work may be of crucial importance to the survival of the state, national survival has emphasized rather different virtues. Polish socialism, in itself, does not help to shape positive attitudes to work as a means of individual survival. The state's role, not merely as protector, but as a factor shaping the whole of individual and collective existence, as well as its position as principal employer, have created the expectationthat the state, not the individual,was responsiblefor solving all the problems of its citizens.

AU the factorson this far from completelist have contributed to a certain conviction in the Polish mind as to the meaning of activities defined as work, and to a generally contemptuous attitude towards work and those "nalire" enough to take it seriously and with full commitment. In Quebec, on the other hand the value of work itself is exemplary. Work on the farm was, of course, the very source of agricultural life, but it was also the guarantor of tradition and its survival. It assumed this role in the strictest sense; its objective was self-sufficiency, in and by the family. It was not essentially a source of capital, but had, first and foremost, a religious significance. The meaning of work admitted no exception; its rhythm was marked by the Angelus, Sunday, holy days and religious ceremonies which made sacred the main events of life, such as, for example,the planting of crops.

Work would however become a source of progress and development, and of capital.Paradoxically,this occurred early, but to the profit of the society as opposed to the individual, and to ensure the survival of the farmer. When a family was too large to establish all its sons on the land, they went to work outside of it (in the city or in the United States) to make enough money to buy land. This process, which was at the origins of urbanization, would have its effect on farming, which was itself soon mechanized. It was not until the 1960s, however, that this transformation appeared in all its force. Fam mechanization would be followed by agro-business. As for a specifically Francophone industrial structure, even though it was dependent,it began emerging underthe aegisof the state. Nonetheless, the French-speakingpopulation remained a minor partner in the industrial sector, not only because they had limited capital, but also because they had so long resisted this change, having favoured tradition and family over economic

National Survival in Dependent Societies

values, "laissantaux autres lefeu des usinespour se consacrer h une mission civilisatrice, i.e.fian~aiseet catholique en Amkrique du Nord" (MgrPaquet, 1915).

The value and the meaning of work were defined in this new industrialized society context, either as a pure source of capital-in the case where the work was meaningless in itself, automated and ungratifying-or as a source of personal satisfaction combiningprestige and wealth and having meaning in terms of the new class structure. The character of work was nevertheless, essentially related to the specifically economicvalue it had recently acquired. Worthy of note with regard to the fate of the work ethic in Quebec, is the consequenceof the establishmentof a public service of a scale in keeping with the new state Quebecers wanted for themselves. Indeed, the recent history of tension between the union of public service employees and the state is indicative of an important mutation in Quebec society: the state has replaced the church. Frequent and massive strikes in the public sector have shown, if only by their severity, that a new understanding is in gestation with regard to the meaning of work; at the least, the old meaning can no longer be taken for granted given the new circumstances. 3.

EGALITARIANISM

In our description of dominant social values in Poland, we have emphasized continuity rather than change. The case of egalitarianismis quite different, and constitutes -at least in its present scope -a new phenomenon.

Here the heritage of the past is very ambiguous. The Polish state of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries was a multinational entity where various nationalities lived in overall harmony interrupted by periods of conflict. The state was controlled by the "szlachta", i.e., gentry (Poland was also sometimes called "the Szlachta Republic") who were much more numerous than in western Europe. On the one hand, the state tried, not always successfully, to block the advancement of the upper strata of the gentry to the circles of aristocracy. On the other hand it took a paternalistic position vis-A-vis other social strata, especially the peasants. Generally speaking, the Polish state of that period was very differentiated ethnically, socially and religiously. Besides ethnically Polish Roman Catholics who were clearly the majority, there were several other religious communities:Protestant, Orthodox, Jewish, Moslem, etc. Differentiation was

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in certain cases connected with a sense of superiority or inferiority,but on the whole the differences were perceived functionally rather than hierarchically. The nineteenth century disrupted the pattern. The absence of an industrial revolution and of a strong and numerous working class, along with the relatively late enfranchisementof the peasants (in "Congress" Poland in 1864) deepened, and in a way distorted, the pattern of social differentiation. The dominant role fell at that time to the inheritors of gentry traditions - the intelligentsia. Nevertheless, a sense of national unity and of alienation from invaders and oppressors helped to smooth these differences and encourage solidarity. The Second Republic which emerged after the First World War began its history in a condition of wide socialdifferentiation,with strongantagonisms surfacing upon occasion. Divisions between strata, classes, and ethnic groups - as well as religious differences - carried with them certain privileges, prejudices, and attitudes of superiority and inferiority.To these divisions were added other distinctions, inherited h m the time of partition, regarding regions which had belonged to different occupying forces. Here again there was a division between "better" and "worse" regions. As a result, Polish society in that epoch was not only highty differentiated, but also rife with antiegalitarian attitudes. The Second World War and particularly the Nazi occupation brought a dramatic change, both in the objective situation and in human attitudes. Pauperization of the entire country led to a sense of imminent national catastrophe and ajoint struggle forliberation involving all strata. The postwar period gave new momentum to the egalitarianism tendencies which were facilitated by various influences, among them the new socio-economicsystem and its doctrine. As a result, in contemporary Poland, one can observe a tendency to radical (even if superficial and sometimes inconsistent) egalitarianism. In the absence of clear-cut criteria for distinguishing "better" from "worse" and since in a l l too many cases the notion of what was "better" was arbitrarily imposed by the authorities, Poles have found it most reasonable to insist that everyone is cast in the same mould and should therefore be measured by the same yardstick (i.e. in the matter of wages). This radical egalitarianism has a harmful impact in many aspects of social and economic life because, among other things, it has more to do with rights than with duties, more with distribution of goods than with their production.

National Survival in Dependent Societies In Quebec, from the end of the eighteenth century (after the conquest in 1760), Quebec began to lay the foundations for an essentially rural society based on the family and tradition. In a different context and for different geopolitical reasons, this community, a community of destiny like Poland, would raise egalitarianism and equality to the status of a social norm. This norm proved functional and prevailed, and its value was generalized to the whole of the society.

The emergence of a bourgeoisie that was mainly professional (doctors, lawyers, etc.) and whose origins were for the most part rural, justified the only socially permitted hierarchy outside the church, except, of course, the hierarchy resulting from foreign domination. This professional elite, versus the rest of the population hierarchy, was sanctioned by the church and had no real economic significance. This norm is best explained in a popular expression which claimed that in Quebec a Quebecer- unlike members of other cultural groups -could not succeedbecause, at the first sign of success,his own people rushed in to contest his success thereby putting him in his place. The solidarity resulting from the conquest and the relative poverty of rural Quebec, glorified by the church in its opposition to the menace that American materialism and Anglo-Saxon capitalism represented to Quebec society, were, as we have pointed out, at the origin of the new society that was in place by the mid-eighteenth century. Vincent Lemieux, who in an extensive study 0971)confirmed this phenomenon of solidarity,found the explanationin the strength of family relationships in a rural society. Furthermore, the degree of strength of these relationships determined the presence of either conservatism or liberalism, that is to say, a relationship of either equality or inequality. A relationship of inequality gave rise to the breaking down of the family and kinship, and the emergence of a society based on achievement, the "achieving society." To succeed in business, or even to want to succeed, was contrary to the social norm and was considered abnormal. More than that, it meant accepting foreign ways, the ways of the dominator, or even worse, of the Protestant religion. In a way, it meant being a traitor to oneself and to one's homeland. What we have here is economicegalitarianism.As forpoliticalegalitarianism, it was legitimized by the religious and social hierarchy in the case of the professional bourgeoisie, whose status depended less on money than on prestige based on knowledge, which in hlm legitimized the social privileges they enjoyed.

Social and National Consciousness ...

The Neo-nationalism of the 1960swas characterized, on the other hand, by the reinsertion of economicvalues into social thought, and the concomitant and progressive disavowal of religion and of the church as an institution. Indeed, both the religion and its particular institutional form had been the central basis of the egalitarianist ethic and of the social structure of pre-World War I1 Quebec. 4.

HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Quebec's history dates back to the eighteenth century, Poland's to the tenth. Thus, the requirements of the comparativemethod would recommend consideration of the last two centuries exclusively. However, in the case of Poland, we have felt obliged to invoke ancient history for two reasons: first, our analysis of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be better understood on the basis of even a superficial knowledge of earliertimes; second, since we are concerned with the nature of Polish historical consciousnessin the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it seems appropriate to give some idea of the sort of past to which we are referring. In contacts with Poles, foreigners are often astonished at the importance attached to history in Polish political thinking. Poles constantly make allusions to history in their interpretation of present-day phenomena and are inclined to seek analogies and examples in the past. The origins of such attitudes and tendencies can be readily traced back to the historical troubles experienced by the last dozen or so generations of Poles.

Historical consciousness has had wide consequences for psychology and behaviour in Polish society. It has strengthened the sense not only of national identity, but also of individual identity, as one perceives one's own existence against the background of past generations. Such attitudes loom behind the importance which Poles attach to national symbols, historic places and relics of the past. They also surface in fierce disputes over historical figures such as Marshall Jozef Pilsudski, leader of the country after the First World War, and also over figures of the remote past, such as St. Stanislaw, Bishop of Krakow, who was condemned to death by King Boleslaw Smialy "The Bold" in the eleventh century. In the latter case, modem debate focusses on the problem of the superiority of the state over the church, and questions of acceptable limits to its intervention. Paradoxically, this kind of historical thinking favours an ahistorical perception of the present, which is often seen as a mere repetition of the past

National Survival in Dependent Societies

For example, some social scientists claim that the "culture of defeat" (seen as honest coping with inevitable defeat) persists in Polish tradition, as a generalization of the nation's experience during the past 200 years. Such a culture encourages turning a blind eye to new elements of reality that have emerged from changes in the country and in the world. In Quebec, F.X. Gameau wrote the first national history in the early 1840s, assessing this strange society and its failure under the French regime and its failure under the English regime at the time of the abortive revolt of 1837.The Durham report, which was the British government's response to the uprising, was to have ensured (through the implementationof the resolutions set forth) the assimilation of French Canadians, thereby settling the problem once and for all.

The report had very little success, principally because the society withdrew into itself with the aim of establishing the foundations of a social system which would permit it to surviveno matter what conditions prevailed. As we have pointed out, the church spearheaded this resistance and the building of the new society; it thus became the society's conscience, particularly its historical conscience. Hence, the society's destiny would be a religious one from then on. The history of prominent figures of this heroic period is the history of priests, missionaries, and those in the religious orders who were the founders and builders of the society. The church gave a history to the society, with the result that it became oblivious to contemporary reality even to the extent that the French regime came to be seen as a golden age. In fact, the French regime had been a colony that had failed.

La reconstruction du passt canadien-fran~aisest alors moins la recherche empirique dune donnbe, c o m e y proce'daient d I' &ranger tant d' kcoles d tendance positiviste, que le dkgagement et le rappel d' une continuitt!de sens d'un retour h des archbqpes qui puissent fonder un destin (F. Dumont, 1974: 10-11).

The Canon Lionel Groulx was the last great historian of this tendency and the first of anew one. He was the first to outline and define a plan for a new society -political independence. He succeeded in giving history an institutional basis, making it possible to study history rather than just dream it. This situation was, nevertheless, quite paradoxical for a modem society. History had only made its appearance as a full-fledged discipline in 1943, combining the art of relating events with "positive knowledge." It was no longer defined

Social and National Consciousness

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simply by tradition and by what had been done, but also by what must be undertaken. History, in fact, had to be made. Henceforth Quebec would change rapidly and begin making its own history, ahistory which would come to be defied less by the forces of tradition and the past than by a sense of what needed to be undertaken. In the meantime, Quebec would attempt to rediscover itself through the rewriting of its own past. Political history opened up to the main contemporarytrends as well as the great debates on the meaning of history itself in which sociologists would also participate. Economic and cultural history, as well as the history of the working class became research enterprises. A national history would also be discovered, and within it, regional histories which were now just beginning to be written. If the British Conquest of 1760and the failure of the 1837 rebellion were at the roots of the Qu6Mcois' historical and national consciousness,the decade of the 1960s marks yet another rupture in the history of this society, as historians have noted. The relative failure of the independentist movement, coupled with the restriction in sovereignty represented by the new Canadian Constitution (1982), may well signal the beginning of a new history which remains to be written. 5. A SENSE OF EXCEPTIONALITY

Closely tied in with the Polish historical consciousness of which we have spoken is the conviction among Poles of the exceptionalnature of their nation.

Allnational communitiesare founded upon a sense of separatenessfrom other ethnic communities. After all, consciousness of one's distinctiveness is not inconsistent with an awareness of being only one member of the family of nations; these nations differ yet belong to the same category of objects. However, there is much to indicate that in Poland the sense of distinctiveness has been transformed into a senseof exceptionality, and this exceptionality has no consistent definition. In the nineteenth century, the struggle for independence- which was always being taken up and lost -gave birth to a messianic myth that Poland was a Christ among the nations who would redeem other peoples with her sufferings.We can clearly see here a search for reasonable historical elements which would substantiatethat Polish martyrdom, romanticism, and bravery in the face of death (qualities which Poles both praised and criticized to an equal degree) were not in vain.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

Polish history remains "inachevt?e".National uprisingsin the nineteenth century, the decline of the Second Republic,the outbreakof the Second World War and the resistance movement during the Nazi occupation all culminated in the tragic and abortive Warsaw Uprising of August-September 1944.In more recent times, the repeated social upheavals have been cyclical, always exploding and fading with no apparent beginning or end.The objectives, though often modified in the course of time, have remained basically the same. A prominent Polish poet and intellectual, Antoni Slonimski, wrote: "I

am running away from our history, the scenario of which must have been written by the devil himself - as everything so fatefully and unmistakably turns into evil; against logic and justice, in spite of human and divine laws." The Poles' sense of exceptionality can indeed be partly explained by direct reference to these great historical failures, and the inability to reach "the other bank of their history." Another writer explains this excessive emphasiswith "things Polish" on over-stylization: "We want too much 'to be' such and such a way, and not another, and hence we 'are' too little at all." (Witold Gombrowicz) Endlessly trying to confirm their own value, Poles observe themselves carefully and comparethemselvesto others. This behaviour produces mixed notions of their superiority and inferiority, leading to never ending disputes on their own national character. The sense of exceptionality sometimes degenerated into a feeling of abnormality. It finds illustration in many colloquial sayings such as "in this country it is inconceivable," "anywhere else it would be possible," or "it could happen only with us." These sayings express something more than general complaints about "this damn mess" and point clearly to a difficulty in adjustingto the surroundingworld; one canlive in it, but not without doubt and misgiving! The contemporary sense of abnormality is not merely the result of historical "unfulflment", although these two realities do actually coincide. The feeling of things being "abnormal" stems in the first instance from a lack of rationality, or simply from the absurdity of individual experiences in everyday life. On the otherhand, this notion of abnormality also testifiesto the existence in social consciousness of certain positive standards of normalcy. It is no doubt easier to envision these standardson the plane of everydaylife than it is to answer the question: what sort of normalcy do Poles expect from history?

Social and National Consciousness

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As for the exceptionality of Quebec, it was first a French colony, and as such was victim of a tragic destiny, though not an exceptional one. Its survival was precarious, its fragility impressive. That it lasted at all is, no doubt, remarkable; one might say that the gods were on its side. An exceptional destiny was, however, created for it. This destiny took the form of a providential mission, that of spreading French Catholic civilizationin North America: Oui, sachons-le Wen, nous ne sommes pas seulement une race civiliske, nous sommes des pionniers de la civilisation; nous ne sommes pas seulement un peuple religieux, nous sommes des messagers de 1' ide'e religieuse; nous ne sommespas seulement des fils soumis de P ~ ~ l i snous e , sommes, nous devons &?redu nombre de ses zklateurs, de ses dkfenseurs, de ses apdtres. Notre mission est moins de manier des capitaux que de rkunir des idkes; elle consiste moins d allurner lefeu des usines qu' h entretenir et dfaire rayonner au loin le foyer lurnineux & la religion et de la pense'e (Mgr Paquet, 1915).

The church made the effort which was necessary to fulfil such a vocation. In fact, until not so long ago the ideological space of this vocation extended to the whole continent. This design was, indeed, the essential fact of Quebec society. It gave it its very form, and insulated it from the surrounding modem world, which itjudged accordingto its own scaleof values, a scalethat disregarded the very conditions that account for this modem world which would eventually prevail even in Quebec. History had to be remade, reread and rewritten. To use the expression of F. Dumont, it had to be made into "positive" knowledge. Two schools of thought, particularly after the 1950s,disputed the exact measure of the advent of this society: the nationalist school and the federalist school. Was the conquest a trauma of such degree that the society had taken nearly two centuriesto recover from it, and would come into its own only with independence; or was it -on the contrary-a piece of historical good fortune, making the society's development possible because it was finally part of a new empire which would look to its needs. All of Quebec history could be summed up around this debate. The ideologies of survival and of catching up (rattrapage) are the prime political expressions of this contradiction. Here we would like to note that it would be interesting to pursue in more depth the comparison of the differing historical and geopolitical circurn-

National Survival in Dependent Societies

stances out of which both societies forged a comparable providential destiny as a means of coping with the tragic situationhistory accorded them. The same applies, of course, to the present situation; what would be the consequences of these same histories and the various strategies deployed at various levels political, economic and cultural -by social groups with a view to constructing a "normal" society?

The last 200 years in the history of Poland mark a period of dramatic experiences and transformations: loss of independence and more than a century of subjugation to foreign powers; twenty years of independence between two great wars, Nazi occupation in which the nation suffered heavy material, moral, and human losses, and the politically and economically turbulent years of adjustment to a new social system. These changes in a "dependent" society inevitably brought profound alterations in everyday life, world outlook, and accepted value systems. However, the transformation was only partial. In fact, the significance of the new systems consisted primarily in creating new situations through which inherited values and attitudes continued to manifest themselves; it was less successful in moulding new values. As well, Poland did not participate l l l y in the processes which transformed Western societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; this marginality partly explains the absence in Polish history of a developed form of capitalism. Consequently, the social levelling processes experienced in Western Europe and North America, which would allegedly lead to a "global village," were experienced in Poland only to a limited extent. Instead, what is strikingin the society are its enduring features: respect for national traditions, strengthof religion and the church, importance of the family, that is, qualities which seem to be rather in recession in Europe and North America. Undoubtedly, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, such a situation would have been labelled backward or "civilizationally behind the times." However, in the middle of the 1980s when the direction and criteria of development were being questioned, this opinion probably would not be so clearly negative. Perhaps the developmental line of social consciousness in Poland could be called dysfunctional, both in view of the international situation and the immediate interests of the Polish people. At any rate, a specific relationship between change and the continuityof social values makes it more difficult for foreign observers to understand what is really happening

Social and National Consciousness

...

in contemporary Poland. By the same token, it is not easy for Poles to understand world reaction to their problems.

Conditions have changed in Quebec. The ideology of rattrapage or modernization has prevailed since 1960, and Quebec has become a modem society. Although this has occurred at the expense of the church and religion, policies to protect the French language and culture have, nevertheless, been put into place. A state has been created, and an open Francophone economy is emerging in Quebec while at the same time a demographic decline is imminent. Furthermore, the lost independence referendum of 1980 and the new Canadian Constitution - the latter in some respects the sequel of the former -mark a low ebb in the independencemovement. Perhaps it is a time to see to the consolidation of what has been gained. To sum up this analysis we wish to stress that in spite of economic, political, and other differences, many similarities between these two societies can be found in the sphere of attitudes and values. We have tried to suggest various hypotheses explaining these similarities. One of these has been advanced in the title of the essay: both are "dependent" societies. Notwithstanding, at least one important difference can be seen in the sphere of social consciousness: it is that Polish society, with its long and dramatic history, continues to experience a strong sense of continuity, while in Quebec it is rather a sense of discontinuity which appears to prevail.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

NOTES 1

2

The Quebec state was obliged to act in accordance with the prevailing spirit of these new Middle Ages. A convincing illustration can be seen in the policies of "internal colonization" which drew support up to the end of the nineteenth century, and were revived during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Paradoxically, this program was &ed out by the state which had traditionally refused to intervenein matters of education and industrialization. However through the initiative and combined efforts of church and state, the development of an agricultural economy was now stimulated by lraining agronomists and establishing schools of agriculture. Colette Moreux (1969: 37-38)has described this process in this strikingpassage: Par ce mode de vie simple, le cultivateurconserve intactes les vertus et la s a t e de la "race", 8 l'abri des maladies morales et physiques qui menacent l'habitant des villes: il assure entre autres1'6panouissement de la cellule de base, elle aussi 'naturelle', de la societb canadiennefrancaise,la famille. La 'fid6lidYdes 6poux...une h o ~ C t subordinae tion de la femme 8 son mari...le respect et la soumission entihe des enfants 8 leurs parents: la 'tendresse' de la mkre, le 'd6vouement7du @re fixent sans Muivoque le statut des diffbrents membres de la famille et lui conRrent force et stabilid. C'est en son sein que les vertus chrbtiennestrouverontleplus facilement8s'exercer, 81' de l'esprit de jalousie et de concupiscence qui marquent les autres relations sociales: c'est 18 particulikrement, que la purete trouvera refuge par une surveillance rkiproque des individus qui composent la maisonnk. Enfin, vertu cardinale, la fkondid aura ici la force de loi. On sait que, malgrb l'absence presque comp15te d'immigrants hcophones et le depart de quelque deux millions de Canadiens fran~aisaux ~ t a t s - ~ noui sdans les auh-esprovinces canadiennes, la population fran~aisea presque centuple depuis la conquCteanglaise; or depuis une vingtaine d'annks, depuis prkisCment que l'influence cl6ricalejoue moins,le taux denatalitbdes Canadiensest sensiblement Cgal,mdme infbrieur,Bcelui de la population anglophonede l'Ontario par example.

VIII THE PROCESS OF DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRIALIZED CAPITALIST AND SOCIALIST SETTINGS

Gary Caldwell Antoni Kaminski Witold Morawski Arnaud Sales

INTRODUCTION In the field of comparative studies, the most developed of all dimensions in which comparisons have been made is that of socio-economic development. The reasons for this are manifold, but in most cases the explanation is quite simple: as the purpose of comparison is often to situate a given country in the family of nations, reference to the world economic order affords the best opportunityto do this; the comparisonis made in terms of economicindicators. This approach is further encouraged by the fact that economic growth has come to be considered the best way to demonstrate progress in the race to modernity, health, and political hegemony. Indeed, from the 1950sthrough to the 1970s, economic indicators were considered to be the best indicators by which to chart the progress of individual societies in this race.

However, for many commentators,descriptions of only the quantitative aspects of economic growth were considered insufficient, and in some cases misleading. Authors of this persuasion have come to attach more importance to qualitative aspects, as manifested in social indicators, and speak in terms of socio-economic development as opposed to economic growth. Furthermore

National Survival in Dependent Societies

-and this point is important-there is an attempt to explain socio-economic developmentitself in terms of such factors as differences in the economic and political social systems ("systemic" differences), cultural diversities, and psychological attitudes. This essay identifies with the qualitative approach, which has become quite widespread. However, we would like to think that the particular contribution of our analysis is the incorporation of a substantial descriptive dimension to an essentially explanatory discourse based on a comparative analysis. The first issue to be faced is the relevant differences between Poland and Quebec. The two societies are very different geographically-in terns of size and location, demographically- with respect to population size, density, and rate of growth, and economically-with respect to the level of development and structure of the economies. These differences are all taken into account in our analysis, but from our perspective, their importance is secondary. The primary purpose of our essay is to examine the impact of institutional structures; hence, we shall be interested, above all, in the consequencesof the differing institutional structures in the two systems. In the present comparative analysis, the social process to be examined is in the mode of industrial and, more generally, socio-economicdevelopment in Quebec and Poland. It would seem to be obvious to us, as students of modernization, that the most crucial set of relations determining the pace or mode of socio-economic development is that between the state and the economy. Equally, we consider the state-economy nexus to be undoubtedly the most central element in the social organization of industrial societies. The relationshipsbetweenthe state and the economy are mediated to the extentthat they are institutionalized. The main thrust of our comparative analysis is, therefore, to examine the two sets of economic and political institutions prevailing in Poland and Quebec from the point of view of the developmental strategies they generate, the vested interests they create and/or reinforce, as well as those interests they destroy or neglect, and the social consequences engendered. It is on this level that we believe some intriguing similarities a~ encountered.

However, to restrict our discussion to the treatment of the two institutional systems as closed systems would be entirely unjustified, as they operate in larger and very different multinational environments. Quebec is part of the world market economy that integrates nation-statesprimarilythrough economic

The Process of Dependent Development ...

mechanisms; Poland belongs to the socialist bloc in which integration is achieved primarily through political mechanisms. The two larger environments put considerable, although different, constraints upon the freedom to manoeuvre of the member countries. Furthermore, both of these larger environments have more or less clear-cut boundaries, although they intersect in the spheres of economic exchange. The upshot of this is that we are dealinghere with two kinds of variables: a set of internal variables having to do with the role of economic and political institutions located within a societal system, and external variables which impinge directly on the possibilitiesof internaldevelopment. In the sociological literature the latter type of relationship is characterized in terms of concepts suchas "dependencyttrelations,"centre periphery" relations,and "metropolitansatellite" relations. In interpreting Poland and Quebec we will attempt to take into account both types of variables, although we shall not accord them equal importance, the internal variables being of primary interest. So far we have alluded to the differences between the two institutional systems. What is interesting, however, is that if one considers the question of economicdevelopment in the two societies from the general perspective of the process of economic development,the results are in some ways very similar: after cyclical periods of short-lived booms, followed by economic stagnation in the senseof decline in the rate of economicgrowth, socialcrisis, and a dearth of creative vision among political elites, both countries found themselves in a cul-de-sac. The position of Quebec is somewhat more satisfactory for many reasons: its economiccrisis is milder, and the recovery of the West's economy will improve the Quebec situation and probably postpone the necessity of reforming the boundary institutions which mediate between the state and the economy for a number of years. In addition, the freedom to manoeuvre politically in Quebec - its membership in the federal state of Canada notwithstanding- is greaterthan that in Poland. Nonetheless, Quebec society is facing a crisis - economic, fiscal and demographic - however mild compared to the crisis in Poland. In the light of the above qualifications, our objective is to examine the present social and economic crises in the two institutionally different countries, in order to find out how and why the crises occurred in each case. If by comparative analysis, we are able to answer these questions, then we shall also be able to contribute to a better understanding of the contemporary institutional environments in Poland and Quebec. First we look at Poland, then at Quebec, and finally we proceed to general conclusions.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN POLAND: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIES, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES The socialist system was introduced in Poland in 1945 subsequent to the Second World War. Indeed, the future of Poland was resolved by the fact that the country had been liberated from Nazi rule by the victorious Soviet Amy. Although the Communists in Poland had been a small minority, they tried to broaden their social support by entering into an alliance with splinter groups from the Polish Socialist Party, the Peasant Party, and the Democratic Party. These splinter groups eventually merged with the Polish Workers' Party, creating the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP)in 1948,or they continued as formally quasi-independentpolitical groups in an electoral bloc associated with the PUWP. Consequently, the institutional system of Polish socialist society was built on the main premises of the Leninist doctrine of the socialist state: that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leading role of the Communist Party within the political system, and state ownership of the means of productionin short, the primacy of politics over economics. Since 1949this same system was uniformly implemented in all countries of the Soviet bloc. The year 1949 was the turning point: the bloc has evolved from internal diversity (i.e. "national roads to socialism") to imposed uniformity. The subsequentdominant role of politics in the domain of economiclife was exercised through central planning of economic development and the active role of the party in economic management. This dominant role has also been reflected in the change in the role of trade unions and certain other social organizations, from that of organs which articulate interests to that of "transmission belts" from the power centre to the masses.

The political and economic integration of the socialist bloc has been achieved through different means at different periods. During the Stalinist period, as was manifested at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), political and economic integration was achieved, to a large extent, by Stalin's personal authority and direct central control over many areas of political, economic, social, and ideological life. After Stalin's death in 1953,the integration has talcen on more institutionalized forms. Thus, for instance, COMECON, which was created in 1949, did not play any significant role until the 1950swhen the organizational structure and diverse

The Process of Dependent Development

...

programs of co-operation and co-ordination of national economic plans started to function and develop. Though Poland is a part of the socialist bloc, it is also dependent on the world economy. This has been increasingly true since the beginning of the 1970s when the regime of Edward Gierek decided to increase economic exchange with the West, making Poland increasingly dependent on Western capital and technology.This shiftin economicpolicy has not been accompanied by functionally complementary economic and social reforms. This, it would appear, was one of the main reasons for Gierek's failure to achieve sustained economic growth. The evidence for such an evaluation is not wanting: Poland bought hundreds of licences without having prepared the economicsystem for the exploitation of modem technology, investments were made without sufficient justification, and a lot of money was spent on representation. The indebtednessof the Polish economy to the West has been graduallyincreasing, especiallysince 1973.Due to the faulty economicpolicies and the unfavourable state of the world economy since 1973, Poland found herself in a position in which she is not able to meet her financial obligations both to the West and, increasingly, to the East. 1.

THE GENERAL LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In this essay, we have chosen to characterize the general level of economic

development in the post-Second World War era in terms of the following indicators: the size and rate of growth of the GNP (in the case of Quebec, the Gross Domestic Product, the nearest available approximation), the rate of growth in the capital industries and the manufacturing sectors, the proportion of the labour force outside of agriculture, and a number of more specific indicators dealing with investmentchoices,energyproduced and used, and the productivity of agriculture. In the case of Quebec we will be attentive to the level of government spending and investment, a dimension of economic activity which must be delimited in a mixed economy. Such a distinction is unnecessary in a socialist economy like Poland where most institutional spending and investment is governmental in nature. A brief review of the situation in Poland with these indicators in mind leads us to a number of general observations on the level of economic development in Poland. The GNP growth index, up to the time of the current crisis,has been relativelyhigh. This index continued to rise until 1979, at which time it began a steady decline for four years through to the end of 1982. GNP

National Survival in Dependent Societies

per capita in US dollars, according to the estimates of the World Development Bank, was approximately $3,300 in 1979. The highest growth rate had been attained in the periods 1952to 1955 and 1972to 1975. Duringboth periods the rate of growth was approximately 10 percent annually. Nonetheless, the general tendency throughout the whole period has been one of a declining rate of growth in the GNP.In this respect, Poland has not been an exception among the socialist countries. It should be borne in mind that the unusually high rate of growth in the 1972 to 1975 period was a direct result of a massive inflow of Western capital. The main factor accounting for this substantial overall growth in GNP was an increase in industrial production, mainly in heavy industry. The proportion of agricultural production in the GNP declined gradually from 34 percent in 1960to 10.4 percent in 1980, while at the same time the proportion represented by industrial production has increased from 37 percent to 54 percent. However& spite of these changes in the relative contributions of agriculture and industry to economic growth, the proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture still exceeds 25 percent. The variation in the annual rate of capital accumulation -investment as opposed to consumption - in this period is of interest. In 1946 capital accumulation compared to the GNP was 17.2 percent. By 1953it had almost doubled to 32 percent. By 1956 it had fallen to 19.5 percent, only to begin rising again slowly, attaining 27.1 percent in 1970. From that point on a steep rise began, resulting in levels of 36.7 percent in 1974,357percent in 1975, and 34.4 percent in 1976. However, after 1976, an accelerating decline set in, resulting in a rate of capital accumulation of 10.9 percent in 1981. In retrospect, an interesting phenomenon can be observed when growth in GNP is plotted against growth in capital accumulation,or investment, over time. Every major political crisis in Poland has been preceded by a decline in the annual rate of growth of investmentsbelow that of the annualrate of growth of GNP. The relationshipbetween these two indexes has been, therefore, quite a good indicator of political crises. We explain this relationship in the following way: faced with declininginvestment,the authoritiesfirst attempted to redress the situation by raising food prices, in the hope that such measures would make more funds availablefor investment. Observersof Polish political life know, however, that in each instance of popular protest in the postwar period, the immediate cause was the decision to increase food prices.

The Process of Dependent Development ... 2.

INSTITUTIONS AND STRATEGIES OF DEVELOPMENT

According to the liberal conception of economic development, the main source of growth is the private sphere of the economy. In the Leninist view of the world, on the other hand, the main source of economic development is the planned activity of the state guided by the CommunistParty. It is assumed that the party possesses all of the knowledge necessary to make optimal decisions, and what is more, that it understands the laws determining the course of history. Themain actors in the socialisteconomicsystem are: the party apparatus (the political bureau, the secretariat of the central committee, economic departments of the centralcommittee),the state apparatus(council of ministers, planning commission,branch ministries, industrialassociations), and industrial enterprises and, to alesser extent, regional and local institutions. These actors have various degrees of influence on differentdecisions, and they use different strategies to influence the decision-makingprocess. In our view, the socialist system is multi-centered and much more complex than it would appear to be. The Leninist doctrine -according to which there is a unified, monolithic power centre that is a sourceof all decisions, while the rest of the system is oriented toward transmitting and implementingcommands coming from the centre - is still maintained officially. This conception is based on two premises: first, that the function of the system is to carry out the revolutionary task of reshaping the social order, and second, that the system also has the functionof providing favourable conditions for accelerated economic growth in a backward economic and social environment. All institutions, outside the power cent& are intended to serve as mission belts" between the party as the vanguard of the proletariat and the masses. These are the basic tenets of the doctrine of the dictatorshipof the proletariat. These tenets obviously imply the need for the wide use of coercion. Under these institutional conditions the only possible strategy of economic growthhas been the strategyof "imposed" industrialization(Morawski, 1980). The main features of this strategy are the following: the primacy given to the production of the means of production over the production of consumer goods, centralized administrative planning, limited autonomy of industrial enterprise, prevalence of administrative commands over material incentives, direct involvementof the party apparatus in the process of economicdecisionmaking, and multiplication of various types of bureaucratic control. This strategy is also one of extensive economic growth, a strategy in which capital

National Survival in Dependent Societies

investments and growth in employment are the main sources of economic growth. We argue that there are three inherent consequences of the implementation of such an institutional system. First, the system is devoid of the natural mechanisms to control investment programs, and is therefore constantly threatened by the problem of over-investment. Second, the system does not develop the means to assure an efficient use of the factors of production, and consequently is constantly faced with the problem of excessive waste of energy, materials, and human effort. Third, under the conditions of strict centralization,the main problem has become the quality of strategic decisions. Since the mid-1950s there has been a general awareness of these inefficiencies, and of the mechanisms which produce them. The first attempt to reform the system was made from 1954to 1958. The reform began with the decision to reduce investment programs, especially in heavy industry, to remove obstacles to growth in agriculturalproduction (political acceptanceof private property in agriculture), and to increase the level of consumption. From 1956 to 1958, some attempts were also made to decentralize the decision-makingsystem and to increase social participation through workers' self management. Unfortunately, these tendencies were reversed in 1958 and 1959 when the ratio of accumulation to consumption sharply inc~ased, decentralization processes were stopped, and self-management institutions took a uniquely ritualistic form. The effect of this reversal was the decline in the rate of growth of GNP, especially in the second half of the 1960s.The lack of growth in the standard of living also became visible. All of this was accompanied by a growing disillusionment among the intelligentsia and the working class. The end came with the mass upheaval in December 1970, and a subsequent change of party and government leadership. The second serious attempt to change the system came at the beginning of the 1970s, but it was a change in strategy rather than in the institutional structure. The change in strategy consisted of: a rapid increase in investment programs, and a substantial rise in the standard of consumption. This ambitious program was financed to a large extent by Western loans. The wide use of Western credits was made possible by the decision to open up the Polish economy to the world capitalist system. This shift in policies could have been successful only if it had been accompanied by serious structural reforms. The Big Economic Organizations reform (WOG)cannot be considered as such, because it consisted only in an unsuccessful attempt to introduce minor changes to the functioning of economic administration. It did not involve the

The Process of Dependent Development

...

enterprise level, and it did not make any changes in the articulation of the power dimensionof the economicorder (workers' participation, trade unions, etc.). In the absence of an economic reform, all the systemic inefficiencies reappeared, amplified by the fact that the resources at the disposal of the decision makers were multiplied by Western credits. The events of August 1980were the inevitable outcomeof the inability of the ruling group to reform the economy. However, this statement of the problem is insufficient. The inability of the ruling group to introduceeconomic reform is also an indicator of the deficiency of the political system itself. It is for this reason that the demands expressed by workers and the whole society in 1980-81 focussed on the need to reform the politicalsystem,either simultaneouslyor as a prerequisite to reform of the economic system. Before we attempt to delineate the social consequenceof the strategiesused, we would like to explore the ramifications for certain specific interest groups in Polish society of these same strategies. 3.

STRATEGIES AND GROUP INTERESTS

Under the conditions of a market economy, decisions concerning investment priorities are located at the level of enterprises. In the planned system, on the contrary, these decisions are located on the level of the state-party bureaucracy. In the first case, the state of the market (or the predicted market demand) determinesthe allocation of resources within the economy. In the second case, decisions concerning the allocation of resources within the economy are conditioned by the relative influence of regions, branches, ministries, and other pressure groups.Representativesof the state bureaucracy claim that this mechanism of decision making leads to the optimization of the satisfaction of social needs, and to the best utilization of production factors. These claims seem hardly acceptable to any student of organizations, as it is difficult to demonstratethat uncontrolled bureaucraticpolitics serves society best. On the contrary, the closeness and conspirational character of decision making processes make the whole system rigid and restrict its ability to change priorities in response to changesin the environment. Furthermore,we postulate that the nature of the dominant pressure groups and the way in which their interests are represented in the economic system results in inefficiency and in a disequilibriumbetween the needs and aspirationsof the society and the goals of the economy (Karninski and Strzebecki, 1980). Examples to support these propositions are plentiful. Let us startwith the role of the so-called "nomenclatura" through which the party controlspersonnel

National Survival in Dependent Societies

policies in the economicadministration. (This is a list of posts, the nomination for which requires confirmation in advance by a superior organ, in most cases a party organ, as well as a list of people who are entitled to occupy these posts.) This system rewards with positions of authority those who are loyal to the party and blindly obey orders from above. This restricts the innovative capacity of the economy and infuses economicdecisions with purely political criteria. Anotherexample is the predominance of heavy industrywhich, although contributing to the capacity of the state to defend itself militarily, also leads to serious economicproblems, namely, it produces a structural imbalance within the economy and creates, among other effects, inflationary pressures. The rigidity of the economicsystem can also be exemplified by many unsuccessful attempts to change economicpriorities, for instance, to give higher priority to housing, health, education, and scientific research. One of the main characteristic features of this economic system is that individuals can be effectively represented in the system as producers, but not as consumers or citizens. This over-representation of the role of producer results in constant pressure on investmentsbecause only through investments can individuals and groups increase their incomes and create better conditions for their material advancement. It is only via the mechanism of investmentthat they acquire control over the resources of the society. The narrowness and selectivity of interests represented in the process of economic decision making would seem to account for the political instability of the whole System. The more effectively the interests of the dominantgroups are represented in the economicdecision making process, the greater becomes the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the goals and the functioningof the economic system and, on the other hand, the needs and expectations of the population. This leads us to speculate that what we have here is the consequence of the functioning, in Polish society, of two distinct types of equilibria: an equilibrium on the institutional level and another equilibrium on the societal level. The equilibrium on the institutional level is achieved to the extent that the dominant interests oust all other interests. The equilibrium on the societal level is met to the extent that social needs and satisfactions are satisfied. Our position is that these two types of equilibriaare, in the Polish economicsystem, in conflict. That is, the more the institutional system is equilibrated, the greater the imbalance at the level of the societal system, and vice versa. This theorem

The Process of Dependent Development

...

explainsthe recurrent outburstsof social dissatisfactionand repeated demands for structural reform of the system, especially its rigidity. In our opinion, this is one of the main structural problems of socialist society (Kaminski, 1983). During the periods of unrest, five themes predominated: 1) the need for independent trade union and employee self- govern-

ment; 2) demand for political democratization (relaxation of censorship, changes in the electoral system and respect of the rule of law, etc.); 3) appeals for a profound economicreform, which would make a much broader use of market mechanisms; 4) demand for a redistributionof some privileges and abolition of other privileges; 5) calls for the dismissal of certain conupt functionaries and the abolition of the nomenclatura. At each critical period in the postwar history of Poland (1956,1970-71, 1980-8I), attempts were made to meet some of those demands. However, in each case there has been, after a certain period of time, a change in policies and a retreat from the promised changes. We can hypothesize therefore, that the closer the system approaches the societal equilibrium, the stronger the pressure becomes within the institutional system to reinstate equilibrium on the institutional level. The effort to stabilize the institutional system is facilitated by the nature of the political relationships with the whole socialist bloc. 4.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEVELOPMENT MODE ON SOCIAL LIFE

The economic system of "real" socialismhas been oriented towards the use of extensivemethods of economicgrowth, in otherwords,high rates of investment and increases in employment. This strategy of economic growth was quite effective-in terms of GNP growth rates-up to the mid- 1960s. At that time, the rate of growth of the GNP stabilized on a rather low level, in spite of continuing high capital accumulation. Also at that time, certain people began to voice the need for a change in the strategy of economic development. Advocating more intensive methods of growth, they argued for methods that could contribute to a rise in productivity, a rise in innovativeness, reliance on modem technology, and more efficient use of energy and materials.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

It was generally agreed that the only way to achieve this was through economic reform. There were, in fact, three serious attempts to implement such a reform: in the periods 1956-58, 1973-75, and 1980-81. All these attempts have had the same four objectives. The first of these objectives was to change the functionof centralplanning. Ratherthan laying on a detailed and rigid administrative program, its function was seen as that of specifying the major goals of socio-economicdevelopment.Second,it was deemed important to decentralize the management system by wider use of the market mechanism. Under such conditions the main instruments of central planning would lose some of their bureaucratic character and function more as guidelines and parameters. Third, it was maintained that the accountability of the management of industrial enterprises to representativebodies of employees had to be implemented. This last objective was contained in the economic reform programs of 1956-58 and 1980-81, but not in that of 1973-75. Fourth, a call was made to modify heavy-industry economic priority in favour of a greater emphasis on consumer goods industries. Although we cannot predict the outcome of the 1980-81 economic reform, the fact is that the reforms of 1956-58 and 1973-75 ended in failure. We should add, however, that the reasons for the failures were political rather than economic. The 1980-81economicreform was, moreover, initiated under the least favourable circumstances. What, then, are the most important political obstacles to economic refom in Poland? On the most general level, the answer to this question seems to be a simple one: it is the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the interests of the system of mobilization, and, on the other hand, the requirements of the system of articulation of the demands of the population (Morawski, 1983). However, the problem becomes more complicated when we try to be more precise in terms of the required institutional changes. Before August 1980,all the organizations that were traditionally designed to articulate the needs and aspirationsof the societyhad been merely "transmission belts" from the power centre to the masses. The system had been devoid of any effectivemechanism relating its goals to the aspirations and needs of the society. This deficiency resulted in a tendency towards a growing social conflict between the power system and the society. The most characteristic feature of this conflict is that it is vertical in nature. This conflict has been suppressed and eliminated, but never acknowledged. Different methods were used in dealing with this conflict; some of them involved coercion, ideological manipulation, the distribution of certain privileges, or official bribery of whole socialgroups and

The Process of Dependent Development ...

sectors of the economy. Nonetheless, as the state of the economy continued to worsen, the conflict could no longer be dissimulated: strikes and work stoppages were a common feature of factory life in the 1970s. The main manifestation of the contradiction between the interests of the power system and the aspirations of the population was to be found in the standard of living and, related to it, the problem of prices of basic commodities. Each time the authorities have tried to raise the prices of food - especially meat - there has been an increase in social unrest and dissatisfaction. The fact that in August 1980 the political demands of the population began to predominate over material demands was due to the growing awareness that the real problems lay, not in the domain of economics, but in the political sphere. Hence, it was assured that a successful economic reform would require important political changes. At the beginning, the leadership of Solidarity embraced the idea that it was possible to implement changes within the existing political system through the legalization of independent trade unions. Later on, Solidarity began to promote the idea of employee self-government. But, as difficulties in reaching an understanding with the power centre became flagrant, more and more voices were heard postulating change in the political system itself. Thus, a situation emerged in which Solidarity began to directly contest the legitimacy of the state. The fact that the political system itself was being called into question is a reflection of the depth of the social and economic crisis Poland is experiencing. We contend that the origin of the crisis was in the institutional system of Polish society. In an effort to assess the social costs of the functioning of the system we now proceed to assessthe social situation inPoland with respect to the satisfaction of some basic human needs, notably food, housing, and medical services. There are, of course, food shortagesin Poland, which have been caused by several factors. First, there has been pressure to collectivize agriculture, although it varied with the changes in the political situation. This pressure has been present throughout the whole postwar period. Between 1970 and 1980, the proportion of land cultivated by individual fanners dropped from 75 percent to 68.4 percent. Second, the collectivized sectorhas been consistently privileged. For instance, investment per hectare of arable land on state farms was 5,157 zl in 1980, while on individual f m s investment did not exceed 2,400 zl. In considering these data one must remember that the level of investment of farmers is dependent upon the availability of materials, ferti-

National Survival in Dependent Societies

lizers, and agricultural equipment; in all these instances state farms had priority. At the same time, the individual farm output as a proportion of total agricultural output was nearly 77 percent. There is no question that private farms are much more efficient than collective ones. In addition, the food industry has been consistently under-invested and neglected by the central planners. This is particularly devastating in light of the fact that Poland has traditionally been an important exporter of farm products. Housing is also a problem in contemporaryPoland. One of the effects of rapid industrialization has been a major migration from the countryside to the cities. This obviously made the pmblem of housing a very serious one. One would have imagined that under central economicplanningthisproblem could have been predicted and solved even before it occurred. Unfortunately, this has not happened and the shortage of housing has been steadily growing. An average family has to wait as long as 20 years for an apartment. Needless to say, the family tensions and personal hardships this situation engenders are considerable. There is even some doubt inPoland about the maintenance,at the present level, of the health of the population. Health services have been a consistently neglected sector of the economy. There is a serious shortage of hospital beds, both in the rural areas and in big cities. There is also an acute shortage of medicine, to the point that there is a real danger of outbreaks of disease of epidemic proportions. Environmentalpollution is also a problem, and in some areas such as Silesia and Krakow the situation has become dramatic. Overall, there has been a marked deterioration in the physical health of the population, reflected in the decline of life expectancy since 1965. 5.

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN POLAND: GENERAL CONCLUSION

As we have tried to show, the institutional system in Poland is not able, even if we assume its willingness, to cope with the basic problems faced by the society.The power system has been trying to bridge the distancebetween itself and the society by using different kinds of instruments. We have already mentioned coercion. At this point we should add that the intensity of coercion has varied throughout the period under discussion, depending upon political and economic circumstances. Besides coercion, the authorities have made wide use of other methods to obtain compliance, chiefly ideological manipulation through the mass media. While coercionhas been aimed at intimidating

The Process of Dependent Development

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the actual or potential enemies of the system, the monopolistic control of the mass media has been used to convince potential supporters, and to create support for the system (generalized support) or for the tasks performed by it (fragmentized support). At the level of general support for the system, the content of propaganda has been based on traditional socialist values such as equality, socialjustice, de-alienation, satisfaction of material and cultural needs, and the special position of the working class. It is our opinion, and there is considerable empirical evidence to support it, that these values have gained widespread social acceptance,although they have not been adequatelyimplemented in the functioning of the socialist state. Let us than formulate the paradox of socialist propaganda: those values which, for the authorities, had largely ritualistic meaning, have become for the society real expectations by which the population has begun to evaluate the achievements of the system. In this way, the official propaganda has provided the society with the language which is being used to criticize the system.

At the level of fragmentized support, the propagandists try to mobilize support for specifictasks undertaken by the state and its agencies. Here, under the conditions of bureaucratic control, the result has been quite opposite: the propagandists treat the message seriously while the social response to the message has been ritualistic. Let us now consider the methods the state uses to try to gain public support through economic policy decisions. We distinguish between two types of such decisions, those of a strategic nature and those of a very specific nature. The strategy of investment in heavy industry. an example of the first type of decision, initially had public support because the public saw in it a promise of a better future (new jobs in industry, improved standard of living, economic advancement of specific areas). This support disappeared in the 1970s as the population realized that its sacrifices were to a large extent fruitless,and that it is possible to build an industrial system in which every new investment in heavy industry produces the need for more investment in the same sector, delaying social benefits indefinitely. It is our conviction that important investment decisions were often made on the basis of propagandist and not economic calculations. On the individual level, the economic decisions of the state are reflected in the system of wages, personnel policies, household expenditures, etc. The activities of the state in this area had either an administrative or a political

National Survival in Dependent Societies

character, leaving little room for economic calculations. It is generally agreed that the system of wages has not provided material incentives for better work and increased productivity, but rather, it has contributed to the decline of the work ethic. As to the relationship between wages and prices, the= was only one way, given the dominationof heavy industry, to avoid strong inflationary pressure: to keep the standard of living at a low level. Once the government gave in to the wage pressure without changing its basic economic priorities, the inevitable effectwas an inflationary spiral. Due to the stiff price regulation, inflation manifested itself above all in the waiting lines. Now, with certain prices regulated by the market, we are faced with both symptoms of inflation. The socialist state has taken upon itself the fulfilment of a much wider range of functions than those performed by any other type of modem state. By trying to control directly every sphereof economic and social life, the socialist state had to take upon itself the responsibility for every failure, thereby becoming a party to every important social and economic conflict Summarizing these considerations, we come to the conclusion that the methods used by the Polish state to gain social support (coercion, ideological manipulation, economic incentives) have lost their effectiveness. The net result of this situation is that when the crisis came in 1980-81, it turned into an open revolt of the society against the state. This could have never happened in a more democratic system where conflicts are much more dispersed and have largely an economiccharacter. It follows that any attemptto refonn the system must start by developing mechanisms that would restrain the monopolistic aspirations of the state bureaucracy. The more centralized a political system becomes, the more the centre disappears. Paradoxically,Poland needs a strong state, but the constant tendency towards over-centralizationin every sphereof social life destroys the state itself, producing spontaneous phenomena with unpredictable consequences for the nation as a whole.

DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT IN QUEBEC AND THE NATIONALIST STRATEGY We turn now to a considerationof economicdevelopment strategy in Quebec. The Canadian economy is characterized by: 1) a large concentration of enterprises; 2) the historical domination of commercial and banking capital;

The Process of Dependent Development ...

3) the very important presence of foreign capital in the manufacturing and mining sectors. This capital, along with the state, has been the major agent of industrialization; 4) the reproduction, in miniature, of the oligopolistic structure of the US or international market in numerous industrial sectors, this structure having been transplanted by the investments of the multinationals; 5) the inability of Canadian enterprises to stand up to international competition, which leads to a reinforcement of the existing high level of concentration; 6) a displacementof the economic centre of gravity from the East to the West of the country, and the subsequentconsecration of Toronto, to the detriment of Montreal, as the economic capital of Canada. Given the liberal character of the economy, the bourgeoisie is the dominant class and the market constitutes the major regulatory mechanism. However, certain structural weaknesses (notably in the industrial sector) which have to do with the colonial origins of Canada have long since necessitated state intervention. Often this intervention has been massive in domains such as transportation and energy, sometimes to support or even stimulate the creation of private enterprises, at other times to build the necessary infrastructure, on other occasions to provide tariff protection, and, at the limit, to create state enterprises to fill certain specific economic functions. Incontemporary Canada, total public sectorexpenditureconstitutes more than 40 percent of the gross domesticproduct. There exists in the public sector- in addition to the federal, provincial and municipal governments and the activities fmanced by them -more than 350 "enterprises" under various forms of state ownership at the federal level alone. Hence, the state, in conjunction with the dominant bourgeoisie which, historically, has been more merchant than industrial in Canada, oriented the Canadian economy in a way which has led to a relatively high degree of industrialization and standard of living. This policy -industrialization under the aegis of an essentially commercial bourgeoisie -worked because of the major role accorded to foreign investment capital, with the result that the Canadian economy is now an integral, and dependent, part of the continental North American economywhere previously it was dependenton the mercantile interests of the British empire. Canada, consequently, sends the greatest proportion (three-quarters) of

National Survival in Dependent Societies

its exports to the United States, while at the same time it is the most important client of the United States. But Canada sells mostly raw materials and semiprocessed products, while it purchases mostly manufactured products. This stateof dependent integration is also manifested inthe ownershipof enterprises: 50 and 60 percent of the assets of manufacturing and mining companies respectively are under foreign control (80 percent US controlled). Of the 200 largest companies in Canada, 41 are under foreign control whereas 20 are state enterprises. Notwithstanding, Canadianscontrol the vast majority of assets in banking, the commercial sector, and transportation. Although in recent years, there has been a reduction in foreign ownership, the dependence that foreign ownership and control entails has resulted in some major and unfortunate consequences for Canadian society. Among these has been the dampening effect on accumulation of capital of an annual outflow of over $2.5 billion of dividends and interest annually; this outflow has been particularly acute in the manufacturingsector. Another consequence has been the scientific and technologicalunderdevelopment which has resulted from the failure of foreign companies to invest in research and innovation in what is, for them, a regional market. A further consequence of the integration of the Canadian and US economies that compounds the problem of capital outflow from Canada is the propensity of Canadians and Canadian financial institutions to invest in the United States. On a per capita basis there is more Canadian investment in the United States than vice versa.

It is in this general Canadian context that one must consider the economic development of Quebec. The social particularities of Quebec society are such that its "national" question determines to a considerable extent development for six million inhabitants, of which 80 percent are Francophone, living on a temtory five times larger than Poland. In order to appreciate the weakness of the influence exerted by Francophone Quebec over its economy, a brief recourse to history is in order. But first, t h e facts will serve to underline the problem: 1)until recently, Francophones controlledless than 10percent of the assets of banks in Quebec; 2) they control less than a quarter of manufacturing in Quebec; 3) among the 100 largest Canadian industrial enterprises, only eight are contr011ed by Francophones and, of these, four are owned by the Quebec state itself. Notwithstanding, Francophone control in the financial sector- insurance, trust companies, and local banking via co-operatives and even chartered banks -has increased substantially in recent years.

The Process of Dependent Development

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It is as a result of such a situation that Quebec has been characterized as being subject to a doubledependence. It is dependentfirstly on foreign capital, particularly US capital, which is the outcome of the penetration of Canada generally by foreign capital, and secondly it is dependent on Anglo-Canadian capital that is a legacy of the superordinate-subordinate relationship established between two different national groups (formerly attached to different metropolitan powers, France and Great Britain) in the same country-state. Indeed, the weakness of French Canadian control and subsequent dependenceis the crux of the Quebec economic dilemma. The question which arises is why this national group, unlike Canadians of British origin, controls such a smallproportion of large-scale enterprise in Quebec. In the contemporary economic context, the level of representation of a national ethnic group in corporate ownership, as well as the type of its insertion in the various sectors of the economy, can only be understood in relation to its capacity to establish big companies. As it happens, this capacity, in the Canadian context in particular, appears to be linked to state power, without which an effective bourgeoisie cannot develop (Sales, 1979). The juxtaposition of the US and Canadian experiences is indicative in this respect. A long colonial period during which Canadians were deprived of state power, and consequently of an autonomous economic project, created a situation in which a bourgeoisienoted for the weakness of its industrial faction emerged. In the case of the French Canadian nation, which was in the process of formation long before 1760, the loss of state power and its attendant commercial and real estate privileges subsequent to the British conquest in 1760in fact meant losing control of accumulation. The loss of financial outlets and networks meant the loss of the fur trade on which commercial capitalism of the time was based. When timber took the place of fir, the same structural supports were lacking. On the other hand, the British, with the economic and political support of the metropolis, were able, from the beginning, to monopolizekey economic activities while taking charge of the administration qf the new temtory. Subsequently,the local statetookover from the metropolis. To understand the role of the state in the establishment of the large Anglo- Canadian enterprise it is sufficient to appreciate that the Anglo-Canadian bourgeoisie relied heavily on two major areas of industrial activity - forest products and metallurgy- where stateinterventionhas been persistent (forest concessions, cartelization of pulp and paper, construction of railroads, shared auto manu-

National Survival in Dependent Societies

facturing pact with the United States, nuclear power plants, and pipelines for the metallurgical industry). Aided by the state, Canadiansof British origin accumulated capitalin the fur, timber, and railroad activities which gave them, but not the French Canadians, the means to participate (along with foreign capital) in the concentration process. It is consequentlynot surprisingthat Anglo-Canadians control the largest share of major Canadian-owned companies, while French Canadians are weakly represented. Whereas the British could enter industry at the core of the structure via the co-operation of the colonial metropolis, the financial institutions, and the federal state, thus meeting the conditions necessary for the development of the large units that came to increasingly dominate industry, French Canadians, in the absence of such powerful means of assistance, could only insert themselves on the margins of the structure. This is why, until the affinnationof the provincial Quebec state, Francophones were found largely in small and medium-sized businesses.

We now leave aside the national question and turn our attention to the actual industrialization of Quebec and the economic development which ensued. In doing so, it is useful to compare Quebec to its sister province in the Canadian federation, Ontario. Together, Quebec and Ontario constituted two-thirds of the population of Canada in 1950, and they were approximately equal in population, 4 million and 4.5 million respectively, at the time (Caldwell and Czarnocki, 1977). Quebec, at the end of the Second World War was well on its way to becoming a fully industrialized, urbanized society. An industrial base had been put into place over the previous century,though muchof this considerable industrial base was oriented to non-durable goods and production of labourintensive consumer goods (textiles, wood products). Overall manufacturing output in Quebec, in terms of value added, was in fact only half that in Ontario, whose population was more urbanized. Parallel with the growth of this substantial industrial base, the infra-structure which accompanies industrialization -transportation and communication networks, electrification and urbanization -had been progressively put into place in Quebec. Hence, with a population slightly less than Ontario, Quebec had an industrial base half as large and an agricultural population which, although equal to Ontario's, had an outputof only half that of Ontario. Although Quebec

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was, by world standards, an industrialized, developed society with aper capita GDP of $1,150 in 1950(current Canadiandollars), it was under-industrialized relative to Ontario, in part because of a non-agricultural primary sector (forestry and mining) which was proportionately stronger than Ontario's. Both provinces, however, were experiencing a comparable rate of growth in manufacturing. As well, both were high-growth societies, with populations increasing by 2.5 percent a year. These important differences in the stages of economic development of Quebec and Ontario have their origins in the articulation of the Canadian economy. Integrated, initially, into a trans-Canadian economy based on Montreal and dependent on a protective tariff instituted as part of the national policy designed to provide an internal market forthe fledglingCanadianconfederation (1867), the Quebec economy flourished. Montreal, the Quebec metropolis, was the hub of industry, commerce, finance, and transport in Canada during the initial period of Canadian industrialization (1850 to the First World War). However, when the ineluctable inland displacement began, sparked by the extension of railways, the growingmarket in the West, and the ascendancy of steel over wood, the hub of the Canadian economy began gravitating to Toronto, the capital of Ontario situated further inland on the Great Lakes. Until this time, imported or foreign-induced industrialization had been sufficiently functional for the different interests in Quebec society that no serious social movement arose to contest it. However, after the Second World War, the momentum of the industrialization process begun to falter and it became less functional: p o w e f l social interests that considered themselves ill-served began to make their influence felt. Indeed, as the centre of the Canadian economy gravitated west, Quebec began to fare less well from the hitherto undisputed benefits of imported industrialization, although abundant water resources, forests, and minerals, and a never-endingsourceof cheap and dependable labour, resulted in an industrial momentum being temporarily maintained. Yet by 1935 it had become apparent that the structural changes that were taking place in manufacturing in North America - such as the automobile industry -were passing Quebec by. Nonetheless, the hothouse effect of mobilization for war production, and the subsequentexpansion in the absolute volume of production that took place, camouflaged a condition that was contributing to the erosion of Quebec's existing level of industrialization. The subsequent postwar continentalization of the Canadian economy only seemed to acceleratethe process of the relativede-industrializationof Quebec.

National Suwival in Dependent Societies

Until after the Second World War, Quebec was neither aware of nor seemed to be suffering from its failure to attain a level of industrialization comparable to that of neighbouring Ontario (and even more, that of United States). In fact, still dominated by anexternal economicbourgeoisie and under the rule of traditional elites and institutions, Quebec actually managed to use the immediate benefits and the opportunities of an extrinsic industrialization to alleviate -and thus maintain in place -the contradictions of a traditional society which has overreached the limits of a traditional society's economic base. This, in fact, was the defining characteristic of Quebec society as it emerged from the war: a society that had experienced a massive structural transformation attendanton industrialization, without at the same time having experienced a parallel cultural and political transformation. In 1945 Quebec was still a traditional society, culturally. The hegemony of the Catholic Church was such that divorce was, to all intents and purposes,non-existent and civil marriage did not exist. The educational system was contmlled by the church as opposed to the state, and still gave pre-eminence to elite education for the professions and the clergy. Moreover, the polity, as represented by the provincial state, the clergy, and its traditional petty bourgeoisie, was marginal to the new industrial order, apart from accommodatingit in their own interests. Yet the pillars of this traditional society were being undermined. The working class was expanding, the union movement was making great strides, despite efforts to suppress it, and the countryside was being transformed by mechanization and the new facility of communication. The commotion of the war and the inroads of radio and television also activated a process of acculturation that was irresistible. During the war, hundreds of thousands of Quebecers (men and women) travelled without having to emigrate; they travelled either to urban centres to work in factories, or overseas with the Canadian forces. Soon the cultural dam broke as the pressures for a secularized, materialistic society piled up. One of these pressures was the closing of the "safety valve" constituted by the emigration of a surplus labour force to the United States after 1935. The so-called Quiet Revolution of the 1960s was in fact the crest of the modernization tide that literally submerged Quebec society. This tidal wave of modernization effectively transformed Quebec culturally, or, rather, brought its culture into phase with its preexisting industrial structure. This modemization was characterized by secularization, consumerism, and the provision of social sesviceslike universal secondary school education, medical care, and hospitalization, and

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a determination to catch up in terms of economic development. How this was done -what institutions and strategies were used, and the interests involved - will be the subject of a subsequent section. Before proceeding to these considerations, we turn now to a review of the evolution of economic development since the Second World War. 1.

THE GENERAL LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Canada emerged from the economic effort imposed by mobilization for war as a highly industrialized country: the prewar industrialplant was developed both in size and in technological sophistication, and remained physically intact. In fact, Canada was notorious in this period for being the country with the second-highest standard of living in the world, close behind the United States. Quebec's standard, however, was below the overall average, while Ontario's was above. The Gross Domestic Product per capita in current Canadiandollarswas $1,150in 1950inQuebec, compared with almost $1.660 in Ontario. Personal disposal income per capita was $838 in Quebec and $1,164 in Ontario. By 1980,30years later, Quebec's GDP per capita was over $10,000, more than three times the Polish figure for the equivalent year. During the early 1950sthe Quebececonomy experiencedsteady growth. Throughout the early and mid-1950s, the volume of value added in manufacturing continued to grow and labour continued to flow out of the countryside; in 1950almost20 percent of the labour force was on farms,whereas in Ontario less than 15percent wasstill on farms. The level of government spending also grew slowly, but steadily. Incomes,however, progressed regularly at approximately 5 percent a year, against a background of inflation rates of less than half that amount. All of this took place in a demographic context of high growth, over 2 percent a year. However, as the 1950s drew to a close, Quebec found itself plunged into the recession that was felt throughout North America. Part of the cyclicalnature of the Western market economy, the recession of the late 1950s was short-lived. One of the results of the end of the 1950s recession was, no doubt, the start of the Quiet Revolution, of which we spoke earlier, and the subsequent massive intejection of public funds into services. Manufacturing and activity in the primary sector again resumed steady growth, particularly in construction and the capital expenditure associated with it. Individual buying power, as expressed in average weekly wages and per capita disposal income, began to show substantial growth again, though not as spectacular as in the early 1950s.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

On &he whole, the 1960s was a period of economic euphoria in Quebec. The availability of a hitherto untapped state credit, a strong tax base resulting from a previously established industrial base, massive US investments, and continued demographic growth nourished the belief that everything was possible in the state of Quebec. However, in retrospect, 1967 was a decisive turning point in the evolution of the Quebec economy. The combination of the onset of another recession, the end of a constructionboom associatedwith the expansion of the public sector, plus the onset of a deceleration of demographic growth conspired to reveal the structural weakness and consequent disequilibrium of the Quebec economy. Once again, a recession was a precipitating factor. The major weakness of the Quebec economy lay in the fact that growth in its manufacturing sector was not keeping up with that of, for example, Ontario's. Nor was productivity in agriculture -now largely industrialized - anywhere close to Ontario's, although differences in climate and soil favour Ontario. This all happened at a time when Quebec incomes were growing, now approaching Ontario's, and social services were equal if not superiorto those in Ontario. In wide economicterms, Quebechad passed from a traditional economy based on the primary (farming, etc.) sector to a postindustrial society in which the majority of the labour force was in the tertiary or service sector, without having sufficiently developed the secondary or manufacturing sector from which the wealth necessary to maintain such a developed tertiary sector must necessarily come. Yet Quebec itself had never been the initiator or even the master of its secondarysector which was, as we indicated earlier, an imported phenomenon directed by non-Francophones. At the end of the 1960s, with the secondary sectorlagging and population growth cut in half, the structural disequilibrium occasioned by an underdeveloped and ageing secondary sector became apparent. Unemployment was up, and the rate of growth in manufacturing activity was down. Moreover, as far as the future was concerned, the level of investment in new manufacturing plants actually stagnated over a six-year period (1967 to 1972). As for investment in the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, natural resources, and construction), in the late 1960s there was no evidence of a developmental thrust that might compensate for a lagging manufacturing sector. But the 1970sbrought economic sunshine back to Quebec. As far as the level of manufacturing activity, consumer aspirations, and income expecta-

The Process of Dependent Development ...

tions are concerned, the Quebec economy is undeniably part of a wider economic system comprising Ontario, Canada, the United States, and much of the industrialized world. Consequently, the cyclical boom in the Western economy in the early 1970s,compounded by a surge in public sector spending and investmentin Quebec, produced a real explosion of prosperity in Quebec. Personal income and consumer spending experienced advances, the likes of which had not been seen in the postwar period, although inflation was now running at over 10 percent a year. The annual growth rate of combined public and private investments grew (in constant dollars) at an annual rate of 15.7 percent in Quebec between 1970 and 1978, compared with 10.5 percent in Ontario. Yet this performance was due in large pan to the role of public investment and an expansion of the tertiary sector. The manufacturing sector actually experienced a net loss of 22,000jobs between 1973 and 1978. Of the l90,000jobscreatedinthesameperiod,113,000were inthe realm of services, commercial or personal, and a further 11,000 were in the civil service proper (Quebec, 1976, 13-22). The pan played by public sector investment in the prosperity of the 1970s is well illustrated by the fact that a full 20 percent of combined public and private investment in this era was attributable to one Quebec state organization, Hydro-Quebec. Once public sector investment is isolated from private sector investment, the decline in the role of private investment in Quebec, relative to Ontario, was very evident in the 1970s. This brings us to the recession that began in 1981. In the 1980s, unemployment, business failures,and plant closings increased throughout the Western economy. Indeed, the number of manufacturing jobs actually declined in Quebec and in Ontario in 1982 and 1983. Needless to say, overall production, as elsewhere in North America, receded. On all of these indicators -unemployment, jobs lost, GDP -Quebec's performance has been worse than Ontario's. Interest rates of over 20 percent made the cost of servicing the already high level of public debt prohibitive, thus excluding all possibility of increasing the level of debt to permit deficit financing as a palliative to a recessionary drop in.demand. This time, the fundamental structural limitation of imported industrialization has come home to roost in Quebec. The provincial state, like many Western governments,no longer has the means to step in and act as a stimulator of economic activity, as it was able to do in the two previous postwar recessions. Worse yet, the government itself, faced with falling resources and no credit, has had to reduce its own massive spending. The fact that Hydro-Quebec has had to cut back drastically on its investment plans -$50 billion over the next ten years -is a dramatic manifestation of

National Survival in Dependent Societies

this. Imported industrialization has created a situation of dependent development in Quebec which indigenous state interventionismhas not yet been able to transcend. Let us now focus on the strategies and institutions deployed over the 30-year period in questionin an attemptto copewith dependentdevelopment. 2.

INSTITUTIONS AND STRATEGIES OF DEVELOPMENT

In a capitalist economy it is assumed that the private sector makes most of the economic decisions. In principle, the holders of political power do not become involved in the organization of production. However, we are now acutely aware of an interdependence in capitalist, as well as socialist, economies, between the process of accumulationand political power as represented by the state. Private capital cannot manage without certain statefunctions such as the guarantee of property rights and control over the supply of raw materials. Furthennore, the state is obliged to sustain, via various mechanisms, the process of accumulation because the state's own material resources and its disposition of these resources are less a function of the preferences of the electoratethan of the very sameprocess of accumulation. Effectively, even the capitalist state - and this has become even more apparent in the present financial crisis - depends upon the economic success of the agents of accumulation and the resources of workers. It is income from these sources that makes possible the deployment of state power and the realization of different state functions, be they economic, educational, protective, or repressive. Hence, the state has a vested interest in the existence of a strong bourgeoisie. In dependent societies such as Quebec, the state has often had to intervene to overcome the inadequacies of the bourgeoisie, if not to create one. Consequently, the state defined by geography and history - be it Canadian or Qu6becois-finds itself compelled to intervene more directly in economic management than in metropolitan economies, often assuming a leadership role in the process of economic development.

Quebec, however, finds itself in a rather specific situation relative to other dependent societies. The Canadian grande bourgeoisie is largely Anglophone and has very limited contacts with the government of Quebec. In effect, the segment of this grande bourgeoisiewhich is located in Quebec does not now consider Quebecto be one of its investmentpriorities. Although there does exist a regional Quebec bourgeoisie, several factors work against it being able to supplant, as an agentof development,the grandebourgeoisieAnglophone

The Process of Dependent Development ... which is increasingly located outside of Quebec (Noisi, 1982). The first of these is that a significant part of the regional Quebec bourgeoisie is declining under the effects of international competition. This is particularly true of the traditional sectors of the economy -textiles, clothing, leather goods, fumiture, and household appliances-which taken together constituted 32 percent of the labour force in the manufacturing sector in 1978. The second factor contributing to the weakness of the regional bourgeoisie is a marked national and ethnic differentiation (French Canadians, Anglo-Saxon Canadians, and Jewish Canadian Anglophones) which precludes cohesion on all but limited questions which are often of a strictly defensive nature. The third factor is the economic and political weakness of regional private capital in Quebecrelative to the monopolistic fraction of the Canadian bourgeoisie. Nonetheless, it is true that since there has emerged in Quebec a number of large enterprises controlled by Francophones. But it is here that the role of the state is particularly evident: many of them are direct state creations; others are backed up either by public participation in their equity capital or by substantial public contracts. Yet the growing role of the state in Quebec in this period is most evident, even surprisingly so, in terms of the growing proportion of fixed capital formation for which the state is responsible. In 1963 in Quebec, the private sector accounted for 70.4 percent of total investments, compared with Ontario's 68.9 percent. Fifteen years later, in 1978, after a regular decline, the private proportion had declined to 54.8 percent whereas in Ontario it had climbed to 74.3 percent. Put the other way around, in Quebec the proportion of investments which were public grew from 29.6 percent in 1963 to 45.2 percent in 1978. But this was not all: in addition to its own investments, the state played an important role since the 1960s in the expansion of private investment by various investment incentive programs and by the multiplier effect created by the implantation of large public works projects (Quebec, 1970: 39). As the Anglophone grande bourgeoisie found itself inconvenienced by a developmentdynamic it no longer controlled and which it even perceived as hostile to its interests, it slowed down its rhythm of investment and began moving existing assets westward to what was a more favourable and more promising investment climate. Quebec became no more than a regional market, albeit an importantone. Meanwhile,the regional or local bourgeoisie, although beginning to flex its muscles, was incapableof assuming the role that

National Survival in Dependent Societies

had been abandoned. Hence, it was the Quebec state, faced with underinvestment by the private sector, which found itself saddled with the burden of assuming a central role in economic development. In order to appreciate how this was legitimized as developmental strategy, we return again to the 1960s and 1970s. What in fact distinguished the Quiet Revolution, ideologically, was the new-found conviction that the state -as the embodiment of the collectivity -should, on the onehand act as a moderatorof market forces, and on the other hand, assume responsibility for the social welfare of the citizenry. This development strategy led to the state becoming involved in certain economic activities, but largely in a stopgap role in activities which the private sector wished to abandon or was not prepared to envisage in a long-term investment perspective. During this era the state or its agencies became involved in the forestry industry, shipbuilding, the financing of certain enterprises, and in planning incentives designed to attract industry to depressed regions of Quebec. The same type of state involvement was witnessed elsewhere in Canada. With the advent of the 1970s, the conception of the role of the state in the economic and social welfare domain expanded. No longer was the state seen by the political class as limiting itself to stepping in where the private sector had withdrawn or feared to tread. Rather, the state itself was now seen as the motor of economicdevelopment: it would lead the private sector. It was in the 1970sthat the governmentof Quebec gave Hydro-Quebec the mandate of making electrical power more readily available to potential industrial sites. It set up a public, integrated steel-makingindustry, and made its entry into oil exploration, and the mining and manufacturing of asbestos (Quebec is the main producer of asbestos in the Western world). Liiewise, in the social domain, the state was no longer content with merely providing a minimum universal welfare standard; it now saw itself as the developer of human capital and the protector of the liberty of citizens. Adult education, legal aid, and the liberalization of abortion, marriage, and divorce are all indicative of this change. Once again, Quebec was littledifferent from the rest of Canada in this respect. As the 1970sdrew to a close, and more particularly with the election of the Parti Qu6Mcois in 1976, the social-democraticpolitical expression of the nationalist movement, the conception of the role of the state in the developmental process again took on a new dimension: the state became the embodi-

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ment of the nation. Because in Quebec the nation is considered by most to be the best guarantee of the long-term fate of Quebecers, the state took upon its shoulders responsibility for development tout court. Subsidiary to this conception of the state was the necessityof seeing to the preservationof the nation. Consequently, seeing to the cultural and demographic sulvival of the nation became a strategy. Legislation was implemented to assure the pre-eminence of the French language in Quebec, to control immigration, to preserve the patrimoine, and to reinstate national history as a compulsory school subject. Cultural developmentcame to be seen as a state responsibility, as was already the case for economic and social development. Indeed, in the new strategy, economic and social developmentwere seen by many as being a corollary, or at least dependent upon, cultural development.In this respect, Quebec differs from most of Canada. Cultural developmentby the state in the interest of the maintenance and viability of the nation, and by consequence, its members, is a globalist strategy. Everything from protection of the environment and regional planning to the restriction of foreign language media (such as English media emanating from the United States)becomes pertinent. Creating the establishment necessary for the state to accomplish such a manifold and challenging mission is an undertaking - at least in the political and economic context Quebec finds itself -that is not without risks. In the next section we touch on one of these risks, the realignment of the social stratification system and the new interests and classprerogativesthat comein the wake of the consolidation of a new class. 3.

STRATEGIES AND GROUP INTERESTS

When one looks back over the strategies that have been employed and the realignment of groups as a function of their interests in Quebec over the last 20 years, it is apparent that the nationalist movement has been a central factor. This movement is, of course, not a new phenomenon in Quebec. However, in the 1960s,it manifested itself with an intensity and a forcehithertounknown. In 1968 a political party issued from a grouping of severalnationalist tendencies the Parti Quebecois was formed. This party, which succeeded in taking power in 1976 was ideologically based on a conception of "sovereignty association" which was in fact a model whereby Quebec would accede to greater, but limited, sovereignty. The ideological premise that now prevails in the Parti QueMcois, despite the failure of the 1980referendum on this question, is that Quebecshould become a sovereigncountry,politicallyindependent of Canada,

National Survival in Dependent Societies

but associated with Canada in a sort of common market. Had sovereignty association been accepted by the population of Quebec in 1980, and had Anglophone Canada accepted it (which is far from sure) the representatives of the Quebec state would have acquired the right of direct representation in the new institutions which would have followed upon the formation of a new economic and monetary union- notably in a hypothetical central bank of the Canada-Quebec union. Such a development would have consecrated the role of the Quebec state in the direction of the new Quebec. But such did not come to pass: a divided vote and internal social conflicts precluded such a development and the presumed increase in economic influence it would have conferred on the Quebec state. Paradoxically, the failure of the referendum did not prevent the Parti Qu6b6cois from being re-elected shortly afterwards, yet it weakened the nationalist movement and allowed the central Canadian state to gain the upper hand. Canada put this advantageto account in the 1982 constitutional reform that effectively led to a reduction in Quebec's powers. The upshot was that on the threshold of the 1980s, Quebec society was faced with a double impasse: a political impasse and an economic impasse. Fortunately, these impasses are not beyond remedy by time and history. And, it must be observed, over the course of the last quarter of a century, the potential for autonomy and the adaptation capacity of Quebec society increased. However, Quebec must come up with new strategies, inspired by a new social vision.

Indisputably, the dynamic of the nationalist movement and the extension of the state in a context of dependence have created a new alignment of group interests in Quebec. In fact, the most significant aspect of the realignment of interests and social power that has resulted from the institutional change and the deployment of the strategies reviewed above has been the emergence,over the last quarter of a century, of a distinctive class social formation in Quebec -the institutional class, or "the institutionals". Composed of civil service managers and professionals, the professional and managerial personnel of govemment-directed educational, medical, and social service establishments, as well as their counterparts in state agencies and enterprises as varied as the liquor control board and Hydro-Quebec, this group has grown out of all proportionto the increase in the size of the economy and the population. Moreover, as educational and regional planning reforms

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get under way, the administrativepersonnel of localjurisdiction have increasingly come- with reason- to seethemselves as part of a largerpublicsystem arranged in hierarchical order with the state authorities at the top. Given the unavoidably centralized and bureaucratic nature of this public apparatus, those actually running it at the local level tend to take their cues from the centre as opposed to actual legal, local jurisdictions; in terns of real power, as well as of their own career prospects within the public sector, they are right. Faced with attemptingto impose its will on an economy and public life, affected by broad forces (international capital, technological innovation, Western mass culture, etc.) Quebec, like other national governments in the West, has had to resort (in what is now a time-honoured tradition in liberal democracies) to venous sorts of regulation. In Quebec, because of a more embracing development strategy and the state's relative political impotence arising from its lack of national sovereignty, the resort to regulation has been even greater. As a result, all sorts of intermediary,state-sanctioned,regulatory instruments -f a m products marketing boards, for instance -have grown up or been expanded upon. Furthermore, faced with a monopolistic authority, the clients of these organizations - farmers are a good example - have organized in function of state power and have created a category of personnel who, although in a nominally conflictual position with a regulatory board or ministry, are, because they share the same lifestyle and have the same relationship to the means of production- from a social class point of view part of the new institutional class. The state-directed sector, established in opposition to the private economic sectorand staffed by administrativepersonnelwho were neversocialized into the ethos of the private sector, has not been willing to assume responsibility for the viability of the private sector. For historical reasons the private sectoris, for the current institutionalclass, a foreign growth- a tree, the fruits of which could only be reaped by shakingit until the fruit fell into their hands. As to the question of who will prepare the soil from which the tree draws its nourishment, this is not a vocation to which the institutionals are favourably disposed. Nonetheless, although the private sector is languishing in terms of the civil society and its institutions, new political forces have emerged which are private in the sense that they are sustained by social realities that exist outside the sphere of the state, its apparatus, its personnel, and its vision. First and foremost, there is now a local elite schooled in the practice of

Natiional Survival in Dependent Societies

democratic leadership, nourished in school boards, municipal governments and co-operatives, which has a depth and tradition that were unknown a quarter of a century ago. At the local level, where this leadershipexercises its influence and effectiveness, the state is experiencing a crisis of credibility. These leaders perceive the state apparatus as inefficient and inflexible and as manned by personnel viewed as better paid than they, as working less and as having absolutejob security. They are thus becoming disenchanted as far as state initiatives and management are concerned. There is widespread concern that the social fabric itself is being penetrated, appropriated, and consumed by the state. In the face of such a disenchantment,the traditional "peasant wisdom" of the politically disenfranchised is again making itself felt in a practice legendary in Quebec: that of playing-off different political authorities against each other, in Quebec's case, the federal state against the Quebec state. Incidentally, it is this tradition which explains why many Francophone Quebecerscould vote against sovereignty associationin the 1980referendum and then vote into power one year later the very party proposing more independence.

Fiially, them is no doubt that there has arisen in Quebec, a by-product of the Quiet Revolution, a whole new generation of Francophone entrepreneurs with whom the state will eventually have to come to terms, if only for its own survival. 4.

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

The dilemma of Quebec is that it is a society attempting to impose an indigenous conception of developmenton a social reality which is now highly integrated into the wider economic and cultural complex that is the North American continent. Throughout most of the continent a different mode of development is at work. Many of the consequences to which we make brief reference here are an outcome of the confrontation of these two modes. As to the inevitability of the contiontation, and the eventuality of some sort of reconciliation, we will return in the last section; but let us now turn to the achievements, the costs, and the challenges which have manifested themselves in the last 30 years of development in Quebec. With regard to the Quebec nation's capacity to assume responsibility and control of its destiny, there have been real advances. The erosion of the position of the French language appears to have been stopped by language

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legislation and a redirection of immigration policy. But perhaps more significantly, Quebec has put into place a class that has taken the instruments of power available to it and has used that power to impose, as best it could, a "national" mode of development. The continental thrust of development has somethingto be said for it, in that Quebecers currently enjoy a level of material consumption and a degree of personal liberty that is only possible in the industrialized, urbanized, secularized society that modernizationhas made of Quebec. The achievements have also been considerablein terms of quality of life at the individual level. Certain basic services have been made available such as high quality, universally accessible, primary and secondary education As for equality of opportunity in access to higher education, some progress was achieved in the 1960s, although it now appears to be threatened. In the sphere of hospital and medical services, Quebec offers perhaps the best services in North America. Social welfare support and services are also of an exceptionally high level. With the help of federal resources, Quebec has created a social service system, the quality of which has been - until recently at least remarkable, even by North American standards.A corollary to the high level of social development is the existence in contemporary Quebec of a labour force that is very healthy and well educated. In terms of individual wealth or living standard, Quebec has also made real progress. In current Canadian dollars the GDP per capita has progressed from $1,150 in 1950to $10,740 in 1980. The average weekly industrial wage has progressed from $40 to over $300, and personal disposable income per capita from $800 to over $7,000 (all in current Canadian dollars) in the same period. In terms of the comparison with Ontario, Quebec has even narrowed the gap on most of these indicators, on a per capita basis. However, in terms of the size of the economy and of the population, if such are indications of development, Quebec is falling behind. For instance, although the GDP of Quebecin 1961was 64percent of Ontario's, in 1980itwas down to 60percent. In Quebec, the pie is getting smaller - at least relative to Ontario - but individual wealth has been not only maintained but improved upon, because there are relatively fewer fingers in the pie. In fact, the population of Quebec is now scarcely growing at all. Regardingthe nature of social life, the most dramatic consequenceshave been an atomization of social life that was unknown -even unheard of -in the traditional society of prewar Quebec. Families are much smaller, as

National Survival in Dependent Societies

evidenced from a fall in the crude birth rate from 30 in 1950 to 15 in 1983. Divorce is now as high as in North America generally; in fact, for the under35 age group, divorce is now the norm. Suicide rates have more than tripled in a quarter of a century and admissions to psychiatric hospitals have soared. These crude indicators point to a certain degree of atomization of social life in Quebec. The speed at which these changes are taking place has also created a rupture in the continuity of social life, the consequences of which have yet to be experienced: young adults socialized in a context where the presence of four or five siblings was current have chosen to have one child or none.

The Quebec dilemma is best reflected in its demography. The contradictions generated by the confrontation of the two developmental modes have been absorbed by a demographic adaptation. As a result of modernization, aspirations at the level of personal consumption and liberty, the imperatives of a national developmental strategy, and a corporatist self- protective reflex on the part of those with the power to protect themselves have combined to create a high level of out-migration and a low level of fertility. Quebec has stopped growing, which in a growth-oriented Western economy presents a particular challenge.Further, and in part as a direct consequenceof the decline in the demographic growth rate, the economy of Quebec is on the verge of contracting - in 1982 Quebec lost twice as many jobs as Ontario (in a population only three-quarters as large). Failure to correct the basic structural disequilibrium of the Quebec economy (indeed, the problem has worsened) portends bleak long-term economic prospects. The demographic adaptation whereby the number of fingers in the pie is reduced is, of course, not a viable long-term solution for the simple reason that the economic base threatens to contract (relatively) at an even faster rate than the population.

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: GENERAL CONCLUSION With regard to differences in economic development in Poland and Quebec, one overall observation is particularly illuminating. Both economies are burdened with major structural deficiencies, but of a different nature. In Poland's case the most striking aspect of the structural disequilibrium is the expansion and dominant position of the secondary sector, to the detriment of the primary and the tertiary sectors. In Quebec's case it is the relative position of the secondary sector that has been allowed to deteriorate, while collective

The Process of Dependent Development ...

resources were channelled into the tertiary sector, this process being dependent on a continued high level of exploitation of natural resources (primary sector). The nature of both these structuraldeficiencies in the Polish and Quebec economies is to a large extent a function of the external variable, which is the constraint imposed by integration into the Eastern and Western systems respectively. Poland, as a member of the socialistbloc, emphasized extensive investment in heavy industries in response to ideological and military considerations common to the entire Eastern bloc. Quebec, on the other hand, functions within what is essentially a continental market characterized by a high level of capital and labourmobility and demand creation fiom the United States. Both societies have in common an attempt to use the state as an instrument of national economicdevelopment,although in Quebecit has been due to intrinsic factors, while in Poland extrinsic factors predominated. Given the circumstances, it seems that only the state is capable of assuming the role of implementingnational development within the constraints imposed by the largerenvironment. In fact, the stateproved indispensablein this respect in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in both countries. In Quebec in the nineteenth century,the Canadian industrialcapitalist class made extensiveuse of the state to mobilize collective capital for the implementation of transportation and facilities, as well as monetary and legal institutions indispensable to large-scale manufacturing. In the first half of the twentieth century, the state was called upon to assume the maintenance and costs of much of this infrastructure, as industrial capital was rechannelled into more specialized activities under pressure of continental competition. Finally, during the Second World War, the Canadian state masterminded what was the most intense and productive period of industrial output in Canadian history. In Poland's case, it was the party-state apparatus which took upon itself the mission of accumulating and expropriating available capital in order to channel it into an industrializationoffensive designed to accomplishin a very short period what had taken much longer in a capitalist economy. However, in social terms the industrialization imposed on the society by the party-state apparatus was very costly. In the process of imposing the sacrifices that were considered necessary to catch up, the party-state apparatus took on a size and complexity that resulted in its acquiring a life of its own. In the case of Quebec, it was the nationalist affirmations of the 1960s - the Quiet Revolution - which

National Survival in Dependent Societies

generated demands upon the state (largely to catch up in terms of services and incomes) that resulted in the same process manifesting itself, albeit in a very attenuated form. There is one crucial factor in our analysis that should be explored at a greater length -that is the position of state within society, and especially the state vis-2-vis other social institutions. It is our opinion that this position is the most important single factor in determiningthe success of industrialand, more generally, economic developmentof a nation. In explainingboth the plight of the Polish economy and the economic difficulties of Quebec we paid disproportionate attention to the role of state policies. An enumeration of the conditions under which states succeed or fail in their economic policies of promotingindustrialization is outside the scope of this essay, and is a topic that still has not been sufficiently examined. Nonetheless, we are tempted to formulate certain conclusions concerning this topic in view of our findings. The position of the state in the societal and institutional framework in which it functions is different in Quebec and Poland. First of all, the Quebec economy is an integral part of the Canadian and, still more broadly, of the world market economy in which the private sector occupies a dominant position. Second, the Quebec state,despite its relative autonomy, is part of the Canadian federal state. It has no central bank and its possibility of introducing custom barriers to protect its enterprises is limited. Hence, the repertoire of economic instruments available to the state is more limited than in the case of other states. Third, it is a democratic state in the sense that it is subject to the control of the freely-electedrepresentativesof society-the Quebec National ~ s s e m band l ~ the Canadian Parliament.

I

In comparison, the Polish economy is a highly closed economy. Nearly

alJ industry is in practice owned by the state, and its functioning has been

cl'osely regulated by central plans. The Polish zloty is not exchangeable to other currencies, and there is no direct connection between the internal and external markets. The bulk of the economicexchange of Poland is channelled through COMECON, an agency whose main task is to co-ordinate the central plans of member countries. The prices set by COMECON aR in a certain indirect way related to world prices but essentially these are typically regulated (or administered) prices. Exchange with the free-market economies, such as it is, is camed out through the intermediary of state foreign-trade agencies that are part of the centrally planned economy. Consequently,if one takes the term "market" in its classical economicsense, one must concludethat

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...

Poland has a very restricted market: exchanges go on but there are, in most cases, no economicmechanisms bringing together demand and supply. Everpresent shortages, not only of consumer goods but also of raw materials, machines, and other means of production, are the most eloquent testimony of this stateof affairs. Second, the institutionalinstrumentsfor controlof the state by the public are extremelylimited, and where they exist at all, very deficient. These important differences notwithstanding, we cannot but notice that the economic policies of both societies -though in the case of Quebec to a lesser extent and in that of Poland to a greater extent -show characteristic features of etatism. Etatism appearswhen the dominant,from the point of view of the formulation of economicpolicy, interests are generated within the state structure in the absence (Poland's case), or to the detriment (Quebec's case) of the private sector. The dominant feature of etatism is the inclination of the state towards big, capital-intensive, prestigious investments, as well as a propensity to act in terms of control, as opposed to profit, considerations. When states expand and are not effectively restrained by the private sector, their policies begin to be more responsive to interests generated within the state sector itself, and less and less responsive to interests external to the institutional framework of the state sector. In amuch quoted passage, Joseph Schurnpeter(1954: 24) formulated an opinion that should probably be considered one of the most important insights of this century:

The fiscal capacity of the state has its limits not only in the sense in which this is self-evident and which would be valid also for a socialist community, but in a much narrower and for the tax state, more painfid sense. If the will of the people demands higher and higher public expenditures, if more and more means are used for purposes for which private individuals have not produced them, if more and more power stands behind this will, and if, finally, all parts of the people are gripped by entirely new ideas about private property and the forms of life -then the tax state will have run its course and society will have to depend on other motive forces for its economy than self-interest. After 65 years of existence, the socialist formation is still at a loss as to what these "other motive forces" should be. The present drive towards economic refom, accentuating self- interest, is an obvious confession of

National Survival in Dependent Societies defeat. The socialist organization of economy proved capable of producing rapid economic growth,under conditionsofbackwardness,by the mobilization of all economic resources and concentration upon a limited number of objectives. But the specific constellation of interests it has generated has proven very resistant and usually effectively hinders attempts aimed at adjusting the economy to an intensive strategy of economic development. The case of Quebec is more interesting in a sense. The nationalist governmentof Quebec set out for itself a series of objectives which comprised both economic and nationalistic aspirations. Not only did it aim at achieving economic growth, it also endeavoured to promote the social and cultural interests of French Canadians. As for the etatist character of the strategy chosen, it would be too easy to explain it away by invoking the misleading parallel with the metropolitan French tradition. We submit that the answer is to be found in the structural restraints within, and generated by, the situation in Quebec itself. The government of Quebec had limited control over its economic environment, however it exercised a certain control over the institutional structure within Quebec. Hence, it directed its attention from what it scarcely controls to what it clearly controls, that is, what was within its legal jurisdictions (Wildavsky, 1979). Accordingly, it found itself creating large state enterprises oriented towards the production of the particular type of product (e.g., steel) or the development of one type of resource (e.g., asbestos). Such enterprises are easy to control. In addition, the Quebec governmentmobilized to provide hitherto non-existent cultural, social, and welfare services, thus extending its scope of activity and control. In so doing it opened new avenues of social mobility for French Canadians: new opportunities for careers in the state structure. In a relatively expansive economic environment, when profits are high

and the population disposes of income that is taxable and credit is readily available, the implementation of such a strategy creates no immediate problems. On the contrary, it generates economic activity in the short term. Yet when economic conditions worsen, profits shrink and credit becomes expensive, the moment of truth amves. What we have, as in many modem societies, is the fiscalcrisis of the state. The government of Quebec, in adefensive move, tried to solve this crisis by raising taxes, thus endangering its own tax base as some businesses emigrated to other provinces while others stopped investing. Larger Anglophone enterprises were the most mobile; smaller Francophone

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enterprises, which have fewer options, weremore likely to continue operation in Quebec. This being the case, heavy taxation became a capital levy on indigenous enterprises, compounding a decapitalization process already underway. The alternatives that now face Quebec society are to find a new and different developmental strategy, or to start looking - in "Schumpeterian" language-for "other motive forces." The first alternative runs counter to the constellation of interests generated by the "tax state" strategy adopted and still in place. The second strategy would no doubt be more acceptableto these same interests but, unfortunately, it would require an epoch-making social invention which is rather improbable. In short, it would appear that relaunching Quebec on the path of rapid economic developmentwould require a thorough reform of the relationship between the state, the economy, and society in Quebec, and by the same token a serious displacement of the dominant coalition of interests. Formulating such a strategy would not only be a difficult task politically, intellectually it would require new and sometimes risky approaches-nothing less than the creationof an experimentalclimate among the upper echelons of the political class. Up until now the strategy that has been followed has been an opportunistic one, based upon a penchant for the easiest, superficially most obvious, and most available solutions. The new approach would have to be much more sophisticated. We would like to conclude our comparative analysis of institutional structures mediating between economy and state in Poland and Quebec with a very general observation. First, we postulate that an industrial social system consists of three subsystems-economy, state, and society -and that each subsystem has developed, historically, its own particular institutions. This being the case, we advance, in the light of the Polish and Quebec experiences in the postwar era, that in a well-functioning society in the modem era the boundaries or identities of the three subsystems must be preserved. If such is not the case, and if one of the subsystems is allowed to dominate the others, the institutions particular to each subsystem become unable to make their particular contributions and their levels of effectiveness begin to decline. In the long run,the functioning of the whole suffers irremediably. On the other hand, if the boundaries and identities of the subsystems are respected and maintained, the subsequent, but inescapable, tensions are productive in the long term. Yet, respecting the conditions necessary for the maintenance of such a

National Survival in Dependent Societies

dynamic equilibrium and the tensions that it implies requires the existence of some kind of societal consensus, the source of which is not entirely evident. Perhaps the source is none other than a historical tradition which is itself the product of the interpenetration of nationalist aspirations on the one hand, and the values and ethical imperatives of our Western civilization on the other.

IX A COMPARISON OF SOCIAL MOBILITY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENT IN QUEBEC AND IN POLAND

Paul Bernard Jean Renaud Michal Pohoskil

In all modem societies, a complex system of social relationships presides over the allocation of people to the various socio-economicpositions and over the distribution of the benefits attached to these positions. In all cases, one also can obselve a tendency to the reproduction over-time of thehierarchies so created, that is, to the preservation of relative advantages and disadvantages over the career span and to their transmission over the generations. This reproduction is not a simple, automatic process, though, since it takes place in the midst of importanttransformations: the very nature of socio-economicpositions evolves, and so do the institutional arrangements through which the distribution is performed.

Comparing such distributional phenomena and institutional arrangements between societies is at once fascinating and difficult. It is fascinating because it reveals much about the underlying dynamics of these societies: social mobility and socio-economic achievement involve sharing the work and sharing the benefits among the members of society; these certainly are core issues, and comparing the ways in which they are performed in various

National Survival in Dependent Societies

places reveals much about how social structure impinges upon the daily lives of people. It is difficult because, as we will see, comparing comparables involves reaching some compromisebetween the standardizationof measures indispensable to confrontation, and having due respect for the specificity of each of the situations compared. In order to sketch such comparativecompromises, and in order to point to major features of interest in a comparison of Quebec and Poland with respect to mobility and achievement,we will briefly indicate fourmajor axes along which we canexpectthe two societies to present similarities and differences. In the first place, one need not agree with the whole of modernization theory to retain some of the predictions it makes about the evolution of societies as they develop economically. It is rather obvious that modem societies commit a drastically reduced proportion of their work force to agriculture, while the surplus is directed in varying proportions to the industrial and the tertiary sectors. A number of changesaccompany this tramformation, as a consequence of differences in the organizationof work among these sectors: the distributions of employment status, education, and occupations are thus profoundly altered in the direction of salaried work, higher and more definite schooling requirements, and higher proportions of managerial, professional, technical and white collar jobs.

Another hypothesized feature of modernizationis more controversial: it is often argued that modem societies and economiescannotoperate efficiently without a relatively large measure of fluidity in occupationalassignmentfrom generation to generation, and within the course of a person's work life. Modem societies would, accordingto this view, converge towards a common model of net socio-professional mobility (that is, mobility inasmuch as it represents an equilibrium between the forces of social reproduction and those pushing toward equality of opportunities, once the specifics of socio-professional distribution in each of the societies being compared have been removed). In the second place, Quebec and Poland obviouslyhave different socio-

economic and political regimes: the first is a market-oriented liberal democracy with social-democratic leanings, while the other is a centrally planned socialist society, where private property is very seldom present, except in the agricultural sector. This should have definite consequences in terns of equality of conditions as well as equality of opportunities. We would expect the distributions of socio-economic goods (education, the various levels of occupation,income) to be more equitable inPoland thanin Quebec; moreover,

A Comparison of Social Mobility

...

social origin should generally play a lesser role in Poland in determining access to schooling, jobs and income. In the third place, the centrally planned economy of Poland has allowed it to embark in a program of industrialization which is unmatched in Quebec. This may explain why, as we mentioned above, the work force released from agricultural production has been employed in industry to a much larger extent in Poland than in Quebec, where, in contrast, the tertiary sector is much more developed. It should also have consequencesfor the wage structure in Poland: emphasis seems to have been laid on remuneration of skilled blue-collar workers, especially in heavy industry.

Finally, men and women seem to occupy very different places in the gender division of paid work in the two societies. For better or for worse, women are largely assigned, in Quebec as well as in other advanced capitalist societies, to clerical and lower professional occupations, as well as to service work, their distribution is thus very different from the one for men. In Poland, by contrast, men and women have more similar distributions; women are only half as present as their Quebec counterparts in managerial, professional and clericaljobs, and they have very little access to skilled blue-collar jobs when compared with Polish men. These distributional differences should have consequences in terms of gender differences in mobility and achievementpatterns. On the one hand, the fact that women in Quebec are largely assigned to a limited number of highly feminized occupational categories should, paradoxically, limit the influence of their social origin on their job attainment: roughly speaking, what mostly matters for a female worker there is her gender, not her father's occupation. On the other hand, the assignment of women to specific occupations and industrial sectors in each society should strongly contribute to the explanation of the income gap between themselves and their male counterparts. Given the interplay of these four factors, how exactly will we go about explaining the various aspects of mobility and socio-economic achievement in the two societies? We will examine in the first place simple distributional phenomena, which constitute the background of the processes through which social positions are allocated. We expect Poland to have a much higher proportion of its work force in agriculture than Quebec, but this gap will narrow as we turn to more recent distributions (the occupations of the sample members' fathers,then their own occupationsin their firstjob, and finally their present job).

National Survival in Dependent Societies

This, however, does not mean that occupational and industrialdistributions in the two societies simply tend to become identical; as we said, Poland is indeed involved in a program of development stressing industrialization, while Quebec's economy is much more oriented towards the service sector. This will have widespread implications for our analysis; one of these involves the occupational distribution of female workers: the overwhelming majority of these will perform non-manual tasks in Quebec, while in Poland their distribution will remain closer to that of their fathers, Given this situation we will, whenever possible, run comparisons of mobility and attainment processes for both the total and the non-farm populations: the parallel between societies should be closer when only the more modem sectors of the economy are taken into account. Considering the prevalence of the rural-agricultural world in Poland, educationhas probably expanded less there than in Quebec; on the other hand, both the Polish and the Quebec states have made considerable effort in the direction of educational development, in order to further economic development and equality of opportunities.Finally, when we turn to income, we would expect Poland, as a socialist society, to display more equality than Quebec. We will analyse in the second place social mobility tables representing the transmission of socio-professionalpositions overthe generations and their evolution in the course of careers. As we mentioned earlier, sociologyhas long abandoned the idea of a convergence of gross mobility rates in all developed societies. Such rates are closely dependent on the occupational structures of the different countries, which vary extensively according to historical and cultural circumstances. What remains of the idea of convergence applies only to net mobility, that is, to mobility rates and configurations once the effect of (marginal) occupational distributions has been removed from the tables. According to Featherman, Jones and Hauser (1975), and to Grusky and Hauser (1984), specific inheritance tends to be uniform across Western nations because there is much uniformity in the economicresources and desirability of occupations. In other words, similarly located people in these societies will have the same desire and opportunity to transmit their position, given similar circumstances with respectto occupationaldistributions. We will try to ascertainwhether this hypothesis also appliesto a socialist society, or whether the abolition of private property (at least on a large scale outside of agriculture) has affected net mobility. We will pay special attention to the case of female workers because,

A Comparison of Social Mobility

...

as we saw above, their very different level of presence in non-manual occupations in the two societies may induce differences in the mobility regimes over and above the effect of the marginal constraints proper. After this examination of the general picture of social mobility, we will undertake the analysis of the channels through which transmission is performed; this will consist in exploring, with the help of regressions, the various influences at play in the distribution of education, occupational status and income among workers. In a socialist society, we would expect opportunities for education to be based more on academic merit than on social status; that is, social origin should play a smaller role in educational attainmentthan it does in a capitalist society. On the other hand, the more traditional character of the Polish economy can counteract this tendency, especially when the rural sector is included in the analysisO2

With respect to occupational status, the same train of thought leads us to think that Poland should display a lesser influence for social origin variables

and a greater one for education. Concerning the former, it may even be that people of working class origin will be relatively favoured in their access tojobs in a socialist society. Concerning the effect of education, the secondary level may play a lesser role in Quebec, where it is fairly widespread in the cohort, than in Poland, where it still is a discriminatingfactor; correspondingly,postsecondary education should have a greater influence in Quebec.' This same situation should prevail with respect to income determination, which reflects to an important extent the occupations people have. Two other variables may register the effects of specific policies of the Polish state. As we said earlier, Polish development is oriented toward industrialization and specific remuneration policies have been designed that favour qualified industrial workers, especially in heavy industry; our data should be able to register the effects of these deliberate policies. The Polish data were gathered in 1972(see Pohoski, 1974).The national sample comprised 9,000 men and 4,000women, aged 30 to 39 years who were part of the economically active population; they had to have worked at least five weeks in the year of reference. The Quebec data, collected for the year 1978,involved a national sample of 4,000 men and women working full- time or looking for a full-timejob at the time of the survey (see Bernard et al., 1979); restrictions paralleling those in Poland, in particular with respect to age,

National Survival in Dependent Societies

reduced this number to 660 men and 300 women. Given these sample sizes, we will deal first, in all of our comparisons,with the situation of men and then, more cautiously and briefly, with that of women. The six-year span between the two studies may prove of some importance, although the impact of the economic crisis of the mid-seventies was not yet severely felt in 1978 by the employed work force in Quebec. At any rate, the situation described in our data cannot be extrapolated without precautions to the present, given the intervening events in the two societies. Let us add that even though we had completed most of the analysis at the end of 1981, a few more bits of data and some adjustments were then considered useful; subsequent circumstances have forced us to proceed without the benefit of these, and we will point as we go to a few less than ideal comparativeprocedures. We do not, however, consider that this invalidates our conclusions concerning major similarities and differences between the two societies. 1.

THETWOWORKFORCES

The major variable of interesthere is of course occupation.The structure of the data allows us to run an approximate diachronic comparison of the two societies; the sample being restricted to people in their thirties, and retrospective data having been obtained, we can observe differences in occupational distributions for three different periods: at the time of the surveys, at the time the respondents held their first full-time jobs after leaving school for the first time, and at their fathers' generation (respondents were asked what job their father held when he was 14, in Poland, and 16, in Quebec). Of course, these three comparisonsdo not refer to entirely distinct periods in the labourmarket, since people forming the single cohort aged 30 to 39 were nevertheless born to fathers of different ages, and since the length of education before the first job is variable. But roughly speaking, they will provide us with three successive readings of the occupational situation in the two societies. Obtaining a comparableand meaningful coding of occupationsrequired careful work, especially given the restrictions put on the number of analytical categories by the sample sizes. The 600 or so basic categories used by Bernard and Renaud in their research were taken from Statistics Canada's four-digit code; they were matched with the 350 or so categories of the Social Classification of Professions prepared by M. Pohoski and K.M.Slomczynski. The aggregating scheme used afterwards closely resembles the one used in Pohoski's previous studies. For men, it comprises five categories :

A Comparison of Social Mobility

...

- professionals and managers - technical and administrative workers

-

service workers, small entrepreneurs, foremen and skilled manual workers - semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers - farm owners, unpaid family workers and hired agricultural workers In the case of women, the small number of cases and the important differences in distribution between the two societies forced us to abandon the distinction between the first two categories as well as between the last two. The three occupational distributions for male workers appear in the margins of Table 1,and coefficients of dissimilarity (interpretable as the proportion of people to be moved in the either one of the distributions compared in order to make the two identical) can be found in the top panel of Table 3. The coefficients on the main diagonal indicate that occupational differences between the two societies are now attenuated when compared with the situation when these workers began their careers and with their fathers' situation. The differences, as well as their attenuation, come almost entirely from a decreasing over-representation of Polish workers in the agricultural sector and, correlatively, a decreasing under-representation in all other occupational categories.

TABLE 1 Socio-professionalmobility tables involvingfather's occupation and son's first and presentoccupations,for males, total manpower (row percentages)

1 s.

g -. s b h

Panel a - Father's occupation by son's first occupation

9

Son's first occupation* 1

P

Father's occupation* 1 Quebec Poland 2

Quebec Poland

3

Quebec Poland

4

Quebec Poland

5 Quebec Poland Total Quebec Poland

48.3 25.0

2

13.3 25.3

3

20.0 24.5

3

4

18.3 21.0

Total

5

0.0 4.3

(N)

%

(60) (372)

9.4 4.3

ff 2 9 U 2. m A

6

Panel b -Father's occupation by son's present occupation Son's present occupation*

1

h) h)

Father's occupation* 1 Quebec Poland

2

3

4

5

Total

(N)

%

59.0 46.5

9.8 15.5

27.9 28.1

3.3 7.2

0.0 2.7

(61) (374)

9.5 4.3

43.9 36.3

24.4 23.1

24.4 31.7

7.3 7.8

0.0 1.1

(41) (372)

6.4 4.3

m

2

Quebec Poland

3

Quebec Poland

4

Quebec Poland

5

Quebec Poland

Total Quebec Poland

b

2 23

&

Panel c -Son's first occupation by son's present occupation 1 ~

(N)

%

2. %

-

p..

b

88.5 82.5

3.5 10.7

7.1 5.3

0.9 0.6

0.0 0.9

(113) (468)

17.2 5.3

3

Quebec Poland

32.9 42.8

34.3 37.3

28.6 14.4

4.3 2.9

0.0 2.6

(70) (689)

10.7 7.7

2

3

Quebec Poland

14.7 12.2

10.4 8.3

62.9 64.3

10.4 11.9

1.6 3.2

(251) (2 156)

38.2 24.2

4

Quebec Poland

5

Quebec Poland

2 h)

Total Quebec Poland

*

2 Total

5

-

Son's first occupation* 1 Quebec Poland

R

Son's present occupation* 2 3 4

tn

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Professionals and managers Technical and administrative workers Service workers, small entrepreneurs, foremen and skilled manual workers Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers Farm owners, unpaid family workers and hired agricultural workers

5

3 h

8

2

3

A Comparison of Social Mobility ...

TABLE 2 Socio-professional mobility tables involving father's occupation and daughter's first and present occupations,for males,total manpower (row percentages) Panel a Father's occupation by daughter's first occupation

-

Daughter's first occupation* 1 2 3 Father's occupation* 72.0 1 Quebec 72.8 Poland

2 Quebec Poland

3 Quebec Poland Total Quebec Poland

Total (N)

%

14.0 17.1

14.0 10.1

(50) (357)

17.6 9.2

62.8 41.4

20.0 22.

17.2 36.6

(145) (949)

51.1 24.4

61.8 17.7

18.0 12.2

(89) 20.2 70.1 (2591)

31.3 66.5

64.1 28.5

18.3 15.1

17.6 (284) 56.4 (3 897)

100% 100%

Panel b -Father's occupation by daughter's first occupation Daughter's present occupation* 1 2 3 Father's occupation* 82.4 1 Quebec 76.2 Poland

Total (N)

%

11.8 10.9

5.9 12.9

(51) (357)

18.0 9.2

69.4 42.5

15.3 23.5

15.3 34.0

(144) (949)

50.7 24.3

Poland

73.0 20.6

21.3 15.8

(89) 5.6 63.6 (2592)

31.3 66.5

Total Quebec Poland

72.8 31.0

16.5 17.2

(284) 10.6 51.7 (3 898)

100% 100%

2 Quebec Poland

3 Quebec

National Survival in Dependent Societies Panel c Daughter's first occupation by daughter's present occupation Daughter's present occupation* 1

2

Total

3

(N) Daughter's first occupation* 1 Quebec 92.5 Poland 85.5

%

5.3 6.6

2.1 7.8

(187) (1 147)

63.0 28.7

2

Quebec Poland

50.0 20.7

41.4 48.4

8.6 30.9

(58) (614)

19.5 15.4

3

Quebec Poland

19.2 6.5

32.7 14.3

48.1 79.2

(52) (2 238)

17.5 56.0

Total Quebec Poland

71.4 31.3

17.2 17.3

11.4 51.3

(297) (3 999)

100% 100%

*

1. 2. 3.

Non-manual workers (professionals and managers, technical and administrative workers) Service workers, small entrepreneurs, foremen and skilled manual workers Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers. Farm owners, unpaid family workers and hired agricultural workers

The same tendencies are observed when we turn to the pattern of change of distributions over time within each society. In Quebec, the sons diverge from the fathers right from the beginning of their work life, being more present in the two non-manual categories and practically absent from agriculture, a trend which is reinforced later on. In Poland, on the contrary, the sons in their first jobs are quite close to the fathers' distribution, only marginally leaving agriculture for manual and service work; it is only in mid-career that their numbers drop sharply in agriculture and increase in the non-manual categories. One gets the overall impression of a lag in Poland with respect to the evolution away from agriculture and toward tertiary occupations, while in both societies, six out of 10 male workers aged 30-39 are presently involved in manual and service work.

A Comparison of Social Mobility

...

TABLE 3 Coefficientsof dissimilarity between the socio-professional distributions of fathersandof sons (or daughters)at their first and present occupations, for males (5 occupational categories)and females (3 occupational categories), total manpower. Panel a males Socio-professional Father's Son's first Son's present distributions* occupation occupation occupation

-

Father's occupation Son's first occupation Son's present occupation

34.1 13.0 36.3

Panel b Socio-professional distributions*

-females

Father's Daughter's first occupation occupation

Father's occupation Daughter's first occupation Daughter's present occupation

*

21.5 37.0 30.4

35.2 19.4 21.8

46.5 38.8 4.6

22.0 15.3

15.5 Daughter's present occupation 54.8

8.4 41.7

The main diagonal displays coefficients comparing the two countries for a given "generational" distribution. The upper triangle presents dissimilarities between distributions within Quebec, while those for Poland are found in the lower triangle.

The distribution of occupations for female workers can be found in the margins of Table 2, and the coefficients of dissimilarity in the bottom panel of Table 3. There is no trend here toward a decrease of differences between societies, even if we focus on the evolution from the beginning to the middle of women's careers. Just as their fathers, Polish women are concentrated in low-skill manual jobs and in agriculture, and this hardly changes as they grow older. On the contrary, two out of three Quebec women are in non-manual occupations throughout their work life, in sharp contrast with what happened to their fathers. Here again, Poland appears less oriented than Quebec toward tertiary occupations.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

The active populations of Poland and Quebec also differ with respect to other socio-economic dimensions. We will examine here the evolution of education over two generations, the distribution of work force in the various economic sectors, the length of the work week, the proportion of workers sharing supervisory functions, and occupational income. We will focus on the non-farm workers (that is, we will exclude those who were farm owners and unpaid family workers at the time of the survey, while including hired agricultural workers) since the variables under study here are mainly pertinent outside of the context of the family farm. The appropriate data will be found in Table 4 for men and in Table 5 for women.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

The number of years of education completed (E2) by male workers is higher and slightly more dispersed in Quebec than in Poland. In both societies, the overwhelmingmajority of workers completed the seven years of primary education, as is shown by variable EP2. With regard to the four years of secondary education (ES2), Quebec workers have completed three on the average,but Polish workersonly halfthat number. The differenceis even more from 12to 16years or striking with respect to post-secondary schooling (En, more). The comparison is not easy with respect to education in the previous generation, since the latter variable was coded in a different way in order to preserve comparability among societies.The proportion of fathershaving had some secondary education (FJ3l) is nearly thnx times larger (at 36 percent) in Quebec than in Poland, and the situation is similarly contrasted with respect to access to post-secondary schooling(FE2). Allin all, there remain important differences between the two work forces, in spite of apparent progress in the overall level of education in both places. Poland is obviously committing a larger share of its middle-aged work forcethan Quebecto the industrial sectorsproper, especiallyin heavy industry (33 percent as opposed to 15 percent). The same thing goes for the primary sector (excluding, as we said, family farms) and, to a lesser extent, for construction. On the other hand, 40 percent of Quebec male workers, as opposed to only 8 percent of Polish ones, work in the servicesector outside of transportation, commerce and public works, and in particular in the public service. This confirms and elaborates on what we had already found in the comparison of occupations. The work week averages 11 hours longer in Poland, and the proportion of the work force performing some sort of supervision over the work of others is higher in Quebec. For comparability purposes, the income variable had to be transformed in both cases. In Poland, net monthly income from main occupation was measured, while the Quebec survey asked for gross income from main occupation in the year before the s w e y . Three distinct problems had to be solved. In the first place, income is of course crucially affected by the number of weeks worked over the year, and adjustments had to be made in order to discount this factor. Polish income data was multiplied by 12 to put it on a yearly basis, while Quebec income was divided by the number of weeks actually worked and multiplied by 52. We are thus comparing fd-time, yearround workers. In the second place, income before deductions was used in Quebec, and net incomein Poland, but this does not invalidatethe comparison, since practically no income tax or social security contributions were levied in

A Comparison of Social Mobility

...

Poland prior to 1984. In the third place, the very meaning of income differentiation in terns of consumption capacity may be somewhat different in the two societies, since Poland subsidizes in various and complex ways housing and basic foodstuffs. This does not make the two situationsincomparable, however, since Quebec also has housing subsidies and guaranteed minimum income pmgrams, and sinceredistributive measures have complex, sometimesperverse, effectsin both societies.This being said, it is possible that the degree of egalitarianism in the access to consumption is somewhat underestimated by the occupationalincomedistribution in Poland; this should not, however, crucially affect the estimates of the various income deteminants we will mainly be paying attention to here. Income means and standard deviations are obviously incomparable, given that the zloty is not freely traded on money markets. We can compute, however, a coefficient of variability (s/~),which shows that the relative dispersion of male incomes is somewhat higher in Quebec (.509) than in Poland (.425).

A Comparison of Social Mobility

...

With respect to education (for daughters and their fathers), the situation of female workers is virtually the same as that of men, except that the former have slightly more schooling than the latter. Polish women have close to half their numbers in industry, construction and the primary sector, while Quebec women are nearly absent from all but light industry. Three quartersof the latter group are in the tertiary sector outside transportation, commerce, and public works, against only one third in Poland, a situation parallel, though at a much higher level, to that of male workers. In Quebec, the average work week of women is much shorter than that of men, but the difference is smaller in the case of Poland; this reflects to a large extent the differences in occupational distributions. Women occupy supervisory positions only half as often as men in both countries. Finally the relative dispersion of female incomes is only slightly larger in Quebec (.505) than in Poland (.471), a fact which probably reflects constraints put on this group's income in both societies; in both cases indeed, female earnings average only two thirds of male earnings.

All in all, there are striking differences between the work forces of the two societies. We find in Poland an impressive dualism between the agricultural sector and the rest of the economy, the effects of which are felt even in the educational,occupationaland sectoral distributionofthe currentlymiddleaged male and female non-fam work force. Such a dualism is long gone in Quebec. Education there is somewhat higher and more dispersed, occupations are more concentrated in the services and away from industrial sectorsproper, and income is less equally distributed. These differences should not be reduced, however, to a simple-minded modernization scheme; the past of a given society seldom is a figure of another's future. For instance, the sectoral distribution of the work force in Quebec may at first sight seem to indicate progress, but it may just as well be interpreted as the sign of weaknesses in its industrial basis. Another example is education, which has recently fallen prey to inflationary tendencies in countries where it has expanded the most. This shows not only that comparisons must be specific and careful, but also that patterns of relationships among such variables must be paid attention to. Accordingly, we now turn to the study of social mobility tables. 2.

INTER-GENERATIONAL AND CAREER MOBILITY

At first sight, mobility patterns displayed in Table 1 for men and in Table 2 for women appear very different in the two societies. The sons of non-manual fathers, for instance, have much lower chances in Poland than in Quebec of

National Survival in Dependent Societies

getting access to non-manual jobs themselves at the very beginning of their careers, and while the overwhelming majority of the sons of agricultural workers in Quebec get out of this activity very early, two thirds of those in Poland remain there. Traces of these differences persist, though much attenuated, when the sons reach mid-career. The dissimilarities are even more strikingin the case of female workers: in early as well as in mid-career, Quebec women have virtually the sameprofessional distribution whatever their social origin, while in Poland the association between father's and daughter's occupations is much closer. Another way of contrasting social mobility in the two societies is to divide up the tables into three zones: people found on the main diagonal are stable, that is, they occupy the same position with respect to the two moments being observed; people in lower triangle are said to be upwardly mobile, and those in the upper one downwardly mobile. Of course, this is a very rough measure, since the occupational categories do not really constitute a unidimensional hierarchy. But it provides us with approximationswhich are quite coherent with what had been found when comparingunivariate occupational distributions.Table 6 shows that amongmale workers, upward mobility is more prevalent during early career in Quebec and in mid-career in Poland; the net result is about equivalent when we look at the I11cycle, that is, h m social origin to son's present occupation. In the case of female workers, however, the surplus of early upward mobility in Quebec does not get compensated later on, so that in the end, stability from social origin to daughter's present occupation prevails in Poland, and upward mobility in Quebec.

A Comparison of Social Mobility

...

TABLE 6 Proportions of manpower upwardly mobile, stable and downwardly mobilein socio-professionalmobility tables involving father's occupation and son's (or daughter's) first and present occupations, for males and females, total manpower. Occupational variables

Males (5 categories) Upwardly mobile

Father's occupation by son's first occupation

Quebec Poland

,423 .284

.368 .529

.209 .I87

Father's occupation by Quebec son's present occupation Poland

.511

.566

.349 .344

.I40 .091

Son's first occupation by Quebec son's present occupation Poland

.345 .500

.551 .429

.lo4 .07 1

Occupational variables

Females (3 categories) Upwardly mobile

Father's occupation by daughter's first occupation

Stable Downwardly mobile

Stable Downwardly mobile

Quebec Poland

.570 .30

.292 .586

.I37 .I14

Father's occupation by Quebec daughter's present occupation Poland

,648 .346

.243

.I09 .lo5

Daughter's first occupation by Quebec daughter's present occupation Poland

.I89 .I48

.747 .763

.550

.064

.089

National Survival in Dependent Societies

These figures represent the experiential aspect of social mobility for the populations involved. But, as we said earlier, analystshave never been content with the description of these gross effects, which are of course heavily dependent on the marginal distributions involved. For instance, the capacity of workers from non-manual social origin to maintain themselves in the same category depends on how many such workers there are and how many such jobs are available when they enter the labour market. Differences in occupational distributions between societies thus impinge on social mobility opportunities, and one would wish to get rid of such differences in order to isolate net mobility effects. One would then be able to compare countries as if they had identical occupational structures and differed only with respect to "fluidity", that is, with respect to the unequal constraints put on later achievements by previous situations. Log-linear analysis provides us with precisely the appropriate instrument? The results of it can be found in Table 7. Each row corresponds to one of the sub-tables in Table 1 (for men) and 2 (for women)? and it presents a succession of models with which we try to fit the data in the mobility matrices. The first model (first column) allows for a difference in occupational structure between societies, but only for the chronologically more remote variable. In the first row, for instance, we examine whether differences in the intergenerational mobility tables of Quebec and Poland are caused exclusively by the difference in the fathers' occupational distributions; the very large value of G2 (a measure similar to chi square) and the very low probability attached to such an hypothesis @ =.000)indicate that such is not the case. The results are just about the same in the second and third models, where inter-societal differences in the second variable (the chronologically closer one) and differences in both occupationalvariables are taken into account respectively. What is missing in the picture, of course, is avery important and rather obvious factor: association between the two occupational variables (common to both societies). This is introduced in the fourth model, together with inter-societal differences in both occupational distributions. The G2 is then drastically reduced, indicating that the fit with the data is considerably improved.

A Comparison of Social Mobility

.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

The conclusions to be drawn from this table (Table 7) with respect to the convergence thesis are rather mixed. In three comparisons out of six (one for men, two for women), there is a significantgap between the last model and the data; this means that a further factor is missing, corresponding to an intersocietal difference in net mobility regimes. On the other hand, the G2 to be explained (corresponding to the independence model in the third model) is very largely accounted for by the common association model (as is indicated in the last column of the table). Moreover, a rather negligible proportion of all cases are misclassified by this common association model: at most up to 1.4 percent of cases would be moved to more proper locations in the table by using a model which provides for differences in social fluidity between the two societies. We can conclude therefore that, once their rather different occupational distributions are taken into account, Quebec and Poland are largely similar in their net (or circulation) mobility. There remain, however, significant differences, and they seem to correspond to what we observed earlier when describing gross mobility patterns. In the case of men, the differences appear in the career mobility table (first job to present job). Polish men experience much more mobility than their Quebec counterparts in this period; they move rather abruptly away from their social origins at this juncture, while such a change rather occurs in the beginning of the career in Quebec. In the case of women, we have already pointed out how social origin has relatively little influence on their careers in Quebec, while it retains a strong effect both on first and present job in Poland. The only matrix with respect to which women in both societiesare similaris the c a m r mobility one: once settled in their first jobs, they tend to remain in the same position. There are, then, some differencesbetween the two societies in net as well as in gross patterns of access to socio-professionalpositions. But the tables we have analyzed only inform us about the flow of people from origin to destination, not about the channels through which movement is achieved. In order to gain such knowledge, we turn to regression models, where a variety of othervariables can be taken into account. And we will of course conml, in this further work, the two prominent factors of differentiation revealed up to now: gender and the distinctiveness of the farm sector.

A Comparison of Social Mobility 3.

...

GETTING AN EDUCATION, GETTING A JOB

As is well known, and as will be confirmed here, education is now a major determinant of one's position in the labour market. It has become customary to contrast its effect on careers with that of social origin variables like father's occupation and father's level of education.Moreover,the lattervariables exert an influence on education itself, and thus, indirectly, on one's occupational achievement. In order to measure such effects, we have run three sets of regression analyses. In the first set, education will be taken as dependent variable, and father's education and occupation as predictors. In the two other sets, occupation will be dependent, and the predictors will be entered in steps: first, the two social origin variables, and then, together with these, education. Comparing the two latter sets will allow us to distinguish the gross effect of social origin on occupation from its effect net of education. We are talking about sets of regressions because we will be comparing Quebec and Poland as usual, but also because analyseshave been made both forthe total and the non-farm work forces. We will thus be able to determine if there are overall differences in career patterns between the two societies, and, if so, whether these differences persist when only the (presumably more similar) non-farm populations are compared.

Before we proceed, however, we have to specify the procedures used to make the comparisons possible. In the first place, the variables have to be defined in the same way in Quebec and in Poland. This is easy enough in the case of education, even though years of schooling spent in different institutional contexts may not have exactly the same meaning in the two societies. But occupations offer a tougher challenge. When they are entered as predictors, we can use them in dummy form, that is, each category then becomes a distinct variable, with a similarmeaning in both societies: the low skill manual category and the agricultural workers category provide the baseline of the model, and the effects of belonging to the professional and managerial category, to the lower non-manual category, or to the skilled manual and service category are in turn ascertained against that baseline. When occupation is the dependent variable, however, we must use a metric form; we have been using standard socio-economic status scales, constructed for each country with regressions relating prestige scores to education and income distribution^.^ The problem with these, however, is that they are constructed differently in Canada and in Poland; for instance, the

National Survival in Dependent Societies

cutting points for education and, above all, for income are different, even incomparable.The result is that the scales are not commensurate; for instance, the status of present job for non-farm men averages 32.9 in Poland with a standard deviation of 14.0, the corresponding figures for Quebec being 49.2 and 15.7.The use of standardized coefficients (betas) is not appropriate, since it would rid us of differences in variance between the two societies, which we want preserved in the analysis, since they may turn out to be a major source of differentiation.Our way around thedifficulty has been to use unstandardized coefficients (slopes and standard errors), dividing them by the mean of the dependent variable for each group. Parameters then become comparable because they use a common metric: b$'s express the net percent (of the mean) increase in the dependentvariable for an increase of one unit in the independent variable. In other words, the regression parameters express relative gains; they do not indicate how many status points, for instance, one gains from one more year of education in a given society, but rather what proportion of the available status points in this society is procured by one year of education. We have applied this procedure to all the regressions analysed here. One last technical point has to be settled. Given the differences in the distributions of the variables, there are no standard tests to decide when the regression parameters differ significantlybetween societies. We used as a rule of thumb that there was such a difference when the parameters (the b/y's) diverged by more than the sum of their standard errors; in other words, any overlap between intervals of confidence was taken to indicate a significant probability for the parameters to coincide.

A Comparison of Social Mobility

...

TABLE 8 Regression analyses of education and socio-economic status for males, total manpower (slopes and standard errors expressed as percentages of the mean of the dependent variable) Depended variable: & R2: Quebec ,186 Poland ,168 b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland Predictors*** b Quebec --

FE1

FE2

FQo Fco vpo

-

14.6" 4.6 9.5* 18.9* 18.8" 87.1*

16.5* 8.7" 13.1" 29.0' 28,5* 92.0*

2.7 5.1 * 2.5 5.O 4.4 1.9

1.3 2.6 0.7 1.8 1.8 0.4

15.2* 3.6 2.8 17.9" 17.8* 90.1 *

17.8* 16.1" 16.1* 31,4* 38.0* 90.4"

3.3 6.3 3.1 6.2 5.5 2.4

1.8 3.8 1.1 2.6 2.7 0.6

4.0 0.1 -4.4 3.4 3.5 6.4" 23.6"

1.9 7.7* 3.5" 3.5 10.6* 11.2* 1.8*

2.7 5.O 2.5 5.o 4.4 0.4 4.3

1.4 2.8 0.8 2.0 2.0 0.1 1.2

** ** **

Constant ** Dependent variable: V2 R2: Quebec .I27 Poland ,121 Predictors b Quebec b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland FE1

FE.2

VQo

vco vpo

**

** ** **

Constant Dependent variable: V2 R2: Quebec ,455 Poland ,507 Predictors b Quebec b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland FE1

FE;!

VQO

vco vpo

I32 Constant

* ** ***

b # 0, with p S .05

** lirs

** **

Ib Quebec - b Poland 112 (s.e. Quebec + s.e. Poland) FEI : father's secondary education; father's post-secondary education; VQo,VCo,VPo:father's occupation in the skilled manual, lower non-manual and professional-managerial categories respectively; E2: highest number of years of schooling ever completed; V2: socio-eco-

nomic status of present job.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

TABLE 9 Regression analyses of education and socio-economic status for males, non-farm manpower (slopes and standad errors expressed as percentages of the mean of the dependent variable).

Depended variable: & R2: Quebec .I59 Poland .I42 Predictors*** b Quebec b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland 14.1* 17.3* 2.8 1.2 FE1 7.9 2.6 2.4 5.6 FE2 0.34" 0.7 1* 0.09 0.04 ** vo Constant 81.5* 80.5* 3.3 1.O Depended variable: V2 R2: Quebec .I25 Poland .094 Predictors*** b Quebec b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland FE1 12.7* 18.5* 3.3 1.7 ** 7.9 8.4" 6.7 3.7 PI% 0.81* 0.1 1 0.06 ** 0.44" vo Constant 78.6* 77.8* 4.0 1.4 Depended variable: V2 R2: Quebec .460 Poland .486 Predictors*** bQuebec bPoland s.e.Quebec s.e.Poland FEI 2.2 2.0 1.3 2.7 FE2 2.0 6.1* 5.3 2.8 vo 0.18* 0.13* 0.09 0.04 ** E2 6.2* 10.7* 0.4 0.2 Constant 17.7* 1.1 4.9 1.5 S*

* ** ***

b#O,withp5.05 Ib Quebec - b Poland 12 (s.e. Quebec + s.e. Poland) FE1 : father's secondary education; FE2 father's post-secondary education; Vo:socio-economic status of father's job; & :highest number of years of schooling ever completed; V2 : socio-economic status of present job.

A Comparison of Social Mobility

...

The top panel of Table 8 shows that in the two societies, slightly less than a fifth of the variance in educational attainment is due to social origin (under the assumptions of the linear model). The level of education of the father has the samepattern of influence in both cases: it is the attainmentof the secondary level which plays the major role, with a minor influence of post-secondary studies. The occupational category of the father, by contrast, determines the schooling of Poles to a larger extent than that of Quebecers, especially for those who were born in the two non-manual categories. These data can be compared with those for the non-farm work force in Table 9. One will notice that difficulties of communication between the authors imposed the use, in this case, of the social status of the father as a predictor, but the differences or similarities between the two tables stand out clearly enough that they can be considered reliable. Concerning education, then, the pattern is much the same in the case of the non-farm population. This was to be expected, since education is mostly acquired in early life, at a time when the future farm and non-farm work forces probably shared similar situations. Differences are more likely to appear in status attainment. We can see from the middle panel of Table 8 that social origin plays a certain role in the socio-economic status of the jobs which men workers get access to (roughly 12 percent of the variance is so explained). The influence of father's post-secondary education and of his belonging to non-manual categories are particularly strong in Poland; we notice, however, that qualified manual workers' sons enjoy an advantage there which isn't manifest in Quebec. But these differences between societies, and more generally, the overall direct influence of social origin is attenuated when education is taken into account (bottom panel of Table 8); the latter variable induces a sharp increase of the proportion of variance explained (it gets close to 50 percent). In Poland, each year of education entails a percentage increase in status which is close to twice that in Quebec. This reflects a greater emphasis on education (the attainment of which is significantly related, as we have seen, to social origin) but also the fact that the averagenumber of years of schooling achieved is one third higher in Quebec (that is, there are less years of education around to share statuspoints in Poland). Moreover, while social origin variables have no significant effect in Quebec once education is controlled, they still have an influence on achievement in Poland. When we look at the non-fam population, the situation is the same except for one crucial aspect: there are no longer differences between the two

National Survival in Dependent Societies

societies in the patterns of influence of social origin once education is controlled. In both cases, most of this influence is carried by father's occupation, while of course the foremost factor determining status achievement remains the level of education. Two main elements appear to stand out from these comparisons. In the first place, the two societies are roughly similar with respect to the ways in which people get education and jobs, even though the father's socio-professional classificationmakes more of a difference for the son's achievementsin Poland than in Quebec; each year of schooling is also more highly rewarded in the former case, though we cannot disentangle the respective effects of differences in the importance and in the average level of education. In the second place, most of the dissimilarities are attenuated when we turn from education to occupational achievements and from total to non-fam work force, possibly indicating greater convergence as time passes and as the work force gets increasingly oriented toward non-agricultural occupations. In the case of female workers, the data are only available for the total work force; they can be found in Table 10.The situationhere is parallel to what we found formen, but the contrasts between the two societies are accentuated. The education of women depends much more on social origin in Poland than in Quebec, as can be seen from the proportion of the variance explained (20 percent as opposed to 7 percent) and from the fact that with one exception, socialorigin predictors only have significanteffects inPoland (top panel). The situation is almost exactly the same when socio-professional achievement is regressed on social origin (middle panel). When education is also taken into account, striking and interesting differences appear (bottom panel): social -originfactors are only significant in Poland, save for father's professionalmanagerial status, which is without influence there, but contributes rather strongly to female occupational achievement in Quebec; as was the case for men, each year of education entails a much higher gain in status in Poland, due to a tighter causality or to a lower average level of schooling.

A Comparison of Social Mobility ...

TABLE 10 Regression analyses of education and socio-economicstatus for females, total manpower (slopes and standad errors expressed as percentages of the mean of the dependent variable). Depended variable: & R2: Quebec .072 Poland .200 Predictors*** b Quebec b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland FEI FE2

VQO VCO WO

Constant

4.1 16.9* -6.0 -5.0 -3.8 100.6*

18.9* 16.7* 14.9* 29.8* 29.7* 91.1"

3.3 7.9 3.4 5.4 7.8 2.9

2.0 3.8 1.2 2.6 3.0 6.2

** ** ** ** **

Depended variable: V2 R2: Quebec .047 Poland .I81 Predictors*** b Quebec b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland FEI

FE2

VQO

vco

VPo Constant

4.5 2.3 -2.8 11.1 12.2 97.6"

26.0" 26.0* 18.8" 43.0* 35.9* 88.1*

4.4 10.6 4.5 8.O 10.5 3.9

2.9 5.5 1.7 3.7 4.3 0.9

** ** ** ** ** **

Depended variable: V2 R2: Quebec .477 Poland .600 Predictors*** b Quebec b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland FEI

FE2 VQo

vco

VPo

&

Constant

*** ***

0.8 -12.8 2.6 11.5 15.6" 7.4* 7.1

6.5" 8.8* 3,4* 12.2* 5.1 12.4* -6.1 *

3.3 8.O 3.4 5.9 7.8 0.5 7.5

2.0 3.8 1.2 2.6 3.1 0.2 1.7

** ** ** **

b#O,withpI.05 Ib Quebec - b Poland I 2 (s.e. Quebec + s.e. Poland) FEl : father's secondary education; father's post-secondary education; VQo,VCo,VPo father's occupation in the skilled manual, lower non-manual and professional-managerial categories respectively; E2 : highest number of years of schooling ever completed; V2: socio-economic status of present job.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

One may relate the sharper differencesbetween societiesseenhere to the greater occupational dissimilarities among female workers than among their male counterparts. As we saw in the first section of the paper, Quebec and Polishmale workers diverge by 37 percent in the distributionof their firstjobs, but only by 16 percent in mid-career, women, on the contrary, have a 39 percent difference in early career, which increases at 42 percent Iater on. Clearly, convergence between the two societies is first and foremost a male affair. 4.

THE DETERMINANTS OF INCOME

Now that we have described how people get education and jobs, we can look in some detail at how they get paid for their work. This will allow us to bring into our analysis factors of a different nature, describingnot only the attributes of the workers, but also those attached to thejobs they hold. This is important, since we will have at our disposal new ways of ascertaining how social circumstances and economic development policies impinge upon social inequality. We will be using a regression model similar to the one applied to socioeconomic status: entering variables in steps will allow us to measure the gross effects of certain variables on income, and then to divide these effects up into direct ones and others mediated through intervening variables. Only social origin will be taken into account in step one; as we will see, it has definite but rather limited effects. In step two, education will be added; this more than doubles the proportion of variance explained, and it could mediate some of the effect of social background on earnings. In the third step a number of descriptors of presentjob are added: socio-professionalcategory (with the low skill manual category and the hired agricultural workers category used as a baseline), economic sector (with construction as a baseline), length of the work week and supervisory position. These variables bring the proportion of variance explained to roughly one quarter, and again they are susceptible to mediate the effects of social origin and education on income to the extent that thesejob characteristics reflect the influence of anterior situations. The model was only run excluding independent farmers, income data for the latterhaving an ambiguous meaning.

A Comparison of Social Mobility

...

TABLE 11 Regressionanalysesof occupational income for males,non-farmworkforce (slopes and standard errors expressed as percentages of the mean of the dependent variable). Step 1 Predictors El

FE2 VQo

vco

vpo Constant

Step 2 Predictors

R2: b Quebec 2.1 -11.7 12.7" 39.9* 23.6* 89.2*

R2: b Quebec

Quebec .055 b Poland 10.5* 5.3 11.8* 12.5* 20.1 * 93.4*

s.e. Quebec 5.4 11.7 5.1 10.1 9.3 3.9

Poland .043 s.e. Poland 1.9 3.9 1.1 2.6 2.7 0.7

** ** **

Quebec .l29 Poland .I23 b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland

El

FE2 VQo

vco

vpo EP2 ES2 EF2 Constant

Step 3 Predictors

R2: b Quebec

Quebec .211 Poland ,283 b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland

National Survival in Dependent Societies

Step 3 (Cont'd) Predictors b Quebec ES2 EF2 VQ2

vc2 vp2

BE1 BE2 BE3 BE4 BE5 BE6 WW DR Constant

* **

***

-1.0 7.7* 1.9 11.7 13.5 -22.5" - 19.4 -15.0 -25.4 -22.0* -23.1* 0.88* 17.2" 40.9

b Poland 3.0" 6.1* 11.7" 1.5 18.1* 21.9* -4.4" -13.5" -12.1* -14.7" -23.7* 0.64* 14.6* 43.1*

s.e. Quebec 2.1 1.8 6.8 9.0 8.8 11.4 10.8 9.9 19.2 9.1 9.1 0.29 4.7 40.6

s.e. Poland 0.4 0.4 1.4 2.1 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.5 2.1 0.05 1.O 5.2

** ** ** **

b#O, withpI.05 Ib Quebec - b Poland 12 (s.e. Quebec + s.e. Poland) FEl : father's secondary education; & F! father's post-secondary education; VQo,VCo ,Vh father's occupation in the skilled manual, lower non-manual and professional-managerial categories respectively; EP2, ES2,EF2: number of years of schooling at the primary, secondary and post-secondarylevels respectively; V Q ,VC2,VP2,present occupation in the skilled manual, lower non-manual and professional-managerial categories respectively; BEl through B& :occupation in the following economic sectors respectively: mining and metallurgy; mechanical, electrical and chemical; other industrial; primary; transport,commerce, public works; others except construction; WW: length of the work week in hours; DR: supewisory position (1 = yes).

A Comparison of Social Mobility ...

The results for the male work force are displayed in Table 11. Step one shows that father's education only has an influence on income in Poland. Father's occupation has significant and parallel effects in both societies, save for the clerical category, which clearly has a greaterpositive impact in Quebec than in Poland. Curiously, the same causal pattern prevails when (the son's) education is controlled (step two), with only some attenuation due to the fact that the latter variable embodies to a certain extent the effect of social origin. One may point out that this attenuationis slightly more pronounced in Poland, and that the trend continues in step three, where characteristics of the occupation are controlled. In otherwords, social originhas a more direct effect on income in Quebec than in Poland; in the latter case, it exercises more of its influence on income through educational and occupational achievement. This, as we hypothesized, may reflect certain features of a capitalist society, where goods can be transmitted privately from generation to generation through inheritance? One must point out, however, that even in this last step, social originfactors have significantdirecteffectson incomein both cases; the advantage occurringto sons of white collaremployees is exclusive to Quebec, however, something we will come back to later, when we consider the effects of the son's occupation. The basic pattern of influence of education on income is set in step two: only post-secondary education has a significant effect in Quebec, while in Poland, secondary (and even primary) schooling is retributed, probably because it is less widespread and consequently less taken for granted. There is a significant difference in returns to a year of post-secondary education in step two, Quebec's being higher than Poland's, but as this variable gets transformed into occupational characteristics in step three, the difference attenuates. The contrasts in the influence of occupational variables are not very many, but rather striking: the level of qualification among manual workers makes for a rather large difference in Poland, but not in Quebec; even though the figures are not quite significant, there is a tendency for the opposite situation to prevail in the case of clerical workers. Workers in the two heavy industrial sectors are paid much more (net, of course, of other factors' influence) in Poland than in Quebec, especially in the mining and metallurgy sector. The other predictors operate in the same way in both societies, including premiums for the construction sector, the number of hours worked and supervisory functions.

National Survival in Dependent Societies

In summary, a male worker in Quebec derives income mainly from his father's occupational situation (especially if the latter was a white-collar employee), from having achieved post-secondary education, from working long hours, or being in the constructionsector, or in a supervisorycapacity; the latter factors being controlled, his own occupational classification does not carry great weight, save for a certain tendency toward a higher income in nonmanual categories. A male worker in Poland is in a somewhat different situation: his income is influenced by his father's education, as well as occupational category (without any effect, however, for sons of lower nonmanual fathers); also determinant are secondary as well as post-secondary education, qualified manual and service work and professional-managerial occupations, and working in heavy industry. Finally, just as in Quebec, construction work, longer hours worked and supervisorypositions get higher remuneration.

We particularly want to stress three differences between the two societies. First, less privilege seems to be granted to clerical work in Poland than in Quebec. On the contrary, emphasis is apparently put, income-wise, on qualified manual and service work and heavy industry in Poland, a feature which probably corresponds to explicit economic development policies. Second,father's occupationseems to carry more weight in Quebec, something which suggests more direct inter-generational transmission of positional advantages in a capitalist, as opposed to a socialist society. And third, the pattern of returns to education can either mean that Quebec has more jobs where post-secondary education is required, or has been subjected to greater inflationary pressures on education (particularly at the secondary level), or both.

Before turning to the situation of the female workers, it may be helpful to compare the two societies with respect to the effect of sex differences on occupational earnings. Table 12presents regressionsparallel to those inTable 11, but applied to the whole work force, male and female, and with gender added as a variable. Three major features impose themselves to our attention. First, gender is a powerful determinant of income, raising the proportion of variance explained at each step by a considerableamount. Second, women are paid less than men by a significant margin in both societies, as the strongly negative coefficients show; these gender differencespersist even when a large number of pertinent factors are controlled. Third, there are significant differencesbetween the two societies (Poland discriminatingmore against women), in the first two steps, but these vanish in the third step. This means that the

A Comparison of Social Mobility ... higher deficit in pay incurred by Polish female workers, as opposed to their Quebec counterparts, is due to their being confined to occupations and economic sectors with less remunerativeprofiles. When these are controlled, an unexplained deficit of more than a quarter of the average worker's income is left in both societies.

TABLE Estimates for the gender variable, regression analyses of occupational income for males and females, non-farm workforce (slopes and standard errors expressed as percentagesof the mean of the dependentvariable for the total sample, irrespective of sex). Step I***

R2: b Quebec

Gender

-37. l*

Step 2

R2: b Quebec

Gender

-37.6*

Step 3

R2: b Quebec

Gender

* ** ***

-28.0*

Quebec .I36 Poland .207 b Poland s.e, Quebec s.e. Poland

-44.0*

4.3

1.2

**

Quebec .256 Poland .288 b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland

-43.5"

4.0

1.1

**

Quebec .304 Poland .396 b Poland s.e. Quebec s.e. Poland

-27.2*

4.8

b#O,withp