National Image: China’s Communication of Cultural Symbols 9811531463, 9789811531460

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Xiangfei Meng

National Image China’s Communication of Cultural Symbols

National Image

Xiangfei Meng

National Image China’s Communication of Cultural Symbols

123

Xiangfei Meng Shanghai International Studies University Hongkou, Shanghai, China Translated by Wei Feng School of Foreign Languages Shanxi University Taiyuan, Shanxi, China

Sponsored by: Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences ISBN 978-981-15-3146-0 ISBN 978-981-15-3147-7 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3147-7

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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1 An Overview of Theories of National Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 The Fundamental Connotation of National Image . . . . . . . 1.1.1 Introducing National Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.2 The Connotations of National Image . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The Functions and Effects of National Image . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 National Image Is an Important Part of National “Soft Power” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 A Positive National Image Can Boost International Discourse Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2 Perceptual Barriers to China’s National Image and Their Causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Historical Shifts in China’s National Image . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 The Stage of Admiration: Prosperous, Diligent and Valiant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 The Stage of Degradation: Closed, Backward and Ugly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 The Degradation-Rapport Stage: Red, Frenzied and Miraculous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Perceptual Barriers to the National Image of Contemporary China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 The National Image of Contemporary China in a Negative Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 The National Image of Contemporary China in a Positive Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Trend of Contemporary China’s National Image

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2.3 A Causal Analysis of the Perceptual Discrepancy in China’s National Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 The Political Factor: The “Western-Centrism” Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 The Cultural Factors: Cultural Differences and Symbol Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 The Media Factors: Hegemonic Discourse and “Loss of Voice” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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3 National Image from a Constructivist Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Insights into Constructing National Image from Constructivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Shared Ideas (Knowledge) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 State Identity (Interests) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3 Holism (Structures) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 A Constructivist Interpretation of National Image . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Model of Construction: Communication ! Shared Ideas ! National Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Intersubjectivity: “Self-Built Image” and “Others-Built Image” with Mass Media as Intermediary . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 The Age of Simulacrum: Information Game and Symbol Contest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Application of Cultural Symbols and the Misunderstanding of Cultural Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 General Analysis of Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Implications and Functions of Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Symbols and the Communication of National Image . . 4.3 Application of Cultural Symbols in the Construction of National Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Connotations and Definitions of Cultural Symbols . . . . 4.3.2 Hollywood Movies and the National Image of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Japanese Animation Industry and the National Image of Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.4 Korean Wave and the National Image of South Korea . 4.4 Intercultural Communication and Misunderstandings of Chinese Cultural Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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4.4.1 Misunderstanding of China’s National Image Caused by Improper Cultural Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.2 The Inevitable Lack of “The Common Field of Experience” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4.3 Case Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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5 The International Communication of Cultural Symbols in the Construction of China’s National Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Value Orientations of Cultural Symbols in the Construction of China’s National Image . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 Construct the National Image Underlining Peaceful Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 Construct the National Image Highlighting Independence and Seeking Common Ground While Shelving Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.3 Construct the Image of a Major and Responsible Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 The Principles of Selecting Cultural Symbols to Construct China’s National Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 The Principle of Reflecting National Characteristics . . . 5.2.2 The Principle of Universality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 The Principle of Synergizing Past, Presence and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.4 The Principle of Being Consistent with the Positioning of Core National Image . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 The Communication Strategies for Cultural Symbols in the Construction of China’s National Image . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 The Communicative Functions of Chinese Cultural Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 The Communication Strategies for Chinese Cultural Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 China’s Black-and-White Art: An Important Cultural Symbol of China’s Peaceful Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 China’s Black-and-White Art and Traditional Culture . . . . . . 6.1.1 The Black and White in Traditional Chinese Culture . 6.1.2 Reflect the Philosophical Connotations of Harmony and Constant Mean in Chinese Culture . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.3 Demonstrate the Chinese Savor, the Chinese Way and the Chinese Beauty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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6.2 The Symbolic Significance of Black-and-White Art in China’s International Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Raise the Awareness of Cultural Identification and Reinforce Cultural Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Project the Aspiration to Seek Harmony Without Uniformity and Communicate the Image of a Harmonious China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3 Downplay Ideological Overtones and Reduce Cultural Barriers to Communication . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 The International Communication Strategy for Chinese Black-and-White Art from a Constructivist Perspective . . 6.3.1 Communicate Black-and-White Harmony and Construct Shared Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.2 Carry Out Cultural Diplomacy and Promote Black-and-White Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3.3 Develop Cultural Industry and Export Cultural Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Introduction

Background and Significance of the Study National image, for its unprecedented level of importance, has now been placed on the agenda of the international and global strategy-making by every nation state in the international community. Since it started to reform and open up, particularly after the 1990s, China has developed its economy remarkably with unparalleled speed and quality. In 2011, China became the second largest economy in the world. However, what comes hand in hand with economic success is the frequent misinterpretation, vilification and defamation of China’s national image, which severely undermines the country’s “soft power”. In fact, “national image might be the thorniest strategic issue for the present China”. Therefore, it is the most urgent and challenging task for China to construct a positive national image, to demonstrate a real China, and to win worldwide understanding, support and recognition in the course of modernization. National image is a complicated issue influenced by various factors. In the international community, it may happen that a country with strong economic power and well-educated citizens does not necessarily appear with a good national image. It may also happen that the national image of a state changes in the international community when its economic and social systems remain the same, and vice versa. All this reveals that the national image of a state does not equate with its status quo or its actual positioning in the world. There exists no necessary and linear causality between the real situation of a state, particularly in terms of material and spiritual well-being, and its national image, nor a positive correlation between national image and the so-called “national ontology”. In reality, national image is fundamentally determined by the comprehensive national power, and nonetheless, cannot be simply equated with the actual situation of the country. National image, to some extent, is constructed. Specifically, it is a relation of mutual identification constructed on the basis of social interaction between countries. As the American scholar Kenneth E. Boulding argues, “National image is a combination of how a country perceives itself and is perceived by other

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agents in the international system, a consequence of information input and output, as well as a type of information capital with a clear structure” (Boulding 1959). In other words, image construction is, in essence, information communication, which implies that information is the essence of image and image is the consequence of information communication. In this sense, the national image of a state can be deemed as the result of the information game as well as a competition of symbolic capital between itself and other countries. It is the result of long and continuous interstate interaction, an expression of identity constructed by other countries or in the international community, as well as a manifestation of the intersubjectivity between “self” and “the other”. Since the information interaction and communication between agents entail certain symbols as carriers, the current well-developed symbolic system and the malleable nature of symbols provide sufficient resources and means for information communication and image construction. Therefore, many countries have switched their attention to nation-related symbolized images based on psychological factors, which makes symbol competition and information game the main battlefield of international competition and one of the core issues of international relations. While China has become the second largest economy in the world, its national image, as an important component of its “soft power”, is no match for its economic strength. Thus, it is of theoretical and practical significance for China to unleash the positive power of symbols, particularly cultural symbols, in national image construction. Nowadays the studies on national image are rather fruitful. The positioning, shaping, communication, construction and promotion of national image have attracted much scholarly attention in disciplines such as international communication, international relations, diplomacy, and public relations. However, there is a need to conduct studies on national image construction from the perspective of cultural symbols. The limited amount of research that has so far concentrated on the importance of cultural symbols and cultural “soft power” in national image construction is lacking in integrated and systematic theoretical analyses as well as in-depth exploration of value orientation, selection principles and communication strategies of cultural symbols. The abovementioned background and significance being considered, the present study draws on theories of constructivism, semiotics, culturology and international communication, and explores the effective communication and application of cultural symbols in China’s national image construction, with an aim to seeking theoretical guidance and practical reference for China’s national image construction

Literature Review Previous studies both domestic and international reveal that national image construction which aims to enhance national “soft power” has been a key academic issue in many countries since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Scholars of

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various fields have conducted multidisciplinary and multidimensional studies on the topic, some having achieved fruitful results. Relevant topics to the present research are summarized as follows: Previous Studies on Connotations, Elements and Functions of National Image Recently both Chinese and international academia have reached a consensus that the national image of a country is determined by two major factors: one is the comprehensive national power accompanied by its execution, and the other is the effect of information communication, particularly, that of international communication. For instance, Sun argues that the national image is the embodiment of public perception and assessment about a state both domestically and internationally, including its politics (including government reputation, diplomatic capability and military preparedness…), economy (including financial power, fiscal strength, product features and quality, and national income…), society (including social cohesion, security and stability, citizen morale and national character…), culture (including technology, education, cultural heritages, customs and values), geography (including geographical environment, natural resources and population) and so forth. He says, “National image is fundamentally determined by the comprehensive national power, and nonetheless, cannot be simply equated with the actual situation of a state. Therefore, image is being constructed in nature” (Sun 2002). Some scholars discuss national image from the perspective of international communication. As the American scholar Kenneth E. Boulding argues, “National image is a combination of how a state perceives itself and how other agents in the international system perceive it, a consequence of information input and output, as well as a type of information capital with a clear structure” (Boulding 1959). However, it is to be noted that the Chinese and the international academic understanding of the connotation and essence of national image still calls for refinement and enhancement, which is inevitably accompanied with disagreements and arguments. At present, many people today tend to “adopt the definition of image in the sense of communication studies in which national image is interpreted as the general impression and assessment of a state held by the public, both domestically and internationally.” Thus, it is generally held that national image is, in essence, an important component of a state’s intangible assets or of what is called “soft power” (Wu 2012a). So far, the academia seems to have achieved a consensus that national image plays a key role in politics, business and diplomacy. A state with a good national image can gain benefits in its political, economic, cultural and social development as well as improve diplomatic relations with other countries in the international community.

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Previous Studies on National Image Positioning and China’s National Image Positioning National image positioning refers to the process whereby a state employs certain types of representative symbols and qualities to construct and communicate self-image. It is the departure point as well as the goal in a state’s image strategy-making. Liu argues that the deciding factors of national image positioning include a state’s comprehensive national power, its domestic and international status throughout history, the development of mass media and technology as well as its people, while the basic principles for national image positioning are to uphold its national interest, to align with its diplomatic strategies, to serve its overall national strategy, and to be based on its own history (Liu and He 2006). However, Xie argues that the most important deciding factors should be the diplomatic philosophy of a state, its national character and the ideological connotation of its national image; and the fundamental principle is that national image positioning must be based on the speed and quality of social development, the well-beingness of the people as well as the general social structure (Xie 2004). Regarding China’s national image positioning, scholars have expressed different opinions from various perspectives. Previous studies show that the ideas on China’s national image positioning have remained fragmentary, full of ambiguity and uncertainty and no consensus has been reached so far. For example, Lv summarizes Deng Xiaoping’s remarks on China’s national image into the following four components: striving for development with the commitment to reform and opening-up, politically stable and united, with peace-loving people, and an independent and diligent nation (Lv 2011). Many other scholars argue that the most fundamental qualities that present China should uphold as its outstanding symbols include peace-loving, highly developed civilization, justice and goodwill, integrity and responsibility. Wu argues that the Chinese government and the Chinese people have made a solemn commitment to the world that China will pursue the path of peaceful development. For this reason, “peaceful development” should be the basic positioning and final target for China to construct and communicate its national image. As Wu indicates, “the basic positioning of China’s national image building is governed by its culture, history, politics and economy, and therefore should meet the practical needs of the whole society” (Wu 2009a). Previous Studies on National Image Construction from the Perspectives of Communication Previous studies on national image construction from the perspectives of communication can be divided into two types: theories on national image construction in general and studies on the construction of China’s national image in particular. The former mainly addresses issues such as agents, means and channels of national image construction. In his discussion of the agents of national image construction, Cheng claims that national image construction is neither a professional area nor an exclusive function

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attached to a certain department, but a top-down systematic process which requires participation of various agents including but not limited to the government, which plays the leading role, the enterprises as well as all the citizens in a particular society (Cheng 2007). In terms of the means of national image construction, Li points out that important aspects such as political influence, military force, economic strength, public relationship, diplomatic discourse, cultural deficit and occasions of communication should be taken into consideration, while Luo emphasizes the importance of culture as an essential element of “soft power” by arguing that a state can win understanding and recognition of others through exerting an influence and even a change on stereotypes formed in history (Luo 2006). Regarding the channels of national image construction, Zhou lists the following ones: daily media report, diplomacy and foreign policies, public occasions such as sports events, international conferences and grand ceremonies, products and brands, inbound and outbound travels, education and overseas studying (Zhou 2008). When addressing China’s national image construction and communication, Wu argues that China’s national image is a cluster concept which is comprised of images in economy, social security, culture, government and the people. Images in these aspects not only constitute part of China’s overall national image, but also serve as the important means for constructing and communicating China’s national image (Wu 2009b). He also points out that national image construction and communication is a systematic process that should be placed on the agenda of national strategy-making. The exploration of new means for China to construct national image entails strategic positioning, strategic planning, strategic integration and strategic public relations management (Wu 2012b). From the perspective of communication theories, many scholars have conducted both diachronic and synchronic studies to investigate what problems may exist in China’s international communication. They put forward various insights and suggestions for China to promote and communicate its national image in the new global context, such as taking an active part in the world discourse system, abiding by international standards in practice, refining guiding principles of news communication, reforming news communication mechanism and adopting integrated communication strategies. All these new methods are expected to help China to take the initiative in international communication and earn a voice in global media. Previous Studies on the Evaluation, Restoration and Crisis Management of National Image Evaluation of the effect of national image strategy is a significant step and an indispensable part in national image strategy-making. However, because it is very difficult to quantify relevant parameters in effect evaluation due to its complexity, the academia is still unable to establish scientific and well-accepted criteria of evaluation for lack of relevant studies in this aspect. For example, Liu thinks that the effect of national image strategy equates with the extent to which the national interest of a state is realized and therefore can be

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subjected to assessment. He draws on the measurement criteria for the degree of fulfilling the goals of national interests designed by Prof. Xuetong Yan to evaluate the results of national image strategy-making (Liu 2009). Compared with the discussion on effect evaluation, issues related to national image restoration and crisis management have received much more scholarly attention. The competence for a state to cope with image crisis in modern public relations, which rid itself out of cognitive dilemma and restored a good national image, has become an important indicator of its political civilization. Studies on the restoration and crisis management of national image mainly concentrate on the classification of national image crisis and the principles, general rules and means of national image restoration. For instance, Cheng classifies image crises into two types: the ones caused by critical incidents and the ones caused by communication problems, such as the lack of necessary communication and improper communication (Cheng 2006). Li argues that national image restoration should adhere to the principles of the people-centered approach, smooth information communication and timely response. He points out that a government should adopt a sincere and honest attitude toward the public, particularly relevant interest groups in its crisis management. When faced with public inquiries and interrogations from the international community, the government should first undertake full responsibility, or primary responsibility at least, to secure public interest, and then conduct investigations into the problem immediately so as to find out other parties that are held accountable (Li 2006). However, other scholars hold the view that crisis management of public relations is by nature crisis communication. In this aspect, the American scholar William Benoit put forward the Image Restoration Theory. The theory, based on the assumption that reputation is the most valuable asset of an individual or an organization, states that restoration of reputation or public image should be placed on a strategic height by a state through the following five means: denial, evasion of responsibility, thorough control of negative communication, remediation and self-examination (Li 2006). Previous Studies on Connotation of Cultural Symbols and Role of Cultural Symbols in National Image Construction Ferdinand de Saussure, the founder of modern semiotics, argues that every symbol is comprised of two components: the signifier and the signified. The “signifier” is a tangible existence, be it a word, a sound or an image, while the “signified” is the concept represented by the symbol. The process of the signifier and the signified combining together is signification (Li 2011). To a great extent, national image is constructed through the symbols communicated through various media, such as words, sounds and videos. Previous studies that discuss the correlation between cultural symbols and national image construction mainly concentrate on the communicative function of cultural symbols, attention seldom being paid to the definition, communication strategies and communication principles of cultural symbols, not to mention in-depth analyses.

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For example, Feng argues that cultural symbols, as the embodiment and carrier of culture, play significant roles in recording, communicating and accumulation in cultural history (Feng 2012). Gong thinks that the symbol system that a state employs in its international communication should display its own national features and be an organic combination of the denotation and connotation of symbols. Furthermore, the symbol system requires frequent updating and the symbols communicated by different media should be distinguished from each other (Gong 2009). As many scholars have pointed out, because international events like Beijing Olympic Games and Shanghai World Expo are held in China, particularly with the broadcasting of China’s National Image Short Films, China has embraced “an era of national publicity”. On the one hand, the short films are regarded as a spotlight of China’s public diplomacy which have brought China into the center of the world stage. On the other hand, some scholars criticize the short films for being imbued with elitism but lacking humanism and thus exerting little influence on the audience.

A Review of Previous Theories Constructivism Constructivism is among the three mainstream theories which were developed from scholarly reflection on and criticism of Western realism and liberalism in international studies and later became the main strength that contended against realism and liberalism. One of the most influential scholars in this line of research is Alexander Wendt from the United States. Although many schools have centered on constructivism and their theories vary more or less, most of them focus on the following three key issues and two cardinal principles. The first key issue rests with the fact that any international political system should include both physical structure and social structure; the second key issue is concerned with the concordance between interests and actions; and the last one centers on the constructive interaction between the world political bodies and their social structures. Regarding cardinal principles, firstly, the social constructive power of any international political structure outweighs its physical construction. That is to say, the main structure of international politics depends more on shared ideas rather than on physical conditions. Secondly, the social structure of any international political body not only affects its acting agents, but more importantly, helps to construct their identities and represent their interests. In other words, the identities and interests of concerned acting agents are not inherent but based on their shared ideas. The methodology of constructivism demonstrates a social nature and as such, emphasizes the influence that the whole exerts on individuals. In the field of international relationship, this refers to the importance of an international body or system to any individual nation state. International cultural system including shared knowledge, expectations and ideas especially exerts an influence on nation states, not only restricting the actions of a nation state but also constructing national

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identities and interests. In terms of its worldview, constructivism does not agree with the idea that the world is absolutely physical in nature but promotes the role of shared ideas to a community. On the one hand, constructivists acknowledge the importance of physical being. On the other hand, they argue that a physical element cannot exert an essential and far-reaching influence on an action unless it is supported by shared values. From the viewpoint of constructivism, the basic structure of an international system is a social one, not a physical one. There stands a mutual interactive and constructive connection between the acting agents and the social structure. The acting agents in an international system are nation states while its structure refers to the distribution of ideologies and values in the international system, which is otherwise called international structural culture. It is commonly seen in an international system that interaction between different acting agents causes the formation of a particular structure and this particular social structure in return, defines the acting bodies, i.e., different nation states and decide how they are accepted by others, by defining their identities and interests, and deciding the essential modes of economy, politics and culture. The Theory of Intersubjectivity In the sociological sense, intersubjectivity refers to the relationship between individuals in a society. The traditional etymology which bases itself on mass media deems communication as a kind of dichotomy between “subject and object”, which, therefore, acknowledges the communicator as the only subject. The intersubjectivity theory alienates itself from the dichotomy between the subject and the object in the traditional etymology and instead emphasizes the unity between the two. Therefore, they don’t think there is a clear distinction between the subject and instead regards communication as a kind of social interaction between communicators. In his monograph Communicative Act Theory, Habermas proposes four types of reasonable acts: (1) the goal-oriented instrumental act; (2) the normative and regulatory act governed by shared values of a community; (3) the dramatic act driven by subjectivity before an audience or in public; and (4) the communicative act between individuals through the medium of language. In Habermas’ opinion, the instrumental act reflects the relationship between subject and object while the communicative act is characterized by intersubjectivity. The communicative act is based on mutual understanding and communication for the purpose of harmonious social relations. The nature of a communicative act is rational and second-order, which involves dialogues and exchanges between different subjects, through which the concerned subject can understand the world from a non-egocentric perspective. In On the Logic of Social Sciences, Habermas proposes that communicating experience results from communicative acts between two subjects at least, which happens in a relatively stable intersubjective framework established through language. The core of the rational communicative act is that it centers on intersubjectivity instead of the subject, i.e., on the framework of “subject-medium-subject”. The actants in communication are mutual subjects and the intersubjectivity revealed

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in human communication is essentially mutual subjectivity which is defined through semiotic interaction. The theory of intersubjectivity offers a solid philosophical foundation for investigations into the intersubjectivity and semiotic interaction between various actants in national image building, their cultural relationship and even cross-cultural communicating modes. Semiotics The human world is fundamentally semioticized with thinking modes, linguistic forms and information communication being part of the semiotic system. In his book 人论, the German philosophy Ernst Cassirer writes that human life is best characterized by its semioticized thinking and action. From the perspective of semioticians, the whole world is a comprehensive semiotic system and the history of human civilization is in essence one in which mankind constructs various symbols and understands the world through such symbols. Currently trending theories in semiotics are primarily proposed by the American sociologist Charles Sanders Pierce, the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, the French scholar Algirdas Julien Greimas and the Italian philosopher Umberto Eco. It has been commonly acknowledged that modern semiotics mainly originates from Saussure’s sign theory. According to Saussure, a single symbol can be divided into two parts: signifier and signified. “Signifier” refers to the phonetic image of symbols while “signified” is the conceptual meaning of symbols. The whole of the two parts makes a symbol. Although Saussure divides a symbol into “signifier” and “signified”, most scholarly attention has been devoted to the “signified” of a symbol. The process of combining signifier with signified is signification which is composed of a system of symbols. “Signified” includes three different modes: direct denotation, implicit denotation and interaction between subjects. Roland Barthes deems interaction between subjects as a process by which the encoder of symbols and their decoder can have accessibility to each other and commonality and shareability of mind. The encoder and the decoder do not conceptualize symbols in their idiosyncratic way but in a similar manner, because they belong to the same cultural group through which shared culture provides them with a sense of interaction. Moreover, the interaction between subjects not only happens between individuals form the same cultural group but also between those from different cultural backgrounds for the reason that most of the direct denotation is shared by the whole mankind, if not inherently, at least through communication. The British scholar Stuart Hall, who has been respected as “father of contemporary cultural studies”, regarded implicit denotation as highly naturalized meaning, for which reason implicit denotation would not cause problems to communication. Whether between individuals of the same cultural group or from different cultures, implicit denotation has the same communicative structure while only the structure and quantity of connotative meaning varies. In real life, individuals express meaning and communicate ideas through symbols. As actants, individuals exhibit their own culture, values and image through various symbols.

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The theories of semiotics can lay a profound theoretical ground for cross-cultural communication and image construction. Theories of International Communication It is generally agreed that communication is a flowing process of information. As a communicative form, international communication can be regarded as a process of information communication across borders via individuals, organizations, governments and technology. International communication emphasizes the interactivity of information flowing across nations between individuals, organizations and governments. For this reason, it has the following three features. Firstly, the purpose and content of international communication are closely bound with national strategic planning of a country. The main goal of international communication is to influence the perception, attitudes and thinking modes of people from other countries on a particular nation state. Secondly, nation states play a major role and participate in facilitating information exchange in international communication, which imparts international communication with a political agenda unavoidably affected by state politics, economic and foreign policies. Thirdly, international communication is in nature cross-cultural communication in communicator–receptor relationship. Differences that arise from diversities in cultural perception and semiotic system between both sides will lead to changes in mutual relationship so that international communication does not only have a political agenda but also has cultural significance (Samovar et al.1998). Many scholars from various disciplines have made contributions to the construction of international communication theories. In 2005, the American Scholar W. B. Gudukunst published Theorizing about Intercultural Communication, a monograph that has later been regarded as the most comprehensive study in cross-cultural communication. According to Gudukunst, cross-cultural communication studies mainly have three approaches: cultural communication theory, cultural variation theory and alien culture communication theory (异文化传播理论), which have become the three basic sources as well as theoretical orientations of cross-culture communication studies. Cultural variation theory focuses on cultural influences that information communication may bring about. It tries to describe and interpret how cultures vary from each other on an individual/cultural level. Alien cultural communication theory explores how people from different cultural backgrounds negotiate, modulate and understand each other for the purpose of effective communication. Some scholars propose three modes of cross-cultural communication that can be adopted to improve cross-cultural communication competence: action mode, cognitive mode and interpretive mode. The action mode adopts the methodologies of ethnography and comparative studies to reveal communicative rules that arise from different cultures and more importantly to acquaint individuals with such rules. The cognitive mode mainly makes predictions for and exerts a control over such possible mental factors like anxiety, hesitation and prejudice caused by conflicts in cultural beliefs and

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principles of values so as to reduce indeterminacy in communication. The interpretive mode places meaning reconstruction at the locus and stresses that both sides in communication should have awareness of their own role in cross-cultural communication and be ready to cooperate with each other and comply with each other’s interpretive rules so that their communication can bring about meaning that both sides can accept (Chang 2003). On the whole, international communication cannot escape from the influence of cultural differences including linguistic diversity, religions, cultural values and many other aspects, all of which cause problems to cross-cultural communication.

Major Research Questions National image is more or less a kind of discourse construction, i.e., the result of interactive communication between self and other. As the primary carrier of discourse construction, cultural symbols exert a tremendous influence on the communication effects of national images, particularly, as to whether they are properly selected, whether they have fulfilled expected functions and whether they have achieved effective results. The present monograph focuses on the following problems including but not limited to the cognitive aspects of China’s national image building, the cultural values of some symbols used in China’s national image construction, selecting rules of cultural symbols and their communicative effects. The main research questions include the following. An Analysis of the Causes of China’s National Image Building from a Cognitive Perspective The Western perception of China has always been changing in history. Sometimes their comments are full of compliments and at other times filled with criticism and discrimination. In certain periods, Western critics even go further to demonize China. What might have caused so much difference in their cognition? An in-depth analysis of the causes behind their changing cognition has far-reaching implications for China’s national image building both in theory and in practice. The present study finds that three factors are responsible for the changes in Western perception of China. Firstly, it is the political reason, in particular, the long-lasting Eurocentrism. The modern Eurocentrism constructed in the Enlightenment not only synthesizes a self-centered Western world but also visualizes the Orient as an eternal other. Such Eurocentrism has become a significant factor that we need to take into consideration in China’s national image building. Some Western countries tend to judge others in a biased manner by their own political ideology and therefore their cognition on the image of others will be distorted and groundless. Secondly, it is the cultural aspect, i.e., cultural variety and barriers caused by different semiotic systems. The national image of a certain country is formed and understood in its particular cultural context, i.e., in a particular set of semiotic

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systems. Cultural difference reduces the effectiveness of communication. The more distance there exists between two cultures, the more difficulties will be caused by differences in their semiotic systems. At present, China aims to advance toward the world, but it is found that Chinese graphic and audiovisual symbols have both confronted with various problems caused by its own semiotic systems. The third factor is related to the medium, mainly to discourse hegemony and aphasia. Whoever owns global information resources owns the capacity to play a dominant role in international discourse and as such is in a privileged position to decide the images of others. Although China has become a big country in mass media, it is still far away from being a leading power in mass media. In addition, China has been more or less misguided in the early outgoing communication stage. It is no wonder that the Chinese media is now suffering from absence and aphasia in international communication. The Interconnectedness Between National Image Building and Symbol Communication From the perspective of constructivism, national identity, national interest and national image are all grounded on interaction and shared knowledge between countries. The interaction between countries is in nature communication of information and so is national image building. In such a mass-media time as characterized by overflowing information, the competition in national image building is essentially attributed to as well as manifested in the competition of effective information communication. Today we are experiencing a global era in which all kinds of ideas and meanings can be immediately publicized and symbolized, and then communicated to every corner of the world. Symbolic signs and their symbolic meanings dominate the patterns of interstate behavior and international relations, and media symbols play a central role in the construction of national images. In this context, countries have turned their attention to various symbolic images of countries that resort to human psychology. In this context, countries have turned their attention to various symbolic images of countries that resort to human psychology. The trend of symbolization in international politics and national image is unstoppable. In today’s international community, the recognition and interpretation of symbols are disseminated and shared among countries. However, in the interaction of symbols, each country does not share the same or common meanings with each other, nor does the information and significance conveyed by symbols necessarily correspond to the real national image. Therefore, symbols and their communication strategies are directly related to the formation of common knowledge, national identity, interests and image. The Value Orientation of Cultural Symbols in the Construction of China’s National Image The misuse and misreading of Chinese cultural symbols in external communication often occurs in history, which has caused many negative or even bad effects on the construction of China’s national image. One important reason is that the symbolic meaning or value orientation of many cultural symbols deviates from China’s

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national image. The process of national image construction is essentially a process of cross-cultural communication. The effectiveness of national image construction depends fundamentally on a country’s intercultural communication ability, and the intercultural communication ability in the construction of national image depends largely on the cultural symbols that embody the core image of the country. The external communication of Chinese cultural symbols should focus on the core image of China. So, what should be the core orientation of China’s national image? The book holds that the greatest achievement that China has made since the reform and opening-up is worth recommending to the international community at present. China hopes that the international community will see a developing country with the rapid growth of its comprehensive national strength, prosperity and progress of civilization. The most valuable information in strategic communication is to let the international community recognize that China is a responsible big country for safeguarding world and regional peace. Therefore, the strategic orientation of China’s national image should focus on the national image of “peaceful development, seeking common ground while reserving differences and being a responsible big country”. In the process of external communication, the value orientation of Chinese cultural symbols should fully reflect the strategic communication goal of “peaceful development, seeking common ground while reserving differences, and being a responsible big country” in China’s national image. We should spare no effort to promote and publicize Chinese cultural symbols which are beneficial to the construction of this core image, and not to choose cultural symbols which are unfavorable or harmful to this image. By such means, cultural symbols can really play a catalytic role in the construction of China’s national image and enhance China’s “soft power” to an important degree. The Selection Principles of Cultural Symbols in the Construction of China’s National Image As indicators of a culture, cultural symbols are determined as well as defined by their cultural connotations. Different languages, cultures, customs, etiquettes and values, and beliefs not only lead to different ways of thinking and behavioral norms, but also to different types of cultural attitudes and perceptions. They may lead to misunderstandings and obstacles in cross-cultural communication. “The iconicity of symbols is so deeply rooted in the structure of human culture that it is easy to overlook the constructive nature of its culture, which can easily lead to misunderstanding and even cultural conflicts” (Li 2011). In fact, symbols express concepts and meanings rather than symbols themselves, and the concepts and meanings of symbols cannot be understood if without taking into consideration of historical, cultural and social backgrounds. It often happens that different audiences have different interpretations of the same cultural symbol. Generally speaking, only audiences with the same cultural background will have a sense of resonance and identity recognition when they interpret the same symbol. Hence, in China’s external communication, how should we make efforts to reduce the phenomenon of the misreading of Chinese cultural symbols caused by cultural

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differences? The book holds that in the process of building China’s national image, when choosing Chinese cultural symbols, we should never attend to big and small matters all at once as one who grasps the eyebrows and the beard all together. In the context of globalization and pluralism in the world today, we should actively integrate into the international discourse system, embody the unique characteristics of the Chinese national culture and highlight the Chinese flavor, Chinese style and Chinese esthetic feeling. At the same time, we should adopt the perspectives of humanism and modernization to carry out international communication and promote Chinese culture, with a view to being widely understood and accepted by foreign audiences. We should also identify and explore the positive image and positive elements of Chinese traditional culture, so as to make the past serve the present and bring forth new insights. The External Communication Strategies of Cultural Symbols in the Construction of China’s National Image The dissemination of cultural symbols is a complex and systematic project with the characteristics of social publicity and social structure. Even further, the external dissemination of cultural symbols is a highly strategic and skillful dissemination. Its timing, methods and means work together to decide the effects of communication. Any change in the above elements may lead to completely different results. So, how to make Chinese cultural symbols understood by more people, and then let the national image of China as a “peaceful development, seeking common ground while reserving differences and a responsible big country” be recognized by more people? The author of the present book holds that it is not enough to rely solely on the government or the people who are responsible for the external dissemination of Chinese cultural symbols. We should draw lessons from the experience of Western countries, pay attention to the effective integration of communication ideas, means and strategies, carry out the international public relations strategy of Chinese cultural symbols in a planned, systematic and organized way, and finally to seek effective marketing means to promote Chinese national cultural symbols. At the national level, special external communication guidance and coordination agencies should be set up. A series of strategic communication frameworks should be formulated and long-term plans should be placed on the agenda of government work. In other words, we must change passive communication into active communication, and gradually establish a hierarchical classification system of different communication methods and strategies, so as to establish the external communication mechanisms of Chinese cultural symbols in the long run. In particular, we should formulate the feedback, evaluation and correction mechanism of cultural symbols in external communication for the purpose of improving the pertinence and effectiveness of communication. In the process of dissemination, we should stress the significance and functions of Chinese cultural symbols and explore their potential meanings. For example, it is recommended that we make use of modern cultural and artistic forms and means to provide new annotation to Chinese traditional culture with a view to disseminating Chinese harmonious culture of both the past

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and the present. We should reconstruct the modernity of Chinese cultural symbols through continuous innovation and transcendence, actively create and supply “shared ideas/values” to the international community, thus enhancing the understanding of China by foreign audiences and enhancing their recognition of China’s national image of “peaceful development, seeking common ground while reserving differences and being a responsible big country”.

Methodology A Historic Perspective Based on the Status Quo of Present China The reasons for the cognitive differences in China’s national image are complex and multilevel. A historical investigation combined with a realistic analysis of China’s image is particularly important for accurately grasping the causes of the cognitive differences of China’s national image, and then improving the pertinence and effectiveness of the strategic dissemination of China’s national image. Based on this consideration, this study first briefly recapitulates the historical context of China’s image in the West, then makes a brief analysis of the reality of China’s national image, conducts a theoretical analysis on the basis of the above description, and finally sums up the specific reasons for the cognitive differences of China’s image. A Research Method of Combining Theoretical Discussion with Case Analysis To a great extent, national image is a kind of discourse construction, that is, the result of the game between self-discourse construction of a particular country and discourse construction by other countries. Based on this, the present study extensively draws on the theories of constructivism, communication, semiotics, social psychology and other disciplines. Meanwhile, by taking American blockbuster, Japanese animation, Korean Current, Chinese National Image Film and Chinese black-and-white art as specific cases, this study analyses the important role of cultural symbols in the construction of national image. Moreover, it also tries to put forward some applicable paths and models for the representation of cultural symbols in the construction of China’s national image in external dissemination. An Interdisciplinary Study with Comprehensive Research Methods Essentially, the concept of national image is an intersubjectivity concept. The national image of a country is not created by the country itself, but by the process of interaction and communication between countries. It only exists in a certain system of meaningful symbols. Therefore, the study of national image inevitably involves the multidisciplinary theories of communication, semiotics, image cognition, culture, psychology, sociology, international politics, diplomacy and so on. This study draws on the theoretical knowledge of the above disciplines, conducts interdisciplinary research and explores the effective use of cultural symbols in the construction of China’s national image.

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Main Academic Value The theoretical significance and practical value of the present research: 1. This study specifically analyses the main reasons for the cognitive differences of China’s national image from the political, cultural and media perspectives, and probes into the practical communication dilemma of China’s national image, which can serve as a reference for further improving the pertinence and effectiveness of the construction of China’s national image. In addition, this study takes cultural symbols as the breakthrough point to study the construction of national image, filling in the blank of similar research and has some originality. 2. From the perspective of constructivism, this study analyzes the important role of symbols, especially cultural symbols, in disseminating information, forming consensus, constructing identity and shaping images. It also focuses on the analysis of the value orientation and selection principles of cultural symbols in the construction of China’s national image, and tries to put forward the dissemination strategies of Chinese cultural symbols. This study reflects the current national strategic reality of China, i.e., building a strong socialist cultural country and enhancing China’s “soft power”, which makes it a book of certain practical significance. 3. In this study, the important symbol of Chinese culture, Chinese black-and-white art, is taken as an example to analyze the function and role of Chinese traditional black-and-white art in the construction of China’s national image of “peaceful development, seeking common ground while reserving differences and being a responsible big country”, so as to put forward the strategic paths and specific strategies for the external dissemination of Chinese black-and-white art. At present, how to use cultural symbols in the construction of China’s national image provides a new attempt and hence has certain academic value for its originality and innovation.

References Boulding, K. E. (1959). National images and international systems. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3(2), 122. Chang, Y. (2003). On the three modes of cross-cultural communication. Journal of Hunan University, 3, 100–103. Cheng, M. (2006). An analysis on communication strategy in national image crisis. Journal of International Communication, 3, 5–9. Cheng, M. (2007). Mass media and the construction of national image. Journal of International Communication, 3, 5–10. Feng, J. (2012). Cultural symbols and cultural soft power. Journal of Kaifeng University, 26(3), 1–4.

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Gong, H. (2009). The semiotic interpretation of China’s national image construction. Youth Journalist, 21, 52–53. Li, G. (2011). Intercultural communication: language, symbols, culture (p. 85). Chengdu: Sichuan Publishing House Baishu bookstore. Li, Z. (2006). Crisis Communication, Media Role and the Repair of National Image. China Radio. China Radio & TV Academic Journal, 3, 25–27. Liu, J., & He, H. (2006). China’s image by international view. Beijing: Communication University of China Press. Liu, Y. (2009). National image strategies research. Studies on the Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, 1, 55–58. Luo, J. (2006). Constructing the foreign cultural strategy of China’s rise. Modern International Relations, 3, 33–37. Lv, X. (2011). Thought and historical value of national image of DENG Xiao-ping. Journal of Agricultural College, 21(01), 19–21. Samovar, L. A., Porter, R. E., & Stefani, L. A. (1998). Communication between culture (3rd ed., p. 48). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company. Sun, Y. (2002). National image’s connotations and functions. In International Forum (vol. 3, pp. 14–21). Wu, Y. (2009a). The construction and communication of the national image of China (pp. 6–13). Shanghai: Fudan University Press. Wu, Y. (2009b). The construction and communication of the national image of China (pp. 44–55). Shanghai: Fudan University Press. Wu, Y. (2012a). A research review of China’s national image and its positioning. China Economist, 5, 9–10. Wu, Y. (2012b). The communication of China’s national image from a strategic perspective. International Review, 4, 1–7. Xie, X. (2004). On national image building from the perspective of soft power. Theory Front, 19, 19–21. Zhou, M. (2008). National image communication research. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Chapter 1

An Overview of Theories of National Image

As a country’s vital intangible asset, national image is the centerpiece and an essential expression of its soft power. Strengthening the research on theories of national image bears great theoretical and practical significance: the analysis of national image’s connotations, functions, effects and methods of construction will shed light on how to construct our national image, further improve the relevance and effectiveness of construction, give full play to national image’s influence, cohesion and powerful appeal, and eventually realize our national strategic intent.

1.1 The Fundamental Connotation of National Image What is national image? This is the first and foremost question in the research on national image because it concerns national image’s fundamental connotation. An in-depth study of the fundamental connotation is a prerequisite to accurately grasp the ways to construct national image, thus improving its relevance and effectiveness.

1.1.1 Introducing National Image National image is not a new issue. Actually, it arose with the exchanges between countries since their establishment. Take China as an example. Its earliest exchanges with foreign countries can be traced back to the pre-Qin dynasty (221 BC–207 BC), which were expanded to East Asia, Southeast Asia, West Asia and Europe during the East Han and West Han dynasties (202 BC–220 AD). Consequently, China’s national image began to be disseminated to the rest of the world. It became more widespread as China’s national strength reached an unprecedented peak in the Tang (618–907) and Song (960–1279) dynasties. Entering the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), renowned Italian traveler and merchant Marco Polo (1254–1324) published his seminal travel log The Travels of Marco Polo (1298–1299, The Travels in short), recounting his © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Meng, National Image, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3147-7_1

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17-year experiences in China, the most affluent country in the East. In the book, he introduced the Yuan dynasty’s political, economic, cultural, social and scientific achievements, and its prosperity stirred up a yearning for the East among Europeans. Because of his immense contribution to shaping the image of ancient China, Marco Polo was regarded as an envoy of culture in China. Throughout Chinese history, the most expensive image construction projects are explorer Zheng He’s (c. 1371–1433) seven naval expeditions to the west of Kalimantan Island between 1405 and 1433. The main goal of these expeditions was to expand the Ming dynasty’s (1368–1644) political influence, link the stability and development between China and its neighbors, create a stable international environment in the long run, and ultimately enhance the Empire’s international prestige. In a nutshell, national image is a historical issue. Correspondingly, the study of national image also has a long history. When asked about city-state Athens’s pursuit of “honor” and “prestige” in protecting and expanding the empire itself, ancient Greek political scholars argued that they did nothing outrageous and their actions were simply to pursue security, honor and self-interest.1 In modern times, Genevan philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) also maintained that at least in our world, people turn to weapons in order to solve three problems, namely power, wealth and prestige.2 Here, the national and individual (citizen’s) pursuit of honor and prestige is in fact the pursuit of (good) national image. It is evident from the classics in international politics that prominent researchers did acknowledge factors like national prestige. However, due to various reasons, political scholars at that time were not able to explore the theory of national image systematically. Relevant studies were found in academic publications, with references to concepts such as honor, glory, reputation and prestige. The research on national image did not take shape until the end of World War II (1939–1945). In international relations, the research initially focused on US–Soviet relations in the 1950s, i.e., the early stage of the Cold War. The Cold War departed from the conventional military campaign and was, to a certain extent, a rivalry for ideology rather than material interests in international relations. In other words, it was a competition in both hard and soft power instead of hard power alone. From then on, the development of respective images between the US and Soviet Union received extensive attention in the study of an enemy image. At the beginning of the Cold War, some political researchers were keen on examining how countries in a “community” imagined each other and how their images were viewed by countries outside the “community”. As a result, international politics began to transform from traditional power politics to image politics. It was in this context that national image became a subject of public discussions and academic research as well as a theme for interstate competition. Consequently, the study of national image has gradually become a particular highlight of international politics, international relations and diplomacy. The term “national image” was first introduced by Kenneth E. Boulding (1910– 1993), a prominent American economist and a leading figure in the neo-institutional 1 Thucydides 2 Wang

(2008). (2005, pp. 106–131).

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economic school, in National Images and International Systems (1959). This article is an in-depth study of national image from the psychological and philosophical perspectives, with an emphasis on the importance of value systems in the formation of national images. To be specific, information is not handled by people at random, but filtered through their value systems. Because national image is shaped on the basis of values with ideological leanings, a country may be portrayed completely different by different media. Boulding proposes to describe national image in three dimensions, i.e., geographical space, attitude and physical strength. The dimension of geographical space, also known as a country’s geographical image, is “the most striking single characteristic of the national [image;]”3 the dimension of attitude indicates a country’s hostility or friendliness; and the dimension of physical strength suggests a country’s strength or weakness. National image mainly revolves around the dimension of attitude, i.e., it helps us determine whether a country is good (“friendly”) or bad (“hostile”). Boulding further asserts that national image is a combination of a country’s self-perception and other actors’ perceptions of it in the international system. It is a subjective impression, not objective truth. “It is this fact that the national image is basically a lie, or at least a perspective distortion of the truth, which perhaps accounts for the ease with which it can be perverted to justify monstrous cruelties and wickednesses.”4 In Boulding’s view, the symbolic image of a country is critical to international relations, and research in this area needs to be strengthened. After all, it is the countries’ respective symbolic images that “lead, under certain circumstances, to the disastrous phenomenon of the arms race. … [Moreover, the] whole of society is permeated with these images of political roles [,]”5 which are often changed or reinforced by messages received. These political images include not only the specific images expected by the roles but also the symbolic images of political institutions. Such symbolic images are vital in international relations, for they can affect how other countries develop their foreign policies. Since Boulding, international politics researchers such as Ole Holsti (1933–), Robert Jervis (1940–), Alpo Rusi (1949–) and Uri Bronfenbrenner (1917–2005) have also studied national image. For example, Jervis, professor of international politics at Columbia University, believes that an ideal national image is usually more useful than surges in military and economic strength. A bad image can lead to great losses that cannot be compensated by any conventional strength. The quality of a country’s image is closely linked with state interests. As a result, studies of national image are widely applied to understand the process of foreign policy formulation. The initial research focused on identifying national image’s values and components and has become the classic study in this field. However, the pioneering political scientists did not provide a strict definition or exact meaning of national image, leaving its conceptualization wide open and constantly changing. This, to a certain extent, has held the theory development back. 3 Boulding

(1959, p. 123). Square brackets (“[]”) are placed around the inserted or altered words and/or punctuations in a direct quotation. 4 Boulding (1959, p. 122). 5 Boulding (1956, pp. 104–109, 112).

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Research on national image in Western society continued to develop along the path of the symbolization and visualization of international relations till the Cold War ended. It evolved from the abstract and general definition of concepts to specific descriptions and figurative expressions. In this process, national image gradually developed into “national brand.” The term “brand” does not solely suggest a certain visual appearance. More importantly, it refers to a symbol with ideographic function. To be specific, it uses specific imagery to represent abstract concepts and spirits. Thus, a brand has the added value of emotional preference. National brand refers to the concrete imagery (often powerful, vibrant, attractive and positive) used to represent a country.6 Western scholars have defined national image from the perspectives of marketing and commercial advertising. When a country’s image is visualized as national brands, the images of all brands will become the national image. If a country can establish and disseminate a distinctive national brand, then it will strengthen its soft power in international affairs and accumulate national strategic soft assets. British independent policy advisor Simon Anholt (1961–) is the first one to coin the concepts of national brand and regional brand. In his book Places: Identity, Image and Reputation (2010), he discussed brand creation and national image from the angles of personality, image and reputation. Anholt contends that “[creating a brand or] altering the image of a country … may require something a little more substantial than graphic design, advertising, or PR campaigns [,]”7 i.e., the regional or national characteristics or cultures. “Comparing to national identity, national brand is undoubtedly of richer, more profound and specific cultural resources. From social, economic, cultural products and services to institutional arrangements of political ideas, they can all be used to rally a global appeal to improve the national image (brand) through exploiting their own added brand values.”8 In this context, countries have opted to create and communicate their national brands as a strategic choice of shaping their national images. Research on national image began to develop in China around the end of the Cold War. Despite the late start, Chinese researchers have delivered fruitful outcomes. They have contributed to defining national image, identifying its relationship with international communication, explaining national image with theories of soft power, and promoting national image construction through international publicity. Now, the research focus has gradually shifted toward localization. Admittedly, there is still more to be done in this stage: our existing theories of national image may not be well-established, and the research has primarily focused on policy implementation, resulting in few discussions on pertinent theories. This is attributable to national image’s complex and interdisciplinary nature as well as our late start in this field. Therefore, the book will begin with reviewing relevant theories of international relations, communication and semiotics, and then apply these theories to the construction of China’s national image from the perspective of cultural symbols.

6 Li

(2011, p. 13). (2010, p. 9). 8 Zhu (2008). Cited in Ding and Su (2009, p. 115). 7 Anholt

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1.1.2 The Connotations of National Image To date, both Chinese and overseas scholars from different academic disciplines have attempted to define national image and examined its connotation from different theoretical perspectives. Since national image is related to political science, international relations and communication, its connotations and functions have been identified and analyzed by many scholars and experts of these fields or other pertinent disciplines. Now, a growing number of researchers have adopted an interdisciplinary approach toward the subject. Although scholars both at home and abroad have introduced many definitions, they have yet to come to a consensus. Nonetheless, they somehow reached a unanimous agreement that national image is determined by two factors: (1) national strength and behavior and (2) communication, especially international communication. For instance, Xu maintains that “a country’s national image is formed in the global news flow—that is, the image presented in foreign media’s news coverage.”9 Guan holds that “national image is an integrated concept, which concerns domestic and foreign public’s overall evaluation and recognition of a country itself, its behaviors, activities and their outcome. It exerts great influence and cohesion and is a manifestation of overall national strength.”10 For Sun, national image reflects domestic and foreign public’s perceptions and evaluations of a country’s politics (e.g., government credibility, diplomatic capability and military preparations), economy (e.g., financial and fiscal strength, product characteristics and quality and national income), society (e.g., social cohesion, safety and stability, national morale and national characteristics), culture (e.g., technological strength, education, cultural heritage, customs and values) and geography (e.g., geographical conditions, natural resources and population). He further argues that “a country’s national image is essentially determined by its comprehensive national power, but it cannot be simply equated to the country’s actual conditions, for it can be shaped to some extent.”11 Some scholars attempt to elucidate national image from the perspective of international communication. According to Boulding, national images “are those which a nation has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which constitute its international environment. … [It is] a highly structured piece of information-capital, developed partly by its inputs and outputs of information and partly by internal messages and its own laws of growth and stability.”12 In organizational behaviorism, Beach and Mitchell find that image is correlated with an organization’s behavioral characteristics and patterns, while national image is primarily defined by the policy behavior of the government—the organization that exercises power on behalf of the country.13 Wang and Xu point out that “national image is the external form of national structure, the reflective tension 9 Xu

(1996). Cited in Liu (2000, p. 27). (1999, p. 23). 11 Sun (2002, pp. 14–21). 12 Boulding (1959, p. 121). 13 Beach, Lee Roy & Mitchell, Terrence R. Image Theory: A Behavioral Theory of Decisions in Organizations. Cited in Staw and Cummings (1990, pp. 1–41). 10 Guan

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of national traditions and cultural legacies’ distinctive effects on the contemporary world, the general measure of a country’s quality and credibility, and the highest level of national soft power.”14 By associating national image with soft power, such definition has elevated national image to new heights and expanded the depth and breadth of research. For research purposes, many scholars “still prefer adopting the definition from the perspective of communication, where national image refers to the general public’s (both domestic and international) basic impression and overall evaluation of a country. In essence, national image is a country’s sizable intangible asset or an important element of its soft power.”15 It is worth noting that both domestic and international academia are still deepening their understanding of and debating over the connotations and nature of national image. There are still many limitations to our research. Drawing on previous research, I contend that national image should be examined within the analytical framework or interpretive paradigm of constructivism, which holds that the world and all beings are constructed. Through social construction, things exist in a meaningful and interconnected way. Therefore, we should promote their creation through interactions. American political scientist Alexander Wendt (1958–) is an important advocate of the constructivist paradigm in international relations. In his seminal Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt examines international relations from a sociological perspective and systematically interprets national identity and its generation mechanism, shedding light on the vital importance of research on national identity. In particular, he emphasizes the role of ideas, maintaining that the international system is the distribution of ideas instead of material capabilities as highlighted in neorealism. In terms of methodology, he advocates holism or structuralism and stresses the effect of the international system on states, which not only restricts state behaviors but also constructs state identities and interests. Wendt argues that state identity is at the core of international relations. It is the most important representation of the international system’s structural transformation. State identity is neither a state’s intrinsic, private or ready-made property nor predetermined or endogenous. Instead, it is “socially” constructed by structures of ideas, or structured ideas, through idea sharing as the state interacts with others in the international community. Hence, state identity is constructed by socially shared knowledge, shared ideas (beliefs and expectations), and common knowledge or intersubjective understandings.16 According to the constructivist theory, national image as a representation of state identity is neither an objective, pre-established entity owned by the state nor an artificial entity subject to the state’s design, positioning or construction. It is a mutual identification between states based on their social interactions. Meanwhile, it reflects a state’s identity given by other states in the international community based on their interactions. There are some basic characteristics of national image.

14 Wang

and Xu (2005, p. 106). (2012, pp. 9–10). 16 Wendt (1999). 15 Wu

1.1 The Fundamental Connotation of National Image

7

First, national image is constructive. As an interactive and constitutive social outcome, it is not a pre-established objective fact or something waiting to be discovered or identified, but rather socially constructed. In other words, national image is not inherent or intrinsic. It is acquired through sustained interactions between the subject and other state actors in the international community or system, which reflects the subject’s behavioral characteristics. Without a specific international system or community or interstate activities, national image will cease to exist. Second, national image is intersubjective. It is developed on the consensus between the subject and the object (the target state and its people). A state’s image incorporates both the state’s self-perceptions and the object’s (the Other’s) perceptions of it. As a result, it represents the subject and object’s common knowledge or understanding, i.e., the product of “compromise.” National image is not fully subject to a state’s unilateral will or effort and does not solely rest on the subject’s consent either. Third, national image is collective. It describes the overall impression and collective evaluation of a state by all the people or the majority rather than any individual within a given area. It is important to emphasize the collectiveness: for one thing, we cannot examine national image without defining the scope of cognitive subjects first. Otherwise, it will be pointless to discuss about national image at all. For another, people of different backgrounds may have different levels of understanding of a particular state. Even if they are presented with the same information, their perceptions and judgement may still differ due to different values and emotional needs. Fourth, national image is malleable. In most scenarios, discrepancies and deviations may arise between the surface and the essence, which indicates the possibility and feasibility to shape national image. In other words, national images can be created and modified. In fact, a state’s image, which represents other states’ overall assessment and impression of it, may or may not be consistent with its behaviors. Therefore, a state should actively participate in international affairs and strengthen its international communication in order to minimize the discrepancies between its images shaped by itself and the Others and construct a national image consistent with its communication goals in the international community. Fifth, national image is relatively stable. For any state, components of its image may change when the pattern of international interaction and how it engages in international social practices change. Nevertheless, due to the international public’s fixed mindset or stereotyping, it is unlikely for other states to substantially change their perceptions and imagination of the subject overnight. Once a fixed mindset or stereotype is formed in the international community, it will remain relatively stable.

1.2 The Functions and Effects of National Image A positive national image can bring handsome returns from the external society, while a negative one can provoke punishment. This is because modern international politics is gradually shifting from “power politics” to “image politics.” In a world

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with increasingly intense international cooperation and competition, the competition for soft power has become the key to international competition. As the centerpiece and an essential component of soft power, national image has become the focal point of international attention. In order to enhance their own voice in the international community, countries strive to shape and communicate positive self-images through economic, political, diplomatic and cultural means. A good national image is a nation state’s vital “intangible asset” with increasingly important functions and effects.

1.2.1 National Image Is an Important Part of National “Soft Power” Why do countries attach great importance to their own images? As a “soft power,” national image determines if a country can maximize its political and economic interests with minimum cost and realize its national strategic goals both in short and long terms. It also affects the country’s political stature, economic engagement and discourse construction in the international community. The concept of soft power did not originate from the Chinese academic circle. Before taking a closer look at it, we need to examine “power” first. Power is not only one of the most important concepts in international politics but also a basic concept in social sciences. Throughout the times, it has been a core research subject for countless philosophers, thinkers and political scientists both at home and abroad. The term was first defined by British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970). In his Power: A New Social Analysis first published in 1938, he defined power as “the production of intended effects. It is thus a quantitative concept: … A has more power than B, if A achieves many intended effects and B only a few.”17 Russell addressed the concurrence of two parties and suggested power as “the production of intended effects,” however, he did not elucidate the content of such “intended effects.” Therefore, his definition is evidently vague. German philosopher Max Weber (1864–1920) also studied power based on the relationship between two actors and further contended that the relationship is of a dominant submissive nature. To him, power is “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.”18 Such dominance refers to actor A’s ability to force actor B into doing something against his/her will, with an emphasis on coercion. Clearly, apart from acknowledging its coercive nature, scholars have long considered power as the ability to secure material interests. German philosopher, economist, historian, sociologist and political theorist Karl Marx (1818–1845) examined power within the framework of classes, struggles and conflicts, designating power as “the capacity of a social class to realize its specific objective interests.”19 Realist scholars of international relations 17 Russell

(2004, p. 23). et al. (1978, p. 53). 19 Lukes (1986, p. 144). 18 Weber

1.2 The Functions and Effects of National Image

9

have incorporated the belief of power as a material control in understanding the international dynamics. For example, according to English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), “the POWER of a man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good.”20 American political scientist Kenneth Waltz (1924–2013) believed that power is a means to realize state interests instead of an objective, and within a “balance of power” system, countries seek to balance rather than maximizing power. Meanwhile, American political scientist and international relations scholar John Mearsheimer (1947–), who first postulated offensive realism, maintains that power “represents nothing more than specific assets or material resources that are available to a state. … States have two kinds of power: latent power and military power.”21 The concept of soft power was first introduced by Joseph Nye (1937–), a renowned American scholar of international relations and a representative figure of neoliberalism. In his debate with those asserting the “American decline” led by British historian Paul Kennedy (1945–) in the 1980s, Nye argued that the US was not declining but rather experiencing changes in its power structure. Instead of using hard power (e.g., economy and military) alone, it also relied on its attractive and appealing soft power (e.g., culture, political values and foreign policies) to dominate the world now. In 1990, he published a series of papers on soft power, including The Changing Nature of World Power in Political Science Quarterly and Soft Power in Foreign Policy. In his seminal book Bound to Lead:The Changing Nature of American Power (1991), Nye pointed out that “the US not only has the hard power, the military force and the economy, but also has the soft power, namely the culture[,] sense of value [and national cohesion].”22 While hard power rests on economic inducements (“carrots”) or military threats (“sticks”) to make others act against their own will, soft power “affects, attracts, and persuade[s] others to believe and admit the rule, sense of value, lifestyle and social system through the spiritual and morality requirements,”23 eventually ensuring them to follow the steps and achieve the results anticipated by the actor with such power. In other words, soft power is the power to attract and appeal within values, ideas, lifestyles and social systems. It is the power to assimilate and regulate on the basis of these factors. In Nye’s view, the post-Cold War era observed two major changes in international politics, namely the transformation of global power and shifts in the nature of power. To be specific, countries were “moving away from the emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier eras. [As the military rivalry between the two superpowers ended, soft power encompassing] factors such as technology, education, and economic growth [were] becoming more important.”24 Consequently, in the light of the transformation of world politics, all countries including the US must learn to achieve their objectives through a new

20 Hobbes

and Tuck (1996, p. 62). (2001, pp. 55, 57). 22 Li and Leng (2017, pp. 69–70). 23 Zhang (2008, p. 273). Cited in Li and Leng (2017, p. 70). 24 Nye (1990, p. 179). 21 Mearsheimer

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source of power, which requires them to respect transnational interdependence, manage the international system’s structure and share mankind’s cultural values.25 Such new source of power is soft power, which mainly manifests in culture, education, mass media and national image. Nye distinguished attractive power from coercive power. He contended that soft power arose from the attractiveness and affinity of intangible (psychological) factors, such as a country and nation’s cultural traditions, ideology, values, ideas, national habits and policies. These factors can be roughly categorized into the political system’s attractiveness, the values’ power to inspire, the cultural appeal, the diplomatic persuasiveness, and the charisma and affinity of the leaders and the people. Since then, soft power as a new form of power has become increasingly important to countries. However, foreign researchers’ growing enthusiasm for this subject was not instantly shared by their Chinese colleagues. Wang Huning (1955–; in office: 2017–), a Chinese political theorist, current member of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Politburo Standing Committee (China’s top decision-making body) and Secretary of the CPC Secretariat, is the first Chinese scholar to expound on this topic. In 1993, he published an article entitled Culture as National Power: Soft Power in Fudan University Journal, examining culture as a soft power. In his article Soft Power and Other Factors in International Relations (1997), Pang Zhongying (1962–), a scholar of international politics, reviewed Nye’s conceptualization of soft power and put forward the issues of communicating Chinese values and culture. He is one of the first domestic scholars who proposed to explore China’s soft power. The academic interest in soft power in China did not surge until the new millennium, especially during the last decade. Soft power is a power of attraction. It allows a country to strengthen its national cohesion, willpower as well as its government’s capability to handle domestic and international affairs. In addition, soft power can influence other countries’ policies, systems and the psychology and behaviors of their governments and people through various channels, and its persuasiveness is directly linked to national image. According to Nye, a country’s power springs from two important factors: (1) its cultural universality and (2) ability to set up norms and system in its own favor when battling for the dominance of the international code of conduct.26 As a reflection of a country’s overall culture, a positive national image can facilitate the communication of its soft power (e.g., politics and culture) in the international arena. Naturally, “image and reputation are becoming critical elements of national strategies, and globalization and media revolution have propelled every government to put a premium on its image, reputation and attitudes.”27 In particular, a country’s influence in the world is subject to its international image, while its people’s cultural, national and social identification as well as national cohesion are directly affected by its domestic image. In the contemporary age featuring image hegemony, national image is a vital component of soft power, and its construction has become increasingly important to countries. 25 Nye

(1990, pp. 177–192). (2005, pp. 20–36). 27 Li and Zhou (2005, p. 120). 26 Zhang

1.2 The Functions and Effects of National Image

11

For instance, Japan, South Korea and the US have successfully communicated their national images and enhanced their soft power through media like anime and manga, TV dramas and video games, and Hollywood blockbusters, respectively. As early as June 2010, Wang Chen (1950–), the then deputy head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee and the minister of the State Council Information Office of China, already illustrated the relationship between national image and soft power in an article named Seize the Historic Opportunity and Shape Positive National Image (tentative translation). He noted that “a country’s image is a hallmark of its cultural soft power, which usually refers to the country’s powerful source of ideas, morality and inspiration forged on the basis of cultural vitality, creativity and communication. Our country’s cultural soft power is rooted in traditional Chinese philosophical beliefs, guided by core socialist values and reflects the call of our time. It manifests as national unity and cohesion domestically and as affinity and influence overseas. Today, its role in competing for comprehensive national power is becoming increasingly prominent. The effect of national image on development and security has never been as large, fast and direct as now. Therefore, improving cultural soft power and shaping a positive national image bear far-reaching implication, including maintaining national development and security, boosting comprehensive national power and competitiveness, raising intellectual and moral standards in the society, improving the overall caliber of the population, building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, and striving to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation”28 (tentative translation). As a hallmark of soft power, national image may influence the competition for comprehensive national power among countries, for specific images often trigger certain types of interstate behaviors. National image is an important component of soft power. The task to construct China’s positive image and improve its soft power has never been more pressing. This is because “[the] strengthening of our cultural soft power is decisive for China to reach the Two Centenary Goals29 and realize the Chinese Dream of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”30 When presiding over the 12th group study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee on December 30, 2013, general secretary Xi Jinping stressed that “[to] strengthen our cultural soft power, we should reinforce the cornerstone of our national cultural soft power[,] … disseminate the values of modern China[,] … [and] showcase the unique charm of Chinese culture. … To build a beautiful image of our country, we should display the Chinese

28 Wang

(2010, p. 7).

29 “By 2021, to celebrate the CPC’s centenary, the goal is to ‘build a moderately prosperous society

in all respects.’ This essentially means making sure that China’s development improves the lives of all its people, particularly those who are below or near the country’s poverty line. By 2049, the centenary of the People’s Republic of China, the goal is to ‘build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious.’ This is the reason why much of the reform being pushed in recent years aims to prevent and control major risks, alleviate poverty, curb pollution, and deepen supply-side structural reform to push forward sustained and healthy economic and social development.” Cited in Huaxia (2017). 30 Xi (2018, p. 178).

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civilization of a long history and unity of diversified ethnic groups with varying cultures; an Oriental power with honest and capable political administrations, developed economy, thriving culture, stable society, unified people and splendid landscapes; a responsible great power that is committed to peaceful development, common growth, international fairness and justice, and contributions to mankind; and a socialist power opening its door wider to the outside world, full of hope, vigor and vitality.”31 To sum up, the four sub-images above have shed light on the direction of constructing China’s national image and reflected the urgency to do so.

1.2.2 A Positive National Image Can Boost International Discourse Power In recent years, China’s international discourse power has sparked heated debate. There have been ongoing discussions on how to construct China’s national image and improve its international discourse power. In the age of globalization, the country with a morally appealing and forward-looking discourse system can impress the others with its discourse and narrative, thus asserting its international discourse power and enjoying advantages in international competition. The subject of discourse was originally introduced in linguistics. The term “discourse analysis” was first used by celebrated American linguist Zellig Harris (1909– 1992), who examined discourse within context, in the linguistic journal Language in 1952. However, discourse did not evolve into a research area until the 1960s. Since then, sociolinguistics emerged in the US. It is the study of language that concentrates on explaining linguistic behaviors from a social perspective and exploring the relations between language and social actors/domains. Entering the 1970s, critical linguistics was developed in the UK, which maintains that language not only reflects but also constructs social process and structure. One of its main tasks is to unmask ideology and champion and interpret the true meaning of texts and discourses in our pervasive social and cultural lives. During the 1980s, the UK and the US saw a surge in publications in discourse analysis, broadening and deepening the scope of discourse theories. Meanwhile, some scholars of international relations gradually adopted a linguistic focus, which mainly followed one of the two pathways: the structural linguistic pathway represented by Swiss linguist and semiotician Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) and the post-structuralist pathway represented by French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1930–2004). Saussure distinguished between language and speech and divided the sign into the signifier and the signified. His theories served as an important assessment tool for international relations to “turn toward linguistics.” To be specific, there is a semiotic structure between the “social” language and the “individualistic” speech as well as behind the “meaning” triggered by the signifier and the signified. This semiotic structure is not available in the real world, but established in the stable internal “system.” According to post-structuralist critical linguistics, language is a static and internal system, which is neither stable 31 Xi

(2018, pp. 178–180).

1.2 The Functions and Effects of National Image

13

nor merely endogenous in the absence of actual relations. Derrida deconstructed structuralism, arguing that the “meaning” of a text can be understood by receivers through deconstruction, whose methods and angles are endless and always changing. Other post-structuralist scholars associated the deconstruction of verbal narrative with identity. They believe that identity is a sufficient condition of the international order instead of a mere facilitator. It is constructed both socially and through verbal narrative. Apart from its wide application in international relations, a discourse has also been extensively studied in many other fields since the 1990s, such as criticizing history, cultural anthropology, literature and journalism. These disciplines borrowed and built onto the original definition of discourse in linguistics (i.e., the use of language), eventually giving the concept new social and historical meanings and prompting the research to a whole new level. In the new millennium, many scholars of sociology, international relations and journalism and communication have conducted interdisciplinary studies on discourse and achieved fruitful results.32 The study of discourse power draws upon the research on discourse and other theories. For example, Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci’s (1891–1937) theory of cultural hegemony, German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas’s (1929–) discourse theory of democracy, French sociologist and philosopher Jean Baudrillard’s (1929–2007) theory of simulacra, and French philosopher and semiotician Roland Barthes’s (1915–1980) semiotic theory have all paved way for the study of discourse power. “Discourse power” was first proposed as an independent concept by Michel Foucault (1926–1984), a French philosopher and leading figure in post-structuralism. In his inaugural lecture dubbed The Order of Discourse at the Collège de France in 1970, Foucault put forward his famous assertion: discourse is power. He argues that the external function of discourse is to organize the world order. Hence, whoever controls discourse will own the right to organize the world order and be in power. By associating discourse with power, Foucault analyzes the meaning of discourse and the network of meanings from a power perspective. He “approaches power from the ‘bottom up,’ … [and views it as a networked,] diffuse, decentralized, ‘capillary’ phenomenon”33 that is present in every aspect of our social life. To be specific, power “is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations.”34 It is on these fluid networks of power that individuals control and are controlled by power, leaving no room for free actions. In Foucault’s words, “[power] is everywhere.”35 He believes that there are omnipresent, complex and networked power relations behind every discourse. Because discourse produces, transmits and reinforces power, discourse itself is power. Discourse links man and the world, for all human knowledge and thoughts are expressed through discourses. History is also constructed by discourse. 32 Wu

(2014, pp. 12–16). (2010, p. 24). 34 Foucault (1990, p. 94). 35 Foucault (1990, p. 94). 33 Urban

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Every piece of history, truth or fallacy, is stated by subjects who exercise power to select, construct and deconstruct the discourses that are eventually documented and passed down. As a result, the effect of discourse power is always present in historical narratives. Foucault’s theory of discourse power has broad implications in the Western world: it has become an assessment tool for hegemonic discourse in international relations. Also, it profoundly and directly reflects Western countries’ attempts to seize the high ground and maintain the initiative in the realm of ideology. For instance, the world’s economic discourse power is still in the hands of the Western countries led by the US, including the main discourse power to set economic rules and commodity prices as well as managing intellectual property, stock market, currencies, financial institutions and credit rating agencies. Discourse power entails both moral and coercive force. To be specific, the moral force concerns attracting listeners and improving their willingness to listen, while the coercive force ensures that people have access to and must listen to the discourse. Simply put, discourse power is the main expression of comprehensive national power and a key indication of a powerful country. Comprehensive national power is constituted by hard power and soft power. Hard power consists of economic, scientific and technological, and military power, with economic power being most fundamental and important. Meanwhile, discourse power secures the initiative. A country falling behind will be beaten, a country in poverty will be starved, and a country without a voice will be scolded. Since the establishment of New China 70 years ago, especially during the four decades of reform and opening-up, we have transformed China into the world’s second largest economy from scratch. Through the Chinese people’s extraordinary efforts under the CPC’s leadership, our country’s hard power has improved rapidly and “[we] have solved the problems of being beaten and starvation[.]”36 However, China’s soft power remains relatively weak, and the country particularly lacks discourse power in international affairs. “[Now] it is time to deal with the problem of being scolded in the international community.”37 Looking back at the development of great parties and countries, we realize that neither “hard power without soft power” nor “unmatched soft and hard power” is sustainable. To a certain extent, China’s national rejuvenation is the rejuvenation of discourse power. Therefore, President Xi Jinping “suggests that a new discourse system should be developed to facilitate mutual understanding between China and the world, and finally, to promote China’s [discourse power in the international community.].”38 Discourse system has great significance in facilitating our understanding of human behaviors and social systems. People from different countries have different discourse systems, which dictate how they observe and interpret the world and thus construct their unique realities. Today, international media remains dominated by Western media. While China is a media giant, it is not a true media power yet. Hence, the West still holds a “hegemonic discourse.” A survey has revealed that as much as 68% 36 Thussu

et al. (2018). et al. (2018). 38 Thussu et al. (2018). 37 Thussu

1.2 The Functions and Effects of National Image

15

contemporary international audiences rely on Western media to learn about China, 10% rely on other countries’ media and only 22% rely on Chinese media. According to statistics, mainstream Western news agencies almost monopolize the sources and interpretations of information around the world, accounting for 80–90% of the total amount, whereas only 5% is disseminated through Chinese media. This explains why even our own mainstream media adopts many messages and photos from overseas media (e.g., CNN) when broadcasting international news. Through their own discourse system, Western countries interpret and judge the social lives, cultures and institutions of developing countries in their own favor. They also intentionally export their discourse system to the third world, thus influencing people’s perception, social psychology and values there. Owing to China’s huge “deficit” in international communication and the obvious “discrepancy” between soft power and hard power, the country’s image in the international community is still largely shaped by the Others rather than itself. This has given rise to a striking contrast between China’s real image and image in Western media. A major cause for such passive situation is that we have not established our own discourse system, and our strengths for development and comprehensive power have yet to be transformed into strength for discourse. Without international discourse power, we are bound to follow the existing Western logic, thus falling victim to the “Western discourse trap.” We have to endure the embarrassment of being constructed by the others’ discourse and risk being wrongly accused or scolded. Therefore, there is a pressing need to construct China’s own discourse system, improve the influence of our discourse in the international arena, and seize the discourse power and initiative of international media. China is still in the period of important strategic opportunity for development, which coincides with the period of important strategic opportunity for improving international discourse power. To improve its international discourse power, we must first implement the task as a national strategy and foster a sound domestic media and conceptual environment. This will enable the Chinese people to develop a profound understanding of the significance of the external environment and international discourse power to national rejuvenation. Next, we must continue to construct and elevate the images of China, the Chinese people and Chinese development and attach great importance to improving the emotional appeal of China’s overall image. We must set the agenda for international discourse and the rules for international discourse, stand firm on the high ground of international discourse, and lead the international discourse through various measures, such as creating special programs, increasing funds, personnel training, creating platforms and fostering favorable environment. In particular, when addressing crucial issues, we need to utilize media and other information carriers to communicate China’s authentic voice and image with sound reasoning and solid evidence. The Chinese ideas and positions need to be expressed through appropriate discourses and formats, and China’s voice needs to be heard when major international events take place. We need to fully showcase China’s image featuring peaceful development, democratic progress, and politeness and hospitality, promote the Chinese voice to go global, and further strengthen the influence and appeal of the Chinese model’s morality.

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A positive national image can improve a country’s discourse power in the international community. Although national image is considered a type of soft power, it is actually created through the combined effort of hard power and soft power, i.e., the result of implementing the national strategy for smart power. In international relations, if a country controls the right to construct national images, then it will gain a decisive advantage in the competition for international discourse power. As we work to construct China’s national image and strengthen our international discourse power, we must keep in mind that our target audience is the overseas public instead of our own people and be aware of their differences. Therefore, it is vital to understand our audience, tell good stories about China, and project the Chinese voice in international communication. Storytelling is the best way to improve the international influence of our discourse system. We must commit to communicating the Chinese position with universal expressions and carry forward the search for internationally acceptable ways to project the Chinese voice and tell good stories about socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese dream, the Chinese people, the extraordinary Chinese culture and China’s peaceful development. These stories need to be accessible, appealing, inspiring and insightful to the international audience. Moreover, we must subtly embed “dao” ( , literal: the way; the Chinese thoughts, claims and views) within the stories. Through storytelling, we can illustrate the Chinese thoughts in a more vivid way, be more vocal at putting forward China’s claims, introduce China’s plan to solve major global issues in more details, and describe the “Chinese model,” “Chinese path” and “Chinese experience” with greater assurance. In a nutshell, storytelling is a patient and systematic method to help overseas audience approach and understand “dao.” To be specific, we need to carry out in-depth research and seek breakthroughs in clarifying the main Western misconceptions about China one by one, including democracy and human rights, ethnicity and religion, judicial system, anti-corruption and promoting clean governance. We must explain our national condition, introduce our progress, and guide the international community to view these issues objectively and fairly. Finally, we need to explore new expressions, combine what we want to share and what overseas audience wants to hear, and find a middle ground between emotional appeal and reasoning. In this way, we will enhance the acceptance of China’s position and ideas and the influence of the “Chinese dream,” “Chinese miracle” and “Chinese shock” in the international community.

References Anholt, S. (2010). Places: Identity, image and reputation. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Boulding, K. E. (1956). The image: Knowledge in life and society. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Boulding, K. E. (1959). National images and international systems. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3(2). Ding, J., & Su, Z. (Eds.). (2009). Asian communication & media studies. Beijing: Communication University of China Press.

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Foucault, M. (1990). The will to knowledge: The history of sexuality. London: Penguin Books. Guan, W. (1999). On national image. Chengdu: University of Electronic Science and Technology of China Press. Hobbes, T., & Tuck, R. (Ed.). (1996). Leviathan (Rev. student ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved July 26, 2019, from https://books.google.com/. Huaxia. (Ed.). (2017, October 17). CPC Q&A: What are China’s two centennial goals and why do they matter? Xinhuanet. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/ 2017-10/17/c_136686770.htm. Li, Z. (2011). China’s international image—A constructivist reading in the age of global communication. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House. Li, L., & Leng, H. (2017). Joseph Nye’s soft power theory and its revelation towards ideological and political education. Humanities and Social Sciences, 5(2). Li, X., & Zhou, Q. (Eds.). (2005). Soft power and global communication. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press. Liu, J. (Ed.). (2000). International communication—Collected theses on modern communication. Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Institute Press. Lukes, S. (Ed.). (1986). Power. New York: New York University Press. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: W.W. Norton. Nye, J. S. Jr. (1990, Summer). The changing nature of world power. Political Science Quarterly, 105(2). Russell, B. (2004). Power: A new social analysis. London: Routledge. Retrieved July 26, 2019, from https://books.google.com/. Staw, B. M., & Cummings, L. L. (Eds.). (1990). Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 12). Greenwich: JAI Press. Sun, Y. (2002). National image’s connotations and functions. International Forum, 3. Thucydides. (2008). History of the Peloponnesian War (D. Xie, Chinese Trans.). Beijing: The Commercial Press. Thussu, D. K., de Burgh, H., & Shi, A. (Eds). (2018). China’s media go global. Oxon: Routledge. Retrieved August 4, 2019, from https://books.google.com/. Urban, H. B. (2010). The power of Tantra: Religion, sexuality and the politics of South Asian studies. London: I.B. Tauris. Wang, X. (2005). The role of national reputation in the rise of the great powers. Quarterly Journal of International Politics, 1. Wang, C. (2010, June 1). Seize the historic opportunity & shape positive national image. People’s Daily. Wang, J., & Xu, P. (2005). International strategy. Beijing: Higher Education Press. Weber, M., Roth, G., & Wittich, C. (Eds.). (1978). Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press. Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing). Wu, Y. (2012). A research review of China’s national image and its positioning. China Economist, 5. Wu, Y. (2014). Production mechanism of China’s discourse power. Shanghai: Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press. Xi, J. (2018). Enhance China’s cultural soft power. In J. Xi (Ed.), The governance of China I (2nd ed.). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Xu, X. (1996). The issue of national image in international news communication. Zhang, X. (2005). An analysis of Joseph Nye’s “soft power” concept. American Studies Quarterly, 19(1). Zhang, M. (2008). The concept of soft power: Propose, development and criticism (Vol. 7). Oxford: Field of Vision. Zhu, Z. (2008). The Communication of national image in the digital age.

Chapter 2

Perceptual Barriers to China’s National Image and Their Causes

A review of China’s history of international exchanges can unveil the Westerners’ ever-shifting impressions, or imagination, of the country. Due to its limited exchanges with the outside world before the mid-eighteenth century, China largely remained an “imagined community” in the eyes of Westerners. It was not until the mid-eighteenth century, especially after the Opium Wars (the First Opium War: 1840–1842, the Second Opium War: 1856–1860), that China was involuntarily integrated into the international system as an entity, thus establishing its contemporary national image in international politics.1 To create a more relevant and effective national image, it is important to first identify the practical barriers in its construction, starting with understanding how issues of China and its image took shape within the Western modern and orientalist discourse systems. This requires us to examine the shifts in the Western perspectives on China’s national image and the causes behind those differences.

2.1 Historical Shifts in China’s National Image The Chinese nation’s 5000 years of history have not only cultivated a splendid national culture but also shaped China’s national images through time. According to Professor Duan Liancheng (1926–1998), our national image has roughly gone through nine transformations: (1) the Splendid China in Marco Polo’s accounts; (2) the Enigmatic China that began to practice isolationism since the mid-Ming dynasty (1460–1552; Ming dynasty: 1368–1644); (3) the “Inferior” China forced to set up treaty ports after the Opium Wars; (4) the Promising China marked by the Chinese people’s resistance against Japanese aggression; (5) the “Resourceful” and “Blue Ant” China, i.e., the People’s Republic of China founded in 1949 (abbr. the PRC, also known as New China) during which most Chinese wore blue due to 1 The “national image of China” discussed in this chapter mainly refers to the construction of China

subject to the Western society’s imagination. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Meng, National Image, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3147-7_2

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the then-limited textile industry; (6) the Frenzied and Turbulent China undergoing the “Cultural Revolution” (1966–1976); (7) the “Shangri-La” China promoted by the US President Richard Nixon (1913–1994, in office: 1969–1974) to the rest of the world; (8) the “Survivor” China in the early stage of reform and opening-up; and (9) the China in a Great Experiment, i.e., China on the rise.2 Therefore, we can infer that the development of China’s national image is filled with twists and turns and closely linked with its national power. One country’s fundamental attitude (perception) toward another generally falls within three categories: admiration, degradation and rapport. The Western perspective on China’s national image has shifted from glorification to defamation and eventually to glorification mixed with defamation, i.e., the stages of admiration, degradation and degradation-rapport.

2.1.1 The Stage of Admiration: Prosperous, Diligent and Valiant The interactions between China and the outside world can be traced back to ancient times, with the earliest known exchanges dating from the Spring and Autumn (770– 476 BC) and the Warring States (475–221 BC) periods. At that time, China was referred as CIN/CINA/SINA by other countries and regions such as the Persian Empire, ancient India and ancient Greece indicating that the social conditions of Qin (an ancient Chinese state which established the first imperial dynasty of China, 897–207 BC) already made their way to both its neighboring countries and the West. The Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD, the second imperial dynasty of China) witnessed the emergence of two networks of trade routes: (1) the “Silk Road” that stretched across Central Asia through the Persian Empire and connected China and Europe, and (2) the “Maritime Silk Road” that facilitated travel, trade and cultural exchanges between China and countries along the South China Sea coastline. Apart from exquisite silk, jade ware and tea, the two ancient trade routes brought China’s national image to Europe as well, from where it subsequently reached other parts of the world. Ancient Greeks addressed the Chinese people as the “Hyperboreans,” which literally means the inhabitants of the Extreme North, casting an aura of mystery over the faraway culture. In the Roman Empire, people raved about fine silk from China, and silk trade became the basis for Sino-Roman relations. As a result, the country was known as Serica (literal: silk), or the “Silk Country,” in pre-Christian Europe. Europeans pictured silk growing into trees like cotton and everyone from Serica being diligent, generous and leading a happy, long and prosperous life: “Serica gained worldwide fame with its silk from the woods. These fine silk yarns grew into the trees and could be woven into fabric once they were soaked and neatly combed. Ladies in ancient Rome looked radiant in silk garments. Silk was transported around the world, which was actually an extremely difficult task.”3 As French sinologist 2 Duan 3 Li

(2004). (2010).

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René Étiemble (1909–2002) once put it, the image of China was mysterious yet prosperous to the outside world at that time.4 From the literary evidence above, we can gather that silk trade offered a new way to fuel Europeans’ imagination toward a mysterious China. Although their imagination was further expanded and elaborated through small-scale intermittent exchanges between China and the West afterwards, it remained vague and abstract on the whole. Since the Qin and Han dynasties, favorable conditions paved the way for China’s “Great Unity” (大一统, dayitong), including continued territorial expansion, increased integration between Han and ethnic minorities, improved political, economic and military systems, and reformed morality and social order. These eventually led to the establishment of a centralized feudal government. As implied in the saying that “anyone who attacked the mighty Han Empire would be killed regardless of distance” (敢犯强汉者, 虽远必诛; gan fan qiang Han zhe, sui yuan bi zhu), China began to embrace the strong and tough image of a great power. Its territorial acquisition reached a new high in the Tang (618–907) and Song (960–1279) dynasties, with diverse ethnic groups co-residing within a vast territory. Its national power during the Tang dynasty was so formidable that the character “Tang” (唐) virtually became a symbol and sign of China. From the Flourishing Period of the Tang (650–820) to the beginning of the Qing dynasty (approximately 1636–1661; Qing: 1616–1912), the country embodied comprehensive national power and led the world in economy, science and technology. In the Song dynasty, the creation of nationwide commercial networks announced the arrival of the commercial age. Elements of economic growth that are typically found in modern society were already commonly available back then, such as fast transport system, the introduction of Jiaozi (交子, the first paper money in history), the establishment of sea lanes, bustling ports, and booming handicraft and financial industries. The Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) saw substantial progress in the exchanges between China and the West. Through his campaigns, Genghis Khan (1162–1227), the first Great Khan of the Mongol Empire, stretched his reign from present-day China to the Danube River and created an empire across Eurasia. At the Empire’s height, its land area reached over 30 million square kilometers (including the north of the Western Siberian Plain), extending northward into Siberia, southward into the Persian Gulf, eastward into the Sea of Japan and westward into the Mediterranean Sea. The previously self-sustaining and reclusive Eurasian civilizations were conquered and forced to open up, which subsequently encouraged Eurasian integration. “The Yuan dynasty occupied a vast portion of Eurasia, stretching as far as the Pacific Ocean on the east and the Danube River, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea on the west, and extending from the Arctic Ocean in the north into the India Ocean in the south. Such ambitious coverage is unprecedented and has not yet been achieved again. One who was proficient in Mongolian could travel from Europe to China without language barriers. Moreover, courier stations were set up throughout the country to ensure efficient transport. Explorers, merchants, clerks and engineers from the Eastern Roman Empire, the Western Roman Empire and Germanic regions all made 4 Étiemble

(2000, p. 49).

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their way to China, where they were allowed to trade and preach freely. If the Eastern and Western civilizations were like parallel lines evolving independently before, they finally met now.”5 Both land and maritime trade with foreign countries flourished during this time. To monopolize trade in the Pacific Ocean, the Yuan dynasty set up Maritime Trade Superintendents’ Offices (市舶司, shibosi) in seven port cities: Quanzhou, Shanghai, Ganpu (southwest of the present-day Haiyan County, Zhejiang Province), Wenzhou, Guangzhou, Hangzhou and Qingyuan (present-day Ningbo, Zhejiang Province). Back then, China established business relations with more than 140 countries and regions, exporting raw silk, silk fabrics, cotton, and gold, silver, iron and chinaware while importing pearls, ivory, rhino horns, hawksbills, diamonds and sandalwood. Quanzhou became the largest trading port in both China and East Asia, whose prosperity was recounted by Moroccan explorer Ibn Battuta (1304–1368 or 1369). According to his description, Quanzhou was one of the largest port cities in the world and produced exquisite velvet and silk. Many ships berthed there, including about 100 large ones and countless smaller ones. There was even a market created specifically for Christian, Jewish and Islamic merchants. Thanks to the favorable climate for trade and cultural exchanges, the Chinese inventions of printing and gunpowder were introduced to Europe while Arabic mathematics, Western medicine and architectural techniques were brought into China. When merchants, explorers and clerks streamed into China from the Western world, wealth and knowledge also steadily flew to the West. These visitors’ spoken and written accounts and people’s own imagination formed a recipe for the image of China. Among all the visitors, Italian merchant Marco Polo was the most prominent. His visit to China during Kublai Khan’s reign (1260–1294; b. 1215, d. 1294) marked an important chapter in China’s history of international exchanges. Born into a Venetian merchant family, a 17-year-old Marco Polo embarked on a journey to China through the Middle East with his father and uncle. It took them 4 years to reach their destination in 1275. Since then, Marco Polo worked for the Yuan government for 17 years, during which he visited almost the entire China. Upon returning to Venice, he was imprisoned due to warfare. Locked away in a prison cell, he dictated his experiences as an official merchant and explorer in China to his cellmate, forming the basis of The Travels. In the book, China was depicted as a highly advanced, glorious and prosperous civilization with leading sciences and technologies, bustling cities and towns, exquisite yet affordable silk and satin textiles, excellent networks of courier stations, and a magnificent capital. The Travels provided Europeans with a comprehensive, reasonably impartial and detailed firsthand account of China. In most Westerners’ opinion, the mysterious country in the East was the “Celestial Empire” with a vast territory and boasted an abundance of resources. Many were drawn by its immeasurable wealth and developed culture. As European travelers made their way to China, their Chinese counterparts also visited Europe for the first time. Although the story of Rabban Bar Sauma (c. 1220– 1294, “rabban” is an honorific title for a teacher in Syrian) never appeared in any Chinese historical document, his expedition was recorded in Western texts. He was 5 Li

(2010).

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a Nestorian Christian monk of Uyghur origin from Dadu, the capital of the Yuan dynasty. In around 1275, Rabban Bar Sauma and his student Rabban Markos (1245– 1317) embarked on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. As they ventured to Baghdad, Rabban Markos was elected as the new Nestorian Patriarch Yahballaha III and Rabban Bar Sauma was appointed as the Visitor General. In 1287, Rabban Bar Sauma was dispatched to visit Europe by Yahballaha III and Arghun Khan (1258–1291, reign: 1284–1391). He was warmly received by Philip IV of France (1268–1314, reign: 1285–1314) and Edward I of England (1239–1307, reign: 1272–1307) in France and by Pope Nicholas IV (1227–1292, papacy: 1288–1292) in Rome. Soon after Rabban Bar Sauma’s mission, Pope Nicholas IV appointed Giovanni da Montecorvino (1247–1328) to preach Christianity in China, who arrived in Dadu in 1294 by sea. In 1336, Emperor Shundi (1320–1370; reign: 1333–1370) sent a mission of 16 people to the Vatican, whose arrival was warmly received by many countries along the journey. Toward the mid- and late-Yuan dynasty (1328–1339), Chinese traveler Wang Dayuan (1311–1350?) visited dozens of countries in South Asia and East Africa on merchant ships and recounted his experiences in Dao Yi Zhi Lue 《岛夷志略》 ( , c. 1349–1350, tentative translation: A Brief Account of Island Barbarians). To sum up, peaceful exchange rather than warfare was the theme for the Yuan dynasty’s foreign relations. Among all the exchanges discussed above, Marco Polo’s journey to China and The Travels, the first detailed account of the East by a European, exerted an incomparable influence on shaping China’s national image and foreign relations. Traditionally, China was perceived through hearsay and rumor in the West, but The Travels presented the European public with a powerful and prosperous “Empire of China” with great unity. As popular new insights mixed with old imagination, the awakening Europe marveled at and yearned for the exotic country’s achievements. In his travel memoir, English traveler Sir John Mandeville corroborated the depiction of an amazing, fertile and prosperous China, with some exaggeration and imagination for a dramatic effect. Since the fifteenth century, an increasing number of European explorers, travelers and preachers visited China, and their written accounts painted a real picture of China from all aspects of the world. The most seminal work is arguably The History of the Great and Mighty Kingdom of China and the Situation Thereof by Spanish explorer Juan González de Mendoza (1545–1618) published in 1586. Thanks to the book, China once again captured the interest of the European general public. It helped the readers understand China, bridging the gap between mysterious rumor and reality. Another influential work belongs to Italian Jesuit priest Matteo Ricci (1552–1610): De Christiana expeditione apud Sinas suscepta ab Societate Jesu (published in 1615, English: On the Christian Mission among the Chinese by the Society of Jesus). In his book, Ricci described his experiences and observation as a Christian missionary in China, introducing China’s general conditions to Europe. It played an important role in promoting cultural exchanges between the Ming dynasty and Europe. It is these Europeans’ own accounts that deepened Westerners’ understanding of China.

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It is safe to assume that ancient China maintained a rather excellent image in the West. Europeans used to hold it as the “Land of Happiness in the East,” the “Pure Land” and “an ancient civilization with refined manners and etiquette.” Prior to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, China’s national image was basically positive too. European priests, merchants and travelers to China did not refrain from exalting the country, though sometimes their words may be subject to exaggeration. Astounded by accounts of its prosperity, the Western general public harbored admiration and envy toward China, and even the royals and aristocrats took pride in owning objects made in China. A consensus on its image was reached across social classes: it was an affluent empire with a highly centralized government and untainted spirit that honored benevolence and righteousness. It was home to Confucius and many other accomplished philosophers as well as its diligent, intelligent, brave and tough people. This image reflects the Westerners’ understanding of China’s military and governmental systems, political philosophy, economy, culture, morality and the Chinese people. Western thinkers from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were also not shy in their praise of and reflection upon the ancient civilization6 : Confucian classics were translated into Latin and published in Paris in 1687. According to German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), “even though science and technology are intersections of the excellences of Europe and China, Europe is superior[,] … [but] ‘certainly they surpass us … in practical philosophy, that is, in the precepts of ethics and politics adapted to the present life and use of mortals.’”7 In his influential works Letters on the English (1733) and Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations (1756; English: Essay on the Manners and Spirit of Nations), French Enlightenment scholar Voltaire (1694–1778), who is widely considered the “conscience of Europe” and “France’s greatest poet,” praised China as “the finest, most ancient, most extensive, most populous, and most civilized kingdom in the universe”8 and the Chinese nation as “the most intelligent and civilized.” Moreover, German philosopher and jurist Christian Wolff (1679–1754) delved into the Chinese philosophical concept of “nature and man in unity” (天人合 一, tian ren he yi, meaning: man is an integral part of nature and therefore ought to behave in accordance with the natural laws), and inferred that Chinese ethics agreed with the spontaneity of reasoning. In particular, it emphasized the importance of selfdiscipline and awareness instead of external force, which was very promising. In his masterpiece An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), renowned Scottish economist Adam Smith (1723–1790) concluded that “China has long been one of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and most populous countries in the world.”9 “The China Fever” in Europe lasted for centuries into the mid- and late-eighteenth century.

6 Zhang

(2011). (2004, pp. 146–149). 8 Voltaire (1792, p. 322). 9 Smith (1776). Cited in Minowitz (2004). 7 Perkins

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2.1.2 The Stage of Degradation: Closed, Backward and Ugly While the Western world was looking up to China with admiration and envy, China dwelled on its past glory with growing arrogance and ignored the unsettling reality: the extravagant and promiscuous lifestyle of the ruling class, severe corruption, economic decline, outdated technology, aggravated annexation, extreme poverty and weakened national defense. As domestic social conflicts continued to intensify, the Chinese feudal society stumbled to the brink of collapse. Actually, economic growth briefly resumed in the early reign of the Ming dynasty: domestic stability and advances in shipbuilding and navigation facilitated the development of long-distance maritime trade. However, the country’s prosperity fueled the rulers’ arrogance, who proclaimed China as the “Celestial Empire.” They intended to demonstrate military and economic prowess and promote etiquette to “overseas barbarians.” Thus, on behalf of Emperors Yong Le (1360–1424, reign: 1402–1424) and Xuan De (1398– 1435, reign: 1426–1435), explorer Zheng He completed seven naval expeditions between 1405 and 1433, reaching the Indo China Peninsula, the Malay Peninsula, Indonesia, the Kalimantan Island and the west to Brunei. His great voyages promoted understanding and friendly exchanges between China and Asian and African countries. Despite this, the Ming dynasty gradually adopted policies toward isolationism since 1449. The isolationism of the Ming dynasty includes two stages, i.e., pre- and postsecond year of Jiajing (a Chinese era name, equivalent to 1523 in the Gregorian calendar. Emperor Jiajing: 1507–1567, reign: 1522–1566), with the first stage further divided into two phases: Phase 1 lasted for 35 years, from the first year of Hongwu (1368; Emperor Hongwu: 1328–1398, reign: 1368–1398) to the fourth year of Jianwen (1402; Emperor Jianwen: 1377–?, reign: 1398–1402), and Phase 2 lasted for 120 years, from the first year of Yongle (1403) to the first year of Jiajing (1522). Phase 1 is marked by banning maritime exchanges. For example, citizens in coastal areas were banned from private sailing since the fourth year of Hongwu (1371) and three years later, the Maritime Trade Superintendents’ Offices in Quanzhou, Mingzhou and Guangzhou were suspended. In the 14th year (1381), citizens in coastal areas were banned from private contact with foreign countries. In the 27th year (1394), the use of foreign incense and other goods was banned, and trade with foreigners without permission was subject to severe punishment. From the 30th year (1397), it was illegal to sail overseas for business. On the other hand, the government basically maintained an “open-door” policy throughout Phase 2, establishing tally trade with over 30 countries in Asia and Africa. In the first year of his reign (1403), Emperor Yongle announced that China would open to any foreign country to pay tribute and dispatched envoys to spread the word. He expected to boost the economy through foreign trade. The second stage spanned between the 2nd year of Jiajing (1523) and the seventeenth year of Chongzhen (1644; Emperor Chongzhen: 1611–1644, reign: 1627–1644), marked by intensified isolationism. In the 12th year of Zhengde (1517; Emperor Zhengde: 1491–1521, reign: 1505–1521), the Port of Guangzhou

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was closed and all maritime shipping was banned. In the 2nd year of Jiajing, the Maritime Trade Superintendents’ Offices became defunct, ending all maritime transport and foreign trade. Against the backdrop of a rapidly developing commodity economy, the increased isolationism bred smuggling. To combat smuggling along the coastline and alleviate the daunting financial burden, Emperor Longqing (1537–1572, reign: 1566–1572) once restored business with Southeast Asia in 1567 at Yuegang, a southeastern Chinese port in Zhangzhou, Fujian Province. Maritime trade through the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean was permitted, though dealings with Japan remained forbidden. These measures led to the fastest growth in foreign trade in the private sector. At the same time, defeated by neighboring ethnic minorities, the deflated Ming government gradually closed its entire borders to escape the frequent invasion. Even though the Ming dynasty concentrated on banning maritime trade, which did not significantly threaten China’s foreign trade, it, to a certain extent, still affected China’s foreign relations and socioeconomic development. The long list of historic achievements in ancient China inflated the ego of the Ming and Qing rulers, feeding them with arrogance and pretentiousness. Convinced that China was the center of the universe, the emperors boasted it as the “Celestial Empire” and held neighboring nations as “barbarians” in contempt. Perhaps this episode from Matteo Ricci’s life in China will help you gauge the scope of their hubris: the Italian Catholic missionary produced a world map named The Shanhai Yudi Quantu《山海 ( 舆地全图》 , literal: The Complete Terrestrial Map), which was criticized by Chinese governmental officials as poppycock and heresy because China was not depicted at the center. To satisfy their vanity, he then made and presented the China-centered Kunyu Wanguo Quantu 《坤舆万国全图》 ( , literal: A Map of the Myriad Countries of the World) to Emperor Wanli (1563–1620, reign: 1572–1620). The complacency and isolationism reached an extreme in the Qing dynasty, especially during Emperor Qianlong’s reign (1736–1795, b. 1711, d. 1799). Except for few enlightened minds like Emperor Kangxi (1654–1722, reign: 1661–1722), most Qing rulers appeared to be conservative, stubborn, ignorant, arrogant and complacent. Emperors Qianlong and Jiaqing (1760–1820, reign: 1796–1820) are known conservatives. In the 58th year of Qianlong (1793), George III of the United Kingdom (1738–1820, reign: 1760–1820) commissioned Earl George Macartney (1737–1806) to meet the Emperor on the occasion of his 80th birthday in the hope of negotiating preferential trade arrangements and sending resident representatives to “attend” business. In his letter to the Emperor, King George III explained that his intention of dispatching an envoy to China was to “study the products of different countries, share technologies and knowledge of life with disadvantaged regions, and co-exist peacefully with the rest of the world.” He also stated that his kingdom would not seek territorial expansion or monetary gain. The King’s request was categorically rejected by Emperor Qianlong with a simple reason: the etiquette and customs of the two nations differed. Later on, Macartney had two unpleasant encounters with the Emperor at the Rehe Temporary Palace, an imperial mountain resort situated in Chengde, Hebei Province. In these meetings, the Qing government demanded that he perform the kow-tow, the Chinese official protocol to greet the Emperor by kneeling on the ground for three times and then touching one’s head on the ground nine times.

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Deeply humiliated by the imposition, Macartney firmly refused to do so and was reprimanded by Qianlong for being an ignorant, prideful and ungrateful barbarian. In the end, a compromise was reached: the British envoy bent one knee as a formal greeting to the Emperor, who later issued an “edict” to praise King George III for his “eagerness to come into touch with our converting influence” and “respectful spirit of submission.”10 Macartney was stunned by the Chinese people’s indifference and lack of humanitarian and public concern. The mission to China shattered his previous respect and positive impression of this civilization, prompting him to join the pro-war faction against the Qing government. Since the Industrial Revolution was almost completed during Emperor Jiaqing’s reign, scientific and technological advances and innovations flourished in the UK. The Emperor shut his eyes to the reality nevertheless, blindly excluding the West and denouncing all their accomplishments as “seductive yet pointless magic tricks and props.” In the “edict” addressed to the British monarch during the 21st year of his reign (1816), Emperor Jiaqing stated that the Celestial Government did not value items produced in remote countries, and none of the beguiling products from his kingdom was deemed precious or rare. He went even further to accuse the scientific products as incapable to keep warm or fill a hungry stomach, which therefore should be forcefully banned. When receiving a British mission led by Earl William Pitt Amherst (1773–1857), the Emperor thought of him as just another envoy to pay tribute among thousands of nations and insisted he perform the kow-tow. The dispute over protocol eventually led the two sides parted on bad terms. The Qing dynasty immediately evicted Amherst and issued an “edict” to the British monarch, asking him not to bother to dispatch envoys from now on, for such long-distance traveling could only be fruitless. As long as his loyalty remained intact, there would be no need to pay tribute at the Celestial Court each year. These reactions reflect the Qing dynasty’s ideology as a global empire: self-centered, isolationist and complacent. As Karl Marx (1818–1883) once pointed out: the ruler of the Qing dynasty, “regardless of the current situation, is comfortable with the status quo, artificially isolated from the world and therefore tries to deceive [himself] with the illusion of perfection of the heavens.”11 This “world-revolving-around-us” imperial ideology hindered China’s growth, and the country lost its lead in the development of world civilizations. As the number of European visitors to China increased, more reports on the country became available, which led to another round of large-scale dissemination of information since the arrival of European Jesuit missionaries. Contrary to the previously popular “China Fever,” many celebrated Enlightenment thinkers, philosophers and writers now turned to criticize the country, resulting in a substantial plunge of its national image. Meanwhile, more and more merchants, missionaries, envoys, soldiers, philosophers, writers and professional sinologists started to feed all kinds of negative news and theories to the Western world. In 1735, French Jesuit historian Jean-Baptiste Du Halde (1674–1743) published The General History of China. Apart from describing the ancient civilization’s culture and history, he expressed 10 Backhouse 11 Zhi

and Bland (1914, pp. 322–331). Cited in Anon (no date). (no date).

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concerns over its stagnation. However, unlike Du Halde’s relatively polite approach, most authors filled their pages with degradation. For instance, in De l’esprit des lois (1748, English: The Spirit of the Laws), the French philosopher Montesquieu (1689– 1755) considered the then Chinese government as despotic: “China is therefore a despotic state, whose principle is fear… It armed itself with its chains. … Public tranquility, that of the laws of China.”12 According to German Idealist philosopher Georg Hegel (1770–1831), the Chinese people “enjoyed a high prestige in the cultural domain, but no matter how high it was or how many classics they had written, they would not live up to that reputation once you knew them better.”13 As for entire China, “those recurring and lingering things replaced what we call history. China was excluded from the world history.”14 Prejudice, degradation and condemnation toward the Chinese people dominated the vocal and unrelenting critics. English writer Daniel Defoe (c. 1660–1731) stated in his novel Robinson Crusoe (1719): “and therefore I must confess it seemed strange to me when I came home and heard our people say such fine things of the power, riches, glory, magnificence, and trade of the Chinese, because I saw and knew that they were a contemptible herd or crowd of ignorant, sordid slaves, subjected to a government qualified only to rule such a people.”15 In a nutshell, “new theories of China flooded into the Western society under a common theme: the country was a conservative and isolationist empire that was backward and decaying. Its glorious image was irreversibly tainted.”16 It only took the Western world slightly over half a century to abandon their China craze, once irresistible to both the monarch and civilians, and turn to degradation and smears. Their contempt and denunciation toward China climaxed during the Opium Wars. On the eve of the war, George Larpent (1786–1855), Chairman of East India and China Association, already pointed out in his proposal to the British government: “Regardless of the past, it (China) is the weakest country now and can only sustain its reign through systematic lies, preposterous and condescending edicts, and the ignorant public.”17 After the Opium Wars, Western powers pried open China’s longsealed door with their military superiority, and a large number of Westerners flooded into the country. During that period, the majority of the Westerners harbored racial supremacy and arrogance against China. Since then, the Chinese nation was solely labeled as isolated, violent, backward, filthy and inferior, completely irrelevant with the progress of civilization, morality or reasoning. Most missionaries “[described] to their home constituents the faded grandeur of a Chinese civilization sinking in decay, sin, and heathenism.”18 From women with lotus feet, brothels, queue (a male hairstyle of a long plait worn at the back) to opium pipes, etc., these elements composed the Western impression of China. Its national image was transformed from the “Celestial 12 Montesquieu

(1748, pp. 144–172). (1995, pp. 118–120). 14 Hsia (1995, p. 114). 15 Defoe and Hazlitt (1841, p. 78). 16 Wu (2009, p. 23). 17 Xu (2000). 18 Fairbank (1987, p. 19). 13 Hegel

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Empire,” “country with refined manners and etiquette,” “affluent land,” and “civilized nation” to “uncivilized barbarians,” “inferior nation,” “declined/stagnated empire,” and the vulnerable “Sick Man of East Asia.”

2.1.3 The Degradation-Rapport Stage: Red, Frenzied and Miraculous From 1840 onwards, China’s backward, declined, ignorant and “Sick Man of East Asia” image was fixated in the international discourse system dominated by Western powers. Since the establishment of the PRC on October 1st, 1949, the Chinese people and the Chinese nation have stood up. However, ideological disagreement gave rise to two completely opposite interpretations of the country’s image within the Western political and academic circles. On the one hand, the “Yellow Peril” was now replaced by the “Red Peril.” The West threatened and imposed a blockade to China while relentlessly distorting its image in the media. On the other hand, Red China became an excellent model for the political system and moral utopia in Western left-wing thought. As far back as the Anti-Fascist War in the first half of the twentieth century, American journalist Edgar Snow (1905–1972), the first Western journalist permitted to conduct interviews in the Red Area (the CPC-controlled areas), published the Red Star Over China (1937) to document his observations in Yan’an, the CPC’s headquarter in northwest China. He described the Chinese Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (Red Army in short) in detail, presenting the leadership’s resilience and statesmanship as well as the people’s revolutionary zeal and dedication to the world. The Red Army’s main force completed the Long March (1934–1935), a strategic retreat to avoid the pursuit of the Kuomintang (KMT) Army which outnumbered them to a great extent. In the journey, they endured the harassments by both the KMT and local warlords and overcame challenges beyond imagination, such as crossing snow mountain and traversing swamps. Their triumph marked a historical turn in forming the Chinese united front to resist Japanese aggression. Red Star Over China became a worldwide sensation and was translated into many languages. As an important channel for the outside world to understand China, it refreshed the Western view on the country, exciting pro-socialism/communism left-wingers in particular. Lots of righteous Western readers were touched by the Red Army’s bravery and resilience. Snow inspired many Westerners to visit Yan’an. Notable visitors included American journalists Agnes Smedley (1892–1950), Wang Gongda (1909–?), Jack Belden (1910–1989) and Earl Leaf, UK-based New Zealander journalist James Bertram, Austrian journalist Hans Shippe (1897–1941), and Colonel Evans Fordyce Carlson (1896–1947) from the US Marine and the delegation from the International Union of Students. Statistics indicate that around 100 foreigners arrived in 20 groups in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region and the base areas behind enemy lines between

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July 1937 (when the Lugou Bridge Incident took place) and September 1939 (the beginning of the World War II). In 1944, the “Northwest China Visiting Team” consisting of both Chinese and foreign reporters reached Yan’an. Also, in that year, the US Army Observation Group traveled there, signifying the US government’s first official contact with the CPC. From 1935 to 1945, Europe and the US experienced two upsurges in visits to “Red China.” With their own eyes, the Western reporters and governmental officials saw the joy and excitement in the Chinese people, who now gained control of their future. They also witnessed the red revolutionary base areas thriving under the CPC’s leadership. A great number of news articles and reports on Red China were published during this period. For example, after his field trip to the base area, American journalist Theodore Harold White (1915–1986) wrote: “Yan’an is a ‘self-sustaining’ government in the experimental phase.”19 He noted that the CPC vigorously promoted democracy in the base areas because they were completely different from the KMT. To be exact, the CPC’s interests were closely tied to those of the farmers. Warsaw-born Jewish journalist Israel Epstein (1915–2005), American journalist Harrison Forman (1904– 1978) and the UK-based German journalist Gunther Stein recalled their impressions after having audited a joint meeting between the Government and Standing Committee of the Consultative Council of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region: the CPC was practical, vigorous and did not value ambitious empty talks. Regarding the public’s attitude toward the CPC, the farmers considered the CPC members as their own leaders and advocates in every aspect.20 Furthermore, based on their close observation in Yan’an, the US Army Observation Group held that “the CPC leadership was incorruptible, dedicated, determined, confident and fully supported by the local community.”21 In the meantime, publications like Thunder out of China (1946) by Theodore Harold White and China Shakes the World (1949) by Jack Belden received worldwide success. The revolutionary zeal across the red revolutionary base areas was in sharp contrast with the decadence and brutality dominating the KMT-ruled regions. Even some of the US government officials in China, such as General Joseph Stilwell (1883–1946), the US Marine Corps General Officer Evans Fordyce Carlson (1896–1947) and diplomat John Stewart Service (1909–1999), considered the image of Red China quite promising. During the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1931–1945), the CPC dedicated itself to driving out Japanese imperialism and building a new China of freedom and equality. In the process, it received wide acceptance and acclaim and established a positive image both at home and abroad. The Chinese nation has stood up since the establishment of New China on October 1st, 1949. Empowered by the extraordinary sense of liberation, the Chinese people gained momentum so high that it made them feel any goal was attainable. Touched by

19 White

(1988, p. 199). and Jacoby (1988, p. 263). 21 Research Department One of the Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee (1995, p. 487). 20 White

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their determination, many friendly Western writers and news reporters busied themselves with interviews, field trips and writings, disseminating the national image of “Red China” to the entire world. The CPC led the Chinese people to become the true owner of their country and transformed the national image. To be specific, China’s achievements in modernization are impossible to be overlooked: the implementation of the first Five-Year Plan (a socioeconomic development initiative issued for the period between 1953 and 1957), the victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the development of the Daqing Oil Field, and the successful nuclear test, just to name a few. Except for premature attempts of the “Great Leap Forward”22 and the “People’s Commune Movement,”23 China projected a national image as self-reliant, hardworking, energetic and committed to modernization on the whole. However, the momentum and development were disrupted by the “Cultural Revolution.” In 1966, the Central Committee of the CPC issued the “May 16 Notification,” launching the “Cultural Revolution.” During this period, Red Guards paraded around China to “eradicate the Four Olds (customs, cultures, habits, and ideas existing in the pre-Communist China),” causing severe damages. The country was purged in the “Rea Sea.” Apart from those so-called landlords, rich farmers, anti-revolutionists, “bad-influencers” and right-wingers, some senior members of the CPC and Great Eminent Officials were denounced as “capitalist roaders” and fell victims to the Red Guards, resulting in many bloody incidents. The unbearable humiliation drove some prominent figures to self-harm and even suicide. The frenzy and brutality exhibited in this period were widespread through foreign media, and China was portrayed as “frenzied” due to series of far-left incidents, such as the Red Guards setting fire on the British Office in Beijing. The Western world saw the Red Guards as callous and ignorant rioters with lack of humanity, whose behaviors significantly damaged China’s image in the international community. Therefore, the “Cultural Revolution” is named among the worst disasters in human history in Western culture. Behind this lasting and destructive hysteria lies the irrational worship toward one individual among almost one billion people. The cost is immeasurable as age-old cultural legacies were destroyed and millions of lives perished. After the “Revolution,” the enormous nation was left with nothing but economic and cultural barrenness. Thus, many Westerners began to reflect on how they had been “deceived” by the “illusion of China” and left-wing thoughts, and resolved to unveil the “truth of China.” Their conviction grew stronger: the real China was not a free or equal democracy as they had once envisioned, but rather shocking and confusing. After the “Cultural Revolution,” China had to restart everything from scratch and embarked on a new expedition. The country and the Western world entered a 22 Also known as Da Yue Jin (大跃进), a nationwide campaign launched by the CPC from 1958 to the

early 1960s in order to rapidly improve the economy through industrialization and collectivization. This eventually led to a serious economic imbalance due to the misconception of “will is might” while overlooking practical economic capacities. 23 Also known as the Renmin Gongshe Movement (人民公社运动), the promotion of establishing large collective units in rural areas since 1958, where people carried out farming, production and logistic activities as a group. This collectivism ended up diminishing individual motivation and damaging rural productivity.

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honeymoon period from the beginning of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s, during which its national image was glorified, idealized and romanticized. In February 1972, the US President Richard Nixon visited China and the two nations issued the Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China. Since then, China began to open to the outside world. President Nixon’s visit changed not only the world dynamics in the midst of the Cold War but also the American and even the Western perceptions of China, whose national image gradually transitioned from “enemy” to “ally.” In this period, China’s images constructed by the US media were mostly positive. The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee took place in December 1978. Its convocation marked a new chapter in Chinese history. At the Third Plenary Session, the CPC Central Committee held that in accordance with both domestic and international situations, the nationwide campaign of exposure and criticism against Lin Biao (1907–1971) and the “Gang of Four”24 should be terminated with swift determination. By prioritizing socialist modernization instead, the CPC and the Chinese people should strive to realize the “Four Modernizations,” i.e., the modernizations in industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology. Following the discussions on the standards of truth, the feasibility of reform and opening-up, the current world situation and Chinese diplomacy, the CPC Central Committee announced the implementation of the “Reform and Opening-Up” policy and vowed to accelerate agricultural development, etc. The Session set the right path for China, marking the beginning of the Chinese economic reform and a turning point for the CPC since New China’s inauguration. In short, China entered a new era featuring reform, opening-up and socialist modernization. From the 1980s onwards, the country enjoyed democracy, stability and economic growth. As the Reform and Opening-Up policy took effect, China broke free from its old mindset of forming foreign relations based on ideological agreement and became more open to the West. In response, the foreign media also changed their tone: Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997), the then leader of China, appeared on the cover of Time magazine in 1978 and 1985. In particular, Deng Xiaoping was featured as the “Person of the Year” in its 1985 special issue. The news magazine also devoted 28 pages to meticulously documenting the profound changes of China since its reform and opening-up. From January 28th to February 5th, 1979, the then Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited the US on the invitation of President Jimmy Carter (1924–, in office: 1977– 1981). Already in his mid-70s, Deng Xiaoping undertook more than 80 engagements in his 8-day official visit, which was later dubbed as the “Deng Whirlwind” by the US media. During Deng Xiaoping’s tour, what struck the Americans most was definitely the moment when he put on a cowboy hat while watching a rodeo show in Simonton, Texas. Millions of American audiences caught this “when in the States, do as the Americans do” moment on TV, a reflection of Deng Xiaoping’s respect to the American culture and friendliness toward the Americans. A female audience later 24 “四人帮”

refers to the group behind the persecution of thousands of Party members during the “Cultural Revolution,” led by Jiang Qing, Chairman Mao Zedong’s widow. The other members are Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao.

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commented that Khrushchev would have not done that. Although the rodeo center is now closed following the owner’s demise, the image of Deng Xiaoping in a cowboy hat waving at the American public in goodwill and confidence has already been eternally etched into the history of China–US relations. On another occasion, when 200 elementary students finished singing “I Love Beijing Tiananmen” in Chinese, Deng Xiaoping and his wife hugged and kissed them affectionately. On that night, President Carter wrote in his journal: “Deng Xiaoping was sincere. He kissed many children, and our journalists reported that a number of viewers were even brought to tears by this touching moment. One of my senators was resolutely against normalizing the US–China relations, however, he admitted he was wrong after this event. There is no way for him to call for a vote against our children singing in Chinese. Deng Xiaoping and his wife seemed to be genuinely fond of the people, and the audiences—both on site and in front of the TV—responded to him (tentative translation).” During the 8 short days, Deng Xiaoping demonstrated his extraordinary diplomatic wisdom and pro-people image, conveying China’s commitment to reform and opening-up, readiness to learn from the West, and confidence in modernization. During this period, Westerners generally praised China for its economic reform, contending successful reform and opening-up would influence China’s future profoundly. Some even suggested the reform and opening-up of China was an important chapter in world history. Entering the 1990s, China continued to speed up its economic reform and achieved domestic stability, continued rapid economic growth, breakthroughs in economic system reform, and improvements in comprehensive national power, living standards and all social undertakings. Impressed by its rapid development in the economy and comprehensive national power, the world now saw China in a new light. As the economic exchanges between China and other countries steadily deepened, the international community pictured China as increasingly developed, open and integrated into the world. At the end of the twentieth century, an article titled The Great Nation in the Eyes of the World was published on the Peruvian newspaper El Comercio. It pointed out that the US spent 200 years developing into an economy commensurate with present-day China, yet it only took China 25 years to reach there. The growth of China was incredible.25 Economic development is one of the Westerners’ most interesting aspects of China, and the “China Miracle” defined its national image in the 1990s.

2.2 The Perceptual Barriers to the National Image of Contemporary China In its early days, New China once overestimated its current capabilities and potential for development. This misperception seriously hindered its process of modernization and left the international community with a dictatorial image of “Red China.” Since 25 Guan

(1999, p. 411).

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the economic reform, especially in the twenty-first century, China has made remarkable achievements and received worldwide attention. However, owing to the country’s existing social problems and the prejudice and stereotyping rooted in Western history, the Western attitude toward China changes among acclaim, “demonizing” and “badmouthing” from now and then. This further complicates China’s national image in the West, breeding both overt and covert mixed impressions. In fact, divided perceptions have always been present within Western culture, creating barriers to construct China’s national image.

2.2.1 The National Image of Contemporary China in a Negative Light Around New China’s inauguration, the CPC proposed three diplomatic strategies in the light of China’s historical and present situation: “Starting Anew,” “Putting the House In Order Before Inviting Guests” and “Leaning to One Side.” In 1950, China and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, forging an international united front against “American Imperialism” and American allies as well as clearly positioning New China’s “image in the international community.” In early December 1948, the CPC Central Committee was informed about an American journalist who claimed to be in close contact with George Marshall (1880–1959), the US special envoy to China. He leaked the US government’s conditions to recognize the New China government to a CPC representative: (1) there must be opposition parties deemed acceptable by the US within the new government, and (2) allow the US to set up military bases in Shanghai and Qingdao. The proposal met the CPC leader Mao Zedong’s (1893–1976) strong opposition and since then, thwarting such “political arrangements” postulated by the US became a pressing issue for the CPC Central Committee. After the liberation of Nanjing, the CPC extended an invitation to Peking (present-day Beijing) for John Leighton Stuart (1876–1962), the then US ambassador to China, but he insisted the CPC accept the US’s terms, including not to carry out “communism,” accepting “democrats and liberals” in the new government, and no alliance with the Soviet Union. In addition to forbidding Stuart to travel to Peking, President Harry Truman (1884–1972, in office: 1945–1953) stated that the US would not work with a communist government. In response to the intervention and arrogance of the US, the CPC leadership announced that they did not harbor even the slightest delusion to change the policies of the Imperialistic US. Consequently, instead of rushing into advancing diplomatic ties with Western countries, the CPC decided to “start anew” and “put the house in order before inviting guests.”26 The well-known “Leaning to One Side” policy was initially proposed in the CPC leader Mao Zedong’s On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship published on June 30th, 1949: “Externally, unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world 26 Hu

(1994, pp. 538–539).

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which treat us as equals and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People’s Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front. … The forty years’ experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years’ experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.”27 On August 5, 1949, the US government issued a white paper entitled United States Relations with China. The document was immediately greeted with fierce criticism from the leadership of the CPC Central Committee and thus began the confrontation between China and the US.28 As a result of “leaning to one side,” New China cut diplomatic ties with nearly all Western powers, and the business of Western agencies and companies in China was almost entirely suspended. On the contrary, China’s exchanges with the Soviet Union flourished, with Soviet people pouring into the country and vice versa. The two nations also forged a strong economic and military alliance. Historically speaking, New China adopted the foreign policy of “leaning to one side” amid complicated circumstances, with one of the critical factors being the Cold War since the “Iron Curtain” speech in 1946. As the rivalry between the US-led Western Bloc and the Soviet Union-led Eastern Bloc took shape, New China with its “leaning to one side” image soon gained recognition from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in East Europe. Their generous financial aid and technological support helped the government of the newly founded PRC to assert itself quickly.29 Later on, China’s “Soviet approach” turned out to have an enduring impact on its quest for socialism. In the meantime, the country was committed to supporting the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America to fight for their national integrity as well as proletarian revolution campaigns around the world. It did not tolerate any form of imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism, earning the respect and support of most Asian, African and Latin American countries. These allowed China to project itself as an Asian socialist power, the most dependable friend and the most loyal supporter of the third world countries, which facilitated the implementation of its international strategies. In particular, with the support from Asian, African and Latin American countries, the People’s Republic of China was reinstated as the legitimate representative to the United Nations in the 1971 UN Assembly. Chairman Mao Zedong once commented that we were carried into the United Nations by our poor friends from Asia and Africa. Nowadays, most Chinese scholars consider the 27 Mao

Zedong (1949). (2002). 29 In the 1950s, the Soviet Union was China’s largest trading partner. In 1950, the China-Soviet trade accounted for 30% of China’s foreign trade. The percentage rose to 56.3% in 1953 and 61.9% in 1955. As of 1956, China-Soviet trading volume grew 6.5 times larger than that of 1950. Please see Pang (2003, p. 487). 28 Niu

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“Leaning to One Side” a rational decision based on the domestic and international environment. The diplomatic strategy’s advantages are manifold: in the political domain, it helped New China break free from the imperial powers’ boycott, develop foreign relations and gain international recognition. The establishment of New China invigorated the quest to socialism, world peace and democracy. In the economic domain, “Leaning to One Side” helped China secure aid and support to revive its economy after the war. In the military domain, it attracted backup for China to thwart the siege of the US and other Western countries, allowing the country to maintain its sovereignty and integrity and elevate its international standing. However, there are also downsides: for one thing, to maintain its alliance with the Soviet Union, China had to unwillingly compromise some of its state interests. For another, it hindered the development of China’s economic relations with the West.30 From 1949 to 1972, China’s strategies for national image construction paid off, but it came at a great cost. In its competition for global influence with the Soviet Union, the US adopted the strategy of containment against socialist countries and “intervened any communist campaign or domestic revolution that was suspected to be of a communist nature around the world.”31 It then imposed boycott, blockade and sanctions against China and supported anti-China/communism organizations to contain its development. In return, China employed counter-containment measures. As a result, the China–US relations sank to the lowest point. During this dark period, China’s national image was defamed by the West to the greatest extent: against the backdrop of the Cold War binary opposition, New China and the entire Western World, the US in particular, spent decades in isolation and hostility. To add insult to injury, the country’s image was further distorted in events like the Korean War (1950– 1953), the Vietnam War (1955–1975), the First (1949–1950) and Second (1954– 1955) Taiwan Strait Crises and the “Cultural Revolution.” Through Western eyes, especially the American media, the “Communist China” was obscure, enigmatic, gloomy, depressing, confused, untrustworthy and filled with uncertainties. It was the “Red Terror” promoting communist “expansion,” “revolution export,” and nuclear threat and proliferation, the “totalistic Red Political Power,” the “Fortress of Fascism,” and “Hell on Earth.” In short, China became the Soviet Union’s satellite state and means to world dominance. Due to propaganda and public opinion control, “[many] Americans perceived China as an aggressive and irrational power whose support for revolutionary movements around the world made it an even more dangerous adversary than the Soviet Union.”32 During this period, the national image of China was completely negative, even worse than the condemned, backward and ignorant “Sick Man of East Asia.” The Western impression on China has plunged to the bottom. Meanwhile, the worldwide communication of China’s national image suffered from the country’s long exclusion from major international organizations, such as the United Nations. Besides, as left-wing opinions kept fermenting at home and 30 Wang

and Cai (2008, pp. 374–375). (1984, p. 48). 32 Harding (1992, p. 3). 31 Bedts

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“revolution export” became increasingly prominent in China’s foreign policies and publicity, both developed and developing countries grew more skeptical about it. Their growing doubt created a barrier for China to project a more acceptable image. Furthermore, the Sino–Soviet relations began to deteriorate since the late 1950s as a result of divergent ideologies, conflicts in state interests and disagreement in foreign strategies. Since his assumption of office, Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971, in office: 1953–1964) utterly repudiated the accomplishments of socialist revolution and development along with the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CPC contended we should remain committed to the cause of the international communist movement, and CPSU’s chauvinism, self-centralism and other wrong views were to be exposed and denounced. The CPSU, on the other hand, often took their opponents by surprise. To be specific, they pressed other countries to accept their own plans and policies by exploiting their numerical majority and prestige in the international communist community. In June 1960, delegations representing communist and workers parties of 51 countries convened in Bucharest, Romania to attend the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers Party. Khrushchev seized the opportunity to orchestrate the Conference of the World Communist and Workers’ Parties from June 24 to 26 (the 1960 Bucharest Conference in short). Without prior notice, the CPSU accused the CPC of being “crazy,” “planning to launch a war” and acting as “a pure nationalist” in tackling the China–Indian border dispute. More accusations ensued as Khrushchev’s followers criticized the CPC for “sectarianism,” “left opportunism” and “fake revolutionary,” etc. The Soviet Union and its allies also intended to defeat China with their so-called majority status. Following the instructions of the Central Committee, the CPC delegation responded that Khrushchev’s actions had set a repugnant precedent in the international communist movement. Once his attempt at the 1960 Bucharest Conference failed, Khrushchev resorted to other measures to ratchet up pressure on China, e.g., tearing up the agreement, withdrawing experts stationed in China, instigating border dispute and creating ethnic rifts in China. The sharp deterioration of Sino–Soviet relations, especially with the Soviet Union’s groundless accusations against China and the CPC, damaged China’s national image in many socialist countries.

2.2.2 The National Image of Contemporary China in a Positive Light Toward the end of the 1960s, the rifts within the Eastern and Western Blocs became glaringly evident, weakening the bipolar power distribution during the Cold War. Meanwhile, a multitiered and diversified global power structure began to surface. From strategic allies to sworn enemies, the Sino–Soviet split encouraged the Western world to deconstruct its concepts on China, which were previously constructed on subjective projections, especially in the US. As the US realized that treating China as an adversary would no longer act in its best interests, China also sought to improve

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its strategic environment to avoid being caught between two fires. In this period, both countries adjusted their own foreign strategies and resumed contact after a “suspension” of almost two decades. This subsequently eased the tension between China and the Western world. In January 1969, Republican Richard Nixon took the oath of office as the 37th President of the United States, whose prospects had never been this grim since the end of World War II in 1945. Troubled by the heavy burden in Vietnam and deepening political, economic and social crises at home, the US gradually lost its advantages in the US–Soviet rivalry and experienced a continued decline in its global dominance. In February 1971, President Nixon presented a report on the US foreign policy for the 1970s to the Congress, in which he stated that an era had ended, so did the order of the postwar international relations. The strategic conditions that had shaped the US foreign policy and practices since 1945 were gone, too. Therefore, the Administration must reshape its policy.33 In his address in Kansas City in June, he named five “great power centers” in the world today, i.e., the US, the Soviet Union, West Europe, China and Japan. To accommodate the new international system and turn the US– Soviet rivalry around, President Nixon decided to approach China and expressed his intention to improve the bilateral relations on different occasions. A series of goodwill gestures were extended afterward: on July 21, 1969, the US announced to ease restrictions on exchanges and trade with China and allow six types of US citizens to visit there, including journalists and members of congress. In his trip to Asia and Europe between July and August, President Nixon repeatedly expressed disapproval of creating an “Asian collective security system” proposed by the Soviet Union. “He stressed that the United States would not be a party to any arrangements to isolate China.”34 He also conveyed the willingness to resume harmonious relations with China through the leaders of Pakistan and Romania. Furthermore, based on the “Nixon Doctrine,” the US withdrew its forces from Vietnam to allow “Vietnamization,” thus signaling its strategic shift in Asia. These signs of reconciliation were reciprocated by China without delay. As the Sino–Soviet relations worsened, especially after the Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island) border dispute, the Chinese government perceived the Soviet Union as a direct threat to its national security. Therefore, it also needed to adjust its long-standing confrontational policy toward the US as a means to counter the Soviet Union. “The small ball pushing the Big Ball forward” marked a crucial turning point for the China–US relations. On April 6th, 1971, as the 31st World Table Tennis (Pingpong) Championships were about to conclude, Chairman Mao Zedong decided to invite the US table tennis team to visit China. As the old Chinese proverb goes, “a tossed stone arouses thousand overlapping ripples.” The news received considerable attention in the two countries as well as the rest of the world. Upon hearing the invitation, both President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (1923–) were delightedly surprised and approved the visit without hesitation. The “ping-pong diplomacy” signified the beginning of the people-to-people exchanges 33 Zi

(1994, p. 603). (2011).

34 Kissinger

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between the two countries, paving the way for a new phase in the China–US relations. Following the momentum and in preparation for his state visit, President Nixon sent Kissinger as a special Presidential envoy on a secret trip to Beijing from July 9 to 11, 1971. On his day of arrival, Kissinger met the then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) who was in charge of foreign policy. On July 15, China and the US announced President Nixon’s impending visit to China, sending shock waves across the world. President Nixon’s week-long official visit to China took place from February 21 to 28, 1972. Among his entourage were the then Secretary of State William Pierce Rogers and Kissinger. When President Nixon landed in Beijing at 11:30 a.m. on February 21, he was greeted by Premier Zhou Enlai and an applauding crowd. President Nixon then extended his hand to Premier Zhou. As the President recalled afterward: “When our hands met, one era ended and another began.”35 Later in the afternoon, Chairman Mao Zedong met President Nixon in his study. After discussions and negotiations of 6 days, the two parties issued the Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (also known as the Shanghai Communiqué), which stands for a major breakthrough in the history of China–US relations. The rapprochement between the two countries had a profound impact on international relations and the worldwide promotion of peace and stability, particularly in Asia. At the banquet on the eve of his departure, President Nixon regarded the 7 days as “the week that changed the world.” Since then, China–US economic and cultural exchanges flourished. Following the release of the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America, China and the US forged diplomatic ties on January 1, 1979, ending the mutual hostility and beginning a new chapter. It was of pivotal importance for global stability and maintaining peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite that China had never been an official ally of the US or any other major Western country, it enjoyed a status that none of the American allies could measure up. Soon after the China–US diplomatic ties were established, the then Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping embarked on an ice-breaking visit to the US from January 28 to February 5, 1979 on the invitation of President Carter. Given that Deng Xiaoping was the first Chinese leader to ever visit the country, the US government attached great importance to designing his itinerary. During his visit, Deng Xiaoping and President Carter exchanged views on international relations, Taiwan, and the China– US relations and signed agreements regarding cooperation in the fields of science and technology and culture. His visit also changed the American general public’s impression of Communist China, which was once thought as the “Red Terror.” His sincerity, open-mindedness and lack of pretension were particularly well received by Americans, thus increasing China’s popularity for the first time since 1949. Moreover, Deng Xiaoping conveyed China’s unyielding determination to reform and openingup, which improved the Western acceptability of China’s image to a record high. From

35 Delzer

(2013).

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then on, the national image of China in most Western countries became increasingly agreeable and acceptable. As the reform and opening-up deepened from the 1970s to the 1980s, China was able to break free from the old mindset of establishing relations based on the ideological stand. Consequently, the political relations between China and Western countries became increasingly favorable, and economic, cultural and educational exchanges and cooperation were also strengthened. Many Western countries and international organizations sought to establish relations with China during this period. In the first two decades since its inauguration (1949–1970), the PRC only managed to establish ambassadorial-level relations with six countries in Western Europe36 (Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Finland, Norway and France) and chargé-level relations with the UK and the Netherlands. As China and the US worked to normalize their relations in the 1970s, the American allies gradually overcame their doubts and formed diplomatic ties with China. On November 6, 1970, China and Italy established diplomatic relations, making Italy the first country to do so in Western Europe. Since then, China also formed ambassadorial-level relations with Austria, Belgium, Iceland, Malta, the UK, the Netherlands, Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. On August 12, 1978, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China was signed by the foreign ministers of both countries. The establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Japan laid a foundation for steady and friendly cooperation across a spectrum of areas in the long run. It also played a positive role in reducing the tension in Asia and promoting world peace. By the end of the 1970s, China had formed ambassadorial-level relations with all the Western European countries except Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and the Vatican City. Meanwhile, the country and Western Europe had made significant progress in exchanges and cooperation across a wide array of domains, such as economy and trade, finance, science and technology, culture and shipping. In particular, the Federal Republic of Germany became China’s largest trading partner in Western Europe, with the two countries’ combined value of imports and exports amounting to 2.07 billion US dollars in 1983. In July 1979, China and the European Community initialed a five-year contract on the textile trade. From 1980, China was granted preferential access to the European market under the Generalized System of Preferences. In conclusion, the consolidation of diplomatic ties paved the way for mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Western Europe. Apart from strengthening its connection with Western Europe, China also managed to amend its relations with the Soviet Union, East Europe, and Yugoslavia and build a stronger bond with the third world. As of 1980, China had formed diplomatic relations with 124 countries across five continents. Against the backdrop of a weakening East–West confrontation, the rapprochement between China and the US served as a profound turning point in China’s relations with the Western world, marking the transitions from isolation to contact and from confrontation to cooperation. The Western society, especially the business community, was drawn to China’s 36 In

this book, the term refers to North, West and South Europe.

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vast market. Meanwhile, “hope” rekindled in those, Americans in particular, who longed for “preaching about” the Western values to Chinese people. They tried to re-examine this unfamiliar land in the East with a more open attitude and refreshed amazement. For many Westerners, a modern conundrum was suddenly solved, and a country that had long been demonized was cast in a new positive light. As China and the Western world re-identified themselves as allies, China’s national image in the West turned favorable again: transforming from the wanderer, the marginalized, the challenger, the revolutionary or the saboteur to the supporter with reservations, the constructive participant, the well-adjusted, the reformer and the upholder in the international order. It was widely acknowledged that China was pursuing economic growth with dignity and was bent on stepping away from the dogmatism in the past three decades. According to an American survey, 71% Americans’ impression of China was positive in 1985, and their average thermometer rating for China reached 53 degrees in 1986.37 Such “honeymoon” period lasted into the late 1980s, during which “China, cut off from the world for long, was envisioned by Westerners as their Shangri-La. It was depicted as a humble, serene, harmonious and blissful nation by the Western media and received high praise for some of its ‘great’ achievements in education, housing, employment, administrative management and social welfare. The hope of China being a ‘good student’ resurfaced in the West, especially in the US: ‘China could be the first communist country to abandon Marxism and embrace capitalism, maybe even carrying out a democratic reform.’ It could be a ‘role model’ for other socialist countries. Hence, the entire Western world welcomed China’s transition from the ‘rebel’ (‘a revisionist/revolutionary state’) to the ‘participant’ in the international system and the beholder of existing international order (‘a status quo state’).”38

2.2.3 Trend of Contemporary China’s National Image While China was adjusting its role in international relations and sent its economy soaring, new issues, disagreements and even conflicts ensued. Since huge mutual interests and fundamental disagreements and conflicts coexist between China and the US (or the Western world in general), the development of China–US and China– West relations is filled with twists and turns, alternating between continuation and interruption and between cooperation and confrontation. As a result, China’s national image also fluctuates accordingly. Toward the end of the 1980s, the Chinese people’s mind was significantly emancipated after a decade-long reform and opening-up. In the meantime, Western countries’ persistent peaceful revolution against China since the Cold War culminated in the “political incident” in 1989. Disillusioned by the Chinese government’s ability to subside the “incident,” bitterly disappointed Western countries abandoned their wish 37 Rielly 38 Li

(1995). (2011a, pp. 81–82).

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to “convert China” and launched smear campaigns against it instead. In particular, Western countries led by the US announced to impose sanctions against China on the ground of its domestic affairs. China firmly opposed such acts and introduced corresponding countermeasures, soon after which drastic changes took place in East Europe and the Soviet Union disintegrated, ending the Cold War. At that time, the Western world generally maintained the “China retrogression theory” (i.e., China had retrogressed to the state prior to the reform and opening-up) and the “China worthless theory” (i.e., alliance with China had lost its strategic significance in containing the Soviet Union), whereas the Chinese leaders held that a “Cold War mindset” still dictated the Western attitude toward China. Consequently, China and the West considered each other the greatest potential enemy in the post-Cold War era, which led China’s national image to deteriorate again. Both parties’ previous “idealized” and “romanticized” perceptions toward each other suffered a major setback. For a brief moment in the 1990s, some American scholars and politicians cast a positive light on China’s reform and opening-up and progressive integration into the international community. However, driven by the inertial thinking and lingering apprehension from the Cold War, they soon painted China as a “threat” by proposing different versions of the “China threat theory” through various channels. It is believed that the propaganda was initiated by Murai Tomohide, an associate professor at the National Defense Academy of Japan. In his article On Potential Threat of China published in Japanese magazine Shokun! (literal: Gentlemen!) in 1990, Tomohide claimed China was a potential enemy in terms of national power. Since then, the “China threat theory” has largely gone through four stages of development. The first wide dissemination of the “China threat theory” took place between 1992 and 1993. To begin with, an article entitled Awakening Dragon: The Real Danger in Asia is Coming from China by American scholar Ross H. Munro was published in Policy Review (Fall 1992 issue), a US conservative journal created by The Heritage Foundation. Munro was convinced that China would be the greatest potential enemy to the US after the Cold War, whose words instantly sent shock waves across all circles of life.39 Next, celebrated Professor Samuel Huntington (1927–2008) at Harvard University published The Clash of Civilizations in the 1993 summer issue of the Foreign Affairs. Laying a heavy emphasis on ideology, Professor Huntington asserted that Confucianism and Islam were Western civilization’s natural antagonists. The second surge in the “China threat theory” happened between 1995 and 1996. In December 1995, Claremont Institute (USA) and Taiwan Institute of International Relations (tentative translation) co-hosted a symposium under the theme “China Threat: Theory or Reality” in Los Angeles. Dozens of delegates representing the US and East Asian political, academic and military spheres attended the event. In the 39 From then on, multiple versions of the “China threat theory” were formed in the US, such as the “threat of China’s population to global food supply” discussed in Who Will Feed China?: Wake-Up Call for a Small Planet (1994) by Lester Russel Brown (1934–), the “military,” “environmental” and “energy threats” proposed by the US Department of Defense, and “civilization threat” (Chinese and Islamic civilizations work together to oppose Western civilization) in The Clash of Civilizations (1993) by Samuel Huntington, etc. See: Li (2011a, pp. 81–82).

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beginning of 1996, politicians and scholars from the US, the UK, Germany, Italy and Russia convened in Paris for an international conference on issues regarding war and peace in the twenty-first century. During the conference, Huntington called for joined efforts of Western nations to combat the challenges from Islamic and Chinese civilizations. Afterwards, mainstream Western media voiced concerns over “China threats:” China’s economic development would increase global oil price; its industry would damage world environment; its enormous import of grain would threaten global supply; “China posed a threat to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait;” and “Hong Kong’s imminent return indicated the threat of authoritarianism to a free and democratic world,” etc. According to China’s Missile Threat published in the Wall Street Journal on December 30, 1996, China’s missile development had already become a threat to the US and its allies, thus steering the “China military threat theory.” The third surge in the “China threat theory” was in 1997. In its annual strategic survey released in April, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (abbr. IISS, London, England) claimed that plenty of evidence had shown that China was about to take resolute actions. On April 14, an article in USA Today pointed out that with Hong Kong and Macau’s imminent return and the reunification of both sides of the Taiwan Straits in the future, China’s influence would increase exponentially. If not contained, its economic and military dominance would span from the Indian Ocean to the Korean Peninsula within less than 10 years.40 The fourth surge in the “China threat theory” took place between 1998 and 1999. On August 13, 1998, the Chicago Tribune published a reader’s letter to the editor, who held that “Red China’s military threat [was] no myth, …[and] the United States’ watchdog mentality and China’s inferior military strength [had] served to ensure that China [acted] as a ‘normal power’” for the moment.41 In November, the US mainstream media including The Washington Times, The Washington Post, The New York Times, the International Herald Tribune and the Newsweek International all clued in the China threat, e.g., “the Sino-Russian partnership of strategic coordination aimed at countering the US influence,” “China was about to test new intercontinental ballistic missile,” and “China was challenging the US in the Pacific Ocean.” On May 25, 1999, the United States House of Representatives released the famous Cox Report on China’s so-called “theft” of US nuclear technology. The Report along with the case of Wen Ho Lee (李文和, 1939–),42 the 1996 United States campaign finance controversy,43 and the publication of Year of the Rat: How Bill Clinton Compromised US Security for Chinese Cash (1998) and Rising: Communist China’s

40 Liu

(2002, p. 32). (1998). 42 Lee is a Chinese American scientist born in Taiwan. He was accused of stealing secrets about the US nuclear arsenal for the PRC in December, 1999, but 58 out of 59 charges were eventually dropped except improper handling of restricted data. 43 The claim that the Chinese government allegedly funded President Bill Clinton’s 1996 re-election campaign to influence the US domestic politics. 41 Huang

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Military Threat to America (2002) by Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II led to the culmination of the “China threat theory.” The “China threat theory” was invented to consolidate major Western countries’ hegemonism and power politics in the first place, which was heavily promoted by their mainstream media. As more and more Westerners fell under the spell of relentless propaganda, they became advocates of the “theory,” encouraging its dissemination even further. In their eyes, China’s development posed a global threat and was no longer good news for people around the world. Hence, the national image of China became a “terrifying dragon” that threatened the Western world. Soon afterwards, the “China collapse theory” came into view. In The Coming Collapse of China published at the end of July 2001, Chinese American lawyer Gordon Guthrie Chang (章家敦, 1951–) stated that contrary to the popular opinion that the twenty-first century was China’s time to shine, the country was actually collapsing. He argued that China’s economic boom was an illusion and the bad debts of the Big Four state-owned banks44 were too high to be sustained. Furthermore, China would experience a trade deficit under the impact of the WTO while its foreign investment would give into a sluggish global economy. Chang asserted that the current Chinese political and economic systems could only last for another 5 years at most, and the declining Chinese economy would begin to collapse before the 2008 Beijing Olympics rather than after. Joe Studwell, a business commentator specializing in the Chinese economy and founder of the China Economic Quarterly, was in the same vein. In his book The China Dream: The Quest for the Greatest Untapped Market on Earth (January 2002), Studwell compared the Chinese economy to a building on sands and a bottomless pit fraught with forgery. Following his prediction of a looming political and economic crisis, he warned Western investors not to risk their fortune in China. On April 1, Time magazine published an article titled Why does China Falsify its Accounts? (tentative translation) stating that China had already drowned in inflated data and to a certain extent; its reputation as an economic power was created on a purely fictional ground. During the first half of 2010, voices like “China is heading toward an economic cliff-edge” started to emerge in Western media. Months later, Western economic authorities Marc Faber (1946–), Kenneth Rogoff (1953–) and James Chanos (1957–) all criticized the “weaknesses” of the Chinese economy, making the dated “news” the headlines again. Whenever important political events took place in China, the “China collapse theory” would often resurface. For example, soon after the Chinese government released the annual economic statistics on the eve of the “Two Sessions”45 in 2014, Western media orchestrated smears against its economic performance, calling it experiencing a hard landing with local governmental debt out of control. Quoting a survey conducted by Merrill Lynch, the New York Times held that the substantial slowdown in China’s economic growth had already become the biggest worry of investors around the globe. Nevertheless, not 44 The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, and the Agricultural Bank of China. 45 两会, Lianghui, i.e., the annual plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

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only did its economy not collapse but also China became the world’s second largest economy in 2011 and has grown steadily ever since. This is no doubt the best defense in the face of those “China collapse theory” believers. Entering the new millennium, the China–US relations have gradually gotten back on the track of steady development. To discuss issues of mutual concern and confront global challenges together, the heads of state have met on different occasions and made presidential phone calls on a regular basis. In the following years, China became more active in participating in international affairs and sped up its integration into the international community. In particular, it assumed an increasingly important role in setting up international rules and maintaining the international economic system. Its effort to overcome the Asian Financial Crisis and the North Korea Nuclear Crisis received worldwide praise. In 2007, China’s contribution to global economic growth exceeded the US for the first time, signifying that China had become the new “locomotive of the world economy” and “global economic engine.” Meanwhile, the country has shown initiative in taking on corresponding international responsibilities and fulfilling international obligations: it was actively engaged in the UN peacekeeping missions, international trade negotiations, disaster relief as well as reducing the impact of global financial crisis and climate change. It was during this period that “theories” centering on “China’s responsibility/contribution” began to surface in the Western world. The “China’s responsibility theory” was proposed by the 74th US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Merritt “Hank” Paulson Jr. (1946–) toward the end of his tenure in January 2009. Paulson argued that the 2008 financial crisis was partially attributable to emerging market economies such as China, whose high saving rates led to global imbalances while abundant capital drove American investors to purchase high-risk assets. Inch by inch, “China’s responsibility theory” and “China’s contribution theory” were accepted by major players in the international system. As China actively participated in international affairs and global governance and assumed increasingly important responsibilities, the international community’s trust in a rising China and the “Chinese model to modernization” grew. Thus, its image as “a great responsible nation” and “a peacefully rising great power” began to take shape. In 2011, China leapfrogged Japan to become the world’s second largest economy, attracting great attention from the international community. From November to December 2014, the Center for International Communication Studies under the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, Millward Brown and Lightspeed GMI conducted third China’s national image global survey. Researchers collected the attitudes and opinions of citizens from nine countries of various geographical regions and levels of development, including developed countries like the UK (Europe), the US (North America), Australia (Oceania) and Japan (Asia) and developing countries like China and India (Asia), South Africa (Africa), Brazil (South America) and Russia (Europe). A total sample of 4500 was drawn, with 500 from each country. The survey reveals the following findings: (1) “China’s image [was]

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steadily improving internationally,”46 which was more acceptable than in 2013. (2) 46% of overseas respondents agreed that China had “rapid economic growth with its people enjoying relatively high living standards”—the most accepted description of China’s overall image. However, 45% of them also noted the relevantly big gap between the rich and the poor. (3) Overseas respondents were optimistic about China’s future development, with 37% believing that “China’s economy will keep growing at a rapid rate.” (4) “Regarding the challenges to China’s future development, ‘addressing domestic corruption, social injustice and other issues’ was selected as the biggest one by the respondents of developed countries (35%), followed by ‘improving the living standards of the Chinese people’ (26%). The respondents in developing countries regarded ‘improving the living standards of the Chinese people’ (29%) and ‘maintaining rapid growth of the economy’ (29%) as the major problems for China’s future development. [(5) The President of the PRC] Xi Jinping [was] the fourth best-known among the leaders of the nine countries.”47 (6) “Overseas respondents [had] a relatively high awareness and recognition of China’s development philosophy and international initiatives. They [were] most familiar with concepts such as ‘a new model of major-country relationship between China and the US’ and ‘lawbased governance.’ The ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ and ‘neighborhood diplomacy featuring amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness’ are the most supported by overseas respondents. (7) China’s economic influence is recognized by the global community. Overall, overseas respondents agreed that ‘China’s economic growth promotes global economic development,’ ‘my country benefits from China’s economic growth’ and ‘China is willing to cooperate with my country in economy and trade, and share the fruits of China’s economic development.’ (8) Developed and developing countries have different understandings of China’s development path and model. In developed countries, 31% of the respondents called [it] ‘a model of centralization led by the Communist Party of China,’ and 23% thought that ‘the basis is letting the state-owned economy play the leading role.’ Most respondents in developing countries called the China model ‘an innovation based on China’s history, culture and reality,’ believing China’s path and model to be ‘the main reasons for China’s amazing development.’”48 To sum up, China’s national image had entered an adjustment period characterized by multidimensionality and globalization. In summary, the four decades of reform and opening-up enabled China to deepen and expand its exchanges with the outside world. As it strives to establish itself in the international community, perceptual barriers to its national image are still evident: (1) its image is largely subject to the dominant cultures’ construction. (2) Negative rumors against the construction of its national image still exist. (3) Bias and prejudices rooted in history still influence how the outside world understands 46 Center

for International Communication Studies under the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, Brown and Lightspeed (2015). 47 Center for International Communication Studies under the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, Brown and Lightspeed (2015). 48 Center for International Communication Studies under the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, Brown and Lightspeed (2015).

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China’s image, especially when the US-led major Western powers harbor lingering doubt about its development, which sometimes even manifests in malicious attacks. Nevertheless, China’s national image in the entire Western world will continue to improve as the country strengthens its international ties.

2.3 A Causal Analysis of the Perceptual Discrepancy in China’s National Image As discussed in the previous section, the Western perception of China’s national image is not static, but constantly changing throughout history. From time to time, the Western attitude toward China shifts from approval and praise to degradation and accusation, even “demonization.” Since the causes of this perceptual discrepancy are complex and multitiered, the section aims to explore the issue from political, cultural and media perspectives.

2.3.1 The Political Factor: The “Western-Centrism” Position Strictly speaking, China’s image first came into the Western view in around 1250. Although there were legends about the “Silk Country” in earlier times, most of them were vague and impossible to verify. In the five centuries since 1250, the Western world constructed a utopian image for China, mostly filled with approval, admiration and glorification. However, their impression took a sudden sharp turn at the height of the Enlightenment movement in around 1750, shifting toward a polarization between admiration and degradation. Why did Westerners keep glorifying China in the first place? And why did they stop doing so in 1750? It was related to the changes within the Western culture rather than those within the Chinese culture. Moreover, it was the expressions selected by the West rather than their cognitive capabilities that were in question. In fact, China’s image took shape in the process of Western modernization, and its transition from admiration to degradation reflects changes in the China-West power dynamics (politics, economy and culture). Therefore, the image of China is merely a cultural projection of the Western world through ages. From 1250 to 1750, the Western world transitioned from the Middle Ages into the Modern era, during which the modern Western mentality was shaped. The Protestant Reformation, Renaissance, capitalism and market economy, and absolute monarchy shook the social structure and belief system of the Middle Ages, triggering panic and anxiety toward social disintegration and crisis in modern time. Caught by the crisis of faith and cultural anxiety, Westerners desperately sought for another culture for inspiration. They needed an image of “the Other” to reflect upon “the Self” and express their own values and wishes through glorifying the former. Eventually,

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Confucian China, blessed with prosperity and stability, became the Westerners’ spiritual safe haven, fueling their “imagination.” It is safe to conclude that despite their limited knowledge of China, Westerners had held a great yearning for the exotic country before the eighteenth century. “Since then, Enlightenment intellectuals depicted China as a model society to facilitate the dissemination of their own philosophies. However, they simply conjured up an idealistic China based on hearsay, which mainly served as a ground to point out contemporary problems in the Western society and express their own opinions.”49 Initially known as “the Land of Kubilai Khan,”50 China’s image was introduced to modern Western culture as a metaphor or symbol, which became a mirror image of “the Other.” From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, the Western world saw China as a majestic empire and constructed the “Khitan image” (契丹, qidan, a nomad from ancient Northeast China) to symbolize its secular prosperity. The construct was designed to not only convey their knowledge and imagination of China but also stand as a metaphor for the Western culture itself. It was also during this period that modern Western mentality took form. Furthermore, the praise for China peaked between 1650 and 1750, coinciding with the Enlightenment movement. China’s image was so heavily glorified that it even became a synonym for high caliber/standard as well as a vision of the future. Enlightenment advocates argued that “their modern cultural concepts, such as nation and democracy, secular materialism and individualism, scientific progress and rationalism, were independent from the ‘unified cultural values’ in traditional Christian doctrine, but could only be explained in metaphors.”51 Here, a utopic China became their medium of expression. Through learning China’s image—a symbol for wealth, sovereignty and glory, Westerners gained new insights and clues to secularism in early capitalism. The utopic image was the manifestation of the Western yearning for the political, economic and social conditions of China. To be specific, European missionaries, philosophers, politicians, merchants and travelers conveyed their dissatisfaction with the current society and expectations of reform through the “utopic” image of China, which then evolved into the “Great Empire of China” and the “Confucian China” as metaphors for ideal imperial political system and benevolent monarchy. “Missionaries projected Christian ecumenism onto a liberal and marvelous China, while philosophers criticized the despotism and vulgar traditions in Europe contrary to ancient Chinese philosophies.”52 Therefore, China was painted as a driving force of social change in Europe during the early modern period, even representing certain social ideals of the elite culture. While the West was looking up to China, the latter was resting on its laurels of history. However, the former “suddenly woke up:” the English Revolution in 1640 led Britain to the path of capitalism. Since then, similar revolutions or reforms took place in the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the US, France, Russia, Germany and 49 Duan 50 This

(2007, p. 32). reference is possibly drawn from the book Travels in the Land of Kubilai Khan by Marco

Polo. 51 Zhou (2006, p. 713). 52 Zhou (2006, p. 713).

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Italy (in chronological order), securing the bourgeoisie rule in the European political system. Through exercising the power of state apparatuses, the ruling class was able to encourage and protect capital formation and promote the development of industry and commerce, especially international trade. Also, patent systems were implemented to protect inventions (including overseas “expeditions”), and academic research, industrial manufacturing, trade, military and politics began to integrate. Gradually, the factory system featuring the use of machinery replaced traditional craft production, resulting in the capitalist countries’ rapid development. The East-West dynamics took a major turn in around 1750 when the Western expansion progressed into the last stage of a triumphant return. By then, the Western world had transformed beyond recognition: enlightening ideas centering on reason had dispelled the confusion from the Middle Ages; inquisitive and brave explorers discovered the New World; as the primitive accumulation of capital paved the way for colonization, the Western culture was also deemed advanced; and eventually, the Western modernity was established. As its productivity and economy soared during the Industrial Revolution, the Western world anchored itself in a “Westerncentrism” position and its attitude toward China deteriorated. The wonderful illusion of China began to shatter and was replaced by dismay, frustration and even anger, which pushed Westerners to another extreme: despising, condemning and degrading China. From glorification and admiration to degradation and resentment, China’s national image suffered a drastic twist in the Western world and did not improve until the end of the twentieth century. Chinese philosopher He Huaihong (1954–) once wrote in his essay The Encounter and Conflicts between Chinese and Western Cultures (1998): “overall, the Western culture treated its Chinese counterpart with curiosity and admiration in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively, but then slided into contempt in the nineteenth century.”53 To establish Western modernity, the Western world needed to abandon the “utopia” that once facilitated self-denial and self-transcendence and seek a new “the Other” for self-assurance and consolidating ideological basis. In other words, “instead of criticizing their own reality for not measuring up to China, Westerners now turned to disparage the country for not being able to keep up, with the purpose of defending the Western modernity’s legitimacy.”54 According to Palestinian American postcolonial scholar Edward Wadie Said (1935–2003), Europe was committed to justifying its conquest of the rest of the world throughout the nineteenth century. Orientalists dedicated themselves to reiterating beliefs like “the Orients” were lazy, clueless, promiscuous, sensitive, unreliable and crazy. European colonists were certain that they could describe the local residents in their conquered territories precisely.55 To Said, “Orientalism is … a set of discursive practices through which the West structured the imagined East politically, socially, military, ideologically, scientifically and artistically” in the post-Enlightenment time.56 Through identifying “the Other” 53 He

(1998). (2006, p. 713). 55 Jiang (2005, p. 116). 56 Buchowski (2006). 54 Zhou

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in the cross-cultural dynamics, the West developed its own identity, constructed “the Self” concept and created the “West-centrism” mindset. During this period, China was used as a recurring “the Other,” casting different and sometimes even contradictory images, such as the “Great Empire of China,” the “Confucian China” versus the “despotic Empire of China” and the “savage Empire of China.” From the end of the nineteenth century to 1949 when New China was founded, both the Western general public and the elite relied on their own print media and missionaries in China as the primary source of information on China. In their view, the Chinese culture was evil, ignorant, backward and therefore must be reformed. (Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that a brief change of tone was observed during the “Red Utopia” time amid the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. The Western world cast a positive light on the images of China and the CPC, even to the point of idolatry. Red China was not only a subject to fuel the Western imagination of a wonderful and exotic land but also a role model for the Western world, especially for the left-wing political activists.) Soon after the founding of New China in 1949, different ideological stands between China and the West and the onset of the Cold War turned the country’s image gloomier. As China established diplomatic relations with the US and implemented the reform and opening-up policy in the 1970s, its national image gradually improved again, receiving mostly positive comments. However, in response to its rapid growth in comprehensive national power, the “China threat theory” and “China collapse theory” became the centerpiece of topics on China in Western media toward the end of the twentieth century. In fact, every reversal of China’s image in the West during the twentieth century was related to changes in the China–West relations, geopolitical dynamics and trends of Western thought. The rise and fall of liberalism, left-wing thought or Neoconservatism was directly linked with the representation of China’s image. In conclusion, the Enlightenment promoted the modern Western conceptual order featuring “Western-centrism,” which played a critical role in changing China’s national image. To be exact, this new conceptual order allowed the West to assert its identity while securing a fictional yet permanent “the Other”—China. “Whenever the Western world experienced elation or dejection, or needed to criticize or vindicate itself, this ‘the Other’ would naturally be brought up to assist the West staying grounded.”57 Indeed, Western countries have been attuned to judge an alien culture based on their own political models and ideology, which are “right” and need to be upheld. This usually results in distorted perceptions of other cultures. Studies have also confirmed that “in modern international communication, the information on one country reported by another is not always true. Under most circumstances, information will first be screened and filtered through the value system of the target audience’s country, and only the segments that accommodate its practical political needs will be reported. In this way, the country can win the general public’s support of its policies through manipulating images of other countries.”58 Behind the disparagement, ridicule and criticism of China’s national image lies the deeply 57 Zhou 58 Dong

(2006, p. 713). (2006).

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entrenched Western political stigma and cultural bias. “The representation of China as ‘the Other’ in the mainstream Western society has always been dictated by white racism, Eurocentrism and European cultural superiority over the past centuries,”59 and this “centrism” essentially springs from their own interests or emotional needs. In other words, the development of China’s national image in the West, or rather the Western construction of China’s image, has been subject to the Western world’s own needs, desires and crises throughout history. More specifically, through constructing and disseminating the national image of China, the West managed to define and reinforce its own identity, expand self-awareness and cultivate self-recognition, eventually strengthening its power and position in the international political system. It is now clear why the modern Western narratives concentrated on praising China during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, but turned to criticism in the age of colonialism and imperialism, which is carried into the ongoing process of globalization.

2.3.2 The Cultural Factors: Cultural Differences and Symbol Barriers A country’s national image does not form spontaneously but is constructed through interstate interactions, which is essentially a process of cross-cultural communication. In essence, to shape national image is to communicate information. In other words, as a result of communication, an image is information by nature. Hence, national image can be defined as “the discourse presentation and discourse construction of a country’s objective general conditions, which are expressed in languages, words and symbols by actors in international relations based on specific cultural meaning systems.”60 Since information processing differs from culture to culture and a country’s image is always perceived within a specific cultural context, the image will only hold in that particular system of meanings and symbols. Not surprisingly, cultural differences may lead to different understandings and perceptions of the same information. Culture is a shared meaning system created by mankind, which encompasses the lifestyles and social momentum of a particular society. It is enduring, systematic and intersubjective with an enormous influence on our perceptions of identities, interests and thus behavioral patterns. To contemporary American sociologist David Popenoe (1932–), “culture refers to the values and meaning system shared within a group or society, including the physical manifestations of these values and meanings. … Culture consists of three important components: (1) Symbols, meanings and values, (2) norms and (3) material culture.”61 Cultural factors are vital for civilizations to evolve because societies are constructed on the basis of cultures in essence. Despite that 59 Wendt

(2000, p. 282). (2006). 61 Popenoe (1987, p. 137). 60 Dong

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cultures grew increasingly aware of each other throughout time, cultural differences have remained distinct and hard to overcome. Huntington once commented: “The crucial distinctions among human groups concern their values, beliefs, institutions, and social structures, not their physical size, head shapes, and skin colors.”62 Cultural differences have always been present and have caused many misunderstandings and even conflicts. “Although many communication problems occur on the interpersonal level, most serious confrontations and misunderstandings can be traced to cultural differences that go to the core of a culture.”63 At the international level, countries communicate their perceptions and understandings of symbols with each other, but they may attach different meanings to the same symbol. For example, when primed with the word “Mao Zedong” (a symbol), most Westerners will interpret it as the leader of “Red China.” Here, the name serves as a relatively concrete symbol. The Chinese people, on the other hand, will attach both concrete and abstract meanings to the same symbol, indicating its intentionality. In addition, “dragon” is held as ferocious and evil in the Western world whereas it is the totem of the Chinese nation, a symbol of power, nobility, dignity and glory as well as a sign for fortune and success. Apart from factors that are deeply rooted in cultural structures such as social norms, conceptual systems and thought patterns, target audiences’ background knowledge and social status may lead to misunderstandings in cross-cultural exchanges, too. For instance, in The Travels, Marco Polo mistook the rhinoceros in the East for the unicorns in the West probably due to the absence of the former in his own knowledge structure. Concepts affect perception and perception determines behavior. In the present international relations, we can often observe that diverse images are rendered for the same country by different cultural meaning systems. To illustrate, the image of the US in the Arab world is drastically different from that in the UK and France. Similarly, China’s images in Africa and the West are not exactly the same either. This is because one state’s image is deeply embedded in the perceptual subjects’ cultural knowledge structures, or shared systems of meanings and symbols. According to constructivism, states can form three types of culture among themselves, under which national images are constructed. To be specific, in a confrontational Hobbesian culture, states are inclined to construct the “enemy” image for each other; in a competitive Lockean culture, they are inclined to construct the “rival” image for each other; and in the mutually friendly Kantian culture, they are inclined to construct the “friend” image for each other.64 In conclusion, cultural differences hindered effective cross-cultural communication, and the greater the difference gets, the harder it is to overcome barriers to foreign exchanges. The cultural differences between China and the West are one of the most important perceptual barriers to construct its national image. In general, the effects of cultural differences on national image can be divided into three main categories. First, cultural identity. Cultures can be grouped based on geographic positions, nationalities, traditional customs, religions and ethnicities. 62 Huntington

(1996, p. 42). et al. (2009, p. 49). 64 Wendt (2000, pp. 255–296). 63 Samovar

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Cultural identity is formed when one group’s culture is accurately interpreted and approved by another group. It can not only encourage cultural sharing but also promote the dissemination of a country’s culture in other countries, thus facilitating the construction of its national image. Second, cultural rejection, which will occur when a culture is not accepted and faces a boycott by another one. Third, culture shock. The concept was developed by Canadian anthropologist Kalvero Oberg (1901–1973) in 1958. It “is precipitated by the anxiety that results from losing all our familiar signs and symbols of social intercourse”65 when one is exposed to an unfamiliar culture. Cultural rejection and culture shock constitute a cultural conflict. If people cling to the feelings, perceptions and habits formed within their own environment as they interact with others, frictions and conflicts will certainly ensue. Hence, cultural conflicts are determined by the nature of culture and are inevitable as civilizations evolve. Some scholars argue that given their incompatibility, cultural differences can only breed cultural conflicts but not cultural identity. According to Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede (1928–), founder of the comparative cultural studies, “culture is more often a source of conflict than of synergy. Culture differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster.”66 Based on his survey in over 60 countries and regions including China, Hofstede developed the “cultural dimensions theory” to analyze behavioral tendencies and values of members from different cultures. To be specific, he proposed five dimensions to compare the Eastern and Western cultures: power distance index (PDI), individualism versus collectivism (IDV), masculinity versus femininity (MAS), uncertainty avoidance (UAI) and long-term orientation versus short-term orientation (LTO). He used the theory to explain the cultural conflicts between China and the West as a consequence of cultural differences.67 The East and the West have taken completely different cultural forms for long and cultural differences, even cultural conflicts, have always been present, manifesting on both the micro- and macro levels. On the micro level, they differ in family education style, interpersonal communication, business operation and trade. For example, although the “Toyota vehicle recall” in March 201068 may just seem like a typical incident of corporate responsibility, it reflects the differences in American and Japanese corporate cultures. Moreover, despite many similarities between Chinese and Japanese cultures, their enterprises clearly differ in terms of business philosophy, management and corporate culture. On the macro level, cultural conflicts are the conflicts between national cultures. The earliest East-West cultural conflict was observed between Christianity and Islam, while the conflict between Confucian and

65 Oberg

(1954). (2001). 67 Wu (2014, p.147). 68 Between the end of 2009 and 2010, Toyota initiated large-scale global vehicle recalls because of increased reports of unintended acceleration. The accidents were caused by an incorrect placement of driver’s side floor mat into the foot pedal and/or mechanical sticking of the accelerator pedal. On March 1, 2010, Akio Toyoda, President of Toyota Motor Corporation, held a press conference in Beijing to announce the recall and apologize to Chinese consumers. 66 Hofstede

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Western cultures took place mainly after the First Opium War in 1840.69 In particular, American culture has cast a negative light on the Arab world for long. As noted by Said in his collection of essays Culture and Imperialism (1993), “in the West, representations of the Arab world ever since the 1967 War have been crude, reductionist, coarsely racialist. … Yet films and television show portraying Arabs as sleazy ‘camel jockeys’, terrorists, and offensively wealthy ‘sheikhs’ pour forth anyway.”70 The mutual construction of national images contingent on cultures is a prominent feature of cultural conflict. Extreme examples include the September 11 attacks and the ensuing wars and conflicts between the US and Arab countries. Culture is always demonstrated through symbols, which can be our utensils, behaviors, and even concepts and thoughts. Hence, culture represents a symbolized world and cultural differences mainly arise from the perception and understanding of symbols. As a critical social phenomenon of mankind, culture is formed through the accumulation and refinement of symbols. To German symbologist Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945), “all these [cultural] forms [in man’s life] are symbolic forms. … Hence, … we should define him as an animal symbolicum.”71 Symbols carry cultural connotations and cultures, in turn, are expressed through symbols. Hence, culture and symbol are inseparable. To a certain extent, a culture’s creation and development is in fact the creation and development of symbols, while cultural misunderstanding caused by cultural differences is essentially the misreading of symbols’ meanings. In our daily lives, people acquire information through two means: (1) direct, i.e., through personal experience, also commonly known as “first-hand information,” and (2) indirect, i.e., through verbal communication or media symbols. Symbols designed for communication can only be recognized and accepted by their receiver when his/her coding and decoding dovetail with that of the sender. However, due to the time–space barrier and limited areas of activity, we still heavily rely on social information systems (mainly the system of symbols from mass media) to understand our external world. The international communication of national image refers to cross-border, -ethnic and -cultural communication through symbols. A symbol’s meaning can be accurately picked up by receivers in other countries only when they accept the pairing of the signifier and the signified. However, because the systems of symbols (language, culture) differ in reality, the sender’s encoding and the receiver’s decoding of the same symbol are not always the same, sometimes even “confronting” each other. The barrier of symbols has great influence on the construction of national image. We must admit that the international communication of Chinese symbols, both verbal (represented by Chinese characters) and audiovisual (represented by images and objects), have inevitably fallen victim to the barrier of symbols. Nowadays, Chinese is the mother tongue of about 1.4 billion people, followed by English with about 400 million native speakers. Yet, Chinese is only widely used in a few countries (e.g., China, Singapore and Malaysia) and only approximately 30 million people 69 Chen

(2005). (1994, p. 36). 71 Cassirer (1944). 70 Said

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take it as their second language. In contrast, English is used worldwide, and far more people speak it as their second language or demonstrate some level of proficiency. While Latin American writers were awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in the mid1980s, their Chinese counterparts remained absent in the list of laureates in the entire twentieth century. The language barrier is a major obstacle in China’s literary quest for “going global.” According to Göran Malmqvist (1924–), the sole sinologist in the Swedish Academy (responsible for choosing the Nobel Laureates in Literature), “lacking good translations in Western languages is a main reason that Chinese writers have not been awarded the Prize.”72 Since the sender and the receiver are not from the same cultural meaning system, the meanings implied by symbols are often misinterpreted. Furthermore, the international communication of “Chinese symbols” has been challenged by traditional stereotypes held by foreign audiences. Admittedly, the predicament can not only be attributed to the “agenda-setting” in the Western world but is also closely linked to our tireless emphasis on cultural legacies in the construction of our national image. For instance, from October 2003 to July 2005, the Chinese and French governments co-sponsored the “China-France Culture Year” featuring a wide range of cultural activities. Apart from promoting cultural exchanges, the project encouraged some people to ponder the two nations’ different focuses on selecting cultural elements. In their opinion, the French promoted their culture with finesse while China tended to lay heavy emphasis on the “official status.” They contended that China even promoted some “tacky stuff” that was prone to misunderstanding, thus hindering the international communication of Chinese culture and the effective construction of China’s national image. What’s even worse, Chinese culture became a victim of the “violence of symbols:” to cater to the Western “taste,” some writers and film directors of Chinese origin intentionally reinforced negative stereotypes of the country through abusing Chinese cultural symbols. In collusion with the West, they strengthened Western prejudice and bias against China. Therefore, to construct an objective and authentic national image, China needs to attach great importance to effectively coding cultural symbols and minimizing cultural misinterpretation.

2.3.3 The Media Factors: Hegemonic Discourse and “Loss of Voice” A country’s image is constructed through its social interactions with other countries; in particular, it is the result of the game among countries’ discourse presentations. Apart from the constraints imposed by ideology and cultural meaning systems, national image is also greatly affected by countries’ capabilities to communicate and construct discourse. “Discourse is power.”73 The famous quote by Foucault unveils some kind of ineluctable power dynamics within spoken words and written texts. 72 Zhang

(2009). (1977, p. 27).

73 Foucault

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Specifically, the power “is a pervasive political technique that penetrates members in the society imperceivably with the aim of controlling their behaviors. It is of a legislative function.”74 Discourse and power are so inextricably intertwined that where there’s discourse, there’s power. The world is shaped by people with the right to speech and writing. In other words, it is in the hands of those with the power of discourse. Henry Luce (1898–1967), former publisher and editor-in-chief of the American magazine Life, even wrote plainly in his editorial The American Century (1941), “[the US needed] to accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit. … It now [became] our time to be the powerhouse from which the ideals spread throughout the world.”75 British scholars David Morley (1949–) and Kevin Robins were also quite straightforward in this regard: “in a free or unregulated exchange between the strong and the weak, the strong tend to do better and to become even stronger. Thus, … freedom of speech has, in fact, meant the opportunity of the American mass media to disseminate their message throughout the world arena. … if free trade is the mechanism by which a powerful economy penetrates and dominates a weaker one, then the free flow of information is the channel through which the lifestyles and the values of America have been imposed on poor and vulnerable societies.”76 Owing to its highly developed economy, culture and powerful appeal of the so-called democracy and religious values; the US dominated the global discourse, demonstrating forceful penetration and expansion into developing countries. As state actors stay interactive in the international community, each one of them is subject to others’ watchful eyes. When many observers try to pass judgement on the behavior of a certain actor, its national image will be created. As a result, the criteria for national image are drawn from the mainstream opinions in international relations to a large extent. Whoever seizes control over the discourse power of national image, he/she will then own the commending height of global power struggle. “With a powerful culture and economy and advanced information and communications technology, a country will be able to dictate its own national image as well as the others’, whereas a country with the opposite reality will often be overpowered by the dominant discourse, whose image will typically be constructed by others to serve their own interests.”77 Dubbed as the “soft power,” media power essentially refers to media’s persuasive yet undetectable influence on people’s perceptions and perceptual styles through information and communications technology. Its effectiveness is no less than the “hard power” such as military strike, economic block and diplomatic isolation. Actually, against the backdrop of globalization, “media now assumes a vital role in promoting a country’s domestic and international images.”78 “On the one hand, it can contain an emergency so the situation will not intensify into a 74 Wang

(2013). (1941). 76 Morley and Robins (1995, p. 221). 77 Zheng (2007). 78 Zhang (2000, p. 3). 75 Luce

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crisis beyond remedy. On the other hand, it can lead to crisis escalation and destroy the present value system.”79 Reflecting upon the development of China’s image in Western society, we can tell that the past practice of isolationism and present lack of clear strategy have cost China its voice in international communication, especially when addressing Western audiences. The situation is further clouded by its occasional mischief in international exchanges. To conclude, China’s construction of “the Self” image has not been able to stand against its image as “the Other” created by the West. Any country in possession of global information resources will be able to dictate the direction of global discourse and have the power to “set up” images for other countries. Otherwise, it will find itself in a compromising situation in the construction of its national image. It is clear that China’s poor national image is directly attributable to a large amount of negative foreign publicity. Over the years, the developed Western world has intentionally targeted China’s human rights, political system, foreign policies, the overall caliber of the population and social conditions. As a powerful tool for information dissemination, Western mainstream media frequently exaggerates, hypes and distorts the conflicts and issues observed in China’s socioeconomic development. The persistent negative publicity bred misunderstandings and even twisted attitudes toward China among many Westerners. Hence, China is trapped in this perceptual barrier, which impedes its national image construction and peaceful development. Meanwhile, under the shield and instigation of Western political powers and mainstream media, forces like overseas “national liberation movements,” “Taiwan independence movement,” “Tibet independence movement,” “Xinjiang independence movement” and “Falun Gong” (法轮功, literal: Dharma Wheel Practice) look to defame China’s national image from time to time. According to Chinese scholar Wu Ying, the massive amount of negative news on China reflects the Western media’s deconstruction of Chinese discourse power. To be specific, the deconstruction is channeled through the Western media system, news philosophy and news production, all of which are catered to the general public’s interests: (1) The media system. Except a handful government-funded broadcasters like Voice of America and Deutsche Welle (English: German wave), the majority of Western broadcasting organizations are privately owned whose financing depends on subscription fees or advertisements, thus ensuring its financial independence from the government. However, to secure funding from audiences and advertisers and sustain their operations, the profit-driven private media opt to cater to the general public’s tastes. (2) The news philosophy. “Anomaly” is the main criterion for news story selection in Western media because positive stories are hard to be accepted by the public. For example, warfare and diseases have long dominated the Western press coverage on Africa, and Western audiences hardly take interest in any other topic. Also, since China “contradicting” the Western world suits the public imagination of the country, reports on China are heavily influenced by the “Orientalist” framework, which has been reinforced over a long period of time. (3) The news production. Since the 1990s, the world media has been monopolized by six Western conglomerates and the “Big Four” news agencies, namely Associated Press (abbr. AP, the US), 79 Li

and Zhao (2002, p. 21).

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United Press International (abbr. UP, the US), Reuters (the UK) and Agence FrancePresse (abbr. AFP, France). They have become the primary sources of information for many developing nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Many reporters with these multinational media agencies have never been to China. However, when asked to cover events pertinent to the country, they will produce news stories based on Western stereotypes, followed by editors’ “scrutiny” and “screening.” Along with the circulating perceptual resonance between media coverage and audiences, nationalism and state interests jointly determine the Western general public’s susceptibility of negative media coverage on China. Under such circumstances, occasional positive reports on China soon drown in the spiral of silence.80 Some Western researchers justify the prevalence of negative coverage on China as a result of their news values and target audiences’ preference, which also dictate the negative tone of domestic news coverage. However, they overlook the differences between domestic and cross-cultural (international) communications. By relating a domestic news story to their own realities, audiences can judge its authenticity relatively easily. In contrast, many have to solely rely on mass media to learn about other cultures. If the media fails in reflecting objective, fair and authentic “foreign realities,” it will distort the public perception of the outside world in the long run. Wrong perceptions will encourage bias accumulation. This also explains why lots of Westerners still hold China as conservative and ignorant and are convinced by the “China threat theory” and the “China collapse theory” despite the rapid development of media. In international relations, a country’s discourse power is mostly determined by its comprehensive national power. Uneven economic and technological development among countries leads to the uneven distribution of communication rights, which subsequently causes discrepancies in discourse power. At present, the power of discourse manipulation is still in the hands of the developed Western world. In 2004, Chinese researchers Hu Angang and Zhang Xiaoqun examined the national power of media (abbr. NPM) of 14 major countries. They found that “the NPM of the US far exceeded other countries. Although China was ranked the second, its NPM was 53% less than that of the US. Of the NPM’s four indicators, [namely basis of communications, domestic communication power, international communication power and media economic development,] China performed better in domestic communication power and basis of communications, equaling to 89% and 56% of the US level, respectively; while its international communication power and media economic development only matched 14% and 6.5% of those of the US, respectively. China had a stronger basis of communications and performed better domestically than Japan, but fell behind in international communication and media economy development. In particular, its media economic development only matched a quarter of the Japanese progress. In comparison with India, China had advantages on the basis of communications, domestic and international communications, but its media economy fell behind, accounting for less than one-third of the Indian progress.”81 Nowadays, 80 Wu 81 Hu

(2014, pp. 156–158). and Zhang (2004).

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the lion’s share of global news reports goes to the US and other Western countries. “Over 76% of press releases around the world come from developed countries whereas news stories released by China are quite few, of which close to 80% are secondary sources relayed from developed countries.”82 By controlling a vast amount of information and media resources, developed countries ensure the successful worldwide dissemination of their messages. Moreover, they can protect their voices even further through a second round of information dissemination through other countries’ reprints and relay broadcasting. Consequently, developed countries can shape their national images freely in the international community and establish evaluation criteria for other countries’ images. As the power of mass media becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of developed countries, especially those major news agencies, the order and power of international communication are now dictated by the very few. “One world, many voices” has turned into “one world, few voices,” and loss of voice will attract slander. For developing countries, if “they cannot speak for themselves, words will be put in their mouths.” Cultural communication (cultural products) also plays an essential part in the construction of international discourse power. As the global leader of written, oral and visual communications, the US casts an enormous cultural influence through a wide assortment of cultural products, such as Hollywood films, printed materials and Disneyland parks. When speaking of American films, people are prone to think about Hollywood. “As an integral part of the American culture, Hollywood films set the highest industry standards and play a significant role in promoting America’s image abroad. Although the American entertainment industry claims to be commercialized and independent, it has remained an indispensable asset in the government’s foreign publicity.”83 With blockbusters like Titanic, Saving Private Ryan, Pearl Harbor, Avatar and film series of Batman, Spider-Man, Iron Man and Bourne Identity, Hollywood has not only achieved great commercial successes but also vigorously promoted America’s image, values and lifestyles, cultivating an acceptance of and yearning for the American life among numerous viewers. No wonder President Ronald Wilson Reagan (1911–2004; in office: 1981–1989), also a former Hollywood actor, considered Hollywood America’s global publicity base. On the surface, China seems to have evolved into a media giant based on the quantity and scale of its mass media, e.g., television and radio broadcasting. As suggested by the “quantity ratios” in some empirical studies, China is even second to the US in terms of media power in the world. “Nevertheless, the development of Chinese media is imbalanced, which is evident in its weak international communication and media economy. Its media power cannot compete with Western countries like the US.”84 We can explore the causes of China’s weak international communication from two perspectives: (1) On the macro level, the management and operating systems require continued reform; funding needs to be increased; the overall scale

82 Li

(2011b). (2011). 84 Hu and Zhang (2004). 83 Zhang

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needs to be expanded; research skills and capability to collect information need further development; and the overall caliber of members in the industry needs to be improved. (2) On the micro-level, the use of multilingual localization needs to be promoted; timeliness in the news has to be emphasized; communicating methods need to be improved; warning mechanism is yet to be revised; and the abilities to cope with crises need to be enhanced. Furthermore, China exports far less cultural products (e.g., books, DVDs) than it imports, and these exports have very limited visibility and influence abroad. Thus, a long journey waits ahead for China to truly become a media power. At the moment, Chinese cultural products are less effective in promoting its national image than the Western ones. Its national image is still sculpted and described mainly by the Western world and its media (culture). Consequently, China often seems “absent” and “voiceless” in international relations. As Said has explained, colonial expansion bred Western prejudices against the East. Westerners examined Eastern culture through the lens of Western-Centrism, thus creating a distorted image. Meanwhile, the East remained a silent “the Other” which cannot defend itself.85 In recent years, the Chinese government and media have stayed committed to constructing an authentic national image. However, because the power to “set up” national images has been controlled by the US-led Western world throughout, and China has made errors in its international communication strategies, the Chinese media (culture) is still “absent” or “voiceless” in international communication. That is why despite its phenomenal progress over the four decades of reform and opening-up, China’s image did not change fundamentally in the eyes of foreigners.

References Anon. (no date). Modern history sourcebook: Qian Long: Letter to George III, 1793. Retrieved August 18, 2019, from https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1793qianlong.asp. Backhouse, E. & Bland, J. O. P. (1914). Annals and memoirs of the court of peking. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Bedts, R. F. de. (1984). Chinese translation by the Research Center of China-US and China-UK Relations, Department of History, Nanjing University. In History of the United States of America (1933–1973). Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Buchowski, M. (2006). The specter of orientalism in Europe: From exotic other to stigmatized brother. Anthropological Quarterly, 79(3), 463. Cassirer, E. (1944). An essay on man: An introduction to a philosophy of human culture. Retrieved February 20, 2019, from https://archive.org/stream/ErnstCassirerAnEssayOnMan/ Ernst+Cassirer+-+An+essay+on+man_djvu.txt. Center for International Communication Studies under the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, Brown, M., & Lightspeed, G. M. I. (2015). China’s National Image Global Survey 2014. Beijing Review. Retrieved February 13, 2019, from http://www.bjreview.com.cn/exclusive/ txt/2015-03/18/content_678738_3.htm. Center for International Communication Studies under the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, Brown, M., & Lightspeed, G. M. I. (2015). China’s National Image Global Survey 2014. Beijing Review. Retrieved February 13, 2019, from http://www.bjreview.com.cn/exclusive/ txt/2015-03/18/content_678738_4.htm. 85 Zhang

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Chen, Q. (2005). The conflict between eastern and western cultures? Journal of Theoretical Reference, 7, 11–12. Defoe, D., & Hazlitt, W. (1841). The works of Daniel Defoe, with a memoir of his life and writings (Vol. II). London: Clements. Delzer, I. (2013). An important handshake. Richard Nixon Foundation. Retrieved August 21, 2019, from https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2013/05/an-important-handshake/. Dong, Q. (2006). My humble opinion on national image and international exchanges. The Journal of International Studies, 43(3), 54–61. Duan, L. (2004). How to help foreigners know China. Revised and enlarged ed. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press (Chapter 1). Duan, P. (2007). Communication strategies in national image construction. Beijing: Communication of University China Press. Étiemble, R. (2000). L’Europe Chinoise (S. Geng, Chinese Trans.). Beijing: The Commercial Press. Fairbank, J. K. (1987). China watch. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. New York: Pantheon Books. Guan, W. (1999). On the national image. Chengdu: University of Electronic Science and Technology of China Press. Harding, H. (1992). A fragile relationship: The United States and China since 1972. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. He, H. (1998). Essays by He Huaihong. Beijing: China Radio Film & TV Press. Hegel, G. (1995). Lectures on the history of philosophy (L. He & T. Wang, Chinese Trans., Vol. 1). Beijing: The Commercial Press. Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). California: Sage Publishing. Hsia, A. (1995). German thinkers on China (tentative translation, A. Chen, Chinese Trans.). Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing. Ltd. Hu, Q. (1994). Hu Qiaomu Hui Yi Mao Zedong (tentative translation: Hu Qiaomu’s Memories of Mao Zedong). Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Hu, A., & Zhang, X. (2004). An empirical analysis on the rapid rise of chinese media. Strategy and Management, 3, 24–34. Huang, L. (1998). Red China’s military threat is no myth. Chicago Tribune. Retrieved February 1, 2019, from https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1998-08-13-9808130060-story.html. Huntington, S. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Jiang, F. (2005). The postcolonial context for cross-cultural communication. Beijing: China Renmin University Press. Kissinger, H. (2011). White house years. New York: Simon and Schuster. Retrieved August 21, 2019, from https://books.google.com/. Li, Y. (2010). The history and changes of “China’s Image”. Journal of Yunnan Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), 42(3), 150–156. Li, Z. (2011a). China’s international image—A constructivist reading in the age of global communication. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House. Li, F. (2011b). An Analysis on strategies of promoting national image. People’s Tribune, 2, 78–79. Li, X., & Zhao, X. (2002). Media. Guangzhou: Nanfang Daily Press. Liu, X. (2002). What motivated “China Threat” and “China Collapse”. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. Luce, H. (1941). The American century. Retrieved February 21, 2019. http://www-personal.umich. edu/~mlassite/discussions261/luce.pdf. Mao Zedong. (1949). On the people’s democratic dictatorship. Retrieved January 25, 2019, from https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_65.htm. Minowitz, P. (2004). Adam Smith’s invisible hands. Econ Journal Watch, 1(3), 400. Montesquieu. (1748). The spirit of the laws (English Trans.). Kitchener: Batoche Books.

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Morley, D., & Robins, K. (1995). Spaces of identity: Global media, electronic landscapes and cultural boundaries. London: Routledge. Niu, J. (2002). The relations of the United States, the soviet union, Kuomintang and the communist party of China between 1945 and 1949. Historical Research, 2, 84–105. Oberg, K. (1954). Culture shock and the problem of adjustment to new cultural environments. Retrieved February 20, 2019, from http://spartanhistory.kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/6/32/6-2090F-116-UA2-9-5-5_001301.pdf. Pang, S. (2003). China in the Era of Mao Zedong (1949–1976) (Vol. I.). Beijing: History of Chinese Communist Party Publishing House. Perkins, F. (2004). Leibniz and China: A commerce of light. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Popenoe, D. (1987). Sociology (Part I) (Y. Liu & G. Wang, Chinese Trans.). Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publishing House. Research Department One of the Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee. (1995). An Exploration of the relations among the soviet union, the communist international and Chinese revolution (p. 449). Beijing: History of Chinese Communist Party Publishing House. Rielly, J. E. (1995). American public opinion and US foreign policy 1995. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 24. Said, E. W. (1994). Culture and imperialism (First vintage books ed.). New York: Vintage Books. Samovar, L. A., Porter, R. E., & McDaniel, E. R. (2009). Communication between cultures (7th ed.). Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning. Smith, A. (1776). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. Voltaire. (1792). A collection of the tales and smaller pieces of Mons. de Voltaire (Vol. 1). Edinburgh: Silvester Doig. Wang, Y. (2013). The “Authority” of discourse mainly comes from the system. Social Sciences Weekly, 5. Wang, X., & Cai, L. (Eds.). (2008). A brief overview on the history of contemporary China. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press. Wendt, A. (2000). Social theory of international politics (Y. Qin, Chinese Trans.). Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Press. White, T. H. (1988). The untold stories of China’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression (tentative translation, C. Cui, Chinese Trans.). Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Publishing House. White, T., & Jacoby, A. (1988). Thunder out of China. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House. Wu, Y. (2009). The construction and communication of the national image of China. Shanghai: Fudan University Press. Wu, Y. (2014). Production mechanism of china’s discourse power. Shanghai: Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press. Xu, H. (2000). What is “national image”? Za Wen Bao, 12 September. Zhang, G. (2000). Inside the media in international relations. Beijing: Communication University of China Press. Zhang, A. (2009). On media symbols & the construction of China’s image under the actor conspiracy effect. Social Sciences Review, 3. Zhang, A. (2011). Media revolution and the evolution of china’s national image. Nanjing Journal of Social Sciences, 11, 100–106. Zheng, L. (2007). Position and identity: A constructivist analysis on China’s national image. Masterlevel thesis at the Central China Normal University. Zhi, D. (no date). Description and annotations of selected historical events of chinese imperial politics. DeepLogic. Retrieved August 18, 2019, from https://books.google.com/. Zhou, N. (2006). Western images of China. Beijing: Peking University Press, “The Preface”. Zi, Z. (1994). The diplomatic history of the United States after World War II (Vol. II.). Beijing: World Affairs Press.

Chapter 3

National Image from a Constructivist Perspective

From the ontological perspective, national image was traditionally seen as an entity with objective reality and even invariability. It was set up (constructed) by the country itself for the purpose of international communication. Hence, its quality was completely dependent on the country’s commitment. A country constructed its image based on its present conditions, namely comprehensive national power and actions. Most studies in this field followed the same logical and narrative framework, beginning with a description of image construction (position, design, shape) and progressing into a discussion on international communication. However, traditional theories cannot explain the following reality: very often, a country’s national image is neither positively correlated with its comprehensive national power nor solely subject to its own intention and efforts in construction. Therefore, many researchers dropped the ontological perspective and turned to an opposite research framework instead, namely constructivism.

3.1 Insights into Constructing National Image from Constructivism In the early twentieth century, international relations were established as a discipline of social sciences with two prominent schools of thought, i.e., political realism and liberalism. Since then, the two schools alternated between themselves in guiding the research and practices in international relations in the West. Toward mid- and late-1970s, the dominance of realism was weakened by the emergence of competing theories. With its systematic exploration of the nature of power, the purposes of foreign policies, and the methods to measure and manage power, classical realism is indeed “an important attempt to studying ‘power,’ a key variable in examining

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political actions both individually and collectively as well as theorizing about international relations to date.”1 However, as globalization developed especially after the Cold War, the limitation of realism became increasingly evident: given the deepening interdependence among countries, the direction of international relations was no longer dictated by “highly political” elements such as military capabilities—the emphasis of realism. In the meantime, the negative effects of globalization and interdependence propelled supporters of neoliberalism into introspection. It was within this context that constructivism flourished. Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, reflections and criticism about mainstream theories such as realism and liberalism encouraged the development of constructivism, which eventually evolved into one of the three major schools of thought in international relations (the other two being realism and liberalism). Although there are many forms of constructivism with various degrees of divergence, e.g., modern constructivism and post-modern constructivism, they all underline three core theoretical propositions and two basic tenets. The three core theoretical propositions are (1) in the international political system, both material and social structures are present; (2) identities that consist interests and behaviors; and (3) actors in international politics and social structures shape each other.2 The two basic tenets are “(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”3 The most prominent figure in constructivism must be German-born American political scientist Alexander Wendt (1958–). His articles The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory (1987), Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics (1992) and academic book Social Theory of International Politics (1999) offer a complete description of the theoretical system of constructivism. Other important works on constructivism include Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Society (1989) by German scholar Friedrich Kratochwil (1944–), Worlds of Our Own Making: The Strange Career of Constructivism (2002) by American scholar Nicholas Onuf (1941–), National Interests in International Society (1996) by American scholar Martha Finnemore (1959–) and The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (1996) edited by American scholar Peter Katzenstein (1945–). Nonetheless, the Social Theory of International Politics remains most seminal, for it offers a comprehensive overview of constructivism in international relations theory. Based on methodology and worldview, Wendt classifies theories of international relations into four categories: (1) holist/materialist, (2) holist/idealist, (3) individualist/materialist and (4) individualist/idealist. He considers his own social constructivist theory holist/idealist. In terms of methodology, his theory is evidently of a social nature, emphasizing group influence on individuals. In international relations, this refers to the international system’s influence on 1 Wang

(2006, p. 118). et al. (2009, pp. 224–225). 3 Alexander (1999, p. 18). 2 Shixiong

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states, especially the significance of the international system’s culture (shared knowledge, expectations and ideas). To Wendt, the international system can regulate states’ behaviors and construct their identities and interests. In terms of worldview, social constructivism rejects pure materialism and highlights the effect of ideas instead. Although Wendt acknowledges the objective reality of material factors, he stresses that these factors can only acquire concrete meanings and affect behaviors through actors’ shared ideas.

3.1.1 Shared Ideas (Knowledge) Shared knowledge (or shared ideas) is the most fundamental element in Wendtian constructivism. Culture and ideas affect the motivations and essential features (identities or properties) of states. Wendt defines culture as “socially shared knowledge.” Therefore, his constructivism can also be simply defined as shared knowledge or culture. In particular, shared knowledge includes the understanding and expectations shared among actors in a certain society. “Specific cultural forms like norms, rules, institutions, conventions, ideologies, customs, and laws are all made of common knowledge.”4 “Common knowledge concerns actors’ beliefs about each other’s rationality, strategies, preferences, and beliefs, as well as about states of the external world. … [It] is subjective in the sense that the beliefs that make it up are in actors’ heads, and figure in intentional explanations. Yet because those beliefs must be accurate beliefs about others’ beliefs, it is also an intersubjective phenomenon which confronts actors as an objective social fact that cannot be individually wished away. Neither a unit-level structure because of its intersubjective nature, nor a macro-level structure because of its subjective one, common knowledge is firmly an interaction-level phenomenon.”5 In this interactive context, common knowledge shapes the identities and interests of actors. To a large extent, the structure of the international political system represents the distribution of ideas among state actors. Through their social interactions and learning, state actors establish interstate common knowledge, including international norms, institutions and rules like international laws, mechanisms, conventions and consensus. Wendt further points out that “the relationship of common knowledge to actors’ beliefs is one of reducibility, not supervenience. Common knowledge is nothing but beliefs in heads, nothing but ‘shared mental models.’ This means that with each change in belief, or each change in membership, the cultural forms constituted by common knowledge become literally different. … [In addition,] common knowledge explains outcomes via the intentional theory of action. Culture matters insofar as it affects the calculations of actors, no more, no less. To that extent not only is the ontology of common knowledge compatible with individualism, but so is its

4 Alexander 5 Alexander

(2003, p. 160). (2003, pp. 159–160).

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explanatory logic.”6 As a key variable in constructivism, culture is actually used interchangeably with concepts like structure and common knowledge in Wendtian constructivism. Wendt recognizes the objectivity of material factors in the international system, however, he contends that they can only become meaningful through ideas. The distribution of ideas is the key factor that allows the structure of the international system to function, with common knowledge or culture being most fundamental. “The central thesis is that the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas. As such only after the ideational conditions of possibility for power and interest explanations have been exposed and stripped out can we assess the effects of materiality as such.”7 According to Wendt, as a subset of structure, material factors such as the human body and state power cannot be reduced to conceptual factors. Given their limited meaning, material factors can only affect actors’ behaviors through social structures. For example, let us presume that both the UK and North Korea possess nuclear power. Then, nuclear power will be a material factor owned by both states. However, the US will only consider the nuclear power of North Korea a threat and thus adopt different policies and actions toward the two states. The US’s decision cannot be explained by the material factor of nuclear power alone, but by its expectations on the UK and North Korea. In this way, nuclear power is given implied meaning.8 Wendt also contends that while structures are formed through actors’ interactions, they construct actors, too. Hence, structures and actors co-constitute each other. In particular, structures of ideas (knowledge) can have two types of effects on actors: causal and constitutive. Ideas not only affect behaviors but also shape actors themselves. As highlighted in constructivism, social structures determine the meanings and identities of individual actors as well as how they participate in economic, political and cultural activities. On the one hand, these structures have a relatively strong power of constitution; on the other hand, they cannot exist independent of actors’ knowledgeable practices. Social structures are merely the results of actors’ practices. When two states interact, they will form common knowledge of their respective roles and expected behaviors. It is this knowledge that prompts them to take certain actions to sustain the exchanges. In turn, such actions will reinforce shared ideas or common knowledge through stimulus–response association. Meanwhile, these shared ideas will also be made known to the rest of the world through the two states’ behavioral tendencies. “Security dilemma—a fundamental concept in international relations—is an example of such common knowledge or structure. When intra-actor expectations raise a great amount of doubt between two actors, the pair will always assume the worst in the other’s motives and intentions. Hence, if one party spends more in armaments, the other will definitely feel threatened, resulting in a security dilemma. On the contrary, security community refers to a completely different social structure. In this scenario, common knowledge fosters mutual trust between 6 Alexander

(2003, p. 161). (2003, p. 96). 8 Alexander (2008, p. 20). 7 Alexander

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the actors. Even though there are conflicts of interest, they are confident that issues can be solved peacefully.”9 After World War II, to uphold their own foreign policies and state interests, the US and the Soviet Union engaged in inharmonious and even confrontational exchanges of discourse and gradually developed antagonism against each other. In other words, they constructed the shared idea that they were rivals and even enemies. Throughout the entire Cold War, the negative shared idea was repetitively confirmed and reinforced through the US–Soviet arms race, a living example of the “self-fulfilling prophecy.” According to Wendt, “[k]nowledge can be either private or shared. Private knowledge consists of beliefs that individual actors hold that others do not. In the case of states this kind of knowledge will often stem from domestic or ideological considerations. It can be a key determinant of how states frame international situations and define their national interests, and so is a major concern in the study of foreign policy. … [Yet] [s]ocially shared knowledge is knowledge that is both common and connected between individuals,”10 with an emphasis on its social nature. Wendt considers the socially shared knowledge as “culture,” which “takes many specific forms, including norms, rules, institutions, [and] ideologies.”11 So, can private knowledge be converted into shared knowledge? The answer is yes. Under certain circumstances, actors’ private knowledge can be converted into shared knowledge through interaction, which facilitates the development of the Self from the “mirror reflections” in the Other. Then, shared knowledge constructs culture, subsequently determining actors’ identities, interests and behaviors. In terms of states, positive exchanges facilitate creating positive shared knowledge, which encourages the construction of positive state identities, interests and images, thus further reinforcing friendly exchanges and vice versa. In conclusion, although constructivists acknowledge the leading role of power and interests in determining state actions, they contend that ideas are more important because power and interests are constructed on the basis of ideas. Therefore, ideas, which shape and determine the meaning and content of power as well as state interests, shall replace power as the most critical factor. In short, power and interests are not material, but constituted by ideas. A state’s power resources alone are meaningless, for power can only be effective after having been given some social meaning: as a result of interstate construction, it exerts some certain influence on other states. The underlying logic is that ideas construct interests, which then construct power. International structures are not material but social, constituted by ideas. In essence, they are the distribution of knowledge or ideas, with the understanding, expectations, identities and interests among state actors being most fundamental. Consequently, “the character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other”12 (i.e., the “socially shared knowledge” among states) instead of power or its structure. Suspicion will lead to distrust and even crisis 9 Alexander

(2008, p. 19). (2003, pp. 140–141). 11 Alexander (2003, p. 141). 12 Alexander (2003, p. 20). 10 Alexander

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rather than trust and understanding. As Wendt already pointed out, the notion that international politics is essentially shaped by power is not unique to realism. However, the views on the constitution of power differ between realism and constructivism. While the former believes that power is mainly constituted by material forces alone, the latter holds that it is mainly constructed by ideas and cultural scenarios.

3.1.2 State Identity (Interests) Identity is one of the core concepts in constructivism. In a sense, constructivism can be considered as the theory of identity politics. Depending on the context, “identity” can be understood as defining qualities, status and recognition/identification. In the Chinese version of Social Theory of International Politics, the word is translated as “status” throughout by Professor Qin Yaqing (1953–). In social psychology, identity refers to the “imagined” uniqueness and individuality processed or projected by actors. In constructivism, states are entities with identities and interests, and identity is treated as “a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions. This means that identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-understandings. However, the meaning of those understandings will often depend on whether other actors represent an actor in the same way, and to that extent identity will also have an intersubjective or systemic quality. [For example,] John may think he is a professor, but if that belief is not shared by his students then his identity will not work in their interaction. Two kinds of ideas can enter into identity, in other words, those held by the Self and those held by the Other. Identities are constituted by both internal and external structures.”13 “The character of this internal-external relationship varies, however, which suggests that rather than being a unitary phenomenon susceptible to general definition there are actually several kinds of identities. Building on several extant and not entirely compatible typologies,”14 Wendt proposed the following four types of identities: (1) Personal or corporate identity. “Personal—or in the case of organizations, corporate—identities are constituted by the self-organizing, homeostatic structures that make actors distinct entities. … [S]tates are actors with certain essential properties [that concern] this kind of identity. An actor can have only one such identity. … [C]onstituting an actor as a physically distinct being depends on creating and maintaining boundaries between Self and Other, and to that extent even personal and corporate identities presuppose ‘difference.’ … Personal/corporate identity is a site or platform for other identities. [(2) Type identity. Borrowed from political scientist Jim Fearon (1963–), Wendt uses the term ‘type’ identity to describe] a social category or ‘label applied to persons who share (or are thought to share) some characteristic or characteristics, in appearance, behavioral traits, attitudes, values, skills (e.g., language), knowledge, opinions, experience, historical commonalities (like region 13 Alexander 14 Alexander

(2003, p. 224). (2003, p. 160).

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or place of birth), and so on.’ … Not just any shared characteristic counts as a type identity, … but only those that have social content or meaning. This content is given by more or less formal membership rules that define what counts as a type identity and orients the behavior of Others toward it. [(3) Role identity, which takes] the dependency on culture … and … exist only in relation to Others. There is no preexisting property in virtue of which a student becomes a student or a master; one can have these identities only by occupying a position in a social structure and following behavioral norms toward Others possessing relevant counter-identities. One cannot enact role identities by oneself. The sharing of expectations on which role identities depend is facilitated by the fact that many roles are institutionalized in social structures that pre-date particular interactions. … [(4) Collective identity. It] takes the relationship between Self and Other to its logical conclusion, identification. Identification is a cognitive process in which the Self-Other distinction becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether. … And it builds on type identities because collective identity involves shared characteristics, but not all type identities are collective because not all involve identification. One can be a ‘French-speaker’ without identifying with the French (the example of France’s failed effort to form a collective identity with Algeria comes to mind). Collective identity, in short, is a distinct combination of role and type identities, one with the causal power to induce actors to define the welfare of the Other as part of that of the Self, to be ‘altruistic.’”15 To Wendt, “[a]ll four kinds of identity imply but are not reducible to interests. … [Identities] designate social kinds or states of being. Interests refer to what actors want. They designate motivations that help explain behavior. (I say ‘help’ because behavior also depends on beliefs about how to realize interests in a given context.) Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests. … Without interests [,] identities have no motivational force; without identities [,] interests have no direction.”16 Drawing from the social interaction theory, Wendt further explains the logic behind the production and reproduction of identities in the social process. Despite being socially constructed across the board, state identities can orient toward either domestic or international construction. “To a relatively large extent, state identities are endogenous to the international system, constructed by the system’s cultures, rules and ideas.”17 Identities determine the interests of actors, who then behave in accordance with such interests. In other words, a state’s identity and interests are constructed by the international system. Once a state actor acquires its identity and interests, it will behave accordingly. “A master can only exist in a slavery structure with available slaves. He can only act in accordance with his identity after having become a master.”18 Granted, changes in state identities will not directly affect state behaviors, but they will stir changes in interests and subsequently in behaviors. According to Wendt, the 15 Alexander

(2003, pp. 224–227, 229). (2003, p. 231). 17 Changping (2002, p. 93). 18 Alexander (2008, p. 23). 16 Alexander

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international system has “at least three kinds of structure at the macro-level, based on what kind of roles—enemy, rival, and friend—dominate the system,”19 namely the Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian structures. In a Hobbesian culture, states identify themselves as enemies and their interest lies in destroying each other. As a result, their dominant behavioral tendency is initiating wars to invade the other’s territories. In a Lockean culture, states identify themselves as rivals and are interested in seeking security instead of power or conquest. In a Kantian culture, states identify themselves as friends and are interested in seeking shared security through nonviolent and reciprocal behaviors. In summary, cultures determine states’ role identities, which in turn determines interests.20 Overall, the discussion of identities and interests in Wendtian constructivism revolves around one core concept: identification. Originally developed in psychology, the term refers to a social actor’s self-identity and individuality, i.e., the defining characteristics that distinguish him/her from others. Naturally, these defining characteristics are socially constructed and “constitute a self-representation based on others’ social acknowledgement. The self-representation and the others’ representations of the same actor have to be consistent.”21 The defining characteristics can also be understood as “the individualistic and distinctive images owned and displayed by an actor, which is formed on the basis of self-other relations.”22 For example, if a professor’s teaching competence is not approved by his students or any education authorities, then he will not be recognized as an excellent teacher. No matter how assertive he may be, his self-proclaimed identity as an excellent teacher will not be acknowledged by the others. Hence, identification is not self-affirmation or selfrecognition at the individual level, but the acknowledgement and recognition from the others through social interactions. Because identification or identity is established on the basis of social collective acknowledgement, interests (constructed by identification) are also determined by Self–Other relations. Correspondingly, state interests are formed and adjusted in the international community. “A country’s identification or identity refers to its own setting of its national image and features based on international acknowledgement. It changes with the mode of interstate interactions: over a certain period, interstate interactions can be consolidated into international norms, which in turn determine each country’s identification (identity) and interests. If the international norms change, so will the identification.”23 Constructivism’s core conceptual system, namely “shared knowledge (identification)—identity (interests)—behaviors,” has inspired the creative research on state interests, state behaviors and the ensuing changes. Once shared knowledge and ideas are formed between state actors, these specific ideas will dictate their exchanges, define their identities and interests, and prompt more accurate and reliable predictions on the other’s behavioral pattern. In particular, countries form shared ideas 19 Alexander

(2003, p. 247). (2003, pp. 246–312). 21 Shuyong (2001, p. 4). 22 Yongtao (1998). 23 Shuyong (2001, p. 5). 20 Alexander

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through interactions, based on which they are able to identify each other’s as enemy, rival or friend and construct mutual identification. For example, as the shared idea or cultural pattern of “Cold War” took shape after World War II, the conviction that the other country was an enemy was sowed in the US and the Soviet Union. It is such conviction that determined their mutual identities as enemies or rivals, their fundamental interests in annihilating the other party, and their confrontational conduct. On the contrary, the US, the UK and Japan constructed mutual identities as friends or allies based on the shared idea of friendliness, resulting in nonviolent and reciprocal interactions.

3.1.3 Holism (Structures) Constructivists maintain that there are two types of facts in the social world: (1) natural facts that exist independent of human will, such as mountains, rivers and population; and (2) social facts that exist on the basis of consensus, such as properties, marriages and sovereignties. In other words, social facts are actors’ shared knowledge created from collective intentions. Correspondingly, the structure of the international political system is two-fold, consisting of material and social structures. While the material structure refers to actors’ relative positions in a given society and the distribution of their material power, the social structure indicates the cultural contents of actors’ behaviors like the dominant beliefs, norms and concepts. In constructivism, social structures are regarded as objective facts and collective social phenomena encompassing three basic elements: shared knowledge, material resources and practices. Specifically, the nature of actors’ relationship is subject to the amount of shared understandings, expectations and knowledge, and actors will become more dependent on each other as the sharing increases. “[M]aterial resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge [(meaning system)] in which they are embedded.”24 Wendt further points out that “social structures are neither actors’ innate brain functions nor the creation of material factors. Instead, their creation and existence are the result of actors’ social practices. In other words, social structures are established on the basis of actors’ interactions. Moreover, they are not static but dynamic, for actors can construct a structure, deconstruct it, and construct a new one based on completely different ideas. If actors’ practices and ideas change, so will the structure of international system.”25 In a constructivist social structure, a given meaning system determines actors’ understandings of and reactions to their surrounding material environment. It also shapes the actors’ social identification, which in turn affects their identities, interests and behaviors. Hence, “countries find themselves in a close transnational and international social network, which controls their opinions on the outside world and

24 Alexander 25 Alexander

(1995). (2008, p. 20).

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their own roles in the international community.”26 If a country fails in understanding the social structure of the international system, then it will not be able to understand its own needs. Power and wealth are merely means rather than goals, and a country must be certain about how to use them. From the constructivist perspective, the international system’s structure is of a social nature instead of absolute materiality. Agents and social structures build onto each other, with the former being state actors and the latter being the distribution of ideas in the international system (also known as the culture of the international system). In particular, agents’ interactions lead to the development of social structure, while social structure also defines the agents’ meanings, identifications, identities, interests and their behavioral patterns in economic, political and cultural activities. As a result, social structure casts considerable influence on shaping the agents’ attributes. It does not exist independent of social actors’ knowledgeable practices, but is actually the product of these actors’ interactive practices. Because constructivism adopts a holist approach by examining state actors in the international system while individualism “overlooks” the social impact on individual identity, the former is superior to the latter in this regard. To be specific, the structure of the international system in constructivism carries the following characteristics. 1. The structure of the international system is the macro-international structure. Drawing on the social theories from German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), American social psychologist George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) and British sociologist Anthony Giddens (1938–), constructivism analyzes the microstructure, namely the structure of interactions. Meanwhile, under the influence of neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism, it also studies the macrostructure, eventually forming its unique micro-macro dualism of structure. To be specific, constructivists explain common knowledge, identification and role structure at the micro level while examining collective identity, culture and systems theory at the macro level. Any social structure, including the international system, is composed at the two levels. 2. The structure of the international system is mainly cultural. Drawn from actors’ social practices, ideas are the most fundamental factor in determining state identities and interests. As a result, they are seen as the core of the constructivist view on interests. State identities and interests are not pre-determined, but rather constructed through the interactions of states. Also, state interests are not static. Instead, they represent the outcome of a state actor’s interactions with the rest of the international community. To Wendt, the international system’s structure is composed of material structure, structure of interests and ideational structure. Because the ideational structure is essentially a cultural structure, which not only determines the meaning of material structure but also constructs interests, the international system’s structure is cultural in nature. The causal and constitutive effects of culture can target agents’ behaviors or properties (identities and interests) alone or together. 26 Shixiong

et al. (2009, p. 224).

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3. The structure of the international system constructs the properties of state actors. The relationship between the structure of the international system and states is constitutive: state interactions form the structure of the international system, while the structure shapes state actors. Hence, the pair is mutually determined and internalized, and their meanings are mutually dependent too. “Assume that in both systems materially dominant powers fulfill a similar function of stabilizing the system, and that they also understand that to be their responsibility, that they have the identical subjective mental states of a ‘hegemon.’ The content of those identities will still be different. In the system where the dominant state is legitimate, it will be empowered by the community of states to perform the functions of, and thus literally be, a ‘hegemon.’ In the other system, where the dominant state’s intentions have a strictly internal basis, other states will attribute to it the identity of ‘bully’ or ‘imperialist,’ and cooperate with its policies only when bludgeoned or bribed. A state literally cannot be a hegemon in such circumstances, any more than a person can be a master without a slave, or a wife without a husband. This does not prevent someone from thinking they are a master, wife, or hegemon, but in the absence of a relevant Other they are deluding themselves.”27 Of course, the structure of the international system is not ever static, but changeable. According to Wendt, it is formed through states’ constitutive interactions and changes with their interactive practices. When the structure of role identities between two states changes, their relations will also change accordingly. If the changes take place among multiple countries, then the international system will be transformed. The China–US reconciliation is a classic example in the history of international relations. The interactions between the two states played a crucial role in shaping role identities and their structures. To illustrate, the process of reconciliation can be generally divided into four stages. The first stage is signaling, during which the US sent signals to convey their willingness to reconcile with China. For instance, to end the hostility, President Nixon addressed China as the “People’s Republic of China” for the first time at a banquet. The second stage is studying. Based on the goodwill gestures of the US, China worked hard on interpreting the US’s real intentions, analyzing its own position in the international community, and anticipating the impact of reconciliation. The third stage is positioning and responding. After a comprehensive review, China seized the opportunity to ease the tension. It invited the US national table tennis team and the then US National Security Advisor Kissinger to visit China, with the latter’s trip conducted in secret. The fourth stage is re-responding, which includes the US’s response to China’s invitation and other gestures of friendship, culminating in President Nixon’s visit to China and the China-US reconciliation.28 Since then, the China-US relations entered a new era. The two states reconstructed a new social structure, smoothly transitioning from “enemies” to “rivals.” In conclusion, the methodology of Wendtian constructivism highlights social influence. It emphasizes the impact of the whole group on individuals as well as the impact of the international system’s structure on individual states, especially the 27 Alexander 28 Shuyong

(2003, p. 177). (2001, pp. 175–177).

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significance of the international system culture (also known as shared knowledge, expectations and ideas). In international relations, constructivism proposes three core propositions: first, the structures of the international system are both material and social. The material structure can be meaningful only within the framework of the ideational structure. The fundamental structure of international politics is of a social nature, not absolutely material. Second, identities constitute interests and behaviors. State identities are the basis of state interests, and state behaviors are determined and altered by the process of international politics (i.e., states’ social interactions) rather than the material structure. The understanding of the constitution of interests will help us explain many international phenomena that have been misinterpreted or overlooked by mainstream theories. Third, state actors and the international structure are mutually constitutive. Social structure determines the meaning and identity of any individual actor as well as his/her behavioral pattern in economic, political and cultural activities. The international social structure is the outcome of state actors’ social practices. Therefore, constructivism can be simply summarized as below: interactions form shared knowledge, shared knowledge constitutes state identities, state identities define state interests, and state interests determine state behaviors. To a certain extent, state identity is a country’s image. Hence, constructivism offers great insights into the construction of national image. First, constructivism sheds light on the fact that national image can be socially constructed. In previous studies, a state’s material power is considered the most critical factor in constructing its national image, which essentially reflects a materialist worldview or a materialist view of national image. Admittedly, we need to acknowledge the objectivity of material elements and that national image is essentially dependent on comprehensive national power. Nevertheless, these material elements can only acquire meaning through ideational elements. Thus, national image cannot be simplified as a reflection of a state’s reality. To some extent, it is constructed to convey a state’s identity on the basis of state interactions. “Quite often, national image does not faithfully reflect a state’s objective reality, for it is the product of state interactions.”29 Therefore, the key to national image construction is to form positive shared knowledge through positive interactions, which will then facilitate identity expression among states. Social constructivism enables us to better understand how national image is socially constructed. Second, constructivism hints at the feasibility of constructing a positive national image of China. State actors and the structure of the international system are mutually constitutive. Therefore, state actors’ practices may be affected by the international system’s structure, and the structure can also be changed when international interactive practices change. Nowadays, China’s national image is still challenged by negative and sometimes even harsh opinions in the international community. In particular, the Western world remains receptive to the “China threat” image while reports that “demonize” China are also common. Nevertheless, as long as we keep interacting with the outside world actively and constructing positive “shared knowledge” on

29 Qingling

and Aihua (2006).

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China, we will eventually turn those distorted impressions around and improve our national image.

3.2 A Constructivist Interpretation of National Image Instead of focusing on individual countries, the constructivist theory explores the effect of the international culture (structure) on national image. It lends a new perspective of macrostructure on the construction of national image. Why do countries care about their images? We may find answers from Wendt’s theory of collective self-esteem, which was developed on the basis of the three national interests (physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being) identified by American behavioral scientist Alexander George (1920–2006) and American scholar Robert Owen Keohane (1941–). Wendt proposed the fourth interest: collective self-esteem— “a group’s need to feel good about itself, for respect or status. … [It] can be expressed in different ways [and the] key factor is whether collective self-images are positive or negative.”30 According to constructivism, since national image is related to national interest, to construct a positive national image is to maintain national interests, i.e., to fulfill the need for collective self-esteem. As a result, a growing number of countries are working hard to maintain positive images. Constructivists argue that national image is not the product of a country’s own design, positioning or construction. Instead, it is the result of social or collective practices, i.e., it is socially constructed. Once countries have achieved mutual identification through interactions, they will determine the identity and subsequently the national image for each other. Here, national image serves as a realistic reflection of national identity and its construction implies a relational concept, whose mechanism can be outlined as “interaction (communication) → construction.” In other words, national image is not the basis or prerequisite for communication, but communication’s continuous outcome.

3.2.1 Model of Construction: Communication → Shared Ideas → National Image Obviously, constructivists do not view national image as an objective creation or a predetermined entity. Instead, it stands for the mutual understanding, acceptance and identification gradually developed between one country and the others through interactions. It represents the country’s “identity” or “role” in the international system. As a result, a country’s image can be defined as “the expression or reflection of its identity given by its target countries through interactions.”31 In this regard, 30 Alexander 31 Zhi

(2003, p. 236). (2011, p. 25).

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national identity is the basis and essence of national image, which in turn reflects national identity. Hence, the process and model of constructing national image can be illustrated as below: communication (interaction) → shared ideas → national identity → national image. Admittedly, the construction of national image is subject to domestic factors like material power, political system, cultural values, ideology and power of communication, but “to a large extent, national identity and image’s development conforms to cultural (identification) logic instead of non-material logic. After all, a country’s survival and development are guided by cultural logic. National identity and image are results of man-made choices (socially and collectively), not the consequence of natural selection.”32 None of the domestic factors or national behaviors can affect the construction of national image until it participates in interstate exchanges, i.e., sharing ideas and establishing mutual identification with other countries. National image and identity are created simultaneously, with the former being a reflection of the latter. Changes in one will alter the other as well. In Our Enemies and US: America’s Rivalries and the Making of Political Science (2003), Ido Oren (1958–), a professor of political science at University of Florida, wrote: “[in early twentieth century, the] images of Imperial Germany, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Stalin’s Soviet Union in American political science differ markedly from those presented before the regimes became America’s enemies. Imperial Germany was transformed from a progressive constitutional state into a recreationary ‘autocracy;’ Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Stalin’s Soviet Union metamorphosed from legitimate laboratories of social or administrative experimentation into embodiments of ‘totalitarian’ evil. The image of Japan, America’s other great enemy in the twentieth century, underwent the same process.”33 To sum up, the shift in a country’s identity (from friend to enemy) changed the Other’s (the US’s) “imagination” about the country (from progressive to evil). Furthermore, the Other’s positive identification will create a positive image of the Self, and vice versa. In terms of origin, national image is constructed through actors’ continuous activities and is maintained and reinforced by some models of social practices. Consequently, the construction of national image is essentially the process of creating, maintaining and changing meaning (shared knowledge). Shared knowledge forms the basis for constructing national image. “It constitutes actors’ identities and interests and affects and determines state actors’ specific behaviors, interests and goals of foreign policies in international politics.”34 Thus, shared knowledge (ideas, meaning) assumes a vital role in the construction of national image. It is formed through social interactions and communication. From the perspective of communication, interaction is information dissemination. All human communications and interactions (both among groups and individuals) are to disseminate information. “Every aspect of our daily lives is affected by our communication with others, as well as messages from

32 Zhi

(2011, p. 47). (2003, p. 9). 34 Xiaosong (2002, pp. 7–10). 33 Ido

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people we don’t even know—people near and far, living and dead.”35 That is why communication became the most pervasive, important and complex part of life. “[Communications] are the cement which [bind the society’s] fabric together.”36 Even though scholars both at home and abroad have yet to reach a consensus on the definition of communication, they generally accept that “communication is the process of information flow.”37 In particular, it refers to the process of exchanging different information, during which the disseminator is not simply giving out information and the receiver is not passively taking in the message. Instead, their relation is dynamic and interactive, suggesting subjectivity or intersubjectivity. In other words, the disseminator and the receiver influence and restrain each other. Moreover, communication denotes an ongoing, ever-shifting, complex and cooperative process of exchanging meanings, which are coded with both linguistic and nonlinguistic symbols that eventually form our world of meanings.38 In essence, communication is a socially interactive process of information exchange via symbols and media. Therefore, interaction is information dissemination. All human communications and interactions (both among groups and individuals) are to disseminate information. As we interact, we exchange information and extract meanings through symbols, which will then be used to form shared knowledge and ideas to explain our surrounding world. In general, our interactions or communication (both among groups and individuals) have progressed through five stages of development, namely oral, written, print, digital and Internet communication. Meanwhile, the form of communication has evolved from interpersonal to mass communication as well as from domestic to international communication, which are coined as the popularization and internationalization of communication. Specifically, interpersonal and mass communication are the two most basic forms. International communication, also known as cross-cultural communication, encompasses interpersonal communication between countries (e.g., meetings between heads of state, bilateral negotiations, cultural exchanges, trips abroad and business and trade) and mass communication aimed at a foreign audience through mass media. Nonetheless, all international communication is designed to “share information (including ideas and values), evoke the target country’s sympathy and sense of identity, establish positive mutual identification between the Self and the Other, and eventually create a positive national image of the Self in the eyes of the Other.”39 Drawing on constructivism, we need to keep the following points in mind in the construction of national image. First, national image is the result of special mental filtering. This psychological mechanism can shape national image through the information selection process (the 35 Littlejohn

and Foss (2008, p. 2). (1989, p. 27). 37 Zhengrong (1997, p. 62). 38 Here, “meaning” refers to (1) an object’s meaning given by subjects and (2) a symbol’s implied spirit. 39 Zhi (2011, p. 45). 36 Norbert

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conscious self-selection of media discourse power, effects of interests and cognitive pathway) and the culture selection process (the subconscious selection of media, cognitive and political cultures).40 As cross-cultural activities keep expanding, a growing number of ethnic groups now spend their lives across multiple societies. When different ethnic groups live in the same community, they increase not only diversity but difficulties in cross-cultural communication. Hence, if we hope to change people’s certain mindsets or opinions that contradict the facts, the key is to send out numerous, persistent and clear “effective messages,” which are the most fundamental building blocks/“inputs” for national image. “The communication of effective information is critical to national image construction, because it is a prerequisite for implementing many strategies (e.g., international publicity, media diplomacy, cultural communication, images of the government, the brand and the general public).”41 As a matter of fact, messages can only affect national image after they have “survived” the target audiences’ mental filtering. In other words, they have been actively selected and held onto by the general public. Second, in spite of their objectivity, material elements can only make a meaningful impact on actors’ behaviors through social structures. It is only until then that these elements will acquire any real substantive content. As discussed previously, the construction of national image is subject to state behaviors and many other factors both at home (e.g., economic and military capabilities, geography, the overall caliber of the population, political system, ideology, social culture, values, religion and communication capability) and abroad (mainly the implementation and execution of foreign policies). However, they cannot influence the construction until being introduced into interstate interactions, i.e., when the Self shares ideas and establishes mutual identifications with the Others. In fact, any country that utilizes social interactions and communication is an active agent in constructing the “reality” of its foreign relations. Moreover, despite the advancements in transportation technologies, the general public still largely rely on indirect sources like domestic mass media to learn about foreign countries. Therefore, a state actor ought to actively engage in international activities and utilize mass media in constructing its national images. Mass media has distinct advantages in information collection, organization and release, namely fast speed, high timeliness and a wide scope of dissemination and coverage. Hence, it is ideal for producing, reproducing and disseminating “effective information” on a large scale, which is intended to reach the international audiences, form positive “shared knowledge” and eventually construct a favorable national image. Third, while national image is shaped by interstate interactions (communication), it is also subject to their further reshaping. In particular, positive interactions promote positive shared ideas and knowledge and thus construct positive identifications, national interests and images, whereas negative interactions lead to negative identifications, national interests and images, causing misinterpretations of images and even confrontations and conflicts. Hence, if a country hopes to change its image in the

40 Wang 41 Youfu

(2006b). (2009, p. 17).

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international community, it must start with changing its interactions with other countries. This will allow new shared ideas and knowledge to form, creating a ground for the mutual reconstruction of national identities and images. For instance, driven by the active exchanges between the UK and the US, the modern UK–US relations have progressed from war, rivalry to allies, and their mutually recognized national images have transitioned from enemies, rivals to friends. In addition, the re-establishment of the China–US diplomatic relations in the 1970s represents the fruit of the new consensus, identifications and identities between the two countries, which were formed through positive interactions based on the convergence of their understanding of each other and the international system. Through sound interactions, China and the US embraced new identities as “strategic partners” and developed mutual state interests in strengthening cooperation and a series of international institutions. The release of the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America marked the initial stage of the institutionalized China–US bilateral ties on the basis of positive interactions. As a result, it is feasible for state actors to change ideas, identifications and ultimately their mutual identities and interests through interactions.

3.2.2 Intersubjectivity: “Self-Built Image” and “Others-Built Image” with Mass Media as Intermediary As discussed in the Preface, strong economic capability and high overall caliber of the population are not a guarantee of a favorable national image in the international community. However, a country’s image may change even if its material conditions or social system have stayed the same for a given period, and vice versa. In fact, national image is essentially determined by a country’s comprehensive national power, but it cannot be simply equated with the country’s actual conditions, because to a certain extent it is constructed and represents countries’ mutual identification based on social interactions. Therefore, national image is not just the product of static subject–object relations, but more often the result of intersubjectivity. Specifically, it is the end product of the integration between “self-built image” and “others-built image” through intermediaries like culture, symbols, information and social relations. “Self-built” refers to the subject’s own construction with an emphasis on intention, while “Othersbuilt” refers to the Others’ result-oriented construction of the subject. National image is built by both Self and the Others. Under the general circumstances of a relatively closed and static time and space, people usually adopt the “subject–object” model to interpret an object’s image, which reflects the simple relationship between subject and object. However, more frequently, we are involved in certain social relations and our interpretations of an object are often affected by the Others’. Furthermore, as we try to sort out the cognitive relations between people or countries, we are challenged by the realization that “the Other (the other country) is not an object.” As a result, we opt for the cognitive

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model of “subject–subject” or “subject–intermediary–subject,” i.e., a model featuring mutual subjectivity or intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity implies the being-with of subjects. Since subjects are essentially individualistic but exist in an intersubjective manner, intersubjectivity is actually the being-with of individualities. According to celebrated German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), “by reason of this with-like [mithqften] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mitdasein].”42 To Heidegger, there are two forms of being-with: (1) the falling characterized by alienation, where an individual becomes submissive to the group; and (2) the transcending authenticity featuring a free relationship between an individual and the Others. Hence, intersubjectivity does not oppose subjectivity or individuality, but rather re-affirms and transcends subjectivity. It is also the popularization and justified form of individualities. Based on the theory of intersubjectivity, the being of each individual or country serves as both subject and object in social interactions. It is both the agent and the object in cognitive activities and embodies the subject–object duality. Intersubjectivity first became a category in Western philosophy in the twentieth century. It focused on examining or regulating how one entity interacted with another complete entity. In A Dictionary of Philosophy (first published in 1976), Lacey states that “[s]omething is intersubjective if there are ways of reaching agreement about it, even though it may not be independent of the human mind. … Intersubjectivity is usually contrasted with subjectivity rather than with objectivity, which it may include.”43 As modern philosophy developed, especially after Heidegger’s work, intersubjectivity was given ontological significance. The concept is based on existence. Instead of constructing subject and conquering object on the ground of subject–object duality, existence refers to the intersubjective being-with and the exchanges and dialogues between self- and target- subjects. On the one hand, the subject–object relations are not direct but indirect in reality, which are established through the intermediary of intersubjective relations. Possible intermediaries include culture, language and social relations. Hence, intersubjectivity is more fundamental than subjectivity. The proposal of intersubjectivity marked a major epistemological change in social sciences, shifting the focus from subjectivity and “subject–object relations” on the cognitive level to the relations between subjects. Since then, the world, especially the phenomenon of spirit, is no longer considered an object but a subject in human cognitive activities. Meanwhile, intersubjectivity indicates the symbiosis, equality and communicative relations between Self- and target- subjects. On the other hand, the intersubjective epistemology also changes the basic content of the philosophical category “existence,” for it implies that “existence” is neither subjective nor objective, but is the intersubjective being-with. As an improvement of the traditional subject–object dualism, the ontological interpretation of intersubjectivity no longer views subject and object as antagonistic. 42 Heidegger 43 Lacey

(1962, p. 155). (1996, p. 168).

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Today, cross-cultural communication has already become a mode of existence for people and society. It relates to individual lives on the micro level and to countries, ethnicities, their relations and globalization on the macro level. Currently, the subject–object dualism based on the Western-Centrism and rooted in scientism has been harshly criticized both at the theoretical and practical levels. Researchers have generally agreed that no culture should consider itself as the subject and the Other’s culture as the object in cross-cultural communication. This consensus is largely inspired by the “intersubjectivity” theory from German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1929–), who unveils the differences between interpersonal and man-nature relationships. “How understanding meaning differs from perceiving physical objects: it requires taking up an intersubjective relation with the subject who brought forth the expression. The so-called perceptual theory of meaning explains the concept of communicative experience and thereby runs into a ‘forgotten theme’ in the analytic theory of science: the intersubjectivity that is established between ego and alter ego in communicative action. … Intersubjective understanding, because it is a communicative experience, cannot be carried out in a solipsistic manner. Understand [Verstehen] a symbolic expression fundamentally requires participation in a process of reaching understanding [Verstndigung]. Meanings—whether embodied in actions, institutions, products of labor, words, networks of cooperation, or documents—can be made accessible only from the inside. Symbolically prestructured reality forms a universe that is hermetically sealed to the view of observers incapable of communicating; that is, it would have to remain incomprehensible to them. The lifeworld is open only to subjects who make use of their competence to speak and act.”44 With mass media as its intermediary, the construction of national image is special (or complex) because the international cultural structure, national identities and images are all constructed through the interactions among actors and the game between Self-built and Others-built images. Generally speaking, the architects of national image will first design its exterior based on their own conception, identify goals for the construction, and fill in the internal content including values, cultural connotations and foreign policies. Then, they will promote the national image to maximize its efficacy and evaluate their own construction. Meanwhile, receivers usually interpret the cultural values, connotations and foreign policies advocated and disseminated by the architects based on their unique cultural backgrounds or practical needs, thus forming their own ideas and attitudes. As architects and receivers interact, extreme discrepancies in their understanding may occur. Nonetheless, through gaming and mutual adjustments, they will eventually reach a compromise and develop shared knowledge. This mechanism of construction is in line with Mead’s theory that “self” is shaped by “I” and “me.” “In correspondence with the three realities in communication (i.e., objective, media and subjective), a country’s national image can be analyzed at three levels: actual national image (objective reality), pseudo-national image (media reality)

44 Jürgen

(1984, pp. 111–112).

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and public image (subjective reality).”45 In particular, pseudo-national image is constructed by media and plays a vital role in constructing the public image. Generally speaking, there are two basic paths for media to construct a national image: (1) the “Self-construction” by domestic media and (2) the “Others-led construction” by foreign media. The term “intersubjective construction” depicts the joint construction by domestic and foreign media. In ancient times, international exchanges depended heavily on interpersonal communication; however, interstate activities have become increasingly involved with mass media in the contemporary international community. Consequently, mass media such as newspapers and periodicals, magazines, broadcast, television, the Internet and cultural products have become increasingly important intermediaries in the construction of national image. With the development of modern communications technology, especially new media technologies and new means of communication like satellite TV and the Internet, mass media’s border-transcending influence is more palpable than ever. Owing to the advancement of information technology, our society is gradually maneuvering into the age of global communication. Given information resources’ growing importance in economic globalization and the continuously increased values and benefits brought by information flow, information delivery has attracted more attention than ever. The wide application of mass media has encouraged international exchanges, promoting international relations to develop at unprecedented speed, depth and width. Driven by the powerful mass media, particularly the flourishing internet-based new media, we have progressed into the age of “mediated reality” where interpersonal exchanges gradually diminished. Our society has almost turned into a virtual environment or a “media reality,” which is the main pathway for countries to interact now. To some scholars, “the process of constructing national image is actually the process of establishing collective identities through the intermediary of mass media of different countries. In other words, it is the process of constructing a country’s media image. This typically involves four stages: media signaling (promotion), media interpretation (learning), media responding and media re-responding.”46 Intersubjective construction refers to the joint construction by Self (“Self-built”) and Others (“Others-built”). It is the ultimate way to shape a country’s national image. Not only does it reflect the essential interrelationship of different parties in national image construction, but it also sheds light on how countries can construct their own images more effectively. Regardless of its nature (by Self, by Others or intersubjective), construction rests on mass media (international exchanges). However, we must be aware that due to factors like cultural differences, value systems and national interests, mass media cannot always honor objectivity, authenticity and justice on all events and issues. Also, interstate media interactions are not always positive, sound or beneficial. Hence, mass media can lead to either authentic, fair and comprehensive or fake, unfair and biased construction. Like a funhouse mirror or a searchlight, media may distort or twist another country’s social reality, causing 45 Duan 46 Zhi

(2007, p. 8). (2011, p. 51).

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misrepresentation and misunderstanding (sometimes intentionally). Countries may engage in rounds of malicious media exchanges featuring degrading, challenging and even demonizing each other, which will lead to negative shared knowledge, mutually negative national identities and images. Moreover, in reality, neither the international system (cultural structure) nor national identities/images can be created with just a single media exchange. It takes multiple (if not countless) rounds of exchanges for countries to form shared knowledge and ideas and subsequently establish national identities and images. Of course, as countries interact (directly or through mass media), if they can identify a direct correspondence between the intersubjective relationship and obstacles in fulfilling their own needs through the fusion of horizons and the game of power, they may be able to reverse their national images.

3.2.3 The Age of Simulacrum: Information Game and Symbol Contest Information is the knowledge of specific facts, topics and events passed onto specific persons at specific times and situations, which generally refers to all content communicated in society. People rely on the acquisition and identification of information to distinguish objects and events, which then allows us to understand and reform the world. Information is in fact a form of universal connection. According to Baidu baike,47 the word “信息” (xinxi) is spelt as “information” in English, French, German and Spanish, as “情昱” in Japanese and as “资讯” in China’s Taiwan. It was referred as “消息” (xiaoxi, literal: news; information) in ancient China. “Information” was first used as a scientific term in 1928 in Transmission of Information by Ralph Hartley (1888–1970), an American researcher of electronics. In 1948, a clear definition was provided by American mathematician Claude Elwood Shannon (1916– 2001), widely known as “the father of information theory,” in his article A Mathematical Theory of Communication. From then on, many researchers came up with their own definitions based on their expertise. Below are some influential examples: Shannon assumed that “information is something that can be used to remove uncertainty.”48 To Norbert Wiener (1894–1964), an American mathematician, philosopher and creator of cybernetics, “[information] is a name for the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust to it, and make our adjustment felt 47 百度百科,

literal: Baidu Encyclopedia, is a collaborative and web-based Chinese encyclopedia developed by Chinese technology company Baidu, Inc, known for creating the eponymous search engine Baidu. Its test and official versions were released on April 20, 2006 and April 21, 2008, respectively. As of February 2018, Baidu baike has already included over 152 million articles covering almost all subject areas, with over 6.44 million netizens participated in content editing. The explanation of “information” can be found at: https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%BF%A1% E6%81%AF/111163?fr=aladdin, cited on March 22, 2019. 48 Mark and Wolfgang (eds.) (2017, p. 170).

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upon it.”49 Both versions are deemed classic and quoted by many. In economic management, information is viewed as valid data for decision-making. Information is represented by symbols. In particular, various types of symbols can be encoded and organized to form information, which can then transmit meanings through media. We acquire information in two ways, either directly through personal experiences or indirectly through others’ verbal and written communications or media symbols. Limited by time and space, a country’s general public rely mostly on social information systems (mainly the symbols provided by mass media system) to understand and cope with their reality. They develop impressions, evaluations and emotions toward other countries according to the information provided by mass media (the “pseudo-environment” of media). As discussed in the previous text, the “pseudo-environment” created by media is not a mirror reflection of social reality, but the information environment subject to media’s re-construction of selected events or information with symbolic meanings. Therefore, apart from the objective reality, such “pseudo-environment” also contains subjective factors of mass media.50 According to renowned American political commentator and communication scholar Walter Lippmann (1889–1974), “we must note particularly one common factor. It is the insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment. To that pseudo-environment, his behavior is a response. But because it is behavior, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo-environment where the behavior is stimulated, but in the real environment where action eventuates.”51 Mass media is the public’s main source of information on the external world as well as an important method to introduce a country’s national image to the international community. Information is encoded into symbols. Hence, symbols play an irreplaceable role in communication. In Mind, Self and Society (1934), Mead, the founder of symbolic interactionism, points out that interactions among individuals are indirect communication through the intermediary of “symbols,” namely symbolic interactionism. Human behaviors are purposeful and meaningful. In fact, many social behaviors involve interactions among both biological organisms and conscious Selves. In a stimulus–response process, humans are clearly aware of the possible responses triggered by their own gestures. When one gesture holds the same meaning for its sender and receiver, it will be considered a “meaningful” one, i.e., symbols. While animals can only interact through meaningless gestures (marks), humans can interact through both marks and symbols. It is the symbolic interaction that separates us from animals. Therefore, symbols form the basis for social lives. Through the use of symbols like languages, words, hand gestures and facial expressions, we interact and build a shared understanding. “Individuals are the products of social relations and the notion of self takes shape from social interactions. The communicative function of social interaction is achieved through languages, attitudes, words, hand gestures, facial expressions

49 Norbert

(1989, p. 17).

50 The “fictional environment” is permeated with media’s own thoughts and views, reflecting certain

positions and political leanings. 51 Walter (1998, p. 15).

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and symbols, which lead to the creation of spirits and selves and impact social structures, eventually forming shared institutions and cultures. Social interactions work their magic through all kinds of symbols, such as languages, words, cultures and institutions.”52 On the theological ground of Mead’s symbolic interactionism, constructivists conclude that collective identities evolve through social imitation, “simple” learning and “complex” learning. In Wendt’s view, through social learning, state interactions at the micro level can develop from the simple social structure consisting of each actor’s private knowledge to the social structure featuring highly socialized shared knowledge and cultural structure. Sound interactions will enhance two state actors’ mutual “understanding” and subsequently enable them to drop their previous “biases.” They will adopt a mutually approved attitude and form “shared knowledge,” thus changing and re-constructing the identification, identity and interests of “self.” The interactions and communication among state actors lead to the formation and development of the states’ “shared knowledge” (international cultural structure), which inherently defines their identities, interests and images. “What this means is that in initially forming shared ideas about Self and Other through a learning process, and then in subsequently reinforcing those ideas causally through repeated interaction, Ego and Alter are at each stage jointly defining who each of them is.”53 National image is the result of a special mental filtering mechanism. Because it is built on the basis of interstate interactions, which is communication in essence, its construction is essentially communication too. In other words, national image is the result of communication, particularly the communication of “effective information.” Therefore, national image is often dubbed as national media image. Given that the communication of “effective information” is at the core of national image construction, the competition for national image becomes increasingly attributable to, dependent on and represented by the game of communicating “effective information” among states in the age of mass media, characterized by information overload. Nowadays, mass media has already risen as a new dominant power in our reality. In the Western world, press and media are crowned as the “fourth power” (i.e., the power of media) after the legislative, executive and judiciary power. To Foucault, the way to exercise power has gradually transitioned from simple corporal punishment to psychosocial punishment in modern society. Through social contract, utilitarianism and symbolic representation, power further consolidates the legitimacy, universality and social effectiveness of its psychosocial punishment. In his influential work The Anatomy of Power (1983), American scholar John Kenneth Galbraith (1908–2006) classifies power into three categories: condign power, compensatory power and conditioned power. In particular, conditioned power is realized by changing others’ beliefs, e.g., gaining submission toward an organization or individuals through persuasion and education. Of the three categories, conditioned power is of most importance in modern sociopolitical life. It is exercised through tools like presentations, pamphlets, books and TV programs, all of which are the “modern

52 Ying

(2005, p. 163). (2003, p. 335).

53 Alexander

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representations of power.” Hence, mass media processes such power. Since the society is not immune to mass media, the impact of its invisible power is everywhere.54 “[M]uch of modern culture is transmitted by the media of mass communication. This has profoundly altered the phenomenological experience of living in modernity, as well as networks of social power.”55 Encoded by symbols, information and the consciousness of receiving information (developed on the basis of information) exert an enormous control on the entire society’s actions, emotions and even thoughts. Man has become completely submissive to the hegemony of media symbols. Empowered by symbols, humans are able to express thoughts, disseminate cultures and preserve civilizations. Human communication is mainly achieved through linguistic symbols. It also involves nonlinguistic symbols, though to a lesser extent. As noted by Armand Mattelart (1936–), a renowned contemporary French scholar of international communication, symbol “is a means of social control: the politics is set out with languages.”56 Nowadays, riding on the waves of information globalization, all ideas and meanings are mediated, i.e., once processed through symbolization and informatization, they will be rapidly disseminated to the rest of the world. To be specific, the coding of symbols features image–text combination, audiovisual integration and multimedia interactivity, and is widely used in current cross-cultural communication. As a result, countries portray themselves with symbolized imageries in the hope of triggering psychological effects in their target audiences. The game of information and symbol contest have become a main battlefield of international competition and a core subject in international relations. The trend of symbolizing international politics, national identities and images is irreversible. To a certain extent, symbols and their meanings dictate interstate behaviors and the dynamics of international relations. It is through the exchanges of symbols that national identities, statuses and images are shaped. Therefore, media symbols are vital in the construction of national image. As mass media becomes inextricably intertwined with our lives, we can foresee the emergence of a “media society” built by media events and the intensified interstate gaming of communicating “effective information” channeled through symbols. The US is the epitome of the trend: through various kinds of media, ranging from Hollywood films, broadcasting, print products, the Internet to Disneyland, it leads the global written, audio and visual communication and exerts an enormous power of communication in the world. Today, a country’s activities for survival and development are no longer confined within its borders. In fact, countries race to open up and engage in globalization. Through different means of international communication across a wide array of domains, they actively participate in dialogues and widen and deepen exchanges to seize opportunities, avoid risks, identify interests and seek development. The more powerful and effective a country’s communication is, the more likely it is to construct a favorable national image and thus obtain greater interests. It is irrefutable that the power of international communication is directly linked with a country’s ability to 54 Zhang

(2009). (2002). 56 Armand. Entrevue dans Le Monde,1 février (2002, p. 118). 55 Stevenson

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defend and further its national interests. In this process, media symbols have evolved from an “either-image-or-text” contest to the integration of both. As a result, images and texts now jointly control and influence communication, image construction and interests. Given the rising importance of constructing China’s national image, it is crucial to utilize the positive effect of media symbols in international exchanges (communication). However, when introduced to the rest of the world, both linguistic (i.e., Chinese characters) and audiovisual symbols (i.e., images and objects) have encountered barriers of various degrees. In addition, even though some may consider China a communication giant based on the quantity and scale of its mass media (e.g., television and radio broadcasting, newspapers and the Internet) or empirical data, its power of international communication is actually quite limited. There is still a long way ahead for China to become a true communication giant, and “Chinese symbols going global” remains an arduous task.

References Alexander, W. (1995). Constructing international politics. International Security, 20(1), 73. Alexander, W. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing). Alexander, W. (2003). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing). Alexander, W. (2008). Social theory of international politics [Chinese translation by Qin, Yaqing]. Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Publishing House. Changping, F. (2002). An analysis on state interests from a constructive perspective. Beijing: The Contemporary World Press. Duan, P. (2007). Communication strategies in national image construction. Beijing: Communication of University China Press. Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time [English translation by Macquarrie, John & Robinson, Edward]. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Ido, O. (2003). Our enemies and US: America’s Rivalries and the making of political science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Jürgen, H. (1984). The theory of communicative action volume one: reason and the rationalization of society [English translation by McCarthy, Thomas]. Boston: Beacon Press. Lacey, A. R. (1996). A dictionary of philosophy (3rd ed.). London: Routledge. Littlejohn, S. W., & Foss, K. A. (2008). Theories of human communication (9th ed.). Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth. Mark, B., & Wolfgang, H. (Eds.). (2017). Information studies and the quest for transdisciplinarity: Unity through diversity. World Scientific Publishing: Singapore. Mattelart, Armand. Entrevue dans Le Monde,1 février 2002 (propoe recueillis par Stéphane Mandard). Cited in Zhu, Zhenming. (2009). The Communication of National Image in the Digital Age in Asian Communication & Media Studies. Beijing: Communication University of China Press. Norbert, W. (1989). The human use of human beings: Cybernetics and society. London: Free Association Books. Qingling, D., & Aihua, L. (2006). Peace development cooperation—Several thoughts on the construction of China’s national image. Theory Journal, 4, 70–72. Shixiong, N., et al. (2009). Contemporary international relations theories in the West. Shanghai: Fudan University Press.

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Shuyong, G. (2001). Constructivism and international politics. Beijing: Changzheng Publishing House. Stevenson, N. (2002). Understanding media cultures: Social theory and mass communication. 2nd edn. London: Sage Publications, [no pagination]. Available from: https://archive.org/ stream/NickStevensonUnderstandingMediaCultures/Nick%20Stevenson%20Understanding% 20Media%20Cultures_djvu.txt. Accessed 23 March 2019. Walter, L. (1998). Public opinion (second printing). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Wang, Y. (2006a). International politics in the West: History and theories. Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Publishing House. Wang, J. (2006b). Power and reputation—A study on china’s national image and its construction in the US. Ph.D. Dissertation, Fudan University. Xiaosong, T. (2002). Constructivism: A method to explain decision making in foreign policies—A case study of the US Policies toward China in the 1960s. International Review, 1, 7–10. Ying, H. (2005). American media & China image: 1995–2005. Guangzhou: Nanfang Daily Press. Yongtao, L. (1998). A critical review on Western Neorealism and constructivism. World Economics and Politics, 11. Youfu, W. (2009). The construction and communication of the national image of China. Shanghai: Fudan University Press. Zhang, A. (2009). On media symbols & the construction of china’s image under the actor conspiracy effect. Social Sciences Review, 3. Zhengrong, H. (1997). Introduction to communication. Beijing: Communication University of China Press. Zhi, L. (2011). China’s international image—A constructivist reading in the age of global communication. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House.

Chapter 4

The Application of Cultural Symbols and the Misunderstanding of Cultural Symbols

4.1 Introduction Given the fact that symbols are the means of communication, information is usually realized in symbols of one kind or another. “Communication involves the sharing of the information symbols.” It is symbols that inform people about their outside world while the outside world is understood and interpreted through symbols. Symbols and their meanings help to create the identity, interests and images of a nation across interactions. People use symbols to communicate and create the national image of the “us” and the understanding of the national image as understood by the “others”.

4.2 General Analysis of Symbols Essentially, national image is not inborn by any nation, but developed via international interaction of self-projection and projection by “others”. National image is usually interpreted against a certain cultural background and is embedded in a symbolic system of specific meanings. In other words, international image is the discourse presentation and discourse construction that actors in international relations undertake by making use of symbols on the basis of a given system of cultural meaning-making. Consequently, an understanding of the implications and functions of symbols sheds light on the intercultural construction of national image both theoretical and practical.

4.2.1 Implications and Functions of Symbols Mankind truly resides in a world of symbols where human minds, languages and communication are inseparable from concrete symbols. The German philosopher Ernst Cassirer, one of the most prominent figures of the Neo-Kantianist Marburg School, © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Meng, National Image, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3147-7_4

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is well-known for his seminal works: An Essay on Man (written and published in English) (Cassirer 1944), Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923–1929), The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel (1969) and Language and Myth (1925). Cassirer noted that the entire culture, e.g., language, myth, art and religion, is created by man with symbols and that mankind is more a creature of symbolism than of politics. “The symbolic thought and symbolic behavior are among the most characteristic features of human life and that the whole progress of human culture is based on these conditions and is undeniable”.1 “He has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything except by the interpretations of this artificial medium”.2 According to Cassirer, mankind is the creature of symbols, more specifically, the creature of creating culture with symbols. While animals may merely react to signs, humans have transformed signs into meaningful symbols. While animals can only passively accept reality, humans live in their world of idealism and can often make idealism as reality. The entire progress of human culture is centered on “products” manufactured by symbolic thought and symbolic behavior, rather than on “given facts” left by Nature. Human civilization as a whole can be considered a process of self-emancipation. The philosophy of mankind is indeed the philosophy of human culture. One defining feature of humans is their participation in human cultural activities during which mankind is entitled to “freedom”. A real sense of human nature, dependent on systems of human activities, implies the indefinite creation of human beings. The varied forms of human culture: myth, language, art and science are merely different embodiments of symbols.3 Symbols are found anywhere, which is the reason why, as semioticians claim, the entire world is a system of symbols. “Man, in contrast, is surrounded by a universe of symbols. Starting with language, the prerequisite of culture, then symbolic relationships with his fellows, social status, law, science, art, morals, religion and innumerable other things. Human behavior, except for the basic aspects of biological needs of hunger and sex, is governed by symbolic entities”.4 Therefore, we might safely conclude that the human history of civilization refers to the history of constructing symbols, or the history of symbolizing nature and human society, or the human history of understanding the world by means of symbols. Then the question is—what on earth is “symbol”? What is the concrete definition of “symbol”? Although known for long, to date, the word has a vague defining realm that lacks consensus as to a concentrated and accurate conceptualization. This is evident even for classic authors. To ancient Greek authors, symbols were no more than omens. The Greek physician Hippocrates of Kos, the Father of Modern Western Medicine (460–370 BC) deemed the symptoms of his patients as symbols and earned himself the title of “Father of Semiotics.” The Greek physician, surgeon, philosopher and scientist in the Roman Empire Aelius Galen (130–210 AD) wrote 1 Cassirer

(1944, p. 45). (1944, p. 43). 3 Guo (2008, pp. 8–16). 4 Von Bertalanffy (1968, p. 197). 2 Cassirer

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a book on syndrome and simply named it Semiotics—a term meaning the study of contemporary symbols. The Christian thinker Aurelius Augustine offered a generalized explanation of symbol: “a symbol is something that, added with feelings and impressions, reminds us of something else”.5 It is inferred that symbols of some might represent others in the sense that they are both material entities in material life and psychological state of mind inspired with subjective impressions. It is worth noting that Augustine’s concept of symbol had a distinct impact on the founding fathers of modern semiotics such as Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) and Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). The Chinese character符 (fu), the first character of the Chinese term for symbol (符号fu hao), related to the meaning of signs, although a clear definition of symbols is not recorded in the Chinese history. There is a handful of phrases in classic Chinese that contains the character符 (fu). For instance, 符瑞 (fu rui) referring to good signs. While符节 (fu jie) and 符契 (fu qi) are inherently understood as the signs of keepsakes. 符selvam2 (fu li) refers to mysterious signs of the Chinese indigenous religion: Taoism. On Concepts and Their Instances 《指物 ( 论》 ; Zhi Wulun in the Romanized system of Chinese characters—pinyin (I suggest you include the Chinese characters.), the book written by Mr. Long Gongsun about a Chinese philosopher of the Warring States Period (475–221 BC), is regarded as the earliest monograph on semiotics in China. Featured as supreme abstraction, the book is acknowledged as the argument that is known to the fewest in the history of Chinese philosophy. It was documented in the Confucian classic The Book of History that “speech is defined as the voice of mind and that writing is defined as the mark of speech”,6 illuminating the fact that ancient Chinese philosophers observed that language is a kind of symbol of expression and realized the importance of Chinese characters as written symbols of recorded linguistic symbols. To them, characters are “the mark of speech”. Despite a lack of accurate definition, symbol is generally understood as any physical image that represents others in certain aspects. As a commonly used element that represents information, symbol may manifest human, object, group or idea of any kind, be it concrete or abstract. Under the inspiration of the general definition of symbol, it implies that language, words, mathematics, music, paintings, objects, postures, expressions, even odors, touch, rituals and customs may well be included in the broad realm of symbols. As the modern semiotician, Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure discovered, symbol is nothing but the dyad between the signifier and the signified. That is, one single sign may be classified into two components: the signifier and the signified. Signifier is responsible for the sound-image, or “image of the hi-fi” and the signified determines the concept/meaning of symbols. A symbol is the unity of these two individual parts. De Saussure used a proud metaphor of a piece of paper that perfectly described the duality as such. Concept as the upward side of this piece of paper and sound as the downward side of this piece of paper is in an inseparable, enduring holism. He further maintained that the bonding relationship between the signifier and the signified is absolutely arbitrary, making arbitrariness 5 Yu

et al. (1988, p. 12). (1980, p. 113).

6 Ruan

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the most inherent characteristics of symbols. As de Saussure stated: “I propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace concept and soundimage, respectively, by signified [signifre] and signifier [signifiant]; these two terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts. As regards sign, if I am satisfied with it, this is simply because I do not know of any word to replace it, the ordinary language suggesting no other”.7 Albeit a key and inspirational divide, the signifier and signified gained less attention than the signification that entails a holistic attitude toward the relationship mode of the signifier—the signified. Symbols are pervasive and permanent. As the accomplished Russian linguist Roman Jakobson (1896–1982) discovered, every message is made of signs.8 Nonetheless, signs may be varied and subject to a wide variety of semiotic categorizations based on the understanding of signs over the long history of semiotics; Charles Sanders Peirce’s (1839–1914) theory of signs was considered the most seminal in this regard. Peirce’s triad sign relation defined three roles encompassing: (1) the sign per se, (2) the sign’s subject matter, called its object, and (3) the sign’s meaning or ramification which formed a kind of effect called its interpretant (a further sign, e.g., a translation). Peirce suggested ten sets of trichotomy among which the most prominent is the categorization of signs into icon, index and symbols—“the most essential categorization of signs” according to Peirce. The criterion of the categorization as such is the relationship between the signifier and the signified, or rather the signification. First, the representation of icon as signifier is the portrayal of the signified, as manifested in the typical icon of portraits that are essentially realistic. A good example is the one of the world’s most well-known artwork—the Mona Lisa portrait by Leonardo da Vinci; it is an icon of the calm lady named Monna Lisa painted during the Italian Renaissance. It is certainly not the lady Monna Lisa herself but a representation of her. Second, the representation of index sign is the signification of causation, implicitly or explicitly, suggesting that the signifier is able to index the signified—usually definite entities or events in association with time and space. A good example of the index sign is the index information at the zoo giving directions to the locations of specific animals. As long as A represents the existence of B and such logic is known to the public, A could be viewed as the icon of B. Third, as far as symbol is concerned, there is no relation of causation or portrayal between the signifier and signified; the representation is based only on conventionalized agreements. A good example of symbol is language that the signifier language signs have only an arbitrary relation with the signified objects or concepts. Among the three types of signs, symbol is the most commonly mentioned and applied, as a result, to many people, “symbols are nothing but signs”.9 Figure 4.1 below illustrates the typology of signs.

7 de

Saussure (1915, p. 67). (1977). 9 Huang and Chen (2016, pp. 61–65). 8 Hawked

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Fig. 4.1 Three types of signs

In real life, the subject of human thought is symbols, through which human thinking is made possible. Human thinking transforms human understanding of appearance of the world into concepts, which are generalized and solidified in human brains as impressions of the objects and processes of both the outside world and the inner thinking world. Such impressions are symbols. “Human mental process is a process of signifying the world and human thinking is, in fact, a process of selecting, integrating, transforming and recreating signs.”10 Symbols reflect the relationship between mankind and the outside world. Culture is created with symbols that have transformed the natural world into the cultural world. Symbols “allow us to establish identity, express thoughts and feelings, reflect about ourselves, define and regulate relationships, and create interaction climates”.11 As the American anthropologist Leslie White (1900–1975) noted in the 1930s, “culture is the total of symbolic signs that created by all human activity”. White’s far-reaching concept of culture infers a dyad function of signs: cognitive and communicative. First, the cognitive function of signs refers to the symbols that help people to reason and discover the essence of matter. According to semiotics, cognition as behaviors of signs is the symbolic effort of people to acquire knowledge. Cognition being the primary function of semiotics is the most significant justification of how signs come into being. As Thomas Albert Sebeok (1920–2001) indicated, “another name of semiotics is cognitive science. I am sure about it.” Without the need for cognition, the advent of symbols would have been impossible in human history. Although cognition may be considered as behaviors of symbols, the ultimate goal is information gathering and understanding of objects in the outside world, rather than for the sake of cognition of symbols per se. Second, the communicative function of symbols refers to the human exchange of thoughts and emotions by means of socially conventionalized symbols. In terms of semiotics, human information communication is nothing other than humans accommodating behaviors through which the application of symbols is employed to express emotions, to exchange and to share information. Communication enables the extension of human imagination and sharing of information. The transference of information 10 Ding

(2010, p. 119). (2014, p. 90).

11 Wood

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realized by symbols is the very process from expression to understanding and from coding to decoding. Communicators have subjects or signified coded as symbolic signs before sending communicating, meanwhile decoding their interlocutors’ symbolic signs for meaningful messages. Coding refers to addressers’ signifying the message to be transmitted to the addressees, inclusive of two procedures—code-making and code-sending. In practice, single-sign (one word in a language) is rarely used but code-integrating signs are often used for meaning-making, allowing signification of symbols to be increasingly far-reaching and long-standing. Expression signifies signs and is the coding during which addressers present addressees with symbols to understand. On the contrary, understanding is the decoding process during which addressees decode symbols into meaning. Coding and decoding are an inseparable, circulating pair in symbol-based communication. It is sensibly observed that the same symbol might incur diversified gestation of the signified—meaning different coding and decoding occurs provided with varied time and space. A good example is the symbol for a dragon. An auspicious icon, a dragon is a cultural symbol for the Chinese people but an evil animal in the West. Another example is the swastika symbol (selvam1), an ancient Buddhist symbol in China and other Asian countries that evinces auspiciousness and good luck in Sanskrit; it was borrowed by Adolf Hitler as the symbolism of the German Nazi Party and as the emblem of Aryan race identity. As a result, the swastika has become stigmatized in the West by association with ideas of racism, hate and mass murder. In a similar vein, different symbols are likely to refer to the same subject or concept in the same time and space, as evidenced that both Uncle Sam and the Statute of liberty which are representative of the United States. This indicates the complexity of symbols that notoriously causes misunderstanding and confusion. Symbols are also noted for their arbitrariness, ambiguity, abstraction, variability and convenience. By arbitrariness, it is meant that signs and their signified objects/concepts have no absolute relationships and signs per se do not connote anything unless they are used in conventional ways to describe the world. By ambiguity, it is meant that the concepts signified by signs are very likely to be ambiguous, blurred and unclear. Sign users, consciously or unconsciously, are usually accused of blurring the signified concepts. By abstraction, it is meant that no signs are capable of explicating complete emotions and entire inner mental activities. Signs are not able to work for pragmatic effects unless in the appropriate contexts of accurate semantic meanings and adequate learner comprehension. By variability, it is meant that meanings of signs are not static but dynamic and always in a changing state even within the same culture. By convenience, it is meant that signs are easily packaged, stored, transmitted in media such as articles, books, photos, movies and computer discs for short-time communication and as long-term record. Owing to the above-mentioned characteristics, symbols are subject to the divergence of meaning that may incur misunderstanding, even confrontation in communication.12

12 Sun

(2008, pp. 45–46).

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4.2.2 Symbols and the Communication of National Image The French semiotician Roland Barthes (1915–1080), after his trip to Japan in the late 1960s, wrote Empire of the Signs, a seminal book on intercultural awareness, largely considered one of his best. He noted that each aspect of the life in Japan, e.g., language, cuisine, city design, product packaging, puppetry, rituals, poems, stationery, even faces may be symbolic for signs of a unique culture that absorbed him in in-depth ethical thinking. Barthes found semiotics useful in the critical examination of Japanese cultural phenomena. The Empire of the Signs with acknowledged subject originality, methodological uniqueness and conceptual profoundness in semiotics was a huge hit that attracted new readers yet caused tremendous cross-cultural shock, reflection and inspiration. For instance, symbolic meanings of Japanese dishes were very intriguing to Barthes. As he wrote: “…hence Japanese food establishes itself within a reduced system of substance (from the clear to the divisible), in a shimmer of the signifier: these are the elementary characters of the writing, established upon a kind of vacillation of language, and indeed this is what Japanese food appears to be—a written food, tributary to the gestures of division and selection which inscribe the foodstuff, not on the meal tray (nothing to do with photographed food, the gaudy compositions of magazines), but in a profound space which hierarchizes person, table, and universe13 ”. Barthes’s keen observation is a manifestation of cuisine culture, loaded with symbolic meaning. As a matter of fact, manifestations that relate to symbols are found in all aspects of a nation. Given the perspective of semiotics, we are equipped with uniqueness and exclusiveness in the construction of the national image. As previously mentioned, human creation, attention and study of symbols enjoy a long history and it might be said that humans had symbols upon their advent and all through their development. Humans created numerous, various, complicated symbols as forms of expression in an attempt to communicate information and convey meanings throughout the history of their various civilizations. Symbols play a critically significant role in the communication and development of human civilizations, as evidenced from record-keeping by knot-tying in primitive times to the advent of writing reading, from oracle characters of the East to Pythagorean numbers of the West, from hieroglyphics to Romanized letters, from letter correspondence to instant messaging, from face-to-face communication to virtual Skype communication. “The generation of multiple kinds of symbols help enable human spiritual maturity across history.14 ” The magic power of symbols lies in the fact that they not only reveal meanings but are also the carrier of meaning of socialized objects generating varied systems of meaning that broaden the width and depth of culture.15 It is symbols that nurture, the inheritance and the spread of human civilizations are made possible. There is no such thing as symbols that are not intended for communication, or rather, the only justification for the existence of symbols is communication. All 13 Barthes

(1982). (1999, p. 574). 15 Zhang (2011). 14 Li

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human spiritual activities, in the form of fables, fairy tales, art and science, are the mere expression of human experience, and, concepts are no more than specific applications of these symbols. Linking the flow of consciousness and orienting human spiritual activities, symbols are an organic unifier of social civilizations. Mankind is endowed with an innovative ability regarding symbols that allow symbols to be learned and communicated between individuals, groups and generations. The relations and interaction of and among human beings are the processes of generation and communication of symbols and their meanings. This interaction is inherently a mind process that is initiated by the sender and transferred to the receiver of the message where such transfer of message depends on the symbols of the sender as thinking subject. Thanks to the application of symbols, human interaction and social interaction are realities and make a lot of sense. The construction of a national image is concerned with the interaction among nations during which the interactional communication of symbols matters. In this sense, a prerequisite for national image construction is the signification of realities. As Harold Lasswell (1902–1978), one of the four founding fathers of communication, asserted in his Propaganda Technique in the World War (Harold 1927), propaganda is the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols.16 National image construction aims at “manipulating” the attitudes of outsiders toward the nation itself. State actors exploit symbols in their own expression of national images and interpret images of other nations with the help of their symbols. The power of image defines reality and constructs the reality basis upon which humans undertake actions. Individuals rely on symbols to express ideas and communicate meanings; state actors rely on symbols to manifest their cultures, values, identity and image. In contemporary times, symbols, as mediation in international interactions that move beyond the barriers of concepts, e.g., individualism, race, nation, society and culture, have become a popular “currency of consciousness” that circulates worldwide. The attention and effort that many nations have paid and made to their national image is beyond imagination. The United States, Japan and China, for instance, invested heavily in the production of national image short films in pursuit of a better presentation of the national image on the international stage. Symbols are embedded in the national image short films—the dynamic integration of visual signs—and are a common carrier of national image communication. In terms of semiotics, national image is a string of typically representative signified and secondary signification through which the nation itself has bridged the gap between itself and its international audience. This bridging effect enables the audience a holistic, in-depth idea of the history, culture, politics, customs, foreign policy and ideology of the nation, ultimately leading to the establishment and construction of a preferred national image. It is certainly noted that this fact might be endowed with different implications in the construction of national image due to a labeling effect. “Supposing that the first step being using symbols in the expression of national image, its effectiveness as the next step is the consideration of what kinds of symbols are to be employed for the acceptance of the audience and their collective beliefs and actions ultimately 16 Harold

(1927/1971).

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formed and undertaken, as pursued by the communicators of national image.”17 In other words, the second step is a matter of the selection of symbols and their means of communication. Not merely a means of information communication, symbols are able to indicate the political recognition of a concealment of the communicators’ status and power. Refraining from explicating facts, communicators are merely in need of providing the signifiers, leaving the implications to impress the media and the general public.18 The “who” question in constructing symbols is a known and representative issue in international relations, whereas the “how” question requires sharp thinking and presentation. As a political right in modern society, constructing symbols is far from an end but also a means—for being accepted in public policy-making and national image construction. The entitlement and acceptance of constructing symbols are usually realized in the game of powers.19 One of the reasons is that human expressions are often limited to symbols, despite their being the subjects of symbols. “It is not I constructing symbols, but it is I being constructed by symbols.” Furthermore, symbols are not only the tools of communication and interaction, but also a vital value carrier that plays a central and long-standing role in the formation of value orientation and way of thinking. Symbols are not only used literally but also metaphorically and implicitly. “The medium is the metaphor”—the claim of Neil Bozeman—implies that medium defines the real world with implicit yet powerful implications, meaning different mediums lead to different habits of information consumption. Communication is essentially the signification process during which information coding and decoding occur. Coding, as its name suggests, entails the process of designation, e.g., thinking, feeling and intensions to understandable codes through media technologies for the purpose of identification. Decoding, conversely, entails the process of converting coded messages into intelligible language, analyzing meanings conveyed through codes or evaluating their meanings. A prerequisite for coding resides in understanding the message receivers; otherwise, information can hardly be transferred. Within the same symbolic meaning system, the communication of symbols is no more than a continuity of coding and decoding, taking place among specific cultural groups according to conventionalized rituals. However, once the symbolic meaning system undergoes change, intercultural communication occurs during which coding and decoding fall short of the consensus. Misunderstanding and ambiguity often arise from intercultural communication, thus requiring both senders and receivers to select appropriate and prudent symbols to overcome cultural differences, to embody meanings of cultural symbols and to participate in social relations. National image construction is, in essence, a matter of intercultural communication. Due to symbols’ characteristics of metaphor, metonymy in coding process and of extension, value adding in decoding process, the success of symbol communication depends on sender effectiveness of the choice, integration, transformation and recreation of symbols. To achieve shared meaning in the construction of national 17 Ding

(2010, p. 121). (2006, pp. 157–159). 19 Ding (2010, p. 122). 18 Li

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image, it is necessary to extract the most critical symbols—from among the complex of symbols selection—which signification may be well understood and recognized in the international community. In other words, the international community audience has no difficulty in comprehending the signifier and the signified that lead to audience resonation and eventually the meaning symbolized as shared beliefs between “us” as the communicating state and “others” as states being communicated.

4.3 Application of Cultural Symbols in the Construction of National Image The construction of national image is based on the interaction of symbols. Cultural symbols, among a variety of symbols, have been widely applied in constructing national images as a key conflicting manifestation of discourse presentation and discourse representations. That is, national image is largely constructed via cultural symbols. We should not ignore the fact that the misinterpretation of Chinese cultural symbols is prevalent in international communication and that China’s image construction and the inappropriate selection of cultural symbols and communication strategies substantially hinders the internationalization of Chinese culture and China’s image.

4.3.1 Connotations and Definitions of Cultural Symbols Culture and communication are inseparable. Communication is related to cultural forms and social behaviors, which is why culture can be considered communication per se as claimed by Edward T. Hall, Jr. (1914–2009), the founding father of the discipline of intercultural communication. Mediated through symbols, communication, as the primary element of cultural development, constitutes the core of culture and social life. A review of cultural literature indicates that there are no fundamental differences in the cognitive root and understanding of culture between West and East. Originating from the Latin word “cultura”, the English word culture has meanings associated with tilling, grooming and training. The Period of Enlightenment thinkers interpreted the word culture as “a ration that counterweighs barbarianism” and by the late eighteenth century, culture as a term was used widely in the everyday life of the Europeans. In the Book of Changes (also called The I Ching, or Yi Jing易经), a Confucian classic, “文” means various forms of crisscross, such as in “物相交, 故曰文”, now literally as “crisscrossing of things is called 文”, (translated by James Legge as “the component elements are mixed together, and elegant forms arise”). “化” means the process of change, such as in “男女构精, 万物化生”, translated by James Legge as “there is an intercommunication of seed between male and female, and transformation in its living types proceeds”. “文” and “化” have also been used in parallel as

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in “观乎天文, 以察时变; 观乎人文, 以化天下” which means “to know about the change of time, one needs to examine astronomy; to change the world, one needs to examine the “文” of people”. It was no later than the Han dynasty(202BC–220AD) when the meaning of “文化” stabilized as “the change of people”. What is culture? Culture is notoriously hard to define. There are numerous definitions of culture, as a great number of scholars and celebrities have attempted termed culture. Although there are over 400 definitions of culture, the British anthropologist Edward Taylor (1832–1917) is usually acknowledged as the pioneer who offered the earliest and groundbreaking definition of culture in his book Primitive Culture published 1871. As Edward Taylor noted in 1871, “culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”.20 Furthermore, having listed over 160 definitions of culture in their monograph “Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions”, American cultural anthropologists Alfred. L. Kroeber (1876–1960) and Clyde K. M. Kluckhohn (1905–1960) held that “culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may on the one other hand, be considered as products of action, and on the other, as conditioning elements of further action.21 ” Another American cultural anthropologist Glifford Geertz (1926–2006) argued in 1973 that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun and he took culture to be those webs. Therefore, the analysis of culture is not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.22 In 2001, UNESCO announced in the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity the definition of culture: “culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that is encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs”. In this definition, it is inferred that culture has two characteristic features: (1) it is accepted and shared among particular ethnic groups and members of a society; (2) it is always associated with a particular ethnic group and is embodied in the common language, common habits, common mentality and characters of ethnic groups as such. An integration of a wide variety of definitions of culture suggests that culture bears three distinctive features: (1) it is created by humans and used to educate humans; (2) culture is handed down from generation to generation and is subject to change; (3) culture is learned, exchanged and changeable. As anthropologists correctly claim, culture is thinkable, learnable and livable. Now that culture’s meaning is expressed in a way that is either implicit or explicit, this expression of meaning has to rely on the communication of symbolic signs. 20 Tylor

(1871). and Kluckhohn (1952, p. 181). 22 Geertz (1973, p. 5). 21 Kroeber

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“Meaning is what gives us a sense of our own identity, of whom we are and with whom we belong”.23 Meanings of representation reinforce our recognition of traditional culture and construct our cultural identity. In this sense, culture is a world of meaning and symbols. Man is the “animal of symbols”. As a combination of symbols, culture is the basic lifestyle of human beings. Geertz (1973) maintained that culture denotes “a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life”.24 Despite language, as a kind of symbols, culture is also manifested in objects, tools, artifacts, symbolized tokens and people’s lifestyle that constitute the entire hardware and software of any human society. These symbols leave a trace of both the material and spiritual life of mankind. We might observe the scenes of past life by locating the traces of symbols as tailors sew and mend separate pieces of cloth to make complete sets of clothing. We might also link symbols chronologically for a history of culture guiding us from the past to the future, just as detectives link their evidence chronologically for the most plausible and complete truth of a case. As a matter of fact, the ability to study culture lies in the fact that we are able to study symbols and enable cultural exchanges by means of symbols. As for the components of culture, the system of symbols is significant. Culture is a symbolic concept through which symbols of culture manifest man’s creative ability and distinguish mankind from other creatures. Ethnic groups and nations have their unique cultural heritages and cultural charms, realized through their cultural system of symbols. In view of the definitions of culture in literature, it is argued that cultural symbols refer to the condensed identification of cultural resources over a long period as well as the essence of material culture and spiritual culture in a given ethnic group, nation or region, representing the characteristics in relation to spirit, substance, intellect and emotion of societies and social groups. The diversity of cultural symbols reflects the richness of cultural contents and it is certain that the categories of cultural symbols are based on the different criteria applied. There are national cultural symbols based on the criterion of nationality; material and spiritual cultural symbols upon the criterion of nature; and symbols of people, festivals and brand and so on upon the criterion of characteristics. The characteristics of cultural symbols are distinct, in comparison to symbols of other types: (1) cultural symbols are more value-added, as they are the essence of material and spiritual culture over a long period of history and the condensed identification of cultural contents in a given ethnic group, nation or region; (2) cultural symbols manifest more national/ethnical features, as they are key representations of national/ethnical culture with which national culture and history are intrinsically imbued; (3) cultural symbols are more identity-conscious, as they give people a common identity of a nation/culture, cultivate their cultural self-confidence and national pride in their mature sense of cultural identity; (4) cultural symbols are better means for the construction of image, as they stimulate resonance among insiders of a given 23 Hall

(1997, p. 3). (1973, p. 89).

24 Geertz

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culture and arouse interest among outsiders of the given culture that may lead to interaction, exchange, understanding and consensus. Owing to these considerations, cultural symbols, as useful resources of representations and discursive constructions, are applied constantly in the construction of national image. Needless to say, the virtual image of a nation is largely subject to its cultural symbols. For instance, the answers to the question “what is Japan” are likely to be mere imagery such as kimono, cherry blossoms/sakura, Japanese national music, Japanese tea ceremony, animation industry, SONY and Yasukuni Shrine, whereas those to the question “what is China” are another set of imagery such as Confucius, the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, Beijing opera, Chinese traditional medicine, Kong Fu, the National Aquatics Center (Water Cube), the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, Chinese characters and the giant panda. A nation is an entity of culture and the representation of the national image depends on its the massive elements that constitute culture or simply, cultural symbols. China has over 5,000 years of history that nurtured the splendid Chinese civilization among which a great number of typical cultural symbols of different ages and places are well-known. Despite these achievements, it is still a somewhat vague concept as to the cultural symbols of China, similar to the vagueness of the socalled construct of Chinese culture, which can hardly be defined in one sentence. Baidu, the a frequently used search engine in China, suggested that the most symbolic Chinese cultural symbols include Chinese calligraphy, seal-engraving, Chinese knots, Beijing opera face painting, shadow puppetry, martial arts, Tai Chi (shadowing boxing), acrobatics, bricks of the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC) and tiles of Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), terracotta warriors, oracle bones, “Four Treasures of Study” (brush, ink, paper and ink stone), the four great inventions of ancient China (gunpowder, printing, paper-making, the compass), red lanterns, Chinese porcelain, Chinese painting, giant panda, red flag, and the Yangzi and Yellow Rivers. Based on a list of 270 representative Chinese cultural symbols, a study indicated that the 10 most representative symbols appropriate for overseas promotion in the view of Chinese undergraduate university students were Confucius, Chinese language/characters, Chinese traditional medicine, Chinese calligraphy, Kong Fu, Chinese cuisine, Beijing opera, the Great Wall, ancient Chinese poems and Chinese tea. First ranked Confucius was selected only by 700 students, less than half of the 2,000-total participating in the study; the tenth-ranked cultural symbol-Chinese tea, got into the top 10 with only 300 votes; this is indicative of a rather wide spectrum of student preference and interest. The findings called into question the status of these cultural symbols, which without exception originated in traditional Chinese culture, not modern Chinese culture nor contemporary Chinese society that also have a number of more modern cultural symbols promoted by the present-day China’s core value system.25 This study shed light on understanding Chinese undergraduates’ attitude toward Chinese cultural symbols and international promotion possibility of such cultural symbols. Nonetheless, the study’s limitations are evident in that, first, no international participants were included; secondly, there was no distinction between 25 Liu

and Wang (2011).

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cultural symbols and signs and the cultural symbols were not clearly defined; thus, the study fell in reliability. A culture does care about its image, because individuals, nations and ethnic groups are all concerned about their own image. It is clear that national image, to a large extent, is the image of national culture, in other words, national image reflects the cultural symbols of a given nation or specifically the meaning representations entailed in the cultural symbols of the given nation. National image, as the cultural selfintegration of one country, may be regarded as the nation’s spiritual self-identity. An analogy could be drawn between the corporate identity system and national identity conceptualization. National identity is a tripartite integration of national mind identity, national behavior and national visual identity, among which the advanced level national mind identity is composed of power system and spiritual identity; the intermediary level is composed of the movement and dynamic systems; the preliminary level is composed of the material and static systems. In a similar vein, national culture is a key determiner of national image—meaning national spiritual culture generating the national mindset whereas national institutional culture stipulates national behavior and lastly national material culture forms the national visual culture. National image entails the refining and externalization of the most profound, positive and influential components of national culture. National image construction means the overall integration and modeling of the national culture, during which, internally, it assumes the public recognition of national culture and externally calls for the globalization of the given culture. Hence, the effectiveness of national image construction depends primarily on a country‘s intercultural communication ability, which ultimately relies on the cultural symbols of the given nation. It is important that, in the age of accelerated globalization, China skillfully selects, promotes and communicates a series of Chinese cultural symbols in its national image construction that bear universal cognitive values and resonate within the international community.

4.3.2 Hollywood Movies and the National Image of the United States Hollywood is certainly a brand that needs no introduction in the world’s film industry. A component of paramount importance in American culture, Hollywood movies are reputed not only in setting the highest standards in the world’s film industry but also in playing a vital role in providing cultural symbols for national image construction of the US Hollywood which has served as a powerful tool of foreign policy of the US ever since its emergence around 1900 when the United States made its début as a world power in the international community. It was not long before Hollywood became the magic extension of America’s global ambitions. Tracing back to its history, Hollywood, an open area just west of the city of Los Angeles, was acquired by the wealthy businessman H. Wilcox. Upon his death, it was inherited to his wife who named it “Hollywood” in the year of 1891. After

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1909, Hollywood attracted independent filmmakers who gaining momentum in film making later spread all over the US. By 1913, the area was teeming with studios and Hollywood became a synonym for American movies. Gradually growing into a political force, Hollywood remained an enigma to many American politicians. As the then American president Woodrow Wilson confirmed: “film has come to rank as the very highest medium for the dissemination of public intelligence, and since it speaks a universal language, it lends itself importantly to the presentation of America’s plans and purposes”. The establishment of the Committee on Public Information in Congress by President Wilson in 1917 was seen as a high point for the partnership between Hollywood and the US government. The committee’s primary goals were to use every medium available to enlist public support against the foreign and perceived domestic attempts to prevent America’s participation in World War I and to spread the “Gospel of Americanism” overseas. Into the 1920s, the fierce competition in the filmmaking industry sparked merges and acquisitions coupled with large-scale bankruptcies that eventually led to a monopoly by the eight giants, taking over not only the US but also the world’s film markets: Metro-GoldwynMayer (MGM), Paramount, Warner Brothers, twentieth Century Fox, Radio-KeithOrpheum Pictures (ROK), Universal Studios, United Artists and Columbia Pictures. The eight companies by the 1920s were the producers of the majority (three quarters) of the world’s films and wielding their unparalleled influences in manipulating British and Canadian markets. Subsequent to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, which finally brought the US into the World War II, the US President Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt invited Hollywood entrepreneurs and tycoons to the White House. Hollywood’s willingness and enthusiasm in producing propaganda films for the White House were noted in many of their productions. A good example was the 1944 biographical film about the 28th American President Woodrow Wilson, a propaganda production glorifying his contributions in creating a new world order under the leadership of the League of Nations. In conjunction with Hollywood’s soft power, in 1945, the US government consolidated its military “hard power” to achieve victory in the World War II. Essentially a Hollywood subsidy plan, the Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) initiated in the year of 1948, provided economic aid and culturally influenced the war-devastated nations of Europe, thus the Hollywood tycoons received a generous government subsidy that worth tens of millions of dollars. A US senator stated that Hollywood should “make contributions to the global Marshall plan in the domain of ideas”. To respond to this call, a Hollywood producer suggested “let Donald Duck be America’s world ambassador”. With its movies spreading American values and lifestyle, shaping international public sentiments and public opinion, maintaining and enhancing its national image and affecting people’s perception of the outside world, Hollywood movies became America’s the most powerful weapon of international cultural imperialism and the most important channel for promoting American values and ideology during the Cold War when spying was a focal theme in Hollywood movies. After the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the terrorist attacks in 2001, the US became actively involved in military confrontations with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, making anti-terrorism another key issue

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of Hollywood movie. Against such a backdrop, many Hollywood artists became victims of political repression McCarthyism, (e.g., the Second Red Scare movement), or simply the Cold War Mentality. For instance, Darryl Zanuck, a Hollywood producer, director and vice president of the twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, used to comment in the British magazine Film and Filmmaking in June 1961, taking substantial pride in calling Hollywood movies “ambassador in the iron box”. He wrote that “these round boxes are filled with tightly rolled films that will travel all over the world, composed of American film producers’ ideas, imagination and creative talents. I believe American movies are most effective for the destruction of Communism.” Four months later, the Kennedy administration sent a memorandum to Hollywood, requesting film industries to be in closer conformity with the nation’s “world strategy”. In his bestsellers such as The Real War, Real Peace and 1999: Victory without War, the former US president Richard Nixon repeatedly warned the US government to be extremely alert to the central role of movies and radio in communication with the world. Thus, it is no wonder that former Hollywood actor and US president Ronald Regan called Hollywood movies the “campaign based on a global scale”. As a matter of fact, the entertainment industry famous for commercialization and independence has long been a strategically critical component in the national image construction and communication of the US government. While earning huge foreign income, Hollywood movies have penetrated all parts of the world with American culture and values. In the 1920s, then Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover asserted that movies should not be exported as ordinary trading goods only because as they shoulder the responsibility of foreign influence with American lifestyles. According to a US congressional report, as the goodwill ambassadors that need no American taxpayer support, Hollywood movies keep the world informed of the American lifestyle and their values, politically, culturally and commercially, and are immeasurable. As a result of economic globalization, Hollywood movies realized unprecedented expansion on a worldwide scale in the past few decades. Since the 1990s, the Hollywood blockbusters exported to China have earned hundreds of millions in income annually by attracting numerous Chinese audiences and consequently posed a serious threat to Chinese cultural identity. For instance, adopting the Chinese legendary saga of Mulan Hua, Disney’s animated movie Mulan in 1998 was a huge hit. However, to cater to the primarily Englishspeaking countries, the film was injected with Americanized heroism and egotism not a part of Chinese culture, and an absolute distortion by the cinematographer. The premiere of Mulan in Los Angeles in June 1998 attracted many celebrities. In total, Mulan made earned a stunning annual revenue of $120 million in the US and $300 million across the globe, and was ranked as the 11th most watched movie in the US and the 12th on the Worldwide Box Office Top 100 in 1998. Kong Fu Panda, another Hollywood movie incorporating Chinese cultural elements of martial arts and the giant panda unique to China, is also an instance of spreading Westernized values disguised with Chinese cultural symbols. Released in the same year, 2008, a couple of Hollywood megahit films—The Forbidden Kingdom and The Mummy: Tomb of the Dragon Emperor also had themes and scenes

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borrowed from traditional Chinese culture yet is deeply rooted in Westernized individualism and heroism. A former US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs once bluntly remarked on July 1995 in meetings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “international trade of cultural products are not merely means of accumulating wealth, but the channel American ideas and idealism rely in order to penetrate the perceptions of the Chinese people. In the long run, such international trading, by opening the market for the American ideological industry (movies, laser discs, software and television) and products that facilitate international communication (faxes, internet, computers), are likely to improve the human rights of the Chinese people, an enhancement that counts as much as all of our efforts, immediate or intergovernmental.” In the global scale, the box office revenue generated by Hollywood movies can be stunning; annual revenue of Hollywood movies has amounted to $20 billion since 1994. No wonder a US politician pointed out correctly that America’s largest exports are no longer land crops, nor factory products but the manufactured American culture.26 Hollywood movies are well-known and popular for their sophisticated cinematic technologies, intriguing screenplays, advanced acting professionalism, exciting sensory stimulation created by perfect visual and audio effects and above all—enormous financial investment. Despite its commercial entertainment value, as a hotbed for global pop culture, the century-old Hollywood film industry is deeply engraved with political themes that are commonly found in action movies, e.g., national security, spying and anti-terrorism. The foe-conscious mentality reflected in Hollywood films protects American values and established order. French sociologist Jean-Pierre Valentin (1963–) suggested that as a vital tool in realizing the hegemony of US national security, American films make heroes of American civil servants, glorify the United States, visualize official and collectively imagined threats-all to support one proposition: The United States of America is a magical and invincible country.27 Indeed, while the Hollywood blockbuster Transformers dominated global cinemas and TV screens, its invisible and implicit beliefs of Americanized concept of democracy and sense of freedom managed to creep into the minds of the global audience subconsciously to form consensus and values. For example, the real-time reaction of Americas’ pride—the United States Marine Corps, a detail in the Transformers, incidentally won worldwide respect and recognition due to the superb buzz generated by this film. What was inferred from the movie Mulan was certainly not Chinese but American values by the presentation and narrative of Mulan from the Western perspective and the demonstration of the fabricated rebellious spirit of this historical Chinese figure of about 1,500 years ago. Hollywood movies, such as Titanic, Saving Private Ryan, Avatar, Batman, Spiderman, Iron Man, Pearl Harbor and The Bourne Identity, have constructed an American superhero international image, exported American lifestyle and values, and created global admiration and recognition of American culture while making enormous financial profit worldwide. In 26 Hu

(2004, p. 191). Reference News, 08 Aug. 2004.

27 Source:

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summary, the United States is overwhelmingly successful in national image construction and presentation, as well as in international communication with the public in the US and abroad by using Hollywood movies as a significant cultural communication channel.

4.3.3 Japanese Animation Industry and the National Image of Japan Known as the Kingdom of Animation, Japan, as the world’s largest producer and exporter of animation, is the origin of 60% of the world’s animation productions and 80% of those in Europe. Among the diversity of Japan’s cultural industry, animation programs and films broadcast on TV and in the cinemas are worthy of particular attention, with their cartoon characters found not only physically in every corner of the public sphere but also psychologically in every part of the Japanese social life, far and wide beyond the boundaries of magazines and TV where they initially appeared. The lost decade of Japan in the 1990s witnessed profound and long-lasting industry restructuring in an attempt to extricate itself from economic recession caused by the collapse of the bubble economy. One of the many important factors that led to the rise and success of Japan’s cultural industry is the government’s strategy to rebuild national strength by promoting Japanese culture, which more precisely, is the transitioning of Japan’s image from that of a Japan that manufactures goods to a Japan that creates culture and from a product manufacturer to an exporter of “cool culture”. A transition positioning as such is a brand-new construction of Japan’s national image during which Japanese animation industry pioneered and took the initiatives to position impressive national cultural symbols in the minds of the global audience, both youths and adults. Japanese animation served as a boon for promoting Japanese culture, projecting Japan’s national identity and enhancing Japan’s national image and global impact. The 1990s also witnessed Japanese comics and cartoons flooding into China, represented by the most famous cartoon character Doraemon, followed by Smart Ikkyu san, Hello Kitty, Saint Seiya, Dragonball, Nowara Shinnosuke, Sakura Momoko and Astroboy. These cartoon characters won exceptional popularity among Chinese teenagers and adults for their vivid portrayal of adolescent life with brilliant imaginary plots. Children particularly favor animated cartoons with heroes bravely struggling for life and success and themes of growing up. Meanwhile, a many Japanese comics and animated cartoons penetrated the North American and European markets, making huge fortunes from TV stations in France, Italy and the US. In every American video shop there is a special Japanese corner and there is a dedicated TV channel for broadcasting Japanese animated cartoons. Produced by the Japanese animation corporation giant Nintendo, Pikachu, was such an absolute rage across America that the cartoon film earned $1.01million in box office revenue on the single day of its premiere. Further, the TV program Pikachu has been aired in 68 countries in 25 languages.

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Entering the twenty-first Century, Japanese animation has become a new mania on a global scale in that 60% of world and 80% of European broadcast animation films are of Japanese origin. Not only has animation an indispensable part of social life in Japan, more importantly, but it has also created a brand-new global culture, wielding the gigantic soft power of Japan internationally. Japanese former deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso (1940–) advocated in his 2006 speech “New Prospect of Cultural Diplomacy” that Japan should strive for a better international image with the international audience, especially the younger generation, via animated cartoon production and comics publication, as simply “animation diplomacy”. Mr. Taro Aso said the Japanese government looks forward to establishing Japan’s image and marketing Japan’s dreams via exports of animated productions. By means of the animation industry, Japan expects to create an image of brightness, warmth and being cool. The audience is deeply absorbed and hooked on the charismatic dialogs, dramatic, exciting plots, intriguing visual effects, and cute, lovely characters of the animated cartoon and comics that exert an implicit influence on audiences with Japanese values, mentality and standards distinguishing between right and wrong.28 In addition to the long-standing pursuit of sensory stimulation and knowledge-sharing, Japanese animation, as do Japanese movies, manifest thought-provoking reflections upon life, the times and society as well as an analysis of human nature that endows its productions with spiritual contents and philosophical implications. The sensational success of Japanese animation is well-known. While Hollywood movies are characterized by entertainment and explicit freedom, Japanese animation is characterized by narrative and implicit restraint. De spite of differences regarding style and contents, Japanese animation is as successful in economic revenue and social impact as Hollywood movies. According to a 2016 report, Japanese animation ranked as the nation’s third pillar of industry with annual revenues amounting to 230,000 billion Japanese Yen. The total income generated by exports of Japanese animation and related products to the US is four times that of Japanese steel products to the US. The unprecedentedly overwhelming influence of Japanese animation is evident in the 15-year ongoing broadcast of Naruto from the first episode of JUMP 43 in 1999 to the final episode of JUMP on November 10, 2014—an unforgettable experience in the adolescent years of millions of fans who were deeply impressed by Naruto characters like Naruto, Sasuke, Sakura, Kakashi and Orochimaru. In spite of the touching narratives of the Japanese cartoonist Kishimoto Masashi (1974–), the continuing success of Naruto over 15 years, as one of the world’s three most well-known animated cartoon, must be attributed to the mature, advanced and sophisticated industrial chain of the Japanese animation, the critical base of the nation’s developed comics industry. The comics industry of Japan began in the 1940s and achieved its apex in the 1960s when its GDP accounted for 10% of the entire publication GDP. Japan takes great pride in its status as the world largest exporter of animated products,—60% of worldwide and 80% of Europe-wide productions. Today, Japan’s overall annual 28 Wang

and Piao (2007, p. 103).

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publication is approximately 6 billion, of which over 30% or 3.1 billion are comicsrelated books and magazines. If consumption of comics-related books, rather than production, is calculated, the proportion would be halved. The immense Japanese animation industry consists of over 430 professional domestic firms and numerous independent producers, together responsible for the production of 80 domestically consumed animated movies and more than 4,000 episodes of TV series. It is reported that 87% of Japanese are fans of animated cartoons and comics and 84% of Japanese own items related to their favorite cartoon characters. In Japan, hundreds of animation clubs of animation fans are in charge of their own periodicals. The competitiveness in the Japanese animation industry is beyond imagination to the extent that 60% of the world’s cartoon TV programs are produced in Japan and watched in 68 countries; in addition, the popularity of Japanese animated movies is such that they are being watched in 40 countries. Many Japanese cartoon characters have become global household celebrities, such as the smart Doraemon, eventually named the official mascot of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. What on earth made Japan’s animation so accomplished? A close examination reveals the underlying reasons. First, there is a complete industrial chain composed of animation, comics, computer games and related sectors producing clothes, toys, beverages and even life necessities, products that engage audiences/fans for a long period of time and even a lifetime. Once cartoonists’ manga attracted sufficient public interest, a series of multimedia productions and related products were launched, including animated cartoons, animated DVD, animated movies, toys, computer games and clothes and more. Recent years also witnessed a reverse order of extending the industrial chain, from the initiation of novels and computer games to the later stage of the launch of manga and animated cartoons. The Japanese animation industry is an intertwined trinity of animated cartoon, manga and computer games—a competitive mechanism ensuring satisfactory market share in the long run. Second, there is the strong attraction on the part of the animation audience. In Japan, animation products are available for all age groups—a positioning characteristic that creates an enormous market with sustainable consumption power and greatly enhances the social status of the animation industry. Consequently, cartoonists enjoy high status, both socially and financially, a motivation for numerous newcomers to join as practitioners and a reserve force. The continuous input of talented staff ensures the stability and development of the professionalism of the Japanese animation industry. Third, rigorous market appraisal and market operation. Prior to the market launch of animated products, Japanese producers conduct all-encompassing, detailed market research, including diversified contents such as market segmentation, engagement of contents, accurate analysis of consumer tastes and estimated revenue. Based on the research outcome, tailor-made products with full consideration of its entertainment value are launched to cater to specific age groups. Fourth, the Japanese animation industry pays great attention to the exploitation of its domestic and world-class production technologies to create the best user experience. For instance, the three-dimensional software applicable to medicine and aviation sectors might be used in the animation production for the contents with enhanced richness and the audiences’ brand-new

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visual experience. Fifth, the Japanese animation industry fortunately receives substantial governmental support, although it used to be criticized by Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) as “vulgar and shameless”. The turning point was the year 2000 when the Japanese government explicitly announced its support of the animation industry in the yearly government White Papers. Of all animated films, the most successful was the 2001 film Spirited Away. The film overtook the then top-grossing film worldwide Titanic at the Japanese box office to become the highest-grossing film in Japanese cinematic history with a total revenue of 30.4 billion Japanese Yen. Ranked among the greatest animated films, Spirited Away won the Academy Award for Best Animated Feature at the 75th Academy Awards in 2003, the Golden Bear at the 2002 Berlin International Film Festival, and was on the British Film Institute’s list of “Top Fifty Films for Children up to the Age of 14” in 2005. With the brilliant success of Spirited Away, the Japanese animation sector set an example for other sectors of the Japanese culture and economy. The outstanding achievements of the Japanese animation sector are unquestionable. “Such achievements that belong not only to the commercial industry but also to art and culture is underpinned by highly advanced industrial chains rather than mere production techniques and technology. It should be noted that technology and industrial chains are means to help provide interesting and enjoyable contents through which Japanese animation products establish a world-class esthetic. Its inner beauty, characteristics of distinctive human care, and national spirit engage the international audience and give them a good impression of the unique Japanese culture. To a great extent, audiences of different genders, races, age groups, social classes are touched by the universal values reflected in Japanese animation, e.g.: solidarity, friendliness, perseverance, motivation, righteousness, integrity, bravery, kindness, love of life. One of the important reasons why Japanese animation sells so well is the skillful exploitation of its cultural uniqueness and the lifestyle of the ordinary Japanese, realized in the contents from the careful at-home making of boxed lunches to the sushi displays in the restaurants, from navy uniform to the furisode kimono, from the Gakuen School Festival to the Shichi-go-san (seven-five-three-year-old) Festival, from shrines to Torii station. Beneath the surface of these cultural symbols is the cultural spirit of Japan embedded in the animation films”.29 “Nowadays as an indispensable part of the childhood and adolescent life of every Japanese, Japanese animation films and manga is seen as an important source of Japanese values, worldview and philosophy of life”.30 After decades of development, the Japanese animation industry, equipped with a full range of sophisticated industrial chains, is an important positive factor in contemporary Japanese economy, and an effective culture ambassador of Japan. While audiences enjoy exported Japanese animated cultural products, unavoidably they “consume” Japanese ideas, concepts and value orientations implicitly entailed therein. In conclusion, as a vital cultural symbol in international communication, Japanese animation plays a critically significant role in the national image of Japan. 29 Wan 30 Zhao

(2015, pp. 1–3). (2010, p. 380).

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4.3.4 Korean Wave and the National Image of South Korea Gangnam Style, a rock-n-roll style of the Korean pop singer PSY (Park Jae Sang) became a worldwide music sensation in 2012 and its horse-ride dancing action is jokingly imitated by millions of fans. The style achieved a viewer audience of 200 million times within 66 days of upload to YouTube—the world’s largest videosharing website—an unprecedented first-time hit for not only a Korean singer, but also any Korean culture activity. No wonder it is said that it is not about Gangnam style but about world style. The overnight sensation of Gangnam style earned PSY a personal meeting with Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, former South Korean diplomat and the eighth United Nations Secretary-General, whose remarks acknowledged PSY’s contribution to world peace, Korea’s national image and confirmed his status as the new most well-known Korean citizen in replacing Moon himself and the brand-new business card of the Republic of Korea. The 2014 Korean romantic soap opera “My Love from the Star”, with an exceptionally excellent viewership rating in China, trigger a new round of nation-wide craze for Korean soap operas; the Korean Wave at this time is literally beyond imagination. For instance, both the Chinese and English version of the novel read by the hero of the soap opera was constantly out-of-stock on the Amazon-China shopping website. The copied clothes, jewelry, household items products that appeared in the TV series “My Love from the Star” have remained top-selling products at China’s online shopping giant taobao.com for a longtime. Two years later, in February 2016, the Korean Wave flooded Asian countries again with the broadcast of another soap opera sensation, “Descendants of the Sun” on the KBS (Korean Broadcasting System). This is the first real-time TV series simultaneously broadcast in China with Korean TV stations. Incorporating two eternal themes—romance and the military— that cater for both young females and males, the drama is remarkable in its exquisite and flawless presentation of details. With the first-time broadcast rating of 14.3%, average rating of 41.6% and the real-time highest rating of 46.6% in Korea, “Descendants of the Sun” had no difficulty making a historic record in the Korean TV history in 2016. As a popular vogue, the drama swiftly swept over China and many other Asian countries. In China, the stream watching reached 4.012 billion times and related Weibo (China’s microblogging) reading of this drama reached 14.7 billion and generated 812 sub-topics discussed among 3.48 million Weibo users as the most frequently mentioned Korean soap opera in the Chinese blog sphere. Not surprisingly, the drama was awarded Best TV Series in Korea’s Golden Globe Awards-the Baek Sange Art Awards on June 3, 2016. Since January 2013, China’s leading and most avant-garde TV station Hunan Satellite Television launched a TV singing competition program named “I Am a Singer” broadcast at 22:00 pm every Friday, the Chinese version of the Korean reality show “I Am a Singer”, part of the Korea TV station’s MBC’s lineup of Sunday Night first aired in March 2011. One year after the test airing in China, in October 2014 Zhejiang Satellite TV launched another popular TV entertainment program and reality show during Friday primetime- “Running Man China”, a spin-off from

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the popular original South Korean variety show “Running Man” by SBS (Seoul Broadcasting System). As part of the SBS lineup of “Good Sunday” and first aired on July 11, 2010 in urban environments, “Running Man” was best characterized as hilarious. With exceptionally good ratings, “Running Man China” has run six seasons and gained great popularity among Chinese fans, in particular the younger generation. As a result of these imported Korean TV programs such as “Running Man” (奔跑吧,兄弟), “I Am a Star” (我是歌手), Daddy, where are we going? (爸爸 去哪儿?)” “Takes a real man” (真正的男子汉) and “Divas hit the road” (花儿与少 年), Chinese fans created a new rage for “Korean Wave”, making worldwide fans of Korea media a history-making record of 22 million in 2014, double that of the 2013 statistics, according to a January 12, 2015 report issued by the Korea Foundation. On a global scale, there is an increasing trend toward the “Korean Wave” style. The term Korean Wave (Hallyu in Korean) first appeared in a 1999 Beijing Youth Daily report as a term warning young Chinese fans about excessive fascination for Korea’s pop culture and celebrities. This worrying phenomenon was purposefully coined as the “Korean Wave” because it is a homophone with the modern Chinese language derogatory term for “cold wave”. An early mention of Korean culture as a form of soft power can be found in the writings of Kim Gu, leader of the Korean independence movement and president of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. This term is sometimes applied differently outside of Korea; for example, overseas, Hallyu drama is used to describe Korean drama in general, but in Korea, Hallyu drama and Korean drama are taken to mean slightly different things. According to the researcher Jeongmee Kim, the term Hallyu is used to refer only to dramas that have gained success overseas, or feature actors that are internationally recognized. The Korean Wave encompasses the global awareness of different aspects of South Korean culture including film and television (particularly “K-dramas”), K-pop, manhwa, the Korean language and Korean cuisine. Some commentators also consider traditional Korean culture in its entirety to be part of the Korean Wave. American political scientist Joseph Nye (1937–) interprets the Korean Wave as “the growing popularity of all things Korean, from fashion and film to music and cuisine.” From 1999 to 2001, the Korean pop culture, mostly representative of “Korean Wave,” swiftly and successfully penetrated to the Chinese entertainment market. Besides the Chinese mainland, the charismatic “Korean Wave” entered other countries and regions in the Asia including Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Vietnam. Given the successful spread of the “Korean Wave,” the Korean entertainment industry proved its power in extending the influence of Korean culture, and promoted Korea’s diverse industries, including service industries such as computer games, food, cosmetics, tourism, medical care, education and manufacturing industries such as automobile, electronics and home appliances. By 2004, “Korean Wave” also began successfully integrating with traditional Korean culture, food, clothing, souvenirs and tourism-a new mission and significance of the “Korean Wave” endowed by the Koreans. According to Korea’s Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism statistics, Korean culture, tourism, health and entertainment industries involving 2.6 million staff earned enormous revenue of 117,000 billion Korean Won (approximately

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138 billion USD) in 2004. Thus, it is not surprising that the government-invested Korea National Tourism Organization set up the “Korean Wave Department”, responsible for the development and promotion of tourist products targeting the global market where popularity of South Korean culture is evident. An opinion survey conducted by the Korea Tourism Organization (KTO) in October 2013 suggested that Korean Wave (Hallyu) influenced almost 60% of tourists who visited Korea. With the Hallyuwood theme park already built and with further upcoming developments, this traffic is expected to increase, which will in turn fuel the growth of the Korean wave. “Korean Wave” has given birth to a complete industrial chain and fostered other emerging economic growth points. Where “Korean Wave is popular, Korean products sell well. According to statistics, Korea experienced a 17.4% increase in overall exports and a 31.6% increase of exports to China in February 2006.31 This branding of Korean soap opera yielded large profits, making the broadcasting entertainment industry the second national pillar industry, following automobile manufacturingKorea’s first pillar industry. There is no denying that the status of Korea as one of the four tigers of Asian economy is largely due to the “Korean Wave.” “Korean Wave” not only stimulated Korean economy, leading to rapid development of related industries and large sums of foreign exchange, but also enhanced Korea’s national image. Korean Wave has provided Korea with an excellent opportunity to showcase its diverse culture, people, its unique entertainment products, exotic locales and its own pan-Asian superstars to the rest of the world and thereby create a very strong brand Korea. A good example is Korean soap opera’s characteristic of promoting Korean traditional culture and national character. Soap operas present audiences recurring scenes of Korean culture and lifestyle, from cuisine, clothing and architecture to homey teahouses, roadside stands and food stalls. With the maddening popularity of Korean soap operas, the focus seems to have shifted toward Korean values, society and emotions. This in turn has given Korea a golden chance to create new perceptions and images of itself across the world. For instance, the Korean TV dramatic hit “Dae Jang Geum” (name of the heroine), promoting the integrity and positivity of traditional Korean medicine as its theme, has effectively popularized traditional Korean food and medicine. This TV drama featuring Korean history was exported to China, Japan, European and North American countries, stimulating the popular vogue of the Korean traditional culture worldwide. In 2005, the Dae Jang Geum’s broadcasting on Hong Kong’s TVB earned a record-breaking rating of 47%. During the airing of the drama, Hong Kong streets lost their characteristic hustle and bustle as the people stayed indoors watching the TV to such an extent that Hong Kong media coined new words like Jang Geum spirit and Jang Geum philosophy in honor of the heroine Ms. Jang Geum. In Vietnam, the TV series was a triumph and, it was even claimed by locals that the drama relieved the country of some of the stress of the bitter memories of the Vietnam War. As a researcher for the Korea Creative Content Agency pointed out, Dae Jang Geum set a brilliant example of elevating South Korea’s national image.32 31 Wang 32 Wang

(2006, 4). (2006, 4).

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High-quality visual cultural products wield a unique power in generating revenue improving and repairing diplomatic relations. To a large extent, international audiences are effectively informed about a foreign country by its movie and TV series. Popular Korean soap operas greatly improved the national image of South Korea by enabling international audiences to learn about the lifestyle of ordinary Koreans; indigenous rustic local customs; the honest, kind true feelings of the people with their persevering characteristics and their never-give-up spirit-a drastic contrast to the previous stereotyped perception of the Korean people held by some in the international community. Such a change plays a positive role in Korean diplomatic relations. Official Korean documents indicated that UNESCO’s Seoul branch elected Mr. Yoon Suk Ho, the well-known director of the TV drama “Autumn Tale” (2000) in 2004, as annual celebrity for his outstanding contribution in internationalizing Korean TV drama and in changing the Japanese’ long-term cultural stereotypes of Koreans. A survey of Japanese merchants suggested that 78.9% of respondents changed their perceptions of Koreans after watching Korean TV dramas.33 In China, Korean TV dramas beginning with “Jealousy” (1992) in 1993, followed by “What Love Is” (1991), “Autumn Tale” (2000), “Winter Sonata” (2002) and “Dae Jang Geum” (2003) were popular. The increasing affection of the Chinese audience for these TV series may be attributed to appreciation for Korean values of courtesy and law, family-orientation, willingness to protect and sacrifice for family members, and the faithful attitude of romantic love. Korean characters with such values gave the Chinese audience deep, unforgettable impressions; consequently, the popularity of Korean TV series boosted a very positive image of Korea as a neighboring country and deepened the Chinese audience’s understanding of Korean culture and the greater appeal of Korean products. The worldwide vogue of the Korean cultural products in the past two decades has various underlying justifications. First, Korean TV series are characterized by distinctive styles and interesting plots that are easy to follow. The humanistic ideals and cultural insights of Confucianism implicitly embedded in the TV series resonate with the detailed, in-depth projection and careful, vivid presentation of the characters. It is worth noting that shared cultural aspects resulting from South Korea’s long history under the influence of China and Confucianism makes its audience in the China, Japan and in the Southeast Asian regions easy to accept, understand and become obsessed about. One of the strategies of managing Korean Wave (Hallyu) is the detailed analysis of its target audience-mostly people in Asian countries. The Korean government and its divisions follow these Asian countries and cultures carefully and closely in order to understand which Korean Wave products would have the best probability of success in different markets before they conduct market segmentation. The secret of entertainment industry is that no one understands these markets better than Korea. Furthermore, Korean TV series are skillful in arousing moving emotions with the sensitive demonstration of heart-breaking romantic love, supportive, sincere friendship, warm and caring affection for family. The repetitive,

33 Zhang

(2007, 6).

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enchanting background music, reinforces the audiences’ emotional experience with the ups and downs of the series characters. Second, from the macro perspective, the government’s supportive policy is a major factor for the success of e Korean TV series. The world financial crisis in the 1998 was undoubtedly part of the reason why the Korean government established the culture industry as a pillar industry in the twenty-first century, a sensible and seasonable policy that led to the rise and flourishing of Korean economy in just a few years with underpinnings that are largely but cultural products. The strategy of developing a strong culture in Korea placed emphasis on the film and broadcasting entertainment industry. Korea is probably one of the only countries in the world that has a Ministry of Culture (Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism to be exact). A division of the ministry, the Popular Culture Industry Division, focuses on Korean pop music, fashion, mass entertainment, comic books, cartoons and other key products. This division along with three other divisions is referred to as the Cultural Content Office, whose budget is a staggering USD 500 million, with the aim to build a USD 10 billion cultural industry export industry by the year 2019. Government supportive policies sustained the entertainment industry, as evidenced in guiding enterprises to adapt themselves for complete commercialization and competition, in setting the criteria of ratings, artistry and ethics, in establishing incentives such as the National Arts and Development Fund, and in increasing financial support for the film and broadcasting industry to above 1% of the total financial allocation that collectively and tremendously encouraged creativity, awareness and proficiency in market competition. Third, the great success of Korean TV series is also attributed to the excellent management. The production of Korean TV series is based on the dyad system of production and broadcasting, dictating that entertainment firms are in charge of the production according to the order of TV corporations to which they belong. As soon as an order is placed, the TV station shoulders the initial investment of 35–45% of production costs, a sum that may largely relieve the financial burdens of entertainment firms who are able to manifest professionalism and focused more on the quality of a TV series. Lastly, win–win situations are created as a result of inter-industry interaction. The film and broadcasting industries join with other sectors and establish relationships such as co-habitation, fusion and derivation. For instance, the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC’s) classic TV series “Winter Sonata” (2002); “Dae Jang Geum” (2003) and “Autumn Tale” (2000) intentionally incorporated elements of fashion, cuisine and cosmetics giving rise to a new wave of these industries flourishing in overseas markets. In conclusion, the triumph of Korean TV series is solidly based on advanced, efficient business model of the nation’s cultural industries, on a national strategy of developing a strong culture in Korea, and on close cooperation among government, industries and markets. In return, the Korean TV premium national brand series produce considerable profits and cultural impact. To date, Korean culture ambassador TV series and films give their global audiences, especially Asian audiences, remarkably deep positive impressions. The Korean Wave, represented by the Korean

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broadcasting industry, enhances Korea’s national image, and more importantly, help in the recovery of national faith and confidence.

4.4 Intercultural Communication and Misunderstandings of Chinese Cultural Symbols Widespread misunderstanding of cultural symbols is prevalent. Due to certain metaphor and metonymy, added with unprofessional decisions related to selection and communication, misunderstandings of Chinese cultural symbols are widespread a problem that calls for attention in many circles.

4.4.1 Misunderstanding of China’s National Image Caused by Improper Cultural Symbols Misunderstanding is occurring frequently in intercultural communication and cultural exchange. The word misunderstanding has as many as 21 million hits in the search engine and in the Chinese academic database CNKI; related articles are more than ten thousand hits. The American literary critic Harold Bloom first stated misunderstanding as a theoretical construct in 1973 and held that misunderstanding is a “creative reading” (p. 93).34 From a macro perspective of culture, some argued that misunderstanding is the false perception and evaluation of one culture from the standpoint of another culture.35 Possible causes of misunderstanding include improper perception of facts; unavailability of relevant materials, and unscientific analysis of given issues. In intercultural communication, there is a wide variety of underlying reasons that may create misunderstanding, e.g., variances in ideology, cultural background, ways of thinking, and reader/audience personal misreading. “It is quite challenging to get away from one’s own culture, traditions, ways of thinking in interacting with people from other cultures. Usually, people attempt to interpret others based on their own stereotypes. The process of selection, sorting out others’ culture based simply on one’s own culture unavoidably gives birth to misunderstanding between cultures.” It is generally believed that there are primarily two types of misunderstanding: conscious and unconscious. Unconscious misunderstanding often occurs because of the cultural differences that readers/audiences usually rely on in their own cultures when judging the behaviors of other cultures. On the contrary, conscious misunderstanding, the intentional behaviors of readers/audience, involves political and ideological preferences, or, special needs and biases. 34 Bloom 35 Zhang

(1973, p. 93). (2001, 2).

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Misunderstanding as a topic of inquiry is at the intersection of disciplines such as intercultural communication, culture studies, comparative literature and interpretivism. In recent times, the most accomplished and representative theorists are Paul Ricoeur (French philosopher 1913–2005) and Stanley Fish (Literary theorist 1938–). According to Ricoeur, as soon as a text is produced, it disengaged itself from both the producer/author and the context in which it was produced; he termed this separation “disengagement”. Hence, the authors’ intention has little influence on the readers’ interpretations or the indefiniteness of the readers’ interpretations of the text. Thus, any interpretations could be groundless and without limitations. It is, after all, the meaningful elements and structure of text that guide readers to various logical interpretations of their own. Stanley Fish (1938–) held a completely different view of the text and maintained that text per se possesses no meaning and that meaning lies only within the readers. Nonetheless, such meaning is not the outcome of personal arbitrariness but is constructed among collective interpretivists and reinforced as common and shared recognition through communication and interaction of large numbers of readers. Fish’s status as a seminal literary critic prompted huge feedback of his contemplations on interpretivism. Seeing misunderstanding as creative reading and as inevitable and conscious, Harold Bloom (Literary critic 1930–) (Bloom 1973, p. 30) evinced that “poetic influence—when it involves two strong authentic poets—always proceeds by a misreading of the prior poet, an act of creative correction that is actually and necessarily a misinterpretation. The history of fruitful poetic influence, which is to say the main tradition of Western poetry since the Renaissance, is a history of anxiety and self-saving caricature, of distortion, of perverse, willful revisionism without which modern poetry as such could not exist”. As regards the mechanism of emergence of misunderstanding, Bloom held that misunderstanding is likely to be the outcome of uncertainties of culture and huge meaning space. Inheritor of French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s concept of “difference”, Bloom noted that reading involves behaviors of difference and meanings of literary texts involve endless conversions, extension and difference of meanings of the signifiers.36 In spite of the genre of the literary texts, misunderstandings take place quite frequently in intercultural communication. The figurativeness and extensiveness of cultural symbols in external communication provide them natural merits in intercultural communication, making cultural symbols primarily representations of national image construction. As aforementioned, bearing in mind cultural symbol characteristics of metaphor and metonymy, we should not neglect the fact that the iconicity of symbols is also deeply rooted in the human mentality of cultural structure. The fact is that once the constructiveness of cultural symbols is ignored, misunderstanding and even cultural conflicts can arise. Differences in language, culture, customs and values cause variances in ways of thinking and behavior norms that ultimately form varied cultural attitudes and perceptions and also misunderstandings and barriers. Studies in intercultural communication indicate that one of the most inevitable barriers of understanding during interaction among people from different cultures is that

36 Li

(2011, pp. 228–234).

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they do not share a common universal system of cultural symbols”.37 Due to the different coding system of cultural symbols, coupled with political and ideological factors, while the cultural symbols are transmitted through international communication, their meanings are not necessarily shared or understood in an expected way and the meaning and contents of such cultural symbols are also not necessarily in accordance with the authentic national image. This is especially true for China, whose cultural symbols are misunderstood in many cases and these misunderstandings have become a major barrier for internationalization of Chinese culture and national image. For example, recent years have witnessed the intentional and routine selection of cultural symbols of terracotta warriors and horses, Chinese knots, clay pots, Royal Palace exhibitions, totem dragons in large-scale cultural activities sponsored by governments, institutions and enterprises to specially cater for the novelty-seeking mentality of most Westerners. What is more, some extremely outdated, even abandoned practices are purposely introduced, leading to pseudo-folklore and pseudo-historical presentation of China. Such irresponsible acts cause substantial misunderstanding of culture and made derogatory associations with the national image of China. During the past three decades of reform and opening since the late 1970s, China’s modernity has been tremendously enhanced by international exchange. Nevertheless, to date, in the minds of the general public in the West, China is still an old, conservative country with a mysterious culture. Some even associate China with fatuousness, feudalism, backwardness and ignorance, a long-standing impression held by Western colonists since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Of the many reasons for this sad fact that should corrected two are malicious reporting on China by the Western media and the inappropriate, unprofessional communication of cultural symbols by China. “To the public of international community, the most representative symbols of Chinese culture must be Chinese cuisine, Kong Fu, big red lanterns and Peking opera.38 ” Joshua Cooper Ramo (1968–), an American political analyst and expert on China studies made his criticism in this way: “China’s flourishing and fascinating contemporary China is increasingly attracting world’s attention. Out of the ten most popular foreign films in the history of America, three are made in China. It does make the Chinese people feel confident to attract world’s attention. However, Chinese officials are still accustomed to brand Chinese culture with fighting and singing in the old-fashioned opera and plain tea. They have not yet been aware of how to make use of the avant-garde part of the contemporary Chinese culture39 ” Let us take Chinese movies as an example. Since mid-1980s, Chinese movies began to make their debut in the awarding ceremony of many international film festivals, bridging a much-needed, wide gap between China and the outside world. It was these films, being awarded or not, that opened a window for the Western public to know China’s history, lifestyle, values, status quo, natural scenery and humanistic 37 Jia

(2011, 2). Chinese cultural symbols overseas, Global Times, 30 Nov. 2007. 39 Ramo (2008, p. 11). 38 Popular

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environments. Nevertheless, out of the ignorance of national image construction in terms of both awareness and strategy or rather, purposeful catering for the (imaginary) tastes of Western audience and reviewers, these Chinese films did not play a positive role in constructing a healthy image of China. As analysts said, among the 23 films awarded in international festivals between the year 1988 and 2006, the majority are related to themes and issues of the Cultural Revolution (the sociopolitical movement in China between 1966 to 1976), bottom of society feudalist male chauvinism, poverty and backwardness and homosexuality.40 These films used specific “lenses” to introduce an ignorant, conservative, backward, dark side of Chinese society as their selling points and, judging from the perspective of national image construction, the films are overloaded with information from which misunderstandings of audience surely arise. For example, the carefully portrayed characters in the 1998 film “Red Sorghum”, the winning film of the 38th International film festival Golden Bear Awards, had ugly, shaved bald heads, wore huge pants with big crotches but no zip in the front, had fleas and seduced someone else’s bride (the heroine) to have sex in the field of red sorghum.41 Such is not the only criticism. Ma (2000) made her sharp remarks: “lenses are like a color filter through which the reality of Chinese elegant culture and China’s fast-changing modern-oriented society are filtered, leaving only poverty, backwardness and perversity on the screen.42 ” In these times of globalization, China’s responses are not effective against the defamation in Western/Hollywood movies which are presented through mysterious, mean, wretched Chinese freaks, Chinese scenery of narrow, noisy, jam-packed shabby towns, and China-related plots related to crimes, gangs and general evil. Chinese filmmakers lack a minimum level of cultural consciousness and a basic sense of cultural responsibility. What the so-called “world recognized” Chinese films manifest are merely the negativity of China, illustrated through conservativeness, fatuousness and backwardness. The so-called Kong Fu movies that seeming promote Chinese traditional culture of martial arts, in most cases, manifest cold, calculating creatures’ erotic details. These so-called “artistic” movies are oriented around the weaknesses of human nature by focusing on rare customs and boring anecdotes, neglecting commonalities that are shared across all cultures and peoples—the search for truthfulness, compassion and beauty. The eccentric image of China presented through these films echoed and, worst of all, encouraged the long-standing misunderstandings and prejudices that Western societies hold against China. “In the old times, the Chinese understanding of “Western” movies was impossibly beyond the interpretations of the producer (Hollywood) and the promoter (Western media) who collaborated as perfectly as parts of a efficiently working machine and knowing exactly what had to be expressed and what need not (conflicts among insiders of empire, not necessarily America or the West, which might often but are all within the framework of interest with a common goal). Movie watching is as superficial as “ice-skating” with no in-depth, sophisticated investigation of “the 40 Zhang

and Wang (2007, 1). (2011). 42 Ma (2000). 41 Zhang

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bottom of the iceberg” and could be useless without systematic analysis of largescale films, without a clear understanding of the relationship between Hollywood and world ruling groups, between producers and media tycoons, without an idea of the underlying reasons that make the so-called masterpiece films other than their artistry (remember never artistry for its own sake), without the invisible side of the Western history. At present, Chinese media practitioners are much more informed than before; however, they are still confined within the interpretation webs of the West and have become microphones and free propagandists for Hollywood. Domestic Chinese journalists are so engaged in this job that they do not have any idea of what is actually being expressed.43 ” Such warnings and criticism might be sharp and hard to accept but are not alarmist. Apparently, the orientalism in the Western perspective that brings little sense of national identity and spiritual comfort to the Chinese audience is not helpful and even counter-productive to the national image construction of China. From scene setting to storytelling and to character projection, Chinese films shoulder the significant responsibility of introducing the image of China to the world. The film and broadcasting industry are hereby advised to understand China’s status quo and to present the spirit of “self-discipline and social commitment” and of “harmony but not sameness”, meaning they should demonstrate Chinese lifestyle, artistic characteristics and cultural traditions while fully incorporating diversity and universality. It is gratifying that such a globalization tendency of culture presentation is noticed in China’s film and broadcasting industry in recent years. A typical example is the Chinese cuisine documentary by e China Central Television in 2012— “A Bite of China” (Chinese: 舌尖上的中国; pinyin: She Jian Shang de Zhong Guo; literal translation: China on the tongue tip) which is a television documentary series on the history of Chinese food: ingredients, cooking methods, meal culture, lifestyle and life philosophy, directed by Chen Xiaoqing, narrated by Li Lihong with original music composed by Roc Chen. The documentary was initially aired on the China Central Television on May 14, 2012 and quickly gained exceptionally high ratings and widespread popularity in China and abroad. This seven-episode documentary TV series that began filming in March 2011 introduces the history and true stories about various foods in over 60 locations on the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan. An enjoyable means of getting to know China’s widely varied cuisine for those unfamiliar with local Chinese food, “A Bite of China” is a perfectly filmed documentary publicizing Chinese tourism, food culture, wisdom and, above all, its national image. The documentary offers overseas audiences a true close-up of contemporary China that is undertaking drastic changes while maintaining its uniqueness, with vivid, warm, compassionate and unforgettable portrayals of ordinary people and their lives, from vendors to chefs, from customers to snack bar owners. It is no wonder that the TV series with English subtitles sells very well in overseas markets. Journalist Oliver Thring of the British Guardian praised it as “the best TV show about food I have ever seen. I would hazard to say it is the best one ever made.”

43 Bian

(2013, p. 3).

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4.4.2 The Inevitable Lack of “The Common Field of Experience” Generated and formed during the mediation of a series of symbols in interstate interactions, the national image of a particular country may only be understood in a particular cultural context. Likewise, cultural symbols may only be understood in particular meaningful systems of signs. One key prerequisite of communication is the availability of mutually understood meaning space which includes that understanding of symbols for communication are shared by all participating parties otherwise communication fails and misunderstandings arise. As a matter of fact, an inevitable barrier to international communication of Chinese cultural symbols lies in the lack of the “common field of experience” caused by cultural differences. Wilbur Schramm’s (American journalist 1907–1987) notion of field of experience can be defined as life experiences, attitudes, values and beliefs that each communicator brings to an interaction and shape how messages are sent and received. A respected expert in the field of communication, Wilbur Schramm’s 1954 three models of communication is a derivation of the Shannon and weaver model of communication, which is one-way and linear. The far-reaching notion of field of experience was introduced in the second model of Schramm’s subsequent to the first model of communication, which was rather simple. According to Schramm, true communication can only take place if the field of experience of the source and the destination of communication overlap. It is within the overlap of the fields of experience that communication in the real sense can occur. By emphasizing the process of encoding and decoding the message, Schramm envisioned the process of communication as a two-way, circular communication between sender and receiver. As Schramm discovered, both senders and receivers of messages are the communicators who bring to the interaction their own “field of experience” or “frame of reference” (e.g., the sum of one’s life experiences including one’s culture and language). The extent to which the sender’s field of experience overlaps that of the receiver reflects their “common field of experience”the fundamental factor that enables effective communication. Hence, to ensure the best communication, communicators need to exploit all possible means (e.g., background information) to construct and expand the overlap of field of experience, i.e., the common field of experience, by taking into consideration all the cultural differences between senders and receivers of messages. In conclusion, the larger the common field of experience, the more resonance in communication, the more preferred communication effect. Lack of common field of experience is distinctively noticed in the external communication of national cultures, with their distinct differences across nations and cultures. Cultural differences, an inevitable objective fact, endow human cultures with diversity. Supposing there are no cultural differences, there is no diversity across human civilizations. There are a number of factors causing long-term differences among cultures that might erode slowly economic life, political life, historical background, geographic locations, race and ethnicity. “Culture is all about

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behaviors and attitudes. One essential determiner that causes ethnic culture of various kinds is the natural environment where ethnic groups reside, exploit natural resources and interpret natural phenomena in their own ways. In addition, during the course of transforming nature, different ethnic groups encounter varying non-natural factors transmitted and handed down in their societies. These practices and beliefs eventually form what is called a unique culture and tradition that bind and guide group members over time.44 ” George E. Marcus (American anthropologist 1943–) (Marcus and Fisher 1986) held that “cultural differences are most deeply rooted in feelings and in complex indigenous reflections about the nature of persons and social relationships”.45 As Samuel P. Huntington (American political scientist, 1927–2008) (Huntington 1996) stated, the crucial distinctions among human groups concern their values, beliefs, institutions, and social structures, not their physical size, head shapes or skin colors. Huntington (Huntington 1996) categorized the contemporary world into eight civilizations: (i) Western, (ii) Latin American, (iii) Islamic, (iv) Sinic (Chinese), (v) Hindu, (vi) Orthodox, (vii) Japanese, and (viii) African; he further drew the attention to the well-known argument that clashes among these civilizations are an objective fact.46 One very influential framework for understanding national identity is Benedict Anderson’s (American political scientist, 1936–2015) (1983) idea of regarding nationalism as “imagined communities”. As Anderson observed, “the imaging of this community is a collective (or intersubjective) cultural process…. Culture is not something “added” on later; it defines nations, national identities and territories.”47 It is a culture that constructs and distinguishes the identity of different ethnic groups and nations and culture may be actualized through concrete symbols. The image of a particular ethnic group is constituted by and linked through multiple core elements. Once cultural symbols veered from the sublime to entertainment and vulgarity, the linkage between core elements of culture and image is subject to breaks and, ultimately, the ethnic culture and national spirit that rest upon cultural symbols will erode and diminish. “Semiology suggests that all cultural products should be seen as texts. Although one cultural product may not be actually written, it is made up of symbols, be it visual, audio or tactile (e.g., sculpture may be touched), which are subject to reading or interpretation.”48 It is implied that the correct interpretation of symbols has important bearing on the cultural tradition of a particular ethnic group. Similarly, the correct interpretation of the cultural tradition of a particular ethnic group relies heavily on the real meanings of the cultural symbols that represent ethnic that cultural tradition. Cognition conventions vary dramatically across cultures and huge cultural differences usually cause a varied tendency of cognitive psychology among members of different cultures. Cognitive psychologists regard communication between human beings as a system of information processing, asserting that cognition is information 44 Tong

(2005, pp. 49–50). and Fisher (1986, p. 45). 46 Huntington (1996, p. 159). 47 Baldwin (1999, p. 159). 48 Baldwin (1999, p. 40). 45 Marcus

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processing that includes encoding, storage and extraction of sensation input. The notion of selective attention in communication studies and cognitive psychology refers to the capacity for or process of reacting to certain stimuli selectively when several occur simultaneously. It is interesting that humans tend to accept those opinions that are in consonance with their own and reject the opinions that are counter to their own values. In this accelerated age of information explosion, people are more likely than previously to adopt the selective attention model in facing the massive signs and the cultural and symbolic meanings behind them. Despite of the language differences that cause textual misunderstanding and miscommunication, the differences of cognition models and cultural values are also responsible for the lack of a common field of experience in the interaction between China and the world. Source and origin created a deep gap between the Chinese cultural values and the Western cultural values. Major differences between Chinese and Western cultural values are summarized as First, characteristic of the integration between heaven and human; Chinese culture is always in pursuit of harmony between human and nature, human and society, outer self and inner self, emphasizing the holism and systematics in terms of ways of thinking, thinking patterns and consciousness. On the contrary, in the characteristic of the separation of heaven and human, the Western culture pays attention to the self-consciousness of original sin that requires them to conquer nature and transform self for self-redemption, emphasizing rational analysis and logical thinking patterns. Second, Chinese culture is a collectivistic culture, advocating interests of family, organization and country that call for modesty, caution and collaboration. As Song Dynasty poet Zhongyan Fan (989–1052) reminded us in his household poem Memorial to Yueyang Tower: “one should be the first to worry for the future of the state and the last to claim his own share of enjoyment”. In contrast, Western culture is a culture, advocating individualism, heroism, personal interest, personal material comfort, and personal rights. Third, Chinese culture seeks stability, stressing “unity and stability”, harmony, peaceful coexistence, contentment with the status quo and progress and development on the basis of stability. By contrast, Western culture seeks change, stresses innovation and acknowledging that everything is in a state of change. In sum, these are three widely acknowledged cultural differences between harmony-oriented Chinese culture and conflict-featured Western culture that constantly lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations of cultural symbols. This is also an example of the lack of a common field of experience between China and the West. National image construction is rooted in national culture, accumulated through the nation’s history. Cultures across nations exhibit a wide range of attributes, characteristics and trends owing to different social processes, and geographic locations. Misunderstandings of cultural symbols largely arise from the alienation of other cultures’ backgrounds, social customs, language and so on. Therefore, we should use every possible means to expand the common field of experience in intercultural communication, to turn cultural differences into cultural adaptation, cultural understanding and cultural recognition, rather than into cultural conflict and culture shock. Toward this end, what should be encouraged is interactions and exchanges mediated

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through culture and language as the basis and critical means of expanding the common field of experience, eliminating misunderstandings and understanding national images among one other properly.

4.4.3 Case Analysis 4.4.3.1

Case One: China’s National Image Short Film (People)

Globalization is an irresistible trend of our times in this accelerated age of rapid economic development when each country strives to retain its status in the international community and enhance its hard and soft power. National image short films serve as significant means to enhance a nation’s soft power. Three official short video clips that target overseas broadcasting and were produced by the Chinese government from Nov. of 2009 to Jan. of 2011 aroused much interest, attention and feedback in the international arena, embarking upon the era of national branding, according to analysts. A one-minute-long promotional short film of China’s national image was aired nonstop from January 17 to February, 14, 2011 on six gigantic LED screens of the “World’s Intersection” in Time’s Square, New York City. 15 broadcasts per hour 24 h a day is a total of 8,400 times in 27 days. During this same time, a condensed version was aired on CNN’s global channels. With the English subtitle “Stunning Chinese Beauty” on the first slide, China’s national image short film featured Chinese film stars, dancers, models in its presentation of more than 50 celebrities in the field of entertainment, sports, science and technology, finance, business. Although without dialog or voice-over, audiences were deeply moved by the series of stunning, smiling faces, the implicit embodiments of wisdom, beauty, bravery, talent, wealth, calmness and confidence of the Chinese people. As representations of Chinese culture, the national image short films manifest China’s pursuit of discourse power in the international community. Needless to say, the purpose of such short films is not to present Chinese celebrities for their own sakes, but to present the overall image of China through the images of these celebrities. The film won widespread praise in highlighting a positive image of China in the realm of foreign affairs. It also shows the central government’s emphasis on China’s national image. A British Guardian article of January 17, 2011 bluntly noted that its intention was no more than to demonstrate China’s soft power. From the perspective of international communication, the national image short film was an integrative attempt of national branding and intercultural communication. However, the communication effectiveness is hard to determine. As the Chinese idiom, the benevolent see benevolence whereas the wise see wisdom, a metaphorical expression indicating that polarized opinions are prevalent. The film’s criticisms are mostly about the inappropriate selection of the symbols it featured with its elitism and lack of humanistic care of the ordinary and falling short of the target of influencing the masses. Of the 50 + celebrities in the film, most Americans were acquainted only with NBA player

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Yao Ming; most of the rest were unknown even to Chinese students/scholars in the US. Notwithstanding a brilliant attempt to show China’s image through implicit embodiments of wisdom, beauty, bravery, talents, wealth, calmness and confidence of the Chinese people, some international viewers may have no idea at all or even have negative associations of China’s image with “conservativeness”, “inflexibility”, “self-restraint” and “conceit”.49 CNN’s criticism of the short film was even harsher— these image ambassadors bring to Americans more fear than friendship.50 An American civil servant surnamed Thompson a South China Morning Post reporter: “By and large, China is little known to Americans. For example, my parents might not have any idea of the name of the Chinese president.”51 Jay Ordan, a tourist from Atlanta in New York City expressed his opinion thus: “The photos are fabulous, so is the filming. But it would be much better if the advertisement had played a lower tune”.52 According to him, the characters looked conceited. Gady Epstein of Forbes Magazine held a similar view and said that American observers watched the promotional short film with their inherent stereotypes and made stern and harsh remarks.53 Bearing the criticism in mind, Chinese scholars suggested that national image short films should avoid elitism and construct a discourse of the ordinary. Although small potatoes, they would be representative of the mainstream Chinese people … “Its biggest demerit is neglecting ordinary faces and trying to show, within 60 s, 50 faces of celebrities that are supposed to represent China54 ”. “The national image short film (People) made use of the concept Chinese as its perspective of storytelling”. “What the think tank of this short film attempted to disseminate is universal values beneath the oriental style impressions and smiles of celebrities from all circles of society and is also the celebration of human nature and the advocacy of individuality, a reinforcement of China’s hybridized values and behaviors in the global context”.55 No matter whether criticism or praise prevails, one question that worth considering is why the visual symbols in the short film (people) that are supposed to establish and change Western audience’s perception and judgment toward China and thereafter enhance China’s image might cause confusion or even blame. One possible cause is the misunderstandings in terms of symbols, which might not be mainstream at all among overseas audience but should be taken sufficient notice of. It is a question that requests both government and various circles to ponder over as to how to select and make the best use of China’s cultural symbols and avoid misunderstandings of them in the construction of China’s national image in intercultural communication.

49 McClatchy—Tribune

Business News. Washington, Jan 19, 2011. (2011, 8). 51 South China Morning Post Ltd. Jan 20, 2011. 52 McClatchy—Tribune Business News. Washington, Jan 19, 2011. 53 He (2011, 8). 54 Liu and Wu (2011, 8). 55 Quan (2011, p. 52). 50 He

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4.4.3.2

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Case No. 2: Beijing Olympics

Olympic Games, a worldwide pageant of sports and culture, are undoubtedly a global media event. In the historical and present times, Olympic Games attracted the world’s attention and global media for its symbolism of peace, friendship, friendliness through sportsmanship. Into the 1980s, a global consensus was reached that peace and development became two mainstream themes shared across the globe. Against such a backdrop, effective communication and publicity of national culture and values in intercultural interactions becomes an increasingly important means of Game, a prerequisite that deepens public awareness of the role of Olympiad. Since 1980s, the public relations role of the Olympic Games has been dramatically highlighted—not merely an implement to boost national economic growth but more importantly a key strategy to promote national culture and enhance national image. Fully aware of this, the 29th Summer Olympic Games was held as a great success in Beijing, the capital of the People’s Republic of China between 8th August and 24th August 2008. The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games provided China a golden opportunity in the national image construction. With an unprecedented scale of audience-4 billion TV viewers, 204 participating teams, 80 senior politicians from across the globe, the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics Games enabled China to stand in the spotlight of the whole world. Gathered in the splendid games are over 10,000 athletes, 21, 600 registered and 5,000 unregistered reporters, over 100 heads of states, senior government politicians, members of royal families and 50,000 international audience and travelers. Hence the question is what kind of communication/media effects are achieved in the 4-h long opening ceremony? Are the cultural symbols of China transmitted properly in the opening ceremony and are in consistent with the agenda setting of media coverage? Is the national image of China thereupon improved in the Western media frame? As one of the best parts of the game, the opening ceremony of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games is the most concerned focal point in the opinions of worldwide media and audience. First of all, let us make a brief review of the grand opening ceremony of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games that is made of four components: welcoming ceremony, theatrical performances, athletes’ admittance and torch lighting ceremony. The first major component welcoming ceremony consists of six parts: countdown, welcome fireworks, historical footprint, fantasy five rings, national flag admittance, the national flag rise and national anthem playing. The countdown was realized through the beating of classic musical instrument fou (缶; fou in pinyin) that made the rhythmic shining of 9, 8, 7, 6, …2, 1. Being lit in the burning point of the national stadium (Bird’s nest), the welcome fireworks that exploded in the upper air created for the audience a magic atmosphere of being situated in the outer space. In the part of historical footprint, 29 gigantic footprints of fireworks “walked” along the center axis of the Beijing city to the national stadium, a creative demonstration of the historical moment of the 29th Olympic Games. The part of fantasy five rings was shown with a sense of aesthetics, where the shinning five rings rose to the skyline before the landing of five flying girls, or the Chinese apsaras. National flag was accompanied

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by 56 children in folk clothes in its admittance, representative of the unity of the 56 ethnic groups of China, while the 9-year-old girl Lin Miaoke was singing “ode to the motherland”. While the national flag of China was rising, 56 singers from 56 ethnic groups of China sang the national anthem together. The second component of the opening ceremony is theatrical performances, including five themes: scroll paintings, Chinese characters, Chinese operas, Silk Road and classic ritual music. What the exquisite scroll paintings that opened in slow pace demonstrated to the world audience was the origin and evolution of the Chinese nation. In the part of the Chinese characters, 3,000 actors played 3,000 students of Confucius and gave recitations of his well-cited quotation: all within the four seas are brothers in The Analects of Confucius. In the meanwhile, a single large moving Chinese character 和 (pinyin: he;harmony) made its gorgeous appearance on the front stage as a vivid illustration of the Chinese invention of typography. During the Chinese operas part, the audience was highly impressed by the percussion music of Peking opera. In the Silk Road part, actors took hold of another Chinese invention: compass in hand as their paddles, reminding audience of the China’s cultural communication with outside world through the maritime silk road that could be traced back to almost 2,000 years ago. In the last part of ritual music, five long scrolls of Chinese ink paintings of classic dancing were real portrayals of the heydays of Chinese societies in history. Incorporated with theatrical performances were fascinating line puppet shows, Kun opera singing and dancing of various ethnic groups of China. The third component of the opening ceremony is athletes’ admittance. Athletes from across 204 countries made their friendly and energetic entrance to the national stadium accordingly. In the final component of torch lighting ceremony, the final torchbearer of the Beijing Olympic, the well-known gymnast and entrepreneur Mr. Li Ning was seen “running” in the air and ultimately lit the torch of the 29th Olympic Games, an exciting and memorable moment that held world’s breath and drew world’s attention to Beijing, China. At this very moment of thrill, China was apparently the focus of the world and Beijing was making headlines in the world’s mainstream media. For instance, a favorable attitude is shown in the Associated Press’ headline of “China’s long-awaited Olympic Opens Stunningly”, New York Times’ headline of China’s Leaders Try to Impress and Reassure World and the Washington Post’s headline of A Spectacular Opening to the 29th Olympiad. In a similar vein, Canada’s leading newspaper The Globe and Mail made the real-time report with the sincere and emotional headline of “We Have Been Waiting for 100 years”. Similarly, the headline of the Los Angeles Times “Human Passion in the Olympic Flame” demonstrated a clear stance of understanding and supportiveness to the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. Reuters’ headline sounds encouraging: Shinning Opening Unveils China’s World Dream. One of the UK’s most influential newspapers, Daily Telegraph, used a metaphorical headline in its real-time coverage: China Made its Debut on the World Stage. Both Times and The Guardian manifested goodwill in their headlines: The Power and the Glory: China Salutes Awestruck World and the Patriotic Olympic: China to Stage a Grand Show. The headline of the Agence France Presse (AFP) indicated much admiration and praise: Opening of Olympic Games: Dazzling China Extending Hands of

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Friendship. Noticeably, a good sense of humor was found in the reportage of The Australian, whose headline read: Confucius Says: Let the Games Begin! Likewise, the German Press Agency (Deutsche Presse Agentur, DPA) expressed its compliment of the significant event with the headline of Beijing’s Games Kick off with Spectacular Opening Ceremony. Despite of biased reference detected from time to time (e.g., Tibet, environmental pollution, security issue, human rights, Tiananmen event, Darfur conflict, China’s culture revolution between 1966–1976) in the Western mainstream media’s coverage of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games, indeed a conformity was found in the interpretation of this glorified globe event that the Western mainstream media acknowledged China’s image as a strong, friendly nation, actively integrating to the world and being recognized by its own citizens. “91.7% reports of the Western mainstream media deemed the Beijing Olympic Games a splendid triumph with flowery expressions that are rarely used in association with China, such as spectacular, dazzling and awestruck”.56 As the website of the Sydney Morning Herald commented, “on the 8 pm tonight, Beijing won a perfect 10 points… The world has never been exposed to such a grand opening ceremony. Drummers’ performance is fabulous, making the atmosphere stunning as an electric shock. It is indeed a huge success.”57 According to the compliment of South Korea’s Yeonhap News Agency, “the opening ceremony of Beijing Olympic allows people enjoyment of visual arts. It is China’s splendid history and the longtime of civilization touched each one in the opening ceremony58 ”. A highlight in the Western mainstream coverage of the opening ceremony is the presentation of distinctive Chinese cultural symbols—the Great Wall, scroll paintings, Peking opera, flying apsaras, Confucius, Silk Road, fireworks and classic ritual music. Their symbolic meanings of China’s facts of long history, bright culture and attitudes of inclusiveness and open-mindedness, peace and friendliness, are well received and well interpreted in the specific context of the Beijing Olympic Games. Thanks to the brilliant platform of the Beijing Olympic Games that have the wonderfulness of Chinese cultural symbols exposed to the world and the professionalism of world media, ideal communication intentions of the organizers was realized: enhancing China’s soft power and constructing China’s national image through cultural communication. In addition to the opening ceremony, Chinese government earned itself a positive, commendable image through considerable amounts of good-quality work, e.g., the humanistic service offered to international journalists, collaborations with international broadcasters, timely press release and service to national media. According to a report by the world leading information consultancy Nielsen on Sep 4, 2008, Beijing Olympic Games enjoyed a global viewership scale of 4.7 billion, or 70% world’s 56 Gan

and Peng (2008). opinion analysis of the opening ceremony of Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. Retrieved Sep. 10, 2008, from www.people.cn/media. 58 Public opinion analysis of the opening ceremony of Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. Retrieved Sep. 10, 2008, from www.people.cn/media. 57 Public

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total population. Given this astronomical sum of audience, China made headlines with its glocalized Olympic concepts, friendly citizens and culture characteristics. In summary, during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, China exhibited an excellent national image to the world that must be attributed to all the good work and service, including efforts of Beijing citizens and volunteers, coverage of Chinese media and world media and also the articulation and presentation of China’s cultural symbols.

References Baldwin, E. (1999). Introducing cultural studies. London: Prentice Hall Europe. Barthes, R. (1982). Empire of Signs (R. Howard, Trans.). New York: Hill and Wang, The Noonday Press. Bian, Q. (2013). The subverted civilization: How come it is China?. Beijing: Orient Publishing Center. Bloom, H. (1973). The anxiety of influence: A theory of poetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cassirer, E. (1944). An essay on man. New York: Doubleday & Company. de Saussure, F. (1915). Course in general linguistics (English translation). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. Ding, L. (2010). National image and its influence upon inter-state behaviors. Beijing: Intellectual Publishing House. Gan, X., & Peng, L. (2008). Analysis of China’s national image in the Western media coverage of the opening ceremony of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. News Journalists, 10. Geertz, G. (1973). The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. New York: Basic Books. Guo, H. (2008). Introduction to modern semiotics. Shanghai: Fudan University Press. Hall, S. (1997). The work of representation. In S. Hall (Ed.), Representation: Cultural representations and signifying practices. London: Sage. Harold, L. (1927/1971). Propaganda technique in the world war. Cambridge: MIT Press. Hawked, T. (1977). Structuralism and semiotics. Berkeley: University of California Press. He, P. (2011). Communication context, value orientations and the symbolic expression of the visualized nations: Strategies of external communication of national branding era. News Journalists, 8. Hu, H. (2004). China’s cultural industry development: Theory and practice. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press. Huang, H., & Chen, Z. (2016). Introduction to semiotics. Shanghai: Orient Publishing Center. Huntington, S. P. (1996) The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Jia, L. (2011). Intercultural communication in the global context—–The communication effects of non-literal cultural symbols. Modern Communication (Journal of Communication University of China), 2. Kroeber, A. L., & Kluckhohn, C. (1952). Culture: A critical review of concepts and definitions. Cambridge: The Museum. Li, Y. (1999). Introduction to theoretical semiotics. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China). Li, Z. (2006). National image construction: political communication and media impacts. Modern Communication (Journal of Communication University of China), 138(01), 157–159. Li, G. (2011). Introduction to intercultural communication—Language, symbols and culture. Chengdu: Sichuan Publishing Group. Liu, T., & Wang, Y. (2011). What cultural symbols do the Chinese need? Shanghai: Liberation Daily.

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Chapter 5

The International Communication of Cultural Symbols in the Construction of China’s National Image

National image is a complex and multi-dimensional concept with rich connotations. It is constituted by sub-images portraying a country’s economy, government, general public, culture and security. Chinese culture can be expressed through a wide spectrum of symbols. In a certain period, a given cultural symbol may be used to promote a particular sub-image, but it may also work against other sub-images at the same time, especially the core image. For example, cultural symbols like the Terracotta Army1 and imperial court exhibitions are valuable to constructing the image of “an ancient civilization.” However, they can also mislead the international community into thinking that the Chinese people were belligerent, ignorant and backward, thus hindering the construction of the image featuring “peaceful development.”

5.1 The Value Orientations of Cultural Symbols in the Construction of China’s National Image The effectiveness of national image construction mainly rests on a country’s power of cross-cultural communication, which largely depends on the cultural symbols representing its core image. The international communication of cultural symbols should be closely aligned with our country’s core image. In other words, the ultimate goal of communicating cultural symbols is to demonstrate the core national image. “The positioning of national image refers to the process where a country selects certain qualities as its hallmarks—the basis to construct and communicate its national

1 Located in Lintong County, Shaanxi Province, northwest China, the Terracotta Army is a collection

of terracotta sculptures dating back to 208 BC. With more than 8000 warriors, 130 chariots and 670 horses, the Army was created to represent the armies of Qin Shi Huang (秦始皇, 259 BC–210 BC, literal: the first emperor of the Qin dynasty). The sculptures were buried with the emperor to guard his safety in his afterlife. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Meng, National Image, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3147-7_5

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image as expected.”2 It endeavors to construct a country’s national image and communicate cultural symbols. Then, what is the current strategic positioning of China’s national image? “If we consider the systematic positioning of national image as attending to every aspect with equal emphasis, then a strategy will be pointless. Strategic planning requires us to identify a representative sub-image with the greatest value in strategic communication. It should be deemed most worthy to be introduced to the international community. That is the gist of national image’s strategic positioning.”3 I believe that China should promote its remarkable achievements since the reform and opening-up and carry itself as a prosperous and civilized developing country with rapidly improved comprehensive national power. Also, we ought to seek the international community’s acknowledgement of China as a major and responsible country committed to maintaining international and regional peace—that is, the most valuable goal in China’s strategic communication. Therefore, the strategic positioning of its national image should center on portraying “a major and responsible country that honors peaceful development and seeks common ground while shelving differences.” Correspondingly, when we select cultural symbols for international communication, we must be certain that their connotations are in line with this positioning. We need to vigorously and persistently promote the cultural symbols that facilitate the construction of China’s core national image while abandoning or cautiously selecting those that do not serve this goal. It is only in this way that cultural symbols can truly become a cohesive force and catalyst in the construction of China’s image and enhance its “soft power.”

5.1.1 Construct the National Image Underlining Peaceful Development In 2005 and 2011, the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China released the white paper titled China’s Peaceful Development, “[declaring] to the rest of the world on many occasions that [China] takes a path of peaceful development and is committed to upholding world peace and promoting common development and prosperity for all countries.”4 “China’s dedication to the path of peaceful development is determined by its culture, economy and progress of democracy. It stands for the country’s solemn commitment to the international community and therefore should be set as the strategic position of its national image. The reason to uphold the path of peaceful development is twofold: to being with, since China is still a developing country, it requires a peaceful international environment in the long run to fully modernize itself. More importantly, in the context of global economic integration, rapid technological development and especially the expedited process of 2 Wu

(2012). (2006). 4 Information Office of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China (2011). 3 Han

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its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), China has enjoyed a rapid economic growth and directly benefited from the existing international political and economic order. There is no reason to sabotage or challenge the order. Hence, we should promote the national image of ‘peaceful development’ to the rest of the world with confidence and persistence, cultivating a sound international environment for public opinion and harmonious and interactive external atmosphere to allow China’s continued peaceful development.”5 In a nutshell, peaceful development is the inevitable way for China to develop. The Chinese nation has always cherished peace. Pursuing and upholding peace is the Chinese people’s social ideal and spiritual pursuit. The Chinese civilization celebrates “harmony and unity” (和合, hehe) and the philosophy of harmony is rooted in its profound traditional culture. To be specific, the character “和” (he, literal: harmony) was detected in Oracle Bone Inscriptions (Jia Gu Wen) and Bronze Inscriptions (Jin Wen), the earliest Chinese writing forms, and studies and interpretations on harmony were included in the works of the Hundred Schools of Thought (诸子百家, Zhu Zi Bai Jia), such as The Book of Changes (also known as The I Ching,《易经》 , late nineth century BC), The Analects of Confucius 《论语 ( 》 , 540-400 BC) and The Mencius 《孟子》 ( , 300 BC). The examples are plentiful: According to The Book of Changes, “the good fortune attached to the pleasure of (inward) harmony arises from there being nothing in the conduct (of the subject of the line) to awaken doubt”6 (和兑之吉, 行未疑也). Mencius held that “opportunities of time vouchsafed by Heaven are not equal to advantages of situation afforded by the Earth, and advantages of situation afforded by the Earth are not equal to the union arising from the accord of Men”7 (天时不如地利, 地利不如人和). Huai Nan Zi 《淮南子》 ( , before 139 BC) mentions that harmony is the most precious vibe/energy in Heaven and on Earth. It balances the yin and yang and separates the day from the night, allowing life to thrive (天地之气, 莫大于和。和者, 阴阳调、 日月分而生物). Since then, the dynamic intellectual traditions, epitomized by the Hundred Schools of Thought, continued to develop and adapt to cultural integrations, eventually evolving into the magnificent Chinese culture championed by Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. Nevertheless, the philosophy of harmony remains an essential ideal and pursuit for the three schools of thought. Centering on harmony, Confucian concepts such as striving for healthy longevity and mental well-being (修 身养性), demonstrating benevolence and love (仁爱爱人), and employing rites and music as educational means (礼乐教化) have resonated with generations of Chinese. As dictated in Tao Te Ching《道德经》 ( , fourth century BC), “out of Tao, One is born; out of One, Two; out of Two, Three; out of Three, the created universe. The created universe carries its yin at its back and the yang in front; through the union of pervading principles it reaches harmony”8 (道生一, 一生二, 二生三, 三生万物。万物负阴 而抱阳, 冲气以为和). This implies that every being is the result of harmonizing yin 5 Wu

(2012). (1990, p. 340). 7 Legge (2017, p. 57). 8 Lin (n.d.). 6 Legge

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and yang. Moreover, the practice of both Mahayana and Hinayana pursues harmony, constantly exploring how to achieve inner harmony and the harmony between man and society. Even more intriguingly, as the three schools influence and build onto each other, the process itself is harmonization. Despite their differences in central doctrines, many schools of thought in China affirm and pursue the philosophical notion of harmony. Beliefs such as harmony between man and nature (天人合一), the doctrine of the mean (中庸, zhong yong) and balance between extreme ideologies (中和, zhong he, literal: neutrality) have been honored throughout history. The concept of harmony and unity has played a crucial part in shaping the traditional Chinese culture. It is assumed that the thought of harmony was formed at the beginning of the Chinese nation. The Chinese people believe that people, families, home country and the world exist in a progressive hierarchy, with people and the world at the lowest and the highest ends, respectively. Only after we have achieved harmony among people and within families, can we aim to maintain the harmony of our country and eventually promote world peace. The ultimate goal is to achieve interpersonal, people society and interstate harmony and unity. The philosophy of harmony and the relentless pursuit of it have been etched into the Chinese perspective on peace and war, cultivating a “defense-oriented strategic culture.”9 The traditional Chinese culture has always deemed peace as most precious. In particular, our nation believes that the occurrence of conflicts is in line with the law of nature, and we must strive for peaceful solutions, namely, integration. Based on his comparative studies of civilizations, celebrated British historian Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889–1975) concludes that the Chinese civilization not only has an ancient history but has also developed incomparable capabilities to assimilate and rejuvenate. Most importantly, China is a major but non-hegemonic country and has never harbored any imperial ambition to seek hegemony or expansion. The Chinese nation takes pride in improved productivity, secured borders and ethnic unity and cordiality rather than territorial expansion or plundering wealth. In its long history, it has developed unique cultural traditions highlighting harmony and unity and the thought of harmony, which casted profound influence on ancient China and inspired the implementation of the guiding principle of peaceful development in its international strategies. Owing to the philosophy of unity and harmony and the pursuit of a harmonious world embedded within the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the Chinese nation is able to strive for great rejuvenation. Furthermore, drawing on the unique Eastern creativity, China proposed the ideal of “a harmonious world,” marking its unparalleled contribution to promoting world peace and development. A peaceful and stable international environment is the prerequisite for China’s economic and social development. The country has benefited from the relatively peaceful and stable international order. In particular, the globalization of Chinese economy is invigorated by the progress of global economic exchanges, especially the strengthened global economic integration. Likewise, the world economy also counts on China. As the largest developing country, China exerts enormous influence. According to foreign media, “China’s economic growth is good news to world 9 Wu

(2009, p. 49).

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economy and export expansion.” “China brings not only challenges but also opportunities,” etc. In 2009, it became the largest exporter and its imports and exports exceeded Germany. In 2011, China replaced Japan as the second largest economy. In 2012, its imports and exports grew to 3866.76 billion US dollars, over 3000 times more than that in the early days of New China. Despite its remarkable economic achievements over the four decades of the reform and opening-up, we must admit that China remains a developing country with relatively low GDP per-capita and is still and will long remain at the primary stage of socialism. Hence, there is a long journey ahead before it achieves building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, which will require the hard work of generations. To realize national prosperity and unity, people’s well-being and the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation, we must remain committed to the path of peaceful development. China’s practice of the reform and opening-up requires a peaceful domestic environment. In the past 40 years, it has made significant progress in socialist democracy, laying the political foundation for upholding peaceful development and gathering public support for the path of reform, opening-up and peaceful development. As stated in the Report to the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, “We must continue to make both active and prudent efforts to carry out the reform of the political structure, and make people’s democracy more extensive, fuller in scope and sounder in practice. We must ensure the unity of the leadership of the Party, the position of the people as masters of the country and law-based governance. To guarantee the fundamental position of the people as masters of the country and to reach the goal of enhancing the vitality of the Party and country and keeping the people fully motivated, we should expand socialist democracy, accelerate the building of a socialist country based on the rule of law, and promote socialist political progress. We should place greater emphasis on improving the way the Party exercises leadership and governance to ensure that it leads the people in effectively governing the country. We should attach greater importance to improving the system of democracy and diversifying the forms of democracy to ensure that the people conduct democratic elections, decision-making, administration and oversight in accordance with the law. We should give greater scope to the important role the rule of law plays in the country’s governance and in social management, uphold the unity, sanctity and authority of the country’s legal system and ensure that the people enjoy extensive rights and freedoms as prescribed by law. We should place high importance on systemic building give full play to the strength of the socialist political system and draw on the political achievements of other societies. However, we will never copy a Western political system.”10 Democracy is the shared legacy of civilizations. Given its extraordinary improvement, China’s socialist democracy will certainly facilitate the country’s integration into the present international system and enhance the outside world’s understanding of it, thus promoting its national image of peaceful development.

10 China.org.cn

(2012).

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In the age of globalization, the ties among countries are closer than ever. Because countries are confronted by common issues and their interests are increasingly intertwined, they have become a community of shared future. Hence, there is a growing importance to ensure durable peace and common prosperity in the world. Meanwhile, given the continued diversification of cultures and national interests and the increasingly multi-polarized politics and economics, there is a pressing need for mutual inclusiveness, respect and equality among countries and nations. In other words, we need to strive for “harmony without uniformity” (和而不同, he er bu tong). Since the 18th CPC National Congress, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC), has tirelessly reiterated that China will resolutely pursue the path of peaceful development and we shall never waver in our commitment. During the third group study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC in January 2013, he pointed out that “[neither] China nor the rest of the world can develop without peace, nor can they enjoy lasting peace without development. We must seize the opportunity and run our own affairs well so as to make our country stronger and more prosperous, and our people lead a better life. This will enable us to pursue peaceful development by relying on our growing strength. ‘The tide of history is mighty. Those who follow it will prosper, while those who resist it will perish.’ Looking back on history, we can see that those who launched aggression or sought expansion by force all ended in failure. This is a law of history. A prosperous and stable world provides China with opportunities, and China’s development also offers an opportunity for the world as a whole. Whether we will succeed in our pursuit of peaceful development to a large extent hinges on whether we can turn opportunities in the rest of the world into China’s opportunities and China’s opportunities into those for the rest of the world so that China and other countries can engage in sound interactions and make mutually beneficial progress. While pursuing peaceful development, we will never sacrifice our legitimate rights and interests or China’s core interests. No foreign country should expect China to trade off its core interests or swallow bitter fruit that undermines China’s sovereignty, security or development interests. … We should let the world learn more about China’s strategy of pursuing peaceful development and let the international community view China’s development for what it is and treat it accordingly. China will never seek development at the expense of any other country’s interests, nor will it shift its problems onto others. We will actively pursue peaceful and common development, uphold the multilateral trading system and participate in global economic governance.”11 During his talks with the then secretary-general of the UN Ban Ki-moon (1944-; in office: 2007–2016) in June 2013 and May 2014, General Secretary Xi Jinping expressed: “The UN should grasp the theme of peace and development, uphold fairness and justice, and speak and act justly. The time of the zero-sum mentality is past, so we should work together for mutually beneficial cooperation instead. The UN should contribute to this. … China needs the UN and the UN needs China. China values the UN and will support it. China’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council entails not only power but also responsibility that it is ready 11 Xi

(2018).

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to shoulder. … The world community should make concerted efforts to promote world peace and development. … [S]eeking political solutions is the right path to address the seemingly endless sequence of international flashpoints. ‘Just when you press the gourd into the water, there floats the gourd ladle.’ These issues must be tackled properly and reasonably. Exerting pressure won’t work, and external military intervention will make things worse. [The] UN … should adhere to political solutions to all conflicts.”12 These talks indicate that the Chinese government will continue to champion peace, development and cooperation and actively promote the philosophies of “harmonious world” and “peaceful development.” When other countries grow uneasy toward China’s growing power, it opts for the path to peaceful development, the most straightforward and comprehensive response to soothe their anxieties. The term “peaceful development” has rich meaning. China’s peaceful development does not solely entail strengthened economic and military power or coordinated development of wealth, culture and democracy. Instead, it aims to promote the well-rounded development and joint progress for the human society. Specifically, the philosophy is mainly reflected in the following four aspects targeting the common good: (1) Uphold the position of promoting enduring peace for all, including carrying out the foreign policy of peace like the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence; treating all countries equally in sovereignty disputes, irrespective of their size, strength and wealth; respecting each country’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; respecting each country’s social system and path of development; settling international disputes peacefully; and maintaining world and regional peace and security. (2) Make joint efforts to tackle challenges. This requires China to deepen its practical cooperation with other countries, maintain and develop an open world economy, invigorate global economy, encourage the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment, promote the international financial system’s reform, oppose trade and investment protectionism or shifting one’s troubles onto the neighbors, strive for a new global partnership for development featuring improved equality, and achieve a vigorous, sustainable and balanced economic growth. (3) Raise the awareness of the community of shared future for mankind and share opportunities for development. This requires China to strengthen its friendly exchanges with other countries, expand converging interests on the basis of mutual benefits, champion a new vision of win–win outcomes for all, work for the common development of all countries instead of pursuing its own development alone, ensure the match between power and responsibilities, work hand in hand to combat rising global issues, and create favorable international environment for other countries’ stable and relatively fast economic development. (4) Strive for common prosperity, which entails actively promoting mutually beneficial strategies to open up, tackling the South-North gap and other global issues, upholding international justice and fairness, working toward more democratic, law-based and rational international relations, reforming the global governance system to address the needs of different parties, and fostering a more fair and equitable international order.

12 Xi

(2018, pp. 274–275).

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To sum up, China’s path to peaceful development is not only rooted in the nation’s love for peace but the only choice for its international strategies in the light of the new developments. Furthermore, it is the Chinese government’s solemn commitment to the international community: China’s peaceful development will not be a threat to the world, but an opportunity to promote world peace and development. Because peaceful development is a sure path for China’s political, economic and cultural development, the positioning of its national image should center on peaceful development. Therefore, our cultural symbols should fully convey this meaning when used in international communication.

5.1.2 Construct the National Image Highlighting Independence and Seeking Common Ground While Shelving Differences National sovereignty’s external functions are expressed through the independence of a country’s foreign policies. Hence, apart from being a key indicator of national independence, independence constitutes the fundamental meaning of national sovereignty. To uphold a country’s sovereignty is to uphold its right to handle internal and external affairs independently. Without independence, a nation and country will lose its dignity, determination, confidence and pride, let alone its right to participate in international affairs and external exchanges independently and fairly. Diplomacy has remained a major task in international politics throughout history. In ancient China, “the geographical vertical (north-south axis) and horizontal (east-west axis) alliances” (合纵连横, he zong lian heng) were a crucial diplomatic strategy among states. Since New China was inaugurated in 1949, independence has served as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, the foundation for building the country, and the basis to go global. China has always followed an independent foreign policy of peace and has carried out friendly exchanges with other countries within the framework of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. During his visit to India and Myanmar in 1954, Premier Zhou Enlai and the Prime Ministers of the two countries proposed the principles of handling international relations, namely, “mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual nonaggression; mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.” Primer Zhou Enlai explicitly pointed out that “[with] respect to foreign relations, we have a basic stand: we uphold China’s national independence and the principal of independence and self-reliance.”13 No matter how the international situation has changed in the past 70 years, the government of New China has stayed committed to its independent foreign policy. In particular, it has insisted on handling international issues in the light of their own merits, self-reliance, and opening-up while firmly opposing alliance, hegemony, and 13 Enlai

(1981).

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uniting or alienating any country based on ideological stand. The Chinese government has promoted friendly cooperation with the rest of the world and has made significant progress in advancing world economy and social development. Its efforts have been warmly received by the international community. Independence is the cornerstone of New China’s peaceful diplomacy. The country’s commitment to the independent foreign policy of peace has allowed certain strategic advantages in its diplomacy across times. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, the CPC Central Committee led by General Secretary Xi Jinping has built on previous diplomatic theories and practices and further promoted and elevated the independent foreign policy of peace. General Secretary Xi Jinping has proclaimed that “[adhering] to independence means that Chinese affairs must be dealt with and decided by the Chinese people themselves. … Adhering to independence means that we will firmly take the socialist path with Chinese characteristics. We will not take the old path of a rigid closed-door policy, nor an erroneous path by abandoning socialism. … Adhering to independence requires us to uphold our independent foreign policy of peace, and follow the path of peaceful development.”14 According to some scholars, Xi Jinping’s view on the independent diplomatic strategy reflects the following features: “(1) We must attach a great importance to building a solid material foundation for independence. If a major country like China relies on other major countries, it will be doomed to fail or become a vassal state. To achieve independence in foreign relations, we must first equip ourselves with a solid material foundation and keep on expanding it. As China continues to open up to the outside world and engage in international affairs, it becomes increasingly important to continuously cement the independence of military equipment, defense technology, industry, agriculture and food safety, and finance. (2) We must put developing a shared source of inspiration for independence high on our agenda. In addition to economic growth, the development of ideology and core values is critical, too. A shared source of inspiration entails confidence in its own path, theories and system, which is the prerequisite to realize the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation. Only with an independent mind can the Chinese people become more reassured and resolute and carry out the “major country diplomacy” with greater confidence. (3) Independence indicates that when participating in international affairs, China must honor history and equality and select its stand and policies justly. For example, it was China’s insistence on justice that led the Syrian issue to return to the right track of political settlement, thus avoiding even more gruesome consequences. In dealing with historical issues in bilateral relations, we must stress the importance of adopting a right approach to history and resolutely reject any wrong tendency or action that runs counter to the history. (4) We must value cultural sovereignty and security. The Chinese diplomatic theories and practices need to be conveyed with Chinese concepts in Mandarin Chinese, for this will enrich the diplomatic discourse framework with Chinese characteristics and reflect our confidence in diplomatic discourse.”15

14 Xi

(2018, pp. 3132). (2014).

15 Changhe

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Independence and seeking common ground while shelving differences are mutually reinforcing. The guiding principle of “seeking common ground among us while keeping our differences” was innovatively put forward by Premier Zhou Enlai in the Asian-African Conference (also known as the Bandung Conference), which took place on April 18–24, 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia. The Conference eventually led to the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Seeking common ground while keeping differences was not the goal, but a step that would lead us closer to it. In other words, the most important task was to identify the next step after having established the common ground. Premier Zhou Enlai explained that “[now] the face of the AsianAfrican region has undergone a radical change. … However, the rule of colonialism in this region has not yet come to an end. … The majority of our Asian and African countries … are still very backward economically. … That is why we demand not only political independence but economic independence as well [, therefore striving for complete independence.] … In the interest of defending world peace, we Asian and African countries … should be the first to cooperate with one another in a friendly manner.”16 To achieve this goal, Asian and African countries should “seek common ground among us, while keeping our differences. … [We] do have different ideologies and different social systems. But this does not prevent us from seeking common ground and being united.”17 Premier Zhou Enlai aimed to eliminate disagreement through seeking “similarities,” shelve disputes through accepting “differences,” and ultimately reach the greatest possible unity. “Seeking common ground” refers to seeking shared ideas, demands and interests while “shelving differences” suggest reserving different opinions, claims and interests. The former and the latter constitute the basis for peaceful and harmonious coexistence. Seeking common ground while shelving differences embodies dialectical thinking, and it has inspired many interpretations such as seeking common ground while setting differences aside, repressing differences while promoting common aspects, and respecting differences and treating others without bias. As a result, the philosophy can also be dubbed “seeking common ground dialectically.” Furthermore, because it implies the universality and particularity of contradiction and the antagonism and unity between commonality and individuality, it is also a fundamental method to approach issues. To be specific, “common ground” refers to universality and commonality and “differences” suggest particularity and individuality. To seek common ground is to identify and expand the common aspects between two parties, while shelving differences requires us to recognize certain individual differences. According to materialistic dialectics, a contradiction represents the unity of two opposing propositions, resulting in the concurrence of differences, mutual exclusiveness, contradiction as well as co-dependence, inclusiveness, consistence, collaboration and interchangeability. Premier Zhou Enlai was highly skillful at using the method in his diplomatic practices. In his toast at the welcome banquet for the US President Nixon in 1972, he expressed that “[the] social systems of China and the United States are fundamentally different and there exist great differences between 16 Zhou 17 Zhou

(n.d., pp. 9–20). (n.d. pp. 21–27).

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the Chinese Government and the United States Government. However, these differences should not hinder China and the United States from establishing normal state relations on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual nonaggression; noninterference in each other’s internal affairs equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence. Still less should they lead to war.”18 To seek the common ground, Premier Zhou first acknowledged the presence of differences and then urged the US to put these aside and work to find similarities. His method reflects the dialectic thinking of acknowledging the differences without pursuing them or letting them hindering seeking the common ground. Undoubtedly, we now live in a differentiated world with highly diverse civilizations. After the Cold War, the international politics has evolved toward multipolarity and multi-civilizations for the first time in history. In Samuel Huntington’s view, “[nation] states remain the principal actors in world affairs. Their behavior is shaped as in the past by the pursuit of power and wealth, but it is also shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences. The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocks of the Cold War but rather the world’s seven or eight major civilizations.”19 “In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. … the most pervasive, important and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. … Cultural commonalities and differences shape the interests, antagonisms, and associations of states.”20 Huntington is assertive that interstate conflicts manifest as inter-civilizational conflicts and would dictate global conflicts in the future. Although he recognizes the conflicts among heterogeneous civilizations, he underestimates people’s cultural tolerance in the modern society. Nevertheless, Huntington maintains that “[in] a multi-civilizational world, the constructive course is to renounce universalism, accept diversity and seek commonalities.”21 As indicated by cross-cultural communication studies, a certain level of cultural differences may encourage mutual attraction and learning instead of provoking conflicts. Differences in civilizations not only represent diversity but also energize cultural creativity. As long as civilizations respect their differences and seek common ground, they can complement, vindicate and learn from each other, eventually coexisting harmoniously. The diversity of civilizations and the mutual learning and assimilation between heterogeneous cultures constitute an important prerequisite for cultures to stay vibrant. Like for the rest of the existing civilizations dating back to ancient times, a main reason for the Chinese civilization’s continuous progress rests in its willingness to seek common ground and inclusiveness while setting differences aside, which suggests a strong resilience and capability to assimilate. Nowadays, a real major country

18 Anon

(1972). (1996, p. 21). 20 Huntington (1996, pp. 28–29). 21 Huntington (1996, p. 318). 19 Huntington

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“must possess some sort of unique experiences and power that can cast an enduring impact on the world. In other words, it must offer a model of development, which can be adapted by other countries to improve their own material production and ideological system.”22 In the four decades of the reform and opening-up, China has achieved political stability, mind liberation, economic growth, cultural prosperity, national unity, social harmony and sound ecological development. Consequently, the “Chinese path,” “Chinese model” and “Chinese experience” have enjoyed a growing demonstration effect with far-reaching impacts. In a broad sense, the model of development with Chinese characteristics is a valuable addition to global diversity. It also indicates the Chinese civilization’s unique glamor and the success of its foreign policies, e.g., independence and seeking common ground while shelving differences. Against the backdrop of globalization, countries’ destiny and future are increasingly intertwined. The zero-sum game mindset has become outdated and is being gradually replaced by interdependence and cooperation. In other words, countries sink or swim together. Therefore, we must keep to the goal of building a community of shared future, cooperating while competing with each other, and striving for mutually beneficial results. We must accommodate other countries’ interests and development while pursuing our own. To promote world economy, we must help each other address pressing issues. As outlined in the Report to the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, “[we] call for promoting equality, mutual trust, inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutually beneficial cooperation in international relations and making joint efforts to uphold international fairness and justice. In promoting equality and mutual trust, we should observe the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and support equality among all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor. We should advance democracy in international relations, respect sovereignty, share security, and uphold world peace and stability. In promoting inclusiveness and mutual learning, we should respect diversity of civilizations and development paths, respect and safeguard the rights of all peoples to independently choose their social system and development path, learn from others to make up for our shortcomings, and advance human civilization. In promoting mutually beneficial cooperation, we should raise awareness about human beings sharing a community of common destiny. A country should accommodate the legitimate concerns of others when pursuing its own interests; and it should promote common development of all countries when advancing its own development. Countries should establish a new type of global development partnership that is more equitable and balanced, stick together in times of difficulty, both share rights and shoulder obligations, and boost the common interests of mankind.”23 Specifically, countries need to “respect one another politically and hold consultations on an equal footing, carry out economic cooperation to draw on one another’s strength, learn from one another through cultural exchanges and seek common ground while putting aside differences.”24 The Chinese government will continue to actively participate in 22 Liu

(1997, p. 2). (2012). 24 Jintao (2009). 23 China.org.cn

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the international affairs, promote UN-related work, and contribute to regional security and development within the framework of independence and seeking common ground while setting differences aside. These are important tasks of improving its national image, too.

5.1.3 Construct the Image of a Major and Responsible Country As discussed previously, China’s peaceful development is a reasonable solution to the multi-polarized international order and economic globalization, and reflects the changes in the current international relations. Admittedly, the country has made notable progress in the past few decades, but it has also been inevitably challenged in the course of promoting world peace and development. Its continued integration to the international community is welcomed by the Western world with caution. In the light of this, China has to embrace such reality: apart from demonstrating its capability to actively participate in the international affairs, it also needs to take on the role of a “major and responsible country” in order to pursue peaceful development. In the light of the ever-shifting international dynamics, especially with China’s sustained fast economic development and rapidly strengthened comprehensive national power since the reform and opening-up, China has played an increasingly important part in the international affairs. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the largest developing country, it cannot shirk from its responsibility to honor the UN Charter by example. The Chinese government had adhered to the diplomatic strategy of “keeping a low profile” (韬光养晦, tao guang yang hui) till mid-1990s. As its strategic focus shifted, the strategy was amended to “keeping a low profile to striving for achievement” (韬光养晦、有所作为, tao guang yang hui, you suo zuo wei), which prompts the country to engage in international affairs and promote world peace and development with confidence and gradually constructs the image of a major and responsible country. Entering the new millennium, the Chinese government calls on to build a harmonious world and promote democracy, both of which celebrate peace, development and cooperation. It is committed to neighborhood diplomatic policies like “building friendship and partnership with neighboring countries” and “pursuing to bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors,” which the international community speaks highly of. The Report to the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China has explicitly pointed out that “China will continue to hold high the banner of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit and strive to uphold world peace and promote common development. … China is committed to peaceful settlement of international disputes and hotspot issues, opposes the wanton use of force or threat to use it, opposes any foreign attempt to subvert the legitimate government of any other countries, and opposes terrorism in all its manifestations. China opposes hegemonism and power politics in all their forms, does not interfere in other countries’

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internal affairs and will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion. China will continue to keep in mind both the interests of the Chinese people and the common interests of the people of all countries, get more actively involved in international affairs, play its due role of a major responsible country, and work jointly with other countries to meet global challenges.”25 The Chinese government has solemnly declared to the international community on many occasions that China strives to be a major and responsible country. In fact, since the 1990s, it has transformed from a challenger and observer to an active participant and contributor in the international system, progressively projecting itself as a major and responsible developing country. Fundamentally speaking, China is still a developing country confronted by many domestic challenges, such as overpopulation, low per-capita resources and severely unbalanced development. Nevertheless, as the country works to enhance socioeconomic development and national comprehensive power, it voluntarily fulfills its international obligations as well. In July, 1997, Asia was struck by the financial crisis. To save their own losses, some countries scrambled to devaluate their currencies, urge fellow countries that were also in crisis to pay back loans, and withdraw their investments, further worsening the overall situation. Yet China vowed not to devaluate its currency renminbi at the risk of its own economy, preventing the affected countries from suffering further currency devaluation. Meanwhile, it called upon the Asian economies to develop and revise a mechanism for regional economic cooperation. During the financial crisis, China demonstrated its commitment to international cooperation and projected a responsible image for the first time. In retrospect, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which first broke out in Southeast Asia, presented a window of opportunity for China’s philosophy and image of a major responsible country to take shape. China proved to Asia and the rest of the world that it was a major and responsible country. As the Chinese government’s actions were recognized by other Asian countries, China’s international reputation soared. China embraced its role as a major and responsible country again when the 2008 Global Financial Crisis attacked. During the onset of the crisis, the Chinese government adjusted its domestic and international economic, trade and financial policies, sparing no effort in alleviating its impact. It earned worldwide respect for its dedication and timely response. The Chairman of the Department of China-related Affairs of the Asia-Pacific Committee of German Business holds that China is a reliable partner amid global financial turmoil. In the political domain, China has established sound and steady relations with major countries and economies. To be specific, it established diplomatic ties with the US in 1979, normalized its relations with the Soviet Union in 1985, and forged a constructive partnership with the European Union (EU) in 1998. Up till now, China has formed partnerships with all major countries. Stable relations between major countries are important to world peace and stability. Moreover, as a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and an active participant of the ASEAN Regional Forum, China strives to peacefully settle border disputes with neighboring countries and foster mutual trust on border issues. It has proposed 25 China.org.cn

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diplomatic philosophies regarding seeking common development and interests, multipolarity, democratic international relations and cultural diversity. It has conveyed a strong sense of responsibility when dealing with international relations and regional and global multilateral mechanisms. Also, China has portrayed itself as a major and responsible country by showing initiatives in cooperating with the international community on many occasions, such as the UN peacekeeping, combating terrorism, solving the Korean nuclear issue, the post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan, the Hurricane Katrina disaster relief, and voluntary debt reduction or exemption to African and Asian countries. The Nouvelles d’Europe, an important European news agency based in Paris, once commended the Chinese government for behaving like a major and responsible country in the post-earthquake and—hurricane reconstruction of ASEAN countries.26 To sum up, China has identified itself as “a major and responsible country” on many important international occasions, and the image serves as one of the guiding principles in its diplomatic practices. Through cooperating with the international community, it has lived up to its responsibility to maintain world peace, too. For example, it has honored pertinent UN resolution and dispatched navy fleets to conduct escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and waters off the Somali coast. Its support in the anti-piracy operations and increasingly important presence in international affairs were also acknowledged by the then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Since 1990, the number of Chinese soldiers and staff taking part in the UN peacemaking operations has increased rapidly. In fact, China has dispatched more people to participate in peacemaking operations than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council. Entering the new millennium, the country has attempted to tackle global issues like climate change in unprecedented depth and width. For instance, it signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. In the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China released in 2006, energy conservation and emission reduction were included as a goal and task. Meanwhile, China has contributed to the alleviation of global climate change by voicing constructive ideas in international conferences and negotiations. During his visit to Central Asia and Southeast Asia in September and October 2013, Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, proposed the initiatives of building the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “twenty-first-Century Maritime Silk Road,” respectively, which attracted worldwide attention. As a reference to the ancient Silk Road, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to promote peaceful development on the basis of effective existing regional cooperation platforms and bilateral and multilateral mechanisms among China and pertinent countries. In particular, it focuses on enhancing policy, infrastructure, trade, financial and people-to-people connectivity and striving for political mutual trust, economic integration and cultural inclusiveness along the “Belt and Road,” eventually creating a community of shared interests, responsibilities and future. Since the establishment of the Belt and Road Economic Zone in 2015, the contracted projects have exceeded 3,000 in total. In the same year alone, Chinese companies directly invested in 49 countries along 26 Anon

(2005). Cited in Ye (2010).

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the “Belt and Road,” marking an 18.2% increase year-on-year. China signed with other “Belt and Road” countries a total of 17.83 billion US dollars’ worth of service outsourcing contracts with an execution amount of 12.15 billion US dollars, representing a year-on-year increase of 42.6% and 23.45%, respectively. After the financial crisis, China as the locomotive of global economic growth innovatively put forward the BRI to promote an all-round opening-up and transform its advantages in production capacity, techniques, capital and experiences into market and cooperative advantages. Through the BRI, it looks forward to sharing its gains, experiences and lessons from the reform and opening-up with other economies, promoting cooperation and dialogs, establishing a more balanced global development partnership, and consolidating the basis for stable global economic development in the long run. On October 2, 2013, President Xi Jinping met with the then Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (1949–; in office: 2004–2014) in Jakarta, Indonesia. During the meeting, President Xi launched the initiative of founding the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to facilitate regional connectivity and economic integration and provide financial support to the infrastructure construction in developing countries within the Asian-Pacific region. The AIIB would cooperate with and complement existing multilateral development banks in the region in order to jointly promote Asia’s stable economic development. The proposal was received warmly by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Later that month, Premier Li Keqiang introduced the proposal to other countries during his visit to Southeast Asia. On October 24, 2014, the ministers of finance or designated representatives of the 21 founding member states including China, India and Singapore signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in Beijing, agreeing to establish the AIIB. As of April 15, 2015, the AIIB had 57 prospective founding members, among which 37 were within the Asian-Pacific region and 20 were not. On June 29, 2015, the Signing Ceremony of the Articles of Agreement of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank took place in Beijing, with the ministers of finance or designated representatives of all 57 prospective founding members in attendance. The AIIB was founded on December 25, 2015. It is the first multilateral financial institution established under the proposal of China. From January 16 to 18, 2016, the Bank’s board of governor convened its inaugural meeting in Beijing. The BRI and the AIIB are important testaments to China’s active participation in international affairs, especially those related to the developing world. As China dedicates itself to promoting world development and harmony, its image as a responsible member of the international community is also reinforced. According to the China’s National Image Global Survey 2015 conducted by the Center for International Communication Studies under the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, most respondents considered the BRI having a positive effect on countries, individuals, regional economy and peace. Those in developing countries and/or from a younger generation showed greater acceptance toward the Initiative. Furthermore, when President Xi Jinping attended the Eighth G20 Leaders’ Summit in September 2013 in St. Petersburg, Russia, he called on countries to strengthen trade policy coordination and assist developing countries building up their trade capabilities. He also announced that “China [had] comprehensively realized the zero-tariff treatment

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to 95% of the taxed items of the least developed countries, which have established diplomatic ties with China, and would bring the above-mentioned proportion up to 97% in 2015. … China was to work with the G20 members to continue to work hard to strengthen the international free trade, and maintain and develop an open world economy.”27 In the Tenth G20 Summit in November 2015 in Antalya, Turkey, President Xi announced that China would create the “South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund,” continue to increase its investment in the least developed countries, and support fellow developing countries to fulfill the 2030 sustainable development goals. In conclusion, China’s solid assistance to less developed countries has elevated its image as a major and responsible country. After having set the goal of being a “major and responsible country” in the 1990s, China has deepened and expanded its participation in the international system fast. On the one hand, the international community looks up to China to take on more responsibilities; on the other hand, China needs opportunities to further establish itself in the world. Thus, shouldering more responsibilities is in line with its own national interests. The word “responsible” implies that China needs to guard its own interests, peace and stability as well as the other countries’. Furthermore, it entails that our country will neither sabotage or threaten the international order and rules, nor merely seek benefits from a secure and prosper world. Instead, China will abide and reinforce the international order and rules and fulfill its responsibilities to promote peace, development, security and stability. In particular, “‘a responsible country’ should set upholding international peace, promoting common development, and building a harmonious world as its priorities. It needs to approve and endorse anything that promotes peace and development while disapproving and resisting anything that runs counter to it.”28 Therefore, China should take initiatives in promoting world development and peace. Today, world peace and development are still challenged by critical issues, including terrorism, regional conflicts, racism, cross-national crimes, threats to economic and cybersecurity, pollution, global warming and famine. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a major developing country with fast-growing comprehensive national power, China should certainly contribute more in maintaining world peace and development. This is not only a historical responsibility entrusted by the international community but also a requirement for China’s own development. As proclaimed by Wang Yi (1953–), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, at the General Debate of the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, “China will firmly fulfill its due international responsibilities and obligations. The Chinese nation is responsible and ready to play its part. Although it remains a developing country facing a daunting task of development, China, as the second biggest economy and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is

27 Embassy of The People’s Republic of China In The Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal. (2013). Xi Jinping Delivers Speech on Trade and Other Issues at the Eighth G20 Leaders’ Summit. [Online]. [Accessed 19 April 2019]. Available from: http://np.china-embassy.org/eng/zgwj/t1076346.htm. 28 Liu (2007).

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fully aware of its responsibilities and expectations placed on it by the international community.”29

5.2 The Principles of Selecting Cultural Symbols to Construct China’s National Image Cultural symbols are signs with specific meanings or special connotations. As important cultural carriers and forms, they represent the unique culture of a company, a region, a nation or a country in an abstract way. In contemporary cross-cultural communication, a country’s image is mainly shaped by cultural symbols, which are represented by cultural products. A country with a relatively consistent culture (e.g., Japan and South Korea) or a relatively short history (e.g., the US) tends to exhibit distinctive cultural features. Therefore, it is more feasible to brand its culture with designated cultural symbols, which are to be replicated and disseminated in large quantities with advanced technologies. For instance, Japan is often associated with anime, manga and Bushid¯o (literal: the way of warriors) while South Korea is known for its TV dramas and cuisine. With the help of “a drink (Coca-Cola), a bun (McDonald’s) and a little mouse (the Mickey Mouse),” the US has made a fortune and exported the American values, succeeding both financially and socially. On the contrary, the Chinese culture is an open, inclusive and assimilating system, and has incorporated an enormous number of symbols which have been passed down since ancient times. However, few of them has been deemed unique or glamorous. To fully implement the strategy of “Chinese culture going global” and improve China’s national image, it is critical to understand how to draw effective symbols from our abundant cultural resources. Both communication and cognitive psychology have looked into selective attention—people’s tendency to accept opinions that accommodate or are close to their own values and reject those that are not. Since information updates rather rapidly in the current context, people are attuned to relying on selective attention to perceive the information and meanings of cultural symbols. From the perspective of semeiology, symbols are coded with concepts and meanings, which cannot be accurately interpreted without knowledge of certain historical, cultural and social background. As a result, receivers from different cultures may perceive the same cultural symbol in completely opposite ways, yet those from the same culture may be more receptible toward it. Communication is the exchange of meanings and information through a shared system of symbols. Those in the field of international communication are tasked to explain China to the outside world and carry out and further its international exchanges. However, due to the differences in languages, cultures and sociopolitical systems, overseas audiences may not have a comprehensive understanding of China and frankly, some of them hardly know anything at all. As a result, we must select 29 UN.org

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cultural symbols that are tailored to the globalized and diverse context. In particular, they must be able to reflect the Chinese nation’s unique cultural characteristics, taste, style and aesthetics. Meanwhile, they must be grounded in anthropologism and modern values and be accessible to a wide foreign public. We also need to utilize those cultural symbols with common meanings, through which the positive aspects of traditional Chinese culture can be expressed innovatively. According to some scholars, “our system of symbols is rooted in traditional Chinese culture, and we need to expand and update it by introducing more modern and internationalized elements. In this way, we can acquire a system of symbols that integrates the images of an ancient China, a modern China and a future China, eventually projecting a historical, modern and approachable national image in international communication.”30

5.2.1 The Principle of Reflecting National Characteristics Many of us are familiar with the saying “only those that are national can become universal.” The culture of a country or a nation can be divided into two parts: the unique national aspects and the universal aspects, or the culture leaning toward national characteristics and the culture leaning toward universality. So, what is the relationship between the national characteristics and universality? Are they completely different or related? The questions led to a century-long debate among Chinese scholars of cultural studies between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which did not subside until the 1990s. Based on the dynamics between universality and particularity, or between commonality and individuality, more and more scholars believe that a culture’s national characteristics and universality are actually two sides of the same coin. In other words, national culture is universal. Some take it even further by contending that the degree of universality increases with national characteristics. World culture is constituted by national cultures, and the former will cease to exist without the latter. The universality of world culture is actually the outcome of integrating national cultures. It is shared among national cultures, namely, the commonality of national cultures. Meanwhile, a culture’s national characteristics imply its individuality that separates it from other cultures. To conclude, a culture’s national characteristics and universality are different yet related. There are no definite boundaries between them and they can be interchangeable under certain conditions. National and world cultures are interconnected and can permeate each other, resulting in the internationalization of national culture and/or the assimilation of national characteristics into the world culture. Therefore, to ensure individuals’ harmonious coexistence without uniformity and seek common ground while shelving differences in resolving fundamental issues, many scholars turn to Habermas’s theories of intersubjectivity and modern communication. Here, the prefix “inter-” suggests the mutual permeation between subjects. In his book, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (1985), Habermas points out that “Self” 30 Cheng

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stands out in one’s interpersonal relations and the word mainly refers to intersubjectivity, i.e., one’s social connections with others. It is only within these connections that a person can exist as a unique individual. Without social groups, there will be no so-called subject of Self. He further explains that “the development of any system begins with ‘positioning,’ namely, setting up boundaries or rules for oneself. A system cannot be established without these boundaries. However, the system will become closed once it is well-established. Closure is the first step of becoming outdated. The only solution to the dilemma is communication. Specifically, we need to identify a reference frame, which allows us to examine our own system from a refreshing perspective. Thus, we can break free the original ‘self-built boundaries,’ expand the original system, and even accept a new one. Such openness and integration will enable us to criticize and rebuild the original system as well as creating a new one.”31 Owing to Habermas’s emphasis on raising people’s awareness of diversity, his theory of intersubjectivity has been widely adopted in the cross-cultural communication studies. Admittedly, certain conditions have to be met for national and world cultures to become interconnected and inter-permeable. Also, not every national culture can be deemed universal, and an increase in national characteristics does not necessarily lead to increased global acceptance. If a national culture is only alive within a limited closed region and is unable to influence other national cultures, then it can only remain national and regional but not universal. In Habermas’s words, “closure is the first step of becoming outdated.” To increase a national culture’s global acceptance, we must ensure that it is appealing to other national cultures and has far-reaching impacts. “The only solution to the dilemma is communication. Specifically, we need to identify a reference frame.” Therefore, to increase Chinese culture’s global acceptance and assimilate the world culture into our own, we must safeguard the openness of Chinese culture and promote cultural exchanges. These entails staying committed to cultural creation and innovation, strengthening international exchanges, and building an advanced culture that celebrates national characteristics and is in sync with global trends. China cannot become a true cultural power until its national culture with distinctive features is recognized by other nations and has demonstrated far-reaching impacts. Human cultures exist in the form of national cultures. In general, a culture’s national characteristics increase with the nation’s history, and vice versa. For instance, the culture of Han (汉, a nation native to China) was formed during the Qin (221 BC–206 BC) and Han (206 BC–220 AD) dynasties. Following the country’s unity, regional cultures and people’s behavioral and psychological patterns gradually converged. This convergence peaked when the campaign of “dismissing the hundred schools of thought and revering only the Confucianism” (罢黜百家, 独尊儒术; ba chu bai jia, du zun ru shu) proposed by Han dynasty scholar Dong Zhongshu (197– 104 BC) was launched. Since then, Confucianism dominated the Chinese national culture and was further reinforced from the Song dynasty (960–1279) onward. Given its long history, the Chinese culture is arguably one of the most distinctive national 31 Owen

et al. (2003, p. 1).

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cultures in the world. Cultures’ national characteristics lay the foundation for the world culture to flourish, and a nation can only enjoy an equal status as others when it preserves its national characteristics. Otherwise, it will risk becoming the subordinate of other national cultures. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a pioneer of China’s democratic revolution, once explained about the importance of nationalism in his lecture series San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People · Doctrine of Nationalism: “We should know that cosmopolitanism is developed from nationalism. Unless the spirit of nationalism is well developed, the spirit of cosmopolitanism is perilous.”32 To a certain extent, a country’s national characteristics and spirit are symbolized and epitomized by its national image. In other words, the nation’s image is the country’s image, and vice versa. In modern time, because all countries are nation states that comprise single or multiple nations, the images of the nation and the country mirror each other. Therefore, a robust national image should be able to reflect distinctive national characteristics in the first place. To be specific, it needs to encompass the overall impression on the country’s history, its role in human society’s development, and the vision of its future. National characteristics, or national uniqueness, refer to a nation’s general and stable psychological features that are demonstrated through behaviors and attitudes. They are shaped by extended living experiences within certain historical context and cast pervasive and profound influence on people’s emotionality, aesthetics, cognition, behaviors and habits. One of the ultimate goals to construct national image is to improve the people’s national identity. What is national identity? To begin with, it is “a national emotion rooted in a national culture and has existed since the day the nation was born. Although nations may be drastically different, their members do have one thing in common (from a certain perspective): the natural tendency to identify with their own nations, usually driven by psychological, emotional, cultural, religious and biological factors, etc.”33 “Quite often, national identity is fixated upon specific historical events and figures, which are turned into cultural symbols later. In this way, these events and names are not only the objects used to foster national identity but also the expressions of national characteristics.”34 Despite the continuously deepening economic integration and globalization, nation state remains the basic unit and an important factor in international politics. Consequently, if we overlook national characteristics and insist on pursuing the so-called “universalism” or “globalization,” which is rather illusive in reality, we will eventually construct a national image that is neither fish nor fowl. It is important to preserve the cultural diversity of nations in international communication, for this is the only way to shape and communicate national characteristics and ensure the harmonious coexistence among countries and nations. In conclusion, national characteristics should be at the core of national image, and China’s image should be able to reflect the goodwill, historical missions and aspirations of the Chinese nation.

32 Sun

(1924). (2012, p. 70). 34 Kang (2002). 33 Long

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National characteristics are expressed through national culture and therefore, to pass on a nation’s cultural legacy is to carry forward its national characteristics. National characteristics are abstract and metaphysical, but as the core of national image, they must be concrete and perceivable at the same time. Just like an organization needs a logo to reflect its culture and philosophy, national characteristics need to be passed down concisely. Thus, we must adopt concrete symbols to represent national characteristics in communication. Specifically, historical and cultural activities that are unique to a culture can be selected as national cultural symbols, such as art, sports, literature and customs. When a national cultural symbol is almost identical with the country’s symbol, the national cultural symbol will be reinforced. Otherwise, complications will arise. Every nation has developed the symbol of its national characteristics, sometimes known as the national totem, such as the Chinese “dragon,” the American “eagle,” the Russian “bear” and the Indian “elephant.” The nationalization of symbols refers to the incorporation of national elements in coding. It offers a unique expression based on a nation’s characteristics. As discussed previously, only those that are national can become universal in the era of globalization. Culture and communication are actually two sides of the same coin. Without communication, national culture will cease to exist. In this regard, symbols cannot be distinctive or viable without national features. To construct a distinctive national image, a country must project its unique national characteristics, which is most appealing to the international community. Therefore, to improve the acceptance, understanding and recognition of Chinese cultural symbols, we need to ensure that they embody the Chinese taste, behavioral patterns and beauty and communicate our unique national characteristics. The Chinese nation’s profound culture and history have offered a rich ground for us to draw distinctive cultural symbols for international communication. In fact, people prefer accepting and understanding symbolized and figurative representations that reflect national characteristics, namely, objects, scenery, customs, conventions and especially discourse, symbols and literature. It is through these representational signs that people can better understand a nation, its characteristics and cultural attributes. For example, as consumerism prevails, commodities, particularly the localized and nationalized cultural commodities, contain not only use- and exchange-values but also semiotic and cultural values. When symbols are embedded within commodities, they will continuously convey their cultural connotations and value orientations while being consumed by consumers. American media scholar John Fiske (1939–) has once put it: “all material-functional resources are imbricated with the semiotic-cultural.”35 The public consumes a commodity’s use-value and semiotic value concurrently a process commonly known as the “brand effect.” Of course, like other cultures, the traditional Chinese culture is not immune to certain historical limitations: there are still many outdated content, uneven development and instances where the good are mixed with the bad. Hence, we must learn to differentiate instead of attaching equal emphasis to all cultural symbols. Specifically, some cultural elements and symbols are backward, decadent and inconsistent with present 35 Fiske

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national conditions. They run counter to the national image construction featuring “peaceful development, seeking common ground while shelving differences, and a major and responsible country.” We must stay vigilant and be able to discern and say no to them. In the international communication of cultural symbols, on the one hand, we need to take into account the preferences and thinking patterns of overseas target audiences. On the other hand, we must avoid overcompensation by selecting symbols that primarily cater to their need for novelty seeking, which will result in empty and untruthful communication. Therefore, we need to examine the connotations of traditional Chinese cultural symbols and select those that will facilitate our national image construction. We must ensure that each symbol’s content and form are complementary.

5.2.2 The Principle of Universality The impact of globalization is profound and comprehensive and manifests as the issue of universality in the cultural domain. In the age of globalization, the fact-finding and ideology regarding cultural universality remain under debate. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that cultural universality is inevitable. In this light of this trend, each nation should participate in the globalization process while striving to maintain its own national cultural characteristics. How does the Chinese culture integrate into the world culture while asserting its independence? That is a question for every Chinese. According to constructivism, “shared knowledge”—the common understanding and expectations of international actors in a certain social environment—is the most fundamental element in the international community. In other words, shared knowledge is international actors’ common and interconnected knowledge. It constructs actors’ identities, interests and images. The construction of national image through cultural symbols should aim to integrate into the global discourse system, seek the common values held by mankind, and promote exchanges of cultural symbols on the basis of “shared knowledge.” As one of the premises, the international communication of cultural symbols must be guided by the ethics, moral standards and values shared by mankind as well as the international standards and protocols. Hence, to improve the effectiveness of our international communication, we need to ensure that Chinese cultural symbols are “open to negotiations:” the symbolic resources from our texts should be made able to interact with those of the overseas target audiences, thus allowing continuous generation of new shared meanings rather than fixating on a static and single meaning. In particular, we must not just focus on promoting our own ideology and values or projecting the Chinese nation’s cultural identity. Instead, we need to adopt a humanistic and modern prospective and ensure that the cultural symbols reflect the common values of mankind. In the global discourse system, the common values of mankind exist objectively for all eternity. For example, to some scholars of ethical bottom lines or “global minima moralia from experience,” “experiences have proved the existence of global minima moralia. This suggests that certain common values are as precious as those

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only pertinent to specific cultures. It has come to many cultural anthropologists’ attention that the majority of the cultures disapprove fraud, theft, violence or incest. Also, no culture sets out to inflict pain, disregard lives or dishonor the deceased. Even for those cultures that have legalized revenge, there is a strict limit on death toll; and even the tribes that once deemed ‘blood sacrifice’ reasonable were simply trying to sacrifice fewer lives in exchange for the majority’s survival.”36 On December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), thus establishing the humanitarian principle of freedom, equality and brotherhood (Article 1), the principle of universal human rights and freedoms (Article 2), and the principle of harmonizing one’s duties to the community, rights and freedoms (Article 29). Entering the 1990s, some prominent figures in religions and ethics proposed the concept “global ethic” to serve as an addition to the “universal human rights.” The Declaration Toward a Global Ethic was ratified by the Parliament of the World’s Religions on September 4, 1993, which documents the following “global ethics:” (1) “rights without morality cannot long endure,”37 which reflects the principle of harmonizing one’s duties to the community, rights and freedoms. (2) Two basic requirements: in accordance with the humanitarian principle, “every person is treated humanely, without exception;”38 and we “must treat others as we wish others to treat us,” which is known as the “golden rule” or the universal principle of “global ethics.”39 (3) “Four irrevocable directives:” first, the “commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life,” i.e., the directive to “[have] respect for life” derived from the ancient directive that “You shall not kill.”40 Second, the “commitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order,” i.e., the directive to “[deal] honestly and fairly” derived from the ancient directive that “You shall not steal.”41 Third, the “commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness,” i.e., the directive to “[speak] and act truthfully” derived from the ancient directive that “You shall not lie.”42 Fourth, the “commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and women,” i.e., the directive to [respect] and love one another derived from the ancient directive that “You shall not commit sexual immorality.”43 The “global ethic” outlined in the Declaration is “neither a global ideology nor one unified religion that transcends all existing religions, let alone a religion that dictates others. Instead, it refers to the fundamental consensus on certain binding values, irrevocable standards and moral attitudes.”44 As the carrier of history and society, mankind passes down the achievements of civilizations from generation to generation, and promotes inter-civilization dialogs 36 Pan

(2005). of the World’s Religions (1993, p. 6). 38 Parliament of the World’s Religions (1993, p. 3). 39 Parliament of the World’s Religions (1993, p. 3). 40 Parliament of the World’s Religions (1993, p. 8). 41 Parliament of the World’s Religions (1993, pp. 9–10). 42 Parliament of the World’s Religions (1993, p. 11). 43 Parliament of the World’s Religions (1993, p. 12). 44 Pan (2005, p. 72). 37 Parliament

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and exchanges. The presence of differences among civilizations does not imply the absence of similarity or commonality. Since we have the same experiences and face the same crises and challenges, we share the same vision and values. Therefore, we must seek common ground while shelving differences and work together to establish “a community of shared future” featuring extensive consultation, joint contribution, shared benefits and win–win results. To integrate into the global discourse system and highlight the common values of mankind in the course of globalization, our international communication should address those focal, hotspot and difficult issues that have garnered worldwide attention, such as pollution, population explosion, resource scarcity, illicit drug abuse and epidemic diseases. In the meantime, it should reflect the common values of mankind, which are not exclusive to the developed Western countries but continuously enriched as the world evolves. These common values may include combating terrorism, maintaining world peace, promoting global economic development, pursuing sincerity, goodness and beauty, cherishing human lives, and protecting fundamental human rights. They are the common moral standards of mankind and the core of the international community’s value system. However, it is worth mentioning that throughout China’s development, Chinese scholars have not reached a consensus on whether human society has shared “modern characteristics” or common values. This divergence of opinion even led to a few misconceptions, some of which have not been cleared up yet and continue to hinder the construction of contemporary China’s image as a civilized, open and modern country. For example, China once produced a TV documentary to introduce its progress in early childhood education, which included scenes of bright and clean kindergarten classrooms and neatly dressed children. However, the documentary met with criticism from the Western audience: all the children featured in the story were sent to boarding schools. They were separated from their parents for six days in a week and could only be with their families on Sundays. How could the Chinese people be so “cruel” and “unreasonable”? Furthermore, we often over-publicize role models’ great personal sacrifice for their careers. For instance, due to work commitment, someone did not return inside his own home even though he passed by the doorstep three times, could not take care of sick family members, or could not request a leave of absence to attend his own parent’s funeral, etc. Another common theme in our international communication revolves around people (including children and adolescents) sacrificing their lives to protect or rescue national or public properties, such as a herd of goats, telegraph poles, crops and forest, etc. In the absence of a background introduction, the Westerners find the Chinese people “terrifying,” “with no regard to human rights,” not cherishing individual lives or values, irresponsible to the young generation or to say the least, unreasonable.45 Similar examples are too many to name. The issue primarily lies in the fact that over the last few decades, we have grown too reliant on this rather static behavioral mode to “promote” our own values to (and even “touch”) the foreign audience. Meanwhile, our understanding and demonstration of the common values of mankind seem insufficient. In fact, the international community will certainly be friendlier and more receptive to a national 45 Lin

(2004).

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image that respects its “modern characteristics” and common values and honors dialogs and exchanges with the Western civilizations on an equal footing. If our international communication runs counter to the principles held by the international community, we will not only lose our discourse power but also be loathed. Actually, the time-honored Chinese culture have many cultural elements to offer, including the emphasis on man-nature harmony and man-society harmony, the pursuit of harmonious interpersonal relations, aspirations linked to national and social stability and solidarity, strong ethics, striving for individual perfection and nobility, and the respect and promotion of knowledge, wisdom and truth, etc. Nowadays, China is an important creator and upholder of the common values of mankind. Its development has not digressed from the advancement of human civilization, nor will it do so. The splendid Chinese culture of 5000 years is a staple of the world civilization. We cherish the civilized accomplishments of mankind, including common values like freedom, democracy, equality and human rights. In fact, the present-day China has made unprecedented improvements in all four areas. We promote cultural diversity and mutual respect and oppose imposing one’s own beliefs as the universal standards on others. The Chinese nation has always pursued and championed these common values of mankind, but we need to figure out how to convey them in the modern times, thus allowing the world the understand our real intention. Cultural export is not the mere dissemination of all cultural elements. Without painstaking cultural construction, these elements will be harshly rejected by audiences from other cultures. Admittedly, in comparison with China, the Western world has more powerful technologies and cultural media and began to modernize and internationalize its values much earlier. Hence, there is still a long way ahead of China. In the light of this, we must first stay grounded and acknowledge the discrepancy. Next, we need to assert our national characteristics while exploring the common values embedded within our own culture. It is crucial for us to engage in dialogs with other cultures in order to innovate our national culture. Once we have selected cultural symbols as cultural carriers, we need to bring their international communication in line with the global context. To be specific, we must adhere to the common standards of international communication and the principle of universality. Admittedly, it is not feasible to establish truly balanced and fair standards with worldwide approval. Nonetheless, if we can align our standards with those of the developed countries and follow the principle of universality, it will improve audiences’ understanding of the backgrounds and meanings. Due to the cultural and psychological differences in cross-cultural communication, the international communication of cultural symbols needs to “deliver national content in an internationally acceptable narrative.” This principle requires us to tailor the (production and) communication of Chinese cultural elements and philosophies to the reading, listening and viewing preferences of overseas target audiences and adhere to the internationally recognized principles and rules. In this regard, developed countries have attached great importance to targeting the public’s needs and developing their cultural industries in the international communication of their cultural symbols. From national cuisine, costumes, music, to inspirational movies and TV programs, there are a plethora of items with immense potential of cultural penetration and diffusion,

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which can all be selected as cultural symbols. For example, one of the secrets behind the international success of South Korean TV dramas and films is their adherence to the principle of universality and the adaptation to current international context. Not confined to the national context, these works integrate traditional Eastern core values into modern life scenes. In particular, national cultural resources, traditional values and national characteristics are projected through glamourous, stylish, empathic and cheerful characters. As overseas audiences are drawn to the carefully rendered plots, the traditional culture and national image of South Korea are also elevated. To cope with cultural heterogeneity in international communication, we need to adopt those cultural symbols with the greatest commensurability. Because people from different countries and nations rely on different systems of cultural symbols, it can be challenging for them to accurately read each other’s intention or capture a cultural symbol’s real meaning, which usually gives rise to misunderstanding. The heterogeneity of cultural symbols has become the biggest barrier to cross-cultural communication. Granted, to enhance the mutual understanding and identification between people, nations and countries of different cultural backgrounds, we need to first improve people’s proficiencies in their mother tongues. In addition, we need to select cultural symbols with the greatest commensurability in order to overcome possible misconceptions. While linguistic symbols can only be comprehended after a lengthy and complex learning process, visual symbols strike audiences as straightforward, real and lively because they directly appeal to people’s sensory system and have greater commensurability. Therefore, countries usually opt for visual symbols in international communication. For instance, typical Western visual symbols (e.g., dalmatians) are repeatedly introduced in the promotional video of China’s national image. These signifiers that are familiar to Westerners are then paired up with the signified to indicate shared symbolic meanings, thus bridging the cultural communication between China and the West and conveying China’s social progress. Likewise, flying white doves, beautiful landscapes and smiley faces are well-known symbols of peace, beauty and friendship and are used by many countries in their national image construction. Furthermore, we need to differentiate the cultural symbols used to address different viewer groups. In the past, we used the same symbols for all viewers regardless of their countries of origin, nationalities, customs, policies and mentalities, and overlooked the importance to address different needs in different periods. Now, we need to select cultural symbols that are tailored to different countries and nations but hold the same connotations.

5.2.3 The Principle of Synergizing Past, Presence and Future Joshua Cooper Ramo (1968–), American scholar and the author of The Beijing Consensus (2004), once pointed out sharply: “[there are] many current attempts to talk about China as ‘ancient’ … [, but] the world needs no reminder of China’s age. What it needs instead is a simple way to understand what is happening in China today. … China’s vital, compelling contemporary culture is drawing fans from around the

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world.”46 “[Its] people should be confident enough to attract the international community’s attention.”47 “Yet Chinese officials generally take the path of least resistance when presenting the nation’s culture, falling back onto old and unsurprising clichés of opera, martial arts and tea instead of turning to China’s vibrant, new cultural leaders.”48 To him, it is critical for China to strengthen its international communication and gain the world’s understanding. In particular, “the country’s very newness, its constant invention of new ideas and solutions to new problems, is a far more powerful way to connect with the world than its ancient traditions. … China must devise a set of ideas, icons, brands and messages that fitted with the country as it is now and as it hopes to be. This is not to say it should abandon its traditional culture; rather it needs to find ways to let the intellectual, cultural and commercial products of a fresh and emerging China complement and strengthen the country’s traditional image.”49 “All history is contemporary history,” which will eventually become new history. Although the history can be in sharp contrast to the presence under certain circumstances, the two are logically connected, implicitly or explicitly, in most cases. Quite often, presence is foreshadowed and even explained by history, while future is projected and announced through presence. Since we cannot completely separate presence from history or future, the objective existence, which serves as the basis for constructing national image, is determined by the presence × history and future × presence interactive effects. In this regard, the positioning of a country’s image should target its objective existence (the core), i.e., a country’s “historic juncture”— where did it come from? How does it carry itself now? And where will it go? Once we have identified the “historic juncture,” it will enable us to define and communicate the representations, signs and details of China’s objective existence with sound logic, sense and in accordance with its reality and development. The positioning of China’s national image and the selection of cultural symbols should be carried out in the same way. Indeed, the present-day China is no longer that ancient, mysterious country in the East. Since New China was founded, the CPC “has rallied and led the people of all ethnic groups of the country in turning the poor and backward old China into an increasingly prosperous and powerful new China and opening-up bright prospects for the great renewal of the Chinese nation.”50 In particular, the country has made remarkable accomplishments in political, economic, social, cultural and ecological domains in the past four decades of reform and opening-up, and has experienced a considerable growth in its national comprehensive power. Meanwhile, its relations with the international community have gone through profound changes: as China stepped onto world stage, the ancient civilization was re-invigorated. Today, under the CPC’s leadership, the Chinese people are striving to realize the Two Centenary goals and the Chinese dream of great national renewal. This not only outlines our 46 Ramo

(2007, pp. 16, 39–40). et al. (2008). 48 Ramo (2007, p. 16). 49 Ramo (2007, pp. 18, 40). 50 China.org.cn (2012). 47 Ramo

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national conditions but also provides foundation for constructing China’s national image in the new era. Therefore, we should present a vibrant China that connects the past, the presence and the future to the world and introduce its accomplishments and national conditions objectively. In the international communication of cultural symbols, we need expand and update the system of symbols that is based on our traditional culture. Specifically, we can integrate the images of ancient, modern and future China by introducing more modern and international elements. In this way, we will create a new system to portray the national image featuring historical traditions, modern vibes and friendliness. This is the only method to truly establish ourselves in the global discourse system and add new contents to the construction of our national image. When presiding over the 12th group study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC. Central Committee on December 30, 2013, general secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that “[to] strengthen our cultural soft power, we should showcase the unique charm of Chinese culture. During its 5,000-year history, the Chinese nation has created a brilliant and profound culture. We should disseminate the most fundamental Chinese culture in a popular way to attract more people to participate in it, matching modern culture and society. We should popularize our cultural spirit across countries as well as across time and space, with contemporary values and the eternal charm of Chinese culture. We should tell the rest of the world about the new achievements of modern Chinese culture, which feature both excellent tradition and modern spirit, both national and international. To this end, efforts should be made to sort out traditional cultural resources and bring back to life relics sleeping in closed palaces, legacies of the vast land of China and records in ancient books. We should convince the people with reason and morality, improve cultural communication with other countries and intensify our system of cultural and educational exchanges, blaze new trails, and use various means, such as mass media, group dissemination and interpersonal communication.”51 He further emphasized that “[to] build a beautiful image of our country, we should display the Chinese civilization of a long history and unity of diversified ethnic groups with varying cultures; an Oriental power with honest and capable political administrations, developed economy, thriving culture, stable society, unified people and splendid landscapes; a responsible great power that is committed to peaceful development, common growth, international fairness and justice, and contributions to mankind; and a socialist power opening its door wider to the outside world, full of hope, vigor and vitality.”52 To construct the images of an ancient civilization, an Oriental power and a socialist great power, we need to align the Chinese nation’s most fundamental cultural genes with the contemporary culture and society. That is, to adhere to the principle of synergizing past, presence and future and paint the world a real image of China. In the construction of national image, a country’s power of discourse is directly reflected in its ability to provide universal reasons to assert its interests associated with 51 Xi 52 Xi

(2018, pp. 179–180). (2018, p. 180).

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the image and obtain international approval. In his recent book The Grand Design (2010), British physicist and philosopher Stephen Hawking (1942–2018) proposed the concept of “model-dependent realism.” His main argument is that our reality is not absolutely objective, but rather dependent on our views, i.e., we see what we want to see. The theory is in the same vein as the “shared concept” in constructivism, both of which stress the provision of knowledge (concept). Interactions create shared knowledge, which constructs identities, images and interests. Admittedly, the “old” still dictates our cultural exports, with the majority related to traditional Chinese culture and very few being contemporary. There are not many cultural symbols ideal for cross-cultural understanding and communication. Hence, the image of contemporary China is absent in lots of Western countries. People are more familiar with artworks and prominent names from ancient China, but have little knowledge on modern China, especially in the contemporary period. Their lack of understanding of the Chinese path, the Chinese model and China’s development strategies significantly hinders the effective construction of our national image. Comparing with the popular cultural symbols representing ancient China, those representing modern and contemporary China are yet to be improved. In fact, foreign target audiences know that China is an ancient civilization and are receptive to our traditional culture. Statistics have shown that most overseas respondents are aware of China’s historical and profound culture. However, historical and cultural legacies belong to the past, and China’s historical charm cannot transform itself into the modern appeal automatically. Traditional cultural resources cannot be equated with cultural “soft power,” either. To ensure their sound economic and social performance, we must modernize and innovatively develop our traditional cultural resources. Our neighbors Japan and South Korea have offered us useful experiences in this area. By combining their cultural resources with the most stylish, avant-garde art forms and the latest science and technology, they have created modern and even futuristic cultural symbols that appeal to audiences both at home and abroad. These symbols have played an important part in promoting cultural diplomacy and constructing national images. To be specific, South Korea has promoted their traditional cultural values overseas through TV dramas and films instead of Samgo-Mu (a traditional Korean drum dance); and Japan has established itself in the overseas market with its most trendy manga instead of the classical Japanese dance-drama Kabuki. If we want the world to recognize the image of contemporary China, we cannot merely promote the cultural legacies from the Fengjian Old China (feudal society) or the cultural symbols dating back to the Republic of China (1912–1949). In other words, there is no need to keep emphasizing China’s ancient history. Instead, we need to redefine the content of Chinese culture by introducing contemporary elements. “With the help of modern art forms and means of communication, we can create more cultural markers, symbols and brands that embody the values of contemporary China. The modernization of China’s national image requires continued innovation and transcendence. We need to invite the overseas audiences to view China not only as an

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ancient civilization but more importantly as a cultural power in modern times. In this way, we can enhance China’s cultural ‘soft power.’”53

5.2.4 The Principle of Being Consistent with the Positioning of Core National Image In The Anatomy of Power, renowned American economist Galbraith categorizes power into three types: condign power, compensatory power and conditioned power. In particular, conditioned power is realized by changing others’ beliefs, including using persuasion and education to gain others’ submission toward an organization or individuals. We understand the world through the media of symbols. As the representation of a country’s/nation’s culture, cultural symbols hold conditioned power to affect, define, modify and shape our individual perceptions and behaviors. This power is everywhere. American sociologist Roland Robertson (1938–) has also noted that “all of international politics is cultural that we are … in a period of globewide cultural politics.”54 Therefore, if we do not reflect on these cultural symbols’ nature, changes and impacts, we will not be able to fully grasp how such power shapes and changes our understanding on our own lives’ symbolic significance. It is through this conditioned power that cultural symbols construct a country’s image and disseminate its values. The contemporary Western culture is a good example here. Western countries have successfully preserved the vital elements in their own cultural traditions and promoted their cultural symbols around the world, which have evolved into the symbols of the Western civilization itself. Hollywood blockbusters have not only brought worldwide commercial success but also served as an important cultural symbol in America’s consumption sector. They have promoted America’s core national image, lifestyle, values and even invade other national cultures. The identification of a country’s image is essentially the identification of its values. Because cultural symbols are important media and method of national image construction, they should reflect a country’s philosophies and values. Otherwise, these symbols will be meaningless in enhancing a country’s soft power or national image. As discussed in the previous text, the construction of national image is actually the mutual construction between media agenda and public agenda. Based on one of the core assumptions of the agenda-setting theory, “mass media relies on the public agenda setting to construct a ‘virtual environment’ for the public, through which it can influence their perceptions and judgement on national image. In other words, mass media creates a cognitive environment for its audience, where it determines which messages are fed to the public and how they interpret them.”55 Consequently, in the age of globalization, the incorporation of national cultural characteristics and core values into cultural symbols is crucial in the construction of national image. 53 Shen

(2008). (1992, p. 5). 55 Tu and Gong (2008). 54 Robertson

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To effectively construct China’s national image, we should ensure that Chinese philosophies and values are reflected through cultural symbols. Once the “souls” of these symbols have been molded, they will exert great power to appeal and inspire in international communication. Today, our cultural symbols should convey China’s core image (or core values) featuring “peaceful development, seeking common ground while setting differences aside, and a major and responsible country.” It is only in this way that they can truly facilitate the construction and communication of China’s national image. China’s national image has improved rapidly in recent years. However, we must admit that such improvement is mainly a result of our rising economic strength. In other words, our national image still depends on our “hard power.” This has sparked worldwide controversy. From the successful experiences of South Korea and Japan, we understand that the construction and elevation of China’s image cannot rely on economic power alone (although China has become the world’s second largest economy in 2011, it is only considered a “major country” in terms of total economic volume). Instead, national image construction should revolve around the essence of China’s cultural soft power. It needs to adopt cultural symbols that reflect Chinese characteristics and are adaptive to the changing times. Needless to say, we have not developed universally accepted cultural symbols that can be accurately associated with the positioning of China’s image yet. As we promote our national image, we need to find equilibria between difficult and complex contradictions such as “being a major country or a poor country,” “seeking development or environmental protection,” “seeking rise or peace,” and “celebrating history or modernity.” Answers to these questions will constitute the “cultural essence” of China’s national image, based on which we can develop our “signature” cultural products like Hollywood movies to the US, manga to Japan, and the “Korean Drama Fever” to South Korea. In conclusion, as communication media continue to develop, Chinese cultural symbols must keep up with the world and portray the image of contemporary China. We cannot no longer dwell on the fantasy of the ancient civilization of 5000 years. Instead, we must adapt our cultural symbols to the changing times and adhere to the principle of reflecting national characteristics, the principle of universality, the principle of synergizing past, presence and future, and the principle of being consistent with the positioning of core national image. Simply put, our cultural symbols need to be first “de-nationalized” and then “re-nationalized.” “De-nationalization” requires us to discard the inappropriate elements in the creation of Chinese cultural symbols. To be specific, we must avoid ethnocentrism and subjectivism and drop any content that is not commensurate with a modern civilization’s development. Instead, we need to embrace universally accepted values and create cultural symbols with universally accepted brand building techniques and artistic expressions. Once we have done so, we still need to integrate elements of the Chinese nation into the “upgraded” cultural symbols, namely, “re-nationalization.” In other words, we aim to leverage the Western advantage in expansion, branding and communication as well as China’s cultural strengths in inclusiveness, harmony and the unity between man and nature, thus allowing Chinese cultural symbols to grow both in width and depth. In this way, we can adapt the Chinese cultural symbols to the cultural globalization

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while maintaining national characteristics in order to ensure the effectiveness of its international communication.

5.3 The Communication Strategies for Cultural Symbols in the Construction of China’s National Image The communication of cultural symbols is highly strategic and technical. Different timing and methods can lead to completely different outcomes. To improve the visibility of Chinese cultural symbols and promote the national image featuring “peaceful development, seeking common ground while shelving differences, and a major and responsible country,” we need to adopt and commit to an integrative communication strategy in the international communication.

5.3.1 The Communicative Functions of Chinese Cultural Symbols Communication is essentially a social interactive process that allows exchange of information through symbols and media. In this process, sender and receiver influence and restrain each other. Their interactions create shared meanings, which construct our world of meanings. The essence of communication also determines its functions. So, what are these functions exactly? In short, they are the impacts and consequences of communicative activities on human society. A more comprehensive discussion on the issue can be found in Many Voices, One World, a UNESCO report published in 1980. The report identifies the following functions: (1) “Information: the collection, storage, processing and dissemination of news, data, pictures, facts and messages, opinions and comments[.] … [(2)] Socialization: the provision of a common fund of knowledge which enables people to operate as effective members of the society in which they live and which fosters social cohesion and awareness thereby permitting active involvement in public life. [(3)] Motivation: … the stimulation of personal choices, and aspirations; the fostering of individual or community activities, geared to the pursuit of agreed aims. [(4)] Debate and discussion: the provision and exchange of facts needed to facilitate agreement or to clarify differing viewpoints[.] … [(5)] Education: the transmission of knowledge so as to foster intellectual development, the formation of character and the acquisition of skills and capabilities at all stages of life. [(6)] Cultural promotion: the dissemination of cultural and artistic products for the purpose of preserving the heritage of the past; the development of culture by widening the individual’s horizons, awakening his imagination and stimulating his aesthetic needs and creativity. [(7)] Entertainment: the diffusion … of drama, dance, art, literature, music, comedy, sports, games, etc. for personal and collective recreation and enjoyment. [(8)] Integration: the provision to all persons, groups and

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nations of access to the variety of messages which they need in order to know and understand each other and to appreciate others’ living conditions, viewpoints and aspirations.”56 As a specific form of communication, international cultural communication has its own features and functions. In general, cultural communication exhibits features like being social, purposeful, creative, interactive, and persistent.57 In the age of globalization, it also displays inclusiveness, diversity and integration. Owing to the internet’s fast development, modern media has turned the world into a big data platform for cultural communication, where cultures meet, interact, compete and integrate. As a result, monoculturalism can no longer meet people’s needs and multicultural integration is inevitable. Against the backdrop of cultural exchanges and integration, the power of culture now assumes an increasingly important strategic position in a country’s comprehensive national power. “Culture is the lifeblood of a nation, and it gives the people a sense of belonging.”58 It continues to be an important source of national cohesion and creativity as well as an indispensable component of comprehensive national power. Hence, cultural communication holds political, communicative and social functions. As the actors in cultural communication, people and social organizations will always display certain ideological or political leanings. Culture can only be disseminated through the exchange of cultural information, during which a universal cultural consensus and identification and the agreement on acceptable and unacceptable behaviors are achieved. To sum up, cultural communication’s inclusiveness, diversity, integration along with its political, communicative and social functions have laid the conceptual and practical framework to enhance our international communication. It is an effective measure to construct our soft power and national image.59 Since cultural symbols are considered as important media or effective carriers of information in cultural communication, they have an important communicative function, too. Taking into account of the functions of communication, the nature of symbols and the roles of culture, I contend that the ideal Chinese cultural symbols (i.e., the ones that reflect Chinese characteristics and are adaptive to the changing times) should at least perform the functions of creating national cohesion, motivating, and integrating values.60 1. The Function of Creating National Cohesion Culture is the objectification of human practices, and it forms stable ways of living through the diffusion of symbols. Every country or nation has created its unique cultural symbols along its unique path to development. These symbols not only carry 56 International

Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (1980, p. 14). (2004). 58 China.org.cn (2012). 59 Wu (2009, pp. 61–62). 60 This is drawn on the views of celebrated Chinese philosophers Zhang Dainian (1909–2004) and Fang Keli (1938–). They proposed three main functions of Chinese culture: to create national cohesion, motivate and integrate values. See: Zhang and Fang (1994). 57 Zhuang

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specific historical meanings, values and memories but also build the cultural identity of the country/nation. Cultural identity refers to the collective identification on cultural meaning system (represented by cultural symbols) among members from the same cultural community. According to cultural anthropologists, it is “the agreement and approval on cultural tendencies of mankind. Such agreement and approval represent our elevated understanding on the natural world and shape the principles of thinking and value orientations that dictate our behaviors. Given that we live in different cultural systems, our cultural identifications differ as well. Therefore, cultural identification also implies a sense of belonging toward a certain culture. Because its scope can be expanded as human cultural groups form and integrate, it is a dynamic concept that evolves with the human culture. It is also a primary factor in the existence and development of human culture.”61 Cultural identification does not target our natural or physiological features, but our social and cultural attributes. Its core is the identification of values, and its main characteristic is a sense of cultural belonging. National spirit is at the core of the values identification of national culture. It is “a vital collective consciousness gradually developed throughout a nation’s history. It encompasses the nation’s worldview, outlook on life, values, thinking and behavioral patterns, ideals, convictions and characteristics. As the heart and soul of national culture, national spirit is also known as ‘the soul of a country,’ with the internal function of motivating the people and the external function of showcasing national image.”62 As the representation of the Chinese nation’s spirit, the basic spirit of Chinese culture contains a tremendous governing power over the mentality of its people. It transcends geographical, class, racial and historical boundaries, and cultivates the minds of generations of Chinese, and unites us to work tirelessly toward the nation’s common and long-term interests. Therefore, looking back at the Chinese history, the Chinese nation can unite to fight against foreign aggression, while in face of domestic disputes, our people can also honor the national identification of “unity of the Chinese nation,” drop personal differences and seek harmonious governance instead of pursuing separatist propositions. These would have not been possible without a national spirit that honors resilience, strives for self-perfection and deems peace as most precious. “Peace as most precious” has also cultivated the Chinese nation’s appreciation of inclusiveness, harmony and unity. Our nation upholds harmony without uniformity, seeks common ground while overlooking differences, and rejects separatism or the amplification of differences. The Chinese people have always considered harmony among family members, neighbors and national unification their rightful pursuit. Such cultural traditions act as a strong cohesive force to promote the development of our national psychology (i.e., unity of the Chinese nation and national unification) and the stable national and social development in the long run. Since the Western Zhou period (c. 1045–771 BC), the concept of great unity—a type of rational selfconsciousness—has taken root in the Chinese culture. As the epitome of traditional 61 Zheng 62 Long

(1992, p. 4). (2012, p. 78).

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Chinese elite culture, the Hundred Schools of Thought developed different, even contradictory, theories. However, they did reach a consensus on national unification, ethnic integration and that the kingdom to be united under one’s way. Thus, their theories contradict and complement each other at the same time. In fact, the political concept of great unity is a reflection of the national cultural spirit underlining the harmony between man and nature and peace as most precious. Furthermore, social cohesion was nourished by concepts like “the world is one big family,” “all the people are my brothers and I share the life of all creatures,” and “all men under heaven are brothers.” “Take pleasure from national unification and be concerned about secession” is the Chinese nation’s rightful political value orientation. The concept of great unity has endured the theoretical examination of different schools of thought like Confucianism and Legalism. More importantly, it has stood the test of time, for ethnic integration and common development flourished during the period of great feudal unity, i.e., the Qin and Han Dynasties (221 BC–220 AD). As a result, the great unity has gradually been etched into the national psychology and has become the Chinese nation’s political mindset. It has robustly promoted the nation’s overall development and sociocultural progress. National spirit is abstract, but as the essence of national image, it must also be concrete and perceivable. Therefore, it must be concretized and symbolized. In this way, it will be ready to be passed down from generation to generation and expressed in international communication. “Sometimes, national spirit sounds like a fairy tale, mysterious yet often fictional, so people are more inclined to believe that it could not be fully represented. Instead, it could only be temporarily captured through affairs, scenery, customs, conventions and especially dialogues, symbols and literature.”63 For example, every nation has its own mascot or totem, which is the concrete and symbolic representation of its national spirit. “A world of symbols puts the histories of nations, societies and countries in order, and connect the past, the presence and the future through our collective lives. In terms of the past, symbols construct our common memories, on the basis of which that we have become a nation. … In terms of the future, symbols glue us together as a nation and show us the directions and the source of our fears. It is through the symbols that we feel ourselves connected with our ancestors and descendants. They make us realize that we will never be completely gone when we die. Thus, we are able to maintain rationality and proceed to our own destiny calmly. We all belong to the eternal world of symbols that predates and lasts after our own existence.”64 For any nation state, the significance of its cultural symbols is manifold: they are signs of its identity, carriers of its goodwill and charm and most importantly, a bond for its cultural identification. Through the implied cultural contents, values and meanings, cultural symbols subtly reinforce people’s collective memories and emotional identification of their country and nation over and over again. The basic spirit of Chinese culture serves as the theoretical foundation for national cohesion to develop and perform. Meanwhile, it also guides the development of Chinese cultural symbols and allows them to perform their crucial function of 63 Delannoi

et al. (2005, p. 197). (2003, p. 630).

64 Kara-Murza

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creating national cohesion. Within the theoretical framework of the national culture’s basic spirit, national cohesion holds the strength of integrative thinking, which can increase the people’s solidarity and identification of national culture. Without the basic spirit, there will be no inspiration and consequently, no national cohesion. 2. The Motivational Function Cultural spirit epitomizes a nation’s cultural traditions. It can stimulate national dignity, confidence and pride, enabling the people to press forward with courage in face of tribulations. The profound Chinese cultural spirit was cultivated through China’s long history. In particular, it has nourished generations of Chinese, inspiring them to work relentlessly toward realizing national reunification, prosperity and social development. Moreover, it has served as the bond that holds our nation’s common mentality and values together: in the course of thousands of years, resilience and striving for self-perfection have been highlighted in Chinese culture, and have motivated our people to press ahead in an unyielding spirit and fight against aggression and oppression both from home and abroad. Our culture also champions putting people first, which has encouraged us to respect others’ values and dignity. Specifically, we believe that upholding justice is more important than pursuing material gains, and we should work hard to discover the others’ values and help them realize their potential. Furthermore, Chinese culture advocates the unity between man and nature and peace as most precious. Such beliefs have motivated people to keep the larger picture in mind and sacrifice personal or partial interests for the greater good. For example, in the modern times, the Chinese people engaged in an indomitable struggle to gain national independence and ensure the survival and salvation of China. After the Opium Wars, Chinese scholar Feng Guifen (1809–1874), a student of Lin Zexu’s,65 appealed to the Qing government that the best way to avenge ourselves was self-strengthening. In fact, “self-strengthening and prosperity” later became the slogan of the Self-Strengthening Movement in the second half of the eighteenth century, where some officials advocated to “learn the superior technology of the barbarian, in order to control him.” Renowned scholar Yan Fu (1854–1921) further stressed that China must “[improve] people’s physical strength (gu-min-li 鼓 民力), [develop] people’s intellects (kai-min-zhi 开民智), and [reinnovate] people’s morality (xin-min-de 新民德)”66 in order to strengthen itself fundamentally. During the Gongche Shangshu (公车上书, literal: “Public Vehicle Petition”) movement in 1895,67 Kang Youwei quoted the Ten Wings, a collection of commentaries to the 65 Lin Zexu (1785–1850) was a Chinese scholar-official of the Qing dynasty. As an Imperial Commissioner, he launched the campaign to suppress opium use in Guangdong Province, Southeast China in 1838. On June 3, 1839, Lin commanded to destroy 1,000 long tons of illegal opium imported from the Great Britain at Humen Town. The event is later known as the Destruction of Opium at Humen, which became a catalyst for the First Opium War. 66 Mou (2009). 67 Following its defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War, the Qing government signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki with the Empire of Japan on April 17, 1895, leading to the former’s cessation of Taiwan and Liaodong to Japan in perpetuity. In April and May of the same year, Chinese scholars and reformers Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929) led 603 civil servant

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Book of Changes, as his theoretical ground for the “reform.” Furthermore, Dr. Sun Yat-sen pioneered the bourgeois democratic revolution, and nationalist Zou Rong (1885–1905) published his patriotic book The Revolutionary Army, in which “revolution” was described as fighting for world justice and an act of natural order. To sum up, they were all profoundly influenced by the resilience and striving for selfperfection embedded in traditional Chinese culture. These thoughts acted as a source of inspiration and were adapted to respond to the call of the times. Later on, the CPC made it its own responsibility to carry forward the resilience and striving for self-perfection: after the May 4th Movement in 1919,68 with its perseverance and unyielding willpower, the CPC led the Chinese people to secure victory in the New Democratic Revolution (1919–1949) and “[toppled] the three mountains of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism.”69 Since the founding of New China in 1949, Chinese Communists demonstrated their great fortitude again. They led the people to complete socialist revolution and embarked on the path to socialism with Chinese characteristics. In conclusion, the basic spirit of traditional Chinese culture remains our culture’s living soul in the modern times. Chinese culture also celebrates the unity between man and nature and deems peace as most precious. Such notions have inspired generations of Chinese to champion collectivism and voluntarily protect the common interests. The Chinese people view heaven, earth and man as a whole, and strive to uphold the unity and harmony among the three. Similarly, we see the interests of individuals, families and country as an inseparable unity. According to classical Chinese philosophy, one needs to “[cultivate] the moral self, [manage] the family, [govern] the state and [safeguard] peace under Heaven.”70 Also, “[in] poverty, one should still hold himself to a high standard; when prosperous, one should contribute to the well-being of all.”71 The common national psychology and values orientation reflected in such teachings have played a significant role in developing and strengthening the Chinese nation. Apart from the Confucian theories mentioned earlier, this holistic values orientation has also been expressed in other schools of thought, such as “Dao emulates spontaneity”72 candidates to petition to Emperor Guangxu (1871–1908; reign: 1975–1908), expressing opposition to the Treaty and calling for its cancellation. This event marked the first political campaign conducted by the reformers. 68 “The May 4th Movement refers narrowly to the outburst of political demonstrations that occurred on May 4th, 1919 [in Beijing], in response to the humiliating provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (among them that Shandong should be transferred to Japanese control). Taken more broadly, the term covers the movement for political, cultural and social change that was set in motion by these demonstrations but grew out of trends within Chinese society and thought. The demonstrations themselves were originally student-led, but set in motion a wave of sympathy demonstrations and strikes that spread beyond the student milieu to encompass everyone from workers to industrialists in cities across the country.” Quoted from Barua, Kaushik. (n.d.). May 4th Movement. [Online]. [Accessed 23 May 2019]. Available from: https://www.academia.edu/8433998/May_4th_Movement. 69 Xi (2017). 70 Xi (2018, p. 188). 71 Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014). 72 Laozi. English translation by Eno, Robert. (2010). Dao De Jing, Version 1.2, p. 17. [Online]. [Accessed 23 May 2019]. Available from: http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Daodejing.pdf.

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(道法自然) in Daoism and the Mohist political ideals of “upward conformity” (尚 同) and “universal love and nonaggression” (兼爱非攻). Such values orientation highlights China’s national character of sacrificing personal, partial gains for the greater good. Chinese cultural symbols are the symbolic representation and epitome of Chinese culture. They are crucial to raise the people’s morale and stir up patriotism in them— the motivational function. For instance, the scene of raising the Five-starred Red Flag (i.e., the flag of China) at international events like the award ceremony of a sports competition has touched many Chinese people, some of whom were even brought to tears. The motivational power of cultural symbols is beyond measure. 3. The Function of Values Integration In the previous section, we talked about China’s national culture as a unified concept that applies to all Chinese people. In fact, this “unified” culture has drawn influences from diversified regional cultures throughout history. Its development is rather long and complex. Although regional cultures like Qilu (齐鲁, originated in Shandong Province, a coastal area of east China), Bashu (巴蜀, originated in Sichuan province and Chongqing city, southwest China), Jingchu (荆楚, originated in Hubei Province, central China), Wuyue (吴越, originated in the area to the south of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, including Shanghai city, Zhejiang Province, the southern part of Jiangsu Province and the eastern part of Anhui Province) and Lingnan (岭南, originated in Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces, south China) differ, they share the same cultural identification: the unity of the Chinese nation. Owing to this shared understanding, these regional cultures were pulled together and gradually integrated into the national culture of China. Today, each regional culture serves as an important member in the Chinese national culture family. Consequently, the Chinese culture spirit carries out the critical function of integrating different values into a unified entity and achieving national unity. In the history of ancient China, every grand unification led to cultural and ideological integration and innovation. According to The Doctrine of the Mean, after its unification in 221 BC, Qin and the other six states used carriages with wheels of the same size, wrote in the same characters, and implemented the same rules (车同轨, 书同文, 行同伦). From then on, language was standardized in China. As Chinese culture continued to flourish in the Sui and Tang dynasties (518-907) as well as the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368-1912), cultural and ideological integration and innovation deepened, too. Every regional culture had distinctive cultural “genes” (values) that separated it from the others. These “genes” were not lost when a regional culture was assimilated into the national culture. Actually, some of them were promoted and cherished by the entire nation. The basic spirit of Chinese culture has the function of integration and innovation, which is rooted in ancient Chinese philosophy. To be specific, the core philosophical concept “harmony” has played a vital role. As explained in the chapter of Zhengyu (郑语, literal: Discourses of Zheng) in Guoyu (国语, literal: Discourses of the States, fourth century BC), “[harmony] generates

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and sameness stops/stifles vitality.”73 The philosophers in ancient China thought of it as the source of innovation. By constantly integrating “different” and contradictory elements into one unified entity, all living things today exhibit some new features that differed themselves from yesterday. This is also documented in the Ten Wings, “making progress is called Great Virtue. Making lives live on is called Change”74 (日新之谓盛德, 生生之谓易). Thanks to the philosophy of harmony, those little cultural traditions originated within regional cultures cannot only reflect the commonality of Chinese culture but also preserve their own distinctive features, namely, individuality. In this way, their contents are enriched, and some have evolved into new traditions. Since the great and little cultural traditions are closely intertwined and compatible, there is no clear cut between them. For instance, many elements from the Chinese culture’s basic spirit are also present in regional cultures, though the degrees may vary. In addition, these elements are generally accepted by both the upper and lower classes. This is because that the basic spirit of Chinese culture appeals to people of all types of backgrounds. Furthermore, it places a high value on the pursuit of benevolence in governance and casts a profound and irreplaceable impact on the nation’s values orientation in ideology, behaviors, social psychology and subconsciousness. Chinese culture cherishes harmony and balance, which has encouraged its people to pursue harmony and moderation while opposing separatism and extremism. Meanwhile, the thought of the unity between man and nature has inspired the research and philosophical traditions to “[investigate] the boundary between heaven and human”75 (究天人之 际), a common idea and value pursued by different schools of thought throughout time. Since Chinese cultural symbols represent the core values of Chinese culture, they also have a strong function of values integration that applies both at home and abroad. On the one hand, the communication of Chinese cultural symbols can strengthen the personal, cultural, national and values identifications of all Chinese on the Mainland, in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and around the world. It can also promote our national consciousness and ideology. On the other hand, through the international communication of these symbols, the discourse system and visual identity system embedded with core Chinese values can be introduced from the “Self” to the “Other.” They can then convey the Chinese cultural values to the international community, form shared knowledge and concepts, and eventually promote China’s image as a great responsible power committed to peaceful development and seeking common ground while setting differences aside.

73 Translators Association of China. (2009). The Latest Suggested Chinese-into-English Translation

on Expressions regarding Building a Harmonious Society by the Translators Association of China. [Online]. [Accessed 23 May 2019]. Available from: http://language.chinadaily.com.cn/trans/200910/21/content_8827779.htm. 74 Zhao (2018). 75 Klein (2018, p. 14).

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5.3.2 The Communication Strategies for Chinese Cultural Symbols In contemporary cross-cultural communication, national images are largely shaped by cultural products, which are represented by domestic cultural symbols. Despite its time-honored history, splendid culture and abundance of cultural symbols, China has not developed effective cultural symbols for international communication. In other words, our current cultural symbols have a limited effect on improving the national image, and their soft power is yet to be enhanced. This is attributable to many factors, including inappropriate selection of cultural symbols and lack of advanced communication techniques as mentioned in the previous text. More importantly, on a subjective level, we lack strategic planning for the international communication of cultural symbols, scientific institutional design and sound policy arrangements. In fact, the coding, decoding and communication of cultural symbols are a systematic endeavor with loads of trivial details to attend to, which, of course, cannot be completed by the governmental or non-governmental sector alone. We should draw on international experience, strengthen the integration of communication concepts, methods and strategies, and see that the publicity strategies for Chinese cultural symbols are systematically implemented according to plan. We need to embrace the concept of “integrated communication” in marketing our cultural symbols. Here, the term suggests that cultural symbols’ international communication is not the behavior of a single actor, but an integrated activity of multiple actors under the influence of various factors. To realize the “integrated communication,” we need to at least meet the three requirements below. First, we must reach a consensus on the overall plan for the international communication of Chinese cultural symbols. In the construction of national image and the international communication of cultural symbols, it is critical to establish a sound international communication mechanism and overall plan. As for China, its successful organization of the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics and the Expo 2010 Shanghai China has graced its media with historical opportunities to express Chinese history, culture and values to overseas audiences. Since 2009, the International Communication Office of the CPC Central Committee began to improve its capacity for international communication through mainstream media like Xinhua News Agency, the People’s Daily, China Central Television (CCTV), China Radio International, China Daily, and China News Service. Based on the existing official discourse, the primary subject of “international communication capacity building” is the domestic media, and the goal is to develop into world-class media. However, we must acknowledge the gaps between the Chinese and Western “national integrated communication systems,” which are evident in the vision, organization and planning, institutional arrangements, system design, implementation and research, etc. As a result, the concept of “integrated communication” remains fairly new to officials at all levels of governmental departments. Due to lack of interdepartmental coordination, the power of international communication remains fragmented, which is further aggravated by the absence of an overall strategic communication system and working mechanism.

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In the Internet Era, the subjects of international communication have gone far beyond the scope of traditional media and understanding, and have become more diversified than ever. In the light of this trend, it is essential for us to establish an independent agency to coordinate international communication at the state level. It shall be entrusted to design the national strategic communication system, develop systems and institutions of international communication, and deliver corresponding strategies. Once the unified framework is drawn, local media branches should implement specific techniques under the state agency’s supervision. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, our capacity building project has made encouraging progress: we have basically completed the “trial phase” of setting up working stations abroad and are proceeding to the next phase, which aims to increase efficiency through the systematic coordination of international communication resources. To conclude, we ought to seize the opportunities created by media integration and take our capacity for international communication to the next level. Correspondingly, we need to develop a strategic communication framework for Chinese cultural symbols and map out long-term plans under the leadership of the state agency for international communication coordination. In particular, the overall strategies for the international communication of Chinese cultural symbols should at least address the following concerns: (1) Introduce the overall global trends in politics, economy, culture and security, the fundamental positioning of China’s national image and ways to construct it, and the opportunities and challenges. (2) Identify the strategic objectives for the short term, midterm and long term, respectively. Develop plans to reach them and specify the tasks and targets in each period. (3) Identify the top priority, policies and breakthrough points. Design and promote cultural symbols that can enhance China’s current image. Identify key areas, contents, targets and requirements in different stages and main methods and organizations to tackle them. (4) Establish a set of sound mechanisms to coordinate the international communication of Chinese cultural symbols, delegate responsibilities to governmental departments at all levels, respond to major emergencies, collect feedback and introduce competition and incentives. Improve the procedure of overseas broadcasting and create synergy through resources integration. Second, segment the audience in order to improve the relevance of Chinese cultural symbols’ international communication. The audience segmentation in communication is largely derived from the market segmentation in marketing. This term was first proposed by American scholar Wendell Smith in the 1950s, whose theory was based on companies’ need to effectively compete in the market with limited resources and the heterogeneity of customer needs. In a specific market, a company with a clear strategic business model can categorize its customers into groups according to factors like their characteristics, behaviors, needs, preferences and values. In this way, it can provide products, services and sales models tailored to different clienteles, namely, market segmentation. Apart from being an essential concept in the theory of customer relationship management, market segmentation has important practical implications for companies: (1) To address customer needs more effectively. Customers have different needs. To satisfy various customers, a company has to segment

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them based on certain standards and provide products and services that best accommodate their needs. (2) To better determine each clientele’s value. Clienteles differ in their values to a company. Market segmentation allows it to identify which clientele is profitable, loyal or potential. (3) To better utilize a company’s resources and capabilities. Every company is tasked with allocating limited resources to different clienteles and achieve the optimal outcome. Hence, it is crucial to collect and study the demographics of their customers. Through market segmentation, companies can develop marketing plans that are highly relevant to different clienteles, thus retaining and increasing the customer base with high values while attracting potential customers. Once a company has identified its high-value clientele, it can conduct quantitative analysis on the effect of customer relationship on future profits, which will shed light on business decision-making. Similarly, to improve the international communication of cultural symbols, we need to take the targeted approach of segmenting the receivers (foreign target audiences). The communication of cultural symbols is cross-cultural in essence, and sender and receiver’s different backgrounds may give rise to misunderstandings. Therefore, in order to increase the effectiveness and relevance of our international communication and improve our national image and cultural soft power, we need to segment our target audiences based on their cultures, values and even their own international communication styles. The amount of cultural differences between two countries usually falls into one of the four categories below: (1) no difference, where countries use the same official language, e.g., the US and Canada. (2) Minor cultural differences, despite that countries use the same official language, e.g., the US and the UK/Australia. (3) Moderate cultural differences, where countries share the same cultural roots but speak different languages, e.g., both China and Singapore value the Confucian culture, but they demonstrate certain cultural differences and use different official languages. (4) Major cultural differences, where countries differ in their cultural origins and languages, e.g., China and the US, or the US and Arab countries. As a result, the amount of cultural differences between China and our target country is not fixed. To avoid misunderstandings raised by cultural differences, we need to select different cultural symbols and develop different communication strategies for our target audience in each country. To begin with, our cultural symbols need to convey universality, or the commonality between China and the target country. We need to closely observe the cultural differences and similarities, and express China’s image with universally accepted symbols. Next, we must transform differences and find the middle ground of both cultures. This entails us to uphold our own stands while integrating foreign cultural elements and values into our cultural symbols. Only in this way, the Chinese cultural philosophies encoded within cultural symbols are most likely to become the “shared culture” of the international community. Third, we must progressively implement the “going global” strategy for Chinese cultural symbols. The “going global” strategy for Chinese culture was proposed at the beginning of the twenty-first century to boost cultural development. Against the backdrop of the ever-shifting international environment, domestic economic development, and the convocation of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, it has become the only way

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for us to transform China into a cultural power and strengthen its cultural soft power. The “going global” strategy was first announced at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2000. It was further improved at the Fourth and Fifth Plenary Sessions of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in September 2004 and October 2005, respectively. The “going global” strategy for culture was later explicitly set out in the Outline of the National “11th Five Year Plan” Period Cultural Development Plan released in September 2006: “Grasping implementation of the important ‘stepping out’76 culture programmes and projects, fully utilizing both international and domestic markets and resources, actively participating in international cooperation and competition, strengthening foreign-related cultural exchange, expanding foreign-related cultural trade, expanding cultural development space, begin to transform the passive situation of our country’s cultural product trade deficit being relative large, shaping a cultural opening structure with national culture as the main part, absorbing beneficial culture from abroad, promoting Chinese culture to step toward the world. … [In particular, major measures in promoting foreign-related cultural exchanges include expanding] foreign-related cultural exchange and dissemination channels, … [fostering] foreign-oriented backbone cultural enterprises, … [and implementing] the important ‘stepping out’ project.”77 Soon afterward, the Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China issued the National “11th Five Year Plan” Period Cultural Development Plan, which states that China needed to promote the implementation of the five development strategies in the next 5 to 10 years, including the “going global” strategy for Chinese culture. Requirements to strengthen cultural development were also highlighted in the Report of Hu Jintao to the 18th CPC National Congress: “The country’s cultural soft power should be improved significantly. … [The] cultural sector should become a pillar of the economy. Even greater progress should be made in taking Chinese culture to the global stage. By taking these steps, we will lay a more solid foundation for developing a strong socialist culture in China.”78 Furthermore, at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in November 2013, the central committee of the CPC put forward that we needed to “develop China into a nation with a strong socialist culture and improve its cultural soft power.”79 China’s introduction of the “going global” strategy for culture is closely linked with its domestic and international situations. Driven by the scientific and technological innovation, social productivity has been continuously unleashed and improved. As our basic material needs have been met by productivity, we strive to satisfy higher spiritual needs. In the light of this trend, the significance of cultural industry 76 This

translation of “走出去” is now revised into “going global.” Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China & General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (2006). Outline of the National “11th Five Year Plan” Period Cultural Development Plan. [Online]. Updated on 23 December 2010. [Accessed 28 May 2019]. Available from: https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2006/09/13/outlineof-the-national-11th-five-year-plan-period-cultural-development-plan/. 78 China.org.cn (2012). 79 Anon (2013). 77 General

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has become more prominent than ever. Culture is an essential element of national economy and a symbol of national comprehensive power, and its critical role in developing national strategies are recognized by countries around the world. Consequently, they race to develop their cultural industries. In particular, developed Western countries have been heavily invested in their cultural industries and have laid down detailed cultural advancement plans followed by strategic visions. As a form of soft power, culture has already become an integral component of a country’s core competence as well as the symbol of its national comprehensive power. Against the backdrop of globalization, the interaction and integration of different cultural systems have become the most notable feature of world culture. Chinese culture needs to interact with other cultures, too. Furthermore, our country is in an important period of strategic opportunity for development and a decisive stage for building a moderately prosperous society in all respects. Our economy and society are going through unprecedented profound transformations, both of which have entered advanced and critical stages. As a result, to build a moderately prosperous society in all aspects, there is an urgent need for the country and society to establish a cohesive, inspirational, integrative cultural value system that reflects the times. Chinese culture must be integrated and adjusted to address national, economic and social development needs. Meanwhile, as an industry with immense potential, it will become an economic pillar and thus contribute to the domestic economic structural reform. Chinese cultural symbols represent the Chinese culture and therefore should be in the vanguard of promoting Chinese culture going global. In terms of form and nature, the international communication of cultural symbols generally falls into two basic forms: cultural diplomacy and cultural trade. Hence, we ought to harness the power of both forms to communicate Chinese cultural symbols worldwide. On the one hand, we should aim to comprehensively demonstrate these symbols through various means, taking into consideration of media (e.g., newspapers, magazines, radio and TV broadcasting, and the internet), communication channels (formal diplomacy and public diplomacy), and platforms (cultural performances, film and TV exchanges, book fairs, art exhibitions, and international events like cultural exhibitions, cultural product fairs and cultural forums). On the other hand, we endeavor to develop a subtle but powerful mechanism for the international communication of Chinese cultural symbols. To begin with, we need to nurture our cultural industry, so it will facilitate the construction of China’s national image and the creation of well-known cultural symbols. We will also design cultural brands and promote cultural trade, for the global market is screaming out for cultural products that feature the Chinese style and represent China’s image. Meanwhile, we will provide dynamic media and platforms to communicate our national image. Apart from intergovernmental interactions, it is crucial to encourage people-to-people exchanges, thus allowing the two channels to complement each other and building synergy for Chinese cultural symbols’ international communication. Moreover, we need to develop feedback, evaluation and correction mechanisms in order to improve communication’s relevance and effectiveness. When communicating cultural symbols, we need to concentrate on exploring their meanings and functions and offering modern interpretations with

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the aid of modern art forms and communication techniques. To be specific, we need to convey the concept of harmony while toning down our own ideology. Chinese cultural symbols can be modernized through continued innovation and transcendence. They produce and provide “shared ideas” to the international community, enhance its understanding on China, and eventually improve its acceptance of China’s national image as “a great responsible power committed to peaceful development and seeking common ground while shelving difference.”

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Klein, E. S. (2018). Reading Sima Qian from Han to Song: The father of history in pre-modern China. Leiden: Brill. Legge, J., (translator). (1990). The Sacred Books of China: The Texts of Confucianism. New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors. Legge, J., (translator). (2017). The Chinese Classics: Part I. Confucius and Part II. Mencius (1891). U.S.: Hidden Light Private Press. Lin, Y. (translator). (n.d.). Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching Chapter 42 Translations at a glance. Retrieved 2 April 2019. http://tao-in-you.com/lao-tzu-tao-te-ching-chapter-42/. Liu, J. (1997). The rise and fall of hegemony. Beijing: Economic Press China. Liu, J. (2007). “China’s responsibility” theories: Challenges or opportunities. Outlook Weekly, 23, 64. Long, X. (2012). From image to identity: Social communication and the construction of national identity. Beijing: Communication University of China Press. Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. (2014). Speech by H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at the Meeting Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of China-France Diplomatic Relations. Retrieved May 23, 2019. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1147894.shtml. Mou, B. (Ed.) (2009). The routledge history of chinese philosophy (Routledge history of world philosophies). Oxon: Routledge. Retrieved May 22, 2019. https://books.google.com/. Owen, S., Chinese translation by Wang, B., & Tao, Q. (2003). Readings in Chinese literary thought, chinese version. Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press. Pan, Y. (2005). Culture and international relations. Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press. Parliament of the World’s Religions. (1993). The declaration toward a global ethic. Retrieved May 13. 2019. https://cloudlogin02.world4you.com/index.php/s/2A1vP2p6nrJzxZe. Ramo, J. C. (2007). Brand China. London: The Foreign Policy Centre. Retrieved May 17, 2019. https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/370659406.pdf. Robertson, R. (1992). Globalization: Social theory and global cultures. London: Sage. Shen, Z. (2008). Culture: Power and rivalry. Theory Monthly, 5, 5–11. Sun, Y. S. (1924). San Min Chu I: The three principles of the people • doctrine of nationalism. Retrieved April 22, 2019. https://sunyatsenfoundation.org/wpcore/wp-content/uploads/San-MinChu-I_FINAL-3-Principles.pdf. Tu, G., & Gong, H. (2008). The Beijing olympics and the agenda setting in the communication of national image. China Radio & TV Academic Journal 7, 5–7. UN.org. (2013). China at a New Starting Point, Statement by H.E. Mr. Wang Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, at the General Debate of the 68th Session of The United Nations General Assembly (English translation). Retrieved April 21, 2019. https://gadebate.un. org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/CN_en.pdf. Wu, Y. (2009). The construction and communication of China’s national image. Shanghai: Fudan University Press. Wu, Y. (2012). The communication of China’s national image from a strategic perspective. International Review, 4, 1–7. Xi, J. (2017). Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success of socialism with chinese characteristics for a new era. In Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Retrieved May 23, 2019. https:// yizhiyoudao.kuaizhan.com/69/87/p475408659e8931. Xi, J. (2018). Strengthen the foundation for pursuing peaceful development, from Xi Jinping: The governance of China I (2nd ed., pp. 272–273). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Ye, H. (2010). Overseas Chinese media and the construction of China’s national image. Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, 2, 134–147. Zhang, D., & Fang, K. (Eds.). (1994). An introduction to chinese culture (pp. 394–399). Beijing: Beijing Normal University Publishing House.

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Zhao, Y. (2018). Zhao Yanying’s English Translation of “The Ten Wings · Companion to Changes· Appendix One.” Retrieved May 23, 2019. http://www.hrexam.com/exam/2018-08/29/565038. html. Zheng, X. (1992). Cultural identification and cultural changes. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. Zhou, E. (1981). Selected works of Zhou Enlai (Vol. I, p. 360). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Zhou, E. (n.d.). Main Speech by Premier Zhou Enlai, Head of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Distributed at the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference, April 19, 1955. In History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Translation from China and the AsianAfrican Conference (Documents). (pp. 9–20). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Retrieved April 10, 2019. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121623. Zhou, E. (n.d.). Supplementary Speech of Premier Zhou Enlai at the Plenary Session of the Asian African-Conference, April 19, 1955. In History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Translation from China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents) (pp. 21–27). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, Retrieved April 10, 2019. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/ 114673. Zhuang, X. (2004). The significance of cultural communication studies in contemporary China. Tianjin Social Sciences, 2, 59–63.

Chapter 6

China’s Black-and-White Art: An Important Cultural Symbol of China’s Peaceful Development

Culture is one of the most important and fundamental factors in the construction of national image. Generally speaking, it consists of two levels: “That which lies above form is called a ‘pathway (dao 道)’ and that which lies below is a ‘particular focus or object (qi 器).’”1 In particular, “dao” is abstract, including religious beliefs, values, concepts, thinking and behavioral patterns whereas “qi” is concrete, including objects and techniques, i.e., the materialized form of culture. Similarly, cross-cultural communication also revolves around “dao” and/or “qi.” “Cultural communication on the ‘dao’ level is tremendously powerful, because the cultural features on this level are related to our spiritual world. Meanwhile, cultural communication on the ‘qi’ level mainly represents a symbolic meaning. It is a more concrete, on-the-surface form of communication, which reflects the instrumental value orientations across different cultural backgrounds in cross-cultural communication.”2 As important signs of national and state cultural spirits, cultural symbols are the combination of a country’s/nation’s “dao” and “qi” cultures. Thus, their role in national image construction is critical. Admittedly, the purpose of constructing China’s national image is to gain universal cultural identification from international audiences and form “shared knowledge.” To reach this ideal outcome, we should promote Chinese culture from both the “dao” and “qi” perspectives. With its time-honored history and magnificent culture, China long held a leading position in world civilizations. As “the only ancient civilization that has continued to this very day,”3 it retains a rich and profound cultural heritage. If we think of Chinese culture as a product, then we need to come up with a distinctive and appealing brand and trademark for it. The Chinese painting and calligraphy epitomizing China’s black-and-white art are one of the perfect candidates here: given that the black-and-white art reflects the Chinese cultural essence of harmony, it can serve as a cultural symbol to promote our national image as a “major and responsible

1 Jones

and He (2015, p. 23). and He (2006, p. 36). 3 China.org.cn. (n.d.). 2 Liu

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country that is committed to peaceful development and seeking common ground while shelving differences.”

6.1 China’s Black-and-White Art and Traditional Culture Chinese painting and calligraphy are a unique line art that revolves around ink and wash technique. So, what is the secret behind their enduring vibrancy throughout the ages? And what have contributed to their rising popularity in the Western world? First of all, they appeal to the eye and the mind. More importantly, the black-and-white art embodies the philosophical concept of the unity of opposites. It is the contrast, harmony and unity of black and white that make our art vibrant and represent the essence of Chinese culture and aesthetics. Chinese calligraphy and painting share the same origin and have carried forward the connotation of the black-and-white dualism throughout art history.

6.1.1 The Black and White in Traditional Chinese Culture The black-and-white concepts are rooted in Chinese history. Research suggests that the alternation of day and night as a result of the Earth’s revolution and rotation was the earliest inspiration for the Chinese people to develop the notion of black and white. In ancient times, our ancestors named such alternation “heaven” (天), indicating that the nature repeatedly manifests itself as the contrast and unity of day and night. This is also implied by Laozi: “Who knows how white attracts, always keeps himself within black’s shade, pattern of humility displayed, in view of all beneath the sky”4 (知其白, 守其黑, 为天下式). Throughout the long development of human societies, human activities basically center around the alternation of day and night. To be specific, “working by day and resting by night” became the most basic rhythm for production and other social activities in primitive and agricultural societies. Through the social practice of working by day and resting by night, our ancestors began to understand “heaven.” They gradually realized that black and white (also known as yin and yang) create and govern all living things, making the pair the king of all living things. “Between heaven and earth, nothing exists as the exception to yin and yang. From ‘action and inaction’ to ‘speech and silence,’ every pairing observes the rule of yin and yang” (天地之间, 无往而非阴阳; 一动一静, 一语一 默, 皆是阴阳之理).5 Hence, deference to the rule of yin and yang is a “great virtue.” The contrast and unity of black and white (yin and yang) drive all living things to evolve. As our ancestors set to make sense of their experiences of “heaven and 4 Legge 5 Zhu

(1990, p. 71). (2002).

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earth” and “yin and yang,” they gradually consolidated the black-and-white concepts, which remained the principle of social practice in ancient China. In particular, white is associated with yang, action, masculinity, light, day and purity, while black is associated with yin, inaction, femininity, darkness, night and impurity. Later on, these concepts were developed into the traditional Chinese philosophical mindset, which highlights the harmony between yin and yang and the unity between man and nature. As documented in ancient texts, “Qian and Kun mark the beginning of yin and yang. They are the ancestors of all living things” (乾、坤者, 阴阳之本始, 万 物之祖宗).6 “Qian represents what is of the yang nature (bright and active); Kun what is of the yin nature (shaded and inactive)”7 (乾, 阳物也, 坤, 阴物也). “The things of the world bear Yin on their backs and embrace the Yang. They exhaust their qi in harmony.”8 “The attributes expressed by Qian constitute the male; those expressed by Kun constitute the female. Qian (symbolizes Heaven, which) directs the great beginnings of things; Kun (symbolizes Earth, which) gives to them their completion.”9 As “[these] two unite according to their qualities,”10 all living things will flourish, the yin and yang will be in harmony, and the order of the universe will be restored. According to the ancient Chinese dictionary Shuo Wen Jie Zi (说文解字, literal: Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters) published in the early second century, the Chinese character “黑” (hei, literal: black) refers to the color created by the smoke from fires (黑, 火所熏之色也), while “白” (bai, literal: white) refers to the color of the West (白, 西方色也). Based on the science of color in modern Western cultures, both black and white come from the mixture of red, orange, yellow, green, cyan, blue and violet. As the simplest colors, the pair also symbolizes the purest expressions. Quite often, black is associated with mystery, infinity and being remote and abstruse, and white is linked with quietness, openness, spirituality and “absence.” Their interplay has made our world a more colorful place. In ancient Chinese philosophy, black and white are a pair of categories in the theory of yin and yang, with black representing yin and white representing yang. The pair is actually the two sides of the same coin, implying the relative attributes of opposing yet connected objects or phenomena. Black and white can only be meaningful in the presence of the other. The two are mutually reinforcing and constraining, and neither can exist independently of the other. The contrast of black and white has allowed the thought of yin-yang harmony in ancient Chinese philosophy to take shape. Meanwhile, it has evolved into the aesthetic emotions in ancient China. To renowned contemporary painter Lu Huaizhong (1945–), “man’s aesthetic emotions initially arise from their aesthetic appreciation for black-and-white. Their aesthetic emotions evoked by black-and-white art are the

6 Huang

and Zhang (2007). (n.d.b). 8 Eno (2018, p. 23). 9 Legge (n.d.a). 10 Legge (n.d.b). 7 Legge

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source of aesthetic experiences, based on which other aesthetic emotions are developed. Our aesthetic emotions to black and white reflect our emotions to the nature and more precisely, a humanized nature. They are the primary and most straightforward aesthetic emotions, the natural manifestation of man’s intuition.”11 The complementary black and white constitute a distinctive, concise and graceful artistic expression and the “source of the aesthetic appreciation of mankind.” The traditional Chinese culture highlights the harmony between man and nature. Such emphasis has encouraged the developments of the black-and-white concepts, the black-and-white aesthetic emotions, and ultimately the black-and-white artistic spirit, one of the main spirits in Chinese art. The Chinese painting and calligraphy, which feature ink and wash technique and black-and-white lines, respectively, fully embody the blackand-white artistic spirit. Thus, they have been the main drivers in promoting Chinese black-and-white art through the ages, whose radiance has never been dimmed.

6.1.2 Reflect the Philosophical Connotations of Harmony and Constant Mean in Chinese Culture The unity between man and nature has always been held in high esteem in Chinese culture. We cherish the harmony and unity between subjectivity and objectivity, and strive to achieve man-nature, man-society and interpersonal harmony and unity. Moreover, the Chinese culture values “peace,” maintaining that peace is most precious and the people should work together and help each other. We believe that “[where] there is harmony there will be unity; where there is unity there will be strength; where there is strength, there will be power to conquer all things.”12 To sum up, peace is a fundamental element and the ultimate pursuit of the Chinese culture. Since Chinese art sets out to capture a glimpse of “the mind of heaven and earth”13 (天地之心) and the way that the universe works, peace has also become its ultimate pursuit. Such notion is expressed by artists of various disciplines based on their own interpretations. For example, musicians pursue the consonance among the five tones. Painters believe that aesthetic patterns lie within crossing lines (错画 为文) and different densities and textures can be expressed through the “five colors of ink” (墨粉五彩). Calligraphers emphasize the mastery of eight basic strokes. In painting, the color of ink can be thick, light, wet or dry while brush pens of varying brush tip firmness, fineness and elasticities are used. In addition, architects attach great importance to the synergy between walls and roofs. Hence, based on the principle that “[harmony] generates and sameness stops/stifles vitality”14 from Zhengyu in Guoyu (和实生物, 同则不继), Chinese arts were developed through combining different elements in their respective media. Here, peace is associated with “mean” 11 Lu

(2005). (2017, p. 39). 13 Jones and He (2015, p. 142). 14 Translators Association of China (2009). 12 Wei

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to suggest “neutralization” (中和, zhong he). To neutralize is to organize diverse or contradictory elements into a harmonious whole under certain cultural rules. It is the core of the whole that makes the harmonious aesthetic emotion and rationality in Chinese art alive. Chinese painting, also abbreviated in Chinese as Guo Hua (国画, literal: national or native painting), is a painting style with a long history and profound traditions. It has stood out in world art for its unique system. Paintings are done by brush pens dipped in ink and pigments on rice paper or silk, and common subjects include figures, landscapes as well as flowers, birds, fish and insects. Technique-wise, there are two main categories: Gongbi (工笔, translation: meticulously realistic) and Xieyi (写意, translation: interpretive, freely expressive and abstract),15 which can be practiced on walls, screens, scrolls, book pages and paper fans. With its distinctive national form and artistic expressions, Chinese painting differs from its Western counterpart. To be specific, as Western painting highlights realism, Chinese painting focuses on conveying spiritual meanings and painter’s personal interests and mood. The Chinese believe that “[inspiration] for art comes from zaohua ([造化,] nature), while the true power for artistic creation surges from the fountain of the heart”16 (外师造化, 中 得心源). In addition, Chinese painting emphasizes the unique use of brush and ink technique and artistic conception with vividness. Painters need to “observe with their eyes, see with their hearts and use shapes to convey spiritual essence.” In conclusion, it seeks to reach a balance or an overall harmony between object and subject, reality and fantasy, nature and life, and materialism and spirituality. It maintains the “mindbody unity” (心物不二), which requires to “forego external things and individual minds” (物我相忘) and pursue “the unity between man and nature.” This is the most distinctive feature of Chinese painting. Chinese painting emphasizes the use of black and white. It has the tradition of “using ink alone to allude to the five basic colors” (运墨而五色具). According to Dao de jing, “[one] who knows white but preserves black becomes a standard for the world”17 (知其白, 守其黑, 为天下式). It means that people should uphold their integrity (white) but not judge the confusing and dark world (black), where the Chinese cultural mentality and the beauty of Chinese painting rest. The creation of black-and-white paintings only requires rush pens, ink and rice paper, yet everything can be painted with these two relatively simply colors, indicating Chinese culture’s capability to generalize. The Chinese Chan sect believes that intuitive learners do not need explicit explanations (妙悟者不在多言). This was listed as a requirement for landscape paintings by poet and painter Wang Wei (699–759, the Tang dynasty) in the Knacks for Landscape Painting (山水诀). Therefore, less is more. Painters need to communicate the richest content with the most concise expressions. “What is and what is not give birth to one another”18 —this principle is reflected in Chinese painting, for brush strokes (“what is”) and blank spaces (“what is not”) are mutually 15 Cao

(2018). External Action Service (EEAS) (2016). 17 Eno (2018, p. 18). 18 Eno (2018, p. 10). 16 European

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reinforcing. For instance, attention to the black-to-white proportion is evident in the Rongqi Studio (容膝斋图, Rongqi Zhai Tu) painted by Ni Zan (1301–1374) in the late Yuan dynasty. The painting depicts several saplings and a thatched pavilion in the foreground against the blurry silhouette of mountains in the background. The absence of figures or motions suggests a tinge of sorrow and ever-lasting silence and solitude. If we examine the snuggling birds painted by Bada Shanren (八大山人, literal: Mountain Man of the Eight Greats, born Zhu Da, ca. 1626–1705), we will come to admire how he gave full expression to the birds’ vitality with restrained brush strokes. Not shaken by formalities, pretension and snobbery, his artworks have become a symbol of pride: straightforward, pure, reflecting both the profound and subtle aspects of life, and adhering to the path of the mean. As a result, Chinese painting would have not developed if it was not for the smart pairing of black and white or the seen and the unseen. Chinese painting and culture are closely related and mutually dependent, with the former being “the most commonly used expression of Chinese national spirit and the most approachable manifestation of Chinese philosophy.”19 Though known for their depictions of fish and shrimps, respectively, Bada Shanren and Qi Baishi (1864–1957) never painted water in their works. Instead, they left large areas of the paper blank to represent water. These intentional “blanks” are not flaws, but fuels to the viewers’ imagination. Here, the seen are painted black and the unseen are suggested by the blanks. We can only preserve the black through first perceiving the white. To be specific, the animals painted in black ink can only be distinguished against a white background. Meanwhile, the visible animals suggest the invisible presence of water. To summarize, the charm of Chinese painting lies in the integration between form and spirit and the harmony between the seen and the unseen. Of all Chinese arts, calligraphy is arguably the most characteristic one. Archeological evidence has shown that inscriptions of paragraphs already existed in the Shang dynasty in the second millennium BC. Apart from their sacred use of recording divinations, these ancient writings are unique because the overall layout of the characters was carefully designed to convey beauty. As the basic component of Chinese characters, strokes are different within each character as well as between characters. The flow of characters and the arrangement of lines coordinate with one another. Hence, although characters exist independently of each other, they share the same essence, creating harmony without uniformity. Since its initial development in the late Han dynasty (25–220) and the Wei-Jin period (220–589), Chinese calligraphy as an art form has been evolving continuously, resulting in different aesthetic pursuits across times. Throughout history, it is generally accepted that “artists of the Jin dynasty pursued the poetic charm of calligraphy, while those of the Tang dynasty [(618–907)] advocated squareness and uprightness of characters. Artists of the Song dynasty (960–1279) admired aesthetic appreciation of calligraphy, while those of the … Ming dynasty (1368–1644) paid more attention to formation of characters.”20 Chinese calligraphy and culture are closely related and mutually dependent. In other 19 Ye

(1986, p. 228). Museum (2018).

20 Suzhou

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words, Chinese calligraphy fully embodies the essence of Chinese culture. This serves as the most crucial factor for Chinese calligraphy to become an important art and establish itself among the arts of the world. Chinese culture values the harmony, balance and the unity between man and nature, all of which have nourished Chinese calligraphy. From the yin and yang in the teachings of The I Ching, the art of mean in Confucianism, the Way of Nature deferred by Taoists, to the epiphany and meditation practiced in the Chan sect, ancient Chinese wisdom has been etched into the aesthetics of calligraphy and artistic conceptions. From each stroke to each character, this artistic practice is not bound by fixed forms and shapes. On the contrary, it celebrates flexibility in the pursuit of harmony. Of course, such harmony does not merely refer to the distribution and balanced segmentation of lines. It is actually an overall balance (or neutralization) between light and heavy elements achieved with artistic techniques. It epitomizes Chinese cultural values such as “peace is most precious” and “the people should work together and help each other.” “From Chinese calligraphy, we can deepen our understanding on how our ancestors viewed the world, appreciate the philosophical wisdom within the inter-transformation of yin and yang, explore the impacts of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, and observe the continuance and development of Chinese cultural traditions.” To sum up, black and white represent the unity of the opposites. They are interdependent and complementary. Without white, there will be no black, and vice versa. Framed by the unseen, our attention is easily directed to the objects depicted (the seen). It is the inter-transformation and addition of black and white have enabled us to render a colorful world and a wide spectrum of emotions. They have also cultivated our aesthetic vision. The traditional black-and-white arts in China, as epitomized by painting and calligraphy, has its unique aesthetic features and artistic strengths: it encourages us to forego external things and individual minds, limit personal thoughts and desires, and strive to achieve harmony within the framework of the unity between man and nature. Furthermore, it acknowledges the presence of differences and diversity. Instead of excluding disagreement and even conflicts, Chinese black-and-white art celebrates coexistence. Consequently, it is, to a large extent, the most commonly used expression of Chinese national spirit and an important reflection of the yinyang harmony. We should utilize this cultural symbol to communicate our culture of harmony and the national image as “a major and responsible country committed to peaceful development and seeking common ground while shelving difference.”

6.1.3 Demonstrate the Chinese Savor, the Chinese Way and the Chinese Beauty Culture is like water: it is soft, but can penetrate deeply into the heart. As an ancient civilization, China has developed unique national cultural traditions and forms of art. Its black-and-white art was the outcome of cultural evolution through the ages,

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starting with the black-and-white concepts, to the black-and-white aesthetic emotions, and ultimately developing into the artistic spirit. It stands as a road map to the ancient civilization that has existed for millennia. Hence, its cultural contents have become a critical component in the Chinese cultural genes and have been deeply rooted in the Chinese people’s hearts. Today, against the ongoing impact of the powerful Western culture, there is a growing need for China to build its culture in a way that allows dialogs with other civilizations while maintaining its own characteristics and to be accepted by the international community. Epitomized by Chinese painting and calligraphy, the traditional Chinese black-and-white arts are important cultural symbols. They can demonstrate the Chinese savor, the Chinese way and the Chinese beauty, thus playing a positive and vital role in the construction of China’s national image and the international communication of Chinese culture. After over 3000 years of development, Chinese calligraphy has acquired an incomparable artistic charm. It is an indispensable part of the extraordinary Chinese traditional culture and a national treasure adored by many. In addition, it has a unique place in world art. As China continues to open up, Chinese calligraphy has been introduced to Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and other countries with Chinese communities, where it enjoys a sound development. Especially in recent years, as China’s international influence and status improves, Chinese calligraphy’s popularity among artists, scholars and the general public in the Western world also increases. A growing number of Westerners have begun to study, collect and admire Chinese calligraphy. Today, learning to read and write Chinese characters has become a trend. Chinese calligraphy as a unique line art has received growing attention from the West. According to French scholar André Kneib (1952–), “as China’s global influence grows, Chinese calligraphy is becoming a subject of admiration in the Western world.”21 Foreigners are amazed that the Chinese were able to develop a set of traditions out of characters, which have encompassed philosophy, sentiments of life and the artistry in using ink. Admittedly, learning and appreciating Chinese calligraphy takes time. However, once people have had the experience, they are very likely to fall in love with it against all odds. In fact, among the overseas students who came to China to study art, many have decided to study calligraphy in the end. Nowadays, dozens of universities in the US have created Chinese calligraphy courses that are warmly received by students. Drawn to the unique Chinese calligraphy and the profound Chinese culture, many American students developed an interest in calligraphy, which later evolved into a fondness for Chinese culture and art. “After their calligraphy lessons, many international students expressed their heartfelt respect and love for Chinese art. In their term papers, they wrote about their understanding of and inspirations from Chinese philosophy, aesthetics, characters and poetry, thus affirming the values of this course.”22 When it comes to Chinese calligraphy’s role in international communication, renowned British art historian Ernst Gombrich (1909– 2001) expressed that “the influence of calligraphy on Chinese culture was similar to 21 Zhou

(2013). and Jiongcai (2010).

22 Jingye

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that of music on Western culture.”23 Moreover, British art historian Michael Baxandall (1933–2008) had held an enduring admiration for China, especially its traditions of calligraphy. In his opinion, calligraphy is a “middle term” between the universally accessible verbal and visual cultures, and it has made the Chinese culture more profound.24 Having been a longtime fan of Chinese calligraphy since childhood, former Secretary-General of the United Nations Mr. Ban Ki-moon speaks highly of the great wisdom within this calming and graceful art. In his remarks at the opening ceremony of the “Aspiring for World Peace, Friendship and Prosperity - Chinese Calligraphy and Painting E xhibition in Celebration of the 2012 Chinese New Year,” he said that “[just] look at what we have here today: people of many countries, deeply engaged with a cultural tradition that is not their own.”25 Calligraphy has become an important bridge between China and the West, allowing more and more Westerners to explore Chinese cultural tradition. Like calligraphy, Chinese painting also has its rightful place in world art. In comparison with paintings from other countries, Chinese painting carries distinctive national characteristics, conveying the unique Chinese savor, Chinese way and Chinese beauty. Since the reform and opening-up, an increasing number of Chinese painters have held exhibitions in Europe and the US. In the meantime, Chinese paintings showcasing “Chinese elements” or “Chinese flavor” are becoming increasingly popular among Western viewers, resulting in an increase in overseas market share. Let’s take the works of distinguished Chinese landscape photographer Mr. Wang Wusheng (1945–2018) as an example. Wang dedicated his entire career shooting Mount Huangshan (literal: Yellow Mountain) situated in southern Anhui province in eastern China. With the help of modern Western techniques, he created many exceptional black-and-white photographs. His works offer an intense contrast by placing various shades of soft and delicate white and gray against large areas of black. Such composition is inherent with and furthers the expressiveness and abstraction of traditional Chinese art. Thanks to this new visual art form, the whole world is able to learn about the notion of harmony rooted in Eastern philosophy and Chinese culture. His portfolios were translated into different languages and released by some of the world’s top art publishers based in Europe, the US and Japan, and were huge commercial successes. Since the 1980s, Wang had held exhibitions in China, the US, Japan and Austria. His photographs had greatly touched many visitors and received universal acclaims: Dr. Wilfried Seipel (1944–), former General Director of the Kunsthistorisches Museum Vienna, has once commented that “[in] his works[,] … contradictions exist everywhere; the unity of opposites reflected in the interaction between the mountains and clouds, movement and stillness as well as light and shadow makes every work of his a valuable token, manifesting the conflict and at the same time unity of human spirit merging with nature in its broadest sense. … This directness, I think, generates huge impact on Western viewers.”26 According 23 Lie

(1985, pp. 66–73). Cited in Yang (2011, p. 168). (1997, p. 168). Cited in Yang (2011, p. 158). 25 UN.org. (2012). 26 Seipel (2000). 24 Baxandall

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to Mr. Carl Aigner (1954–), former General Director of the Kunst Halle Krems, Austria, “Wang Wusheng’s works not only present the beauty and grandeur of the mountains, but also illustrate the fairy tale complex. Gazing at his works, you feel the instantaneous moment as well as the continuous flow of time. In fact, the more you look at them, the more you feel a momentary sensation, an illusory mood. We Europeans would associate his works with the paradise described by Christianity, which also talks about the feeling that transcends time and space.”27 To Chinese literary theorist Wang Yuanhua (1920–2008), on the one hand, his photo books are of strong national characteristics and have captured the lasting charm of ancient China. On the other hand, they also communicate the essence of world art and thus are in line with the global art spirit and aesthetic consciousness. Since Chinese black-andwhite landscape painting alludes to ideas like the yin-yang harmony and the unity between man and nature, it is a classic Chinese cultural symbol. Furthermore, it evidently plays a special role in demonstrating the Chinese culture of harmony in crosscultural communication. Through the black-and-white art, thousands of foreigners have experienced the unique Chinese culture and improved their understanding on the country.

6.2 The Symbolic Significance of Black-and-White Art in China’s International Communication Artistic communication is an important type of social communication and can be used for educational and recreational purposes. The Chinese black-and-white arts epitomized by calligraphy and painting illustrate the underlying significance of traditional Chinese culture, preserve and carry forward the Chinese nation’s collective memories, and showcase the Chinese culture’s aspiration for “harmony.” Therefore, they are of great symbolic significance to reinforce the identification of national culture, disseminate the harmonious image of China, and reduce barriers to cross-cultural communication.

6.2.1 Raise the Awareness of Cultural Identification and Reinforce Cultural Identity It is vital for any given nation state to create a positive self-image for its citizens, increase their identity awareness, and eventually help them build a strong national identity. Otherwise, the state will lose a stable psychological basis and fail in establishing itself among nations in the world. Citizens’ identification to their nation state paves the way for its unity, stability and continuity. Some scholars contend that “countries in the process of modernization may be confronted by six types of crises, 27 Aigner

(1998).

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namely crises of identity, legitimacy, foreign infiltration, engagement, integration and allocation, with the crisis of identity being the first and most fundamental.”28 To some extent, identification is a matter of life and death for a nation state. Identity theory was originally developed in social psychology. Later on, German social psychologist Erik Erikson (1902–1994) made “identity” and “identity crisis” the main topics in contemporary social theories. The term “identification” is widely used in social science with various connotations. For instance, Sigmund Freud’s definition is generally accepted in modern psychology: identification refers to the process of an individual’s emotional and psychological assimilation to others, groups or models. Nonetheless, the academic community is still working on revising the definition. Based on pertinent research, I contend that “identification” describes an actor’s dynamic construction of his own role, identity and relations with the Others through social interactions. It deals with the actor’s introspective responses to the following questions: “who am I,” “where am I,” “who are they,” and “where do they belong.” Social psychologists consider identity to be the innate and unconscious driving force behind human behaviors. Identities ensure the existence of cultural groups and their members as well as determining how they interact with the outside world. Specifically, they shape our lifestyles, guide our behaviors, and influence our expectations of others and anticipations of their behaviors. The concept of identity can be examined from different angles: in terms of social levels, there are mainly personal and social identities. In terms of social dimensions, the main concerns are economic, political, cultural and social identities. Of the identities at all levels and across all social dimensions, culture identity is the core. In the Information Age, content’s quality is far more important than its quantity. Hence, for any country or nation, its consideration for the type, quality and international recognition of culture in international communication implies strategic decision-making. This is the most important task in developing cultural communication strategies, i.e., the key to effective cultural communication strategies. In other words, the fundamental problem of cultural communication strategy is essentially cultural identification, i.e., which type of national culture should a country promote to win the international community’s understanding, favor and goodwill? “In order to understand the role that culture plays in the process of identity construction and deconstruction … [, American anthropologist Jonathan Friedman (1946–) differentiates] among the three ways that culture is implicated in the larger system [, which are referred to] as culture I, II and III. Culture I refers to that vaguest of all concepts of culture, the one discussed and battled over by anthropologists since the inception of the discipline. … [It] refers to an objective (in the sense of objectified) description of the content of the lives of the population ‘out there’, defined by its distance from ‘us.’ … As such, [culture I itself] refers to the specific properties of another society’s system of meaningfully organized repertories of social action. This may include anything from dialect, gestures, styles of production and consumption to 28 Bai,

Luxun. Aspects of Political Development. Cited in Fudan University Department of History & Center for Comparative Studies of Modernization, Fudan University (2003).

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religious behaviors, symbols of identity and social values. … Culture II refers to the set of elements used by a population in its own self-identification. Rather than our identification of them, it refers to their identification of themselves. … Culture II … is usually known as the culture of ethnic identity. It is based exclusively on notions of commonality of language, blood and descent[.] … [It] is crucial in the formation of larger ethnic or minority blocs that can defend or advance their interests in the larger system[.] … Culture III is culture as the organizer of total life processes including material reproduction. It defines itself in fundamental opposition to the larger system. … It flourishes in periods of contraction. It may flare up in periods of expansion, which for the populations in question are periods of marginalization, ‘ethnocide’ and cultural collapse, but it is only in periods of civilizational decline that it can appear to be a superior ideology to that of the center itself and that it can gather massive support for its goals. … [In summary, as] modernism collapses in the center, there is an exponential increase of cultural identities both at home and abroad. At home there is a search for what has been lost, and in the periphery for a cultural or even national autonomy previously repressed by the center.”29 The importance of cultural identity has received full recognition from many scholars. According to French-born American scholar Clotaire Rapaille (1941–), “[cultures] are created and evolve over time, though the rate of change is glacial. A culture might not experience a significant shift for generations. When cultures do change, the changes occur in the same way as in our brains-via powerful imprints. These powerful imprints alter the ‘reference system’ of the culture, and the significance is passed down to subsequent generations.”30 Here, “cultural significance” is actually the “shared knowledge” acquired by people in the same nation state, namely cultural identity. British-Czech social anthropologist Ernest Gellner (1925–1995) once pointed out that “men really love their culture, because they now perceive the cultural atmosphere (instead of taking it for granted), and know they cannot really breathe or fulfill their identity outside it.”31 Similarly, American social critic Jeremy Rifkin (1945–) holds that cultural identity offers people “a way to ensure that their voices are heard and they have a safe haven in the new multipolar world.”32 “One of the most important responsibilities of any culture is to assist its members in forming their identities.”33 Some scholars even believe that cultural identity is of vital importance to a country’s survival. In 1992, Japanese scholar Sakaiya Taichi (1935–2019) analyzed the factors behind the Soviet Union’s dissolution and the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe. He did not think that the Dissolution was primarily caused by economic deterioration, because there had been no precedent. Japan was in extreme poverty toward to end of the Pacific War (1941–1945), but no one wished to surrender due to economic difficulty. Neither did the people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 29 Friedman

(1994, pp. 88–90). (2006, p. 29). 31 Gellner (2006, p. 107). 32 Rifkin (2006, p. 222). 33 Samovar et al. (2009, p. 52). 30 Rapaille

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during the Vietnam War (1955–1975) nor the people of Cambodia later on. Had the collapse of the socialist Soviet Union truly been the result of economic deterioration, the country should have been gone during or at the end of the German–Soviet War (1941–1945), when economic situation was much worse. In Sakaiya Taichi’s view, there are only two conditions that will bring destructive changes to a government— losing the capability to maintain public security and people’s faith in its culture. The main reason for the collapse of the socialist system in the Soviet Union is its socialist culture. To be specific, the Soviet people lost faith in the socialist ideals and the leadership’s decision-making and moral characters, because the communist party had abandoned the culture of scientific socialism, which was Lenin’s legacy and arguably the only thing holding the country together. Furthermore, the Japanese scholar warned that the socialist culture in China might also collapse due to the end of the Cold War and the worsening economic inequality, which is quite alarming. In the light of this, we must be keenly aware that there is indeed a subtle, even easily overlooked but serious problem in China, namely the loss of cultural convictions or cultural conviction crisis. We must attach paramount importance to this issue. Cultures differ in their cultural identities. In essence, cultural identification is a process of comparison and recognition, through which members in the society are able to establish their “cultural identity,” find their “cultural belonging,” adjust their “cultural attitude” and control their “cultural behaviors.” In fact, it is everywhere in our social lives. Problem of cultural identification will always surface when radical shifts take place or the domestic culture is invaded by a heterogeneous one. In addition, it is always connected to specific cultural patterns, based on which individuals will choose their identities. Against the backdrop of economic globalization, the relations among nation states or cultures have never been more complex. As a result, individuals from different cultures are surrounded by symbols with various cultural meanings, which have made their cognitive, value and behavioral systems particularly vulnerable to confusion. This will inevitably lead to cultural identity crisis or the phenomenon of multiple cultural identities. Nation states are imagined communities. Building cultural identity has great implications for China: to begin with, it is an important objective for constructing national image and the inevitable way to boost consensus in realizing modernization. Moreover, it can be used as the primary strategy for preventing our national culture and sovereignty being undermined by globalization. In modern society, cultural identity also performs the important functions of maintaining the legitimacy of governmental administration, social integrity and stability. In the light of this, many countries have adopted measures to tap into the full symbolic resources. In particular, they have coded or re-coded historical, cultural and religious elements into symbols. These symbols can be accepted by the people, help them form a strong cultural identity, and eventually create an “unconscious driving force to affect behaviors.” Once the people have identified with their national culture, such internal, unconscious driving force will contribute to the stability and development of the country and the nation. Of these symbols, cultural symbols’ role in reinforcing cultural identity is

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incomparable, for they reflect a nation state’s values, lifestyles and cultural aspirations, constitute the foundation for collective consciousness, and preserve and carry forward its collective memories. Drawing on the theories of Corporate Identity System (CIS), we can classify the National Image Identification System into three groups, namely, National Conceptual Identity System, National Behavioral Identity System, and National Visual Identity System. Of these systems, the National Visual Identity System mainly relies on symbols, especially the cultural ones, to construct national image and reinforce cultural identity. China has been a multi-ethnic country since ancient times, and cultural identity has always been a strategic theme for maintaining national security and unity. Chinese black-and-white art is our important cultural symbol, for it embodies the essence of Chinese culture, represents the core values of the Chinese nation, and preserves and carries forward the nation’s collective memories. Furthermore, it performs the function of visual identification in cultural exchanges. In particular, in international communication, black-and-white art can evoke the awareness of national cultural identity among the Chinese people especially the overseas Chinese, and strengthen their cultural identity. For example, Chinese calligraphy can create powerful cohesion. For one thing, the Chinese characters are the ideographic symbols used by Chinese both at home and abroad. With the international stature of Asian culture rising steadily, Chinese character circles have also been formed: China’s neighbors Japan and South Korea have witnessed their calligraphy rising to global prominence. In the meantime, Asian countries with large Chinese communities have shown a strong sense of responsibility to preserve the Chinese culture, leading to the sound development of Chinese calligraphy. Calligraphy represents the same cultural roots shared by the Chinese both at home and abroad, and its promotion has strengthened the national identity and unity of Chinese around the world. For another, the Chinese nation is a big family with 56 ethnic groups, all of which use the Chinese characters to communicate. Of the 55 ethnic minorities, some also have their own languages with corresponding calligraphy techniques and skills, and this has encouraged mutual exchanges and learning with the practice of writing Chinese characters. In this way, as people from these ethnic minorities practice and carry forward their own ethnic calligraphy, they can enhance their understanding and acceptance of the Chinese calligraphy, too. There are also many ethnic minorities without their own languages, who completely rely on Chinese characters for written communication. These people consider Chinese characters their own language and are committed to studying and carrying forward Chinese calligraphy. In summary, the development and flourishment of calligraphy is a crucial step to the great development and flourishment of the Chinese culture. Calligraphy is integral to promoting ethnic groups’ joint development, cultural interactions and cultural integration. It functions as a strong cohesion that adapts to the changing times.

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6.2.2 Project the Aspiration to Seek Harmony Without Uniformity and Communicate the Image of a Harmonious China Joshua Cooper Ramo (1968–), an esteemed American scholar and expert on China’s national image, notes that China is a country of great cohesion and centripetal force; however, it often displays a strong centrifugal force at the same time. “China’s opposites are also what defeat any attempt at a simple explanation of the place—and thus reinforce the country’s reputation as untrustworthy. [For instance,] [insisting] ‘China is not a threat’ at a time of booming military budgets only undermines China’s credibility. Explaining that China is both peaceful and wants a strong military is incredibly difficult proposition—even if it is true. … Foreigners, confronted with the great complexity of China, tend to reduce their opinions of the country to oversimplified ideas. Westerners in particular struggle with the idea of opposites existing at the same time.”34 So, what can we do to enhance other countries’ understanding of “our contradicting and complex reality”? In Ramo’s view, “[creating] a frame for thinking about China is of tremendous importance.”35 To be specific, he proposed to create the framework of “White (淡色) China.” “The most powerful brands in the world are white brands, brands onto which we can project our hopes and dreams and desires in the same way you would project an image onto a movie screen. … [A] better Chinese word than white (baise) might be dan, a water-like sort of blandness. … The Chinese character of dan … suggests a kind of blandness or blankness.”36 Ramo further pointed out that “[the] most powerful white brands aren’t consumer products; they are cultural, political and intellectual. … This kind of ‘blankness’ is particularly powerful for good and ill in politics. … To some degree this approach to making meaning is reflected in the vast yet deep spaces of traditional Chinese art or in the epigrammatic characters of the Chinese language, each of which require a bit of poetry to feel out their particular meaning.”37 Therefore, “China needs a dan-like national image”38 to help the outside world better understand its reality. As discussed in the previous text, the current international communication of Chinese cultural symbols should reflect the value orientation toward harmony, the cultural aspiration for “harmony but not uniformity,” and the image of “a major and responsible country committed to peaceful development and seeking common ground while shelving difference.” Throughout history, harmony has always been an ideal condition for human existence/lifestyle as well as the universal language in human society. It has been the subject of constant concern and longing for people in both hemispheres. In particular, harmony has been the basic spirit of traditional 34 Ramo

(2007, p. 42). (2007, p. 42). 36 Ramo (2007, pp. 41–42). 37 Ramo (2007, p. 41). 38 Ramo (2007, p. 19). 35 Ramo

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Chinese culture throughout millennia. The traditional Chinese culture believes in “harmony without uniformity” and “the unity between man and nature,” and champions peace and unity. The Chinese people acknowledge the presence of differences and diversity and do not exclude disagreement or even conflicts. Ultimately, we strive to achieve unity in diversity. Likewise, Greek philosopher Pythagoras (c.570–c.495 BC) and his followers envisioned a harmonious universe as early as 2500 years ago. In Pythagoras’s opinion, universal harmony existed in the whole nature world (“celestial harmony”), the human society (“Virtues is harmony”), as well as between heaven and man (“the unity between man and nature”). In the four decades of reform and opening-up, Chinese economy has grown in a rate beyond commonplace and achieved remarkable development. However, “China threat theory” and “China collapse theory” also surface alternately. There have been repeated talks of both optimism and pessimism, and China’s national image has been criticized and challenged by the outside world on multiple occasions. In the light of this, the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China released the white paper titled China’s Peaceful Development Road and China’s Peaceful Development in 2005 and 2011, respectively. China has declared “to the rest of the world on many occasions that it takes a path of peaceful development and is committed to upholding world peace and promoting common development and prosperity for all countries.”39 Today, as the international media becomes increasingly complex and heated, countries’ competition over soft power also intensifies. As China is vigorously pursuing the path of peaceful development, it needs not only a peaceful domestic and international environment but also a gentle and composed national image. To enhance its soft power, China must project its aspiration to seek harmony without uniformity and communicate the image of a harmonious country. Hence, in order to modernize China’s national image, it is critical to explore and create more cultural signs, symbols and brands that can demonstrate the Chinese savor, Chinese way and Chinese beauty with modern forms of art and cultural communication techniques. As an important form of art and symbol of harmony in Chinese culture, the black-andwhite art fully captures the essence of “dan se” (淡色, literal: the “grey” in between black-and-white) proposed by Ramo: known for its intricate combination and sharp contrast of black and white, it reflects the value orientations toward unity of the opposites, harmony without uniformity, and gentility and humbleness. In this regard, the Chinese black-and-white art can and should be considered one of the ideal symbols for communicating the culture of harmony to the foreign audiences and constructing the image of a dan se China within global discourse.

39 Information

Office of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China (2011).

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6.2.3 Downplay Ideological Overtones and Reduce Cultural Barriers to Communication When working on projects on cultural relations, we often need to ponder which term is more appropriate: “cultural diplomacy” or “international propaganda.” Generally speaking, propaganda refers to the intentional spread of information and the process of disseminating thoughts and ideas. “It is the communicative activity held to influence others’ beliefs, attitudes, faiths and behaviors.”40 Therefore, propaganda revolves around instilling a doctrine or claim. To be exact, as a technique of “expression” or method of information transmission, it can be used to control the recipients, evoke them to strengthen, weaken, accept or abandon certain convictions, and ultimately behave in accordance of the sender’s intention and interests. Common forms of “expression” include speeches, texts, images and music. Unlike the ordinary information dissemination or announcement, propaganda is a media activity with the tendency to hide the truth and information. Thus, it is strongly ideological and politically charged. In fact, it is usually referred as “political propaganda.” For any country (sender), international propaganda is aimed to control the target country’s public opinion and subsequently its government, force it to change attitude toward the sender, and implement foreign policies that are in the sender’s absolute favor.41 Cultural diplomacy, on the other hand, refers to “the diplomacy based on cultural communication and exchanges. It is a sovereignty’s diplomatic activity to realize specific goals or foreign strategic intentions via cultural means.”42 It primarily serves to realize the sender’s foreign strategic intentions mainly through cultural exchanges and information communication. On the theoretical level, there are clear differences between cultural diplomacy and international propaganda in a normal international situation. What distinguishes international propaganda is its “one-way self-expression, or information output to the target country (receiver). The sender’s value orientations are involuntarily instilled to the target country, through which the sender aims to exercise a comprehensive and complete psychological control over the receiver’s people.”43 In contrast, cultural diplomacy takes account of the receiver’s needs and expectations, honors its voluntary acceptance and freedom of choice, and stresses the importance of exchanges and interactions. Thus, cultural diplomacy can only come into effect when cultures exchange ideas. Moreover, in terms of method, international propaganda frequently resorts to psychological tactics, coaxing and public relations, whereas cultural diplomacy highlights cooperation, mutual understanding and mutual benefits.44 The former concentrates on short-term goals and is strongly utilitarian, while the later focuses on long-term results and displays clear restraint. 40 Li

(1989, p. 13). (2005, pp. 45–46). 42 Li (2003, pp. 83–87). 43 Li (2005, p. 46). 44 Hu (2008, p. 40). 41 Li

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To further illustrate their differences, researchers have comparatively analyzed the contents and outreaches of international propaganda and cultural diplomacy. In their view, “the main players in ‘cultural diplomacy’ include governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations that have close connections with the Government and receive strategic guidance from it. They rely on relatively formal and systematic methods and use culture to conceal their strategic intentions. As for ‘international propaganda,’ the main players are governmental agencies or social organizations that are directly controlled or restrained by the Government. Their methods are most formal and systematic with relatively straightforward strategic intentions. From ‘cultural diplomacy’ to ‘international propaganda,’ the scope of implementing body and types of available methods will decrease, while the clarity of strategic intensions and degree of straightforwardness will increase. ‘International propaganda’ attaches a greater importance to one-way communication, but ‘cultural diplomacy’ focuses on two-way interactions.”45 From the perspective of communication, different means of communication seldom reach the same effect in any given cultural mode. In international political communication, if we overlook the target audiences’ cultural differences and selectivity, we will risk diverting the contents from their intended objectives or even achieving opposite effects. We cannot promote mutual and accurate understanding between cultural entities without a sound understanding of the target audiences’ perceptions, emotions and needs. The construction of national image is essentially the construction of an identity. It places great emphasis on knowledge-sharing, which implies interactions on the cognitive level. A country may be seen in a negative light due to different ideological stand and the public’s preference biases in the target country. As a means of communication or channel for information exchanges, cultural diplomacy can counterbalance the effect of such negative perceptions as much as possible. Meanwhile, it can tone down the signs of “propaganda” and subtly enhance the international audiences’ understanding, even approval, of the sender’s culture. As a Chinese poem on rain on a spring night goes, “With wind it steals in night; Mute, it moistens each thing.”46 Cultural diplomacy can attain such subtle effect in communication, too. In fact, culture “possesses an intangible collective affinity and appeal characterized by thoughts (spirits or awareness). Such affinity and appeal are referred as ‘culture power’ by scholars of international politics.”47 From the perspective of strengthening national soft power, a country carries out international cultural communication (diplomacy) in order to invite other countries to emulate its own culture, elevate its cultural appeal (cultural power) and national image, and eventually gain others’ understanding, support and cooperation during the implementation of its foreign strategies. Specifically, these objectives are achieved through cultural demonstrations, exchanges and identification. Because culture revolves around values in essence, its influence on cognitive subjects is intangible and soft. In cultural 45 Wu

(2009, p. 75). (2018). 47 Sun and Li (2007). 46 Li

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communication (diplomacy), it has proven difficult for target countries to detect foreign governments’ political and diplomatic strategic intentions. Therefore, countries have seen cultural communication as an effective “soft” approach to construct their national images. Language has boundaries, but art does not. The Chinese black-and-white art is a silent language of art, a visual symbol that reflects and transcends the Chinese national characters. Such visual symbol targets human senses directly, striking a vivid first impression with people of different nations, countries, gender and religions. Owing to its immediacy and vividness, Chinese black-and-white art can easily convey its cultural connotations to overseas audiences, thus improving their understanding and acceptance. This type of art can subtly downplay ideological overtones and reduce cultural barriers to communication, thus making communication more approachable, straightforward and intangible. As American scholar of management Tony Schwartz (1923–2008) once pointed out: “the best political commercials … do not tell the viewer anything. They surface his feelings and provide a context for him to express these feelings. … The ‘news-reel’ commercial … is not very effective for this purpose.”48 Chinese black-and-white art is undoubtedly the sort of “political commercial” that “does not tell the viewers anything.”

6.3 The International Communication Strategy for Chinese Black-and-White Art from a Constructivist Perspective As shown in the China’s National Image Global Survey 2015, oversea respondents believe that “the most representative Chinese elements are traditional Chinese medicine, martial arts and Chinese food, which, respectively, account for 50%, 49% and 39%.”49 However, comparing with domestic respondents, they had a much lower recognition of other Chinese cultural traditions, such as Confucius and Confucianism, calligraphy, painting and seal-engraving, folk customs, and folk shows and acrobatics. This suggests that the international communication of Chinese black-and-white art (calligraphy and painting) still has a long way to go. To improve the situation, China should aim at both the strategic and tactical levels. On the strategic level, it needs to create and deliver the idea of harmony without uniformity embedded in Chinese black-and-white art to the international community, ultimately turning it into a shared idea. On the tactical level, it needs to carry out its cultural diplomacy and develop its cultural industry, continuously expanding the cultural communication and influence of black-and-white art. Only in this way can the Chinese black-andwhite art truly function as a cultural symbol in the construction of China’s national image as “a major and responsible country committed to peaceful development and seeking common ground while shelving differences.” 48 Schwartz 49 Anon

(1974, pp. 92–93). (2016).

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6.3.1 Communicate Black-and-White Harmony and Construct Shared Knowledge Based on constructivist theory, state interests are determined by state identity and state’s self-identification. Nevertheless, state identity, image, interests and behaviors are ultimately constructed by cultural concepts (shared knowledge) formed through interstate interactions. In other words, they are determined by state actors’ collective expectations. That is to say, to raise culture power, construct positive identification, and improve its own national image in target countries, a country must first ensure that its cultural beliefs and value orientations have been disseminated worldwide and accepted by the general public in the target countries. Therefore, with the purpose of improving its national image and cultural soft power, it should pursue the following strategic objective in its cultural diplomacy: create and offer shared (cultural) ideas to the international community, and provide normative guidance to pertinent countries as they decide on its identity and image. In this regard, the visibility of shared (cultural) ideas in the international community should be the country’s primary strategic concern in its cultural diplomacy. Tactics-wise, it needs to fully utilize all channels of communication to enhance its capability of international cultural communication, thus ensuring the worldwide acceptance of its national culture (private ideas) and evoking public approval in other countries. In this way, its own culture can be transformed into an international one shared among pertinent countries. As the country gains approval for its national culture from the public overseas (i.e., the process of forming shared ideas), it constructs a favorable national image, too. Represented by calligraphy and painting, the Chinese black-and-white art has not been influenced by heterogeneous culture much. As a result, it has maintained rich national characteristics. Admittedly, the black-and-white art can convey the Chinese nation’s unique aesthetic pursuit and passion for life to other nations. However, due to the relatively big differences between Chinese and foreign cultures, we must acknowledge that traditional Chinese culture acts as a double-edged sword in international communication. Foreigners often view traditional Chinese culture as ancient and mysterious. On the one hand, this mystery attracts them to learn more about traditional Chinese culture. On the other hand, they can be discouraged by barriers to communication and become intimidated by traditional Chinese culture. The Chinese black-and-white art is no exception. Although Chinese painting enjoys a long and profound history, we must also admit that this form of art unique to the Chinese nation has never made a major impact or been widely accepted around the world. Despite the growing popularity of learning Chinese language and the increase in Chinese calligraphy enthusiasts abroad, there remains a long journey ahead for the international communication of Chinese calligraphy. There are a few factors behind the limited influence of Chinese black-and-white art abroad, such as foreign audiences’ struggle with the painting techniques or the stroke order, a fundamental of calligraphy. Furthermore, they find it difficult to comprehend the underlying cultural significance. The Chinese black-and-white art is a “silent language” from a cultural system that runs counter to the Western cultural

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thinking in many aspects. Hence, to make the its international communication more influential, we need to place greater emphasis on teaching the techniques and more importantly, communicating values. Enthusiasts and collectors of Chinese black-andwhite art both at home and abroad need to understand the idea of harmony without uniformity behind the two colors. As they try to appreciate and learn the black-andwhite art, we must encourage them to gradually understand and embrace the Chinese culture of harmony, form shared ideas, and eventually deepen their understanding on China’s national image as “a major and responsible country committed to peaceful development and seeking common ground while shelving differences.”

6.3.2 Carry Out Cultural Diplomacy and Promote Black-and-White Art Cultural diplomacy is “an effective method to promote mutual understanding and trust between countries or the peoples as well as constructing and strengthening a country’s national image and soft power. It is carried out by the government or non-governmental organizations through educational and cultural projects, mutual visits, performance and exhibitions, and trade of cultural products.”50 Thus, the main players in cultural diplomacy range from the government of any sovereignty, nongovernmental organizations, enterprises, public institutions, think tanks, academia, mass media, to other civil groups and individuals. It is aimed to fulfill the country’s strategic intentions in foreign affairs through means like cultural exchanges and information communication. With its growing comprehensive national power and international influence in recent years, China has vigorously pursued an unprecedented multi-player, diverse-form cultural diplomacy both at the official and peopleto-people levels. In terms of Chinese culture “going global,” the most talked about projects include a series of “China Culture Year” and “cultural festival” activities, the strategy of teaching Chinese as a foreign language, and the Confucius Institute program. Meanwhile, the country is actively carrying out cultural diplomacy through channels and medium like multilateral cooperation organizations, international forums and major sports events. It seeks to exploit cultural diplomacy’s “softness” and “subtlety” in order to showcase the unique charm of Chinese culture. Given the effectiveness of cultural diplomacy, we should make full use of this form (channel) in the international communication of Chinese black-and-white art, and invite the world to savor and share the art and communicating the Chinese culture of harmony. Let us take a closer look at the Confucius Institute program. The Confucius Institutes are educational and cultural exchange institutions set up by the Office of Chinese Language Council International (汉办, Hanban) around the world. They are tasked with promoting the Chinese language learning and communicating Chinese culture and Chinese studies. The first Confucius Institute was inaugurated in Seoul, South 50 Hu

(2008, p. 32).

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Korea on November 21, 2004. As of December 1, 2015, there were already 500 Confucius Institutes and 1000 Confucius Classrooms in 134 countries and regions. In particular, the 500 Confucius Institutes were established in 125 countries and regions, with 110, 46, 169, 157 and 18 in 32 Asian countries, 32 African countries, 40 European countries, 18 Northern and Southern American countries, and 3 Oceania countries, respectively. The 1000 Confucius Classrooms were created in 72 countries, with 90, 23, 257, 544 and 86 in 18 Asian countries, 14 African countries, 28 European countries, 8 Northern and Southern American countries and 4 Oceanian countries, respectively. For Comoros, Myanmar, Mali, Tunisia, Vanuatu, Grenada, Lesotho, The Cook Islands and the European Union, there were only Classrooms but no Institute. The Program has largely met the world’s demand to learn Chinese and deepened foreigners’ understanding on Chinese language and culture. Also, it has strengthened the cultural exchanges and cooperation between China and the rest of the world, improved China’s friendships with other countries, and promoted the diversification of world culture. Today, Confucius Institutes have become important venues for people across the globe to learn Chinese language and culture as well as understanding contemporary China, and they have been warmly received by locals from all walks of life. As of 2015, the total number of registered students at Confucius Institutes reached 1.394 million, with 44,000 full-time and part-time teachers both from home and abroad. Furthermore, 404 institutes across 108 countries participated in the celebration of the 2nd “Global Confucius Institute Day,” during which over 1400 activities were organized, attracting over 1.2 million participants. Throughout the year, 44 performance groups consisting of Chinese college students or professionals held 320 cultural performances in 260 Confucius Institutes in 57 countries across five continents, attracting 520,000 audiences. In addition, more than 100,000 students representing 115 countries participated in the “Chinese Bridge” Chinese Proficiency Competition. Apart from the contestants who were already studying in China, 133 college students from 97 countries and 402 high school students from 81 countries especially traveled to China for the competition. According to Wang Yuechuan (1955–), a scholar from the Peking University, it is not enough for China to establish Confucius Institutes or Confucius Classrooms overseas for the sole purpose of teaching Chinese language. As a more effective approach, these institutions should also cultivate students’ aesthetic sense through offering courses in traditional Chinese musical instruments, Go (an ancient Chinese board game), painting and especially calligraphy, ultimately Chinese classics.51 To our delight, many Confucius Institutes and Classrooms have already made satisfying progress in promoting Chinese calligraphy through offering courses and holding exhibitions, contests and forums. The Denver Confucius Classroom in Denver, Colorado (the first one in the US) is a great example here. In 2009, it started teaching elementary Chinese, Chinese calligraphy and culture. The Institution also selected 16 college students to participate in an international calligraphy and painting competition in Shanghai and another six to attend an international culture and calligraphy

51 Li

(2010).

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exhibition in Seoul. Moreover, it held the 2nd “Chinese-American Teachers and Students Joint Calligraphy Exhibition” at the art gallery of Naropa University, Boulder, Colorado. The Institution has tapped into the potential of mass media as well: for Chinese readers, it runs a special section named The Denver Confucius Classroom in the local Chinese newspaper Chinese American Post all year long, providing information and relevant data to lecturers of Chinese for pedagogical purposes; and for English readers, it has created a column on Chinese idioms and calligraphy in an English magazine, introducing Chinese culture and calligraphy through anecdotes, etc.52 Through these measures, the Denver Confucius Classroom has effectively encouraged the international communication of Chinese calligraphy and expanded the influence of Chinese culture. Of course, within the strategic context of Chinese culture “going global,” we need to promote cultural exchanges both at the official and people-to-people levels, thus allowing better development of China’s black-and-white art in the world and improving the communication of China’s national image. As China’s comprehensive national power continues to rise, the Western society has also grown increasingly vigilant toward China’s cultural export. The non-official, people-to-people cultural exchanges can rise above politics and ideology and are therefore more convincing, which can contribute to the Western world’s improved acceptance of China’s objective image and extraordinary culture. The black-and-white art is a Chinese cultural heritage, and its soft nature has made itself an ideal subject for people-to-people communication. It can promote the understanding between China and the rest of world and provide a solid foundation for official exchanges. It is heartening to see that in recent years, a growing number of Chinese calligraphers and painters have engaged in the cultural dialog between China and the West through their participation in cultural events abroad, such as holding solo exhibitions, attending forums on calligraphy and painting, and demonstrating calligraphy and painting skills at the events. The international communication of Chinese calligraphy and painting has become increasingly frequent. In particular, a surge of people-to-people exchanges have been observed in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the US and France. There is also an increase in official activities. For instance, in June 2015, the China Daily Global Edition launched a project titled “Telling the Story of Chinese Calligraphy and Painting” (tentative translation), which looked to recruit outstanding artists of contemporary Chinese calligraphy and painting to hold exhibition series and attend forums both at home and abroad. As the most characteristic and iconic symbol of Chinese culture, calligraphy and painting have had many foreigners under their spell, ranging from those enthusiasts, skilled calligraphers/painters, collectors to plastic artists. Epitomized by calligraphy and painting, the Chinese black-and-white art is an important bridge for the cultural communication between China and the world outside.

52 Jingye

and Jiongcai (2010).

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6.3.3 Develop Cultural Industry and Export Cultural Products Today, the cultural sector is of unprecedented importance as countries seek development and compete with each other. Culture has transcended its traditional roles as the symbol of national identity and the bond of national spirit, and has become the fundamental path and means to achieve coordinated development between culture and economy and to promote comprehensive social and personal development. In the past two decades, many countries have amended their development indicators and evaluation systems, attaching more weight and a greater stature to culture. In this process, cultural industry has served as the most important driving force. Thanks to the ongoing development of industrialized system and assembly-line production, cultural industry has stepped away from manual work to pursue large-scale manufacturing, generating more colorful cultural contents and cultivating new forms of business through advanced scientific technologies. “Cultural industry’s fast development has significantly increased the contribution of cultural elements to economy and social welfare, prompting cultural economy to become a crucial component of the national economy which has yielded enormous economic benefits. In the meantime, for pertinent countries, large-scale exports of cultural products have promoted the dissemination of their values, strengthened their soft power, and delivered social benefits.”53 In some developed countries, cultural industry has long been the pillar of economy and has generated remarkable economic profits. To be specific, the US has taken the lead in global cultural industry, and cultural industries in Japan, France, Germany, the UK and South Korea have also taken up a significant share in their own economies. Nowadays, cultural industry has already evolved into an important economic and cultural force around the globe, whose scale is still expanding. Entering the new millennium, the Chinese government has full recognized the importance of cultural industry, and has vigorously promoted the great development of cultural industry. As a result, the cultural market has taken an initial shape, with its output and the number of professionals increasing year by year. Cultural consumption has grown steadily, and its environment has continuously improved. In addition, the reform of cultural system continues to deepen, and cultural management is becoming more and more standardized. The process of Chinese culture “going global” has been accelerated, too. In a nutshell, the great development of cultural industry has promoted China’s cultural soft power, and the cultural industry has turned into a strategic industry to promote the coordinated, scientific and inclusive development across economy, politics, culture, society and ecology. Cultural industry and culture are mutually reinforcing: while the industry’s development presents an historic opportunity to promote and develop the traditional Chinese culture, the nation’s time-honored history, brilliant culture and distinctive regional cultures also offer rich resources for the industry’s further growth. In particular, many cultural symbols can be used to showcase the unique charm of Chinese culture. As an iconic symbol of 53 Zhang

et al. (2011, p. 13).

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Chinese culture and the epitome of traditional Chinese art, the black-and-white art needs to be industrialized in order to expand its communication power, influence and aesthetic appeal. Currently, the Chinese calligraphy culture is confronted with quite a few challenges. Domestically speaking, due to insufficient teaching workforce, lack of training mechanism, and the serious impact of scientific development and social changes,54 we are gradually losing some of the traditional calligraphy areas or arenas, even experiencing episodes of lacking cultural support as a result of traditional cultural rupture. Internationally speaking, Chinese calligraphy “is in the international context where the global culture experiences tendencies to Westernization and homogenization.”55 Such issues have hindered Chinese calligraphy’s further development and international communication. Some scholars contend that “apart from market operation, we need to strategize on promoting calligraphy based on logically sound principles that also reflect the Scientific Outlook on Development and the notion of sustainable development.”56 Such “strategic thinking” is actually the “strategy for building a great culture” based on calligraphy’s cultural chain, which is aimed to industrializing the calligraphy culture. “Given the nature of Chinese calligraphy, the calligraphic culture cannot be held within practice (a cultural phenomenon) alone. Instead, we need to fully exploit its cultural connectivity and the corresponding ‘cultural chain,’ thus developing the ‘great calligraphy cultural (or pan-calligraphic cultural) industry’ that is linked to other social and economic spheres.”57 The great calligraphy culture’s development rests on the strategic institutional arrangement from a macro-cultural perspective and the strategic consideration of Chinese calligraphy as a holistic culture instead of a single form of art. In fact, due to its nature, Chinese calligraphy can perform a connecting function in the Chinese cultural system, eventually forming a cultural industry linked by calligraphy. The reason is manifold: in terms of values and meaning, calligraphy is an iconic and intuitive cultural symbol that captures the essence of Chinese culture. In terms of the types of culture, it concerns aspects related to material, spiritual, economic, living, leisure and architectural cultures. In terms of means of cultural preservation, it is seen in poetry and couplets written on rice paper and paper fans as well as engravings on bamboo, wooden panels and the surface of porcelain.58 Owing to these features, calligraphy contains economic, cultural, historical and commercial values and has been found useful in a wide array of industries, including interior decoration, tourism, marketing, aesthetics, leisure, physiotherapy and media. As a matter of fact, using calligraphy as a way to stay healthy is becoming increasingly popular. Many local governments are also willing to fund the calligraphy and painting industry because of its low cost and rich cultural contents. Moreover, to project their 54 E.g., writing, the practical orientation of calligraphy, has been gradually replaced by computer technologies. 55 Wang (2004). 56 Zhang (2006). 57 Zhang (2006). 58 Zhang (2006).

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corporate cultures, lots of companies have adopted elements of Chinese calligraphy and painting in designing their logos. In 2007, the China Calligraphers Association launched the nation-wide selection of the “City of Chinese Calligraphy” (tentative translation). Since then, a number of places with rich calligraphy traditions have been named the “City of Chinese Calligraphy,” the “Land of Chinese Calligraphy” and the “Mountain of Chinese Calligraphy,” encouraging the emergence of cultural industries and cultural products centering on (or “connected by”) calligraphy and painting. This has boosted the development of Chinese calligraphy and painting culture and made the two arts more influential. To promote the external exchanges of Chinese calligraphy and painting and the exports of pertinent cultural products, scholars have proposed many relatively feasible strategies and tactics. In terms of strategies, we should look in areas like academic research (the core), regular cultural exchanges, promoting events and tourism, modern marketing, cultural publicity and cultural product management. In terms of tactics, we can export cultural products and communicate the Chinese calligraphy and painting culture through holding exhibitions and training, improving the art market, and conducting research on teaching calligraphy and painting. In the meantime, we must realize that no living culture is static like a pool of stagnant water. Without “oxygen”, culture would have turned into “cultural relics” or “fossils.” Therefore, we need to attach great importance to the “internationalization” of Chinese calligraphy culture on the basis of “localization,” especially in the manufacturing, packaging and communication of calligraphy works and paintings. In particular, we should adopt modern artistic expressions and means of communication to give our cultural products’ a modern touch and elevate their aesthetic appeal, which will eventually increase their influence and promote the construction of China’s national image as “a major and responsible country committed to peaceful development and seeking common ground while shelving differences.”

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