Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land: Articles Presented at the 2nd International Congress of Napoleonic Studies 9781463225643

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Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of Ottoman and Turkish studies are brought together in Analecta Isisiana. These scholarly volumes address important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on the subject.

Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land

Articles Presented at the 2nd International Congress of Napoleonic Studies

Edited by

Aryeh Shmuelevitz

The Isis Press, Istanbul

pre** 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul Originally published in 2002 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of The Isis Press, Istanbul. 2010

o

ISBN 978-1-61719-109-1

Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

Honorary Advisory Committee and Organizing Committee Introduction: The Organization of the Congress Editor's Preface

7 9 11

Articles : The Peculiarities of Napoleon's Oriental Campaign: An Introduction, by Mordechai Gichon The Impact of the French Expedition to Egypt on Early 19th Century Ottoman Reforms, by Seçil Karal Akgiin La Bataille d'Aboukir et ses implications stratégiques, by Michèle Battesti La Bataille de Sediman du 7 octobre 1798, by FernandBeaucour The Detroye Outpost: An Outpost on the Siege Perimeter of Acre, by Ariel Berman L'Emploi tactique de la "mine" lors du siège de Saint-Jean d'Acre : un exemple de combat en mode dégradé (Campagne de Syrie, 1799), by Allain Bernède Napoleon's Expedition and the Return of Europe to the Middle East, by Gideon Biger Napoleon and Jezzar: A Local Perspective, by Amnon Cohen Egypt was Worth a Turban: Bonaparte's Flirtation with Islam, by Mary Kathryn Cooney How Surgeon Larrey Treated General Caffarelli: A Case Study in the History of Military Medicine, by Eran Dolev The Surgeon and the Emperor: A Humanitarian on the Battlefield, by Moshe Feinsod. Napoleon Bonaparte as Perpetuator and Destroyer of the Ideas of the French Revolution, by Walter Grab Joseph Sulkowski, Aide-de-Camp de Bonaparte en Égypte, by Monika Haman A Precursor of Bonaparte's Expedition to Egypt: Leibnitz, Author of the Consilium Aegyptiacum to Louis XIV, by Alexander Yali Haran Bonaparte's Egyptian Campaign in Contemporary French Art, by Marcus Junkelmann

13 25 35 41 51

61 75 79 87 101 107 119 127

135 143

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CONTENTS

The Operations and Effectiveness of the Ottoman Navy During Napoleon's Invasion of Egypt, 1798-1801, by Kevin D. McCranie The Napoleonic Re-Conquest of Corsica, 1796: A Necessary Preliminary for the Egyptian Expedition, by J. M. P. McErlean Chateaubriand et l'expédition de Napoleon Bonaparte en Terre-Sainte, by David MandeIson Napoleon's Own Rendering of His Expedition to Egypt and the Holy Land, by Lauro Rossi Egyptian Perceptions of Bonaparte's Expedition: The Bicentennial Debate, by Shimon Shamir The Emergence of the Eastern Question: Did Napoleon's Conquest of Egypt Beget the Involvement of the European Powers in the Middle East?, by Aryeh Shmuelevitz The Battle of the Pyramids: Futile Victory, by James W. Shosenberg. Phélippeaux and Napoleon, by Helen S. Smith Polish Participation in Napoleon's Egyptian Expedition, by John Stanley La Politique des Effectifs, by Jacques Vernet Napoleon in the Holy Land: Motives and Consequences, A Review of Research Presented at the 1999 International Napoleonic Society Congress in Israel, by J. David Markham List of Participants

155

165 171 193 219

231 235 253 259 267

281 289

HONORARY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Prof. Dr. Dr. Fernand Beaucour, FINS Prof. Dr. David G. Chandler, D Litt, FRHistS, FINS Prof. Donald D. Horward Ph. D, FINS Prof. Dr. Raimondo Luraghi, FINS Dr. Ben Weider CM, President of the INS

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

Israel Prof. Mordechai Gichon, M.A., Ph.D, FSA, FINS, Lt. Col, IDF (ret.) Co-chair Col. IDF (ret.) Benny Michelsohn, M.A., member Mr. Alon Klebanov, FINS, member Prof. Dr. Aryeh Shmuelevitz, member Mrs. Perlina Varon, member and secretary

U.S.A. Mr. J. David Markham M.A., M.Ed., Exec. President INS, HNS American Co-chair

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS

In 1997, the Israeli Society of Napoleonic Research (ISNR) proposed to the International Napoleonic Society (INS) that it convene its Second International Congress in Israel in 1999. Holding the congress in Israel was conceived by the ISNR as the main scholarly event of its "Napoleonic Year," commemorating the 200th anniversary of Napoleon's Holy Land Campaign. The suggestion and the overall plan, forwarded by Mordechai Gichon, president of the ISNR, was approved by the INS. David Markham, vice president and editor in chief of the INS, joined the Israeli committee set up to organize the congress. The guiding principle of the congress was to allow for a maximum of time for field trips to the sites of the Napoleonic battles and sieges, along with several other activities. Accordingly, following the opening ceremony on Sunday evening, July 4, 1999, the program consisted of three and a half days of lectures and two and a half days of excursions. The congress was held under the academic auspices of Tel Aviv University. Most of the lectures were convened at the Tel Aviv University campus, with a half day of lectures held at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the final session hosted by the Old Acre Development Company in one of the recently excavated Crusader vaults in that city. Sixty scholars from nine countries participated in the congress. Some of the activities were attended by a broader audience. Between lectures, the participants visited two exhibitions arranged especially for the congress: (1) Napoleonic Books (mainly rare) from the Tel Aviv University Library and the private libraries of A. Klebanov and M. Gichon, arranged by the TAU Library and Klebanov; and (2) Jaffa in the Napoleonic Period, arranged by T. Schacham, curator of the Jaffa Museum of Antiquities. It is our pleasant duty to thank the members of the organizing committee for their valuable assistance in a great variety of spheres and subjects, especially Perlina Varon, who was ably assisted by Arion Shachaf and Eyal Gichon. Preparations for the excursions, including visual aids at the sites, were arranged by Eran Gichon. Lt. Col. (ret.) Efi Melzer assisted in various areas, including the design and production of the printed materials.

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T H E O R G A N I Z A T I O N OF T H E C O N G R E S S

We mention with gratitude the support for the congress given by Mayor of Tel Aviv-Yafo, Gen. (ret.) Ron Huldai, His Excellency the Ambassador of France Jean Noel de Bouillane de Lacoste, Mayor of Acre Dr. Shmaryahu Biran, and Chairman of the Old Acre Development Company David Harari. Prof. Itamar Rabinovich, President of Tel Aviv University, addressed the congress during a plenary session, while the Hebrew University of Jerusalem hosted our session there. Mr. Harari's efforts merit special mention. Ably aided by his late assistant, Kobi Yakobi, he went to great expense to prepare Old Acre and its defenses for our visit. A lasting contribution is the erection of 16 historic signposts with concise information indicating the major phases of the Napoleonic siege, which were prepared in time for the visit of the congress. He also arranged for the Acre Conservatory Orchestra to enliven our farewell dinner. A major portion of the expenses of organizing and running the congress was generously covered by the International Napoleonic Society under the direction of its president, Dr. Ben Weider, C.M., Off. Leg. d'Honneur. Tel Aviv University covered all expenses connected with convening the sessions at its campus. The Cultural Cooperation Councellor of the French Embassy, A. Defay, arranged for flight tickets for two French colleagues to attend the congress. All preparatory work (other than that of the travel agency) was rendered without compensation. Without the provision of this support and these services, the conference would not have attained the success that it did. We gratefully acknowledge the editing of the congress lectures by our colleague, Prof. Aryeh Shmuelevitz. The fruit of his labor is in our hands at this moment. Last, but not least the congress organizers wish to commend the efficient and smooth services rendered by the Unitours travel agency in convening and running the congress. Mordechai Gichon, Co-chair Organizing Committee

J. David Markham, Co-chair Organizing Committee

PREFACE

The 26 articles in this volume are revised versions of a total of 35 papers presented at the International Congress on Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land, 1798-1801. The remaining papers were not available for publication here. The conference was opened by Mordechai Gichon, who delivered the keynote lecture on the peculiarities of Napoleon's Near Eastern campaign. It was concluded by David Markham, who reviewed the papers presented, focusing on the motives and consequences of Napoleon's conquest of Egypt and the Holy Land. The papers discussed a wide range of topics, as follows: Military aspects of the conquest included analyses of the adaptation of the French Army to the Middle East; the recapture of Corsica; the occupation of Malta based on instructions by the Directoire; the battles of Aboukir, Sediman and the Pyramids; the operational and logistic challenges of passing Sinai; the siege and conquest of Jaffa and the massacre of the prisoners of war there; the siege of Acre; and maps and landscapes of the battles. In addition, the participation of Polish soldiers in Bonaparte's battles in Egypt was discussed, as was the involvement of the Ottoman Navy in the campaigns against Napoleon. Two papers were dedicated to the medical treatment of the soldiers, focusing on the contributions of the surgeon, Larrey. Another important area was the exploration of attitudes then and now toward Napoleon's conquest of Egypt and the Holy Land, including a review of the conquest as it appeared in contemporary art; the notion of Leibnitz as a precursor to Napoleon's strategic thinking; Chateaubriand and the campaign in the Holy Land; present-day Egyptian perceptions of the conquest of Egypt by Napoleon; and Governor of Acre Ahmad Jezzar vis-à-vis Napoleon. Attention was devoted to Napoleon and the French Rvolutionary doctrine; the impact of the French expedition on the Ottoman state and its reforms; the return of the European Powers to the Middle East as a result of Napoleon's occupation of Egypt; and the question of whether the impact of the West and the return of the Powers began only following Napoleon's conquest or even before.

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PREFACE

The participants in the conference took part in three study tours of Napoleon's battlefields in the Holy Land. The first was devoted to the siege and conquest of Jaffa and included visits to the main sites of the siege and to the points along the walls and the seashore where the French army managed to penetrate the town and subdue it. The second was a tour of the battlefields of the Galilee: the sites (Dovrat and Giv'at Ha-Moreh) of the battle of Mt. Tabor, the battlefield of Ilaniya, and a drive along the route of the advance of Murat's forces through the Upper Galilee via Tiberias and Safed. The third tour covered the sites where Napoleon's forces were concentrated, especially those sites where Napoleon attempted to break through the walls and conquer Acre. The tour concluded with a visit to the CitadelPalace of the Ottoman Governor of Acre, Ahmad Jezzar Pa§a, and to his mosque, medrese and tomb. All the study tours were accompanied by explanations and discussions of the sites and of the French, Ottoman and British military moves and operations, led mainly by Mordechai Gichon. We are grateful to the participants in the conference who shared their knowledge and insights and made the event a success. Our thanks in particular to those who agreed to revise their material for this publication. Since not all the papers were submitted for publication in this volume, the editor and the board decided to arrange the compilation alphabetically by author's names rather than in the order of presentation at the conference. Spelling styles and transliteration were unified, although various exceptions were permitted, especially in view of the bilingual format of the volume as well as the citing of a large number of Slavic names. The publication of this volume was made possible by generous grants provided by Dr. Ben Weider, president of the International Napoleonic Society, and by Professor Shimon Shamir, incumbent of the Kaplan Chair in the History of Egypt and Israel at Tel Aviv University, as well as by the decision of Mr. Sinan Kuneralp, publisher Isis Ltd., to assume the expenses of producing the book. To all, our deepest gratitude. Aryeh Shmuelevitz, Editor

THE PECULIARITIES OF NAPOLEON'S ORIENTAL CAMPAIGN: AN INTRODUCTION! Mordechai GICHON

Rudyard Kipling, asked once what was special about the Middle East, replied: "The Middle East is the buckle of the belt that girdles the world," meaning, in less poetic parlance, the Middle East is one of the major hubs of world traffic — what I have termed the Afro-Euro-Asian land bridge. 2 This was, of course, true in antiquity and up until Ottoman times. That an awareness of this factor, with all its geopolitical, strategic and economic implications, was reactivated, is due solely to Napoleon's campaign in the Levant. Orientalists have long stressed that despite its brevity, Napoleon's campaign to Egypt and Palestine must be acknowledged as the starting point of most later developments in the region, 3 lending additional weight to the study. Even taken by itself, however, Napoleon's campaign for the conquest of Egypt and Palestine is one of the most fascinating episodes in the endless list of military enterprises centring on the Middle East. Its contemporary impact was great. Although his later undertakings and feats, which had a more immediate and a broader influence on world affairs, overshadowed the memory of, and research on, the oriental campaign, its obscurity, happily, is dissipating. The campaign had a number of unusual traits that were unique then. The very conception of the campaign constituted a remarkable first: an indirect approach on an intercontinental scale to solving a major strategic problem affecting national security.

^This paper was conceived as an introductory lecture and as a framework for the deliberations of the congress, which, fortuitously, touched upon most of the subjects raised. Detailed tactical coverage for most battles and sieges was provided by the writer of this article when conducting the congress participants around the relevant sites. Bibliographical references will be provided. Gichon, "The History of the Gaza Strip, a Political and Geo-strategic Perspective," The Jerusalem Cathedra 2, ed., L. I. Levine (Jerusalem), pp. 282-317. 3 E.g., M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 27: "A new epoch had opened in the history of the Near East." Cf. George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 2nd ed., 1956), pp. 12-15.

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M o r d e c h a i

G I C H O N

Napoleon's final victory over the land forces of the powers that made up the First Coalition, and the peace treaty drawn up at Loeben and signed in Campo Formio on 17 October 1797, left only Britain hostile to France. Typically, the British concentrated on warfare at sea and in the colonies. This impelled the French government to find a way to force Britain to cease its naval actions, which were causing the young republic severe economic damage, and agree to peace. 1 An invasion of the British Isles was decided upon. Napoleon, the victor in Italy and a rising star in the galaxy of republican generals, was chosen to conduct a thorough investigation of the ways and means to mount such an enterprise and to command its subsequent implementation. Napoleon (then, and until assuming the imperial crown, still Bonaparte) decided that the French navy could not guarantee the safe passage of an invasion force through the Manche channel. He therefore proposed to the Directoire, in his capacity as designated commander of the enterprise, an alternative plan: to disrupt Britain's growing stranglehold on France's economy by attacking its commerce from a French base on the shores of the Levant. 2 As far back as c.1670, Leibnitz had proposed to Louis XIV that the king make himself master of Egypt. Following Catherine II's Turkish wars, various scholars and statesmen discussed carving up portions of the empire of the "Sick Man on the Bosphorus," as the sultan of the declining Ottoman Empire became to be nicknamed toward mid 19th century.3 French proposals along these lines were aired right up to the eve of Napoleon's campaign. Yet it was Napoleon alone who translated this notion into a plan of action. Using what was then a unique grand strategy on an international scale, he planned to defeat and subdue the enemy not by striking at its homeland, or engaging in a direct confrontation with its primary armed might, but through an indirect effort. 4 He planned to break the British stranglehold on France and its overseas possessions and interests by capturing a site in the eastern Mediterranean and erecting a permanent French base on it. His aim was to exploit this "external position" and strike from it, when opportune, at British holdings and spheres of interest to the north, south and ^Georges Lefèbre, Napoleon, Vol. I, trad. H. F. Stockhold (London: Routledge + Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 56-59; Allain Bernède et Laurent Leprévost, "Aspects Stratégiques," AUain Bernède et Gérard J. Caduc, eds., La Campagne d'Égypte 1798-1801 (Musée de l'Armée, 1978), pp. 17-18. 2 J. M. Thomson, Napoleon Bonaparte, his Rise and Fall (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963), pp. 94-96; Bernède et Leprévost, "Aspects Stratégiques," pp. 17-29; C. de La Jonquière, L'Expédition d'Egypte 1798-1801, 5 vols. (Paris: Henri Charles Lavauzelle, 1899-1907), I, pp. 172-76. ^Charles Roux, Les Origines de l'expédition d'Egypte (Paris: Pion Nourrit et Cie., 1910); Anderson, The Eastern Question, Ch. 1, p. 1 ff. 4 B . H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy, rev. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960). Surprisingly, Liddell-Hart overlooked this outstanding first example of the intercontinental indirect approach.

NAPOLEON'S ORIENTAL CAMPAIGN

15

east. Had Napoleon's fleet not been destroyed (on 1 August 1798) soon after his successful landing in Egypt (on 1 July), and had Russia, Austria, Portugal and Naples not decided to join Britain and renew the war with France in December 1798, this imaginative strategy might have been consequential. As it stands, even after failure, it foreshadows the "grand strategy" that was adopted by the great powers of the 20th century.

The second unique aspect of Napoleon's conception touches on the campaign orders themselves. While the Directoire approved his proposal whether it grasped all its implications or not — the actual orders issued to Napoleon, dictated, to the best of my understanding, largely by Napoleon himself, contained a remarkable additional aim. Article 4 of the decree of 23 Germinal, year VI (12 April 1798) states: "II améliora par tous les moyens qui seront en son pouvoir, le sort des naturels d'Egypte," i.e., "He shall improve by all the means at his disposal, the lot of the native population of Egypt." Elsewhere, Napoleon declared that one of the aims of the expedition was to repay a "dette d'honneur" — a debt of honour — to the Orient, fountainhead of all Western knowledge, by endowing it with the great achievements of the European civilizations that came later.1

A third exceptional facet was the creation of a well-organized civilian, scientific and technological "assault force" — the Mission des Sciences et Arts — which was included in Napoleon's army when it left Toulon on 19 May 1798. It consisted of 168 scholars, technical experts and artists whose tasks included both the study of the state of affairs in their respective fields in the Levant and passing on the knowledge and achievements of French (and, thereby, European) arts and sciences to the local population. Never before or after had a military campaign encompassed ab initio the directive and the means for a major cultural expedition on the scale initiated and directed personally by Bonaparte, who managed to recruit the highest level of French scholarship for it. Parallel to the financing of the armaments and stores necessary for his approximately 33,000-strong fighting force, he succeeded in obtaining a financial allocation sufficient to equip the mission with the best instruments and tools available, from theodolites (surveyors' telescopes) to containers for botanical and zoological samples. 2

1 Decree by the Directory on the aims of the Egyptian campaign, dated 12 April 1798, de La Jonquière, I, pp. 341-42. English translation: M. S. Anderson, The Great Powers and the Near East (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), pp. 18-19. 2 De La Jonquière, I, pp. 662-65.

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GICHON

All these preparations, the later activities of the Institut d'Egypte, and the various industrial enterprises founded in Egypt indeed had a distinctly pragmatic side. Bonaparte knew that he needed scholarly and technical know-how to assess local conditions and resources in order to fulfil a goal he considered imperative: to develop the backward countries of the region so that they could maintain his army once he established a permanent base in the Levant and implemented his planned actions against Britain and its allies. He may also have guessed that the sea lanes to France would be precarious, even before experiencing a naval disaster such as the one at Aboukir. Granted this pragmatic aspect, however (which was to typify all of Napoleon's public welfare policies), there was also an explicit thrust toward fostering enlightenment, progress and social justice, as he understood these concepts. In the case of Egypt, the Institut consistently aimed to demonstrate the products of French science to local scholars and the intelligentsia. Under the circumstances, these efforts were premature, and, moreover, the French stayed too short a time to show immediate results. Still, the collection of artefacts and data in fields ranging from archaeology, geography and botany to medicine was a great success, as exemplified by the 36 volumes of published memoirs and proceedings of the Institut, entitled Description d'Egypte (C. L. F. Panchoucke, ed.). 1 Despite its brief stay in Egypt, the French presence there had such an impact, that French culture and technology became the basis for the modernization of Egypt. This development was initiated and promoted by Muhammad 'Ali (1805-1848), who openly modelled his style of rule on the French emperor.2

A fourth observation regarding the campaign relates to the 29-year-old Bonaparte's flair and vision. He was the first of the European leaders since antiquity to perceive the potential of the Jewish people in their dispersal as a political factor, and endeavoured to gain their goodwill and interest in abetting specific political and military activities — in this case, his expedition to the East. short and useful assessment of the work of the scientific mission and the Institute of Egypt established by its members is provided by Christopher Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt (London: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 27-33; 164-76. Herold is critical of the French expedition and its leader, so much so that his views frequently lack balance and detachment. Just because of this, his summarization of the French scientific and technological efforts merits citing: "Never before or since, has a study of such scope and thoroughness been accomplished on the basis of field work carried out in so short a space of time (three years), and under such inadequate and harassing circumstances." (Ibid., p. 167). Cf. Nicole Dhombre, "Napoleon et les Scientifiques," Le Souvenir Napoléonien 340 (avril 1985), pp. 9-18. All unbiased scholars agree that the Institut d'Egypte laid the foundation for regional studies in the sphere of human endeavours and their hysical environment. A. Sabiy, L'Empire égyptien sous Mohamed Ali (Paris: Pion, 1930); V. J. Puryear, France and the Levant From the Bourbon Restauration (Berkeley, 1941); Charles Issawi, Egypt at Mid-century (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 18-30.

NAPOLEON'S

ORIENTAL

CAMPAIGN

17

With this in mind, Napoleon's agents, backed up by his propaganda machine, offered the Jewish people the restoration of their independence in their ancient homeland, with Jerusalem as their rightful capital. Even if such a notion was no more than a vague idea, it was a dramatic precursor of the Balfour Declaration 118 years later, which pledged Great Britain's aid in the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The most explicit written evidence of Napoleon's line of thought was a manifesto discovered in Prague on the eve of the Second World War. 1 Viewed by most historians as a genuine contemporary document, it was thought by some scholars to have been a forgery devised in 1798-99 during the strife between the mainstream Jewish community in Prague and the heretic Frankist sect. The Frankists upheld the legitimacy of the pseudo-messiah, Shabetai Zevi (died in 1676), a mystic whose multi-faceted dogmas captured the imagination of many Jews. Jacob Frank, a charlatan, revived Shabetian messianism and established a following in many large Jewish congregations, a development viewed as a serious threat by the establishment of Jewish leadership. 2 According to the forgery thesis, the document was contrived to play into the hands of the Habsburg authorities, implicating the Frankists as collaborators with Napoleon and the French. Even if the document is a fabrication, however, its existence presupposes an awareness by the Habsburgian authorities of sundry Napoleonic activities to gain Jewish support for his schemes outside France regarding the restoration of a Jewish homeland. Otherwise the contents of the document would have been considered at the turn of the 18th century in Europe, either irrelevant or, at worst, not particularly subversive. Moreover, if producing an incriminating document was the objective, a much more incriminating type of evidence could have been fabricated. In short, a forged manifesto of that character could be effective only if the existence of similarly worded pronouncements was known. Indeed, various reports in the contemporary French and German press offer proof of the credibility of the contents of the manifesto. 3 The influence of this unprecedented approach to the Jews has not been sufficiently stressed. From about 1850 onward, starting with the fathers of modern Zionism, such as Rabbi Zevi Kalischer, through the scholarly work of

' Fran? Kobler, n. 2 and 3, below. On Frank and Frankism: Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schoken, 1946); idem, The Messianic Idea in Judaism, (1971); Hans J. Schoeps, Barockjuden, Christen, Judenchristen (1965); Franz Kobler, N.14, below. ^Franz Kobler, Napoleon and the Jews (New York: Schocken Books, 1976). This volume sets out research viewed as authoritative by many scholars. See, most recently, Nathan Shur, Napoleon in the Holy Land (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), pp. 117-120. For the opposite view: Simon Schwarzfuchs, Napoleon, the Jews and the Sanhédrin (London: Routledge + Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 22-27; Jacques Derogy et Hesi Carmel, Bonaparte en Terre Sainte (Paris: Fayard, 1992), pp. 331-73.

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Moses Hess (c. 1860) and the activity of a growing number of non-Jewish scholars, thinkers and statesmen, the Napoleonic example was quoted to support the feasibility of a secularly inspired and initiated return to Palestine. When Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement, was questioned by the German emperor, Wilhelm II, Herzl himself cited Napoleon's approach regarding the feasibility of a return to Zion. 1

Yet another unique trait of the Holy Land campaign is Napoleon's strategic plan, a conception that, while apparent in a modified form in his Italian campaign in 1797, became a distinctive component of his strategy upon its application in Palestine in 1799. Napoleon's modus operandi was to contain one foe with inferior forces, strike along interior lines at the other from inferior positions, subdue it, and rush to face the first one. Napoleon learned in December 1798 that the sultan had concluded a military alliance with Great Britain and that the two were preparing a two-pronged invasion: one by sea, with forces to disembark at Alexandria, and the other by land, with troops to march southward through Syria-Palestine and Sinai. The two forces were to converge in the Nile delta and expel the French from Egypt. He immediately decided to strike at one of the two enemy forces before they could co-ordinate their efforts. Knowing that, owing to the prevailing winds and currents, a disembarkation on Egypt's shores could not be carried out before the end of May, he made his move into the Holy Land. There he planned a pre-emptive, preventive campaign that would destroy the enemy forces of the Pa$aliks of Damascus and Acre. This was the distinctive Napoleonic manoeuvre, attempted for the first time on a grand scale.2 While he was not breaking new ground entirely, as Frederick II of Prussia had brilliantly demonstrated this method in his wars,3 Napoleon took the risks involved one step further. Whereas Frederick had always left forces — weak, but capable of determined defence — facing the foe to be tackled second, Napoleon had the delta and Lower Egypt practically stripped of troops. Nearly all his other forces were fighting in Upper Egypt on an expedition mounted simultaneously against the Mamluk bey, Murad, who had retreated there. Moreover, weather favourable to a hostile landing, expected at the end of May, forced Napoleon to carry out his Palestine enterprise within five months:

See M. Gichon, "Napoleon, Eretz Israel and the Jews," in Napoleon in Eretz Israel, Collected Papers (Hebrew), forthcoming, on Kalischer: Richard Lichtheim, Geschichte des Deutschen Zionismus (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass), p. 42, on Herzl: Kobler, Napoleon and the Jews, p. 208. 2 Napoléon I, Commentaires III (Paris: Imprimeries Impériales, 1867), pp. 23-24. 3 For a good summarization of Frederick's campaigns: Oesterreichisches Bundesministerium für Heerwesen, Die Wichtigsten Feldzuge der Weltgeschichte (Wien: Militarwissenschaftlich- und technische Mitteilungen, 1928), pp. 24-29. On his strategy: Liddell-Hart, Strategy, pp. 105-12.

NAPOLEON'S ORIENTAL CAMPAIGN

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planning, preparation, traversing the Sinai desert, capturing all of Palestine up to the Litani river (viewed by him as the country's border) — a distance of c. 450 km, establishing his rule there, and returning in time to deal with the anticipated Anglo-Ottoman landing at Alexandria. All this had to be achieved from mid-December to May. 1 In this context, two additional unique features of the campaign demand mention, however brief. It was conducted in a region about which very little was known — a virtual terra incognita, in an environment completely alien to contemporary French military experience. In contrast to the colonial wars of the 17th and 18th centuries, which commenced with a gradual expansion from primary bridgeheads, this campaign was to be achieved entirely by a single, vast coup de main. The other feature is that Napoleon's 13,000-man Palestinian force made the first desert crossing ever by a modern European army, with all that this entailed: problems of transport, food and water, and hostile Bedouins. His solutions were to serve as guidelines as late as the First World War period and even thereafter.2 The idea of a camel corps, conceived by Napoleon on the eve of the crossing of Sinai, 3 was subsequently to become an essential component of the French colonial armies. So, too, was the fast-shooting drill by alternating ranks to better repel the swift attacks by desert raiders. 4 Another preventive means against such attacks were the pieux — specially shaped stakes with hooks that permitted the erection of palisades at top speed. This mobile palisade technique largely foreshadowed the "concertina" wire fencing of the Second World War vintage.5 These details show that the oriental campaign was remarkable not only on the strategic level, but in originating tactical and technical solutions to unprecedented demands that were to prove to be of long-standing value. In light of the extent of the interior lines envisaged, and the difficult nature of the regions to be traversed, the question that must be considered is how well the risks of this enterprise were calculated and how capable the French invasion force was of executing the plan. ^On the Sinai Campaign: M. Gichon, "Napoleon's March Through Sinai — 1799," in Sinai Regional Studies, ed., G. Gvirzman, A. Shmueli et al (Tel Aviv University, 1978), pp. 877-92 (Hebrew). 2 Ibid; de La Jonquière, L'Expédition, IV, Ch. 2, p. 73 ff. ^Ordre portant création d'un Régiment de Dromadaires (9 Janvier 1799), in Correspondance Militaire de Napoléon I, Vol. II (Paris: Pion, 1875); Comm. Denis, "Emploi des Camelins pendant la Campagne d'Egypte," Revue Historique de l'Armée (Paris: 1963, 19e année), pp. 3, 39-54. 4 Comm. Denis, pp. 93-94; Napoléon I, Commentaires II. 5 O n pieux: Napoléon I, Commentaires II, p. 418; Napoleon's remark that, as the campaign progressed, the use of the pieux was relinquished, glosses over the fact that the stakes were cumbersome to carry, and that the troops found sundry ways to rid themselves of this additional burden once they felt that they could do without it. The general idea, known from antiquity, was revived in Egypt because of the appropriate conditions. Allgemeine Militärencyklopädie, Vol. VII (Leipzig: J. H. Wewel, 1877) calls them "Palissaden" or "Sturmpfähle": "Bei Lagern welche befestigt werden sollen ein gutes und schnelles Hilfsmittel."

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Conceivably, the intrinsic properties of the material at the command of the military historian makes such questions difficult to answer. Often, we lack evidence of the deliberations that went into the decision making. This limitation decidedly applies to the campaign under discussion. The means at our disposal to offer an answer are therefore largely indirect indications. The success or failure of a campaign cannot in itself be used as a sufficient measuring rod. Too many decisive battles have been won by the unpredictable last ounce of stamina of the fighting men responding to their immediate commanders, in the face of a foe equally resolute thus far. On the level of grand strategy, surely, barring exceptional developments, Britain's command of the sea would have brought Bonaparte's entire oriental enterprise to a disastrous end sooner or later. Limiting ourselves to the Palestinian campaign, we must reiterate that the major logistic prerequisites were well appreciated, though solved satisfactorily only on paper. The operational problems of dealing with an enemy far superior in numbers, and positioned behind permanent fortifications (even if antiquated), were underestimated. The experience of victory over generally superior forces, coupled with the backwardness encountered in local technology and administration, caused Napoleon to overestimate his capabilities within the limitations of the available time and the parameters of space. Still, the proximity to success does not absolutely rule out the feasibility of the achievement of the conquest of Palestine as planned. The causes for the military failures and defeats throughout the campaign must be attributed largely to Napoleon's mounting apprehension of an Anglo-Ottoman landing on the Egyptian shores prior to his completing the conquest of Palestine. Consequently, his tactical thinking was overly influenced by the quest for time-saving moves and devices which were often self-defeating. Two sets of examples must suffice, one from the actual fighting and the other from military intelligence: (1) All the assaults on Acre incorporated self-defeating time-saving moves and omissions that nullified the gains of the attacks.1 (a) The assault on 1 April was mounted without waiting for the proper extension of the mine under the foundations of the corner tower to be attacked. (b) Attacks were launched without waiting for the arrival of supplies necessary for the mounting of divisions and secondary efforts. ! m . Gichon, "The Siege of Acre," in Napoleon in Eretz Israel, in press.

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(c) A series of four attacks on the town's defences were mounted before the third parallel had reached the glacis of the moat, so as to enable the soldiers to commence their assault close to the walls. (2) Time limitations convinced Napoleon to forgo collecting intelligence on the enemy and its fortifications, and to concentrate on the acquisition of logistic intelligence only. This cost Napoleon no less than 12 days in besieging El-Arish and Jaffa, so that not enough time remained to subdue Acre. On reaching that town, he neglected to verify the true nature of the moat, causing the miscarriage of the first assault, which had had the best chance of success.1

The necessity to return to Egypt before the capture of Acre spelled failure as far as the conquest of Palestine was concerned. However, the goal of destroying the enemy in Palestine was achieved. With the Ottoman forces wiped out in the Esdrealon Valley,2 Napoleon was able to concentrate on the seaborne menace and push back the invaders at Alexandria with heavy losses to the enemy.3 Yet, the abandonment of his army there in order to take command in Europe ruined the chances to attain the strategic goal of the Eastern campaign: the establishment of a permanent French base in the Levant. The entire question of why Napoleon aimed at remaining in the Holy Land after crushing the Ottoman forces there also merits discussion. The reasons may be gleaned from his declarations, his writings and his course of action. First, he had a keen appreciation of Palestine's eternal strategic role as a land bridge and the importance of holding it securely for any future development, e.g., to threaten or, alternatively if peaceful conditions were established, carry on trade with Anatolia, the Balkans and the Persian Gulf — and through it, India. 4 Second, he wished to deny the British navy use of the

^M. Gichon, "Intelligence as a Decisive Factor during Napoleon's Campaign in Palestine 1799," in Acta of the 1st International Congress of the INS at Alessandria, ed., V. Scotti Douglas (Alessandria, 1997), pp. 626-33. On the Battle of Mount Tabor: M. Gichon, "The Sands of E l Arish and Mount Tabor," Maarakhot 160 (Tel Aviv, 1964, Hebrew), pp. 17-24; Nathan Shur, Napoleon's Campaign, pp. 106-15. 3 Bernède et Leprévost in Bernède et Chaduc, La Campagne d'Egypte, pp. 87-96. ^Attempts to use Palestine as a stepping stone northward and eastward were widely known even then. See William Sidney Smith, in an official letter to Nelson dated May 9, 1799, in Anonymous, The Siege of Acre (London: W. Glendinning, 1799), pp. 74-75; a communication in the Moniteur, dated June 1799, quoted by Philip Guedella, Napoleon and Palestine (London: George Allen + Unwein, 1925), p. 24. Both of these, together with Napoleon's Indian plans, are mentioned by M. de Bourienne, Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte (London: Richard Bentley, 1836), pp. 189-90. The emperor's reminiscences in Commentaires III, 21-22, contained a kernel of truth. Notably, in his planning, he frequently envisioned a broad exploitation of the immediate de facto goal, to which he gave preliminary thought without going into tangible detail before the opportunities presented themselves. Cf.: Georges Spillmann, Napoléon et l'Islam (Paris: Librairie Petrin, 1969), pp. 46-48.

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Palestinian coast as a base for the effective blockade of Egypt. This countermove on land to a threat by sea is reminiscent of a similar tactic by Alexander the Great, who captured ancient Israel in order to deny the use of its harbours to the Phoenician fleet. 1 Lastly, Napoleon was conscious of the fact that the Egyptian population was not sufficiently numerous or disposed to sustain the necessary efforts required for his plans of further economic, political and military expansion. He hoped, in contrast, for wholehearted assistance by the ethnic and religious minorities of Palestine and southern Syria, some of considerable strength and potential, and for their readiness to join his army — namely, the Christians, Jews, Druze, Alawis and the Galilean Bedouin tribes. In a letter to Rear-Admiral Lord Nelson, dated 9 May 1799, Commodore Sidney Smith predicted that should Acre fall, these populations would side with the French.2 The confrontation of the French forces with a completely alien Muslim population, religion and culture was in itself a distinctive aspect of the oriental campaign. In the preparatory stages of the campaign, the general-en-chef and his immediate staff did nothing to disabuse the men of the exaggerated expectations of the "fabulous and prosperous" Orient. Their ensuing disillusionment and disappointments were soon translated into active antagonism to the local population, who, in turn, reacted ruthlessly wherever possible toward the non-believing invaders.3 Students of colonialism will find great interest in Napoleon's genuine efforts to overcome this mutual hatred, although the brevity of his stay made most of these efforts illusory.4 The contacts, also all too brief, with the minorities in Palestine were on a significantly more positive basis. The oppressive and fanatic rule of Ahmad Jazzar predisposed them favourably toward the French, even if they hesitated to declare themselves openly prior to a decisive French victory (see above). Of interest, too, is the French army's attitude toward the Holy Land. 5 The majority of Frenchmen who published reminiscences of their stay there attested to a resurgence of religious sentiment, which manifested itself in their desire to be conducted to the holy places and to be informed about what had 'De La Jonquière, L'Expédition d'Egypte, IV, p. 8. ^Anonymous, The Siege of Acre, loc. Cit. in n. 1 p. 20, above. 3m. Gichon, "East Meets West — Egypt and Palestine, 1798-1801. The Encounter and its Consequence's," in Acta of the XXTVth International Congress of Military History of the CIHM, " ed., Barata (Lisbon, 1998), pp. 238-43. 4 M . Gichon, "Napoleon in Western Galilee," in The Western Galilee and the Coast of Galilee, Convention of the Israel Exploration Society 1966, ed., J. Braslav (Jerusalem), pp. 153-64 (Hebrew). •5Cf. Gichon n. 4 above. Idem, "The Impact of the French Revolution upon Bonaparte's Campaign in the Holy Land," in Acta of the 15th Congress of the CIHM (Paris, 1989), p. 234; F. Wenke Wilberg, Napoleon, Die Memoiren seines Lebens 3-4 (Wien, Hamburg 1912), pp. 403-5, 416-17, 421-24, 433, ff.; F. M. Kicheisen, Napoleon im Lande der Pyramiden (Leipzig: 1918), p. 186; G. Spillmann, Napoléon et l'Islam (Paris: 1969), pp. 79-80, 86ff.

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happened at each of them. This was a telling gauge of the actual effectiveness of the anti-religious educational trends of the French republican authorities. The rapid and massive Catholic revival in France after the concordat with Pope Pius VII in 1801 is not surprising, even on the basis of these testimonies alone.

One last observation regarding the campaign centres on an innovation in the battlefield, namely, the tactical manoeuvre that turned the tables on the Mamluk ascendancy. 1 The Mamluk ruler, Murad, aptly expressed the prevailing Eastern conception of mounted warfare when, upon learning that the French force included only 800 horsemen, declared: "No need for a general alert. I and my household cavalry are sufficient to cut off all the Frenchmen's heads like melons being harvested." Nevertheless, 21 days later, the French entered his capital, and defeated their mounted foes in every ensuing battle up to and including Mount Tabor. The reason for the French success was their systematic application of the hollow-square tactic', "le carré," composed usually of brigades or demi-brigades. The squares, contained a unit of musket-wielding infantrymen in some depth facing when static, in all four directions, capable of rapid, heavy, sustained volleys of fire to break up the attacking enemy. If the enemy succeeded in coming close, they used their bayonets. Moving in pairs, each square served in turn as a firing base supporting the one advancing or retreating. Between them, they crushed the enemy cavalry, leading to Napoleon's dictum: "One Mamluk horseman is superior to ten French, but a French square is superior to any number of Mamluks." The adoption of this tactic merits recognition in view of the standard 18th-century French tactical conception based solidly on the line, the column and the mixed employment of both. The immediate and nearly faultless adaptation of the hollow square, therefore deserves special praise.2 Napoleon's military genius ought not overshadow the important contributions to the campaign made by other outstanding minds, quite aside from the scholars and scientists attached to the Mission des Sciences et Arts. The best known of these was Napoleon's chief engineer, Gen. Caffarelli Dufalga, who was notable for devising and applying novel means and methods in the sieges. His multi-faceted innovations merit detailed scrutiny by all who seek to gain knowledge of 18th-19th-century military engineering.

'Napoleon I, Commentaires II. hbid.

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Another important figure was Nicholas Jacques Conté, the chief mechanical engineer of the expedition and a member of the scientific mission as well. His inventiveness was put to use in setting up vital workshops in Egypt to produce ammunition and equipment for the French army. Had Napoleon followed his advice, heavy artillery would have been taken along during the crossing of Sinai, on specially constructed broad wheels. 1 An unusual emphasis was put on the hygiene and medical care of the forces. The pragmatic motivation to protect the all-too-limited manpower is obvious. However, the commitment and resourcefullness of the two chief medical officers added a special dimension to the medical history of the campaign. Frequently, they acted in opposition to Napoleon and his subordinate commanders when they deemed it necessary for humanitarian reasons. The quest for proper remedies induced Chief Physician Dr. René Nicholas Desgenettes to go so far as to infect himself with sera taken from the blood of patients suspected of having been infected with contagious diseases. During the campaign, Chief Surgeon Dominique Jean Larrey perfected techniques of battlefield surgery — a revolutionary concept then, making him the father of modern military surgery.2 In the end, sea power triumphed over land power in Napoleon Bonaparte's campaign in the Levant, a development facilitated by the small size of the French expeditionary corps. 3 Furthermore, all ranks lost much of their élan when they learned that the commandant-en-chef had suddenly departed, en route back to France to assume command of the rekindled war there. They felt that they had been deserted, and their sole motive thereafter was to assure their own return home. In spite of these adverse developments, Napoleon's army left the imprint of French culture and technology in Egypt and Palestine, which was to play an important role in the reawakening Middle East. It would be difficult to imagine the development of 19th-century Syria, Palestine and Egypt without the printing press introduced there by the French army, or the French education provided to a large portion of the Jewish youngsters there by the Alliance Israélite Universelle school network years before such initiatives emanated from the German and English spheres of culture. 1 "His mechanical ingenuity bordered on sorcery: with the most rudimentary materials he was able to manufacture whatever tools were needed and, if necessary, the tools to make the tools." Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt, pp. 32, 267. 2 René Nicolas Desegnettes, Histoire médicale de l'Armée d'Orient (Paris: Coulebas, 1802), Dominique Jean Larrey, Mémoires (Paris: Demonville, 1803); Paul Fiaire, Napoléon et Larrey (Tours, 1902); G. J. Chaduc et Chr. Dickes, "La Campagne d'Egypte," in Bernède et Chaduc, pp. 132-35. % o r an apt resumé of this process, see M. Battesti, La Bataille d'Âboukir 1798 (Paris: 1998), pp. 137-73.

THE IMPACT OF THE FRENCH EXPEDITION TO EGYPT ON EARLY 19TH CENTURY OTTOMAN REFORMS Segil KARAL AKGUN

Although the influence of innovations introduced in Russia by Peter the Great on reformist Ottoman Sultans Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-39) has been discussed by many historians dealing with Ottoman efforts at modernization, the impact of Napoleon Bonaparte's Egyptian campaign also deserves attention when early 19th-century reforms in the Ottoman Empire are considered. These influences may be classified as direct and immediate, such as those on diplomatic and military change, and indirect, namely, inspiring Muhammad 'Ali Pa§a's post-Bonaparte reforms in Egypt. Their evaluation involves an exploration of the campaign, its consequences, and the lasting, multidimensional effects that Bonaparte had on this critical region of the Mediterranean. By 1798, the year of the Egyptian expedition, Bonaparte, the young and exceedingly ambitious French general, with impressive military successes behind him, had set his mind on making France the leading colonial power in the world. This depended, he knew, on defeating the British in the Mediterranean. He was also convinced for some time by then that the most established power in the Mediterranean, the Ottoman Empire, was nearing collapse. These views were shared by France's Foreign Minister Talleyrand, who, like Napoleon, was determined that France should get a share of the spoils from the weakened empire. The Egyptian campaign was planned by both men. With Ottoman preoccupations with the West growing, the state, relying primarily on the Muslim population of this area, lost its control over the Mediterranean. This had already attracted the attention of several Western rulers, particularly the French Kings Louis XV and XVI, leading to careful scrutiny of the Mediterranean and of Egypt. 1 Bonaparte, therefore, was appointed chief of the "Army of the Orient," in March 1798, in order to open the door to "the most futile, and yet the most fruitful adventure" 2 in the Middle East.

'Byron Cannon, "Laws and Court in XlXth Century Egypt," SLC, 198, p. 8. ^Christopher J. Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt (London, 1962).

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The military and political success of the Egyptian campaign, in the French view, depended on the possibility of a permanent stay in Egypt. This, in turn, depended on acquiring support for the campaign by the Ottoman sultan. Since neither Talleyrand nor Napoleon, the two key figures in France, wanted to break off or even jeopardize France's carefully cultivated favourable relations with the Porte, the campaign was prepared in secrecy. Part of the plan was that once the campaign became known to the Ottoman Empire, the Porte would be assured that the expedition was by no means offensive, but that its aim was to suppress the Mamluks, who were a serious source of irritation both for the Ottoman administration and French residents in Egypt. The alibi worked, engendering a diplomatic fiasco for the Ottoman Empire. As soon as the Directory approved the expedition, on 12 March 1798, tasking Talleyrand with the diplomatic, and Bonaparte with the technical preparations, the campaign took shape as a secret, rapid and large-scale operation with both a military and scientific character 1 . The destination was kept secret, but the assumption widely held was that it would be an offensive against England. Yet, the fact that Prof. Gaspard Monge, a distinguished member of the French Academy of Sciences who was to lead the Science and Arts Mission during the campaign, was collecting maps and data on Egypt, and that orientalists and speakers of Arabic and Turkish were being sought, as were typographs with Arab characters, suggested that the destination of the extraordinary armada and crew converged in Toulon had to be eastbound. The Ottoman Embassy in Paris, however, was singularly inefficient in obtaining information about the expedition and relating it to the Porte. This ultimately prompted the Ottoman administrators to seriously re-evaluate its foreign service both as a system and in terms of the individual qualifications of its representatives in missions abroad. Meanwhile, vast territorial expansion had engendered an arrogance in the Ottoman Empire that had translated itself into an isolationist policy. The resultant distancing from developments in the West was reflected in stagnation in all fields, including in diplomacy. The administration regarded the installation of embassies in foreign states as beneath its dignity, and viewed sending plenipotentiary envoys whenever necessary as sufficient. The establishment of permanent embassies in major European capitals had only begun under Selim III (1789-1807). Thus, it was not difficult for Talleyrand to allay the suspicions of the Ottoman ambassador in Paris, Seyid Ali Efendi, who had heard many rumours and had listened to warnings by the Russian representative in Paris. Ali Efendi, lacking the skills, diligence and know-how ^Enver Ziya Karal, Fransa, Misir Osmanli imparatorlugu (1797-1802) (Istanbul, 1938), pp. 5051.

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required in diplomacy, was easily convinced, especially by the assurances of M. Ruffin, the French chargé d'affaires in Istanbul, that France bore no hostility to, nor was it about to launch any action against, the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, in as much as the Ottoman state intentionally avoided the teaching of foreign languages, Seyid Ali Efendi knew no French, or any other foreign language. His discussions in Paris were conducted by means of an interpreter, in this case a pro-French Greek, M. Khedouri. This, naturally, did not help the Ottoman cause. Even after the French fleet sailed from Toulon, on 19 May 1798, Ali Efendi, continued discussions with Talleyrand regarding the destination of the campaign, only to be reassured as late as 21 June that England was the target. The Porte learned of the 2 July French landing in Alexandria through a message sent to Istanbul on 17 July by sailors who had heard the news from a captain who happened to witness the event. 1 Obviously, the Ottoman-French war impelled by the expedition damaged relations between the two countries. Moreover, the Ottomans were compelled to negotiate with England and Russia for protection against France. The treaties concluded with these two states, on 3 and 4 January 1799, initiated a balance-of-povvers policy that the Ottoman Empire pursued in its foreign relations from that point on. Nevertheless, Selim, a reformist sultan, who, by interacting with Europe, broke f r o m the traditional Ottoman isolationist policy, was determined to reinforce diplomatic relations with all foreign states in order to accomplish his planned pro-Western reforms. Ever since he was heir apparent, France had been the focus of his inspiration, and especially noting the positive marks of the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt, he had no hesitation over resuming amicable relations with it once peace was restored. So it is possible to claim that initial impacts of the French expedition to Egypt reflected upon diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire. However, the Ottoman ambassador dispatched to Paris in January 1802, Halet Efendi, fell far short during his three-year mission, in fulfilling his assignment to attract support for Ottoman reform. This was largely due to his dejection over the unexpectedly humiliating treatment of him by Bonaparte, who became emperor in 1804, and Talleyrand, the two architects of the Egyptian campaign. Selim's efforts to invigorate Ottoman diplomacy and accomplish some of his goals by diplomatic means thus remained futile. Still, he gained an understanding of the weakness of the empire in the field of diplomacy through these experiences.

1 Ibid., pp. 82, 84. For correspondence between Seyid Ali Efendi and the Porte based on documents in the State Archives, see ibid., pp. 149-90.

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Vast internal and external problems in the empire during the following years further highlighted the necessity to improve its diplomacy. Reforms introduced by Mahmut II (1808-1838) included changes in the traditional office of the reis-ul-kuttab (chief scribe), responsible for conducting both the domestic and foreign affairs of the state. A decision that diplomacy must be handled separately by persons with expertise led to the division of this office in two in 1836 : an interior ministry and a ministry of foreign affairs (Nezareti Hariciye)} The establishment of an independent ministry to deal with foreign affairs resulted in the appointment of qualified ambassadors and staff for the Ottoman embassies. They were given instruction in foreign languages, a translation bureau was opened, and new post-primary schools were established to train civil servants. Furthermore, foreign ambassadors in the empire were treated more cordially. They were even allowed to sit in the presence of the Sultan during Mahmut II's reign. The Nezaret-i Hariciye also began to monitor travel abroad by introducing a passport system. Previously, this documentation was handled by foreign embassies in the Empire, to which even the Ottoman ambassadors assigned abroad were obliged to apply.2 The second area in which the French expedition and the Ottoman military defeat in Egypt impacted on the Ottomans was in inducing major military change, replacing ineffective military concepts followed for nearly a century. Selim had ascended to the throne well aware of the Ottoman decline and the Western-style reforms essential to halt it. His long admiration for France, illustrated by a correspondence as one of the heirs apparent with Louis XVI, 3 made that country a material mentor. Upon becoming sultan, he launched an extensive reform movement, called the Nizam-i Cedid (the New Order), whose most important features were weakening the authority of the reactionary 'ulama' and reorganizing the military. As his predecessors, he also sought French support for military improvements and invited French experts. Ironically, in 1793, Napoleon Bonaparte, then a new general anxious to make his name, applied for service in the Near East to improve the Ottoman army. 4 Selim's military reorganization included both reforming the traditional Janissaries and setting up a new, Western-style army, also called Nizam-i Cedid. However, by the time the Ottomans declared war against France, on 25 September 1798, the Janissaries, supported by anti-Nizam-i Cedid politicians, ^Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1977), p. 36. 2 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi (Ankara, 1947), Vol. V, pp. 160-61. I s m a i l Hakki Uzungar§ili, "Selim IH'ün Veliaht iken Lui XVI ile Muhaberati", Belleten, Cilt II (Ankara Nisan, 1938), pp. 191-246. TSaral, Fransa, Mmr ve Osmanli ìmparatorlugu, p. 36.

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had long showed resistance to the new methods of training and weaponry. The population, too, was generally contemptuous of the Nizam-i Cedid army, and of the movement itself, which they regarded as infidel because of their Western origin. This hostility was also fed by new taxes levied for the irad-i cedid, a special treasury established to meet the expenses of the Nizam-i Cedid. Some 130,000 Ottoman soldiers were posted to Egypt, including both Nizam-i Cedid and the Janissaries, as against approximately 35,000 French soldiers facing them in Alexandria. The Nizam-i Cedid fighters were inexperienced (the new army was founded in 1794), and the Janissaries, fighting alongside a force they regarded as rivals, recalcitrant. The Ottoman military defeat was inevitable. Ultimately, the French were driven out of Egypt only with the support of the English and Russian military, the latter gaining access to the Mediterranean through the straits for the first time. Selim's negotiations with Russia, the Ottomans' archenemy, spurred collaboration between the anti-Nizam-i Cedid 'ulama and the Janissaries, and the formation of a movement that eventually brought about the abdication of Selim III. The Nizam-i Cedid was disbanded, and Selim was assassinated in 1808. 1 By the time Mahmud II succeeded to the throne, the French had long evacuated Egypt, and Muhammad Ali, who had arrived in Egypt with the Albanian troops to reinforce the Ottoman forces, had acquired fame and popularity by preventing the English landing in Egypt. Appointed governor in 1808, Muhammad Ali enhanced his popularity during the first few years of Mahmud's sultanate by suppressing the Mamluks, a promise that Bonaparte had been unable to fulfil. As Mahmud tried to re-establish the authority of the Ottoman sultanate, which had been weakened by a series of successful Janissary uprisings, Muhammad Ali put the French contributions to good use. Many of the projects conceived by the French to turn Egypt into a modern country were implemented by him. Anxious to overcome his rivals, provide territorial security and win over the Egyptian people, Muhammad Ali gave priority to the military, to the centralization of the administration, and to increasing the country's wealth. Accomplishing these aims was possible by utilizing the French soldiers and technicians who chose to stay behind after the French evacuation. Establishing a modern army and navy, Muhammad Ali set about restoring peace and order by putting an end to the prolonged Mamluk threat and suppressing the Wahhabi uprising in the Arabian Peninsula. Economic policies that he pursued soon produced revenue sources which enabled him to fund further reforms.

' On the Nizam-i Cedid, see: Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, Vol. V; Stanford Shaw, Between New: The Ottoman Empire Under Selim III, 1789-1807 (Cambridge, 1971).

Old and

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Seçil

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AKGÛN

Meanwhile, Mahmud's initial military restructuring had, with deplorable similarity to the Nizam-i Cedid experiment, failed. At the time, the Morea uprising (1822-30) mushroomed into the Greek revolt and, ultimately, independence, just at the point that Mahmud, anxious to implement reforms, needed to reinforce his authority. Ottoman military inefficiency forced him to seek assistance from Muhammad Ali, who promptly came to the aid of the sultan, only to lose his fleet in Navarino in 1827 in an attack by a Russian, English, French and Greek coalition. This ended Ottoman supremacy over the Greek, a major loss, although it did not prevent the sultan, and the Muslim world at large, from admiring Muhammad Ali's successful innovations in Egypt and holding him in esteem. Mahmud's need to seek help from a vassal, coupled with the loss of Morea, fortified his determination to implement radical reforms, starting with the military. Previous efforts to reform the Janissaries had all been in vain, and two attempts to establish a new, modern army alongside the Janissaries had led on both occasions to a duality in which the traditional won out over the new. Unwilling to prolong the coexistence experiment, Mahmud took the courageous step of abolishing the Janissaries, in 1826, and establishing an army that was Westernized from its attire to education and training, naming it Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (the Muhammedan Victorious Armed Forces). 1 This new military format, including its system of drafting, ranks, payment and retirement, 2 with educational changes introduced by the Tanzimat, was retained until the end of the empire. Even though the new army was not yet sufficiently trained when the Russian war broke out following the Greek revolt, the removal of the Janissaries restored Mahmud's confidence and provided him the authority he sought to carry out the rest of the radical reforms he planed. The reforms were inspired mostly by Muhammad Ali, and indirectly by Bonaparte. Muhammad Ali systematically perpetuated almost all the changes and new values introduced in Egypt by the French campaign. His closely studied and admired reforms, which gradually elevated economic and socio-cultural life of Egypt, served as a model for Mahmud II and for later Ottoman reformers. The French had essentially revolutionized the government and society in Egypt, creating an entirely new class of administrators, tax collectors, police and the like. 3 The same was observed in the Ottoman Empire: Bonaparte, convinced that the success of the campaign largely depended on gaining the confidence of the people and the co-operation of the ruling class, meticulously

' Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, Vol. V, p. 154-55. Musa Çadirci, "Renovations in the Ottoman Army", Revue Internationale d'Histoire Ankara, 1988, p. 87. 3 Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 259. 2

Militaire,

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planned a complementary annex to the expedition — a Scientific and Artistic Commission. It numbered 167 persons, consisting of civil engineers, surveyors, cartographers, musicians, the well-known poet ParsevalGrandmaison, the famous mathematician Fourier, astronomers, botanists, surgeons, pharmacists, archaeologists, architects, chemists, mineralogists and zoologists. The additional civilian entourage of nearly 500 included cooks, servants, small businessmen, drummers, laundresses and many other persons with specific skills. 1 This group of French people, by their knowledge, skills and experience indisputably laid the groundwork for later advances in Egypt ranging from the deciphering of hieroglyphics and archaeological discoveries regarding the pyramids to the construction of the Suez Canal and the introduction of new crops. Each speciality demonstrated to the local population introduced new dimensions to them, opened doors to Western civilization, and created cultural, technical and economic opportunities. Muhammad Ali realized that perpetuating these innovations required a well-endowed treasury along with a modern educational system. He established a state monopoly in the areas of agriculture, communications, industry and commerce in order to monitor and obtain maximal benefit from all production. He invited foreign agricultural experts to demonstrate irrigation and improve cultivation. He constructed a channel connecting the Nile River to Alexandria and to the delta, thereby irrigating thousands of acres of land, naming it, as a tribute to the Sultan, Mahmudiye Kanali. Irrigation stimulated the cultivation of new industrial crops, such as cotton, sugar, rice and indigo, which contributed towards an increased per capita prosperity. The advent of new revenues prompted Muhammad Ali to the revenue system. He carried out surveys to assure that revenues were justly assessed and recorded. 2 The country's economy expanded through the creation of such new industries as the production of alcohol, sugar, thread and cloth, with Egypt developing foreign markets for textile products in particular. Unemployment problems were also alleviated. Educational reforms that Muhammad Ali introduced were based on the secularized Western model. Rather than attempting to alter the existing madrasas, he devoted efforts to overcoming illiteracy by establishing nonreligious public schools, later focusing his attention on vocational schools. A large number of vocational schools, beginning with schools of engineering, were opened, mostly with foreign faculty members. Hundreds of bright students were sent to major European cities to study and return to teach.

W o l d , p. 25-31. Shaw and Shaw, Vol. II., p. 11. See also Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, Vol. VI, pp. 85-89.

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AKGUN

Reading materials gained importance as schools proliferated. Before the campaign, Egypt had no printing industry. The first such enterprises were established with French, Arabic and Greek metal type that Bonaparte brought along. Bonaparte's proclamations were printed first, followed by the first book, the first newspaper (the weekly Le Courrier de VEgypte), and a scientific periodical (La Decade Egyptienne).' Muhammad Ali was also cognizant of Bonaparte's emphasis on health. A physician brought to Egypt along with the Scientific and Artistic Commission, Dr. Desgenettes, had observed the high rate of infant mortality and widespread ophtalmia, small pox and bubonic plague in the area. He printed and circulated simple informative materials to combat these diseases. Dr. Desgenette also made plans to construct a modern 550-bed hospital to replace the existing 75-bed installation, where patients received practically no treatment. Due to lack of funds, the project had remained unrealized. With the help of a Frenchman, M. Clot, Muhammad Ali put it into effect. 2 Mahmud II, in his reform program, followed a similar path as Muhammad Ali's. He, too attached importance to gaining the support of the people. Toward this end, he took pioneering steps towards eliminating religious discrimination by banning forced distinctive attire for non-Muslims.3 He reorganized and centralized the revenue system under the Ministry of Finance that he established. Having abolished the Janissaries, he then abolished the feudal timar fiefdom system as well and ended confiscation of property by the sultan.4 He initiated cadastral surveys, regular censuses to accurately estimate revenue collection, postal routes and an address system. Aware of the value of education in the process of accepting reform, he introduced compulsory elementary education (for boys only) in new secular primary schools, called ru§tiyes. These schools, too, were initially staffed by instructors invited to Egypt from western countries, while Ottoman students were sent abroad to be trained as teachers. He established a War College and an advanced military school. He opened a medical school — the Tiphane Cerrahhane, under the supervision of Prof. Bernard, an Austrian physician brought for this purpose. As Muhammad Ali, he instituted a quarantine system to prevent the spread of contagious diseases, and supported the distribution of informative pamphlets about such diseases, 5 mostly by American medical missionaries. Along with foreign educators, Mahmud had permitted missionaries to enter the empire from the early 1820s. By the 1830s, they were rendering valuable health and education services to the

^Herald, pp. 165-66. The title of the first book to be published was "Exercises in Literary Arabic Extracted from the Koran for Those Who are Studying that Language." 2 Ibid„ p. 175. 3 Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, Vol. V, p. 158. 4 Ibid„ Vol. VI (1954), pp. 197-99. 5 Shaw and Shaw, Vol. II, p. 11.

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33

empire, regardless of their ultimate intentions, by erecting schools and hospitals in remote regions not reached by the state. 1 The revitalization of the printing industry, initiated by Selim III, was continued by Mahmud. Selim had made efforts to establish libraries and to publish books in translation, inter alia in order to provide reading materials for the new military school he had established, Miihendishane-i Berri Humayun (Land Engineering School), an addition to the existing Naval Engineering School. During Selim's reign, Ottoman statesmen had become aware of the importance of the press, by then widespread in Europe, mainly through a French newspaper published by the French Embassy in Istanbul from 1795, to which the Ottoman ambassador in Paris, Halet Efendi later contributed news clippings. Mahmut became the first Ottoman sultan to accord importance to the press. He invited the French publisher of Le Spectateur de VOrient (later renamed Courrier de Smyrne) to Istanbul in 1830 to start the first official newspaper in the empire, Moniteur Ottoman. This was followed by the appearance of Takvim-i Vekayl ("Calendar of Events"), the first newspaper in Turkish. A weekly with a circulation of 5,000, it contained reports of official state proceedings along with general news, and was published in French as well. 2 Napoleonic influences on Ottoman reforms are observable even in the later Tanzimat and Megrutiyet (Constitutional) eras. Bonaparte was aware that science left monuments more lasting than war. According to Christopher Herold, "his understanding of art and science was primitive, but his penetrating intelligence enabled him to use them for his purpose". 3 Inspired by the French National Institute, to which he had been elected in 1797, he ordered the establishment of the Institute of Egypt, 4 which developed the field of orientalism. The study of orientalism, conceived in the early 14th century, 5 was revived in the late 18th century by Silvestre de Sacy, who redefined issues and ideas and secularized the study of religion. Many of the translators recruited for Napoleon's campaign were followers of de Sacy's teachings. 6 The campaign introduced a totally new approach to the study of the Orient and exposed the field of orientalism to Egypt. This mind-set eventually penetrated into the Ottoman Empire, from the second half of the 19th century, and was particularly influential in developments of Ottoman art.

^Seçil Akgiin, "Missionaries in the Ottoman Empire," Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Vol. 13, September 1989, Muncie, Indiana, p. 91. Karal, Osmanh Tarihi, Vol. V, p. 162. 3 Herold, p. 167. 2

A

Ibid.

5

Edward W., Orientalism (London, 1978), p. 49. 6 1bid., p. 83.

34

Segi 1 KARAL AKGUN

An invaluable aid in grasping the sustained impact of the expedition is to be found in Napoleon's Campagnes d'Egypte et de Syrie, 1798-1799, dictated by him to General Bertrand on Saint Helena. In it, Bonaparte, who aimed to become the sovereign ruler of Egypt, reveals the importance he attached to respecting the customs and beliefs of the population, his development program for the country's natural resources, plans for the equitable distribution of revenues, a stern but fair and uniform application of the law, and efforts to gradually grant self-government to people accustomed to subjugation. 1 He become so popular in Egypt, that he was called Sultan Kebir (the Great Ruler). By contrast, Mahmud's application of these same principles, and his mild measures aimed at a division of powers — namely, the formation of the Supreme Council of Judiciary Ordinances (Meclis-i Valayi Ahkami Babi Ali), the consultative assemblies and the cabinet system — earned him the epithet Gavur Padi§ah (Mahmud the Infidel), although he styled himself Mahmud-i Adli (Mahmud the Just). 2 The Muslim majority in the empire was not ready to accept his reforms which they perceived as radical. These reforms, however, were to serve as the foundation for later Ottoman modernization, and eventually, for the Turkish republic founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk.

W o l d , p. 177. Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, Vol. V. pp. 152-64.

2

LA BATAILLE D'ABOUKIR ET SES IMPLICATIONS STRATÉGIQUES Michèle BATTESTI

Depuis le traité de Campoformio (17 octobre 1797), la France, vainqueur du continent européen, était engagée dans une lutte inexpiable avec l'Angleterre, maîtresse des mers, sans perspective de victoire prochaine. Pour sortir de cette impasse stratégique, le Directoire, déterminé à «dicter la paix à Londres», concentra sur les côtes de la Manche l'armée d'Angleterre, forte de 80 000 hommes et commandée par le jeune général Bonaparte, auréolé de ses victoires en Italie. Mais en février 1798 à l'issue d'une inspection, Bonaparte jugea la «descente» inexécutable et préconisa un changement de front : la conquête de Malte et de l'Égypte, province nominalement turque, appartenant en fait à la féodalité militaire des Mamlûks. Cette substitution n'avait rien de saugrenu. Elle permettait la réalisation d'un plan opérationnel, élaboré dès 1776-1778 par des diplomates et des officiers de marine en cas de démantèlement de l'empire Ottoman, et correspondait à de judicieux calculs stratégiques basés sur l'effet de surprise et l'absence de la Royal Navy, exclue de la Méditerranée depuis 1796. En recourant à la stratégie périphérique dans l'Orient lointain, objectif «d'un genre inaccoutumé pour l'Europe moderne», Bonaparte jouait la carte maritime, retournant ainsi contre l'Angleterre son arme favorite. Le 5 mars 1798, Talleyrand et Bonaparte parvinrent à convaincre le Directoire du bien-fondé de la colonisation de l'Egypte, présentée comme une opération de représailles contre l'Angleterre pour compenser la perte du Cap de Bonne Espérance, frapper son commerce et s'emparer d'une nouvelle route des Indes «abrégée». Les préparatifs de l'expédition furent une course contre la montre, car le corps expéditionnaire devait intervenir au plus tard en juillet, avant la crue du Nil, pour éviter l'erreur de Saint-Louis en 1250. En dix semaines, il fut concentré 30 000 hommes avec armes et bagages, dans cinq points d'embarquement (Toulon, Marseille, Gênes, Civitavecchia, Ajaccio). La logistique était considérable à raison d'une tonne et demie par homme, incluant 171 pièces d'artillerie de siège et de campagne. L'originalité de l'expédition résidait dans la Commission des sciences et des arts, composée de 167 «savants» de toutes disciplines et destinée à dresser une encyclopédie vivante de l'Égypte. Pour projeter cet ensemble à l'autre bout de la Méditerranée, la flotte expéditionnaire, commandée par le vice-amiral Brueys, se composait de 54

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bâtiments de guerre (dont 13 vaisseaux, 8 frégates et une flottille fluviale) et de 280 navires de commerce. «Après avoir fait plus que le possible», 130 voiles appareillèrent de Toulon, le 19 mai. La première phase de la traversée transméditerranéenne était une gageure dans la mesure où elle supposait la jonction en pleine mer des trois convois de Gênes, Corse et Civitavecchia, opération très risquée en cas d'intervention anglaise. Absent au rendez-vous, le dernier convoi causa quelques inquiétudes, mais finalement l'armada se trouva au complet devant Malte. L'île-forteresse, réputée inexpugnable, capitula le 11 juin, après avoir esquissé un semblant de défense. Bonaparte prit le temps de refaire la législation maltaise avant de lever l'ancre, le 19 juin, pour mettre le cap sur Alexandrie. Le secret avait été si bien gardé que pour la plupart des membres de l'expédition, ce fut une révélation. En raison de l'encombrement des vaisseaux qui annihilait leur valeur militaire, les marins appréhendaient une rencontre avec une escadre anglaise, dont la présence était signalée en Méditerranée. Mais une telle épreuve leur fut épargnée. Le 1 e r juillet, 43 jours après le départ de Toulon, 1 602 milles parcourus à la vitesse moyenne de deux nœuds, l'expédition parvint saine et sauve à Alexandrie. Bonaparte avait réussi son pari et déjoué les Britanniques, seule ombre au tableau, Nelson avait fait escale deux jours plus tôt, et son possible retour à plus ou moins brève échéance faisait peser une menace mortelle sur l'expédition. Accompli dans la précipitation, le débarquement ne s'en déroula pas moins sans encombre et Alexandrie tomba sans coup férir. Sérieux mécompte, le Port-Vieux d'Alexandrie s'avéra inaccessible aux vaisseaux, contrairement au plan concocté à Paris. En attendant de trouver la passe signalée par les pilotes égyptiens, Brueys proposa d'embosser la flotte dans la rade d'Aboukir, située à mi-distance d'Alexandrie et de Rosette ; dispositif que Bonaparte avalisa avant de partir pour Le Caire. Appuyé par la flottille du contre-amiral Perrée remontant le Nil, Bonaparte écrasa les Mamlûks à la bataille des Pyramides, le 21 juillet, s'adjugeant l'Egypte. Mais quelques jours plus tard, le sort bascula. Après une traque désordonnée de soixante-dix jours en Méditerranée, Nelson surgit au large de la baie d'Aboukir, à 14 heures le 1 e r août 1798, surprenant l'escadre de Brueys, censée l'attendre de pied ferme depuis près d'un mois. Alors que Brueys craignait une rencontre avec une escadre anglaise supérieure, la balance des forces en présence était à parité avec même un avantage pour les Français, puisque Nelson alignait treize vaisseaux de 74 canon et un de 50 (Leander), armés de 1 012 canons à majorité de 24 livres contre 1 182 principalement de 36 livres aux Français qui disposaient d'un trois-ponts de 120 canons (l'Orient), de 3 vaisseaux de 80, de 9 vaisseaux de 74 et de 4 frégates. Il est vrai que trois de ces 74 canons étaient particulièrement délabrés et vétustés, ce qui obérait la valeur militaire de l'escadre. À contrecœur, Brueys décida de combattre à l'ancre, car il ne disposait pas d'hommes en nombre suffisant pour manœuvrer en même temps les voiles et l'artillerie. Bénéficiant d'un vent favorable, Nelson passa sans attendre à

LA B A T A I L L E

D'ABOUKIR

37

l'attaque en dépit des aléas d'un combat de nuit, de l'absence de deux de ses vaisseaux en reconnaissance à Alexandrie et de son ignorance de l'hydrographie de la rade. Sa tactique reposait sur l'exploitation de la supériorité quantitative et qualitative des bâtiments anglais en caronades, dont l'efficacité n'était redoutable qu'à courte portée. Décidé à livrer une bataille de destruction, il ordonna de combattre la ligne française au plus près, par "portion" en commençant par l'avant-garde. Foley, commandant le bâtiment de tête anglais, le Goliath, prit l'initiative audacieuse de passer entre la ligne d'embossage française et la terre. Un pari jouable dans la mesure où les vaisseaux anglais, de plus petit tonnage que leurs homologues français, avaient un tirant d'eau sensiblement inférieur. Il fut suivi par quatre vaisseaux tandis que Nelson, à bord du Vanguard, et les autres quatre vaisseaux attaquaient du large. Le dernier de la ligne, le Culloden, s'échoua sur les récifs d'Aboukir où le Leander tenta de lui porter secours. Le Culloden ne parvint à se dégager qu'à l'issue des combats, mais si ses 74 canons manquèrent à Nelson, il servit de balise aux deux vaisseaux retardataires. Reliés les uns aux autres par des câbles et des filins, les vaisseaux français ne purent que subir la manœuvre anglaise. Ceux de l'avant-garde, les plus mauvais vaisseaux français, furent pris en tenaille et, à 18h 30, écrasés des deux bords par des forces supérieures. L'attaque anglaise accrut la faiblesse des Français, contraints de combattre des deux bords alors que le manque d'hommes leur permettait d'armer difficilement toutes les pièces d'un seul bord. Le Guerrier et le Conquérant furent même surpris avec leurs batteries masquées du côté de la terre. Les Français marquèrent toutefois des points. Le Bellerophon, ayant manqué son mouillage, se trouva opposé au vaisseau-amiral Y Orient, qui avec ses 120 canons était presque deux fois plus puissant. Moins d'une heure plus tard, il quittait la ligne rasé comme un ponton, et aurait même amené son pavillon d'après les témoignages des Français, qui dans la furie des combats manquèrent son amarinage ainsi que celui du Majestic. Les combats furent livrés à bout portant, à une si courte distance que les bourres des canons anglais mirent le feu à bord du Tonnant. L'habileté et la rapidité des canonniers anglais, remarquablement entraînés, furent supérieures dès le début de la bataille d'autant plus qu'en raison du dispositif français, les vaisseaux anglais pouvaient s'embosser dans la meilleuré posture pour avoir toute leur bordée battante, accabler leurs adversaires par des tirs d'enfilade meurtriers ou déchiqueter les ponts ennemis avec leurs caronades. L'avant-garde française était sérieusement malmenée, lorsqu'à la tombée de la nuit survinrent VAlexander et le Swiftsure, suivis plus tard par le Leander, constituant pour Nelson une réserve providentielle. Mais celle-ci aurait très bien pu être annihilée par l'arrière-garde française si son commandant, le contre-amiral Villeneuve, avait profité des vents, qui avaient contrarié l'arrivée des deux vaisseaux anglais en reconnaissance à Alexandrie, pour remonter la baie et prendre à son tour en tenaille la ligne anglaise. À ce stade de la bataille, rien n'était encore perdu. Le dénouement aurait pu tourner au "match nul". Le vaisseau Timoléon avait hissé ses huniers pour inviter son

38

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amiral à se porter au secours de leurs compagnons en mauvaise posture, mais Villeneuve demeura impassible. Les renforts anglais concentrèrent leurs tirs contre le centre de la ligne française. À 22h00, l'Orient explosa, entraînant une suspension d'armes d'un quart d'heure, tant la stupéfaction était grande devant cet événement rarissime : la disparition d'un des fleurons de la marine française, un trois-ponts arborant de surcroît le pavillon du commandant en chef. L'arrière-garde, en pleine confusion, coupa ses câbles pour éviter les débris enflammés, Les bâtiments entrèrent en collision et se tirèrent même dessus, achevant de désorganiser la ligne. Un à un, dix bâtiments français amenèrent leur pavillon. La frégate Artémis et le Timoléon furent incendiés par leurs équipages pour échapper à l'ennemi. Le lendemain matin le désastre français était consommé. Seuls deux vaisseaux (Généreux, Guillaume Tell) et deux frégates (Diane, Justice) quittèrent indemnes le champ de bataille avec Villeuve, qui avait assisté aux combats en "spectateur oisif comme le stigmatisa Napoléon à Sainte-Hélène. Les pertes françaises étaient très sévères : anéantissement de la flotte, 1 700 tués dont Brueys et trois commandants des vaisseaux, 1 500 blessés et plus de 3 000 prisonniers (relâchés par Nelson dans l'incapacité de les nourrir). En comparaison, les Anglais n'avaient que 218 hommes tués, 678 blessés et deux vaisseaux avariés. Nelson enragea d'avoir laissé échapper un cinquième de la puissance de feu de l'escadre française, mais les vaisseaux anglais étaient trop avariés pour poursuivre la division de Villeneuve. Lejoille, commandant le Généreux, faussa compagnie à cette dernière et s'offrit le luxe de s'emparer du Leander, porteur des dépêches de Nelson. Une petite compensation au désastre d'Aboukir. Celui-ci sanctionnait la stratégie défensive choisie par Brueys, aggravée par trois fautes militaires : la tête de ligne non défendue par les batteries terrestres de l'îlot d'Aboukir ; l'embossage des bâtiments trop loin des hauts fonds pour être alignés sur le tirant d'eau de l'Orient ; la ligne trop distendue qui interdisait aux bâtiments de croiser leurs feux et de se soutenir mutuellement. De surcroît, Brueys était persuadé que les Anglais éviteraient les récifs d'Aboukir et poussés par les vents du nord-ouest dominants, seraient jetés dans le fond de la baie où il avait placé ses meilleurs vaisseaux, les mieux commandés. Son dispositif était censé faire face à une attaque prononcée par des vaisseaux ennemis courant ligne parallèle, le canonnant de la mer et s'en revenant. En fait, mis en échec par la «prise en tenaille» des Anglais, il facilita leur manœuvre. La valeur militaire de l'armée navale s'était délitée durant le mois d'attente : minée par l'indiscipline, malade de la dysenterie, mouillée trop loin de la côte, elle avait rencontré des problèmes inextricables de logistique qui l'avaient mis au bord de la famine et de la soif. La bataille de destruction voulue par Nelson ouvrit une nouvelle ère de la guerre sur mer et eut d'incommensurables répercussions stratégiques. Elle bloqua en Égypte la meilleure armée française, octroya la maîtrise de la Méditerranée à l'Angleterre, qui en position de faire pression sur les Européens accéléra la formation de la deuxième coalition contre la France.

LA

BATAILLE

D'ABOUKIR

39

Bonaparte tenta de redresser sa situation gravement compromise en éliminant la menace que faisaient peser les Ottomans sur l'Égypte. Il prit l'initiative de la campagne en Terre sainte, mais s'il parvint à vaincre les Ottomans au Mont-Thabor, sa progression fut stoppée net à Saint-Jean-d'Acre. La flottille (4 avisos, 2 canonnières, un chébec) transportant des vivres et l'artillerie de siège fut interceptée par les Anglais ce qui obéra l'opération. De retour en Egypte, Bonaparte refoula à la mer un débarquement anglo-turc à Aboukir, effaçant par une victoire la fâcheuse impression du désastre naval de l'année précédente. Au printemps 1799, le Directoire avait envoyé une expédition de secours sous les ordres du vice-amiral Bruix. À la tête de l'escadre de Brest, Bruix était bien parvenu à pénétrer en Méditerranée où les forces anglaises étaient dispersées, et à rallier l'escadre espagnole de Carthagène. Mais il n'eut pas l'audace de traverser la Méditerranée et se contenta de ravitailler l'armée d'Italie avant de ramener, le 8 août, la flotte combinée à Brest où les Anglais la bloquèrent. Cet échec incita Bonaparte à quitter l'Égypte. Avec la même chance insolente qu'à l'aller, il atterrit à Fréjus le 8 octobre. Trois semaines plus tard, le 18 Brumaire, il prenait le pouvoir. À partir de ce moment, il n'eut de cesse de conserver les gages acquis en Méditerranée orientale dans la perspective d'une négociation avec Londres. Il organisa une nouvelle expédition de secours, confiée à Bruix qui ne put quitter Brest qu'en janvier 1800. L'envoi régulier de bâtiments isolés — un tiers f u t intercepté par les Anglais — ne parvint pas à acheminer des renforts suffisants, Malte capitula le 5 septembre 1800. Une nouvelle expédition de secours fut placée sous les ordres de Ganteaume. En janvier 1801, elle déjoua les forces anglaises et franchit Gibraltar. Après moult péripéties et des ordres comminatoires de Bonaparte, Ganteaume gagna la Méditerranée orientale et croisa à la mi-juin devant le littoral égyptien sans parvenir à débarquer les troupes qu'il transportait. Rien ne pouvait plus sauver l'Égypte française. Le 8 mars 1801, les Anglais avaient débarqué à Aboukir 15 000 hommes, pour en déloger l'armée d'Orient qui capitula honorablement à Alexandrie le 2 septembre 1801. Les soldats français furent rapatriés avec armes et bagages sur les bâtiments de la Royal Navy. Commencée à Alexandrie, la conquête de l'Égypte s'achevait trois ans et deux mois plus tard, mais son échec était consommé dès le désastre naval d'Aboukir, le 1 e r août 1798.

LA BATAILLE DE SEDIMAN DU 7 OCTOBRE 1798 Fernand BEAUCOUR

La conquête du Caire n'était pas suffisante pour assurer la tranquillité de l'Egypte ; il fallait encore anéantir les Mamluks et leurs Beys. Ibrahim Bey se tenait dans la Basse Egypte où il soufflait l'insurrection contre les Français. Murad Bey était en force à Sediman, en Haute Egypte où il attendait l'occasion d'intervenir avec ses Mamluks. Bonaparte se réserva de vaincre Ibrahim Bey. Murad Bey conservait la masse principale des Mamluks désorganisés par les importantes pertes qu'ils avaient subies dans les batailles qui avaient permis à Bonaparte d'entrer au Caire le 25 juillet 1798, mais il devait trouver en Moyenne et Haute Égypte de nombreuses ressources pour réorganiser son armée. Faute de cavalerie et de moyens de transport, Bonaparte ne put songer à le poursuivre immédiatement, ce qui devait donner à Murad Bey le temps de reconstituer ses forces. Murad qui s'était retiré à une certaine distance ne semblait pas dangereux, ce qui permettait à Bonaparte d'agir avec des troupes suffisantes contre Ibrahim Bey arrêté à Belbeis, à dix lieues seulement du Caire. Bonaparte poursuivit Ibrahim qui s'échappa après la bataille de Saleyeh du 11 août 1798 vers le désert de Syrie et revint au Caire le 15 août. Un résultat notable était atteint. Ibrahim était hors d'Égypte et il suffisait de lui barrer la route du retour. Avec Murad, Bonaparte tenta une négociation et lui envoya un habitué de l'Égypte, Rosetti qui avait entretenu avec lui de bonnes relations. Les négociations échouèrent et Bonaparte résolut alors de reprendre l'offensive contre Murad Bey et ses Mamluks réfugiés en Haute Égypte ; il attendait de savoir ce que faisait Murad avant d'envoyer des troupes dans le Fayoum. La division Desaix partit les 25 et 26 août du Caire ; elle était constituée, au moment de son départ, de 6 bataillons d'infanterie, 2 de la 21 e légère et 2 du 61 e de ligne, accompagnés d'un détachement d'artillerie servant 2 pièces de 5 et d'un détachement de sapeurs. Ces troupes s'embarquèrent sur le Nil et arrivèrent le 31 août à Béni-Souef pour se lancer à la recherche de Murad Bey ; celui-ci s'était retiré à l'intérieur des terres, à l'ouest, à la hauteur d'Abou Girgeh, c'est-à-dire plus en amont.

42

F e r n an d B E A U C O U R

Desaix prit position en avant de la ville, s'appuyant, au Nil, sous la protection des bâtiments de guerre qui avaient amené ses troupes. Murad était à Behneseh, sur le Canal Joseph. La division de Desaix va se rembarquer le 3 septembre au soir et mit à la voile le lendemain matin pour remonter le Nil jusqu'à Abou Girgeh, tandis que Bonaparte faisait partir du Caire le 5 septembre de nouvelles troupes vers Desaix, deux pièces de canon et des munitions qui rejoindront la division le 8 septembre près à!Abou Girgeh. Bonaparte recommandait à Desaix d'attaquer Murad partout où il se trouverait, mais en tenant ses forces toujours réunies ; il déconseillait de les diviser pour essayer d'envelopper l'ennemi car, en Egypte, pays coupé par des canaux et mal connu, les manœuvres étaient trop incertaines. Desaix va exécuter, au prix de grands effort, une reconnaissance par terre. Il partit le 6 septembre au matin, mais l'inondation couvrait le pays. Il parvint jusqu'à proximité de Behneseh où étaient les Mamluks qui s'y trouvaient tranquilles avec des barques chargées de provisions et de munitions dont s'empara le détachement qui fut chargé de les garder. Rapp, alors capitaine, désarma courageusement deux Mamluks ; les autres disparurent dans le désert. Murad avait quitté Behneseh huit jours plus tôt pour Elahoun, à l'entrée du Fayoum. Revenu à Abou Girgeh dans l'après-midi du 7 septembre, Desaix se remit en route le 8 septembre au matin avec sa flottille après avoir été rejoint par le convoi venu du Caire qui lui apportait 20.000 rations ; 30.000 lui avaient été annoncées. Le soir, il atteignit Minieh. Deux jours plus tard il était à Melaoui et constatait que le canal aboutissant à cette ville ne pouvait donner passage qu'à de très petites barques ; il dut continuer sa navigation qui fut fort ralentie faute de vent et il n'arriva que le 12 septembre, à Darout el Cherif, à l'entrée du Canal Joseph. Le détachement laissé à Behneseh avait remonté le canal pour rejoindre le Nil et arriva avec 19 barques chargés de vivres. Desaix ayant appris qu'il y avait des Mamluks à Siout décida de s'y rendre ; il arriva le 15 septembre. Mais les Mamluks qui étaient dans le voisinage, avertis, n'y étaient plus ; ils s'étaient retirés vers Behneseh. Cette pointe de Desaix en Haute Egypte n'avait pas réalisé ses espérances. Le 19 septembre, le convoi redescendit le Nil et arriva le 20 septembre à l'entrée du Canal Joseph. Un autre convoi de ravitaillement en biscuit et en cartouches les y attendait ; le 23 septembre un autre convoi apportait encore des rations de biscuit ainsi que 80 hommes, en renfort ; l'effectif atteignait alors 3.200 hommes.

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Desaix reçut, avec ce dernier convoi, une lettre de Bonaparte écrite de Gizeh le 18 septembre approuvant le projet d'entrer dans le Canal Joseph pour poursuivre Murad Bey. De son côté, Bonaparte surveillait aussi ce Mamluk. L'obligation de remonter le Nil pour entrer dans le Canal Joseph avait fait craindre que ses communications soient interceptées et que Murad puisse faire un retour offensif au Caire. Desaix acheva ses derniers préparatifs pour entrer dans le Canal. Murad Bey ne s'était pas éloigné du Fayoum ; il n'avait pas les forces suffisantes pour tenter une offensive sur Le Caire où Bonaparte conservait plus de la moitié de l'Armée d'Orient. Desaix laissait sur le Nil six bâtiments de guerre ; deux devaient suivre son mouvement sur le Canal Joseph et descendre jusqu'à Beni Souefet les quatre autres croiser sur le Nil. A cette époque, la navigation dans le Canal Joseph présentait d'assez grandes difficultés et il fallait se mettre en garde contre les attaques des Arabes et des Mamluks. Ce f u t le 24 septembre, un peu avant l'aube, que la division Desaix entra dans le Canal. Pendant dix jours la navigation fut contrariée par des difficultés dues au cours tortueux du Canal ; il fallait tirer les djermes et les désensabler. Ce ne f u t que le 8 octobre que la division Desaix arriva à Behneseh, mais il n'y avait plus de Mamluks et l'on apprit qu'ils se trouvaient vers Ellahoun, au Fayoum. Le 3 octobre 1798, au matin (12 vendémiaire) la division avait rencontré les premiers avant-postes des Mamluks de Murad Bey. Desaix avait fait débarquer ses troupes et s'était porté lui-même avec un détachement sur les dunes dominant le Canal. On se tirailla, l'ennemi se retira et la division se rembarqua pour continuer sa route sous la protection de quelques centaines d'éclaireurs marchant à la hauteur des barques pour tenir éloignés les ennemis. Le lendemain 4 octobre (13 vendémiaire), Desaix ne vit rien. Au bout d'une heure de chemin apparut un corps de 600 Mamluks placé sur la rive, attendant la division Desaix pour la fusiller ; les inondations ne permettaient pas de débarquer vis-à-vis d'eux et les Français reculèrent d'une demi-lieue pour pouvoir débarquer et marcher aux ennemis qui se présentèrent au moment du débarquement, mais les compagnies de carabiniers de la 21 e légère les éloignèrent et les empêchèrent de gêner le débarquement et la formation de la division ; deux pièces de canon y furent jointes. Elle se mit en marche en côtoyant l'inondation et marcha vers eux. Muhammad Elfi Bey commandait les Mamluks ; le combat dura quatre heures puis ils se retirèrent. Il n'y eut pas de blessés ; les Mamluks laissèrent plusieurs chevaux. La division attendit alors ses barques qui avaient été gardées par 200 hommes et montées par les malades et les éclopés.

44

Fernand

BEAUCOUR

Le 5 octobre (14 vendémiaire) de bonne heure, la division se mit à nouveau en mouvement ; le vent était contraire. Des tirailleurs marchaient autour pour écarter les ennemis. Bientôt apparut toute l'armée des Mamluks placée sur les hauteurs parallèles au Canal. La division marcha sur elle. La tente de Murad Bey était reconnaissable et Desaix le distinguait, assis, entouré de ses lieutenant. La division formée en carré était éclairée par deux petits pelotons de 200 hommes soutenant deux autres petits pelotons qui éloignaient les ennemis qui tiraient une quantité de balles sur le carré. Les Français marchèrent à grands pas et à la charge vers les ennemis dans ces dispositions. Les Mamluks ne les attendirent pas et se replièrent après avoir reçu quelques coups de canon qui touchèrent deux hommes et deux chevaux. Desaix poursuivit l'ennemi toute la journée sans l'atteindre. Le 6 octobre au matin, (16 vendémiaire), les Mamluks réapparurent ; Desaix marcha à leur rencontre mais ils s'éloignèrent, vinrent se placer derrière les Français et marchèrent vers leurs barques qui arrivaient. Desaix fut obligé de reculer pour les couvrir. L'ennemi s'avança alors vers les Français en poussant de grands cris, les harcelant en les croyant en retraite, mais le feu vif des pelotons les plus avancés et quelques coups de canon l'éloignèrent constamment ; il s'aperçut de son erreur. Dans l'après-midi, Desaix fit continuer la marche du convoi qui n'avait plus rien à craindre ; il poursuivit de nouveau Murad Bey qui ne tarda pas à disparaître. Murad se prépara alors à attendre Desaix près de Sediman où il était campé et où il avait rassemblée le plus d'Arabes possible, requis dans les villages voisins, à pied ou à cheval. Le 7 octobre au matin (16 vendémiaire), Desaix partit de très bonne heure. Il savait que Murad qui avait rassemblé tous ses moyens, fort de 4 à 5.000 chevaux, tenterait une opération vigoureuse. Le pays était formé de monticules irréguliers. Vers 7 heures du matin, Desaix vit les ennemis qui, du pied des vallons, venaient rapidement vers eux. Il eut à peine le temps de replier ses petits pelotons sur les carrés et de mettre les pièces en batterie que, de toutes parts, les ennemis se précipitèrent sur ses troupes. Ils se jetèrent sur les deux petits carrés placés à 200 pas du grand, de 180 hommes chacun. Ils firent feu à dix pas et croisèrent la baïonnette. L'ennemi ne put entrer dans le premier carré : le feu qui le couvrait l'arrêta. Les deux pièces de 5 tirèrent à mitraille et jetèrent la mort parmi les Mamluks. Les premières attaques furent terrassées et les pelotons ennemis détruits par les feux. Ils recommencèrent une troisième fois et culbutèrent le petit carré qu'ils avaient attaqué qui se retira dans le grand carré où les blessés reçurent des

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soins. Les Mamluks vinrent aussi attaquer l'autre carré, mais ils furent repoussés par son feu ce qui ne permit pas de l'entamer et de l'enfoncer comme l'autre. Ils tentèrent aussi, mais en vain de s'attaquer au grand carré qui fit bonne contenance tant par sa canonnade que par le feu nourri de sa mousqueterie. Les troupes de Desaix montrèrent beaucoup de bravoure et de fermeté ; elles enlevèrent même à l'ennemi des pièces de canon. Les Mamluks ne parvenant pas à détruire le grand carré, se portèrent sur divers monticules d'où ils ne cessaient de fusiller les Français et où ils eurent le temps, sur une colline, d'installer quatre pièces de canon. La bataille durait depuis une heure et demie et le canon faisait des ravages dans nos rangs. Desaix décida de battre la charge ; la division marcha alors, en ordre, à l'ennemi et courut vers les canons qui furent pris par Rapp, malgré une charge vigoureuse des Mamluks par derrière et au milieu de la course des Français dont la vigueur étonna les ennemis qui prirent la fuite en désordre. Desaix les poursuivit mais, sans chevaux, il ne pouvait le faire suffisamment pour profiter de sa victoire. Il conduisit ses blessés à Sédiman pour les soigner, les installer sur des barques et prendre des subsistances. Il renvoya ses grosses barques qui, par le manque d'eau à cet endroit, ne pouvaient servir et les remplaça par une quarantaine d'embarcations plus légères abandonnées, avec quelques provisions, par les Mamluks. Dans ce combat, Desaix eut 30 hommes tués ; les Mamluks en perdirent 400 environ. Complètement défait, Murad Bey se retira dans le Fayourn, derrière le lac de Garah. Desaix fit son rapport à Bonaparte d'Ellahoun, le 9 octobre (18 vendémiaire). Son intention était de chasser les Mamluks de Garah puis de retourner sur le Nil pour reposer ses troupes harassées et y vivre ; le Général Friant et l'Adjudant Général Donzelot s'étaient particulièrement signalés. Ayant constamment marché dans les sables, les troupes étaient sans souliers et sans habits et très fatiguées. La division Desaix va rester campée à Ellahoun du 9 au 12 octobre 1798 ; puis, après l'évacuation de ses blessés, elle se remit en marche pour pénétrer dans le Fayoum et tâcher d'en expulser les Mamluks. Elle atteignit Medinet el Fayoum le 12 octobre ; les Mamluks étaient toujours à Garah, de l'autre côté de Fayoum. Ils se retirèrent ensuite à Sédiman puis dans les environs de Beneseh sur le Canal Joseph.

Fernand

46

BEAUCOUR

Dès le 11 octobre on eut, au Caire, la certitude d'une importante victoire remportée par Desaix sur les Mamluks. Bonaparte envoya alors le général Zayonchek pour organiser la province de Beni Souef. Il chargea Desaix d'organiser le Fayoum et la province de Minieh. Desaix se porta alors, à la fin d'octobre dans le Fayoum pour organiser cette province. Murad, après avoir pillé Minieh, paraissait alors décidé à se reformer plus au sud, dans les environs de Siout.

Le 26 octobre (5 brumaire) d'Ellahoun, Desaix disait à Bonaparte que sa division était réduite à 1.800 hommes, que les ophtalmies atteignaient presque tout le monde, lui comme les autres qu'il ne pouvait organiser la province de Minieh dont il était trop éloigné. A la fin d'octobre, Desaix s'installa à Medinet el Fayoum, avant d'entreprendre une nouvelle expédition contre Murad Bey. C'était l'époque de l'insurrection du Caire, le 21 octobre, promptement réduite par Bonaparte. Plus tard, en décembre 1798, dans une nouvelle campagne, à la suite de sa victoire à Samhoud, en Haute Egypte, le 22 janvier 1799, Desaix refoulera Murad Bey et ses Mamluks jusqu'aux cataractes du Nil. La victoire de Samhoud montrait, une fois de plus, l'impuissance de la cavalerie des Mamluks à entamer l'infanterie française. Déçu dans ses illusions, Murad ne songea plus qu'à soustraire à l'atteinte de ses vainqueurs les débris de son armée désorganisée et démoralisée. Ces victoires successives assureront la tranquillité en Egypte. Elles permettront ainsi à Bonaparte d'organiser l'administration de l'ensemble de ce pays et de poser les bases fondatrices de ce qui deviendra un état indépendant, en lui donnant une identité : la Cartographie de l'Egypte, travail savant parmi de nombreux autres, en sera un remarquable élément dont on n'a pas assez retenu l'importance. Elles ouvrirent aussi aux savants de l'expédition de Bonaparte et à l'histoire de l'ancienne civilisation égyptienne l'immense domaine archéologique que constituait la Haute Egypte.

- F. Beaucour, La campagne

d'Égypte (1798-1801),

inédits de Noël Dejuine, du 20e Régiment de Dragons,

d'après

les

dessins

(Levallois, Centre d'Études

Napoléoniennes, 1983). - F. Beaucour, Y. Laissus et C. Orgogozo, La découverte (Flammarion,

de

l'Egypte,

1989).

- C. de La Jonquière, L'expédition d'Égypte (1798-1801),

(Paris, s.d.), t. III.

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Extrait de F. BEAUCOUR, La Campagne d'Égypte (1793-1801) d'après les dessins de Dejuine

M&t i i M I t t t r a né e

48

F e r n an d B E A U C O U R BATAILLE DE SEDIMAN

(D'après un croquis du capitaine GARBÉ) LÉGENDE : A. Formation de la division après son débarquement le 13 vendémiaire (4 octobre).— B. Bivouac de 13 vendémiaire. — C. Bivouac du 1 vendémiaire. — D. Bivouac du 15 vendémiaire .— E. Formation de la division au commencement de la bataille (16 vendemiaire - 7 octobre). — L. Corps des Mamluks. — M. Positions de différents corps de Mamluks après la charge pour fusiller sur le carré. — N. Attaque des Mamluks. — P. Attaque des Mamluks. — Q. Fuite des Mamluks vers le Fayoum.

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D'après un croquis établi au Depot de la Guerre, vers 1800Éehelle de 1/4.000 environ LÉGENDE : A. Position du général Desaix pour recevoir le combat.— B. Corps de flanqueurs. — C. Position de l'armée de Murad-Bey se préparant à livrer bataille. — D. Attaque sur le corps des flanqueurs de droite. — E. Artillerie des Mamluks. — F. Position des Mamluks après la charge et pendant la canonnade. — G. Position de la division Desaix après avoir enlevé l'artillerie de Murad-Bey et avoir mis son armée en déroute.

THE DETROYE OUTPOST : An Outpost on the Siege Perimeter of Acre Ariel BERMAN

The Detroye outpost was located about 4 km. east of Acre and 2 km. south of the village of al-Makr, on a top of a hill called Khirbet al-Tantùr. Today, the site is marked by the remains of a First World War military position, apparently an observation post, consisting mostly of trenches prepared by the Turkish Army. In fact, they had hardly been used, as the British Cavalry 1 , in a swift move, captured Acre from the east in September 1918, and the place was abandoned soon after. Reports kept in the Archives of the Mandate Department of Antiquities mention the trenches as of 1920 (Fig 1).

A map, prepared in 1870 by two intelligence officers, Mieulet and Derrien, for the French General Staff, notes the location as Jalal Tantur — Ruines de la Redoute Detroye (1799) 2 . Victor Guérin, in his survey of 1875 3 described J. Tantur, pointing to its strategic advantages, but ignored the fact that it was an outpost. The British Survey of Western Palestine, notes briefly that Tell alTantur was a Redoubt during the Siege of Acre 4 . The date of occupation of the site by the French is not recorded. It probably occurred soon after their arrival in Acre on 19 March 1799. A diary kept by Captain Doguereau 5 notes: "Depuis le commencement du siège, le Gen. Murât était resté avec sa cavalerie en observation sur la route de Damas." The cavalry tasks were mainly the rear protection of the siege and observation eastward.

'C. Falls, and A. F. Beck, Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine. From June 1917 to the End of the War (London, 1930), p. 535. M. M. Mieulet et Derrien (Capitaines d'Etat-Major), Levés en Galilée, Faisant suite à la Carte du Liban de l'Etat-Major Français, Exécutés en 1870. ^M. V. Guérin, Carte de La Galilée Ancienne et Moderne, Accompagnant La Description Géographique, Historique et Archéologique de la Palestine (Paris, 1875), 3e partie, Galilée II, 4

C. R. Conder, aud H.H. Kitchener, The Survey of Western Palestine, Memoirs I (London 1881), p. 353; PEF Map V, L. g. 8-15. J.P. Doguereau (Général), Journal de l'Expédition d}Egypte (Perrin: Paris, 1904), p. 212; Massicot (Commandant), Journal d'un dragon d'Egypte (Dubois : Paris, 1899), p. 78. 5

52

Ariel

B ERM

AN

The construction oi the outpost apparently began only on 8 April during the interval between Gen. Murat's two route marches to Safed. Jacques Miot, the commissaire des guerres of Murat's cavalry units, gives an amusing commentary on the events and circumstances of the construction of the outpost on the hill: Les rapports des espions nous annonçaient toujours la marche de troupes considérables, qui devaient faire lever le siège. La cavalerie eut ordre alors de quitter la ligne de l'armée, et de venir s'établir sur le penchant d'une colline au débouché des gorges qui conduisent à Nazareth et à Saffet. On construisit au sommet une redoute en pierres, et nous bivouaquâmes sur le penchant. Chaque pierre que les dragons enlevaient de terre pour se faire un lieu de repos, découvrait des insectes rampants et des scorpions : bientôt nous en fûmes tous piqués, mais nous étions déjà familiarisés avec cette piqûre, dont on nous avait tant effrayés ; de l'huile posée sur la plaie en dissipait l'inflammation au bout de quelques heures. Au-dessus de la cavalerie, le général Murât avait fait élever sa tente. Quoiqu'aux avant-postes, il se couchait dans des draps. Je lui disais un jour : "Si l'ennemi venait nous surprendre, comment feriezvous, mon Général ?" Hé bien, me répondit-il, je monterais à cheval en chemise, on me distinguerait mieux dans l'obscurité. Quant aux aidesde-camp, au père Francesco, et moi, nous reposions dans nos manteaux sous la tente du Général. 1 On 13 April, Général Berthier, the chief of staff, ordered Gen. Murat to move toward Safed with his cavalry and with the 25 th Demi brigade of infantry men, who were stationed at different posts and in the outpost. On that occasion, Gen. Berthier stated that the outpost would be called from now on : Redoute Detroye?- According to custom, posts and batteries were named in honour and memory of distinguished persons, and so it was. In this case Detroye, a staff officer of the Génie (Engineers) commanded by Gen. Caffarelli, author of the Journal sur la campagne d'Egypte, was killed on 30 March in a counterattack by the defenders against the assailants outside the walls of Acre, He was a well-liked officer whose loss was keenly felt. An abstract of the order of the day from 26 Germinal (15 April) says that Général en chef Bonaparte named the outpost, staffed by the "avant-garde" under the command of Gen. Murat: Redoute Detroye?

F. Miot, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des expéditions en Egypte et en Syrie, Ie édition (Paris, 1804 [an XII], pp. 177-78). La Jonquière (C. de) L'Expédition en Egypte, Tomes IV-V (Lavauzelle : Paris, 1906), IV, p. 403. hbid., IV, p. 390.

THE DETROYE

OUTPOST

53

In the absence of Gen. Murat and his cavalrymen, the carabiniers of the 22 nd Light Brigade arrived from Haifa to replace them. The dragons à pied had remained behind to guard the equipment and the two pieces of 5 (Pound) cannon. The next day these were dragged toward Safed. Gen. Domartin was ordered to replace them by two pieces of 4 (Pound) from the pare (artillery arsenal) supply. Meanwhile the command of the outpost was entrusted to Gen. Andréossy until Gen. Murat's return. Emergency instructions were transmitted to Gen. Andréossy as follows : "En cas d'alarme il devra faire tirer un coup de canon, puis quatre minutes après, trois autre coup tires l'un sur l'autre. A ce signal, la générale sera battue au camp On 19 April, the Adj. Gen. Leturcq, en route to suppress a hostile Arab assemblage in the Mount Carmel, area, took 200 infantrymen of the 25th Demi Brigade and 100 horses from Brigadier Chief Destainville at the outpost. 2 That same day, Gen. Murat returned from his journey to Safed and Tabariya. Capt. Beaumont returned the day after, escorting the two pieces of 5 (Pound) cannon, which were stuck midway to Safed at the village of Rama. 3 Gen. Murat set up a tent on top of the hill — an elegant and spacious tent taken as booty after a skirmish on 15 April near the Daughters of Jacob Bridge with the Damascene Pa§a's son, the Sheikh 'Abbas. 4 The lifestyle at the cavalry camp was quite agreeable, particularly that of Gen. Murat and his entourage, in comparison to those, who suffered in the trenches around Acre. The atmosphere was oriental, carpets were spread in the tent instead of chairs, excellent, Lataquie tobacco was served in Turkish pipes, and Smyrna wine was abundant.5 At the end of the siege, on the night of 19 May, a detachment of dragons (cavalry) left the Montagne de la Cavalerie, among them Jacques Miot. Miot, visiting there on duty, must have stayed at the outpost for days, yet totally ignored its official name in his diary, calling it by his own nicknames, such as "notre place sur la montagne" and "la montagne de la cavalerie," but, curiously, never mentioned its official name, Redoute Detroye. 6

l

Ibid., IV, p. 403. Ibid., IV, p. 442. 3 Miot, pp. 190-91. 2

4

clbid„ p. 193.

J

lbid., p. 192-93. M. Dupont, Murat Cavalier, Maréchal de France, Prince et Roi (Hachette : Paris, 1934), p. 69. 6 Miot, p. 221.

54

Ariel

BERMAN

Several years ago, I conducted a methodical survey of locations, connected to Bonaparte's campaigns in the Galilée, and the siege of Acre. One of these sites, probably the most fascinating, was the Detroye outpost. Because its location remained outside later development projects, no considerable change occurred in the area during the last two centuries, apart from damage from the First World War positions and forest planting during the last two decades. It was possible to locate artefacts and small metal objects in certain places, evidence of events there in the course of time. I located several concentrations of metallic objects, at the western part of the hilltop and along the slope facing Acre. Obviously these were where the soldiers were quartered as described by Miot. The finds were mostly lead musket bullets, small Ottoman silver coins, a copper Louis XV demi-sol (pi. I, fig. F), all kind of buckles, rings, a set of spurs (pl. II. fig. A), a bronze trigger guard belonging to a pistol (pl. II, fig B), parts of a sword sheath, decoration (pl. I. fig. G), and a large quantity of iron horseshoe nails. Additionally, several uniform buttons made of copper were located, mainly of the common passepartout type jackets. Several regimental marked buttons were also found, belonging to the 25 th Demi Brigade of Gen. Kléber's division (pl. I, fig, B). These men stayed at the outpost commanded by Brigadier Chief Destainville permanently, in as much as that Destainville was at the outpost constantly. Two buttons were from the 18 th and 32 nd Demi-Brigades, part of Gen. Bon's division. One copper button, belonged to an artillery staff officer (pl. I, fig. C). Another copper button belonged to the Troupes Bourgeoises et Irrégulières : volontaires gardes nationaux, chasseurs à cheval, Département de Rhône et Loire. Variant du modèle décrété le 23 Décembre 1790, portée en 1791 et 1792, probably the city of Lyon. 1 These Chasseurs (light cavalrymen) were annexed to the 22 nd Regiment under the Command of Gen. Murat. Two Maltese uniform buttons were also found: one, copper with a large cross of Malta on its face, and the second, of pewter, with a Maltese cross combined with an Admiral anchor on its face, probably belonging to a navy crewman or officer (pl. I, fig. D).

Fallou, Le Bouton d'uniforme français (La Giberne, 1915) p. 233.

THE DETROYE

OUTPOST

55

Conclusions The artefacts found in the field and in the sources in the literature are completely compatible. If I am correct, however, the identification of the two Maltese buttons, found at the outpost represents an innovation, i.e., the participation of some Maltese soldiers in the Syrian Campaign. This conflicts with what the sources tell us about the campaign. Possibly, not all the Maltese forces remained garrisoned in Suez and elsewhere in Egypt. Or, there is always the possibility that a particular French soldier carried or used them on his jacket and, without any scruples, caused us food for thought now.

56

Ariel

BERMAN

THE D E T R O Y E

OUTPOST

Fig. A. Passe-partout buttons

Fig. B. Boutons de régiment ftà

Fig. C. Boutons de régiment and officier d'artillerie d'état major

Fig. D. Maltese units boutons

Fig. E. Boutons rond à la hussard

Fig. G. Parts of a sword sheath Pl. I.

57

Ariel

B E R M AN

\

Fig. A. An iron set of spurs

Fig. B. A bronze trigger quand of a pistol Pl. II.

THE

DETROYE

OUTPOST

L'EMPLOI TACTIQUE DE LA «MINE» LORS DU SIÈGE DE SAINT-JEAN D'ACRE : un exemple de combat en mode dégradé (campagne de Syrie, 1799) Allain BERNÈDE

Le contexte et l'enjeu Après la prise d'Alexandrie, le 15 messidor an VI (3 juillet 1798), la bataille des Pyramides du 3 thermidor (21 juillet) a ouvert les portes du Caire à Bonaparte. Certes, du point de vue militaire, les Mamluks 1 ont cédé devant une guerre de type européen totalement nouvelle pour eux, mais maintenant, le minuscule corps expéditionnaire français, 21 894 hommes selon l'état du 1 e r fructidor an VI (18 août 1798), doit pour survivre, assurer la protection de sa base de ravitaillement désormais réduite à la Basse-Égypte après la destruction de la flotte française en rade d'Aboukir le 15 fructidor (1 er août). Or, sous la pression des Anglais, la situation appelée aujourd'hui géostratégique, évolue de façon sensible dès la fin de fructidor. Le 23 fructidor (9 septembre), le Sultan ottoman, poussé par les émissaires du cabinet de Londres et, à l'abri de toute menace sur les Détroits depuis l'anéantissement de la flotte de l'amiral Brueys, déclare la guerre à la République française. Bonaparte, sous peine de se voir privé de toute liberté d'action2, s'organise pour tenir à la fois la Basse-Égypte et contrer la politique anglaise sur les côtes du bassin oriental de la Méditerranée tandis qu'il a confié à Desaix le soin de pourchasser Murad-Bey en Haute-Égypte. Appliquant le principe d'économie des moyens, au sens de la gestion des ressources, Bonaparte incorpore dans son armée tous les personnels qui peuvent l'être en créant par exemple une légion maltaise ou en mettant sur pied un régiment de Dromadaires ... Puis, après avoir remanié la défense du Caire et la protection du delta du Nil de façon à en laisser en place que le minimum ^Bien que très diminués depuis la destruction de leur sultanat en 1 5 H par le sultan ottoman, les chefs mamelouks, munis du titre de «Beys», restent très puissants en Égypte. 2 L'École supérieure de guerre française a retenu dans le sillage du colonel Foch, professeur d'histoire et de tactique générale, les trois principes de la guerre : liberté d'action, concentration des efforts, économie des moyens. Voir - Des principes de la guerre par le lieutenant-colonel breveté Ferdinand Foch, 1903, réédition, Imprimerie nationale, 1997, préface André Martel.

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indispensable, avoir calculé au plus juste les forces attribuées à Desaix en Haute-Égypte, il s'engage lui-même, début février, avec toutes les forces disponibles, en Syrie, respectant ainsi le principe de concentration des efforts. Ainsi la Syrie, est-elle identifiée comme le théâtre principal des opérations, car elle constitue, en même temps, le refuge des Mamluks d'Ibrahim-Bey après la bataille des Pyramides, le centre de la puissance politique et militaire de Jezzar Pa§a de Saint-Jean d'Acre, et la voie terrestre pour les forces dépêchées par la Sublime Porte susceptibles d'assurer le relais à terre de la menace anglaise en Méditerranée orientale. Le 22 pluviôse an VII (10 février 1799), Bonaparte définit clairement ses objectifs dans une missive adressée au Directoire : J'ai, dans l'opération que j'entreprends, trois buts : I o Assurer la conquête de l'Egypte en construisant une place forte audelà du désert, et dès lors, éloigner tellement les armées, de quelque nation que ce soit, de l'Egypte, qu'elles ne puissent rien combiner avec une armée européenne qui viendrait débarquer sur les côtes ; 2° Obliger la Porte à s'expliquer, et, par là, appuyer les négociations que vous avez sans doute entamées ... 3° Enfin ôter à la croisière anglaise les subsistances qu'elle tire de Syrie...

Un engagement hors des «normes connues» des Français (carte n° 1) Dans les derniers jours de pluviôse an VII (premiers jours de février 1799), après avoir devancé les forces de Jezzar à al-'Arish de façon à éviter le goulet d'étranglement du point de passage obligé de Kathié, les Français voient s'évanouir devant eux après seulement quelques escarmouches, des petits détachements de Mamluks. Néanmoins, les forces de Jezzar, prenant le relais avec une redoutable efficacité, contraignent les Français à un combat bien particulier de place en place. Quand ces derniers ont perdu assez de temps et usé une part de leur potentiel, elles reportent leur action sur l'étape suivante alors que les Mamluks continuent à faire peser l'insécurité sur la place conquise et les lignes de communications. Enfin, dans la soirée du 28 ventôse (18 mars), après al-'Arish, Gaza, Jaffa, Haïfa, la division Bon, placée en avant-garde arrive, enfin, sous les murs de Saint-Jean d'Acre. Le lendemain, le siège est mis en place et Berthier, chef d'état-major du corps expéditionnaire français, arrête le règlement pour l'exécution du service.

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Manifestement, l'épreuve de force est engagée. Dans cette guerre, alors que rien, ni le terrain, ni le climat, ni les techniques de combat, ni les adversaires, ..., n'ont d'équivalent avec ce qu'ils connaissent, les Français doivent trouver des alliés afin de briser, avant qu'il ne soit trop tard, l'étau en cours de constitution. Quant aux Anglais, craignant que l'intrusion de forces européennes dans cette région ne provoque un désarroi tel que la Sublime Porte ne soit plus en mesure d'anéantir les intrus, ils ne souhaitent pas, comme Jezzar, qui ne peut pas abandonner la place forte de Saint-Jean d'Acre sans courir le risque de disparaître, voir les Français s'avancer plus loin en Syrie. Dès le 1 e r germinal (21 mars), les Anglais signent leur détermination en attaquant violemment le port de Haïfa.

Sous les murs de Saint-Jean d'Acre : de l'emploi tactique des forces Le 6 germinal (26 mars), les travaux de siège sont «contrariés», écrit Berthier, par une sortie de la garnison. L'appui feu que les bateaux anglais fournissent depuis le large témoigne de la collusion des intérêts des deux adversaires. Il convient donc de briser le plus rapidement possible cette connivence pour avoir une chance de l'emporter. Or, deux jours plus tard, les Français connaissent leur premier échec sanglant. L'assaut est brisé par un tir plongeant de l'ennemi empêchant tout accès à l'étroite ouverture pratiquée dans la muraille par leurs canons. Du point de vue tactique, les Français ne sont pas parvenus à constituer un éboulis assez important pour y engager de puissantes vagues d'assaut et une ouverture assez large de façon à limiter l'importance de tirs défensifs plongeants. Ce n'est donc pas à la vaillance des hommes que se juge la valeur opérationnelle du corps expéditionnaire français, mais à son aptitude technique à ouvrir une Brèche*. *En matière de siège offensif, la technique de la Brèche est connue depuis l'Antiquité. Complètement renouvelée par l'ingénieur français Vauban durant la guerre de Hollande (1672-1678), elle a été codifiée à la fin du XVIII e siècle. Après avoir découpé la muraille avec deux tranchées verticales réalisées à l'aide de séries de coups de canons de façon à délimiter la masse à faire s'écrouler, l'assaillant continue le travail de destruction par une succession de coups sur le tiers inférieur de la partie de la fortification visée, pour, enfin, faire s'effondrer l'ensemble en tirant avec toutes les pièces disponibles au centre de la partie attaquée. L'éboulis sert alors de rampe d'accès aux colonnes d'infanterie montant à l'assaut.

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Dans la pratique, l'Artillerie de Campagne 1 n'étant pas assez puissante pour réaliser une telle entreprise, c'est à la capacité d'amener sur place un Matériel de Siège 2 , qui donnera, ou non, le niveau requis au corps expéditionnaire français pour assumer sa mission. Compte tenu de l'état de la ligne de communication par voie de terre, seule la voie de mer, en dépit de la présence anglaise, peut être considérée, comme praticable. Malgré la capture d'une partie de la flotte sortie d'Alexandrie, l'amiral Genteaume maintient encore cette voie, le 9 germinal (29 mars) pour faire transporter par la flotte de Perrée, au moins jusqu'à Jaffa, des pièces de Vingt-quatre et dix-huit. Sous les murs de Saint-Jean d'Acre, l'échec d'un nouvel assaut le 12 germinal (1 er avril), démontre bien que l'artillerie de campagne et les moyens incendiaires employés n'ont d'autres conséquence que d'aboutir à une surconsommation de munitions et de poudre et qu'il faut se résigner à attendre l'arrivée du matériel de siège. Cependant, alors qu'il est contraint de faire face à de nouveaux adversaires en provenance de l'est lors de combats qui se déroulent à partir du 11 germinal (31 mars) sur Nazareth puis au mont Thabor, tout en protégeant sa ligne de communication vers le sud et en observant vers le nord, Bonaparte fait continuer les travaux entrepris sous les murs de Saint-Jean d'Acre notamment ceux de la mine destinée à ruiner la grosse tour d'angle de la fortification. Le 20 germinal (9 avril) le commandant en chef du génie du corps expéditionnaire, Caffarelli, est blessé par une balle alors qu'il inspecte les tranchées. L'incident est grave, car chacun a bien compris qu'il est indispensable de faire vite et qu'en tout état de cause, si les pièces d'artillerie parviennent sous les murs de la place assiégée, elles seront toujours en nombre limité. Ainsi, tous les autres moyens de combat devant être exploités de façon à obtenir le meilleur rendement possible, la mine prend une place déterminante.

^L'artillerie de campagne a été créée par l'ordonnance du 13 août 1765. Durant les guerres de la Révolution, son service est défini par le règlement du 1 e r avril 1792 et elle comporte des pièces du système de Gribeauval de quatre, huit, et douze, (le calibre étant le poids du boulet exprimé en livres, la livre valant sensiblement un 1/2 kilogramme). 2 L e Matériel de siège comprend à la fois de l'artillerie de siège, en principe des pièces de seize ou vingt-quatre, des obusiers de huit pouces et des mortiers de dix pouces ainsi que des parcs du génie dits également de siège.

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La mine : difficultés techniques et tactiques (carte n° 2) Une lecture attentive du journal de siège permet de se faire une idée des difficultés de tous ordres qui viennent entraver les travaux de la mine et ce juste au moment où le génie, toujours important dans un siège, se voit priver de son chef. Se sont, bien sûr, les aléas de la guerre mais ici, ils aggravent considérablement une situation difficile compte tenu des efforts déjà exigés par les opérations de police aux abords de la place. Le rédacteur du journal du siège note le 29 germinal (18 avril) : - «Les mineurs cheminent difficilement et avec les plus difficultés ; le terrain change à chaque instant de nature...»

grandes

- «Travail ordinaire pour rétablir les dégradations des bombes ou des éboulements occasionnés par le mauvais terrain ... Les mineurs, ... rencontrent un mur en bonne maçonnerie ; on espère avoir rencontré les fondations de la tour...» Le 1 e r floréal, 20 avril : - «On ne peut avancer la sape debout que de dix pieds ; on commence une première traverse en crochet, pour empêcher Venfilade ; le terrain se trouve si mauvais et les éboulements si fréquents que l'on y renonce après plusieurs tentatives...» Le 2-3 floréal, (21-22 avril) : - «Le canon de l'ennemi ayant presque détruit le commencement de la sape debout, on la recommence ; on ne l'avance que de quelques pieds ; les assiégés y tirent de plusieurs points.» Mais surtout le 3 floréal, (22 avril) : - «On s'aperçoit que l'ennemi contre-mine.» Le lendemain encore : - «On n'avance la sape debout que de 15 pieds. L'ennemi a presque entièrement détruit le travail de la veille...» La situation des Français est précaire. Les travaux réalisés par l'ennemi lui permettent de prendre en tenaille la mine française mais ils sont également sur le point d'avoir la capacité de ruiner la contre-mine.

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Devant cette situation, et bien que l'artillerie de siège ne soit toujours pas arrivée, ni la mine française aussi avancée que souhaitable, Bonaparte décide de brusquer les choses. Deux Fourneaux* organisés en Camouflets* et espacés de huit pieds sont «chargés avec six cents livres de poudre chacun tandis qu'un Globe de compression est pratiqué, sous le glacis1, à trois pieds de la galerie principale, ... (et) chargé de 1 500 livres». *Le fourneau est une charge de poudre placée dans un milieu résistant (terre ou maçonnerie) en vue de réaliser un effet de destruction. L'expulsion de la charge produisant généralement un entonnoir, l'ennemi peut venir s'y installer, c'est la raison pour laquelle le dispositif peut être organisé en camouflet, c'est-à-dire qu'un calcul très rigoureux de la charge explosive, en fonction des matériaux environnants, permet d'éviter le phénomène d'entonnoir.

Le Globe de compression est en fait un fourneau de mine surchargé destiné à produire un puissant effet de destruction des superstructures mais également des contre-mines. La charge globale de poudre avoisine donc les deux tonnes et même s'il s'agit de poudre relativement médiocre, les capacités de destruction sont non négligeables. L'emploi simultané des fourneaux organisés en camouflets et du globe de compression démontre la capacité technique des Français et atteste de leur volonté de destruction rapide dans tous les domaines. Si les Français éprouvent le besoin de doubler le classique assaut d'infanterie appuyé par de l'artillerie de campagne sur une brèche, par des tirs de mines à grande capacité de destruction prouve qu'ils jouent leurs derniers atouts et n'ont pas l'intention de prolonger le siège. Force est cependant de constater que ces moyens ne sont pas employés dans les meilleures conditions possibles. La mine manque de poudre et voit ses travaux préparatoires contrariés par l'ennemi. L'artillerie ne dispose que de bouches à feu de campagne et de deux pièces de calibre seize, que l'activité des assiégés a, encore, empêché de regrouper en une batterie de brèche. Quant à la caronade*, malgré son calibre de trente-deux, elle n'est pas en mesure de compenser ces déficiences. *La Caronade est une bouche à feu à tube très court destinée au tir direct adoptée par la Marine anglaise à partir de 1782. Nécessitant peu de poudre, son emploi à terre permet des destructions économiques même si sa manœuvre s'avère *Le glacis est la partie de la fortification située en dehors du fossé qui se raccorde au terrain naturel.

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être difficile compte tenu d'un recul important imputable à son faible poids. Elle est cependant impropre à l'ouverture d'une brèche compte tenu de son manque de précision. Ici cette bouche à feu est très certainement une pièce de récupération, car ce calibre n'existe pas dans la Marine française.

Le 5 floréal (24 avril), au moment où le feu de l'artillerie de campagne a, enfin, fait taire les batteries ennemies, à neuf heures du matin, la mine est mise en œuvre. Une partie de la tour s'effondre, les décombres produits, donnent, comme prévu, une rampe d'accès. Après un instant d'hésitation, les hommes de Jezzar ont réoccupé la partie supérieure non effondrée de la tour et dispensent un tir meurtrier sur les Français. Un deuxième assaut, lancé dans l'après-midi, n'est pas plus heureux. Dès lors Bonaparte, même s'il ne désarme apparemment pas devant Saint-Jean d'Acre et si Berthier demande encore à la place de Gaza de faire «passer le plus promptement possible des poudres dont il a le plus grand besoin», on sent bien qu'il prépare son ultime tentative. Deux jours plus tard, dès le 7 floréal (26 avril), alors que Caffarelli succombe à ses blessures, de nouveaux travaux sont entamés. Refaire les stocks de poudre et amener les grosses pièces d'artillerie avant qu'il ne soit trop tard, telle est la préoccupation essentielle de Bonaparte. De nouvelles batteries sont armées mais toujours avec des pièces de campagne. De prodigieux efforts pour annihiler les travaux de contre-mine de l'ennemi sont entrepris, en particulier de nuit pour profiter de la répugnance des musulmans à combattre après le coucher du soleil mais également en aménageant la mine en globe de compression. Tous ces combats sont menés avec vigueur mais en quelques sortes «à l'économie», car la poudre fait cruellement défaut. Malgré leur désir de temporiser provisoirement de façon à assurer une meilleure concentration des efforts, les Français sont contraints de réagir le 14 floréal (3 mai). En dépit de ces exigences, le 16 floréal (5 mai) au soir, le commandant de l'artillerie, Dommartin, obtient encore que l'on diffère de vingt-quatre heures la mise à feu de la mine pour attendre de la poudre, bien que les travaux techniques soient, cette fois, terminés et la mine déjà chargée avec un minimum de poudre. Ce que veut Dommartin est clair : une charge, la plus forte possible, de façon à faire des dégâts les plus considérables pour empêcher l'ennemi de réoccuper la partie surplombant l'éboulis servant de rampe d'assaut. Il veut que la mine réalise ce que l'artillerie ne pourra jamais faire, faire effondrer la muraille sur une grande largeur.

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Or, brutalement, dans la nuit du 16 au 17 floréal (5 au 6 mai), l'ennemi évente la mine française et la désorganise ! Le 18 floréal (7 mai), enfin le renfort d'artillerie de siège tant espéré étant là, les dispositions pour un nouvel assaut sont prises. La poudre arrivée en même temps et désormais inutile est cependant employée en partie dans une Fougasse* pour faire sauter la partie de la tranchée qui sépare les Français de l'ennemi de façon à ouvrir le chemin de la grosse tour. * La Fougasse est un récipient rempli de poudre que l'on place au fond d'un puits de mine et que l'on fait sauter soit isolément soit par groupe pour gêner la progression de l'assaillant.

Les hommes de Jezzar, abondamment ravitaillés en poudre par les Anglais avaient, jusqu'à ce moment-là, utilisé cette technique défensive mais maintenant les Français l'emploient en offensive pour faciliter l'accès à la brèche ouverte dans la muraille. Cependant malgré tous les efforts de l'artillerie, trois pièces de vingtquatre tirant de très près et les assauts répétés, il n'en demeure pas moins que l'ouverture dans la muraille n'est pas assez large. Le 23 floréal (12 mai), alors que tous les assauts n'ont toujours pas permis de chasser l'ennemi des points hauts des remparts à partir desquels il fusille les soldats de Bonaparte, il ne reste plus qu'un seul espoir de l'emporter, jeter dans la bataille l'ultime division à ne pas avoir éprouvé de revers au pied des murs de Saint-Jean d'Acre, celle de Kléber qui rentre des opérations de dégagement vers l'est (carte n° 3). Le 1 e r prairial (20 mai), devant l'impossibilité de venir à bout d'un adversaire particulièrement pugnace, faute d'avoir réussi à réunir à temps le matériel de siège, alors que les courriers annoncent plusieurs soulèvement dans le delta du Nil, Bonaparte renonce à l'entreprise et lève le siège.

Le constat : un combat en mode dégradé Alors que le corps expéditionnaire français était entraîné de plus en plus loin de sa base de ravitaillement de Basse-Égypte dans une spirale d'usure de son potentiel et donc, à terme, conduit à une inéluctable destruction, les intérêts objectifs des Anglais et de Jezzar conjugués, ont ramené la guerre à des «normes d'emploi des armes» connues des Français. Cependant ces derniers, situés à l'extrémité d'une ligne de communication à la capacité incertaine et au débit aléatoire compte tenu des difficultés du terrain et du climat relayées par un ennemi aussi actif sur terre que sur mer, n'ont pas été en mesure d'employer certaines de leurs armes, artillerie ou mine, dans des conditions optimales de rendement.

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Faute d'une artillerie de siège offensif, les Français ont dû avoir recours à une artillerie de campagne pour tenter d'ouvrir une brèche dans la muraille de la place assiégée. Plus tard encore, la mine, employée pour suppléer l'artillerie défaillante, s'est montrée inefficace. Dans un premier temps ce sont des difficultés techniques et tactiques qui ont été la cause de l'insuffisance tandis que dans un deuxième temps, quand l'artillerie a été enfin là, la mine n'a pas été en mesure de jouer un rôle significatif, le temps ayant laissé à l'ennemi le loisir de ruiner son efficacité. Ainsi, l'observateur attentif peut-il noter que la notion de temps, combinée avec celle de ligne de communication, débit et élongation, conduit à une sorte de point de bascule qui voit le rendement des ressources, humaines et matérielles, fléchir dangereusement. Le point à ne pas dépasser, sous peine de graves mécomptes, est alors tout proche. Dans le cas de Saint-Jean d'Acre, ce sont les conditions d'emploi de l'artillerie et de la mine et non les artilleurs ou les sapeurs qui sont en cause. Leur courage a été reconnu lorsqu'il se sont vus attribuer plus de la moitié des armes d'honneur1. De l'étude des techniques opérationnelles mises en œuvre durant cette campagne de Syrie de 1799, il ressort que si l'emploi des forces est étroitement lié à la notion de ligne de communication, le caractère de précarité de certaines techniques tend à s'accentuer avec l'élongation de cette ligne. Faute d'une capacité à satisfaire les besoins en temps, quantité et nature, ce n'est pas un véritable combat interarmes qui s'est instauré mais un combat en mode dégradé qui relève d'une tentative de substitution d'une arme à une autre, la mine à l'artillerie par exemple. Malgré la faiblesse de son rendement ce type de combat qui amène à effectuer des compensations entre du temps, des moyens, de l'ingéniosité..., n'est pas cependant un mode mineur à l'utilité contestable bien au contraire, il est un des moyens qui permet la conduite d'opérations militaires dans une sorte de fourchette d'incertitude où rien n'est définitivement joué. Vu sous cet angle, cette capacité de fonctionnement n'est certainement pas un signe de faiblesse mais une force dans le sens où elle permet d'agir en dehors du cadre strict des prévisions et de repousser les limites de la force opérationnelle engagée. Loin d'être la preuve d'une carence de la part de ceux qui servent, cet emploi témoigne de leur technicité et de leur savoir-faire pour exploiter une arme, matériel ou matériaux, avec un rendement acceptable alors qu'il n'a pas été conçu pour un tel emploi.

t o u t e s les décorations de l'Ancien Régime ayant été abolies, Bonaparte distribue, à titre de récompense des armes d'honneur. Ici, sur les trente-cinq attribuées sous les murs de Saml-Jean d'Acre onze reviennent aux artilleurs, deux aux ouvriers, six aux sapeurs et mineurs tandis que seules par ailleurs les 18e et 32 e demi-brigades de ligne ont été récompensées.

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Quant à son utilité, elle ne saurait être mise en cause à partir du m o m e n t où permettant de satisfaire aux principes d'économie des forces et concentration des efforts elle concourt à la liberté d'action du chef dans la

mesure où permettant la prolongation du combat, elle lui octroie des délais.

Sources et

bibliographie

Archives Service historique de l'Armée de terre, Vincennes. Côte B6-83. Copies ordonnées par le Premier Consul pour servir à l'histoire... Ouvrages Ader, Histoire de l'expédition d'Égypte et de Syrie, Revue pour les détails stratégiques par le général Beauvais, Paris, A. Dupont, 1826. Bainville Jacques, Bonaparte en Egypte, Paris, Flammarion, 1936, 127 p. Bernede Allain, La campagne de Syrie, page 22 à 32, in Revue d'histoire militaire Samothrace n° 2, 1993. Aspects stratégiques, opérationnels et tactiques d'une projection de force, chapitre : La campagne de Syrie février-mai 1799, ou les limites de l'action, in Catalogue du musée de l'Armée, La campagne d'Égypte 1798-1801, Mythes et réalités, Paris, 1998, pages 69 à 85. Berthier Maréchal, Relation des campagnes en Egypte et en Syrie, Paris, P. Didot l'Aîné, an VIII (1800) 182 p. Carmigniani J.C. Tranié J., Bonaparte, la campagne d'Égypte, Fayard, 1992. Chalbrand Colonel, Les Français en Égypte ou souvenir d'Égypte et de Syrie par un officier de l'expédition, Recueillis et mis en ordre par J. J. E. Roy, Tours, Maine, 1856, 236 p. Desvemois Général baron, Avec Bonaparte en Italie et en Égypte, Mémoires publiés par Albert Dufourq, Paris Pion s.d. 317 p. Doguereau Général, Journal de l'expédition d'Égypte, Publié d'après le manuscrit original, avec une introduction et des notes par C. de la Jonquière, chef d'escadron, Direction de la section historique de l'État-major de l'Armée, Paris, Perrin, 1904, 430 p. Duboulos-Dupas, Ferdinand et Folliet André, Le général Dupas, Italie, Égypte, Grande Armée, 1792-1813, Paris, Lib. militaire R. Chapelot et Cie 1899, 255 p. Gall H., Journal d'un officier de l'armée d'Égypte. L'armée française en Égypte 1798-1800, manuscrit mis en ordre et publié par H. Galli., Paris, G. Charpentier, 1883. Guitry Commandant, L'armée de Bonaparte en Égypte 1798-1801, Paris, Ch. Lavauzelle, 1899-1904, 5 volumes. Michalonr R. et Vernet J., "L'adaptation d'une armée française à la fin du XVIII e siècle à un théâtre d'opération proche-oriental", colloque international d'histoire militaire, Château de Vincennes, 1976. Laurens H., L'expédition d'Égypte, réédition, Seuil, 1997.

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NAPOLEON'S EXPEDITION AND THE RETURN OF EUROPE TO THE MIDDLE EAST Gideon BIGER

Napoleon's expedition to the Middle East opened a new era for that region, which was marked by the intervention and eventual domination of Europe in the lives of the people living there and its influence on developments in every areas. This era lasted for some 150 years, until the establishment of viable, independent states in the Middle East and the retreat of the European powers from the region. European involvement in the Middle East was not a new phenomenon. It began in the Old World with the domination of Greco-Roman culture in the region from the 4th century BC. to the 7th century AD. Thereafter, the influence of the Islamic world supplanted that of Europe for some 400 hundreds years. The Crusaders brought the European presence back to the eastern shore of the Mediterranean in 1099, but this lasted for only 200 hundreds years. European domination over Cyprus and several other Greek islands was maintained until the late 16th century, but the rise of the Ottoman Empire, and especially the capture of Constantinople in 1453, evicted Europe from the Middle East. From the 14th century onward, Europe was preoccupied with local self-definition and disregarded the Middle East. At their zenith, the Ottomans closed off the Middle East and blocked the commercial activities that had linked Europe with the Far East by the way of the Middle East (or Near East, as it was called then). This inter alia, promoted the Europeans to seek new routes to the Far East, bringing the Spaniards to America and the Portuguese to India via the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa. Europeans rarely visited the Middle East between the 16th and the 18th centuries with the exception of a small number of pilgrims who came to visit the holy sites in the Holy Land and merchants who had business in the area. The European mind was far removed from the Middle East. During that period, the Europeans explored and took control of exotic areas in Africa, Asia and America. European domination of those areas brought about extensive commercial activity which by-passed the Middle East. Moreover, the EuTopean states were involved in their own internal problems and were more interested

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in Europe than in the Ottoman Empire, which governed the area as well as the southern shore of the Mediterranean. The Middle East was, for most Europeans of the late 18th century, terra incognita — an unknown land. Napoleon's expedition, although failing to achieve any of its military or political targets, marked the beginning of new relations between Europe and the Middle East. These new ties may be categorized in five areas, namely military, politically, scientifically, culturally and general knowledge, each initiated by Napoleon's mission and activity in Egypt and the Holy Land.

Military

Involvement

In 1798, after nearly 500 years of non-involvement, a European army captured a portion of the Middle East and European soldiers ruled the area. The Europeans, driven out of Egypt and Palestine in 1291 and from Cyprus in 1571, had returned to the area. Although Napoleon did not retain his hold there for long, his expedition evoked the involvement of other European armies in the Middle East. The British followed Napoleon to Egypt and Palestine in 1799. Twenty-five years later, in 1821 they were involved in the war of independence of Greece. In 1830, France captured Algeria and in 1840 a coalition of European armies fought together with the Ottoman sultan against Mohammad 'Ali in Lebanon and the Holy Land. European soldiers, generals and admirals were not unfamiliar figures in 19th-century Middle East. Starting with Napoleon in 1798, this presence continued with the British capture of Aden following the Napoleonic wars (in 1839), their take-over of Cyprus in 1878, and the occupation of Egypt in 1882, after which European armies conquered the whole of the Middle East. Today, British soldiers, still retain several bases in Cyprus but the last of the European occupation troops left the area in the 1960s.

Political

Involvement

Although not directly involved in the Middle East before Napoleon's expedition, the Europeans were concerned about the "Eastern question" and the "sick man on the Bosphorus" especially after the 1687 siege of Vienna. In the 18th century the French were partly involved with Dahr al-Omar, a local Arab leader from northern Palestine, who tried to establish an autonomous territory in the Galilee area, but this was a minor episode not reflective of any trend. Napoleon's mission represented the first direct involvement of a European power in the Middle East. It was not only a military mission. It introduced European diplomacy into the region. Although the French occupation did not

AND THE RETURN OF EUROPE TO THE MIDDLE EAST

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last long, and once Napoleon withdrew from Egypt the British left the area too, both powers, as well as the Russians and the Austrians, kept a close watch on both the internal and external affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Napoleon's expedition demonstrated the importance of the Middle East to France and other European states and from then on Europe gradually became the dominant power in the Middle East. European political dominance receded only in the 1950s, some 150 years after Napoleon's arrival there.

Scientific

Involvement

Napoleon's army was accompanied by a large numbers of scientists and experts in a variety of fields who opened the Middle East to the Western world. A great deal of work was invested in the first scientific mapping of Egypt and the Holy Land. The discovery of the Rosetta Stone, which provided the key to the deciphering of Egyptian hieroglyphs, was another scientific achievement of the expedition. Although some knowledge of the archaeological treasures of the Middle East existed previously, Napoleon's expedition paved the way for scholarly research of the pre-classical civilizations of the Middle East. The expedition promoted the arrival to the Middle East not only of pilgrims but also of researchers leading scientific expeditions. In 1814 the lost city of Petra was rediscovered, with it the knowledge of ancient Nabatean culture was brought to the light. Ancient Egyptian artefacts, taken to Paris, marked the first step in the establishment of the great European museums and with it the opening of departments of archaeology and orientalism in European universities. Indeed, the European scientific and scholarly world rediscovered the Middle East through Napoleon's expedition.

Cultural Influence The expedition initiated the influence of European cultures in the Middle East. Local political figures, the aristocracy and the mercantile world of the Middle East gradually adopted European ways of thinking and behaviour into the day-to-day life of the Middle East. French and other European languages were introduced. European missionaries arrived, inculcating, besides Christianity, modern education and the construction of modern churches, schools and hospitals. New crops were introduced, especially cotton. The Middle East, which had been closed to the cultural influence of Europe for centuries, was suddenly open to European intervention. Perceiving the supremacy of European culture, the people tried to become European. The rise of the Levantine class — Middle Easterners with European manners — is also one of the achievements of Napoleon's expedition to the Middle East.

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knowledge

A reciprocal influence also emerged. If the Middle East was rediscovered and affected by Europeans, Europe, too, was influenced by the expedition. Knowledge of the Middle East entered European homes through the press, which reported about the expedition at length. Later, drawings of the milieu of the region were circulated, books about it were published, and people all over Europe began to learn about the Middle East. The Holy Land and Egypt were no longer mythical areas, laying far away in the remote East under the Muslims, but began to be seen as near — filled with mystery yet accessible. Napoleon opened the Near East to every European, and from then on, Europe was linked to it.

Conclusions

Napoleon's stay in the Middle East was brief, his military and political goals not achieved. However, his expedition established new ties between Europe and the Middle East, and, from then on, the region was closer to the public eyes in Europe — to politicians, generals, businessmen, scientists and every knowledgeable European. The Middle East after Napoleon was never the same as it had been for centuries, an area close to Europe geographically but remote from it perceptually. Napoleon opened the door through which the people of the Middle East and the Europeans became more familiar with each other. Although failing military, Napoleon connected Europe to the Middle East.

Suggested

Bibliography

M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 - A Study in International Relations (London, 1966). Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (Indiana University Press, 1964). D. Kushner, (Ed.), Palestine in the Ottoman Period (Jerusalem 1986). M. Ma'oz, (ed.), Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period (Jerusalem 1975). A. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers (eds.), The Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East (Chicago and London 1968).

NAPOLEON AND JEZZAR: A LOCAL PERSPECTIVE Amnon COHEN

Bonaparte's conquest of Egypt, though only a brief episode in the annals of that country, is usually regarded as a turning point in the history of the Middle East. For many years it has been referred to as inaugurating the era of modernization in the local Egyptian context, while in the wider context of European military and political history it is seen as leading to a major defeat for French colonial ambitions achieved by Britain's combined naval might and diplomatic skills. The Palestinian intermezzo, a small fraction of the entire Egyptian campaign, also marked the French army's first major defeat at the hands of a local force. This local aspect of the international setback is the focus of this paper.

The initial period Less than two months after his landing in Abu Kir on 1 August 1798, i.e., at a very early stage, Bonaparte instructed the French general in charge of the province of Damietta to write to Ahmad Jezzar Pasa (as well as to the governor of Tripoli) apprising him that he should not regard the French as his enemies. The French meant no harm to him or his subjects, and they were advised to proceed in their normal routine. 1 Two days later, Bonaparte himself wrote to Jezzar, addressing him as governor of Sidon and Acre, elaborating on the same theme: his war was aimed at the Mamluks, Jezzar's enemies as well, while he, Napoleon, was actually a friend of Islam in Egypt and elsewhere. He wished to maintain peaceful relations with Jezzar for the mutual benefit of their mercantile interests. 2 A French officer, chef de brigade Beauvoisins, accompanied by two Syrian merchants, was dispatched to carry this letter on board one of Jezzar's vessels, formerly held by the French in Egypt. Because the initial request by the French party to land at the port of Jaffa was not granted, they could neither meet with the French vice-consul there nor get even a vague idea about its fortifications. The letter, however, was received, after which they were

Plan and J. Dumaine, Correspondance de Napoleon 1er (Paris, 1860), Vol. 4, p. 363. Ibid„ pp. 380-81.

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dispatched on a fast boat to Acre, but upon arrival there they were refused permission to land. Two days later, on 5 September, they were put into another boat and ordered to sail back. Jezzar, they were told, could not see them, as he had official guests from Istanbul visiting him, but he intended to send Bonaparte a secret answer in a short while, and was even prepared to meet with him anywhere but at Acre. 1 Jezzar never went beyond this cryptic allusion to a possible encounter, and the events that unfolded in the following weeks only increased his evident mistrust. Recurrent uprisings in Egypt indicated growing instability there, while the last months of the year witnessed the build-up of a military coalition in Istanbul with Britain and Russia. Bonaparte wrote to Jezzar again on 17 November 1798, this time more succinctly: If Jezzar did not refrain from extending further help to the Mamluk Ibrahim Pa§a, the French army would attack Acre. However, if Ibrahim were expelled to a distance of "40 hours" from the Egyptian borders, friendship and good commercial relations between their two countries would prevail. Jezzar's style was equally terse: he apprehended the messenger and a short while later had him executed.2 Meanwhile, preparatory steps were gradually being taken by the Ottomans as well. The earlier appointment of Jezzar to the new position of commander in chief of Egypt, though accompanied by an exquisite robe and an even more precious sword, proved an insufficient incentive to get him to attack the invading army. In his reply to Istanbul he apologized for staying in his own territory due to alleged instability there, while promising to incite the Bedouin tribes in Egypt as well as to encourage the Mamluk beys to keep harassing the French. Official firmans sent from Istanbul a few weeks later announced the replacement of Jezzar by Ibrahim Pa§a as commander in chief. Retaining his old post of governor of Sidon, Jezzar was now appointed (September-October 1798) commander in chief of the Syrian coast, thereby extending his domain to include the strategic port of Jaffa. 3 Toward the end of the year he was promoted to the rank of governor of Damascus, Tripoli and Cairo, as well as of Acre, Jerusalem and Nablus. He was also named commander of the annual haj caravan. In short, he became he unprecedented ruler of Syria and Egypt combined. 4 His primary assignment was the

l C. de la Jonquière, L'expédition d'Egypte 1798-1801 (Paris, 1899-1907), Vol. 2, pp. 536-39; A . al-Rahman al-Jabarti, 'aja'ib al-athar fi'l-tarajim wa'l-akhbar (al-Qahira, 1322), Vol. 3, pp. 1516. 2 Î. H. Uzunçarçih, "Bonapart'in Cezzar Ahmed Pasa'ya mektubu ve Akka muhasarasina dair bir devis," Belleten, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Ankara, 1964), pp. 456-57. For an almost identical French translation, see Correspondance, Vol. 5, pp. 148, 359. 3 Muhimme defterleri series (Prime minister's Archives, Istanbul), Vol. 207, pp. 4-5, 84-85, 16162. 4 Cevdet tasnifl, Dahiliye Series (Prime Minister's Archives, Istanbul), Documents 41380, 7764; A. Cevdet, Tarih-i Cevdet (Istanbul, 1271-1301), Vol. 7, p. 70.

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expulsion of the French from Egypt, along with the restoration of the annual haj caravan to the holy shrines of Mecca and Medina. For this he would receive all the necessary forces: naval and ground units, artillery and cavalry accumulated by his predecessors, as well as new reinforcements. Jezzar did not sit idly by, waiting for these promises to come true. He announced his intention to invade Egypt in a series of letters to various Bedouin tribes and other elements of the opposition there. The capture by his army of the al-Arish outpost on the coastline between Jaffa and Damietta was clear evidence of his plans, as were the stockpiles of food and military equipment that he amassed in Gaza, Ramie and Jaffa. The French, who became aware of all these maneuvers through their intelligence networks, could only interpret them as preparatory steps toward an Ottoman gathering to be launched against them. 1 The initial indifference they displayed up until the end of 1798 changed largely as a result of the take over of the desert citadel of alArish. That is not to suggest that the Palestinian campaign should be seen as a preemptive strike against Jezzar; it had other and much wider purposes. However, the timing, and the sense of urgency, were prompted by the gathering storm in the north: the first orders for such a campaign were issued by Bonaparte in January 1799. 2 Although one of the major aims of Bonaparte's Syrian campaign was to break up Jezzar's military and political might, he tried to conceal his intentions as long as he could. His first orders issued to Kleber, for example, were to portray his offensive as aimed exclusively at the Mameluk beys who had escaped from Egypt and taken refuge in al-Arish and Khan Yunis. Even as late as the battle of Jaffa, Bonaparte wrote to Jezzar that since he had no dispute with him, he could keep his rule and his territories intact if they combined forces against the Mamluks and the British. 3 These were, indeed, valid military considerations, but under the new circumstances, such aims could not be attained without an inevitable clash with Jezzar. Each passing day increased the threat he posed to the French plans, so that Bonaparte had no choice but to take the initiative and oust him. Acre, Jezzar's capital, was thus the real target of the French army, and while Jezzar's strategy was to try and stall them as much as he could, speed was the guiding principle behind Bonaparte's tactics. After some delay, al-Arish was taken on the night of 20-21 February; Gaza proved to constitute ' Sce Correspondance, Vol. 5, p. 359; A. de Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane avec les puissances étrangères (Paris, 1864), Vol. 1, pp. 572-73. ^Jonquière, L'expédition, Vol. 3, pp. 460-64, Vol. 4, p. 132 ; D. Lacroix, Bonaparte en Egypte (1798-1799), (Paris, 1899), pp. 247-48; F. Charles-Roux, L'Angleterre et l'expédition française en Egypte (Le Caire, 1925), Vol. 1, pp. 148-53. Conquière, L'expédition, Vol. 4, p. 279; Correspondance, Vol. 5, pp. 354-55.

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barely any obstacle (24 February); and four days of a heavy artillery barrage crushed Jaffa's defensive system a week later. Further north, near the village of Qaqun, a mounted attack was launched f r o m the nearby hills against the marching army, but the general did not let his army be tricked by such a diversionary attempt and kept pressing forward. With this failed maneuver providing the final proof of Bonaparte's actual plan, Jezzar ordered an immediate withdrawal of his garrison and defensive artillery f r o m Haifa and their redeployment in Acre. The French army reached Jezzar's capital on 19 March 1799 and laid siege to it. 1

The siege of Acre The Ottoman defence of the besieged Acre was based on three main elements: British naval support, fortifications, and recurrent offensive raids out of the beleaguered garrison. Captain Wood (soon to be replaced by Sidney Smith as the commanding officer of the British Squadron in the eastern Mediterranean), sharing Jezzar's assessment of an imminent French invasion, pledged his support. Smith, upon assuming his post, confirmed this to Jezzar in writing. The advancing French column triggered an "almost desperate" letter f r o m Jezzar to Smith on 1 March, reporting Bonaparte's victories (including the capture of Jaffa, which would only be finalized several days later) and the rather poor state of his own troops. Realizing that the French were headed toward Acre to lay siege to it, he predicted that "if his troops did not show greater courage, Acre would hold out for a very short time." He asked, therefore, that Smith dispatch two vessels to the adjacent bay of Haifa, and also order systematic patrolling of the coastline between Damietta and Gaza to forestall potential enemy naval convoys. Conceptually, Smith tended to disagree with Jezzar's implied strategy of concentrating all the British forces in Acre, and he suggested the alternative of pounding the French flanks rather than risking a direct confrontation. However, he granted the two requests, and also appointed a British liaison officer (Wright), whom he immediately dispatched to Acre. At this stage Smith considered cutting off the advancing French army f r o m Egypt by landing a substantial force at its rear, then continually bombarding its main body with his naval artillery to dissuade it from progressing further. Jezzar, who had given his consent to this strategy, excused himself from actively participating in for the duration of the Ramadan month of fasting. Bonaparte's swift advance on Acre, however, made this entire scheme illusory. 2

1 Lacroix, Bonaparte, pp. 260-77; Jonquière, L'expédition, Vol. 4. pp. 185-203, 216-68, 289-99; Correspondance, Vol. 5, p. 365; A. Berthier, Relation des campagnes du général Bonaparte (Paris, an VIII), pp. 64-65; I. Al-Nimr, Ta'rikh Jabal Nablus wa'l-Balqa' (Damascus, 1938), Vol. 1, p. 163. ^Charles-Roux, L'Angleterre, pp. 154-57.

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The positioning, eventually, of three British battlesphips at Haifa bay proved highly beneficial to the defense effort. On 18 March, just one day before the main French army reached Acre, the British vessels managed to capture a French convoy carrying the heavy pieces of siege artillery — a major setback to the war plans of the invading army and a vital contribution to the defense of the besieged town. In the following weeks this flotilla provided Acre with ongoing support. Although the direct nature of its artillery fire meant that it could not launch enfilade volleys at the besieging units hidden from its sights by the contours of the town, it harassed the French flanks steadily, thereby allowing the defenders to group at a single parapet rather than thinning out to confront possible attacks from any of the town's three sides. Two further aspects of direct British support are noteworthy: the British steadily monitored and reported on Ottoman build up of naval and military reinforcements on the island of Rhodes, and they actively participated in the defense of the town. About 800 British troops and artillerymen manned the fortifications. They were occasionally spotted and identified there by the French troops, and in some cases (e.g., that of Major Oldfield) even paid the ultimate price. 1 The second element of British involvement in the defense of Acre, albeit indirect, was in the area of fortifications. Through British initiative and support, a French royalist expert, Phelippeaux, who had joined them at a much earlier stage, undertook to assist Jezzar by upgrading the town's existing fortifications. From the moment he landed in Acre, Phelippeaux, an engineer, began applying his know-how systematically. First he had the walls repaired and reinforced. Then he had the captured French artillery pieces mounted on the walls and put into proper defensive use. Throughout the siege, whenever the attacking army managed to breach the walls of the city (most particularly at the most vulnerable spot — the corner tower, al-burj al- 'ali), he had the gaps filled immediately with makeshift barriers studded with barrels of gunpowder so as to reduce the danger of a take-over by the enemy. He also had several outside positions dug out at that spot and properly equipped, thereby significantly improving the defenders' capacity to repel offensives. He introduced two further important modifications: night shifts of soldiers manning the walls, which were also constantly lit so as to prevent any unnoticed approach from the outside; and the construction of a second line of fortifications inside the town, an unprecedented feature that was totally unanticipated by the besieging French.

Ibid., p. 157; Jonquière, L'expédition, Vol. 4, p. 303 note 2, p. 468; Lacroix, Bonaparte, pp. 326-27; Berthier, Relation, p. 74; Lieut. Col. Alderson, Notes on Acre and Some of the Coast Defences of Syria (n. p., n. d.), p. 30; J. X.-B. Saintine, J. Marcel and L. Reybaud, Histoire scientifique et militaire de l'expédition française en Egypte (Paris, 1832), Vol. 5, pp. 373-74.

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Phelippeaux knew that his ingenuity notwithstanding, Bonaparte would eventually achieve a breakthrough. He concentrated, therefore, on the potential area of penetration — the corner tower area — and had a second, inner fortified wall erected there. On 7 May, when the French vanguard finally managed to storm through a breach they had made in the outer perimeter wall, they unexpectedly found themselves facing another wall. Having just prevailed in what they took to be the crucial turning point of the battle, they had no thought of retreating but pushed forward. However, they soon found themselves, trapped between the two walls, easy targets for fire directed at them from the new — and unscathed — fortifications, as well as from the rooftops of nearby buildings. The French attack, potentially the most dangerous one of the entire siege, was doomed, repelled by the double-wall concept that took the enemy by surprise. The third element on which Jezzar's defense of Acre was based was essentially psychological. The initial mood of the military units assigned to defend the town, was one of shock. They were impressed by the magnitude of the enemy, they knew of its recent victories both in Egypt and in Palestine, and they were hardly trained for this type of static warfare. However, once the first attempt by the French to storm the town (28 March) failed, they realized that their enemy was not invincible. Moreover, their fighting was not just defensive; they soon started taking the initiative as well. As compared to a total of 14 attempts by the French to break into Acre, Jezzar's army mounted 26 counterattacks, emerging from the walls and striking the French units. These sorties occurred throughout the entire two-month period, beginning even before the first major French offensive and lasting up to the final days of the siege. 1 French historians extol the exceptional courage displayed by the Turkish garrison fighters in these counterattacks, which afforded them slim chances of returning alive.2 The role of the supreme Ottoman commander, Jezzar, merits consideration. In contrast to Sidney Smith's condescending characterization of Jezzar's alleged panic until his own arrival, French sources draw a different picture. 3 The panic that swept through the entire population when the French army approached, according to French accounts, had no effect on Jezzar. When, for example, a French salvo managed to blast a large hole in the walls during their first major effort to break through (28 March), some of the soldiers stationed there deserted their positions, only to see Jezzar himself rushing toward the gap position, shouting and shooting his pistols at the enemy 1

Histoire scientifique, Vol. 5, p. 423; Alderson, Notes, pp. 28-29, 36; Berthier, Relation, pp. 85, 105; Correspondance, Vol. 5, pp. 420-21,440. ^Lacroix, Bonaparte, p. 327. 3 Histoire scientifique, Vol. 5, 28-29 p. 256; E. Lockroy, Ahmed le Boucher, la Syrie et l'Egypte au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1888), pp. 241-43.

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through the gaping wall, whereupon the soldiers followed his example and resumed their positions. Notably, it was only then, once this major attack had failed, that Smith ordered some of his own soldiers and artillery officers to join in the active defense of the town. 1 Jezzar's stamina and fighting spirit did not wane throughout the entire siege: he repeatedly rebuffed all of Bonaparte's attempts to talk him into striking a deal that would be tantamount to surrender. From his palace, he issued orders to his troops, distributed ammunition, and allotted monetary rewards to those who displayed bravery. At crucial moments, such as the major attack of 7 May, he dashed to the walls himself. The appearance of the supreme commander at that attack, followed by his bodyguards, shouting and firing his pistols, dispelled the fear of the soldiers and reversed the tide of events. Three days later, in the course of the last major French attempt to storm the walls, Jezzar changed tactics, ordered his units to improvise a mock retreat, and when the confident French vanguard followed them into the city, his soldiers turned on them and cut them down. 2 Although his attention was focused on the immediate events in Acre, Jezzar sought other ways to relieve the pressure by resorting to secret channels outside. He regularly corresponded with Damascus, Aleppo, Sidon, Nablus and Jerusalem, encouraging the local population to keep attacking the French, whose weakness he contrasted with the military superiority and ongoing support of the British. Monies distributed by his agents in different parts of Palestine proved an even more convincing argument for the gradual build up of an army to consist of local elements along with regular Ottoman units from Damascus and Aleppo. The underlying idea was to have this army attack the rear of the besieging French, in tandem with a major offensive by the besieged on their trenches surrounding the town. This scheme, however, was preempted by Kleber's famous victory near Mount Tabor. 3 This defeat notwithstanding, Jezzar's garrison continued its relentless defense of Acre, signalling protracted, futile efforts to the depleted besieging French units.

Conclusion Bonaparte's swift and easy conquest of Cairo, which culminated his Egyptian campaign, appeared to be replicating itself as his army marched through Palestine on its way to a take over of Acre. There was nothing Conquière, L'expédition, Vol. 4 , pp. 341-42; 1. H. Uzunçarçili, Osmanli Tarihi (Ankara, 1956), Vol. 4, p. 5. 2 AIderson, Notes, p. 34; Histoire scientifique, Vol. 5, pp. 375-78. -Conquière, L'expédition, Vol. 4, pp. 355, 363, 379; Lockroy, Ahmed, p. 246; Berthier, Relation, pp. 71-75; Correspondance, Vol. 5, pp. 395,402; Nimr, Ta'rikh, pp. 160-65.

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speculative or overconfident in this appraisal, based as it was on a sober consideration of the factors involved. Conquering Acre was a matter of days, he wrote to General Berthier.1 To his surprise, the siege of Acre went on for over two months (19 March-20 May), at the end of which he was forced to return empty-handed. The Palestinian campaign was not a total failure, since the French managed to outmaneuver the Ottoman army that had been sent from Damascus, while the Ottoman naval squadron that was building up in Rhodes had to be diverted from its original and objectively more important assignment — Egypt, to a new, and temporarily more vital arena, Acre. Before abandoning his onslaught on Acre, Bonaparte delivered a heavy artillery barrage that caused further destruction and casualties to the town and its population. Yet these last blows could not alter the basic military outcome. From a purely military standpoint, Bonaparte probably made the right decision when he ordered the lifting of the siege. In view of the growing number of casualties among his soldiers and officers as a result of the plague that was raging, as well as the alarming news from Europe and Istanbul, he hardly had any alternative. Still, all these wider considerations could not obscure the elementary fact: in the battle fought between Bonaparte and Jezzar, the French lost. Students of military history identify a variety of reasons, objective as well as subjective, for this outcome: overextended supply routes, lack of appropriate cannons and poor intelligence for the French, who focused their attacks on a spot that had been reinforced; and ongoing support for the Ottomans from the sea. 2 The inhabitants of the neighbouring region, who observed the military arena from the nearby hilltops, 3 perceived it as an extended duel between two gladiators, though in modern guise. Simplistic as such a perspective may seem, it was basically accurate: both parties were initially motivated by a variety of factors, but the ongoing battle gradually took on a highly personal nature. In retrospect, Jezzar's performance was a credit to the sultan, although for Jezzar himself, the episode was a matter of life and death. Bonaparte's defeat, a personal blow indeed, was interpreted as such both in Palestine and in Egypt, where the contemporary appraisal was similar to the historical one outlined here: it was not only a French defeat, but, equally, a personal victory for Jezzar.4

Conquière, L'expédition, Vol. 4, p. 329. Correspondance, Vol. 5, pp. 422. Jonquière, L'expédition, Vol. 4, pp. 493-530,629-37; Histoire scientifique, Vol. 5, pp. 414-19; Alderson, Notes, pp. 37-38; Cevdet, Tarih, Vol. 7, pp. 92-93. 3 C . M. Watson, "Bonaparte's Expedition to Palestine in 1799," Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement, 1917, p. 29. ^Al-Jabarti, 'aja'ib, Vol. 3, pp. 68-71. 2

EGYPT WAS WORTH A TURBAN: BONAPARTE'S FLIRTATION WITH ISLAM Mary Kathryn COONEY

The Muslims of Egypt had never seen the like. In the past they had witnessed the landing on their shores of aggressive, western powers such as the Crusaders, but these European armies, while attacking Egypt, had deliberately waged a war to wipe out the influence of Islam. Never had these foreign armies and especially their commanders behaved in the same manner as the French force which marched into Cairo in July 1798. From the moment that the general in chief, Napoleon Bonaparte, set foot on this ancient and mysterious land, he had emphasized to his soldiers that they would be campaigning only against the Mamluk Beys. While briefly enlightening the army about the beliefs of Islam, so novel to the French, Bonaparte exhorted them to avoid any affronts to the Egyptian people or their religion. "Have regard for their Muftis and their Imams, as you have had for the rabbis and bishops. Have, for the ceremonies which the Koran prescribes and for the mosques, the same tolerance which you had for the convents, for the synagogues, for the religion of Moses and Jesus Christ."1 Likewise, to the Egyptian people he issued a proclamation reiterating these sentiments of toleration and claiming that he and his compatriots showed greater deference for Islam than the Mamluks. As proof that they were "the true friends of Muslims," he informed the population that his army had destroyed the power of the Papacy and had also dissolved the order of the Knights of Malta which had harassed the followers of Islam for centuries. 2 During his sojourn in Egypt, Bonaparte displayed even more proofs that he did not just respect Muslims and their faith, but that he exhibited a real preference for Islam. At

1 Proclamation a l'armée de terre, 4 messidor an VI (22 June 1798), Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, Correspondance de Napoleon 1er, publiée par ordre de l'empereur Napoleon III, 32 vols. (Paris, 1859-1869), No. 2710, IV:256-57; François Charles-Roux, "La Politique Musulmane de Bonaparte," Napoleon: Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes 24 (Jan.-June 1925): 23-24. ^Proclamation, 14 messidor an VI (2 July 1798), as cited in Ibid., No. 2723, IV:269-71. Nakoula el-Turk claimed that Bonaparte said that "the French are also true Muslims ..." [Nakoula el-Turk, Histoire de l'expédition des Français en Egypte (Paris, 1839), 22]. For Bonaparte's personal understanding, views, and interpretation of Islam, see Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, Mémoires pour servir a l'histoire de France, sous Napoleon, écrits a Sainte-Hélène, par les généraux qui ont partage sa captivité, et publiés sur les manuscrits entièrement corrigés de la main de Napoleon, 8 vols. (Paris, 1823-25), 2; Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, Campagnes d'Italie, d'Egypte et de Syrie, 3 vols. (Paris, 1872), 2; Georges Spillmann, Napoleon et Vlslam, Collection Historique Series, ed. André Castelot (Paris, 1969); Christian Cherfîls, Bonaparte et l'Islam (Paris, 1914).

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various times, he donned a turban and along with his army, actively participated in the Islamic rituals. His organization of three festivals, the flooding of the Nile, the Birthday of Muhammad, and the anniversary of the French Republic, characterized to what ostentatious, propagandistic extent he would go to illustrate his esteem for the worship of Allah. In 1788, ten years prior to Bonaparte's arrival, Constantin-François Volney on his fact-finding mission to the Middle East assessed the possibility of a French invasion of Egypt as a strike against Britain and its trade in the eastern Mediterranean. His conclusion rejected the feasibility of such an operation on the premise that it would necessitate an attack on three separate enemies. The British who fiercely guarded their eastern, economic interests would view such aggression as a threat to India. The Ottoman Porte, Selim III in Constantinople, the titular ruler of Egypt, would perceive the attack as a severance of the traditional Ottoman/French diplomatic bond and throw in his lot with the British. The Muslim population of Egypt, the most formidable of the three opponents, would regard the French as infidels and call for a holy war against the invaders. To avoid confronting this triad, Bonaparte, devised a plan which, if successful, would render Britain his only opponent. He would reassure the Porte and the other Islamic political leaders that the attack on the Beys was not an assault on the Ottoman Empire; indeed, the eradication of the corrupt Mamluk government would ensure greater regularity to the flow of Egyptian tribute into the Ottoman ruler's coffers. As for the third potential belligerent, Bonaparte hoped to pacify the Muslims by utilizing a tactic previously untried by the West against an Islamic nation, charm. By showing interest in Islam and even a preference for it over Christianity, Bonaparte, ever the propagandist, hoped to court the favour of the native Egyptian population and earn their acceptance of the French occupation. In particular, he wished to create a bond of mutual respect and trust between the French, especially the army, and the local people whom his troops had liberated from the Mamluks.1 Once he had defeated the Beys at the Battle of the Pyramids, Bonaparte marched triumphantly into Cairo proclaiming himself the liberator of the Egyptian people and immediately set about the task of reforming the administration. In order to avoid the tri-partisan war which Volney had predicted, he took immediate measures to prove himself an assiduous suitor of Islamic support. Since approval through religion represented perhaps the most effective, peaceful means of consolidating his position and for his dream of future eastern expansion, no means would be spared to convince the Muslims of the fellowship which he and his army shared with them. Even hinting at the ^Bonaparte to Ahmed-Pasha, 14 messidor an VI (2 July 1798) and 5 fructidor an VI (22 August 1798), Napoleon, Correspondance de Napoléon, No. 3078, IV:530; Napoléon, Campagnes d'Italie, II, 211-12; M. Vertray, L'Armée française en Égypte (Paris, 1883), 81-82; Jacques Benoist-Méchin, Bonaparte en Egypte ou le rêve inassouvi (Lausanne, 1966), 192.

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possible conversion of himself and his entire military force, he would later sum up his efforts to win over the people in a paraphrase of Henry IV, "Paris was worth a Mass... [therefore] the Eastern Empire and maybe the subjugation of all of Asia would have been worth some pantalons and a turban ! " 1 Assuming that the common people would follow the council of the Muslim religious leaders, he first sought the company of the ulemas from Cairo's university of al-Azhar, one of the most revered institutions of Qur'anic study in the Islamic world. Always demonstrating to them the most profound esteem, the general in chief in their presence offered due thanks to Allah for his military success. He even suggested that the Qur'an had predicted his arrival as Muhammad's messenger, sent to punish the unjust Beys. The ulemas for their part, decided to somewhat submit to Bonaparte's request and declared to the people that the French loved Islam and its followers. Therefore, all true believers must acquiesce to French authority and pay the designated tribute. These learned men frequented the house of Bonaparte where he continued to exhibit the greatest inquisitiveness for the exegesis of their holy text. However, they would put his true conviction for Islam to the test when they suggested that the commander and his army prove their devotion to Islam by embracing the pillars of faith. Bonaparte realized that he needed some means of convincing the people of his admiration for Islam without making a permanent, religious commitment. One way by which he could compromise would be to attempt to wed the adherents of Islam and his army through the mutual celebration of both Muslim and French Republican festivals. 2 With the destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir Bay, it became even more imperative for Sultan Kebir—Bonaparte's Egyptian name—to begin his courtship of Islam in order to secure local support for his army, stranded in a foreign land and completely cut off from France. Therefore, less than a week after the naval disaster, the general lost no time in commencing his operation by investing himself and his men with official functions for the ceremony of the flooding of the Nile. Every year the inundation of the river, lasting from June until October, would bring to its basin fertile alluvium from which the inhabitants could produce enough food to feed not only all of Egypt but also ^Emmanuel-Auguste-Dieudonné, Comte de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, 2 vols (Pans, 1842), 1:468; Nakoula el-Turk, Histoire de l'expédition, 49. Neither pantalons nor turbans represent unique symbols of Islam. Perhaps this serves as an excellent example of Bonaparte's lack of understanding of the Muslim religion and confirmation that his overtures to Islam were for purely propaganda purposes. 2 Bonaparte to General Kleber, 5 fructidor an VII (22 August 1799), Napoleon Correspondance de Napoléon, No. 4374, V:737; Napoleon, Campagnes d'Italie, 11:212-13, 215Abd-al-Rahman al- Jabarti, Merveilles biographiques et historiques ou Chroniques du cheikh Abd-el-Rahman el- Djabarti 9 vols. (Cairo, 1888-96), VI:79; Emmanuel-Auguste-Dieudonné Comte de Las Cases, Memoirs of the Life, Exile, and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon, 2 vols. (London, 1836), I: 140; Abel Alcais, Napoléon et la religion: Idées et sentiments 'de Napoléon à l'égard de la religion (Rome, 1923), 42; Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt, 149; Peyre L'Expédition d'Egypte, 125; Charles-Roux, "La Politique Musulmane," 26-27.

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export the surplus to the rest of the Mediterranean. Since the age of the pharaohs the point at which the flood reached its peak was a time of rejoicing and sacred ritual. In antiquity, priests would process to the river's edge and sacrifice a statue (or even a real woman) to the Nile as a symbol of the goddess Isis, seeking her husband Osiris in the underworld. The fertility resulting from the silt deposits would be the divine pair's sign of their regeneration.1 The coming of Islam brought an end to the pagan element of this ritual, but Islam did not preclude the recognition of the importance which the flooding played in Egyptian life. As part of the revised festivity, the dike of the canal of Cairo, the most important of the Nile's canals, would be broken, and the flood waters would inundate the entire city making Cairo into an Arabian Venice. After the Fatimid conquest of Egypt, the new Shi'it dynasty needed a means of convincing their Sunni subjects that they would both undertake the responsibility of maintaining public works — such as the canal — and respect the local religious customs. No better means could have been chosen than by a Fatimid participation in the flooding ritual. Accompanied by a sumptuously ornamented cortege, the caliph himself attended the ceremony and indicated the signal for the dike to be broken. Like his Fatimid predecessors Bonaparte would also use the Nile fete as an excellent public relations appearance.2 The general sent invitations to the Muslim religious and secular leaders asking them to join him in what he predicted would be the grandest Nile feast which Egypt had yet witnessed. On the morning of 1 fructidor an VI (18 August 1798), the Nilometer registered that the waters had risen to fourteen cubits, signalling the beginning of the jubilee. 3 In the manner of the Fatimids, an elaborate train including the Pa§a, the members of the divan of Cairo, the ulemas of al-Azhar, the commander of the janissaries, and other Muslim notables as well as the French generals travelled with Sultan Kebir to the Nile island of Roudah where the dam inhibited the waters from the canal of Cairo. While the French garrison arranged itself along the length of the canal, ^Napoleon, Campagnes d'Italie, 11:41-47; Clement de la Jonquière, L'Expédition d'Égypte 17981801, 5 vols. (Paris, 1904), 111:477; Benoist-Méchin, Bonaparte en Egypte, 139; Charles Roux, "La Politique Musulmane," 38. 2 Paula Sanders, Ritual Politics and the City in Fatimid Egypt, SUNY Series in Medieval Middle East History, ed. Jere Bacharach (Albany, 1994), 99-104. Bonaparte himself proclaimed that he would re-establish the glory of the Fatimids [Napoleon, Campagnes d'Italie, 11:216]. 3 Statement of the rupture of the canal of Cairo made in the presence of the general in chief Bonaparte, as cited in de La Jonquière, L'Expédition d'Egypte, 11:480, Footnote 1; Napoleon, Campagnes d'Italie, 11:223; Abd-al-Rahman al-Jabartî, Journal d'un notable du Caire durant l'expédition française 1798-1801, trans. & ed. Joseph Cuoq (Paris, 1979), 47. The Nilometer (miqyas) was a marble, graduated column located on the island of Roudah in the river. At the time of the French expedition it was the official frame of reference in determining when the dike should be broken. According to de La Jonquière, the Nilometer had to reach 16 cubits before the festival could begin. [Napoleon, Campagnes d'Italie, 11:44; de La Jonquière, L'Expédition d'Égypte, 11:479-80.]

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French melodies by the revolutionary composer Etienne Mehul intermingled with the sounds of Arabian instruments. Artillery shots announced the moment when the dignitaries mounted a dais, richly ornamented with gold and appropriate symbols. An official reading of the Nilometer announced to the exultant crowd that the life-giving waters had risen faster this year than in previous seasons. For Bonaparte, nature itself seemed to betoken his claim to the favour of Allah. 1 Acting in the role of a Muslim caliph, Sultan Kebir gave the signal for the dike to be severed. As the river rushed through the open canal, the crowd and the army welcomed the flood with cheers and more artillery salutes. The waters flowed through the city rendering it accessible only by boat for the next several days. In keeping with the ancient custom, a clay, female statue was caste into the river while the assembled women plunged into the torrent to bathe in the waters of the Nile, reported to possess miraculous qualities on this day. Bonaparte continued to play the role of the eastern potentate by generously casting money from his dais into the canal for the divers and awarding a prize to the first boat which entered the canal. Likewise, he distributed caftans and pelisses, fur-trimmed cloaks, to the leading Muslim officials and invited them to a banquet at his headquarters in the square of Ezbekieh. That night, and for several subsequent nights, the reflection of lights from the illuminated houses shone in the flooded streets. 2 Two days later the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (mawlid) on 3 fructidor an VI (20 August 1798) accorded Bonaparte another opportunity to cadge the endorsement of the indigenous people and bind the French more closely to Egypt and Islam While of unknown origin, this feast day had been part of both the Sunni and Shi'i sacred calendars for centuries. The earliest recorded account of this celebration seemed to have come during the Fatimid reign of al-Mu'izz li-Din Allah in the tenth century whose purpose in establishing this tradition appeared to have been his desire to win the support of the masses through popular festivals. This daytime ritual, one of five birthdays commemorated by Shi'is, had three main parts: 1 ) an appearance by the caliph, 2) the recitation of the Koran in his presence, and 3) his Napoleon, Campagnes d'Italie, 11:223-24; Jabartî, Journal d'un notable. 47; Courrier de l'Egypte, 12 fructidor an VI (29 August 1798), No. 1; Benoist-Méchin, Bonaparte en Egypte, 140; Peyre, L'Expédition d'Egypte, 128, Spillmann, Napoléon et l'Islam, 86. Spillmann and Ader claimed that for this occasion Bonaparte really did wrap his head in a turban and clothe himself in caftan and pantalons, a costume which brought much amusement to the army; however, Jabartî described the general as dressed in his uniform [Jabartî, Journal d'un notable, 47; Jean Joseph Ader, Histoire de l'expédition d'Égypte et de Syrie (Paris, 1826), 112; Spillmann, Napoléon et l'Islam, 86]. The divan was the local governing body of Cairo established by Bonaparte. 2 Courrier de l'Égypte. 12 fructidor an VI (29 August 1798), No. 1; René-Edouard de Villiers du Terrage, Journal el souvenirs sur l'expédition d'Egypte 1798-1801, ed. Marc de Vffiiers du Terrage (Paris, 1899), 70-71; Jabartî, Journal d'un notable, 47; Benoist-Méchin, Bonaparte en Égypte, 140-41; Charles-Roux, "La Politique Musulmane," 39.

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presentation of gifts to the elite. The last of these remained politically the most important since these offerings solidified the bond between the caliph and his chief ministers. After the fall of the Fatimids, the commemoration of Muhammad's birth continued with some ritualistic differences instituted by the subsequent Sunni regimes. Bonaparte, who had learned of this special day through his study of Islam before his debarkation, determined that "the feast of the Prophet [would be] celebrated with more splendour than ever."1 On the first of these three days of festivities the general in chief attempted to impress the scholars of al-Azhar by sitting with them cross-legged on the floor, assuming a meditative expression and actively participating in the ritual movements included in the sacred reading of the Qur'an and the life of Muhammad. In the tradition of al-Mu'izz, he exercised his right as a sultan to present to the descendent of Muhammad, Sheikh al-Bakri an ermine caftan, the symbol of the latter's new position as head of the sheikhs.2 Upon the completion of these rites, Bonaparte and his general staff solemnly processed to the home of Sheikh al-Bakri where artillery discharges announced their arrival and departure. In addition to the mutton and Turkish coffee of al-Bakri's feast, other Arab specialities were offered throughout the city at banquets where the Frenchmen were ordered to with their Muslim brethren in remembrance of the birthday of Islam's greatest Prophet. This was just the sort of rapprochement which Bonaparte had hoped to achieve in regard to the French and the Muslims. Furthermore, this situation also afforded the French with the opportunity to observe the everyday lives of the Egyptian people which the commander presumed would lead to a greater understanding between the two, very different cultures.3 For several days the festivities continued with the traditional rituals and activities for the Prophet's birthday. During the day, snake charmers, dancers, and trained animals performed their feats for the enjoyment of the assembled crowd, while the praises of the Prophet and shrill cries characterized the nocturnal processions through the illuminated streets. As Bonaparte had requested, the French garrison also had its part in this celebration. It saluted the Prophet by military manoeuvres, artillery discharges, and fireworks ^Bonaparte to Ahmed-Pasha, 5 fructidor an VI (22 August 1798), Napoléon, Correspondance de Napoléon, No. 3078, IV:530; N. J. G. Kaptein, Muhammad's Birthday Festival: Early History in the Central Muslim Lands and Development in the Muslim West until the 10th/16th Century (Leiden, 1993), 20-34. Napoleon, Me'moires, Ii:265-66; Napoléon, Campagnes d'Italie. 11:225-26; Jabartî, Journal d'un notable, 48; Spillmann, Napoléon et l'Islam, 86; Benoist-Méchin, Bonaparte en Egypte, 14142; Charles-Roux, "La Politique Musulmane," 40. ^Napoléon, Mémoires, 11:266-67; Napoléon, Campagnes d'Italie, 11:226; Alphonse de Beauchamp, Mémoires secrets et inédits pour servir à l'histoire contemporaine (Paris, 1825), 1:175; Courrier de l'Egypte, 12 fructidor an VI (29 August 1798), No. 1; Nakoula el-Turk, Histoire de l'expédition, 51; Ader, Histoire de l'expédition, 114-15; Benoist-Méchin, Bonaparte en Egypte, 142.

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displays, all to the accompaniment of French and Turkish music. Then, the soldiers could mingle with the people and take note of the practices associated with this holy day. The troops curiously observed the exhibitions of the fakirs or santons. These Muslim mendicant holy men formed a circle in which, according to the French, they shrieked and gyrated until one or all fell to the ground from exhaustion. 1 Bonaparte commanded his generals stationed in the other cities of Egypt to observe this feast with as much splendour as he had ordered in Cairo. At Alexandria Jean-Baptiste Kléber, ordered a canon salute, and at night he, together with the aga (the chief officer) of the janissary corps, left the illuminated headquarters of the French garrison to dine at the home of the local sheikh, al-Messiri. The sheikh, wishing to impress his foreign guest, served rice in the colours of the French flag. The next evening as the celebration continued, Kléber reciprocated by hosting a dinner for the sheikh, the aga, and the members of the Alexandria divan. In acknowledgement of the honour paid him by the tricoloured rice and in an effort to prove himself sensitive to Islamic precepts, Kléber's table offered only non-alcoholic beverages. 2 Jacques François Menou, the governor of the province of Rosetta, along with some of his officers and some of the French intellectuals attended Sheikh al-Balad's all-night feast at which carpeted tents were set up in the street to accommodate all the guests. By extending the army's participation to the provincial celebrations, Bonaparte demonstrated that he recognized the need to convince all Egyptians of the sincerity of the French in regard to religion. 3 At the end of August, Bonaparte developed the protocol for the third and most spectacular festival of all, the commemoration of the founding of the French Republic on 1 vendemiaire an I (22 September 1792). For the previous two Muslim holy days, he had attempted to win the approbation of the population by incorporating his army into the performance of the usual rituals and festivities. This time, he hoped to draw the Egyptian people even closer to the French by allotting to the former some roles in the French New Year's celebration. 4 With the general in chief at liberty to design his own plan for the French holiday, he sought to link the prestige of Egypt's past to the military prowess of the French army. Therefore, he had constructed in the square of

^Nakoula el-Turk, Histoire^de l'expédition, 51; Étienne Louis Malus, L'Agenda de Malus: Souvenirs de l'expédition d'Égypte 1798-1801, ed. General Thoumas (Paris, 1892), 89; Villiers du Terrage, Journal et souvenirs, 71-72; Journal de Detroye, as cited in de La Jonquière, L'Expédition d'Egypte, 11:481-82; Benoist-Méchin, Bonaparte en Egypte, 142. ^Napoléon to Vial, 3 fructidor an VI (20 August 1798), Napoléon, Correspondance de Napoléon, No. 3050, IV, 507; Journal of the chief-of-staff of Kleber, as cited in de La Jonquière, L'Expédition d'Egypte. 11:506-07; Charles-Roux, "La Politique Musulmane," 41. •^Vivant Denon, Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt, The Middle East Collection (New Ywtk, 1973), 1:202-5; Charles-Roux, "La Politique Musulmane," 41-42. 4 d e La Jonquière, L'Expédition d'Egypte, III: 19.

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Ezbekieh a four-sided pyramid of granite, seventy feet in height, with a pedestal decorated in bas-relief. One side of the pyramid bore the gold inscription: To the French Republic. An VII, and the other side: To the expulsion of the Mamluk. An VI. Engraved on the other two sides were these same phrases in Arabic. A circle of columns, each one inscribed with the name of a department of France, surrounded the pyramid and were connected by double garlands, the symbol of the indivisibility of the French nation. The colonnade opened in two places; for the portico entrance, the general had written in Arabic: There is no God but God. and Muhammad is his prophet. To parallel this Muslim entrance, an arc de triomphe was erected directly opposite the portico and displayed a painting of the Battle of the Nile by Michel Rigo, one of the artists of the Institute of Egypt. In this way, the opposite approaches would symbolize how the separate cultures of the French and the Muslims would come together under the administration of the French Republic, denoted by the circle of unity. On the seven altars erected outside the circle, candles, trophies of war, tricolour flags, and civic crowns framed lists of the brave soldiers who had died in the initial battles to free the Egyptians from Mamluk rule. With Egyptian symbols glorifying the Republican virtues of valour and unity, Bonaparte had created the perfect mise en scène for the execution of his grand pageant. 1 On 1 vendemiaire, three shots hailed the French New Year and summoned the troops to assemble at the square of Ezbekieh. Bonaparte had invited his generals, administrators, and members of the Institute as well as all the Muslim, Christian, and Syrian leaders to observe this day's ceremonies with him. The French put on their dress uniforms, and the Egyptians arrayed themselves marvellously in cashmere turbans and muslin pelisses ornamented with gold and silver. The dazzling cortege processed to the square and, to the sound of military marches, placed itself on the carpeted platform at the foot of the pyramid. The troops of Generals Jean Lannes, Joachim Murat, Louis-André Bon, and Thomas Dumas greeted their general in chief with artillery fire, after which they passed before him in review and performed military m a n o e u v r e s . 2 The guns and music ceased as the Adjutant General Pierre-François-Joseph Boyer proceeded to read Bonaparte's stirring

The first five altars were dedicated to the five divisions of the army, the sixth to the marine, and the seventh to the general staff, artillery, and engineer divisions. There appeared to be some discrepancy in the various eyewitness accounts of this scene so this paper has reported the arrangement as it was described by the majority of the narratives. Also, the above description was in complete conformity with that of the Courrier de l'Egypte. Courrier de l'Egypte, No. 8, 6 vendémiaire an VII (27 September 1798); Beauchamp, Mémoires secrets, 176; Jabartî, Journal d'un notable, 52; Villiers du Terrage, Journal et souvenirs, 75; Benoist-Méchin, Bonaparte en Egypte, 144-45. 2 Courrier de l'Egypte, No. 8, 6 vendémiaire an VII (27 September 1798); Beauchamp, Mémoires secrets, 176-77; Jabartî, Journal d'un notable, 55. For minute details of the troop arrangements, see Bonaparte to Berthier, 4 complémentaire an VI (20 September 1798), as cited in de la Jonquière, L'Expédition d'Egypte, 111:22.

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proclamation to the troops. In recalling the great victories which his men had earned, particularly over the past two years, he urged them to keep in mind the triumphant destiny to which they had been called. The men, some a bit teary-eyed as noted by one eyewitness, received such a rousing appeal with enthusiastic cries of vive la République, while the orchestra seconded these sentiments with a patriotic hymn composed for the occasion by Rouget de Lisle. The military display ended with the commissioning of a detachment, made up of men from each battalion, to crown the highest pyramid at Giza with a tricolour flag. 1 Bonaparte once again feted the Muslim leaders as well as his compatriots with a magnificent banquet at which he deferred to the dietary restrictions of Islam in finalizing the menu. For the decorations Bonaparte did not fail to capitalize on the opportunity to once again propagandize as he intermingled the Turkish colours with the French tricolour and the cap of liberty with the crescent. At dessert the French toasts to their Republic, Alexandre Berthier's raised glass "to the goodness of the people of Egypt," and more patriotic songs drew the applause of all. 2 Foot and horse races provided the afternoon entertainment with the latter receiving the most interest since the famed Arabian horses would be matched against the French steeds. At this particular race the only French entry belonging to Simon de Sucy claimed victory, while Berthier's and Andoche Junot's Arabians came in second and third. 3 The day finished with illuminations of the pyramid complex and a fireworks display. As with the birthday of Muhammad, Bonaparte sent out the order for the feast of the French Republic to be celebrated in the provincial areas as well. 4 Menou conducted his ceremony in much the same way as Bonaparte, even commanding the building of an artificial pyramid encompassed by a circle around which his troops would march. Foot races, illuminations, and fireworks were sponsored as well. 5 At Alexandria, Kléber's garrison troops executed military manoeuvres in much the same fashion as their Cairo brothers-in-arms. However, instead of parading around a man-made pyramid, 1 Proclamation à l'armée, 1 vendémiaire an VII (22 September 1798), Napoléon, Correspondance de Napoléon, No. 3365, V, 1-2; Courrier de l'Égypte, No. 8, 6 vendémiaire an VII, (27 September 1798); Bonaparte to Berthier, 4 complémentaire an VI (20 September 1798), as cited in de La Jonquière, L'Expédition d'Égypte, 111:21-22; Benoist-Méchin, Bonaparte en Egypte, 145-46. Georges Mauguin, "Un chant de guerre pour l'Egypte," Revue des études napoléoniennes (1934), 264. ^Courrier de l'Égypte, No. 8, 6 vendémiaire an VII, (27 September 1798), Jabartî, Journal d'un notable, 55. D Courrier de l'Egypte, No. 8, 6 vendémiaire an VII, (27 September 1798), Beauchamp, Mémoires secrets, 177; Jabartî, Journal d'un notable, 55; Villiers du Terrage, Journal et souvenirs, 75-76. 4

Courrier de l'Égypte, No. 7, 1 vendémiaire an VII (22 September 1798). Ibid., No. 10, 15 vendémiaire an VII.

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the Alexandria battalions formed a square around the column of Pompey surmounted by the tricolour flag. Fireworks and lanterns on the houses and Cleopatra's needle illuminated the entire night as the French danced to the sounds of their patriotic hymns.1 In supervising these grandiose festivals, Bonaparte, time and again, sought to persuade the Egyptians that he desired to form an integrated society of mutual respect between the Muslim community and his French army. Sultan Kebir seemed to fancy himself as the individual who would dispel from these people the myths that they had entertained about westerners since the time of the Crusades, namely that all Europeans sought the destruction of Islam. The French, as Bonaparte hoped to show, would not only tolerate Islam but would make unprecedented efforts to become better acquainted with it. 2 Despite his assertions of promoting cultural harmony though, the fact of the matter remained that pacification of the Muslim population was necessary in order to establish French dominance in the Middle East. Therefore, he had his overtures of goodwill widely publicized throughout the entire Islamic world. He assured Ahmad Pa§a that the French felt kinship with the followers of Islam and would therefore do everything possible to protect Muslims and ensure that the annual holy days would continue with even greater splendour than previously.3 Furthermore, he requested that the Muslim leaders of Cairo address to the Sharif of Mecca a letter which would express his favourable sentiments; naturally, he would have approved the final copy. 4 He even sent his generals as envoys to the religious leaders of the other Egyptian cities to inform them of his fabulous displays and his favouritism for the religion of the Prophet. Auguste Frédéric Louis Marmont was to enlighten the sheikh of Rosetta of "the manner in which we have celebrated the feast of the Prophet... and that no one more than I is persuaded of the purity and the holiness of the Muslim religion."5 Yet, despite all these protestations, the ultimate proof of the success of his plan would lie in the reaction of the Muslim people to his demonstrations. To read Bonaparte's accounts of these festivities, one certainly receives the impression that his scheme accomplished his goal perfectly; according to him, Muslims and Frenchmen walked arm in arm enjoying universal fraternity under Sultan Kebir's benevolent administration. On the same day as the llbid., No. 10, 15 vendémiaire an VII (6 October 1798). ^Bonaparte to Kle'ber, 12 thermidor an VI (30 July 1798), as cited in de La Jonquière, II: 316; Las Cases, Memoirs of the life, III: 39. ^Bonaparte to Ahmed-Pasha, 5 fructidor an VI (22 August 1798), Napoléon, Correspondance de Napoleon, No. 3078, IV :530. 4 Sheikhs and notables of Cairo to the Sherif of Mecca, as cited in Courrier de l'Égypte, No. 6 , 2 complémentaire an VI (18 September 1798). ^Bonaparte to Marmont, 11 fructidor an VI (28 August 1798), as cited in Cherffls, Bonaparte et l'Islam, No. 3147, Doc. Ill, 18.

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flooding of the Nile, Bonaparte declared to Menou that "the feast which one celebrated here for opening of the canal of the Nile appeared to cause pleasure to the inhabitants." 1 The letter to the Sharif of Mecca also described the general's role in the ritual while the Courrier de l'Egypte reported that "an immense populace" escorted him both to the river and back to his headquarters while pronouncing vigorous acclaim for their new ruler. "Yes, you have come to deliver us by the order of the merciful God; because you have been victorious and you have the most beautiful Nile that there has been in a century: these are two blessings which God alone can grant." 2 No doubt Bonaparte had certainly embellished these accounts of the event in order to use them in his public relations campaign. Contrarily, Abd-al-Rahman al-Jabartî, a m e m b e r of Cairo's merchant class, looked on this unabashedly propagandistic use of a sacred holiday with complete contempt. He would not even allow that very many spectators attended the ceremony and especially that no Muslims left their homes that night to see the city in lights. According to him, only the non-Egyptian, non-Muslim people took part in the nocturnal illumination, and they even scandalously allowed their women to view the scene as well. 3 Jabartî for his part manifested his own, anti-French prejudices in his journal; thus, he would naturally have no desire to see the French succeed at anything, especially in convincing his fellow Cairenes that the French favoured Islam. Therefore, the truth of the situation must have lain somewhere in-between the disparate reports of Bonaparte and Jabarti. For an account of the birthday of Muhammad, reading only the Courrier de l'Egypte and the letter to the Sharif of Mecca would transmit a false impression of the situation. The holy day may very well have been observed "with the greatest pomp," and Bonaparte may have "spent much money" on the festivities, yet it remains doubtful that this exhibition managed to secure for him "the satisfaction of the true believers." 4 Although Nakoula al-Turk asserted that the French celebrated the feast with greater pomp and ceremony than the Mamluks, Jabartî once again paints a very different picture. He recounts how Bonaparte noticed that no preparations were underway at the usual time for the celebration of this birthday. When he inquired after the reason for this permission, Sheikh al-Bakri, who was responsible for the feast by order of his title, claimed that the religious leaders decided to dispense with the custom for that year given the recent, tumultuous events. Not satisfied with this reasoning, Bonaparte must have realized the real reason for this ^Bonaparte to Menou, 1 fructidor an VI (18 August 1798), Napoléon, Correspondance de Napoléon, No. 3042, IV:497. 2 Courrier de l'Égypte, No.l, 12 fructidor an VI (29 August 1798); Sheikhs and notables of Cairo to the Sherif of Mecca, as cited in Ibid., No. 6, 2 complémentaire an VI (18 September 1798). The French account again used Dieu rather than Allah. %abartf, Journal d'un notable, 47. 4 Courrier de l'Égypte, No. 1, 12 fructidor an VI; Sheikhs and notables of Cairo to the Sherif of Mecca, as cited in Courrier de l'Egypte, No. 6, 2 complémentaire an VI.

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cancellation: the Islamic nation still did not trust these foreigners and refused to include them in their sacred rituals. As a result, the general himself had to donate the money and oversee the feast's organization while at the same time obtain the participation of the mufti only by a threat of death. 1 This time, Jabarti's details bore more veracity than Bonaparte's since the former's description of the reluctance of the Muslims of Cairo mirrored the opposition which Menou encountered in Rosetta. Not only did the mufti there neglect the arrangements, but he even spread the rumour among the people that the French had proscribed the jubilee. When Menou found out about this, he too had to resort to duress in order to obtain the mufti's, support. Apparently, the Islamic community did not trust the future Abdullah any more than it trusted his commander in chief.2 Indeed, the Muslims must have discerned Sultan Kebir's courtship of Islam for what it truly was, mere propaganda. The French New Year seemed to be the only one of the three feasts for which the Muslims evinced any positive appreciation. Like later colonizers who would try to inspire awe in their conquered peoples with military parades, the French, according to the Courrier de VEgypte, rather impressed the Egyptians with their troop manoeuvres, the good order in their ranks, and their artillery discharges. 3 Even Jabarti confessed that the invited notables who accompanied Bonaparte at the pyramid ceremony and dressed in their finest attire appeared "on this day, extremely happy."4 However, this holiday did not win the complete approval of all the eastern observers, some of whom missed the scene's Egyptian/French symbolism. "The French said that the column was the tree of liberty, but the Egyptians responded that it was rather the pike with which they were impaled and the sign of the conquest of their country. The pike remained pitched for about ten months, and when it was removed the Egyptians felt great delight."5 While the Muslims may have enjoyed these outlandish productions at the time, the people would soon show how much credibility they put in Bonaparte's attempts to win them through their religion. The French canon which had been used to signal the flooding of the Nile, the arrival of the Prophet's birthday, and the French New Year would soon be turned towards the Cairenes as they erupted in revolt.

ijabartî, Journal d'un notable, 48; Ader, Histoire de l'expédition, 113. For more information on the role of the ulemas and the sheikhs in late eighteenth-century Egypt, see Nikki R. Keddie, Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500 (Berkeley, 1972). Denon, Travels in Upper, I, 200-1; Benoist-Méchin, Bonaparte en Égypte, 143. 3 Courrier de l'Égypte, No. 8, 6 vendémiaire an VII (27 September 1798); Charles-Roux, "La Politique Musulmane," 44. ^Jabartî, Journal d'un notable, 55. ^Nakoula el-Turk, Histoire de l'expédition, 52.

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In showing his predisposition for Islam through the celebration of these festivals, Bonaparte had hoped to make his army acceptable to the local people so that they would not feel that their religion was threatened. As the commander in chief he could assign roles for his troops in these feasts and mandate their participation. Yet, in trying to integrate them into Islamic customs, he must have assumed that his soldiers would unquestionably trust their general's judgement and whole-heartedly embrace their Muslim brethren. This certainly was not the case. While he had ordered his troops to outwardly show respect for the beliefs and holy men of Islam, their internal opinions and prejudices against a religion of which many had probably never even heard would remain unchanged. The French, instilled with an aversion f o r religiosity, viewed the practices and rituals of Islam to which the ordinary people clung as disdainfully as they had the traditions of Catholicism which the Revolution had disparaged. Witnessing the faqirs at Muhammad's birthday the soldiers, who described these holy men as "maniacs" and "venerated fools," were animated with only "pity and contempt." 1 For the same festival, the entertainment disgusted Vivant Denon who denounced the dancing as "not the expression of joy, or of gaiety, but of an extravagant pleasure, which made hasty strides towards lasciviousness; and this was the more disgusting, as the performers, all them of the male sex, presented in the most indecent way scenes which love has reserved for the two sexes in the silence and mystery of the night." 2 Even Bonaparte's second in command Kleber resented his order to play a role in a feast filled with superstition and bizarre rites. Among the chief officers only Menou would take the ultimate step and convert; most would maintain Kleber's attitude toward the religion of the Prophet. 3 On Saint Helena Napoleon would still assert that had he converted, his army—fiercely loyal and obedient to its commander in chief—would have eagerly followed him. Nonetheless, he tempered this claim by accepting the reality that, "they would have treated it as a joke..." 4

' Mai us, L'Agenda de Malus, 89; Villiers du Terrage, Journal et souvenirs, 72. Denon, Travels in Upper, 205. Eloquent indignation indeed from the former courtier and ornographer of the ancien regime. Charles-Roux, "La Politique Musulmane," 41; Benoist-Méchin, Bonaparte en Egypte, 143. Both French and Muslims suspected that the sixty-year old Menou had converted only in order to marry the daughter of a Rosetta bathkeeper. 4 Las Cases, Memoirs of the life, 10:39. Bourrienne unequivocally denied that Bonaparte pursued such a policy in regard to Islam and attacked Sir Walter Scott's biography for presenting the general as an avid suitor of Muslim support. "Bonaparte had never been, other than by curiosity, in a mosque and never showed himself a moment persuaded to the mission of Muhammad [Bourrienne's emphasis]; this absurdity may have entered into a novel injurious to the French nation; it must be rejected by history." [See Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne, Mémoires de M. de Bourrienne. ministre d'état: sur Napoléon le directoire, le consulat, l'empire et la restauration (Paris, 1829), 11:165-67, 173.] Since the memoirs of the soldiers in Egypt, the journal of Jabartî, and Napoleon's own writings refute Bourrienne's claim, his memoirs have not been included as a source. However, Las Cases wrote that Napoleon, propagandist to the very end, put forth on Saint Helena that he only entered a mosque "as a conqueror, never as one of the faithful" [Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, 11:468]. 2

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Ultimately, Bonaparte's scheme to delegate roles for himself and his army in the Muslim festivals and to incorporate the community of believers into the celebration of the French national holiday failed to convince the Islamic community that his professions of preference for their religion were genuine. "However, in spite of all their [the French's] efforts, they could not inspire confidence in their [the Muslim population's] hearts."1 The revolt in Cairo, only one month after the last celebration, would prove that the spectacles had not succeeded in impressing the people either. In their eyes the French, no matter how fantastic their displays of affinity for Islam, would always be seen as infidels, and as long as "the first key of the Holy Kaaba" remained in the hands of idolaters, Muslims everywhere would feel nothing but shame. Likewise, the general in chief failed to persuade his army that it would benefit from a symbiotic relationship with what his soldiers discerned as only another form of fanaticism. "The prediction of Volney would be realized" for indeed, all his efforts could not prevent the inevitable tri-part war. 2 In the end, Bonaparte was forced to concede that he would never be quite suitable in a turban.

^Nakoula el-Turk, Histoire de l'expédition, 49. ^Napoléon, Campagnes d'Italie, 11:211-12. As for the other two opponents whom Volney had indicated, at the beginning of 1799, Bonaparte went to war with the Porte who had just added his empire to the Second Coalition. The British harassed the French in Egypt until Menou, the last governor after Bonaparte's departure for France, finally capitulated in 1801.

HOW SURGEON LARREY TREATED GENERAL CAFFARELLI: A CASE STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF MILITARY MEDICINE EranDOLEV

In his will written in exile at St. Helena on 25 April, 1821, Napoleon mentioned the name of Baron Dominique Jean Larrey, noting: "Larrey was the most virtuous man I have ever known." He added: "Larrey was the most honest man, and the best friend to the soldiers that I ever knew... He tormented the generals, and disturbed them out of their beds at night whenever he wanted accommodation or assistance for the wounded and sick ... I hold him in the highest esteem. If the army were to raise a monument to the memory of one man, it should be that of Larrey. 1 " Dominique Jean Larrey is recognized as one of the greatest military surgeons of all times. He revolutionized the role of the field surgeon by allowing surgical teams to operate as close to the front line as possible. 2 Inventing the "ambulance volante" (flying ambulance) after the Rhine campaign of 1792, Larrey introduced the element of "time" as an important factor in the treatment of casualties and may be considered the forefather of modern emergency medicine. The ambulance volante unit was made up of surgeons, nurses and medical orderlies whose surgical equipment was located and arranged in specially designed carts drawn by horses. These surgical units became an essential part of the combat units, treating casualties on the battlefield and evacuating them in the carts to field hospitals for further treatment 3 . Larrey was a highly skilled surgeon, mainly a traumatologist, who

1 P. E. Bechet "Dominique Jean Larrey: a Great Military Surgeon" Ann. Med. Hist., 9 (1937) 428-36. 2 0 . H. Wangesteen, S. D. Wangesteen and C.F. Klinger "Wound Management of Ambroise Pare and Dominique Jean Larrey, Great French Military Surgeons of the 16th and 19th centuries" Bull. Hist. Med., 46 (1972), 207-34. 3 J. C. Da Costa, "Baron Larrey — a Sketch", Bull. Johns Hopkins Hosp. 17 (1906), 195-215. L. A Brewer III, "Baron Dominique Jean Larrey (1766-1842): Father of Modern Military Surgery Innovator, Humanist", J. Thorac. Cardiovasc. Surg. 92 (1986), 1096-98. Dominique Jean Larrey, Memoirs of Military Surgery, and Campaigns of the French Army, translated by Richard Willmott Hall, (Baltimore : Joseph Cushing, 1814), Vol. 1, pp. 173-75.

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considered amputation in severe cases of compound fractures as a means of debridment1. Many surgical innovations have been attributed to him.2 He was, however, not only a great military surgeon but an able medical officer concerned with the health of the troops at all times. He was also a humanist. Long before the establishment of the Red Cross Organization, Larrey treated casualties on the battlefield, comrades and foes alike, with the same skill and devotion and with no discrimination whatsoever. Soldiers admired him for saving so many lives and nicknamed him "The Providence". Larrey encountered the young General Napoleon Bonaparte in 1793, following him thereafter in over 25 campaigns and 60 battles. He was with Napoleon as chief surgeon during the expedition to Egypt and Palestine in 1799, chief surgeon of the Grand Armée in Russia in 1812, and in his last battle in Waterloo 3 . He served in the military for over forty years. Early in his military career he began to keep a diary, in which he wrote every day, no matter what the circumstances. In it he described various events and the cases he had treated, evaluating them, drawing conclusions from them, and even criticizing the treatment he himself had given or recommended. One of the cases that Baron Larrey described in his memoirs, based on his diary entries, was that of the injury, treatment and eventual death of General Caffarelli, a commander in the Egyptian expedition. Larrey wrote" : I was impatient to return to camp and examine the wounded, in whose fate I was much interested, and in particular for General Caffarelli, whose arm I had taken off some days before our departure for Mount Tabor. I was satisfied with his state; the wound began to cicatrise, and every appearance gave me hopes of his cure; but some unfortunate circumstances interrupted the operations of nature, and rendered all my cares unavailing. I shall thereafter detail his case. General Bonaparte ordered the preparations for the siege to be continued, and determined on a third assault, which was made two or three days after. This attack was to have been preceded by the explosion of a mine which would have sprung the grand tower that was already partly demolished; but this mine was discovered, and the enemy pushed their works as far as our first line, in such a manner that brisk skirmishes took place every day between them and our troops. It became necessary to change our measures and multiply our operations,

^O. H. Wangesteen, S. D. Wangesteen and C.F. Klinger, "Wound Management of Ambroise Paré and Dominique Jean Larrey, Great French Military Surgeons of the 16th and 19th centuries", Bull. Hist. Med. 46 (1972), 207-234. 2 J. C. Da Costa, "Baron Larrey — a Sketch", Bull. Johns Hopkins Hasp. 17 (1906), 195-215. 3 J. C. Da Costa, "Baron Larrey-a Sketch", Bull. Johns Hopkins Hosp. 17 (1906), 195-215.

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which increased the number of the wounded and the labours of the soldiers. The disease already mentioned made great progress; nevertheless, as it was important to take the city, new assaults were successively made, until they amounted to thirteen. It may easily be imagined, (to say nothing of the vicissitudes of the atmosphere and of the insalubrity of the soil of the plain of Acre) what we had to suffer during the siege of ther city. I did not enjoy a moment's repose. I was incessantly in the ambulances or running from the camp to the trenches, and from the trenches to the hospital, or busied in going through the divisions, where we had almost as many sick and wounded as in the ambulances. We had about two thousand wounded in this siege. In general the wounds were severe, sometimes three near each other. Seventy amputations were performed; two of which were at the articulation of the os femoris with the acetabulum... Of six amputations of the arm at the scapular articulation, four were perfectly successful; the two others were followed by death, from the concussion of the ball... General Caffarelli, previous to the third assault, was struck by a musket-ball from the ramparts, which fractured the articulation of the left elbow: all the articular surfaces were broken up, the condyles of the humerus sparated by a longitudinal fracture, the olecranon entirely detached, all the ligaments were torn, the insertions of the tendons and the aponeuroses wounded or torn assunder. In addition to this there was an injury of the whole limb, and of the organs of the abdomen, and of the thorax caused by the violent concussion of the ball, and the fall of the patient which took place at the instant he was wounded. This wound required amputation of the arm; the general himself requested it. After the operation, the pains soon abated, and the wound was healing rapidly, when, on the thirteenth day from that of the operation he was seized with all the symptoms of nervous fever, occasioned, no doubt, by the coolness and dampness of the nights, the insalubrity of the camp, and other causes foreign from the operation. On the nineteenth day from the operation, the general died. On opening his body, which was done in the presence of the chief physician, Desgenettes, who had also assisted in the treatment of his disease, a purulent abscess was found in the substance of the liver, and another of considerable size in the left lobe of the lungs with an effusion in the thorax. It is very probable that this internal disorder was occasioned by the shock which these organs had undergone, and by a bilious idiosyncrasy. 1 ijean Dominique, Larrey, Memoirs of Military Surgery, and Campaigns of the French Army, translated by Richard Willmontt Hall, (Baltimore, Joseph Cushing, 1814), Vol. 1, pp. 173-75.

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The context of this chapter in Larrey's memoirs is well known: In 1798, General Bonaparte was ordered by the Directorate in Paris, to sail to Egypt as head of a military expedition, that included some 38,000 soldiers. On 8 February 1799, he left Egypt with the intention of conquering Palestine and Syria with an expedition of 13,000 soldiers. After 113 days in Palestine, Napoleon had to retreat back to Egypt as a result of his failure to conquer Acre and the many losses on the battlefield and due to the plague. The French casualty rate was about 30%-40% during the Galilee campaigns, which included the unfortunate siege of Acre. Some 1200 soldiers were killed, 2300 were wounded and about 1000 died of the plague. Among the dead were 44 medical officers. Still, enough doctors remained under the chief physician René Desgenettes and the chief surgeon Dominique Jean Larrey, to continue to give appropriate medical and surgical services to the fighting soldiers. In light of the extensive suffering of the French troops and the large number of sick and wounded, the explicit mention of the case of General Caffarelli in Baron Larrey's memoirs is curious. The reason for it lies in the personalities of both heroes of this episode — Caffarelli and Larrey. Who was General Caffarelli? General Louis Marie Joseph Maximilien Caffarelli du Falga was the commander of the Engineer Corps of Napoleon's Egyptian expedition, a brave soldier and a well-liked commander. Born in 1756, he was a professional soldier and had lost a leg during the Rhine campaign of 1792. Recovering from that amputation, he continued his military career and was assigned to General Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition. He sailed to the Orient, his wooden leg a quite exceptional feature then. In Egypt, he was nicknamed by the local people "Abu Hashab" — "the one with the wooden leg". According to one source, he first encountered Dominique Jean Larrey during the French landing in Egypt: On the evening of July 1, the fleet anchored in the bay of Marabout, about 12 miles west of Alexandria. Bonaparte was advised against landing immediately as there was a strong wind blowing and a heavy sea running, but he could not risk the British appearing and, besides, he wanted to surprise the Turks before they could organize their defence. Good luck was with them as boat-load after boat-load reached the beach without serious mishap. The only anxious moment was then the popular General Maximilien Caffarelli, in command of the engineers, managed to get his wooden leg tangled up in the rigging and fell overboard. Larrey leaped into the sea and dragged him through the surf to the safety of dry land.1 G. Richardson, Larrey: Surgeon to Napoleon's Imperial Guard (London: John Murray, 1974), p. 45.

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Caffarelli had considerable influence over Napoleon. He strongly supported the idea of the independence of the medical service from the supply corps. His death during the siege of Acre was a severe blow to French military medicine. Larrey was puzzled by the cause of Caffarelli's death. It seemed to him that he had been treated well, and no complications at the site of the amputation had been detected. Certainly, Larrey was not blamed. Yet, as an experienced military surgeon, he felt that he must do everything he could to determine the cause of Caffarelli's death. Typically, as a surgeon of integrity, Larrey did not perform the autopsy of the general by himself or for himself but invited the chief medical officer of the force, Prof. René Desgenettes, to attend it. The autopsy revealed several abscesses in various internal organs. Today, the cause of death would be defined as septicaemia — the spread of micro-organisms into the blood stream, causing multi-organ failure. However, decades before the great discoveries by Pasteur and Lister regarding microbes and antisepsis, no one could be blamed for an inability to understand the mechanism of deterioration in the case. Moreover, even in the event of a correct surmise, there was no way, at that time, to treat the condition. The cause of death was attributed to climatic factors, according to what was known and accepted at the time. It well suited the general feeling, articulated in Larrey's memoirs, about the suffering that the French force endured in Palestine, mainly during the siege of Acre.1 Hippocrates, who is considered the father of Western medicine, wrote in 5th century BC.: "If you want to be a good physician — follow the army." He also wrote : "If you want to be a great doctor, try to learn from your mistakes." It would appear that Baron Dominique Jean Larrey, Napoleon's favourite surgeon, took both these pieces of advice. General Maximilien Caffarelli was buried together with other soldiers, on the battlefield itself. The exact place of the grave was forgotten in the course of time, to be discovered only in 1969, when a skeleton, without a leg and an arm was definitively identified. A tombstone was erected at the site 1 Dominique Jean Larrey, Memoirs of Military Surgery, and Campaigns of the French Army, translated by Richard Willmott Hall (Baltimore: Joseph Cushing 18)4), Vol. 1, pp. 173-75.

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commemorating the brave soldier and the special epoch in the histories of France and Palestine:1

ICI REPOSENT LE GENERAL LOUIS CAFFARELLI ET SES COMPAGNONS DE L'ARMEE DE NAPOLEON BONAPARTE MORTS AU SIEGE DE SAINT JEAN D'ACRE 1799

' f . Schiller, "How General Caffarelli's Grave was Discovered" Kardom 24/25 (1983), 177-179, (Jerusalem, Ariel).

THE SURGEON AND THE EMPEROR: A HUMANITARIAN ON THE BATTLEFIELD Moshe FEINSOD

Introduction The modern state requires the services or specialities of physicians and surgeons in areas quite remote from pure medicine, in which their decisions have far-reaching financial consequences, such as in the area of damages and liability or the determination of degree of disability, sometimes in the political arena, and even when life and death are hanging in the balance. In such situations, the physician is liable to find himself influenced by substantial pressures. While normally in situation such as these experienced specialists are enlisted, in the military framework physicians who have just completed their medical studies and have not yet developed a well-established and stable medical personality are called upon to fill this role. The physician in the military is considered both an officer and a commander, such that together with carrying out military duties, he must deal with professional and ethical issues which are not always well defined or established, while sources of authority are far removed. He must carry out his responsibility in spite of pressures from unit commanders and fellow officers. The physician must share with his comrade officers the problems of command and of accomplishing the missions, while at the same time consistently hearing of the hardship of the soldiers who place their trust in him. In addition to the expected function of caring for the sick or injured soldier, the most difficult and complex task of the military physician from every point of view is on the one hand to be concerned with the well-being and health of the soldier, while on the other determining his fitness, sometimes in spite of protest, and thus sending the soldier on missions which endanger his life. It appears that there is no single solution to this problem. However, the story of the Commission of Inquiry at the Customs House in Bautzen, in which the surgeon, Dominique Jean Larrey, plays a leading role, can serve for every physician as a stellar example in terms of his behaviour and decision making.

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Dominique Jean Larrey, Biographical Notes Dominique Jean Larrey (1766-1842), one of the great names in the annals of surgery in general, and military surgery in particular, left his village, Baudean, in the Pyrénées Mountains, and moved to the central city of the region, Toulouse, in order to study in the faculty of surgery. Following the completion of his studies in 1788, he served for a number of months as a physician aboard the frigate Vigilante, then hurried to Paris in order to study under the tutelage of M. Desault, who was a pioneering surgeon at the HôtelDieu Hospital. Toward the end of his studies, he developed a specialized needle for suturing blood vessels and was awarded the Gold Medal of the Academy of Medicine for his invention. Following the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, an alliance of European states was organized for the purpose of putting down the rebellion and reinstating the kingdom. In 1793, a large popular army was conscripted in order to protect the borders of France from the armies of the European alliance. Larrey was attached to the forces of the Revolution, and as such he began to serve as a military surgeon, an office which he held from that time until the end of his life, and to which his life was dedicated. His best-known contribution was the rapid evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield, while beginning to treat them as close as possible to the time of the injury. An evacuation vehicle attached to horses was immediately labelled the "Ambulance Volante" — the "Flying Ambulance." This was the first time that the wounded were evacuated by a fast-moving battlefield vehicle rather than at the end of the day, or days, of battle on the shoulders of their comrades or by slow-moving oxcarts. Larrey never ceased perfecting his rapid treatment methods by exploiting his anatomical knowledge. He invested much time in instructing surgical staffs, while constantly increasing their professional skills and their level of dedication to their task. His attention to the correct treatment of battlefield injuries, regularly changing clean bandages, and his prevention of the immediate suturing of battlefield wounds brought about impressive results in comparison to other wars fought in the nineteenth century. Larrey met Napoleon during the French siege of the city of Toulon (1793), and remained close to him ever since. He accompanied Napoleon during all of his battles and was appointed the chief surgeon of Napoleon's guard. He was among the close friends of some of the best and highest-ranking officers of Napoleon's army (Desaix, Lannes, Durec), and suffered great persona] tragedy when, during the many battles, these close friends themselves became casualties of war. Larrey's dedication to the wounded and to the responsibilities of his position knew no limits and no rest. He performed surgery on the battlefield under fire and was twice wounded himself while caring for his patients.

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Moreover, he cared for the enemy wounded as if they were soldiers of his own army, and by doing so hé laid the foundation of the code of ethics of all medical corps, while demonstrating the ideals of the Red Cross, before the organization's establishment, by his own personal example. For the wellbeing of the wounded, he dared to enter into conflicts with the highest-ranking officers in order to achieve his ends. Napoleon himself had great respect for Larrey, and in his will referred to him as "the most virtuous man I have ever met." Larrey was granted the title Baron of the Empire by the emperor, although the soldiers who knew his dedication first hand, called him "The Providence." They were ready to give their souls for him, and during the retreat from Russia they actually evacuated him by carrying him on their shoulders. In his memoirs, which were shown to the British physician O'Meara, Napoleon described Larrey thus: Larrey was the most honest man, and the best friend to the soldiers I ever knew. Vigilant and indefatigable in his exertions for the wounded, Larrey was seen on the field of battle, after an action, accompanied by a train of young surgeons, endeavouring to discover if any signs of life remained in the bodies. In the most inclement weather and at all times of the night or day, Larrey was to be found among the wounded. He scarcely allowed a moment's repose to his assistants, and kept them eternally at their posts. He tormented the generals and disturbed them out of their beds at night whenever he wanted accommodations or assistance for the wounded or sick. They were all afraid of him, as they knew he would come and make a complaint to me. He paid court to none of them, and was the implacable enemy of the, fournisseurs} After each battle, Larrey chronicled and critically evaluated his medical decisions and his surgical procedures. On many occasions he broadened his knowledge by a very precise examination of amputated limbs or the bodies of the fallen from the battlefield. These observations served as the basis for several monographs and for his major work composed of four volumes, Mémoires de Chirurgie Militaire et Campagnes 1812, 1817, which was translated into English immediately upon publication. Later in life he summed up his experiences in the book Campagnes et Voyages, 1841. These books contain, in addition to original observations 2 and medical-surgical information, descriptions of the battles fought during the war, the everyday lives of soldiers and their emotional problems. 3 During his travels in the course of the wars, Larrey met with the local physicians in every location in order to become acquainted with them and to learn from them as much as possible. He thereby Iß. L. O'Meara. Napoleon in Exile (1822), quoted by P. E. Bechet, "Dominique Jean Larrey - A Great Military Surgeon," Ann. Med. Hist., 9 (1937), 428-36. M. Feinsod and J. Aharon-Peretz, "Baron Larrey's Description of Traumatic Aphasia", J. Hist. Neuroscience, 3 (1994), 45-52. 3 G. Rosen, "Nostalgia: A 'Forgotten' Psychological Disorder", Psychol. Med.., 4 (1975), 340-54. 2

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formed strong bonds that crossed enemy boundaries. For example, he developed a lasting relationship with the German physician S. von Somerring, who was renowned for his impressive knowledge of anatomy and pathology. Following Napoleon's final defeat in 1815, Larrey was persecuted for his unshaken faith in the deposed leader and suffered through a most difficult period. However, his prestige as a humane physician led to the request for his services by a rehabilitated army. His titles were returned and he was appointed chief surgeon and professor of surgery in the central military hospital, Val de Grâce, where a military medical college was established which exists to this day. In 1829 he was elected to the Academy of Sciences. Even in his old age, Larrey did not retire from his clinical responsibilities. He died in Lyon at the age of 76 from pneumonia, which he contracted during his examination of the health services provided for soldiers who were serving in Algeria.1

The Commission of Inquiry at the Customs House of Bautzen During the year 1813, Napoleon began a series of military marches into Germany designed to restore French rule in Europe, which had been weakened after the terrible defeat he had suffered in Russia (1812). Within a short period of time, he succeeded in conscripting and raising an army of over 600,000 soldiers and gained victory in a number of battles against the allied forces of Russia, Prussia and Austria, which had attempted to push back his army to France. This great army was hastily established and only partially trained, so that Napoleon placed the emphasis on numerical superiority, while in the past his advantages were in the mobility of his forces, the quality of his officers, and his brilliance in manoeuvre on the battlefield. Not surprisingly, the proportion of losses was high. Even when the French forces were victorious, the proportion of battlefield casualties was almost twice as high as those of the allied armies. While before the Russian campaign, Napoleon's armies had been reinforced by volunteers and French soldiers filled with the thirst for combat, this time most of the soldiers were enlisted French citizens and residents of conquered countries.2 The enlistment officers even forced the P. Triaire, Dominique Larrey et les Campagnes de la Révolution et de l'empire 1768-1848 (Tours: Maison A. Marne et Fils, 1902); P. Busquet, Jean-Dominique Larrey (Le Baron), Ire et 2e parties (Paris: Librairie J-B Baillière et Fils n. d.); H. Drouin, Vie du Baron Larrey (Paris: Les Laboratoires Martinet, 1930); A. Soubiran, Le Baron Larrey Chirurgien de Napoléon (Paris: Fayard, 1966); J. H. Dibble, Napoleon's Surgeon (London: William Heinemann Medical Books, 1970). 2 Y . Shelah, Napoleon 1813 - The First World War (Jerusalem: Keter, 1996, Hebrew), pp. 6797.

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conscription of 14-year-old boys as well as men with various disabilities. Consequently, most attempts to receive a medical certificate that would grant a deferment from mandatory military service evoked bribes and corruption. 1 The well-known surgeon, Dupuytren, writes in his memoirs that he once received an unsigned letter (the following is a free translation) complaining about the behaviour of one of his assistants by the name of Richarand: If in one word the disgrace could be described The abomination of the mass conscription How for gold and money A man would sell his brother's blood Just say "Richarand" and nothing need be added. 2 Attempts to avoid military service even after conscription were a frequent occurrence, and one of the methods used was self-mutilation and the causing of injury, including the amputation of the right thumb, extraction of the two front teeth (which the experienced soldier needed in order to open the package of gunpowder while loading his rifle), or the infliction of serious wounds to the soles of the feet, which would prevent the soldier from serving efficiently. 3 Even the severe punishments meted out for these attempts to escape from military service were not sufficient to put an end to the incidents of self-mutilation. The French General Staff was in a state of constant tension stemming from doubt concerning the abilities of the rapidly conscripted army, which was poorly equipped, lacked cavalry, and above all suffered from insufficient training of the young draftees. Napoleon received varying reports concerning the quality of his army. Some evaluations referred to them as a collection of riffraff from the street, while others praised their skill and enthusiasm. Harsh criticism was directed against the officer corps, both field officers and the highest level of staff officers. An atmosphere of doubt and apprehension prevailed concerning future events. 4 In the first three weeks of May 1813, Napoleon carried out a series of battles aimed at gaining control over Saxony and forcing the allied armies to the east. Two main battles were fought during this month, resulting in the Armistice of Plaswitz. The initial battles were fought in the area of the village of Lutzen during 2-4 May. Napoleon was victorious there, but his losses were very heavy and the number of wounded (8,000) was far greater than expected. F. Lemaire, Napoleon et la Médecine (Paris: Editions F. Bourin, 1992), pp. 206-8. H . Mondor Dupuytren (1945), quoted by J. F. Lemaire, Napoléon et la Médecine (Paris: Editions F. Bourin, 1992), p. 199. ^Lemaire, op. cit. 4 Shelay, op. cit. 2

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Moreover, he and his staff were disappointed because in spite of winning the battles, there was no clear military victory and the allied armies were able to carry out an organized withdrawal in order to reorganize and fight again. Less than three weeks thereafter, a second battle was fought in the area of the city of Bautzen. The French army was victorious in this battle also, but the price was extremely high (35,000 soldiers were killed, two thirds of whom were French) and still there was no clear-cut victory. An additional 6,500 wounded soldiers were sent to collection points for medical treatment. The allied forces also suffered a large number of wounded, part of whom were left behind on the field of battle. Larrey found wounded Prussian and Russian soldiers in hiding, and he provided medical treatment to them just as he treated the soldiers of his own army. At General Staff meetings in which the numbers of available soldiers and the numbers of wounded were discussed, several officers, among them Marshals Soult and Oudinot, claimed that the majority of those wounded in the fingers, hands or arms were nothing but shirkers who had purposely injured themselves. Chief Physician Desgenettes and the senior surgeon, Yvan, agreed with this contention. The marshals demanded serious punishment for self-mutilation in order to deter others. 1 Discussions on this subject continued for a number of days, with Napoleon taking part actively, as the topic was grave and was one of principle. At first on 26 May he ordered Marshal Berthier, his senior aide: "Order in the most formal of manner that any man wounded in his fingers won't be returned to active duty, and also won't be evacuated to Dresden or Munich." However it later became apparent that Desgenettes and Yvan were not the only physicians who believed that the wounded soldiers had caused their injuries by their own hand. In a letter dated 9 June, Marshal Oudinot sent to Marshal Berthier a copy of a letter from Lapiomont, chief surgeon of the Twelfth Corps in which Lapiomont reports that approximately 60 men are wounded in the arms and hands and declares that these are young soldiers who had caused their own injuries. The senior surgeon, Eve, and the chief doctor of Brezden Hospital, Baulen, concurred with this contention. Napoleon was furious and, viewing the matter very seriously, demanded that steps be taken to deter soldiers from such actions, including the shooting of every fourth suspected soldier. Rumours circulated that Napoleon had sent to Marshal Clarke a secret message in which he instructed that "Every soldier found guilty of self mutilation, in order to avoid military service, would be punished by execution." 2 Here it should be mentioned that execution for evasion of military service or cowardice during the heat of the battle was commonplace in conscripted armies or in situations of forced military service. In Europe this practice continued unabated until the Second World War.

'"Iriaire,Soubiran, Dibble, op. cit. ^riaire, Soubiran, op. cit.

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In view of the aggressive stance taken by Marshall Soult, whom Napoleon regarded highly, and considering the opinions of the surgeons, it is no surprise that Napoleon informed the head of his staff, Daru, on 11 June, that any soldier wounded in the hand would be considered self-mutilated. He ordered that all the suspiciously wounded be concentrated in a prison camp in the area of the Bautzen Customs House. In the first stage, 2,128 wounded were sent to the camp, and their number eventually rising to 2,410. An additional 282 wounded who were transferred there from Meissen brought the total to 2,692. Various sources of information concerning the quantities of men vary by only a few dozen. The high number of suspiciously wounded men amazed the staff officers, who were apprehensive about the reaction to a mass execution of soldiers, and their reaction was to make do with the public execution of a smaller number of soldiers who would serve as an example. Apparently, Napoleon was still uncertain as to how to proceed, and felt the need to obtain factual or ethical evidence. He postponed his final decision, and arriving in Dresden on 10 June at the height of preparations for the executions, he called in Larrey, who until then had not been involved in the matter. Napoleon, agitated, demanded support f r o m Larrey as well as information concerning how to differentiate between self-mutilation and battlefield injury. Larrey, despite the pressure placed upon him by the emperor, insisted that only a fundamental examination of the circumstances of injury could allow the differentiation between the two, for the wound itself is no different in the two circumstances. This reply caused an angry reaction by Napoleon, who responded: "Do you dare to doubt the marshals?" Larrey, however, remained steadfast in his stand and did not retreat, although some of his colleagues supported the position taken by Marshal Soult. After 20 years of distinguished service, for which he was honoured and bemedalled, no one of any rank in the army could stand up to the enormous prestige of Larrey. Even the emperor himself blanched before the firm position taken by his surgeon. Angered, Napoleon roughly ordered Larrey to study the question and to report to him formally within 48 hours. On 13 June, the chief of the Office of the Emperor published a notice of the formation of a commission of inquiry and in parallel promulgated the information that anyone found guilty of self-mutilation would be turned over immediately to the grand prévôt, a post analogue today to that of chief military police officer. The practical implications of this notification was that although the numbers were uncertain executions were being planned. 1

1

Correspondance, D. J. Larrey, Fonds Larrey, Nouvelle acquisitions française, cote 5886, lettre

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In a race against the clock, Larrey called upon four senior surgeons to assist him: Eve, whose title was chirurgien principal, Charmes, Thebault and Boceoer, who held the rank of chirurgien major. They assembled in the Bautzen Customs House. Larrey began his work at 5 a.m. on 16 June, worked almost without rest, and finished at noon on 19 June. By then, every one of the 2692 wounded soldiers had been brought in and examined in order to determine the cause of his injury. The opposition and suspicion of the entire General Staff concerning the establishment of an investigating committee was illustrated by the ceaseless and close supervision of the officers, including the grand prévôt, General Rader, as they observed the examination of the wounded by the committee. General Rader offered to "assist" Larrey by attaching an assistant trained in the methods of rapid military investigation of suspects. The offer was soundly refused. When the wounded began to assemble in the examination hall, this same "assistant" was unable to stand the sight of the open wounds, and he fled from the hall. The committee examined each one of the wounded and studied the source and type of every wound observed on his body. Each wounded soldier described his actions and the position of his body at the time he suffered the wound. The conclusions of the committee were as follows: 1. Almost all of the wounded had been wounded by live fire. The wounds inflicted by other weapons, such as knives or bayonets, were caused by weapons that had been pointed in the direction of the wounded. 2. Most of the wounded soldiers had been wounded at the same time in another part of their bodies, or the injury was consistent with the type of wound caused by a rifle bullet. 3. A small number of soldiers whose wounds were not consistent with the above description were experienced soldiers who had participated in many battles and whose patriotism and faith in the cause could not be doubted. 4. The high proportion of wounded hands among the young soldiers resulted from a lack of experience in the proper method of firing their rifles while standing in formations of three rows. The rifle barrels of the last rows were too close to the soldiers in the first row and they fired too rapidly as a result of their inexperience, resulting in burns to their hands.

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5. A proportion of the soldiers were wounded while charging up the hill with their rifles positioned in front of them and their hands were held forward, so that the hands were the first part of the body to be exposed as the defending enemy fired down at them. Similar situations had been described in the past in the first war in Poland and also in Spanish battles, where a similar suspicion had arisen and was found to have no basis in fact. 6. The committee states that there is no proof, even of the slightest type, that any of the wounded soldiers examined had actually mutilated himself. A precise examination of the findings would change the opinion of those who were of the mistaken opinion that the wounds were self-inflected.1 All of the files of the findings were transferred by Larrey himself to Napoleon. When Larrey arrived at Napoleon's headquarters, the officers were waiting for him in order to take the material from him. However, he refused to turn over the files to them. By passing them, he personally placed the material directly into the hands of Napoleon. The emperor inquired angrily if Larrey had not changed his opinion. Larrey responded that he was able to prove that the charges against the young soldiers were without foundation, and that all of their rights must be reinstated. Furthermore, he recommended that upon their recovery they must be allowed to return to their units, and that the emperor had no choice but to be proud of them. Napoleon glanced through the documents, and after a few moments of angry consideration, he regained his composure and remarked to Larrey: "A leader honoured with the services of an individual such as yourself should be pleased." He embraced Larrey and sent him on his way. If these matters had been reported in Larrey's memoirs, there might have been reason to suspect that they had been exaggerated. However, the incident as reported here was noted in Napoleon's memoirs. At a later stage, a messenger appeared and delivered to Larrey a portrait of the emperor decorated in diamonds, together with a monetary gift as a token of Napoleon's appreciation. Following this incident, Larrey circulated the following proclamation among his senior assistants. Draw your comrades' attention to the subject of the legal aspects of surgery, and at this occasion it must be pointed out that if there is a suspicion of self-mutilation, the surgeon cannot make this 1

Dossier Larrey. Archive du Service de Santé (Musée du Val-de-Grâce).

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M o s h e F E I N S OD determination, in that there is no proven sign which allows one to differentiate between a wound which was inflicted by the individual himself or as a result of a foreign source. This is entirely unfamiliar territory for the surgeon, in spite of the fact that the state and the law have determined that it is his responsibility. In criminal cases it is the judge who must delve into the conscience and the motives of the accused. The physician is and must be a friend of humanity, and as such it is his responsibility to serve as an adviser. It is your responsibility to treat patient, guilty or innocent, equally because the body of the patient is our chief concern and the rest does not concern us. [emph is mine M. F.] Make these thoughts known to your colleagues and act so that no one, and certainly not an innocent individual, will be executed. 1

Postscript Approximately nine months after the events described in this article, Napoleon was defeated, his regime collapsed and he was exiled to the island of Elba. The following year, he returned to rule France for a hundred days until his final defeat in the Battle of Waterloo (1815). Larrey was wounded in that battle and became a prisoner of war of the Prussians, who usually executed the wounded French soldiers. His life was saved because initially the Prussians thought that he was Napoleon, and he was brought before a high-ranking officer. At first, the officer, realizing that it was not the emperor, ordered that Larrey be executed. At this point, however, the Prussian army physician interfered and warned against executing such a respected and well-known individual. Larrey was brought before the Prussian supreme commander, Marshall Blücher. When Blücher heard the name of the prisoner, he approached him, embraced him, and thanked him because in one of the previous battles Larrey had cared for wounded enemy soldiers and had saved the life of Blücher's son. Blücher returned clothing and money that had been stolen from Larrey and sent him off to recover. As a consequence of his complete faith in the deposed emperor, Larrey was persecuted and suffered through a most difficult period. However, his medical and personal prestige resulted in the rehabilitated army requesting his reinstatement, and his titles and office were restored to him. Marshal Soult was very quickly integrated into the new regime and rose to become minister of war. He did not forget the incident of the wounded soldiers, however, and perceived the affair as a personal affront to his honour. He grew to dislike Larrey with so virile a hatred that periodically he used his

' D. J. Larrey Mémoires de Chirurgie Militaire Imprimeur-Libraire, 1877), pp. 173-82, 427-34.

et Campagnes,

Tome IV (Paris: J. Smith

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influence to the detriment of Larrey and his son, also a physician, even though the army was in need of their medical services. 1 Larrey's earnest request was that upon his death he be buried among his comrade officers close to the grave of Napoleon in the Invalides area. When he died, however, Soult refused to honour his last wishes, claiming that the site was reserved for marshals of the army only. The City of Paris, bestowing upon him its highest honour, granted a graveside for eternal rest in the prestigious cemetery of Père Lachaise. Moreover, his name was inscribed in the Arch of Triumph, together with a relief on the borders of the arch in which he is depicted as personally tending the wounded in the heat of battle. In 1995, on the anniversary of the Battle of Austerlitz, the French army fulfilled its final obligation to Larrey when, in full military ceremony, his remains were transferred for burial alongside the marshals of France in the proximity of Napoleon's grave. *

Ethical mandates may be insufficient either because their declarative nature is often isolated from everyday reality, or because of the suspicion that those who formulate them view themselves as unblemished — a state that only a few truly outstanding individuals achieve. Perhaps a study of the annals of medical practice and the analysis of outstanding examples of exemplary behaviour will be useful in contributing to the formulation of values and the fashioning of a personality that will stand up firmly even under pressure.

^Triaire, Soubiran, op. cit.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE AS PERPETUATOR AND DESTROYER OF THE IDEAS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION Walter GRAB

On 8 thermidor, year II, 26 July 1794, Maximilian Robespierre delivered a speech to the Convention in which he predicted Bonaparte's usurpation of the state's power. He mentioned no names, but warned the assembly in these words: "If you slacken the reins of the Revolution, then military power will seize them and scatter the dishonoured representatives of the people. We will perish for failing to speak in support of freedom and the people will curse our memory!" Robespierre, the "Incorruptible," who had wanted neither war nor the export of revolution, but under whose rule France had succeeded in warding off all its enemies, was placed under arrest the next day. With the execution of the Jacobin leaders, the humanitarian dream of a just empire of reason and virtue died as well. After the Jacobin dictatorship had successfully fended off all attacks by the counterrevolution, the bourgeois class of capitalist profiteers became dominant. It disbanded the Paris Commune, purged the Revolutionary tribunal of sansculottes, and abandoned the planned economy of the Jacobins. In December 1799, First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte proclaimed a new constitution which no longer contained a declaration of human rights. He ruled over France even more absolutely than the kings preceding him, and regarded the state as his own personal property. He mocked the notions of popular sovereignty and parliamentarism, and replaced the principle of free elections with a system of referenda directed from above. In doing so, he demonstrated to dictators of future generations how it was possible to distort the concept of democracy. However, although the usurper discarded those parts of the revolutionary ideology for which he could not find any advantage, his form of government was nevertheless rooted in the political heritage of the Revolution. Bonapartism borrowed several important concepts from Jacobinism, reinterpreting them to suit the requirement of autocracy. The three fundamental principles of this rule were national glory (gloire nationale), the guarantee of revolutionary proprietary (garantie révolutionnaire), and the centralized governmental authority (principe d'autorité).

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Napoleon's rule relied on the army for the maintenance of his power. The Jacobins, who liberated France from the burden of feudalism, had created a people's army consisting of legally equal and personally free citizens who would defend the country against its enemies. The Jacobins had sought to inspire each fighter by stressing that he was a member of a "great nation" which had thrown off the yoke of despotism by its own efforts. Jacobin patriotism thus linked national self-emancipation with a belief in democracy. In contrast to this political conviction, Napoleonic patriotism was based on the notion that France had the right to rule the entire continent of Europe as a hegemonic power, i.e., to subjugate other peoples. The concept of gloire nationale meant giving French political and economic interests precedence over the needs of other countries. The new order of France, while based on the achievements of the Revolution, had national and private profit as its most important impetus. It retained the perception of the religious foundation of the feudal state as obsolete and superfluous, yet the national ideology that replaced it, based on a common language, culture and tradition, blurred the antagonistic interests of property owners and exploited workers, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Napoleon introduced bourgeois reforms wherever his army was victorious. Although he had destroyed and ended the revolution within France, paradoxically, he extended its legacy beyond the French borders, becoming both the liberator and the oppressor of the peoples of Europe. The annihilation of feudal privileges, the proclamation of religious freedom, the modernization of the civil service, the judicial system and public instruction, the secularization of monasteries and bishoprics, and the abolishment of servitude were undoubtedly in the interest of Germany, Italy and Spain, which had not liberated themselves from feudal systems of privilege. The proprietary guarantee (garantie révolutionnaire), anchored in Article 94 of the Constitution of the year VIII (December 1799) and in the other two Napoleonic constitutions, those of 1802 and 1804, confirmed, significantly, that the changes in ownership which the Revolution had evoked were no longer reversible. Property that had once belonged to the crown, the church and émigré aristocrats, and which had been acquired by the bourgeoisie and by the peasantry during the Revolution, would remain in the hands of the new owners. Most of these changes of ownership had been carried out in 1793 during Jacobin rule when Robespierre and his colleagues were in power. By guaranteeing the sanctity and inviolability of ownership, Napoleon was able to commit to his rule all those who had materially benefited from the Revolution, as his fall from power would imply a threat that such property might be returned to the former owners. The garantie révolutionnaire, therefore, was one of the main contributing factors in the Napoleonic victories on the battlefield, as no fewer than three million French peasants who had

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been subjects of the feudal aristocrats and the church had purchased the land they had cultivated, and which was the basis of their existence, on very good conditions. Although Napoleon tried to efface all memory of his revolutionary roots after he had been crowned emperor in 1804, both the common people and the soldiers in his army never forgot that he had preserved the proprietary guarantee and regarded him, therefore, as the genuine offspring of the Revolution until his final defeat. The third principle of Napoleonic rule, the principe d'autorité, implied that all legislative and executive powers were concentrated in the person of the autocrat. This was a complete negation of the revolutionary concepts of popular sovereignty and the separation of powers. The principle of authority deprived the population of any opportunity to express its political views. The system of prefectures created by Napoleon gave the dictator a loyal administrative and legal bureaucracy that exercised wide powers both at the higher and the lower levels. Each prefect represented the principe d'autorité within his own administrative unit. He was responsible for the execution of the law in his own particular département, and regularly reported on the political mood of the population to headquarters in Paris. In this way, Napoleon was able to perfect the centralist tendencies of the old absolutist system in France. However, even though Napoleon consistently and systematically developed an absolutist model of governance, and has been called by some historians "the last enlightened despot," it would be a mistake to equate him with the kings of the old regime. Those rulers had relied on the feudal social hierarchy handed down from the Middle Ages, with all its privileges and ancient special customs, while the subjects of the new autocrat were equal in the eyes of the law. Social status was no longer determined by immutable factors such as noble birth and descent, but by the dynamic principle of ownership. The chief beneficiaries of the Revolution were the upper middle classes, whose economic interests lay in developing France's trade and industry. The principe d'autorité was entirely compatible with such pursuits and fitted in nicely with the wishes of those who had helped Napoleon up into the saddle. Following his rise to power, Napoleon set out to prove himself in five separate fields: as a general, a diplomat, an economist, a reformer and a lawgiver. His first task was to destroy the alliance of enemy powers who had fought against France in the second war of coalition — England, Austria and Russia, and force them, through a series of military defeats, to recognize the hegemony of France in central Europe. He also addressed himself to extinguishing the royalist fires being fanned by the English in the Vendée and in Normandy, silencing the remnants of the democratic opposition in France,

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straightening out the national budget, restoring economic viability to the currency, and making peace with the Catholic Church and the Papal court. His main task, however, was the permanent legal codification of the political and social gains of the bourgeoisie, which had achieved its primary goal during the Revolution and was Napoleon's most important mainstay. All these tasks were fully accomplished by Napoleon during his five years as consul, from 1799 to 1804. He began to organize his dictatorship immediately after the proclamation of his first constitution by announcing a plebiscite. Of seven million citizens who were entitled to vote, four million abstained, over three million voted in favour of the constitution, and some 1,500 voted against it. The chief purpose of Napoleon's referendum system was to depoliticize the masses. This was also the aim of the abolition of the freedom of the press. In January 1800, nearly all political papers were banned, and the four that remained had a joint daily circulation of scarcely 10,000. Censorship was in the hands of the minister of police, Fouchd, who created a political secret service that deployed an army of agents to uncover plots hatched by both royalists and Jacobins. The reorganization of the banking system was intended as a weapon against the dominance of the English economy. The newly founded Bank of France, which was given sole authority to issue bank notes, managed the national debt and arranged loans to finance the wars. Napoleon's economic and fiscal policies reflected his efforts to strengthen the modern capitalist system of France and thereby commit the bourgeoisie materially and ideologically to his regime. Important sources of income in the country were not only taxes, but also booty and reparations from the territories he had conquered. French production was safeguarded by a protectionist system of import tariffs. Taxes were mainly indirect and were therefore viewed favourably by the propertied classes. The state did not interfere with the profits of employers and businessmen, but wage earners were deprived of every opportunity to conduct a collective struggle against their exploitation. Whenever disputes arose over working conditions or wage levels, the courts recognized only depositions submitted by the employer. Moreover, the ban on trade unions and other such organizations, which had been decreed by the Loi Le Chapelier in 1791, was tightened. This was accomplished by the introduction of a special pass that all workers had to produce when hired, which contained information about his training, previous employment and political views. The proletariat was, in actuality, a victim of police repression and the arbitrariness of employers.

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Napoleon knew that his ability to consolidate his regime ultimately depended on military success. Taking a leaf from the terrorism employed by the Jacobin government during the Revolution against its enemies within France, he applied terrorist measures externally. In May 1800 he set off with his army to northern Italy, where the French army had been ejected by the Russian General Suvarov a year before. The French had been replaced by the Austrian army after Russia retired from the war. Napoleon's unexpected expedition over the Alps via the St. Bernard Pass enabled him to surprise the Austrian enemy. Indeed, his victory in the battle of Marengo on 14 June 1800 was crucial to the continuation of his rule. Had he lost, the English would have undoubtedly helped restore the Bourbons to the French throne. The war dragged on for several months. Only after General Moreau had crushed the Austrians at Hohenlinden in Bavaria at the end of 1800 was Emperor Franz willing to conclude a peace agreement. The treaty of Luné ville in February 1801 confirmed that France had retained its supremacy in Italy and therefore had the right to the Rhineland, which was annexed to it. The death knell had finally sounded for the decrepit thousand-year-old "Holy Roman Empire of the German nation." Ironically, in ridding Germany of its archaic condition, the heir of the Revolution advanced the interest of social and political progress. The French victory in the second war of coalition enabled Napoleon to dismantle opposition at home. Attempting to bring about a reconciliation between his regime and aristocratic opponents of the Revolution, he ordered the names of around 50,000 emigrant supporters of the Bourbons to be struck from the list of banned émigrés in October 1800. However, a request by the pretender to the crown, the brother of the executed king, Louis XVI, to be allowed to return to France was denied. Moreover, the plot by royalist conspirators to dispose of the first consul by means of an explosive device on 25 December 1800 evoked charges by Napoleon that the attempt on his life had been perpetrated by the Jacobins. Although Fouché furnished evidence that the left-wing opposition had not been involved in the plot, Napoleon ordered the deportation of 130 actual and alleged Jacobins to Devil's Island in Guiana and the Seychelles in the Indian Ocean. Following the fall from power in the spring of 1801 of English Prime Minister Pitt, who had organized the military alliance against France, his successor, Addington, accepted Napoleon's offer of peace in the hope that England could reduce its huge national debt. The treaty of Amiens, in 1802, signified England's agreement to give up its military bases in the Mediterranean. Napoleon, however, refused to withdraw from any territory in French hands. It soon became clear that the treaty was nothing but an armistice and that the resumption of war was only a question of time.

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For several months, however, the powers appeared to recognize French hegemony. The guns were silent for the first time in ten years. Napoleon was at the peak of his popularity, and his term of office was extended for the duration of his life. Over 3,500,000 people voted to ratify this change in the constitution in the plebiscite of 1802, and only some 8,000 voted against it. Émigrés who swore an oath of allegiance were granted the right to return, and about 140,000 did so. Only a few thousand were excluded from the amnesty. This reconciliation with the counterrevolutionaries served to repress democratic nations. The same tendency was apparent in the Concordat with the Catholic Church and the Papal court negotiated between France and the Pope and proclaimed in April 1802, an agreement that enabled the Church to exert greater influence on the people of France. Napoleon viewed this agreement positively. Although he himself was religiously indifferent, he recognized the importance of religion as a stabilizing factor in the social order, observing : "Without fear of eternal damnation, the poor will assault the rich and massacre them." The Concordat ended the battle between church and state that had been raging since 1790. The French state recognized Catholicism as the official religion of the state. In return, the Pope relinquished all claims to church property expropriated by the state during the Revolution. He also agreed to the empowering of civil authorities to record civil weddings and divorces as well as births and death. Archbishops and bishops would be appointed by Napoleon and only afterward consecrated by the Pope. The issuing of papal communiqués would require permission from the state. In return, the state would pay the salaries of priests and maintain the churches. The celebration of religious festivals was again permitted. Priests who had emigrated or had been imprisoned were allowed to return. The revolutionary calendar was abolished at the start of 1806. The Concordat represented a compromise between revolution and restoration. This compromise was also discernible in the most important reform of Napoleon's consulate, namely, the Code Civil des Français, later called the Code Napoléon. The code, issued in March 1804, was the dictator's crowning glory. It became the keystone of the legal system in France and in the countries conquered by the French army. Drafted by a board of legal experts, it was debated in the Council of State (Conseil d'État), an institution made up of 50 experienced lawyers appointed by Napoleon, responsible for preparing decrees and laws. The Civil Code systematized all secular and private laws that had been enacted during the Revolution. It was based on the premise that the bourgeois law of ownership was a natural law, secure and inviolable, which would be

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protected from attack from both feudal and proletarian forces. The freedoms of occupation, movement, contract and religion were granted the status of legally sanctioned regulations only. The idea of equality was understood to mean equal access to those civil rights guaranteed by law, but not equality of social and economic conditions. The Civil Code did not commit the state to pay benefits of any kind to invalids, the unemployed or the penniless. Family law was conservative, with the husband having the right to dispose of his wife's property, and the wife requiring her husband's permission to transact business of any kind. Illegitimate children were at a pronounced disadvantage in claiming an inheritance. Once the English government realized that for Napoleon a peace was merely a continuation of war by other means, and that the French dictator might use his dominant position on the continent to attack England, it declared war in May 1803. This was followed by a failed royalist plot to assassinate Napoleon. At that point the first consul resolved to transform his status to that of emperor. This was supported by those who were benefiting from his authoritarian regime and profiting f r o m the codification of the garantie révolutionnaire and France's hegemony in Europe. They demanded that Napoleon's rule be stabilized once and for all. On 18 May 1804 the Senate voted to change the form of government f r o m a consulate to an empire. In the plebiscite held to ratify the establishment of the empire, over 3,500,000 votes were cast in favour and 2,500 against. Napoleon stated explicitly that he did not wish to be regarded to be a successor of the French kings, but rather as an heir of Charlemagne, who had attempted to resuscitate the Roman Empire. In reality, however, the new empire was heir to the Revolution. Although the Pope was present at the coronation ceremony held in the Notre Dame cathedral in Paris, Napoleon, wishing to demonstrate that he owed his imperial power solely to his own ability, placed the crown on his head himself.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Geoffrey, Bruun, Europe and the French Imperium (New York, 1963). Owen Connelly, The Epoch of Napoleon (New York, 1972). Vincent Cronin, Napoleon (London, 1971). Emile Dard, Napoléon et Talleyrand (Paris, 1938). Felix Markham, Napoleon (New York, 1970). Walter Markov, Die Napoleon-Zeit (Leipzig, 1985). Maximilien Robespierre, Textes choisis, 3 vols. (Paris, 1965). J. H. Rose, Napoleonic Studies (London, 1906). Eugen Tarlé, Napoleon in Russia (London, 1956). J. M. Thompson, Napoleon Bonaparte. His Rise and Fall (Oxford, 1963). Jean Tulard, Napoléon (Paris, 1978).

JOSEPH SULKOWSKI, AIDE-DE-CAMP DE BONAPARTE EN ÉGYPTE Monika HAMAN

Parmi ceux qui ont suivi Bonaparte en Egypte il y avait aussi quelques Polonais. Il y avait le général Zajgczek, qui après le Congrès de Vienne sera nommé lieutenant général du Royaume de Pologne. En attendant, en Egypte, surnommé par ses soldats "général Pastèque" à cause de sa prédilection pour ce fruit, il gouvernait plusieurs provinces 1 . L'ingénieur Joseph Lazowski, bien que né en France, avait des origines polonaises — son père a émigré de Pologne avec le roi Stanislas Leszczyifski. Envoyé par le Comité de Salut Public en Turquie pour y travailler comme officier du génie au service de la Porte, à son retour en France il remit en janvier 1798 au Directoire un mémoire sur la Turquie, dans lequel il décrivait la décomposition de cet État et émettait l'opinion que lors de son inévitable partage l'Egypte devrait échouer à la France. Pendant la campagne d'Égypte il s'est distingué aux sièges de Jaffa et d'Acre et fut promu aux rang de chef de brigade 2 . Trois autres officiers polonais, Grabirfski, Szumlaríski et Hauman se sont portés volontaires pour l'expédition et ont participé aux premières batailles, mais affaiblis par les maladies, ils ont été autorisés en septembre 1798 de revenir en France 3 . Szymon Askenazy, l'auteur de l'œuvre magistrale Napoléon a Polsha (Napoléon et la Pologne) remarque avec l'esprit que dès lors qu'il y avait en Égypte une poignée de nobles polonais, un Juif polonais ne pouvait pas manquer d'y être. Il s'agissait de l'orientaliste Zalkind Hurwicz, originaire de la ville de Lublin en Pologne, employé à Paris à la Bibliothèque Nationale comme conservateur et traducteur des langues orientales. En Égypte Bonaparte lui confia l'imprimerie arabe et la rédaction d'une revue en cette langue.

Ijadwiga Nadzieja, Générai JôzefZajQczek 1752-1826, Warszawa 1975, pp. 239-295. Adam Skatkowski, Les Polonais en Égypte 1798-1801, Cracovie 1910, p. XLV et suiv. 3 Leur voyage de retour s'est terminé mal. Faits prisonniers par les corsaires turcs, ils furent enfermés à l'arsenal d'Istanbul. Hauman mourut en captivité, les deux autres officiers furent finalement libérés. Szymon Askenazy, Napoléon a Polska, Warszawa 1918, t. III p. 66. 2

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Le plus proche de Bonaparte était cependant son aide-de-camp Joseph Sutkowski. C'est à cet émigré polonais et officier français, mort pendant la campagne d'Égypte et dont le nom figure sur l'Arc de Triomphe à Paris, que je voudrais consacrer ma communication. Sa vie, brève mais riche en événements extraordinaires, a inspiré plusieurs œuvres littéraires. Sa personnalité fascinait les auteurs d'autant plus, que sa biographie présente de nombreuses taches d'ombre. Tout d'abord, rien n'est certain sur sa naissance. Nous savons seulement qu'il était un descendant illégitime de la famille des Sulkowski, riche aristocratie de fraîche date1, mais nous ne savons pas s'il était le fils du prince François ou de son cousin, le comte Théodore. Quant à sa mère, le problème est encore plus compliqué : était-ce une demoiselle hongroise, une gouvernante française ou une princesse RadziwiW ? Sa date de naissance est incertaine aussi, d'après certains documents il naquit en 1773, selon d'autres en 1770, ce qui d'ailleurs paraît plus probable2. Joseph Sulkowski fut élevé par ses oncles ; il passa ses premières années chez le prince Alexandre, feld maréchal autrichien, puis chez le prince Auguste. Ce dernier était richissime, cultivé et corrompu — il détourna une partie des fonds de la Commission d'Éducation Nationale de Pologne et était à la solde des ambassadeurs étrangers. Il se consacra cependant avec soin à l'éducation de son neveu à qui il s'est attaché n'ayant pas d'enfants propres. Il le fit commandeur de l'Ordre de Malte — dignité héréditaire dans la famille. En 1783 le jeune Joseph commença sa carrière militaire comme cadet dans le régiment fondé par la famille. Tant que son tuteur vivait il obtenait de l'avancement chaque année. Quand le prince Alexandre mourut en 1786, Joseph était déjà lieutenant. Désormais la modeste paye d'officier devait subvenir à ses besoins, car le prince Antoine Sulkowski qui succéda à Alexandre comme chef de famille et titulaire du majorai, l'avait privé de la commanderie de Malte et de la pension qui y était attachée. Pendant son service à l'armée de Pologne Joseph Sulkowski se lia avec les radicaux de gauche, appelés plus tard "jacobins polonais". C'est à cette époque que se sont cristallisées ses opinions qu'il gardera toute sa vie : patriotisme ardent, républicanisme farouche, sensibilité à l'égard de la situation des paysans — classe sociale la plus défavorisée en Pologne d'alors. La constitution du 3 mai 1791 le déçut - il lui reprochait d'avoir gardé le

1 Alexandre Joseph Sutkowski (1695-1762), fondateur de la branche princière de la famille, a obtenu son titre de prince en 1752. 2 A . M. Skalkowski, Rodowôd Jdzefa Suikowskiego ijego listy mlodociane (La généalogie de

Joseph Sulkowski et ses lettres de jeunesse), Poznan 1934.

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système monarchique et de n'avoir pas fait assez pour améliorer le statut des serfs. Il consigna ses critiques dans un écrit intitulé „Dernière parole d'un citoyen polonais", mais qui n'a pas été publié. Promu au grade de capitaine en décembre 1791, il combattit vaillamment dans la guerre contre la Russie. Sa défense du pont de la rivière Zelwa lui apporta la croix Virtuti Militari — la plus haute décoration militaire polonaise. Après la capitulation de la Pologne il émigra, comme beaucoup de patriotes. Il se rendit d'abord à Vienne et de là — à Paris. Il fit le voyage de Vienne à Paris en compagnie de son compatriote Piotr Maleszewski 1 , par lequel il fit à Paris la connaissance d'Alexandre Rousselin de St Albin, alors commissaire de la section des Quatre Nations et père de son futur biographe 2 , ainsi que de l'orientaliste Jean Michel Venture de Paradis 3 . Naturalisé Français, Sulkowski fut attaché au nouvel ambassadeur de France à la Porte, Sémonville, en tant qu'expert des affaires polonaises. (Remarquons qu'à cette époque de nombreux patriotes polonais se réfugiaient en territoire turc en attendant le moment de l'insurrection.) Devançant Sémonville, Sulkowski arriva à Venise, mais le gouvernement vénitien l'en expulsa au bout de quelques jours. 4 L'envoyé de France à Venise le fit partir pour Florence, où Sulkowski apprit l'arrestation de Sémonville et en même temps reçut l'ordre du gouvernement français de se rendre à Alep et y attendre des instructions. Il arriva en Syrie en novembre 1793 et y attendit six mois ses instructions, pour rejoindre finalement Constantinople, où l'ambassadeur de France était alors Descorches de Sainte Croix, vieil ami de la Pologne. Sulkowski prépara pour le gouvernement français un mémoire sur la situation en Pologne, où l'insurrection de Kos'ciuszko était déjà déclenchée et en septembre, déguisé en marchand arménien, partit pour la Pologne, portant les lettres de Descorches à Kosciuszko et à Ignace Potocki. Au moment où il arriva en Pologne, la défaite était déjà accomplie, tout le pays était occupé par les troupes ennemies. Sulkowski retourna à Constantinople et de là à Paris.

* Piotr Maleszewski (1767-1828) fils illégitime du primat Michel Poniatowski, républicain d'opinions radicales. J. Sulkowski, Mémoires historiques, politiques et militaires sur les révolutions de Pologne 1792, 1794, la campagne d'Italie 1796, 1797, l'expédition du Tyrol et les campagnes d'Égypte 1798, 1799, par Hortensius de St Albin, Paris 1832. Ce livre comporte deux parties, la première contient une biographie de Sulkowski, la deuxième ses écrits. 3 Jean Michel Venture de Paradis (1742-1799), orientaliste et diplomate, mort à Saint Jean d'Acre. 4

Sur les détails de cette affaire voir les documents reproduits dans: A. Skalkowski, Les Polonais en Egypte, p. XIV et suiv.

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Rentré à Paris, Sulkowski demanda à être admis dans l'armée française. Au bout d'un certain temps ses démarches furent enfin couronnées de succès. Affecté à l'armée d'Italie, il se présenta au quartier général de Bonaparte à Livourne le 28 juin 1796. Ayant vite remarqué ses qualités de soldat, quatre mois plus tard Bonaparte se l'attacha comme aide-de-camp. A ses côtés Sulkowski commença à apprendre l'art de la guerre dans l'espoir de pouvoir utiliser plus tard ses connaissances au service de la Pologne. Cependant les événements ne lui ménagèrent pas des désillusions. Il était déçu par la conclusion à Tolentino du traité de paix avec le Saint Siège, considérant le gouvernement pontifical comme le plus réactionnaire. La cession de Venise à l'Autriche était une autre déception. Pires encore furent l'armistice de Leoben et le traité de Campo Formio qui anéantissaient les espoirs de voir bientôt les troupes françaises entrer en Galicie et libérer du moins une partie du territoire de l'ancienne Pologne. Ce dernier sentiment était partagé par les officiers et les soldats des Légions polonaises du général D^browski. Sulkowski était d'ailleurs très hostile à celui-ci. L'émigration polonaise était alors scindé en deux fraction — aux modérés, partisans de la constitution du 3 mai, auxquels appartenait le général Dçtbrowski et la plupart de ses officiers, s'opposaient les radicaux qui combattaient le chef des Légions avec virulence. Dans sa correspondance Dgbrowski se plaignait souvent de l'hostilité que lui témoignait Sulkowski et déplorait — à juste raison — les mauvais effets que cela pouvait avoir sur l'attitude de Bonaparte à l'égard des Légions et de la Pologne en général. Les lettres écrites pendant la campagne d'Italie par Sulkowski à son ami Piotr Maleszewski ont été communiquées par celui-ci à Carnot. Retrouvées dans les papiers de Carnot par son biographe Marcel Reinhard, elles lui ont fourni le matériel pour son livre Avec Bonaparte en Italie} L'auteur y esquisse en quelque lignes un portrait psychologique de Sulkowski qui parait très juste. Il souligne le caractère trop ardent de ses convictions et ses préjugés, son attachement à la révolution, son mépris agressif pour les institutions monarchiques, sa haine farouche de l'aristocratie, de l'Église et du clergé. Tout épris de liberté qu'il était, Sulkowski était pourtant conscient du fait que certains des adversaires de la France révolutionnaire défendaient, eux aussi, leur indépendance et leur liberté. En particulier le cas du Tyrol lui donna fort à penser. Il semble avoir compris le problème — dont ses contemporains ne se rendront compte que beaucoup plus tard — du retournement des principes de la Révolution française contre la France elle-même.

^Marcel Reinhard, Avec Bonaparte en Italie d'après les lettres inédites de son aide-de-camp Joseph Sulkowski, Paris 1946.

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Sulkowski a collaboré à la préparation de l'expédition d'Égypte. Une certaine connaissance de l'Orient et de la langue arabe qu'il a apprise pendant son séjour prolongé à Alep, le rendait d'autant plus utile. Embarqué le 19 mai sur le vaisseau amiral VOrient, le 10 juin il mena l'avant-garde à l'assaut de La Valette et le 2 juillet il monta sur les murs d'Alexandrie. Après la prise d'Alexandrie il fut promu au grade de chef d'escadron. Il participa à la bataille des Pyramides et à de nombreux autres combats. Le 11 août, lors de la bataille de Salehheyeh il subit plusieurs blessures. Promu au grade de chef de brigade, il consacra le temps de sa convalescence aux travaux scientifiques entrepris dans le cadre de l'Institut d'Égypte dont il a été nommé membre. Il faisait notamment partie d'une commission chargée d'étudier la situation de l'enseignement et de l'ordre judiciaire civil et criminel en Egypte et de proposer les améliorations dans ce domaine, améliorations qui pourraient être acceptées par la population. Une autre tâche, à laquelle il collaborait, était la préparation d'un vocabulaire arabe „pour mettre les Français en état d'établir avec les habitants de l'Égypte les communications qu'exigent les besoins communs de la vie,,.1 Trois semaines à peine après avoir été sérieusement blessé, il présenta à la séance de l'Institut la description de la route du Caire à Salehheyeh et cinq jours plus tard il fit part à ses collègues de l'Institut de sa découverte dans un village au bord du Nil d'un buste d'Isis et de deux pierres avec des inscriptions hiéroglyphiques. Un portrait de Sulkowski, dessiné par le citoyen Dutertre à cette époque, nous montre un homme prématurément vieilli, traits tirés et cheveux rares. 2 Cependant les fatigues et les dangers de la campagne ne l'ont pas empêché de consigner par écrit ses observations et ses réflexions. La prise de Malte est décrite dans sa "Lettre de Malte" 3 . Les Notes sur l'expédition d'Égypte4 forment la suite de ce document. Il est à regretter que le manuscrit est illisible à beaucoup d'endroits, en conséquence de quoi la pensée de Sulkowski souvent échappe au lecteur. La relation commence par l'appareillage de la flotte napoléonienne de Malte le 19 juin 1798, le débarquement en Égypte et la prise d'Alexandrie. Constatant que pour la conquête de l'Égypte la possession d'Alexandrie n'avait pas beaucoup d'importance, Sulkowski dresse un tableau de la haute et basse Égypte sous le rapport militaire, puis raconte la difficile marche de l'armée vers le Caire, les souffrances des soldats causées par la chaleur et la soif, les premiers accrochages avec les mamelouks et le combat de Chebreiss. Les passages où il ÏCité d'après A . Skatkowski, Les Polonais en Égypte, p. XXIX. ^Reproduit ibidem au frontispice. ^Manuscrit conservé aux Archives Historiques de la Guerre, publié dans: A. SkaVko'wslù Les Polonais en Egypte, p.l et suiv. ^Publiées ibidem, pp. 12- 73.

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caractérise les mamelouks sont malheureusement en grande partie illisibles, par contre ses remarques concernant la formation des carrés d'infanterie peuvent sans doute intéresser l'histoire militaire. Sa sensibilité au sort des couches sociales les plus démunies lui fait noter non seulement les souffrances des soldats, mais aussi l'extrême misère des habitants, exploités sans scrupules par les propriétaires des terres. Il déplore les spoliations effectuées par les soldats, en constatant à regret, que le "seul remède à ce désordre, celui de donner au soldat une nourriture régulière, était impraticable". 1 Un long passage est consacré aux Arabes, aux Bédouins, leurs chevaux, leurs armes et leur manière de combattre. Le récit s'interrompt sur les débuts de la bataille des Pyramides. La Description de la route du Caire à Salehhyeh est datée du 2 septembre 1798. Sulkowski y constate que la conquête d'Égypte ouvre un champs nouveau aux recherches scientifiques, jusqu'ici impossibles, parce qu'un peuple malheureux et barbare s'y opposait. La géographie est la première science qui peut en profiter et c'est là qu'il voit l'intérêt de sa Description, parce que la route de Salehhyeh était encore inconnue aux Européens. „Cette route — écrit-il — qui est celle que les caravanes suivent pour se rendre en Syrie... semble tracer la limite entre l'Égypte et le désert." Il cherche les vestiges de l'antiquité à Belbeys — l'ancien Bubaste et regrette qu'à Salehhyeh il n'y a plus aucune trace de la forteresse qui y avait jadis été construite par Saladdin. Il s'intéresse naturellement au sort des habitants de ces contrées et observe que les fellahs y paraissent moins malheureux que ceux des bords du Nil. Leurs champs sont mieux cultivés et leurs maisons mieux entretenues. Sulkowski explique cette amélioration par l'éloignement de ces villages de leurs oppresseurs — les mamelouks qui préféraient vivre confortablement au Caire. Quand en octobre 1798 la population du Caire se révolta, Sulkowski n'était pas encore bien rétabli de ses blessures. Cela ne l'empêcha pas de partir à l'aube du 22 octobre avec quelques hommes d'escorte en reconnaissance en dehors du Caire. A son retour, il fut attaqué par les Arabes. Son cheval glissa, Sulkowski tomba à terre et fut massacré. „C'était un officier des plus grandes espérances" écrivit Bonaparte dans un rapport officiel sur les événements du Caire. 2 A l'endroit où il fut tué, sur le chemin de Belbeis, à la place d'une mosquée démolie Bonaparte fit construire un fort auquel on donna le nom de Sulkowski. Les vestiges de ce fort existent, paraît-il — encore aujourd'hui. Par contre un monument de Sulkowski, fondé en 1834 par le général Henryk

^Ibidem p. 65. Cité d'après A Skalkowski, Les Polonais en Égypte, p. XXXVI.

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Dembinski 1 à Alger, fut détruit au bout de quelques mois par la population du faubourg Bab-El-Nasr. Sa jeunesse, son idéalisme, sa vie mouvementée en firent en Pologne le héros d'au moins deux pièces de théâtre 2 et d'un excellent reportage historique 3 , sans parler d'autres publications moins importantes. Dressant un portrait idéalisé du personnage, les auteurs mettaient l'accent sur le caractère progressiste de ses opinions sociales et restaient discrets sur la question — un peu embarrassante — de son hostilité à l'égard des Légions polonaises et de leur créateur, le général Dybrowski. Une question qu'ils ne pouvaient pas manquer de soulever était celle des rapports entre lui et Bonaparte. Même sans adopter des hypothèses plus ou moins fantaisistes, comme celle avancée par Hortensius de Saint Albin que Bonaparte avait envoyé Sulkowski exprès à la mort, en craignant de trouver en lui un rival à la gloire militaire 4 , ils soulignaient que son attachement à la liberté et son républicanisme ne se laisseraient pas concilier à long terme avec les ambitions de Bonaparte et que, si Sulkowski n'avait pas été tué, une rupture entre eux aurait été inévitable.

Henryk Dembinski (1791-1864), officier polonais, participa aux campagnes de 1809, 1812 et 1813, se distingua dans l'insurrection de 1830-1831 et joua un rôle important dans la révolution hongroise de 1848. •'Stefan Zeromski, Sulkowski, 1910; Roman Brandstaetter, Znaki woinos'ci (Signes de la liberté! 1953. '' J

Marian Brandys, Oficer najwiçkstych nadziei (Officier des plus grandes espérances), 1986.

^Hortensius de St Albin, J. Sulkowski, Mémoires, p. 162.

A PRECURSOR OF BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT: LEIBNITZ, AUTHOR OF THE CONSILIUM /EGYPTIACUM TO LOUIS XIV Alexandre Yali HARAN

The 17th century was a time of great concern by the Christian West regarding the Turkish threat, which had witnessed a natural continuum of the preceding century, the apogee of the power of the Ottomans. The reigns of Louis XIII and Louis XIV are peppered with projects, treatises and military operations directed at the Turks. The call for a crusade was sounded by several writers, such as Cérizier, chaplain of Anna of Austria, King Louis XIII's wife, and author of Vannée françoise ou la seconde campagne de Louis XIV (1656); Petis de La Croix, who wrote La Turquie chrétienne ; and Antoine de Montméran, author of Le temple de la nativité du roi (1661). The most interesting of the war plans against the Turks conceived at the time, and the one that enjoyed the greatest celebrity later on, was that devised by the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, who posited as its ultimate goal the conquest of Egypt 1 . Leibnitz proposed King Louis XIV a military campaign against the Turks, as an outcome of his comprehension of the international situation prevailing during the first decade of the Sun King's personal rule. At that time France adopted an aggressive policy against its neighbours and emerged as a real threat to Europe. Taking the law into his own hands, Louis XIV invaded the Spanish Netherlands in 1667, and in 1670 drove the duke of Lorraine out of his own country. Leibnitz first arrived at Mainz in the autumn of 1668, just at the time when its elector, John Philip, was abandoning the pro-French policy he had pursued since 1658. This policy was based on the assumption (which the elector shared with his foreign minister, baron Christian von Boineburg) that the House of Habsburg constituted a greater threat to the freedom of the German princes than would a treaty with France against Austria.

'timilienne Naert, La pensée politique de Leibniz (Paris: PUF, 1964), pp. 54-57; Rudolf ^falter Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth-Century Revolution (New York and London: Garland 1985) pp. 127-36.

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With France's latest military moves, the elector of Mainz grasped the danger, renounced his French connection, and sought help in Vienna. His plan was conceived to join the Triple Alliance of Holland, England and Sweden against France. Boineburg viewed the elector's new manoeuvre with growing anxiety. His diplomatic instinct told him that it was unwise to affront France without being at least equal to her in strength. Having lost the confidence of his master, however, he had no influence on him. Still, the minister felt that John Philip's irresponsible step must be prevented at all costs. He commissioned a report ordained from the 25-years-old lawyer-philosopher, Leibnitz, armed at persuading the elector to give up his bellicose intentions. The result was the Memorandum on how to safeguard, in accordance with the present circumstances, the securitas publica interna et externa and the Status Praesens, which Leibnitz wrote, on Boineburg's orders, in 1670. Leibnitz sought to prove in his memorandum that the Triple Alliance was a frail reed, and woe to him who would lean upon it for support. He exhorted the German princes, instead, to form a federation, for only such an alliance, in his view, could bring security and power to the empire. The alliance was to have a joint standing army, a treasury and a federal council. In his conclusion, Leibnitz raises the idea of a joint crusade by the European powers against the archenemy, the infidel Ottomans. As Erasmus of Rotterdam a century before, the philosopher was positing a new aim for European politics as a mean to secure peace for the Continent. At the time, the Ottomans were effectively massing great forces at the eastern gate of Christendom. Leibnitz was inspired by several events in East Europe (Montecuccoli's defeat of the Ottomans at Saint-Gotthard in 1664 and the war of Candia in 1669), which infused Europe with a new crusading spirit. He reasoned as a German for whom the Turkish peril in the 17th century was a palpable reality. The elector of Mainz received Leibnitz's memorandum of August 1670, written at Schwalbach in the course of three days, but it had no effect whatever on his policy. Negotiations with the Emperor concerning the triple alliance continued, although they were broken off in the end. In the meantime, the danger from the West grew more menacing. By autumn of 1671, the state of France's armaments clearly indicated its intention to strike at the country's neighbours as soon as the moment was auspicious. An atmosphere of panic and fear spread through the Rhenish principalities, especially Mainz. By the end of 1671, it was obvious that the French preparations were armed at Holland. Mainz feared the disruption of the "imperial peace", entailing possible loss of its own freedom.

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In those dramatic circumstances, Leibnitz drew up his plan for a just European settlement, the famous Consilium Aegyptiacum. The unknown young philosopher took it upon himself to work out a plan for the use of the king of France, a plan designed to restore the European balance of power and at the same time provide a defence against "the barbarians and infidels". The plan was based upon his metaphysical belief that Harmonia est diversitas identitate compensata — "Harmony is composed of diversity compensated by identity." Louis XIV was asked several times to lead a crusade against the enemy of Christendom. Exhortations to undertake a new crusade were a familiar feature of the poetry and prose addressed to the king. Leibnitz, however, did not count on appealing to the Christian conscience of the French monarch. His plan was more sober and circumspect, and he was aware of what distinguished it from countless enthusiastic proposals made by others. Boasting in a letter to the duke of Hanover (October 1671): It is obvious that these great armaments of France must at last be discharged; that should they be discharged in Europe a long universal war would ensue, bringing piteous ruin to many hundreds of thousands of men; and that therefore all Christians (not only the Catholics) would wish them to be discharged against the archenemy in the East [...] I am bold enough to assert that, apart from the invention of the fabulous lapis philosophorum, nothing more important could be offered to such a potentate as the King of France. Leibnitz's secret plan (known only to Boineburg meanwhile) was to reestablish the European balance of power by proposing the conquest of Egypt to Louis. The scheme included a historical survey of all earlier expeditions against Egypt. It discussed, in a favourable light, Egypt's economic and geographical position, and pointed out how easy such a conquest would be. The memorandum took great pains to show that France's gain from a continental war would be very little. In Egypt, by contrast, a quick victory was certain. Naval and commercial supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea, the honour and title of a king in the East, and the office of arbiter between east and west would be the fruits of his enterprise. According to Leibnitz, the expedition could be accomplished with moderate forces in twelve months. It would ruin Dutch interests and trade more effectively than any war; and France would at a stroke dispel the hatred and suspicion that had mounting against her everywhere in Europe. Leibnitz argued the weakness and fragmentation of the European powers risked the nightmare of Louis XIV becoming master of Europe. Well informed, Leibnitz knew of the secret promise made by the elector of Bavaria to support the election of the French monarch to the imperial crown. The

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philosopher thus came to the conclusion that the best way to deflect the powerful king from European affairs was to interest him in waging war against the Ottomans in Egypt. In seeking to enhance the notion of the conquest of Egypt, Leibnitz cited the advantages of such an expedition. Egypt, he wrote, was the key to the Ottoman Empire: it was the grenary of the empires and it was from this country that the Sultan extracted all his wealth. The day Egypt was snatched from him, the Turkish empire would be dragged down to its ruin.1 Well aware of Louis' aggressive intentions against Holland, Leibnitz explained that the Dutch would remain invincible so long as the East Indies trade stayed in their hands. Whatever the outcome of a French victory over them in Europe, the Dutch would preserve their naval and commercial strength. Since a war in the Far East against the possessions of the United Provinces was impracticable, only the conquest of Egypt, linchpin of the trade with Asia, could bring about the collapse of the mercantile republic. According to Leibnitz, the king of France ought not aspire to the "obsolete and impossible domination" of the old Continent, but strive for the "general direction or arbitration of things." By the conquest of Egypt, France would acquire the control of maritime trade and would rule the seas. She would become the "absolute sovereign" and the prestige of her army would make her "the military gymnasium of Europe." Other benefits that this project would achieve would be the blossoming of Christianity in Asia and Africa, and finally, the happiness of all humankind. Because of its geographical location, Leibnitz points out, Egypt is destined to serve as a link between the three continents. The isthmus of Suez is the bridge between the trade of the Indies and Europe. Egypt will be the foundation of Christian might in Africa: Numids, Abyssinians and Arabs will place themselves under the law of the Europeans. In addition, Egypt might provide an access route to the inaccessible China, which he held a special fascination for throughout his life. Leibnitz assigns spheres of colonial expansion beyond the old Continent to the various European powers: to England and Denmark - North America, to Spain - South America, to Holland - the East Indies. Sweden and Poland, instead of tearing each other apart, will penetrate into Siberia. To France Africa and Egypt. The German philosopher thus adopted the Grand Design of the French minister of Henri IV, Maximilien de Béthune due de Sully. According to that ambitious plan, conceived in the beginning of the 17th century, Europe would cease to "conspire against herself" by turning her combative ardour against her true enemies — the prize that must be paid in order to guarantee peace and stability on the Continent.

1 Leibniz, "Consillium JEgyptiacum", Mémoire sur la conquête de l'Egypte (trad. A. Vallet de Virville, 1842), pp. 14-30; Jean Baruzi, Leibniz et l'organisation religieuse de la terre (Paris, 1907), p. 10.

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Leibnitz hoped to bring into being a European entity with the Holy Roman Empire constituting its core. He wanted that the rivalries and dissensions between electors and princes, and conflicts between opposing religious persuasions to cease. The political union he desired would be modelled on a federalist system. The kind of Europe he dreamt of was that of the Middle Ages, governed conjointly by a spiritual leader (the pope) and a temporal ruler (the Holy Roman emperor). The expedition to Egypt was for the philosopher, the ideal means to obtain such a result. In the spring of 1672 Leibnitz decided to demand a personal audience with the French king in order to present him his plan. Through Boineburg's efforts, the philosopher received a positive reply to his request. On 12 February 1672 the French foreign secretary, Arnauld de Pomponne, wrote to the German diplomat that the king would be glad to receive the author of the plan. Yet Pomponne viewed Leibnitz's project coldly, telling to Louis XIV : "Je ne vous dis rien sur les projets d'une guerre sainte ; mais vous savez qu'ils ont cessé d'être à la mode depuis Saint Louis " — "I do not find fault with holy war projects, but you know well that they have ceased to be in fashion, even since Saint Louis." Leibnitz left for Paris on 19 March, arriving there at the end of the month. He had come too late, however. France declared war on Holland on the 6 April, and on the 28 April Louis XIV, together with by Pomponne, left for the battlefront. What Leibnitz had feared in Mainz had now come to pass: the European "universal war" had broken out. Leibnitz did not call the politicians to whom he had been recommended, for they had other things to do besides to see an obscure German lawyer, of whom they had never heard. Leibnitz's letters of introduction to them were found among his papers posthumously. The philosopher was even more deeply hurt by the cool reception afforded him by the intellectual circles in Paris. No one was interested in speculations and abstract exercises; they wanted to see "realities." After a few encounters, he found it advisable to change course and promote his model of a calculating machine in order to be able to present himself at thc forum sapientiae with a "real" invention. Still it was not until the early death of his patron Boineburg that he finally gave up this idea of an Egyptian expedition. In 1803, when the French troops entered Hanover, the Consilium /Egyptiacum was found in the archives of the city and sent on to Napoleon.

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Several attempts to attract attention to the idea of a crusade were made in during the reign of Louis XIV. As in the past, and despite thé Turkish policy adopted by the Sun King, France continued to be the object of solicitation for a war against the infidels. Appeals by the Greeks for help continued to be addressed to Western Europe, generally contributing to the perpetuation of agitation over the vacant throne of the eastern Roman Empire. The imperial capital of the East, Constantinople, was promised to Louis XIV in the crusade plan presented by Friar Michel Febvre in his treatise Le Théâtre de la Turquie, written in 1682, while Egypt and Jerusalem were granted to the king of Spain. A similar plan was drawn up in 1686 by the French consul in Damietta, Father Jean Coppin, author of Le Bouclier de l'Empire ou la guerre sainte... : the imperial crown of the East would go to the King of France, and Egypt and the Holy Land to the Catholic monarch of Castile. During the years following the liberation of Vienna from the Ottoman siege of 1683, a rumour circulated in Europe that Pope Innocent XI had conceived a European crusade that would be initiated with the ascension of a French ruler to the re-established throne of Constantinople. 1 Captain Gravier d'Ortières led a reconnaissance mission in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean during 1685 and 1687, in preparation for the launching of a French attack against Istanbul. In his Memoirs, d'Ortières also airs the wild dream of the elevation of a son of Louis XIV to the seemingly abandoned throne by Byzantium. The conquest of Egypt constituted a highly popular theme in panegyric and prophetic literature during the entire 17th century. The city of Memphis (capital of the ancient kingdom of Egypt, located near Cairo) was considered the goal of such a crusade in many prophetic texts. Les signes merveilleux et espouvantables, apparus sur la cité de Constantinople le dernier jour de mars 1613 ("The marvellous and horrible signs that appeared over the city of Constantinople on the last day of March 1613") tells us that Memphis is the place where, according an ancient Arabic prophecy, lays a marble stone carrying the inscription that "The big Empire will be destroyed by the race of the Lilies." "Je sçay bien que les oracles ; prédisent tous quà ton fils; sont reservez les miracles; de la prise de Memphis" — "I know very well that all the oracles predict that the miracles of the capture of Memphis are reserved to your son" ] Djuvara, Cent projets de partage de la Turquie (1281-1913) (Paris, 1914), p. 191), p. 229; Ludovic Drapeyron, "Un projet français de conquête de l'empire ottoman au XVI e et au XVII e siècles," Revue des Deux Mondes, 126 (1876), p. 142 ; François Charles-Roux, France et Chrétiens d'Orient (Paris, 1939), p. 53; F. de Bojani, Innocent XI, sa correspondance avec ses nonces, (Rome 1910), tome I, p. 687; Victor L. Tapie, "Europe et Chrétienté : idée chrétienne et gloire dynastique dans la politique européenne au moment du siège de Vienne (1683)," Gregorianum, 42 (1961), p. 271.

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— writes Malherbe to Louis XIII 1 . For the anonymous author of L'oracle de la pucelle d'Orléans proposé au roy ("The Oracle of the Maiden from Orléans Proposed to the King", 1614), urges Louis XIII to "briser la corne au croissan infidèle; raser Memphis d'un seul coup de son aelle" 2 — "smash the horn of the infidel crescent; ruin Memphis by a single stroke of his wing." Similarly, Du Bois-Hus, writing in 1646, foresees that Louis XIV will plant his standards in Memphis. 3 A predilection for the classical authors explains the particular interest in Memphis. Les Prophéties divines tirées du Pseaume 71 de David et appliquées à la personne du Roy... ("The Divine Prophecies extracted from Psalm 71 of David and Applied to the Person of the King," 1660) interprets psalm 71, verse 9: Coram ilio procident Aethiopes et inimici eius terram lingent — "The Ethiopians will bow down to him, and his enemies will lick the soil," thus: "Mais quand nostre grand Prince aura conquis l'Egypte sur les Othomans, comme il en est à la veille, qui doute qu'il ne reçoive les hommages du Preste Jean Empereur d'/Kthyopie" 4 — "When our great monarch conquers Egypt over the Ottomans, as he is on the eve of doing, who doubts that he will receive deference from Prester John, emperor of Ethiopia. " A device presented by Jean Guisse to the Dauphin, the future Louis XIV, predicting his victory over the Turks, shows a dolphin over an overturned crocodile, piercing his belly with the points of his flippers, with the caption: "Monseigneur le Dauphin appuyé des advantages qu'il reçoit et recevra tous les jours de Dieu et du Roy, remettra l'Egypte et le Nil entre les mains des Chrestiens [...]". — "Monseigneur le Dauphin, backed up by the advantages that he receives and will receive every day from God and the King, will restore Egypt and the Nile to the hands of the Christians". 5

^Jean-Baptiste Poisson (ou Poysson), Imitation et amplification de l'églogue faite en latin par le Père Campanelle sur la naissance de Monseigneur le Dauphin (s. 1. n.d., BNF. Yc. 982), note p. 39. L'oracle de la pucelle d'Orléans proposé au roy (Paris, 1614, BNF. Lb36.312), p. 10. ^Michel Yvon, sieur Du Bois-Hus, La Nuict des Nuicts, le jour des jours, le miroir du destin ou la Nativité du Daufin du Ciel, la naissance du Daufin de la terre et le tableau de ses aventures fortunée (Paris : Jean Pasle, 1641, BNF. Ye. 7732), p. 150. ^Prophéties divines tirées du Pseaume LXXI de David et appliquées à la personne du Roy... par F. P. religieux de St. François C (Paris: Gilles André, 1600, BNF. Ye 4046), I st , p. i 1. The diplomatie relationships established between France and the princes of the Maghreb are presented by this author in the same spirit of submission: the 10th verse (which in Christian tradition applies to the Magis) "Les roys de Thase, et les Isles luy offriront des presens, les Roys des arabes et de Saba luy feront des dons," is interpreted in a more prosaic sense: "Ce qui est tellement vray à la lettre, que le Roy de Thunis a envoyé depuis trois mois un Ambassadeur en France, qui a fait la reverence au Roy à Bayonne, et luy a offert de beaux presens de la part de son Maistre [...] L'on attend que les deux autres Roys de Tripoli et d'Alger en feront bienstot de mesme [...]." Ibid., 2 è m e partie, pp. 12-13. 5 Jean Guisse, Explication des devises présentées au Roy et à la Reine sur la naissance de Monseigneur le Dauphin... (s. 1. n.d., biblio. Mazarine 1086 pièce 20), pp. 1-2.

BONAPARTE'S EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN IN CONTEMPORARY FRENCH ART Marcus JUNKELMANN

„For the arts the expedition to Egypt was to be an event of unequalled importance, possibly even more important than the Italian campaign." 1 I think, it is not too much to say that we have for no other event of comparable dimensions in all the time before the common use of photography such a wealth of contemporary pictorial representations as for the French expedition to Egypt and Syria, a material unique in quality as well as in quantity. It is this richness which makes it quite impossible to give — in the frame of such a short lecture — an adequate impression of the volume and the various nature of the expedition's pictorial heritage. This enormous wealth of pictures came into existence not by chance but by conscious planning, as Napoleon took with him numerous scientists and some artists, the so-called „savants", to make possible a reliable documentary account of his conquest in a really encyclopaedic manner fitting the spirit of enlightenment. So one can speak of an artistic and scientific conquest paralleling the military and administrative conquest. After the end of the expedition and despite its failure, Napoleon continued to keep the memory of his Egyptian adventure alive by encouraging and sponsoring monumental depictions of scenes connected with the events in Egypt and Syria. The expedition became immediately part of the developing Napoleonic legend, as it had formed the background for the coup d'état of the charismatic leader returning like a „deus ex macchina" from a still victorious campaign to deliver France from chaos and defeat. In addition to this, the romantic character of the expedition, the fascination of its exotic oriental setting, the touch of „forty centuries" of history, and the dreams of a new

^Timothy Wilson-Smith 1996,73.

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French overseas-empire contributed to the lasting popularity of the Egyptian theme. Though interest in ancient Egypt and in the Musulman Orient was not new, it got fresh impulses by the expedition that were the starting-point for two influential genres of 19th century art: Egyptomania and Orientalism. I will not deal with the abundant material of later orientalist or historistic provenance painted by artists who had not witnessed the period, and tried to recreate the image of the expedition on the base of the survived contemporary material, the most famous and successful being Jean-Léon Gérôme. These later paintings are often quite well researched and accurate in their details, but they are second-hand and lack, of coarse, the style and the spirit of the period. As we have seen, the contemporary material falls into two main categories, the documentary and the monumental. The former was created by artists and scientists who were actually on the spot, and is therefore of an exceptionally authentic character. The aim of these men was in the first place to give an accurate picture of the things they thought interesting to contemporaries and posterity. Though most of them were scientists and not trained artists they were not without higher artistic ambitions, but usually they subordinated these ambitions to scientific correctness. For practical reasons they produced almost exclusively small-scale-pictures, usually in graphic techniques like pencil-drawing and aquarell-painting. Most of them were not designed as works of art in their own right but as preliminary studies for etchings that were to be published in the two famous documentary publications brought forth by the expedition, Dominique Vivant Denon's Voyages dans la basse et haute Egypte pendant les campagnes du général Bonaparte, which appeared with enormous success in two volumes in 1802, and the colossal Description de l'Égypte, published in 21 volumes between 1809 and 1828. The originals used for these etchings have in most instances survived, and, of course, they have a much more immediate impact than the etchings. In the last years some of the originals have been published, too, though never in a systematic manner. Denon's sketches are now in the British Museum, while the originals of the many collaborators of the Description de l'Égypte like André Dutertre, Nicolas-Jacques Conté, Antoine Cécile, CharlesLouis Balzac, Edme-François Jomard, Jean-Constantin Protain, often magnificent gouaches whose colours were lost in the contemporary publications, except for a few reproduced as lithographs, are now incomplete and scattered among several collections. The largest number is in the Bibliothèque Nationale, some are in the Muséum de l'Histoire Naturelle, in the Louvre, in the military archives at Vincennes, in the Victoria and Albert Museum and in private collections. The drawings of the profile portraits of most of the leading officers and savants by Dutertre — the only academic painter among the latter - are in the Bibliothèque Nationale, the gouache portraits of some of them representing the whole figures are conserved at Versailles.

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While the publication of the Description de l'Egypte started not before 1809 and took almost 20 years to be completed, Denons's book appeared already in 1802, thanks to the circumstance that Denon stayed in Egypt only one year and returned with Bonaparte to France in 1799, while most of the other savants remained in Egypt until the end of the expedition in 1801. The short space of time he had in Egypt and the fact that he had to follow the troops during their operations, sometimes even drawing under fire, and that he was therefore usually in a hurry, explain that many of his pictures are of a more spontaneous, less exact nature than those of the other members of the Institut d'Egypte. His drawings of archaeological material are therefore of less reliability, but the sketches he made of the events whose witness he was are convincing small reportages. Denon's book is a travel account blending the telling of adventurous stories with scientific report. This, together with the early date of its publication explains that it had a much wider and more immediate impact than the dreadfully expensive, slow-appearing and thoroughly scholarly volumes of the Description de l'Égypte. So the Egyptian Revival-Style developed much more under the influence of Denon's work than that of the Description. A curious example of this is the huge Egyptian Service made between 1805 and 1807 at Sèvres, and given in 1808 by Napoleon to Tsar Alexander I (today in Moscow). A second, almost identical service was made for Joséphine in 1810-1812, but was refused by her. Louis XVIII gave it to Wellington in 1818 commenting „ Do little gifts - keep friendship alive" 1 (today in the Wellington Museum at London). Besides many cups and plates painted by Jacques-François-Joseph SwebachDesfontaines with scenes taken f r o m Denon's book, both services have a centrepiece about 8 meters long containing the temple of Philae, four obelisks from Dendera and Edfu, colonnades, two pylons after the examples of the gateways at Karnak, four Memnon-figures and avenues of sacred rams, all done in biscuit-china and again modelled after Denon's drawings. In contrast to the Egyptian part of the expedition the Syrian part of it was left almost completely unrecorded by the savants. Denon was following Desaix to Upper Egypt during the time of the Syrian campaign, and the other members of the Institut remained at Cairo and other places in Lower Egypt. Let's now turn our attention to the paintings of monumental character which were without exception the work of trained artists who had not been in Egypt or Syria. None of the leading French painters followed Bonaparte on the expedition, though Antoine-Jean Gros who was to become the greatest of the „Egyptian" artists complained in letters to his mother that the general had not taken him along: 1

Charles Truman 1982, 28.

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... m'aurait compris dans son état-major, j'aurais peint des costumes orientaux, des mameloucks, des janissaires, des pachas, des chevaux arabes et turcs; j'aurais encore été mêlé à l'armée française, et j'aurais peut-être gagné des victoires en peignant Bonaparte vainqueur. Ainsi que Charles Le Brun a peint l'ancien Alexandre, moi j'aurais peint le nouveau. 1 The paintings of Gros, Girodet, Lejeune, Guérin and others therefore lack the immediate and absolute authenticity of the documentary pictures. But they could use all the sketches and other material brought home from the expedition, including oriental costumes and weapons, while the officers involved in the events to be illustrated offered advice and sometimes their own sketches. Denon himself became the first director of the Louvre and Napoleon's dominating art director, and he was anxious to provide the selected artists with as much information as possible to achieve a high degree of accuracy, according to the pronounced wishes of his master. Napoleon who had a keen eye for the propagandistic value of art wanted his painters to deal with subjects of contemporary history and not with ancient stuff, and he wanted them to do this in a realistic manner. This was in contrast to the usual Neoclassicist practice to represent recent history - if at all - in a very stylized fashion, the persons looking more like the heroes of Greece and Rome than contemporary soldiers and civilians. Napoleon had a special aversion for the allegorical method of representing history which was understood only by an elite circle of connoisseurs. This meant that the artists had to do a lot of research before starting to paint. It should be noted that battle painting in the late 18 th century was completely out of fashion, even the Republic had glorified more the political heroes of the Revolution than her warriors. By contrast Napoleon was resolved to please his soldiers by building public monuments to their deeds and sponsoring paintings which were in their character nothing less than monuments on canvas. As a contemporary critic remarked, under the Empire the Salons became a real military camp.2 In Napoleonic history-painting there were „three interlocking strategies: historical memories, moral contrasts, and scientific postures."3 The character of the representation depended very much on its size. There were roughly two sizes which were very differently handled: tableaux moyens and tableaux grands. The former ones tended to contain a multitude of small figures in a dominating landscape-setting, while the tableaux grandes were filled by rather few, but very large, often life-sized figures constricting human masses and 1 2 3

Norman Schlenoff 1965, 153. Manfred Heinrich Brunner 1979, 54. Todd Porterfield, 47.

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landscape to a mere background-scenery for the frieze-like figure-constellation in the foreground. The latter method conformed rather well with the NeoClassicist rules of the school of Jacques-Louis David, to which most of the leading painters belonged, including Gros and Girodet. General Louis-François Lejeune was one of the most successful battlepainters of the Napoleonic age though the Neo-Classicists didn't like him as he connected the Baroque-tradition of the topographic-analytical school of battle-painting developed by the Dutch in the 17 th century with narrative, often romantic details. Almost all his paintings measure around 180x260 cms, and belong therefore to the medium-sized category. Only the „Battle of the Pyramids" 1 is with 180x425 cms much larger than the others, though in style it is a tableau moyen, too. As it is not surprising for an officer of the génie corps, Lejeune's pictures are very informative and reliable regarding details of topography, troop formations, arms and uniforms, though he tends like most battle-painters to idealize the colourful appearance of the soldiers untouched by dirt, smoke and the wear and tear of campaigning, especially under as trying conditions as in Egypt or Syria. The „Battle of the Pyramids", dating from 1806, and the „Land Battle of Abukir" which was painted five years earlier and measured 185x255 cms, give in a very similar fashion an exact view over the greatest part of the battlefield from a fictional high viewpoint. The disciplined order of the French lines, columns and squares which are performing to almost geometrical perfection stands in decisive contrast to the confused and apparently leaderless swarms of the Mameluckes and Turks. Heirs to the ancients, the French drive out representatives of the Orient's unfortunate history that separates them from the grandeur of the Pharaohs [represented by the Pyramids in the background]. Victorious, the French inherit the Pyramids as emblems of their own grandeur. This model of the evolution of civilization, in which French power and rationality is aligned with Pharaonic Egypt and set off against the East's contemporary rulers, is sounded in many paintings, where it is contrasted to Oriental chaos. 2 Though without doubt conforming to a propagandistic stereotype announcing Western superiority, the contrast between the European and Oriental military organization and tactics in Lejeune's pictures is at the same time a simple depiction of reality. In the artist's third picture dealing with the expedition, this aspect is present again, but in a much less prominent manner, being put in the distance where the actual fighting between the squares of 1 2

The picture hangs, like all battle-paintings by Lejeune, in the museum at Versailles. Todd Porterfield, 63.

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Kléber and the Turkish horsemen takes place, while in the foreground we see Bonaparte — surrounded by a colourful mixture of French (including Polish) and Oriental followers — come to rescue. The subject of the picture is the „Battle of Mount Tabor". It dates from 1803 and has a size of 180x260 cms. In the very foreground it contains a significant scene: a French soldier discovers beneath a bush a half-buried gothic monument bearing the fleur-delis and an inscription of King Louis the Saint. This reminder of the crusades in a biblical setting near Nazareth with Mount Tabor as dominating feature in the landscape converts Napoleon and his Republican soldiers into defenders of Church and Faith. It is certainly not by chance that between 1801 and 1803 three major works of French art represented scenes of the campaign in Palestine, so completely ignored by the savants during the expedition. These were the years of reconciliation with the Catholic Church in which Napoleon negotiated with the Vatican to conclude a Concordat (1802) and to get the Pope's consent for his coronation (1804). The first of these pictures, Antoine-Jean Gros' oil-sketch for his „Combat of Nazareth", in 1801 struck already this note by manipulating the perspective in such a manner that Mount Tabor came into the picture. 1 The sketch was a preliminary study for a huge painting with a length of some eight meters that was never executed. On the first sight it is an astonishing fact that the first large-scale battle-painting of the period was dedicated to a rather small affair at which Napoleon himself was not present. On April 8, 1799, a small French detachment under General Junot had defended itself successfully against a vastly superior force of Oriental horsemen in the mountains between Nazareth and Mount Tabor. A few days after the combat it was the last stage of the siege of Acre - Bonaparte published an order-of-theday that this heroic feat of arms should be the subject of a large painting. The artist was to be elected by competition. No doubt, this was a measure to bolster the moral of his troops for the last attacks. In 1801 the competition took place at Paris. The jury included not only art-experts but military men, too, among them Junot himself. With 9 to 6 votes Gros won the competition. As Gros, who up to that date had some reputation only as a painter of portraits and not of historical subjects, was known to be a protégé of Joséphine Bonaparte there was an outcry against the decision of the jury as being the end of free competition. In the long run this fear was not unjustified, but in this case Gros had — in contrast to the other

For Gros' „Combat of Mount Tabor" see Manfred Heinrich Brunner 1979, 98-140, and Todd Porterfield 1998, 45-53. The sketch, which measures 134,9x195 cms, is now in the Musée des Beaux-Arts in Nantes.

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artists - simply realized what was laid down in the conditions of the competition, by following the instructions by Junot and Denon, and giving the action on the painting a correct setting as well as he could do. This he demonstrated by explaining his methods to the jury and to the public in form of texts and sketches which were exhibited together with the oil-sketch. In spite of Gros' intention to put the combat accurately on canvas the result is completely different from Lejeune's pictures. We see little of order and formations, but a wild mêlée dominated by small groups of large-sized combatants engaged in savage hand-to-hand-fighting. The contrast between Europeans and Orientals is here not one of order against chaos, because the whole picture shows tumult and chaos, but it is expressed in the reactions and the behaviour of the individual combatants. The exemplary stories that they are telling illustrate in part incidents contained in the informations given to Gros, in part they are invented. The violent motions and the coloristic splendour of the sketch stood in contrast to the practise of Gros' teacher David and the Neo-Classicist school, and formed a great inspiration for the early romantic and orientalistic painters, especially Géricault and Delacroix. It was never executed, not because the First Consul didn't want to see another general's deeds glorified, as often is assumed, but because the political scenery changed and other subjects got priority. So it happened that not the „Combat of Nazareth" became the first large-scale historical painting of Gros, but the „Pestiférés de Jaffa", the „Plague-stricken of Jaffa", and it was the greatest success of his whole career.1 When in 1809 a jury had to elect the best historical paintings of the last 10 years Gros' Jaffa-picture was regarded second only to David's „Sacre "?• It was ordered by Joséphine Bonaparte in 1803, but it is quite certain that the initiative came from Bonaparte himself. He was then First Consul, and preparations to make him Emperor were under way. Therefore a monumental picture featuring the future Emperor as the man of destiny seemed appropriate. At the same time there was need to contradict the rumours connected with the sinister events at Jaffa, the massacre of the Turkish prisoners as well as the poisoning of the French sick on the retreat to Egypt. These rumours originated in British and royalist propaganda and were well known at the time. So it was intended to supersede the black legend of Jaffa with a white one.

1 For the „Pestiférés see Walter Friedländer 1941; H. Molliaret, J. Brossolet 1968; Manfred Heinrich Brunner 1979, 141-179; D. G. Grisby 1995; Todd Porterfield 1998, 53-61. The picture is hanging in the Louvre. 2 D. G. Grisby 1995,4.

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It is very interesting to see how Gros has changed his composition until he came to the well-known solution of the finished version in the Salon of 1804, a huge canvas measuring 523x715 cms. The incident which should present Napoleon as a human leader instead of a cynical killer was found in the writings of the leading army-doctor Desgenettes, who had accompanied Napoleon as he visited the Armenian monastery serving as hospital for the plague-stricken. During his tour Napoleon came across the lifeless body of one of the sick soldiers barring the exit of a little room. Napoleon helped with his own hands to carry away the body, no doubtt, in the intention to demonstrate his confidence that the plague was not contagious, and to encourage his men to ignore the danger. In his first sketches Gros depicted quite literally the actual event, placing the incident in the interior of a room filled with sick soldiers, and showing Napoleon bearing the body. In the finished version most things have been changed. The setting is now in the open, in the courtyard of the monastery, the town of Jaffa towering in the background. The rather small and simple building of the monastery has been enlarged enormously, the architecture is now that of a mosque. All these changes can be explained with practical and artistic reasons - to make it easier to identify the locality, and to give the scenery a decidedly oriental touch. More problematic is the very different nature of Napoleon's action. He no longer is helping to remove a body but he is touching a sick man in a symbolic, not to say religious manner. The interpretation is difficult as the scene is riddled with contradictions. It reminds of religious paintings - Jesus bringing Lazarus back to life, St. Thomas touching Christ, diverse saints healing sick men, as well as the French tradition of the roi thaumaturge, the king as healer, a capacity defined as part of the power given to him by God. But the picture leaves little doubt that most of the plague-stricken will die. 1 Of course, the religious and monarchical allusions should not be taken too verbally. There was a new tradition dating from the French Revolution to cite religious symbols in a way which denies the traditional meaning and borrows from it at the same time. Remember David's dead Marat reminding of the dead Christ, but not really being a reincarnation of Christ. In a similar manner we have in Gros' picture a multifaceted playing with old traditions and new intentions culminating in a vaguely sublime image for the future emperor. A n y w a y this kind of propaganda was quite successful. Fouche's police reported that people said in front of the painting that this was the Emperor's most beautiful deed. 2

' Christopher Prendergast 1997 (162, 168) sees in Gros' Pestiférés" as well as in his later „Napoleon on the Battlefield of Eylau" cases of „overcoding": „Napoleon can only with difficulty be authoritative ruler, tragic victim, redemptive saviour, and humanitarian benefactor in a scene of war, for which he was in any case primarily responsible ... As overcoded image, Gros' Eylau thus wants it several ways at once, both the redemptive and the catastrophic, the sacred and the secular ..." 2 D. G. Grisby 1995, 34.

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Gros' „Jaffa" picture was the model for quite a lot of monumental paintings stressing the humanity and benevolence, the dementia of Napoleon, the most famous of them being Gros' „Napoleon on the battlefield of Eylau" (1808). Several of them show incidents of the Egyptian expedition: PierreNarcisse Guérin, „Napoleon pardoning the rebels at Cairo" (1808; of the same subject Gros himself had made sketches in ca. 1803, but his picture was not finished), François-Henri Mulard, „Napoleon giving a sabre to the defeated military chief of Alexandria" (1808), Guillaume-François Colson, „Napoleon's entrance in Alexandria, saving an Arab family" (1812). „... the consistency of the humanitarian stress is something relatively new and dates broadly from the realignment of the civicheroic with bourgeois values in certain forms of late eighteenthcentury sensibility ... If the crucial image remains that of the victorious general, it is nevertheless consistently tempered by the image of a „fatherly" Napoleon ... C o l s o n ' s Clémence de l'Empereur envers une famille arabe, when the focus is not on Arab soldiers but on an Arab family ... is perhaps the clearest instance of this generic hybrid, neither grand history painting nor religious allegory, but something close in spirit to domestic genre painting." 1 These staged acts of clemency often enough have to conceal a more sinister reality. So although the pardoning after the revolt of Cairo has taken place in fact, not a few of the rebels were nevertheless executed. The humanity of Napoleon came the brighter into shining when contrasted with the savagery displayed by the Arabs during the revolt. It was Anne-Louis Girodet de Roussy-Trioson who gave this contrast the most stirring expression in his painting „The revolt at Cairo" ("La révolte du Caire", 1810, 365x500 cms), illustrating the event which formed the very cause for the „Pardonings" conceived by Gros and executed by Guérin. 2 Little has been left of order and discipline. The French have been forced to fight it out in the barbarian way of their enemies. Violent and disturbing the action is - Stendhal spoke of „a nest of vipers which one uncovers by moving an ancient vase" 3 - , in its stylized manner of movement and its focus on a few monumental figures in the foreground it has still a decidedly Neo-classicist touch. The same is true for the classical, but unrealistic nakedness of the athletic Arab defending the sinking body of an effeminate pasha splendidly wrapped in silk and fur. The pair, which is not without a strong homoerotic touch, stands for two stereotypes connected with the Orient: animality and decadence. On the right leg of the Arab is clinging a black warrior - naked too, holding the cut-off head of a French hussar in his hand, forming almost exactly the centre of the whole picture.

1 Christopher Prendergast, 164. ^ For Girodet's „Revolt of Cairo" see George Levitine, 277-286. The picture which mcasTaes 365x500 cms, is hanging in the museum at Versailles. 3 Journal, vol. IV, 26, November 10, 1810 (George Levitine, 285).

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Head-hunters as embodiments of oriental savagery figure in the foreground of another battle-piece of the Egyptian campaign, too. This is Gros' „Battle of Abukir" (1806), one of the largest (578x968 cms) and most spectacular paintings of the period. 1 Though it shows some influence of Lejeunes's picture of the same subject, as Lejeune himself depended on drawings of Denon, the contrast between the two paintings could not be greater. Lejeune gives a clear, informative survey of the whole action, Gros leads into the midst of dynamic fighting. This is - as in Girodet's „Revolt" - even more remarkable as the painters of the tableaux grandes normally avoided to show the combat itself from the near. 2 So Gros can put life-sized figures of almost sculptural quality into the foreground. Murat, who had ordered the painting, is the hero of the composition, charging on a magnificent white horse ahead of his cavalry right into the Turks. In wild fury Mustafa Pa§a, the Turkish commander, tries to stop his fleeing soldiers while his son is surrendering to Murat who in calm self-control holds back his horse to spare the defeated enemy. That the Pa§a and his son were captured by Murat in person is a case of artistic license, as the general was wounded and hors-de-combat before these events took place. Again the individual characteristics typify eastern and western mentality. Pierre Chaussard wrote in a discussion of the Salon of 1806, that Murat's "calme de la supériorité, la valeur éclairée ... représente l'héroïsme français ... son regard est serein ... son coursier est véritablement orgueilleux du poids qu'il porte ...", while the Orientals would show „la férocité stupide ". The picture as a whole is described as a recreation of classical antiquity, „plutôt un chant de poème épique, semblable aux Grecs, les Français triomphant de l'antique Orient"? The fourth and last painting Gros dedicated to the Egyptian campaign represents the battle of the Pyramids (1810). 4 The only thing in common with Lejeune's handling of the same subject consists of the silhouette of the Pyramids looming prominently in the centre of the background. While Lejeune gives a panorama of the battle at the moment of decision, Gros has chosen the scene before the battle when Napoleon made his famous speech to his generals: „Allez, et pensez que du haut de ces monuments quarante siècles

1 The original title is: „Charge de cavalerie exécutée par le général Murat à la bataille d'Abukir, en Egypte". The painting measures 578x968 cms and is shown in Versailles. See Manfred Heinrich Bruimer, 187-247.

2

David never painted a real combat-picture, neither ancient nor contemporary. The nearest to it is his „Sabine women", but even this shows the interruption of the fight and not the fighting. In Pausanias français, Paris 1808,78 (Christopher Prendergast, 97). 4 Original title: ,J3onaparte haranguant l'armée avant la bataille des Pyramides". It measures 389x513 cms (before the enlargement of 1835 389x284 cms), and is hanging in the museum at Versailles.

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vous observentIt is indeed an illustration of this sentence, Napoleon, mounted on a oriental charger, pointing with both hands in the direction of the said monuments. The picture was originally not as broad as now (389x513 cms) having been enlarged in 1835 to fit into the place reserved for it in Louis Philippe's new museum at Versailles. The original size made Napoleon's gesture even more dominating than now. Almost the whole picture is occupied by the large figures in the foreground, Napoleon in the centre, mounted generals brandishing their sabres to the right and to the left of him, on the bottom some misplaced, but picturesque nude Orientals looking up to their conqueror full of admiration. Only a small gap between the mouth of Napoleon's horse and some generals' heads allows a view into the distance where the army stands ready for battle and where, far away, the pyramids make their appearance like a mirage. Uniting the military achievement with the presence of the ancient and the modern Orient and giving it a touch of the unreal, Gros' painting transforms into „the dream of the Egyptian campaign" 2

REFERENCES Bcaucour Fernand, Laissus Yves, Orgogozo Chantai, La découverte de l'Egypte, Paris 2 1997 (1989). Brunner Manfred Heinrich 1979, Antoine-Jean Gros. Die napoleonischen Historienbilder, Diss. Bonn. Bryson Norman 1988, Representing the Real: Gros' Paintings of Napoleon, in: History of the Human Sciences 1, 75-103. Cannelli Cristina, Gorgone Giulia, Mascilli Migliorini Luigi 2000, Napoleone Bonaparte in Egitto. Una spedizione tra conquista e conoscenza. 17981801 (Catalogue), Rome. Cederlof Olle 1967, "The Battle Painting as a Historical Source. An Inquiry into the Principles", in: Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire 26, 119-144. Constans Claire 1998, Musée national du château de Versailles: Les peintures, 2 vols. Paris. Cormier Leslie Humm and others 1982, All the Banners Wave. Art and War in the Romantic Era 1792-1851 (Catalogue), Providence.

There are several versions of this sentence. It is often assumed that the speech took not place at all, and that the famous words were a later invention, the first mention of it being made in Denon's „Voyages". But Napoleon's proclamations in Egypt are full of reminders to ancient history and admonitions to his soldiers to be worthy of the men in whose steps they were walking. So it would seem completely in character that Napoleon made such a remark in view of the Pyramids. Certainly it was no speech to the whole army, but to the officers suTto-amimg him, just as Gros has painted it in his picture. 2 Todd Porterfield 1998, 74.

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Crow Thomas 1995, Emulation. Making Artists for Revolutionary France, New Haven, London. Curl James Stevens 1994, Egyptomania: The Egyptian Revival: A Recurring Theme in the History of Taste, Manchester. Denon Dominique Vivant 1802/ 1989, Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Egypte pendant les campagnes du général Bonaparte, ed. by Jean-Claude Vatin, 2 vols., Cairo. Francastel Albert 1925, "Les Dessins de Dutertre à Versailles (Souvenirs de l'Expédition d'Égypte", in: Napoléon. Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes 24, 88-96. Friedländer Walter 1941, Napoleon als „Roi Thaumaturge", in: Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 4, 139-141. Grigaut Paul L. 1950, „A Romantic Sketch by Baron Gros: Murat at Abukir", in: Bulletin of the Detroit Institute of Arts 29, 1950, 6-11. Grisby Darcy Grimaldo 1995, „Rumor, Contagion, and Colonization in Gros's Plague-Stricken of Jaffa (1804)", in: Representations 51, 1-46. Humbert Jean-Marcel 1989, L'Egyptomanie dans l'art occidental, Paris 1989. Humbert Jean-Marcel, Pantazzi Michael, Zieger Christiane 1994, Egyptomania. Egypt in Western Art 1730-1930 (Catalogue), Ottawa 1994. Junkelmann Marcus (in preparation), „Vierzig Jahrhunderte blicken auf euch herab!" Bonapartes Ägyptenexpedition 1798-1801, Mainz. Laurens Henry 1989, L'expédition d'Égypte 1798-1801, Paris. Lelièvre Pierre 1993, Vivant Denon. Homme des Lumières, „Ministre des Arts" de Napoléon, Paris. Levitine George 1978, Girodet-Trioson. An Iconographical Study, New York, London. Molliaret H., Brosselet J. 1968, "A propos des „Pestiférés de Jaffa" de A. J. Gros", in: Jaarboek van het Koninklijk Museum voor schone Künsten Antwerpen 1968, 263-307. Piussi Anna Ruth 1992, Images of Egypt during the French Expedition (17981801), Diss. Oxford 1992. Porterfield Todd B. 1998, The Allure of Empire: Art in the Service of French Imperialism, 1798-1836, Princeton, N. Y. 1998. Prendergast Christopher 1997, Napoleon and History Painting. Antoine-Jean Gros's La Bataille d'Eylau, Oxford. Schlenoff Norman 1965, „Baron Gros and Napoleon's Egyptian Campaign", in: Essays in Honor of Walter Friedländer, New York, 152-164. Stolpe Elmar 1990, „Der Krieg als Drama der Leidenschaften in der militärischen Malerei des napoleonischen Zeitalters", in: Ekkehard Mai (ed.) 1990, Historienmalerei in Europa, Mainz, 173-191. Truman Charles 1982, The Sèvres Egyptian Service 1810-1812, London. Tulard Jean 1991, L'Histoire de Napoléon par la peinture, Paris. Wilson-Smith Timothy 1996, Napoleon and His Artists, London.

François Cécile, Frontispiece of the first edition,of the Description de l'Egypte, Paris 1809. The main picture shows assorted Egyptian monuments which in reality are situated from Alexandria down to Assuan. It is framed in Egyptian-Roman triumphalistic manner, on top the victorious Napoleon in classical nudity driving a Greek-Roman chariot, in the corners below. Pharaonic cartouches with the Napoleonic bee.

Jean-Constantin Protajji, Bonaparte in the hall of the palace of Hasan-Kashef at Cairo the r ™ D '"¿^3' { Egypte Drawing with gouache for the Description de VÉeypte 1798y 1799. Pans, Bibliothèque Nationale.

James Gillray, „L'insurrection de l'Institut Amphibie" or „The Pursuit of Knowledge". Cartoon on the French „savants", here experimenting with crocodiles as riding animals. Engraving from an „Original Intercepted Drawing", 1798.

Aridré Dutertre, „Savant" in front of a colossus at Karnak. Drawing for the Description l'Egypte, 1799-1801. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale.

de

Jean-Charles Tardieu, Halt of Desaix' army at Assuan, 2 February 1799, one of the soldiers is inscribing the distance to Paris on an Egyptian monument. Painting, Salon of 1812. Musée national du chateau de Versailles.

André Dutertre, Portrait of General Desaix. Gouache for the Description 1800. Musée national du château de Versailles.

de l'Égypte,

1798-

Dominique Vivant Denon, Denon drawing the ruins of Hieraconpolis. Drawing, 1798-1799. London, The British Museum.

Dominique Vivant Denon, Council of the „Divan militaire". Drawing, 1798-1799. London, The British Museum.

Dominique Vivant Denon, Death of Chef de brigade Duplessis, 2 April 1799. Drawing. London, The British Museum.

Swebach-Desfontaines after Dominique Vivant Denon, Plate of the second Egyptian Service with the death of Duplessis. Porcelaine, 1811. Sèvres, Musée national de Céramique.

Swebach-Desfontaines after Dominique Vivant Denon, Plate of the second Egyptian Service with the death of Duplessis. Porcelaine, 1811. Sèvres, Musée national de Céramique.

Swebach-Desfontaines after Dominique Vivant Denon, Plate of the second Egyptian Service with the death of Duplessis. Porcelaine, 1811. Sèvres, Musée national de Céramique.

Louis-François Lejeune, The Battle of the Pyramids. Salon of 1806. Complete view and details. Musée national du château de Versailles.

Louis-François Lejeune, The Land Battle of Aboukir. Salon of 1801. Musée national du château de Versailles.

Louis-François Lejeune, The Battle of Mount Tabor. Salon of 1803. Muse'e national du château de Versailles.

General Andoche Junot, Map of the combat at Nazareth. Nantes, Musée des Beaux-Arts.

General Andoche Junot, Map of the combat at Nazareth. Nantes, Musée des Beaux-Arts.

Antoine-Jean Gros, Reworked map after Junot and translation into prospect of the combat at Nazareth. Nantes, Musée des Beaux-Arts.

Antoine-Jean Gros, Oil-sketch for the combat at Nazareth, 1801. Nantes, Musée des BeauxArts.

The court of the Armenian monastery at Jaffa. Photo Author.

Antoine-Jean Gros, Drawing and oil-sketch for the Pestiférés de Jaffa. 1802-1803. Musée du Louvre, and New Orleans, Museum of Arts.

Paris,

Antoine-Jean Gros, Les pestiférés Musée du Louvre.

de Jaffa. Salon de 1804. Complete view and detail. Paris,

Pierre-Narcisse Guérin, Napoleon pardoning the rebels at Cairo. Salon of 1808. Musée national du château de Versailles.

Guillaume-François Colson, Napoleon's entrance in Alexandria, saving an Arab family. Salon of 1812. Musée national du château de Versailles.

Anne-Louis Girodet de Roussy-Trioson, The Revolt at Cairo. Salon of 1810. Musée national du château de Versailles.

Dominique Vivant Denon, The Land-Battle of Abukir. Drawing, 1799. London, The British Museum.

Antoine-Jean Gros, Oil sketch for the Battle of Aboukir. Ca. 1805. Detroit, Museum of Fine Arts.

Dominique Vivant Denon, The Land-Battle of Abukir. Drawing, 1799. London, The British Museum.

Antoine-Jean Gros, The Battle of the Pyramids. Salon of 1810. The detail reproduced here corresponds to the original size of the painting. Musée national du château de Versailles.

THE OPERATIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OTTOMAN NAVY DURING NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF EGYPT, 1798-1801 Kevin McCRANIE

In mid-January 1801, two corvettes arrived at Marmorice escorting the Kapudan Bey's demasted, flagship the Sun, 80, the victim of lightning strikes in a recent storm. 1 This typified the story of the Ottoman navy during the French invasion and occupation of Egypt between 1798 and 1801. The Ottomans called this conflict the War of the Triple Alliance, the capstone of a pivotal period of Ottoman history when Sultan Selim III tried to selectively modernize the Ottoman Empire. Part of Selim's modernization plan involved the rebuilding of the navy along western lines. Although the Ottoman shipyards produced modern ships, the Ottoman navy never completely overcame its inadequacies in the areas of training and logistics. These problems became obvious during the French invasion and occupation of Egypt. After the crushing French defeat at Aboukir Bay on 1 August 1798, the Ottoman navy became the third most powerful naval force in the Mediterranean behind Britain and Russia. Before the French were finally expelled from Egypt in 1801, the Ottoman navy was second only to the British in the Mediterranean. In 1796, two years prior to the French invasion of Egypt, this fleet, a curious hybrid of its Eastern tradition and Western technology, boasted seventeen ships-of-the line and twenty frigates and corvettes. 2 The Ottoman Empire even had a modern western style dockyard and naval facilities with the Arsenal in Constantinople, 3 yet their navy failed to reach its potential just like the weather beaten naval force that sailed into Marmorice in early 1801. Even though the Ottoman navy never could compete with the British navy, it participated in all the major campaigns in the Levant between 1798 and 1801 supporting the Russians and later the British in their bid to thwart the burgeoning French influence in the region. As such, understanding the size of ^jEneas Anderson, A Journal of the Forces which sailed from the Down in April 1800 (London J. Debret, 1802), 14 January 1801, 194. 2 Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New : The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 17891807, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 158. 3 Shaw, Between Old and New, 157; Jonathan Grant, "Rethinking the Ottoman "Decline" : Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries " Journal of World History, 10:1 (1999): 189.

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operations conducted by the Ottoman navy as well as its ability to sustain active naval operations is critical in determining the effectiveness of their navy during the time when the French occupied Egypt. By 1798, the Ottoman Empire was in a state of virtual disintegration. Power emanating from Constantinople was relatively weak. It did not effectively extend to the countryside in Anatolia much less to Egypt where a set of rulers known as Mamluks ruled technically in the name of the Sultan. With this weakness in mind, a French army under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt in 1798, quickly conquering Lower Egypt. However, their maritime link to France was severed almost immediately when the British naval force under Admiral Horatio Nelson nearly destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir Bay on 1 August 1798.1 This victory was of great importance. It trapped the French in Egypt for the next three years; it convinced Sultan Selim III to declare war on France and it allowed the Ottoman, British, and Russian navies undisputed control of the Mediterranean. Selim declared war on France in September 1798 and during the following January secured separate military alliances with both Russia and Britain. This, the Triple Alliance, would be the vehicle by which Selim planned to force the French out of Egypt and to check French territorial designs in the Balkan. French involvement in the Balkans had begun in late 1797 with the treaty of Campo Formio. One of the treaty's provisions gave the French control of the Ionian Islands, strategically located at the mouth of the Adriatic Sea. French presence in these islands threatened the Balkan Peninsula — the richest part of the Ottoman Empire. At the time of the invasion of Egypt, Selim and his advisors were more concerned about the French presence in the Balkans than their presence in Egypt. In addition, the threat to the Balkans also had peaked the Tsar's interests. As a result, a powerful Russian naval force of thirteen warships was dispatched from Sebastopol to the Eastern Mediterranean to cooperate with the Ottoman Turks. The Russians were a traditional enemy of the Ottoman Empire and had fought several wars with the Ottomans over the previous century. The Russians only became allies with the Turks to combat the French threat. Selim believed that any Russian force in the Eastern Mediterranean should have Ottoman naval forces attached to guard against underhanded dealings by their new "ally." Thus, a Turkish force of four ships-of-the-line, six frigates, and four corvettes under the Kapudan Bey (Admiral), Kadri Bey, joined the Russian fleet in the Dardanelles during September 1798. The majority of this force under Russian command sailed with orders to capture the Ionian Islands on 1 October. This armament arrived off Corfu in November blockading the port

1 R. C. Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant: 1559-1853, (Princeton : University Press, 1952), 354-64 ; J. Christopher Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt, (New York, Harper & Row, 1962), 102-24.

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and laying siege to the town. The Turkish fleet and their Russian counterparts co-operated in maintaining a loose blockade of the city. During this time, Kadri Bey respected the Russian commander and maintained cordial relations, but he did not jeopardize his fleet since he generally kept his ships in the offing letting the Russians patrol the waters around Corfu. Although there were problems in the alliance, the French were forced to surrender in March 1799. 1 A f t e r the capture of Corfu, the Russians focused their attention on Ancona, located on the Italian peninsula. The Turks again assisted the Russians and later the Austrians; however, fewer Turkish ships took part in these operations and friction again occurred between the allies delaying the successful conclusion of the siege until November. During this period, the majority of the Russian and Turkish fleets sailed to Messina and then Palermo in Sicily. At the latter port, an incident occurred in early September between the people of Palermo and the Turks. Although the problem began as an altercation between a single Turk and several Sicilians, soon a full-scale riot engulfed the city, and the Turks sustained over one hundred casualties. The Turkish sailors overcome with rage almost bombarded the city. With some difficulty, Kadri Bey and his officers prevented this incident, but the morale of the sailors had collapsed after a year of continuous operations and the prospect of booty in near future appeared dim. Thus, Kadri Bey's Ottoman ships proceeded to sea and sailed for Constantinople in mid-September. This ended the phase of naval operations where the Turks acted in conjunction with the Russians. 2 In October 1798, when the combined Ottoman and Russian fleet sailed to the Adriatic, the Turkish naval presence off Alexandria was minuscule. Instead of utilizing Turkish naval forces for these operations, the Ottomans relied on the British to maintain a naval presence off the coast of Egypt. 3 In March 1799, the Ottomans began to change their policy as the French army under Napoleon Bonaparte advanced north into Syria. The French were no longer confined to Egypt — this invasion threatened Damascus and even ^Edward M. Fitzgibbon, "Alexander I and the Near East: The Ottoman Empire in Russia's Foreign Relations, 1801-1807," (Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1974), 25-29; J. C. Hurewitz, "The Background of Russia's Claims to the Turkish Straits: A Reassessment," Belleten, 38 (1964): 282-83 ; P. Pisani, "Une expédition russo-turque aux îles Ioniennes," Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, 2 (1888): 203-205; Edward Ingram, Commitment to Empire : Prophecies of the Great Game in Asia 1797-1800, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 218-19; Anderson, Naval Wars, 367-71; Norman E. Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 1797-1807, (Chicago: University Press, 1970), 86-88, 93; Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey", Journal of World History, 1 (1953): 120. ^Anderson, Naval Wars, 373-74, 380-81; Saul, Russia in the Mediterranean, 118-119; Harold Acton, The Bourbons of Naples (1725-1825), (London, 1957; reprint, Great Britain: Prion, 1998), 430. Acton indicates that the Turks sustained two-hundred casualties including one-hundred awi twenty dead and eighty wounded. 3 Shaw, Between Old and New, 264.

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Anatolia, advancing as far as Acre where they encountered stubborn resistance from the Ottoman governor supported by ships of the Royal Navy. Since the outcome was in doubt, Selim dispatched a fleet from Rhodes to Acre with much needed infantry reinforcements. With this influx of men, the Turks held Acre until May 1799 when the French army withdrew to Egypt.1 After stopping the French advanced at Acre, the Ottoman leadership began to shift even more of their forces against the French in Egypt. As the Ottomans focused their naval and military might against Egypt, their operations in the Adriatic especially after the capture of Corfu in March 1799 were smaller in scale implying that Ottoman reinforcements were increasingly channelled toward Egypt. This also indicated that the capabilities of the Ottoman navy limited the Sultan to conducting one major operation at a time. Selim assembled a substantial Ottoman naval and military armament at Rhodes during early 1799. This force eventually consisted of seven ships-ofthe-line, five frigates, and fifty-eight other vessels under the command of the Patrona-Bey (Vice Admiral). The purpose of this armament was to transport an army of at least, 12,000 and perhaps as many as 15,000 soldiers commanded by Mustafa Pa§a for an invasion Egypt.2 This fleet sighted Alexandria on 11 July 1799 and landed at Aboukir on the 20th. Five days later, Bonaparte destroyed the Ottoman army on the beach at Aboukir. Although the Ottoman navy survived this operation without appreciable losses, the army suffered one of its worst defeats during the war. This was the first and only attempt during the War of the Triple Alliance where the Ottoman navy undertook a major operation without the assistance of one of her allies.3 The Ottoman Empire's navy proved capable of mounting limited operations during the first year of their war against France. Their leaders even assembled a large fleet to invade Egypt. Although the total Ottoman naval forces were far from negligible, what was their overall effectiveness? In assessing this, several areas become very important. First, the efficiency of the dockyards and the ability of the Ottoman Empire to supply the navy became a major constraint on the capability of their navy to mount sustained operations. Second, the quality of the seamen and Ottoman seamanship worked to limit the season when active naval operations could be conducted in a given year. Finally, the Ottoman command structure and the capabilities of their senior officers provide a glimpse into the decision making capability of the Ottoman navy. 1 Smith to Nepean, 9 May 1799, The Naval Chronicle, 2:620-22; Smith to Nelson, 31 May 1799, John Barrow, The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, (London, R. Bentley, 1848), 1:255-60; Nathan Schur, Napoleon in the Holy Land, (London, Greenhill Books, 1998), 128,146. 2 C. de La Jonquière, L'expédition d'Egypte, 1798-1801, (Paris: H. Charles-Lavauzelle, 1907), 5:325-27; Herald, Bonaparte in Egypt, 518; Shafik Ghorbal, The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehemet Ali, (London, 1928), 101. Specifics of this operation are sketchy. There were very few western observers of the action. James cites the number of ships as thirteen of-the-line, nine frigates, seventeen gunboats, and thirty-seven other vessels. See Anderson, Naval Wars, 381. %erold, Bonaparte in Egypt, 519-20; Anderson, Naval Wars, 381.

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When Selim came to power, the Ottoman navy was almost completely ineffective. Although the Ottomans had previously tried to modernize the navy, they had only limited success. Their naval technology lagged far behind Western Europe and many of the ships were nearly unseaworthy. Over the next decade, the Ottoman navy made great strides in improving the quality of their ships. Selim appointed Kilgiik Hiiseyin Pa§a as the new Kapudan Pa§a (Grand Admiral) in March 1792. He would remain in this position until late 1803. In an era of turbulent foreign relations and difficulties at home, Hiiseyin Paga brought stability to the naval establishment. With Selim's help, he imported French craftsmen and naval architects, considered to be the best in the world, to rebuild the Ottoman navy and the dockyards at Constantinople known as the Arsenal. The yard at Constantinople was by far the most important Turkish naval arsenal producing one-third of the ships of the line during Selim's reign. The building of ships at other naval yards continued and produced most of the frigates and corvettes. Of the other yards, the one on Rhodes was also important, and the Ottomans produced four frigates and two corvettes there between 1793 and 1799. By 1796, the Ottoman navy had seventeenth ships-ofthe-line and twenty frigates. The Russians commented, perhaps with envy, that the Turkish ships in the Adriatic during 1798-99 were constructed in accordance with the most recent French designs. Even with the French occupation of Egypt, the French naval architects remained in Constantinople until 1804 overseeing the construction of new ships and teaching Ottoman craftsmen how to build ships by utilizing modern French naval technology. 1 With the formation of the Triple Alliance in January 1799, Selim placed part of the Arsenal at Constantinople under English control. Since he had dispatched the majority of his available naval force to the Adriatic and the British naval force in the Levant remained small, the British naval commander convinced the Turks that the construction of additional vessels would be of great assistance. Although the Turks never allowed the British to exercise full control over the entire yard, it successfully provided the British with modest orders consisting of small craft and boats constructed by a British shipwright in Ottoman service named Spurring. In January 1799, construction began on five gunboats at the Arsenal. Within a month, they already showed form, and Spurring indicated that they could be launched the following month. In addition, the arsenal began to produce launches on the British model. This demonstrated that the Ottoman Arsenal at Constantinople partially switched from French naval designs as they had used before Bonaparte's invasion of

Shaw, Between Old and New, 157-58, 412 ; R. Skalovskii, Zhizn' Admirala Feodora Feodorovicha Ushakova, (St. Petersburg, 1856), 239-40 as cited in Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 79; Nejat Giilen, Dünden Bugüne Bahriyemiz, (Istanbul, 1988), 118-19 as cited in Grant, "Rethinking Ottoman Decline," 189-90.

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Egypt to become temporarily influenced by the British. 1 However, problems remained and seemed to mount the longer the Sultan remained in the war. Money to pay for these orders quickly became a problem.2 Keeping the Ottoman navy ready for battle required huge quantities of supplies. Part of these were locally produced, while foreign equipment made up the deficiencies. The Ottomans were able to domestically produce many of their own supplies such as planks, masts, ropes, and cables. In early 1801, the British naval commander preparing for the invasion of Egypt even sent a ship to the Ottoman arsenal at Constantinople to procure the above items for his fleet. As a result, the Ottoman navy was partially able to refit Royal Navy vessels with Turkish stores.3 However, the Ottoman navy proved deficient in other areas, especially in metal goods. A major source for anchors, cannon, and shot came from the Russian naval arsenals in the Black Sea. After the Russians began to drift away from the alliance in late 1799, this source of supplied dried up and the Ottomans turned to the British requesting the procurement of substantial quantities of shot, shell, powder, and small arms with an estimated value of £ 150,000.4 Thus, in distinct areas, the Ottomans relied on foreign sources to maintain their navy at a level capable of at least limited operations. Also, this was another limitation on the ability of the Ottoman navy to commit substantial forces to any operation. Active operations expended supplies at an alarming rate, and this was costly, while playing second seat to her allies forcing them to perform the majority of operations incurred little to no expense for the Ottomans. In addition to logistical problems, the weather limited the ability of the Ottoman navy to conduct naval operations. This was especially true when comparing them with their Western European contemporaries. In the age of sail where vessels were made of wood and relied on masts, spars, cordage, and canvas for propulsion, storms could wreak havoc on a fleet, especially one not prepared for heavy seas. When comparing foul weather in the Mediterranean to storms in the North Sea and the Atlantic, they appeared mild, yet storms still battered the Mediterranean, especially during the winter months. Poor weather limited the ability of the Ottoman navy to conduct active operations. Even during the War of the Triple Alliance, the Ottoman navy still wintered at

1 Smith to Nelson, 24 January 1799, Life of Smith, 1:251-53; Smith to Spencer, 22 February 1799, Private Papers of George, Second Earl Spencer First Lord of Admiralty, 1794-1801, ed. H. W. Richmond, (London, Naval Records Society, 1924), 4:65-66; Shaw, Between Old and New, 158, 441. 2 Smith to Spencer, 27 February 1799, Spencer Papers, 4:66-67. 3 Kapudan Pasha to Keith, 1 January 1801, Great Britain, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, [Hereafter NMM], Keith Manuscripts, KEI/15/3. ^Elgin to Grenville, 29 January 1800, Great Britain, Public Record Office, London [Hereafter cited PRO], Foreign Office [Hereafter cited FO], 78/28.

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Constantinople. 1 According to one British naval officer, "There is no getting these fair weather birds [the Turks] to navigate in winter, our example exciting any astonishment without emulation." 2 Although the Ottoman naval officers refused to proceed to sea in the middle of the winter, the same British officer conceded it was for the best. He claimed, "It must be confessed that, ill found as they are, it would be exposing them to destruction for them to cruise on this coast [Egypt] or that of Syria in winter." Sailing in the winter was difficult and changing the courses with heavy canvas in rough seas challenged even the most experienced sailors. The Ottoman ships lacked the heavy weather canvas necessary to sail in foul weather; instead, their sails were of light cotton. For the Turks, this did have a benefit. The lighter sails were easier to handle and given the fact that their vessels contained few experienced seamen — this was an advantage. 3 Although one could argue that the British contempt for other navies would lead to such disparaging comments, the Russians made similar criticisms of the Turkish navy's manning problem. 4 Besides the faults regarding seamanship, the Ottoman navy received compliments in other areas. Nelson remarked on the cleanliness and organization aboard the Ottoman ships he had seen. Another British officer claimed, "Their artillery is both well manned and expertly handled." 5 The Ottoman command structure was unusual, especially when compared to the nations of Europe. The commander of the navy was the Kapudan Pa§a (Grand Admiral), one of Selim's ministers and also the governor of the Morea. During the period in question, Klifiik Hiiseyin Pa§a, Selim's closest friend, held this position. He was ardently anti-Russian and pro-British and led the more radical reformers in the Ottoman court. Although he had no background in naval affairs, he constantly pushed for the modernization of the Ottoman navy. 6 The rank of Kapudan Pa§a had no analogy in any other country and caused a quandary for the British as to how the Grand Admiral would be saluted and a major political incident involving the Russians nearly occurred over the same matter. Perhaps, he was closer to royalty since he had married into the Sultan's family. 7

Wraith to Keith, 8 March 1800, The Keith Papers. Selected from the Papers of Admiral Viscount Keith, ed. Christopher Lloyd, (London, Naval Records Society, 1952), 2:211-12. 2 Smith to Spencer, 22 February 1799, Spencer Papers, 4:65-66. 3 Smith to Keith, 8 March 1800, The Keith Papers, 2:211-12. 4 Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 67,79. 5 Smith to Keith, 8 March 1800, The Keith Papers, 2:211-12; Nelson to Spencer Smith, 10 September 1799, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson, ed. N. H Nicolas, (London: H. Colburn, 1845-46), 4:7-8. 6 Shaw, Between Old and New, 13, 48, 87-88,412. 7 Elgin to Nelson, 15 January 1800, NMM, KEI/18/3.

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Directly below the Kapudan Pa§a was the Kapudan Bey, roughly equivalent to an admiral. Kadri Bey, the Turkish commander who worked with the Russian in the Adriatic, held this position, and this was often a stepping stone to the Kapudan Pa§a. Kadri Bey received this promotion in 1803. Under the Kapudan Bey was the vice-admiral, the Patrona Bey. 1 Nelson had nothing but compliments for Kadri Bey commending him to the Kapudan Pa§a on the merits of his character and claimed his ship was in good order. On the other hand, the Russians complained that he lived in regal splendour aboard his flagship to the extent that his sailors had little room to sleep. In addition, the Russians asserted that he stayed out of action as much as possible. 2 A British naval officer made a similar assertion about another senior Turkish officer calling him a "dilatory old woman." According to him, "His [the Turkish officer's] aversion to the whistle of shot makes him no sort of use." 3 Overall, the Kapudan Pa§a was a remarkable officer, a gifted leader, and the force behind the modernization and utilization of the Ottoman navy. His senior officers did not serve him as well as they should have. Although they were capable of conducting limited operations and could keep a clean and efficient ship, they preferred their lavish lifestyles and continually avoided the risks associated with combat. Although the Ottoman navy was far from perfect, there were bright spots. They had a modern naval yard at Constantinople, their ships were well built and the Kapudan Pa§a was an excellent leader. Still, they faced their most difficult challenge in 1801 while assisting the British in the reconquest of Egypt. Without the Kapudan Papa's assistance, a difficult operation appeared nearly impossible for the British. 4 Prior to the invasion in late December 1800, the British fleet anchored at Marmorice on the coast of Anatolia. The Kapudan Pa§a had already ordered the local Pa§a to assist in procuring supplies, and he had sent his Supreme Commissariat to Rhodes to "expedite preparations." 5 Through the Kapudan Pa§a's efforts, Ottoman officials kept the British supplied at Marmorice, and provided valuable assistance to the expedition such as pilots familiar with the coast of Egypt and vessels capable of navigating the Nile. 6

Shaw, Between Old and New, 155, 164, 412; Anderson, Naval Wars, 389-90. Charting the accomplishments of the other Ottoman naval officers becomes problematic. Often, authors provide only their names and at other points merely their ranks. At times, the rank is the Turkish rank, and at others their closest English equivalent. 2 Nelson to the Kapudan Pasha, 4 November 1799, Dispatches of Nelson, 4:88; Saul, Russia and the Mediterranean, 79. 3 Smith to Elgin, 22 April 1800, Life of Smith, 1:403-11. 4 Abercromby to Keith, 12 January 1801, James Meek, Meek's Draft on the Life of Keith, NMM, KEI/47/54. 5 Pasha of Candia to Keith, November 1800, NMM, KEI/15/1; Kapudan Pasha to Keith, 28 December 1800, NMM, KEI/15/3. 6 Kadir Bey to Keith, 8 January 1801, Reis Effendi to Keith, 9 January 1801, NMM, KEI/15/1.

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In mid-January, one demasted Turkish ship-of-line-line and several frigates arrived at Marmorice commanded by the Kapudan Bey. Although this was not a powerful addition to the fleet, the arrival of the Turkish contingent demonstrated their resolve to cooperate with the British. 1 More important than this, the Kapudan Pa§a sent messages assuring the British commander that he had orders f r o m the divan to sail from Constantinople with a substantial armament. The Kapudan Pa§a wished to sail to Marmorice where he could jointly plan the expedition with the British; however, contrary winds prevented the sailing of the Ottoman fleet from Constantinople. The Kapudan Bey even ordered that his subordinates were "strictly advised to obey" the British commander's orders demonstrating the inferior position of the Ottoman Empire in their alliance with Britain. When the British fleet finally sailed f r o m Marmorice, the Turkish navy had yet to join them in force, but Turkish merchant vessels made up nearly a third of their fleet, and the British c o m m a n d e r expected the imminent arrival of a substantial Ottoman contingent. 2 The Ottoman Fleet arrived off the coast of Egypt several days after the British had secured a beachhead. The Turkish force had been divided into three small divisions. The Kapudan Bey arrived on 18 March with three-of-the-line and four to five frigates and corvettes. 3 The British naval commander declared, "The Kapudan Bey is come to anchor [but] not much use to us we look for the Kapudan Pasha." 4 The Turkish Grand Admiral arrived about a week later on 26 March with several frigates and two of the line including the Selimiye of 132 guns. On the following day, the Patrona Bey arrived with an additional ship of the line and several frigates escorting a convoy of transports loaded with 4,000-5,000 soldiers. 5 Soon after their arrival, the Kapudan Pa§a detailed three of-the- line and three frigates to assist the British naval force blockading Alexandria. In all, Selim detached a large proportion of the entire Ottoman navy to assist the British in their invasion of Egypt. These forces were actively involved in the blockade of Alexandria and in escorting transports to Egypt. They conducted operations roughly equivalent to the British. Although the total number of ships employed was not massive, only totalling six shipsof-the-line, this almost equalled the seven British ships-of-the-line detailed to

1

Anderson, Journal of the Forces, 14 January 1801,194. Kapudan Bey to Keith, 15 January 1800, NMM, KEI/15/2; Kapudan Pasha to Keith, 25 & 27 January & 28 February 1801, NMM, KEI/15/3; Lists of Ships of War at Marmorice, 21 February 1801, The Keith Papers, 2:267-69. 3 Meek, Life of Keith, NMM, KE/47/3/151; Anderson indicates there were only two of the line See, Naval Wars, 389. ^Keith to Mary Elphinstone, 18 March 1801 addendum to 28 February letter NMM KEI/46/243. •'Elgin to Grenville, 6 November 1799, PRO, FO 78/24 ; Keith's Journal, 26-28 March 1801, PRO, Admiralty Papers, ADM 50/36, Meek, Life of Keith, NMM, KEI/47/3/170-72; Anderson, Naval Wars, 390. Anderson claims that the Selimiye only mounted 110 guns. 2

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guard the British fleet of Egypt.1 Later, the Kapudan Pa§a advanced up the Nile with his soldiers and Turkish gunboats and was responsible for assembling many hundreds of native craft called djerms. These were extremely important carrying a large proportion of the supplies up the Nile toward Cairo. 2 Furthermore, the British depended on the Turks for a proportion of their supplies while in Egypt including lemons and biscuits. Although difficult, the invasion of Egypt was a success and the last French soldiers surrendered to the British and Turkish forces in September 1801.3 The French surrender effectively ended the War of the Triple Alliance. The lack of a French naval force in the Mediterranean during much of the period allowed the Ottoman navy to sail with relative freedom. Their ships sailed as far west as Palermo, and their navy participated in several large-scale operations, yet there were problems with the navy. The most important being available funds. This not only limited the size of the navy, but also their ability to retain seasoned sailors, and actively employ their ships in sustained naval operations. Of nearly equal importance was the inability of the Ottoman navy to procure some naval stores. At times, they had to rely on the Russians, and at other points, they had to look to Britain for supplies. Even so, the Ottomans produced a surplus in certain areas, supplying the Royal Navy with cables, cordage, and planks. While the British navy constantly remained at sea, the Ottoman navy only sortied from Constantinople on specific occasions. For a navy that lacked adequate resources, this made the best of a bad situation. At Acre and during the invasion of Egypt, detachments of the Ottoman navy sailed with specific objective such as landing soldiers and reinforcements. Furthermore, the quality of the Ottoman leadership was mediocre, but perhaps better than it at first seemed. The Kapudan Pa§a was by all accounts an exceptional officer and leader, but his subordinates were at best steady, yet they were probably not cowards. Claims that the Ottoman officers did not like to fight might have something to do with the supply situation. Their ships could sustain severe damage in battle, and the powder and shot expended would also need to be restocked. As a result, the Ottoman navy was a fragile instrument. Even so, they limped along, participating in all the major naval campaigns in the Levant during the War of the Triple Alliance. The Ottoman navy always made its appearance even if its forces never operated at a hundred percent strength, just as the Kapudan Bey's demasted ship, the Sun, that sailed into Marmorice in mid-January 1801.

* Anderson, Naval Wars, 388. Stevenson to Keith, 3 June & 3 July 1801, NMM, KEI/18/7; Keith to Paget, 19 March 1801, The Paget Papers : Diplomatic and Other Correspondence of the Right Hon. Sir Arthur Paget, G.C.B: 1794-1807, ed. Augustus B. Paget, (London: W. Heinemann, 1896), 1:361. 3 Mustapha Bey to Keith, 15 April 1801, Kapudan Pasha to Keith, 18 April 1801, NMM, KEI/15/3. 2

THE NAPOLEONIC RE-CONQUEST OF CORSICA, 1796: A NECESSARY PRELIMINARY FOR THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION J. M. P. McERLEAN

Historians dispute. Napoleonic historians, prompted by the Napoleonic bicentenary, debate the origins of the Egyptian Expedition. Was Napoleon inspired by his reading of Baron de Tott when still a student? Was Ms colloquy in Corsica in 1792 with the great French expert on Egypt, Volney, significant? Was the Directory's decision to authorise and finance the Expedition derivative from ancien regime plans for Egypt? Was its main motivation the necessity to attenuate British military strength? Sending Napoleon far away from France might have been a factor, since the Directors were thus not overshadowed by the brilliant General fresh from the triumphs of the Italian campaign. Or should the tortuous diplomatic manoeuvres with the Sultan of the recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talleyrand, be considered a determinant factor? Such issues, hallowed in historiography by discussions over multiple decades, have been recently freshly aired. But in these controversies, little attention has been paid to the importance of the French reoccupation of Corsica in 1796. French control of Corsica was considerably diminished in 1793, following the denunciation in the French Convention of General Paoli. Paoli, the hero of the unsuccessful resistance to the French invasion of Corsica in 1768, had returned to Corsica after the outbreak of the French Revolution. He had become the head of the new Departmental administration, thus provoking the jealousy of younger candidates for office in the island. His discomfort with the execution of Louis XVI and the memory of his many years of exile in England caused suspicions to be voiced about his ultimate intentions. The French declaration of war against Britain in 1793 envenomed the accusations made against Paoli. Self-defence determined Paoli's decision to resist French demands for abdication and surrender. The French government retained control only of three major ports, Corte, St. Florent and Bastia. Napoleon, identified for good reasons by the Paolists with the French Republican cause, fled Ajaccio and joined the Republicans. He was on the ship that bombarded Ajaccio at the end of May 1793, and soon after, he and his family settled in France.

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The British Navy, together with their allies, the Spanish, accepted an invitation from Toulon to occupy this major French port in August. This denied France any significant naval presence in the Mediterranean. Nelson's ship, the Agamemnon, was the first British vessel seen by Corsicans off their coast. A first British attempt to capture St. Florent, ineptly conducted by Commodore Linzee, failed in October. By the end of December, however, the French had succeeded in driving out from Toulon the British and Spanish. In this success Napoleon had played a vital role. Sir Sidney Smith, supposed to destroy the vessels abandoned in Toulon by the British, failed to burn them all, thus permitting the French Navy to begin the process of rebuilding a creditable naval force. Having lost Toulon, the British needed a base which would allow them to blockade Toulon with ease. This consideration was largely determinant of the first steps to work out an arrangement with Paoli, from February 1794. Conjugated British military and naval forces successively drove out the French garrisons from St. Florent, Bastia and Calvi. In the last two sieges Nelson played a major role. These British successes seemed to have brought the French regime to an end. Paoli negotiated an arrangement with British representatives and this was confirmed by a meeting starting on June 10 of an elected Corsican National Assembly or Consulta. By this arrangement George III became King of Corsica, his viceroy being the British politician and diplomat Sir Gilbert Elliot. Clearly the Corsicans expected this arrangement to last for ever. With much expenditure of time and energy a parliamentary constitution was worked out by June 19 for the new Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. The island was to be defended by the British army and navy. Proposals were submitted to the Parliament for reforms, especially one that should have worked out a settlement of the religious issue and brought back the Catholic Church of the ancien regime. However the idealism of this fresh start was blunted by obtrusive realities. The British government in London did not appreciate the good will of the Corsicans nor the incredible strategic value of the island. Rather they were obsessed by the advantages gained or to be gained in South Africa and the West Indies. Financial and military resources that would have gone far to reinforce Corsica were taken away or not allocated there. The expenses of maintaining and improving Corsica, expenses which had already been a drain on French resources under the ancien regime and the successive revolutionary governments, were now to be met from taxing the Corsicans. Many Corsicans, not the least of whom was the former leader, Paoli, had assumed that Great Britain, a rich country, would subsidise them. In wartime, this was a forlorn hope. So taxes indisposed the Corsicans, from whom few if any taxes had been levied during the turbulent years of French revolutionary rule. Paoli had thought in terms of Britain and Corsica combining to great

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commercial advantage, particularly in terms of trade with Italy. But this again was only a pipe dream in wartime. The quality of Gorsican naval and military levies, f r o m the British point of view, was disappointing and thus employment opportunities anticipated by the Corsicans turned out to be nonexistent. The return of émigrés, with whom the British had no quarrel but whose past actions during the ancien regime and the early years of the Revolution left distasteful memories for many Corsicans, was yet another aggravating feature. So there were reasons for Corsicans, at first well disposed to Britain, to be disappointed. Moreover, amongst the Corsican population there were partisans of the French Revolution who had never abandoned their faith in the Republic. Thus the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom was far from being a secure possession of the British Empire. Certainly the French Republic intended to regain Corsica. At the prompting of Saliceti, Commissioner of the Republic, a number of attempts were made to land French troops in Corsica. However the British Navy was equal to this challenge, deriving particular advantage from their base at St. Florent for watching over Toulon, and from Bastia for controlling the Italian shoreline. Time and again the French ships had to return to Toulon, the worse for wear. Certainly the British Navy consistently had a clear superiority over the French particularly in 1795. Had Nelson enjoyed unfettered command yet more damage would have been inflicted on the French navy, but his superior officer, Admiral Hotham, thought caution a better policy. Ships that were to reach Egypt in 1798 survived limited British successes off Corsica. The British Navy co-operated with its Austrian and Italian allies on land during the first stages of Bonaparte's Italian campaign. The advantage tipped to the French side as Bonaparte won more and more victories in Italy in his campaign of 1796. Genoa could no longer be relied upon as a neutral port. Especially significant was the French occupation of Livorno (Leghorn) on June 27th because this neutral port in Tuscany, a short distance from Bastia, had been a principal source of supplies for the British especially in terms of repairs to damaged ships. Moreover these ports now needed to be added to the list of those blockaded with diminishing resources. The Spanish government, a British ally in 1793, was moving towards an alliance with France, thus doubling the naval opposition to Britain. The British occupation of Corsica was but one element that indisposed the Spanish. The government in London had no firm policy of retaining and exploiting Corsican strategical and other advantages (as compared to new colonial acquisitions) and reports of internal unrest in the island pushed them towards thoughts of withdrawal. So the principal ministers, Pitt, Dundas and Portland, ordered the island to be abandoned. This order came just as the Viceroy was reporting that the interior situation of the island was improving. This report in turn prompted the London authorities to countermand their order

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to abandon. This contradictory order arrived in the Mediterranean after the military and naval forces had already left Corsica. Already on the orders of Napoleon a number of small groups of Corsicans had begun slipping across the sea from nearby Italy and infiltrating the interior of the island. Nelson did not have enough frigates and other small craft adequately to patrol the Corsican shoreline. The better to prevent this infiltration from Italy, Elba and Capraja were seized. Once it seemed likely that the British were in difficulties and likely to withdraw, Napoleon, under the cover of Spanish ships now his allies, sent more troops from Livorno to the north of the island, under the command of the aged and deaf, Corsican general, Antonio Gentili. Under the orders of Nelson and the protection of the guns of the British Navy the British military and civilian establishments evacuated Bastia on October 19th 1796, and Ajaccio and Calvi a week later, and withdrew to Elba, and then moved by degrees to Gibraltar. As they left Bastia, advance troops of Gentili moved in. Nelson was the last to leave. The British establishment was finally evacuated from Elba on January 29, 1797, this operation again supervised by Nelson. By this time the Kingdom of Naples had dropped out of the war. As Nelson sailed through the straits at Gibraltar on February 12 his was the last British naval vessel to leave the Mediterranean. Two days later he participated in the British victory over a large Spanish fleet at Cape St. Vincent. In Italy Bonaparte went on from victory to victory. Particularly important for future developments was the overrunning of Venice in May, because this allowed the French to supplement the number of naval vessels under their control by adding nine captured there. In July 1797 when negotiating peace terms with the Austrians (the treaty of Campo-Formio, signed in October), General Bonaparte had the pleasure of meeting General Desaix, recently arrived after his successes in Germany, and of conversing with him at length on a number of occasions at nearby Passeriano. According to some accounts, it seems possible that at this time Bonaparte first raised with Desaix the idea of the Egyptian Expedition. Why not? The Mediterranean was a power vacuum. In terms of the long drawn out war between Britain and France the British withdrawal from Corsica, then from Elba and finally from the Mediterranean altogether, was a disaster. At the time it was hard to credit. Sir Gilbert Elliot, fresh from talks in Naples, wrote to London in January 1797 asking for reinforcements. Nelson was enraged. General de Burgh, commander of the remaining British troops in Elba, did not believe that he had to leave and was pretty much pushed out by Nelson. One of the earliest writers on Nelson, the poet Robert Southey, wrote of the withdrawal from Corsica that "it was disgraceful thus to abandon it". A more recent strategic commentator, the late A. B. Rodger, condemns the British decision in particularly severe terms.

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When Bonaparte had won the assent of the Directory to the Expedition and was putting together his fleet at Toulon, there was no unit of the British Navy in the Mediterranean. On the 19th of May 1798 Napoleon's main fleet sailed f r o m Toulon. Other vessels were to sail f r o m Marseilles, Genoa, Ajaccio and Civitavecchia. Nelson had sailed from Gibraltar on May 9 with three 74s, two frigates and a smaller vessel. Hampered by strong winds he finally arrived off Toulon after Napoleon had sailed. For a scouting expedition perhaps this force was adequate, but certainly no match for Napoleon's thirteen ships-of-the-line, four frigates and twenty other naval vessels, nor much able to stop over a hundred troopships. Soon Nelson received adequate reinforcements and put them to good use in the battle of the Nile. The inability of the Navy to prevent the organisation of the Egyptian Expedition, its sailing and arrival in Egypt in 1798, stemmed directly f r o m the British withdrawal from Corsica in October 1796 and its re-conquest by troops sent by Bonaparte. In sharp contrast to this extraordinary abandonment of a valuable naval and military base in 1796 may be indicated the later policy: the capture of Minorca in 1798, the capture and retention of Malta, the occupation of Sicily and the establishment of a naval base in Sardinia at the Magdalena Island, much prized by Nelson. After the Napoleonic wars were over Britain established a protectorate over the Ionian Islands that lasted for some decades and after relinquishing this, acquired Cyprus. The British government had not understood the value of Corsica in 1796. It paid a heavy price for this in subsequent years. But it learned a lesson. Only after the Second World War did the process of withdrawal from Mediterranean naval and military bases resume.

Bibliography Dorothy Carrington, Sources de l'histoire de la Corse au Public Record Office de Londres. Ajaccio, 1983. Jean Defranceschi, '"Bonaparte et la Reconquête de la Corse, 1795-1796", Proceedings of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1994. Defranceschi, La Corse et la Révolution française. Ajaccio, 1991. Desmond Gregory, The Ungovernable Rock: A History of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom. London, 1985. David Lyon, Sea battles in close-up: the age of Nelson. Ian Allan, 1996. Leonard A. Macaluso, "Antoine Saliceti and the Loss of Corsica", Proceedings of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1994. J. M. P. McErlean, Napoleon and Pozzo di Borgo in Corsica and after. Mellen, 1996 McErlean, "Corsica 1794: Combined Operations", in Jack Sweetman, ed., New Interpretations in Naval History, Naval Institute Press, 1993.

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McErlean, "A Forgotten Kingdom: George Ill's Corsica (1794-1796)", in Proceedings of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1994. Contains a selective bibliography. McErlean, "Le Royaume anglo-corse: un rêve irréalisable?", Etudes Napoléoniennes, Nos. 23-25, 1990. McErlean, "Napoleon, Nelson and Corsica, 1793-1796", Member Gazette, the Napoleonic Alliance, No. 2, 1997. Laure Murât, Nicolas Weill, L'expédition d'Egypte: le rêve oriental de Bonaparte. Gallimard, 1998. Paul Noirot et Dominique Feintrene, red., La campagne d'Egypte 17981801: Mythes et réalités. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1998. Carola Oman, Nelson. Hodder and Stoughton, 1947. A. B. Rodger, The war of the second coalition, 1798 to 1801: a strategic commentary. Oxford, 1964. Gonzague Saint Bris, Desaix: le sultan de Bonaparte. Perrin, 1995. Robert Southey, The life of Nelson. Blackie, n.d.

CHATEAUBRIAND ET L'EXPÉDITION DE NAPOLÉON BONAPARTE EN TERRE-SAINTE David MENDELSON

On sait la place que Napoléon a occupée dans la mythologie littéraire moderne : les plus grands écrivains, de Victor Hugo à Stefan Zweig en passant par Walter Scott, Stendhal, Balzac, Hugo, Nerval, Tolstoï et Dostoïevski, l'ont présentée, tour à tour, sous un jour positif ou négatif. 1 Chateaubriand a été le premier d'entre eux et son témoignage est resté d'autant plus précieux qu'il s'est fondé sur sa quadruple expérience d'écrivain, d'historien, d'homme politique et de voyageur. Au plan littéraire, il a joué un rôle fondamental dans l'évolution de la littérature française moderne en y initiant, avec Madame de Staël (l'une des premières protectrices du jeune Bonaparte, puis son ennemie), le pré-romantisme. Or, celui-ci s'est attaché, notamment à mettre en relation la littérature et l'Histoire : c'est à ce titre que Chateaubriand a pu commencer à présenter Napoléon, dans les divers essais qu'il lui a consacrés, ainsi que dans ses Mémoires (Ibid.), comme un personnage, à la fois, historique et romanesque. Au plan politique, il a joué un rôle actif en exerçant les fonctions de légat, d'ambassadeur et de ministre des Affaires étrangères sous la Restauration. Il a ainsi élaboré, au moment où se développait l'historiographie française moderne, un point de vue que nous pourrions qualifier de «pré-scientifique», qui nous permet de le rapprocher aujourd'hui de ce que nous dénommons l'Histoire culturelle et qui a englobé des considérations d'ordre, à la fois, historique, politique, sociologique et littéraire, qui semblent éclairer d'un jour tout particulièrement pénétrant le mode de développement de la «légende» napoléonienne. En tant que voyageur, enfin, il a été l'un des premiers français, à son époque, à séjourner en Angleterre, où il a pu directement connaître l'opinion que s'en faisaient les écrivains et les historiens locaux, puis en Amérique, dans divers pays d'Europe et enfin en Orient et en Terre-Sainte, où il s'est rendu en 1806 et d'où il a ramené un récit de voyage, l'Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem et de Jérusalem à Paris (1811), dans lequel il a longuement médité sur les effets de l'Expédition de Bonaparte, tout en inaugurant une mode, celle du «Voyage en Orient», qui a profondément marqué la culture française moderne.

^Cf. Regenbogen, Lucian, Napoléon a dit - Aphorismes, citations et opinions, Préface de Jean Tulard, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1998, Préface, p. 11 sq.

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Une relecture des divers essais qu'il a consacrés à Napoléon — Mémoires de ma vie, 1811 ; De Buonaparte et des Bourbons (1814) ; Les Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe (1848-1850); etc. — montre comment il a déployé cette dimension littéraire et culturelle de l'Histoire en le critiquant, tout en s'assimilant à lui. Il y mêle, en effet, des jugements qu'il entend élever au niveau de la grande Histoire et, de l'autre, des appréciations personnelles qui prennent souvent un tour sentimental et renvoient parfois à ses préoccupations les plus intimes. Les écrivains du XIX e et du début du XX e siècles et, notamment, Marcel Proust 1 , ont bien relevé cette faculté qu'il a eue de relativiser l'Histoire et la vie subjective ainsi que la réalité et l'imaginaire, d'une façon qui évoque, à certains égards, les modes de création des mythes. Rien de plus significatif, à cet égard, que les manipulations auxquelles il s'est livré pour faire coïncider une série de dates qu'il considérait comme symboliques: il a « forc(é) la chronologie pour donner à Bonaparte une naissance jumelle de la sienne en 1768 [...] » 2 . Il a faussé, de même, la date de son arrivée à Jérusalem pour la faire coïncider avec celle de sa fête (la fête de son saint) 3 et l'ériger ainsi en un événement qu'il n'a cessé de commémorer tout au long de sa vie et de son œuvre. 4 Il a ainsi élaboré une conception du temps qui combine ses diverses normes : chronologique, mythique et imaginaire ; linéaire, cyclique et combinatoire ; et, enfin, sociale et individuelle 5 . Ce qui permet de s'expliquer les contradictions des jugements qu'il a portés sur l'empereur et la complexité des leurs relations et de l'opinion qu'ils ont eue l'un de l'autre : «Pour mieux en finir avec son héros, Chateaubriand joue de l'ubiquité des temps. Analogies, comparaisons et parallèles, si précieux pour exprimer le tragique de la répétition, reviennent sous sa plume.» 6 Voilà qui nous permet d'entériner, d'abord, le jugement d'ensemble qui a été porté sur ces relations. Il s'est éloigné de Napoléon, qui l'avait pourtant ramené en France, après l'attentat d'Enghien et l'a sévèrement critiqué. Napoléon, de son côté, a censuré ses écrits, l'a empêché d'assister à sa réception à l'Académie française, lui a quasiment fait couper les vivres et l'a poussé, enfin, plus ou moins directement, à s'exiler. Il n'a cessé, cependant, de lui vouer une profonde admiration. «C'est [...] un homme qui fait honneur à

1 Proust, Marcel, A la recherche du temps perdu, Texte établi et présenté par Pierre Clarac et André Ferré, Paris, Gallimard, 1961, «Bibliothèque de la Pléiade», III, 319. ^Juliette Hoffenberg, Chateautriand, Préface de Juliette Hoffenberg, Paris, La Table Ronde, 1998, «La petite Vermillon», p. 7. ^Chateaubriand Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem et de Jérusalem à Paris, Présentation de Georges Faugeron, Paris, Julliard, 1964, «Littérature, p. 269. Nous donnerons les références suivantes à cette œuvre entre parenthèses dans le texte. 4 Oavid Mendelson, L'ombre et le mirage de Jérusalem dans la vision des écrivains voyageurs et dans les arts du XIXe siècle, Tel-Aviv, Yedioth Akharonoth, 2000 (en hébreu); et Paris, L'Harmattan, 2000 (en français), p. 144 sq. 5 C f . notamment, Chateaubriand. Le tremblement du temps, Colloque de Cerisy dirigé par Jean-Claude Berchet et Philippe Berthier, Textes réunis et présentés par Jean-Claude Berchet, Toulouse, Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 1994. 6 J. Hoffenberg, op. cit., p. 13.

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son pays», a-t-il déclaré en 1806, «et que je regrette, moi qui suis le seul qui ai eu à s'en plaindre.»1; et il a ajouté en 1809: «Tout ce qui est grand et national doit convenir au génie de Chateaubriand.»2 Celui-ci, de son côté, n'a cessé de se comparer à lui et on peut effectivement les mettre en parallèle à bien des égards. 3 Tous deux étaient issus de la petite noblesse provinciale ; tous deux ont voué un sentiment particulier à leur mère et à leur(s) sœur(s) ; tous deux ont eu un «caractère double», à la fois conservateur et révolutionnaire, croyant et athée, etc., etc... 4 ; tous deux se sont rendus en Italie et en Orient et ont caressé le «rêve oriental»5 ; tous deux ont fait carrière à Paris : Napoléon s'est lancé tout jeune dans la carrière des Lettres et s'est toujours intéressé à la littérature et Chateaubriand s'est considéré, «depuis sa première jeunesse jusqu'en 1800», comme un «soldat et voyageur» 6 ; et tous deux, surtout, ont ajouté une dimension imaginaire à l'Histoire en se référant à des modèles mythiques. On n'a pas assez souligné, à cet égard, que Chateaubriand a publié Mémoires de ma vie en 1811, au retour de son voyage en Orient, en même temps qu'il revoyait les notes de son Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem et que Napoléon a dicté peu après ses propres mémoires, le Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, que Las Casés a édités en 1823. Une étude comparée des deux œuvres permettrait sans doute de renforcer l'idée qu'ils ont été «deux êtres doubles, se redoublant l'un l'autre [...]» et qui ont eu «des destins croisés».7 La remarque vaut tout particulièrement pour le périple qu'ils ont accompli, l'un après l'autre, en Orient et en Terre-Sainte. C'est là que Napoléon a commencé à cultiver sa «légende» ; c'est au retour de cette expédition qu'il a commencé sa carrière à Paris ; et c'est à la fin de sa vie, dans ses Mémoires, qu'il a accentué la dimension «légendaire» à cette expédition. Chateaubriand, de son côté, s'est rendu en Orient pour profiter de l'intérêt que cette région avait suscité en France à la suite de l'Expédition de Bonaparte. Il importe de bien souligner ce lien que ses exégètes ont rarement mis en évidence : «Son voyage en Orient et en particulier son pèlerinage ne peut que servir ce projet, car il lui donne l'occasion d'associer son nom à ceux de personnages illustres : allant des héros bibliques jusqu'à Bonaparte. Un voyage au Levant est fait pour intéresser le public français qui a fraîchement en

^Cité par L. Regenbogen, op. cit., 314. Cité par Id., Ibid., p. 316. 3 Cf. Sieburg, Friedrich, Robespierre, Napoléon, Chateautriand, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1967. Chateaubriand: p. 479 sq. 4 Cf. Schorn, Alan, Napoleon Bonaparte, New York, Harper Collins, 1997, p. 270. 5 Cf. Tersen, Émile, Napoléon, Paris, Le Club Français du Livre, 1959, p. 54 sq. ^Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe, Édition nouvelle établie d'après l'édition originale et les deux dernières copies du texte - Avec une introduction, des variantes, des notes, un appendice et des index par Maurice Levaillant et Georges Moulinier, Paris, Gallimard, 1, \ 9 5 \ , «Bibliothèque de la Pléiade», p. 1046. Hoffenberg, op. cit., p. 7. 2

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mémoire le souvenir de la Campagne de Bonaparte f...]». 1 Il s'est rendu célèbre, de fait, à son retour de Terre Sainte, en publiant son Itinéraire qui l'a mis au pinacle des écrivains de son temps. Ce voyage et, plus précisément, le passage en Terre Sainte, aura donc contribué à conférer à nos deux personnages une dimension mythique. Les historiens, cependant, ont attribué à l'Expédition de Bonaparte des raisons d'ordre plus strictement politique, militaire et économique. Ils considèrent, en général, que celui-ci a surtout voulu repousser les Anglais de leurs positions en Egypte et dans le Proche-Orient, refouler leurs alliés turcs en s'appuyant sur les populations locales et enfin rouvrir à la France la voie du commerce vers l'Extrême-Orient. Ses déclarations sur le rôle émancipateur de la République et l'action de la mission scientifique en Égypte n'auraient ainsi fait que servir de paravent à des visées bien plus concrètes. Le récit de Chateaubriand nous invite, au contraire, à réinsérer ces considérations dans une plus large perspective historique et culturelle, qui leur confère leur véritable valeur. Il nous indique, en effet, tout au long de ses récits de voyage et de son Itinéraire qu'il a relié ses deux visites en Amérique et en Orient. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, il a cherché à redécouvrir, au-delà du cadre européen, vers l'Occident et vers l'Orient, les traces des premiers hommes et des premières cultures de l'univers. D'où ses nombreuses comparaisons entre les Arabes de Palestine et les Indiens d'Amérique. 2 En d'autres termes, c'est l'avenir de la civilisation européenne qu'il a cherché à discerner en comparant ses deux points d'horizon géographiques et historiques : d'une part, IVAncien Monde» et les sources religieuses, éthiques et culturelles de l'Europe, qu'il avait déjà présentées dans le Génie du christianisme ; et, de l'autre, le «Nouveau Monde» et la nouvelle société qui était en train de s'y construire et qui constituait un prolongement de la nouvelle société urbaine industrielle anglaise. Et c'est dans cette perpective que se précise la portée fondamentale des deux passages de Napoléon et de Chateaubriand en Palestine : c'est à cette vision du destin de l'Europe et de ses deux systèmes de valeurs possibles qu'ils se sont confrontés, de même, d'ailleurs, que les Anglais, dont les Américains s'étaient détachés. Pour rétablir cette perspective, c'est à Tocqueville, l'ami et le confident de Chateaubriand, qu'il faudrait se référer. L'opposition des Français et des Anglais, tous deux européens, n'aurait donc été que superficielle et momentanée. Chateaubriand ne fait presque jamais référence, tout au long de son Itinéraire, à la présence des Anglais dans la région et à la prédominance qu'ils y ont conservée. Ce qui lui permet de suggérer que c'est moins un conflit entre Français et Anglais qu'entre Européens et Orientaux qui s'est déroulé là.

1

Fernande Bassan, Chateaubriand et la Terre-Sainte, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France 1959, p. 30. 2 Cf. Chateaubriand, Itinéraire, op. citp. 301, 303-304, etc.

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Ces Orientaux, ce sont les musulmans et, tout d'abord, les Turcs héritiers de Saladin et des vainqueurs des Croisés. Et c'est ainsi que Chateaubriand s'écarte des conflits politiques du moment pour esquisser une analyse historique que nous qualifierions aujourd'hui de «longue durée». En effet, il salue, à la fois, l'action des anciens «chevaliers» croisés et de l'«empereur», avec lequel il est pourtant en froid : «La valeur française», écrit-il, «est rentrée en possession de la renommée qu'elle avait autrefois dans ce pays : ce furent les chevaliers de France qui rétablirent le royaume de Jérusalem, comme ce sont les soldats de France qui ont cueilli les dernières palmes de l'Idumée. Les Turcs vous montrent à la fois et la Tour de Beaudouin et le camp de l'empereur.» (p. 270) Il va de soi qu'il n'a pu voir en même temps cette tour et ce camp, puisque Bonaparte n'a presque pas quitté la côte lorsqu'il est remonté du sud au nord de la Palestine et ne s'est presque pas engagé en direction de Jérusalem. Nous en connaissons les raisons : la montée était très malaisée ; elle était contrôlée par des pillards ; les Turcs tenaient Jérusalem ; et c'est le gros de l'armée turque, regroupé dans le nord du pays et, notamment, à Acre, qu'il se proposait d'attaquer. Ce qui importe ici à Chateaubriand, cependant, c'est de souligner cette continuité du conflit entre chrétiens et musulmans, autrement dit entre occidentaux et orientaux et de montrer que le rayonnement de Bonaparte, malgré sa défaite, ne s'est pas atténué, car il n'en a constitué qu'un épisode. Il poursuit ainsi la réflexion qu'il a entreprise dans le Génie du christianisme et qui l'a placé à contre-courant de l'idée que se faisaient ses contemporains, suivant les critiques des Philosophes du XVIII e siècle et des historiens anglais, de l'Histoire des croisades. «Les écrivains du XVIIIe siècle», écrit-il, «se sont plus à représenter les croisades sous un jour odieux. J'ai réclamé un des premiers contre cette ignorance ou cette injustice (dans le Génie). Les croisades ne furent des folies, comme on affectait de les appeler, ni dans leur principe ni dans leur résultat. Les chrétiens n'étaient point les agresseurs. Si les sujets d'Omar, partis de Jérusalem, après avoir fait le tour de l'Afrique, fondirent sur la Sicile, sur l'Espagne, sur la France même, où Charles Martel les extermina, pourquoi des sujets de Philippe I er , sortis de la France, n'auraient-ils pas fait le tour de l'Asie pour se venger des descendants d'Omar jusque dans Jérusalem ? C'est un grand spectacle sans doute que ces deux armées de l'Europe et de l'Asie marchant en sens contraire autour de la Méditerranée, et venant chacune sous la bannière de sa religion, attaquer Mahomet et Jésus-Christ au milieu de leurs adorateurs. N'apercevoir dans les croisades que des pèlerins armés qui courent délivrer un tombeau en Palestine, c'est montrer une vue très bornée en histoire. Il s'agissait non seulement de la délivrance de ce tombeau sacré, mais encore de savoir qui devait l'emporter sur la terre, ou d'un culte ennemi de la civilisation, favorable par système à l'ignorance, au despotisme, à l'esclavage, ou d'un culte qui a fait revivre chez les modernes le culte de la docte antiquité, et aboli la servitude.» (p. 346) «Les

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croisades», poursuit-il, en reprenant l'analyse classique, «[...] nous ont empêchés de devenir la proie des Turcs et des Arabes. Elles ont fait plus : elles nous ont sauvés de nos propres révolutions ; elles ont suspendu, par la paix de Dieu, nos guerres intestines ; elles ont ouvert une issue à cet excès de population qui tôt ou tard cause la ruine des États : remarque que le père Mailbourg a fait, et que M. de Bonald a développée.» (p. 347) Il semble reporter ces remarques à l'Expédition de Bonaparte. Au-delà des considérations qui ont opposé, sur le moment, les Français et les Anglais, c'est une bien plus longue confrontation qui s'est reportée sur cette terre et qui a façonné la mentalité de ses habitants : «Les peuples de l'Orient sont beaucoup plus familiarisés que nous avec les idées d'invasion. Ils ont vu passer tous les hommes qui ont changé la face de la terre: Séostis, Cyrus, Alexandre, Mahomet, et le dernier conquérant de l'Europe [Napoléon].» (p. 363) Et c'est dans le cadre de ce vaste mouvement que s'est inscrit le conflit de l'Islam et de la Chrétienté, annonciateur de bien d'autres confrontations, notamment coloniales. Ce serait donc pour des raisons purement tactiques que Napoléon Bonaparte a cherché à s'appuyer sur les Arabes contre les Turcs. Il ne les a eux-mêmes considérés que comme des envahisseurs qui ont jadis chassé les Pharaons constructeurs des Pyramides, du Sphinx et des autres monuments témoignant d'une civilisation qui datait, comme il l'a souligné, de «quarante siècles». Or, ce sont Saladin, au temps des croisades, et les Mamelouks, au temps de Bonaparte, qui ont fini par l'emporter sur les chrétiens d'Occident. D'où la mélancolie de Chateaubriand. Il se réclame de l'héritage des croisades : l'un de ses ancêtres y a reçu ses armes familiales ; il se compare au Sénéchal et trouvère Thibaut de Champagne partant pour l'une des croisades ; il se recueille devant les tombeaux des premiers rois francs, Godefroy de Bouillon et Beaudouin ; et se montre très fier de ce que les Pères qui l'hébergent lui confèrent, à son départ, le titre de chevalier de Jérusalem. Il adopte donc, à ce stade préalable de sa réflexion, une opinion très conservatrice sur l'Expédition de Bonaparte. *

Il témoigne ainsi d'une profonde hostilité à l'égard des Turcs, héritiers des Sarrasins, et leur attribue tous les maux qu'il constate dans le pays.1 C'est peut-être pour exprimer, indirectement, le ressentiment qu'il ressent vis-à-vis de l'empereur : «L'écrivain a mis dans ce violent réquisitoire contre les Turcs, tous ses sentiments de révolte à l'égard de Napoléon.»2 : «Il est évident qu'il a forcé la note en accablant la Porte plus qu'elle ne le méritait [...]». 3 II ne peut oublier, cependant, que Soliman I er le Magnifique a signé, jadis, des ^Malte-Brun, cité par F. Bassan, op. cit., p. 158. F. Bassan, Ibid., p. 108.

2

3

ld„ IbkL, p. 167.

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Capitulations avec François I e r qui ont assuré à la France une position politique et commerciale de choix dans la région 1 : «Fait important», c'est alors que celle-ci «(a acquis) la sécurité pour les navires arborant le pavillon de la Terre-Sainte, qui sont considérés comme neutres et respectés même par les barbaresques [...], c'est pourquoi Chateaubriand est allé jusqu'à Constantinople pour prendre le bateau des pèlerins, voguant sous la bannière de la Croix.» 2 . La Révolution a interrompu ces relations en limitant le départ des pèlerins en Terre-Sainte et les religieux chrétiens du pays en ont éprouvé un vif ressentiment ; de même qu'ils se sont écartés de Bonaparte, qui ne s'est guère préoccupé de leur sort. Chateaubriand laisse pourtant entendre que celui-ci a renouvelé la protection que la France avait traditionnellement accordée aux chrétiens et, notamment, aux religieux français ; mais Pillavoine, le consul à Saint-Jean-d'Acre, se plaint de leurs «sentiments antifrançais»3. Il a voulu, en fait, reprendre ce rôle d'intercesseur et il a même cherché à redonner toute son influence à la France, après 1803, en demandant à son nouvel ambassadeur à Constantinople de protéger, en particulier, les Lieux Saints. 4 Or, Chateaubriand peut constater la réalité de ces efforts quand il s'apprête à s'embarquer, à Constantinople, pour la Palestine: «Il y avait dans ce moment même [...]», remarque-t-il, «une députation des pères de Terre Sainte ; ils étaient venus réclamer la protection de l'ambassadeur [le général SébastianiJ contre la tyrannie des commandants de Jérusalem.» (p. 227) Il était donc possible de se plaindre de ce genre d'exactions que le pouvoir central, trop affaibli et trop éloigné des diverses régions de son empire avait du mal à contenir. La campagne de Bonaparte, en effet, avait restreint le pouvoir turc dans le pays «et son histoire n'offre alors qu'une suite de troubles et de séditions, causés par l'ambition et l'avidité des pachas, qui ne craignent plus de recevoir des reproches d'un sultan devenu trop faible.»5 Lorsque Chateaubriand arrive dans le couvent des Pères latins de Jérusalem, ceux-ci attendent l'arrivée d'envoyés de l'Aga chargés de lever la contribution qu'il exige d'eux. Les Pères craignent qu'ils en exagèrent le montant et peut-être qu'ils se livrent à des exactions pour appuyer leurs exigences. Or, ils savent que Chateaubriand a de hautes relations en France et qu'il arrive muni de lettres de recommandation qui lui permettraient sans doute d'intervenir en leur faveur. «Il faut être dans la position des pères de Terre-Sainte», explique Chateaubriand, «pour comprendre le plaisir que leur cause mon arrivée. Ils se crurent sauvés par la présence d'un seul Français. Je remis au père Bonaventure de Nola, gardien du couvent, une lettre de M. le général Sébastiani. "Monsieur, me dit le gardien, c'est la Providence qui vous amène. Vous avez des firmans de route ? Permettez-nous

1

Id., Ibid., p. 30 Cf. Chateaubriand, Itinéraire, op. cit., p. 228; F. Bassan, p. 30. Bassan, op. cit., p. 159. 4 Id., Ibid., p. 31. 5 Id„ Ibid., p. 32.

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son discours de réception à l'Académie).» 1 On peut estimer qu'il n'a fait ainsi qu'obéir à la simple prudence : «Il ne pouvait critiquer plus énergiquement sans s ' e x p o s e r . » 2 L'argument, cependant, n'est que partiellement recevable : pourquoi ne s'est-il pas montré aussi prudent lorsqu'il se trouvait en France et qu'il y a publié ces autres écrits ? La vérité est qu'il a acquis sur place une vue bien plus équilibrée des deux régimes. C'est ainsi qu'il critique la Sublime Porte, mais concentre ses attaques contre ses représentants locaux en soulignant qu'ils jouissent d'une relative autonomie et se permettent de rivaliser avec leurs collègues et même de critiquer le pouvoir central. Il développe, ici une critique de caractère plutôt historique et politique que religieux et rejoint ainsi le «réalisme» napoléonien : l'«empire», en général, est une forme de gouvernement nécessairement despotique, mais qui accorde une certaine autonomie aux peuples qui lui sont soumis. Bien d'autres écrivains voyageurs, de Lamartine à Pierre Loti, en passant par Nerval et Flaubert, estimeront, effectivement, après lui, que la Sublime Porte témoigne d'un véritable libéralisme religieux et même politique. 3 Il souligne que la présence de la France se fait encore largement ressentir dans le pays après le départ de Napoléon Bonaparte. On peut s'étonner qu'il rende ainsi hommage à l'empereur qu'il critique si durement dans ses autres écrits. Il agit peut-être ainsi «sur le conseil de Sébastiani» afin d'«amadouer la censure impériale» 4 ; mais il ne fait pas preuve, en général, de la même prudence. Ne reculant pas devant ses propres contradictions, c'est donc bien un jugement positif qu'il porte ici sur l'empereur : il «ne fait pas œuvre de courtisan, mais d'historien impartial [,..]». 5 Il explique lui-même qu'il est sans doute porté à exagérer cette influence de la France dans le pays parce qu'il doit dignement représenter son pays à l'étranger : «Les h o m m e s » , remarque-t-il, «sont encore plus sensibles à la réputation de leur pays hors de leur pays, que sous le toit paternel L...]» (p. 255) Il estime que l'expédition de Bonaparte, quel que soit son dénouement, a rehaussé le prestige des armes françaises. 6 Celui-ci a essayé de convaincre la population arabe qu'il avait l'intention de la libérer du joug turc et il a donc espéré creuser une scission entre les deux peuples. Les Arabes, cependant, ne pouvaient oublier qu'il était chrétien et donc, comme le souligne Chateaubriand, l'héritier des croisés. Ils ont été révoltés, en outre, par les exactions qu'il a commises, notamment, à Jaffa ; et il a froissé, enfin, les susceptibilités des notables du Caire. Tout ceci ne les a pas empêchés, cependant, de vouer une certaine admiration au général révolutionnaire. C'est ce qu'affirme Chateaubriand quand il évoque, par ]

M . ¡bld., p. 128. Id., Ibid. Cf. David Mendelson, op. cit., p. 109 sq.

2

4F.

5 cit., p. 127. Id.,Bassan, Ibid., p.op.127. °Cf., sur tout ce passage, Id., Ibid., p. 126 sq.

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son discours de réception à l'Académie).» 1 On peut estimer qu'il n'a fait ainsi qu'obéir à la simple prudence : «Il ne pouvait critiquer plus énergiquement sans s ' e x p o s e r . » 2 L'argument, cependant, n'est que partiellement recevable : pourquoi ne s'est-il pas montré aussi prudent lorsqu'il se trouvait en France et qu'il y a publié ces autres écrits ? La vérité est qu'il a acquis sur place une vue bien plus équilibrée des deux régimes. C'est ainsi qu'il critique la Sublime Porte, mais concentre ses attaques contre ses représentants locaux en soulignant qu'ils jouissent d'une relative autonomie et se permettent de rivaliser avec leurs collègues et même de critiquer le pouvoir central. Il développe, ici une critique de caractère plutôt historique et politique que religieux et rejoint ainsi le «réalisme» napoléonien : l'«empire», en général, est une forme de gouvernement nécessairement despotique, mais qui accorde une certaine autonomie aux peuples qui lui sont soumis. Bien d'autres écrivains voyageurs, de Lamartine à Pierre Loti, en passant par Nerval et Flaubert, estimeront, effectivement, après lui, que la Sublime Porte témoigne d'un véritable libéralisme religieux et même politique. 3 Il souligne que la présence de la France se fait encore largement ressentir dans le pays après le départ de Napoléon Bonaparte. On peut s'étonner qu'il rende ainsi hommage à l'empereur qu'il critique si durement dans ses autres écrits. Il agit peut-être ainsi «sur le conseil de Sébastiani» afin d'«amadouer la censure impériale» 4 ; mais il ne fait pas preuve, en général, de la même prudence. Ne reculant pas devant ses propres contradictions, c'est donc bien un jugement positif qu'il porte ici sur l'empereur : il «ne fait pas œuvre de courtisan, mais d'historien impartial [,..]». 5 Il explique lui-même qu'il est sans doute porté à exagérer cette influence de la France dans le pays parce qu'il doit dignement représenter son pays à l'étranger : «Les h o m m e s » , remarque-t-il, «sont encore plus sensibles à la réputation de leur pays hors de leur pays, que sous le toit paternel L...]» (p. 255) Il estime que l'expédition de Bonaparte, quel que soit son dénouement, a rehaussé le prestige des armes françaises. 6 Celui-ci a essayé de convaincre la population arabe qu'il avait l'intention de la libérer du joug turc et il a donc espéré creuser une scission entre les deux peuples. Les Arabes, cependant, ne pouvaient oublier qu'il était chrétien et donc, comme le souligne Chateaubriand, l'héritier des croisés. Ils ont été révoltés, en outre, par les exactions qu'il a commises, notamment, à Jaffa ; et il a froissé, enfin, les susceptibilités des notables du Caire. Tout ceci ne les a pas empêchés, cependant, de vouer une certaine admiration au général révolutionnaire. C'est ce qu'affirme Chateaubriand quand il évoque, par ]

M . ¡bld., p. 128. Id., Ibid. Cf. David Mendelson, op. cit., p. 109 sq.

2

4F.

5 cit., p. 127. Id.,Bassan, Ibid., p.op.127. °Cf., sur tout ce passage, Id., Ibid., p. 126 sq.

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exemple, une scène à laquelle il a assisté en approchant du «hameau de Saint Jérémie» : «Tout à coup», raconte-t-il, je fus frappé de ces mots, prononcés directement en français: «En avant : Marche !» Je tournai la tête, et j'aperçus une troupe de petits Arabes tout nus qui faisaient l'exercice avec des bâtons de palmiers. Je ne sais quel vieux souvenir de ma première vie me tourmente ; et quand on me parle d'un soldat français, le cœur me bat : mais voir de petits Bédouins dans les montagnes de la Judée imiter nos exercices militaires et garder le souvenir de notre valeur ; les entendre prononcer ces mots qui sont, pour ainsi dire, les mots d'ordre de nos armées, et les seuls que sachent nos grenadiers, il y aurait eu de quoi toucher un homme moins amoureux que moi de la gloire de ma patrie [...] / Je donnai quelques médins au petit bataillon, en lui disant : « En avant : Marche !» Et afin de rien oublier, je lui criai : «Dieu le veut ! Dieu le veut» ! comme les compagnons de Godefroy et de saint Louis.» (p. 265-266) Les Turcs maintenaient l'ordre dans les grandes villes, mais non dans le reste du pays, où les voyageurs étaient rançonnés et parfois maltraités par des bandes de pillards. Leur hôtes leur conseillaient donc de revêtir des vêtements arabes pour éviter de se faire repérer. Cet usage s'est ensuite généralisé pour d'autres raisons : ils aimaient à se déguiser pour se donner la sensation de changer de personnalité et de vie. Chateaubriand s'en tient à la première version pour glorifier, là encore, l'image de la France. Lorsqu'il s'est rendu de Jérusalem à Bethléhem, le gouverneur arabe, Ali Gaga, l'a invité à changer de vêtement : «C'était un homme de tête et de courage», explique-t-il, «dont j'eus beaucoup à me louer. Il commanda d'abord par nous faire quitter, à moi et à mes domestiques, le vêtement arabe pour reprendre l'habit français : cet habit, naguère si méprisé des Orientaux, inspire aujourd'hui le respect et la crainte.» (p. 270) Et il note plus loin: «Nous sortîmes par la porte de Jaffa pour faire le tour complet de Jérusalem. Nous étions couverts d'armes, habillés à la française, et très décidés à ne souffrir aucune insulte. On voit que les temps sont bien changés, grâce au renom de nos victoires [...]» (p. 328-329) *

Il découvre bien d'autres traces de la présence française lorsqu'il se promène à travers le pays. C'est ainsi qu'il rencontre des Français d'origine qui y sont restés après le départ des troupes de Bonaparte. A Jaffa, par exemple, il reçoit la visite de «M. Contessini, qui aspirait au vice-consulat de Jaffa, et de MM. Damiens père et fils, Français d'origine, jadis établis auprès de Djezzar, à Saint-Jean d'Acre.» (p. 254) Ceux-ci lui racontent des «choses curieuses sur les derniers événements de la Syrie.» (Ibid.). Il s'agit, à en juger par d'autres passages du texte, des intrigues que mènent les potentats locaux et qui les amènent parfois à se lier à des Français qui continuent de leur imposer le respect : «[.. .1 ils me parlèrent de la renommée que l'empereur et nos armes

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ont laissée au désert.» (p. 254-255) Les Pères des églises chrétiennes sont tout particulièrement hostiles aux Turcs et seraient ravis si les Européens organisaient une nouvelle expédition dans la région. Le patriarche arménien de Jérusalem, Arsenios, ne mâche pas ses mots: « fil] me parla des Turcs avec mépris. Il m'assura que l'Asie entière attendait l'arrivée des Français ; que s'il paraissait un seul soldat de ma nation dans son pays, le soulèvement serait général.» (p. 363) Les Turcs continuent donc d'être soumis à ce genre de critiques. Chateaubriand estime que l'empire Ottoman offre le parfait modèle de la «tyrannie asiatique» déjà défini par Montesquieu et par les Philosophes du X V I I I e siècle. Il vitupère contre le «despotisme musulman» (p. 260) et remarque que «les peuples de l'Orient», «(a)ccoutumés à suivre les destinées d'un maître, (...) n'ont point de loi qui les attache à des idées d'ordre et de modération politique ; tuer quand on est le plus fort leur semble un droit légitime; ils s'y soumettent ou l'exercent avec la même indifférence. Ils appartiennent essentiellement à l'épée ; ils aiment tous les prodiges qu'elle opère: le glaive est pour eux la baguette qui élève et détruit les empires.» (p. 363) Il justifie ainsi le pouvoir de l'empire Ottoman : «Il faut, parmi les tribus des descendants d'Ismaël des maîtres, des serviteurs, des animaux domestiques, une liberté soumise à des lois.» (p. 304) Le fait est que le «despotisme oriental» n'empêche pas les Arabes d'avoir leur franc-parler et de s'amuser à remettre les deux souverains en compétition : «J'ai vu Ali-Gaga», raconte Chateaubriand, «se fâcher à Jéricho contre un Arabe qui se moquait de lui, et qui lui disait que, si l'empereur avait voulu prendre Jérusalem, il y serait entré aussi aisément qu'un chameau dans un champ de doura.» (p. 363) Il est ainsi amené à bien différencier les causes des Turcs et des Arabes. Il ne cesse de montrer, tout d'abord, que les Turcs ont tendance à se décharger des maux qui accablent le pays sur les Arabes et les Bédouins (cf. p. 269 ; etc.). Or, c'est le régime ottoman qui en est, selon lui, le premier responsable : la Porte est incapable de contrôler les agissements et les querelles de ses représentants locaux. C'est de ces conflits que Bonaparte a voulu tirer profit, mais il n'y est pas parvenu, de même qu'il n'a pu instaurer un système plus efficace en Europe quand il en est devenu le maître. De fait, suggère Chateaubriand, le régime ottoman a échoué parce qu'il n'a pu empêcher la multiplication des guerres intestines qui ont causé la ruine du pays. Or, ces ravages ont été bien moins étendus et bien moins prolongés qu'il le prétend. En d'autres termes, il se livre ici à une sorte de projection en songeant aux guerres que Napoléon poursuit en Europe et qui vont mener, selon lui, à une telle situation. C'est donc au principe même du despotisme et de sa violence qu'il s'attaque ici : «(s)a déformation est due à sa haine de la tyrannie.» 1 «Par ce côté politique, il retrouve (sans l'avoir cherché) les récriminations qui figurent déjà dans tous les pèlerinages contre les gouverneurs musulmans, l

Id.,Ibid„ p. 167.

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mais avec un esprit moderne il a dépassé les attaques purement religieuses pour s'en prendre au régime lui-même, et cet aspect est le plus personnel et le plus original de sa relation.» 1 Il reprend ainsi, en réalité, les attaques que Montesquieu a lancées contre le «despotisme» et que les Philosophes ont appliquées à la Monarchie absolue agonisante, mais sans le reconnaître explicitement, car il s'oppose, en principe, à leur idéologie. Or, il avait lui même affirmé, dans son Essai sur les révolutions, à l'époque où il penchait vers un nouveau libéralisme, que l'Ancien Régime avait échoué parce qu'il avait asservi, en premier lieu, la noblesse et que la Révolution et Napoléon n'avaient fait qu'aggraver ce despotisme. Il en arrive ainsi à adopter une position extrêmement originale : celle de l'«aristocrate révolutionnaire» qui se dresse contre toutes les formes de despotisme, mais ne peut prôner l'instauration d'un régime intermédiaire de l'autocratie et de la Révolution et se voit donc contraint de se réfugier dans un individualisme que nous n'hésiterions pas à qualifier, rétrospectivement, d'anarchiste : «[...] s'il s'attache à la liberté, c'est moins par un sentiment raisonné et pour le bien des peuples, que par un profond élan anarchique qui le pousse à ignorer toute règle, toute loi sociale, toute convention, dès qu'il joue pour son propre compte. Ici, dans cet Orient assoupi sous le joug, parmi ces peuples énervés, Chateaubriand renforce son potentiel de révolte...». 2 C'est donc l'expérience du voyage qui lui permet d'extérioriser, dans une certaine mesure, sa haine du despotisme et, à un plan plus intime, celle d'une instance qu'il assimilera plus tard à l'autorité paternelle. Son père, en effet, un petit hobereau, a été ruiné par la Révolution et il pense que Napoléon subira le même sort. N'a-t-il pas déjà affirmé la «vanité» de l'Histoire, dans son Essai sur les révolutions, en se référant à la sentence du roi Salomon : «Vanité des vanités; tout n'est que vanités» ? Il se dégage alors d'une partie de ses préjugés et adopte un point de vue plus personnel, plus créatif et plus littéraire sur les êtres qu'il croise durant sa visite, au point d'imaginer leur existence et même de s'identifier à eux. C'est le cas, notamment, lorsqu'il visite un quartier où vivent une partie des Arabes de Jérusalem, le «Harat-el-Maugrarbé, la rue des Maugrabins» (p. 361). Il y retrouve la dimension de l'Histoire de «longue durée», mais en adoptant, cette fois, le point de vue des adversaires des croisés, puisque c'est la défaite des Arabes qui lui vient, cette fois, à l'esprit. «Ces Maugrabins [...]», remarque-t-il, «sont les Occidentaux ou Barbaresques. On compte parmi eux quelques descendants des Maures chassés d'Espagne par Ferdinand et Isabelle. Ces bannis furent reçus dans la ville sainte avec une grande charité ; on leur fit bâtir une mosquée ; on leur distribue encore aujourd'hui du pain, des fruits et quelque argent. Les héritiers des fiers Abencerrages, les élégants architectes de l'Alhambra, sont devenus à Jérusalem des portiers qu'on recherche à cause de

l

ld„ Ibid., p. 168. Louis Martin-Chauffier, Chateaubriand ou l'obsession de la pureté, Paris, Gallimard, 1943, cité par F. Bassan, op. cit., p. 167.

2

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leur intelligence, et des courriers estimés pour leur légèreté. Que diraient Saladin et Richard si, revenant tout à coup au monde, ils trouvaient les chevaliers maures transformés en concierges au Saint-Sépulcre, et les chevaliers chrétiens représentés par des frères quêteurs ?» (p. 361-362). Les vainqueurs et les vaincus d'hier réapparaissent ici réconciliés par un même destin. En tant qu'aristocrate ruiné par la Révolution et par l'Empire, il s'identifie, en effet, à ces princes chassés par les rois catholiques. C'est ainsi qu'il s'assimilera, dans l'œuvre qu'il écrira après l'Itinéraire et qui en constituera une sorte de suite romanesque, le Dernier des Abence'rages (1826), à un prince arabe qui vient se recueillir sur la tombe de ses ancêtres, près de Tunis, comme lui-même vient de péleriner sur celles de ses ancêtres croisés. C'est en ce sens, peut-être, qu'il a repris l'idée qu'avait eue Bonaparte de favoriser l'indépendance des peuples arabes de la région. Ce qui, entre autres, lui a valu d'être qualifié de «prophète [...] de la décolonisation». 1 *

Il considère, cependant, en général, que les Arabes et les Turcs sont également musulmans et ne se différenciaient qu'aux plans politique et culturel, les premiers ayant établi leur domination sur les seconds. Pour le reste, il envisage les Arabes d'un point de vue, à la fois, mythique et scientifique, dans la tradition des voyageurs du X V I I F siècle et, notamment, de Volney, et dans la perspective de son propre voyage en Amérique, c'est-à-dire comme les descendants, d'une part, des contemporains de la Bible et, de l'autre, des premiers habitants du Nouveau Monde. Dans la réalité, il les considère, tout à fait négativement, comme des barbares et des brigands que ne peut excuser que la tyrannie à laquelle ils sont soumis. Il reconnaît, du moins, leur esprit combatif et leur audace et celles-ci suffisent à expliquer la défaite qu'ils ont finalement contribué à infliger aux Français. C'est ainsi qu'il revient sur les principales batailles qui ont opposé les deux forces. Il met l'accent, notamment, sur la prise de Jaffa, qui a depuis toujours été parée d'une aura mythique: «Joppé aurait été bâtie avant le déluge» (p. 255) (les archéologues nous disent aujourd'hui que c'est la deuxième ville, après Jéricho, qui a été bâtie à l'ère néolithique). C'est là que «Noé entra dans l'arche» (?!) ; et c'est là « qu'abordèrent les flottes d'Hiram, chargées de cèdres pour le temple, et que s'embarqua le prophète Jonas [...]» (p. 256). Jaffa a donc bien constitué le «port» ou la «porte» mythique de la Terre Sainte et de toute la région; en fait, le point central où se sont croisés les axes de l'Orient et de l'Occident, mais aussi du Nord et du Sud de cette partie du globe terrestre. Ce qui explique que Bonaparte y a établi son quartier général et n'a pas accordé la même importance, ni stratégique, ni symbolique, à Jérusalem. Chateaubriand souligne ainsi qu'elle a été, de tout temps, un lieu stratégique central et donc 1

Chateaubriand, Le tremblement du temps, op. cit., Préface.

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un incessant lieu de batailles : «Joppé tomba cinq fois entre les mains des Égyptiens, des Assyriens et des différents peuples qui firent la guerre aux Juifs avant l'arrivée des Romains en Asie [...] Vespasien la saccagea de nouveau [...] Elle passa avant toute la Syrie sous le joug des Sarrasins. On la retrouve dans les historiens des croisades [...]» (p. 256-257). «Quand les chevaliers eurent été contraints d'abandonner entièrement la Terre-Sainte, Jaffa retomba avec toute la Palestine, sous le joug des soudans d'Egypte, et ensuite sous la domination des Turcs.» (p. 257-258). Volney montre comment elle a ensuite souffert des «guerres de Dâher et d'Aly-Bey [...]» (p. 258). Il conclut enfin cette évocation historique en évoquant «les derniers événements» : «Les Français, commandés par l'empereur, la prirent d'assaut en 1799. Lorsque nos soldats furent retournés en Egypte, les Anglais, unis aux troupes du grand vizir, bâtirent un bastion à l'angle sud-est de la ville [...] Djezzar, ennemi du grand vizir, vint mettre le siège devant Jaffa après le départ de l'armée ottomane [...] Le nouveau pacha prit sa route à travers la Palestine ; par une de ces révoltes si communes en Turquie, il s'arrêta dans Jaffa, et refusa de se rendre à son pachalik. Le pacha d'Acre [...] reçut ordre d'attaquer le rebelle, et Jaffa fut assiégée de nouveau [...]» (p. 259). «J'espère», conclut-il, «qu'on voudra bien pardonner l'audité de ces détails, à cause de l'importance que Jaffa avait autrefois, et de celle qu'elle a acquise dans ces derniers temps.» (p. 259). L'opposition de l'Egypte à la Turquie est en train de renforcer, en effet, sa position stratégique. L'évocation de toutes ces batailles lui permet de souligner les valeurs, à la fois, stratégique et mythique de cette ville. A l'époque où il s'y rend, il ne sait rien des exactions que Napoléon, à son tour, y a commises et sur lesquelles il s'étendra, avec leurs témoins et d'autres auteurs contemporains, dans ses Mémoires : le massacre des Mamelouks et l'empoisonnement des pestiférés français que Bonaparte ne souhaitait pas ramener avec lui en Egypte. Les pages dans lesquelles il décrit l'aura mythique et le climat de violence qui ont toujours caractérisé la ville laissent cependant prévoir de façon très suggestive ces futures informations. On en jugera par tel passage où il décrit les souffrances des croisés assiégés : «[la soif] fut si grande durant le siège, que les soldats creusaient la terre et pressaient les mottes humides contre leur bouche ; ils léchaient aussi les pierres mouillées de rosée ; ils buvaient une eau fétide qui avait séjourné dans des peaux fraîches de buffles et de divers animaux ; plusieurs s'abstenaient de manger, espérer tempérer la soif par la faim...» (p. 415). Et il multiplie les descriptions de massacres en donnant l'impression qu'il confond les deux périodes historiques des croisades et de l'Expédition de Bonaparte. *

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Il tend ainsi à se dégager de l'emprise de l'Histoire et à lui conférer une dimension a-temporelle ou, plutôt, «multi-temporelle». Telle a été, de tout temps, la fonction de la littérature, entendue au sens le plus large du terme : l'épopée gréco-latine et la Bible ; et les œuvres littéraires et autres, qui ont su s'en inspirer. C'est pour écrire une épopée, Les Martyrs ou les Martyrs de Dioclétien (1809), qu'il s'est rendu en Terre-Sainte et, plus précisément, à Jérusalem, où il désirait contempler le paysage qu'il allait transformer en décor de la partie centrale de cette œuvre. C'est bien avant son départ, d'ailleurs, et, notamment, dans le Génie du christianisme, qu'il a caressé le projet de donner une nouvelle vigueur à cet antique lien du mythe, de l'Histoire et de la littérature. Il a donc inscrit son projet dans une voie différente de celle que les historiens allemands et anglais étaient en train de frayer en fondant l'historiographie moderne sur des questions, notamment, de datation. Il s'est plutôt préoccupé, en effet, de concevoir les valeurs spirituelles, morales et imaginaires que ces événements ont pu revêtir dans l'esprit de leurs contemporains et qu'il aurait voulu voir se prolonger dans la modernité. Il reliait ces valeurs au christianisme, mais dans une perspective qui débordait largement hors de la foi proprement dite et touchait aux domaines, à la fois, de la philosophie, de la littérature, de l'architecture et des arts. On n'a pas suffisamment souligné, à cet égard, que c'est lui qui a jeté, après Voltaire et sans doute pour contrer son anti-christianisme, les fondements de ce que nous dénommons aujourd'hui l'Histoire culturelle. D'où l'intérêt qu'il accorde aux auteurs qui ont développé cette conception chrétienne de la temporalité mythique et de l'Histoire. Il a lui-même traduit en français le Paradis perdu de John Milton ; et il ne cesse de citer, tout au long de son Itinéraire, les poètes qui ont tenté de créer une épopée chrétienne en s'attachant à l'Histoire des Croisades, tels que le Tasse dans la Jérusalem délivrée et la Jérusalem perdue. Il a suivi pas à pas, sur le terrain, son texte à la main, les mouvements des armées croisées et musulmanes ; et Lamartine, qui a contrôlé ses localisations, a dénoncé ses erreurs les plus flagrantes. Quoi qu'il en soit, c'est à partir de cette expérience qu'il semble avoir songé à donner un même caractère épique à l'expédition de Napoléon Bonaparte. Il évoque, par exemple, le passage d'Alexandre à Jérusalem (p. 340), alors que celui-ci ne s'en est jamais approché, parce que les thuriféraires de Napoléon Bonaparte n'ont cessé de comparer son expédition et ses visées sur l'Orient à celles de son illustre prédécesseur1. Lorsqu'il retrace l'itinéraire des héros de la Jérusalem retrouvée, dans la «Suite du voyage de Jérusalem» (p. 401 sq.), il décrit essentiellement la bataille qui se déroule à Jérusalem et dans ses environs, mais évoque également d'autres lieux qui reviendront dans la relation de l'Expédition de Bonaparte. Celui-ci, par exemple, a repris dans les deux sens le trajet qu'effectuent les héros de la Jérusalem délivrée en passant de Jaffa et Ascalon à Gaza, Raphia et Damiette (p. 410) ; et il remarque qu'il suit la même route :

*Cf. J. Hoffenberg, op. cit., 23,77 et L. Regenbogen, op. cit., 276.

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«Lorsque je passai de Jaffa à Alexandrie», «notre caïque descendit jusqu'en face de Gaza, dont la vue me rappela (d)es vers de la Jérusalem.» (Ibid.) En bref, cette lecture et ce voyage lui ont permis de jeter les fondement d'une épopée moderne : «Quiconque», s'exclame-t-il, «est sensible à la beauté, à l'art, à l'intérêt d'une composition poétique, à la richesse des détails, à la vérité des caractères, à la générosité des sentiments, doit faire de la Jérusalem délivrée sa lecture favorite. C'est surtout le poème des soldats : il respire la valeur et la gloire ; et, comme je l'ai dit dans Les Martyrs, il semble écrit au milieu des camps sur un bouclier.» (p. 417) Soulignons la formule : « C'est (...) le poème des soldats». Il s'en inspirera dans certaines pages de ses Mémoires ; et Napoléon dans ses récits de bataille et dans son Mémorial. En somme, c'est en mêlant l'Histoire des croisades et l'épopée du Tasse qu'il a développé certains des procédés littéraires à partir desquels ses successeurs, à la fois disciples et rivaux, tels que Victor Hugo, élaboreront la «Légende». On en jugera par tel passage où il souligne «la renommée que les armes européennes ont obtenue dans les expéditions d'outre-mer. Le temps de ces expéditions est le temps héroïque de notre histoire ; c'est celui qui a donné naissance à notre poésie épique. Tout ce qui répand du merveilleux sur une nation ne doit point être méprisé par cette nation même. On voudrait en vain se le dissimuler, il y a quelque chose dans notre cœur qui nous fait aimer la gloire [...]» (p. 347). C'est à propos des croisades qu'il lance cette remarque, mais elle vaut, tout aussi bien, pour la «gloire» impériale. *

L'Itinéraire jette un certain jour sur un autre aspect de l'expédition de Napoléon Bonaparte qui a défrayé, jusqu'aujourd'hui, la sagacité des historiens : son attitude envers les Juifs et plus précisément envers le passé hébreu du pays. Nous savons que cette question a soulevé de longues discussions et a abouti, semble-t-il, aux conclusions suivantes : Napoléon Bonaparte s'est peut-être appuyé sur certaines communautés et certains cercles juifs méditerranéens pour assurer le succès de son expédition; il a même cherché à se ménager l'appui du préposé aux finances juif du pacha local, cependant, contrairement à une légende qui s'est répandue à cette époque, il n'a pas rédigé de proclamation dans laquelle il aurait prôné le rétablissement du royaume de David ; le texte en question est un faux qui a sans doute été répandu dans le milieu proche de son frère, Lucien, président de l'Assemblée. Tout ceci n'estompe pas l'intérêt qu'a alors suscité cette idée et que confirme le témoignage de Chateaubriand. Nous voyons que celui-ci, en effet, s'intéresse tout particulièrement au sort des Juifs et ceci pour un ensemble de raisons qui peuvent être résumées comme suit : il reprend l'héritage d'aristocrates libéraux, tels que Mirabeau, Clermont-Tonnerre et Malesherbes, qui ont demandé que la condition des Juifs soit adoucie; il connaît de près l'œuvre de Pascal, qui a souligné le lien des deux religions ; il l'a lui-même relevé ce lien dans le Génie

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du christianisme; et c'est sur l'initiative d'un prêtre libéral, l'abbé Grégoire, que la Révolution a émancipé les Juifs. Il insiste enfin sur une dernière raison, d'ordre, cette fois, littéraire : les Juifs sont le «Peuple du Livre» : «Pénétrez dans la demeure de ce peuple», raconte-t-il, «vous le trouverez dans une affreuse misère, faisant lire un livre mystérieux à des enfants qui, à leur tour, le feront lire à leurs enfants. Ce qu'il faisait il y a cinq mille ans, ce peuple le fait encore.» (p. 426-427). Et nous le voyons errer dans les rues de Jérusalem à la recherche d'un rabbin qui voudrait bien lui vendre une Bible : «Le drogman me fit entrer dans une espèce d'école ; je voulus acheter le Pentateuque hébreu dans lequel un rabbin montrait à lire à un enfant, mais le rabbin ne voulut jamais me le vendre.» (p. 356). Tel est le climat dans lequel les romantiques ont voulu réhabiliter le «Juif errant» et on le pressent déjà à travers ces pages de l'Itinéraire où Chateaubriand semble discuter indirectement avec Napoléon Bonaparte. Celui-ci vient de donner une organisation aux Juifs de France en instaurant le Sanhédrin (1806) et les Consistoires (1808) : il «parle longuement des Juifs de Jérusalem» parce que « Napoléon se préparait à réunir le Sanhédrin.» 1 Celui-ci, cependant, n'a pas songé à accorder d'autonomie aux Juifs, mais a voulu, au contraire, précipiter leur assimilation. Durant son passage en Terre Sainte, c'est également pour des raisons d'ordre pragmatique, et non spirituel qu'il a cherché à nouer des contacts avec eux. Chateaubriand a un point de vue différent : le peuple juif a une réalité et celle-ci se vérifie par sa présence sur la terre de ses aïeux ; il continue de témoigner du passé du christianisme ; et celui-ci doit veiller à sa préservation. Peu importe, donc, les raisons pour lesquelles Bonaparte n'est pas arrivé à Jérusalem, il a tenu, lui, à intituler son livre Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem et de Jérusalem et de Jérusalem à Paris. Les deux villes, dans son esprit, ne peuvent être dissociées. Lamartine et les écrivains suivants choisiront la dénomination plus générale du Voyage en Orient. Il est donc habilité à constater, sur place, que Napoléon ne s'est pas vraiment préoccupé du destin des religieux chrétiens. Ceux-ci sont victimes de «spoliations», de «mauvais traitements» et de «menaces de (...) mort.» (p. 426). Les Juifs subissent un sort plus terrible encore et il leur consacre un long et célèbre plaidoyer 2 : «[...] voyez cet autre petit peuple qui vit séparé du reste des habitants de la cité. / Objet particulier de tous les mépris, il baisse la tête sans se plaindre ; il souffre toutes les avanies sans demander justice ; il se laisse accabler de coups sans soupirer ; on lui demande sa tête, il la présente au cimeterre. [...] Ce qu'il faisait il y a cinq mille ans, ce peuple le fait encore. Il a assisté dix-sept fois à la ruine de Jérusalem, et rien ne peut l'empêcher de tourner ses regards vers Sion. Quand on voit les Juifs dispersés sur la terre, selon la parole de Dieu, on est surpris, sans doute ; mais,

^F. Bassan, op. cit., p. 152. J e remercie le père Marcel Dubois, de Jérusalem, de m'avoir signalé que Chateaubriand s'est notamment inspiré, ici, d'une pensée de Pascal. Cf. Marcel Dubois, «Le discours littéraire chrétien sur le mystère d'Israël», in David Mendelson, Les Francophonies d'Israël, Limoges, Presses Universitaires de Limoges, P.U.L.I.M. - Presses de la Francophonie, 2000 (sous presse). 2

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pour être frappé d'un étonnement surnaturel, il faut les retrouver à Jérusalem ; il faut voir ces légitimes maîtres de la Judée esclaves et étrangers dans leur propre pays ; il faut les voir attendant, sous toutes les oppressions, un roi qui doit les délivrer.» (p. 427). Ce ne sera pas, en tout cas, Napoléon... Et c'est Chateaubriand, si l'on en croit le témoignage d'une dame bonapartiste, Mme Hamelin, qui fréquentait les salons où il a trôné, à son retour, en «Pèlerin» des temps nouveaux, qui pensera à demander à l'empereur une aide destinée à reconstruire le Temple de Jérusalem : «Mon plus beau rêve», lui aurait-il dit, «serait d'obtenir de votre enchanteur (Napoléon) cinq architectes, cinq millions pour aller en son nom rebâtir le temple de Jérusalem qui vient d'être brûlé.»1 En fait, c'est l'église du Saint-Sépulcre, et non, bien sûr, le Temple, qui venait d'être incendiée. En bref, ces anecdotes montrent qu'un mouvement d'idées philo-sémites s'est bien développé en France à cette époque et qu'il s'est relié au rôle que Napoléon Bonaparte a joué en France et aurait pu jouer en Terre Sainte s'il l'avait réellement désiré et si les circonstances le lui avaient permis. *

Le témoignage de Chateaubriand s'avère infiniment précieux, enfin, d'un point de vue plus largement culturel et qui aura, de ce fait, une plus longue portée, mais que ni les historiens ni les littéraires n'ont, semble-t-il, relevé : c'est Chateaubriand qui a inauguré le Voyage en Orient moderne, mais il en a lui-même tiré l'idée, notamment, de l'Expédition de Bonaparte et il convient de rappeler ici qu'il se considérait lui-même, entre autres, comme un «soldat et voyageur» (voir plus haut), autrement dit qu'il reliait bien ces deux expériences. Son Itinéraire continue ainsi de revêtir un caractère quasiment militaire parce que les voyageurs doivent se protéger contre d'éventuels agresseurs. Certains passages prennent ainsi le ton de l'expédition de Bonaparte : «Nous découvrîmes bientôt, derrière nous, au bord du Jourdain, une troupe d'une trentaine d'Arabes qui nous observaient. Nous fîmes marcher en avant notre infanterie, c'est-à-dire nos Bethléémites, et nous couvrîmes leur retraite avec notre cavalerie [...]» (p. 299) ; etc., etc... Les voyageurs circulent toujours en groupe et accompagnés de janissaires ou de serviteurs armés. Ce sentiment de crainte s'atténuera avec le temps. Il en restera, cependant, le besoin d'établir les itinéraires avec une précision quasiment militaire. Les voyageurs «établ(issent)» un «camp» en rase campagne, allument un feu et tirent des provisions de leurs sacs comme des soldats (p. 288 sq., etc.). Ils portent souvent un costume arabe qui peut être assimilé à une sorte d'uniforme, comme le montre l'exemple du mameluck de l'empereur, Roustan. C'est également au cours de ce voyage que les visiteurs et, notamment, les écrivains, rencontrent des conteurs qui leur rappellent ceux des Mille et une nuits et s'émerveillent des beautés de la littérature orale que l'industrie européenne et I r Bassan, op. cit., note p. 89.

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occidentale du livre est en train de refouler : «Tout ce qu'on dit de la passion des Arabes pour les contes est vrai [...]» (p. 302), s'émerveille Chateaubriand. Or, ce type de conte a contribué à façonner le récit de la «Légende» telle que l'ont colportée les «Égyptiens», les premiers compagnons de l'empereur. Balzac en a donné un fameux exemple en écrivant le «récit de Goguelat», dans Le Médecin de campagne, qui se réfère précisément à des sources orientales. Dans l'Itinéraire, le conteur et ses auditeurs excitent leur imagination en prenant du café (p. 303), la boisson qui est alors devenue l'un des grands «excitants modernes» (Balzac). La scène revêt le caractère d'un tableau qui annonce ceux des orientalistes et comporte, là encore, une touche martiale: «|\..] quelques têtes de chevaux qui s'avançaient au-dessus de la troupe et qui se dessinaient dans l'ombre, achevaient de donner à ce tableau le caractère le plus pittoresque [...]» (p. 303). Ces «tableaux» se multiplient et représentent, tour à tour, des sujets que populariseront les orientalistes : des «Arabes [...] à la démarche fière» (p. 300) ; des «femmes» (arabes) au « port noble » et qui « par la régularité de leurs traits, la beauté de leurs formes et la disposition de leurs voiles (...) rappellent un peu les statues des prêtresses et des Muses.» (p. 302) ; des «chameaux (...) ornés de franges, de banderoles et de plumes» (p. 302) ; des «juments» caractéristiques de «la noblesse de leur race» et un «cheval arabe enchaîné dans le sable brûlant, les crins descendants épars [...]» (ibid.) ; etc., etc... Parmi ces sujets, le paysage de Jérusalem occupera une place de choix. Napoléon veut alors transformer Paris en une Rome moderne et il est en train d'y faire construire de nouveaux monuments dans le style néo-classique qui lui est cher. Chateaubriand semble lui opposer la Jérusalem mythique où un autre empereur, Julien l'Apostat, a commencé à bâtir la Lutèce de pierre et peut donc être considéré comme le premier constructeur de Paris. Or, Julien a également servi de gouverneur en Judée et il a tenté d'y «rebâtir le temple» de Jérusalem (p. 344), mais en a été empêché par des événements surnaturels que rappelle Chateaubriand : «des globes de feu sortant des fondements à demi creusés dispersèrent les ouvriers et ne permirent pas d'achever l'entreprise.» (ibid). Or, il se convainc donc à Jérusalem que Paris est elle aussi rehaussée par une certaine sacralité quand il note, par exemple, que la montagne de Sion est «à peu près de la hauteur de Montmartre» (p. 329) (le «Mont des Martyrs»). Il souligne ensuite que les croisades et leurs suites ont joué un rôle important dans le développement de la culture française. «Quant aux (...) résultats des croisades», affirme-t-il, «on commence à convenir que ces entreprises guerrières ont été favorables au progrès des lettres et de la civilisation.» (p. 347). Il songe aux sources d'inspiration de l'épopée chrétienne et, peut-être, du Roman de la rose. C'est de Palestine que Thibaut de Champagne, sénéchal et trouvère, dont il salue le souvenir, a ramené cette fleur si éminemment emblématique de la Vierge, de la féminité et de la poésie. Les Arabes lui ont conféré une valeur purificatrice qu'il évoque en rappelant une célèbre anecdote : «Saladin ne voulut point entrer dans la mosquée du Temple, convertie en église par les chrétiens, sans en avoir fait laver les murs avec de l'eau de rose.

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Cinq cents chameaux, dit Sanut, suffirent à peine pour porter toute l'eau de rose employée dans cette occasion : ce conte est digne de l'Orient.» (p. 349-350). Il se livre à de nombreuses réflexions de tendance scientifique sur les monuments, les phénomènes naturels et la flore du pays (p. 260, etc., etc...) et se réfère ainsi aux guides des pèlerins et, surtout, aux études des voyageurs savants du XVIII e siècle, mais il ne peut oublier que Bonaparte a renouvelé ce genre d'intérêt durant sa campagne d'Egypte. C'est également en Egypte que Bonaparte et ses hommes ont découvert les «bazars» qui lui ont plus tard donné l'idée d'ouvrir de nouveaux passages à Paris, non loin des Grands Boulevards, et de leur donner, ainsi qu'aux rues avoisinantes, des noms évocateurs de son Expédition : place et passage du Caire, rue d'Aboukir, etc., etc. Chateaubriand relève ainsi que la «rue du bazar» «est la grande rue et le beau quartier de Jérusalem.» (p. 355) ; alors que les autres «bazars», «sont infects» (p. 425). Les visiteurs continuent de consommer du café en abondance (p. 362). Le réception chez le patriarche Arsénios donne une idée du charme qu'ils ont découvert en Orient : «Je bus d'excellent café de Moka. On m'apporta des confitures, de l'eau fraîche, des serviettes blanches ; on brûla du bois d'aloès, et je fus parfumé d'essence de rose au point de m'en trouver incommodé.» (p. 363). C'est alors que le patriarche émet le vœu de voir revenir l'empereur (ibid.). La Palestine a autrefois été un pays relativement riche et Chateaubriand aurait pu indiquer que les croisés ont ramené d'Orient un grand nombre de nouvelles denrées. Il se contente de souligner la variété des repas qui lui sont servis (p. 387-388). Le complément est fourni par l'Égypte, comme l'indiquent les dernières lignes du récit de la visite en Terre Sainte : «Nous arrivâmes à Jérémie vers minuit : il fallut manger un agneau qu'Abou-Gosh nous avait fait préparer. Je voulus lui donner quelque argent, il le refusa, et me pria seulement de lui envoyer deux couffes de riz de Damiette quand je serais en Egypte : je lui promis de grand coeur, et pourtant je ne me souvins de ma promesse qu'à l'instant même où je m'embarquais pour Tunis. Aussitôt que nos communications avec le Levant seront rétablies, Abou-Gosh recevra certainement son riz de Damiette ; il verra qu'un Français peut manquer de mémoire, mais jamais de parole. J'espère que les petits bédouins de Jérémie monteront la garde autour de mon présent, et qu'ils diront encore : "En avant ! marche !"» (p. 428). C'est que le commerce de l'Europe avec l'Orient et l'Extrême-Orient s'est perpétué, malgré des aléas, à travers l'Egypte et, plus précisément, la zone où les Français ont ouvert, plus tard, le canal de Suez. *

L'Itinéraire nous apporte donc, en conclusion, un précieux témoignage sur l'opinion que Chateaubriand a eue de Napoléon à un moment très particulier de leur double carrière. Celui-ci était alors au sommet de sa gloire et il venait de prendre des sanctions à son égard pour répondre à ses critiques ; il avait lui-même quitté la France et s'était rendu en Orient, où l'Expédition

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française s'était soldée par un échec ; et il aurait donc toute raison et tout loisir d'aggraver ses critiques. C'est ce qu'a pensé l'un des commentateurs de son œuvre: «L'écrivain publia en 1811, sous le titre de L'Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem, le récit de son voyage dans le Proche-Orient. Le livre n'est qu'un pamphlet déguisé contre l'absolutisme.» 1 Chateaubriand n'y aurait donc fait que se venger, à travers ses diatribes contre la tyrannie du Sultan, des avanies que lui a infligées Napoléon. Or, nous venons de voir que son jugement est bien plus complexe. Il se trouve à l'étranger, sur les lieux mêmes où les armées françaises ont combattu pour une cause qui aurait pu être celle de la chrétienté et il est gagné par un sentiment patriotique qui le pousse à porter un jugement plus nuancé sur Bonaparte : celui-ci a imposé le respect de la France au pouvoir turc et aux potentats de la région ; il a même contribué, par ce biais, à assurer un peu plus de protection aux ordres chrétiens, comme le montrent son intervention, aussi timide soit-elle, en faveur des Pères latins et son échange de lettres avec l'ambassadeur Sébastiani ; et il a de nouveau attiré, en général, l'attention sur la Terre Sainte. Ce n'est que plus tard, dans les Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe que Chateaubriand lui reprochera d'avoir semé la violence dans le pays où le Christ avait d'abord répandu son message de paix et de miséricorde : «Bonaparte», écrira-t-il ainsi, «met le siège devant Saint-Jean d'Acre. On verse le sang à Cana, qui fut le témoin de la guérison du fils du centenier par le Christ ; à Nazareth, qui cacha la pacifique enfance du Sauveur ; au Thabor, qui vit la Transfiguration [...].» 2 La bataille de Nazareth a inspiré l'un des tableaux du baron Gros qui ont commencé à diffuser la «Légende» orientale de Napoléon. Chateaubriand a contribué à l'éclosion de cet orientalisme qui s'est d'abord teinté de religiosité quand il a décrit, notamment, Jérusalem et les Lieux Saints. C'est plus tard, également, que seront connus les exactions que Bonaparte a commises, notamment, à Jaffa et l'épisode des pestiférés de Jaffa a inspiré le tableau le plus connu du baron Gros 3 . La référence aux guérisons du Christ est évidente ; il se trouve que l'attitude de Bonaparte a été, en fait, hautement condamnable, ainsi que Chateaubriand le soulignera, là encore, dans ses Mémoires. Tout au plus essaiera-t-il d'atténuer certaines accusations en se réfugiant derrière l'analyse de deux auteurs anglais, Walter Scott, l'auteur d'une Life of Napoléon, et sir Robert Wilson 4 il retrouvera, ainsi, momentanément, face à la «barbarie asiatique», un point de vue européen. C'est également dans l'Itinéraire qu'il a développé la conception du temps qu'il a menée à son plus haut degré de complexité dans ses Mémoires et qui permet de comprendre comment il a contribué, directement ou indirectement, à l'élaboration de la dimension temporelle de la «Légende» : «Pour illustrer l'épopée napoléonienne, mythologie, littérature, poésie ou

' L. Regenbogen, p. 315. ^Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe, op. cit., 1,90. 3 Sur Chateaubriand et ces tableaux de Gros qu'il a admirés, cf. F. Bassan, p. 30. 4 Cf. J. Hoffenberg, p. 83 et note p. 96-97.

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simple réminiscence se croisent. Il se produit des interférences et, au sein de la chronologie, d'anachronismes. L'Histoire essaime et prolifère [,..]».1 Il finira par souligner que Napoléon s'est lui-même livré à cette manipulation des mythes et de l'Histoire et il reviendra sur l'idée qu'il a développée dans l'Itinéraire selon laquelle l'Histoire de l'Expédition en Terre Sainte aurait pu être récrite dans les termes du Tasse : «Dans ce lieu des miracles, Kléber et Murât renouvelèrent les faits d'armes de Tancrède et de Renaud : ils dispersèrent les populations de la Syrie, s'emparèrent du camp du pacha de Damas, jetèrent un regard sur le Jourdain, sur la mer de Galilée, et prirent possession de Scafet, l'ancienne Béthulie [...]». 2 Et il résumera cette épopée en revenant sur l'anecdote qu'il n'a cessé de se remémorer : «Les enfants arabes des montagnes de la Judée m'ont appris des traditions plus certaines lorsqu'ils me criaient en français : «En avant marche !» «Ces mêmes déserts », ai-je dit dans les Martyrs, «ont vu marcher les armées de Sésostris, de Cambyse, d'Alexandre, de César : siècles à venir, vous y ramènerez des armées non moins nombreuses, des guerriers non moins célèbres.» 3 Il ne croyait pas si bien, ou plutôt si mal dire : les armées se sont succédées dans la région jusqu'à la fin de notre XX e siècle. Theodor Herzl a salué en Napoléon, en se fondant sur le texte évoqué plus haut, l'un des annonciateurs de la renaissance de cet État juif que Chateaubriand a plus précisément appelée de ses vœux. Les Arabes ont adopté une position mitigée vis-à-vis de son Expédition, mais il a très évidemment contribué à la naissance du mouvement des nationalités arabes moderne. C'est lui, enfin, qui a donné l'élan au Voyage en Orient. Chateaubriand, en effet, reprendra certaines des remarques qu'il avait déjà esquissées à ce propos dans son Itinéraire et résumera en quelques formules des plus suggestives les rêves qu'il a attribués à Bonaparte et qui seront concrétisés par l'ouverture du canal de Suez et par le déferlement des produits orientaux en Europe : «Du Caire, Bonaparte se rendit à Suez [...] Il reconnut les traces d'un canal que commença Sésostris, qu'élargirent les Perses, que continua le second des Ptolémées, que réentreprirent les soudans dans le dessein de porter à la Méditerranée le commerce de la mer Rouge. Il projeta d'amener une branche du Nil dans le golfe Arabique : au fond de ce golfe, son imagination traça l'emplacement d'un nouvel Ophir, où se tiendrait tous les ans une foire pour les marchands de parfums, d'aromates, d'étoffes de soie, pour tous les objets précieux de Mascate de la Chine, de Ceylan, de Sumatra, des Philippines et des Indes.» 4 Les écrivains qui ont suivi Chateaubriand en Orient et, notamment, Nerval, Flaubert et Loti, ont, à leur tour, évoqué cette voie royale. Elle passait par Ophir et a été suivie, notamment, par la reine de Saba, lorsqu'elle est venue rendre visite au roi Salomon à Jérusalem et lui a apporté une quantité d'«objets précieux». Et ce sont ces objets que les nouveaux bazars du XIX e siècle, les Grands Magasins, ont présentés, entre autres, à leur clientèle et qui ont enflammé l'imagination des écrivains, de Chateaubriand à Proust, en passant par Balzac, Nerval, Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Flaubert, Zola, Huysmans et Loti. 1

Cl'. Id„ Ibid., p. 13-14. Cité par Id„ Ibid., p. 90. 3 Cité par Id., Ibid., p. 90-91. ^Chateaubriand, Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe, op. cit., I, 116. 2

NAPOLEON'S OWN RENDERING OF HIS EXPEDITION TO EGYPT AND HOLY LAND Lauro ROSSI

In May 1798, when the French fleet that was taking Bonaparte to Egypt set out from Toulon, a general feeling of apprehension gripped all the European monarchical powers. Since the Directory had maintained absolute secrecy about the arrangements for and scope of the expedition, their suspicions were certainly well founded. The question that recurred in the frantic dispatches from the chancelleries was: Where is the new expedition bound to? Naples, Florence and Lisbon did not conceal their wariness. Even Spain, despite her alliance with France, was ill at ease. Some said the expedition was directed toward India. Others said Brazil, Morocco, Algeria, the Near and the Far East. There were also conjectures about Sardinia. No one considered Egypt a serious possibility, Only after Malta had been captured did Egypt of the Mamelukes appears as a likely target, but absolute certainty would have to wait for news of the invasion of Cairo and the battle of Aboukir. Of all the campaigns mounted by the Directory, the one in Egypt is undoubtedly the most enigmatic. Even today, after so much research, starting with that by La Jonquière, 1 the Directory's decision is difficult to interpret. Christopher Herold's book, valid to this day, does not manage to penetrate the secret or furnish a plausible explanation, 2 especially if we consider that such a rash undertaking fell wholly outside the traditional pattern of revolutionary wars or wars of conquest. This was so not only because of the difficulties it would have to face and the precarious results it could obtain in a faraway setting obscured by distance and the sea, exacerbated by the impossibility of counting on timely reinforcements, but even more so because of the inevitable repercussions the expedition would have on the defensive and offensive policies of the fearful and wary European powers, and on the unstable equilibrium that the Peace of Campo Formio had created on the continent. One of the enigmas of the campaign certainly lies in the relationship between Bonaparte and the Directory, which was anything but idyllic. A most interesting passage in Barras' Mémoires, refers to the first fortnight of March

J 2

C. de La Jonquière, L'expédition en Egypte 1798-1801, 5 vol. (Paris 1899-1907). J. C. Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt (New York, 1962).

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that year: "A new coalition is brewing in Europe, and the Egyptian expedition will hasten it. All military forces should have been deployed behind the frontiers, along the coast opposite England, but Bonaparte must leave. His presence weighs heavily on the Directory." 1 It would appear, then, to have been exile, or at least temporaiy exile, for the conqueror of Italy. Yet the issue is much more complex. Today, Napoleon's campaign to Egypt can be reconstructed in several ways, such as through diaries, memoirs, iconography, or the wide publicity given to each and every phase of it. An interesting alternative is to interpret it through Napoleon's own letters, dispatches, edicts, pamphlets and bills — a bulk of material collected in the Correspondance of the Corsican general. Edited between 1858 and 1869, it includes — or should include — all the documents Napoleon produced in his lifetime. These writings allow us an insight not only into his judgements, opinions and projects, but his impressions and moods as well. The reader is prompted to picture the most outstanding moments of the enterprise; the departure from Toulon, the invasion of Malta, the capture of Alexandria, the Battle of the Pyramids, the naval disaster in Aboukir Bay, the battle of Mount Tabor, the siege of Acre, and Napoleon's return to France. The available material on the Egyptian expedition, as that about the first campaign to Italy, 2 is extremely interesting for several reasons: first, because in spite of the inevitable bias and inaccuracies, it remains a first-hand historical source for the reconstruction of event that were to be decisive for Italian history; secondly, because these documents reveal some of the traits that would distinguish Napoleon's character in the years to come. The most outstanding of these traits was his capacity as a propagandist and a catalyst of public opinion. "No one better than he," wrote François Furet, "understood that the reign of blood nobility had been replaced by the reign of public opinion." 3 Propaganda had already been experimented with during the Revolution, but it was Napoleon who made a powerful instrument of it. His war bulletins and his reports to the Directory (published in several newspapers) are true masterpieces in the way all the passages are calibrated for a purpose. He vividly portrayed the unfriendly environment, making a great flourish over the courage of French officials and soldiers yet without diminishing the valour of the enemy. Each paragraph is weighted so as to make him emerge as the supreme commander who sees and controls everything, the true artificer of French glory.

' p . J. F. N. Barras, Me'moires, 4 vol. (Paris, 1895-96). Cf. for a first approach, L. Rossi, Napoleone Bonaparte, La campagna d'Italia 1796-1797 (Manziana, 1997). •'CI'. F. Furet and M. Ozouf, Dizionario critico della Rivoluzione francese (Milano, 1988).

2

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A "genre" in itself are his exhortations to the soldier: rhetorical as they may be, they denote a great capacity for communication and evoke lofty prospects. Another interesting "genre" are his proclamations to the conquered peoples: paternalistic, understanding, but also overwhelmingly aggressive, they leave no room for concessions. Tulard is absolutely right when he warns the reader never to trust Napoleon's accounts or bulletins as a reliable source of information, yet admits that they are hard to do without. 1 A famous, if unsuspected admirer of Bonaparte, Henri Bayle — better known as Stendhal — wrote that Napoleon's proclamations are the best means to grasp his military genius character, 2 illustrating that at the beginning he could be loved with unrestrained passion, for he had not yet robbed France — and, we would add, Europe — of her freedom. I3 The Start of the Campaign: Toulon Before setting sail, Napoleon addresses his men. Toulon, le 30 floréal an 6 (19 mai 1798) Aux soldats de terre et de mer de l'armée de la Méditerranée Soldats, Vous êtes une des ailes de l'armée d'Angleterre. Vous avez fait la guerre de montagnes ; de plaines, de sièges ; il vous reste à faire la guerre maritime. Les légions romaines, que vous avez quelquefois imitées, mais pas encore égalées, combattaient Carthage tour-à-tour sur cette même mer et aux plaines de Zama. La victoire ne les abandonna jamais, parce que constamment elles furent braves ;patientes à supporter la fatigue, disciplinées et unies entre elles. Soldats, l'Europe a les yeux sur vous ! Vous avez de grandes destinées à remplir, des batailles à livrer, des dangers, des fatigues à vaincre ; vous ferez plus que vous n'avez fait pour la prospérité de la patrie, le bonheur des hommes et votre propre gloire. Soldats, matelots, fantassins, canonniers, cavaliers, soyez unis ; souvenez-vous que, le jour d'une bataille, vous avez besoin les uns des autres. Soldats, matelots, vous avez été jusqu'ici négligés ; aujourd'hui la plus grande sollicitude de la République est pour vous : vous serez dignes de l'armée dont vous faites partie. Le génie de la liberté, qui a rendu, dès sa naissance la République l'arbitre de l'Europe, veut qu'elle le soit des mers et des nations les plus lointaines.

'j. Tulard, Dictionnaire Napoléon (Paris, 1989), p. 313. ^Stendhal, Memorie su Napoleone (Rome, s.d.), p. 11. 3 Documents I, III a b, IV, IX, XIV b appear in Punckoucke (éd.), Œuvres de Napoléon Bonaparte. 5 vols. (Paris, 1821), Vol. II, pp. 213, 252, 254, 261,443; Vol. IV, p. 117- documents II, III c, V, VI, VII, Vili, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV a, XV, XVI a b c , XVII are included in Correspondance under numbers 2665, 2719, 2834, 3045, 3110, 3365, 4026, 4138, 4188 4235 4323,4358,4359,4364,4374.

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II Capture of Malta A few days after taking Malta, Napoleon sends word of it to North Africa so as to intimidate the population. Quartier général, Malte, 27prairial an VI (15 juin 1798) Aux consuls de France à Tunis, Tripoli et Alger1 Je vous préviens, Citoyen, que l'armée de la République est en possession, depuis deux jours, de la ville et des deux îles de Malte et du Gozzo ; le pavillon tricolore flotte sur tous les forts. Vous voudrez bien, Citoyen, faire part de la destruction de l'Ordre de Malte et de cette nouvelle possession de la République au bey près duquel vous vous trouvez, et lui faire connaître que désormais il doit respecter les Maltais, puisqu'ils se trouvent sujets de la France. Je vous prie aussi de lui demander qu'il mette en liberté les différents esclaves maltais qu'il a ; j'ai donné l'ordre que l'on mît en liberté plus de deux mille esclave barbaresques et turcs que l'Ordre de Saint-Jean-de-Jérusalem tenait aux galères. Laissez entrevoir au bey que la puissance qui a pris Malte en trois ou quatre jours serait dans le cas de le punir, s'il s'écartait un moment des égards qu'il doit à la République. III Arrival in Egypt Arriving at the coast of Alexandria, Bonaparte harangues his soldiers, issues a proclamation to the people of Egypt, and dispatches a letter to the pa§a claiming that he has come to free the people from the yoke of the Mamluks. A bord de l'Orient le 12 messidor an 6 (30 juin 1798) Proclamation aux soldats Soldats ! Vous allez entreprendre une conquête dont les effets sur la civilisation et le commerce du monde sont incalculables. Vous porterez à l'Angleterre le ' Devoizc, Guys (Alphonse), Jean-Bon Saint-André.

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coup le plus sûr et le plus sensible, en attendant que vous puissiez lui donner le coup de mort. Nous ferons quelques marches fatigantes ; nous livrerons plusieurs combats ; nous réussirons dans toutes nos entreprises ; les destins sont pour nous. Les beys mameloucks, qui favorisent exclusivement le commerce anglais, qui ont couvert, d'avanies nos négocions et qui tyrannisent les malheureuz, habitans des bords du Nil, quelques jours après notre arrivée, n'existeront plus. Les peuples avec lesquels nous allons vivre sont mahométans ; leur premier article de foi est celui-ci : "il n'y a pas d'autre Dieu que Dieu, et Mahomet est son prophète". Ne les contredisez pas ; agissez avec eux comme nous avons agi avec les juifs, avec les Italiens ; ayez les égards pour leurs muphtis et leurs imans, comme vous en avez eu pour les rabbins et les évêques ; ayez pour les cérémonies que prescrit l'alcoran ; pour les mosquées, la même tolérance que vous avez eue pour les couvens, pour les synagogues, pour la religion de Moïse et celle de Jésus-Christ. Les légions romaines protégeaient toutes les religions. Vous trouverez ici des usages différens de ceux de l'Europe : il faut vous y accoutumer. Les peuples chez lesquels nous allons entrer traitent les femmes différemment que nous ; mais, dans tous les pays, celui qui viole est un monstre. Le pillage n'enrichit qu'un petit nombre d'hommes ; il nous déshonore ; il détruit nos ressources ; il nous rend ennemis des peuples qu'il est de notre intérêt d'avoir pour amis. La première ville que nous allons rencontrer a été bâtie par Alexandre : nous trouverons à chaque pas de grands souvenirs, dignes d'exciter l'émulation des Français. Alexandrie, le 13 messidor an 6 (1er juillet 1798) Proclamation au peuple d'Egypte Depuis trop long-temps les beys qui gouvernement l'Egypte insultent à la nation française, et couvrent ses négocians d'avanies : l'heure de leur châtiment est arrivée. Depuis trop long-temps ce ramassis d'esclaves achetés dans le Caucase et la Géorgie tyrannisent la plus belle partie du monde ; mais Dieu, de qui dépend tout, a ordonné que leur empire finit. Peuples de l'Egypte, on vous dira que je viens pour détruire votre religion ; ne le croyez pas : répondez que je viens vous restituer vos drois, punir les usurpateurs, et que je respecte, plus que les mameloucks, Dieu ; son prophète et le Koran. Dites-leur que tous les hommes sont égaux devant Dieu : la sagesse, les talens et les vertus mettent seuls de la différence entre eux. Or, quelle sagesse, quels talens, quelles vertus distinguent les mameloucks, pour qu'ils aient exclusivement tout ce qui rend la vie aimable et douce ? Y-a-t-il une belle terre ? Elle appartient aux mameloucks. Y-a-t-il une belle esclave, un beau cheval, une belle maison ? Cela appartient aux mameloucks. Si l'Egypte est leur ferme, qu'ils montrent le bail que Dieu leur en a fait. Mais Dieu est juste et miséricordieux pour le peuple ; tous les Egyptiens sont appelés à gérer toutes les places: que les plus sages, les plus instruits, les plus vertueux gouvernent, et le peuple sera heureux. Il y avait jadis parmi vous de grandes villes, de grands canaux, un grand commerce. Qui a tout détruit, si ce n'est l'avarice, les injustices et la tyrannie des mameloucks ?

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Qadhys, cheykhs, Imâms, tchorbâdjys, dites au peuple que nous sommes aussi de vrais Musulmans. N'est-ce pas nous qui avons détruit le pape, qui disait qu'il fallait faire la guerre aux Musulmans ? N'est-ce pas nous qui avons détruit les chevaliers de Malte, parce que ces insensés croyaient que Dieu voulait qu'ils fissent la guerre aux Musulmans ? N'est-ce pas nous qui avons été dans tous les temps les amis du grand-seigneur (que Dieu accomplisse ses desseins), et l'ennemi de ses ennemis ? Les mameloucks au contraire ne sont-ils pas toujours révoltés contre l'autorité du grand-seigneur, qu'ils méconnaissent encore ? Ils ne font que leurs caprices. Trois fois heureux ceux qui seront avec nous ! Ils prospéreront dans leur fortune et leur rang. Heureux ceux qui seront neutres ! Ils auront le temps de nous connaître, et ils se rangeront avec nous. Mais malheur, trois fois malheur, à ceux qui s'armeront pour les mamelouks, et combattront contre nous: il n'y aura pas d'espérance pour eux ; ils périront.

A bord de l'Orient, 12 messidor an VI (30 juin 1798) Au Pacha d'Egypte Le Directoire exécutif de la République française s'est adressé plusieurs fois à la Sublime Porte pour demander le châtiment des beys d'Egypte, qui accablaient d'avanies les commerçants français. Mais la Sublime Porte a déclaré que les beys, gens capricieux et avides, n'écoutaient pas les principes de la justice, et que non-seulement elle n'autorisait pas les outrages qu'ils faisaient à ses bons et anciens amis les Français, mais que même elle leur ôtait sa protection. La République française s'est décidée à envoyer une puissante armée pour mettre fin aux brigandages des beys d'Egypte, ainsi qu'elle a été obligée de le faire plusieurs fois, dans ce siècle, contre les beys de Tunis et d'Alger. Toi, qui devrais être le maître des beys, et que cependant ils tiennent au Caire sans autorité et sans pouvoir, tu dois voir mon arrivée avec plaisir. Tu es sans doute déjà instruit que je ne viens point pour rien faire contre l'Alcoran ni contre le Sultan. Tu sais que la nation française est la seule et unique alliée que le Sultan ait en Europe. Viens donc à ma rencontre, et maudis avec moi la race impie des beys. IV The Taking

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As soon as he lands in Alexandria, Bonaparte takes the city and immediately thereafter publishes an edict to rouse the army. Alexandrie le 17 messidor an 6 (5 juillet 1798)

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Aux soldats Bonaparte, général en chef, ordonne : 1. Les noms de tous les hommes de l'armée française qui ont été tués à la prise d'Alexandrie, seront gravés sur la colonne de Pompée ; 2. Ils seront enterrés au pied de la colonne. Les citoyens Costas et Dutertre feront un plan qu'ils me présenteront pour l'exécution du présent ordre ; 3. Cela sera mis à l'ordre de l'armée. 4. L'état-major remettra à cette commission l'état de noms des hommes tués à la prise d'Alexandrie.

y The Battle of the Pyramids After several encounters, Bonaparte occupies the capital of Egypt and informs the Directory. Quartier général au Caire, 6 thermidor an VI (24 juillet 1798) Au Directoire Exécutif Citoyens Directeurs, [...]Le 2 thermidor, au matin, nous aperçûmes les Pyramides. Le 2, au soir, nous nous trouvâmes à six lieues du Caire, et j'appris que les vingt-trois beys, avec toutes leurs forces, s'étaient retranchés à Embâbeh, qu'ils avaient garni leurs retranchements de plus de 60 pièces de canon. Le 3, à la pointe du jour, nous rencontrâmes leur avant-garde, que nous poussâmes de village en village. A deux heures après midi, nous nous trouvâmes en présence des retranchements et de l'armée ennemie. J'ordonnai aux divisions des généraux Desaix et Reynier de prendre position sur la droite, entre Gyzeh et Embâbeh, de manière à couper à l'ennemi la communication de la haute Egypte, qui était sa retraite naturelle. L'armée était rangée de la même manière qu'à la bataille de Chobrâkhyt. Dès l'instant que Mourad-Bey s'aperçut du mouvement du général Desaix, il se résolut à le charger. Il envoya un de ses beys les plus braves avec un corps d'élite qui avec la rapidité de l'éclair, chargea les deux divisions. On le laissa approcher jusqu'à cinquante pas, et on l'accueillit par une grêle de balles et de mitraille qui en fit tomber un grand nombre sur le champ de bataille. Ils se jetèrent dans l'intervalle que formaient les deux divisions, où ils furent reçus par un double feu qui acheva leur défaite. Je saisis l'instant, et j'ordonnai à la division du général Bon, qui était sur le Nil, de se porter à l'attaque des retranchements, et au général Vial, qui commandait la division du général Menou, de se porter entre le corps qui venait de le charger et les retranchements, de manière à remplir le triple but d'empêcher ce corps d'y

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rentrer ; de couper la retraite à celui qui l'occupait ; et enfin s'il était nécessaire d'attaquer les retranchements par la gauche. Dès l'instant que les généraux Vial et Bon furent à portée, ils ordonnèrent aux lre et 3e divisions de chaque bataillon de se ranger en colonnes d'attaque, tandis que les 2e et 4e conservaient leur même position, formant toujours le bataillon carré, qui ne se trouvait plus que sur trois de hauteur, et s'avançaient pour soutenir les colonnes d'attaque. Les colonnes d'attaque du général Bon, commandées par le brave général Rampon, se jetèrent sur les retranchements avec leur impétuosité ordinaire, malgré le feu d'une grande quantité d'artillerie, lorsque les Mameloucks firent une charge. Ils sortirent des retranchements au grand galop ; nos colonnes eurent le temps de faire halte, de faire front de tous côtés, et de les recevoir la baïonnette au bout du fusil et par une grêle de balles. A l'instant même, le champ de bataille en fut jonché. Nos troupes eurent bientôt enlevé les retranchements. Les Mameloucks, en fuite, se précipitèrent en foule sur leur gauche ; mais le général Vial y était en position ; un bataillon de carabiniers, sous le feu duquel ils étaient obligés de passer, à cinq pas, en fit une boucherie effroyable ; un très-grand nombre se jeta dans le Nil et s'y noya. Plus de 400 hameaux chargés de bagages, 50 pièces d'artillerie sont tombés en notre pouvoir. J'évalue la perte des Mameloucks à 2,000 hommes de cavalerie d'élite. Une grande partie des beys a été blessée ou tuée ; MouradBey a été blessé à la joue. Notre perte monte à 20 ou 30 tués et à 120 blessés. Dans la nuit même, la ville du Caire a été évacuée ; toutes leurs chaloupes canonnières, corvettes, bricks et même une frégate ont été brûlés, et, le 4, nos troupes sont entrées au Caire. Pendant la nuit, la populace a brûlé les maisons des beys et commis plusieurs excès. Le Caire, qui a plus de 300.000 habitants, a la plus vilaine populace du monde. Après le grand nombre de combats et de batailles que les troupes que je commande ont livrés contre des forces supérieures, je ne m'aviserais pas de louer leur contenance et leur sang-froid dans cette occasion, si véritablement ce genre de guerre tout nouveau n'avait exigé de leur part une patience qui contraste avec l'impétuosité française ; s'ils se fussent livrés à leur ardeur, ils n'auraient point eu la victoire, qui ne pouvait s'obtenir que par un grand sang-froid et une grande patience. La cavalerie des Mameloucks a montré une grande bravoure ; ils défendaient leur fortune, et il n'y a pas un d'eux sur lequel nos soldats n'aient trouvé trois, quatre ou cinq cents louis d'or. Tout le luxe de ces gens-ci était dans leurs chevaux et leur armement ; leurs maisons sont pitoyables. Il est difficile de voir une terre plus fertile et un peuple plus misérable, plus ignorant et plus abruti. Ils préfèrent un bouton de nos soldats à un écu de six francs. Dans les villages, ils ne connaissent pas même une paire de ciseaux. Leurs maisons sont d'un peu de boue. Ils n'ont pour tout meuble qu'une natte de paille et deux ou trois pots de terre. Ils mangent et consomment en général fort

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peu de chose. Ils ne connaissent point l'usage des moulins ; de sorte que nous avons constamment bivouaqué sur des tas immenses de blé, sans pouvoir avoir de farine. Nous ne nous nourrissons que de légumes et de bestiaux. Le peu de grains qu 'ils convertissent en farine, ils le font avec des pierres ; et, dans quelques gros villages, il y a des moulins que font tourner des bœufs. Nous avons été continuellement harcelés par des nuées d'Arabes, qui sont les plus grands voleurs et les plus grands scélérats de la terre, assassinant les Turcs comme les Français, tout ce qui leur tombe dans les mains. Le général de brigade Mireur et plusieurs autres aides de camp et officiers de l'étatmajor ont été assassinés par ces misérables. Embusqués derrière des digues et dans des fossés, sur leurs excellents petits chevaux, malheur à celui qui s'éloigne à cent pas des colonnes ! Le général Mireur, malgré les représentations de la grand'garde, seul, par une fatalité que j'ai souvent remarqué accompagner les hommes qui sont arrivés à leur dernière heure, a voulu se porter sur un monticule, à deux cents pas du camp : derrière étaient trois Bédouins qui l'ont assassiné. La République fait une perte réelle : c'était un des généraux les plus braves que je connusse. Il y a dans ce pays-ci fort peu de numéraire, pas assez pour solder l'armée, beaucoup de blé, de riz, de légumes, de bestiaux. La République ne peut pas avoir une colonie plus à sa portée et d'un sol plus riche. Le climat est très-sain, parce que les nuits sont fraîches. Malgré quinze jours de marche, des fatigues de toute espèce, la privation absolue de vin et même de tout ce qui peut alléger la fatigue, nous n'avons pas de malades. Le soldat a trouvé une grande ressource dans les pastèques, espèce de melons d'eau, qui sont en très-grande quantité.

VI The Aboukir Naval Disaster Napoléon learns that the British fleet under Nelson's command has destroyed the French armada at Aboukir and has taken the city. Apparently unruffled, he writes a fatalistic letter to the Directoiy. Quartier général, au Caire, 2 fructidor an VI (19 août 1798) Au Directoire Exécutif Citoyens Directeurs, /.../ le 18 messidor, je suis parti d'Alexandrie ; j'écrivis à l'amiral d'entrer, sous vingt-quatre heures, dans le port de cette ville, et, si son escadre ne pouvait pas y entrer, de décharger promptement toute l'artillerie et tous les

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effets appartenant à l'armée de terre, et de se rendre à Corfou. L'amiral ne crut pas pouvoir achever le débarquement dans la position où il se trouvait, étant mouillé devant le port d'Alexandrie sur des roches et plusieurs vaisseaux ayant déjà perdu leurs ancres : il alla mouiller à Aboukir, qui offrait un bon mouillage. J'envoyai des officiers du génie et d'artillerie, qui convinrent avec l'amiral que la terre ne pourrait lui donner aucune protection, et que, si les Anglais paraissaient pendant les deux ou trois jours qu'il fallait qu'il restât à Aboukir, soit pour débarquer notre artillerie, soit pour sonder et marquer la passe d'Alexandrie, il n'y avait pas d'autre parti à prendre que de couper ses câbles, et qu'il était urgent de séjourner le moins possibles à Aboukir. Je suis donc parti d'Alexandrie dans la ferme croyance que, sous trois jours, l'escadre serait entrée dans le port d'Alexandrie ou aurait appareillé pour Corfou. Depuis le 18 messidor jusqu'au 6 thermidor, je n'ai eu aucune espèce de nouvelles, ni de Rosette, ni d'Alexandrie. Une nuée d'Arabes, accourant de tous les points du désert, était continuellement à 500 toises du camp. Le 9 thermidor, le bruit de nos victoires et différentes dispositions rouvrirent nos communications. Je reçus plusieurs lettres de l'amiral, où je vis avec étonnement qu'il se trouvait encore à Aboukir. Je lui écrivis sur-le-champ pour lui faire sentir qu'il ne devait pas perdre une heure à entrer à Alexandrie ou à se rendre à Corfou. L'amiral m'instruisit, par une lettre du 2 thermidor, que plusieurs vaisseaux anglais étaient venus le reconnaître, et qu'il se fortifiait, pour attendre l'ennemi, embossé à Aboukir. Cette étrange résolution me remplit des plus vives alarmes ; mais déjà il n'était plus temps, car la lettre que l'amiral écrivait le 2 thermidor ne m'arriva que le 12. Je lui expédiai le citoyen Jullien, mon aide de camp, avec ordre de ne pas partir d'Aboukir qu'il n'eût vu l'escadre à la voile. Parti le 12, il n'aurait pu jamais arriver à temps. Cet aide de camp a été tué en chemin par un parti arabe, qui a arrêté sa barque sur le Nil et l'a égorgé avec son escorte. Le 8 thermidor, l'amiral m'écrivit que les Anglais s'étaient éloignés, ce qu'il attribuait au défaut de vivres. Je reçus cette lettre le 12, par le même courrier. Le 11, il m'écrivait qu'il venait enfin d'apprendre la victoire des Pyramides et la prise du Caire, et que l'on avait trouvé une passe pour entrer dans le port d'Alexandrie. Je reçus cette lettre le 18. Le 14, au soir, les Anglais l'attaquèrent. Il m'expédiait, au moment où il aperçut l'escadre anglaise, un officier pour me faire part de ses dispositions et de ses projets : cet officier a péri en route. Il me paraît que l'amiral Brueys n'a point voulu se rendre à Corfou avant qu'il eût été certain de ne pouvoir entrer dans le port d'Alexandrie, et que l'armée, dont il n'avait pas de nouvelles depuis longtemps, fût dans une position à ne pas avoir besoin de retraite. Si dans ce funeste événement, il a fait des fautes, il les a expiées par une mort glorieuse. Les destins ont voulu, dans cette circonstance comme dans tant d'autres, prouver que, s'ils nous accordent une grande prépondérance sur le

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continent, ils ont donné l'empire des mers à nos rivaux. Mais, si grand que soit ce revers, il ne peut pas être attribué à l'inconstance de la Fortune ; elle ne nous abandonne pas encore ; bien loin de là, elle nous a servis dans toute cette opération au delà de ce qu'elle a jamais fait. Quand j'arrivai devant Alexandrie et que j'appris que les Anglais y étaient passés en forces supérieures quelques jours avant, malgré la tempête affreuse qui régnait, au risque de me naufrager, je me jetai à terre. Je me souviens qu'a l'instant où les préparatifs du débarquement se faisaient on signala dans l'éloignement, au vent, une voile de guerre : c'était la Justice, venant de Malte. Je m'écriai : "Fortune, m'abandonnerais-tu ? Quoi, seulement cinq jours ! Je marchai toute la nuit ; j'attaquai Alexandrie à la pointe du jour, avec 3,000 hommes, harassés, sans canons et presque sans cartouches, et, dans les cinq jours, j'étais maître de Rosette, de Damanhour, c'est-à-dire déjà établi en Egypte. Dans ces cinq jours, l'escadre devait se trouver à l'abri des Anglais, quel que fût leur nombre ; bien loin de là, elle reste exposée pendant tout le reste de messidor ; elle reçoit de Rosette, dans les premiers jours de thermidor, un approvisionnement de riz pour deux mois ; les Anglais se laissent voir en nombre supérieur, pendant dix jours, dans ces parages ; le 11 thermidor, elle apprend la nouvelle de l'entière possession de l'Egypte et de notre entrée au Caire ; et ce n'est que lorsque la Fortune voit que toutes ses faveurs sont inutiles, qu'elle abandonne notre flotte à son destin. Talleyrand est-il à Constantinople ? Envoyez à Ancône 500.000 francs et quelques officiers de marine pour armer les trois vaisseaux que nous y avons ; envoyez-en autant à Corfou. Faites réunir tous nos vaisseaux qui sont à Toulon, Malte, Ancône, Corfou, Alexandrie, pour pouvoir nous trouver encore avec une flotte. Quand j'aurai plus de détails sur la situation des Anglais, je vous les enverrai. Je vous salue.

VII To the Sharif of Mecca Bonaparte takes care to write to the Sharif of Mecca to assure him that he has no intention of interfering with the departure of pilgrims. Quartier général, au Caire, 8 fructidor an VI (25 août 1798) Au Chérifde la Mecque1

' Ghalib-Ibn-Musa'id.

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En vous faisant connaître Ventrée de l'armée française en Egypte, je crois devoir vous assurer de la ferme intention où je suis de protéger de tous mes moyens le voyage des pèlerins de la Mecque ; les mosquées et toutes les fondations que la Mecque et Médine possèdent en Egypte continueront à leur appartenir comme par le passé. Nous sommes amis des musulmans et de la religion du Prophète ; nous désirons faire tout ce qui pourra vous plaire et être favorables à la religion. Je désire que vous fassiez connaître partout que la caravane des pèlerins ne souffrira aucune interruption, qu'elle sera protégée de manière qu'elle n'aura rien à craindre des Arabes. VIII Speech to the Army Bonaparte stays in Cairo for two months in order to reorganize the administration of the country. He delivers a speech to the army on the anniversary of the foundation of the French Republic. Quartier général, au Caire, 1er vendémiaire an VII (22 septembre 1798) Proclamation à l'armée Soldats ! Nous célébrons le premier jour de l'an Vil de la République. Il y a cinq ans, l'indépendance du peuple français était menacée ; mais vous prîtes Toulon : ce fut le présage de la ruine de nos ennemis. Un an après vous battiez les Autrichiens à Dego. L'année suivante, vous étiez sur le sommet des Alpes. Vous luttiez contre Mantoue, il y a deux ans, et vous remportiez la célèbre victoire de Saint-Georges. L'an passé, vous étiez aux sources de la Drave et de l'Isonzo, de retour de l'Allemagne. Qui eût dit alors que vous seriez aujourd'hui sur les bords du Nil, au centre de l'ancien continent ? Depuis l'Anglais, célèbre dans les arts et le commerce, jusqu'au hideux et féroce Bédouin, vous fixez les regards du monde. Soldats ! Votre destinée est belle, parce que vous êtes dignes de ce que vous avez fait et de l'opinion que l'on a de vous. Vous mourrez avec honneur, comme les braves dont les noms sont inscrits sur cette pyramide, ou vous retournerez dans votre patrie couverts de lauriers et de l'admiration de tous les peuples. Depuis cinq mois que nous sommes éloignés de l'Europe, nous avons été l'objet perpétuel des sollicitudes de nos compatriotes. Dans ce jour, quarante millions de citoyens, célèbrent l'ère des gouvernements représentatifs, quarante millions de citoyens pensent à vous. Tous disent : c'est à leurs travaux, à leur sang que nous devrons la paix générale, le repos, la prospérité du commerce et les bienfaits de la liberté civile.

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IX The Cairo Revolt Bonaparte forgives the inciters of a revolt in Cairo. Au Caire 1er nivôse an 7 (21 décembre 1798) Aux habitans du Caire Des hommes pervers avaient égaré une partie d'entre vous : ils ont péri. Dieu m'a ordonné d'être clément et miséricordieux pour le peuple ; j'ai été clément et miséricordieux envers vers vous. J'ai été fâché contre vous de votre révolte ; je vous ai privés pendant deux mois de votre divan ; mais aujourd'hui je vous le restitue : votre bonne conduite a effacé la tache de votre révolte. Chéryfs, eulémas, orateurs de mosquées, faites bien connaître au peuple que ceux qui, de gaîtéde cœur, se déclareraient mes ennemis, n'auraient de refuge ni dans ce monde ni dans l'autre. Y aurait-il un homme assez aveugle pour ne pas voir que le destin lui-même dirige toutes mes opérations ? Y aurait-il quelqu'un assez incrédule pour révoquer en doute que tout, dans ce vaste univers, est soumis à l'empire du destin ? Faites connaître au peuple que, depuis que le monde est monde, il était écrit qu'après avoir détruit les ennemis de l'islamisme, fait abattre les croix, je viendrais du fond de l'occident remplir la tâche qui, m'a été imposée. Faites voir au peuple que, dans le saint livre du Qoran, dans plus de vingt passages, ce qui arrive a été prévu, et que ce qui arrivera est également expliqué. Que ceux donc que la crainte seule de nos armes empêche de nous maudire, changent ; car, en faisant au ciel des vœux contre nous, ils sollicitent leur condamnation ; que les vrais croyons fassent des vœux pour la prospérité de nos armes. Je pourrais demander compte à chacun de vous des sentimens les plus secrets du cœur ; car je sais tout, même ce que vous n'avez dit à personne : mais un jour viendra que tout le monde verra avec évidence que je suis conduit par des ordres supérieurs, et que tous les efforts humains ne peuvent rien contre moi : heureux ceux qui, de bonne foi, sont les premiers à se mettre avec moi !

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X March to St. John of Acre Bonaparte spends the winter of 1799 in Cairo. Threatened by Jezzar Pa§a, who was gathering troops against him, Napoléon proceeds toward St. John of Acre, occupying Jaffa and ail of Palestine on his way. Quartier général, Jaffa, 19 ventôse an VII (9 mars 1799) A Djezzar-Pacha Depuis mon entrée en Egypte, je vous ai fait connaître plusieurs fois que mon intention n'était point de vous faire la guerre ; que mon seul but était de chasser les Marneloucks : vous n'avez répondu à aucune des ouvertures que je vous ai faites. Je vous avais fait connaître que je désirais que vous éloignassiez Ibrahim-Bey des frontières de l'Egypte : bien loin de là, vous avez envoyé des troupes à Gaza, vous avez fait de grands magasins, vouz avez publié partout que vous alliez entrer en Egypte, vous avez effectué votre invasion en portant 2,000 hommes de vos troupes dans le fort d'El-A'rych, enfoncé à dix lieues dans le territoire de l'Egypte. J'ai dû alors partir du Caire, et vous apporter moi-même la guerre que vous paraissiez provoquer. Les provinces de Gaza, Ramleh et Jaffa sont en mon pouvoir. J'ai traité avec générosité celles de vos troupes qui s'en sont remises à ma discrétion. J'ai été sévère envers celles qui ont violé les droits de la guerre. Je marcherai sous peu de jours sur Saint-Jean-d'Acre. Mais quelles raisons ai-je d'ôter quelques années de vie à un vieillard que je ne connais pas ? Que sont quelques lieues de plus à côté du pays que j'ai conquis ? Et, puisque Dieu me donne la victoire, je veux, à son exemple, être clément et miséricordieux, non-seulement envers le peuple, mais encore envers les grands. Vous n'avez point de raison réelle d'être mon ennemi, puisque vous l'étiez des Mameloucks. Votre pachalik est séparé de l'Egypte par les provinces de Gaza, de Ramleh et par d'immenses déserts ; redevenez mon ami, soyez l'ennemi des Mameloucks et des Anglais : je vous ferai autant de bien que je vous ai fait et que je peux vous faire de mal. Envoyez-moi votre réponse par un homme muni de vos pleins pouvoirs, et qui connaisse vos intentions ; il se présentera à mon avant-garde avec un drapeau blanc, et je donne ordre à mon état-major de vous envoyer un sauf-conduit que vous trouverez ci-joint. Le 24 de ce mois, je serai en marche sur Saint-Jeand'Acre ; il faut donc que j'aie votre réponse avant ce jour.

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XI Battle of Mount Tabor Bonaparte lays siege to St. John of Acre. An Ottoman army force coming from Damascus attacks General Kléber. Bonaparte cornes to his aid, and together they manage to defeat the enemy. Quartier général, devant Acre, 21 floréal an VII (10 mai 1799) Au Directoire Exécutif Citoyens Directeurs, [...] Vous avez vu, par ma dernière dépêche, la rapidité avec laquelle l'armée a passé le désert, la prise d'El-A'rych, de Gaza, de Jajfa, la dispersion de l'armée ennemie, qui a perdu ses magasins, une partie de ses chameaux, ses outres et ses équipages de campagne. Il restait encore deux mois avant la saison propre au débarquement ; je résolus de poursuivre les débris de l'armée ennemie et de nourrir pendant deux mois la guerre dans le cœur de la Syrie. Nous nous mîmes en marche sur Acre [...]. Le 22, l'ennemi déborda la droite du général Kléber, et se porta dans la plaine d'Esdrelon, pour se joindre aux Naplousains. Le général Kléber se porta entre le Jourdain et l'ennemi, tourna le mont Thabor et marcha toute la nuit du 26 au 27 pour l'attaquer de nuit. Il n'arriva qu'au jour en présence de l'ennemi ; il forma sa division en bataillon carré ; une nuée d'ennemis l'investit de tous côtés ; il essuya toute la journée des charges de cavalerie ; toutes furent repoussées avec la plus grande bravoure. La division Bon était partie, le 25 à midi, du camp d'Acre, et se trouva, le 27 à neuf heures du matin, sur les derrières de l'ennemi, qui occupait un immense champ de bataille. Jamais nous n'avions vu tant de cavalerie caracoler, charger, se mouvoir dans tous les sens. On ne se montra point ; notre cavalerie enleva le camp ennemi, qui était à deux heures du champ de bataille ; on prit plus de 400 chameaux et tous les bagages, spécialement ceux des Mameloucks. Les généraux Vial et Rampon, à la tête de leurs troupes formées en bataillons carrés, marchèrent dans différentes directions, de manière à former, avec la division Kléber, les trois angles d'un triangle équilatéral de 2,000 toises de côté ; l'ennemi était au centre. Arrivés à la portée du canon, ils se démasquèrent ; l'épouvante se mit dans les rangs ennemis ; en un clin d'œil, cette nuée de cavaliers s'écoula en désordre et gagna le Jourdain ; l'infanterie gagna les hauteurs ; la nuit la sauva. Le lendemain, je fis brûler les villages de Genyn, Nourès, Soulyn, pour punir les Naplousains. Le général Kléber poursuivit les ennemis jusqu'au Jourdain.

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XII Acre's Siege Raised After two months of vain assaults on the walls of the city, Bonaparte gives up his design to take Acre and informs the Directory and the army. Quartier général, devant Acre, 28 floréal an VII (17 mai 1799) Proclamation aux soldats Soldats, vous avez traversé le désert qui sépare l'Afrique de l'Asie avec plus de rapidité qu'une armée arabe. L'armée qui était en marche pour envahir l'Egypte est détruite ; vous avez pris son général, son équipage de campagne, ses outres, ses chameaux. Vous vous êtes emparés de toutes les places fortes qui défendent les puits du désert. Vous avez dispersé aux champs du mont Thabor cette nuée d'hommes accourus de toutes les parties de l'Asie dans l'espoir de piller l'Egypte. Les trente vaisseaux que vous avez vus arriver devant Acre, il y a douze jours, portaient l'armée qui devait assiéger Alexandrie ; mais, obligée d'accourir à Acre, elle y a fini ses destins ; une partie de ses drapeaux orneront votre entrée en Egypte. Enfin, après avoir, avec une poignée d'hommes, nourri la guerre pendant trois mois dans le cœur de la Syrie, pris 40 pièces de campagne, 50 drapeaux, fait 6,000 prisonniers, rasé les fortifications de Gaza, Jaffa, Hayfâ, Acre, nous allons rentrer en Egypte ; la saison des débarquements m'y rappelle. Encore quelques jours et vous aviez l'espoir de prendre le pacha même au milieu de son palais ; mais dans cette saison la prise du château d'Acre ne vaut pas la perte de quelques jours ; les braves que je devrais d'ailleurs y perdre sont aujourd'hui nécessaires pour des opérations plus essentielles. Soldats, nous avons une carrière de fatigues et de dangers à courir ; après avoir mis l'Orient hors d'état de rien faire contre nous cette campagne, il nous faudra peut-être repousser les efforts d'une partie de l'Occident. Vous y trouverez une nouvelle occasion de gloire ; et si, au milieu de tant de combats, chaque jour est marqué par la mort d'un brave, il faut que les nouveaux braves se forment et prennent rang à leur tour parmi ce petit nombre qui donne l'élan dans les dangers et maîtrise la victoire.

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XIII The Angel al-Mahdi Back in Cairo, Bonaparte informs the Directory about what has happened during his absence. Quartier général, au Caire, 1er messidor an VII (19 juin 1799) Au Directoire Exécutif Au commencement de floréal, une scène, la première de ce genre que nous ayons encore vue, mit en révolte la province de Buhyreh. Un homme, venu du fond de l'Afrique, débarqué à Derne, arrive, réunit les Arabes et se dit l'ange El-Mahdy, annoncé dans le Coran, par le Prophète ; 200 Moghrebins arrivent quelques jours après, comme par hasard, et viennent se ranger sous ses ordres. L'ange El-Mahdy doit descendre du ciel ; cet imposteur prétend être descendu du ciel au milieu du désert ; lui qui est nu prodigue l'or, qu'il a l'art de tenir caché. Tous les jours il trempe ses doigts dans une jatte de lait, se les passe sur les lèvres ; c'est la seule nourriture qu'il prend. Il se porte sur Damanhour, surprend 60 hommes de la légion nautique, que Von avait eu l'imprudence d'y laisser au lieu de les placer dans la redoute d'El-Rahmânyeh, et les égorge. Encouragé par ce succès, il exalte l'imagination de ses disciples, et doit, en jetant un peu de poussière contre nos canons, empêcher la poudre de prendre et faire tomber devant les vrais croyants les balles de nos fusils : un grand nombre d'hommes attestent cent miracles de cette nature qu'il fait tous les jours. Le chef de brigade Lefebvre partit d'El-Rahmânyeh avec 400 hommes pour marcher contre l'ange ; mais, voyant à chaque instant le nombre des ennemis s'accroître, il voit l'impossibilité de mettre à la raison une si grande quantité d'hommes fanatisés. Il se range en bataillon carré et tue toute la journée ces insensés, qui se précipitent sur nos canons, ne pouvant revenir de leur prestige. Ce n'est que la nuit que ces fanatiques, comptant leurs morts (il en avait plus de 1,000) et leurs blessés, comprennent que Dieu ne fait plus de miracles. Le 19 floréal, le général Lanusse, qui s'est porté avec la plus grande activité partout où il y a eu des ennemis à combattre, arrive à Damanhour, passe 1,500 hommes au fil de l'épée, un monceau de cendres indique la place où fut Damanhour. L'ange El-Mahdy, blessé de plusieurs coups, sent luimême son zèle se refroidir ; il se cache dans le fond des déserts, environné encore de partisans ; car, dans des têtes fanatisées, il n'y a point d'organes par où la raison puisse pénétrer. Cependant la nature de cette révolte contribua à accélérer mon retour en Egypte. Cette scène bizarre était concertée et devait avoir lieu au même instant où la flotte turque, qui a débarqué l'armée que j'ai

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détruite sous Acre, devait arriver devant Alexandrie. L'armement de cette flotte, dont les Mameloucks de la haute Egypte avaient été instruits par des dromadaires, leur fit faire un mouvement en basse Egypte ; mais, battus plusieurs fois par le chef de brigade Détrès, officier d'une bravoure distinguée, ils descendirent dans le Charqyeh. Le général Dugua ordonna au général Davout de s'y porter. Le 19 floréal, il attaqua Elfy-Bey et les Bïly ; quelques coups de canon ayant tué trois des principaux kâchefs d'Elfy, il fuit épouvanté dans les déserts.

XIV Letters to the Muslims Bonaparte writes to the Sultan of Darfur and the Sharif of Mecca, pretending to be a Muslim believer. The letter to the Divan of Cairo is especially significant. Quartier général, au Caire, 12 messidor an VII (30 juin 1799) Au Sultan du Darfour Au nom de Dieu clément et miséricordieux ! Il n'y a pas d'autre dieu que Dieu, et Mahomet est son prophète ! Au sultan du Darfour, Abd-elRahmân, serviteur des deux cités saintes, calife du glorieux prophète de Dieu, maître des mondes. J'ai reçu votre lettre ; j'en ai compris le contenu. Lorsque votre caravane est arrivée, j'étais absent, ayant été en Syrie pour punir et détruire nos ennemis. Je vous prie de renvoyer, par la première caravane, 2,000 esclaves noirs ayant plus de seize ans, forts et vigoureux ; je les achèterai tous pour mon compte. Ordonnez à votre caravane de venir de suite et de ne pas s'arrêter en route. Je donne des ordres pour qu 'elle soit protégée partout. Rahmanieh, le 3 thermidor an (22 juillet 1799) Au Divan du Caire Choisis parmi les gens les plus sages, les plus instruits et les plus éclairés que le salut du prophète soit sur eux ! Je vous écris cette lettre pour vous faire connaître qu'après avoir fait occuper le lac Natron, et presque le Bahhireh, pour rendre la tranquillité à ce malheureux pays et punir nos ennemis, nous nous sommes rendus à Rahmanieh. Nous avons accordé un pardon général à la province, qui est aujourd'hui parfaitement tranquille. Quatre-vingts bâtimens, petits et gros, se sont présentés pour attaquer Alexandrie ; mais, ayant été accueillis par des bombes et des boulets, ils ont

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été mouiller à Aboukir, où ils commencent à débarquer. Je les laisse faire, parce que mon intention est, lorsqu'ils seront tous débarqués, de les atteindre, de tuer tout ce qui ne voudra pas se rendre, et de laisser la vie aux autres pour les mener prisonniers, ce qui fera un beau spectacle pour la ville du Caire. Ce qui avait conduit cette flotte ici, était l'espoir de se réunir aux mameloucks et aux Arabes pour piller et dévaster l'Egypte. Il y a sur cette flotte des Russes, qui ont en horreur ceux qui croient à l'unité de Dieu, parce que, selon leurs mensonges, ils croient qu'il y en a trois. Mais ils ne tarderont pas à voir que ce n'est pas le nombre des dieux qui fait la force, et qu'il n'y en a qu'un seul, père de la victoire, clément et miséricordieux, combattant toujours pour les bons, confondant les projets des méchans, et qui, dans sa sagesse, a décidé que je viendrais en Egypte pour en changer la face, et substituer à un régime dévastateur un régime d'ordre et de paix. Il donne par là une marque de sa haute puissance : car ce que n'ont jamais pu faire ceux qui croient à trois, nous l'avons fait, nous qui croyons qu'un seul gouverne la nature et l'univers. Et, quant aux musulmans qui pourraient se trouver avec eux, ils seront réprouvés, puisqu'ils se sont alliés, contre l'ordre du prophète, à des puissances infidèles et à des idolâtres. Ils ont donc perdu la protection qui leur aurait été accordée ; ils périront misérablement. Le musulman qui est embarqué sur un bâtiment où est arboré la croix, celui qui tous les jours entend blasphémer contre le seul Dieu, est pire qu'un infidèle même. Je désire que vous fassiez connaître ces choses aux différens divans de l'Egypte, afin que les malintentionnés ne troublent pas la tranquillité des différentes villes : car ils périront comme Damanhour et tant d'autres, qui, par leur mauvaise conduite, ont mérité ma vengeance. Que le salut de paix soit sur les membres du divan !

XV A Second Battle at Aboukir Bonaparte is in Cairo when a second Ottoman force lands at Aboukir. He attacks and gains a brilliant victory. Quartier général, Alexandrie, 10 thermidor an VII (28 juillet 1799) Au Directoire Exécutif Citoyens Directeurs, je vous ai annoncé, par ma dépêche du 21 floréal, que la saison des débarquements m'avait décidé à quitter la Syrie. Le débarquement a effectivement eu lieu le 23 messidor ; 100 voiles, dont

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plusieurs de guerre, se présentèrent devant Alexandrie et mouillèrent à Âboukir. Le 27, l'ennemi débarque, prend d'assaut et avec une intrépidité singulière la redoute et le fort d'Aboukir, met à terre son artillerie de campagne, et renforcé par 50 voiles, prend position, sa droite appuyée à la mer, sa gauche au lac Ma'dyeh, sur de très-belles collines. Je pars de mon camp des Pyramides le 27 ; j'arrive le 1er thermidor à El-Rahmânyeh, je marche sur Birket-Gheytâs, qui devient le centre de mes opérations, d'où je me porte en présence de l'ennemi le 7 thermidor, à six heures du matin. Le général Murât commande l'avant-garde ; il fait attaquer la droite de l'ennemi par le général Destaing ; le général de division Lannes attaque la gauche ; le général Lanusse soutient l'avant-garde. Une belle plaine de 400 toises séparait les ailes de l'armée ennemie ; la cavalerie y pénètre ; elle se porte avec la plus grande rapidité sur les derrières de la droite et de la gauche : l'une et l'autre se trouvent coupées de la second ligne. Les ennemis se jettent à l'eau pour tâcher de gagner les barques qui étaient à trois quarts de lieue en mer ; ils se noient tous, spectacle le plus horrible que j'aie vu. Nous attaquons alors la seconde ligne, qui occupait une position formidable, un village crénelé en avant, une redoute au centre et des retranchements qui la liaient à la mer ; plus de 30 chaloupes canonnières la flanquaient. Le général Murât force le village ; le général Lannes attaque la gauche en longeant la mer ; le général Fugière se porte, en colonnes serrés, sur la droite de l'ennemi. L'attaque et la défense deviennent vives. La cavalerie décide encore la victoire ; elle charge l'ennemi, se porte rapidement sur le derrière de la droite et en fait une horrible boucherie. Le chef de bataillon de la 69e, Bernard, et le citoyen Baille, capitaine des grenadiers de cette demi-brigade, se sont couverts de gloire. La redoute est prise, et, les hussards s'étant encore placés entre le fort d'Aboukir et cette seconde ligne, l'ennemi est obligé de se jeter à l'eau, poursuivi par notre cavalerie : tout se noya. Nous investissons alors le fort, où était la réserve renforcée par les fuyards les plus lestes ; ne voulant point perdre de monde, je fais placer six mortiers pour les bombarder. Le rivage, où les courants ont porté l'année dernière les cadavres anglais et français, est couvert de cadavres ennemis ; on en a déjà compté plus de 6,000 ; 3,000 ont été enterrés sur le champ de bataille. Ainsi, pas un seul homme de cette armée ne se sera échappé lorsque le fort se sera rendu, ce qui ne peut tarder. Deux cents drapeaux, les bagages, les tentes, quarante pièces de campagne, Hussein-Moustafa, pacha d'Anatolie, cousin germain de l'ambassadeur turc à Paris, commandant en chef l'expédition, prisonnier avec tous ses officiers: voilà les fruits de la victoire.

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XVI More Letters to Muslim Chiefs Bonaparte sends a peace proposal to the Sultan of Morocco, the King of Tripoli and the Grand Vezir. He addresses them in Muslim phraseology. Au Caire, 28 thermidor an VII ( 15 août 1799) Au Sultan du Maroc Il n'y a d'autre dieu que Dieu, et Mahomet est son prophète ! Au nom de Dieu clément et miséricordieux ! Au sultan du Maroc, serviteur de la sainte Kasbah, puissant parmi les rois, et fidèle observateur de la loi du vrai prophète. Nous profitons du retour des pèlerins du Maroc pour vous écrire cette lettre et vous faire connaître que nous leur avons donné toute l'assistance qui était en nous, parce que notre intention est de faire, dans toutes les occasions, ce qui peut vous convaincre de l'estime que nous avons pour vous. Nous vous recommandons, en échange, de bien traiter tous les Français qui sont dans vos états ou que le commerce pourrait y appeler. Au Caire, 28 thermidor an VII (15 août 1799) Au Bey de Tripoli Il n'y a d'autre dieu que Dieu, et Mahomet est son prophète ! Au nom de Dieu clément et miséricordieux ! Au bey de Tripoli, serviteur de la sainte Kasbah, le modèle des beys, fidèle observateur de la loi du vrai prophète. Nous profitons de l'occasion qui se présente pour vous recommander de bien traiter tous les Français qui sont dans vos états, parce que notre intention est de faire dans toutes les occasions tout ce qui pourra vous être agréable et de vivre en bonne intelligence avec vous.

Quartier général, au Caire, 30 thermidor an VII (17 août 1788) Au Grand Vizir Au grand Vizir, grand parmi les grands éclairés et sages, seul dépositaire de la confiance du plus grand des sultans. J'ai l'honneur d'écrire à Votre Excellence, par l'ejfendi qui a été fait prisonnier à Aboukir et que je lui renvoie, pour lui faire connaître la véritable situation de l'Egypte et entamer entre la Sublime Porte et la République française des négociations qui puissent mettre fin à la guerre qui se trouve exister pour le malheur de l'un et de l'autre

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Etat. Par quelle fatalité la Porte et la France, amies de tous les temps et dès lors par habitude, amies par Véloignement de leurs frontières, la France ennemie de la Russie et de l'Empereur, la Porte ennemie de la Russie et de l'Empereur, sont elles cependant en guerre ? Comment Votre Excellence ne sentirait-elle pas qu'il n'y a pas un Français de tué qui ne soit un appui de moins pour la Porte ? Comment Votre Excellence, si éclairée dans la connaissance de la politique et des intérêts des divers Etats, pourrait-elle ignorer que la Russie et l'empereur d'Allemagne se sont plusieurs fois entendus pour le partage [sic] citoyen Bauchamp, consul de la République, sur la caravelle. Pour toute réponse, on l'a emprisonné ; pour toute réponse, on a créé des armées, on les a réunies à Gaza et on leur a ordonné d'envahir l'Egypte. Je me suis trouvé alors obligé de passer le désert, préférant faire la guerre en Syrie à ce que l'on me la fit en Egypte. Mon armée est forte, parfaitement disciplinée et approvisionnée de tout ce qui peut la rendre victorieuse des armées, fussent-elles aussi nombreuses que les sables de la mer. Des citadelles et des places fortes hérissées de canons se sont élevées sur les côtes et sur les frontières du désert ; je ne crains donc rien, et je suis ici invincible ; mais je dois à l'humanité, à la vraie politique, au plus ancien comme au plus vrai des alliés, l'empereur Sélim, la démarche que je fais. Ce que la Sublime Porte n'atteindra jamais par la force des armes, elle peut l'obtenir par une négociation. Je battrai toutes les armées lorsqu'elles projetteront l'envahissement de l'Egypte, mais je répondrai d'une manière conciliante à toutes les ouvertures de négociations qui me seraient faites. La République française, dès l'instant que la Sublime Porte ne fera plus cause commune avec nos ennemis, la Russie et l'Empereur, fera tout ce qui sera en elle pour rétablir la bonne intelligence et lever tout ce qui pourrait être un sujet de désunion entre les deux Etats. Cessez donc des armements dispendieux et inutiles. Vos ennemis ne sont pas en Egypte ; ils sont sur le Bosphore, ils sont à Corfou, ils sont aujourd'hui, par votre extrême imprudence, au milieu de l'Archipel. Radoubez et réarmez vos vaisseaux ; reformez vos équipages d'artillerie ; tenez-vous prêts à déployer bientôt l'étendard du Prophète, non contre la France, mais contre les Russes et les Allemands, qui rient de la guerre insensée que nous nous faisons, et qui, lorsqu'ils vous auront affaiblis, lèveront la tête et déclareront bien haut les prétentions qu'ils ont déjà. Vous voulez l'Egypte, dit-on ; mais l'intention de la France n'a jamais été de vous l'ôter. Chargez votre ministre à Paris de vos pleins pouvoirs, ou envoyez quelqu'un chargé de vos intentions et de vos pleins pouvoirs en Egypte. On peut, en deux heures d'entretien, tout arranger. C'est le seul moyen de rasseoir l'empire musulman, en lui donnant la force contre ses véritables ennemis, et de déjouer leur projet perfide, qui, malheureusement, leur a déjà si fort réussi. Dites un mot, nous fermerons la mer Noire à la Russie et nous cesserons d'être le jouet de cette puissance ennemie, que nous avons tant de sujets de haïr, et je ferai tout ce qui pourra

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vous convenir. Ce n'est pas contre les musulmans que les armées françaises aimeraient à déployer et leur tactique et leur courage ; mais c'est, au contraire, réunies à des musulmans qu'elles doivent un jour, comme cela a été de tout temps, chasser leur ennemi commun. Je crois en avoir assez dit par cette lettre à Votre Excellence. Elle peut faire venir après d'elle le citoyen Beauchamp, que l'on m'assure être détenu dans la mer Noire. Elle peut prendre tout autre moyen pour me faire connaître ses intentions. Quant à moi, je tiendrai pour le plus beau jour de ma vie celui où je pourrai contribuer à faire terminer une guerre à la fois impolitique et sans objet. Je prie Votre Excellence de croire à l'estime et à la considération distinguée que j'ai pour elle.

XVII Departure from Egypt Having learned the news from France, Bonaparte décidés to leave Egypt. He writes to Kléber. Quartier général, Alexandrie, 5 fructidor an Vil (29 août 1799) Au général Kléber Vous trouverez ci-joint, Citoyen Général, un ordre pour prendre le commandement en chef de l'armée. La crainte que la croisière anglaise ne reparaisse d'un moment à l'autre me fait précipiter mon voyage de deux ou trois jours. Je mène avec moi les généraux Berthier, Lannes, Murât, Andréossy et Marmont, les citoyens Monge et Berthollet. Vous trouverez ci-joint les papiers anglais et de Francfort jusqu'au 10 juin ; vous y verrez que nous avons perdu l'Italie ; que Montone, Turin, et Tortone sont bloqués. J'ai lieu d'espérer que la première de ces places tiendra jusqu'à la fin de novembre. J'ai l'espérance, si la fortune me sourit, d'arriver en Europe avant le commencement d'octobre. Vous trouverez ci-joint un chiffre pour correspondre avec le Gouvernement et un autre pour correspondre avec moi. Je vous prie de faire partir, dans le courant d'octobre, Junot ainsi que les effets que j'ai laissés au Caire et mes domestiques. Cependant je ne trouverais pas mauvais que vous engageassiez à votre service ceux qui vous conviendraient. L'intention du Gouvernement est que le général Desaix parte pour l'Europe dans le courant de novembre, à moins d'événements majeurs. La commission des arts passera en France sur un parlementaire que vous demanderez à cet effet, conformément au cartel d'échange, dans le courant de novembre, immédiatement après qu'ils auront achevé leur mission. Ils sont, dans ce moment-ci, occupés à ce qui reste à faire, à visiter la haute Egypte. Cependant, ceux que vous jugeriez pouvoir vous être utiles, vous les mettriez en réquisition sans difficulté.

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L'effendifait prisonnier à Aboukir est parti pour se rendre à Damiette. Je vous ai écrit de l'envoyer en Chypre. Il est porteur, pour le grand vizir, de la lettre dont vous trouverez ci-joint la copie. L'arrivée de notre escadre de Berat à Toulon et de l'escadre espagnole à Carthagène ne laisse aucune espèce de doute sur la possibilité de faire passer en Egypte les fusils, les sabres, pistolets, fers coulés dont vous avez besoin et dont j'ai l'état le plus exact, avec une quantité de recrues suffisante pour réparer les pertes de deux campagnes. Le Gouvernement vous fera connaître alors, lui-même, ses intentions, et moimême, comme homme public et comme particulier, je prendrai des mesures pour vous faire avoir fréquemment des nouvelles. Si, par des événements incalculables, toutes les tentatives étaient infructueuses, et qu'au mois de mai vous n'ayez reçu aucun secours ni nouvelles de France, et si, cette année, malgré toutes les précautions, la peste était en Egypte et vous tuait plus de 1,500 hommes, perte considérable, puisqu'elle serait en sus de celle que les événements de la guerre vous occasionneraient journellement, je pense que, dans ce cas, vous ne devez point vous hasarder à soutenir la campagne prochaine, et que vous êtes autorisé à conclure la paix avec la Porte Ottomane, quand bien même l'évacuation de l'Egypte devrait en être la condition principale. Il faudrait simplement éloigner l'exécution de cette condition, si cela était possible, jusqu'à la paix générale. Vous savez apprécier aussi bien que personne, Citoyen Général, combien la possession de l'Egypte est importante à la France. Cet empire turc, qui menace ruine de tous côtés, s'écroule aujourd'hui, et l'évacuation de l'Egypte par la France serait un malheur d'autant plus grand que nous verrions, de nos jours, cette belle province en d'autres mains européennes. Les nouvelles des succès ou des revers qu'aurait la République en Europe doivent aussi entrer puissamment dans vos calculs. Si la Porte répondait aux ouvertures de paix que je lui ai faites, avant que vous n'eussiez reçu de mes nouvelles de France, vous devez déclarer que vous avez tous les pouvoirs que j'avais, entamer la négociation, persister toujours dans l'assertion que j'ai avancée que l'intention de la France n'a jamais été d'enlever l'Egypte à la Porte, demander que la Porte sorte de la coalition et nous accorde le commerce de la mer Noire, et enfin six mois de suspension d'hostilités, afin que, pendant ce temps-là, l'échange des ratifications puisse avoir lieu. Supposant que les circonstances soient telles que vous croyiez conclure ce traité avec la Porte, vous ferez sentir que vous ne pouvez pas le mettra à exécution qu'il ne soit ratifié ; et, selon l'usage de toutes les nations, l'intervalle entre la signature d'un traité et sa ratification doit toujours être une suspension d'hostilités. Vous connaissez, Citoyen Général, quelle est ma manière de voir sur la politique intérieure de l'Egypte ; quelque chose que vous fassiez, les chrétiens seront toujours nos amis. Il faut les empêcher d'être trop insolents, afin que les Turcs n'aient pas contre nous le même fanatisme que contre les chrétiens, ce qui nous les rendrait irréconciliables. Il faut endormir le

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fanatisme en attendant qu'on puisse le déraciner. En captivant l'opinion des grands cheiks du Caire, on a l'opinion de toute l'Egypte et de tous les chefs que ce people peut avoir. Il n'y en a aucun moins dangereux pour nous que des cheiks qui sont peureux, ne savent pas se battre, et qui, comme tous les prêtres, inspirent le fanatisme sans être fanatiques. Quant aux fortifications, Alexandrie et El-A'rych, voilà les deux clefs de l'Egypte. J'avais le projet de faire établir, cet hiver, des redoutes de palmiers : deux depuis Sâlheyeh à Qatyeh, deux de Qatyeh à El-A'rych ; une de ces dernières se serait trouvée à l'endroit où le général Menou a trouvé de l'eau potable. Le général de brigade Sanson, commandant le génie, et le général de brigade Songis, commandant l'artillerie de l'armée, vous mettront au fait chacun de ce qui regarde son arme. Le citoyen Poussielgue a été exclusivement chargé des finances ; je l'ai reconnu travailleur et homme de mérite. Il commence à avoir quelques renseignements sur le chaos de l'administration de ce pays. J'avais le projet, si aucun événement ne survenait, de tâcher d'établir, cet hiver, un nouveau système d'impositions, ce qui aurait permis de se passer, à peu près, des Coptes. Cependant, avant de l'entreprendre, je vous conseille d'y réfléchir longtemps ; il vaut mieux entreprendre cette opération un peu trop tard qu'un peu trop tôt. Des vaisseaux de guerre français paraîtront indubitablement cet hiver à Alexandrie ou à Bourles ou à Damiette. Faites construire une batterie ou une tour à Bourlos. Tâchez de réunir 5 ou 600 Mameloucks que, lorsque les vaisseaux français seront arrivés, vous ferez arrêter dans un jour au Caire ou dans les autres provinces et embarquer pour la France. Au défaut des Mameluks, des otages d'Arabes, des cheiks-el-beled qui, par une raison quelconque, se trouveraient arrêtés, pourraient y suppléer. Ces individus, arrivés en France, y seraient retenus un ou deux ans, verraient la grandeur de la nation, prendraient de nos mœurs et de notre langue, et, de retour en Egypte, nous formeraient autant de partisans. J'avais déjà demandé à plusieurs fois une troupe de comédiens ; je prendrai un soin particulier de vous en envoyer. Cet article est très-important pour l'armée et pour commencer à changer les mœurs du pays. La place importante que vous allez occuper en chef va vous mettre à même de déployer les talents que la nature vous a donnés ; l'intérêt de ce qui se passe ici est vif, et les résultats en seront immenses sur le commerce et la civilisation : ce sera l'époque d'où dateront de grandes révolutions. Accoutumé à voir la récompense des peines et des travaux de la vie dans l'opinion de la postérité, j'abandonne l'Egypte avec le plus grand regret. L'intérêt de la patrie, sa gloire, l'obéissance les événements extraordinaires qui viennent de s'y passer, me décident seuls à passer au milieu des escadres ennemies pour me rendre en Europe. Je serai d'esprit et de cœur avec vous ; vos succès me seront aussi chers que ceux où je me trouverais moi-même, et je regarderai comme mal employés tous les jours de ma vie où je ne ferai pas quelque chose pour l'armée dont je vous laisse le

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commandement, et pour consolider le magnifique établissement dont les fondements viennent d'être jetés. L'armée que je vous confie est toute composée de mes enfants ; j'ai eu, dans tous les temps, même au milieu de leurs plus grandes peines, des marques de leur attachement ; entretenez-les dans ces sentiments ; vous le devez par l'estime et l'amitié toute particulière que j'ai pour vous, et pour l'attachement vrai que je leur porte.

EGYPTIAN PERCEPTIONS OF BONAPARTE'S EXPEDITION: THE BICENTENNIAL DEBATE Shimon SHAMIR

The controversy over the historical significance of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt is not a new phenomenon in Egyptian intellectual life. Generations of Egyptians have examined this issue from a variety of viewpoints. Even the writings of the first Egyptian historian of the French occupation, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, who composed his earliest works on the subject while Egypt was still under French occupation, included contradictory impressions and evaluations. Yet, never has this controversy reached such high intensity as in recent years, following the agreement between the Egyptian and French ministers of culture to celebrate the bicentennial of the expedition by a full roster of cultural events. Many Egyptians were appalled by the notion that the anniversary of so traumatic an experience as occupation by an alien power could be regarded as an occasion for celebration, and accused their minister of lacking proper national and historical sensitivity. The minister hastened to explain that the intention was not to celebrate the occupation but to pay tribute to two centuries of fruitful relations between Egypt and France and to their "joint horizons," but to no avail. The cat was out of the bag and a storm of heated debates broke out. It was not a limited, self-contained discussion, but, rather, reflected broader cleavages in the Egyptian belief system and spilled over into many related issues. The subject was discussed at length in radio and television programs, and positions were expressed in numerous articles carried by newspapers and periodicals and even in several popular books that were published specifically on the issue. 1 This article deals with the evaluation of Bonaparte's expedition as a controversial issue in the Egyptian public debate carried on during the bicentennial year in the media. For this reason it does not include the views of Egyptian historians expressed in their academic works It also excludes views expressed by Egyptians in European languages and published in the foreign media. For such views, see Egypte/Monde arabe No. 1: L'expédition de Bonaparte vue d'Egypte, September 1999. Of particular interest in this issue is a survey by two researchers from 'Ayn Shams University of the positions on the French expedition taken by 28 Egyptian "historiens professionnels:" Ramadan al-Khuli et 'Isa 'Abd al-Raziq, "Un bilan controversé • Le point de vue des historiens égyptiens," ibid., pp. 25-45. Khuli and 'Isa note that the historians were conspicuously absent from the public debate, some of them sharply criticizing its politicized and polarized character. Note : For an expanded Hebrew version of this article see Alpayim, No. 20.

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The participants in the debate articulated a great diversity of opinions, which may be arranged, somewhat schematically, in two groups: those who regarded the French expedition as a totally negative event and therefore vehemently rejected the idea of celebrations, and those who saw positive elements at least in the consequences of the expedition, and, accordingly, were not opposed to commemorating it. The proponents of the negative position can be characterized as holding a conflictual conception of history. Whether they regard their community as essentially Egyptian, or stress its Islamic and Arab identity, their collective self-image is that of an entity involved in a bitter struggle against a fierce enemy. The fateful confrontation with this foe is perceived by them as the pivot on which the region's history turns. It constitutes the criterion that determines which historical records are to be stored in the reservoirs of the collective memory and which must be driven to the shadowy realm of forgetfulness. For both radical nationalists and Islamists, Western imperialism is the historic enemy. It is the greatest threat that emerged in modern times to Egypt, to Arabism and to Islam. Through its military and economic power imperialism sought to dominate these entities politically, exploit their resources, and obliterate their culture. The essential importance of the French expedition is defined by its being an imperialistic act. The invasion is not regarded as merely a short-lived episode, but as one of the most aggressive and ambitious Western assaults on the region. It is interpreted as a stage in a grand imperialist design, extending as far as India, and as part of an elaborate scheme to turn Egypt into a French colony. Compared to earlier writers on the subject, the proponents of the negative view in the present-day debate tend to base their argumentation more extensively on French sources, both primary and secondary. A great many articles and books, published mostly in 1998, ground their propositions on the rationale that self-incrimination is the ultimate proof. Thus for example, a book entitled "Two Hundred Years since the Invasion of the French Hypocrites," written by Zaynab 'Abd al-'Aziz, a professor of cultural studies, derives evidence from Napoleon's reminiscences in St. Helena for the argument that his hidden purpose had been to colonize Egypt, pure and simple. Other writers scrutinize the numerous memoirs left by veterans of the expedition to prove their point about its far-reaching scope.

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Writers in this vein totally reject the notion that the expedition was inspired by any kind of idealism, or even that some idealistic motives existed alongside the invaders' imperialistic ambitions. They stress the point that the lofty statements made by Bonaparte in the printed proclamations he distributed in Egypt and in his conversations with the Cairene ulema were nothing but a smoke screen. His promises to liberate Egypt from the Mamluk yoke, to implement liberty, equality and fraternity, to give power to the representatives of local society, to appoint and promote officials purely by merit, and to advance the country through science and knowledge were not only incomprehensible to the Egyptians but amounted to no more than what 'Abd al-'Aziz termed "a cheap deception." In her book she asks rhetorically: Does it stand to reason that any government in the world would undertake an adventure of dispatching tens of thousands of its troops merely for the purpose of liberating a distant and alien people? Or just for bringing to it enlightenment and modernity?" 1 The negative significance of Bonaparte's invasion is highlighted by positioning it in a long historical course of imperialist designs on Egypt, thus relating it to both preceding and subsequent developments. In the latter context, Bonaparte's invasion is viewed as the opening shot in the imperialistic scramble for Egypt. The evacuation of the French forces threw the country into a turmoil of power struggles in which British, Ottoman and other forces competed to fill the "power vacuum" that the French had left behind. In subsequent decades, Egypt became the object of what the Egyptian historian Shafik Ghorbal called "the Egyptian Question," namely the race to achieve indirect or direct control of the country. This was an extension of the broader "Eastern Question" that related to all the territories of the shrinking Ottoman Empire. The winners in this race were, of course, the British, who eventually occupied Egypt and controlled it for seventy years. French imperialism was repelled in Egypt, but France did not remain empty handed, for it "compensated" itself in the course of the 19th century by colonizing North Africa. Nor did it withdraw completely from involvement in Egypt. According to this interpretation, de Lesseps' Suez Canal enterprise was nothing but an attempt to return to Egypt through the back door. This scheme, notes Dr. Mustafa ' A b d al-Ghani ironically, was perhaps less ambitious than that of Napoleon — "for the latter wanted to colonize the whole of Egypt; while the former intended to turn only the region of the canal into a colony." 2 An idea that came up in the context of the bicentennial to restore the statue of de Lesseps, which had been demolished by Nasser, was

'zaynab 'Abd al-'Aziz, Mi'ata 'am 'ala hamlat al-munafiqin 13. 2 Al-Ahram, 30 March 1998.

al~faransis (Cairo, 1998), pp. 11-

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passionately rejected by Ni'mat Ahmad Fu'ad, a highly respected Egyptian intellectual. Instead of memorializing this dubious adventurer, she maintains, it would be better to memorialize the tens of thousands of Egyptian labourers who perished in constructing the canal. 1 Accordingly, argue the exponents of this school of thought, the two centuries marked by the bicentennial milestone constitute the era of the disastrous imperialist onslaught in Egyptian history. Egyptians should not be lenient with regard to the aggressors, for their threat is still impending. Today, it is the United States that leads the attack, employing a variety of sophisticated means to impose its hegemony over Egypt. The struggle is still going on, they warn, and the debate over the Napoleonic bicentennial is actually one of its fronts. The fact that the French expedition was the starting point of the imperialist era in Egypt, in this view, does not mean that it did not have roots in earlier history. In fact, the expedition was the culmination of preceding developments. Thus, a professor of French culture at Cairo University, Dr. Layla 'Anan, in her book "The French Expedition: Enlightenment or Falsification?" studiously surveys sources in order to detect the roots of imperialist orientations, and particularly those which targeted Egypt, in French political thought. Louis XIV and Talleyrand are the two protagonists in this narrative. The emergence of the French self-view as the "Rome" of the modern age, it is pointed out, turned attention toward Egypt. The loss of the French colonies in America also nourished a growing interest in the Orient. On the conceptual level, maintains 'Anan, once the idea of "civilization" struck roots in the intellectual life of France, only a short step was needed to provide the concept of mission civilisatrice as a legitimization of imperialist ventures. 2 When it comes to those exponents of this school who incline toward Islamism, the tendency is to trace the roots of the Napoleonic invasion back to the period of the Crusades. The most common association is with the Crusade of Louis IX, who five and a half centuries earlier had landed in the delta and penetrated it all the way to Mansura. Bonaparte's secularism and his professed reverence for Islam are not seen as contradictory to the presentation of his expedition as an integral part of the thousand-year Christian Crusade against Islam. 'Abd al-'Aziz, for example, refers to the expedition as "the sanguinary crusader-imperialist onslaught." 3 Similar expressions are common in the writings of intellectuals who are of the same mind.

l Al-Ahram, 11 February 1998. ^Layla 'Anan, Al-hamla al-faransiya, Part 1 - Tanwir am tazwir (Cairo, 1998). 3

'Abd al-'Aziz, p. 22.

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But what of the benefits brought to Egypt by Bonaparte's expedition — the printing press, the Institut d'Egypte, the Commission of the savants and all their scientific projects? Idle talk, respond the critics. The cultural and industrial supremacy of imperialism, writes the editor of the monthly Ádab wa-Naqd (citing Noam Chomski), "does not bestow legitimacy on its attacks." More telling is Hazem Shahata, who expresses the same idea by a series of sarcastic questions: Did all those who fell in battle, in the two mutinies of Cairo, go wrong because they "stupidly" failed to grasp that behind the [French] canon stood the printing press? ... Would all the architects of the bicentennial celebrations, and their supporters, regard an invasion by a foreign power and a bombardment by their artillery taking place today as acceptable only because when this power departs it might leave us a computer which is unknown to us? 1 Even the most impressive project of the Commission, the Description de VEgypte, is seen as part of the onslaught on Egypt. The conceptual framework for this view is provided by Edward Said's Orientalism, which maintains that by studying the Orient the Europeans turn it into an object, define and possess it, convert it into a text. The Description was therefore an expression of a power relationship, "a 'textural' attack on an alien culture... a sophisticated battle plan against Islam." 2 Ghada Nabil adopts this view with the blunt statement: "Napoleon is dead but Edward Said is alive." 3 The Description is thus depicted as an attempt to uproot Egyptian-Oriental history, with its particular cohesiveness and identity, and assimilate it into "world history" — namely the history of the Europeans. This interpretation of the work of the Commission expands the meaning of the French expedition to purport not merely military aggression but also a "cultural attack" (ghazw thaqafi) seeking to obliterate the Egyptian identity and personality. Nothing good can come out of foreign occupation, claims the renowned literary critic Raja' al-Naqqash. In an open response to a historian from alAzhar University, who had written him a letter lauding the positive consequences of the French expedition, Naqqash said: "The imperialists, whatever presentations of progress and culture they may bring with them, have no aim but to substantiate from A to Z their own interests, whereas the people subjugated to them... will always end up as the losers." Unfortunately, the proponents of this view complain, the acknowledgement of the so-called beneficial results of the expedition has taken root among Egyptians as an idée fixe, while in fact the existence of such benefits is a highly doubtful 1

Adab wa-Naqd, June 1998, p. 7; Hazem Shahata, Al-Ahali, 14 January 1998. See James Steele, An Architecture for People (London, 1997), pp. 181-82. 3 Adab wa-Naqd, pp. 18-21.

2

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proposition. The work of the Scientific Commission, as they show in the context of the orders issued by Bonaparte, was channelled to serve the needs of the occupation and colonization of Egypt, just as the printing press was used mostly for French propaganda (and eventually was even withdrawn f r o m Egypt). 1 The deep resentment the exponents of this view feel toward any readiness to see positive sides to the expedition is nurtured by the abundant historical records attesting to the brutality of French rule. Indeed, there is no scarcity of evidence to show that, in contrast to the enlightened intentions expressed in Bonaparte's instructions to his troops and his proclamations to the Egyptian people, the actual conduct of the occupiers was increasingly harsh (perhaps even in comparison with other European occupations in the region). Writers in this vein detail the oppressive measures applied by the French troops, citing not only Jabarti's chronicles but also the testimonies of the French themselves, who often recorded brutalities that surpassed anything found in Jabarti. Extensive use is made of such writers as Vivant Denon, who nonchalantly depicted cases of killings and destruction in Upper Egypt and other regions (not to mention the carnage in Jaffa). 2 The vivid descriptions of French atrocities lend powerful emotional reinforcement to these writers' arguments. Readers are reminded of the slaughter committed by the French in the wake of each Cairo revolt, the execution of many notables as acts of deterrence or revenge, the pillaging and burning down of villages and the massacre of their inhabitants. In spite of attempts made by French officers to prevent abuses of the population, the writers point out, there were many cases of pillage, rape and harassment. Holy places, notably the mosque and madrasa of al-Azhar, were desecrated. Because of these deeds, notes Layla 'Anan, even some European intellectuals feel that the Egyptian expedition "was the black page in the entire history of Napoleon." 3 Against this background, the supporters of the bicentennial celebrations are d e n o u n c e d as actual traitors. "Indeed," writes ' A b d a l - ' A z i z , "commemorating the French expedition amounts, by any yardstick, to betrayal; it is not, as some people try to put it, just a matter of disgrace." In her opinion, it is a triple treason: against the homeland, which was plundered and devastated; against the people, who were butchered and ravished; and against history, whose pages are soaked with the blood of Egyptians. Those 'Raja' al-Naqqash, Al-Ahram, 30 March 1998; Mustafa 'Abd al-Ghani, ibid. See also Hilmi alNamnam, Al-misriyun wa-hamlat bunabart (Cairo, 1998), pp. 16-18. ^Vivant Denon, Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Egypte (Paris, 1802). 3 LayIa 'Anan, Al-hamla, Part 2 - Fi mahkamat al-ta'rikh (Cairo, 1998), p. 25. See also her Alhamla al-faransiya: Bayna al-ustura w'al-haqiqa (Cairo, 1992).

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who, in spite of all this, support the celebrations are weak-minded, subservient and self-effacing. They are ignorant of the history of their country, lack a sense of dignity, harbour hidden intents, and suffer from a victim complex. 1 What, therefore, should be done instead of celebrating the bicentennial? Here is a compilation of some of the propositions. Instead of commemorating Bonaparte's landing in Egypt, its date should be declared a day of mourning, a day for soul searching and reckoning, a day for reviving national consciousness. Historians should be mobilized to conduct a comprehensive survey of the sufferings of the Egyptian people under the French occupation and their acts of heroism in resistance to it. The French, too, should undertake certain assignments: they should study the true facts of the damage they inflicted on Egypt, and rectify the idealized image of Napoleon which is still prevalent among them. They should pay compensation for all the properties they plundered and the resources they exploited. First and foremost, they should restore to the proper owners the antiquities, artefacts and manuscripts they had carried away. Those who were responsible for the atrocities should symbolically be tried as war criminals. The president of France should apologize, in the name of all his people, just as the British apologized in India and the Japanese in Korea, for "this is the norm today: the aggressors apologize to their victims." 2 *

* Hi

In the face of these strongly worded accusations, how do the adherents of the other school of thought defend their position? Naturally, they do not try to justify the French invasion per se, nor do they view the occupation itself as worthy of commemoration. In fact, they hardly dispute their opponents' version of French misdeeds. Where they do differ is in the hierarchy of importance ascribed to various aspects of this chapter in the history of Egypt. They acknowledge that the conquest of Egypt was bad but, as the liberal thinker Muhammad 'Awda says in an interview, this dossier has long been closed. Post-expedition France has been a very different entity. More significant than the brief occupation is the fact that in most of the subsequent two centuries, France was a friend of Egypt. It supported the projects undertaken by Muhammad 'Ali and his successors, refrained from taking part in the 1882 occupation of the country, its intellectuals encouraged the nascent Egyptian nationalist movement, and its institutions supported the development of Egypt in such important areas as education, law, finance and trade. In today's generation especially, says 'Awda, the existence of a "different ^Abd al-Aziz, p. 11. See also Hilmi Salem, Adab wa-Naqd, p. 10 and Salah, 'Inani in Akhbar alAdab, No. 146, cited in Khuli and 'Abd al-Raziq, p. 38. 2 Ahmad 'Abd al-Mu'ti Hijazi, Al-Ahram, 29 April 1998; Shahata, ibid; Ghada Nabil, Adab waNaqd, p. 24; 'Abd al-'Aziz, pp. 15, 22-23, 168-70.

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France," which maintains favourable attitudes and policies toward Egypt and the Arabs, is evident. He draws attention to the fact that in France the bicentennial of the expedition was proclaimed as the "Year of Egypt" and not as the "Year of Napoleon." In parallel, he suggests, Egypt should celebrate the bicentennial by "paying tribute to our national history and not to the fact that we were invaded and occupied". 1 Another writer, Hilmi Salem, lauds those who see no fault in the commemoration of the expedition in these terms: "They belong to a trend that believes that the world has undergone a transformation, that international relations have changed, and that the excessive talk about 'imperialism, occupation and resistance, 1 has become obsolete." 2 Their opponents, they claim, are immersed in the quagmire of an immutable conceptual world — an outdated world that revolves solely around the image of a battle of destinies conducted against a historic enemy which, as time passes, increasingly turns out to be more mythological than historical. Their fixation with this idea has developed into a formidable obstacle to gaining entry into the modern age. The focal point in the position held by the bicentennial supporters is the argument that the expedition was the step toward the introduction of the ideas of the Enlightenment (tanwir) into Egypt. The losses incurred under the French occupation, they say, are a matter of the past, but the ensuing gains endure to this day. On this matter they derive support from the writings of a number of Egyptian intellectual historians, most notably the liberal writer Louis ' A w a d . His magnum opus, "The History of Modern Egyptian Thought," opens with this unequivocal statement: "There is no escape from considering Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition of 1798, and the continuing links with Europe that developed in its wake, as the decisive factor which molded political and social ideas in their modern sense in Egypt." Acknowledging that important changes had taken place in Egypt during the century preceding the appearance of Bonaparte, 'Awad reiterates his basic position, namely that the French expedition was "the watershed separating two different worlds": the old Turkish-Mamluk world, and the modern world, "in which every significant step was necessarily accompanied by a system of political, social and cultural ideas." 3 Hence, the exponents of this view maintain, the expedition deserves to be commemorated, above all because it signified change. True, the ideals of the French Revolution were not immediately absorbed, but their very appearance in Egypt had great historical importance. Figuratively speaking, ' Al-Ahali, 11 March 1998. SaIem, pp. 9-10. ^Luyis 'Awad, Ta'rikh al-flkr al-misri al-hadith (Cairo, 1969), Ch. 1. 2

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the "printing press" did stand behind the "cannon." The body of knowledge accumulated by Bonaparte's scholars, notes the leftist writer Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah, is a precious cultural asset which remains at the disposal of the Egyptians to this day (including the Institut d'Egypte, which still exists in Egypt). 1 Continuity is perceived as the key factor here. Shortly after the French withdrawal, a variety of modernization projects were initiated, implemented mostly with the skills of French experts (including renegades from Napoleon's army). In subsequent decades, and during the entire course of the 19th century, important developments took place in the cultural area that expanded this link to France. A Translation Institute was established, which rendered into Arabic works of such authors as Montesquieu; delegations of students were sent to study in Paris, while French teachers (including, at one point, SaintSimonists) came to Egypt; Egyptian intellectuals internalized and disseminated such concepts as constitutionalism and civil rights based on the French model; and the Egyptian civil code was patterned on the Code Napoléon. These developments culminated, in the first half of the 20th century, in an upsurge of cultural creativity and political innovation designated by some historians as the "period of liberal experimentation." The intellectual and political elites who guided this process were inspired mostly by France and many had actually been educated there. Significantly, Taha Husayn, the greatest Egyptian writer of the time, proposed celebrating the 150th anniversary of the expedition. Exponents of the bicentennial commemoration point to the irony that even the nationalist ideology which their opponents uphold so ardently was influenced by ideas drawn from the French conceptual world. Moreover, the expedition itself was an important factor dialectically in the emergence of Egyptian patriotism. The entire argumentation in favour of the bicentennial commemoration is based, therefore, on the distinction between the objectives of the French invasion, which are admittedly negative, and its actual results, which are regarded as overwhelmingly beneficial. "Whereas the expedition was imperialistic by its motives," writes Hazem Saghiya, "it does not follow that it was imperialistic in its consequences." 2 This dialectic approach prompts certain philosophical associations, mostly with Hegel's conception of history. Hegel's outlook, reverberating the shock waves of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, depicted history as a "slaughterhouse" in which powerful irrational forces run wild and yet, out of this turmoil, reason and progress materialize. Rationality is ^•Al-Ahali, 4 March 1998. Al-Hayat, 4 March 1998.

2

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history's actuating power and its ultimate objective at the same time. It uses the destructive craving for power of leaders like Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon to realize itself and establish the consciousness of freedom. Hegel defined this as the "cunning of reason" in the historical process. Significantly, of all the participants in the contemporary Egyptian public debate, it is the professor of Western philosophy, Fu'ad Zakariya, who uses Hegel as a reference. The entire controversy, he writes in one of his articles, "can be settled with some philosophical insight." On the face of it, he says, the expedition was an imperialistic act in the context of inter-power rivalry and the Egyptians had to pay the price for it, but at the same time it manifested the Hegelian "cunning of history," for behind the harsh face of occupation stood the inner logic of history which led to the revival of the discourse of a dormant civilization. 1 Zakariya's article provoked a wave of furious reactions not because of its philosophical argumentation but due to a daring analogy that was contained in it: the comparison of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt to that of Nasser's forces to Yemen in the early 1960s. Zakariya relates in that article that while on a visit to Yemen he found that the Yemenites had erected a magnificent monument to Nasser's expedition. In answer to his question, the hosts explained that although that war had exacted a high price in human and material losses from the Yemenites, it nevertheless activated the process of modernization. Indeed, remarked Zakariya, just as Bonaparte's army was accompanied by a contingent of scientists, so did the Nasserite expeditionary forces bring with them numerous professional experts — teachers, physicians and engineers. This was yet another manifestation of the "cunning of history," he concluded. 2 The angry voices raised against the audacity of this very comparison by many intellectuals (among them the prominent poet, 'Abd al-Mu'ti Hijazi) illuminated the wide gap between two opposing mind-sets: the readiness to reexamine the complexities of even the most sensitive national issues with an open mind, as against a reluctance to reconsider any of the conventional constructs of the collective images of self and other whose revision might be too painful. *

*

*

The debate over Bonaparte's expedition would not have become so animated had it not been linked inherently to some of the most basic issues of Egyptian historiography. One such issue is the problem of periodization. At l

Al-Ahram, 30 January 1998. Ibid.

2

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which point in time should the beginning of the modern era in Egypt be set? Or, in the Arabic terminology, when did the nahda (revival) begin ? Can it be pinpointed to Bonaparte's arrival in Egypt, as conventional histories hold, on the assumption that he "opened" Egypt to the West? Or should the internal developments in Egypt in the second half of the 18th century be considered the origins of modernity, as both Egyptian and Western historians have recently suggested (some of them drawing on the theory of dependenzia, which links these developments to the Industrial Revolution)? Alternatively, ought this beginning be deferred to Muhammad 'Ali's period, when the process of modernization was actually initiated? The two latter versions, of course, downgrade the historical significance of the French expedition to marginal importance. "It did not make any substantial impression on the Egyptians," 'Anan concludes. 1 Another such issue relates to the question of identity. W h o is a "foreigner" in the history of Egypt which is so rich in invasions f r o m the outside? Where exactly should the line be drawn between Alexander, who Hellenized Egypt; the Fatimids, who imposed a Shi'a culture on it; and the French, who turned Egypt into a Francophone country? 2 Why should the image of one conquest in the collective memory be positive while that of another so repugnant? And, if the French are considered imperialists, should not the Ottomans be similarly regarded, in spite of the fact that they were Muslims? As these dilemmas are pondered in the public debate, it becomes increasingly evident that what gives them weight is their direct bearing on the crucial question of the identity of the Egyptians themselves. 3 A particularly intense argument revolves around the issue of historical objectivity. Each school of thought blames the other for confusing myth with reality. While the supporters of the bicentennial are accused of pro-Western bias, they on their part, accuse their opponents of imposing present-day ideologies on the historical narrative. A particularly outspoken protagonist, 'Izzat al-Khamisi, criticizes her opponents for mixing politics with history, presenting history in black and white terms, claiming a monopoly on absolute truth, employing emotional rhetoric, and using history to evade uneasy realities and bolster an inflated self-view. Their version of the expedition, says Khamisi, is the product of this failure to seek objectivity, however the concept may be defined. 4

I'Anan, Part 2, p. 177.,This is also the view of a number of leading European historians. See, e.g., André Raymond, Egyptiens et Français au Caire, 1798-1801 (Cairo, 1998), published with the bicentennial in mind. 2 S e e Hijazi, Al-Ahram, 22, 29 April 1998. -*See Shimon Shamir, "Self-View in Modern Egyptian Historiography," Shimon Shamir (ed.), Self-Views in Historical Perspective in Egypt and Israel (Tel Aviv, 1981), pp. 37-58. 4 Al-Hayat, 7 May 1998.

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This discussion is linked also to the issue of revising the history books used in Egyptian schools. A study conducted by an Egyptian scholar on the image of the French expedition in Egyptian textbooks found that the version formulated in 1909, which underscored its positive consequences (evidently under French influence, which was quite strong at that time), while also mentioning some negative sides, remained essentially unchanged throughout the century. 1 The call for revision thus comes f r o m both camps. "It is necessary," writes Majed Yusuf, in summing up the subject, "to reread our entire history in a courageous, fresh and free fashion." 2 Textbooks are not the only works that come under scrutiny. The debate on the proper presentation of the expedition extends to literature and other genres. Particularly revealing is the controversy over Yusuf Shahin's film, Adieu Bonaparte'. Can the friendship between General Caffarelli and the Egyptian youth depicted in the film be regarded as a passionate call for EastWest dialogue, as some observers feel, or is it simply a devious embellishment of the zero-sum conflict between the East and West, as perceived by others? 3 A formidable barrier seems to separate these two perspectives. The East-West relationship is indeed the broad issue with which the bicentennial dispute is associated. How to face the challenge of the West has been the central question in the lives of the Egyptians for two whole centuries. As in many other societies living under the impact of the West, this issue casts its long shadow over all spheres of life. It splits the Egyptians into two camps: those who reject the West and cherish authenticity (asala), and those who seek a synthesis with Western culture in the spirit of modernity (mu 'asara). The gap between the two camps is wide: they employ different paradigms to interpret reality, hold different perceptions of the world, are committed to different hierarchies of priorities, and — inevitably — have different historical narratives.

^Reported, by 'Abd al-Ghani, At-Ahram, 30 March 1998. t-Adab wa-Naqd, pp. 45-56,154. 3 Ahmad 'Abd al-'Al, Adab wa-Naqd, pp. 34-36.

ON THE EMERGENCE OF THE EASTERN QUESTION: DID NAPOLEON'S CONQUEST OF EGYPT BEGET THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST? Aryeh SHMUELEVITZ

Introduction It is generally accepted that the Eastern Question — that is, the struggle among the European powers for hegemony in the Middle East and their involvement in the region's internal affairs — arose as a by-product of Napoleon's conquest of Egypt at the end of the eighteenth century. According to this view, the conquest turned the Ottoman Empire into a key factor in relations among the European powers, and the arena in which they tried to solve their conflicts. Another school dates the emergence of the Eastern Question as far back as the fourteenth century. Adherents of this school argue that the Ottomans began to play an important role in European politics upon establishing their rule in the Balkans. They became involved in internal European wars and, in particular, fostered friendly relations with the western and northern European states of France, Britain, Holland and, later, Sweden. Organized European expeditions tried and failed to halt the Ottoman advance into central Europe; in the sixteenth century, the Ottomans campaigned as far as the gates of Vienna. By that time, the Ottoman Empire was already deeply involved in European politics. This involvement took the form of signed treaties, known as the Capitulations, between the Ottoman Empire and France and Britain. However, during the seventeenth century, the balance of power gradually shifted. The European powers became the dominant factor and began to establish themselves in the Ottoman Empire, especially in the field of trade. Napoleon's conquest of Egypt and parts of the Holy Land undeniably added new dimensions to the struggle among the European powers over the establishment of strongholds in the Middle East. Furthermore, it accelerated reform in the Ottoman Empire, starting in Egypt. However, an examination of developments in the Empire during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries confirms that both the struggle and the reforms actually began in the early eighteenth century following the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699).

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Europe1s Involvement in Ottoman Internal and Foreign Affairs since the Eighteenth Century At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Russians launched the conquest of Ottoman territories along the northern shores of the Black Sea. Their penetration of the northern parts of the Balkans soon led to the involvement of the European powers in the Ottoman Empire's internal and foreign affairs. Tsar Peter the Great carried out military expeditions until the Ottomans defeated him in 1711; further Russian advances had to wait until after his death. Sweden was also involved in this war; its King Carl XII was at the time in Ottoman territory, trying to arrange collaboration between his country and the Ottomans against their common enemy, the Russian Empire. It was not yet a full-blown struggle among the European powers; Ottomans were still to a certain extent successful in their wars against Russians and the Austrians. Furthermore, Swedish efforts, supported by Crimean Tatars, to persuade the Ottomans to continue warring against Russians, in order to relieve them of Russian pressure, were to no avail.

the the the the

However, in the 1730s, after the demise of Peter the Great, Russia and Austria resumed the wars against the Ottoman Empire. Two important factors in relations among the powers originated in this conflict. The first followed on Russia's encroachment on the Balkans, which lead to new areas of contention between it and Austria, such as control over the mouth of the Danube. The second factor was the interference of other European powers in the wars as mediators, with the aim of ending hostilities and starting peace negotiations under their auspices. This interference led to tension in Europe. France, a veteran ally of the Ottomans with vested interests in the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Empire, was among the mediating Powers, in the peace negotiations between the Ottomans and the Russians, which concluded in the Peace Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. France's arbitration brought it the dividend of a new agreement with the Ottomans, known generally as the New Capitulation Agreement of 1740. It provided the French with more privileges in the field of trade, and with the protection of Catholic communities all over the Empire, especially in the Holy Land and the Levant (Syria and Lebanon). According to the agreement, French pilgrims to the Holy Land and Catholic monasteries in Palestine and the Levant enjoyed special privileges and security. The French tried to involve the Ottomans in Europe's internal problems, such as the partition of Poland. The Ottomans on the other hand, caught between the French and the Russians and Austrians, sought another ally in Europe vis-à-vis the latter two. Through British mediation, they tried to forge an alliance with the Prussians, who, while preferring to remain neutral, nonetheless took it upon themselves to mediate from time to time between the Ottoman Empire and Austria.

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Hostilities between Russia and the Ottoman Empire resumed in the years 1767-1774 and ended in a new treaty, again with the mediation of European powers. The Treaty of Kugiik Kaynarca, as it is called, provided Russia with freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Danube, permission to pass the Straits, establishing of a permanent legation in Istanbul and consulates in various parts of the Empire, protection of the Greek Orthodox community in the Empire, and special privileges for Russian citizens staying in the Empire, better known as Capitulations. Consequently, Russian involvement in Ottoman internal and foreign affairs increased. The Russian and Ottoman Empires continued to wage wars in the 1780s and 1790s and again the later co-operated with the Swedes, forcing the Russians to keep at least part of their army in the north along the Swedish border. This time the British became more involved in efforts to stop the Russian advance into Ottoman territory. They began in 1791-92 by joining the Prussians and the Dutch in pressuring Austria and Russia to stop the war against the Ottomans and to enter negotiations. The plans of Catherine the Great to break up the Ottoman Empire and divide it among the powers, in a manner similar to the division of Poland, came to light in the 1780s and 1790s. According to this plan, the French would acquire the Levant and Egypt. The Russian advance, and Catherine's scheme, aroused some concern in Great Britain regarding the routes though the Middle East to India. Pitt the Younger, who served as British Prime Minister at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, was aware that Russian expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire threatened British interests in the region, but few others discerned the danger. Pitt warned Russia to halt the wars, and was prepared to send a naval fleet with infantry units to the Baltic Sea and to land forces near the Russian capital if needed. The notion of threatening the Russians with military force, however, met with objections in Parliament. Members of Parliament denied that Russian penetration to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean posed any danger to British interests. It bears mention in this context that the Russian Navy had already fought in the Mediterranean, during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1767177. In addition to destroying the Ottoman fleet at the Bay of £e§me, they had extended their aid to the rebellion against the Ottomans in the Holy Land. Prime Minister Pitt claimed that the Russian penetration would jeopardize British interests in the area as well as the use of the routes to India. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and his plans for India lent credence to Pitt's concerns, suggesting the prudence of acting to prevent other powers from establishing strongholds in the Middle East. Pitt won the vote in Parliament, but did not implement his plan because public opinion at that time favoured Russia over the Ottomans. It was only much later, in the 1840s, that Sir Stratford Canning, formulated policy to prevent the Russians from dismantling the Empire.

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of Reforms

SHMUELEVITZ in the Eighteenth

Century

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Ottomans sent delegations to France and Austria to determine why the Europeans, whom they perceived as infidels, defeated them. One result of the mission was the introduction of military reforms, especially in the artillery and the navy, and the establishment of modern secular military schools to prepare the young cadre for new, modernized units. These were not the only reforms. The most important, in my opinion, was the permission given by the Shaykh-al-Islam to establish printing house that would be permitted to print books in Arabic characters (except those dealing with religion). This was a watershed in the history of the Middle East. It made possible the above-mentioned establishment of secular military schools and opened the Empire to new ideas from the West by translating European material into Turkish and publishing it. Furthermore, the modernization in daily life began in the eighteenth century. It came as a result of the influence of Christian neighbours and of the diplomatic corps in the capital, Istanbul. Conclusion

Napoleon's invasion of Egypt did not beget the Eastern Question. It gave momentum to the process of reformation already underway in the region and exacerbated pre-existing conflicts among the European powers. The origins of the Eastern Question can thus be dated to eighteenth century, which saw the emergence of struggles among the European powers, the powers' initial involvement in internal Ottoman affairs, and the early stages of modernization.

Selected Bibliography Anderson, M.S. The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774-1923. London, 1966. Davison, Redoric H., Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876. Princeton, 1963. Hourani, A., Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939. London, 1962. Karpat, Kemal H., An Inquiry into the Social Foundation of Nationalism in the State: From Social Estates to Classes, from Millets to Nations. Princeton, 1973. Lewis, B., The Middle East and the West. London, 1963/64. Lewis, B., The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London, 1965. Mardin, §erif, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought : A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas. Princeton, 1962. Polk, Willam and R. Chambers (eds.) Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East. Chicago, 1968. Taylor, A.J.P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918. Oxford, 1954. Yapp. M. E., The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792-1923. London, 1987.

THE BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS: FUTILE VICTORY James W. SHOSENBERG

"... an army of brave men to conquer India" At 5:00 p.m. on 5 December 1797 a young man stepped down from a post carriage before a small house at 6 rue Chantereine, Paris. "At first sight," noted an contemporary, "he seemed ... to have a charming face; so much do the halo of victory, fine eyes, a pale almost consumptive look, become a young hero."1 The young hero was Napoleon Bonaparte. Two years had passed since he had seen his home. In 1795 the government had appointed him to command the Army of Italy. In that short period of time he had defeated five Austrian armies as well as the army of the Kingdom of Sardinia, and the army of the Pope. He had recaptured Corsica from England and destroyed the Venetian Republic. He had annexed Nice and Savoy to France. He had forced peace on continental Europe. Only England, safe behind the bulwark of her powerful navy, remained at war with the French Republic. As word spread of the hero's return, Paris exploded with joy. Engravings, songs and poems portrayed Bonaparte in print, music and verse. When the play, Le Pont de Lodi (The Bridge at Lodi, the location of one of his victories) was staged, the victor's name was cheered at every performance. La rue Chantereine was renamed la rue de la Victoire. (The Street of Victory) Across Paris from la rue de la Victoire, however, at the Luxembourg Palace, were five men who were much less enthusiastic about Bonaparte's arrival in Paris, although in public they were careful to conceal this fact. Paul-François-Jean-Nicholas Barras, Jean François Reubell, Louis Marie de La Revellière-Lepeaux, François de Neufchateau, Philippe Antoine Merlin de Douai were the members of the Directory, the executive of the government of the French Republic. The Directors knew full well that public acclaim was the least reason for Bonaparte's return to the French capital. Wrote Barras: "... Bonaparte ... considered himself the arbiter of France's fate. He continued to keep up his secret correspondences with foreign cabinets.... his object... was that the ' Duc de Broglie. Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand. (London, undated) 1, 196.

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Directorate should invest him with a dictatorship of European affairs ...he addressed us in such an imperious fashion that the Directorate could imagine it was listening to a master dictating his will. We were not the men to tolerate such insolence; a lively and heated discussion ensued in which Bonaparte dared to threaten us with his resignation.... Thereupon Reubell, taking up a pen and handing it to him without the slightest sign of emotion ...said: 'Sign then, citizen general.' Bonaparte, abashed, did not sign, and withdrew in silent humiliation."1 The abashed young general realized that the time was not yet ripe for a coup d'état. Bonaparte understood that his public support was founded not only on his victories, but also on the perception that he was loyal to the Republic. If he failed to sustain this illusion his popularity would evaporate. His secretary, Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Charbonnière de Bourrienne once said to him that "it must be agreeable to him to see his fellow citizens so eagerly running after him. 'Bah! ' Bonaparte replied, 'The people would run just as fast to see me if 1 were going to the scaffold.'" 2 In his schemes Bonaparte had an important ally in the person of Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, Foreign Minister of France. In July 1797 Talleyrand had given a public lecture on "The Advantages of Acquiring New Colonies." In it he proposed that France find new colonies to replace those it had lost to England in the West Indies. Talleyrand identified Egypt as a suitable substitute. As Foreign Minister, Talleyrand had corresponded with Bonaparte, discovering that they shared a contempt for their employers. On 6 December Bonaparte went to the Hôtel de Gallifet at 73, rue de Grenelle — the home of the Foreign Minister. There he met Talleyrand, a man described as having "a pale face, impenetrable, motionless as a mask, except for the quivering of his nostrils, pockmarked skin joining a shamelessly turned up nose, mouth turned down at the corners, and piercing green-grey eyes. The Foreign Minister had a badly deformed foot, but carelessly dissimulated himself from the cane he needed to help him walk." 3 The two men discussed the merits of a conquest of Egypt. At first glance a military expedition to Egypt seemed insane. It meant attacking a little-known country. It meant attempting to evade the British fleet in the Mediterranean. It meant depriving France of an army and her most illustrious general at a time when renewed hostilities appeared likely to break Ipaul-François-Jean-Nicholas Barras. Memoirs of Barras. (New York, 1896) III, 251. 2

Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Charbonnière de Bourriene. Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte. (New York, 1891)1,124. 3 F r o m Franz Blei. Talleyrand, 1980. Quoted in Revue du Souvenir Napoléonien, mai-juin 1998, 16.

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out on the Continent. On the other hand such an expedition had great potential advantages. If France could occupy the Isthmus of Suez, she would sever one of England's trade routes to India, which was Britain's main source of wealth. Better, Egypt could serve as a base for the actual conquest of the Indian sub-continent. Finally as a French colony, Egypt would be worth all those that France had lost. Bonaparte was enthusiastic about the expedition. In addition to the advantages to France, he could see the advantages to himself. His absence would allow the Directors sufficient time to squander the residue of their popularity. At the same time a successful campaign would raise his own popularity to new heights. The key to the expedition was to placate the Ottoman Empire, the current owner of France's proposed colony. While Bonaparte agreed to undertake the conquest of Egypt, Talleyrand agreed to travel to Constantinople as the Ambassador of France. There, he would explain to the Sultan, Selim III, that the French conquest of Egypt was "effected on behalf of the Porte (Ottoman Empire) in order to foil the Russian and English intriguers who are perpetually at work in that unfortunate country." "If we did the Turks such a service," he wrote, "they would almost certainly be bound to grant us a privileged position there as well as commercial advantages of which we stand in need." 1 While Bonaparte and Talleyrand made their plans, the Directors were busy too. In a twist of fate, they wanted Bonaparte to leave Paris as much as he now wanted to go. In January 1798 the Directors appointed General Napoleon Bonaparte to the command of "The Army of England," to prepare for a Channel crossing and invasion of England. This was not at all what Bonaparte had in mind. On 23 February 1798 he wrote to the Directory: ... To carry out an invasion of England without command of the sea is as difficult and daring a project as has ever been undertaken. It could be done only by a surprise crossing ... landing in small boats, during the night, after a seven or eight hours' passage ... This operation requires long nights, and therefore wintertime. ... We should therefore give up any real attempt to invade England, and content ourselves with the appearance of it, while devoting all our attention and resources to the Rhine, so as to deprive England of Hanover and Hamburg.... Or we might well make an expedition into the Levant and threaten the commerce of India? [italics mine]

* Letter from Talleyrand to Napoleon, 23 September 1797. From Emile Dard. Napoleon and Talleyrand. (London, 1937), 23. ^Albert Carr. Napoleon Speaks. (MacMillan, 1941), 88.

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After consideration — and considerable encouragement from Talleyrand — the Directors concluded that an expedition to Egypt was a wiser choice than an expedition to England. Not only would Bonaparte be absent from Paris; he would be absent from France. With luck the imperious young general might be away for years. He might even die in battle or succumb to some exotic mid-eastern disease. Moreover, an expedition to the mysterious land of the Pharaohs would enjoy widespread public support. The publication of Volney's book, Voyage en Egypte et Syrie, published in 1787 had fired a huge public interest in the east. As an added bonus, an invasion of Egypt would cost less than an invasion of England because the main strength of the French Fleet was already in the Mediterranean. General Charles Antoine Morand pretty much summed up the whole situation in a letter to a friend written on 25 May 1798. "... Bonaparte welcomed [the expedition], if he himself didn't suggest it to the Directory, because with the degree of power, renown and glory he has attained, he can hardly live in safety in France under the eye of a shadowy and weak government, in midst of the rivalries, jealousies, and fears that his glory cause to those around him. Pressed by his friends and his enemies, and even more by the circumstances in which our country finds itself, it is necessary that Bonaparte either leaves [France], destroys the Directory, or stays to be crushed by it. Understanding this situation he has put himself at the head of an army of brave men to conquer India or to form an empire in Asia, and the Directory will sacrifice thirty thousand Frenchmen to its fear and jealousy." 1

"...six arpents of land"

The Directory found some nine million francs for the expedition, primarily by sending General Guillaume-Marie-Anne Brune to plunder Switzerland. Once Bonaparte received the money he rendered no accounts, and spent the funds as he wished. The expedition's headquarters was not at the Ministry of War; it was at Bonaparte's house at 6 rue de la Victoire. Bonaparte selected the admirals, generals, and troops himself. The generals included Louis-Alexandre Berthier, chief of staff; Louis-Marie-Joseph Maximilien Cafarelli du Falga in command of the engineers, Elzear-Auguste Cousin de Dommartin in command of the artillery, and Thomas-Alexandre Dumas in charge of the cavalry. The army was organized in five divisions under Generals

1 Général Charles Antoine Morand. Lettres sur l'expédition d'Egypte (de l'Italie à la prise du Caire) suivies de son Carnet de Route de Chef de Brigade (De Rome à Assouan) 1798-1799, (Paris, 1998), 5.

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Louis Charles-Antoine-Desaix, Jean-Louis-Ebenezer Reynier, Jean-Baptiste Kléber, Jacques-François de Boussay comte de Menou, and Louis-André Bon. The total strength of the Army of the Orient was 35,000. Of the 21 regiments of cavalry and infantry taken on the expedition, all had served under Bonaparte in Italy. Bonaparte appointed Admiral François Paul Brueys d'Aigalliers to command his fleet. Brueys would be responsible for between 280 and 309 ships of all sizes, with crews totalling 6,500 men. With the expedition were about 400 wives or mistresses of the officers. The remaining "femmes légales" comprised female employees of the National Printing House (Imprimerie Nationale), and School of Mathematics (Ecole des Mathématiques) who worked in financial administration. A number of prostitutes managed to slip aboard the ships as well. 1 Bonaparte's wife Josephine, did not make the journey. She preferred to remain behind in France. From Italy, Bonaparte had sent the wealth of the South to France; from Egypt he planned to send the wealth of the East. He invited a Commission of the Sciences and Arts (Commission des Sciences et des Arts) to accompany the army. In all 167 scientists and technical experts joined the expedition. 2 Bonaparte himself was a member of the Institute of France. By giving a scientific tone to his expedition, he increased his popularity and allied himself with France's intellectuals. All was ready by mid-May. To boost morale, on 10 May Bonaparte addressed his soldiers. In his speech he promised each soldier "that upon his return to France he shall have enough to buy six arpents of land." 3 (An arpent is about 4200 square meters.) On 19 May the French set sail from the ports of Toulon, Ajaccio, Genoa, and Civitaveccia. Once at sea, the convoys rendezvoused and sailed for Malta, which they reached on 9 June. Bonaparte laid siege to Valetta on 11 June. Within 24 hours the French seized control of the entire island from its rulers, the Order of the Knights Hospitalers of Saint John of Jerusalem, a military remnant of the First Crusade.

'For a discussion of the role of women on the expedition, see Chaduc et Dickes, "Les Femmes de l'Expédition, La Présence Féminine". Revue du Souvenir Napoléonien, décembre 1998 janvier 1999, 33. The list of scientists and technical experts was impressive. It included Gaspard Monge, the inventor of descriptive geometry; Claude-Louis Berthollet, the chemist; Jean-Baptiste Fourier, the brilliant mathematician; Gratet de Dolomieu, the mineralogist; Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, the naturalist; René-Nicholas Dufiche Desgenettes, physician; Nicholas-Jacques Conté, famous lor his lead pencils, Jomard, the archeologist and Vivant Denon, engraver among others. Christopher Herold. Bonaparte in Egypt. (London, 1962), 4.

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Leaving General Claude Henry Belgrand comte de Vaubois, and 3,500 troops to garrison Malta, on 19 June, Bonaparte left the island and sailed for Egypt. In the holds of his ships were more than 7 million francs of exaction and other loot seized from the Knights. Bonaparte's expedition was incredibly lucky in its voyage. The British fleet, under Rear Admiral Horatio Nelson, had been patrolling the waters off Toulon when Bonaparte's fleet was preparing to sail. The British ships were scattered by a gale just 24 hours before the French emerged. When Nelson returned to Toulon, the French fleet had vanished. Nelson gambolled that it had sailed east. On 28 June his ships arrived at Alexandria looking for the French. They were two days too early. The English fleet was back at sea when Bonaparte's fleet arrived off the Egyptian coast on 1 July.

"... it will suffice to meet them with untrained young

mamluks"

At daybreak the French had their first view of Egypt. One of the scientists, the engraver Vivant Denon, wrote: "To the west I saw the coast, which extended like a white ribbon across a sea-blue horizon. Not a tree, not a habitation, it was not only dreary, but a desolate place, silent and dead ... One of [our soldiers] said to a comrade, pointing to the desert: 'Look, here are the six arpents that you were promised.'" 1 On 1 July in the middle of the night the French troops started to come ashore on the beaches at Marabout about eight miles west of Alexandria. The sea was rough and nineteen soldiers drowned. Everyone, including the commander-in-chief, slept on the beach, wet, hungry and thirsty. At six in the morning, Bonaparte ordered the Army to its feet. Jacques Miot, Commissary of War, described the events that followed: "... not more than four or five thousand men were as yet landed; but neither horses nor artillery, nor from the roll of the sea was it possible to land them. Bonaparte would not wait, but giving orders that the troops should follow him in columns as they landed, began his march for Alexandria. The road was across the desert; but all seemed animated by the ardour of novelty, and General Caffarelli, who had a wooden leg, performed the march on foot, rather than wait for a horse."2 Tired, and almost mad with thirst, the French reached the walls of Alexandria at 8:00 a.m. Bonaparte ordered an immediate assault on the city. One column under Menou stormed the Triangular Fort, while two others under 1 Dominique Vivant Denon. Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Egypte pendant les campagnes de général Bonaparte, (Paris, 1998), 52. 2 M . Jacques Miot. Memoirs of my Service in the French Expedition to Egypt and Syria. (Chippenham, 1997), 11.

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Kléber and Bon attacked the two gates into the city. Fortunately for the French, Alexandria was in poor condition to resist. The city's once powerful wall, supported with 360 towers, had been neglected and was in ruin. In some places the walls were level with the ground. Wrote the Egyptian historian 'Abd al-Rahman Jabarti "... As for the weapons, nothing remained except some broken-down cannons which were useless."1 Nevertheless, the Egyptians put up a stubborn resistance. Records al-Jabarti: ... "the inhabitants of the port, the Kashif of al-Buhayra and the Bedouin who were with him attacked the French and fought them fiercely. ... Meanwhile the French continuously increased in number. They scaled the ruined parts of the wall surrounding the port and entered it. The people looked about and suddenly found the French behind them, and withdrew in haste seeking their homes only to discover that the French ... had surrounded the walls. The people took refuge in the inns, khans and houses and locked themselves in. Others fortified themselves and locked themselves in the big tower and the Citadel, firing continuously for some time from the tops of their houses and windows with bullets, but their gunpowder ran out and they were not at all prepared."2 After three hours of fighting Alexandria surrendered. In the battle about 100 French soldiers were killed and 200 wounded, including Kléber and Menou. Between 700 and 800 Egyptian defenders were killed or wounded. Immediately Bonaparte issued a proclamation assuring the Egyptians that... "I come to restore your rights and ... I honour more than the Mamluks, God, his Prophet, and the Qu'ran."3 The French had captured the second city in Egypt, and Bonaparte had another victory to add to his record. He and his soldiers, however, had not yet encountered the main defenders of Egypt. The Mamluks were members of a military caste. They were purchased as child-slaves from impoverished peasant families in southern Russia. Their masters, who had also been slaves, brought them to Egypt, converted them to Islam, and trained them as mounted warriors for the sole purpose of ruling the country. For more than five hundred years, the Mamluks had ruled Egypt, although since their defeat by the Turks in 1517, officially they were subservient to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. The Mamluks were required to pay an annual bounty to Constantinople and to accept a Viceroy appointed by the Sultan. By 1798, however, the bounty had not been paid for years and the Viceroy was no more than a puppet of the 23 Mamluk Beys who comprised the government. 'Abd al-Rahman Jabarti. Al-Jabarti's Chronicle of First Seven Months of the French Occupation of Egypt, June-December 1798. Muharram-Rajab 1213. (New York. 1993), 22. ¿Ibid. 22. •^Napoléon Bonaparte. Correspondance de Napoléon 1er. (New York, 1974), IV, 191.

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The Mamluks obtained their wealth by charging enormous duties on goods entering or leaving Egypt. Ten thousand English pounds worth of Indian spices, for example, would pay up to 8,000 or 9000 pounds to pass through Egypt. By 1798, however, the Mamluk population was in decline. It was eroded by constant factional fighting and the plagues that stuck lower Egypt, particularly Cairo in the 1780s and 1790s. In addition the advance of the Russian Empire into the Caucasus had cut the Mamluks off from their traditional recruiting grounds. When the French arrived the Mamluk population numbered about 8000-10,000.' They comprised a small fraction of the total Egyptian population of two and a half million. The vast remainder of Egyptians were fellaheen or peasants. A third group, the Bedouin, roamed the deserts that formed fourteen-fifteenths of Egypt. They numbered only a few tens of thousands. In 1798 two of the Mamluk beys, Ibrahim and Murad, had formed an uneasy and mutually suspicious alliance in Cairo. It was they who exercised the real power. By that time Ibrahim had reached his sixties and Murad was gaining the ascendancy. Murad Bey was in his late 40s. He was an ambitious soldier and adventurer who was physically energetic even by Mamluk standards. When news of the capture of Malta reached Cairo, Murad Bey summoned Carlo Rosetti, the Venetian Counsel, to ask him about the French. In vain did Rosetti attempt to explain to Murad who Bonaparte was or the power of the French army. "What do we have to fear from the French," scorned Murad, "particularly if they are like the traders that we have here? If they land a hundred thousand it will suffice to meet them with untrained young mamluks, who will cut off their heads with one slice of their scimitars."2 When news of the capture of Alexandria reached Cairo, Murad met with Ibrahim and the other Mamluk leaders. They agreed to write to the Sultan to ask for help. In the meantime Murad, as Sari Askar, or commander-in-chief, would set out with an army against the French. Murad Bey spent two days gathering his army. Meanwhile, he sent to Cairo ordering that a huge iron chain should be set up at the inlet of Rosetta, stretching from bank to bank so that the French ships could not pass into the Nile. This, he felt, would delay the French until he could carry out his own plans. ^Daniel Crecelius. "The Mamluk beylicate of Egypt in the last decades before its destruction by Muhammad 'Ali Pasha in 1811". From The Mamluks in Egyptian politics and society [sic], (Cambridge, 1998), 130. Henry Laurens, L'Expédition d'Egypte 1798-1801. Bonaparte et L'Islam, Le choc des cultures. (Paris, 1989), 80.

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"... are you taking us to India?" In the meantime, a hundred miles to the north at Alexandria, Bonaparte had no intention of waiting until Murad was ready to attack him. He gave orders for the army to advance immediately to al Rahmaniya on the Nile. He divided the army into two columns. He ordered the first column, which included the f i f t h division, commanded by General Charles-François-Joseph Dugua, replacing the wounded Kléber, to march along the coast to Rosetta. A flotilla of fifteen riverboats, manned by six hundred French sailors, was dispatched from the fleet to meet him. In addition to the sailors and soldiers the riverboats would carry the civilian scientists and army wives. Once Dugua and the flotilla forced the mouth of the Nile it was to sail upstream to join the other French column at al Rahmaniya. The command of the flotilla was given to navy Captain Jean-Baptiste Perré. Dugua's march was to be easy on the soldiers. On 8 July the column reached Rosetta without incident. The second column, under General Desaix comprised the remainder of the French army—25,000 men. It included the divisions of Desaix, Bon, Reynier, and Honoré Vial, who replaced Menou. This column Bonaparte ordered to march directly to al Rahmaniya by way of al Beydah and Damanhour by the most direct route — 60 miles across the plains of Buhayra. Adjutant General Pierre-François-Joseph Boyer described the route: "When you leave the town [Alexandria] to go to the Nile, you find a perfectly bare desert, wherein, at intervals of fifteen miles, you meet with one bad well of brackish water. Imagine an army obliged to cross these arid plains, which offer not the slightest shelter to the soldier from the unbearable heat that prevails." 1 Vivant Denon noted the absence of preparation. "... [Bonaparte] put on troops on the march as soon as they disembarked, and without allowing them the time to acquire any information on the places they were going to occupy. One officer, among others, said to his troops on the point of departure...My friends, you are going to sleep at Beda [al Beydah]; you hear at Beda; nothing more difficult than that; let us march, my friends, and the soldiers marched." "It would be difficult," concluded Denon, "to describe a more striking contrast of naiveté on one side and confidence on the other." 2

'.lohn G. Gallaher. General Alexandre Dumas, Soldier of the French Revolution. (Carbondale 1997), 107. ^Dominique Vivant Denon. Voyage dans hi Basse et la Haute Egypte pendant les campagnes de général Bonaparte, (Paris, 1998), 67.

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The columns set off on 7 July. By the end of the first day men suffering from blistered feet, sore eyes, and exhaustion were straggling behind. To straggle was to die, for bands of Bedouin tribesmen swarmed around the marching column, killing every laggard. The French cavalry could not protect the infantry. The number of mounted cavalrymen was small and their horses weak from the voyage. One party of French soldiers was captured while they were firing ovens in which to make bread. The Bedouin forced the men to fire the ovens, then threw them alive inside. The band of the 61st Demi-brigade was captured. The men were made to play for the entertainment of their captors, then massacred. Water supplies were quickly exhausted. When one division halted at a well, 30 soldiers were trampled to death in the rush for water, while others, finding the well dry, committed suicide. A disillusioned François-Martin-Noel de Bernoyer wrote to his wife, "I see, but too late, that we are dupes required to undertake projects born in the delirious minds of exalted men, who in order to satisfy their overriding ambitions, do not consider their numerous victims.... the negligence of General Bonaparte, who has done nothing to supply water to his army! It is the one indispensable item for a voyage across the desert."1 On 7 July Bonaparte and his headquarters staff left Alexandria to rejoin the army. Jacques Miot marked the devastation behind Desaix's column. "We passed many dead bodies of our soldiers maimed, and decapitated by the Arabs. Bonaparte examined one of them attentively. Seeing the difficulties of our march, 'let us heed nothing,' said he, 'the virtues at least are for us.' He marched through the night with his head wrapped up in a handkerchief, and frequently touched Berthier upon the shoulder, saying 'So, Berthier, we are here at last!'" When the French reached al Rahmaniya, Miot recorded ... "the whole army, as if by one impulse, rushed by thousands into the Nile; it was not enough to drink of its water; they did not stop to take off their clothes; but ran in as fast as they arrived, that every limb might partake of the refreshment, and that they might drink at every pore. No sound of drums, no command of their officers could restrain them." 2 But while the French soldiers were joyously splashing in the Nile, the Mamluks appeared. Murad had marched up from Cairo with his cavalry, accompanied by a flotilla of armed feluccas on the river. With 800 picked men he trotted forward along the riverbank. He stood watching as the French 1 François Bernoyer. Avec Bonaparte en Egypte et en Syrie 1798-1800. 19 lettres inédites. (1981), 50. M. Jacques Miot. Memoirs of my Service in the French Expedition to Egypt and Syria. (Chippenham, 1997), 17.

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officers frantically herded their soldiers back into the ranks. The French infantry formed into squares six men deep, the first rank kneeling with their bayonets pointing out, the others preparing to fire over their heads. The French cavalry and the transport sheltered in the centre. Sweating artillerymen dragged their cannon to the corners of the square. Murad ordered his Mamluks to charge. With the first blast of cannon the Mamluks faltered and wheeled into the desert. They left about 40 dead and wounded on the field. A dozen Frenchmen were hurt. The following day, Dugua's column arrived at al Rahmaniya and soon afterwards, the flotilla under Captain Perre. It had cost him the lives of a couple hundred men but Bonaparte had gained a week on Murad. At dawn on 13 July Bonaparte's learned that a Mamluk force was standing to meet him at the village of Shubra Khit, a few miles further upstream. Here, Murad had assembled about 4,000 Mamluk cavalry supported by 10,000 infantry, mostly untrained peasants. On the Nile he had nine or ten armed feluccas preparing to attack the French flotilla. Again ordering his soldiers into squares Bonaparte ordered his infantry to march on the village. T o protect his left flank f r o m the Mamluk gunboats, he ordered Perre to sail his flotilla upstream. Unfortunately, a strong north wind drove Pere's gunboats ahead of the marching infantry. The Mamluks opened a heavy cannon fire on the French flotilla from both riverbanks and their gunboats. They followed up with a naval assault. Four French gunboats were boarded. The scientists and soldiers on board fought for their lives. Hearing the cannons Bonaparte hurried his soldiers forward. Once again the Mamluks charged directly into the French fire. They made no impression on the squares. The majority were shot down or unhorsed before they could strike a blow. Then a lucky French shot destroyed the Mamluk flagship, and the Mamluks retreated. The French recovered their lost gunboats. Each side lost about 200 men. Leaving the enemy no time to recover, Bonaparte ordered his exhausted army to advance on Cairo, 80 miles away. "Our sufferings ... now greatly increased," wrote Miot. "All the villages were deserted, and the soldiers had no bread to eat, though we actually lay upon heaps of corn. W e were totally without animal food, though there were fruits in abundance. The Arabs, always hanging on our flanks, cut off all stragglers. In some melon grounds, on the banks of the river, and at a little distance only from our bivouac, I saw the bodies of many Frenchmen, naked and headless, and stretched out with their breasts towards the ground; an atrocious murder being the last outrage

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they had suffered from an enemy, who publicly gratify propensities which nature abhors...." 1 "... ma Chère Amie," wrote a despondent François Bernoyer to his wife".... the suffering exhausts the men and frequently leads them to an irreversible despair. If I preserve my own life, it is only for you: each time I breathe, it is a sacrifice that I make for you." 2 As the march continued a disgruntled grenadier yelled at the passing Bonaparte. "Hey general! Are you taking us to India?" The indefatigable general responded: "It is not with soldiers like you that I would undertake that expedition!3 Resignations from the officers poured in. Bonaparte ignored them. Later he wrote: "The officers complained more loudly than the soldiers, because the comparison was proportionately more disadvantageous to them. In Egypt they found not the quarters, the good tables, nor the luxury of Italy." 4 The soldiers might complain and the officers attempt to resign, but everyone knew there was only one course open to them — to follow Bonaparte and advance. "... a boiling pot on a fierce fire " On 21 July the French army neared Cairo. There, they found the entire Mamluk army waiting for them. Miot recalled, "The Mamluks were extended before us in a long and splendid line. The novelty and splendour of their appearance, their glittering colours and standards, excited a general admiration amongst us. Never was displayed a more impressive scene. On the right was the Nile; and Cairo beyond it, with all its hundred minarets and domes; on the left were the Pyramids, the highest, the oldest, the most durable of the works of men." 5 Bonaparte pointed to them when he gave the word, and exclaimed, "Remember that from the summit of yonder monuments forty ages are beholding us!" 6

1M. Jacques Miot. Memoirs of my Service in the French Expedition to Egypt and Syria. (Chippenham, 1997), 18. ^François Bernoyer. Avec Bonaparte en Egypte et en Syrie 1798-1800. 19 lettres inédites. (1981), 58. ^Marie-Hélène Legrand. Citoyens Officiers de Napoléon. (Derval, 1987), 133. ^Somerset de Chair. Napoleon's Memoirs. (London 1948), 307. 5 M . Jacques Miot. Memoirs of my Service in the French Expedition to Egypt and Syria. (Chippenham, 1997), 21. In his Memoirs, Miot has reversed his viewpoint. From the French position, looking south, the Nile and Cairo would have been on the left and the pyramids to the right. 6 M . Jacques Miot. Memoirs of my Service in the French Expedition to Egypt and Syria. (Chippenham, 1997), 21.

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Foolishly, Ibrahim and Murad had split their army. Ibrahim had 18,000 infantry massed uselessly on the far side of the Nile. Murad, with 6,000 Mamluks, 15,000 infantry and 40 guns was on the near side. He had centred his infantry on the village of Embabah. To the left of his infantry, he positioned his Mamluk horsemen, each man mounted on a magnificent Arabian horse. Every Mamluk was armed with a musket, several pairs of pistols, a number of javelins, battle axes, maces and daggers, and his principal weapon, a curved razor-sharp sword of Damascus steel. As well as his weapons, each Mamluk carried most of his worldly possessions with him. His bright silk vests and baggy pantaloons were filled with jewels, gold and silver. Despite their faulty dispositions — and poor recent performance — the Mamluks were supremely confident. Al-Jabarti records, "... the Mamluks were contemptuous of their enemy, unbalanced in their reasoning and judgement... They never considered the number of their enemy too high, nor did they care who among them was killed. They acted as if they following the tradition of the Community (of Muhammad) in early Islam and saw themselves as fighters in a holy war. Indeed they considered anyone who fled a traitor to his community, and an apostate to his faith and creed." 1 With him Bonaparte had 25,000 men, about 30 guns and a few cavalrymen. He stationed the divisions of Desaix and Reynier on the French right opposite Murad's Mamluk cavalry. He sent the divisions of Bon and Vial divisions to the left. These two divisions halted opposite Embabah. Dugua's division was in the centre of the French position. Bonaparte and his staff sheltered in Dugua's square. The battle began about 2:00 p.m. "I ordered the divisions of General Desaix and Reynier," wrote Bonaparte, "to take up position on the right, so as to cut the enemy's communication with Upper Egypt, which was his natural retreat. As soon as Murad Bey saw General Desaix's movement he decided to charge him. He sent one of his bravest beys with a corps d'élite, which charged the two divisions with the speed of lightning..." 2 Captain Jean-Baptiste Vertay was in Reynier's division. "... we saw the Mamluks leave their camps by groups," he wrote, "marching with an air of confidence to meet us. The division to which I belonged ...had the honour of being the first attacked. On our front, within gunshot, a small ravine protected the square. When the Mamluks gained the ditch, which was not deep, General Reynier gave the command 'To your ranks!' and in the twinkling of an eye we

'Abd al-Rahman Jabarti. Al-Jabarti's Chronicle of First Seven Months of the French Occupation of Egypt, June-December 1798. Muharram-Rajab 1213. (New York. 1993), 36. Napoléon Bonaparte. Correspondance de Napoléon 1er. (New York, 1974), IV, 250.

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were formed in square six men deep, ready to sustain the shock. This movement had been carried out with really remarkable precision and coolness. Scarcely had the order to commence firing been given, when a cloud of cavalry surrounded us."1 Screaming Allah! Allah! the Mamluks swarmed around the French squares, firing their pistols, throwing their javelins and slashing at the French soldiers. French musket-fire roared around the squares slamming thousands of musket-balls into the packed ranks of the careening horsemen. Wrote al Jabarti, "... the rifles of the French were like a boiling pot on a fierce fire." 2 The result was al Rahmaniya and Shubra Khit repeated on a larger scale. Unable to break into the squares, the torrent of Mamluks swept past the flanks of the two divisions and ebbed away to the south, leaving hundreds of dead and wounded behind them on the sand. Wrote Bonaparte, "I seized that moment and ordered General Bon's division, which was on the Nile, to go in to attack the fortifications [at Embabah], and General Vial to move between the force which had just charged and the emplacements..."3 As the French columns neared Embabah, the Egyptian guns fired just one volley. Then the troops of Vial and Bon poured over the entrenchments into the village. "Here," records Miot, "the Mamluks had thirty or forty pieces of cannon, which they knew so little how to use that they had not time to load them for a second discharge. They were routed at the point of the bayonet; some of them had their clothes set on fire by our muskets, and were in this dreadful manner burnt as they lay mortally wounded."4 Wrote al-Jabarti, "When Ibrahim Bey, the Pa§a, and those who were with them at the entrenchments saw that the people on the western bank were defeated not only did they not stand firm in their positions, but they took to flight on horseback abandoning the entrenchments, tents, cannons, and all.... Then the French, once they had captured the western entrenchments and the galleons of Murad Bey, immediately directed the mouths of the cannons towards the eastern bank and furthermore shot at the Egyptians with bullets. When the people saw that Ibrahim Bey and his followers had fled and that the continuous barrages of fire were directed towards them, they themselves fled to Bulaq and towards Cairo. In their great alarm they took to their heels and ran 1

Christopher Lloyd. The Nile Campaign. Nelson and Napoléon in Egypt. (New York, 1973), 65. Abd al-Rahman Jabarti. Al-Jabarti's Chronicle of First Seven Months of the French Occupation of Egypt, June-December 1798. Muharram-Rajab 1213. (New York, 1993), 37. ^Napoléon Bonaparte. Correspondance de Napoléon 1er. (New York, 1974), IV, 250. 4 M . Jacques Miot. Memoirs of my Service in the French Expedition to Egypt and Syria. (Chippenham, 1997), 24. 2

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like the waves of the sea in such a way that the cleverest among them became he who ran faster than his neighbour... Their cries and lamentings rose up from far and near. They entered the city crowd after crowd and the women, singly and in pairs, wailed from the windows. People bumped into one another, the yelling, clamour, and rage becoming tremendous." 1 The Battle of the Pyramids was over. After just two hours of fighting Murad and his remaining Mamluks were fleeing to the south, Ibrahim Bey and his force to the east. Mamluk casualties amounted to 2000 killed and wounded. The French captured 20 guns, 400 camels, and all the Mamluk baggage and camp equipment. Total French casualties were 300 killed. 2 The surviving French soldiers were soon running happily about looting the possessions of the dead Mamluks. The next day Cairo surrendered. On 24 July, led by their regimental bands playing martial music, the French marched into the city.

"...the time I spent in Egypt was the most delightful of my life..." Once the euphoria of capturing Cairo ebbed, however, the morale of Bonaparte's soldiers plummeted anew. On 27 July 1798, General Dumas wrote to Kleber. "... all goes very ill. The troops are neither paid nor fed, and you may easily guess what murmurs this occasions, loudest perhaps among the officers." 3 Morale reached rock bottom in early August when news of the fleet reached Cairo from Alexandria. Bonaparte had left the French fleet of 17 warships anchored in the Bay of Aboukir. On 1 August, in a daring manoeuvre, Horatio Nelson had split his English squadron, sending his ships between the French fleet and the shore. Caught in a vicious crossfire the French never had a chance. Brueys had lost 13 out of 17 warships and his life. Without a fleet the French army was stranded in Egypt. Moreover, the Egyptians stubbornly refused to see the French as liberators from the Mamluks. They viewed them as heretics. "Whenever a Frenchman has to perform an act of nature," wrote al-Jabarti, "he does so wherever he happens to be, even in full view of people, and he goes away as 'Abd al-Rahman Jabarti. Al-Jabarti's Chronicle of First Seven Months of the French of Egypt, June-December 1798. Muharram-Rajab 1213. (New York, 1993), 37.

Occupation

Digby Smith. The Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book. Actions and Losses in Personnel Colours, Standards and Artillery 1792-1815. (London, 1998), 140. ^Christopher Lloyd. The Nile Campaign. Nelson and Napoleon in Egypt. Illustrated Sources in History. (New York, 1973), 65.

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he is, without washing his private parts after defecation. If he is a man of taste and refinement, he wipes himself with whatever he finds, even with a paper with writing on it, otherwise he remains as he is. They have intercourse with any woman who pleases them and vice versa.... They do not shave their heads nor their pubic hair. They mix their foods. Some might even put together in one dish coffee, sugar, arrack, 1 raw eggs, limes, and so on....As for the name 'Bonaparte' this is the title of their general, it is not a name. Its meaning is 'the pleasant gathering,' because Bona means 'pleasant,' and parte means 'gathering' " 2 The French in turn detested the Egyptians. "Once you enter Cairo, what do you find?" wrote Major Jean-François Detroye, "... blind men, half-blind men, bearded men, people dressed in rags, pressed together in the streets or squatting, smoking their pipes, like monkeys at the entrance of their cave; a few women of the people, hideous, disgusting, hiding their fleshless faces under stinking rags, and displaying their pendulous breasts through their torn gowns; yellow, skinny children covered with suppuration, devoured by flies; an unbearable stench, due to the dirt in the houses, the dust in the air, and the smell of food being fried in bad oil in the unventilated bazaars ..." 3 In additional to his military and cultural problems, Bonaparte had personal troubles. He had hardly entered Cairo when he received word that his wife Josephine had been having a prolonged affair with a cavalry officer named Hippolyte Charles. On 25 July he wrote to his brother Joseph. "I have much domestic distress; ...That every different feeling towards the same person should be united in one heart is very painful... I am tired of human nature." 4 The worst was yet to come. In letter after letter to the Directory Bonaparte asked if Talleyrand had gone to Constantinople to negotiate a treaty with Turkey. Talleyrand in fact, had not. The wily politician had rightly calculated that so long as he had English support, the Sultan would have no intention of surrendering Egypt to France. As a result, there took place on 8 September the event Bonaparte feared most; Turkey declared war on France. Selim III began to mass his huge armies to drive the French from Egypt. Ahead was the abortive invasion of Syria, Bonaparte's defeat at Acre 5 and reprieve at the victory of Aboukir. 1 Arrack is an alcoholic drink distilled from fermented palm sap, rice, or molasses. ^Abd al-Rahman Jabarti. Al-Jabarti's Chronicle of First Seven Months of the French Occupation of Egypt, June-December 1798. Muharram-Rajab 1213. (New York, 1993), 29. ^Christopher Lloyd. The Nile Campaign. Nelson and Napoleon in Egypt. Illustrated Sources in History. (New York, 1973), 67. 4 Napoléon Bonaparte. Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon with his Brother Joseph Bonaparte. (New York, 1856), 1, 48. -'For an overview of this campaign and the Battle of Mount Tabor, see James W. Shosenberg, "Napoleon Saves the Day at Mount Tabor," Military History, April 1999,42.

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For France the expedition to Egypt was a futile venture. The only lasting achievement was the accomplishments of the French scientists who scoured the country and recorded their findings in words and drawings. But France paid a heavy price for the ten folio volumes and two anthologies of the Description de I'Egypte. Of the 35,000 men she sent to Egypt, 8,900 would perish. For Bonaparte the outcome was quite different. On 23 August 1799, judging that the time was right, he abandoned his army, and with a few companions, stole away to France. On 9 November, three months after his departure, he overthrew the Directory and became first Consul, head of the French government. A s he had foreseen, the Expedition to Egypt had successfully laid the foundation for the next phase of his career. To the end of his life, he would hold fond memories of his time in Egypt. He told a contemporary, "In Egypt I found myself freed f r o m the obstacles of an irksome civilization. I was full of dreams. I saw myself founding a religion, marching into Asia, riding an elephant, a turban on my head and in my hand a new Qur'an that I would have composed to suit my needs. In my undertaking I would have combined the experience of two worlds, exploiting for my own benefit the theatre of all history, attacking the power of England in India. The time I spent in Egypt was the most delightful of my life because it was the most ideal. 1,1 The long-suffering soldiers that he left behind in Egypt held a quite different view, one that was succinctly expressed in the words of a song written by Major Antoine Charles Louis I^a Salle. 2 "The water of the Nile is not champagne: Why make war where there's no cabarets?" 3

^Christopher Herold. Bonaparte in Egypt. (London, 1962), 3. Yves Laissus. L'Egypte, une adventure savante avec Bonaparte, Kléber et Menou 1798-1801. (Fayard, 1998), 86 - "L'eau du Nil n'est pas du Champagne: Pourquoi vouloir faire campagne dans un pays sans cabarets?" 2

PHÉLIPPEAUX AND NAPOLEON Helen S. SMITH

Louis-Edmond le Picard de Phélippeaux was born in 1768 in the Vendée. He was the son of an officer, a Vendéen and a monarchist. In 1783, at the age of fifteen, he entered the Ecole Militaire in Paris where he became the classmate and chief enemy of a Corsican student two years his junior, named Napoléon Buonaparte. Their aggression was such that the sergeant-major, Picot de Peccaduc, attempted to stop the fighting that went on between them even during class time, by sitting between them. But then he got kicks from both of them. The students at the Military College were of two social classes. The majority were boursiers or royal pupils, the sons of poor nobles, most of them without powerful family influence, who had to work for admission into the higher branches of the services where promotion might be hoped for according to merit. The minority were sons of great families whose future in the king's bodyguard or in the infantry or cavalry was assured. The government had declared that the chief aim of the education at the Military College should be to turn out men of the world with savoir-vivre, agreeable manners and that polite tone so rare and so difficult to acquire; pupils "whose judgement should be formed rather than memory charged". The establishment was on an elaborate scale and the food was sumptuous. Napoleon said to Las Cases at St. Helena, "at the Military College we were served and fed in a magnificent manner, treated throughout like young officers accustomed to great luxuries, far exceeding those of most of our families." It was a most extravagantly managed school and was suppressed for that reason in 1787, two years after Napoleon had left. As artillery students, both Napoleon and Phélippeaux would have learned from General Jean Du Teil, the author of a recent book, L'Usage de l'Artillerie Nouvelle, of the new artillery techniques, especially stressing the importance of the concentration of fire against a single point. What he described were the principles of warfare between 1792 and 1815, those same principles which formed the essence of the Napoleonic method. They included concentration of efforts, attacking the enemy in flank or in rear, with maximum secrecy, attack upon communications and rapidity of execution.

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Phélippeaux, as Napoleon's fellow classmate, was exposed to these same lessons in artillery, and in turn used these skills against him at the siege of St. Jean d'Acre. It is worth noting that the two permanent personal enemies whom Napoleon made before his appearance in the public eye, Louis-Edmond le Picard de Phélippeaux and the Corsican, Charles-André Pozzo di Borgo, should both have been able to stand in his way at an important crisis later on. Phélippeaux helped to beat back Napoleon's assault Acre and Pozzo di Borgo stiffened the Czar's reluctance to make peace with Napoleon at Moscow. When these students were examined in September 1785, a large number obtained commissions, and of those from the Military College, Phélippeaux was forty-first and Napoleon was forty-second. Having passed their examinations and obtained their commissions of Second Lieutenant, they went to their regiments, Phélippeaux to the artillery regiment of Besançon and Napoleon to the regiment of La Fère, garrisoned at Valence. Valence was the nearest artillery centre to Corsica and provided two companies for Corsica. Phélippeaux was promoted to Captain of the Besançon regiment in 1789, but resigned his commission and emigrated from France in 1791. For the next four years he served in Condé's army against the French Republic. In 1795 he returned to France to help the Comte de Rochette and others to organize an insurrection in the central province of Berri. This was crushed, and Phélippeaux was arrested and imprisoned in Bourges. He escaped with the help of a female relative and clandestinely resumed counter-revolutionary activities. In the early spring of 1798 he returned to Paris to liberate an English naval officer held in the Temple prison where Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette had been imprisoned before their executions. The Englishman's name was William Sidney Smith. He had entered the navy at thirteen, been commissioned a lieutenant, and seen action in such places as Chesapeake Bay and St. Kitts. Later he had volunteered his services to King Gustavus III of Sweden, was commissioned in the Swedish navy and fought against the Russian navy and its Admiral John Paul Jones. Gustavus rewarded him with a title which George HI recognized, hence the "Sir". After a brief stay in England, Smith went to Constantinople where his brother, Charles Spencer Smith, was First Secretary at the British Embassy. Recalled to England by the Admiralty in 1793 he found no transportation, so he bought a ship, took on a number of British sailors for a crew, crossed the Mediterranean and joined the British squadron at Toulon. When Napoleon forced the evacuation of Toulon, Smith volunteered to burn the ships that had to be left behind. At this point the French authorities began to take notice of him. Since he held no active commission in the

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British navy, they regarded this feat as an act of piracy. Later when he was serving in the Channel he was captured when attempting to rescue a lugger at Le Havre and imprisoned in the Temple in Paris. Phélippeaux, who had been rescued himself on the eve of his execution, was now in Paris to organize the escape of three royalists also in the Temple, with two agents who had helped effect his own escape: Boisgirard, who had been engaged as a dancer at the Opera and Hyde de Neuville, a descendant of the Earl of Clarendon. They agreed to include Smith in the escape from the Temple. One escape plan called for a tunnel to be dug from a nearby house, beneath the street and under the prison all. One of the men let it be known that he was in love with a girl in the house near the prison and that was the reason for his frequent visits. In fact he was busy tunnelling. When the tunnel reached the outer wall of the prison a mason had to chip at the stone, and to drown the noise a little seven-year old girl was recruited to parade up and down the street above the tunnel beating a tin drum. This plot failed when the final stones rolled into the yard almost at the feet of a sentry. But Phélippeaux reorganised and began by making love to the jailer's daughter as a pleasant and efficient way of getting in touch with the prisoners. Sidney Smith was told again to be ready for another attempt at escape. Phélippeaux procured false papers for himself as a police commissioner. Then one day he presented himself at the Temple with his friends disguised as policemen, produced a forged order, had Smith released to him and they raced away in carriage. However, the carriage turned a corner too sharply, broke a wheel, skidded into a fruit stall and hit a child. A crowd shouting and calling for the police surrounded them. Phélippeaux, deciding it was not a time for lingering, threw open the carriage door and told the others to follow him. They managed to push through the crowd, running through the narrow streets towards the river and then over the bridges. All but one crossed, and that was Boisgirard, who turned towards the Opera, where he danced that evening. When Smith's absence was discovered, gallopers were sent to alert all the gates of Paris. Checkpoints were put up on the main roads to the Channel ports. Descriptions were circulated. That night they stayed in a safe house in the Rue de l'Université and early the next morning Phélippeaux led them on their journey to the coast. They had no passports or travel documents and had to pass guards, barriers and the gates of Paris. But this was eventually accomplished and they arrived in Rouen where they stayed at a royalist's house while forged passports were prepared.

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When the passports were ready, they dressed in rough seamen's clothes, made their way to Honfleur where Phelippeaux had chartered a small fishing boat and they were soon on the open sea. Out of the Channel, a ship flying a British ensign was sighted, they came alongside and were welcomed aboard. On May seventh they were off Portsmouth, went ashore and immediately set out for London where they arrived the next morning. Smith rushed to his mother's house and introduced Phelippeaux to her as the man who had rescued him. The impact of the news of this daring escape was euphoric as there was a need for heroics after so much grim news over the past year when the French had triumphed everywhere. In France, General Bonaparte heard news of the escape in Toulon where he had arrived to supervise the embarkation of his Expeditionary Force. Two days later Bonaparte sailed for Egypt and subsequently advanced into Syria and captured Jaffa after a bloody battle. When Jaffa surrendered the commander was spared but most of the garrison were slaughtered. It was after Napoleon had captured Jaffa that he wrote to Jezzar Pa§a saying he would march in a few days against Acre. Jezzar Pa§a was the Ottoman Governor of the Levant from the Nile Delta to the Turkish border. A Bosnian by birth, he had sold himself when young to a Mamluk and became a tax gatherer for his master with such ruthlessness that the finally took over the huge Levantine province and its capital at Acre. Djezzar Pasha's capital was ancient. In Roman times in was known as Ptolmais and it had been named St. Jean d'Acre by the Crusaders who had captured and lost it twice after sieges of dreadful carnage. It remained much as King Richard the First of England had known it. Napoleon believed Acre would fall just as Jaffa had, for here also, his army outnumbered the defenders and its ancient walls would be no defence against the siege guns which were on their way from Egypt by ship. Acre was on the coast and could be in part defended by the English squadron of ships in those waters. Once Acre was taken, the only fortified city ahead was Aleppo, and that was far from sea and British ships. So the road to Constantinople would be clear and so would the road to Damascus and India. Meanwhile, Sir Sidney Smith's influence had gained Phelippeaux a British Colonelcy and Smith was now accredited to the Porte as an Envoy Plenipotentiary and was also in command of a squadron cruising off Egypt and Syria. Phelippeaux accompanied Smith on his diplomatic mission to Constantinople and then on to Acre where he was presented to Jezzar Pa§a. These two remarkable men, Smith and Phelippeaux, now arrived to help to help the Pa§a with the defence of Acre.

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Phelippeaux inspected the medieval walls and bastions and found them crumbling and with a few cannon facing the sea. He managed to convince Jezzar of the dangers and the garrison and gangs of labourers were put at his disposal. Phelippeaux began to strengthen the walls, mount guns, construct trenches and excavate the moat. The trenches he constructed were behind the old fortifications, thus creating a double rampart which in turn broke the successive French attacks, and which were called lines of "contre approche". Meanwhile, Smith immediately noted that Napoleon was using lighter artillery and divined that he had not received his siege train. So he put his vessels at sea to work, succeeding in capturing the siege guns from Admiral Peree. Thus Napoleon, having lost his battering train, conducted his operations for a whole month with field artillery. The captured heavy guns eventually reached Phelippeaux and were installed in the fortress by this expert artilleryman. The talented Phelippeaux successfully directed the defence to defeat every effort Bonaparte could make and foil every stratagem. Later, on St. Helena, Napoleon told Montholon that Phelippeaux had had, by one of the mysteries of chance, an immense influence on his destiny; for Phelippeaux had stopped him before St. Jean d'Acre. "Without him, I would have had taken the key to the Orient, I would have marched on Constantinople, I would have rebuilt the throne of the Orient". But Napoleon had also declared on St. Helena, that the failure of the expedition was clear to him from the moment of Nelson's victory; because any force which cannot be augmented must melt away and eventually surrender. Napoleon also told Las Cases that it was bizarre at St. Jean d'Acre to see Europeans arrive to fight in such a decrepit place to establish control of a part of Africa. But it was even more bizarre that those who were directing opposite efforts were of the same nation, the same age group, the same class, the same military branch — artillery — and the same school. But Phelippeaux was unable to enjoy his triumph, for just as Napoleon raised the siege of Acre in 1799, he died, either of exhaustion — as Smith believed — or of the plague. Smith wrote to Earl St. Vincent, First Sea Lord, that "Col. Phelippeaux, the engineer, has fallen as a sacrifice for this service ; want of rest and exposure to the sun having given him a fever of which he has died."

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Bibliography Ghislain De Diesbach, Robert Grouvel, Echec a Bonaparte: Louis Edmond de Phe'lippeaux, 1767-1799. Perrin. 1980. Michael Durey, "The British Secret Service and the Escape of Sir Sidney Smith from Paris in 1798", History, vol. 54, no. 275, July 1999. Tom Pocock, Thirst for Glory: the life of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith. Pimlico, 1998. Peter Shankland, Beware of heroes: Admiral Sir Sidney Smith's War against Napoleon. William Kimber, 1975.

POLISH PARTICIPATION IN NAPOLEON'S EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION John STANLEY

Polish participation in Napoleon's expedition to Egypt is an integral element in the history of the Poles' relationship with the French leader. Although the Egyptian expedition involved numerically few Poles, this episode highlights the key elements in Poles' attraction to the Napoleonic enterprise as well as the reasons for Napoleon's involvement with the Poles. The story of the Polish role in Egypt is thus a part of the pattern established in other climes, before and after the Egyptian invasion. Polish legions and armies supported France in Italy, Haiti, Austria, Spain, and Russia. Napoleon was often able to use the Polish Question to suit his purposes. It is no surprise that the Egyptian chapter of the Napoleonic epic contains Polish characters just as previous episodes did and later tales would. While the Polish presence in Egypt fits this pattern of Polish participation in the Napoleonic enterprise, this chapter in the history of Polish relations with Bonaparte illuminates it and provides evidence for the link between Napoleon and his faithful Poles. From its conception, the Poles appeared as crucial to the Egyptian expedition. 1 After the Peace of Campoformio, Bonaparte considered using in Egypt the 8,000 Poles who had been captured as prisoners of war. Gathered in Venice, these troops were to be shipped to Egypt. However, these Polish soldiers were poorly armed and equipped, indeed often barefoot. The French soon realised that there was neither the time nor the resources to turn these prisoners into an army. Moreover, while these Poles had no objection to fighting for France, they were unwilling to participate in an overseas expedition. 2 Discounting these Poles in Venice, there still remained the Polish Legions in the Roman Republic. They could easily be shipped with Desaix's division from Civitavecchia. Here too, however, there was a catch: the 1 "L'idée d'une expédition en Egypte à peine conçue, on vit le nom polonais s'y attacher ..." Adam Skalkowski, Les Polonais en Egypte 1798-1801. (Cracow: G. Gebethner et Cie, 1910), v. 2

Ibid. vi; Jan Pachonski, Legiony Polskie, Prawda i Klgska 1794-1807, t. 2: Zwyciçstwa i Klçski 1797-1799 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1976), 55, 122.

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weakness of the French position in the Roman Republic. D^browski's legion were regarded as essential to the maintenance of French rule. 1 As a result of these calculations, the decision was made to keep the Polish troops in Italy. Although the Polish Legions did not accompany the French to Egypt, individual Poles did accompany Bonaparte. Most notable among these figures was Captain Jozef Suikowski (1770-1798) who served Bonaparte as adjutant. 2 However, Jozef Feliksazkowski (1759-1812) as head of an engineer's battalion also played an important role. A third major figure was General Jozef Zaj^czek. 3 An additional three Polish soldiers joined the French expedition from Civitavecchia, with the division of General Louis Desaix. While several Poles also sought to join Desaix's force, only Jozef Joachim Grabiiiski (17711843) 4 , Antoni Hauman (c. 1765-1799) 5 , and Jozef Korczak Szumlan'ski (1774-1809?) succeeded and were assigned to the 7th hussar regiment in Desaix's division. (In actual practice, they were assigned to the general's staff). Besides these military figures, the French employed Zatkind Hurwicz (c. 17401812) among the scholars who accompanied the Middle Eastern campaign. 6 This small band of seven Poles permits us to dissect the Polish connection to Bonaparte in Egypt, but also to reflect more broadly upon the Polish role in the Napoleonic vision. These figures had their own distinct road to Egypt, perhaps the most quixotic of Napoleonic adventures, and their individual tales permit us to explore Polish involvement in Napoleon's campaigns, in Egypt and beyond. Sutkowski represented the most eminent of the Poles accompanying Napoleon. He was involved in the planning of the Egyptian expedition from its conception. A member of the Polish szlachta, he had fought the Russians in 1792. Like so many Polish patriots, he left the Commonwealth in disgust and despair after the Second Partition of 1793 and went into exile. He because associated with the most radical of Polish parties, the Jacobins, and was naturally attracted to revolutionary France. As a newly minted French citizen,

l

Ibid„ p. 123. ^Karol Kozmiriski Jozef Sulkowski (Warsaw, Ksi?g. Wojskowa 1935). - Marian Brandys, General Arbuz (Warsaw: Iskry, 1988); Jadwiga Nadzieje, General Jozef Zajqczek 1752-1826 (Warsaw: Wydawnicto Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1975); Jadwiga Nadzieja, "General Zajaczek w Egipcie (maj 1798 - paz'dziernik 1801), Studia i Material y do Historii Woyskowosci, t. 15, cz. 1 (Warsaw, 1969). 4

Jan Pachonski, Jozef Grabinski (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1975). %ean Pachorfski", Hauman Antoni, "Polski Slownik Biograficzny, 9 (Wroclaw: Zaklad Nar. im.

Ossoliiiskich, 1960/61), 309. Jan Reychman, "Hurwicz (Hurwic, Hourvitz), Zlakind Salomon" Polski Slownik Biograficzny, 10 (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy imienia Ossoliiiskich, 1962/6), 115-16. I must thank Dr. Monika Haman for drawing this scholar to my attention. 6

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he was sent to Aleppo to wait upon further instruction. He had already begun to study Turkish in Warsaw; he now learned Arabic during his five months in Syria. Leaving Aleppo for Constantinople, he put himself at the disposal of Descorches, the Republic's ambassador. Assigned an intelligence mission to Poland during the Koáciuszko Uprising by Descorches, he disguised himself as an Armenian merchant and crossed into Galicia from Wallachia. However, he did not reach Poland until September, in time to learn only of his country's defeat. He returned to Constantinople where he penned an essay on the Polish situation which made clear his radical views. Returning to Paris, he was recommended by the current Foreign Affairs Minister, Charles Delacroix, to Minister of War Petiet as "Polonais de naissance, Français de cœurs" 1 . He was assigned to the Army of Italy in 1796 and, at October's end, Sulkowski entered Bonaparte's service. He joined Junot, Marmont, Duroc, and Louis Bonaparte as an aide de camp in the Bonaparte's staff, "cette pépinière de futurs maréchaux de la France et de grands dignitaires de l'Empire." 2 Only a year younger than his commander, he was not intimidated by the general's manner: "Il jugeait son chef avec une sévérité souvent extrême ; il le haïssait tout en l'admirant". 3 Despite this distance, Bonaparte depended on Sulkowski precisely because he knew he could count on the Pole's sense of duty, if not of close friendship. In 1798, he accompanied Napoleon in his preparations for the English invasion; he travelled in the same carriage as Lannes and Bourrienne. He distinguished himself in the siege of Malta and was as active in the intellectual discussions of the Institut d'Egypte as he was in military pursuits. By the time of his death in the Cairo uprising, there could be no doubt that Sulkowski saw in revolutionary France not only his ideological home but also the sole hope for a resurrection of his Polish homeland. He served Napoleon well because he identified the Corsican with the revolutionary and progressive cause which might eventually liberate Poland. In contrast Lazowski had grown up in the court of the exiled Polish king, Stanislaw Leszczytiski, in Nancy. He grew up speaking the language of his French mother and, given the circumstances, it seems remarkable that the Polish spelling of his surname survived. In every respect, he seemed completely assimilated to France and its culture. Having graduated from the Ecole des ponts et chaussées, he served in the ports of Dieppe and Cherbourg. In the xenophobic atmosphere of the Terror, he was reminded of his origins when he was arrested, probably only because of his foreign name. This arrest served to remind him of his ties to Poland, but events in the ancestral

^Skaikowski, p. xxi. Ibid., p. xxiv. J A. V. Arnault, Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire (Paris, Dufey 1833) 4:81-2.

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homeland also captured his attention. It would have been impossible to remain ignorant of the Polish Commonwealth's fate during this period, — war, partition, revolution, eradication — and Lazowski now witnessed a third wave of Polish emigration to France. In his Réflexions sur les causes naturelles de l'union entre la Porte Ottomane, la France, la Pologne, la Suède et le Danemarck, he passionately called for the resurrection of Poland.1 Released from arrest and sent by the Committee of Public Safety to the Ottoman Empire, it seems clear that Lazowski saw service to Poland in his work to improve the Turks' defences. Although officially employed by Constantinople, he was guided in his actions by the French Residents. Indeed, all of the proposals made for the defence of Turkish positions, he shared with the French government! Lazowski was among the last French officers to leave the Porte in 1797, having seen the Sublime Porte fail to act upon any of his proposals or recommendations so improve its defences, much to his disgust. Upon his arrival in Paris, he submitted a mémoire on the Turkish situation, in which he suggested the partition of the Ottoman Empire with France securing Egypt and the Aegean islands. Promoted by the Directorate to a battalion chief [chef de bataillon], he was soon at work on the preparations for the Egyptian expedition. Participating in the military campaign in Egypt he also found himself in Syria. After the death of General Caffarelli, he commanded the corps of engineers. In this position, he directed the fortification of Cairo in 1800. Like so many future Polish émigrés, Lazowski saw no contradiction in serving two fatherlands. Indeed, he seemed to think that service to one promoted the interests of the other. Serving in Egypt and Syria, this Pole witnessed the worst days of the campaign and managed to survive, departing Alexandria while carrying dispatches from Menou and arriving in Paris in November 1800. After the death of Sulkowski and the departure of Lazowski, General Zajjczek still remained. This Polish general had been in military service since 1768 and active in Polish politics as a Jacobin. After the third partition of Poland in 1795, he left for France where he sought military service.2 Assigned to the Army of Italy, he was chosen by Bonaparte to organise the Polish troops in Brescia. With the end of the Italian campaign, he was denied service in the Republic's army. It was Bonaparte's direct intervention, which saw Zajaczek assigned to the Egyptian expedition. It was clear that the Polish

Paris: Impr. De Pougin, l'an V, as cited in Skalkowski, p. LI. "... la Pologne sera ressuscitée de ses cendres, la Pologne à laquelle tient l'existence de la Porte, la sécurité de la Suède et du Danemarck, la conservation de la Prusse, la prospérité de la Hollande, l'influence de la France au Nord, la tranquillité de l'Europe et la liberté de son commerce". 2 For the second time, since he had served as a lieutenant in the first Hussar regiment under Count F. A. de Chercheny in 1775.

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general had Napoleon's confidence. 1 He was charged with the defence as well as the administration of the important Egyptian provinces of Menoufieh, BeniSouef, Fayum, Minieh, and Rosetta. Promoted to the position of division general [général de division] in May 1801, he soon became the commander of the cavalry. Even in August 1801, he could not contemplate surrender, voting against capitulation in the war council. A soldier, Zajaczek fought for France out of ideological belief as well as professional need. Napoleon quickly recognised his skill and continued to use them until 1813. A trio of Poles may be treated together. In contrast to the previous three figures, Grabiiiski, Hauman, and Szumlarfski were of a lower rank and j o i n e d the Egyptian expedition not out of any sense of mission — ideological, patriotic, or military — but rather to escape the consequences of a duel. All three had fought in the Polish war of 1792 and the Kosciuszko Uprising of 1794, as well as in the Polish Legion in Italy. As a consequence of their involvement in a duel which led to the death of Major M. Zabtocki, they were forced to resign from the Polish legion. However, they had well placed protectors: Generals Gouvion, St. Cyr, and D^browski all urged Bonaparte, Kléber, and Desaix to permit the trio to join the French troops departing for Egypt. Even Sutttowski intervened with Bonaparte in favour of Grabiiiski. They were ultimately permitted to join the 7th hussar regiment in Desaix's division. In fact, all three became members of Gen. Desaix' staff. After participating in the Battle of the Pyramids and the expedition to Upper Egypt, in 1798, the trio were released from service, enjoying ill health, and sailed from Alexandria for France. However, their ship fell into the hands of Turkish corsairs and they subsequently spent a year in chains in Constantinople. Hauman perished during Turkish captivity, in the arms of Szumlarfski. After the intervention of the Spanish ambassador, Grabiiiski was granted his freedom; while Szumlarfski won his after the intervention of Hussan, the Czartoryski f a m i l y ' s agent in Constantinople. While their presence in Egypt was almost accidental, these three picaresque adventurers enjoyed the favour of highly placed figures. While the particular events give a piquancy to their tale, these soldiers, were typical of the cannon fodder necessary to staff the Napoleonic establishment. 2

1 Napoléon I. Correspondance, 4: 2334, 24 juillet 1798. "Le général Zajoncek s'est fort bien conduit dans plusieurs missions importantes que je lui ai confiées". The trio's tale is so fantastic that Skatkowski refused to give it credence. Skaikowski, p. LXVIII, footnote #3. It is Jan Pachoriski who has rediscovered their place in the Egyptian expedition.

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Zalkind Hurwicz, born in Lublin, was among the first Polish representatives of the Jewish Haskallah, or enlightenment. He studied with rabbis in Metz as well as in Berlin, before taking up Oriental languages in Nancy and Strasbourg. He became involved in the struggle for Jewish emancipation during the French revolution and was appointed in 1798 as a translator and curator in the Oriental division of the Bibliothèque Nationale. Despite his Jewish origins and ongoing ties to the Jewish community, he regarded himself as a Pole, signing articles as "Pole" or "Polish Jew." Knowing Turkish, Hebrew, Arabic, and Greek in addition to German, Italian, English, and Russian, his linguistic skills singled him out as a scholar with skills of use to the French in Egypt. Napoleon appointed him to manage the Arabic printing press which the French brought with him to the Middle East. He also directed the French school established in Cairo. In addition it was hoped that his presence would influence the Jewish community in Egypt as well as in Palestine to co-operate with the French armies. A brilliant ideologue, a reborn patriot, a professional soldier, three adventurers and a linguistic scholar — only seven Poles participated in the Egyptian expedition, but four occupied important positions and all enjoyed the favour of their French superiors. The names of Sulkowski, Lazowski, and Zaj^czek are even found on the Arc de Triomphe. If the motives of these Poles are straightforward, Napoleon's own attitude toward Poland is more ambiguous. He clearly felt a personal loyalty to Sulkowski 1 , and his later relations with Maria Walewska as mistress and Wasowicz as secretary are well known. He learned from his experience in Egypt — as already demonstrated in Italy — that he could count on the Poles and the skills they brought to him. However, it was primarily Polish military prowess and loyalty which gained the future Emperor's respect. Through his association with the Poles, Bonaparte came to understand the prominence they gave to their homeland's independence: all else was secondary. He was therefore able to play on this nationalism to serve his own interests. He came to believe that "les Polonais sont au fond attachés à la France2". Similar stories to those of the Poles in Egypt would resound in the swamps of Haiti, the highlands of Spain, and the broad plains of Russia. Polish participation in Egypt forms but an eddy in the broader pattern of Polish ties to France and, more particularly, to Napoleon. In their hope that *Many years later, in exile, the Emperor spoke several times of Sulkowski. "Je ne puis vanter assez le caractère, le beau courage, l'imperturbable sang-froid de mon pauvre Sulkowski..." Bourrienne, Mémoires (Paris, 1829) 2: 128-9. ^Napoléon I. Correspondance de Napoléon 1er publiée par ordre de l'Empereur Napoléon III. Paris, 1858), 17:20, # 13755.

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independence might yet be granted to the Polish homeland based on cooperation with and service to Napoleon, the Poles re-affirmed their ties to the West despite their occupation by the three East European autocracies. Although Napoleon eventually resuscitated a Polish state, it was not to strengthen the Polish cause but rather to weaken the Prussian kingdom. The relationship between Napoleon and the Poles who served him was that of commander and commanded. Nevertheless it was a firm rock upon which Napoleon knew he was able to build campaign after campaign. The Egyptian expedition underlines the role which each side was to maintain throughout the relationship. Napoleon was able to use the Poles as a tool and the dream of a reconstituted Polish state as a lure. Egypt was scarcely on the margin of Polish consciousness, but Bonaparte was still able to find Poles willing to serve in key positions and to serve valiantly and with devotion. The pattern of subservience had already been set.

LA POLITIQUE DES EFFECTIFS Jacques VERNET

Partie pour un pays où elle ne devait guère avoir à combattre, l'Armée d'Orient subit des pertes sérieuses dès son arrivée. Les premiers tués au combat (6 officiers et 15 hommes) tombent dans l'assaut d'Alexandrie, mais l'armée avait eu la veille 20 noyés au cours du débarquement. Le tribut payé par l'armée aux éléments naturels sera plus lourd que celui des pertes au feu, exception faite de certaines rencontres avec les Mamluks ; de même, la population hostile sera fatale à nombre d'imprudents et de négligents. L'invalidité, la vieillesse, mais aussi la désertion sont autant de facteurs supplémentaires de réduction des effectifs.

I. ACTION DIRECTE: ORGANISATION ET GESTION UNITÉS

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Le recomplètement des unités Le recomplètement des unités se fait en premier lieu à partir de la ressource locale déjà spécialisée, Mamluks et janissaires, puis non spécialisée, comme les Grecs, les Coptes et les esclaves noirs. Puis il s'avère nécessaire, compte tenu de la rupture des liaisons avec la métropole, d'incorporer des Français : ce sont tout d'abord les marins survivants d'Aboukir, puis les domestiques, les employés rendus disponibles par les réformes de l'administration, enfin les ordonnances qui sont remplacées dans leurs services par des Mamluks. Autorisation a aussi été donnée d'intégrer des Egyptiens de Basse-Egypte dans les unités régulières. En Haute-Egypte, Desaix s'essaie à cette politique, et reçoit l'aval de créer une compagnie de sapeurs égyptiens ; il s'allie certaines tribus arabes, avec plus ou moins de succès. Ce n'est qu'une fois la présence française assurée que s'organise l'appel des autochtones dans nos formations. Mais ce qui singularise en la matière l'armée d'Orient, c'est le succès de l'enrôlement noir. Dans une correspondance adressée en juin 1799, à Poussielgue et à Desaix qui mènent les opérations en Haute-Egypte, Bonaparte demande plusieurs centaines d'esclaves noirs, «... pour pouvoir ea mettre une centaine par bataillon». Ils seront choisis et achetés parmi les esclaves

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acheminés vers l'Egypte. En décembre 1800, on en trouve dans les unités de la Basse-Egypte. Selon l'âge, ils sont fusiliers, tambours ou fifres, remplaçant dans ces deux derniers emplois les Français passés aux compagnies du centre. Après Aboukir, la ressource européenne sera utilisée pour recompléter les unités. Le commandement va utiliser toutes les possibilités que les "trains" de l'armée peuvent lui offrir. Deux tentatives de recensement des individus sur leur position administrative sont faites par l'ordre du jour du 18 novembre 1798, puis à nouveau le 20 juin 1799 car ni employeurs, ni employés n'obtempèrent volontiers. Face à cette situation, Bonaparte, à la veille de son départ, ordonne la réunion de l'administration des subsistances et des transports militaires. Cela permet de réduire le nombre d'employés en versant le surnombre dans l'infanterie ou la cavalerie, selon leur choix. Est demandé aussi aux autres administrations (finances, enregistrement, monnaie) de procéder à une compression de personnel au profit de l'encadrement des armes de mêlée. Par la suite, Kléber enjoint de remplacer les ordonnances des officiers généraux par des Mamluks, les renvoyant aux unités de cavalerie d'où elles avaient été détachées. Une dernière tentative de récupération du personnel européen est conduite par Menou, lorsqu'il réduit, encore une fois, le nombre des employés des administrations.

La réorganisation des unités Fin juin 1799, Bonaparte prescrit une réorganisation profonde des demibrigades d'infanterie. Le quota des compagnies de chaque bataillon est réduit de huit à cinq afin de maintenir une capacité feu-choc normale de 50 à 60 fusils par compagnie. La compagnie d'éclaireurs, créée pendant le siège de Saint-Jean d'Acre est conservée. Les bataillons reçoivent une pièce d'artillerie de 3 ; les servants en sont fournis par les demi-brigades. Les régiments de cavalerie ne subissent aucune modification particulière, si ce n'est l'augmentation de leur possibilité de feu. Le corps des guides forme l'escorte et la réserve du général en chef, préfiguration de la garde impériale. Organisé par ordre du 6 juillet 1798, il reçoit une compagnie d'artillerie en septembre. Après la campagne de Syrie, Bonaparte le fixe à deux compagnies à pied, deux à cheval et une d'artillerie, mais le désorganise mi-1799 en prenant 200 guides avec lui pour son retour en France. Une dernière réorganisation se fera en juillet 1800 pour ramener le corps des guides à une compagnie à pied, une compagnie à cheval, et une demi-compagnie d'artillerie.

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Parallèlement à Bonaparte qui créé le régiment de dromadaires au niveau de l'armée, Desaix à la poursuite de Murad Bey, imagine de monter son infanterie sur chameaux. En mai 1799, Belliard peut organiser une première compagnie. Desaix le harcèle pour que 300 fantassins puissent être montés fin mai. Friand et Morand sont également poussés à utiliser ces coursiers, et en septembre 1799, Desaix peut rendre compte à Kléber qu'il dispose de 800 fantassins montés. Peu à peu, une forte proportion de l'infanterie française se déplace, en Moyenne et Haute-Egypte, en utilisant les dromadaires. En effet, les unités de Haute-Egypte ayant été rappelées lors des négociations menés par Kléber en vue du réembarquement, les dromadaires ont été répartis dans les divisions. Celles-ci peuvent alors former des unités de découverte montées, suivant ainsi l'exemple donné par le général Reynier, à l'origine de la création d'une compagnie d'éclaireurs-dromadaires à 90 hommes. Jusqu'à la fin, les demi-brigades conserveront leurs dromadaires pour les patrouilles et les reconnaissances.

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Les circonstances ou les besoins particuliers poussent le commandement français à créer de nouveaux types d'unités, dont certaines vont se révéler parfaitement adaptées ; en revanche, d'autres ne donnent que des déboires.

Le régiment de dromadaires Le régiment est créé, après une première expérimentation dans le domaine du transport des bagages et des blessés, par Bonaparte, au retour de sa reconnaissance de Suez, en janvier 1799. Les personnels des deux escadrons (à 2 puis 4 compagnies) proviennent des corps de l'infanterie. Cependant, ils sont assimilés à la cavalerie par leur armement et leur position administrative ; ils reçoivent un sabre, un fusil de dragon et une lance (temporairement). Le régiment est placé à la suite de la cavalerie et touche la solde et les masses d'entretien propres aux dragons. L'uniforme est un mélange de vêtements européens (pantalon, dolman, gilet de hussard) et africains (cachouk et burnous). A la différence de l'infanterie portée qui n'utilise ses montures que pour les déplacements, les dromadaires combattent avec leurs chameaux. Il leur est certes difficile de charger ; mais, approchant au plus près de l'adversaire, ils

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mettent pied à terre et forment le carré au centre du dispositif. Parfois, les dromadaires s'abritent derrière leurs montures dans les situations graves. Ce régiment est apte à appuyer la cavalerie comme à éclairer l'infanterie. Commandé pendant toute leur existence par le chef de bataillon puis chef de brigade Cavalier, le régiment participe à toutes les opérations de la campagne d'Orient de 1799 à 1801. Ses fonctions privilégiées sont les escortes, le transport rapide du courrier, l'éclairage et la surveillance des intervalles terrestres ou côtiers, la surveillance du désert et le contrôle des tribus insoumises. Rapatrié en 1801, le régiment de dromadaires est dissout et son personnel passe à la gendarmerie.

La légion maltaise La légion maltaise prend ses origines dans la volonté d'éviter à la petite division du général Vaubois, laissé en garnison à Malte, la menace d'éléments perturbateurs ; Bonaparte embarque donc avec lui les meilleurs des anciens militaires au service de l'Ordre souverain de Saint-Jean. Utilisés d'abord comme complément de la garnison des vaisseaux français, les Maltais sont regroupés en un bataillon après la prise d'Alexandrie. Confiée au général Dumuy, l'organisation s'en avère difficile et l'emploi limité. Puis par ordre du 30 août 1798, la légion maltaise est créée à Rammanieh, sous les ordres du chef de bataillon Mac Sheely. Après trois mois de mise sur pied, elle est envoyée à Suez pour y tenir garnison sous le commandement du général Junot lequel, désigné pour participer à l'expédition de Syrie, emmène avec lui les meilleurs éléments regroupés dans la compagnie de grenadiers. Mac Sheely, resté à Suez, voit ses Maltais déserter ou comploter pendant tout le premier semestre 1799. Instruit de ces incidents, Bonaparte dissout la légion maltaise et ventile ses 272 hommes dans la cavalerie, l'infanterie et les dromadaires, mais les Maltais ne serviront pas avec plus de zèle.

La légion nautique La destruction de la flotte à Aboukir rend disponible environ 3 000 marins. Kléber, qui commande à Alexandrie, après avoir tenté un recensement des rescapés, rend compte de ses projets à Bonaparte : «on recomplétera tous les équipages du restant de l'escadre ; la 69 e demi-brigade recrutera 360 hommes, l'artillerie et le génie prendront ensemble deux à trois cents hommes ; le reste sera réuni en un corps particulier commandé par le capitaine de frégate Martinet».

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Dès le 22 août 1798, la légion nautique comprend quatre compagnies de canonniers et une compagnie de sapeurs-pionniers. Le 26, les deux premières compagnies partent rejoindre le général Dumuy qui surveille les côtes du Delta. La légion nautique participe ensuite aux opérations de maintien de l'ordre, avec plus ou moins de bonne volonté et de compétence. Mécontent, Bonaparte la dissout simultanément à la légion maltaise, et en répartit les effectifs (426 hommes) selon un modèle identique. Plus tard, Kléber devenu général en chef relance l'idée, et après Héliopolis, il reforme avec les marins non embarqués une unité destinée à la défense des forts et des côtes. Peu de succès. Menou ordonne que «450 marins seront tirés de la marine actuellement existente en Egypte pour être incorporés sur le champ dans différents corps de l'armée». Après Canope, Menou achève la mobilisation des équipages sans emploi dans un bataillon (524 hommes) qu'il confie au chef de brigade Massé. Rapatrié en France, ce bataillon est dissout.

La légion grecque La légion grecque est le résultat du volontariat de Grecs de Damiette se proposant de servir aux côtés des unités françaises, lors de la révolte d'HassanToubar, dans la région du lac Madieh (septembre 1798). Ainsi, Bonaparte autorise la formation à Rosette, au Caire et à Damiette de trois compagnies grecques, chargées de la protection de la navigation sur le Nil. Elles participent avec plus ou moins de zèle aux colonnes mobiles opérant dans le Delta. Après Héliopolis, Kléber sent la nécessité de renforcer ses effectifs et encourage le Grec Nicole Papagoglou, qui avait levé la compagnie de Damiette, à recruter des soldats sur les équipages des navires grecs immobilisés à Alexandrie afin d'intégrer la légion grecque, créée par ordre du 17 avril 1800. Elle s'organise donc en huit compagnies dont une d'artillerie, absorbe les unités existantes, remplaçant ces dernières dans leur mission locale par d'autres unités. Le 23 septembre 1800, la légion grecque ressemble 670 hommes qui participent au service de garnison du Caire et assurent la défense de la ville en l'absence de l'armée. Cependant, l'encadrement grec ne suffit pas à donner satisfaction au niveau de la discipline et de l'instruction. Le 1 e r novembre 1800, le chef de brigade Coliquet est nommé à la tête des légions grecque et copte ; puis des officiers et sous-officiers français rejoignent la légion grecque. En mars 1801, le général Destaing conduit à Canope deux compagnies de cette formation (grenadiers et éclaireurs) qui se réfugient ensuite dans Alexandrie. Inclus dans la capitulation de septembre, les personnels qui n'ont pas déserté sont ramenés en France où ils constituent un élément du régiment des chasseurs d'Orient.

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La légion copte La légion copte est constituée d'éléments égyptiens mais chrétiens. Jusqu'à la deuxième insurrection du Caire, les généraux considèrent les Coptes comme des auxiliaires, nécessaires mais peu scrupuleux, de l'administration des finances en Egypte. Mais lors de cette seconde révolte, cette communauté sera l'une des principales victimes de la vindicte de la population cairote. Kléber propose alors à Maallem Yacoub, chef des Coptes, d'organiser une légion semblable à celle des Grecs (17 avril 1800). Les volontaires sont recrutés dans les communautés du Delta et de Haute-Egypte, et incorporés dans l'infanterie légère de Donzelot. Commandée par le chef de brigade Sedarious, la légion détache une compagnie d'ouvriers à l'arsenal de Gizeh aux ordres de l'artillerie et forme une compagnie de canonniers. Avec ses cinq compagnies de fusiliers, son effectif total est de 805 hommes, très appréciés pour leur tenue et leur discipline. Lors des affaires de mars 1801, la légion copte reste en garnison au Caire sous Belliard mais ses coreligionnaires de la 21 e légère se distinguent brillamment à Canope. Marqués par les trois mois d'attente et la forte épidémie de peste de 1801, les survivants sont embarqués à Rosette. En France, ils compléteront le noyau du régiment des chasseurs d'Orient.

Les Mamluks et les janissaires à cheval La création d'une cavalerie formée de Mamluks et de janissaires à cheval est décidée peu après la bataille des Pyramides. Simultanément, Bonaparte prescrit l'incorporation des jeunes Mamluks dans les unités régulières, et charge un Mamluk rallié, d'origine grecque, Bartholoméo Serra, de recruter une unité de volontaires parmi ses anciens compagnons d'armes. Destinée surtout à des missions de sûreté, cette compagnie participe aux opérations de police dans la province du Caire et se distingue dans l'anéantissement de la première insurrection de la capitale ; puis cette unité participe à la campagne de Syrie en y assurant la protection des communications. Lors de ce séjour, des autochtones avaient servi dans les rangs français, et les avaient suivis au cours du repli, accompagnés de Mamluks déserteurs des troupes d'Ibrahim Bey. Regroupés à Katieh, ces personnels sont organisés par le sheikh Yacoub Habaily en deux compagnies de janissaires.

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L'une d'elles est transformée sur ordre de Kléber, en compagnie de janissaires syriens à cheval. Ces cavaliers s'équipent et se montent à leurs frais, mais touchent une solde journalière ainsi que les rations de vivres et de fourrage. Ils sont armés d'un tromblon, d'un pistolet d'arçon et d'un cimeterre. Satisfait des services de cette unité, Menou crée une seconde compagnie de janissaires à cheval sous les ordres du sheikh Youssef. Ces formations sont à 3 officiers, 2 sous-officiers et 95 cavaliers autochtones et un sous-officier français. Quelques mois plus tard, Menou fusionne les trois unités dans le régiment des Mamluks de la République. Le commandement en est confié à Bartholoméo, nommé chef de brigade (colonel) depuis juillet. Organisé comme un régiment de cavalerie français, l'uniforme et l'armement restent orientaux. Instruits rapidement par un officier détaché des guides, les Mamluks participent à la recherche du renseignement autour du Caire lors de son investissement par les Anglo-Turcs, et à la bataille de Canope, dans la division de cavalerie du général Roize. Rapatriés avec leurs familles, les survivants forment un escadron de Mamelouks, placé sous les ordres du chef du brigade Rapp et organisé comme un escadron de hussards. Il est bientôt affecté à la cavalerie de la garde impériale.

Les janissaires

à pied et les unités

supplétives

La création d'unités supplétives répond à deux besoins ; d'une part, former des unités de police dans chaque province ; d'autre part, renforcer l'armée, soit en les intégrant, soit en les adaptant à une unité française. Par ses ordres du 25 juillet pour le Caire, et du 27 juillet 1798 pour les provinces, Bonaparte institue cinq compagnies de janissaires pour la police de la capitale, et une dans chacune des six provinces, pour le maintien de l'ordre. Après les deux révoltes du Cairo et les pourparlers d'al-Arish, ces unités dispersées par les événements ou victimes de la fureur populaire doivent être reconstituées, avant de disparaître définitivement au départ des Français en 1801. Un certain nombre de leurs chefs s'expatrient et suivent l'armée. La première unité combattante de janissaires à pied est la compagnie d'Omar, du nom de son chef, un janissaire turc. Créée le 2 septembre 1798, elle est rattachée aux guides avec une organisation et une solde calquées sur celles d'une compagnie de guides à pied. Instruite et gérée par des cadres français, elle semble être totalement intégrée aux guides lors de la réorganisation de juin 1799.

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Après al-Arish, et marchant vers la Syrie, Bonaparte lève parmi les prisonniers turcs, trois compagnies de Maghrébins et une d'Arnautes (Albanais). Elles sont chacune adaptées à une division et l'armée et se montrent courageuses et fidèles. En Syrie même, les Français reçoivent des renforts temporaires : cavalerie du sheikh Daher devant Acre, fantassins de la tribu des Moutoualis qui tiennent garnison à Sour (ancien Tyr) jusqu'à la levée du siège. Il y eut même l'idée de créer des corps auxiliaires de Druses et de Maronites (musulmans et chrétiens syriens), idée qui fut abandonnée en raison de l'échec d'Acre.

La garde nationale Une garde nationale a été organisée à partir de la population franque locale et européenne, venue avec l'armée. Peu avant la première révolte du Caire, Bonaparte ordonne que dix compagnies de garde nationale soient créées «avec tous les employés et individus quelconques à la suites de l'armée et, en général, tous les Européens qui se trouvent au Caire.» Ce projet resta plutôt théorique.

II. L'ACTION SANTÉ

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A côté de cette approche quantitative destinée à conserver le potentiel de l'armée d'Orient, les généraux en chef vont tenter une approche qualitative en demandant au service de santé les efforts nécessaires pour assurer la survie des effectifs.

L'organisation du service Dès le lancement des préparatifs de l'expédition, Bonaparte a eu le souci d'assurer un soutien médical conséquent et compétent. Des praticiens de grand renom sont désignés, comme Desgenettes, médecin chef de l'expédition ou Larrey, nommé chirurgien-chef. Ce sont donc 168 officiers de santé qui embarquent avec 142 administrateurs des hôpitaux mis à la disposition de l'administrateur en chef de l'armée. Les ambulances divisionnaires ont leur dotation en matériel et sont renforcées de médecins en surnuméraire.

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Avant d'arriver à Alexandrie, Desgenettes, précise les conditions particulières du service en Egypte sur le plan médical, met en garde contre le charbon pestilentiel, et indique la conduite à tenir lors des marches ou des engagements.

Les fléaux égyptiens Ces fléaux sont de deux types : soit des atteintes pathologiques propres aux régions du Moyen-Orient, soit des affectations plus communes aggravées par les conditions de vie en pays subtropical. Citons parmi les principales, la dysenterie, la diphtérie et la typhoïde, les insolations, nombreuses lors de la marche d'Alexandrie au Caire ou dans la traversée du désert du Sinaï, le tétanos contre lequel il n'existe aucune parade. L'ophtalmie, si caractéristique de l'expédition qu'elle fut appelée ophtalmie d'Egypte ou ophtalmia militaris, maladie transmise par les mouches ou l'eau polluée, aggravée par la réverbération. En 1801, un recensement portant sur 205 invalides irrécupérables à Alexandrie fait apparaître 48 cécités complètes et 56 partielles. Les maladies vénériennes sont courantes, car la prostitution est florissante. S'y ajoutant les risques graves encourus par le fait des parasites et des insectes, ainsi que la peste bubonique, présente surtout en Syrie, bien qu'endémique dans tout l'Orient méditerranéen. Cette dernière maladie apparaît à Alexandrie et à Damiette dès décembre 1798 et se propage lors des regroupements de troupes. L'utilisation de l'habillement turc contaminé à Jaffa en est aussi un facteur de propagation. Dès septembre 1799, la menace réapparaît dans le Delta ; tous les déplacements à l'intérieur de l'Egypte sont alors contrôlés et un cordon sanitaire est mis en place sur l'ensemble du pourtour du pays. L'épidémie, se reproduit au Caire lorsque le pays est envahi par les AngloTurcs.

Les mesures cliniques Dès août 1798, des mesures d'hygiène sont prescrites sur la propreté des boucheries et l'établissement des dépôts de détritus à proximité des places et des bivouacs. Durant la campagne de Syrie, il faut renouveler les dispositions élémentaires pour la salubrité des cantonnements et des bivouacs.

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A côté de cette prophylaxie collective, le comportement individuel du soldat se voit modifié quant à son alimentation, son habillement, la propreté, les loisirs ... et son insouciance ! Les connaissances existantes, les observations et les expériences faites permettent au corps médical et à Desgenettes en particulier — qui s'est inoculé la peste pour mieux en découvrir le remède — de prescrire des soins et des traitements efficaces.

Les mesures techniques Il s'agit de pouvoir diriger les malades ou blessés vers les hôpitaux ou les lazarets créés dès l'installation de l'armée d'Orient. Moins d'un mois après le débarquement, des hôpitaux sont établis à Bulak, au Vieux Caire, à Gizeh et au Caire, après celui fondé à Alexandrie dès l'occupation de la ville. Mais les inspections fréquentes montrent des négligences : saleté, absence de soins qualifiés, alimentation défectueuse. Des missions de salubrité sont créées. Elles mettent au point et appliquent les mesures de quarantaine strictes qui sont établies à partir de septembre 1799 pour lutter contre la peste. Concernant le milieu égyptien, le contrôle des décès civils et l'établissement de cimetières civils et militaires sont ordonnés à Alexandrie et au Caire. Un essai de modernisation de l'hôpital civil de la capitale, le Moristan, est tenté, sans grand résultat. Enfin, pour améliorer les connaissances et les techniques de soins et de guérison, des cours d'anatomie et de chirurgie sont dispensés par Larrey. L'armée adapta aussi ses moyens, en donnant des chameaux de transport aux ambulances centrales, et divisionnaires ; elle fabrique des palanquins, des paniers spéciaux et des lits démontables adaptables à ces animaux de bât, pour le transport des malades ou des blessés.

Les invalides et les vétérans Les invalides et les vétérans sont soumis au principe de base du rapatriement sur la France ; qu'il s'agisse d'invalides absolus ou non, inaptes en tout cas au service actif, ou de vétérans, trop âgés pour suivre les opérations. Bonaparte fera partir en janvier 1799 vers l'Europe 200 de ces braves ; mais face au blocus anglo-turc qui l'oblige à conserver ce personnel sur place, il crée des compagnies de vétérans qui aident au service de garnison au Caire, pendant l'expédition de Syrie.

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Après le départ de Bonaparte, Kléber renvoie les vétérans dans les dépôts des unités pour simplifier leur administration, mais parallèlement il fait recenser et rassembler tous les invalides à Rosette. Il pense à leur rapatriement possible grâce à un accord avec les autorités navales anglaises. Après Héliopolis, l'espoir disparaît : les invalides sont formés en un bataillon stationné à Alexandrie et à Rosette en mai 1800, une demi-brigade d'invalides sera créée sous les ordres du général Fugière. Certains cadres sont utilisés dans des emplois sédentaires ou administratifs. Menou crée par la suite une commission devant étudier l'emploi éventuel des invalides, et une maison de soins pour les plus handicapés. Mais ceux-ci ont la fibre militaire bien ancrée, et sur leurs représentations, Menou leur accorde d'être réorganisés et armés pour le service de garnison. Finalement, ce sont 21 officiers et 394 hommes de troupe invalides qui sont rapatriés en 1801.

III. LE BILAN L'Armée d'Orient compte 35 000 officiers et combattants de toutes catégories lors de son embarquement à Toulon. L'effectif embarqué après la capitulation en septembre 1801 s'élève à 21.180 personnels. En fin de compte, les pertes totales de l'armée d'Orient peuvent être estimées à 13 500 hommes. Ce chiffre peut être tempéré par les 2 000 rapatriés au cours des trois années ; malgré tout, c'est un tiers des personnels embarqués en juin 1798 qui est perdu. Il est possible de dire aussi que les pertes de l'armée d'Orient sont dues pour 47 % aux combats et pour 57 % à la peste et aux maladies. C'est un bilan particulièrement lourd, que Talleyrand n'avait pas mentionné au Directoire en février 1798.

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Janissaire à cheval.

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Soldat du Régiment des Dromadaires.

NAPOLEON IN THE HOLY LAND: MOTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES A REVIEW OF RESEARCH PRESENTED AT THE 1999 INTERNATIONAL NAPOLEONIC SOCIETY CONGRESS IN ISRAEL J. David MARKHAM

The French campaign in the Holy Land has long been the subject of fascination, debate, disagreement, and legend. It was in some ways Napoleon's most romantic campaign, and whatever its military and political consequences, it unleashed a torrent of interest in all things Egyptian; an interest which continues to this very day. The International Napoleonic Society was, therefore, delighted to join with the Israeli Society for Napoleonic Research in sponsoring this congress. We have brought together over two dozen scholars from around the world, and the high quality of their papers reflects their outstanding scholarship. It is always difficult to present a summary of research. This congress has, however, presented some broad themes into which I will integrate the work presented. If this paper presents enough information to entice the reader to look more closely at the papers published in the congress proceedings, then it will have been quite successful. That said, the goal is to present the themes of the congress, rather than a simple recitation of each paper's main point, and consequently some papers may have been left out of this paper. Mordechai Gichon tells us that Rudyard Kipling saw the Middle East as the "buckle of the belt that girdles the world." Indeed, a very small area has had a very great impact on history. In one sense, Bonaparte's campaign was but a blink of an eye in the history of the area; in another sense, it may be seen as something of a watershed. The papers presented at this congress may be observed through perhaps three prisms — that of military matters, that of what we may call cultural matters, and that which involves issues of intent and consequence. The majority of the papers dealt with military matters. Perhaps the major issue here was the question of innovation. There seemed to be some general agreement that Napoleon was not so much an innovator as he was a

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commander who could adapt and improve the ideas. This point is stressed by Allon Klebanoff among others. As Mordechai Gichon points out, Napoleon's strategy of striking two halves of an enemy before they can join had been done by no less than Frederick the Great. Nonetheless, Napoleon's move to destroy the Ottoman land army and then the sea army was an important adaptation which we will see again in his campaigns. The French also brought a level of organization and discipline that was alien to the forces they faced, and time and time again led to their victory even against numerically superior forces. This was manifest in the French use of ordre mixte, a combination of line a column for maximum power and shock effect, as discussed by Allon Klebanoff. Both Gichon and Jacques Vernet point out that at its most basic level, the Egyptian campaign is an example of the victory of sea power over land power. Abukir Bay sealed the fate of the French army, as the British fleet would in many ways seal the fate of Napoleon's career. An isolated army faces numerous consequences of that isolation, all of them bad. An isolated army must even more than most armies live off the land. In the most interesting and unexpected example of this, Vernet reminds us of the use of black slaves in the campaign. These soldiers were, according to General Kleber, good additions to the French force. That the use of Blacks in the French army is a little known aspect of the campaign cannot come as a great surprise. The participation of Blacks on both sides of the American civil war, as well as in World War Two, has historically been accorded relatively little coverage. One military component that was discussed throughout the congress was the formation known as the hollow square. Jacques Vernet first raised the issue, and many others continued what at times almost seemed to be an obsession of the congress! At least two useful thoughts emerged from those discussions. First, the squares were not strictly an innovation, but rather an adaptation of Russian and other past usage of the concept. The Macedonian Phalanx and the Roman Turtle were given as examples of ancient formations that might have been the precursors of the hollow square. Secondly, while the square is usually thought of as a defensive structure, it could also be used as a forward-moving offensive formation. The logistic difficulties of maintaining a square of some 1600 men moving forward simply boggles the mind. Even so, Kleber used it to some advantage at Mt. Tabor.

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The grand disaster of the campaign was, of course, the destruction of the fleet at Abukir Bay. Michèle Battesti provides a very detailed description of the battle. She suggests that the defeat sprang from three errors by the French Admiral Brueys: the French ships were too far from the shore batteries, too far from the shallow water (allowing the British passage on both sides of the French line), and too far from each other. The defeat at Abukir Bay had major negative consequences for the French situation. Its most obvious consequence was the resulting isolation from France, and the need for the French army to campaign with very minimal assistance from the motherland. Beyond that, and of at least equal importance, Kevin McCranie points out that it was the defeat at Abukir Bay that convinced the Ottoman Sultan, Selim, to declare war on France. T w o things related to this battle seem worthy of additional comment. A s we all know, archaeological discoveries can often lead to greater understanding of historical events, and Battesti's research is based in part on recent such discoveries. Nothing new there, perhaps, except that in this case the discovery was under water. A series of underwater archaeological discoveries in the area have unearthed, if that is the right term here, such diverse finds as Cleopatra's palace and the French flagship 1 'Orient. The archaeologist that made the discoveries has indicated that it was the latter discovery which actually excited him the most. Ms. Battesti also describes one of the truly unique events of the battle. When the French flagship 1 'Orient blew up, there were two immense explosions that blew the ship apart. Incredibly, the battle paused for a full ten minutes while the combatants of both sides stood by in awe. A similar, and in this case fatal, reaction occurred at the Battle of Marengo, when the Austrians paused in confusion after the explosion of an ammunition wagon. This hesitation gave the French an opening, and they took it. Unfortunately for the French, they were not in a position to exploit the delay at Abukir. If Abukir Bay was a major defeat for the French, it was followed by a significant victory at the Battle of Sediman. As Fernand Beaucour suggests, this allowed the French to remain, and led to what was almost a successful adventure. Sometimes events that appear almost unrelated can have a close, even causal relationship to great events. Such it was with the French re-conquest of Corsica. As John McErlean points out, this signalled a British withdrawal from the area, allowing the French to, for the moment, operate relatively freely in the Mediterranean.

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We are all better able to appreciate Napoleon's campaign by our visits to the sites, and are grateful for the opportunities we have had to do just that during this congress. In a similar way, Benny Michelsohn's film of the Sinai can only increase our amazement that the French army even got to the Holy Land from Egypt, never mind what was done after they arrived. If there was any true innovation, perhaps it was by the one true hero of the campaign, Dr. Dominique Larrey. He showed that the true glory lies in the saving of lives rather than in the takinq of them. As Drs. Eran Dolev and Moshe Feinsod point out, his work was nothing short of amazing. His use of the flying ambulance and his constant effort to learn from his experience placed him on the cutting edge of medicine and gained him the respect of soldiers on all sides of the wars. Of special note here is the idea that by taking horses from soldiers to save the wounded, Larrey changed forever the priorities of war, giving precedence to the saving of the wounded. Some of the papers dealt with what we might loosely call the cultural aspects of the expedition. Napoleon himself set the stage for this with his overtures to Islam and his establishment of the Institute of Egypt. Mary Cooney reminds us, however, that his commitment to Islam was at the very least suspect, and not taken very seriously by either the Muslims or his own soldiers. This despite his creation of special ceremonies to highlight his "commitment." His soldiers, like Alexander's before him when faced with their leader's increasingly Persian outlook, were not amused. Closely related to the cultural theme is our final theme, that of intent and consequence. The intent is a fascinating topic for speculation. We all know the "official" reasons for the campaign. Luigi Migliorini suggests a parallel with the crusaders, and indeed, many of the younger, more romantic soldiers saw themselves in this light. Napoleon, he suggests, was seeking in Egypt what he found in Italy, namely a tie to the past that would show continuity to the present. Migliorini also suggests that Napoleon is building on the military spirit of the day to bring some sort of closure to the French Revolution. Marcus Junkelman reminds us that Napoleon is ever anxious to improve and promote his image. Thus, as had been the case in Italy, from the very beginning he promoted the creation of paintings, prints, medallions and other monuments to the glory of his exploits. Part of this what might be called propaganda effort was necessitated by the very negative, very personalized demonization of Bonaparte by the British. Thus, to counter the accusations of the murder of the plague victims, the painting by Gros over dramatizes and romanticizes the touching of the plague victims at Jaffa

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Mordechai Gichon points out that documentary evidence suggests that both Napoleon and the Directory wanted to "improve" the region and bring the presumed advantages of western civilization to the people of Egypt and the Holy Land. Shimon Shamir would return us to a more traditional, and perhaps more cynical Egyptian view of Napoleon's motives. T o the Egyptians, Napoleon's campaign was imperialistic in nature, and all of the other, more positive, aspects of the campaign should be seen as consequences rather than goals. The motives for his continued siege of Acre, even after the Ottoman land force had been vanquished, are a little harder to explain. Comparison with Alexander the Great is inevitable, and many would have him going to India. I suggest that an equally Alexandrian possibility is that Napoleon wanted to close off the ports of the area to the British, much as Alexander did to the Persians. This matches well with John McErlean's comments regarding Corsica. It also supports the set of orders f r o m the Directory discussed by Lauro Rossi, that seem to indicate that Bonaparte was ultimately expected to topple the Ottoman throne. In any event, one can also argue that he simply stayed too long, a mistake that he repeated in Moscow. Perhaps after Mt. Tabor he should have just declared victory and left! Of course, as Gichon has pointed out, if Napoleon had been willing to use the observation balloons available to him, the entire matter of Acre would have likely turned out differently. So too, as Helen Smith reminds us, had he not had to face the traitorous activities of an old schoolmate named Phelippeaux, who designed the inner defenses that the balloons would have detected. The consequences of the campaign are equally fascinating to consider, and can be seen in terms of both Napoleon and the region. Napoleon's image both benefited and suffered from the campaign. In the short term, at lease, he was seen as the great conquering hero, and the person responsible for "rediscovering" ancient Egypt. In the long run, the Description d'Egypte and other work made significant advances in our knowledge of the region. A good, if usually ignored, example of this is the creation of new maps described by Anne Godlewska. On the other hand, as Nathan Schur and others pointed out, two of the three significant blemishes on the character of Napoleon stem from this rather brief campaign. The killing of the prisoners of war at Acre, the plague, and the due d'Engien are, according to Schur, the three issues, the first two of which relate to this campaign.

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Other consequences of a personal nature include John Gallaher's Davout, whose career was enhanced by the campaign, and John Stanley's Polish officers, who brought knowledge of Polish issues to Napoleon early in his career. This was no doubt true of Monika Hainan's Joseph Sulkowski, Bonaparte's Polish aide-de-camp, though his own career was cut short during riots in Cairo. While not necessarily directly related to the campaign in Egypt and the Holy Land, there is no doubt that music is another area where Napoleon had a significant impact. It is often said that there are more books written about Napoleon than anyone else. It seems that he ranks high on the list for music as well, at least if you look at the issue somewhat broadly. Allon Klebanoff took us on a virtual tour de force of Napoleonic music, bringing home forcefully—and most enjoyably—Napoleon's influence in that area of our cultural heritage. This influence continues today. Klebanoff shared a 1930s composition based on Byron's Ode to Napoleon. My collection includes a recording of modern jazz based on Revolutionary and Napoleonic tunes, and even a 1972 rock opera that was re-released in 1989, La Révolution Française, where Napoleon plays a small roll. We know that many writers were fascinated with Napoleon—Stendhal, Tolstoy and Byron to mention but a few. To that list we must now add Beethoven and Haydn among many others. As to the impact on Egypt and the Holy Land, Gichon suggests that the campaign initiated almost all successful development in this area. The French left their culture and technology as their main heritage to the reawakening Middle East. The printing press and the French educational system were critical to the development of 19th-century Palestine. As Walter Grab points out, Napoleon was in some eyes better at promoting the reforms of the French Revolution in his areas of conquest than he was at home. On the other hand, Aryeh Shmuelevitz points out that the Ottoman Empire itself was already reacting to western influence, and Napoleon's actions simply pushed them further in the direction they were already heading. It is worth noting that Turkey, the heir to the Ottomans, is generally acknowledged to be the most "western" of the Islamic nations, and has applied for membership in the European Union. Historians and even politicians of various countries disagree as to whether or not the area benefited from the French expedition.

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In periods of extreme nationalism or religious fervour, the historical issue becomes muddled with more current political and/or religious issues. There can be little doubt that Gidon Biger is correct in his belief that after Napoleon, Egypt and the Holy Land would no longer be the same. Whether or not that is a good thing is, of course, open to continual debate. For those who were listening, this congress made significant strides toward a good historical backdrop for that discussion.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Akgün, Se£il Karal, Professor, Dr., Department of History, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. Battesti Michèle, Professor Dr., Centre d'Études d'Histoire de la Défense, Chateau de Vincennes, France. Beaucour, Fernand, Professor, Dr., Dr., Centre d'Études Napoléoniennes, Levallois, France. Berman, Ariel, ISNR, Qiriat Tivon, Israel. Bernède, Allain, Colonel, Dr. en Histoire, Délégation Militaire Départementale de la Meuse, Thierville, France. Biger, Gideon, Assoc. Professor, Dr., Department of Geography, Tel Aviv University, Israel. Cohen, Amnon, Professor, Dr., The Harry S. Truman Research Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Cooney, Mary Kathryn, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, USA. Dolev, Eran, Professor, M.D., Faculty of Medicine of Tel Aviv University, Elias Sourasky Medical Center, Israel. Feinsod, Moshe, Professor, M.D., Rambam Medical Center, Department of Neurosurgery, Haifa, Israel. Gichon, Mordechai, Professor, Dr., ISNR, Department of Classical Studies, Tel Aviv University, Israel. Grab, Walter t , Professor, Dr., Department of History, Tel Aviv University. Haman, Monika, Professor Dr., Warsaw, Poland. Haran, Alexandre Yali, Dr., Department of History, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel. Junkelmann, Marcus, Dr., Elsendorf, Germany. McCranie, Kevin D., Assis. Professor, Dr., Brewton-Parker College, Mt. Vernon, Georgia, USA. McErlean, J. M. P., Professor, Dr., McLaughlin College, York University, Toronto, Canada. Markham, J. David, M.A. M.Ed., Executive Vice-President and Editor-inChief, International Napoleonic Society. Mendelson, David, Professor, Dr., Department of French, Tel Aviv University, Israel. Rossi, Lauro, Professor, Dr., Biblioteca di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea, Roma, Italy. Shamir, Shimon, Professor, Dr., Department of Middle Eastern and African History and the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, Israel.

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Shmuelevitz, Aryeh, Professor, Dr., Department of Middle Eastern and African History and the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, Israel. Shosenberg, James, W., DDS, MSc., Oshawa Ontario, Canada. Smith, Helen S., Toronto, Canada. Stanley, John, Ontario Ministry of Education, Toronto, Canada. Vernet, Jacques Colonel, Dr., Editeur, Revue Historique des Armées, Chateau de Vincennes, France.